Representation of Cognitive Structures: Syntax and Semantics of French Sentential Complements 9783110805956, 9783110157604

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Representation of Cognitive Structures

W DE G

Cognitive Linguistics Research 11

Editors

Rene Dirven Ronald W. Langacker John R. Taylor

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Representation of Cognitive Structures Syntax and Semantics of French Sentential Complements

Michel Achard

1998 Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formely Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter G m b H & Co., Berlin

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

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Achard, Michel, 1959— Representation of cognitive structures : syntax and semantics of French sentential complements / Michel Achard. p. cm. - (Cognitive linguistics research ; 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 3-11-015760-8 (cloth ; alk. paper) 1. French language - Complement. 2. French language - Syntax. 3. French language — Semantics. 4. Cognitive grammar. I. Title. II. Series. PC2369.A25 1998 445—dc21 98-18504 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - Cataloging-in-Publication

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Achard, Michel: Representation of cognitive structures : syntax and semantics of French sentential complements / Michel Achard. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1998 (Cognitive linguistics research ; 11) ISBN 3-11-015760-8

© Copyright 1998 by Walter de Gruyter G m b H & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printing: Werner Hildebrand, Berlin Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin Printed in Germany

Contents

Preface

χΐ

Chapter 1. Introduction: meaning and form

1

1.1. Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory

1

1.1.1. Verbs and complements: semantic compatibility 1.2. Cognitive linguistics 1.2.1. Cognitive Grammar 1.2.1.1. The structure of meaning 1.2.1.2. The nature of grammar 1.2.1.3. A usage-based model 1.2.1.4. Complementation in Cognitive Grammar

6 9 11 12 20 23 26

1.3. Claims and advantages of the construal approach

29

1.4. Summary

30

Chapter 2. Dimensions of construal

33

2.1. Introduction

33

2.2. The coding of events: basic elements of clause structure

34

2.2.1. Stage, setting and participants 2.2.2. Reference points 2.2.3. Reality 2.3. Conceptualization of complex clauses 2.3.1. Semantic layering of a finite clause 2.3.2. Event integration 2.3.3. A note on complementizers 2.3.4. Perspective

35 40 41 45 48 51 56 59

vi

Contents

2.4. Construal of French complements

64

2.5. Summary

72

Chapter 3. Causation/perception constructions

73

3.1. Introduction

73

3.2. Structural solutions

76

3.3. VOV and W : different construals on the same base

82

3.3.1. Construal and event structure 3.3.2. Conceptual flexibility and grammatical constructions 3.4. Main verbs and complement structures 3.4.1. The perception verbs 3.4.2. Causation: energy source analysis 3.4.2.1. Faire and W 3.4.2.2. Forcer and VOV 3.4.2.3. W/VOV alternation following laisser 3.4.3. Laisser, faire, the perception verbs and transitive clauses 3.4.3.1. The faire par construction 3.43.2. Laisser 3.4.3.3. The perception verbs

83 86 93 93 97 99 101 104 111 111 113 116

3.5. Discussion and conclusion

119

Chapter 4. Perspective: modal constructions

123

4.1. Introduction

123

4.2. French modals

124

4.2.1. A French modal class 4.2.2. Structure of the French modals 4.3. The complements of modals

125 131 136

Contents vii

4.3.1. Semantic analysis of the French modals 4.3.1.1. Main-verb constructions 4.3.1.2. Root senses Pouvoir. Possibility Devoir: Obligation Recapitulation 4.3.1.3. Epistemic senses 4.3.2. Realignment of the modalforce 4.3.3. Speaker control 4.4. Discussion and conclusion

141 142 146 147 154 159 159 161 166 171

Chapter 5. Conceptualizing subject constructions Finite and infinitival complements

173

5.1. Introduction

174

5.2. Main verbs and the meaning of the CSC 5.2.1 Meaning of the CSC

176 177

5.2.2 Types of main verbs 5.3. Infinitival and finite complements 5.3.1. The distribution of finite/infinitival complements 5.3.2. Viewing arrangement and syntactic realization 5.4. Main verbs and complement structures 5.4.1. The perception verbs and the optimal viewing arrangement 5.4.2 The volition verbs and the egocentric viewing arrangement 5.4.3. The verbs of emotion reaction 5.4.4. Alternative construals 5.5. Discussion and conclusion

177 180 181 187 190 191 194 199 202 207

viii Contents

Chapter 6. Grounding

217

6.1. Introduction

217

6.2. The indicative/subjunctive distinction

219

6.2.1. The data 6.2.2. Towards the definition of an indicative clause 6.2.2.1. Conception of an abstract element: dominion 6.2.2.2. A folk model of reality 6.2.3. Meaning of an indicative clause 6.3. Main verbs and complement structures 6.3.1 The perception verbs 6.3.2. The declaration verbs 6.3.3. Propositional attitude: certainty, thoughts, and beliefs 6.3.3.1. Certainty and knowledge 6.3.3.2. Thoughts and beliefs: penser and croire 6.3.3.3. Suspicion 6.3.4. Verbs followed by subjunctive complements 6.3.4.1. Volition and desire 6.3.4.2. Verbs of emotion reaction 6.3.4.3. Events versus propositions: the case of espärer 6.3.5 The subjunctive and a specific mental space 6.3.6. Spanish CSCs 6.3.6.1. French and Spanish: similarities and differences 6.3.6.2. Thoughts and beliefs: creer,pensar, sospechar 6.3.6.3. Esperar, and the verbs of emotion reaction

220 222 223 224 225 228 228 233 239 240 243 244 245 246 248 251 253 256 257 258 261

6.4. Discussion and conclusion

265

Chapter 7. Impersonal constructions

269

7.1. Introduction

269

Contents

7.2. The meaning of French impersonals 7.2.1 Impersonal constructions as setting subject constructions 7.2.2. Impersonal constructions as existential constructions 7.3. The meaning of simple impersonals

ix

275 277 279 282

7.3.1. Pure existentials 7.3.2. Locational constructions 7.3.3. Coming into existence 7.3.4. Coming into C's consciousness

283 284 286 288

7.4. The meaning of complex impersonals

292

7.4.1. A bstract existentials 7.4.2. Evaluative impersonals 7.4.3. Emotion reaction impersonals 7.4.4. "Raising" impersonals 7.4.5. Epistemic impersonals 7.4.6. Deontic impersonals 7.5. Complement distribution in impersonal clauses 7.5.1. Deontic impersonals 7.5.2. The emotion reaction impersonals 7.5.3. The evaluative impersonals 7.5.4. The epistemic impersonals 7.5.5. The case of il est possible 7.6. Relation between constructions 7.6.1. CSCs and impersonals 7.6.2. Modals and epistemic impersonals

292 294 295 296 297 3 00 304 3 04 306 307 309 312 313 314 315

7.7. Conclusion and discussion

317

Chapter 8. Concluding remarks

319

8.1 Recapitulation

319

χ

Contents

8.2 Discussion

323

Notes

331

Chapter one Chapter two Chapter three Chapter four Chapter Chapter six Chapter seven

five

331 333 335 340 344 347 350

References

355

Index

367

PREFACE

This book investigates the distribution of infinitival and finite complements (indicative and subjunctive) in French. The emphasis is placed on the causation/perception, modal, conceptualizing subject, and impersonal constructions. The framework in which the analysis is conducted is Cognitive Grammar, which will be henceforth abbreviated as CG. Two aspects of the CG model are of particular importance to this work. The first one is that the surface form of a linguistic expression reflects a particular cognitive organization, and that formal differences between the various constructions reflect semantic/conceptual differences. As a result, any investigation of the form of a construction cannot be dissociated from the study of its meaning. The second important aspect of CG is that the meaning of a linguistic expression is characterized in terms of the particular construal its presence imposes on a conceptual base. Different domains of human experience such as reality, perception, force dynamics to name just a few constitute the conceptual base relative to which the meaning of the complement constructions needs to be characterized. Evaluating each construction's meaning therefore amounts to precisely determining how it structures the relevant parts of those domains. Once their meaning is recognized, the distribution of each construction with a given main verb naturally emerges from the necessary semantic compatibility between meaningful expressions. This book presents a fairly large array of constructions, all of which have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, and would probably deserve their own monograph. My goal is therefore not to provide an exhaustive analysis of all of them, but to show that French complementation can be considered in a global fashion. Each construction is analyzed in reasonable detail, but I hope that the constructs developed in each chapter provide the necessary foundation for even finer grained analyses.

xii Preface

The concentration on one single language represents a trade off. On the one hand, it reduces the scope of the possible claims. On the other hand, it affords a unified look at a single system, and reveals a satisfying understanding of the ecology of that system. This book represents the culmination of several years of interest in complementation. My first pass at the topic resulted in my dissertation, completed at the University of California at San Diego under the direction of Ronald W. Langacker. The analysis of the causation/perception constructions presented in Chapter three was further developed and published in Cognitive Linguistics. Some parts of the analysis of the infinitival/finite complements presented in Chapter five appeared in Linguistics. I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to Ronald W. Langacker for his help, support and kindness over the years. I am also grateful to Rene Dirven and John Taylor, the editors of the Cognitive Linguistics Research series for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. I would also like to thank the numerous individuals who contributed stimulating discussions, as well as generous comments on the various papers and presentations leading to this book. This includes the faculty and my fellow graduate students at UCSD, my students (graduate and undergraduates) at the University of Florida and Rice University, my colleagues at these two institutions, and the participants at the various conferences and colloquia where different parts of this work were presented. I also thank Antonio Gil, Maura Velazquez Castillo, and Ricardo Maldonado for their help with the Spanish data. Finally, this project would have never been completed without the unfailing assistance of my wife Melanie, whose patience, organization and expertise with software, graphic programs, and technology in general far exceeds my own. This book is dedicated to her.

Chapter 1. Introduction: meaning and form

This chapter represents the first part of the introduction. First, it briefly presents the problem of the relation between meaning and form in different linguistic theories. Second, it introduces the most important aspects of the Cognitive Grammar model in which the analysis of the complement constructions is conducted. Third, it presents the main claims to be substantiated in the following chapters. Chapter two represents the second part of the introduction. It focuses in detail on the different aspects of construal, that is to say the various dimensions along which the meaning of the complement constructions is evaluated.

1.1. Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory The relation existing between the meaning of an expression and its syntactic form is central to any linguistic theory, and it is expressed in Cognitive Grammar in a straightforward manner. One of the main objectives of the model is to capture the symbolic function of language, namely to allow the symbolization of conceptualizations by means of phonological sequences. Only three types of units are posited in a CG grammar, namely phonological, semantic, and symbolic units. A symbolic unit consists in the symbolic association established between a semantic unit (its semantic pole) and a phonological unit (its phonological pole). The semantic pole of a linguistic expression is referred to as a "predication". The lexicon, morphology and syntax are strictly describable by means of symbolic units. Importantly, they form a continuum and can not be naturally divided into separate components. Consequently, any symbolic unit in the language has a semantic and a phonological pole. This means that any grammatical construction has meaning, even though it is usually more abstract than that of lexical items. A second crucial tenet of CG is that meaning is equated with conceptualization. The meaning of an expression is characterized in terms of the particular structure it imposes on a conceptual scene.

2 Introduction: meaning and form

Semantic investigation thus consists in eliciting exactly how a given expression construes the scene it describes. The symbolic nature of the CG model has important consequences for the relation between meaning and form, as well as the proper tools to be used to relate them. Syntax and semantics are not viewed as two different levels of linguistic organization. Rather, the specific form and syntactic behavior of an expression is motivated (at least partially) by its semantic organization, and thus inseparable from it. The spirit of the analysis presented in this monograph is well captured by Wierzbicka (1988: 3) who writes: "Grammar is not semantically arbitrary. On the contrary, grammatical distinctions are motivated (in the synchronic sense) by semantic considerations; every grammatical construction is a vehicle of a certain semantic structure; and this is its raison d'etre, and the criterion for determining its range of use". Throughout the following chapters, I will treat the syntax of each complement construction as the reflection of its conceptual/semantic structure. Since that structure represents the linguistic convention of the specific construal of a conceptualized scene, I will investigate in detail precisely how each construction structures the scene it describes. In order to illustrate this position, consider the example in (1), which anticipates the analysis presented in Chapter three: (1)

Marie a fait manger les enfants Mary made eat the children 'Mary made the children eat'

The causative construction illustrated in (1) exhibits a puzzling discrepancy between the perceived semantic role of the causee (the children) with respect to the subordinate verb (eat), and its syntactic coding. The children perform the act of eating, even though they are forced to do so. In that sense, the noun phrase les enfants can be viewed as the logical subject of the verb manger. It is, however, realized syntactically as a direct object, as shown by its post-verbal position and its possible cliticization as the plural object pronoun les in Marie les a fait manger 'Mary made them eat'. In Chapter three, I

Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory 3

argue that the causative construction presented in (1) ( W in Chapter three) has a specific meaning, and that meaning represents a conventionalized way of construing an induced scene.1 In a nutshell for now (the details are given in Chapter three), W structures the induced scene as the main subject's sole responsibility, even though the complement process is performed by another entity. Consequently, the causee is not viewed as the initiator of the subordinate process, but as a reluctant participant. Its coding as a direct object reflects its nonagentive role. The particular form of the construction, i.e. the unexpected place and coding of the causee, directly follows from its semantics, that is to say the highly specific way in which it construes the induced scene. The specificity of that construal sets W apart from other causative constructions which structure the induced scene differently, and thus have different syntactic forms. The claim that semantics are somehow involved in the syntactic realization of complement constructions is not particularly controversial. However, it will soon become apparent that the semantic constructs that are used in this monograph to characterize the complements are quite different from those invoked in other solutions. I would like to briefly show, in this introduction, that the adoption of a different view of meaning is dictated by a different conception of the relation between meaning and form. The view that the syntax of an expression is inseparable from its semantics sets CG apart from most current linguistic models. A more common stance consists in positing at least two separate autonomous levels of organization, each with their independent sets of primitives and compositional rules, and a principled way of relating them. For example, in standard Government Binding theory, θ theory and the projection principle (UTAH in Baker 1988) account for the interface between the argument structure of a predicate and its syntactic representation. Other theories make use of other devices. In Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan and Kanerva 1989), the Lexical Mapping Theory serves a similar function.2 In any model that recognizes the independence of a semantic and syntactic level of representation, a crucial function of a semantic theory

4 Introduction: meaning andform

is to manage the interface between the two. For example, Jackendoff (1990: 1) isolates two specific areas which should constitute the scope of semantic theory, namely "meaning" which seeks "to develop a formal treatment of semantic intuition", and "correspondence", whose task is "to characterize the relationship between the formal treatment of meaning and the formal structure of syntax". The correspondence component is specifically designed to capture the isomorphism between the semantic and syntactic levels of representation.3 This is a notoriously difficult task, because the two levels only interact in a partial fashion, and a great part of the semantics of an entity is not relevant to its syntactic behavior. For Bouchard (1995), the difficulty of determining which element gets mapped comes from the kind of semantics adopted in the model. He writes (1995: 1) [insertions in brackets mine]: "most linguistic theories are based on the wrong semantics [because they] incorporate information that is part of the background knowledge of the speakers". These theories are "too concrete; they involve elements that play no explanatory role in grammar".4 In order to select precisely the semantic information which is relevant to syntax, Bouchard posits an other level of semantic organization, separate from both the level of conceptual structure and syntax. This additional level allows Bouchard to separate the "reference" of a sentence, i.e. "the situation to which it can refer in a given use", from its "meaning", or in other terms "its abstract semantic representation" (Bouchard 1995: 6). Bouchard's theory of meaning is therefore separate from a theory of knowledge. It can be called minimalist "because only a small abstract part of meaning is relevant to grammatical processes; situational aspects are not part of grammar" (Bouchard 1995: 6). The problem consists in precisely identifying which elements are relevant to grammatical processes. Bouchard (1995: 17) justifies his isolating a specific level of grammatical (G)-semantics in the following way: "This partitioning effect is caused by the way conceptual properties are organized in our mental representation. They are not all represented in the same way, and only a certain class of representations are accessible to correspondence rules that map onto syntactic form, namely those representations that take the form of tree structures". The restriction of

Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory 5

G-semantics to that very abstract subset of primitives allows Bouchard to claim a one-to-one match up between semantic and syntactic elements. It is not my purpose here to consider Bouchard's system in detail. 5 1 would like to point out, however, that the particular semantic view it defends is entirely determined by the need for isomorphism between the semantic and syntactic levels of organization. Consequently, the tools used for semantic investigation will be geared towards expressing that isomorphy. The adoption of a different kind of semantics in a CG analysis also results from a particular view of the form/meaning relation. There is no particular component in charge of the semantics/syntax interface, since they do not constitute two different levels of organization. Throughout this monograph, semantics will predominantly mean lexical semantics, even when it applies to grammatical constructions. Because of its symbolic function, the syntax of an expression is a reflection of its conceptual/semantic structure, and it represents the linguistic convention of the specific construal of the scene it describes. The goal of a CG analysis is therefore to systematically investigate the kinds of scenes coded by the different constructions, reveal the specificity of the construal each of them provides, and show how that construal is reflected in its form. The panoply of CG investigative tools reflects that methodology. The view of semantics defended throughout this monograph can be called "subjectivist" (see next section, as well as Chapter two), because its purpose is to analyze the human experience of various domains, and capture fine-grained conceptual differences expressed by the use of different constructions. The constructs introduced in the next chapter are used to isolate the specific conceptual dimensions along which conceptualizers express differences in the construal of specific scenes. In the following chapters, this approach is applied to French complement constructions. For each conceptual category, namely causation/perception, modality, desires, emotions, etc., I explore the specificity of the construal provided by each construction, and show how its particular form reflects that construal.

6 Introduction: meaning and form

1.1.1. Verbs and complements·, semantic compatibility6 Since complement constructions have their own meaning, their distribution with the different main verbs is strictly a matter of semantic compatibility between meaningful elements. One of the most important goals of this monograph is precisely to explore what it means for two elements to be semantically compatible. Throughout the following chapters, I systematically investigate the semantic aspects of the verbs and constructions that motivate their co-occurrence. As an example, let us briefly come back to the example in (1). In Chapter three, I propose a meaning for VV in terms of the specific construal its presence imposes on the induced scene. I also isolate the lexical semantic features of the main verb faire 'make' which make it solely compatible with the kind of construal provided by W . The distribution between faire and the W construction is thus solely explained by the semantic match up between the two entities. In this approach to complement distribution, the relation between the main verb and the complement structure is direct, in the sense that the lexical semantics of the main verb straightforwardly match up with the complement form, without being mediated by an intervening level of any kind. This makes the CG account radically different from all the analyses that associate the lexical entry of the main verb to an element of extra-linguistic reality. These obviously include the purely syntactic solutions in which each verb is associated with a subcategorization frame which specifies the type of syntactic structure which can follow it.7 However, they also include more semantic analyses, where the relation between the main verb and the complement is mediated by a level of semantic interpretation. Let us briefly review some such proposals. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) argue that two features in the main verb, namely "factivity" and "emotivity", explain the type of complements they occur with. The higher predicates can be "factive" or "nonfactive", "emotive" or "non-emotive", and that determines their co-occurrence restrictions with different complements, because these interpreted categories are linked with specific complement forms. Research conducted in the same tradition includes Karttunen (1971), and the

Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory 7

work of the Generative Semantics movement (Ross 1970, Lakoff 1971, R. Lakoff 1968, McCawley 1968, Sadock 1969, and Searle 1970).8 Other good examples of "mediated" accounts include Grimshaw (1979), and Ransom (1986). For Grimshaw (1979: 280): "predicates do not select for a particular syntactic form, but for a particular semantic type". Beside its syntactic subcategorization, a given verb is also associated to a semantic frame, composed of three variables over semantics: Ρ (proposition), Q (question), and Ε (exclamation).9 Ransom (1986: 198), seeks to "represent the modality meanings of complements as part of the complement, separate from the higher sentence, and as a property of the sentence rather than a property of a lexical form". She isolates two separate types of modalities, namely "information" and "evaluation" modalities. The four information modalities are "truth", "future truth", "occurrence", and "action". The four evaluation modalities are "predetermined", "determined", "undetermined", and "indeterminate". These two sets of modalities combine to produce sixteen possible modalities. The matrix verbs in English exhibit co-occurrence restrictions with specific modalities, which explains their complement distribution. All these accounts can be called meaningful, because they crucially invoke some aspect of meaning to explain complement distribution. However, it is meaning of a particular kind, which involves a level of interpretation of the lexical semantics of the main verb and the linkage of that level to the syntax (see preceding section). By contrast, the account presented in this monograph does not recognize a layer of semantic interpretation. It directly matches up the semantics of the main verb and that of the complement structure. Once again, complement distribution is the direct result of the semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement construction. Consequently, to explain the distribution of each construction, we need to i) characterize its meaning, that is the particular construal it presents of the scene it describes, and ii) evaluate the compatibility of that construal with the different main verbs which participate in the construction. No other stipulation, principle, or statement is required in the grammar. For example, in Chapter five, I show that obviation (the

8 Introduction: meaning and form

impossibility for certain verbs to be followed by finite complements when the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential, as for example in *Je veux que je parte Ί want that I leave') can be explained by a fine interplay between the lexical semantics of the main verbs and the particularities of a situation where the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential. Crucially, unlike in most other accounts, no further stipulation is required in the grammar, beyond the semantic description of the main verb and the complement construction. The analysis presented here follows Givon (1980, 1990) in recognizing an iconic link between the complement form and the main clause subject's attitude towards the complement scene. Givon treats the form of the complement as the consequence of the "influence" exerted by the main clause subject over the complement scene (see Chapter two). I do not believe that "influence" is necessarily the most relevant feature that explains the distribution, but I will follow the idea that due to its lexical semantics, certain verbs impose a specific construal on their complement scene, and hence motivate a certain construction. Other verbs are more flexible, and potentially compatible with several construals. In those cases, the selection is made according to the pragmatics of the speech situation. The solution presented in this monograph therefore provides a unified treatment of the semantics and pragmatics of complement selection. Finally, since the meaning of the constructions represents a conventional construal imposed on a base, the conclusions reached in this monograph only apply to French. For example, the analysis of the W construction proposed in Chapter three cannot be directly applied to its counterparts in different languages. However, cross-linguistic observations will be made at the relevant points of the analysis. It should be clear from this rapid introduction that the approach to the form and distribution of complement constructions proposed here is deeply embedded in cognitive linguistics, and that the claims it makes need to be understood within that tradition. In the next section, I therefore briefly survey the aspects of the movement the most relevant to the purposes of this monograph, as well as the most fundamental

Semantics, syntax, and linguistic theory 9

tenets of the CG model in which the analyses of the different constructions are conducted. 1.2. Cognitive linguistics Cognitive models of linguistics recognize the role of human experience in providing the basic meaning and intentions coded in natural language. Over the past two decades, an impressive body of work has established the relevance of world experience to linguistic realization in several areas which include time and space (Casad and Langacker 1985, Herskovits (1988), Vandeloise 1984, 1986), force dynamics (Sweetser 1990, Talmy 1988, Langacker 1991), or human emotion in general (Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Wierzbicka 1988). One of the most important consequences of grounding language use in human experience is the primary emphasis placed on meaning. Wierzbicka (1988: 1) writes: "Language is an integrated system where everything conspires to convey meaning—words, grammatical constructions, and illocutionary devices (including intonation)". It should be clear from the previous section, however, that the notion of meaning in cognitive linguistics is quite different from the way it is used in generative linguistics or other formal frameworks. Meaning does not represent denotation or reference, nor can it be considered a relationship between linguistic units and elements of extra-linguistic reality (such as the truth conditions of a sentence for instance). In cognitive linguistics, meaning is equated with conceptualization. To be more specific, meaning consists in the human interpretation of the world. It is subjective, anthropocentric, and reflects dominant cultural concerns and culture-specific modes of interaction as well as features of the world as such (Lakoff, 1987, Langacker 1991, Wierzbicka 1988). The study of meaning is clearly established as the most important goal of cognitive linguistics, and that includes the study of syntax. Wierzbicka (1988: 1) writes: "If semantics is to be defined as the study of meaning encoded in natural languages, then syntax is simply a part of semantics". That emphasis on meaning should not be misconstrued, however, as denying any legitimacy to syntactic investigation, but it

10 Introduction: meaning and form

does clearly refute the notion that grammar is semantically arbitrary. On the contrary, the specific form of a grammatical construction is motivated by semantic, pragmatic, and functional considerations. In that respect, the cognitive position is fully compatible with the functionalist position expressed by Bates and MacWhinney (1989: 3) as follows: "The forms of natural language are created, governed, constrained, acquired and used in the service of communicative functions". However, one must be careful to restrict the similarities of cognitive linguistics to functionalist models to a moderate kind of functionalism. The cognitive program does not share the views of extreme functionalism expressed for example in Garcia (1979) who claims that the study of form is totally irrelevant to the study of function. The stance developed in this monograph is closer to the type of functionalism defined by Givon (1985: 1017) [emphasis in the original] as follows: "In approaching the relation between form and function, I believe one must reject either the extreme transformational position of the total independence of structure, or the extreme functionalist position of the total irrelevance of structure in favor of a more realistic assessment of the exact role of structure in human language and its acquisition. But above all, I think, one must keep in mind that a child's motivation in acquiring a language is overwhelmingly a fiinctiortal motivation". With this kind of functionalism, the view developed in this monograph shares the idea that syntax is an adaptive system which reflects the motivation of the user, as well as the dynamics and adaptation of the system to ecological pressures. In the words of Bates and MacWhinney (1989: 8): " Grammars can be viewed as a class of solutions to the problem of mapping non-linear meanings onto a highly constrained linear medium whose only devices are word order, lexical marking, and supra segmentals". The emphasis placed by cognitive linguists on the meaning of grammatical constructions should not overshadow the fact that grammatical meaning is fairly different from lexical meaning. For one thing, grammatical forms represent the linguistic conventionalization of highly specific aspects of our conceptual structure. This point has been most eloquently argued by Talmy (1983: 227) [insertions in brackets mine]:

Cognitive linguistics

11

"They [grammatical forms] represent only certain categories, such as space, time (hence also form, location, and motion), perspective-point, distribution of attention, force, causation, knowledge state, reality status, and the current speech events to name some main ones. And, importantly, they are not free to express just anything within these conceptual domains, but are limited to quite particular aspects and combinations of aspects, ones that can be thought to constitute the structure of those domains". Secondly, grammatical meaning is more abstract that lexical meaning, because it applies to a wider range of elements. An important part of the work undertaken in this monograph is precisely to show how lexical and grammatical meanings combine with one other. In order to show this precisely and convincingly, we need a specific theory to provide the necessary investigative tools. Cognitive Grammar represents such theory, and it is presented in the next section.

1.2.1. Cognitive Grammar The model of Cognitive Grammar has been developed by Ronald W. Langacker since 1976, and has provided the description of a large body of linguistic data, as shown for example in Lindner (1981), Maldonado (1988, 1992), Newman (1981), Rice (1987), Rubba (1993), Vandeloise (1984, 1986), van Hoek (1992, 1995, 1997) inter alia. Obviously, space considerations force me to only present the aspects of the model most relevant to the analysis of complementation. For a more thorough examination of the issues raised, as well as a justification of the claims, I will refer the reader to Langacker (1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1988e, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, in press), as well as to the aforementioned authors. It was already mentioned that only phonological, semantic, and symbolic units can be found in a CG grammar, and that the lexicon, morphology, and syntax are strictly describable by means of symbolic units. This reduced apparatus is accompanied by a severe content requirement. The only units ascribable to a system are: i) semantic, phonological or symbolic units which are (part of) occurring expressions, ii) schematizations of permitted structures, iii) categorizing

12 Introduction: meaning and form

relations between permitted structures (Langacker 1987a: 488). As a phonological example, take the word cat. It is composed of the occurring expression [kaet]. One schematization over that occurring expression is of the type [CVC], and the categorizing relation existing between the occurring expression and the schema is one of instantiation: [CVC] * [kaet]. The three units described here constitute the only types of constructs that can be posited for the representation of any level of linguistic construction. Importantly, the content requirement rules out purely grammatical constructs, i.e. elements that are given no phonological or semantic value (diacritics, traces, filters etc.). It also implies that rules cannot be different in nature from the expressions they describe. They can only be schematizations of actually occurring expressions. The manipulation and creation of linguistic units crucially rests on certain cognitive abilities, which are not language-specific, but part of our more general system of cognition. Some of the most important ones are: i) the ability to form structured conceptualizations, ii) to perceive and articulate phonological sequences, iii) to form symbolizing relations between conceptual and phonological structures, iv) to use one structure as the basis for categorizing another, v) to conceive of a situation at different levels of abstraction (schematization), vi) to establish correspondence relations between different structures, vii) to combine simple structures into more complex ones, ix) to impose figure / ground organization on a scene, and x) to construe a scene in alternate ways (imagery). 1.2.1.1. The structure of meaning In the CG model, meaning is equated with conceptualization, which is to be explicated in terms of cognitive processing. It includes not only fixed concepts but also novel sensations and experiences as they occur. Conceptualization includes abstract and intellectual conceptions as well as sensory, emotive, and kinesthetic sensations. It also subsumes a person's cultural and social awareness of the speech event. Langacker (1988a: 6) writes: "Entertaining a particular conceptualization, or

Cognitive linguistics

13

having a certain mental experience, resides in the occurrence of some complex 'cognitive event'. An established concept is simply a cognitive routine, i.e. a cognitive event (or event type) sufficiently well entrenched to be elicited as an integrated whole". A linguistic expression is characterized semantically relative to one or more knowledge structures called "cognitive domains" (Langacker 1987a: 147-166). The notion of cognitive domains is quite similar to Fillmore's frames (1982) or Lakoff s (1987) idealized cognitive models (ICM). Some domains are irreducible: they pertain to our experience of space, time, the different senses, emotions, etc. Most linguistic expressions are, however, characterized with reference to complex domains. Any knowledge system or conceptualization can function as a domain for the characterization of a linguistic expression, regardless of its possible complexity or abstractness. Presumably, such structures are ultimately grounded in the set of cognitively irreducible domains alluded to above, but this relationship may be quite indirect, and a particular expression must be described in terms of structures that occupy appropriate positions in hierarchies of conceptual elaboration. The aspects of the scene that are specifically included in the meaning of a particular expression (predication) constitute the "scope of predication" of that expression. An expression's scope of predication may sometime include only a limited portion of the relevant cognitive domains. Particularly relevant to this monograph, different folk models that pertain to our conventional conception of certain concepts can be used as cognitive domains relative to which the meaning of linguistic expressions is characterized. To take an example, the domain of time in general, as well as the way we socially learn to subdivide it into years, months, and weeks, is necessarily activated when the word Tuesday is used. Similarly, the whole system of kinship relations is the background against which the meaning of the word father gets characterized. Importantly for the purposes of this monograph, the meaning of an expression can be characterized with respect to a particular "mental space" (Fauconnier 1985). A mental space is a conceived situation of any degree of complexity, which comprises a set of elements and

14 Introduction: meaning and form

relations holding between these elements. This includes belief systems, emotional or volitional states, the conception of reality as it currently stands or stood in the past, alternative reality spaces such as the situation described in a book or a film, etc. Importantly, spaces can be embedded into one another, and correspondences are established between elements of different spaces. The presence or absence of correspondence between entities existing in different spaces can represent important meaning differences. For example, the difference between the specific and non-specific reading of the indefinite article can be accounted for by the existence of the entity considered in one or two spaces. In the sentence John wants to marry a dancer, John may have a particular dancer in mind (specific reading) or not (non-specific reading). The verb want sets up the specific space of John's wishes, which is different from reality space (the space where John expresses his desires). If the dancer only exists in the space of John's wishes, and not in reality space, the reading is non-specific. If the dancer exists both in the space of John's desires and reality space, the reading is specific. In the case of a specific reading, there exists a correspondence between the dancers that exist in both spaces. In Chapter six, I will show that the notion of mental space is relevant to the characterization of the indicative/subjunctive distinction. In a nutshell, the indicative inflection presents the event in the complement with respect to reality, whereas the subjunctive indicates it is only to be considered with respect to a more restricted mental space. For example, with a volitional verb such as vouloir 'want' in Jean veut que les etudiants sortent 'John wants the students to get out', the subjunctive indicates that the event of the students' leaving is only to be considered with respect to the mental space set up by vouloir to express John's desires, and not with respect to reality. The cognitive domains a linguistic expression evokes are necessary to its meaning, but they are not sufficient. The meaning of an expression cannot be derived from the sole observation of characteristics intrinsic to the entity described. CG embraces the subjectivist view of meaning presented above in that the semantic value of an expression involves the way the conceptualizer chooses to think about it and represent it, as

Cognitive linguistics

15

well as the properties inherent to the scene conceptualized. Langacker (1988a: 7) expresses that pivotal claim of the CG framework as follows: "Linguistic expressions and grammatical constructions embody conventional imagery, which constitutes an essential aspect of their semantic value. In choosing a particular expression or construction, a speaker construes the conceived situation in a certain way, i.e. he selects a particular image (from a range of alternatives) to structure its conceptual content for expressive purposes". Alternate constructions impose contrasting images on the conceived situation. The meaning of an expression therefore includes both the knowledge system it evokes when the expression is activated, as well as the particular "construal" the conceptualizer imposes on the scene. The notion of construal is quite general, and comprises several dimensions. I will show that a very important part of the meaning of complement constructions depends on the type of construal imposed on the complement scene by a given conceptualizer. One particular dimension of construal concerns the conceptualizer's ability to impose a "profile" on a "base", which derives the semantic value of a linguistic expression. The base consists of those facets of active cognitive domains that are directly relevant to the expression, hence necessarily accessed when the expression is used. The profile is a sub-region within the base. It is that sub-region that the expression designates and thus makes prominent within the base. It is important to bear in mind that the particular profile imposed on a base is a consequence of the way in which the conceptualizer construes the scene, and not an inherent property of that scene. Note importantly that different linguistic expressions can have the same base, and only be different due to the nature of their profile. Figure 1 illustrates this.

16 Introduction: meaning andform

hub

spoke

rim

Figure 1: Profiling In Figure 1, as in the remainder of this monograph, profiling will be indicated in heavy (bold) lines. Notice that hub, spoke and rim have the same base, but that each term makes salient a different sub-structure within that base. We will say that these terms differ in their profile. In this example, the meaning difference resides in the imposition of a different profile on the same base. The notion of profiling also allows us to provide a semantic characterization of grammatical categories (nouns, verbs, adjectives etc.). According to the nature of their profile, the entities described by linguistic expressions can be divided into "things" and "relations" (Langacker 1987a, 1987b). A thing "represents a region in some domain" (Langacker 1987a: 189). A region is defined as a "set of interconnected entities" (Langacker 1987a: 198). Count nouns represent a bounded region, mass nouns represent an unbounded region in some space. Concentrating on count nouns, physical objects represent bounded regions in three-dimensional space. Other nouns are bounded in some domain. For instance, hour or minute is bounded in time. Physical objects are easily construed as a single region because they are compact and spatially contiguous (plate, rock, table etc.). Langacker also points out that even entities that are not spatially contiguous such as constellation or archipelago can also be construed as a region in some domain. The conceptualizer construes these spatially dissimilar elements as a region and manipulates them as a unitary entity. The other grammatical categories (prepositions, adjectives, participles, adverbs and verbs) are relations. Relations "profile the interconnections between two or more conceived entities" (Langacker

Cognitive linguistics 17

1987a: 215). Relations can be of two kinds: simple and complex. Simple relations (prepositions, adjectives) profile only one configuration existing between two entities. For instance, the preposition in profiles a spatial relationship between two things, one of which is contained in the other. Among the salient participants in a relational entity, one stands out as the primary figure within the profiled relationship, and is construed as the element being located, evaluated, or described. That participant is called the "trajector" (indicated in the diagrams as "tr".). The trajector is often associated with the function subject. Another participant with a substantial degree of salience is called the landmark (indicated as "lm" in the diagrams). The landmark is often associated with the function object. Note that an expression can have more than one landmark. The notions of trajector and landmark are very close to Talmy's (1978) notions of "figure" and "ground". Figure 2 illustrates the simple relation profiled by the preposition in. Figures 2, 3, and 4 are taken from Langacker (1988e).

Im Figure 2: A simple atemporal relation: in The trajector is the primary figure in the profiled relation. The landmark is the secondary figure in the profiled relation. In a complex relation, typically, the trajector occupies successive positions with respect to the landmark, and that defines a path leading to the final state. As an example, consider the preposition into illustrated in Figure 3.

18 Introduction: meaning and form

Figure 3: A complex atemporal relation: into The dotted lines in Figure 3 indicate the correspondence (identity) between the trajector and the landmark in the different successive positions leading to the final state of inclusion. Note that the final state is similar to the relation profiled by in in Figure 2. However, into profiles a complex relation which involves the successive positions occupied by the trajector with respect to the landmark until the final state of inclusion. The two types of relations illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 are called "atemporal relations" (Langacker 1987a: 214-243). Verbs are also complex relations because they profile multiple configurations between the trajector and the landmark. The relation they profile is different from the type illustrated in Figure 3 because it is specifically and saliently seen as unfolding through time. For that reason, verbs are said to have a "temporal profile". As an example, consider the verb enter illustrated in Figure 4. O..

Figure 4. A temporal relation: enter

Cognitive linguistics 19

Figure 4 illustrates a temporal relation. The temporal profile is indicated by the heavy (bold) arrow. It indicates that the different states the relation goes through are scanned sequentially, i.e. they are activated and then fade as the next configuration is activated. This type of scanning is to be contrasted with the summary (global) scanning representative of atemporal relations. We can briefly recapitulate the difference between the types of relations as follows: atemporal relations profile configurations conceived atemporally and accessible as a whole. They can be simple (presenting one configuration) or complex (presenting multiple configurations). They include adjectives, prepositions, adverbs and participials. Processes profile a series of states, scanned sequentially and unfolding through time. Processes correspond to the class of verbs. Importantly, since they are characterized in terms of their profile, the difference in meaning between the grammatical categories is a matter of the way a specific entity is construed by the conceptualizer, not that entity's intrinsic content. Other important aspects of construal will be considered later. Cognitive linguistics embraces a semantic theory based on the ideas of family resemblance and complex categories (Rosch 1977, Lakoff 1987 among others). A fixed expression is often polysemous. It has a variety of related senses that form a complex category that can be represented as a network. For instance, the semantic network of the noun ring is given in Figure 5 (from Langacker 1988d).

Figure 5: Ring: semantic network of a complex category A particular meaning can stand in two types of relations to another: extension, and elaboration. In Figure 5, the dashed arrows represent

20 Introduction: meaning andform

extension relations (from the prototype), and solid arrows represent elaboration relations. An entity elaborates another entity when it is construed with a greater degree of precision. The type of representation of a complex category illustrated in Figure 5 is not only valid for lexical items. In this work, I assume that complement structures are amenable to the same type of characterization, namely organized around a central prototype, with extension and elaboration relations linking that prototype to other instances of the category. 1.2.1.2. The nature of grammar It has already been said that language represents a continuum of symbolic structures. These structures can vary along different parameters such as complexity, entrenchment, productivity, regularity, but do not divide naturally into discrete regions. Grammar (syntax, morphology and the lexicon) is accommodated solely by means of symbolic units. A CG grammar therefore represents a structured inventory of conventional linguistic units. A unit is a well-mastered cognitive routine that can be complex internally even if the speakers can access it effortlessly. The units of grammar represent the speaker's knowledge of established linguistic convention. Novel expressions have to conform to constructional schemas, which are abstracted over the set of occurring expressions that elaborate them. These constructional schemas are only different in nature from the occurring expressions in that they are more schematic, i.e. less specific. Constructional schemas represent the CG equivalent of rules. This view is compatible with the one defended by Construction Grammar (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988, Goldberg 1992, 1995). A grammatical construction is an assembly of symbolic structures which specifies how two or more component expressions can be integrated to form a unit of greater complexity, the composite structure. The integration of the component structures at the semantic and phonological pole constitutes a valence relation. It is the semantic structure of a morpheme that determines how readily it lends itself to certain kinds of valence relations (Langacker 1988b). The valence of a

Cognitive linguistics 21

morpheme is thus partly motivated by its semantic structure. This position, it should be noted, does not make the claim that syntax is folly predictable from semantics. It was stated above that grammar represents the conventionalization of linguistic usage. Speakers therefore have to learn conventional grammatical patterns, and linguists have to describe them specifically. The need to attend to grammatical constructions individually does not, however, justify the position that grammar is a separate component of the linguistic system. Rather, grammar reduces to configurations of symbolic structures, and incorporates meaning as one of its two poles. Grammatical elements impose a specific construal on some conceptual content, and provide a conventional means of symbolizing these construals. This conception of grammar and the latter's connection to meaning is particularly important for the analysis presented in this monograph. To give just an example, the meaning of the main verb plays a vital part in the determination of the kind of complements it occurs with (its syntactic behavior), but it cannot be said that the meaning of the verbs allows the prediction of the syntactic realization of the complement. Each grammatical construction must be systematically described and learned. We have seen that a composite structure results from the integration of two or more component structures. Integration is effected by correspondences established between sub-parts of the component structures, and the superimposition (unification) of the corresponding entities. Importantly, a composite structure can serve as component structure in a higher-order grammatical construction. The order in which a progressively more complex expression is formed is known as constituency. Typically, one component structure elaborates a substructure of the other. The sub-structure being elaborated is called an "elaboration site" (or e-site). Also, the composite structure typically inherits its profile from one of the component structures, which is then referred to as the "profile determinant". The profile determinant is represented by a heavier line around the component structure. Figure 6 illustrates the integration of component structures into a composite structure with the very simple string cat out of bag (i.e. the cat out of the bag, integrated as a noun phrase).

22 Introduction: meaning and form cat out of bag

out of

bag

Figure 6. Cat out of bag The units cat and bag designate specific types of physical objects represented mnemonically here.10 At the first level of grammatical organization, out of combines with bagn Out of is a relational expression which describes a configuration involving two objects. The configuration results from one of the objects following a trajectory from an in relation to an out relation. Out of therefore makes reference to two objects as part of its own meaning. These objects are very schematic (we only know that one can be a mover and that the other must be some type of container). In the diagram, the circle and the ellipse represent the schematic objects, the arrow between them the trajectory of the mover. The moving object is identified as the trajector, the container as the landmark. The trajector and landmark are e-sites (represented by the shaded areas), to be elaborated by the more specific objects that take part in the construction in the course of grammatical integration.

Cognitive linguistics

23

At the first level, the nominal bag elaborates the landmark of out of. This is expressed by the arrow going from the landmark e-site to the box containing the nominal bag. The dotted line indicates the correspondences between the two entities. Note that at this level, out of is the profile determinant. At the second level, the composite structure resulting from the integration considered at level one is integrated with the nominal cat. Cat elaborates the trajector of the relation, the landmark of which has already been elaborated at level one. Here again, the dotted line represents the correspondences between the two entities. The solid arrow represents the elaboration relation between the (shaded) e-site and the nominal that elaborates it. Note that at this level of grammatical organization, cat is the profile determinant. The third level represents the completed integration of the operation performed at level two. The connecting lines between the different levels represent the categorizing relations between the different structures. 1.2.1.3. A usage-based model One of the goals of this work is to explore the way in which the meaning of lexical items is compatible with certain grammatical constructions and not with others, which explains complement distribution. In order to understand that point, I need to briefly consider the way in which lexical items and grammatical constructions cohabitate in the vast array of form/meaning pairings that constitute the grammar of a language. My explanation finds its theoretical validity in Langacker's usage-based model (Langacker 1987a, 1988c, in press). In a usage-based model, lexical elements and grammatical rules represent different aspects of our knowledge of a language. It is described by Langacker (1987a: 494) as follows: "Substantial importance is given to the actual use of the linguistic system and a speaker's knowledge of its use; the grammar is held responsible for a speaker's knowledge of the full range of the linguistic conventions, regardless of whether those conventions can be subsumed under more general statements". The usage-based approach constitutes a "non reductive approach to linguistic structure that employs fully articulated schematic networks and

24 Introduction: meaning and form

emphasizes the importance of low level schemas" (Langacker 1987a: 494). A full description of the model is well beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is interesting to consider the application of the model for the concept of semantic compatibility that constitutes the core of the analysis presented in this book. The lexicon of a language can be defined as the set of expressions that have been conventionalized as units. This means that it contains at the same time lexical items and grammatical constructions. As indicated earlier, a schematic template can be likened to a lexical item. Consider for example the ditransitive structural template [[send\ [NP] [NP]] which the verb send participates in as in for example John sent Mary the book, or I sent the IRS the money. The usage-based model states that knowledge of the English ditransitive construction involves simultaneous knowledge of a complex network of constructions and lexical items at different levels of abstraction. Figure 7 (from Langacker in press) represents a fragment of that knowledge.

Figure 7: Grammatical knowledge The ditransitive construction is represented as a subschema of the more abstract transfer verb template (along with other transfer verbs such as give for example). Note that the transfer subschema is itself a subschema of the more general [[V] [NP] [NP]] template. On the other hand, the ditransitive subschema [[send\ [NP] [NP]] also represents a

Cognitive linguistics 25

lexical property of the lexical item send, and belongs to the network of schemas describing its syntactic behavior. It is therefore represented alongside other constructional schemas which send also participates in. An important aspect of this monograph consists in exploring the meaning relations between the lexical items and the constructions it participates in. To truly understand that relation, we need to pay attention to the lexical semantics of the main verb, and see how it matches with that of the expression. Let us return to the example of send. It is the norm in CG for a lexical item to be polysemous. It is therefore not exactly similar in every situation. For example, send in Figure 7 has three variants that participate in the three grammatical constructions. These three variants represent three contextual meanings of send in the particular ecology of the construction it appears in. In order to find out the meaning of a context-free send, one would need to abstract away from the particular variants observed in specific constructions to see what they have in common. It is a consequence of the usage-based model that the context-dependent variants are in a way more fundamental than the context-neutral schematization one finds in a dictionary's lexical entry. The notion of semantic compatibility has to be understood against the background of the usage-based model. It should be viewed as the evaluation of the context-free lexical item with respect to the meaning of the construction. Let us consider one example. In causative constructions, faire 'make' and forcer 'force' have different distributions. Faire participates in the [\faire] [INF] [NP]] template (called VV in this monograph) illustrated in Marie fait lire Jean 'Mary makes John read'. Forcer on the other hand participates in the [[forcer] [NP] ά [INF]] schema (VOV here) illustrated in Marie force Jean ά lire 'Mary forces John to read'. Obviously, the meaning offaire or forcer in W and VOV is a specific variant (its specificity will be considered more specifically in Chapter three). In order to find out the context-free meaning of the verbs, we need to further examine the other constructions they participate in. For example, both verbs occur in a transitive construction as in Jean a fait une betise 'John did something stupid', or Marie a force la serrure 'Mary forced the lock'. Saying that forcer

26 Introduction: meaning and form

is incompatible with W involves i) finding out the meaning of forcer by abstracting over its variants in particular constructions, and ii) evaluating what aspect of its semantic structure conflicts in the particular environment of VV. Note that this methodology suppresses the apparent circularity involved in evaluating the meaning of the constructions and the verbs that participate in the constructions. The meaning of the constructions is evaluated not with respect to the particular variant that appears in it (that would be pointless) but with respect to the context-free meaning of the main verb. This context-free meaning is obtained by the schematization over the variants attested in individual constructions in which the verb participates. In that view, the possible occurrence of a subschema is motivated by the (context-free) meaning of a particular verb. For each construction considered in this book, the objective will be twofold. First to investigate the specific templates (the syntax of the constructions), and secondly, to investigate the semantic motivation for the presence of certain main verbs in these templates (the distribution of the constructions). This way of looking at complementation represents an important departure from the way the notion has traditionally been investigated. 1.2.1.4. Complementation in Cognitive Grammar This section introduces the concepts made available by the theory of Cognitive Grammar to investigate the notion of complementation. The notion of profile determinant has already been introduced. It corresponds to the traditional notion of head with respect to the other component structure(s) at the same level of grammatical organization. The head cannot be predicted on independent grounds, and it must be specified as part of the schematic characterization of the construction. The component to be integrated with the head can bear a "complement" or a "modifying" relation to the latter. A complement structure is a structure that corresponds to and elaborates a salient sub-part of the conception evoked by the head. In our example, bag elaborates the landmark of the relational predication out of. It is therefore a

Cognitive linguistics 27

complement of out of. The head-complement relation is illustrated in Figure 8. integrated structure

head

complement

Figure 8: Complement construction A modifier construction is a structure of which a salient sub-part gets elaborated by the head. For instance, in the expression big tree, tree profiles a thing, and big is a modifier profiling the relation between a thing and a location above the norm on a size scale. The composite expression profiles a thing and not a relation, tree is therefore the head. The thing profiled by tree corresponds to the trajector of big and elaborates it. The modifier construction is illustrated in Figure 9.

head

Figure 9: Modifier construction

modifier

28 Introduction: meaning and form

This monograph is particularly concerned with a special kind of complement, namely clausal complements. A complement clause is a subordinate clause that functions as an argument with respect to a governing element (the head). A more precise investigation of the meaning of subordination will be presented in Chapter two, but for now, let us simply stipulate that a subordinate clause is a clause which is conceptually subordinated, in the sense that its processual profile is superseded at a higher level of organization. Given the definition of complement proposed above, a complement clause elaborates a salient sub-part of the head (the main verb). The clausal complement construction I believe she left is illustrated in Figure 10. tr 1m p .. Im sppg — wmSä •

9 •

Figure 10:1 believe she left12 In Figure 10, the subordinate clause she left elaborates the landmark of the main verb believe (the profile determinant of the main clause). It is therefore a complement. Complement constructions constitute a complex category, for which clauses of the type described in Figure 10 might be regarded as prototypical. Constructions depart from the prototype with respect to i) the complement's degree of centrality to the verb's argument structure, ii) the nature of the governing element, and iii) how clause-like the complement's internal structure is. Since this monograph is concerned with verbal complementation, I will mostly focus on the internal structure of the complement clause, or in other words, how clause-like it is. In chapter two, it will be shown that the internal structure of a complement clause is directly tied to the specific type of construal imposed on the scene it describes.

Claims and advantages of the construal approach 29

1.3. Claims and advantages of the construal approach The brief introduction presented in this chapter has shown the centrality and complexity of the notion of construal to the investigation of meaning in general. Chapter two more specifically presents the dimensions of construal pertinent to the evaluation of complement constructions, and the following chapters illustrate these dimensions for different constructions to show how the specific meaning each construction codes is reflected in its form and distribution. The individual cases of the specific constructions each illustrates the following two general principles, namely: i) grammatical constructions are meaningful, and their form reflects a certain cognitive organization, that is to say a particular kind of construal imposed on the conceptualization, and ii) the distribution of the different constructions with the different main verbs reflects the necessary semantic compatibility between two meaningful elements. The account presented in this monograph offers several advantages over current accounts of complement constructions. The first one is its integration and parsimony. The constructions presented in Chapters three to seven represent an eclectic array of forms that have traditionally been studied in various areas of grammar. For example, even though some semantic treatments of causatives do exist (Cannings and Moody 1978), causatives have predominantly been treated in the syntax. On the other hand, the distribution between indicative and subjunctive complements has mostly been considered in the semantics. Other constructions are more evenly balanced. Control structures for instance have been investigated both from semantic and syntactic standpoints. I will show throughout this work that this division is unwarranted and arbitrary. It seems that the criterion for assignment in the syntax or the semantics involves at the same time i) how readily available the meaning of the construction is, and ii) how mechanistically interesting the construction is. I will argue that in order to be better understood, verbal complementation should be given a global account. I will show that the core meaning of complementation is to be found in the conceptual dynamics of the integration of a subordinate event into the main event along different dimensions of construal. Under that

30 Introduction: meaning andform

view, verbal complementation is treated as a unified phenomenon where semantic, pragmatic and syntactic factors are involved in a fine interplay that determines complement selection. A related advantage of this solution is its capacity to capture the relation between constructions. For example, the similarities between modals and impersonal constructions will naturally emerge out of the analysis, as will the connection between subjunctive and infinitival complements (crucial for the understanding of obviation). A second particularity of the analysis developed here is that unlike alternative accounts, it considers at the same time the form and distribution of the constructions. We will see throughout the following chapters that syntactic treatments of complements have been primarily concerned with the structural properties of the constructions, much to the detriment of their distributional properties. In the CG analysis, the two issues are inseparable, because the particular construal representative of a construction determines that construction's form, and its distribution is determined by semantic compatibility. Form and distribution are therefore naturally integrated. Finally, perhaps the most interesting advantage of this solution is that it does not posit any principle, mechanism, or statement in addition to what is necessary to describe the meaning of the main verbs and complement structures. Complement distribution naturally emerges out of the invocation of properties required for the description of any linguistic expression. 1.4. Summary This introductory chapter presented the view of the meaning/form relation defended in this monograph. It was argued that the form of a linguistic expression is inseparable from its meaning. In Cognitive Grammar, there is no sharp division between the lexicon, morphology, and syntax. Language is best represented by a complex array of symbolic units at different levels of abstraction. All linguistic expressions, including grammatical constructions therefore are meaningful, their meaning being characterized as the particular construal their presence

Summary 31

imposes on the conceptualization. Consequently, the following two claims are made, to be developed and elaborated throughout the following chapters: i) the form of each complement construction reflects its meaning, i.e. a particular construal of the conceptual base, and ii) the distribution of the constructions with different main verbs is directly explainable by the necessary semantic compatibility between the different elements of the construction (verb, complement structure, etc.). Importantly, the lexical semantics of the main verbs and the complement constructions match up directly, without any intervening level of semantic interpretation.

Chapter 2. Dimensions of construal

This chapter presents an overview of the different dimensions of construal along which the meaning of the various complement constructions can be evaluated. This includes possible alternative structurings of different cognitive models, as well as different possible perspectives imposed on the complement scene. 2.1. Introduction The CG claim that meaning is equated with conceptualization, and that the semantic import of a construction is characterized in terms of the construal its presence imposes on a base commits the theory to a thorough investigation of what construal means. In the absence of a careful definition, the notion is so powerful and general that it might lead to unfortunate vagueness if its scope is not defined properly. As a reminder of how far-reaching the notion is, recall from Chapter one that it is profiling, a matter of construal, which is responsible for the difference between the different grammatical categories such as nouns and verbs. It should therefore be clear that a global definition of construal is well beyond the scope of this chapter. I will merely describe the aspects of this subtle notion which are the most relevant to the evaluation of complement constructions. It was claimed in Chapter one that the specific form of each French complement construction directly reflects the particular way in which a given conceptualizer structures the complement scene, and that different syntactic realizations indicate alternative construals. This chapter presents an overview of the different areas where conceptualizers have the flexibility of making the alternative choices that result in different syntactic manifestations. Complement constructions typically code complex events (to be defined more precisely in the course of this chapter), and our conception of events is organized relative to an array of cognitive models

34 Dimensions of construal

which structure different aspects of our experience and understanding of the world (Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987a, 1991). These models constitute part of the conceptual base that grammatical constructions structure in alternative ways. To begin the study of French complement constructions, it is therefore useful to present the different models with respect to which the constructions presented in the following chapters are characterized. This chapter is organized in the following fashion: Section two presents the different cognitive models that underlie basic clause structure. Section three is concerned with the conceptual organization of multi-clause constructions. Section four recapitulates the different dimensions of construal along which French complement constructions will be evaluated and previews the following chapters. Section five summarizes the chapter

2.2. The coding of events: basic elements of clause structure The first models to be considered pertain to the basic organization of a clause. The relevance of basic clause structure to complementation is clear. First, the same cognitive domains are operational for the single clauses and the complex ones, since both code events (at different levels of complexity). Second, the same construal principles (profile assignment, subject selection, etc.) govern simple and complex clauses. Third, even though complex events are coded structurally differently from simple ones, the individual elements of complex events are often construed metaphorically in terms of simpler ones. For example, in Chapters five and six, a subordinate clause (part of a complex event) will be shown to be construed as an abstract participant (part of a simple event). Finally, complex clauses are often organized following the conceptual template of simple clauses. For example, Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) argue that the causative of intransitive verbs (a complex clause) follows the conceptual model of a transitive (basic) clause. It should be clear, however that the following sections do not pretend to provide an exhaustive description of all the cognitive models rele-

The coding of events

35

vant to the coding of events, but a selection of the models (or aspects of models) directly pertinent to the concerns of this monograph. 2.2.1. Stage, setting and participants Necessary to the conception and the report of an event are basic considerations about energy, time, location, and participants, which get articulated in different related cognitive models. The first of these models directly pertains to what constitutes an event, and more particularly to our conception of dynamic interaction. According to Langacker's billiard-ball model (Langacker 1991: 13), we think about the world being populated by discrete physical objects, which move through space and can make contact with each other. Motion is driven by energy, which some objects produce, and some others get from outside sources. When motion results in contact, energy is transmitted from the mover to the impacted object, which can in turn participate in further interaction. The overall energy exchange takes the form of an "action chain", illustrated in Figure 11 (from Langacker 1991: 283).

Head

Tail

Figure 11: Action chain In Figure 11, the initial object, that is the one initiating the forceful contact, is referred to as the "head", and the final object, that is to say the ultimate recipient of the transmission of energy, the "tail". The basic semantic roles, such as "agent", "patient", or "instrument" (role archetypes in CG), are established relative to the role they play in the action chain. These archetypes are pre-linguistic notions, and they are directly based on our experience as people who manipulate objects. To take just a few examples, the archetypal agent is "a person who volitionally initiates physical activity resulting, through physical contact, in the transfer of energy to an external object" (Langacker

36 Dimensions of construal

1991: 285). The archetypal patient by comparison is "an inanimate object that absorbs the energy transmitted via externally initiated physical contact and thereby undergoes an internal change of state" (Langacker 1991: 285). An instrument is "a physical object manipulated by an agent to affect a patient; it serves as an intermediary in the transmission of energy" (Langacker 1991: 285). To use a simple example, the independent clause Jean a mange la pomme 'John ate the apple' represents an action chain where John is the head and the apple the tail. The second relevant model pertains to our perceptual experience of events. It has been named the "stage model" by Langacker (1991), because "the role of the perceiver is in many ways analogous to that of someone watching a play" (Langacker 1991: 284). The perceiver's gaze is directed outward, towards a specific region which constitutes the focus of her attention, and represents only a portion of her possible range of vision. The focused area of viewing attention is similar to a theater stage, which constitutes the stable setting where the actors interact and the play develops. In a way similar to a spectator, the viewer tends to organize the elements of the scene unfolding in front of her into a stable setting, with participants moving around it. The perception of the scene further resembles a play, with its own temporal organization, and interaction among the participants, which gets analyzed into discrete events. Langacker (1991: 284) summarizes the stage model as follows: "In summary, the stage model idealizes a fundamental aspect of our moment-to-moment experience: the observation of external events, each comprising the interaction of participants within a setting." By putting together the relevant aspects of the billiard ball model and the stage model, we obtain the "canonical event model" (Langacker 1991: 286) illustrated in Figure 12 (from Langacker 1991: 285).

The coding of events

37

setting

t

I I JL / \ I V I \ / FigureJ2: The canonical event model In the conceptualization illustrated in Figure 12, the stage model contributes the notion of an event occurring within a setting, and a viewer observing it from the outside. The billiard ball model contributes the minimal conception of an action chain, the head of which is recognized as an agent, and the tail of which is recognized as a patient. In sum, the canonical event model represents "the natural observation of a prototypical action" (Langacker 1991: 286). The concepts described up to this point are pre-linguistic notions, and they serve as the base for the coding of events into clauses. The particular realization of a clause, however, represents the conceptualizer's choice to structure that base, i.e. express what is most prominent depending of its communicative needs. In order to illustrate this point, consider the examples in (2)-(4). (2)

Jean a casse la vitre avec un caillou 'John broke the window with a rock'

(3)

Un caillou a casse la vitre Ά rock broke the window'

(4)

La vitre a casse 'The window broke'

38 Dimensions of construal

The pre-linguistic notions that serve as the base for the conception of the event are the same in (2)-(4). They can be represented as an action chain with three participants, namely an agent, an instrument, and a patient. In spite of their common conceptual base, the syntactic realization of the sentences (2)-(4) is quite different. In (2), the agent (Jean) is coded as the subject, the patient (the window) as the object, and the instrument (the rock) as an oblique (instrumental). In (3), the agent is not specifically mentioned, the instrument is coded as the subject, and the patient as the object. In (4), the agent and the instrument are not specifically mentioned, and the patient is coded as the subject. The different syntactic realizations in (2)-(4) reflect the speaker's specific construal of the action chain that underlies the conceived event. In (2), the entirety of the action chain is profiled, as illustrated in Figure 13, where J, C, and V respectively stand for Jean, caillou, and vitre.

Head

Tail

Figure 13: Complete action chain In (3), the initial portion of the action chain (the agent's role) is left unprofiled, and the rest of the chain is in profile, as illustrated in Figure 14.

Head

Tail

Figure 14: Partial profile of an action chain In (4), both the initial and intermediate portions of the chain (the roles of the agent and the instrument) are left unprofiled, and the final part of the chain alone is in profile, as illustrated in Figure (15).

The coding of events 39

Head

Tail

Figure 15 : Minimum profile of an action chain The consideration of the examples in (2)-(4) along with Figures Π Ι 5 shows that the subject of the clause is always the profiled head of the action chain, independently of its semantic role, and the clausal object is the profiled tail of the chain, also independently of its semantic role. When only one participant is coded, as in (4), it is coded as the subject, and the clause has no object. Importantly, this solution treats structural assignment as a matter of clausal prominence, and subjects and objects are "focal participants" (Langacker 1991: 301). To be more precise, Langacker (1991: 301) writes that syntactic functions represent "a separate dimension of organization, wherein certain participants are singled out for special prominence irrespective of their semantic roles. Choosing a participant to be subject or object is very much akin to focusing a spot light on it; by making these selections, the speaker directs attention to the focused participants (as well as to the interconnections which involve them directly), and thereby imposes a particular image on the scene." The recognition of subjects and objects as focal participants affords a definition of those notions in terms of their respective prominence within the clause. More specifically, the subject is the most focal figure at the clausal level (the entity recognized as the trajector), and that the object is the second focal figure at the clausal level (the clausal landmark). Importantly, in the CG analysis, the recognition of an entity as subject or object is independent from its semantic role.13 The idea of alternative profiles imposed on a conceptual base (which includes different choices of subject and object selection) is central to the investigation of complement constructions. For example, Langacker (1995) shows that the relation between raising and non-raising constructions illustrated for example in It seems that John is sick and John seems to be sick is a matter of two alternative construals of the same base, which includes the choice of different entities as subject. In

40 Dimensions of construal

Chapter seven, I show that the relation between modal constructions such as Jean doit partir 'John must leave' and II faut que Jean parte 'It is necessary that John leave' can also be analyzed in similar ways. In Chapter three, I show that the construal of the logical subject of the subordinate verb as a valid agent of the process profiled by that verb is crucial to the selection of a particular causative construction. 2.2.2. Reference points Another cognitive model relevant to the concerns of this monograph pertains to the localization of entities. Part of our knowledge of the world includes the fact that it is populated by a great variety of objects, and that some of these objects are more salient than others, and therefore more easily identifiable. Other objects by comparison are only visible if one seeks them out actively. Salient objects are used as reference points for the location of less-salient ones, that is to say, the location of a non-salient object is calculated with respect to a more salient one. The resulting reference-point model is illustrated in Figure 16 (from Langacker 1991: 170).

W

Figure 16: The reference-point model

The coding of events

41

In Figure 16, W stands for the world, V for the viewer, and Τ for the target, or in other words the entity the viewer is trying to locate. Each object that can potentially be used as a reference point anchors an abstract region defined as the set of objects it can be used to locate. This abstract region is called the reference point's "dominion" D. The viewer's mental path takes her to the target via the reference point with which she makes initial contact. In Langacker (1991), the reference-point model is primarily articulated to account for possessive constructions. For example, in the girl 's arm, the conception of the girl (the whole) is expectedly more salient than the arm (the part). If the part is being located, it is more easily located through its proximity to the girl (or any other salient conceptual relation it may hold to the reference point). In CG terms, the girl is used as a reference point, and the arm is in its dominion. When a viewer wants to locate the arm (the target), its conceptual path takes her initially to the reference point, and then to the target. The use of the reference-point model, however, goes well beyond the description of possession, and can be applied metaphorically to a whole range of constructions, which include setting subjects, and topic constructions (Langacker 1991, 1993, 1995). For example, in Chapter six, I show that the notion of dominion plays a crucial part in the indicative/subjunctive distinction in conceptualizing subject constructions. In Chapter seven, I show that in impersonal constructions, the setting of the event profiled in the complement (see Section 2.2.1 above) can be invoked as a reference point for the location of the subordinate process. 2.2.3. Reality One important aspect of our coding of events to be represented by the categories of mood and tense concerns i) their location in or outside reality and ii) their relation with respect to the time of the utterance. Mood and tense considerations are obviously crucial to the description of complement constructions, and they need to be characterized against the background of another broad reaching cognitive model, namely the

42 Dimensions of construal

one which structures our understanding of reality. The model is so complex that it probably makes sense to consider it a set of related independent models, even though the final conception is fully integrated. The full articulation of the model of reality is well beyond the scope of this work, so I will limit myself here to the aspects that are the most relevant to our current concerns. More specific aspects of the model will be presented as they become relevant to the characterization of particular constructions. There is an idealized conception that reality is an objective entity, independent from all conceptualizes, of which each person has a very limited and fragmentary knowledge (as indicated by the irony contained in the phrase a know-it-all). We know certain things and do not know others, we know that our knowledge of some facts is incomplete or simply false. We also know that other people may have a very different set of elements they consider true, that they are likely to have a different experience of reality, depending on their experience of the world. Even though, at a very abstract level, reality is thought of as being objective and independent from its conceptualization, each individual is only aware of a sub-part of it. Each conceptualizer's experience of the world represents her own conception of reality. Of course, since an important part of our knowledge of the world is common human or cultural experience, a substantial degree of overlap is expected between peoples' conceptions of reality. Some human facts, which arise from common sensory perception, are universally considered true (fire burns, snow is cold, stones are not good to eat). Similarly, the basic facts that pertain to the organization of a given community are likely to be shared by most members of that community. For instance, most Americans know that the United States has a president, and the colors of the US flag. Obviously, the people who share the greatest part of their experience of the world will have the most overlap in their conceptions of reality. For expository reasons, it is useful to keep separate two different facets of our conception of reality, even though the first one is part of the second (more inclusive) model. Very basically, reality represents the history of what actually happened. This includes the events (or

The coding of events

43

states) which are currently in progress or have actually occurred, the events which we see (or think we see) happening, and those which have (or we think have) happened. This conception of reality is called basic reality. It is illustrated in Figure 17 (From Langacker 1991: 242). Irreality (Known) Reality / Immediate^ / Reality \

1© 1 Figure 17: Basic epistemic model However, part of what it means to be aware of the dynamic nature of reality involves some knowledge of the possible paths the course of events will take, given the state of the world and its evolutionary momentum. A more abstract and inclusive conception of reality therefore needs to include, along with the events of basic reality, the knowledge of what is not, of what could or could not possibly happen. An illustration of Langacker's (1991: 275) dynamic evolutionary model is given in Figure 18. That model incorporates as its components different ways we think about the world. Firstly, that it is structured in a particular way, so that certain situations are possible, while others are precluded. Secondly, the fact that only a portion of reality is known to a given conceptualizer. Also included are certain force-dynamic notions, which yield the notion of "evolutionary momentum" when applied metaphorically to these models. The first of these elements is the dynamic property of reality. Even though reality is usually considered stable, it is not a static configuration of events. It is conceived as evolving through time. Langacker (1991) talks about reality being perceived as an "ever evolving entity whose evolution continuously augments the complexity of the structure

44 Dimensions of construal

already defined by its previous history. The cylinder depicting it should be imagined as growing along the axis indicated by the arrow" [the arrow depicts the axis along which reality evolves] (Langacker 1991: 242). Its "growth" along the time axis yields a force-dynamic dimension in our conception of reality. Langacker (1991: 276) writes: "There is an essential force dynamic aspect to our conception of its structure which we see as constraining and influencing the elements which unfold within it." It follows that its "evolutionary momentum" (a more precise characterization of its force dynamic nature) allows the future course of events to be predictable to some extent. Some elements are seen as possible, while others are definitely excluded from the possible turn of events. Langacker (1991: 276) speaks further of the "organic continuity" of the evolution of reality: "successive instantiations of reality cannot represent totally distinct and unrelated conceptions. Instead, one instantiation bequeathes most of its organization to its successor, which diverges from it in only limited ways and only as permitted by the world's structure." Part of our conception of reality includes the understanding that the way it has already evolved leaves the potential for further evolution in constrained directions. The possibility of predicting with reasonable confidence which among those directions will actually be realized is by itself a reflection on the way reality has evolved so far. In this sense, it is part of reality. These elements are illustrated in the dynamic evolutionary model presented in Figure 18: (from Langacker 1991: 277).

Figure

18:

Dynamic evolutionary model

The coding of events

45

Reality is depicted by the cylinder, and C is a conceptualizer (identified as the speaker). The dashed double arrow represents evolutionary momentum, which tends to carry reality along a certain path and precludes it from taking others. Those paths that are not excluded will be referred to as "potential reality". Reality is often constrained enough that the future course of events can be predicted with reasonable confidence. Such cases will be referred to as "projected reality". For example, a sentence in the future such as Marie viendra demain 'Mary will come tomorrow' is considered an element of projected reality, because knowledge of the way things have evolved so far lead the speaker to predict with confidence that reality will evolve to include the profiled event. These two models of reality (basic and epistemic) are of crucial relevance to the categories of tense and modality, very much at issue in this monograph. Following Langacker's (1991) analysis of English modality, I show in Chapter four that the epistemic model constitutes the base relative to which the description and characterization of epistemic modals can be accomplished. In Chapter six and seven, I show that in collaboration with the Reference Point model, the two models of reality presented in Figures 17 and 18 play an important part in the analysis of the semantic import of the indicative and subjunctive inflection. The cognitive models considered in this section pertain at the same time to the conception of simple and complex event, along with many other linguistic expressions. The notions more directly pertinent to the conception of complex events are presented in the next section. 2.3. Conceptualization of complex clauses

Despite their similarities with independent (simple) clauses, multiclause constructions nonetheless pose their specific problems. This section considers the dimensions of construal specific to complement constructions, and in particular, the ways in which single events can be combined to form complex ones. It was said in Chapter one that a complement clause elaborates the landmark of the main verb. It was

46 Dimensions of construal

also said that a complement clause is conceptually subordinated, in the sense that its own profile is superseded by that of the main verb .14 We now need to explore further the conceptual underpinnings of complex clause formation. Following work by Givon (1980, 1990), as well as Haiman (1985), I will consider that the prototypical value of an independent (indicative) clause is to describe a single, independent event. A subordinate clause, by comparison, describes an event that is viewed as conceptually dependent on the main verb, in the sense that its very existence is viewed with respect to the process profiled by the main verb. In the most extreme case of the causative constructions, the subordinate event only exists because it is induced by the main subject. For example, in Marie fait rire les en/ants 'Mary makes the children laugh' the complement rire les en/ants only occurs as a result of Mary's actions. The relation between the main verb and the complement clause is not always so extreme. The complements of modals are viewed as potentially occurring, their conditions of occurrence being determined by the main verb. The verbs of perception, declaration, propositional attitude, volition, and emotion reaction will be called conceptualizing subject construction (CSC) verbs. Chapters five and six will show that CSC verbs present the sort of mental operation the main clause subject performs on the complement content. In the CSC cases, the event in the complement is viewed as dependent on its perception, report, desire, etc. For example, in Jean dit qu 'il a fini 'John says that he has finished', the complement qu 'il a fini is viewed as dependent on John's act of saying. The sentence primarily describes an act of saying, not one of finishing. The precise relation between the main verb and the complement represents an important aspect of this monograph, and it will be investigated throughout the following chapters. For now, I would simply like to emphasize the fact that the complement clause is dependent on the main verb, in the sense that the occurrence of the event it describes is viewed with respect to the main process.15 Turning now to the form of complement constructions, a subordinate clause can be syntactically realized in several ways, as illustrated in (5)(7).

Conceptualization of complex clauses 47

(5)

a. b. c. d.

(6)

a. b. c.

(7)

a. b. c. d.

II faut parier plus fort 'You must speak louder' Je veux rester id Ί want to stay here' Marie aime aller au cinema 'Mary likes going to the movies' Jean sait nager 'John knows how to swim' Jean force Marie ä aller ä la fac 'John forces Mary to go to the university' J'ai envie de retourner en Californie Ί feel like going back to California' II est facile de recevoir un proces verbal au Texas 'It is easy to get a traffic ticket in Texas' Jean sait que Marie est malade 'John knows that Mary is sick' Je voudrais bien que Jean me prete sa voiture Ί would like John to lend me his car' Je crois qu 'il a demissione Ί think that he resigned' Je suis content qu 'eile ait compris Ί am glad that she understood'

In all the examples in (5)-(7), the subordinate clause codes an event, but that event is syntactically realized differently in the different examples. For example, it is represented by a bare infinitive in (4a), where the participant in the subordinate process is not only left unmentioned, but not even directly identifiable (possible the hearer). In (5b), (5c), and (5d), the subordinate event is also coded as a bare infinitive, but the main participant in that process is necessarily analyzed as coreferent with the main clause subject. In (6), the event is also coded by an infinitive, but the latter is preceded by a preposition (a or de). The main participant is construed as coreferential with one argument of the main

48 Dimensions of construal

verb in (6a) and (6b) (object in (6a), and subject in (6b)), and more abstract in (6c) where it could be anyone. Finally, in (7), the subordinate event is coded as a finite clause. The subordinate verb carries modal inflection (indicative in (7a) and (7c), or subjunctive in (7b) and (7d)), and the main participant in the subordinate process is explicitly mentioned and coded as the subject of the subordinate clause. Note that the internal organization of the subordinate clause in (7) is exactly similar to an independent clause. For example, in (7a), Marie est malade 'Mary is sick' could stand alone as an independent clause. It was claimed earlier that by definition all subordinate complements are conceptually dependent on the main verb. However, all do not exhibit the same degree of dependence. Following work by Givon (1980, 1990), Haiman (1985, and Langacker (1991), the next sections argue that the particular forms of the complement illustrated in (5)-(7) reflect the level of conceptual dependence of the subordinate event with respect to the main event. 2.3.1. Semantic layering of a finite clause Before we address the issue of conceptual dependence per se, it is useful to precisely determine the semantic import of the different elements that enter in the formation of a finite clause. Langacker (1991: 33) argues that a finite clause represents a layering of semantic functions.16 The conceptual core of the verb phrase is the verb stem, whose semantic function is to present a process type. For example, a verb like courir 'run' presents a certain type of activity. It is recognizable, and can be differentiated from other closely related activities, such as walking or sprinting. That process type, however, is not instantiated, that is anchored to a specific time and place, as well as particular participants. At the type level, it is impossible to differentiate between two different realizations of a process. That differentiation is done at the instance level. A type is instantiated if it is considered with respect to its domain of instantiation, namely time for verbs (Langacker 1987a, 1991). Two different instances of the same type will therefore have two different time addresses. For instance, Mary's running once at

Conceptualization of complex clauses 49

10:00 a.m., and another time later in the day at 6:00 p.m. represent two instances of the running type, because they occur at different points in time. Obviously, at the instance level, the process evoked by the verb is tied to specific participants. Therefore, two running episodes by John and Mary occurring at the same time count as two instances of a process type. An instance of a process can further be quantified, and for verbs, the non-finite markers provide the quantification. In French, the non-finite markers that can be added onto an infinitive are the aspectual and voice markers. As it applies to verbs, quantification can be understood as providing information relative to the internal structure of the process. The aspectual marker is traditionally analyzed as indicating, with respect to some temporal reference point, whether the process is completed or still in progress. Concerning the passive marker, Langacker (1991: 197) writes that it "overrides the content verb with respect to one dimension of imagery, namely which processual participant assumes the status of trajector." In other words, the passive marker provides information concerning the specific coding of the participants in the complement process, i.e. their figure/ground organization. As an example, consider the sentences in (8) and (9). (8)

Je voudrais etre revenu ά sept heures Ί would like to have returned at seven o'clock'

(9)

Jean doit avoir έίέ έΐιι president 'John must have been elected president'

Both (8) and (9) represent instances of a process type. In (8), the returning event type is anchored in a specific time (before seven) and participants (Je). In (9), the election event type is predicated of a specific person (Jean), and the election has a particular address in time, even though it is not made specific. Furthermore, both instances are quantified, in the sense that additional information which goes beyond their conceptual core is provided by the perfect and voice markers. In (8), the process must be accomplished before the specific time of seven

50 Dimensions of construal

o'clock. In (9), the aspect marker codes the completion of the infinitival process at the time of the utterance, and the passive marker shows that the grammatical subject is not the agent of the profiled relation. The semantic organization of the verb group is organized in a layered way. A process can only be quantified once it has been instantiated. For example, consider the modal construction in (10), which anticipates the analysis given in Chapter four. (10)

Marie sait jouer du piano 'Mary can play the piano'

In (10), jouer du piano represents a process type. The sentence profiles the possible realization by Marie of any instance of that type. However, the type is not instantiated, because the construction does not profile an actual episode of Mary playing. Consequently, it cannot be quantified, as illustrated in (11) by the infelicity of the perfect marker. (11)

*Marie sait avoir joue du piano 'Mary knows how to have played the piano'

When an instance of a process type is quantified, it can further be grounded. Grounding predications presuppose that an instance has been established, and they give information concerning its relation to the speech act participants (most importantly the speaker and hearer). For verbs, grounding predications include the tense and modality markers, which directly relate the event profiled in the complement to the speech situation. I would also argue that the person markers are also grounding predications. The grounding role of the category person in French is expressed by Moignet (1981) who writes (1981: 91 translation mine): "La declinaison en personne etablit un rapport entre l'etre concerne par l'evenement dit dans l'enonce et l'etre qui conduit l'evenement qu'est l'enonce, le locuteur." 'The personal marking establishes the connection between the entity involved in the event

Conceptualization of complex clauses 51

which is being reported, and the entity which does the reporting event, the speaker.' Following the CG definition of grounding, the presence of personal inflection establishes a relation between the participant(s) in the event considered and the speech situation (the speaker/hearer); it will therefore be considered a grounding predication. In terms of their semantic function, the infinitive and indicative complements stand at both endpoints of elaboration of a process type. At the minimal end of the spectrum, an infinitive represents a process type, and at the other end, a full indicative clause represents the most possible elaboration of a process, namely a grounded instance of a process type. The recognition of the category person as a grounding predication has important consequences for the analysis of the indicative and the subjunctive inflection. In Chapter six, I will argue that both indicative and subjunctive clauses are grounded, in the sense that they are both marked for the category person, but that they cannot be considered grounded in the same way. Indicative clauses will be shown to be "fully grounded", because they include tense predications, whereas subjunctive clauses are not marked for tense (Sandoval 1984). Chapter six illustrates the difference in the nature of the kind of grounding provided by the two modal inflections. Intuitively for now, we will see that an indicative clause considers the complement scene with respect to reality while a subjunctive clause is strictly concerned with locating the complement process with respect to a more limited and localized mental space (Fauconnier 1985).

2.3.2. Event integration It was mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.3 that even though complement clauses are dependent on the main verb, they do not all exhibit the same level on dependence. This section shows that there is a high degree of correlation between the level of semantic elaboration of the complement clause (coded by the specific form of the complement), and the latter's level of relative independence with respect to the main event. More specifically, following Givon (1980, 1990) as well as Langacker (1991) I will argue that that the form of the complement is

52 Dimensions of construal

isomorphic to the relative independence of the event it codes with respect to the main event. In other words, the degree to which a complement clause approximates an independent clause reflects the degree of independence with which it is construed by some conceptualizer. In that light, different complement forms represent different levels of independence, and the analysis of those forms amounts to studying the conceptual dynamics of event integration, i.e. the elements which determine the level of independence of a given complement. Since the conceptual independence of the subordinate event is reflected in the complement's form, it can formally be evaluated. Givon (1980: 338) provides the following parameters for evaluating the degree of independence of the subordinate event with respect to the main event: "i) The degree to which the agent/subject/topic marking of the embedded clause reflects the markings in independent/main clauses; ii) The degree to which independent-clause tense-aspect-modality marking of the verb is preserved in the embedded clause; iii) The presence or degree-of-presence of predicate-raising of the complement clause verb onto the main verb; i.e. the degree to which the complement verb is lexicalized as one word with the main verb". Givon's parameters will prove important throughout the following chapters, and therefore deserve some illustration. Consider the examples in (12) and (13). (12)

Marie sait que Jean est parti 'Mary knows that John left'

(13)

Marie a fait partir Jean 'Mary made John leave'

In the construction in (12), the complement structure is a full indicative clause. The subordinate verb has all the markings available to an independent verb, and the subordinate subject Jean is marked in the nominative, in the same way as the subject of an independent clause would be. Furthermore, the subordinate verb is a full lexical item, and shows no sign of raising. The event of John's leaving coded as an

Conceptualization of complex clauses 53

indicative clause is therefore construed with the maximum independence consistent with its position as a complement. In the causative construction in (13), on the other hand, the subordinate verb partir is in the infinitive, and therefore does not exhibit the markings of an independent clause verb. Furthermore, the logical subject of the infinitive Jean is not marked in the nominative as would the subject of an independent clause, but in the accusative.17 In that case, the same event of John's leaving is much less independent than it was in (12). I will argue in Chapter three that after lexical causatives, the causative constructions in (13) represent the highest level of integration of a subordinate event into the main event. The considerations of the semantic import of complement constructions, as well as the relative independence of the subordinate event from the main event are crucial to our understanding of complementation, but they do not tell the whole story. The fundamental question addressed in this work concerns the motivation for presenting the subordinate event at a particular level of independence. More specifically, two questions need to be answered: i) why are the complements of certain verbs construed more independently than that of other verbs? and ii) when the same verb can take several complements, what motivates the choice of a particular construction? The semantic structure of the main verb seems to provide an ideal starting point for the investigation of these questions, because complement distribution can be analyzed in terms of semantic verb classes. It is well known for example (and it will be explored in depth in Chapter six) that subjunctive complements are found in French following (among others) the verbs of volition and emotion reaction. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the meaning of the main verb will provide crucial information as to the level of independence of the complement. Givon (1980, 1990) insightfully explores "the systematic isomorphism that exists between the semantics of the complementtaking verbs, and the syntax of verb-plus-complement constructions" (Givon 1990: 515). Givon's account considers the form of the complement as a consequence of the "binding force" of the main verb, or in other words, the influence of the main clause subject over the

54 Dimensions of construal

complement scene. He argues that a binding scale can be observed, starting with the manipulation verbs {cause, make, force) usually represented in terms of their implicativity, and that that scale can be extended all the way down to the cognition/utterance verbs such as know. The consideration of the "emotional factor" provides another dimension, and gives opposite results depending on whether it applies at the top or at the bottom of the scale: "The more the subject/agent of a cognition/utterance verb is emotionally committed to the outcome encoded in the complement clause, the higher will the verb be on the binding scale. The more emotionally involved the subject/agent of a manipulative verb is with the outcome encoded in the complement clause, the lower the manipulative verb will be on the binding scale" (Givon 1980: 337). The resulting binding hierarchy is as follows. The implicative manipulative verbs (make, have, cause) are at the very top, followed by the non-implicative and increasingly emotion encoding verbs {tell, request, ask, want) in the middle. Emotion encoding cognition verbs {regret) occupy a lower position, and non- emotive cognition verbs {know) are at the bottom of the scale. Givon's intention of relating the syntactic realization of the complements of certain verbs to the place those verbs occupy on the scale is clear. He writes (1980: 337): "The main purpose of this study is to show that the syntactic structure ("coding") of the complement clauses of verbs which take verbal/sentential complements is largely predictable from their position on our binding scale. Not altogether unexpectedly, the binding force of a verb roughly correlates to the degree to which its complement appears syntactically like an independent/main clause. The relation is, however, inverse. The higher a verb is on the binding scale, the less would its complement tend to be syntactically coded as an independent/main clause". To briefly illustrate Givon's analysis, the implicative/successful verbs in French (the highest on the scale) involve predicate raising, and cannot be followed by more independent finite complements. This is shown in (14) and (15).

Conceptualization of complex clauses 55

(14)

J 'ai fait manger Jean Ί made John eat'

(15)

*J 'ai fait ά Jean qu ΊΙ mange Ί made John that he eat'

However, the slightly lower non-implicative manipulative verbs can take both (dependent) infinitival and (more independent) subjunctive complements. This is shown in (16) and (17), where we see that the subjunctive mood covers the middle of the binding scale. (16)

Je lui ai dit de manger la pomme Ί told him to eat the apple'

(17)

Je lui ai dit qu 77 mange la pomme Ί told him that he eat the apple'

Note that Givon's analysis nicely correlates with Langacker's idea of different forms serving specific semantic functions. It makes intuitive sense that a process type (which merely presents the conceptual content of a verb) should be more easily integrated into a main process than a fully elaborated conception of a process type, which also includes specifications relative to the particular speech situation it takes part in. In other words, the degree of syntactic completeness of the complement, i.e., how closely it approaches an independent clause, parallels the degree of elaboration of the process type described in the complement. This will be considered in greater detail in Chapters three and four. Givon's account provides very interesting insights on the relation between main verbs and complement constructions, and the notion of semantic compatibility developed in this monograph is deeply indebted to it. However, it only successfully explains why certain verbs are followed by certain complements. Because it exclusively relies on the meaning of the main verb, it is not well equipped to handle the cases

56 Dimensions of construal

where the same verb can be followed by two different complements. This is illustrated in (18) and (19). (18)

Jean croit revenir demain 'John believes to come back tomorrow'

(19)

Jeatii croit qu 'ili reviendra demain 'John believes that he will come back tomorrow'

In (18) and (19), the main verb is the cognition verb croire 'believe', and the complement scene is coded as an infinitive in (18), and as an indicative in (19). Givon's account can insightfully show that the possibility of being followed by either an infinitival or a finite complement (in cases of coreferentiality between the main and subordinate subjects) is a characteristic of the cognition verbs because they occupy a certain position on the binding scale. However, it does not explain what motivates the particular construal of the subordinate event in both cases. The present analysis explains that motivation by thoroughly investigating the semantic import of the complement construction. In Chapter five, I show that the finite and infinitival clauses each impose a different perspective on the complement scene (to be explained in Section 2.3.4). I also argue that perspective is a matter of construal, and it can be motivated either by the lexical semantics of the main verb, or some conceived property of the speech situation. Consequently, an analysis based on the semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement construction can explain both the presence of specific complements following specific verbs, and the choice between two complement forms when that choice is possible. 2.3.3. A note on complementizers So far, nothing has been said about complementizers, but it is clear that they are also meaningful elements, and they need to be accounted for in any account of complementation. In French, an infinitival complement can be preceded by either ä 'to' or de 'from', and a finite complement

Conceptualization of complex clauses 57

(indicative or subjunctive) must be preceded by que 'that'. The status of que as a complementizer is uncontroversial, but the status of α and de which are prepositions in their other uses needs to be addressed. I will consider the prepositions first, before presenting que. From the perspective adopted in this work, the status of ά and de is clear. They will be considered meaningful, and their meaning needs to be compatible with that of the construction they partake in.18 Their presence, therefore, merely adds one additional layer to the semantic puzzle presented earlier. Calling these prepositions meaningful, however, goes against a long established tradition which refers to them as mots vides 'empty words' (Vendryes 1921). However, Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1995) argue that when they precede infinitival complements, ά and de are meaningful, and that their meaning is motivated by their meaning in other contexts. Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1995: 350) present their objective in the following way: "Our goal is to show that semantic properties of a and de motivate their occurrence in one particular set of constructions in which their semantic content is not obvious, namely those in which the preposition introduces an infinitive complement." Their account of the prepositions is fully compatible with the analysis developed here, and I will briefly summarize it in this section. I will show in the relevant places how it relates to the investigation of specific complement constructions. In their lexical uses, α and de indicate spatial relations. Since Talmy (1974, 1983), the semantic of spatial relations is analyzed using the notions of "figure" and "ground". The figure is the object whose location is being described, the ground is another object or location with respect to which the figure is being located. The meaning of ά "includes both temporal and spatial relations involving one point: either static location of the figure at a point, or a dynamic motion of the figure along the path to a specified point." Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1995: 360). De has a "dynamic sense in which the figure originates (spatially or more abstractly) from a ground of unspecified configurational properties", but other senses of the preposition are static. In particular, the part/whole relation where the ground is the whole entity and the figure is a part of that entity seems to be present in

58 Dimensions ofconstrual

all the senses of de. The part/whole relationship is an intrinsic relationship between two entities. Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1995) argue that this characterization also holds for the static uses of French de. The use of a and de with infinitives is motivated by the semantics of the prepositions and the verbs they associate with. Kemmer and BatZeev Shyldkrot (1995: 367) claim that: "the notion of a path towards a goal is also, we would claim, central to the meaning of ά as coding a relation between the subject referent, which represents the figure, and a ground, represented by the action or process coded by the infinitive. The figure is construed to follow a path to the ground via the process designated by the main verb; and the path involved can be characterized, as a first approximation, as the active application of the subject to the goal of carrying out the action named by the infinitive." In Chapter three, I will show that the semantics of forcer 'force' or obliger 'oblige' and the following infinitive construction (VOV) motivate the use of α in that construction. The semantics of de in infinitival constructions are also motivated by the lexical meaning of the preposition. More specifically, the notion of intrinsic relation considered for the lexical cases is directly applicable to the use of de in infinitive constructions. In Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot's words (1995: 367): "In any infinitive construction, there is an intrinsic relation between the action designated by the main verb, and that designed by the infinitive". Although that intrinsic relation is always present in all infinitival constructions, it is specifically referred to only when de is present. The semantics of de therefore make it relevant to the infinitival construction. It can only appear, though in the absence of a more specific relationship, such as the one coded by ά. Finally, Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot argue that among all French prepositions, only ά and de possess the semantic attributes which make them felicitous in the infinitival construction, which explains why no other preposition can be found in that context. The idea of semantic compatibility between the verb, the complement construction, and the preposition that constitutes the core of Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot's analysis is obviously compatible with the

Conceptualization of complex clauses 59

ideas defended in this monograph. As indicated above, it will be invoked in Chapter three to explain the use of ά with forcer, in Chapters five, six, and seven, it will be used to explain the presence of the de preposition with the verbs of possibility, obligation, and emotion reaction. The case of que is simpler and less controversial. The complementizer can only appear preceding finite complements, which, as we have seen, represents the greatest possible independence of the subordinate process with respect to the main process. The presence of que enhances that independence. Langacker (1991: 447) analyzes complementizers (in particular the English "that") in the following fashion: "Complementizers are plausibly analyzed as imposing an atemporal, maybe even nominal construal on the structures they combine with". The French que serves a similar function, and the subordinate clause it combines with hence becomes more noun-like. Langacker (1991: 440) notes that the presence of a complementizer involves "conceptual distancing whereby the subordinate process is construed holistically and manipulated as a unitary entity". This brief note on the "grammatical" elements which precede complements (a and de will be called prepositions, que a complementizer) reinforces the ideas expressed earlier in terms of semantic compatibility. A, de, and que are best treated as additional meaningful pieces of the semantic puzzle which constitutes a grammatical expression. 2.3.4. Perspective It has already been mentioned that the conceptualizer's relation to the scene conceptualized is considered metaphorically in terms of perception (Langacker 1985, 1990). Consequently, an important dimension of construal concerns the specific "perspective" imposed on the conceptualized scene. The term perspective subsumes the particular "vantage point" from which the scene is conceptualized, as well as the "viewing arrangement" (to be explained shortly) existing between the perceiver

60 Dimensions of construal

and the perceived entity. Let us first consider the notion of vantage point. The ground (which contains the speaker, the addressee, and the immediate speech circumstances) represents the default vantage point from which a linguistic expression is conceptualized. Langacker (1991: 441) writes: "I suggest that one should take quite seriously the notion of the ground being—in some real sense—the vantage point from which a linguistically coded scene is viewed. In particular, the circumstances of the speech event, together with the nature of the grounding relationship can be thought of as defining a sort of viewing frame representing what is immediately accessible for focused observation... The viewing frame serves as a window on the situation described by a finite clause, and the clause's processual profile is by definition the focal point within the immediate scope thus defined".19 However, the internal complexity of multi-clause constructions can provide an added layer of difficulty pertaining to the vantage point from which the complement scene is conceptualized. The difference between different constructions is illustrated in (20) and (21). (20)

Le professeur fait rire ses etudiants 'The teacher makes his students laugh'

(21)

Le professeur croit que ses etudiants rient (de lui) 'The teacher believes that his students are laughing (at him)'

In (20), the sentence is conceptualized from the vantage point of the speaker. Note that the subject (the teacher) might not even be aware of the effect she has on her students. In other words, the main subject does not act as a conceptualizer with respect to the complement scene. In constructions such as (20), the speaker is the only relevant conceptualizer in the sentence. The situation is different in (21). The communicative purpose of the sentence is to describe the mental stance of the main clause subject with respect to the complement scene, or in other words the conceptualization of the main clause subject. The speaker

Conceptualization of complex clauses 61

reports that conceptualization, which, in the case of (21), she might not even share. With the verbs whose subject functions as a conceptualizer with respect to the complement scene, the complement constructions include an additional conceptualizing relation. The profiled relation existing between the main subject and the complement clause can be viewed as equivalent to that existing between the speaker and her conceptualization (the main clause). Langacker (1991: 442) expresses the similarity between the relation which holds between the main clause subject and the complement and the construal relation (i.e. the relation existing between the ground and the grounded structure) as follows: "The analogy is strongest when the subject (or another main-clause participant) functions as conceptualizer with respect to the contents of the subordinate clause, e.g. with verbs like say, believe, imagine, want, enjoy and realize. The subject's conceptualizing role vis-ä-vis the subordinate structure is then comparable to that of the speech-act participants in conceptualizing an expression's meaning (the construal relationship)." When the main clause subject has a conceptualizing role with respect to the complement scene, it naturally constitutes the vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized. In this monograph, such constructions will be referred to as conceptualizing subject constructions. The recognition of the vantage point from which a complement clause gets conceptualized has important syntactic repercussions. First, it yields a useful distinction between conceptualizing subject constructions, that is to say constructions where the complement scene is construed from the vantage point of the main clause subject, and speaker-oriented constructions, where the speaker is the sole relevant conceptualizer in the sentence. In Chapter four, I will show that the distinction between these two kinds of constructions affords a satisfying way of distinguishing the French modal verbs from all the other verbs that also take infinitival complements. In Chapters five and six, it will be shown that the vantage point from which the complement scene is conceptualized goes a long way towards explaining the syntactic realization of the complement.

62 Dimensions of construal

The consideration of the vantage point from which an entity is construed is necessary, but not sufficient. The relative position of the viewer and the object of perception in the viewing relation (the viewing arrangement) represents another important aspect of perspective. Langacker (1985: 120) argues that a viewing situation can be characterized: "relative to the asymmetry between the observer in a perceptual situation and the entity that is observed". This asymmetry yields two basic types of viewing arrangements, respectively called the Optimal Viewing Arrangement (henceforth OVA) and the Egocentric Viewing Arrangement (henceforth EVA). These two arrangements are presented in Figure 19 (from Langacker 1985: 121).

Figure 19. OVA and EVA Figure 19a depicts the OVA, in which S (the self or observer) strictly acts as the subject of perception, and is not itself an object of perception. It is thus characterized as maximally "subjective", and O, the object of perception (the other or observed) as maximally "objective" (a strict object of perception). The OVA magnifies the observer/observed asymmetry. The self is so involved in the perceptual activity that she loses all self-awareness and strictly concentrates on the object of perception. To be fully objective, the entity observed must occupy a privileged position of maximum perceptual acuity. It has to be close to the observer for maximum salience, but not so close as to blur her vision. It must be a clear, well-defined object, distinct from both the background and the observer. When it occupies the "objective scene" or "on-stage region", characterized as the area of maximum visual attention and acuity, the conditions of the OVA are met. Since the observer has lost all self-awareness in her observing the scene, her participation in the viewed activity is said to be maximally subjective.

Conceptualization of complex clauses 63

The OVA contrasts with the EVA, which is presented in Figure 19b. The main difference is the extension of the objective scene. The EVA "accommodates the natural interest that most people have in themselves and the relations they bear to the entities around them" (Langacker 1985: 122). The locus of attention goes beyond the region of maximal perceptual acuity to incorporate the observer. The latter is thus part of the extended viewing scene. She remains the observer, but she is also, to some degree, a participant in the scene observed. She is therefore more objectively construed. From a linguistic standpoint, we are not interested in perception per se, but in the meaning of linguistic expressions. The perceptual relationship described above is only a special case of a more general construal relationship between the conceptualizer and the object of conceptualization. The terms subjectivity/objectivity will thus be used with respect to the role played by the conceptualizer within the conceptualization that constitutes an expression's semantic value (its scope of predication). Three possibilities arise, presented in Figure 20 (from Langacker 1985: 125).

Figure 20: Degrees of subjectivity of the ground In these diagrams, G stands for the ground, the dotted circle stands for the objective scene and the box stands for the expression's scope of predication. In 20a, the conceptualization makes no reference to the ground. This represents the case for most common nouns, such as cat, dog, or rock. In 20b, the ground is included in the meaning of the expression but is not profiled. It is used only as a reference point for the purposes of isolating the entity described. This configuration describes a noun such as Tuesday in its deictic sense of I'll come on

64 Dimensions of construal

Tuesday, for example. The ground is a reference point because it provides the current point of time from which Tuesday can be calculated. In 20c, the ground is the profiled entity within the scope of predication of the expression. The expression designates (profiles) a grounded element. This configuration would describe a subject pronoun such as / for instance. The three stages of Figure 20 depict a scale of subjectivity of the ground. It is maximally subjective in 20a, because it is not invoked as part of the expression's meaning. It is construed more objectively in 20b, where it is part of the expression's meaning but not profiled, and it is maximally objective in 20c, where it is the profiled object of conceptualization. The viewing arrangement between the conceptualizer and the conceptualized entity has been shown to be syntactically very relevant (Langacker 1985, 1991). In Chapters four, five and seven, I show that the perspective imposed on the complement scene is the key element in explaining the distribution of infinitival and finite complements in modal, conceptualizing subject, and impersonal constructions. 2.4. Construal of French complements In order to at the same time recapitulate the different dimensions of construal relevant to multi-clause constructions, as well as preview the analysis developed in the upcoming chapters, this section presents French complementation at a level of abstraction which overlooks the differences observed in individual structures. This will help us to understand the issues clearly, and develop a vocabulary to talk about them efficiently. The specific constructions are considered in more detail in chapters three to seven. The overall conceptual picture of complementation is presented in Figure 21.

Construal of French complements 65 objective axis

> I aa

(A

Sp=speaker Sj=subjcct Q =conccptualizcr V|=vcrb CLj=clausc

Figure

21\

Complementation in conceptual terms

The outer rectangle CLi represents the sentence; Vi represents the main verb. The inner rectangle CL2 represents the complement structure, and V2 represents the subordinate verb. The dual role of the speaker, as a speaker and a conceptualize^ is illustrated by S and Co respectively. The dotted arrow going from Co to CLi indicates the direction of conceptualization. It illustrates the fact that the whole sentence represents the conceptualization of Co. As was indicated earlier, for the conceptualizing subject verbs, the subject acts as the conceptualizer of the complement scene. To accommodate these verbs, the dual role of the main clause subject as a subject and a conceptualizer is indicated by the S1/C1 notation. The trajector of the subordinate verb (the logical subject of that verb) is left unspecified in Figure 21, because its marking varies a lot from construction to construction. We have already seen that in the case of the conceptualizing subject verbs, the sentence contains two relevant conceptualizing relations. The first one occurs between the speaker and the conceptualization CLi. The second one occurs between the subject Ci and her conceptualization CL2. Since Co and Ci represent the vantage points from which their respective conceptualizations are structured, these construal relations can be thought of as two axes of viewing arrangement, along which different viewing configurations will be possible. These two axes are represented in the diagram by the two arrows outside CLi. The relation between the speaker and the sentence defines the subjective

66 Dimensions of construal

axis, because it contains the main conceptualizing subject. The relation existing between Ci and the complement CL2 defines the objective axis, because it occurs as part of the objective scene (the speaker's conceptualization). Obviously, the respective relevance of the two axes of viewing arrangement depends on the construction considered. The subjective axis will be especially relevant for speaker-oriented verbs, and the objective axis will be primarily be relevant for conceptualizing subject verbs. For example, in Chapter four, I show that the syntactic realization of the complements of modals reflects specific viewing configurations along the subjective axis. In Chapter five on the other hand, the difference between infinitival and finite complements following conceptualizing subject constructions is imputed to different viewing configurations along the objective axis. The different complement constructions under investigation in this monograph exhibit variations within this abstract template in two related areas. The first one is in the inner structure of the subordinate clause CL2, which can be in a finite mood (where V2 is in the indicative or the subjunctive mood) or infinitive (where V2 is in the infinitive mood). The second one is in the semantic role, syntactic function, and explicit mention of the trajector of the subordinate structure (left unspecified in Figure 21). In order to provide a global view of how each particular construction fits in that general frame, I will conclude this introductory chapter by previewing the analysis of the constructions developed in the following chapters. Chapter three explores the two constructions of causation/perception illustrated in (22)-(24). (22)

a. b.

Jean a fait pleurer Marie *Jean a fait Marie pleurer 'John made Mary cry'

(23)

a. b.

Jean a laisse pleurer Marie Jean a laisse Marie pleurer 'John let Mary cry'

Construal of French complements 67

(24)

a. b.

*Jean a force ävenir Marie Jean a force Marie a venir 'John forced Mary to come'

In these constructions, the infinitival complement can only be a bare infinitive. With faire 'make' in (22), the infinitive pleurer 'cry' must directly follow the main verb, and it must precede its logical subject Marie. The logical subject is also marked in the accusative. In this work, that construction is referred to as the W construction. With laisser 'let' in (23), W alternates with another construction, namely VOV, where the logical subject of the infinitive (Marie) directly follows the main verb, and it precedes the infinitive. With forcer 'force' in (24), VOV alone is possible. I argue that W and VOV represent two separate constructions, which each reflect a specific construal of the perceived/induced scene. That particular construal represents the meaning of each construction. The difference between the two constructions, i.e. the dimension of construal along which they present alternative choices, involves two related factors. The first one is how independently the complement clause is viewed with respect to the main clause. The second one is which element of the complement scene (the subordinate process itself or the logical subject of that process) is viewed as initially salient by the main subject. The distribution of W and VOV with the different main verbs results from the semantic compatibility between the verbs and the constructions. I show that the meaning of certain verbs {faire 'make' and forcer 'force') makes them strictly compatible with one construction ( W and VOV respectively), and incompatible with the other construction. Laisser 'let' and the perception verbs, on the other hand, are compatible with both constructions, the speaker's choice being determined by specific properties of the speech situation. Chapter four is concerned with the syntactic realization of the complement of modals. Although the complement of modals must be an infinitive, in certain cases, that infinitive can include the markers of

68 Dimensions of construal

aspect and voice. In other cases, it is impossible, as illustrated in (25) and (26). (25)

a. b.

(26)

a. b.

Jean doit comprendre 'John must understand' Jean doit avoir compris 'John must have understood' Marie sait nager 'Mary knows how to swim' *Marie sait avoir nage20 'Mary knows how to have swum'

The presence or absence of markers on the infinitive is shown to be determined by different viewing configurations along the subjective axis, and more precisely by the extent to which the speaker is present in the scope of predication of each modal (i.e. the specific force dynamic configuration coded by each modal). Chapter five investigates the infinitival/finite complement distribution in conceptualizing subject constructions. This distribution is illustrated in (27)-(29). (27)

a. b.

(28)

a. b.

Jean veut partir 'John wants to leave' *Jeant veut qu 'ilj parte 'Johni wants that hei leaves' Marie croit avoir compris 'Mary believes to have understood' Marie croit qu 'eile a compris 'Marie believes that she understood'

Construal of French complements 69

(29)

a. b.

*Jean voit avoir grossi 'John sees to have put on weight' Jean voit qu ΊΙ a grossi 'John sees that he put on weight'

Although most conceptualizing subject verbs follow the pattern of croire 'believe' in (28) and accept both infinitival and finite complements, the volition verbs in (27), and the perception verbs in (29) are respectively only felicitous followed by infinitival and finite complements. I argue that for all those conceptualizing subject verbs, the difference between infinitival and finite complements is imputable to different viewing configurations along the objective axis. In a nutshell, infinitival complements reflect a subjective construal of the complement clause, that is to say that the subordinate clause is construed internally, from the vantage point of the subordinate subject. A finite clause on the other hand is the sign of an objective construal of the complement scene (from the vantage point of Ci). As part of their lexical semantic organization, different verbs impose different kinds of viewing arrangement on their complement scene, and can therefore be followed by different complement forms. I show that the perception verbs impose an inherently objective construal on the complement scene, and in case of coreferentiality between the main and subordinate subjects are therefore solely compatible with finite complements. The volition verbs on the other hand impose an inherently subjective construal on the complement scene, and can only be followed by infinitival complements in case of coreferentiality. Most other verbs, however, are potentially compatible with both a subjective and an objective construal of the complement scene, and can therefore be followed by both infinitival and finite complements given the particularities of the speech situation. Chapter six considers the indicative/subjunctive alternation in conceptualizing subject constructions, some examples of which are given in (30)-(33), where IND stands for indicative, and SUB J for subjunctive.

70 Dimensions of construal

(30)

a. b.

Je remarque qu 'il est venu (IND) *Je remarque qu 'il soit venu (SUBJ) Ί notice that he came'

(31)

a. b.

Je crois qu 'il est venu (IND) *Je crois qu 'il soit venu (SUBJ) Ί believe that he came'

(32)

a. b.

*Je veux qu ΊΙ viendra (IND) Je veux qu 'il vienne (SUBJ) Ί want him to come'

(33)

a. b.

*Je suis content qu 'il est venu (IND) Je suis content qu 'il soit venu (SUBJ) Ί am happy that he came'

As the data in (30)-(33) indicate, certain verbs (perception, declaration, propositional attitude) can only be followed by indicative complements (in the positive form), while the verbs of volition and emotion reaction can only be followed by subjunctive complements. I argue that the meaning of both inflections is evaluated in terms of the kind of grounding it provides for the complement process, i.e. the way in which it relates that process to the speech situation. The indicative indicates that the complement is viewed relative to its position with respect to reality, and therefore independently accessible to the speaker or other conceptualizers. The subjunctive inflection, on the other hand, indicates that the process evoked by the subordinate verb is specifically conjured up to characterize the desires or emotional state of the main clause subject. Crucially, that process only exists in the mental space its conjuring up creates, and there is no access for the speaker independently from the relation existing between the subject and her desires or emotions. The import of the subjunctive inflection is therefore to set up the local mental space where the complement resides. Certain verbs are exclusively compatible with the indicative inflection, and invariably appear with indicative complements. Other

Construal of French complements 71

verbs are strictly compatible with the subjunctive inflection, and can therefore only be followed by subjunctive complements. Finally, some verbs are potentially compatible with both inflections. This is reflected syntactically by a great deal of synchronic, diachronic, and crosslinguistic variation in the choice of the complement. The distribution of French complements is compared to the situation in Spanish. Chapter seven investigates impersonal constructions illustrated in (34) and (35). (34)

a. b.

(35)

a. b.

II est important qu 'il vienne demain (SUBJ) 'It is important that he come tomorrow' II est necessaire qu 'eile parte (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that she leaves' II est possible qu 'il ait compris (SUBJ) 'It is possible that he has understood' II est certain qu 'eile est partie (IND) 'It is sure that she left'

Impersonal constructions are interesting because they share properties with both modal and CSC constructions. They are very close semantically to the modals, and like the modals, they can have both deontic and epistemic meaning, as illustrated in (34) and (35) respectively. Like CSC verbs however, they can be followed by finite complements, i.e. indicative in (35b) or subjunctive in (34a), (34b), and (35a). I argue that impersonal constructions are existential in nature, that is to say they pertain to the presence of events and propositions in someone's conception of reality. The impersonal pronoun il is shown to code the immediate scope of the existential predication, or in other words, the direct circumstances that allow the conceptualizer of the complement scene to make her statement concerning its presence in reality. Chapter eight summarizes the results, and briefly outlines avenues for further research.

72 Dimensions of construal

2.5. Summary This chapter has presented an overview of the different dimensions of construal along which the different French complement constructions will be evaluated. The meaning of a given construction is characterized by the specific way in which that construction structures its conceptual base. In order to preview that base, different cognitive models have been presented, which pertain to our conception of events, and how we observe them. These models included the billiard ball model, the stage model, the reference point model, and two models of reality. Most of these models are present, at least in some measure, in the conceptual base of all complement constructions. A specific dimension of construal concerns the dynamics of event integration, i.e. how single events combine with each other to form complex ones. Different complements have been shown to code events viewed at different levels of independence from the main event. Another dimension of construal concerns the perspective imposed on the conceptual scene, that is to say i) the vantage point from which the complement scene is conceptualized, and ii) the specific viewing arrangement existing between the subject and object of conceptualization (that is to say respectively the speaker or main subject and the complement clause). Finally, the global conceptual picture of French complementation was considered, at a level of abstraction that overlooks the differences found in individual constructions.

Chapter 3. Causation/perception constructions

This chapter shows how perceived differences in the objective scene result in the selection of two different constructions (henceforth referred to as W and VOV) with the verbs of causation and perception. The analysis accounts at the same time for the structural and distributional properties of the constructions. In the first part of the chapter, I show that the particular syntactic form of W and VOV reflects their meaning, to be understood in terms of the particular way in which each construction structures the perceived/induced scene. The second part of the chapter investigates the distribution of the constructions. It is shown that the distribution of W and VOV with the various main verbs is a matter of their semantic compatibility with those verbs. 3.1. Introduction French causation/perception structures are notoriously problematic for any linguistic theory, due to the issues they raise about the argument structure of the main predicate, and the syntactic coding of the lexical information contained in the embedded predicate. Let us briefly review the facts. The infinitival complement o f f a i r e 'make' must immediately follow the causative verb. The logical subject of the infinitive has to follow the infinitive, and it is usually marked in the accusative.21 The resulting W construction (post-verbal subject construction in Kayne (1975)) is illustrated in (36). (36)

a. b.

Marie fait pleurer Jean (VV) 'Mary makes John cry' *Marie fait Jean pleurer 'Mary makes John cry'

Following laisser 'let' and the perception verbs voir 'see', regarder 'watch', entendre 'hear', ecouter 'listen', sentir 'smell', W alternates

74 Causation /perception

constructions

with another construction, namely VOV, where the logical subject of the infinitive follows the infinitive. The possible occurrence of both constructions is illustrated in (37) and (38). (37)

a. b.

(38)

a. b.

Marie laisse pleurer Jean (W) 'Mary lets John cry' Marie laisse Jean pleurer (VOV) 'Mary lets John cry' Jean voil partir Marie ( W ) 'John sees Mary leave' Jean voil Marie partir (VOV) 'John sees Mary leave'

With other verbs expressing causation such as forcer 'force' or ob liger 'oblige', VOV alone is possible, as illustrated in (3 9).22 (39)

a. b.

*Marie force ά partir Jean ( W ) Marie force Jean ä partir (VOV)23 'John forces Mary to leave'

When the embedded infinitival complement is a transitive verb, its logical subject can be preceded by the preposition a 'to' as in (40a), or by the preposition par 'by' as in (40b). (40)

a. b.

Marie fait laver la voiture ά Jean (W) 'Mary makes John wash the car' Marie fait laver la voiture par Jean (W) 'Mary makes John wash the car'

Importantly, even though W and VOV can both be felicitous in certain circumstances, the two constructions are not semantically interchangeable. Kayne (1975: 232) calls the difference in meaning between the two a "difference in collusion and intentionality". He gives the following example (from Kayne 1975: 232):

Introduction

(41)

a. b.

75

Le gardien a laisse le prisonnier s 'echapper Le gardien a laisse s 'echapper le prisonnier 'The guard let the prisoner escape'

Kayne points out that in the sentence with VOV in (41a), the guard and the prisoner are in agreement about the escape, but that is not the case with W in (41b). Furthermore, with the perception verbs, he argues that the use of VOV involves more direct perception of the nominal object of perception (Marie in (38b) for example). The research on the structures illustrated in (36)-(41) has a long and distinguished tradition, but the overwhelming focus has been placed on the structure of W , to the detriment of the distribution of the constructions with the different main verbs, or the semantic differences between them. When these differences are noted at all, they are generally dismissed as surface phenomena, unrelated to the structural properties of the construction. For example, Quicoli (1976) argues that meaning differences such as those observed in (41) do not affect the truth conditions of the sentence, "but rather constitute aspects of meaning (parallel to 'focus' and 'presupposition') which are determined by properties of surface structure" (1976: Sect. I).24 The account proposed in this chapter takes a different approach, because it considers the form, the meaning, and the distribution of the constructions inseparable. Consistent with the principles presented in Chapters one and two, the analysis relies on the assumption that the surface form of an expression reflects a specific cognitive organization, and that syntactic differences are the manifestation of conceptual differences. Consequently, VV and VOV are treated as two separate constructions, each with its own specific meaning to be characterized in terms of the way in which each construction structures the induced/perceived scene. The difference in meaning between the two constructions is shown to involve two related factors, namely i) how independently the complement clause is viewed with respect to the main clause, and ii) which element of the complement scene (the process itself or the logical subject of that process) is viewed as initially salient by the main subject. The distribution of W and VOV with the

76 Causation /perception

constructions

different main verbs is shown to be strictly a matter of semantic compatibility between meaningful elements. Faire and forcer are shown to be highly compatible with W and VOV respectively, and incompatible with the other construction. Laisser and the perception verbs are shown to be compatible with both constructions, depending on specific semantic parameters. This chapter is structured in the following fashion: Section two presents some structural solutions to the problem, and shows why they are not satisfactory. Section three proposes a semantic characterization of W and VOV. Section four considers the distribution of the two constructions with the different main verbs. Section four is concerned with the distribution of a and par complements with faire, laisser, and the perception verbs. Section five discusses the results and concludes the chapter. 3.2. Structural solutions The emphasis placed on the structure of W is not surprising, because one of the necessary goals of any modern linguistic theory is to show how it successfully handles the structural aspects of problematic constructions. W is indeed problematic due to the less than obvious mapping between the semantics (or the argument structure) of the subordinate verb and the syntactic realization of the complement clause. The causee is perceived as the logical subject of the infinitive, but unlike other subjects in French, it occurs post-verbally and it is marked in the accusative. This discrepancy constitutes a difficulty for virtually any theory concerned with the mapping of semantic information into syntax. To give just one example, it poses a serious challenge to the standard Government Binding assumptions concerning Theta Theory and the projection of arguments from the lexicon to DStructure (Reed 1991). These structural properties of W , and the need to successfully account for them have driven research since Kayne's initial transformational account (Kayne 1969). Not only has W been much more studied than VOV, which does not present the same problems, but even within the study of post-verbal subjects, almost exclusive focus

Structural solutions 77

has been placed on faire, where the construction is obligatory. Although W also occurs following the perception verbs and laisser, it only does so optionally, and these verbs are seldom granted more than a passing comment in discussions of the construction. Note in passing that constructions with the par complements illustrated in (40) are commonly referred to as faire par constructions, even though they can also occur with other verbs. Furthermore, discussions of W are invariably called discussions of causatives, even though, as will be shown here, insight from perception would greatly benefit our understanding of the construction. Finally the term causative in the literature means structurally causative. This explains why verbs such as forcer or obliger, which cannot be followed by W are never mentioned in discussions of causatives. All these cues are taken as strong indications that the main drive of most current research has been structural, and that the distribution of the constructions with the different main verbs was considered far less important. The account presented here, by comparison, attends to both the structure and distribution of the constructions.25 Considering the plurality of the theoretical angles from which W has been considered, the consensus reached is quite remarkable. The basic insight is that sentences such as (36a) are the result of some kind of combination between the main and subordinate predicates or clauses.26 For a few accounts, that combination occurs in the semantics, where the argument structure of the embedded predicate fuses with that of the causative morpheme (Alsina 1992), but for most solutions, it occurs in the syntax. Syntactic accounts usually include an underlying level where the construction conforms to what we know about the word order and argument structure in the language, before the surface form is derived by some kind of manipulation. For example, in the initial generative position (Kayne 1969, 1975), the causee is base generated in its normal pre-verbal position at D structure, and receives its thematic role by the embedded predicate, before being derived by a causative transformation rule (predicate raising). Kayne's (1975) causative rule is given in (42) (From Kayne 1975: 207).

78 Causation / perception constructions

(42)

X faire NP V Y 1 2 3 4 5 6 —» 1 2 4 5 3 6

Relational Grammar (henceforth RG, Perlmutter and Postal 1977), Fauconnier (1983), Aissen and Perlmutter (1983), Gibson and Raposo (1986) draws on the same insight. W is produced by the rule of clause union which, according to Aissen and Perlmutter (1983): "makes all dependents of the embedded verbs into dependents of the matrix verb". Clause union is defined universally as follows (from Aissen and Perlmutter 1983: 379, [insertions in brackets mine], "If the complement is intransitive, the 1 [subject] of the complement verb becomes the 2 [direct object] of the matrix verb. If the complement is transitive, the 2 of the complement verb becomes the 2 of the matrix verb, and the 1 of the embedded verb becomes the 3 [indirect object] of the matrix verb." Clause union occurs if the main verb is marked in the lexicon as a trigger verb. Note that the generative and RG accounts are different. RG does not pose any transformation of the clause, but merely a kind of reorganization. However, they both share an underlying level of representation at which thematic relations are determined, and way of yielding the surface form from that underlying level. I will say very little about the structural solutions briefly mentioned here, because they basically do what they are designed to accomplish, namely produce the right surface forms. I obviously will not follow in that line of research, because cognitive linguistics in general and Cognitive Grammar in particular do not accept underlying levels of representation in linguistic analysis. The greater difficulties for most accounts of W come from the way in which they approach the distributional properties of the constructions. Two kinds of solutions have generally been proposed to account for the alternation following laisser and the perception verbs. The first one stipulates that the mechanisms which derive the surface form of W following faire occur optionally following laisser and the perception verbs. For example, in Kayne (1969), the causative rule occurs obligatorily following faire, and optionally following laisser. Similarly, in Relational Grammar, faire is

Structural solutions 79

marked in the lexicon as an obligatory trigger verb, and laisser as an optional trigger verb. The second type of solution does not posit an optional rule, but different underlying structures for faire on the one hand, and laisser and the perception verbs on the other hand. For example, in Kayne (1975), the causative rule is obligatory, but it can only occur when the main verb (index 2 in (42)) is followed by a sentential complement (a structure of the type V [§ NP V (NP) Y], Since faire only subcategorizes for a sentential complement, FI always occurs. On the other hand, laisser and the perception verbs are assigned two different deep structures, or in other words, they subcategorize for two different frames. These two frames are illustrated for laisser in (43). (43)

Laisser [ — S] [—NPS]

When laisser is followed by a sentential complement, FI always occurs. When it is followed by [—NP S], the subject of S is deleted by Equi NP deletion. The surface form of the W construction in (44a) is derived from the D-structure in (45 a). The surface form of the VOV construction in (44b) is derived from the D-structure in (45b). (44)

a. b.

Jean laisse pleurer Marie Jean laisse Marie pleurer 'John lets Mary cry'

(45)

a. b.

Jean laisse [$ Marie pleurer] [$ Jean laisse Mariej ellejpleure]]

The causative rule FI cannot apply to (45b) since its structural description stipulates only one NP between the main verb and the subordinate verb. With faire, its structural description is always met since the verb only subcategorizes for S. FI thus always occurs. The rule is therefore obligatory, but can only occur in cases where the verb subcategorizes for S.

80 Causation /perception

constructions

There have been numerous analyses of causative constructions in the generative tradition since Kayne's influential work (Rouveret and Vergnaud 1980, Burzio 1981, Rochette 1988, Rosen 1989, Reed 1991, 1992 inter alia), and these analyses reflect the increased sophistication of generative theories. However, for our purposes here, they invoke the same kinds of moves adopted in Kayne's solutions, namely either i) the assignment of one subcategorization frame for all causative verbs (faire, laisser and the verbs of perception), some type of rule (or movement), and a stipulation (in the syntax or the lexicon) which makes the application of the rule obligatory with faire and optional for the other verbs, or ii) the assignment of two different subcategorization frames for laisser and the perception verbs while faire only has one. The first type of solution is found in Rochette (1988), for instance, the second one in Rosen (1989) and Reed (1991). The differences between the analyses which posit two subcategorization frames mostly involve the structure of these frames (CP versus IP or VP versus small clause). Although interesting and important, these issues are not directly relevant to our purposes. What we are mostly concerned with is the kind of strategies by which the "optional" distribution of the W and VOV constructions following laisser and the verbs of perception are captured, and these strategies are basically similar to Kayne's. I will therefore not consider these more recent accounts in any further detail. Both the optional and the two frames accounts successfully match up certain lexical items with specific syntactic behaviors, but they fail to provide any motivation for these match ups. The optional trigger verbs are simply marked in the lexicon, as are the particular association of a given verb with a particular subcategorization frame (or frames). This lack of motivation yields three problems, the first two being closely related. First, they fail to explain why the two structures should alternate precisely following laisser and the verbs of perception. Second, they offer little insight into the possible motivations for the choice of one structure over the other when that choice is possible. For example, Kayne (1975) notices that the assignment of two different frames to W and VOV corroborates the meaning differences between the constructions presented in (41). He writes (1975: 232): "The assign-

Structural solutions 81

ment of distinct deep structures to pairs such as elle a laisse Jean partir (laisser NP—S), elle a laissi partir Jean (laisser —S) is not unnatural on semantic grounds, since the two constructions are, in fact, not necessarily synonymous". However, this corroboration seems almost accidental, because there is no systematic exploration of the relation between the frames and the specific meaning they convey. Third, by making the selectional restrictions necessary to handle laisser and the perception verbs a lexical characteristic of the main verb—it is the main verb which is marked as a trigger verb or subcategorizes for a specific frame— they are not equipped to capture the fact that certain verbs (the reflexive/middle among others) are often infelicitous in the W construction. For example, compare (46) with (47). (46)

a. b.

J'ai entendu les en/ants crier (VOV) J'ai entendu crier les enfants ( W ) Ί heard the children scream'

(47)

a. b.

J'ai entendu les enfants se disputer (VOV) ??J'ai entendu se disputer les enfants ( W ) Ί heard the children argue'

Entendre presumably has the same selectional properties in (46) and (47). However, only (47a) is felicitous. This means that the analysis of the complement structure cannot solely rely on the lexical properties of the main verb, but that other elements, including the nature of the infinitival process, must also be considered. The account presented here faces none of these difficulties. By focusing on the meaning of the constructions, it explains why they alternate precisely following laisser and the perception verbs. It also allows us to motivate the use of a given construction in a particular context. Finally, complement selection is not a lexical property of the main verb, but the expression of the necessary semantic compatibility between the component parts of the construction. The difference between (46) and (47) can therefore be explained by the different fit of

82 Causation /perception

constructions

the verbs crier and se disputer with W . The first step in the analysis is to investigate the meaning of both constructions. 3.3. VOV and W : different construals on the same base The semantic import of VOV and W can be characterized by analyzing the specific construal the constructions impose on their common base. In causation and perception alike, the main verb profiles the relation existing between its trajector (the initiator or perceiver) and a situation in the world (used as a default case for any mental space). That situation typically includes a subordinate process, namely the process being perceived or induced, and the participants in that process. The main participant in the subordinate process is the logical subject of that process. The difference between the causation and perception verbs pertains to the main subject's responsibility towards the complement scene. The perception verbs profile the perceptual contact between their subject and the complement scene. The causative verbs {faire and forcer) profile the instigation of the complement process by the main clause subject. Note that even though laisser is usually considered a causative verb, it is similar to the perception verbs in that its subject merely acts as a potential agent. It has the possibility of preventing the causee from performing the infinitival process, but elects not to do so. A process in the world involving some participants), induced or perceived by the main clause subject, represents the base relative to which the meaning of W and VOV gets established. VOV and W structure that base in alternative ways. In order to fully understand these alternative construals, it is important to bear in mind two aspects of verbal complementation pointed out by Givon (1980, 1990) and presented in Chapter two: The first one is that the syntactic realization of the complement may be determined by the conceptual relation which binds it to the main verb. The second one is that the markings on the subordinate clause correlate with the degree to which the event coded in that clause approximates an independent event. I will show here that W and VOV represent different stages in the

VOV and W: different construals 83

coding of the complement scene as an independent event. I will then investigate the conceptual reasons for that difference in coding. 3.3.1. Construal and event structure Any semantic definition of the constructions has to be compatible with what we know of their structures. It is clearly attested in the literature that W is monoclausal, and VOV biclausal. Since these facts are largely uncontroversial, I will only briefly illustrate them with arguments from clitic placement and embedded negation.271 will then show how that structural information is relevant semantically. In French, clitics must precede the verbs to which they are dependent. When cliticization occurs in a monoclausal construction, the clitics are placed directly in front of the matrix verb, since all the terms are dependent on that verb. When cliticization occurs in a biclausal structure, the clitics must be placed in front of the embedded verb, since they are arguments of that verb. The cliticization facts with W are clearly indicative of monoclausality, as illustrated in (48). (48)

a. b. c.

Je fais venir Jean (W) Ί make John come' *Je fais le venir Je le fais venir Ί make him come'

The direct object clitic le in (48) needs to be placed directly before the matrix verb, thus indicating that it is dependent on that verb. The same cliticization facts argue in favor of the biclausality of VOV. Consider the difference between a VV construction in (49), and a VOV construction in (50).

84 Causation / perception constructions

(49)

a. b. c.

(50)

a. b. c.

II laisse manger la pomme a Paul ( W ) 'He lets eat the apple by Paul' II la lui laisse manger *Il la laisse lui manger 'He lets him eat it' II laisse Paul manger la pomme (VOV) 'He lets Paul eat the apple' II le laisse la manger *// le la laisse manger 'He lets him eat it'

In (49), both clitics representing the direct object la pomme (la) and the logical subject of the infinitive Paul (lui) are placed in front of the matrix verb. Cliticization provides different results in (50). The clitic la (for the direct object of the complement structure) does not depend on the matrix verb. This is visible by its position in front of the infinitive in (50b), and the impossibility of placing it in front of the matrix verb in (50c). The case of the clitics strengthens the argument in favor of the monoclausality of W and the biclausality of VOV. In W in (49), the direct object of the embedded predicate (la pomme) is marked as an accusative (la), and the logical subject of the embedded predicate (Paul) is marked as a dative (lui). These facts are consistent with the application of clause union. On the other hand, in VOV in (50), the logical subject of the complement structure (Paul) is not the indirect object, but the direct object of the matrix verb. This is shown in (15b) by the accusative case of the clitic le. Embedded negation provides additional evidence of the monoclausality of W and the biclausality of VOV. Moore (1991) notes that the possibility of getting a negation in the embedded clause is a sign that the construction is biclausal. The negation facts in (51) and (52) constitute further evidence that W is monoclausal, and VOV biclausal. (51)

On a laisse Jean ne pas manger sa soupe (VOV) 'Someone let John not eat his soup'

VOV and W: different construals 85

(52)

*0n a laisse ne pas manger sa soupe ä Jean ( W ) 'Someone let John not eat his soup'

Structural information is not primarily semantic, but it does provide important insight into the meaning of the constructions. We have already indicated, based on work by Givon (1980, 1990), Haiman (1985), Langacker (1991) inter alia, that the schematic value of a clause is to present a single independent event, with the verb of the clause profiling that event. On the basis of the structural evidence, I claim that as a monoclausal construction, W construes the scene as one single event, whereas VOV construes it as two events. Following Givon's criteria presented in Chapter two, we can say that W and VOV represent different degrees of independence of the complement process. With W , the subordinate process is fully integrated into the main process to form a complex verb, and its argument (its logical subject) an argument of that complex verb. The construction therefore only presents one event. With VOV, the subordinate process is viewed as an independent event. [VO] (the main verb followed by the logical subject of the infinitive) represents the main event, and [V] (the subordinate process) another event. Taking J'ai vu Marie courir Ί saw Mary run' as an example, J'ai vu Marie Ί saw Mary' represents the seeing event. Courir represents another event. Evidence in favor of that position comes from the fact that in the VOV construction, the perception of an entity doing something necessarily entails the perception of that entity (Schwartze 1974, Lemhagen 1979, Willems 1983). To keep the same example, J'ai vu Marie courir entails J'ai vu Marie. This is illustrated in (53) and (54). The context of (53) and (54) is the following: I know that Mary is running in a race. I watched every runner go by, but I did not see (recognize) Mary. I know that I must have seen her run because I saw every runner pass in front of me. In that context, VOV construction in (53) is not possible. Note that VV is not subject to the same constraint, as attested by the felicity of (54).

86 Causation / perception constructions

(53)

*J'ai du voir Marie courir, mats eile allait si vite que je ne I 'ai pas vue! (VOV) Ί must have seen Mary run, but she was going so fast I did not see her!'

(54)

J'ai dü voir courir Marie, mais eile allait si vite que je ne I'ai pas vue! (W) Ί must have seen Mary run, but she was going so fast I did not see her!'

Example (53) is infelicitous because in VOV, Marie is the object of the seeing event, which is explicitly denied in the second part of the sentence. The analysis of W as a complex monoclausal structure is common to most treatments of causatives, but the account presented here is original in that the formation of a complex predicate does not invoke underlying levels of linguistic organization. In the following sections, I show that W is the result of a very specific profile assignment, and that consequently, the formation of a complex predicate can be successfully explained in terms of the cognitive operations necessary to impose that profile on the base. These operations are quite simple, if one considers the flexibility of our conceptual apparatus, and the ease with which alternative construals of a situation involving participants can be achieved. Furthermore, the cognitive operations posited for W are independently attested for other constructions. 3.3.2. Conceptual flexibility and grammatical constructions The relation profiled by the main verb can be viewed as the kind of contact established with the complement scene by some conceptualizer. Contact is generally established with a particular entity of the scene, which will be called "salient".28 In the case of W and VOV, the infinitival process as a whole and the main participant in that process (the logical subject of the infinitive) are in direct competition for initial salience, i.e. the point at which conceptual contact is established with

VOV and W: different construals 87

the complement scene. I claim here that the linguistic coding of the complement scene as W or VOV depends on which of these two entities is initially salient. The preliminary exploration of these notions is restricted to vision, because it is particularly clear in that domain that W and VOV are among four constructions which represent the conventionalized coding of specific configurations of relative salience between the infinitival process and its logical subject. It will become clear very soon, however, that the analysis can naturally be extended to the other senses and causation. The prototypical object of vision is a thing (in the technical CG sense), but things can always be considered against the background of some activity or process, even if that process is merely standing still. In the situations where that background is not particularly relevant, it has minimum salience, and is therefore not explicitly mentioned. The participant alone, or object of seeing, is salient. The resulting transitive construction is presented in (55). (55)

J'ai vu Paul Ί saw Paul'

In (55), Paul is the object of seeing. The activity he is involved in is in the background, with a minimum degree of salience. The transitive construction illustrated in J'ai vu Paul is represented in Figure 22.

Figure 22\ Profiled participant: transitive construction In Figure 22, the subject ( j ' ) is the primary figure in the relation profiled by the verb, and thus identified as elaborating the trajector of that verb. The participant in the complement scene (Paul) is the secondary figure in the relation profiled by the main verb. It is thus identified as

88 Causation /perception

constructions

the landmark of that verb. The activity the participant is involved in is not profiled. The scenario presented in (55) has been argued to present the purest perceptual relation (D'Andrade 1987), but several other cases are also possible. For instance, the reverse situation can occur, where the complement process itself as a whole (the activity) is the object of the perception verb, and the participant in that process has minimum salience. The resulting bare infinitive construction is presented in (56). (56)

J'ai regards jouer Ί watched play'

In (56), the process of jouer as a whole is salient, and thus recognized as the object of the main verb. The subordinate process necessarily involves participants, since jouer is not an impersonal verb, but these participants have minimum salience and they are not explicitly mentioned.29 The bare infinitive construction illustrated in J'ai regards jouer is presented in Figure 23.

tr

Im

Figure 23: Profiled process: bare infinitive construction In Figure 23, the subordinate process itself (jouer) is the secondary figure in the relation profiled by the main verb, and thus identified as the landmark of that verb. The participant in the complement process does not have individual salience, and it is therefore not profiled. The transitive construction and the bare infinitive construction present straightforward cases of profile assignment, because only one entity is in profile. In that sense, these two constructions can be viewed as the two endpoints of a continuum of perceptual salience between the infinitival process and the participant involved in that process. VOV

VOV and W: different construals 89

and W represent intermediate cases, where both participant and infinitival process are in profile. The difference between the two constructions rests on which entity of the complement scene is initially salient. In VOV, the main participant in the subordinate process and that process as a whole are both in profile, but the participant has initial salience, and is therefore recognized as the primary landmark of the profiled relation. The process that participant is involved in is recognized as a secondary landmark of that relation. The main verb therefore has two complements. One is the participant, the other the process as a whole. The VOV construction illustrated in (38b) Jean voit Marie partir is presented in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Participant and process in profile: VOV VOV in Figure 24 has the semantic structure described in Langacker (1991: 410). Its trajector is the perceiver/causer, its primary landmark is the trajector of the subordinate process; and that process, taken as a whole, functions as a secondary landmark. The trajector and the primary landmark are elaborated by nominals respectively identified as subject and direct object. The secondary landmark is elaborated by an infinitival complement. Taking (38b), Jean voit Marie partir as an illustration, the main clause subject Jean elaborates the trajector of the perception verb. The logical subject of the infinitive Marie elaborates the primary landmark of that verb. The infinitival process partir functions as a secondary landmark to the perception verb.30 The particularity of W is that the construction involves the focal "readjustment" of the elements of the base. The process itself has initial salience, but the participant subsequently becomes salient. In terms of the analysis presented here, that readjustment can be analyzed as two

90 Causation /perception constructions

successive cognitive operations of secondary figure (landmark) assignment. First, in a way similar to the bare infinitive construction, the complement process as a whole is recognized as the landmark of the main verb, while the participant in that process remains unprofiled. The result of that cognitive operation is the formation of a complex verb. Secondly, in a way similar to the transitive construction, the participant in the subordinate process is recognized as the landmark of that complex verb. This analysis is consistent with the data presented in (54), which show that the logical subject of the infinitive is not the object of the main verb. Recall that Je vois courir Marie does not necessarily entail Je vois Marie. The felicity of (54) is easily explained by the fact that in W , Marie is only profiled as the landmark of the complex verb voir courir. This account also allows us to capture the insight of Hatcher (1944: 284), who gives the following description of W following verbs of vision when they profile someone's appearance on a stage. "With A vit entrer B, it is the activity which first strikes the attention. A is aware first that someone made an appearance, that something has suddenly entered his range of vision—and then does he recognize the entrant". Hatcher goes on to say that W simply leaves us with the picture of an entity, while the activity which accompanied its coming on stage has disappeared. The focal readjustment posited for W precisely represents the shift in salience described by Hatcher. W is illustrated in Figure 25. The two figures in Figure 25 (marked as 1 and 2) represent the two consecutive cognitive operations needed to perform the focal readjustment required by the construction. They represent the compositional path (Langacker 1991) of the construction.

VOVand W: different construals 91

Ο tr

OVRT tr

Im

QW Im

Figure 25: Focal readjustment: W During the first cognitive operation, W takes a process as a complement but does not give particular focal status to a participant. The landmark of the perception/causation verb is the infinitival process; the participant in that process is not profiled. The choice of the subordinate process as the landmark during the first cognitive operation represents the derivation of a complex verb. As the result of a second cognitive operation, the logical subject of the infinitive is recognized as the landmark of the complex verb, and thus identified as the direct object of that verb. Taking (38a) Jean voit partir Marie as an illustration, during the first cognitive operation, the infinitive partir elaborates the landmark of the perception verb voir, and thus derives the complex verb voir pleurer. During the second cognitive operation, the nominal Jean elaborates the landmark of that complex verb, and is therefore marked as a direct object. Despite its specific structure, W is not cognitively different from the other constructions. It merely represents the linguistic coding of one possible configuration of relative salience between the subordinate process and the participant in that process. The other constructions complete the inventory of possibilities. The formation of a complex verb is not mysterious. It simply represents a convenient way of referring to situations where the main and subordinate processes are so conceptually close (to be explored throughout the chapter) that for all intents and purposes, they can be viewed as different parts of some complex process. The most seemingly surprising trait of W , namely

92 Causation /perception

constructions

the focal readjustment imposed on the complement scene, is cognitively very plausible. Even in a situation where the process itself may have initial salience, it is very hard to ignore its main participant altogether. The recognition of the logical subject of the infinitive as the landmark of the complex process acknowledges its intrinsic salience. That salience explains that the participant can only be left unprofiled under very specific conditions, as attested by the severe constraints placed on the bare infinitive construction (Achard 1993). The focal readjustment of W is thus best viewed as the natural recognition of the salience of a participant in a process, in a situation where the process itself is initially more salient. Note that under this analysis, the profile of W is very similar to that of a transitive clause. The result is fully consistent with Kemmer and Verhagen's (1994) claim that a transitive clause constitutes the conceptual template relative to which the causative of intransitives is formed. The difference in profile between W and VOV, and the difference in the event structure of the two constructions have been introduced separately for expository convenience, but the two notions are obviously intricately connected. The two aspects of the meaning of the constructions come together when one considers their respective treatment of the logical subject of the infinitive. In VOV, the participant in the complement process has initial salience, and it is profiled as playing two different roles in two separate events. It is at the same time the object of the main verb (the primary landmark of the main relation), and the main participant in the subordinate event (the trajector of the subordinate relation). I would like to propose that the main reason for the initial salience of the participant is its role as the generator (the energy source) of the subordinate event. The importance of the agentive role of the logical subject of the infinitive with VOV will be considered in details for causatives in Section 3, but I would like to mention at this point that part of what makes VOV a two event construction is precisely the fact that the logical subject of the infinitive is construed as the energy source which generates or at least sustains the infinitival process. It is the presence of that separate energy source which validates the construal of the complement scene as an independ-

VOV and W: different construals 93

ent event. For example, in J'ai vu Marie courir, the construal of Marie as the energy source of the running process explains its initial salience, but it also validates the construal of the running event as an independent event. W profiles only one event, which includes both the main and subordinate processes into a single complex form. The logical subject of the infinitive is not construed as the main participant in the subordinate process, but as the object of the complex verb (a theme in Langacker's 1991 classification). The absence of a separate energy source prevents the complement scene from being construed as an independent event, and explains its integration in the main event. 3.4. Main verbs and complement structures This section attempts to clarify the notion of initial salience. I will show that the initial salience of a given entity of the complement scene is determined by a fine interplay between the meaning of the main verb (Givon 1980), the nature of the subordinate process, and the qualities of the main participant(s) in that process. Since initial salience amounts to a comparison between the infinitival process and its logical subject, characteristics of these two entities will bear on the outcome. However, the lexical semantics of the verbs of perception and causation respectively orient our focus more specifically toward the process and the participant. Perception and causation are therefore presented separately. 3.4.1. The perception verbs In the perception domain, the processes which are the most initially salient are those which can be instantly recognized, without any need for their source to be identified. This instant recognition allows the subordinate process to form a tight semantic unit with the main verb, easily accessible as a well-established perceptual routine. To be more specific, a process tends to be initially salient if its conceptual content

94 Causation / perception constructions

almost exclusively pertains to the sense evoked by the main verb. This is illustrated in (57) and (58). (57)

a. b.

(58)

a. b.

J 'at entendu crier Marie ( W ) Ί heard Mary scream' ? ?J 'ai entendu cuisiner Marie (W) Ί heard Mary cook' J'ai vupartir Paul ( W ) Ί saw Paul leave' ??J'ai vu nettoyer Paul ( W ) Ί saw Paul clean'

Examples (57) and (58) show that crier 'scream' and partir 'leave' can easily be used in W with entendre and voir respectively, but cuisiner 'cook' and nettoyer 'clean up' are usually not felicitous with the same verbs. Examples (57) and (58) illustrate the difference between the verbs which describe basic sensory experiences (crier 'scream', parier 'speak', chanter 'sing\ partir 'leave') and other verbs, which denote material activities (laver 'wash', nettoyer 'clean', cuisiner 'cook'). The meaning of the verbs of sensory experience almost exclusively pertains to the impression they leave on the main subject's perceptual field (auditory in (57a), visual in (58a)). They are therefore instantly recognized, even before their source can be localized. Even if we can ultimately identify the person who screamed, the scream itself has initial salience. The initial salience of the process in (57a) and (58a) explains the formation of the complex verb, and therefore the felicity of W . The verbs of material activity on the other hand tend to describe processes which involve the use of machines or instruments (as in (57b) and (58b)). These processes can also be seen or heard, but their meaning does not exclusively pertain to the perception they evoke. In particular, the location of their source is central to the identification of the process. The difference between the verbs of sensory perception and material activity is clear. A scream can easily be recognized, even if

Main verbs and complement structures 95

its source is not identified. A cooking episode is not so easily recognized, unless the cook itself is identified. For example, if I enter a kitchen where cooking implements are obviously displayed, I may assume that cooking is potentially going on, but in the absence of someone cooking, I cannot identify the cooking process with certainty (I might simply have entered a messy kitchen). The verbs of material activity do not form as tight a semantic unit with the perception verbs, because the initial salience of their logical subject (provided by their role in the generation of the activities they present) is too difficult to bypass. Consequently, in the situations described by (57) and (58), VOV is preferred, because it recognizes the agentive role (and therefore the initial salience) of the logical subject of the infinitive. This is shown in (59) and (60). (59)

J'ai vu Marie cuisiner (VOV) Ί saw Mary cook'

(60)

J'ai vu Paul nettoyer (VOV) Ί saw Paul clean up'

This analysis is consistent with the observation of Hatcher (1944), who notes that the most frequent processes in a W perceptual (visual) structure are those which denote the entry of their subject on stage. As frequently attested examples of subordinate processes in the W construction she gives the following: voir entrer 'see come in', voir sortir 'see leave', voirparaitre 'see appear'. The felicity of the verbs of sensory experience with W does not mean that these verbs can only be used with that construction. If for any reason (which will be considered later with laisser), the logical subject of the infinitive is viewed as the initially salient entity in the complement scene, VOV is perfectly felicitous, as illustrated in (61): (61)

J'ai encore entendu ton reveil sonnerpendant une heure! (VOV) Ί heard your alarm clock ring for one hour again!'

96 Causation /perception

constructions

It is interesting to note that the constraints placed on the kind of processes which can be used in W are the strongest in cases of direct immediate perception, i.e. when one current instance of the subordinate process is being perceived. Voir has two senses in which it does not present immediate perception, namely "summarizing" and "auxiliary" voir. With summarizing voir, the subject either evokes simultaneous occurrences of a process and analyzes them as belonging to the same type, or she recalls previous experiences of the process and invokes them together. Auxiliary voir does not present perception per se, but a more mental kind of conceptualization (Chocheyras 1968, Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot 1984). In both cases, virtually any process can occur with W . For example, the verbs of material activity are perfectly felicitous with W . Compare the direct perception sense in (62) with the summarizing sense in (63). (62)

??Il a vu cuisiner Marie ( W ) 'He sees Mary cook'

(63)

II a vu cuisiner tous les grand chefs d'avant guerre ( W ) 'He saw all the great pre-war chefs cook'

Similarly, reflexive and middle verbs are not usually felicitous in W with perception verbs, because the se marker makes reference to the participants in the process, which makes it more difficult for the verb to be readily part of a complex process (Achard 1993). This is illustrated in (64). With summarizing voir however, they pose no difficulty, as illustrated in (65). (64)

?? Ce matin, j 'ai vu s 'installer mes voisins ( W ) 'This morning I saw my neighbors settle down'

(65)

Chaque matin, il voyait s 'eveiller son enfant et il souriait (W) 'Every morning, he would see his child wake up and he would smile'

Main verbs and complement structures 97

In the same way, the constraints previously observed on W do not apply to auxiliary voir either, as illustrated in (66) and (67). (66)

Dans ces circonstances, on a vu s 'enerver meme les plus calmes/ (W) 'In such circumstances even the calmest people can be seen to get nervous'

(67)

Personne η 'a interet a voir se developper un systeme anarchique (W) 'No one has any interest in seeing an anarchist system develop'

The loosening of the constraints on W with summarizing and auxiliary voir is fully consistent with the analysis proposed here. The formation of a complex verb depends on the creation of a tight semantic unit between the main verb and the infinitival process, and thus the instant recognition of that process. That recognition is expectedly the most difficult in cases of immediate perception, where one single occurrence of the process is perceived. The cognitive operations of recollection and evaluation of multiple instances of the infinitival process invoked by summarizing voir strengthen the connection between that process and the main verb (as well as minimize the perceptual impact of the participant), which explains why virtually any verb can be felicitously used in W . When the main verb does not involve perception per se, but a more mental kind of conceptualization, as in (66) and (67), instant recognition is obviously not an issue. 3.4.2. Causation: energy source analysis So far, we have mostly concentrated on the conditions which render the infinitival process initially salient. In order to understand the distribution of W and VOV with causative verbs, we need to explore further the conditions which make the logical subject of the infinitive (the causee) initially salient. It was briefly mentioned earlier that in VOV, the participant in the complement scene is the most salient figure

98 Causation / perception constructions

in that scene, because it is construed as the energy source which generates (or at least sustains) the infinitival process. That aspect of the construction is more specifically relevant when the main verb is a causative verb, because in that case, the main subject is often also an energy source with respect to the whole clause. When a scene is coded by VOV, it is conceived as having two separate energy sources generating two separate activities, since the main and subordinate processes are kept separate. As an example, consider the sentence Mary forced John to run. The primary source of energy comes from Mary, the subject of the causative verb. The secondary source comes from John, the subject of the infinitive. What VOV encodes is the control exerted by the primary source of energy over the secondary source. The subordinate process is performed by its own subject, but it is induced by the subject of the causative verb. When a scene is represented by W , it is conceived as having only one energy source, since the logical subject of the infinitive is treated as an object of the complex verb. The construction encodes the perception or induction by the main subject of the event as a whole, and not the initiating role of the logical subject of the infinitive in that event. The key point in the initial salience of the causee (and therefore in the distribution of W and VOV) is its capacity of being considered a valid energy source for the infinitival process. Note that this is consistent with the statement made earlier that in VOV, the logical subject of the complement process is at the same time the object of the main verb, and the generator of the complement process (subject-like). The more agentive the causee is with respect to the infinitival process, the more difficult it is to construe it as a mere object with respect to the main structure, and thus the greater the difficulty of using W . We are now in a position to consider the distribution of W and VOV with causative verbs. In the following sections, I show that the lexical semantics offaire and forcer present a perfect fit with VV and VOV respectively, while laisser is compatible with both constructions.

Main verbs and complement structures 99

3.4.2.1. Faire and W Faire is a very widely used verb in French, and a detailed analysis of its lexical semantics is well beyond the scope of this chapter. I will merely point out the facets of its meaning which most directly pertain to its being analyzed as a perfect semantic fit with W . With an inanimate object, faire profiles the bringing into existence of that object. This is illustrated in (68) and (69). (68)

Jean a fait un gateau 'John made a cake'

(69)

A la plage, on fait des chateaux de sable One makes sand castles at the beach'

In (68) and (69), the subject is a full fledged agent. It is completely responsible for the creation of the object profiled in the complement. Depending on the nature of the object, the subject of faire can also be responsible for a certain type of activity. (70)

A la maison, c 'est papa qui fait le menage 'At home, it's daddy who does the housework'

The meaning of faire in (70) does not involve the creation of an object, but the subject's responsibility for the accomplishment of a certain activity. The subject is still an agent, who exercises a certain amount of energy towards the completion of an activity. The meaning offaire in W is similar to that of the verb in (70). In (71) and (72) for instance, the subject of faire is an agent, the highly dominant force with respect to the infinitival process regardless of the agentivity of the causees. (71)

Marie fait danser Paul (W) 'Mary makes Paul dance'

100 Causation / perception constructions

(72)

Sort pere fait itudier Marie (W) 'Her father makes Mary study'

In (71) and (72), the causees are all humans, and could thus be considered a valid energy source for the generation of the infinitival process. However, they are treated as objects of the complex verb. A possible analysis of the meaning offaire in W based on the examples above could claim that the energy coming from the main subject combines with (and possibly overrides) the energy coming from the causee. Such an analysis however would not adequately account for the examples in (73) and (74), where the main subjects are inanimates and therefore not agents in the prototypical sense of the term. (73)

La fumee fait tousser Jean ( W ) 'Smoke makes John cough'

(74)

Ce livre a fait reflechir Marie (W) 'This book made Mary think'

In these examples, the notion of combining force is not central. The subjects cannot be considered energy sources per se. Certain properties they possess simply trigger the occurrence of the infinitival process. Even though Mary in (74) definitely performs the act of thinking, that process is triggered by the main subject. This type of situation prototypically occurs with psychological or physiological verbs. The causee is not construed as engaged in a mental act, but as responding to outside stimulus. The psychological or physiological process is viewed as a potential operation, stored up in the mind or body, and waiting to be unleashed.31 If the subjects in (73) and (74) are not agents, they are nonetheless responsible for the occurrence of the subordinate process. The notion of full responsibility of the subject for the occurrence of the complement process is present in all instances of faire, and thus represents an important feature of the context-free meaning of the verb (see Chapter one, Section 1.2.1.3). It is that feature which directly motivates the use offaire in the W construction.

Main verbs and complement structures 101

The cases involving force, which could be considered prototypical of faire in a causative construction, constitute manner-specific variations of the more schematic notion of subject responsibility for the complement scene. Faire presents a perfect semantic fit with W , because the responsibility of the subject for the occurrence of the complement process gives the main verb the highest possible level of binding strength toward the subordinate process (Givon 1980, 1990), and therefore provides the closest possible bond between the two verbs. Regardless of its own lexical semantics, the infinitival process is tightly connected to the main verb by virtue of being directly induced by the subject of that verb. In other words, the infinitival process is always initially salient, because faire is inherently tied to the realization of the subordinate process, not to the participant's role in generating that process.32 The lack of recognition of the agentive role of the causee also accounts for the infelicity of faire with VOV, because the verb cannot provide the direct interaction between the two energy sources required by the construction. The purely object-like status of the causee with faire is incompatible with a causee's dual role in VOV.33 3.4.2.2. Forcer and VOV The use offorcer with an inanimate object necessarily implies that that object is somehow designed to prevent the subject from performing a certain activity. This is illustrated in (75)-(77). (75)

Le voleur a force la serrure 'The thief forced the lock'

(76)

La voiture a force le barrage de police 'The car broke through the police blockade'

(77)

*Il a force la boite de conserve pour priparer son diner 'He forced the can to prepare his dinner'

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constructions

In (75), the function of the lock is to prevent illegal entry. In (76), the function of a police blockade is to stop cars. The use of forcer is felicitous because the subject overrides the resistance placed in her way with the purpose of stopping her. Even though the can in (77) might be more difficult to open than the lock in (75), it was not designed to stop anyone's progress. The lack of built-in resistance makes the use of forcer infelicitous. The meaning offorcer involves direct interaction (pressure) between the subject and the object. Inanimate objects do not have any choice. They resist as long as their structure allows them to, and then break. Animates have more flexibility. They can change direction, adjust their behavior to elude difficulties. Animates can also be made to go in different directions. I contend that the force dynamic organization of the verb is similar when it is used in a causative construction, but that the focus of attention is moved to the result complement process. The important point is that the direct contact between the subject and the object (here between the subject of the matrix verb and the causee) is preserved. Furthermore, the causee must be able to generate and control the infinitival process, which accounts for the well-known fact that it is generally animate. The necessary control of the complement process makes forcer quite different from faire, as the data in (78) and (79) show. (78)

Jean a fait rire Marie 'John made Mary laugh'

(79)

*Jean a force Marie a rire 'John forced Mary to laugh'

Example (78) shows that forcer cannot appear with all types of complements. All the spontaneous reaction verbs, such as laugh, cry, faint, etc., whose occurrence is beyond the subject's control are normally excluded except in situations where these processes are expected to be controlled, such as in the stage directions given to an actor for instance.

Main verbs and complement structures 103

The subject of the infinitive must be capable of deliberately initiating the infinitival process, even if she is forced to do so. With forcer, as was the case with faire, an overriding force analysis is tempting. One could easily say that the main subject applies pressure to another entity to perform a process which that entity must generate by itself. However, such an analysis could not account for (80) and (81), where the subjects offorcer are inanimates. (80)

Les travaux sur I 'autoroute ont forci Jean ά faire un d0tour (VOV) 'The road work on the freeway forced John to take a detour'

(81)

La situation economique a force Marie a renoncer ä ses vacances (VOV) 'The economic situation forced Mary to cancel her vacation'

The examples in (80) and (81) do not involve force per se. The road work and the economic situation present the motivation for an action taken by the subject of the infinitival process. An important aspect of the meaning of forcer is that its subject makes it necessary for the causee to act in a certain way. In other words, forcer obligatorily involves a strong interaction between the main subject and the causee which, as a result of the interaction, must reluctantly initiate the infinitival process. That interaction between subject and object, as well as resistance on the part of the object, are part of the context-free meaning offorcer (that is to say outside the VOV construction). The natural fit of forcer with VOV is clear. The causee is always initially salient, because it is invariably recognized as the energy source of the subordinate process. It is therefore naturally coded by the construction best suited to recognize that salience. Similarly, forcer is infelicitous with VV, because that construction does not recognize the infinitival subject as an energy source. The respective meanings offorcer and VOV also motivate the use of the preposition a in the construction. Recall from Chapter two (section 2.3.3) that according to Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shildkrot (1995: 367),

104 Causation /perception

constructions

the notion of a path toward a goal central to the meaning of ά. The figure is construed to follow a path to the ground via the process designated by the main verb. With forcer, the causee's path towards the infinitival process needs to be made specific, because it is not naturally initiated by the causee, but induced by the main subject. Furthermore, an important aspect of the meaning of ά involves the active application with which the subject carries out the infinitival process. That facet of the meaning of the preposition is fully compatible with the agentive role of the causee in VOV. Even though the causee is being induced to act, it nonetheless must act volitionally, with full conscience of what engaging in the subordinate process entails. Note importantly that the meaning of ά explains why the preposition can only be present with forcer and VOV. With W , the infinitival process is incorporated as part of a complex verb, and thus not viewed as the endpoint of a path. With laisser and VOV, the causee does not exhibit the necessary active application towards the infinitival process.34 Even though she can be viewed as a valid energy source to the infinitival process, the causee may not be aware that she is involved in that process, and can therefore not be said to be actively applying herself to its realization. This can be illustrated for example in Marie α laissä Jean dormir 'Mary let John sleep', where John is not actively applying himself toward sleeping. Only the verbs which demand a conscious effort on the causee's part (forcer or obliger) can felicitously occur with a. 3.4.2.3. W/VOV alternation following laisser Consistent with the previous observations pertaining to faire, forcer, and the meanings of W and VOV, I propose that VOV is felicitous following laisser only if the causee is construed as a valid energy source which generates (or at least sustains) the infinitival process. If not, W is selected.35 This hypothesis suggests a natural starting point. Since inanimate causees are not prototypically agentive, we would expect that they will tend to be used in the W construction. The data in (82)-(84) confirm this hypothesis.

Main verbs and complement structures 105

(82)

a. b.

J'ai laisse tomber mon stylo ( W ) ??J'ai laisse mon stylo tomber (VOV) Ί let my pen fall'

(83)

a. b.

(84)

a. b.

Le cuisinier a laisse brüler la viande ( W ) ??Le cuisinier a laisse la viande brüler (VOV) 'The cook let the meat burn' J'ai laisse glisser mes skis ( W ) ??J'ai laisse mes skis glisser (VOV) Ί let my skis glide'

None of the causees in (82)-(84) can be considered the energy source which generates the infinitival process. In sentences (82) and (83), the causees are patients, at the receiving end of an energy chain, the origin of which is not expressed in the sentence (gravity for (82), the heat for (83)). Their status as patients is not compatible with their use in a VOV construction which would treat them as energy sources. The case in (84) is slightly different. The causee (the skis) is not a patient, it is not affected in the same way as the others. It does not undergo a change of location as in (82) or a change of state as in (83). Skis are instruments, designed to perform specific functions. Gliding is one of these functions, but the skis can hardly be viewed as generating the gliding. The difficulty of considering the causees in (82)-(84) as the energy sources generating the infinitival process accounts for their more felicitous use with W . One must however resist the temptation to oversimplify the situation and claim that their lack of agent-like qualities prevents inanimates from occurring in the VOV construction. This would simply be false, as the data in (85)-(87) indicate. (85)

a. b.

J'ai laiss0 brüler le gratin ( W ) ??J'ai laisse le gratin brüler (VOV) Ί let the casserole burn'

106 Causation /perception

constructions

(86)

a. b.

J'ai laisse brüler le feu jusqu 'a l'aube ( W ) J'ai laisse le feu brüler jusqu 'ά I 'aube (VOV) Ί let the fire burn until dawn'

(87)

a.

Mon voisin a encore laisse sortner son reveilpendant une heure (W) Mon voisin a encore laisse son reveil sonner pendant une heure (VOV) 'My neighbor let his alarm clock ring for one hour again'

b.

Note the difference between (85) and (86). Le gratin in (85) is also a patient, the case is similar to that of the meat in (83). Le feu in (86) is also inanimate, but it is not a patient. It has greater potential for generating (or at least sustaining) the process in the complement. From a scientific standpoint, fires are not self-generated. They require outside energy sources: wood, oxygen etc. However, in front of a roaring bonfire, we tend to forget the energy provided by outside elements. The momentum gathered by the fire gives it a life of its own, as if it were indeed self-generating. Its role relative to the burning process is very different from that of the casserole in (85). It is not the patient in the burning process, but is rather conceived as a full-fledged energy source. It is therefore not surprising that it can appear in the VOV construction in (86). When an entity is involved in a process over a long period of time, it becomes possible to consider it responsible for that process, even if it merely performs a function it has been programmed for. In (87), the alarm clock does what it has been set to do, as did the skis in (84). However, after its ringing has gone on for some time, the clock can be considered responsible for the ringing, even though the true energy source of the process is the person who set it.36 One of the cognitive capacities that we have is to give instruments designed to perform a certain process the ability to generate that process. We use that ability to express certain communicative nuances. For instance, by construing his skis as greatly responsible for the gliding process, a racer can

Main verbs and complement structures 107

emphasize the ease with which victory was obtained. In that context, the use of the VOV construction in (88) is much better than it was in (84). (88)

J'ai seulement laisse mes skis glisser tout seuls jusqu'ä la ligne d'arrivee! (VOV) Ί simply let my skis glide by themselves to the finish line'

Similarly, sentence (89) would be appropriate to describe the surrealists' technique of automatic writing (where the pen has a will of its own), because it most emphasizes the causee's agentivity. (89)

lis laissaient leur plume courir sur le papier ά sa guise (VOV) 'They let their pen run on the paper on its own'

The initial hypothesis is confirmed by the inanimate causee data. Outside the special type of construal expressed in (86)-(89), they are more felicitous in a W position, due to their lack of agentive qualities. Animate causees present a different case. They are prototypically agentive. They can thus very easily be part of the VOV construction. In fact, outside a particular context, it is very difficult to prefer one construction over the other, as indicated in (90).37 (90)

a. b.

Sa mere laisse Pauljouer dans le jardin (VOV) Sa mere laisse jouer Paul dans le jardin ( W ) 'His mother lets Paul play in the garden'

However, if the degree of agentivity of the causee can be evaluated, the differences between the two constructions can be teased apart. Consider the data in (91)-(94). (91)

Jean laisse partir Marie quand il veul (W) 'John lets Mary leave whenever he wants'

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constructions

(92)

??Jean laisse Marie partir quand il veut (VOV) 'John lets Mary leave whenever he wants'

(93)

Jean laisse Marie partir quand eile veut (VOV) 'John lets Mary leave whenever she wants'

(94)

?Jean laisse partir Marie quand eile veut ( W ) 'John lets Mary leave whenever she wants'

In (91)-(94), the adverbial modifiers quand il veut 'whenever he wants' and quand elle veut 'whenever she wants' increase the degree of agentivity of Jean and Marie respectively by lending them a greater will of their own, and thus an added capacity to initiate the subordinate process for Marie (or at least choose the time of that process) or the causative process for Jean. Permission represents a highly asymmetrical type of relationship. The increased control over the subordinate process given to Jean by the adverbial quand il veut decreases Marie's role in the accomplishment of that process. If Jean is all-powerful towards the accomplishment of one process, Marie is necessarily powerless towards the accomplishment of the same process. As a result, we expect that when the control (agentivity) of the subject of the causative verb is increased, the causee would be construed as more object-like, and appear as part of W . This prediction is borne out, as illustrated in (91). Conversely, Jean's limitless power is incompatible with an image of Marie as the energy source responsible for the generation of the infinitival process, and hence incompatible with VOV, as illustrated in (92). With quand elle veut, which gives her greater validity as the energy source generating the infinitival process, the causee Marie very easily appears in the VOV construction, which stresses her subject-like role towards that process. This makes sentence (93) felicitous. Conversely, her active part in the generation of the infinitival process is not fully compatible with the object-like role towards that process she is confined to by the semantics of W . Although sentence (94) cannot be said to be ungrammatical, it makes people uncomfortable. When they do accept it, they wonder who elle in quand elle veut is, as if they

Main verbs and complement structures 109

were reluctant to accept Marie and eile as coreferential because their respective semantic roles are different. Note that this problem does not arise in (93). The situation with animate causees once again goes in the direction predicted by the initial hypothesis. In the contexts where the recognition of the causee as an energy source with respect to the infinitival process is needed, VOV tends to be preferred. The importance of the agentivity of the causee for the selection of W or VOV has now been established, but other factors also need to be considered. Recall that in the perception domain, the lexical semantics of certain verbs allows them to form a tight conceptual unit with the main verbs. This is also the case for laisser, as illustrated in (95) and (96). (95)

a. b.

La voiture laisse passer les pietons ( W ) ??La voiture laisse les pietons passer (VOV) 'The car lets the pedestrians pass'

(96)

a.

Les grevistes ont laisse passer les coureurs du Tour de France (W) ??Les grevistes ont laisse les coureurs du Tour de France passer (VOV) 'The strikers let the Tour de France racers pass'

b.

Despite the human causees, the data in (95) and (96) are perfectly explainable if we consider the nature of the infinitival processes. Tomber 'fall' and passer 'pass' are very basic translational motions through space, for which the energy source is constant: gravity for tomber, the momentum gathered by the entity in motion for passer. For example, passer only profiles the trajectory of the subject across the perceiver's field of vision. It is not concerned with the way in which the activity is generated, but views it in progress, once momentum has been gathered. It is therefore difficult to construe the subject of passer and tomber as the energy source responsible for the generation of their respective processes, and hence use them in a VOV construction. This explains the oddity of (97b).

110 Causation / perception constructions

(97)

a. b.

Jean a laisse tomber Marie (du plongeoir) sans essayer de la retenir (W) ?Jean a laisse Marie tomber (du plongeoir) sans essayer de la retenir (WOW) 'John let Mary fall (from the platform) without trying to stop her'

However, compare (97b) with (98). (98)

Jean a laisse Marie sauter (du plongeoir) sans essayer de la retenir (VOV) 'John let Mary jump (from the springboard) without trying to stop her'

The subject of sauter 'jump' is more volitional than that of tomber 'fall' which is simply a patient. It is therefore easier to construe the causee in (98) as the initiator of that process, and hence as a legitimate energy source. The felicity of the use of VOV is thus consistent with the analysis developed here.38 As a conclusion to this section, I would like to reemphasize the need for a global view of the conditions which determine the presence of W or VOV with the different main verbs. Characteristics specific to the infinitival process itself, or the participant in that process have been considered alternatively to explain the distribution of the two constructions. This presentational strategy is difficult to avoid, because the semantics of the main verb naturally steer our focus in the direction of a particular entity of the complement scene. It seems easier to evaluate the distribution of W and VOV with the perception verbs in terms of the salience of the infinitival process, because salience and perception seem to be so closely related. The analysis of the same distribution with laisser seems to more naturally invoke the status of the causee as the energy source of the infinitival process, because the notion of energy is directly relevant to causation. It should be clear, however, that the characteristics of the process and the participant simply cannot be considered separately, because they represent so to speak the two sides

Main verbs and complement structures 111

of the same coin. It is precisely because the subjects of tomber and passer cannot be considered as energy sources that these processes are so naturally initially salient with laisser. Similarly, the material activity verbs are not initially salient with the perception verbs, because the generating role of their subject towards the process they present is too difficult to bypass. 3.4.3. Laisser, faire, the perception verbs and transitive clauses So far, we have only been concerned with intransitive clauses. However, the type of solution proposed for intransitives also offers interesting insight into the behavior of transitive clauses following laisser and the perception verbs. The distribution of W and VOV with transitive clauses is the focus of this section. 3.4.3.1. The faire par construction There are two possible markings for a transitive clause in a W construction, differentiated by the coding of the logical subject of the infinitive. These are illustrated in (99) and (100). (99)

Paulfait manger le gateau a Jean (W) Paul makes eat the cake to John 'Paul made John eat the cake'

(100) Le professeur a fait corriger les examens par ses etudiants (W) The professor made grade the exams by his students 'The professor made his students grade the exams' In (99), the causee is marked with the preposition a. (100) illustrates the illustrious faire par construction (Ruwet 1972, Kayne 1975, Hyman and Zimmer 1976, Cannings and Moody 1978, Rouveret and Vergnaud 1980, Fauconnier 1983, Postal 1984, 1989, Burzio 1986,

112 Causation / perception constructions

Gibson and Raposo 1986, Legendre 1987, 1990 inter alia). Faire par is reminiscent of a passive construction, where the agent is also marked by par, as in Sa voiture a ete lavee par le micanicien 'His car was washed by the mechanic'. Consequently, the most important controversy surrounding faire par has been centered around the possible involvement of passive in the causative rule (i.e. a passive movement in the embedded complement prior to the causative movement). Accounts arguing in favor of passive involvement include Ruwet (1972), Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980), Gibson and Raposo (1986). On the other hand, Fauconnier (1983), Burzio (1986), Legendre (1987, 1990) argue that passive is not involved in faire par, and propose different alternatives to account for the presence ofpar. For the purpose of this chapter, it is interesting to note once again that most accounts of faire par are exclusively concerned with faire, although Kayne (1975: 249) claims that FP (his faire par transformation rule) involves the same set of verbs which trigger FI (his regular causative transformation rule), namely faire, laisser, and the verbs of perception. I will show in this section that the situation is much more complicated, and that even though faire par is very productive, laisser par, and voir par (as an example of the verbs of perception) are much more constrained. It will be shown that the type of analysis previously proposed for intransitive clauses allows us to provide a viable account of both ά and par complements in transitive clauses. Consistent with the methodology adopted throughout this work, ά and par complements are treated as meaningful elements, and their semantic import must be compatible with the meaning of the main verb and that of W or VOV. This section does not pretend to provide an exhaustive study of a very complex issue, but merely to indicate a direction for further investigation. For the sake of clarity, I will limit myself to cases such as (101) and (102), where the causee is respectively treated as a benefactive (a) or instrumental (par) complement. This is not, of course, intended to suggest that the meanings of ά and par complements in W are always so clearly identifiable.39

Main verbs and complement structures 113

(101) Elle a fait obtenir le tableau a Jean-Jacques ( W ) 'She made Jean-Jacques get the picture' (102) Elle a fait obtenir le tableau par Jean-Jacques (W) 'She made Jean-Jacques get the picture' Example (101) clearly has a benefactive reading, because the picture necessarily ends up in Jean-Jacques' possession. Example (102) has an instrumental reading, Jean-Jacques might have bought the picture for someone else. The type of analysis developed for intransitive clauses allows us to carefully examine the semantic compatibility between the main verbs (mostly laisser and the verbs of perception), the causative constructions ( W and VOV), and the two case markers (a and par). The situation with faire will not be considered in detail, because it is fairly straightforward, and it has been thoroughly investigated (see references above). The distributional difference between laisser and the verbs of perception will be shown to be imputable to the meaning difference between those verbs. 3.4.3.2. Laisser The analysis of transitive clauses following laisser is especially interesting because W and VOV are in direct competition. Consider the examples in (103)-(108). (103) IIa laisse Jacques lire la lettre (VOV) 'He let Jack read the letter' (104) a. b.

II a laissi lire la lettre ä Jacques (W) ??Il a laisse lire la lettre par Jacques ( W ) 'He let read the letter to /??by Jack'

(105) IIa laisse les enfants manger le gateau (VOV) 'He let the children eat the cake'

114 Causation / perception constructions

(106) a. b.

II a laisse manger le gateau aux enfants ( W ) ??Il a laisse manger le gateau par les enfants (W) 'He let eat the cake to /??by the children'

(107) Le general a laisse ses soldats tuer des civils (VO V) 'The general let his soldiers kill civilians' (108) a. b.

Le general a laisse tuer des civils ά ses soldats (W) ? ?Le gemral a laisse tuer des civils par ses soldats (W) 'The general let kill civilians to /??by his soldiers'

In (103), (105), and (107), the transitive clause appears with VOV. In (104a), (106a), (108a), it appears with W , and the causee is marked by a. In (104b), (106b), and (108b), it also appears with W , but the causee is coded by par. In order to account for the distribution presented in (103)-(108), we need to explain i) the difference in meaning between a transitive clause embedded with VOV as in (103), (105), and (107), and benefactive W (with a marking) as in (104a), (106a) and (108a), and ii) the infelicity of instrumental W {par complements).40 Let us begin with benefactive W . The crucial point is the difference in the status of the causee in W and VOV. In VOV, it is a direct object, in W , it is coded as a benefactive. The two constructions are possible, but their meanings are quite different. As we saw previously, the direct object in a VOV construction designates an entity that has a certain level of agentivity, and hence is capable of initiating the infinitival process. In (105), for example, the children initiate the eating process, and the main subject simply does not stop them. In W , the causee is marked with the benefactive marker. A possible aspect of the meaning of that marker recognizes the inclination of the recipient for the thing she receives. In the permission context of laisser and W , it is easy to construe the causee as showing some inclination toward the infinitival process. This is fully consistent with the status of the subject of laisser as a potential agent. Its non-interference in the desire

Main verbs and complement structures 115

expressed by the causee can be seen as some sort of reward for the latter. For example, in (106a), the cake has been set aside for the children to eat. Note that the use of W or VOV highlights different aspects of the causee. In VOV, its status as the initiator of the infinitival process is emphasized. In W , its status as the recipient of a some action (often a favor) is brought to light. The second issue concerns the infelicity of par complements with W . Once again, this is explained by the instrumental coding of the causee in the construction. An instrument cannot be construed as initiating a process, rather it merely represents the means by which that process gets carried out (Langacker 1991, Kemmer and Verhagen 1994). Since the subject of a transitive process is very agentive by definition, it does not match up well with a construction which does not recognize its agentive value. Note that the specific meaning o f f a i r e makes for a very different situation following that verb. (109) Le gineral a fait tuer des civils par ses soldats (W) 'The general made his soldiers kill civilians' Because it establishes the responsibility of its subject for the accomplishment of the infinitival process, faire is perfectly compatible with the use of instruments to achieve that goal. The soldiers are instruments in the hands of the general, used to carry out a process conceived and designed by him alone. Their use by the general in (109) is conceptually similar to John's use of the hammer in the sentence John broke the window with a hammer (Langacker 1991, Kemmer and Verhagen 1994). The instrumental interpretation of the causee in a transitive clause following laisser is often infelicitous because the subject of laisser is only a potential agent, who merely reacts to an on-going situation. The construal of the causee as an instrument is problematic, because there is no true energy source to make use of that instrument. This explains the oddity of (108b). The sentence presents the soldiers as instruments. However, the absence of a true source of energy in the sentence poses them as the generators of the killing. They are therefore better realized as more agentive (intentional) than their status as an

116 Causation / perception constructions

instrument would warrant, and VOV is more felicitous because it codes their agentivity better. 3.4.3.3. The perception verbs The distribution of a and par complements with the verbs of perception is rather complicated. It is illustrated in (110)-(117). (110) J'aivu Marie porter la valise (VOV) Ί saw Mary carrying the case' (111) a. b.

??J'ai vuporter la valise äMarie (in the sense of Mary carrying the case) ( W ) ? ?J 'ai vu porter la valise par Marie (W) Ί saw carry the suitcase ??to /??by Mary'

(112) J 'ai entendu Paul claquer la porte (VOV) Ί heard Paul slam the door' (113) a. b.

??J 'ai entendu claquer la porte a Paul (W) ? ?J 'ai entendu claquer la porte par Paul (W) Ί heard slam the door ??to /??by Paul'

(114) J'ai entendu (vu) l'Opera de Paris jouer Carmen (VOV) Ί heard (saw) the Paris Opera play Carmen' (115) a. b.

*J'ai entendu (vu) jouer Carmen ά l'Opera de Paris (benefactive sense) ( W ) J'ai entendu (vu) jouer Carmen par l'Opera de Paris (W) Ί heard (saw) perform Carmen *to /by the Paris Opera'

(116) J'ai vu le couple Russe exicuter un superbe triple saut (VOV) Ί saw the Russian couple execute a superb triple jump'

Main verbs and complement structures 117

(117) a. b.

*J'ai vu executer un superbe triple saut au couple Russe (W) J'ai vu executer un superbe triple saut par le couple Russe ( W ) Ί saw execute a superb triple jump *to /by the Russian couple'

With the perception verbs, VOV is always felicitous. A complements are most often infelicitous, as in (111), (113), (117a). Par complements can also be infelicitous, as in (11 lb), and (113b), but they are possible in certain cases such as (115b) and (117b)41 In order to account for the data presented in (110)-(117), we need to explain why i) benefactive (a) complements are most often impossible with the verbs of perception, and ii) instrumental (par) complements are only felicitous in certain cases. Given the definition of the a complements adopted here, the answer to i) is straightforward. With a verb of perception, the main subject is not an agent (or even a potential agent), but a mere observer of the scene evoked in the complement. In (111a) and (113a), the infinitival complement cannot be interpreted as being designed to favor the logical subject of the infinitive, and the latter cannot be construed as a beneficiary. The benefactive complements are not compatible with the perception verbs because those verbs do not involve an agent, capable of providing what the subject of the infinitive would be benefiting from. The difference of distribution between laisser and the perception verbs comes from the different role these verbs grant to their respective subjects. This in turn makes them compatible with different types of oblique complements. The situation is more complicated for the par complements. W par is only possible with a fairly limited number of semantically related verbs, which I will refer to as the "show" verbs. The list includes among others realiser 'realize', executer 'execute', jouer 'perform', interpreter 'interpret' chanter 'sing'. The conceptual content of these verbs mostly pertains to showing or hearing. It is therefore natural that they form a very tight semantic unit with their complement. Jouer une

118 Causation / perception constructions

piece 'perform a play' and executer un mouvement 'execute a movement' have a very high level of entrenchment as units. This is, however, not sufficient to explain the instrumental role of the logical subject of the infinitive. I propose that the sense in which we can refer to the latter as an instrument represents an extension from the prototype. It is important to note that these participate in well established cognitive models of entertainment. It is part of our culture that certain plays, certain musical pieces, certain athletic moves constitute institutionalized activities one could call "classics", and that we see these classics interpreted on various occasions by different artists or athletes. According to that model, any classic piece has a history of its own, which is composed of all its interpretations by specific performers. Even though each performer provides the energy source behind her own performance, she also adds on to other performances by other performers which constitute the history of the classic. In that sense, she can be considered an instrument to the continuing elaboration of her discipline. I believe that the plurality of the participants in a classic activity renders possible the construal of those participants as instruments. They are, however, non-prototypical instruments, because there is no clearly delineated agent which makes use of them. Rather, the social motivation for the constant development of these institutionalized activities acts as a very abstract agent. In that case, each contributor can be construed as an instrument, regardless of the agentivity demonstrated in her particular performance.42 Notice that the conception of an activity as a classic is often a matter of context. Almost any activity can be construed that way, in which case the use of a par complement will be felicitous. This accounts for the difference between (118) and (119). (118) *J'ai vu courir 100 metres par Tom ( W ) Ί saw run 100 meters by Tom' (119) Voir courir le 100 metres par Carl Lewis, ςα vaut le coup\ (W) 'To see the 100 meters run by Carl Lewis, that's worth it!'

Main verbs and complement structures 119

In (118), the infinitival process does not represent an institutionalized activity. In (119), courir le 100 metres is viewed as a classic activity (notice the presence of the definite article), the scene presenting Lewis' own interpretation of it, his contribution to the history of the discipline. 3.5. Discussion and conclusion W and VOV have Both been shown to be meaningful constructions. Their semantic import is characterized by the specific way they structure the complement scene composed of some process going on in the world, and the main participant involved in that process. The determining factor for the choice of a particular construction has been shown to be which entity of the scene is construed as initially salient (stands out within the scene). The specific conditions which render the process or the participant salient have been brought to light and investigated. Consideration of the meaning of the constructions has enabled us to analyze their distribution with the different main verbs in terms of semantic compatibility. Faire and forcer have been shown to be highly compatible with W and VOV respectively, and incompatible with the other construction. The verbs of perception and laisser have been shown to be compatible with both constructions. The analysis initially developed with reference to intransitive clauses was naturally extended to transitive clauses. The distribution of W and VOV, as well as a and par complements, was also shown to result from the necessary semantic compatibility between the different main verbs, the causation/perception constructions, and the oblique complements. Consistent with the claim made in Section 1, this account explains at the same time the structural and distributional properties of the two constructions. I expect the claims made about VOV to be largely uncontroversial, but the treatment of W might need to be defended. I would like to conclude this chapter by briefly showing how the proposed solution is compatible with some seemingly problematic facts discussed in the literature. The most original aspect of the analysis is that W is not derived from an underlyingly biclausal structure, but from two successive operations of profile assignment. The construction

120 Causation / perception

constructions

presents a single event, where the subordinate process forms a complex predicate with the main verb by virtue of being initially salient, and the logical subject of the infinitive is treated as an object of that complex verb. The CG notions of profiling, and compositional path of an expression allows us to account for the formation of a complex verb without resorting to positing underlying levels of representation. Importantly, these notions also provide a natural explanation of the syntactic phenomena which originally led researchers to posit underlying forms. It has long been noted in the literature (Ruwet 1972, Legendre 1990) that causees exhibit subject-like behaviors (subject oriented adverbials for instance) which seems to indicate that they are underlying subjects. Even though grammatical constructions usually make reference to profiled entities, they can also refer to unprofiled entities. In the analysis proposed here, the subject-like role of the causee (as the trajector of the subordinate relation) is part of the compositional path of the construction. The fact that it is not profiled in W does not prevent it from being relevant to other constructions. Similarly, the claim that the causee is only profiled as an object does not mean that it should exhibit all the prototypical qualities of objects. The fact that causees in French do not passivize (Zubizaretta 1985), or cannot be raisees in object raising constructions (Legendre 1986) do not invalidate the analysis presented here. Once again, causative constructions resemble transitive constructions, and the marking on the causee is similar to that of direct objects, but the compositional path of the two constructions is very different. It would therefore be unreasonable to expect them to exhibit identical behaviors. The research on the semantic structure of causation has a long and prestigious tradition in cognitive linguistics, and this chapter has largely benefited from that tradition. I hope it showed that a Cognitive Grammar analysis can provide the level of fine grained examination necessary to handle data from a single language in some depth. Although this account only deals with French, it fits perfectly well with the hypothesis of Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) that causative clauses are "built up" on the conceptual model of simple clauses, by investigating the kinds of cognitive operations which permit the process of

Discussion and conclusion 121

complex verb formation. As it now stands, the account is far from complete. In particular, the presence of clitics in the constructions, and the specific marking patterns on the causee need to be given further consideration, but I believe that the line of investigation developed in this chapter can naturally be extended to those issues.

Chapter 4. Perspective: modal constructions

This chapter is the first that evaluates the importance of perspective to the syntactic realization of the complements. Recall from Chapter two that perspective pertains to the conceptualizer's position with respect to the scope of predication of the complement. Chapters four and five investigate the syntactic manifestation of that position in modal constructions (Chapter four), and conceptualizing subject constructions (Chapter five). The invocation of perspective for the analysis of modals presents two advantages. First, the vantage point from which their complement is conceptualized allows us to distinguish the modals from the conceptualizing subject verbs. The complements of modals are conceptualized from the speaker's vantage point, whereas the complements of the conceptualizing subject verbs are conceptualized from the vantage point of the main clause subject. Second, the isolation of different configurations of viewing arrangement between the speaker and the complement scene, i.e. along the subjective axis (see Figure 21), allows us to explain the selectional restrictions that exist between the different modals and their complements. 4.1. Introduction A whole chapter devoted to modals in a monograph concerned with verbal complementation in French might seem somewhat unusual, because French modals are not usually considered with respect to the syntactic realization of their complements. Two reasons might explain that lack of interest. First, it is difficult to clearly delineate a French modal class, since the verbs that carry a sense of modality are not structurally different from other complement taking verbs. Second, the interesting issues with respect to their complements do not pertain to their structure—all the complements of modals are in the infin-

124 Perspective: modal constructions

itive—but to the specific form of that infinitive, in particular with respect to the distribution of markers of aspect and voice. As indicated in Chapter three, structural considerations have dominated the research on complementation, and most linguistic theories have had little motivation to focus on distributional issues. The difficulties associated with modal complementation should not, however, overshadow their relevance to a global picture of complementation. In this chapter, I show that the recognition of the notion of perspective allows us to tackle these difficulties with confidence. With respect to the specificity of the French modals, Section two shows that the vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized allows us to outline a class of French modal verbs, and to keep those verbs separate from the conceptualizing subject verbs to be considered in Chapter five. With respect to the specific form of the complements of modals, Section three shows that different configurations of viewing arrangement along the subjective axis, that is to say between the speaker and the complement clause, are reflected by the possible presence of markers of aspect and voice on the infinitival complement. The account of modals developed in this chapter presents the advantage of investigating issues that had previously gone unnoticed, and it relates modal constructions to other French complement constructions. It is organized in the following fashion. Section two presents the background of French modals, and delineates a French modal class. Section three explains the distribution of aspect and voice on the infinitival complement of modals. Section four discusses the results and concludes the chapter. 4.2. French modals A modal system is typically composed of a small class of verbs that exhibit certain semantic and structural characteristics. For instance, in English, the modal verbs do not have infinitive forms, they do not agree with the subject, and they do not have participial forms. It is also generally recognized that they have defective morphology. Another element, which renders possible the analysis of English modals as a

French modals 125

grammatical class, is their common historical development. They come from content verbs that originally denoted capability or volition, but later eventually developed into modals via semantic change (Langacker, 1991, Traugott 1989). The modal class in English can therefore be analyzed as an intermediate case in the diachronic evolution from lexical items to grammatical markers (Langacker 1991: 269). French does not have a distinctive modal class. The verbs traditionally considered modals are not structurally or morphologically different from other verbs, and they are usually described as auxiliaries. The problem with treating French modals as auxiliaries is twofold. First, the broadness of that category makes it virtually impossible to precisely isolate a modal class, and secondly, the term auxiliary wrongly suggests that modal constructions are not complement constructions. In this section, I argue that i) there is indeed a class of modal verbs in French, and that this class should include pouvoir 'can', devoir 'must, and the capability sense of savoir 'know how', and ii) modals are regular biclausal constructions, where the infinitive is a true complement of the main verb. 4.2.1. A French modal class The difficulty of treating French modals as auxiliaries is apparent in Cervoni's definition of the term (Cervoni 1987: 83 [translation mine]): "Au sens le plus strict du terme, un auxiliaire est une forme verbale dont le röle est de pourvoir un autre verbe au participe ou ä l'infinitif des categories formelles qui lui manquent: temps, mode, personne, aspect." 'In the strictest sense of the term, an auxiliary is a verbal form whose role is to provide another verb in the infinitival or participial form with the formal categories it is lacking: tense, person, mood, aspect.' Since the modals are not morphologically distinct, other criteria are needed to differentiate them from any other verb which takes infinitival complements. Different solutions have been proposed. For instance, Benveniste (1974: 177) includes the modals in his study of auxiliary relations (relations d'auxiliatiori). Modality represents one type of auxiliary relation along with temporal relation (the relation

126 Perspective: modal constructions

provided by the auxiliary in compound tenses), and the relation de diathese (found with the passive auxiliary etre). In Benveniste's system, there are two primary modal verbs, namely pouvoir 'can' and devoir 'must'. Other verbs, such as aller 'go, vouloir 'want\ falloir 'be necessary', desirer 'desire', esperer 'hope', which can also be followed by infinitival complements can also occasionally provide auxiliary relations of a modal type (1974: 188). Cervoni (1987) argues that even though pouvoir and devoir are the only indisputable modals, the system of verbal modality should also include savoir 'know' and vouloir43 The other verbs which can also be followed by an infinitival complement (such as croire 'believe' or esperer 'hope') are used as "semi-auxiliaries of modality". Most attempts to define a modal class in French have centered around two kinds of arguments, namely semantic and structural arguments, which both point to devoir 'must' and pouvoir 'can' as indisputable modals. Semantically, both verbs provide the linguistic coding of two components of modality as a logical category, namely possibility and obligation, and both devoir and pouvoir exhibit root and epistemic meanings. Structurally, devoir and pouvoir are the only candidates that can never be followed by finite complements (Benveniste 1974). Let us briefly consider these arguments in turn. One of the characteristics of modals cross-linguistically is that they exhibit two sorts of related senses. The first one is called "root" or "deontic", and denotes obligation, permission, or ability. The second sense is referred to as "epistemic", and denotes necessity and possibility in reasoning (Sweetser 1982, 1990, Palmer 1979 1986, Langacker 1991 inter alia). This distinction is illustrated for English in (120) and (121). (120) a. b.

He must be home by six, I insist You can go play in the garden

(121) a. b.

He must be at home, I see his car in the driveway He may be in France now, I know he was thinking of going

French modals 127

The examples in (120) illustrate the root senses of must and can. (120a) conveys an order, the obligation for the subject to perform the complement process. (120b) conveys a permission given to the subject. The sentences in (121) illustrate the epistemic meaning of the same modals. (121a) presents the strong likelihood for the process profiled by the infinitive to be occurring, provided by the epistemic force of logical reasoning, (121b) presents the possibility for the infinitival process to be occurring. It is a characteristic of modals cross-linguistically that they can exhibit these two senses. The same type of modality effects, i.e. the presence of root and epistemic meanings, can be observed with devoir and pouvoir, as illustrated in (122) and (123). (122) a.

b.

(123) a.

b.

Jean doit absolument venir ce soir, le patron veut le voir 'John must absolutely come tonight, the boss wants to see him' Jean est tres fort, il peut soulever plus de cent kilos 'John is very strong, he can lift over one hundred kilos' Marie doit souvent venir ici, eile connait tons les serveurs 'Mary must be coming here often, she knows all the waiters' Jean peut etre arrive maintenant, il est plus de sept heures 'John may have arrived now, it is after seven o'clock'

The examples in (122) present root modality. Devoir expresses obligation in (122a), and pouvoir expresses possibility in (122b). The sentences in (123) have an epistemic meaning. (123a) expresses the only logical conclusion provided by the force of reasoning. (123b) expresses possibility. The situation described by the infinitive is made possible by the world being in a certain way. Examples (122) and (123) present a semantic argument for including devoir and pouvoir in a

128 Perspective: modal constructions

modal class, since they have both a root and epistemic sense, which is characteristic of modals elsewhere.44 This semantic argument is corroborated by the structure of devoir and pouvoir, because unlike other possible candidates, these two verbs cannot be followed by finite complements, as illustrated in (124)-(126). (124) a. b.

(125) a. b.

(126) a. b.

Ilpeutpartir 'He can leave' *Il pent qu 'eile parte 'It can that she leave' II doit partir 'He must leave' *Il doit qu'elle parte 'It must that she leave' II espere partir 'He hopes to leave' II espere qu 'eile partira 'He hopes that she will leave'

Unlike esperer 'hope' in (126), devoir and pouvoir in (124) and (125) can only be followed by an infinitival complement. Both semantic and structural criteria seem to point to devoir and pouvoir as the only two modals, but I would like to argue that another criterion needs to be taken into account, namely the vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized, and that once vantage point is recognized, the modal class should also include in addition to devoir and pouvoir the capability sense of savoir 'know how'. Recall from Chapter two that certain multi-clause constructions include two conceptualizing relations, namely the construal relation existing between the speaker Co and the sentence CLj, and another similar relation between the main clause subject Ci and the complement clause CL2. For example, in Jean espere partir 'John hopes to leave', the communicative purpose of the sentence is to describe John's

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conceptualization. The complement scene (coded by partir) represents that conceptualization, and it is conceptualized from John's vantage point. Consistent with the terminology used in Chapter two, esp0rer is a conceptualizing subject verb. The subjects of modals, by comparison, do not have a conceptualizing role with respect to the complement process. In Jean doit partir 'John must leave' for example, John may not even be aware that he needs to leave. With modals, the speaker is the sole relevant conceptualizer in the sentence, and the complement scene is conceptualized from her vantage point. I submit here that the vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized constitutes the crucial determining criterion between modals and the conceptualizing subject verbs to be considered in Chapters five and six. At first sight, the addition of savoir seems to invalidate the structural argument which indicates that modals must take infinitival complements, since savoir can be followed by a finite complement, as illustrated in (127). (127) a. b. c.

Marie sait nager 'Mary knows how to swim' Marie sait qu 'eile nage tous les matins 'Mary knows that she swims every morning' Marie sait que Paul nage tous les matins 'Mary knows that Paul swims every morning'

However, note that the sense of savoir with an infinitive in (127a) is different from the sense of the same verb with a finite complement in (127b) and (127c). The subject Marie in (127a) is not a conceptualizer with respect to the process nager. The sentence merely describes her capability of performing a process type. This sense of savoir will be referred to as the sense of "capability". On the other hand, (127b) and (127c) present the "cognition" sense of savoir, where the main clause subject acts as a conceptualizer towards the complement process. The communicative purpose of the sentence is precisely to present the main subject's conceptualization (to be considered in further detail in Chapters five and six). I will claim that in its capability sense (in cases

130 Perspective:

modal

constructions

such as (127a)), savoir is a modal. In that sense, it cannot be followed by a finite complement. Consequently, savoir will be analyzed as a polysemous verb, with one of its senses being a modal, and another one being a conceptualizing subject verb. The treatment of savoir as a polysemous verb is in perfect agreement with the fact that modals take infinitival complements. In fact, an infinitival complement following savoir is often the sign of a modal use.45 This is corroborated by numerous examples where the cognitive sense is infelicitous with an infinitival complement. This is illustrated in (128)-(131). (128) Je sais que je comprends chaque fois qu 'il m 'explique Ί know that I understand every time he explains it to me' (129) *Je sais comprendre chaque fois qu 'il m 'explique Ί know to understand every time he explains it to me' (130) Je crois que je comprends chaque fois qu 'il m'explique Ί believe that I understand every time he explains it to me' (131) Je crois comprendre chaque fois qu 'il m 'explique Ί believe to understand every time he explains it to me' Croire is a cognitive verb, and savoir has a cognitive sense. The context in (128)-(131) is favorable to a cognitive interpretation. However, (129) is infelicitous. Notice that the interpretation of the form savoir + infinitive as a modal or a cognition verb greatly depends on the nature of the infinitival process. Two opposite cases were presented in (127a) and (129). In (127a), the physical nature of the process imposes a modal interpretation, whereas the cognitive nature of the process makes the modal sense of the main verb infelicitous.46 The modal meaning of savoir illustrated in (127a) will therefore be studied along with pouvoir and devoir, whereas its cognitive meaning illustrated in (127b) and (127c) will be studied in the next chapter,

French modals 131

along with other verbs of cognition, such as penser 'think', croire 'believe'. The situation is different for the another possible modal candidate namely vouloir, as illustrated in (132). (132) a. b. c.

Jean veut venir 'John wants to come' *Jeanj veut qu'ilj vienne 'John wants that he come' Jean veut que Marie vienne 'John wants Mary to come'

Vouloir has the same sense with an infinitival complement in (132a) and a finite complement in (132b) and (132c). In the three sentences, the subject has a conceptualizing role with respect to the complement process. Vouloir will therefore strictly be analyzed as a verb of volition, and considered in detail in Chapters five and six. One could finally object that savoir does not have an epistemic sense, and can therefore not be considered a modal. This argument has little merit. First, not all recognized modals have both senses (shall has no obvious epistemic meaning in English). Secondly, savoir capability is very close semantically to the ability sense of pouvoir (as for example in Jean peut marcher 'John is able to walk') which has no epistemic sense either. The semantic similarities between the two verbs will be explored further in Section 3. The recognition of the notion of vantage point therefore allows us to restrict the class of French modals to devoir, pouvoir, and savoir in its capability sense. 4.2.2. Structure of the French modals It was claimed earlier that modal constructions are complement, and not auxiliary constructions. This section argues that the modal construction is a biclausal construction, where the modal and the infinitive complement each represent an independent event. The analysis of modals as biclausal structures goes against their usual classification as

132 Perspective: modal constructions

auxiliaries, because auxiliary constructions are usually monoclausal.47 However, it is substantiated by the systematic behavior of modals as biclausal constructions, as shown in (133)-(135). (133) a. b. c.

(134) a. b. c.

(135) a. b. c.

Elle peut soulever la table 'She can lift the table' Elle peut la soulever *Elle la peut soulever 'She can lift it' Elle doit rentrer la voiture 'She must put the car in the garage' Elle doit la rentrer *Elle la doit rentrer 'She must put it in the garage' II saitprendre le metro 'He knows how to take the subway' II sait le prendre *// le sait prendre 'He knows how to take it'

Examples (133)-(135) illustrate the modals' reaction to clitic climbing. Note that the scope of the clitics is restricted to the subordinate clause, thus indicative of biclausality. The results from clitic climbing are corroborated by the negation tests. Examples (136) and (137) show that with modals, the infinitival process alone can be negated. (136) Je peux ne pas rentrer ce soir, si tu preferes Ί can not come back tonight, if you prefer' (137) Elle doit ne I 'avoir jamais vu 'She must never have seen him'

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133

Negation is possible in (136) and (137), therefore indicating biclausal properties. Finally, one last indication that modal structures are biclausal is provided by the use of the restrictive ne...que, illustrated in (138) and (139). (138) linepeut rentrer que ce soir 'He can only come back tonight' (139) II peut ne rentrer que ce soir 'He may only be back tonight' (138) and (139) show that the two events profiled by pouvoir and rentrer can be evoked independently. When both the modal and complement verbs are in the scope of ne...que (as in (138)), the sentence only has a deontic sense. When ne...que is attached to the complement verb, the sentence can be either deontic or epistemic, but the preferred reading is epistemic. The arguments from clitic climbing, negation, and ne...que validate the analysis of modal structures as biclausal constructions.48 The structure of modals is presented in Figure 26.

tr

Im

Figure 26: The structure of modals In this analysis of French modality, the modal is the main verb. Its subject is the trajector of the profiled relation. The complement process as a whole functions as a relational landmark. Critically, the participant in that process is not profiled. Also note that the correspondence lines between the trajector and the participant in the infinitival process indicate necessary coreferentiality. The dashed double arrow indicates modal, i.e. potential force that is physical in the case of root modality,

134 Perspective: modal constructions

and more mental in the epistemic cases. Taking the sentence Jean sait nager 'John knows how to swim' as an example, the subject Jean elaborates the trajector of the modal verb sait. That process is represented by the double arrow. The complement process nager is recognized as the landmark of the main (modal) verb. The correspondence lines indicate coreferentiality between the trajector of the main verb Jean and the trajector of the complement process that remains unprofiled. In terms of their event structure, I have analyzed the modal construction as a biclausal construction, representing two separate events. The main clause presents the situation of obligation, possibility, permission, which is considered a full-fledged event. The process profiled by the infinitive is also analyzed as an event. Both events instantiate the clausal schema. Figure 26 can therefore be completed to include the biclausality of the modal construction. This is done in Figure 27. Event

tr

I

Im

Figure 27: Event structure of modals Even though structurally, modal constructions are best analyzed as biclausal constructions, the label of auxiliary attached to them is understandable when one considers the meaning of the construction. The modals pouvoir, devoir, and savoir are all quite schematic in meaning, in the sense of Langacker (1987a). Their meaning necessarily evokes another process, which profiles the activity whose conditions of occurrence are being evaluated. The idea of the schematicity of the modals is very close to Guillaume's notion of verbes puissanciels49 Cervoni (1987: 85) explains the notion of a verbe puissanciel as follows (trans-

French modals 135

lation mine): "Comme la notion fondamentale d'existence—quoi qu'ä un moindre degre—les notions qu'expriment les verbes puissanciels ont une anteriorite logique par rapport aux notions exprimees par tous les autres verbes, anteriorite de la meme espece que celle de la condition par rapport ä la consequence, ou de la puissance par rapport ä Peffet." 'Like the fundamental notion of existence—although to a lesser degree—the notions expressed by the verbes puissanciels have a logical anteriority with respect to the notions expressed by all the other verbs. An anteriority of the same kind as condition with respect to consequence, or causality with respect to effects'. For further discussion about the verbes puissanciels, see Moignet (1981: 277). Under Guillaume's view, the infinitival process is also the necessary complement of the modal auxiliary verb. From Langacker's idea of schematicity, as well as Guillaume's notion of verbe puissanciel, it is clear that part of the meaning of the modals involves the consideration of a process to be carried out, only present schematically when the meaning of the modal alone is being considered. It is not the immediate realization of that process which is profiled by the sentence, but the conditions under which it is potentially realized by the main clause subject (or by another participant in the discourse). That realization of the complement process is mediated by possibility, probability, capability, etc. The specific meaning of each modal will be considered in detail throughout this chapter, but we can say that schematically, the semantic import of modal constructions is to profile the speaker's evaluation of the conditions of realization of the complement process (possibility or obligation). Their semantic schematicity, i.e. the necessary evocation of another process as part of their meaning explains the label of auxiliary given to modals. The main verb just does not feel like a full-fledged event, because it cannot easily be considered without reference to a subordinate process. The intuition which the term "auxiliary" captures therefore concerns the main verb's necessary evocation of the complement process, and not the event structure of the modal construction.

136 Perspective: modal constructions

4.3. The complements of modals Now that the modal constructions have been established as complement constructions, we can focus more specifically on the syntactic realization of their complement. It has already been mentioned that modals can only take infinitival complements. This section investigates the possible presence of markings on the infinitive. Infinitival complements in French can usually combine with the grammatical markers of perfect aspect (auxiliary etre 'be' or avoir 'have' + past participle of the main verb) and passive {etre + past participle of the main verb). In control constructions for example, the infinitive freely combines with both aspect and voice markers, as illustrated in (140). (140) a. b. c.

Jean espere finir ά I 'heure 'John hopes to finish on time' Marie espere avoir fini a I 'heure 'Mary hopes to have finished on time' Marie espere etre elue 'Mary hopes to be elected'

In (140a), the content verb finir is in the infinitive. (140b) is in the so-called past infinitive. The auxiliary avoir is in the infinitive, and finir is in the past participle. (140c) is a passive sentence. The auxiliary is etre, and the main verb is in the past participle. However, certain constructions place tighter restrictions on the presence of these markers on their complement structures. For example, in the causative construction presented in Chapter three, the infinitive can only be used in its bare form, as shown in (141a). It cannot be inflected by an aspect marker as in (141b), or a voice marker as in (141c). (141) a. b.

Marie fait travailler Jean 'Mary makes John work' *Mary fait avoir travaille Jean 'Mary makes John have worked'

The complement of modals 137

c.

*Marie a fait etre elu Jean 'Mary made John be elected'

With the modals, the possible presence of grammatical marking on the infinitival complement varies depending on the sense of the verb considered. The distribution of the markers of aspect and voice with the different senses of the modals is presented in (142)-(155).50 The ability sense ofpouvoir and savoir are both most felicitous when they are followed by a straight infinitive. This is illustrated for savoir in (142) and (143), and for pouvoir ability in (144) and (145). (142) *// sait avoir nage 'He knows how to have swum' (143) ??Il sait etre enfermeil 'He knows how to be locked up' (144) *Il est tres fort, ilpeut avoir souleve la table 'He is very strong, he can have lifted the table' (145) ??//peut etre enferme dans le placard 'He can be locked in the closet' At first sight, the possibility sense of pouvoir seems similar to the ability sense. In (146) and (147), the infinitival complements cannot be marked for aspect or passive morphology.52 (146) *Il peut avoir nage ά cinq heures ce soir 'He can have swum at five o'clock tonight' (147) *Jean peut etre frappe par la police 'John can be hit by the police'

138 Perspective: modal constructions

However, in other cases, the presence of the perfect or passive markers on the complement is perfectly felicitous, as illustrated in (148) and (149). (148) a. b.

(149) a.

b.

Marie peut etre revenue a six heures si vous voulez 'Mary can have returned at six o'clock if you'd like' Jean peut avoir fini dans cinq minutes si c'est important 'John can have finished in five minutes, if it is important' Paul pourra etre raccompagne par un professeur si vous voulez 'Paul will be (able to be) taken home by a teacher if you want' Voire voiture pourra etre wparie dans deux heures 'Your car will be (able to be) fixed in two hours'

The root sense of devoir (obligation) imposes no constraints on the following infinitival process, as illustrated in (150) and (151). (150) II doit avoir etudie la legon avant de faire I 'exercice 'He must have studied the lesson before doing the exercise' (151) II doit absolument etre Ιώέή tout de suite 'He must absolutely be released right away' In their epistemic senses, neither devoir nor pouvoir places any constraints on the following complement process. This is illustrated in (152) and (153) for devoir and in (154) and (155) for pouvoir. (152) II doit etre parti, je ne vois pas sa voiture 'He must have left, I do not see his car' (153) II doit etre enferme, je I 'entends crier 'He must be locked up I hear him scream'

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(154) II pent ne pas avoir compris, ilfaudrait r0p0ter 'He might not have understood, we should repeat' (155) II pent etre enfermi, il vaut mieux l 'appeler 'He might be locked up, we had better call him' The distribution of the markers of aspect and voice with the different modals presented in (28)-(41) is summarized in Table 1. Table 1. Distribution of grammatical markers after modals Epist. Aspect Voice

Pouvoir + +

Root Devoir + +

Devoir + +

Pouvoir /po.

Pouvoir/db.

Savoir

+/-

-

-

+/-

-

-

We can clearly see from the data summarized in Table 1 that the modals divide into three natural classes with respect to the kind of constraints on grammatical marking each verb imposes on its complement process. The first one is composed of the epistemic modals, and the root sense of devoir. The second one contains the possibility senses of pouvoir. The third one is composed of the ability sense of pouvoir and savoir. These constraints on grammatical marking can be expressed in terms of a gradation. The epistemic modals ( = = > ® ~ . Im

^ \ ^I

'0 Figure 34: Obligation. S=LP In Figure 34, the subject is the target, therefore marked T. It is located downstream from the force emanating from the locus of potency (identified as the speaker) which remains unprofiled. The situation described in Figure 34 with the subject of the modal as the target and the speaker as the source of the deontic force might be prototypical, but it is by no means exhaustive. Sweetser (1990) notes that the speaker is not always the source of the force. She discusses such examples as (176b), which could be uttered by someone reading off a diet guide. In that case, the source of the force would be distinct from the speaker to be associated, maybe, with the doctor who designed the diet). This constitutes a second type of situation, where the speaker merely conveys the obligation coming from the locus of potency to the target. This configuration is presented in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Obligation S * LP

The complement of modals 157

In Figure 35, the speaker is distinct from the source of obligation. This is simply indicated by the absence of a correspondence line between S and LP. Note that the source of obligation can be greatly diffused and impossible to isolate precisely. In some cases, it is merely some traditionally accepted social belief system. This is illustrated in (177). (177) Les etudiants doivent respecter leurs professeurs 'Students must respect their teachers' I would argue that (177) illustrates the configuration presented in Figure 35. The speaker merely conveys a source of obligation coming from a set of values he agrees with, or at least knows about. The main difference between the types of configuration described in Figures 34 and 35 concerns the role of the speaker in the imposition of the force of obligation to the target. Figure 34 illustrates the "strong" role of the speaker, where she is identified with the source of obligation. Figure 35 presents a weaker role of the speaker, where she merely conveys that force. Let us now consider the second parameter, namely the role of the subject vis-ä-vis the target. The examples in (176) and (177) illustrate cases where the subject itself is the target. This is, however, not always the case. Talmy (1988) discusses examples such as (178), where the trajector of relation profiled by the modal verb is not the target. The latter remains an unprofiled part of the base. (178) La pizza doit aller au four ä onze heures 'The pizza must go in the oven at eleven o'clock' The pizza in (178) is not capable of exercising any force or going anywhere. The target of the force of obligation is another participant which remains unprofiled. The configuration of (178) is given in Figure 36.

158 Perspective: modal constructions

Im

TR

ό

Figure 36: Obligation: unprofiled target The target of the force of obligation is unprofiled in Figure 36. It must, however, perform the task of putting the pizza into the oven. In spite of its patient role, the relation profiled by the modal recognizes the pizza as the trajector. It is therefore profiled. Notice that the target's being distinct from the subject is independent from the role of the speaker vis-ä-vis the source of obligation. The speaker could be identified as the locus of potency, but she could also be conveying an order from another source. To briefly summarize, the category of obligation has been shown to cover four possible force-dynamic configurations, depending on whether the speaker can be identified as the source of obligation, or merely conveys it, and whether the subject—the trajector of the modal— is or is not the target in charge of bringing about the landmark process. Note that the precise location of the source of obligation and the target can often only be determined by pragmatic factors (Sweetser 1990). Grammatical (or semantic) categories can sometimes provide indications. For instance, inanimates are not typically identified as the target, because they lack the agentive qualities to bring about the complement process. However, these indications are not sufficient. An animate for instance is not necessarily the target in a situation of obligation.

The complement of modals 159

Recapitulation The preceding sections have provided an inventory of the forcedynamic configurations for the root senses of the modals devoir, pouvoir, and savoir. Firstly, savoir and the ability sense of pouvoir have been shown to be main-verb constructions (in Langacker's technical sense presented in Note 54). The subject is clearly identified as the locus of the potency directed at the landmark process. The speaker is not involved in the verb's force-dynamic configuration. Its only role is that of conceptualizing the whole situation. Secondly, the possibility sense of pouvoir profiles the absence of a barrier between the subject and the complement process. In that case, the locus of potency has been shown to be more diffuse and to incorporate the circumstances of the event. It can still be associated with the subject in certain cases, if the latter exhibits a great deal of intentionality with respect to the accomplishment of the infinitival process, but it is not necessarily the case. Importantly, the speaker becomes associated with the locus of potency as the latter gets more diffused. The sense of permission has been shown to be a special case, which profiles the possibility in the social domain of the subject performing the complement process. Finally, devoir illustrates the category of obligation, where a participant in the speech situation is under the obligation of performing the process profiled by the infinitive. Situations of obligation have been shown to vary along two parameters, namely i) the strong or weak role of the speaker in the assignment of the obligation force, and ii) the identification or not of the subject as the target of that force. Importantly, with obligation, the subject can never be identified as the locus of potency. The latter can be associated with the speaker (in the case of a direct order), or be more diffuse and difficult to isolate precisely. 4.3.1.3. Epistemic senses The description of epistemic modality is made relative to Langacker's dynamic evolutionary model presented in Chapter two (Figure 18). Recall from Chapter two that the model captures the dynamic aspect of

160 Perspective: modal

constructions

our conception of reality, by which the knowledge of what has happened so far enables us to predict the course of events with reasonable confidence. Future events do not happen randomly, but are themselves a manifestation of the way reality has evolved so far. Evolutionary momentum carries reality along certain possible paths and excludes others. The possible paths represent potential reality. In certain cases, reality is constrained enough that the future course of events can be predicted with confidence. These cases are said to occur in projected reality. With respect to the dynamic evolutionary model, the characterization of the future epistemic sense of devoir and pouvoir is rather straightforward. Pouvoir is simply defined as placing the process in potential reality. This is illustrated in (179). (179) Je ne vois pas de lumiere, il peut ne rentrer que demain Ί do not see any light, he may only come back tomorrow' In (179), the observation of certain elements of current reality (the absence of light) suggests to the speaker that the course of reality can possibly include a path that contains the event of the subject's coming back tomorrow. Devoir places the infinitival process in projected reality. This is illustrated in (180). (180) II a laisse la porte ouverte, il doit revenir bientöt 'He left the door open, he must be coming back soon' Given the nature of current reality, namely the open door, the course of reality can reasonably be expected to include the coming back process in the near future. The model presented above needs to be slightly adjusted to accommodate the cases where the events profiled by the infinitival process following devoir and pouvoir are construed as possibly occurring, or having occurred. Such cases are illustrated in (181)(184).

The complement of modals 161

(181) II lui parle souvent, il doit bien la connaitre 'He often talks to her, he must know her well' (182) II ne m 'a rien dit, ilpeut ne pas s'en etre rappele 'He did not say anything, he may not have remembered' (183) line ripond pas, il ne doit pas avoir compris 'He does not answer, he must have misunderstood' (184) II peut s 'etre rappele de son nom par hasard 'He might have remembered his name by chance' In (181), the process connaitre is construed as highly likely to be occurring now. In (182)-(184), the infinitival processes are construed as highly likely to have occurred already. The important point is that even though the events profiled by the infinitival process are construed as being likely to be occurring or having occurred, their occurrence is not known by the speaker for a fact. In situations such as those described in (181)-(184), the focus shifts from the evolution of reality to the speaker's conception of reality. Recall from Chapter two that a given conceptualizer is aware that she knows only part of reality. The notion of evolutionary momentum occurs in a more subjective way, in the speaker's own thought process. In the same way as reality has been shown to evolve along an external time axis, our knowledge about reality can be thought of as evolving along a more subjective, mindinternal axis. Along that axis, the same type of analysis proposed for the future modality senses holds for the examples in (181)-(184). Devoir places the infinitival process in projected reality, pouvoir in potential reality. 4.3.2. Realignment of the modal force In order to validate the hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this section that the presence of markers on the infinitival complement of modals reflects a subjective realignment of the modal force, we need to

162 Perspective:

modal

constructions

i) show how the configurations of force dynamics specific to each modal can be analyzed in terms of viewing arrangement, that is to say precisely investigate the mechanics of the realignment of the modal force, and ii) explain why this realignment should be reflected by the presence of the markers of voice and aspect on the infinitival complement. This section considers these two points in turn. As it pertains to sentential complementation, a critical aspect of the evaluation of the viewing organization inherent to a construction rests on the relative position of the conceptualization and main relations. Let us consider the main-verb constructions as an example. It was shown in the preceding section that with savoir and pouvoir ability, the locus of potency of the modal force is exclusively associated with the subject. Consequently, we can say that the subject anchors the main relation. Since the speaker merely points out the physical relation of ability profiled by the main verb without interfering in its force-dynamic pattern, the modal relation is kept maximally separate from the conceptualization relation. Another way of expressing this would be to say that the two relations originate from two clearly delineated and maximally different sources. The conceptualization relation originates with the speaker, and the main relation originates with the main subject. Since the conceptualizing subject (the speaker) is kept outside the object of her conceptualization CLi, I take such constructions as instantiating the optimal viewing arrangement presented in Chapter two (see Figure 19b). The main-verb constructions can therefore be said to involve a maximally objective construal of the objective scene CLi. We need to exercise caution here. Because we are concerned with complement constructions where the complement clause is conceptually dependent on the main clause (see Chapter two), positing the total separation of the conceptualization and main relation would represent a severe oversimplification. At the very least, even in the case of a maximally objective construal of the main relation, the speaker can always evaluate some aspect of that relation, as illustrated in (185). (185) Marie pent soulever 100 kilos facilement 'Mary can lift 100 kilos easily'

The complement ofmodals

163

The main relation profiled by pouvoir ability is viewed as maximally separate from the conceptualization relation, because Mary is the clearly delineated origin of the modal force. However, the presence of facilement 'easily' shows that the speaker can evaluate the main relation, that is she has enough knowledge of the subject to be able to comment on the conditions of accomplishment of the infinitival process. Consequently, the modal relation is not entirely separate from the conceptualization relation. The evaluative faculty illustrated in (185) is part of the speaker's conceptualizing role, and I suggest that it constitutes the anchor point onto which the modal force progressively gets realigned. The essence of the subjectification analysis proposed here is that the modal force anchored by the subject becomes progressively more and more aligned onto the conceptualizing relation anchored by the speaker. In terms more directly pertinent to modal constructions, the locus of potency of the modal force gets progressively more diffuse and associated with the speaker. I will now illustrate that gradual realignment with the possibility sense of pouvoir and epistemic modality. We have seen that in the possibility sense of pouvoir, the locus of potency is no longer defined as the subject, but incorporates the circumstances surrounding the subordinate event. It has also been shown that an important characteristic of the subject is its capacity of showing initial agentivity (intentionally) towards the realization of the complement process. I have claimed that the more intentional the subject is, the more easily it tends to be associated with the locus of potency. I will explain this claim here, and show that the variation observed with the possibility sense of pouvoir is imputable to the presence of two specific configurations which each show different levels of association of the modal force with the speaker. In the first configuration, the role of the speaker is merely to point out the absence of a barrier standing between the subject and her accomplishment of the complement process. The speaker has knowledge of the circumstances external to the process which enable the subject to perform that process, but she has no power to influence

164 Perspective: modal constructions

them. Crucially, she does not claim responsibility for the occurrence of the complement. This configuration is again illustrated in (186). (186) Jean peut passer vous voir demain matin, il η 'a pas de rendez-vous 'John can come and see you tomorrow morning, he has no appointments' In the absence of adversary circumstances, John is willing and able to perform the infinitival process. Implicit to (186) is John's possibility of canceling the appointment if he so pleases. Examples such as (186) are quite similar to main-verb constructions in that the intentionality of the subject allows the latter to still be very clearly associated with the locus of potency of the modal force. The situation, however, is not as clearcut as with the main-verb expressions. It was said in Section 4.2 that the speaker is also remotely associated with the locus of potency in examples such as (186), because she is aware of the circumstances that make the subject's realization of the process possible. Nevertheless, she remains mostly a witness to the relation of possibility existing between the subject and the complement process. In terms of viewing arrangement, this configuration represents some departure from the main-verb constructions. The modal force is in some small measure associated with the speaker, but remains mostly associated with the subject, because of the latter's intentionality towards the infinitival process.58 In the second configuration of the possibility sense of pouvoir the speaker takes responsibility for the occurrence of the infinitival process. Consequently, she is more closely associated with the locus of potency. This situation is illustrated in (187), where a manager tells a customer about a second visit of her delivery person. (187) IIpeut revenir ce soir si vous voulez 'He can come back tonight if you want' In the case of (187), the subject cannot be associated with the locus of potency. The latter can be identified either with the speaker, or with

The complement of modals 165

a source close to the speaker (possibly the addressee in (187) as indicated in si vous voulez). Compare (187) to (186). In (186), the subject is ultimately responsible for the accomplishment of the infinitival process. In (187), the speaker takes responsibility for the occurrence of that complement. The subject is treated as an instrument, and therefore exhibits no intentionality towards the realization of the infinitival process. The cases where the subject cannot be associated with the locus of potency are precisely those where there is no restriction on the presence of grammatical marking in the complement, as illustrated in (188). (188) IIpeut etre revenu avant la nuit si vous voulez 'He might be able to come back before dark if you want' In (188), the speaker has the authority to impose a schedule on the subject. She can therefore take responsibility for the occurrence of the infinitival process. In such examples, the emphasis is not on the physical capacity of the subject to perform the complement process, but on the speaker's responsibility for the occurrence of that process. Importantly, the increased importance of the speaker in the forcedynamic configuration of the modal blurs the distinction between the modal and conceptualization relations. I will therefore argue that in the second configuration of pouvoir, the conceptualization CLi is construed from a more internal and subjective vantage point, and that the modal relation is (at least partially) realigned onto the conceptualization relation. Note that this realignment is rendered possible by certain pragmatic considerations of the modal situation, in particular the hierarchical situation between the subject and the speaker, which allows the latter to take responsibility for the occurrence of the infinitival process. The realignment of the modal relation onto the conceptualization relation is complete in the case of epistemic modality. In that sense, epistemic modality represents the opposite case from the main-verb constructions. Langacker (1991: 273) expresses the difference between the two constructions in the following way (insertions in brackets

166 Perspective: modal constructions

mine): "Epistemic modals are naturally regarded as the endpoint of this development process [the diffusion of the locus of potency]. They lie at the opposite extreme from the main-verb expressions in regard to how the locus of potency is conceived and characterized: with a main verb, the locus is salient and well delineated (usually a particular person), whereas an epistemic modal represents the limiting case in which it is not identified as any individual or any specifiable facet of the world. Conceived with maximal vagueness and minimal restrictiveness, the locus of potency is in effect equated with the world and its evolution, construed inclusively and as an undifferentiated whole." Since the locus of potency is identified with the evolutionary momentum of reality, it is necessarily speaker-internal, because consideration about the world and its evolution are only accessible to the speaker by the mental operations of observation and analysis.59 In the case of epistemic modality, the modal relation is indistinguishable from the conceptualization relation because both are anchored by the speaker. Consequently, epistemic modality will be considered as instantiating the egocentric viewing arrangement presented in Chapter two. 4.3.3. Speaker control The previous section showed that the loosening of the constraints on the infinitival complement presented in Figure 28 correlates with a subjectification of the modal force. However, we still need to show why an objective construal of CLi precludes the presence of the markers of aspect and voice on the infinitival process, while a subjective construal renders their presence possible. I would like to argue here that i) the presence of the grammatical markers reflects the speaker's conceptual manipulation of the infinitival process, and ii) that manipulation is only possible when CLi is construed subjectively, because it is only in that configuration that the speaker has independent conceptual control of the subordinate process. To understand the idea of conceptual manipulation as it is used here, we need to reconsider the layering of semantic functions exhibited by the verb phrase. Recall from Chapter two (Section 2.3.1) that an

The complement of modals 167

infinitive represents a process type, and that the non-finite markers (aspect and voice in French) provide information relative to the innerstructure of a particular instance of that type. That information within the clause is viewed as corresponding to the function of quantification for a nominal. I propose that the quantification of an instance of the process profiled in the complement represents the speaker's conceptual manipulation of the complement process. Let us take an example. The stem nager 'swim' represents a process type. That process can be instantiated, that is considered with respect to a particular situation. It can further be quantified. In Marie doit avoir nage, eile a les cheveux mouilles 'Mary must have swum, her hair is wet' for example, the process nager is instantiated because the speaker has a particular episode of the process in mind, tied up to a specific time and place. It is also quantified, because the instance of the process type is considered with respect to its inner-structure (accomplished at the time of the utterance). The operations of instantiation and quantification represent the speaker's conceptual manipulation of the original nager type. The speaker's absence of conceptual control when CLi is construed with maximum objectivity is clear. With the main-verb constructions, the modal relation is anchored by the subject, and the speaker has no independent access to the infinitival process.60 It is only with the realignment of the modal force onto the subjective axis, i.e. when the difference between the main and conceptualization relation becomes blurred, that the speaker, as the subject of the conceptualization relation also becomes more directly associated with the main relation. To phrase it differently, the speaker gains independent access to the complement process when she becomes more clearly associated with the locus of potency of the modal force. The correlation between the speaker's proximity to the locus of potency and her control over the complement process is well illustrated by the example in (188). It was said that the speaker is close enough to the locus of potency of the modal force to assume responsibility for the occurrence of the infinitival process. That commitment is only possible if the speaker has enough control over the process to perform the operations of instantiation and quantification it requires. Consistent with the hypothesis

168 Perspective: modal constructions

formulated earlier, the speaker's control is manifested by the absence of restrictions on the complement process. Note importantly that the notion of the speaker's control over the infinitival process must be dissociated from her trying to influence the course of events. In such examples as Un enfant heureux doit etre aime/savoir nager/avoir beaucoup lu Ά happy child must/be loved/know how to swim/have read a lot', the speaker has no possibility or desire to influence the course of events. The grammatical marking on the infinitive is an indication of her conceptual control over the infinitival process, not her willingness to alter the course of events. The two configurations of pouvoir present an interesting illustration of the notion of speaker-control in the sense that they suppose different pragmatic relations between the speaker and subject, and that these relations are reflected in their respective control over the infinitival process. The speaker is more likely to have control over the complement process if the subject's agentivity (impulse) with respect to that process can easily be by-passed. This is clearly easier to do with certain verbs than with others. It is for example quite easy with the "scheduling" verbs such as repartir 'start again\finir 'finish', terminer 'terminate' etc. With more agentive verbs, it is more difficult for the modal to emphasize the conceptual relationship between the speaker and the complement process, because the physical relationship between the subject and that process is strong. In other words, with pouvoir possibility, the speaker can only take the responsibility for the occurrence of the complement process if the subject's association with the locus of potency is not too difficult to by pass. This is illustrated in (189). (189) V.Joe peut avoir tue Billy ά cinq heures 'Joe can have killed Billy at five o'clock'61 Even in the context where the speaker is a Mafia boss, planning his killers' schedule, (189) sounds rather strange. A passive form, as illustrated in (190), is much more felicitous.

The complement of modals 169

(190) Billy pent etre descendu avant la nuit, pas de probleme 'Billy can be wasted before nightfall, no problem' The felicity of (190) over (189) is perfectly consistent with the analysis proposed here. A verb such as kill presents a very physical type of relation between its trajector and landmark. It is hard not to consider the subject as the locus of potency. A speaker control reading (not epistemic) is therefore difficult. When the subject is not an agent, as in the case of a passive, the speaker can more easily be identified with the locus of potency, and therefore establish a conceptual relationship over the complement process. The meaning of epistemic modality involves the speaker's evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of the infinitival process. This is once again illustrated in (191). (191) Marie doit etre revenue ä six heures, je vois sa voiture 'Mary must have returned by six o'clock, I can see her car' In (191), the speaker's interpretation of reality allows her to place Mary's return in projected reality. The speaker necessarily has direct access to the complement process because the whole evaluative procedure that allows the placement of the complement process with respect to reality is speaker-internal. To phrase it differently, with epistemic modals, the speaker has control over the complement process because she anchors both the main and conceptualization relations. Consistent with hypothesis proposed here, that control is reflected by the presence of the markers of voice and aspect on the infinitival complement. One last problem needs to be considered to fully account for the chart in Figure 28, namely to explain why the root sense of devoir (obligation) patterns with the epistemic modals with respect to the kind of constraints it imposes on the infinitival process. It should be clear by now that obligation is quite similar to the second configuration of pouvoir illustrated in (187) and (188). The subject of devoir cannot be identified with the locus of potency, because it lacks the initial impulse,

170 Perspective: modal constructions

or initiative towards the complement process, which is a characteristic of the subject of pouvoir in its first configuration. This is illustrated in (192) and (193). (192) Tu peux venir si tu veux 'You can come if you want' (193 ) *Tu dois venir si tu veux 'You must come it you want' In (192), the addition of si tu veux 'if you want' emphasizes the agentive role of the subject who can initiate her actions. This is not possible in (193), where the subject is viewed more like an instrument than an agent. The difference between the roles of the subject of devoir and pouvoir in the first configuration is reminiscent of the difference between faire and laisser considered in the preceding chapter. Recall the analysis o f f a i r e in terms of the responsibility of its subject for the realization of the complement process, and the treatment of the logical subject of the latter as a patient, regardless of its role with respect to the process. The notion of responsibility is not directly relevant here, but the trajector of devoir is also treated as an instrument, whose role is to realize the landmark process conceived and initiated by the speaker, or an entity the latter is in contact with. The control of the speaker in the case of obligation is obvious. In order for her to use the subject as an instrument to perform the complement process, there must be a direct conceptual relationship between the speaker and that process. Obligation therefore provides the speaker with necessary control over the infinitival complement, even if she is not necessarily recognized as the locus of potency itself. What obligation shares with epistemic modality, and therefore justifies their similar syntactic behavior is that under no circumstances can the subject be identified as the locus of potency of the modal force. The control over the complement process is therefore in the speaker's hands. To briefly recapitulate, an entity's direct access to the locus of potency of the modal force gives that entity some kind of control over

The complement of modals 171

the complement process. The subject's physical control is demonstrated by maximal restrictions on the marking of the complement process. The speaker's control takes the form of a conceptual relation established directly with the infinitival process. Speaker control is indicated by minimal restrictions placed on the possible marking of the complement process. Furthermore, speaker control was analyzed in terms of the subjectification of the modal force, by which that force gets progressively more subjectively construed, i.e. associated with the speaker. The main-verb constructions present a maximally objective construal of the complement scene. The locus of potency is a clearly identifiable and well-defined entity, and the modal force is also objectively construed. Importantly, it is kept maximally separate from the conceptualization relation. The speaker's absence of control over the complement scene is a consequence of her position, external to that scene. The other configurations indicate a progressive realignment of the modal relation onto the conceptualizing relation. With epistemic modals, the realignment is complete, and the two relations are indistinguishable from each other. The endpoints of this continuum of subjectification correlate with the endpoints of the scale of grammatical restriction presented in Figure 28. The presence of grammatical marking is the sign of the passage from the physical control of the subject over the infinitival process to the direct conceptual control of the speaker over the same process. The possibility sense of pouvoir represents an area where the control can shift between the subject and the speaker depending on pragmatic considerations presiding over the situation. 4.4. Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has investigated the relevance of the construal dimension of perspective to the analysis of modal constructions. It has produced the following results. First, the modals have been shown to be speakeroriented constructions, where the speaker is the only relevant conceptualizer, and the subject has no conceptualizing role with respect to the complement process. This is important because it enables us to differentiate between the modal verbs and the conceptualizing subject verbs

172 Perspective: modal constructions

that can also take infinitival complements. The recognition of perspective (vantage point) therefore provides a conceptual criterion which validates a modal class in French and specifies which verb can be a member of that class. Second, the recognition of perspective enables us to treat modal constructions as complement constructions, and investigate the syntactic form of the complement. The restrictions placed by different modals on their infinitival process have been shown to be imputable to the speaker's direct conceptual control over the complement process. Speaker-control was shown to be highly dependent on the particular viewing arrangement existing between the speaker and her conceptualization. The scale of restriction on the infinitive follows a scale of subjectification (realignment) of the modal force along the subjective axis. From maximally objective in the case of the main-verb constructions, it becomes maximally subjective in the case of epistemic modality, where it cannot be distinguished from the conceptualizing relation. The advantage of this type of analysis is one of unity. The perspective dimension will be shown in the following chapter to be a very powerful and explanatory notion, which is critical to the study of several complement constructions. The recognition of its relevance for modality allows us to clearly compare modal constructions to other constructions, because we can use the same investigative tools. In the following chapter, it will be shown how perspective also plays a crucial part in the distinction between infinitival and finite complements in conceptualizing subject constructions. Finally, the analysis points to the similarity of the processes involved in the synchronic and diachronic study of language. The account of the development of English modality in Langacker (1991) from main-verb constructions to the current modals emphasizes the subjectification of the modal force, a kind of explanation which has also been shown in this chapter to account for the synchronic distribution of the complements of French modals.

Chapter 5. Conceptualizing subject constructions Finite and infinitival complements

Chapters five and six are concerned with conceptualizing subject constructions (CSC). A CSC is a structure where the landmark of the relation profiled by the main verb can be a fully elaborated finite clause. We will be particularly interested in two aspects of the complement distribution of these constructions, namely i) the difference between infinitival and finite (indicative or subjunctive) complements, and ii) the distinction between the indicative and subjunctive moods when the verb is finite. For ease of exposition, these two issues are kept separate and respectively presented in Chapters five and six. In this chapter, I show that the difference between infinitival and finite complements is primarily a matter of perspective, and that the selection of a given complement reflects a particular configuration of viewing arrangement between the main clause subject and the complement scene, that is to say along the objective axis. More specifically, finite complements signal an objective construal of the complement scene (including the subordinate subject) from the vantage point of the main clause subject. The presence of an infinitival complement on the other hand is the sign of the subjective construal of the complement scene, and in particular of the subordinate subject. As part of their lexical semantics, certain verbs inherently impose an objective construal between their subjects and complements, while other verbs impose a subjective construal. In specific conditions, they are therefore only compatible with finite and infinitival complements respectively. Most verbs, however, are compatible with the two kinds of construal, and the choice between the two complement constructions is determined by properties of the speech situation.

174 Conceptualizing

subject

constructions

5.1. Introduction Conceptualizing subject constructions have already been briefly introduced in Chapter four, in order to keep them separate from the modal constructions. They can formally be distinguished by the fact that they can take both an infinitival or a finite complement (either in the indicative or the subjunctive mood). The presence of infinitival complements is restricted to the cases where the main and subordinate subjects Si and S2are coreferential. When the subjects of the two verbs are different, the subordinate verb V2 can be in the indicative or the subjunctive. Examples of complements are given in (194)-(197), where (INF) stands for infinitive, (IND) for indicative, and (SUBJ) for subjunctive. (194) a. b. c.

(195) a. b. c.

(196) a. b. c.

Paul croit comprendre (INF) 'Paul believes to understand' Paul croit que Marie est malade (IND) 'Paul believes that Mary is sick' Pauli cro't 4U *h comprend (IND) 'Paul believes that he understands' Paul a dit avoir compris (INF) 'Paul said to have understood' Paul dit que sa fille ätudie le Latin (IND) 'Paul says that his daughter studies Latin' Paul\ dit qu 'ilj a compris (IND) 'Paul said that he has understood' Paul veut repartir tout de suite (INF) 'Paul wants to leave right away' Paul veut que vous veniez tout de suite (SUBJ) 'Paul wants that you come right away' *Paulj veut qu 'ilj parte tout de suite (SUBJ) 'Paul wants that he leave right away'

Introduction

(197) a. b. c.

175

Paul a peur d 'etre malade (INF) 'Paul is afraid of being sick' Paul a peur que Marie soit malade (SUBJ) 'Paul is afraid that Mary is sick' *Paulj a peur qu 'ilj soit malade (SUBJ) 'Paul is afraid that he is sick'

Examples (194)-(197) illustrate the range of issues covered in this chapter, as well as Chapter six. Examples (194a)-(197a) present infinitival complements. Note that in all cases, the subject of the main verb and of the subordinate verb are coreferential. Examples (194b)-(197b) present the difference in the mood of the subordinate verb. In (194b) and (195b), the subordinate verb is in the indicative, in (196b) and (197b), it is in the subjunctive. Note that in these cases, the complement is always preceded by the complementizer que 'that'. Examples (194c)-(197c) present finite complements when the subjects of the main verb and that of the subordinate verb are coreferential. (194c) and (195c) are felicitous, (196c) and (197c) are not. Although both infinitival/finite and indicative/subjunctive distinctions can be analyzed as different choices in the construal imposed on the complement scene, I will argue that these two choices are made with respect to different dimensions of construal, namely perspective for the infinitive/finite alternation, and grounding for the indicative/subjunctive distinction. For the sake of clarity, these two issues will be kept separate. This chapter investigates the infinitival/finite distribution. Chapter six focuses on the indicative/subjunctive distinction. In the following sections, I argue that the difference between infinitival and finite complements in CSCs results from a difference in viewing arrangement between the conceptualizer of CL2 (the main clause subject Ci), and her conceptualization, that is to say along the objective axis (see Figure 21). In a nutshell, a finite complement illustrates the optimal viewing arrangement (OVA) between the conceptualizer and her object of conceptualization. In that configuration, the complement clause is construed with maximum objectivity from the vantage point of the main clause subject. An infinitival

176 Conceptualizing subject constructions

complement, on the other hand, illustrates the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA), where the complement clause is construed from the internal vantage point of the subordinate subject. I will show that a given complement type (finite or infinitival) is obligatory when the lexical semantics of the main verb are compatible with only one viewing arrangement of the complement scene. When the verb is potentially compatible with both viewing arrangements, the pragmatics of the situation determine complement choice. This chapter is organized in the following fashion: Section two presents the meaning of the CSC, and introduces the various main verbs that participate in the construction. Section three presents the semantic analysis of infinitival and finite complements. Section four evaluates the distribution of the two complement constructions with the different main verbs. Section five discusses the results and compares the account developed in this chapter to other accounts of similar phenomena. 5.2. Main verbs and the meaning of the CSC One of the recurrent themes of this monograph is that any level of a grammatical construction is a meaningful symbolic unit. It was shown in Chapters three and four that not only the main verb and the complement structure have meaning, but the constructions as a whole also have their own semantic import. Similarly, the CSC involves the representation of a certain type of event structure. The consideration of the construction itself as a meaningful template imposes constraints of semantic compatibility between its own meaning and that of every one of its internal elements. The main verbs must therefore be semantically compatible with the meaning of the construction. The starting point of the analysis involves the consideration of the semantic import of the conceptualizing subject construction.

Main verbs and the meaning of the CSC 177

5.2.1 Meaning of the CSC Recall that the active conceptualizing role of Ci constitutes one of the major conceptual differences between the modals considered in Chapter four and the CSC verbs. In fact, the communicative purpose of the conceptualizing subject construction is precisely to describe Ci's conceptualization of the complement scene. That scene itself represents some event in the world (or in some other mental space), which is currently occurring, has, will, might or is expected to occur. The complement content is therefore described in its relation to the general course of events, or in other words reality.62 The main clause subject conceives that event for the specific purpose of reporting it, expressing her perception, belief, desire of it, or voice her feelings about it. This purpose can be viewed as the expression of the specific way in which Ci conceptually relates to the event profiled in the complement, or in other words, Ci's specification of her position with respect to that event. The main verb profiles the exact nature of that relation. I will therefore propose the following definition for the meaning of the construction. The conceptualizing subject construction codes the speaker's presentation of Ci's conceptual relation with respect to the event represented by the complement clause. Obviously, the semantic value of the construction imposes semantic restrictions on its component parts. Only the verbs that can express a conceptual relation between Ci and CL2 can occur in the construction.

5.2.2 Types of main verbs The generality of the definition of the CSC is indicative of the variety of verbs that participate in the construction. In this chapter, I will not attempt to provide an inventory of all those verbs, but concentrate on some of the most commonly used ones, namely the verbs of perception, declaration, propositional attitude, volition, and emotion reaction presented in (198)-(212). These five classes, however, do not pretend to be exhaustive. A great number of verbs that do not belong to any of them can nonetheless appear in the construction. For example,

178 Conceptualizing subject constructions

attendre 'wait' as in Jean attend que sa mere revienne 'John is waiting for his mother to return' does not belong to any of the five aforementioned classes, but can be used in a CSC. Note also that attendre is compatible with the meaning of the construction, because it presents Ci's conceptual relation with respect to the event in the complement.63 The perception verbs are introduced in (198) and (199). (198) Paul voit que Marie est malade (IND) 'Paul sees that Mary is sick' (199) Jean a remarque que Marie avait grossi (IND) 'John noticed that Mary had put on weight' Examples (200)-(202) present the declaration verbs. (200) Le docteur dit que nous ne dormons pas assez (IND) 'The doctor says that we do not sleep enough' (201) IIjure qu 'on ne I 'y prendra plus (IND) 'He swears that he won't be caught again' (202) Jean pretend que Marie est malade (IND) 'John claims that Mary is sick' The category of propositional attitude involves the description of any level of certainty (or uncertainty) exhibited by the main clause subject towards the content of the complement structure. The verbs of propositional attitude are illustrated in (203)-(206). (203) Tout le monde pense que Marie est belle (IND) 'Everyone thinks that Mary is beautiful' (204) Je crois que la porte est fermee (IND) Ί believe that the door is locked'

Main verbs and the meaning of the CSC 179

(205) Marie sait que Jean est parti (IND) 'Mary knows that John has left' (206) Je suppose que vous savez ou j 'habite (IND) Ί suppose that you know where I live' The examples in (20) and (208) present the volition verbs. (207) Le directeur veut que tu partes tout de suite (SUBJ) 'The director wants you to leave right away' (208) Papa demande que tu le conduises au bureau (SUBJ) 'Daddy asks that you drive him to work' Finally, the verbs of emotion reaction are introduced in (209)-(212). (209) J'ai peur qu 'il ait compris (SUBJ) 'I'm afraid that he understood' (210) Paul est content que vous soyez revenu (SUBJ) 'Paul is glad that you came back' (211) Marie etait fachee que nous I 'ayons oubliee (SUBJ) 'Mary was angry that we forgot her' (212) Je crains qu 'eile soit perdue (SUBJ) Ί fear that she is lost' The examples in (198)-(212) illustrate the core verb classes that participate in the CSC. The label of verb classes might constitute a convenient heuristic, but it is not entirely satisfactory. A more accurate description of the semantic grouping of a given set of verbs would indicate that all the members of that particular set share important elements of their base. The evocation of those common elements provides their semantic unity, therefore justifying the label of class.

180 Conceptualizing subject constructions

The semantic characterization of each individual verb therefore needs to consider the conceptual base it evokes, as well as the exact nature of the profile it imposes on that base. The different categories that constitute the bases on which the Vi verbs impose their specific profiles correspond to different categories that compose our Western folk model of the mind (D'Andrade 1987). Each category's complex internal structure is organized as an Idealized Cognitive Model (Lakoff 1987), and that ICM figures prominently in the base on which each particular verb imposes its own profile. The semantic investigation of the different verbs will therefore need to consider both the relevant ICMs, and the specific profile imposed by each verb. However, for expository purposes, I will divide the task of semantic investigation between two chapters. Throughout the following sections, I will restrict myself to the specific aspects of the models and verbs that directly bear on the infinitival/finite complement distinction. A more thorough description of the different ICMs, as well as the specific import of each verb is provided in Chapter six, when the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements is investigated. 5.3. Infinitival and finite complements It is now time to investigate the syntactic coding of the complement scene as a finite or infinitival complement. Since the complement clause evokes Ci's conception of a specific scene of the world, it seems reasonable to assume that facet of the world represents a specific instance of the process type profiled by the subordinate verb. The syntactic form of the complement, however, may code that process in a variety of ways. When it is coded as a finite indicative clause, the form of the complement iconically represents its conceptual status of a grounded instance of a process type (Langacker 1991: 33). For example, in Jean croit qu'il comprend 'John believes that he understands', the subordinate process comprendre is anchored to a specific time, with a specific participant. Iconically, the clause that codes it represents an independent event, with its own subject (John) and its own independent grounding. When the complement scene is

Infinitival and finite complements

181

coded as an infinitive, on the other hand, its form does not match its conceptual status. In Jean croit comprendre 'John believes to understand', the process of understanding conceptually refers to a precise situation in time, and its main participant is recognized as John. However, it is not coded as a finite clause, as one might expect for a specific instance, but as an infinitive, which usually codes a process type. We therefore need to explain what motivates the construal of a specific scene as a process type, and the conceptual means by which that construal is possible. In the next section, I first present the data pertaining to the distribution of finite and infinitival complements before proposing an analysis. 5.3.1. The distribution of finite/infinitival complements The verbs of perception (e.g. remarquer 'notice', voir 'see', entendre 'hear') are only felicitous with a finite complement, as illustrated in (213) and (214).64 (213) a. b.

(214) a. b.

Je vois que je grossis tous les jours Ί see that I gain weight every day' *Je vois grossir tous les jours Ί see gaining weight every day' J 'entends que j 'ai gagne le gros lot Ί hear that I won the first prize' *J'entends avoir gagne le gros loF Ί hear to have won the first prize'

The verbs of declaration exhibit a wide range of behaviors. Dire 'say', illustrated in (215) and (216), can be found with an infinitival complement, but the resulting sentence does not always sound very natural, as in (216b). (215) a.

II disait qu 'il etait alle en Amerique 'He said that he went to America'

182 Conceptualizing subject constructions

b.

(216) a. b.

II disait etre alle en Amerique 'He was saying to have been to America' II a dit qu ΊΙ avait vole le vase 'He said that he had stolen the vase' ?Il a dit avoir vole le vase 'He said to have stolen the vase'

Other verbs of declaration such as avouer 'acknowledge', admettre 'admit', reconnaitre 'recognize' illustrated in (217) and (218) are fully compatible with both infinitival and finite complements. (217) a. b.

(218) a.

b.

IIaadmis qu ΊΙa vole le vase 'He admitted that he stole the vase' IIa admis avoir vole le vase 'He admitted stealing the vase' Elle a avoue qu 'eile rentrait tous les soirs ά cinq heures 'She admitted that she came back at five o'clock every night' Elle a avoue rentrer tous les soirs ά cinq heures 'She admitted coming back at five o'clock every night'

The verbs of manner of declaration such as murmurer 'whisper' and balbutier 'mumble' in (219) and (220) are usually infelicitous with an infinitival complement: (219) a. b.

(220) a.

II a murmure qu 'il etait venu ά l'heure 'He whispered that he came on time' *Il a murmure venir ά l'heure 'He whispered to come on time' II a balbutie qu 77 savait la νέηίέ 'He muttered that he knew the truth'

Infinitival and finite complements

b.

183

*Il a balbutie savoir la νέηίέ 'He muttered to know the truth'

The verbs of prepositional attitude (e.g. etre stir 'to be sure', croire 'believe, penser 'think', se douter 'suspect' presented in (221) and (222)) are felicitously followed by both types of complements. (221) a. b.

(222) a. b.

II croit qu ΊΙ comprend 'He believes that he understands' II croit comprendre 'He believes to understand' Elle est sure qu 'elle gagnera 'She is sure that she will win' Elle est sure de gagner 'She is sure to win'

The volition verbs vouloir 'want' and desirer 'desire' cannot be followed by finite complements in case of coreferentiality between the main and subordinate subjects. They are illustrated in (223) and (224). (223) a. b.

(224) a. b.

*Je veux que je revienne a I 'heure Ί want that I come back on time' Je veux revenir a Vheure Ί want to come back on time' *Je desire que je parte en vacances Ί wish that I go on vacation' Je desire partir en vacances Ί wish to go on vacation'

Under specific conditions, however, such as the presence of a passive marker or a modal, these verbs can (at least with some degree of naturalness) be followed by personal complements. This is illus-

184 Conceptualizing subject constructions

trated in (225)-(227) (from Ruwet 1984: 94-95), who first pointed out these facts. (225) a. b.

(226) a. b.

(227) a.

b.

?Je veux que je sois autorise ά partir demain Ί want that I be allowed to leave tomorrow' Je veux etre autorise ά partir demain Ί want to be allowed to leave tomorrow' ?Je veux que je sois enterre dans mon village natal Ί want that I be buried in my native village' Je veux etre entern dans mon village Ί want to be buried in my village' Je veux que je sois en mesure de partir des demain Ί want that I be in a position to leave as early as tomorrow' Je veux etre en mesure de partir des demain Ί want to be in a position to leave as early as tomorrow'

Finally, the verbs of emotion reaction exhibit a behavior very close to the volition verbs. They are usually only followed by an infinitival complement as illustrated in (228)-(230). (228) a. b.

(229) a. b.

Je suis content d'etre rentri Ί am happy to have come back' ??Je suis content que je sois rentre Ί am happy that I have come back' Marie regrette d'avoir abandonne 'Mary regrets to have quit' ??Marie regrette qu 'eile ait abandonne 'Mary regrets that she quit'

Infinitival and finite complements 185

(230) a. b.

Paul est desole d 'avoir perdu sa montre 'Paul is sorry to have lost his watch' ??Paul est desole qu 77 ait perdu sa montre 'Paul is sorry that he lost his watch'

However, if the subordinate clause contains a passive marker or a modal, as illustrated in (231) and (232), the sentences with a finite complement improve significantly. (231) J'aipeur que je doive encore voyager ce week end Ί am afraid that I have to travel again this week end' (232) J'aimerais bien que je puisse enfin lui parier Ί would love that I could at last talk to him' To summarize the data presented in (213)-(232), any satisfactory account of the infinitival/finite complement distribution in French CSCs will have to account for three separate, yet related issues, namely: i) why the verbs of perception and manner of declaration cannot be followed by an infinitival complement, ii) why the verbs of volition and emotion reaction cannot ordinarily be followed by a finite (subjunctive) complement when Ci and S2 are preferential, and iii) what is the conceptual import of the grammatical elements which make it more felicitous for these verbs to be followed by finite complements.66 Before proposing an analysis of these three issues, a methodological note is in order. The presentation of finite and infinitival complements in distributional terms constitutes some departure from the way in which these constructions are usually considered. It was already pointed out in Chapter three that the approach illustrated in this monograph differs from structural solutions in its attention to distributional issues. This difference must also be pointed out here, because it determines both the scope and methodology of the analysis. Structural accounts of the data in (213)-(232) have focused on the examination of two specific issues, namely control, and obviation.

186 Conceptualizing subject constructions

Control structures are constructions where one argument of the complement verb is left unrealized, because it is understood as coreferential with an argument of the matrix verb (its controller). For example, (221b) and (222b) present cases of subject control, because the controller is the subject of the matrix verb (Comrie 1985, Farrell 1995, Manzini 1983, Pollard and Sag 1991, Rooryck 1990, Rosenbaum 1967, Ruwet 1983 inter alia). Similarly, the ungrammaticality of the finite complement in (223a) and (224a) has been extensively studied, and traditionally referred to as "obviation". Verbs are said to have obviative complements when "the subject in the subordinate clause must be disjoint in reference from certain NPs in the immediately higher clause" (Farkas 1992: 85). If control and obviation have each received a great deal of attention in the literature, the opposite phenomenon from obviation, namely the impossibility for an infinitival complement to follow the perception verbs (and some declaration verbs) as in (213b) and (214b) has gone virtually unnoticed, because it does not present any particular structural interest. In this chapter, I show that the control, obviation, and perception cases are different manifestations of the same general construal principles, and that they should be considered together. This kind of analysis is in sharp contrast with existing accounts of control and obviation for two reasons. First, the two constructions are generally considered as related but separate phenomena, and secondly, most solutions invoke construction-specific mechanisms to structurally explain the surface form of each construction. With respect to the first point, control and obviation are shown to be essentially a matter of perspective. The distribution of the complements in (213)-(232) results from a fine interplay between the perspective imposed on the complement scene, the semantics of the main verb, and properties specific to the speech situation. As indicated in the hypothesis postulated at the beginning of this chapter, the impossibility for a main verb to have a specific kind of complement is imputable to the specific viewing arrangement imposed by the semantics of the main verb, and the specificity of the situation where the main and complement clause subjects are coreferential. With respect to the second point, it is shown

Infinitival andfinitecomplements 187 that no construction-specific mechanism is needed once the notion of perspective is recognized. In the remainder of this section, I show that the semantics of the perception verbs force their subjects to construe the object

of

perception with maximum objectivity, regardless of whether the main participant in the subordinate relation is coreferential or not with the perceiver. These verbs will be analyzed as perfectly illustrating the optimal viewing arrangement ( O V A ) . Because of their semantics, the verbs of volition, on the other hand, tend to impose a more subjective construal on the complement scene. Consequently, they will be treated as pure cases of the egocentric viewing arrangement ( E V A ) . In cases where the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential, the subjective construal of the subordinate subject (S2) naturally follows from the semantics of the volition verbs. The other verb classes will be shown to make the two kinds of viewing arrangement available to Ci, the choice between the O V A and E V A being determined by pragmatic considerations.

5.3.2. Viewing arrangement and syntactic realization The relation between the viewing

arrangement

imposed

on

the

complement scene and the syntactic realization of the subordinate clause represents the core of the analysis, and it must be further explored. The crucial element in the difference of viewing arrangement between finite clauses and infinitival complements concerns the exact nature of the object of conceptualization, and more specifically the role of the main participant in the subordinate relation as an object or subject of conceptualization. The coding of the complement as a finite clause or an infinitival complement reflects the precise nature of what the main clause subject Ci externalizes as an object of conceptualization. When the complement is coded as a finite clause, it is construed with maximum objectivity from the vantage point of Ci. Crucially, the main participant in the subordinate relation is also construed objectively, as an object of conceptualization. It is on stage, profiled as the trajector

188 Conceptualizing subject constructions

in the subordinate relation. The clause itself, including its main participant is the object of conceptualization of Ci. The object of thought of Ci is a particular individual (the subordinate subject) engaged in the activity profiled by the subordinate verb. Note that this configuration maximizes the asymmetry between Ci and S2, since they are respectively treated as subject and object of conceptualization. The viewing arrangement of a finite clause is presented in Figure 37. objective axis

V point

predication CL2

Figure 37: Finite clauses: OVA For ease of exposition, the figures in this chapter only represent the speaker's conceptualization (the objective scene CLi), and the viewing organization within that scene. The speaker herself, as well as the main conceptualizing relation are not represented. Figure 37 illustrates the OVA. The complement clause is viewed as an object of conceptualization from the vantage point of Ci. Importantly, the subordinate subject S2 is also on stage, and thus objectively construed. The viewing arrangement expressed by the presence of an infinitival complement reflects the blurring of the asymmetry between subject and object of conceptualization. S2 is not viewed as part of the object of conceptualization, but as the specific point from which the complement clause is conceptualized. More specifically, the conceptualizer is of course Ci, but Ci construes CL2 from the vantage point of S2. This is possible since the two are coreferential. The object of conceptualization of Ci is only the activity profiled by the subordinate verb, viewed from the vantage point of someone engaged in it, and not the existence or identity of the individual engaged in that activity. The viewing arrangement of infinitival complements is illustrated in Figure 38.

Infinitival andfinite complements

189

objective axis

/

'N

A

A

scope of

( c ^ w a / w — ' V point

CL2

predication

Figure 38: Infinitival complements: EVA Figure 38 illustrates the EVA, because the complement clause is conceptualized from inside its scope of predication. CL2 is conceptualized from the vantage point of Ci occupying the position of S2. If we take seriously the claim that the subjective construal of S2 explains the presence of an infinitival complement, several points need to be made specific. The first concerns the correlation between the subjective construal of an entity and the latter's lack of explicit mention. Langacker (1985) notes that the objective construal of an entity is often indicated by the explicit mention of that entity, whereas the subjective construal of an entity is expressed by the lack of explicit mention of that entity. For example, in John is across the table from me, the reference point (from) me is put on stage. It is thus construed objectively and explicitly mentioned. In John is sitting across the table, the reference point is not put on stage, but construed subjectively and not explicitly mentioned. Note that the French data presented in this chapter are very similar. The objective construal of S2 in the case of a finite clause is accompanied by its explicit mention, whereas the subjective construal of S2 in the case of an infinitival complement is reflected by its lack of explicit mention.67 The second point concerns the correlation between the subject's lack of explicit mention and the presence of an infinitival complement in the subordinate clause. Recall that the main difference between infinitival and finite complements is that infinitival complements are not grounded, i.e. include no person, tense, or mood predications (Langacker 1991: 33). Note that different levels of grounding can be observed. An indicative clause can be said to be fully grounded because it includes both person and tense markers. A subjunctive clause is only partially grounded because it does not include tense

190 Conceptualizing subject constructions

markers, but it still contains person markers which relate the complement to the speech situation (to be explored in detail in Chapter six). It therefore seems that in French (and quite possibly in several other languages), person markers constitute the minimum grounding, and that other verbal grounding predications cannot occur unless person markers are also present. If the subordinate subject is not explicitly mentioned, person marking on the verb is not needed, and the complement is expressed as a process type, not considered with respect to the speech situation. Note that the analysis presented here can easily account for the fact that the subjective construal of the subordinate subject in CSCs is only possible in French when the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential. Recall that CSCs describe the conceptualization of Cj. If Ci and S2 are different, the subordinate subject has no conceptualizing role. It is only when Ci conceptualizes her own participation (as S2) in the complement process that she can adopt S2's vantage point to construe CL 2 . Finally, we need to provide semantic/conceptual motivation for the analysis, or in other words validate positing S2 as a subject or object of conceptualization. In the next section, I will show that the construal of S2 as a subject or object of conceptualization depends on the conceptual distance existing between Si and CL2 (and therefore S2). The notion of conceptual distance will become clearer when we consider the semantics of the particular Vi verbs. It will be shown that: i) conceptual distance is partially determined by the semantics of Vi, and ii) it can be modified by the presence of specific grammatical elements in the subordinate clause.68

5.4. Main verbs and complement structures This section explores the claim that the verbs of perception and volition impose viewing arrangements representative of the O V A and E V A respectively between their subject and their complement scene, while the other verbs are compatible with both viewing arrangements depending on the situation.

Main verbs and complement structures 191

5.4.1. The perception verbs and the optimal viewing arrangement Part of our ICM of perception views objects as part of the outside world, and we establish contact with some of them through our senses. Nouns following verbs of perception therefore illustrate the purest perceptual relation between the subject and object (D'Andrade 1987). That perceptual contact with an outside object is illustrated in (233) and (234). (233) Marie voit les roses 'Mary sees the roses' (234) Paul entend la cloche 'Paul hears the bell' Example (233) presents visual contact between Marie and the roses.69 In (234), the contact between Paul and the complement is established through hearing. In (233) and (234), the object of perception is placed at a comfortable distance from the perceiver, so that the act of perception can be as efficient as possible.70 Because it profiles the contact existing between a perceiver and an entity with its own independent existence outside that perceiver, a perceptual relation maximizes the subject/object asymmetry. In other words, it presents a perfect illustration of the OVA. A consequence of the viewing organization implicit to a perceptual relation is that the object of perception is always construed objectively. This is true regardless of the nature of that object, i.e. whether it is coreferential to the subject or different from it (Ruwet 1984). Let us take an example. In a VOV construction presented in Chapter three, the presence of an object of perception coreferential to the subject yields the same result as a different object. This is illustrated in (235) and (236). (23 5) Je vois Marie vieillir jour apres jour Ί see Mary getting old day after day'

192 Conceptualizing subject constructions

(236) a. b.

Je me vois vieillir jour apres jour71 Ί see myself getting older day after day' *Je vois vieillir jour apres jour Ί see getting older day after day'

Examples (235) and (236) show that a perceptual relation does not treat a situation where both subject and object are coreferential differently from a situation where the subject and object are non-coreferential (Ruwet 1984). In terms of the analysis proposed here, the object of perception must be construed objectively in both cases (and thus explicitly mentioned), and it is coded as the landmark of the perception verb. A distinction is warranted at this point between the related concepts of the objective construal of an entity, and the conceptual distance existing between the conceptualizer and the entity conceptualized. So far, we have argued that the conceptual distance between the conceptualizer and the conceptualized entity is greater when the former construes the latter objectively than subjectively. However, the notions of objective construal and conceptual distance must retain some degree of independence. To illustrate that point, consider the pair of examples in (237) and (238). (237) Je vois Marie courir (INF) Ί see Mary run' (23 8) Je vois que Marie court (IND)72 Ί see that Mary runs' The sentence in (237) illustrates the VOV construction again, where the main verb has two objects of perception, namely the main participant in the subordinate process, and that process itself (see Chapter three). In (238), the object of perception is a more abstract entity, represented by a finite clause. The contrast between (237) and (238) has frequently been noted in the literature (Schwartze 1974, Lemhagen 1979 Kleiber 1988 inter alia). The consensus is that the difference is

Main verbs and complement structures 193

primarily a matter of direct versus indirect perception. The structure with an infinitive necessarily involves the perception of an object (Marie in (237)), whereas the finite complement in (238) does not imply that Marie was actually seen. Furthermore, the infinitival complements exhibit necessary temporal co-occurrence with the main verb, which is not the case for the final clauses (Schwartze 1974: 22). Bolinger (1974) expresses the contrast between (237) and (238) in terms of the opposition between a "percept" and a "concept". Example (237) expresses a precept, because of the direct perceptual contact existing between the main subject and the object of perception. In (238), the object of perception is viewed as a facet of the main clause subject's conception of reality (to be explained in detail in the next chapter). Bolinger notes that the presence of a finite complement after a verb of perception necessarily involves greater conceptual distance between the subject and the object of perception than when the verb is followed by an infinitive.73 I fully agree with Bolinger's view, but the distinction he notes must be further explicated in terms of the constructs used in this monograph, and in particular with the claim that the object of perception is always construed objectively. I argue that Marie in (237) and que Marie court in (238) are both construed objectively, and that the greater conceptual distance between the subject je and Marie results from the nature of the object of perception. Marie is the object in (237), that is to say she is the secondary figure of the profiled relation. This is not the case in (238), which presents an interaction with a "propositionalized" event, i.e. an event that includes its position with respect to reality (this will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter), and where Marie is only a part. Marie is not part of the main relation, and can only be accessed as part of the subordinate clause. The conceptual distance between je and Marie is therefore greater, because the latter is only a part of the object of perception, and it is not directly part of the relation profiled by the main verb. Note, however, that the greater conceptual distance in the case of a subordinate clause is (at least in some measure) independent from the objective construal of the object of perception.74

194 Conceptualizing subject constructions

The optimal viewing arrangement they impose between their subject and object represents an important semantic/conceptual characteristic of the verbs of perception. That semantic property explains why in a CSC, the whole CL2 clause must be construed objectively from Ci's vantage point. The participation of S2 in the relation profiled by V2 is also construed objectively. Importantly, the coreferentiality of Ci and S2 does not change the type of viewing arrangement existing between subject and object. The subordinate clause is necessarily construed objectively, and the conceptual distance between Ci and S2 is such that S2 cannot be treated as a conceptualizing presence, i.e. construed subjectively. 5.4.2 The volition verbs and the egocentric viewing arrangement As indicated earlier, the verbs of volition such as vouloir 'want', and ctesirer 'desire' present the most resistance to finite (subjunctive) complements in cases of coreferentiality. As was shown to be the case with the perception verbs, I show here that the impossibility of a finite complement following verbs of volition in cases of coreferentiality results from the combination of the semantics of the main verb and the special situation where the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential. When Ci and S2 are coreferential, they are so conceptually close that S2 cannot be construed objectively, unless outside elements increase the conceptual distance between Ci and S2. As expectedly, the construal of S2 as a conceptualizing presence is reflected in the infinitival form of the complement. The previous section showed that the conceptual distance between the subject and the complement imposed by the verbs of perception is manifested in the objective construal of the complement scene, and hence of the participants in that scene. The verbs of volition present the opposite case. The type of viewing arrangement existing between their subject and their complement exemplifies the EVA, where the subject/object asymmetry is blurred, and the subject of conceptualization's presence in the scope of predication of the complement makes it very close to the latter conceptually. Given that specific arrangement,

Main verbs and complement structures 195

the most natural construal of CL2 (by Ci) in cases of coreferentiality is from the vantage point of S2. The latter is therefore viewed as a conceptualizing subject, and not as an object of conceptualization. In order to argue in favor of this hypothesis, we need to show that: i) independently of the CSC, the subject of vouloir imposes an EVA between its subject and complement, and ii) the specific situation where Si and S2 are coreferential has special relevance for the verbs of volition. We have seen that a verb of perception profiles the perceptual contact existing between its subject and object, i.e. an entity perceived with its own existence in the world, independently of the subject. This is once again illustrated in (239). (239) Paul voit une orange 'Paul sees an orange' In (239), the orange exists independently, and Paul makes contact with it.75 The situation is different with the verbs of volition. Consider (240). (240) Paul veut une orange 'Paul wants an orange' The orange in (240) is not (necessarily) part of the external world, but may exist exclusively as Paul's conceptualization. The object of a wanting relation does not need to exist independently of the subject. A wanting relation can emerge out of the conceptualization of an object alone, and in that sense can be exclusively conceptualizer-internal. We can say in other words that the object of a wanting relation is a creation of the subject. Note that it is of course possible to desire an object existing independently in reality, but in that case, the wanting relation is superimposed on the perceptual/conceptual relation. The important point is that unlike a perceptual relation, the independent existence of the object of desire is not a prerequisite for a wanting relation.76

196 Conceptualizing subject constructions

Similarly, when vouloir is used in a CSC, the event profiled in the complement represents the favored outcome for the main clause subject, and in that sense is again the creation of the subject. Regardless of its use in a particular grammatical construction, the most important facet of the meaning of vouloir for our purposes is that its complement content is subject-internal in the sense that it has no necessary independent existence outside the subject's conceptualization of it. Because the object is necessarily the conceptual product of the subject, vouloir blurs the asymmetry between subject and object. The complements of volition verbs are conceptually much closer to their subjects than the complements of perception verbs because the content of the complement is not external to the main clause conceptualizer but conceived by her alone. In the same way as the distance between subject and object introduced by the perception verbs illustrates the OVA, the conceptual proximity between the two arguments introduced by vouloir can be said to illustrate the EVA. Given the particular viewing arrangement of vouloir, coreferentiality between main and subordinate subjects is quite different from a situation of non-coreferentiality, because it further reduces the conceptual distance between subject and object. In both cases, CL2 represents the conceptualization of Ci, an event conceived of by Ci alone. However, when the main participant in CL2 is different from Ci, it cannot be treated as a conceptualizing subject, and must therefore be objectively construed. The whole clause, including its main participants is the object of conceptualization. On the other hand, when Ci and S2 are coreferential, the sentence describes Ci's conceptualization of her participation in a particular activity. Since that activity is the sole creation of Ci, the latter's most natural vantage point is S2's. S2 is thus most naturally construed as a conceptualizing presence, not itself conceptualized and not specifically mentioned. The object of conceptualization is the activity alone. To phrase it differently, what Ci externalizes as an object of thought is only the activity profiled by the infinitive, viewed from her own vantage point of someone engaging in it, and not her own existence or identity as the person engaging in it.

Main verbs and complement structures 197

Let us illustrate the analysis with an example. Consider Ruwet's paradigmatic Je veuxpartir Ί want to leave'. The subjects of vouloir and partir are coreferential (je), and the complement scene CL2 represents the conceptual creation of Ci. The vantage point from which Ci construes her participation in the complement scene is from within that scene, and more specifically from the vantage point of S2. S2 is therefore viewed as a conceptualizing presence, and not as an object of conceptualization, and it is not specifically mentioned. The process alone (partir) represents the object of conceptualization. We can now understand how a specific situation conceptualized by Ci can be linguistically coded by a bare infinitive. The lack of explicit mention of the participant in the subordinate process follows from its subjective construal, and the lack of person marking on the verb follows from the lack of explicit mention of the subject. It seems reasonable to claim that a wanting relation is primarily selfdirected. With respect to this analysis, one could hypothesize that the coreferential cases are most representative of the viewing arrangement imposed by vouloir on its complement scene. Under this hypothesis, vouloir would inherently impose a subjective construal on its complement, and finite clauses would only be possible when additional distance is established between Ci and CL2. This is possible in two cases. First, when Ci is different from S2 (non-coreferentiality), and second if the presence of specific grammatical elements (modals or passive voice, for example) increases the distance between Ci and S2 in cases of coreferentiality. Recall that the addition of a passive marker or a modal to the subordinate clause greatly improves the felicity of finite complements with the volition verbs. This was illustrated by Ruwet's (1984) data in (225)-(227), repeated here for convenience. (225) a. b.

?Je veux que je sois autorise ά partir demain Ί want that I be allowed to leave tomorrow' Je veux etre autorise ά partir demain Ί want to be allowed to leave tomorrow'

198 Conceptualizing subject constructions

(226) a. b.

(227) a.

b.

?Je veux que je sots enterre dans mon village natal Ί want that I be buried in my native village' Je veux etre enterre dans mon village Ί want to be buried in my village' Je veux que je sois en mesure de partir des demain Ί want that I be in a position to leave as early as tomorrow' Je veux etre en mesure de partir des demain Ί want to be in a position to leave as early as tomorrow'

The data in (225)-(227) find a natural explanation in the analysis developed here. The conceptual distance between Ci and CL2 is the most reduced when Ci wishes to participate in an event she also initiates and is entirely responsible for, or to state it differently, when there is no outside influence which bears on the realization of the event. (Ruwet 1984, Farkas 1992). When the complement contains a modal or a passive, the participation of S2 in V2 is mediated by forces out of Ci's control (an external agent in the case of a passive, or some undetermined conditions in the case of a modal). These outside forces make it easier to construe S2 as an object of conceptualization by increasing the conceptual distance between Ci and S2's actual participation in CL2. Increasing conceptual distance is reflected by the greater felicity of a finite clause in the complement. Notice that the treatment of obviative complements in terms of an inherent subjective construal imposed by the main verb is exactly the reverse from the account given of perception verbs. The inherently objective construal imposed by the perception verbs on their complement process renders a more subjective construal of CL2 difficult. With the obviative complements, the conceptual closeness between Ci and CL2 makes for a preferred subjective construal of the conceptualizer's involvement in the subordinate process. In the case of coreferentiality, where the conceptual distance between Ci and S2 (and therefore CL2) is the shortest, the use of a finite clause is generally

Main verbs and complement structures

199

infelicitous. It is only with the increase in conceptual distance provided by independent markers (cf. Ruwet's data) that the role of the trajector of the complement relation can receive an objective construal, and hence be explicitly mentioned. 5.4.3. The verbs of emotion reaction The case of the verbs of emotion reaction is very similar to the volition verbs, at least as far as the viewing arrangement they impose between their subjects and complements. The emotion reaction verbs profile Ci's reaction to the event profiled by CL2. They are predominantly factive (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, Karttunen 1971), because they presuppose the truth of their complement. For example, in Je suis content qu'eile soit partie Ί am glad that she left', the complement qu 'eile soit partie is presumed to have occurred. However, the verbs indicating fear, such as craindre 'fear', or avoirpeur 'to be scared' are not factive. For example, in Marie a peur d'etre malade 'Mary is afraid of being sick', the complement is not presupposed true. If the volition verbs are conceptually close to their complements by virtue of the complements being subject-internal, the subject of the emotion reaction verbs is close enough to the event profiled in the complement to allow for that event to trigger a reaction. In Jean est content qu 'elle soit partie 'John is happy that she left', the subject Jean is close enough to the process in the complement to feel joy about it. It therefore seems reasonable to claim that the verbs of emotion reaction involve a reduced conceptual distance between their subject and their object. When Si and S2 are coreferential, as for example in Marie est contente d'etre revenue 'Mary is glad to have come back', Ci is expressing a reaction towards an event she was part of. The conceptual distance between Ci and CL2 is expectedly rather short, since the evocation of the reaction recalls the experience. In case of coreferentiality, S2 constitutes a natural vantage point for Ci to construe the complement scene. The construal of the complement scene from an internal vantage point is not surprising. It could be paraphrased as

200 Conceptualizing subject constructions

reliving (or living in anticipation if the verb is not factive) the event expressed in the subordinate clause. The presence of the grammatical markers that increase the conceptual distance between the subject and the complement has the same effect on the verbs of emotion reaction than it has on the volition verbs. Consequently, the felicity of finite complements when the subordinate clause contains a passive or a modal can be analyzed the same way as it was for the volition verbs. One difference between the verbs of volition and the verbs of emotion reaction concerns the presence of the preposition de preceding the infinitive with the verbs of emotion reaction. Consistent with the general claim of the analysis, de is a meaningful element, and its meaning needs to be compatible with that of the other elements of the construction. It was argued in Chapter two that the presence of the preposition de indicates an intrinsic relation between two entities. In the case of the emotion reaction verbs, the two entities are the two relations profiled by the two verbs of the sentence, namely the event expressed in the subordinate clause and the reaction triggered by that event. The presence of de makes specific the relation existing between the event and the reaction it triggers in Ci. If the presence of de poses no more problems than the presence of ά in the VOV construction following forcer in Chapter three, one could wonder why it is found primarily with the verbs of emotion reaction. I believe that the use of the preposition is explainable with the emotion reaction verbs, because unlike that of other verbs, the complement is in some measure established independently of Ci. Consider for example the difference between Je veux aller au cinema Ί want to go to the movies' and Je suis content d'aller au cinema Ί am happy to go to the movies'. With vouloir, we have seen that the event of going to the movies is solely initiated by Ci, and does not need to exist independently. With etre content, the action of going to the movies is presented as existing independently, but not necessarily initiated by Ci. The arrangements may have been made without Ci's knowledge for example. Ci reacts to an existing situation, and the presence of de can be explained precisely because the two event are not connected by the mere fact of being both conceived by Ci. The relation between the two therefore

Main verbs and complement structures 201

needs to be made explicit. With the non-factive verbs, the complement content is also presented independently from Ci, because the latter has no control over its occurrence. For example, in Marie a peur de ne pas reconnaitre son amie 'Mary is afraid not to recognize her friend', the event of not recognizing her friend is presented as a "fact of life", possibly occuring outside of Mary's control. The preposition de makes specific the relation between Mary's fears and the possible occurrence presented in the complement which is beyond her control. This analysis also explains the presence of de with verbs other than emotion reaction, such as attendre 'wait', which behave in a way similar to the emotion reaction verbs. For example, in J'attends d'avoir de l'argent Ί am waiting to have money', the event of having money must occur independently of Ci, i.e. to be an established facet of reality. A final problem remains, namely whether the presence of de calls into question the validity of a subjective construal of the complement scene. One could argue that de is a complementizer (Huot 1981), and that its presence preceding the infinitive has the same objectifying effect as other complementizers are argued to have (see Chapter six). If this were the case, an analysis of the infinitive as the sign of the subjective construal of the complement scene would be misguided. In order to answer this objection, two elements need to be kept separate, namely i) the conceptual distance between Ci and CL2, and ii) the viewing arrangement existing between them. With respect to i), it is true that since the subordinate clause is viewed independently from Ci, the complement of the emotion reaction verbs may not be as close conceptually to Ci as the complement of the volition verbs where CL2 is the sole conception of Ci. However, the specific mention of the intrinsic relation existing between the subordinate event and the reaction it triggers has little bearing on the viewing arrangement existing between Ci and CL2. As was indicated earlier, the notions of conceptual distance and objective/subjective construal are related, yet independent. Even though the conceptual distance between subject and object is not as short as with the volition verbs, it is nonetheless short enough to require a subjective construal of the subordinate subject in cases of coreferentiality.77

202 Conceptualizing subject constructions

We have so far dealt only with the verbs that exclusively illustrate the OVA and the EVA. However, most verbs can impose either a subjective or objective construal on the complement scene. In order to strengthen the analysis, we now need to isolate some of the specific conditions that favor a particular viewing arrangement when both are possible. In the rest of this chapter, I consider some examples taken from the verbs of propositional attitude and declaration. 5.4.4. Alternative construals With respect to the dimension of perspective, the verbs of perception and volition have been shown to be polar opposites, because they respectively impose an OVA and EVA between their subject and object. That polarity makes intuitive sense because it echoes the basic human concerns about the matters of the self and the matters of the outside world. The imposition of a particular viewing arrangement is part of the verbs of perception and volition's semantic structure, which explains why they are not easily compatible with the opposite construal. In between these polar opposites, however, the great majority of verbs do not impose a particular viewing arrangement between their subjects and objects. For each situation, the main subject therefore has a choice between an objective and subjective construal of her participation in the subordinate process. It should be clear that the purpose of this section is not to determine every factor responsible for the selection of infinitival or finite complements for the verbs that present that option. This would involve many complicated issues, which are difficult to isolate and put to the test, because they ultimately amount to speaker choice. I merely wish to show the relevance of an analysis based on the notions of subjectivity/objectivity to the study of verbs other than volition and perception, and show that the same principles of viewing organization observed in the case of vouloir and the perception verbs are also at work in the optional cases. The subjectivity / objectivity analysis of the infinitival/finite complement distribution rests on the construal of S2 as a subject or object of

Main verbs and complement structures 203

conceptualization. This straightforwardly allows us to capture the intuition that when a verb is followed by an infinitival complement, its subject is somehow more implicated or involved in the complement process than when the same verb is followed by a finite complement. Compare for instance (241) and (242). (241) Jean espere qu ΊΙ reviendra ä l'heure 'John hopes that he will come back on time' (242) Jean espere revenir a l'heure 'John hopes to come back on time' Both sentences are equally felicitous. However, intuitively, the main subject in (242) is more committed to the realization of the complement process (or at least more eager for the realization of that process) than in (241), where he seems more detached. This intuition is well captured in the analysis proposed here, where the infinitive in (242) indicates that the main subject construes the complement clause from the vantage point of someone involved in it already (S2). The intuition concerning sentences such as (242) is corroborated by the situation following croire 'believe'. Croire has two meanings—it can denote the subject's uncertainty about something, or the fact that the subject holds a certain belief. Interestingly, when the verb conveys the uncertainty of its subject, the presence of an infinitival complement is rather strange. (243) a.

b.

Je crois que je joue a six heures (mais je ne suis pas sür) Ί believe that I play at six o'clock (but I am not sure)' ??Je crois jouer ά six heures (mais je ne suis pas sür) Ί believe to play at six o'clock (but I am not sure)'

204 Conceptualizing subject constructions

(244) a.

b.

Je crois que j 'ai un rendez-vous demain (mais je suis pas sur) Ί believe that I have an appointment tomorrow am not sure)' ??Je crois avoir un rendez-vous demain (mais je suis pas sur) Ί believe that I have an appointment tomorrow am not sure)'

ne (but I ne (but I

Conversely, when the subject holds a certain belief, wrong as it might be, the presence of an infinitival complement is perfectly felicitous. (245) Je croyais avoir un rendez-vous hier, mais je m 'etais trompel Ί believed to have an appointment yesterday, but I was wrong!' (246) J'ai couru, je croyais etre en retard Ί ran, I thought to be late' The facts presented in (243)-(246) are consistent with the analysis presented earlier. The main subject is closer, more involved in the complement process when the latter describes a belief she holds, rather than when it presents a fact whose position with respect to reality she is still trying to assess. Consequently, she is more likely to construe her participation in that process more subjectively. Note also that a finite clause often felicitously indicates the subject's lack of particular enthusiasm (again, a certain detachment) towards the complement process. In (247) and (248), A is a baby-sitter. Β asks him what she is going to do today. The two sentences constitute A's response. (247) a.

Je pense que j 'irai encore a la piscine. La mere veut toujours que j 'y emmene les enfants Ί think that I'll go to the pool again. The mother always wants me to take the kids there'

Main verbs and complement structures 205

b.

??Je pense aller encore ά la piscine. La mere veut toujours que j 'y emmene les enfants Ί think to go to the pool again. The mother always wants me to take the kids there'

(248) Je pense aller ά la piscine. IIfait beau, et les enfants aiment ςα Ί think to go to the pool. The weather is nice and the kids like it' In (247), the baby-sitter is following orders, and shows no particular enthusiasm towards the complement process. Importantly, it is not her idea. The example in (248) presents her own decision. She is therefore expected to be more involved in it. Note that the situation described in (247) and (248) is reminiscent of the analysis of the influence of the passive and modal markers on the possible use of a finite clause following vouloir. In both instances, the presence of outside forces (the mother in (247) and (248)) seems to facilitate a more objective construal of the subordinate subject. The last examples presented in this section concern the verbs of declaration. Recall that not all verbs of declaration are equally felicitous with an infinitival complement (Lemhagen 1979, Postal 1974). To briefly recapitulate the facts, dire 'say' can be followed by an infinitive, but the result is not always very natural. Other verbs such as avouer 'admit', reconnoitre 'recognize' and pretendre 'claim' are totally natural followed by an infinitival complement. Finally, the verbs of manner of declaration such as crier 'scream' or murmurer 'whisper' cannot be followed by an infinitival complement. This distribution is predicted by the analysis proposed here. It was shown in the preceding section that the involvement (or enthusiasm) of the main clause subject towards the complement clause is often marked by a subjective construal of S2. It therefore comes as no surprise that among the verbs of declaration, the verbs which are felicitous with an infinitival complement are precisely those where Ci shows the most emotion reaction towards the content of the complement process. Intuitively for now, but it will be considered in more

206 Conceptualizing subject constructions

detail in Chapter six, the complement of avouer 'admit', pretendre 'pretend' and reconnaitre 'recognize' profile a statement which is not merely transmitted to the hearer, but also defended against adversity (for pretendre) or resigned to in the case of reconnaitre and avouer. It is therefore expected that they should most naturally allow the subjective construal of S2's role in CL2. For example, in Jean α ανοιιέ avoir vole la voiture 'John admitted having stolen the car', one can expect that the topic of the stolen car has already been debated, and that John's acknowledgment of his participation in it was heavily solicited. On the other hand, the verbs that cannot be followed by infinitival complements present no emotional involvement by their subject with respect to the complement content. Dire is usually merely concerned with the transmission of information, and the verbs of manner of declaration specifically emphasize the nature of the delivery of the message. The manner in which a message is delivered can convey a specific emotion—one reacts differently to a muttered message than a shouted one—but it does not per se indicate any emotional involvement in the message conveyed (c.f. examples (219) and (220)). Note however that when it is used with an infinitival complement, the meaning of dire is quite close to that of admettre or pretendre, as illustrated in (249). (249) J 'ai jamais dit I 'avoir rencontre Ί never said to have met him' Here again, the use of a finite clause introduces a certain distance between the main clause subject and the complement clause. When the subject intends to dissociate herself from the complement content, a finite complement is generally the chosen option. Consider (250). (250) a.

b.

Je reconnais que je suis coupable, mats je ne merite pas la prison Ί admit that I am guilty, but I do not deserve jail' ?Je reconnais etre coupable, mais je ne merite pas la prison Ί admit to be guilty, but I do not deserve jail'

Main verbs and complement structures 207

In (250), in order to plead her case, the subject can legitimately be expected to show that the guilty person and the one standing in front of the court are as far apart as possible. The finite clause is preferred because it emphasizes the distance between these two conceptions of the main subject. 5.5. Discussion and conclusion The specific form of infinitival and finite complements in French CSCs has been imputed to a difference in perspective along the objective axis. The critical point concerns the construal of the subordinate subject S2 as a subject or object of conceptualization. When it is realized as finite complement, CL2 is construed objectively, from the vantage point of Ci. S2 is also construed objectively, i.e. as an object of conceptualization, and explicitly mentioned. The markings on the subordinate verb follow the explicit mention of the subordinate subject. That type of viewing arrangement was identified as the optimal viewing arrangement Langacker (1985, 1991). Infinitival complements have been argued to illustrate the egocentric viewing arrangement. They reflect Ci's subjective construal of the complement scene, or more specifically the construal of CL2 from the vantage point of S2 that is to say from a vantage point internal to CL2. S2 is thus construed as a conceptualizing subject, and not explicitly mentioned. The infinitival process represents the sole object of conceptualization. The coding of the subordinate process as an infinitive naturally follows the lack of explicit mention of the subordinate subject. The distribution of the complements with the different main verbs has been shown to result from the semantic compatibility between meaningful elements. As part of their semantic structure, the verbs of perception have been shown to inherently impose an objective construal on the complement scene (and particularly on S2). The fact that it is difficult for the perception verbs to be followed by infinitival complements is a manifestation of that inherent objective construal. As part of their semantic structure, the verbs of volition have been shown

208 Conceptualizing subject constructions

to impose a subjective construal on the complement scene. The inherent presence of Ci in the scope of predication of CL2 combined with the minimal conceptual distance existing between Ci and S2 in the cases where the two are coreferential renders the subjective construal of S2 almost necessary, unless other elements (a passive marker or a modal) increase the distance between Ci and S2. Other verbs allow more freedom to Ci to construe the complement scene objectively or subjectively, and pragmatic properties of the speech situation dictate the speaker's choice between two possible construals of the complement scene. As a conclusion, I would like to specifically discuss two aspects of this chapter, namely: i) its focus on the distribution of infinitival/finite complements in French, and ii) its method of analysis, that is to say a strict reliance on the semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement structure. With respect to i), the scope of this chapter represents some departure from the current trend in linguistic research which tends to focus on the structural specificity of individual constructions, and not on the distribution of these constructions. In this section, I show that my account of the distribution of the complement forms represents a complement to a general theory of control. With respect to ii), the example of obviation is used to show that distributional issues are better explained by invoking semantic compatibility than by positing construction-particular devices. Even though it involves the description of infinitival complements, the solution presented here cannot be considered a theory of control because the issues of control and distribution are different in scope. A theory of control aims to predict and explain the nature of the binding between the argument structure of the main and subordinate predicates. For example, it can explain why in Jean pense partir 'John thinks that he will leave', the subject of the main verb Jean is also viewed as the subject of the subordinate verb partir, whereas in Jean demands a Marie de partir 'John asks Mary to leave', it is the indirect object of the main verb Marie which is the controller of the subordinate verb partir. The issue of controller choice was not even raised in this chapter, because subject control cases were the sole focus of

Discussion and conclusion

209

investigation. However, an analysis of the distribution of infinitival complements is needed to complement control theories, because such theories cannot predict the syntactic realization of the complement. In other words they cannot account for the distributional difference between the presence of an infinitival complement and a finite clause in Jean pense qu 'ilpartira 'John thinks that he will leave', for example. The complementarity of the two analyses is clear. A theory of control indicates which main clause argument is the controller in the case of an infinitival complement, a distributional account explains why that infinitival structure is chosen over the competing finite clause construction. Given their complementarity, it is not surprising that the analysis developed here shares several important characteristics with the semantic accounts of control (Farkas 1988, Farrell 1995, inter alia). First, like these analyses, my solution considers the semantics of the main verb partly responsible for the choice of the complement structure. Secondly, all semantic accounts invoke some notion of conceptual distance. For example, in Farrell (1995), the "principle of minimum distance" between the arguments of the main predicate and the subordinate verb is shown to account for a major part of the control phenomena. In Farkas's (1988) account, the presence of a specific responsibility (RESP) feature explains the choice of the controller. The participant which holds the RESP relation with respect to the subordinate process is likely to be the controller of that process. Certain aspects of Farkas's RESP feature can be viewed as another way of evaluating conceptual distance. To take just one example, consider (247) and (248), repeated here for convenience. (247) a.

Je pense que j 'irai encore a la piscine. La mere veut toujours que j 'y emmene les en/ants Ί think that I'll go to the pool again. The mother always wants me to take the kids there'

210 Conceptualizing subject constructions

b.

??Je pense aller encore a la piscine. La mere veut toujours que j 'y emmene les enfants Ί think to go to the pool again. The mother always wants me to take the kids there'

(248) Je pense aller a la piscine. IIfait beau, et les enfants aiment ςα Ί think to go to the pool. The weather is nice and the kids like it' The difference between (247) and (248) was analyzed in terms of the type of construal of CL2, motivated by the level of interest manifested by Ci towards CL2. This is fairly close in spirit to invoking the responsibility of Ci towards CL2. However, the recognition of the constructs of subjectivity and objectivity renders the use of any constructionspecific feature (such as RESP) unnecessary. My solution is more directly compatible with accounts such as Farrell's (1995) which posit no construction-specific stipulation to account for control, but derive the phenomenon from cognitive constraints placed on the conceptual organization which underlies the construction. A thorough investigation of the complementarity of the two analyses deserves further attention, but is beyond the scope of this chapter. Obviation presents a slightly different case, because the issue is by definition a distributional one. Note that the analysis presented here is very close to Ruwet's (1984) initial insight. Ruwet recognizes the basic asymmetry between the subject and the object of conceptualization, and notes that this asymmetry is magnified when the subject and the object of conceptualization are different. In this case, Ruwet (1984) talks about a "self' (subject of conceptualization) to "other" (object of conceptualization) relation. A finite clause provides the only possible coding of a self-to-other relationship. The cases of coreferentiality blur the basic asymmetry because the subject of conceptualization is coreferential with the main participant in the subordinate relation. In Ruwet's terms, coreferentiality presents a self-to-self relationship, which can be coded by an infinitival complement (one single mention of the subject). Ruwet notes that the relationship

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211

profiled by the main verb may profile different aspects of the self, in which case it is viewed as similar to a self-to-other relationship and can be coded with a finite clause. Ruwet's conclusion is that this possibility of choice is used iconically. Two occurrences of the subject expressed by a personal complement will be felicitous if the self-to-self relationship determined by the main verb presents different parts of the self and is thus presented like a self-to-other relationship. Conversely, if the self-to-self relationship is viewed as radically different from a selfto-other relationship, one occurrence of the subject (an infinitival complement) will be felicitous. Following the hypothesis that the surface structure iconically represents the semantic content of the sentence, some modification of the content will also be reflected in the form. Any modification which introduces some distance into the selfto-self relationship established by the verbs which usually take infinitival complements renders the use of a personal clause considerably more acceptable. The spirit of the solution presented here can be anticipated in Ruwet's treatment of perception and volition as "cas extremes" 'extreme cases' (Ruwet 1984: 90). The main difference from Ruwet's account involves the generality of the mechanisms invoked. The use of the notion of viewing arrangement allows us to precisely express Ruwet's self-to-self7self-to-other relation in terms of more general construal principles, which in turn relates the treatment of obviative complements to other grammatical constructions such as the modals considered in the previous chapter for example. What the two solutions share, however, is the fact that the distribution of infinitival/finite complements is imputed to the semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement construction. I claim here that this kind of solution should be preferred over a constructionspecific account because it captures the insight of construction-specific accounts and relates obviation to a larger number of constructions. For example, Farkas's (1992) claim is based on the similarity between infinitival and subjunctive complements (they mark some sort of "dependency") which separates them from indicative complements. This means that they will be in competition in certain contexts. With

212 Conceptualizing subject constructions

verbs such as vouloir, the presence of a subjunctive complement is "blocked" in cases of coreferentiality because a more specific form is available, namely an infinitival complement. Farkas notes that the infinitive very often marks "subject dependency" cross-linguistically, that is the fact that the matrix subject is coreferential with the subordinate subject. In languages where the subjunctive marks "world dependency"—the fact that the situation described in the complement is presented as inheriting features from other worlds— the infinitive and subjunctive inflections are in competition in cases of coreferentiality. Elaborating on Ruwet's insight that the tendency of obviation seems to disappear when the complement is passivized, or contains a modal or a non-agentive verb, Farkas notes that in cases of obviation, "the controlled argument is the initiator of the situation in which it is a participant" (Farkas 1992: 103). Farkas concludes that the feature RESP, independently shown to be crucial for control, also plays an important part in obviation. She writes: "the obviation effect is most robust if both controller and controlled argument are in RESP relation with Sp [the complement situation] (Farkas 1992: 104; insertion in brackets mine). She therefore suggests that there is a "canonical control case" conceived for the use of subject dependent complements. The semantic characterization of that case is that both Si and S2 (in our terminology) bear the RESP relation to CL2. Farkas's conclusion is that obviation effects will be the strongest when the conditions of the canonical control case are met. There are two main advantages to Farkas's account, namely i) it relates the obviation facts to the control facts, and ii) it explains why only the verbs which take subjunctive complements in cases of noncoreferentiality have obviative complements in cases of coreferentiality. The solution presented here offers the same advantages, but I will only relate the control facts to the obviation facts here. I will defer the discussion of the relation between obviative and subjunctive complements to Chapter six, where the analysis of subjunctive complements is presented in detail. With respect to i), however, the obviation facts are not presented as any different from control facts. Obviation is imputed to the particular semantics of the vouloir type verbs and the specificity

Discussion and conclusion

213

of the situation where Ci and S2 are coreferential. Both accounts treat obviation as a constraint on distribution; they simply provide different explanations for that constraint. In addition to capturing the same major insights, the solution developed in this chapter presents two additional advantages. First, no construction-specific blocking device is required. The obviation constraint naturally arises from conceptual principles that are necessarily invoked for any linguistic expression. Second, it naturally relates the obviation facts to the perception facts to provide a global understanding of the constraints operating over complement distribution. The perception and volition verbs emerge as the two endpoints on a continuum of the subjectivity/objectivity with which the complement scene is construed, and the syntactic realization of their respective complements reflects their position in the continuum. The greater freedom allowed to the other verbs reflects their intermediate position in the continuum. One of the advantages of the approach undertaken in this monograph is the very general character of the elements that motivate the particular form of complement constructions. Perspective represents a prime example of one such far-reaching notion. In Chapter four, it was shown to account for the presence of the aspect and voice markers on the complement of modals. It this chapter, it is invoked to explain the difference between infinitival and finite complements in CSC constructions. This is indeed a favorable result, because it affords a high level of conceptual unity for the analysis of very different constructions. However, can we be certain that the kinds of perspective presented in Chapters four and five are truly instances of the same phenomenon? It is, indeed, a legitimate question, because the subjective/objective construal of an entity seems to be reflected by different syntactic behaviors. With the modals in Chapter four, the maximally objective construal of the objective scene along the subjective axis is reflected by the fixed (uninflected) nature of the complement. A more subjective construal of the objective scene is accompanied by possible marking on the complement, which implies an increase in the amount of phonological elaboration of that

214 Conceptualizing subject constructions

complement. Conversely, along the objective axis, the opposite situation seems to obtain. The objective construal of the complement scene is reflected by the explicit mention of the subordinate subject (as well as the markers of tense, mood and person on the verb). The subjective construal of S2 is reflected by the presence of a bare infinitive, and thus by a decrease in the amount of phonological elaboration of the complement. This seemingly opposite result of a subjective/objective construal in different situations should not be surprising because the notion of viewing arrangement is always relative to a specific situation, and its syntactic reflex depends on exactly what element the construal applies to. The difference in the situation along the subjective and objective axes can be explained by the inherent complexity of multi-clause constructions, as well as which entity is construed subjectively or objectively. Along the subjective axis, the object of conceptualization with respect to which construal exhibits potential variation is the whole objective scene, and not a clearly delineated entity within that scene. The shift from an objective to a subjective construal is characterized by the realignment of some aspect of the main relation onto the conceptualization relation, but the vantage point from which the clause is conceptualized is not shifted in a way that can be easily located. Along the objective axis, the shift in viewing arrangement is easier to delineate. The results presented in Chapter five are imputable to the subjective/objective construal of the subordinate subject, and its lack of explicit mention when it is construed subjectively is consistent with similar patterns observed in different constructions in different languages (Langacker 1985, 1990, 1991). I do not think that the differences between the effects of a subjunctive/objective construal of the complement clause in Chapters four and five call into question the usefulness of the notion of perspective to explain the syntactic realization of the complement in both cases. It can still be maintained that the same notion of perspective provides the motivation for the specific form of the complements of modals and CSC verbs. However, the work presented in this book is still preliminary in many respects, and this claim has to be made carefully.

Discussion and conclusion

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Additional work is needed before the relation between viewing arrangement and syntactic realization can be made explicit and convincing. The different possible configurations of viewing arrangement need to be made more precise, and the relation of perspective to the related notion of conceptual distance needs to be made explicit. It is only with a precise knowledge of the mechanisms which go into the evaluation of conceptual distance that claims based on perspective can obtain their full explanatory power.

Chapter 6. Grounding

This chapter continues the investigation of conceptualizing subject constructions, and focuses on the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements. It shows that the distinction between the two moods essentially pertains to the dimension of grounding, that is to say to the relation of the complement clause to the speech situation. It is argued that the indicative inflection is the sign that the complement clause is presented as a "proposition", that is an element considered with respect to its position in some conceptualizer's conception of reality. The subjunctive inflection indicates that the complement clause is not considered relative to reality, but with respect to a specific mental space exclusively relevant to the main clause subject. The distribution of the modal inflections with the main verbs is once again a matter of semantic compatibility. The verbs which are fully compatible with the conception of their complement as a preposition will be followed by the indicative, while others which are incompatible with the conception of their complement as a proposition will be followed by subjunctive complements. Other verbs are shown to be compatible with the indicative, but to prefer subjunctive complements because the conception of their complement as a proposition is not directly relevant to their meaning.

6.1. Introduction In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the difference between infinitival and finite complements in C S C s can be imputed to a difference in viewing arrangement between Ci and CL2 (along the objective axis). Infinitival complements have been shown to reflect a subjective construal of the subject's participation in the subordinate process, and CL2 is viewed from the vantage point of Ci occupying the position of S2. Finite complements have been argued to indicate an objective construal of CL2 (including the participation of S2 in V2), from the

218 Grounding

vantage point of Ci. At that point, however, no difference was made between indicative and subjunctive complements, which have both been called finite. The use of that term in Chapter five was the broadest possible. The subordinate clause was called finite if S2 was explicitly mentioned, and if there was some kind of marking on V2. If the term finite was sufficient to indicate the result of an objective construal of CL2, it is obviously not sufficient to differentiate between indicative and subjunctive inflections. In this chapter, I argue that the indicative and subjunctive moods need to be characterized along another dimension of construal, namely the kind of grounding (see Chapter two) each inflection imposes on the complement scene. I investigate the meaning differences between the indicative and subjunctive inflections in terms of the particular way in which each mood relates the complement content to the speech situation.78 The distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements results here again from the necessary compatibility between the main verbs and the mood inflections. I will show that the verbs that are necessarily followed by indicative complements are solely compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause. Conversely, the verbs that must be followed by subjunctive complements are incompatible with the meaning of the indicative, and therefore solely compatible with the meaning of the subjunctive. Other main verbs are potentially compatible with the meaning of both inflections, and mood selection is made depending on specific properties of the speech situation, as well as speaker choice. As has been the case throughout this monograph, the notion of semantic compatibility involves at the same time the lexical semantics of the main verb, as well as the pragmatic properties of the speech situation. The account of mood selection presented in this chapter partakes of the semantic tradition of modal research (Rivero, 1971, Terrell and Hopper 1974, Wierzbicka 1988 inter alia).7 An analysis based on the kind of construal the indicative and subjunctive inflections impose on the complement scene, however, presents two advantages. First, by investigating the meaning of both constructions (as opposed to most accounts which exclusively concentrate on the meaning of the subjunctive), it is remarkably well suited to handle the verbs which

Introduction 219

take both indicative and subjunctive complements. Second, by critically invoking a specific dimension of construal as the crucial difference between the two inflections, it sheds a more global light on the indicative/subjunctive distinction by directly relating it to the other French complement constructions considered in this monograph. This chapter is organized in the following fashion. Section two presents an analysis of the meaning of the indicative and subjunctive inflections. Section three considers the indicative/subjunctive distribution with the different main verbs. Section four summarizes the results obtained in the chapter, discusses them, and relates them to the conclusions reached in the previous chapter.

6.2. The indicative/subjunctive distinction Before proceeding with the analysis, a point should be made clear about the methodology adopted, as well as the scope of this chapter with respect to a full-fledged account of the indicative/subjunctive contrast in French. Sentential complements do not constitute the only environment where the indicative and subjunctive moods are in opposition. A similar contrast can also be observed in relative and adverbial clauses for instance. The solution proposed for sentential complements is not supposed to directly accommodate those cases. Consistently with the semantic theory defended by Cognitive Grammar, I consider the indicative and subjunctive moods to be radial categories, with distinct but related senses in different constructions. It is only after careful examination of each particular construction that the overall indicative/subjunctive contrast can be fully understood. This chapter is strictly concerned with the situation in finite complements. The methodology proposed can, however, be extended to the study of other constructions.

220 Grounding

6.2.1. The data The distribution of indicative/subjunctive complements in French is illustrated in (251)-(265). The verbs of perception are followed by indicative complements, as illustrated in (251) and (252). (251) Paul voit que Marie a vieilli (IND) 'Paul sees that Mary has got old' (252) Marie a remarque que Jean avaitperdu ses cheveux (IND) 'Mary noticed that John had lost his hair' The verbs of declaration are also mostly followed by indicative complements. Examples are given in (253)-(255). (253) Le professeur dit que ses etudiantsprogressent (IND) 'The professor says that his students are improving' (254) II m 'apromis qu 'il ne la connaissait pas (IND) 'He swore to me that he didn't know her' (255) Jean pretend qu 'ilparle anglais (IND) 'John claims that he speaks English' In the positive form, the verbs of propositional attitude are followed by indicative complements, as shown in (256)-(259). (256) Les en/antspensent que vous avez apporte des biscuits (IND) 'The children think that you brought cookies' (257) Je crois que tu as tort (IND) Ί believe that you are wrong' (258) Marie sait que Jean a demenage (IND) 'Mary knows that John has moved away'

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(259) Je suppose que le gardien la connaissait (IND) Ί suppose that the guard knew her' The volition verbs are followed by subjunctive complements, as illustrated by the examples in (260) and (261). (260) Je veux que vous soyez a I 'heure (SUBJ) Ί want you to be on time' (261) Le policier demande que vous rentriez tout de suite chez vous (SUBJ) 'The policeman demands that you get back into your house right away' Finally, the verbs of emotion reaction are also followed by subjunctive complements, as illustrated in (262)-(265). (262) J 'ai peur qu 'il ne puisse pas se lever (SUBJ) 'I'm afraid that he cannot get up' (263) Paul est heureux que vous I'ayez ramene (SUBJ) 'Paul is happy that you gave him a ride back' (264) Marie etaitfachie que nous ne soyons pas passe la voir (SUBJ) 'Mary was angry that we didn't visit her' (265) Je crains qu 'eile ne connaisse pas le chemin (SUBJ) Ί fear that she does not know the way' To briefly summarize, when the main verb is a verb of perception, declaration, or propositional attitude, the subordinate verb is in the indicative mood. When the main verb is a verb of volition or emotion reaction, the subordinate verb is in the subjunctive.

222 Grounding

6.2.2. Towards the definition of an indicative clause The first part in the analysis is to evaluate the semantic import of the indicative and subjunctive inflections. This section will be concerned with the indicative. Following Langacker (1991: 439-440), it was argued in several places in this monograph that a complement coded as an indicative clause present the highest possible level of independence with respect to the main clause, and that independence is reflected by the objective construal of the complement scene (see Chapter five). Considerations of perspective alone, however, are not sufficient to differentiate between indicative and subjunctive inflections. Both moods are necessarily preceded by the complementizer que 'that' which serves an objectifying function (Langacker 1991: 447), and allows for the complement scene to be construed globally as a unitary entity. Consequently, both indicative and subjunctive complements represent particular scenes in the world, or in other words particular instances of a process type, with their own independent access to the speech situation (grounding). The central question with respect to the indicative/subjunctive distinction is the way in which the event profiled in the complement scene fits within the general course of events, or in other words with respect to reality. The appropriate dimension of construal along which the mood distinction will be evaluated is therefore grounding. In his analysis of the finite clause, Langacker (1991: 33) argues that an indicative clause represents a grounded instance of a process type, that is to say an instance with its own reference to the speech situation, independently from the main clause. This chapter elaborates on that claim to provide a definition of the indicative inflection in French, and show how the meaning of that inflection must fit with that of the main verb. It also argues that the subjunctive represents an "arbitrary instance" of a process type (to be explained in the course of the chapter), specifically conjured up for a specific purpose, and not presented as part of reality. Regardless of the mood of the subordinate verb, the complement clause presents a particular situation happening in the world or an other mental space. That situation, however, is viewed as a participant in the main relation, and thus as an abstract object. Consistent with the

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223

definition of CSCs, the construction presents the nature of Ci's conceptual relation with that object. Consequently, in order to investigate the complement clause, we need to show how the complement content can be viewed as an abstract object. This involves the consideration of two Idealized Cognitive Models presented in Chapter two. The first one is concerned with abstract possession, the second one involves the organization of our folk conception of reality. 6.2.2.1. Conception of an abstract element: dominion We have already seen that the organization and structure of the most abstract domains of our experience are more easily understood metaphorically, i.e. in terms of the organization and structure of other concepts which are more familiar to us (Lakoff 1987, LakofF and Johnson 1980, Reddy 1979 inter alia). Our understanding of reality is based on such metaphors. Particularly relevant to our concerns are the conceptual metaphors "ideas are objects", and "beliefs are objects". A given conceptualizer handles the abstract elements she conceives of or knows in a way similar to concrete objects. She manipulates them in a quasi-physical fashion. She can, for instance, extract them as in this man is a mine of information, accept them as in thanks for giving me the straight facts, misplace them as in I forgot who won the Super Bowl last year, or share them as in do you want me to give you a clue? The relationship which holds between a conceptualizer and the elements (ideas or beliefs) she conceives of can be viewed as one of abstract possession or, to put the relation in metaphorical terms, "knowing (or conceiving) is owning". A direct consequence of the "knowing is owning" metaphor is that abstract possession is organized in a way similar to physical possession. Recall from Chapter two that in Cognitive Grammar, possession is characterized relative to the reference-point model. The possessed object is localized through its relation to a reference point. For example, in John's pen, the pen is identified by first making mental contact with its owner John. The set of objects that can be identified via a particular reference point is called that reference point's dominion. For example, if the reference point is a person, the set of

224 Grounding

objects she owns constitutes her dominion. Similarly, by virtue of "knowing is owning", the set of beliefs, ideas, emotions a person holds can be considered as the set of abstract objects that constitutes that person's dominion. This section argues that in the metaphorical domain of ideas, beliefs, opinions and emotions, the elements of a conceptualizer's dominion are fully grounded structures called "propositions", and that a conceptualizer's dominion is fully describable by a set of propositions. In Section 6.2.3,1 will show why propositions must be fully grounded, i.e. be in the indicative mood. ΑΛ

*

6.2.2.2. A folk model of reality Langacker (1991: 440) writes: "Grounding locates the event in relation to the speaker's conception of reality." In order to show precisely how this is the case, we need to further consider two facets of the model of reality presented in Chapter two which are directly relevant to the characterization of the indicative and subjunctive inflections. The first one is that each conceptualizer's experience of the world represents her own conception of reality, potentially different (at least partially) from other conceptualizers'. The second one is the multi-level character of reality. Recall that at the most basic level, reality represents the history of what actually happened, that is the events or states which are currently in progress or have actually occurred, the events which we see (or think we see) happening, and those which have (or we think have) happened. The level of elaborated reality, however, recognizes our awareness of its dynamic nature, referred to as its evolutionary momentum. This more inclusive conception of reality therefore incorporates along with the events of basic reality, the knowledge of what is not, of what could or could not possibly happen. The division between basic and elaborated reality is of crucial relevance to the indicative/subjunctive distinction. If basic reality is the level of events, elaborated reality represents the level at which the occurrence (or, as the case might be, the possible or non-occurrence) of events is described or reported. The elements of elaborated reality must therefore be considered relative to the speech situation, or in other words, include grounding (and particularly tense) predications.

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Let us take just one example to illustrate the transition between basic and elaborated reality. Let us assume that John's arrival at a certain point of time represents an event a given conceptualizer A is aware of. That event is part of A's basic reality. When A reports the event of John's arrival as Jean est arrive a 5 heures 'John arrived at 5 o'clock', the event is reported as an element of elaborated reality, that is to say with respect to a particular place in reality (here accomplished reality). Like her dominion, a conceptualizer's conception of elaborated reality is therefore composed of propositions. More precisely, a conceptualizer's conception of elaborated reality is composed of the set of propositions she accepts as true. 6.2.3. Meaning of an indicative clause The meaning of the indicative inflection emerges from the articulation of the notions of dominion and elaborated reality. More precisely, the concept of elaborated reality is crucial in determining exactly what it means for an element to be in some conceptualizer's dominion. I propose here that a thought, idea, opinion is in a given conceptualizer's dominion if that conceptualizer can entertain it with respect to elaborated reality, or in other words, if she can present it as a possible element of reality. For example, in Jean est venu 'John came', the independent clause is presented as a part of the speaker's dominion, because it is given a possible address in elaborated reality. Because a conceptualizer's presents of an event with respect to reality (as part of her dominion) does not mean she considers it true. Even if the utterance Jean est venu is a blatant lie, it is nonetheless presented with respect to reality because it is given a putative address in reality. It is thus part of the speaker's dominion. This position allows the notions of elaborated reality and dominion to be integrated, yet separate. A dominion is composed of the set of propositions which a conceptualizer can entertain with respect to reality, i.e. for which she can provide a supposed address in reality, and elaborated reality is composed of the set of propositions she holds true (notice the manipulative term here). Consequently, a conceptualizer's dominion obligatorily includes her conception of elaborated reality but the converse is not true. A given

226 Grounding

conceptualizer's conception of elaborated reality cannot be larger than her dominion. The critical role played by the notion of elaborated reality in the establishment of a conceptualizer's dominion explains why propositions must be fully grounded, which was only assumed earlier. By definition, a proposition needs to have a putative address in reality, and therefore include tense predications, which provide that address. Critically, only indicative complements can perform that function, because they alone contain tense predications. Subjunctive complements, on the other hand, cannot be located with respect to elaborated reality. For example, in Je veux que Jean revienne Ί want John to come back', the subjunctive complement Jean revienne is given no possible address in elaborated reality. It is merely considered with respect to the subject's wishes. Since it is the only structure which obligatorily incorporates the tense predications necessary to provide its address with respect to reality, the only appropriate verbal structure for the expression of a proposition is a folly articulated indicative clause (Langacker 1991: 439). I therefore propose the following definition for the indicative inflection. The indicative mood signals that the event expressed in the complement is in some conceptualizer's dominion, i.e. presented with respect to its position in elaborated reality. This definition accounts for the presence of the indicative mood in simple sentences (as well as in Vi in a CSC) in a natural way. The production of any sentence has to be understood against the background of a model of communication (to be considered in further detail in Section 6.3.2). Communication can be thought of as the sharing of information. Part of what we do when we share information is address the status of what is being said with respect to elaborated reality. Consider the independent clause examples in (266)-(268). (266) Marie est belle 'Mary is beautiful' (267) Jean regarde la ίέΐέ 'John is watching TV'

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distinction

227

(268) Marie demenage aujourd'hui 'Mary moves out today' The examples in (286)-(268) present independent clauses. In each instance, the speaker is the conceptualizer of the sentence. Each independent clause represents a proposition, and thus an element of her dominion. The grounding (tense) predications define the precise location of the proposition in a specific area of elaborated reality. In (266) for example, the present tense provides the proposition's putative address in immediate reality. There is no obvious way of knowing if the speaker considers the proposition true (part of her conception of elaborated reality), or if she deliberately lies. In both cases, however, the propositions expressed in the independent clauses are in her dominion, hence justifying the indicative inflection. If the speaker is genuine, her purpose is to share a part of her conception of elaborated reality with the hearer. If she is lying, she is attempting to lead the hearer astray by trying to convince her to include a wrong piece of information into her conception of elaborated reality. There is an ICM of communication (as well as a Gricean maxim) which allows us to interpret independent clauses such as the ones in (266)-(268) as true by default, unless some other element forces us to do otherwise. Independent clauses in the indicative can anchor the element of the conceptualizer's dominion in different areas of reality, as illustrated in (269) and (270). (269) Marie reviendra vite (FUT-IND) 'Mary will quickly return' (270) Pierre η 'est pas venu hier 'Peter did not come yesterday' In (269), the future grounding predication potentially locates the proposition Marie reviendra vite in projected reality. Pierre η 'est pas venu hier in (270) includes a negative grounding predication. However, it still describes a possible facet of elaborated reality, by presenting a possible path that reality did not take. Similarly, the

228 Grounding

presence of the indicative mood in V, in a CSC is an indication that CLi is in the speaker's dominion. I will now show that the mood variation in V2 is imputable to whether or not the complement of Vi represents a proposition, or, more precisely, if the content of the complement can be viewed as part of some conceptualizer's dominion. The approach is as follows. The meanings of certain Vi verbs are fully compatible with the notion of proposition. They are thus compatible with the meaning of the indicative inflection and will appear with an indicative complement. The term fully compatible means that the subject of these verbs can construe the scene described in the complement as a proposition, and that particular construal is directly relevant to the verb's meaning. Some verbs are not semantically compatible with the notion of proposition. They are therefore not compatible with the meaning of the indicative and will be followed by subjunctive complements. Other verbs are only potentially compatible with the meaning of the indicative mood, because even though their subjects have the ability to construe the complement scene as a proposition, that particular construal is not directly relevant to their meaning. A verb's partial compatibility with the indicative inflection is reflected syntactically by a great deal of synchronic, diachronic, and cross-linguistic variation in mood of its complements.

6.3. Main verbs and complement structures This section is concerned with the evaluation of the meaning of the main verbs and the indicative and subjunctive inflections. As indicated in Chapter five, the semantic characterization of each verb needs to be considered against the background of the relevant ICMs which provide the conceptual base relative to which they impose their profile. 6.3. J The perception verbs Recall that objects are considered part of the outside world, and we establish contact with some of them. Perception is represented as the

Main verbs and complement structures 229

presence of quasi-physical contact between a conceptualizer and an entity of the world, so that the conceptualizer and that entity are in a certain way connected. When a perception verb is a main verb in a CSC, it is not understood as presenting straight perception (Langacker 1991: 440). The notions presented in this chapter enable us to reconsider and refine the analysis started in the previous chapter of the difference between VOV and CSC constructions with perception verbs. These constructions are repeated in (271) and (272). (271) a. b.

(272) a. b.

J'at entendu la cloche sonner (INF) Ί heard the bell ring' J'ai entendu que la cloche sonnait (IND) Ί heard that the bell was ringing' Le policier avule prisonnier s 'enfuir (INF) 'The policeman saw the prisoner escape' Le policier a vu que le prisonnier s 'enfuyait (IND) 'The policeman saw that the prisoner was escaping'

It was noted in Chapter five that the CSCs in (271b) and (272b) examples involve more conceptual distance between their subject and object than the VOV's in (271a) and (272a), mostly because of the different nature of the object of perception. We are now in a better position to evaluate the nature of a finite clause as an object of perception. In (271b) and (272b), the subordinate event is coded as a proposition; that is to say an independent element of Ci's conception of elaborated reality. The object of perception is "propositionalized", in the sense that Ci does not interact with a physical object directly, but with an independent facet of reality. Besides reflecting additional conceptual distance between the participants in the perceptual relation, the use of perception verbs in a CSC often involves the passage from perception to cognition or, in other words from concrete to abstract (Sweetser 1987). Consider the examples in (273)-(276).

230 Grounding

(273) Je vois qu ΊΙ m 'α menti Ί see that he lied to me' (274) Jean sent que Marie ne I 'aime plus 'John feels that Mary does not love him any more' (275) Jean verra bien assez töt qu ΊΙ est ruim 'John will realize soon enough that he is ruined' (276) a. b.

*J'ai entendu que Marie est malade Ί heard that Mary is sick' J'ai entendu dire que Marie est malade Ί heard that Mary is sick'

Examples (273)-(276) illustrate the fact that voir 'see' and sentir 'smell' take on the more general meaning of realize and feel respectively. This has been pointed out by Sweetser (1987), who notices that diachronically, most terms of understanding come from originally vision terms. Note however that entendre 'hear' shows some resistance to being used in the same cognitive fashion. Examples (276a) and (276b) show that entendre in a CSC is only felicitous when the subject of CL2 evokes physical sensations. In (276a), the sentence can not mean that the speaker heard rumors about Mary. It is only felicitous if the speaker heard the physical manifestation of Mary's sickness, by hearing her getting up in the middle of the night for instance. The information meaning requires the verb dire 'say' as illustrated in (276b). With the most cognitive perception verbs in Vi position, V2 can be in the future, as indicated in (277b) and (278c). (277) a. b. c.

Je vois qu ΊΙ a gagne hier Ί see that he won yesterday' Jean voit que Paul ne viendra plus 'John sees that Paul won't come any more' Jean sent que Paul lui posera des problemes 'John feels that Paul will cause him difficulties'

Main verbs and complement structures 231

(278) a. b. c.

Paul remarqua que Marie avait maigri 'Paul noticed that Mary had lost weight' ?Paul remarque que Marie ne viendra plus maintenant 'Paul notices that Mary won't come any more' *Paul entend que Marie sera malade 'Paul hears that Mary will be sick'

Some elements of current reality may make it easy to foresee specific aspects of projected reality. In that case, we can predict them with the certainty of logical reasoning. The certainty is such that the circumstance expressed in the complement is part of Ci's conception of elaborated reality. Prediction involves judgment rather than perception. It is thus not surprising that the verbs that show the most flexibility in the passage to cognition are more felicitous in those cases. The fact that entendre and remarquer are always strictly perceptual accounts for the infelicity of (278b) and (278c). Examples (273)-(278) clearly show that the position of perception verbs as Vi in a CSC implies some important departure from their original meaning. It involves either additional conceptual distance between the participants in the perceptual relation they profile, or the semantic extension to a more abstract type of cognitive relation. However, the basic idea that they profile a certain type of connection between a conceptualizer (their subject) and their complement remains present, even though the nature of that connection has changed. In a CSC, the presence of a perception verb in Vi position profiles the mental contact existing between Ci and CL2. Every specific verb renders more precise the exact nature of that contact (vision or understanding for voir, smell or feeling for sentir, etc.). Crucially, the presence of mental contact between subject and complement means that the latter's content is part of the main clause subject's conception of elaborated reality, or at least, in her dominion. When the main verb is in the future as in (277b), the proposition expressed in the complement is not yet in the subject's dominion. However, the indicative is motivated by the presence of the proposition expressed by the complement in the speaker's conception of elaborated reality. Furthermore, the proposition is presented as being in Ci's conception

232

Grounding

of elaborated reality in the very near future. The verbs of perception are thus fully compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause. Their use as Vi in a CSC indicates that the speaker situates the proposition expressed in the complement in some conceptualizer's conception of elaborated reality (usually Ci's, or possibly her own), and hence in that conceptualizer's dominion. The traditional analysis of perception verbs insists on their factive character (Karttunen 1971, Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). As factive verbs, they presuppose the truth of their complements. It is a valid observation that the complements of perception verbs are prototypically true. However, this is not always the case. Consider the example in (279), where a person is telling another person that a mutual acquaintance of theirs is totally persuaded that his wife is betraying him. (279) II voit qu 'eile le trompe dans tons ses gestes! 'He sees that she betrays him in everything she does!' In (279), the complement is not necessarily true. The same sentence could be used to describe the difficulty of persuading the husband that he is not being betrayed. Examples such as (279) can be used to illustrate the difference between an analysis concerned with the truth conditions of the sentence, and the account presented here, where the particular conceptualization of a given conceptualizer is being considered. An analysis of the presence of the indicative mood in terms of the truth-value of the complement would have difficulties explaining examples such as (279). A conceptual account has no problems with this type of data. The indicative is motivated by the fact that in the present and the affirmative form, the speaker presents the proposition expressed in the complement as part of Ci's conception of elaborated reality, and hence in his dominion. The fact that the same proposition is not in the speaker's conception of elaborated reality (or anyone else's for that matter) has no bearing on the presence of the indicative inflection. The cases where the complement can be considered "true" are simply cases where the speaker and Ci (and possibly other conceptualizers) share that particular facet of elaborated reality. In

Main verbs and complement structures 233

terms of the analysis proposed here, factivity is reducible to shared conceptualization. 6.3.2. The declaration verbs The exchange of ideas and information certainly represents one of the core functions of our linguistic experience. Expectedly, the ICM which structures our folk conception of communication is highly complex, and I will merely focus here on some of its relevant elements. We exchange ideas in order to enlarge our knowledge of the world. Other people provide us with the information we may lack, and in return, we give other people the benefit of our experience by transmitting our knowledge to them. The presentation of the information the speaker proposes to the hearer as propositions is fully consistent with our overall communicative strategy. In a prototypical kind of communication, each speaker speaks to be believed. She tries to convince her interlocutor that she is right, and that the latter should locate the proposition she offers in her conception of elaborated reality. As Vi in a CSC, the verbs of communication profile the transmission by the main clause subject of the proposition expressed in the complement to another person. Examples involving verbs of communication are given in (280) and (281). (280) Paul dit que Marie est belle 'Paul says that Mary is beautiful' (281) Le directeur a declare que Paul devait partir 'The director declared that Paul had to go' Dire 'say' constitutes the most neutral way to describe the subject's communicative act. Other verbs give further information about the precise manner in which that act is performed. Chuchoter 'whisper', balbutier 'mumble', crier 'shout', declarer 'declare', s'exclamer 'exclaim', Hurler 'scream' represent some of those verbs. Crucially,

234 Grounding

the communication verbs presented in (280) and (281) do not profile any type of confrontation between the interlocutors as to the location of the proposition with respect to elaborated reality. The verbs simply profile the passage of a piece of information from the speaker to the hearer. Of course, the latter has the option of rejecting the proposition offered to her if it does not correspond to her interpretation of the world, but that possibility is not evoked by the verb. However, our ICM of communication cannot be reduced to mere transmission of information. It has already been pointed out that part of what we do when we speak is try to convince other people that they should adopt our views of the world. This points to a potential conflict if our interlocutor is resistant to accepting the information we have to offer. It was noted in Chapter five that several verbs of communication also profile a certain amount of confrontation between the interlocutors regarding the location of the proposition with respect to elaborated reality.81 Consider the examples in (282) and (283). (282)

Jean pritend

que Marie a

gagne

'John claims that Mary has won' (283)

II t 'a juri

qu ΊΙ ne I'avaitpas

vue

'He swore to you that he hadn't seen her' Like the verbs in (280) and (281), the verbs in (282) and (283) profile the main clause subject's transmission of the proposition expressed in the complement to the hearer. However, unlike those in (280) and (281), they presuppose the existence of a background of communication prior to the production of the utterance. They imply that C / s claim that the proposition he offers deserves to be included in the hearer's conception of elaborated reality is controversial, and needs to be defended. Along with the act of transmission of the proposition by Ci, the latter's extra effort to convince his interlocutor is also profiled. Another set of verbs presents the other end of the communicative act. They profile their subject's final decision to accept or reject the proposition previously offered to her by her interlocutor. Such verbs

Main verbs and complement structures

235

include convenir 'agree', reconnaitre 'recognize', admettre 'admit', avouer 'confess'. An interesting particularity of these verbs is that they can be followed by either indicative or subjunctive complements. Consider the examples in (284) and (285). (284) a. b.

(285) a.

Jean reconnait que Paul s 'est ameliore 'John recognizes that Paul has improved' Ma mere a convenu qu 'eile avait tort 'My mother agreed that she was wrong' The topic of conversation is a rich person, who behaves in a very obnoxious manner. A and Β represent different speakers discussing that behavior. A: Oh, que veux tu, il est riche! 'Oh, what can you do, he is rich!' B: Je conviens qu 'il soit riche, mais ςα η 'excuse pas sa conduite (SUBJ) Ί agree that he is rich, but it does not excuse his behavior' b. The following conversation presents two different reactions to a petty theft offender's being sentenced to 5 years in jail. A agrees with the verdict, Β does not. A: Mais enfin, c 'est un voleur! 'But, he is a thief B: J'admets que ce soit un voleur, mais il ne merite pas une peine aussi lourde (SUBJ) Ί admit that he is a thief, but he does not deserve such a heavy sentence' c. Discussing the unexpected selection of a young athlete for the Olympics. A agrees with the selection, Β does not. A: II a fait beaucoup de progres 'He has improved a lot'

236 Grounding

Β: Je reconnais qu 'il aitfait des progres mais il η 'est pas pret pour les Jeux Olympiques (SUBJ) Ί recognize that he improved, but he is not ready for the Olympics' Prior to the production of (284), Ci/Si's interlocutor has proposed a proposition (Paul s 'est ameliore 'John has improved', sa mere a tort 'his mother is right', with the purpose of convincing the main clause subject to locate it in her conception of elaborated reality. The sentences in (284) represent the latter's response. She expresses complete agreement with her interlocutor, and unconditionally accepts the proposition into her conception of elaborated reality, hence justifying the use of the indicative. The cases in (285) are quite complex, and they would deserve more careful scrutiny than I am ready to give them here, but I believe that the constructs developed in this chapter afford us a first pass at the phenomenon. Notice, first of all, that all the examples are formally very similar. The main clause subject is in the first person (the speaker and the main clause subject are (»referential) and a negative proposition following mais 'but' modifies the agreement expressed by the main verb. I propose that in spite of the apparent agreement conveyed by the meaning of Vi, the presence of the subjunctive marks the rejection by the main clause subject of the "overall proposition" offered to her by her interlocutor. The notion of overall proposition demands further explanation. The propositions offered to Ci in (285) are of a special kind. They all carry certain presuppositions, namely a rich person can be expected to behave obnoxiously, a thief deserves maximum penalty, and an athlete who has improved a lot deserves to be considered for the Olympics. Those presuppositions could very well represent propositions on their own, but they are included in the original proposition offered to Ci. A distinction therefore needs to be made between the explicitly mentioned content of the proposition, that is excluding the presuppositions, and the content of the proposition including the presuppositions. The term overall proposition will be used to refer to the proposition including the presuppositions.

Main verbs and complement structures 237

Even though Ci accepts the proposition offered to her, she refuses the overall proposition because of the presuppositions it carries. The proposition following mais makes her position explicit by canceling the presuppositions, and hence marks her rejection of the overall proposition. In (284a) for instance, the main clause subject agrees with the fact that S2 might be rich, but he refuses to accept the behavioral presuppositions which her interlocutor assumes go along with his wealth. The presence of the subjunctive indicates the fact that Ci does not accept the overall proposition as part of her conception of elaborated reality. Note, however, that this explanation cannot be entirely satisfactory. According to the definition provided earlier in this chapter, the indicative reflects the fact that a proposition is in a conceptualizer's dominion, i.e. the fact that the latter conceives of the proposition with respect to elaborated reality. There is no doubt that in the cases in (285), the event in the complement can be viewed as part of Ci's dominion. This possibility is illustrated by the fact that the complement of such sentences can be in the indicative. (286) Je reconnais qu ΊΙ est riche mais ςα ne I 'excuse pas Ί recognize that he is rich, but it does not excuse him' In (286), the technical validity of the proposition is acknowledged, but its presuppositions canceled. The subjunctive in (285) seems to be a stronger way to mark the fact that the weight of the presuppositions causes the conceptualizer to reject the overall proposition. For now, I will simply say that Ci refuses to treat the complement content as part of her dominion, but chooses to present it as a hypothetical situation, simply relevant to the mental space of the current discussion. I will show in Section 6.3.5 that the subjunctive represents a natural choice to indicate that the complement content is restricted to a specific mental space.82 In the examples in (285), the acceptance of the proposition described in the complement is a matter of interpretation of the world by different conceptualizers (their opinions). However, the level of personal interpretation is greatly reduced with certain verbs. Avouer 'confess'

238 Grounding

for instance leaves little room for interpretation. Consider the example in (287). (287) Jean a avoue qu ΊΙ avait vole le vase 'John confessed that he had stolen the vase' In (287), a vase has been stolen and John is suspected to be responsible for the theft. Under pressure, he surrendered the facts. His confession allows everyone to accept the proposition expressed in the complement as part of their conception of elaborated reality, without any further interpretation. The fact that avouer is prototypically concerned with the unveiling of an element of elaborated reality accounts for its infelicity with subjunctive complements. Compare (288) to (285). (288) *J'avoue que ce soit un voleur mais il ne miritepas une peine aussi lourde Ί confess that he is a thief, but he does not deserve such a heavy sentence' Unlike the case with the verbs in (285), the use of avouer with a subjunctive complement is infelicitous. Avouer is strictly concerned with the revelation of the location of the proposition in elaborated reality. The subject can not refuse it due to the weight of the presuppositions. The complement thus needs to be in the indicative. To briefly recapitulate, it has been pointed out that the verbs of communication profile some aspect of a complex conceptual base, represented by our ICM of communication. The main clause conceptualizer is trying to convince the hearer to accept the complement content in her conception of elaborated reality. She therefore includes its putative address in reality, and thus presents the complement content as part of her dominion. The declaration verbs are therefore straightforwardly compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause.

Main verbs and complement structures 239

6.3.3. Propositional attitude: certainty, thoughts, and beliefs The world is a difficult place to know completely. The only way to reach some level of understanding of it is through the interpretation of the elements that unfold throughout the course of events. Our beliefs and certainties about the facts of the world are provided to us by clues coming from various sources. For instance, the sound of a car near Mary's house might lead me to believe that she is now coming home. However, those hints do not provide us with undeniable certainty about the presence of the proposition considered in elaborated reality. They simply permit us to assess that presence with varying degrees of confidence. Furthermore, since our opinions about the world are mostly a matter of interpretation, different conceptualizers are likely to interpret the world differently, and reach different conclusions. The verbs of propositional attitude profile the whole range of possible levels of commitment by the main clause subject to the proposition expressed in the complement. Examples of such verbs in a CSC are given in (289)-(292). (289) a. b.

(290) a. b.

(291) a. b.

(292) a.

Jean sait que Marie est malade 'John knows that Mary is sick' Tout le monde sait que la terre est ronde 'Everyone knows that the earth is round' Jean est convaincu que Marie a tort 'John is convinced that Mary is wrong' Je suis sur que vous avez faim Ί am sure that you are hungry' Je pense que j 'ai compris le probleme Ί think I understood the problem' Les en/ants croient que le pere Noel existe 'The children believe that Santa Claus exists' Jean soupgonne que sa femme le trompe 'John suspects that his wife is unfaithful'

240 Grounding

b.

Sa mere se doute que Jean fume 'His mother suspects that John smokes'

The verbs presented in (289)-(292) profile different levels of commitment by the main clause subject to the presence of the proposition expressed in the complement in her conception of elaborated reality. With the verbs in (289) and (290), the latter is presented in Ci's conception of elaborated reality. With such verbs as penser (illustrated in (291)), Ci considers the proposition a good candidate for insertion into her conception of elaborated reality. With verbs like soupgonner in (292), the main clause subject evaluates the proposition as a possible candidate for insertion into her conception of elaborated reality. 6.3.3.1. Certainty and knowledge The verbs of knowledge presented in (289) and the verbs of certainty presented in (290) exhibit strong similarities, because both present the circumstance expressed in their complement as being in their subject's conception of elaborated reality. However, philosophers of language have repeatedly pointed out the differences between them. The concept of knowledge necessarily involves reference to some notion of "truth" (Nissenbaum 1985). Knowledge has traditionally been considered a true belief, which has been verified by logical or empirical truth conditions. However, since we operate within a framework where meaning is equated with conceptualization, the very notion of truth needs to be further defined. In the analysis proposed here, truth does not always refer to objective concepts, universally and unquestionably observable. It very often merely rests on a conventionally accepted opinion, validated or dictated by someone or a group of people invested with the authority to determine its value. The knowledge of something is a matter of agreement between the subject of the knowledge verb and the authority who assumes responsibility for the validity of the proposition expressed in the complement. For instance, the speaker in (289) validates Jean's position by assuming the responsibility to declare the

Main verbs and complement structures 241

proposition true. Consequently, with verbs of knowledge, the speaker and the main clause conceptualizer both have the complement proposition in their respective conceptions of elaborated reality. The verbs of certainty are solely concerned with the main clause subject's position towards the proposition expressed in the complement. They profile its presence in Ci's conception of elaborated reality, but are totally neutral as to anyone else's belief. In that respect, they are similar to the belief verbs to be considered later. Consequently, with verbs of certainty, the speaker and the main clause subject do not necessarily share the proposition expressed in the complement in their respective conceptions of elaborated reality. This semantic difference between the verbs of certainty and knowledge accounts for the different types of modifying phrases they can respectively associate with. Compare (293) with (294). (293) Jean sait de source sure que le pwsident va demissioner 'John knows from authorized sources that the president will resign' (294) *Jean est persuade de source sure que le prisident va demissioner 'John is persuaded from authorized sources that the president will resign' In (293), responsibility for the validity of the proposition expressed in the complement is not only assumed by the speaker (as is usually the case with savoir) but also by the source sure. The modifying phrase is semantically compatible with the main verb because it reinforces the idea, already conveyed by savoir, that the proposition needs to be sanctioned by a source of authority. In (294), etre persuade is not concerned with the validation of the subject's position. It merely describes it. The validation of the object of certainty verbs is in some sense irrelevant (even though one needs certain elements in order to form an opinion). The presence of the modifying phrase in (294) thus constitutes a case of semantic incompatibility.

242 Grounding

Since the verbs of certainty profile the presence of the proposition in Ci's own conception of elaborated reality, their use with common knowledge propositions (which are by definition shared by a whole section of the population) is quite strange. Compare (295) to (296). (295) ?Jean est certain que la terre tourne autour du soleil 'John is certain that the earth revolves around the sun' (296) Jean est certain que l'eau boue ä 50° 'John is certain that water boils at 50°' Example (295) is only possible as a sarcastic statement making fun of John's poor knowledge of physics. The description of the proposition as only present in one person's conception of elaborated reality represents a violation of the Gricean maxim of quantity. With the verbs of certainty, the speaker (and possibly other conceptualize«) does not usually share Ci's position. On the other hand, the example in (296) is perfectly felicitous (even though it can also be sarcastic). It describes a belief solely attributed to John which, crucially, the speaker does not share. The fact that most people do not share that belief is inconsequential here. The semantics of the verbs of knowledge and certainty offer interesting insight into the relation between the participants of an act of communication. Imagine (297) produced by a contemporary of Galileo's. (297) Galilee est convaincu que la terre tourne autour du soleil 'Galileo is convinced that the earth revolves around the sun' Even though Galileo was finally proven right, his position was not in agreement with that of the authorities of the time. In (297), the proposition expressed by the complement is not necessarily part of the speaker's conception of elaborated reality. The use of a verb of certainty, which solely indicates Ci's belief, can thus appropriately be used by his adversaries. Compare this situation to the opposite case in (295), where the proposition has become so commonsensical (partly due to Galileo's heroic stance) that the use of a verb of certainty can

Main verbs and complement structures 243

only express irony. Similarly, the sentence in (298) could only be produced by someone who assumes the authority to validate Galileo's claim (which might be difficult to imagine at the time). (298) Galilee sait que la terre tourne autour du soleil 'Galileo knows that the earth revolves around the sun' The sentence in (298) needs to be produced by a speaker who shares Galileo's conviction and assumes the authority to validate his claim. Even though the verbs of knowledge and certainty exhibit strong semantic differences, both are compatible with the meaning of the indicative, since in both cases the proposition expressed in the complement is part of the main clause conceptualizer's conception of elaborated reality. The main semantic difference between the two classes of verbs, namely the fact that the speaker also has the proposition in her conception of elaborated reality with savoir, is not relevant to the selection of the indicative inflection. 6.3.3.2. Thoughts and beliefs: penser and croire Verbs like penser 'think' or croire 'believe' present weaker beliefs than the verbs of certainty. The contrast between the verbs of belief and certainty is illustrated in (299) and (300). (299) Jean est sur que Paul est arrive 'John is sure that Paul has arrived' (300) Jean pense que Paul est arrive 'John thinks that Paul has arrived' In (299), the proposition Paul est arrive is considered as part of the main clause subject's conception of elaborated reality. In (300), it is only considered a good candidate for insertion into Ci's conception of elaborated reality. Note that penser exhibits the same neutrality as etre certain as to the speaker's position concerning the location of the proposition expressed in the complement. It simply profiles the situa-

244 Grounding

tion of the proposition as a good candidate for insertion into Ci's conception of elaborated reality. Croire 'believe' is ambiguous. It can pattern with penser, in which case the complement proposition is considered a good candidate for insertion into Ci's conception of elaborated reality. This case is illustrated in (301). It can also mean "hold the belief that", as illustrated in (302). In that case, the proposition is definitely part of Ci's conception of elaborated reality. (301) Jean croit que Marie est partie, mais il η 'est pas sur 'John believes that Mary has left, but he is not sure' (302) Paul croit que tous les Americains ont un cheval *mais il η 'est pas sür 'Paul believes that all Americans have a horse *but he is not sure' When croire patterns with penser, it is neutral as to the speaker's position towards the proposition expressed in the complement. When it means "hold the belief that", it is very similar to the certainty verbs considered earlier. The main difference between that sense of croire and the verbs of certainty is that the latter verbs imply the previous consideration of the proposition, and a decision made by Ci to consider it true. Croire does not evoke the consideration of possible alternatives to the proposition expressed in the complement. It simply describes Ci's belief, which might have never been questioned.83 6.3.3.3. Suspicion The verbs of suspicion such as soupgonner 'suspect', se douter de 'have an idea that' present a much weaker commitment by the main clause subject to the complement proposition. The circumstances in CL2 are presented as possible candidates for insertion into Ci's conception of elaborated reality. Note that the speaker is neutral as to the situation of the proposition. The latter is exclusively considered with respect to Ci's conception of elaborated reality.

Main verbs and complement structures 245

The verbs of propositional attitude are fully compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause because their meaning precisely consists in evaluating the complement clause with respect to its position in elaborated reality. The hierarchy considered between the verbs etre sür 'to be sure', penser 'think', and soupgonner 'suspect' involves the level of commitment by the main clause subject to the presence of the complement in her conception of elaborated reality. Total commitment is provided by the etre sur verbs. The penser verbs present the proposition as a very good candidate for insertion into the subject's conception of elaborated reality, and the soupqonner verbs present the proposition as a possible candidate. Savoir is analyzed in the same way as the certainty verbs, with the added particularity that the speaker and Ci both have the proposition expressed in the complement in their respective conceptions of elaborated reality. 6.3.4. Verbs followed by subjunctive complements It is now time to turn to the verbs of volition and emotion reaction which take subjunctive complements. It will be shown that the meaning of the volition verbs is incompatible with the meaning of an indicative clause, because they do not allow the event expressed in the complement to be considered as part of any conceptualizer's dominion. In other words, they do not present a proposition. The presence of the subjunctive inflection in the subordinate verb reflects that semantic incompatibility. The verbs of emotion reaction are not incompatible with the meaning of an indicative clause, but the construal of the complement scene as a proposition (although possible) is not crucial to their meaning. The presence of the subjunctive inflection reflects the irrelevance of the construal of the complement content as a proposition for the subject. It is important at this point to invoke again the distinction made earlier between events and propositions. Recall that the distinction between events and propositions corresponds to the distinction between basic and elaborated reality. More specifically, basic reality corresponds to events, and elaborated reality corresponds to propositions. The distinction between events and propositions is directly

246 Grounding

relevant to the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements in French. It has already been shown that the verbs that take indicative complements are compatible with the meaning of a proposition. I will claim that the verbs that take subjunctive complements are those which are solely concerned with the events expressed in their complements, and therefore incompatible with the construal of those events as propositions. This accounts for the volition verbs which are incompatible with the meaning of an indicative clause, as well as the verbs of emotion reaction for which the construal of the complement scene as a proposition is not directly relevant. I will now consider these two cases in turn. 6.3.4.1. Volition and desire In the previous chapter, it was shown that an important facet of the meaning of vouloir is the fact that there is no necessary existence of the object outside the subject's conceptualization of that object. Consequently, wanting something necessarily implies that the object of desire is not in the wanter's possession.8 With a simple sentence such as John wants an orange for example, the orange is not in John's possession. The orange is also the object of John's desire. Consider the examples in (303), where the volition verbs are in Vi position in a CSC. (303) a. b.

Jean veut que Marie parte 'John wants Mary to leave' Le directeur desire que Jean vienne tout de suite 'The director desires that John come right away'

In the examples in (303), the objects of Ci's desire (Mary's departure, John's immediate arrival) are events. Their accomplishment would change the course of events in the direction most suitable for the main clause subject. The volition verbs express a conflict between the current state of affairs and Ci's comfort. The accomplishment of the event described in the complement will resolve that conflict. For instance, in (303a), Mary's departure will resolve John's displeasure.

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Volition verbs are thus not concerned with the description or report of the event expressed in the complement, but rather with the accomplishment of the events necessary for the world to fit the desires of the main clause subject. Importantly, the realization of these events does not necessarily figure among the plausible paths reality is likely to take. Volition can thus be considered as a way to try to change the world. This view of volition is very much in the spirit of Bolinger's (1968) notion of "influencing the outcome", or Searle and Vanderveken's (1985) "world to word direction of fit" of commissive and directive predicates. On psychological grounds, it seems reasonable to propose that one desires an event, not a proposition. This psychological observation has a strong correlate in the analysis proposed here. The ungrammaticality of volition verbs with an indicative complement neatly falls out of the semantic incompatibility between the meaning of those verbs and that of a proposition. A fundamental difference between events and propositions is that since propositions are grounded, they are tied to the time of speech (immediate reality). Events are not. Consider the ungrammatical sentences in (304). (304) a. b.

*Je veux que vous mangez (END) Ί want that you eat' *Elle demande que vous partez (IND) 'She demands that you leave'

The complements in (304) are in the present tense. They are thus candidates for insertion in immediate reality. There is, however, no basis to include them there, because vouloir only presents the desire of the subject, and not the latter's assessment of the way things are. The assessment of a proposition cannot be based on some conceptualizer's desire, because desires do not provide any evaluation of reality. This is compatible with the fact that one wishes events, and not propositions. Notice importantly that the ungrammaticality of (304) is truly caused by the semantic incompatibility between vouloir and the indicative, and not by the presence of the present tense. A future in the complement clause fares no better.

248 Grounding

(305) a. b.

*Je veux que vous mangerez (IND-FUT) Ί want that you will eat' *Elle demande que vous partirez (IND-FUT) 'She demands that you will leave'

The events named by manger 'eat' and partir 'leave' can conceivably occur in the future. However, the propositions vous mangerez 'you will eat' and vous partirez 'you will leave' are candidates for insertion into elaborated reality (more precisely, projected reality). This means that reality can be predicted to evolve in such a manner as to incorporate those events. Recall that prediction into projected reality is rendered possible by the evaluation of the evolutionary momentum of current reality. With vouloir, there is no evolutionary basis to the projection, since only a desire is expressed. A wish or a command does not provide any assessment of reality, but expresses the event whose occurrence would please the conceptualizer the most. The volition verbs in French are thus incompatible with the meaning of an indicative clause because they do not allow Ci to construe the event presented in the complement as a proposition. 6.3.4.2. Verbs of emotion reaction It has been shown that the volition verbs are incompatible with the meaning of a proposition, and hence with that of the indicative inflection. Even though they are also followed by subjunctive complements, a similar statement can not be made for the verbs of emotion reaction, since they used to be followed by indicative complements in Old French. Furthermore, in other Romance languages (Romanian, Spanish under certain conditions) the indicative mood can be present in the complement. The claim here is that although its construal as a proposition is possible, it is the consideration of the event presented in the complement scene that is directly relevant to the meaning of the verbs of emotion reaction. Consider the examples in (306)-(309). (306) Jean a peur que Marie ait tout decouvert (SUB J) 'John is afraid that Mary found out everything'

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(307) Je suis content que vous soyez venu (SUB J) 'I'm glad you came' (308) Je deteste que tu habites si loin (SUBJ) Ί hate that you leave so far away' (309) Je suis desole qu'elle ait echoue (SUBJ) Ί am sorry that she failed' The verbs in (306)-(309) profile the reaction of their subject towards the scene presented in the complement. It is the particular construal of that scene which determines the syntactic behavior of the verb. First of all, unlike the volition verbs, the verbs of emotion reaction are to some degree compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause. In order for the subject to exhibit a particular reaction towards the event expressed in the complement, she must be able at some level to accept that event as a possible facet of elaborated reality. It is thus possible for the subjects of the verbs of emotion reaction to construe the content of their complement as a proposition. However, the construal of the complement content as a proposition is not directly responsible for the subject's reaction. More directly relevant to the reaction profiled by Vi is the particular event profiled in CL2. I claim that the subjunctive inflection in (310)-(313) indicates that the verbs of emotion reaction are specifically concerned with the reaction of their subject to the event expressed in the complement. The relevance of events or propositions to a particular main verb accounts for the contrast in (310) and (311). (310) Jean sait que vous avez echoue (IND) 'John knows that you failed' (311) Jean est desole que vous ayez echoue (SUB J) 'John is sorry that you failed' The conceptual content of the complement structure is similar in (310) and (311). However, that content is construed differently in the two sentences. In (310), the semantics of Vi indicate that the speaker

250 Grounding

is mostly concerned with the description of a facet of Ci'S conception of elaborated reality. The construal of the complement content as a proposition is thus directly relevant. In (311), the speaker is more concerned with the description of John's reaction to a particular event expressed in the complement. It is undeniable that C t is capable of construing the complement content as a proposition, but that construal is not directly relevant to the meaning of the main verb (and hence to the communicative purpose of the sentence). The solution presented here is consistent with Wierzbicka's (1988) analysis of the subjunctive following emotion reaction verbs as "anti-cognitive". However, the verbs of emotion reaction are not the only ones concerned with the subject's reaction to a particular event. Consider the following contrast. (312) Jean est confiant que vous partirez 'John is confident that you will leave' (313) Jean attend que vous partiez 'John is waiting for you to leave' In (312), the conversational motivation of the sentence is the characterization of John's degree of confidence towards the presence of the proposition in his conception of elaborated reality. On the other hand, one waits for events, not propositions. This is illustrated in (313). The construal by Ci of S2's departure as a proposition would be irrelevant. The complement is therefore in the subjunctive. The object of fear verbs can be analyzed in two different ways: intellectually and emotionally. If an intellectual view is adopted, the complement can describe a proposition (hence be in the indicative). Knowledge of current reality enables the conceptualizer to predict the occurrence of an event in the future. The occurrence of that event gives rise to a new facet of the world, construed as a proposition. The conceptualizer's judgment analyses that proposition as potentially detrimental to her. This view of fear is illustrated by the use of the indicative mood in English.

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(314) John is afraid Mary will not come back Fear can also be conceived as affecting the conceptualizer emotionally. The mere consideration of the effect the event may have on her causes the fear. In that case, fear is extra-judgmental. French adopts this second view. Consider the examples in (315). (315) a. b.

Jean craint que Marie ait eu un accident (SUB J) 'John fears that Mary had an accident' J'aipeur que Paul η 'ait pas compris (SUBJ) Ί am afraid that Paul did not understand'

The verbs of fear in French are viewed as a specific kind of emotion reaction verbs. The speaker's reaction is extra-judgmental and involves the fearful feeling of a particular event.85 6.3.4.3. Events versus propositions: the case of esperer The analysis presented here allows us to capture subtle semantic differences between verbs that are otherwise very close in meaning. These semantic differences are in turn reflected in their different syntactic behaviors (i.e. the kind of complements they take). As an example, consider the notoriously difficult case of esperer 'hope'. Conceptually, a hope is very close to a wish. In both cases, the scene described in the complement is uncertain, and its realization represents the desired outcome for the main clause conceptualizer. However, syntactically, esperer patterns with the belief verbs, taking indicative complements and rejecting the subjunctive. The contrast between espirer and the volition verbs is illustrated in (316) and (317). (316) a. b.

Je veux qu 'il gagne au Loto (SUB J) *Je veux qu 'il gagnera au Loto (IND) Ί want him to win the Loto'

252 Grounding

(317) a. b.

J 'espere qu ΊΙ gagnera au Loto (IND) *J'espere qu ΊI gagne au Loto (SUBJ) Ί hope that he will win the Loto'

In accordance with the analysis presented above, I will claim that the complement presents an event in (316a) and a proposition in (317a). The ungrammaticality of (316b) has already been accounted for by the semantic incompatibility between the volition verbs and an indicative clause. More precisely, with vouloir, there is no current basis to indicate that reality can be expected to evolve in such a way as to contain the event described in the complement. This is not the case with esperer. A hope is different from a wish in that there must be some indication that leads the conceptualizer to believe that the momentum of reality might lead it along a path that includes the preferred outcome. This difference between vouloir and esperer is illustrated in (318) and (319). (318) Je veux gagner au Loto, mais je ne joue jamais Ί want to win the Loto, but I never play' (319) ??J'espere gagner au Loto, mais je ne joue jamais Ί hope to win the Loto, but I never play' Whereas (318) is perfectly felicitous, (319) is strange. One can not hope for a particular outcome unless one takes some action (or has some independent evidence) which indicates that this outcome is indeed possible. Similarly, (317a) is infelicitous if Ci knows that S2 never plays. This semantic difference between vouloir and esperer accounts for their syntactic difference. The subject of esperer is aware that the course of events might take different paths and merely points out one of those paths as the most beneficial for her. Crucially, what allows her to even entertain the idea that reality might evolve in such a way as to incorporate the event most beneficial for her is the presence of certain elements of current reality that validate his interpretation. For instance, the fact that S2 played (or usually plays, or even that Ci thinks that S2 usually plays) in (317a) constitutes an indication which

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justifies Ci's belief that reality might evolve in such a way as to incorporate S2's winning. Esperer therefore involves the description of a possible facet of elaborated reality, appropriately described by a proposition. Ci can conceive of that proposition and claim her anticipation to establish it in his conception of elaborated reality. It is therefore part of Ci's dominion, and esperer is compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause.86 The different syntactic behaviors of vouloir and esperer illustrated in (66) and (67) are thus based on the respective semantics of the main verbs. In spite of their conceptual proximity, the two verbs are compatible with different types of complements because their respective subjects construe the content of their complements differently.8 6.3.5 The subjunctive and a specific mental space It is now time to reconsider the problem of grounding briefly mentioned earlier. It has been shown that the verbs that take indicative complements allow their subjects to construe the complement content as a proposition (a part of their dominion) which necessarily entails the consideration of the complement scene with respect to reality. The tense predications provide the putative address of the complement content in that space. The verbs which take subjunctive complements have been shown to be either incompatible (in the case of vouloir) or unconcerned (in the case of the emotion reaction verbs) with the construal of the complement content as a proposition. If the import of the indicative mood is to describe a proposition, i.e. situate the complement content with respect to reality, what is the import of the subjunctive mood? In order to provide a satisfactory answer to that question, I propose to reconsider the parallel drawn at several points of this monograph between nominals and finite clauses in terms of their semantic functions. We have already seen that a finite clause represents a grounded instance of the process type profiled by the verb or, to be more specific, a proposition, a unique element of some conceptualizer's dominion. It has also been shown that elaborated reality is the relevant mental space with respect to which the proposition gets characterized. I propose that the analysis of a subjunctive clause

254 Grounding

further contributes to this parallel by presenting the event profiled in the complement as an "arbitrary instance" of a process type. Langacker (1991: 68) uses the notion of arbitrary instance to account for the use of the indefinite article a in opaque contexts of the kind John wants to marry a dancer. In the non-specific reading of the sentence (where John has no specific dancer in mind) the dancer only inhabits the specific mental space composed of John's desires, but has no independent connection either with John or the speaker outside that space. The dancer only exists in the space of John's desires, and it is only accessible—to the speaker and John himself—as an element of that space. In other words, the dancer represents an arbitrary instance, conjured up for the specific purpose of specifying John's desire, and it has no existence outside that space. The notion of arbitrary (conjured up) instance is also invoked to describe the value of the indefinite article in predicate nominative constructions such as Paul is a doctor (Langacker 1991: 64), and the generic use of the indefinite article in such examples as A wombat is a mammal (Langacker 1991: 106). I submit that the subjunctive has a similar semantic function.88 In a CSC, a subjunctive clause designates an arbitrary instance of the process type specified by the subordinate verb specifically conjured up for a very limited and localized purpose, namely to characterize the desires or emotional state of a given conceptualizer. Crucially, that instance only exists in the mental space its conjuring up creates. There is no access for the speaker (or for the main clause subject) independently from the relation existing between Ci and her desires or emotions. The import of the subjunctive inflection is therefore to set up the local mental space where the complement resides. The type of analysis proposed here is consistent with the observation that the subjunctive has no tense. There is no need to provide the complement with a putative address in order to locate it, because it is situated in its own local space. This analysis is also consistent with the presence of que with both indicative and subjunctive clauses. It has been claimed that complementizers provide a kind of nominal construal for the complement clause. An indicative clause represents a grounded instance of the type described by the verb, a subjunctive clause

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represents an arbitrary instance of the process type described by the verb, conjured up for very specific local purposes. Notice that the property of the subjunctive inflection to set up a space different from reality space (the default parent space) is independent of its presence in the CSC. It is also attested in certain cases with independent clauses. For example, consider the set up of a mathematical problem Soit un triangle rectangle 'Given a right triangle'. The triangle is not to be considered with respect to elaborated reality, but with respect to a particular space set up for the needs of the problem. The use of the subjunctive soit signals that specific limited space. Furthermore, when a hypothetical space is created for the sake of discussion, the subjunctive also naturally occurs. Compare for instance the examples in (320) and (321) where the same verb supposer 'suppose' is used. (320) a. b.

Je suppose qu ΊΙ reviendra ce soir (IND) *Je suppose qu 77 revienne ce soir (SUBJ) Ί suppose that he will come back tonight'

(321) a. b.

*Suppose qu 77 reviendra ce soir (IND) Suppose qu 'il revienne ce soir (SUBJ) 'Suppose that he comes back tonight'

(320a) shows that supposer is followed by an indicative complement in a CSC. The complement content is presented as part of Ci's dominion. (320b) shows that a subjunctive complement is impossible. However, in (321b), the subjunctive is felicitous (following an imperative) and the indicative is infelicitous in (321a). The sentences in (321) do not describe a facet of reality, but an alternative space, conjured up for the specific purpose of the argument. A possible paraphrase of (321b) could be What follows if we assume that. Other verbs that behave in a similar way include imaginer 'imagine', mettre 'posit', admettre 'admit'. That property of the subjunctive of setting up an alternative mental space in which the complement content is located can help us to refine the explanation given in Section 6.3.2 concerning the possible

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presence of the subjunctive following verbs such as reconnoitre 'recognize' or admettre 'admit'(see the examples in (285)). Recall that with those verbs, the subject rejects the overall proposition offered to her by canceling the presuppositions she disagrees with.89 The use of the subjunctive in those cases is very similar to its use in (321b). The complement content is invoked as a hypothesis, especially conjured up for the purpose of the conversation. Even if that hypothesis is accepted, the rest of the sentence does not necessarily follow. The (optional) use of the subjunctive represents a way of blocking the presuppositions which might otherwise be inherited from the parent space (speaker reality).90 The difference in the nature of the grounding provided by the indicative and subjunctive inflections is now clear. The indicative presents a proposition, and therefore assesses the location of the complement content with respect to reality. The tense predications provide a putative address for that proposition in reality. The subjunctive is more concerned with the event described in the complement. It presents an arbitrary instance of the process type described by the verb, which solely inhabits the very local space the mere fact of conjuring it up has created. The specificity of the grounding provided by the subjunctive inflection is that it situates the complement content outside elaborated reality.

6.3.6. Spanish CSCs It is well known that all Romance languages share similarities and differences in the distribution on indicative and subjunctive complements in CSCs. This section investigates some differences between French and Spanish, and shows that the analysis proposed for French can naturally be extended to account for the Spanish data.

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6.3.6.1. French and Spanish: similarities and differences The distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements in French and Spanish CSCs is similar in the following ways: In both languages, the verbs of perception, declaration, knowledge and certainty take indicative complements. This is illustrated in (322)-(325). (322) a. b.

Vi que salio (IND) Je vois qu 'il est parti (IND) Ί see that he left'

(323) a. b.

Pablo dice que Maria vendrä (IND) Paul dit que Marie viendra (IND) 'Paul says that Mary will come'

(324) a. b.

Juan sabe que Maria estd enferma (IND) Jean sait que Marie est malade (IND) 'John knows that Mary is sick'

(325) a. b.

Juan esta seguro que Pablo duerme (IND) Jean est stir que Paul dort (IND) 'John is sure that Paul is asleep'

Furthermore, the volition verbs are invariably followed by subjunctive complements in French and Spanish alike, as illustrated in (326). (326) a. b.

Maria quiere que el vaya (SUBJ) Marie veut qu 'ilparte (SUBJ) 'Mary wants him to leave'

The differences of mood distribution between the two languages concern three areas, namely i) the verbs of thought and beliefs, ii) the emotion reaction verbs, and iii) esperer/esperar 'hope'. I will consider these three cases in turn.

258 Grounding

6.3.6.2. Thoughts and beliefs: creer, pensar, sospechar Whereas in French the verbs of thought and belief (in the positive form) must be followed by indicative complements, similar verbs in Spanish can be found either with indicative or subjunctive complements. Recall that verbs such as pensar 'think', creer 'believe', or sospechar 'suspect' present weaker beliefs than the verbs of certainty or knowledge which can only be followed by indicative complements. The contrast between the verbs of suspicion, belief and certainty is summarized in (327)-(329). (327) Juan esta seguro que Pablo duerme 'John is sure that Paul is asleep' (328) Juan piensa que Pablo duerme 'John thinks that Paul is asleep' (329) Juan sospecha que Paulo duerme 'John thinks that Paul is asleep' In (327), the proposition Pablo duerme is considered as part of the main clause subject's conception of elaborated reality. In (328), it is only considered a good candidate for insertion into the subject's conception of elaborated reality. In (329), the commitment is weaker still. The proposition is only considered a possible candidate for insertion into elaborated reality. I argue that the main difference between (327) on the one hand and (328) and (329) on the other hand, is that in (328) and (329) the status of the proposition is still debated by the main clause subject. If this is not enough to question the possible use of the indicative (the complement content can still be construed as a proposition), it is nonetheless enough to allow for the possible presence of the subjunctive inflection, should the speech circumstances be favorable. For example, it is well attested that sentences such as (330) and (331) are both possible.

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(3 3 0) Juan piensa que Μαήά volvera (IND) 'John thinks that Mary will come' (331) Juan piensa que Μαήά vuelva (SUB J) 'John thinks that Mary will come' The indicative in (330) is usually analyzed as indicating a higher degree of certainty in the subject towards the occurrence of the complement than the subjunctive in (331). The analysis proposed here allows us to capture this distinction naturally. Consistent with the definitions of the indicative and the subjunctive, we will say that in (330), the complement content is viewed with respect to elaborated reality, whereas in (331), it is only considered relative to the mental space of the main subject's beliefs. One can understand why the restriction of the complement content to a particular mental space can be interpreted as a lack of certainty with respect to the actual occurrence of that complement by one again invoking the Gricean maxim of quantity. By electing to present the complement content as only existing in the space of her own beliefs, the subject emphasizes the lack of evidence required to consider it with respect to reality. The difference between the indicative and subjunctive inflection can be used to differentiate between direct and indirect evidence for instance. Consider (332). (332) a. b.

Su madre sospecha que Juan fuma (IND) Su madre sospecha que Juan fume (SUBJ) 'His mother suspects that John smokes'

Both sentences possibly describe the same objective situation, but one can suspect that when the speaker utters (332a) or (332b), she assumes that the mother is relying on different kinds of clues to base her suspicions on. For example, (332a) would be appropriate in the face of direct evidence, such as finding cigarettes in Juan's room for instance. Example (332b) would be felicitous in the presence of more indirect evidence, such as the knowledge that all of Juan's friends smoke, and that Juan has a tendency to imitate them. Here again, the

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presentation of the complement content relative to a more global mental space (available for people to share) represents greater certainty, although the final status of the proposition is not yet set. The subject merely feels confident enough to propose it as a good candidate. The possibility of using the indicative or subjunctive can be used to express subtle semantic nuances. Consider a situation where an attorney defending his client addresses the jury in the following way. (333) Pienso que no es culpable, si ustedpiensen que no sea culpable, deben votar que es inocente! Ί think that he is not guilty, if you think (SUBJ) that he is not guilty, you must vote that he is innocent!' The attorney uses the indicative to describe his own evaluation of the situation, and propose the defendant's innocence as an established element of elaborated reality. When he evaluates the possible thinking of the jurors, however, the subjunctive is used. Clearly, the attorney does not want the jury to question his client's innocence! I believe the kind of analysis provided here accounts for the subjunctive naturally. The subjunctive indicates that the plausible innocence of the client must not even be debated, i.e. assessed with respect to reality, that its mere conception by the jurors as a possible event (independently of its establishment in reality) should be sufficient to pronounce a not-guilty verdict. The analysis also accounts for the behavior of creer 'believe'. Creer like French croire is ambiguous. It can pattern with pensar, in which case the proposition expressed in the complement is considered a good candidate for insertion into the subject's conception of elaborated reality. In that case, the indicative is usually used, but the subjunctive is also possible under conditions similar to the ones defined for pensar. However, the verb can also mean "hold the belief that", in which case it is more similar to the verbs of certainty and situates the complement content in the subject's conception of elaborated reality. It is not surprising that in that sense, creer cannot be followed by subjunctive complements, as illustrated in (334).

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(334) Juan cree que Santa Claus existe *exista perο no esta seguro 'John believes that Santa exists, but he is not sure' Although the verbs of belief are normally compatible with the construal of the complement content as a proposition, the fact that the status of the complement is still debated allows for the possible presence of the subjunctive. In that case, the restriction of the complement to the mental space of the subject's beliefs is interpreted as lack of sufficient evidence to present it with respect to reality. 6.3.6.3. Esperar, and the verbs of emotion reaction Unlike French esperer, esperar is generally followed by subjunctive complements, but the indicative is also possible depending on the subject's confidence in the realization of the complement scene (Real Academia Espanola: Esbozo de una nueva gramätica de la lengua Espanola: par. 3.13.4). This is illustrated in (335). (335) a. b.

Espero que vengas manana (SUBJ) Espero que vendras manana (IND) Ί hope that he will come tomorrow'

The difference between (335a) and (335b) is that the main clause subject is more sure of the complement's outcome in (335b) than in (335a). The presence of the subjunctive inflection following esperar should not constitute a surprise given the analysis of modal inflection presented in this chapter. Recall that conceptually, a hope is a sort of hybrid concept. It is close to a wish in that the scene described in the complement is uncertain, and its realization represents the desired outcome for the main clause subject. On the other hand, unlike a wish, a hope is anchored in some aspect of reality, in the sense that there must be some aspect of reality that justifies the hope for a certain outcome. It was mentioned earlier that French esperer emphasizes the fact that a hope is anchored in reality, to the expense of the favored outcome for the subject aspect. Spanish esperar can focus on the two aspects of the verb, and the use of a specific mood reflects which side

262 Grounding

of a hope is more relevant to the communicative purpose of the sentence. The verbs of emotion reaction present an interesting problem. They are most often followed by subjunctive complements, as illustrated in (336a), but in certain cases the indicative mood can be possible in the complement, as in (336b). (336) a. b.

Estoy contento de que hayas visto la pelicula (SUB J) Estoy contento de que has visto la pelicula (IND) Ί am happy that you saw the movie'

With respect to the analysis proposed here, the construal of the complement as a proposition seems quite plausible with the emotion reaction verbs. In order for the subject to exhibit a particular reaction towards the event expressed in the complement, he must be able at some level to accept that event as a possible facet of elaborated reality. The possible construal of the complement as a proposition in (336) is therefore easily explainable. However, it is the consideration of the event presented in the complement scene which is directly relevant to the meaning of the verbs of emotion reaction, and not the construal of that event as a proposition. In (336) the viewing of the movie (the event in the complement) is directly responsible for the subject's reaction, and not the fact that that viewing can be presented as a facet of reality. The greatest compatibility of the emotion reaction verbs with the subjunctive inflection is quite obvious. Since the semantic value of the main verbs is to describe the effect of a particular event on their subjects, these verbs match up best with the subjunctive inflection which restricts the consideration of the complement content to the mental space of the subject's reactions. It is interesting to note that the use of the indicative inflection, and therefore the presentation of the complement as a proposition often involves the distancing of the subject from the complement content. Consider (337), where a young person just announced to his mother that he is getting married against her will.

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(337) Estoy contenta de que casaste /(IND) Ί am happy that you are getting married' (337) is ironic, and the use of the indicative enhances the irony. By presenting the complement content as an element of elaborated reality, the mother emphasizes the fact that it is beyond her personal grasp, and that she cannot do anything about it.91 Even though the kind of analysis presented in this chapter is primarily concerned with French, it can naturally be extended to investigate cross-linguistic similarities and differences. First, note that the necessary semantic match up between verbs and complement constructions predicts the areas of differences in the complement distribution of French and Spanish. The verbs that have been shown to be strongly compatible with either inflection in French also exhibit similar consistency in Spanish (perception, certainty, volition). It is in the situations where the status of the proposition with respect to elaborated reality is still being debated that the differences between the two languages have been observed. In these situations, French and Spanish differ in the possible use of the subjunctive to express uncertainty. The French usage of a specific modal inflection seems to be more grammaticalized, in the sense that it is necessary if its semantic conditions are met. For example, with croire 'believe', the complement must be considered with respect to elaborated reality, even if its final status is still under discussion. That semantic property of the verb renders the use of the indicative necessary. The language does not allow an alternative construal of the complement scene, as an element whose status with respect of reality is unsure. Spanish allows for that construal, and makes use of the subjunctive marker to reflect it. Note that this flexible use of the subjunctive inflection is attested in other French constructions, particularly in questions. Compare (338a) to (338b). (338) a. b.

Crois tu qu'ilestarriv0?(JND) Crois-tu qu ΊΙ soit arrive?(SUBJ) 'Do you think he has arrived?'

264 Grounding

The situation in (338) is similar to the Spanish situation, but it is only possible in interrogative sentences (or sometimes negative sentences). The use of the indicative or the subjunctive marks the particular anticipation of the speaker for a positive or neutral answer. The flexibility French demonstrates in certain situations, Spanish demonstrates throughout the conceptualizing subject construction. Should we then say that the indicative and subjunctive have the same meaning in French and Spanish? The quick answer would have to be no, if we consider strict distributional data, since the range covered by both inflections is obviously different. However, we also note a large area of overlap between the two languages in the most prototypical usage of the two inflections. In fact, it seems reasonable to posit that the meaning of the inflections is similar in French and Spanish, but that their conventionalized range of usage is different. This demands some explanation. I would maintain that the indicative inflection codes dominion in both languages, and that the subjunctive inflection codes the exclusive relevance of the complement scene to a mental space relevant to the main subject. What is different between French and Spanish is the construal flexibility offered to Spanish speakers in cases where the status of the proposition with respect to reality is still at issue. In those cases, the use of the indicative or subjunctive inflection can be used to show which way the subject is leaning. That construal flexibility is also observed with emotion reaction verbs. We have seen that the meaning of those verbs includes at the same time the knowledge that the event expressed in the complement can be considered with respect to reality, but also the fact that the focus is placed on the reaction to an event, not the construal of that event as a proposition. Spanish speakers can choose to focus on the reality of the complement scene by coding it as a proposition (by using the indicative) or on the exclusive relevance of the subordinate event to the subject by construing it as restricted to Ci's mental space. This kind of analysis points to the conceptual consistency of mood selection across languages, while preserving language specific characteristics and explaining them in terms of construal.

Discussion and conclusion 265

6.4. Discussion and conclusion The indicative and subjunctive inflections have been shown to differ in the nature of the grounding they provide the complement clause with. The indicative construes the complement scene as a proposition, that is to say as a part of some conceptualizer's dominion. Importantly, its presence in a conceptualizer's dominion indicates that the complement content is considered with respect to elaborated reality. The subjunctive on the other hand is not folly grounded. It does not consider the complement content with respect to reality, but with respect to a more localized mental space, set up to describe the main subject's desires or emotions. The semantic compatibility between the mood inflections and the main verbs was shown to account for the distribution presented in (251)-(265). The verbs of perception, communication, and propositional attitude have been shown to be fully compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause because they allow the speaker to present the circumstance described in the complement as part of Ci's dominion (to construe the complement content as a proposition), or in other words as a unique instance of the process type expressed by the subordinate verb. The presence of indicative complements following these verbs illustrates that compatibility. On the other hand, the verbs of volition have been shown to be incompatible with the meaning of an indicative clause since they are solely concerned with the event described in the complement, and not with the report of that event as a proposition. The verbs of emotion reaction have been shown to be potentially compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause. Even though Ci is capable of construing the content of the complement as a proposition, it is the very occurrence of the event (and not the possible description of that event as a proposition) which is the most relevant to the main verb's meaning. The subjunctive inflection illustrates the irrelevance of the construal of the complement's content as a proposition. An analysis based on different degrees of compatibility for the presence of indicative complements precisely isolates the verbs (espdrer and the verbs of emotion reaction) which are the most likely to exhibit synchronic,

266 Grounding

diachronic and cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic realization of their complements. The account presented in this chapter is firmly rooted in the semantic tradition of modal research, and it shares some of the insights of the previous accounts developed within that tradition. For example, Terrell and Hooper (1974) classify sentences into six types, according to certain attitudes the speaker can adopt, namely "assertion", "report", "mental act", "comment", "doubts", "imperative". The propositional complement in these six classes is associated with the semantic notions of "assertion" or "presupposition". Terrell and Hooper's claim is that the choice of mood (indicative or subjunctive) consistently correlates with a certain semantic notion.92 In the account presented here, each modal inflection is also associated with a particular semantic function: the indicative presents the content of the complement as a proposition (a unique instance of the type described by the verb), the subjunctive presents it as an arbitrary instance conjured up to occupy a very local mental space. Our account also shares similarities with Wierzbicka's (1988) solution. Wierzbicka analyzes the subjunctive inflection as possessing the elements of "anti-assertion" and "anti-cognition". The verbs of volition illustrate the "anti-assertive" component. The presence of the subjunctive inflection means that the subject "refrains from committing himself to an assertion" (Wierzbicka 1988: 142), thus refusing to imply that he is in control. The verbs of emotion reaction illustrate the anti-cognitive component of the subjunctive, namely: "I don't want to say I know this" (Wierzbicka 1988: 146). The anti-cognitive analysis of the emotion reaction verbs is compatible with their treatment as it was presented in this paper. The anti-assertive analysis of the volition verbs also presents similarities with our account, since elaborated reality was shown to represent the level of reality where events are reported, and thus considered as propositions. The originality of the account presented here is that the meaning of the indicative and subjunctive inflections is characterized by the nature of the construal each mood imposes on the complement content. This type of analysis has desirable consequences. For instance, it is

Discussion and conclusion

267

particularly well equipped to deal with the verbs that can take both indicative and subjunctive complements, as illustrated in (339). (339) a.

b.

Jean comprend que ses parents ne peuvent plus payer ses etudes (IND) 'John understands that his parents cannot afford his tuition anymore' Jean comprend que vous ne vouliez plus aller a l'ecole (SUBJ) 'John understands that you do not want to go to school anymore'

The same verb comprendre 'understand' is followed by an indicative complement in (339a), and by a subjunctive complement in (339b). This is straightforwardly accounted for by the analysis presented here. The variation in the mood of the complement is explained by different construals of the complement by Ci in (339a) and (339b). In (339a), the communicative function of the sentence is to present a facet of John's conception of elaborated reality. The indicative is therefore justified. In (339b), the situation is very similar to the cases involving the verbs of emotion reaction, in that the communicative function of the sentence is to present Ci's reaction to a particular event expressed in the complement. The main clause subject knows that S2 does not want to go to school, and reacts (intellectually here) to that event. The construal of the complement content as a proposition, even though it is possible, is less relevant to the sentence. One last issue remains to be considered, namely the relation between the dimensions of perspective and grounding. It was shown that these two dimensions of construal must be kept separate, because they pertain to two different types of distinctions, or in other words different decisions made by the conceptualizer of the complement clause. The choice by Ci between a subjective and objective construal of CL2 yields the distinction between infinitival and finite complements, where the complement scene is represented as a process type (infinitive), or as an instance of a process type (finite complement). Among objectively construed complements, a further distinction is

268 Grounding

needed, namely between different kinds of instances (fully grounded or arbitrary) of the process profiled by V2. Despite the separate character of the two dimensions, one needs to account for the fact that the obviative verbs (the verbs which can only be followed by an infinitive complement when Si and S2 are coreferential) are predominantly followed by subjunctive complements when Si and S2 are different. This relation is readily accounted for in the analysis presented here. In Chapter five, it was argued that the obviative verbs cannot take finite complements because the conceptual distance between the subject and object of conceptualization is too short to allow objectification. In this Chapter, we have seen that the subjunctive inflection situates the complement content with respect to a local mental space considered exclusively in relation to the main clause subject (set up to present her wishes, desires, emotional state, etc.), as opposed to the indicative which situates the complement relative to some conceptualizer's conception of reality. The connection between obviative and subjunctive taking complements is therefore clear. Because the verbs which take indicative complements always consider their complement content with respect to reality (and hence outside of the sole relevance to the main subject), the complement scene can always be construed objectively, if the circumstances render that construal relevant. The obviation constraint, i.e. the impossibility of objectifying the complement scene, only applies if that scene is exclusively presented in its relation to Ci, that is to say with verbs that take subjunctive complements.

Chapter 7. Impersonal constructions

This chapter investigates the distribution of infinitival and finite complements in complex impersonals. These constructions are argued to be existential in nature, or more specifically to pertain to the existence of events or propositions in some conceptualizer's conception of reality. It is shown that the meaning of the different complement forms as it has been defined in the previous chapters is directly extendable to impersonal constructions. 7.1. Introduction The term impersonal constructions (henceforth IC) is used to describe constructions where the grammatical subject is the so-called dummy pronoun il 'it'. 93 II exhibits all the well-known properties of French subjects, namely i) it is located before the predicate, ii) it can be inverted in question formation, and iii) it dictates verb agreement. These properties are illustrated in (340). (340) a.

b.

c.

II est venu trois en/ants It came three children 'Three children came' Est-il venu trois en/ants? Is it came three children 'Did three children come?' II est monti deux voitures It came up two cars 'Two cars came up'

The examples in (340) illustrate impersonal constructions in simple sentences. In (340a) and (340c), the pronoun il precedes the predicate and dictates verb agreement, since the two verbs are in the third person singular. The example in (340b) shows that it participates in the

270 Impersonal constructions

subject/verb inversion that typically occurs in French question formation. In traditional grammars, the impersonal subject is contrasted with the "real subject" i.e. the entity which is perceived as generating the verbal process. For example, in (340a) and (340c), despite singular agreement on the verb, the post verbal nominale trois en/ants, 'three children' and deux voitures 'two cars' are respectively perceived as performing the processes of venir 'come' and monier 'come up'. They are therefore traditionally referred to as the "real" subjects (Grevisse 1986). The impressive amount of research about impersonals has mostly focussed on /V's semantic and/or syntactic value, and its relation to the post-verbal nominal. The term impersonal can be applied to a whole array of constructions, each of which would deserve individual consideration.94 However, because this monograph is primarily concerned with sentential complement distribution, we will mostly concentrate on complex impersonals. The specific classes of expressions investigated in the following sections are illustrated in (341)-(353). The examples in (341) illustrate the "raising" impersonals.95 (341) a. b.

II semble que Jean soit parti (SUBJ) 'It seems that John has left' II parait que Marie a gagne (IND) 'It appears that Mary has won'

The examples in (342)-(344) present the deontic impersonals, where the speaker indicates that a specific event must occur. (342) a.

b.

II est imperatif de revenir a I 'heure (INF) 'It is imperative to come back on time II est imperatif qu 'eile revienne ά I 'heure (SUB J) 'It is imperative that she come back on time'

Introduction 271

(343) a.

b.

(344) a.

b.

II est necessaire de demander un passeport avant de voyager α I 'etranger (INF) 'It is necessary to apply for a passport before traveling abroad' II est necessaire qu 'il demande un passeport avant de partir (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that he apply for a passport before leaving' II convient de tabuler les votes le plus vite possible (INF) 'It is necessary to count the votes as soon as possible' II convient que le comite tabule les votes le plus vite possible (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that the committee count the votes as soon as possible'

Examples (345)-(347) illustrate the epistemic impersonals, where the speaker presents the likelihood of occurrence of a certain event. (345) a. b.

(346) a. b. (347) a. b.

*// est probable de venir (INF) 'It is probable to come' II est probable qu 'il est venu (IND) 'It is probable that he came' *// est evident de ne rien comprendre (INF) 'It is obvious not to understand anything' II est ivident qu 'il η 'a rien compris (IND) 'It is obvious that he has not understood anything' *// est certain de pleuvoir demain (INF) 'It is certain to rain tomorrow' II est certain qu 'il pleuvra demain (IND) 'It is certain that it will rain tomorrow'

272 Impersonal constructions

Complex impersonate can also express the reaction to a certain event. Emotion reaction ICs are considered in (348)-(350). (348) a. b.

(349) a. b.

(350) a. b.

II est regrettable de ne pas connaitre ses parents (INF) 'It is regrettable not to know one's parents' II est regrettable qu'il ne connaisse pas ses parents (SUB J) 'It is regrettable that he does not know his parents' II est important d'essayer de continuer (INF) 'It is important to try to go on' II est important que vous essayiez de continuer (SUBJ) 'It is important that you try to go on' II est stupide d 'essayer de I 'arreter (INF) 'It is stupid to try to stop her' II est stupide que la police essaye d'arreter les manifestants (SUBJ) 'It is stupid that the police try to stop the demonstrators'

Finally, complex impersonal constructions can present the evaluation of a particular event, as illustrated in (351)-(353). (351) a. b.

(3 52) a. b.

(353) a.

II estfacile de se tromper (INF) 'It is easy to make a mistake' *Il est facile qu 'il se trompe (SUBJ) 'It is easy that he makes a mistake' II est impoli de partir sans saluer ses hötes (INF) 'It is impolite to leave without saluting your hosts' *// est impoli qu 'ilparte sans saluer ses hötes (SUBJ) 'It is impolite that he leave without saluting his hosts' II est difficile de connaitre tous ses voisins (INF) 'It is difficult to know all one's neighbors'

Introduction 273

b.

*Il est difficile qu ΊΙ connaisse tous ses voisins (SUBJ) 'It is difficult that he know all his neighbors'

Several points are worth noticing in the preceding examples. The first one concerns the distribution of complement forms. Complex impersonal constructions contain the whole range of complements already discussed in this monograph. For example, the deontic impersonals are followed by an infinitive in (342a), (343a), and (344a), and a subjunctive clause in (342b), (343b), and (344b). The epistemic ICs are followed by a finite clause in the indicative in (345b), (346b), and (347b). Complex impersonals often select both infinitival and finite complements, but two selectional restrictions need to be noted. The epistemic ICs cannot select an infinitival complement as illustrated in (345a), (346a), and (347a), and evaluative ICs cannot felicitously occur with a finite clause, as shown in (351b), (352b), and (353b). These restrictions will be considered in detail in Section 7.5. Second, most of the impersonals presented in (341)-(353) are closely related to the verb classes investigated in Chapters four, five, and six. Only the evaluative ICs do not have personal counterparts. The deontic ICs are obviously semantically close to the deontic modals. The epistemics ICs are both close to the epistemic modals and to the CSC verbs of propositional attitude. Finally, the emotion reaction ICs are directly related to the CSC verbs of emotion reaction.96 However, despite their shared semantic similarities with the modals and CSCs, the impersonals are different from both those constructions in one important respect. The vantage point from which the complement clause is construed is not as critical to the characterization of the impersonals as it is for the modals or CSCs. As a default case, the complement clause is conceptualized by the speaker, but it can also easily be viewed from another conceptualizer's vantage point, as illustrated in (354). (3 54) Selon Marie, il est possible que Jean soit parti (SUBJ) 'According to Mary, it is possible that John left'

274 Impersonal constructions

The example in (354) presents Mary's conceptualization. Even though she is not coded as the subject of the impersonal, she represents the vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized. Unlike the situation with the modals and CSC verbs, that vantage point is in large measure independent from the coding of the complement scene as part of an impersonal construction. In this chapter, I show that this relative indifference to the vantage point from which the complement clause is construed is a direct consequence of the meaning of the impersonal construction. In the following sections, I argue that the ICs are fundamentally "existential" in nature. More specifically, I claim that the complex ICs presented in (341)-(353) pertain to the location of events and propositions with respect to some(one's) conception of reality. Consequently, these constructions are primarily concerned with the existence of the event or proposition coded in the complement, and not with the specific conceptualizer responsible for its conceptualization. The emphasis placed on the existence of the complement content to the detriment of the person responsible for its conceptualization explains that the specific vantage point from which the complement clause is conceptualized is not an important characteristic of the construction. Once the meaning of the construction is recognized, the distribution of the different complements is shown to follow the same principles described throughout the preceding chapters. This chapter is organized in the following fashion. Section two presents the basic semantic import of French impersonal constructions. Section 3 investigates the meaning of the single clause impersonals. Section four is concerned with the meaning of the different complex ICs presented in (341)-(353). Section five investigates the distribution of finite and infinitival complements in complex ICs. Section six briefly considers the relation between the complex ICs and the modal and CSC constructions. Section seven recapitulates the results and concludes the chapter.

The meaning of French impersonals 275

7.2. The meaning of French impersonals The most basic question to the treatment of impersonals concerns the semantic status of il. Is the pronoun meaningful or not? For syntactic analyses, the answer is clearly no 97 This position is expressed most eloquently by Gaatone who claims (1970: 391 [translation mine]): "Le pronom //[...] est introduit comme appendice obligatoire du verbe et, non commutable avec un autre element a l'interieur de ce contexte, il n'est porteur d'aucune information." 'The pronoun il is introduced as an obligatory appendix to the verb, and since in this context it cannot be replaced by another element, it bears no information.' Consequently, the syntactic tradition views il as a mere syntactic place holder, whose only function is to satisfy the structural need for a surface subject in French.98 For the semantic tradition, however, the fact that il cannot be substituted in an impersonal construction does not necessarily indicate it is meaningless. Semantic investigations of impersonals have attempted to i) show that il is a real subject, and ii) provide the construction's semantic import. The analysis proposed in this chapter addresses these two issues. However, before we get under way, a methodological note is in order. It should be clear that the account presented here does not pretend to cover all the cases of impersonal constructions. I believe that the meaning of ICs (and therefore of il) is best represented as a radial category. The attempt at a semantic definition of impersonals undertaken in this chapter simply aims at the characterization of the complex ICs illustrated in (341-353). The precise relation between the meaning of those constructions and the other instances of impersonals is left for further research. The most obvious characteristic of the impersonal pronoun is its close relation to the complement content. Chafe (1970) focuses on that relation and argues that the semantic import of the English it is to cataphorically announce the content expressed in the complement. For example, in a sentence such as It is difficult to speak a foreign language, the impersonal it serves to cataphorically announce the complement content speak a foreign language. Importantly, the impersonal construction has a "non-extraposed" equivalent, where the

276 Impersonal constructions

infinitival clause appears in subject position, as in To speak a foreign language is difficult. However, there seems to be more to the meaning of it than a mere cataphoric function. Bolinger (1973) shows that in certain cases, the non-extraposed equivalent of the impersonal construction is infelicitous, and that therefore, it must have some semantic import beyond its cataphoric value. This is illustrated in (355) (from Bolinger 1973: 264). (355) a. b.

It's pleasant in California *In California is pleasant

If the semantic function of the impersonal it were merely to cataphorically announce the locational in California, one would expect that locational to be able to occur as a subject in the non-extraposed equivalent. The example in (355a) shows that it is not the case. Consequently, it must be adding its own semantic import. Bolinger (1973) analyzes the English impersonal it as "a nominal with the greatest possible generality of meaning" (1973: 268). More specifically, "it has as its referent precisely the 'environment' that is central to the whole idea" (1973: 261). Bolinger's definition of environment may not be quite precise enough (for a detailed critique, see Ruwet 1990). However, he points to a crucial aspect of impersonals, namely their coding of some kind of "circumstance" surrounding the event presented in the complement." This chapter elaborates on Bolinger's insight. In a nutshell, I argue that impersonal constructions are fundamentally existential in nature, that is to say they pertain to the existence of concrete and abstract entities. I take il as profiling a specific kind of "abstract setting" (Langacker 1991, Smith 1985, 1994), identifiable as the immediate scope of the existential predication. The analysis will center around the following three points. First, impersonals represent instances of "setting subject" constructions. Second, simple (single clause) impersonals typically pertain to the existence of concrete entities, and the complex impersonals presented in (341)-(353) pertain to the existence

The meaning of French impersonals 277

of abstract objects (events or propositions). Third, the abstract cases represent a natural extension of the more concrete ones. 7.2.1 Impersonal constructions as setting subject constructions The first step in the analysis is to show that the impersonal pronoun il is a legitimate subject. In this section, I argue that il represents an abstract setting within which the event profiled in the complement takes place. The setting of a linguistic expression must be characterized with respect to the canonical event model presented in Chapter two. Recall that both the participants in the verbal process and the setting in which that process occurs are available for grammatical marking in any given clause. The specific construal imposed on the scene conceptualized determines the grammatical marking of the clause representing that scene. In the unmarked case, the participants in the verbal relation are the focal elements of the scene, and thus chosen as trajector and landmark. This is illustrated with the simple example in (356), where the focal elements are the participants in the verbal relation. (356) Marie a regarde Paul 'Mary looked at Paul' (356) profiles a looking relation between the two focal participants, namely Marie and Paul. These participants are respectively identified as the trajector and the landmark of the profiled relation. Marie is recognized as the subject of the clause, because at the clausal level, she is the primary figure (the trajector). Even though the process described in (356) necessarily occurs somewhere, the location (or setting) within which the relation between the participants takes place remains an unprofiled part of the base. It is possible, and even quite common, to explicitly mention the setting as an oblique, as in (357). (357) Marie a regarde Paul dans la salle de cinema 'Mary looked at Paul in the Movie Theater'

278 Impersonal constructions

In (357), the setting is the Movie Theater. It is not part of the profiled relation, but it is explicitly mentioned. This coding of some episode occurring in a particular location is probably prototypical, in the sense that it best corresponds to the canonical event model ICM (Langacker 1987a, 1991), but other construal choices are possible. In certain cases, the setting itself can be the primary figure in the profiled relation, and therefore be coded as the clausal subject. This possibility is illustrated in (358): (358)

Cette salle de cinema a connu de glorieux moments! 'This Movie Theater has witnessed some glorious moments'

In (358), the setting cette salle de cinema is the primary figure in the profiled relation, and thus selected as the clausal subject. Such constructions where the trajector status is conferred to the setting are referred to as "setting subject constructions" (Langacker 1991: 345). Setting subjects are quite frequent in everyday language, as shown in (359) for English. (359) a. b. c.

Under the couch is full of coins Tuesday is a bad night for TV A courtroom has seen many tears100

The choice of the setting of an event as the clausal subject is quite common cross-linguistically, and therefore unproblematic. I would now like to propose that il codes an abstract setting, and that consequently, French impersonal constructions can be classified as setting subject constructions. The analysis of impersonal subjects as the abstract setting of the event in the complement is not new. It is proposed for English (LakofF 1987, Langacker 1991), German (Smith 1985, 1996), and Russian (Smith 1994). For example, Smith (1996) analyses the German impersonal es as a polysemous element, which profiles the setting within which a relation takes place. The nature of the setting and the latter's level of participation in the relation profiled by the main verb are linked in a semantic chain which constitutes the meaning of the impersonal pronoun. As an example, one of the

The meaning of French impersonals 279

clearest senses of es is described by Smith (1996) in the following way: "es is best viewed functionally as a kind of presentative or wideangle focusing device that profiles a physical or temporal setting within which some state or action is conceived to take place." That locus can be physical as, for example, in Es steht eine Vase auf dem Tisch 'There is a vase on the table', where the impersonal es presents the physical region wherein the contact relation between the vase and the table can be isolated. An important part of the analysis of French impersonals thus consists in precisely defining the specific nature of the setting il profiles. In the next section, I argue that il represents a portion of reality within which the existence of some object can be observed. 7.2.2. Impersonal constructions as existential constructions101 In the preceding section, it was claimed that impersonal constructions pertain to the existence of certain objects in some(one's) conception of reality. The broad formulation of the claim should not overshadow the complexity of our conception of reality. In fact, as was indicated at several points in this monograph, our view of reality is extremely complex, with many dimensions, facets, and levels. One aspect of reality particularly relevant to the investigation of impersonal constructions concerns its hierarchical organization. It was already argued that different conceptualizers have different conceptions of reality. It is also the case that with respect to certain topics, some people know more than others. In that case, their conception of reality can be used as the necessary authority to sanction the opinions of those who know less. Depending on experience and expertise, different conceptualizers rank at different levels on a scale of knowledge. This hierarchical organization can also be observed within a given conceptualizer's conception of reality. Within one single person, different integrated models at various levels of abstraction can be considered real. Let us take a simple example. Each person can observe the behavior of various entities she interacts with. The observed events are recorded as "real". The sum of the recorded events forms a consistent model of observed behavior. This model can

280 Impersonal constructions

sanction the occurrence of certain events, i.e. it is with respect to this model that these events will be judged as having or not occurred. At a more abstract level, however, we know that different behaviors have predictable consequences. These consequences are not necessarily directly observable, but they nonetheless constitute another consistent level of our conception of reality. The levels of observed behavior and the consequences of those behaviors exhibit a certain degree of independence. It is certainly possible to evoke someone's behavioral traits without evoking the consequences of those traits. However, the two levels are also closely related. We have the ability of changing our behavior if we realize that our actions might bring about unfavorable consequences. To put it differently, input from the more inclusive level of reality often triggers changes at the behavioral level. For example, the realization that cigarettes are nefarious to her health might induce a person to stop smoking. I will show in Section 7.4. that the complex impersonals often emphasize the hierarchical organization of our conception of reality. In those cases, it will be important to precisely evaluate the different levels involved, as well as /7's role with respect to them. Importantly, the hierarchical organization of our conception of reality is largely independent from the division between basic and elaborated reality considered in Chapters two and six. Recall that basic reality is the level of the events, whereas elaborated reality is the level of propositions, which include their own independent grounding predications. The construal of the different elements of reality as events or propositions represents a particular dimension of reality, but both levels are themselves hierarchically organized. The hierarchy presented above between people's behavior and the consequences of their behavior occurs at the level of basic reality. It is only with the report of the elements of those two levels with respect to the speech situation (when they are given an address in reality) that they become part of elaborated reality. Elaborated reality can also be viewed as an array of integrated conceptions at different levels of abstraction. Consider for example John believes that Bill thinks Mary may know Paul. If elaborated reality consists of propositions, including grounding, then the sentence involves successive embedded views of

The meaning of French impersonals 281

elaborated reality, each of which, with its own independent grounding and modality. Each conception gets assessed for validity at a higher level. It therefore seems clear that our capacity to relate to elements of reality as events or propositions constitutes a specific dimension of our model of reality. It was shown in Chapter six that it is along that dimension that the indicative and subjunctive inflections get characterized. However, this dimension alone is not sufficient to enable us to characterize the meaning of the impersonal constructions. The semantics of these structures needs to be characterized with respect to the hierarchical organization of reality. In other words, impersonal constructions assess the existence of both events and propositions with respect to their relevant levels of reality. The different levels of integrated conceptions that constitute the base relative to which the meaning of the (complex) impersonals must be characterized are quite difficult to delineate and define precisely. Consequently, the following analysis is preliminary in many respects I hope, however, that the notions presented here will prove useful for further and more exhaustive account of impersonal constructions. Let us, as a starting point, overlook the complexity of our conception of reality, and consider what elements are needed to substantiate the original claim that existential predications always pertain to some(one's) conception of (actual or imaginary) reality. Let us consider the example in (360). (360) II est venu peu de touristes sur la cote d'Azur cette annee 'There came few tourists on the Riviera this year' The sentence in (360) presents the existence of a specific element Ε (few tourists coming) with respect to someone's conception of reality R, within which E's existence is being manifested. R itself is not specifically named in the sentence. In particular, it should not be confused with E's specific location within R, which we will call L. L specifically pertains to E's physical and temporal setting, but R is inherently a more inclusive and abstract notion. For example, in (360), L is represented by the two adverbials sur la cote d'Azur, and cette

282 Impersonal constructions

αηηέβ. R, on the other hand, contains among other things, all the elements of observation, knowledge, and comparison that allow the speaker to come to the conclusion expressed in her statement. I propose that //, (and quite possibly other impersonals in other languages) profiles the abstract setting identifiable as the immediate scope for the existential predication (henceforth IS). If the conceptualizer of the sentence C is thought of as peering out through a viewing frame, the immediate scope is that portion of the world being viewed that is subtended by that frame as any given moment. I suggest that il profiles the part of the viewed world subtended by the viewing frame. Thus, within some general domain R, il picks out a locus of attention, such that Ε is observed within it at a certain location L.102 Let us come back to our example in (360). R represents C's conception of reality, or in other words the cognitive domain within which E's existence is being predicated. II profiles the immediate scope of the existential predication, that is the specific part of R immediately necessary for E's construal. L (sur la cöte d Azur and cette annee) represents the location within R where Ε can be found. In the next section, I show that the elements presented here allow us to provide a satisfactory account of the impersonals pertaining to concrete entities. The complex (abstract) impersonals presented in (341)-(353) will then be shown to represent natural extensions of the concrete cases. 7.3. The meaning of simple impersonals

This section presents the meaning of four impersonal constructions that pertain to the existence of concrete entities. I take as the purest examples of existential constructions the cases where the IC profiles the presence of a concrete object in reality. The other constructions will be shown to involve some semantic extension from those central cases.

The meaning of simple impersonals

283

7.3.1. Pure existentials The pure existential ICs often involve the verb exister 'exist' They are illustrated in (361). (361) a. b.

II existe des pneus qu 'on a pas besoin de gonfler 'There exist tires that do not need inflating' II η 'existe pas de fruits sans noyau ni pepins 'There exist no fruit without stone or seeds'

In (361), the speaker reveals to the hearer the presence (or absence) in reality of a certain concrete object. Let us consider (361a) as an example. In some conception of reality R, the existence of an object Ε (a specific kind of tires) is asserted. The assertion naturally presupposes a conceptualizer C, who as a default case is identified with the speaker. The reality R where existence is predicated is not made specific, but the default case would be current reality. Also note that the specific location within R where Ε can be located is not made specific either, because the communicative purpose of the sentence is simply to establish E's presence within R. Consistent with the hypothesis proposed earlier, il profiles the immediate scope for the existential predication, that is to say the part of R subtended by the viewing frame within which Ε is observable. In (361), it includes, among other things, the knowledge of the state of the art in tire production. Finally, we need to consider E's modality of existence, which we will call M. Simple existence, as in (361) represents the simplest case. We will see shortly that some aspectual considerations pertaining to E's appearance on a scene are also possible with concrete existentials. Generally, however, E's possible modalities of existence are much more reduced for concrete entities than for more abstract ones. Pure existential constructions as in (361) primarily profile E's presence in R. Related notions such as the person responsible for the conceptualization, or the exact location within R where Ε can be found are secondary. In particular, it is crucial to our understanding of the construction not to confuse E's existence in R with its location at L.

284 Impersonal constructions

The exister constructions are infelicitous to describe a given entity's location, if that entity is unquestionably known to be part of R (to exist). This is illustrated in (362). (362) *Il existe des peches dans le panier 'There exist peaches in the basket' In (362), the existence of the peaches is not in question. The purpose of the sentence is to indicate their location at L. (the basket). Exister is infelicitous because it solely pertains to establishing E's presence in R. This does not mean that E's location can never be specified with exister, but that location must be directly pertinent to E's existence, as shown in (363). (363) II existe au village des gens qui savent la verite 'There exist in the village people who know the truth' In (363), the location au village 'in the village' has a restrictive value. It is crucial to determining E's existence, because it outlines the proper subset of des gens. The mention of the locational is therefore possible, because of its important role in the establishment of E's existence within R.'03 7.3.2. Locational constructions Locational constructions represent the first kind of semantic extension from pure existentials. In French, location is most commonly expressed by il y a 'there is'. II y a constructions are presented in (364). (364) a. b.

II y α des peches dans le panier 'There are peaches in the basket' IIy a deux livres sur I 'etagere 'There are two books on the shelf

The meaning of simple impersonate 285

The constructions illustrated in (364) are perhaps the most common impersonal constructions in French. Their label of "locational", as opposed to existential reflects the fact that unlike the pure existentials, they are more concerned with establishing E's location at L than its presence in R. Let us take (364a) as an example. Within a certain conception of reality R, the presence of an object Ε {des peches) is established at location L {dans le panier) by a conceptualizer C (the speaker). II profiles the region of R within which Ε is shown to be located. What about y then? I suggest that the locational y renders specific the containing function of the immediate scope profiled by il, which is implicit in other constructions. II profiles the section within R that is selected as allowing the viewing of Ε. Y makes specific the fact that that part of R acts as an abstract container. More precisely, y refers back to the immediate scope profiled by il, and reinforces its status as an abstract location. Here again, it is important to keep the physical location L and the abstract location profiled by y separate. L represents a portion of the physical world. Y makes specific the fact that the portion of R subtended by the viewing frame through which Ε can be observed is used as an abstract setting. The description of the construction also needs to make specific the role of the verb a. Avoir 'have' is primarily a possession verb. For example, in Jean a deux livres 'John has two books', a profiles the possession relation between Jean and the books. I suggest that the verb's role in a locational predication is quite similar. Consistent with the existential nature of the construction, the relation between the book and the table (E at L) contained in reality can be construed as reality's abstract possession. A profiles that abstract possession. Since il represents the part of R within which Ε can be observed, its choice as the trajector of the possession relation is perfectly natural. Note that this analysis of impersonals is a little different from the one proposed by Smith (1985, 1996) for the corresponding German case Es steht eine Vase auf dem Tish 'There is a vase on the table'. In Smith's analysis, the impersonal es profiles the physical region wherin the relation between the vase and the table can be observed. In the analysis presented here, il profiles a part of R, that is to say the part of

286 Impersonal constructions

reality which constitutes the immediate scope within which Ε can be seen. Because the notions of existence and location are so close, it is not surprising that ily a constructions can be used to express existence, as illustrated in (365). (365) Ily α des pneus qu 'on a pas besoin de gonfler 'There are tires that do not need inflating' In (365), L is not specified, and Ε is generic enough for the sentence to have an existential reading. However, unlike the exister existentials, il y a expressions can be used with a definite object, as illustrated in (366). In (366), a father tells his child to do his homework. (366) Fais tes devoirs sur la table de la cuisine 'Do your homework on the kitchen table' Je peux pas, ily a les livres de Pierrot sur la table! Ί can't, there are Pierrot's books on the table' Ily a is not the only locution that expresses location. Rester 'remain' for example also profiles E's location at L, as illustrated in (367). (367) II reste des peches dans le panier 'There remain peaches in the basket' In (367), we can assume that some peaches in the basket have been eaten. The location of the remaining ones at L therefore needs to be reestablished.104 7.3.3. Coming into existence A second kind of semantic extension from the pure existential constructions concerns E's modality of existence. Instead of profiling E's presence in R, some impersonals profile its coming into existence, or in other words, its appearance in R. This is illustrated in (368), where MIDD stands for the middle marker se.

The meaning of simple impersonals 287

(368) a.

b.

c.

II se fait de belles voitures de nos jours It MIDD makes some beautiful cars nowadays 'One makes nice cars nowadays' II se construit une maison en deux mois It MIDD builds a house in two months 'One builds a house in two months' II se cree des machines de plus en plus compliquees It MIDD creates machines more and more complicated 'One creates more and more complicated machines'

The examples in (368) present middle impersonals. These constructions profile the creation (or coming into existence) of a concrete object.105 Their existential value is confirmed by the fact that the verbs that do not pertain to E's coming into existence are often infelicitous in the construction, as illustrated in (369). (369) a.

b.

c.

*Il se ditruit une maison en une heure dans un ouragan It MIDD destroys a house in one hour in a hurricane Ά house gets destroyed in one hour in a hurricane' *// s 'achete de belles maisons dans cette ville It MIDD buys some nice houses in this city 'One buys some nice houses in this city' *Il se regarde de belles voitures chez les concessionnaires It MIDD watches some nice cars at the dealerships 'One watches some nice cars at the dealerships'

The coming into existence can also be predicated of a process, as illustrated in (370). (370) a. b.

II commence äy avoir des nuages 'There begins to be clouds' II commence äy avoir du monde 'There begins to be a lot of people'

288 Impersonal constructions

c.

II finit par y avoir de la poussiere 'There ends up being dusty'

In the examples in (370), the impersonal construction profiles the beginning (or in other words the coming into existence) of a process. In that sense, they are directly related to the examples in (368). The main difference between them concerns E's nature. Note that here again, the verbs which do not pertain to the coming into existence of a process are not usually felicitous in the construction, as illustrated in (371). (3 71) a. b. c.

? ?I1finit de pleuvoir 'There finishes to rain' *//finit d 'arriver du monde 'There finishes to arrive people' *Ilfinit d 'y avoir des nuages 'There finishes to be clouds'

7.3.4. Coming into C's consciousness A further extension of E's modality of existence is presented in (372). (372) a. b. c. d.

II est monte une voiture 'There came up one car' II est arrive deux en/ants There arrived two children' II est descendu deux types 'There came down two guys' II est venu les gendarmes 'There arrived the police'

The examples in (372) do not profile E's coming into existence, but its appearance in a given conceptualizer's range of perception or consciousness. Let us take (372a) as an example. E's coming into existence is not being debated. Cars are unquestionably part of reality. The sentence profiles the appearance of a particular car in C's range of

The meaning of simple impersonals 289

perception. The perceived similarity between the appearance of a class of objects in reality and the appearance of a particular object in C's range of consciousness constitutes the basis for the semantic extension. Expectedly, the most felicitous verbs in the construction profile E's appearance in C's range of consciousness. Those indicating departure from consciousness are less felicitous, as illustrated in (373). (373) a. b.

??// est reparti une voiture There left a car' ??Il est mort trois civils 'There died three civilians'

Similarly, the verbs that do not pertain to E's presence in C's consciousness are excluded from the construction. This is illustrated in (374). (374) a. b.

*Il a dormi deux etudiants 'There slept two students *Il a mange tout un groupe de touristes 'There ate a whole group of tourists'

Since these constructions are not concerned with the existence of an entity, but with that entity's appearance into C's consciousness, they can be found with definite entities, if those entities are immediately recognizable. This is illustrated in (375). (375) II est monte la voiture du facteur 'There came up the mailman's car' The examples presented in (360)-(375) do not pretend to be exhaustive of all the constructions that pertain to the existence of concrete objects. However, I hope that they are sufficient to show that i) the exister constructions represent the purest existential cases, and ii) the other constructions considered in this section represent natural extensions of those pure existentials.

290 Impersonal constructions

The existential constructions pertaining to concrete entities exhibit certain common characteristics. First, since the object whose existence is predicated is concrete, they mostly pertain to verifiable existence. Consequently, the importance of the conceptualizer C is minimal. Second, for most of the constructions (with the exception of the ones denoting pure existence), the location L generally needs to be made specific. Third, the range of E's possible modalities of existence is fairly limited. Beside pure existence, they have been restricted to some aspectual notions of remaining in existence, coming into existence, and appearing on a scene. In the next section, I argue that the complex impersonals presented in (341)-(353) represent further natural extensions from the concrete cases investigated in this section. Complex impersonals mostly pertain to the existence of abstract objects, namely generalized events and propositions. Because of E's abstract nature, we can anticipate some differences between the concrete and abstract constructions. First, we can expect that L will become less important. Second, as we get further away from direct observable existence, we can expect C's role to become more and more important, and the range of modalities of E's existence to be significantly increased. To be more specific, C's reaction, attitude, or force-dynamic experience will be shown to constitute a modality that somehow bears on E's existence in R. This modality will be considered the analog of the simple existence or aspectual notions in the case of concrete impersonals. As a preface to next section, we can note that if all the examples in (360)-(375) presented concrete objects, all the constructions can occur with more abstract objects. This is illustrated in (376)-(379). The examples in (376) present the pure existential cases. (376) a. b.

II existe des sentiments beaux et delicats 'There exists feelings beautiful and refined' II est des choses qu ΊΙ vaut mieux ne pas dire 'There are things that are better left unsaid'

The meaning of simple impersonals 291

The existence of concrete objects is mostly described with exister. With more abstract objects, the possible range of verbs in the impersonal construction increases, as illustrated by the examples in (377). (377) a. b.

II regne dans la piece grand silence 'There reign in the room a great silence' IIflotte dans I 'air un parfum de printemps 'There floats in the air a fragrance of spring'

The locational constructions can also occur with abstract objects, as illustrated in (378). (3 78) a. b.

II y a un malaise dans I 'air 'There is a malaise in the air' II y α des idees qui font aussi mal que des coups 'There are ideas as damaging as blows'

Impersonal constructions can also code the coming into existence of an abstract object. This is illustrated in (379). (379) a. b. c.

II s 'est instaure un climat de confiance 'There was established a climate of confidence' lis 'est cree un consensus imm0diat 'There was created an immediate consensus' II s 'est defini des horizons differents 'There were defined different horizons'

Finally, an abstract object's appearance into C's range of consciousness can also be coded by an impersonal complement, as indicated in (380). (380) II est arrivd sur la vilie une bouffee d'optimisme 'There arrived upon the city a breath of optimism'

292 Impersonal constructions

7.4. The meaning of complex impersonate We now have the elements required to investigate the meaning of the complex impersonals presented in (341)-(353). In this section, I show that i) these constructions pertain to the existence of events or propositions, and ii) they represent natural extensions of the simple cases presented in the preceding section. 7.4.1. Abstract existentials The close connection between the simple and complex cases is clearly illustrated by the fact that certain verbs participate in both constructions with very similar meanings. I will start this section by examining two of those verbs, namely arriver 'arrive', and se faire 'occur'. These verbs represent an ideal transition from the concrete to the abstract impersonals, because despite E's different nature in the concrete and abstract senses, its modality of existence is largely similar in both instances. They will therefore be called "abstract existentials". Consider the examples in (381) and (382). (381) Ilse fait qu ΊI ne pouvait pas partir avant trois heures (IND) 'It happens that he could not leave before three o'clock' (382) a. b.

II arrive de se tromper (INF) 'It happens to make a mistake' II arrive que Jean soit absent le vendredi (SUBJ) 'It occurs that John is absent on Fridays'

The verbs se faire in (381) and arriver in (382) have already respectively been presented with concrete objects in examples (369a) and (371b). Recall that in those instances, the constructions present the creation of particular objects (369a), or the entry of an object into C's range of consciousness (370b). In the complex cases, the sentences pertain to the occurrence of a proposition in (381), and an event in (382) (this will be developed further in the next section). An analysis quite similar to the one proposed for the concrete cases can be given

The meaning of complex impersonals 293

here. Let us take (382b) as an example. The occasional occurrence of an event Ε (John's absence) is stated in some conception of reality R. This directly corresponds to the entry of an object in C's range of consciousness. The difference between the concrete and abstract cases can be attributed to the specific nature of Ε as an event in (382b). The role of il is also similar in both cases. It delineates the subpart of R within which the event can be observed. Here again, the impersonal can be viewed as profiling the immediate scope of the existential predication, that is to say the part of reality in which Ε is directly observable. Note that in the examples in (381) and (382), the conceptualizer does not produce any special kind of epistemic effort. The sentences merely pertain to E's directly observable occurrence. Consequently, for concrete and abstract impersonals alike, C's role is not crucial. It is also worth noting that E's modality of existence is quite similar in the simple and complex cases. Recall that E's modality of existence with arriver in (371b) is its appearance on a scene. Similarly, in (382), E's modality of existence is occurrence, or to emphasize the connection between the concrete and abstract cases, the appearance of a certain event on the scene of reality. The concrete and abstract cases with se faire are also very similar to each other. The verb was shown in (369a) to indicate the coming into existence of a concrete object. In (381), the proposition il ne pouvait paspartir avant trois heures 'he could not leave before three o'clock' is also presented as being manifested for the first time. The most common interpretation of the sentence is that a previously unknown facet of reality reveals itself to the audience unexpectedly. Here again, E's modality of existence is quite similar in the concrete and abstract cases. Another point in common between the examples in (381) and (382) and the concrete impersonals is C's minimal role with respect to E's modality of existence. In both instances, that minimal role might be explained by the fact that Ε is objectively observable. As we move further away from the directly observable cases, we will see that C gains more and more importance, and that E's modality of existence becomes more and more associated with her.

294 Impersonal constructions

7.4.2. Evaluative impersonate If the constructions with se faire and arriver profile the occurrence of an event, the evaluative impersonals presented in (351)-(353) qualify the conditions of that occurrence. The effort of qualifying the occurrence of an event as easy, difficult, polite, impolite, etc. can only be performed by the conceptualizer. Consequently, C's role with respect to E's existence will be more important than it was in the se faire cases. In order to illustrate the shift in C's role between the purely existential and evaluative impersonals, let us compare (382a) II est facile de se tromper 'It is easy to make a mistake' with (351a) II arrive de se tromper 'It happens to make a mistake'. In (351a), the conceptualizer is a mere witness to E's occasional occurrence, without any further epistemic effort on her part. C's occurrence is directly observable, and it is sufficient to establish C's statement as true. In (382a), E's modality of existence is its ease of occurrence. This entails C's judgement of the way in which Ε usually occurs. That judgement represents an analytical effort on C's part, which goes beyond mere observation. She needs to be aware of the way in which people usually perform E, and evaluate that performance on a scale of difficulty. C's role in establishing E's modality of existence is therefore significantly higher than it is in (351a). Expectedly, E's modality of existence in (382a) is also less directly verifiable than in (351a), because it is more closely tied to C's judgement. E's occurrence alone is not sufficient to confirm C's statement. Only the evaluation of the ease with which Ε was performed would accomplish that task. We can assume that C relies on different kinds of knowledge and information to merely observe or evaluate the occurrence of an event. However, for both constructions, that knowledge is provided by the part of R on which attention is focussed to observe E. In both cases, that focus of attention within R is profiled by il. The impersonal therefore has the same function with the abstract existentials and evaluatives as with the concrete cases presented earlier. In all instances, even though the content of the focused area of attention invariably changes, il profiles the immediate scope of R within which Ε can be located.

The meaning of complex impersonate 295

7.4.3. Emotion reaction impersonals Let us now consider the case of the emotion reaction impersonals presented in (348)-(350). Note that these constructions have a corresponding "non-extraposed" structure, where the subordinate clause appears in subject position. This is presented in (383). (383) a.

De ne pas connaitre sesparents est regrettable (INF) 'Not to know one's parents is regrettable' b. Qu ΊΙ ne connaisse pas ses parents est regrettable (SUB J) 'That he does not know his parents is regrettable' In the sentences where it is placed in subject position, Ε is simply presented as a stimulus inducing a certain experience in C. For example, in (383), the fact that someone might not know her parents induces a feeling of regret in C. In the corresponding emotion reaction impersonal construction presented in (348)-(350), the immediate scope profiled by il is the locus of the factors inducing the experience in C. However, in those examples, Ε is a central component in the global stimulus, possibly the most central or sole component. In other words, at the extreme, Ε is the active zone of the immediate scope with respect to the process of inducing C's experience (Langacker 1987a: 271-274). The meaning difference between the impersonal and the non-extraposed constructions is admittedly quite subtle. It does, however, appear clearly in specific situations, as illustrated in (384). (384) a. b.

Que Marie soit venue (ä la fete) est regrettable (SUB J) 'That Mary came (to the party) is regrettable' II est regrettable que Marie soit venuefä la fete) (SUB J) 'It is regrettable that Mary came (to the party)'

In (384a), Ε (Mary's coming to the party) is marked as the subject. It is that event alone that induces C's feeling of regret. In (384b), the immediate scope of the existential predication is chosen as subject. C's

296 Impersonal constructions

feeling of regret is induced by the immediate circumstances associated with Mary's coming. The source of C's regret is therefore somewhat larger in scope than in the non-extraposed construction. We can easily imagine that it incorporates impressions pertaining to the general atmosphere of the party, a possible tension in the air, the dynamic between the guests, etc. These consideration are not directly available in (384a), where Mary's coming alone induces C's feeling of regret. Consequently, if the emphasis is placed on the party itself, the choice of Mary's coming as the subject provides questionable results, as illustrated in (385) and (386). (385) C 'etait comment la fete hier? 'How was the party last night?' Pas mal. II est regrettable que Marie soit venue c 'est tout! 'Not bad. It's regrettable that Mary showed up, that's all! (386) C 'etait comment la fete hier? 'How was the party last night?' ??Pas mal. Que Marie soit venue est regrettable, c 'est tout! 'Not bad. That Mary showed up is regrettable, that's all! In (385) and (386), the question concerns the party itself. A response strictly concerned with Mary's coming as in (385) is too narrow in scope to answer it satisfactorily. The sentence in (386) is more felicitous because it codes as its subject the general circumstances surrounding Mary's appearance at the party. Mary's coming is incorporated into the more global frame of the general impression her presence generated (Bolinger 1973, Schwartz 1972). 7.4.4. "Raising " impersonals Unlike the emotion reaction impersonals, the "raising" impersonals presented in (341) do not have a corresponding non-extraposed construction where the subordinate clause appears in subject position. This is illustrated in (387).

The meaning of complex impersonals 297

(387) a. b.

*Que Jean soitparti semble (SUBJ) 'That John has left seems' *Que Marie a gagne parait (IND) 'That Mary has won seems'

The infelicity of the examples in (387) shows that Ε itself (John's departure) does not per se "give off" a particular impression. In the impersonal construction, the immediate scope profiled by il, —the part of reality on which attention is focussed—provides C with a general impression concerning the state of R. To phrase it differently, the global, undifferentiated circumstances within the immediate scope provide C with an impression. As a result, C makes a provisional judgement concerning E's occurrence in R. The fact that Ε itself is not the stimulus that triggers C's impression can be further seen in the fact that a raising impersonal can be uttered on the basis of observed evidence, even if Ε itself has not been observed. For example, it is perfectly possible to utter II semble que Marie soit revenue 'It seems that Mary came back', even if the return itself has not been witnessed. The impression created by outside evidence, such as the lights being on at her house, or her car in her driveway is sufficient to provide the basis for the speaker's statement. When the conceptualizer of the complement clause is different from the speaker, she is often mentioned as an oblique, as in II semble ä Jean que Marie est venue 'It seems to John that Mary came'. As indicated in Section 7.1, the presence of a conceptualizer other than the speaker is not crucial to the meaning of any impersonal construction. In the "raising" cases, the construction codes C's provisional judgement concerning E's occurrence in R. When C is different from the speaker, the latter simply attributes the judgement to her. 7.4.5. Epistemic impersonals The epistemic impersonals presented in (342)-(344) are in some ways similar to the "raising" constructions, because they also pertain to C's level of confidence with respect to E's presence in R. Let us begin the

298 Impersonal constructions

analysis with the example in (388), where the subordinate clause containing Ε is placed in subject position. (3 88) Que Jean ne la connaitpas est vrai (IND) 'That John does not know her is true' The sentence in (388) presents a proposition evaluated as true, and therefore contains the expected connotations of objective validity that truth conveys. The construction predicates an exact match between the proposition Ε (Jean ne la connait pas) and the corresponding portion of some conception of reality R. In the most neutral case, we can assume that the conception of reality with respect to which the proposition is located is the speaker's, but it is not always the case. In (389), the proposition is viewed as corresponding to a facet of another conceptualizer's conception of reality. (3 89) Selon Marie, que Jean ne la connait pas est vrai (IND) 'According to Mary, that John does not know her is true' In (389), the status of R is specified as Mary's conception of reality. This, of course invokes a higher-order reality R', in which the entire sentence is taken as being true (i.e. it is asserted that in the speaker's conception of reality, Mary's view of reality includes the truth of que Jean ne la connait pas). This indicates that the hierarchical organization of various conceptions of reality (see Section 7.2.2) will play a major role in the semantic evaluation of epistemic impersonals. A simple assertion such as Jean ne la connait pas merely points to a fragment of R. It is, however, being tacit concerning its accuracy with respect to R. This is part of the subjectively construed speech act force of assertion. On the other hand, que Jean ne la connait pas est vrai objectifies the notion of matching a proposition to reality, construing Jean ne la connait pas as an independent object that would have the potential not to match any facet of reality at all. Hence the (overall) scope of the proposition steps outside of R to a higher level of reality R' to encompass the relation between R and propositions that may or

The meaning of complex impersonals 299

may not match it. In (389), the assertion that Ε does match is pointed to a fragment of this higher-level of reality R \ Of course, since the whole point of a predicate such as il est vrai is to assess propositions with respect to reality, and by default, the reality one conceives of oneself as occupying, there is a real sense in which R' is not distinct from R, but only an elaborated version of it. We are now ready to consider the impersonal counterpart of (388) given in (390). (390) II est vrai que Jean ne la connait pas (IND) 'It is true that John does not know her' I suggest that in sentences such as (390), the impersonal highlights the separation between R and R'. More specifically, il delimits the scope of R' within which the matching of Ε to the corresponding fragment of R is carried out. In order to further illustrate the difference between R and R', consider the example in (391). The context is the following. A university program has a policy concerning the number of absences the students are allowed before their grade gets lowered. One instructor is arguing that a particular student's grade should be lowered because she has exceeded her allowed absences. The instructor's supervisor disagrees. (391) Instructor:

Supervisor.

Les regies sont claires. Elle aurait dü les suivre 'The rules are clear. She should have followed them' II est vrai que nous avons des regies. Mais la meilleure des regies reste notre bon sens (IND) 'It is true that we have rules, but the best rule remains our common sense'

In (391), R represents the conception of reality where the rules are written. The proposition nous avons des regies 'we have rules'matches a fragment of that reality. However, there is another conception of reality (common sense) where the reality of the rules can be interpreted and nuanced to fit the particularities of each situation. The

300 Impersonal constructions

instructor's position is strictly within the bounds of R, while the supervisor is at the level of R'. Note that the supervisor's strategy is not to challenge E's validity within R, but to invoke another conception of reality where Ε no longer matches.106 Given the absolute nature of vrai, there is not too much by ways of factors external to the fragment of reality considered actually influencing the conceptualizer's judgement. By contrast, other epistemic verbs more saliently bring into the picture the notion of external facets of R' (evidence of various sorts) bearing on C's epistemic judgement. This is illustrated in (392). (392) II est probable que Jean est venu (IND) 'It is probable that John came' In (392), the nature of the predication il est probable saliently brings into the picture the possible elements of R' (clues of various kinds) which bear on C's judgement. These cues allow her to evaluate the matching of Ε with the relevant fragment of R as possible. The presence of il highlights the separation between R' and R, with C— occupying R'— having a certain force-dynamic experience in trying to extrapolate R (accepted reality) to encompass E. As indicated earlier, C's epistemic experience constitutes E's modality of existence. Different epistemic predications indicate different levels of certainty at which the conceptualizer arrives concerning E's presence in R. With il est certain 'it is certain', the clues from R' allow C to be one hundred percent positive that the proposition in the complement matches a fragment of R. 7.4.6. Deontic impersonals Let us finally consider the deontic impersonals illustrated in (342)(344). It has already been mentioned at several points of this monograph that deontic predications attempt to influence the course of reality and bring about a new facet of the world. This is illustrated again in (393). (393) is uttered during a board game. Player A reminds

The meaning of complex impersonals 301

player Β that the rules of the game require her to perform a specific action. (393) IIfaut que tu bouges tonpion (SUBJ) It is required that you move your pawn 'You must move your pawn' In the example in (393), the event Ε is viewed as necessary in R. The physical motions required are part of the physical world, and directly observable by the players. The reasons for the necessity, however, do not come from R, but from an alternative space AS identifiable as the rules of the game in (393). For the duration of the game, R is required to conform to the specifications of that alternative space. AS is therefore the locus of the deontic force applied to the hearer to perform Ε in R. The deontics can therefore be analyzed in a way similar to the other impersonals constructions considered in this chapter. Ε represents a specific event. R represents some conception of reality with respect to which Ε needs to be carried out. E's modality of existence is necessity, and it is dictated by the need of R to conform to AS (at least with respect to the occurrence of E). The conceptualizer's awareness of AS allows her to express the deontic force directed at the occurrence of E. II represents the immediate scope of AS, that is to say the portion of the rules which renders E's occurrence necessary. In a way similar to the epistemic examples, /Ts presence highlights the separation between R and AS, with the conceptualizer—occupying AS—issuing the necessary deontic force for Ε to occur in R. In (393), the separation between R and AS is clear. The nature of AS, however, is not always so easy to delineate. Consider the example in (394). (394) II est necessaire que vouspartiez (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that you leave' The reasons for E's necessity in (394) can be quite diverse. In the limiting case, the speaker merely wants reality to conform to her

302 Impersonal

constructions

wishes. In any event, the deontic force aimed at E's occurrence results from some pressure for R to conform to another space, regardless of the nature of that space. In some cases, E's occurrence in R is dictated by the rules of another more global level of reality. This is illustrated in (395). The context is the following. John is a smoker, and his doctor is pointing out to him that only a change in behavior would allow him to enjoy continuing good health. (395) II est necessaire que vous arretiez de fumer (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that you stop smoking' The example in (395) also includes two different spaces, even though both of them represent different levels of reality at different degrees of generality. The first one represents John's daily habits and behaviors. We will call this conception of reality R, because it represents the space where Ε must occur. The event of John's smoking represents the fragment of R that needs to change. The second level of reality could be called the rules of good health. In that conception, the different elements of R produce desirable or undesirable consequences for a person's well being. In cases such as (395), this alternative space to R could be called R', because it also is part of our conception of reality. In (395), R and R' are in conflict with respect to a particular fragment. More specifically, John's smoking in R has negative consequences in R'. The purpose of the deontic impersonal is to resolve the conflict between R and R'. Here again, the impersonal il profiles the immediate scope of R' (the set of habits which promote a healthy life) which renders E's occurrence (John's quitting smoking) a necessity. From the examples in (393)-(395), it is clear that the nature of the alternative space to R is irrelevant for the purpose of deontic impersonals. The construction emphasizes the difference existing between R and any space that motivates the necessary occurrence of a given event in R. As a recapitulation to this section, it is appropriate to reconsider two claims made at the beginning of this chapter, namely i) the simple impersonals pertain to the existence of concrete objects, and ii) the abstract impersonals represent natural extensions of the simple cases.

The meaning of complex impersonals 303

With respect to i), it was shown in Section 7.3 that the different single clause impersonals represent semantic extensions from a pure existential construction involving exister. Purely existential constructions profile the presence of a concrete entity Ε in reality. E's modality of existence is simply existence, and the conceptualizer's role is merely that of an observer. From this central cases, two kinds of extensions have been investigated in the concrete domain. The first one concerns the passage from E's existence (its presence in R) to its location at L. It was illustrated by the il y a and rester constructions. The second extension involves E's modality of existence. Pure existence naturally extends to the aspectual notion of coming into existence. This extension was illustrated by the se faire constructions. A further extension involves at the same time E's modality of existence and its location. The monier and arriver cases were shown to profile E's appearance into C's range of consciousness. With respect to ii), the se faire and arriver constructions were shown to provide the transition between the concrete and abstract cases, because they both occur in single clause and complex constructions. The difference between the two concerns the nature of E. In a complex construction, Ε is an event or a proposition. This naturally extends its modality from existence to occurrence. In these abstract existentials, C's role is similar to the one she has in the concrete examples, namely that of an observer. From these central cases in the abstract domain, three kinds of extensions were observed, each involving the expansion of C's role with respect to establishing E's occurrence. In the first kind of extension, E's modality of occurrence shifts from simple occurrence to evaluation of occurrence. With the evaluative impersonals, it is no longer E's occurrence that is at stake, but the conditions under which that occurrence comes about, as well as its possible consequences. The emotion reaction impersonals represent one step further along that path. These constructions are not concerned with E's occurrence per se, but with C's reaction to it. The second kind of extension from simple occurrence involves C's epistemic analysis of E's occurrence. With the "raising" constructions, the judgement concerning E's presence in R is performed on the basis

304 Impersonal constructions

of a general impression provided by the immediate circumstances that surround E. C's epistemic effort is more apparent in the epistemic impersonals, where E's status with respect to R is the result of the systematic analysis of clues coming from a more inclusive conception of reality R \ Finally, in the third kind of extension, E's modality of occurrence shifts to necessity of occurrence. The relation between the concrete and abstract cases is clear. Both pertain to E's existence in R, and in both cases, il profiles the immediate scope for the existential predication. The differences between them can be attributed to two factors, namely i) the nature of E, and ii) C's role in determining E's modality of existence. I take the close connection between the concrete and abstract impersonals as validation for the analysis of complex impersonals as existential predications. 7.5. Complement distribution in impersonal clauses Now that the existential value of the complex ICs has been established, we can address the issue of complement distribution in the subordinate clause. In this section, I show that the definitions of the complement forms proposed in the previous chapters naturally account for the distribution presented in (341)-(353). The basic idea is the following. The complement will be in the infinitive or in the subjunctive if the entity whose existence is predicated is an event, or in other words an element of basic reality. The difference between the infinitive and the subjunctive mood depends on the event's degree of generality or elaboration. Conversely, the complement will be a finite clause in the indicative if Ε is a proposition, that is to say an element of elaborated reality that contains its own independent grounding predications. I will consider in turn the distribution of complements in the different constructions.

7.5.1. Deontic impersonals As illustrated in (342)-(344), deontic impersonals may select infinitival or subjunctive complements. With respect to the mood of their

Complement distribution in impersonal clauses 305

complements, these constructions are very similar to the volition verbs considered in Chapters five and six. Like those verbs, they are concerned with the occurrence of a particular event to solve a conflict. In the case of the deontics, an event Ε needs to occur so that a portion of basic reality R can conform to the specifications of an alternative space. E's occurrence does not necessarily figure among the plausible paths reality is likely to take, and thus has no basis in reality. Like the volition verbs, the deontic impersonals are incompatible with the construal of their complement content as a proposition, and therefore with the meaning of the indicative inflection. Infinitival complements code events that refer to general situations, applicable to many specific instances of those situations. This is illustrated in (396). (396) IIfaut toujours reconfirmer son vol avant de partir (INF) One must always reconfirm one's flight prior to departure' The example in (396) has a general value. The infinitive appropriately codes a type of behavior that yields benefits in every one of its instances. It is applicable to every person in a position to perform the infinitival process. Subjunctive complements, on the other hand, code a specific instance of a process type, with its own participants. For example, in II est necessaire que Jean reconftrme son vol avant de partir 'it is necessary for John to reconfirm his flight prior to departure', the complement codes a specific instance of the reconfirming process, with John as a participant. That instance is arbitrary, because it does not reflect a facet of reality. It is specifically conjured up for the purposes of illustrating the way in which R should conform to AS. Consistent with the definition given in Chapter six, the subjunctive mood represents the expected coding of that arbitrary instance. It is worth noting, however, that an infinitival complement can also code a specific situation, as illustrated in (397).

306 Impersonal constructions

(397) Vous pouvez aller au άηέτηα, mais attention, ilfaut revenir avant 11 heures! (INF) 'You may go to the movies, but careful, it is required to be back before 11 o'clock' Let us assume that the example in (397) refers to parents giving a curfew to teenagers. In that case, the statement directly refers to a specific situation, and it is quite clear that even though they are not explicitly mentioned, the children are expected to perform the infinitival process. The interpretation of the infinitive as coding a general or specific process is made possible by the pragmatics of the speech situation. 7.5.2. The emotion reaction impersonals The emotion reaction ICs are very similar to the CSC verbs of emotion reaction presented in Chapter six. Even though they are potentially compatible with the construal of their complement content as a proposition, they are more concerned with C's reaction to a particular event. Recall that with emotion reaction impersonals, the event in the complement plays a crucial part in that reaction, because it constitutes the active zone of the immediate scope of predication with respect to inducing C's response. As was the case for the deontics, the presence of the subjunctive usually codes a more specific situation. Even when the complement content refers to an actually occurring instance of the verbal process, it is construed as an arbitrary instance, conjured up for the purposes of characterizing C's emotional state. Here again, depending on the pragmatics of the speech situation, an infinitival complement can have a general or specific reading. Compare for example (350a) and (348a), repeated for convenience in (398) and (399). (398) II est stupide d'essayer de I 'arreter (INF) 'It is stupid to try to stop her'

Complement distribution in impersonal clauses 307

(399) II est regrettable de ne pas connaitre ses parents (INF) 'It is regrettable not to know one's parents' In (398), the infinitive refers to a specific situation, possibly occurring in from of the speaker's eyes. The speaker analyzes the situation and evaluates the validity of a certain course of action. In (399), the sentence has a more general meaning, close to the summarizing sense of the perception verbs considered in Chapter three. The subordinate process is construed as schematic for its specific instantiations. Regardless of the particular circumstances, its occurrence triggers a feeling of regret. This generality is further exemplified by the possibility to add the adverbial toujours 'always' to examples such as (399), in order to reinforce the universality of the statement. These kinds of emotion reaction constructions resemble the evaluative impersonals, because they provide an emotional chart of our reaction to certain events. Just as it is part of our experience to anticipate our interaction with various processes, it is also part of our experience to know that certain events provoke predictable emotional reactions. 7.5.3. The evaluative impersonals Two aspects of the distribution of evaluative impersonals deserve particular attention. The first one concerns the presence of infinitival complements. The second one is the fact that finite complements cannot occur in the construction. The compatibility of the evaluative ICs with infinitival complements requires little explanation. Since the meaning of the construction is precisely to evaluate the way in which people typically interact with a particular process, that process is naturally coded by an infinitive. Note, however, that the complement of an evaluative IC does not present an event per se, but a potential event. The incompatibility of evaluative ICs with finite clauses is also quite straightforward. Evaluatives profile the evaluation of a general process. They may compare that process to other processes, but they are not concerned with any of its specific instances, as they describe particular situations. The evaluation is made at the level of the type,

308 Impersonal constructions

and therefore, the only possible coding for that type is an infinitival complement. Note interestingly that the evaluation of the type may be restricted to a particular participant, but the complement is still in the infinitive. This is illustrated in (400) and (401). (400) II lui est difficile d'arriver ά I 'heure (INF) 'It is hard for him to arrive on time' (401) II lui estfacile de parier Franqais (INF) 'It is easy for her to speak French' In (400) and (401), the processes arriver ά I'heure 'arrive on time' and parier Franqais 'speak French' are evaluated as respectively difficult and easy in reference to a specific participant expressed in each case by the dative clitic lui. However, even though it is restricted to a specific participant, it is the process type itself which is evaluated, and therefore, as long as it involves the specific participant it is predicated of, it is true for each particular instance involving that participant. Note, however, that if Vi is in the conditional mood, the felicity of a finite complement improves significantly, as illustrated in (402)-(404). (402) II serait agreable qu 'ilparle Franqais (SUBJ) 'It would be nice if he spoke French' (403) II serait impoli que tu partes sans avoir salue la maitresse de maison (SUBJ) 'It would be impolite for you to leave without saying good bye to the hostess' (404) II serait difficile que tu rencontres ma famille (SUBJ) 'It would be hard for you to meet my family' The presence of the conditional marker in (402)-(404) creates an imagined situation, or in other words an instance of the complement

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process, specifically conjured up for the purpose of exposing what reaction its occurrence would trigger. Let us take (403) as an example. An arbitrary instance of partir sans saluer la maitresse de maison 'leave without saluting the hostess' is evaluated as potentially impolite should the subject perform it. Since the situation in the complement is construed as an arbitrary instance of the process profiled by the verb, it is appropriately coded as a subjunctive clause. 7.5.4. The epistemic impersonate Two aspects of the complement distribution in epistemic ICs will be considered here. The first one is their occurrence with an indicative clause. The second one is the fact that infinitival complements are impossible in the construction. In Chapter six, the verbs of propositional attitude were shown to profile their subject's level of commitment to the presence of the proposition expressed in the complement in her conception of elaborated reality. This is again illustrated in (405). (405) Jean croit que Marie est partie (IND) 'John believes that Mary left' In (405), the speaker presents John's beliefs. The latter is entertaining a certain conceptualization involving Marie and the process of partir, and that conceptualization is presented as a good candidate for insertion into elaborated reality. The consideration of the complement as a proposition motivates the use of the indicative inflection. In the epistemic ICs, the conceptualizer (usually identified as the speaker) is also attempting to evaluate the presence of a proposition in elaborated reality. Consider (406). (406) II est probable que Marie est partie (IND) Ί1 is probable that Mary left' In (406), the speaker presents her own beliefs, coded by an impersonal construction. The use of il est probable objectifies the speaker's

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constructions

epistemic judgment. The communicative purpose of the construction is to use certain aspects of reality to evaluate how it is likely to evolve (or have evolved) with respect to certain events. Epistemic ICs operate at the level of elaborated reality, because they report E's status with respect to the speech situation, i.e. they provide it with an address in reality. For example, in (406), clues from reality allow C to form a judgement concerning the presence of Marie est partie 'Mary left' in elaborated reality. The indicative inflection reflects E's construal as a proposition. In a way similar to the verbs of propositional attitude, the epistemic impersonals also allow the speaker to exhibit different degrees of certainty with respect to the reality of the complement content. Compare for example (406) to (407). (407) II est certain que Marie est partie (IND) 'It is certain that Mary left' The difference between (406) and (407) pertains to the speaker's degree of certainty with respect to the proposition Ε matching a fragment of elaborated reality. The presence of a subjunctive clause when there exists some doubt concerning E's presence in elaborated reality is also straightforward. Consider (408). (408) a. b.

II est douteux que Marie soit partie (SUBJ) 'It is doubtful that Mary left' II est impossible que vous I 'ayez rencontre (SUBJ) 'It is impossible that you met him'

In (408), the speaker is expressing doubts that the course of reality included the events in the complement. That doubt, or in other words the negation of E's presence in reality is expressed by the subjunctive inflection. The description of a specific event that did not happen does not, by definition, present a facet of elaborated reality, but an arbitrary instance of a similar process. An arbitrary instance is all the conceptu-

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311

alizer can conjure up for purposes of illustration, since the "real" instance did not occur. With respect to the infelicity of infinitival complements in epistemic ICs, it was pointed out in Chapter four that an epistemic judgment pertains to the evaluation of the likelihood of the specific instance of a process type. It is impossible to assess the likelihood of occurrence of a process type, because a type is not tied to a particular time or location. In order to assess its likelihood, we need information relative to time, place, and participants, that is to say information pertaining to instances. Probability, evidence, certainty cannot be predicated of types, but of specific instances of those types. Let us consider the example in (345b), repeated for convenience in (409). (409) II est probable qu ΊΙ est venu (IND) 'It is probable that he came' In (409), the conceptualizer relies on clues from R' (made available by the immediate scope profiled by il) to pass an epistemic judgement concerning the presence of Ε in R. This judgement is rendered possible by the evaluation of the way reality has, and is likely to evolve. It was argued in the previous chapters that a facet of elaborated reality can only be coded by an indicative clause. It is therefore not surprising that the indicative alone is possible in the complement. The infinitive is impossible because the mere mention of a process type does not include any address with respect to reality that would serve as the basis with respect to which reality can be evaluated. When a piece of reality is unveiled, or in other words when the (partial) result of evolutionary momentum is finally apparent, a finite clause alone is possible, as illustrated in (410) and (411). (410) a. b.

II s 'avere qu 77 la connaissait (IND) 'It turns out that he knew her' *Il s 'avere de la connattre (INF) 'It turns out to know her'

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constructions

(411) a.

II apparait que le prisident est implique (IND) 'It appears that the president is implicated' *// apparait d'impliquer le president (INF) 'It appears to implicate the president'

b.

In (410) and (411), a facet of elaborated reality (a proposition) has been revealed to the speaker. It is therefore expected, given the definition of a finite clause proposed in Chapter six that it would be the only possible way of coding the newly discovered facet of reality.107 The impossibility for epistemic ICs to be followed by infinitival complements is therefore perfectly consistent with the analysis of the impersonal constructions presented in this Chapter, as well as with the analysis of the complement forms presented throughout this monograph. 7.5.5. The case of il est possible The last problem to be considered in this section concerns the behavior of il est possible 'it is possible'. This expression is problematic, because unlike the semantically close il est probable, it can indifferently be followed by a finite clause or an infinitival complement, as illustrated in (412). (412) a. b.

II est possible de suivre ce cours (INF) 'It is possible to take that course' II est possible qu 'il suive ce cours (SUBJ) 'It is possible that he is taking that course'

In a nutshell, the different distribution of complements following il est possible and il est probable can be attributed to the fact that possibility applies to events, and probability applies to propositions. Popular wisdom clearly states that Tout est possible 'everything is possible'. This means that any event has the potential to occur. Consequently, a judgment of possibility is not per se an epistemic judgment. It does not require any particular knowledge of the world, or careful examination of the way reality has evolved (since anything can

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happen). II est possible simply indicates that no obstacle obviously stands in the way of the occurrence of a particular event. That reading of possible obstacles does by itself constitute some observation of reality, but it does not involve the careful investigation of the course of events that would be needed for a true epistemic judgement. For example, in (412b), the judgment of possibility can be made by merely knowing that the course is being offered. On the other hand, probability represents a true epistemic act, because it pertains to the evaluation of the way in which reality has evolved. This evaluation entails a close analysis of the clues that bear on the epistemic judgement. The kind of information C requires to pass an epistemic judgement on E's presence in R is much richer than she would require to pass a possibility judgement. For example, in order to pass the probability judgment corresponding to (412b) (II est probable qu'il suivra ce cours 'It is probable that he will take this course') C would need to know more than whether or not the course is offered. She would also require information pertaining to the student's major and schedule, her likes and dislikes, etc. Only then would she have the knowledge base necessary to determine whether Ε is a likely part of elaborated reality.108 The difference in complement distribution following il est possible and il est probable can therefore be attributed to the semantic difference between the two expressions. 7.6. Relation between constructions One of the most crucial claims developed in this monograph is that alternative grammatical constructions represent different construals imposed on a conceptual base. In this section, I would like to briefly consider two examples that illustrate the possible motivations for the speaker's choice of construction. The first one concerns the emotion reaction CSCs and impersonals. The second one concerns the modal and epistemic impersonal constructions.

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constructions

7.6.1. CSCs and impersonate In many situations, emotion reaction CSCs and emotion reaction impersonals represent very close alternative construals, as illustrated in (413) and (414). (413) Je regrette que tu aies dämenage (SUBJ) Ί regret that you moved away' (414) II est regrettable que tu aies demenage (SUBJ) 'It is regrettable that you moved away' The objective content of sentences (413) and (414) is relatively similar, but the construal represented by each construction is quite specific. In (413), the speaker and the main clause subject are coreferential, but the conception of the speaker as the conceptualizer of the subordinate clause is put on stage and coded as the main clause subject. The fact that it is coreferential to the speaker is not particularly significant. The sentence presents the conceptualization of the main clause subject, independently of the latter's relation to the speaker. From its vantage point of Ci, the main clause subject construes the complement content objectively, and that objective construal is represented by the finite aspect of the complement clause. In (414), the main subject is the immediate scope of the existential predication, that is to say the locus of the factors inducing an experience in C. Several factors may influence the choice of one construal over the other, and I will not attempt to describe them her. It is worth mentioning, however, that the choice of the immediate scope of R as a subject entails a broader perspective on the whole situation. The choice of a personal subject solely presents that person's reaction to a particular event. The impersonal subject, by comparison, incorporates the possible reasons that motivate C's reaction. For example, (413) solely considers C's reaction to John's leaving. In (414), on the other hand, the experience of regret associated with John's moving away is provided by the consideration of the immediate consequences of his departure. These consequences may include more than what is

Relation between constructions 315

contained in a purely emotional reaction. In fact, C's emotional response to John's leaving may be in conflict with the reasons that trigger her reaction of regret. In that case, the impersonal construction alone is felicitous, as illustrated in (415) and (416). (415) II est regrettable que Jean ait demenage, mats personellement il ne me manque pas (SUBJ) 'It is regrettable that John moved away, but personally, I do not miss him' (416) ? ?Je regrette que Jean ait demenagä, mais personellement il ne me manque pas (SUBJ) Ί regret that John moved away, but personally, I do not miss him' In the situation presented in (415) and (416), C's reaction of regret to John's leaving must be kept separate from her emotional reaction to the same event. We can, for example hypothesize that John was a useful employee or a convenient neighbor, and that he will be missed for solely pragmatic reasons, which leave C emotionally untouched. This situation can only be coded by an impersonal construction, because those pragmatic considerations are available in the abstract setting coded as subject, and they do not conflict with C's emotional position expressed in the mais 'but' phrase. It is more difficult to separate a person from her own emotional state. The sentence in (416) is therefore perceived as contradictory. 7.6.2. Modalsandepistemic impersonals It has been pointed out that a situation of necessity or epistemic modality can be coded by a modal or an impersonal construction. This is illustrated in (417) and (418). (417) a.

Marie doit arreter de fumer (INF) 'Mary must stop smoking'

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b.

(418) a. b.

lis doivent etre partis, la maison estfermee (INF) 'They must have left, the house is closed up' II est necessaire que Marie arrete de fumer (SUBJ) 'It is necessary that Mary stop smoking' II est probable qu 'ils sont partis, la maison est fermee (IND) 'It is probable that they are gone, the house is locked up'

(417a) and (418a) present cases of deontic modality, whereas (417b) and (418b) illustrate epistemic cases. The claim is obviously not that the two groups of sentences are equivalent in meaning, but that both kinds of constructions can be used to construe a situation of deontic or epistemic modality. The modal and impersonal constructions present the same base and impose their specific construal on it. Let us consider the deontic constructions in (417a) and (418a) as examples. Here again, the difference between the constructions is primarily a difference in subject selection. With the modals, the target (the entity in charge of performing the complement process) is coded as the main subject. With the impersonal construction, the immediate scope of AS, that is to say the circumstances that render E's occurrence in R necessary is coded as the subject. Modal constructions therefore place the emphasis on the main subject and the action that she must perform, since both are the focal figures of the modal relation. Impersonal constructions on the other hand are more concerned with the occurrence of the event in the complement, and place less emphasis on the conditions of its realization. Consequently, in the case of direct interaction between the speaker and the person responsible for the accomplishment of the complement process, the impersonals represent a less direct, less confrontational or face threatening mode of interaction.109 When the speaker wants to express a direct interaction between two participants, the modal construction represents a perfect choice. This is presented in (419).

Relation between constructions 317

(419) Tu dois partir, je te I 'ordonne 'You must leave, I order you to do so' In (419), both the origin and the target of the deontic force are coded as the subject of their respective clauses. The modal construction directly codes the direct interaction between the speaker and the main clause subject. The choice of an impersonal construction to code a similar scene does not yield such direct confrontation. Consider (420). (420) IIfaut que tu partes, je te I 'ordonne 'It is imperative that you leave, I order you to do so' In (420), even though the origin of the deontic force is explicitly mentioned, the choice of the impersonal subject makes it appear more difficult to locate. Furthermore, the target is not coded as the main subject. The combined effect makes the sentence less directly confrontational. The selection of a particular construction is ultimately a matter of speaker choice. A truly complete analysis would need to carefully investigate the possible semantic motivations of that choice, which lies well beyond the scope of this chapter. We can safely assume, however, that impersonal constructions will represent a preferred choice whenever the situation calls for an emphasis on the event that needs to occur, rather than on the person responsible for that event (Dutra 1998). 7.7. Conclusion and discussion This chapter has argued that impersonal constructions are predominantly existential in nature, that is to say they pertain to the presence of a certain entity in reality. Complex impersonals were shown to represent a natural extension from the simple cases. The difference between the two was shown to depend on two factors. The first one is the nature of E. With the simple impersonals, Ε is a concrete object. With the complex impersonals, Ε is an abstract object, namely an event or a proposition. The second one is E's modality of existence.

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For the concrete impersonals, these modalities are restricted to simple existence, as well as some aspectual considerations pertaining to coming into existence and appearing on a stage. For complex impersonals, the conceptualizer's epistemic experience in assessing E's status with respect to R can be viewed as the analog of simple existence. Consequently, the range of possible modalities is considerably enlarged with the abstract constructions. With the concrete and abstract constructions alike, the impersonal pronoun il was analyzed as an abstract setting, identifiable as the immediate scope of the existential predication. Once the particularities of the impersonal constructions are recognized, the distribution of infinitival, subjunctive, and indicative complements can be explained using the same principles developed throughout this monograph. The gaps in the distribution, that is to say the impossibility for a finite clause to follow an evaluative verb, and the infelicity of an infinitival complement in an epistemic IC, were shown to follow from the semantic incompatibility between the complement forms and the constructions. The analysis presented here should be considered more as a starting point than the final word on complex impersonal constructions. A complete account of the phenomenon would involve careful examination of discourse data to determine the conditions which favor a specific construal, and hence the selection of a particular construction. This approach alone would enable us to truly isolate the specificity of the ICs with respect to the modal and CSC constructions. I believe, however, that the frame of analysis developed in this chapter provides the necessary tools to successfully carry out this future research.

Chapter 8. Concluding remarks

This chapter recapitulates and discusses the results obtained throughout this book. The first part provides a summary of the previous chapters. The second part discusses some issues raised by the analysis, and lays the foundations for further research. 8.1 Recapitulation Chapters one and two have laid out the problem of the relation between form and meaning, and argued that a subjectivist view of meaning is required to render the complexities of complement distribution. Recall that a subjectivist view of meaning emphasizes the importance of world experience to the representation of linguistic structures. Consequently, the base relative to which different complement constructions are characterized represent different aspects of human world knowledge. The different chapters have investigated several of those aspects. For example, different aspects of our conception of reality have been shown to constitute the base relative to which different complement constructions get characterized. First, Chapter seven has shown that our hierarchical conception of reality, that is the way in which different integrated conceptions at different levels of abstraction can be considered "real", is of critical importance for the semantic characterization of impersonal constructions. Second, as shown in Chapter six, the different conceptions of reality that can be articulated to form the model of elaborated reality was shown to represent part of the base relative to which the meaning of the indicative and subjunctive inflections is characterized. Similarly, the Reference Point Model that articulates our experience in locating objects has been shown to be relevant to the indicative/subjunctive distinction (Chapter six). An important aspect of cognitive grammar in general and of the analysis presented here in particular is that the form of a grammatical

320 Concluding remarks

construction is at least partially motivated by its meaning. Furthermore, meaning has been argued to represent the specific way in which a given expression structures a conceptual base. For example, in Chapter three, W and VOV have been shown to provide different construals of the same conceptual base, with the differences in construal representing their differences in meaning. It was argued that W involves the initial salience of the subordinate process over the main participant in that process, whereas VOV stresses the initial salience of the primary participant in the subordinate clause, which gets coded as the primary landmark of the main verb. The difference in construal is reflected in the forms of the constructions. For W , the initial salience of the subordinate process can be structurally interpreted as the formation of a complex verb, with the logical subject of that complex verb being coded as its landmark. The difference between W and VOV clearly illustrates a situation where the form of the constructions reflects the specific structuring it imposes on the conceptual base. Since meaning is a matter of construal, different complement constructions have been investigated along different dimensions of construal. In Chapter three, W and VOV have been shown to code different properties of the objective scene. Chapter four and five have investigated the relevance of the notion of perspective to the realization of French complements. It was argued that the vantage point from which the complement is conceptualized allows us to keep separate different constructions that might otherwise be impossible to differentiate on purely structural terms. In Chapter four, a basic distinction was proposed between speaker-based verbs, that is verbs with which the speaker is the sole relevant conceptualizer in the sentence, and the subject-based verbs, where the main clause subject acts as a conceptualizer with respect the complement clause. For these verbs, the subordinate clause is conceptualized from the vantage point of the main clause subject. It was argued in Chapter four that modals are speaker-based, whereas CSC verbs are subject-based. In addition to the vantage point, the perspective existing between the conceptualizer and the object of conceptualization has been thoroughly investigated. In Chapter four, it was shown that the presence of

Recapitulation

321

aspectual or passive markers on the complement of modals can be explained by the particular conceptual structure of the different modals, which reflects a specific configuration of viewing arrangement along the subjective axis. In Chapter five, the difference between infinitival and finite complements in CSC constructions has been imputed to differences in configurations of viewing arrangement along the objective axis. The presence of a finite complement was argued to reflect an objective construal of the complement clause (including the main participant in the subordinate relation). The presence of a finite clause reflects a subjective construal of the complement scene, where the latter is conceptualized from the vantage point of C2 or, to use a figurative phrase, from within. Finally, grounding was shown to be another dimension of construal critical to the characterization of French complements. In Chapter six and seven, the difference between indicative and subjunctive inflections was argued to be a matter of grounding, that is of the relation of the complement to the speech situation. The indicative and subjunctive inflections have both been shown to be grounding predications, but they differ in the kind of grounding they provide. The indicative situates the complement content with respect to elaborated reality, where as the subjunctive restricts the grounding to a particular mental space. The results obtained in this monograph are firmly grounded in the cognitive linguistics tradition, and they share interesting characteristics with other solutions. In particular, the view of complementation presented here is quite compatible with Givon's (1980) binding hierarchy, where the form of the complement is viewed as a consequence of the "binding force" of the main verb. Like Givon's analysis, the solution proposed in this book recognizes the importance of the main verb in complement selection. As we have seen, it is the particular semantics of certain main verbs that dictate their semantic compatibility with certain complement structures. For example, in Chapter five, vouloir has been shown to be followed by subjunctive complements because of its own lexical semantics. The same can be said o f f a i r e in Chapter three. The difference with Givon's account is twofold. First, by making complement selection a matter of construal,

322 Concluding remarks

and not binding force, we can readily accommodate the fact that the perception verbs can behave in ways similar to the most highly manipulative causative verbs. The difference here is the shift in focus from the meaning of the main verb to the similarity existing between a perceived and induced scene. Secondly, the recognition of the meaning of each construction allows us to justify the choice of a particular construction when that choice is indeed available. Givon can successfully identify the different complements a given verb can take, but his analysis does not readily extend to the possible motivations for the speaker's choice in specific discourse conditions. Because the current analysis seeks to identify the fine-grained conceptual differences coded by each construction, it is particularly well equipped to investigate the motivation that presides over the choice of each construction. The current account is therefore compatible with the typological orientation of Givon's analysis, and it elaborates on its insights in two directions. First it spells out the particulars for French, that is it investigates what it is exactly that different complements code, and secondly, it provides the conceptual motivation for the specific distribution of the verbs and complements. The spirit of the account presented here is perhaps closest to that of Wierzbicka (1988), because it argues that semantic compatibility alone can account for complement distribution. Wierzbicka's analysis of English complementation does not stipulate any formal or nonsemantic constraints, but directly falls out of careful semantic examination. The syntactic possibilities are determined by the intended meaning. Wierzbicka's analysis relies on thorough semantic investigations of the meaning of the main verb and that of the complement structure in order to determine their semantic compatibility. In her system, very much like in the one presented here, syntactic infelicity follows from semantic ill formedness. In both accounts, the co-occurrence restrictions are simply dictated by the necessary semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement structure. The obvious difference between the two accounts comes from the very different ways in which each solution represents meaning, and the philosophical differences that result from that representation. Wierzbicka relies on a set of semantic primitives

Recapitulation

323

that allow her to create a semantic metalanguage capable of capturing and describing subtle semantic distinctions. The account presented here does not make use of semantic primitives, but places the emphasis on construal and cognitive abilities. The full examination of the differences between the two kinds of accounts would be beyond the scope of this chapter. Finally, the account presented in this monograph is deeply indebted to the work of Nicolas Ruwet, whose analysis of obviation is at the heart of my whole approach to complementation. Ruwet most eloquently spelled out the iconic relation existing between the form of an expression and its meaning, and he clearly situates the perception and volition verbs at the opposite endpoints of a continuum of complement distribution. The current study is obviously fully compatible with Ruwet's treatment of obviation, and the use of the notion of perspective allows us to apply its insights to related phenomena in different constructions. 8.2 Discussion It is fitting in this concluding chapter to reexamine the most important claim made at the beginning of this book, namely that the semantic compatibility between the main verb and the complement structure is sufficient to fully explain complement distribution. Exclusive reliance on semantic compatibility allowed us to i) account at the same time for the form and distribution of the constructions, and ii) to eliminate from the description of the constructions everything that does not directly pertain to the characterization of their meaning, such as filters, stipulations, co-occurrence restrictions, etc. The form/distribution part of the claim was already addressed. It was shown that the meaning of each construction at least partly motivates its form, and distribution follows meaning, since all parts of a construction need to be compatible semantically. With respect to ii), it was shown that a careful semantic description of the main verbs and the complement structures is all that is required for their distribution. For example, in Chapter three, there is no need to specify which verbs occur with W or VOV, because the respective lexical semantics of

324 Concluding remarks

faire and forcer allow those verbs to be solely compatible with one construction. Similarly, in Chapter five, no specific rule is posited to account for the behavior of obviative verbs. Verbs such as vouloir are shown to only allow infinitival complements when the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential as a direct result of the inherently subjective construal they impose between their subject and complement. In a situation of coreferentiality, the minimal conceptual distance between the conceptualizer and object of conceptualization renders an objective construal of the complement scene impossible unless it is objectified by the presence of a passive or conditional marker. Similarly, because of specific lexical properties, remarquer imposes an objective construal of its object, and consequently, in a CSC, the complement must be coded as a finite clause, regardless whether or not the main and subordinate subjects are co-referential. The same analysis holds for the distribution of indicative/subjunctive complements. The perception, declaration and propositional attitude verbs have been shown to be predominantly compatible with the indicative inflection in the positive form. On the other hand, the volition verbs have been shown to be solely compatible with the subjunctive inflection. The verbs of emotion reaction have been shown to be potentially compatible with both inflections, and that flexibility is reflected both diachronically and cross-linguistically. The same verbs are followed by indicative complements in Old French, and they can be followed by either indicative or subjunctive complements in Spanish, Italian and Romanian. It therefore seems that an analysis based on semantic compatibility does provide the desired results, but in order for those results to be convincing, we need to fend off a possible argument based on the apparent circularity of the analysis. The argument can be summarized as follows. You cannot claim that two elements are semantically compatible if you do not have independent evidence of their meanings independently of each other. Since your semantic investigation takes into account the very situations where the verbs and constructions are together, you cannot claim to have independent evidence, and therefore any claim of compatibility is circular.

Discussion

325

It is obvious that independent evidence is crucial to any claim, semantic or otherwise. It seems to me, however, that the reasoning above is based on one critically faulty assumption, namely that it is possible to find the meaning of a verb fully independently of that verb's occurrence in grammatical constructions. Recall that in Langacker's usage-based model, the use of a particular verb in the context of a grammatical construction is more fundamental than its context-free variant, such as the variant that could be found in a dictionary. To take just an example, the meaning of faire in W is more fundamental than the context-free meaning of faire, which can only be obtained by abstracting over its usage in all the grammatical constructions it participates in. It is therefore impossible to provide a meaning for faire (or any lexical item) which would be fully independent from the verb's use in any construction. To be more specific, it is impossible to evaluate the meaning of faire independently from its meaning in W , because its meaning in W is part of the information that yields the invariant meaning. This of course does not mean that the notion of independent evidence must be abandoned, but it needs to be defined carefully. It is true that we can only evaluate the compatibility between a lexical item X and a construction Y if we can point to a property of X's invariant meaning that justifies that compatibility. It is, however, false to say that X's behavior in Y should not be considered in the investigation of X's invariant meaning. In fact, it is the intersection of the meanings of X in all the constructions it participates in that yields its context-free meaning. Consequently, the only way of isolating the context-free meaning of a lexical item is to investigate its specific meaning in all the constructions in which it occurs. To put it differently, since the context-free meaning of a lexical item emerges from its specific meaning in a number of constructions, the properties essential to X's context-free meaning must be present in those constructions. I suggest that if we can i) isolate the specific features of a verb that justify its compatibility with a given construction, and ii) show that these features are part of the verb's context-free variant, we have independent evidence for the semantic compatibility between the verb and the construction. The independence of the evidence comes from the fact that

326 Concluding remarks

the property of the verb that justifies its compatibility with the construction is also attested in other contexts. Let us take the behavior of forcer in causative constructions as an example. It was argued in Chapter three that forcer is incompatible with the W construction and compatible with VOV because of its lexical semantic properties. Recall that W does not allow direct interaction between the main clause subject and the causee, and that the latter is not conceived as the initiator of the subordinate process. In VOV, the causee is viewed as the initiator of the infinitival process, and the main subject directly interacts with it. In order to provide independent evidence for forcer's compatibility with VOV, we need to show precisely what aspect of forcer's context-free variant motivates the verb's behavior in causative constructions. It was argued in Chapter three that the invariant meaning of forcer involves the subject's direct interaction with an entity that offers some resistance. This property is apparent in a transitive construction because forcer is only appropriate with an object that has been designed to offer resistance (see Section 3.4.2.2). Causative constructions provide a specific context for the use of forcer. The object is an event to be performed by an animate entity. The resistance offered by an event is predominantly located in the entity in charge of performing it. Direct interaction with an entity that offers resistance (a property of the context-free forcer) therefore naturally extends to direct interaction with the causee in a causative construction. Furthermore, the intentional character of the causee (which further contributes to the compatibility offorcer with VOV) represents a direct extension of the notion of resistance in a situation where the entity in charge of performing the complement process is animate. The kind of resistance animates offer to an induced situation is first and foremost a resistance of will. The causee therefore needs to be fully conscious (although reluctant) of her role in the complement process. Forcer's exclusive semantic compatibility with VOV has independent evidence, because it is motivated by specific characteristics that are part of the contextfree variant of the verb. The same kind of argument can be made for vouloir and subjunctive and infinitival constructions. It was argued in Chapter five that the

Discussion 327

verb is incompatible with finite complements when the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential. It Chapter six, we saw that vouloir is incompatible with the indicative inflection. In both instances, the verb's behavior can be explained by a semantic property of its context-free variant, namely the inherently subjective construal it imposes between its subject and its complement. It was argued that independently of the construction it appears in, the object of vouloir has no necessary independent existence outside its conceptualization by the subject. Consequently the conceptual distance between the subject and complement is minimal. This property of vouloir manifests itself differently in different constructions. When the main and subordinate subjects are coreferential, the most natural vantage point to construe the complement scene is from the S2 position, which is reflected by its coding as an infinitival complement. The fact that the complement of vouloir has no independent existence outside its conceptualization by Q also explains why the verb is incompatible with the indicative inflection. Recall that the indicative codes a proposition, or in other words a facet of some conceptualizer's dominion considered with respect to its position in reality. In both cases, the compatibility between vouloir and a particular complement form is explainable by a specific characteristic of its context-free variant. It can therefore be said to be independently motivated. Another possible objection concerns the possible cross-linguistic validity of the semantic compatibility analysis. More specifically, for example, one could object that it is impossible to claim that faire is incompatible with VOV, because "make", the semantic equivalent of faire in English only occurs in a VOV type construction. The answer to this objection is straightforward. Since English does not have W , the question does not arise. Compatibility must obviously reflect the global ecology of the language, and it is thus necessarily language specific. The same kind of objection is no more valid when another language has the same distinctions. For example, it was pointed out in Chapter three (see Note 33) that Spanish has the W/VOV distinction, but that hacer, the equivalent of faire can be followed by either construction. This does not invalidate, or even weaken the analysis proposed for French. As it was claimed in Chapter three, French faire

328 Concluding remarks

and Spanish hacer mean the same thing only approximately, and they are actually quite different in terms of the binding force they exhibit. This is corroborated by the behavior of the same verbs in other constructions that reflects the same traits. Recall from Note 33 that unlike French faire, its Spanish counterpart frequently occurs in a CSC, where it is followed by a subjunctive complement. According to Givon's (1980) criteria, this indicates that hacer has less binding force than faire, which is consistent with the verb's felicity with both W and VOV. It therefore seems that both French and Spanish both code perception/causation scenes in the same alternative ways, but in French alone the lexical semantics of faire are sufficient to impose a particular construal. In Spanish, with all verbs, the choice between W and VOV is dictated by the pragmatics of the speech situation. The language specific quality of the analysis proposed here does not mean that it is totally silent on cross-linguistic matters, but it renders quite specific the nature of the cross-linguistic claims. A good example of the cross-linguistic value of the analysis is given in Chapter six for the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complements in French and Spanish. It was shown that even though the distribution of the two moods is different in the two languages, the areas where the differences are observed are predicted by the analysis. The verb classes that were considered exclusively compatible with one inflection in French are also followed by the same inflection in Spanish. The difference between the two languages is to be found in the areas where the motivation for one specific inflection is weaker. The cross-linguistic value of the analysis can therefore be expressed as follows: In languages that exhibit similar ecology (i.e. in our example subjunctive/indicative alternation in CSC constructions), the areas of similarity and possible variation should be predicted. In our example, given a language comparable to French or Spanish, the verbs for vouloir and remarquer should not be followed by the same mood inflection. Note that the analysis proposed in this book affords a unified and general view of the distribution of main verbs and complement structures. Different complement constructions are shown to code different semantic/conceptual fields, such as a perceived/induced

Discussion 329

scene (Chapter three), a potential scene (Chapters four and seven), a "real" or desired scene (Chapters five, six, and seven). These scenes can all be construed in different fashions, and some conventionalized construals are represented by grammatical constructions. For example, an induced scene can be viewed with minimal involvement of the logical subject of the subordinate verb, or with more involvement of the latter. The first scene corresponds to the construal provided by W , the second one by VOV. Similarly, in a CSC construction, two polar opposites seem to emerge, namely the things we perceive (i.e. real), and the ones we desire, which have little relation with reality. Perceived things get coded with the indicative, and desired things get coded with the subjunctive. In case after case, two different grammatical constructions seem to code polar opposite construals of a situation (although, and it was not emphasized here, domains such as perception can be coded by more than two alternatives). When the constructions are matched up with the main verbs, some verbs are obviously only compatible with one kind of coding, because of their lexical semantics, and they thus only occur with one construction. However, other verbs are semantically ambivalent, in the sense that they are not incompatible with any construction. Depending on the pragmatics of the situation, one of the alternatives becomes more appropriate. In that view, both the semantics of the main verb and the pragmatics of the speech situation are at the same time kept separate, but given a similar treatment. For certain verbs, the semantics alone are sufficient to impose a specific construal, for others, the speaker must evaluate the parameters of the speech situation to make her selection. Construal therefore presents the advantage of recognizing the difference between semantics and pragmatics, but also of recognizing that it is a matter of degree, and thus provides a unified account of the two phenomena. The preliminary character of the analysis has been mentioned at several points of this monograph. My goal was not to deliver the last word on all the issues considered, but to provide a unified way of investigating a fairly large array of constructions. I hope to have shown that the notion of construal is critical to our understanding of complementation, but the investigation of its possible dimensions is

330 Concluding remarks

still in its infancy. Further research is needed in several directions for us to realize its true importance. First, the notions presented in this book such as perspective, viewing arrangement, conceptual distance, event integration, etc. need to be made more precise and possibly formalized. We need to know exactly what dimensions of construal are relevant to the syntactic realization of complements, and how to precisely evaluate them. Second, the construal analysis of the different constructions needs to be confronted to real discourse data in order to evaluate the part played by information management in the selection of a particular form. Finally, we need to investigate the way in which this analysis fits in a typological account of complementation. Language expresses differences in complementation in different ways. For example, languages such as Japanese and Korean use different complementizers. Other languages make use of different kinds of nominalization patterns. Can the notions of perspective and construal be successfully applied to these languages and if so how? I will leave these issues for further research, but it is my hope that the constructs developed in this book might provide a framework within which they can be successfully integrated.

Notes

Chapter one 1. 2.

3.

4.

W also occurs with the verbs of perception. Chapter three provides an analysis of both causation and perception constructions. The separation between the syntax and the semantics of a sentence is independent from the number of levels allowed for the syntactic representation. For example, both GB and LFG posit a separation between the syntax and the semantics, but GB allows two strata of syntactic representation (D and S structure), while LFG only allows one level. For Jackendoff (1990: 27) that isomorphism can be explained by an evolutionary quality of syntax: "Syntax presumably evolved as a means to express conceptual structure, so it is natural to expect that some of the structural properties of concepts would be mirrored in the organization of syntax". In fact, since the generative semantics movement of the 1970's whose system of semantic representation adopted the syntactic tree configuration, there is a generalized practice to assume for semantics a system of representation as close to a syntactic system as possible. Prefacing his statement by the requirement that that his semantic theory "be in all respects compatible with the world view of generative linguistics" (Jackendoff 1990: 8), Jackendoff (1990: 32) draws an analogy with Chomsky's creativity argument to motivate generative syntax and claims that "corresponding to the infinitely large variety of syntactic structures, then, there must be an infinitely large variety of concepts that can be invoked in the production and comprehension of sentences. It follows that the repertoire of I-concepts expressed by sentences cannot be mentally encoded as a list, but must be characterized in terms of a finite set of mental primitives and a finite set of principles of mental combination that collectively describe the set of possible I-concepts expressed by sentences. For convenience, I will refer to these two sets together as the grammar of sentential concepts [emphasis in the original]". The machinery available for learning these concepts must therefore mirror the Universal Grammar available to children. Consequently, the possible I-concepts are called the "elements of Universal Grammar for conceptual structure" Jackendoff (1990: 32). Bouchard specifically criticizes Jackendoff s (1983, 1990) model, where "there is a single level of mental representation, conceptual structure, at which linguistic, sensory, and motor information are compatible" Jackendoff (1983: 17), and the mapping onto the syntactic representation occurs directly from

332 Notes

5.

6.

7.

8.

that conceptual structure level. Bouchard argues against a two level system because it cannot adequately constrain the kind of semantic information that gets mapped into the syntax. One might, however, note that isomorphism comes at a great price. The strong claims that the model makes in terms of the psychological reality of a particular system of representation are difficult to motivate independently. Bouchard himself agrees that our knowledge of mental representation is not very deep, and yet, he claims that some elements are stored as tree structures. It is fairly uncontroversial that certain notions can be adequately represented by tree configurations, but it constitutes quite a leap to claim that they are stored as such. Tree configurations have shown their usefulness as linguistic notation devices, but it would take serious empirical evidence to pose them as psychologically real. In the absence of independent evidence to the psychological reality of trees, Bouchard's total isomorphism seems more the result of his motivation to adopt the same system of representation for syntax and semantics. The notion of complementation does not figure prominently in the English pre-transformational literature. For Jespersen (1939), the believe complements for instance are to be treated very schematically as a nominalization. He writes (1939: Ch.2. Sections 2.1-2.2): "The difficulty of joining an object [clause] to certain verbs can be evaded by inserting the fact (or the circumstance). These constructions are frequent in modern English scientific prose... there are no examples in the OED". It is with the rise of generative grammar (Chomsky 1965, and particularly Rosenbaum 1967) that the issue of complementation has become one of the crucial areas of linguistic argumentation. The idea is that "a verb is positively specified with respect to the contextual features associated with the context in which it occurs" Chomsky (1965: 93). The subcategorization frame accompanies a lexical entry. For instance, eat is accompanied in the lexicon by the following frames: eat [+V, +NP], which indicates that the verb can be used transitively as in John ate a cookie, and [+V] which indicates that the verb can be used intransitively, as in We ate early. We know that not every verb can take every kind of complement. The notion of subcategorization frame intuitively corresponds to a simple need, namely to specify the types of complements which can follow a specific main verb. It represents the most obvious way of capturing the syntactic realization of complements, and also provides a way of grouping verbs into classes, on the basis of their syntactic behavior (Gross 1975). The Generative Semantics movement was concerned with verbs such as declare, promise, demand, and permit, which exhibit both a truth value modality and a speech act value (action modality). These differences in meaning are captured by abstract predicates (DECLARE and IMPERE) or by the features [+declarative] or [+imperative].

Notes 333 9.

For instance, think takes a proposition as its complement. Its two subcategorization frames (syntactic and semantic) will therefore be as follows (from Grimshaw 1979: 287): think [—S], [—J>], On the other hand, find out, which can take a proposition, a question or an exclamative, will have the following frames: find out [—S], [—[P Q E}]. Notice that the syntactic subcategorization frames are similar for both verbs. The difference is in the semantic frame. 10. The diagrams in this monograph and CG in general are to be taken as a useful heuristic, and do not make any claim of psychological reality. For instance, in Figure 6, cat and bag could also have been represented by C and Β respectively. 11. It is also possible to have the elaboration of the trajector in the first level, with the landmark being elaborated at the second level. 12. In CG, a finite clause profiles a process. The notation in Figure 10 indicates a process when the letter's internal complexity is irrelevant to the point considered.

Chapter two 13. The articulation of the different models presented here afford a convincing account of argument structure, that is to say the relation between the semantic role of an entity and its syntactic realization within the clause. Recall from Chapter one that most models posit two separate levels of semantic and syntactic representation, and some mechanism to relate them (Bouchard 1995, Bresnan and Kanerva 1989, Dowty 1991, Jackendoff 1983, 1990 inter alia). With respect to these models, the CG solution presents several advantages. First, it does not encounter the problem of having to define and validate a small number of semantic primitives, because the semantic roles are experientially based, relative to our pre-linguistic knowledge of the world and dynamic interaction between objects. The second difference concerns i) the separation between the semantic role of an entity (which all accounts share), and ii) the way in which these semantic and structural roles are connected. With respect to i), CG is fully capable of recognizing the difference between the semantic role of an entity and its syntactic function, because the subject/object assignment represents an independent dimension of construal, separate from the semantic role assignment. With respect to ii), however, the two notions do not need to be linked by any stipulation, because they do not interact across different levels of organization, but merely represent two kinds of conceptual phenomena invoked for different purposes. Semantic role assignment is done with respect to the conception of an action chain, syntactic role assignment with respect to clausal organization. The two levels are therefore separate because they arise as the byproduct of different conceptualizations, but they are naturally integrated by virtue of both being choices made by the speaker at

334 Notes different levels of conceptual organization. Note finally, that the CG solution is also well equipped to capture the correlation existing between certain semantic roles and syntactic functions. For example, we know that agents are often coded as subjects, and that correlation is captured by the fact that the head of an action chain (definition of an agent) has a level of inherent prominence provided by its role which makes it a prime candidate to be selected as the clausal primary figure (the subject). 14. From a formal standpoint, complement constructions are constructions where one of the arguments of the main verb is a clause. Despite its verbal profile, that clause is linguistically treated as a participant in the higher-level main clause relation, as illustrated by the cliticization facts presented in the following. (i) a. Marie a vu la giraffe (au zoo) 'Mary saw the giraffe (at the zoo)' b. Marie I 'a vue 'Mary saw it' (ii) a. Marie a vu que ses amis η 'avaient pas menti 'Mary saw that her friends had not lied' b. Marie I 'a vu 'Mary saw it' The sentence in (i) contains a simple clause that profiles the perceptual relation between a subject participant (Mary), and an object participant, (the giraffe). In (ib), the object participant is cliticized as /'. The example in (ii) is a complex construction that profiles the relation between a subject (Mary) and a subordinate finite clause (i.e. a clause with its own tense marking and structural organization). In spite of its clausal status, (iib) shows that it can be cliticized as /', in a way similar to the object participant in (ib). In that sense, even though it is a non-prototypical participant, the subordinate clause in (iia) can be called a participant in the main relation, and it can be part of the argument structure of the main verb. 15. This definition is admittedly quite general, but that generality is required to cover the whole range of complement constructions. In the following chapters, I will provide more precise definitions of each of the structures considered in this monograph. It should be clear, however, that I do not pretend to exhaustively describe French complementation. In particular, such constructions as aspectuals, or movement veibs (Lamiroy 1983) will be left for further investigation. 16. Langacker draws a parallel between nominals and finite clauses with respect to the semantic function of their respective constituents. He writes (1991: 33): "the semantic relationship between a simple noun and a full nominal (e.g. between bear and the bear) is held to be precisely analogous to that between a verb stem and a finite clause (e.g. taunt and Harry taunted the bear)." With

Notes 335

17. 18.

19.

20.

respect to the noun phrase, the noun represents a type specification, an instance involves the consideration of a type with respect to its domain of instantiation, namely space. Plurality assumes the function of quantification, and nominal grounding predications include articles, demonstratives, and certain quantifiers. The parallel between nominals and finite clauses will be explored at different points of this monograph. The accusative marking is visible if the noun is cliticized as in Marie I'a fait partir 'Mary made him leave'. One additional issue concerns the grammatical status of a and de when they precede infinitival complements. Are they prepositions, as they are in other uses such as aller a Paris 'go to Paris', or venir de Lyon 'come back from Lyon'? or are they complementizers? Huot (1981) argues that de is a complementizer, but a a preposition. However, her arguments are based exclusively on the grammatical properties of the two elements, and in cognitive linguistics, the fact that two elements have different properties does not constitute proof that they are different underlyingly (see Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot 1995 Note 13). Consequently, a and de will be treated as prepositions when they precede infinitival complements, just as in their other uses. Note that here again, the notion of grounding goes in the direction of greater independence of the event coded by a finite clause. The presence of grounding predications on the subordinate verb provides a finite clause with its own independent viewing frame, from which the profiled process can be accessed independently of the main verb. By comparison, a process profiled by an infinitive does not have its own viewing frame, and can only be accessed through the main verb. This sentence is only impossible in the modal sense of savoir 'know how'. The verb, however, has another cognitive sense (as in Marie sait qu 'eile nage 'Mary knows that she is swimming') in which the sentence would be acceptable. The justification for positing two senses for savoir 'know', as well as the differences between the two senses are provided in Chapter four.

Chapter three 21. The case marking on the logical subject of the infinitive is most visible when the latter is a third person clitic. Third person accusative forms include le (masculine), la (feminine), and les (plural). Third person dative forms are lui (masculine or feminine), and leur (plural). With nouns, accusative is marked as zero, whereas dative is marked with the preposition ά. Cases involving clitics will not be considered in this chapter. 22. These verbs are not traditionally included in a discussion about causative constructions, because their syntactic behavior is unproblematic. However, the purpose of this paper is to show that the specificity offaire can only be under-

336 Notes

23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

stood against the more general background of force dynamics (Talmy 1976), and verbs such as forcer or obliger are crucial to the expression of force in French. Note that with the forcer type verbs, the infinitival complement is preceded by the preposition ά. As indicated in Chapter two, ä is a meaningful element, and its semantic import in this construction is fully compatible with its meaning as it is described in Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1995). A more thorough evaluation of the way in which its meaning fits VOV will be provided in Section 3.4.2.2. For in depth discussion of the meaning of ά, also see Vandeloise (1986). Meaning differences similar to those presented in (41) are also considered in Strozer (1976) for Spanish. A notable exception is Hyman and Zimmer (1976), who specifically consider the alternation of the post and pre-verbal subjects with laisser and the verbs of perception. Their analysis is basically compatible with the one presented here, and it will be mentioned at relevant points of this chapter An important exception to the reductionist approach is Kemmer and Verhagen's (1994) account of causatives as complex structures built up on the conceptual model of simple clauses. Kemmer and Verhagen's approach is perfectly compatible with the analysis proposed here, and that compatibility will be mentioned at relevant points of this chapter. This type of test is quite frequently used in the literature. In particular, it is used in Morin (1978) for French, Aissen and Perlmutter (1983) and Moore (1991) for Spanish. The term "salient" is intended in a sense broader than pure perceptual salience. It will become clear as we proceed with the analysis that it also covers the causation cases. The conditions under which this type of construal of the complement scene is possible with the veibs of perception are quite complex. They are considered in detail in Achard (1993). The event structure of VOV is not included in the Figure. Its inclusion would result in the following description, where el is the seeing event, and e2 is the subordinate event:

31. This type of structure is reminiscent of middle constructions in various languages, as well as impersonal subject constructions, where the subject is

Notes 337 situated downstream from the energy source, even if it is the only participant (Kemmer 1994). The only difference here is that since we have a causative construction, the source is specified. 32. Evidence for the patient role of the causee (emphasized both in the meaning of faire and W ) comes from the behavior of certain middle verbs in the W construction, as illustrated in the following. (i) a. ??Marie a fait se lever les enfants a six heures 'Mary made the children get up at six o'clock' b. Marie a fait lever les enfants a six heures 'Mary made the children get up at six o'clock' (ii) a. ??Fais s 'asseoir les enfants quand le spectacle commence 'Make the children sit down' when the show begins' b. Fais asseoir les enfants quand le spectacle commence 'Make the children sit down when the show begins' The examples above show that whenever possible, the middle marker se is deleted in W . This fact finds a natural explanation in the analysis provided here. Maldonado (1988) analyzed the Spanish middle marker se as emphasizing the dual role (agent and patient) of the subject of the infinitive, and a similar analysis of its French counterpart is assumed here. Information about the agentivity of the causee, i.e. its consideration as the controller of the infinitival process, is not the most natural fit with the semantics of the W construction, because the latter confines the causee to the role of theme (patient) of the complex cause process. It was already pointed out that the subject offaire is fully responsible for the occurrence of the infinitival process. Faire and the se marker present a certain amount of conflict because they both perform the same semantic function of denoting the controller of the infinitival process, but point to different controllers. Of course, it is impossible to say that se is incompatible with faire and W . In certain cases, the middle marker cannot be deleted, and W does appear with se. However, the tendency of deleting the marker whenever possible goes in the direction of the analysis presented here. 33. This claim is valid for the French faire, and does not necessarily apply to its counterpart in closely related Romance languages. For instance, in Spanish, hacer can be used with VOV. A comparison of the two verbs' lexical semantics is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I would like to point out that they seem to differ in their binding strength (Givon 1980), and therefore in the extent to which their complement can approximate an independent clause. For example, hacer can be followed by subjunctive complements, and still retain its causative meaning, as for instance in Juan hizo que yo me enojara 'John made me angry'. In the rare instances where faire can be followed by a finite complement, its meaning is no longer causative, but closer to "explain", as in Tout cela fait que je le connais bien 'All this makes that I know him well'.

338 Notes

34.

35.

36.

37.

Also note that in the French example, the subordinate verb is in the indicative, and not in the subjunctive form (see Chapter six). Hacer therefore seems to be more flexible than faire in the kind of profile it imposes on a causative base, and that flexibility makes it compatible with a wider range of grammatical constructions than its French counterpart. The notion of active application, critical for the meaning of a in causative constructions has independent evidence. Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shildkrot (1995: 367) argue that: "the preposition a is used in cases of greater mental directedness towards a goal than is found with the use of de or zero." They illustrate that point in the following examples. From Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shildkrot (1995: 366). (i) a. Elle a touchi le radiateur 'She touched the radiator' b. Cet enfant touche a tout ce qu 'il trouve 'That child touches everything he sees' In (ia), the contact can be accidental, whereas in (iib), it results from the child's conscious and systematic exploration of his surroundings. Lisa Reed (p.c.) notes that the analysis of the distribution of W and VOV with laisser in terms of the agentivity of the causee is reminiscent of the accusative/dative alternation on the causee observed with faire in certain dialects (Dorel 1980, Reed 1991). I fully agree with her comment, but further investigation of the similarity between the two phenomena would necessarily involve the consideration of clitics, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Note that this explanation in terms of energy source is also valid for the similar cases with perception verbs such as (52b). In (52b), the participant in the subordinate process is salient because it is viewed as generating the infinitival process. Hyman and Zimmer (1976) consider the difference between VOV and W in terms of the way they code old/new information. They give the following examples (from Hyman and Zimmer 1976: 194-195). (i) a. J 'ai entendu I 'enfant pleurer b. J'ai entendu pleurer I 'enfant Ί heard the child cry' In (ia), the new information can be l'enfant pleurer, and in (ib) pleurer I 'enfant. In that case, the two sentences are synonymous. However, the possibility exists that the new information in (ia) is restricted to pleurer, and to l'enfant in (ib), in which case pleurer is topical. Hyman and Zimmer illustrate that possibility in the following examples (from Hyman and Zimmer 1976: 195): (ii) a. J'ai entendu I 'enfant pleurer, pas rire ?J'ai entendu pleurer l'enfant, pas rire Ί heard the child cry, not laugh'

Notes 339

38.

39.

40.

41.

b. J'ai entendu pleurer l'enfant, pas I 'adulte ?J'ai entendu l'enfant pleurer, pas I'adulte Ί heard the child ciy, not the adult' The a. sentences are better because it is new information that is being contrasted. I agree that discourse factors need to be taken into consideration in order to account for the distribution of W and VOV. In particular, they may represent the strongest motivation in the case of animate subjects, when agentivity cannot be evaluated. I believe that these notions can be integrated in the kind of analysis presented here, but I will leave the matter for further research. For discussion of related phenomena, see Langacker (1987: 320). Note that the two processes of passer and tomber are conceptually so simple that they are prime candidates to be incorporated into a complex verb. Laisser tomber and laisser passer have in fact become lexicalized in French. Their lexicalization involves a metaphorical extension. Laisser tomber means 'to drop' or 'abandon'. Laisser passer means 'not to mention'. A semantic characterization of all instances of a and par complements obviously needs to be rather abstract (Cannings and Moody 1978). Also note that the consideration of the causee as a benefactive or instrumental is compatible with Kemmer and Verhagen's (1994) proposal that the causatives of transitive clauses are built on the conceptual model of ditransitive and instrumental clauses, and that consequently, the marking on the causee reflects the perceived similarity between its role in the caused event and the oblique complement in the simple clause. I am not claiming here that all par complements are impossible following laisser. In fact, some are attested in the literature. For instance, Grevisse (1986: 1036) gives the following example from Genevois: Un garde a laisse admirer par ma femme son poignard Ά guard let admire by my wife his dagger'. Furthermore, in certain situations, W with par is at least as natural as VOV. Compare for example Je me laisserai guider par mon cheval to Je laisserai mon cheval me guider Ί will let my horse guide me'. Also consider the following example where W par is perfectly natural. (i) II a laiss0 arreter ses complices par la police 'He let arrested his accomplices by the police' To understand these examples completely, a more thorough analysis would be required to find out in particular what kind of agent (or instrument) the horse and the police are, as indicated by their respective functions in the process they perform. Specific discourse considerations might also play an important part in the a/par distinction. I do not claim that all a complements are infelicitous with the perception verbs. The following examples are quite natural: (i) a. Je η 'ai jamais vu porter un plateau ä cette serveuse Ί have never seen carry a tray to this waitress'

340 Notes b. Je η 'ai jamais entendu dire un mot a cet employe Ί have never heard say a word to this employee' Interestingly, these examples seem better when the perception verb is negated. Compare (i) to (ii). (ii) ??J'ai vu une fois porter un plateau a cette serveuse Ί have seen once carry a tray to this waitress' Furthermore, Kayne (1975: 232) cites the following. (iii) J'ai vu faire des betises a Jean Ί have seen do foolish things to John' All these examples, however, involve summarizing voir. Also, a more finegrained investigation of the ά complements would be needed to account for these examples. 42. An exhaustive analysis would also need to account for the fact that the show verbs of voluntary perception are infelicitous with W par. (i) *J'ai regardi jouer leur meilleur match de I 'annee par les Gators Ί watched play their best match of the season by the Gators' (ii) *J'ai ecoute chanter Othello par Pavarotti Ί listened sing Othello by Pavarotti' With those verbs, since attention is focussed on the stage, it is simply not possible to bypass the initial salience of the logical subject of the infinitive. Intense focus on the scene necessarily results in direct interaction (perception) with the most salient entity of the scene. VOV is preferred because it recognizes this direct contact.

Chapter four 43. The argument is that the imperative forms of the four verbs savoir, devoir, pouvoir, vouloir are not borrowed from the indicative mood, as it normally is the case, but from the subjunctive (which is representative of the true auxiliaries avoir 'have' and etre 'be'). The borrowing of a subjunctive form to express the imperative is a characteristic of a "verbe puissancier (Guillaume 1929). 44. The distinction between root and epistemic modality must not be confused with other types of distinctions. For instance, permission and possibility are both expressions of root modality. This is illustrated in the following: (i) Marie peut soulever la table, eile est assez forte 'Mary can lift the table, she is strong enough' (ii) Marie peut jouer dans le jardin, mais il ne faut pas qu 'eile aille sur la route 'Mary can play in the garden, but she cannot go on the road' In (i), Mary's physical possibility is described, (ii) describes the permission she receives. Both (i) and (ii) are however examples of root modality.

Notes 341 45. The observed correlation between the fact that CSC verbs can take infinitival complements and the conceptualizing role of their subject towards the complement scene does not mean that all the verbs which take finite complements necessarily have a conceptualizing subject. In fact, impersonal verbs such as &tre possible 'be possible', as illustrated in II est possible qu 'elle soit partie 'It is possible that she left' do take finite complements, even though they do not have a conceptualizing subject. The impersonal constructions will be considered in detail in Chapter seven. 46. Certain sentences are ambiguous between a modal and a cognitive reading. Consider for example II sait etre charmant 'He knows/knows how to be charming'. If the subject is a conceptualize^ a finite complement is also possible: II sait qu' il est charmant 'He knows that he is charming'. In the modal sense, the infinitive is the only possible solution. 47. For example, sentences with etre or avoir (the fundamental auxiliaries) profile only one event (as in J'ai dormi Ί slept', or Je suis rentre Ί came in'). 48. Note that the response of true auxiliaries to the tests of monoclausality is inconsistent. For example, both avoir 'have' and future aller 'go' are considered auxiliaries, but the construction ανο/r+past participle consistently behaves as a monoclausal construction, while a//er+infinitive exhibits some biclausal properties. The difference between the two constructions is illustrated in (i) and (ii). (i) a. J'ai mang0 lapomme Ί ate the apple' b. Je I 'ai mangie c. *J'ai la mangie Ί ate it' (ii) a. Je vais manger la pomme Ί am going to eat the apple' b. *Je la vais manger c. Je vais la manger Ί am going to eat it' Clitic climbing is necessary in (i), thus indicative of monoclausality, but it is impossible in (ii), therefore indicative of biclausality. On other tests, however, both avoir+PP and a//eH-infinitive behave as monoclausal constructions, as illustrated in the following: (i) J'ai ne pas mange la pomme Ί have not eaten the apple' (ii) Je vais ne pas partir ce soir ' I am not going to leave tonight' In (i) and (ii), both constructions do not accept the negation of the content verb, therefore indicative of monoclausality.

342 Notes 49. The veibes puissanciels are an illustration of the "subductivity" (subductivite) of auxiliaries in general. For Guillaume (1938), the subductivity of auxiliaries is a property which makes them pre-exist other verbs from the point of view of the idea {ideation). Guillaume (1938: 10) gives the following definition of auxiliaries (translation mine): "Les veibes auxiliaires sont des verbes dont la genäse materielle, interrompue par un ach£vement plus rapide de la gön&e formelle, reste en suspens, ne s'achöve pas et appelle, en consequence, un complement de mattere qui ne peut venir—l'ontog0n£se du mot dtant close—que de l'exterieur: d'un autre mot." 'Auxiliary veibs are veibs whose material genesis, interrupted by a faster termination of their formal genesis, has remained unfinished, unaccomplished, and consequently requires a complement of matter, which can only come from the outside, from another word, since the ontogenesis of the auxiliary is finished.' Subductivity is a matter of degree. For instance, etre precedes pouvoir, and pouvoir precedes faire. 50. The presence of a modal preceding the infinitive could also be considered, as for example in Jean doit savoir nager 'John must know how to swim', but the results would not be significantly different from those obtained with aspect and voice alone. Modals are therefore not considered in this chapter for brevity sake. See Achard (1993) for further discussion. 51. Some speakers have found that sentence remotely possible, if etre enfermi 'be locked up' represents a specific skill the subject possesses, as for example in the case of a magic act, or an experienced burglar who relies on his capacity of being locked up in different places to rob them. However, my consultants all point to the marginality of the sentence, and invariably favor constructions such as II sait se laisser enfermer 'He knows how to get himself locked up' to describe such situations. 52. The sense of permission of pouvoir represents a special case of possibility, and will be considered with possibility. 53. Not all analyses of modality emphasize their force dynamic nature. For a recent analysis which does not make use of the concept of force dynamics, see Kronning (1996). 54. The term "main-veib construction" is used specifically to refer to the ability sense of pouvoir and savoir. Importantly, these verbs do not have an epistemic sense. This technical use of the term should not overshadow the fact that all modals are main (i.e. content) verbs in French. 55. This is corroborated by the fact that sentences with savoir seem very close semantically to predicate nominal constructions. For instance, il sait jouer au basketball 'he can play basketball' is very close to c'est un basketteur 'he is a basketball player'. The same correlation is not found with pouvoir. I do not claim of course that the modal sentences with savoir and the predicate nominal constructions are identical in meaning, but the correlation is worth

Notes 343 mentioning in the light of savoir profiling a quality that has become part of the subject. In the same vein, Moignet (1981: 277) notes that "On sait nager de fagon permanente, on peut nager dans telle ou telle eventualite." O n e knows how to swim permanently, one can swim under specific circumstances.' 56. If some clear cases of the three senses of pouvoir can be isolated, in the reality of communication it is often difficult to tease these senses apart. For instance, consider the following example. (i) II peut conduire ά 140 a I 'heure 'He can drive at 140 kilometers per hour' Sentence (i) is ambiguous because pouvoir can have the three senses referred to earlier. The sentence can point to the subject's physical ability and reflexes, in which case pouvoir will have its ability sense. It can also point to the car the subject is driving, or the road conditions, in which case pouvoir would have its possibility sense. Finally, the speaker may refer to the speed limit and pouvoir would have its permission sense. 57. The account presented in this monograph is primarily concerned with the form of the complements of modals, and will therefore not specifically consider what types of modality the verb presents. For a thorough analysis of the meaning of devoir, see Kronning (1996). 58. The difference in viewing arrangement between the main-verb constructions and the first configuration of pouvoir possibility has syntactic correlates. Unlike pouvoir possibility, the main-verb constructions can only be followed by adverbials indicating time and place in very specific conditions. This is illustrated in (i) and (ii): (i) Jean peut passer ά cinq heures 'John can come by at five o'clock' (ii) *Jean sait nager a cinq heures 'John can swim at five o'clock' The main-verb constructions can be followed by adverbials if those adverbials present some variation of the process type. This is illustrated in (iii). (iii) Marie sait nager a la piscine 'Mary knows how to swim at the pool' In (iii), a la piscine 'at the pool' provides a narrower type than the original nager, in the sense that pool swimming differs from ocean or river swimming. With information which cannot be interpreted as narrowing the process type, the sentence becomes much less felicitous, as shown in the following example, where the felicity of the example is determined by the hearer's ability to construe nager a la piscine de I 'universite as a valid type of swimming: (iv) ??Marie sait nager a la piscine de I 'universiti 'Mary knows how to swim at the university's pool' The difference between the main-verb constructions and the first configuration of pouvoir possibility will be analyzed in the next section in terms of the

344 Notes conceptual manipulations that the speaker can perform on the infinitival process. It will be shown that in main-verb constructions, the speaker can only express the complement process as a bare type (see Section 2.3.2), where as with pouvoir possibility, she can instantiate that type. 59. The fact that the subject is no longer the locus of potency explains the absence of restrictions on the nature of the subject of epistemic modals. Impersonals and weather expressions can be main clause subjects, as illustrated in the following: (i) a. II doit y avoir du vi lain 'The situation must be ugly' b. Π α dü pleuvoir a Paris aujourd 'hui 'It must have rained in Paris today' II in (i) is an impersonal. In both the a. and b. cases, however, it can be the subject of an epistemic modal. 60. The main-verb constructions are not the only constructions that illustrate the OVA. The causation/perception constructions presented in Chapter three, as well as the movement constructions (Lamiroy 1983) also provide a maximally objective construal of the objective scene. These constructions can also only be followed by an bare infinitive, as illustrated in the following. (i) *Marie a fait avoir pleure Jean 'Mary made John have cried' (ii) *Marie va avoir cherchi le journal 'Mary goes to have fetched the paper' The analysis of these constructions is quite similar to the one given for the main-verb constructions. The subject is the origin of the force that brings about the infinitival process, and the main relation is maximally separate from the conceptualization relation. 61. Note that sentences such as (189) are perfectly felicitous in their epistemic sense. This observation is fully compatible with the analysis presented here, because the agentivity of the subject is not a factor for the epistemic interpretation of the utterance.

Chapter five 62. The precise characterization of the complement with respect to the course of events primarily depends on the mood of the subordinate verb. It will be considered in detail in Chapter six. 63. Certain verbs that are not typically CSC verbs can nonetheless be found in the construction with different degrees of felicity. Consider the marginal example ΊΕΙΙβ lui a dessine qu 'eile itait partie 'She drew him that she had left'. The verb dessiner 'draw' is not a CSC verb, but the sentence is fairly acceptable. This situation can be explained by semantic extension—dessiner is close

Notes 345

64.

65. 66.

67.

68.

enough to a declaration verb to be used as such—and by the fact that the CSC itself is meaningful. It is partly because it is part of the construction that dessiner can be interpreted as a conceptual verb. When the perception verbs are used in a CSC, they present a more "mental" kind of perception than in any other construction (transitive clause, W , or VOV). The relation between direct (physical) perception and its mental counterpart is considered in detail in Section 5.4.1, as well as Chapter six. This sentence would be felicitous in the intentional sense of entendre. That sense is not considered here. A distinction is in order here. We need to differentiate the W construction presented in Chapter three from the CSC with an infinitival complement. Consider the following examples which compare the verbs of propositional attitude in (i) to W in (ii): (i) a. Je crois que je comprends Ί believe that I understand' b. Je crois comprendre Ί believe to understand' c. *Je me crois comprendre Ί believe me to understand' (ii) a. Je vois que je maigris Ί see that I am loosing weight' b. *Je vois maigrir Ί see loosing weight' c. Je me vois maigrir Ί see me loosing weight' If the object of perception is cliticized (as in (iic)) W might look like a CSC, because the infinitive alone follows the main verb. However, the comparison between (ic) and (iic) illustrates the difference between the two constructions. When, in this section, reference is made to the fact that perception verbs cannot take infinitival complements, it is meant in the sense illustrated in (iib). For a more general discussion of the correlation between the phonetic (surface) realization of a complement and its degree of conceptual distance to the matrix subject, see Haiman (1985). Note that the necessity for a finite clause to accompany the explicit mention of the subordinate subject in a CSC is language specific. In English for instance, the trajector (the logical subject) of the complement clause can be overtly expressed even when the subordinate verb is in the infinitive. This is illustrated below. (i) a. I want myself to win b. I want to win

346 Notes

69.

70.

71. 72.

In (ia), the participant in the complement relation is construed more objectively from the vantage point of the main clause subject than in (ib), as indicated by its explicit mention. In (iib), the participant in the relation evoked by the complement clause is construed subjectively, and hence not overtly mentioned. It is well documented, however, that (ia) and (iib) cannot be used interchangeably in all contexts. Consider the following: (ii) Who do you want to win? a. ??I want to win b. want myself to win In (ii), the context requires the participant in the complement relation to be specifically mentioned, so only (iib) is felicitous. In this case, the fact that I and myself are «»referential is irrelevant, (iib) has the same form when the participant in the subordinate process is not coreferential with the main clause subject as in "I want Mary to win". Examples such as (ii) are precisely those where the contracted form wanna is infelicitous. In a generative account, this infelicity is imputed to the presence of a trace left behind by who in its move to COMP. In terms of the analysis proposed here, one could argue that wanna represents one step further in the subjective construal of the relation profiled by the subordinate verb. Consequently, it can only be used in cases where the construal of the complement clause is subjective already. It is infelicitous in (ii) because the construal of the complement clause is objective. Not all transitive clauses illustrate direct physical perception. For example, in Marie vit de la satisfaction dans sesyeux 'Maiy saw satisfaction in his eyes', the perception is more mental, in the sense that satisfaction cannot be immediately perceived, but needs to be interpreted from more concrete observation (such as a certain brightness in the eyes for example). The conceptual distance necessary between subject and object of perception is illustrated in (i) and (ii) (from Ruwet 1984: 90). (i) ?Je remarque que j 'allume une cigarette en tremblant Ί notice that I light a cigarette trembling' (ii) Je remarque que j 'allume une cigarette chaque fois que je m 'enerve Ί notice that I light a cigarette every time that I get nervous' In (i), the complement is too conceptually close to the viewer to be perceived accurately, (ii) involves a shift from immediate perception to summation of experience. The generalization achieved by the contemplation of numerous past experiences provides additional conceptual distance between the perceiver and the object of perception, and thus explains the felicity of the sentence. The difference in word order between (235) and (236) comes from the fact that in French, clitics must precede the verb they are arguments of. A frequently used perception construction associates a relative clause to the object of perception, as, for example, in Je vois Marie qui court Ί see Mary

Notes 347

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

who is running'. These constructions will not be investigated here. See Kleiber (1988) for a thorough analysis. Besides reflecting additional conceptual distance between the participants in the perceptual relation, the use of perception verbs in a CSC often involves the passage from perception to cognition or, in other words from concrete to abstract (Sweetser 1987). In some situations, only one construal of the complement process is conventionalized. Certain uses of voir are only felicitous with an infinitival complement. For instance, Je me verrais bien vieillir ici Ί could easily see myself getting old here' is possible, but the corresponding finite complement would be impossible: *Je verrais bien que je vieillis ici. This is true even if Paul is seeing something which is not "real". The issue is not the reality of the entity, but the fact that it is perceived as such by the main subject. In an expression such as II a vu trente six chandelles 'he saw thirty six candles', the candles are not real in the sense that their presence could not be confirmed by other people, but they are real for the subject, i.e. they are present in a mental space artificially created for example by a blow to the head or too much alcohol. For example, in Paul veut I'orange 'Paul wants the orange', the presence of the definite article means that the orange has an independent status in the current discourse. In that case, the wanting relation is superimposed onto the existing relation. It is difficult to test the relative conceptual distance existing between Ci and CL2 with the verbs of volition and emotional reaction, but it seems to me that the presence of a finite complement in cases of coreferentiality between Ci and S2 is less infelicitous with the verbs of emotional reaction than it is with the volition verbs. Compare the following examples. (i) *Je veux que je sois parti a I 'heure Ί want that I have left on time' (ii) ?Je suis content que je sois parti ά I 'heure Ί am happy that I left on time' It seems to me that (i) is a little better than (ii). This would argue in favor of an increased conceptual distance between Ci and CL2 for the emotional reaction verbs than for the volition verbs.

Chapter six 78. This chapter will not consider negation. The connection between negation and the subjunctive mood seems to run very deep. It is well known that the verbs of propositional attitude such as croire 'believe' or penser 'think' are frequently followed by subjunctive complements in the negative form. In fact, in the negative form, even the veibs of perception can be followed by subjunctive

348 Notes

79.

80.

81. 82.

83. 84. 85.

86.

complements, as in the following example: Je n'avais pas remarque qu'il fasse (SUBJ) aussifroid Ί had not noticed it was so cold'. The felicity of the sentence is greatly helped by the presence of the past tense (plus-que parfaif). The connection between negation and the subjunctive mood is therefore not restricted to certain types of veibs, but seems to involve more general elements. It will not be considered here. For discussion about the relation between negation and the subjunctive, see Winters (1989). The most complete description of the internal organization of the French verbal system, and therefore of the indicative/subjunctive distinction can be found in Guillaume (1929, 1990, 1992). Guillaume analyzed the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive in terms of the level of completion of the verbal chronogenesis (chronogenese). When it is in the indicative, the chronogenesis of the verb is complete. When the verb is in the subjunctive, its chronogenesis is interrupted before its completion (also see Moignet 1981). In this chapter, the focus is placed on the controlling role of the conceptualizer with respect to the elements in her dominion, not on the reference point aspect of the Reference Point model. The importance of the reference point value of the subject of multi-clause constructions will be investigated in Chapter seven. Recall from Chapter five that these verbs are those for which the subjective construal of the complement scene is the most natural. The use of the subjunctive to express the rejection of a proposition is further corroborated by its presence following the so-called negative verbs, such as nier 'deny' or refuser 'refuse'. The particular connection between the subjunctive mood and the negation of a proposition is noticed by Wierzbicka (1988: 144): "If the subjunctive implies a speaker's reluctance to commit himself to a proposition, it is natural that negative sentences should favor the subjunctive since in negative sentences, the speaker rejects the proposition anyway". See Lindholm (1969) for a related discussion of the difference between "believe it" and "believe so" in English. The fact that volition is parasitic on the absence of possession is illustrated by the fact that in Old English, want and lack were synonyms (Newman 1981). Notice that the difference between the expression of fear in French and English points out to a natural psychological distinction: judgment pertains to propositions, whereas perception (or feelings) pertains to events. As it has been indicated earlier, a hope is conceptually very close to a wish. The "hope" verbs are less compatible with the meaning of an indicative clause than the verbs of perception, declaration, or propositional attitude. This accounts for the cross-linguistic variation observed in the Romance languages. In Italian, the equivalent of espirer is followed by subjunctive complements. In Spanish, esperar can be followed by either indicative or subjunctive

Notes 349

87.

88.

89.

90.

complements depending on the subject's confidence in the realization of the complement scene (see Section 6.3.6.1). The difference between esperer and vouloir clearly shows that we need to keep separate the assessment of the course of reality in terms of preference (a hope), and the anticipatory reaction to the occurrence of an event (a wish). Consider the following example: (i) Je ne veux pas qu 7/ gagne au Loto, mais j 'espire qu 7/ gagnera, parce que tout le monde en beneficirait Ί do not want him to win the Loto, but hope he will, because then we would all benefit from it' The use of espirer reflects a rational analysis of the situation, which evaluates the impact of a specific course of events. Vouloir, on the other hand, simply describes the emotional impact of the event on Ci. In that, it is similar to the emotional reaction verbs. I am grateful to Ronald Langacker for suggesting the example to me. I am grateful to Ronald Langacker for pointing out to me the relevance of the notion of arbitrary instance for the characterization of the subjunctive inflection. Sentences such as (285) are only felicitous when the main clause subject and the speaker are coreferential. They are impossible when the speaker is different from the main clause subject, as for example, in *Jean reconnait qu ΊΙ ait fait des progres mais il η 'est pas pret pour les jeux. 'John recognizes that he has improved, but he is not ready for the Olympics'. This fact has a natural explanation in the analysis proposed here. Since the use of the subjunctive is motivated by Ci's desire to cancel the presuppositions previously offered to her in a particular discourse situation, it needs to be used by someone actively involved in that situation. Ci's strategy cannot be described outside the particular situation which motivates it. This type of explanation is consistent with the analysis of presupposition inheritance with the indicative and subjunctive mood in Spanish proposed in Mejias-Bikandi (1993), who notices that in the cases where the two moods can be used the use of the indicative and the subjunctive has different implications for the relevance of presuppositions in the parent and complement spaces. When the indicative is used, a presupposition existing in the complement space will also be assumed to exist in the parent space (speaker reality). On the contrary, with the subjunctive, a presupposition relevant in the complement space is not assumed relevant in the parent space. For instance, consider the example in (i): (i) No es cierto que el presidente ha dejado de fumar 'It is not true that the president has given up smoking' (IND) The presupposition "The president used to smoke" is associated to "The president has given up smoking" in the complement space created by the space

350 Notes builder No es cierto. In (i), where the verb is in the indicative, the hearer assumes that the presupposition "The president used to smoke" is also valid in the speaker reality space, or in other words that the speaker knows (or believes) that the president used to smoke. The situation is different when the subordinate verb is in the subjunctive as in (ii): (ii) No es cierto que el presidente haya dejado de fumar 'It is not true that the president has given up smoking' (SUBJ) In (ii), the presupposition "The president used to smoke" is only relevant in the space introduced by No es cierto. There is no assumption that it is also relevant in the speaker reality space. 91. Another alternation between indicative and subjunctive complements concerns pairs such as temo/me temo. See Maldonado (1994) for insightful discussion of the phenomena. Maldonado's account is perfectly consistent with the analysis developed here. 92. The problem with Terrell and Hooper's analysis (acknowledged by the authors themselves) is that the classes of "mental act" and "comment" which are both associated with the semantic notion of presupposition take different complements. "Mental act" verbs take indicative complements, whereas "comment" verbs take subjunctive complements.

Chapter seven 93. The pronouns ςα or cela 'this' is also found in French impersonal constructions. The difference between // and ga/cela will not be investigated in this chapter. 94. For example, ICs can occur with both active and passive morphology. Passive morphology is illustrated in the following: (i) II α έίέ arrete de nombreux contrebandiers a la frontiere (par la police) There were arrested several smugglers at the border (by the police) 'Several smugglers were arrested at the border (by the police)' 95. The term "raising impersonal" refers to the traditional analysis of these structures as allowing raising. The raised equivalent of (341a) for example would be Jean semble etre parti 'John seems to have left'. 96. Certain epistemic impersonal constructions are also close to the perception verbs, as illustrated in (i): (i) II est visible que tous sont coupables 'It is visible that all are guilty' These constructions will be treated along with epistemics. The volition verbs do not have an impersonal equivalent, but they are close in meaning to the deontic ICs. 97. IV s presumed lack of meaning explains the label of "dummy subject" given to the pronoun throughout the syntactic literature.

Notes 351 98. Obviously, the particular mechanisms that have been invoked to explain the presence of the placeholder vary depending on the particular theory in which analyses are based. In the transformational tradition, il is inserted by Impersonal Transformation Gaatone (1970), Martin (1970) (see also the whole literature about the there insertion in English). Other syntactic theories rely on other means to explain it's presence. For example, in Relational Grammar, (Perlmutter 1983, Legendre 1990 among others), the presence of il is imputable to the need of French to have a final subject (1). Since the original subject (the pivot nominal in RG terminology) is demoted to object (2), the dummy appears to fill the vacated slot and determine surface agreement. The dummy appears in different strata depending on the class of the verb which participates in the impersonal construction. For example, Legendre (1990) argues that il enters as a 2 in an unergetive IC, and as a 1 otherwise. 99. Other kinds of meaning have been proposed for il. For example, Spitzer (1928: 160-222 cited in Grevisse 1986) claims that the pronoun has a mythical value, and that it represents "/e grand neutre de la nature" 'the great neuter of nature', or in other words a paraphrase for God. For him, il pleut 'it is raining' is viewed in a way similar to Jupiter tonat 'Jupiter thunders' of the Latins. 100. The three examples in (359) illustrate spatial settings. Temporal settings are also possible, as in Midnight sees a lot of crime for example. 101. The idea of analyzing the impersonals as existential constructions was suggested to me by Ronald Langacker (p.c.). I am also indebted to him for suggesting the descriptive constructs used in this chapter. 102. Different impersonals set up the locus of attention of existential predications in slightly different ways. For example, in English, it presents a broad scope IS, but the use of there constitutes instructions to "zooms in" and establish a more focussed viewing area. These are, of course, abstract applications of the more concrete uses of the corresponding deictic elements. Hence, there existentials tend to more strongly incorporate a specification of some particular time and place to anchor the focus of viewing. A similar contrast might exist between il and ςο/cela in French, but it will not be investigated here. 103. Another consequence of the strictly existential nature of the construction is the fact that the entity whose existence is being predicated cannot be preceded by a definite article. This is illustrated in (i): (i) *Il existe les pneus qu 'on a pas besoin de gonfler 'There exist the tires that do not need inflating' In (i), the presence of the definite article indicates that Ε is a known entity in the current discourse. This is perceived as a conflict with the existential value of the impersonal construction. There is a sense that the presentation of an entity's existence should coincide with its first mention in discourse.

352 Notes 104. The cases with rester are interesting because they have an existential flavor. One might argue that they present E's existence at L. Under this analysis, E's existence at L would need to be reestablished, as the result of an earlier action. In that case, the rester constructions would constitute intermediate cases between the pure existentials and the locationals. 105. In these constructions, the presence of the middle se indicates that Ε is construed as possessing certain characteristics that facilitate the process profiled by the vert>. For a detailed analysis of middle constructions, see Maldonado (1992). 106. The exact match between a proposition and reality often needs to be debated. The example in (391) represents in a sense the opposite situation from the cases presented in Chapter six where the declarative verbs admettre 'admit', reconnoitre 'recognize', etc. are followed by subjunctive complements. Recall that in these cases, the subjunctive codes the fact that the overall proposition, i.e. the proposition that includes the presuppositions it conveys, does not match reality. In (391), the opposite obtains. The proposition matches a narrow level of reality, but not the more inclusive R'. 107. The sentences in (410) and (411) must not be confused with raising constructions with similar verbs. For example, compare (410) and (411) with the following: (i) II (le president) apparait etre implique 'He (the president) appears to be implicated' (ii) II (Jean) s 'avere la connaitre 'He (Jean) turned out knowing her' Unlike the examples in (410) and (411), // is not an impersonal, but a subject pronoun. 108. The analysis proposed here is corroborated by the etymology of probable. The Latin probare from which it derives means "that can be proven". The idea of proof necessarily involves the discovery of tangible elements (i.e. some fragments of reality) that bear on E's status in R. 109. The kind of cognitive processes at work in the alternation between the modal and complex IC constructions is reminiscent of those involved in raising constructions (Langacker 1995). Langacker (1995) shows that raising can be explained successfully by treating the raised and non-raised instances as two separate senses, which are used in different contexts. For example, likely has two senses, illustrated respectively in It is likely that Mary will win, and Mary is likely to win. It is obvious that the alternation between modal and impersonal constructions is not a traditional case of raising because the main verbs are different in the two constructions. However, abstracting away from the difference in lexical items, the possible alternation between an impersonal setting subject and the main participant in the complement process used as the main subject is similar. I would claim that the alternation considered here

Notes 353 constitutes an instance of "conceptual raising" because it involves the selection of the main participant of a (complement) process as the subject of the main process. This possibility is exclusively a property of construal, which allows the speaker the flexibility to structure her conceptualization in alternative ways. Under this view, the only special characteristic of traditional raising verbs is that the raising possibility involves two variants of the same lexical item.

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Index λ meaning, 56-58,335, 338 with faire, 74, 111 vAthforcer, 103, 336 with laisser, 114 with perception veibs, 117, 339 Abstract existentials C's miminal role, 293 modality of existence, 291-292 semantic structure, 291 Abstract object, 289 coming into C's consciousness, 291 coming into existence, 291 locational constructions, 290 pure existentials, 290 Abstract setting, 276, 278, 282, 285 See also Setting subject construction Accusative, 53,73 Action chain, 35-38 Active zone, 295 Address (in reality), 225-226, 311 See also·, Indicative clause; Proposition Agent, 35-38 Agentivity (of the causee), 92,98-99, 101, 106-107 Animate causee with forcer, 102 with W , 107- 109 Anti-assertion (meaning of the subjunctive), 266 Anti-cognition (meaning of the subjunctive), 266

Arbitrariness (of grammar), 1, 10 Argument structure, 3,73, 76-77 causation/perception construction, 85 in Cognitive Grammar, 333 Arriver, 292, 302 Attendre, 177 Auxiliary, 125, 131, 135 Auxiliary relation, 125 Avouer, 237 Bare infinitive construction, 92 semantic structure, 88 Barrier, 147, 148 social domain, 152 See also Force dynamics Basic clause structure, 34 Basic semantic roles, 35 Benefactive, 112, 114,117 See also A with perception verbs See also λ νάϋ\ faire See also A with laisser Biclausal construction, 83, 119, 125, 341 modals, 131, 133-134 Binding force, 53, 101, 321 Binding hierarchy, 54 Causative transformation rule, 77,79, 112 Clause union, 78, 84 Cliticization, 83-84, 334-335, 341 with modals, 132 Cognitive domains, 13

368 Index See also Cognitive models; Idealized cognitive models Cognitive event, 13 Cognitive Grammar cognitive abilities, 12 content requirement, 10,12 symbolic nature, 1, 20 See also Cognitive models; Construal; Landmark; Perspective Predication; Viewing arrangement; Trajector; Usage-based model Cognitive linguistics, 7, 9, 321 See also Cognitive Grammar, Functionalist position Cognitive models, 34 basic epistemic model, 43 billiard-ball model, 35 canonical event model, 36 cognitive model of entertainment, 118 dynamic evolutionary model, 43-44, 159 reference-point model, 40,223, 319 stage model, 36 western folk model of the mind, 180

Complement construction, 27-28 Complement distribution, 6-7, 30 See also Semantic compatibility Complementation, 64, 332 in Cognitive Grammar, 26 Complementizer, 56, 59,175, 201, 254, 335 Complex impersonals, 270,272 abstract existentials, 291 as extensions of simple impersonals, 289 deontic impersonals, 270,300 emotion reaction impersonals, 271, 294

epistemic impersonals, 271,297 evaluative impersonals, 293 raising impersonals, 270,296 Complex veib, 86,90-92,119 See also Event Component structure, 21 Composite structure, 21 Compositional path, 90, 120 Comprendre, 267 Concept, 193 Conceptual control, 167 Conceptual dependence, 48,52 Conceptual distance, 190,193, 197-198, 346 compared with objective construal, 192,201 in case of coreferentiality, 194, 196,199 volition verbs compared with emotion reaction verbs, 347 Conceptual manipulation, 166 Conceptual structure Jackendoffs model, 331 Conceptual/semantic structure, 1, 5 Conceptualization relation, 61,65, 165 main-veib constructions, 162-163 realignment, 214 See also Viewing arrangement Conceptualizing subject construction, 61, 66,68-69, 217 compared to modals, 174 semantic structure, 176-177 Spanish, 256 Constraints on impersonal complements, 273 on perception, 94-97, 336 on the complement of modals, 136, 139, 166 Construal, 14

Index 369 alternative, 202 different dimensions, 29,33, 320 grammatical categories, 15-19 objective, 64 profile and base, 14, 33 subjective, 64 See also Grounding; Perspective; Viewing arrangement Construction Grammar, 20 Constructional schema, 20 Context-free meaning, 25-26 discussion, 325 See also Usage-based model Control espirer, 136 subject control, 208 theory, 29, 185,208-209 Conference (between main and subordinate subjects), 8,174-175, 183, 185-186, 194 Croire, 130, 203 compared with Spanish creer, 260 hold the belief that, 244 synonym ofpenser, 244 Cross-linguistic similarities, 263 Cross-linguistic validity (of the analysis), 327, 328 De meaning, 56-58, 335 with emotion reaction veibs, 200, 201 Declaration verbs, 178 an ICM of communication, 233 French compared with Spanish, 257 manner of declaration, 182,233 with an indicative clause, 181,220 with an indicative or subjunctive clause, 235, 237, 255

with an infinitival complement, 181

Deontic impersonals compared with volition verbs, 304 semantic structure, 300 with a subjunctive clause, 304 with an infinitival complement, 304 Deontic modality (see Root modality) Devoir, 127-128 epistemic, 138, 161 obligation, 127,138, 154, 169 schematicity of meaning, 134 Dire, 233 Direct interaction, 102-103 Direct perception, 75, 96,192 Ditransitive construction, 24 Dominion, 41, 223-227, 245, 348 Egocentric viewing arrangement (see Viewing arrangement) Elaboration relation, 19 Elaboration site, 21-23 Embedded negation, 84 Emotion reaction impersonals compared with emotion reaction veibs, 305 compared with non-extraposed variant, 295 non-extraposed variant, 294 semantic structure, 295 with a subjunctive clause, 305 with an infinitival complement, 306 Emotion reaction verbs, 179 conceptual distance, 199 cross-linguistic variation, 324 factivity, 199 French compared with Spanish, 262

370 Index irrelevance of a proposition, 248 obviative complements, 185 with a subjunctive clause, 184,221 with an infinitival complement, 184 Emotional involvement, 206 Energy source, 92, 97, 101, 104-105, 108-109, 115, 118, 338 primary source, 98 secondary source, 98 Entendre, 345 with an indicative clause, 230-231 Epistemic impersonals compared with propositional attitude verbs, 308 il est possible, 311 incompatibility with an infinitival complement, 310 modality of existence, 300 semantic structure, 298 with a subjunctive clause, 310 with an indicative clause, 309 Epistemic modality, 126,159 conceptualization relations, 165, 169 Equi NP deletion, 79 Esperer compared with Spanish esperar, 261, 348 compared with vouloir, 252,349 event versus proposition, 251,253 with an indicative clause, 251 Evaluative impersonals compared with abstract existentials, 293 modality of existence, 294 semantic structure, 293 with a subjunctive clause, 308 with an infinitival complement, 307 Event, 274, 279, 289,292, 304

complex, 33, 45, 85 independence, 46, 48, 51, 53, 82, 85, 180, 222 integration, 51 propositionalized, 193,229 simple, 34,45 versus proposition, 245, 248 See also Biclausal construction; Binding force; Complex verb; Givön's parameters; Monoclausal construction Evolutionary momentum, 43,45, 160, 166, 248 subjective, 161 See also Elaborated reality Existential construction locus of attention, 351 Exister, 283-284, 289, 290 Extension relation, 19 Faire compared with Spanish hacer, 327, 337 context-free meaning, 25, 99-100, 325 responsibility, 99 with W , 101 Faire par construction, 74, 111-112, 115 Fear verbs, 250 Figure/ground, 17, 57 Finite clause optimal viewing arrangement, 175 viewing arrangement, 188,207 See also Indicative clause Focal participant, 39 Focal readjustment, 89,92 Force dynamics, 147 modals, 141 negation of possibility, 147

Index 371 Force dynamics configuration epistemic modality, 159-161 main verb construction, 142-146 obligation, first configuration, 155, 156 obligation, second configuration, 156 obligation, third configuration, 158 possibility, 147-154 Forcer context-free meaning, 25,101, 103, 326 with VOV, 74, 103, 326 Form (of a construction), 1, 54, 319, 323 Functionalist position, 9 See also Cognitive linguistics Generative Semantics movement, 7, 332 Givön's parameters, 52 See also Event Government Binding, 3,76, 80, 331 Ground, 63,64 See also Grounding predication Grounding, 175,180, 218, 321 Grounding predication, 50, 70 See also Person marker, Tense predication Head, 26-27 Iconic link, 8, 211 Idealized cognitive models, 180,228 See also Cognitive models II est possible compared with il est probable, 312 II est probable, 299 IIy a, 284, 302

existential meaning, 285 Imagery (see Construal) Immediate scope of predication, 282 within R, 283, 294, 296 within R', 298, 302 Impersonal construction, 71, 269, compared with conceptualizing subject constructions, 313 compared with modals, 315, 352 existential nature, 274, 281 Impersonal subject, 270 cataphoric function, 275 meaning, 275,282 Impersonal transformation, 351 Inanimate causee, 104-107 Inanimate subject with pouvoir and savoir, 145 with W , 100, 103 Indicative clause compared with subjunctive clause, 254 full grounding, 189 meaning, 180 See also Finite clause; Grounding; Proposition Indicative inflection French compared with Spanish, 264 independent clause, 226 meaning, 226 Indicative/subjunctive distinction, 13, 69, 175, 217 Indirect perception, 192 Induced scene, 82 Infinitival complement meaning, 181 viewing arrangement, 175, 188-189, 207 Infinitival/finite complement distinction, 175,181

372 Index Influence, 7 Instance (of a process type), 48-50, 167 arbitrary instance, 254, 256, 305, 308 grounded instance, 51, 180, 222 Instantiation, 48,167 See also Semantic function Instrument, 35, 38, 112, 115,118 role of the target, 155 See also Basic semantic roles; Faire par, Par Integration, 21, 23 See also·, Component structure; Composite structure; Elaboration site Jurer, 234 Laisser VOV/W alternation, 104 Laisser passer, 109, 339 Laisser tomber, 109, 339 Landmark, 16,22, 87-88, 90-91,133, 277 See also Construal Lexical Functional Grammar, 3 Lexical semantics, 5,7-8 Location (within R), 281-283 Locus of attention, 282, 351 See also Scope of predication Locus of potency, 142,144, 154,162 diflusion, 149,154,163 See also Force dynamics configuration Main-verb construction, 142, 342 force-dynamics configuration, 143

Meaning equated with conceptualization, 12 of grammatical forms, 10 in Cognitive grammar, 5 in Cognitive linguistics, 9 subjectivist view, 5,9,13,14, 319 Mental ability {see savoir capability) Mental contact, 231 Mental space, 13, 51,70,237,253, 254, 321 Metaphor, 223 Middle impersonals, 286 Middle verbs with W , 337 Modal class, 123-124,126,128 Modal construction compared to conceptualizing subject construction, 129 event structure, 134 semantic structure, 133 Modal force realignment, 141, 154, 162-163, 165, 167 subjectification, 171 See also Viewing arrangement Modal verbs schematicity of meaning, 135 Modality of existence, 289 C's force dynamic experience, 290 coming into existence, 286 simple existence, 283 Modifier construction, 28 Monoclausal construction, 83, 86, 341 auxiliaries, 131 Negation with modals, 132 Object, 39

Index 373 Objective axis (see Viewing arrangement) Objective construal along the objective axis, 188 along the subjective axis, 140 explicit mention, 189,192,207, 214,345 prepositional attitude verbs, 205 Obviation, 7-8, 210, 323 definition, 185 Falkas' account, 211 Ruwet's data, 183, 197 Optimal viewing arrangement (See Viewing arrangement) Optional distribution, 80, 81 Overall proposition, 236,255 Par with causative construction, 339 with laisser, 112, 114 with perception verbs, 112,117, 340 Passive (voice) marker, 49,68 Passivization, 120 Patient, 35,38 See also Basic semantic roles Percept, 193 Perception verbs, 178 as factive verbs, 232 compared with volition veibs, 213 French compared with Spanish, 257 ICM of perception, 191,228 inherent objective construal, 191, 229 purest perceptual relation, 88, 191 with an indicative clause, 181, 220,231 Perfect marker, 49,68,136 Person maiker, 50-51,189

See also Grouding predication Perspective, 59,175,186,207,213, 320 relation to grounding, 267 See also Construal; Viewing arrangement Physical capacity (See Pouvoir ability) Phonological pole, 1 Possessive construction, 41 abstract possession, 223 Post-veibal subject, 73,76 Potential agent, 82,114,115 Pouvoir, 127-128 ability, 137,142-143 ability/possibility/permission ambiguity, 343 epistemic, 138, 161 permission, 152-153 possibility, 127, 137, 147 schematicity of meaning, 134 Pouvoir possibility compared with main-verb construction, 343 first configuration, 163,168 force dynamics configuration, 148 second configuration, 164,168 Pragmatics (of the speech situation), 8, 190, 208, 306, 329 Predication, 1,13 Pre-linguistic notions, 37 Presupposition, 237, 256, 349 Pretendre, 234 Principle of minimum distance, 209 Process, 19 Process type, 48, 140, 166, 181, 307 See also Semantic function Profile bare infinitive construction, 88

374 Index finite clause, 187-188 infinitival complement, 189 main-verb construction, 143 modal construction, 133 pouvoir possibility, 148 transitive construction, 87 VOV construction, 89 W construction, 90 Profile determinant, 21,26 Proposition, 224, 227-228, 231-232, 233, 240, 256, 274, 289,292, 299, 304 versus event, 245,248,251 Propositional attitude verbs, 178 compared with perception verbs, 345 different levels of commitment, 239 with an indicative clause, 183, 220,239 with an infinitival complement, 183 Quantification, 48,166,167 See also Semantic function Que, 59 See also Complementizer Raising, 39,120 Raising impersonals semantic structure, 296 Real subject, 270 Realignement (see Modal force) Reality basic, 42, 224, 245, 280 current, 160 current reality, 283 elaborated, 224-226,245,280, 309, 319 hierarchical organization, 279-281, 298-299, 301, 319

immediate, 227 potential, 45, 160-161 projected, 45,160-161,227,248 Relation, 16 complex atemporal, 18 simple, 17 temporal, 18 Relational Grammar, 78 Remarquer, 324, 346 with an indicative clause, 231 RESP (relation), 209,212 Responsibility, 100, 115 Rester, 286, 302, 352 Restrictive, 133 Root modality, 126-127, 142 Salience, 86, 336 initial, 86, 92, 93-94, 97-98, 101, 103, 320 intrinsic, 92 relative, 87, 91 Savoir, 129 capability, 128,130-131,137,142, 144, 335, 342 cognition, 130 modal/cognition ambiguity, 341 schematicity of meaning, 134 Scheduling verbs, 168 Scope of predication, 13,64,68 modals, 141 See also Immediate scope of predication Se faire, 292-293, 302 Self-to-other relationship, 210 Self-to-selfrelationship,210 Semantic compatibility, 6,29-30, 56, 67, 75,81, 113, 175, 202, 207, 211, 218,228, 238, 243, 245, 321 discussion, 323 independent evidence, 325

Index 375 Wierzbicka's account, 322 Semantic extension from pouvoir ability, 153 from pure existentials, 303 from simple existentials, 282,289, 303 Semantic function, 48, 51, 55, 334 Semantic network, 19 Semantic primitives, 322 Semantic representation, 3 See also Meaning; Semantics/syntax interface Semantic pole, 1 Semantic structure (of the main verb), 53,69 Semantic tradition (of modal research), 218, 266,321-323 Semantics/syntax interface, 3, 5, 7, 331-332 Semi-auxiliaries of modality, 126 Sentir with an indicative clause, 230 Separation between R and AS, 301 Separation between R and R \ 299 Sequential scanning, 19 Setting subject construction, 41,276, 278 See also Abstract subject Showveibs, 117 Simple impersonals coming into C's consciousness, 288 coming into existence, 286 locational constructions, 284 pure existentials, 282 Speaker-control, 166, 169,171 Speaker-oriented verbs, 61,66,171, 320 Speaker's role

as a conceptualize^ 144,163 in force dynamics configuration, 149, 154 strong role, 150, 152, 157 Spontaneous reaction veibs, 102 Structure (see Construal) Subcategorization frame, 6-7,79-80, 332-333 Subject, 39, 73, 314-317 Subject/object assymetry, 194, 196, 210

optimal, 191 Subjectification, 140,163 See also Modal force Subjective axis (see Viewing arrangement) Subjective construal along the objective axis, 188-189 along the subjective axis, 140 declaration verbs, 206 propositional attitude verbs, 204 Subjunctive clause partial grounding, 189 Subjunctive inflection In an independent clause, 255 French compared with Spanish, 264 meaning, 253 See also Grounding instance (of a process type) Subordinate clause, 28,34 Summary scanning, 19 Supposer, 255 Syntactic realization (See Form of a construction) Syntactic representation, 3 Target (of the modal force), 154 See also Force dynamics

376 Index Temporal profile, 18-19 Tense predication, 51,189,224,226, 256 Thing, 16 Trajector, 16,22,49,65, 82,87,88, 133, 277, 278 Transitive clause, 92 with laisser, 113 with perception verbs, 116 withVOV, 111 with W , 111 See also Faire par Transitive construction Semantic structure, 87 Truth, 240 Underlying level (of representation), 77-78, 120 Unit phonological, 1 semantic, 1 symbolic, 1,20 Usage-based model, 23, 25, 325 Valence relation, 20 Vantage point, 60,61,65 impersonals, 273 in case of coreferentiality, 194, 197 infinitival complement, 175, 188 of a finite clause, 175 of modals, 124, 129, 131, 172 subjective, 165 with emotion reaction veibs, 199 See also Viewing arrangement Verbs of belief, 243 Verbs of certainty, 240 compared with the verbs of knowledge, 241 Verbs of knowledge, 240

French compared with Spanish, 257 Verbs of material activity, 94 Verbs of sensory experience, 94,95 Veibs of suspicion, 244 French compared with Spanish, 259 Verbs of thought, 243 French compared with Spanish, 258 Viewing arrangement egocentric viewing arrangement, 62, 166, 187, 194 objective axis, 65,175, 214, 321 objective construal, 166,344 objective scene, 62 of a finite clause, 187-188 of an infinitival complement, 187189 optimal viewing arrangement, 62, 162, 187, 188 subjective axis, 65-66,140,167, 213-214, 320 subjective construal, 166,189 Viewing frame, 60,282-283, 335 Voice (passive) marker, 136 Voir auxiliary, 96 summarizing, 96 with an indicative clause, 230 Volition verbs, 179 French compared with Spanish, 257 incompatibility with propositions, 245 inherent subjective construal, 194, 198 with a subjunctive clause, 183,221 with an infinitival complement, 183 Vouloir, 131

Index 377 compared with esperer, 252 context-free meaning, 195,197, 246, 326 incompatibility with propositions, 247 VOV construction, 67,74 construal, 82 event structure, 336 semantic structure, 89 with perception verbs, 95

W construction, 67, 73, 82, 89 semantic structure, 91 with animate causees, 107-109 with inanimate causees, 104-107 with perception verbs, 93 Wanna, 345 Y, 285

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