Religious NGOs at the United Nations: Polarizers or Mediators? 2018006610, 9780815362821, 9781351111232

Citation preview

Religious NGOs at the United Nations

Examining the involvement of religious NGOs (RNGOs) at the UN, this book explores whether they polarize political debates at the UN or facilitate agreement on policy issues. The number of RNGOs engaging with the United Nations (UN) has grown considerably in recent years: RNGOs maintain relations with various UN agencies, member-state missions, and other NGOs, and participate in UN conferences and events. This volume includes both a quantitative overview of RNGOs at the UN and qualitative analyses of specific policy issues such as international development, climate change, business and human rights, sexual and reproductive health and rights, international criminal justice, defamation of religions, and intercultural dialogue and cooperation. The contributions explore the factors that explain the RNGOs’ normative positions and actions and scrutinise the assumption that religions introduce non-negotiable principles into political debate and decision-making that inevitably lead to conflict and division. Presenting original research on RNGOs and issues of global public policy, this volume will be relevant to both researchers and policy-makers in the fields of religion and international relations, the United Nations, and non-state actors and global governance. Dr Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany. Prof Dr Klaus Dieter Wolf, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany.

Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics Edited by Jeffrey Haynes London Metropolitan University, UK

This series aims to publish high-quality works on the topic of the resurgence of political forms of religion in both national and international contexts. This trend has been especially noticeable in the post-cold war era (that is, since the late 1980s). It has affected all the ‘world religions’ (including, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism) in various parts of the world (such as, the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa). The series welcomes books that use a variety of approaches to the subject, drawing on scholarship from political science, international relations, security studies, and contemporary history. Books in the series explore these religions, regions and topics both within and beyond the conventional domain of ‘church-state’ relations to include the impact of religion on politics, conflict and development, including the late Samuel Huntington’s controversial – yet influential – thesis about ‘clashing civilisations’. In sum, the overall purpose of the book series is to provide a comprehensive survey of what is currently happening in relation to the interaction of religion and politics, both domestically and internationally, in relation to a variety of issues. An Introduction to Religion and Politics (2nd edition) Theory and Practice Jonathan Fox Religious Responses to Marriage Equality Luke Perry The Politics of New Atheism Stuart McAnulla, Steven Kettell and Marcus Schulzke Religious NGOs at the United Nations Polarizers or Mediators? Edited by Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Studies-in-Religion-and-Politics/book-series/RSRP

Religious NGOs at the United Nations Polarizers or Mediators?

Edited by Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Baumgart-Ochse, Claudia, 1974– editor. | Wolf, Klaus Dieter, editor. Title: Religious NGOs at the United Nations : polarizers or mediators? / edited by Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge studies in religion and politics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018006610 | ISBN 9780815362821 (hardback) | ISBN 9781351111232 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations—Non-governmental advisory organizations. | Religion and international relations. | Non-governmental organizations. Classification: LCC JX1977.3.A2 R45 2018 | DDC 341.23—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018006610 ISBN: 978-0-815-36282-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-11123-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Preface and acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1 Introduction: religious NGOs at the United Nations: polarizers or mediators?

vii viii x xii

1

C L A U D I A B A U MGART- OCHS E

2 Religious NGOs at the UN: a quantitative overview

26

A N N - K R I S T I N B E I NL I CH AND CL ARA BRAUNGART

3 Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC: a specific contribution to global climate politics?

47

K AT H A R I N A G L AAB, DORI S F UCHS , AND JOHANN ES FR IED ERICH

4 ‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’: religious NGOs and the struggle over sexual and reproductive health and rights at the UN

64

A N N - K R I S T I N B E I NL I CH

5 Faith-based organizations and international development in a post-liberal world

84

G E R A R D C L A RKE

6 Religious NGOs and the quest for a binding treaty on business and human rights M E L A N I E C O N I- Z I MME R AND OL GA P E ROV

106

vi

Contents

7 Reconciliation versus punishment: religious NGOs and the International Criminal Court

126

C L A R A B R A UNGART

8 Preventing a global blasphemy law: religious NGOs at the UN and the ‘defamation of religions’ campaign

148

C L A U D I A B A UMGART- OCHS E

9 Religious NGOs at the UN: advancing interreligious dialogue and cooperation?

167

J E F F R E Y H AYNE S

10 Conclusions: religious NGOs: mediators between distinctiveness and alignment

184

C L A U D I A B A UMGART- OCHS E AND KL AUS DI ETER WO LF

Appendix: List of RNGOs registered at ECOSOC in 2012 Index

195 203

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7

Religious background of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs Fields of activity of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%) Status of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%) Regional origin of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by headquarters location (%) ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by date of foundation (%) ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by date of accreditation (%) RNGO foundation and ECOSOC-accreditation by decade (in numbers)

31 34 36 37 40 40 41

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 7.1

RNGOs accredited with ECOSOC Religious affiliation of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%) Religious affiliation amongst ECOSOC-accredited NGOs and worldwide ECOSOC-accredited RNGO engagement by religious affiliation and policy field ECOSOC status of RNGOs by religious affiliation Regional origin of NGOs and RNGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by religious affiliation and region Date of RNGO accreditation by religious affiliation RNGO positions

30 32 33 35 36 38 38 42 137

Boxes 5.1 A typology of faith-based organizations 5.2 The use of faith in the work of FBOs

87 88

Contributors

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse is a senior researcher at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Her research is concerned with the role of religion in international relations, focusing in particular on the Middle East conflict as well as transnational civil society and the United Nations. Her research has appeared in Globalizations; Politics, Religion & Ideology; and Democratization. At PRIF, she co-directed a research project on religious NGOs at the UN together with Klaus Dieter Wolf. Ann-Kristin Beinlich is currently a research associate at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and a doctoral student at Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. Her dissertation examines motivations of religious civil society actors in the political sphere from an interdisciplinary perspective. Being a scholar in religious studies, her research interests include all facets of the relation of religion and politics with a particular focus on the perspective of faith-based actors. Clara Braungart is a research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany. Her research interests include religion and politics, transitional justice, and international development. She particularly focuses on hybridity in transnational politics and has a regional focus on East Africa. Before joining PRIF, she studied political science, theology and global studies in Münster, Strasbourg, Lund, and Shanghai. Gerard Clarke is Associate Professor, specializing in politics and international development, in Swansea University in the UK and Head of the Department of Political and Cultural Studies. He has published the results of research on religious non-governmental organizations or faith-based organizations in developing country contexts in a number of journals, including Third World Quarterly, Journal of International Development, and the European Journal of Development Research. He is the editor, with Michael Jennings, of Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Melanie Coni-Zimmer is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany. Her areas of research include the role of transnational corporations and corporate social responsibility in international

Contributors

ix

politics and in zones of conflict. She has worked on self-regulatory and multistakeholder initiatives in the field of natural resources and on the interactions between civil society and business. Johannes Friederich is a research fellow at the Chair of International Relations and Sustainable Development, Institute for Political Science, at the University of Münster. His research interests are changes of norms as a function of material crises, international political economy (IPE), and religious actors in global climate politics. Doris Fuchs is Professor of International Relations and Sustainable Development and speaker of the Center for Interdisciplinary Sustainability Research at the University of Münster. Her research focuses on sustainable consumption and development, the power of non-state actors in global governance, and agrifood, climate, energy, and finance policy and politics. Katharina Glaab is Associate Professor in Global Change and International Relations at the Department of International Development and Environment Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Her research and teaching revolve around questions of normative change and the politics of knowledge. She has published on norms in international relations, faith actors and climate change, conflicts around agricultural biotechnology in China and India, and critical research on power. Jeffrey Haynes is Emeritus Professor of Politics at London Metropolitan University. He is currently writing two books on the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. He has research interests in several areas, including religion and international relations; religion and politics; democracy and democratization; and the politics of development. Haynes has more than 230 publications, including over 40 books. Haynes is book series editor of ‘Routledge Studies in Religion & Politics’, co-editor of the journal Democratization, and co-editor of Democratization’s book series, ‘Special Issues and Virtual Special Issues’. Olga Perov is currently a trainee at the NGO Campact. She completed her B.A. in European Studies at the University of Passau and her M.A. in International Studies/ Peace and Conflict Studies at Goethe University Frankfurt and Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. From 2015 to 2017 she was a research assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Her research interests include human rights, climate change, internal conflicts, and non-state actors in world politics. Klaus Dieter Wolf is an associate fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Until his retirement in 2017, he was professor of International Relations at Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany, and Executive Director of PRIF. He has written extensively on private actors in global governance and on international institutions. His publications include The Role of Business in Global Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, co-author), Global Crime Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, co-editor), and Resistance and Change in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, co-editor).

Preface and acknowledgements

Transnational non-governmental organizations are generally regarded as principled actors who help to set and implement universal global norms and thereby make desirable contributions to global governance. This study scrutinizes this expectation by focusing on a group of NGOs which insert religion-based norms into the formulation and negotiation of policy goals. Religious communities and organizations take an increasingly activist stance in many of the pressing political problems of today’s world, transcending the separation of private and public spheres in international politics and institutions. While religion has made a comeback in international relations research in recent years, the term ‘religion’ still evokes mainly associations with violence, war, and terrorism among scholars. The book puts into question this normative bias against religious participation in global politics. The contributors examine whether the widely held suspicion is correct that conflicts over policy issues become ‘fundamentalized’ as soon as religious actors are involved. They analyze under which conditions religious NGOs (RNGOs) either undermine or advance understanding and agreement on contested issues – and what causes their course of action. This book evolved over a period of four years in the course of a research project conducted at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Many other scholars accompanied us along the way. We are particularly grateful for the invaluable critical input we received from Clifford Bob, Deborah Avant, and Lars-Erik Cederman. Our special thanks go to the authors of the following chapters. Their dedication has greatly supported our job as editors. Drafts for all chapters were discussed at an authors’ workshop in April 2017 at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The editors wish to acknowledge the generous financial support we received from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG), without which this book would not have been possible. We also want to thank our research assistants Janna Chalmovsky, Sonya Krasteva, Andreas Löpsinger, and Olga Perov for their tireless help at various stages of the production process. Margaret Clarke’s and Matthew Harris’ careful and constructive language editing was invaluable for getting this book published, too. Finally, we wish to express our gratitude to Claire Maloney

Preface and acknowledgements xi and the editorial, production, and marketing colleagues at Routledge, and last but not least Jeffrey Haynes, the editor of the Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics, for his support. Claudia Baumgart-Ochse Klaus Dieter Wolf Frankfurt am Main

Abbreviations

ACADHOSHA Action des Chrétiens activistes des droits de l’homme à Shabunda ACT Alliance Action by Churches Together AJC American Jewish Committee AMICC American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court APRODEV Association of Protestant Development Agencies ARC Alliance of Religions and Conservation ASP Assembly of States Parties (ICC) BIC Bahá’í International Community BJP Bharitiya Janata Party CAFOD Catholic Fund for Overseas Development CAN Climate Action Network CCIA Commission of the Churches for International Affairs CDM Clean Development Mechanism C-Fam Center for Family and Human Rights CFC Catholics for Choice CI Caritas Internationalis CICC Coalition for the ICC CIDSE Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) CJA Climate Justice Action CJN Climate Justice Now CJR Centre for Justice and Reconciliation COP Conference of Parties (UNFCCC) CPD Commission on Population and Development CRNGO Committee for Religious NGOs (UN) CSO civil society organization CSR corporate social responsibility CSVGC-NY Committee on Spirituality, Values, and Global Concerns CSW Christian Solidarity Worldwide CSW Commission on the Status of Women (UN)

Abbreviations xiii DFG DFID DPI DRC ECOSOC EU FaithFem FBO FENICC FGM FIAN FPI FRY FWCC GA HRC HRW HYV IARF ICC ICC ICCR ICJ ICPD ICTY IHEU IITC IOE IPPF IR IRW ISIS JPNL LGBTIQ LWF MCC MDGs MSI MPV NGO NU NWAC ODA

Deutsche Forschungsgessellschaft/German Research Foundation Department for International Development Department of Public Information (UN) Democratic Republic of the Congo Economic and Social Council (UN) European Union Faith and Feminism Working Group to the United Nations faith-based organization Faith and Ethics Network for an International Criminal Court female genital mutilation FoodFirst Information and Action Network Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Friends World Committee for Consultation General Assembly (UN) Human Rights Council (UN) successor to: UN Commission on Human Rights – UNCHR Human Rights Watch Hindu Yuva Vahini International Association for Religious Freedom International Criminal Court International Chamber of Commerce Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility international criminal justice International Conference on Population and Development International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia International Humanist and Ethical Union International Indian Treaty Council International Organisation of Employers International Planned Parenthood Federation International Relations Islamic Relief Worldwide Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Justitia et Pax Netherlands Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer Lutheran World Federation Mennonite Central Committee Millennium Development Goals Marie Stopes International Muslims for Progressive Values non-governmental organization Nahdlatul Ulama Native Women’s Association of Canada official development assistance

xiv Abbreviations OEIWG OHCHR OIC OPCV OTP PAC PGA PLO PoA QUNO REDD RFP RNGO RSS SDGs SRHR TA TJ UMS UN UN DESA UNAOC UNCHR UNDP UNEP UNESCO UNFCCC UNFPA UNHCR UN-IATF RD URI USAID USFENICC UUA VWU WCC WEOG WJC WICC WVI

Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (HRC) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Organisation of Islamic Cooperation previously: Organisation of the Islamic Conference Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor (ICC) Political Action Committee Parliamentarians for Global Action Palestinian Liberation Organisation programme of action Quaker United Nations Offices Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation Religions for Peace religious non-governmental organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Sustainable Development Goals sexual and reproductive health and rights Treaty Alliance transitional justice Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta United Nations UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs UN Alliance of Civilizations United Nations Commission on Human Rights UN Development Programme UN Environment Programme UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UN Population Fund originally: UN Fund for Population Activities UN High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development United Religions Initiative United States Agency for International Development US branch of FENICC Unitarian Universalists Association Victims and Witnesses Unit (ICC) World Council of Churches Western European and Others Group World Jewish Congress Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court World Vision International

1

Introduction Religious NGOs at the United Nations: polarizers or mediators? Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Across the street from the UN headquarters in New York is a 1960s office block housing the Church Center for the United Nations. Although owned by the group United Methodist Women, the building is home to a wide variety of religious organizations such as the Quaker United Nations Office, the World Council of Churches, and the multi-religious NGO Religions for Peace. The Center is a vibrant place hosting not only religious services but also numerous UN-related seminars and other events. In a way, it embodies the phenomenon we explore in this book: the commitment of religious organizations to pay heed to what goes on at the UN and to work to get their religiously based views incorporated into UN debate and policy-making. Like many diverse religious groups based elsewhere, most of the organizations housed in the Center are accredited as NGOs at the UN. They maintain relations with various UN agencies, with member-state missions, and with other NGOs, and they take part in UN conferences and other events. In 2012, of 3,937 NGOs accredited to the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 339 were religious or faith-based, the majority (around 60 per cent) coming from Christian traditions (see the overview by Beinlich and Braungart in this volume). Against this background, the contributors to the present volume ask whether the widely held suspicion that the involvement of religious actors automatically ‘fundamentalizes’ arguments over policy issues is correct. They identify the situations in which religious NGOs (RNGOs) promote agreement on contested issues and those in which they hamper it – and the factors that determine which course of action they follow. Although the role of religion in international relations is an established area of study, until very recently the involvement of religious NGOs in UN affairs was not an aspect of it that elicited much interest.1 Among scholars of international relations (IR), the term ‘religion’ continues mainly to be associated with violence, war, and terror. This no doubt has to do with Samuel Huntington’s predictions concerning the religious basis of future conflict (Huntington 1996), after which much research in this field was dedicated to establishing whether religion did indeed provoke violent conflict and terror and if so how this occurred and why.2 The conclusions arrived at ranged from essentialist assertions that religion per se is the problem to instrumentalist theories claiming that religion is simply a cloak for secular conflict. The instrumental approach also allowed the converse

2

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

hypothesis – that religion fosters peace and reconciliation.3 However, the resulting categorization into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ religion has haunted research ever since (Mavelli and Wilson 2016). The normative overload in much of the IR literature on religion has hampered exploration of the way in which religious actors engaging with international relations steer a course between their own religious self-identity and the ‘religious’ characteristics ascribed to them by social environments. This is the situation of RNGOs: they enter the thoroughly secular environment of the UN to promote their ideas and objectives, and their identities undergo constant challenge and renegotiation as they engage with different institutional set-ups and respond to both broader political developments and internal changes. The common practice of labelling RNGOs as either ‘progressive’ or ‘conservative’,4 often implying an equation with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ religion, therefore fails to convey the extent and breadth of roles and normative positions adopted by RNGOs within the UN – as evidenced in the contributions to this volume. Turning to the macro-level political changes that create the parameters for RNGO engagement: the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an era in which international institutions such as the UN increasingly opened up to civil society participation. Indeed, some observers spoke of a ‘power shift’ (Mathews 1997), in which the state’s once exclusive prerogative in international relations was migrating to inter-governmental organizations, transnational NGOs, and multinational corporations. The study of interstate relations was now complemented by analyses of a global-governance complex involving a wide array of actors, settings, and modes of policy-making and implementation (Nye and Donahue 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). Attention shifted from the security and political management of the state to the security and wellbeing of the individual – a change of focus reflected in the growing importance accorded to universal human rights (Risse et al. 1999). At the same time, religious communities themselves were undergoing major change as a consequence of globalization: their transnational presence increased and they became genuinely de-territorialized entities (Casanova 2007; Kippenberg 2013), actively participating in global public policy-making across a wide range of areas (Kippenberg et al. 2013; Marshall 2013). This window of opportunity for civil society participation appears currently to be narrowing: right-wing nationalism and populist politics are on the rise worldwide, reinvigorating state-dominated power politics. Multilateral cooperation and international law – characteristic features of the liberal world order – are under fire from various quarters, and in many countries the space for civil society activism is being squeezed (Wolff and Poppe 2015). The crisis being undergone by the liberal world order changes the conditions under which both religious and non-religious civil society actors engage with global public policy in international organizations. Against this background, the debate on postsecularism engaged in by scholars of political theory5 has inspired fresh thinking on religion in international relations. It calls into question the supposedly clear-cut distinction between the secular and religious spheres and challenges the presumed normative superiority of secular reasoning in the political realm. In the midst of the crisis of liberal-secular

Introduction 3 politics, the role of religion is being re-evaluated. Postsecular thought, ‘prompted by the idea that values such as democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion, and justice may not necessarily be best pursued within an exclusively immanent secular framework’, proposes ‘radical theorizing and critique’ (Mavelli and Wilson 2016, p. 251; Mavelli and Petito 2012). The present volume picks up on these postsecular ideas, exploring the ways in which non-state religious actors get involved with the UN and whether they act as mediators or polarizers in policy-making processes. The term ‘mediating’ is here used in the sense not of a neutralist stance but of a capacity to contribute to the understanding and resolution of controversial issues. ‘Polarizing’, meanwhile, denotes a tendency to thwart tangible outcomes in policy processes. Sometimes, however, polarizers may also precipitate vigorous debate, which, depending on the actors and context involved, may facilitate agreement as well as disrupt it. It is important to note that we use these terms not evaluatively but descriptively, as a means of categorizing the effects of RNGO advocacy on policy processes irrespective of the content of the policies in question. The individual chapters of the book analyse RNGO advocacy in various contested policy fields: climate change, women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, international development, business and human rights, international criminal justice, defamation of religions, and intercultural dialogue and cooperation. In each of these fields, the authors begin by showing how RNGOs position themselves with regard to the normative issues at stake and what kind of strategies they employ to achieve their objectives. They then home in on the reasons underlying these RNGO choices and behaviours, setting out a series of case studies that explore the characteristics of the actors involved, the make-up of the institutional environment and its effects on actors’ actions, and the specific configuration of the normative conflict in each policy field. They conclude with an analysis of the influence of RNGOs on the UN policy process, asking whether such organizations facilitate and enhance UN policy formulation and decision-making or whether they complicate and disrupt them. The analytic focus of the present book is on religious organizations that are non-governmental and that operate within the UN. There are, of course, not only various non-governmental religious actors working to influence global public policy from outside the UN but also a number of powerful non-NGO religious actors working within it – the Vatican is one example, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) another. In order to be able to include this latter group in their deliberations, some scholars (such as Haynes 2014) have preferred the term ‘faith-based organization’ (FBO).6 Although the present book takes account of these kinds of actors wherever they happen to be involved in the policy issues at stake, its main interest lies in uncovering the ways in which identifiably religious non-governmental organizations are adapting to a situation in which space for civil society participation at the UN is becoming increasingly contested. How have the changing political tides affected them? Do they modify their positions – and if so along what lines? With whom do they align themselves? One of the major methodological advantages of focusing on a specific type of actor operating in a series of what are essentially similar institutional conditions is the ease it

4

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

brings to the concluding task of comparing chapter findings. By looking at RNGO advocacy across different policy fields, we are able to point to patterns of RNGO engagement with the UN that go beyond the dichotomous schema described previously. Based on our observations here, we draw conclusions as to what drives these organizations’ actions – and in so doing move research in this area on from its hitherto largely exclusive focus on the rise in number of RNGOs at the UN and the nature of their activities. For the purposes of this volume, we build on Berger’s initial definition of religious NGOs as: [F]ormal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level. (Berger 2003, p. 16) In the same vein, Petersen identifies RNGOs as ‘NGOs that describe and understand themselves as religious, referring in their name, activities, mission statements or elsewhere to religious traditions, values and ideas’ (Petersen 2010, p. 4). The focus in these definitions is on the NGOs’ own identification of themselves as religious, spiritual, or faith-based – as expressed variously in their organizational structure and identity, their strategic orientation and engagement, and their motivation, stance, and behaviour. As we see it here, however, it is not just what the relevant actors themselves convey that counts as religious, spiritual, or faithbased; it is also what is perceived as such by others. Given that application of the category ‘religion’ or ‘religious’ may take into account multiple dimensions of an actor’s identity, we adopt a discursive approach that views religion not as a phenomenon sui generis but as a domain of social and symbolic communication just like those of sports, technology, and music. On this view, the term ‘religion’ is ‘an empty signifier that can be activated with definitions, meanings, and communicational practices’ (Stuckrad 2013, p. 17). The discourse that determines the meaning can be defined as ‘the societal organization of knowledge about religion’ (Stuckrad 2013, p. 17). The first section of this introduction will situate the study of religious NGOs within the broader debate about religion, global governance, and post-secularism. The second section will show how the analyses set out in this book build on and develop existing research on RNGOs at the UN. Having outlined the analytical framework underpinning the case studies in a third section, the introduction will conclude with a brief description of each of these.

The disappearing window? Religion and global governance The claim that there has been a ‘religious turn in IR’ (Kratochvíl 2009) may be something of an exaggeration: studies featuring religious institutions, actors, and

Introduction 5 ideas are still only rarely encountered in the pages of IR journals – or indeed in those of general political-science publications (Philpott 2002; Wald and Wilcox 2006; Kettell 2012, 2014). That said, religion has undoubtedly made inroads into the discipline (for an overview of the literature, see Philpott 2009 and Bellin 2008). As mentioned at the outset, the predictions of Samuel Huntington generated considerable debate in this area in the 1990s (Henderson and Tucker 2001; Fox 2004; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006), and the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ precipitated a further wave of academic contributions exploring the role of religion, notably political Islam, in international politics (Roy 2004; Moghadam 2008; Haynes 2009). Since then, discussion on these matters has been dominated by the religion–violence nexus. For many observers, the threat to peace, security, and global order which they see religion as constituting is epitomized by the organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda, and by Jihadist movements in general (Keohane 2002, pp. 272–87; Tickner 2009) – an impression reinforced most recently by the actions of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Preoccupied as they were with the connection between religion and violence, most IR scholars working in this area overlooked the fact that from the 1990s onwards the evolution of global governance created a new opportunity-structure through which religious actors could engage with international politics. Ruggie described this development as ‘a fundamental reconstitution of the global public domain – away from one that equated the public with “states” and the interstate realm to one in which the very system of states is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and partial, institutionalized arena concerned with the production of global public goods’ (Ruggie 2004, p. 500). Transnational non-state actors – including entities as diverse as corporations, civil society organizations, and social movements – played a crucial role in bringing about this reconstitution. In the face of pressing transboundary issues such as climate change, poverty, migration, and terrorism, traditional ‘territorialist governance’ (Scholte 2002, p. 287) seemed no longer adequate to its task, unable to respond to growing demands that ‘straddle the existing territorial boundaries of political units and call for the extension of public policy beyond the state’ (Wolf 2008, p. 225; see also Weiss and Wilkinson 2013, p. 3). With global governance, attention was redirected away from the security and economic prosperity of the state to the security and well-being of the individual. Universal human rights formed the core of a nascent transnational morality according to which ‘all human beings possess an inherent dignity and equality, fundamental freedoms, and the right to democratic self-governance’ (Banchoff 2008, p. 11). Although – despite these developments – global governance remained, and remains, profoundly secular in nature (Adamson 2005, p. 548; Haynes 2014, pp. 44–51), it has opened up new avenues for participation by religious actors (Benford 2010). With its emphasis on human rights, it has created an ideational opportunity-structure for a whole range of religious communities and organizations whose traditions are rich in notions of love, mercy, compassion, human dignity, and the sanctity of life. Most religious organizations are part of wider communities and networks that are deeply rooted in local societies. As such they

6

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

often have long histories as providers of health care, education, and welfare. In the course of globalization, the underlying networks have become increasingly transnationalized. Most religions, to be sure, have always had some sort of transnational dimension to their history – not only because ‘human flows so often transcend arbitrary political demarcations, but also because religious teachings frequently encourage geographic expansion’ (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008, p. 212). Today, however, religions are increasingly loosening their ties to their regions of origin and becoming genuinely de-territorialized (Casanova 2008, pp. 116–17). Modern communications technologies, economic interdependence, and geographical mobility have enhanced the ability of dispersed religious groups and congregations to be in contact with one another, giving them a renewed sense of being part of a universal community that transcends nation-state borders (Levitt 2004; Casanova 2007). The ‘de-privatization of religion’ (Casanova 1994), widely discussed in the 1990s, is thus a phenomenon under way not only within states but also in the transnational sphere: [P]ublic religions constitute powerful societal actors and can make use of a transnational infrastructure, both in ideational and in logistic terms. [T]his indicates that public religions seem to provide a solution to problems that are provoked by the frazzling out of traditional nation states and that state transformation cannot be adequately understood without taking religious communities into account. (Kippenberg 2013, p. 137) This is not to say – as Rudolph pointed out way back in 1997 in her introduction to the seminal work Transnational Religion and Fading States (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997) – that transnational religious activism in global civil society is devoid of friction: given that ‘the plurality of transnational spaces entails difference as well as commonality with respect to epistemes, identities, and expectations, transnational civil society can be the site of conflict as well as cooperation’ (Rudolph 1997, p. 2). If one considers the backlash against global governance and the global human-rights regime currently being led by nationalist and populist movements across the world, this statement, although made 20 years ago, seems even more relevant today. Clifford Bob (2012) has argued powerfully along the same lines, describing transnational politics in general as a locus of intense conflict, the latter often involving confrontation between influential right-wing transnational advocacy networks and their left-wing liberal counterparts over matters such as human rights and social justice. Given the changing political environment, the question arises of how religious actors are likely to position themselves in the future – particularly in regard to controversial issues such as women’s rights and HIV prevention policies. We already have evidence that conservative religious movements such as Pentecostalism and Islamism ‘have not prospered by blending into [the] allegedly global ethos of liberal modernity’ (Thomas 2005, p. 115). How will religious actors who have deliberately chosen to engage with the liberalsecular environment of the UN respond to the changes outlined here?

Introduction 7 As far as tackling these developments theoretically is concerned, the most promising approaches are those that have emerged under the heading of ‘postsecularism’. Although the somewhat motley collection of writings gathered under this rubric in IR do not yet amount to a full-fledged theory, they do open up a new perspective on the complex relationship between religion and politics. Their ultimate inspiration is a lively debate initiated by political theorists as to the proper place of religion in the public sphere (Taylor 2007; Calhoun et al. 2011). A particular influence here has been Jürgen Habermas’ suggestion that the moral intuitions of faith might both serve as a corrective to the ills of neoliberal globalization and help us cope with the increasing pluralism of modern societies (Habermas 2005, 2006). One facet of Habermas’ argument, however, has given rise to criticism. His caveat that whilst religious voices in civil society should be taken seriously, they need to be translated into a universally accessible, neutral, secular language before being introduced into state institutions and allowed to influence decision-making is cited as proof of an instrumental, and basically secular, understanding of religion (Beckford 2012; Dallmayr 2012; Mavelli and Wilson 2016). Ploughing their own furrow, postsecular authors in IR have sought to go beyond the religious–secular divide, analysing the way in which this dichotomy is constructed and subsequently exploited for political ends and the way in which actors move across the breach and adapt their identities, language, and actions.7 The contributions to this volume explore the permeability and negotiability of the religious–secular divide in a context hitherto treated as a domain of liberal secularism. The turn to global governance was due in no small part to the increase in transnational civil society activism in the 1990s. NGOs whose activism was founded on liberal ethics, human rights, and scientific knowledge were depicted as agents through whom global liberal-secular norms were transmitted to national and local societies, which, by contrast, were mostly portrayed as backward, particularistic cultures. The religious roots and affiliations of many of the NGOs, though mentioned en passant, were rarely accorded any significance as determinants of the organizations’ normative orientations (Willetts 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Florini 2000). Some scholars expected that religious actors would inevitably become secularized once they entered the institutional environment of global governance: [D]iscussions of religious resurgence overlook the crucial fact that the institutional nature of religion itself has changed in a secular direction. The transition from the religious order to the non-governmental membership organization is a shift from the highly disciplined, totalistic brotherhood or sisterhood committed to working primarily for the glory of God to a voluntary, world-citizenship based modern organization pursuing rationalized progress, egalitarian universalism, and social justice. (Boli and Brewington 2007, pp. 220–1; see also Boli and Thomas 1999, p. 43) A ‘modern’ organization, according to this view, cannot work both for the glory of God and for egalitarian universalism. Moreover, since religious NGOs have

8

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

to compete for the attention of policy-makers and donor funds – just as other NGOs do – they very soon adopt strategic, goal-oriented modes of behaviour and begin to use the vocabulary and rationale of liberal discourse (Hopgood and Vinjamuri 2012). Recent studies have called into question the notion of norms as clearly defined, universally accepted prescriptions and principles that are generated at the global level and ‘diffused’ to the local level in societies across the world. Scholars have begun to argue that norms are always subject to contestation and that all involved actors bring their own cultural baggage and their own interpretations and understandings of norms and policies to the negotiating table (Acharya 2009; Wiener and Puetter 2009; Wolff and Zimmermann 2015). On this view, norms are fluid, subject to change, their meaning in each case hinging on the way in which they are appropriated and interpreted by actors. Focusing on the emergence, transformation, and contestation of norms in global politics allows closer inspection of religious actors’ ‘baggage’. How far this baggage prompts a particular behaviour on the part of RNGOs is, however, still undetermined. Whereas organizational sociology suggests that religious organizations ‘are “strong-culture organizations” – in other words, they have distinctive, explicitly articulated values that are meant to suffuse all of the organization’s activities’ (DiMaggio 1998, p. 9), others have argued that they have become thoroughly secularized entities that do not differ in any meaningful way from their secular counterparts (Boli and Brewington 2007; Haynes 2014).

Religious NGOs at the UN Since the 1990s, there has been an enormous increase in the number of NGOs seeking involvement in UN debate, decision-making, and policy implementation (Willetts 2000; Alger 2002). As indicated earlier, 3,937 NGOs enjoyed consultative status with the Economic and Social Council in 2012 and of these, approximately 9 per cent identified themselves as religious, faith-based, or spiritual. A substantial majority of this subgroup – 60 per cent – belonged to the Christian tradition. Other religious traditions seem less inclined to engage with global policies in the UN context (see the overview by Beinlich and Braungart in this volume). NGOs can also get involved in specific policy fields by signing up for UN conferences and other events that do not require ECOSOC accreditation. The UN approach to religion In recent decades, the UN has created both ideational and institutional opportunities for participation by religious NGOs. There is growing acknowledgement of the fact that incorporating religious views into UN policy discussion and implementation makes the organization’s decisions more acceptable to a number of major constituencies around the world where lives and worldviews are underpinned by religious belief systems (Boehle 2010b). During the 1990s, the series of World Conferences which the UN held on human rights, women, and other issues

Introduction 9 provided ‘focal points for FBOs to move to the forefront of UN-focused activism’ (Haynes 2013, p. 4). Religious NGOs were also involved in some of the major civil society campaigns of the decade, including the Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt relief (Busby 2007) and the international campaign to get landmines banned (Berger 2003, p. 20). In the early 1990s, UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) began highlighting the contribution which religious organizations could make to peacebuilding and reconciliation. Under its auspices, a series of conferences were held which explored the role of religions in conflict situations and the resources they had at their disposal for creating a culture of peace (Boehle 2010b, p. 395). Soon after this, the UN leadership itself began taking a greater interest in the issue of religion. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN from 1997 to 2006, was particularly active in this area, promoting a new openness to, and appreciation for, religion and religious values in the global organization (Religion Counts 2002, p. 25). Speaking in 1998, he described the UN as ‘a tapestry not only of suits and saris, but of cleric’s collars, nun’s habits and lama’s robes – and of mitres, skullcaps and yarmulkes’ (Annan 1998). In August 2000, in a bid to advance interreligious understanding and encourage the teaching and practice of peace, Annan welcomed more than a thousand senior religious, spiritual, and indigenous leaders from over seventy different faiths to the Millennium World Peace Summit in New York. In his opening address, the Secretary General contrasted the frequent association of religion with light and the widely experienced darker side of its practice. Too often, he said, ‘religious extremism [has] oppressed or discriminated against women and minorities. Religion has often been yoked to nationalism, stoking the flames of violent conflict and setting group against group. [But] the problem is usually not with the faith, but with the faithful.’ He called on the spiritual leaders to ‘set an example of interfaith dialogue and cooperation [and] help bridge the chasms of ignorance, fear and misunderstanding’ (Annan 2000). UN efforts to engage with RNGOs on issues such as human rights, peace, development, humanitarian aid, and intercultural dialogue were intensified in the wake of 9/11. Azza Karam, senior advisor on culture at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), describes these events, and later attacks on UN offices in Kabul, as a defining moment that caused the UN ‘to pause and consider how to engage with religion’. Since then, she says, the UN environment has changed considerably: ‘We have come from a place where religion was not seen to today where we have an inter-agency task force which seeks to systematize [the] UN’s relations with religion.’8 The Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, chaired by UNFPA, was established in 2007 with the aim, according to its first report, of ‘ensur[ing] a broad based and deliberate engagement of religious NGOs as a critical part of the civil society representation’ (UN IATF-RD 2015). In this report, covering the period 2013 to 2015, the task-force gave a detailed review of the measures which ten UN agencies – among them UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect – had taken to foster their working relationships with

10

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

both local and international faith-based NGOs and with religious communities and leaders. The next report, published in 2016, featured thirteen UN agencies (UN IATF-RD 2016). UNFPA has been particularly active in seeking relationships with religious NGOs, in the hope of securing their cooperation on development-related issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention and maternal and reproductive health and rights (Haynes 2013, p. 19; Karam 2010). Because of the controversy that surrounds UNFPA’s ‘core mandate’ – namely, ‘reproductive health issues and gender roles’ (Marshall 2013, p. 149) – the organization has taken the lead on religion amongst UN agencies. This is a trend that began under the organization’s former executive director Thoraya Obaid. UNFPA’s mandate is a particularly delicate one to execute within religious communities, but other UN institutions have encountered equally difficult situations, and this has led some in their ranks to express reservations about direct RNGO engagement. One well-documented example is that of the World Bank and the series of dialogues with religious leaders initiated by its former president James D. Wolfensohn. Although the ‘sparks and discord’ were accompanied by ‘new insights for all concerned’ (Marshall 2013, p. 152), the initiative was opposed by the top echelons of management at the World Bank. One of the major UN initiatives aimed at promoting intercultural and interreligious dialogue was the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), established in 2005 at the suggestion of the governments of Spain and Turkey (see Haynes in this volume). A High-level Group was appointed by Kofi Annan ‘to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures today’ and to formulate a plan of action to overcome related tensions and conflicts. Amongst the Group’s members were prominent figures such as the former president of Iran Mohammed Chatami and Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa. The report produced by the Group (UNAOC 2006) serves as a basis for the present-day strategies and actions of the UNAOC. Because ‘[w]e live in a time when religious communities and faith-based organizations are playing an increasingly significant role in the public sphere’, says former UNAOC research and education manager Thomas Uthup, ‘Naturally the Alliance must address religion and religious issues in bridging divides between people’ (Uthup 2010, p. 403). Working at the interface between religion, politics, and society, the UNAOC frequently cooperates with religious leaders, providing practical support for projects involving young people, education, the media, and migration and aimed ultimately at forging peace between cultures. This cooperation, however, is dependent on the relevant faithbased actors having, as former UNAOC director Marc Scheuer puts it, ‘an attitude of inclusion and a strong human rights record’.9 In recent years, forums and meetings to promote interreligious dialogue have also been initiated by individual states, or groups of states, working with the support of the UN. One such gathering was the now dissolved Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace. The establishment of the Forum was the key outcome of the 2005 Conference on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, which had been convened by a core group of member states together with representatives of UNESCO and UN DESA (the United Nations Department of Economic and

Introduction 11 Social Affairs) and a number of religious and interfaith NGOs. World Interfaith Harmony Week, established by the UN at the suggestion of King Abdullah II of Jordan and held annually in the first week of February, is another event designed to facilitate interreligious dialogue and understanding. People all over the world are invited to mark the Week by organizing events of their own choosing – be it shared breakfasts, community work projects, or fundraising sales.10 All in all, then, the attitude of the UN towards religious actors has undergone considerable change in recent years. Many of its agencies now seek to engage with local and international RNGOs in a coordinated and systematic way and are able to pass their experience on to other UN entities in reports, recommendations, and best-practice guidelines. At the same time, as the remark by UNAOC director Marc Scheuer indicated, UN institutions take care to select their religious partners on the basis of their compliance with UN norms and regulations, spelling out their own normative criteria for engagement with such organizations. In its 2016 report, the Inter-Agency Task Force, for example, describes its own standards here as being ‘in line with UN values and principles and [supportive of] the realization of [the UN’s] mandates in human rights, sustainable development and peace and security’ (UN IATF-RD 2016). Thus – to quote Scheuer again – apart from not appearing on the UN’s list of terrorist organizations, potential religious collaborators should have ‘a track record of acting in conformity with UN values and principles’.11 RNGO approaches to the UN RNGO activity in the UN falls into two broad categories. The first is concerned mainly with introducing a religious perspective into the work of the UN and offering religious counselling. The aim of those engaging in this kind of activity is to strengthen spiritual and ethical values inside the organization and also to make the challenges facing the latter better known to their own constituencies. In line with these objectives, they have set up forums such as the NGO Committee on Spirituality, Values, and Global Concerns (CSVGC-NY), the Spiritual Caucus at the UN, and the Committee of Religious NGOs (CRNGO). They also make most of the meetings and conferences they organize open to all UN, NGO, and UN memberstate staff. The mission statement of the Committee on Spirituality is illustrative of this first type of RNGO approach. It talks of ‘recogniz[ing] the importance of connecting with our divine essence, inner wisdom and the oneness of life’ and expresses the conviction that ‘a greater regard for values and a greater consciousness of ‘spirit and soul . . . particularly at the UN . . . will allow . . . the finest and the highest levels of human potential to flourish for the benefit of all’ (CSVGCNY 2017). The Committee of Religious NGOs articulates similar objectives, describing itself as ‘a forum for exchanging and promoting shared religious and ethical values in the deliberations of the world organization’ (CRNGO 2017). All the forums mentioned also serve as major networking hubs for religious NGOs. The second type of activity – the one engaged in by most RNGOs – is much broader in compass, addressing all areas of global public policy at the UN,

12

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

including health care, migration, climate change, security, human rights, and peace. Like their secular counterparts, religious NGOs can be divided into two classes depending on the nature of their activities: advocacy NGOs (these include organizations providing education and training) and operational or service NGOs, which are directly involved in implementing policies and programmes (de Jonge Oudraat and Haufler 2008, p. 15). Advocacy NGOs such as the Quakers, the World Council of Churches, the Bahá’í International Office, and B’nai Brith have dealings with a wide range of UN institutions including the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and the Peacebuilding Commission. Service NGOs, meanwhile, enter into public–private partnerships with UN agencies. By way of example: because of the expertise which religious humanitarian NGOs have in the relevant fields, UN agencies such as the UNDP and UNFPA regularly consult with them. They also delegate elements of their programmes and other activities to them because they have the necessary transnational networks, resources, and staff to carry them out. Previous studies of religious NGOs at the UN have been concerned mainly with explaining the growth in RNGOs over recent decades and with classifying the organizations by type and size, describing their activities, and attempting to show how their presence at the UN blurs the supposedly sharp distinction between the religious and the secular. Very little research has been done into the actual approaches of RNGOs to global politics and whether they have a polarizing or mediating influence when it comes to contested policy issues. In their pioneering work on this hitherto neglected group of NGOs at the UN, Berger (2003) and Petersen (2010) provided quantitative overviews of the relevant groups at the time of their research. Both studies offer multi-dimensional frameworks that are of particular value in analyzing RNGO activity. Berger distinguishes between religious, organizational, strategic, and service dimensions, while Petersen’s analytic categories are religiosity, orientation, organization, and also stance vis-à-vis the UN, states, and other NGOs. Both these multi-dimensional approaches – which in fact have a lot in common – make it possible to give a nuanced account of RNGO engagement with the UN. That this engagement is not devoid of friction is a fact noted by both authors. Petersen, for example, argues that whereas at the national level the different UN organs are able to choose the RNGOs they work with according to their normative orientation and the degree of consensus between the two parties, at the global level ‘the religious connection can result in great tensions between the UN and the religious NGOs. Here, it is about principled and political discussions rather than practical consensus-seeking, and as representatives of “absolute truths”, religious NGOs have great potential for being difficult partners in negotiations’ (Petersen 2010, p. 9). At this level too, the UN necessarily has to deal with NGOs that are strongly critical of its operations. This criticism, says Petersen, comes mainly from ‘right-wing Christian NGOs from [the] USA’ but is also endorsed by a small number of Muslim and Jewish NGOs (Petersen 2010, p. 9). Haynes, author of the first book-length study of religious actors – or, as he terms them, ‘faith-based organizations’ – at the UN (Haynes 2014), also makes mention

Introduction 13 of RNGOs of right-wing or conservative inclination. However, this religious outlook, he says, is not the only one to be found at the UN: liberal, progressive FBOs are also represented. This ideological variation, Haynes argues, cuts across religious traditions, so that ‘faith per se is not a fixed or obvious category or value, implying a consistent world view’ (Haynes 2014, p. 4). Rather, he contends, ‘there are big ideological differences between “liberal” and “conservative” FBOs, and it is not correct to presume a general “secular” versus “faith” division at the UN between FBOs and secular actors’ (ibid., see also Berger 2003, p. 10). The most heavily contested issues at the UN, says Haynes, are those relating to justice and human rights and involving ethical and moral norms, values, and behaviour. It is on the basis of these that, as he puts it, the ‘battle lines [are] drawn up between actors at the UN’ (Haynes 2014, p. 55). However, although FBOs are ‘significant components’ in this normative dissension, they are not, according to Haynes, the cause of it. FBOs are to be found on all sides of the argument – whether the issue is development or sexual and reproductive health and rights – often collaborating with ideologically like-minded secular civil society organizations. Haynes argues that this building of coalitions and alliances with secular NGOs is unavoidable for most FBOs: only a few of them – mainly Northern-based Christian NGOs such as World Vision and Caritas Internationalis – have budgets sizeable enough to make them major players in and of themselves. He therefore sees FBOs at the UN as ‘necessarily strategic, goal-orientated actors, using a variety of often-pragmatic approaches to try to achieve their goals’ (Haynes 2014, p. 3). Thus, whereas Petersen highlights the way in which religious claims to ‘absolute truth’ can make RNGOs difficult partners, Haynes points to the necessary compliance of these organizations with the UN’s secular, liberal norms and beliefs and their unavoidable adaptation to its rules and conventions (Haynes 2014, p. 23). Although motivated by their faith, they find themselves subject to the same constraints as their non-religious counterparts, having to operate in an environment characterized by limited resources, political conflict, and an overwhelmingly liberal-secular world view. According to Lehmann (2016), this adaptation to the UN environment stands in a dialectical relationship to the observation of a general resurgence of religion to the public sphere. Aiming, as he says, to see into the ‘black box’ of religious actors, he argues that over time the engagement of religious bodies with the UN leads to internal changes within them. He illustrates this with in-depth case studies of two of the first religious NGOs to be given UN accreditation: the Commission of the Churches for International Affairs (CCIA), which is part of the World Council of Churches (WCC), and Pax Romana, a Catholic lay movement. He shows how these organizations, having initially viewed the UN itself and issues such as universal human rights as distinctively secular phenomena, and addressed them from a religious perspective, gradually allowed them to become part of their own make-up, shifting the perceived boundary between the religious and the secular and transforming their input from one of ‘church diplomacy’ to one of ‘civil society activism’ (Lehmann 2016, p. 177). In sum, Lehmann’s contention is that religious resurgence of the kind in question amounts to a form of secularization (Lehmann 2016, p. 182). If he is right, one would expect all RNGOs to

14

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

socialize into the UN environment over time, soften their particularistic edges, and gradually assimilate UN norms and values. Lehmann, however, presents no empirical evidence that might confirm this hypothesis beyond his case studies, across religious traditions. A fuller picture of RNGO–UN interaction emerges from a major research project conducted at the University of Kent in the UK (Carrette and Miall 2017). Run by an interdisciplinary research group, the project not only produced a comprehensive data-set on RNGOs at the UN, covering their mission statements, objectives, funding, and organizational resources; seeking to ‘draw out the tensions of integration and marginalization in the UN – NGO process’ (Carrette 2017, p. 3), it also examined the ways in which RNGOs acquire legitimacy and influence vis-àvis the UN and its member states. In this connection, it looked in depth at the UN processes in which RNGOs seek to be involved, in both Geneva and New York, and conducted a number of case studies of specific religious traditions – Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism – and their patterns of inclusion and exclusion in UN processes. Adopting a discursive view of religion, the Kent group rejects the idea of analyzing it as a ‘thing’ which one simply observes, preferring to see it as part of the organizational process of the UN: ‘part of the dynamic process within diplomatic and networked relations’. Viewed in this way, religion ‘becomes visible and invisible in the UN system as part of strategy and process’ (Carrette 2017, p. 11). Whereas the Kent project focused on legitimacy and processes of inclusion and exclusion, the present volume is primarily interested in the causes and effects of RNGO advocacy and action and employs a comparative research design to identify patterns of engagement and assess the impact of these on UN policy processes.

Analytical framework In 2007, Boli and Brewington wrote that ‘almost all international or internationally oriented religious NGOs . . . toil away largely unnoticed, yet they are numerous, energetic, and often significant actors in many global sectors’ (Boli and Brewington 2007, p. 204). Today, although still numerous and energetic, RNGOs no longer go unnoticed. As we have just seen, the research done in recent years has been concerned chiefly with describing and systematizing RNGOs’ work, exploring the relationship between the religious and the secular in the UN context and analyzing the varying ‘visibility’ and ‘invisibility’ of religion that results from strategic decision-making. What has been missing in the literature so far is any systematic cross-issue comparison of RNGO activities aimed at identifying patterns of RNGO engagement with the UN and shedding light on the motives and causes underlying specific RNGO behaviour. Building on recent research into the ambivalence of non-state actors in general, the present volume asks whether the inclusion of religious non-state actors in policy processes increases the chances of just and peaceful governance or diminishes them (Baumgart-Ochse et al. 2012, p. 2). Is the political process by which compromise and agreement is achieved on contested policy issues at the UN helped or hindered by RNGOs? Does their advocacy enrich and invigorate the debate and decision-making process or does it

Introduction 15 simply disrupt it? And what are the factors that determine whether RNGOs act as polarizers or mediators in the policy process? With these questions in mind, each chapter begins with an account of RNGO positions and performance in specific policy fields. Attention is then turned to the factors determining RNGOs’ patterns of engagement and the impact these have on the policy process in question. In addressing these issues, the contributors look in depth at facets which most scholars have hitherto dealt with only cursorily. The socializing and secularizing effects of the UN environment on RNGOs are one such aspect; actor characteristics such as normative beliefs, policy stances, and organizational resources are another. The contributions also take into account the specific configuration of contested issues in the given policy field. Position and performance Each chapter opens with an account of the position and performance of RNGOs in a particular policy field (development, international criminal justice, and reproductive rights are some of the areas covered). It examines the content of RNGO advocacy on the normative issues in question, documenting the positions taken in relevant debates and negotiations. It then asks whether clusters of RNGOs from one religious tradition, or with analogous organizational structures, can be seen to take similar normative positions on the issue or whether all RNGOs are to be found in the same camp. It explores the differences in position between religious and non-religious NGOs and the stances taken by RNGOs vis-à-vis other actors in the field such as states and UN agencies. Special attention is paid to the language used by RNGOs to present their views and goals: Are they confrontational, naming and shaming particular policies or actors and reinforcing the divide between opposing camps by way of ‘othering’? Or do they endeavour to promote compromise and agreement, making an effort to listen to, and understand, the views of others on the contested issue? And to what extent do they use religious language in their publications and utterances? The strategies used by RNGOs to achieve their objectives are also analyzed. Here again, the focus is on whether the organizations opt for a confrontational style or a cooperative one. The repertoire of strategies at their disposal is a wide one: they can lobby UN agencies and state representatives, conduct campaigns inside and outside the UN, take part in debate and decision-making, organize so-called side events, or put out relevant publications. The authors analyze the ways in which RNGOs use these various strategies to either promote or prevent agreement on specific solutions to the problem in question – though it is, of course, theoretically possible for a confrontational approach to be pursued and for agreement nonetheless to be advanced. Patterns of RNGO activism Having documented RNGO position and performance, the authors of the individual chapters explore the factors that help determine why RNGO behaviour has

16

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

a polarizing or a mediating influence? Three specific clusters of factors are taken into account, the first two of which build on the multi-dimensional frameworks which Berger (2003) and Petersen (2010) proposed as a basis for analyzing the operations of RNGOs at the UN. The first cluster of factors covers actor characteristics. These include religious and denominational affiliation and moral and ethical orientation and practice. A link might, for example, be established between denominational affiliation or moral conviction and a certain type of behaviour in a given policy field. Assumptions – for example that conservative and right-wing RNGOs will inevitably prove problematic actors in UN negotiations – are subjected to critical scrutiny. The extent to which religious practice pervades an organization’s set-up is also examined. Is staff recruitment based on religious affiliation? Does prayer play a role? Is financing religion-based? The hypothesis here is that the degree of an RNGO’s ‘religiousness’ correlates with the location of its performance on the confrontation–correlation spectrum and with the tendency of that performance to either help or hinder agreement on contentious issues. Links between other actor characteristics and RNGO performance in the given field are also examined. For example: can differences in RNGOs’ behaviour be explained by differences in their size, financial resources, or organizational structure? The second cluster covers external factors, and these too are explored from the point of view of their influence on the courses of action adopted by RNGOs. As previously pointed out, RNGOs that decide to engage with the UN enter a profoundly secular environment. Although many member states have religious affiliations, they normally keep them out of processes, negotiations, and working relations at the UN. In addition, most of the non-religious civil society actors and the staff of the UN agencies tend, by and large, to conform to the UN’s secular rules. RNGOs ally themselves to, or oppose, non-religious counterparts; they maintain working relationships with UN agencies; and they lobby state representatives. What impact does all this have on their religious identity? Is there any evidence that RNGOs undergo processes of socialization into the UN environment? Once they have operated inside the UN for a while, do their goals and values begin to converge with those of the institution, ultimately making mediators of them? And does such convergence entail secularization of the RNGO, as Lehmann suggests? Does competition for access and funds influence an RNGO’s stance in a discourse, softening or hardening normative convictions? The third cluster of factors centres on the configuration of the particular normative conflict under discussion. Does it involve conflicting principles or conflicting interpretations of the same principle? How close are the contested issues to the core norms of the particular RNGO’s own religious tradition? And, on a related note, is the RNGO itself, and its wider constituency, affected by the norms and regulations at issue in the policy field in question? The hypothesis in the case of this cluster is that the type of normative conflict involved and the degree of relevance the conflict has to the RNGO concerned affect the nature of the advocacy the organization engages in and the actions it takes.

Introduction 17

Plan of the book The first chapter of the book, by Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart, provides a quantitative overview of the 339 RNGOs accredited to the UN as of 2012. The review, based on the major data-set recently produced by the project ‘Religious NGOs at the UN: Polarizers or Mediators’ at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, details the policy interests and geographic origins of the organizations in question, the dates they were founded, the dates they obtained UN accreditation, and their consultative status. From this empirical basis it is possible to draw theoretical conclusions about RNGO influence on UN procedures and about the factors determining the nature of RNGO advocacy and action. Light is thrown, for example, on the link between preferred policy field and religious tradition or geographic origin, on the extent to which RNGO impact on the policy process is affected by UN socialization, and on the relationship between an organization’s tradition or geography and its consultative status and ‘clout’. Katharina Glaab, Doris Fuchs, and Johannes Friederich examine the role of RNGOs in the climate-change negotiations relating to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Scholars have generally focused on secular actors in this context, only rarely addressing the part played by RNGOs. And yet these organizations have been involved in this area for quite some time– indeed, the publication by Pope Francis of the encyclical Laudato Si’ suggests they are becoming even more active on this issue. The chapter begins by situating RNGOs in the historical context of climate-change negotiations and then compares their positions, styles of language, and strategies to those of other civil society actors. From this it becomes clear that religious actors, whose behaviour may be influenced by religious norms and concepts, tend to adopt less technocratic, less utilitarian stances than their secular counterparts and also to opt for less confrontational, more mediatory strategies. Overall, though, the complementarity of the religious and secular positions among NGOs is such that there is scope for RNGOs to make a major contribution to sustainable global governance. The discourse on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) is one of the most controversial in which RNGOs are involved – as the contribution by AnnKristin Beinlich demonstrates. During the 1990s, the normative implications of issues such as women’s rights, family planning, and development were the subject of fierce debate at the UN. Religious actors successfully opposed women’s-rightsbased moves to get liberal approaches to family planning – particularly abortion and contraception – incorporated into the UN agenda. As a result, the debate became highly polarized. This chapter outlines the history of the SRHR discourse and the notion of aggregate rights. In the course of this mapping, three types of RNGO networks are identified: pro-life, progressive, and pro-choice. Unlike previous accounts, therefore, this one is not based on division into two extremes competing to address fundamental norms (how to define life) or conflicting rights (the right to life vs a woman’s right to choose). The ‘tripartite’ account of the position, performance, strategies, and discursive impact of RNGOs in the relevant networks corrects the commonly held picture of all-round aggression and shows

18

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

that many of the religious NGOs, though utilizing the discourse for intra-religious purposes, do not disrupt it. Whereas RNGOs play a rather ambivalent role in the SRHR discourse, their contribution to international dialogue and exchange on the issue of development has been viewed as a rather positive one, by both scholars and practitioners, since the 1990s. Gerard Clarke describes how agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the UK Department for International Development have overcome their traditional antipathy to organized religion and their concerns about the erosion of the boundary between church and state and now see FBOs as valuable interlocutors and partners. Although these moves have elicited criticism from secular-minded academics such as Amartya Sen, the new post-liberal order is transforming the debate and creating new challenges for development agencies and FBOs alike. Clarke examines the key patterns of conservative nationalism in the context of international development and assesses their implications for these two groups. In their chapter, Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov turn their attention to the various attempts that have been made since the 1970s to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a document welcomed by the private sector but criticized by the NGO community. Two years later, the Council established the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG), whose brief was to negotiate a binding treaty in this area. The chapter focuses on these two initiatives, analyzing the positions and strategies of a number of RNGOs that are active in larger networks involving both religious and non-religious actors. Amongst the organizations in question are the Catholic developmental umbrella-organization Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE), Franciscans International, Bread for the World, and Misereor. The networks, for their part, include the Treaty Alliance, made up of NGOs and social movements that keep a critical eye on, and take part in, the work of the OEIWG and advocate for a binding international treaty on business and human rights. Within these networks, RNGOs – mainly from Christian traditions – highlight the concerns of victims of corporate abuse and underline the need to put human rights before corporate interests. The main conflict here seems to be one not between religious and non-religious NGOs but between, on the one hand, NGOs and like-minded states and, on the other, particular industrialized countries and the private sector. Debating on the issues in question, RNGOs mainly use the language of human rights and argue for sustainable development. Although their religious background clearly has a bearing on their involvement in this policy field, this is rarely mentioned in official UN discussions. The next chapter revisits the (ongoing) debate about the relative merits of restorative (reconciliatory) and retributive (punitive) justice and the attitudes of RNGOs in this area. Taking the restorative–retributive distinction as her theoretical starting point, Clara Braungart reviews the debates of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the actors involved in its operations and from this data maps the stances of RNGOs in this forum. Religious actors have long been the focus of

Introduction 19 research into Transitional Justice (TJ), notably in post-conflict situations, generally emerging as champions of reconciliation. Based mainly on investigation into specific situations, this pro-reconciliation image leads one to expect that, in the context of the ICC, where most actors favour a retributive approach, RNGOs will seek to challenge the prevalent norms. As this chapter shows, however, the positions adopted by RNGOs at the Court vary depending on the context and policy field concerned and are promoted in a non-confrontational way. My own contribution explores RNGO advocacy in relation to a campaign conducted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation with the aim of getting the banning of the defamation of religion recognized as a human rights norm by the UN. Between 1999 and 2011, a series of resolutions to this effect were adopted, first by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the Human Rights Council, and later by the UN General Assembly. The resolutions went through despite the fact that they curtailed freedom of expression, but in the mid-2000s support for such motions declined, and, in the face of diplomatic pressure from Western states and opposition from civil society (including lobbying by RNGOs), they were eventually voted down. Although the resolutions were ostensibly aimed at protecting religion from defamation, many RNGOs claimed that the OIC’s real objective was to establish a global anti-blasphemy law that would legitimize the domestic blasphemy provisions through which dissident voices were silenced in its more authoritarian member states. Besides wishing to uphold international human-rights standards, these RNGOs feared that adoption of the resolutions would expose their own constituencies to increased repression. The theme addressed by Jeffrey Haynes is a quintessentially religious one, namely interreligious dialogue and cooperation. He describes how the attacks of 9/11 propelled the question of how to avoid a ‘clash of civilizations’ to the top of the international agenda and made improved communication between religions – and cultures – a major concern of global governance. One product of this concern, as we have seen, was the creation, in 2005, of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. The efforts of the Alliance, explains Haynes, were focused on three levels: the international community (especially the UN), the world of states, and civil society. There were, he points out, no existing ‘templates’, either at the UN or elsewhere, on which the UNAOC could base its own approach, and no suitable conceptual or practical tools it could use to tackle interreligious or intercultural clashes. Compelled to start from scratch, it has managed to realize only a handful of its goals over the past 12 years. Haynes examines the factors that prompted the UN to promote interreligious and intercultural dialogue through the UNAOC and reviews the burgeoning number of religious NGOs that are also pursuing this path, sometimes in concert with the UN body.

Notes 1 Examples of the recent interest include Stensvold (2017), Carrette and Miall (2017), Lehmann (2016), Haynes (2014), Baumgart-Ochse (2014), Marshall (2013), Carrette and Trigeaud (2013), Carrette (2013), Petersen (2010), Karam (2010), Boehle (2010a, 2010b), Grills (2009), Berger (2003), Rivlin (2002), Religion Counts (2002).

20

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

2 See e.g. Appleby (2000), Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000), Fox (2002, 2004), Svensson (2007), Neuberg et al. (2013), Basedau et al. (2016), Toft et al. (2011). 3 Examples of this kind of Wutargument are found in Weingardt (2007), Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009), Coward and Smith (2004). 4 On this, see e.g. Haynes (2014). 5 Calhoun et al. (2011), Gorski et al. (2012), Habermas (2006), McLennan (2010). 6 The term ‘faith-based organization’ has its origin in the literature on non-profit organizations in the United States (see e.g. Bielefeld and Cleveland 2013; Sider and Unruh 2004). In the literature on international organizations, the term ‘religious non-governmental organization’ is more common. 7 See e.g. May et al. (2014), Barbato and Kratochwil (2009), Bettiza and Dionigi (2014), Boesenecker and Vinjamuri (2011), Hurd (2015), Sullivan et al. (2015). 8 Personal communication with A. Karam, 4 April 2012. 9 Personal communication, 3 April 2012. All M. Scheuer quotations here are from this source. 10 See the Interfaith Harmony Week website: http://worldinterfaithharmonyweek.com/ (accessed 28 April 2017). 11 Personal communication, 3 April 2012. All M. Scheuer quotations here are from this source.

References Acharya, A., 2009. Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian regionalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Adamson, F.B., 2005. Global liberalism versus political Islam: Competing ideological frameworks in international politics. International Studies Review, 7 (4), 547–69. Alger, C., 2002. The emerging roles of NGOs in the UN system: From article 71 to a people’s millennium assembly. Global Governance, 8, 93–117. Annan, K., 1998. Secretary-General stresses religious, spiritual dimensions of United Nations work in keynote address [online]. Available from: www.un.org/press/en/1998/ 19980427.SGSM6541.html [Accessed 25 April 2017]. Annan, K., 2000. Secretary-General, addressing Millennium Summit of religious, spiritual leaders, urges participants to set example of interfaith cooperation [online]. Available from: www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/sg2639.html [Accessed 25 April 2017]. Appleby, R.S., 2000. The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield. Banchoff, T., 2008. Introduction. In: T. Banchoff, ed. Religious pluralism, globalization, and world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–38. Barbato, M. and Kratochwil, F., 2009. Towards a post-secular political order? European Political Science Review, 1 (3), 317–40. Basedau, M., Pfeiffer, B., and Vüllers, J., 2016. Bad religion? Religion, collective action, and the onset of armed conflict in developing countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60 (2), 226–55. Baumgart-Ochse, C. (2014). Religiöse Akteure als Beiträger zu Global Governance. In: I.-J. Werkner and O. Hidalgo, eds. Religionen–Global Player in der internationalen Politik? Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 15–32. Baumgart-Ochse, C. et al., 2012. The relevance of private actors in the transnational sphere for just peace governance. PRIF Working Paper 13. Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Introduction 21 Beckford, J.A., 2012. Public religions and the postsecular: Critical reflections. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 51 (1), 1–19. Bellin, E., 2008. Faith in politics: New trends in the study of religion and politics. World Politics, 60, 315–47. Benford, R.D., 2010. Framing global governance from below: Discursive opportunities and challenges in the transnational social movement arena. In: C. Bjola and M. Kornprobst, eds. Arguing global governance: Agency, lifeworld, and shared reasoning. London: Routledge. Bercovitch, J. and Kadayifci-Orellana, S.A., 2009. Religion and mediation: The role of faith-based actors in international conflict resolution. International Negotiation, 14, 175–204. Berger, J., 2003. Religious nongovernmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14 (1), 15–39. Bettiza, G. and Dionigi, F., 2014. How do religious norms diffuse? Institutional translation and international change in a post-secular world society. European Journal of International Relations, 21 (3), 621–46. Bielefeld, W. and Cleveland, W.S., 2013. Defining faith-based-organizations and understanding them through research. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42 (3), 442–67. Bob, C., 2012. The global right wing and the clash of world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boehle, J., 2010a. Religious NGOs at the UN and the Millennium Development Goals: An introduction. Global Change, Peace & Security, 22 (3), 275–96. Boehle, J., 2010b. The UN system and religious actors in the context of global change. CrossCurrents, 60 (3), 383–401. Boesenecker, A.P. and Vinjamuri, L., 2011. Lost in translation? Civil society, faith-based organizations and the negotiation of international norms. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5 (3), 345–65. Boli, J. and Brewington, D.V., 2007. Religious organizations. In: P. Beyer and L. Beaman, eds. Religion, globalization, and culture. Leiden: Brill, 203–31. Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M., 1999. INGOs and the organization of world culture. In: J. Boli and G. Thomas, eds. Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 13–49. Busby, J.W., 2007. Bono made Jesse Helms cry: Jubilee 2000, debt relief, and moral action in international politics. International Studies Quarterly, 51 (2), 247–75. Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., and VanAntwerpen, J., eds., 2011. Rethinking secularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carrette, J., 2013. The paradox of globalisation: Quakers, religious NGOs, and the United Nations. In: R.W. Hefner et al., eds. Religions in movement: The local and the global in contemporary faith traditions. London: Taylor & Francis, 37–56. Carrette, J., 2017. Introduction: Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations. In: J.R. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1–17. Carrette, J.R. and Miall, H., eds., 2017. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Carrette, J.R. and Trigeaud, S.-H., 2013. The religion-secular in international politics: The case of ‘religious’ NGOs at the United Nations. In: A. Day, G. Vincett, and C.R. Cotter, eds. Social identities between the sacred and the secular. Farnham: Ashgate, 7–22. Casanova, J., 1994. Public religions in the modern world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

22

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Casanova, J., 2007. Rethinking secularization: A global comparative perspective. In: P. Beyer and L. Beaman, eds. Religion, globalization, and culture. Leiden: Brill, 101–20. Casanova, J., 2008. Public religions revisited. In: H. de Vries, ed. Religion: Beyond the concept. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 101–19. Committee of Religious NGOs at the United Nations, 2017. About [online]. Available from: https://rngos.wordpress.com/about/ [Accessed 5 May 2017]. Committee on Spirituality, Values, and Global Concerns-NY, 2017. CSVGC-NY [online]. Available from: http://csvgc-ny.org/csvgc/ [Accessed 2 May 2017]. Coward, H. and Smith, G.S., eds., 2004. Religion and peacebuilding. Albany, NY: State University of New York. Dallmayr, F., 2012. Post-secularity and (global) politics: A need for radical redefinition. Review of International Studies, 38 (5), 963–73. de Jonge Oudraat, C. and Haufler, V., 2008. Global governance and the role of NGOs in international peace and security. AIGCS Policy Report 33. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary Germany Studies. DiMaggio, P., 1998. The relevance of organization theory to the study of religion. In: N.J. Demerath, III et al., eds. Sacred companies: Organizational aspects of religion and religious aspects of organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7–23. Dingwerth, K. and Pattberg, P., 2006. Global governance as a perspective on world politics. Global Governance, 12 (12), 185–203. Florini, A.M., ed., 2000. The third force: The rise of transnational civil society. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. Fox, J., 2002. Ethnoreligious conflict in the late twentieth century: A general theory. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Fox, J., 2004. Religion, civilization, and civil war. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Gartzke, E. and Gleditsch, K.S., 2006. Identity and conflict: Ties that bind and differences that divide. European Journal of International Relations, 12 (1), 53–87. Gorski, P.S. et al., eds., 2012. The post-secular in question: Religion in contemporary society. New York University Press. Grills, N., 2009. The paradox of multilateral organizations engaging with faith-based organizations. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 15 (4), 505–20. Habermas, J., 2005. Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Habermas, J., 2006. Religion in the public sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (1), 1–25. Hall, R.B. and Biersteker, T.J., eds., 2002. The emergence of private authority in global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hasenclever, A. and Rittberger, V., 2000. Does religion make a difference? Theoretical approaches to the impact of faith on political conflict. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29 (3), 641–74. Haynes, J., 2009. Transnational religious actors and international order. Perspectives, 17 (2), 43–69. Haynes, J., 2013. Faith-based organisations at the United Nations. EUI Working Paper. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. Haynes, J., 2014. Faith-based organizations at the United Nations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Henderson, E.A. and Tucker, R., 2001. Clear and present strangers: The clash of civilizations and international conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 45 (2), 317–38.

Introduction 23 Hopgood, S. and Vinjamuri, L., 2012. Faith in markets. In: M.N. Barnett and J.G. Stein, eds. Sacred aid: Faith and humanitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 37–64. Huntington, S.P., 1996. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Hurd, E.S., 2015. Beyond religious freedom: The new global politics of religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Karam, A., 2010. The United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA’s) legacy of engaging faith-based organizations as cultural agents of change. CrossCurrents, 60 (3), 432–50. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K., 1998. Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keohane, R.O., 2002. The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the liberalism of fear. Dialogue IO, 1 (1), 29–43. Kettell, S., 2012. Has political science ignored religion? PS: Political Science & Politics, 45 (1), 93–100. Kettell, S., 2014. Do we need a ‘political science of religion’? Political Studies Review, 14 (2), 210–22. Kippenberg, H.G., 2013. ‘Phoenix from the ashes’: Religious communities arising from globalization. Journal of Religion in Europe, 6 (2), 143–74. Kippenberg, H.G., Lehmann, K., and Nagel, A.-K., 2013. Varieties of deprivatization: Revisiting religious communities in the public sphere. Journal of Religion in Europe, 6 (2), 133–42. Kratochvíl, P., 2009. The religious turn in IR: A brief assessment. Perspectives, 17 (2), 5–12. Lehmann, K., 2016. Religious NGOs in international relations: The construction of ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’. London: Routledge. Levitt, P., 2004. Redefining the boundaries of belonging: The institutional character of transnational religious life. Sociology of Religion, 65 (1), 1–18. Marshall, K., 2013. Global institutions of religion: Ancient movers, modern shakers. London: Routledge. Mathews, J.T., 1997. Power shift. Foreign Affairs, 76 (1), 50–66. Mavelli, L. and Petito, F., 2012. The postsecular in international relations: An overview. Review of International Studies, 38 (5), 931–42. Mavelli, L. and Wilson, E.K., 2016. Postsecularism and international relations. In: J. Haynes, ed. Routledge handbook of religion and politics. London: Routledge, 251–69. May, S. et al., 2014. The religious as political and the political as religious: Globalisation, post-secularism and the shifting boundaries of the sacred. Politics, Religion, & Ideology, 15 (3), 331–46. McLennan, G., 2010. The postsecular turn. Theory, Culture & Society, 27 (3), 3–20. Moghadam, A., 2008. The globalization of martyrdom: Al Quaeda, salafi jihad, and the diffusion of suicide attacks. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Neuberg, S.L. et al., 2013. Religion and intergroup conflict: Findings from the global group relations project. Psychological Science, 25 (1), 198–206. Nye, J.S. and Donahue, J.D., eds., 2000. Governance in a globalizing world. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Petersen, M.J., 2010. International religious NGOs at the United Nations: A study of a group of religious organizations. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance [online]. Available from: https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/847 [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Philpott, D., 2002. The challenge of September 11 to secularism in international relations. World Politics, 55 (1), 66–95.

24

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Philpott, D., 2009. Has the study of global politics found religion? Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 183–202. Religion Counts, 2002. Religion and public policy at the UN. Washington, DC: Religion Counts. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C., and Sikkink, K., eds., 1999. The power of human rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rivlin, B., 2002. Thoughts on religious NGOs at the UN: A component of global civil society. In: P.I. Hajnal, ed. Civil society in the information age. Aldershot: Ashgate, 155–73. Roy, O., 2004. Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Rudolph, S.H., 1997. Religion, states, and transnational civil society. In: S. Hoeber Rudolph and J. Piscatori, eds. Transnational religion & fading states. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1–24. Rudolph, S.H. and Piscatori, J.P., eds., 1997. Transnational religion and fading states. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ruggie, J.G., 2004. Reconstituting the global public domain: Issues, actors, and practices. European Journal of International Relations, 10 (4), 499–531. Scholte, J.A., 2002. Civil society and democracy in global governance. Global Governance, 8, 281–304. Sider, R.J. and Unruh, H.R., 2004. Typology of religious characteristics of social service and educational organizations and programs. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33 (1), 109–34. Stensvold, A., ed., 2017. Religion, state and the United Nations: Value politics. London: Routledge. Stuckrad, K. von, 2013. Discursive study of religion: Approaches, definitions, implications. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 25, 5–25. Sullivan, W.F. et al., eds., 2015. Politics of religious freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Svensson, I., 2007. Fighting with faith: Religion and conflict resolution in civil wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (6), 930–49. Taylor, C., 2007. A secular age. Cambridge: Belknap Press. Thomas, S.M., 2005. The global resurgence of religion and the transformation of international relations: The struggle for the soul of the twenty-first century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tickner, J.A., 2009. On taking religious worldviews seriously. In: H.V. Milner and A. Moravcsik, eds. Power, interdependence, and nonstate actors in world politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 223–40. Toft, M.D., Philpott, D., and Shah, T.S., 2011. God’s century: Resurgent religion and global politics. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. UN Alliance of Civilizations, 2006. Report of the high-level group [online]. Available from: www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf [Accessed 1 June 2017]. UN Interagency Taskforce on Religion and Development, 2015. Highlights of FBO engagement by United Nations entities 2013–2015 [online]. Available from: www. partner-religion-development.org/fileadmin/Dateien/Resources/Knowledge_Center/ UNIATF-ToR-and-2014-Overview.pdf [Accessed 27 April 2017]. UN Interagency Taskforce on Religion and Development, 2016. Engaging religion and faith-based actors in 2016: Annual report of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Engaging Faith-Based Actors for sustainable development [online]. Available from: www.partner-religion-development.org/service/news-archive/article/new-annual-

Introduction 25 report-engaging-religion-and-faith-based-actors-in-2016-published-by-un-task-force/ [Accessed 2 May 2017]. Uthup, T., 2010. Bringing communities closer: The role of the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC). CrossCurrents, 60 (3), 402–18. Wald, K.D. and Wilcox, C., 2006. Getting religion: Has political science rediscovered the faith factor? American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 523–9. Weingardt, M.A., 2007. Religion Macht Frieden: Das Friedenspotential von Religionen in politischen Gewaltkonflikten. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Weiss, T.G. and Wilkinson, R., 2013. Rethinking global governance? Complexity, authority, power, change. International Studies Quarterly, 58, 1–9. Wiener, A. and Puetter, U., 2009. The quality of norms is what actors make of it. Journal of International Law and International Relations, 5 (1), 1–16. Willetts, P., ed., 1996. The conscience of the world: The influence of non-governmental organisations in the UN system. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Willetts, P., 2000. From ‘consultative arrangements’ to ‘partnership’: The changing status of NGOs in diplomacy at the UN. Global Governance, 6, 191–212. Wolf, K.D., 2008. Emerging patterns of global governance: The new interplay between the state, business, and civil society. In: A.G. Scherer and G. Palazzo, eds. Handbook of research on global corporate citizenship. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 225–48. Wolff, J. and Poppe, A.E., 2015. From closing space to contested spaces: Re-assessing current conflicts over international civil society support. PRIF Report 137. Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Wolff, J. and Zimmermann, L., 2015. Between banyans and battle scenes: Liberal norms, contestation, and the limits of critique. Review of International Studies, 42 (3), 513–34. Wuthnow, R. and Offutt, S., 2008. Transnational religious connections. Sociology of Religion, 69 (2), 209–32.

2

Religious NGOs at the UN A quantitative overview Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart1

Introduction The United Nations has maintained relations with non-state actors since the time of its foundation. During the 1990s, actors of this kind became increasingly involved in transnational endeavours to bring about global social and economic justice (Wolf 2016), and this led to the formalization of their relations with the UN. Resolution 1996/31 of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) laid down the ground rules for collaboration between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN and provided for a system of accreditation with the Council (Martens 2005). This chapter offers a quantitative overview of religious NGOS (RNGOs) amongst these accreditees and offers pointers for further research – qualitative as well as quantitative – in this area. Official UN figures about the number of ECOSOC-accredited NGOs do not record the religious affiliation of accredited organizations. Therefore, it is not clear what proportion of these are religious. An added complication, when assessing the impact of RNGOs at the UN, is the fact that many UN agencies – with an eye to the additional outreach and legitimacy afforded by religious actors – will also actively involve non-ECOSOC-accredited religious players in their work. This is the case, for example, with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which collaborates extensively with religious and faith-based actors in the fields of population politics and development.2 Accreditation is also possible with the UN’s Department of Public Information (DPI), but this affords only passive status, with access to information but no opportunity to play an active part in proceedings. Despite the DPI activities and the work with non-accredited NGOs, we have opted to focus our research on ECOSOC-accredited organizations. Not only does ECOSOC accreditation remain the only formal route to active NGO participation in a key UN organ; the ECOSOC framework also provides a point of reference for UN agencies, and accreditation with this body therefore assumes major importance in the overall UN context. Although UN agencies are increasingly reaching out to RNGOs, there are no up-to-date figures on the presence and activities of these organizations at the UN. The last published survey dates back to 2009 (Carrette and Trigeaud 2013; Bush

RNGOs at the UN 27 2017a; Trigeaud 2017). Conceptual vagueness is also a problem: the term ‘religious NGO’ frequently goes undefined, both in the UN context and in relevant scholarly works. Against this background, we offer an updated data-set based on ECOSOC’s comprehensive list of accredited NGOs for 2012.3 Containing details of religious affiliation, year of foundation, year and type of ECOSOCaccreditation, geographical base, and declared fields of activity, the new data-set expands considerably on previous analyses, which often feature only numbers and religious affiliation (Knox 2002; Berger 2003; Petersen 2010). The work done as part of the project ‘Religious NGOs at the United Nations’ at the University of Kent in Canterbury (Carrette and Miall 2013, 2017; Carrette and Trigeaud 2013) has centred both on NGOs registered with the DPI – whose rules of accreditation are not as stringent as those of ECOSOC – and with the ECOSOC. Kent’s key data is based on a survey of all DPI-accredited NGOs for which the response rate was approximately 6 per cent, or 192 out of a total of 3,275 (Bush 2017a). In addition, a counting of RNGOs analog to our collection method was conducted looking at ECOSOC-accredited NGOs (Trigeaud 2017). For reasons of comparability, we refer to the latter data set when needed. Kent’s overall purpose differed from our own: whereas we were gathering information to assist analysis of the conduct and stance of RNGOs in UN debates (see the introductory chapter in this volume), Kent’s interest lay in the representation and accountability of religious traditions at the UN. Thus, our focus is on political process rather than on the visibility of religious traditions in the UN context. Using our data-set, we seek to provide new insights into the preferences of particular religious traditions in regard to policy issues and into the period of accreditation from which we expect certain socializing effects of the UN environment on RNGOs. The data also allows us to correlate religious tradition with geographical background and reassess ideas about the relationship between Western states4 and other regions represented at the UN. Our first task is to bring some conceptual clarity to the issue in question: we look at the various ways in which RNGOs are understood in the literature and explain the definition of them with which we work here. We then present our data-set, which gives a quantitative overview of religious involvement at the UN, and we suggest ways in which the data might be exploited in further research. The chapter concludes with a summary of our findings.

Definitions and clarifications Religious NGOs did not attract much scholarly attention until 2003. Although NGOs in general had become a favoured topic of research during the 1990s (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Martens 2005), Julia Berger was the first scholar to point up the presence of specifically religious NGOs at the UN (Berger 2003). As explained in the introductory chapter to the present volume, like Berger (2003, p. 16) we define RNGOs as non-profit civil society organizations that evoke, implicitly or explicitly, religious, spiritual, or faith-based symbology in their discourses. This

28 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart may happen via their organizational structure and identity, their strategic orientation and engagement, their motivations, and their stance and behaviour within policy discourses and in the networks of which they form part. In line with this definition, governmental and intergovernmental organizations – such as the Holy See and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – which are formally or institutionally related to state actors are excluded from our analysis. When we use the term ‘religious’, we do so in awareness of the critical observations made by Haynes in its regard (Haynes 2014, pp. 8–9). We realize, most importantly, that the term is insufficient to encompass traditions and worldviews of non-Western origin – apart from those of Abrahamic lineage (Fitzgerald 2008, 2011). Research in the field shows that most relevant NGOs refer to themselves as faith-based rather than religious (see also Carrette and Trigeaud 2013). Thus, in the Kent project, when respondents were asked to self-identify on the basis of a range of descriptors including not only secular and spiritual options but also ethnic and cultural ones (Bush 2017a, p. 48), most of the contingent of 192 identified as secular (n = 110) and a not insignificant proportion as faith-based (n = 34). Interestingly, the ‘religious’ category was actually the one least chosen (n = 9).5 In light of all these factors, we concur with the view that the term ‘religious’ cannot fully comprehend non-Western traditions and other worldviews. We nonetheless opt to use the expression ‘religious non-governmental organization’ – RNGO – and we do so for two reasons. Firstly, despite the drawbacks mentioned, it is the term used by the dominant strand of literature dealing with these actors in the UN context, and since we see our contribution as part of this strand, we follow the same convention. Secondly, this usage accords with official UN and ECOSOC parlance relating to NGOs.6 Religion in a secular setting The UN overall may be described as a secular organization that implicitly upholds the distinction between the religious and the secular (Knox 2002, p. 12). We too use this distinction. However, as Bush (2017a) points out, ascribing religious identity to a worldview is always problematic. While organizations characterizing themselves as Bahá’í, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, or Sikh can – in general – easily be categorized as religious in this secular setting, there are also critical cases which raise the question of researcher subjectivity and the repercussions which an investigator’s decisions may have on religious dynamics. Actors may, for example, invoke a scholarly classification as ‘religious’ in order to legitimize their own identity claims. At the same time, researchers must remember that an organization’s internal understanding of itself will not necessarily tally with their own classification. Bush cites the case of the RNGO Catholics for Choice (CFC), which, despite being accused of disobeying basic magisterial teachings and, as a result, having its Catholic identity denied by the Vatican and by various Catholic civil society actors that disagree with its positions, continues to assert its Catholic status. Here, the supposedly neutral researcher is called upon to decide what does and does not count as Catholic. Since the matter is hotly disputed even in intra-religious discourse, the researcher’s decision might contribute to the construction of social reality (Bush 2017a, pp. 42–3).

RNGOs at the UN 29 One of the difficulties with the concept of religion is that it often intersects with other identity markers such as culture and ethnicity. Some Jewish organizations, for example, see Judaism not as a religion but as a cultural tradition or ethnic category and would therefore not describe themselves as religious or faith-based, referring to themselves as ‘secular Jews’ (Berger 2003; Carrette and Trigeaud 2013, p. 12; Bush 2017a). Again, although spiritual beliefs and practices are an integral part of the social identities of certain indigenous NGOs, other indigenous organizations may speak of cultural rights rather than of religious issues. The case of two Native American NGOs may help to illustrate the difficulties involved in distinguishing between NGOs and RNGOs – and our own approach to this task. On their websites, the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) and the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) describe themselves respectively as: [F]ounded on the collective goal to enhance, promote, and foster the social, economic, cultural and political well-being of First Nations and Métis women within First Nation, Métis and Canadian societies . . . Much like a ‘Grandmother’s Lodge’, we as aunties, mothers, sisters, brothers and relatives collectively recognize, respect, promote, defend and enhance our Native ancestral laws, spiritual beliefs, language and traditions given to us by the Creator. (NWAC 2017) And [A]n organization of Indigenous People from North, Central, South America, the Caribbean and the Pacific working for the Sovereignty and Self Determination of Indigenous Peoples and the recognition and protection of Indigenous Rights, Treaties, Traditional Cultures and Sacred Lands. (IITC 2017) Given the unambiguous references to a ‘Creator’ and to ‘spiritual beliefs’ in the first description and the focus on the protection of indigenous rights in the second, we classify the NWAC as religious and the IITC as secular. To put the problem of critical cases in perspective: out of a total of 3,937 ECOSOC-accredited NGOs (as of 2012), only 12 were not immediately identifiable by us as either religious or secular. In terms of our overall survey, therefore, this group has minimal quantitative significance. In addition, empirical evidence shows that the organizations involved play only a minor part, if any, in most discourses at the UN.

Religious reality at the UN: quantitative findings As mentioned previously, the data presented here is based on the ‘List of nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2012’ (E/2012/INF/6), published by ECOSOC. All

30 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart NGOs on the list were matched against our definition of an RNGO, taking into account the descriptions of them in the ECOSOC database, their names, their profiles of themselves, and their mission statements. Every NGO identified as religious was added to the study’s database, with details of name, geographical base, religious tradition, chosen area of activity/policy field, year of foundation, and year and type of ECOSOC accreditation. Numerical presence of RNGOs at the UN Our data shows that in 2012, RNGOs made up 9 per cent (n = 339) of the total number of NGOs accredited with ECOSOC. This compares with analogous figures in studies by Knox (2002), Berger (2003), Carrette and Miall (2017), and Petersen (2010) (see Table 2.1). Given that sources and collection processes for the four data-sets mentioned were neither uniform nor equally transparent,7 a measure of interpretive caution is in order. Even so, it is possible tentatively to identify a trend here, namely that although the number of RNGOs accredited at the UN has almost doubled in the period in question – from 180 in 2000 to 339 in 2012 – as a proportion of all UN-accredited NGOs, the number has remained stable at slightly less than 10 per cent. The findings here therefore contradict the widespread assumption – in society, in the media, and in the scholarly debate – that religion in general is a growing force in the world. Representation of religious traditions at the UN As recorded in 2012, the distribution of religious traditions within the group of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs is by and large the same as that reported in previous studies (Berger 2003; Petersen 2010; Carrette and Miall 2017). By far the largest proportion of all accredited RNGOs – 59 per cent – belong to the Christian tradition. Muslim NGOs constitute the second-largest group, representing 13 per cent of the total, with Jewish NGOs accounting for 7 per cent. Hindu and Buddhist organizations make up, respectively, 3 per cent and 4 per cent of the total, and the remaining 14 per cent is divided between multi-religious organizations (6 per cent) and groups from ‘other religious traditions’. This last category, at 8 per cent,

Table 2.1 RNGOs accredited with ECOSOCa 2000b

2003c

2009d

2010e

2012

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

180

9

263

9

239

7

320

10

339

9

a

In numbers and as a percentage of all ECOSOC-accredited NGOs. Knox (2002) quotes figures from 2000. Berger (2003) does not specify a year for her figures. d Trigeaud (2017) quotes figures from 2009. e Petersen (2010) does not specify a year for her figures. b c

RNGOs at the UN 31 encompasses the Bahá’í faith, Zoroastrianism, Jainism, Shinto, indigenous beliefsystems, Rastafarianism, alternative religious movements, spiritual groups, and Freemasonry. Figure 2.1 summarizes what is in fact a much more detailed body of data. Information was collected, for example, on intra-religious tradition and denomination. Most RNGOs do not declare a denomination. Valid information can only be provided for some Christian RNGOs. The dominant religious tradition among Christian NGOs is Catholicism, which accounts for 26.7 per cent (n = 90) of all ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs and 40.9 per cent of the Christian contingent within these. Comparison of the different data-sets mentioned could prove indicative in terms of changes in affiliation-dominance and the junctures at which different traditions have been mobilized (see Table 2.2). Here again, however, the variations in data sources and collection methods need to be taken into account. The source and method of the 2000 data-set, for example, is not reported, and the information is therefore unsuitable for comparison. Again, although the data-set for 2009 is based on ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs, it lacks detail on certain religions (Bahá’í, for example, which it either omits or includes in the ‘other’ category). These anomalies aside, the overall picture is a consistent one, and the conclusions that follow here are based on a comparison of the four more clearly documented data-sets (2000, 2003, 2009, and 2010) and our own.8 When our own data (2012) is set alongside that of Berger (2003) and Petersen (2010), it is clear that, despite a steady increase in the number of accredited NGOs, the distribution of religious affiliations within this group has remained relatively stable. The figures across all data-sets show a marked and enduring preponderance of Christian RNGOs, running at about two-thirds of all accredited religious organizations. A similar consistency is observable for the Buddhist

Multi-religious 6% Other 8%

Hindu 3% Buddhist 4% Muslim 13%

Christian 59%

Jewish 7% Figure 2.1 Religious background of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs

32 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart Table 2.2 Religious affiliation of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%) Religious affiliation

2000a

2003b

2009c

2010d

2012

Christian Muslim Jewish Buddhist Hindu Multi-religious/Interfaith Bahá’í Jain Spiritual Other

61.0 15.0 7.0

57.4 12.2 11.0 3.8 0.4 4.9 0.7 0.4 9.1

61.0 14.0 7.0 8.0 3.0

58.4 16.3 6.9 4.4 0.9 3.4

7.0

7.8 1.9

59.6 12.7 6.8 3.8 3.2 5.9 0.3 0.6 4.4 2.7

8.0

9.0

a

(Knox 2002, p. 17). (Berger 2003, p. 24). c (Trigeaud 2017, pp. 82–3). d (Petersen 2010). b

contingent,9 but when it comes to other religious traditions, the picture is more variable. In the case of Jewish RNGOs, the number of those accredited appears to decline between 2003 and 2010/2012. This may have to do with variations in the definition of an organization as religious or ethnic/cultural or with the fact that a number of Jewish RNGOs formed overarching NGOs or networks. Another possible explanation is that most Jewish RNGOs had already been accredited by 2003 and that as the number of RNGOs from other traditions increased after that date, the Jewish share of the total shrank. In the case of Muslim NGOs, there is a similar fluctuation – from 12.2 per cent in 2003 to 16.3 per cent in 2010 and a subsequent fall back to 12.7 per cent in 2012. The percentage of Hindu organizations, by contrast, appears to have ballooned steadily between 2010 and 2012. Here again the religious/cultural distinction may be playing a part. In addition, there are a number of RNGOs – for example, those promoting the practice and values of disciplines such as yoga – which, though not strictly religious, can be classed as spiritual. Comparison of groups under the ‘other’ and ‘multi-religious’ heads is a rather hit-and-miss affair, given that categories here necessarily overlap and ascriptions vary. Nonetheless, taken overall – and pace previous caveats – the Hindu, multi-religious/interfaith, Bahá’í, Jain, spiritual, and ‘other’ categories show a relatively steady share of the total complement of accredited RNGOs over the period in question: 15.5 per cent in 2003, 12.1 per cent in 2010, and 17.1 per cent in 2012. As Table 2.3 reveals, compared to worldwide religious populations, Christian and Jewish NGOs are clearly over-represented at the UN: the percentage of Christian organizations amongst ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs as a whole is almost twice that of Christians in the global population, and in the case of Jewish organizations the factor rises to 35. Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, on the other hand, are markedly under-represented. The main reason for this disparity is undoubtedly

RNGOs at the UN 33 Table 2.3 Religious affiliation amongst ECOSOC-accredited NGOs and worldwide Religious affiliation

% of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (as of 2012)

% of world population (as of 2010)

Christian Muslim Jewish Buddhist Hindu Other

59.6 12.7 6.8 3.8 3.2 8.0

32.0 23.0 0.2 7.0 15.0 7.0

Source: Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2012).

the historical affinity between Judaeo-Christian culture and the UN and NGO traditions. There was marked Christian and Jewish involvement in the formation of the UN (Knox 2002; Berger 2003; Haynes 2014), and the strength of the organization’s Judaeo-Christian roots is such that many non-Western and non-Christian actors have been prompted to challenge its legitimacy. Christian communities also have a long tradition of organizing themselves for public-welfare purposes into what we would now call non-governmental organizations (Kippenberg 2015), and as a result Christian actors are very familiar with secular political structures and able easily to adapt to UN procedures. In addition, Christian traditions are known for their relatively high degree of institutional organization – the Catholic Church, for example, is strongly hierarchical and highly structured, and this influences the way the Catholic laity sees and organizes itself (Marshall 2013; Beittinger-Lee 2017). Enhancing these advantages is the generous funding which many Christian organizations enjoy and which places them among the top-ranking RNGOs in terms of wealth (Berger 2003; Haynes 2014). Preferred RNGO fields of activity According to Petersen (2010), only 13.9 per cent of accredited RNGOs focus exclusively on what he calls ‘religious promotion’ (and what we call ‘religious aims’), with 47.3 per cent working on ‘non-religious’ issues such as culture, health, the social domain, and the environment, and 38.8 per cent working on both. At the same time, says Petersen, most RNGOs cite religious conviction as the main motivation for their engagement as a whole. In the pragmatic approach adopted in the present study, we do not make an a priori distinction between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ activities. Instead, we proceed inductively, identifying RNGO fields of activity (Figure 2.2) from the organizations’ own descriptions of themselves. The result is the most detailed analysis of RNGO fields of activity to have been produced to date. A number of RNGOs claim to be active in more than one field, and this allows for, and explains, multiple references. On the other hand, it sometimes makes differentiation by fields of activity problematic. Furthermore, although certain RNGOs – including modestly sized ones – cite a wide range of fields as falling

34 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart religious/spiritual aims

48

(sustainable) development

26

education

25

disaster relief/humanitarian aid

23

children's rights/youth programmes

22

health

20

human rights

19

peace

19

women's rights

19

environment

15

sexual and reproductive health and rights migration/refugees

13 4

Figure 2.2 Fields of activity of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%)

within their brief, it is unlikely that they are active in all of them. These factors should be borne in mind when considering the data presented here. Religious aims encompass strong engagement by RNGOs (48 per cent) (cf. Berger 2003, p. 32). Although the pursuit of religious aims is clearly a crosscutting activity that can occur in many areas, many ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs explicitly identify it as a field of work in its own right. Our data shows that the four standard fields in which most RNGOs are active are (sustainable) development (26 per cent), education (25 per cent), disaster relief (23 per cent), and children’s/ youth programmes (22 per cent). Engagement in all fields except that relating to ‘migration and refugees’ – which lies at only 4 per cent – varies between 15 and 26 per cent, giving an overall picture of essentially uniform distribution across the different fields. The distribution of religious affiliations within each field of activity varies widely (Table 2.4). There is a clear predominance of Christian NGOs in all fields, with organizations from this tradition representing at least 50 per cent of all RNGOs working in the given field. The causes previously cited for Christian over-representation in the UN as a whole also explain the preponderance here. By looking at the preferred fields of activity of the different religious traditions, we can get a sense of the way in which theology and history shape the relevant organizations’ agendas. For Jewish NGOs, for example, the main field of engagement is human rights. As an American Jewish Committee (AJC) representative commented to us, the history of Judaism, and above all the Holocaust, point up the crucial nature of these rights.10 In the case of Muslim NGOs, development-related issues emerge as an area of particular concern – unsurprisingly, since much of the global Muslim population is to be found in the developing world and will therefore be especially keen to see developmental processes advanced.11 In regard to Buddhist NGOs, meanwhile, their emphasis on peace and the prevention of harm

RNGOs at the UN 35 Table 2.4 ECOSOC-accredited RNGO engagement by religious affiliation and policy field Religious Development Peace affiliationa (sustainable) n Christian Jewish Muslim Buddhist Hindu Multireligious Other Total

%

n

%

Environment Human rights

SRHRb

Religious/ spiritual aims

n

n

n

%

n

%

55 5 13 2 1 6

63 6 15 2 1 7

40 0 4 7 2 7

61 30 0 0 6 3 11 5 3 5 11 5

58 0 6 10 10 10

39 8 6 2 1 5

60 30 12 1 9 3 3 2 2 1 8 5

6 88

7 100

5 65

8 4 100 52

8 100

4 65

6 1 100 43

% 70 2 7 5 2 12

% 87 10 25 7 6 11

53 6 15 4 4 7

2 18 100 164

11 100

a The small number of ECOSOC-accredited humanist NGOs are not included here. Though pursuing what are essentially spiritual, human-rights-oriented aims, they do so, as it were, in the cause of a negative freedom of religion, rendering their status ambiguous. b Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.

to other living creatures points to powerful influences from Buddhist teaching (Oberlies 2000). This stance accounts for their engagement in peace (11 per cent) and environment (9 per cent) – though the actual number of organizations active in both fields is only seven (peace) and five (environment). RNGO status at ECOSOC ECOSOC grants three types of accreditation or consultative status: General, Special, and Roster. The first two, though similar in terms of the rights and duties they confer on NGOs, differ in the operational scope involved. NGOs with General Status are expected to make significant contributions to ECOSOC and other UN bodies across a wide range of fields; NGOs with Special Status operate in a narrower field and have more specific competences. Unlike organizations in General Consultative Status, NGOs in Special Status cannot propose agenda items or speak at meetings. Roster Status, meanwhile, is given to organizations which, while not fulfilling the criteria for the other types of status, are competent to make occasional contributions to relevant UN proceedings – though they may only do so at the request of ECOSOC or other UN organs (ECOSOC Res.1996/31, Martens 2005). Figure 2.3 summarizes our data on the types of status held by RNGOs at ECOSOC. It shows that 77 per cent of all accredited RNGOs – in other words, the great majority – hold Special Consultative Status, implying that they have only limited potential influence. Some RNGOs also participate in UN activities, on the basis of temporary accreditation. Since our database focuses on formally accredited RNGOs, this and any informal engagement with the UN will not show up here.

36 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart

8%

15%

General Consultative Status Special Consultative Status Roster

77%

Figure 2.3 Status of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs (%)

Table 2.5 ECOSOC status of RNGOs by religious affiliation Religious affiliation

Christian Jewish Muslim Buddhist Hindu Other Multi-religious All RNGOs

General Consultative Status

Special Consultative Status

Roster Consultative Status

n

%

n

n

%

12 0 7 1 1 3 3 27

5.9 0 16.3 7.7 9.1 11.1 15.0 8.0

158 20 31 8 8 19 17 261

32 3 5 4 2 5 0 51

15.8 13.0 11.6 30.8 18.2 18.5 0 15.0

% 78.2 87.0 72.1 61.5 72.7 70.4 85.0 77.0

One striking fact to emerge from the correlation of religious tradition and ECOSOC status (see Table 2.5) is the narrow margin of difference between the numbers of Christian and Muslim NGOs with General Consultative Status – an unexpected finding in view of the overall predominance of Christian RNGOs. As of 2012, there were 12 Christian and 7 Muslim RNGOs with this status. The equivalent figures for Special Consultative Status were 158 and 31. Thus, the ECOSOC status that confers the greatest number of rights across the broadest range of fields is more evenly distributed among Christian and Muslim NGOs than the narrower and more specialized kind. The key to this may be organizational structure: largescale, broad-scope RNGOs of the kind granted General Consultative Status are, by their nature, fewer in number – whether Muslim or Christian. Although Muslim NGOs emerged later than their Christian counterparts, there are now many

RNGOs at the UN 37 well-established large-scale groups from this tradition. For these established organizations, obtaining ECOSOC accreditation is relatively easy. For smaller set-ups that are less firmly rooted and have no historical tradition of proximity to UN headquarters, the financial and bureaucratic barriers to accreditation are considerably more daunting. Geographical origins of RNGOs ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which, as mentioned previously, lays down guiding principles for the accreditation of NGOs, states that: ‘The Committee, in considering applications for consultative status, should ensure, to the extent possible, participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly from developing countries, in order to help to achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world’ (ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, 5). However, as previous research has shown (Bush 2017b, p. 46), and as our own study confirms, the gap between aspiration and reality is considerable. Our analysis here is based on the Regional Groups of Member States at the UN. In order to see whether the context of the UN headquarters plays a significant role, we treat the United States as a separate category. Using location of headquarters as an indicator of origin, we identify the overwhelming majority of ECOSOCaccredited RNGOs as being Western-based: over 80 per cent have their offices either in the United States or in WEOG countries (see Figure 2.4). In addition, accounting for over one-third of all accredited RNGOs, US based organizations heavily outnumber organizations from other states of origin. Our data thus indicates that the UN and ECOSOC are falling considerably short of their professed goal of regional balance. 50 43 38

40 30 20 10

10 5 1

3

Eastern European Group

Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)

0 African Group

Asia Pacific Group

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

USA

Figure 2.4 Regional origin of ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by headquarters location (%)

38 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart Table 2.6 lists the regional origins of ECOSOC-accredited NGOs and RNGOs (as of 2007 and 2012 respectively). Unfortunately, the regional attributions as given in the sources do not correspond exactly, so direct comparison is not possible. Even so, the Western (i.e. European and North American) over-representation is clear. One particularly notable feature is the figure of 38 per cent for US RNGOs as against only 29 per cent for US NGOs – a figure which, even if other countries were separated out, could not be equalled in the other categories. The imbalance may be due to the comparatively strong resource base and role of religious (mainly Christian and Jewish) NGOs in US politics. Any consideration of RNGO origin by religious affiliation must take cultural context into account. Table 2.7 indicates two general trends: First, there are RNGO headquarters of all religious traditions in WEOG states as well as in the United States. Second, Christian RNGOs’ headquarters can be found in all regions. While the latter may be explained by the missionary past of Christian traditions which has resulted in an extensive global spread of Christianity, it is more difficult to make sense of the former. Table 2.6 Regional origin of NGOs and RNGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC NGOs (as of 2007a)

RNGOs (as of 2012)

Region

%

Region

%

Europe North America Asia Oceania Africa Latin America+ Caribbean

37 29 16 1 11 6

Western European + Other Group USA Asia-Pacific Group

43 38 11

African Group Latin American + Caribbean Group

5 3

a Figures for NGOs from Global Policy Forum (www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/NGOs_in_ Consultative_Status_with_ECOSOC_by_Region.pdf, accessed 11 Jan. 2018)

Table 2.7 ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by religious affiliation and region Religious affiliation

Africa

AsiaPacific

Eastern Latin Western USA Europe America + European + Caribbean other

n

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

N

%

3.0 0 27.9 38.5 54.5 14.8 5

3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0

7 0 0 0 0 1 1 9

3.5 0 0 0 0 3.7 5.0

107 10 11 4 4 8 3 147

53.0 43.5 25.6 30.8 36.4 29.6 15.0

71 13 11 4 1 14 14 128

35.15 56.5 25.6 30.8 9.1 51.9 70.0

%

Christian 8 4.0 6 Jewish 0 0 0 Muslim 9 20.9 12 Buddhist 0 0 5 Hindu 0 0 6 Other 0 0 4 Multi-religious 1 5 1 Total 18 34

RNGOs at the UN 39 One possible explanation for the Western preponderance in the RNGO presence at the UN lies in the ECOSOC provisions governing NGO accreditation. According to Resolution 1996/31, for an NGO to have a consultative relationship with ECOSOC, it must be recognized by its national government – which in the case of organizations critical of their home regimes may be problematic. Whereas RNGOs from democratically run Western countries – where freedom of speech and assembly are an established part of the system – will have little difficulty securing this approval, for Southern RNGOs, the task is likely to be much harder. More generally, the way in which national governments shape relations between politics and religion will promote or prevent religious civil society engagement, and in this respect too RNGOs from Western – typically democratic – states will have the advantage. This North-versus-South depiction is, of course, simplistic: as a recent study by Poppe and Wolff (2017) has once again demonstrated, clamp-downs on civil society actors by governments/government authorities are not confined to the South. Disparity in the resources available in different regions also contributes to the numerical dominance and superior influence of Northern over Southern NGOs – an aspect of which NGOs themselves are aware (Bush 2017b, pp. 55–6). This disparity has two possible outcomes: Western NGOs may exploit their superior resources to their own advantage, to secure greater power and recognition and get their own agendas implemented, or they may use their influence, resources, and networks to support Southern actors and populations. Dates of RNGO foundation and UN accreditation So far, the literature on RNGOs has not considered the effect which dates of foundation and accreditation may have on the specifics of religious actors’ engagement (neither Berger 2003 nor Petersen 2010 nor Carrette and Miall 2017 discuss this). More information about this may, however, be instructive for discussing potential socializing effects of the UN context on RNGO behaviour. The 1990s are often portrayed as the decade of the NGO (Martens 2005, pp. 2–3). When the UN opened up ECOSOC accreditation to national NGOs in 1996,12 there was a major NGO surge into the transnational sphere. Although this general trend was matched by a rise in RNGO accreditations between 1990 and 1999, half of all RNGOs in our data-set were actually established between 1940 and 1990 (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Comparison of dates of foundation and dates of accreditation indicates that newly established RNGOs are unlikely either to seek or be granted ECOSOC accreditation immediately. The reason for this may be organizational – to cope with the bureaucracy involved in applying for, and maintaining, ECOSOC accreditation, an organization needs to be firmly established and adequately funded. In some cases, however, the reason for the delay may lie with the approving body – ECOSOC’s Committee on Non-governmental Organizations. Martens, for example, states that in the early 2000s, applications for accreditation rose to between 300 and 400 per year, but the NGO Committee could process no more than 100 cases annually, with the result that NGOs had to wait several years to be accredited (Martens 2005).

40 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart 13 10 9

3

5

4

4

10

6

5

4 3

2 1

be

fo re 18 18 00 00 – 18 18 50 49 – 19 18 00 99 – 19 19 10 09 – 19 19 20 19 – 19 19 30 29 – 19 19 40 39 – 19 19 50 49 – 19 19 60 59 – 19 19 70 69 – 19 19 80 79 – 19 19 90 89 – 20 19 00 99 – 20 20 10 09 –2 01 2

0

Figure 2.5 ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by date of foundation (%)

40

24

2 01 –2 10 20

20 00 –2 00 9

9 99 –1

19 60 –1 96 9

90

19 50 –1 95 9

19

1

5

19 80 –1 98 9

2

5

19 70 –1 97 9

3 19 46 –1 94 9

17

Figure 2.6 ECOSOC-accredited RNGOs by date of accreditation (%)

As indicated previously, the rise in RNGO accreditations with ECOSOC (see Figure 2.6) echoed the trend for NGOs in general (Martens 2005, pp. 2–3): during the 1990s they quadrupled compared to the number for the 1980s (n = 18; 1990s: n = 79); between the 1990s and the 2000s, they doubled (n = 134). Allowing for the expected delay between foundation and accreditation, it is clear that from

RNGOs at the UN 41 the 1990s onwards there was a huge surge in applications for consultative status: whereas in previous decades the level of applications/accreditations had run below that of prior foundations, from the 1990s it rose above it (see Figure 2.7 and Table 2.8). On the face of it, these figures confirm the perception of an enhancement in the global profile of religious actors – as reported, for example, by José Casanova (1994, 2008). However, the impact of what Casanova (1994) terms ‘public religions’ has been relativized, because non-religious NGOs also flooded the transnational arena, and the number of RNGOs as a proportion of all ECOSOCaccredited non-governmental organizations has thus remained stable. In the first two decades of the UN’s existence, all organizations accredited with ECOSOC were either Christian or Jewish – for the historical reasons previously alluded to (cf. Knox 2002 and Lehmann 2016). Since 1970, the Judaeo-Christian preponderance in accredited RNGOs as a whole has slowly been shrinking – though more than half are still from Christian traditions (Table 2.8). Accreditations of Muslim RNGOs, for their part, began to rise during the 1990s and 2000s and have continued their upward trend in the present decade, with six organizations accredited between 2010 and 2012 and many more pushing through to the transnational sphere. The promotion of religious pluralism may be one of the factors driving this increase. Another may be the impact of Muslim extremism and a resultant desire on the part of Muslim organizations to engage transnationally in the hope of projecting a more favourable image of Muslims and Islam. The rise in numbers may also reflect a catch-up by Muslim RNGOs on their long-since highly institutionalized Christian counterparts.

160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Figure 2.7 RNGO foundation and ECOSOC-accreditation by decade (in numbers)

Christian Jewish Muslim Buddhist Hindu Other Multi-religious Total

Religious affiliation

32 4 6 4 3 6 3 58

15.8 17.4 14.0 30.8 27.3 22.2 15.0

76 7 18 4 7 12 11 135

37.6 30.4 41.9 30.8 63.6 44.4 55.0

%

n

n

%

2000–09

2010–2012

50 3 13 3 1 5 5 80

n 24.8 13.0 30.2 23.1 9.1 18.5 25.0

%

1990–1999

Table 2.8 Date of RNGO accreditation by religious affiliation

12 0 1 2 0 2 1 18

n 5.9 0 2.3 15.4 0 7.4 5.0

%

1980–1989

12 1 2 0 0 2 0 17

n 5.9 4.4 4.7 0 0 7.4 0

%

1970–1979

0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3

n 0 8.7 2.3 0 0 0 0

%

1960–1969

5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6

n

2.5 4.6 0 0 0 0 0

%

1950–1959

6 4 0 0 0 0 0 10

n

3.0 17.4 0 0 0 0 0

%

1940–1949

9 1 2 0 0 0 0 12

n

4.5 4.4 4.7 0 0 0 0

%

Unspecified

RNGOs at the UN 43

Summary and outlook The aim of this chapter has been to provide a quantitative overview of RNGOs at the UN. The findings we present largely confirm those of previous studies, notably in regard to religious affiliation and cultural background (cf. Berger 2003; Petersen 2010; Carrette and Miall 2017) and to regional origins and years of foundation and accreditation (cf. Martens 2005). Going beyond this, we provide the first detailed analysis of RNGO activity across different fields. As in previous studies, one of the most striking findings of our research is the disproportion in the representation of religious traditions at the UN, with Christian and Jewish RNGOs heavily over-represented relative to the numbers of Christians and Jews worldwide. A similar disproportion is observable in the case of area of origin: RNGOs from Western states outnumber those from any other area. The dominance of Judaeo-Christian and Western RNGOs seems to reflect the numerous historical but also political, social, and economic advantages these RNGOs have in comparison to others. Denominational bias is also observable in the distribution of RNGOs across fields of activity, where theological teaching can be seen to influence area of operation – the focus of Buddhist RNGOs on work for peace being one example. One cross-cutting field of engagement here is the promotion of religious aims: almost 50 per cent of RNGOs pursue goals that have to do either with their religious values (mercy or compassion, for example) or more directly with matters (such as persecution) affecting their own tradition. Given the disproportion in RNGO representation at the UN, this last finding is disquieting. It is, of course, legitimate for RNGOs to work to advance their own interests – just as states and other non-governmental actors at the UN do. However, the disproportionate representation of religious traditions clearly misses UN’s and ECOSOC’s own goal of equal participation. One important step towards greater diversity in the RNGO landscape would be to actively foster the involvement of poorly resourced organizations. In a striking departure from the popular view that we are seeing a resurgence in religion, our findings do not indicate that religious actors have gained in importance over time. Although RNGOs made their way into the transnational sphere in increasing numbers from the start of the 1990s, they did so by the same route offered to all NGOs. This was the decade when the UN systematized and encouraged NGO participation, resulting in an all-round surge in ECOSOC accreditations. Proportionally, RNGO accreditation has remained stable, at slightly less than 10 per cent of all NGOs. The data presented here points up characteristics of RNGOs that may help explain their impact on discourses in the transnational sphere and, as a result, encourage further theoretically and practically useful research in this area. Knowing more about the organizational and financial aspects of RNGOs, for example, will lead to a better understanding of the current regional and denominational biases – and ultimately to a rectification of these, thus helping the UN and ECOSOC live up to their goal of equal participation by actors from all religious traditions

44 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart and all parts of the world. Another obvious gap in research highlighted by our findings concerns the pursuit of religious aims as a predominant field of engagement for the majority of RNGOs. Additional qualitative studies are needed here in order to explore the content of this finding and the ways in which RNGOs seek to realize these aims. Some of the questions raised here are explored in greater detail in the qualitative case studies presented in the remaining chapters of the book. Each of these examines actors and stances in a particular policy field, with particular reference to the goals and strategies pursued by RNGOs. As well as enabling us to compare RNGO activity across a range of areas, they make a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about RNGOs at the UN.

Notes 1 We wish to thank Andreas Löpsinger, Sonya Krasteva, and Olga Perov for their assistance with data collection and analysis. 2 The point about extended cooperation was made by Azza Karam, senior advisor at UNFPA (personal communication, 24 Mar. 2015). 3 The data-set was compiled as part of a research project entitled ‘Religious NGOs in the United Nations: Mediators or Polarizers?’ carried out at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The project started in 2013, and the database is based on the – at the time – latest list (2012, E/2012/INF/6), according to which there were 3,735 ECOSOC-accredited NGOs in September 2012. 4 When using the term ‘Western’, we refer to the United States and the states belonging to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) at the UN. Besides Western European countries, WEOG includes Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, and Turkey. 5 This shows that NGOs identify with religion in different ways – in other words, religion can vary in importance for different NGOs. This has implications in terms of the pervasiveness of NGO religiosity (Beinlich and Braungart 2015). 6 Unofficially, UN actors commonly use the terms ‘faith-based organization’ and ‘faithbased actor’ rather than referring to ‘non-governmental organizations’, which would restrict the compass to accredited NGOs and would also exclude actors that do not see themselves as religious in the narrow sense (Karam 2010b, 2010a). 7 Only Berger and Carrette/Miall clearly identify their data sources and methods of collection. 8 For the sake of transparency and to facilitate further research, the full list of RNGOs on which our data-set is based is given in the Annex to this volume. 9 The apparent anomaly of 8 per cent in the 2009 figures comes about because Trigeaud (2017, p. 83) has a single category for ‘Buddhist, Indian, Asian traditions and NRM’. 10 Personal communication, Dec. 2014. All quotations here are from this source. 11 Recent UNDP figures indicate that none of the (mainly Muslim) Arab countries manages to equal the average Human Development Index (HDI) score of 0.9 for OECD countries: www.arab-hdr.org/data/indicators/2012-54.aspx (accessed 14 Aug. 2017). 12 Prior to this, it had only been open to international NGOs (Martens 2005).

References Beinlich, A.-K. and Braungart, C., 2015. What is distinctive about religious actors in international politics? The religiousness of religious NGOs at the United Nations.

RNGOs at the UN 45 Paper presented at the General Conference of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, GA. Beittinger-Lee, V., 2017. Catholicism at the United Nations in New York. In: J. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 177–94. Berger, J., 2003. Religious nongovernmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14 (1), 15–39. Bush, E., 2017a. The problem of categories: Exploring religion and NGOs through survey research. In: J. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 39–52. Bush, E., 2017b. Representation, accountability and influence at the UN: Results from the survey of religious NGOs. In: J. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 53–72. Carrette, J. and Miall, H., 2013. Religious NGOs and the United Nations in New York and Geneva [online]. Available from: http://erb.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/UNNGO-Report-4.pdf [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Carrette, J. and Miall, H., eds., 2017. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Carrette, J. and Trigeaud, S.-H., 2013. The religion-secular in international politics: The case of ‘religious’ NGOs at the United Nations. In: A. Day, G. Vincett, and C.R. Cotter, eds. Social identities between the sacred and the secular. Farnham: Ashgate, 7–22. Casanova, J., 1994. Public religions in the modern world. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Casanova, J., 2008. Public religions revisited. In: H.D. Vries, ed. Religion: Beyond a concept. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 101–19. Fitzgerald, T., 2008. Discourse on civility and barbarity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fitzgerald, T., 2011. Religion and politics in international relations. London: Continuum. Haynes, J., 2014. Faith-based organizations at the United Nations. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. International Indian Treaty Council, 2017. About IITC/Acerca de CITI [online]. Available from: www.iitc.org/about-iitc/ [Accessed 18 January 2018]. Karam, A., 2010a. The United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA’s) legacy of engaging faith-based organizations as cultural agents of change. CrossCurrents, 60 (3), 432–50. Karam, A., 2010b. Concluding thoughts on religion and the United Nations: Redesigning the culture of development. CrossCurrents, 462–74. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K., 1998. Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kippenberg, H.G., 2015. The social capital of religious communities in the age of globalization. In: P. Pachis and D. Wiebe, eds. Chasing down religion: In the sights of history and the cognitive sciences. Thessanoliki: Equinox Publishing, 215–32. Knox, G., 2002. Religion and public policy at the UN: A Religion Counts report. Washington, DC: Religion Counts. Lehmann, K., 2016. Religious NGOs in international relations: The construction of ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’. Milton Park: Routledge. Marshall, K., 2013. Global institutions of religion: Ancient movers, modern shakers. Milton Park: Routledge. Martens, K., 2005. NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, professionalization and adaptation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

46 Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart Native Women’s Association of Canada, 2017. Welcome to NWAC [online]. Available from: www.nwac.ca/ [Accessed 18 January 2018]. Oberlies, T., 2000. Buddhismus. In: C. Auffarth, J. Bernard, and H. Mohr, eds. Metzler Lexikon Religion: Gegenwart, Alltag, Medien. Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 186–92. Petersen, M.J., 2010. International religious NGOs at the United Nations: A study of a group of religious organizations. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance [online]. Available from: http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/847 [Accessed 12 May 2014]. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2012. The global religious landscape [online]. Available from: www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/ [Accessed 18 July 2017]. Poppe, A. and Wolff, J., 2017. Schlechtes Vorbild Deutschland: Der Fall Attac im Licht globaler Einschränkungen zivilgesellschaftlicher Handlungsspielräume. PRIF Spotlight 2/2017. Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Trigeaud, S.-H., 2017. Religious NGOs, UN participation and fieldwork methodology. In: J. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Wolf, K.D., 2016. Die UNO: Geschichte, Aufgaben, Perspektiven. München: C.H. Beck.

3

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC A specific contribution to global climate politics? Katharina Glaab, Doris Fuchs, and Johannes Friederich

Introduction Saving the Earth and its peoples from dangerous climate change is an economic, social and environmental issue – and a moral and ethical one too that goes to the core of many if not all of the world’s great faiths . . . It is time for faith groups and religious institutions to find their voice and set their moral compass on one of the great humanitarian issues of our time (Figueres 2014)

Recent developments in climate politics indicate that the appeal issued by Christiana Figueres, then executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has to some extent been heeded. The most prominent illustration of this has been the role of Pope Francis and his publication of the encyclical Laudato Si’ (Pope Francis 2015) on the eve of the key climate change conference in Paris in 2015. The encyclical focuses on the issue of sustainable development and presents climate change as a moral and ethical challenge. Besides this, it is rumoured that a phone call put in by Pope Francis to the president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, during the Paris conference had a major influence. Until the very last minute, Nicaragua remained fundamentally opposed to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, arguing that it would lead to a three-degree rise in temperature. This objection could have stymied the whole Agreement, and the story is that Ortega, elected to office by a predominantly Catholic population, changed his position after a telephone conversation with the Pope, instructing his lead negotiator to drop the objection to adoption (Seidler 2015). Though anecdotal, this narrative is indicative of the important role which religious actors can play in global climate change politics and of their potential influence on UNFCCC debates. Climate change is one of the most important challenges of our time and, as such, is a key area of interest for the United Nations. Apart from the necessity for changes in individual behaviour, there is an urgent need for global institutional arrangements that can provide an effective response to developments. A number of different actors are currently attempting to get such arrangements put in place, and one of these is the UNFCCC. The meetings and negotiations conducted by this

48

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

global body are attended not only by states and corporate players but by large numbers of civil society organizations. By feeding in knowledge and expertise, and by raising awareness and mobilizing the public, such organizations push states to raise the bar on climate and, as a result, have become an indispensable part of global policy-making. Over the past twenty years, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has grown and so has the number of them accredited to the UNFCCC – and thus able to take part in the latter’s meetings (Lövbrand et al. 2017). The important role played by civil society actors in global climate change negotiations has been documented in the literature (see, for example, Corell and Betsill 2001; Brunnengräber 2011; Bulkeley et al. 2014; UNFCCC 2017). In most cases, such actors are seen as having a positive influence: NGOs are viewed as championing the interests of economically and socially disadvantaged groups and are credited with the potential to enhance the democratic legitimacy and transparency of climate change policies (Altvater et al. 1997; Beisheim 2004). In their accounts, scholars have, however, focused on the contributions made to UNFCCC policy-making by actors such as indigenous peoples (Wallbott 2014), human-rights groups (Nicholson and Chong 2011), and the climate justice movement (Hadden 2015). So far, they have given little consideration to the part played by religious NGOs (RNGOs). Again, although there are extensive bodies of literature in the fields of theology and of environmental ethics that deal specifically with the links between religion and climate change (Tucker 2003; Gottlieb 2006; Veldman et al. 2012), these too neglect the activities of religious actors within the UNFCCC. Yet alongside an increase in the participation of civil society actors as a whole in UN climate change conferences, there has been increasingly visible activity by RNGOs in particular. The papal encyclical not only attracted widespread attention amongst relevant groups, both religious and secular; it also fuelled a public debate on the ethical dimensions of anthropogenic climate change and triggered discussion in the specific forum of the climate change conferences. Organizations from virtually all faiths have secured accreditation with the UNFCCC and take part in its conferences and meetings. In this connection, in 2015 Muslim leaders issued an Islamic declaration on climate change, and in the run-up to the Paris conference, a number of other actors published an interfaith statement on the theme. Given that about 80 per cent of the world’s population adhere to a religion, there is huge potential for RNGOs to act as a driver not only of sustainable behaviour at the individual level but also of global environmental governance (Gardner 2003). That said, one cannot assume that religious actors will automatically pursue (wider) environmental objectives (Taylor 2015). Evangelical Christians, for example, are recognized as one of the most climate-sceptical groups in the United States (Carr et al. 2012). Indeed, as well as being cited as evidence of the duty to care for God’s creation, scripture has been used for centuries by Christians to justify human domination and exploitation of the environment (White 1967). Many observers have actually accused Christianity of being complicit in the destruction of the environment (Glaab 2014). For all these reasons, it makes sense to try to achieve a better understanding of the positions and behaviour of religious actors

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 49 in the context of the UNFCCC. With this in mind, the present chapter explores the advocacy work and strategies of RNGOs inside that organization. The chapter continues with a short introduction to the history of UN climate change negotiations and the involvement of RNGOs in these. This is followed by an analysis of the substantive positions, use of language, and strategies of RNGOs and a consideration of how these compare with those of other NGOs. The concluding section discusses possible reasons for the similarities and differences between religious and secular NGOs in the context of the UNFCCC. The analysis presented here is based on 25 interviews with a variety of civil society actors from religious and non-religious backgrounds and on participant observation at the Conferences of Parties (COPs) and a number of intersessional meetings of the UNFCCC held in Bonn between 2013 and 2016.1

A historical outline of UN climate change conferences and RNGO involvement in them The international community has been discussing environmental challenges since the 1970s and during this period has set up a series of programmes designed to facilitate international response in this area. One such was the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which, since its inception in 1972, has worked to promote the development of environmental policy at international level. To begin with, UNEP and other relevant programmes focused on securing multilateral agreements relating specifically to the environment, but the establishment of the Brundtland Commission in 1983 saw the concept of ‘sustainable development’2 and the notion that environment and development are inextricably linked make their way onto the international agenda. At the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 – the largest global environmental gathering of state and non-state actors to have taken place till then – governments agreed to set up the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This was intended as a political space through which to work for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the prevention of further global warming. One hundred and ninety-three states have signed up to the UNFCCC since its foundation. The Convention’s key decision-making body is the ‘Conference of Parties’ (COP). This has met annually since 1995 to try to negotiate a binding treaty that will reduce the threat of climate change. An initial step towards this objective was the Kyoto Protocol, which placed obligations on states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Brühl and Rosert 2014, pp. 33–6, 344–7). Once the 2020 expiry of the Protocol began to loom on the horizon, however, the need for a new agreement began to make itself urgently felt, and in 2015 states signed up to the so-called ‘Paris Agreement’, subsequently ratified by sufficient member-states to bring it into force in 2020. Civil society was involved in UN debates about the environment from the outset, and since the first major international conference on the topic – in Stockholm in 1972 – NGO participation, encouraged by the UN, has grown rapidly. At the Rio Conference in 1992, more than 1,400 civil society organizations, all lobbying for their different causes, were registered as observers. Compared to this, participation

50

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

in UNFCCC COPs was relatively small: only 200 or so NGOs were registered at the first such event, in 1995. Since then, however, numbers have steadily increased (Cabré 2011). Thanks to the input of scientists and the media, public awareness of climate change has grown, and COP-22, held in Marrakesh in 2016, saw over 2,000 NGOs registered. Some of these organizations share particular interests, and they have come together in what are known as ‘Constituencies’ – a status which, for example, allows them to speak on behalf of the relevant groups in the plenary. There are currently nine such Constituencies in the UNFCCC, representing groups as diverse as women, youth, indigenous peoples, trade unions, and business (Hadden 2015, pp. 17–21; UNFCCC 2017).3 Faith groups take part in UNFCCC activities simply as part of wider civil society and do not have a Constituency of their own. NGOs use their role as observers not only to shape agendas and influence negotiations – through direct lobbying, through the provision of expert advice, and by exercising a ‘watchdog’ role on behalf of the public – but also to network and exchange information (Schroeder and Lovell 2012). By organizing themselves into Constituencies, they pool resources and knowledge and are thus able to exploit to the full their right to give oral and written statements in plenaries. Most of the literature on civil society actors credits them with exerting a positive influence on negotiations and resultant outcomes. Scholars point out, for example, that NGOs enhance the legitimacy of international climate-change governance by introducing the interests of marginalized social groups into the process (Nasiritousi et al. 2015). Other benefits of the NGO presence, they argue, are that it helps ensure the transparency of negotiations through monitoring and that it leads to enhanced outcomes thanks to expert input from the organizations concerned (Brand 2000, pp. 171–3; Beisheim 2004). Recently, however, more critical observers have pointed to power asymmetries between NGOs – in particular a North–South divide – and have cautioned against assuming that the objectives pursued by civil society actors will be public and broad-based in nature rather than private and particularist (Frantz and Fuchs 2014; Brühl and Gereke 2015, p. 679). Whereas NGO involvement in global environmental governance has been the object of extensive study, relevant activity specifically by RNGOs has received much less attention from the scholarly community. This is despite the fact that religious actors have the same opportunity to engage here as other civil society actors (Baumgart-Ochse 2014) – and have availed themselves of it, taking part in numerous debates on the environment. Participation by religious actors in the 1992 Rio Conference, for example, was significant, and their involvement in international environmental organizations continues to grow (Glaab 2014, pp. 240–1). RNGOs have in fact been active at the UNFCCC since the latter’s foundation. Actually quantifying their numbers here is difficult because the descriptions they give of themselves, and the mission statements they put out, do not always clearly identify them as religious. In addition, talking solely in terms of numbers is not indicative, since some of the organizations listed are made up of many different groups. By way of example: the World Council of Churches (WCC) states that it represents over 500 million people belonging to almost 350 member-churches in over 100 countries (WCC 2017). A more useful indicator may be the number of

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 51 organizations involved in the Interfaith Liaison Committee – an informal network of religious organizations registered with the UNFCCC. Although the Committee lists over fifty members, not all of these describe themselves as religious or spiritual.4 According to our own calculations, a number of around thirty, including both small-scale organizations and large conglomerates, is nearer the mark. This is made up mostly of faith-based development organizations and church associations. Although not a non-state actor and therefore not part of the RNGO grouping, the Holy See does send representatives to take part in the meetings of the faith groups.5 As pointed out previously, most of the RNGOs involved with the UNFCCC are Christian and come from the Global North; however, the UNFCCC process is seeing a steady rise in the number of participants from non-Christian backgrounds and the Global South (Glaab and Fuchs 2015, p. 102). In the runup to COP-21 in Paris, for example, a number of different Islamic groups came together to organize a conference and issue an ‘Islamic Declaration on Global Climate Change’ (International Islamic Climate Change Symposium 2015). The relative dominance of Christian groups may be explained both by the potential lack of funds for attendance for Islamic countries from the South and by the traditionally higher degree of institutional organization of Christian groups in the political arena. Despite the differences in organizational form and religious representation, RNGOs of all denominations have recently begun to collaborate more closely on global climate change governance. Not having an official Constituency of their own, and thus not being able to present statements and position papers, the groups in question have come together in the previously mentioned Interfaith Liaison Committee. This was formed at COP-19 in Warsaw, following a request by the UNFCCC secretariat. Within this network of faith-based organizations, groups work both to strengthen their collective advocacy as religious entities and to improve communication between themselves and with the UNFCCC. Many religious organizations are also active in other civil society networks, such as the Climate Action Network (CAN), and work with groups concerned with human rights, the environment, young people, and indigenous communities. In most cases, this leads to more effective and efficient organization and greater visibility (Glaab 2017).

The role of RNGOs at the climate change conferences Discursive contention around the notion of sustainable development is well documented in the literature (see, for example, Lifin 1995, Dryzek 2005). There have been numerous studies illustrating the varied construal and terminological use of ‘sustainable development’ by state and non-state actors across different policy fields (Fuchs and Lorek 2005; Feist and Fuchs 2013; Graf 2013). Against this background, it makes sense both to examine the way in which civil society in general, and RNGOs in particular, frame the challenges which climate change poses in terms of sustainability and to consider what bearing these framings have on strategy and coalition formation.

52

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

Civil society coalitions and normative conflicts at the UNFCCC In addition to coming together into Constituencies, most NGOs at UN climate change conferences work in coalitions and networks with other civil society actors, with a view to bundling resources and coordinating action. The way these networks have developed over time reflects the areas of particular contention at the UNFCCC and indicates the kind of civil society environment in which RNGOs are operating. One of the oldest and largest of these bodies is the previously mentioned Climate Action Network, which was established in 1989 by an initial complement of sixty-three organizations and now has over one thousand members. The Network’s early member-groups tended to be more academic than activist, and as a result CAN tended to favour technical solutions and technical language. It sought to establish its standing and legitimacy chiefly through the scientific and technical expertise it fed into the process. As its membership became larger and more diverse, however, and as the issue of fairness came increasingly under discussion, differences of opinion between member NGOs over the approaches to be adopted became increasingly evident. As a result, at COP-13 in Bali in 2007, a group of civil society organizations unhappy at the way CAN was operating quit the network and formed a new coalition called Climate Justice Now (CJN). This body wanted to focus more on developing countries, which, it argued, were least responsible for emissions but suffered most from them. CJN also used less technical language and engaged in a more general critique of the political system in an attempt to reach a wider audience (Hadden 2015, pp. 30–2). Despite all this, CJN’s focus on justice was not really taken up in the UN climate change conferences, and some of its members therefore set up another organization, Climate Justice Action (CJA), with a view to influencing global climate governance ‘from the outside’ rather than via the UNFCCC process. This new network includes many organizations from the global justice movement who pursue a more direct, radical, and combative line, questioning the neoliberal logic which it perceives as being dominant at the UNFCCC. In contrast to CAN and CJN, CJA organizes many events and protests not tied to climate change summits. The upshot of all this is that civil society at the UNFCCC appears today to be divided into three networks: one that concentrates on technical, market-based strategies and two others attempting chiefly, through differing strategies, to advance the cause of global justice (Unmüßig 2011, pp. 54–5; Hadden 2015, pp. 22–35). This line of conflict, however, is not the only one dividing NGOs at the UNFCCC. The longest-standing and probably most extensive division within civil society in this area is the difference of views over North–South burden sharing. Some groups – often those closer to the global justice movement – criticize the Northern dominance, in both staffing and material resources, at the UNFCCC, believing that this results in a disproportionate focus on those issues that the countries in question deem important. Justice activists demand, as a matter of fairness, that economically wealthy countries assume greater responsibility on climate change on the basis that they are the primary producers of CO2 emissions and thus chiefly to blame for the effects of these. Other groups, whilst acknowledging the historical responsibility of

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 53 industrialized countries, demand that countries in the Global South – particularly emerging economies such as China, Brazil, and India – also do their bit to reduce emissions and achieve overall global-warming goals (Unmüßig 2011, pp. 51–2; Hadden 2015, pp. 96–7. A related point of contention is the type of tool that should be used to tackle climate change. One group of organizations, mostly members of CAN, seek reform of existing economic arrangements to produce a ‘green economy’ and prefer market-based solutions such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the REDD measures (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation). The groups belonging to CJN and CJA, by contrast, believe that more radical, systemic change is needed that goes beyond the economic and technical solutions negotiated within the UN system and call for a systemic change involving fundamental societal and politico-economic reforms rather than simple technical solutions. In their view, for example, carbon trading and similar market-based approaches are insufficient (Unmüßig 2011, pp. 52–4; Hadden 2015, pp. 95–6). To summarize: civil society representation at the UNFCCC is broad, working across UN Constituencies, but it is not without its conflicts. The divisions run along both normative and strategic lines. Despite these conflicts, it remains the case that NGOs operate from a common base and pursue cooperative strategies: they all argue for a binding treaty and global de-carbonization as a means of achieving the 1.5- or 2-degree target and agree on the need for financial and technological transfers from Global North to Global South. With these objectives in mind, they seek to influence state delegates and apply pressure to bring about the speedy and satisfactory implementation of binding treaties (Unmüßig 2011, p. 51).6 Normative positioning of RNGOs Within the contested normative field of climate change, religious actors may be found occupying positions between other players, but one feature that distinguishes them is their emphasis on ethical aspects. Examination of submissions and statements by RNGOs reveals a particular linguistic style: in contrast to the more technical, scientific parlance of most secular NGOs, the language of religious actors tends markedly towards the moral and ethical. Though not eschewing discussion of technical measures and tangibles, RNGOs will also readily invoke the role of values and principles in saving the planet and will stress the non-material dimension of a ‘good life’ (Glaab and Fuchs 2018). The approach of most RNGOs thus goes beyond the ‘triple bottom line’ of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social); it is more holistic, incorporating moral, ethical, and spiritual dimensions. Human–environmental relationships are a central theme of RNGO statements at UN climate change conferences, as are the effects of climate change on the most vulnerable (Glaab 2017). Thanks to their particular focus on human development, RNGOs are well positioned to point out the moral limits of the current economic system. When it comes to ‘green economies’, however, differences of stance are observable

54

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

among religious actors. Some RNGOs simply criticize the concept as too narrowly focused on economic prosperity, whereas others challenge the growth paradigm itself, advocating reductions in individual consumption and greater care in the use of resources and calling for the focus to be shifted from economic issues to people.7 The measures which different RNGOs propose as a means of achieving their goals also differ. Some call for economic practices to be overhauled so that they are oriented to human needs rather than economic growth – thus promoting a radical shift away from present economic norms. Others work with existing instruments and seek to change these to varying degrees – focusing, for example, on fairness in the global trading system or on the question of taxation. In terms of RNGO positions as a whole here, though some clearly fall within the parameters of the present global economic order, most are more radical than those articulated in CAN. Similarities are particularly marked in the area of justice. Different permutations of the concept feature prominently in RNGO statements on climate change. Calls are made for both intra-societal and intergenerational fairness, these being linked into RNGO concern with human development. On the RNGO view, since others are our equals, and thus have the same rights and entitlement to dignity, justice must also be shown to the most vulnerable and to the generations that will come after us: ‘We urge the rich to support the poor and the vulnerable significantly and everywhere, especially in the Least Developed Countries, Small Island States and Sub-Saharan Africa’ (Interfaith Summit of Climate Change 2014). This stance is in marked contrast to most of the arguments put forward by delegations and secular NGOs, who view justice as a matter relating largely to states and inter-state parity. With justice, as with the green economy, however, consensus is not quite complete: where Christians, Jews, and Muslims talk chiefly of justice, Buddhists, Hindus, and others not at home with the Abrahamic concept often opt for the term ‘harmony’. This suggests that the prominence of the former notion in RNGO representation at UN climate change conferences may, again, be down to the dominance of Christian groups (Glaab 2017, pp. 1116). The particular RNGO approach – focusing less on technicalities and more on intangibles, including, most notably, justice – is something which religious actors themselves regularly point out in conversation. The faith-based and in particular [the] Christian approach [contributes] specific aspects which I believe are helpful . . . I would like to mention two in particular. First of all, we look at the world and the environment not in a purely utilitarian sense. [Thus] the environment is not only [the] source of all riches . . . we are [also] responsible [for protecting] it – which gives a little bit of a different accent than those who take care of the environment from a non-religious perspective. Another aspect is the issue of justice . . . [The] geographical component includes the justice element and the responsibility of Western industrialized countries for the global impacts of climate change . . . justice is a key word we try to underline in this respect.8

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 55 The particular emphasis on climate justice is well illustrated by the case of the World Council of Churches and its Climate Change Programme. An umbrella organization with around 350 members, mainly from the Global South (WCC 2017), the WCC has been involved in global climate politics since becoming formally associated with the UN – and was engaging with sustainable development issues even before that. As far back as the 1970s, it was organizing sustainabilityrelated events and promoting the views propounded in the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report. In 2006, despite financial constraints, it spent substantial sums strengthening its engagement on environmental issues, shifting resources from other programmes in response to its members’ increased preoccupation with climate justice (WCC 2005).9 Because of its history and size, the WCC plays a prominent and influential role in climate politics at the UNFCCC. The WCC’s normative positions on climate change have not varied much over the years. In general, the organization lays stress on the fact that such change is not purely a scientific issue but has an ethical dimension as well. In addition to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and ambitious binding agreements, it therefore calls for changes in lifestyle and for increased regard for climate justice (WCC 2005).10 It points to the high-consumption lifestyles of the rich countries as the cause of climate change and to the poor countries of the Global South as the chief victims of it. It also criticizes the imbalance of power between these two groups of states, which it claims has blunted the climate ambitions of perpetrator countries, and underlines its own strong ties to those most vulnerable to, and most affected by, climate change (WCC 2005).11 In early climate negotiations, the notion of adaptation (measures designed to cope with actual climate change) did not figure prominently, and the WCC, like most other NGOs, focused on mitigation (measures designed to forestall climate change). It saw adaptation as a form of surrender, implying as it did that mitigation was not going to work – or indeed would be dropped altogether (WCC 2005, pp. 26–7). In 2001, it changed its position and began to stress the need for adaptation as part of overall ambitions for mitigation. It justified this broadened compass by citing its close connections with its communities and constituencies on the ground in the Global South, for whom adaptation programmes were vital. Another enduring target of WCC criticism since its espousal of the Club of Rome report has been the prevailing liberal economic model. The focus on growth and consumption, it believes, must be reduced. Strategic positioning of RNGOs RNGOs at the UNFCCC operate within a broader civil society field, sometimes pursuing the same strategies as secular NGOs but sometimes not. Like many other civil society actors, they engage in lobbying, networking, media work, and campaigning, and they bring knowledge and expertise to the table. Some RNGOs – particularly faith-based development organizations with a long record of action at UNFCCC – regularly work with other civil society bodies to produce reports and policy papers through which technical expertise is channelled into negotiations. In such instances, RNGO language does not differ significantly

56

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

from that used by other NGOs, with religious actors readily adapting to the scientific and technical parlance typical of UNFCCC conferences: ‘We talk their language. We speak the algorithm.’12 On the other hand, RNGOs will often also use religious arguments based on the notions of empathy and (particularly in the Abrahamic traditions) the stewardship of God’s creation. As caretakers of the things of God, commented a representative of the Holy See to us, we are ‘called [upon] to use wisely and distribute justly the goods of God’s earth’.13 Such religious references are particularly common in interactions with negotiators from countries with strongly religious backgrounds.14 Many RNGO statements, however, draw on ethical and moral arguments that do not involve reference to God or other transcendent values. Another aspect in which RNGOs differ from other civil society organizations – according both to their own statements and to our observations – is their inclination towards moderate and mediatory approaches. Many of them actively seek to improve communication and trust between delegates from different states and tend to confine their activity to the UNFCCC setting: ‘[W]e always talk about trust-building . . . within, between and among the parties that are negotiating here at the UNFCCC.’15 At the same time, because they are in close contact with their respective communities in different countries, and in many cases therefore have direct experience of the impact of climate change, they frequently see themselves as mediators between the international and the local. Connection to their constituencies is a key factor for them, and they endeavour to bring local experience (of the impacts of climate change) into the UNFCCC process. The mediatory approach pursued by RNGOs is again well illustrated by the case of the WCC. Recognizing the need for coordinated action, it works to build trust between all actors and cooperates with other civil society players as a member of CAN. It manages to combine this role as mediator with inputs of an ethical, spiritual, and justice-related nature, which it explicitly acknowledges as its specific contribution to the debate.16 When it comes to working with other faith groups, the WCC has been active in this area since the early 1990s. Because its membership is made up chiefly of Protestant and Orthodox churches, it has tended to seek collaboration with representatives of other Christian traditions, notably Roman Catholics. However, it also began, quite early on, to promote cooperation with other faith communities – playing a major role, for example, in organizing interfaith dialogues and other events with actors from the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim traditions.17 The reasons for the WCC’s cooperative approach may lie in its experience of having to strike a balance between its many different members across the world. Coordination has always been a key element in its work, and this may have influenced its global strategy on climate change. Its organizational structure may also have been a factor in its early involvement in this area: unlike many other faith groups, it has global coverage, an international focus, and experience of working with the UN. Against this background, that it should engage with the UNFCCC is almost a foregone conclusion (see Braungart in this volume). Indeed, our interviews suggest that many RNGOs find it normal that international institutions such

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 57 as the UNFCCC should play a major role in environmental policy-making. As a consequence, they have confidence in their ability to exert influence from inside rather than outside this setting – through trust-building among delegates, for example, or through lobbying: ‘We are not as radical’, comments one ACT Alliance representative, ‘we are a little bit boring’.18 This is in contrast to the approach of CJA, which, as we have seen, reacted to what it regarded as the inadequate achievements of UN climate change conferences by seeking new, more combative modes of action, outside summit confines, to help it reach its goals. This means that, whereas RNGOs and CJA are quite similar in their normative stances, including criticism of market-based approaches, the forms of action they espouse as a means of influencing climate change negotiations are markedly different. One often-cited incident illustrative of the difference in strategic approach between RNGOs and many of their secular counterparts (mostly members of CJN and CJA, but also some belonging to CAN) is the walk-out at COP-19 in Warsaw in 2013. About 800 civil society attendees quit the summit in protest at what they viewed as the Conference’s low aspirations, claiming that most of the industrialized countries were making less rather than more effort and that Poland, the host of the conference, had been got at by lobbyists from the coal industry (Vidal and Harvey 2013). In contrast to this much-reported gesture, the strategy opted for by most RNGOs was the non-confrontational one of sticking with the summit: ‘[T]he faith communities decided that they would not walk out but try to engage,’ comments a representative of Norwegian Church Aid. ‘Fortunately . . . the Secretary General of the UNFCCC took cognizance of that fact. She sent a chief of party to come and meet the faith community.’19 One reason for RNGOs’ preference for mediation over confrontation may lie in their religious beliefs – at least, apparently, in the case of Christian organizations. To quote Norwegian Church Aid again: ‘The faith community to some extent – from the Christian perspective – believes that we are the salt of the earth. You can’t salt the food . . . if you keep the salt out of the food.’20 The mediatory approach, in its turn, may be the reason why, despite differences in language and normative focus, most RNGOs belong to CAN – a body that also pursues moderate strategies. RNGOs are keen to highlight the alignment between their own specific contributions to the UNFCCC and those of other NGOs. They see other civil society actors as allies with complementary expertise and priorities: ‘[W]e find the work that the faith organizations and our resource partners – who are civil society organizations – are doing very complementary. It’s like a two-pronged approach – you bring the faith voice, but you also bring the scientific voice. In bringing the two, we [hope] we are going to capture more people than you would if you just dealt in the spirituality of the dominion that God has given us.’21 To RNGOs, any disagreement here has to do with the way principles are interpreted, prioritized, and resolved and not with the principles themselves.22 This is a view apparently shared by secular NGOs, and observation of interaction between the two groups suggests that they both see themselves as part of an alliance working towards the same goals.23 The complementary nature of their differences is something that the secular actors also

58

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

highlight: ‘[I]n my opinion it’s a really helpful situation . . . to have differences in opinions and strategies and it goes quite well together, especially in this international focus.’24 Currently, then, the overall strategy of many RNGOs is to bundle resources with civil society networks but at the same time maintain their profile as a distinct group with specific strengths.25 In this respect, it makes no difference whether the organizations in question belong to CAN, CJN, or CJA. What matters is that they play their part, in tandem with other NGOs, in promoting agreement and action on a binding and ambitious treaty.

Understanding RNGO practice in UN climate change negotiations What are the reasons for the similarities and differences between RNGOs and their secular counterparts? In what follows, we discuss which particular RNGO characteristics, such as organizational structure, resourcing, and normative core, together with the constraints imposed by the UN environment, may play in this regard. One of the important ways in which RNGOs differ from secular organizations is in having a more direct relationship with their constituencies. Many religious NGOs, particularly those from Christian traditions, have ties to actual churches and their members. By contrast, many secular groups, such as environmental and development NGOs, human-rights organizations, and women’s organizations, seek to represent a particular section of society but are much less able to demonstrate any practical link to it or communicate directly with it. The fact that religious actors have this extensive constituency, and are able to communicate directly with it, may also enhance RNGO legitimacy at the UNFCCC in the eyes of other actors.26 A more important factor in determining the positioning and behaviour of RNGOs is their composition. Whereas many secular NGOs active at the UNFCCC have predominantly Northern memberships, a number of their religious equivalents have a majority of members from the South. The ACT Alliance, for example, has 144 church and church-based members worldwide, and around 75 per cent of these come from countries in the Global South. Of course, Northern members continue, by and large, to enjoy better resourcing, financially and in terms of knowledge, and the real distribution of influence between North and South within organizations is therefore likely to differ from the numerical distribution of their constituencies.27 Nevertheless, our interviews show that an increased sense of responsibility vis-à-vis members in the Global South is a hallmark of the work of many RNGOs. This leads, for instance, to their funding Southern participation in delegations via the ACT Alliance. More than this, however, it helps determine the substantive focus of RNGO work – directing it, for example, onto those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change: ‘We feel . . . we have the responsibility [b]ecause our constituency is [already] suffering the consequences of climate change.’28

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 59 The difference in normative core, specifically the faith factor, is undoubtedly also a contributing cause of divergences between religious and secular positioning and behaviour. Unsurprisingly, RNGO statements contain more religious references than those of their secular counterparts. But many religious actors accept the secular and heterogeneous character of the UNFCCC and adapt their language to it, and this helps to limit the potential for disagreement with secular NGOs. ‘Do we have to define it [the problem] according to our particular religion? No. But we are motivated and encouraged to be present because of this. But in a multilateral environment . . . you have so many cultures, so many approaches to understanding, what is beyond the spiritual way. And that’s to be respected.’29 A good number of RNGOs choose not to use religious language – such as talk about the stewardship of Creation – in UN negotiations. Others vary their idiom depending on the topic and interlocutor. When delegates from a strongly religious country are being lobbied, for example, it is considered strategically helpful to use religious parlance: ‘When we talk with Sweden, there’s no use [bringing in] faith language . . . When we talk with Peru, it’s very good [to have it]. When you talk with Poland, it’s also very good [to have it].’30 Faith may also have an impact in other areas. Might it, for example, influence the attitudes and practice of RNGO representatives at the UNFCCC, helping them master frustrations and increasing their resolve to persevere and go down the mediating route – in contrast to others who are ‘totally burnt out’ and ‘really lose hope’?31 Or is it that RNGOs, being in many cases relatively new to this institutional environment, have not yet become disillusioned with it? Secular NGOs with a longer history in the climate change process, particularly those under the CJA umbrella, have often come to perceive UN structures as closed and no longer see many opportunities for influencing outcomes within them. It could be that RNGOs go for the mediatory approach, and opt to work from inside the UN, because they have less experience of climate change conferences and their frustrations (Glaab 2017, p. 1120). The duration of individual organizations’ involvement in UN climate change conferences may also help to explain some inter-RNGO differences. As one might expect, religious NGOs that have substantial experience in the UNFCCC appear to have better developed connections to other civil society organizations. In addition, they are more familiar with technical language and approaches and are able to make technical inputs. RNGOs in the development field, for example, tend to have more extensive experience of the UN environment and are thus able to take a more technical view.32 That said, RNGO advocacy work is always dependent to some extent on the specific representatives involved and on how they frame and shape the work on climate change within the organization itself and within the UN. The financial and staffing resources of RNGOs are, of course, another factor in determining their ability to access information and provide expertise. In making these references to the potential role of faith in the climate change arena we are not forgetting the ambivalent relationship between religion and the

60

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

environment mentioned at the outset. However, although ambivalences persist,33 recent years have seen RNGOs across all religions place a more marked emphasis on sustainable development and the ‘stewardship of Creation’.34 By way of example: the encyclical issued by Pope Francis was widely welcomed by religious NGOs – and by their secular counterparts – as a positive contribution to the debate on climate change and as an additional source of momentum for increasing engagement in fostering sustainable development. A final determinant of RNGO practice in climate change negotiations is the limitation of options due to formal UN constraints. Religious actors at UN climate change conferences rely on collaboration with other NGOs in particular because they do not have Constituency status at the UNFCCC (though interfaith meetings show that a number of RNGOs aspire to this). This procedural circumstance forms the foundation of RNGOs’ distinctive yet collaborative input on climate change.

Notes 1 Most of our interview partners were from Christian organizations. Although this reflects a general dominance of Western and Christian bodies at the UN (see Berger 2003), COPs held in countries and regions that are not predominantly Christian are attended by greater numbers of non-Christian organizations. COP-18 in Doha, for example, had a strong contingent of Muslim civil society organizations. Unfortunately, during the time our research was carried out, the relevant conferences took place in predominantly Christian countries (Poland, Peru, and France). As a result, there was not much opportunity to talk to non-Christian RNGOs, and this has to be borne in mind when it comes to interpreting our conclusions. 2 The Commission defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 3 The full nine Constituencies are business and industry NGOs, environmental NGOs, indigenous peoples organizations, local government and municipal authorities, research and independent NGOs, trade union NGOs, women and gender constituency, youth NGOs, and farmers and agricultural NGOs (UNFCCC 2017). 4 According to a Committee representative (personal communication, Oct. 2016). 5 Representing as it does the Vatican City State, the Holy See is an anomaly at the UN. With its special status as an observer state, it has more rights than strictly non-state actors. It does not have voting rights but does enjoy more extensive rights to take part in, and speak at, plenaries and delegate meetings. Despite these differences, however, because of its important role and visibility in the UNFCCC process, its obviously religious character, and its cooperation with certain RNGOs at the UNFCCC, we include it in the present analysis. 6 Representative of BUND, personal communication, Dec. 2016. 7 Representative of the Quakers, personal communication, Oct. 2014. 8 Representative of the Conference of European Churches, personal communication, June 2014. 9 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. 10 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. 11 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. 12 Representative of the Lutheran World Federation, personal communication, June 2014. 13 Representative of the Holy See, personal communication, June 2014.

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 61 14 Representative of Christian Aid Malawi, personal communication, June 2014. 15 Representative of the ACT (Action by Churches Together) Alliance, personal communication, June 2014. 16 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. 17 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. See also: WCC 2005. 18 Representative of the ACT Alliance, personal communication, Oct. 2014. 19 Representative of Norwegian Church Aid, personal communication, Oct. 2014. 20 Representative of Norwegian Church Aid, personal communication, Oct. 2014. 21 Representative of Norwegian Church Aid, personal communication, Oct. 2014. 22 Representative of the We Have Faith network, personal communication Oct. 2014. 23 Representative of Avaaz, personal communication, Jan. 2017. 24 Representative of Greenpeace, personal communication, Jan. 2017. 25 Representative of the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, personal communication, Nov. 2014. 26 Representative of the ACT Alliance, personal communication, June 2014. 27 Representative of the ACT Alliance, personal communication, June 2014. 28 Representative of the WCC, personal communication, June 2014. 29 Representative of the Quakers, personal communication, June 2014. 30 Representative of the ACT Alliance, personal communication, June 2014. 31 Representative of Brahma Kumaris, personal communication, Nov. 2013. 32 Representative of the ACT Alliance, personal communication, June 2014. 33 A survey by the Pew Research Center (2015) shows that only 25 per cent of white Evangelical US-Americans believe that global warming is taking place and is caused by human activity. This figure is substantially lower than the US average of 45 per cent. 34 Notice also the newly formed ‘Multi-faith Simple-Living Initiative’, which was announced at the COP-23 in Bonn, Germany, Nov. 2017.

References Altvater, E. et al., eds., 1997. Vernetzt und Verstrickt. Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen als gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Baumgart-Ochse, C., 2014. Religiöse Akteure als Beitrag zur Global Governance. In: I. Werkner and O. Hidalgo, eds. Religionen–Global Player in der internationalen Politik? Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 15–32. Beisheim, M., 2004. Fit für Global Governance? Transnationale Interessensgruppenaktivitäten als Demokratisierungspotenzial–am Beispiel der Klimapolitik. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Berger, J., 2003. Religious nongovernmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14 (1), 15–39. Brand, U., 2000. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Staat und ökologische Krise. Konturen kritischer NRO-Forschung. Das Beispiel der biologischen Vielfalt. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Brühl, T. and Gereke, M., 2015. Der Beitrag von Non-State Actors zum Schutz der Umwelt: Eine kritische Analyse der Rolle von NGOs in der Klimapolitik. Zeitschrift für Außen und Sicherheitspolitik, 8 (2), 677–94. Brühl, T. and Rosert, E., 2014. Die UNO und Global Governance. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Brunnengräber, A., 2011. Das Klimaregime. Globales Dorf oder sozial umkämpftes, transnationales Terrain? In: A. Brunnengräber, ed. Zivilisierung des Klimaregimes. NGOs und soziale Bewegungen in der nationalen, europäischen und internationalen Klimapolitik. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 17–43.

62

K. Glaab, D. Fuchs, and J. Friederich

Bulkeley, H. et al., 2014. Transnational climate change governance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Cabré, M., 2011. Issue-linkages to climate change measured through NGO participation in the UNFCCC. Global Environmental Politics, 11 (3), 10–22. Carr, W. et al., 2012. The faithful skeptics: Evangelical religious beliefs and perceptions of climate change. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature & Culture, 6 (3), 276–99. Corell, E. and Betsill, M., 2001. NGO influence in international environmental negotiations: A framework analyses. Global Environmental Politics, 1 (4), 65–85. Dryzek, J., 2005. The politics of the earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feist, M. and Fuchs, D., 2013. Agrarpolitik und Ernährungssicherheit im Strudel der Finanzkrise. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 6 (1), 197–209. Figueres, C., 2014. Faith leaders need to find their voice on climate change. The Guardian [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/may/07/faith leaders-voice-climate-change [Accessed 7 April 2017]. Frantz, C. and Fuchs, D., 2014. The impact of civil society on sustainable development. In: M. Freise and T. Hallmann, eds. Modernizing democracy: Associations and associating in the 21st century. New York, NY: Springer, 83–96. Fuchs, D. and Lorek, S., 2005. Sustainable consumption governance: A history of promises and failures. Journal of Consumer Policy, 28 (3), 261–88. Gardner, G., 2003. Engaging religion in the quest for a sustainable world. In: G. Gardner, C. Bright, and L. Starke, eds. State of the world, 2003: A Worldwatch Institute report on progress toward a sustainable society. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 152–75. Glaab, K., 2014. Religiöse Akteure in der globalen Umweltpolitik. In: I. Werkner and O. Hidalgo, eds. Religionen–Global Player in der internationalen Politik? Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 235–51. Glaab, K., 2017. A climate for justice? Faith-based advocacy on climate change at the United Nations, Globalizations, 14 (7), 1110–24. Glaab, K. and Fuchs, D., 2015. Religiös und grün? Die Rolle von glaubensbasierten Akteuren im globalen Diskurs der nachhaltigen Entwicklung. ZPol – Journal of Political Science Sonderband 2, 95–117. Glaab, K. and Fuchs, D., 2018. Green faith? The role of faith-based actors on the sustainable development discourse. Environmental Values, 27 (3), 289–312. Gottlieb, R.S., 2006. A greener faith: Religious environmentalism and our planet’s future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Graf, A., 2013. Doing sustainability? Verstehende Rezeption diskursiver Unternehmensmacht. In: A. Brodocz and S. Hammer, eds. Variationen der Macht. Tagungsband der DVPW-Sektion Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 113–31. Hadden, J., 2015. Networks in contention: The divisive politics of climate change. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Interfaith Summit of Climate Change, 2014. Climate, faith and hope: Faith traditions together for a common future [online]. Available from: http://interfaithclimate.org/ the-statement/ [Accessed 7 April 2017]. International Islamic Climate Change Symposium, 2015. Islamic declaration on global climate change [online]. Available from: http://islamicclimatedeclaration.org/islamic declaration-on-global-climate-change/ [Accessed 7 April 2017]. Litfin, K.T., 1995. Ozone discourses: Science and politics in global environmental cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. Lövbrand, E., Hjerpe, M., and Linnér, B.-J., 2017. Making climate governance global: How UN climate summitry comes to matter in a complex climate regime. Environmental Politics, 26 (4), 580–99.

Religious NGOs at the UNFCCC 63 Nasiritousi, N., Hjerpe, M., and Bäckstrand, K., 2015. Normative arguments for non-state actor participation in international policymaking processes: Functionalism, neocorporatism or democratic pluralism? European Journal of International Relations, 22 (4), 920–43. Nicholson, S. and Chong, D., 2011. Jumping on the human rights bandwagon: How rightsbased linkages can refocus climate politics. Global Environmental Politics, 11 (3), 121–36. Pew Research Center, 2015. Catholics divided over global warming [online]. Available from: www.pewforum.org/2015/06/16/catholics-divided-over-global-warming/ [Accessed 14 June 2017]. Pope Francis, 2015. Encyclical letter Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on the care for our common home [online]. Available from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [Accessed 7 April 2017]. Schroeder, H. and Lovell, H., 2012. The role of non-nation-state actors and side events in the international climate negotiations. Climate Policy, 12 (1), 23–37. Seidler, C., 2015. Papst soll sich in letzter Minute in Klimakonferenz eingeschaltet haben. Spiegel online [online]. Available from: www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/ paris-papst-soll-klimakonferenz-vor-dem-scheitern-bewahrt-haben-a-1067562.html [Accessed 14 June 2017]. Taylor, B. 2015. Religion to the rescue (?) in an age of climate disruption. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, 9 (1), 7–18. Tucker, M.E., 2003. Worldly wonder: Religions enter their ecological phase. Chicago, IL: Open Court. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2017. Statistics on observer organizations in the UNFCCC process [online]. Available from: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ observer_organizations/items/9545.php [Accessed 4 April 2017]. Unmüßig, B., 2011. NGOs in der Klimakrise. Fragmentierungsprozesse, Konfliktlinien und strategische Ansätze. In: A. Brunnengräber, ed. Zivilisierung des Klimaregimes. NGOs und soziale Bewegungen in der nationalen, europäischen und internationalen Klimapolitik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 45–57. Veldman, R.G., Szasz, A., and Haluza-DeLay, R., 2012. Introduction: Climate change and religion: A review of existing research. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, 6 (3), 255–75. Vidal, H., and Harvey, F., 2013. Green groups walk out of UN climate talks. The Guardian [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/mass-walk out-un-climate-talks-warsaw [Accessed 7 April 2017]. Wallbott, L., 2014. Indigenous peoples in UN REDD+ negotiations: ‘Importing power’ and lobbying for rights through discursive interplay management. Ecology and Society, 19 (1), 21. White, L. Jr., 1967. The historical roots of our ecological crisis. Science, 155, 1203–7. World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987. Our common future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Council of Churches, 2005. Climate change [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene. org/en/folder/documents-pdf/Climate_Change_Brochure_2005.pdf [Accessed 13 June 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2017. Frequently asked questions [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/faq#how-many-member-churches-does-the-wcc-have now- [Accessed 4 April 2017].

4

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ Religious NGOs and the struggle over sexual and reproductive health and rights at the UN Ann-Kristin Beinlich

Introduction Religion and sex – two spheres apparently in tension with one another. Religion and abortion – two that are even more so. No: this chapter will not be exploring the theological, philosophical, or rights-based discourse on sex(uality), contraception, and abortion. I leave that hard-fought debate to theologians, activists, feminists, and political actors. The debate itself, however, has far-reaching consequences for the international order. During the 1990s, the UN came under huge pressure from religious actors who felt their moral values were being undermined as a result of the stances taken by the majority of the organization’s actors on issues such as population, development, and women’s rights. Since that first wave of indignation, the UN’s secular spaces have had to accustom themselves to the presence of active religious players and to the impact they have – disruptive or harmonizing – on the debate about sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Since the start of the 1990s, the number of religious and faith-based actors has been growing, and they have become increasingly successful at influencing the SRHR discourse. This has stoked concern in the international feminist movement, amongst NGOs, and in the significant number of Western states supportive of SRHR (Sjørup 1999). As a result, the SRHR discourse has emerged as a prime battleground between traditional, ‘conservative’ world views and ‘liberal’ perspectives, a key stumbling-block in all this being abortion.1 It would seem impossible to describe the discourse as anything other than highly polarized – in terms of both actors and substance. As regards the first, we have a vocal group of ‘conservative’ religious actors contrasting with a rather silent body of secular ‘liberal’ players (Neale 1998; West 1999; Chappell 2006; Joachim 2007), and the discourse is framed as one of religion versus secularism, fuelling the perception and construction of religion as something obstructive, ‘conservative’, and outdated. In terms of substance, there is an oversimplified perception of SRHR as a discourse about abortion and contraception, leading to a dichotomous distinction between pro-life and pro-choice positions that admits of no intermediate position.2

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 65 Against this background, the present chapter poses two questions: 1

2

What positions do religious NGOs (RNGOs) actually occupy in this reputedly highly polarized policy field, where religious pro-life actors supposedly dominate the discourse? Does a mapping of RNGOs at the UN support the claim that ‘liberal’ secular NGOs champion sexual and reproductive health and rights and ‘conservative’ RNGOs seek to undermine them, or is the picture a more nuanced one? If the stereotype of religious actors as ‘conservative’ and disruptive proves inaccurate, what motivates the positions and behaviours they do adopt?

In attempting to answer these questions, the chapter explores the way the SRHR discourse at the UN has evolved under the influence of religious actors. It first outlines the history of SRHR – an exercise which in itself points up the decisive part played by religious actors in this area. Issues relating not only to the forum in which the discourse takes place and the participating actors but also to the content of the debate are highlighted. The chapter then moves on to analyze the positioning and behaviour of relevant RNGOs from the point of view of the overarching question posed in this book – namely, do such organizations hamper or facilitate agreement on specific policy issues in the UN context? I show that there are three categories of RNGOs, each representing a different position in the discourse. The empirical evidence I offer contradicts the conventional view both of researchers and of the relevant players themselves, in which actors’ positions are seen dichotomously as either ‘pro-life’ or ‘pro-choice’. Instead, it points to the existence of a substantial group of actors which, whilst generally progressive – on issues such as homosexuality, LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer) rights, women’s rights, contraception, and HIV/AIDS – explicitly avoids taking a stance on abortion. The chapter concludes with an explanatory account of RNGO positions and a summary and appraisal of the role of RNGOs, and of religious actors in general, in the discourse on SRHR. Complications that come with the territory The information presented here is based on interviews and field research, including participatory observation conducted in 2015 and 2016 in the context of the annual sessions of the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and Commission on Population and Development (CPD). The aim was to talk to actors representing all points of view on SRHR, but gaining the trust of the organizations and individuals concerned proved a delicate and challenging task. Indeed, the contacts I did manage to talk to, either formally or informally, advised me that interview requests are normally declined or, at the least, subjected to rigorous checking. Suspicion seems to go with the territory and makes many actors defensive, evasive, and hard to access. Thus, conservative players fear that any information provided will be misused, liberal players worry about snoopers and violent reprisals, and state representatives fight shy of taking a stance for reasons

66 Ann-Kristin Beinlich of discretion or tactics or to avoid the charge of partiality. In many cases, prolife actors asked me to state my own view on abortion, and many contacts were broken off once my research interest became clear. To my particular surprise, one pro-choice NGO sought verification that I was not acting on behalf of Planned Parenthood – the most important and most prominent pro-choice organization and provider of abortion services in the United States.3 Conversely, in one case my affiliation with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt helped me secure an interview because the person concerned was familiar with the Institute and its work.

Mapping the SRHR discourse SRHR: different things to different people Because it overlaps with, or encompasses, issues dealt with by a number of different UN bodies, the topic of SRHR surfaces in a variety of UN contexts. Institutionally, its base is in population and development. Indeed, the UN set up its Population Fund (UNFPA – from its former name ‘United Nations Fund for Population Activities’) specifically with SRHR at its core. However, if one looks at the civil society actors currently engaged in this field, it is clear that the main arena in which advocates of SRHR are active is women’s rights. Because the women’s rights movement was able to frame the issue in a way that made it amenable to consideration under a number of general heads, it is this perspective that has come to dominate the discourse. The number of different framing strategies in operation means that there is no one, uniform understanding of SRHR. In the 1994 Programme of Action (PoA) adopted by the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the issues of family planning, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, human sexuality, and gender relations, along with matters to do with young people, all appear under the heading of reproductive health. This points to SRHR’s simultaneous ‘umbrella’ reach over women’s rights, children’s rights, and issues of health, population, and development. In addition, recent UN debates indicate an extension of that reach to include the discourse on LGBTIQ, girls’ rights, and gender (UNFPA 2016), with men’s rights also beginning to feature more often on the agenda (Promundo and UNFPA 2016). All in all, then, sexual and reproductive health and rights ‘are by no means restricted to women’, though ‘understandings of them are . . . tightly linked to evolving understandings of women’s rights and equality’ (UNFPA 2016, p. 20). The terms ‘reproductive health’ and ‘reproductive rights’ were coined by the ICPD at its 1994 session in Cairo (UNFPA 2004). It defined the first as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes’ (UNFPA 2004, p. 40). In line with this understanding of reproductive health and the already recognized national laws and international consensus documents, it further stated that: These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 67 their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of [SRHR]. (UNFPA 2004, p. 40) Even at this early stage, therefore, reproductive health rights are considered to cover sexual health – though no further explanation of the latter is given. It was after the 1994 ICPD that this area was added to the UN’s definition of reproductive rights and explicitly became a UN goal (UNFPA 2016, p. 19). Although not expressly mentioned in official elucidations of SRHR, abortion (and to a lesser extent contraception) is the most fiercely contested element of the discourse. ‘Conservative’ actors at the ICPD were able to get their reservations on abortion acknowledged, resulting in the inclusion, in the PoA, of a clause stating that ‘[i]n no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning’ (UNFPA 2004, p. 58). Abortion, hence, is not to be seen as falling within the notion of SRHR as outlined above. The history of SRHR in outline Although ‘reproductive rights’ were identified as an issue as far back as the 1980s and were discussed under this rubric during the 1990s (Joachim 1999, 2007; West 1999), it was only in the wake of a number of crucial UN conferences that the actual term ‘SRHR’ established itself and that the relevant components were framed as human rights (Wichterich 2015). The term combines the previously differentiated issues of sexual health, reproductive health, and reproductive rights and is now the one most commonly used by UN agencies and civil society actors in relation to these topics. If we look more closely at usage, however, preferences emerge which betray the moral and political stances of the actors in question – be they states, international organizations, or NGOs. Thus, during the interviews I conducted in 2015 and 2016, pro-life actors – such as Rebecca Oas, associate director of research at C-Fam4 – repeatedly expressed their dislike of the term because they saw it as euphemistic and masking the true facts. What put the issue of SRHR on the international agenda was primarily the fight waged by the women’s movement (particularly from the 1980s onwards) against issues such as patriarchy, violence against women, femicide, and the various kinds of psychological and physical discrimination perpetrated on women. Although religious customs relating to sexuality emerged as an issue once the topic began to be debated openly, religious civil society actors did not predominate in the discourse at that stage. The first time religion had an impact (indirectly) was at the UN Population Conference in Mexico City in 1984. At this meeting, the US delegation withdrew financial support for international family-planning measures following calls to the US government by the national pro-life lobby – with its strong right-wing Christian contingent – that it should act to save lives (Higer 1999; Joachim 2007). A harsh critic of the ‘liberal’ UN, which it long viewed as the ‘Anti-Christ’, the Christian Right eventually swallowed its objections and, in the 1990s, decided to engage strategically in the international sphere in order to promote its own points of view (Buss and Herman 2003, p. 33).

68 Ann-Kristin Beinlich The ICPD 1994 in Cairo marked a turning point in the international discourse on reproductive rights: after years of struggle, the women’s movement had succeeded in getting these rights onto the agenda of a major UN conference, and the intense debate on population policies, particularly those relating to fertility-control, gave the rights increased prominence (Higer 1999; Joachim 2007; Wichterich 2015). Opposition to the Cairo Plan of Action was immediate and vocal, bringing a decisive turn in the tide for the ICPD. The driving force behind the moves to stymie the Plan of Action was the Holy See. It mobilized every Church institution and likeminded player it could think of, urging them to put pressure on delegations to oppose the inclusion of contraception and abortion in the Plan of Action (Buss 1998; Reese 2005). In its pursuit of this goal, it found allies not only in Catholic countries but in fundamentalist Muslim states such as Iran, Libya, the Sudan, and Pakistan. Acting together, these players were able to delay negotiations, often by availing themselves of UN procedural devices such as ‘bracketing’ – marking parts of a text off as non-agreed (Joachim 2007). In the end, the Holy See joined the consensus on the overall PoA but entered numerous reservations regarding the chapters dealing with SRHR (UNFPA 2004; Joachim 2007). Besides being framed as part of population policy, SRHR became more prominent in the UN debate on women’s rights – beginning at the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing in 1995. Because of the ‘conservative’, ‘patriarchal’ influence that certain religious actors and states were seeking to exert in this forum, the topic acquired unexpected relevance in the official debates (Chappell 2006, p. 493). The feminist movement was caught off-guard (Buss 1998; West 1999), and it was again the Holy See that led the charge, confident of support from a variety of allies. The earlier network it had formed with Catholic and Muslim countries was reactivated to propagate the members’ views on women’s empowerment (Joachim 2007). Although the Holy See was more temperate in its agenda than it had been in Cairo and backed the dominant position on women’s rights, the opposition to SRHR was reiterated and found expression in a number of reservations recorded in the final document (Buss 1998). More recently, reference has been made to SRHR in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2000, 2015; Wichterich 2015). However, the evocation of the Cairo and Beijing Plans of Action in the SDGs, for example, suggests a revival of the old dynamics and indicates that power relations in this area remain much the same. Apart from major conferences such as those of Cairo and Beijing, the main forums in which parties with an interest in SRHR can disseminate ideas and discuss urgent issues are now the annual CSW and, to a lesser extent, the CPD. RNGOs active in these contexts are therefore of particular relevance to this study.

Religious actors in the SRHR discourse The summary just given of the development of the SRHR discourse has in itself pointed up the crucial role played by religious and faith-based actors in this area. The main impression that emerges is one of obstructive, disruptive participants

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 69 in the discourse who seek to thwart the measures proposed by the international community. Up to now, the literature has posited two postures in the discourse on SRHR, centred on the contested issues of abortion and contraception. On the one hand, it is said, there are the ‘pro-lifers’, who oppose abortion (and also contraception, though to a lesser extent) on the basis that life itself begins at conception and the right to life must be respected. In the other camp, says the literature, are the ‘prochoicers’, who champion abortion (and contraception) on the basis of a woman’s right to choose (Haynes 2014). In fact, scrutiny of the actual practice of religious actors suggests they divide into not two but three groups in relation to SRHR: the pro-life group has a clearly defined outlook and identity, but amongst the remaining actors there is an important distinction to be drawn between ‘progressives’ and those who are explicitly pro-choice. Here again, abortion is the crucial differentiator: whereas pro-choice actors unambivalently support a woman’s right to choose, progressives are reticent on the topic, focusing instead on the huge range of other issues clustered under the SRHR umbrella. Contraception, for its part, is supported more or less explicitly by both progressives and pro-choicers on most occasions. Significantly for our purposes, progressives make up a larger proportion of all actors than do expressly pro-choice players. No to abortion! Religious pro-life actors The most visible religious actors in the SRHR discourse at the UN are those strongly opposed to abortion. Amongst these, Jennifer Butler (2006) describes the Christian Right as fighting on behalf of the traditional or ‘natural’ family and against the dangers that threaten this – feminism, sexual liberation, reproductive rights, and homosexuality/LGBTIQ. United in this pro-life network, says Butler, are Evangelical, Catholic, and Mormon actors of predominantly US-American origin. These players have established ties with a number of Islamic governmental actors who are supportive of their ideas on family planning (Buss and Herman 2003; Butler 2006). Against the background of the ICPD 1994, the Christian Right gradually established a permanent presence at the UN. Since then, NGOs such as the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (now the Center for Family and Human Rights – C-Fam), the Family Research Council, Human Life International, the World Family Policy Center, United Families International, and the Howard Center have played a forceful role in the discourse (Butler 2006). Whatever the issue, they consistently make their voices heard in the furtherance of their interests. The network’s breakthrough in international terms came with the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, where a somewhat unorganized Christian Right put its weight behind the Holy See (West 1999; Buss and Herman 2003). Over subsequent years, this network became more powerful and showed (and still shows) itself capable of causing significant disruption in the SRHR discourse (Knox 2002; Buss and Herman 2003). By the time of the first review of the Beijing Plan of Action (‘Beijing+5’) in 2000, the Christian Right network had got

70 Ann-Kristin Beinlich its act together and ‘“stormed” the Beijing+5 process, sending nearly four hundred delegates with the apparent intent of ensuring a disruptive attendance at every meeting’ (Buss and Herman 2003, p. 101). Its aim, say Buss and Herman, was to counter the supposed destruction of the ‘natural family’ and combat the ‘culture of death’ which it was claimed abortion represented (Buss and Herman 2003, p. 57). Details of concerted campaigns by pro-life actors are also to be found in accounts of CSW sessions. The Christian Right has been known to disrupt these meetings, interrupting negotiations and acting in a way that has occasionally necessitated the intervention of security personnel. This tactic of direct disruption is backed up with activities that undermine the overall atmosphere of the event – a phenomenon I myself witnessed during the CSW meetings I was able to observe as part of my field research. By way of example: pro-life actors will hand out rubber embryos, not only at their own side events but occasionally also inside UN premises. Other provocative, emotionally charged strategies (of which there are many) include displaying images of aborted foetuses or body parts. Azza Karam, senior advisor at UNFPA, confirms that fear of aggressive and uncivil behaviour is a reality amongst those attending meetings.5 These strategies are backed up with first-hand accounts of abortion by self-styled ‘survivors’ who appeal to the emotions with painful descriptions of their physical and psychological experiences but make no apparent attempt at constructive engagement. This tactic appears to have fostered feelings of frustration and mistrust in the SRHR community. At the same time, pro-life RNGOs will try to link into the mainstream discourse by framing their positions in terms that the majority of actors can concur with and by incorporating references to progressive content. Thus, they will enter into debates about phenomena which all actors, whatever their position, will condemn – rape, forced or sex-selective abortion, forced sterilization, and so on – but they will use these debates as a means of tacitly disseminating their core message about abortion being fundamentally wrong. The evidence indicates that most pro-life RNGOs concentrate on only one or two related issues but that this kind of focus – on the family, for example – enables them to bring in other matters and thus disseminate their central message to a wider public. Only a small number of these actors forgo overarching frames and openly state their pro-life agendas. The Catholic NGOs Priests for Life and Human Life International – whose actual names give away their pro-life stance – are amongst the rather rare actors in this category. Both within the family frame and beyond it, the role of women is central to pro-life argumentation (see Priests for Life 2014, 2015). Women are depicted as the mainstay of the family, and their job, it is argued, is to be caring wives and mothers. Issues of all kinds are interpreted in terms of how they affect women’s vocation: malnutrition, poor hygiene, and disease all have to be combated in particular in order that women and girls can fulfil their child-bearing and nurturing functions. Pro-life RNGO strategies thus utilize the UN discourse but frame conclusions and narratives in ways that serve the organizations’ interests. Statements by pro-life RNGOs contain very few overtly religious arguments. Although their definition of the beginning of life is based on scripture, most of

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 71 their other arguments lean heavily on science. Repeated references are made to the negative physical and psychological effects which abortion has on women’s health – the adverse correlation between breast cancer and abortion as well as late pregnancies often being highlighted in this connection. In an attempt to combine science with faith-sensitive sexuality, scientifically based modes of natural family planning are also presented (notably at events co-organized by the Holy See). Pro-life RNGOs also respond to calls by the discourse community to collect quantitative data that will help improve SRHR measures – as demonstrated by events organized by bodies such as C-Fam. The UN actually made the strengthening of quantitative sources the guiding theme of the 49th session of the CPD in 2016, but pro-life actors are often to be found denying the accuracy of data or rewriting the arguments. Another key strategy employed by pro-life RNGOs is that of naming, shaming, and blaming their opponents. The prime targets of blaming are international organizations, first and foremost the UN and its agencies. The Christian Right rejects the UN on the basis that it is a forum for liberal worldviews and a threat to moral values. Thus, C-Fam accuses UNFPA of favouring abortion over education as a means of reducing maternal mortality, claiming that this demonstrates a lack of concern for children on UNFPA’s part. Likewise, the UN is charged with disregarding women’s needs by treating female empowerment as a top-down process rather than seeking to involve real women in it. The UN’s view of SRHR is condemned as narrow in that it implies abortion and sterilization are the only instruments of reproductive health. Individual players accuse the UN of bias, claiming it clearly favours those who share its outlook. At the same time as all this, where the UN’s decisions and official statements accord with their own interests, organizations such as C-Fam will acknowledge this. Doing so enables them to present those interests as in conformity with UN policy and, in the long run, facilitates accountability. The UN is not the only target of pro-life criticism: NGOs that hold different views are accused of spreading misinformation, of lacking legitimacy, and of undermining the traditional image of gender and family. The most high-profile example of this is C-Fam’s attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the pro-choice RNGO Catholics for Choice (CFC). C-Fam claims the organization is in breach of the official moral teachings of the Catholic Church on contraception and abortion and can therefore no longer be regarded as Catholic.6 In making such claims, C-Fam is using the transnational arena to negotiate intra-religious dynamics and power relations, as a result not only upping the atmosphere of mischief and disruption but also distracting attention from the real issues. Silent on abortion: religious progressives The opponents whom pro-life RNGOs find themselves confronting on SRHR do not constitute a homogenous group. In addition to pro-choice actors, they comprise a number of progressive players so far neglected in the research. This group supports SRHR but keeps its own counsel on the critical issue of abortion. In

72 Ann-Kristin Beinlich adopting this position, it echoes the official stance of the UN, which opted to exclude abortion as a means of family planning in the belief that its inclusion would render the organization vulnerable to objection from both civil and state pro-life actors. Such a positioning entails a shift of focus away from abortion (and contraception) to issues like gender relations, women’s health, maternal health, and girls’ rights and health care. A review of the combined body of actors involved in the SRHR discourse shows that the majority of them fall into this moderately progressive but ‘silent’ group. The factors driving the progressive approach are religious in nature. Catholic NGOs eschew discussion of abortion for the sake of maintaining relations with the church. Thus, Progressio (also known as the Catholic Institute for International Relations), though making explicit mention of SRHR, does not say how it interprets it and so avoids laying itself open to charges of heterodoxy (Catholic Institute for International Relations 2015). At a different level, umbrella organizations such as the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the World Council of Churches (WCC) have to accommodate the different stances and ethical tenets of their many member churches. Procedural rules, and the need for these organizations to preserve their integrity as collective bodies, dictate that they put forward consensual positions on behalf of members who may hold differing views on highly controversial issues such as abortion, as pointed out to me by Geronimo D. Desumala III, advocacy officer at the WCC, and Christine Mangale, programme coordinator at the LWF.7 In contrast to pro-life actors, other RNGOs involved in the discourse have been slow to build reliable networks. Intensive collaboration has always taken place on an informal basis, but the actors themselves have repeatedly stressed the need to adopt a more strategic approach if they are to up their effectiveness. Just recently, in 2016 and 2017, two major networks of overlapping actors were established to address the issues of women’s rights and SRHR. For reasons to do with accessibility and accountability, the topic of abortion (and contraception) is never mentioned explicitly. Instead, attention is focused on gender justice and the role of women. The Faith and Feminism Working Group to the United Nations (FaithFem) was founded in 2016 with encouragement from the organization UN Women. Made up mainly of RNGOs with a UN base in New York – these include the Bahá’í International Community (BIC), the LWF, the WCC, and Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) – the network has a clear advocacy approach promoting gender equality.8 The rather larger Side by Side Faith Movement for Gender Justice, launched in 2017, is an interreligious, transnational network consisting of a number of national churches, religious umbrella organizations, religious aid agencies, and other RNGOs.9 Both these networks seek a reform of patriarchal structures in the relevant religious communities and a reinterpretation of religious scriptures in ways that will foster an innovative approach to gender relations. In line with these goals, progressive RNGOs in general focus on gender justice and women’s (health) rights. Because of this, they are active across a wide range of policy fields, and this multi-issue involvement enables them to introduce new perspectives on SRHR and to engage in cross-cutting framing that underlines the

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 73 importance of effective action in this area. Although the progressive networks mentioned above include ‘stand-alone’ multi-issue RNGOs, the major players in them are umbrella organizations. Amongst the more active in this category are the WCC and LWF, which maintain and facilitate relations with most progressive actors. As pointed out previously in relation to umbrella organizations, internal structures require that the stances taken by WCC and LWF representatives at the UN mirror consensual positions reached by their member churches. These stances therefore tend to reflect the most rigid rather than the most progressive norms prevailing in those churches – here, in particular, on abortion. Very occasionally, progressive RNGOs will advance religious arguments in the context of official UN statements (WCC 2007, 2013). A case in point is the promotion of human rights on the grounds that human beings are created in the image of God. However, these rare references can easily be interpreted in human-rights terms and can be accommodated without too much trouble by non-believers. The general approach, however, is illustrated by the case of Progressio: according to its policy and advocacy officer, Fatima Haase, although the organization’s agenda is informed by Catholic social teaching, as outlined by the Catholic Church, no explicit reference is made to this in its formal statements.10 On the whole, where statements are made, religious arguments are eschewed in favour of references to UN documents and decisions and scientific data – and also to the first-hand experiences of those affected by the issues in question, which are commonly cited in the discourse.11 Progressive Muslim NGOs Up to now, the civil society discourse on SRHR has been dominated by Christian NGOs, which have a long history at the UN. Recently, however, progressive Muslim NGOs have increasingly been making their voices heard on this and other issues of women’s rights. On the question of abortion, though, they have remained as silent as their Christian counterparts. The reasons for their silence may, however, be different. The indications are that basic issues relating to women’s rights as a whole (SRHR but also gender equality, basic human rights, family law, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation) have yet to be addressed in relevant communities and that against this background abortion appears too specific a concern and not of such urgency. Another factor mitigating the urgency may be the anthropological view, shared by all schools of thought in Islam, that life begins on the 120th day after conception (IRW 2009). Of significance in intra-religious terms, and a common feature of the argumentation of dominant progressive Muslim actors, is the reference to misinterpretation of Islamic teachings and notably of the Quran as a source of these. When it comes to questions of gender roles, for example, all the organizations in this group – be it Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), Musawah (the name means ‘equality’ in Arabic), or MPV – call for a genuine, reformed interpretation of Islam.12 They argue that where there are contradictions between the Quran and teachings or tradition, the life of the Prophet Muhammad should be the final authority.

74 Ann-Kristin Beinlich Scripture, they say, should not be taken verbatim but should be read as symbolic language. Likewise with norms, which in the area of women’s rights are, they say, not religious but social in nature and therefore can and should be deconstructed with a view to achieving social justice. Musawah is probably the most influential women’s rights NGO at the moment. Although it is headquartered in Indonesia, its representatives play a very active role at relevant CSW sessions and beyond this. It is an outspoken critic of patriarchy in Muslim societies, a position which brings it very much in line with the USbased MPV. Both these RNGOs have been rather successful at finding partners to help them promote their agendas: amongst the actors they can call on are the LWF, the WCC, and the Bahá’í International Community – all of which have a considerable history and reputation at the UN. For Musawah and MPV, neither of which is (so far) accredited with ECOSOC, this opens up a channel for increased participation in, and engagement with, the UN. The values and activities of these organizations are rooted in scripture. The underlying motivator, according to Shafferan Sonneveld, global advocacy director at MPV, is an inherently critical attitude to the patriarchal system of interpretation and its pronouncements. Both are seen as outdated and unfitted to contemporary society13, and the individual is encouraged to find ways of approaching and interpreting the text critically. By adopting the Prophet as the archetypal rolemodel and going back to the beginnings of Islamic tradition, these RNGOs are consciously espousing a radical shift in the anthropology and theology of Islam. Perception of gender roles changes accordingly, with MPV, for example, arguing for gender equality on the basis of the Prophet’s interaction with, and support for, women: ‘He never beat women. He included them in decision-making processes. He appointed the first women imams to lead prayer.’ MPV has also criticized patriarchal attitudes to LGBTIQ rights: at a 2015 meeting on religion and SRHR, its UN representative concentrated his fire on what he considered the inappropriate, patriarchal interpretation – in other words, rejection – of these rights by the Permanent Observer of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at the UN. This shows that progressive Muslim groups are also ready to challenge formal bodies representing their own communities and societies. When it comes to the rhetorical approaches adopted by these groups, parables, quotations from the Quran, and theological arguments figure alongside secular, issue-focused language containing references to official UN documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or to scientific data. The human-rights frame is the one most often used by these groups as their reference point when promoting agendas on gender-related issues closely tied to SRHR. Although the crucial stumbling-block of abortion (and contraception) is not explicitly mentioned, Muslim RNGOs cooperate with, and support, NGOs that take a progressive stance on SRHR at the UN – and have done so from the outset, enhancing their legitimacy, visibility, and credibility. In this connection, Musawah, like MPV, is a member of the FaithFem network. Whereas neither MPV nor Musawah make any explicit mention of abortion, concentrating rather on other SRHR issues, IRW – one of the largest Muslim

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 75 NGOs – declares the practice permissible under certain conditions and in this sense might be seen as somewhat more liberal than the other progressive groups mentioned. Its stipulations are that any abortion must be ‘in line with Islamic values and humanitarian imperatives’ (IRW 2009, p. 4). What it is referring to here is the Muslim doctrine, accepted by all schools of Islam, that abortion within the first 120 days of pregnancy, though unlawful, is permissible (IRW 2009, p. 14). Contraception, for its part, is not of concern to any Muslim actor, whatever their school of thought, and science-based forms of it are accepted: if Allah is minded to create a new life, he will do so regardless of such measures (IRW 2009, p. 12). But even here, IRW respects Islamic ethics in supplying contraceptives only to married couples. Religious arguments are thus explicitly deployed and trump the needs of those affected. All in all, then, IRW emerges as marginal amongst progressive RNGOs: it is a multi-issue organization that focuses predominantly on development aid and has a primarily service-based orientation; at the same time, it is one of the very few RNGOs explicitly to sanction abortion. Given its delimited, problem-oriented stance on abortion, however, and its multi-issue mode of operation, in which SRHR becomes one of many issues, I consider IRW to belong in the intermediate, ‘progressive’ group in the SRHR discourse. The special role of UNFPA When it comes to UNFPA, pro-SRHR progressives such as the WCC, Progressio, and Musawah are, as it were, pushing at an open door (Obaid 2009). UNFPA was the first UN agency to recognize the importance of religious actors as potential partners in development cooperation. It has set up various programmes in which collaboration with local religious leaders and traditional officials, acting as mediators, forms the basis for the dissemination of information and aid. Besides engaging in this kind of cooperation on the ground, UNFPA has increasingly interacted with faith-based advocacy NGOs in workshops, working groups, and informal meetings. In 2008, it launched the Global Interfaith Network for Population and Development, which consolidated the partnerships between RNGOs and UNFPA, with a view to putting the resources and authority often vested in faith-based actors to work in advancing the human-rights agenda (UNFPA 2009). Although this is essentially the only official link between UNFPA and religious actors, unofficial contacts abound. UNFPA makes determined efforts to ensure that faith-based actors involved in its work fulfil the same criteria as those applied to any non-governmental partner. Agreement on human rights as guiding principles and as the basis for terms of engagement is one such criterion. As a kind of ‘litmus test’, UNFPA tries to assess the positions of particular RNGOs on gender-equality and SRHR-related issues. This allows it to gauge the degree of trust between the two sides and the likelihood that they will be able to agree on a set of shared development priorities. Whether an organization will accept the provision of safe and affordable family-planning as part of universal access to health care is an example of the kind of yardstick involved.14

76 Ann-Kristin Beinlich

Yes to abortion: religious pro-choice actors Of the various UN-based NGOs that explicitly support both abortion and contraception, only one is religious – the US-based Catholics for Choice (Vik et al. 2013). All the others – like Planned Parenthood and the International Planned Parenthood Federation – are secular. Since its foundation in the 1970s, CFC has challenged the Catholic hierarchy and its pronouncements on women, reproductive health, and abortion (CFC 2014). It has appealed instead to the notion of social justice and to the theological concept of conscience, which it claims the magisterium itself defends as the key guide for believers and which it says is rooted in the teachings of the early church. Jon O’Brien, CFC’s president, describes the official position of the Catholic hierarchy on women and reproductive health as ‘outdated, outmoded, and unjust’.15 This, he says, is demonstrated by Catholic practice on the ground: as CFC has repeatedly pointed out, national and global statistics show that the majority of Catholic women make use of medical forms of birth control and that many also have abortions. In CFC’s view, therefore, the Church’s proclamations on reproductive health have no legitimacy, either theologically or in practice. Challenging the institutional Catholic Church as a whole has become CFC’s central objective. As a result, the organization’s brief now extends beyond the SRHR discourse – although the latter serves as a major reference point for the challenge (and vice versa). Following the large-scale conferences of the 1990s, and the Holy See’s impact on these, CFC launched a campaign to have the See deprived of its Permanent Observer status at the UN (Buss 1998; Beittinger-Lee 2017). This ‘See Change’ campaign won support from many civil society actors, both secular and religious, and led to a UN review of the status in 2004 (CFC 2013b; BeittingerLee 2017). Apart from organizing this concerted campaign, CFC regularly issues statements and publications on SRHR in which it criticizes the Holy See for its misrepresentation of the needs of lay Catholics (see, for example, CFC 2013a). CFC also engages in the naming, shaming, and blaming of its civil society opponents. Amongst its ‘Opposition Watch’ publications, for example, is a series entitled ‘Opposition Notes’, in which it openly presents and criticizes high-profile individual Catholic pro-life NGOs in the (US) discourse on abortion.16 Its tacit criticism of differently minded actors is far more widespread, with organizations being referred to as ‘anti-choice’ but not actually named. This approach enables CFC to make truth claims without laying itself open to ripostes from its opponents. Given the prominent role of CFC in the SRHR discourse, one would expect it also to have a high profile in UN processes involving civil society. After years of participation in these, however, it has wound down its role here. The reason for this, according to Jon O’Brien, is that the availability of forums such as the CSW has resulted in a marked downgrading of civil society’s role.17 Doubting the effectiveness and impact of the established procedures open to civil society, CFC has expressly changed its tactics, now relying more on lobbying, second-track consultation, networking, use of the media, research, campaigning, and other approaches designed to counter the drawbacks of the UN environment. CFC has

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 77 not given up entirely on UN forums but has come to the conclusion that if civil society wants its voice to be heard, it must use other strategies as well.

Patterns of activism explained From the account just given, it is clear that the dichotomous explanations repeatedly advanced both by actors themselves and by scholars do not adequately capture the dynamics of the discourse. There is no straight dichotomy, either of actors or of issues. On the most contentious element of SRHR – abortion – at least three positions are identifiable: opposition, silence, and full support. Although abortion can be used as a marker with which to distinguish different actors, SRHR as a whole covers a wide and complex range of issues and voices. Actors with moderate, and thus less disruptive, points of view play their part in shaping the discourse. Despite this, the large group of RNGOs in this category – those who keep their own counsel on abortion and focus on the remaining array of SRHR-related issues such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and maternal health – has been neglected in the literature. At the level of the actors themselves, the notion that there is a dichotomy between religious and secular here is unsustainable: religious actors can be found in all of the three groups that shape the SRHR discourse. The preconceived idea that such actors are inevitably pro-life is demonstrably wrong. That many RNGOs remain silent on abortion makes them hard to identify as a group, but the existence of this quietly ‘progressive’ majority, distinct from the rather small group of clearly pro-choice RNGOs, belies the construct of a religious–secular divide. Religious actors, like their secular counterparts, hold a variety of views. Most of the RNGOs that have been mentioned here as being involved in the SRHR discourse are US-based and Christian. Besides reflecting a Christian preponderance in UN-accredited RNGOs (see Beinlich and Braungart in this volume), this points to a particular Christian concern with abortion that is not shared by other religious traditions. In the case of Muslim NGOs, one possible interpretation of the lesser preoccupation is that they have more pressing priorities in the area of basic women’s rights – securing gender equality, for example, or combating discrimination. A more obvious explanation, however, may be that, whereas Christian teaching defines life as beginning at conception, in Islam, as in many other traditions, the start of life is dated later and the debate about abortion is therefore not seen as having the same urgency (Nordmann and Birnbaum 2003; IRW 2009). That said, although Muslim NGOs and their constituencies may be less concerned than their Christian counterparts with the issue of abortion, they have acquired an increasingly high profile in the overall SRHR discourse over recent years. As well as being preponderantly Christian, actors in the SRHR discourse are also largely Western. This again reflects UN accreditation, but it also points to a transference of regional peculiarities to the transnational sphere, most importantly from the United States. Here, abortion is a recurrent national theme that surfaces

78 Ann-Kristin Beinlich repeatedly in political and judicial debates and has prompted something of a ‘culture war’ within civil society, with the Christian Right playing a powerful role. Meanwhile, the interests of developing societies, where violence against women is still common and AIDS/HIV poses a deadly threat, suggest the need for a different order of priorities in SRHR. Against this background, talk of abortion (as a means of family planning) comes across as evasive indulgence. The types of strategies employed by religious NGOs are similar to those used by their secular counterparts. Naming, shaming, and blaming opponents and, conversely, networking with like-minded actors, are clear traits of all the groups discussed, and particularly of pro-life and pro-choice players. Amongst civil society actors, for example, the Christian Right succeeded in building an interreligious network at the national and international level which was able to lend support to the Holy See. The See itself brought together a number of like-minded delegations from Catholic and Muslim states and, thus networked, was able to influence the interstate negotiations on SRHR that took place in the course of the ICPD 1994 and Beijing 1995. Progressive actors, for their part, have been slower in appreciating the need to be more strategic in their collaborations. Having done so, they have now established two networks to remedy the deficit. Framing is another strategy employed by RNGOs. Pro-life actors in particular use it because it allows them to portray themselves, both to the UN and to their own constituencies, as ‘part of the team’. Thus abortion, being too delicate a topic to be addressed explicitly, is generally embedded in, or framed in terms of, related but less controversial issues. Progressive RNGOs and their habit of remaining silent on contentious issues such as abortion have so far been overlooked in accounts of SRHR. The primary reasons for the silence lay in religious norms and in the possibility of the RNGOs being required to justify their positions vis-à-vis their own constituencies. In addition, the restraint is a sign of adaptation to UN conventions and to the overall UN narrative regarding SRHR. In the UN context, a variety of issues are subsumed under the umbrella of SRHR, and most measures regarding these subissues secure overall consensus. With this in mind, given the persistent contention over abortion, the UN has avoided recognizing the latter as a legitimate means of family planning. The eschewal practised by progressive RNGOs echoes this official stance and also allows RNGOs to present themselves as legitimate and trustworthy partners of the UN – something they have done very successfully, as their many collaborations with the UN prove. In contrast to the silent progressives, the ‘conservative’ actors in the UN debate on SRHR tend to be aggressive and bullish – an approach that unsettles the general atmosphere and hampers progress in the discourse. The reasons for this behaviour cannot be identified with certainty. It may stem from the fact that many dominant players in the UN discourse have garnered their experience in the US-American context, where the abortion debate is characterized by a significant degree of aggression and violence. In his comments on the ‘pro family’ – the US anti-abortion – movement, Juergensmeyer (2003), for example, highlights the aggressive and violent rhetoric which its members employ against those who

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 79 oppose it. Transnational RNGO sources at the UN corroborate these impressions. Beyond this, the aggression may have to do with the Christian Right’s initial rejection of the UN, which Christian RNGOs’ are perhaps echoing in their ‘naming and blaming’ of the organization. The strategy of naming, blaming, and shaming in order to delegitimize opponents is one that is pursued by all actors, from pro-life to pro-choice, though to different degrees and in varying ways. These practices clearly disrupt the discourse on SRHR: protagonists do not take each other seriously, and this leads to a neglect of substantive positions and arguments. Emotion and surmise trump logic, and the end result is to frustrate reasoned political resolution. Certain RNGOs criticize actors from the same tradition. The most explicit examples of this are found in the Catholic community, but there are also occurrences in the Muslim context. Wherever it happens across the religious spectrum, it implies a challenge to the respective hierarchy and thus a need to renegotiate religious identity and truth claims. Such challenges are bolstered by a reinterpretation of norms and traditions – a common practice among progressive and pro-choice actors – often involving a return to original sources that legitimize the new stance and enable the actors involved to declare existing traditions and values invalid. Focusing on issues and stances on which a majority of actors are agreed defuses combative tendencies and promotes general harmony in the discourse. The use of framing, for its part, can help attract support from private individuals, thus enlarging a constituency and mobilizing supporters.

Conclusion The idea, set out at the start of this chapter, that RNGOs disrupt the discourse on SRHR specifically because of their ‘conservative’, value-oriented stance can be neither confirmed nor disproved. The picture is too diverse for such a judgement and calls for a differentiated analysis in which, first and foremost, the dichotomies that have prevailed in the literature up to now are broken down. That SRHR is a complex set of issues is a fact acknowledged by the majority of the relevant actors, both secular and religious. The stumbling-block is abortion, which creates a division in the SRHR constituency – though into three rather than two groupings: pro-life, progressive, and pro-choice. RNGOs are often perceived, and described, as disruptive and aggressive in themselves, upping levels of hostility in the discourse by creating an atmosphere of mistrust, recrimination, and fear and by engaging in actions that sow confusion. This profile is clearly applicable to the pro-life movement and may be explained by this group’s view of the ‘liberal’ UN as a threat to its values. Contrasting with this group, however, are a number of progressive RNGOs who are quiet on the subject of abortion for religious reasons and concentrate on other SRHRrelated issues such as maternal mortality, sexual violence, and FGM. This mirrors the UN’s own stance of eschewal on abortion as a means of family planning, and progressive RNGOs are unanimously supportive of the organization, often

80 Ann-Kristin Beinlich collaborating closely with its agencies. This close relationship precludes the need for intensive engagement and results in these RNGOs playing a rather detached and guarded role in the discourse. Equally reticent is the probably only pro-choice RNGO: Catholics for Choice. Although enjoying quite a high profile, it does not play a very vocal part in the open discourse, having chosen to try and influence crucial actors by the more inconspicuous means which political structures have to offer. The UNFPA and other UN agencies, for their part, well aware of the positive impact which faith-based actors can have on the implementation of SRHR and related measures, have created space for collaboration. This interaction has twoway implications: on the one hand, it imposes a need on the relevant RNGOs to accept UN norms; on the other, the RNGOs are able to exploit the SRHR discourse, and the wider UN debate, for intra-religious purposes, citing it in support of their efforts to renegotiate power relations, truth claims, and claims about identity. In relation to SRHR, RNGOs thus exert both disruptive and integrative influences in the UN setting, and the stereotypical view of religion being a threat per se to internationally shared, ‘secular’ values does not bear scrutiny. In fact, were it not for the RNGOs’ own identification of their positions as faith-based, these groups would be indistinguishable from their secular counterparts.

Notes 1 Interest-related terminology has changed over time. Whereas the term ‘reproductive rights’ was used in the agenda-setting and implementation phases, and was closely linked to matters of family planning, the debate brought a shift to a more comprehensive understanding, and this has come to be termed ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’ (SRHR). I use the latter term in relation to the current discourse and the term ‘reproductive rights’ when speaking of the contemporaneous context. 2 There are many different characterizations of the actors involved. To avoid the pitfalls of subjectivity in the use of such terms as ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’, I rely on the respective groups’ descriptions of themselves. In the field of SRHR, abortion and contraception are the key bones of contention, and postures on these are the main bases for characterization: actors who reject abortion and contraception with the declared aim of preserving life are commonly described as ‘pro-life’; actors who are supportive of such health measures, and notably of free choice for the mother, are described as ‘prochoice’. As will be demonstrated here, however, there is a third, ‘progressive’ group that supports SRHR in general but keeps its own counsel on abortion. 3 To avoid any misunderstanding, I made my status as a research associate and doctoral candidate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt clear throughout and gave the name of the body (DFG – German Research Foundation) and project (‘Religious NGOs at the UN: Mediators or Polarizers?’) for which the interviews were being conducted. In one case, the project title was attacked as implying a subjective evaluation of the actors, which I should state is clearly not my position. 4 Interview with R. Oas, 26 Mar. 2015. 5 Interview with A. Karam, 24 Mar. 2015. 6 C-Fam’s denial of CFC’s Catholic identity puts it in the same camp as the Vatican, which, in the run-up to Beijing 1995, repeatedly challenged the organization’s accreditation as a Catholic body (Holy See Mission 1997b, 1997a).

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 81 7 Personal communication with G.D. Desumala III and C. Mangale, 30 Mar. 2015 and 26 Apr. 2016. 8 More information at Faith and Feminism Civil Society Working Group to the United Nations, https://faithfem.squarespace.com/about/ (accessed 3 Apr. 2017). 9 For the full list, see Side by Side, ‘Member Organisations’, http://sidebysidegender. org/member-organisations/ (accessed 3 Apr. 2017). 10 Interview with F. Haase, 15 Mar. 2015. 11 Interview with G.D. Desumala III, 30 Mar. 2015. 12 Cf. the debate at the CSW side-event ‘Developing an Islamic Response to Combating and Speaking Out against Gender-based Violence’, organized by Islamic Relief Worldwide in New York on 15 Mar. 2016. 13 Interview with S. Sonneveld, 23 Mar. 2016. All quotations in this section are from this source. 14 Interview with A. Karam, 24 Mar. 2016. 15 Interview with J. O’Brien, 29 Mar. 2016. All quotations in this section are from this source. 16 More information at Catholics for Choice, ‘Opposition Watch’, www.catholicsforchoice. org/library/opposition-watch/ (accessed 2 Apr. 2017). 17 Interview with J. O’Brien, 29 Mar. 2016. All quotations in this section are from this source.

References Beittinger-Lee, V., 2017. Catholicism at the United Nations in New York. In: J.R. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 177–94. Buss, D., 1998. Robes, relics and rights: The Vatican and the Beijing conference on women. Social and Legal Studies, 7 (3), 339–63. Buss, D. and Herman, D., 2003. Globalizing family values: The Christian right in international politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Butler, J., 2006. Born again: The Christian right globalized. London: Pluto Press. Catholic Institute for International Relations, 2015. Statement (E/CN.6/2016/NGO/12). Catholics for Choice, 2013a. Statement at the Commission on the Status of Women: Challenges and achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for women and girls: A Catholic perspective. E/CN.6/2014/NGO/20. New York, NY: United Nations. Catholics for Choice, 2013b. The Catholic Church at the United Nations: Church or state? Washington, DC: CFC. Catholics for Choice, 2014. Catholics for choice. Washington, DC: CFC. Chappell, L., 2006. Contesting women’s rights: Charting the emergence of a transnational conservative counter-network. Global Society, 20 (4), 491–520. Haynes, J., 2014. Faith-based organizations at the United Nations. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Higer, A.J., 1999. International women’s activism and the 1994 Cairo Population Conference. In: M.K. Meyer and E. Prügl, eds. Gender politics in global governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 122–41. Holy See Mission, 1997a. Holy See delegation challenges NGO accreditation of ‘Catholics for a free choice’ to United Nations women’s conference. In: C.J. Marucci, ed. Serving the human family: The Holy See at the major United Nations conferences. New York, NY: Path to Peace Foundation, 854.

82 Ann-Kristin Beinlich Holy See Mission, 1997b. Holy See delegation questions accreditation of ‘Catholics for a free choice’. In: C.J. Marucci, ed. Serving the human family: The Holy See at the major United Nations conferences. New York, NY: Path to Peace Foundation, 853. Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009. Reproductive health policy. Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide. Joachim, J.M., 1999. Shaping the human rights agenda: The case of violence against women. In: M.K. Meyer and E. Prügl, eds. Gender politics in global governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 142–60. Joachim, J.M., 2007. Agenda setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender violence and reproductive rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Juergensmeyer, M., 2003. Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Knox, G., 2002. Religion and public policy at the UN: A Religion Counts report. Washington, DC: Religion Counts. Neale, P.R., 1998. The bodies of Christ as international bodies: The Holy See, wom(b)an and the Cairo Conference. Review of International Studies, 24, 101–18. Nordmann, Y. and Birnbaum, M., 2003. Die aktuelle Biomedizin aus der Sicht des Judentums. In: S. Schicktanz, C. Tannert, and P. Wiedemann, eds. Kulturelle Aspekte der Biomedizin: Bioethik, Religionen und Alltagsperspektiven. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 84–106. Obaid, T.A., 2009. Opening address and welcome. In: United Nations Population Fund, ed. Policy roundtable with faith-based organizations: Strengthening partnerships for population and development. New York, NY: UNFPA, 10–14. Priests for Life, 2014. Statement at the Commission on the Status of Women. E/CN.6/2015/ NGO/127 [online]. Available from: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/ CN.6/2015/NGO/127 [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Priests for Life, 2015. Statement at the Commission on the Status of Women. E/CN.6/2016/ NGO/13 [online]. Available from: http://undocs.org/E/CN.6/2016/NGO/13 [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Promundo and United Nations Population Fund, 2016. Strengthening CSO-government partnerships to scale up approaches engaging men and boys for gender equality and SRHR: A tool for action. Washington, DC, New York, NY. Reese, T.J., 2005. Im Inneren des Vatikan: Politik und Organisation der katholischen Kirche. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Sjørup, L., 1999. The Vatican and women’s reproductive health and rights: A clash of civilizations? Feminist Theology, 7 (21), 79–97. United Nations General Assembly, 2000. United Nations Millennium Declaration. A/ RES/55/2. New York, NY: United Nations. United Nations General Assembly, 2015. Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. A/RES/70/1. New York, NY: United Nations. United Nations Population Fund, 2004. Programme of action: Adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5–13 September 1994. New York, NY: UNFPA. United Nations Population Fund, 2009. Policy roundtable with faith-based organizations: Strengthening partnerships for population and development. New York, NY: UNFPA. United Nations Population Fund, 2016. Religion, women’s health and rights: Points of contention and paths of opportunities. New York, NY: UNFPA. Vik, I., Stensvold, A., and Moe, C., 2013. Lobbying for faith and family: A study of religious NGOs at the United Nations. Oslo: Norad.

‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply’ 83 West, L.A., 1999. The United Nations women’s conferences and feminist politics. In: M.K. Meyer and E. Prügl, eds. Gender politics in global governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 177–93. Wichterich, C., 2015. Sexuelle und reproduktive Rechte. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. World Council of Churches, 2007. Statement at the Commission on the Status of Women: Ecumenical Women: Justice for the poor and care for life and creation continue to be at the heart of the matter. E/CN.6/2008/NGO/37. New York, NY: United Nations. World Council of Churches, 2013. Oral statement. New York, NY: WCC.

5

Faith-based organizations and international development in a post-liberal world Gerard Clarke1

Introduction Many of the largest religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs) registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) are active in the field of ‘international development’, promoting improved human well-being in low- and medium-income countries through the provision of aid and associated measures. These include the big four faith-based development NGO networks: Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE, International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity), the ACT Alliance, World Vision International (WVI), and Caritas Internationalis.2 These networks rank among the largest and best-resourced civil society networks involved in international development, due not only to co-funding from official development agencies but also to generous support from the faithful, making them less dependent on official funding than their secular peers and better able to mobilize supporters or volunteers.3 Although this book focuses on RNGOs, I use the term ‘faith-based organizations’ (FBOs) in reference to organizations which represent the focus of this chapter, firstly, because the term has acquired a wide currency in the international development literature and policy world and, secondly, because some of the organizations registered with ECOSOC, and explored in this book, are faith-based rather than religious (a distinction explained further below). As much as possible, I discuss FBOs which are ECOSOC-registered, but I also discuss other FBOs whose activities frame the context in which ECOSOC-registered FBOs work across the globe. To distinguish between them, ECOSOC-registered FBOs mentioned in the following discussion appear with an asterisk symbol (*) following their name. Since the late 1990s, FBOs active in the promotion of international development have benefitted from a revision or erosion of the secularist policies of multilateral organizations and of the Western governments which provide much of their funding. Today, many multilateral and bilateral agencies have dedicated staff, policies, and programmes to sustain relationships with faith communities and with FBOs. This comparatively new ‘faith and development’ interface was challenging for development agencies and for faith communities alike. Prior to the breakthrough, Western official donors were largely ambivalent about the relationship between

RNGOs and international development 85 faith and development and about the activities of most FBOs.4 Heavily influenced by the separation of church and state in liberal democracies, they felt that religion and faith were largely counter-developmental, that religious discourses with strong historical resonance were relatively inflexible and unyielding in the face of social and political change.5 The antipathy was often reciprocated. Faith leaders invariably saw themselves as defenders of traditional moral values amid the onslaught of secular modernity, and many were wedded to a paternalistic view of poverty and the poor, ready to advocate the charitable obligations of the faithful but less willing to advocate for political and social change that benefitted the faithful as citizens as much as dutiful believers. With notable exceptions, the main faiths emphasized the spiritual and moral dimensions of poverty at the expense of the material, and representative organizations avoided poverty-focused social engagement and dialogue with governments and donors. Today, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) count among the leading multilateral organizations committed to engagement with faith communities. As significant multilateral organizations, the Bank and the UNDP sometimes function as epistemological rivals in their competing efforts to influence the international development community. The World Bank was the first prominent multilateral to engage with FBOs in the context of international development, but as the Bank has retreated, the UNDP has become more prominent in sustaining the evolving faith and development dialogue. Building on the Bank’s ‘Faith and the Environment’ programme which ended in 2005, for instance, the UNDP has established a close relationship with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) since 2009, working to involve faith communities in support of the environmental targets associated with the UN Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) and their successor, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).6 Other UN agencies have also sought dialogue with FBOs on the post-2015 development agenda or on the subsequent SDGs (see, for instance, UNFPA 2014 and 2015), much of it conducted through the UN InterAgency Task Force on Religion and Development (UN-IATF RD) established in 2007 (see, for instance, UN-IATF RD 2015 and 2016). Today, plenty of issues divide secular-minded and development-focused official agencies from their faith-based interlocutors and partners. For official, including UN, agencies, these include the sexual and reproductive rights of women; appropriate measures to fight the spread of communicable diseases and to support those affected; proselytising by Christian and Islamic organizations; the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender individuals and communities; and the necessary civic or peaceable basis of public religion (issues where a minority of ECOSOC-registered FBOs adopt contrarian positions). For FBO leaders and representatives, they include a continuing lack of faith literacy in development agencies; the enduringly secular language used in initiatives such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); the liberal or cosmopolitan attack on traditional family values; and competing emphases on the non-material (including spiritual) versus the material dimensions of poverty, deprivation, and exclusion. For the most parts, these issues define the sharp edges of the faith

86

Gerard Clarke

and development interface. In practice, this means that FBOs such as WVI* can be mediators in some contexts (e.g. in the provision of support to communities) and polarizers in others (e.g. opponents of the sexual and reproductive rights of women in particular contexts). Secular-minded and development-focused agencies, including UN agencies, must therefore negotiate an organizational landscape in which FBOs vary according to their organizational characteristics, religious mandates, and programmatic activities. As I argue in the following sections, however, these tensions have been amplified in recent years by the rise of conservative nationalism and by the parallel retreat from multilateralism and from transnational dialogue based on the language of tolerance and respect.7 In the following section, I argue that FBOs come in many institutional forms and deploy faith-based or religious values in different ways in the context of international development. I then explore the rise of conservative nationalism and the contributory role of strident religious discourses before considering the implications for organizations most closely associated with the ‘faith and development’ interface. In the last section, my conclusion, I explore some of the distinct challenges for official development agencies and for FBOs arising from the emergence of a post-liberal world. In keeping with the aims of the volume, the chapter explores variations in the role of FBOs as mediators or polarizers through reference to their own characteristics and mandates and through an exploration of the wider and changing political environment in which they operate.

Faith-based organizations and international development The term ‘faith-based organization’ comes from the United States and, in contrast to the term ‘religious organizations’, encompasses a range of spiritual traditions, such as Rastafarianism, Confucianism, the Church of Scientology, Zoroastrianism, or the Falun Gong, represented in the UN by organizations such as Federation of Zoroastrian Associations of North America* and the International Rastafari Development Society*. These faith traditions sit alongside the established and carefully codified ‘book’ religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, Buddhism, Shinto, or Daoism, which account for the majority of ECOSOC-registered RNGOs and FBOs. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, the term ‘FBO’ refers to any nongovernmental organization (NGO) which derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings or principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within the faith (Clarke and Jennings 2008, p. 6), and the analytical focus here is on organizations involved in (1) public policy debates and associated political contests in the context of international development; (2) social and political processes that impact directly or negatively on the global poor; and (3) direct efforts to support, represent, or engage with the global poor (Clarke 2008, pp. 24–5). Box 5.1 sets out a typology of FBOs that are relevant in this context, and many of these institutional types have played a direct or indirect role in the recent rise of conservative nationalism, either as polarizers or as mediators.

RNGOs and international development 87

Box 5.1 A typology of faith-based organizations Faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies: rule on doctrinal matters, govern the faithful, and represent them through engagement with the state and other actors; Faith-based charitable or development organizations: mobilize the faithful in support of the poor and other social groups, and fund or manage programmes which tackle poverty and social exclusion; Faith-based socio-political organizations: interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, organizing and mobilizing social groups on the basis of faith identities but in pursuit of broader political objectives or, alternatively, promote faith as a socio-cultural construct, as a means of uniting disparate social groups on the basis of faith-based cultural identities; Faith-based missionary organizations: spread key faith messages beyond the faithful by actively promoting the faith and seeking converts to it or by supporting and engaging with other faith communities on the basis of key faith principles; Faith-based radical, illegal, or terrorist organizations: promote radical or militant forms of faith identity, engage in illegal practices on the basis of faith beliefs, or engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the grounds of faith. Source: Clarke (2008), p. 25

Charitable or development organizations are the most immediately significant in the context of international development because of their close programmatic and funding-based relationships with official donors and include UK organizations such as Christian Aid* or Islamic Relief*, German organizations such as Misereor or Brot für die Welt*, or significant international networks such as World Vision International*. Representative or apex bodies are important as interlocutors of government and of official development agencies alike and include, in a UN context, the World Evangelical Alliance*, the World Jewish Congress*, and the Bahá’í International Community*. Most ECOSOC-registered FBOs fit into one of these categories, but beyond them sit a range of other institutional forms which official donors can find challenging to engage productively. Socio-political organizations, for instance, are often based on significant membership and hold potential to influence government policy as well as the views of their constituents. They can also be important providers of social services such as education. But their stridently partisan political nature can also prove challenging for official development agencies keen to avoid contentious politics. These include Saudibased organizations promoting Wahhabi and Salafi currents of Sunni Islam across the globe, including the International Islamic Relief Organization*, an affiliate of the Muslim World League*.

88

Gerard Clarke

Missionary organizations (in the Christian tradition) or those committed to daw’ah (spreading the word of God) in the Islamic tradition can be problematic interlocutors of official donors, since they can work closely with the poor to provide desperately needed public goods and services, but their commitment to proselytising directly challenges the secular nature of official donor policy and its commitment to non-discrimination (where it leads to helping people on the basis of creed, rather than need).8 Radical, illegal, or terrorist organizations are the most difficult to engage but can be important where the extreme poor, the current focus of international development (via the UN SDGs), are concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected states. The close relationship between poverty and fragility in such countries makes it essential that official donors understand (at minimum) the organizations that are relevant on the ground and look for opportunities to productively engage with them directly or through intermediaries, for instance, to negotiate food or medical supplies to vulnerable civilians or to extract refugees or civilians in need of medical attention. Beyond this institutional typology, it’s also important to recognize the different ways in which FBOs deploy faith-based values in their activities. Box 5.2 sets out a typology of ways in which faith is used in the work of FBOs relevant in the context of international development. UK organizations such as Christian Aid* or

Box 5.2 The use of faith in the work of FBOs Passive: Faith is subsidiary to broader humanitarian principles as a motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters and plays a secondary role in identifying, helping, or working with beneficiaries and partners. Active: Faith provides an important and explicit motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters. It plays a direct role in identifying, helping, or working with beneficiaries and partners, although there is no discrimination against non-believers, and the organization supports multi-faith cooperation. Persuasive: Faith provides an important and explicit motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters. Plays a significant role in identifying, helping, or working with beneficiaries and partners and provides the dominant basis for engagement. Aims to bring new converts to the faith or to advance the faith at the expense of others. Exclusive: Faith provides the principal or overriding motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters. It provides the principal or sole consideration in identifying beneficiaries. Social and political engagement is rooted in the faith and is often militant or violent and directed against one or more rival faiths. Source: Clarke (2008), pp. 32–33

RNGOs and international development 89 Islamic Relief*, for instance, wear their faith fairly lightly. Faith is used to mobilize the support of the faithful but plays almost no role in the provision of support to beneficiaries or in the hiring of staff, defining features of the passive stance. In the active case, organizations such as World Vision* or Tearfund*, inspired by evangelical or Pentecostal discourses (for instance), can try to influence staff or beneficiaries religiously or spiritually, and the distinction between need and creed can become operationally blurred. Missionary or daw’ah-inspired organizations, such as the Ghana-based God’s Harvest Foundation* or the Saudi-based World Muslim League*, deploy faith in a persuasive manner, combining the provision of services such as health, education, or microfinance with active proselytising. Donor organizations usually require them to strictly separate these two distinct aspects of their work, with donor support of the service delivery mission but with contractual prohibitions on public funding for proselytising activity. In practice, however, relevant FBOs can find it difficult to maintain these distinctions in their operations. The final category can be the most difficult and problematic since relevant organizations can be significant providers of public goods and services and can establish fruitful relationships with operational partners. But the work of strident organizations such as Samaritan’s Purse (a multi-national evangelical Christian relief agency) can stimulate inter-faith tension in local contexts and complicate the work of FBOs committed to inter-faith dialogue.9 Similarly, exclusivist organizations such as the multi-national Barnabas Fund, supporting persecuted Christians around the world, can militate against inter-faith dialogue by supporting one community relative to others, fostering resentment or criticism.10 As the following sections reveal, FBOs of all hues, regardless of how they deploy faith in their work, have been directly and indirectly affected by the rise of conservative nationalism with consequences which are explored in the conclusion.

Polarizing FBOs and the rise of conservative nationalism The rise of conservative and populist nationalism in the aftermath of the international economic and financial crisis of 2008 has significant implications for FBOs. In the next section, I explore the impact on charitable and development FBOs operating internationally, many of which serve as mediators in the context of international development. In this section, however, I explore the role of key representative organizations, socio-political organizations, and radical, illegal, or terrorist organizations which have contributed directly and indirectly to its rise. These organizations therefore serve as examples of polarizers, and their activities, ostensibly confined within national boundaries, resonate transnationally and internationally, propelled by media reportage and the aggressive social media campaigns of some governments, complicating the role of FBOs which act as mediators within the UN or in other multilateral forums. Conservative nationalism arises in the context of a distinct rage against the global, against the economic, social, and political aspects of globalization which have, or which are perceived to

90

Gerard Clarke

have, upset domestic orders and caused wrenching social dislocation, especially in the period since 2008–09. A key phenomenon in this regard is the putatively relentless march of secular modernity, often perceived to be a universalizing and totalizing ideology which erodes the national sense of amour propre and its cultural distinctiveness and uniqueness. This nationalism is invariably atavistic, seeking a return to a romanticized and an idealized past when the nation was reputedly great and its culture homogenous, proud, and distinct. Conservative, populist, and atavistic nationalism comes in various combinations, but it invariably challenges liberal political arrangements in democratic or democratizing nation-states, through disruptive politics or the discrediting of politics-as-usual, through the simplification of political diagnostics, through the coarsening or hardening of political language and through the invocation of victimhood and the demonization of distant others. The phenomenon, arguably, can be traced to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia from the late 1980s and the rise of Slobodan Milošević, a fiery Serbian nationalist leader charged with war crimes for his role in the violent persecution of national and religious minorities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo before he died in a prison cell in The Hague in 2006.11 Milošević’s close links to leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church during his years in power helped to consolidate his social and political power base during the years of violent nationalist, ethnic, and religious conflict that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. In contemporary times, Milošević’s style of rule and promotion of religious conservatism as an adjunct to a political strategy of conservative and atavistic nationalism is most closely reflected in the rise of Vladimir Putin as prime minister and president of the Russian Federation.12 Putin was relatively distinctive on the world stage for much of the 2000s,13 but the phenomenon of conservative nationalism took root towards the end of the decade after the global economic and financial crisis began in 2007–08. Benjamin Netanyahu, for instance, was elected prime minister of Israel in 2009, Xi Jinping became the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, Narendra Modi became prime minister of India in 2014, and Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in 2016. Following Trump’s election, three of the five permanent member-states of the UN Security Council are currently in the grip of conservative nationalism (Russia, China, and the US). Add to this mix a Brexit-era United Kingdom, and four out of five permanent members were ruled in 2017 by leaders committed to conservative nationalism and to a variable retreat from multilateral commitments. Further add to the mix leaders such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary (elected to a third term in April 2018), Recep Erdoğan in Turkey (elected as president in 2014), Beata Szydło in Poland (elected 2015) and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines (elected in 2016), and it becomes evident that across the world the liberal order of the post–World War II period is under threat amid the emergence of a distinct postliberal model or regime-type, fuelled by a multi-faceted but distinct rage against the global. Religious nationalism has long been a significant phenomenon in national politics, but it has taken on an increasingly international significance in recent

RNGOs and international development 91 decades as the global village becomes smaller and more connected. As the United Nations Development Programme argued in 2004: Political activism for cultural domination exists in all major religions. In the United States, Christian extremists bomb abortion clinics. In India, Hindu extremists have fomented anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, even as Muslim extremists have targeted Hindus. The Jewish Gush Emunim, a militant settler group, aims to recreate a Biblical Israel and has used violence to expel Palestinians. The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria threatens to kill those who do not pray and women who choose not to wear a headscarf. In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which claimed to be associated with Buddhism, poisoned commuters on the Tokyo subway system in 1995. (UNDP 2004, pp. 74–5) As this suggests, religious nationalism has been a factor in international politics since the late 1970s14 and accelerated in the early 1990s amid the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and allied states and the rise of identity politics. It subsided in the first decade of the new millennium, but it has risen again in recent years, serving as an important adjunct to conservative, populist, and atavistic nationalism, with many conservative or nationalist FBOs in different national contexts helping to propel or consolidate the phenomenon. Putinism, the distinctive philosophy or ideology of Vladimir Putin, for instance, is a distinct form of Russian nationalism linked to a continuing process of de-Sovietization, and it is rooted in an increasingly symbiotic relationship between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church, where Putin provides state resources in return for political support (e.g. through the return of public buildings owned by the Church in the pre-1917 period).15 Similarly in China, Xi Jinping’s tough approach to political dissent and his retreat from further economic liberalization has been grounded in a persistent invocation of political, moral, and spiritual Confucianism, as he seeks to expound a distinct ideology of benevolent rule (much as Putin tries to foster a distinctly Russian form of managed democracy) and engage in further de-Maoification of the Chinese Communist Party.16 In the meantime, the rights of religious minorities, including Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, and the Buddhist-inspired Falun Gong, are carefully circumscribed. The pattern is replicated in other major powers. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used his years of office (from 2003), first as prime minister and then as president, to roll back the secular nationalism associated with Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the contemporary Turkish state, and to promote a creeping Islamization of society and the state. In doing so, he has skilfully played on voters’ resentment at decades of secular rule by pro-European elites, popularly known as ‘White Turks’, when Islamic practices, such as the wearing of the head scarf, were restricted and disparaged (Shaheen 2017). In the process, Erdoğan parted ways in 2013 with former colleague Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric closely associated with a moderate and cosmopolitan form of Islam with which Erdoğan became increasingly disenchanted.17 Following a clumsy military coup attempt

92

Gerard Clarke

in July 2016, which Erdoğan blamed on Gülen and the supporters of Hizmet, the Gülenist social movement (estimated to have the support of 10 per cent of the Turkish population (Beaumont 2016)), a systematic purge led to the arrest of 50,000 and the sacking or suspension of 100,00 people in one year (Kingsley 2017), including journalists, academics, and military or police officers, and the closure of organizations, including schools, colleges, and universities suspected of membership of, or association with, Hizmet or its US off-shoot, the Alliance for Shared Values. Erdoğan’s victory in the April 2017 constitutional referendum heralds the introduction of a new constitution that will expand presidential power and potentially keep him in office until 2029, consolidating conservative (including religious) nationalism and the roll-back of the secular state in Turkey. Similarly in India, Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014 through the consistent invocation of Hindutvah, or Hindu nationalism, and through the Sangh Parivar, an alliance of Hindutvah organizations, including the ruling Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP); the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, translated as National Volunteers’ Corps of Self-Help Organizations) (a mass membership and right-wing socio-political organization); Rashtra Sevika Samiti (a women’s organization committed to traditional Hindu notions of femininity); and Sewa Bharti & Sewa International (the ostensibly charitable and development arms of the RSS).18 Leader of the BJP and a member of the RSS, Modi was chief minister of Gujarat state during the inter-communal riots in 2002 when up to 2,000 people were killed and 150,000 driven into refugee camps, and his state administration was directly implicated in the riots (Nussbaum 2009, pp. 50–1). In office, Modi has been careful not to inflame secularist passions, but in early 2017 he provoked controversy in appointing Yogi Adityanath as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, with over 200 million people. A firebrand Hindu spiritual leader, Adityanath heads the Hindu Yuva Vahini (HYV), a Hindu nationalist youth movement accused of stoking religious tensions between Uttar Pradesh’s 40 million Muslims and its Hindu majority. In office, Adityanath has been accused of targeting butcher’s shops and abattoirs, mostly run by Muslims, to discourage consumption of cow and buffalo meat in a state where the slaughter of both animals remains legal, while the HYV has been accused of discouraging inter-religious relationships, especially between Muslim men and Hindu women, and of attacking Christian organizations suspected of proselytising (Safi 2017). In the US, Donald Trump was barely aware of Modi’s example in India when campaigning for the office of president in 2016, but his campaign bears brief comparison with that of Modi and the BJP in its calculated promotion of faith-based or religiously charged contentious politics. As the candidate of the Republican Party, Trump reached out to disaffected conservatives and anti-liberals, through social media, the ‘alt right’ (alternative right) press, and ‘super-PACs’ (independent political action committees (PACs) formed to support a particular candidate and offering anonymity to donors). This included disaffected religious conservatives from a variety of traditions but rooted especially in outsider organizations associated with the evangelical and Pentecostal churches which have flourished

RNGOs and international development 93 in recent decades. Trump reached out successfully to born-again Christians, evangelical outsiders and advocates of the controversial ‘prosperity gospel’ (as well as more mainstream Christians) and secured the support of prominent televangelists including Jerry Falwell Jr and Joel Osteen,19 as well as ‘super-PACs’ targeted at evangelical voters such as ‘We Serve USA’ and allied advocacy groups, such as InService USA or Concerned Women of America (Easley 2016). He did this by promising to appoint conservative and anti-abortion justices to the federal benches and to the Supreme Court, to restore the Reagan-era ‘global gag rule’ (or the ‘Mexico City policy’ of 1981) (prohibiting federal funding of organizations which putatively promote abortion or sterilization through services to support the sexual and reproductive rights of women), and to repeal the 1954 ‘Johnson Amendment’ which limits the ability of religious leaders to participate in partisan or personality-focused political campaigns. The ‘Johnson Amendment’ allows Church ministers, for instance, to condemn abortion from the pulpit as a contravention of scriptural command, but it forbids ministers from commanding ‘Don’t vote for candidate X because s/he supports abortion.’ The Amendment was partially repealed by Executive Order on 5 May 2017, partly as a result of lobbying by the Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty* (Burke 2017), potentially paving the way for new ‘super-PACs’ committed to faith-based lobbying and advocacy, dragging faith leaders further into the milieu of partisan and contentious politics, and provoking faith-based tension between moderate and strident faith groups and their leaders.

Conservative nationalism and its consequences for mediating FBOs The rise of conservative nationalism has significant consequences for a range of FBOs committed to international development, exacerbating the challenges which they already faced in 2017, including the challenge of mediating the different forms of international cooperation and dialogue on which international development depends. These challenges arise in significant part from the juxtaposition of two diametrically opposing trends. On the one hand, the international community faced a series of unprecedented humanitarian crises. Compounding the humanitarian crisis in Syria, in which 6.3 million people were internally displaced and 5 million lived in besieged cities and hard-to-reach areas (International Committee of the Red Cross 2017), an additional 20 million people were at risk of starvation due to conflict or drought in four separate countries: Yemen (7 million people), Somalia (6.2 million), South Sudan (4.9 million), and northeast Nigeria (1.8 million) (Pilling 2017). According to Stephen O’Brien, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, ‘At the beginning of the year [2017], we are facing the largest humanitarian crisis since the creation of the United Nations’ (ibid). This further compounded a deteriorating global humanitarian situation which challenged the institutions of global governance. In his opening remarks at the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016, for instance,

94

Gerard Clarke

the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued a global call to action in the context of unprecedented challenges in the new millennium: The world is at a critical juncture. We are witnessing the highest level of human suffering since the end of the Second World War. Nearly 60 million people, half of them children, have been forced from their homes due to conflict and violence. The human and economic costs of disasters caused by natural hazards is also escalating. In the last two decades, 218 million people each year have been affected by disasters, at an annual cost to the global economy that now exceeds US$300 billion. (UNFPA 2016) But in opposition to this unprecedented humanitarian need, levels of official development assistance (ODA) have been falling in real terms since 2013 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015), aid fatigue and aid scepticism have become engrained in many Western countries,20 and both personal and corporate donations to leading charities have been falling, according to the Department for International Development (DFID) (2016, p. 9). The problem of rising demand for humanitarian relief amid declining supply of funding and public support for it, however, is exacerbated by the contemporary rage against the global and the rise of conservative nationalism. In the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, the UK’s proposed withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit) will adversely affect faith-based relief and development agencies, potentially drawing them into alignment with UK conservative nationalism. First, with the change of government following the EU referendum of June 2016 has come a significant reform of relationships between the DFID and associated civil society organizations (CSOs), including FBOs (ibid). Under these reforms, CSOs are now expected ‘to deliver results for the world’s poor and for the British public’ (my italics) (DFID 2016, p. 6), a significant new focus on the national interest. CSOs will also be expected to compete to a greater extent for funding, with large CSOs losing access to ring-fenced and policy-based funding. Four large faith-based relief and development agencies (Christian Aid*, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), WVI*, and Islamic Relief*), for instance, will lose access to upfront unrestricted core funding through Programme Partnership Agreements and will now compete with other CSOs for DFID funding against a backdrop of declining support from the British public and from corporate and institutional donors (DFID 2016, p. 9). Secondly, UK withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2019 will potentially cut the EU’s development cooperation budget, including the 13 per cent which it courses through NGOs.21 UK faith-based relief and development agencies will potentially lose access to EU funding, while other EU-based FBOs may also see their funding cut. Together, the EU and its 28 member-states constitute the world’s largest supporters of international development, providing over half of international aid (Watkins 2016), while the EU’s development cooperation spending makes it the world’s largest source of multilateral aid, providing more

RNGOs and international development 95 than twice the aid funded, for instance, through the World Bank’s International Development Association facility (ibid.). The UK provides approximately 11 per cent of the EU’s total budget22 and 14 per cent of the EU’s development cooperation funding.23 The loss of this funding, if it happens, will hit both European and developing country FBOs supported by the EU and undermine EU programmes in fragile and conflict-affected countries in which inter-faith cooperation is central to peace-building and a resilient social fabric. In the United States, however, the consequences for FBOs have been more farreaching following the election of Donald Trump as president and his assumption of office in January 2017. Trump’s attempts, in his first year in office, to limit travel to the US from a number of Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, to temporarily suspend refugee movements from the region, and to favor asylum applicants from members of religious minorities in the Middle East (i.e. nonMuslims) have been stalled by the courts, but they have also provoked widespread opposition from US-based FBOs involved in refugee resettlement or international humanitarian action.24 In addition, many FBOs, including mainstream Protestant and liberal Jewish organizations, have opposed the restoration of the ‘global gag rule’ (and the broadening of its scope to all US-funded global health assistance), prohibiting the award of American government funding to NGOs working overseas which provide information on abortion as a family-planning option. The restoration will primarily affect secular NGOs, especially the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) (the world’s largest non-governmental provider of reproductive and sexual health care services to women in low and medium income countries) and Marie Stopes International (MSI), but it will also affect the work of IPPF and MSI partners in at least thirty countries, faith-based and secular alike.25 The ban, for instance, will cost the IPPF an estimated US$100 million over four years and endanger the lives of millions of women and girls unable to secure reliable access to contraceptive services (Sengupta 2017; Mutiga 2017). The wider scope of the ‘global gag’ rule became apparent in early April 2017 when the State Department announced the termination of US funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) because, it claimed, the organization ‘supports, or participates in the management of, a program of coercive abortion and involuntary sterilization’, a claim denied by the UNFPA (Reuters 2017). US funding, the UNFPA responded, ‘has saved tens of thousands of mothers from preventable death and disabilities’, suggesting that its termination will endanger the lives of women around the world. A more existential concern arises, however, from Trump’s outline budget for the first full financial year of his administration forwarded to Congress in March 2017. This proposes a 24 per cent cut in the budget of the State Department, including a 32 per cent reduction in budget of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (a State Department agency) and in US funding to the United Nations, including support for the UN SDGs, an ambitious plan widely supported by most ECOSOC-registered FBOs or RNGOs (Tabuchi 2017; Gnanaselvam 2017). A proposed cut of 31 per cent in the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency, including the proposed termination of the

96

Gerard Clarke

US$70 million Climate Protection Program, will also involve less US funding of measures in support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the associated treaty signed in Paris in December 2015 (Tabuchi 2017). Allied to a significant proposed increase in Defense Department spending, the budget involves an anticipated pivot in US diplomacy from the projection of soft power to a renewed assertion of hard power. These moves threaten to roll back the significant work of US and other international FBOs to promote international public policy to fight poverty and fragility and to tackle global collectiveaction problems. Threats to the effective collaboration between FBOs and multilateral donors, however, are evident in developing as well as developed nations. In Indonesia, for instance, the moderate Islamic social movements Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah* have tens of millions of members or beneficiaries each and function as socio-political organizations (campaigning on issues such as human rights and democratic reform) and as social service providers, delivering health and/or education services (see, for instance, Hefner 2000). They have helped to maintain a relatively liberal political culture in which, for instance, it is possible to be both Muslim and gay (or transgender).26 Both have been adversely affected, however, by the conflict between traditional Indonesian Sunni Islam and contemporary transnational Islamism (or radical political Islam) based on Wahhabi and Salafi schools of jurisprudence indigenous to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf region. Muhammadiyah*, for instance, implements projects for the benefit of women and children in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and lobbies for greater respect in Indonesia and abroad for the rights of women enshrined in international human rights law. It depends on a democratically constituted public sphere to engage in lobbying and advocacy but finds this space constricted by rising religious tension, for instance, Islamist opposition to the former governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (commonly known by his Hakka Chinese nickname, ‘Ahok’), and to demands that he be convicted on charges of blasphemy and of insulting Islam.27 Elected in 2014, Ahok contended with significant opposition to his position as the first non-Muslim to hold the powerful role of governor of Jakarta. In a speech at a rally in September 2016, he referred to Verse 5:51 of the Quran,28 arguing that it neither prevented him from holding office as a non-Muslim nor obliged pious Muslims to vote against him.29 In response, Islamist organizations, including the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), organized a large anti-Ahok rally in Jakarta in November 2016, accusing him of blasphemy and of insulting Islam, and generating popular pressure which forced the authorities to press charges against him. Due to the resultant court case, Ahok was unable to contest the Jakarta gubernatorial elections of February and April 2017, and in May 2017, he was sentenced to two years in jail. The jailing of Ahok and the wider anti-Ahok movement has destabilized the government of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as ‘Jokowi’) and polarized a society noted for its moderate and civic Islam. Since his election, Jokowi has moved to the right, in some respects, to secure his position (for instance, by lifting a moratorium on the execution of people

RNGOs and international development 97 convicted of capital offences), but his government is not conservative nationalist, and it has avoided recourse to conservative religious values to broaden its appeal or shore up its support base. The case of Indonesia under Jokowi, however, illustrates the role of conservative religious populism in undermining the legitimacy of democratically elected governments which labour to defend the cause of religious pluralism.

Conclusion In an episode of the fictional US TV series The West Wing, the president’s expected quiet morning is ruined by media reports of American ‘hostages’ in Sudan, after twelve US aid workers are detained on charges of proselytizing.30 Later that day, a congressman with two constituents among the twelve pleads their case with the president, arguing that they were working for an American relief NGO and that they were not proselytizing (acknowledging the illegality of Christian proselytizing in Sudan). In discussion with the president, however, he concedes that his constituents are ‘religious’. ‘If someone asks them what it means to be Christian’, he explains, ‘of course they’re gonna answer’. Later, a report from US diplomats on the ground notes that the congressman’s constituents were in possession of eighteen bibles and a video of the lives of the apostles when arrested. ‘Did the NGO know about this?’ asks the president of his chief of staff. ‘They never identified themselves as evangelists,’ the latter replies. ‘Undercover agents?’ asks the president. ‘Spies for Christ? Yeah,’ comes the weary response, as the chief of staff contemplates the diplomatic tussle ahead. The storyline highlights a profound challenge for Western governments and for international development, including UN, agencies: how to harness the latent empathy of the faithful for the plight of their brethren in developing countries while maintaining the impartiality, and the respect both for national sovereignty and the cultural (including religious) diversity of host and beneficiary communities, which they are usually charged to uphold. This challenge is particularly apparent in the present climate. In recent years, the focus of international development efforts has changed significantly. From fighting extreme poverty in lowincome countries, the focus is now on promoting social stability and institutional resilience in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In this context, the concern of this volume to distinguish between the role of FBOs as mediators and as polarizers is particularly relevant, since the shift in focus from poverty to fragility creates new challenges for faith-based and secular organizations alike, as religious conflict, and wider ethno-cultural conflict, threaten stability and resilience in fragile states. Mediating FBOs which have long played an important role in fighting poverty are now challenged to help promote this resilience by supporting interreligious dialogue and respect for the rights of religious minorities. Recent initiatives such as ‘Christian Witness in a Multi-Religious World: Recommendations for Conduct’ (2011),31 which seeks to replace the traditional focus of Christian missionary organizations on proselytizing, or bringing new converts to the faith, with a new focus on witnessing, or standing in solidarity with host and beneficiary

98

Gerard Clarke

communities, or the 2016 Marrakesh Declaration, calling for the respect of religious minority rights in Muslim-majority countries,32 can play a significant role here by promoting ideational change and new norms of behaviour which allow some proselytizing FBOs to move from being polarizers in specific national contexts to mediators helping to promote solidarity and understanding across national boundaries. The contemporary rage against the global and the rise of conservative nationalism, however, endanger these efforts and add a new dimension to the challenge. Over the last twenty years, official development agencies have sought dialogue and partnership with faith communities and associated organizations, and a distinct ‘faith and development’ policy interface has developed over that time, contributing new ideas, new funding streams, and new institutional mechanisms to the international development effort. Today, however, donor agencies and FBOs alike face significant challenges as a result of the rise of conservative nationalism and the retreat from multilateral commitments which it entails. In the case of the United Kingdom, for instance, projected exit from the European Union in 2019 may well entail the termination of British funding to the EU’s development cooperation budget, worth UK £976 million (EU €1,141 million) in 2016 (Stevens 2017). This will undermine the EU, the world’s largest provider of multilateral development assistance, with a potential fall of about 14 per cent in its development cooperation spending following Brexit. This will adversely affect both UK and EU FBOs which avail of EU funding and may cut EU funding to fragile and conflict-affected countries where FBOs work to promote peace and interfaith dialogue through their relief and development interventions. In the case of the United States, a projected cut of 28 per cent in the budget of the State Department for the 2018 financial year will lead to substantial reductions in allocations to the United States Agency for International Development, and to the UN, including support for the UN SDGs. The US has already announced the termination of official funding to the UNFPA, worth US$75 million in 2015 (Solomon 2017), with further announcements expected in due course. The restoration of the ‘global gag’ rule (or ‘the Mexico City policy’) (the justification for the termination of UNFPA funding), will harm secular NGOs predominantly and strengthen strident FBOs, or polarizers, campaigning against reproductive and sexual health-care services for women in low- and medium-income countries, endangering their lives. While the rise of conservative nationalism in Western contexts (for instance the United Kingdom and the United States) threatens to damage the relationship between development and faith communities built up over twenty years, its rise in non-Western contexts presents a more formidable range of challenges. As development policy becomes increasingly concerned with institutional fragility in weak and conflict-affected states, policies of conservative, populist, and atavistic nationalism pursued by governments in medium- and low-income states threaten to divide societies and to sow ethnic, cultural, and religious divisions which increase fragility in already weak and conflict-affected states or which undermine the delicate social fabric in countries where progress and stability has been interconnected and hard-won.

RNGOs and international development 99 In his 2011 autobiography, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair predicted a twenty-first century characterized by novel forms of conflict, including religious conflict: [H]ow different faiths and different cultures relate to each other, learn to work and live with each other, will quite possibly be the determinative issue of the twenty-first century . . . [T]his century is unlikely to see the repetition of the clashes of fundamental political ideology which so marked and scarred the twentieth century, but it could easily be a century shaped by clashes of cultural or religious ideology. (Blair 2011, p. xlii) In some respects, the prediction seems alarmist, echoing Samuel Huntington’s controversial 1997 thesis of an emerging ‘clash’ of religiously rooted ‘civilizations’ (Huntington 1997). The recent rise of conservative nationalism, however, appears consistent with such predictions, not least in highlighting the central role of religious nationalism in contemporary international affairs. Conservative nationalism comes in many forms, and in each of the countries in which it is evident, it has its own dynamics. But invariably, religious nationalism is a component part. In the United States, for instance, Christian conservatives oppose the construction of mosques or burn down existing ones. In Israel, the coalition government of Benjamin Netanyahu includes religious parties such as United Torah Judaism, Shas, and Jewish Home, variously committed to the establishment of a Jewish state and the expulsion of Palestinians. In Sri Lanka, the government, representing the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, has refused to make substantive concessions to Muslims or to Hindu Tamils since the end of the civil war in 2009, hindering reconciliation and consociationalism. In India, the Hindu nationalist government is empowering sectarian Hindu leaders in heartland states such as Uttar Pradesh. In Saudi Arabia, despite tentative reforms, the government continues to tolerate the export of Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines by organizations and activists, fuelling tension among Muslim communities in other countries. Contemporary conservative nationalism and its corollary, religious nationalism, threaten much of the progress achieved over the last twenty years as a result of formal dialogue and partnership between development agencies and faith communities, and the work of mediating FBOs. It also threatens important UN initiatives, including the SDGs 2016–2030. Conservative and populist nationalism now challenges faith communities and associated FBOs afresh to build bridges in place of walls or, in the language of political scientist Robert Putnam, to promote bridging (inclusive) in place of bonding (exclusive) forms of social capital (Putnam 2000, pp. 22–3). Amid the emergence of a distinct post-liberal order in international relations, the compact between development agencies and faith communities may need to be reformulated and remade anew. Priorities for UN agencies, for instance, include reaching beyond the development and representative organizations that deploy faith in a passive or active manner, the focus of donor engagement efforts to date, and to engage with other organizations,

100

Gerard Clarke

including socio-political, missionary (proselytizing), and radical organizations which deploy faith in a persuasive or exclusive manner (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.2), organizations which can function as polarizers in the context of international relations. But this requires sustained dialogue and creative normative and institutional approaches to engagement that will test the capacity of UN agencies. The challenge, however, is as important as it is huge.

Notes 1 I am grateful to the editors of, and contributors to, this volume for valuable feedback on the first draft of this chapter at a workshop in the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in March 2017 and to the editors for helpful suggestions on subsequent revised drafts. I am also grateful to my departmental colleagues Emel Akcali and Eugene Miakinkov for helpful comments. I remain responsible, however, for any errors of fact or omission here. 2 CIDSE is a coalition of 17 official Catholic development agencies committed to social justice, whose members usually draw inspiration from the Vatican II reforms and from liberation theology; ACT Alliance is a network of over 150 Protestant church, humanitarian, and development agencies, mostly associated with mainstream/mainline Protestant churches affiliated to the World Council of Churches. It replaces the former Association of Protestant Development Agencies (APRODEV). WVI is a network of World Vision national organizations in North America, Europe, and Australasia inspired by evangelical and Pentecostal branches of Christianity and active in relief, development, and advocacy activities; and Caritas Internationalis is a network of Catholic agencies which is more conservative than CIDSE and more directly influenced by orthodox Catholic social teaching. For further details of each of these organizations, see their websites: CIDSE: www.cidse.org/; ACT Alliance: http://actalliance. org/; WVI: www.wvi.org/; and Caritas Internationalis: www.caritas.org/ (all accessed 25 Jan. 2018). 3 See, for instance, Clark (2003, pp. 131–6), in which these agencies dominate the top ten international NGO networks by volume of ODA received, occupying, for instance, three of the top five places. 4 This paragraph draws on text in Clarke and Jennings (2008, p. 1). 5 Illustrating this position, Alastair Campbell, Chief of Staff to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, famously remarked in 2003 that ‘We don’t do God’. Highlighting the ambiguous nature of the assertion, however, he did so to stop his boss talking about his Christian beliefs in an interview with a reporter (See Brown, 2003). 6 In November 2009, UNDP and ARC held a meeting (‘Many Heavens, One Earth’) at Windsor Castle, England, in which representatives of nine major faiths made thirty-one long-term commitments to environmental action; in 2011, in a meeting in Nairobi organized by ARC, ARC partners from eleven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa agreed to a series of long-term environmental action plans; while in September 2015, a UNDPARC meeting of faith representatives in Bristol, England (‘Faith in the Future’), led to agreement of ‘the Bristol Commitments’, or ‘Faith plans for a sustainable future’, a series of commitments in support of the UN SDGs. See ARC (2017). 7 In the forthcoming discussion, I refer to ‘conservative’, as well as to ‘populist’ and ‘atavistic’, nationalism. Some state nationalism today is both radical (left-wing) and populist, for instance, in the regimes of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and (to a lesser extent) Evo Morales in Bolivia, but this left-wing nationalism is not relevant to the analysis here, as neither leader has sought to invoke religious doctrine in support of nationalist ideology while both have been respectful of religious minorities. 8 The principle of non-discrimination, or helping people on the basis of need, not creed, is also enshrined in the Red Cross Code of Conduct (1995), although the Code does not prohibit proselytizing.

RNGOs and international development 101 9 Samaritan’s Purse can work effectively with secular organizations, including UN agencies, but its strident approach to proselytizing can also provoke inter-faith tension. In El Salvador, for instance, it has provoked tension between the Catholic majority community and local Protestant evangelical churches. According to Dr Paul Chiles, Samaritan’s Purse country director in El Salvador, ‘We are first a Christian organization and second an aid organization . . . We can’t really separate the two’ (Gonzalez 2001). 10 The Fund has criticized Muslim refugees for persecuting Christian refugees in the Middle East and has recently been accused of anti-Semitism as a result of its support to Eritrean Christian refugees (see https://barnabasfund.org/news/Barnabas-Fundstatement-on-recent-criticism). A similar organization, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, has been consistently (and controversially) denied accreditation by the UN NGO Committee (see Freedom of Religion or Belief 2016). 11 Milošević served as president of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 1997 to 2000 (the FRY later broke up to become the separate states of Serbia and Montenegro). Milošević was first charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1999. He was arrested by FRY officials in 2001 and extradited to The Hague to face trial before the ICTY. 12 Putin served as prime minister from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012. He served as president from 2000 to 2008 and again from 2012 to the present. 13 His closest peer being perhaps Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey (see further below). 14 Especially with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the parallel rise of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. 15 In early 2017, for instance, negotiations were underway between the governor of the region of St. Petersburg and officials of the Russian Orthodox Church for the return of Saint Isaac’s Cathedral in St Petersburg, one of the most beautiful buildings in the city and currently a state museum. The governor is expected to act, however, on instructions from Moscow (Luhn 2017). 16 See, for instance, Economist (2015) and Page (2015). 17 Until 2013, Erdoğan had been content for Gülenists to infiltrate state institutions, believing that this aided his objective of purging these institutions of Kemalist secularists. 18 On the Sangh Parivar and its component parts, see Jaffrelot (2008). 19 See, for instance, Dias (2016) 20 In the UK, for instance, aid fatigue has been evident since 2010, in reaction to the global economic crisis of 2008-09 and the atmosphere of austerity which it induced in many countries. A DFID survey in February 2010 revealed that 35 per cent of people supported further aid spending, down from 49 per cent in 2008, while 53 per cent believed that ‘most aid is wasted’, up from 47 per cent. See DFID (2010, p. 2). 21 See www.seekdevelopment.org/seek_donor_profile_eu_april_2012.pdf. UK funding to the EU’s development cooperation programme may, of course, survive Brexit, not least because it will be difficult for the government to reallocate almost UK£1billion of spending, although this currently seems unlikely given the current popular political climate in the UK and to the antipathy both to the EU and to foreign aid spending. 22 The UK provided 11 per cent of the budget for 2007–2013. See Cipriani (2014, p. 20). 23 An estimate, based on extrapolating the figure for UK contributions to the European Development Fund budget for 2008–2013 (US$3.4 billion or 14 per cent) to the EU’s total development cooperation spending during this period (of which the EDF accounted for 44 per cent). See www.seekdevelopment.org/ seek_donor_profile_eu_ april_2012.pdf. 24 For a list of these FBOs, see Jenkins (2017). 25 See, for instance, Pro-Choice America (2017). 26 Although the terms ‘gay’ and ‘transgender’ are invariably seen both as Western and as inherently political and thus are largely avoided by gay and transgender Muslims in Indonesia.

102

Gerard Clarke

27 Personal communication with N. Azizah, Head of the Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMS), 9 Feb. 2017. 28 ‘O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed he is [one] of them. Allah guides not the wrongdoing people’. 29 In the process, Ahok touched on a wider debate among Muslims whether to interpret individual verses of the Quran in isolation or contextually (in the context of the Quran as a whole) (personal communication with N. Azizah, see endnote 26). 30 In Episode 9 of Series 5, first broadcast in 2003, titled ‘Abu El Banat’ (Arabic for ‘Father of Daughters’). 31 A joint initiative of the World Council of Churches, the World Evangelical Alliance, and the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. See for instance World Council of Churches (2011). 32 An initiative of the Moroccan king and government and of supportive Sunni Islamic scholars. See Marrakesh Declaration (2016).

References Alliance of Religions and Conservation, 2017. Faith in the future: The faiths and the Sustainable Development Goals. Bath: Alliance of Religions and Conservation (in association with UNDP). Beaumont, P., 2016. Fethullah Gülen: Who is the man Turkey’s president blames for the coup attempt? The Guardian [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ jul/16/fethullah-gulen-who-is-the-man-blamed-by-turkeys-president-for-coup-attempt [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Blair, T., 2011. A journey. London: Arrow Books. Brown, C., 2003. Campbell interrupted Blair as he spoke: ‘We don’t do God’. The Daily Telegraph [online]. Available from: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1429109/Campbellinterrupted-Blair-as-he-spoke-of-his-faith-We-dont-do-God.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Burke, D., 2017. Donald Trump’s big, bizarre religious day. CNN [online]. Available from: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/trump-religion/index.html [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Cipriani, G., 2014. Financing the EU budget: Moving forwards or backwards? London: Rowan & Littlefield. Clark, J., 2003. Civil society and the battle for ethical globalization. London: Earthscan. Clarke, G., 2008. Faith-based organizations and international development: An overview. In: G. Clarke and M. Jennings, eds. Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: Bridging the sacred and the secular. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 17–45. Clarke, G. and Jennings, M., 2008. Introduction. In: G. Clarke and M. Jennings, eds. Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: Bridging the sacred and the secular. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–16. Department for International Development, 2010. Public attitudes towards development: Spring 2010. London: DFID & TNS. Department for International Development, 2016. Civil society partnership review. London: DFID. Dias, E., 2016. Donald Trump’s prosperity preachers. Time [online]. Available from: http:// time.com/donald-trump-prosperity-preachers/ [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Easley, J., 2016. Carson allies to target evangelicals with pro-Trump super-PAC. The Hill [online]. Available from: http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/282150-carson-alliesto-target-evangelicals-with-pro-trump-super-pac [Accessed 14 December 2017].

RNGOs and international development 103 Economist, 2015. Confucius says, Xi does. The Economist [online]. Available from: www. economist.com/news/china/21659753-communist-party-turns-ancient-philosophysupport-confucius-says-xi-does [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2016. Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) – in full [online]. Available from: https://forbinfull.org/ [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Gnanaselvam, S., 2017. Opinion: Federal budget claims support for evidence but slashes funding for it. Devex news [online]. Available from: www.devex.com/news/opinionfederal-budget-claims-support-for-evidence-but-slashes-funding-for-it-90515 [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Gonzalez, D., 2001. U.S. Aids conversion-minded quake relief in El Salvador. The New York Times [online]. Available from: www.nytimes.com/2001/03/05/world/us-aidsconversion-minded-quake-relief-in-el-salvador.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Hefner, R.W., 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Huntington, S.P., 1997. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017. Syria in focus [online]. Available from: www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/middle-east/syria [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Jaffrelot, C., 2008. Hindu nationalism and the social welfare strategy. In: G. Clarke and M. Jennings, eds. Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: Bridging the sacred and the secular. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 240–59. Jenkins, J., 2017. A list of faith groups opposing Trump’s new Muslim ban. Think Progress [online]. Available from: https://thinkprogress.org/faith-groups-opposing-new-muslimban-d88a75caea/#.odlhbl52c [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Kingsley, P., 2017. Mysteries, and a crackdown, persist, a year after a failed coup in Turkey. The New York Times [online]. Available from: www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/world/europe/ turkey-erdogan-failed-coup-mystery.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Luhn, A., 2017. Plan to hand control of St. Petersburg cathedral to church sparks outcry. The Guardian [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/ plan-to-hand-control-of-st-petersburg-cathedral-to-church-sparks-outcry [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Marrakesh Declaration, 2016. The rights of religious minorities in predominantly Muslim majority countries: Legal framework and a call to action [online]. Available from: www. marrakeshdeclaration.org/ [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Mutiga, M., 2017. How the US global gag rule threatens health clinics across Kenya and Uganda. The Guardian [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2017/jan/24/how-the-us-trump-global-gag-rule-threatens-health-clinicsacross-kenya-and-uganda [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Nussbaum, M.C., 2009. The clash within: Democracy, religious violence and India’s future. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press & Harvard University Press. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015. Development aid stable in 2014 but flows to poorest countries still falling [online]. Available from: www. oecd.org/dac/stats/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-stillfalling.htm [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Page, J., 2015. Why China is turning back to Confucius. The Wall Street Journal [online]. Available from: www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-is-turning-back-to-confucius-14427 54000 [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Pilling, D., 2017. Why is the world facing worst humanitarian crisis since 1945? Financial Times [online]. Available from: www.ft.com/content/bbf48ad8-08af-11e7-ac5a903b21361b43 [Accessed 24 January 2018].

104

Gerard Clarke

Pro-Choice America, 2017. Effects of the global gag rule: Examples from around the world [online]. Available from: www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2.Effects-of-the-Global-Gag-Rule.pdf [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Reuters, 2017. US withdraws funding for UN Population Fund [online]. Available from: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-un-populattionfund/u-s-withdraws-funding-for-u-npopulation-fund-idUSKBN17600T [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Safi, M., 2017. Rise of Hindu ‘extremist’ spooks 40 million Muslim minority in India’s heartland state. The Observer [online]. Available from: www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/mar/26/modis-man-flexes-muscular-hinduism-shock-election [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Sengupta, S., 2017. Trump revives ban on foreign aid to groups that give abortion counselling. The New York Times [online]. Available from: www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/ world/trump-ban-foreign-aid-abortions.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Shaheen, K., 2017. Erdoğan faced death for us: Adulation fuels president’s bid to tighten his grip on power. The Observer, 2 April. Solomon, F., 2017. U.S. ends funding for UN reproductive health agency, claiming links to abortion. Time [online]. Available from: http://time.com/4724227/unfpa-funding-trumpmexico-city-policy-abortion/ [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Stevens, J., 2017. Foreign aid soars by £1.2 Billion . . . . The Daily Mail [online]. Available from: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4382132/UK-aid-spending-10-EU-revises-sizeeconomy.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. Tabuchi, H., 2017. What’s at stake in Trump’s proposed E.P.A. Cuts? The New York Times [online]. Available from: www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/climate/trump-epa-budgetcuts.html [Accessed 24 January 2018]. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, 2015. Highlights of FBO engagement by United Nations entities 2013–2015 [online]. Available from: www. partner-religion-development.org/fileadmin/Dateien/Resources/Knowledge_Center/ UNIATF-ToR-and-2014-Overview.pdf [Accessed 27 April 2017]. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, 2016. Engaging religion and faith-based actors in 2016: Annual report of the United Nations inter-agency task force on engaging faith-based actors for sustainable development [online]. Available from: www.partner-religion-development.org/service/news-archive/article/new-annualreport-engaging-religion-and-faith-based-actors-in-2016-published-by-un-task-force/ [Accessed 2 May 2017]. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, 2015. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Engaging Faith-Based Actors for sustainable development and humanitarian work: Highlights of FBO engagement by United Nations entities 2013–15. New York, NY: The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, 2016. Engaging Religion and Faith-Based Actors in 2016: Annual report of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Engaging Faith-Based Actors in sustainable development. New York, NY: The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development. United Nations Development Programme, 2004. Human development report 2004: Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world. New York, NY: UNDP. United Nations Population Fund, 2014. Religion and development post-2015: Report of a consultation among donor organizations, United Nations development agencies and faith-based organizations. New York, NY: UNDP.

RNGOs and international development 105 United Nations Population Fund, 2015. Realizing the faith dividend: Religion, gender, peace and security in agenda 2030. New York, NY: UNFPA. United Nations Population Fund, 2016. World Humanitarian Summit [online]. Available from: www.unfpa.org/events/world-humanitarian-summit [Accessed 14 December 2017]. Watkins, K., 2016. What would a Brexit mean for EU development assistance. Devex [online]. Available from: www.devex.com/news/what-would-a-brexit-mean-for-eudevelopment-assistance-88265 [Accessed 14 December 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2011. Christian witness in a multi-religious world [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/inter religious-dialogue-and-cooperation/christian-identity-in-pluralistic-societies/christianwitness-in-a-multi-religious-world [Accessed 14 December 2017].

6

Religious NGOs and the quest for a binding treaty on business and human rights Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

Introduction Since the 1970s, various attempts have been made in the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations to negotiate a binding treaty on the rights and obligations of transnational corporations (Sagafi-nejad 2008; Mantilla 2009). These attempts are linked to broader debates about the responsibilities of corporations in society. From the very beginning religious actors have influenced this debate. An early example is the Sullivan Principles that aimed at improving the situation of non-white employees of US corporations in apartheid South Africa. Reverend Leon Sullivan (minister of the Zion Baptist Church in Philadelphia) was the main figure behind the initiative (Bernasek and Porter 1997). This chapter analyzes the role of religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs) in the debate on business and human rights. The focus is on two recent initiatives under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC): the development of the voluntary UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that were endorsed by the HRC in 2011, and the recent and still ongoing process of negotiating a binding treaty on business and human rights since 2014. The need for regulation of corporate activities is most visible at the local level where corporations are directly and indirectly involved in human rights violations and cause environmental degradation which may have a negative impact on human rights. The most serious corporate violations of human rights take place in the Global South. In general, NGOs are considered to be very influential in this policy field (ConiZimmer and Flohr 2015; Yaziji and Doh 2009). They make corporate human rights violations public. They target companies directly through cooperative and confrontational strategies (Coni-Zimmer 2012) such as blaming and shaming tactics or offer dialogue to improve corporate practices. In addition, NGOs target corporations indirectly by advocating regulation of corporate activities in host and home states of corporations as well as in international organizations. Most NGOs agree that there is a strong need for stricter regulation. We expect RNGOs to play important roles at the local, national, and international level in this policy field. Many RNGOs and other religious actors have ties to communities around the world. Their engagement at the local level not only supports and empowers

RNGOs and business and human rights

107

people affected by corporate operations, but networks of religious organizations can also be used to report and make human rights violations known to the public. Such information can be used for advocacy purposes in home states of corporations as well as in international organizations. We will start by mapping the policy field that is the debate about the regulation of transnational corporations in the United Nations. We will briefly summarize different initiatives that have been developed since the 1970s. The focus will, however, be on two recent ones: the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the negotiations on a binding treaty that are taking place in an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) of the HRC. After that, in the main part of this chapter we will analyze the positions and strategies of different RNGOs in these two international processes. The RNGO cases analyzed include the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE, International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity), and Franciscans International. We also include information about some international RNGOs that are passively following the debate but have not made the issue a priority and about the engagement of RNGOs at the national level in Germany. It will be shown that RNGOs are often engaged in civil society networks, such as the Treaty Alliance, a global campaign that advocates a binding treaty on business and human rights. Analysis of the debate on business and human rights shows that the positions of RNGOs and their strategies are hard to distinguish from those of secular organizations. We reflect on some of the reasons for this in the concluding part of the chapter. In addition, we will discuss why only very few religious organizations have made the current international debate on a binding treaty a priority and why the organizations engaged come exclusively from Christian traditions.

Policy field: regulation of transnational corporations Since the 1970s, there have been many attempts in the United Nations to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. This includes the intergovernmental negotiations on a code of conduct from the 1970s until the early 1990s, the development of the UN Draft Norms on Business and Human Rights by an expert commission, and the establishment of the UN Global Compact in 1999 (Sagafi-nejad 2008). More recent initiatives are the development of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011 and the new attempt to negotiate a binding treaty on business and human rights in an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2014. Early attempts to regulate transnational corporations During the late 1960s a debate emerged about the negative influence of transnational corporations in developing countries. The controversy on how to contain this influence unfolded in the context of discussions of the New International

108

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

Economic Order advocated by the newly independent developing countries who were demanding a more just economic world order. Negotiations about a code of conduct for transnational corporations started in the 1970s and brought to the surface conflicts that are still present in debates until today. Among the major issues are whether a code should be binding or voluntary for corporations, the legal status of corporations in international law, what kinds of corporations would be regulated (private and/or state-owned, large and/or small and medium-sized), and what role the UN should play in monitoring implementation (Brewer and Young 1998; Sagafi-nejad 2008). Negotiations ended in a stalemate and were formally concluded without an agreement in 1992. The World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 1992 is usually identified as a watershed in relations between the UN and the private sector. The private sector was referred to as an important partner in the solution of global problems in the summit’s outcome document (Coni-Zimmer 2014, pp. 166–7). Moreover, the debate about corporate social responsibility (CSR) gained increasing attention during the 1990s. CSR is concerned with the responsibilities of corporate actors in society beyond legal obligations under the conditions of globalization (Vogel 2008). Related to the discussion about CSR is the growing reliance on voluntary standard initiatives that have emerged since the 1990s. The idea is that corporations commit voluntarily to implementing these standards, whether for normative reasons or as a consequence of a cost-benefit analysis (Flohr et al. 2010). The emerging partnership paradigm culminated in the launch of the UN Global Compact in 1999–2000. The Global Compact was initiated by then UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, who had closely consulted with the business community beforehand. The idea is that corporations voluntarily commit themselves to implementing in their business activities nine (later ten) broad principles in the areas of human rights, social standards, the environment, and anti-corruption (Rieth 2009). From the very beginning the Global Compact has been criticized – especially by NGOs – for its voluntary approach that allows corporate ‘bluewashing’, in other words corporations enhancing their reputation by engaging with the UN without changing business practices. Taking a different approach, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established an expert working group in 1997. The Working Group itself decided to develop a binding instrument that became known as the UN Norms. It included not only provisions on human rights but also on consumer and environmental protection (Mantilla 2009, pp. 285–7). Ultimately, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided in 2004 not to consider the draft. One of the reasons for this decision was certainly the strong lobbying by economic actors. In contrast, most NGOs welcomed the UN Norms because of their binding character (Mantilla 2009, p. 288). The UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights Despite ignoring the UN Norms, the issue of business and human rights remained on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights. In 2005 – at the request of

RNGOs and business and human rights

109

the Commission – UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed political science professor John Ruggie as Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (Mantilla 2009, p. 289). What followed was an intensive consultation process with a diverse set of stakeholders organized by the UN Special Representative outside the formal UN system. This means that states, international organizations as well as NGOs and actors from the private sector engaged in this process, e.g. by making written submissions and participating in hearings, workshops, and conferences. Participation was not bound to having consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Moreover, consultations took place in different regions and were therefore more easily accessible for a broad range of actors.1 The participation of the private sector that supported Ruggie’s mandate was remarkable and stands in stark contrast to processes that take place within the United Nations system where the private sector is usually only represented by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE). Both organizations have ECOSOC consultative status. During the Ruggie process, a broad range of large transnational corporations as well as many law firms provided input and expertise. Some even provided financial and other support for Ruggie’s mandate, a procedure which attracted some criticism (Martens 2014, pp. 16–17). In 2011, the HRC endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as proposed by Special Representative John Ruggie. The Guiding Principles rest on three pillars: the first is the state duty to protect human rights, the second is referred to as the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the third deals with access to remedies for victims of corporate human rights violations (Ruggie 2014, p. 7). The HRC also agreed on follow-up mechanisms, but these can be characterized as rather weak. They include the establishment of a working group of five independent experts and an annual Forum on Business and Human Rights that takes place in Geneva. In addition, the development of National Action Plans has been called for by the working group (UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2016). The business community was supportive of the work done by Ruggie and welcomed the resulting UN Guiding Principles. The NGO community was more critical because of the non-binding nature of the Principles. Some prominent organizations even asked the HRC not to endorse the Principles because they mainly confirmed the status quo (Martens 2014, p. 17). The Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) The process of implementing the UN Guiding Principles had hardly started when Ecuador and other states sponsored a resolution at the Human Rights Council proposing the establishment of an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group tasked with negotiating a binding treaty on business and human rights.2 One crucial difference between the Ruggie Process and the OEIWG concerns the actors involved in the process. The OEIWG is at the core an intergovernmental forum where states take center stage and negotiate. Participation in the OEIWG is open

110

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

to all member as well as observer states of the UN and to NGOs having consultative status with ECOSOC. The private sector’s interests are represented by the IOE and the ICC. There was broadening participation in the OEIWG sessions, with some sixty states participating in its first session in 2015 and more than eighty states taking part in 2016 (Seitz 2016). For the third session in 2017, a draft elements paper was developed which contains a sketch of provisions to be included in a future treaty.3 Despite the early stage of the negotiation process, some conflict lines are already discernible. The major (norm) conflict is between states that are in favor of a binding treaty and those which are against it. The resolution establishing the OEIWG was only voted for by twenty states, while fourteen voted against it, and thirteen abstained. Among those voting against the resolution were major economic powers such as Germany, France, Japan, and the United States (HRC 2014), which argued that the development of a binding treaty would endanger the consensus built around the UN Guiding Principles and the progress made in their implementation (Martens and Seitz 2016, pp. 22–3). The conflict is far from being resolved, and it is not clear whether and how important states, including those from the EU, will participate in the OEIWG process. At a lower level from this general conflict over the necessity of a binding treaty there have been controversies over which corporations are to be regulated; which human rights a future treaty should cover; what rights and duties states and corporations should have; how access to remedy could be realized for victims, including questions of corporate legal liability and extraterritorial obligation; and what kinds of implementation mechanisms should be established (HRC 2016, 2017; Martens and Seitz 2016). The role of NGOs The NGO community has rallied around the macro-demand4 for a binding treaty and formed the Treaty Alliance (TA), whose membership includes RNGOs (see the next section of this chapter). While all members are generally in favor of a binding treaty, they have varying ideas about its form and content. In addition, it is important to distinguish between those NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status that can formally participate in the proceedings of the OEIWG5 and other NGOs. A large number of the latter group was present in Geneva at the time of the OEIWG sessions. As members of the TA they participate in preparations by civil society organizations for the negotiations and engage in lobbying of state delegations. In addition, they prepare and participate in side and public events. The TA has formulated some general demands regarding a treaty in its statements, the latest of which was signed by more than 900 organizations and more than 1,300 individuals (TA 2017). These demands include that the negotiations in the OEIWG should lead to an effective legally binding treaty to ‘enhance the protection of affected individuals and communities against violations related to the operation of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (TA 2017). The TA has reaffirmed the primary obligation of states to protect human rights

RNGOs and business and human rights

111

and demands that states should be obliged to regulate corporations, including their extraterritorial operations. It also calls upon states to ensure effective access to remedy for victims of corporate operations and to establish an international monitoring mechanism. Moreover, the TA has published a principled statement on corporate capture to prevent the undue influence of the private sector ‘whose primary interest in the process falls outside the objective of promotion and protection of human rights’ (TA 2016). These very general demands correspond to the phase of negotiations where a draft treaty is not yet available. Under the umbrella of the TA, a more radical approach is being pursued by the ‘Global Campaign to Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Corporate Impunity’ (Global Campaign 2017). The network is more grassroots-based and comprises over two hundred social movements, organizations, and affected communities. Activities pursued include the development of an alternative ‘Peoples Treaty’ as an instrument for formulating grievances and a vision of how regulation should look from the perspective of those affected. Being more radical, the network explicitly criticizes the capitalist economic system, framing corporate human rights violations as ‘the expression of systemic injustice of capitalism’ (Global Campaign 2017).

The role of religious NGOs In this section we analyze the engagement of RNGOs that have either been active in the Ruggie process and/or the negotiations of the OEIWG. There are huge differences in levels of engagement by RNGOs. Few RNGOs have made the debate about business and human rights a priority, while many others are supporting the process passively. We present three short case studies of international RNGOs (ICCR, CIDSE, and Franciscans International) that have shown a substantial level of engagement in the debate. We also include examples of NGOs that are engaged to a lesser degree. In addition, we refer to the engagement of RNGOs at the national level, taking the Treaty Alliance Germany as an example. Our analysis is based on scholarly literature as well as on primary sources. The latter include documents related to the Ruggie process and to the work of the OEIWG such as submissions of NGOs and other documents published by different stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with some NGO representatives engaged in the policy field to gain additional insights into the role of RNGOs. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)6 The ICCR is a faith-based NGO located in New York and probably the most prominent RNGO active in the field of CSR. Founded in 1974, it is not a classic advocacy organization. Instead, it focuses on issues of ethically responsible investment and advises members on ‘how to use their stockholdings to reform a wide range of corporate behaviors’ (Ermann and Clements 1984, p. 186). Two prominent issues the ICCR dealt with in the 1970s were the role of US corporations in apartheid

112

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

South Africa and the marketing of breast-milk substitutes in African countries. Today, membership is ‘open to any institutional investor regardless of the size of its portfolio, faith-based or secular, interested in the promotion of corporate social responsibility’ (ICCR 2017b). However, only religious organizations enjoy full membership rights. The ICCR is not related to a specific religious tradition or belief but instead emphasizes that its ‘faith heritage is embodied in our coalition’s inspiration to seek justice and act on behalf of those who are more vulnerable’ (ICCR 2017c). Still, members mainly come from the Christian tradition, with some outreach activities to other traditions taking place. In the area of responsible investment, the organization and its members mainly use three strategies: dialogue with corporations on critical issues, convening multistakeholder roundtables, and filing stakeholder proposals at corporate meetings. Currently, priority issues include corporate governance, climate change, food, and human rights (ICCR 2017a). As part of its human rights engagement, the organization and members have ‘provided input and support for the creation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (ICCR 2013, p. 5; ICCR 2011). The ICCR made a submission to the Ruggie process in 2006 (no download available). In 2008, it supported a joint statement made by religious and non-religious responsible investors to the Human Rights Council in favor of the framework developed by the Special Representative and asked the HRC to extend the mandate for another three years (Statement by Socially Responsible Investors 2008). In 2011, the ICCR welcomed the Guiding Principles as ‘a defining framework for that needs to be done to improve the on-the-ground impact of corporations on the full range of human rights’ (ICCR 2011). In its current work on human rights, the organization uses the Guiding Principles as the global reference framework because they establish ‘the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in company operations and supply chains’ (ICCR 2017a). The organization has no consultative status with ECOSOC, and it seems that it has not been active in connection with the treaty process. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE, International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) CIDSE is a network organization of eighteen Catholic development agencies from Europe and North America. Founded in 1967, the organization is based in Brussels and became registered at ECOSOC in 2007. CIDSE regards itself as part of both the church community and the civil society. As a sister organization of Caritas Internationalis, CIDSE works closely with the Holy See, and its work is accompanied by an ecclesiastical assistant.7 Unlike Caritas, it is not part of the institutional church, instead maintaining a status as an independent NGO under Belgian law. The protection of human rights is the most important goal in realizing CIDSE’s vision of a ‘society based on social, economic and gender equality and solidarity’ (CIDSE 2016). ‘Business and human rights’ is one of the organization’s four main working areas, as part of which the development of an international regulatory framework is the explicit goal.8

RNGOs and business and human rights

113

Of all the RNGOs engaged in the debate about business and human rights, CIDSE is uniquely active at both the EU and UN level. CIDSE believes that the ‘impacts of the activities of transnational corporations should be at [the] heart of development discussions’ (CIDSE 2011) because those corporations are becoming increasingly important ‘in shaping global and local economic and political structures’ (CIDSE 2011). During the Ruggie process, CIDSE was the most active RNGO, providing three submissions in the consultation process. As an advocate of a legally binding instrument from the beginning of the Ruggie process, CIDSE criticized the voluntary guiding principles as insufficient for preventing and remedying human rights abuses by corporate activities and instead considered them as a starting point that can be extended through more ambitious implementation mechanisms9 (CIDSE 2013). Since the establishment of the OEIWG, CIDSE has contributed oral and written statements, published briefings and reports, and co-organized expert panels and side events. While in recent years the focus has shifted to the more promising treaty process, the member organizations of CIDSE have continued to advocate at the national level the scaling up of the implementation of the Guiding Principles (CIDSE 2014). One example is the work of Misereor in Germany (see the section on RNGOs at the national level). Besides participating in the OEIWG, CIDSE has also taken the more indirect route of influencing EU member states and engaging with EU parliamentarians sympathetic to its position in order to take on a more assertive role in the OEIWG. Furthermore, CIDSE has developed legal content to serve as a framework for a binding treaty that would effectively protect against human rights violations by corporations. Here CIDSE focuses primarily on removing barriers to justice for affected communities and shows how the treaty could address trade and investment policies which allow companies to sue states for compensation and could thus adversely affect human rights protection (Blackburn 2017; Krajewski 2017). Strategically, CIDSE follows a strongly cooperative approach. CIDSE engages with states, international organizations, legal experts, other NGOs, and faithbased actors (cf. CIDSE 2017). CIDSE is an early member and part of the facilitation group of the TA and co-authors its statements and submissions as well as co-organizes its events with other NGOs, often including Franciscans International, Bread for the World, Friends of the Earth, or SOMO. Some of these allies are RNGOs themselves, although the primary prerequisite for cooperation is a shared vision for engendering transformational change in economic structures.10 The cooperation with mostly non-religious NGOs and the environment of the UN contribute to CIDSE arguing its positions in almost exclusively secular human rights language, being mindful of ‘the right moment and context’ for using religious language, such as in meetings with other faith-based organizations or government representatives.11 Although the role of religion is not at the forefront in CIDSE’s work, it is an important underlying principle ‘even if it is not tangible’.12 While the submissions and statements to the HRC and the OEIWG do not contain such references, other documents cite the Pope or other Catholic dignitaries, and the network maintains close relationships with church leaders (e.g. CIDSE 2017).

114

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

Furthermore, CIDSE and its member organizations often target conservative politicians in their lobbying work, approaching them with a discussion on the basis of shared moral principles and reach audiences that secular organizations cannot reach. Therefore, CIDSE sees itself as offering added value in ‘building bridges’ between different groups of actors with shared goals.13 Franciscans International Franciscans International is a faith-based NGO that was founded in 1989 as a ‘project of the Franciscan family’.14 It bases its work on Franciscan values, such as human dignity and respect for God’s creation, and aims at bringing a Franciscan voice to the UN. Franciscans International considers itself to be a faith-based human rights organization (Franciscans International 2017b). Importantly, the organization is independent of the Catholic Church and does not have to follow official positions of the church. The Franciscan network has global reach; Franciscans are active in many countries around the globe at the national as well as the local level. Achieving ‘progress towards the adoption of an international treaty effectively addressing human rights abuses by business’ is one of the main aims in the organization’s International Strategy 2017–2020 (Franciscans International 2017b, p. 5). Business and human rights ‘naturally evolved as a topic’ for the organization because Franciscans on the ground were ‘more and more concerned about the role and influence of business’.15 Transnational corporations continue to perpetrate human rights and environmental abuses through their activities . . . Affected communities . . . suffer from poor access to healthcare, violence, or the worst forms of child labour, among other human rights violations. (Franciscans International 2017b, p. 7) Franciscans International became visible and active in the international debate on business and human rights in 2014, when the prospect for a binding international treaty arose. Like CIDSE, Franciscans International shares with the large number of NGOs the macro-demand for a binding treaty: although the voluntary UN Guiding Principles are perceived as inadequate, the two processes are characterized as ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ (Franciscans International 2015, p. 3). The organization participated in sessions of the OEIGW in 2015 and 2016. It prepared written submissions (Franciscans International 2015; FIAN et al. 2016), organized side events, and is engaged in informal advocacy activities targeting states. In a written submission for the first session of the OEIWG, Franciscans International put forward general considerations regarding a binding treaty (Franciscans International 2015). For the second session, Franciscans International prepared a submission together with other NGOs, such as FIAN and Society for International Development (FIAN et al. 2016). In both submissions, concrete cases were

RNGOs and business and human rights

115

presented to demonstrate corporate involvement in human rights violations, barriers keeping remedies and reparations from reaching victims, and conclusions for the design and content of the future treaty. In addition to involvement in the formal negotiation process and in order to give grassroots activists and victims of corporate human rights violations a platform to formulate their grievances, Franciscans International engaged in organizing public and side events during the week of the session of the OEIWG.16 Side events offer an opportunity to expose certain issues that could not be articulated as freely during formal negotiations. For example, during official negotiations, NGOs would not or very rarely make reference to certain company or country cases. Rather, the focus is on general legal issues related to the treaty.17 By contrast, during side and public events, activists, particularly those from the Global South, have the opportunity to share personal experiences. All this demonstrates that Franciscans International takes a very cooperative stance. The organization has been part of the TA from the very beginning. Like CIDSE, Franciscans International is also part of a core group within the network that acts as a facilitating group. One of the aims of the campaign is to attract more states to the upcoming third round of the OEIWG. Franciscans International is engaging in informal advocacy activities in this regard. There is some ‘natural’ collaboration and division of labor with other religious NGOs, such as CIDSE (based in Brussels and more active in the EU context). However, the most important factor influencing cooperation with other civil society organizations is that substantive positions are shared.18 Franciscans International is much more principled when it comes to dialogue and cooperation with the private sector. Because the primary interest of the private sector is not the promotion and protection of human rights, Franciscans International is very critical when it comes to the idea of opening up negotiations to the private sector19 (cf. TA 2014). In the context of the treaty process, Franciscans International uses professional human rights language. Religious arguments are not very visible. This may be due to the UN environment in which the treaty negotiations take place and to cooperation with other civil society organizations. However, religious values and arguments underpin and guide Franciscans International’s engagement20 (Franciscans International 2017b, p. 1). It is obvious that Franciscans International (like any other NGO) has to communicate with different audiences, including other civil society organizations and state representatives on the one hand, and the Franciscans movement on the other. Reaching out to the Franciscan community is important, because this movement is the main source of legitimacy for Franciscans International’s work.21 Reaching different audiences means the organization may have to resort to different language and arguments. Other RNGOs active at the international level CIDSE and Franciscans International have been the most engaged RNGOs in the work of the OEIWG. Other RNGOs have been active to only a limited degree. A brief look at four other RNGOs – the World Council of Churches,

116

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

the Quaker United Nations Office, the Lutheran World Federation, and Caritas Internationalis22 – all of whom showed an interest in the OEIWG process – may provide explanations for their limited engagement. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was officially founded in 1948 and today represents the largest ecumenical community with more than 340 churches from more than 110 countries. The WCC’s core aim is the ecumenical goal of Christian unity. WCC’s Ecumenical United Nations Office seeks to help member churches and communities to more easily gain access to decision makers in the UN ‘to strengthen and enhance UN discourse and practice on issues of peace and security, sustainable development and human rights’ (WCC 2013). The rationale for the WCC’s work on human rights protection ‘is based on our biblical and theological foundations and reiterated and called forth in Holy Scripture through the voices of the prophets, the ministry of Christ and in the letters of the apostles’ (WCC 2012), which is clearly evident in biblical references and quotations on the WCC’s website and in its publications. The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) is an RNGO that seeks to ‘carry forward the Quaker traditions of patient, quiet diplomacy at the United Nations, working for a more peaceful and just world’ (QUNO 2017). It currently focuses its work primarily on the areas of peace, climate change, and human rights. QUNO’s approach is to facilitate an inclusive dialogue with all actors involved by following the Quaker ideal of ‘transformation through relationships’ (Tomlinson 2008). On issues of corporate abuse of human rights, QUNO regularly organizes events with NGO and business representatives (and other experts and stakeholders) (e.g. at the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights). QUNO emphasizes both ‘the great potential of business for sustaining peace but also the potential for exacerbating or generating conflict through ill-considered business practices’ (QUNO 2016). The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is a global communion of more than 140 Lutheran churches worldwide. The organization’s strategic priorities are theological and ecumenical work, mission, and service and advocacy work ‘to be an effective voice for justice, peace and human rights’ (LWF 2013). The LWF relies strongly on the values of its Lutheran tradition and sees the HRC as one body through which it can promote justice and human rights by organizing side events, lobbying state representatives, and offering a platform for grassroots actors (LWF 2017). Caritas started as a Catholic humanitarian organization in Germany in 1897. In the 1950s, the national Caritas organizations jointly founded the federation Caritas Internationalis (CI), which nowadays consists of more than 160 members worldwide (CI 2017a). Although its sister organization CIDSE works independently, CI has a very close relationship with the Catholic Church. Caritas Internationalis itself is based in the Vatican City state, and the Holy See appoints three of the seven members of CI’s Representative Council. CI is ‘inspired by the Gospels, by the teachings of the Catholic Church . . . to respond to humanitarian disasters, to promote integral human development and to advocate on the causes of poverty and violence’ (CI 2017b). Its publications make use of strongly religious language and refer to papal statements. On the issue of business and human rights, CI observes the OEIWG process. Some national Caritas organizations or regional

RNGOs and business and human rights

117

initiatives such as the Pan-Amazon Ecclesial Network (REPAM) work on the issue but not at the international level.23 These four NGOs showed at least some interest in the OEIWG when it was established. They are listed as participants in the first session of the OEIWG in 2015 (HRC 2016). However, their initial interest did not develop into an active and/or long-term engagement. Only Caritas Internationalis participated in the second session of the OEIWG. Furthermore, none of the organizations is active in the TA. Although Caritas Internationalis is interested in the process, it decided not to become involved more actively due to other priorities and limited resources.24 Similarly, QUNO decided after internal discussions not to engage in this negotiation process, citing limited resources as the reason for this decision.25 Another reason why QUNO may not be more active is that it differs significantly from CIDSE and Franciscans International by favoring a dialogue approach that also includes business actors. QUNO does not reject a binding treaty, but it considers the UN Guiding Principles a good basis for reducing human rights violations in the Global South that can be advanced further by increasing company-community engagement and improving the knowledge companies have about the rights of local communities (Finnegan 2013). All four organizations focus on human rights, in particular the rights of vulnerable people, as one or even the most important reason for their engagement at the UN level. What stands out is the explicitly religious justification for this engagement. The values of their religious tradition underpin the work of all RNGOs that we looked at in this study, but while CIDSE and FI use human rights language in their work, the centrality of religious values is a common feature very clearly evident on the websites and in publications of WCC, QUNO, LWF, and Caritas Internationalis. It is also noteworthy that WCC, QUNO, and LWF pursue explicitly religious goals such as mission and ecumenical unity, which give religion a different standing in their work. Activities of RNGOs at the national level Members of the TA are not only international NGOs focusing on the negotiations in the United Nations. The network also includes a much larger number of organizations and movements active at the national and local level. One example is the Treaty Alliance Germany that seeks to convince the German government to engage actively and constructively in the OEIWG negotiations (Treaty Alliance Deutschland 2017; Seitz 2016, p. 2). The Treaty Alliance Germany is a network of fifteen organizations, of which three are religious: Bread for the World, Misereor, and Christliche Initiative Romero (CI Romero) (Treaty Alliance Deutschland 2017, p. 3). Bread for the World is ‘the globally active development and relief agency of the Protestant Churches in Germany’ (Bread for the World 2017). Founded in 1958, Misereor is the German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Development Cooperation. Both organizations emphasize their reliance on local partners based in developing countries to achieve their goals. Moreover, both organizations are

118

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

active in national and, to some extent, international policy debates targeting policymakers and the broader public (Bread for the World 2017; Misereor 2017a, 2017b). The third religious organization active in the Treaty Alliance Germany is CI Romero. The organization was founded in 1981 and focuses on labor and human rights in Central America, where it strives to address injustices and poverty (CI Romero 2017). All three organizations have worked for some time on various topics related to the human rights impact of corporations and often cooperate with non-religious NGOs. For example, all three organizations are active within the German NGO network Arbeitskreis Rohstoffe (Working Group Natural Resources), which focuses on human rights and social and environmental standards in the context of natural resources and their extraction. Bread for the World and Misereor also closely collaborate with the Global Policy Forum on a project that deals with the influence of corporate actors on international policy processes (Global Policy Forum 2017, p. 16). They have also both contributed to the development of the German National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights. National Action Plans are policy documents that outline national policy strategies for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles (UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2016). The German consultation process was organized by Germany’s Foreign Office in 2015 and included stakeholders from business, academia, and civil society. The National Action Plan was finally released in December 2016 and was immediately criticized by German civil society organizations for being business-friendly and weak. A detailed analysis backing this assessment was published soon after and supported by Bread for the World and Misereor (CorA-Netzwerk et al. 2017). As part of the Treaty Alliance Germany, the three RNGOs advocate for a binding treaty at the national level, such as by providing expertise for and lobbying the German government. The network has recently published a joint position paper (Treaty Alliance Deutschland 2017) which is much more substantial and detailed than the short statements of the TA. The position paper starts out from the observation that the UN Guiding Principles are non-binding and plans for implementation remain ‘toothless’ and ‘result in differing national standards’ (Treaty Alliance Deutschland 2017, p. 5, authors’ translation). The treaty process should therefore build on the Guiding Principles to develop a more effective instrument. The UN Guiding Principles and a future treaty are not portrayed as contradictory but as complementary. This is an important argument because the German government is still very sceptical about, if not opposed to, the need for a binding treaty. The position paper formulated ideas on different issues including such far-reaching proposals as the establishment of an international court for corporate human rights violations26 (Treaty Alliance Deutschland 2017). Summary of findings The findings of this study suggest that, at least in the field of business and human rights, RNGOs do not adhere to a special position or use special strategies after

RNGOs and business and human rights

119

all. RNGOs are active as part of larger civil society networks. They often cooperate with other religious and non-religious organizations. Large parts of the NGO community share a general preference for strong and binding regulation of corporate activities. However, there are also differences. One group puts more emphasis on the potential of the Guiding Principles to change corporate practices. These organizations are not opposed to a binding treaty, but they do not consider it a priority. Examples include the ICCR and probably QUNO. A second group engages in both processes, the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles and the treaty process. A third group seems to be rather disappointed with the UN Guiding Principles and their implementation and therefore focuses on the treaty process that is perceived to offer a better solution to the regulatory problem. Examples include CIDSE and Franciscans International. The analysis shows that RNGOs employ the usual repertoire of NGO strategies, meaning their strategies do not differ strongly from non-religious NGOs. Cooperation with other NGOs is a major strategy employed by RNGOs. There are ‘naturally’ close relationships among RNGOs. However, RNGOs are often part of larger networks with non-religious organizations, such as the TA. The selection of partners seems to depend mainly on the commitment to the same goals in the policy field and, in addition, is motivated by the burden-sharing effects this provides for organizations with limited resources as well as by the desire to scale up pressure on states.27 This does not mean that the religious identity of these NGOs does not play a role at all. Religious NGOs are different from their secular counterparts in that they are not only motivated by human rights values but also by the values of their religious traditions. This can take different forms in practice. For some RNGOs, their religious tradition provides the source of the underlying values of their work and motivation while they pursue the same goals and use the same strategies and language as their secular counterparts. Other RNGOs explicitly pursue the goal of bringing religious goals and perspectives to the UN. The RNGOs most active in the OEIWG (i.e. CIDSE and Franciscans International) fall into the first category. Such organizations emphasize that their religious values and their tradition’s understanding of ideas such as human dignity, justice, responsibility, and stewardship of creation motivate and underpin their engagement in the debate about business and human rights.28 While religious values are visible in RNGO mission statements and organizational histories, these values are not explicitly expressed in their daily work on human rights issues in the UN. This may be due to RNGOs having to adapt to their environment to be successful. The two processes, the Ruggie process and the OEIWG, have been initiated by the UN HRC. Active participation requires a certain degree of expertise in human rights and legal issues. Another possible factor leading to more use of secular language may be the cooperation of RNGOs with non-religious civil society organizations. Networks such as the TA are largely comprised of secular organizations; the language all members can stand behind is human rights language. Being a religious organization may also offer an advantage when approaching certain target groups. For example, it may be possible for RNGOs to more

120

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

easily access conservative government officials on the basis of their reputation and shared values and moral principles. RNGOs are then able to add value to the process in their role as a bridge to audiences that are more difficult to reach for non-religious NGOs.29 Most RNGOs adopt a critical stance on involving the business sector in the process of norm development. They highlight the role of business actors as the perpetrators of human rights violations and the object of the regulatory measures that are to be developed. Moreover, their view is that the protection of human rights is not a primary interest of the business community. As a consequence, many NGOs have taken a critical stance on the broad-based participation of economic actors in the Ruggie process and are skeptical of, if not opposed to, some form of inclusion of the private sector in the OEIWG negotiations.

Conclusion Only very few RNGOs are currently strongly engaged in the negotiations in the OEIWG. This study hints at some of the reasons for this. Most international RNGOs are rather small and have only limited capacities, which force them to decide on priorities. RNGOs may then choose to prioritize other issues and invest their limited resources in areas where their position differs significantly from secular NGOs. Related to this is the fact that the negotiation of an international treaty requires legal expertise that many religious NGOs may not have readily available. What is striking is that virtually all RNGOs engaged in the international debate in this policy field seem to belong to Christian traditions. There is one caveat in that the focus of this contribution has been on the international debate in the UN and, to some degree, on the German debate, and not so much on the nationallevel activities of religious actors in countries of the Global South. This would constitute a rich field for further research. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this chapter point to the virtual absence of actors from other religious traditions in international debates. This is even more striking considering the fact that not only Christian communities around the world are affected by corporate abuse and that the Ruggie process was not limited to NGOs accredited with ECOSOC, where Christian NGOs constitute the majority (see Chapter 2 in this volume). One potential explanation lies as much in the country of origin as in the Christian traditions themselves. Although they work with partners and communities all over the world, the RNGOs in the case studies of this chapter are all based in Europe and North America, which are predominantly Christian regions. These developed world regions are where still most transnational corporations are based and where NGOs have the resources to engage in long-term and highly technical international regulatory processes. RNGOs may often feel ‘a particular moral responsibility for the actions of businesses from their own country’30 and therefore be more active in seeking the regulation of corporations at both national and international levels in order to hold actors from their own societies morally accountable. Whether RNGOs act as polarizers or mediators in the field of business and human rights is not easy to answer. They are probably neither of the two. The

RNGOs and business and human rights

121

debate can be characterized as polarized in the sense that there are two groups of states: one group of states favors voluntary standards (i.e. the UN Guidelines) and the other group favors complementing the UN Guidelines with a binding treaty. Most NGOs support the latter group of states. RNGOs belong to the huge community of civil society organizations that favor strong human rights regulation of corporate activities. However, RNGOs do not seek to contribute to a further polarization of this debate but rather to convince states belonging to the first group to become actively engaged in negotiations. At the same time, RNGOs cannot be perceived as mediators in the current debate because they have many positions regarding the regulatory problem and its solution that they advocate at the national and international level.

Notes 1 For a documentation of the process, see Business and Human Rights Resource Center (2017). 2 The full name is ‘open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (HRC 2014). 3 While conducting research for and writing this chapter, the publication of the draft elements paper was expected in the run-up to the third session of the OEIWG. The draft elements paper was made publicly available in October 2017. 4 Rietig (2016) distinguishes between macro-demands and micro-demands. Macrodemands ‘can be communicated easily as a short message to the media and unite a large group of NGOs with otherwise divergent detailed interests’ (Rietig 2016, p. 272). 5 For a list of NGOs that participated in the proceedings of the OEIWG, see Human Rights Council (2016) and Human Rights Council (2017). 6 This short organizational profile is based only on publicly available information. No interview was conducted with ICCR staff. 7 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 8 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 9 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 10 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 11 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 12 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 13 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 14 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 15 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 16 For an example, see Franciscans International (2017a). 17 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 18 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 19 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 20 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 21 Personal communication with a representative of Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017. 22 While doing research for this chapter, the authors contacted these four organizations for additional information about their engagement. In this section, e-mail correspondence with these organizations is cited as ‘personal communication’ in the endnotes. 23 Personal communication with a representative of Caritas Internationalis, 4 Sept. 2017. 24 Personal communication with a representative of Caritas Internationalis, 4 Sept. 2017. 25 Personal communication with a representative of QUNO, 6 July 2017. 26 Personal communication with a representative of Bread for the World, 26 Sept. 2017.

122

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

27 Personal communication with representatives of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017; Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017; Bread for the World, 26 Sept. 2017. 28 Personal communication with representatives of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017; Franciscans International, 12 Sept. 2017; Bread for the World, 26 Sept. 2017. 29 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017. 30 Personal communication with a representative of CIDSE, 29 Sept. 2017.

References Bernasek, A. and Porter, R.C., 1997. Private pressure for social change in South Africa: The impact of the Sullivan Principles. Review of Social Economy, 55 (2), 172–93. Blackburn, D., 2017. Removing barriers to justice: How a treaty on business and human rights could improve access to remedy for victims. Amsterdam: SOMO. Bread for the World, 2017. Who we are [online]. Available from: www.brot-fuer-die-welt. de/en/bread-for-the-world/ [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Brewer, T.L. and Young, S., 1998. The multilateral investment system and multinational enterprises. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 2017. UN Secretary-General’s special representative on business and human rights [online]. Available from: https://business-human rights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights [Accessed 19 July 2017]. Caritas Internationalis, 2017a. Governance: How Caritas is structured [online]. Available from: www.caritas.org/who-we-are/governance/ [Accessed 18 October 2017]. Caritas Internationalis, 2017b. Our mission: Towards a civilization of love [online]. Available from: www.caritas.org/who-we-are/mission/ [Accessed 18 October 2017]. Christliche Initiative Romero, 2017. Schwerpunkte [online]. Available from: www.ci-romero. de/ueberuns_cir_schwerpunkte/ [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, 2011. Business and human rights [online]. Available from: www.cidse.org/business-a-human-rights.html [Accessed 16 June 2017]. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, 2013. The UN protect, respect, remedy framework and the guiding principles: Driving change? CIDSE Briefing. Brussels: CIDSE. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, 2014. CIDSE written statement on the occasion of the UN Human Rights Council [online]. Available from: www.cidse.org/publications/business-and-human-rights/business-and-human-rightsframeworks/cidse-written-statement-on-the-occasion-of-the-un-human-rights-council. html [Accessed 16 June 2017]. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, 2016. Who we are [online], Available from: www.cidse.org/who-we-are.html [Accessed 16 June 2017]. Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, 2017. Value of a future UN treaty on businesses and human rights highlighted at EU panel debate [online]. Available from: www.cidse.org/articles/business-and-human-rights/value-of-a-futureun-treaty-on-businesses-and-human-rights-highlighted-at-eu-panel-debate.html [Accessed 16 June 2017]. Coni-Zimmer, M., 2012. Zivilgesellschaftliche Kritik und Corporate Social Responsibility als unternehmerische Legitimitätspolitik. Leviathan, Special Issue 27, 319–36. Coni-Zimmer, M., 2014. Corporate Social Responsibility zwischen globaler Diffusion und Lokalisierung: Britische und chinesische Ölindustrie im Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

RNGOs and business and human rights

123

Coni-Zimmer, M. and Flohr, A., 2015. Zwischen Konfrontation und Kooperation: Das Verhältnis zwischen NGOs und Privatwirtschaft. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Special Issue 7, 567–88. CorA-Netzwerk, Forum Menschenrechte, and Venro, 2017. Kein Mut zu mehr Verbindlichkeit [online]. Available from: www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/user_ upload/NAP_Kommentar.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2017]. Ermann, M.D. and Clements, W.H., 1984. The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and 1st campaign against marketing infant formula in the Third World. Social Problems, 32, 185–96. Finnegan, L., 2013. All voices heard: Natural resources, conflict and company-community engagement. Geneva: QUNO. Flohr, A. et al., 2010. The role of business in global governance: Corporations as normentrepreneurs. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. FoodFirst Information and Action Network FIAN International et al., 2016. Written submission for the second session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights [online]. Available from: http://franciscansinternational.org/resources/ un-work/global/ [Accessed 11 September 2017]. Franciscans International, 2015. Submission to the 1st session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human right [online]. Available from: http://franciscansinternational.org/ resources/un-work/global/ [Accessed 11 September 2017]. Franciscans International, 2017a. FI contributes to grassroots voices being heard at UN negotiations on treaty on business and human rights [online]. Available from: http:// franciscansinternational.org/old/News.111.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=488& cHash=99d30e32f6a2f59eb2162e4a2bf2bd88 [Accessed 11 September 2017]. Franciscans International, 2017b. Franciscans International Strategy 2017–2020: Reclaiming the central role of human rights [online].Available from: http://franciscansinternational. org/fileadmin/media/2017/Global/Strategy_2017_2020/FI_Strategy_2017-2020_ final_ENG.pdf [Accessed 11 September 2017]. Global Campaign, 2017. Peoples Treaty [online]. Available from: www.stopcorporateim punity.org/ [Accessed 11 September 2017]. Global Policy Forum, 2017. Jahresbericht 2016: Rechenschaftsbericht des Vorstands [online]. Available from: www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Jahresberichte/ GPF_Jahresbericht_2016_web.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2017]. Human Rights Council, 2014. Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. A/HRC/RES/26/9. New York, NY: United Nations. Human Rights Council, 2016. Report on the first session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an international legally binding instrument. A/HRC/31/50. New York, NY: United Nations. Human Rights Council, 2017. Report on the second session of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. A/HRC/34/47. New York, NY: United Nations. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 2011. ICCR welcomes the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights [online]. Available from: https://web.archive.org/ web/20120314080801/www.iccr.org:80/news/press_releases/2011/pr_ruggie032511. php [Accessed 20 January 2018].

124

Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Olga Perov

Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 2013. Statement of principles and recommended practices for confronting human trafficking and modern slavery [online]. Available from: www.iccr.org/statement-principles-and-recommended-practicesconfronting-human-trafficking-and-modern-slavery [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 2017a. Human rights [online]. Available from: www.iccr.org/iccrs-issues/human-rights [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 2017b. Membership in the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility [online]. Available from: www.iccr.org/membership [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 2017c. The connection between faith and investing [online]. Available from: www.iccr.org/our-approach/connection-betweenfaith-investing [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Krajewski, M., 2017. Ensuring the primacy of human rights in trade and investment policies: Model clauses for a UN treaty on transnational corporations, other businesses and human rights. Brussels: CIDSE. Lutheran World Federation, 2013. Diakonia [online]. Available from: www.lutheranworld. org/content/diakonia [Accessed 16 July 2016]. Lutheran World Federation, 2017. International affairs and human rights [online]. Available from: www.lutheranworld.org/content/international-affairs-and-human-rights [Accessed 16 July 2017]. Mantilla, G., 2009. Emerging international human rights norms for transnational corporations. Global Governance, 15, 279–98. Martens, J., 2014. Corporate influence on the business and human rights agenda of the United Nations. Aachen: Misereor, Brot für die Welt & Global Policy Forum. Martens, J. and Seitz, K., 2016. Auf dem Weg zu globalen Unternehmensregeln: Der ‘Treaty-Prozess’ bei den Vereinten Nationen über internationales Menschenrechtsabkommen zu Transnationalen Konzernen und anderen Unternehmen. Berlin: Global Policy Forum and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Misereor, 2017a. About us [online]. Available from: www.misereor.org/about-us [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Misereor, 2017b. Leitbild [online]. Available from: www.misereor.de/fileadmin/publikationen/ leitbild-misereor.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2017]. Quakers United Nations Office, 2016. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP) and QUNO highlight natural resources and conflict sensitive business approaches [online]. Available from: www.quno.org/timeline/2016/11/geneva-peacebuilding-platform-gpp-andquno-highlight-natural-resources-and-conflict [Accessed 16 July 2017]. Quakers United Nations Office, 2017. QUNO history [online]. Available from: www.quno. org/about/news-history [Accessed 16 July 2017]. Rieth, L., 2009. Global governance and corporate social responsibility: Welchen Einfluss haben der UN Global Compact, die Global Reporting Initiative und die OECD Leitsätze auf das Engagement deutscher Unternehmen. Opladen: Budrich. Rietig, K., 2016. The power of strategy: Environmental NGO influence in international climate negotiations. Global Governance, 22, 269–88. Ruggie, J.G., 2014. Global governance and ‘new governance theory’: Lessons from business and human rights. Global Governance, 20, 5–17. Sagafi-nejad, T., 2008. UN and transnational corporations: From code of conduct to Global Compact. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Seitz, K., 2016. ‘Morality cannot be legislated, but behavior can be regulated’: Bericht über die zweite Tagung der UN-Arbeitsgruppe zur Erstellung eines verbindlichen

RNGOs and business and human rights

125

Rechtsinstruments zu Wirtschaft und Menschenrechten, 24. – 28. Oktober 2016. Geneva: Bread for the World, Global Policy Forum and Misereor. Statement by Socially Responsible Investors, 2008. Statement by socially responsible investors to the eighth session of the Human Rights Council on the third report of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General on business and human rights [online]. Available from: https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reportsand-materials/SRI-letter-re-Ruggie-report-3-Jun-2008.pdf [Accessed 30 January 2018]. Tomlinson, A., 2008. ‘Doing that which tends to the peace of all’: Examining the roots of Quaker service at the UN. New York, NY: QUNO. Treaty Alliance, 2014. Enhance the international legal framework to protect human rights from corporate abuse [online]. Available from: www.treatymovement.com/statement/ [Accessed 29 September 2017]. Treaty Alliance, 2016. UN treaty must address corporate capture [online]. Available from: www.treatymovement.com/statement/ [Accessed 29 September 2017]. Treaty Alliance, 2017. We call States to participate actively in upcoming negotiations of the international treaty to ensure protection of human rights from the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises [online]. Available from: www. treatymovement.com/statement/ [Accessed 29 September 2017]. Treaty Alliance Deutschland, 2017. Für eine menschenrechtliche Regulierung der globalen Wirtschaft: Positionspapier der Treaty Alliance Deutschland zum UN-Treaty-Prozess zu transnationalen Konzernen und anderen Unternehmen. Berlin: CorA-Netzwerk für Unternehmensverantwortung. UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, 2016. Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights [online]. Available from: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ Business/UNWG_NAPGuidance.pdf [Accessed 16 September 2017]. Vogel, D., 2008. Private global business regulation. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261–82. World Council of Churches, 2012. International consultation on ecumenical advocacy for the protection of the human rights of migrant workers in the Arabian Gulf region [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/commissions/ international-affairs/commission-on-international-affairs-policy/consultation-onmigrant-workers [Accessed 16 July 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2013. Ecumenical United Nations Office (EUNO) [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/what-we-do/wcc-un-office-new-york [Accessed 16 July 2017]. Yaziji, M. and Doh, J., 2009. NGOs and corporations: Conflict and cooperation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

7

Reconciliation versus punishment Religious NGOs and the International Criminal Court Clara Braungart

Introduction ‘You cannot beat a snake with a long stick.’ I was introduced to this Swahili proverb by a representative of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Northern Uganda who was trying to get me to understand why her organization was so critical of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its approach to the decades of atrocities suffered in her region.1 In her view, only local approaches based on restorative justice could deal appropriately with the aftermath of the conflict; the ICC was a remote institution, too far away to be able properly to get to grips with the perpetrators. The criticism voiced by this Ugandan religious NGO echoes the widespread discontent felt by African states towards the ICC. In 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia made their dissatisfaction with the ICC’s record known by announcing they were withdrawing from the Rome Statute – the ICC’s founding treaty. Their main complaints were that, until 2016, the Court had focused its investigations solely on the African continent and had in some cases put peace at risk through its activities (ICC 2017a; Kersten 2017). In addressing the theme that overarches all the contributions to this volume – namely, to what extent RNGOs stoke controversy or help assuage it – this chapter takes the ICC and the debates surrounding it as its starting point. It is not concerned with normative comparisons between restorative (reconciliatory) treatments of gross human-rights violations and the sort of retributive (punitive) approach pursued by the ICC. Its object, rather, is to provide an empirical analysis of RNGO positions on restoration and on the ICC and to posit reasons for these stances. There is a widespread assumption, notably among scholars, that religious actors will generally adopt a reconciliatory position in transitional justice (TJ) (see, for example, Philpott and Powers 2010; Llewellyn and Philpott 2014). If this is correct, one would expect religious organizations involved with the ICC to be challenging its operations, given that these are based on the retributive norm of international criminal justice (ICJ). From the start, however, religious players seem to have been positively disposed to the Court: 10 per cent of the NGOs present at the ICC’s founding assembly in 1998 – the Rome Conference – were religious in character, and most of them supported the notion of ICJ and of a court to administer it.2

Reconciliation versus punishment 127 Against this background, the present chapter focuses on the following questions: if the majority of actors associated with the ICC favour a retributive approach to justice, where does that leave RNGOs? Do they try to reconcile the restorative and retributive principles, or do they continue to argue for restoration? Is their approach confrontational or cooperative? And finally, what are the main drivers of their behaviour? I begin by outlining the main area of contention and give a brief account of the distinction between restorative and retributive justice. Following on from this, I give an overview of the debate surrounding the establishment of the ICC. Having introduced the key actors and described their respective stances, I am then able to map the majority and minority positions in the field. I then analyze the stances and behaviours of relevant RNGOs, focusing on the most active amongst them. I conclude with a summary of the findings.

Restoration and retribution: two incompatible approaches to justice? Restorative and retributive approaches to justice both aim to re-establish social order in the aftermath of conflicts and atrocities, but they do so with differing emphases. In retributive schemes, crime is seen primarily as a violation of law, and for that violation to be made good, the perpetrator must be punished (Allais 2012, p. 343; Clark 2008, p. 340). Punishment is thus seen not only as a deterrent (see Teitel 2008; Wertheimer 1976) but as the key mechanism in implementing justice (Buckley-Zistel 2009, pp. 22–7). The emphasis on law, and the necessity of determining proportionate penalties, renders the application of retributive justice a highly standardized and formalized affair (Allais 2012, p. 343; Reddy 2012, p. 18). Even so, restorative aspects may complement the proceedings (Garbett 2013, p. 193; Chappell 2011, pp. 50–2; Funk 2015, p. 5). Restorative approaches, by contrast, work on a broader, more holistic understanding of justice, in which crime is seen as harm towards an individual or community (Clark 2008, p. 340). The main aim of restorative justice is therefore to restore social relations, which it seeks to do through measures such as reconciliation (Reddy 2012, p. 18), compensation (Chappell 2011, pp. 50–2), renewed espousal of shared values, processes leading to a shared understanding of past events (Wenzel et al. 2012, p. 28), and the empowerment of victims (Zehr and Mikra 1998). The whole of the affected community is thus included in the restorative-justice process (Coates and Umbreit 2006; Keller 2007, p. 191; Vieille 2013, p. 175). Amongst the essential tools here are dialogue and communication (Clark 2008, p. 34), and the central focus is the rehabilitation of victims: their point of view, their experience of injustice, and their demands in regard to action shape the whole process of restoration (Allais 2012, p. 338). Here again, though, elements of the ‘opposing’ system may play a role, with punishment sometimes figuring as part of the approach3 (Vieille 2013, pp. 175–7; Wenzel et al. 2012, p. 28). To reiterate: restoration and retribution are not necessarily opposed to each other: they reflect different emphases in the task of coming to terms with past events.

128

Clara Braungart

The distinction between restorative and retributive approaches has been much debated in the transitional justice sphere. This has followed increasing criticism of international criminal justice as being a largely Western creation that is too narrow and too focused on the perpetrator – a shift that triggered an upsurge in interest in restoration. Transitional justice itself is now generally understood to mean a collection of approaches designed to help post-conflict societies come to terms with past events and build a peaceful future (Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 2011, p. 1; Arthur 2009, p. 334; Shriver 2007, p. 209).4 Although TJ comprises a variety of elements – criminal justice proceedings, truth commissions, reparation, security sector reform, and the creation of memorial sites – it is often criticized as being dominated by a legalistic understanding of justice as criminal justice (Andrieu 2010; Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 2011; Teitel 2014, p. xviii). Some of the scholars voicing this criticism point to indigenous peacemaking, traditional justice, and local modes of reconciliation as other possible paths to justice. Amongst the grassroots initiatives which they cite as important contributors to long-term healing and reconciliation are the gacaca courts in Rwanda – which are described as ‘responding to both legal and non-legal concerns after the genocide’ (Clark 2007, p. 836; similarly Iliff 2012, p. 254).5 Another major strand of this literature focuses on religious actors supportive of restorative approaches to TJ and peacebuilding. Authors such as Appleby, Lederach, Powers, Little, Philpott, Boesenecker, Vinjamuri, Brudholm, and Cushman have published extensively on this topic.6 Philpott, for example, argues the merits of an ‘ethic of reconciliation’ that utilizes the potential of religious actors in this area (Philpott 2012a, p. 289). He and Llewellyn go so far as to equate reconciliation with restoration, seeing the latter simply as a secular version of the former since both focus on social healing (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014, p. 28). Philpott gives numerous examples of religious actors working in favour of reconciliation in post-conflict situations – in South Africa, for instance, and in Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland, Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Germany, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, and Iraq (Philpott 2012a, p. 7, 2012c, pp. 156–7). Philpott’s point, overall, is that religious actors have an immense potential for fostering reconciliation and can therefore play a key role in Transitional Justice processes. The contribution of Boesenecker and Vinjamuri to debate in this area has also been significant. They too see religious actors as facilitators of reconciliation: Religious communities, local, national and international, have been key players in efforts to break with an oppressive and violent past . . . One distinguishing characteristic of such engagement has been a particular conception of justice anchored in religious ethics, in particular the emphasis placed on forgiveness and reconciliation. (Vinjamuri and Boesenecker 2008, p. 155) In more recent publications, however, these authors have focused on the diverse nature of religious actors’ norms, values, and roles, underlining the fact that RNGOs

Reconciliation versus punishment 129 hold a wide range of positions in the field of TJ and stand for more than just reconciliation (Boesenecker and Vinjamuri 2011). This brings us neatly to the present enquiry into RNGO stances. Given the high profile of the ‘retributive v. restorative’ debate in matters relating to international criminal justice, the history of the establishment of the ICC provides an ideal empirical basis from which to assess the positions taken by religious actors in these discussions. In the section that follows, I give a brief overview of the creation of the ICC, the actors involved in this, and their approaches.

The establishment of the ICC: actors and debates The ICC exists to bring to trial individuals guilty of grave crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and, as of 2017, the crime of aggression (on the original mandate of the Court, see Beigbeder 2011, p. 187; on the crime of aggression, see ICC 2017c). The bulk of the Court’s work relates to the prosecution of war criminals. There were three discernible phases in the ICC’s development, each featuring different forms of engagement and different actors. During the initial period, from 1995 to 1998, an Ad Hoc Committee and a Preparatory Committee made the arrangements for the Rome Conference – the gathering at which the Court’s founding statute was agreed. From 1998 to 2002, a Preparatory Commission drew up the Court’s rules of procedure – for example on the collection of evidence – and decided on the crimes that should come under ICC jurisdiction. This phase also saw efforts aimed at convincing states to sign up to the Rome Statute to ensure its entry into force in 2002. From that year, the Court then took up its duties (Deitelhoff 2006, pp. 198–201; Haddad 2015). During the first and second phases, the debate about the ICC was dominated by states. A so-called ‘like-minded group’ of around fifty states (amongst them the Netherlands, South Africa, Argentina, and Germany) argued for an independent court with close control over the jurisdictions of member states. The P5,7 by contrast, along with a number of other less enthusiastic states, maintained that the ICC should intervene only in exceptional cases (Deitelhoff 2006, pp. 173, 208–9). Though state-heavy, the first and second phases also saw NGOs play an important part in mobilizing support for the Court and for the ratification of the founding treaty. During the ongoing third phase, since the Rome Statue entered into force, NGO involvement has become more diverse – though, as the following paragraphs will show, the ICC scene is very much dominated by human-rights NGOs and by a preference for retributive forms of justice. In general, the ICC shows itself very open to input from non-governmental actors. Thus, Article 44 of the Rome Statue permits the involvement of experts in any of the ICC’s organizational bodies, including judicial chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) (Tallberg et al. 2014, pp. 764–5). Again, even at the time the Court was being established, NGOs were submitting ideas to the Preparatory Committee – in addition to mobilizing state support as previously described (Deitelhoff 2006, p. 173). The Rome Conference was attended by 236 NGOs, and since the Rome Statute came into force in 2002, NGOs have been

130

Clara Braungart

involved with a variety of organs and divisions of the Court: they take part in the yearly meetings of all states parties to the Statute (the Assembly of States Parties, ASP) – the ICC’s highest legal and executive body; they support the work of the Registry by cooperating with, or voicing their criticism to, the Outreach division; and they assist the Office of the Prosecutor by putting investigators in touch with intermediaries and witnesses (Haddad 2015).8 The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) is one of the major NGOs associated with the ICC. In Haddad’s view, ‘CICC is civil society at the ICC’; it is the ‘facilitator and gatekeeper of most civil society access to the Court’ (emphasis in original, Haddad 2015, p. 17). Founded in 1995 by William Pace, director of the World Federalist Movement, and Christopher Hall, legal officer of Amnesty International, CICC originally had twenty-five member organizations, its steering committee being made up of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Commission of Jurists, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), and the World Federalist Movement. Today, the Coalition comprises over 2,500 organizations (Cakmak 2008, p. 380; CICC 2017; Haddad 2015, p. 14). Because of its longestablished links with the ICC, the Coalition does not engage in public criticism of the Court and does not involve itself in specific situations dealt with by the latter (Haddad 2015, pp. 18, 35). It does, however, criticize states and states parties (Haddad 2015, p. 50).9 As the composition of CICC’s initial steering committee indicates, the NGO landscape around the ICC is dominated by human-rights organizations, whose chief aim is to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’ – as the Preamble to the Rome Statute puts it (ICC 1998b) – do not go unpunished and who believe that international law serves a deterrent purpose. Although a clear majority of these actors favour retributive approaches to justice (HRW 2016; CICC 2017), this does not preclude the incorporation of restorative elements into their agendas: CICC, for example, states its determination to get the ICC to ‘[place] victims at its heart’ (CICC 2017). In general, however, CICC and most other NGOs focus on having a functioning court capable of holding responsible individuals to account. It has already been noted that restoration and retribution are not mutually exclusive. Although the ICC’s agenda is predominantly retributive in nature, it also includes non-legalistic and restorative elements such as victim participation, reparation, and co-operation with local actors (Chappell 2011, pp. 50–2; Funk 2015, p. 5; Garbett 2013, p. 193). Given that these components were already included in the Rome Statute (Arts. 15, 19, and 43), it is clear that the notion of justice embodied in the ICC has restorative as well as retributive dimensions (Andrieu 2010; BuckleyZistel and Zolkos 2011). These restorative aspects have, by and large, been endorsed by NGOs (Chappell 2011, pp. 50–2). The main means by which restorative justice is applied in the ICC framework is through the granting of rights to victims – who are not simply treated as witnesses but are permitted actually to participate in the processes (ICC 1998b, Art. 68.3; Pena and Carayon 2013). The ICC’s Office of the Public Counsel for Victims

Reconciliation versus punishment 131 (OPCV) coordinates victim participation and also organizes legal representation (ICC 2017b). Affairs relating to victim and witness participation are also dealt with by the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU), which comes under the Court Registry. The Unit is provided for under the Court’s ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (ICC 2002). Similarly, reparations are included in the ICC’s official mandate (ICC 1998b, Art. 75), being disbursed from a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV). The legal framework underpinning victims’ rights is open to the criticism of leaving too great a scope for judicial interpretation (Braungart 2016; Pena and Carayon 2013, p. 520), and the decisions arrived at by the respective units do not necessarily reflect a truly victim-centred approach. Nevertheless, these measures clearly open the ICC up along restorative lines. Once the Court took up its work, the ‘restoration vs. retribution’ debate increased in intensity. In relation to Northern Uganda, for example, the decision of the Office of the Prosecutor to issue an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony in 2005 was met with objections from many NGOs and local actors who opposed this retributive approach, arguing that only if an amnesty was granted to the perpetrators would the road to peace be opened up (Oola 2015, p. 157). The arrest warrants were not revoked. The ICC thus contains elements of both retribution and restoration, and although the retributive features predominate, there are NGOs that explicitly applaud the Court for finally getting a degree of restorative justice institutionalized in an international organization. Favouring restoration over retribution therefore does not necessarily imply outright rejection of the ICC. This finding is of particular relevance when it comes to the positions adopted by religious NGOs.

RNGOs at the ICC: retributive or restorative? If the majority of actors associated with the ICC favour a retributive approach to justice, where does that leave RNGOs? Do they take the position usually ascribed to them and advocate reconciliation and restoration? Do they attempt to reconcile the two principles? Or do some of them actually argue for retribution? Is their attitude one of confrontation or one of cooperation? And lastly, what lies at the root of whatever position and attitude they turn out to take? The following overview of the role of RNGOs at the ICC is based on singlecase studies of particularly active RNGOs. I begin with a brief description of each organization, outlining its stance vis-à-vis the ‘restoration v. retribution’ question and the ICC and indicating whether it is cooperative or confrontational in its approach. In line with the clusters of explanatory variables set out in the book’s introductory chapter, I search for underlying determinants of position in the areas of actor characteristics (organizational structure, resources, religious aspects); external factors (networks, members, audiences); and actors’ interpretations of the potential norm-conflict between retribution and restoration. The investigation is based on a qualitative content analysis of published material and archive documents from a number of RNGOs combined with in-depth interviews with RNGO representatives.10 Case selection was based on the set of

132

Clara Braungart

RNGOs that either took part in the Rome Conference, have attended one of the ASPs, or were members of the Faith and Ethics Network for an International Criminal Court (FENICC). From within this universe of cases I chose for analysis the most active NGOs – that is to say, those that had participated in at least two of the events mentioned. FENICC and the Washington Working Group A key player in bringing together RNGOs in the area under scrutiny here was the Faith and Ethics Network for the International Criminal Court (FENICC). The Network began in 1997 as a faith-based caucus of CICC, officially becoming FENICC in 2002. Made up of a number of NGOs, it initially included on its board the Bahá’í International Community (BIC), the Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, Caritas Internationalis, Justitia et Pax Netherlands, the World Council of Churches (WCC), and Religions for Peace (RFP) (Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court 1997, p. 2; Naber and Watson 2006, p. viii). From 2002 onwards, FENICC had an international branch (FENICC) and a US branch (USFENICC).11 The international branch was active until 2009 – lobbying diplomats, arranging side events at ASP sessions, organizing ‘lunch meetings’ with NGOs, and joining with the Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (CJR) in producing a manual on reconciliation entitled Advancing Justice and Reconciliation in Relation to the International Criminal Court (Naberand Watson 2006). It also submitted a draft preamble for the Rome Statute which provided for a restorative dimension to ICC operations (Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court 1998). The Network as originally set up aimed to ‘examine the moral, ethical and religious considerations surrounding the Court’, to ‘[raise] awareness at the grassroots level’, and to ‘[help] shape the ICC’, and it explicitly cited ‘reconciliation’ and ‘restorative justice’ as issues it would be addressing (Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court 1997, p. 1). Given its roots in CICC, its integrative operation as a network, and its constructive contributions to the ICC, the FENICC-Network can clearly be classified as cooperative. Its position was both prorestoration and pro-ICC: all its activities were clearly supportive of the Court but at the same time were aimed at bolstering the latter’s restorative aspects. Action des Chrétiens activistes des droits de l’homme à Shabunda Action des Chrétiens activistes des droits de l’homme à Shabunda (ACADHOSHA) is a Christian organization based in the municipality of Ibanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo and accredited with ECOSOC since 2011 (ACADHOSHA 2014). It has attended four sessions of the ASP – the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala and three routine sessions (11th in 2012 to 13th in 2014). Overall, ACADHOSHA can be classified as cooperatively inclined. It calls for improvements in ICC victim outreach, questioning the usefulness of investigations and trials ‘if the communities who suffer serious crimes do not have access to relevant information in real time’ (ACADHOSHA 2014), but it is both implicitly and explicitly supportive of the Court.

Reconciliation versus punishment 133 American Jewish Committee/Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights The American Jewish Committee (AJC) is a US-based NGO with offices around the world.12 As well as taking part in the Rome Conference, the AJC was a member of FENICC and in 1996 served on the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions relating to the ICC. More recently, it has engaged much less with the ICC – apart from referencing it in statements of various kinds.13 On occasion, however, it still ventures a public comment in the Court’s regard – as was the case when the latter rejected the Palestinian Authority’s request to be allowed to recognize its jurisdiction (and thus have its statehood acknowledged), an ICC ruling of 2012 which the AJC publicly endorsed (AJC 2012). When Palestine eventually acceded to the Rome Statute in 2014, AJC took a critical stance.14 The AJC has a strong human-rights focus and in 1971 founded its own humanrights organization – the Jacob Blaustein Institute (Korey 2009, p. iv). The Institute’s current director sees the ICC as an important player in this field and, on justice more generally, considers that the Judaic principle of ‘an eye for an eye’ brings with it a sense of proportionality that is vital for achieving reconciliation.15 Although overall the AJC is supportive of the ICC and focused on retributive justice,16 it takes a rather pragmatic view, summed up in the observation that ‘the world is a better world with law than without law’.17 In sum, then, the position of the AJC is retributive and pro-ICC but also pragmatic and hence cooperative. Bahá’í International Community/Bahá’í of the United States The Bahá’í International Community (BIC) is an NGO that represents the Bahá’í community at the global level. It has liaison offices in New York and Geneva and cooperates closely with national Bahá’í representations (BIC 2017). The BIC has taken part in seven sessions of the ASP and was also a participant at the Rome Conference. From 2002 to 2009, a BIC representative co-chaired FENICC,18 and a representative of US Bahá’í is currently the chair of the WICC – the Washington Working Group on the ICC (WICC 2017).19 As demonstrated by their involvement in networks such as FENICC and WICC, both the BIC and US Bahá’í are generally pro-ICC and cooperative – all the while remaining pragmatic, as pointed out by one WICC-based representative of US Bahá’í: ‘[this is] not to say that . . . the ICC is perfect . . . but it’s better than the alternative, which is not cooperating, not trying to solve these problems in a coherent fashion.’20 Their chief interest, however, lies in restoration: ‘Our focus was really much more on the forgiveness and reconciliation side of it, rather than the justice side of it, the retribution.’ Overall, therefore, the stance of these two groups can be summed up as both pro-ICC and restorative. Centre for Justice and Reconciliation Founded in 2003 by the Catholic organization Justitia et Pax Netherlands (JPNL), the CJR took part in three ASP sessions and was also a member of FENICC. Since

134

Clara Braungart

2010, its activity has declined, and its tasks are currently performed by JPNL. CJR previously cooperated closely with the World Council of Churches and BIC,21 and the main fields in which it was active were: lobbying and cooperation with the ICC; work with local organizations in conflict regions; and research – notably on conflict regions and TJ.22 In 2004 it organized a round-table meeting on the ICC and the situation in Northern Uganda. It also published two handbooks on TJ and shared the findings of its research in workshops on the ground in Uganda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mark 2007; Naber and Watson 2006). The CJR’s stance was a cooperative one: it laid stress on its relations with other NGOs and with FENICC and highlighted its collaboration with local organizations and its work liaising between these and the ICC.23 It sought to enhance the profile of restoration and reconciliation at the Court whilst supporting the latter’s operations: ‘legal justice cannot bring about lasting peace [so it is] important to . . . invest in reconciliation between people. [Ultimately however] those people who are responsible . . . for all the violence have to be brought to justice.’ Friends World Committee for Consultation (the Quakers) The Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC) is the body representing the Quakers at the global level. It is associated with the Quaker United Nations Offices (QUNO) and since 1985 has worked on a number of UN committees dealing with crime. The FWCC also supported the creation of the ICC, took part in the Rome Conference, and was a founding member of FENICC (see Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court 1997; ICC 1998a; Quakers in the World 2017). Whilst thus supporting the ICC, it also maintains a clearly restorative focus, stressing ‘the need for restorative justice approaches to be integral to the Court’s practice’ (Quakers in the World 2017). Its engagement in FENICC places it amongst the cooperative NGOs. Mennonite Central Committee Founded in 1950 by North American Anabaptists (Mennonites and Brethren in Christ), the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) is an RNGO with a UN liaison office in New York and some fifty offices worldwide. Its chief areas of interest are development and peacebuilding (Welty 2014; MCC 2017a, 2017b). The case of the MCC is an exceptional one in that in 2006, having worked in support of the ICC from 1997 and having been a founding member of FENICC, the Committee changed its position and terminated its association with the Network. During the period in question, the Committee conducted most of its ICC-related activities from its UN office, operating within FENICC and in working groups with other NGOs. At first, it saw the ICC set-up as compatible with restorative approaches to justice,24 but in the mid-2000s it became more critical of the Court’s approach, and in an attempt to convince the ICC community of its shortcomings,25 it invited local organizations to come and voice their complaints about the Court to the UN (Ugandan organizations, for example, were invited to the UN Security

Reconciliation versus punishment 135 Council’s working group on Uganda and to the NGO Working Group on the Security Council). Realizing the Committee would not be able to convince other actors to change their position – in particular on the ICC’s operations in Uganda – the MCC’s UN director withdrew the organization from FENICC,26 and since then the Committee has concentrated its efforts on restorative justice and peacebuilding (see for example Armster and Stutzman Amstutz 2008). Although the MCC’s position has always been clearly pro-restoration, the organization’s view as to whether this stance and the ICC approach were compatible changed over time, leading to a more confrontational attitude on the part of the Committee and ultimately to the organization’s withdrawal from ICC-related activities. Pax Christi International Pax Christi, a Catholic organization founded in 1945 as a Franco-German movement for reconciliation after the Second World War, is made up of over 120 member organizations, including national sections, local groups, and affiliated bodies. It defines itself as ‘an autonomous Catholic entity in which laypeople, bishops, and other religious members work as equals in pursuit of peace and reconciliation’ (Pax Christi International 2015). Pax Christi took part in the Rome Conference and attended ASP 3 in 2004. The year before that, it had published a paper advocating universal ratification of the Rome Statute (Pax Christi International 2003). Overall, however, the approach of Pax Christi International to the ICC is a passive one, consisting largely of monitoring and comment. In its public statements on the ICC, the organization underlines its support for the Court: on its webpages, for example, it points to its membership in the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its efforts, within this, to ‘[focus] attention to ensure widespread ratification of the Treaty of Rome and its effective implementation’ (Pax Christi International 2017, 2003). At the same time, it endorses reconciliation-based approaches – commenting positively, for example, on the previously mentioned CJR manual (Pax Christi International 2006). In sum, therefore, Pax Christi’s position is one of support for the ICC and simultaneous argument in favour of reconciliation. Religions for Peace/World Conference for Religions for Peace The organization Religions for Peace (RFP) was founded in 1970 as an interreligious network. It currently takes the form of a world council of religious leaders served by an international secretariat and acting in concert with 92 national and 5 regional councils, with input from a women’s network, a youth network, and several thousand individual members (RFP 2014, 2017). The religious leaders involved come from the Bahá’í faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, indigenous traditions, Jainism, Islam, Sikhism, Shinto, Daoism, and Zoroastrianism (RFP 2014, p. 21). The organization’s overall goal is ‘to advance effective multi-religious cooperation for peace on global, regional, national and local levels’ (RFP 2017).

136

Clara Braungart

RFP initiatives relating to the ICC are coordinated by the international secretariat. In 1997, the organization published a statement supporting the creation of the Court, and in the same year it joined the faith-based caucus of CICC (later FENICC) as a founding member and member of the steering committee. It took part in the Rome Conference and attended the 2004 session of the ASP. It also contributed to the development of the CJR manual on reconciliation through work with interreligious councils in Uganda and the DRC.27 RFP’s position can be summed up as restorative, tending to the passive, but generally supportive of the ICC: ‘RFP supports the ICC while being sensitive about, and respective of, the views of local religious communities – particularly those who are working in a multi-religious coalition and [engaging with] the government and all the parties to advance peace and reconciliation.’28 This concern to maintain consensus precludes RFP’s taking a clear-cut position on the ICC: many of the organization’s members see restoration and the ICC as being irresolvably opposed, but RFP maintains a cooperative attitude towards the Court and endeavours to bring the different points of view together. World Council of Churches When it was founded in 1948, the World Council of Churches (WCC) was an ecumenical network consisting of 147 churches, most of them from either North America or Europe. Today, this ‘fellowship of churches’ has over 348 members representing 500 million Christians, the majority belonging to churches in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the Pacific (Link 2008, p. 54, 2008, pp. 13–4; WCC 2017).29 From the late 1990s until 2006, the WCC ran an ‘Impunity, Justice and Reconciliation’ programme dealing with transitional justice and the ICC. Through this, it engaged in lobbying, networking, and advocacy – some of these activities being undertaken during ASPs, when the programme’s director would engage in dialogue with state representatives and ICC organs. In addition, the WCC has released various statements, including a WCC General Assembly position paper and a number of press releases, on the issues in this area.30 The WCC supports both the ICC and the notion of restorative justice. In fact, it sees the former as a step towards getting the latter implemented at the international level (WCC 2005). Factors underlying behaviour and positioning From the individual accounts just given, it is clear that RNGO behaviour around the ICC is largely cooperative and non-confrontational. In addition, when the specific positions adopted by the selected organizations in regard to the ICC itself and to the merits of restorative and retributive approaches to justice are compared (Table 7.1), we discover that almost all the RNGOs favour a restorative approach. The data also reveals, however, that all but one of the RNGOs are supportive of the Court – despite its predominantly retributive character and despite this or that failing

Reconciliation versus punishment 137 Table 7.1 RNGO positions Position

Organization

Pro restorative justice

ACADOSHA Bahá’í CJR FENICC FWCC MCC Pax Christi International RFP WCC

Pro retributive justice

AJC

Pro ICC

ACADOSHA AJC Bahá’í CJR FENICC FWCC Pax Christi International RFP WCC MCC

Contra ICC

they may consider afflicts it. Almost all the RNGOs thus appear to view the pursuit of reconciliation as compatible with the operations of the ICC. Given the general tenor of existing literature on transitional justice and religion, in which the latter is depicted as inherently reconciliatory, this is surprising. In what follows, I explore the rationales underpinning RNGOs’ approaches to justice, their support for the ICC, and their largely cooperative demeanour, and I highlight other factors, notably organizational structure and funding, that help determine RNGO behaviour vis-à-vis the Court. The evidence confirms the prevailing assumption – referred to at the outset – that religious actors will generally take a restorative line. Analysis of arguments made by RNGOs also reveals that, as might be expected from this finding, the organizations in question derive their positions on justice (whether restorative or retributive) from their respective religions. The aspects to which they refer in doing this, however, are varied. They may focus mainly on religious values and scripture or on their constituencies. As the vast majority of RNGOs takes a restorative approach, the following paragraphs explain their respective reasoning for restoration.31 WCC, BIC, and MCC base their reasoning for restoration on religious values and scriptures.32 A quote by WCC illustrates this way of arguing in favour of a restorative approach. In this case, WCC refers to the New Testament: The pursuit of justice, peace and reconciliation has been at the core of the mission of Christian churches as a response to the teaching of Jesus in the

138

Clara Braungart Sermon on the Mount: ‘Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled . . . Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called the children of God’ (Matthew 5: 6–9). (WCC 2005)

When it comes to constituency-related arguments for a restoration, RNGOs may conceive of a religion as a social community and invoke this, directly or indirectly, in support of their stance. A BIC/FENICC representative offers an example of direct justification of a restorative stance: The vast majority of human beings – of people on the planet – are, whether you like it or not, faith-based . . . and understand those sensibilities much more . . . than the legalist concept [with which] the Court and the Rome Statue [are] preoccupied. In other words, the average person has a much better understanding of concepts of peace and forgiveness and reconciliation than they do [of] legalist concepts of procedural justice.33 In other words, religions are groups of human beings, and because restoration is an approach that most human beings understand, religious NGOs best represent their constituencies by arguing for restorative approaches. Although other restorative RNGOS (MCC, WCC, CJR, RFP) refer to religions as communities made up of persons and member churches, they do not make a direct link between this idea and their approach to justice. Since they all make reference to local organizations’ calls for restoration, however, there is an indirect connection. The WCC, for example, points to the positions adopted by its member churches as a major determinant of its stance at the international level: [W]e don’t consider ourselves as a Geneva-based international NGO [but] as a fellowship of churches. [We try not to be an] international NGO [that comes] to Geneva to sell what the communities should do to achieve reconciliation [and] submit a case to the ICC. [Rather, we come] to work with the communities who are members of the WCC in order to enable them to play this key role.34 An organization’s relationship with its constituent members also plays an important part in shaping its self-image – this is the case not only with the WCC but also with the MCC, the CJR, BIC, FENICC, and RFP.35 Moving on to the generally supportive attitude of RNGOs towards the ICC: the main argument which restoratively inclined organizations advance in this connection is the contribution which they say the Court makes to the restorative cause at the international level – and the fact that accountability and punishment are integral to achieving restorative justice. This is the position taken by FENICC, BIC, the CJR36 – and also the WCC, which explains its stance as follows: Finally [the ICC] will contribute to the process of reconciliation by replacing the stigma of collective guilt with the catharsis of individual accountability . . .

Reconciliation versus punishment 139 The ICC, through the importance given to the participation of victims in its structure and proceedings, brings this dimension to the international level in a new way . . . The ICC responds to victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation. (WCC 2005) The main reason these RNGOs support the Court is therefore that they perceive its operations to be compatible with restorative approaches. How is this possible? Besides the fact that the ICC, as indicated in the quotation, has a number of restorative elements built into its framework, actors in the transitional justice field, particularly those involved with the ICC, though tending to favour retributive forms of justice, will endorse certain restorative aspects. The environment around the ICC can thus be summarized as largely retributive but also supportive of a degree of restoration. The effect of the predominantly legalistic context, where most actors are arguing on the basis of international (criminal) law and human rights, has not been to cause restorative RNGOs to buckle: instead, they have set about forming alliances, thus constructing their own – restorative – environment and helping to shape, rather than simply being shaped by, external circumstances. The perception of compatibility results in a cooperative attitude on the part of RNGOs – but as the case of the MCC demonstrates, perceptions can change. The shift in this organization’s position on the ICC points to other potential determinants of RGNO behaviour, namely conflicting environments and organizational structures. Explaining the MCC’s shift, the director of its UN office remarks: ‘We contacted our local groups – in our work at the UN we try to represent our local partners – and . . . they said, “No! Do not go with the ICC!”’37 The external demands on the MCC – emanating notably from its membership of FENICC and the legalistic context of the ICC – were at odds with the internal demands arising from its membership and associates. The fact that the clash of environments led to a change of stance on the part of the central body is a result of organizational structure: had the MCC not been answerable to its local members to the degree that it was, it would probably not have discontinued its support for the ICC. The outcome is thus a function of the interplay between external environments and organizational structure. No doubt because of the decentralized and multi-locational structure of many RNGOs, such clashes appear to be a relatively common occurrence: RFP, WCC, the CJR, and FENICC, though all supportive of the ICC, report robust criticisms of the Court from their local members and local organizations.38 How strongly such tensions play out depends on the organizational structure of the RNGO in question. The more ‘bottom-up’ an RNGO is in its configuration, the more powerfully the tension between local and international contexts is likely to make itself felt. Thus, in contrast to the MCC, which ‘[opted] to work with community-based reconciliation efforts rather than working [with] internationally based understandings of justice’39 and shifted the focus of its activity to the local sphere, the WCC, the CJR, FENICC, and RFP sought to address the tensions either through mutual accommodation of the differing environments or by adopting a rather passive stance at the international level.

140

Clara Braungart

RFP and the WCC, being membership-based, need to ensure that their UN representations act in concert with their local members. The WCC’s approach to this (in relation to the ICC) was initially to air the differing positions of its members in public and try to ‘[forge] links between different regions, different experiences’.40 Later, but again in response to a decision by its membership, it reallocated funds from the ICC to climate justice.41 Local criticism also played out in the RFP, but the effect in this case was to render the organization more passive vis-à-vis the ICC.42 In the case of the MCC, meanwhile, its response to local demands was, as we have seen, both radical and swift: it secured a hearing for the concerns of its Ugandan member-organizations at the UN level, eventually resigned from the FENICC network, and began actively to oppose the ICC’s engagement in Northern Uganda. In contrast to these RNGOs, FENICC and the CJR, having only international member-organizations, with no devolution of decision-making powers to local bodies, were not obliged to adjust their positions in line with local concerns and so continued with their support for the ICC. Even so, they too were vocal in conveying local criticisms.43 Whether bottom-up or top-down, therefore, it is clear that organizational structure and local relations have a significant impact on RNGO positions – and indeed they are aspects to which a number of RNGOs themselves (RFP, the WCC, the CJR, and the MCC) make reference.44 Funding is another key determinant – not directly of the position an organization takes but of whether it engages at all. From 2009/2010, FENICC, the WCC, BIC, and the CJR reduced their activity around the ICC. In the view of FENICC and the CJR, the underlying factor here was trend: ‘So the ICC for a period of time was the sexy thing – it got a lot of funding – but I can guarantee you that after five years the funding dried up and that’s when FENICC dried up.’45 This is borne out by the facts: whereas in the period from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, when the ICC was establishing itself, initiatives such as FENICC and the CJR received financial support from a variety of governments and other donors, such monies became much harder to come by in subsequent years. In the case of the WCC, meanwhile, the decrease in funding resulted from the members’ decision – mentioned previously – to reallocate the ICC budget to climate justice.

Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to shed light on the positioning and behaviour of RNGOs in regard to transitional justice. Taking as its starting point the widespread assumption that religious actors will generally adopt a restorative approach, it examined the attitudes and activities of RNGOs in an environment in which the retributive approach to justice predominates – the International Criminal Court. The investigation revealed that only one of the RNGOs in the survey exclusively supports the retributive approach and the ICC but that those RNGOs that favour restorative modes of justice – the vast majority – also back the Court. In addition, contrary to expectation, there was minimal evidence of confrontational behaviour by RNGOs. The analysis confirmed the assumption that most religious NGOs working in transitional justice are of restorative inclination. It also revealed that the

Reconciliation versus punishment 141 majority of them explain their attitudes to justice in terms of their respective religious tradition but do so by reference to different aspects of religion. Some invoke their constituencies, others sacred texts, and still others religious values. The findings also demonstrate that most restorative RNGOs, despite their position on justice, support the (largely retributive) Court. The reasons for this, as the study also reveals, are, firstly, that they view retributive measures as integral to the restorative process and, secondly, that they see the Court and its environment as sufficiently open to restoration to be compatible with their own approach. What also emerges, however, is the determination of restorative RNGOs to uphold their point of view in the retributive environment. Another facet highlighted by the analysis is the tension that can arise between an organization and its local members in regard to compatibility of approaches, with local bodies often not sharing the international body’s supportive attitude to the ICC. The findings show RNGOs adopting different strategies to cope with this tension, depending on their organizational structure: the greater the decisionmaking power vested in local bodies, the more an organization adapts its stance at the international level – though all RNGOs voice members’ criticisms at the ICC. The founding of FENICC and the MCC’s decision to quit the latter and cease its activities around the ICC are both examples of RNGOs’ resolve to be the doers and not the done to.

Notes 1 Personal communication, 9 Sept. 2015. 2 This figure was arrived at by identifying relevant NGOs on the list of participants at the Conference and applying the same criteria to them as those used for the RNGOECOSOC database (see Beinlich and Braungart in this volume) (United Nations 1998). 3 Notions as to what constitutes punishment, however, differ, with some approaches, for example, treating imprisonment, fines, and even work done for victims as punitive (Daly 2002, p. 60). 4 The term was originally used primarily in relation to countries where authoritarian regimes had been ousted and more democratic arrangements were emerging (Arthur 2009, p. 321). 5 Some scholarly voices (see e.g. Mac Ginty 2008, p. 141) do, however, warn against romanticizing traditional and local approaches to TJ. In the aftermath of conflict and mass atrocity, traditions themselves need to be reinstated – a point made by both Iliff (2012) and Allen (2010, p. 247). 6 Appleby 2008, Lederach and Appleby 2010, Little and Appleby 2004, Boesenecker and Vinjamuri 2011, Brudholm and Cushman 2009, Powers 2010, Philpott 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2015. 7 The five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 This NGO liaison function was highlighted to me by an Outreach Coordinator for Kenya and Uganda (personal communication, 14 Sept. 2015) and by several NGO interviewees. 9 Individual NGOs belonging to CICC do, however, comment (sometimes critically) on the Court’s operations. This has been the case with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Uganda Victims’ Foundation, and the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice. See e.g. HRW 2014 and Amnesty International 2014. See also Haddad 2015, p. 7, 18.

142

Clara Braungart

10 ICC information on the Rome Conference and the ASPs; RNGO websites and other sources of information; in-depth interviews with NGOs and RNGOs; material in the archives of CICC and the Centre for Justice and Reconciliation. 11 US FENICC is currently headed by Bruce Knotts, director of the Unitarian Universalists Association (UUA) at the UN. The organization engages in information sharing but does not organize many activities around the ICC. Another US body working in the field is the American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC), whose convener, John Washburn, was a co-founder of the original faith-based caucus (USFENICC 2016). 12 AJC 2015. Also: personal communication with AJC Rep. A, Dec. 2014. (I conducted individual interviews with two AJC representatives, here identified as Rep. A and Rep. B.) 13 Personal communication with AJC Rep. B, Dec. 2014. See also Korey 2009. 14 Personal communication with AJC Rep. B, Dec. 2014. 15 Personal communication with AJC Rep. B, Dec. 2014. 16 Personal communication with AJC Reps. A and B, Dec. 2014. 17 Personal communication with AJC Rep. B, Dec. 2014. 18 The individual concerned was in fact working for US-Bahá’í but was dealing specifically with UN relations and was therefore placed in the Bahá’í offices at the UN, with the BIC. Since the BIC is accredited with ECOSOC, he was able to access ASP sessions (personal communication with former BIC and FENICC representative, Dec. 2014). 19 WICC is a US-based network comprising both secular and religious NGOs. It supports the idea of the ICC and works chiefly to secure US ratification of the latter. It has taken part in a number of ASPs. 20 Personal communication with former BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014. All quotations in this section are from this source. 21 Personal communication with former JPNL director, June 2015. 22 Information garnered from the CJR archives. 23 Personal communication with former JPNL director, June 2015. All quotations in this section are from this source. Also: Naber and Watson 2006. 24 Personal communication with the director of the MCC’s UN office, Dec. 2014. 25 Personal communication with the director of the MCC’s UN office, Dec. 2014. 26 Personal communication with the director of the MCC’s UN office, Dec. 2014. 27 Personal communication with the deputy secretary-general of Religions for Peace, Dec. 2014. 28 Personal communication with the deputy secretary-general of Religions for Peace, Dec. 2014. 29 WCC members include churches from the Orthodox, Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Moravian, Old Catholic, Pentecostal, and Reformed traditions as well as United/Uniting and Free/Independent churches, Disciples of Christ churches, and the Friends (Quakers) (Ökumenischer Rat der Kirchen 2017, WCC 2017). 30 Personal communication with WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015. 31 The only RNGO clearly favouring retribution is AJC, who refers to the Torah in favour of retributive measures. In the case of the AJC, however, the reference is seen as cultural rather than religious (personal communication with AJC Rep. B, Dec. 2014). 32 Representatives of these organizations have argued their restorative positions on the basis of scripture (personal communication with MCC UN office director, Dec. 2014; WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015; former BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014). 33 Personal communication with former BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014. 34 Personal communication with WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015. 35 Based on personal communication with MCC UN office director, Dec. 2014; WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015; WICC/US-Bahá’í representative, Dec. 2014; former

Reconciliation versus punishment 143

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

JPNL director, June 2015, BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014; deputy secretarygeneral of Religions for Peace, Dec. 2014. Based on BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014; US-Bahá’í representative, December 2014; former JPNL director, June 2015. Personal communication, Dec. 2014. Personal communication with representatives of all four organizations. Personal communication with the director of the MCC’s UN office, Dec. 2014. Personal communication with WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015. Personal communication with WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015. Personal communication with the deputy secretary-general of RFP, Dec. 2014. Personal communication with BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014; CJR/JPNL representative, June 2015. See also Centre for Justice and Reconciliation 2007. Personal communication with director of MCC’s UN office, Dec. 2014; deputy secretarygeneral of RFP, Dec. 2014; WCC programme coordinator, Apr. 2015; former JPNL director, June 2015. Personal communication with BIC/FENICC representative, Dec. 2014.

References Action des Chrétiens activistes des droits de l’homme à Shabunda, 2014. Message to the members of The Hague working group on the ICC communication strategy [online]. Available from: www.iccnow.org/documents/ACADHOSHA_Speech_Final.pdf [Accessed 7 January 2016]. Allais, L., 2012. Restorative justice, retributive justice, and the South African truth and reconciliation commission. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39 (4), 331–63. Allen, T., 2010. Bitter roots: The ‘invention’ of the Lord’s Resistance Army: An insider’s view. In: T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot, eds. The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myths and realities. [S.l.]: Zed, 242–61. American Jewish Committee, 2012. AJC welcomes ICC rejection of Palestinian statehood bid [online]. Available from: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ajc-welcomes-icc-rejection of-palestinian-statehood-bid-146010615.html [Accessed 25 January 2018]. American Jewish Committee, 2015. About AJC [online]. Available from: www.ajc.org/ whoweare#additional-information [Accessed 25 January 2018]. Amnesty International, 2014. Kenya: Justice for victims of post-election violence still an urgent priority [online]. Available from: www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/iccdrops-charges-against-kenyan-president/ [Accessed 14 January 2016]. Andrieu, K., 2010. Civilizing peacebuilding: Transitional justice, civil society and the liberal paradigm. Security Dialogue, 41 (5), 537–58. Appleby, R.S., 2008. Building sustainable peace: The roles of local and transitional religious actors. In: T. Banchoff, ed. Religious pluralism, globalization, and world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 125–54. Armster, M.E. and Stutzman Amstutz, L., eds., 2008. Conflict transformation and restorative justice manual: Foundations and skills for mediation and facilitation. Akron, PA: Mennonite Central Committee, Office on Justice and Peacebuilding. Arthur, P., 2009. How ‘transitions’ reshaped human rights: A conceptual history of transitional justice. Human Rights Quarterly, 31, 321–67. Bahá’í International Community, 2017. About us [online]. Available from: www.bic.org/ about/about-us [Accessed 20 September 2017]. Beigbeder, Y., 2011. International criminal tribunals: Justice and politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

144

Clara Braungart

Boesenecker, A.P. and Vinjamuri, L., 2011. Lost in translation? Civil society, faith-based organizations and the negotiation of international norms. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5 (3), 345–65. Braungart, C., 2016. Von Uganda nach Den Haag: Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof und der Fall des ehemaligen Kindersoldaten Dominic Ongwen. HSFK-Standpunkte Nr. 2, Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Brudholm, Thomas and Cushman, Thomas (ed.), 2009. The religious in responses to mass atrocity. Interdisciplinary perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buckley-Zistel, S., 2009. Frieden und Gerechtigkeit nach gewaltsamen Konflikten. APuZ [online]. Available from: www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/32172/politischesteuerung [Accessed 17 January 2018]. Buckley-Zistel, S. and Zolkos, M., 2011. Introduction: Gender in transitional justice. In: S. Buckley-Zistel and R. Stanley, eds. Gender in transitional justice. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–33. Cakmak, C., 2008. Transnational activism in world politics and effectiveness of a loosely organised principled global network: The case of the NGO coalition for an International Criminal Court. The International Journal of Human Rights, 12 (3), 373–93. Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, 2007. Annual report 2006. The Hague. Chappell, L., 2011. The role of the ICC in transitional gender justice: Capacity and limitations. In: S. Buckley-Zistel and R. Stanley, eds. Gender in transitional justice. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 37–58. Clark, J.N., 2008. The three Rs: Retributive justice, restorative justice, and reconciliation. Contemporary Justice Review, 11 (4), 331–50. Clark, P., 2007. Hybridity, holism and ‘traditional’ justice: The case of the Gacaca courts in post-genocide Rwanda. The George Washington International Law Review, 39 (4), 765–837. Coalition for the ICC, 2017. About the coalition [online]. Available from: www.coalitionfortheicc. org/about-coalition-0 [Accessed 29 September 2017]. Coates, R.B. and Umbreit, M.S., 2006. Chapter 7: Restorative justice mediated fialog. In: M.S. Herrman, ed. The Blackwell handbook of mediation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 175–90. Daly, K., 2002. Restorative justice: The real story. Punishment & Society, 4 (1), 55–79. Deitelhoff, N., 2006. Überzeugung in der Politik: Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie internationalen Regierens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft. Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court, 1997. Foundation statement of the Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court [online]. Available from: www.amicc.org/docs/Faith_causus_stmt.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2016]. Faith-Based Caucus for an International Criminal Court, 1998. Draft preamble the statute of the International Criminal Court [online]. Available from: www.iccnow.org/documents/ FaithBasedRecomm.pdf [Accessed 8 January 2016]. Funk, T.M., 2015. Victims’ rights and advocacy at the International Criminal Court. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garbett, C., 2013. The truth and the trial: Victim participation, restorative justice, and the International Criminal Court. Contemporary Justice Review, 16 (2), 193–213. Haddad, H.N., 2015. Rearing a fledging court: NGOs and the International Criminal Court. ISA Human Rights Joint Conference 2015. Den Haag. Human Rights Watch, 2014. ICC: Hopes for justice set back: Prosecution withdraws Kenyatta charges [online]. Available from: www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/05/icc-hopes justice-set-back [Accessed 14 January 2016].

Reconciliation versus punishment 145 Human Rights Watch, 2016. International justice [online]. Available from: www.hrw.org/ topic/international-justice [Accessed 14 January 2016]. Iliff, A.R., 2012. Root and branch: Discourses of ‘tradition’ in grassroots transitional justice. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6 (2), 253–73. International Criminal Court, 1998a. Final act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court. A/CONF.183/10. New York, NY: United Nations. International Criminal Court, 1998b. Rome Statute. A/CONF.183/9. New York, NY: United Nations. International Criminal Court, 2002. Rules of procedure and evidence. ICC-ASP/1/3. New York, NY: ICC. International Criminal Court, 2017a. Situations under investigation [online]. Available from: www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx [Accessed 19 September 2017]. International Criminal Court, 2017b. Victims [online]. Available from: www.icc-cpi.int/ about/victims [Accessed 20 September 2017]. International Criminal Court, 2017c. Assembly activates Court’s jurisdiction over crime of aggression [online]. Available from: www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1350 [Accessed 12 January 2018]. Keller, L.M., 2007. Seeking justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims’ reparations. Thomas Jefferson Law Review, 29 (2), 189–218. Kersten, M., 2017. Between disdain and dependency: Uganda’s controversial place in the ICC-Africa relationship [online]. Available from: https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/03/29/ between-disdain-and-dependency-ugandas-controversial-place-in-the-icc-africa relationship/#more-7328 [Accessed 19 September 2017]. Korey, W., 2009. An epitaph for Raphael Lemkin. New York, NY: Jacob Blaustein Institute For the Advancement of Human Rights. Lederach, J.P. and Appleby, R.S., 2010. Reconciliation: An ethic for peacebuilding. In: D. Philpott and G. Powers, eds. Strategies of peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 91–114. Link, H.-G., 2008. Hoffnungswege: Wegweisende Impulse des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen aus sechs Jahrzehnten: [Ökumenischer Rat der Kirchen 1948–2008, 60 Jahre Ökumene]. Frankfurt am Main: O. Lembeck. Little, D. and Appleby, R.S., 2004. A moment of opportunity? The promise of religious peacebuilding in an era of religious and ethnic conflict! In: H.G. Coward and G.S. Smith, eds. Religion and peacebuilding. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1–26. Llewellyn, J.J. and Philpott, D., 2014. Restorative justice and reconciliation: Twin frameworks for peacebuilding. In: J.J. Llewellyn and D. Philpott, eds. Restorative justice, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, New York: Oxford University Press,14–34. Mac Ginty, R., 2008. Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace. Cooperation and Conflict, 43 (2), 139–63. Mark, I. van der, 2007. Reconciliation: Bridging theory to practice: A framework for practitioners. The Hague: Centre for Justice and Reconciliation. Mennonite Central Committee, 2017a. About MCC [online]. Available from: http://mcc. org/learn/about [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Mennonite Central Committee, 2017b. What we do [online]. Available from: http://mcc. org/learn/what [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Naber, J. and Watson, R., 2006. African faith-based communities: Advancing justice & reconciliation in relation to the International Criminal Court. The Hague: Centre for Justice and Reconciliation.

146

Clara Braungart

Ökumenischer Rat der Kirchen, 2017. Brüder-Unität und historische Friedenskirchen [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/de/kirchenfamilien/bruederunitaet-undfriedenskirchen [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Oola, S., 2015. In the shadow of Kwoyelo’s trial: The ICC and complementarity in Uganda. In: C. de Vos, S. Kendall, and C. Stahn, eds. Contested justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pax Christi International, 2003. The International Criminal Court: One standard of justice: An action guide [online]. Available from: www.iccnow.org/documents/HagueAp pealArt98BriefApr03.pdf [Accessed 5 February 2015]. Pax Christi International, 2006. Pax Christi International newsletter [online]. Available from: www.paxchristi.net/sites/default/files/newletters/en/2006/NL148E06.doc [Accessed 9 December 2017]. Pax Christi International, 2015. About us [online]. Available from: www.paxchristi.net/ about-us [Accessed 20 January 2016]. Pax Christi International, 2017. Human rights violations and struggle against impunity [online]. Available from: www.paxchristi.net/our-work/human-rights/human-rightsviolations-and-struggle-against-impunity [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Pena, M. and Carayon, G., 2013. Is the ICC making the most of victim participation? International Journal of Transitional Justice, 7 (3), 518–35. Philpott, D., 2012a. Just and unjust peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Philpott, D., 2012b. Reconciliation as religious worship. In: R. Czada, T. Held, and M.A. Weingardt, eds. Religions and world peace: Religious capacities for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 205–13. Philpott, D., 2012c. What religion offers for the politics of transitional justice. In: T.S. Shah, A. Stepan, and M.D. Toft, eds. Rethinking religion and world affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 149–62. Philpott, D., 2015. Reconciliation, politics, and transitional justice. In: R.S. Appleby, A. Omer, and D. Little, eds. The Oxford handbook of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Philpott, D. and Powers, G., eds., 2010. Strategies of peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Powers, G.F., 2010. Religion and peacebuilding. In: D. Philpott and G. Powers, eds. Strategies of peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 317–48. Reddy, P., 2012. Peace operations and restorative justice: Groundwork for post-conflict regeneration. Farnham: Ashgate. Religions for Peace, 2014. Strategic plan 2014–2018 [online]. Available from: http:// rfp.org/sites/default/files/pubications/RfP%20Strategic%20Plan%202014-2018%20 Print%20Office%20Version.compressed.pdf?utm_source=Religions+for+Peace+Glo bal+Newsletter&utm_campaign=Recommendations+Request&utm_medium=email, [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Religions for Peace, 2017. History [online]. Available from: http://rfp.org/vision-history/ history [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Shriver, D.W., 2007. Repairing the past: Polarities of restorative justice. CrossCurrents, 57 (2), 209–17. Tallberg, J. et al., 2014. Explaining the transnational design of international organizations. International Organization, 68 (4), 741–74. Teitel, R.G., 2008. Editorial note: Transitional justice globalized. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2 (1), 1–4. Teitel, R.G., ed., 2014. Globalizing transitional justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reconciliation versus punishment 147 The Quakers in the World, 2017. Work on crime and justice through international Quaker organisations [online]. Available from: www.quakersintheworld.org/quakers-in-action/107/ Work-on-crime-and-justice-through-international-Quaker-organisations [Accessed 20 September 2017]. United Nations, 1998. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court: Non-governmental organizations accredited to participate in the conference. A/CONF.183/INF/3. New York, NY: United Nations. USFENICC, 2016: Background [Online]. Available from: www.amicc.org/about/faith/, [Accessed 15 January 2016]. Vieille, S., 2013. Frenemies: Restorative justice and customary mechanisms of justice. Contemporary Justice Review, 16 (2), 174–92. Vinjamuri, L. and Boesenecker, A.P., 2008. Religious actors and transitional justice. In: T. Banchoff, ed. Religious pluralism, globalization, and world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 155–79. Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court, 2017. About [online]. Available from: www.washingtonicc.org/about/ [Accessed 17 January 2018]. Welty, E., 2014. Faith-based peacebuilding and development: An analysis of the Mennonite Central Committee in Uganda and Kenya. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9 (2), 65–70. Wenzel, M., Okimoto, T.G., and Cameron, K., 2012. Do retributive and restorative justice processes address different symbolic concerns? Critical Criminology, 20 (1), 25–44. Wertheimer, A., 1976. Deterrence and retribution. Ethics, 86 (3), 181–99. World Council of Churches, 2005. The International Criminal Court: Statement by the WCC Central Committee, Geneva, 15–22 February 2005 [online]. Available from: www. oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-commissions/international-affairs/impunity/the-international-criminal-court [Accessed 28 September 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2017. What is the World Council of Churches? [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us [Accessed 27 September 2017]. Zehr, H. and Mikra, H., 1998. Fundamental concepts of restorative justice. Contemporary Justice Review, (1), 47–55.

8

Preventing a global blasphemy law Religious NGOs at the UN and the ‘defamation of religions’ campaign Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

In 1999, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),1 brought before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) a draft resolution calling for the prohibition of the defamation of Islam. The OIC is the world’s second-largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations, comprising fifty-seven self-declared Muslim countries. The resolution talked of a rise in Islamophobia and of the need, in light of this, to take measures to protect Islam from denigration. After negotiations with Western member-states of the UNCHR, the resolution was adopted under the broader title ‘Defamation of Religions’. Between 1999 and 2011, the OIC continued its campaign to get the ban on the defamation of religions established as a new norm in the context of the UN humanrights regime. Variations of the resolution were adopted by the UNCHR and its successor, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), and the UN General Assembly (GA). Only in 2011 did the OIC give in to growing pressure from Western states and agree to a new version of the resolution that no longer talked of the ‘defamation of religions’. Although the contested resolution is now off the table, the conflict that lay behind it – between the right to freedom of expression and the concern to protect religion, and more specifically Islam, from denigration – is still smouldering (Bielefeldt 2001). This conflict has been at the core of a number of recent events that triggered transnational waves of protest and, in some cases, provoked deadly violence. The Rushdie Affair (1989), the cartoon crisis (2005), and the attack on Charlie Hebdo (2015) are cases in point. Media coverage of these events was global, and the cartoon incident caused a serious international diplomatic crisis (Bonde 2007; Baumgart-Ochse 2017). Compared to these reverberations, the attention attracted by the OIC campaign among the broader public was minimal. In the context of the UNCHR/HRC, however, the proposed resolution drew fierce criticism from both state and civil society actors. Among the NGOs that engage with the UN humanrights system, many are of a religious or faith-based nature (Trigeaud 2017), and given that the issue of the defamation of religions is one of direct concern to these organizations, the debate surrounding it provides a promising setting in which to explore the positions and motivations of religious NGOs (RNGOs). The chapter begins with a description of the normative conflict at the root of the ‘defamation of religions’ dispute. This is followed by an overview of some of

Preventing a global blasphemy law 149 the actors involved – the OIC itself, state players, the UN, and NGOs in general – and their positions vis-à-vis the OIC campaign in the period 1999 to 2011. The chapter then homes in on RNGOs and their engagement with the defamation issue in the years in question. A selection of these organizations is then examined in greater detail with a view to establishing their normative positions, their methods of advocacy, and the factors underlying their activism. The overall conclusion, presented in the final section, is that while it is difficult to identify specific impacts of RNGO activism on the debate, there is no doubt that the input of these organizations helped pave the way for the ultimate rejection of the ‘defamation of religions’ concept in 2011.

Conflicting norms: Freedom of expression vs protecting ‘religion’ Religions as such are not protected by international human-rights provisions.2 What the latter do, rather, is uphold the right of individuals or groups freely to choose their religion or belief and to practise it. The most important document in which this right is set out is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 of the Declaration states, ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance’ (GA 1948). Freedom of religion and belief is also a core element of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (GA 1966).3 The right is deemed to extend to individuals who decide not to belong to any religion or to believe in anything: both positive and negative freedom of religion are valid – and only the combination of the two ‘[give] this human right its libertarian character’ (Bielefeldt 2012, p. 16). By contrast, there is no right in international human-rights law to have one’s religion or belief excluded, across the board, from the possibility of criticism, denigration, or insult (Temperman 2008, p. 525). Although Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contain provisions limiting the right to freedom of expression, these only take effect in exceptional cases. The level at which expression of an opinion is defined as unacceptable, and therefore as warranting prosecution, is pitched extremely high – such an expression would have to constitute a threat to national security, for example, or infringe the rights of others. Article 20 makes explicit reference to religious hatred: ‘Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’ (GA 1966). However, protection of religion is not in itself a legitimate ground for restricting the right to freedom of expression: ‘The ICCPR does not specifically target defamation of religion as an operative “carve-out” for protection’ (Foster 2009, p. 35). The right to freedom of opinion may only be restricted where there is incitement to religious hatred resulting in discrimination, hostility, or violence (Graham 2009, p. 19).

150

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Both the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to freedom of expression are deemed part of customary international law, which is binding on all states, even those that have not ratified the relevant documents (Dobras 2008, p. 342; Cismas 2014, pp. 45–8).4 The provisions relating to freedom of religion and freedom of opinion are based on philosophical principles that are generally recognized as having guided the course of the international human-rights regime since the foundation of the United Nations. The historic task of creating a normative framework for a universal system of human-rights legislation inevitably came up against the problem of getting the various cultures and religions represented in the UN to agree which points of reference they could all work to (Foster 2009, p. 19). Following extensive consultations, the idea of the dignity of the human person emerged as a viable basis for human rights. In the very first sentence of the UN’s founding document – the UN Charter – the participating states affirm their ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ (GA 1945). All subsequent covenants, protocols, treaties, and declarations in which the concept of human rights is further developed echo this philosophical affirmation of the principle of personal human dignity. That the concept of human dignity was able, despite the cultural heterogeneity of the UN’s member-states, to bridge the differences between them was due not least to the fact that it was never precisely defined in any of the relevant UN documents (Donnelly 2013, pp. 28–9). As a result, everyone could identify with it. The UN ‘successfully drafted its formative documents based upon broad, largely undefined principles that member countries did not disagree with on a philosophical level at the very outset, given the open-ended nature of the definition’ (Foster 2009, p. 38). The concept of dignity holds a special value that enjoins respect. Historically, it was closely tied to particular social positions or offices, but the shift to human dignity represents a democratization: ‘The claim of human dignity is that simply being human makes one worthy or deserving of respect; that there is an inherent worth that demands respect in all of us’ (Foster 2009, p. 21; Donnelly 2013, p. 29). A corollary of this philosophical rationale for human rights is that these rights only ever apply to the individual: only an individual human being, not a collectivity or a belief system, can lay claim to them (Donnelly 2013, p. 30). The OIC’s arguments in favour of a ban on the defamation of religions diverge from this basic principle: in place of the individual in need of protection we have an idea or conviction – specifically, religion (Graham 2009, p. 78). The earliest draft of the anti-defamation resolution, introduced for the first time into the Commission on Human Rights by Pakistan in 1999, on behalf of the OIC, still went by the title ‘Defamation of Islam’. Supporters of the resolution argued that the Islamophobia now rife in the West necessitated measures to protect Islam from hostile treatment and insult. On behalf of the European Union (EU), Germany called for attention to be directed not just at Islam but at other religions as well (Blitt 2011, p. 353). After tough negotiations, the resolution – eventually adopted without a vote by the Commission – emerged bearing the title ‘Defamation of Religions’, but its focus remained very clearly on Islam. It expressed great concern at the ‘negative stereotyping of religions’ and underlined the way in which

Preventing a global blasphemy law 151 Islam was ‘frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism’. It was worrying, it said, that the media were ‘[being] used to incite acts of violence, xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam and any other religion’. It therefore called on states ‘within their national legal framework, in conformity with international human rights instruments to take all appropriate measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious intolerance’ (OHCHR 1999). Clause 3 of the resolution, with its mention of ‘acts of violence, xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam and other religions’, uses ideas and phraseology familiar from, for example, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which calls on states to outlaw ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’ (GA 1966). The wording of the resolution thus reflects a desire on the part of the OIC to frame the issue of defamation in terms of ‘well-known human rights categories such as racism, discrimination, religious freedom, xenophobia and incitement to hatred and violence’ (Skorini and Petersen 2017, p. 50). The difference is that the defamation resolution spotlights discrimination and violence towards Islam and other religions – in other words towards a creed or idea – rather than towards individual people or groups of people. The resolution thus clearly promotes a new norm – one that is at odds with the overall normative foundation of the UN human-rights system, in which the focus is on individual rights rather than on the rights of collectivities or belief systems. In an attempt to get a particularist religion-based norm transposed into the UN’s liberal, secular human-rights framework, however, the OIC had deliberately employed a language replete with references to UN human-rights concepts (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014; Kayaoglu 2014).

The OIC campaign in the United Nations: mapping the field The manifest contradiction between the two norms at stake in the defamation debate – the protection of religion and religious sentiment from offence and the right to freedom of expression – is mirrored in the clear-cut division between the various actors championing and opposing the defamation resolutions. The OIC, the main driver of the defamation resolution, is the only intergovernmental organization in existence that is defined not by the region it represents or the functional objective it pursues but by the religious orientation of its member-states – though this ranges in degree from constitutional embodiment of Islam as the state religion to the presence of a substantial Muslim minority and encompasses all the widely differing trends within Islam. Although in many respects the OIC functions in the same way that secular intergovernmental organizations do within international relations, its religious aspect sets it apart from other bodies: ‘the idiosyncrasy of the OIC is categorical, for whilst adhering to the secular logic of multistate functionalism, its ideological source is reflected solely in terms of a religious attribute, that of Islam, and its purpose is guided by a single

152

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

imperative, that of pan-Islamism’ (Sheikh 2003, p. 16). Decisions are made by two-thirds majority of the assembly of member-states, regardless of whether the states that vote are Islamic by constitution or, like Turkey and Lebanon, explicitly secular. The 1972 OIC Charter stipulates absolute respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of member-states, bringing the OIC into line with the standards of the UN, from which it seeks recognition as a legitimate association of states. The OIC came into being in the 1960s. The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 June War against Israel was perceived as a gross humiliation and resulted in a weakening of the secular pan-Arabism of the pro-Soviet regimes. In August 1969, an Australian tourist carried out an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa mosque in the old quarter of Jerusalem, but neighbouring Arab countries suspected that Israel itself had masterminded this assault on one of Islam’s most important holy places. Both events seemed to testify to the inability of secular ideologies to defend the interests of Muslims and to the need to return to a pan-Islamic vision (Sheikh 2003, p. 36). In September 1969, twenty-four countries plus the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) founded what was then known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Organization was held together mainly by its members’ shared hostility to Israel, and as a result, the issue of the holy places of Islam in Jerusalem – and thus also of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – remained core themes of the OIC for decades. Beyond this, the OIC hardly ever managed to speak with one voice, but since 2005, it has undergone a remarkable transformation: member-states elected the Organization’s first General Secretary, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, and a ten-year action plan was drafted that resulted in issues such as sustainable development in member-states, emergency aid, closer cooperation with other international organizations, and the fight against violent extremist ideologies making their way onto the OIC agenda (OIC 2005). The OIC’s charter was also overhauled: it now made reference, for the first time, to human rights, to democracy and the rule of law, to equality before the law, and to women’s rights (Hermann 2013) – though always in the context of Islamic values and without calling the sovereignty of member-states into question. It was also during Ihsanoğlu’s tenure that the OIC’s name was changed from ‘Organization of the Islamic Conference’ to ‘Organisation for Islamic Cooperation’ – a programmatic title signalling the upgrading of the organization from conference to distinct entity. Chief among the OIC’s stated goals is the improvement of the status of Muslims worldwide and the promotion of the ‘lofty values of peace, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity’ (OIC 1972). To this end, the OIC has worked to establish a framework of Islamic Human Rights. This process began with the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (OIC 1990), the principles of which were revised and reinvigorated in the 2005 Ten Year Program of Action, and it has continued with the creation of an Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission in 2011 (Petersen 2012). The task has not been an easy one: OIC member-states are ‘an extremely varied group of states in terms of economic status, political systems, cultural traditions, national and geopolitical

Preventing a global blasphemy law 153 interests and different religious schools of thought’ (Skorini and Petersen 2017, p. 45). Besides disagreeing over a whole range of political issues, they differ in their opinions as to how Islamic law should be interpreted in regard to contemporary human rights (Cismas 2014). When Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, launched the campaign to prohibit the defamation of religions, human-rights organizations and academic observers suspected that the OIC’s real motive was not so much to combat Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims, as it had declared, but to secure international legitimation for the sometimes draconian blasphemy laws in force in its memberstates (Dobras 2008; Belnap 2011; Marshall 2011; Rehman and Berry 2012). Pakistan itself operates one of the world’s most stringent legal regimes in this regard. The OIC managed to garner support from other members both of the Human Rights Commission and later of the Human Rights Council. Among those who gave their backing were Russia, China, and large numbers of countries from the developing world: ‘Many states shared the perception that the West was upholding double standards in its advocacy of human rights, and a fear that Western states were using human rights as a form of intervention’ (Beittinger-Lee and Miall 2017, p. 163). To these countries, the defamation controversy thus provided a welcome opportunity to rebut the West’s human-rights-based criticism of their policies. The OIC also succeeded in influencing the Asian and African groups of states, which often come together into voting blocs at the UN: ‘Voting on the Defamation of Religions resolution in the UN divided largely along north – south lines [,] with the African, Asian and Latin American groups, China and Russia joining the OIC against the West’ (Beittinger-Lee and Miall, p. 164). On the other side of the divide, the WEOG – Western European and Other Group of States – gave voice to two basic criticisms in regard to the OIC campaign. The first was that it focused narrowly on Islam – which continued to be given priority in the text of the resolution even after the latter’s title had been changed from ‘Defamation of Islam’ to ‘Defamation of Religions’. The second was that the resolution was incompatible with other human-rights provisions, most notably the right to freedom of expression. In the wake of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the ‘war on terror’ that followed these, tensions between Western and Muslim states increased. The OIC argued that Muslim populations in Western societies were now effectively under blanket suspicion of supporting or perpetrating terrorist violence and that anti-Islamic discrimination as a whole was on the rise. At first, these arguments seemed to have been heeded: when the defamation of religions resolution came before the UNCHR for the first time, in 2001, 29 states voted for it, 15 against, and 9 abstained. This trend was not to last long. Having come under closer scrutiny following 9/11, the resolution began to be sharply criticized by Western states and human-rights organizations, and support for it gradually declined. In 2005, when the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten triggered worldwide protest, and in some cases violence, by indignant Muslims who saw the pictures as a clear case of defamation and blasphemy, the OIC used its influence to transform

154

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

the issue from a Danish domestic controversy to an international political crisis (Baumgart-Ochse 2017). In tandem with this, it intensified its efforts to have the ban on the defamation of religions recognized as an integral part of international human-rights law. and when the defamation resolution was brought before the General Assembly for the first time, in 2006, it won the support of 58 per cent of UN member-states. However, as Western criticism grew ever louder, the resolution increasingly lost support by the mid-2000s. In 2008, following Barack Obama’s accession to the presidency, the United States resumed its seat at the Human Rights Council in Geneva and intensified diplomatic efforts to resolve the defamation issue. Thanks to the superpower’s leverage, many states that had previously supported the resolution now voted against it. Working with the EU, the United States managed to secure OIC acceptance of a new text which eschewed mention of the defamation of religions and fell within the parameters of accepted human-rights legislation. Resolution 16/18, headed ‘Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping, Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence against, Persons based on Religion and Belief’ (GA 2011), was adopted for the first time in 2011 and was greeted by many politicians and observers as a breakthrough in the decade-long controversy. However, meetings that have taken place since then as part of the intergovernmental implementation mechanism – the so-called Istanbul Process – have shown that the OIC still adheres to its basic position, namely that freedom of expression should be limited in order to protect religion and religious sentiment. Although the concept of defamation is no longer in evidence, the controversy over the two rights at issue here persists (Skorini and Petersen 2017). Another important player in the defamation controversy was the UN itself, which not only provided the platform for continued diplomatic exchange and public debate but also played an active part of its own – mostly through its Special Rapporteurs. Appointed by the Secretary-General, Special Rapporteurs are mandated to cover specific areas – such as human rights – and as part of their duties engage in activities such as fact-finding, report writing, and mediation. Of the various Special Rapporteurs who were asked to report on the issue of the defamation of religions, one is notable for his championing of the defamation concept. This was Doudou Diène, who held the post of Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance from 2002 to 2008. Diène expressed grave disquiet at the surge in discrimination against Muslims in the wake of 9/11 and the war on terror. Islamophobia, he contended, was the most serious current manifestation of the mistreatment of religious minorities. and in his reports he classified it, along with Christianophobia and anti-Semitism, as a form of defamation of religion, deeming this to be equivalent to xenophobia and racism (UNCHR 2005). Rehman and Berry have argued that by referring explicitly to the defamation of Islam, Diène ‘[blurred] the boundaries between Islamophobic statements that target Muslim minorities and legitimate intellectual criticism of Islam or Islamic practices’ (Rehman and Berry 2012, p. 441). His use of the concept of the defamation of religions, they say, ‘seems to lend support to an interpretation that is similar in content and scope to

Preventing a global blasphemy law 155 the concept of blasphemy’ (ibid.). Other Special Rapporteurs with a connection to the defamation controversy – the Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, for example – took the view that the existing provisions of human-rights law must be upheld and that any attempt to limit freedom of expression in the name of protecting religion must be opposed. Also active in the defamation debate were representatives of civil society. In the years following the cartoon crisis, a number of NGOs lobbied against what they perceived to be a serious threat to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Amongst the most prominent organizations in this group were the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) and the human-rights NGO Article 19. In a 2007 submission to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva, IHEU described the defamation of religions resolutions as ‘both unnecessary and deeply flawed’. What these measures really sought to do, they said, was to ‘protect religion from critical evaluation and . . . stifle religious dissent’, and they would therefore ‘constitute a violation of the principles of the UN Charter and a disavowal of the freedoms of individuals in favor of those who deny them in the name of group rights’ (IHEU 2007). A 2009 IHEU policy paper detailed the ways in which the defamation concept would infringe both the right to freedom of expression and the right to religion or belief as enshrined in international human-rights law and drew an analogy between laws on defamation and laws on blasphemy (IHEU 2009). Advancing similar arguments, Article 19 also lobbied against the defamation resolutions, publishing a number of critical statements on its website. Together with other NGOs, Article 19 and the IHEU gathered evidence of human-rights violations and commissioned expert opinion on human-rights law which they then passed to state representatives as ammunition in their arguments against the notion of the defamation of religions. Civil society activism against the defamation of religions approach reached its peak in 2009, when 239 organizations from 46 countries signed a ‘Joint NGO Statement on Danger of UN “Defamation of Religions” Campaign’. In this document, the groups concerned criticized the defamation concept as ‘having no basis in domestic or international law’ and accused the OIC of misusing the UN ‘to legitimise domestic blasphemy laws’ and attempting to silence human-rights activists (UN Watch 2009).

Religious NGOs and the defamation of religions Of the NGOs who signed the 2009 Joint Statement, around 16 per cent can be classified as religious (Beittinger-Lee and Miall, p. 166). They included, among many others, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Caritas Internationalis, the World Jewish Congress (WJC), and the Ahmadiyya Community, and they encompassed a multiplicity of religious traditions, among them Christian, Muslim, and Jewish denominations. By contrast, when looking at the organizations involved with the HRC, we were unable to identify a single RNGO (or, for that matter, a secular one) which openly supported the OIC campaign. Despite the OIC’s claim

156

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

that it was seeking to establish a human-rights norm that would protect religion, religious actors from civil society generally opposed the defamation concept. Although the OIC campaign had a number of religious supporters outside the HRC – the most notable being the Russian Orthodox Church, which reportedly sought to make common cause with other conservative religious entities to combat Western secularism (Cismas, p. 67) – RNGOs within the HRC followed the lead of organizations such as Article 19 in declaring the campaign a threat to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief. In what follows, a detailed analysis will be given of four RNGOS that have been particularly active in the defamation debate: the Bahá’í International Community, the International Association for Religious Freedom, the World Council of Churches, and the Lutheran World Federation. Other RNGOs that were interviewed – the World Jewish Congress, for example, or B’nai Brith5 – signed the Joint NGO Statement but did not engage in any other activities and are therefore not included here. The analyses are based on UN documents, websites, and interviews with RNGO representatives at the UN in Geneva. Baháí International Community The Bahá’í International Community (BIC) is an NGO that represents the Bahá’í religion at the United Nations. It was one of the first RNGOs to secure representation at the UN, being accredited in 1948. It currently has consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and maintains offices in New York and Geneva that are particularly well staffed by comparison with those of other RNGOs. BIC has a strong record of advocacy for human rights in general and for freedom of religion and belief in particular. It is a signatory to the 2009 Joint NGO Statement. Also in 2009, in a statement to the UN Commission on Social Development headed ‘Reclaiming Freedom of Conscience, Religion or Belief to Promote Social Integration’, it identified this freedom as an essential but widely neglected component of social integration. The concept of the defamation of religions, it said, ‘has distorted the international human rights framework and challenged human rights machinery’ and has ‘selectively restricted the space for peaceful public exploration and debate of belief-related issues’ (BIC 2009). The statement then went on to make practical suggestions for promoting compliance with the right to freedom of religion and raising awareness on the ground. According to Diane Ala’i, the BIC’s representative at the UN in Geneva, the BIC played a very active part in the debate on the defamation issue. The main problem in this area, Ala’i argues, is that the concept of the defamation of religions is not clearly defined and that there is no agreement as to who should decide what counts as a religion. This latter issue originates ‘mainly [with] OIC countries who recognize particular religions and don’t recognize others [and use] defamation of religion just to stifle the expression of people who just disagree with them’.6 For members of the Bahá’í faith, however, says Ala’i, it is important that ‘people can make their own choice’ when it comes to religious belief.

Preventing a global blasphemy law 157 It is because ‘freedom of religion or belief has to come first . . . and freedom of expression has to be respected’ that the BIC sought to raise awareness of the defamation issue – although, ‘as a religious person’, says Ala’i, she can understand that people may be offended by certain types of speech. Ala’i herself was active in side events at the UN in Geneva, and BIC took part in all the OHCHR’s Expert Workshops on incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred. The workshops addressed ‘the relationship between freedom of expression and hate speech, especially in relation to religious issues’ and resulted in the ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’ – which avoided any reference to ‘defamation of religions’ (OHCHR 2012). In all these activities, the BIC has cooperated with other actors in the field – including states, NGOs, and Special Rapporteurs. ‘Because we have to all work together’, says Ala’i, ‘I think that cooperation is essential – first because it increases your capacity but also [because it] increases your understanding. You can always enrich your thinking and your ideas by listening to others and seeing what they have to say – and then try to move one step above because of that consultation and discussion with other people.’ Summing up the BIC’s engagement with the issue of defamation of religions, Ala’i comments, ‘I don’t think we fight. I think we raise awareness.’ Underlying the BIC’s position on the defamation of religions are a number of different factors. On the basis of a theological belief in the oneness of God and of humanity, the Bahá’í faith defines itself as seeking to ‘exert a positive influence on the welfare of humankind, promote education, peace and global prosperity, and safeguard human honour and the position of religion’ (BIC 2017). In line with this, says Diane Ala’i, it is above all the notion of the oneness of humankind, of the need to engage in friendly consultation with all the peoples of the world, and of the realization of world peace that guides the BIC’s operations at the UN. Also of importance in relation to the BIC’s engagement with the defamation issue, she says, is the belief that each individual has the spiritual responsibility to search out the truth for themselves rather than simply adopting the religion or belief of their parents. The Bahá’í community’s own experience of discrimination in a number of OIC member-states was also a factor in BIC’s decision to oppose the OIC campaign. In Iran in particular – but to some degree in other countries as well – the community is subject to severe state repression because, says Ala’i, its belief in the Bahá’u’lláh, the founder of the Bahá’í religion and believed to be the last prophet after Mohammed, is seen in and of itself as blasphemy by the Muslim authorities in these countries. The issue of the defamation of religions is thus closely connected both to core Bahá’í norms and to contemporary experiences of discrimination and repression among Bahá’í believers. With regard to organizational structure, although the BIC receives guidance from the Bahá’í leadership, the overall formulation of positions is based on consultation between individual Bahá’í communities and organizational branches. The BIC is funded solely from membership fees and, as well as relieving the organization of the need to fundraise, this financial independence gives it scope to voice its own opinions. Despite this self-sufficiency, it seeks alliances with

158

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

many different actors in the field and has a reputation for joining with a variety of players to champion human rights – specifically the right to freedom of religion or belief – drawing on the contacts it has built up since it joined the UN in 1948. International Association for Religious Freedom The International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) was founded in 1900 under the original name of ‘International Council of Unitarians and Other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers’. The Association describes itself as ‘the world’s oldest global inter-religious organization . . . with 73 member organizations in 26 countries, from faith traditions including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Bahá-í, Shinto and Zoroastrianism’ (IARF 2017). Its main focus today, as its current name suggests, is religious freedom, in support of which it works to encourage dialogue between believers from different religious traditions. With regard to the defamation of religions issue, the IARF was critical of the OIC campaign from the outset. The Association’s former representative in Geneva, John Taylor, describes the IARF position as close to that of the Special Rapporteurs, who, he says, considered that ‘the defamation issue has a bad impact on our relationships’.7 In line with this thinking, the Association expressed its opposition both to the relevant resolutions and to the blasphemy laws of countries such as Pakistan. According to Taylor, the resolution was initially successful because ‘there were some bad examples of defamation against Islam and we wanted to be sensitive to . . . Muslim feelings. [W]e were always critical of a form of freedom of speech which was also breaking other people’s rights and freedoms – and so we [were] sympathetic with Muslims . . . not sympathetic with the violent reactions, but sympathetic with the overall feeling.’ However, says Taylor, ‘when it became a sort of witch-hunt, we couldn’t approve.’ As a response, the Association tried to get other examples of defamation – against Christians, Buddhists, and other religions – included in the resolution. The IARF used various strategies to influence the debate. Taylor relates, for example, that it made a ‘load of quiet input’ into the resolution and that this ‘eventually made the defamation issue a more universal issue that was also concerned about anti-Christian propaganda and anti-secular propaganda’. Along with other NGOs seeking to ‘steer away from the exclusive anti-Islamic focus’, it also made statements to the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council. On another front, it established working relationships with the successive Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief and in this connection, as chair of the NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief, organized a number of well-attended hearings with Rapporteurs Abdalfattah Amor and Asma Jahangir (ECOSOC 2008). The aim in all these undertakings, says Taylor, was to initiate dialogue between representatives not only of different religions and beliefs but also of individual theological strands. The IARF’s position on the defamation of religions derives from its overall commitment to freedom of religion – the basis of its engagement with the UN. A

Preventing a global blasphemy law 159 flyer giving an overview of the Association describes freedom of religion or belief as ‘a precious human right that potentially enables the best within our religious lives, or our search for truth or enlightenment, to flourish’ (IARF 2015). As a means to securing such freedom, the IARF identifies three aspects that must be worked on: ‘freedom from oppressive interference or discrimination . . . on the grounds of religion or belief’; ‘mutual understanding, respect, and the promotion of harmony’; and ‘accountability by religious communities to ensure that their own practices uphold the fundamental dignity and human rights of their members and others’ (IARF 2015). This set of priorities in itself signals the likely position of the IARF in the defamation debate. Just as the IARF had been critical of the OIC campaign for its exclusive focus on Islam and for its misuse of the concept of defamation to justify domestic blasphemy laws, IARF representative John Taylor expressed disquiet at current discriminatory and defamatory trends towards religions more generally. Also, in relation to breadth, the IARF, being an interreligious NGO whose members come from a variety of religious backgrounds, does not promote specific theological concepts but instead focuses on ideas that enable dialogue and cooperation to take place between different religions, mostly from a liberal perspective. The IARF was granted consultative status by ECOSOC as far back as 1972, and its knowledge of UN processes has undoubtedly eased its task when it comes to influencing the debate (Trigeaud 2017). Financially, it is dependent mainly on funds provided by its member organizations, these monies being used to finance the Association’s international offices. In addition, the IARF will sometimes request third-party funding for specific projects. World Council of Churches The World Council of Churches (WCC) is an ecumenical umbrella organization comprising (in 2013) 345 member churches across 110 countries and claiming to represent over 500 million believers. Founded in 1948, it brings together churches from various traditions – Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Baptist, Methodist, Reformed, and others. Through its Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), it has maintained a continuous presence at both the New York and Geneva headquarters of the UN from very early on. As well as seeking to bring about Christian unity and undertaking missionary work and evangelism, the WCC claims to ‘engage in Christian service by serving human needs, breaking down barriers between people, seeking justice and peace, and upholding the integrity of creation’ (WCC 2017). The Council’s core budget is made up of membership fees and contributions from other Church-related agencies. Increasingly, it also receives monies from the UN and individual governments to fund specific activities. From the time it was founded, the WCC focused strongly on human rights – and particularly the right to freedom of religion and belief. Although shrinking resources have forced the CCIA to reduce its involvement with the Human Rights Council more recently, the Commission’s present director, Peter Prove, states his

160

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

intention to strengthen this work in the coming years.8 In 2006, when the new Human Rights Council held its first session, the CCIA and other religious and non-religious NGOs – including the IARF and the Lutheran World Federation – issued a statement regarding the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief. The NGOs talked of ‘confusions and even acts of violence over the failure to respect both the freedom of religion and belief and the freedom of expression’ and concluded that it was ‘necessary to protect convictions based on religion or belief from defamation’ but ‘equally necessary to protect responsible use of freedom of expression from virulent over-reactions’ (CCIA et al. 2006). At the UN’s anti-racism Durban Review Conference in 2009, the CCIA and LWF made a joint oral statement expressing their appreciation of the fact that ‘the concept of “defamation of religions” does not inappropriately intrude into the human rights framework of [the Conference’s outcome] document, which instead properly addresses itself to the stigmatization of “persons based on their religion or belief”’ (CCIA and LWF 2009). This position was reiterated in a statement adopted by the WCC at its 10th Assembly in 2013, which declared that ‘an approach that protects religions rather than people only undermines the basic human rights principles and international human rights standards as well as giving way to abuse laws in local contexts that persecute religious minorities’ (WCC 2013). CCIA director Prove sees defamation as ‘yet another iteration of the old discourse about cultural relativism of human rights.’ It is, he says, ‘a dangerous, a treacherous and slippery slope to relativizing and weakening international human rights protection’. Prove states his intention to keep a close eye on the implementation of the new consensus resolution 16/18 of 2011, focusing in particular on OIC states, who he considers show ‘insufficient introspection on how religious minorities are treated in their own contexts and what the implications of this normative measure would be – or should be – in their own contexts.’ At the same time, Prove believes Western states too have a responsibility to ‘address expressions of Islamophobia [and] Anti-Semitism and other religious intolerance in their own societies’. In terms of strategy, the CCIA intends to get its voice heard by playing a more active part in HRC discussions on defamation. Another key method of leverage for the Commission is to call on its member churches to engage with their governments and societies on this issue. The WCC’s position in the debate on defamation derives from its church-based identity and its theological foundations, which, says Prove, are ‘extremely important and extremely salient’ for the Council’s work. In fact, ‘there is hardly an activity, hardly a piece of advocacy that isn’t explicitly founded in some sort of biblical or theological basis.’ Religious motivation is widespread among WCC staff; executive recruitees must be endorsed by member churches; and staff at the WCC headquarters are offered bi-weekly prayer opportunities. However, staff ‘[are not] being paid to be an international prayer group in Geneva’, says Prove. Rather, they are there to function as ‘the secretariat of a global constituency of member churches around the world, and to serve their interests’. Although the WCC seeks to act in solidarity with, and speak on behalf of, victims and

Preventing a global blasphemy law 161 vulnerable communities everywhere – regardless of their religion – the interests of member churches do play a significant role, Prove concedes, especially in situations of extreme threat or stress, when the concerns of Christian communities naturally based on self-interest. Lutheran World Federation The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an umbrella organization which, according to its website, comprises 145 member churches in the Lutheran tradition representing 74 million Christians across 98 countries (LWF 2017). Its three core areas of activity are: holistic mission, theology, and ecumenical and interfaith relations. A long-standing champion of human rights, and in particular of the right to freedom of religion or belief, the LWF has affirmed its commitment to the latter in a number of resolutions adopted by its Assemblies and Councils (LWF 2013). Ralston Deffenbaugh, former assistant general secretary for international affairs and human rights at the LWF, sees the universal declaration of human rights as ‘a document that’s very much consistent with our understanding of Christian values’.9 In line with the Lutheran respect for individual conscience, the LWF considers human rights to be a personal rather than communal matter. Hence, explains Deffenbaugh, the right to freedom of religion or belief is also ‘a freedom for the individual, not for an established religious body or established religion’. Given this outlook, says Deffenbaugh, the LWF, though acknowledging ‘the Muslim sensitivity to insults against their dignity or to insults against the Prophet or the religion’, was unable to accept the normative and legal concepts underlying the defamation resolutions. As mentioned previously, at the first session of the HRC and at the Durban Review Conference, the LWF joined with the WCC and other NGOs in issuing statements critical of the notion of the defamation of religion. It also cultivated relationships with the relevant Special Rapporteurs, worked to raise awareness among its member churches, and, as Deffenbaugh describes it, strove not only to ‘stand with and defend Lutherans when their freedom has been restricted’ but also to ‘be in solidarity with people from other denominations or other faiths’ when they found themselves in the same position. Whilst it was not a particularly active advocate in UN debates on defamation, the LWF did make a point of monitoring developments – notably the implementation of the Rabat Plan. With regard to motivation, Deffenbaugh sees faith as the main driving force of LWF’s work: ‘We do that because of our faith, our understanding that we are – [as] a good Lutheran saying [puts it] – freed by grace to love and serve [our] neighbour.’ All the members of LWF’s executive staff are Christians and need the endorsement of a church to be appointed.

Conclusion The OIC’s campaign to have prohibition of the defamation of religions established as a human-rights norm divided the UN’s member-states. Whereas from

162

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

1999 to 2011 the OIC managed, with the help of states from the African and Asian groups, to get the relevant resolutions adopted by the UNCHR, the HRC, and the UN General Assembly, Western states opposed the underlying notion that freedom of expression should be limited for the sake of protecting religion and religious sentiment from offence. The two principles at issue – freedom of expression and the protection of religion from defamation – have proved difficult to reconcile, and although the latest version of the resolution (Resolution 16/18 of 2011) attempts to do just this, the conflict persists. The OIC justified its campaign by claiming that religions, most notably Islam, needed to be protected from phenomena such as discrimination, intolerance, negative stereotyping, and violence. Despite this profession, reflected in the associated resolutions, virtually all the RNGOs at the UN in Geneva, whatever their religious tradition or denomination, rejected the resolutions. Organizations such as the IARF, the BIC, the LWF, the WCC/CCIA, and Dominicans for Justice lobbied actively against the OIC initiative, both formally and informally, arranging faceto-face meetings with Special Rapporteurs and state representatives, organizing side events, and making oral and written statements to the UNCHR and HRC. In all these activities, these RNGOs sought to cooperate with other actors – secular NGOs, Special Rapporteurs, state representatives, and so on. Tellingly, the peak of civil society resistance to the OIC campaign was marked by a collective NGO declaration – the Joint NGO Statement referred to earlier – whose signatories included large numbers of RNGOS. From the point of view of language, in the Joint Statement and in other publications and declarations, RNGOs were unambiguous in their rejection of the defamation of religions resolutions and in their criticism of the OIC for its alleged export of blasphemy laws to the international sphere. At the same time, RNGOs such as the IARF, the WCC, and the LWF expressed sympathy in regard to OIC concerns about growing Islamophobia and sought to take these worries seriously. Accordingly, rather than simply demonizing the OIC, they turned to human-rightsbased language to challenge the legality and legitimacy of the resolutions. Though explicit, their critique of the resolutions remained largely within human-rightsbased parameters. Most RNGOs argued along the same lines as the Joint NGO Statement, claiming that the defamation resolutions were an attempt to legitimize and internationalize the kinds of domestic blasphemy laws commonly used in OIC member-states to silence or repress religious communities that were not officially recognized and that they therefore threatened religion rather than protected it. This argument is particularly pertinent in the case of the BIC, given that in Iran and elsewhere, certain Bahá’í beliefs are deemed blasphemous in and of themselves by the Islamic authorities and the Bahá’í community is therefore subjected to harsh repression by the state. The point about endangerment of other religions is also of particular significance to the interreligious IARF: besides having declared interfaith cooperation on religious freedom to be its main goal, this body is made up of mainly liberal variants of religious traditions, and these are more often the target of restrictions in states that privilege conservative religions. RNGOs thus see the

Preventing a global blasphemy law 163 defamation resolutions as a potential threat to their own constituencies, and this is a major factor in their determined rejection of them. Other factors also contributed to RNGOs’ positioning with regard to the concept of Defamation of Religions. The RNGOs presented in this chapter all have a long history of engagement with the UN and as a result are well versed in UN policy processes, have good connections to other actors in the field, and are steeped in the human-rights-based language and the norms and values typical of the UN’s operations in Geneva. As a consequence, when the OIC launched its campaign to get a new and controversial norm established, they were quick both to grasp what was at stake normatively and to formulate an appropriate response. The precise impact of religious NGOs and their secular partners in the debate on the OIC campaign between 1999 and 2011 is difficult to quantify. What we can say, however, is that by actively engaging with the issues, by providing information and expertise, by giving advice on ethical and theological matters, and, in certain cases, by reporting on their own direct experience of blasphemy laws, RNGOs undoubtedly helped pave the way for the eventual demise of the resolution on the defamation of religions.

Notes 1 The Organization changed its name in 2011 to ‘Organization of Islamic Cooperation’ (OIC). 2 What follows here is based on my treatment of the subject in Baumgart-Ochse 2015. 3 Art. 18: ‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.’ 4 The great majority of OIC member-countries have signed the Covenant. Amongst the exceptions are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, which have neither signed nor ratified it. 5 Personal communication with representatives of World Jewish Congress (1 Oct. 2015) and B’nai Brith (28 Sept. 2015). 6 All quotations from D. Ala’i in this section are from: Personal communication, 4 Mar. 2015. 7 All quotations from J. Taylor are from: Personal communication, 5 Mar. 2015. 8 Personal communication, 2 Oct. 2015. All P. Prove quotations here are from this source. 9 Personal communication, 3 Mar. 2015. All R. Deffenbaugh quotations here are from this source.

References Bahá’í International Community, 2009. Reclaiming freedom of conscience, religion or belief to promote social integration [online]. Available from: www.bic.org/statements/

164

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

reclaiming-freedom-conscience-religion-or-belief-promote-social-integration#M1p8Dd qSZ3RAa9Qd.97 [Accessed 12 October 2017]. Bahá’í International Community, 2017. Bahá’u’lláh and his covenant [online]. Available from: www.bahai.org/beliefs/bahaullah-covenant/ [Accessed 25 November 2017]. Baumgart-Ochse, C., 2015. Which gets protection-belief or believer?: The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the campaign against the ‘defamation of religions’. PRIF report. Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Baumgart-Ochse, C., 2017. Protecting religion: Muslim opposition and dissidence against Western representations of Islam. In: S. Gertheiss et al., eds. Resistance and change in world politics: International dissidence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 187–213. Beittinger-Lee, V. and Miall, H., 2017. Islam, the OIC and the defamation of religions controversy. In: J.R. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 155–74. Belnap, A.G., 2011. Defamation of religion: A vague and overbroad theory that threatens basic human rights. Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale. Rivista telematica, April, 1–50. Bettiza, G. and Dionigi, F., 2014. How do religious norms diffuse? Institutional translation and international change in a post-secular world society. European Journal of International Relations, 21 (3), 1–26. Bielefeldt, H., 2001. Säkularisierung – ein schwieriger Begriff: Versuch einer praktischen Orientierung. In: M. Hildebrandt, M. Brocker, and H. Behr, eds. Säkularisierung und Resakralisierung in westlichen Gesellschaften: Ideengeschichtliche und theoretische Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 29–42. Bielefeldt, H., 2012. Streit um die Religionsfreiheit: Aktuelle Facetten der internationalen Debatte. Erlanger Universitätsreden, 77 (3). Blitt, R.C., 2011. Defamation of religion: Rumors of its death are greatly exaggerated. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 62 (2), 347–97. Bonde, B.N., 2007. How 12 cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed were brought to trigger an international conflict. Nordicom Review, 28 (1), 33–48. Cismas, I., 2014. Religious actors and international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs et al., 2006. The mandate and work of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion: Joint written statement submitted by non-governmental organizations* on the roster at the first session of the Human Rights Council [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/ commissions/international-affairs/human-rights-council/the-mandate-and-work-of-thespecial-rapporteur-on-freedom-of-religion [Accessed 20 November 2017]. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs and Lutheran World Federation, 2009. Joint oral intervention by the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches at UN’s Durban Review Conference [online]. Available from: www. oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/unity-mission-evangelismand-spirituality/just-and-inclusive-communities/dalits/oral-intervention-at-un-durbanreview-conference [Accessed 20 December 2017]. Dobras, R.J., 2008. Is the United Nations endorsing human rights violations? An analysis of the United Nations’ combating defamation of religions resolutions and Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, 37, 339–80. Donnelly, J., 2013. International human rights. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Economic and Social Council, 2008. Committee on non-governmental organizations: Quadrennial reports for the period 2003–2006. E/C.2/2008/2/Add.3. New York, NY: United Nations.

Preventing a global blasphemy law 165 Foster, J., 2009. Prophets, cartoons, and legal norms: Rethinking the United Nations defamation of religion provisions. Journal of Catholic Legal Studies, 18 (19), 19–57. General Assembly, 1945. Charter of the United Nations [online]. Available from: www. un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html [Accessed 18 October 2017]. General Assembly, 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights [online]. Available from: www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm [Accessed 18 October 2017]. General Assembly, 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [online]. Available from: www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2017]. General Assembly, 2011. Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief. A/HRC/31/L.34. New York, NY: United Nations. Graham, B., 2009. Defamation of religions: The end of pluralism? Emory International Law Review, 23, 69–84. Hermann, R., 2013. Modernisierungsschub: Die ‘Organisation für islamische Zusammenarbeit’ als Motor für Veränderungen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May, 10. International Association for Religious Freedom, 2015. Trifold pamphlet [online]. Available from: https://iarf.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IARF-Trifold-Pamphlet-2015. pdf [Accessed 12 October 2017]. International Association for Religious Freedom, 2017. About the IARF [online]. Available from: https://iarf.net/about/ [Accessed 5 October 2017]. International Humanist and Ethical Union, 2007. Combating ‘defamation of religion’ unnecessary, flawed, and morally wrong [online]. Available from: iheu.org/iheu-combatingdefamation-religion-unnecessary-flawed-and-morally-wrong/ [Accessed 12 October 2017]. International Humanist and Ethical Union, 2009. Speaking freely about religion: Religious freedom, blasphemy, and defamation of religions [online]. Available from: iheu. org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/Speaking%20Freely%20about%20Religion_0.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2017]. Kayaoglu, T., 2014. Giving an inch only to lose a mile: Muslim states, liberalism, and human rights in the United Nations. Human Rights Quarterly, 36 (1), 61–89. Lutheran World Federation, 2013. Statement on freedom of religion or belief [online]. Available from: www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/Council2013-Statement_ Freedom_Religion_Belief.pdf [Accessed 20 November 2017]. Lutheran World Federation, 2017. About the LWF [online]. Available from: www.lutheran world.org/content/about-lwf [Accessed 12 November 2017]. Marshall, P., 2011. Exporting blasphemy restrictions: The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 9 (2), 57–63. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1999. Defamation of religions. E-CN_4-RES-1999–82. New York, NY: United Nations. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012. Rabat Plan of Action [online]. Available from: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Seminar Rabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf [Accessed 20 December 2017]. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 1972. OIC Charter [online]. Available from: www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=53&p_ref=27&lan=en [Accessed 2 October 2017]. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 1990. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam [online]. Available from: www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/ intergovernmental-organisations/oic/THE%20CAIRO%20DECLARATION%20 ON%20HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20IN%20ISLAM.pdf [Accessed 2 November 2017].

166

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 2005. Ten year programme of action [online]. Available from: www.oic-iphrc.org/en/data/docs/legal_instruments/OIC%20Instruments/ TYPOA-%20AEFV/TYPOA-EV.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2017]. Petersen, M.J., 2012. Islamic or universal human rights?: The OIC’s Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission. DIIS Report 2012/03. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Rehman, J. and Berry, S.E., 2012. Is ‘defamation of religions’ passé? The United Nations, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and Islamic State practices: Lessons from Pakistan. George Washington International Law Review, 44, 431–72. Sheikh, N.S., 2003. The new politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic foreign policy in a world of states. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Skorini, H.I. and Petersen, M.J., 2017. Hate speech and holy prophets. Tracing the OIC’s strategies to protect religion at the UN. In: A. Stensvold, ed. Religion, state and the United Nations: Value politics. London: Routledge. Temperman, J., 2008. Blasphemy, defamation of religions & human rights law. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 26 (4), 517–45. Trigeaud, S.-H., 2017. On and behind the scene: Religious NGO processes at the OHCHR of the UN in Geneva. In: J.R. Carrette and H. Miall, eds. Religion, NGOs, and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 89–118. UN Commission on Human Rights, 2005. Defamation of religions and global efforts to combat racism: Anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and Islamophobia: Report submitted by Mr. Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.4. New York, NY: United Nations. UN Watch, 2009. Joint Statement on danger of UN ‘defamation of religions’ campaign [online]. Available from: www.infosud.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=4272 [Accessed 12 October 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2013. Statement on the politicization of religion and rights of religious minorities: Adopted by the WCC 10th Assembly as part of the report of the public issues committee [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/ documents/assembly/2013-busan/adopted-documents-statements/politicisation-ofreligion-and-rights-of-religious-minorities [Accessed 20 November 2017]. World Council of Churches, 2017. What is the World Council of Churches? [online]. Available from: www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us [Accessed 20 November 2017].

9

Religious NGOs at the UN Advancing interreligious dialogue and cooperation? Jeffrey Haynes1

Interreligious dialogue and cooperation is a key issue, especially since 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’). The attacks on the USA that day, carried out by nineteen al Qaeda operatives and which killed around three thousand people in Manhattan and at the Pentagon, brought to a head an issue which was already on the international agenda: how to avoid a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993, 1997). Following 9/11, the aim of improving interreligious – and intercultural – dialogue became an important concern of global governance, an issue which the United Nations (UN) took up in 2005 by creating the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC). The UNAOC’s ambitious aim was to defuse what some believed to be a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and the Muslim world by working within an emerging framework of global governance.2 This would be achieved by focusing efforts at three, interrelated, levels: the international community (especially the UN), states, and civil society. Because the issue was de novo, there were no pre-existing templates at the UN or elsewhere which the UNAOC could adapt for its work. Lacking adequate conceptual and practical tools to deal satisfactorily with the issue of interreligious and intercultural clashes, the UNAOC was compelled to start from scratch. Over the last dozen years, its goals have been slow to be realized. The aim of this chapter is to examine how and why (1) the UN has sought to further interreligious and intercultural dialogue through the UNAOC, and (2) burgeoning numbers of religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs) seek to pursue interreligious and intercultural dialogue, sometimes working with the UNAOC to try and achieve that goal.

RNGOs at the UN: responding to international crises Two developments have made ‘religion’ of some significance at the UN. The first was the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ and the subsequent aim to try to improve things via intercivilizational – that is, interreligious and intercultural – dialogue. Second, there was the impact of neoliberal globalization, drawing attention both to global inequalities and the need for enhanced global justice. The latter was pivotal in opening up the UN for efforts by some RNGOs to work towards improved

168

Jeffrey Haynes

development and, via registration with the UN’s Economic and Social Council, develop the capacity to focus resources on these tasks. Overall, as Marshall notes: Each crisis involving interreligious tensions and violence sparks some form of interfaith response. In the contemporary setting (where extremism and terrorism are priority concerns in international affairs) religiously linked violence tends to dominate many interfaith approaches, from research to direct action on the ground. (Marshall 2017, p. 6) How was the issue of ‘clash of civilizations’ and an associated concern, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, dealt with at the United Nations? The UN’s response was initially slow, gathering pace only after a personal initiative of the then president of Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami.3 Khatami sought to address the issue of continuing tensions between the West and Iran – and by extension the Muslim world more generally – by calling for regular dialogue under UN auspices. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1998, Khatami called for the international community to make sustained attempts to reduce tensions between the West and the Muslim world. Following Khatami’s intervention, the General Assembly designated 2001 as the ‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations’. However, before Khatami’s initiative could develop, his efforts were summarily derailed by 9/11 and its consequences: the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). These actions, undertaken in the name of combating ‘Islamist terrorism’, were however perceived by many in the Muslim world as reflecting a Western desire collectively to punish Muslims for 9/11 and subsequent radical Islamist attacks on Western targets. In the wake of these developments, the UN became more amenable to activities of selected RNGOs in pursuit of improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue. For an NGO or RNGO to be ‘selected’ by the UN, it is necessary to register with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).4 Only then can it seek to impact, individually or working with others, upon questions of global governance, including what ‘appropriate’ norms and values the UN should reflect and pursue (Marshall 2013; see also Bob 2012). The overall point is that in the last few decades the UN has become increasingly concerned with the need for improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue, which centres on cultural and religious issues and differences and which UNAOC was created to deal with. The UNAOC’s brief is to work at three levels: the international community, states, and civil society. Not only RNGOs are interested in interreligious and intercultural dialogue; there are also several secular organizations active at the UN whose concern is to work in the fields of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and this overlaps with the work of some RNGOs. In recent years, numbers of NGOs registered with ECOSOC has reached around 4,000, with about 9 per cent (339) judged to be RNGOs (Beinlich and Braungart in this volume). This contrasts with the UN’s early years, which involved almost exclusively interactions between (secular)

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 169 UN entities, (secular) governments, and (secular) NGOs. Increasing numbers of RNGOs active at the UN indicate not only that numbers of transnational RNGOs have recently grown but also that they increasingly wish to influence global public policy at the UN, including in relation to improved international cooperation towards helping resolve extant economic and social concerns. In sum, growth in numbers of RNGOs registered at the UN characterizes a global context marked by a claimed ‘clash of civilizations’, underpinned by a widespread religious resurgence, which influences morally and ethically informed values in debates about global public policy at the UN, including in relation to the activities of many RNGOs. The UN is a major meeting point of religion and culture-based networks, concerned with a variety of objectives in global governance, including human rights, social conventions and arrangements, and development inequalities (Marshall 2013; Bob 2012). Overall, increasing RNGO presence at the UN reflects two main developments. First, there is the impact of what some perceive as civilizational ‘clash’ or conflict (Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993, 1997), with a corresponding focus on the part of some RNGOs and UN bodies, especially the UNAOC, to strive for improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue. Second, there is generally increased focus on ‘values’, ‘norms’, and ‘behaviour’ in international relations after the Cold War, including in relation to perceptions of the often-deleterious impact of globalization – and its corollary, increasing impact of global capitalism – on the ‘have nots’. Reflecting these developments, many RNGOs at the UN pursue a concern with various aspects of justice and human rights, including how povertystricken people in poor and undeveloped countries can improve their positions via, inter alia, the Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) and Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030) (Haynes 2016; Marshall 2013). However, achieving improved and more equitable international development is not simply a moral or theological concern. As Lynch (2012) notes in a blog post on the Religion Factor, when RNGOs ponder international development they typically move from initially moral dimensions to consider a highly material factor: ‘neoliberal competition of the “market” of international development’. This issue is connected to the impact of the post-Cold War world, whereby globalization appears to encourage or exacerbate an unjust and polarized world, that is, where the rich (‘elites’) benefit disproportionately. In sum, the past twenty-five years – that is, the post-Cold War era – was a time of deepening globalization, which coincided with a widespread religious resurgence with growing prominence of ethical and moral (often overlapping with faith-based) concerns in debates about values, norms, and behaviours (Bob 2012) and, for some, emergence of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Today, at the UN, religion-influenced views and opinions are frequently heard in relation to ethical and moral controversies focusing on the nature and impact of post-Cold War globalization in relation to increasingly polarized international development outcomes, with the rich improving their position and the poor doing much less well, as well as ‘climate change, global finance, disarmament, inequality, pan-epidemics and human rights’ (Carrette and Miall 2012, p. 3). The focus, values, and content of global public policy at the UN are

170

Jeffrey Haynes

increasingly influenced ‘by the moral resources that “religions” offer and agencies of global governance need an awareness of what religious actors are doing and sensitivity to religious difference’ (Carrette and Miall 2012, p. 2).

The UNAOC and ‘the clash of civilizations’ The UNAOC was created under the auspices of the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Annan delegated authority to a UNAOC High Representative to lead the Alliance as a vehicle to improve ‘civilizational’ dialogue between two specific entities: the West and the Muslim world. The UNAOC was specifically focused on a new yet fuzzy term in the UN lexicon: ‘civilization’. Yet, creating UNAOC as the key UN ‘platform’ for enhanced (and, hopefully, improved) ‘civilizational’ dialogue at the UN, with the implicit connotation of improved inter-faith relations between Muslims and Christian Westerners, might be thought of as anomalous. This is because the UN, both by tradition and design, is both state-centric and secular. Why then seek to create a unique sui generis entity, the UNAOC, to improve ‘inter-civilizational’ dialogue? What might it hope to achieve? An early UNAOC Concept Paper points to the need ‘for a committed effort by the international community – both at the institutional and civil society levels – to overcome [civilizational] prejudice, misconceptions, misperceptions, and polarization’ (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación 2005). Who might be the key players in this effort? What are the values that they might bring to the UN table? A key problem with much of what the UN does is that it is often very difficult for states to agree upon and implement policies because of their lack of shared values. In addition, from the time the UNAOC was created, the international community watched in horror as a new wave of terrorism and violent extremism erupted from entities such as Islamic State, Boko Haram, and al Shabaab. Many believed that there was no point in trying to enter into ‘dialogue’ with such actors; instead, they must be destroyed. Critics contend that the notion of an ‘alliance’ of civilizations is highly problematic, because of its exclusionary tendencies. The rationale for the creation of the Alliance was as follows: the Alliance was meant as ‘a call to all of those who believe in building rather than destroying, who embrace diversity as a means of progress rather than as a threat, and who believe in the dignity of humankind across religion, ethnicity, race, and culture’ (Nirenberg 2008, p. 3). Thus the Alliance brings together all who welcome variety and censure polarization, thus defining itself through both hostilities and segregations. In other words, from the outset the Alliance was against those who, it avers, would prefer to destroy than to construct, try to eradicate diversity rather than welcome it, and do not believe in the dignity of humankind. It is clear who those who put together the 2005 Concept Paper have in mind: followers of the rival model, the ‘clash of civilizations’. By definition, such people are demolishers, eliminators, people haters; or, barbarians. They cannot possibly be part of the Alliance of Civilizations because they lack the necessary characteristics of being civilized. Put this way, the Alliance is itself also already a ‘clash’. Nirenberg (2008, p. 3) avers that it is not uncommon to perceive

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 171 the ‘blitheness with which the [Alliance] sailed into aporia’.5 Rather, ‘it is characteristic of the two most popular models we have available for understanding the historical relationship between the Christian West and Islam . . . Models that posit a history of synthesis or “alliance” between Islam and the West quickly reproduce the “clashes” or oppositions that they pretend to over-come’ (Nirenberg 2008, p. 3). On the other hand, explanations that assert Islam’s elimination from or clear opposition to the triumphs of Europe and the West are no more persuasive, not least because they are unable to explain the intricate particularities of Christianity and Islam’s interactive historical and ideational relationships. In addition, there is a challenge of Christians and Muslims understanding each other that goes back to the earliest days of Islam in the seventh century. An eminent Catholic theologian, Father Samir Khalil Samir, S.J., contends that such interfaith ‘dialogue [is] challenged by many stark differences, [yet] there are also some areas of agreement, especially in family life and morality. Given the reality that recent years have witnessed numerous controversies in Western countries over the impact of increasing Muslim populations, multiculturalism and assimilation, and the fact that Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the world, the need to understand the Islamic faith assumes an even greater urgency for Catholics’ (Samir cited in Valentine-Owsik 2011). For his part, the High Representative of the UNAOC, Nassir Abdualziz Al-Nasser, argues that the Alliance was established as a ‘soft-power tool to promote dialogue for peace and development . . . [C]ross-cultural dialogues are a crucial component in our efforts to build peace, tolerance, harmony, and mutual understanding around the world’ (Al-Nasser 2014, p. xv). In sum, the idea of civilizational dialogue is controversial for several reasons, including its potentially exclusionary tendency and a possible lack of common ground between different religious faiths. Partly for these reasons, the Alliance focuses upon what it calls its ‘soft-power’ capacity to ‘promote dialogue for peace and development’ in ‘cross-cultural’ contexts.

RNGOs in partnership with UNAOC The Alliance of Civilizations was expected to bring together both states and civil society to work towards civilizational dialogue, and included within the ranks of civil society actors are selected religious non-governmental organizations. For RNGOs to engage institutionally with the UN, it is necessary that they agree to core UN values, as captured in the United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Puchala et al. 2007, pp. 117–35). The UN vets NGO and RNGO involvement at the UN, and if the values of an NGO are not deemed appropriate an NGO is not allowed to register with the UN’s Economic and Social Council, the gatekeeper for NGO involvement at the UN. As a result, it is quite difficult for RNGOs to be a polarizing force at the UN, that is, in terms of UN values: if an RNGO is not willing to conform to such values it will not be allowed to engage with the UN. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that, for example, a Muslim and Christian RNGO would not see eye to eye on a

172

Jeffrey Haynes

particular issue. Partly for this reason, the UNAOC engages primarily with interfaith RNGOs, which by definition are striving to find common ground. It is important to bear in mind that the Alliance’s goals are somewhat vague (that is: ‘promote dialogue for peace and development . . . [C]ross-cultural dialogues are a crucial component in our efforts to build peace, tolerance, harmony, and mutual understanding around the world’). Especially for inter-faith RNGOs it is easy to ‘sign up’ for such goals but potentially more problematic for, for example, RNGOs that follow teachings closely of a particular faith rather than inter-faith concerns. Overall, it is clear that the relationship between the Alliance and selected RNGOs is mutually supportive, provided we bear in mind that to engage with the UNAOC it is necessary for RNGOs broadly to share its somewhat vague goals. Marshall (2017, p. 6) notes that: ‘Taking stock’ of contemporary interfaith work is a large challenge. Dialogue and action among religiously linked actors come in many shapes, sizes, colors, and tones. They range from talk around a dinner table to grand affairs of church and state. The nature of action varies, shaped by available tools and the implicit or explicit “theory of change” that lies behind the action. Some efforts are tangible and pragmatic (for example joining together to protect religious sites from direct threats or lobbying for specific humanitarian action). Others have a much more general goal of increasing understanding among different communities and faiths and thus helping to build solid community relations, or social cohesion. The quotation is highlighting an immensely important issue. How do we understand and make sense of what the hundreds of RNGOs at the UN, and the thousands worldwide, do to achieve goals in relation to ‘interfaith work’? Social scientists find it necessary to count, label, assess, and analyze what they are studying to make the world understandable and explicable. But it is likely that many RNGOs have little concern with what social scientists think (of them). It is fair to assume that many of the RNGOs registered at the UN with ECOSOC or connected to the UN’s Department of Public Information (DPI)6 are ‘singing from the same song sheet’ when it comes to what they want to achieve: increased interreligious and intercultural dialogue with the goal of making the world a better place. On the other hand, it would be naïve to assume that there are not outliers which – despite rhetorical and/or public acceptance of UN norms – nevertheless have their own goals which might not overlap entirely with those of the UN. It is highly unlikely that the al Qaedas and Islamic States of this world are seeking registration with ECOSOC at the UN. But do the hundreds of RNGOs at the UN, and the thousands worldwide, constitute a recognizable ‘social movement’? On the one hand, there is the view that the very sight of burgeoning numbers of RNGOs is positive proof of a coming together of the world’s great faith traditions, trying to fathom what those from other faiths are about, seeking to achieve and to work together for shared common goals: peace, cooperation, a better world. Many, on the other

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 173 hand, do not share such a benign view; they may regard the many RNGOs at the UN and elsewhere as collectively amounting to not very much: ‘disparate, worthy endeavours with unproven impact’ (Marshall 2017, p. 6). However one perceives RNGOs and what they do, it is difficult to assess whether RNGOs at the UN have improved interreligious dialogue and cooperation. In this context, several questions arise: (1) Do RNGOs constitute a recognizable ‘social movement’? (2) Does RNGO dialogue achieve lasting benefits? (3) Can RNGOs collaborate meaningfully in pursuit of shared goals, or are they too self-interested? (4) Can RNGOs achieve lasting financial stability?, and (5) Is there anything distinctive about RNGOs? That is, what, if anything, sets them apart from endeavours carried out by other, secular, actors, such as the pursuit of peace, via conflict resolution efforts? First, efforts to examine RNGO interreligious and intercultural cooperation efforts as constitutive of a movement fall at the first hurdle: it is very difficult or even impossible to discern structure and form. Further, there is no agreed upon definition of what an interreligious and intercultural entity comprises, and there is no comprehensive listing of such efforts or organizations. Finally, links between such entities are at best weak and at worst absent. In sum, it is impossible comprehensively to evaluate the sum of individual and collective RNGO efforts to build interreligious and intercultural cooperation. Second, ‘dialogue’ is the buzzword at most international gatherings these days, including at the UN. Dialogue is a constant theme of interreligious and intercultural work – although it is far from clear what, if anything, ‘dialogue’ can concretely achieve. Some regard dialogue as the antithesis of ‘action’, denying or holding back putatively effective efforts to change things for the better. We have all seen the photographs or videos, or maybe we’ve been at dedicated international events, where an array of august, mostly aged, almost invariably male religious leaders nod sagely when they hear demands that we must all ‘work harder’ substantially to improve interreligious and intercultural relations and make the world a better place. But, as things do not seem clearly to improve, maybe it is not surprising that some are very sceptical that such ‘dialogue’ achieves anything lasting and beneficial. Third, collaboration and partnerships are another endless refrain in such work. Many umbrella organizations exist to try to bring together and focus individual efforts. While such labours suggest that interreligious and intercultural efforts should be part of a robust and dedicated global institutional structure to achieve such aims, it is not clear how the plethora of extant efforts works collectively to this end. Fourth, most RNGOs pursuing interreligious and intercultural improvement goals are short of money. Very few have regular or sufficient incomes to carry out the work that they think needs doing. As Marshall (2017, p. 7) notes, ‘[F]inancial support for interfaith work has tended to be tepid and poorly sustained.’ Fifth, despite often lofty goals, which in the overwhelming majority of cases are pursued with sincerity, many RNGOs do not always seem clear regarding what, precisely, the goals are or how concretely they might be achieved. It is

174

Jeffrey Haynes

rarely clarified how – or even if – stated goals would be monitored (and incidentally this holds for the UNAOC too). In sum, there are hundreds of RNGOs registered at the UN. Many seek improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation. Yet there is no clear evidence that these RNGOs form a social movement. There is also a lack of certainty that their attempts at ‘dialogue’ ‘work’, as well as often problematic attempts at inter-RNGO collaboration, consistent financial uncertainties and shortfalls, and few, if any, monitorable goals. If this rather damning assessment has any validity, what is the point of RNGOs at the UN in relation to interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation? Why would the UNAOC choose to work with such entities and vice versa? Given the huge number and disparate nature of RNGOs active at the UN, there is little to be gained by trying to present a comprehensive overview. Instead, the remainder of the chapter examines the activities of three ‘umbrella’ RNGOs which regularly share platforms at the UN and elsewhere with the UNAOC. The aim of the section is to address three questions noted earlier: (1) Do RNGOs constitute a recognizable ‘social movement’? (2) Does RNGO dialogue achieve lasting benefits? (3) Can RNGOs collaborate meaningfully in pursuit of shared goals, or are they too self-interested? In the chapter’s conclusion we briefly address the critique of Nirenberg (2008) that the UNAOC itself replicates the exclusionary rhetoric of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and whether the three RNGOs we examine reinforce or moderate the alleged confrontational nature of the Alliance. The three RNGOs we examine – necessarily briefly – are all members of the umbrella Committee for Religious NGOs (CRNGO) at the UN.7 They are Religions for Peace (a global RNGO umbrella entity which focuses on senior-level interactions), United Religions Initiative (a global RNGO with strong links to grassroots organizations around the world, especially in the Global South), and Bahá’í International Community (an interfaith RNGO that works explicitly to advance civilizational interactions). Each focuses on interfaith dialogue at the UN; is registered with ECOSOC or the DPI; has significant experience of working at the UN on interreligious and intercultural dialogue, including with the UNAOC; and shares a perception that improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue is necessary for improved global governance to deal with pressing problems facing humanity. Taken together, the three RNGOs provide a sample of the membership of the CRNGO at the UN engaged in consistent interaction with the UNAOC.8 Religions for Peace Religions for Peace (RFP) has its headquarters in New York City across the UN Plaza from the United Nations building. It is headed by Dr. William Vendley, theologian and veteran interfaith activist, who serves ‘as a member of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Council’.9 The website of the UNOAC’s 7th Global Forum – held in Baku, Azerbaijan, in April 2016 – describes RFP as ‘the world’s largest multi-religious coalition advancing common action for Peace functions’ (UNAOC Global Forum 2016a). RFP works via advocacy, seeking to

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 175 bring conflicting parties together while sometimes actively engaging in mediation. Recently, in addition, RFP has sought to extend its concerns to include development activities, including HIV/AIDS prevention and climate change concerns (Marshall 2017, p. 61). RFP has UN consultative status, focusing considerable attention on core UN institutions in New York. RFP was formally established in 1970, during the first World Conference of Religions for Peace in Kyoto, Japan. RFP, a partnership of regional and national chapters, organizes ‘Global Assemblies’, roughly every five years: Leuven, Belgium (1974); Princeton, New Jersey, USA (1979); Nairobi, Kenya (1984); Melbourne, Australia (1989); Riva del Garde, Italy (1994); Amman, Jordan (1999); Kyoto, Japan (2006); and Vienna, Austria (2013). Over time, RFP has created and developed a network of regional and country chapters, which vary both in terms of their strength and in relation to their work and practical mandate. RFP organizes ‘interreligious councils’ in 92 countries, structured into five regions, through which it initiates both dialogue and action. While each has a council of presidents, an executive council, and a council of trustees that support a secretariat, there is in practice considerable variation among councils’ structures, agendas, and capacity (Marshall 2017, p. 61). In addition, like many other religious institutions, historically RFP’s formal organizational structures have been dominated by men. Recently, a network of activists within RFP has sought to highlight the issue of a paucity of women in leadership positions, pressing the incumbent leadership to change things. In response, recent years have seen RFP making sustained efforts to develop a ‘women of peace’ network. ‘This group meets separately during global assemblies and has an independent work program, though it has suffered serious funding issues. A similar structure reflects concern to bring in youth voices through parallel mechanisms’ (Marshall 2017, p. 61; also see Marshall and Ogega 2015). RFP engages with UNAOC on specific platforms. UNAOC work with RFP is focused on problems and prospects of interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation, including how to defuse and undermine religious extremism. An example of this kind of interaction took place on December 12–13, 2014, in Abu Dhabi. The event was a high-level conference – purportedly the ‘first global multi-religious high-level convening on violent religious extremism’ – prominently featuring, inter alia, leaders of both the UNAOC and RFP, as well as Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, President, Forum for Peace in Muslim Societies10 and H.E. Cardinal John Onaiyekan, Archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria.11 The conference was convened by the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies12 in cooperation with Religions for Peace. The aim of the conference, entitled ‘Religions Taking Action Together to Counter Violent Religious Extremism’, was to provide detailed examination and analysis of factors that ‘drive’ violent religious extremism. The conference presented a multi-religious consensus, emphasizing that Christians and Muslims working together can do much to combat the impact of violent religious extremism on their communities. Efforts were necessary to identify, develop, and build medium- and long-term collaborative multi-religious efforts to

176

Jeffrey Haynes

combat the scourge of violent extremism. In addition, the conference highlighted how potentially all religious communities are vulnerable to the effects of violent religious extremism and the strong need for religious communities, both interfaith and intra-faith, to work together to present a united voice against all forms of violent religious extremism. Conference presentations from both Al-Nasser and Vendley asserted the importance of enhanced cooperation of religious persons of various faiths working together on one of the greatest threats to the well-being of humanity. The conference closed with an inter-faith statement and action plan to counter violent religious extremism. We have seen that RFP acts globally. The organization has a long track record of seeking to facilitate interfaith dialogue, including at the UN. It does not seem to be the case that RFP reinforces what Nirenberg (2008) alleges is the UNAOC’s exclusionary and confrontational conception of inter-faith relations. This is because RFP has a truly global outlook, looking beyond a narrow ‘Western-Islamic’ focus, which Nirenberg (2008) sees as being a main problem with the UNAOC. United Religions Initiative The United Religions Initiative (URI) was launched in San Francisco in 1995 by the Rt. Rev. William Swing (Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of California from 1979 until he retired in 2006). Over the next decades, the URI network (known as ‘Cooperation Circles’) grew rapidly, extending into the Global South and more widely. By 2010 URI’s Cooperation Circles had more than doubled since 2002, from 185 to about 450. In 2017, the URI network of Cooperation Circles numbered 838 (URI 2017a). According to Penn (2010, p. 10), URI ‘supporters range from the US Department of State to the European Union, as well as prominent bishops within the Catholic Church’. From inception, the URI has taken inspiration from the United Nations. URI’s beginning was linked explicitly to the UN’s fiftieth anniversary celebration, held in San Francisco’s Grace Cathedral in 1995. The event stimulated Bishop Swing to found a ‘United Religions’. Swing says that ‘We were intoxicated by a vision . . . If there was a United Nations, what about creating a United Religions?’ (URI 2017b). On June 26, 2000, URI signed its Charter to link its founding date with that of the United Nations. Links between the URI and the UN have grown over the years. URI Cooperation Circles around the world take part annually in the UNAOC/CRNGO flagship event, World Interfaith Harmony Week. In recent years, several URI Cooperation Circles have won the World Interfaith Harmony Week contest, an international honour sponsored by the founder of the World Interfaith Harmony Week, King Abdullah II of Jordan. URI delegates regularly take part in UN events, including a yearly youth delegation. In 2015, URI was invited to join the seventieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations. URI is based in San Francisco, far from the UNAOC, based in New York. To help overcome the geographical distance, some 5,000 kilometres, between San Francisco and New York, the URI has two representatives at the UN: Monica

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 177 Willard and Mussie Hailu. In addition, URI Executive Director Victor Kazanjian actively seeks to build connections with the UN, including the UNAOC, to further the work of the URI Cooperation Circles. According to Kazanjian: ‘We hope to build more formal partnerships which allow both our Cooperation Circles and regional offices to be in closer contact with UN agencies . . . It allows the UN to see us as a partner in distributing materials to the grassroots, and allows us to be a partner in strategic policy work that affects the communities in which we work around the world’ (URI 2017b). The relationship between URI and UNAOC is potentially beneficial, as each has strengths which complement those of the other. On the one hand, the UNAOC has found it difficult to reach local communities, while a key URI strength is community education. According to Kazanjian: ‘We can get things into the hands of people at a grassroots level, and translate high-level policy statements into a context they find relevant and useful.’ The UN’s high profile is good for the URI, enabling the organization to achieve a higher profile. Monica Willard, one of the two URI Representatives to the United Nations in New York, was president of CRNGO in 2010–2013. In addition, Willard has worked with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) on the annual Student Observance for the International Day of Peace at UN Headquarters since 1997. While CRNGO president, she organized programmes for World Interfaith Harmony Week, including two held in the UN General Assembly. Because of Willard’s various senior roles at the UN, she is a very well-known figure in both UN and RNGO circles, including in relation to UNAOC. While Willard still plays a role in helping organize the annual World Interfaith Harmony Week, Victor Kazanjian is now the ‘public face’ of the URI in its dealings with the UN, including with the UNAOC. Kazanjian represented URI on two panels during World Interfaith Harmony Week, 2016. This platform enabled Kazanjian to get across a central message of URI: it is necessary ‘to challenge people to re-examine their notions of “leadership” and see empowering the grassroots as a key to sustainable community and global peace and justice’ (URI 2016). Growing involvement of URI with UNAOC and with the UN more generally is illustrative of how some RNGOs are seeking to develop their relationship with this key focal point of global governance. However, often when people think of interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation at the UN, they have in mind an archetypal view: a coming together of senior ‘religious leaders’, defined by their official positions as (very often) men with formal senior leadership positions in their various religious communities. This of course excludes so many other kinds of religious leaders, such as women, indigenous leaders, younger peer leaders, and ordinary people of all identities. Such people typically provide leadership for interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation in communities around the world, very often without official recognition or publicity. The URI perspective is that while official religious leaders are honoured as wise partners in interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation, so too are ‘ordinary’ people, also working to achieve interreligious and intercultural harmony. The idea that all are equal, highest to lowest, is one of the messages that URI seeks to bring

178

Jeffrey Haynes

to the UN and to the UNAOC. While the UNAOC states a desire to work at three interrelated levels – the UN, state, and civil society – there is little hard evidence that it has achieved much in relation to civil society, including RNGOs. It remains to be seen whether working closely with a local community-focused entity, such as URI, will help UNAOC achieve its goals in this regard. The URI’s raison d’être is interfaith dialogue, and pursues this as its key aim, including at the UN. Like RFP, URI does not appear to reinforce what Nirenberg (2008) alleges is the UNAOC’s exclusionary and confrontational conception of inter-faith relations. As with RFP, URI has a truly global outlook, looking beyond a narrow ‘Western-Islamic’ focus, which Nirenberg (2008) sees as being a main problem with the UNAOC. Bahá’í International Community at the UN According to the sacred scriptures of the Bahá’í faith, all human beings ‘have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing civilization’. The goals of the office of the Bahá’í International Community (BIC) at the UN chimes well with those of the UNAOC: BIC is motivated by the idea that ‘every nation, community, and person has a part to play in building a peaceful and prosperous global society’. Bahá’í efforts seek to reflect this vision and are informed by a number of related convictions: (1) humanity is engaged in a continuing process of spiritual, moral, social, and scientific development, (2) humanity is at the ‘threshold of a new stage of global connection and interdependence’, and (3) this stage of development is characterized by increasing ‘awareness of the oneness of humankind – a principle that will come to infuse all facets of organized life’ (BIC 2017) The Bahá’í International Community’s United Nations Office represent the worldwide Bahá’í community at the UN, including at events organized by the UNAOC in partnership with global civil society. Within the context of the UN, the BIC is recognized as an international NGO, with affiliates in over 180 countries and territories, which together represent a cross-section of humanity. The BIC engages with the UN and its member states, as well as with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. BIC representatives take part in major UN conferences and international gatherings, especially those related to gender equality, human rights, and social and sustainable development. The BIC Office registered with the UN as an NGO recognized by the Department of Public Information in 1948 and was granted Consultative Status with ECOSOC in 1970. Formal associations with other UN agencies followed: the UN Environmental Programme in 1974; the UN Children’s Fund in 1976; and the (former) UN Development Fund for Women and the UNAOC from 2005. In addition, over the years, the BIC has worked closely with the Offices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the High Commissioner for Refugees; the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and UN Women. Overall, the aim of the Bahá’í UN Office, like the UNAOC, is to contribute to discourses at the international level about how to realize a peaceful and prosperous global society involving enhanced intercivilizational interactions. Given that the Office

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 179 seeks to promote a culture of cooperation and collaboration through principled and constructive interactions with diplomats, UN officials, NGO representatives, and others, it is not surprising that the Bahá’í UN Office regularly works with the UNAOC. This is in the context of the Bahá’í UN Office joining with others, including the UNAOC, in a cooperative exploration of better ways to address problems of global concern. Two brief examples will give a flavour of the BIC’s work with the UNAOC at the UN. In November 2011, representatives of the Bahá’í International Community’s UN Office were invited to present the principles and practices of the Bahá’í faith, as part of the Faith Series Briefings organized by the UN Department of Public Information. The Faith Series briefings were a part of the weekly briefings organized by the Department of Public Information and co-sponsored by the UN Alliance of Civilizations. Bahá’í Representatives Bani Dugal and Ming Chong joined Kenneth Bowers, Secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States, in presenting the principles and practices of the Bahá’í faith, including the history of Bahá’í engagement with the UN and the emerging patterns of Bahá’í community life around the world. Dr. Thomas Uthup, at the time research manager at the UNAOC, introduced the work of the Alliance, and Ms. Maria-Luisa Chavez, chief of NGO relations at the Department of Public Information, moderated the event. On 15 June 2015, the Bahá’í International Community’s UN Office took part in an ‘education for global citizenship’ event at the UN. The seminar brought together diplomats, UN officials, including Jordi Torrent of the UNAOC, and representatives of civil society to consider how the promotion of global citizenship can help create the kind of peaceful world envisioned by the UN Charter – and the more sustainable one outlined in the post-2015 development agenda. Ambassador Oh Joon of the Republic of Korea to the UN stated that: ‘Given the strong need to tackle global challenges, such as violent extremism, global citizenship education shares the importance of a common understanding of universal values, such as justice, human rights and dignity, gender equality, and cultural diversity.’ According to Jordi Torrent, project manager of Media and Information Literacy initiatives at the UNAOC, it is very important to ‘look into Youth, Media and Education from a global perspective within the general umbrella of Media Literacy’.13 It is this context and concern which explains why such events as ‘education for global citizenship’ are regularly held at the UN with RNGO involvement, including that from BIC. Like RFP and URI, BIC is focused on inter-faith dialogue and cooperation. BIC does not appear to reinforce what Nirenberg (2008) alleges is the UNAOC’s exclusionary and confrontational conception of inter-faith relations. BIC has a truly global outlook, looking beyond a narrow ‘Western-Islamic’ focus, which Nirenberg (2008) sees as being a main problem with the UNAOC.

Conclusions The UN is a focal point of global governance concerns, including how to build stronger interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation, involving both

180

Jeffrey Haynes

state and non-state actors. The aim of this chapter was in part to highlight and seek to explain the changing context of global governance concerns over the last twenty-five years, that is, since the end of the Cold War and deepening globalization. We noted increasing concern with issues of interest to religious actors, including RNGOs, albeit in a context – the UN – which remains highly secular. The last two-and-a-half decades have seen increasing numbers of issues coming under the purview of global governance. During this time, we have also seen growing concern with a ‘clash of civilizations’, a situation which might be ameliorated by improved interreligious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation, including under the auspices of a specialist UN entity, the Alliance of Civilizations. This is not to suggest that because the UN is a focal point of global governance concerns that these concerns are easy to resolve; it is, on the one hand, necessary to recognize the importance of such issues for international development and security and the difficulties of achieving improvements and, on the other, important to identify the increased dangers to international security and stability raised by the perceived ‘clash of civilizations’, as well as to appreciate the potential importance of RNGOs for improving global governance outcomes. We briefly examined three umbrella RNGOs active at the UN: Religions for Peace, United Religions Initiative, and the Bahá’í International Community at the UN. They were not intended as representative of ‘typical’ RNGOs at the UN, not least because there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ RNGO, whether at the UN or more generally. The purpose of succinctly surveying what they do at the UN in relation to the UNAOC was to identify the kinds of events they take part in and what they are supposed to achieve. In particular, the analysis was supposed to explore whether these RNGOs help to mitigate what some observers have called the ‘clash of civilizations’ or reinforce the exclusionary character which is engrained in the UNAOC. We saw that while URI is a significant partner with UNAOC in the annual UN-focused World Interfaith Harmony week, RFP works with the UNAOC in a different context and setting: seeking to improve specific inter- and intra-religious relationships; in our case study, it was relations between Christians and Muslims. Finally, Bahá’í International Community at the UN engages primarily in events designed to advance efforts towards building global civil society, for example, in relation to ‘education for global citizenship’. In sum, each of these three RNGOs is engaged in specific initiatives with the UNAOC.

Notes 1 The author acknowledges financial support for this research from the John Templeton Foundation via the ‘Enhancing Life Project’. Details of the latter at http://enhancinglife. uchicago.edu/. 2 In this chapter, ‘the West’ refers to the following regions and countries: Europe, the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand. The term is used to refer to any country and/ or geographical region whose culture is ‘Western’, that is, historically and culturally heavily influenced by western European cultures. In this chapter, the ‘Muslim world’ is synonymous with the notion of a transnational community of Islamic believers, the ummah, suggesting shared religious, cultural, and civilizational characteristics.

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 181 3 Khatami was Iran’s president between August 1997 and August 2005. 4 ECOSOC is the UN ‘organ facilitating international cooperation on standards-making and problem-solving in economic and social issues’ (www.un.org/ecosoc/en/). 5 Aporia is an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument, or theory. 6 ‘The Department of Public Information (DPI) was established in 1946, by General Assembly resolution 13 (I), to promote global awareness and understanding of the work of the United Nations. DPI undertakes this goal through radio, television, print, the Internet, video-conferencing and other media tools.’ (UN DPI 2017). 7 A somewhat representative umbrella organization bringing together 38 RNGOs active at the UN (CRNGO 2017). 8 None of the members of the CRNGO are Islamic organizations. The great majority are either Christian or interfaith, with a smattering of Jewish, Buddhist, and Hindu entities. 9 The designation is in quotation marks as the author is unclear what ‘the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Council’ is. There is no mention of such a Council at the UNAOC website, nor has the author come across it in interviews and discussions for this chapter and in the context of his wider current study of the UNAOC. 10 Like Dr Vendley, Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah was a speaker at UNAOC’s 7th Global Forum, Baku, Azerbaijan, 5–7 April 2016 (UNAOC Global Forum 2016b). 11 The 2014 event was followed by similar events in 2015 and 2016. Details at http:// peacems.com/?events=religions-taking-action-together-to-counter-violent-religiousextremism&lang=en. 12 Abu Dhabi-based Forum for Prompting Peace in Muslim Societies works mostly towards resolving civil strife that in the majority of cases is dressed in the cloak of religion. Those who use religion to validate and justify their violent acts rely on their own flawed understanding and interpretation of religion. Hence, we refute them with a scholastic approach by providing not a counter narrative, but rather the primary narrative of peace and prosperity that relies upon sound religious texts in order to provide the antidote and to provide them with the correct interpretation and understanding. (Bin Bayyah 2015) 13 Personal communication, 22 June 2017.

References Al-Nasser, N.A., 2014. A year at the helm of the United Nations General Assembly. New York, NY: New York University Press. Bahá’í International Community, 2017. About us [online]. Available from: www.bic.org/ about/about-us [Accessed 7 December 2017]. Bin Bayyah, S.A., 2015. National dialogue conference [online]. Available from: http:// peacems.com/?banners=national-dialogue-conference-house-of-state-address-byshaykh-abdallah-bin-bayyah&lang=en [Accessed 7 December 2017]. Bob, C., 2012. The global right wing and the clash of world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carrette, J. and Miall, H., 2012. Big society or global village? Religious NGOs, civil society and the UN’. Briefing paper for research findings event, 28th November, London. Details at www.kent.ac.uk/secl/thrs/news/index.html?view=399 [Accessed 10 January 2017]. Carrette, J. and Miall, H., eds., 2017. Religion, NGOs and the United Nations: Visible and invisible actors in power. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

182

Jeffrey Haynes

Committee of Religious NGOs at the United Nations, 2017. Member organizations [online]. Available from: https://rngos.wordpress.com/member-organizations/ [Accessed 7 December 2017]. Haynes, J., 2016. National sovereignty, globalisation and securitisation of international migration [online]. Available from: https://doc-research.org/en/report2/national-sovereigntyglobalisation-securitisation-international-migration/ [Accessed 7 September 2017]. Huntington, S., 1993. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 22–49. Huntington, S., 1997. The clash of civilizations. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Lewis, B., 1990. The roots of Muslim rage. The Atlantic [online]. Available from: www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/ [Accessed 7 December 2017]. Lynch, C., 2012. Religious humanitarianism in a neoliberal age. The Religion Factor Blog [online]. Available from: http://religionfactor.net/2012/09/12/religious-humanitarianismin-a-neoliberal-age/ [Accessed 29 May 2013]. Marshall, K., 2013. Global institutions of religion. London: Routledge. Marshall, K., 2017. Interfaith journeys: An exploration of history, ideas, and future directions, Draft, February. Washington, DC: World Faiths Development Dialogue. Marshall, K. and Ogega, J., 2015. Strengthening religious women’s work for peace. In: K. Marshall and S. Hayward, eds. Women, religion, and peace: Illuminating the unseen. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2005. Alliance of civilizations [online]. Available from: http://fund-culturadepaz.org/eng/ALLIANCE/Alianzaingles.pdf [Accessed 7 December 2017]. Nirenberg, D., 2008. Islam and the West: Two dialectical fantasies. Journal of Religion in Europe, 1 (1), 3–33. Penn, L., 2010. The religious face of the new world order: From the Vatican to the White House and the United Religions Initiative: Part II: The Interfaith Movement-and the United Religions Initiative: Grow worldwide. America’s Survival, Inc [online]. Available from: www.leepenn.org/B16_encyclical_v74_part2.doc [Accessed 3 April 2017]. Puchala, D., Laatikainen, K., and Coate, R., 2007. United Nations politics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. UN Alliance of Civilizations Global Forum, 2016a. 7th UNAOC global forum speakers and moderators [online]. Available from: http://baku.unaoc.org/speakers/ [Accessed 7 December 2017]. UN Alliance of Civilizations Global Forum, 2016b. Forum booklet [online]. Available from: http://baku.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Forum_booklet_web.pdf [Accessed 21 December 2017]. UN Department of Public Information, 2017. Overview [online]. Available from: www. un.org/en/sections/department-public-information/department-public-information/ department-public-information/index.html [Accessed 7 December 2017]. United Nations Charter (1945) Available from: http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/ [Accessed 5 April 2018] United Religions Initiative, 2016. World Interfaith Harmony Week at the UN [online]. Available from: www.uri.org/the_latest/2016/02/world_interfaith_harmony_week_at_ the_un [Accessed 4 April 2017]. United Religious Initiative, 2017a. We unite [online]. Available from: www.uri.org/the_ world_of_uri [Accessed 4 April 2017]. United Religious Initiative, 2017b. URI and the United Nations [online]. Available from: https://uri.org/uri-story/20170316-uri-and-united-nations-0 [Accessed 4 April 2017].

RNGOs at the UN: dialogue and cooperation? 183 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Available from: www.un.org/en/universaldeclaration-human-rights/ [Accessed 5 April 2018] Valentine-Owsik, C., 2011. An alliance of civilizations? Understanding Catholic-Islamic dialogue. An interview with Father Samir Khalil Samir, S.J. Our Sunday Visitor [online]. Available from: www.osv.com/MyFaith/Stewardship/Article/TabId/689/ArtMID/13732/ ArticleID/729/An-Alliance-of-Civilizations.aspx [Accessed 11 July 2017].

10 Conclusions Religious NGOs: mediators between distinctiveness and alignment Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

The overall impression of the UN is that of a solidly secular institution founded on and promoting secular rules, norms, ideas, and policies. As the contributions to this volume have shown, however, religion is by no means absent from the UN establishment. The opening-up of the global body to civil society participation from the 1990s also brought with it a rise in the number of religious non-governmental organizations seeking to make their voices heard at the international level. The overarching goal of the present volume was to shed light on the causes and effects of RNGO advocacy and action at the UN. Two key questions guided the endeavour. Firstly, does the involvement of RNGOs in UN policy processes help bring about a better understanding of controversial issues and facilitate resolution, or does it thwart the achievement of tangible outcomes? And secondly, where religious non-state actors opt for a more mediating or a more polarizing role, what are their reasons for so doing? In seeking answers to these questions, we adopted a comparative approach that allowed us to identify patterns of RNGO engagement, trace the causes of these, and assess the impact they have on policy processes at the UN. The individual chapters considered the guiding questions in the specific contexts of climate change; women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights; international development; business and human rights; international criminal justice; defamation of religions; and inter-cultural dialogue and cooperation. In our summing up, we begin by looking at the overall evolution of RNGO engagement at the UN. We then summarize the observations of individual chapters concerning RNGO position and performance in the relevant policy fields, and from this we are able to discern patterns of RNGO behaviour. Explanations for these are then posited on the basis of actor characteristics, external factors, and the particular configuration of the normative conflict under scrutiny in each case. The concluding section elaborates on the added value of this study for postsecular theorizing and points out areas for future research.

RNGOs at the UN: what the data tells us In 2012, 339 of the 3,937 NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council were religious in nature (see the analysis by Ann-Kristin Beinlich and Clara Braungart in this volume). Comparison of the data gathered for the

Conclusions

185

present study with previous quantitative findings shows that while the numbers of both non-religious and religious NGOs with ECOSOC accreditation have risen over the last fifteen years, the proportion of religious or faith-based organizations in this group has remained relatively stable. As far as civil society involvement at the UN is concerned, therefore, the current commonly held assumption that religion is in the ascendant is not confirmed. The data also shows that, relative to the findings of the earliest study in the comparison (Berger’s 2003 investigation), Christian predominance among RNGOs at the UN has remained by and large the same, at roughly 60 per cent, whereas the percentages for other religious traditions have undergone a degree of change. The finding on Christian preponderance reflects both the traditionally strong normative and institutional links which Christian organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Catholic Church enjoy with the UN and the superior organizational and financial capacities of the bodies themselves, which enable them to play major roles – in development and the delivery of humanitarian aid, for example. The data also points up the fact that most Christian RNGOs hail from, and are headquartered in, the United States or other countries in the UN’s Western European and Others Group – and so have the advantage of operating in (mostly) democratic conditions and being able to draw on the resources typically available in industrialized countries. Another factor to emerge from the data is that whereas Christian organizations are present in virtually every policy field, other major religious traditions at the UN demonstrate certain preferences in regard to the issues they address. Jewish RNGOs, for example, are active predominantly in the field of human rights; Muslim organizations focus on development; and Buddhist groups opt to work mainly in the area of peace and reconciliation. These preferences can be accounted for by reference to geographical origins, historical developments, and respective theological and religious emphases. Half of all RNGOs also indicate on their websites or in other publications that, apart from involving themselves in particular policy fields, they actively seek to promote their own religious traditions.

RNGO positions and performance The first of the two tasks the individual chapters set themselves was to explore RNGO positions on the particular policy conflict under scrutiny and to determine what kind of strategies these organizations employ to realize their goals. As indicated in the introductory chapter, religion continues to be thought of as a ‘troublemaker’ by political scientists and IR scholars. There is a widespread suspicion that as soon as religious actors get involved, conflicts over policy issues become fundamentalized: religious players introduce their particular brand of views into the mix, and these – being justified, so it is argued, by reference to ‘other-worldly’ criteria rather than secular norms and principles – complicate the task of securing agreement based on negotiation and compromise. In this book, the authors have sought to set these much-vented assertions (prejudices?) aside and look empirically at the statements and actions of RNGOs in the UN context. What positions do these organizations adopt on the normative

186

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

issues in question, and how do they go about achieving their objectives? Do they play a mediating or a polarizing role in policy processes? And does the religious character of RNGOs have a specific bearing on their behaviour? This approach allows the possibility that, having entered the institutional environment of global governance and adopted the vocabulary, rationales, and strategic, goal-oriented behaviour of liberal discourse, religious NGOs will behave just like ‘ordinary’ NGOs. Whether they act as polarizers or mediators may then be due to factors unrelated to their religious identity. In their chapter on climate change, Katharina Glaab, Doris Fuchs, and Johannes Friederich show that the stances adopted by RNGOs tend to be less technocratic and less utilitarian than those taken up by their secular counterparts. Although well versed in the technical and scientific language in common use in the UNFCCC context, RNGOs will also employ ethical and moral arguments when taking part in relevant processes. Religious lines of reasoning, by contrast, are rare, though the authors note some strategic use of them in interactions with negotiators from countries with strong religious backgrounds. When it comes to performance in the climate-change sphere, the authors find that RNGOs show a preference for strategies based on mediation rather than on confrontation. Compared with this clearly constructive, mediating stance in climate-change debates, the behaviour of RNGOs in the field of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights is more ambivalent. Confirming previous findings in this area, Ann-Kristin Beinlich demonstrates the part played by conservative religious actors in creating a highly polarized discourse over fundamental norms (how to define life) and conflicting rights (the right to life and a woman’s right to choose). In this pro-life versus pro-choice stand-off, Beinlich finds most religious actors on the pro-life side (Catholics for Choice being the exception). At the same time, Beinlich offers empirical evidence that a picture of out-and-out polarization and antagonism in this area does not tell the whole story. In the middle ground, she identifies a distinct group of ‘progressive’ RNGOs who, for internal religious reasons, refrain from taking a position on the most contested issue in this field – abortion – and thereby allow scope for constructive cooperation with a wide range of UN agencies and other partners. In his exploration of the ‘faith and development interface’, Gerard Clarke conveys a fascinating picture in which, despite all the tensions and antipathies one might anticipate, multilateral development agencies are found reaching out for dialogue and partnership with religious NGOS – or faith-based organizations, as Clarke terms them. Clarke tells of remarkable achievements resulting from compacts between development agencies and FBOs, with the latter emerging as cooperatively inclined. The obvious possibility of changes in attitude is, however, not ignored, and Clarke points to the influence of changing external conditions in this regard – notably the rise of conservative nationalism, as a result of which FBOs are being drawn into the polarizing discourses of religious nationalists. Business and human rights is an area in which RNGOs already find themselves part of a polarized debate. Whereas the private sector and certain industrialized states champion voluntary standards for business actors, as laid down in

Conclusions

187

the relevant UN guidelines, other states and most of the NGO community call for strong, binding regulations for corporate activities. The study by Melanie ConiZimmer and Olga Perov shows that the stance and demeanour of RNGOs in this area do not differ significantly from those of their secular partners in the NGO community. They do not actively behave in a way that would further polarize the debate, but given their solid and unequivocal espousal of corporate regulation, they cannot be classed as mediators either. The academic literature on transitional justice has generally viewed religious actors as being strongly focused on reconciliation as opposed to the supposedly retributive approach of the International Criminal Court. In her survey of RNGOs that interact with the Court, Clara Braungart asks how these organizations actually stand on the restorative-versus-retributive issue. She finds that the majority of RNGOs support a restorative approach. However, given that the Court has incorporated aspects of restorative justice in its operations, most RNGOs – except one outlier – view their own approach as compatible with the Court’s work and thus engage with it in a cooperative manner. The OIC’s campaign to have defamation of religions prohibited in humanrights law was seen by RNGOs as an attempt to establish a global anti-blasphemy law. Virtually all the RNGOs that took an active part in the debate on this issue at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva rejected the resolutions seeking prohibition, arguing that the OIC’s true purpose was to legitimize its members’ domestic blasphemy laws – laws which, it was argued, were used to silence dissident voices in the states concerned. In her analysis, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse shows that, besides wishing to uphold international human-rights standards, certain RNGOs feared that the defamation resolutions might lead to increased repression of their own constituencies. Despite their rejection of the defamation project, RNGOs refrained from demonizing the OIC and its member states and treated their concerns regarding increasing Islamophobia in Western societies seriously. Although they took a firm stance, they did not aggravate the existing polarization. Jeffrey Haynes highlights the interreligious and intercultural dialogue which the burgeoning number of RNGOs pursue in an effort to defuse what some believe is a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and the Muslim world. The UN has encouraged these activities and pinned major hopes on them in the framework of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Haynes focuses on three umbrella RNGOs and finds that all of them have helped to advance interreligious and intercultural dialogue in different contexts and with different methods and strategies. In sum: the picture which the empirical evidence conveys of RNGO positioning and performance at the UN is a varied one. In the areas of business and human rights, defamation of religions, and sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are characterized by highly polarized debates over conflicting norms and policy goals, RNGOs adopt relatively firm positions (on either side of the debate). Only in the field of SRHR, however, have they acted as true polarizers, disrupting the policy process. And even here, in this highly contested domain, the evidence shows that not all the religious actors concerned have been involved in the polarization. As Ann-Kristin Beinlich demonstrates, there is a hitherto overlooked

188

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

group of progressive RNGOs that chooses to remain silent on a key bone of contention and thereby facilitates understanding and cooperation with other actors in the field. All in all, the empirical evidence presented in the different chapters suggests that RNGOs tend to opt for cooperative, mediating stances and nonconfrontational modes of behaviour. On the visibility of religion in general and of religious argument in particular, the authors observe that the language and behaviour of RNGOs is in many cases indistinguishable from that of non-religious counterparts. RNGOs tend to adopt the terminology and conventions of the policy fields they engage with, although they will quite often supplement technical and rights-based arguments with moral and ethical reasoning. When interacting with states and non-state actors that have strong religious identities, however, some RNGOs will graduate to full-blown religious argumentation in order to get their point across to their interlocutors and persuade them of their case.

Factors influencing RNGO positioning and performance The second task tackled by the individual chapters was to try to discover what drives RNGO behaviour in the policy field in question. Under what conditions do RNGOs hamper or, conversely, promote understanding and agreement on contested issues? What makes them position themselves and behave in the way they do? In considering these questions, the authors focused on actor characteristics, external factors, and the particular configuration of the normative conflict in the policy field in question. Actor characteristics With regard to actor characteristics, the authors looked at two aspects in particular. The first was the extent to which religious norms and religious practice influence RNGOs’ internal and external deliberations and actions. In other words, is there a correlation between the degree of ‘religiousness’ of an RNGO and its tendency to confrontation or cooperation and to obstructiveness or facilitation? The second was organizational make-up. Here, the authors asked whether differences in the behaviour of RNGOs can be explained by factors such as size, resources, and structural type (hierarchical or loose). The qualitative evidence presented in the individual chapters does not justify the conclusion that the degree to which an RNGO’s work is pervaded by its religious norms and practices correlates with its propensity to confrontation. Even in the field of sexual and reproductive health, where highly confrontational RNGOs at the two ends of the pro-life/pro-choice spectrum justify their positions with religious arguments, there is a substantial group in the middle who are open to cooperation. RNGOs in the pro-life group, arguing on the basis of strict religious norms about the beginnings of life, see the UN’s liberal-secular approach to family planning as intrinsically threatening to their

Conclusions

189

values and adopt a highly confrontational and disruptive attitude, aggravating the existing polarization in this field. Confrontation has also been the response of the pro-choice group (notably Catholics for Choice), though the adversary in this case is intra-religious (the Vatican). The remaining RNGOs, however, whose position is broadly in line with that of the UN, choose not to declare themselves on the main object of controversy and thus have scope to cooperate and mediate. In other chapters too, no definitive correlation is demonstrated between religiousness and confrontation. In the debates on climate change and international development, religious conviction and regard for ethical norms appear to lead to a constructive and cooperative attitude on the part of RNGOs. The same is true in the field of interreligious dialogue and cooperation – although here one should remember that the UNAOC engages primarily with interfaith RNGOs, and these, by definition, are seeking common ground. Selection bias is therefore at work in this case: polarizing RNGOs that do not share the UNAOC’s goals are automatically excluded. In other fields such as the defamation of religions and business and human rights, RNGOs tend to use the technical, rights-based parlance of the policy field in question when they advocate for particular objectives. Many of these organizations have strong religious identities – reflected in, for example, their recruitment policies, the space they accord to worship and prayer in the workplace, and their habit of referring to the theologies and ethics of their religious traditions when asked to account for their normative orientations. When they enter the public debate on the issues in question, however, their positions and behaviour are mostly indistinguishable from those of their non-religious counterparts. The second actor characteristic considered by the authors – organizational make-up – is clearer in its impact on RNGO position and performance. Overall, the evidence suggests that large, complex organizational set-ups comprising several hierarchical and locational levels tend to exhibit behaviour of a more cooperative and mediatory kind than do smaller counterparts. To take the example of the World Council of Churches: it may be that the Council’s experience of having to manage many different global members with diverse interests contributes to its cooperative approach on climate change and on the defamation of religions. In other cases, such complexity can prompt changes of position or produce apparently contradictory behaviours. In the field of international criminal justice, for example, where many RNGOs have decentralized, multi-locational structures, demands at the international level – particularly with its law-dominated framing of issues – may clash with local stances on the issues. As a result, certain RNGOs have difficulty articulating a clear-cut position in international debates. In areas such as international development, meanwhile, the cooperative role of RNGOs clearly has to do with their nature as primarily service-based organizations rather than with a particular programmatic stance. An RNGO of this kind will obviously be more inclined to take on a partnership role rather than cast itself as antagonist.

190

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

External factors In his chapter on interreligious dialogue and cooperation, Jeffrey Haynes notes that the institutional environment of the UN is such that RNGOs’ scope for exerting polarizing influences is, in fact, circumscribed. An RNGO that is unwilling to conform to the UN’s core values, as laid down in foundational documents such as the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, will not be permitted to engage with the organization in the first place – although, as Ann-Kristin Beinlich’s study of the SRHR field demonstrates, there is still ample room for dissent and argument in regard to specific norms. This raises the question of the impact of the institutional environment (not only the UN bureaucracy but also states and governments) on RNGO behaviour and religious identity. Is the same process of UN socialization that Martens (2005) observed in NGOs in general also detectable in RNGOs? Do the goals and values of RNGOs that have been active at the UN over a substantial period of time gradually converge with those of the institution, turning the RNGOs in question into mediators? And does this convergence entail a secularization of these organizations? A similar question can be posed in regard to the influence of the broader international relations environment. The chapters on RNGO activity in climate change, business and human rights, and defamation of religions suggest that this kind of socialization does indeed take place. RNGOs that have worked in the given field for a long time have betterdeveloped links with other, non-religious, NGOs than do ‘newcomers’. They are also more familiar with the technical and legal language of UN debates and discussions. A simultaneous process of secularization, however, is not observable. Rather, many RNGOs do have strong religious identities and refer to religious motivations for their engagement with the UN – but they decide deliberately whether they use technical, legal, ethical, or religious arguments depending on the interlocutors’ identity and interests. RNGOs, it seems, do not lose their religious identity; they learn to adapt to the requirements of their environment. Here again, the study on SRHR appears to be something of an outlier, in that a number of the faith-based actors that feature there show no sign of being socialized into the UN’s normative framework despite their long-time presence in it. The decisive impact which external environments other than that of the UN can have on the positioning and behaviour of RNGOs is demonstrated in the chapter exploring the role of religious actors in international development. The direction taken by religious NGOs in this field appears to depend to a marked degree on the activities and influence of other actors. Currently, these latter include parties in revolt against ‘the global’, who are reaching out to RNGOs and seeking to instrumentalize them for their own purposes. The cooperative potential of RNGOs has become compromised: apparently caught up in the general retreat from multilateralism, they are being drawn into alignments with conservative nationalism that make it impossible for them any longer to fulfil their role as development partners in the way that would have been expected previously. But that role too was the product of environmental influence, though of a converse kind, namely the shift to multilateralism that had been underway since the late 1990s. The

Conclusions

191

present post-liberal order is transforming the debate and creating new challenges for development agencies and FBOs alike. RNGOs that actively sought to prevent the translation of defamation-ofreligions resolutions into human-rights law were also influenced by external factors. They feared the resolutions would reinforce and legitimize national blasphemy laws in a number of OIC countries (and beyond) and, in the case of certain RNGOs, endanger their own constituencies and communities at home. Configuration of the normative conflict The nature of the normative conflict in question and the impact of this on RNGO behaviour was also explored in the individual chapters. Is the clash between different principles or between different interpretations of the same principle? And how closely do the contested issues touch on the core norms of the RNGOs’ own religious traditions? The expectation was that the nature of the conflict and its relevance to RNGOs would affect their position and performance. What emerges from the findings is that principled normative conflicts do indeed result in more clear-cut, principled responses by RNGOs. This is observable, for example, in the conflicts over SRHR, defamation of religions, and business and human rights, in which RNGOs adopt robust, unequivocal positions and act accordingly. The degree to which RNGOs contribute to polarization in relevant debates does, however, vary: whereas other RNGOs in the defamation debate express understanding for some of the OIC’s arguments, this attitude of openness to ‘the adversary’ is not found in the SRHR discourse. This aversion to cooperation and compromise may have to do with the sensitivity of the contested norm – namely, at what point life begins – in terms of the core principles of the RNGOs’ own religious traditions. Even those RNGOs that actively avoid further polarization of the discourse here – the ‘progressive’ group – have not settled on a middle position between the two extremes but have simply decided to keep their counsel. The principled nature of the conflict, which touches on some of the religious actors’ core norms, thus fosters a confrontational style of debate. In the fields of climate change, international criminal justice, and international development, the normative conflict is not as clear-cut. RNGOs active in climate change view the differences of opinion in this area as conflicts of interpretation rather than conflicts of principle. They see themselves as being on the same side as many NGOs and civil society actors of non-religious stamp, but they introduce a moral, ethical, spiritual, and, in some cases, religious perspective into the debate rather than relying purely on technical, utilitarian arguments. In international development, the differences between development agencies and RNGOs, at the outset, were a matter not so much of conflicting principles but of differing understandings of development and how it should be promoted. Compared with the position of certain RNGOs in SRHR, for example, the cautious attitude of charity-oriented NGOs – which made them appear inflexible and foot-dragging in regard to the need for political change – bore much less relation to their core

192

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

religious norms. In the case of international criminal justice, meanwhile, the rather homogenous demeanour of RNGOs vis-à-vis the ICC and restorative justice can be explained primarily as a product of the policy field itself – which admits of cooperative and compromise-oriented behaviour – and of the nature of the norm conflict that characterizes it. Although the ICC is a primarily retributive institution, the majority of RNGOs see its operations as compatible with the restorative approach to justice which they themselves favour.

Religious NGOs: crossing the religious–secular divide Recent works on the postsecular in international relations have seriously questioned the idea that it is possible to distinguish between religious and secular spheres in global politics. Hurd (2008), Mavelli and Petito (2012), and Wilson (2012) argue that such dichotomies – the legacy of the decades-long predominance of the secularization theory in the social sciences – obscure the depth of the entanglement between the religious and the secular in many aspects of contemporary politics. Taking as its starting point Habermas’ ideas about the postsecular (Habermas 2006), the debate in international relations has begun to focus on the possibility of developing new models of politics that incorporate religious norms and arguments. A not insignificant driver in this process has been the negative fall-out from neoliberal globalization and the attendant desire to find a replacement for the now-spent emancipatory potential of purely secular, liberal norms. The contributions to this volume show that the line between the religious and the secular is indeed a difficult one to draw. The UN itself upholds the religious– secular divide. This is evident in its language and proceedings, which follow strictly secular guidelines. But the RNGOs that make the decision to engage with the UN do not leave their identities at the door when they enter the organization. Most of those that feature in these pages will refer to their religious identities, norms, and principles when asked why they engage with the UN. As we have seen, this does not mean they will necessarily use religious language or refer to religious norms when making their arguments in UN debates: many – though not all – eschew religious parlance and opt instead for the technical, issue-focused idiom of the policy field in question. The reasons for this restraint may be found, on the one hand, in the socializing effects of the UN context and the simple need to adapt in order to be understood and listened to. In addition, however, there is evidence that RNGOs are strategic in their use of religious arguments, deploying or forgoing them depending on the identities and preferences of their interlocutors. The institutional environment of the UN – embodying the secular – therefore does have a socializing influence on religion, but religious actors maintain their religious identities and introduce religious arguments and ideas whenever they deem it appropriate and helpful to their cause. Some postsecular theorists actually talk of a full-blown paradigm shift that is moving us beyond the present notion of the religious–secular divide as one of the foundational dimensions of secular modernity (Mavelli and Wilson 2016). Mainstream political science and IR scholarship, however, continues, on the whole, to see religion as entraining conflict, or indeed violence, once it enters the political

Conclusions

193

sphere. The chapter findings here do not demonstrate a unidirectional link between RNGOs’ religious identity and motivations and their positions and performance at the UN. The oft-evoked idea of a dichotomy between the religious as a source of division and conflict and the secular as a prerequisite to understanding and agreement is not borne out. On the contrary, the majority of RNGOs considered in this study emerge as non-confrontational and cooperative and thus helping to resolve conflict rather than fuelling it. The recent opening-up of many UN agencies to increased participation by RNGOs can be seen as an attempt to turn religious resources – not only material assets but also normative influence and vast outreach opportunities – to account in the UN’s work. This may not yet qualify as the new ‘religion-inclusive’ model of politics called for by certain postsecular theoreticians, but RNGO engagement with the UN undoubtedly helps to test the ground here. It is clear from the research carried out for this book that in situations where the norms at stake touch upon religious actors’ core beliefs, interaction between these actors and the secular UN can at times be difficult. The study also shows, however, that in most of the cases scrutinized, RNGOs help to promote understanding and agreement on contested policy issues, at the same time managing to make the views of their constituencies known to the organization. When it comes to the scope of these findings, it should be remembered that the analytical focus of the present volume is on RNGOs inside the UN. Given the normative threshold that non-state actors must attain in order to be accredited with the organization, there is obviously a selection bias involved here towards the ‘good ones’, not taking into consideration presumably more radical RNGOs. The deliberate limitation of this study allowed for focusing systematically on the explanatory value of factors such as the socializing effect of the institutional environment, configuration of the normative conflict, or certain actor characteristics. For a fuller picture, further research would have to cover the parts of the transnational sphere beyond UN confines and look at the activities of domestic religious actors, who in many cases have a major influence on the policies pursued by their home states at the UN. Consideration of these aspects was beyond the scope of this study. Systematic comparison of the activities of religious and non-religious NGOs at the UN – rather than the sporadic analyses offered so far – would, in addition, be a promising line of enquiry and would help us better understand the complexities involved as RNGOs negotiate their identity between religious distinctiveness and alignment with the secular.

References Berger, J., 2003. Religious nongovernmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14 (1), 15–39. Habermas, J., 2006. Religion in the public sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (1), 1–25. Hurd, E.S., 2008. The politics of secularism in international relations. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Martens, K., 2005. NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, professionalization and adaptation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

194

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Klaus Dieter Wolf

Mavelli, L. and Petito, F., 2012. The postsecular in international relations: An overview. Review of International Studies, 38 (5), 931–42. Mavelli, L. and Wilson, E.K., 2016. Postsecularism and international relations. In: J. Haynes, ed. Routledge handbook of religion and politics. London: Routledge, 251–69. Wilson, E.K., 2012. After secularism: Rethinking religion in global politics. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Appendix List of RNGOs registered at ECOSOC in 2012

3HO Foundation 8th Day Center for Justice ACT Alliance – Action by Churches Together Admiral Family Circle Islamic Community Adventist Development and Relief Agency Africa Muslims Agency African American Islamic Institute Agricultural Missions Agudas Israel World Organization Al Zubair Charity Foundation Al-Hakim Foundation Al-Khoei Foundation All India Christian Council All India Movement for Seva All India Shah Behram Baug Society for Scientific and Educational Research Alliance Defense Fund Alulbayt Foundation American Family Association of New York American Foundation of Savoy Orders American Jewish Committee American Life League Anglican Consultative Council Antioch Christian Centre Art of Living Foundation ASEER Foundation – All About Social, Educational, Rights Foundation Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace Assembly of First Nations – National Indian Brotherhood Association catholique internationale des services pour la jeunesse feminine Association of Presbyterian Women of Aoteaora, New Zealand Association Points-Coeur Associazione Casa Famiglia Rosetta Associazione Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale Australian Association of Yoga in Daily Life

196 Appendix Australian Catholic Social Justice Council B’nai B’rith Bahá’í International Community Baptist World Alliance Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Bharat Sevashram Sangha Bischöfliches Hilfswerk Misereor Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University Bread of Life Development Foundation Bridges International Brot für die Welt Buddha’s Light International Association Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation Campaign Life Coalition Canadian Council of Churches CARE – Christian Action Research and Education Caritas Internationalis Carmelite NGO Catholic Daughters of the Americas Catholic Institute for International Relations Catholic International Education Office Catholic International Union for Social Service Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid Catholic Women’s League Australia Catholics for Choice Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir Center of Concern Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief Centre d’animation, de formation, de recherche et d’appui au développement Centre d’information et de conseil des nouvelles spiritualités Centre for the World Religions Centre for Women, the Earth, the Divine Chabad – International Jewish Educational and Cultural Network Children’s Fund (Formerly Christian Children’s Fund) Christian Aid Christian Blind Mission Christian Conference of Asia Christian Legal Fellowship Church Women United Church World Service CIDSE – Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité CLIPSAS – Centre of Liaison and Information of Masonic Powers Signatories of Strasbourg Appeal Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement

Appendix 197 Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches Community of Sant’Egidio Company of the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul Concerned Women for America Concile mondial de congrès diplomatiques des aumoniers pour la paix universelle des droits humains et juridiques Concordis International Trust Conference of European Churches Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd Congregations of St. Joseph Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations Couple to Couple League International Croissant rouge algérien Dayemi Complex Bangladesh Dominican Leadership Conference Dominicans for Justice and Peace Ecospirituality Foundation Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans Edmund Rice International Endeavour Forum Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention Ethiopian World Federation European Union of Jewish Students Evangelical Fellowship of India Commission on Relief Family Africa Family of the Americas Family Research Council Federación Internacional de Fe y Alegría Federation of Islamic Medical Associations Federation of Jain Associations in North America Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe Federation of Zoroastrian Associations of North America FOCSIV – Federazione degli Organismi Cristiani Servizio Internazionale Volontario Focus on the Family Focus on the Family Association (Canada) Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi Fondazione Marista per la Solidarietà Internazionale Food for the Hungry International Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief Franciscans International Fraternité Notre Dame Friends World Committee for Consultation

198 Appendix Fundación Eudes General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists Global Action against Poverty (Formerly Brothers of Charity) Global Aid Network Global Family for Love and Peace God’s Harvest Foundation Gran Fraternidad Universal Greek Orthodox Archdiocesan Council of North and South America Habitat for Humanity International Hadassah – Women’s Zionist Organization of America Haiti Mission Hawaii Association of International Buddhists Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Hindu Council of New Zealand Incorporated Hoffnungszeichen Hope Worldwide Howard’s Center for Religion and Society IFENDU for Women’s Development Imamia Medics International Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society Indian American Muslim Council (Formerly Indian Muslim Council USA) Indian Muslim Federation (UK) Initiatives of Change International Inner Trip Reiyukai International Institute of Noahide Code Institute on Human Rights and the Holocaust Interchurch Medical Assistance International Association for Human Values International Association for Religious Freedom International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty International Association of Initiatives of Change International Association of Y’s Men’s Clubs International Buddhist Foundation International Buddhist Relief Organisation International Catholic Child Bureau International Catholic Committee of Nurses and Medico-Social Workers International Catholic Migration Commission International Catholic Rural Association International Christian Organisation of the Media (Formerly International Catholics Organisation of the Media) International Circle of Faith Chaplaincy Corps International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care International Confederation of Christian Family Movements International Confederation of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul International Council of Catholic Men

Appendix 199 International Council of Jewish Women International Council on Jewish Social and Welfare Services/American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee International Federation of ACAT – Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture International Federation of Catholic Medical Associations International Federation of Catholic Universities International Federation of Rural Adult Catholic Movements International Indian Treaty Council International Islamic Committee for Woman and Child International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations International Islamic Relief Organization International Justice Mission International Kolping Society International Mahavira Jain Mission International Movement of Apostolate in the Independent Social Milieus International Movement of Apostolate of Children International Movements of Catholic Agricultural and Rural Youth International Muslim Women’s Union International Presentation Association of the Sisters of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary International Rastafari Development Society International Religious Liberty Association International Samaritan International Shinto Foundation International Solidarity and Human Rights Institute International Young Catholic Students International Young Christian Workers Islamic Center of England Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry Islamic Heritage Society Islamic Human Rights Commission Islamic Relief Islamic Relief USA Islamic Shipowners Association Islamic Women’s Institute of Iran Islamic-American Zakat Foundation Istituto Internazionale Maria Ausiliatrice delle Salesiane di Don Bosco Jesuit Refugee Service Jubilee Campaign Junior Chamber International Kabbalah Centre Karamah – Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights Kindernothilfe Knights of the Southern Cross (Australia)

200 Appendix Kosmos Associates Ladies Charitable Society Lassalle-Institut Latter-Day Saint Charities Legião da Boa Vontade LGWPF – Lama Gangchen World Peace Foundation Licht für die Welt – Christoffel Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Loretto Community Lucis Trust Association Lutheran World Federation Manavata Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers Maryknoll Sisters of St. Dominic Mata Amritanandamayi Math MaterCare International Mennonite Central Committee Minaret of Freedom Institute Minhaj-ul-Quran International Morality in Media Mother’s Union Movimento Italiano Casalinghe Muhammadiyah Association Muslim Aid Australia Muslim World League Myochikai – Arigatou International (Formerly Arigatou Foundation) National Board of Catholic Women of England and Wales National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund Native Women’s Association of Canada New Seminary Order of St. John Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement International Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities OSMTH – Sovereign Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem Pag-Aalay Ng Puso Foundation (Offering of the Heart Foundation) Partnership for Global Justice Passionists International Pathways to Peace Pax Christi International Pax Romana Planetary Citizens Prasad Project Presbyterian Church USA Priests for Life Prison Fellowship International Pro Deo – International Association for the Promotion of Democracy under God

Appendix 201 Project Kesher Quaker Earthcare Witness Reach Out and Care Wheels Religious Consultation on Population, Reproductive Health and Ethics Restoration World Outreach Ministries Rissho Kosei-kai Russian Peace Foundation Sacro Militare Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio Sakyadhita Salesian Missions Salvation Army Samaritan Community Center/The Samaritan Coalition Sant Nirankari Mandal Save a Child’s Heart in Memory of Dr. Ami Cohen School Sisters of Notre Dame Scouts musulmans algériens Service Peace and Justice in Latin America SIIAEC – International Secretariat of Catholic Technologists, Agriculturalists and Economists (Secrétariat international des ingénieurs, des agronomes et des cadres économiques catholiques) Simon Wiesenthal Center Sisters of Charity Federation Sisters of Mercy of the Americas Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur Society of Catholic Medical Missionaries Society of Catholic Social Scientists Soka Gakkai International South Sudanese Women Christian Mission for Peace Southern California Ecumenical Council Spirituality for Kids Sri Swami Madhavananda World Peace Council St. Joan’s International Alliance Stiftung Brot für Alle Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund Tamil Christian Broadcasting Network Tearfund Teresian Association The Grail Triglav Circle UNANIMA International Unitarian Universalist Association United Church of Christ Board for World Ministries United Methodist Church United Methodist Church General Board of Church and Society United Religions Initiative

202 Appendix Universal Peace Federation Viva Network VIVAT International Vojenský a špitální Rád svatého Lazara Jeruzalémského (Military and Hospitallier Order of St. Lazarus of Jerusalem) Volontariato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo Women’s International Zionist Organization Women’s Missionary Society of the African Methodist Episcopal Church Won-Buddhism Women’s Association Word of Life Christian Fellowship World Alliance for Youth Empowerment World Alliance of Reformed Churches World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations World Association for Christian Communication World Barua Organization World Catholic Association for Communication World Christian Life Community World Conference of Religions for Peace World Council of Independent Christian Churches World Council of Muslim Communities World Evangelical Alliance World Family of Radio Maria World Federation of Khoja Shi’a Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities World Federation of Methodist and Uniting Church Women World Fellowship of Buddhists World Islamic Call Society World Jewish Congress World Movement of Christian Workers World Muslim Congress World Organization of Former Students of Catholic Education World ORT Union (Organisation, Reconstruction, Training) World Student Christian Federation World Union for Progressive Judaism World Union of Catholic Women’s Organizations World Vision Canada World Vision International World Women’s Christian Temperance Union World Young Women’s Christian Association Worldwide Organization for Women Young Women’s Christian Association of Nigeria Youth with a Mission YWCA Canada – Young Women’s Christian Association Canada ZOA Vluchtelingenzorg Zoroastrian Women’s Organization

Index

Page numbers for figures are in italics, and page numbers for tables are in bold. 9/11 attacks 5, 9, 19, 153–4, 167–8 Abdullah II 11, 176 abortion 17, 64–80, 80n2, 186–9; global gag rule (Mexico City policy) and 67, 93–5; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Abu Dhabi 175–6 Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative 126 ACT Alliance 57–8, 84, 100n2 Action des Chrétiens activistes des droits de l’homme à Shabunda (ACADHOSHA) 132 active faith deployment 88–9 actor characteristics 16, 188–9 Ad Hoc Committee (International Criminal Court [ICC]) 129 Adityanath, Y. 92 Advancing Justice and Reconciliation in Relation to the International Criminal Court 132 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 133 advocacy organizations 3, 12 Afghanistan 101n14; United States invasion of 168 African countries: business, human rights, and 106, 111–12; defamation of religions campaign and 153, 162; International Criminal Court (ICC) and 126–8 aggression, crime of 129 Ahmadiyya Community 155 ‘Ahok’ (Purnama, B.) 96–7, 102n29 aid fatigue 94, 101n20 AIDS see HIV/AIDS AJC (American Jewish Committee) 34, 133, 142n31

Ala’i, D. 156–8 Al-Aqsa mosque 152 Algeria 91 Alliance for Shared Values 92 Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) 85, 100n6 Al-Nasser, N. 171, 176 al-Qaeda 5, 167 al-Shabaab 170 alternative religious movements 31 American Jewish Committee (AJC) 34, 133, 142n31 American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC) 142n11 Amman, Jordan Global Assembly (1999) 175 Amnesty International 130, 141n9 Amor, A. 158 Anabaptists 134 Annan, K. 9–10, 108–9, 170 anti-Ahok movement 96–7 anti-blasphemy laws 19, 148–66, 187 anti-Muslim violence 91 anti-Semitism 101n10, 154, 160 apartheid 106, 111–12 apex bodies 87; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) aporia 171, 181n5 Appleby, R. 128 APRODEV (Association of Protestant Development Agencies) 100n2 Arab countries 44n11, 152 Arbeitskreis Rohstoffe (Working Group Natural Resources) 118 ARC (Alliance of Religions and Conservation) 85, 100n6

204

Index

Armed Islamic Group in Algeria 91 Article 19 (NGO) 155–6 Asian group of states 153, 162 Assembly of States Parties (ASPs) 132–6 Association of Protestant Development Agencies (APRODEV) 100n2 Atatürk, K. 91 atavistic nationalism 90–1, 98, 100n7; see also conservative nationalism Aum Shinrikyo 91 austerity 101n20 Australia 44n4 Bahá’í faith 31–2, 156–7, 162, 178–9 Bahá’í International Community (BIC): defamation of religions campaign and 156–8, 162–3; international development and 87; interreligious dialogue, cooperation, and 174, 178–80; reconciliation, punishment, and 132–4, 137–40, 142n18; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 72–4 Bahá’í International Office 12 Bahá’í of the United States 133, 179 Bahá’u’lláh 157 Baku 174 Bali 52 Ban, K-m. 94 Barnabas Fund 89, 101n10 Baumgart-Ochse, C. 187 Bayyah, A. 175, 181n10 Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty 93 Beijing 68–70, 80n6 Beijing+5 69–70 Beinlich, A-K. 17, 186–90 belief, freedom of 154–63 Berger, J. 4, 12, 16, 27, 30–1 Berry, S. 154–5 Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP) 92 BIC see Bahá’í International Community (BIC) Blair, T. 99, 100n5 blasphemy laws 19, 148–66, 187 bluewashing 108 B’nai Brith 12, 156 Bob, C. 6 Boesenecker, A. 128 Boko Haram 170 Boli, J. 14 Bolivia 100n7 Bonn 49 book religions 86 Bosnia 90

Bowers, K. 179 bracketing 68 Braungart, C. 17–19, 187 Brazil 53, 128 Bread for the World (Brot für die Welt) 18, 87, 113, 117–18 breast-milk substitutes 112 Brewington, D. 14 Brexit 90, 94–5, 98–9, 101n21 Brudholm, T. 128 Brundtland Commission 49 Buddhism 14, 86, 91, 99, 158 Buddhist NGOs 30–5, 43, 54, 185 Burundi 126 Bush, E. 28 business, human rights and 106–25, 186–7, 191 Buss, D. 70 Butler, J. 69 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) 152–3 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD; 1994) 66–70, 78 Cairo Plan of Action 68 Campbell, A. 100n5 CAN (Climate Action Network) 51–4, 56–8 Canada 44n4 capitalism 169 carbon trading 53 Caritas Internationalis 13, 84, 100n2, 112, 116–17, 132, 155 Carrette, J. 30 cartoon crisis (2005) 148, 153–4 Casanova, J. 41 Catholic Church 33, 71–3, 76, 114–17, 185 Catholic developmental organizations 18, 100n2 Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute 69; see also Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam) Catholic Institute for International Relations (Progressio) 72–5 Catholicism: sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 68–73, 76–9; United Nations processes and 14, 31–3 Catholics for Choice (CFC) 28, 71, 76–7, 80, 80n6; ‘Opposition Watch’ publications 76 CCIA (Commission of the Churches for International Affairs) 13, 159–63 CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 53

Index Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam) 67–71, 80n6 Central America 118 Centre for Justice and Reconciliation (CJR) 132–40 charitable organizations 87; see also faithbased organizations (FBOs) Charlie Hebdo attack (2015) 148 Chatami, M. 10 Chavez, M-L. 179 children’s rights 66 children’s/youth programmes 34 Chile 128 Chiles, P. 101n9 China 53, 90–1, 153 Chinese Communist Party 90–1 Chong, M. 179 Christian Aid 87–9 Christianity: business, human rights, and 107, 112, 116; climate change and 48–9, 61n33; defamation of religion and 158; international development and 86, 89, 92; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 67–73, 78–9; United Nations processes and 170–1 Christian missionary organizations 88–9, 97–8 Christian NGOs 1, 8, 12–13, 18, 30–8, 41–3, 185; business, human rights, and 120; climate change and 51, 54, 57–8, 60n1; defamation of religions campaign and 155–6; reconciliation, punishment, and 136; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 67–73, 77–9 Christianophobia 154 Christian Solidarity Worldwide 101n10 ‘Christian Witness in a Multi-Religious World: Recommendations for Conduct’ 97–8 Christliche Initiative Romero (CI Romero) 117–18 church associations 51 Church Center for the United Nations 1 church diplomacy 13 Church of Scientology 86 CICC (Coalition for the International Criminal Court) 130–2, 135–6, 141n9 CIDSE (Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité [International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity]) 18, 84, 100n2, 107, 112–19 CI Romero (Christliche Initiative Romero) 117–18

205

civil society activism 2–3, 6–9, 12–13, 16–19, 27–8, 39, 184–5; business, human rights, and 119–21; climate change and 48–59; defamation of religions campaign and 155; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 66–7, 76–9 civil society organizations (CSOs) 94 CJA (Climate Justice Action) 52–3, 57–8 CJN (Climate Justice Now) 52–3, 57–8 CJR (Centre for Justice and Reconciliation) 132–40 Clarke, G. 18, 186 clash of civilizations 19, 99, 167–71, 179–80, 187 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 53 Climate Action Network (CAN) 51–4, 56–8 climate change 17, 47–63, 186, 189–90 Climate Change Programme (World Council of Churches [WCC]) 55 climate justice 52–5 Climate Justice Action (CJA) 52–3, 57–8 Climate Justice Now (CJN) 52–3, 57–8 Climate Protection Program 96 Club of Rome: Limits to Growth report 55 CO2 emissions 52–3 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) 130–2, 135–6, 141n9 Cold War 2, 169 ‘Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping, Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence against, Persons based on Religion and Belief’ (Resolution 16/18) 154 Commission of the Churches for International Affairs (CCIA) 13, 159–63 Commission on Population and Development (CPD) 65, 68, 71 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 65, 68–70, 74–6 Committee of Religious NGOs (CRNGO) 11, 174–7 Committee on Non-governmental Organizations 39 Committee on Spirituality, Values, and Global Concerns (CSVGC-NY) 11 Communism, collapse of 91 Concerned Women of America 93 Conferences of Parties (COPs) 49–50 Confucianism 86, 91 Coni-Zimmer, M. 18, 187 conscience, theological concept of 76

206

Index

conservative nationalism 18, 86, 89–100, 100n7 conservative RNGOs 13, 65, 78–9, 80n2 conservative views, on abortion 64–71 Constituencies 50–3, 60, 60n3 Consultative Status accreditations 35–9, 38, 178 contraception 17, 64–5, 69–71, 75–6, 80n2, 95; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Cooperation Circles 176–8 Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE; International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) 18, 84, 100n2, 107, 112–19 COP-13 (Bali) 52 COP-18 (Doha) 60n1 COP-19 (Warsaw) 51, 57 COP-21 (Paris) 51 COP-22 (Marrakesh) 50, 98 COPs (Conferences of Parties) 49–50 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 108, 111–12 corporations, transnational: regulation of 107–11; see also business, human rights and Court Registry 131 CPD (Commission on Population and Development) 65, 68, 71 crime, restoration and retribution justice and 127–9 crimes against humanity 129 CRNGO (Committee of Religious NGOs) 11, 174–7 Croatia 90 CSOs (civil society organizations) 94 CSR (corporate social responsibility) 108, 111–12 CSVGC-NY (Committee on Spirituality, Values, and Global Concerns) 11 CSW (Commission on the Status of Women) 65, 68–70, 74–6 cultural relativism 160 Cushman, T. 128 Daoism 86 daw’ah 88–9 de-carbonization 53 Defamation of Islam resolution 150–3 defamation of religions campaign 19, 148–66, 187, 191 Defense Department (United States) 96 Deffenbaugh, R. 161

de-Maoification 91 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 134–6 denominational affiliations 16, 26–7, 31–8, 32–3, 43 Department for International Development (DFID) 18, 94, 101n20 Department of Public Information (DPI) 26–7, 172–4, 177–9, 181n6 de-Sovietization 91 Desumala, G. 72 developing countries 107–8, 153 development 17–18, 66; international 84–105, 169, 190–1; religious NGOs (RNGOs) and 34, 84–105, 189; sustainable 11, 18, 34, 47–55, 60n2 development organizations 87, 98; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) DFID (Department for International Development) 18, 94, 101n20 dialogue, as buzzword 173 Diène, D. 154–5 dignity 150 disaster relief 34 Doha 60n1 Dominicans for Justice 162 donor organizations 89, 98 DPI (Department of Public Information) 26–7, 172–4, 177–9, 181n6 DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 134–6 Dugal, B. 179 Durban Review Conference (2009) 160–1 Duterte, R. 90 Earth Summit in Rio (1992) 49–50 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 1, 8, 184–5, 195–202; accreditation with 26–44; business, human rights, and 109–12, 120; defamation of religions campaign and 156; international development and 84–7, 95; interreligious dialogue, cooperation, and 168–80, 181n4; Resolution 1996/31 of 26, 37–9 economic crisis (2008) 89, 101n20 economic justice 26 Ecuador 109 Ecumenical United Nations Office (World Council of Churches [WCC]) 116 EDF (European Development Fund) 101n23 education, religious NGOs (RNGOs) and 34 ‘education for global citizenship’ event 179

Index El Salvador 101n9, 128 environmental issues, religious NGOs and 35 Environmental Protection Agency 95–6 Erdoğan, R. 90–2, 101n13, 101n17 Eritrean Christian refugees 101n10 essentialism 1–2 EU referendum (2016) 90 European Development Fund (EDF) 101n23 European Union (EU) 94–5, 98, 113; Defamation of Religions resolution and 150–1, 154 Evangelical Christians: climate change and 48–9, 61n33; international development and 89, 93, 100n2; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 69–71 exclusive faith deployment 88–9, 100 Expert Workshops on incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR]) 157 expression, freedom of 149–51, 154–63 extremism 41, 91–2, 175–6 ‘faith and development’ policy interface 84– 6, 98, 186 Faith and Ethics Network for an International Criminal Court (FENICC) 132– 41, 142n11 Faith and Feminism Working Group to the United Nations (FaithFem) 72–4 ‘Faith and the Environment’ programme (World Bank) 85 faith-based organizations (FBOs) 3–4, 12–13, 20n6, 28, 51, 64, 75, 94–100; business, human rights, and 114; defined 86; international development and 84–105, 186; typologies of 86–9; see also religious NGOs (RNGOs) Faith Series Briefings 179 Falun Gong 86, 91 Falwell, J. 93 family planning 17–18, 66–72, 75, 78–80, 95; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Family Research Council 69 FBOs see faith-based organizations (FBOs) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 101n11 Federation of Zoroastrian Associations of North America 86 female genital mutilation (FGM) 77

207

feminist movement 64, 68–9; see also women’s rights FENICC (Faith and Ethics Network for an International Criminal Court) 132–41, 142n11 FI (Franciscans International) 18, 107, 113–19 Figueres, C. 47 financial crisis (2008) 89, 101n20 FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) 114–15 former Yugoslavia 90, 101n11 Forum for Peace in Muslim Societies 175 Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies 175, 181n12 Forum on Business and Human Rights 109 Fourth World Conference of Women (Beijing; 1995) 68–70, 80n6 fragility 88, 96–8 framing: business, human rights, and 111; climate change and 51, 59; defamation of religions campaign and 151; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 64–74, 78–9 France 110 Francis (Pope): Laudato Si’ 17, 47–8, 60 Franciscans International (FI) 18, 107, 113–19 freedom of belief and religion 154–63 freedom of expression 149–51, 154–63 Freemasonry 31 Friederich, J. 17, 186 Friends of the Earth 113 Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC) 134 FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 101n11 Fuchs, D. 17, 186 fundamentalization 1, 185 GA (UN General Assembly) 19, 148, 154, 162, 168 gacaca courts 128 Gambia, The 126 gay, as term 101n26 gender justice 72 gender relations 66; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) gender roles 10, 71–5 General Status accreditations 35–7 Geneva 109–10 genocide 129 German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Development Cooperation (Misereor) 18, 87, 113, 117–18

208

Index

German National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights 118 Germany: business, human rights, and 110–13, 117–20; charitable and development organizations in 87; Defamation of Religions resolution and 150–1; engagement of RNGOs in 107; reconciliation in 128 Ghana 89 girls’ rights 66; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Glaab, K. 17, 186 Global Assemblies 175 ‘Global Campaign to Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Corporate Impunity’ 111 global gag rule (Mexico City policy) 67, 93–5, 98 global governance 2–8, 48, 93–5, 177–80; see also international development Global Interfaith Network for Population and Development 75 globalization 2, 7, 89–90, 98, 108, 167–9, 190–2 global justice 52–5, 167–70 Global North 51–3, 58–9 Global Policy Forum 118 Global South 51–5, 58–9, 115–17, 120 global warming 49; see also climate change God’s Harvest Foundation 89 Grace Cathedral 176 green economy 53–4 greenhouse gas emissions 49, 55 Guatemala 128 Gujarat 91–2 Gülen, F. 91–2 Gülenism 92, 101n17 Gulf region 96 Gush Emunim 91 Haase, F. 73 Habermas, J. 7, 192 Haddad, H. 130 Hailu, M. 177 Hall, C. 130 hard power 96 harmony 54 harm prevention, religious NGOs and 34–5 Haynes, J. 12–13, 19, 28, 187, 190 HDI (Human Development Index) 44n11 health issues 66; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Herman, D. 70 High-level Group 10

Hinduism 14, 86 Hindu nationalism and extremism 91–2, 99 Hindu NGOs 30–2, 54 Hindu Tamils 99 Hindutvah 92 Hindu Yuva Vahini (HYV) 92 HIV/AIDS 6, 10, 65–6, 78 Hizmet (social movement) 92 Holocaust, the 34 Holy See 28, 51, 56, 60n5, 68–9, 78, 112; Permanent Observer status of 76 homosexuality 65 Howard Center 69 HRC see Human Rights Council (HRC) HRW (Human Rights Watch) 130, 141n9 Human Development Index (HDI) 44n11 human dignity 150 humanitarian crises 93–5 Human Life International 69–70 human rights 2, 5–6, 34; business and 106–25, 186–7, 191; defamation of religions campaign and 149–51; international development and 96; reconciliation, punishment, and 126–47; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) as 67, 73–5 Human Rights Council (HRC) 12, 18–19, 187; business, human rights, and 106–9, 112–13, 119; defamation of religions campaign and 148–51, 154–62 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 130, 141n9 human sexuality 66; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Hungary 90 Huntington, S. 1, 5, 99 Hurd, E. 192 HYV (Hindu Yuva Vahini) 92 IARF (International Association for Religious Freedom) 156–63 ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) 109–10 ICC (International Criminal Court) 18–19, 126–47, 187, 192 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 149–51 ICCR (Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility) 107, 111–12, 119 ICJ (international criminal justice) 126–8 ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development; 1994) 66–70, 78 ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 101n11

Index identity markers 29 IHEU (International Humanist and Ethical Union) 155 Ihsanoğlu, E. 152 IITC (International Indian Treaty Council) 29 illegal organizations 87–9; see also faithbased organizations (FBOs) ‘Impunity, Justice and Reconciliation’ programme 136 Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (2011) 152–3 India 53, 90–2, 99 indigenous NGOs 29–31 indigenous peacemaking 128 individuals, power shift to 2 Indonesia 74, 96–7, 101n26 InService USA (advocacy group) 93 instrumentalism 1–2 intercivilizational dialogue 167; see also interreligious dialogue and cooperation Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 107, 111–12, 119 Interfaith Liaison Committee 51 International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) 156–63 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 109–10 International Commission of Jurists 130 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD; 1994) 66–70, 78 International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité [CIDSE]) 18, 84, 100n2, 107, 112–19 ‘International Council of Unitarians and Other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers’ 158; see also International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 149–51 International Criminal Court (ICC) 18–19, 126–47, 187, 192 international criminal justice (ICJ) 126–8 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 101n11 International Day of Peace 177 international development 84–105, 169, 186, 189–91 International Development Association (World Bank) 95 International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) 155

209

International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) 29 International Islamic Relief Organization 87 International Organisation of Employers (IOE) 109–10 International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) 76, 95 International Rastafari Development Society 86 international relations (IR) 1–7, 192–3 interreligious dialogue and cooperation 9–11, 167–90 intra-religious relations 18, 28, 31, 71 investment, responsible 111–12 IOE (International Organisation of Employers) 109–10 IPPF (International Planned Parenthood Federation) 76, 95 IR (international relations) 1–7, 192–3 Iran 68, 157, 162, 168 Iranian Revolution (1979) 101n14 Iraq 128; United States invasion of 168 IRW (Islamic Relief Worldwide) 73–5 ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) 5, 170 ‘Islamic Declaration on Global Climate Change’ 48, 51 Islamic Defenders Front 96 Islamic Human Rights framework 152–3 Islamic Relief 87–9 Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) 73–5 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 5, 170 Islamism 6, 96–7 Islamist terrorism 168 Islamization 91–2 Islam/Muslims 41, 96–9, 101n26, 101n29; defamation of religions campaign and 148–66; international development and 86–8, 91–2, 96–9; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 68–9, 73–9; United Nations processes and 14, 168–71; see also Muslim NGOs Islamophobia 148–55, 160, 187 Israel 44n4, 90–1, 99, 152 Israeli–Palestinian conflict 152 Istanbul 93–4 Istanbul Process 154 Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights 133 Jahangir, A. 158 Jainism 31–2, 86 Jakarta 96 Japan 91, 110

210

Index

Jerusalem 152 Jewish extremism 91 Jewish faith-based organizations (FBOs) 95 Jewish Home (religious party; Israel) 99 Jewish NGOs 12, 29–34, 41–3, 54, 155–6, 185 Jihadist movements 5 Johannesburg 108 Johnson Amendment (1954) 93 ‘Joint NGO Statement on Danger of UN “Defamation of Religions” Campaign’ (2009) 155–7, 162 ‘Jokowi’ (Widodo, J.) 96–7 JPNL (Justitia et Pax Netherlands) 132–4 Jubilee 2000 campaign 9 Judaeo-Christian culture 33 Judaism 34, 86, 133; see also Jewish NGOs Juergensmeyer, M. 78–9 June War (1967) 152 justice: climate 52–5; economic 26; gender 72; global 52–5, 167–70; restorative and retributive 18–19, 126–47, 187; social 6, 26, 52–5, 74–7; traditional 128; transitional (TJ) 19, 126–9, 134–6, 140–1, 187 Justitia et Pax Netherlands (JPNL) 132–4 Jyllands-Posten 153–4 Kabul, attacks on United Nations offices in 9 Karam, A. 9, 70 Kazanjian, V. 177 Kemalist secularists 101n17 Khatami, M. 168 Knotts, B. 142n11 Knox, G. 30 Kony, J. 131 Kosovo 90 Kyoto Protocol 49 landmines 9 Latin American group of states 153 Laudato Si’ (Francis) 17, 47–8, 60 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 130 leadership 177–8 Lebanon 152 Lederach, J. 128 left-wing nationalism 100n7 left-wing transnational advocacy networks 6 Lehmann, K. 13–16 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer (LGBTIQ) rights 65–6, 74 Leuven, Belgium Global Assembly (1974) 175

liberal faith-based organizations (FBOs) 95 liberalism 2–3, 6–8, 13, 55, 90, 192 liberal RNGOs 80n2 liberal views, on abortion 64–9, 188–9 liberation theology 100n2 Libya 68 Limits to Growth report (Club of Rome) 55 ‘List of non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2012’ 29–30 Little, D. 128 Llewellyn, J. 128 Lutheran World Federation (LWF) 72–5, 116–17, 155–6, 160–3 Lynch, C. 169 macro-demands 110, 114, 121n4 Maduro, N. 100n7 Mangale, X. 72 Marie Stopes International (MSI) 95 market-based solutions 52–3 Marrakesh Declaration (2016) 50, 98 Marshall, K. 168, 172–3 Martens, K. 39, 190 maternal health 77 Mavelli, L. 192 MCC (Mennonite Central Committee) 134– 41 MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) 68, 86, 169 media, polarization and 89 Media and Information Literacy initiatives 179 mediation 3, 17, 56–9; business, human rights, and 121; international development and 86, 89, 93–9; religious NGOs and 184–94 Melbourne, Australia Global Assembly (1989) 175 Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 134–41 men’s rights 66; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Mexico City policy (global gag rule) 67, 93–5, 98 Miall, H. 30 micro-demands 121n4 Middle East 95, 101n10 migration 34 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 68, 86, 169 Millennium World Peace Summit 9 Milošević, S. 90, 101n11

Index Misereor (German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Development Cooperation) 18, 87, 113, 117–18 missionary organizations 87–9, 97–100; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) mitigation 55 Modi, N. 90–2 Morales, E. 100n7 Mormons 69 MPV (Muslims for Progressive Values) 72–5 MSI (Marie Stopes International) 95 Muhammad 73–4, 153, 157 Muhammadiyah 96 Mujahideen 101n14 Multi-faith Simple-Living Initiative 61n34 multilateralism 84–6, 90, 94–8, 186 multi-religious organizations 30–2 Musawah 73–5 Muslim civil society organizations 60n1 Muslim extremism 41, 91 Muslim NGOs 12, 30–7, 41, 86–9, 185; climate change and 48, 51, 54; defamation of religions campaign and 155–6; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 73–9 Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) 72–5 Muslim world, defined 180n1 Muslim World League 87 Nairobi, Kenya Global Assembly (1984) 175 naming, shaming, and blaming 71, 76–9, 106 National Action Plans 109, 118 nationalism see conservative nationalism national RNGOs 117–18 National Volunteers’ Corps of Self-Help Organizations (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS]) 92 Native American NGOs 29 Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) 29 need and creed distinction 89, 100n8 neoliberalism 7, 52, 167–9, 192 Netanyahu, B. 90, 99 New International Economic Order 107–8 New Testament 137–8 New Zealand 44n4 Nigeria 93 Nirenberg, D. 170–1, 174–8 non-discrimination 100n8

211

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) see religious NGOs (RNGOs) non-NGO religious actors 3–4; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) non-religious issues 33–5 non-Western traditions 28, 33 normative positioning 191–2; climate change and 52–5, 59; defamation of religions campaign and 149–51; globalization and 169; of religious NGOs (RNGOs) 2–3, 8, 185–8 Northern Ireland 128 Northern RNGOs 39, 51 Northern Uganda 126, 131, 134 North-South divide 39, 50–3 Norwegian Church Aid 57 NWAC (Native Women’s Association of Canada) 29 Oas, R. 67 Obaid, T. 10 Obama, B. 154 O’Brien, J. 76 O’Brien, S. 93 ODA (official development assistance) 94 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 44n11 OEIWG (Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group) 18, 107–20 Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 129–31 Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) 130–1 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 155–7, 178 official development assistance (ODA) 94 Oh, J. 179 OIC (Organisation for Islamic Cooperation/Organization of the Islamic Conference) 3, 19, 28, 74, 148–63, 163n1, 187, 191 Onaiyekan, J. 175 OPCV (Office of the Public Counsel for Victims) 130–1 Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) 18, 107–20 operational NGOs 12 ‘Opposition Watch’ publications (Catholics for Choice [CFC]) 76 Orbán, R. 90 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 44n11 Organisation for Islamic Cooperation/ Organization of the Islamic Conference

212

Index

(OIC) 3, 19, 28, 74, 148–63, 163n1, 187, 191 Ortega, M. 47 Osteen, J. 93 ‘other religious traditions’ organizations 30–2 OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) 129–31 P5 129 Pace, W. 130 Pakistan 68, 148–50, 153, 158 Palestinian Authority 133 Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 152 Palestinians 91, 99 Pan-Amazon Ecclesial Network (REPAM) 117 pan-Arabism 152 pan-Islamic movement 152 Paris Agreement 47–51, 96 Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) 130 passive faith deployment 88–9 paternalism 85 patriarchy 68, 72–4 Pax Christi International 135 Pax Romana 12 peace: international development and 95, 98; religious NGOs and 34–5, 43 peacemaking, indigenous 128 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 17, 66, 80n3 Penn, L. 176 Pentecostalism 6, 89, 100n2 ‘Peoples Treaty’ 111 Perov, O. 18, 187 persuasive faith deployment 88–9, 100 Petersen, M. 4, 12–13, 16, 30–3 Petito, F. 192 PGA (Parliamentarians for Global Action) 130 Philippines 90 Philpott, D. 128 Planned Parenthood 66, 76; see also International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) 152 pluralism 7, 41, 97 PoA (Programme of Action) (1994) 66–70 Poland 57, 90 polarization 3, 10; business, human rights, and 121; international development and 86, 89–93, 97–100; religious NGOs

and 184–94; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 64–5; United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and 170 policy field 107–11 political Islam 5 politico-economic reforms 53 Poppe, A. 39 Population Fund see United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) population issues 66–8; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) populist nationalism 89–91, 97–9, 100n7; see also conservative nationalism post-liberalism 84–105, 191 postsecularism 2–4, 7, 192–3 poverty 85, 88, 96–7 Powers, G. 128 Preparatory Committee (International Criminal Court [ICC]) 129 Priests for Life 70 Princeton, New Jersey Global Assembly (1979) 175 pro-choice RNGOs 17–18, 64–6, 69, 76–80, 80n2, 186–9 Programme of Action (PoA) (1994) 66–70 Programme Partnership Agreements 94 Progressio (Catholic Institute for International Relations) 72–5 progressive RNGOs 17–18, 69, 71–80, 80n2, 186–8 pro-life RNGOs 17–18, 64–80, 80n2, 186–9 proselytizing 88–9, 97–8, 101n9 prosperity gospel 93 Protestant Churches 117–18 Protestant faith-based organizations (FBOs) 95, 100n2 Prove, P. 159–61 public–private partnerships 12 punishment see reconciliation and punishment Purnama, B. (‘Ahok’) 96–7, 102n29 Putin, V. 90–1, 101n12 Putinism 91 Putnam, R. 99 Quakers 12 Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) 1, 116–19, 134 Quran 73–4, 96, 101n29 Rabat Plan 157, 161 racism 154

Index radical organizations 87–9, 100; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief 155 Rashtra Sevika Samiti 92 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National Volunteers’ Corps of Self-Help Organizations) 92 Rastafarianism 31, 86 ‘Reclaiming Freedom of Conscience, Religion or Belief to Promote Social Integration’ 156 reconciliation and punishment 19, 126–47, 187, 191–2 Red Cross Code of Conduct (1995) 100n8 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) measures 53 refugees 34, 95, 101n10 Regional Groups of Member States 37 regulation, of transnational corporations 107–11 Rehman, J. 154–5 religion: climate change and 48; defamation of 19, 148–66, 187, 191; de-privatization of 6; freedom of 154–63; global governance and 4–8; meanings of 1–4, 27–9; transnational dimensions of 6; United Nations approach to 8–11, 14; violence and 1, 5, 91, 175–6 Religion Factor (blog) 169 religion-inclusive model 193 Religions for Peace (RFP) 1, 132, 135–40, 174–80 Religions Taking Action Together to Counter Violent Religious Extremism’ conference 175–6 religious and denominational affiliations 16, 26–7, 31–8, 32–3, 43 religious conservatism 90; see also conservative nationalism religious minorities, rights of 91, 97–8 religious nationalism 99–100; see also conservative nationalism religious NGOs (RNGOs) 184–94; business, human rights, and 106–25; climate change and 47–63; defamation of religions campaign and 148–66; defined 4, 27–30; Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) registered 195–202; international development and 84–105; interreligious dialogue, cooperation, and 167–83; linguistic styles of 53–6, 59, 78–9, 88–9, 119; quantitative overview

213

of 26–46, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40–1, 42; reconciliation, punishment, and 126–47; role of, at the United Nations 1–25; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 64–83 ‘Religious NGOs at the United Nations’ project 17, 27 religious–secular divide 7, 12, 192–3 REPAM (Pan-Amazon Ecclesial Network) 117 representative organizations 87–9; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) reproductive health and rights see sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Republican Party (United States) 92 resilience, international relations (IR) and 97 Resolution 16/18 (‘Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping, Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence against, Persons based on Religion and Belief’) 154 Resolution 1996/31 (Economic and Social Council; ECOSOC) 26, 37–9 responsible investment 111–12 restorative and retributive justice 18–19, 126–47, 187 RFP (Religions for Peace) 1, 132, 135–40, 174–80 Rietig, K. 121n4 right-wing Christians 67–73, 78–9, 93, 99 right-wing RNGOs 12–13 right-wing transnational advocacy networks 6 Rio Conference (1992) 49–50 riots, inter-communal (India; 2002) 92 Riva del Garde, Italy Global Assembly (1994) 175 RNGOs see religious NGOs (RNGOs) Rome Conference 126, 129–36 Rome Statute 126, 129–35 Roster Status accreditations 35–7 RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [National Volunteers’ Corps of SelfHelp Organizations]) 92 Rudolph, S.: Transnational Religion and Fading States 6 Ruggie, J. 5, 109–13, 119–20 ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (International Criminal Court [ICC]) 131 Rushdie Affair (1989) 148 Russia 153 Russian Federation 90–1

214

Index

Russian nationalism 91 Russian Orthodox Church 91, 156 Rwanda 128 Salafism 87, 96, 99 Samaritan’s Purse 89, 101n9 Samir, S. 171 Sangh Parivar 92 Saudi Arabia 87–9, 96, 99 Scheuer, M. 10–11 science: climate change and 53–7; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) 71–5 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) 68, 86, 95, 98–9, 169 secularism 2–3, 7, 12, 28–9, 80, 84–6, 90–2, 156, 192–3 secularization 7–8, 13–14 secular Jews 29 secular NGOs 41, 57–9, 65, 78, 95, 98 ‘See Change’ campaign 76 Sen, A. 18 Serbia 101n11 Serbian Orthodox Church 90 service NGOs 12 Sewa Bharti 92 Sewa International 92 sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) 10, 17–18, 64–83, 186–91; defined 66–7; global gag rule (Mexico City policy) and 67, 93–5, 98 sexually transmitted diseases 66 Shas (religious party; Israel) 99 Shinto 31, 86, 135 Side by Side Faith Movement for Gender Justice 72 Sierra Leone 128 Sikhism 86 Sinhalese Buddhists 99 social justice 6, 26, 52–5, 74–7 social media campaigns 89 social movements 172–4 societal reforms 53 Society for International Development 114–15 socio-political organizations 87–9, 100; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) soft power 96 Somalia 93 SOMO 113 Sonneveld, S. 74 South Africa 106, 111–12, 126–8 Southern RNGOs 39, 51

South Sudan 93 Soviet Union, collapse of 91 Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 154–5 Special Rapporteurs 154–62 Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief 158–60 Special Status accreditations 35–7 Spiritual Caucus at the UN 11 spiritual organizations 31–2 SRHR (sexual and reproductive health and rights) 10, 17–18, 64–83, 186–91; defined 66–7; global gag rule (Mexico City policy) and 67, 93–5, 98 Sri Lanka 99 State Department (United States) 95–8 states, power shift from 2, 5 sterilization 71, 93–5 Stockholm conference (1972) 49 strategic positioning, climate change and 55–8 Student Observance for the International Day of Peace 177 Sudan 68, 134 Sullivan, L. 106 Sullivan Principles 106 Sunni Islam 87, 96 super-PACs 93 sustainable development 11, 18, 34, 47–55, 60n2 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 68, 86, 95, 98–9, 169 Swing, W. 176 Syria 93 Szydło, B. 90 TA (Treaty Alliance) 18, 107, 110–19 Tamils 99 Taylor, J. 158–9 Tearfund 89 televangelists 93 Ten Year Program of Action (2005) 152–3 terrorist organizations 87–9, 170; see also faith-based organizations (FBOs) TFV (Trust Fund for Victims) 131 Tibetan Buddhists 91 Timor-Leste 128 Tokyo, Japan, poisoning in 91 Torah 142n31 Torrent, J. 179 traditional justice 128 transgender, as term 101n26

Index transitional justice (TJ) 19, 126–9, 134–6, 140–1, 187 transnational non-state actors 5–6 Transnational Religion and Fading States (Rudolph) 6 transnational RNGOs 79 Treaty Alliance (TA) 18, 107, 110–19 Treaty Alliance Germany 111, 117–18 Treaty of Rome 135 Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace 10–11 Trump, D. 90–5 trust-building 56 Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) 131 Turkey 44n4, 90–2, 101n13, 152 Tutu, D. 10 Uganda 126, 131, 134–6, 140 Uganda Victims’ Foundation 141n9 UK see United Kingdom (UK) UN see United Nations (UN) UNAOC (United Nations Alliance of Civilizations) 10–11, 19, 167–80, 187–9 UN Children’s Fund 178 UNCHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) 19, 108–9, 148–50, 153–4, 158, 162 UN Commission on Social Development 156 UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) 10–11 UN Development Fund for Women 178 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 9–12, 18, 44n11, 85, 91, 100n6 UN Draft Norms on Business and Human Rights 107 UN Environmental Programme 178 UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) 49 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 9–10, 178 UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) 17, 47–63, 96, 186 UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) 9–12, 26, 66–7, 70–1, 75, 80, 95, 98 UN General Assembly (GA) 19, 148, 154, 162, 168 UN Global Compact 107–8 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 18, 106–14, 117–21

215

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 9–10, 148–50 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 12, 18–19, 106–9, 112–13, 148–51, 187 UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development (UN-IATF RD) 9–11, 86 Unitarian Universalists Association (UUA) 142n11 United Families International 69 United Kingdom (UK): aid fatigue in 101n20; Brexit and 90, 94–5, 98–9, 101n21; charitable and development organizations in 87–9; conservative nationalism in 90, 94–5, 98–9; European Development Fund (EDF) and 101n23 United Methodist Women 1 United Nations (UN) 184–94; business, human rights, and 106–25; climate change and 17, 47–63; defamation of religions campaign and 19, 148–66, 187, 191; disruption of processes of 68–71; funding to 95; international development and 84–105; interreligious dialogue, cooperation, and 167–83, 187; quantitative overview of religious NGOs (RNGOs) at 26–46; reconciliation, punishment, and 126–47; role of religious NGOs at 1–25; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 64–83 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) 10–11, 19, 167–80, 187–9 United Nations Charter 150, 155, 171, 179, 190 United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 96 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 19, 108–9, 148–50, 153–4, 158, 162 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) 10–11 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 9–12, 18, 44n11, 85, 91, 100n6 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 9–10, 178 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 49 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 17, 47–63, 96, 186 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 9–10, 148–50

216

Index

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 9–12, 26, 66–7, 70–1, 75, 80, 95, 98 United Religions Initiative (URI) 174–80 United States 44n4; business, human rights, and 110; climate skepticism in 48; conservative nationalism in 90–9; geographical origins of RNGOs and 37–8; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 67–71, 77–9, 95 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 95, 98 United Torah Judaism (religious party; Israel) 99 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 74, 149, 171, 190 universal human rights see human rights University of Kent 14, 27–8 UN NGO Committee 101n10 UN Norms 108–9 UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 9–10 UN Peacebuilding Commission 12 UN Population Conference (Mexico City; 1984) 67, 93–5, 98 UN Security Council 12, 90 UN Special Representative 109, 112 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 108 UN Women 72, 178 URI (United Religions Initiative) 174–80 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 95, 98 Uthup, T. 10, 179 Uttar Pradesh 92, 99 UUA (Unitarian Universalists Association) 142n11 Uyghur Muslims 91 Vatican 3, 28, 60n5, 80n6 Vatican II reforms 100n2 Vendley, W. 174–6, 181n10 Venezuela 100n7 Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) 131 Vienna, Austria Global Assembly (2013) 175 Vinjamuri, L. 128 violence, religion and 1, 5, 91, 175–6 Wahhabism 87, 96, 99 war crimes 129 War on Terror 5, 153 Warsaw 51, 57 Washburn, J. 142n11

Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court (WICC) 132–3, 142n19 WCC see World Council of Churches (WCC) ‘We Serve USA’ (super-PAC) 93 Western European and Other Group of States (WEOG) 37–9, 43, 44n4, 153, 185 ‘Western-Islamic’ focus 176–9 Western NGOs 77–8 West/Western, defined 180n1 West Wing, The (television show) 97 ‘White Turks’ 91 WICC (Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court) 132–3, 142n19 Widodo, J. (‘Jokowi’) 96–7 Willard, M. 176–7 Wilson, E. 192 witnessing 97–8 WJC (World Jewish Congress) 87, 155–6 Wolfensohn, J. 10 Wolff, J. 39 Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice 141n9 women’s rights 6, 17–18, 65–74, 96, 186; see also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) Working Group Natural Resources (Arbeitskreis Rohstoffe) 118 World Bank 10, 18; ‘Faith and the Environment’ programme 85; International Development Association 95 World Conference of Women (1995) 78 World Conference on Religions for Peace 135–6, 175 World Conferences (1990s) 8–9 World Council of Churches (WCC) 1, 12–13, 185, 189; business, human rights, and 115–17; climate change and 50, 55–7; defamation of religions campaign and 156, 159–63; Ecumenical United Nations Office 116; international development and 100n2; reconciliation, punishment, and 132–40, 142n29; sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and 72–5 World Evangelical Alliance 87 World Family Policy Center 69 World Federalist Movement 130

Index World Humanitarian Summit (2016; Istanbul) 93–4 World Interfaith Harmony Week 11, 176–7, 180 World Jewish Congress (WJC) 87, 155–6 World Muslim League 89 World Summit on Sustainable Development (1992; Johannesburg) 108 World Vision International (WVI) 13, 84–9, 100n2

217

xenophobia 154 Xi, J. 90–1 ‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations’ (2001) 168 Yemen 93 yoga NGOs 32 Yugoslavia 90, 101n11 Zoroastrianism 31, 86