285 36 22MB
English Pages 316 Year 1975
JANUA LINGUA RUM STUDIA M E M O R I A E NICOLAI VAN WIJK D E D I C A T A edenda curai C. H. VAN S C H O O N E V E L D Indiana University
Serìes Maior,
58
INDUCTIVE SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX Foundations of Empirical Linguistics
by
LEO ZAWADOWSKI Lakehead University
1975
MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS
© Copyright 1975 Mouton & Co. B.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, bv print, photoprint, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 73-94305 ISBN 90 279 3463 0
Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., The Hague.
microfilm,
PREFACE
The present book deals with fundamentals of the system of exact empirical linguistics. It is possible to form a really scientific linguistic theory, free of speculation and mentalism, using only well defined terms (and then painstakingly following these definitions throughout), free of essayism or vagueness, and free of either pretentious pseudo-scientific verbiage or illegible "symbolic" notation, which conceals so well inadequacies of the product. Above all, we need a linguistic theory containing only statements proved by observable facts, and arranged so that what follows is based on what precedes; i.e. objective and "formalized" without pseudo-algebra. This does not really seem too much to demand, if we want linguistics to be a science. These methods and principles are here applied to the problems that constitute the foundations of the theory of language, like text ("spoken chain") as opposed to language, the semantic relation and polysemy, "form" as opposed to "substance", grammatical relations, division of the total meaning among the elements of the construction, determined facts as opposed to non-determined ones, sentence, etc. Keeping close to facts, concentrating on meaning, and insisting on the distinction of grammatical facts as opposed to lexical ones, are the three focuses of the book reflected in the title. Semantic problems are dealt with in this book with referential relations taken as the basis. This makes it possible to speak conclusively about these hitherto elusive facts, and it is a prerequisite of objective semantics. As for the distinction between grammatical and lexical facts, its understanding has always been, among linguists, a criterion of a good linguist, regardless of minor details of the "school" to which he otherwise belonged. Pre-structural linguists had a handicap in this respect, because their theories, being mostly individualistic, made them rather insensitive to this distinction; it is not accidental that many recent prints reflect the same insensitiveness. To safeguard continuity of development of linguistics is especially important now, when so many prints are published which show absence of coherent and scientific information on important linguistic works written before a recent development swept the "market". Especially European achievements are ignored and often known less than superficially. Accordingly, the system set forth in this book is built up organically
6
PREFACE
starting from an analysis and a detailed but constructive criticism of great theories of the pre-structural and of the structural period (especially Saussure's, Biihler's, Hjelmslev's). On the other hand this book does not enter into explicit polemics with developments that strongly deviate from some basic principles of scientific representation of facts or do not even attempt to build further what existed before them. However, our criticism of some pre-structural theories clearly also holds against such recent developments: they share with the pre-structural period many of its principal blunders, especially resulting from psychologism and speculation. Through the process of constructive criticism, what was vaguely expressed by a previous author may be made explicit in a new and exact formula. New definitions, solutions and proofs are integrated with what continues to hold from the great achievements of the past. It is only congruent with the above principles that this book is not only concerned with satisfying epistemological principles but also with its immediate use to the reader: it is arranged so that no knowledge or "training" in linguistics is prerequisite to reading and studying it. It is designed not only for linguists but also for all other readers who want to obtain scientific insight into language and are willing to learn, especially those who want to get out of the maze of hypostases, fallacies, and pretentious verbiage (or pretentious "algebraic" encodings of trivialities or of falsehoods) so much of which is in circulation on the subject of language, and who want then to be able to understand facts of language with a thinking mind, and possibly to describe them: it is hoped that this book will offer them some help. Lakehead, Ontario
L.Z.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
5 I. LINGUISTICS AND THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
1. Contemporary Linguistics
11
2. Functions of Text
25
3. A Classification of Signs and Semantic Systems
46
II. SEMANTICS OF SIMPLE SIGNS
4. The Meaning of Sign
71
5. Referential Meaning and Behaviorist 'Meaning*
93
6. Learning and Understanding Signs
100
7. Meaning of Polysemous Signs
108
8. Polysemy or Homonymy?
117
9. Semantic and Non-semantic Components of Information
127
UI. GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS AND DEEP STRUCTURE
10. Syntagmatic and Commutational Relations
149
11. Regular and Irregular Constructions
159
12. Language, Potential System, and "parole"
163
13. Conventionality and Motivation
173
14. Substance and Structure
182
8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV. VERB AND SENTENCE
15. Verbal Forms and their Terminology
197
16. Time and Tense
204
17. From Periphrastic Construction to Compound Tense
215
18. The Problem of Sentence and its Holistic Definitions
224
19. Sentence: Its Grammatical Definition
237
V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LANGUAGES
20. Language Families and Language Unions
255
21. Attested and Conjectural Comparative Grammar
275
22. Polyglotism and Bilingualism
283
Index
301
Signs and Abbreviations
316
PART I
LINGUISTICS AND THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
1
CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTICS
1. LINGUISTICS AS SCIENCE
1.1. A system of statements about a domain of the perceptible world is a science if it fulfils the following conditions: the terms used are either plain, common, and unambiguous elements of the language in question or are exactly defined by means of such plain, common, and unambiguous elements. The statements are proved, except for the unproved initial statements; these are listed explicitly, and are either stated to be unprovable or are referred to another science. The unprovable statements are primary, evident statements, accepted by all normal unbiased people. The statements form a system, i.e. they are arranged in a way that corresponds to the structure of the domain in question, and to the needs of an adequate communication (representation) of that domain. The statements are adequate, and the whole system is adequate to the domain communicated in it. Adequacy consists, among other things, in containing not only statements about particular observed facts, but also general statements, i.e. statements about CATEGORIES (classes) of facts.1 1.2. According to this definition, which is correct and universally accepted by epistemologists but ignored by many writers on language, there was almost no science of language before the beginning of the 19th century. If the term linguistics is used as equivalent to science of language, there was no linguistics before that period. Then we cannot speak of a PRESCIENTIFIC period of LINGUISTICS: we have to speak of a prescientific period of the STUDY OF LANGUAGE. However, it seems that there existed sciences of some particular languages, especially Ancient Greek, Latin and French; but the scientific aspect of works relating to each of these languages dealt with a relatively small area of the language in question. The change observed at the beginning of the 19 th century consists in the appearance of works scientifically describing relations between some languages, viz. their GENETIC RELATIONS: the works in question are of comparative Indo-European linguistics. 1 The latter requirement was stated in the old principle: Nan est scientia nisi de generalibus: de singularibus non est scientia.
12
LINGUISTICS AND THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
Philologies of particular languages were created under this impulse, to serve the needs of the new science. They also helped to develop the sciences of particular languages. Does it follow that the science of LANGUAGE was created, i.e. the science of all languages and of categories of languages and language facts ( = general linguistics)? The genetic relations of a group of languages are not part of general linguistics. But it seems true that the works of comparative IE linguistics also contained statements which belong to general linguistics. Understandably, most of these statements concerned the genetic relations of languages. On the other hand, however, that general linguistics had a very narrow scope. Most of those works of the first half of the 19th century which are mainly concerned with general linguistic problems are works of literature or 'philosophy' rather than science. General linguistics became a full-fledged science rather in the second half of the 19th century with the first scientific works on phonetics. Some domains of language became objects of scientific description as late as the first half of the 20th century. 1.3. At the beginning of the 20th century, linguistic works appeared or became known which introduced new statements and methods, very different from those of the 19th century — the works of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay and Ferdinand de Saussure.2 Their combined influence later gave the impulse for a new linguistic school: the functional and structural school of Prague (the 'Prague School', which began in 1926). Soon a large body of the work of this school, merged with findings of some phoneticians (Jespersen, Jones), and a few other linguists, became universally known and accepted, so that all scientific linguistics became what is generally called structural linguistics. Incidentally, most of this doctrine, especially the fundamental statements, is true, so that the new trend constituted an improvement in the state of linguistics. The year 1930 may be considered as an approximate date of the beginning of a new period. 'Structuralists' often called their linguistics simply MODERN or RECENT linguistics, and that of the preceding period, TRADITIONAL linguistics. These terms are entirely inadequate.3 The term STRUCTURAL is the most widely used, but is inexact and misleading: it has at least two meanings, and in its narrower sense refers to a small part of what is covered by its wider sense (see below, 6.4.). 1.4. The name of a scientific doctrine should be appropriate to its essential features: its statements and methods. We are going to try to establish these. Anticipating the results of the present chapter we can say that linguistics, as enriched and improved by ' About the exchange of ideas between them see: Roman Jakobson, "The Kazan' School of Polish Linguistics and its Place in the International Development of Phonology", Selected Writings II (The Hague, 1971), 394-428. * This was seen in the '60's, when some authors, possibly only pretending to be ignorant, started referring to all preceding linguistics, including 'structural linguistics', as 'traditional', while they presented some new trends, advocated by themselves, as the only 'modern' linguistics.
CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTICS
13
the results achieved around 1930 and later, contains two principal statements: (1) language COMMUNICATES EXTRA-LINGUISTIC reality, (2) the data for linguistic research are ORAL TEXTS (which may be recorded, written down, etc.), and RELATIONS between the text elements and the EXTRATEXTUALS. They have to be described EXACTLY AND ADEQUATELY. This was in contrast to the absence of a clear notion about the function of language in the preceding periods, and consequent failure to distinguish functional facts in the texts. It was also in contrast to the description of language facts in terms of alleged psychological (mental) facts, current in the preceding periods. Consequently this linguistics is COMMUNICATIVE TEXTUAL (and referential) linguistics. Since this term is still too cumbersome for current use, we may have to continue to use the term structural, which is almost a standing term for the period in question. The Prague School called their linguistics FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL4, which is also in agreement with the terminology of Baudouin de Courtenay. The term functional is also used by some other linguists (e.g. Martinet). The term structural has some disadvantages: it may be used in a wide sense and in a narrow sense. It may be said that all schools of linguistics that arose from the combined influence of Baudouin de Courtenay and Saussure are structural in the wide sense, but only some particular schools are structural in the narrow sense (see below, 6.4.). Besides, the structural character, even in the wide sense, is but a secondary feature of communicative-textual linguistics. 2. COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION
2.1. The typical answer of pre-structural linguistics to the question of the function of language was: the function of language is to 'express', to manifest, the 'ideas' and feelings of the speaker, and to evoke similar (if not identical) ideas and feelings in the mind of the hearer. Instead of ideas, mental images (Vorstellungen) were often mentioned. Observations about the expression of wishes and about releasing certain kinds of behavior on the part of the hearer were sometimes added. This was in strange contradiction with the current assertion that language is part of the 'mental life' of the speakers (part of their 'psychology'). For, how can a part of mental life (necessarily inaccessible to observation) serve to MANIFEST ideas and feelings, i.e. to make them accessible to observation? But this contradiction passed unnoticed in the imprecise and changing formulations. Those who did not adhere to extreme psychologism (extreme mentalism) could easily dismiss it. This doctrine about the function of language made it impossible to define language in accordance with the ACTUAL (then and later) USE of the term language. For this definition includes facial expressions and certain gestures in the scope of the term language, none of which are normally referred to as language or text. Consequently * J. Vachek, The Linguistic School of Prague (Bloomington, 1966), 6-7.
14
LINGUISTICS AND THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
the following additional features were invoked to define the language sign: its phonic character, the fact that it is produced consciously and (or) purposely, the fact that it is not a picture or another kind of imitation of its referend (i.e. of the entity to which it refers). But it was impossible to define the degree of consciousness and purpose necessary for being an 'act of speech': reading a text in a language unknown to the reader, sentences produced by a phonograph record, the talk of a parrot or of an inebriated man, were insoluble problems. 5 2.2. Saussure made a decisive step toward the solution of the problem: he took up the assertion of some Greek 'grammarians' that the relation between language (or elements of language) and extratextuals is based on a convention (96aet, Dative of 3£ai, etc.; That refers to allegedly "relatively motivated" words. On the contrary, it is said that men, sheep "ne rappelle rien"; elm "est tout à fait isolé".1 Of course a definition of facts based on what is allegedly recalled by them is not adequate. The use of alleged mental phenomena in the definition of a linguistic fact is particularly detrimental here, as will be seen presently. 1.4. CLG established the distinction of SYNTAGMATIC relations and "associational relations" ("rapports associatifs"). When speaking about the "associational" relations CLG does not give examples of all possible instances of alleged associational relations but only of associational relations between MORPHOLOGICALLY DIVISIBLE signs, i.e. between constructions (compound words or derivatives), 8 and those relations simply resulting from COMMUTATIONAL RELATIONS between one morphological constituent in each sign in question, and one in a "related" sign. The only exception to this are the examples of alleged associational relations based "sur la seule analogie des signifiés", e.g. apprentissage, éducation, instruction",7 in which commutational relations of the morphological parts do not play any role. It is seen that although in the chapter on the two kinds of relations CLG speaks of "associational" relations, the author intuitively and fairly consistently refers to COMMUTATIONAL relations between some morphological parts of the signs in question. The same is done, and this time entirely consistently, in the chapter on "fonctionnement simultané des ordres de groupements", which follows the theory of relations. 8 The same is the case in the section on "relative motivation". E.g. F poirier is mentioned in the section on "relative motivation" as "relatively motivated" in virtue of its relation to cerisier, pommier, etc. and not by any means in virtue of any rela« CLG 182. • CLG 181. • Even within this scope (narrower than would result from the définition) not all kinds of possible associations are illustrated by examples. E.g. possible associations based on contiguity of referends (cf. e.g. Wundt, Die Spraehe II, 621) are omitted entirely; the associations based on "simple communauté des images acoustiques" are illustrated only by examples exhibiting textual identity of whole morphological elements (not parts of such elements), e.g. enseignement - Justement). ' CLG 174. • CLG 176-180.
176
GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS AND DEEP STRUCTURE
tion based e.g. on some identical meaning contents that would not result from commutational relations of morphological parts (e.g. poirier, arbre, chêne, plante).9 1.5. It is seen that Saussure considers as "relatively motivated" only grammatical constructions, viz. such as exhibit regular syntagmatic and commutational relations, morphic ('formal') as well as semic. This is also seen from his remarks intended to prove that a particular sign is "relatively motivated". E.g. it is said that "dix-neuf est solidaire associativement de dix-huit, soixante-dix, etc. et syntagmatiquement de ses elements dix et neuf. Cette double relation lui confère une partie de sa valeur. 10 CLG believes that the "relative motivation" has various degrees and depends on the degree of distinctness of syntagmatic and "associational" (in reality, commutational) relations. He seems to consider morphic relations and semic relations as coincident. He says that the relative motivation est d'autant plus complète que l'analyse syntagmatique est plus aisée et le sens des sous-unités plus évident. En effet s'il y a des éléments formatifs transparents, comme -ier dans poirier vis-a-vis de ceris-ier, pomm-ier, etc. il en est d'autres dont la signification est trouble ou tout à fait nulle.11 What is true is that semic relations do not necessarily coincide with morphic relations; of course Saussure could not know that. Besides, Saussure did not have explicit criteria for distinguishing real grammatical relations. E.g. he says that: En rapprochant des mots tels que coutelas, fatras, plâtras, canevas, on a le vague sentiment que -as est un élément formatif propre aux substantifs, sans qu'on puisse le définir plus exactement.11 We must explicitly apply the objective criteria of a grammatical construction (above, 55. 159). it is not surprising that among the examples of "relatively motivated" constructions there are regular and irregular constructions, and no distinction is made. E.g. F fréquemment, E ships {flags, etc.), G k ôcboco (Xûaco, etc.), Lat. inimicus are semically regular, while F couperet, autrefois, G Handwerk, are semically irregular. As for magister, it is (i.e. the stem of this noun is) not a construction at all, and it is useless to invoke a relation with magis, as there are no regular morphic ("formal") relations between its presumable constituents (mag-is-tr(o)). It is seen that Saussure's intuition was rather that morphically and semically regular constructions are "relatively motivated", but this intuition was too vague to find a correct exemplification, and, of course, could not be defined or described correctly. However, the necessary distinctions are now made and defined (see above, 160 sqq.). 13 We must now find whether there are proofs that regular constructions are • "Associational" relations based "sur la simple communauté des images acoustiques" are not represented by examples in the theory of "relative motivation" at all. " CLG 182. " CLG 181. " CLG 181. See above, 159. " Cf. Proceedings of the Vlllth International Congress of Linguists (Oslo, 1958), 420-422.
CONVENTIONALITY AND MOTIVATION
177
"relatively motivated". The same question may be asked with regard to other classes of text elements.
2.
2.1. We have to begin with non-determined classes. We omit the question of whether morphemes (classes), e.g. E /teibl/, E /sir)/, F /tabl/, F /Jat/, etc. are relatively motivated, because this problem is dealt with elsewhere (above, 47), and Saussure himself contributed much to the doctrine of their conventional character.14 We proceed to the non-determined classes determining potential constructions, i.e. to the TYPES of regular constructions. What CAN be not entirely conventional in them? The constituent morphemes are entirely ('absolutely') conventional. Consequently, if there is anything in them that is not absolutely conventional, it can only be the grammatical relations. E.g. in Latin verbal forms (e.g. video, vides, etc.) the following grammatical relation holds: the morpheme communicating a property is followed by a morpheme communicating the person who is the bearer of that property (i.e. who belongs to the class of entities characterized by that property). Quite a different relation holds in English (7see, you see, etc.), where the morpheme communicating the person in question PRECEDES the other morpheme. These relations are conventional, as they are different in different languages. Analogously, the law that holds for the Verbal Noun in English is that a suffix identical with that of Present Participle follows the lexical verbal morpheme, possibly preceded by the Article. In Old Greek it is that the Article precedes a segment identical with the Infinitive. And so on. In fact the grammatical relations in UNPREDICTABLE CLASSES (types) of collocations of text segments are the factor that determines the multiplicity and variety of grammatical structure of various languages. If they were non-conventional, all languages would have the same grammatical structure. It is useful to recall that the grammatical relations in unpredictable classes of text elements are part of the LANGUAGE in the exact and restricted sense (see above 164-165). 2.2. We proceed to the determined ('regular') constructions, MEMBERS of undetermined but determining classes (i.e. of 'master classes'). E.g. the classes F coureur, dormeur, pêcheur, are members of the class F {lexical verbal morpheme + /oer/}, i.e. F Nomen Agentis. These classes belong to the potential system of the French language (i.e. are determined by the French language in the exact sense). When a speaker produces a text segment [darmoe:r], he produces a specimen of the class dormeur, and of the class F Nomen Agentis, i.e., he uses the resources of the French potential system and of the French language. And analogously for English sailing (or any other particular Verbal Noun sub-class). Now, are F coureur, E sailing, etc. relatively non-conventional? Their morphemes M
CLG 100 sqq.
178
GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS AND DEEP STRUCTURE
are conventional. Are the grammatical relations in them less conventional than those in the 'master type', i.e. in the undetermined but determining class (e.g. E Nomen Verbale)? E.g. is the grammatical relation in sailing less conventional than in E {verbal lexical morpheme + suffix identical with that of Pres. Partic.}? The 'master-relation' consists in that ANY E verbal lexical morpheme is followed by such and such a suffix. The relation in sailing differs from it in that it holds between a PARTICULAR E verbal lexical morpheme, viz. /seil-/ and the suffix. To be sure, the relation is not exactly the same ; the suffix /-ig/ is ALWAYS preceded by a verbal lexical morpheme, (it IMPLIES such a morpheme), but not necessarily by /seil-/. There is no DEPENDENCE (and consequently no predictability) between sail and -ing. Analogously the categorial semic relation, which decides about the MEANING of sailing is only the master-relation, i.e. the relation that holds for the whole type: sailing participates in it only as a member of the master-type. 2.3. It is seen there is no specific grammatical relation between sail and ing, there is only a participation of sailing in the master-relation : sail- participates in it through its features by virtue of which it is a verbal lexical morpheme, not through its phonemic composition (/seil-/). Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish: (1) the relation between sail-, as a member of a phonemically defined class (/seil-/), and -ing: no dependence, no semic relation. (2) The relation between sail as a member of the class E {Verbal Lexical Morpheme}, and ing: dependence, semic relation. The relation (2) in sailing is EXACTLY the same as in reading, sleeping, pulling, weaving, etc., i.e. the same as holds for the whole class of E verbal nouns. The RELEVANT morphic and semic features of sailing are given in the definition of the master-class. If the latter is conventional, so is the former. Consequently if we have to think of a limitation of conventionality it is possible only to ask if the relation between a class and its subclass is not a non-conventional one. The answer is : it is certainly non-conventional, as it is proper to all classes of anything anywhere at any time. Does it follow that sailing is "relatively non-conventional"? A misunderstanding has to be eliminated at this point. When linguistics says that language is conventional, or in particular that, e.g. E /kaet/ or /bout/ are conventional, and absolutely conventional, it does not mean that they do not participate in any non-conventional relations. E.g. all text elements are physical bodies, and are in non-conventional relations with the mechanism (organs of speech) that produces them, the environment (room, etc.) in which they are produced, the organ of hearing that is set in motion by them, etc. But it does not mean that they are relatively nonconventional, for their production is simply (not 'relatively') CONVENTIONALLY RELATED TO THE PRESENCE OF SUCH AND SUCH EXTRATEXTUALS, and THAT IS what is referred to when it is said that, e.g. E /kaet/ is CONVENTIONAL. Accordingly any non-conventional relation in which sailing participates does not alter the fact that what serves the communicative function in it is as conventional as the morphemes. Sailing is DETERMINED by the master class and is PREDICTABLE from it.
CONVENTIONALITY AND MOTIVATION
179
But it is predictable from a CONVENTIONAL entity, so its conventionality (its conventional relation to extratextuals) is not diminished by it. 2.4. When Saussure feels that the determined predictable constructions are relatively motivated, it is possible (and indeed most probable) that his intuition is that they are motivated in the ORDINARY sense of the word. O f course what is of interest is not what Saussure thought but what could be said now, and whether it would be correct or not Now if one asks why a speaker has produced textual specimens of sail- and of -ing in this order and with reference to such and such extratextual elements, it is not incorrect to answer that it is because in the primary semantic system there exist such and such morphemes (classes), and such and such grammatical relations between them, defining the class E {Verbal Noun}. Further, because one of the determined subclasses of it is sailing, and because in the extratextual complex that has to be communicated there is an entity that is a potential referend for sailing, by virtue of the semic relations between its constituents, and of the resulting meaning. If one wishes, one may consider accordingly that the use of sailing is non-conventionally motivated in the ORDINARY sense of the word motivated. But so is the use of ANY text-element, not only of predictable constructions. This motivation is not 'relative' and has nothing to do with conventionality. However, this motivation is of little interest to linguistics, and does not deserve any special consideration. On the contrary, it is hardly possible to say, even in the ordinary sense of the word motivated, that sailing itself (its morphic and semic features) is 'motivated* by the master class. In fact motivate normally means ±
¿-language ¿-language ¿¿-language G-
SIGNS text(s) extratextual(s) specimens of a class of text elements class of signs an individual sign, specimen of a class of signs class of referends an individual referend, specimen of a class of referends a definite class of signs, e.g. E [kaet] the class of referends of the signs of the above class of signs the class of referends of the signs of the class S k a class of referends that are extratextuals (which is the usual case) the class of ships reference of 1st degree reference of 2nd degree whenever p (then) q, q whenever p, p implies q p and q one of the two: p, q (either p or q) single brackets contain the description of a 7-class (its characteristic set), e.g. E [kaet] double brackets: specimens of T-classes (individual segments) meaning content division in meaning contents language as defined by external definition language as defined by internal definition semantic system fulfilling both the external and the internal definition of language is prefixed to a term used in a glossematic sense LANGUAGES
CL D E F G IE It Gk Go L LL
Classical Latin Danish English French German Indo-European Italian Greek Gothic Latin Late Latin
Li Mo O OCS P PIE PL PR Ru Sk
Lithuanian Modern Old Old Church Slavic Polish Proto-Indo-European Popular Latin Proto-Romance Russian Sanskrit