Reporting the Attacks on Dubrovnik in 1991, and the Recognition of Croatia [1 ed.] 9781443893411, 9781443872799

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Reporting the Attacks on Dubrovnik in 1991, and the Recognition of Croatia

Reporting the Attacks on Dubrovnik in 1991, and the Recognition of Croatia Edited by

Renaud de la Brosse and Mato Brautović

Reporting the Attacks on Dubrovnik in 1991, and the Recognition of Croatia Edited by Renaud de la Brosse and Mato Brautović This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Renaud de la Brosse, Mato Brautović and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-7279-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7279-9 All papers were double-blind peer reviewed and presented at the international conference “Reporting on attacks on Dubrovnik, and recognition of Croatia”, in Dubrovnik, Croatia, on October 1-2, 2011. Organised by the University of Dubrovnik

CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Dr. Renaud de la Brosse and Dr. Mato Brautoviü Part I: Global Media, International Relations and Strategic Communication during Wartime: The Example of Dubrovnik Chapter One ............................................................................................... 10 The Media-Political Paradigm: Dubrovnik and the Creation of the Croatian State Dr. Albert Bing Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 26 Wartime Information Policy in Croatia and its Aftermath Branko Salaj Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 42 Six Hours Away: About the Besieged Dubrovnik from Afar Dr. Ivo Banac Part II: Practices of Wartime Reporting from the Dubrovnik Area: Journalists between Patriotism and Profession Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 52 Journalists between Patriotism and Profession Dr. Stjepan Maloviü Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 61 News Reporting About Attack on Dubrovnik in 1991: The Importance of Being on Location Dr. Mato Brautoviü, Julijana Antiü Brautoviü and Marko Potrebica

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Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 75 Dissemination of Information as a Contribution to the City Defence Berta Dragiþeviü Chapter Seven............................................................................................ 83 HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau in the Croatian War of Independence 1991/92 Vedran Beniü Part III: Media Analysis on the Subject of War in Dubrovnik and Croatia Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 104 Miloševiü’s Propaganda during the Attacks on Dubrovnik and Croatia Dr. Renaud de La Brosse Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 131 Reporting About the Attack on Dubrovnik by Montenegrin (Bi)Weeklys Dr. Goran Cvjetinoviü, Romana John and Dr. Mato Brautoviü Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 157 Coverage of the War in Dubrovnik in the Serbian Daily Politika (October 1, 1991 – January 2, 1992) Janja Sekula Gibaþ and Slaven Ružiü Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 172 The Serbian Justification of Wars in Yugoslavia through Media: Reporting War in Croatia – Dubrovnik Nora Nimani Musa and Sadie Clifford Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 185 Croatian Print Media Coverage of Humanitarian Activities Organised in 1991 in the Dubrovnik Region Julija Barunþiü Pletikosiü and Željka Križe Graþanin

PREFACE

In 1991, Croatia suffered a brutal war of aggression waged by the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian and Montenegrin Territorial Defence forces and volunteers. During the war, a third of the country’s territory was occupied, numerous crimes were committed, and the country suffered tremendous material damage. The Dubrovnik area and the entire Dubrovnik-Neretva County were the far southern military targets. Consequently, a large part of the Dubrovnik region was occupied, pillaged, and burned. In its attempts to justify the aggression, in its efforts to impose its political concept, and during the military attack and occupation, the aggressor resorted to various modes of propaganda, which are carefully and thoroughly analysed in this book. The relevant analysis significantly contributed to revealing the truth about the attack on the farthest southern region of Croatia. The best attempt to justify the military intervention arguing that the military operation was necessary in order to help the endangered Serbian population and protect the military facilities and members of the JNA in the area proved entirely wrong and inapplicable in the case of the Dubrovnik region since there were no military bases there and the meagre Serbian population was not at all endangered. The attempts to present the defenders as foreign mercenaries or rare extremists in TV news and reports and the magazine cynically called War for Peace were also unsuccessful since, even in the most difficult conditions, the local radio and improvised print media still operated in Dubrovnik. The people in the occupied area where no objective news was practically available and where manipulation was therefore possible, faced the hardest times. It is precisely there that the idea of establishing the new Dubrovnik Republic was proposed in order to persuade the citizens who did not flee from the Dubrovnik area to separate from Croatia. Fortunately, this calculated plan was also unsuccessful.

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The propaganda used by the aggressor in its attempts to justify the war of aggression fought against Croatia, as shown in the book, did not succeed in covering up the criminal intentions, the brutality, and crimes committed by those who advocated the idea of Greater Serbia in the Dubrovnik area. —Nikola Dobroslaviü Head of Dubrovnik-Neretva County

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to express gratitude to the sponsors who helped organise the scientific conference entitled “Reporting on Attacks on Dubrovnik and Recognition of Croatia - Twenty Years Later” and publish this collection of works, namely Dubrovnik-Neretva County and the Head of DubrovnikNeretva County Nikola Dobroslaviü, the City of Dubrovnik, and Deputy Mayor of Dubrovnik Tatjana Šimac Bonaþiü, Dubrovnik Airport, University of Dubrovnik Student Centre, Municipality of Konavle, and Hoteli Maestral.

INTRODUCTION DR. RENAUD DE LA BROSSE, LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY & UNIVERSITY OF REIMS, SWEDEN/FRANCE

DR. MATO BRAUTOVIû, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

In autumn 1991, the city of Dubrovnik underwent a siege of several weeks, marked by loss of human life and destruction. As with so many other martyr cities of today - like Aleppo or Kobanî in Syria - this assault against ancient Ragusa illustrated the ‘special’ place devoted to urban areas within armed conflict. The destruction caused, in the context of such urban clashes, refers to the reality of established facts, as well as to their representations for the warring parties and their inhabitants. From this point of view, in an era marked by excessive media coverage of armed conflicts, opponents at stake aspire to something more than only military benefits strictly speaking. Of course, the city as such can represent an important strategic issue, because of the concentration of power, the wealth at its disposal, and its demographic weight (Tratnjek, 2011). Do not cities, today, concentrate the majority of the world’s population? Thus the conquest or the capitulation of a city is seen as an indicator of military and political success, more so when it is a symbolic centre (capital, etc.). But if the city is a place and object of the theatre of war, it has always been the subject of narrative discourse by the belligerent. As if a scene in a play, and through the media, the city has turned into a full discursive place - that of the existing representations between opposing parties in conflict. Urban warfare does not take place only in the city, it also takes place in the discursive construction through the media, and often in a context marked by the absence of neutral or free media... Twenty-five years on, it’s clear that only the traditional media participated in the process of narration of the Yugoslav conflict. Today, we must of course add the role played by social networks in the coverage of urban conflicts, as in Syria, for example. These are no longer just journalists of traditional media that

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broadcast images from the battlefield, at least when they manage to get there despite many difficulties, but more and more citizen journalists, and actors of the conflicts themselves. The novelty, in this case, arises from the incessant flow of information which emanates from more and more actors, that henceforth media professionals do not have time to check... Some, in this respect, are using the expression “information pollution” (Yaman, 2016) to describe this phenomenon on which professionals have little control. It is therefore sometimes impossible to see clearly what is relevant or important among the jumble of stories and figures, especially where these mobile sources are sometimes solely those of the conflicting parties. Besides the military action itself, belligerents have integrated the fact that they must also control the management of public and international perceptions of the nature of the conflict in which they are invested. Going back to the siege of Dubrovnik, the aim was not its annihilation, as was the case for example for Stalingrad as part of the total war waged by the soldiers of the Third Reich against those of the Red Army. In this case, it was more of a targeted campaign of destruction intended to meet specific goals. One being to remove, by bombing, the symbolic places of exchange and of the possible meeting between diverse populations that ordinarily took place in the city. The former mayor of Belgrade, Bogdan Bogdanoviü (1993) coined the concept “Urbicide”, to express the orchestration of the massacre of cities in the former Yugoslavia, and the relentlessness against buildings seen as symbols of urbanity (libraries, places of worship, etc.). The media images of the damage caused to the Pearl of the Adriatic have been deeply rooted in the minds of residents of the city itself, among outside observers in general, and of the international public opinion in particular. Out of the approximately 11,425 buildings damaged in Dubrovnik and its surroundings by the artillery of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Pavloviü, 70), which was mainly composed of contingents of Montenegrins, there were a large number of cultural monuments (the Sponza Palace, the Rector’s Palace, Saint Blaise’s Church, the Franciscan Monastery, the Onofrio Fountain...) without any military value. Here, as in Sarajevo, the Urbicide consisted of the destruction of monuments and sites symbolic of the plural identity of city dwellers. François Chaslin (1997) defined it as “monumental hatred,” that is to say as a desire for “urban cleansing”, aspiring to “cleanse” the territory by denying the existence of the city by the destruction of its monuments.

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As stated by S. Pavloviü, the “government-controlled Montenegrin daily Pobjeda played a crucial role in “reminding” the citizens of Montenegro (...) of the “urgency” of defending the Motherland against the forces of fascism and oppression…” (2005, p. 60). Any dissenting voice was likened to an act of betrayal, and was denounced as such. A controlled media was one of the pillars that allowed the Presidents Bulatoviü from Montenegro and Miloševiü from Serbia, to broadcast a truncated view of the military situation on the ground. The military threat represented by Croatian troops in the region was grossly exaggerated. The underlying goal was to invite the Montenegrin population, and the Serbian one, to adhere to the military operations against a city that was indeed delivered to itself concerning its defence... As in the case of other besieged cities like Vukovar, for example, military operations on the ground were presented in the media as defensive actions. The result is known, the nationalist sentiment has always been flattered, annihilating any credible form of opposition to the policy conducted against Dubrovnik, as a plot of Croatian territory coveted by the powers that be, in Podgorica particularly.

Structure of the book This book is special in that it gives a combined scientific and practical overview of the subject matter, considering that the articles presented in it have been prepared by both, the scientists and the practitioners (war ministers, journalists, and propagandists) who were actually involved in the events that the media of the time reported about. By giving such a combined scientific and practical overview, this book represents not only a secondary, but also a primary source of information about the propaganda war waged during the conflict between Croatia and Serbia in 1991. The book is structured in three parts: Global media, international relations, and strategic communication during wartime: The example of Dubrovnik, practices of wartime reporting from the Dubrovnik area: journalists between patriotism and profession and Media analysis on the subject of war in Dubrovnik and Croatia. In the first part, the book examines the impact of the attack on Dubrovnik on the recognition of Croatia by the international community, the strategic steps taken by the Croatian Government in the media/propaganda war and the role of the diaspora in winning over the international public to favour the Croatian side.

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In an article titled “Media-political paradigm: Dubrovnik and the creation of the Croatian state”, Dr. Albert Bing analyses foreign media perceptions of Dubrovnik during Croatia’s Homeland War (1991-1995) and its relevance to Croatia’s state independence. Besides an analysis of the basic features of contemporary media in shaping public opinion and their influence on political decision-making, the author also considers the phenomena of “accelerated history” and “real-time history.” Croatian wartime Minister for Information Branko Salaj, in an article “Informing against aggression and foreign prejudice”, gives an overview of a weaker part’s defensive strategy, aimed at improving the general image of the attacked country, and untied to any direct military objectives or wartime disinformation activities. Salaj points out that during the war of aggression which the country suffered in the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia’s most serious information problem was how to reach foreign audiences with simple facts about the conflict. The Ministry of Information fulfilled this task by carrying out a programme of great openness to foreign journalists and rejecting the idea of war censorship. Subsequent initiatives to create a solid professional media environment in a country lacking adequate democratic experience were somewhat less successful. Large semi-covert post-war foreign programmes of media support, but mainly instigating political change, largely failed to identify and address roots of instability in South East Europe. Dr. Ivo Banac, in “Six hours apart: about the surrounded Dubrovnik from afar”, addresses the siege of Dubrovnik as seen by an outside “observer” namely by himself as a researcher working in the United States. In the context of divided and largely passive Western policy, it is shown how the battle for public opinion has been important in Croatia and abroad. Starting from his own position, the author examines how the CroatianAmerican Diaspora started acting as an impromptu interpreter of Croat interests at that time. Even if they tried to act as a lobby on behalf of their homeland, it was, from the beginning, without any significant contact with the American media or for that matter with the relevant academic and political communities. In the second part, the book examines the reporting practices used to cover the siege of Dubrovnik and the role of local and international journalists, non-governmental organisations and fixers. Special attention is devoted to the conflict which arises when professional journalistic standards and

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patriotism clash, particularly if the journalist is reporting from his own town and his own family is in danger. In an article titled “Journalism between patriotism and profession”, Dr. Stjepan Maloviü discusses the issue of strict adherence to professional standards in war reporting. The author argues that, in certain cases related to the Croatian side, journalists were forced to disregard professional standards, as well as that a journalist must report according to his/her personal conscience, professional dignity, and integrity, while applying professional reporting standards and principles of ethics. Dr. Mato Brautoviü, Julijana Antiü Brautoviü, MA, and Marko Potrebica, MA, in an interesting contribution “News reporting about attack on Dubrovnik in 1991: The importance of being on location”, give an overview of the circumstances in which the reports about the war in Dubrovnik during the autumn of 1991 were prepared, presenting the differences in the working conditions of local and international journalists. The authors analysed the possible impact of official sources, limited access to information, and the role of fixers in specific war conditions, such as a siege. In an article titled “Dissemination of Information as a Contribution to the City Defence”, war participant and Inter-University Centre War Secretary Berta Dragiþeviü describes cooperation between the named nongovernmental organisation and international journalists, specifically emphasising the role of Dr. Kathleen V. Wilkes, a world-renowned British philosopher, in the promotion of Dubrovnik. “HTV studio Dubrovnik during the Homeland War 1991/92” is an article written by war correspondent Vedran Beniü. He describes the activities and work of correspondents of Croatian Radio-television Dubrovnik (HTV Dubrovnik), the only permanent TV crew working in Dubrovnik during the first months of the war. Thanks to intelligent technical solutions contrived by the engineers and technicians of Odašiljaþi i veze, the HTV Dubrovnik crew managed, despite all the difficulties, to regularly broadcast footage from besieged Dubrovnik only 24 days after the Yugoslav Air Force had destroyed the TV transmitter on Mount Srÿ, which was indispensable for broadcasting news reports. The third part of the book is an analysis of the war propaganda used by the Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin media.

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Dr. Renaud de la Brosse, in an article titled “Miloševiü’s propaganda during the attacks on Dubrovnik and Croatia”, defines war propaganda per se and the manner in which the media controlled by Serbian President Slobodan Miloševiü used it. De la Brosse states that Miloševiü took control of the Serbian media in order to impose his nationalist propaganda and justify the political project of creating a Greater Serbia – which would be home to all Serbian people. The media turned out to be an active tool that contributed to the preparation and conduct of war, against Croatia particularly. Dubrovnik, as well as Vukovar, were priority targets, both victims of and subject to propaganda war. The author describes the processes at stake, providing numerous examples of misbehaviours by media and journalists during that period. Dr. Goran Cvjetinoviü, Romana John, MA, and Dr. Mato Brautoviü, in “Reporting about the attack on Dubrovnik by Montenegrin (bi)weeklys”, analyse the role of the Montenegrin media in the war waged during the 1990s, which has so far not been analysed at all, but rather superficially marginalised and belittled. The article gives an analysis of the texts published on the topic of the war in Dubrovnik in the period from 1 October to 30 November 1991 by two Montenegrin (bi)weeklys, Nikšiüke novine and Boka. In an article titled “The Serbian justification of wars in Yugoslavia through media: Reporting war in Croatia – Dubrovnik”, in which the authors give an overview and analysis of reports published by Serbian daily Politika, Janja Sekula Gibaþ and Slaven Ružiü argue that Politika, as a medium strongly inclined to Slobodan Miloševiü’s regime, wrote about the war in Dubrovnik in a particularly inconsiderate and biased manner. Politika’s reports fully supported the aggressor and actions in an attempt to discredit the legally elected government of the Republic of Croatia and the small number of defenders that protected the Dubrovnik area. In “The Serbian justification of wars in Yugoslavia through media: Reporting war in Croatia – Dubrovnik”, Nora Nimani Musa and Sadie Clifford examine the way the Serbian newspaper Jedinstvo, published in Kosovo, reported the war in Croatia at the beginning of the attacks on Croatian cities. The newspaper’s headlines and articles helped in the creation of public discourse among Serbs in Kosovo by representing the war as a war for freedom. This study of Jedinstvo’s front page articles shows how Serbs spread propaganda by representing the Croatian fighters as hooligans who looted and sacked the cities, and the Serbians as the military forces fighting for order against these rebels. They also

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highlighted the number of troops from neighbouring countries who volunteered to join the Serbian army, in order to give the impression their cause was widely believed to be righteous. In the last article called “Humanitarian activities in the Dubrovnik area in 1991 as reported in the Croatian media”, Julija Barunþiü Pletikosiü and Željka Križe Graþanin give an overview of the manner in which the media, particularly the print media, reported on the grave situation in Dubrovnik, and covered the related humanitarian campaigns and efforts.

References Bogdanoviü, B. (1993). L’urbicide ritualisé. Vukovar-Sarajevo… La guerre en ex-Yougoslavie, Paris, Esprit, 33-37. Chaslin, F. (1997). Une haine monumentale: essai sur la destruction des villes en ex-Yougoslavie. Descartes & Cie. Pavlovic, S. (2005). Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the War for Peace. spacesofidentity.net, 5(1). Tratnjek, B. (2011, 31st October). Géographie des conflits Les lieux de mémoire dans la ville en guerre : un enjeu de la pacification des territoires. [Weblog]. Retrieved 27 May 2016, from http://www.diploweb.com/Geographie-des-conflits-Les-lieux.html Yaaman, A. (2016). Les guerres de l’information qui entourent les villes assiégées de Turquie. Retrieved 30 June 2016, from http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinions/les-guerres-de-l-informationqui-entourent-les-villes-assi-g-es-de-turquie-1511097216

PART I: GLOBAL MEDIA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DURING WARTIME: THE EXAMPLE OF DUBROVNIK

CHAPTER ONE THE MEDIA-POLITICAL PARADIGM: DUBROVNIK AND THE CREATION OF THE CROATIAN STATE DR. ALBERT BING, CROATIAN INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, CROATIA

Summary The focus of this work is an analysis of the foreign media perceptions of Dubrovnik during Croatia’s Homeland War (1991-1995) and its relevance to Croatia’s state independence. Besides an analysis of the basic features of contemporary media in shaping public opinion and their influence on political decision-making, the author also considers the phenomena of “accelerated history” and “real-time history.” Keywords: Dubrovnik and war, collapse of Yugoslavia, media and politics, wartime propaganda, Croatia’s state independence, real-time history

Dubrovnik in 1991 as a media/political paradigm and real time history “To besiege those who have besieged Dubrovnik with public opinion…” (d’Ormesson, 1992, p. 126)... This lucid thought was perhaps the most precise diagnosis of the significance of public perceptions of Dubrovnik contained in the reflection which summarises the efforts by the countless global personalities who raised their voices against the barbaric devastation of this historical city and the imperilment of its residents in 1991. This “defensive formula” was coined by the French humanitarian André Glucksmann (otherwise an intellectual who earned his doctorate on

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a thesis rather appropriately entitled “The Philosopher in the City”).1 Glucksmann, Jean d’Ormesson (writer and academic), together with Bernard Kouchner and others, formed the French contingent in an international humanitarian “brigade” whose informal members decided to assist the besieged city through activism. Their objective was, as formulated by d’Ormesson, “to attract the world’s attention to Dubrovnik’s fate.” In order to achieve this, he was prepared to take deliberate action to provoke media attention; in an interview published in 1992, he announced that if impeded by the blockade, he would descend into the city by parachute. He explained the purpose of such – targeted – actions using the idea that today, in the “modern era,” communication is so potent that it is possible to halt war by means which are no longer within the domain of war but rather peace (d’Ormesson, 1992, p. 126). Besieging those who had besieged Dubrovnik with public opinion implied the attraction of media attention and the provocation of political responses. As formulated by linguist Dubravko Škiljan in a study of the semantics of war, war constituted “a multi-dimensional phenomenon,” and one of the vital dimensions of this phenomenon is the “media presence,” not only in reporting, but also in “the production of wartime reality itself” (Škiljan, 2000, p.177). The latter postulate implies the influence which the media may exert on the course of a war by forming public opinion and policy. The case of Dubrovnik at war was just one of the media vignettes in the kaleidoscope of complex stories which accompanied the dramatic collapse of the multi-ethnic Yugoslav state. Nonetheless, after the siege and the frequent attacks on the city which culminated in the autumn and winter of 1991, Dubrovnik attained the status of a first-class news item on the global stage and became a value-laden criterion for political assessments. This metamorphosis, crucial to an understanding the importance of Dubrovnik’s reception in Croatia’s process for gaining state independence, requires a brief overview of some of the general aspects which link the historical context of interactions between events, the media and politics. First, there is the phenomenon of “accelerated history,” of which the media are an integral component as “a part of the diplomatic-political process”; this is a correlation of the exceptionally dynamic alteration of the 1 One of the paradigms that would be imposed as a stereotype of the Yugoslav wars was the motif of besieged cities (Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Zadar, Sarajevo…), wherein the city was often interpreted as a cosmopolitan entity confronting the ethnically uniform armies (often with a rural character) besieging them. On this, see Belaj, V. (1992). See also Bougarel, X. (1999).

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qualitatively different events (“accelerated history”) which characterised Yugoslavia’s demise (Plevnik, 2003, p. 87), and the possibility of their interactive observation, wherein integrated technologies play an increasingly prominent role. This primarily communicative aspect in which the media play a major role ties into the tendency of shorter lapses between the gathering, transmission, and processing of information on an event – practically within the framework of “real-time (history)”; even as an event is ongoing, scholarly works appear which analyse them, and their synthesis opens new historical perspectives as well. The appearance of integrated media – and their most vigorous aspect in the final decade of the twentieth century was the development of the Internet – reflected a new dimension in the process of global democratisation (even though one may equally speak of the possibilities for public manipulation). This question also became relevant to the formation of two media paradigms during the siege of Dubrovnik in 1991: the Croatian defensive paradigm, represented by Dubrovnik, and the aggressor paradigm, which encapsulated the Greater Serbian ambitions of Slobodan Miloševiü and the Yugoslav People’s Army. In the broader historical context, events tied to Yugoslavia’s collapse and international circumstances overlapped with the centuries-long process of democratisation of Western civilisation which was certainly very closely tied to the development of free media and the involvement of public opinion in policy (Kissinger, 2000, p. 144). Even though this is a generally-accepted fact today, this trend assumed global proportions only at the onset of the twentieth century, and experienced its culmination in the past two decades (which coincided with events such as Yugoslavia’s break-up). The emergence of the United States as a superpower on the world stage in the First World War validated the Wilsonian precedent in extolling global public opinion as a moral authority to oppose secretive backroom deals and the Realpolitik of the nineteenth century (Kissinger, 2000, p. 207). In the words of contemporary Realpolitik guru Henry Kissinger, “leaders are obliged to deal with constituencies that tend to receive their information via visual images. All this puts a premium on emotion and on the mood of the moment at a time that demands rethinking of priorities and an analysis of capabilities” (Kissinger, 2000, p. 786). The contemporary phenomenon of symbiosis between the media, public opinion, and politics proved to be a vital factor in the collapse of the Yugoslav state. The question of interpretation of events, particularly of a complex war (actually the series of Yugoslav wars), as elaborated by Škiljan has shown many ambiguities and controversies, which in the

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historical context of the confrontation between Realpolitik and universal principles, in Kissinger’s words, have followed history “from Abyssinia in 1935 to Bosnia in 1992.” Despite the unprecedented spread of the possibility of observing events and the commensurate cognitive perspectives, the problem of attaining a consensus on many burning issues in international relations, including the problem of sanctioning the criminal behaviour of individual states, remains an open problem. However, the contemporary phenomenon of synergy between the media, the public, and policy at its base creates a potent confrontation between empathy and public assessments based on universal values and the stance which reduces the human community to “the nihilistic banality of homo homini lupus” (Arendt, 1996, p. 214).

Internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis and the media The violent collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s provoked considerable consternation in developed democracies. From a state which had a reputation as the most successful communist experiment in the imaginarium of the international order, Yugoslavia became virtually overnight a “temporary by-product of the collapse of European empires” (after the First World War) and a Pandora’s Box which it was best to ignore. At the moment of liberal democracy’s triumph, the fall of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the proclamation of a new world order and the appearance of unity among Europe’s developed democracies, the Yugoslav reminder of the recent quality of European history in the twentieth century (which Zbigniew Brzezinski described as the “era of European civil war”) seemed an inappropriate, vulgar gesture which dared impinge upon the idyll of the end of history. The event was all the more unpleasant because it was not occurring in some far corner of the world, but in Europe’s immediate backyard. The image of dying Yugoslavia in the early 1990s in the perceptions of Westerners was perhaps best sketched by American historian Sabrina P. Ramet in the title to one of her books which followed this event: The Balkan Babel (in Webster’s Dictionary, one of the definitions of the term Babel – here linked to the proverbially problematic term Balkan, is: noisy confusion) (Ramet, 1992; Ramet, 1999). In the cacophony of news in which the global media attempted to convey events in Yugoslavia, many stereotypes emerged, in which it was no easy task to discern “who’s who” in the complex Yugoslav story. Even in a superficial perusal of the foreign media when tensions were rising in Yugoslavia, it is easy to observe a

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priori aloofness toward the political motives of “nations in transition.” A stereotype which dominated the media of the politically most influential countries when the Yugoslav crisis began to escalate can be summarised using a headline from The Los Angeles Times, which told readers that “Fanatics shatter Europe’s Humpty Dumpty.” The diagnosis of this “shattering” was simple: “Nationalism that was cramped down by communist leaders for more than four decades burst out last year in the guise of democratic freedom. The Balkan interpretation holds that, having long been denied national identity, each ethnic group is now entitled to expression in the outcome” (Williams, 1991, May 19). In the eyes of the Western media, the conflict which ensued had a “distinctly Balkan flavour, a tangled mix of obscure motives, ethnic hatreds, bluff and counterbluff.” The explanation for this diagnosis was certainly found in the experiences of the past, and added to these were instructive suggestions on how to deal with the “latest” episodes of current Balkan disputes: “the history of the Balkans is written in blood. The Serbs and Croats have hated each other for centuries, the Hatfields and McCoys of a murderous backwater that has long threatened the peace of Europe. Now the region where World War I began could present Europe with its first big conflict of the post-cold-war period. This time there is a crucial difference: the outside world is not taking sides (…) Europe doesn’t need another economic basket case, and in the case of Yugoslavia, it could have six of them to deal with (…) the crisis in Yugoslavia also may set a bad example for nationalists and central governments in other countries with disgruntled minorities…” (Watson, 1991). Attempts to rationalise the problem of perceptions of the “Yugoslav crisis” constituted a long-term process which never definitively elaborated the media stereotypes established in 1991. The paradigm of a static understanding of Yugoslav unity was at the very least just as problematic as the stereotype of the “eternally chaotic Balkans”; the media stereotypes which accompanied the outbreak of the “Yugoslav crisis” became prejudices which served as a demagogic pretence to avoid the problem. Ultimately, this stance by the West led to a series of tragic repercussions.

The media and the establishment of the Croatian state Besides organising its defence after the onset of the aggression in 1991, Croatia was confronted with the challenge of legitimising its position in the international community. The process of dismantling a formerly common state implied the transformation of the existing republic

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institutions into new state institutions of authority. Given the complex circumstances surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia, this was not a simple task, particularly given the extraordinarily vital role of the foreign media in the formulation of public perceptions of this event (Bing, 2009, p. 50). Upon the establishment of the new government in Croatia, institutions which were supposed to respond to the need to legitimise Croatian interests were also established. Despite varying success and divergent approaches to reporting (depending on political influences), an important contribution to these efforts was made by the newly-formed Ministry of Information, the new Croatian National News Agency (HINA), and the Croatian Information Centre, under whose auspices the Foreign Press Bureau (FPB) operated.2 A propagandistic approach was apparent in the work of individual institutions and media which indicated transition difficulties, i.e. the problem of aligning the media aspects of political culture with the standards of developed democracies. Over time, this approach proved not only a problematic way to confront Greater Serbian aspirations, but also a chronic source of discord. The view held by the authorities that the media are a suitable instrument for denouncing political opponents proved to be a problematic manifestation of continuity with rigid authoritarian policies (which prior to the introduction of political pluralism were successfully opposed by the media in Croatia and Yugoslavia in the 1980s), and this did not go unnoticed among foreign observers of Croatian society’s transition (Thompson, 1999). The individuals filling some of the most important posts relevant to the promotion of Croatian interests abroad were appointed according to the principle of political party affiliation (rather than qualifications), which provoked dissatisfaction among a part of the Croatian public, and particularly among the ranks of the Croatian émigré intelligentsia (Bing, 2007, p. 179). According to political analyst Višnja Starešina, Croatian representative in the United States Frane Vinko Golem’s associates described 2

Even those these – information-oriented – institutions were headed by individuals perceived as political émigrés (with differing political affinities), such as Branko Salaj or Ante Beljo, who were, not without grounds, seen as holding the aspiration (unpopular abroad) to depose Yugoslavia, they demonstrated an openness to the media. According to Jerry Blaskovich, “In sharp contrast to many of their colleagues, they were well aware of the value of truth in the media and democracy” (Blaskovich, 1998). Institutions such as the Foreign Press Bureau demonstrated a high level of professionalism and credibility, which did not pass unnoticed in international media circles. This was, for example, acknowledged by Pulitzer Prize winning reporter Roy Gutman of Newsday (Blaskovich, 1998).

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him “as an honest, simple, and above all frugal man,” who was “exceptionally loyal to Tuÿman.” However, “he knew nothing about diplomacy, nor did anybody tutor him prior to his arrival”; “his spoken English was passable, but his writing skills were poor” (Starešina, 2004, p. 77). President Tuÿman himself was the primary generator of misunderstanding of Western media culture; his efforts to personally represent the state he headed were not the most successful. Tuÿman’s book Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy at the time of its U.S. publication was ranked 146,567 in sales on Amazon.com (Globus, 1998). On the other hand, the most influential person representing Croatia in the United States was Croatian journalist and writer Slavenka Drakuliü (Letica, 1997). However, due most certainly to her political opposition to Tuÿman’s views, she was actually not included in the first edition of the lexicon of Croatian writers published in Croatia (HRT1, 2004). That approach to the Western media was not without consequences to Croatia’s presentation of itself abroad. As noted in his subsequent writings by President Tuÿman’s advisor at the time, Mario Nobilo, summarising Croatia’s official relations with the U.S. at the beginning of the 1990s: “Croatia did not, unfortunately, place sufficient emphasis on publicity in New York and throughout North America, even though the role of the United Nations and the U.S. was crucial to resolving the crisis. The Croatian authorities were more obsessed with the status symbols of hardwon independence rather than on deployment of resources to end the war and facilitate reconstruction” (Nobilo, 2000, p. 266). The consequence of these chronic problems in Croatia’s presentation aboard was the never entirely overcome tendency to equate the aggressor with the victim.

The role of Dubrovnik in changing the media paradigm The fate of the two most outlying bastions of Croatia’s defence – Vukovar and Dubrovnik – was the most decisive in influencing a change in the world public’s perception of Yugoslav circumstances in 1991 (Silber, 1991; Bing, 2009, p. 50). The fall of Vukovar, followed by massacres, expulsion of its residents, and the removal of Vukovar POWs to unknown destinations, was accompanied by a great deal of disinformation intended to conceal and manipulate the truth.3 But in the case of Dubrovnik, the 3

One such piece of disinformation was the report of the alleged massacre of 41 Serbian children in Borovo Naselje by Croatian soldiers. The obvious propaganda aim was to validate the actions of the Yugoslav Army and Serb paramilitaries and to conceal the true crimes perpetrated against captives which soon followed. This

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media did not exhibit the same doubts. Even though at one point during the shelling, Croatian humanitarian Dr. Slobodan Lang responded to protests by those preoccupied with protecting cultural heritage by saying that Dubrovnik’s historical fortified walls also serve to protect the city’s residents; the image of this ancient pearl enshrouded in a thick cloud of smoke became a media motif much more potent than the veritable inflation of human casualties that could be found at every step in occupied Croatia. The most important element in the transmission of information was the image. As explained as long ago as 1922 by Walter Lippmann in his seminal work Public Opinion, the foundation of successful media communication is the empathic connection between “the world outside” and “the pictures in our heads” (taken from the title of his book’s introduction: “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads”) (Jergoviü, 2004, p. 187). The motif of imperilled Dubrovnik as, crudely stated, “the pretty picture” desecrated by some vandal without doubt corresponded to the rudimentary foundation of receiving, processing, and accepting information on a criminal act, in Lippmann’s words, as a clear “picture in our head.” The picture of the attack on “the Croatian Venice” – as Dubrovnik was portrayed (in words and photographs) by individual journalists, was a message in and of itself, but nonetheless simply a form. The genuine content was provided by many individuals from a diversity of backgrounds, who experienced the attack on Dubrovnik as an attack on a complex of civilisational values. D’Ormesson’s exclamation uttered in besieged Dubrovnik in 1991 – “A new Europe is being born here!” (Lang, 2008) – threw down the gauntlet before the members of the European Community, which at the time were attempting to promote the economic integration (of particular national interests) into a union that would not only share interests but also a set of values. During the critical autumn and winter of 1991, the city’s defence by arms was bolstered by the written word, a concert held in the besieged city, a conference of scholars… and, as needed, the readiness of an activist and respected intellectual (d’Ormesson) to make a precarious parachute jump. Appeals issued by Ivan Supek and Kathrin Wilkes, the tireless advocacy of humanitarians Slobodan Lang and Bernard Kouchner, and the efforts of false story originated with Belgrade Television, and was picked up by Reuters (reporter Goran Mikiü) and then published in a number of media, e.g. The Chicago Tribune (1991). Serbs, Croatians level new charges of war-time massacres (Gorin, 2008).

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emergent Croatian diplomacy and distinguished foreign politicians such as Emma Bonino and Claiborne Pell created a global network of guardians of Dubrovnik which was rooted in universal humanitarian, but also civilisational, values. Images of the city’s suffering coupled with a virtual choir of countless major personalities, from members of the Pugwash Group to Nobel laureates – whose call for an end to the war in Croatia was published by The New York Times in late December 1991 – gave succour to the city’s small number of defenders and made the aggressor waver.4 By linking the struggle for freedom with universal values, the Dubrovnik paradigm conferred legitimacy to Croatia’s positions. Lang’s admonition that Serbian military actions were “The War Against Three Crosses” corresponded to a minor but significant adjustment of the media picture of the Croats in the Yugoslav chaos (Blaskovich, 1998, p. 65). Dubrovnik was no longer just “a tourist attraction (…) from Yugoslavia”; it was also a historical cosmopolitan hub - “a medieval walled city on the Adriatic (…), for centuries a meeting place of three great civilisations, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim” (“each contributed to its artistic heritage”); Dubrovnik became a vital point of distinction in the Yugoslav conflicts: “Currently the city is being shelled by Serbian troops who are trying to wrest it away from its Croatian defenders” (Anonymous, 1991). One of the chroniclers of the war in Croatia, American physician Jerry Blaskovich, in his study on the foreign media during the war in Croatia, astutely stated: “The Serbs made a cardinal mistake when they besieged Dubrovnik in the beginning of October, 1991. The Yugoslav conflict 4

The role of Dubrovnik (“an ancient city which for a thousand years has preserved its freedom though surrounded by powerful forces”) as one of the world centres for the promotion of the anti-war Pugwash Group was underlined by Ivan Supek together with the members of the Croatian Pugwash Group in the journal Encyclopedia moderna. In their appeal (July 9, 1991) addressed to their “Dear Pugwash Friends,” they condemned the “neo-Stalinist regime of Serbia” and warned that the “the new association of free Europe cannot be created by insisting on preservation of political entities created in the past for various reasons, entities which did not fulfil the expectations and interests of their people”. “Dear Pugwash Friends”, (Ivan Supek and Paolo Budinich, eds.), Encyclopedia Moderna 36, Year XII, 1991, Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, Zagreb and Trieste International Foundation for Scientific Progress and Freedom, Trieste, 44-45. The same journal also contained older reports on the organisation of a Pugwash symposium in Dubrovnik on “Science and Ethics” (1975) and “The DubrovnikPhiladelphia Statement” (1976) which “also incorporates material from a report entitled Humanistic Morality”. See Ibid, 157-160, 181-186. The appeal from roughly one hundred Nobel laureates calling for an end to the aggression against Croatia was published in The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1992.

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might have remained a backwater civil disorder in the eyes of the media if the Dubrovnik attack and siege hadn’t drawn international attention. For the first time the media became sceptical of Serbian justifications for their war” (Blaskovich, 1998, p. 70). The shelling of Dubrovnik, accompanied by official statements made by the city’s attackers about the “burning of automobile tyres” in the city – as an allegedly contrived attempt by “Ustaša” propaganda to discredit the “liberation” operation by the Yugoslav People’s Army – aroused the genuine astonishment of many reporters who witnessed a rather different state of affairs on the scene.5 The demonstration of the struggle against “the special war” using leaflets about ‘Ustaša criminals’ did not fare better (Biserko, 2006). Attempts to use the media to prove the “supra-national” character of the Yugoslav Army’s military campaign by broadcasting the Balkan epic motif of gusle-playing above besieged Dubrovnik – which was apparently supposed to evoke memories of the national liberation character of the World War II Partisan movement – was another complete fiasco (in this regard, a bizarre detail which may be noted is the ‘marketing’ move by the German television network RTL, which decided to air a series of Yugoslav war films just as the Yugoslav conflict broke out). Essentially the actions taken by the Yugoslav Army’s propagandists actually did more for the Croatian cause than the totality of Croatian publicity. The evident difference between “lead” and “gold” finally spurred significant changes in media paradigms. The attention accorded by the most respected European media to the situation in Dubrovnik can be seen in the example of articles contained in the British newspaper The Independent at the end of October 1991. Notable British foreign affairs commentator Marcus Tanner filed a summary report from Belgrade on “the danger to Dubrovnik.” Together with a detailed report on circumstances in the besieged city, compiled on the basis of wire reports, Tanner provided a series of details which set the criteria for evaluating this event. Dubrovnik 5

The airing of images of Dubrovnik in flames on Belgrade Television was accompanied by comments in which Western cameramen in particular are accused of manipulation; that “automobile tyres were set on fire in front of the cameras to convince people that the city was burning.” A “moderated” interpretation of this event in August 1992 was offered by Belgrade Television’s chairman of the board, who “acknowledged that some damage was inflicted upon the city, but with the following caveat: Only four houses were destroyed in Dubrovnik, all owned by Serbs.”

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was depicted as a city that not only belonged to Croatia, but also to European and world heritage: “the spirit of Europe.” As a universal bond between European values and the motif of the city’s defenders, he cited the “Latin inscription on Fort Lovrijenac: ‘Liberty is not to be sold for any kind of gold’.” Tanner countered statements made by Yugoslav Army officers that reports of Dubrovnik’s shelling were part of a “diabolical plan” to impugn the army with wire reports sent from the Dubrovnik area which contained information on attacks on the city, including its historical core. Citing reports from European Community monitors, Tanner also warned of the suffering of the besieged population and noted that besides the motive to conquer there was no other reason to attack this Croatian city, because there were “neither a substantial Serbian minority nor federal military base which the army can claim to be protecting” (Tanner, 1991). Tanner’s colleague Phil Davidson was reporting directly from Dubrovnik at the same time. Davidson reminded readers of the peacetime image of the city as a centre of world culture by citing Berta Dragiþeviü, “of the city’s Inter University Centre”, who “pined for the days when Shakespeare was played in the open air during the summer festival: ‘Derek Jacobi played the lead a few years ago,’” she said. ‘We used to play Hamlet on the ramparts of Fort Lovrijenac. It’s our own Elsinore’” (Davidson, 1991). Several days later, the same reporter noted news and credible testimony to the fate of the city and its inhabitants, Britain’s Ambassador in Belgrade who “along with diplomats from four Western nations (…) saw the suffering of the people of Dubrovnik at first hand yesterday”; after visiting refugee centres for those who fled their combat areas to the safety of the walled city, the Dutch Ambassador said that although the shooting had stopped for several days, ‘the destruction of the soul of Dubrovnik is going on.’” (Davidson, 1991). Prompted by the suffering of Dubrovnik and its inhabitants, some of the most influential bards of world journalism raised their voices against this barbaric assault, censuring their governments for their silence. “Suppose that at this moment Venice were being shelled and bombed in a civil war, its treasured monuments menaced, its population starved. Would the Western world be silent?” thundered Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, in his article “Where Is the Outrage?” (Lewis, 1991). Lewis noticed that “the tragedy that has overtaken Yugoslavia is the direct result of the ambitions of the Serbian Communist leader, Slobodan Miloševiü.” The shelling of Dubrovnik, and “it is hard to see what military value it has as a target (…), best illustrates the nature of Mr. Miloševiü’s war.” Lewis concluded by warning that despite the fact that “the United States and its

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friends are ordinarily reluctant to assist the ethnic breakup of other countries” there is the attack on Dubrovnik which is little more than a “criminal act” (Lewis, 1991). Lewis was joined in his condemnation of Dubrovnik’s destruction and calls for the international community to intervene by many other respected American journalists, who denounced their government for the “American abdication in Europe” (American abdication in Europe, 1992). In the newsmagazine Time, Strobe Talbott (1991), in a piece with the acerbic headline “Fiddling While Dubrovnik Burns” (25 November 1991), called out European and American officials for their empty rhetoric and hypocritical expressions of revulsion, who appeared to have found their justification in formulations such as that contained in a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger that “peaceful means…rarely work against people ‘intent on killing each other’” (Talbott, 1991). Talbott warned that “the civil war in Yugoslavia is more than just a tragedy for the people of one country” rather it is the “first test” of European security. As European and American officials were “dithering over the future of the Atlantic defence partnership and the preservation of peace on the [European] Continent,” competed in “fiddling with doctrine while Dubrovnik burns,” Talbott rightfully speculated as to whether it would have been worthwhile for the “Western alliance…to survive the end of the cold war.” Patrick Buchanan, a former advisor to three U.S. presidents who subsequently went on to run for this office twice, in a provocative article with the headline “A new indifferent order?” (a paraphrase of the elder George Bush’s announcement of “a new world order”), posed the rhetorical question: “…where are the Americans who enjoy a reputation for standing up for principle while the slaughter of the Croatians goes on?” (Buchanan, 1991a). In another article, Buchanan went a step further. Using an obvious analogy in an attempt to better communicate the Croatian position to the American public, he also sought action: “When the thirteen colonies first declared their independence, the first republic that proved brave enough to extend diplomatic recognition to the men who stood up to the mighty British Empire was the tiny Croatian city-state of Ragusa – now known as Dubrovnik. Why not have the Sixth Fleet return the favour and show Old Glory in the harbour? All the Croatians want is what we once wanted – to be free” (Buchanan 1991b). The lead editorial appearing in a late-November 1991 edition of The New York Times dramatically proclaimed that “The World must Act”: “To Guernica, Coventry, Stalingrad, and Dresden the world may now add Vukovar and Dubrovnik. For now, the fighting is limited to Croatia, in

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what used to be Yugoslavia. But unless civilised powers bestir themselves, there’s no certainty it will stop there. Western countries have mechanisms through which to act – NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community and, ultimately, the U.N. Security Council… The world obviously can’t intervene in every local conflict. But when, as in the former Yugoslavia, organised armies brutalise civilians in sustained battles over boundaries, the international community has a duty to become involved” (The World must Act, 1991). For one brief moment in the world’s attention in the autumn and winter of 1991, Dubrovnik, thanks to the media, became “the watershed of [the world’s] conscience,” as formulated in his memoirs by Stjepan Mesiü (Mesiü, 1994, p. 291). In an article with the indicative headline “Europe cannot be built on Dubrovnik’s ruins,” the Special War Issue of Almae Matris Croaticae Alumni noted that many “academicians, movie stars, Nobel Prize winners, University professors, writers, famous film and theatre directors and actors from all over the Europe and America have been sending their letters, messages, appeals, protests, and petitions” (Gaudeamus, 1991, p. 27). This pressure exerted by the world public certainly had an impact on world policies. According to Mesiü, the fate of Dubrovnik “set the tone for the third Hague session on 25 October” as part of the conference deciding on the further course and outcome of the “Yugoslav crisis”: “the dark news from Dubrovnik had a powerful impact on the mood of the major powers, both in Europe and America” (Mesiü, 1994, p. 291). Despite the vital role of the media in “change of perception”, the politics of international forums did not proceed without inconsistencies and wavering. Jerry Blaskovich noted that media influence actually had rather limited effect on Western governments. Instead of steps that would have clearly indicated the end of tolerance for crimes as a method for achieving political aims, Western diplomacy opted for the path of least resistance. In order to avoid further bloodshed and destruction, “Lord Carrington urged the citizens of Dubrovnik to surrender.” Confronted with the increasingly hopeless situation of the Croatian defenders, even the French Minister for Humanitarian Relief, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, “naively tried to broker a unilateral cease-fire with the Serbian forces. Without Croatian consent, he offered to demilitarise Dubrovnik… The Serbs allowed humanitarian organisations to send three ships to evacuate 1,700 women with their children. Once accomplished, the next step would’ve been for the Serbs to take the city. Instead, the women refused to leave their sons, husbands, and fathers. The women of Dubrovnik evoked what Slobodan Lang called the Masada strategy. The citizens of Dubrovnik felt that the only way to confront the Serbian

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strategy of generating refugees as tools of genocide was for every member of society to refuse surrender. The Dubrovnik crisis dissipated after the Croat forces mounted a counter-offensive, and the Serb forces retreated from the high ground” (Blaskovich, 1997, p. 32-33). The resolute resistance by Croatia’s population was decisive to the survival and international recognition of Croatia. To be sure, this by no means diminishes the importance of the media and the public, which despite the prejudices and stereotypes which surrounded Yugoslavia’s collapse, managed to draw a sufficiently clear line between authentic values and criminal folly. In a speech delivered in Toronto before a gathering held to enlist aid for Vukovar and Dubrovnik on the date of the fiercest shelling of Dubrovnik, December 6, 1991, historian Ivo Banac cited an observation made by a Croatian journalist (Jakov Jukiü from the Catholic Church weekly Glas koncila) which, ultimately, proved relevant to the international reception of the war in Croatia: “Every war, always and everywhere, begins with the discovery of the truth about oneself and others” (Banac, 1992, p. 46). From the standpoint of media reception, this observation perhaps mostly came to the fore precisely in the cases of Dubrovnik and Vukovar. During a visit to Dubrovnik in August 1993, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia at the time, Peter Galbraith (who had also travelled to Dubrovnik in 1991 on a fact-finding mission), stated with complete justification that “the fate of Dubrovnik and Vukovar opened the public’s eyes to what was happening in Croatia” (Obradoviü, 1993). This fact was certainly not without significance to the international recognition of Croatia’s independence.

References American abdication in Europe. The New York Times Editorial (1992, January 11). Anonymous (1991, November 2). Dubrovnik Under Siege. Washington Post Arendt, H. (1996). Totalitarisam. Zagreb: Politiþka kultura. Banac, I. (1992). Dubrovnik i Vukovar. In Dubrovnik u ratu (p. 46). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska – Dubrovnik branch, New Series (Year III, Nos. 2-3). Belaj, V. (1992). Kad Vlašiüi silaze u grad (Gradu s divljenjem). In Foretiü M. (Ed.), Dubrovnik u ratu (63-71). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska – Dubrovnik Branch, New Series (Year III, Nos. 2-3).

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Bing, A. (2007). KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid! Critical Observations of the Croatian American Intellectuals During the Establishment of Political Relations Between Croatia and the United States, 1990-1992. In Krišto J. (Ed.), Review of Croatian History 2(1) (pp 179-205). Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest —. (2009). “Domovinski rat i inozemni mediji”, Hrvatska revija, 3, 50-54. Biserko, S. (Ed.), (2006). Dubrovnik: “Rat za mir”. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. Blaskovich, J. (1997). Anatomy of Deceit. New York: Dunhill Publishing. 32-33 —. (1998). Anatomija prijevare-Medijski rat za Hrvatsku. Zagreb: Moderna vremena. Bougarel, X. (1999). Yugoslav Wars: The Revenge of the Countryside between Sociological Reality and Nationalistic Myth. East European Quarterly 33(2), 157-175. Buchanan, P. (1991a, September 25). A new indifferent order, U.S. taking a back seat. Washington Times. —. (1991b, December 15). Our heroic allies blind to rape in Croatia. Tribuna Media Services. d’Ormesson, J. (1992). Razgovor. In Dubrovnik u ratu (p. 126). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska –Dubrovnik Branch, New Series (Year III, no 2-3). Davidson, P. (1991, November 30). Shell attacks ‘destroying city’s soul. The Independent. —. (1991, October 29). We are ready to die. Everyone in this city must be free. The Independent. Gaudeamus (Association of Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities) – Special War Issue (1991, autumn). Europe cannot be built on Dubrovnik’s ruins. 1(4). Zagreb. Globus (1998, October 16) Gorin, J. (2008, June 10). Vukovar Follow-up. Republican Riot. HRT1. (2004, July 4). Nedjeljom u 2. Jergoviü, B. (2004). Odmjeravanje snaga: novine i politika u Hrvatskoj u prvom razdoblju tranzicije. Zagreb: Sveuþilišna knjižara. Kissinger, H. (2000). Diplomacija. Zagreb: Golden marketing, Lang, S. (2008, October 23). Naša, vaša i njihova Hrvatska. Hrvatski list. Letica, B. (1997, July 4). Slavenka Drakuliü najutjecajnija je hrvatska novinarka u Americi! Globus. Lewis, A. (1991, November 4). Where Is the Outrage, The New York Times. Mesiü, S. (1994). Kako je srušena Jugoslavija. Zagreb: Mislav press.

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Nobilo, M. (2000). Hrvatski Feniks, Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990.-1997. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus. Obradoviü, K. (1993, August 17). Vukovar i Dubrovnik otvorili oþi. Veþernji list. Plevnik, D. (2003). Praksa etiþkog novinarstva – Deset zakrvavljenih godina. Zagreb: Masmedia. Ramet, S. P. (1992). Balkan babel : politics, culture, and religion in Yugoslavia. Boulder, C=: Westview Press. Ramet, S. P. (1999). Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Silber, L. (1991, November 11). Yugoslav Gunboats Shall Hotels in Dubrovnik. Washington Post. Starešina, V. (2004). Vježbe u laboratoriju Balkan. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak Škiljan, D. (2000). “Semantics of War”. In N. Skopljanac Brunner (Ed.), Media & War (p 177). Zagreb: Centre for Transition and Civil Society Research; Belgrade: Agency Argument. Talbott, S. (1991, November 25). Fiddling While Dubrovnik Burns. Time. Tanner, M. (1991, October 25). Federal army tightens siege of Dubrovnik; The Danger to Dubrovnik. The Independent. The World must Act. (1991, November 24) New York Times. Thompson, M. (1999). Forging a War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia & Bosnia-Hercegovina. Luton, UK: University of Luton Press/Article. Watson, R. (1991, July 8). Fire in the Balkan, Newsweek. Williams, C. (1991, May 19). Fanatics shatter Europe’s Humpty Dumpty. The Sunday Age (from Los Angeles Times).

CHAPTER TWO WARTIME INFORMATION POLICY IN CROATIA AND ITS AFTERMATH BRANKO SALAJ, WARTIME CROATIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION

Summary The role of media in modern wars is often discussed from the dominant warrior’s perspective – media activities are usually viewed as complementing or even replacing military operations. This paper views the matter in a different perspective, as a part of a weaker part’s defensive strategy, aimed at improving the general image of the attacked country, and untied to any direct military objectives or wartime disinformation activities. During the war of aggression which the country suffered in the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia’s most serious information problem was how to reach foreign audiences with simple facts about the conflict. The Ministry of Information fulfilled this task by carrying out a programme of great openness to foreign journalists and rejecting the idea of war censorship. Subsequent initiatives to create a solid professional media environment in a country lacking adequate democratic experience were somewhat less successful. Large semi-covert post-war foreign programmes of media support aimed mainly at instigating political change but in doing so largely failed to identify and address the roots of instability in South East Europe. Keywords: Defensive media strategy, international credibility, Homeland War, Ministry of Information

Introduction During the Homeland War in the beginning of 1990s, the Croatian government followed an information policy of extraordinary openness.

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Before describing why and how the policy was shaped, a word of caution about its relevance to the subject matter of this conference. History, geography, and culture have always made Dubrovnik a very special place. For tragic reasons this held particularly true during the war 1991-92. A close and destructive siege of the city from land and sea by the invading Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) created almost battlefield-like conditions throughout the city. Few places in Croatia were so intensely observed by the press, national and international, as Dubrovnik, and reporters could within a short time and in the small area under siege easily establish most facts. Hence, there was a very real danger that the complete openness under the prevailing circumstances could give the aggressor important tactical information which he could easily use, given the JNA’s overwhelming operational supremacy. There was therefore a lot of suspicion in the air, and the local authorities in Dubrovnik had to restrict in some ways the information which, under the general approach, would have been free. During the most dramatic period of the encirclement and using easily intercepted communications there were also very limited possibilities to openly discuss the central media policy from Zagreb. When the military activity abated somewhat and the danger of JNA attempts to occupy the city itself subsided, journalists regained full autonomy. I may possibly have marginally contributed to it, after piercing at night the Yugoslav navy blockade of the city in the beginning of January 1992.

General setting of the communication war The first democratic elections in March-April 1990 were marked by a referendum-like vote against the menace of the Greater Serbian populist movement, led by Miloševiü, and in favour of Croatian parties, particularly HDZ, which sought to achieve full sovereignty for Croatia either within a Yugoslav confederation or as an independent country. Miloševiü responded with a number of steps aimed at taking control of the republic. Immediately after the election the JNA seized the depots of the (mainly hand-held) weaponry of the Croatian Home Guard and Serbian intelligence officers started organising a series of civil disorders which culminated in August 1990 with a full-scale uprising in regions where Serbs were in local majority. The JNA was typically used to provide cover for such operations and then cordon off the area.

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As a part of these war preparations the army took also steps to physically control all communication lines between Croatia’s North and South well in advance of the open warfare in the summer of 1991. Striving to gain total control of telecommunications, numerous air and artillery attacks were then made on national and local Croatian TV/radio transmitters, but the attempt ultimately failed. Military defence of Croatia had to be organised from scratch in a society already coping with the enormous pressure of a triple change – that of political and economic systems and of the state itself. Resulting defence problems on different levels were often resolved by individual inventiveness and the resourcefulness of ordinary citizens facing a serious existential threat. Sometimes it created administrative chaos or resulted in amateurish defence moves. It may occasionally have served as a tactical advantage of confounding the attackers but an important domestic priority was to establish a firm military chain of command and to channel the existing strong popular resistance into a force capable of coordinated action. It was crucial for this endeavour that safe lines of communication be re-established and maintained. On the whole, the aggressor had an immense advantage of being able to use both domestically and abroad a large number of secure and longestablished communication and media channels. Leadership in Belgrade disposed over a whole range of civil and military interior networks and in its relations with the rest of the world it had full access to a myriad of foreign and Yugoslav federal diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and media channels and international news agencies. Comparatively, Zagreb could be seen as a poor cousin from the countryside, with some vulnerable broadcasting outlets and a broken land communication network. It was seen by the international community as a political midget with a few foreign consulates, a few Croatian foreign trade companies, and fax lines open only to an engaged but in an operational sense largely unorganised Diaspora. A good example of the international isolation of Croatia is offered by the case of Croatian news agency, HINA, created in the summer of 1990 to replace the Yugoslav agency Tanjug, taken over by followers of Miloševiü. All foreign news agencies except AFP felt bound by their exclusive ties to Tanjug and declined to cooperate. This initially prevented Croatia from establishing normal two-way news lifelines with Western audiences. One of the few bright spots was that Croatian public TV,

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having served as the Eurovision’s hub for Yugoslavia, could use the preexisting arrangement for daily video reports from the war theatre. Croatia’s problem in informing international public opinion lay, however, not primarily in the physical scarcity of distribution channels. The problem was rather that many media outlets were extremely restrained against any news item originating from a Croatian source. With such an attitude at the bottom it was difficult to expect foreign audiences to start questioning prevailing perceptions of the crisis and the war. Ever since assuming a strategically important neutral stand between the two Cold War blocs, Yugoslavia enjoyed very favourable press in the West despite continuing as a somewhat reformed Communist dictatorship. These sympathies included a critical view of anything that could endanger the ostensible unity of the country. The Yugoslav government used its virtual sanctuary on the international scene as a springboard for a vicious propaganda campaign against its opponents. One of its favourite themes was to describe even the most democratic-minded Croat opposition as being followers of the WW2 Fascist-aligned Ustaša regime. As a result, many influential international quarters, particularly important parts of media, had an ingrained residue of distrust of any democratic movement in Croatia. In keeping with their established preference for Yugoslav unity, the powers remained at the end of the 1980s aloof to existential fears which the outburst of the Greater Serbian populist movement under Miloševiü produced particularly in Slovenia and Croatia. Since Croatia was practically unarmed at the beginning of open military onslaught, the country attempted to internationalise the conflict; this, however, could succeed only if Western public opinion understood the nature of the conflict. The probability of this happening hinged in turn on the quality of news and the credibility of those telling the story. These general ideas became the basis of thinking which permeated the reorganisation and wartime activities of the Ministry of Information. I shall here deal only with the role of the Ministry as the press office of the Government for international and domestic press and as an agent of democratic change in the media in general. Other important areas of the Ministry’s work, such as an ambitious programme of documentary publications, monitoring of national and international media for internal government use, a programme of field support to local radio stations in war-afflicted regions, etc., are omitted for the sake of brevity.

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Informing international media The Ministry decided right from the beginning of my tenure that the information emanating from it would have to be painstakingly factual and credible. To avoid any mistrust, the Ministry would not participate in propaganda activities or cover up any unpleasant truths: credibility had such a high intrinsic value that we should stand for it at all costs. We did not necessarily have to spell out all we knew or discerned but what we said had to be true to the best of our knowledge. Even under these rules, by no means self-evident in war, it could not be expected that the information emanating from official sources would, abroad, be unconditionally believed. Besides an already mentioned fairly general international bias against Croatia, a number of provocations and covert enemy activities took place, on the domestic front aimed at negatively influencing foreign media. In attempts to bedevil Croatia in the international community, operatives of Yugoslav Army intelligence engineered explosions in front of the Jewish community centre and Serb Orthodox bishopric in Zagreb as well as the Jewish monument at Zagreb’s Mirogoj Cemetery. It was therefore important to identify available information channels to large, and above all influential, audiences. One possibility was to use all sorts of personal, professional, cultural, business, religious, and sports contacts in other countries. Early on, many private citizens and groups started using such contacts for humanitarian and peace initiatives, such as, e.g. initiating an appeal for peace by Nobel Prize winners. Even the Ministry joined the field, compiling its own global list of some 400-500 persons, primarily members of the Diaspora politically and socially active in their communities. Every night they were being sent computerprocessed faxes containing a rundown of daily news which provided background information which they could then choose to use in their own local initiatives: op-ed letters, speeches at public demonstrations of support, expressions of gratitude to donors of all sorts, etc. This large effort abroad saw important results in local communities and in a few cases led to accomplishments of a truly national sort. It could, however, not be more than marginally successful in neutralising the broad impact of often prevailing prejudiced views, cultivated by official or semiofficial sources: violence, hatred, and wars were projected as indigenous to the Balkans, and the ongoing aggression as just another in a never-ending

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chain of hostile acts. On such a morally levelled field, questions of right or wrong were simply excluded. Who then stood a chance of being trusted in their home countries as objective witnesses and interpreters of the ongoing war? The answer was seemingly simple: foreign correspondents. They had credibility and experience, most of them had no personal interest in the conflict, and some of them were at the outset even sympathetic towards Yugoslavia. It could only be hoped that they would be sufficiently intellectually honest to report what they saw even when this went counter to the established, “politically correct” preferences in their home countries or possibly even to their own preconceived notions. Even at the outskirts of the Balkans it was a brave assumption to make, but we made it. Very early in the war the Ministry therefore decided to follow a policy of extreme openness towards foreign journalists. It followed three simple principles which – to be frank – in some people’s opinion bordered on hopeless blue-eyed naiveté: ƒ Never compromise own trustworthiness; ƒ Create best possible conditions for the press, including a complete freedom of movement; ƒ No censorship. Allowing such extreme professional freedom of action in wartime, including the possibility of visiting combat zones, was not only unique, but risky in several respects. There was a huge security risk: the country was awash with spies and provocateurs of all colours. There was also a risk that, not unusual in war, something awkward may happen on one’s own side which one would prefer not to get reported. There was finally a personal risk for newsmen themselves – conditions at the front eventually became so bad that journalists and the Red Cross, based behind Croatian lines, often preferred to drive around in unmarked cars in order to be less conspicuous to those on the other side. A record number of people from the media, close to 30 and most of them foreign nationals, lost their lives during the second half of 1991 alone, which is an extraordinary high incidence of casualties in such a short span of time. The policy of openness paid off. By the end of 1991, the changing mood and perceptions of Western audiences made it more palatable for many EU politicians to finally give in to the mounting pressure and accept Croatia’s quest for independence. Of course, it was essential that the Croats had

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shown they could withstand the onslaught of a militarily superior enemy, while the resulting diplomatic crisis abundantly revealed the lack of a common European foreign policy, with repercussions for the whole European edifice. But the media reporting and changed perceptions of war, which it induced in foreign audiences, were important in achieving the final outcome. Much of the work with foreign journalists was done by the Foreign Press Bureau (FPB), formally independent but an officially backed voluntary outfit which was primarily funded and staffed by young people from the Croatian Diaspora, particularly from the United States, and also Canada and Australia. It had offices in a few key cities and up to a hundred young bi- or multilingual volunteers at various times took part in it, serving in offices equipped with detailed maps, the latest bulletins from major global news organisations, rundowns on the latest news from different battlefields, and weather forecasts. If foreign journalists needed an interpreter the volunteers were free to help. Their knowledge of Croatian institutions was not always perfect, but they compensated for that with experience of foreign civilisations and languages (most often American English) and a contagious enthusiasm. Besides a direct impact on the quality of first-hand reporting the policy of openness may also have contributed to some internal soul-searching in important Western media. As the Cambridge historian Brendan Simms remarked, reports from war correspondents in the area diverged as a rule rather strongly and systematically from editorial opinions, influenced as they were by the views of home chancelleries. This tendency was documented also in a doctoral dissertation at Cambridge.1 According to a close collaborator of the French President Mitterrand and later Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, the change in perception of the conflict in domestic media, induced in a similar way, played an important role in the French decision to belatedly yield to entreaties to recognise Croatia. In other words, the policy of openness worked – it was right to bet, as in essence Croatia did, on the personal integrity and objectivity of the majority of foreign correspondents.

1

Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour, Britain and the destruction of Bosnia [Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2001], pp.100-1. Joseph Sanders Pearson, British press reactions to the onset of war in ex-Yugoslavia (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2001).

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Holding the domestic front Let me now shortly discuss the domestic war information. As already mentioned, Croatia’s transition was aggravated by fighting an uneven defensive war. The enemy was enormously superior in all aspects, except motivation, and was capable of engineering sophisticated and dangerous provocations. There were also frequent breakdowns in communication, improvised exercises in official authority, and cases of social pathology (such as profiteering and lack of discipline); inherent in war, but magnified by the labours of a simultaneous triple shift of political, economic, and state paradigms. Many differing private narratives are possible about the domestic press in such a war. Many of them can, even when contradicting one another, include some grain of truth. To critically evaluate and synthesise these narratives would require time and space which is not at our disposal. I shall therefore limit myself to a short sketch of the general situation in Croatian media in 1991 and to review the activity of the Ministry of Information in this context. It merits particular attention because it has passed almost unobserved that an initially unarmed country survived a vicious war of aggression, occupation of more than a quarter of its territory, and large foreign operations of influencing media without resorting to censorship. Domestic media shared many of the war problems with society at large. Most of the printed media had been extremely weakened and their circulation dwindled; there was a general shortage of paper, the purchasing power of the public took a sharp dive, and it was very difficult to transport printed national press throughout the war-torn country. The circulation of the printed press fell by two-thirds or more but some new weeklys were started. Electronic media, particularly public TV/radio, managed to carry on despite frequent attacks on its production and distribution facilities, and strengthened their unique informative and mobilising role. On the whole, and taking into account the Communist era legacy and the constraints of war conditions, Croatian press, relatively quickly, started to diversify. While the political scene was overwhelmingly dominated by HDZ, there existed a number of media outlets in which other, sometimes strongly opposing, views were available to the public. The weeklys Danas and then newly started Globus, large parts of the Dalmatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija and Novi list (Rijeka), local Zagreb station Radio 101 and the yellowish (tabloidesque) weekly Slobodni tjednik are some early

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examples. Official propaganda concentrated on strengthening the defence preparedness and showing cruelties committed by the aggressor while different civil society initiatives centred on pleas for peace. One of the most popular daily programmes on public TV was Slikom na sliku (A picture unmasking a [doctored] picture) which specialised in showing how the enemy misrepresented events by selective editing of footage or even ascribing own crimes to Croatian defenders.

Inherited values Like other transition countries, Croatia was plagued by inherited perceptions of the political role of journalism which permeated both public life and editorial offices. The finest recognition a journalist could aspire to in the Yugoslav system, and one which placed him or her right at the top of the professional pyramid, was to become an editor-commentator. In many quarters the ideal of commenting rather than impartially reporting or painstakingly researching had survived the fall of communism. Despite fine declarations from all sides, there was little in-depth understanding of the deontology of the free press and its rules and limitations. This held true both for the media and for the society they were servicing. In an environment where commenting journalism prevails, most of what is being said or printed is ultimately viewed through coloured glasses, in search of a hidden meaning or a partisan interest. Yet, this state of mind notwithstanding, Croatian media – the vast majority then still governmentowned – displayed even during the war a good deal of differences of opinion or dissent, at times even stark criticism of the government itself. The phenomenon could possibly be explained on sociological grounds. When the Swedish Nobel Prize-winning economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal dealt with underdevelopment, he introduced the notion of “soft states”. The idea of such a society was not tied to a particular form of government – it described instead a state in which group relations (family, village, region, interest coteries in military, business, culture, religion, sports, etc.) were more important than the standards set by formal laws and regulations or by the interests of society at large. The citizen does not see himself as a bearer of unalienable rights and obligations but as a part of various social networks within which mutual favours are traded or exchanged. Common good in such a state falls easy prey to narrow private interests.

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The feeling of national identity, discouraged and persecuted during the Communist period but strengthened in the fight for independence, superimposed itself upon other group identities; but its new exuberance did not change the nature of the system. Behind a fairly general patriotic resolve to defend the country smouldered a number of individual and group conflicts of interest, some of which even sharpened under the simultaneous conditions of war and transition. They played havoc on preexisting informal networks – some of them changed character, some evaporated having lost their usefulness in the new power structure, and some new ones took shape. However, the logic of mutually exclusive social networks largely persisted as opposed to a society built upon individual competence, responsibility, and the rule of law. The media could and should have fulfilled a corrective role in this respect but many of them were themselves so enmeshed in societal networks that they could not be expected to be strong independent agents of common interest. After almost four decades of life in Sweden I was quite aware that the professionalism of the entire trade and the general perception of the role of media in society was one of the problems which could not be changed overnight, particularly not in wartime. All the Ministry with its limited resources could do was hold the institutional door open and generally encourage a glide towards a more responsible and independent journalism. But our first job was to help to win the war, to survive as a free nation. We therefore did not see our task as meddling into the inner workings and editorial policies of the media. In particular, the Ministry left also the most important media sector, public broadcasting, largely on its own and limited itself to generally overseeing the public company’s adherence to its legal framework. This allowed the Ministry to concentrate on its primary informative role, particularly abroad, and on such additional wartime organisational tasks as, e.g. helping the network of local radio stations to continue to function despite frequent artillery and air attacks.

Wartime management of media Under prevailing warlike conditions several important public sectors were governed by the so-called crisis decrees of the Cabinet, subject to subsequent validation by the Parliament. When I came to the Ministry at the end of August 1991 a draft of a crisis decree for the information sector awaited me in the safe. I thought that in a small country like Croatia and with a complex media sector it should be possible to avoid formalising a set of rigid restrictive rules and find instead a common ground as to how to

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behave under war conditions. At a meeting with a dozen editors-in-chief I told them that as a part of such an informal understanding the Ministry would have only two priorities: 1) An absolute ban on military and military-related news and comments. 2) That political criticism is desirable in a democracy, but in times of war the media should avoid extreme inflammatory accusations, hateful comments, or expressions of hopelessness. Although Croatia had an all-party coalition Government of Democratic Unity and a rather broad range of opinions was present in the media, some editors were not happy about the second proposal and would have preferred censorship instead. Their experience from the years of Communism had taught them to be cautious: the responsibility for self-restraint was bound, they thought, to quickly evolve into their taking the blame for every line written under their baton. The editors’ reaction illustrates the nature of mental impediments to democratic changes. The original idea was that even under extraordinary circumstances a form of mutually agreed restraint would leave room for creativity and freedom in framing own editorial policy. This was the type of thing which I guessed would be a natural thing to do in similar circumstances in a democratic environment, of say a Scandinavian type. In a different environment, where the standing of a journalist was less secure and without the tradition of journalistic independence, the idea was met with suspicion. Hence, editors asked for and received a confidential onepage memo on the position of the Ministry. A boulevard weekly published it. Shortly afterward, in a period of mounting military aggression on all fronts, a leading weekly published on the whole front page a picture of the president of the country and superimposed over it the question: Who betrayed the country? For me it was the first lesson in local habits and more were to come. It was then determined that a decree was necessary after all and it gave the Minister and the new Information Headquarters of the Republic wideranging powers. In practice very little changed. Trying to preserve the original idea I assured the media and the general public in several extensive interviews that the decree was to be kept in reserve as the legal grounds for any need to react to some extreme and as yet unforeseen circumstances. This was also strictly observed; the Info HQ did not have any staff and met four times, for informal seminar-like discussions of the

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general media situation. On three occasions a member of the Info HQ, the deputy Prime Minister, a Social Democrat, informally briefed editors-inchief on the political situation. The powers of the decree were used only once, at the beginning of 1992, on the very day the Yugoslav air force shot down a U.N. helicopter over Croatian territory, killing five foreign observers. Despite a previous warning by the Ministry, a weekly published a second instalment of transcripts of extensive, illegally taped conversations between the commanding officer of the Vukovar front and the highest military and civilian authorities in Zagreb. The incriminated issue of the weekly was removed from circulation and it reappeared a few hours later with reports on protests against the measure replacing former transcript pages. But an official notice had been served that a wilful publication of military matters would not be tolerated. Soon after the cessation of general hostilities the Decree was repealed.

Laying legal foundations of a free and responsible press A few months after the general armistice at the beginning of 1992, a new Law on Public Information was promulgated as a kind of Magna Carta of Croatian journalism. It was subsequently redacted on two occasions but its general philosophy was never put in doubt. The general approach was inspired by the Swedish principles of free press, which seemed to set ambitions high enough. It soon turned out, however, that incorporating good intentions into a Law was far simpler than having them strictly applied in a society with specific previous experiences. It is a matter of conjecture whether the Ministry of Information, dissolved by the autumn of 1992 for fear that it might abroad be labelled “Ministry of Truth”, could under more peaceful conditions have served as an institutional promoter of press liberties under the new Law. As it turned out during the initial period of the military cease-fire, but with the continued high international tension and pressures of the 1990s, there was no administrative body within the bureaucratic structures of the Government which could decisively act on behalf of the free press. Seen in retrospect, it is evident that officialdom, faced with criticisms of all sorts – deserved, exaggerated, or straightforward malignantly and often funded by foreign sources – used to respond with inherited tendency towards indignation and a feeling of betrayal of national interests. An in-house countervailing power to this frame of mind could probably have made a lot of difference – but there was none.

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One of the main provisions of the Law on Public Information was to take the freedom of the press out of the courts. A public Commission on the Freedom of Public Speech was to be instituted not only as a matter of principle but also as a practical solution to avoid inefficiently long court proceedings under judges unfamiliar with journalistic deontology. The Commission would consist of representatives nominated by different trade and profession groups within the information/culture segment of society and would promptly deal both with journalists’ complaints concerning any infringement on their professional freedom and complaints of citizens against the media. The media concerned would be obliged to publish the findings. Unfortunately, the Commission was never appointed and as a result the whole decade of the 1990s was marred by libel actions in ordinary courts in which, among others, some leading politicians alleged that unsubstantiated assertions in the press had tarnished their reputation. Irrespective of the formal merits of the cases, the spectacle of proceedings against journalists was of course massively exploited both in domestic and international media. A telling detail in this sordid story is why the important Commission envisaged by the Law remained a dead letter. One of its members was to be nominated by the oldest Croatian cultural institution Matica hrvatska, and its chairman, a noted author, was at the time also president of a liberal party. Illustrating the proverb about good intentions paving the road to hell, he felt that it would run counter to his liberal persuasion to nominate someone to a body which formally would be appointed by the Government… And those, who from the start did not particularly like the idea of a Commission, had their day. Since one of the nominating institutions envisaged by the Law did not come up with a name – there was no Commission… There were also several other important provisions of the Law which for a number of years proved to be “too much too early”. One of them was the obligation for public authorities to respond to newsmen’s inquiries within a reasonable time. Only data specifically classified as secret was to be withheld from the public. Publishers were required to annually list owners of their media. While substantial progress has been made in observance of these and similar rules basic to creating a vibrant, knowledgeable, and responsible information system, the application of the Law is still often marred by considerable delays and hesitation.

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Foreign media support – pursuing political rather than qualitative objectives In other words, the transformation of the media as a mouthpiece of the Communist regime to a key participant in democratising society is still not completely achieved despite high initial ambitions. A considerable Western financial influence in this respect – always present but seldom acknowledged – has not been as profoundly beneficial as could be hoped for. Countries of the European Union and the United States have spent significant sums of money on media activities in the region as a whole and Croatia in particular. Some approximations point to an input in the whole region of some $1 billion over a 20-year period, of which say only $200250 million went to Croatia. It has passed so unnoticed that even mentioning it somehow smacks of political incorrectness. The main problem with foreign activities in media has been that the financing concentrated mainly on short-term objectives of diversifying and politically influencing the media instead of helping to set long-term standards of the quality and independence of their reporting and, in the region as a whole, confronting the roots of aggression. A report on a media support programme for the Stability Pact for South East Europe, which dealt with the period 1996-2006 conceded that notions such as “independent”, “the truth”, etc., were really used to signal political allegiance and had little to do with the quality of reporting: “The claim that a large share of media support aimed primarily at specific, short-term political goals resulting in ‘a change of vocabulary but not grammar’ is understandable, but must be seen in the context of the still-evolving political culture of the region.”2 The report’s author, Aaron Rhodes, left no doubt that the primary goal was diversity of media (in fact, their opposition to governments) and not their quality: “[s]upport was at times implemented not by media-assistance professionals but rather by political operatives or their representatives. Much of it had an ad hoc quality… It was often covert and unregulated, without reference to clearly defined criteria and without transparent procedures, and in some cases bypassed laws and regulations that were at 2 Aaron Rhodes: Ten Years of Media Support To the Balkans: An Assessment [Yasha Lange, Amsterdam 2007], p. 23. The report commissioned by the Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe. Rhodes was executive director of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IFH), based in Vienna (Austria).

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odds with international standards. Grants were made in cash, often by embassy personnel using year-end funds or NGOs operating with flexible funding.” Such “[o]vertly political media support has left a residue of cynicism about media support in general, which colours attitudes about the international community,” a Croatian informant said, “we have been used to achieve political objectives [the overthrow of HDZ], and then abandoned. Assistance was not to promote democracy and values.” The cavalier treatment of the need for quality reporting was a serious problem. An even more important problem lay in the policy preferences revealed by the distribution of large sums of money to regional media. The Rhodes report left no doubt about the great difference in the order of “war sins” attributed to Serbia and Croatia respectively: in Serbia “the media [were made] “a weapon for serving an aggressive ethnic nationalism… [and] hate speech” and they “mobilised the population in wars against Croatians, Bosniaks, and Kosovars, and unlike ‘the West’, us[ing] sophisticated propaganda techniques to carry a tribal, nationalist message.” Reporting on the Croatian media, Rhodes mentioned that they “enjoyed several periods of relative liberalism” but that “in the early 1990s the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tuÿman sought to bring it under strict control, often with politically-motivated defamation suits, takeover attempts, or efforts to obstruct publication through censorship.” There is of course a far-reaching qualitative difference between descriptions of the two situations. An aggressive tribal, nationalist message, which uses sophisticated means to mobilise a nation against other nations, is considerably more perilous than an aggressed country’s alleged – and condemnable – efforts to alleviate the resulting internal instability by attempting to control the media using different economic and judicial means. Yet, of the millions of dollars recorded in the Rhodes report and aimed at bringing about political change in the two countries, the “sanitising” expenditure in Serbia was only 23% higher than in Croatia.3 The difference was even more alarming along the aggressor-aggressed 3

Over a 10-year period (1996-2006) Rhodes accounts for an expenditure of € 269 million (approx. $ 370 million) while pointing out that this is only a “recorded figure and does not include data from important private foundations and several government agencies.”

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divide: about 63 percent of the recorded sums were used to influence media in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia while only 25 percent were supposed to counter the preaching of an aggressive ethnic nationalism and its remnants in Serbia and Montenegro! Seen in retrospect, it is doubtful that the powers properly understood the root of Dubrovnik’s war sufferings. Or, alternatively, that they really cared to weed it out.

CHAPTER THREE SIX HOURS AWAY: ABOUT THE BESIEGED DUBROVNIK FROM AFAR DR. IVO BANAC, UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB, CROATIA

Summary In this article, the author addresses the siege of Dubrovnik as seen by himself as an outside observer, who was at the time a university professor of history working in the United States. In the context of divided and largely passive Western policy, he demonstrates how the battle for public opinion was important in Croatia and abroad. Starting from his own position, the author examines how the Croatian-American Diaspora started acting as an impromptu interpreter of Croat interests at the time. When they acted as a lobby on behalf of their homeland they did not have significant contact with the American media or for that matter with the relevant academic and political communities. The author argues that the Serbs lost the battle for Dubrovnik not because they were militarily ineffective, but because, thanks in part to the work of the Diaspora, the focus of international interest in the fate of this fabled city was never permitted to falter. Keywords: Croatian War of Independence, Dubrovnik, Serbian Lobby, Croatian Diaspora

Introduction Twenty years have passed since the attack of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) on Croatia, in implementation of Greater Serbia’s political programme, and the revision of history has already taken a toll. For example, a little while back an ethnically Croat former Yugoslav diplomat,

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who stood by Belgrade in 1991, falsely represented himself in one of our schizophrenic dailies as practically Mickiewicz’s latter-day Konrad Wallenrod in the camp of the enemy. If he and others had the sense to keep silent, our media space might well be freer of historical fancies and misrepresentations. But, no; those who sat out Croatia’s drive for freedom and dignity wish to be recognised. That is why the controversies and conflicts of 1991 will continue for as long as Croatia’s independence remains an open issue for various opponents. We can count on their rage to arrive at the truth. For example, in his most recent propaganda book U tuÿem veku (In an Alien Century), Dobrica ûosiü speaks quite openly of Slobodan Miloševiü’s aims in 1991: “First he [Miloševiü] took the centre stage as a national democrat and the unifier of Serbia when he reedited the anti-Serb Constitution of 1974, then as the defender of Yugoslavia in 1991, and finally as combatant for the Serbian state and the unification of the Serb people in the uprisings of Serbs from across the Drina River. All of these motives were historically just and democratic” (ûosiü, 2011, p.127-28). ûosiü’s words are a helpful reminder to those in Croatia, who – in our state of euphoria, political amateurishness, and advanced internal divisions – have already forgotten how close to defeat and, indeed, extinction Croatia was in June 1991. A few weeks ago, a telling book, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia by Josip Glaurdiü, was published in the United States. This book describes with the precision of a scalpel how Croatia was turned over to the tender mercies of her enemies in the summer of 1991. At the end of July there commenced the ethnic cleansing of the Croat population in the areas marked for the new Greater Serbia state, moreover by a planned scenario: first, the provocations of various “volunteers”, under the control of Miloševiü’s secret service (SDB); second, incursions of the JNA under the excuse of containing the “inter-ethnic conflict”; third, application of excessive military power and the expulsion of the Croat population, accompanied by the destruction and incineration of their property. Radovan Karadžiü’s statement in The Guardian (5 August 1991) was telling – the conflict will cease when the Croats accept defeat.

Battle for public opinion In these circumstances the strategy of Croatia’s president Franjo Tuÿman can be reduced to avoiding open conflict with the JNA in order to purchase the time necessary for persuading the West to come to Croatia’s

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aid, as well as the time needed to work on the JNA officer cadre, at least the non-Serbs among the military brass. This strategy prompted great resistance within the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), but the elementary problem was that the Western help was not forthcoming. The British and French diplomats barely concealed their sympathies for Miloševiü, and the Americans were preoccupied with Gorbachev’s problems and the possibility of Soviet dissolution. Under the circumstances, as a result of divided and largely passive Western policy, the battle for public opinion became very important. It is well known that the German press played a major role, but it is less known how much the critical writing of the British press – in The Times, The Guardian, and The Independent – slowly acted on public opinion. Croatia’s isolation at the beginning of the war and the vast amount of negative propaganda that was hurled at the imperilled country had an effect on the patriotic sentiments of the Croatian Diaspora, which had previously rarely acted in unison. This was especially so in the United States, a country with a long tradition of Croatian settlement. CroatianAmericans, however, were marked by generational divisions and rather limited intellectual resources. Political emigration, long isolated from the mainstream of Croatian immigrants, was itself divided by largely irrelevant historical issues, and existed apart from the most recent generation of the newcomers, who had been arriving on the American shores since the early 1970s. Among the latter one could find many entrepreneurs, skilled workers, and professionals who only recently started entering the traditional Croat fraternal associations – the Croatian Fraternal Union (HBZ) and the Croatian Catholic Union of U.S.A. and Canada (HKZ) – and then, in 1990, started establishing chapters of the new homeland political parties, especially the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and organisations of the University of Zagreb alumni (AMCA). This newest generation of Croatian-Americans, which was most alert to the political developments back home, started acting as an impromptu interpreter of Croat interests, as a lobby on behalf of their homeland, albeit without any significant contacts with the American media or for that matter with the relevant academic and political communities.

Role of the Croatian diaspora It is very difficult to recapture the enthusiasm of those times, when the North American Croat community for the first time came together under new leadership and with new methods. From the first, every effort was

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made to capture the interest of the media and the political establishment. Thanks to my visibility in the community, largely because of my writings, I was frequently tapped in these efforts, often being queried for advice in writing various petitions to political and governmental leaders, but as often acting entirely on my own, as various newspapers, journals, TV and radio stations, civic and academic organisations, sought my opinion and expertise. Although I was already critical of the various missteps which the Croatian government of President Franjo Tuÿman undertook at the time, my visibility nonetheless was promoted by the coordination of New York Croat organisations, which used my services on key occasions. After the proclamation of Croatian and Slovenian independence on June 25, 1991, and the beginning of the JNA attack on Slovenia, I spoke at a rally of Croat, Slovene, Bosnian, and Albanian organisations, held on Sunday, June 30, 1991, before the United Nations building on the East River. This was a rousing speech in which I tried to explain that the conflict was the culmination of inequities that the non-Serbs had experienced in Yugoslavia since its inception, that the government of Ante Markoviü and the JNA, which it in theory commanded, had no solutions to the crisis, because they allowed and legitimated Miloševiü’s Greater Serbia project, and that the Croats and the other non-Serbs will not accept the half-loaf of confederation with which the Western governments blandished them at this late hour.1 In fact, the American media was not well disposed to Croatian and Slovenian independence. At first it was difficult to get our point of view across in the most influential newspapers, the exceptions being regional papers such as the Long Island Newsday and the Ontario Windsor Star that carried some of my op-ed pieces in June and July. Matters changed as the conflict intensified, but also as an after effect of a politically loaded speech that President George Bush Sr. delivered on 1 August 1991, in Kiev, during a state visit to the U.S.S.R. This speech, which the conservative columnist William Safire forever fixed in collective memory as the “Chicken Kiev speech,” came as a rude awakening to the Ukrainian audience that expected a modicum of American understanding for Ukrainian independence aspirations. Instead, President Bush disappointed his listeners by stating that “freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not aid those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred” (Wikisource, 2011). 1 For the Croatian translation of this text see Banac, I. (1992). Protiv straha: ýlanci, izjave i javni nastupi, 1987-1992 (pp. 125-131). Zagreb: Slon.

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Without naming anybody, it was obvious that President Bush was dissuading Ukrainians and others in the U.S.S.R. by scolding Croats and Slovenes. This was not lost on me and several of my “hyphenated” academic colleagues, notably the Ukrainian-American historian Roman Szporluk of Harvard and the Lithuanian-American poet and literary scholar Tomas Venclova of Yale. We were needless to say delighted when a week later The New York Times published an op-ed piece by Czesáaw Miáosz, the Polish-American poet and Nobel laureate, who strongly criticised the President’s views. Titled “Some Call It Freedom,” the article stressed that the Soviet state committed unspeakable crimes against humanity and that “the desire of people who suffered from these crimes to lead an independent existence should be viewed in this light” and “cannot be ascribed merely to nationalistic differences.” But Miáosz broadened the attack by noting that “Dramatic events in Yugoslavia and the European efforts to find a peaceful solution to the feud among the republics there indicate that much more is involved than ‘a core’ from which parts ‘secede.’ Even if national animosities play a considerable role, the heart of the matter is a political system. Journalists who stress nationalistic passions while neglecting the main difficulties do us a disservice” (Miáosz, 1991). A few days later I wrote an appreciation to Miáosz, mentioned similar reactions on the part of Szporluk and Venclova, and proposed to Miáosz that we “join forces in order to alert US public opinion” (I. Banac, personal communication, August 14, 1991). Indeed, after the attempted Soviet putsch of 19 August 1991, which was greeted by Miloševiü and his Serb allies in Croatia, the air was somewhat cleared on the issue, but not sufficiently to stem the continued attacks on Croatia. It was increasingly clear that much more needed to be done to alert the American public and prompt the US and other Western governments into action, especially after the JNA attacks on Zagreb and Dubrovnik in September. To that end on 18 September I wrote a petition titled “An Appeal for Peace in Croatia,” in which I noted some of the most notorious facts about the JNA’s escalation of war against Croatia and urged the Western governments and all humanitarian organisations to come to the aid of Croatia (Banac, 1992, p.156). I immediately sent it to Miáosz with a letter noting that “what particularly upsets me is not the inaction of the Western governments … [but] by the total indifference of public opinion, particularly of intellectuals.” I wrote him:

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“Can you imagine the uproar that would be provoked by the bombing of Warsaw, or even of Minsk? Colleagues call me over other matters and matter-of-factly add, “You must be busy now.” Busy?! I am in despair! My country is being destroyed and I am encountering an ocean of indifference. And frankly I do not care what idiocies Mr. Tuÿman committed. No amount of idiocy, or even malignancy, can justify the bombing of innocent people in time of however unreal peace.”

I asked him to sign the appeal and persuade “at least five instantly recognisable names in culture and literature” to sign it as well (I. Banac, personal communication, September 18, 1991). In fact, my Yale colleagues Mirjan Damaška and Paško Rakiü joined me in sending this appeal to a number of scholars and public figures. In due course we had nearly thirty signatures, including, besides Miáosz, those of Joseph Brodsky, McGeorge Bundy, Milton Friedman, Walter F. Mondale, Linus Pauling, Eugene V. Rostow, and Meryl Streep, in addition to numerous colleagues, many of them from Yale. Josip Kristiü, a Croat activist from New York City and the head of Truth about Croatia, Inc., then had it published as a full page paid advertisement in The New York Times on 11 October 2011.

Importance of Dubrovnik Where is Dubrovnik in this story? At its core. Taking advantage of Dubrovnik’s familiarity abroad, we left no stone unturned in linking the destruction of Croatia’s most distinguished heritage site to stem the fury of the aggressors. When the shelling started, Jure Šutija, who had long links with the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, a vibrant academic institution that the JNA destroyed on 6 December 1991, called his 74-year old friend, Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the middle of the night, asking him to do something on Dubrovnik’s behalf. This is just one of the many examples of how the Diaspora moved on behalf of Croatia, resisting the misinformation of the Serb lobby and that of various leftist sympathisers of Miloševiü. Though six time zones away – or “six hours away,” as we used to say, we never wavered in bringing this issue to the attention of influential individuals and the public generally. The Serbs lost the battle of Dubrovnik not because they were poorly armed – they had overwhelming military superiority – but because the glance of international interest in the fate of this fabled city was never permitted to falter. The only surprise is that Miloševiü and his planners failed to

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understand the political risks of attacking Dubrovnik. It can be fairly said that their miscalculation still smarts. It is significant that Dobrica ûosiü avoids any mention of Dubrovnik in his ample writings. But in October 1991 he jotted down the following tortuous “explanation”: “1 October 1991. [...] Milorad Vuþeliü phones to tell me that he will drink coffee on Stradun, in Dubrovnik, which is surrounded by the Montenegrins and the Užice Corps, this evening or tomorrow. They have destroyed the hotels in Lapad and to the east of Dubrovnik, in those magical places, also the TV tower, gasoline pumps... Milorad is exultant! He is excited and exalted by the Montenegrin bravery. These feelings are shared by Montenegrin physicians. Isn’t this Montenegrin vanity one of the basic promoters and sources of energy for their bravery? Isn’t such vanity the basic anthropological quality of Montenegrins, created in their closed society? Why can’t they see how many dangers are brought by this victory? And can the conquest of Dubrovnik be a victory? It cannot! Dubrovnik is not a Croatian but a tourist city: it is a city of all the world’s tourists who have seen it. Antiustašism is a motif of the Serb war with the Croats. Defence from genocide. But this war is unreasonable and hopeless. By attacking Dubrovnik, the Serbs turn themselves into barbarians. They are destroying the most beautiful city on both sides of the Adriatic. All the tourists of the world are today against the Serbs. Also, all the historians, writers, and painters. The destruction of Dubrovnik, if it is true, will not be forgiven to the Montenegrins...” (ûosiü, 2002, p. 398).

It is a curious fact that it is very difficult to trade with blame, no less than with pardon...

References Banac, I. (1992). Protiv straha: ýlanci, izjave i javni nastupi. 1987-1992. Zagreb: Slon. —. (1991, August 14). Personal communication with Miáosz, Czesáaw. In the author’s possession. —. (1991, September 18). Personal communication with Miáosz, Czesáaw. In the author’s possession. ûosiü, D. (2002) Pišüevi zapisi (1981-1991). Belgrade: Filip Višnjiü —. (2011) U tuÿem veku. Belgrade: Laguna Miáosz, C. (1991, August 8). Some Call It Freedom. The New York Times, p. A21.

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Wikisource (2011) Chicken Kiev speech. Retrieved from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Chicken_Kiev_speech

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PART II: PRACTICES OF WARTIME REPORTING FROM THE DUBROVNIK AREA: JOURNALISTS BETWEEN PATRIOTISM AND PROFESSION

CHAPTER FOUR JOURNALISTS BETWEEN PATRIOTISM AND PROFESSION DR. STJEPAN MALOVIû, CROATIA

Summary This paper explores the troubled relationship between the professional ethics of journalists and patriotism. The aim was to establish whether journalists blindly adhere to professional standards in war reporting: truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, impartiality, and balance. The case method was used and it showed that journalists in some cases have to deviate from professional standards. The author concludes that everyone has to report in accordance with their conscience, professional dignity, and integrity, applying professional standards in reporting and adhering to ethical principles. Keywords: war reporting, journalistic ethics, Croatian war for independence, patriotism

Introduction: In war, truth is the first casualty In war, truth is the first casualty. This is a common, often used slogan that tries to explain everything happening in conflicts and how journalists, whose task is to inform, have a difficult and thankless task. War reporting is one of the most difficult professional tasks. Paradoxically, journalists have not had much opportunity to learn about war reporting. Especially in the countries of the Socialist bloc, where they lived in a quiet, idyllic society, which was not really like that, but left that kind of impression. Former Yugoslav journalists did not often go on special missions to the hotbeds of war in the second half of the 20th century, except with the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) troops to the Suez Canal.

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The first major conflict broke out in Kosovo. Until then, the communist government successfully covered up conflicts. The anecdote ‘Stop Reuters’ is well known when a communist strongman thought that his command would be sufficient to stop Reuters’ journalists from reporting, as it would have been for the local journalists. But those “idyllic” times have passed and journalists flocked to Kosovo to report what was happening there and whether this was the beginning of the end of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict was fierce, both sides did not hesitate to employ any means available, and journalists had to face the short end of the stick because they did not know where to position themselves. If they were behind the Yugoslav police the protesters threw stones at them, and if they were behind the protesters they swallowed tear-gas. From the perspective of later destruction and war, this seems ridiculous, but this was just the beginning. The Ex-Yu journalists went on a long and arduous path of war reporting, which lasted all the way to the mid-90s. The difficulties of war reporting can be seen most vividly from the testimony of Ron Haviv, a renowned American photojournalist, who reported from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. His photographs have travelled the world showing the reality of war, and his exhibition and monograph Blood and Honey (2000) impressed the public not only with its documentary, but also its artistic power. “Ron Haviv’s photos on the war in Yugoslavia speak for themselves as journalism and as art,” said Chuck Sudetic (Havic, 2000, p. 16). The following story tells how Haviv experienced the horrors of war: In Vukovar, in the middle of the battlefield, he encountered a woman who held her arms out to him. A member of the Serbian forces shouted, “No pictures, no pictures,” and pulled one man from the group of people and shot him dead with a short burst. Haviv did not take any pictures. After some time he went to Bijeljina. Arkan’s people turned the streets into a living hell, they killed anything that moved. One young man managed to free himself from the hands of Arkan’s men and started running, but had nowhere to go. A Serbian soldier shouted to Haviv, “No pictures, no pictures,” and shot the young man in the back. And again Haviv did not take any pictures. The rampage continued. Unprecedented atrocities. Arkan was also caught by the lens. Haviv began shooting. His video camera captured the horrific images. His main concern was how to deliver his footage to the newsroom.

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He somehow managed and his footage has travelled the world. Haviv was also on other battlefields and his video camera captured the biggest horrors, but he has never forgotten how his life hung by a thread while filming flagrant killings. Therefore, it is not easy to be a war reporter, even when you’re a worldrenowned journalist like Ron Haviv. Croatian journalists have also faced horrible events, and many have even lost their lives in the process. We will never forget Siniša Glavaševiü’s radio reports from Vukovar, which gave a true picture of what was happening in this then-besieged town. Professional journalists know how hard it is to report from a war zone and respect professional standards. But not everyone had such high standards. There were those who were the worst spokesmen of the gods of war, calling on people to kill their former neighbours, polluting the media space with their poisonous words.

Professional standards: Blind adherence to professional standards endangers safety Modern journalism is based on the following professional standards: truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, impartiality, and balance (Maloviü, 2006, p. 18). At first glance, this is what very clearly defines the attitude a journalist should have toward reporting on an event. The professional standards of reporting are the clearest and most unambiguous indication of whether the news is written so that it can be trusted or, at least, accepted as a real report on a certain event and that we do not need to check any further. The professional standards distinguish a professional journalist from today’s ever-present citizen journalist1. A basic rule of journalism is that the story must be verified with at least one other, independent source. A news story with only ONE source of information is incomplete and one-sided. Some media companies, such as the Canadian Broadcast Company (CBC), require their reporters to confirm the news from three independent sources, which is extremely difficult, but this news is very credible (Owen, 1997, p. 61). 1

Citizen journalism: term applies to the citizens who report to the newsrooms on the events they witness, send photographs or videos. Numerous media base their content on such contributions and the most popular newspapers are ‘OhmyNews’.

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Once we begin discussing the professional standards in more depth we end up in difficulty. Is it possible to abide by them all the time? Are the professional standards rather an obstacle to reporting? Is blind adherence to professional standards counterproductive? Such dilemmas most frequently occur in the most complex type of reporting: war reporting! War reporting is anyhow very complex and difficult and puts journalistsreporters in impossible situations. The idea of war is difficult for us to grasp. People suffering, killed, wounded, towns destroyed, civilian casualties... It is not easy to find the right level of reporting. On the other hand, war also implies heroism, bravery, humanity, understanding, solidarity... These are all elements that are ranked high in assessing news value and there is no journalist or editor who can ignore events that contain them. A war is a conflict between two sides. Journalists usually take sides. There are so few wars, and even fewer journalists, who can report on developments on both sides of the war. You are either with us or against us. If journalists fail to report on both sides of the conflict, then they are considered to be ‘neutral’, which is less and less the case. Hence, the first rule of this profession is already difficult to achieve. What is really going on on the other side of the battlefield? Does the enemy’s point of view have the right to be a part of professionally written news? Journalists of the world’s agencies can achieve that luxury only if they are reporting on local war where both sides are ready to accept the journalists of the world’s media and tell them their story. But, was an American journalist able to report from Osama Bin Laden’s hideout? Does the public have the right to the information from that source? Is the news of the American journalist complete if Osama is not one of his sources, but he reports only the US side of the story? It is painfully evident how the professional standards of journalism go down when reporting on a war in the homeland. Not only is a rule of two independent sources brought into question. Given that it is practically impossible to enforce, we will not insist much on this point. Also, other professional standards can hardly withstand the trials of war reporting. Examples from the war in Croatia will be used to analyse whether it was possible to adhere to proper professional standards.

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Truthfulness Truthfulness is the first of the professional standards which, according to the American theorist does not need to be prescribed, because they say that the news is true, and if it is not true, then it is not news. W. Lance Bennett points out that “truthfulness and factuality of the newspaper story is guaranteed by the use of documentary reporting” (Bennett, 1988, p. 147). One radio reporter from a town on the Adriatic coast reported on the mortar attack on the town where his radio station was located. As a good reporter he went to cover the event and spotted that enemy mines dropped into the sea, missing the town. He stated that in his report and it was true. But, the next mortar round hit the town! And instead of killing fish, this time people were seriously injured. Apparently the enemy gunners were also listening to his radio station. It never occurred to him to make such reports again, as, in war reporting, telling the truth might be lethal.

Accuracy Accuracy is another professional standard. Croatian journalists had information about how the first military units, newly established, were illequipped, lacking weapons, ammunition, and how volunteers came to the battlefield in jeans and sneakers. Was it necessary to disclose such information? Is releasing the information that a town is unprotected also considered professional reporting?

Fairness Fairness is one of the most important categories of reporting, and the aforementioned W. Lance Bennett used the notion of fairness to replace the formerly used term objectivity. According to the authors of the Missouri Group, in reporting, fairness implies that you will try to cover every possible point of view on the reported event. Rarely, it is just one, and more often, two or more different points of view. Fairness means that you will provide an opportunity to anyone mentioned in the report to comment and present their side of the story. And above all, fairness implies that you will do everything possible not to be influenced by your prejudices and preconceptions while reporting and editing (Missouri Group, 1992, p. 14). The fairness of a war correspondent is most challenged when confronted with severe irregularities, even war crimes, committed by the army of the

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country to which it belongs. A journalist cannot keep such thing to himself and must report it. There is no doubt about that. But it is easier said than done. American journalists who reported on the war crimes committed in Vietnam had one mitigating circumstance: war crimes were committed by the US military, but on foreign soil, in a foreign country. War crimes committed in a defensive war are not quite the same thing. Strictly speaking, a war crime is a war crime. There is no justification or expiry date for war crimes. Each country must prosecute such crimes. Every journalist who has true and accurate information must act fairly and disclose the same. To be able to do this he must have great courage and very high humanistic and professional ideals. The price paid for publishing such information is very high and journalists often find themselves under attack and condemned by their countrymen for betrayal of national heroes by labelling them criminals. The Hague trials clearly testify to that fact and war crime witnesses even today, some twenty years after the event, face the condemnation of their countrymen for testifying or reporting on war crimes committed by the soldiers of their country.

Impartiality Impartiality is a trap that occurs during the reporting by the international media of a war which is considered as a local conflict. The following example illustrates this best: despite all sanctions and threats from world powers, the most wanted war criminal, Radovan Karadžiü, was nominated for President of the Republika Srpska, and Sky News provided valuable media space and time to the official spokesman of Serbs who zealously argued how this was the will of the citizens. The fact that Karadžiü should be in court rather than on a list of presidential candidates, and the fact that the world just took extensive preliminary actions to reduce his political role, seem of no importance in comparison with the objectivity of presenting the events. Sky News’ journalists presented ‘both sides’ (Maloviü, 2007, p. 23). At first glance, he abided by the principle of impartiality, but this was a negative application of the principle, while the criminal and the victim cannot be presented on equal and impartial terms. Covering both sides of the story is a journalistic standard, but such coverage is not fair, while the war criminal was given as much media space as any presidential candidate in another country where presidential elections take place in peace. From today’s perspective of The Hague Tribunal and the indictment against Karadžiü, such reporting is considered unprofessional.

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John Sparrow, an English journalist and communications delegate for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, publicly opposed the application of the principle of impartiality, which is one of the postulates, not only of journalism, but also of the operation of this organisation. Sparrow said that he cannot report and act objectively when it comes to conflict, because he is always on the side of the victim, never on the side of the victimisers. False impartiality implies giving victimisers an opportunity to ‘explain’ their crime and make the victim look like the guilty party. This is the case when machismo men justify rape by saying that the ‘woman had asked for’ it by dressing ‘provocatively’. False impartiality prevails in communities that, in fact, support the aggressor, but due to public opinion this cannot be reported publicly. On the other hand, world events have taught journalists not to easily characterise one side of the conflict. A person might start as a protester, then become a rebel, then a revolutionary, and eventually overthrow the ruling party and becomes a statesman representing a country. The path from revolutionary to statesman is not uncommon, but the media has different terms for the same person in different periods of their activity, such as immature opposition, rebel, red danger, criminal against the people... But if this person wins, then he is the leader of the civil discontent, visionary, a fighter for freedom and justice, our beloved and respected president. Experienced journalists avoid adjectives because they can act impartially and can manipulate the points of view.

Balance American authors, Hiebert, Ungurait, and Bohn, point out how difficult it is to provide balanced reporting on crisis situations, especially in the war, when portraying both sides of the conflict can lead to accusations of not being a patriot, and even being a traitor for presenting the enemy’s side of the story (Hiebert, Ungurait & Bohn, 1991, p. 416). Then how to write a report? We see that these news values, which might provide journalists well during peaceful times, are hard to abide by when journalists are in a war stricken area. There is no recipe, particularly one which would be universally applicable. But this is the situation in journalism and reporting in general; every event

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is a different story, and a journalist should tell each story in the best professional way.

Conclusion: Mission Impossible?! Is it possible to be professional whilst reporting on events and respect all the standards of journalistic profession? Maybe another war story can shed some new light on the dilemmas faced by journalists, war correspondents from their attacked country. In 1995, a paramilitary unit led by the convicted war criminal, Milan Martiü, fired missiles loaded with cluster bombs at the city of Zagreb. The first attack inflicted heavy casualties. The city was faced with a difficult situation; missiles could be launched at any time from enemy positions on the Kupa River, twenty kilometres from the city centre. And these are specifically designed for killing people who walk the streets unprotected. When people hear the sirens’ wailing sound and empty the streets, the potential number of victims is substantially reduced. In such cases, it is extremely important when the general alert siren goes off. The City Centre responsible for alerting citizens had its observers, who could spot a rocket launcher. If the alert siren goes off right away, explosive bells will fall on empty city streets. The Centre had no doubts; as soon as the rocket launcher appeared, the sirens were sounded. Martiü’s men knew that an attack would cause no damage, so they retreated. Zagreb echoed sirens, but there was no attack, and thus the frustrated citizens began to complain. “False alarms” became a possible news story. Let us recap; if journalists publish the truth, they will endanger safety, because the enemy will change their tactics. By not publishing the story they protect the citizens, who will always be better off for vacating the streets, and there will be no attack; but they will thus compromise their professional standards and pass on the opportunity to publish a good story. The journalists/correspondents in countries that have suffered brutal and aggressive attacks are always faced with such dilemmas. It is impossible to keep the balance and impartiality when homes are being destroyed, our loved ones are hurt or injured, and when the country is under the threat of war. Then what is left? There is no recipe, let alone clear instructions. Everyone has to report in accordance with their conscience, professional dignity, and integrity, applying professional standards in reporting and adhering to

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ethical principles. This path is very difficult, responsible, and thankless, but it is the only one possible.

References Bennett, L. W. (1988) News: Politics of illusion. London: Longman Brooks, S. B., Kennedy, G., Moen, D. R. & Eanly, D. (Missouri Group). (1992). News Reporting and Writing. New York: St. Martin’s Press Haviv, R. (2000) Blood and Honey. New York: TV BOOKS Hiebart, R. E., Ungurait, D.F. & Bohn, T. F. (1991) Mass Media VI: An Introduction to Modern Communication. New York: Longman Maloviü, S. (2007) Media and Society. Zagreb: International Centre for Education of Journalists (ICEJ) and the University Library Maloviü, S. (2006) Basic of Journalism, Zagreb: Golden MarketingTehniþka knjiga Owen, J. (1997) News sources, lecture on Journalistic Workshop. Zagreb.

CHAPTER FIVE NEWS REPORTING ABOUT ATTACK ON DUBROVNIK IN 1991: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ON LOCATION DR. MATO BRAUTOVIû, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

JULIJANA ANTIû BRAUTOVIû, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

MARKO POTREBICA, UNIVERSITY OF MOSTAR, BIH

Summary When cultural heritage of world importance such as Dubrovnik gets caught up in the whirlwind of war, this attracts the great interest of the media and journalists, and which does not die down even months after the outbreak of war. This paper reviews the circumstances of reporting on the attack on Dubrovnik in the autumn of 1991 as well as the differences in working conditions of local and foreign journalists. It includes an analysis of the possible impacts of official sources, limited access to information, and the role of local guides (fixers) in the specific war conditions of war such as the siege. Keywords: Dubrovnik, 1991, war reporting, journalists

Introduction The attack of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Montenegrin reservists on Dubrovnik in October 1991 was a very important media topic that attracted a large number of local and foreign journalists to the Dubrovnik area. According to Albert Bing (2009), the attack and

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subsequent siege of Dubrovnik sparked “widespread outrage across the world and unequivocal condemnation of the Serbian aggression in the most influential world media” (p. 52). “Dubrovnik was only the latest in a string of Croatian towns under attack. Novska, Nova Gradiška, Karlovac, Petrinja, Osijek, Sisak, and other nondescript grey little towns had been pummelled throughout the previous month. But Dubrovnik, Byron’s ‘Pearl of Adriatic’, was different. A tourist destination with few peers, this was a place people knew and cherished… But no amount of obfuscation could confuse the fact that their assault against a city with 90 per cent Croat population was a clear-cut case of territorial aggression” (Russell, 1993, p. 222).

Unlike the situation in other Croatian regions where the Serbian minority launched an uprising backed by the JNA and Slobodan Miloševiü’s regime in the Republic of Serbia, in the Dubrovnik area there were very few members of the non-native Serbian minority. In addition, by the inclusion of Dubrovnik under the protection of UNESCO in 1979, all the military bases of the JNA were displaced from the immediate surroundings of Dubrovnik, making Dubrovnik some kind of demilitarised zone without military and strategic importance. However, according to the plans of the military leadership of the JNA from July 1991, the southern part of Croatia, including Dubrovnik, was to be occupied and isolated from the rest of the country. The first stage of the operation involved the occupation of the Dubrovnik area, and the military action planned for August started in October 1991 (Antic Brautoviü and Brautoviü, 2009). The war in the Dubrovnik area turned out to be an excellent example of war reporting for the study of specific circumstances in which war reporters have to work, taking into account the right balance of patriotism and journalistic ethics, responsibility to the community, ethical standards, accuracy, and objectivity, and the importance of reporting from the scene.

War reporting and reporting from the scene Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer (2004) state that “Journalists are expected to function variously during war: to be present enough to respond to what is happening, yet absent enough to stay safe; to be sufficiently authoritative so as to provide reliable information, yet open to cracks and fissures in complicated truth-claims that unfold; to remain passionate about the undermining of human dignity that accompanies war, yet

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impartial and distanced enough to see the strategies that attach themselves to circumstances with always more than one side” (p. 4). Reporting on war is very dangerous for journalists and requires them to have significant capabilities for the collection and distribution of information. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (Moeller, 2002, p. 270), about 30 journalists lost their lives during the Croatian War of Independence in 1991 and in the first few months of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. The first attacks on journalists took place in August 1990, just after the first democratic elections, when a group of Croatian journalists was attacked by Serbian rebels in the town of Obrovac. In 1991 many of them were tortured and killed by Serbian forces. Even one-third of all journalist victims of that period were Croatian journalists (Novak, 1997 as cited in Maloviü & Selnow, 2001, p. 126). “The Serbian men surrounded the journalists and shouted threats at them, saying they would be killed and thrown in the river if they stayed around. Claiming that Croatian journalists had unfairly reported on Serbian issues and regularly maligned Serbian president Miloševiü, the angry group even accused the journalists of being Ustaša, a Nazi-like hate group often associated with Croatian nationalism” (Maloviü & Selnow, 2001, p.123).

Maloviü and Selnow (2001) report that the war was fought brutally in a way that surprised even the veterans of war reporting and “attracted more international journalists than any battle since the Gulf War” (p. 126). “As of mid-December, journalists had been killed in Yugoslavia’s sixmonth-old civil war. Two Soviet journalists had been missing since September and were presumed dead. Dozens more had been wounded or abused at the hands of captors. And at least a dozen had lost limbs or been critically wounded by mortar fire, grenades, land mines, and snipers…” (Ricchiardi, 1992).

Professor Sherry Ricchiardi (1992) considered that “…Serbians view the Western press as sympathetic to Croatia’s struggle for independence from Belgrade, making reporters and photographers fair game for attacks.” Apart from Serbian negative attitudes about foreign journalists, the problem with reporting lay in the fact that the front line was often changed, and reporters often were not adequately prepared for war reporting (Ricchiardi, 1992). “Very often journalists came to Zagreb, checked into the Hotel Intercontinental, paid a visit to the Press Bureau, found an interpreter,

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In war reporting there is a lot of manipulation and one-sidedness. BoydBarrett (2004, p. 28) states that the greatest manipulation of the causes of war happens at its beginnings, but that manipulation continues during the entire war. In modern armed conflicts journalists are also exposed to manipulation by official sources, such as government and military officials who limit the access to data and information and use journalists and the media as a tool for spreading war propaganda and psychological warfare. Croatian journalists were not trained for war reporting and very often they “were drafted and participated in activities of the Crisis Headquarters (Krizni štab)” (Maloviü & Selnow, 2001, p. 130). All this resulted in that the “news filtered through the Crisis Headquarters was less accurate, and stories from battlefields were stripped of details after they met the censor’s red pencil” (Maloviü & Selnow, 2001, p. 132). War reporting is generally one-sided. The media typically report on the war from the viewpoint of the country where there the media owners and readers are located, and which reflects the official policy of the government (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 29). So, on the one hand, a journalist is obliged to respect the principle that makes him a journalist - to report truthfully and objectively - and on the other hand, is forced to act against this same principle guided by the criteria of “restrictive truth” (Hudelist 1992 , p. 16). “…a journalist’s sense of citizenship, even patriotism, may call into question his or her perception of how best to conduct oneself as a reporter. All too often, journalists encounter those who demand to know: are you with us, or are you against us? It is at this point that individual journalists determine for themselves what their role should be, knowing that their ad hoc decision may have profound implications for how their audiences come to understand the nature of war and consequences for its victims” (Allan and Zelizer, 2004, p. 5).

Foreign journalists and the attack on Dubrovnik Foreign war reporters covered war events in Croatia from April to December 1991. During the summer of 1991 they were located in the regions of Banovina, Lika, and Kordun, from where they moved to

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Slavonia and the area around Vukovar in August and September, and in early October 1991, after the beginning of the attack on the south of Croatia, they ended up in Dubrovnik. They came to Dubrovnik through Montenegro in the framework of propaganda activities and psychological warfare of the JNA. For these purposes, Montenegro opened a press office in Herceg Novi and organised ‘study tours’ to the ‘newly-liberated’ areas. Some journalists arrived by road via Split, but this route was closed a few days after the beginning of the war because it was occupied by the JNA, and some arrived in boats from Rijeka and speedboats of the Croatian Army from the Pelješac peninsula. The JNA had on several occasions brought foreign journalists to the Dubrovnik area, but they would soon realise that these “tours” did more harm than good to its reputation. During one such trip to Dubrovnik, a Croatian journalist, Antun Masle, returned to the occupied Cavtat with his foreign colleagues (on 28 October 1991), and was immediately arrested by the Military Police of the JNA, which was witnessed by foreign journalists, including Roy Gutman and Laura Silber. He was released thanks to their protests. Masle was the first and the last Croatian journalist who reported from the occupied territories. He wrote several reports and articles about his detention and things he saw while passing through the destroyed Konavle. The JNA took serious measures to prevent any unauthorised access by journalists. Thus, one of its terms of unblocking Dubrovnik seaport on 14 October 1991, was that entry to press and television representatives must be banned (Dubrovaþki vijesnik, 1991). In October 1991, on the Marina ferry boat line from Split to Dubrovnik, the JNA demanded that four British and two Austrian and two French journalists disembark on the island of Korþula (Mirkoviü, 1991). All these actions of the JNA had been targeted at controlling the media damage sustained as a result of widespread destruction and looting of the Dubrovnik area. Thanks to the actions of the JNA and what they were able to see on-site, journalists were little by little able to distinguish which side in the conflict was bad, and which was good. Alec Russell, then a correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, in his book with the indicative title ‘Prejudice & Plum Brandy’ (1993) describes his experience during his stay in war-torn Dubrovnik:

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Chapter Five “The fight for Dubrovnik was a different war from that raging in Slavonia and the Krajina. This was a battle of spite and jealousy. …Tim Judah of The Times…spent several days with the federal forces as they plundered their way towards Dubrovnik in the early days of the siege. As soldiers emerged from the duty-free at Dubrovnik’s ýilipi Airport, with trolleyloads of whiskey and cigarettes, Tim asked their commander what the JNA’s policy was on looting. There was a slight pause before the officer replied stiffly that the goods were ‘the gift of the grateful people of ýilipi.’” (p. 241-242)

A BBC correspondent, Misha Glenny, had similar experiences. In his book ‘The Fall of Yugoslavia’ (1996) he describes the destruction of Konavle that he witnessed during the “study” trip organised by the JNA on 28 October 1991. “From the minute we crossed into Croatia, the work of the Montenegrins became all too visible. They had plundered and burned every single house. Each was pock-marked with bullets or left with gaping holes from mortars and grenades… There were no contents left in any of the houses, everything had been taken by the marauding reservists. This is what had motivated the Montenegrins and led to such a dramatic turn-around in support for the war. Videos, televisions, furniture, jewellery, and material goods of all other kinds flooded into Nikšiü and Titograd…” (p. 133)

Another 40 of Glenny’s colleagues, of which 15 were foreign journalists, joined him on the mentioned trip. A Croatian daily newspaper, Slobodna Dalmacija, published what the journalists saw on that occasion and cited an Italian radio journalist, Edoardo Ballara, who said that even in his worst dreams he could not have imagined such a horrific war, of which unfortunately by then they had the wrong view (Slobodna Dalmacija, 1991a). Their presence on the field enabled foreign journalists to bypass the manipulation of the federal government and the army and provide credible reporting. Russell (1993) explained: “When a reporter applies pen to paper, fear and anger have to be kept under control, but there are times when passion is essential to communicate the force of a story. This was Europe 1991 and an army was randomly shelling a city of minimal strategic significance and with a large, defenceless civilian population…the siege of Dubrovnik was nonetheless a terrible crime and all the more important because it was a conduit for conveying the primitivism of the JNA. In Belgrade the proud and puissant federal generals were furious at being compared with barbarians. At dinner a few days later they ranted that the Daily Telegraph was taking sides. On

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the day of the worst attack, when a shell was landing every few seconds, these same generals blithely swore that not one puff of dust had been moved in the old city” (p. 241).

As the situation became more and more dangerous, and the JNA and reservists were increasingly approaching the walled city, little by little foreign journalists started leaving Dubrovnik. This was witnessed by BBC News executive, Chris Cramer, (2011): “The wake-up call for me came when BBC newsmen covered the siege of Dubrovnik in October 1991. The team I had assigned there decided the situation was too dangerous to stay. The city was under constant bombardment and their lives were at risk. They told me they were leaving. I was furious, knowing that our media competitors were going to stay and, as it turned out, produce remarkable coverage which won several broadcast awards. How could my staff do this to me? How could they leave a story of such magnitude when the world needed to know what it looked like and how it felt to the people who lived there?” (p. 169)

However, the remaining journalists helped to ensure that the information on the suffering of Dubrovnik would end up in the world’s media. The British ITN television crew, including journalist Paul Davies and cameraman Nigel Thomson, filmed one of the fiercest attacks on Dubrovnik in November 1991 and sent the footage into the world via satellite link. Dubrovnik’s authorities did everything they could to be at the disposal of foreign journalists, in compliance with the strategy of the Ministry of Information1. In August 1991, the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Dubrovnik was established, which was, among other things, responsible for providing public information, information activities, and propaganda (Croatian President, 1991). The Crisis Headquarters established the municipal press centre, which held regular weekly press conferences starting from 15 August 1991 (Brailo, 1991a) (Riloviü, 1991). On 1 October 1991, upon the beginning of the general attack on Dubrovnik, press conferences were held on a daily basis with occasional interruptions due to disorientation and organisational problems caused by the circumstances of war. The problems during the first days of war were best illustrated by the statement of the President of the Crisis Headquarters, Željko Šikiü, at the meeting held on 12 October 1991 when he said that “we must maintain our composure and capabilities so we can get out of 1

See more in the chapter Salaj, B. Wartime information policy in Croatia and its aftermath

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this situation” (Macan, 2001: 38). This meeting was followed by a period of consolidation and the meeting of the Crisis Headquarters on 15 October saw the formation of the Information Group composed of Antun Matiü, Joško Jelaviü (journalist and editor of Radio Dubrovnik), Petar ýumbeliü, Božo Vodopija (journalist and editor of Dubrovaþki vijesnik), and Danko Atijas (Macan, 2001: 41). President of the Group was Antun Matiü, who a few days earlier said that after the first defeat “Croatian forces ... launched a fierce counterattack ...,” and that, “over 400 aggressor soldiers were killed on the Dubrovnik battlefield” (Slobodna Dalmacija, 1991b). The biggest success of the Dubrovnik press centre, although unplanned, was achieved on 1 October 1991 when the journalists left the press conference and witnessed the JNA aircraft attack on the telecommunications system on Srÿ Hill. The conference participant, Željko Šikiü, described this event: “After the first explosion we ran to the windows and watched helplessly as aircrafts launched missiles at the same target. Clouds of dust and smoke were surging at the foot of the fortress and the tower on Srÿ Hill. The aircraft fired a number of missiles, but not very precisely... I commented to the assembled journalists as the attack on the telecommunications node on Srÿ Hill being the enemy’s attack on the truth. In the age of developed information transfer, it is important to stop the possibility of spreading the truth. What you do not see on TV or in the newspapers may as well not have happened...” (Šikiü, 2011).

Dubrovnik’s authorities and the Crisis Headquarters allowed foreign journalists access to a satellite phone which was located in the office of the Mayor of Dubrovnik, in order to be able to send reports to their newsrooms. During larger attacks, journalists stayed in the Mayor’s office and had a technician at their disposal. Russell (1993) states that “although unstable, the system worked and let them concentrate on the practical difficulties of reporting on the siege” (P. 237).

Local journalists as ‘fixers’ In war situations local journalists often turn into local guides or fixers (Murrell, 2015). This was also the case with Dubrovnik reporters. Foreign journalists regularly came to the newsroom of Radio Dubrovnik, and the bureaus of Croatian Television and Slobodna Dalmacija looking for information, contacts, translators, and transport. In October 1991, a special guide book for foreign reporters was issued under the title ‘Dubrovnik in the war’ by Vinka Ljubimir from Radio

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Dubrovnik. This guide contained “information that can be of great benefit to foreign reporters: chronology of the war; organisation of life in the occupied town; data on victims; bombing, destruction, and damage of cultural monuments; on the work and programming of Radio Dubrovnik and the editions of Dubrovaþki vjesnik as well as information about specific institutions where journalists could ask for information” (Dubrovaþki vjesnik, 1991). Alec Russell (1993) said that the Australian journalist Paul McGeough rented a Renault 4 from Radio Dubrovnik in order to make a tour of Dubrovnik and determine the damage caused by the shelling by the attackers. “...to appreciate the full horror of the attack, you had to leave the sanctuary of the city walls and take to the road” (p. 238). Editor Jelaviü (2009, p. 86) confirmed that the newsroom of Radio Dubrovnik was regularly visited by reporters of the BBC, France-Presse, El Pais, etc. In November 1991, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991c) published photo-news with the following description: “If while reading a newspaper, you come across the news from France Presse from Dubrovnik, now you can see how it was written. Victoria Sregiü, correspondent of the French Agency, types a report on the recent developments in the town on the computer. She is typing in the fresh air, at the entrance to Dubrovnik’s bureau of Slobodna Dalmacija, which is for the past two months, during the blockade, the first press-centre for many foreign correspondents on the southern Croatian front” (P. 6).

In November 1991, the office of the Libertas convoy, which published the leaflet ‘The Voice from Dubrovnik’, became another informal press centre for foreign journalists. The leaflet was printed in two languages, and its purpose was, in addition to promotion, providing information to foreign journalists. Dr. Kathy Wilkes, a professor of philosophy at the University of Oxford, had a significant role in briefing foreign journalists. Dr. Wilkes worked with the Secretariat of the Inter-University Centre, tirelessly promoting the truth about the suffering of Dubrovnik. Russell (1993) said that “…she appeared to be on a crusade to share the city’s suffering. Her pro-Croat arguments stood no chance in the hurly-burly of the night-time discussions” (p. 233). It should be noted that in addition to the protests, letters of readers and telephone calls made by local officials, there was a large number of

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citizens who voluntarily informed the world public and politicians on what was happening in the Dubrovnik area.

Local journalists and their attitude towards the city under siege Maloviü and Selnow (2001, p. 135) state that the majority of Croatian journalists during the war years between 1991 and 1995 tried not to harm their country during the most difficult battles, but at the same time tried not to be used for war propaganda. In the Dubrovnik area, the conflict between journalistic ethics and the public’s right to know about the cases of (self) censorship is best illustrated by an incident that occurred in November 1991 when local journalists refused to disclose the information that Croatian troops had left the most important line of defence on Srÿ Hill. Dubrovnik reporters, upon receiving that information from the Defence Command of Dubrovnik, agreed not to disclose the same. The meeting was attended by journalists of Slobodna Dalmacija, Dubrovaþki vjesnik, Radio Dubrovnik, HINA, and others. In this case, a release of truthful information could have been suicidal2. Local journalists took the reporting on the attack on Dubrovnik as their duty and responsibility to the community and they produced their reports in line with the aim of ending the siege as soon as possible. “For some people these reports might seem too dramatic and exaggerated. We wanted our message to be heard around the world, hoping that our cries for the salvation of Dubrovnik and its people would reach out to the world public, especially those who made decisions on war and peace” (Jelaviü, 2012, p.83). Similar reports from the attacked Vukovar were received from Siniša Glavaševiü, a journalist from Croatian Radio Vukovar, who was executed at the Ovþara farm when Serbian paramilitary forces took over Vukovar (Glavaševiü, 2001).

The editor of Radio Dubrovnik, Joško Jelaviü (2012), said that in their war reports they tried to be as objective as possible and avoid “hate speech against anyone, including enemy soldiers, their troops, and the military and political leadership” (p. 83). Jelaviü (2012) explained that they coordinated the announcement of bad news with local military and political leadership and they were aware that 2 See more in the chapter Maloviü, S. Journalism between patriotism and profession

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that was not in accordance with the ethics of journalism, but according to their assessment, it was of interest to the community. “We did not always publish the bad news, which could cause additional anxiety and panic among the people, or we did it in an appropriate manner and again in agreement with the source of information, primarily the Defence Command, Municipal Crisis Headquarters, and the Civil Protection. The basis of the journalistic work is to accurately and objectively report the facts, and this must be the principle of every journalist; but in war sometimes, and especially when you receive small bits of information, it is better to keep quiet or say it in a way that will not upset the already suffering people” (p. 83).

However, during the most difficult months of the war, in the fall of 1991, local journalists had to fight against the accusations based on rumours that they issued a call to ‘treason, sale, or surrender.’

Attitude of local authorities towards local journalists While the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Dubrovnik and leading people of Dubrovnik were open to foreign journalists, with Croatian, and especially local journalists, they were trying to establish a kind of “censorship”3 and were quite reserved and disoriented by the situation. Such an attitude towards local journalists can be explained by the fear of journalists who emerged during the communist system when they were considered to be in the service of politics and they went through a system of checks by the Communist Party and security services4. Also, the Regulation on information in wartime conditions (Croatian President, 1991b), stipulated that the media “are obliged to act in accordance with the requirements of the Information Headquarters of the Republic of Croatia, municipal, administrative bodies responsible for informing also the defence commands in the area where they are located” and that a journalist or publisher can be penalised “up to five years’ imprisonment.” The dissatisfaction of Dubrovnik journalists and correspondents with such treatment resulted in a letter of 26 October 1991 in which they requested from the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Dubrovnik the following: 3

See more in the chapter Salaj, B. Wartime information policy in Croatia and its aftermath 4 See more in the chapter Beniü, V. HTV’S Dubrovnik Bureau in the Croatian War of Independence 1991/92

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Chapter Five “...to inform Dubrovnik and the Croatian public, and of course us, local reporters, about everything timely and accurately, in order to know exactly what is going on these days in Dubrovnik. We believe that we have a moral and professional obligation, after twenty-six days of war, to address you in this way, since all our proposals and suggestions for the improvement of informing in wartime were rejected on a regular basis for reasons incomprehensible to us.”

Also in January 1992, during the visit of the Minister of Information, Branko Salaj, Dubrovnik journalists pointed out that “the organisation of informing at the municipal level was not good and that the sources of information were often closed, even when there was no need for that” (Obradovic, 1992 p. 2).

Interest in reporting on Dubrovnik continues in 1992 The intense media interest for Dubrovnik under siege continued in 1992. Although there was no complete register of journalists reporting from the Dubrovnik area, the Register of Permits kept by the Defence Command of the Municipality of Dubrovnik can serve as a source of data on their numbers and the agencies to which they reported. The Register is a record of issued licences for shooting/reporting in the period from early June to late October 1992, when 182 permits were issued, of which 98 to foreign journalists. The largest number of permits was issued in June, while the lowest number was issued in October 1992. The explanation of strong interest of journalists for reporting from the Dubrovnik area during late spring and summer of 1992 can be found in the military activities of the Croatian Army on the western Dubrovnik front, which resulted in the liberation of the Dubrovnik area (Dubrovnik littoral, Župa Dubrovaþka, and Konavle) and the ‘revenge’ of Bosnian Serb forces which shelled Dubrovnik due to the inability to stop the penetration of the Croatian Army. In addition to the permits issued to Croatian journalists (84), most of the permits were issued to journalists from Germany (18), Great Britain (16), France (14), and the USA (11). The list of agencies interested in reporting from the Dubrovnik area is quite interesting. Permission was requested by the journalists of the world’s greatest media agencies such as The Washington Post, Reuters, USA Today, The Times, Der Spiegel, The Associated Press, RTL, Le Figaro, and France Press.

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Conclusion Dubrovnik’s example shows that it is very important that war correspondents report directly from the war zone. In the war zone they can get true and accurate information that is often contrary to the claims of the official sources. On the other hand, official sources do not necessarily manipulate all journalists. Dubrovnik’s example shows how local authorities manipulated local journalists, while they were completely open towards their foreign colleagues. Federal authorities tried to manipulate them, but journalists did not fall for it because during “study tours” they realised who the aggressor was, and who was the victim. At the same time, local journalists kept some information secret, although they got it from official sources, because they believed that revealing it would not be in the interest of the citizens or themselves. Finally we should add that, in addition to official sources, journalists can be influenced by other actors who, with their attitude (for example, Dr. Kathy Wilkes) or help (local journalists or fixers), inflict their own views of the conflict on the reports of their foreign colleagues.

References Antiü Brautoviü, J., & Brautoviü, M. (2009). Attack on Konavle. Exhibition catalogue. Allan, S., & Zelizer, B. (2004). Rules of engagement: journalism and war. In: Allan, S. & Zelizer, B. (ed.) Reporting war: Journalism in wartime. London: Routledge, 3-22 Bing, A. (2009). Croatian War of Independence and foreign media. Hrvatska revija 9 (3). 39-55 Boyd-Barret, O. (2004). Understanding: The second casualty. In: Allan, S. & Zelizer, B. (ed.) Reporting war: Journalism in wartime. London: Routledge, 25-42 Brailo, L. (1991, August 16). From the first press conference in the municipal press centre. Slobodna Dalmacija. Cramer, C. (2011). Taking the Right Risk. In: Owen, J. & Purdey, H. (ed.) International News Reporting: Frontlines and Deadlines. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 163-190 Glavaševiü, S. (2001). Stories from Vukovar. Zagreb: 24sata.

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Hudelist, D. (1992). Journalists under a helmet: about some tendencies in Croatian journalism during the defensive war 1991/1992). Zagreb: Globus. Jelaviü, J. (2012). Radio Dubrovnik in the Croatian War of Independence. In: Tomašiü, A. (ed.) 70 years of Radio Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik: Croatian Radio – Radio Dubrovnik. Macan, T. (2001). The last siege of Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska Dubrovnik Maloviü, S. & Selnow, G.W. (2001). The People, Press and Politics of Croatia. London: Praeger. Mirkoviü, V. (1991). The blockade of the truth. Slobodna Dalmacija, 16 October 1991, 1. Moeller, S. D. (2002). Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death. New York: Routledge. Obradoviü, Ĉ. (1991). Comments of Dubrovnik journalists. Dubrovaþki vjesnik 2138. p. 2. President of the Republic of Croatia, (1991, July 22). The decision of the Croatian President on the establishment and activities of crisis headquarters in Croatia. Retrieved from URL: http://www.branimirglavas.com/images/seks/str1.gif —. (1991). Regulation on informing. Slobodna Dalmacija. 9 November 1991, 12. Riloviü, M. (1991, August 17). Readiness of defence. Dubrovaþki vjesnik, p. 2. Ricchiardi, S. (1992). Kill The Reporters! Retrieved from http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=1511 (18.2.2016). Slobodna Dalmacija (1991a, October 1991). Foreign journalists appalled. Slobodna Dalmacija. p. 3. —. (1991b, October 4). Over 400 aggressor soldiers killed. Slobodna Dalmacija, p. 5. —. (1991c, November 27). Allo, Paris. Slobodna Dalmacija, p.6. Šikiü, Ž. (2011, November 4). Contribution to the Croatian welfare. Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/site/doprinoshrvatskojdobrobiti Vodopija, B. (1994). War editions of Dubrovaþki vjesnik. Dubrovnik : Dubrovaþki vjesnik.

CHAPTER SIX DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CITY DEFENCE BERTA DRAGIýEVIû, WARTIME EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE (IUC)

Summary Fulfilling, at that time, the function of wartime Executive Secretary of the Inter-University Centre (IUC) in Dubrovnik, the author tells how the dissemination of information by some insiders contributed to the defence of the city. Under the leading figure of the Mayor of Dubrovnik, Pero Poljaniü, the author explains how the coordination of the action of information dissemination was organised in the besieged city - especially his appeals for help throughout the world. Even if, twenty years after, the work here reported may not seem particularly important, it was nevertheless of great significance or value in the way that some witnesses helped the city in this difficult chapter of its history. It is thus believed and hoped that in doing what they could do they offered at least a small contribution to the defence of the city and to the liberation and recognition of Croatia. Keywords: Dubrovnik 1991, Inter-University Centre, Kathleen V. Wilkes, appeals

Introduction: Activities prior to attack Summer 1991, in Dubrovnik, was characterised by a heavy atmosphere; disturbing news from the north of the country and war manoeuvres; the attack on the town of Vukovar. Instead of preparations for the 20th anniversary of the Inter-University Centre (IUC) our office, on a daily basis, receives communications on the cancellation of autumn

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programmes. “Moja domovina” (My Homeland) was being played permanently on television. We listened to news and hoped that war operations would not come to Dubrovnik. In July appeals against war were launched by Academician Ivan Supek, the founder of the IUC (appealing for protection of endangered humanist principles and values), then those by Dubrovnik Festival, the Lions Club, Healthy City Dubrovnik, and others. Our office circulated them to numerous addresses. During twenty years of IUC operation in Dubrovnik hundreds of scholars, students, journalists, and diplomats passed through our office and thus a huge number of addresses, fax and telephone numbers were saved in our archive. On September 1, 1991 the city of Dubrovnik was blockaded-isolated by sea, air, and land. We were imprisoned, trapped. In late August Dr. Kathleen V. Wilkes (Kathy), professor from Oxford University and Chair of the Executive Committee of the Inter-University Centre (IUC), came to Dubrovnik and decided to stay with us in spite of the threat of war. With the help of our colleagues Vlasta Brunsko and Sreüko Krziü (and Pave Brailo from outside), Kathy and I engaged in dissemination of information on the situation in Dubrovnik. Our telephones and fax machine still functioned. The Mayor of Dubrovnik, Pero Poljaniü, invited us to coordinate the action of dissemination of his appeals throughout the world. In the following days, appeals by Mayor Poljaniü and other information were sent out to dozens of addresses… Due to difficulties in communications we did not receive many answers to our appeals (many of them reached us much later). From answers received we learned that our friends were shocked with what was happening to Dubrovnik and engaged themselves in distributing information on the situation in the town. They wrote articles for their newspapers, talked on radio and TV. Many of them also reacted promptly to our appeals for different kinds of help, in particular necessary medicines, even if channels for sending them to Dubrovnik were very insecure and limited. It is not simple to list all with whom we communicated in those weeks and who were closest to us at a time when we needed them most. However, at least a number of names should be mentioned: Professor Ivan Supek, then President of the Croatian Academy of Science and Professor Zvonimir Šeparoviü then Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his associate Marijan Kostrenþiü, always had their telephones

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and faxes open to us. From the circle of IUC functionaries we had permanent contact with Professor Orjar Oyen, from Bergen, Director General of IUC, Dr. Peter Fischer-Appelt from Hamburg and Professor Ivo Banac, from Yale. For dissemination of our information we could continually rely upon Dr. Drago Štambuk, from the Croatian Centre in London, Father Ilija Živkoviü, Voice of America, and Tane Dušilo, from Washington, Stjepan Suþiü and Vera ýiþin Šain from Matica Hrvatska in Zagreb, Snježana Hefti and Lucia Bronzan, Comitato di Solidarieta per la Croazia, Milano. Hundreds of copies of the faxes sent out throughout that period are saved in the IUC archives. They represent a valuable testimony of the work performed as a specific contribution to the spreading of truth on Dubrovnik in times of aggression, and contain numerous names of those who helped us in our actions for Dubrovnik. In late September, when communications through our telephone/fax became difficult, Kathy and I were invited to move to St. John’s Fortress (which became the seat of the City Crisis Headquarters). In painter Djuro Pulitika’s art studio, through a satellite fax/telephone (one of the three in town) we continued with our efforts to reach and inform the world. At that time Miho Katiþiü from the Mayor’s office joined us and continued to work with us in the following months.

Appeals during war After the first bombardments in early October 1991 (when the city remained without electricity and water) Kathy and I moved to the office of Mayor Poljaniü, in City Hall, and continued our work there. It was hard to share the satellite telephone/fax with all who needed it for top important contacts. Also, at that time all connections were very slow and unreliable. However, we continued with our regular contacts including a number of journalists among them: C. G. Strohm (Die Welt), G. Reismuller (FAZ), who reported on the war in and around Dubrovnik, and Krsto Cviiü (London). Along with many others, Jasmina Kuzmanoviü (Danas) was our permanent contact in Croatia. In spite of problems in communications we somehow learned that many of our friends engaged in various actions in order to inform relevant political and other circles about the suffering of Dubrovnik. The IUC director Orjar Oyen wrote to Federico Mayor, Dr. Peter Fischer-Appelt approached the German Chancellor, Professor Frano ýale wrote to President Giulio

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Andreotti, Professor Vladimir Djuro Degan wrote to President Mitterrand, Professor Bariša Krekiü from UCLA, wrote to American President George Bush. Appeals against the war, in defence of Dubrovnik and Croatia, were launched by Swedish Rectors, Law of the Sea experts (via professor Budislav Vukas), University Council Innsbruck, Swiss law professors, the Universities of Trieste, Ljubljana, Oxford, Oldenburg, Indiana, Budapest, Orebro, Padova, Sofia, London, Wroclaw, Stuttgart, Norwegian Rectors, German philosophers, Slovenian archaeologists, Danish Rectors, Victimology association, etc. President of the Norwegian Council of Universities Inge Lonning (1991, p. 590) wrote in his appeal: “Dubrovnik will continue to be a historical monument, but from now on, perhaps for centuries, a monument to the madness of man and to the irresponsibility of those who continue to commit such totally unbelievable acts.” Throughout this war period Kathy, with all her contacts, played a crucial role. She worked as a special secretary/personal assistant to the mayor, translating his appeals (sent out on September 17, 19, 24, and 30, October 5 and 15, November 4), sending her own letters to leading journals: The Times, The Independent, The Guardian, The Observer, The Sunday Times, The Sunday Telegraph, The Financial Times, The New York Times, etc. In addition she approached her personal acquaintances: President Vaclav Havel (whom she knew from their dissident days in the late seventies), George Soros (with whose support she greatly helped Central and East European scholars), Lord Carrington (whom she knew through her uncle, Sir Alec Douglas Hume, former British Prime Minister) appealing to them to help stop the war in Dubrovnik and Croatia. Through Kathy’s special contacts in Great Britain, Mayor Poljaniü addressed Margaret Thatcher, Prince Charles, Douglas Hurd, John Major, etc. Kathy was indefatigable in her work, she constantly reported on the situation in Dubrovnik talking daily on the BBC. She wrote daily columns in Glas iz Dubrovnika (The Voice of Dubrovnik). Working day and night, with immense courage Kathy accepted all dangerous situations. In those months many who should have stayed in town left it, disappeared, and moved to safer places. Kathy was not a Dubrovnik citizen, but she loved the city, did much for it in times of peace, and promptly decided to stay with us in time of war (for many years Kathy with her colleagues from Oxford University organised at the IUC postgraduate programmes on “The Philosophy of Science” and thus was a permanent visitor to the city).

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In her letter1 from October 1991 she wrote: “I am often asked why I have remained in town. I owe much to Dubrovnik: to the IUC specifically, to the city of Dubrovnik particularly, and to Croatia generally… The IUC, the people I met through the IUC, have given me constant intellectual stimulation, hospitality, friendship. So I have a large debt. A small gesture of repayment seems the least I can do. For me it is unthinkable to leave the town just now.” On October 31, 1991 Convoy Libertas arrived in Dubrovnik, breaking the sea blockade. Its arrival gave us great psychological support, bringing to us many friends, among them also Stjepan Mesiü, at that time still in the position of President of the Yugoslav Presidency.

The most difficult times for Dubrovnik After their departure the situation in Dubrovnik became more and more difficult, and with frequent bombardments in mid-November 1991 everything looked hopeless. However, we continued doing the impossible in equally impossible conditions2. Communications were more and more difficult. The arrival of French Minister Bernard Kouchner and Italian Minister Margherita Boniver3 on November 19, 1991 offered to Dubrovnik hope, and great support, psychological and practical4. Their proclamation 1

A letter which Kathy wrote to Mihajlo Markoviü - through Belgrade weekly magazine “Vreme” was often quoted. Professor Markoviü, a well-known Serbian philosopher, often participated in IUC programmes in times when, as a dissident, he was banned from Serbian universities. In time of war he became a fierce follower of Miloševiü’s policy. 2 At that time when the city was without electricity, when radios could operate only on batteries which were hard to secure and all we could listen to was Dubrovnik radio every full hour for several minutes, Stjepan Suþiü, from Matica Hrvatska in Zagreb together with Vlado Gotovac, President of Matica Hrvatska, organised a very special programme for us. Every few days for a few minutes leading Croatian intellectuals: Ivan Supek, Vlado Gotovac, Frano ýale, Ivo Padovan, Nedjeljko Fabrio, etc., addressed Dubrovnik citizens through Dubrovnik radio, expressing their support, giving us strength to endure, giving us the confirmation that we were not abandoned. 3 In late 1992 Margherita Boniver wrote a book “Dubrovnik, o cara” with vivid memories of her stay in wartime Dubrovnik, dedicated to Italian President Francesco Cossiga who enabled their action. 4 They engaged their war ships La Rance and San Marco to evacuate children and women.

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Dubrovnik-Ville de Paix/Ville Blanche was not widely welcomed but their presence secured days of calm, which ended soon after their departure. On November 24, 1991 an appeal by the Mayor of Dubrovnik was sent to friends around the world, describing the situation in the town, a situation which we thought could not become worse. But the worst did happen soon after - the heavy bombardment on December 6, 1991 on St. Nicholas’ Day, caused many victims and destruction of immense dimensions. Along with palaces within the walled city, the IUC building was hit and destroyed by incendiary bombs. Having already sent out an appeal on December 3, 1991 Mayor Poljaniü sent out a dramatic appeal on December 6, 1991 informing the world of this most recent crime against Dubrovnik. On December 9, 1991 Kathy and I sent out a letter (1991, p. 623) to IUC friends and colleagues describing the destruction of the city and the IUC and asking them for help. We wrote: “We had a dream in 1971, the project of uniting the world in Dubrovnik. With twenty founder-member universities we started and made it become true. This dream is now in ashes, not metaphorically but literally. We now have to start dreaming again; now we have the potential of 240 member-institutes, we trust that we will have as many of you as possible sharing this new dream.” In the following days the remaining parts of the IUC archives, which were saved in a part of the ground floor which did not end up in flames were transported to the building of Matica Hrvatska on Stradun. Vlado Gotovac, president of Matica Hrvatska, also offered us space for an IUC temporary office in their building. A week after the destruction, on December 14, 1991 Professor Ivan Supek arrived in Dubrovnik with a group of academics and professors from Zagreb. Upon his initiative the Croatian Academy organised a conference on “Restoration and future Development of Dubrovnik”. This visit and their appeal to the world to help revitalise Dubrovnik and to support the continuation of the IUC activities, were a most special gift to the wounded city. The world was shocked with what happened to Dubrovnik. Reaction was coming from all corners of the globe. Telephones and faxes were permanently occupied.

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For New Year’s Eve Minister Kouchner organised a French humanitarian action. The Orchestre de Chambre National de Toulouse, with Barbara Hendricks as soloist, sailed into the city with friends of Dubrovnik including politicians, philosophers, writers, journalists (among them Peter Brook and Michel Piccoli), etc. Their concert in the Franciscan church in a city still in darkness was most memorable. In December 1991, the Croatian Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, appointed Miho Katiþiü, Tomo Vlahutin, and I coordinators of the press service of Dubrovnik.

Peace had come In early January 1992 the Sarajevo Agreement brought a period of peace and on January 15, 1992 Croatia was recognised as an independent state. Sometime after, Kathy5 departed for home. I returned to my regular duties at the IUC, but also continued, together with Miho Katiþiü, to circulate information on the situation in Dubrovnik. Much work was done in February, March, and April 1992 when the city was still under siege and suffered from occasional bombardments in the closer and wider area. In late April 1992 I left Dubrovnik to undergo an operation in Zagreb. Miho continued the work on information dissemination.

Conclusion Twenty years later the work reported herein may not seem particularly important. However, it was the only way in which some of us could help the city in this latest difficult chapter of its history. We believed and hoped that in doing what we could do, we offered at least a small contribution to the defence of the city and to the liberation and recognition of Croatia.

5

In recognition of her work for the city Kathy Wilkes was made honorary citizen of Dubrovnik on St. Blaise’s Day in 1993. A few years later she was awarded an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Zagreb. Kathy died in spring 2003 and following her wish her ashes were deposited in the sea under Fortress Lovrjenac.

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References Lonning, I. (1991, October 25) Letter. In: M. Foretiü (ed.), Dubrovnik u ratu (590). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska Dubrovnik. Wilkes, K. & Dragiþeviü, B. (1991, December 9). Letter to IUC friends. In: M. Foretiü (ed.), Dubrovnik u ratu (623). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska Dubrovnik.

CHAPTER SEVEN HTV’S DUBROVNIK BUREAU IN THE CROATIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1991/92 VEDRAN BENIû, WAR CORRESPONDENT FROM DUBROVNIK FOR CROATIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTER (HRT)

Summary In this paper the author, as a person giving a first-hand account of the events taking place in Dubrovnik in wartime, reflects on the activities of HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau during the first and hardest days of the bombardment of Dubrovnik in 1991 and 1992. The Dubrovnik television crew was the only news crew providing continual coverage of the events in Dubrovnik in the first few months of the war. Other news crews would come and stay for a few days and leave. One of the reasons was that the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and the Yugoslav Navy (JRM) had a direct order to prevent any news reporter from entering Dubrovnik, which was under siege at the time. Despite all the difficulties, HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau managed to regularly broadcast from the surrounded city of Dubrovnik after a resourceful technical solution enabled them, only 24 days after JNA’s air strikes destroyed all the emitters on Srÿ, to broadcast using equipment at hand which they had used to establish a microwave link with Zagreb, which allowed them to send video material immediately after recording. .

Keywords: war, the besieged city of Dubrovnik, television picture, broadcasting, journalistic ethics, war experience

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Introduction When on the first day of open aggression against Dubrovnik on October 1, 1991 two Yugoslav Air Force jet fighters launched missiles and destroyed the television tower on Srÿ, it was clear that the doctrine of the Yugoslav People’s Army relating to the role of the media in war was starting to translate into practice. Namely, in pre-war time in a military exercise called Ništa nas ne smije iznenaditi (NNNI; Nothing May Surprise Us), held every year to test the preparedness of the so-called System of National Defence and Self-Defence, employees of Radio Dubrovnik, at the time part of Radiotelevizija Zagreb (today’s HRT), would regularly perform a drill that involved transporting a portable radio transmitter to a defensive position. Though at the time, in the building of Dubrovnik Radio Station, TV Zagreb (predecessor to Hrvatska radio televizija - HTV) was active as well, other journalists did not take part in similar NNNI drills. It was in line with the Yugoslav People’s Army doctrine according to which television as a media outlet was not something to be relied upon in wartime, because it is very easy to target broadcasting facilities necessary to transmit television signals.1 Indeed, after repeated air strikes, television broadcasts from Dubrovnik to Zagreb through the tower on Srÿ were not to be depended on. After Srÿ was deactivated, HTV Dubrovnik Studio’s news crew and employees of Odašiljaþi i veze2 found it less difficult to record military activities than to find a way to achieve television broadcasts from besieged Dubrovnik to Zagreb without electricity and telephone lines, so that the material could be broadcast on the national network and internationally, as the whole world was watching and interested in what was going on in Dubrovnik. Additional and fundamental problems included limited technical and human resources at HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau at the time.

1

At the time portable television broadcasting equipment for satellite transmission was not as developed as it is today. 2 Odašiljaþi i veze was part of HRT at that time, until the Croatian Government in 2002 decided to exclude it from HRT as an independent company, because with the introduction of several television networks with national concession, and not only HRT, they were supposed to broadcast for all televisions (HRT, 2011).

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Situation in HTV’s Dubrovnik bureau at the beginning of the war In pre-war times there were five employees in HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau.3 In the building on 1 Pero ýingrija Street there were also eight technicians employed at the company Odašiljaþi i veze. In peacetime they were in charge of maintaining broadcasting and transmission facilities in Dubrovnik-Neretva County, except on the island of Lastovo. Not a month before the war in the Dubrovnik area, cameraman Slobodan Božaniü suddenly and without prior notice left Dubrovnik one morning and travelled to the Canary Islands. He was replaced by the crew’s former sound engineer Ante Peruša. In addition, two more unplanned events occurred. While recording the first day of the attack on Dubrovnik, in Rijeka dubrovaþka on October 1, 1991 the only electronic camera HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau had at its disposal broke down. As Dubrovnik was besieged, the only other professional camera available in Dubrovnik at the time belonged to Dragan Banoviü, so he became a permanent member of the Dubrovnik news crew in the first two and a half months of the war in Dubrovnik. Also, on the first day of open aggression against Dubrovnik, October 1, 1991, Mato Kristoviü was employed as a sound technician (today a cameraman in HTV’s Dubrovnik Studio). Afterwards, with the JNA’s occupation of Cavtat, from the middle of October 1991, Zvonko Conjar, another member of the Dubrovnik television crew, remained in the occupied town of Cavtat, where he still lives today with his family. There was no time to waste, so Sreüko Bilopavloviü was immediately hired as a driver and sound technician. Additional human resources were needed, as at the time the so-called Umatic system was used which does not have a videoscope within the body of the camera as today’s equipment does. At least two persons were necessary to record, one cameraman with a shoulder-mounted camera and a sound technician holding a quite heavy videoscope. Their equipment was

3

Vedran Beniü – journalist, Slobodan Božaniü – cameraman, Ante Peruša – sound technician, Zvonko Conjar - driver/light technician and Neda Bilopavloviü – office assistant.

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connected with a two-metre cable, so that they had to walk close to one another the whole time.4 On top of that, HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau at that time had no possibility to edit the report, but they would send it to Zagreb, same as in peacetime, and material would be edited without the presence of the journalist-author, according to his or her written instructions sent to editors in Zagreb, first by telex and later by telefax. All said in this introduction is to show that despite numerous challenges in terms of personnel and technical difficulties, HTV’s Dubrovnik crew still managed to continue reporting and was the only television crew continually covering events in the besieged city of Dubrovnik in the first three months of war in 1991, with occasional arrivals of reporters and cameramen from other studios by the end of year, as well as several foreign crews.

TV reporting in wartime In principle, in reporting from Dubrovnik in wartime, the Dubrovnik television crew, similar to other journalists, was faced with three types of problems: a) How to gather relevant information; b) How to send information/picture information from besieged Dubrovnik; c) How to maintain professionalism and at the same time come to terms with the fact that it was their hometown that was under attack.

Relevance of information Fifteen days after the beginning of the attack on the south of Croatia, the Command of the Military Naval Sector Boka, Yugoslav War Navy, on October 15, 1991 issued a command on the so-called conditional unblocking of the Port of Dubrovnik. Under that command (Gamulin, 1992), the Port of Dubrovnik was unblocked under the following conditions: 4

U-matic is a system for professional electronic on-the-spot recording, which was among the first to use video cassette tapes. It was launched in the 1970s. The video tape inside U-matic cassettes is ¾ inches wide – 1.90 cm (Magoun, 2007, p. 136).

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a. “vessels carrying motor vehicles, food, medicines, medical supplies and humanitarian teams are allowed to dock; b. member of the press and television crews are to be prevented from entering; c. armed and unarmed people who may represent reinforcements for towns and ports are to be prevented from entering; d. in all situations women, children, wounded, and sick are to be allowed to leave” (p. 529). What strikes the eye is that the ban on journalists entering Dubrovnik was high on the list issued by the Yugoslav War Navy’s Command, even higher than reinforcements. The JNA was evidently aware of how news of the attacks on Dubrovnik might be received by the international community, so they used every means possible to limit the number of reporters who could witness what was happening. Therefore, reporting from the besieged city of Dubrovnik, especially in the initial and decisive days of war, fell on the back of a small group of Dubrovnik correspondents. From the start, Dubrovnik reporters realised that at official press conferences information from the front line was scarce. That is why rumours started that spread across the besieged city, especially as Montenegrin radio stations intentionally broadcast lies. Additionally, especially electronic media (more Radio Dubrovnik than HTV) were exposed to continual pressure from citizens who thought that daily reports from Dubrovnik about the bombardment and hit targets were actually useful to the enemy and their targeting, as almost during the entire war in the Dubrovnik area enemy forces that surrounded the city had no direct view from their positions, especially from Žarkovica. The city’s civilian authorities were quite reserved toward Dubrovnik reporters, holding them to be unreliable people loyal to the former Yugoslav socialist system. Equally closed, concise, and reserved in its medial releases, was the Command Headquarters of the defence of Dubrovnik. On the initiative of Luka Brailo, who was Slobodna Dalmacija’s correspondent at the time, the situation culminated in a joint statement directed towards the city’s authorities and Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Dubrovnik signed on October 26, 1991 by ten Dubrovnik journalists from different bureaus: “It is the twenty-sixth day of war in the Dubrovnik area. Dubrovnik is completely surrounded by the Federal Army, blocked from land and sea. It

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is a public secret that the troops of the so-called Yugoslav People’s Army, that came to the area in what they call a liberating mission to unblock barracks and military installations that have not been here since the sixties and to protect the local Serbian and Montenegrin population and others who do not see the Republic of Croatia as their homeland, are at the gate of the city. Objectively speaking, they have us trapped and it is only a matter of time, i.e. on the order of the High Command, when they will move against what they call ‘paramilitary Ustaša formations’ that retreated toward the walls of Dubrovnik. After the occupation, rampage, and destruction in Konavle, Župa dubrovaþka, and most of the Dubrovnik coastline, we are witnessing further destruction and mindless attacks on Rijeka dubrovaþka and its population day after day. Also, we are witnessing an unprecedented exodus of the Croatian population from Dubrovnik, as more than eleven thousand women, children, and elderly people have left by ferries to date. When it is known that in the narrow town area there are over twelve thousand refugees from the occupied parts of Dubrovnik Municipality and a large number of people waiting to sign up for evacuation, it becomes more than clear that if this situation continues, Dubrovnik will experience faith unlike any other war zone in Croatia. In this situation, it is certain that the Federal Army has given a new ultimatum to the municipal authorities or, as Dubrovnik town government calls it – Yugoslav People’s Army’s proposals – of which foreign press and the international public have been notified, but not members of the Croatian media or Croatian public. Reasons why this is being done are unknown to us, but it is a fact that the local population has been put in total information blockade since the beginning of hostilities and that the lack of information on what is happening is becoming unbearable. Therefore, we are requesting the municipal authorities and the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Dubrovnik to issue timely and accurate notifications to Dubrovnik and Croatian citizens and, of course, us, the local press, of the current situation in Dubrovnik. We believe that it is our moral and professional obligation to issue this appeal after twentysix days of war, because all our suggestions and proposals on how to improve delivery of information under war conditions have so far regularly been met with inexplicable rejection5.”

5 The letter was signed by: Luko Brailo – Slobodna Dalmacija, Božo Vodopija – Dubrovaþki vjesnik, Ĉorÿe Obradoviü – Dubrovaþki vjesnik, Ilija Papac – Veþernji

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The situation, however, remained the same throughout the war and similar remarks were made by reporters in a tumultuous meeting held between Dubrovnik reporters and the Minister of Information of Croatia Branko Salaj in Dubrovnik on January 9, 1992, when it had already become clear that Dubrovnik would be defended. After Minister Salaj emphasised that war against Croatia was being waged on three fronts – on the battlefield, at the negotiating table, and in the media, and that Croatia needed to be defended on all three fronts, followed a strong reaction by Dubrovnik reporters which was covered by the local weekly newspaper: “President of the Dubrovnik office of the Croatian Journalists’ Association Luko Brailo emphasised that throughout the war the organisation of reporting on municipal level was not good and that information sources were often inaccessible even when there was no actual need for them to be. Antonio Salvia and Vedran Beniü said that in the hardest times for Dubrovnik municipal authorities had not called press conferences, while Dubravko Cota noted how Croatia might have done more to stop the information blockade Dubrovnik was in during most of the war. Suad Ahmetoviü noticed that in the news broadcast by Radio-Crna Gora at 15:30h there were reports on the status of negotiations with the occupation army, while Dubrovnik reporters were not notified of the results of negotiations until the evening hours after the news was broadcast-ready” (Dubrovaþki vjesnik, 1992, p. 2). Due to all the difficulties in gathering relevant information, Dubrovnik reporters acted on their own initiative and established an informal journalistic pool, regardless of the differences between the media and agencies they reported to. Events were plentiful and Dubrovnik reporters relatively few, so some information was available only through mutual exchange of information. Dubrovnik reporters were meeting daily at a specific time on the premises of Radio Dubrovnik (which had a power aggregate) and exchanged the most important information received during the day. Only owing to such self-organising, Dubrovnik reporters were able to carry out their work professionally in a completely surrounded town.

list, Anet Maruniü – Slobodna Dalmacija, Božo Brzica – Radio Dubrovnik, Vedran Beniü – HTV’ Dubrovnik Bureau , Stipe Puÿa – HINA, Mano Alkoviü – Tanjug and Joško Jelaviü – Croatian radio station Radio Dubrovnik.

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How to send information? All Dubrovnik reporters, regardless of the media they worked for, were faced with a problem of information delivery to their newsrooms. It needs to be said that reporters had only one telephone for intercity calls. For the longest period of time that telephone line was located in one of the rooms at the Plakir hotel and afterwards in the post office on Ilijina Glavica. That was how the newsrooms could be sent articles and telephone reports could be recorded. However, that was insufficient for television because it was necessary to find a way to send picture information as well. The first recordings of attacks on Dubrovnik were sent by car to Split, but after Slano was occupied on October 7, 1991 that also became impossible. After that the only way to send anything was by Jadrolinija’s boat Slavija, which had a permit issued by the Command of the Military-Naval Sector Boka to sail into Gruž harbour under the conditions of so-called limited exclusion. That meant the inspection of passengers and vessels after leaving Dubrovnik; in the first days in the waters just opposite Dubrovnik, and later in the Port of Kumbor in Boka Kotorska. Dubrovnik’s HTV television crew would give the crew of Slavija recorded U-matic cassettes upon embarking and they would hide them in the engine room, and after arriving at Split hand them over to the employees of the Split HTV studio. From there they were sent to Zagreb by standard microwave, so-called link connections. As recordings from Dubrovnik sent aboard the Slavija were a day or two old, the employees of Odašiljaþi i veze would try to find any way possible to use the technology available at Dubrovnik at the time to establish a connection that would enable picture information to be sent again by link, i.e. aerial transmission. They had come up with an original technical solution, unique, and the only one possible in the war conditions existing in Dubrovnik at the time. Namely, an idea came up to use one of the transmitters on Velika Petka, used for broadcasting television programming to households in the pre-war period. To explain the idea in a less technical language, it basically meant that HTV’s reports from Dubrovnik were not to be sent via for that purpose intended special direct link microwave connections (which were now destroyed), but they would be sent from the Dubrovnik war studio located in the basement of the Villa ýingrija via the Petka repeater using a broadband transmitter usually used for television broadcasting to households. That also meant that those lucky people who had emergency power aggregates in wartime Dubrovnik, because the power supply was cut off, could watch the television reports

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Dubrovnik’s news crew and its technical and broadcast team tried to send to Zagreb. That signal would be received at the Rota facility on the peninsula of Pelješac the same way as household television sets receive regular television programmes. The signal would be amplified to go through Biokovo to Zagreb. Arrangements regarding technical details of establishing such an aerial connection between Dubrovnik and Zagreb would include Dubrovnik radio amateurs, because, as explained earlier, telephone connections with the surrounded city of Dubrovnik were down. There was a problem with the quality of the picture, because the signal emitted from Dubrovnik was interrupted by signals from the Italian TV transmitter that used the same channel used to send pictures to Rota. That required a rapid improvisation that included an antenna receiving system on Rota, which helped reduce interruption. The first successful transmission of television pictures from Dubrovnik to Zagreb on the same day came at just the right time – on that day enemy bombs hit the historic monuments in the heart of the city walls for the first time, causing damage to the Sponza Palace, Synagogue, and the roof of the Rupe Museum. “On October 24, 1991 only twenty days after all links with Dubrovnik were cut off, HRT recordings showing the situation in Dubrovnik, ghostly empty Stradun filled with rubble witnessing the destruction of centuriesold walls, managed to reach Zagreb and from there the rest of the world. With pleasure and relief we watched images from Dubrovnik taken from HRT on CNN and other channels that evening. Interruption caused by the Italian transmitter still occurred occasionally, but no one cared about that anymore – the facts and contents were far more important. It was a huge victory in the battle to reach international media space, while the enemy already boasted and wrote about the complete destruction of the Croatian information delivery system” (Kulušiü, 2001, p. 113).

The shock caused by the fact that television pictures were reaching the world on the same day they were recorded is best shown in the reports broadcast on numerous television channels. When asked by a journalist, in a report on Televizija Sarajevo, JNA’s General Andrija Rašeta, who was chief negotiator with the Croatian government on JNA’s retreat from Croatia in 1991, offered short answers with multiple counter-questions, which is usually the case when the person being interviewed has no valid reply to the question. He replied with “Which Dubrovnik? Attack on Dubrovnik?”, and when asked directly

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about the published television recordings of damage caused to old town core he said: “I saw the recordings from Dubrovnik, but what is shown is not true” (Beniü, 1997). Slovenian Television started their report by showing the launching of projectiles against Dubrovnik: “The recording you are watching was sent to the world by Belgrade Television. It undeniably confutes the Army’s statements about how they are not attacking Dubrovnik. Meanwhile TANJUG reports that the Army did not launch missiles at the old town core, but states that the Croatian forces mined the town causing destruction so they could accuse the Army. Despite the poor quality of the recording, Croatian Television broadcast images showing the destruction of the old town core” (Beniü, 1997). Television Montenegro showed an interview in which Lieutenant Commander of the Second Operative Group of Yugoslav People’s Army for Dubrovnik-Hercegovina Warzone, Colonel Savo Lakiü, with the help of TV Montenegro reporter Milan Šüekiü, unsuccessfully attempted to undermine the importance of what HTV’s broadcast has shown the world: “COLONEL SAVO LAKIû: Some plaster on the ground, several broken tiles, that does not prove anything. TV MN REPORTER MILAN ŠûEKIû: What we saw last night was sad and ridiculous! COLONEL SAVO LAKIû: That is part of the scenario that has been prepared from the start and is now being put into practice. They prepared locations and are now activating mines set up all over the town so they could report that JNA is launching attacks against the old town core.”

Sarajevo Television cited Lakiü saying that “last night’s recording showing the streets of Dubrovnik is even less believable than the one allegedly showing recent air strikes on Banski dvori in Zagreb” (Beniü, 1997). The unconventional solution to the information blockade of Dubrovnik regularly causes amazement among foreign television professionals. The story was even mentioned in the introductory lectures at one of the plenary sessions of the Annual Meeting of the European Association of Regional Television – CIRCOM (Beniü, 2003). Everyone participating in the discussion that followed agreed that in their technically equipped and smooth-running studios, where perfection is found in daily routine, it is

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not likely that anyone would come up with such a resourceful solution to the problem that Dubrovnik faced. Only after the reports broadcast by Croatian Television showing the destruction of Dubrovnik’s monuments reached international TV stations, did foreign news crews start arriving in Dubrovnik (French CANAL 5, British ITN, and WTN). The ITN crew lead by Paul Davies stayed the longest. They came at just the right time to record an uninterrupted fiveday attack on Dubrovnik in November 1991. The ITN crew was experienced in reporting from war zones (cameraman Nigel Thomson had the nickname ‘Crazy Nigel’). They were fully equipped for recording and editing, which also included satellite equipment for sending recorded material. They stayed at the Argentina hotel (as did all foreign press members) which afforded an ideal position for impressive recordings of attacks on the old town core of Dubrovnik. For reporting from Dubrovnik, Paul Davies received a Golden Nymph Award at the 1991 Television Festival in Monte Carlo. As with many other foreign reporters, Paul Davies’s crew was in everyday contact with the HTV Dubrovnik crew. Producer Sandy MacIntyre regularly cooperated with the Dubrovnik news crew and often joined them in reports from the ground. Today MacIntyre is vice-president and head of the news section of the Associated Press Television News (APTN) agency (AP, 2013). Brian Green, WTN cameramen, also stayed in wartime Dubrovnik for a longer period of time and regularly worked with the HTV Dubrovnik crew, almost as one of its regular members. The technological solution to the problem of video broadcasts from Dubrovnik enabled the recording of the worst destruction of Dubrovnik’s old town core to reach international televisions stations immediately on December 6, 1991. Later, during the war, as the enemy lines moved farther from Dubrovnik, which enabled the establishing of better microwave connections, the basement of the Dubrovnik HTV studio was the constant feeding point, the place from which all television reports emitted from Dubrovnik were sent into the world.

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Staying professional despite all Dubrovnik reporters, the same as other Croatian reporters in their towns, found themselves in a specific situation at the beginning of the war – they had to report about events which included the destruction of their hometowns and the deaths and suffering of family members, friends, and acquaintances. In the completely surrounded town of Dubrovnik, without electricity, drinking water, or enough to eat they not only had to send several daily reports to their newsrooms, but also had to search for food which was scarce in these harsh conditions while constantly worrying about the safety of their families. These facts alone make a huge difference between detached, professional reporting by reporters who came to Dubrovnik as outsiders, especially from other countries, and those living and working in Dubrovnik. In that situation Dubrovnik reporters were faced with multiple ethical dilemmas, primarily about the line that must not be crossed when it came to journalistic ethics. The basic criterion was the one of truthfulness. That was the principle fostered by other reporters as well and that translated into a joint journalistic statement directed towards Dubrovnik authorities on October 26, 1991. Personally, my determination that in wartime one must above all stay faithful to the principle of truthfulness became even stronger just before the war started when I was invited, as the only HTV reporter in Dubrovnik, to attend a meeting at the Dubrovnik Defence Command. In that conversation my attention was drawn to the fact that for the HTV show For Freedom it would be appropriate to record a mother with one son serving in the JNA and another as a volunteer fighter in the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). They noted how it would be nice if she invited her son to leave JNA and join his brother in the Croatian ZNG. “Of course, I will be happy to follow up on that story. Are you aware of such a case?” I asked. “There is no need for that. Find an old lady and tell her to act in front of the camera!” I immediately declined to make such a report, knowing that if I agreed to that (and that it would soon be revealed as a false story) I would lose all journalistic credibility in the eyes of my viewers in the decisive days that were to follow. The resolve to stay, dedicated above all to the truthfulness

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of the information we are reporting, was becoming even stronger in me and among my fellow reporters in Dubrovnik once we saw the abundance of lies and false information coming from the enemy side and which was so unbelievable that it seemed impossible that anyone would believe it. There was only one incident that was an exception to that general standing of Dubrovnik reporters, a Dubrovaþki vjesnik publication at the beginning of the war. There was no electricity to print newspapers and in the beginning there were issued daily fliers and later hand printed war issues. The first war flier by Dubrovaþki vjesnik was written as propaganda material directed at JNA, and, among other things, read as follows: “ENEMY LOSSES: Casualties included 450 enemy combatants and reliable sources tell us there are over 1000 wounded. Two enemy airplanes, three tanks, two armed transporters and over ten trucks and other vehicles were destroyed. A large number of the occupation army’s combatants and reservists were captured or they surrendered and a large amount of military equipment was taken... ...There is no room for panic. Nobody can win against the people. War Bureau of Dubrovaþki vjesnik” (Dubrovaþki vjesnik, 1991b)

However, the following issue of Dubrovaþki vjesnik did not include fliers in the style of socialist ONO and DSZ doctrines, like the one shown above with false data about as many as 450 dead enemy combatants, which, I am positive, none of its readers believed anyway. The biggest dilemma in war reporting came before Dubrovnik reporters in November 1991. Notwithstanding the proclamation of December 6 as the Day of Dubrovnik Defenders to commemorate the all-day bombardment in 1991 when town monuments suffered major destruction, in all following recounts of events it became clear that the hardest days in the defence of Dubrovnik were those between the 11th and 14th of November, 1991. Such thoughts were confirmed by Major-General Nojko Marinoviü (Lieutenant Colonel in wartime), Dubrovnik Defence Commander, commenting that during those days members of the Defence Command even had a permit to leave the town: “I have to say that Dubrovnik was often hanging by a thread in those days, and 11th – 14th November were decisive days in the defence of the city. I had to decide the war tactics, but my ethics do not let me decide on the morals, so that day I offered everyone a chance to leave, because I knew what their faith would be if JNA entered the city. They

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asked me, ‘And you Commander?’ I replied: ‘I am staying!’ and they said ‘Then we are staying too!’” (Dubrovaþki list, 2010, p. 54) One night, after days of exhausting bombardment of Dubrovnik, which lasted from dawn until dusk, Dubrovnik reporters gathered at the previously mentioned self-organised pool at the Dubrovnik Radio Station to make their regular evening telephone reports from the Dubrovnik Defence Command, and received disturbing information that the city would be defended from the Adriatic Highway. That meant that the stronghold of Dubrovnik’s defence, the Srÿ Fortress, had been abandoned. One should know that that fortress was much more than a stronghold for the people of besieged Dubrovnik. Every morning the Croatian flag would be raised atop the television tower in the vicinity of the fortress, signalling to everyone living in Dubrovnik that the defenders of Dubrovnik were still holding their defensive positions. Shocked by the statement of the Command, attending Dubrovnik reporters (from radio stations, television, HINA, Slobodna Dalmacija, Veþernji list, and Dubrovaþki vjesnik) reached a unanimous decision about withholding that piece of information from the public! It was a shared opinion that by publishing that information they would cause panic among the citizens of the besieged city and it is not certain what further developments would come in the war situation after the spreading of that information. The evening report only offered information that the hardest battles so far took place at the edge of the city. It so happened that the only publication that reported the abandonment of the Srÿ Fortress was Zagreb’s newspaper Vjesnik. This is the introductory report by Suad Ahmetoviü (1991) for Vjesnik with a subheading that states how “due to strategic reasons, Croatian forces retreated from Srÿ”: “In the defence of Dubrovnik there has been a change. On Wednesday evening the Croatian forces retreated from the strategic position in the Imperial Fortress atop Srÿ, a promontory overlooking the old cultural and historic heart of the city. As we have been notified at the Dubrovnik Defence Command, it was, in military jargon, a controlled decision intended to enable the forces to choose a tactically more favourable site for the location of the front line. Namely, in the last few days the enemy directed all forces and heavy artillery from the land, sea, and air to the Imperial Fortress. Looking up from the city beneath Srÿ how the Imperial Fortress is being repeatedly hit by bombs with black clouds of smoke rising from it afterwards, the people of Dubrovnik, impressed with the courage of their defenders, wondered how their soldiers are managing to survive in such a hellish atmosphere.

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Sadly, the enemy moved forward from their position on Žarkovica above the eastern edge of the city across the hilltop Bosanka. In combat for the fortress, both sides suffered serious casualties and many deaths, but the Defence Command emphasised that the enemy suffered greater losses compared to the resources involved. THE ENEMY WILL NOT COME DOWN FROM SRĈ! The army of occupation has not yet entered the Imperial Fortress, but it is realistic to expect that on Thursday morning their flag will be raised on that monumental building, just as they did after the occupation of the fortress on Žarkovica. On our question as to how the city will be defended from now on, we were told that the enemy will not be allowed to come down from Srÿ. Therefore, if war operations continue, the most decisive and important battle will take place at the edge of the city. In the Defence Command there is a belief that the enemy will not enter the city because that would mean risking huge losses. The enemy’s position above the town is definitely unfavourable in terms of defence, but one has to remember that from their previous positions Serbian combatants widely used the possibility to inflict major criminal destruction upon Dubrovnik, previously unseen by this ancient city in its millennia-long history. It is of key importance how the area of Rijeka dubrovaþka will be defended. We have been told that Mokošica and other settlements on both river banks are ‘parts of an elastically defended area’. For the western front in Dubrovnik Municipality, near Slano and neighbouring settlements, the Defence Command explained that those areas and Dubrovnik are treated completely separately in terms of military tactics and politics” (Ahmetoviü, 1991, p. 5).

As the news about retreat from the Srÿ Fortress was not published in any electronic media, but only in the Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik, it failed to reach the enemy attacking Dubrovnik. It so happened that the fortress was empty for three days, as the enemy believed that the Croatian defenders were still in it. During regular negotiations with the JNA representatives in Boka Kotorska on November 14, 1991, which were actually used to buy precious time necessary to consolidate the defence of Dubrovnik, negotiators realised that the other side was completely unaware that the fortress on Srÿ was abandoned and that they still had not occupied it. They managed to send that information to Dubrovnik and Croatian defenders returned to the fortress. Twenty years after the war, consulted for the purposes of writing this paper, reporter Luko Brailo, who was the one to receive the shocking news about the Srÿ Fortress from the Defence Command on behalf of all Dubrovnik correspondents, maintains that withholding the news, under the

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war circumstances at the time, was justified from the aspect of both humanity and professionalism: “From the 11th to 14th November, 1991 the sieged Dubrovnik suffered the hardest days of war. When our Defence Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Nojko Marinoviü said that the ‘Croatian forces had to pull back and that the town will be defended from the nearest point of communication,’ we realised that Srÿ had been abandoned. It was a shock to all of us, as we were all aware what the news about the falling of Srÿ into enemy hands would mean for the defence of our town and people in Dubrovnik. We discussed the situation and everyone explained their view of that completely valid and confirmed piece of news-information, and we reached a unanimous decision: we will not publish it as we have heard it, but we will rephrase it and say that the hardest battles so far have taken place. We were convinced that, if we were to publish that news in the evening Croatian Radio Daily Chronicle– Radio Zagreb – the morning after with first daylight people would start swimming and rowing toward Italy. I am equally convinced today, regardless of dilemmas concerning the ethics of such treatment of information, that we did the right thing under such horrific conditions of war and the siege of Dubrovnik” (L. Brailo, personal communication, 2011).

Asked to give opinion on the same topic, now retired journalist and wartime manager of Dubrovnik Radio Station Joško Jelaviü offered: “In news reports during the Croatian War of Independence, especially in the hardest moments for besieged Dubrovnik and people hiding in basements and shelters without water, electricity, or any link with the outside world, I remembered and followed the old Italian saying ‘Never lie, but don’t always tell the truth’. It is in the nature of journalism to offer an accurate and objective account of the facts to the public. That is a maxim every journalist must follow, but in war it is sometimes better to withhold bad or disturbing news or convey it in a way that will not cause additional unrest or panic among people who are already suffering. That is why I didn’t hesitate at all in agreeing with my colleagues not to include information that the defence line was now at the Adriatic Highway and not on Srÿ in the evening news on the 11th and 12th of November, 1991, because that would indicate that the Croatian combatants pulled back from Srÿ. Why did we not publish that news? Because the fortress on Srÿ was the symbol of our town’s defence and saying that it was abandoned and in the evening hours would cause indescribable panic among the people of Dubrovnik, and it is a big question as to what would happen next and what would be the faith of Dubrovnik if the enemy heard about that. In two days, when defenders returned to Srÿ, it turned out that we were right. We later received confirmation from the Defence Command and personally

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from General Nojko Marinoviü. In short, there was no Hamlet’s dilemma. The solidarity of us war reporters not only showed that we had moral and journalistic integrity, but it enabled the surrounded and suffering people to persevere, because while the Croatian flag was on the fortress even those whose spirit was at the lowest level had hope that the Croatian Athens would not fall” (J. Jelaviü, personal communication, 2011).

I personally commented on the decision not to publish the information about defenders pulling back from the fortress in an interview for the newspaper, as follows: “That is, I hope, the last time I felt pride for not conveying a piece of information as a reporter”6 (Beniü, 1994, p. 25).

Closing comments Covering war is a difficult and challenging task for every reporter. In Croatia, domestic reporters had an even more difficult job. Unlike foreign reporters, they also had to find a way to stay professional and detached while faced with the possibility of losing their loved ones and watching their hometown being destroyed and their homeland being attacked. I believe that Dubrovnik reporters, despite such circumstances, stayed loyal to their profession and did not betray its principles. It is also true that Croatian forces in war-stricken Dubrovnik acted in a way that did not make that difficult. Dubrovnik’s war story is unstained, so to say. That story could even be described as the epitome of the conflict between good and evil, the city and its citizens on the one side and those who bombarded and besieged it on the other. Everyone did their best in that chaos, so did the Dubrovnik reporters, making sure that they did not cross the line when it came to staying faithful to the basic ethical principles of their profession. I believe that it can be concluded that, regardless of multiple difficulties, limited human and technical resources, the crew of HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau acted just like that, while reporting as the only television crew continually covering the first months of war from the completely surrounded Dubrovnik. Of course many things could have been done better and differently. However, the HTV Dubrovnik crew succeeded in the most important thing 6

VEýERNJI LIST, “Vedran Beniü: Dopisnici su rudari novinarstva”, Zagreb, 24. VI 1994, p. 25

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– the images of the destruction of Dubrovnik, despite all efforts of the enemy, in the first and the hardest days of war, reached viewers daily, showing the world what was happening. The importance of that is also reflected in the confused initial reaction of the JNA Commander on October 24, 1991 when the recording of the bombarded old town reached the international public instantly. Similar confusion, and anger of the attackers, was caused by the photos of occupied and burned Konavle and VHS recordings of Grude under occupation, which Croatian Television showed for the first time in 1992. They were made secretly in an occupied area and transferred to Dubrovnik. Parts of that material reached HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau through Luka Brailo, and two colour film rolls reached the bureau thanks to Zvonko Conjar, a member of HTV’s Dubrovnik Bureau, who had been living with his family in occupied Cavtat since April 1992. In the end, let me offer a personal experience of the author of this paper and maybe a lesson to any future television reporter faced with a similar situation. During the war in Dubrovnik I found myself in an extremely sensitive situation on several occasions with a limited supply of 20-minute U-matic cassettes at the disposal of the Dubrovnik television crew. I had to choose what to delete in order to be able to record new content. I decided to keep the recordings of the devastation of Dubrovnik and delete some of the interviews. Today I am certain that many of the decisions I made were wrong. Even though amateur equipment available at the time was not as advanced as today and not available to as many people, there were numerous quality amateur recordings of the bombardment of Dubrovnik. What cannot be found and what will never be available to anyone today are recordings of conversations with those people caught in the midst of war. Eyewitness memories and the account of events given at a later time may never have the same dramatic and documentary value as material recorded at the time and in the atmosphere in which events are actually taking place. It is true that in the HTV Archives in Zagreb fragments of such interviews may be found as they were included in news reports, but today, decades later, the whole recorded material would be of great value. Therefore, when faced with the dilemma of what to delete and what to keep, with today’s experience in war reporting my answer is clear: ONLY the best video of the destruction of property and ALL of the interviews. Other sources will have video recordings of buildings being destroyed, but those conversations will never be repeated again in the same atmosphere and with the same intensity of emotion.

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References Ahmetoviü, S. (1991, November 14). VJESNIK, Pregovori utišali topove. Vjesnik, pp. 5. AP. (2013, March 18). AP VP Sandy MacIntyre named director of global video news. Retrieved from http://www.ap.org/Content/Press-Release/ 2013/AP-VP-Sandy-MacIntyre-named-director-of-global-video-news Beniü, V. (1994, June 24). Vedran Beniü: Dopisnici su rudari novinarstva. Veþernji list, pp. 25. —. (1997). Prkos je strujao Gradom (fragmenti za nezaborav 1.10.1991.15.01.1992. [Motion picture]. Available from HRT. —. (2003). Lecture at 21st annual meeting CIRCOM. Italy. Brailo, L. (2001, September 1). Personal communication. Dubrovaþki list (2010, January, 21); From the minutes of the public panel ‘Neüemo zaboraviti’ organised by the Museum of Contemporary History - Dubrovnik Museums. Dubrovaþki list, pp. 54 Dubrovaþki vjesnik (1991, October, 5) 1st war edition of Dubrovaþki vjesnik. —. (1992, January 18). Dubrovaþki vjesnik, pp. 2 Gamulin, N. (1992). Kronologija ratnih zbivanja. In M. Foretiü (ed.), Dubrovnik u ratu (525-549). Dubrovnik: Matica Hrvatska Dubrovnik. HRT. (2011, September, 15) Retrieved from http://www.hrt.hr/index.php?id=173&tx_ttnews[cat]=96&tx_ttnews[tt _news]=326&tx_ttnews[backPid]=185&cHash=7a4a5cb205 Jelaviü, J. (2001, September 3). Personal communication. Kulušiü, P. (2001), Domovinski rat (pokušaj informacijske blokade Dubrovnika). In Z. Prelog & N. Vonþina (Ed.), Zbornik zapisa i sjeüanja djelatnika RZ, RTZ i HRT u povodu 75. obljetnice Hrvatskoga radija i 45. obljetnice Hrvatske televizije (113). Zagreb: HRT. Magoun, A. B. (2007). Television: The Life Story of a Technology. London: Greenwood Press.

PART III: MEDIA ANALYSIS ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR IN DUBROVNIK AND CROATIA

CHAPTER EIGHT MILOŠEVIû’S PROPAGANDA DURING THE ATTACKS ON DUBROVNIK AND CROATIA DR. RENAUD DE LA BROSSE, LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY & UNIVERSITY OF REIMS, SWEDEN/FRANCE

Summary Miloševiü took control of the Serbian media in order to impose his nationalist propaganda and justify the political project of creating a Greater Serbia – which would be home to all Serbian people. The media turned out to be an active tool that contributed to the preparation and conduct of war, against Croatia particularly. Dubrovnik, as well as Vukovar, were priority targets, both victims of and subject to propaganda war. The author describes the processes at stake, providing numerous examples of misbehaviours by media and journalists during that period. All possible tricks were carried out in order to legitimise the use of force against those who were depicted as enemies to the Serbian people at large. Conspiracy paranoia, disinformation, manipulation, stigmatisation, etc., helped in demonising the non-ethnic Serb population, spread fear among the public, and laid the foundations for the worst possible atrocities. Keywords: Media, political propaganda, war, Miloševiü, manipulation, Greater Serbia.

Introduction Slobodan Miloševiü knowingly used and controlled the media in Serbia to impose the themes of nationalist propaganda to justify to the citizens the creation of a State – which would be home to all Serbian people – and also

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to strengthen his authority. For the propaganda disseminated through the press and audio-visual media to be fully effective, Miloševiü personally ensured control over the public media, restricted the freedom of speech of the existing independent media by using all measures to prevent them from informing the citizens, and made sure that the journalists followed the official line and adhered to the ideas and programme of the government – in short made sure that they bowed to the discipline imposed. While the media paved the way for the war which erupted with Slovenia and Croatia’s declarations of independence on 25 June 1991, television channels, radio stations, and newspapers also knowingly sustained it by devoting themselves to the war effort and waging an intense media battle of hateful propaganda and biased and untrue information. On all sides, the feelings and resentment of the peoples making up the Federation were indisputably manipulated and used – with everything orchestrated by true propaganda specialists - in order to stigmatise differences in identity and make it quite impossible for these peoples to live together within the Yugoslav region (Šüekiü, 2015).

Propaganda as a political tool The use of propaganda by the belligerents in the Yugoslav conflict was not new (Carruthers, 2011). In the event, they did nothing but reuse certain techniques and methods tried and tested in other contexts, especially Nazi Germany of the thirties where the techniques of manipulating crowds using propaganda and disinformation (Chakhotin, 1940) had prepared and conditioned German public opinion for the Second World War and the genocide that came with it. Historically, political propaganda is closely linked to war and may certainly be viewed as war prosecuted by other means. It is intended to build and bolster national cohesion, but also to create fear and disorder among the enemy. All politicians and governments naturally seek to establish their legitimacy, gain support for their ideas, and obtain the backing of the greatest number of people possible. Historical precedents exist to demonstrate the effectiveness of political propaganda and the ravages that it can cause. Stalinist propaganda, especially under the strict control of a man like Andreï Jdanov, would pervade every sector of society (politics, science, cinema, sports, painting, literature, music, etc.) with a view to the coming about of a “New Man”: “a being” to be created to which

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ultimately any form of opposition would be sacrificed – through political purges, deportation of population groups, and murder of opponents. Obsessive and focused on the cult of the leader (Stalin) and the repetition of dogma and slogans, Stalinist propaganda – to which Maoist propaganda could be likened – included censorship, centralised control of broadcasting means (media), and the use of news or staged events. Any other form of critical expression was excluded (Sorlin & Sorlin, 1972; Mond, year unknown). But it was the Nazi regime, under the guiding influence of Hitler and Goebbels, which would break the most ground in using propaganda as a weapon in and of itself (Grosser, 1972) to mobilise the German masses around slogans such as the conquest of lebensraum and the defence of the German people (supposed to be the pure and superior component of the white race, the Aryan) – preludes to the establishment of a thousand-year Aryan empire. Unlike communist propaganda, which generally sought to mobilise people around tangible objectives, Nazi propaganda did not any assign itself any specific goals but instead looked to cause emotional shock and played greatly on the irrational feelings of the masses. It sought to stimulate the hatred and hunger for power lying dormant in them. What makes it possible to characterise it is that the idea counted for less than the psychological shock it sought to produce on the masses by using techniques and procedures exploiting the psychic, physiological, and unconscious mechanisms of crowds. In what follows, we will back ourselves on the definition that Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell (2014, p.7) have given of propaganda: “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. In the former Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, the same techniques were used: the trick is to keep it simple; to project one’s faults onto others; to turn the news to your own advantage; and continually repeat your message.

One objective: unite all Serbs The main political programme of the Miloševiü regime since 1987 was to highlight the need to unite within a single territorial entity all Serb populations spread over Yugoslav territory. Meanwhile, the other ethnic groups were implicitly or explicitly encouraged to clear out of the place.

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These objectives were relayed through the controlled media, by many key Serbian politicians conveying the idea that the non-Serb populations must leave the territory where the Serbs are living or submit themselves… - as shown by the following examples: “Only the peoples of this Yugoslavia have the right to decide its destiny because it was not the republics which created Yugoslavia but the peoples (...) The Serbian people want to live in a single State. For this reason, any division into several States which would separate the various parts of the Serbian people by placing them in different sovereign States cannot, in our opinion, be accepted, that is - and I will be more specific still - cannot even be considered” (Slobodan Miloševiü, cited in Danas (1991a)) “We have nothing against the fact that the new “Poglavnik” of the Ustaša, Franjo Tuÿman, is forming his independent State of Croatia but only to the west of the Karlovac-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. We will avenge the Serbian blood and present the bill for all the crimes and a million Serbian victims to the new Ustaša movement. All Serbism; Serbism has no price! (...) 100,000 Croats must leave Serbia, otherwise Serbia will quite simply not be able to accommodate the unfortunate Serbs driven out of Croatia. This will just be an exchange of population, carried out under the pressure of the Croatian government’s terror” (Vojislav Šešelj, President of the Serbian Radical Party, cited in Politika (1991)). “This is the third or the fourth republic to want out of Yugoslavia… The path they embarked on is the same highway which led Croatia to hell, but the hell of war in BiH would be even more terrible, for Muslims could perhaps become extinct… Hence don’t try to negotiate things in Europe to which you are not entitled” (Radovan Karadžiü, president of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia, cited in Vecernje Novosti (1991)). “I would like to inform the Serbian people that we are going to correct all the injustices regarding the borders traced by Josip Broz with his dirty finger out of boredom. He sold Serbian territories cheap to the Croats and Muslims. The Muslims are only a negligible minority, which must yield to the majority Serbian people. We will not stop, we will chase them all the way to Zagreb if necessary. We have revenge in our blood and in our oath” (Božidar Vuþureviü, president of the Self-Proclaimed Region of Eastern Herzegovina, cited in Danas (1991)).

Generally speaking, the expulsion of non-Serbs is presented repeatedly in the media as an absolute security necessity. A good example is the declaration made by academic and novelist, as well as Ideologist of Greater Serbia, Dobrica ûosiü who, by skilful use of rhetoric, begins by saying that he never called for ethnic cleansing while in fact wishing for it:

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Mirko Kuliü, a parliamentary member of Miloševiü’s socialist party, hesitates between an expulsion taking into account humanitarian criteria and more radical measures: “In this situation, when Croats are committing genocide against Serbs, the question is whether we should thus react towards Croats… I don’t favour the same measures, for it would mean that we would have to kill and slaughter Croats in Serbia, but humane re-settlement of the population could be effected voluntarily…” (Borba, 1992)

Commander of the Novi Sad army, General Andreja Biorþeviü, opts for the hardline approach: “All Serb countries and Serb people must be in one state. And if you cannot provide for that diplomatically, we shall ensure that by war and there shall be rivers of blood…” (Vreme, 1992)

For Radovan Karadžiü, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the existence of a Unitarian Serbian State cannot even be called into question: “No force or power can prevent us from creating a Serb state…. only God may, and God shall not do it, because he is on our side” (Radio Belgrade II, 1993).

As regards the union of Serbian territories, metropolitan Amfilohije Radoviü states that: “The backbone of those United Countries is perhaps known and, in the face of all misfortunes, it is taking shape. And that backbone is Serbia and Montenegro, perhaps Eastern Herzegovina, a good part of Bosnian Krajina, Serb Krajina… The outlines of those Serb countries are emerging amid all these developments and it is a pity that we did not respond to the woes and screams from Srpska Krajina on time” (Duga, 1992c).

Direct threats are frequently made through the media, to the attention of non-Serbs, which are promised reprisals in case of opposition to the policy of Belgrade: “Serbs must not renounce their age-old objective to live in one state. That idea is priceless. We must act like other serious peoples in history in similar circumstances (...) Serb people must regain their confidence and dignity. And must defend themselves. Even if they were the only people in

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the world, or the only one putting up resistance to the whole world” (Gojko Dogo, poet, in Politika Ekspres (1992)).

Vojislav Šešelj is even more explicit when it comes to means of retaliation to be employed in case of opposition to Serbia’s interests: “We have already deployed several Chetnik groups in Zagreb, and in some other cities in Croatia, which are trained for sabotage and terrorist actions, and, should a massacre of the Serbian civilian population happen, the Chetniks will strike against Zagreb and other Croatian strongholds with all their force. You see, revenge is blind during the process of retaliation. We might have innocent victims: however, nothing can be done about that. Let the Croats think first. We are not going to strike first, but if they strike, we will not pay attention to our target anymore. If the Army does not disarm the Ustašas urgently, a lot of blood is going to be shed” (Interview by Verica Miliüeviü, ON (1991)).

Old technics, specific aims The propaganda is built on simple messages, not to say simplistic. One of them conveys the idea that the existence of Serbians as a people is directly threatened by the presence on site of other ethnic groups. As demonstrated by the inflammatory declarations of Vojislav Šešelj systematically broadcast by the media: “I think that all Croats should be expelled, barring those who responded to the call-up. Also exempt should be Serb Catholics (Šokci and Bunjevci) who enjoy full equality. We shall give the addresses of exiled Serbs from Zagreb and Varaždin to the Croats” (Cited in Vecernje Novosti, (1992)). “I would expel Croats on several grounds. Firstly because they are utterly disloyal inhabitants of Serbia, the vast majority of them are members of HDZ, or collaborate with that party, and they do their utmost to internally destabilise Serbia. They are close collaborators of Ustaši. We shall have to retaliate because Tuÿman expelled 160,000 Serbs. In view of the latter, what are Croats in Serbia waiting for? Thirdly, the largest number of Croats living today in Serbia were settled by Ante Paveliü in Zemun, Slankamen, and other places… at work is the principle of the state reason in a situation when the state is at risk. We must foil those fifth columnists. We would do that in an utterly humane way. We would give them addresses of Serbs driven out of Croatia. Those are clear-cut, simple and utterly humane solutions. We cannot treat Croats in a human way, and our own people in an inhumane way” (Cited in Osmica (1992)).

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Propaganda messages are thus conveyed by various brief but striking phrases in keeping with advertising principles: issue a marching order which summarises the goal to be attained and has the weight of a command common to the members of a party, group or community; put out a slogan, which is more like a war cry and whose contents are imbued with much more passion (which plays on hatred, exaltation, etc.); or provide a symbol (an image, drawing, tune) which has magical or mystical connotations for a given social group (community, ethnic group or people). Ultimately, it is a question of finding the short and clear phrases, which make it possible to condense a programme or political doctrine in a way easy for the masses to remember. The extreme simplification leads to resort to the most defamatory terms, and allows easily to stigmatise an entire group as such. Many simplistic, caricatured and pejorative nationalist political declarations were thus relayed by the media controlled by the Belgrade authorities to discredit Albanians, Croats and Muslims (Božiü-Roberson, 2004). In its edition of 5 July 1991, Duga magazine published the words of a campaign of the ultranationalist radical Vojislav Šešelj who stated that “the Croats had to have their throats cut, not with a knife but with a rusty spoon.” Another example, the declaration of Biljana Plavšiü, quoted by Borba on 1993, 8 February: “Rape unfortunately belongs to the war strategy of Muslims and some Croats towards Serbs. For Islam rape is normal, for that religion tolerates polygamy. Throughout 500 years of Turkish occupation both begs and agas were entitled to spend the first night with a recently married woman from the ‘mob’. Also, under Islamic religious tenets the nation of a child is the one of his father…”

It is also common to use an incisive phrase to summarise to extremes the evils with which the authorities are faced and which it means to ascribe to its many enemies. In this case, the conspiracy theory is put forward, a very convenient procedure, which makes it possible to cast all enemies in the same light – as did Hitler’s propaganda that dwelt at great length on the pseudo-conspiracy of the democrats, plutocrats, and Bolsheviks against Europe: “The break-up of Yugoslavia by dint of national secessions in which Germany, together with the EC, America, and later Islamic powers played a major role was tantamount to a declaration of WW3 with the same goals as WW1 and WW2. The Serb people responded by a war of defence, a war for their survival and their democratic state. Despite that war and its goals,

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Serbs shall survive and attain their fundamental national objectives. Serbs shall create a new state, whose character shall deny and prevail over national and ideological goals of all sides and participants in the Serb civil war, waged under occupation in 1941-1945 period. This current war and its objective – a single, unified state of Serb people – should suspend our ideological antagonisms and divisions originating in the civil war and WW2… Hence the national reconciliation was set in place by history itself” (Dobrica ûosiü quoted in Nada (1994)).

“The best defence is attack”. This could be another propaganda slogan of the Miloševiü regime. In fact, it is all about denouncing crimes that your enemies would be on the verge of perpetrating, to better justify the attacks that you project on your opponents... The public opinion campaign relayed through the media to justify the war against the Croats is a good example of this. In its special edition of July 1990, Duga magazine applied itself to the task in its own way. Mihajlo Markoviü, Marxist and philosophical ideologist and close collaborator of the Serbian president, wrote that “the tragedy of the Croatian Serbs has still not ended - it is ongoing and in the near future could reach tragic proportions.” In the same edition, Dr. Jovan Raskoviü, leader of the Serbian democratic party of Krajina, took up the same idea: “The status of the Serb people in Croatia is worse than the status of any, even the smallest national minority in Yugoslavia. Everyone has the right to language, culture mass media, etc. We, the Serbs in Croatia, are the only ones who are deprived of that right. To strip one people of their right to their mother tongue and alphabet is a kind of crime.”

The content of news lent itself to all kinds of arrangements and manipulations: emphasise that aspect of an event and underestimate such other information, because inconsistent with the message to be conveyed; be silent about an event or alter its meaning, etc. For instance, on 16 January 1993, when an umpteenth massacre resulted in 8 dead and 18 wounded in Sarajevo and Serbs were killed in the Bosnian village of Skelane, Belgrade Television reported only the second incident. Belgrade Television also remained totally silent on certain news stories: no information would be given on 5 February 1992 about the fact that a very famous Bosnian Muslim actor had been viciously beaten up in Belgrade, and the same held true, on 19 October 1992, when 17 people were killed and 150 wounded in Sarajevo and again, on 18 March 1993, after Serbs destroyed five mosques in Bijeljina, one of which was protected by UNESCO (Pešiü, 1994).

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Propaganda at war There is thus little doubt that the media were designed as a propaganda lynchpin by Belgrade (Trionfi, 1999). Such control over the most important broadcasting channels would be accompanied by a method combining propaganda, partial (and biased) information, false news, manipulation, non-coverage of certain events, etc. This entire arsenal would be mobilised to help justify the creation of a State for all Serbs and so legitimise an ethnic policy which was presented as a fight for freedom, a measure taken to protect the Serbian people’s native soil – and, lastly, reinforce the power and position of the Miloševiü regime. Whilst war was breaking out in Slovenia and clashes between Croatian and Serbian autonomist forces were growing in number in Croatia (Zakošek, 2008), the Serbian entire propaganda machine would work towards preparing public opinion for the need to protect the Serbs living outside Serbia and so for the war with Croatia. When interviewed on Serbian Television, Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, stated (Laliü, 1997): “I don’t think force should be used to prevent Slovenia from seceding from Yugoslavia. Their leaving us is to our mutual advantage. As for Croatia, things are a bit different. We can’t have the same attitude towards the Croatians as towards the Slovenes. The Croatians can go as well, but without Serbian territories. Since the federal government practically does not exist, the Serbian government should assume authority over the entire territory or what remains of Yugoslavia. The military high command has to accept it, otherwise the army will fall apart. The Serbian army can be formed within 48 hours, since the majority of Serbian officers would join it. The withdrawal of troops and arms to the Karlobag-Ogulin-KarlovacVirovitica line should be ordered, thus amputating Croatia.”

It was again on television that the regime’s figureheads would set out the objectives to be achieved – following the example of a certain Mihajlo Markoviü, an academician and Vice-President of the party in power, when he announced in a televised interview (Laliü, 1997): “It is more and more evident that the Croatian leadership will not have the power to impose its will upon the Serbs in Krajina, Slavonija, Western Srem…and Baranja. By establishing a new ethnic border and withdrawing the Yugoslav Army to this new border of Yugoslavia, we will prevent the further prolongation of this war.”

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The use of the media for nationalist purposes was thought of as a fullyfledged component of a military campaign and, in this sense, we can truly speak of “war media” (de la Brosse, 1996). By making up lies, inventing differences and overplaying oppositions between communities, the television, radio and written press played a dangerous game. Systematic recourse to false, biased information and non-coverage of certain events made it possible to inspire and arouse hatred and fear among the communities. The media prepared the ground psychologically for the rise in nationalist hatred and became a weapon when the war broke out. Locking the media down almost completely would allow the Serbian leader and his party, the Serbian Socialist Party, to run away with the first free elections in December 1990. Aside from the Politika written press group, television would prove to be the essential instrument for turning the history of Serbia into mystique. The traditional dispenser of official ideology, television remained the most important medium by far since for a long time it would constitute1 the only source of information for over 90% of the Serbs. As such, by re-writing history and relying on snippets of truth – through a selective memory which “involves exonerating oneself from (one’s own) crimes while stirring up memories of the crimes committed by the others” (Ceroviü, p. 190) – the media would contribute to demonising the other communities, especially the Kosovo Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. Generally, before Serbia triggered the war, Belgrade’s audio-visual media broadcast many programmes recalling historic events always likened to the persecutions allegedly suffered by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. The taking of power by HDZ in Zagreb during the April-May elections 1990 was to be a jump forward in this respect. With the pretext that the new constitution voted by the Croatian parliament turned the Serbs into a national minority and supported by the signal given to them by Slobodan Miloševiü in an address to the Serbian parliament and broadcast by TV Belgrade, organised on-the-ground resistance (Laliü, 1996):

1 The restricted number of news organisations existing in Serbia up until 1995 – including the few and far between media organisations which were independent but extremely limited in what they could broadcast and so had small followings – were more than ever under threat. After control was reassumed over Borba, the only independent daily newspaper (early 1995), and Svetlost, which had the largest regional circulation in Serbia in September, the independent television station Studio B (limited to Belgrade) was nationalised in February 1996.

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Chapter Eight “Recent events and, above all, grave conflicts and acts of state-terrorism in Croatia, aggravated the Yugoslav political crisis, which already had a long history of ethnic strife, and assumed proportions of an armed conflict with elements of a civil war, with numerous casualties, columns of refugees, break-downs in traffic and supply… What we have now is a natural and legitimate self-defence immanent in the historical dignity of any nation. All efforts directed at qualifying it as banditism through loud, wellorganised propaganda and ballyhoo only reveal a counterproductive and non-effective concept, essentially chauvinistic and pro-fascist, which stifles the national interest and human dignity of a people fighting a just battle for equal national and civil rights.”

Thus a new kind of propaganda “war reporter” came into being at Serbian Television and a great many interviews of Croatian Serbs were carried out and broadcast, all tending towards an exacerbation of the on-the-ground situation and only the most extremist positions were permitted to appear. At the same time as such reports which were the lead story on the televised evening news, there were special programmes, some of up to 90 minutes, whose primary aim it was to pit the Serbian public against its designated enemies and to prepare the way for war. In these programmes can be found the themes of Serbian resentment as expressed in the Memorandum of the Academy of Belgrade in 1986. There again the interviews with the Croatian Serbs appeared over and over again. One man being interviewed said: “Baranja and West Srem ethnologically and historically absolutely belong to the Serbian people. So do all other territories inhabited by Serbs. It would be absurd to turn Croatia, or any other territory into a Serbian one…”

To the question of what, in his opinion, should be the boundaries of the new Serbian State, another man answered: “The boundaries of the Serbian autonomous Region will be… There is a historical link. Where Serbian blood was shed by the Ustaša knives, there will be our boundaries.”

In another interview, a third man said that: “If the Croats really want to create an independent state they can do so on their ethnic territory. Could you imagine that these people would disappear, that these mountains would fall, or a Croatian flag would be hoisted instead of the Serbian one?” (Laliü, 1996)

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In another attempt to intimidate public opinion in late January 1991, Serbian Television broadcast a document – “The truth about the arming of the HDZ terrorist groups in Croatia” – filmed by the Defence Ministry counter-espionage service (KOS) in mid-October 1990 which had “proved” the direct responsibility of the leaders in power in Zagreb in the illegal arming. In the black and white video, the public can see the Croatian Minister of Defence, Martin Spegelj, filmed by a hidden camera, setting out his plan of action against the Yugoslav barracks and promising liquidations. At least that was what was announced by Serbian Television because, on screen, the words spoken by Martin Spegelj are inaudible and it is an off-screen voice which repeats them for the Serbian viewers: “And if something should happen, just give orders to all your men: kill the extremists. On the spot. On the street, in the barracks, wherever. Just shoot right in the stomach. It is not going to be a war, but a civil war without mercy. Not even for women and children. Just plant bombs in family apartments” (Laliü, 1996).

The video, broadcasted twice the same evening, created the desired effect, that is an electric shock in Serbian public opinion which thus saw the confirmation of the intrinsically evil nature of the authorities in Zagreb... The highest Serbian moral and intellectual authorities were involved in conditioning public opinion to justify the upcoming war with Croatia. On national television, from the heights of their unchallenged authority, they participated in interpreting what the vital interests of Serbia were. The incessant reminders of the Independent Croatian State and atrocities committed by the Ustachas were an alibi for the political objectives of the regime and were at the root of the development and strengthening of interethnic hatred. A televised report on 4 August 1991 was thus devoted to a ceremony held during the excavation of the remains of martyrs of Ustaša crimes, presented to the public in dozens of small coffins, presided over by the academic Dobrica ûosiü: “One of the greatest sins of my generation is this funeral which we perform fifty years too late, the funeral of Prebilovac martyrs. We committed this sin because we foolishly believed that by forgetting the Ustaša crime we contributed to the brotherhood of the Serbian and Croatian peoples” (Laliü, 1997).

The parallel between the past and the present comparing Franjo Tuÿman’s regime to that of Ante Paveliü, was made to raise anti-Croatian hatred to

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fever pitch. Thus we see Jovan Raskoviü, psychiatrist, academic and leader of the Croatian Serbs on Serbian Television at the time state at a rally at the time: “The genocide has begun, and it depends on the Serbs in Croatia and in Serbia and the international factor, Europe and the world whether their movement will reopen its concentration camps and the pits used as collective tombs. But one thing is for sure: Serbs will never again be led to the pits by just a couple of Ustašas. Serbs have to put up a great resistance and the genocidal idea will collapse along with the genocidal Croatian state” (Laliü, 1997).

The supposed “genocidal nature” of the Croatian people was originally discussed in the work of a Croatian Serb psychiatrist, Jovan Raskoviü, who, in a book entitled The Mad Country (Luda Zemlja), would contribute to awakening the Serbian people and justifying the creation of a Greater Serbia. There was not a single debate or Serbian TV programme on the issue of the Serbian minorities in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo to which this special guest and specialist in such matters was not invited. Meanwhile, his book was the subject of a media campaign throughout the Federation in 1990 (newspapers and television) during which he was described as the greatest scientist and psychiatrist of his age. Radovan Karadžiü, his psychology student from the groups in Zagreb in 1988-1989, would draw greatly on Raskoviü’s ideology to alert the Bosnian Serb population to the threat of genocide fomented by the Bosnian Muslims which allegedly hung over them. The action of Karadžiü, who rose to head of the SDS thanks to Raskoviü’s protection and that of his party, followed in the steps of Raskoviü (Karadžiü, 1996). The “genocidal nature” of the Croatian people would especially be exploited by Duga magazine in the column by the journalist and intellectual, Brana Crnevic. The radical, Vojislav Šešelj, would himself state on several occasions that, as a genetically cowardly people, the Croats were disposed to perpetrating genocide. During a meeting with the Orthodox bishop, Lukijan, in Borovo Selo, near Vukovar in Croatia, in September 1991, he openly described the Croats as a “genocidal” and “perverted” people (Stav, 1991). This tendency would continue to grow when the war with Croatia began, especially with the showing of a documentary called “Umetnici o genocidu” (“The Genocide Professionals”) which, drawing on the testimony of many people, recounted the crimes of Ante Paveliü’s Croatian government in 1941. The intention of the programme was to

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awaken in the collective memory a feeling of persecution identical to that felt by the Serbs during the Second World War and ended with the entire Croatian people being cast as criminals (Hartmann, 1999). The media propaganda was especially successful because it exploited deep-rooted reflexes relying on feelings enduringly entrenched in the Serbian collective consciousness (Oberschall, 2000). A systematic contrast was made between the Serbian people characterised as innocent and just and those who had made martyrs of them down the centuries and who now had to be stopped to prevent new misfortunes from befalling the Serbs. In this regard, the countless and suspect “historical parallels” truly prepared public opinion day in day out for the outbreak of the conflict. By exaggerating some of the facts and simplifying others, the entire media would become stays for the Serbian nationalist ideology. By creating “simple oppositions, clearly defining enemies and using shock phrases and carefully chosen words” they would offer to millions of people a simplistic and narrow reading of a reality that was otherwise complex and ambiguous.

Media at the heart of the Yugoslav war The propaganda action to make the population support the nationalist war policies took the form of genuine opinion-forming campaigns (Payne, 2005). Sometimes, it was a matter of justifying the capture of territories termed ancestral but occupied by the enemy – an enemy that had to be “driven out” – and sometimes it was a matter of blackening an ethnic group or nation to better legitimise the violence used against it (that is, in fact, to cast yourself as the victim of the others’ nationalism to better feed your own) or even reducing to nothing or almost nothing any form of opposition to the nationalist powers within each of the republics. The war was to accelerate the drifts of professionals who were becoming actors, if not soldiers, in the conflict. In contradiction with the ethics of the profession, we see for example, reporters participating in interrogating Croatian and/or Bosnian Muslim prisoners (Laliü, 1999), presenting people who were too close or too far away from the events being reported as witnesses to the crime, taking sides with one of the protagonists in the conflict, etc.

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The following example is quoted from a report by a journalist from TV Novi Sad, interviewing a Serbian or Montenegrin pyrotechnician shelling the enemy lines on the front around Dubrovnik: - Reporter: “How long have you been here? Do you have visitors?” - Pyrotechnician: “It has been… two months. A month and a half.” - Reporter: “Have you had any reporters or TV crews?” - Pyrotechnician: “Apart from this crew from TV Novi Sad, no one else came.” - Reporter: “TV Novi Sad wishes you luck.” And the pyrotechnician resumes his shelling again in front of the camera (Laliü, 1997).

The feeling aroused in the Serbian public by the broadcasting of images of bodies of innocent Serbian civilian victims or the relating of such facts, was a technique that was to be widely used by Serbian Television to provoke a reaction of horror towards the enemy and so support for the regime – which we think of as the war in Croatia and Bosnia. Television played on the emotions of the public by presenting individual tragedies without given prior warning as to the programme content with which the viewer would always sympathise, particularly when it concerned children, the most fragile group. This is best illustrated by the following example. When the fighting was raging in Croatia, TV Belgrade broadcast the “testimony” of an Orthodox religious dignitary from a monastery in Zemun – Friar Filaret – who, sitting in front of a table, on which was lying a blackened human skull which the camera zoomed in on, told the following story: - “Ustašas raided a Serbian village near Kukuruzari. They captured little Ilija and made his mother watch them cut the boy’s throat. Then they took his body away” - Reporter: “It happened on his birthday?” - “Yes, on August 2, this year. The boy’s mother ran after them begging them to give her son’s body, but they carried him away and later burned his corpse. The skull is the only thing left. But she wouldn’t have got even his skull if it hadn’t been for one woman who, although a Catholic, was humane and compassionate enough to show her the place where her son was buried. So she went there and found only this charred skull” (Laliü, 1997).

Justify the use of force against the enemy The political and military goal of a State for all the Serbs, which presupposed annexing Bosnian and Croatian territory in which Serbs lived,

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was supported by the Serbian media that served as tools to legitimise the use of force and violence. In July 1991, Slobodan Miloševiü would again choose Serbian Television to deliver a speech in which he announced that war had become inevitable: “Serbia cannot protect itself from the war to which it may be exposed if it is not ready for it and if it becomes lulled into a belief that it cannot happen. Its readiness should, for now, be expressed, firstly, within the Yugoslav National Army and, secondly, within its own armed forces, comprised of the Serbian Territorial Army units, which are trained to defend the Republic of Serbia. The Serbian Territorial Army forces have modern equipment and, when it comes to their number and quality of training, they are superior to similar forces outside Serbia, including their so-called ‘para-military units’. This is what the citizens of Serbia should know and take into account” (Laliü, 1997).

Similarly, the most senior military authorities took over the television resulting in an increase in the number of reports on Miloševiü’s visits to the Armed Forces and the Army’s high level of readiness in case it was required to act. Furthermore, the Defence Minister, Veljko Kadijeviü, announced the decision to intervene in Croatia in a speech retransmitted on national television. From that point on, everything possible was done to swing public opinion firmly behind the regime. Messages of support flooded in to RTS, such as those for the Army convoys leaving Belgrade for the front “cheered on by the students”: “We filmed the long convoy around 2 a.m. on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. Several hundred students came down onto the highway cheering the Yugoslav Army convoy.” The following day, messages from hand-picked Serbian citizens filmed in front of the endless procession of military convoys were shown one after another on television to galvanise public opinion and promote a united front: “This should have happened long ago. Tonight we will all go and defend our country!”; “You are ready to defend it?”; “Any time” (Laliü, 1997). Above the ensuing noise of weapons and fighting, only those opinions most strongly behind the objectives of territorial conquest would be heard. Systematic media coverage was given to Vojislav Šešelj’s positions, such as the declaration he made in September 1991 before the Serbian parliament, which was broadcast by Belgrade Television: “Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica must be our option and the army must withdraw its troops to this line. If they cannot be withdrawn from Zagreb without a fight, they should pull out under fire, and constantly shell

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Chapter Eight Zagreb. The army still has unused resources. If its troops are in danger it has the right to use napalm bombs and everything else it has in its arsenals. It is more important to save an army unit than to fear there might be casualties. It’s their own fault. They wanted war, now they have it” (Laliü, 1997).

Belgrade television systematically strove to justify the use of force and therefore violence by the Serbs by bombarding the public with simplistic statements (Kurspahiü, 2003), which contained only very rarely any exact information or indications, even as concerned, dates or places. Serbian Television’s coverage of the fighting in Vukovar was especially illuminating: in the way in which the events were portrayed, and in particular the losses inflicted upon the enemy, all possible means were used to make the public think that it was the Serbs that were defending the town. Through reports and commentaries interwoven with images, television sought to foster inter-ethnic and religious hatred towards the Catholic Croatian community: general opinion portrayed them as inhuman - thereby making their humiliation, destruction and elimination easier and indeed more legitimate. To achieve this end, special correspondents carried out more and more interviews of forces, personnel and civilians. The interview of Ljilja Kojic, commander of the Slavonia and Baranja Region Territorial Defence Headquarters, which was filmed with the front-line in the background, demonstrates that the Yugoslav Federal Army participated in the demonisation process. Questioned by the Serbian Television journalist about the Ustašas’ use of Serbian women and children as human shields (it should be noted that the question was not framed as an allegation), the officer confirmed that it was true without providing any evidence in support: “Well, that is unfortunately correct, it proves they are weak, it proves they are inhuman, it shows how far they are prepared to go, they are not only sacrificing Serbs, whom they have imprisoned and arrested and kept as hostages, but also their own Croats who did not go along with them” (Laliü, 1995).

The accounts of supposed Ustaša atrocities obtained from civilians by the reporters on location in Vukovar did not provide a shred of evidence supporting the allegations and the witnesses were never eye-witnesses. In a report which examined the issue, a journalist showed to the camera some gold teeth in the palm of his hand and asserted:

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“I am holding in my hand some gold teeth, they told me these teeth were extracted with a knife, from practically living people, whom they killed” (Laliü, 1995).

Later on during an interview of an elderly man in green uniform, the journalist asked: - “Do you have any examples of anyone being killed, slaughtered, or having suffered similar atrocities?” - “I left earlier but as far as I know there were other kinds of torture.” - “What happened?” - “Well, they slaughtered, gouged out eyes, cut off children’s fingers. In baking pans on liberated territories we found children they wanted to roast. Soldiers with heads cut off, the injured were disembowelled.” - “They have no mercy even on those wounded?” - “They have no mercy on anyone, I don’t know how that is, what are they, animals or what, they are not human” (Laliü, 1995).

Everything possible was done to stigmatise the enemy. From this angle, the Serbian media constantly emphasised the crimes committed by the Croatian regime during the Second World War. As such, television viewers were led to believe that the Croatian people were all genocidal and the Serbian public was conditioned to lapse into inter-ethnic hatred. Again during the Vukovar siege, Serbian Television announced, very appropriately, that a newly published, historical account referring to Italian sources confirmed that the Croatian Ustašas had indeed intended to annihilate the Serbian people during the Second World War - allegedly an intention also implicitly shared by Franjo Tuÿman’s Croatia: “A very special historical testimonial has just recently been published on Croatian Ustaša crimes against the Serbs during the so-called Independent State of Croatia. Previously undiscovered secret documents of the Italian Army say, among other things, that Zagreb had a Church-State project of total Serb annihilation (…) In those several months in 1941, practically from the birth of the Independent State of Croatia on April 10, all through April-May 1942, inasmuch as the Italians were there to record the events, the number of casualties reached a number probably greater than 80,000. Every serious researcher could easily confirm this, but regardless of this figure, here it says 46,286 people – Serbs, and it gives the dates, places, names of perpetrators, and indicates where those documents can be found” (Laliü, 1995).

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Stigmatise the opponent Meanwhile, the Croats and their soldiers were bluntly singled out as “Ustašas” or fascists fighting on behalf of Germany. Serbian television and press tried to show the public that the Croatian government led by President Tuÿman was nothing other than an echo of the Second World War Ustaša power. Politika Ekspres drew this parallel in its 27 July 1991 edition when it reported on the fear of the Croatian Serbs faced with the “Croatian militia” and its checkerboard emblem (the “Sahovnica”) inspired by the flag of the Croatian fascist regime allied to the SS and Hitler. More generally, the war reports prepared by Serbian Television correspondents at the sites of the fighting were entirely shot around this objective of branding the enemy. In one of the first war reports devoted to the fighting in Croatia and broadcast on the news at 19:30 hours, the description given to the viewers of the opponent’s camp was symptomatic of the media coverage in the months to come: “The panic-stricken Tuÿman mercenaries and villains, calling themselves the guards, have barricaded themselves in the centre of Kostajnica, shooting at everything. We also found out that a horde of butchers from Tuÿman’s Black Legion is headed towards Banija. The horde of mercenaries and murderers thirsty for Serbian blood barricaded in Kostajnica seem to realise that they have been written off” (Laliü, 1997).

The Serbs’ enemies were compared to demonic forces using carefully chosen vocabulary designed to stir up fear and hatred (Kolstø, 2012). The terminology used by the Serbian media to stigmatise the enemy was imposed on them by the policies set out in unwritten directives. They were requested, for example, not to say things such as “the Croatian forces attacked the village” anymore, but instead to speak about the “Ustaša hordes” or “Vatican, fascist, barbarian hordes” who “attacked the village” (Humblot, 1993). One can note that this terminology had an effect on the way of thinking and speaking of the public in general. The vocabulary created by the Serbian media under control, principally of the RTS, became the way people spoke. In a great many accounts of and interviews with civilians, the same expressions and turns of phrase figure endlessly. As on television, the word “genocide” was used indiscriminately. We can hear this in the report on the blockade at Ljubovija of the UN humanitarian aid meant for Srebrenica and Bratunac, in which the reporter interviews several Serbian women on their motivations. Their answers follow more or less the language of the journalistic propaganda:

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“My son was killed in this war. I don’t want this aid to feed his enemies! They committed genocide against the Serbs, they slaughtered, castrated, gouged eyes and now we should feed them so that they could kill us all!”; “My only son and a 22-year-old grandson got killed! I don’t want anyone to help the Ustašas! They burned down my home! What more do they want!”; “I lost a 17-year-old daughter and my husband! I won’t let them kill again!” etc. (Laliü, 1999).

The words and expressions used by the people interviewed are those learned from the television and mentally structure their way of talking and serve as ready-made terms. On 21 January 1993, a report from Belgrade Television carried out on the Croatian front line warns the Serbian viewers to: “Be careful with Ustašas. Even when they are dead they can kill you” (Pešiü, 1994). The good and evil Manichaeistic approach was also valid for describing the fighting. Reports showing the Serbian forces manoeuvring presented no images of destruction or civilian victims. When the Serbian forces attacked a town, the action was presented as a means of defence. According to official terminology, the Serbs never attacked first. It is true that on Serbian Television the fighting at Vukovar was always presented as another “liberating” act of the town – this extract from a report by one of the special on-site envoys when control was taken of one of the districts of the town by the Serbian troops is an evidence of this: “Another in a series of victories in the battle for Vukovar – the fall of the infamous Milovo brdo, the last oasis of Ustaša fighters in the upper part of the town, proving that army assessments were absolutely realistic. As of today, the Yugoslav flag is flying on the town’s highest point. The citizens from this part of town have come out of their shelters to embrace the freedom they had waited for so long. In this military operation, brave local territorial defence units accompanied Yugoslav People’s Army units. This successfully completed operation has become one of the most significant victories in the campaigning to liberate Vukovar. Fighting side by side, the Army and territorial defence units made a significant drive into Pionirska Street, finally taking and connecting with the liberators of Milovo brdo. It needs to be said that enemy resistance was crushed without losses. Presently the Army is pulling out the exhausted civilians in the occupied areas and moving them to safety. The suffering and pain in their eyes have given way to tears of joy, kissing and embracing the liberators, and a thousand and one ‘thank you, thank you’” (Laliü, 1995).

The journalistic commentary provided to the Serbian public on the television news on TV Belgrade, as the key to understanding the conflict,

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does show any distance either and becomes a caricature. Ratko Dmitroviü, the presenter of the news at 19:30 hours, thus justifies the siege of Vukovar: “In Vukovar more than a thousand Serbs are feared to have been butchered by the Croatian neo-fascists, including several dozen Serbian children who have fallen victim to the Ustaša knives. Bodies of entire families are still being found slaughtered on the very doorsteps of their homes. This town is a great Serbian martyrdom. For the past months, Vukovar’s outskirts have just been the outer limits of a huge concentration camp” (Laliü, 1997).

Another example is this extract from the programme “No-one is like me” broadcast on Radio Belgrade’s second station on 12 December 1991 during which Milos Bojoviü, a Socialist Party deputy in the Serbian parliament, declared: “Why are you asking me about war? You must also know that Serbia is not at war! Serbia is not at war! Nor is Krajina. At war are Ustaša authorities in Croatia, and you have witnessed how they do it - in a wily, perfidious way. They have prepared genocide against Serbs. They simply want to eradicate us. But it is not only war. At stake are the interests of Germany, Italy and Austria. Small people get a handful of dollars and you can do anything with them. But Serbs are different; they cannot be bribed, or bought. They are always ready to defend their homeland, their state, and their freedom. That is history. That is a genetic legacy in Serb genes. But all the cards are now on the table. Now everything is clear. There are the three largest denominations: the Catholics, the Muslims, and the Orthodox - the best and brightest among them. All possible efforts are now being made to enslave all of the Orthodox peoples living in these territories, to turn us into galley-rowers. But that shall not happen!” (Idem)

The contrast with the reports on the offensives conducted by the Croatian troops who spared nothing, destroyed everything and systematically slit the throats of Serbian civilians is startling! Croatian and Muslim soldiers said to be “dirty, cowardly and drugged up” were compared with Serbian fighters who were praised as brave and rash, always ready to come to the aid of the victims and the innocent. Admittedly, the Croatian and Bosnian media can also be criticised for making so much use of terms discrediting the Serbs, including “Chetnik terrorists”. If a comparison is made between Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian nationalist propaganda, it is noticeable that Serbian propaganda surpassed the other two both in the scale and content of the media messages put out.

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Conspiracy paranoia However, what set Serbian nationalism far apart was its paranoia. This can be illustrated by the fact that in the media and politicians’ speeches the idea of a conspiracy against the Serbian nation was ever-present. The principle vehicle for the theory of the international conspiracy of which Serbia was allegedly the victim, in its reports Serbian Radio Television systematically advanced this argument and denounced “the world (which) wants to make us submit, and sacrifice our honour and our brothers in Bosnia and Croatia” against a background of Serbian people in exile and massacred Serbian soldiers (Reporters sans frontières, 1993)… Shortly after the start of the war with Croatia and in light of the support, which certain sections of the international community were giving to Croatia – Belgrade Television was often to target the Vatican and Germany, seen as historical allies of Croatia. As such, it was to broadcast a report covering a street demonstration accusing the Vatican of supporting the “Ustaša fascist regime”. An elderly woman waving a banner on which was written “Vatican Satan” stated: “The Pope should go to Jasenovac! The Pope is an Ustaša.” In the same report pictures were broadcast of the historian, Ratko Petroviü, with a loudspeaker in his hand, addressing the demonstrators in these terms: “The genocide of the Serbian people has been going on under the auspices of the Vatican. This is now going to stop!” (Laliü, 1997)

At almost the same time, Germany was directly accused of being at the head of a conspiracy by the Serbian Minister of Defence, Veljko Kadijeviü, whose communiqué was read by the presenter of the television news on TV Belgrade: “Germany has openly attacked our country for the third time. It now resorts to modern methods, but it also uses the fascist methods from World War II. Germany then made use of the so-called “fifth column”. Now it is opting for various other methods of special warfare, in preparation for economic and military action” (Laliü, 1997).

The written press also spread the notion of a conspiracy supposedly hatched abroad, which recurred like a leitmotiv.

Triumph of disinformation If disinformation consists of using “information - and especially mass information - techniques to mislead or to conceal and misrepresent facts”,

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we may truly say that it triumphed in the Yugoslav conflict. From whatever angle the problem is considered – and although it is again true that the Serbian media “distinguished themselves” in the field – all the media (press agencies, newspapers, radio and television…) or almost all of them regularly falsified the truth, imposed blackouts on certain “crucial” information or invented false news. Some of the “media” would use the whole range of possibilities afforded by the three techniques indiscriminately. Generally, any information contradicting the official propaganda was methodically swept aside. Indisputably, one of the most flagrant examples of this was the shelling of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik by Serbian forces (Pavloviü, 2005). The images shown of Dubrovnik came with a commentary accusing those from the West who had taken the film of manipulation and of having had a tyre burnt in front of their cameras to make it seem that the city was on fire. On 11 August 1992, the president of the board of directors of Belgrade Television acknowledged the damage inflicted on the town but specified that “there are just four houses in Dubrovnik which are destroyed and these belong to Serbs…” As for the shells fired at Sarajevo and the damage caused, for several months it was simply as if it had never happened in the eyes of Serbian television viewers because Belgrade television would show pictures of the city taken months and even years beforehand to deny that it had ever occurred. The journalist Daniel Deluce (2000/2001), formerly a Reuter’s correspondent in Sarajevo, would write in this regard: “Serbian Radio Television created a strange universe in which Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, had never been besieged and in which the devastated Croatian town of Vukovar had been ‘liberated’.” He went on to say: “the media offensive launched by Belgrade contributed to the appearance of equally detestable propaganda in other Yugoslav republics and its aftereffects would be felt for years.” Through the voice of its presenter Risto Ĉogo, TV Pale was to assert throughout the siege of Sarajevo that the Muslims were “shelling themselves” (Subašiü, 2002, p.16). This negative reconstruction of the facts was to be widely relayed by Television Belgrade, which stated on 26 December 1992 for example that the Muslims were carrying out the siege of Sarajevo: “Muslims are keeping Sarajevans under siege from inside the city, and Serbs are just protecting their own hills around the city…”

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Along the same lines, the TV Belgrade commentator attributed the fire in the Sarajevo University Library to the Muslims and gave the following account of the event: “Last night in Sarajevo, there was a fire in the University Library. Luckily, the invaluable cultural treasure had been moved out of it two months before. It is now difficult to establish what exactly caused the fire. True, there was heavy fighting near Trebevic last night. We scrutinised the façade for shell-damage close-up, but were unable to find any. We noticed, however, that the flames licked from within. It all points to yet another Muslim manipulation like the one in Dubrovnik when car tyres were set on fire” (Laliü, 1999).

Broadcasting false news to stigmatise the enemy further The making up of false news is another form of disinformation, perhaps the most harmful. SRNA, the Bosnian Serb television station, would speak “of the starving lions in Sarajevo zoo to whom ‘the Muslims threw the Serbian children and women to eat’ at a time when Sarajevo was cut off from the world” (Ponorac, 1992). This propaganda technique that involved hammering home and repeating the same words and expressions over and over again to make the masses believe they were true was previously employed by Nazi Germany. Other equally insane lies used by the Serbian media without checks being made – such as the existence of “necklaces that the Croats made from fingers cut off Serbian children” (Humblot, 1993) - were invented to fanaticise the Serbian populations scattered over various territories and ultimately to justify policies of conquest and ethnic cleansing (Žarkov, 2007). Implicit in the crude set ups was the notion that all means were valid against such demons. As a conclusion, one would like to quote the International Committee to Protect Independent Media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998), which, in its report Restriction on the Broadcast Media in FR Yugoslavia, writes: “News programmes modify or even create information in order to fit the political objectives of the government. Often that objective is to create and foster enemy images among the population. Before and during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, RTS whipped up Serbian nationalism by dehumanising non-ethnic Serbs and promoting visions of Serbia’s historical glory. The media campaign aimed at instilling and fostering fear

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References Borba (1992, April 3). —. (1993, February 8). Božiü-Roberson, A. (2004). Words before the war: Miloševiü’s use of mass media band rhetoric to provoke ethnopolitical conflict in former Yugoslavia (1). East European Quarterly, 38(4), 395-409. Carruthers, S. L. (2011). The media at war. Palgrave Macmillan. Ceroviü, S. (no date). Is Information Possible in the Face of Propaganda? In Dialogues and Chakhotin, S. (1940). The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda. (5th ed.). New York: Alliance Book Corporation. Danas (1991a, January 15). —. (1991, October 29). Deluce, D. (Winter 2000-2001). The Media War. NATO Review, 48(3), p. 16. Documents for the Advancement of Mankind/Experiences and Reflections on National Reconstruction and Peace, working documents of the Foundation for the Advancement of Mankind, no. 64. Duga (1990a, July 13). —. (1991b, July 5). —. (1992c, April 20). Grosser, A. (1972). Hitler, la presse et la naissance d’une dictature. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, Collection U2. Hartmann, F. (1999). Miloševiü, La diagonale du fou. Paris: Denoël. Humblot, C. (1993, July 23). Ex-Yougoslavie: médias fauteurs de guerre II. L’Hystérie ‘patriotique’. Le Monde, p.5. Jowett, G. S., & O’Donnell, V. (2014). Propaganda & persuasion. Sage Publications. de la brosse, R. (Janvier 2003). Propagande politique et projet “d’Etat pour tous les Serbes” : conséquences de l’instrumentalisation des médias à des fins ultranationalistes. La Haye: International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 107 p. —. (1996). Les voix de la guerre. In Cot, J (Ed), Dernière guerre balkanique ? Ex-Yougoslavie : témoignages, analyses, perspectives (pp. 165-181). Paris: Fondation pour les Études de Défense, L’Harmattan-FED.

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Karadžiü, R. (1996, June 28th). Nation and State Above All, Declaration to the Assembly in Pale. Pale : SRNA News. Kolstø, P. (Ed.), (2012). Media discourse and the Yugoslav conflicts: Representations of self and other. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Kurspahiü, K. (2003). Prime time crime: Balkan media in war and peace. US Institute of Peace Press. Laliü, L. (Producer). (1999). Images and Words of Hate: Year Three. [Television programme]. Belgrade: ARHITEL, The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media. Laliü, L. (Producer). (1997). Images and Words of Hate: Year Two. [Television programme]. Belgrade: ARHITEL, The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media. —. (Producer). (1995). Images and Words of Hate: Vukovar 1991. [Television programme]. Belgrade: ARHITEL, The Right to Pictures and Words against Censorship and Abuse of Media. Mond, G. Le système d’information et de propagande en URSS et dans les Pays de l’Est. Université Paris II: Polycopiés, Institut Français de Presse. Nada (1994, July). Oberschall, A. (2000). The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and racial studies, 23(6), 982-1001. ON. (1991, May 24). Osmica. (1992, April 22). Pavlovic, S. (2005). Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the “War for Peace”. spacesofidentity.net, 5(1). Payne, K. (2005). The media as an instrument of war. Parameters, 35(1), 81-93. Pesic, M. (1994). Manipulations on Television Belgrade. London: A Thesis in International Journalism Presented to the Department of Journalism, City University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree, Department of Journalism, City University. Politika. (1991, May 14). Politika Ekspres. (1992, April 6). Ponorac, J.B. (November 1992). Les émules de Goebbels. La lettre de Reporters sans frontières, p. 7. Promene. (1992). Dnevnik. Novi Sad. Radio Belgrade II. (1993, March 1). Reporters sans frontières (1993), La liberté de la presse dans le monde. Report 1993, pp. 338-339.

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Šüekiü, R. (2015). The Media and the wars in the western Balkans in the last decade of the XXth century. Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, 1(2), 1-8. Sorlin, P. & Sorlin, I. (1972). Lénine, Trotski, Staline: la presse et l’évolution du pouvoir en Russie soviétique, 1921-1927. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, Collection Kiosque. Stav (1991, September 9th). N° 82, p. 29. Subašiü, K. (2002). Role of the Media and the Internet as Tools for Creating Accountability to Poor and Disadvantaged Groups : Former Yugoslavia. Human Development Report Office, 2002/18(Occasional Paper, Background for HDR 2002). The International Committee to Protect the Independent Media in Yugoslavia (September 1998). Restrictions on the Broadcast Media in FR Yugoslavia. Free Slobodna, p.7. Thompson, M. (1994). Forging War The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Avon: Article 19 “International Centre against Censorship”. Trionfi, B. (1999). The Kosovo news and propaganda war. P. Goff (Ed.), International Press Institute. Veljanovski, R. (1998). Le revirement des médias audiovisuels. In Popov, N (Ed), Radiographie d’un nationalisme: les racines serbes du conflit yougoslave (pp. P 316). Paris: Les Editions de l’Atelier. Vecernje Novosti (1991, October 16). —. (1992, April 17). Vreme (1992, March 30). Zakošek, N. (2008). Democratisation, state-building and war: The cases of Serbia and Croatia. Democratisation, 15(3), 588-610. Žarkov, D. (2007). The Body of War: Media, Ethnicity, and Gender in the break-up of Yugoslavia. Duke University press.

CHAPTER NINE REPORTING ABOUT THE ATTACK ON DUBROVNIK BY MONTENEGRIN (BI)WEEKLYS DR. GORAN CVJETINOVIû, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

ROMANA JOHN, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

DR. MATO BRAUTOVIû, UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

Summary Coverage of the war developments during the 1990s by the Croatian and Serbian media has to a great extent already been investigated. On the other hand, the role of the Montenegrin media has so far not been analysed. Their influence on the war developments during the 1990s has rather been superficially marginalised (Thompson, 1994, p. 2) and belittled. This paper gives an analysis of the texts published on the topic of the war in Dubrovnik in the period from 1 October to 30 November 1991 by two Montenegrin (bi)weeklys, Nikšiüke novine and Boka. The analysis shows that the Montenegrin print media actually played quite an important role in the attempts to justify the military campaign in the Dubrovnik area and manipulate the Montenegrin public into believing that the only right thing to do was to attack Dubrovnik and Croatia. Keywords: War Reporting, Dubrovnik 1991, Montenegro, Nikšiüke novine, Boka

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Introduction Although the postulates of the professional journalistic reporting practice have long since been clearly defined, extraordinary situations, such as wars, often (or almost always) affect the journalistic work and content directed towards the audience conveyed through the media. Such situations give rise to uncertainty regarding the accuracy and objectivity of the information used by the journalists. How to define the role of a journalist in war affected areas at all? How to be sure that their truth does not differ from the truth advocated by the opposing sides or the end user (the one reading, listening to, or watching the news)? How to approach such a horrific topic and events witnessed by the journalists professionally, without emotions? Finally, how can a journalist be sure that his work and the medium he works for are not just manipulative tools used to achieve a particular political agenda? These are only some of the concerns that arise when speaking about war reporting. In the words of BBC war correspondent Kate Adie from the foreword to a book called Reporting War – Journalism in Wartime (Allan & Zelizer, 2004): “The principles of reporting are put to a severe test when your nation goes to war. To whom are you true?” The role of a war correspondent is very specific, and “it is beset by an array of problems associated with allegiance, responsibility, truth, and balance. Such problems arise from time to time in the daily implementation of ordinary, everyday modes of journalism, of course, but their apparent lack of easy resolvability in wartime poses challenges that raise questions about the practice of journalism in more forms than just reporting war” (Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p. 3). National identity and an incapability to differentiate militarism and patriotism affect journalistic work. There are numerous examples of war reports that don’t give a broader perspective of the event, or even worse ones – those reports that are filled with information that is deliberately intended to deceive the public (Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p. 3). “Journalists may unthinkingly subscribe to or knowingly comply with the objectives, ideologies, and perspectives of one or another side to a conflict. Alternately, they must struggle to make sense of the “big picture” in resistance to information monopolies imposed by state and military. Such challenges are the essence of war reporting” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 26). Being able to find and share stories from reliable sources, to stay objective and try to understand the complicated situation from the perspectives of all sides included, is a hard job, especially knowing that all information

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shared with the public will have substantial effect on their way of thinking and even participating. But, the fact is that journalists and the media typically choose stories that in a way empower the point of view of the country they and their audience live in. As author Robert A. Hacker points out: “Most journalists are citizens of particular states and members of national cultures, and they are not immune to the biases of nationalism in covering international conflict, particularly when their news organisations and audiences are also nationally biased” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 26).

Us vs. them “War reporting as a distinct category of journalism, a genre, is a generally taken for-granted feature of our information environment. In effect, the genre of war reporting serves a propaganda purpose. Its generic character has been exploited by state and other propagandists in ways that cripple the capacity of media consumers to make useful sense of the world” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 25). Manipulation often comes from those who are defined as official sources (officialdom and state representatives). They’ll do their best to completely monitor and intervene in communication when the stories don’t fit their plans, strategies, and objectives. One of the first facts that is often sacrificed and afterwards misrepresented in media is the truth about what caused or who started the war, and the explanation of all preludes to war. As author Prasun Sonwalkar describes, there is a special node of so-called “othering”, as a selective project, that happens at the level of nation. “The discourse of nations and nationalism is premised on several assumptions about common myths and historical memories, a common, mass culture, a historic territory, common legal rights, and duties of members, etc. The “we”/”they” dynamic is central to nation formation and, in the case of young nations, to nation building. It assumes a version of hegemony by which one view of society is made to appear as the “natural” order of things, beyond rational questioning, which may completely delegitimise or even obliterate alternative versions” (Sonwalkar, 2004, p. 209). Another author, Nag, also claims that nations have always been concerned about “us” against “them”; nations are always obsessed with “self” and discriminate the “other”. The construction of the national self has always been only vis-à-vis the “other” (Nag, 2001). Taking in the consideration everything mentioned above it is not surprising that most of the journalistic reports and news regarding war

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topics are always set in a particular frame that presents the war in some familiar cultural terms.

War reporting in Croatia One of the topics still discussed in the context of the war on the territory of Former Yugoslavia is the role and influence of the media before, during and after the war waged in the 1990s. It is already known and proven that in this war, as in many others throughout history, the media were used for propaganda and manipulation purposes (Thompson, 1994). But, the question to which a clear answer has not been provided yet (and probably never will be at all) is: “To what degree did the journalists and the media foment hatred between the two sides engaged in the war, attempt to justify the crimes committed and influence the course of the war with carefully engineered false reconstructions of events?” In this paper, we will try to give answers to the above questions by analysing the role of the Montenegrin print media (the Nikšiüke novine weekly and the Boka biweekly) in the war waged on the territory of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area. It is an undeniable fact that media and journalists play a very important role in a psychological war. “War propaganda results in psychological effects which serve either to mobilise or intimidate, to demonise or glorify, to accuse or justify” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 11). One of the first attempts to understand the role and the effect of media in this war was the research project called The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict. As it is explained it the preface to the report: “To what degree and in which ways the media have been used for propaganda and manipulation of opinions? Are the media themselves responsible for the wars?” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 7). The report was edited by Marjan Malešiü, and a team of researchers from different ex-Yugoslav countries that analysed the media in the period from 1 August 1991 to 31 January 1992. In the report, they explain that the discussion about the characteristics of the war in Croatia have given rise to many difficulties, both concerning its definition and the appropriate identification of the enemy, and in determining the nature of the armed conflict itself. They defined the situation like this: “The war in Croatia is a war between two states, Croatia and Serbia, one that contains elements of classic

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aggression, civil war, ethnic conflict and confrontation between the forces of communist totalitarianism and forces aspiring to a democratic social system. To a lesser degree, and primarily at a symbolic level, the war also has a religious dimension… It is a local war, a geographically limited war, a mixture of a war between two states and a civil war” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 21). Their findings also clarify that “the propaganda campaign orchestrated in Belgrade aimed at Serbs in and outside Serbia was complemented by the army media (…) and all military operations were preceded by a media campaign, the aim of which was to create an atmosphere of threat or endangerment to individuals, a period during which the mass media carried ‘reports’ of violence (murders, rape, robbery, etc.). Within the framework of this concept of dissemination of information, the reports of violence were used as ‘justification’ for the use of military means to protect the ‘endangered people’” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 25-32). Their analysis showed that communications in abnormal and extreme situations were characterised by “generalisations combined with the use of categories, stereotypes, labelling and value-weighted, emotionally charged attributes” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 81). Another author, Mark Thompson, in his book Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994) tried to explain the role of the media and the characteristics of war reporting. In the Introduction to the book, William Shawcross, notes that “propaganda used specifically to incite national hatred and fear was amongst the essential weapons in the war waged to destroy Yugoslavia” (Thompson, 1994, p. 1). The author further explains that “a campaign of intense propaganda was needed before war was thinkable in Yugoslavia, let alone inevitable” (Thompson, 1994, Preface, XI). The above analysis showed that the mass media fully accomplished their role to use political, warmongering propaganda, a role assigned to them by the political forces. But, the thesis that mass media activity was the main cause of the wars in Yugoslavia was not confirmed, which was explained as follows: “(…) the thesis might be confirmed, if mass media were independent and free, but we have to conclude that the media were mainly an instrument of governing politics in the respective republics” (Malešiþ, 1993, p. 125).

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Taking into consideration the role of the Montenegrin media (which is the basis for analysis in this paper), it is very important to mention the manner in which Mark Thompson defines their significance (or rather how he mistakenly belittles and simplifies it). “The Republic of Montenegro played a more or less voluntary role of Serbia’s partner in war. Although Montenegro was no less zealous in its role played in the media battle, its effect was insignificant. The material contribution of Montenegro to the war could not have been crucial (...) the government-controlled Montenegrin media played to the tune composed by Belgrade” (Thompson, 1994, p. 2). However, the Montenegrin media were not at all as harmless as Thompson describes. Rather, they were the ones leading the warmongering campaign to begin an offensive on Dubrovnik and Croatia. In his book Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti (1999), Montenegrin historian Živko Andrijaševiü described the role of the Montenegrin daily newspaper Pobjeda in the preparation of the Montenegrins for a war in Croatia, particularly the region of Dubrovnik. Local Montenegrin media and their role were however entirely excluded from the related scientific analyses made so far, and it does not seem probable that such an analysis will ever be made since access to the mentioned media archived in the Montenegrin National Library (the only place where all Montenegrin media from the 1990s are stored) was “forbidden” soon after the authors had been granted it.

Methodology The purpose of this paper is to give an analysis of the mentioned media that, contrary to the views of certain historians, in fact contributed rather immensely in October and November of 1991 to prompting the Montenegrin military forces to attack the region of Dubrovnik and Croatia in support of the idea of Greater Serbia. We are primarily referring to Boka, a biweekly published in Kotor (a region bordering with Croatia), and Nikšiüke novine, a weekly published in Nikšiü (known for its extremist pro-Greater Serbia views). The units of analysis were texts published in the mentioned media, thematically associated with the war and war developments in the Dubrovnik region. A total of 39 texts, representing various journalistic genres, from news to reports and commentaries, were analysed. A qualitative analysis of the content was performed in order to investigate the manner in which the Montenegrin media presented the very reason and

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goal of the war and the manner in which they presented their own and Croatian soldiers in the period from 1 October to 30 November 1991.

The attack and the first days of the war The first issue of the biweekly Boka analysed for research purposes was published on 1 October 1991, on the very day of the massive attack on Dubrovnik. In the morning hours of 1 October 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Territorial Defence (TO) forces crossed the Croatian border and began an offensive (Antiü Brautoviü & Brautoviü, 2009). The front page of the mentioned issue of Boka featured a dominant headline which read An Armed Conflict is Taking Place on Prevlaka and along the Border with Croatia1 which was an introduction to an interview conducted by journalist Maja Matkoviü (1991a) with the then President of the Municipal Assembly of Herceg Novi, Velimir Ĉurÿeviü. In a text headlined I believe in Reason2, Maja Matkoviü pointed out that the interview was conducted after Ĉurÿeviü had visited the military positions of the JNA and the TO forces “in the area of Debeli brijeg and the Prevlaka peninsula.” Ĉurÿeviü suggested to the journalist what she should write about. Thus, she wrote in her article that Ĉurÿeviü “wanted to emphasise the friendly attitude of the citizens of the Municipality of Herceg Novi towards the members of the JNA and TO forces who were showing great patriotism in the dire moments when the homeland was in danger” (Matkoviü, 1991a, p. 1). In this manner, the author suggested a view which was just the opposite of the real situation on the front line. The members of the JNA and the Montenegrin Territorial Defence forces rounded up along the border with Croatia waiting to begin an offensive on Konavle in order to defend themselves from the barely armed Croatian police troops and civilians. This view was maintained and supported during the entire period of war reporting. The Montenegrin propaganda interpreted the awaited attack as a defence offensive, as if the aggressors were the victims and the victims were the aggressors. Ĉurÿeviü further noted that the JNA and TO forces were preparing a defence against the members of the Croatian Police (MUP) and the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), and that the local citizens were helping the “defenders” in their efforts by providing food and shelter in their homes. Ĉurÿeviü regretted that “the good citizens of Vitaljina and other 1 2

Na Prevlaci i duž granice prema Hrvatskoj vodi se oružani sukob Vjerujem u razum

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parts of the Konavle region, who were suffering from the war, failed to understand that they were in fact the ones who could help mitigate the situation,” and that “they made a mistake when choosing sides, as they decided to support the ones who were now leading them (and we are all aware where to) instead of turning their backs on the Croatian Government and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), because now they would get the worst of it” (Matkoviü, 1991a, p.1). In addition to the interview with Ĉurÿeviü, the front page also featured a news headline Defenders of Montenegro under Rapid Fire3. In the associated text, the author outlined the chronology of the conflict that was taking place at the border near the Prevlaka peninsula. Since it was the same day that the mentioned text was written (1 October 1991, according to journalist Vojislav Beloica) that the JNA and TO units entered the Croatian territory and started a military action that would result in a quick victory and occupation of the Konavle region, it is interesting to read how the Montenegrin propaganda presented the “true” state of affairs. Journalist Beloica reported that, from as early as 25 September, fire was being shot for several hours a day from infantry arms and mine throwers located in the village of Vitaljina in the region of Konavle, thus “opening a new battlefront in Yugoslavia.” The author further states that the JNA and TO units were forced to fire back “shooting warning shots and opening artillery volley fire.” The thesis concerning the composition of Croatian voluntary forces, which was, as it will be seen further in the text, supported during the entire war reporting period by both analysed papers, is also noteworthy. The journalist thus states that Croatian volunteers were in fact “legionaries” composed of “Kurds, Iraqis, and other mercenaries.” In his propagandist article, the journalist however did not state the sources of such information (Beloica, 1991a, p. 1). Finally Beloica reported that, as he was writing this article, the fire was subsiding, and added that “those aware of the fact that the Ustaša soldiers were regrouping and consolidating their troops during the day knew that new provocations and sleepless nights should be expected.” And so, in the same article, the Kurds and the Iraqis became Ustašas. On page 3 of the same edition, his fellow journalist Maja Matkoviü (1991b, p. 3) wrote, in an article headlined Life Carries On4, that Croatian troops were composed of “members of the MUP and ZNG forces.” She analysed life in Herceg Novi under the new circumstances and said that all institutions were open 3 4

Rafali na branioce Crne Gore Život se odvija

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and fully functional, except for the Dubrovnik shopping centre Dubrovkinja, whose employees, mainly citizens of the Konavle region, did not to come to work. She recognised, however, that certain problems arose due to the general mobilisation enforced on 21 September, as the men had to leave their workplaces and join the JNA reserve forces. Herceg Novi prepared three hotels to accommodate the reservists, including Njivice, Igalo, and Park. The text also featured a communication issued by the Herceg Novi Security Centre in which it warned the citizens that they should carry their personal documents for identification purposes at all times since “a few days ago the Security Centre arrested several persons with an antagonistic agenda.” The text did not provide detailed information about these alleged members of the fifth column (Matkoviü, 1991b, p. 3). Beloica also wrote a text headlined A Perfect Defence5 in which he reports about his interview with Momir Bulatoviü, the President of the Presidency of Montenegro, who visited the Boka Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy and spoke with Commander Krsto Ĉuroviü, Mayor Ĉurÿeviü (of Herceg Novi), and President of the Herceg Novi Town Government Krsto Tomaševiü. Bulatoviü justifies opening fire on the Croatian territory arguing that “all the mines and other explosive devices were used solely for defence purposes.” Furthermore, he points out that one of the aggravating circumstances was the fact that “Croatian extremist armed forces were walking freely in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in the area near the Dubrovnik border. The problem was solved after the JNA reserve forces arrived in East Herzegovina. Bulatoviü was extremely satisfied with the organisation and behaviour of the Montenegrin reservists and said: “Despite being a warrior nation, the Montenegrins have never throughout history been known as looters, persecutors, oppressors, or arsonists” (Beloica, 1991b, p. 3). A framed section next to the article by Maja Matkoviü Life Carries On featured a text by Beloica in which the journalist reported that “the acting commanders of the Boka Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy were either put in isolation or detained because they committed treason.” The named traitors were Ivo Milišiü, a Navy Ship Captain and former Chief of Staff of the Boka Naval Sector (VPS) Headquarters, and Lieutenant Colonel Ante Nogiü, an Administrative Clerk at the Commander’s Office of the Boka VPS. Beloica further wrote that Nojko Marinoviü, Commander of one of the units of the JNA garrison in Trebinje escaped and later joined the Dubrovnik Crisis Headquarters, serving as a commanding officer in the 5

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real Dubrovnik defence forces. Beloica reminds that prior to the alleged treason by Milišiü and Nogiü, eight officers and twelve junior officers (more precisely 18 Croats and 2 Muslims) “left the VPS on their own request and went to “their beautiful”6. In a text Waging an Unusual Type of War7 the author, V. Beloica, reports about a meeting of the leading officials of the People’s Party of Montenegro attended by the party’s President Novak Kilibarda and party officials from Kotor, Budva, Tivat, and Herceg Novi. The purpose of the meeting was the submission of a request that state borders with Croatia be changed and express disappointment regarding the fact that JNA was not attacking the territories from which fire was coming. Members of the meeting thus demanded from the Montenegrin Parliament the passing of a decision establishing that the border with Croatia did not have a historical footing since “it was irregular”. Confirming to the journalist that the Croatian troops were firing grenades at the border village of Malta, Kilibarda said “it was unusual that the Army was not firing back at the territories from which it was being attacked - a phenomenon in the history of war.” Members of the People’s Party therefore asked themselves “why was Montenegro shamefully keeping quiet about its view of where the border should actually be?” Dr. Mitar ývoroviü, President of the party’s Representatives Club sitting in the Montenegrin Parliament, stated that “the border should be established along Brgat, Dubac, and the waters near Kupari because it was there that the economic and political interests of Montenegro were defended” (Beloica, 1991c, p. 3b). Another three short news features by Beloica were published on the same page, all associated with the propaganda and the war. In the first text headlined Graves for the Mines8 (Beloica, 1991d, p. 3b), the journalist claimed “it was a known fact that members of the MUP and ZNG forces were using sacral and other convenient buildings to achieve their fascistlike ideas.” Beloica further wrote that the JNA scouts from the military base on Prevlaka “recently found out that the ‘legionaries’ were desecrating even the graves, using four tombs near the Church of the Holy Salvation in the village of Vitaljina to store mines and other explosives,” and concluded that “even so, they couldn’t achieve their insane intentions.” The article fails to elaborate on the nature of such intentions. 6

“Our beautiful” is the national anthem of Croatia and the country is often dubbed so as well. 7 U fenomen ratu 8 Grobovi za mine

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In the second text headlined Weddings of Reservists9 (Beloica, 1991e, p. 3b), the journalist reported that, “in the past week, six marriages were concluded, including several members of the reserve forces.” The third news feature headlined Liberate the Gates10 (Beloica, 1991f, p. 3b) is in fact a quote by Kilibarda on the topic of Prevlaka. The President of the People’s Party explains that the annexation of Prevlaka to Croatia would represent a breach of international law asserting that “if the economic structure of a region depended on a single geographical detail, such detail must belong to the relevant region.” The last “war related” article by Beloica (1991g, p. 6) in this issue of Boka was headlined Sabotage at the Water Supply Company11 and referred to the information received from the Security Centre about how, on 25 September, “Tuÿman’s legionaries tried to sabotage the Water Supply Company12 that was supplying the citizens of Herceg Novi with drinking water from the Plat hydro system.” Petar Janþiü, Director of the Herceg Novi Water Supply Company said that “the water unballasting chamber near Debeli brijeg was damaged,” thus reducing the water supply (Beloica, 1991g, p. 6). The front page of Nikšiüke novine issued on 4 October 1991 featured a full page photo of three reservists posing next to a mine thrower and three associated headlines: Montenegro Shall Surrender to No One13, Life for Freedom, Dignity for Nothing14 and There’s Hope, Crisis Can be Ended15. A commentary by M. Stojoviü headlined Freedom and Peace are Slowly Being Restored16 dominated the texts. It featured a photo of three reservists aboard a tank and began with a propagandist yet almost poetic introduction: “We have enjoyed freedom for a long time and we thought it would never end. But the ‘vampirical’17 Ustašas have risen again, using their kamas and filling the pits with slaughtered innocent people. The gentlemen

9

Vjenþanja rezervista Osloboditi vrata 11 Diverzija na Vodovod 12 Vodovod 13 Crnu Goru ne damo nikome 14 Život za slobodu, obraz nizašta 15 Nada je na našoj strani, izlaz iz krize je moguü 16 Sloboda i mir se polako vraüaju 17 A word often used locally (“povampiren”) in this context. 10

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The journalist further reported that it took the Montenegrins a long time to realise how dangerous the situation was, but, once they did, they impatiently waited for the order to attack. He called Dubrovnik a “shameful Ustaša fort” and continued lamenting about Montenegrin military honour and readiness to give life to defend freedom. He finished the commentary with a verse from the song about the JNA: Where the People’s Army Passes, Happy Land will be Born 18 (Stojoviü, 1991a, p. 4). A list of the 24 killed and 119 wounded soldiers from the territory of Montenegro and a text written in the style of a commentary headlined Both Honour and Duty19 by journalist M.D. Krivokapiü were both published on the following page. In his commentary, the journalist did not distinguish between the Montenegrins and the Serbs but referred to both as ‘the Serbian people’. “Innocent Serbian people living in the area were suffering and losing lives” thanks to Croatia’s politics which largely resembled the politics supported by the Ustaša movement. He further stated that the young Montenegrin soldiers (“our boys”) were fighting for peace not only in Montenegro but even wider afield because “they were also positioned in East Herzegovina where they protected their brothers, the people of Herzegovina, from the threats and invasion of the Ustaša army.” Krivokapiü also wrote about a group of people who refused to fight or join the reserve forces referring to them as “men without honour,”20 shaming the entire nation. He continues asserting that the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians “have been priding themselves upon their ethical and military code of conduct for centuries,” and paraphrased a traditional saying, He Who Refuses to Join the Reserve Forces is Worth Nothing21. Nikšiüke novine was putting pressure on all those who were not thrilled by Montenegro’s military adventure in the area of Dubrovnik and Bosnia and Herzegovina whether because they were simply against the war per se or they actually understood the true state of affairs (Krivokapiü, 1991, p. 5). The same page featured a message from the Municipal Committee of the Red Cross calling upon citizens to help the families of financially threatened reservists and give blood. It also featured an interesting news 18

Kud narodna vojska proÿe, sreüna üe se zemlja zvat I þast i dužnost 20 “mali ljudi” 21 Tko nije za rezervu, nije ni za þega 19

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headline Ironworkers Request to Join the Volunteer Forces22 in which a journalist signed as Ĉ.M. reports, in the attempt to counter the reports of those who refused to join the reserve forces, that on the premises of the Nikšiü Ironworks23 “the workers organised a demonstration assembly demanding they be allowed to join the volunteers.” The text also included a statement by the Ironworks Director in which he stated that those who wished to join the volunteer forces and had not received a wartime working schedule were free to do so. Finally, the news report indicates that more than a thousand Ironworks employees had already been mobilised and joined the JNA reserve forces (Ĉ.M, 1991, p. 5). The assembly at the Ironworks was attended by Montenegrin Ministers Vojin Ĉukanoviü and Božidar Babiü. Journalist Z. Zekoviü used the opportunity to interview Lieutenant Colonel and Montenegrin Defence Minister Babiü. Babiü claims that he visited the Ironworks to personally check “the progress of defence preparation measures adopted by the Montenegrin Government in June.” He admitted that Montenegro “was not directly affected by the war fire,” but pointed out “that it might not have been necessarily so if adequate measures had not been taken” (Zekoviü, 1991a, p. 11). The Minister thus used Nikšiüke novine to justify the attack on the Dubrovnik region and presented it as a preventive attack.

After two weeks of war A report headlined Records from the Battlefront24 was published on the first page of Boka issued on 15 October 1991. It served as the main headline introducing a text sub-headlined Armistice Expected after Fierce Fighting25. The article follows the propaganda pattern used in the previously mentioned texts and so reports about thousands of armed Black Legion soldiers26 (the black uniform is a symbol of the Ustaša soldiers) who almost attacked Montenegro. The author further argues that “the Croatian side took advantage of the presence of the European Peace Commission to ‘reinforce its troops and attack the JNA positions along the border and the military base on Prevlaka. Around two thousand Black Legion soldiers from West Herzegovina were brought by Libertas buses from Dubrovnik to Molunat, wherefrom they were deployed to positions 22

Metalci traže odlazak u dobrovoljce Željezara 24 Zapisi s ratišta 25 Nakon žestoke vatre oþekuje se primirje 26 “crnokošuljaši” 23

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in Debeli brijeg and the village of Vitaljina’” (Boka, 1991a, p. 1). According to the text, this was a reason for concern and the people of Herceg Novi “demanded that the competent authorities distribute weapons, so that they could join the members of the JNA in their efforts to defend the territory of Montenegro” (Boka, 1991a, p. 1). Boka thus persists in presenting the aggression and the attack as acts of ‘defence’. In his text, the author also justifies the artillery attacks on the wider Dubrovnik area by accusing the Croatian side. According to Boka, no arms were fired. It was only the Black Legion soldiers faking the bombing. A framed text headlined Fake Bombing27 includes a statement by Frigate Captain Mihajlo Žarkoviü claiming that “in order to demonstrate that the JNA was firing first and thus intimidate the citizens of the Konavle region, the Ustaša soldiers used pyrotechnic devices to fake bomb, grenade, and mine explosions as justification for attacking the members of the JNA and TO forces who so far never fired first” (Boka, 1991a, p. 1). Boka justifies the penetration of the JNA forces on the territory of Croatia, explaining that “members of the Croatian National Guard and Black Legion soldiers” had attacked Prevlaka and that the JNA forces were forced to make a counter attack in order to push them towards the village of Ĉuriniüi. The article also features comments about Croatian Television (HTV) claiming that “the Ustašas were using HTV to disseminate false information that VPS Commander Krsto Ĉuroviü was replaced.” Sources at the VPS dismissed the allegation and provided a statement (by some other officer and not the Commander himself) that Commander Ĉuroviü spoke highly of the Montenegrin and Serbian war correspondents and journalists who, as opposed to their Croatian colleagues, “gave a truthful account of the war developments in the region” (Boka, 1991a, p. 2). On page 3 however Boka published an obituary for Commander Ĉuroviü who was killed on 5 October under suspicious circumstances, to say the least, while flying in a military chopper above the region of Konavle (Miliþeviü, 1991, p. 3). During the occupation of the Konavle region, the JNA and TO forces often burned homes and blamed others for it since, in the words of its commanding officers, an army as ethical and honourable as the JNA was incapable of committing such horrific acts. Instead, “it was the Croatian mercenaries and Black Legion soldiers that burned numerous residential and other buildings to cover their traces and destroy equipment, 27

Lažno bombardiranje

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ammunition, and weapons” (Boka, 1991a, p. 2). The new Commander of the Boka Naval Sector, Milan Zec, explained the war strategy saying: “We are trying to fragment their troops but they are waiting in ambush and residential buildings, using cultural monuments and hospitals to achieve their purposes. They are playing dirty” (Boka, 1991a, p. 2). Boka goes even further and presents the liquidation of civilians as crimes committed by the Croatian side. When Baldo Ĉuraš, a citizen of Konavle who worked as butcher in a supermarket in Igalo, was murdered, two JNA soldiers testified that they found, at the landfill in the village of Dubravka, “three bags with mutilated bodies of three local people” (Boka, 1991a, p. 2). The unnamed journalist reports, basing his information on “reliable sources” that Ĉuraš was murdered by “Ustašas” because he didn’t allow them to set up a cannon in front of his house in order to fire at Debeli brijeg (the border between Croatia and Montenegro). Before killing him, Ustaša soldiers also “raped his wife and 10-year-old daughter right in front of his eyes, and then chopped his head, arms, and legs off and left his mutilated body in the landfill” (Boka, 1991a, p. 2). In its attempts to win the support of the Montenegrins, Boka published a text written by journalist Ružica Daniloviü headlined A Bull for the Army28 in which Mirko Lazareviü regretfully but proudly stated: “Since I cannot be at the battlefield with the Army, I can at least prepare a bull for the soldiers to make them feel that the ordinary folk supports and cares about them” (Daniloviü, 1991, p. 2). In a text headlined Ustaša Strongholds Defeated29 and sub-headlined Molunat, Gruda and ýilipi Liberated30, which begins with a portrayal of Montenegrin reserve soldiers (members of the Sava Kovaþeviü brigade from Nikšiü and the Fifth Montenegrin Proletarian Brigade from Titograd) singing a song called It’s nice to Walk through Montenegro31 while marching through the villages of Konavle (Boka, 1991b, p. 3), the author reports that the JNA and TO forces cut off the continental access to Dubrovnik at Slano, that they occupied Dubac, and that there were only 3 kilometres left to the city itself. The thesis concerning the composition of the Croatian troops is supported in this text as well. The text speaks about “Kurds, Tamils, Iraqis, Romanians, Bulgarians, Filipinos, Muslims 28

I vola za vojsku Pala uporišta ustaša 30 Osloboÿeni Molunat, Gruda i ýilipi 31 Lijepo ti je Crnom Gorom proüi 29

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(Bosniaks), Albanians (Kosovars), and even Germans,” as members of the Croatian defenders. The text also includes testimonies of three reserve soldiers elevated by the military success (Drago Ĉukanoviü from Nikšiü, Marko Radanoviü from Radanoviüi, and Milorad Pribiloviü from Budva): “If the Ustašas do not surrender, we will go to Dubrovnik, capture them and then organise a fiddle party on Stradun to celebrate!” (Boka, 1991b, p. 3) The three interviewed reservists continued claiming that the former administrative border could not be restored once the armistice was reached “as too much blood had been shed.” This edition of Boka also featured an article about the demonstrations led by the citizens of Herceg Novi who were expressing their dissatisfaction regarding the fact that they placed the refugees from the region of Konavle in the best hotels in town. “They are shooting at us, killing us, and we are accommodating them in our best hotels!” The author further reports that, after the demonstrations, the refugees were sent back to the villages they escaped from. Maja Matkoviü (1991c, p. 6) also wrote a text on the topic of refugees headlined Gratitude for Hospitality Shown32 in which a few refugees from Konavle “had nothing but words of praise for the JNA” (Matkoviü, 1991c, p. 6). The truth was in fact just the opposite. The civilians and war prisoners were taken to a concentration camp in the Montenegrin village of Morinj. A text signed by Gojko Markoviü headlined Treacherously on Montenegro Too33 (1991a, p. 8), published on page 8, gave a chronological overview of the events in the period from June to October 1991, as seen by the Boka journalists. The front page of the 1108th edition of Nikšiüke novine published on 18 October 1991 features a photo of a reservist. The main headline read At Military Positions of Our Soldiers34 accompanied by a sub-headline Where this Army Passes, No Ustašas Will Remain35. The second page features yet another photo, this time presenting soldiers aboard a tank and a quote from a song about the JNA Where the People’s Army Passes, Happy Land will be Born. Nikšiüke novine continued to present the Montenegrin reservists, Territorial Defence soldiers, and members of the Montenegrin police as followers of Partisans and the JNA, and the Croatian side as supporters of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and its fascist regime (Nikšiüke novine, 1991a, p. 2). 32

Zahvala za gostoprimstvo Muþki i na Crnu Goru 34 Na ratnim položajima naših vojnika 35 Kuda ova vojska kreüe tu ustaša ostat neüe 33

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Page 3 includes photos of 12 people killed and a short text supporting the already seen thesis of a forced war motivated by national and religious reasons, just as in the case of NDH and its attitude towards the minorities. The author further reports that “thanks to the fascist-like and genocidal politics of the Croatian state officials, aimed at anything even remotely associated with the Orthodox church and Serbian nation, the Serbs in Croatia were for months defending their homes and freedom from the bloodthirsty Ustaša armada” (Nikšiüke novine, 1991b, p. 3). Page 4 features a list of 37 killed and 154 wounded soldiers in the period of 1 to 9 October 1991, including date of birth, name of father, and city they were from. Journalist Milan Stojoviü visited the military positions where the soldiers from Nikšiü were deployed and wrote a news report headlined Our Soldiers – Heroes Like None Other36 (Stojoviü, 1991b, p. 5). In his text, he writes: “Gun fire, cannon roar, and treacherous shots by cowards again. The glorified Montenegrin army was however victorious once again” (Stojoviü, 1991b, p. 5). Nikšiüke novine continued to support the thesis that when the Montenegrins went to war, they did not go around pillaging but instead defended their homes and freedom. A report from the Dubrovnik hinterland was published, headlined Where this Army Passes, No Ustašas Will Remain (Nikšiüke novine, 1991c, p. 68). The report describes the war events in Popovo polje from where the Army was attacking Ravno and where “Ustašas could not be exterminated since they kept emerging from underground like mushrooms after the rain.” The author once again referenced the crimes committed in 1941, when the citizens of Ravno (Ustašas) were pulling eyes from the heads of the Serbian people, “competing against each other (to see) who could pull out more” (Nikšiüke novine, 1991c, p. 7). The author continued to report that numerous prisoners were taken to the prison (camp) in Bileüa, including a large number of foreigners as well. Besides Morinj, Bileüa was one of the most notorious concentration camps where numerous civilians and members of the Civil Protection Order, reserve MUP and ZNG forces, were held captive. A novelty introduced by Nikšiüke novine were letters from readers, used as yet another means of war propaganda (Nikšiüke novine, 1991d, p. 9). On page 11, the paper featured a poem written by Snežana Ĉurÿiü, a fourth grader from Olga Galoviü Elementary School in Nikšiü, entitled A Salute 36

Naši borci - junaci kakvih nema

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to the Soldiers37, and on page 12 it included a letter from Staniša Živanoviü from Nikšiü who said in his letter that he would be honoured to join the war although he was 49. 14-year-old Milica Neneziü wrote that she would love to join her brother on the battlefront if not as a soldier then “at least as a courier or the one passing the ammunition.” Yet another citizen of Nikšiü wrote about giving away 1000 German marks to the Army “since he was unable to join the war himself because he had to leave for Germany where he was temporarily working” (Nikšiüke novine, 1991d, p. 22).

November 1991 The front page of the edition of Boka published on 1 November 1991 featured a headline Ustašas Have Left Cavtat38 (Boka, 1991c). According to Boka, the Army entered the small town “with almost no shots fired.” Around 1500 locals “cordially welcomed” the special forces of the Military Police and the JNA. Boka also reported about the negotiations held in the village of Moþiüi situated in the Konavle region between the representatives of the European Mission, the Boka Naval Sector, and the Dubrovnik Town Government. A framed text next to the headline featured an anecdote about Hrvoje Macan who participated in the negotiations as a representative from Dubrovnik who refused to give any comments to the news reporters and journalists. However, when he heard that one of the journalists was from Priština, he called her to one side and told her that “as she was one of their kind,” that “he would tell her the truth.” The journalist turned out not to be “one of his kind” and refused his offer (Boka, 1991c, p. 1). According to Boka, “most citizens of Cavtat were loyal but there was also a number of Ustaša soldiers dressed as civilians who were persecuted and arrested daily.” Boka also reported that 150 from the total number of almost nine thousand people, mainly older persons, returned to the villages of Konavle, all of which were by that time already occupied. On the second page of this edition Boka reported that the JNA “had liberated” the villages of Plat, Mlini, and Kupari in Župa Dubrovaþka, losing only five soldiers while “killing and wounding countless Ustaša soldiers” (Boka, 1991c, p. 2). We find out from the text headlined Surrender of Ustašas Awaited39 that Brgat and Dubac were occupied as well and that the 37

Pozdrav vojnicima Ustaše napustile Cavtat 39 ýeka se predaja ustaša 38

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defenders of Dubrovnik retreated inside the walls of the Old City of Dubrovnik. Admiral Miodrag Jokiü said “he was waiting for the Ustašas to surrender as there was no place for them among the citizens of Dubrovnik” (Boka, 1991d, p. 2). Boka continues describing the loyalty of the citizens of Montenegro who readily joined the TO forces. It thus reports in an article headlined Good Mandatory Army Draft Response40 that 98% of conscripted men in Tivat joined the TO forces and 94.31% joined the armed forces, adding that 200 volunteers expressed their “wish to be immediately deployed to the battlefront” (Popadiü, 1991, p. 2b). Page three of this edition of Boka features an interview with Velimir Ĉurÿeviü, Mayor of Herceg Novi, who said that “thanks to the long and demanding training of the Montenegrin soldiers,” no one from Herceg Novi was killed, except for Admiral Ĉuroviü (Dragomanoviü, 1991a, p. 3). Journalist Milan Dragomanoviü (1991b) contributed to this edition of Boka with an anecdote from the border village of Malta (Montenegro) based on interviews with local people on the topic of pre-war relations with neighbours and the war itself. Although he himself says that no one from the village was killed and that no house was hit in the shooting, he wrote a long report about how the people of the Konavle region suddenly turned into aggressors (Dragomanoviü, 1991b, p. 3). The last page of this edition of Boka, page 8, featured a chronological overview of events in the period from 10 to 27 October 1991 signed by journalist Gojko Markoviü (1991b). In the note associated with 12 October 1991, the author spoke about “revealing the Ustaša doctrine of war,” claiming that “new soldiers were transported from Dubrovnik to Cavtat by speedboats, taking back the dead, the wounded, and the living with enough gold to pay for the ride.” In the note associated with 13 October 1991, he reported that the “President of the Dubrovnik Town Government broke all Guinness records when he told an outright lie that 15 thousand grenades had been fired on Dubrovnik.” In the note associated with 16 October 1991, the day after Cavtat was occupied, when the TV crews arrived, he wrote that “young citizens were refusing to speak and hiding their faces, which reminded them of Kosovar Albanians who hated Yugoslavia.” In the note associated with 23 October 1991, the author claimed that more than 100 members of the MUP and ZNG forces were captured. According to him, another 150 were captured on 25 October in Kupari and Mlini. He 40

Dobar odziv obveznika

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told the foreign reporters that more than nine thousand Ustaša soldiers had been killed (Markoviü, 1991b, p. 8). The numbers regarding Croatian troops, the number of killed and captured soldiers, suggest that the size of the Ustaša army was highly overestimated. The front page of the edition of Nikšiüke novine published on 1 November 1991 featured a photo of soldiers carrying arms (missiles and ammunition) for military planes and the citizens of Nikšiü sending messages from the front line: Montenegro – Be Like Us41 and We Will Proceed Victoriously Towards Zagreb, if That’s What it Takes42. After listing the names, photos, and data concerning the financial status of 13 citizens of Nikšiü who were killed in the war, in an editorial text headlined Enjoying Sun in Ragusa, Returning Bombs to Belgrade43, journalist Pavle Boškoviü expressed his views about the war. He said that the entire world was so concerned about the attack on Dubrovnik “which was bathing in the sun and peace in the strong, friendly embrace of the Yugoslav armed forces. One of the pearls of the world heritage was saved. The other, Plitvice Lakes, was at this very moment being for the third time under the attack of the Ustaša soldiers. No one is concerned about them. They are on the Serbian side” (Boškoviü, 1991, p. 1). News reporter Milan Stojoviü (1991c) penned a four page long report from the front line headlined Ravno – An Ustaša Stronghold No More44. The report featured a series of photos of soldiers in the occupied village of Ravno and their testimonies about the conflicts. His own comments are much more interesting, however. He resents “the lies told in the severe propaganda war led against Serbia and Montenegro not only by Western Yugoslavia but also by Western Europe, including the information reported by Radio Dubrovnik the day before that Trebinje had been entirely destroyed.” Furthermore, Stojoviü revealed the true role of the occupied village, saying that it was “a training centre for slaughterers, just like in 1941.” This time Serbs would not allow it. Stojoviü was particularly fascinated by the soldiers from Nikšiü. After visiting Ravno in the company of Captain Rato Bojoviü he published the Captain’s statement: “It is said here in Trebinje that the soldiers from Nikšiü came because no one else was crazy enough to do it!” (Stojoviü, 1991c, p. 4-5)

41

Crna Gora – Budi kao mi Iüi üemo ako treba kroz pobjede do Zagreba 43 Raguzi sunce, bombe Beogradu 44 Ravno više nije ustaško 42

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On pages 8 and 9 under the headline Daddy, how many Ustašas have you killed45 Maksim Vujaþiü (1991) reports about the special unit formed within the Nikšiü Territorial Defence forces. Almost one third of the entire space is covered by two photos, banknotes in the value of 100 and 5000 kuna from the period of the Independent State of Croatia, featuring also the following text: “Some of the confiscated bills that Tuÿman used to pay his soldiers.” The text is accompanied by a photo of a soldier holding a mine thrower grenade with the following message: “Franjo, stop! You can’t go any further because this bomb is meant for you!” The text was motivated by the words of soldier Rajko Kavaja who told the news reporter in occupied Zvekovica near Cavtat that he kept a war journal to reveal the truth to his four-year-old son who asked him the last time he was home: “Daddy, how many Ustašas have you killed?” The edition also includes the letters from readers in the form of poems. In his poem called Quietly, oh Quietly the Autumn Speaks to Me46, Velimir Vukoviü, an eighth grade student, sends a message to the soldiers to “destroy the vampirical fascism” (Nikšiüke novine, 1991e, p. 8-9). The paper also published a poem by Tatomir Mujoviü, a retired person, entitled Dedicated to our Soldiers on the Front Line47 (Nikšiüke novine, 1991c, p. 11) and a poem called Mrki and his Battalion48 written by Milan Kljajiü, a soldier from Banija fighting in the Sava Kovaþeviü Brigade (Nikšiüke novine, 1991c, p. 19). Journalist Zorica Zekoviü reported from the Dubrovnik hinterland where she visited members of the Veljko Vlahoviü Brigade. The text headlined Putting our Hope on Soldiers from Nikšiü49 included a statement by Predgrad Popoviü: “Wherever there is fire, the soldiers from Nikšiü play the first violin in our military orchestra!” and “God willing, the entire Montenegro will become one great Nikšiü!” (Zekoviü, 1991b, p.10) Journalist M. Stojoviü wrote about interviews with the father of twins Vlad and Veselin Božoviü who visited his boys on the Vukovar front line and the mother of Oliver Radonjiü who was positioned at Dvor na Uni who was “angry at the students demonstrating in an effort to bring the reservists home” (Stojoviü, 1991d, p. 12).

45

Tajo, koliko si ubio ustaša Tiho, o tiho govori mi jesen 47 Posveüeno našim vojnicima na ratištu 48 Mrki i njegova þeta 49 Nikšiüani naša uzdanica 46

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On page 13, this Montenegrin weekly published yet another propagandist article whose intention was to connect this war with the Second World War. The headline next to a huge map of NDH was an alleged quote by Ante Starþeviü: “Serbs are made to be slaughtered.” The text was in fact a list of testimonies and alleged statements. It included a would-be statement by Humlija Berberoviü, an Ustaša soldier, who said that “10000 Serbs were slaughtered in the church in Glina,” and a quote ascribed to Ante Paveliü: “The one who is incapable of ripping a child out of a mother’s womb could never be a good Ustaša soldier!” A testimony of the daughter of Mile Babiü on Radio Knin deserved a special frame. She said that her father was one of the 13 Serbian patriots “slaughtered at the Korana bridge in Karlovac, and that she actually saw him slaughtered, his eyes pulled out of his head, in the morgue” (Ĉukanoviü, 1991, p. 13). Journalist Milan Stojoviü brings a report from the Dubrovnik hinterland headlined From Trebinje to Ravno50. Around that time the mosque in the centre of Trebinje (Bosnia and Herzegovina) was blown up and fully destroyed. Stojoviü’s statement concerning a particular event that happened 20 days prior to this incident is therefore truly interesting. He claims that “about 20 Muslims (Bosniaks) slaughtered a pig and left it in front of the mosque in Trebinje just to provoke a conflict” (Stojoviü, 1991e, p. 20-21). The edition of Boka published on 21 November 1991 was dominated by two events. The first was covered by two headlines, namely High Ustaša Officials Captured51 and Misused Trust – JNA52, signed by journalist V. Beloica (1991h). The corresponding articles reported about the arrest of seven persons, “members of the Crisis Headquarters and most extremist members of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ).” According to Beloica, they were first arrested when the JNA entered Cavtat and detained for a day or two, thus being given “a second chance.” However, the “brains of the operation,” Antun Kralj and Ivo Bobiü and five other people, including Beba Pister Banoviü, “Secretary of the Paraga’s party who possessed files containing the names of Serbs and non-conforming Croats who were to be liquidated,” maintained contact with Dubrovnik through a ship called Argosy (Beloica, 1991h, p. 2).

50

Od Trebinja do ravnog Uhapšeni ustaški þelnici 52 Zloupotrijebili povjerenje - JNA 51

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Beloica also wrote a text headlined Brkoviü – A Citizen of Konavle53 in which he comments on the dedication in a book found in the house of Luka Korda, one of the leading HDZ officials in the Konavle region, which read: “To my dear friend and fellow soldier Luka Korda, your comrade in arms Jevrem Brkoviü.” This is precisely how the author starts his text and then presents his comments. The first comment was about Brkoviü, “a citizen of Titograd claiming to be a citizen of Konavle, who was betraying and working against his own people under the command of the Ustaša authorities in Zagreb.” “Trying to please Tuÿman’s hawks together with a group of Montenegrins who shared his views, the outcasts from the Montenegrin people, Brkoviü had long since proved that he was ‘ready to defend his home country’54. Therefore his readiness to conform is not surprising and that is why he is rightfully considered in Montenegro a traitor and a degenerate spawn of his own people” (Beloica, 1991i, p. 6).

Instead of the conclusion It is evident from the above analysis that the war propaganda used by the two investigated Montenegrin (bi)weeklys supporting the high-ranking political and military officials of Montenegro in their attempts to justify the attack on Dubrovnik and Croatia rests on several theses and methods. On the basis of the statements given by their interviewees or texts written by their journalists, Boka and Nikšiüke novine claim that the attack was in fact a preventive defence and that “the JNA was the victim and not the aggressor.” They also argue that the Croatian side was the first to open fire and that “all the mines and other explosive devices were used solely for defence purposes.” If Montenegrins doubted that was true, their arguments were confuted claiming that that the “Ustaša soldiers used pyrotechnic devices to fake bomb, grenade, and mine explosions to prove that the JNA attacked first and thus intimidate the citizens of Konavle.” Propaganda was also used to win the support of the Montenegrins, which is reflected in the interviews with a large number of reservists and reports from the front line, their statements and greetings sent home, extensive lists of donors, letters from readers, and references to the Montenegrin tradition. Particularly significant are the letters from children and other family members. What may be the worst example of this mode of propaganda is the question posed to one of the reservists while on leave by 53 54

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his four-year-old son: Daddy, how many Ustašas have you killed? If anyone in Montenegro was against the war, it was the “people with no honour” who “were shaming the entire nation,” and that He Who Refuses to Join the Reserve Forces is Worth Nothing. Propaganda used to present the opposing (Croatian) side rests on the identification of the legitimate Croatian forces with the Ustaša soldiers from the Second World War. The supported thesis was that the Montenegrins were defending their homes and freedom for months from the bloodthirsty Ustaša armada, while the few hundred Croatian defenders were presented as “thousands of armed Black Legion soldiers who almost attacked Montenegro.” The worst example of this type of propaganda in the analysed papers was the following text, which alludes to the crimes committed by the Ustaša soldiers 45 years ago: “The vampirical Ustašas have risen again, using their kamas and filling the pits with slaughtered innocent people.” The Ustaša soldiers were supported by “legionaries”, including “Kurds, Iraqis and other mercenaries.” Montenegrin (bi)weeklys went even further and claimed that, besides the Kurds and the Iraqis, “Tamils, Romanians, Bulgarians, Filipinos, Muslims (Bosniaks), Albanians (Kosovars), and even Germans” fought on the Croatian side. Croatian citizens were not to blame for what the Ustašas were doing, but Dubrovnik was a “shameful Ustaša fort” and it was expected that “the Ustašas should surrender as they had no place among the citizens of Dubrovnik.” Most of the citizens of the occupied town of Cavtat “were loyal, but there was also a number of Ustaša soldiers dressed as civilians who were persecuted and arrested daily.” The fourth goal of the war propaganda used in the analysed Montenegrin print media was to justify destruction and pillage. Boka and Nikšiüke novine state on many occasions that “the Montenegrins have never throughout history been known as looters, persecutors, oppressors, or arsonists.” Churches and cemeteries were being destroyed by the Croatian side that used “sacral and other convenient buildings in efforts to achieve its fascist-like ideas.” In the attempt to justify burning of homes and pillage, the analysed media argue that the Croatian side, i.e. “mercenaries and Black Legion soldiers burned numerous residential and other buildings to cover its traces and destroy equipment, ammunition, and weapons.”

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The analysed media show that the Montenegrin war propaganda was far more fierce and manipulative than the propaganda used by the Serbian media.

References Allan, S., & Zelizer, B. (2004). Rules of engagement: journalism and war. In: Allan, S. & Zelizer, B. (ed.) Reporting war: Journalism in wartime. London: Routledge, 3-22. Antiü Brautoviü, J., Brautoviü, M. (2009). Attack on Konavle. Katalog izložbe. Beloica, V. (1991a, October 1). Rafali na branioce Crne Gore. Boka, 469, 1 —. (1991b, October 1). Savršena odbrana. Boka, 469, 3 —. (1991c, October 1). U fenomen ratu. Boka, 469, 3b —. (1991d, October 1). Grobovi za mine. Boka, 469, 3b —. (1991e, October 1). Vjenþanje rezervista. Boka, 469, 3b —. (1991f, October 1). Osloboditi vrata. Boka, 469, 3b —. (1991g, October 1). Diverzija na Vodovod. Boka, 469, 6 —. (1991h, November 21). Zloupotrijebili povjerenje. Boka, 472, 2 —. (1991i, November 21). Konavljanin Brkoviü. Boka, 472, 6 Boka (1991a, October 15). Nakon žestoke vatre oþekuje se primirje. Boka, 470, 1-3 —. (1991b, October 15). Pala uporišta ustaša. Boka, 470, 3 —. (1991c, November 1). Ustaše napustile Cavtat. Boka, 471, 1 —. (1991d, November 1) ýeka se predaja ustaša. Boka, 471, 2 Boškoviü, P. (1991, November 1). Raguzi sunce, Beogradu bombe. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 1 Boyd-Barret, O. (2004). Understanding: The second casualty. In: Allan, S. & Zelizer, B. (ed.) Reporting war: Journalism in wartime. London: Routledge, 25-42. Ĉ.M (1991, October 4). Metalci traže odlazak u dobrovoljce. Nikšiüke novine, 1107, 5 Daniloviü, R. (1991, October 15). I vola za vojsku. Boka, 470, 2 Dragomanoviü, M. (1991a, November 1). Neka zavlada mir. Boka, 471, 3 —. (1991b, November 1). Granate iz komšiluka. Boka, 471, 3 Ĉukanoviü, M. (1991, November 1). Ante Starþeviü: Srbi su posao za klanje. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 13 Hackett, R. A. (2006). Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media. Conflict & Communication online, 5 (2).

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Krivokapiü, M.D. (1991, October 4). I þast i obaveza. Nikšiüke novine, 1107, 5 Malešiþ, M. (1993). The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict. Stocholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar. Markoviü, G. (1991a, October 15). Muþki i na Crnu Goru. Boka, 470, 8 —. (1991b, November 1). Muþki i na Crnu Goru. Boka, 471, 8 Matkoviü, M (1991a, October 1). Vjerujem u razum. Boka, 469, 1 —. (1991b, October 1). Život se odvija. Boka, 469, 3 —. (1991c, October 15). Zahvala za gostoprimstvo. Boka, 470, 6 Miliþeviü, Z. (1991, October 15). Takvi se ne zaboravljaju. Boka, 470, 3 Nag, S. (2001). Nationhood and Displacement in Indian Subcontinent. Economic and Political Weekly, 36 (51). Nikšiüke novine (1991a, October 18). Kuda ova vojska kreüe tu ustaša ostat neüe. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 1-2 —. (1991b, October 18). Slava našim junacima. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 3 —. (1991c, October 18). Slava našim junacima. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 6-8 —. (1991d, October 18). Pisma þitatelja. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 9-22 —. (1991e, November 1). Pisma þitatelja. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 8-19 Popadiü, D. (1991, November 1). Dobar odziv obveznika. Boka, 471, 2b Stojoviü, M. (1991a, October 4). Sloboda i mir se polako vraüaju. Nikšiüke novine, 1107, 4 —. (1991b, October 4). Naši borci - junaci kakvih nema. Nikšiüke novine, 1108, 5 —. (1991d, November 1). ýasno je braniti otadžbinu. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 12 —. (1991e, November 1). Od Trebinja do Ravnoga. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 20-21 —. (1991c, November 1). Ravno više nije ustaško. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 4-5 Thompson, M. (1994). Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. London: Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship. Vujaþiü, M. (1991, November 1). Tajo, koliko si ubio ustaša. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 8-9 Zekoviü, Z. (1991a, October 4). Neprijatelj üe biti potuþen i prije granica Crne Gore. Nikšiüke novine, 1107, 11 —. (1991b, November 1). Nikšiüani naša uzdanica. Nikšiüke novine, 1109, 10

CHAPTER TEN COVERAGE OF THE WAR IN DUBROVNIK IN THE SERBIAN DAILY POLITIKA (OCTOBER 1, 1991 – JANUARY 2, 1992) JANJA SEKULA GIBAý, CROATIAN HOMELAND WAR MEMORIAL AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, CROATIA

SLAVEN RUŽIû, CROATIAN HOMELAND WAR MEMORIAL AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, CROATIA

Summary Although more than twenty years have passed since the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and the Serbian and Montenegrin Territorial Defence (TO) forces attacked the city and municipality of Dubrovnik, the Croatian, Serbian, and international media still find the war in Dubrovnik an interesting topic to write about. The fierceness of the war, the specific nature of the territory where it was fought, and the shelling of the protected Old Town of Dubrovnik by the JNA units made the war in Dubrovnik an interesting subject for numerous news reporters in the fall of 1991. In that period, certain Serbian print media, primarily those strongly inclined to Slobodan Miloševiü’s regime, wrote about the war in Dubrovnik in a particularly inconsiderate and biased manner. Politika, a Serbian daily published in Belgrade, represents a perfect example of such media. As of the beginning of October 1991, it provided daily and exhaustive coverage of the conflict in Dubrovnik, fully supporting the aggressor and carrying out, from the present perspective, such propaganda that would stop at nothing in an attempt to discredit the legally elected government of the Republic of Croatia and the small number of defenders that protected the Dubrovnik area.

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Since Politika’s coverage of the war in Dubrovnik has been rather purely investigated in Croatian historiography so far, we have tried to determine the manner in which the articles published in this Serbian daily in the observed period were conceptualised, i.e. establish whether there were one or more paradigms that the writers applied when writing stories about the “Dubrovnik battlefield”. We have therefore divided our paper into four different sections based on the extent of coverage of particular topics that, almost as a principle, present the main theses appearing in the stories published in Politika in the observed period. Keywords: Politika, Dubrovnik, JNA, Montenegro, coverage, war conflicts

Introduction At the end of the 1980s, Politika became one of the most important instruments of the Greater Serbia propaganda, helping Miloševiü’s regime to set the ground for the war in Yugoslavia. In 1991, Politika reported daily about the attacks on Serbian villages and towns across the Republic of Croatia committed by “Ustaša soldiers”. In the fall of 1991, it also actively covered the developments in the “Dubrovnik battlefield”. Since the Croatian, Serbian, and Montenegrin public had so far almost exclusively referred to the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda concerning the coverage of the war in Dubrovnik, we decided to analyse the manner in which and the extent to which the war developments in and around Dubrovnik were covered in the Belgrade daily newspaper Politika. Our overview of the articles published in Politika about the events in the Dubrovnik area covers the period from October 1, 1991, when the conflicts intensified, until January 1992, when the Sarajevo Agreement was signed. Politika devoted substantial attention to the war in Dubrovnik, confirmed by the fact that, in the observed period, it published at least three articles on the topic of the city of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area daily. In addition to news reports received from the Tanjug news agency, it also had several of its own news reporters stationed in the Dubrovnik area, including Božidar Miloševiü and Zdravko Šakotiü. The coverage of the attack on Dubrovnik and the surrounding area in Politika may be “roughly” divided into four characteristic thematic sections, including reports about the progress made by the troops of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and members of the Territorial Defence (TO) of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in the Dubrovnik

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battlefield and their conflicts with the members of Croatian troops; reports about the course and outcomes of negotiation talks between the representatives of the JNA, the European Community (EC) and legal authorities of Dubrovnik; reports about the propaganda aimed at discrediting the Croatian state and defenders of Dubrovnik as well as glorifying own goals; reports about the activities of the self-formed Committee for Demilitarisation and Autonomy of Dubrovnik whose goals included, among other, the establishment of a new “Dubrovnik Republic”.

Coverage of the war conflicts in the Dubrovnik battlefield Politika followed the Yugoslav People’s Army on its journey of conquest since the very beginning of the conflicts in the Municipality of Dubrovnik. In the attempt to prepare the public for the events that were about to occur, Politika published a large article in its October 2 edition headlined Army Makes “Black Legion” Retreat1, in which it informed its readers that the JNA had started an attack on this part of the Republic of Croatia. According to Politika, the Command of the 9th Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy (VPS JRM), also known as the Boka Kotorska Naval Sector, started performing “offensive operations” on the border between Croatia and Montenegro because the members of the Dubrovnik Municipal Assembly “had ignored the previously made warnings that their paramilitary formations were provoking and opening fire on the JNA units and military facilities, as well as disturbing and harassing the residents” (Miloševiü, 1991a). Politika further explained that the direct reason for deployment and engagement of the Army in the wider Dubrovnik area was the “large-scale” attack on the JNA positions by the members of the Croatian troops stationed at Konavle with the help of 2000 “legionaries from Bosnia and Herzegovina” that, allegedly, posed an immediate threat to Igalo, Herceg Novi, and the entire Boka Kotorska bay (R. K., 1991a). During the following days, Politika “victoriously” reported about the progress made by the “provoked” JNA towards Dubrovnik. It published extensive reports about the JNA’s occupation of Konavle and Župa Dubrovaþka, and devoted special attention to the JNA’s occupation of ûilipe and Cavtat (Miloševiü, 1991b; R. K., 1991b; R. K., 1991c). According to Politika’s journalists reporting from the occupied villages and towns, the life soon normalised after they “had been liberated” by units of the JNA. The reporters emphasised that the local residents, who 1

Armija potiskuje „crnu legiju”

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had been hiding in their basements under the influence of the Croatian propaganda that “spread fear of the Army,” finally came out of their shelters, and that “the Army was there to help the citizens return to their homes and continue their everyday lives.” According to Politika, only two days after the town had been “liberated,” 80 families returned to Cavtat. Their only responsibility was “to live and work peacefully and report every three days to the Command of the town” (R. K., 1991b; Beüiroviü & Šakotiü, 1991; Šakotiü, 1991a; Miloševiü, & Šakotiü, 1991e). The “victorious and brave” army marching towards Dubrovnik was also vividly depicted in reports from the military positions, which particularly glorified the 5th Montenegrin Proletarian Brigade of the Yugoslav People’s Army that was made up of “soldiers from Titograd,” whose “fierce fire” enshrouded Dubrovnik “in fog,” and the Sava Kovaþeviü Brigade that was filled up with soldiers from Nikšiü (Miloševiü, 1991a; Ivanoviü & Beüiroviü, 1991; Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991c). In its October 27 edition, Politika published an article headlined Free View of Dubrovnik from Dubac2, depicting the occupation of one of the most important positions above the city where the soldiers from the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian battlefields, the units of the 5th Montenegrin Proletarian Brigade and the 10th Montenegrin Brigade met together. Politika also described the atmosphere at Dubac: “Milija Zindoviü is playing the accordion, playfully hitting the keys with his fingers, young men in olive-grey uniforms join hands in a reel. This is how the 1st Troop of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Montenegrin Proletarian Brigade celebrates a successfully completed mission: occupation of Dubac and the surrounding area by the units of the Yugoslav People’s Army…” The article further describes the exceptional heroism of the troops who captured this strategic position without losing a single soldier, particularly mentioning among them “teacher Milka Ĉakoviü who joined the troops as a volunteer” and was “the only woman in the armour units,” brave Captain Mustafa Barakoviü from Titograd, and three young men from Mojkovac wounded in the battle of Mlini who “hid in the shrubs surrounded by enemy forces and were taken in and saved by our tank crewmen two days after.” The text further emphasises the mixed structure of the mentioned unit by nationality, since it included, besides Montenegrins, Albanian, Macedonian, Bosnian, and a few Croatian citizens as well (Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991c).

2

Slobodan pogled s Dubca na Dubrovnik

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According to Politika, Dubrovnik was, at that moment, ready to surrender. In its article headlined Expecting Surrender of Croatian Forces3 published on October 12, Politika reported that the Army units had captured about 200 Croatian police officers and members of the Croatian National Guard and occupied the most important positions around Dubrovnik, which was reason enough to expect that the Croatian troops fighting in the area would soon surrender (Tanjug, 1991c). Similar expectations concerning the fate of the defenders of Dubrovnik were also published on October 26 in an article headlined Only Surrender Can Save Dubrovnik4, which included a statement by Milan Zec, Navy Ship Captain and Head of the Headquarters of the Boka Kotorska Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy, in which he reported that the Yugoslav People’s Army forces would stop in the immediate vicinity of the city, in the Dubac - Brgat – Komolac section, thus completely encircling and occupying Dubrovnik and forcing the Croatian forces to surrender (Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991b). In the meantime, the Commander of the Operational Group of the JNA responsible for the Herzegovinian and Dalmatian battlefield, which was to occupy the far south of the Republic of Croatia according to the plans prepared by the General Headquarters in Belgrade, Lieutenant Colonel General Jevrem Cokiü, gave a statement to the journalists writing for Politika saying that the main goal of the Army in that part of the battlefield was to “once and for all, stop the threats with firearms and stones” which were directed at the local Serbian people (obviously referring primarily to the Serbs from East Herzegovina) (Miloševiü, 1991b). At the beginning of November 1991, Politika quoted the Commander of the Boka Kotorska Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy, Vice Admiral Miodrag Jokiü, who claimed that the Croatian forces in Dubrovnik were ready to surrender, but that the officials in Zagreb refused to give them permission to do so. Jokiü pointed out that the “parade of ships led by President Stjepan Mesiü” (referring to the Libertas convoy that managed to bring the desperately needed humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik despite the sea blockade imposed by the ships of the Yugoslav Navy) was nothing but another way in which the authorities of the Republic of Croatia were putting pressure on the defenders of Dubrovnik (Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991e). In their articles, the journalists writing for Politika kept accusing the members of the Croatian troops of conscientiously provoking the JNA and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian and Montenegrin Territorial Defence 3 4

Oþekuje se predaja hrvatskih snaga Samo predaja spasava Dubrovnik

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forces, in cooperation with the alleged mercenaries from various countries around the world (e.g. Kurds, Albanians, Romanians, etc.), as well as of devastating and destroying the city of Dubrovnik, which the above mentioned JNA and TO forces were desperately trying to protect. In his article headlined Peaceless Nights of Zaton5 published on December 4, 1991, Božidar Miloševiü reported that the December 3 attack on the Army units positioned at Stara Mokošica by the Croatian “paramilitary” units that used mine throwers, machine guns, and snipers from their positions on Sustjepan, Nuncijata, and the island of Koloþep had lasted throughout the entire day, and that the attacked Army troops, after refraining from the use of force for a long time, had finally been forced to engage in battle with “all available arms,” (Miloševiü, 1991h) The same author wrote a picturesque article about the famous Montenegrin ethic ideal of “humanity and bravery” headlined I Saved My Men6, published on December 10, 1991, which included an interview with JNA Captain Vladimir Kovaþeviü. The article reported on the military operation carried out by Captain Kovaþeviü on December 6, when the said captain, without notifying his commanding officers, ordered his men to attack and occupy Fort Imperial on Mount Srÿ from their position on the nearby Žarkovica hill, and then ordered them to retreat, even though the fort had almost been occupied, after seeing that the “members of the Croatian troops were themselves targeting the civil facilities in the centre of Dubrovnik,” fearing that the Army troops would be held responsible for the attack. Further in the text, Miloševiü cynically concludes that the Old Town seems to have been spared in the conflicts of that day, pointing out that, all things considered, Dubrovnik “still remains an ace up the sleeve of Croatian authorities, which they use as their trading asset in the world market” (Miloševiü, 1991e).

Coverage of the peace talks between the representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army, the European Community, and the legal authorities of the Municipality of Dubrovnik A significant number of articles published by Politika about the “Dubrovnik area” reported that the Croatian side did not respect the agreed ceasefire periods and conclusions reached at The Hague Peace Conference. As 5 6

Nemirne noüi zatonske Spasovao sam svoje vojnike

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their main thesis, the journalists writing for Politika claimed that the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) conscientiously provoked the JNA with the aim of accusing the same of waging a war of aggression against the city of Dubrovnik in front of the international community. In its articles, Politika also constantly defamed the Croatian negotiators, claiming that they were avoiding meetings and had unrealistic, radical demands, and that they were, in fact, incompetent for performing an activity of this kind, as opposed to the representatives of the Army who were open for a constructive discussion with their opponents at all times. In the light of their failure to attend the peace talks on November 17, 1991 in Cavtat, in his article headlined Storm Prevents Dubrovnik Negotiators from Attending Peace Talks7, which was published that same day, D. Beüiroviü directly attacks the Croatian delegation from Dubrovnik, claiming that the justification that a severe storm had prevented them from sailing out of the Port of Gruž in the direction of Cavtat and attending the peace talks, did not hold water and was utterly scornful. According to Božidar ûelebiü, Yugoslav Navy Ship Captain, the purpose of the mentioned peace talks was to discuss the “borders, war prisoner exchange, battlefield rehabilitation and retreat of the remaining Croatian paramilitary forces from Mount Srÿ and Rijeka Dubrovaþka, as well as the complete demilitarisation of Dubrovnik” (Beüiroviü, 1991b). Since the Croatian delegation from Dubrovnik failed to join the peace negotiations in Cavtat in the following days either, the same author wrote another article on the same topic that was published on November 19, 1991 under the headline of Dubrovnik Negotiators Have Nothing to Say8, in which he bitterly reported that, although the JNA team and the delegation of the European Community had been expecting its arrival for days, “the ship carrying Dubrovnik negotiators was nowhere to be seen.” Thus, according to him, the Croatian negotiators made the efforts to enforce peace in this area, which the Army “was so eager to achieve,” impossible to pursue. At the same time, however, the Croatian side was also accused of using the existing ceasefire “to a great extent to find better positions and fill up its troops” (Beüiroviü, 1991c).

7 8

Oluja omela dubrovaþke pregovaraþe Pregovaraþi iz Dubrovnika zanemeli

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In his article published on December 6, 1991 headlined Dubrovnik, Only Item of Agenda9, Božidar Miloševiü writes about the negotiations in Cavtat between the Commander of the 9th Naval Sector of the Yugoslav Navy at Boka Kotorska, Vice Admiral Miodrag Jokiü, and Frigate Captain Sofronije Jeremiü, and the authorised representatives of Croatian Parliament, Davorin Rudolfo and Petar Kriste. According to Miloševiü, the latter agreed to attend the negotiations in Cavtat only after the representatives of the Dubrovnik Municipal Assembly had caused suspension of all negotiation activities by their radical and unrelenting demand presented at the previous meetings with high-ranking JNA commanders that, as a precondition for signing a peace agreement, the Army must make a complete retreat from the Municipality of Dubrovnik (Miloševiü, 1991i).

Examples of propaganda news reports about the developments in Dubrovnik and the surrounding area in the period from October 1991 to January 1992 One of the most important goals of the articles published by Politika about the developments in the observed area was, besides ensuring coverage of the JNA’s journey of conquest, also to “spread the truth” about the identity of the real aggressor that was attacking and destroying the Old Town of Dubrovnik. The main thesis was that the JNA was not targeting the local cultural and historical monuments, and that the Croatian side was trying to defame the Army in the eyes of the international and domestic public by disseminating false information about such activities being carried out on its part, thus forcing the Army to stop its efforts to finally “liberate” the city. Immediately after the JNA and the Montenegrin Territorial Defence forces crossed the border between Croatia and Montenegro at Konavle on October 5, 1991, Politika published an article headlined JNA Fears for Dubrovnik10 on the first page, expressing its fears that the “Ustaša soldiers and foreign mercenaries” were devising a plan to destroy the city and accuse the Army of committing such an atrocious act of vandalism (Tanjug, 1991a). Even before the shelling of Dubrovnik started, Politika had already advocated the Greater Serbia propaganda, thus helping the Serbian regime 9

Dubrovnik, jedina taþka denvnog reda JNA strahuje za Dubrovnik

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prepare the Yugoslav public for the destruction that was to ensue. In October 1991, Politika thus published a series of articles in which it reported that the “members of the Army were making best efforts to spare Dubrovnik” and that the JNA units “were strictly ordered not to open fire within the city” (Tanjug, 1991d). The articles also included the appeals addressed to the citizens of Dubrovnik by the Serbian side to protect their city and their lives by surrendering to the Army troops (B. Ĉ., 1991). On October 8, 1991, Politika published a speech by Branko Kostiü, Member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from Montenegro, addressed to the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro in reference to the situation in the city of Dubrovnik: “Considering that the JNA units are slowly approaching Dubrovnik and that this unique gem of the world cultural and historical heritage has already been put in jeopardy, I hereby address the citizens of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area, the high-raking Croatian officials and the entire domestic and international public. The members of the JNA, mainly comprised of forces from Montenegro, will protect Dubrovnik as they would protect their Kotor or Cetinje. However, several thousands of Tuÿman’s soldiers, showing no interest in protecting the city, are already gathering in the Old Town ready to abuse this cultural and historic location. According to certain information, they have already devised a plan to liquidate particular valuable buildings in Dubrovnik in order to simulate an Army attack and later accuse the Army of destroying the city.” Kostiü called upon the representatives of the European Community and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) to send their observers to Dubrovnik to report the truth about the events in Dubrovnik “in case of tragedy or destruction of the city” (Beüiroviü, 1991a). At the end of October 1991, in an article headlined Military Life Dearer than Dubrovnik City Walls11, Politika published a manifest of the Democratic Party of Montenegro addressed to the JNA unit commanders fighting in the “Dubrovnik battlefield” in which it was emphasised that the same “had no right to attempt to spare Dubrovnik by sacrificing the lives of their soldiers and senior officials.” Quite the opposite, they “should hold the latter dearer than the cultural goods.” He concluded his address by saying that “the efforts to spare Dubrovnik could not last indefinitely” (Tanjug, 1991f).

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The already biased reports published by Politika on the topic of the war in Dubrovnik were further inflamed by the frequent appeals made by Serbian intellectuals, historians, students and professors from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, as well as journalists and representatives of Serbian political parties, whose purpose was to warn the public that “destruction of Dubrovnik would be remembered as an act of vandalism unimaginable to the civilised world” (B. Ĉ., 1991; Tanjug, 1991b; S. R., 1991). However, the persons making the appeals did not consider the JNA forces responsible for the potential destruction of Dubrovnik, but claimed that, if the Old Town of Dubrovnik should be destroyed during future military operations, the Croatian side would be solely responsible. On October 25, 1991, Politika thus published a news article about a telegram from Slobodan Lazareviü, President of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia, addressed to the representatives of the European Community in Cavtat and Dubrovnik, in which he demanded that journalists be allowed access to Dubrovnik because the “world public had lately been receiving frequent information about threats to the cultural heritage of Dubrovnik,” allegedly by the units of the JNA and the Montenegrin Territorial Defence forces, and particularly because “there were justifiable fears that the Ustaša forces positioned in Dubrovnik had already mined the Old Town walls and were ready to repeat the scenario used for the attack on Banski dvori, a historical sight in Zagreb, i.e. commit yet another crime against cultural heritage and present the other side as the one responsible for it in the eyes of the public” (Tanjug, 1991e). In order to provide evidence which would confirm Dubrovnik as a place “with a high concentration of Ustaša forces and ammunition fully engaged in the military conflict” (Tanjug, 1991f), Politika published a series of reports and testimonials about the situation in the city, which was characterised as “chaotic,” since the citizens were forced to hide in their shelters because of the mutual confrontations between the “Ministry of Internal Affairs forces (mupovci), the Croatian National Guard forces (zenge) and the members of the Black Legion.” The latter allegedly fought because some of their members were ready to surrender to the JNA units because of the hopeless situation in the city, while the most extremist of the same were strongly against surrender (Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991d). According to articles written by Politika’s news reporters, a large number of black people allegedly participated in defending the city in November 1991. It was assumed that they arrived, together with other African mercenaries, on board ships participating in the Libertas humanitarian

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convoy led by Stjepan Mesiü, the then President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Miloševiü, B. & Šakotiü, 1991f). Politika also informed its readers that the citizens of Dubrovnik were holding Serbs as hostages (Anÿelkoviü, 1991). In the attempt to depict the difficult situation in Dubrovnik, Politika also reported that the “members of the Croatian National Guard and the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, unable to dispose of the dead bodies of their fellow soldiers, poured gasoline over them and set them on fire” (Miloševiü & Šakotiü, 1991a). The analysed daily also frequently reported about individual citizens of Dubrovnik who, after successfully fleeing the city, joined the JNA forces. The article First Group of Dubrovnik Citizens Joins JNA12 written by Božidar Miloševiü and published on November 27, 1991 tells the story about 17 young people who fled from Dubrovnik to Mokošica, which was then controlled by the Army, where they voluntarily put on the JNA uniforms and informed the military organs that, in spite of the difficult situation in the city, there was still a number of “fanatics” ready to fight to the end (Miloševiü, 1991j). The article headlined Where is the Black Smoke Coming from13, signed by S. Demiroviü and published on December 9, 1991, is a perfect example of the typical propaganda technique used by Politika and the majority of other Serbian and Montenegrin media of the time. It included a statement by the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Operational Group of the JNA responsible for the Herzegovinian battlefield, General Major Radomir Damjanoviü, given at the conference in Trebinje that the black smoke that rose above the Old Town of Dubrovnik on December 6, during the artillery attack on the same by the JNA units, was in fact caused by the members of the Croatian troops positioned inside the city who intentionally started a fire by burning automobile tyres! (Demiroviü, 1991)

Reports about plans to establish a new “Dubrovnik Republic” Besides the already mentioned topics, the journalists writing for Politika also focused on, from the present perspective, truly absurd idea of an ambitious group of local citizens inclined to the then Serbian and Montenegrin regimes that, after the Croatian forces finally leave the city of 12 13

Prva grupa Dubrovþana prešla u JNA Otkud crni dim

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Dubrovnik, a new “Dubrovnik Republic” should be proclaimed, which would, as its famous predecessor, be de facto independent from the rest of the Republic of Croatia. In his article headlined Unsurprising Silence of Dubrovnik Citizens14, Božidar Miloševiü claimed, on the basis of interviews with the citizens of the occupied town of Cavtat, that most of the local Croatian citizens, except for the “immigrants from West Herzegovina sworn to serve the Croatian Democratic Union and Tuÿman,” had advocated greater autonomy of the Dubrovnik area even before the conflicts started. The article also reported that President Tuÿman had allegedly reacted rather strongly to such ideas and completely rejected the same (Miloševiü, 1991d). In his article headlined Athens of neither Croatia nor Serbia15 published on December 2, 1991, the same author reports about the meeting of the Committee for Demilitarisation and Autonomy of Dubrovnik, which advocated the establishment of a new “Dubrovnik Republic”, emphasising that this initiative would contribute greatly to the stabilisation of the rather complex situation in the area. One of the leading members of the mentioned Committee, Dr. Blažo Zlopaša, stated that “one and the same city could not be the Athens of two nations,” and that the best solution for both sides was therefore to establish an independent republic with Dubrovnik as the capital city (Miloševiü, 1991g). The Committee issued a manifest in which it informed the public that its activities were nonpartisan and independent, and that it was open for cooperation with all those who share the same opinion, irrespective of their nationality or religion (Miloševiü, 1991d). In his article headlined I am neither a Prince nor a Conspirator16 published on December 15 that same year, Božidar Miloševiü includes notes from an interview with Aleksandar Apolonio, Chairman of the said Committee. Describing himself as the “incorrigible lover of Dubrovnik,” truly aggravated by being forced to leave the city, Apolonio explained that, after realising where the “new democracy” advocated by the Croatian authorities was leading, he decided to revive the idea of establishing an independent “Dubrovnik Republic” that, according to him, the local citizens had never really given up on. He added that he would not be the 14

ûutanju Dubrovþana ne treba se þuditi Ni srpska ni hrvatska Atina 16 Nisam ni knez ni zaverenik 15

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future prince of the newly-established republic and that he was convinced that, after demilitarisation of Dubrovnik and lifting of the blockade, peace could be restored and that “freedom would surely return” (Miloševiü, 1991f).

Conclusion Judging from the number of articles published in Politika on the topic of the war in Dubrovnik, we can conclude that, in the observed period, this Serbian daily devoted substantial attention to the developments in Dubrovnik and its surroundings. The analysis of the content of the mentioned articles, however, showed that the main purpose of the same was not simply to inform the readers about the war developments in the area because the analysed texts did not really provide a factual and objective depiction of the situation. They were actually were mainly used as instruments of the propaganda justifying the war of aggression and advocating the idea of Greater Serbia. It is evident from the content of the articles that the main purpose of the same was, on one hand, to raise the morale and awake the “spirit of a fighter” among the public, thus encouraging the people of the area to join the attack on the Republic of Croatia, and, on the other, to justify the aggression and crimes already being committed against Croatia and those which would be committed against it in the future. Politika’s articles in which the Croatian authorities were systematically accused of planning to destroy the Old Town of Dubrovnik, which started being published at the beginning of October 1991 and which served to prepare the Serbian public for the possible destruction of this unique world cultural heritage site, perfectly exemplify the stated conclusion.

References Anÿelkoviü, B. (1991, October 18): Muslims Free, Serbs in Hostage Camps (Muslimani na slobodi, Srbi u logoru kao taoci), Politika, p. 10. B., Ĉ. (1991, October 7): Save Dubrovnik (Saþuvajte Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 5. Beüiroviü, D. (1991a, October 8): Soldiers Devastate Dubrovnik (Bojovnici ruše Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 9. —. (1991b, November 17): Storm Prevents Dubrovnik Negotiators from Attending Peace Talks (Nevreme omelo dubrovaþke pregovaraþe), Politika, p. 9.

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—. (1991c, November 19): Dubrovnik Negotiators Have Nothing to Say (Pregovaraþi iz Dubrovnika zanemeli), Politika, p. 10. Beüiroviü, D., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991, October 16): Army in Cavtat (Armija u Cavtatu), Politika, p. 9. Demiroviü, S. (1991, December 9): Where is the black smoke coming from (Otkud crni dim), Politika, p. 6. Ivanoviü, V., and Beüiroviü, D. (1991, October 15). Soldiers don’t Mind Darkness (Mrak ne smeta bojovnicima). Politika, p. 9. Miloševiü, B. (1991a, October 2): Army Makes Black Legion Retreat (Armija potiskuje crnu legiju), Politika, p. 5. —. (1991b, October 5): White Flag above Dubrovnik (Beli barjak nad Dubrovnikom), Politika, p. 7. —. (1991c, October 7): JNA Occupies ýilipi Airport (JNA zaposela aerodrom ýilipi). Politika, p. 1. —. (1991j, November 27): First Group of Dubrovnik Citizens Joins JNA (Prva grupa Dubrovþana prešla u JNA), Politika, p. 9. —. (1991d, December 1): Unsurprising Silence of Dubrovnik Citizens (ûutanju Dubrovþana ne treba se þuditi), Politika, p. 7. —. (1991e, December 10): I Saved my Men (Spasavao sam svoje vojnike), Politika, p. 9. —. (1991f, December 15): I am neither a Prince nor a Conspirator (Nisam ni knez ni zaverenik), Politika, p. 7. —. (1991g, December 2): Athens of neither Croatia nor Serbia (Ni srpska ni hrvatska Atina), Politika, p. 5. —. (1991h, December 4). Peaceless Nights of Zaton (Nemirne noüi zatonske). Politika, p. 8. —. (1991i, December 6): Dubrovnik, Only Item of Agenda (Dubrovnik, jedina taþka dnevnog reda), Politika, p. 9. Miloševiü, B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991a, October 25). Old Town of Dubrovnik not Bombed (Stari Dubrovnik nije bombardiran). Politika, p. 11. Miloševiü, B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991b, October 26): Only Surrender May Save Dubrovnik (Samo predaja spasava Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 9. Miloševiü, B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991c, October 27): Free View of Dubrovnik from Dubac (Slobodan pogled sa Dubca na Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 9. Miloševiü B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991d, November 3): Mutual Confrontations among Croatian Soldiers (Meÿusobni obraþuni hrvatskih bojovnika), Politika, p. 1.

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Miloševiü, B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991e, November 2): Zagreb against Surrender of Dubrovnik (Zagreb ne odobrava predaju Dubrovnika), Politika, p. 9. Miloševiü, B., and Šakotiü, Z. (1991f, November 12): Last Positions of Paramilitary Forces around Dubrovnik Finally Destroyed (Razbijena i posljednja uporišta paravojnih snaga oko Dubrovnika), Politika, p. 9. R., K. (1991a, October 2): Battles from Dubrovnik and Knin to Vukovar (Bitke od Dubrovnika i Knina do Vukovara), Politika, p. 1. —. (1991b, October 16): Army Enters Cavtat (Vojska ušla u Cavtat), Politika, p. 1. —. (1991c, October 25): Naval Offensive near Dubrovnik (Pomorski desant kod Dubrovnika), Politika, p. 1. S., R. (1991, October 8): Protect Dubrovnik (Traži se zaštita Dubrovnika), Politika, p. 12. Šakotiü, Z. (1991a, October 17): Refugees are Returning (Izbeglice se vraüaju), Politika, p. 13. —. (1991b, October 22): Soldiers Flee towards Dubrovnik (Bojovnici beže prema Dubrovniku), Politika, p. 11. Tanjug (1991a, October 5): JNA Fears for Dubrovnik (JNA strahuje za Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 1. —. (1991b, October 6): Appeal to Save Dubrovnik (Apel da se saþuva Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 1. —. (1991c, October 12): Expecting Surrender of Croatian Forces (Oþekuje se predaja hrvatskih snaga), Politika, p. 10. —. (1991d, October 20): Ustaša Legions and Foreign Mercenaries Planning to Devastate Dubrovnik (Ustaške legije i strani plaüenici pripremaju rušenje Dubrovnika), Politika, p. 10. —. (1991e, October 25): Efforts to Allow Journalists Safe Access to Dubrovnik (Omoguüiti novinarima da bezbedno uÿu u Dubrovnik), Politika, p. 11. —. (1991f, October 25): Military Life Dearer than Dubrovnik City Walls (Vojniþki život draži od dubrovaþkih zidina), Politika, p. 11.

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE SERBIAN JUSTIFICATION OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH MEDIA: REPORTING WAR IN CROATIA – DUBROVNIK NORA NIMANI MUSA, UNIVERSITY OF PRIŠTINA, KOSOVO

SADIE CLIFFORD, THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, UK

Summary Every war in the former Yugoslavia has been accompanied by Serbian journalistic propaganda portraying the Serbs as victims. Serbian authorities wanted the war in the former Yugoslavia in early 1990s to be seen as an internal matter of the defunct country, in order to support their policy of using the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to suppress all nonSerbian nationalism and to keep the international community out of the war. This paper examines the way the Serbian newspaper Jedinstvo, published in Kosovo, reported the war in Croatia at the beginning of the attacks on Croatian cities. The newspaper’s headlines and articles helped in the creation of public discourse among Serbs in Kosovo by representing the war as a war for freedom. This study of Jedinstvo’s front page articles shows how Serbs spread propaganda by representing the Croatian fighters as hooligans who burn and steal in the cities, and the Serbians as the military forces fighting for order against these rebels. They also highlighted the number of troops from neighbouring countries who volunteered to join the Serbian army, in order to give the impression their cause was widely believed to be righteous. To explore how the Serbian media reported their attacks, especially on the city of Dubrovnik, this paper examines the articles published on the front pages of the Serbian newspaper Jedinstvo for the critical period of October

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7 – October 25 of 1991. The major fighting in Dubrovnik took place in this month, when the city was first besieged. The people were left without water and electricity for four months and this resulted in many people leaving their homes and taking refuge in neighbouring countries. Keywords: Croatia, JNA, media propaganda, Jedinstvo, Serbian authorities, Kosovo

Introduction “Lying is an aspect of our patriotism and confirmation of our innate intelligence. We lie in a creative, imaginative, and inventive way.” —Dobrica ûosiü1

The bloodiest wars in Europe since World War II took place in Yugoslavia, between the countries that used to call themselves brothers, and most of whom shared the same language. After the death of Josip Broz Tito2 in 1980, nationalism among Serbs led to the violent breakup of former Yugoslavia. During the wars, Serbian authorities tended to justify their fighting, and “in order to win the support of an already sympathetic international community and their own population, the Serbian war propaganda was almost entirely focused on the self-justification of its actions” (Maleševiü, 2010, p.210). The role of the media in Yugoslavia in 1990s was “emphasised as being to some extent responsible for the outbreak in former Yugoslavia, also proving that the media can play a major role in psychological warfare in the mobilisation of public opinion in order to achieve political goals” (Maleševiü, 2010, p.210). In the fall of 1991 the media coverage of events was becoming pure propaganda. Jedinstvo3 was the Serbian language newspaper published in Priština, an outlet which framed news from the perspective of Serbian nationalism by constructing a Croat menace to Serbs, invoking old memories of the Ustaša and threatening that Croats wanted to repeat the genocide of the Serbs (MacDonald, 2002). In this paper we present a study of Serbian news propaganda at the end of 1991, during the first attacks on Croatia by the JNA forces from 1

Dobrica ûosiü was a president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 Josip Broz Tito was the 1st president of the former Yugoslavia 3 Serbian owned newspaper published in Kosovo during the 90s and still exists in a new form as an electronic media. 2

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Montenegro led mainly by Serbian authorities. There are also articles from The New York Times for comparison with a perspective not in favour of the Serbian policy. The focus will be on the propaganda of Jedinstvo through which we argue that the Serbian authorities aimed to manipulate Serbian public opinion to believe that they were fighting for “the restoration of Serb national pride,” (Kurspahiü, 2003, p.68) and they created Croats as the image of their enemy. There are 36 articles in this qualitative sample, published from Monday 7 to Friday 25th of October in the front page of Jedinstvo. This period was chosen as the beginning of the Serb-led attacks on Croatia, a time when motivation to attack would be important.

The historical context The crises began in the 1980s, however they were intensified with the Slovenian and Croatian idea of independence and self-determination, and their declaration of independence in the 90s. This was the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the bloody wars, when thousands were killed (thousands are still missing), there was human loss, and massive destruction. Terrible massacres happened in front of the eyes of the world, many children faced the most terrible scenes and were traumatised, and many of them were orphaned. In 1986 the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) drafted a memorandum and some parts of it were firstly published in the Serbian newspaper Vecernje Novosti which awakened Serbian national consciousness (Morus, 2007), and it caused political turbulence in the whole Yugoslavia. “In this document Serbs and Serbia were shown as the only victims of the communist Yugoslavia, discriminated in the national, economic, political, and cultural sense. The document was an analysis of the Yugoslav system crisis and the proof of ‘endangered Serbian people.’ In the next period it will become fundamental legitimation of Serbian nationalism. In the following years, the Memorandum became the foundation of Serbian nationalist discourse” (Maldini and Vidovic, 2007, p.198).

In the following years, in 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, Slovenia had a ten day war, but Croatia had a four year war with Serbian military forces, for which there are many reasons, one of them being that:

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“Croatia entered the war less prepared in terms of having gained the support of both domestic and international public. The Croatian public had actually been divided over the issue of independence and Croatia’s international image was still tarnished by the genocide committed by Croatian Ustašas against Serbs during World War II” (Šimiü, 1994, p. 44).

In the autumn of 1991 the situation in Croatia was desperate. The major fighting in the city of Dubrovnik – known as the Pearl of Adriatic - took place in October; the city was left without water and electricity for four months and this resulted in thousands of refugees. Dubrovnik was liberated in May 1992, and the war in Croatia ended in 1995, leaving behind great losses in people but also in the economy and culture, with many ancient buildings destroyed. The second country that had a terrible war against Serbian forces was Bosnia, a country which is still rehabilitating. The war took place between April 1992 and December 1995. In this war Serbs used another weapon, the lowest one – they raped the Bosnian women in order to humiliate them and their husbands. They went so far that they even impregnated women to give birth to Serbian children. They attacked Bosnian villages and raped women and girls, they took them to holding centres – in schools and sports halls, and they were raped there for days and weeks. They raped these women with a political purpose to intimidate, humiliate, and degrade them and others affected by her suffering (Nizitch, 1993). The Serbian Orthodox Church was also politicised and played an important role in the wars. Patriarch Pavle was photographed blessing war criminals such as Radovan Karadžiü, Ratko Mladiü, and Momþilo Krajisnik, (Sarajevska Princeza, 2006) before they went to the battle field. This happened just a few days before Serbian forces committed genocide in Srebrenica.

Voverage of the war in Croatia in October 1991 – Jedinstvo Jedinstvo, the first Serbian language newspaper and the Albanian language newspaper Rilindja were launched in Kosovo on 12 February 1945 by the Yugoslav Communist Party’s local committee for Kosovo (Berisha, 2006). Until the 80s it was not so popular among Kosovo Serbs since they preferred to read news from the newspapers published in Belgrade and distributed in Priština, but “after Miloševiü’s coming to power Jedinstvo intrigued the public by articulating requests of the political circles such as

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the Serb Resistance Movement which asked for the radicalisation of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo” (Berisha, p. 220). From June 1999 until August 1999 it was not published at all, because most of its journalists left Kosovo along with the withdrawal of the Serbian forces. Since August 1999 it has been printed in Belgrade on weekly basis, and it has offices in Mitrovica and Gracanica near Priština. It is estimated to have a circulation of around 2,000 copies (Berisha, p. 236). With the coming of Miloševiü to power the media changed drastically; he took control of the media, state TV, and appointed people from the police and military and the journalists from the magazine “Communist” (Pejic, 1998, p. 9). Almost all articles published in Jedinstvo in October 1991 were without the names of authors. The sources used in them were mainly Serbian high officials and Army members, frequently using conference press releases as sources, but rarely civilians. There was a tendency to represent Croats as Ustaša who attacked the army and wanted to take control over Croatia, and they represented themselves [Serbs] as victims who had to fight back. In order to justify their actions, the Serbian authorities used media to such an extent that they even stoked fear among their audience about the creation of a new Ustaša state, and their purpose was to convince their audience that they had no choice but to fight back “unless they were to experience genocide again” (Šimiü, 1994, p.44). Articles in the front pages of Jedinstvo reported mostly about the attacks from the Croatian forces and about the agreements and meetings of high officials, while the articles in The New York Times spoke about both sides of the fighting in detail - some describing the fighting hour by hour. The “most shocking fighting took place in eastern Croatia, around the cities of Vukovar and Osijek, which Serbs hoped to incorporate into a unified Serbian state” (Frucht, 2005, p.559). While Serbs were fighting for Greater Serbia, in Croatia this war of independence is known as the “Homeland War” [Domovinski rat] (Frucht, 2005, p.445). In March 1991 the JNA under the command of Serbian forces started damaging Croatian cities and villages. The international community sent many reporters to the front line. On January 1992 in Croatia the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were sent, and later a further 14,000 peacekeepers were dispatched to monitor the ceasefire (Frucht, 2005, p.445). However, Serbs did not stop the attacks and massacres were happening before the eyes of the world. Articles published by international news agencies during the early days of the conflict in Croatia were mainly about the tourism industry which was failing in the “picturesque Adriatic

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coast” (Engelberg, 1991), where only a little attention was paid to the people. During the summer of 1991 the city of Split, which is known for its beauties, had no tourists; there were only journalists covering Yugoslavia’s crisis. At the beginning of the attacks, local people were mainly concerned about tourism, and an article published in The New York Times in June describes this fear among the citizens and their concerns about having the “worst season in their memory” while the “visitors from Europe and United States were staying away, apparently frightened by this nation’s ethnic violence” (Engelberg, 1991). In the following months the tone of reports in The New York Times changed from concern for tourism to horror and sympathy with regards the war. The New York Times reporter David Binder spent a week in Dubrovnik during the siege and according to his diary the siege was happening right before the eyes of the European Community, 13 military officers from seven countries were sent to monitor the fighting between Serbs and Croats: “standing on the seaside terrace, they [European monitors] watch the navy and army slam old Dubrovnik” (Binder, 1991). In his report, the JNA is the aggressor, attacking the city while the Croats defend it. Binder describes the fighting in detail, shelling and shooting, sniper fire, reporting on the number of people being killed and wounded. He recalls the town’s place in the Western imagination as a tourist spot and uses it to contrast with its contemporary reality, by mentioning the sunny weather and the beauty of this ancient city saying that “this place is beautiful even in these hours of torture” (Binder, 1991). In his diary Binder describes the moments when the “relief ship” came for the monitors and they took thousands of refugees with them, women, children, and old people. In this article there is a sense of sympathy and sorrow for the victims of war, but there was no call for a UN armed intervention. The Serbian military forces made no secret of their desire to conquer Croatia, especially the coastline, as Milan Martiü4 is cited in an article published in the New York Times said “it’s in our interest and the interest of the army to have a large port” and continued saying that “the territory that the Krajina militia and territorial defence forces will forever be Serbian, there is no need to hide it” (Sudetiü, 1991). Serbian authorities wanted to keep this issue under their control by keeping the international perception of the war as a domestic issue. The first article published in October 7 in Jedinstvo was about the “internal 4

A Serb who called himself the defence minister of Krajina.

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problems of the country,” following a report about the city of Vukovar being on fire. Despite the international community’s warning for economic sanctions and warnings about the escalation of the situation in Croatia, the fighting did not stop. The article blames the Croatians. The presidency session of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took place in Belgrade and it was concluded that the Republic of Croatia did not respect the Hague agreement, in terms of unblocking barracks and other military targets, and on contrary they continued to expand their attacks against the army. The article “Ratiste u okolini Dubrovnik” (Warzone in Dubrovnik area) describes Croatian “Ustaše” as “savages” who whilst escaping follow a scorched earth policy, burning their former hideouts. In order to make the situation seem under the control of the Serbian authorities, the media reports write that despite the fighting and burnings the situation is good, quoting the general mayor Branko Stankoviü: “the situation is good. I would say very good.” There was no Croatian civilian or military cited in this article which makes it a biased article, however it was successful propaganda of its time. These articles constructed powerful imagery of Serbian ‘victims’ and Croat ‘attackers’. As Branka Magus in her paper about the war in Croatia writes, “Belgrade’s war against Croatia did not enjoy much support among Serbs either in Serbia or Croatia and a description of it in the Western press as an ethnic war between Croats and Serbs simply parroted Miloševiü’s propaganda” (2006, p. 118). The Serbian newspapers did not show any reluctance by Serbs to fight against Croats, reporting that there had been a morale-boosting 3,500 volunteers from the Bosnian border areas. On the 10th of October it reported the agreement for a cease fire; to unblock the earth and sea on both sides of the Adriatic coast and its interior which would also be made to enable free movement of people, food, and various goods. After announcing this agreement the reports in Jedinstvo tended to justify the actions of the Army, reporting that the army respected this agreement but Croatian Ustaša provoked them, and the Army had to respond to these provocations by using force, but even when they used it, it was not used against the people, but against the “vampiremade Ustaša and the destroyers of Yugoslavia” (“The army respects truce”, 1991, p.1). Jedinstvo also reported that it was not the intention of the army to destroy the ancient city, and its cultural and historical heritage,

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still blaming the Croats calling them the “tuÿmanians” 5 who wanted to abuse the situation by getting the JNA condemned for intending to destroy the city which was protected by UNESCO. Placing Serbia in the ‘victim’ pose became a habit of Serb newspaper editors and journalists. They were aware of the importance of one of the most beautiful cities in former Yugoslavia and its heritage; however they did not stop the attacks while putting the blame on Croats. In these articles Croats are even labelled with outlandish names like “vampires” (“The army respects truce”, 1991, p.1). However later events showed that in the JNA under Serbian command, there was no attempt to preserve the historical and cultural values of Dubrovnik, they attacked and damaged it. According to analysis conducted by the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments in conjunction with UNESCO, it was found that, of 824 buildings in the Old Town, 563 (or 68.33 per cent) had been hit by projectiles in 1991-1992 and nine buildings were completely destroyed by fire (United Nations International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2001). The irony is that “people here (in Serbia) still don’t believe that Dubrovnik was shelled,” says Veran Matiü the founder of B-92 which is the only independent radio network in Serbia, and this is the result of the Serbian TV propaganda when Belgrade TV showed Dubrovnik with columns of smoke and then said that it was caused by the local people burning tyres (Perlez, 1997). On the other side, the Serbian President, Slobodan Miloševiü, giving a television interview, said that the talks about the ceasefire agreement were between the Croatian authorities, the Army, and the European Union, and he as a Serbian president was not involved in these talks because “as you know well, no one opened fire from even a square centimetre of Serbian territory, therefore we cannot talk about the cease fire” (“Same rules for all”, 1991, p.1). Miloševiü was manipulating the Serbian audience, and also others who might have been following the Serbian media. By saying this, Miloševiü wanted to appear “clean” and apart from the war, even though this was only for the public. He was very successful with his propaganda that even the European Union could not decide unanimously about the Croatian problem. The European Union could not come up with a final and unanimous decision about the crisis and the acceptance of Slovenian and Croatian independence. The resolution on the acceptance of Slovenian and Croatian independence was rejected with 82 votes, where 54 voted for, and five 5

Croatian fighters named after their president Franjo Tuÿman.

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abstained, and this was because “such a move would undermine negotiations in The Hague, which resumed today in the presence of the leaders from Croatia, Serbia, and the Army” (“Rejected Resolution”, 1991, p.1). Reporting during war time sometimes inspired journalists to show their patriotism and to flag their nationalism in their articles. Croatia wanted to be independent. Serbs did not want to let them. News articles were becoming more and more nationalistic. “The turning point” was an article published on October 15, a day before the meeting of Slobodan Miloševiü and Franjo Tuÿman in Moscow, and it concluded that Serbia had many friends in the Soviet Union and “they are aware that it is about the big alliance against Serbia, who has many international connections, therefore they warn the Croats not to seek their happiness through the destruction of Serbia” (“The turning point”, 1991, p.1). This article was timed to boost morale for the Serbs ahead of the crucial Moscow meeting. The Belgrade initiative, which was open to all republics and nations that wanted to continue life together in Yugoslavia, introduced a solid platform for improving the future relations in Yugoslavia. The irony of this was that this life together had to be under Serbian control. In Kosovo, Albanian students were going to house-schools and many Albanians were expelled from their jobs. Even though the Serbs claimed that they were a democratic state (“Serbia is and remains democratic”, 1991, p.6), there was no democracy for Kosovar Albanians, who were living in fear of the Serbian authorities. In the articles published in Jedinstvo in October 1991 we can read about the “Croatian Ustaša as vampires, destroyers, and also as ‘beasts’,” (“War against the beast”, 1991, p.1) and there is also a tendency to present Croats as attackers and the army as victims. In this article there was cited the “innocent” Bosnian fort, which was cut off from supply for three days, without food and water, and their only solution for those stationed there was to fight back against the enemy which in case were “not human, but beasts” who heavily attacked them (“War against the beast”, 1991, p.1). The European Community tried to intervene peacefully in this conflict, by organising peace conferences. In October 25, the European Community sponsored the organisation of a peace conference. An article published in The New York Times under the title “Serbs reject plan opposed by Europe” in October 25, 1991 is about the rejection of the Serbian president Miloševiü of the EC’s proposal for the reconstitution of Yugoslavia while emphasising the fact that Croatia was under Serbian attack. The New York Times reports about “Franjo Tuÿman, the President of Croatia, which has

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been under attack by the Serb dominated federal army” (p.1). In contrast, the Serbian Jedinstvo reported that “early this morning they [Croatian forces] attacked the positions of JNA and the army responded to these attacks” (The Army advancing, 1991, p.1), and the Serbian colonel Radoslav Sviþeviü in his interview for Jedinstvo and Radio Priština said that there will be no ceasefire because the army knows that “it could serve Croatian paramilitary forces for the new regrouping of forces and bringing of new units and occupying military positions” (The Army advancing, 1991, p.1). The two articles report about the same issue very differently. The Serbian article justifies their actions and blames the Croats for attacking first, posing as victims, with interviews of military personnel to make these claims conferring authority on the construction. They exclude any Croatian sources, silencing any challenge to their story. The two newspapers present quite different viewpoints on the war. Jedinstvo uses over-emotive, even shrill language, sources its news entirely from Serb authority figures and clearly takes the Serb side in the question of ‘who-shot-first’. In contrast the New York Times, has, as a distant reporter in the war, a wider viewpoint, calmer language and sometimes identifies Serbs as aggressors in the context of the Serbdominated Yugoslavian army. Although the NYT is a reported viewpoint, it clearly has a far lesser agenda to persuade than Jedinstvo.

Conclusion Just as Napoleon is thought to have said “in war the moral element and public relations are half the battle,” so the Serbian authorities showed that they knew the importance of the media. Miloševiü’s rise to power was accompanied by huge media propaganda extracted from the memorandum of SANU of 1986 mixed with historical myths, thus bringing on board his ship two very influential bodies in Serbia – the Academy of Science and Serbian Orthodox Church. This set him on his path to control the media and its transformation to a war machine. Yugoslavia was once considered a prosperous country, where the nations were called brothers, and we argue that the Serbian media failed in their democratic duty to supply accurate news to its audience, especially those that did not have access to other media. The justification of Serb attacks on the city of Dubrovnik by putting all the blame on Croatian counterparts can be counted as adding to the atmosphere of distrust between the ethnic groups which may have contributed to the length and ferocity of the war.

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We argue that the Serbian media played an important role in the last wars in former Yugoslavia and its dissolution. The lack of balanced information made Jedinstvo an unreliable, even dangerous source of disinformation, which ultimately failed its audience and all the nations of the former Yugoslavia.

References Appeal for ceasefire (1991, October 08) Jedinstvo, p.1 Berisha, Isuf. (2004, June 11-12) Kosovo/a. Paper presented at Media Ownership and its impact on media independence and pluralism: Concentration of media ownership and its impact on media freedom and pluralism, Bled, Slovenia. Retrieved at http://www2.mirovniinstitut.si/media_ownership/pdf/kosovo_a.pdf Binder, David. (1991, 16th November) Dubrovnik diary: Shelling, sniper fire, chaos and for a few, escape by sea The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/16/world/dubrovnik-diary-shellingsniper-fire-chaos-and-for-a-few-escape-by-sea.html Blitz, Brad K. (Ed.) (2006) War and change in the Balkans: nationalism, conflict and cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Call for agreement: (1991, October 12-13) Jedinstvo, p.1 Cavtat liberated (1991, October 16) Jedinstvo, p.1 Cavtat on Fire, Fighting continues around Dubrovnik (1991, October 08) Jedinstvo, p.1 ýilipi taken - battlefield around Dubrovnik (1991, October 07) Jedinstvo, p.1 Croatia violates the agreement (1991, October 09) Jedinstvo, p.1 Croats escaping too (1991, October 08) Jedinstvo, p.1 Engelberg, Stephen. (1991, 6th June) Strife cripples Yugoslavia’s big tourist industry. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/06/business/strife-cripplesyugoslavia-s-big-tourist-industry.html Frucht, Richard C. (2005) Eastern Europe: an introduction to the people, lands and culture (Vol. 1). Pennsylvania: ABC-CLIO Full Agreement - Talks between Mihail Gorbaþov and Slobodan Miloševiü in Moscow (1991, October 16) Jedinstvo, p.1 Markiü, Željka & Nizich, Ivana. (1993) War crimes in Bosnia– Herzegovina, (Vol. II). Helsinki: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Helsinki-04.htm Kurspahic, Kemal. (2003) Prime time crime: Balkan media in war and peace. Washington: USIP Press Books

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MacDonald, David Bruce. (2002) Balkan holocaust? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia. Manchester: Manchester University Press Magas, Branka (2006) The war in Croatia. In Blitz, Brad K. (Ed.) War and change in the Balkans: nationalism, conflict and cooperation (p.118 123). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Maldini, Petro & Davorka, Vidoviü. (Eds.). (2007) Transition in Central and Eastern European countries: experiences and future perspectives, Zagreb, Political Science Research Centre. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/4601462/Transition_in_Central_and_Eastern _European_Countries_-_Introduction Maleševiü, Siniša. (2010) The sociology of war and violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Montgomery, Paul. (1991, October 26). Serbs reject plan posed by Europe. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1991)/26/world/serb-rejects-plan-posed-byeurope.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%222% 22%3A%22RI%3A12%22} Morus, Christina (2007). The SANU Memorandum: Intellectual authority and the constitution of an exclusive Serbian ‘people’. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 4(2), 142-165 Pejic, Nenad. (1998) Media’s responsibility for the war in former Yugoslavia (Vol. 31). Trier: Trier Zentrum für Europ. Studien Perlez, Jane (1997, August 10) Serbian Media is a One - Man Show. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08)/weekinreview/serbian-media-is-aone-man-show.html Presidency of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ordered immediate ceasefire (1991, October 19-20) Jedinstvo, p.1 Rejected Resolution- EU Parliament rejected the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (1991, October 11) Jedinstvo, p.1 Same rules for all - Statement of Slobodan Miloševiü on the Beograd TV station: (1991, October 12-13) Jedinstvo, p.1 Sarajevska Princeza. (2006, January 21). Shocking…Serb Orthodox priest blessing the paramilitary soldiers just before genocide. [Web log comment]. Retrieved from http://sarajevskaprinceza.blogger.ba/arhiva/?start=39 Serbia was and remains democratic: (1991, October 14) Jedinstvo, p.6 Signed an agreement for ceasefire: (1991, October 10) Jedinstvo, p.1 Šimiü, Predrag. (1994) The former Yugoslavia: The media and violence, the media in former Yugoslavia. RFE/RL Research Report, 3(5), 40-47

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Sudetiü, Chuck. (1991, August 20) Truce in Croatia on edge of collapse. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/20/world/truce-in-croatia-on-edgeof-collapse.html The Army advancing (1991, October 25) Jedinstvo, p.1 The army respects truce (1991, October, 10) Jedinstvo, p.1 The second round of talks- About the Dubrovnik battlefield (1991, October 19- 20) Jedinstvo, p.1 The turning point (1991, October: 15) Jedinstvo, p.1 Ultimatum E3 for Yugoslavia (1991, 07) Jedinstvo, p. 1 Unaccepted withdrawal of Yugoslav army JNA (1991, October 12-13) Jedinstvo, p.1 United Nations International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2001, October 2). Press Release. Full contents of the Dubrovnik indictment made public. Retrieved from http://www.icty.org/sid/7948 Vukovar on fire (1991, October 07) Jedinstvo, p. 1 War against the beast (1991, October 15) Jedinstvo, p.1

CHAPTER TWELVE CROATIAN PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES ORGANISED IN 1991 IN THE DUBROVNIK REGION JULIJA BARUNýIû PLETIKOSIû, CROATIAN HOMELAND WAR MEMORIAL AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, CROATIA

ŽELJKA KRIŽE GRAýANIN, CROATIAN HOMELAND WAR MEMORIAL AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, CROATIA

Summary In the fall of 1991 when the Dubrovnik region and the city of Dubrovnik suffered a war of aggression and destruction fought with the aim of building Greater Serbia, the defence efforts included, besides the engagement of military troops enlisting, among others, volunteers from all parts of Croatia, various humanitarian activities and contributions by individuals, which together formed a unique front aimed at helping the citizens of Dubrovnik and the Dubrovnik region endure a life under siege more easily by collecting humanitarian aid and ensuring that it reached the city. Among such humanitarian initiatives, the Libertas convoy organised at the end of 1991 was the most famous one. The media also played a significant role in sensitising the public and encouraging the Croatian citizens to help and show solidarity to the citizens of Dubrovnik. The purpose of this paper is to present how the media, the print media in particular, reported on the difficult situation in Dubrovnik and their coverage of the related humanitarian initiatives and efforts. Keywords: Dubrovnik, Homeland War, media, humanitarian activities, Libertas convoy

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Introduction After a part of the Serbian population in Croatia started an open rebellion in the summer of 1991, the war of aggression fought by the Serbian paramilitary forces with the help of the Yugoslav People’s Army spread across Croatia in the fall of 1991, reaching also the region of Dubrovnik. Already in September, the Yugoslav Navy blocked the sea access to the city. Soon after, on October 1, the Yugoslav People’s Army, Montenegrin Territorial Defence, East Herzegovinian Territorial Defence and Serbian and Montenegrin paramilitary forces started a massive attack on the Municipality of Dubrovnik. On the same day, the aircrafts of the Yugoslav Air Force bombed the transmitter on Srÿ Hill cutting off all communications lines with Dubrovnik, as well as the power transformation station in the village of Komolac and the Dubrovnik water supply station, leaving the citizens of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area without electricity and water. Following the occupation of Slano on October 4, road communication with Dubrovnik was also cut off. From that moment on, Dubrovnik was under a complete land, sea and air blockade (Radeliü, Marijan, Bariü, Bing & Živiü, 2006, p. 147-150). Besides volunteers and members of the Croatian Army who participated in the efforts to defend Dubrovnik and the surrounding area, various humanitarian organisations and numerous cultural and public workers, both Croatian and international, also contributed to defence efforts and provided help to the citizens of Dubrovnik by collecting humanitarian aid and ensuring that it reached the city, as well as by making public statements to the media. The media that provided daily reports on the casualties and destruction of Dubrovnik, a city that has been on UNESCO’s World Heritage List since 1979, and the life of its citizens, also played a significant role in sensitising and encouraging the Croatian and international public to help the city of Dubrovnik and its citizens. It is precisely for this reason that their coverage of the numerous humanitarian activities organised during the fiercest and most severe attacks on the city and its surroundings in the period from September to December of 1991 is considered important. This paper gives an overview of the Croatian print media published in the period from September to December of 1991 and their daily coverage of the situation in Dubrovnik and the humanitarian activities and peace initiatives organised during the fiercest and most severe attacks on the city and its surroundings, with a special emphasis on the Libertas and Libertas

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2 convoys, as the two most famous humanitarian initiatives organised with the aim of breaking the sea blockade of the city of Dubrovnik and ensuring delivery of the desperately needed humanitarian aid to the tormented and exhausted citizens of Dubrovnik. The overview of the Croatian print media includes Croatian daily newspapers Veþernji list, Vjesnik and Slobodna Dalmacija, and Croatian weekly magazines Danas and Globus.

First humanitarian activities Veþernji list reported almost daily on the events in Dubrovnik, the attacks on the city, destruction of its cultural heritage, civil casualties and various peace efforts and calls for help. Veþernji list also published various reports on the war in Dubrovnik taken from the foreign media and called upon the international public to help the city of Dubrovnik and its citizens in any way they can. For example, in its October 8 edition (Veþernji list, 1991a), it published a short feature in which it reported that Le Figaro, a French daily newspaper, included a large picture of Dubrovnik on its last page and a public statement made by renowned French academic Jean d’Ormesson under the headline “Dubrovnik Must be Saved!”1 Slobodna Dalmacija also reported on the war developments in Dubrovnik daily and exhaustively, covering also the humanitarian side of war stories. Almost each edition of Slobodna Dalmacija issued in the period from September to December of 1991 included news headlines about the war horrors and destruction of Dubrovnik already on front pages, and news reports from Dubrovnik, accompanied by numerous photographs, regularly filled 3 to 4 pages of each edition. In its October 6 edition, Slobodna Dalmacija published an interesting short feature about anti-war demonstrations in Belgrade headlined “A Cry for Dubrovnik”2. Over a thousand citizens of Belgrade participated in the public demonstrations aimed at stopping the crime against Dubrovnik calling upon the Serbian public “to help prevent Dubrovnik from becoming Guernica of the Balkans” (Slobodna Dalmacija, 1991a). The Zagreb edition of Veþernji list published on October 21, 1991 included a short feature headlined “Food and Juice for the Citizens of 1 2

“Treba spasiti Dubrovnik” “Vapaj za Dubrovnik”

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Dubrovnik”3 reporting on the food and juice aid delivered from Rijeka to Dubrovnik by the Balkanija ferry. About 20 tonnes of food and juice were collected and delivered to Dubrovnik in response to public TV messages from artist Milka Podrug Kokotoviü. The same edition also featured a short text about the peaceful demonstrations by a group of Dubrovnik citizens, i.e. Dubrovnik students who studied in Zagreb, whose aim was to raise the public’s awareness of the true extent of war suffering of Dubrovnik and its citizens, who were starving and living under a complete blockade (Veþernji list, 1991b). On October 23, 1991, Veþernji list published an article about the aid sent to Dubrovnik by the Jewish Community of Zagreb, which included food, water and medical supplies. The aid collected and sent by Caritas was delivered to Dubrovnik on board the same ship that departed from Rijeka. Eight courageous women from Zagreb, including famous opera singer Božena Ruk – Foþiü, started a unique initiative entitled “There will Come a Time to Sing”4. Veþernji list published a feature about the mentioned initiative on October 24, 1991 headlined “Shooting Grenades on Stradun”5. These women started a campaign with the aim of supplying Dubrovnik with 80 tonnes of food and sanitary material. None of these women had any relatives in Dubrovnik. Their campaign was motivated simply by the desire to help the tormented citizens of Dubrovnik. Vjesnik also published a short text about this initiative (Vjesnik, 1991a). In its October 26 edition, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991b) published an article headlined “Landing in Dubrovnik by Parachute if Necessary!”6, which included several excerpts from a statement given by Jean d’Ormesson, a French academic, writer and news reporter, published in the French daily Le Figaro in which he stated, among other, that on October 23 he had organised, in cooperation with a group of other writers, representatives from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNESCO, a peaceful visit to Dubrovnik but the Yugoslav Navy had prevented them from disembarking the ship and forced them to return to Bari, Italy, the day after their arrival with unfinished business.

3

“Hrana i sokovi za Dubrovþane” “Za pjesmu üe vremena bit” 5 “Granatama po Stradunu” 6 “I padobranom se spustiti u Dubrovnik!” 4

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Libertas humanitarian convoy Veþernji list featured numerous articles about the organisation and course of the voyage of the Libertas humanitarian convoy. It brought daily reports on the movements of the convoy and its voyage from Rijeka to Dubrovnik via Split, and particularly on the obstacles posed by the Yugoslav Navy to the convoy participants and the stopping of the convoy at the entrance to Dubrovnik. Convoy participants included a number of small boats led by the Slavija. In the period from October 28, 1991, when the convoy set out on the voyage to its destination from Rijeka, until October 31, 1991, when it sailed into Dubrovnik’s Port of Gruž, Veþernji list featured daily reports in which it referred to that period as “a week of political and humanitarian solidarity shown by the entire Croatian nation to besieged Dubrovnik.” The article also reported on the convoy’s voyage from Rijeka to Dubrovnik and that, during the voyage, the convoy had been joined by numerous ships and boats from all Croatian ports proudly flying the Croatian flag. Many convoy participants, including news reporters from all over the world, came to Rijeka by bus to join the convoy. Send-off celebrations were organised in Rijeka and other Croatian ports, with Split being the convoy’s last stop on the journey to its final destination. The headline “Peace Offensive in Dubrovnik”7 appeared on the front page of the double edition of Veþernji list published on October 31/November 1, 1991. The edition also included several short features about the convoy and its voyage towards the Port of Gruž (Veþernji list, 1991d; 1991e). Veþernji list continued writing about the significance of the convoy and its moral, symbolic and media impact after it had already reached its destination, which is evident from its November 2 edition (1991f) featuring reports from Delo, a Slovene daily that also reported on the moral significance of the convoy for both the citizens of Dubrovnik and the entire Croatian public. According to Veþernji list, Delo reported that the “Yugoslav Army had been defeated under the walls of Dubrovnik” and it referred to the Libertas convoy as “a true milestone in the Croatian Homeland War.” In the mentioned period, Vjesnik also reported on the Libertas convoy daily. The front page of its October 30 edition featured a text headlined “The Convoy’s Goal Goes Beyond Dubrovnik”8, emphasising that the 7 8

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convoy’s great success could signify “the beginning of a large caravan that could bring home hundreds of thousands of refugees in the following days and months” (Vjesnik, 1991b). The same edition also included a few more short features about the convoy. For example, a short text headlined “Army to Attack the Convoy”9 reported that Dubrovnik radio amateurs had intercepted a message from the commanders of the Boka Military Naval Sector in which a detailed inspection of passengers and ships participating in the convoy had been ordered. In its November 3 edition, Vjesnik (1991c) published an overview of the success of the Libertas convoy and an article about the convoy’s return to Rijeka headlined “Peace Convoy Returns to Rijeka”10. In its address to the citizens of Rijeka and the international public upon arrival of the convoy to Rijeka, Stipe Mesiü said that the idea of the convoy had been successful because its motivation was to achieve victory for Croatia. In the same edition, in the Topics of the Week section, a large article headlined “Saint Blaise in the Arms of the Occupying Forces”11 featured an overview of the voyage on board the Slavija and the Libertas convoy. Slobodna Dalmacija also reported daily and exhaustively on the Libertas convoy and its voyage from Rijeka to Gruž. The October 29 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991c) devoted an entire page to the convoy or, more precisely, to the press conference held in Zagreb, at which the members of the initiative commission for the return to Dubrovnik explained the civil initiative to organise an aid convoy for the citizens of Dubrovnik. The same page included a feature about the convoy’s send-off from the Port of Split, as well as a feature about the big interest and desire of numerous Croatian citizens to join the convoy. The headline “Grand Send-off”12 appeared on the front page of the October 30 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991d). It referred to the text about the convoy’s send-off from Split in the evening of October 29 when the Slavija sailed out from the Port of Split with around 800 passengers, numerous famous persons from the cultural, music and entertainment scene, Croatian Parliament and Government delegations, and Stipe Mesiü, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who joined the convoy in Split. The first pages featured an 9

„Armijski napad na konvoj” „Konvoj mira vratio se u Rijeku” 11 „Sv. Vlaho u zagrljaju okupatora” 12 „Veliþanstveni ispraüaj” 10

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article headlined “Entire Croatia Stands by Dubrovnik”13, which included a report from the press conference held prior to the convoy’s sail-off to Dubrovnik. At the press conference, Prime Minister Franjo Greguriü emphasised the significance of an initiative such as this for the citizens of Dubrovnik. The press conference was also attended by President Stipe Mesiü, Deputy Prime Minister Milan Ramljak, Ministers Davorin Rudolf and Petar Kriste, Vice Chairman of Croatian Parliament Stjepan Sulimanac, and Sveto Letica, Commander-in-Chief of the Croatian Navy. The headline “No, none will return!”14 and the article about the Libertas convoy’s voyage were published in the double edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991e) issued on October 31/November 1, 1991. The text mainly referred to the conversation between Stipe Mesiü and General Pavle Strugar, Montenegrin Territorial Defence Forces Commander, who stopped the Slavija and the convoy in the Pelješac Channel claiming that the ship was carrying weapons and that it should be redirected to Zelenika, Montenegro, while the small ships and boats in the convoy should return to their respective ports of departure. Stipe Mesiü was determined: “No, the Slavija will not sail to Zelenika, the Slavija will not leave the convoy!” After that, Stipe Mesiü spoke with Admiral Stane Brovet. After the Admiral had stopped the convoy for inspection purposes, Stipe Mesiü again responded that none would return, that all ships led by the Slavija would proceed further towards Dubrovnik. The same page also included several short features about the Libertas convoy. For example, the text headlined “Firearms were Stronger”15 was about a dozen of small boats from Suüuraj, Sumartin, and the coastal area of Makarska that wanted to join the convoy but were intercepted in the Neretva Channel by the Yugoslav Navy and forced to return. The same edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991f) also included a short feature about one more humanitarian effort aimed to help Dubrovnik. The text was headlined “Aid from BiH Arrives to Gruž”16, and it referred to around 80 tonnes of food, medical supplies and clothes delivered to Dubrovnik on October 30, 1991 on board the Balkanija ferry from the Red Cross of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aid was transported from Sarajevo to Split, where it was loaded onto a ship that would carry it to Dubrovnik.

13

„Cijela je Hrvatska uz Dubrovnik” “Ne, svi idu dalje!” 15 “Rafali su bili jaþi” 16 “Pomoü iz BiH stigla u Gruž” 14

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After the military inspection in Zelenika, Boka Kotorska, the aid finally reached Dubrovnik. The entire front page of the November 2 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991g) was dedicated to the Libertas convoy under a large print headline “The Convoy of Love Defeats the Blockade of Hate!”17 The content of the first several pages was also entirely dedicated to the convoy. A text headlined “Dubrovnik Remains a Bastion of Democracy and Freedom”18, revealed the sentiments of the citizens of Dubrovnik expressed upon arrival of the Slavija and the convoy to Dubrovnik’s Port of Gruž on November 1, who welcomed the high Croatian officials, artists and guests from the public and cultural scene with an energetic applause and singing “Our Beautiful”19, the Croatian national anthem. Several other features were dedicated to the convoy’s arrival to Dubrovnik, including texts headlined: “And the Convoy Docks on Stradun”20, “The Truth Should Stop the Conflict”21, etc. The central two pages of this edition of Slobodna Dalmacija, filled with photographs from Dubrovnik, were also dedicated to the convoy’s arrival to Dubrovnik. But, almost ironically, the last page of this edition reported on the new attacks on Dubrovnik that happened on that same day, and the problems that the citizens of Dubrovnik had been facing for days, ever since Dubrovnik and its surrounding area were cut off from the power and water supply networks. Most of the following editions of Slobodna Dalmacija during the entire month of November featured reports on new attacks on Dubrovnik and severe destruction of civil targets and cultural goods, mainly appearing on the front page. Two pages of the November 3 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991h) were again dedicated to the Libertas convoy, featuring mostly photographs of the convoy’s arrival at the city, the people gathered on Stradun and a few photographs of the daily war horrors and suffering in Dubrovnik. One of the texts published in Slobodna Dalmacija on November 4 (1991i) featured a statement and an overview on the convoy’s significance for the citizens of Dubrovnik given by Dubrovnik Mayor Pero Poljaniü. A text

17

“Konvoj ljubavi jaþi od blokade mržnje!” “Dubrovnik ostaje bastion i demokracije i slobode” 19 “Lijepa naša” 20 “I konvoj se ukrcao na Stradun” 21 “Istina bi trebala zaustaviti sukob” 18

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headlined “Libertas Raises Hope”22 reported on the press conference dedicated to the opening of the Dubrovnik Peace Convoy Office. The November 6 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991j) featured an article by Slobodan Lang, published in the following editions as the Libertas Journal feuilleton, which included his comments and overviews about the situation in Dubrovnik, particularly those related to humanitarian initiatives and the Libertas convoy. Globus and Danas, the Croatian weeklys published during the period when Dubrovnik was under siege, also featured articles dedicated to the Libertas convoy. In its edition issued on November 8, 1991, Globus featured an exhaustive article headlined “I was a Stowaway on board the Slavija”23, which was in fact a journal written by British journalist Christopher Long who joined the peace convoy in Split. Among other things, Christopher Long wrote the following in his journal: “The plan was for the Slavija and her convoy of 38 small ships to carry the message of solidarity and the practical aid that was so desperately needed in Dubrovnik… it was supposed to attract the attention of the world to what is happening in Croatia and, above all, it came from the heart.” In its edition issued on November 5, 1991, Danas, a Croatian informative and political weekly, featured an exhaustive four-page article about the organisation of the Libertas convoy and its arrival to Dubrovnik.

International humanitarian activities The following editions of Croatian dailies, mostly Slobodna Dalmacija, included exhaustive reports from Dubrovnik, primarily about war developments, attacks on the city and increasingly severe destruction that culminated on December 6, 1991. They also covered humanitarian activities and peace initiatives organised after the Libertas convoy had left Dubrovnik. The November 10 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991k) included a feature headlined „We Must Prevent Dubrovnik from Becoming Guernica of the Balkans”24, which was in fact a brief report from the peace movement forum held in Belgrade, at which the citizens of Dubrovnik 22

„Libertas budi nadu” „Bio sam slijepi putnik na brodu Slavija” 24 “Treba sprijeþiti da Dubrovnik postane balkanska Guernica” 23

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who managed to flee from the city spoke publicly, calling upon the world to stop the aggression and attack against Dubrovnik. In its November 14 edition, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991l) featured a short text headlined “Ship Carrying Aid for Dubrovnik”25 about an initiative by the International Red Cross Commission to send a ship carrying aid for Dubrovnik. In its November 15 edition, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991m) published a feature headlined “Rain Stops Fires in Gruž”26, which also included a brief overview on the Slavija’s sail-off with around 3500 wounded persons, pregnant women, mothers with children, foreigners and refugees that had been accommodated in devastated or severely damaged Dubrovnik hotels. The European Union Monitoring Mission and a few representatives from city authorities also boarded the Slavija and sailed from Dubrovnik. The November 18 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991) featured a statement by Italian President Francesco Cossiga from his speech given at the San Marco Military Base, where the San Marco, the Italian Navy ship that later transported aid to Dubrovnik, was stationed. In his speech, Cossiga called upon the authorities in Belgrade to stop the military operations in Croatia and allow the ships carrying humanitarian aid access to Dubrovnik. The article also featured reports from Italian daily newspapers. Corriere della Sera, for example, featured a whole-page text headlined “Dubrovnik – A City of Hostages”27, and the Republica daily featured a text headlined “Children from Dubrovnik with War in their Eyes”28, a heart-felt report from Pula where the Slavija brought the refugees from Dubrovnik. That same day, Veþernji list (1991g) published an article headlined “Dubrovnik Must be Saved.”29 “The mad and obsessive destruction of Dubrovnik and the suffering of refugees from Dubrovnik have attracted attention of most British Sunday newspapers and magazines. The Sunday Telegraph, for example, published a call for help addressed by Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, to his British colleague Linda Chalker, who was responsible for organising aid for other countries. ‘The only way to make any progress in this bloody, meaningless 25

„Brod pomoüi za Dubrovnik” „Kiša gasi Gruž” 27 “Dubrovnik – grad talaca” 28 “Djeca Dubrovnika s ratom u oþima” 29 “Dubrovnik se mora spasiti” 26

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war, that very much resembles the Lebanese war, is to send little crumbs of help, and the only way to avoid political paralysis is to send a series of humanitarian delegations of ministers to Dubrovnik…,’ said Kouchner inviting other EC ministers to come and help stop the war.” The same page also featured an article headlined “San Marco to Sail to Dubrovnik”30 reporting that the high Italian politicians’ determined efforts had resulted with a permission to send the auxiliary Italian Navy ship San Marco with humanitarian aid for the children, the wounded and the sick to Dubrovnik (Veþernji list, 1991h). In its November 20 edition, Veþernji list (1991i) again reported on the Italian Navy ship San Marco in a text headlined “And the La Rance Sails Out”31. The San Marco “sailed into Brindisi with 782 refugees from Dubrovnik” on November 19, and the French ship La Rance sailed into the Port of Gruž on November 20, contributing to the establishment of a “humanitarian corridor”, as reported by Veþernji list on November 21 (1991k). The November 21 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991o) featured a short news article about the arrival of the La Rance, a French Navy hospital ship, carrying over 100 tonnes of humanitarian aid to the port of Dubrovnik after being detained for several hours in the waters surrounding Dubrovnik. At the Port of Gruž, the La Rance was welcomed by Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, who stayed in Dubrovnik at the time. In its November 23 edition, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991p) published an interview with Peter Luznik, St Blaise Aid Fund Chairman. The Fund was established on October 1, 1991 as a legal humanitarian organisation responsible for collecting all types of humanitarian aid. The November 23 edition of Veþernji list (1991k) featured a text headlined “Courage and Act of Conscience”32 about Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, who stayed in Dubrovnik and called upon high officials and celebrities from across the world “to come to Dubrovnik and help the Croatian nation and history avoid another Vukovar…” He also decided to inspire UN General Secretary to organise a global campaign to save Dubrovnik. 30

“San Marco u Dubrovnik” “Isplovljava la Rance” 32 „Hrabrost i nalog savjesti” 31

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During November, Veþernji list featured articles about other humanitarian organisations and aid for the citizens of Dubrovnik as well. For example, the November 24 edition (Veþernji list, 1991l) featured a text headlined “On the Road of Uncertainty”33 about 284 tonnes of food and medical supplies delivered to Dubrovnik by the Ilirija, as well as about the humanitarian mission organised by the Jewish Community of Zagreb. The November 25 edition of Veþernji list (1991m) featured a text headlined “Fires from Slano” which reported, among other, that ships from around the world carrying food, medical supplies and other humanitarian aid were coming to Dubrovnik, including the Poladio from Italy and the Di Maratos from Malta. On November 24, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991r) published a statement by Margherite Boniver, Italian Immigration Minister, who visited Dubrovnik on board the San Marco. After her visit to Dubrovnik, she stated that the “humanitarian corridor had been opened and that it was necessary to keep it so, since that was the only way to prevent Dubrovnik’s demise, which was possible at any moment.” On November 29, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991s) featured a report from the press conference given by the UNESCO delegation under the headline “The World is Opening its Eyes”34. The delegation had arrived to Dubrovnik the day before and hung three United Nations flags at most prominent old city centre locations, where they also opened a UNESCO Office. In its November 30 edition, Veþernji list (1991n) featured an article about Bernard Kouchner’s repeated visit to Dubrovnik and the address given by Libertas Office President Slobodan Lang to the citizens of Dubrovnik on November 29, announcing, among other, that in the period from December 1-10 Dubrovnik would host a Peace Festival to be opened by Mr. Bernard Kouchner. On December 1, Vjesnik (1991d) reported on the conference on protecting human rights of refugees from the Municipality of Dubrovnik, on which occasion, Slobodan Lang, Libertas Love and Peace Convoy Office President, said that “it was absolutely impossible to divide the citizens of Dubrovnik by nationality or religion,” and emphasised that, in the difficult

33 34

„Na putu neizvjesnosti” „Svijet otvara oþi”

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days of war, no one suffered discrimination when it came to distribution of humanitarian aid that was coming from Croatia and abroad. The December 2 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991t) featured the headline “May Dubrovnik Unite Europe”35 and an exhaustive report about the commencement of the 10-day Peace Festival festivities organised by the Libertas Convoy Office under the auspices of French Minister Bernard Kouchner. The Festival began on December 1 and was opened by Slobodan Lang who said that “the Festival was the first gathering of intellectuals held in a besieged city.” On this occasion, Jean d’Omersson, Member of the French Parliament and Academy who stayed in Dubrovnik at the time, also gave a speech for the citizens of Dubrovnik.

Libertas 2 humanitarian aid convoy All Croatian dailies featured texts about Libertas 2, a new aid convoy. On the front page of its December 10 edition, Vjesnik (1991e) reported that the Liburnija ferry carrying around 300 refugees from Dubrovnik and a few hundred other convoy participants, including public and cultural workers and Croatian and international journalists had set sail towards Dubrovnik (Vjesnik, 1991f). On December 13, Slobodna Dalmacija (1991u) featured a front-page headline about the arrival of the Libertas 2 convoy to Dubrovnik, while page 5 of the same issue featured an exhaustive article about the arrival of the 25 ships participating in the convoy to Dubrovnik on December 12. A few days after the Libertas 2 convoy had sailed into Dubrovnik, Vjesnik featured an overview on the participants in the convoy who sailed into devastated Dubrovnik and their impressions of the situation in Dubrovnik: “Tears for all that suffering come streaming down their faces in rare moments only, since their priority is to survive, save the children. The food is cooked on improvised furnaces ignited by twigs at the steps in front of the houses, and broken beams and trees are carefully used as firewood. The black market is blossoming. In the thick darkness that enshrouded the city below Srÿ Hill before the clock struck 5, the Liburnija was like a gleaming lighthouse boarded by Dubrovnik castaways from civilisation” (Vjesnik, 1991f).

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The December 21 edition of Slobodna Dalmacija (1991v) featured a short report on the Christmas gift to Dubrovnik from Caritas of the Sarajevo Roman Catholic Archdiocese that send a humanitarian aid convoy from Sarajevo to Dubrovnik called “Merry Christmas, Dubrovnik!”36 After signing the Sarajevo Peace Accord on January 2, 1992 and after its ratification the day later, the first phase of the war in Croatia was finished and a period of ‘either war, nor peace’ began. The same was true of the Dubrovnik region. The fighting and destruction stopped and the daily and exhaustive reporting on the war situation in Dubrovnik in the media became less intensive.

Conclusion It can be concluded that the analysis of the Croatian highest circulation print media published during the Homeland War, i.e. during the period from September to December of 1991 when the fiercest and most severe battles were fought in Dubrovnik, when the city and its surroundings suffered tremendous devastation and the citizens were either forced to leave the city or remain in the city under minimum living conditions, deprived of electricity and water, showed that the analysed media provided quite an exhaustive coverage of the situation in Dubrovnik and on the Dubrovnik front line, as well as that, since the outbreak of the war, every edition featured at least one text devoted to the war in Dubrovnik, and news headlines on the topic of the situation in Dubrovnik often filled the front pages of all Croatian daily newspapers. Much attention was also dedicated to humanitarian activities, with all the print media providing regular and exhaustive coverage, often specifying the exact quantities of items delivered to the citizens of Dubrovnik. Logically, the two most famous humanitarian initiatives, the Libertas and Libertas 2 convoys, were most exhaustively covered. The media regularly reported on the movements of the convoy, the misfortunes and obstacles on its voyage, as well as the send-off and welcoming celebrations at different ports. Thanks to the media and their daily reports from the front lines and articles on the topic of Dubrovnik and its citizens, the humanitarian efforts in particular, the Croatian and international public were able to follow the developments on the Dubrovnik front line, have a daily insight into the situation in an attacked and besieged city and, thus motivated, react by organising various humanitarian campaigns, public protests or addresses, primarily calls for 36

“Sretan ti Božiü, Dubrovniþe!”

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help addressed to the international community. We can certainly say that the Croatian print media played a significant role in sensitising the Croatian and international public concerning the situation in Dubrovnik and the suffering of its citizens, and thus also contributed to the success and number of humanitarian activities and the international recognition of Croatia on January 15, 1992.

References Danas (1991, November 5). Globus (1991, November 8), Bio sam slijepi putnik na brodu Slavija (I was a Stowaway on the Slavija) Radeliü, Z., Marijan, D., Bariü, N., Bing, A., Živiü, D. (2006), Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat (Formation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War), Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Slobodna Dalmacija (1991a, October 6), Vapaj za Dubrovnik (A Cry for Dubrovnik), p. 7. —. (1991b, October 26), I padobranom se spustiti u Dubrovnik! (Landing to Dubrovnik by Parachutes if Necessary!), p. 17. —. (1991c, October 29). p.3. —. (1991d, October 30), Veliþanstveni ispraüaj (Grand Send-off), p.1. —. (1991e, October 31/ November 1), Ne, svi idu dalje! (No, none will return!), p.3. —. (1991f, October 31/ November 1), Pomoü iz BiH stigla u Gruž (Aid from BIH Arrives to Gruž), p.4. —. (1991g, November2), Konvoj ljubavi jaþi od blokade mržnje (The Convoy of Love Defeats the Blockade of Hate), p.1. —. (1991h, November 3), p.6-7. —. (1991i, November 4), Libertas budi nadu (Libertas Raises Hope), p.4. —. (1991j, November 6), Dnevnik Libertas (Libertas Journal), p.4. —. (1991k, November 10), Treba sprijeþiti da Dubrovnik postane balkanska Guernica (We Must Prevent Dubrovnik from Becoming the Guernica of the Balkans), p.5. —. (1991l, November 14), Brod pomoüi za Dubrovnik (Ship Carrying Aid for Dubrovnik), p.40. —. (1991m, November 15), Kiša gasi Gruž (Rain Stops Fires in Gruž), p.3. —. (1991n, November 18). p.15. —. (1991o, November 21). p. 6. —. (1991p, November 23), Sv. Vlaho bdije nad Dubrovþanima (St Blaise Watches over the Citizens of Dubrovnik), pp. 6-7.

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—. (1991r, November 24), p.12. —. (1991s, November 29), Svijet otvara oþi (The World is Opening its Eyes), p.5. —. (1991t, December 2), Neka Dubrovnik ujedini Europu (May Dubrovnik Unite Europe), pp.4-5. —. (1991u, December 13), pp.1-5. —. (1991v, December 21), p.4. Veþernji list (1991b, October 21), Spasimo Dubrovnik (Let’s Save Dubrovnik), p. 32. —. (1991c, October 24), Granatama po Stradunu (Shooting Grenades on Stradun), Veþernji list. —. (1991d, October 31/November 1), Milju po milju prema Gružu (Mile by Mile on the Journey to Gruž), p.3 —. (1991e, October 31/November 1), Brodovi zanoüili kod Mljeta (Ships Stop for a Night’s Rest near Mljet), p.3 —. (1991f, November 2), Pretres brodova (Ship Search and Inspection), p.5 —. (1991g, November 18), Dubrovnik se mora spasiti (Dubrovnik Must be Saved), p.32. —. (1991h, November 18), San Marco u Dubrovniku (San Marco in Dubrovnik), p. 32. —. (1991i, November 20), Isplovljava La Rance (And the La Rance Sails Out), p.9. —. (1991j, November 21), p.9 —. (1991k, November 23), Hrabrost i nalog savjesti (Courage and Act of Conscience), p.9. —. (1991l, November 24), Na putu neizvjesnosti (On the Road of Uncertainty), p.8. —. (1991m, November 25), Vatra iz Slanog, (Fires from Slano), p.9. —. (1991n, November 30), p.9. —. (1991a, October 8), Treba spasiti Dubrovnik (Dubrovnik Must be Saved), p. 21. Vjesnik (1991a, October 22), Hrana stigla u Dubrovnik. (Food Arrives in Dubrovnik), p. 3 —. (1991b, October 30), Cilj konvoja nije samo Dubrovnik (The Convoy’s Goal Goes Beyond Dubrovnik), p. 1 —. (1991c, November 3), Konvoj mira vratio se u Rijeku (Peace Convoy Returns to Rijeka), p.3. —. (1991d, December 1) —. (1991e, December 10), p.1.

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—. (1991f, December 10), Krenuo konvoj Libertas, vraüaju se Dubrovþani (The Libertas is on its Way, Citizens of Dubrovnik are Returning) p.1. —. (1991g, December 16), Na Stradunu suza suzu stiže (Tear after Tear on Stradun), p. 5.