Religion and British International Development Policy (Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy) 3030382222, 9783030382223

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS, AND POLICY

Religion and British International Development Policy

Aikande Clement Kwayu

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

Series Editor Mark J. Rozell Schar School of Policy and Government George Mason University Arlington, VA, USA

This series originated under the co-editorship of the late Ted Jelen and Mark J. Rozell. A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism, whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as Al-Qaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy serves a growing niche in the discipline of political science. This subfield has proliferated rapidly during the past two decades, and has generated an enormous amount of scholarly studies and journalistic coverage. Five years ago, the journal Politics and Religion was created; in addition, works relating to religion and politics have been the subject of many articles in more general academic journals. The number of books and monographs on religion and politics has increased tremendously. In the past, many social scientists dismissed religion as a key variable in politics and government. This series casts a broad net over the subfield, providing opportunities for scholars at all levels to publish their works with Palgrave. The series publishes monographs in all subfields of political science, including American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. The principal focus of the series is the public role of religion. “Religion” is construed broadly to include public opinion, religious institutions, and the legal frameworks under which religious politics are practiced. The “dependent variable” in which we are interested is politics, defined broadly to include analyses of the public sources and consequences of religious belief and behavior. These would include matters of public policy, as well as variations in the practice of political life. We welcome a diverse range of methodological perspectives, provided that the approaches taken are intellectually rigorous. The series does not deal with works of theology, in that arguments about the validity or utility of religious beliefs are not a part of the series focus. Similarly, the authors of works about the private or personal consequences of religious belief and behavior, such as personal happiness, mental health, or family dysfunction, should seek other outlets for their writings. Although historical perspectives can often illuminate our understanding of modern political phenomena, our focus in the Religion, Politics, and Policy series is on the relationship between the sacred and the political in contemporary societies.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14594

Aikande Clement Kwayu

Religion and British International Development Policy

Aikande Clement Kwayu Development Research and Consultancy Bumaco Limited Moshi, Tanzania

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy ISBN 978-3-030-38222-3 ISBN 978-3-030-38223-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © fotoVoyager/E+/Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Frediel and Clement Kwayu

Acknowledgements

One morning, seven years after completing my Ph.D., a dear friend, Rahime S. Kürüm, who was also a colleague at the University of Nottingham in the UK, called me. Her message was this—you should write a book based on your Ph.D. thesis. It sounded like a command but with kindness and love. I took it seriously. To ensure that I “obeyed”, Rahime introduced me to Melis Cin. The task ahead was enormous, not least the amount of research I needed to do to extend and update the analysis. UK politics has seen considerable change in the last seven years, including the new dynamics of Brexit politics. Both Rahime and Melis assisted and encouraged me throughout writing the book proposal. I thank both of them for their advice and encouragement. I thank the team at Palgrave Macmillan who have provided all the guidance needed throughout the manuscript preparation. This book is based on my Ph.D. research, of which I received supervision from the School of Politics in Nottingham between 2007 and 2011. I thank my supervisors—Steven Fielding and Neville Wylie—and all the team at the School of Politics. I am grateful to all the interviewees, back in 2011, who gave their time and insight. I also appreciate the UK government’s web archival resources with papers, statistics, strategy, policy documents and speeches, through which I was able to source primary documents from DFID and other departments. Writing a book is a long and demanding journey, there are many people who have helped me in this journey. I cannot mention all of them here but I wish to express my appreciation to each person who has been

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there for me. I would like to mention Katherine Baldwin of Yale University who gave me initial advice on how to respond to reviewers. I thank Kristin Phillips of Emory University who looked through my response to reviewers and provided comments. Adolf Mkenda for calling often to encourage me and to all my friends who have been wishing me well. Special thanks go to the team at Bumaco Limited, Moshi office, who provided space and all the support that I needed with so much love. There are many people who prayed for me including Kaka Benja, Pallangyo and Dennis Raymond. My siblings: Isaria, Alilya, Amani and Shirumisha, and my niece, Christina-Ruth, have been of constant support to my writing journey. Isaria always ensured that I had access to finance and resources whenever I needed to travel for research purposes. May God provide her with everything she ever needs and make her cup overflow. My academic career and research owe much to Amy Stambach of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Prof. Stambach’s support in my research, skill development and confidence has been invaluable. I thank her for the constant loving support, mentoring, coaching and for opening many doors throughout my career. She is heaven sent and I am forever grateful. May God bless her forever. Like a complex and beautiful tapestry, all the efforts towards this book are knitted together by my parents; my dad Clement Kwayu and mom, Frediel Kwayu. They have given all of theirs to support me in material form and with unconditional love they have followed every stage of my social life and career. I always count on them. Words can never describe my appreciation of them. May the name of my Lord, Jesus Christ, be honoured.

Praise for Religion and British International Development Policy

“Faith and religious identity are profoundly involved in development— ‘the freedoms to be and to do’, in the words of Amartya Sen. Many of those making change happen around the world are motivated and sustained by their faiths. In contrast, aid—the project that seeks to trigger development—is often highly secular, operating in the realm of evidence, randomized controlled trials and logical frameworks. Dr. Aikande C. Kwayu explores this paradox in the case of the UK’s aid programme, held up as a model by many other aid donors around the world. This book is invaluable in seeking to bridge the gap and fill the ‘faith-based hole’ in contemporary discussions of aid and development”. —Duncan Green, Senior Strategic Adviser, Oxfam, GB “Dr. Aikande Kwayu tackles one of the emerging features of international affairs: the growing trend of secular governments working with religious institutions in shaping international development policies. This study opens a window into the way the UK government has developed policies and shaped their politics in a way which make possible partnerships with faith institutions. The book is a valuable resource not only for students of international politics but also a compelling case for strengthening partnerships between public and faith based institutions”. —Wilfred Mlay, former Vice-President of World Vision International, Africa Region

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PRAISE FOR RELIGION AND BRITISH INTERNATIONAL …

“An impressive piece of scholarship, Religion and British International Development Policy makes a significant contribution to several fields, including political science, international relations, and public policy. Dr. Aikande C. Kwayu presents us with a meticulously researched account of the changing logics of British faith-based development policy and the mobilization of religion within successive government regimes. I know of no other analysis of religion and development politics that is more clearly argued and insightful than this eagerly awaited work”. —Amy Stambach, Director of Global Studies and Professor of Educational Policy Studies and Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, and author of Faith in Schools (2019) “This is an excellent book that reconnects religion within the discipline of international relations and especially the public funding of faith-based organizations and faith communities operating overseas. We are in an era where national security and the rise of terrorism using religion is threatening our very fabric of society and security. Thus, highlighting the importance of British soft power (in the era of Brexit and post) in this book in the faith-based arena is an essential conversation and debate that needs to take place from the policy-making perspective”. —Heba F. El-Shazli, Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Mason University, USA

Contents

Part I

Introduction, Research Design and Context Setting 3

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Introduction

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Faith and Development: A Manifestation of Resurgence of Religion in International Relations

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The UK’s International Development Policies from the End of the Cold War to the Present

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Part II Analysis of Religion at the Government Policy Making Level 4

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Faith-Based Organisations in the UK’s International Development Policy

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Faith Communities in the UK’s International Development Policies

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Brexit and UK International Development Policy: Implications for the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups

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Conclusion

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Index

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PART I

Introduction, Research Design and Context Setting

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Religion in International Relations Analysing the relationship between faith groups and the UK government in regard to international development policies is a contribution of this book towards the study of religion in international affairs. Since the end of the Cold War, religion has re-emerged as an important phenomenon in international affairs. This has received a considerable amount of attention from the scholarly community of the international relations (IR) discipline. IR scholars started to analyse the role of religion in various areas such as new terrorism, conflicts and peacemaking (Juergensmeyer 1993; Thomas 2005). Before 1989, the issues pertaining to the Eastern and Western blocs had been so contentious that other challenges in the international community attracted little academic recognition. Religion was one aspect that was almost absent in IR as a discipline during the Cold War (Wald and Wilcox 2006). However, the lack of attention to religion in IR goes back to before the Cold War started. In the history of IR theory, religion was recognised as an important force in the period before the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years’ War. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), which devastated Europe with an enormous death toll and an approximate reduction in the German population from 60 per cent to 20 per cent (Cooper et al. 2013), had a strong religious element through which the Holy Roman Empire sought to expand its dominance via the Pope and the Catholic Church. © The Author(s) 2020 A. C. Kwayu, Religion and British International Development Policy, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0_1

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In the Westphalian Treaty, the monarchs of Western Europe agreed “to give the individual kings the authority to choose a version of Christianity and impose it upon their country; that the king (and not the church) was granted spiritual authority over the inhabitants of his kingdom, and no outside actor had the right to challenge this authority within his realm” (Knutsen 1997: 84). That agreement (referred to in the treaty as cuius regio eius religio) separated the church from the state (king). The king (representative of a sovereign territory) and not the church was in control of the state. Although there is no consensus in IR scholarship that the Treaty of Westphalia marked the beginning of modern IR theory (Buzan and Little 2000; Krasner 2001; Osiander 2001), the international state system that emerged after the Treaty has significantly influenced both the discipline and the role of religion in international affairs (Holsti et al. 1991; Bagge Laustsen and Wæver 2000). The Treaty, as Stephen Krasner observes, “validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom” (Krasner 2001: 21). Considering the situation before 1648, it was, arguably, appropriate for the Treaty to ensure the separation of church and state. Nevertheless, it was a mistake for IR scholars to ignore religion when the discipline became an established academic subject at the end of the First World War. The discipline’s tendency to overlook some of the crucial aspects within the international scene led to the marginalisation of religion. After the First World War, “the subject matter of International Relations”, writes Knutsen (1997: 211), Discussed in the first formative years was curiously out of touch with the political realities of the age; many of the courses taught were theoretically barren; many of the books written were ideologically myopic. Early students of world affairs confined themselves to the Wilsonian vision of world politics, and rarely ventured to explore the many non-liberal theories, which swept the streets outside their ivory towers…’

With the same insight, Carr observed that “the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study” (Carr 1964: 8). In that respect, IR was preoccupied with security studies in attempts to avert another war. War and peace discourses turned out to be the centrepieces of IR. This was partly the argument for the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and, subsequently, the United Nations (UN) in 1945. However, the ideological differences

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between the East and West led to the Cold War, which took over as the key issue-area in IR. The politics of the Cold War and the subsequent focus on bipolarity and state systems, as well as the Westphalia legacy of ignoring religion, prevented IR scholarship from recognising religious forces that were materialising in the international system. In 1979, an Islamic revolution associated with Ayatollah Khomeini took place in Iran, and this revolution, Esposito argues, had a global impact (Esposito 1990). The revolution was one event where religion resurfaced with tremendous force, and yet it had little impact on scholarly understanding of religion in international affairs. The force of religion, in events such as the Iranian Revolution, had to wait until the end of the Cold War to receive any attention from the discipline. “What appeared to be an anomaly when the Islamic revolution in Iran challenged the supremacy of Western culture and its secular politics in 1979”, writes Juergensmeyer (1993: 1–2), “has become a major theme in international politics in the 1990s. The new world order that is replacing the bipolar powers of the old Cold War is characterised not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling of old empires, and the discrediting of communism, but also by the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances”. Hatzopoulos and Petito (2003) made similar observations. The end of the Cold War released the discipline from its obsession with power-politics/state-centric analyses and prompted the discovery of ‘newer challenges’ in international affairs. During the Cold War, most security analysts were preoccupied with conventional military issues and saw the state, especially aggressive states such as the former Soviet Union, as the main centres or sources of threat. However, in the post-Cold War period, there has been a tendency to recognise ‘new enemies or new sources of threat’, which need to be located within the broader framework of the ‘New Security Agenda’. Thus, we see this debate between ‘traditionalists’ who focus on the state as the main source of threat and ‘wideners’ who have expanded the security agenda to deal with new threats and new enemies (Buzan et al. 1998). The so-called Copenhagen School has championed the New Security Agenda. The Copenhagen School presents the securitisation theory. From this theoretical perspective, securitisation is a “speech act through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the

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threat” (Buzan et al. 2003). Religion might be analysed in the context of securitisation theory (Buzan et al. 2003; Bagge Laustsen and Wæver 2000; Krahmann 2005; Betts 1998; Hoffman 1996). Issues of religious extremism and radicalisation have led to global security challenges. Religion has been used as a mobilisation and justification tool to recruit followers and supporters of terrorism. Subsequently, a number of scholars have gone on to study religion in IR. There has been a proliferation of workshops and working groups on religion and IR, such as the Religion and IR Section in the International Studies Association (ISA); the British International Studies Association (BISA) working groups on Religion, Security, and IR; and the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) standing group on Religion and IR. Furthermore, statesmen and diplomats are mentioning religion in their speeches, thus underlining the importance of religion in contemporary world affairs. Various university departments have established research centres for Religion and IR.1 Nonetheless, many aspects of religion in IR are still treated at only a cursory level in the literature. The literature is focused mainly on the role of religion in international politics, with little focus on how governments are responding to that phenomenon.2 It is important to analyse governments’ reaction towards the rise of religion in international affairs, especially since the line between international and domestic affairs has become blurred (Putnam 1988; Risse-Kappen 1991). It should be noted that international politics cannot be explained in isolation, without addressing some aspects of domestic politics. In the UK, for example, some of the government policies that were designed to deal with issues of religion could be categorised as both domestic and international. An example of this was the 2003 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ policy. The policy aimed at countering the ideological and theological underpinnings of the terrorist narrative, in order to prevent radicalisation, particularly among the young, in the UK and overseas; and increasing the understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim countries and communities, and working with them to promote peaceful, political, economic and social reform (FCO 2004; Brighton 2007). This is just one example that shows the close link between international and domestic politics dealing with religion. In looking at this connection, mention can be made of the tide of Islamism that rose in the UK, which some policy experts and security officials saw as a response to the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as general Western foreign policy in the Middle East, Afghanistan

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and Pakistan. To understand this, it is crucial to note the historical trend to frame British Muslim identity and reactions to global events. Ahmad and Sardar (2012) document how international events such as the OPEC Oil Crisis in the early 1970s, the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie Affair and recently September 11, 2001 have all framed British Muslim identity and conceptions of Islamism. On the other side, this framing is also contributed to by reactive actions by some British Muslim (Ahmad and Sardar 2012). For example, some British-born radicalised Muslims reacted by performing terrorist attacks in the UK (Ahmed 2005). That was obvious from the speech made by Mohammed Saddique Khan, one of the London 7/7 bombers (McGrory and Theodoulu 2005), who apportioned the blame for his terrorist acts to the British government for intervening in Iraq. Many British-born Muslims feel strongly about their collective Islamic identity, i.e. the ummah, which refers to the worldwide Muslim community. The ummah is seen as one big Muslim family and thus if the West attacks innocent Muslims in the Middle East, radicalised and extremist British-born Muslims might react to this by bombing people or properties in the UK, because of their collective sense of Islamic identity (Choudhury 2007). This is problematic, as Sardar and Ahmed (2012: 3) argued “an identity that is specifically based on religion is, by definition, problematic. At the very least, it raises questions of loyalty: if Muslims owe their allegiance to a universal community- the ummah – what are they first: British or Muslim?” Islamist ideologues such as Maulana Mawdudi from Pakistan have argued that the worldwide Muslim community or the ummah is like a human body. Islamist ideologues such as Mawdudi and his writings would have a profound impact on British-born Muslims because he is from Pakistan and most British-born Muslims have a Pakistani background. According to the 2011 Census, Muslims compose of 4.8 per cent of the population of England and Wales. Out of the entire Muslim community in the UK, 47 per cent are British born and the rest are immigrants. The population of Muslims in the UK is larger than the combined non-Christian faith population in the country. 68 per cent of the Muslim community are of Asian origin. The public face of British Islam (religion) and British Islamism (political ideology)3 is, thus, dominated by South Asian/Pakistani strands of Islam and Islamism (Lewis 1994), just as in France we see North African Islamic and Islamist religious traditions prevailing. It is partly out of these communities’ connections to their countries of origin that we see

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how international events, which involve religious forces, might impact on domestic British politics. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to focus only on British Muslims and Islamism as a public face of religion in British domestic politics and its direct link to international politics. The Christian community in Britain has a strong presence in politics and it influences both domestic and international politics. The Church of England, for example, is a strong institution within the British community providing various social services in particular education. The UK government recognises the role of these faith institutions. The government, for example, has formed partnerships with them such as the Department of Education Memoranda of Understanding with the Church of England (DFE 2016a) and the Catholic Church (DFE 2016b). Other religious and faith communities such as Hindus and Sikhs are recognised as part of society by the UK government. Their voices and concerns are taken into consideration in community-related aspects of government decision-making. The positive contribution of various faith communities in the UK has been recognised and documented by the government (MHCLG 2018). In the light of the above discussion, the aim of this book is to contribute to the study of religion and politics by assessing how the resurgence of religion in international affairs and politics at large has been reflected in the way the UK government conducts business. Prior to unpacking this aim, it is important to define the meaning of the term ‘religion’ in this book. As will be shown in the next section, it has not been easy to define the term ‘religion’, or to agree on a single definition of it. That is arguably one reason that could explain the lack of detailed analysis of religion in IR. Theorising religion in IR has been made difficult by various factors, one of them being the difficulty to conceptualise religion in a way that it can be operationalised in the discipline. Nevertheless, Sandal and Fox (2013) have argued and demonstrated that there is room to analyse religion using existing IR theories. This is made possible by having a clear definition of religion through identifying the aspect of religion that is being studied. In this respect, this book focuses on the institutional/sociocultural aspect of religion instead of its spiritual/theological/theist aspect. The next section defines religion and categorises two different institutional structures relevant to understanding religion in IR.

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Defining Religion Different disciplines within the social sciences such as law, sociology and anthropology have attempted to define religion more than IR and Political Science in general. This is partly because, as noted above, IR and Political Science avoided religion in their analyses. Nevertheless, there has not been an agreed definition in any of those disciplines that attempted to define religion. The lack of a clear definition of religion has led to an argument that favours leaving religion undefined. One of the key advocates of that approach is Nadel (1954: 7–8). He wrote: Whichever way we propose to circumscribe the province of things religious, we are bound to encounter a border zone, which defies precise a priori allocation on this or that side of the boundary. To be sure, this residue of inaccuracy is entailed in the broad view of religion, which we made our starting point. But no other starting point seems feasible. Bluntly stated, what we set out to do is to describe everything in a particular culture that has a bearing on religion. And since “religion” is precisely one of those words which belong to the more intuitive portions of our vocabulary, and hence cannot be given a sharp connotation, we have no choice but to feel our way towards the meaning it should have in given circumstances. We must not risk omitting anything that might be relevant; the risk we have to take is that including, besides “religion proper”, also that “border” zone composed of mere superstitions; of science misconstrued or all too crudely attempted; and of science aiming too high or incompletely severed from mystic thought.

This kind of approach is not appealing to this book and generally to our understanding of religion in international politics. To understand and to be able to analyse the role of religion in politics, we need to operationalise religion for empirical and analytical purposes. Furthermore, religion needs to be specifically defined because it means different things to different people at different places at different times and is thus quite an ambiguous and vague term. Thus when scholars talk about ‘religion’ in the social sciences, they need to be more specific in their definition or pin down their explanations to which aspect of ‘religion’ they are actually referring. The border zones, which Nadel (1954) mentions, can be put into two categories: (a) theological definitions and (b) sociocultural definitions. The theological definitions, also known as ‘theistic’ definitions (Southwold 1978; Platvoet 1990), include those, which look at religion from the point of view of belief in an existing supernatural being or God.

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Such definitions borrow their central idea from Tylor, who suggested “a minimum definition of religion to be the belief in a spiritual being” (Tylor 1871). This aspect of religion can be further summarised by Platvoet (1990: 195) observation that religion “may be defined as any behaviour which believers interpret as communication, direct or indirect, between themselves and beings whose existence and activity cannot be verified or falsified but whom the believers believe to exist and to be active in their lives and environment”. The sociocultural definitions are those that look at religion from the perspective of its effect in the society or culture, such as the work of religious institutions within the society. Such definitions follow the perspective of Durkheim and Swain (1915), who defined religion as a “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”. Since this book is informed by social science research, religion here is analysed from a sociocultural rather than theological aspect. It is religious institutions more than religious beliefs that are the main focus of this book. Thus, the book narrows religion to mean faith groups, which includes faith-based organisations (FBOs), and faith communities. These faith groups are discussed in the next few sections.

Faith-Based Organisations FBOs are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with religious identities. FBOs often refer to religious charities (which can be Islamic, Christian, Jewish or Hindu) that strive to bring about social justice and raise the material standards of the oppressed and marginalised in any society through humanitarian and developmental aid/efforts. It should be noted that conceptualisation of faith organisations in the literature has been mixed in the sense that they do not distinguish FBOs (i.e. NGOs with religious identity) from faith institutions (such as churches) that carry out development work as well. Marshall (2006), for example, in her assessment of the FBO, notes, The most fundamental and important thing that they [the religious organizations] bring is the depth of commitment to fighting poverty. Fighting poverty is at the core of most of the major religious traditions in the world […] The Jewish faith, the Muslim faith, and Buddhism, for example, are

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focused very much on the people who are excluded, the people who suffer and the people who are poor […] Faith organizations have for millennia addressed some of the most complex ethical and moral issues that societies face. And the development business confronts many of those issues because it involves transformation.4

That definition is problematic since it mixes faith communities with FBOs. To examine the policy and its relation to religion, specificity is required for precise analysis. It is in this light that this book separates FBOs with faith communities. The religious identities of FBOs differentiate them from other NGOs that may have similar objectives. In this book, NGOs are taken to be nonprofit-making entities (Mawlawi 1993: 292; Weiss 1996: 437; Martens 2002) that are interested in advancing international development. Unlike secular NGOs, which deal with similar international development agendas, FBOs have “a constituency which is broader than humanitarian concerns […] that is a duty to respond to the needs of the poor and marginalised” (Ferris 2005). Berger (2003: 25) distinguishes FBOs from secular NGOs in that their “identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions”. Scholars such as Haynes (2009) and Marshall (2001) underscore the spiritual support, their perspective on conflicts and platform for resolution, commitment, history and mobilisation capacity (of their faith communities) as unique advantages of FBOs. Other scholars have attempted to posit general features of FBOs (Jeavons 2004; Unruh and Sider 2001; Smith and Sosin 2001), which include but are not limited to: (i) affiliation with a church or denomination; (ii) selection of board members/staff based on their religious beliefs; (iii) mission statement that has explicitly religious references; (iv) financial support from religious sources; (v) choice of name; (vi) reliance on religious values, beliefs, activities or experiences in information processing and decision-making. Even with these features, FBOs can still be difficult to identify (Bouta et al. 2005). Thus, for the purpose of clarity, this book defines FBOs as those NGOs that declare a faith-based identity in their vision and/or mission statements. This definition excludes those NGOs that started out of religious motivation but ceased to carry their faith identity, and those that do not have a formal link with any religious body such as a church. To clarify this definition, it is necessary to compare and contrast the examples of Oxfam and Progressio. Oxfam was first started by a vicar, Canon

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Milford, but currently is not inspired by faith, and thus does not qualify as an FBO in this research. On the other side, Progressio is identified as an FBO because its values and operations were5 inspired by Catholic teachings and this was explicitly stated in its mission statement. FBOs that are analysed in this book target not only beneficiaries who share their religious creed, but also those who do not. They do not discriminate on the basis of religion or race. This is in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) code of conduct, which they have to sign before carrying out humanitarian work. These articles state “Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone”; and “Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint” (ICRC 1994), respectively. Additionally, these FBOs are also members of Bond— a non-partisan networking organisation for UK NGOs that work in international development.6 Bond brings these organisations together in order to collectively advocate policy recommendations to the UK government, European Union, and to other international/multilateral platforms. Signing the ICRC Code of Conduct and becoming a member of Bond does not prevent FBOs from working with other faith groups such as local churches or mosques as partners both at domestic and international levels. Thus, in this book, FBO is a collective term for religiously motivated NGOs working in the area of international development. FBOs were established as a faith-motivated response to international situations such as increased levels of poverty, the emergence of newly independent states in the 1960s after decolonisation, and various humanitarian crises. Recent conflicts have also triggered the establishment of more FBOs. The Human Relief Foundation was established in response to the Gulf War of 1991, while Muslim Hands and Human Appeal International were established as a result of the Bosnian conflict (1992– 1995). Thus, like many other NGOs, FBOs start as relief agencies with short-term goals, which evolve into long-lasting organisations (Havers 1991; Korten 1987). Interestingly, although the formation of these FBOs is inspired by religious values, none of them were established for proselytising. The primary aim was to provide humanitarian assistance. Critically, some FBO officials feel the term itself signifies the persistent secular thinking among scholars and policymakers. An interviewee (2011) for this book, who was also an official in a certain FBO said, “it would be clearer if organisations are given references to their own particular

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faith, for example, Christian organisations rather than faith-based organisations”. However, because this book takes religion and faith in a wider context without special focus on a single faith or denomination, the term FBO is maintained to present such organisations as described above.

Faith Communities The difficulty in defining ‘community’7 extends to its various classifications such as, in our case, faith communities. In spite of being among the most trusted of communities within civil society around the world,8 there has not yet been a single definition of what a faith community is (Smith 2004). Therefore, this section does not attempt to suggest a clearer definition but to marshal various concepts regarding faith communities in order to arrive at an operational definition for the purposes of the analysis in this book. According to Lowndes and Chapman (2005), faith communities are made up of individual citizens and their families who have a religious identification or affiliation and may or may not take part in regular worship (whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu and so on). This definition is limited in scope because faith communities may bring together people geographically far apart who only share the same faith or religious affiliation. They do not have to be from the same families. The UK Department for Communities and Local Government defined faith communities in the UK “as communities of Christians, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs amongst other traditions”.9 Furthermore, faith communities in the UK are regarded as ‘key communities’ for the following reasons: (i) their size and distribution across the UK; (ii) they have existing networks of people; resources; equipment and competencies; (iii) they have networks of employed staff and volunteers—many of them with specialists skills; (iv) they have networks used to deal with people in crisis; and (v) they have networks which will be there for the long term and have the religious motivation to aid recovery from crisis (VSCP 2014). To engage with government departments, faith communities have to channel their communication through faith leaders or designated organisations in the form of a council or forum. These forums can be in different forms such as councils, associations, alliances, or a church denomination. In this light, this book analyses faith communities as those forums, councils, or organisations through which religiously identified communities engage with government departments. For instance, the Church of England qualifies as a faith community in this book since it represents

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the Anglicans in the UK. Another example is the Evangelical Alliance, which represents evangelical Christians in the UK. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is another faith community discussed in this research. Communities differ from FBOs in that while FBOs have international development as their primary goal, faith communities are groups in society with various goals, most of which have a domestic focus. The UK government recognises faith communities as ‘key communities’ managed under the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government with the Minister for Faith who is responsible for and works with religious and community leaders to promote faith, religious tolerance and stronger communities within the UK.10 Nevertheless, with the rising salience of religion in international affairs, there has been increasing mutual recognition and engagement between governments and faith communities in matters relating to international development. In fact, as noted above— some of the faith communities in the UK have had their identity framed and influenced by events at a global level. This is particularly the case with the Islamic community in the UK, e.g. events such as September 11, 2001 have influenced perceptions of them.

Explaining Religion and British International Development Policy This book explores and provides explanations for the relationship between the UK government and faith groups (FBOs and faith communities) in relation to an international development agenda. The main proposition is that the resurgence of religion in international affairs has led to an intensified relationship between the UK government and faith groups. In this light, the book is informed by the assumption that it is exogenous factors (the resurgence of religion in the international affairs) that are influencing the UK government’s relations with faith groups. This proposition can be countered by the argument that there may be other factors that can explain the relationship between the UK government and faith groups. As it will be made evident in Chapter 3, British international development policies have been influenced by various factors, two major ones being: (i) attitudes of politicians and political parties in power with regard to the third sector (i.e. private and voluntary sector), and (ii) the context (domestic and international) and the general political mood around the international development agenda. Thus, these factors may, in one way

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or another, lead to a heightening or lessening of tensions in the relationship between the government and faith groups. To this end, the book explores: the idea that the relationship between the UK government and faith groups can be explained by the respective attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector, which includes voluntary groups like faith groups as well as other groups; and the relationship between the UK government and faith groups can be explained by the increasing prominence of an international development agenda in British politics. In connection to this, it should be noted that these two propositions are endogenous, that is, they significantly depend on internal (domestic factors), while the main proposition depends on external/international factors, that is, the resurgence of religion in international affairs. Thus, this book explores three main propositions as outlined below: i. The resurgence of religion in international politics can explain the relationship between the UK government and faith groups ii. The attitudes of the political parties and politicians towards the third sector (voluntary and private sector) can explain the relationship between the UK government and faith groups iii. The increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics can explain the relationship between the government and faith groups.

The Brexit Factor For the last three years, arguably nothing has preoccupied or redefined UK politics—both domestically and internationally—as much as Brexit. Leaving the EU has proven to be one of the most complicated tests the government of the UK has had in recent decades since the Cold War. In relation to this book’s three propositions as mentioned above, Brexit is a key variable in all of the three propositions. In the first proposition, Brexit can be classified as an exogenous force in the sense that what would be the impact of the exit from the EU on the UK’s international development agenda? With regard to the second proposition, the question would be how are the attitudes of political parties and politicians on international development as well as the on the role of faith groups in the UK changing as a result of Brexit? And the third proposition could also be further qualified with the question: Would Brexit enhance the prominence of the

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international development agenda in British politics? To understand the implications on our understanding of the place of religion in policymaking, as well as the rationale behind these propositions, it is important to explain the choice of studying the UK government in this book.

The Uniqueness of the UK This book broadly covers three main aspects, which are: the resurgence of religion in international affairs; the relationship between the government and the third sector; and the international development agenda. Looking at these three aspects, there is no better country than the UK to explore these propositions. There are various historical reasons for this but with ongoing Brexit politics, the rationale for the UK as a case study to explore the role of religion in international development policy becomes even stronger. The UK can generate observable implications to the propositions. Brexit is an emerging factor that can provide a further analytical framework through which we can explore these propositions to gauge their strength in explaining the role of religion in policymaking and implementation.

The Resurgence of Religion in UK Politics As one of the key state actors in international politics, the UK has faced the impact of the resurgence of religion in international affairs. Literature (reviewed and discussed in more details in the next chapter) underscores ‘religiously justified’ terrorism as one of the manifestations of the resurgence of religion in international affairs. First, the UK has been the victim of these kinds of terrorist attacks. One of these was the 7/7 bombings (in 2005), which were carried out by extremist British nationals who were inspired by international extremists. It is thus, tellingly, evident that the resurgence of religion has not only been manifested in international affairs, but also in domestic politics. This is to be expected in increasing globalisation, where the line between domestic and international matters is continuously blurring. In the UK, matters of religion have become more and more pronounced in politics. The inclusion of a religious affiliation question in the 2001 census was one indication of the rising importance of religion in UK politics.11 In the 2011 census, the question on religious affiliation was asked again, from which the results showed that 59.3 per cent of the population identified themselves as Christian and 4.8

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per cent identified themselves as Muslims.12 The link between the international resurgence of religion and this particular decision to include a question on religion in the census is traceable. In 1987, the UN suggested this in its ‘Recommendations for the 1990 Census of Population and Housing in the Economic Commission for Europe’.13 For the UN to recommend this, it must have started to recognise the importance of religion in international matters. Furthermore, religion in the UK has projected itself as a source of identity (Bruce and Voas 2004). There are groups in British society that have religion as their source of identity such as the Muslims, Hindus, Jews and Sikhs.14 Religion as an identity is also one of the variables in the Northern Ireland conflict (Cairns and Darby 1998; Whyte 1991). The academic interest in analysing multiculturalism in Britain is another indicator of the significance of religious identity in the UK (Brighton 2007; Modood 1994). Although multiculturalism includes various elements such as ethnicity and race, the religious aspect has been increasingly becoming a weighty element, especially with the rise of political Islam and extremism.15 The 7 July 2005 bombings in London triggered a heated discussion on the British model of multiculturalism as a model of integration, and the failures associated with this model, as well as to what extent this model paved a way towards the rise of Islamism in the UK. It has been argued that since Britain embraced multiculturalism, this paved the way for separatist Islamic and Islamist enclaves to come into existence in Britain, which interact selectively with mainstream British society. It is believed by some that these separatist enclaves have given rise to Islamist or extremist ideologies (Mukherjee 2011). There is evidence of continuous inspiration and recruitment to terrorism based on extremist religious ideologies. Daesh, a global terrorist group also famously known as Islamic State (IS), attracted approximately 900 UK nationals to travel to Syria as caliphs (HMG 2018a). Regarding this, the presence of religion in recent British politics is considerably felt to be as a result of the religiously motivated terrorism and its accompanying counter-terrorism discourse. This terrorism is more specifically linked to Islamic radicalisation of Britishborn Muslims and extremism, an example of which is the 7 July 2005 bombings in London and various other attacks including the five attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 only. The people who carried out these vicious acts like Mohammed Saddique Khan were British citizens who held extreme views about their religion. Others have been recruited such as the 19-year-old Shamima Begum who left Britain to join the IS

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in Syria. In November 2019, a British born 28 year old, Usman Khan, who was formerly convicted of a terrorist offence, used a knife to attack and stab people to death near London Bridge. These extremist Britishborn Muslims are influenced by Islamist propaganda mostly through the Internet. In connection with this, mention may be made of Roy (2004) theory of ‘neo fundamentalism’, which argues that present-day Islamist terrorist movements have now become de-territorialised (no longer confined to any particular territory) and supranational. In other words, these movements have spread worldwide as a result of globalisation, the use of email, social media and the Internet, therefore having a profound impact on British-born Muslims who carry out terrorist attacks on British soil and beyond. Roy (2004) argued that Islamist ideology has spread from the madrasas or Islamic seminaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Islamic bookshops in London and Paris. Paris and France in general have faced enormous challenges with regard to terrorism relative to other countries in Europe. For example, among the 49 terrorist attacks in continental Europe between 2015 and 2018, almost half of those targeted France (HMG 2018a). The two main schools of Islamist thought that influenced terrorists included Middle Eastern Wahabbism and South Asian Deobandism (Metcalf 2002, 2003; Cesari and McLoughlin 2005). Examples of such movements, which became supranational, include both South Asian and Middle Eastern movements such as the Jamat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamat (which affiliated institutes in Leicestershire and Yorkshire) and also Middle Eastern movements/groups such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (which had their British versions and offshoots like Al-Mahajaroun as well) (Mukherjee 2008, 2009). Through efforts to counter such extremism, British politicians and policymakers found themselves dealing with issues of religion at home as well as abroad. The government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST (HMG 2006), which has recently been reviewed (HMG 2018a) focuses on four main aims—Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The Prevent strand’s objective has dealt with the religious ideology of Islamism in order to stop people from becoming extremists. The Prevent strand has had its own strategy and the government carried out reviews of it (HMG 2007, 2008, 2011; Home Office 2008). The Conservative-led coalition government under David Cameron also reviewed the 2007 Prevent Strategy and published another Prevent Strategy in June 2011. This strategy was reviewed again during Theresa May’s administration and was published in June 2018. All of these strategies, the previous reviews and

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annual reports place emphasis on working with and in partnership with faith communities. One of the differences between the 2007 strategy and the 2011 strategy is that while the former puts more emphasis on working with Muslim communities16 in order to integrate them, the latter strategy insists on collective efforts such as promotion of interfaith dialogue as well as working with other sectors such as Ofcom, Ofsted and charities (HMG 2011). The latest strategy (2018) and subsequent community integration action plan (HMG 2019) have a holistic approach to tackle hatred, erosion of women’s rights, the spread of intolerance and isolation—using strategies such as economic integration, language learning, community work, integration of migrants and education. This holistic approach aims to prevent other emerging triggers of terrorism in particular ‘the feeling of otherness’ that may be promoted by the same efforts that concentrate on one community and also the emergency of the new extreme right groups. All strategies, as well the National Security Strategy (NSS) (HMG 2008), the reviewed 2015 NSS as well as the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR) (HMG 2018b), recognise the heightened threat of Islamist terrorism and radicalisation as one of the key security problems. The Prevent Strategy is designed to deal with extremism. Since Islamist triggered terrorism still poses a severe17 risk to national security, the UK government takes this very seriously. This is largely why issues of religion are influencing domestic politics. The resurgence of religion in UK politics is therefore reflected in the context of security and prevention of terrorism more than anything else. Although there are other ways in which the government interacts with faith communities, faith schools, and faith groups at large,18 terrorism has been the largest catalyst for discussion of religion and politics in the UK. The Prevent strand of CONTEST is also applied in prison services, whereby the government has designed special jails with the aim of stopping radicalisation. Although these jails focus on all types of radicalisation—such as Islamism and the extreme right-wing—there has been criticism and concern that only Muslims have so far been placed in those jails (Grierson 2019). Thus, just as terrorism dominates the discussion of the resurgence of religion in international politics,19 so it dominates the discussion of the re-emergence of religion in domestic politics too.

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The Increasing Salience of the International Development Agenda in UK Politics The UK is one of the major international development/aid donors. International development defines the country’s external relations with many states in the Global South as well as in its relations with multilateral organisations such as the UN and its agencies. Over a period of time, notably since 1997 when the Department for International Development (DFID) was established, the UK has been recognised as one of the principal donor countries championing the course of international development on the global platform (Gulrajani 2014; OECD 2008). Although there are other countries, particularly the Scandinavian nations, that provide more aid (in proportion to their national income20 ) to the developing countries, the political weight and the international advocacy that the UK government provides for international development has been, arguably, unparalleled. This can be traced back to the 1970s. In their analysis of the G8 and G20 meetings and the development agenda, Larionova and Rakhmangulov (2010: 69) observed that “the highest share of development commitments in the G7/G8 were registered during the presidencies of the UK (1977, 1984, 1998), Germany (1985, 1999), and Canada (1981, 1995)”. There may be counter-arguments suggesting other factors to explain the G8’s agenda of the time (e.g. the severe famine and hunger situations in the early 1980s), but the consistency of the UK in promoting international aid in the G8 undermines such counter-arguments. Moreover, in 1977 the UK’s advocacy of international aid in the G8 matched the Government’s 1975 white paper on international aid titled ‘The Changing Emphasis of British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poor’. Furthermore, the 2005 G8 meeting, that the UK presided over, again had its main focus on international development, further highlighting the UK as a leading advocate for international aid. Britain does not only place international development on the G8 agenda when it is presiding: in the 2011 G8 meeting, for example, David Cameron passionately defended international development and the need to give more aid even in times of economic recession (Cameron 2011). During his presidency of the G8 Summit in 2013, David Cameron put emphasis on international tax systems and also on the fight against terrorism (Cameron 2013). The UK government clearly places great importance on international development. This is not only a matter of rhetoric. The continued push to place issues related to international development in G7/G8 summits by the UK

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is evidence of its commitment to see international development high up on the agenda. Among the G7 countries, it is only the UK and Germany that have reached the 0.7 per cent of GNI target. The UK became the first donor country to enshrine this commitment into Law since 2015 (Anderson 2015). By 2017, other G8 members countries were below 0.7 per cent with Canada at 0.26 per cent; France at 0.43 per cent; Germany at 0.66 per cent; Italy at 0.26 per cent; Japan at 0.23 per cent; USA at 0.18 per cent; and Russia at 0.08 per cent (OECD 2017; Tew 2019). As a result of Brexit, the UK government’s focus on ‘Global Britain’ will further promote international development and aid to enhance its relations with the Global South. As we will see in Chapter 6, the UK has not backslide on its commitment to be a leader of the international development agenda in the world. At the 2019 UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings in New York, the UK reiterated its commitment to international development and announced new funding pledges for climate/environmental protection and family planning. Observing rhetoric as well as analysis of key documents such as the annual reviews (from 2016 to 2018) of the NSS, the SDSR and the NSCR, there is evidence that international development is taken as a strategic means to project British influence in the global sphere and to strengthen relations around the world. This will have implications on faith groups given the strong presence and role of faith groups in lives and politics in the Global South.21 Although various talks and discussions on Brexit and International Development have focused on gearing aid towards the establishment of more trade relations with the Global South,22 especially since some of these countries (apart from the BRICS) are emerging economies (Bremmer 2015), the possibility for further consideration of religion as a variable in international development post-Brexit is, arguably, still high. This book is interested in examining this. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on these issues. Furthermore, since its establishment, DFID has focussed on international development policy coherence and forging partnerships within the recipient community. Clare Short, the first Secretary of State for International Development, explained the significance of DFID, saying: “The establishment of the new Department for International Development presented an enormous challenge and opportunity to shift the balance of UK foreign policy […] Britain became a leading player in development because we created a department with authority over developmental aspects of all UK policy” (Short 2004). That way, DFID “became extremely influential throughout the development community after 1997” (Barder 2005). Morrissey (2002: 2) explains that “whereas

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the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), which was the DFID predecessor, appeared to largely accept the lead of the World Bank on development policy; DFID has been more inclined to have its own people study the policy issue”. Furthermore, Morrissey (2002) gives an example of how influential DFID was among members of donor communities, explaining that “DFID was among the leaders in getting economists and social development advisors to consider the effects of macroeconomic stabilisation on the poor, and DFID staff were seconded to the IMF to advise on this issue” (Morrissey 2002). In the light of this, it could be argued that DFID has independence in policy decision-making and is a strong aid department that has the confidence to execute policies that are respected in the donor community. The British government spends money on research in the area of development studies. DFID, for example, runs ‘Research for Development’, which is a free access online database containing information about research programmes supported by DFID. Research for Development provides interested British audiences with the latest information about research funded by DFID including news, case studies and details of current and past research in over 30,000 project and document records.23 By October 2019, DFID’s Research for Development had about 33,648 outputs.24 In connection to the point above, it should be mentioned that DFID funded a research programme at the University of Birmingham on ‘religion and its connections with development’. The aim of this research was to develop the shared concepts and analytical tools that are currently lacking, in order to improve the understanding of relationships between faith and development based in comparative analysis of world faiths (especially Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, but also Buddhism, Sikhism and traditional belief systems) across Africa and Asia, with a focus on Nigeria, Tanzania, India and Pakistan (Rakodi 2007; Nolte et al. 2009; White et al. 2010). The research further complemented this book’s interest. Religions and Development (RaD) research underscores the importance of the argument presented in this book, as it shows that DFID recognises the role of ‘faith and development’. The main difference between the RaD research programme and this book is that, while RaD focused on religions and faith in the developing countries (i.e. recipient countries), this book focuses on the relationship between DFID and UK-based faith groups. For the reasons mentioned above, the UK’s international development policy provides the best case study to investigate how the UK government engages faith groups in formulating and implementing policies.

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Neoliberalism and Its Impact on Governance From the 1980s and more so in the post-Cold War era, Western governments have been changing their ways of operation to embrace neoliberal ideas (Geddes 2006; Denters and Rose 2005). UK politics has also embraced neoliberal ideals, which in effect brings the third sector into government processes. Neoliberal ideas have been appealing to governments due to the changing environment both at domestic and international levels (Jessop 2002). The term ‘neo-liberalism’, writes Geddes, can be used in two linked senses: in the wider sense of a ‘new capitalism’, the historical outcome of the restoration of capitalist power in the context of advanced managerial capitalism; and in the narrower sense—a set of policies implemented since the 1980s to restore and maintain capitalist power as the basis for a new phase of development (Geddes 2006; Duménil and Lévy 2001). Although neoliberal ideals, most of the time, have been perceived as leaning more towards the right, left-wing parties and their administrations embraced these ideals too. In the USA, for example, the Clinton administration promoted these ideals, which led to the term ‘new’ democrats. Similarly, in our case, the UK has also been marked by such changes. Margaret Thatcher embraced such ideas, as did the New Labour government of 1997 (Finlayson 2003; Gilbert 2004). The New Labour government, for instance, embraced a policy ideology known as the ‘third way’, which is basically a system where the government partners with the third sector in providing public services. This ‘third way’ led to some policies that were similar to Thatcher’s policies. The coalition government under David Cameron adopted the ‘big society’ plan, which had more or less similar language, with ‘third way’-style ideas such as partnering with communities, private and voluntary sectors in providing services to the public. Likewise, Theresa May introduced the ‘shared society’, which further promotes community and strong institutions within the society to facilitate citizens’ obligations and responsibilities to one another (May 2017). These various terms like ‘third way’ ‘big society’ and/or ‘shared society’ are more a matter of political, rather than ideological, difference. Within the same political frameworks, this book also explores the attitudes of political parties and politicians in the UK towards the third sector and tries to explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. In the neoliberal context, the government partners with private and voluntary sectors in implementing policies. Partnerships are thus a major

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way for governments to function in a globalised world. Although most of the literature that discusses neoliberalism in the UK is based on local governance, especially focusing on initiatives such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) (Geddes 2006), there has been an argument that neoliberalism has played a role in implementation of international (foreign) policies (Kendall and Anheier 1999), including international development policies. This will be made clear in Chapters 4 and 5 in the analysis of the relationship between the government and faith groups. The above three sections explain the elements in UK politics that justify the rationale for choosing the UK as the subject of this study of the relationship between the government and faith groups in the implementing of international development policies. The UK government is dealing with the resurgence of religion at home, which also has international connections because of the globalised era in which we live; from this standpoint, it is safe to assume that the resurgence of religion in international affairs has had an effect on politics and hence governmental decisions. The issues of political Islam (Islamism) and extremism have directly affected UK society. There are radicalised people in the UK and so the government is not only responsible for thwarting such processes abroad but also at home. Partly as a result of this interconnectedness between the global and the regional/local, and the neoliberal ideals of private/public partnerships, the UK government has embraced the idea of working with the third sector to implement some of its policies. For example, in implementing the counter-terrorism strategy, the government has been working in partnership with faith communities and charities in order to prevent extremism in communities. Similarly, to deal with terrorism abroad (which has a large impact on the British domestic situation) among other factors, the UK government has been promoting an international development agenda both internationally and at home. In connection to this, the argument on the link between terrorism and poverty should be discussed. Whereas policymakers have tended to attribute poverty as one of the possible factors for terrorism (Rice 2005; Bush 2002; Easterly 2016; Stern 2000; Berrebi 2007), literature and scholarly evidence has shown that terrorism is positively associated with high income and education (Krueger and Maleckova 2002; Berrebi 2007). In this light, it is difficult to argue that poverty explains terrorism. Evidence from analyses of terrorists and suicide bombers (Hassan 2001; Berrebi 2007; Krueger and Maleckova 2002) has underscored terrorists’ adequate education and income status.

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Nevertheless, the rationale for international development and for assisting countries through foreign aid as a means to fight terrorism still stands. Terrorism has to be fought in multiple fronts including military, police, sociopolitical and other innovative means in consideration of the complex nature of terrorism as a security threat. Terrorism, which by and large falls under ‘new security threats’, cannot be fought using conventional military attack only. International development plays a role in the fight against terrorism. This is because international development covers and addresses a number of issues that can directly or indirectly facilitate incidences of terrorism. These include injustices, authoritarianism, failing and failed states, and inadequate public services including education and health. Literature has shown that terrorist organisations make use of failed states as havens (Lennon 2003; Von Hippel 2002). Most of these groups are hosted in failing or weak states. As it will be shown later in the book that terrorist groups are increasingly recruiting from Western countries (which indicates they are people with income and better life standards) but their operating camps are hosted in weak states. Terrorists also capitalise on grievances nurtured by poverty. Some of the terrorist groups get legitimacy among people and citizens of the poor countries through provisions of public services. The Taliban, for example, provided public services to people in Afghanistan (Cameron 2019; Berman 2003), so did the Hezbollah in Lebanon and also Hamas in Palestine (Berman 2003). So instead of depending on only military activities in areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of poor people, it would be more advisable to provide the countries with food and healthcare provisions, thereby raising the material standards of the local people as well as building up their state and justice systems (Lennon 2003). This, as we will see in later chapters, explains the British international development policy decision to focus on fragile states. Thus, Britain’s international development policies and humanitarian aid policies tie in very closely with the theory that poverty may, directly or indirectly, cause much of today’s new terrorism. Britain takes this poverty-terrorism argument very seriously and thus provides other fragile states with aid and development assistance. As we will see in later chapters, the government policy on international development has also been changing over a period of time, signalling its increasing salience in British politics. Brexit provides another angle for exploring these propositions even further. Leaving the EU and the apparent need to expand the UK’s sphere of influence in global politics, has led to increasing discussion of linking aid

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to trade. As noted above, Brexit will, arguably, lead to more attention to the Global South hence more strategic use of international development to enhance closer relations with the global south. In the annual review of the security strategy following Brexit, the UK government emphasised that it will “strengthen its overseas network, reinvest its relationships around the world, champion rule-based systems including free trade and use of soft power to project its values and advance UK interests” (HMG 2018b). The question is how will the focus on trade impact the government’s partnerships with the third sector and in our case—faith groups? Attempts to answer this question are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Overview of Research Design and Methodology This book draws on qualitative methods as it seeks to explore, interpret and explain the government’s relationship with faith groups. Through the case study analysis method (Yin 2003; Gerring 2004), international development policy was taken as a case to understand how the government works with religion at policy level. A possible critique of this approach could be that qualitative studies select on dependable variable and therefore fail to study samples with the full range of variation of this variable (Mahoney 2007), however since the aim of this book is to explore and explain, a case study is a more appropriate method. To understand these relationships, the research did not need to subject the case to the same kinds of selection issues that arise in quantitative approaches (Collier et al. 2004). Different research strategies are organised to answer different research questions. The usefulness and strength of a research method depend on the question that a particular researcher seeks to answer. Yin (2003) explains that a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. As noted above, one of the propositions this book aims to explore is whether the resurgence of religion in international politics has influenced the UK government’s relations with faith group. At the same time, it can be argued that the relationship between the government and faith groups is a reflection of the salience of religion in international politics. Thus, a case study strategy is useful to understand these issues, as it is capable of investigating and exploring such propositions, which cannot easily be separated from the context. The context, both domestic and international, is a crucial factor in this research. The other two propositions focus on the

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domestic context, in particular in British politics—the research seeks to investigate the role of political parties and politicians in the formation of the international development agenda, which in turn can have an impact on the government’s engagement with faith groups in that matter. Similarly, the context of Brexit cannot be removed from this analysis—since it is affecting decision-making in policy circles. Levy (2002) presents two types of case studies. These are (1) atheoretical or configurative-idiographic case studies, and (2) Interpretive or disciplined-configurative case studies. Atheoretical case studies are traditional single-case analyses often associated with area studies. They are highly descriptive and aim to understand and interpret a single case as an end in itself. Interpretive case studies aim to explain/interpret a single case but that interpretation is explicitly structured by a theory or welldeveloped theoretical framework. The analysis in this book is informed by a research design that is a combination of both types of case study. It is a ‘within-case’ analysis that describes British international development policies and uses a causal theory (historical institutionalism—explained in Chapter 2) to map the relationship between faith groups and the UK government in implementing international development policies from 1992 to 2019. The 1992 Bosnian War marks the starting point, an event that reminded the world of the force of religion in international matters in the post-Cold War era. This book covers four government regimes—the Conservative (1992–1997); New Labour (1997–2010); the Conservative-led coalition (2010–2015); and the Conservative (2015–2019). Covering the four regimes has allowed the assessment of the role of political party ideology in policymaking, in particular the international development agenda, as well as the relationship between political parties in power and the third sector (in our case faith groups). For coherent analysis and comparative purposes, this period is divided into four periods, according to the government in power. Thus, the periods are: 1992–1997; 1997–2010; 2010– 2015; and 2015–2019. This structure makes it a longitudinal/crosssectional analysis, which refers to the examination of data collected at different points in time (Menard and Elliott 1990). This structure has also ensured internal validity during the analysis. In explanatory case studies, internal validity is achieved when the researcher considers different explanations or causes, including rival explanations, to the outcome. Thus, analysis at different points in time exposes the research to possible rival explanations. For instance, a resurgence of religion might have led to a heightened relationship between the government and faith groups at one

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point in time but not at another point. From such a finding, the researcher may further probe/analyse the data in order to find other factors that may explain the heightened relationship. Since this book focuses on one unit of analysis—successive UK international development policies—processtracing was selected to uncover the causal paths behind the relationship between the government and faith groups. Process-tracing is an appropriate method for discerning various possible causal mechanisms that may lead to an intensified or less intensified relationship. Using this tactic, the researcher can discern which of the propositions has more explanatory power and at what period in time. George et al. (2005: 207) argue that process-tracing is an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development, not only because it generates numerous observations within a case, but because these observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case. It is the very lack of independence among these observations that makes them a powerful tool for inference. Thus, the purpose of process-tracing is to connect the phases of the policy process and enable the investigator to identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular decision through the dynamic of events (George and McKeown 1985; Tarrow 1995). Furthermore, King et al. (1994: 227) explain that process-tracing involves “searching for evidence - evidence consistent with the overall causal theory about the decisional process by which the outcome was produced”. On this point, Collier et al. (2004) discuss ‘within-case’ analysis in their ‘causal-process observation’, which is defined as an insight or piece of data that provides information about the context or mechanism. Documentary research and analysis is a crucial part of the data collection process. Documentary analysis is a well-established method in the social sciences (Bryman 2004; Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). Documentary analysis is advantageous in that documents can provide an important historical perspective on any area being studied and is extremely cost-effective and productive (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). Documentary analysis also forms an excellent means of triangulation, helping to increase the trustworthiness, reliability, and validity of research, especially as most documents are publicly accessible (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). To a large extent, the documents needed to map the trend in the relationship between the government and faith groups are from the DFID: the ODA from 1992 to 1996; and DFID white papers, reports, policy and strategy papers published between 1997 and 2019. Equally important are the documents from faith groups, including their annual reports, lobbying materials, policy statements, vision and mission

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statements, publications, and financial and annual reports. In addition, the election manifestos (for all elections between 1992 and 2019) of the two major political parties—Labour and Conservatives, as well as the 2010 election manifesto of the Liberal Democrats and the Coalition Agreement have been analysed. Various parliamentary discussions on international development between 1992 and 2019 (obtained from Hansard Written Answers) have also been taken into account. Heated discussions on Brexit in Parliament and its impact on British international development are also crucial to gain insight on various attitudes and possible policy direction. Such debates may be helpful in a number of ways: they can hint at the position of political parties and specific politicians on certain policies, and they may also highlight support and reasons for certain policies. Official speeches made by relevant officials in regard to international development have also been useful. Speeches, as explained by Mumford and Selck (2010: 302), “are tools to present what the speaker and his or her party are offering, but also a means of laying down the range of possibilities”. In this book, speeches, along with other documents (as mentioned above) are assessed to grasp the extent to which faith groups are engaged in the UK’s international development agenda. A number of factors were considered during the analysis of the documents. These include the documents’ context, authorship, intended audience, intentions and purposes, vested interests, style and tone, and presentation (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). To complement the information from these official documents, in particular to gain an understanding of the political climate of the time, other sources (primary and secondary), published scholarly (journal) articles, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) research papers, CREDIT Research papers (published by the University of Nottingham’s Economics department) following the establishment of DFID, Reality of Aid reports, Independent Commission on British Aid reports, Bond reports and press releases, DEVEX news and other sources have been consulted. For the purpose of understanding the climate in the ‘international development world’ and its perspective on faith groups, documents from the World Bank, the UN and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have also been analysed. In addition to documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews of faith groups’ officials and former officials in DFID were conducted. Although these were conducted between 2010 and 2011, the insight gained at that time was still relevant and has been updated by the close follow-up of press release and other news/public information released

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by the faith groups and officials. Close follow-up and observation of social media accounts and in particular Twitter posts by faith groups and DFID officials have been useful to not only gain insight but also understand the attitudes, feelings and moods at different times and on different issues with regard to international development policy. Semi-structured interviews allow a certain degree of flexibility and for the pursuit of unexpected lines of enquiry during the interview (Grix 2004). In a case study, interviews appear to be guided conversations rather than structured queries and although the researcher pursues a consistent line of inquiry, the actual stream of questions is fluid rather than rigid (Yin 2003; Rubin and Rubin 1995). In general, interviews are said to reach the parts other methods cannot reach (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). Studying documents can allow a researcher to see the way the organisation portrays itself in print, but interviewing allows a researcher to investigate and prompt things that cannot be observed (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). During 2009, the researcher visited several UK FBOs from the two principle religions in the UK—Islam and Christianity—and interviewed officials who deal especially with advocacy and policy development. There were two main reasons for interviewing these NGOs: the first reason was that a list of FBOs was selected for potential interviews on the basis of their operations and their ‘perceived’ relationship with the government during the time of interviews (2010 and 2011). Three, out of five interviewed FBOs, had an official partnership arrangement with DFID. On the other hand, two did not have any official partnership with the government but received funding from the government through various funding schemes, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4. The second reason is that those were the FBOs that accepted the researcher’s interview request at that time. Interviews with FBOs generated information about their engagement with the government, such as lobbying for certain policies (advocacy), funding applications, and general engagement with the government in matters relating to international development. The interviews sought and provided an insight into organisations’ faith identities and how these identities impact on their relations with the government. The researcher also carried out semi-structured interviews with an umbrella organisation for Muslim Charities. This particular interview helped the researcher to gain an understanding of the difficulties faced by small Islamic agencies and why they fail to engage with the government. The interview was also useful as MCF brings together more than one agency. Finally, the researcher

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carried out an unstructured interview with an official from the World Bank’s department for Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics (DDVE) in Washington, DC. DDVE served as the World Bank’s focal point on the intersection of faith and development. The unit maintained partnerships with FBOs as well as broader dialogues on development issues.25 In early 2011, interviews were carried out with two former officials of the DFID. These officials held key positions in the department and were responsible for key policy decisions that were made during their time in office. Some interviewees requested anonymity. Any wishes the interviewees expressed in the interview were granted. To ensure consistency in referencing, all interviewees are anonymous in this book. To avoid potential bias in the interviews, the author sought a triangulation method to check data from different sources. This is especially since the interviews were carried out eight years prior to the finalisation of the manuscript. The findings from the interviews were crosschecked with findings from documents, interviews from other sources, and published materials. Jick (1979: 604) maintains that, “the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premise that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another”. Following Yin’s suggestions, the author made efforts to grasp all issues that were being studied. The author was interpreting the information as it was being collected (Yin 2003). In addition, counter-arguments were devised throughout the data collection, which was also part of the data analysis. Another crucial stage in this research was data analysis. Data analysis in qualitative research can be messy and complicated (Wellington and Szczerbinski 2007). However, organisation and a clear focus to link the data to the main propositions helped the author to efficiently analyse qualitative data. In the light of this, the author reread most of the data collected (e.g. white papers, policy papers, reports, reviews and speeches) while highlighting and annotating key and relevant phrases, and words that can be linked to the proposition in one way or another. Different colours were used to highlight data related to FBOs and faith communities and for each proposition. Data was also broken down into different parts in accordance with the time framework. This helped to manage the data and also to analyse each set of data in its own context. This was followed by the search for common themes and patterns. In addition, the author read beyond the documents by putting them into context and historical perspective. This is where the secondary sources and literature review proved to be useful. For example, in analysing the policies of the

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period from 1997 to 2010, it was important to consider the New Labour ‘third way’ policies, the Ethical foreign policies, and the international context (such as the UN Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goal). It was also important to analyse the rhetoric around post-Brexit vote and politics. The causal theory and the framework informed by historical institutionalism, which is briefly explained below and there is more detail in Chapter 2, were applied to describe the explanatory power of each of the propositions.

Historical Institutionalism Historical institutionalism is one of the major types of new institutionalism. Other major types of the institutional theory include rationale choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Institutional theory, as observed by Bulmer and Burch (1998: 603), “is [a] theory of the middle range. It provides a link between deeper, structural factors such as those located in the economy, society and wider polity on the one hand, and human agency on the other”. Academic works on institutionalism, and in particular historical institutionalism (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Steinmo 2008), have argued that gradual changes take place within institutions. Historical institutionalism takes into account the effects of institutions on political processes and outcomes. One of the core claims of historical institutionalism is that institutions do not only channel policy and structure political conflict but also define interests and objectives (Thelen 1999). In that way, policy interests may be perceived in accordance with the institutions in place, for example, the UK government may define their interests in working with faith groups in accordance with their norms, rules, regulations or even the organisation. One of the key assumptions of historical institutionalism is that institutions are persistent and resistant to changes. Thus, it lies in explaining the persistence of institutions and their policies, rather than evaluating the nature of those policies and institutions (Peters 1999: 73). In general, historical institutionalism seeks to explain rather than predict (Steinmo 2008; Della Porta and Keating 2008). Nevertheless, historical institutionalists pursue an understanding of how history shapes outcomes by examining patterns over time (Steinmo 2008). New institutionalism, and in particular historical institutionalism, is thus relevant in achieving this book’s main objectives: (i) to investigate successive UK government’s international development policies and explore policy

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change over time; and (ii) to examine the causes of policy changes and their impact on the role of faith groups in policy process. To do that, this book investigates whether the policy changes are a result of: exogenous factors—in our case the resurgence of religion in international affairs and Brexit; or indigenous factors—which in our case include the attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector and the international development agenda. The analytical framework that is informed by historical institutionalism is explained in Chapter 2 in more detail and used to understand the rest of the chapters.

Book Structure This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on introduction, theoretical approaches, literature review and historical background of the UK’s international development agenda. The second part of the book focuses on the empirical analysis. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework of the book. The chapter is divided into two major sections. Section one is a review of literature on the re-emergence of religion in international politics and the nascent agenda of ‘faith and development’ in which the role of faith groups in international development is discussed. Section two introduces the theory of new institutionalism, with a particular focus on historical institutionalism, and explains the rationale behind adopting this theoretical perspective. Following that is the presentation of the analytical mechanisms that will be used for our analysis in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The third chapter is a historical review of the UK’s international development agenda. The chapter maps out the general trends and changes in the UK’s international development policies, with a particular focus on the period between 1992 and 2019. This chapter aims to disentangle the various themes in international development that prevailed during different periods of time. It cements the analytical structure—showing how policies changed and continued in each period of time from 1992 to 1997; 1997 to 2010; 2010 to 2015; and 2015 to 2019. The chapter will identify variations and points of change in order to guide the analysis of causal factors in the following chapters. Chapters 4 and 5 are empirical chapters, which explore the relationship between faith groups and international development policies. These chapters trace the narrative of FBOs and faith communities’ relationships with international development policies, respectively. The book

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introduces the faith groups in accordance with the definitions presented in this chapter. Each chapter follows the analytical structure in chronological order—that is the period from 1992 to 1997; 1997 to 2010; 2010 to 2015; and 2015 to 2019. Next, the chapters move on to discuss the findings on the relationship between faith groups and international development policies. In Chapter 4, which analyses the relationship between the UK government and FBOs, it is found that the UK government interacts with FBOs in the same way as it does with other NGOs that deal with international development. To access government funding, for example, FBOs have to undergo the same procedure that any other NGO would. In Chapter 5, which analyses the relationship between the UK government and faith communities, it is found that most faith communities do not have international development as their primary goal but the government engaged with them, especially in the period from 1997 to 2010. Their relationship was basically in the area of awareness raising and campaigning. However, in the period since May 2010, the government has moved ‘awareness-raising’ down the priority list and changed its strategy, which has led to a weaker relationship between the government and faith communities. The book will examine whether in the period between 2015 and 2019, with consideration of Brexit, the government has or is reviewing its relations with faith groups. Each of these chapters is concluded by an analysis, which follows an historical institutionalism approach. Chapter 6 analyses the rising salience of the international development agenda within British politics. The findings in this chapter suggest that the ‘promotion of international development’ moved beyond party politics to become a British/national agenda. In the 2010 election manifestos of all three major political parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat) agreed with and promised to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) for international aid. The chapter also examines the election manifestos of 2015 and 2017 for all major political parties, the post-Brexit referendum rhetoric and actions in relation to the international development agenda. The chapter aims at examining the implications of Brexit on the international development agenda and predicts the future of that agenda. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this book. The chapter starts with a summary of the whole book. This is followed by a discussion of the key findings and an explanation of this books’ contribution to IR, International Development and Policy Studies. In addition, policy lessons are presented.

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Conclusion This chapter has provided an introduction to the book with a brief presentation of the main arguments of the book, the rationale for the book and the justification for focusing on the UK for a wider understanding. It has also briefly indicated the possible implications of Brexit on the UK’s international development policy. The chapter has defined and conceptualised religion from an institutional perspective rather than as a belief-system. In order to facilitate systematic examination of policy patterns over a period of time, religion, in this book, is narrowed down to faith groups. The conceptualisation of faith groups divides them into two categories: FBOs and faith communities. The chapter defines each of these categories. Distinguishing the types of faith groups is key in the analysis since, as it will be made clear in Chapters 4 and 5, the government interacts with each of them in a different manner due to their organisational frameworks. This categorisation, thus, enables specific and systematic analysis of the relationship between the government and different types of faith group. The chapter then explains the methodology deployed and the propositions that are explored in this book. In the same light, the chapter briefly introduces historical institutionalism, which is the theoretical framework for this book. This theory and its analytical approach are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The chapter ends by presenting the structure of the book, the summary for each chapter and the links between them, which form a coherent narrative as shown in the following book chapters.

Notes 1. Centre for the Study of Religion and Politics, University of St. Andrews; The Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs (Georgetown University); the Institute for Culture, Religion and World Affairs (University of Boston); the Faith and Globalisation Programme at Durham University, and Politics, Religion and Philosophy at Lancaster University, UK. 2. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 2, where the literature of religion in international affairs is reviewed. 3. Also compared with the other ‘isms’ of the previous century, like fascism, Marxist Leninism and Nazism. See also Mukherjee, K. (2011). British Universities and Islamism. Comparative Strategy, 30(1), 60–78. 4. This quotation has been shortened.

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5. As we will see in Chapter 4, Progressio closed down in 2017 due to lack of funding. However, it is incorporated in this book’s analysis since it was active up to 2017 when it had to be shut down. 6. More information about this organisation can be obtained from its website. https://www.bond.org.uk/about-us. Accessed 16 Oct 2019. 7. There is no single accepted definition of community in academic literature. In trying to find a coherent definition, Robert Booth Fowler (1995) came up with three kinds of community (communities of ideas; communities of crisis; and communities of memory). Even after that, Fowler acknowledges that those kinds are not exhaustive of all academic views on community. For Fowler’s work and other discussions on community, see: Etzioni, A. (1995). New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities. Virginia: The University Press of Virginia. 8. Scholars such as Scott Thomas have argued that faith communities are long-lasting civil societies. Robert Putnam also noted that the ‘churched’ societies (in America) continue to strive while other associations are declining or dying. Furthermore, the World Bank study on the ‘Voices of Poor’ (Narayan et al. 2000) noted that faith communities are the most trusted civil societies among the poor communities around the world. 9. In the 2001 census, 76.8 per cent of the UK population identified themselves as having some religious affiliation, 71.6 per cent identified themselves as Christian, and 2.7 per cent of respondents identified themselves as Muslim; 1 per cent as Hindu; 0.6 per cent as Sikh; 0.5 per cent as Jewish; 0.3 per cent as Buddhist; and 0.3 per cent as followers of other religions. For more information, please see http://www.communities. gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/151393.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2010 (now Archived in the government’s website). 10. For more on this department and the responsibilities of the Minister for faith please see https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/minister-forfaith. Last accessed 8 July 2019. 11. This was the first time the UK census asked this question in the last century (apart from in Northern Ireland). 12. For this and the entire 2011 census results, please see Office for National Statistics. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales2011/201212-11. Accessed 8 July 2019. 13. For a detailed discussion of this and the religion question in the 2001 UK Census please see Weller, P. (2004). Identity, Politics, and the Future(s) of Religion in the UK: The Case of the Religion Questions in the 2001 Decennial Census. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19(1), 3–21. 14. This point will further be elaborated on in Chapter 5, where faith communities are discussed.

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15. For Example, Prime Minister David Cameron’ speech in Munich at Feb. 2011’s Security Conference highlighted how politics links multiculturalism and political Islam. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pmsspeech-at-munich-security-conference. Accessed 16 Oct 2019. 16. The 2007 Prevent Strategy concentrated on the Muslim community more than any other area: this is exemplified by the fact that funds to Prevent were allocated on the basis of Muslim population size. 17. Both 2011 and 2018 CONTESTs indicate that the risk of new terrorism in UK is SEVERE. 18. The UK government’s interaction with these groups will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. 19. Chapter 2 elaborates this point in more detail. 20. These countries give more than the UN target of 0.7 per cent of national income to international aid. 21. This was one of the reasons why the World Bank decided to engage with faith groups in development work in the mid-2000s after the research findings from Voices of the Poor (Narayan et al. 2000). See for example, Marshall, K. (2001). Development and Religion: A Different Lens on Development Debates. Peabody Journal of Education, 76(3–4), 339–375. 22. For example these opinion articles here. https://brexitcentral.com/tag/ international-development/. Accessed 9 July 2019. 23. For this see DFID, Research for Development Output. Live Update. https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs. Accessed 9 July 2019. 24. See Note 23. 25. This unit does no more exist in the World Bank but the work of faith and development continues through the Bank’s Faith Initiative. For more information see https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/brief/ faith-based-organizations. Accessed 17 Oct 2019.

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HMG. (2018a, June). CONTEST: Countering international terrorism: The United Kingdom’s strategy. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/ 140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf. Accessed 9 July 2019. HMG. (2018b, March). National security capability review. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web. pdf. Accessed 4 Sept 2019. HMG. (2019, February). Integrated communities action plan. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/778045/Integrated_Communities_Strategy_Govt_ Action_Plan.pdf. Accessed 9 July 2019. Hoffman, B. (1996). Intelligence and terrorism: Emerging threats and new security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Intelligence and National Security, 11(2), 207–223. Holsti, K. J., Holsti, K. J., & Holsti, K. J. (1991). Peace and war: Armed conflicts and international order, 1648–1989 (Vol. 14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Home Office. (2008, March). The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering international terrorism (Annual Report). ICRC. (1994). Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-0021067.pdf. Accessed 16 Oct 2019. Jeavons, T. H. (2004). Religious and faith-based organizations: Do we know one when we see one? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33(1), 140–145. Jessop, B. (2002). Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: A statetheoretical perspective. Antipode, 34(3), 452–472. Jick, T. D. (1979). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(4), 602–611. Juergensmeyer, M. (1993). The new Cold War? Religious nationalism confronts the secular state (Vol. 5). Berkeley: University of California Press. Kendall, J., & Anheier, H. K. (1999). The third sector and the European Union policy process: An initial evaluation. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2), 283–307. King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Knutsen, T. L. (1997). History of international relations theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Korten, D. C. (1987). Third generation NGO strategies: A key to peoplecentered development. World Development, 15, 145–159.

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Krahmann, E. (Ed.). (2005). New threats and new actors in international security. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Krasner, S. D. (2001). Problematic sovereignty: Contested rules and political possibilities. Columbia University Press. Krueger, A. B., & Maleckova, J. (2002). Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: Is there a causal connection? (National Bureau of Economic Research No. w9074). Larionova, M., & Rakhmangulov, M. (2010). A tale of two institutions: New figures, new opportunities. International Organizations Research Journal, 5, 68–92. Lennon, A. T. (Ed.). (2003). The battle for hearts and minds: Using soft power to undermine terrorist networks. Cambridge: MIT Press. Levy, J. S. (2002). Qualitative methods in international relations. In Evaluating methodology in international studies (pp. 432–454). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lewis, P. (1994). Islamic Britain: Religion, politics, and identity among British Muslims: Bradford in the 1990s. London: I.B. Tauris. Lowndes, V., & Chapman, R. (2005). Faith, hope and clarity: Developing a model of faith group involvement in civil renewal (Civil Renewal Research Programme: Main Report). De Montfort University, Leicester. Mahoney, J. (2007). Qualitative methodology and comparative politics. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 122–144. Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (2010). A theory of gradual institutional change. In Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power (pp. 1–37). Marshall, K. (2001). Development and religion: A different lens on development debates. Peabody Journal of Education, 76(3–4), 339–375. Marshall, K. (2006). Religion and international development. Pew Research Centre: Religion & Public Life. https://www.pewforum.org/2006/03/06/ religion-and-international-development/. Accessed 4 Sept 2019. Martens, K. (2002). Mission impossible? Defining nongovernmental organizations. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 13(3), 271–285. Mawlawi, F. (1993). New conflicts, new challenges: The evolving role for non-governmental actors. Journal of International Affairs, 46(2), 391. May, T. (2017, January 8). The shared society. https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/the-shared-society-article-by-theresa-may. Accessed 10 July 2019. McGrory, D., & Theodoulu, M. (2005, September 2). Suicide bomber’s video confession blames Iraq war. The Times. Menard, S., & Elliott, D. S. (1990). Longitudinal and cross-sectional data collection and analysis in the study of crime and delinquency. Justice Quarterly, 7 (1), 11–55.

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Metcalf, B. D. (2002). Traditionalist’ Islamic activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. ISIM Paper, 1. Metcalf, B. D. (2003). Travelers’ tales in the Tablighi Jamaat. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 588(1), 136–148. MHCLG. (2018, November). Faith in communities: Bridging the divide. A report on how faith communities are helping to make strong neighbourhoods. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/756211/Faith_in_Communities_-_Bridging_ the_Divide.pdf. Accessed 3 Sept 2019. Modood, T. (1994). Establishment, multiculturalism and British citizenship. The Political Quarterly, 65(1), 53–73. Morrissey, O. (2002). British aid policy since 1997: Is DfID the standard bearer for donors? (CREDIT Research Paper, No. 02/23). Mukherjee, K. (2008, November). British Islamism and the South Asian Connection. Briefing. University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies. Mukherjee, K. (2009). Islamism and neo-fundamentalism (pp. 17–32). Surrey: Ashgate. Mukherjee, K. (2011). British universities and Islamism. Comparative Strategy, 30(1), 60–78. Mumford, D., & Selck, T. J. (2010). New Labour’s ethical dimension: Statistical trends in Tony Blair’s foreign policy speeches. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12(2), 295–312. Nadel, S. F. (1954). Nupe religion. London. Narayan, D., Chambers, R., Shah, M. K., & Petesch, P. (2000). Voices of the poor: Crying out for change. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. Nolte, I., Danjibo, N., & Oladeji, A. (2009). Religion, politics and governance in Nigeria. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/ 57a08b79ed915d3cfd000d3c/wp39.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. OECD. (2008). Effective aid management: Twelve lessons from DAC peer reviews. OECD. (2017). Net official development assistance from DAC and other countries. Preliminary Data. https://www.oecd.org/development/financingsustainable-development/development-finance-data/ODA-2017-completedata-tables.pdf. Accessed 18 Oct 2019. Osiander, A. (2001). Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth. International Organization, 55(2), 251–287. Peters, B. G. (1999). Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism. London: Pinter. Platvoet, J. (1990). The definers defined: Traditions in the definition of religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 2(2), 180–212. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.

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Rakodi, C. (2007). Understanding the roles of religion in development (Religions and Development Working Paper 9). Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c479/ a575f8bb6866052a10da24e7e12442ad23da.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. Rice, S. E. (2005, October 20). The national security implications of global poverty. On the Record, Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/on-therecord/the-national-security-implications-of-global-poverty/. Accessed 12 Dec 2019. Risse-Kappen, T. (1991). Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies. World Politics, 43(4), 479–512. Roy, O. (2004). Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (1995). Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). Religion in international relations theory: Interactions and possibilities. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Sardar, Z., & Ahmad, W. I. U. (2012). Introduction. In W. I. U. Ahmad & Z. Sardar (Eds.), Muslims in Britain: Making social and political space (pp. 1–16). New York: Routledge. Short, C. (2004). An honourable deception? New Labour, Iraq and the misuse of power. London: Free Press. Smith, G. (2004). Faith in community and communities of faith? Government rhetoric and religious identity in Urban Britain. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19(2), 185–204. Smith, S. R., & Sosin, M. R. (2001). The varieties of faith-related agencies. Public Administration Review, 61(6), 651–670. Southwold, M. (1978). Buddhism and the definition of religion. Man, 13, 362–379. Steinmo, S. (2008). Historical institutionalism. In Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective (pp. 118–138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stern, J. (2000). Pakistan’s jihad culture. Foreign Affairs, 79, 115. Streeck, W., & Thelen, K. A. (Eds.). (2005). Beyond continuity: Institutional change in advanced political economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tarrow, S. (1995). Bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide in political science. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 471–474. Tew, R. (2019, April). OECD releases preliminary overseas aid figures for 2019. Bond. https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2019/04/oecd-releases-preliminaryoverseas-aid-figures-for-2018. Accessed 16 Oct 2019. Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 369–404.

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Thomas, S. (2005). The global resurgence of religion and the transformation of international relations: The struggle for the soul of the twenty-first century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture: Researchers into the development of mythology philosophy, religion, art and custom (Vol. 2). London: J. Murray. Unruh, H. R., & Sider, R. (2001, October). Religious elements of faith-based social service programs: Types and integrative strategies. In Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Meetings. Columbus, OH. Von Hippel, K. (2002). The roots of terrorism: Probing the myths. The Political Quarterly, 73(s1), 25–39. VSCP. (2014, May). Brief guide on engaging the faith communities in civil protection. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/308698/Brief_Guide_on_Engaging_ the_Faith_Communities_in_civil_protection.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2019. Wald, K. D., & Wilcox, C. (2006). Getting religion: Has political science rediscovered the faith factor? American Political Science Review, 100(4), 523–529. Weiss, T. G. (1996). Nongovernmental organizations and internal conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, 435–460. Weller, P. (2004). Identity, politics, and the future(s) of religion in the UK: The case of the religion questions in the 2001 decennial census. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19(1), 3–21. Wellington, J., & Szczerbinski, M. (2007). Research methods for the social sciences. London: A&C Black. White, S. C., Devine, J., Jha, S., & Gaines, S. (2010). Religion, development and wellbeing in India. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/collegesocial-sciences/government-society/research/rad/working-papers/wp-54. pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. Whyte, J. (1991). Interpreting Northern Ireland. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Yin, R. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

CHAPTER 2

Faith and Development: A Manifestation of Resurgence of Religion in International Relations

Introduction The nexus between faith groups and international development has its backbone in the ‘faith and development’ agenda, which brings into discussion the role of religion in various aspects of international development such as fighting poverty, peace-building and reconciliation, and the creation of civil societies. The ‘faith and development agenda’ may be both the result of, and an indicator of, the resurgence of religion in international politics. The conventional discourse of international development has been dominated by discussions on economic growth and economic theories. As a result of that (and similar to the discipline of IR) religion, for a long time, was not included in the scholarly analysis of international development (Selinger 2004). However, from the late 1990s, when religion started to resurge back into international affairs, international development partners such as the World Bank and the United Nations started to recognise and appreciate the role of faith in development (Myers et al. 2000; Berger 2009; Clarke 2006). The World Bank, for example, established a unit to deal with matters of faith and development; the unit, originally known as the ‘Directorate for Faith’ was later renamed ‘Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics (DDVE)’. This emerging sensitivity towards the role of faith in international development has led to academic interest in analysing the role of religion in international development. The scholarly analysis © The Author(s) 2020 A. C. Kwayu, Religion and British International Development Policy, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0_2

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of religion in international development is incorporated in the wider literature that discusses the resurgence of religion in international affairs. As noted in Chapter 1, it was only after the end of the Cold War that international relations (IR) embarked on a serious analysis of religion and its role in international affairs. Nonetheless, the literature on religion in international affairs is still very general and thus lacking in many aspects, such as the impact of the resurgence of religion on governmental policies. This book contributes to the scholarly literature by exploring the relationship between the UK government and faith groups with regard to international development policies from 1992 (the year the Bosnian conflict broke out) to 2019. The assumption is that the relationship between the government and faith groups has been gradually heightened since the end of the Cold War due to the global resurgence of religion in international affairs. The book, therefore, explains how policies respond to outside influences and change as a consequence of those influences. Brexit provides a further opportunity to examine the extent to which policies respond to these influences. Counter to that argument, the second and third assumptions are that the relationship between faith groups and the government depends on two indigenous factors: the attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector and the neoliberal way of governing; and the increasing prominence of the international development agenda within British politics. Again, the third proposition underscores the relevance of analysing the impact of Brexit—as to what extent has it enhanced the prominence of the international development agenda within British politics. With respect to the second and third assumptions, this book investigates and analyses the influence of internal factors in policy process. The exploration of these propositions will strengthen the analysis and credibility of the first proposition, i.e. the impact of the resurgence of religion on governmental policies. As policy emerges through the work of institutions, it is appropriate for us to look at how institutions operate and how they may or may not respond to exogenous factors, in this case, the resurgence of religion in international affairs. Accordingly, this book traces the UK’s international development policies from 1992 to 2019 in order to explore change. This change may be an entire policy theme that opens up an opportunity for the government’s engagement with faith groups or a specific policy change that has a direct impact on the government’s engagement with faith groups. Following that, the book examines the causes of that change

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in order to analyse whether it was due to exogenous or indigenous factors as described above. In order to achieve this, a theoretical framework through which the analysis can be carried out is introduced. This theoretical framework is derived from: (a) religion in international relations (IR) literature and (b) the theory of new institutionalism in particular its historical institutionalism strand. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section reviews the IR literature on the resurgence of religion in international affairs. This review offers a useful context for analysis in future chapters as well as locating the analysis within the literature. In addition, this review not only highlights the gaps in the literature but also presents the case for analysing the relationship between the government and faith groups with regard to international development policies. In the second section, the chapter discusses the theory of new institutionalism with an emphasis on historical institutionalism. The focus on historical institutionalism is justified by its explanatory power to elucidate the causes of institutional change.

Religion in International Relations (IR) Literature Marginalisation of Religion in IR International relations (IR) as a discipline originated in the West and as a consequence of this it is hugely influenced by the political history of the West. Although IR is often regarded as the twentieth-century subject (Knutsen 1997; Hoffman 1977), international relations go further back.1 Pre-twentieth-century historical trends had a great impact on the conduct of international relations in the twentieth century, as well as its subject matter. Events, such as Thirty Years War, enlightenment theories and ideas that promoted reason as opposed to irrationality, had a profound impact on political science, international politics and its perception of religion. Enlightenment theories promoted the vision of a balance of power seen as a policy, which benefited the entire system of states (Knutsen 1997). Different kings and leaders promoted their states’ power, independent of universal church leadership, and thus created the need for each state to ensure that it had adequate power relative to the others. It was the beginning of the creation of the Hobbesian system of anarchy, whereby there was no universal power above political entities. In 1815, Fénelon (1815; Knutsen 1997: 141), for example, argued that

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“a country conducts a balance of power policy in order to preserve itself and its neighbours from servitude […] for the over-increase of power in any one influences the general system of all the surrounding nations”. Specifically, “enlightenment contributions to International Relations”, as argued by Knutsen (1997: 143), “included a shift in focus from the individual state to a state system”. Thus enlightenment ideas together with the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 contributed to the Westphalian system (i.e. a system based on the ‘principles of autonomy and territory’) (Krasner 1995: 115). Similarly, Ruggie (1993) argued that thinking on the realist balance of power has its origin in the eighteenth century. Thus positioning the state as the main unit of analysis. Furthermore, the enlightenment underscored the secularism theory. The theory of secularism proposes that as the world modernises, the forces of religion in the society will decline to become only a private matter. With that view, religion was to be treated as something private to an individual. The mixing of the Westphalian system and the secularism theory have had an influence on IR scholarship and contributed to the marginalisation of religion (Casanova 2001; Juergensmeyer 1993). Therefore, the Western nature of the discipline contributed towards the relegation of religion in the scholarly analysis of IR (Fox and Sandler 2004; Tamimi and Esposito 2000; Wald and Wilcox 2006). Although IR scholarship in the USA and Europe, specifically Britain, differs (Weæver 1998), both sides of the Atlantic share major principles and theories. While historically the Americans have focused more on rational choice and empiricism in IR, scholars in Britain (also known as the English School) put emphasis on ‘International Society’, and this is broadly based on history and philosophy. Scholars on either side, however, abide with the Westphalian system (Jones 2003). According to Krasner (1995: 121), “the Westphalian model is a basic concept for some of the major theoretical approaches to international relations, including neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, for both of which it is an analytic assumption, as well as international society perspectives, for which it is an empirical regularity”. As a result of this, religion was omitted from analysis by both schools of IR. This is because religion was mostly manifested in terms of an institutional church, and this was isolated in an analysis that perceived the state as an actor. Furthermore, the emphasis of ‘empiricism’ and ‘reason’ brought about by the European enlightenment did not allow analysis of beliefs, which were integral to religion. The analysis of belief was not only ignored in international affairs but also in domestic and public policy spheres (Nelson 1988).

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In connection to the above explanation, there is an argument that religion was on the backburner of IR scholarship because of the scholars’ lack of interest, rather than from the major guiding theories of IR. For example, Sandal and James (2011) explain how major IR theories, such as classical realism, neorealism and neoliberalism, can integrate religion as a variable to explain international affairs. Although this argument can be critically dismissed because the theories reflect the scholars’ views of the world (meaning that scholars only formulate theories that explain their points of view), there are propositions which may support the argument that marginalisation of religion is due to the reluctance of scholars, rather than the inadequacy of the theories. For example, scholars have been comfortable in dealing with ideas but not, curiously, religion (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Blyth 1997; Yee 1996; Jacobsen 1995; Campbell 1998). Most of their works quote Max Weber (1946; Gerth and Mills 1946) “The Social Psychology of the World Religions” or Reinhold Niebuhr’s works on social justice, yet they do not devote attention to the role of religious beliefs and ideas in particular. They argue that secularisation was deeply entrenched in the scholarship and it influenced how scholars viewed the world. In the West, observes Tamimi and Esposito (2000: 9), “the mixing of religion and politics is regarded as necessarily abnormal (departing from the norm), irrational, dangerous, and extremist”. Juergensmeyer (1993: 27) echoes similar sentiments arguing that “secular nationalism was thought to be not only natural but also universally applicable and morally right”. In addition, the lack of a serious analysis of religion even after the 1979 Iranian Revolution highlights scholars’ reluctance to discuss religion. The Iranian Revolution was an Islamic revolution driven by a religious motive to attain political power. The revolution was a blow to the secularisation theory, which suggests that as a society modernises, religion becomes a private, individual matter (Haynes 2014; Thomas 2005; Wald and Wilcox 2006). Nevertheless, the event was evidently not challenging enough to trigger significant scholarly interest towards religion. Nonetheless, secularisation theory cannot independently explain the scholars’ lack of interest in discussing religion. If it could, religion would not have become a topical issue in the post-Cold War period. The overwhelming scholarly interest in analysing Cold War issues after the Second World War outweighs the capacity of secularisation theory in explaining the marginalisation of religion in IR scholarship. Although secularisation theory has historical foundations, the theory was sustained by events in

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the international scene that were attracting more scholarly attention than religious matters. Carr (1964: 211) pointed out that IR, just like any other scholarly discipline, came into being in ‘response to some social or technical needs’. Thus, in the first years of IR as a discipline (i.e. after the First World War) scholars were more concerned with preventing another war: as Carr (1964: 8) observed, “the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course of direction of the study”. In the same manner, the discipline was later on preoccupied by the politics of the Cold War because this was the required response from the 1950s up to late 1980s. Similarly, at the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new security threats and subsequent non-state actors in international politics attracted scholarly attention. In addition to the above reasons, the sidelining of religion in international relations has been attributed to methodological difficulties that religion may pose. It is difficult not only to define religion, but also to test this definition (Wald and Wilcox 2006; Fox and Sandler 2004). Religion involves beliefs, which are almost impossible to measure. In addition, the dominance of quantitative methods in IR as a discipline further pushed religion away, since such methods are often not able to measure variables that cannot be quantified. Although there are some aspects of religion that can be quantified, such as institutional aspects, it is almost impossible to quantify beliefs, which are integral to religion. Furthermore, the difficulty in measuring religion has been exacerbated by the lack of scholarly literature on religion (Fox and Sandler 2004). The lack of literature in this area has contributed to the lack of a scholarly theoretical background through which religion can be quantified and studied. Although it is true that there are methodological difficulties in studying religion, it is not a convincing reason for academia to put aside such a crucial element in society. Religion is not only limited to beliefs but it may include other aspects such as religious institutions which have the capacity to work beyond beliefs. Looking at religion as simply belief ignores other aspects of religion that can be equally important. As discussed in Chapter 1, the definitions of religion cover theological (beliefs in supernatural beings) points of view as well as sociocultural points of view. Religion may act as a social force even if people do not believe in its theological doctrine. Moreover, if IR scholars were interested in religion, they could formulate a conceptual framework within which they could focus their analysis. This is what scholars did in the post-Cold War period, when they started to see the importance

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of bringing religion back into IR. Sandal and Fox (2013), advocate for attempts to use existing IR theories in analysing religion. Bringing Religion into IR The weighty presence of religion in politics was evident in various parts of the world such as liberation theology in Latin America in the 1960s (Gill 1994) yet political literature was still blind and reluctant to include religion as a variable in its mainstream analysis. The tradition of sidelining religion in IR was called into question by the dramatic events in Iran in 1979. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was an inspiration to groups that wished to establish an Islamic government (by the adoption of Shariah law), and as a result Islamic movements ‘came to the fore in many countries and Islam became the feared medium of subversion and revolt for many governments. Leaders rushed to adopt Islamic positions to compete with the opposition’ (Zubaida 2000). The Iranian Revolution and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, became a shining example and an inspiration to other religious groups in the Muslim world. In his Vilayat-i-Faqi,2 Khomeini called for the subordination of political power to Islamic precepts and called on the ulema (theologians) to bring about an Islamic State and to participate in its legislative, executive and judicial affairs (Hiro 1989). An Islamic State requires an Islamic ruler who should know the Shariah thoroughly. The imams were the ones who possessed these qualifications but in the absence of an imam, Muslims must find an alternative to avoid living in anarchy or under alien rule (Hiro 1989), though lacking the infallibility and personal superiority of an imam, a just faqi (Islamic jurist) is qualified to lead an Islamic State (Hiro 1989). Such jurisprudents were also to oversee the actions of the executive and the legislative branches of government. At its simplest, Khomeini’s Vilayat-i-Faqi is the rule of ‘divine law’ interpreted and applied by the just faqi (Hiro 1989). It proved that “authentic” Islam is a revolutionary ideology which could inspire the masses because it spoke to them in their own language (Zubaida 2000). In connection to this, we can see how Al Qaida, Daesh (the Islamic State), AlShabaab, Boko Haram and other Islamist groups’ arguments for terrorism may fit with the Vilayat-i-Faqi, especially with its emphasis on ‘the absence of alien rule’. These groups have argued that the presence of American forces in Muslim lands (the Middle East and Afghanistan) or a Western informed government system is one of the reasons

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for terrorist attacks. Boko Haram, for example, is translated as either ‘Western education is forbidden’ or ‘Western influence is a sin/sacrilege’. It is important to mention that secularism and modernity, as universal ideals, were not able to perform to the level that was expected when starting from the domestic level. The “weakening of secular nationalism”, writes Juergensmeyer (1993: 23), “is linked to the perception that secular institutions have failed to perform […] In many parts of the world the secular state has not lived up to its own promises of political freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice”.3 A vivid example of this failure of secularism is the Baath Political Party in Syria, which identified itself as a secular party but has not been able to meet its expectations, with increasing cases of human rights abuses contributing to the rise of religious movements and a civil conflict with enormous human loss and suffering. In the 2011 protests, religion became central to the opposition rhetoric (Pierret 2014). This underscored the argument that if secularism’s ethos does not bring prosperity or live up to its expectations, society starts to look at religion, which may provide a better alternative. Berger (1999: 11) observed that modernity “tends to undermine the taken-for-granted certainties by which people lived through most of history. This is an uncomfortable state of affairs, for many an intolerable one, and religious movements that claim to give certainty have great appeal”. Scholars such as Akhtar (1990) argue that whatever may be said about the causes of the current decline of Islam as a religious and political force, there is no denying the increasing threat of secularity. Secularity has become more and more pronounced even in the most traditional Muslim countries and Akhtar (1990) further argues that Islam in principle is a theocratic doctrine in which all the details of secular existence should be subordinated to religious prescriptions. In fact, some scholars (Sivan 1990; Lawrence 1989; Gellner 1992; Char 2010) have argued that much of present-day Islamism or Islam as a major political force is a response to and a reaction against Western secularism and the onslaught of Western values which are spreading rapidly in the Muslim world as a result of globalisation. This, it is argued, could explain why there has been a rise in Islamic motivated/founded political parties even if their practices align more to a secular party, with the aim of obtaining and maintaining power. An example of this is the AKP in Turkey (see Çinar 2011), which identified itself as an Islamic party during its formation in 2001 but has passed through the political phases of a secular political party—starting as a democratic observing party (Dagi 2008) claiming to be more of a

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‘conservative democratic party’. The AKP has gradually made a backslide into authoritarian practices. The Iranian Revolution is thus portrayed as the initial motivator for the rise of political Islam, which has become one of the most topical issues in the post-Cold War era. This is a problem in the literature, which manifests the limitation in examining Islamism and Political Islam prior to 1979. Scholars such as (Lerner 1958; Gerges 1999; March 2015) have underscored this problem by showing the cursory analysis of political Islam and Islamism from which the classical religious (ideological) doctrine is missing. Although it may be true that the Iranian Revolution had an impact on the rise of political Islam, there are many other explanations for this. These other explanations include arguments that political Islam resulted from increasing levels of poverty, or that political Islam is a response to Western values and foreign policies that are widely perceived as unfair (Salla 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). The various explanations for the rise of political Islam highlight the scholarly interest in analysing religion. Most theories that try to explain the rise of political Islam tend to provide reactive explanations arguing that it is a response to poverty, racism, and Western foreign policy in the Middle East/Afghanistan, and globalisation. This narrow reactive view of political Islam is well captured by Gerges (1999) extensive analysis of US foreign policy on political Islam. He argued that “politics and contemporary security concerns, more than culture, propaganda, and history, account for America’s preoccupation with Islamism” (Gerges 1999: 17). Aside from the narrow focus on state and realpolitik, scholars are now trying to explore and analyse the role religion plays in international relations within the context of the ‘new’ security agenda, as dictated by the international system. The end of the Cold War released IR as a discipline from its tapered emphasis on the state. The discipline expanded its analytical frame to investigate the role of non-state actors and other pressing issues in international affairs. For example, security studies started to look beyond conventional military capabilities and towards other security threats such as poverty, disease, identity conflicts, failed states and their spillover effects and climate change/environmental issues. As a result of expansive digital technology, information and data are becoming a security agenda. Cybercrimes and digital attacks threaten state security. The emerging nontraditional threats are studied under the framework of the ‘New/Critical Security Agenda’. In general, the New Security Agenda proposes that an issue becomes a security matter when it receives an extraordinary reaction

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from the government or an institution with authority to act (Buzan et al. 1998). The interference in elections by data companies and their impact on privacy and the overall democratic performance are receiving extraordinary attention and reactions from the government. Cybersecurity poses new threats to state security. Similarly, issues that are brought about by political Islam, and subsequently terrorism, fall under the New Security Agenda. Diseases are also posing new security threats. The 2015 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), for example, added diseases and natural disasters as key areas of security concern. Others that were also listed in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) included terrorism, extremism and instability; state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition; the erosion of rules-based international order; and the impact of technology/cyber threats and wider technological developments. From that, we see only one threat as related to traditional state-based security competition, the rest all fall under the categories of the New Security Agenda. The New Security Agenda advocated by the Copenhagen School and scholars such as Barry Buzan differ from earlier scholars in the sense that earlier scholars, during the Cold War period, had a state-centric approach to security; they saw aggressive states that were following a policy of territorial expansionism and aggrandisement as major threats (e.g. the former Soviet Union). The focus of these new scholars is a major shift from the state to newer ‘threats’; the concept of security and the political context have changed in a major way in the post-Cold War period, with a special focus on non-state actors, many of whom are Islamist ideologues. The New Security Agenda has been severely criticised by the old school in particular the neorealists for widening the agenda so much that it is becoming increasingly difficult to pinpoint the real threats in the post-Cold War period. One of the core criticisms is with regard to methodology and conceptualisation of security (beyond state) and threat (beyond military force) with the worry that the field (security studies) is becoming incoherent (Krause and Williams 1996). It is the new security threats, specifically terrorism, that has forcefully brought religion to the attention of IR scholars. Although scholars who analyse religion in IR have cited the 1979 Iranian Revolution, it was already too long ago to gain considerable interest. The religious dimension in conflicts such as the Bosnian War, which happened in the immediate period after the end of the Cold War, has received academic attention, but the analysis of this conflict has focused more on the sociopolitical causes than religion specifically. However, terrorism,

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especially after the September 11 (2001) attacks in New York and Washington, DC, has steered rigorous academic discussion on the role of religion in international relations (Lincoln 2010). While such terrorism is not unprecedented, as Hoffman observes, “religion and terrorism share a long history” (Hoffman 1993: 1) the current terrorism is a combination of religious stimulus and political intent. There are many examples of such terrorist acts in recent years (Morgan 2004; Cronin 2003; Juergensmeyer 1997; Hoffman 1993; Ranstorp 1996), but two had a significant effect on both the discipline and practice of international relations. These are the September 11, 2001 and the July 7, 2005 attacks in the USA and the UK, respectively. Both of these attacks were carried out by what are generally referred to as Islamic extremists. These attacks were large in scale (especially September 11, 2001) and were carried out in the most powerful countries in the world. Most scholars who analyse religion in international relations have cited September 11, 2001 as one event that has proved the force of religion in international politics. Both September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 highlighted how threatening religious extremism and radicalisation could be to international security. As a result, government strategies for dealing with such terrorism have incorporated ways of dealing with religious fundamentalism. The UK, for example, placed counterterrorism as one of its key international priorities, authoritatively articulated in a strategy paper titled CONTEST (HMG 2006, 2018). Prevention of religious extremism and radicalisation is one of the key strands of this strategy. There had been many other attacks such the 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in East Africa; the 2002 bombings in Bali; the 2004 bombings in Madrid; and the 2008/2011 bombings in Mumbai. There have also been attacks in other countries of Europe such as in Paris, France. Several attacks have occurred in Nairobi Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria. Most of these attacks targeted Western citizens or non-Muslim countries, or even Muslims who are not seen to be sufficiently pious by Islamist ideologues/terrorists. There have been random attacks that aim at making statements. For example, the attacks in Kenya have aimed to end the Kenyan military contribution/presence in Somalia fighting against the AlShabaab. They claim their motivation and inspiration are based on religious doctrine. For instance, Al Qaeda and other transnational Islamist groups derive their inspiration from revivalist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (Egypt) and Maulana Mawdudi (Pakistan). The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) is more extreme and violent, they derive inspiration from Abu-Baker

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al Baghdadi (killed in October 2019), who is originally from Iraq (Gulmohamad 2014). Noteworthy, is the nascent recruitment trend, whereby terrorist organisations and in particular ISIS, are recruiting terrorists from European countries and also from the USA. Williams et al. (2018) documented the recruitment strategy of terrorist organisations from September 11, 2001 to 2018 and showed that recruits, increasingly, are more likely to be Caucasian/white or African/black and have been born in the USA. Even more interesting they found out that recruits are more likely to have converted to Islam as part of their radicalisation process. ISIS, more than Al Qaeda, has focused on recruiting people who were born in either the USA or Britain (RAND 2018). The 2019 estimate shows that a total of 850 Britons have travelled to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq and that around 250–300 foreign fighters who are still in Syria are estimated to have come from the UK (Sabbagh 2019). Thus, the West can no longer afford to ignore the presence of religion as both a domestic and an international force. It has become too risky for governments to keep relegating religion to the private sphere. Consequently, scholars have increasingly addressed religion and there is a budding interest in further academic research in the area of religion and international politics. Religion has, therefore, managed to gradually make its way into IR scholarship. Thomas (2005) termed this return of religion to international relations as the ‘resurgence’. The term ‘resurgence’ denotes the strength with which religion has returned. Since the idea of secularisation was embedded into institutions, it was difficult for religion to receive any intellectual attention. At best, religion was considered only as a private matter that should not interfere with international affairs. The fact that religion has been able to break through the institutional hurdles and gain recognition marks a powerful comeback. However, it is mainly political Islam, more than any other factor, which has triggered scholarly attention to the role of religion in international affairs. “The global resurgence of religion in the 21st Century”, writes Thomas (2005: 10), “has largely been demonstrated by the following main events: the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and September 11 […] these events challenged scholars’ interpretation of the modern world”. Both of these events involve political Islam. However, this does not mean that political Islam is the only aspect marking the presence of religion in international relations. There are other aspects of religion that seem passive but are influential in international affairs. For example, the work of faith leaders and religious institutions

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in dealing with international issues such as conflicts cannot go unnoticed. These faith leaders and religious institutions may exert soft power in tackling some of the issues in international affairs. Soft power, as defined by Keohane and Nye (1998), is the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want. It is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or culture or the ability to set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the preferences of others.

Religious institutions and leaders have been instrumental in issues of conflict and peace-building. This is done through their soft power, awarded to them by the moral authority they hold. The work of Desmond Tutu in the post-apartheid South Africa reconciliation effort is an example of how faith leaders can exert soft power towards solving some global issues. Another example is the work of the late Pope John Paul II.4 The current Pope Francis is also active in building peace—such as in his 2019 meeting with two factional leaders of South Sudan (Bermudez and McKeown 2019). Religious institutions such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Quakers have also been active in matters of conflict resolution and peace-building. The Quakers, for example, have offices in every major UN office, such as Geneva and New York, to lobby for policies that promote international peace and stability. Such efforts from faith institutions and faith leaders have been noted by IR scholars (Langhorne 2008; Johnson and Sampson 1994) and are contributing towards a growing body of literature that attempts to bring religion into IR scholarship and practice. On the contrary, the soft power of religion has also been responsible for conflicts and terrorism. It is the convincing power of religion that may mobilise groups of people into fighting other groups. Religion has been used as an inspiration in identity conflicts. For example in Bosnia, religion was used to marshal Christians against Muslims. Ter Haar and Ellis (2006), for example, explained how traditional religious leaders in Sierra Leone initiated young men as fighters (Kamajor militias) in the 1990s civil war. Religion was also one of the polarisation factors in the North–South Sudan conflicts, where the Arab Muslims of the North were fighting the Black/African Christians and Animists of the South.

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Mention may also be made of religious ethnic conflicts in Nigeria especially between the Muslim north and Christian south. We should also not forget the ‘communal riots’ between Hindus and Muslims in the context of the Indian subcontinent with special reference to territorial disputes over Kashmir. Other religious conflicts include the Islamist secessionist movements among Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, China’s far northwest, which is also called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Mukherjee 2010a). Another ethnic conflict in China, which has a strong religious-political identity, is the separatist movement in Tibet (Mukherjee 2010b). Mention may also be made of Islamist separatist tendencies in South Thailand, South Philippines (especially Mindanao) and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia. Similarly, religious views may lead to radicalisation and extremism. People who have carried out major international terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War period are those who hold extreme views of their religions. It is, therefore, as Haynes (2014: 113) writes, “becoming difficult to ignore the soft power of religion as it is becoming increasingly visible in many parts of the world, linked to what is widely understood as the general resurgence of religion with international and foreign policy ramifications in some countries”. As a soft power, religion has benefited from expanding information technology. Modern technology gives easy access to hate and extremist speeches, inspiration, motivation and support through the Internet in the form of: emails, blogs, YouTube, other social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Whatsapp (Klausen 2015)—as Bloom (2013) terms them ‘radicalising milieus’. In connection to this, mention may be made of Olivier Roy’s theory of neo-fundamentalism in his book Globalised Islam, he talks about the role of websites and technology in spreading Islamist messages. Such extreme doctrines may legitimise terrorist activities (Juergensmeyer 1993; Fox and Sandler 2004; Thomas 2005). Increasingly, terrorists have become more creative in order to appeal to more youths in digital space. This creativity has been described as ‘jihadi cool’ which refers to “the rebranding of Jihadist forms of terrorism into an appealingly ‘hip’ subculture through the use of social media, rap videos, counter-culture magazines, clothing and other forms of propaganda aimed at disaffected youth” (Huey 2015). The expansion of a transnational religious influence in the globalisation era directly challenges the secularisation theory, which argues that as society modernises, religion becomes a private matter. However, the reverse of that has been happening. Religion’s soft power has penetrated and influenced both domestic and international affairs in the globalised world (Banchoff 2008).

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As a result of the undeniable expansion of religious issues in international affairs, secularisation theorists have acknowledged the presence of religion in the public sphere. Peter Berger, a long-term and renowned scholar of secularisation, renounced the assumption that we live in a secularised world. “The data”, write Berger et al. (2008: 11), “made it difficult to hold the theory of secularisation”. He argued, “the world today, with some exceptions, is as furiously religious as it was, and in some places more so than ever” (Berger 1999: 2). According to a number of scholars, this exception is Europe (Berger 1999; Davie 2010; Buruma 2010). In their report, which arose from the research carried out by the Centre for Religion and Culture at the University of Boston, Berger et al. (2008) have argued that modernisation and secularisation theory cannot be generalised. They maintained that while both Europe and the USA are modernised, religion is more visible in the American public sphere than it is in Europe. However, the resurgence of religion is also apparent in Europe. One vivid example of the emergence of religion as a force in international politics was the Bosnian conflict. In this conflict, religion was clearly and explicitly used as an effective mobilising tool. Moreover, Europe has encountered, in significant ways, issues of political Islam including extremism and radicalisation. As mentioned earlier, British citizens with extreme religious views carried out the July 7, 2005 bombings. Klausen (2005: 8) attests to this, arguing that “there is a popular fallacy that public life in Europe is secular”. In their edited book, Ahmad and Sardar (2012) illustrate the presence of Muslims and Islam in Britain public life. They traced and noted how, since the 1970s, Islam and Muslims in Britain have been framed by global events citing the 1970s OPEC oil boycott, the Rushdie affairs in the 1990s and terrorism acts (in particular the September 11, 2001 attacks) (Ahmad and Sardar 2012). Different chapters in their book analyse the presence and evolution of Islam in public life in the UK, for example, the services of Muslim chaplains in different social settings such as in prisons and hospitals (Ali and Gilliat-Ray 2012). Thus, Islam is integral to the multicultural face of Britain. On the other side, the emerging departments in universities, think tanks and research centres which aim to analyse the role of religion further highlight the growing prominence of religion in international affairs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a number of universities, both in the UK and in the USA that have sub-departments for religion/politics in their social sciences faculties. To take one example, the famous Carnegie

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Endowment Council’s journal entitled Ethics and International Affairs was established towards the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, to discuss ideas and norms that may have influenced international affairs. The first publication, in 1987, featured articles that addressed several questions including: ‘how do we respond to revolutionary changes in Iran?’, ‘implications of the papal visit to Poland in 1983 for Solidarity movement’ and ‘ethics and etiquette of the third world debt’.5 In addition, academic survey agencies, which carry out polls that are crucial in collecting and marshalling large data sets, have been establishing units to carry out surveys on religion and attitudes towards religion and politics. The Pew Forum, for example, set up a forum called ‘Religion and Public Life’ in 2001. This specific forum was set up to “promote a deeper understanding of issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs”.6 The recognition of the role of religion in international relations is more vivid with the introduction of “Islamic NATO”, which is the name given to the relatively new ‘Islamic Military Coalition’, led by Saudi Arabia and including other Islamic member countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, African and Gulf States (Sandano 2017). Although the coalition has had political challenges such as its exclusion of Shia countries as well as the recent Egyptian reluctance to participate (Voltaire Network 2019), its creation indicates sensitivities to religion in fighting terrorism and other civil tensions in Muslim countries. Owen and Ludlow argue that this coalition might develop into a regional (Middle East) peacekeeping force, which is more acceptable (if they include Shia) and more efficient than the proxies that have not worked in Syria or Yemen (Owen and Ludlow 2017). To explain the role of religion in both domestic and international affairs, the literature discusses the nature of religion. This is because, as we shall see, the resurgence of religion in international relations has manifested itself in more than one way. The Dual Nature of Religion and Its Impact on International Relations Religion has a two-sided nature that makes its role in international politics both negative and positive. Appleby (1999) explains this double-sided nature of religion as the ‘ambivalence of the sacred’. The negative side of religion can be explained by its ability to cause or exacerbate ethnic conflicts. In causing conflict, religion can act as a legitimising force that may

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provide “moral” support in carrying out vicious actions. This is also the case for terrorism and suicide bombings, which some Islamist ideologues would call martyrdom. What Western academics see as Muslim suicide bombings, Islamists see in a totally different light, viewing the Muslim ‘bomber’ as a ‘martyr’ engaging in an act for the greater cause of Islam and the ummah. The terrorists and suicide bombers are usually convinced that their actions are legitimate and that they have access to a faith reward. In the same manner, religion has also been used as a mobilising factor for conflicts between groups with different religious beliefs. One point of arrival for religion in international politics is through identity, which has become an important aspect in post-Cold War politics (Little 1996; Appleby 2001). Identity issues are often part of inter- and intrastate conflicts (Haynes 2014; Appleby 2001). Religion-related conflicts have attributes that may further complicate the conflict situation, hence hindering effective peace processes. This is because religious identities are transnational and feelings of discrimination and exclusion can easily proliferate and lead to conflict. By using the Minority at Risk (MAR) dataset to explore local conflicts, Fox and Sandler (2004: 69, 82) observed that “those local conflicts with religious dynamics attract more foreign intervention than other types of local conflict […] moreover, religion causes conflict to cross borders more often than other conflicts”. Religious identity is not confined within a border. For example, Muslims and Christians are spread all over the world and they have a collective name for their communities, which are ummah and the Church of Christ, respectively. In relation to the transnational nature of religious identity, and perhaps one of the controversial centrepieces in scholarly discourse of the resurgence of religion in international relations, is Huntington (1993, 1996) ‘clash of civilisations ’ thesis. Huntington (1993: 25) explained, “Over the centuries, differences among civilisations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts”. Religion is integral to his definition of civilisation, as he argued, “Civilisations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important religion” (Huntington 1993: 25). In fact, he asserted that “one of the factors of the clash of civilisations is the global resurgence of religious identity, which is replacing diminishing local and state-based identities” (Huntington 1996). Furthermore, Huntington insists that inter-civilisational clashes are usually conflicts “between peoples of different religions” (Huntington 1996: 253).

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There are many reasons for disagreeing with the clash of civilisations thesis. One of these is the proposition that “[there are] great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (Huntington 1993: 22). Conflicts, both interstate and intrastate, are caused by various factors and it is difficult to attribute such conflicts to only one factor. Scholars of conflicts, such as Gurr (1994) and Henderson (1998), argue that there are other dominating sources of conflict aside from culture. These other sources of conflict may include transformations in political systems and economic factors. In most civil conflicts, religion has only acted as a catalyst or a mobilising factor. The conflict between North and South Sudan was about resource control as well as political power, but religion came into the picture as a divisive factor, in the same way as race. Similarly, in Bosnia, religion was one of many factors of division. Huntington was also criticised because of the way he viewed the world and what he called ‘civilisation’. His views have been severely criticised for being simplistic since he identified Western Christendom on the one side and six other ‘civilisations’ on the other side. These very simplistically identified categories were seen as security threats. So we have the green threat of Islam and Islamism associated with the Middle East or the Muslim world, the red Sinic threat associated with the rise of China, the Indian threat in South Asia, the African threat, the East European threat associated with Orthodox Christianity and the Latin American threat. Huntington’s emphasis was on conflicts, especially religious– cultural conflicts, between the West and any of these categories, and totally ignored the notion that there could be conflicts between these categories or conflicts within each category. For example, the continuous tension between the Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East is a conflict within the Islamic faith. However, it should also be mentioned that Huntington’s theory fits with prominent Canadian scholar Charles Taylor’s theory of incommensurability. Taylor (1992) very well-known book, Sources of the Self, talks about complex identity issues and how cultures are different and cannot be measured with the same criteria that we use to measure our own culture, because there are different notions of what is considered to be good or bad. Each culture is grounded in a very specific historical, sociological and political context, which differs from other contexts. Both Huntington and Taylor focus on the differences that exist between cultures. Despite the criticisms directed at Huntington, events like September 11, 2001 and the emergence of terrorist allied groups such as Daesh (Islamic State), Al-Shabaab and

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Boko Haram have shown that there is a great deal of truth to some of his key arguments. These groups’ main and shared claim is the fight against Western culture. Boko Haram, for example, is a direct translation of ‘Western Education is forbidden’. The rise of extreme rights in Europe is arguably another manifestation of the clash of civilisation. For example, the June 2011 shootings and bombings in Norway can also substantiate Huntington’s argument. Anders Behring Breivik, the man who confessed to the shootings and wrote the 1500 page manifesto (2083: A European Declaration of Independence), claimed to have done so due to the failure of Norwegian politicians to defend Western culture from Islamic influence. The extreme right wing, which is emerging in Europe, expresses grievances against migrants who come from different cultures. They feel that their culture is superior to the culture of migrants and that interactions with migrants may dilute or spoil their superior culture. Politicians of the extreme right capitalise on such feelings. Such feelings and divisive politics could explain the narrative of the ‘Leave’ campaign in the UK Brexit referendum in early 2016. The forces of religion go beyond borders because citizens of different countries often share the same religion. This explains why religious conflicts are complicated and provoke mixed feelings around the world. Religious fundamentalism, as discussed earlier, is becoming an increasingly important factor in both domestic and international politics, with political Islam being a good example of this. Contrary to the above discussions, religion can be a force for good in international affairs. Religious leaders, organisations and communities may be instrumental in achieving peace and stability. Although religion, as discussed above, can be a source of divisions and exclusions within societies, religious communities have the capacity to form long-term and well-founded societies, which are recognised as a force for global development and peace. The real existing communities in world politics, writes Thomas, “are the faith communities that make up much of the developing world” (Thomas 2005: 196). This argument is based on the fact that “religious groups have the deepest grassroots connections that bring together the local with the global in their communities” (Thomas 2005: 217). Although this is true, deep connections can also bring about counter-effects, especially in a society where there is more than one religion. At this point, unless there are effective and sustainable ways that allow tolerance, pluralism, interfaith networks and interactions, such profound connections can lead to exclusion and greater tension within a society. This irony can be illustrated by an example from Tanzania.

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In mainland Tanzania, there are equal proportions of Muslims and Christians. Muslims and Christians have their own communities that are well-grounded through mosque or church arrangements. Both communities live together, side by side, in harmony. There may be various reasons for this harmony, but one major explanation is the Ujamaa (familyhood) policy that was embraced by the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere. Ujamaa policy was a socialistic ideal that unified people of different creeds and races (i.e. Blacks, Arabs and Indians). Under the Ujamaa policy, a person was a Tanzanian first, before anything else. This policy superseded all other ‘identification’ that may have led to division. In their systematic observation of the societal composition and identity structures in Tanzania, Heilman and Kaiser (2002) argue that Tanzania is not a battleground for conflicting civilisations. “Tanzania”, they argue, “demonstrates that uncovering and analysing relationships between identity groups as well as between identity groups and the state elucidates how cross-cutting cleavages complicate the mobilisation of individuals and organised groups based on identity” (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 692). In some aspects, the Ujamaa policy is similar to the French model of mono-cultural liberalism whereby a person is French first, before anything else. Similarly, under the Ujamaa policy, a person is Tanzanian before anything else. Thus, for plural communities to live together there are compulsory institutional arrangements in place in order to ensure that differences do not lead to exclusion. Nevertheless, leaders of various religions can play a positive role in ensuring pluralism and tolerance in communities of more than one faith. Religious leaders, through interfaith dialogues, can act as ‘shock absorbers’ to control and manage any possible tension. Religion, as Thomas (2005: 196) argues, “may be only one of the factors involved in the conflicts that divide communities, but at the same time religious non-state actors often have the most extensive contacts in those communities. They provide a key way of transforming the politics of these communities in a sustainable way, because the impetus for peace and reconciliation comes from the transforming power of their faith”. Such good works done by faith leaders and faith institutions in general are discussed below under the section ‘Faith and Development’.

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Faith and Development The relationship between faith and development and the resurgence of religion in international affairs can be summarised by Thomas (2004: 136) argument that “the way culture, religion and spirituality increasingly impact the debate over the meaning of international development is an aspect of the resurgence of religion”. International development organisations have been exploring the potential of faith leaders and faith institutions in fighting global poverty, and other issues such as civil conflicts. Partly as a result of that, there have been academic discussions on faith in international development (Jennings and Clarke 2008; Marshall and Keough 2005; Marshall and Van Saanen 2007; Ter Haar 2011). These discussions reached a significant level in 1998, when the World Bank President James Wolfensohn and the Church of England’s former Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, co-chaired an Interfaith Conference on Poverty and Development. The conference led to the establishment of the World Faith Development Dialogue (WFDD) (Marshall and Van Saanen 2007). Arguably, this conference was a reaction to the idea that poverty needs to be understood more holistically, which was substantiated by a World Bank project known as ‘Voices of the Poor’. For this project, poor people around the world were asked to say what poverty meant to them and what they thought would work in order to lift them out of that situation. “The ‘Voices of the Poor’”, wrote Clare Short and James Wolfensohn (Narayan et al. 2000: ix), was “different from all other large-scale poverty studies […] Using participatory and qualitative research methods, the study presents very directly, through poor people’s own voices, the realities of their lives. How do poor people view poverty and well-being? What are their problems and priorities? What is their experience with the institutions of the state, markets, and civil society? How are gender relations faring within households and communities?” From this project, the World Bank discovered that religious leaders and institutions were often the most trusted people and institutions in developing countries (Narayan et al. 2000: 137; Stambach 2005). Religion, with its belief, rituals, practices and institutions, is central to the social, cultural and moral life of these communities (Belshaw et al. 2001; Thomas 2005). In connection with this, it is important to explain that initiatives such as a qualitative study of this kind (the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project), underscored a trend in the post-Cold War era of recognising ‘new’ concerns in the international community. Although the World Bank had been

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dealing with matters of international development since its establishment, the focus had been on economic growth, and the Bank’s methods were quantitative. The Bank narrowly focused on economic solutions such as the balance of payments, investments and structural adjustment policies including privatisation and foreign direct investments in the developing world. In this way, the Bank mainly dealt with the state to ensure that economic policies are in line with the Bank’s idea of development. Thus, devising and commissioning a study such as ‘Voices of the Poor’ was an unprecedented step taken by the Bank. This is because in the post-Cold War era of globalisation, the state has to be recognised as only one actor among many. The Bank’s president (1995–2005), James Wolfensohn (Ter Haar 2011: xvii), argued that one of his main goals was to broaden the approach to development. “However important its place and role”, he maintained “it was never wise to have economic growth as [the] primary lens […] the Bank needed to be guided by a more comprehensive and more complex view of societies”. The Bank’s acknowledgement of the need to hear from the ‘other side’ or clients (i.e. poor people) was a remarkable change in attitude that opened doors for the Bank to see alternative ways of dealing with issues of international development. Together, the WFDD conference and the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project led to the World Bank’s establishment of the ‘Directorate for Faiths’, later renamed the ‘Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics’ (DDVE). The renaming from ‘faith’ to ‘ethics’ and ‘values’ illustrates the prevailing secular institutional constraints on religion in development discourses. Even after enormous evidence from the ‘Voices of the Poor’ study, it was still uncomfortable for the Bank to have a straightforward title for the unit that was dealing with faith. Such a situation replicated itself in the USA when President Barack Obama changed the name of the ‘Faith-Based Initiatives’ Office and expanded its mandate to include wider community initiatives of the White House. The ‘Faith-Based Initiatives’ Office was established in 2001 by his predecessor President George Bush Jr. In relation to our interest in ‘faith and development’, following George Bush’s decision to open this office, USAID (the development agency of the USA government) established the ‘Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiative’ in 2002. The aims of the ‘Center’ include (i) to serve as a bridge between faith and community-based non-government organisations and government, (ii) to increase the capacity of faith and community-based non-government organisations or NGOs to better compete for funding opportunities, (iii) to eliminate barriers to faith and community-based

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organisations, and (iv) to increase collaboration among the people and organisations that are trying to address some of the greatest social service needs in our world today.7 The Centre was renamed to ‘Faith and Opportunity Initiatives’.8 Furthermore, in 2004 USAID passed a ‘rule’, which generally ensured that FBOs were able to compete fairly for USAID funding, and that USAID programming decisions were based on the programme eligibility criteria, without regard to the religious character or affiliation of applicants.9 Moreover, although FBOs could not use direct USAID funds for inherently religious activities, FBOs could continue to engage in religious activities as long as they were privately funded, separate in either time or location from USAID activities, and voluntary for beneficiaries of the USAID-funded activity.10 Religion in public life in the USA is more pronounced than in most, if not all, Western countries (Bartkowski and Regis 2003; Conger and Green 2002). The Christian/Evangelical Right groups, for example, have been active in pushing their agenda into politics. President George W. Bush is a Christian and he acknowledged the influence of his faith on his political decisions (Suskind 2004). The evangelical movement has grown in power and prominence by increasing its influence within the Republican Party and by supporting a variety of public policy issues that further its goal of making a permanent place for religion within government (Sager 2010). Thus, the establishment of the White House Faith Office, for example, was out of President Bush’s personal faith conviction and its contribution in communities and international development. Back to the World Bank’s faith unit, it is arguable that the renaming was only cosmetic, since the goals of the unit did not change. The DDVE maintained its mission (working as a focal point on the intersection o faith and development). The World Bank (2006: 3) report stated that: Religion is a central part of the international system […] even if it wished to do so, the Bank could not entirely sidestep the faith engagement.

The ‘faith and development’ debates were not limited to the World Bank alone; other multilateral development agencies took on board interfaith initiatives as vital to attain the phased out Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—2000–2015.11 These included the United Nations, the World Health Organisation and the ILO (Peccoud 2004; Thomas 2005). Faith and development aspects were also considered during the

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consultation and now in implementing the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Tomalin et al. (2019) show how faith groups were engaged through UN structures during consultation on the SDGs and their role analysed in terms of participation and also perception from the multilateral policymakers. Through the UN Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development, the UN ensured proper engagement of faith groups in consultations for SDGs (Tomalin et al. 2019). In implementing the SDG, the Task Force has now changed its name to Interagency Task Force on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development—ITAF-FBO (Tomalin et al. 2019). Development agencies as well as bilateral donors are explicitly analysing faith in their development agenda. Some have been mentioned earlier and they include: the World Bank’s WFDD; USAID’s Centre for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI); the UN Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development (UNIATF); GIZ (Germany) International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD) (Tomalin et al. 2019). There are also interfaith initiatives and conferences around the theme of faith and development. Between September and November 2009, DFID, World Vision, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Islamic Relief and Oxfam, along with the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA), collectively organised a seminar series entitled ‘The New Perspective on Faith and Development’. Speeches and talks on that theme were given by key figures in international development such as the former UK prime minister, Tony Blair, the former minister for the ODA, Lynda Chalker, the former Secretary of State for International Development, Douglas Alexander and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams.12 Other such developments were: the conference— ‘Faith Commitments for the Green World’, from 2 to 4 November 2009, co-hosted by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and Britain’s Prince Philip; and the November 2008 UN General Assembly Interfaith Meeting initiated by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. DFID published the Faith Partnership Principles (DFID 2012). The promotion of faith in international development debates is a result of the active engagement of faith-based organisations and faith communities towards tackling global issues such as poverty and climate change. In 2005, faith groups actively engaged in the memorable ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign (MPH) in the UK. The MPH campaign brought together various groups including faith-based organisations, faith communities, academics and trade unions to raise awareness of increasing global

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poverty levels, and to remind Western donor countries to honour their aid commitments. The impact of this campaign was significant. Although it was not only the faith groups that carried out the MPH campaign, their active participation highlighted their potential in matters of international development. This followed the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, which was organised mainly by faith groups. This campaign, as we shall see in Chapter 5, further underscored the ability of faith communities to raise awareness and have an impact on policy. In addition to campaigning and raising awareness in the developed world, faith groups have demonstrated their capacity to perform in even the most difficult situations. Faith groups have better access to sensitive and remote areas than many other development agencies such as government departments or the U.N. As it is stated in the ‘Voices of the Poor’ report (Narayan 2000: 134): In some regions NGOs with the strongest presence are religiously affiliated. This is the case, for instance, in Benin, where these organisations function as one of the most visible and widely distributed institutional safety nets for the poor. “The majority of the orphanages are run by Catholic sisters, the only country-wide nutritional program is managed by Cathwell (Catholic Relief Services), and nuns and priests have set up several programs to assist the sick, the abandoned, and the destitute. In Cotonou the Catholic Church is arguably the strongest presence helping the most vulnerable. In Panama over half the communities acknowledge churches and schools for their support. In Vietnam poor Catholic households in need of support turn to the church. In Georgia the Russian Orthodox Church and the International Orthodox Church Charities run soup kitchens for the elderly and disabled and distribute food and medicines. In Pakistan, Mosques and shrines are valued as sites of charity. Ashrams are mentioned in some places in India as places of refuge for the poor.

The effectiveness of faith groups during humanitarian crises is often notable. Faith communities around the world contributed towards humanitarian assistance to Bosnia during the conflict. Smock (2004: 48) observed that “the number of international and local faith-based organisations operating in Bosnia was impressive, as was the number contributing to ethno-religious reconciliation”. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the Muslim communities in Bosnia, who were to a large extent the victims, received remarkable assistance from fellow Muslims around the world. In 1993, Muslims in Nottingham, UK, for example, sent humanitarian packages to Bosnia (Interview 2011).13 The incredible actions

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taken by Muslim communities and countries around the world to send humanitarian assistance to Bosnia raised some eyebrows, and Huntington (1993) took it as further evidence for his notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’. In his reactive article, he asked ‘If not Clash of Civilisations, then what?’ Huntington described how the Muslim world stood in solidarity with Muslims in Bosnia. This argument is undermined by the fact that Bosnian Muslims did not only receive humanitarian support from the Muslim world, but also from non-Muslim governments, organisations and people. The humanitarian rather than the religious aspect of the crisis arguably moved the Muslims in Nottingham who sent humanitarian assistance. This is supported by the fact that the project developed into a fully registered charity, known as Muslim Hands. The charity has now grown to a substantial size, operating in different parts of the world including Africa and Asia. This Islamic charity provides humanitarian and development assistance to various groups of people regardless of their creed or race. In addition, the potential of faith groups in dealing with some international political issues is substantiated when they join forces to form interfaith initiatives. Interfaith initiatives are gaining recognition, even in dealing with probably the most deep-rooted of conflicts in contemporary international politics: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Alexandria Declaration of the Religious Leaders of the Holy Land which came out of the 2002 Middle East Interfaith Summit convened by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, and hosted by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, resulted in the first ever declaration signed by the leaders of all the faiths in the Holy Land (Abu-Nimer 2006; White 2011). This is an important stage in a conflict, which has religion at its core. Having a declaration signed by the leaders of the major factions involved in the conflict is a step that cannot be ignored. Although the conflict and tension between Israel and Palestine still persist, such declarations, while they may seem small, have a profound impact on society and save lives. Andrew White, a pastor in Baghdad, who was one of the organisers and participants in this conference, attested that “the Alexander conference and declaration has given birth to a large number of grass-roots projects established by the delegates, that involve both Israelis and Palestinians - for example arranging exchanges and encounters between schools and training up people to go and teach students of Orthodox Judaism and Islam about the other faith and its adherents” (White 2011: 41). Another result is

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the establishment of an Israeli and Palestinian Institute of Peace, with centres in Gaza, Jerusalem and North Israel. In the light of the above discussion, it is not strange that the international development debate is incorporating religion into its agenda. Religion is connected to various issues that are concerned with international development. Religion can play a role in ethnic conflicts such as in Bosnia. Faith communities can sustain civil societies in both poor and rich countries, and faith-based organisations can work even in the most difficult situations of conflict and poverty. Duncan Green (2018) emphasised to development donors that “if you’re serious about ‘Working with the Grain’ of local societies and institutions, understanding the role of religion is crucial”. Furthermore, interfaith initiatives could be the most promising means to resolve international tensions such as terrorism, insurgency and religious intolerance. Faith groups, through different strategies including interfaith frameworks, are countering and addressing socio-economic development issues brought by neoliberal globalisation (Dreher and Smith 2016). These realities of faith are not new; what is novel is their rediscovery and appreciation by scholars of international relations, who now regard them as important dimensions worthy of analysis. Bruce has suggested that “Western donors who promote civil society should consider religious groups, because they are probably the most real civil society existing in the developing world as it is in accordance with the virtue–ethic approach to foreign aid policy”. By virtue-ethic approach, he means “the ways Western donor governments can help to assist the capacity building of faith-based NGOs or of churches, mosques and temples in faith communities more directly, so they can become the kind of communities of character that can generate the social capital that contributes to social change and development”. The heavy presence of faith groups in developing countries has been attributed by many scholars as one of the main rationales for engaging with religion in international development. Thus, one important dimension of religion is its capacity to contribute to the world’s development. It is this dimension of religion that is the central concern of this book. This book is interested in tracing the relationship between faith groups and the UK government in international development policy process including policy formulation and implementation. Overall, in the literature there is a general discussion and analysis on faith and development. However, analysis at policy level is still lacking. Clarke et al. (2007) and Clarke (2006, 2007) provides the most explicit treatment of the subject in his examination of DFID’s engagement with

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faith-based organisations between 2004 and 2005. Clarke’s work is excellent and can supplement certain dimensions of this research. However, the period he covers is only short and as a consequence of this his conclusions cannot be generalised to cover the whole of this research. The broad scope covered in this research allows the analysis of the impact of ‘the resurgence of religion in international politics’ on the government’s international development policies, specifically with regard to faith groups. The historical background of the marginalisation of religion in IR as a discipline and the resurgence of religion in international politics has had an impact on UK government policies. Because the role of religion in international politics has manifested in matters that have to do with ‘new security threats’ which include issues of terrorism, civil conflicts and poverty14 ; there has been a consensus, as shown in the above ‘faith and development’ discussion, to incorporate faith groups in dealing with those issues. This is the rationale behind the focus on UK’s international development policies. One reason why the UK was chosen as the focus for this book is because it is a major donor country as shown in the introduction chapter and thus its international developmental policies are advanced and have proven to be adaptive to the changing world. The UK, as the aspiring ‘aid superpower’15 at one point, is the best country case to understand the relationship between states and faith groups in the global fight against poverty and conflict. To understand the processes, a causal theory that explains how policies are shaped by external forces is needed. Historical institutionalism, which emerges from the theory of new institutionalism, promises to offer a better fit for such a task.

Analysing Religion at Government Policy Level Through New Institutionalism We have seen in the section above that literature in the area of religion and international relations has only focused on the role of religion at an international level without giving much attention to its impact on government policies. In addition, due to a long-term marginalisation of religion in the discipline, there has been limited theorisation of the role of religion in the policymaking process. This can be attributed to the fact that, in trying to explain the role of religion (especially beliefs and ideas) in international politics, scholars have made use of grand IR theories such as constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) and have suggested further

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attempts to use existing grand theories (Sandal and Fox 2013) that are broad but not sufficient to explain the role of religion at a policy level. Thus, to understand the policy reaction to religion, we need theories that are analytical and capable of exploring the impact of the resurgence of religion on the government’s policymaking process. This could be done through exploring and pinpointing policy changes, exploring and examining possible causes of policy change, as well as examining the actors, organisations and the standard operating procedures/rules. Institutional theory, as observed by Bulmer and Burch (1998: 603), “is [a] theory of the middle range. It provides a link between deeper, structural factors such as those located in the economy, society and wider polity on the one hand, and human agency on the other”. Having said that, new institutionalism has a capacity to look at intermediate-level variables (Steinmo and Thelen 1992) and thus offers a framework through which a detailed analysis that looks beyond organisation structures can be carried out. New institutionalism widens the concept of institutions to intangible ideas, norms and customs that are embedded within political systems. Traditional political institutions (old institutionalism), such as the legislature, the legal system and the state, as well as traditional economic institutions, such as the firm, have receded in importance from the position they held in earlier theories (March and Olsen 1983). The theory originated from behavioural and normative points of view whereby social institutions and ideas embedded in institutions were considered arenas for political behaviour (March and Olsen 1983). New institutionalism maintains that “political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions” (March and Olsen 1989: 17). The rise of new institutionalism is a cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from their observers (March and Olsen 1989). Lowndes (2001: 97) argues that, “new institutionalism is actually building upon the insights of the best of the traditional institutionalists, within the context of more explicit and sophisticated theoretical frameworks”. Grasping how institutions react to external and internal forces may help us understand policy change. Institutional change may happen suddenly due to external shocks or gradually due to internal factors. Academic works on institutionalism, and in particular historical institutionalism (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2009), have argued that gradual changes take place within institutions. The ways through which institutions change,

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either suddenly due to external shocks or gradually, will be discussed in more detail in the coming sections. Thus, new institutionalism is analytically capable of gauging and assessing the impact of an emerging or emerged phenomenon on the existing institutions. For instance, several scholars of the European Union have used new institutionalism theory to study the impact of Europeanisation on member states’ policies (Bulmer 1993; Hix 1998; Jupille and Caporaso 1999). New institutionalism is thus relevant in achieving this book’s main objectives: (i) to investigate successive UK government’s international development policies and explore the policy change over time and (ii) to examine the causes of policy changes and their impact on the role of faith groups in policy process. To do that, this book investigates whether the policy changes are a result of: exogenous factors—in our case the resurgence of religion in international affairs and Brexit or indigenous factors— which in our case include the attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector and the international development agenda. New institutionalism theorises different roles of institutions in political, economic and sociological outcomes. In this respect, new institutionalism comprises of various schools of thought including: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, international institutionalism and network institutionalism (Peters 1999). As a whole, new institutionalism provides two kinds of approach to analyse the mechanism in which institutions affect individual’s actions and have effects on political outcomes. These are the ‘calculus approach’ and the ‘cultural approach’. In the calculus approach, institutions affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action (Hall and Taylor 1996). In the cultural approach, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action; not only do institutions provide strategically useful information; they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors (Hall and Taylor 1996). Each school of thought of new institutionalism uses either of these approaches. Uniquely, historical institutionalism uses both of them hence making it useful in our understanding of this book’s focus. This strand of new institutionalism is explained in more detail in the next section.

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Historical Institutionalism Historical institutionalism takes into account the effects of institutions on political processes and outcomes. One of the core claims of historical institutionalism is that institutions do not only channel policy and structure political conflict but also define interests and objectives (Thelen 1999). In that way, policy interests may be perceived in accordance to the institutions in place, for example, the UK government may define their interests in working with faith groups in accordance with their norms, rules, regulations or even the organisation. In the matter of international development, the institutions in the UK may include the goals that the Department for International Development (DFID) wants to achieve, the norms and values of the UK government such as equal human rights, free trade, freedom to worship and poverty reduction. The UK’s legislation, in our case the International Development Acts (1980 and 2002), the International Development Reporting and Transparency Act (2006), International Development (Gender Equality) Act (2014) and Official Development Assistance Target Act (2015), may define government interests in international development policies. For these reasons, institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole “cause” of outcomes (Steinmo et al. 1992) rather they shape outcomes (Steinmo 2008). One of the key assumptions of historical institutionalism is that institutions are persistent and resistant to changes. Thus, it lies in explaining the persistence of institutions and their policies, rather than evaluating the nature of those policies and institutions (Peters 1999: 73). Thus, historical institutionalism does not seek to explain how institutions were formed, but rather their existence, change and stability. Although historical institutionalism focuses on the change and persistence of institutions, it does not ignore ideas behind the formation of institutions. Looking at ideas behind institutions is arguably how scholars use historical institutionalism to study the formation/construction of institutions. This follows the assumption that institutions constitute embedded ideas, which is linked to the core of historical institutionalism analysis, known as “path-dependence”. Under the concept of path dependency, institutions are understood to be following a path that was established during their initial formation. Ideas serve as mobilising forces for collective action by social groups that want to create or change institutions, and for institutional actors themselves, ideas serve as the glue that holds an administration, party or agency together in its tasks, help to

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garner support and provide a standard to evaluate the institution’s policy outcomes (Meijerink 2008). Scholars of historical institutionalism have advanced their analysis and they are increasingly giving attention to the role of temporality in the analysis of institutional change. With the path dependence concept, there was an assumption that institutional change was only possible if there was an external shock that would create a critical juncture and force the institution to leave the path. That assumption has been criticised. Raadschelders (1998), for example, has argued that path dependency lacks explanatory power. He asserted that it is only by virtue of retrospect that we are aware of stages or paths of development. ‘Path dependency’ refers to a string of related events, causality in retrospect. The “concept does not come even close to pinpointing a mechanism or mechanisms that propel social change” (Raadschelders 1998: 576). Nevertheless, the concept of path dependency is still useful in analysing policy as it provides a label for the empirical observations and intuition that policies, once established, can be difficult to change or reform (Kay 2005: 558). Path dependence analysis can complement the temporality arguments of institutional analysis. Kay (2005: 554) argues that path dependence is an empirical category, an organising concept, which can be used to label a certain type of temporal process. Given the consideration above, historical institutionalism framework has the capacity to underscore the factors and ideas embedded in the UK institutional structures for international development that may facilitate or hinder the relationship between the government and faith groups. In that way, any change in policy with regard to working with faith groups, historical institutionalism can help to highlight the cause—if it is exogenous (as in this case the resurgence of religion in international politics and Brexit) or indigenous (political parties, actors—such as politicians). Historical institutionalism emphasises the origins and development of institutional structures. This is due to the school’s interest in tracing the historical records for evidence of factors explaining political actors’ actions (Büthe 2002). Historical institutionalists thus look at institutional change over time. This makes it an analytical tool capable for use in this research as it examines the UK’s international development policies over a period of time. The methods and theoretical attributes of historical institutionalism allow the analysis of this case study. It investigates the formation of institutional structures and explains how the formed structure influences policy.

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Several criticisms have been raised of the historical institutionalist approach. Historical institutionalism has been criticised for ‘merely telling stories’ (Thelen 1992). This criticism is based on the opinion of rational choice theorists who argue that historical institutionalists are engaged in something less than theory building (Thelen 1992). In supporting rational choice against historical institutionalism, Levi (1997: 21) argues that rational choice is “almost always willing to sacrifice nuance for generalisability and detail for logic”. However, such criticisms tend to forget that historical institutionalism does take into account some of the rational choice propositions. For example, similar to rational choice, historical institutionalism takes into account the role of institutions in influencing actors’ behaviour. It is arguable that historical institutionalism stands to be a better theory builder than the rest since it brings together elements from different schools of thought within new institutionalism. This is called eclecticism. Eclecticism, as noted by Hall and Taylor (1996: 957) selects new institutions for instrumental purposes, much as rational choice analysis would predict, but draws them from a menu of alternatives that is made historically available through the mechanisms specified by sociological institutionalism.

Nevertheless, the eclectic nature of historical institutionalism has also been criticised on the grounds that historical institutionalism has devoted less attention than the other types of new institutionalism “to developing a sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour, and some of its works are less careful than they should be about specifying the precise causal chain through which the institutions they identify as important are affecting the behaviour they meant to explain” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 950). Moreover, Hay and Wincott (1998: 951) argue that While this view (i.e. the capacity of historical institutionalism to use both calculus and cultural approach) makes historical institutionalism appear ‘pivotal’ to future dialogue between institutionalisms, such a reading neglects the potentially distinctive social ontology of this approach.

They based their argument on the basis that such a view may “leave historical institutionalism prone to precisely the tendential structuralism characteristic of much institutionalist analyses” (Hay and Wincott 1998: 951).

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However, that is not much of a concern, since for historical institutionalism, institutions provide “the context in which political actors define their strategies and pursue their interests” (Steinmo et al. 1992) which means institutions serve as a defining environment in which behaviours are shaped and constrained. Historical institutionalism goes even further and explains that institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history (Steinmo et al. 1992; Hall and Taylor 1998). Thus, historical institutionalism is able to generate real observable events and propositions that are then brought to bear on empirical phenomena (Thelen 1992; Levi 1997). Moreover, historical institutionalism has the advantage of focusing on context and development over time. Such an approach is appropriate for examining the context and the trend of the relationship between faith groups and governments on international development policies. Another criticism directed towards historical institutionalism is related to its weakness in explaining agency. The relationship between structure and agency is not well explained in historical institutionalism. Thus, Hay and Wincott (1998: 953) maintain that “historical institutionalism must directly confront one of the perennial issues or dilemmas of social science - the relationship of structure and agency”. In general, they suggest that historical institutionalists should analyse the ideas, rules and other institutions while regarding the structure–agency relationship. Although historical institutionalism does not explicitly explain the agent as it broadly looks at social structures, it does not completely ignore their role. Using historical institutionalism, actors can be analysed by looking at how they are constrained by established institutions. In the same way, it can explain how the actors responded to the new institutions that may have been brought about by changes. Accordingly, Hall and Taylor (1998: 958) responded to such criticism, arguing that both rational choice and historical institutionalism “contain many lines of analysis that grant actors a substantial role in the production and reproduction of institutional structures”. All in all, such analytical weaknesses of historical institutionalism should be taken into consideration; nevertheless, they cannot disqualify its main strengths and capacity to provide a comprehensive picture of policy continuity and change. Historical institutionalism enables us to trace the policy process and examine stability and change. For these reasons, scholars have sought to study the influence of external factors in policy process through historical institutionalism. For instance, Bulmer

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and Burch (2001) used a historical institutionalist approach to study the influence of the EU on British and German central governments, and Ikenberry (2016) suggested a historical institutionalist approach to study American foreign economic policy. Overall, when compared with other schools of thought within new institutionalism, historical institutionalism has had “the most extensive body of empirical work” (Lowndes 2001) and “has several methodological advantages […] in the ways in which history itself shapes outcomes […] examine patterns over time […] historical process tracing allows the scholar to test for the arrow of causality in a way in which simple correlation analysis cannot” (Steinmo 2008: 135).

The Analytical Framework of Historical Institutionalism as Applied in This Book Given the general explanation of historical institutionalism above, it is crucial to now outline the key concepts of the sub-theory that is applied in our understanding of how faith groups are engaged in the British international development policy process.

Path Dependency (Institutional Stability) The assumption is that the ideas that were brought in the formation of institutions get embedded and hinder any change or reform. Thus institutions follow a path that was established during their formation. Path dependency, thus, refers to the fact that when initial choices are made they determine future development and once a path is chosen other alternatives are ruled out. Historical institutionalists assume that institutions will follow the path because reversing it will be costly (Pierson 2000). In that respect, Pierson (2000: 251) observes that path dependence involves the following claims: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent events; and particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse.

In addition to that, Ikenberry also observed that path dependency carries with it several claims: first, institutional structures shape and constrain the

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capacities of groups and individuals within them; they refer to both organisational characteristics of groups and to the rules and norms that guide the relationships between actors (Ikenberry 2016; Pierson 2000); second, institutional change is episodic and dramatic rather than continuous and incremental (Krasner 1984). Ikenberry (2016) sees institutional change as only abrupt, but there are scholars who have argued that institutions can change out of a gradual process that becomes transformative over a period of time.

Institutional Change Although historical institutionalists have argued that institutions are persistent and stable, they do not reject that institutions do change. But how do they explain change? They account for institutional change in two major ways. The first way is the episodic change caused by crises, and the second way is the incremental or cumulative changes that may be transformative. Both of these ways are utilised in this book and will be discussed separately below. Critical Junctures (Episodic Changes): institutions change as a result of an episodic crisis. For institutions to change there should be a significant crisis that is capable of either modifying them or creating new ones. These crises may originate from either exogenous factors or indigenous factors. Krasner and Froats (1998) argues that crises might be generated internally or externally: internally generated crises are precipitated by dynamic changes in society; externally generated crises are generated by threats from the international system that lead to state efforts to increase extraction (i.e. efforts that can precipitate societal resistance). Krasner and Froats (1998) categorisation of crises is vital here, since this book’s proposition is to test if the relationship between faith groups and the UK government is caused by external factors (i.e. the resurgence of religion in international affairs and Brexit) or by internal factors (i.e. political parties in power, politicians and the domestic politics of the international development agenda). These crises are referred to as ‘critical junctures’, by which Ikenberry (2016: 225) explains that ‘large scale social crises at one moment are likely to have profound effects on the institutions of the state’. For institutions to change there have to be crises, since institutional structures once established, argues Ikenberry (2016: 224), are difficult to change even when underlying social forces continue to evolve. Similarly, Collier and Collier

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describe a critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier 1991). In the above respect, critical junctures lead to new institutional paths. Bulmer and Burch (1998) introduce the concept of ‘critical moments’, which they differentiate from critical junctures. They define a critical moment “as an opportunity which arises for a significant change - such opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a critical juncture at which there is a clear departure from previously established patterns” (Schneider and Aspinwall 2001: 76–78). Using the example of the EU, Bulmer and Burch (1998) show that major change at the European level may create a critical moment at a national level (i.e. member states) but not necessarily a critical juncture. In this book, critical moments are identified in relation to the resurgence of religion in international politics as well as in the Brexit process. Such critical moments include: the Bosnian conflict, which highlighted the role of religion in civil conflicts, the Jubilee Debt Campaigns (1998) which showcased the role of faith groups in international development matters along with the World Bank/Church of England conference on faith and development and ‘Voices of the Poor’ project report. Other identified critical moments are the September 11, 2001 bombings and other terrorist attacks including the emergence of new groups such as Daesh (ISIS) and Al-Shabaab. Other critical moments are informed by the Brexit process—from referendum to the two administration changes—bringing Theresa May and latterly Boris Johnson into power. Whether such critical moments led to critical junctures or not will be a matter of discussion and analysis of policy developments. Almost similar to ‘critical moments’ is the concept that has been termed ‘Window of Opportunity’ (Snare 1995; Kingdon and Stano 1984). Kingdon and Stano (1984: 165) defines ‘window of opportunity’ as “opportunities for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems”. Essentially, this concept, unlike ‘critical moments’ and ‘critical junctures’, provides a context to analyse the agency. In that respect, this book investigates if the critical moments provided windows of opportunity for certain actors to influence policy. How does, for example, Brexit provide a window of opportunity for certain politicians to either support or discourage the international development agenda? These actors could also be faith

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groups who may want to direct international development policies in a certain direction. Incremental (transformative) Changes: Historical institutionalists also argue that institutional change can be brought about by gradual or incremental changes. Usually such changes leave the principles and structures at the foundation of an institution unchanged (Immergut 2006). However, Bulmer and Burch (1998) argue that continuous incremental changes may accumulate and lead to transformation. Accordingly, this book goes beyond surface analysis, that is only capable of identification of critical junctures, and explores small institutional changes in the international development agenda. That is followed by an investigation of the causes of those changes and an analysis of the impact of those changes on the relationship between the government and faith groups. From the above we can see that the theory of historical institutionalism is appropriate for the analysis in this book. The prepositions of institutional stability (‘path dependency’) and institutional change (‘critical moments’, ‘window of opportunity’, ‘critical junctures’ and ‘incremental changes’) are capable of assisting the analysis of the impact of the resurgence of religion in international politics on the UK’s international development policies and the consequences of this on the relationship between the government and faith groups.

Conclusion This chapter has presented a review of the literature with regard to religion in international politics. The review has shown how religion was marginalised in the study of international relations (IR). Various factors for the scholarly snub of religion have been examined including the discipline’s (IR) obsession with the state as the main actor in the international politics and the subsequent impact on the analysis of security from a state-centric perspective; the historical misgivings about the role of religion given the Thirty Years War experience which led to the Westphalian Treaty in 1648 that established the state, rather than the church, as the sovereign authority; the lack of interest leaves out religion from the main theories that underpin IR. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is credited as triggering interest within IR scholarship in studying religion. However, the literature shows that the end of the Cold War further opened the discipline up to widen its perspectives on actors as well

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as to ‘new’ security threats. In relation to that, we saw emerging interests in analysing religion. The attacks of September 11, 2001 enhanced this interest further, to the extent that Scott Thomas (2005) termed this budding interest as the “resurgence of religion” in international politics. Both the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to an enormous concentration on political Islam and Islamism as compared to other aspects of religion. The literature, as noted above, is thus reactive. In reviewing religion in international politics, two sides can be noticed—the negative role and the positive role of religion. Appleby (1999) calls this the ‘double-sided’ nature of religion. The negative role of religion is related to extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism and civil conflicts (ethno-religious). The positive side relates to the role of religion in international development (faith and development). In the faith and development agenda, the role of faith groups in international development is discussed. This book, as shown in this chapter, focuses on the positive side of religion. The faith and development agenda builds towards the theoretical framework of the book. In doing that, the chapter presented a second part, which introduced the theory of new institutionalism, with a particular focus on historical institutionalism, and explained the rationale behind adopting this theoretical perspective. Historical institutionalism complements the methodological approach used in this book—that of process tracing—by exploring the patterns over a period of time (1992–2019). Steinmo (2008) explains how historical institutionalism is fit for historical process tracing. As noted in Chapter 1, process tracing is appropriate for this book’s analysis. In a way that Vennesson (2008) maintains that “process tracing is an instrument that helps [the] researcher to be sensitive to the temporal boundaries, or period effects, with respect to the specific causal claims being forwarded”. Thus, historical institutionalism informs the book’s analytical framework, which has been presented in this chapter. The framework focuses on tracing the process through institutional change in two ways: (i) episodic change and (ii) incremental transformational change. The framework is used for our analysis in the following chapters.

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Notes 1. This can be justified by the works of pre-twentieth-century thinkers such as: Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War; Machiavelli. The Prince; and Clausewitz. On War. These works assert that relations between different political entities with geographical boundaries and authorities existed. 2. Collection of series of lectures given by Ayatollah Khomeini prior to the revolution—they informed the “law”/rule that came to have legal basis after the revolution. 3. This quote has been shortened. 4. For example, the Pope’s visit to Poland in 1983 had a significant impact in showcasing the role of religion in international politics. This point is again mentioned in a later section, which will further highlight its importance. 5. For this and more about the journal and its relevance to this study, see Rosenthal, J. H. (2011). From the Editor. Ethics and International Affairs, 25(1). https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/ 2011/from-the-editor-full-text/. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. 6. See Pew Forum site at https://www.pewforum.org/2001/03/01/thelaunch-of-the-pew-forum-on-religion-and-public-life/. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. 7. USAID, The Centre for Faith-Based and Community Initiative, at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/fbci/about.html. Accessed 23 Aug 2011. Now partly available at https://www.usaid.gov/ FBCI. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. 8. The renaming has allowed to expand its mandate to other community stakeholders who may not necessarily be faith-based. See https://www. usaid.gov/faith-and-opportunity-initiatives. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. 9. For more information on this, please see USAID “Rule” for Participation by Religious Organizations at https://www.usaid.gov/faith-andopportunity-initiatives/usaid-rule-participation. Accessed 17 Oct 2019. 10. Refer to Note 9. 11. These were eight targeted goals that the donor community produced as indicators in the fight against global poverty. The UN endorsed the goals in 2000 and they were to be achieved by 2015. 12. For example see Rowan William’s speech available at http://aoc2013. brix.fatbeehive.com/articles.php/768/new-perspectives-on-faith-anddevelopment. Accessed 18 Oct 2019. 13. See also Muslim Hands, About Us at https://muslimhands.org.uk/ about-us. Accessed 18 Oct 2019. 14. There is academic literature that argues that political Islam is a response to poverty, see, for example, Rice, S. (2005, October 20). The National Security Implications of Global Poverty. Speech. Washington, DC: Women’s National Democratic Club. https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-

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record/the-national-security-implications-of-global-poverty/. Accessed 18 Oct 2019. 15. This has been repeated by several UK Secretary of States for International Development starting with Andrew Mitchell in 2010, see https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=YVe1ezMJcIo. Accessed 18 Oct 2019.

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CHAPTER 3

The UK’s International Development Policies from the End of the Cold War to the Present

Introduction The UK’s international development policies are as dynamic as other governmental policies. International development policies change in response to various factors that may be domestic or international. These policies may be as a response to exogenous factors such as global poverty situations or the prevailing international agenda on development.1 They may also be as a result of domestic politics such as political party ideologies. Together, the domestic and international factors determine the policy outcome and ultimately, for our case, the role of faith groups in implementing these policies. In this chapter, the UK’s international development agenda from the end of the Cold War to present (2019) will be mapped out and classified with regard to these factors. This mapping and classification will then serve as a context for future analysis of the causes of the relationship between faith groups and the government in the international development policy process. This analysis will be covered in Chapters 4 and 5 discussing faith-based organisations (FBOs) and faith communities, respectively. The mapping and classification of international development policies is necessary not only for setting out the context for analysis but also for understanding the causes of international development policy change. Identifying the types of causes (international or domestic) has a wider

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relevance in particular since engaging faith groups in international development is integral to the ‘faith and development agenda’, which is global. To forward this discussion on to the UK, as one of the biggest aid donor countries and renowned advocates for international development, the exogenous factors that influence the British international development policymaking process need to be clarified. As noted in the previous chapter, international donor agencies such as the World Bank have brought faith groups to the table in an effort to ensure an inclusive and effective fight against poverty. In addition, issues in the international sphere have influence on the UK’s government policies. The rise of terrorism in the international sphere and in particular the September 11, 2001 bombings led to the making of the first counterterrorism strategy for the UK in 2003. International development policies cannot be explained in isolation and are inextricably linked with domestic politics. The two main political parties (i.e. Labour and the Conservatives) in the UK have managed international development differently whenever they have been in power. Personal leadership may also have an impact on international development policies. Thus, if the overview of the international development policies reveals that policies result as a response to what happens outside the UK, it lends more support to this book’s first proposition that the resurgence of religion in international affairs heightens the relationship between the government and faith groups than if the opposite (i.e. international development policies are a result of dynamics in domestic politics) is found. For classification and coherence purposes, this overview is divided into four periods covering four government regimes from 1992 to 2019. However, before commencing the analysis in 1992, it is important to look at what happened before. Sections covering analysis of each period 1992–1997, 1997–2010 and 2010–2015; 2015–2019 will then follow this. The first section covers the period during which the Conservative Party was in power, with John Major as prime minister. The second section analyses the time when the New Labour Party was in power with two prime ministers in this period—Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The third section analyses the period since the Conservative-led coalition government (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) took over, and the final section analyses Conservative Party rule led by three prime ministers— David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson. The classification of the time period is uneven because different political groups were in power

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for different lengths of time. The analysis in this chapter uses the historical institutionalism analytical framework described in Chapter 2 to analyse policy stability and change. The final section is the conclusion.

British International Development Agenda (Pre-1992) The history of the UK’s interest in international development2 can be traced back to 1929, when the Colonial Development Act was enacted. The 1929 Act marked the official beginning of the UK’s aid to colonial governments. Prior to that, there was no systematic government machinery to guide and channel overseas aid to the colonies. The Act introduced “a greater degree of self consciousness and systematisation, created the machinery for the examination of all projects, and more importantly, introduced an entirely new concept of colonial development in which the provision of annual grants and loans would prove mutually advantageous to the UK and the colonial territories” (Abbott 1971: 70). In connection with this, it is important to mention that it is always the case that aid has to align with domestic interests. This is because international aid is given from taxpayers’ money, and the government has to justify this to its citizens. Accordingly, the Act’s objective was specifically to assist in “aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” (HMG 1929: 1(i)). This objective highlighted the mutual benefit. Arguably, the catalyst for formalising and legislating international aid was the great economic depression in the 1920s, which may have led to less demand for British-manufactured goods and consequently unemployment. The 1929 Act, writes Tomlinson, “was passed at a time when Britain was suffering serious unemployment as a result of its poor recovery from the postwar slump” (Tomlinson 2003: 416). The UK needed to boost its economy and trade, and thus, the government had to ensure the stability of colonial economies. The reason why Britain had to provide aid to the colonial governments is because these economies were tied up with the economy of the UK, they were where the British government extracted its raw materials. The British government could not afford to let the colonial economies dwindle because if they started to dwindle, then that would have an adverse impact on the mother British economy. Furthermore, a number of former German colonies, such as Tanganyika, were entrusted

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to Britain following the First World War and the decisions of the Versailles Treaty (1919). It was, thus, crucial for Britain to consolidate its position in these new colonies it was entrusted with. It should always be remembered that the aid that was provided to colonial governments and their respective economies was mainly to serve the interests of the mother economy, i.e. Britain. Thus, it can be seen how the economic interests of the distant colonies were made subservient to the interests of the mother economy. For instance, railways were introduced in the colonies to transport raw materials from the point of extraction to factories or to the ports where these raw materials were shipped off to Britain. In 1940, the government legislated another International Development Act known as the Colonial Welfare and Development Act. This Act widened the scope of the 1929 Act. The 1940 Act was passed during the Second World War, and there are a number of suggested motives behind the British government passing this Act. Arguably, it was important for the British government to advance the machinery that was providing aid because as Tomlinson argues, the development of colonial resources was overwhelmingly crucial for the strengthening of the Sterling Area (Tomlinson 2003). Britain needed to repair its balance of payments, and for that to happen, the colonies (which composed part of the Sterling Area) had to be in good economic shape. Another reason for the passing of the 1940 Act is the argument that Britain wanted to maintain its reputation as a capable colonial power. The Act was passed in the war period, and there were mounting criticisms of European imperialism by the Americans.3 For instance, President Woodrow Wilson attacked colonialism in his speech on self-determination that is ‘the one nation-one state theory’, in which he mentioned his 14 points. Accordingly, the 1940 Act was crucial for “revoking any possible future suggestion (e.g. from the Americans) that British colonies should be placed under international mandate, and helping to secure the support of colonial peoples for Britain’s wartime plans” (Havinden and Meredith 2002; Clarke 2007: 464). Even with the pressure for decolonisation, the British wanted to maintain their influence in the colonies. This was vivid in the statements made by the then Secretary of State for Colonial Office Malcolm MacDonald (1938–1940) insisting that the main purpose of the British Empire is the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty’s subjects in whatever part of the earth they live. Furthermore, there are arguments that when the Second World War erupted, Britain started to prepare for the decolonisation of its colonies (Pearce 1984: 79). The ‘Colonial Reforms’ in 1943, for

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example, were designed towards self-governing but without undermining British influence. Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for Colonies (MacDonald’s successor), stated that the aim was “to guide colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire” (Pearce 1984: 80; Flint 1983). The British, arguable, were not yet ready to fully release their colonies, neither did the officials believe that the colonies were ready for immediate self-governance. The 1940 Act was passed as a result of the political situation at that time. Britain was keen to hold onto its colonies both for purposes of its own economy and for international prestige, but at the same time tried showing the international community that it was genuinely concerned about the welfare of its colonies through the Act of 1940. Whether Britain was preparing for decolonisation or strengthening British imperialism is a debate that requires greater discussion, beyond the scope of this book. However, one point, that is established so far, is that even at these early stages of the British international development agenda, the exogenous factors in the international sphere had already influenced the British development agenda. All in all, in the years that followed the 1940 Act, aid became a very important policy in dealing with the Commonwealth countries. The reasons for giving aid were mainly economic. The UK government wanted to ensure good balance of payments and strengthening of the pound. Tomlinson, for example, argues that the Attlee government (Labour, 1945–1951) was desperate to exploit resources such as Malayan rubber and West African cocoa to get foreign exchange (Tomlinson 2003). That was important for the balance of payment, which could be obtained by exporting manufactured products, which would get Britain dollars/foreign exchange. The British international aid agenda went a step further when the Department of Technical Co-operation was established in 1961. This department was under the Foreign Office, and it was to deal with the technical side of the aid programme. Other colonial aid responsibilities were split between the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office.4 The diversity in the management of aid at that time reflected the different objectives of the aid. These were “grants in aid of administration, grants in aid for special purposes like flood relief and reconstruction, assistance for development and investment” (Jones 1977: 32). All in all, the establishment of the Department of Technical Co-operation was a remarkable development within British aid machinery. By 1961, some of the British colonies, e.g. Ghana, had

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gained independence. The change of status from colonies to independent states impacted the role of aid. Some of the functions of the Department of Technical Co-operation in relation to newly independent countries were facilitated by a programme known as the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS), and they included: topping up salaries of expatriate officers to the extent deemed necessary to make their recruitment or retention possible, as well as to help with the recruitment of new officers on contract; and paying half the cost of compensation to officers who chose or were asked to retire prematurely (Little and Clifford 1965: 36). For example, just before the independence in Tanganyika, which was one of the colonies, the colonial government’s members of staff, and in particular the expatriates, were compensated through a loan from the British government to the government of Tanganyika (Mtei 2009: 63). This was a form of foreign aid from the government in the UK to the colonial government. In 1964, when the Labour government had just been elected, the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) was set up. This was an independent ministry with a cabinet minister—Barbara Castle. The reason for the establishment of the ODM was more political than functional. The Labour Party leaders had lobbied for the expansion of aid machinery and aid policy while they were in opposition. In 1958, James Callaghan who was the Labour MP with various shadow ministerial and governmental positions and who, later on, became the prime minister (1976–1979) gave a speech in parliament arguing that the British government should accept the 1 per cent GDP aid target (Tomlinson 2003: 148) (the idea of 1 per cent of GDP for aid was first proposed by the World Council of Churches in the 1950s and later on adopted by the UN in the 1960s, and revised to 0.7 per cent in 1969). Such lobbying further complimented Harold Wilson’s (Labour leader and prime minister from 1964 to 1970; 1974 to 1976) campaigns for a greater aid effort from rich countries. His book (Wilson 1953) led to the establishment of the charity War on Want (Tomlinson 2003: 418), which is still operating today (i.e. 2019). The attitudes of Labour leaders to aid were reflected in the 1964 election manifesto, which had a section titled ‘The New War on Want’. The section outlined the plan to create the Aid Ministry with an agenda that included: expansion of trade of developing countries, increasing the share of national income going to aid and ‘reviving’ the concept of the World Food Board for the disposal of agricultural surplus (Labour Party 1964: 423). Thus,

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when the Labour Party got into power in 1964, they established the ministry, which was headed by Barbara Castle. The arguments for the ministry were: to have an independent ministry which would put aid out of politics, and that the ministry would focus more on humanitarian aspects of aid. In connection with this, the independent ministry would put more emphasis on the long-term development side of aid rather than using it for gaining political support from developing countries. The assumption in Labour was that under the Foreign Office, aid would be used for shortterm ‘political kudos’ (Little and Clifford 1965: 322–323). Nevertheless, there are also arguments for managing aid under the Foreign Office. Aid could have greater political power since the Foreign Office has more political backing than the Aid Ministry. Thus, although an Aid Ministry allows autonomy and more emphasis on the development side of aid, it could be difficult to gain political support, which is essential for sustainability. This debate keeps coming back even, as will be seen in later sections, after the establishment of the independent aid ministry with a cabinet status, still the argument persists in some government circles. The debate comes down to whether aid should be linked to domestic interests or not, as well as finding ways to justify the use of taxpayers’ money for aid. All in all, considering the structure of British aid machinery at that time, it was more appealing to have a separate ministry. The ministry brought together the functions of the former Department of Technical Co-operation and the overseas aid policy functions of the Foreign, Commonwealth Relations and Colonial offices and of other government departments. Through these connections, it is clear that the ministry brought together aid functions that were separated into different departments. As already presented above, the Department of Technical Cooperation did not bring together all the functions of aid administration. Prior to 1964, various departments including the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office and the Treasury were all involved in aid administration. Apart from the organisational structure, the purposes of British aid remained the same. These included the focus on balance of payment, emphasis on private investments and the tendency to give aid to members of the Commonwealth—who were former colonies (Tomlinson 2003; McKinlay and Little 1978). In that light, Tomlinson (2003: 425) shows that there was “conflict between the promised new dawn on aid and the government’s economic policies, which led to a running battle in the Labour government between the Overseas Development Ministry and the Treasury”.

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In 1965, the ODM published a white paper on international development. This white paper put forward the case for aid as a moral duty with an emphasis on working with recipient countries. The paper promoted the development aspects of aid (Barder 2005; Castle 1965; House of Lords 1965; ODM 1965). From the parliamentary discussions between the Minister of Overseas Development and other Members of Parliament (House of Lords 1965), as well as from secondary analysis of British aid policy (Tomlinson 2003: 424), it is clear that the ministry was not able to meet its ambitious goals—especially that of keeping the development aspects of aid as it had promised before the election. This was a time when the government had to cut spending, aid was linked to trade, which meant leaving the development goals behind. The 1965 paper was arguably a failure. It was difficult for the ministry to achieve the goals especially of keeping the development aspects of aid. Issues of trade and balance of payment were still important, and aid still served the purpose of trade through private investments and technical assistance. This resulted in the publication of another white paper in 1967. The title of this second paper, The Work in Progress, shows that the paper was a reactive one in response to the difference between the white paper of 1965 and the actual work between then and 1967. For that reason, the Overseas Development Institute qualified the 1967 paper as (“designed to meet Parliamentary Questioning about what British Aid-Programme really amount to?”) (ODI 1967). Following that, international aid machinery in the UK went through several institutional changes reflecting both domestic and international politics. In 1970, when the Conservative Party got elected into government, they incorporated the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Ministry of Overseas Development was renamed the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and was headed by a minister who reported to the Foreign Office Secretary. Although this looked like a demotion for the ODM, the ODA carried out the same function as the previous ODM. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) observed that “the conversion of [the] ODM into a functional wing of the FCO keeps together the professional aid staff and body of expertise developed in the ODM, and the management of aid is to continue as a function distinct from the conduct of foreign affairs. The new arrangements are therefore unlikely to have immediate or important implications on routine administration and the professional efficiency of the aid programme” (ODI 1970). From

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the observation above, it is evident that there were different styles of aid management by the two parties—the Conservatives and Labour—and they were more political driven than functional. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that in the Conservative election manifesto of 1970, under the section titled, A Stronger Britain in the World, it was stated that the Conservative government will deal with poverty and the developing world through: expansion of international trade; encouraging private investment overseas; and providing capital aid and technical assistance (Conservative Party 1970). This emphasis was repeated by the Conservative Prime Minister’s (Edward Heath) UN speech in 1970 (ODI 1970). In 1974, the Labour government upgraded the agency into an independent ministry. However, at this time the minister who headed the ODM did not have a cabinet seat status. In support of the ministry and the Labour policy, the ministry published a white paper, titled ‘The Changing Emphasis of Britain’s Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest’ (1976). The white paper’s main areas of concern included: to give an increasing emphasis in our bilateral aid to the poorest countries, especially those in the group most seriously affected by the rise in the price of oil and other commodities; to give special emphasis to programmes oriented towards the poorest groups within these countries, and especially to rural development; to promote situations in which British concessional aid funds can best serve to stimulate matching contributions from other governments; and to encourage the deployment of such aid through both multilateral and bilateral channels towards the poorest countries (ODM 1975, 1976; Hewitt 1978; Barder 2005). The emphasis that the Labour government was placing in the aid policy, at this time, is different from the previous Conservative government priorities. Although the functions of aid might be the same, the aid language and management by the two parties were very different. Such differences underpin the influence of ideology into aid policy (Thérien 2002). Five years after the reestablishment of the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM), the returning Conservative government demoted the ministry to an agency (Overseas Development Administration, ODA) under the FCO, and this remained the situation until 1997, when the (New) Labour Party got into power and established the Department for International Development (DFID). In their 1979 election manifesto, the Conservative Party’s aid policy was not different from the policy in the manifesto of 1970. The areas of priority included ensuring the growing market and supply of raw materials from Commonwealth countries;

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providing aid, technical cooperation and encouragement of voluntary work; development of trade and private investment; and strengthening the Commonwealth (Conservative Party 1979). In addition, and worth noting, is that in the manifesto section on foreign policy towards Africa and the Middle East (which was under the same section as aid and trade—titled ‘A Strong Britain in a Free World’), it was clearly stated that the Conservative government would counter the threat from allies of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa (Thérien 2002). From that, the influence of the Cold War on British relations to African countries can be seen, which composed a large percentage of the Commonwealth membership. Aid was, thus, linked with containment efforts to hinder the spread of communist ideas and influence from the Soviet Union. In relation to that, it can be seen in the years between 1979 and the early 1990s the British international aid agenda was very much influenced by the neoliberal ideas of Thatcherism. The term ‘Thatcherism’ is derived from the former UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990). The policies that Margaret Thatcher embraced came to be known as Thatcherism (Bale 2017). Thatcherism was characterised by neoliberalist ideas, which included: free market principles, monetarism, privatisation, reduction of direct taxes and cuts in public spending (Heffernan 2000; Gamble 1994; Kavanagh 1990; Leys 1989). To implement those ideals, the government preferred not to intervene in economic affairs, in order to let the markets operate freely, while denationalising economic enterprises. However, at the same time there was a need for strong and independent state authority to ensure such ideas were institutionalised and implemented. This was a paradox. Andrew Gamble’s book, which is titled The Free Economy and the Strong State, explains this paradox in Thatcherism. In the book, Gamble (1994: 235) argues that: Restoring the health of economic and social life in Britain and restoring incentives, as promised by the 1979 manifesto, meant rolling back the state in many areas. But this could only be successful and a free economy established if the state was simultaneously strengthened in other areas.

For the most part, Thatcherist ideals could accommodate the private sector (i.e. businesses) but not necessarily the voluntary sector. This is arguably because, ironically, the state had to be strong in order for some of the policies to be implemented, so the challenges posed to some Thatcherist policies by voluntary sectors were not encouraged.

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In his book, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?, Kavanagh (1990) shows how Thatcherism did not favour what the early Conservative thinker Edmund Burke called ‘little platoons’. He gives examples of how the Thatcher government challenged the position of voluntary groups, interests and self-governing professions such as the Higher Education Committee, the Church of England, the NHS and the BBC (Kavanagh 1990). The example of the church, which was mentioned above, is one vivid illustration. This was arguably due to the individualism that Mrs. Thatcher embraced, and the belief that each person is responsible for their own fate and that they should work to improve their lives. These neoliberal ideas were prevalent not only in the UK, but also in the USA under President Ronald Reagan and permeated major international organisations. As a result, the aid business was very much affected by policies. In the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed Structure Adjustments Policies (SAPs) on developing countries. In summary, the SAPs included four basic elements: currency devaluation, the removal/reduction of the state from the workings of the economy, the elimination of subsidies in an attempt to reduce expenditures and trade liberalisation […] such prerequisites were intended to lead to the ‘adjustment’ of malfunctioning economies in order that they become viable components of a global system (Riddell 1992: 53). By and large, these policies were not successful, and according to the former World Bank’s Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, “the SAPs proved neither necessary nor sufficient for development” (Stiglitz 2005). The SAPs were a failure mostly due to the reluctance of developing countries to accept them. There was a lack of political will from recipient countries due to the perception that SAPs were neo-colonial tools to exploit their resources. This colonial blaming and rhetoric was also a kind of shield used by the leaders of developing countries, whose economies were not performing and poverty levels were on the increase. Most developing countries in Africa during the 1980s were highly indebted, and their economies were collapsing. Tanzania, for example, had practised socialist policies (Ujamaa) since the late 1960s, and by the 1980s, the country had high levels of poverty. The intervention by the IMF to change the economic approach through SAPs was received with mixed emotions. As a result, President Julius Nyerere, who had introduced Ujamaa policies, wisely decided to resign to allow another leader to take the country through the economic changes. The leadership decision to leave office was one reason why Tanzania continued to enjoy peace as it allowed for a bearable transition from

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socialist to neoliberal economic policies. Many countries have experienced turbulent times in the transition, which was also combined with the end of the Cold War. Global politics in the period between the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s were challenging. Aid became one of the tools through which some countries could be managed and influenced. Aid for developmental reasons can be classified as tied and untied. Much of the aid that the West was offering the developing world was tied aid, which meant that there were always some conditions attached before the assistance or aid was actually given to that country. The recipient country, having no choice in the matter, not only accepted the aid but also indirectly embraced the ideals associated with SAPs, which in the long run had an adverse impact on the already strained economies. Nevertheless, such transition was needed in many countries—as in Tanzania. There are a number of things that are apparent from the brief (sketch) history of the British international development agenda from 1929 to the end of the Cold War. Firstly, it is clear that the British aid agenda and allocation was directed mainly towards the Commonwealth countries that were former colonies of Britain. In 1929, when British aid was instituted, it was to aid the colonies. These colonies continued to receive aid even when they became independent. There is still a strong tie of support to the former colonies through the Commonwealth platform. Secondly, the management of aid and the priority of aid aspects (i.e. trade vs. development) depended on the government in power. It was evident that the differing ideologies of the Labour and Conservative parties shaped different attitudes towards aid. While the Labour Party emphasised development aspects and an independent ministry to ensure that, the Conservative Party put more emphasis on trade and private investment, as well as managing aid under the Foreign Office. Thirdly, the structure and functions of aid in those years automatically encouraged bilateral aid, which meant that aid was given directly to another state. Although the emphasis of trade and private investment brought in the private sectors (particularly corporations), the aid relationship was between state (the UK) and other states (recipient country). The third point is particularly crucial for our analysis, which looks at the relationship between the government and faith groups. Faith groups are part of a voluntary sector, and there was clearly no room for them to function as implementers of foreign aid during that time. As will be seen in later chapters, the prominence of NGOs, including faith-based organisations (FBOs), rose in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, due to Thatcherite policies in the UK, the

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emphasis on the market and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), UK government aid was mainly bilateral, which meant it was given directly to other state governments. The only non-state actors who were involved were corporations, as they were supported by ‘Aid and Trade Provisions’ (which will be explained later) to encourage private investment by British companies in developing countries. The context of the Cold War has to be taken into consideration. As noted in Chapter 2, during the Cold War the main unit of focus, for most of international affairs, was the state. Thus, even aid was administered as a state tool to gain power and influence over other states. In this way, the Thatcher administration, for example, used aid to ensure further consolidation of neoliberal ideals in other states as they were closing up the fight against communist ideals. At this point, the importance of multilateral aid in the British aid agenda must be mentioned. Although there was not much emphasis placed on explaining the multilateral aspect of the British aid agenda in earlier sections, there is evidence that multilateral aid and development agencies were not ignored in the aid business. First of all, as seen above, there were mentions of the World Council of Churches’ proposal of a target of 1 per cent of GDP for aid, and the adoption of that by the UN in 1960, which was later reviewed and revised to 0.7 per cent of GDP for aid. These targets were discussed in the UK parliament, and it is evident that decisions made by multilateral aid agencies influenced the UK’s policy on international aid. In addition, Britain was instrumental in the establishment of the UN, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All of these organisations have international development as their primary concern. The ODA was responsible for international development management from 1979 up to mid-1997. However, in 1989 the Cold War ended and that marked the beginning of major changes in international relations as well as the discourse in international development. The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to the extent that some scholars, such as Francis Fukuyama, explained it as the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989). Although it was true that the end of the Cold War brought with it significant changes in international relations, and consequently IR as a discipline, most of what happened in the post-Cold War era had already begun during the Cold War even as both international politics and IR as a discipline concentrated on the East-West ideological tension, to the exclusion of the analysis of other events. This, as discussed in earlier chapters, led to

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the analysis of various aspects of international politics/relations, including the role of non-state actors, which were not considered in earlier periods when the discipline of IR was developing. Similarly, discussions on international development both at domestic and international policy levels changed. The SAPs of the 1980s were abandoned, and other policies and actors came to the political forefront. This was in order to deal with the environment that the post-Cold War world was facing. In that way, international development issues were incorporated into issues of the ‘new’ security agenda that includes poverty, terrorism, immigration, ethnic and civil conflicts, climate change and disease. In fact, one of the ways to deal with these ‘new’ security threats is to ensure human and economic development. Overall, the end of the Cold War in 1989 marked a turning point in IR as a discipline. New concerns arose in international relations and foreign policies aimed at different and new goals. The objectives of international aid gradually changed to meet the needs arising from the end of the Cold War. British international development institutions had to respond to these changes. In the light of this, the next sections of this chapter trace and analyse British international development policy in the postCold War period starting from 1992 to 2019. The rationale for starting in 1992 instead of 1989 is because in 1992 the Bosnian conflict erupted, highlighting the ‘new’ threats and forces of religion in the post-Cold War world. In addition, in the British context, 1992 was an important year, since there was an election and John Major, from the Conservative Party, became the prime minister. Thus, British international development policies from 1992 changed significantly and saw gradual developments and shifts from the policies of the Cold War period. To draw out the significance of these developments, the following sections will focus on two issues which will be examined within each of the periods outlined above: (a) the prevailing theme that guided international development policies at that period of time and (b) the way in which each of the government’s (i.e. Conservative [1992–1997]; New Labour [1997–2010]; the Coalition [2010–2015]; and Conservative [2015–2019]) ‘ideology’ impacted upon the international development agenda, especially with regard to the work of faith groups; and finally, (c) the chapter discusses institutional analysis, in which there will be a discussion of the policy changes to determine whether they were incremental or radical, and an attempt to identify the establishment of a new direction (if there was one).

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First Period (Conservative Government Under John Major): 1992--1997 By 1992, the Cold War had concluded, but the effects of the end of the East-West ideological battle were still being felt. The former USSR was disintegrating, new independent states were emerging, and the stability that Europe had enjoyed for several decades after the Second World War was now being challenged by the new rising tide of nationalism. It could be argued that the bipolar situation during the Cold War phase was comparatively more stable than the post-Cold War period, when new threats started to emerge. Mearsheimer (1990) captures this well in his article on instability in Europe after the Cold War. Swift changes in the balance of power in the post-Cold War period sometimes impacted on international security and stability. The Bosnian conflict erupted during this year. This conflict underscored the kind of security threats that the world would be facing in the post-Cold War era. These threats included ethnic and civil conflicts, poverty, humanitarian crises and climate change, among other challenges. In response to that, states had to look into new ways of dealing with such threats. Military capabilities were no longer sufficient to ensure global stability and peace. In fact, troops were deployed to supply humanitarian goods as opposed to fighting. The UK, for example, sent its troops to supply food to Bosnia and to ensure that humanitarian aid agencies were able to safely supply medicine and other supplies to victims of the conflict (Major 1992). Since most of these new security threats could be dealt with through economic and human development, international development policies started to change as a reaction to this. As will be shown, in this period, there were gradual but significant changes in international development that were not only experienced in the UK but also in multilateral aid agencies too. These changes in the international development agenda in response to the ‘new’ security threats have led to discussion of the ‘securitisation of international development’. Securitisation of international development refers to practices where international aid is dispensed for the ultimate purpose of ensuring peace and stability in both the recipient country and the donor country. Since the 1990s, arguments for aid have included objectives such as: ‘aid to help reduce immigration to Western countries’; ‘aid to curb new terrorism’; and ‘aid to prevent civil conflicts’. In the post-Cold War era, stability, as Duffield (2001: 310) argues, “is achieved by activities designed to reduce poverty,

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satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create representative civil institutions and protect the vulnerable, as well as to promote human rights”. As will be seen in this section, and in later sections, such objectives of aid have been integral to the British international development agenda. In 1992, the Conservatives won the UK general election and John Major remained prime minister. Looking at the Conservative Party election manifesto, it can be seen that the party already had plans for overseas aid to focus on: democracy and the free market; direct private economies in the developing world; debt relief, liberalisation of world trade and support for good government; and building efficient institutions and accountable governments to improve public administration and the legal system in a number of countries. In addition, the manifesto stated that the government would use overseas aid to promote good government, sensible economic policies, the rooting-out of corruption, respect for human rights and the rule of law. These policies reflect what Duffield (2001) explained above, i.e. the promotion of activities such as fighting corruption, building civil institutions for democracy and human rights among other activities, with the main goal of achieving stability. Aspects of the rule of law, democracy and human rights became conditions to be met in order to receive aid. In that respect, the prevailing international development agenda came to be known as political conditionality. Political conditionality is best explained as an aid-guiding agenda covering the concepts of human rights, democracy and good governance. These three concepts formed the conditional basis for Western governments’ aid allocation in the early 1990s. Political Conditionality Policies The UK government tied its overseas assistance to human rights, good governance and democracy (Conservative Party 1992; Crawford 2000). The keenness of the UK government to pursue and tie its aid to these principles was marked in 1990 when the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, gave a landmark speech at the Overseas Development Institute (cited in Barder 2005), stating that: Economic success depends to a large degree on effective and honest government, political pluralism and observance of the rule of law, as well as freer, more open economies […] While countries tending towards pluralism, public

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accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles should be encouraged, those which persisted with repressive policies, corrupt management, or with wasteful and discredited economic systems should not expect aid donors to support their folly with scarce aid resources which could be used better elsewhere.

In a number of speeches that were delivered by John Major as prime minister (1990–1997), terms such as good government, and promotion of democracy and human rights often appeared in relation to British activities in the developing world, and especially in relation to the new Eastern European States.5 For example, in his speech at the 1991 Commonwealth in Harare, Major said that “this meeting must set the framework for the Commonwealth of the 1990s, we must build on our existing strengths, make the most of new possibilities. But the bedrock of what we must do must be the general application of democracy and human rights. It is on that basis that we can build good government and economic prosperity” [emphasis added] (Major 1991). Furthermore, Baroness Lynda Chalker, who was the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister of Overseas Development from 1989 to 1997, often highlighted the centrality of human rights, democracy and good government in the British overseas development agenda (Chalker 1991). These political conditionality policies were matched to aid allocation. The percentage of aid allocation towards good governance in Africa, for example, rose sharply from 3.5 per cent in the year 1988/1989– 1989/1990 to 8.4 per cent in 1993/1994–1994/1995 (Killick 2005: 668). Political conditionality of good government in this period focused on reforming the political institutions of recipient countries in areas such as accountability and transparency in government transactions, promoting multiparty systems and civil societies. The political conditionality tied to the UK’s international development policies was not a matter of rhetoric alone; indeed, the government could actually suspend aid on the grounds of bad governance. For instance, after several failed efforts to convince President Daniel Moi’s government to reform his politics and increase respect for human rights, Britain and other donors suspended programme aid to Kenya in 1991 and 1995 (Cumming 2017). Other examples could be highlighted, but the point that needs to be made is that the early 1990s saw a transformation in the direction of the UK’s development aid. By and large, political conditionality policies had a greater impact on the developing world as compared to the 1980s SAPs. One of the

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visible results was democratisation and introduction of liberal policies in most countries as well as the introduction of multiparty systems in countries that had only a single party. Huntington (1993) termed this shift as ‘third wave’ democratisation. This is partly because most recipient countries had no choice and accepted them, sometimes willingly, sometimes unwillingly. Since the Cold War was over, these countries did not have much of a voice anymore as they did during the Cold War, when the big powers were constantly looking for ideological allies. That is why, in 1991 Baroness Lynda Chalker, the former minister for foreign aid, stated that (Cummings 2017: 112): For 20 years, smart opinion dubbed any criticism by Western countries of the political systems of developing countries as “neo-colonialist”. Like much of the conventional wisdom of the period, this was claptrap.

During the Cold War, development assistance was often used as a political instrument to contain communism. The practice was that “aid was used to bolster allies, whether democratic or not” (Cumming 2017: 12). Evidence of such practice can be found in the massive aid support from the Western countries (mainly USA, France and Belgium) to Zaire (currently DRC), while it was under the dictatorship of Mobutu Joseph Sese Seko (Callaghy 2001: 143). During the Cold War, the West was more concerned about containing communism than spreading democracy, or dealing with human rights issues. The West’s victory (in the Cold War) made it possible for Western ideals to be imposed on the rest of the developing world. Tying foreign aid to these ideals was one way of achieving this. On the other side, although political conditionality emerged strongly as a theme of international development policies in the early 1990s, it was arguably not unprecedented. The failure of SAPs in the 1980s may have been a wake-up call to the donor community that political systems have to change in order to realise economic success. The end of the Cold War was, however, an opportunity for Western donors to impose the new agenda of political conditionality. Partly as a result of that, many developing countries change their political system from a single-party system to a multiparty system. Tanzania, for example, amended its constitution in 1992 to register other political parties. Following that, Tanzania increasingly received foreign aid to the point that the country came to be known as a ‘donor darling’ (Menocal and Mulley 2006). Thus, in the immediate

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post-Cold War period many countries adopted Western styles of democracy and political values to make sure that they received aid from the West. The principles of political conditionality were not practised by the UK alone, but also by the rest of the donor community, including multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD. These organisations receive money collectively from various donor countries that entrust them to implement development programs and projects in recipient countries. Although these organisations, with the exception of the UN, are able to pursue their own agenda and implementation procedures, major donor countries influence them through weighted voting (World Bank and IMF)—the weight of the vote depends on the member’s financial contribution. Thus, whatever these organisations carry out is often in line with the donors’ interests. However, due to their rich expertise, these organisations are, in certain situations, more competent in international development matters, hence their ability to convince and influence donor countries. Such was the case in the 1980s when the IMF introduced the SAPs that were embraced by the donor countries in their allocation of bilateral aid. Thus, just as the donor countries influenced the multilateral policies of international development, multilateral policies influenced donor countries’ international development policies as well. As a result, both multilateral and bilateral aid policies speak the same language at the end of the day. The UK is one of the most prominent members of these organisations. This is because of its relatively high financial contribution to these organisations. Agreements passed by these institutions are crucial to the UK’s international development policies, as will be discussed in a later section on the issue of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In fact, it should be obvious that the UK international development policies would reflect a multilateral agenda because Britain, as a prominent member, puts forth policy recommendations to those organisations, along with the financial strength to push them forward. Baroness Lynda Chalker observed that “the UK has obligations to multilateral aid organisations which, to a large extent, determine the level of British contribution to them” (Chalker 1994: 243). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of these international developmental organisations published reports, passed declarations and established institutions that stressed the same themes of good governance,

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democracy and human rights as pre-conditions for foreign aid. For example, the World Bank’s (1992) ‘Development and Governance’ report defined governance and underscored its importance to development. The OECD-Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC), Development Co-operation Guidelines Series, such as ‘Participatory Development and Good Government’ published in 1995, insisted that member states should promote good governance and participatory development in developing nations. These guidelines governed the UK government’s criteria for evaluating aid and trade provision (House of Commons 1993). Other general international organisations, such as the European Union (EU), have international development on their agenda. The EU international development policies are also in line with other multilateral organisations’ policies. For example, at the immediate end of the Cold War in 1989, the EC Council of Ministers adopted political conditionality as an ‘aid regime principle’ (Baylies 1995: 322). Building upon this, the ‘Development Co-operation’ in the Maastricht Treaty Article 130, Paragraph 2, declared that ‘community policy in Development and Co-operation shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In addition to political conditionality, the UK’s foreign aid was also tied to trade through a special programme known as the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP). ATP was introduced in 1978 by the Labour government. In general, “ATP was a scheme where aid was specifically used to support British exporters, mostly to middle-income countries” (Morrissey 2002: 11). With the ATP plan, ODA had to allocate “about 5 per cent of UK aid to finance developmentally sound projects, which also served a number of UK commercial purposes” (Toye 1991: 99–100). The commercial purposes of ATP, as they were presented to parliament, were: (a) facilitating entry into a new market or sector; (b) establishing or maintaining technological links; (c) retaining a traditional market temporarily endangered; (d) combating the aggressive use of aid by trading competitors; and (e) helping UK industries to ‘secure orders of commercial and industrial importance’ (Toye 1991: 100; Morrissey 1990; Toye and Clark 1986). In connection with this, it is important to mention the controversy that ATP brought into the political conditionality aid agenda. The ATP scheme tied aid to trade. Within the framework of ATP, aid money was allocated to British companies that would invest in developing countries. For market reasons, these business companies were willing to invest

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only in those developing countries with a certain level of income. In that way, the companies were not investing in the poorest countries, which needed the most development assistance, nor were they necessarily investing in countries that had good human rights records. For example, there were criticisms when Britain, through ATP, doubled its aid to Oman and Indonesia in the years between 1980 and 1992/1993. Oman had a relatively high income per capita compared to other countries in the developing world, while Indonesia had been accused of mass violations of human rights, particularly in the case of East Timor. The aid increase to these two countries correlated with an increase in sales of British arms to these two countries (House of Lords 1994). One of the biggest criticisms of the ATP scheme was the British government’s aid provision towards the construction of the Pergau hydroelectricity dam in Malaysia. The UK government funnelled £234 million of aid money through the ATP scheme to fund the construction of this dam. According to the International Development and Co-operation Act of 1980, the Pergau dam did not prove to be of developmental value. The Act stated “The Secretary of State shall have the power, for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or the welfare of its people, to furnish any person or body with assistance, whether financial, technical or of any other nature”. In accordance with the Act, the dam was not developmental since it was more expensive than other alternative sources of energy, such as the gas turbine plants proposed by the World Bank (Hare 1995). But the British government considered it appropriate to fund British companies to construct this dam and went ahead with the project anyway (Hare 1995: 227). In reaction to this, the Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), Sir Tim Lankester spoke out against the British government’s plan to fund the Pergau project but the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Hurd considered it appropriate to allocate aid provisions for the construction of the dam (Hare 1995). This was followed by campaigns by NGOs, prominently the World Development Movement, before the Parliamentary Select Committee of Foreign Affairs (Whitaker and Routledge 1994) and the High Court finally investigated the issue. In 2012, Lankester (2013) wrote a book with more details on what happened and stakeholders who were involved both from the government and non-government sectors.

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The Pergau dam scandal marked the beginning of aid and trade reviews. Subsequently, the Overseas Development Administration started to evaluate tied aid programmes, and the findings were disappointing. For example, in 1996 the ODA carried out an evaluation of the water supply project to 16 communities in Nepal by British contractors, which was commissioned and funded by the ODA in 1992. The ODA found that the project was only ‘partially successful’, partly because the implementing agency, i.e. the British contractors, gave insufficient attention to social issues and concentrated too much on ensuring a high-quality standard of infrastructure (FCO/ODA 1996; Chinnock and Collinson 1998). In addition, the evaluation found that the Nepalese water department lacked the capacity, maintenance budget and necessary spare parts and tools to keep the taps in working order. The project was left unfinished with three of the largest schemes uncompleted due to ‘significant time and cost overruns’ and five schemes were dropped altogether (FCO/ODA 1996). After these reviews, there was a consensus within the ODA against the practice of tying aid to trade. The report (FCO/ODA 1996) concluded that “the UK would benefit from untying its aid programme, even on a unilateral basis”. Such policy reviews within the ODA were internal factors that were forcing policy change. There were also external factors that were proving that political conditionality and tied aid policies were not working. Global poverty levels were still high. By 1996, the poverty rates based on the population living below US $1 a day were as follows: East Asia 14.93 per cent; East Europe and Central Asia 5.1 per cent; Latin America 15.63 per cent; Middle East and North Africa 7.81 per cent; South Asia 42.26 per cent; and sub-Saharan Africa 48.53 per cent (Besley and Burgess 2003). These high levels of poverty and human suffering in Africa and other parts of the global south moved the international community into acting in solidarity to tackle poverty. In contemplating how to deal with the world’s poverty, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) set international goals in 1996. The United Nations’ General Assembly adopted these goals in 2000. They came to be known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs comprised of 8 goals, which were: (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (ii) achieve universal primary education; (iii) promote gender equality and empower women; (iv) reduce child mortality; (v) improve maternal health; (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vii) ensure environmental sustainability; and (viii) develop a global partnership for

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development. The target year for achieving these goals was 2015. These goals, as will be seen in the next sections, were integral to the British international development agenda. In 2015, other international goals were set, famously known as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) comprising of 17 goals. The SDGs, as different from MDGs, were more inclusive in their making. This inclusiveness was to ensure that all key development stakeholders were engaged—both the UN and civil society across the world (Tomalin et al. 2019). SDGs have also been incorporated into the British Development agenda. In this way, the influence of external factors on British development policies can be seen. However, there are also domestic factors that play a role in the shaping of policy. These factors for policy change will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, which discusses policy change and continuity using the historical institutionalism framework discussed in the previous chapter.

Second Period: (Labour Government Under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) 1997--2010 In May 1997, the 18-year Conservative government ended in the election of the Labour Party, which had rebranded itself as New Labour. The rebranding of the Labour Party to New Labour was not cosmetic. It reflected various changes that were happening in the Labour Party. To cope with the political and social wave of the moment and to win the election, the Labour Party had to carry out changes that would help the party win the election. These changes were meant to differentiate the old Labour from the New Labour. In his book, A Journey, Tony Blair recalls: “New Labour was all about understanding this social evolution (i.e. choice, freedom to earn more money and spend it, and people’s desire to have a new relationship with the state: as partners or citizens, not as beneficiaries or clients) […] It wasn’t about ‘coming to terms’ with such an evolution. It was about rejoicing in it, recognising that this was not an unfortunate reality that we had to learn to acknowledge in order to make progress” (Blair 2011: 91). Steven Fielding argues that “In opposition, Blair’s electoral strategy was to obscure Labour’s differences with Thatcherism and stress his willingness to maintain key Conservative reforms so as to appeal to wavering voters” (Fielding 2003). Thus, New Labour embraced ‘third way’ policies and placed New Labour in a ‘middle’ position that is neither Thatcherism nor old Labour’s social democratic policies. The ‘third way’, Blair maintains, is not an attempt

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to split the difference between Right and Left; it is about traditional values in a changed world (Blair 1998). Thus, New Labour’s ‘third way’ policies were a response to both domestic and international social factors. Globalisation and neoliberal ideas of free and open markets were gaining momentum. The end of the Cold War further exacerbated these ideals. In the UK, the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major embraced such policies and were in power for 18 years. Thus, for Tony Blair and other Labour leaders such as Gordon Brown, it was necessary for the party to change so that they could appeal to people, win the election and maintain victory. New Labour stayed in power for 13 years and survived three elections. In connection with this, it is worth noting that the process of changing the Labour Party did not happen overnight. The process took some years, and the abolition of Clause IV in Labour’s constitution in 1995 marked the beginning of New Labour. Clause IV bounded the party to cooperate with the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, and to advocate for the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service. Clare Short, the first Secretary of State for International Development in 1997, argued that the New Labour’s ‘third way’ “was an attempt to turn triangulation - the identification of two opposing views so the middle position can be pursued, into a philosophy” (Short 2004: 2). In effect, the ‘third way’ ideology put Labour in the centre, between the left and right. The New Labour government implemented neoliberal ideas such as open markets and privatisation, which, to some extent, made it appear Thatcherite. In fact, there are arguments that Thatcherism is not very far from New Labour’s ‘third way’ policies. One of the professed strengths of Margaret Thatcher was that “she did not only change her party but she also influenced the Labour Party” (Evans 1997; Hills 1998). On the other side, the ‘third way’ is portrayed as a distinct ideology that leans towards the left. Giddens (2003: 36) argued that the ‘third way’ refers to “a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adapt socialdemocracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past two or three decades […] it is a third way in the sense that it is an attempt to transcend both old-style social democracy and neo-liberalism”. There are visible differences between Thatcherism and the ‘third way’, as Driver and Martell (2000: 149) explain:

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…third way could promote wealth creation and social justice, the market and the community; it could embrace private enterprise but not automatically favour market solutions; it could endorse a positive role for the state – for example, welfare to work – but need not assume that governments provide public services directly: these might be done by the voluntary or private sectors; and it could, above all, offer a communitarian, rather than individualist view of society in which individuals are embedded in social relations which give structure and meaning to people’s lives – and that it is the role of governments to promote ‘the community’ as a way of enriching individual lives.

In this way, Driver and Martell (2002: 70–79) maintained that the ‘third way’ is “concerned with finding alternatives to state provision […] leading to the state working in ‘partnership’ with the private and voluntary sectors”. This emphasis on ‘partnership’ is crucial to the analysis in this book. The main aim is to analyse the relationship between the government and faith groups (which belong to voluntary sectors), and such a policy (i.e. partnership with voluntary sectors) facilitates the government to engage with faith groups in implementing some of their policies (i.e. international development policies). The New Labour government made international development a priority. In hindsight, international development fitted in with the larger context of what New Labour called ‘Ethical Foreign Policy’. The Ethical Foreign Policy of New Labour leaders (like Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Robin Cook and Clare Short) aimed to pursue moral international policies, moving from focusing only on ‘national interests’ to a consideration of the poorest in the world (Chandler 2003; Booth et al. 2000; Smith et al. 2001). An example of Ethical Foreign Policy in action was the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Britain joined other Western countries, such as the USA, to stop the mass killings. Realistically, it could be argued that the Kosovo intervention was not in Britain’s national interest. Although New Labour separated the functions of international development from the Foreign Office, assisting the world’s poor and tackling global poverty is integral to the Ethical Foreign Policy. The factoring of issues such as human rights and humanitarian intervention into international policies was a key aspect of the Ethical Foreign Policy. By and large, the Ethical Foreign Policy was idealistic, and on a number of occasions, it proved difficult to implement. All in all, there were significant changes in the British international development agenda from 1997 onwards. There are various

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possible explanations for these changes, which were both domestic and international, as will be seen throughout this chapter. There were radical and significant institutional changes in the first years of the New Labour government. The Overseas Development Administration that was under the remit of the FCO was upgraded to a full ministry: the Department for International Development (DFID). A cabinet minister heads DFID and not only manages bilateral and multilateral aid, but also ensures that all other government departments are consistent in development policies. Although it was not the first time that the ODA had become a full ministry, the mandate that DFID was given was unprecedented. DFID made fighting global poverty a priority. This was different from the previous long-term focus on economic growth. At this point, it is useful to define the two terms: ‘economic growth’ and ‘economic development’, and the distinction that exists between the two concepts. The term ‘economic growth’ is primarily associated with the GDP of a particular country. Development, on the other hand, is a much broader concept based on a consideration of people’s quality of life taking into account issues such as health, education and human security, since these elements of human life cannot be quantified. Separating the ODA from the FCO was a significant institutional change. The previous arrangement had survived for 18 years, and the international development agenda was intrinsically linked to other foreign policies. Although international development is a foreign policy in the sense that it is a policy meant to deal with Britain’s external relations, it is different from other foreign policies due to its philanthropic attributes. There may be and more often are national interests behind international development policies, but inherent to these policies is the moral drive to help improve the lives of people who are struggling with poverty and other issues such as conflicts and humanitarian crises. On the other side, the mainstream foreign policies have national interests at their core and they do not care much about the other aspects. Thus, separating the ODA from the FCO did not only symbolise change in institutional structure but also institutional ideas and norms that created a new path in the British international development agenda. There are arguments that nothing major changed with this separation, such as Howard White’s claim that “closer examination of the historical record shows that there has been far more continuity than change in British aid” (White 1998: 152). Arguments such as White’s are an exaggeration, in contrast to

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most scholars’ arguments that DFID brought major changes to international development policies (Morrissey 2002). Morrissey (2002), further, explains “the increased political status of development was matched by funding. The British aid budget was increased by 40 per cent from $3.2 billion to $4.5 billion, representing 0.26 per cent and 0.32 per cent of gross national income, in 1997 and 2000 respectively” (Morrissey 2002: 1). In addition, the orientation of aid policy changed as well, “away from the concern with promoting British commercial and political interests that prevailed in the ODA towards a focus on reducing poverty in the poorest countries. DFID have been concerned that aid, especially increased flows, is used effectively and targeted towards reducing poverty. This concern has been manifested in a number of ways, notably through coherent policy-making and analysis, reflected in the tenor of the two international development white papers and a ‘results-oriented’ perspective that has guided the way the department operates in practice” (Morrissey 2002: 2). In connection with this, the department abolished the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) as well as sponsoring a new bill which would later become an Act (2002) that would provide a legal basis for DFID’s new focus on prioritising the fight against poverty, as opposed to other ‘interests’ that international aid might embrace. The 2002 International Development Act repealed the 1980 International Development Act, which was deemed lacking in some key aspects that needed to support the new policies that had been decided upon. While the 1980 Act allowed the Secretary of State to provide assistance of a “financial, technical or any other nature to promote the development or maintain the economy of a country or territory outside the UK, or the welfare of its people” (Richard 2011), the new one allowed the Secretary of State for Development to provide ‘development assistance’ to any country or territory outside the UK to contribute to a reduction of poverty (Richard 2011). Thus, the new Act was more specific regarding the nature of assistance, in having to contribute to poverty reduction (the multilateral agenda of the moment). The 1980 Act allowed the government to use aid for commercial purposes, while the 2002 Act does not allow development assistance to be used for any purpose other than poverty reduction. The new Act emphasised poverty-reduction aspects, as opposed to economic growth. These policies, excellently presented in the ambitious first DFID white paper, were titled ‘Eliminating World Poverty’.

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To achieve the goal of ‘eliminating world poverty’ policies along with other international goals set by the rest of the OECD-DAC and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), DFID opted for a partnership with recipient countries, rather than imposed political conditionality. This partnership was not only with recipient countries but also with voluntary sectors, the private sector and international aid agencies such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD. DFID decided to work with these groups to reduce poverty. Thus, partnership and poverty reduction guided international development policies in the period between 1997 and 2010. Partnership and Poverty-Reduction Policies In 1997, the New Labour government published a white paper, titled ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century’. This white paper reflected the international spirit of partnership on poverty reduction. This confirms the impact of multilateral agreements on the UK’s international development policies, and vice versa. Furthermore, the 1997 white paper redefined the UK’s development policies beyond traditional aid assistance. It stated the new vision of the UK international development agenda (DFID 1997: 16): This is not just a white paper about aid. It is a white paper about sustainable development and a secure future for our planet and its people.

To eliminate world poverty, the UK’s international development policies had to change. Some of the previous interests, such as using foreign aid to promote British trade, had to be kept aside. For that reason, the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) had to be abolished, on the grounds that “it lacks poverty elimination as its central focus” (DFID 1997: 45). The abolition of the ATP and other political ties to foreign aid in April 2001 opened doors for non-commercial/non-profit organisations to become partners in the UK’s international development agenda. This strengthened the spirit of partnership not only with recipient governments but also with civil societies and NGOs that were not as close to the UK’s international development agenda as the commercial companies. The idea of partnership was intrinsically linked to poverty eradication policies, which became the core international development agenda. The

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1997 white paper explicitly defines recipient countries and other development agencies, such as civil societies, as ‘partners’ (DFID 1997: 6): Work closely with other donors and development agencies to build partnerships with developing countries to strengthen the commitment to the elimination of poverty, and use our influence to help mobilise the political will to achieve the international development targets.

Thus, the UK government, along with the multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, incorporated a poverty eradication theme into their policies. The World Bank and the IMF introduced a strategy focusing on poverty reduction in 1999. This strategy was known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Under this strategy, countries were supposed to write a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to access development assistance from these institutions. The plan transferred ownership of development initiatives from the donors to recipient countries. That was partnership. PRSP replaced the structural adjustments and political conditionality aid regimes of the 1980s and early 1990s, respectively. PRSP was an initiative that acknowledged and supported the importance of domestic cultures, politics in development and a sense of ownership from the recipient’s point of view. PRSP was in line with partnership policy. With relevant modification, the UK adopted the PRS. In countries, which were categorised as weak or failed states, DFID modified PRSP into an initiative known as Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments (PRDE) and incorporated the MDGs into those strategies. The MDGs had a target-driven time-framework, which was to halve the world’s poverty by 2015. The MDGs and the poverty-reduction strategy papers constructed the basis for multilateral development agendas. Recipient countries had to incorporate MDGs into their PRSPs by outlining their strategies for achieving the goals by the target year, 2015. In 2000, the UK government published a second white paper, titled ‘Eliminating Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the World’s Poor’. Most of the targets for this white paper were similar to the MDGs. The only notable difference was the emphasis on ‘good government’, which, interestingly, was one of the conditions in the early 1990s. This was one sign of policy continuity. However, good government was not now represented as a condition for aid, but as an important aspect of development. The tone and presentation of it did not come out as conditionality or hierarchical order but a crucial prerequisite through which development

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can be achieved. By and large, the first white paper (1997) set out what DFID intended to do. The 2000 white paper targeted the challenges of globalisation that were missing from the first white paper. The September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks had an impact on international development policies and, as will be seen in Chapter 4, had an indirect impact on the ‘partnership’ policies with some of the Islamic aid agencies in particular. This is because one of the agreed international ways of tackling such large-scale terrorism was to control money flow and prevent money laundering. This affected some of the contributions to Islamic charities/agencies in the UK. There is plentiful evidence of change in international development policies during this period. These changes will be further clarified in Chapters 4 and 5. On July 7, 2005, another terrorist attack occurred in London. These attacks happened on the same day that the G8 meeting was being chaired and hosted by the UK in Scotland. This attack, as will also be seen in the next chapters, had an impact on international development policies, especially with regard to poverty reduction. This is because the terrorists were British-born citizens, but with Pakistani origin and training in Pakistan. Some of these terrorists’ justification for carrying out such a vicious attack was Western foreign policy, which they judged as unfair and against the Islamic world. Such allegations were not necessarily true, and as will be seen in the next chapters, Britain gives international development assistance to Pakistan and many other countries in the Muslim world. In fact, Pakistan has been among the top UK aid recipients for many years. UK aid to Pakistan had increased from £15 million in 2000/2001 to £66 million in 2003/2004; by the year 2005/2006, UK aid to Pakistan was £97 million (DFID 2007). Although there are various studies that suggest limited correlations between poverty and terrorism (Krueger and Maleckova 2002; Krueger and Malecková 2003; Berrebi 2007), international development policy has not sidelined the fight against poverty as one of the means to curb terrorism. To curb the roots of terrorism, poverty has to be reduced. Poverty can be used as a justification for unfair policies and discrimination. This is linked to ways through which terrorist groups recruit. Following the emerging terrorist attacks on British soil and beyond, plus the G8 meeting that was preceded by a historic anti-poverty campaign (Make Poverty History), the UK government compiled a third white paper on international development. This paper was published in 2006. The paper outlined plans to carry out promises made in the 2005 G8 meeting, EU presidency and the Make Poverty History campaign (2005). In 2005, the

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Commission for Africa also published its report on how to fight poverty in Africa. This commission was established in 2004 by Tony Blair and was composed of 17 prominent figures in international development. They included the late former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, and the former president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa. The stated aim of the Commission for Africa was to take a fresh look at Africa’s past and present and the international community’s role in its development path. The commission was established to seize on the political and symbolic opportunity that 2005 presented to make a difference for Africa. Tony Blair’s motive for establishing such a commission can be summarised by his statement below (Kampfner 2004: 123): The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don’t, it will become deeper and angrier.

Thus, the 2006 white paper, just like the previous two white papers (1997 and 2000), had its main focus on poverty reduction. In 2007, there was a change in leadership within the New Labour government. Tony Blair resigned and Gordon Brown took over as party leader and prime minister. Both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were supporters of the international development agenda and DFID. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown supported DFID’s budget. Short (2004) recalls that Brown’s determination to reduce poverty has been sustained through his policy of redistribution by stealth and his interest in efforts to reduce global poverty. Even after his premiership, Gordon Brown has continued with the fight against poverty at a global level with various global education initiatives.6 Thus, under Gordon Brown’s leadership between 2007 and 2010, the UK government kept its international development focus on partnership and poverty reduction. In 2009, DFID published a fourth international development white paper titled, ‘Building Our Common Future’. This paper focused on three challenges: global financial crises; conflicts and fragile states; and climate change. These were considered to be the main challenges faced in eliminating world poverty. The paper makes a priority of fragile states and links the insecurity in these states to domestic security (i.e. in the UK or the West in general) (DFID 2009):

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We will […] give greater priority to our efforts to tackle the effects of conflict and state fragility on the poorest. Violent conflict and weak governance lie at the root causes of much poverty. Around a third of the 1.4 billion people below the poverty line today live in fragile countries, as well as half of the children who die before they reach their fifth birthday and half of the children who are not in primary school.

For the most part, the white paper (2009) complemented the three previous white papers (1997, 2000, and 2006). Like the previous papers, the paper was channelled towards the MDGs. As seen in the paragraph above, DFID was concerned with extreme poverty and child mortality, which comprised the first and fourth of the MDGs, respectively. Other factors that were evidently influencing the international development agenda were the financial crises and, arguably, the general election in 2010. The financial crises had multiple effects on development—not so much in reducing the amount of aid flow—since aid expenditure kept increasing each year—for example from 0.36 per cent in 2007/8 of GNI to 0.56 per cent in 2010/117 —but in increasing poverty levels and conflicts in the developing world. With regard to the 2010 elections, New Labour had to highlight its achievements, and arguably, the international development agenda (though perhaps low priority in domestic politics and less appealing to the majority electorate) was one thing that underscored the difference between the Labour and Conservative governments. International development was a major issue because David Cameron (as will be seen) advocated it, and had already begun major changes to the Conservative Party’s standpoint on international development. The 2010 elections had much to do with showing the compassionate side of the Conservatives against the entrenched view of the Conservatives as less compassionate relative to the Labour Party. Thus, the 2009 white paper was crucial for New Labour. All in all, the main policy guide for New Labour, until the time when they were taken out of power in 2010, continued to be based on partnership and poverty reduction.

Third Period (Conservative-Led Coalition Government Under David Cameron) 2010--2015 In May 2010, the general election in the UK resulted in a hung parliament. Thereafter, a coalition government was formed between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. Since the Conservatives won

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most support, David Cameron led the coalition government as prime minister. From 2005, when Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party, he changed his party’s standpoint on international development. This was in line with the modernisation process he had undertaken in his party leadership. In his book For The Record, Cameron explained, “we had to modernise the party and make it electable once again - not with a modest change to our image but a full-blown overhaul of who we were, the issues we addressed, how we conducted ourselves and what we had to say to people in twenty-first century Britain” (Cameron 2019). One of the new ideas that Cameron introduced to his party is the concept of ‘big society’. The ‘big society’ involved “redistributing power from the state to society; from the centre to local communities, giving people the opportunity to take more control over their lives” (Conservative Party 2010: 37). The ‘big society’ idea could be traced from the 2009 Conservative Party conference in Manchester, where David Cameron talked about placing less emphasis on government and more on society. In his own words, which were a sharp contrast to former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Cameron said, “I have some simple beliefs. That there is such a thing as society; it’s just not the same thing as the state” (Cameron 2009b). Following that, Cameron talked about the ‘big society’ in a number of his speeches (Cameron 2009a) and the 2010 Conservative election manifesto described the ‘big society’ as an idea that ran through all policy programs. In his book, Cameron (2019) underscored that ‘big society’ is the idea from which all of the Conservative Party government’s reform would flow and would be put front and centre of the government programme. In summary, he has described ‘big society’ to have been derived from the concept that ‘real change is not what government can do on its own. Real change is when everyone pulls together’. The Conservative-led coalition government adopted the idea of the ‘big society’ and the Cabinet Office managed it. The ‘big society’ idea suggested the coalition government’s attitude to charities and voluntary groups. The ‘big society’ plans were to empower such groups and allow them to deliver public services where they could. The Conservative Party’s 2010 election manifesto emphasised the government will “strengthen and support social enterprises to help deliver our public service reforms by creating a ‘big society’ Bank, funded from unclaimed bank assets, to provide new finance for neighbourhood groups, charities, social enterprises and other non-governmental bodies” (Conservative Party 2010). The Cabinet Office underscored its support towards

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the creation and expansion of mutuals, co-operatives, charities and social enterprises, and support of these groups to have much greater involvement in the running of public services. The ‘big society’ idea received a number of criticisms, especially due to budget and spending cuts that the coalition government undertook. In a number of speeches and in a newspaper article (Cameron 2011), David Cameron defended the idea. This will now be examined further and how “big society” impacted the relationships between the government and faith groups in the next chapters. Another major change that David Cameron introduced to his party is the promotion of international development. Since 2005, the Conservative Party’s standpoint on international development dramatically changed. For example, Cameron decided that the Conservative government would keep DFID as an independent department in Whitehall. This differed significantly from previous Conservative governments that had always preferred international development to be managed by the FCO. As the 2010 elections led to a coalition government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of these parties had their own election manifesto and each of them included their policies on international development. The Conservative Party published a green paper on international development titled ‘One World Conservatism, A Conservative Agenda for International Development’. The Liberal Democrats did not publish an independent paper for international development, but their manifesto had sections on international development issues (Liberal Democrat Party 2010), which summarised what a Liberal Democrat government would do for international development. After considering their differences, the two parties published the full coalition agreement, titled ‘The Coalition: Our Programme for Government’ (HMG 2010b) in which there was a page on international development listing what the coalition government would do. This list was very basic, and it did not give any details of how those policies were to be achieved. For the most part, the list reflected most of what was already in the Conservative green paper. There was one exception though, which was presumably the main Liberal Democrat contribution to the coalition’s international development agenda: the idea of enshrining into law the promise of achieving 0.7 per cent GNI for aid by 2013.8 The prime minister, David Cameron, appointed Andrew Mitchell as Secretary of State for International Development. Mitchell had been the Shadow Minister for International Development since 2005. This suggested that the coalition government’s international development agenda was considerably based

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on the Conservative green paper on international development. There was cabinet reshuffling during this period, yet the position of Cabinet Secretary for International Development remained a Conservative one. The main difference between the green paper and the previous white papers was the focus on ‘value for money’. While the previous DFID white papers focused on ‘partnerships’, the Conservative-led coalition put forth ‘value for money’ as the key policy guiding agenda on international development. Value for Money Policies The green paper insisted on the need to ensure ‘value for money’ through output-based aid, independent evaluation and transparency. DFID was to be more output driven than input focused. In other words, the value of aid money would be measured by what was achieved and not how much aid had been given. To achieve this, DFID would ensure scrutiny of the recipient country while reassuring British taxpayers that their money is well spent (Conservative Party 2010a: 17–18). It was emphasised that, “value for money had always been important but never more so than now” (Mitchell 2010). That emphasis on ‘value for money’ could not come at a better time as the UK economy was facing recession and plans for budgetary cuts were underway. In connection with this, it is worth mentioning that the coalition government cut budgets to all departments apart from DFID and the National Health Service (NHS). That was a remarkable move, since international development had never been a priority over other domestic affairs. Thus, to justify this to the British taxpayers, the government had to ensure ‘value for money’ by focusing on the outcome, e.g. how many girls and/or children have gone to school as a result of UK aid, or how many infant lives have been saved as a result of UK aid. In connection with this, in the 2010–2015 government policy on education in developing countries, DFID explained how supporting and investing in education programs in developing countries will lead to less foreign aid in the future and improve the countries’ ability to trade (HMG 2010a). For British taxpayers to access information on aid and to know whether their money is spent properly, the green paper proposed the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee. Inherent to the ‘value for money’ policies was transparency. Unlike the previous Conservative administration (1979–1997), the Conservative-led coalition government started to publish “full information about all of

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DFID’s projects and programmes, including the results of impact evaluations, on its website” (Conservative Party 2010a: 16). In addition, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, launched the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee (Mitchell 2010), which ensured that DFID publishes details of all money that is spent on international development. This information was to be provided not only to British taxpayers but also to recipient communities in developing countries. In his first speech delivered at the Oxfam and Royal Exchange forum, the Secretary of State for International Development said the new UK Aid Transparency Guarantee will also “help to create a million independent aid watchdogs – people around the world who can see where aid money is supposed to be going – and shout if it doesn’t get there” (Mitchell 2010). Connected to the transparency aspect of ‘value for money’ was the establishment of an Independent Aid Watchdog (Conservative Party 2010a). This watchdog is an independent body that gathers evidence about the impact and outcomes of British aid and carries out impartial analysis of the objectives and effectiveness of aid. In this way, the Secretary of State and other policymakers in DFID would be able to decide on policies that are evidence-based. Clearly, ‘value for money’, with its focus on results and aid outputs, was the key agenda for the Conservative-led coalition government’s international development agenda. In connection with the emphasis on ‘value for money’ and the result/evidence-based analysis of aid, the coalition government’s international development policy placed emphasis on wealth creation, as opposed to poverty reduction. It is easier to quantify and measure wealth creation than poverty reduction. Thus, to ensure and measure ‘value for money’ there was more focus on the private sector and the idea that business that could invest in recipient countries, and so promote economic development. The coalition government focused on trade. For instance, through Vodafone, the coalition government was supporting a project in East Africa, known as MPESA. In this scheme, people can send and receive money through their mobile phones. As a result, they can access capital and the market more easily. This facilitates micro-financing, which is key to small-scale trade and businesses that can create wealth in developing countries. MPESA has proven to be a successful initiative that has ensured financial inclusion to a larger population of both rural and urban areas in East Africa. It has filled the gap that most traditional banking had

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left in particular in low-income communities.9 In Tanzania, for example, MPESA and other mobile money subscriptions have spread significantly—from 112,000 subscribers in 2008 to over 60 millions subscribers in 2016.10 Given the population of Tanzania, which is estimated at 57 million in 2019, the statistics on subscription illustrate that a number of people have subscribed to two or more mobile money accounts. MPESA has facilitated a digital wallet and allowed for other services including saving and credit through other similar digital products within it. The positive results, as those exemplified by MPESA, illustrate the “output” based and wealth creation focus of international aid.

Fourth Period (Under the Conservatives Three Prime Ministers’ Leadership and Brexit) 2015--2019 This period is dynamic not least due to Brexit politics and the subsequent political implications leading to administration changes involving three prime ministers—David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson—and five cabinet ministers for international development—Justine Greening, Priti Patel, Penny Mordaunt, Rory Stewart and Alok Sharma. David Miliband, who was the former Foreign Secretary and currently holding a top international development position at a global level, has noted that “this constant ministerial turnover is a challenge to the UK’s ability to lead change in the global system” (DFID Media Team 2019). The only consistency that this period is so far enjoying is being under the Conservative Party. In the light of that, this section will focus on the 2015, 2017 and 2019 Conservative Party election manifestos (Conservative Party 2015, 2017, 2019) and the 2015 Strategy for International Development. Nevertheless, the section will also look into implications of Brexit politics on the international development agenda—with minor details since Chapter 6 has more details on Brexit. Analysis of both the 2015 manifesto and the 2015 strategy shows policy continuity in particular with regard to the 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid commitment and the independence of DFID as a stand-alone ministry with a cabinet secretary. There is also continuity with regard to emphasis on ‘value for money’ and transparency in aid allocation. Nevertheless, there is a change in approach, in particular on how the aid is spent, as well as change in framing/presenting the international development agenda to the public. This framing is crucial since it reflects the context—of which there’s emergence of extreme right and nationalistic feelings, which deem

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aid as a waste of public funds. This same context partly explains Brexit. In the light of that, the emphasis has been on the benefits that giving aid will bring to the national interest. That is also manifested in the 2015 strategy title—“Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest” with the “commitment to the world’s poor and also [to] have international development at the heart of international security and foreign policy”. Similarly, the 2015 election manifesto section on international development emphasises that “everything we do around the world will be driven by a determination to protect your security and help you prosper”. Furthermore, the manifesto linked giving aid to businesses, arguing that “aid helps prevent failed states from becoming havens for terrorists, builds long term markets for our businesses and promotes global prosperity and reduces migration pressures”. Notably, securitisation of aid is a continuity in this period—as noted in the new security agenda from which new security threats are those that can be partly addressed by soft means, such as aid giving. In relation to that, the manifesto insisted on the use of aid to “tackle global terrorism and the poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism”. The 2017 manifesto echoed a similar trend, with more emphasis on justifying the aid budget given that Brexit politics had started following the 2016 vote. The manifesto, however, highlighted the need to change international rules. This is notable since it’s the rules such as those set by OECD and through other multilateral platforms that frames aid to be spent on poverty elimination projects instead of being directed to promote domestic interests such as trade. The government also underscored the possibility of changing the International Development Act so as to give itself freedom on how and where to spend the aid budget. The 2019 manifesto sets alarm bells ringing that there will be a possible major change in the British international development agenda. The manifesto kept the promise of maintaining 0.7 per cent of GDP for aid; however, it did not mention the independence/stand-alone status of DFID. Although there was no mention of reducing the cabinet status of DFID, the silence in re-emphasising its independence as a stand-alone department is worrying. This is especially because Boris Johnson has been known for not being a fan of an independent DFID (McVeigh 2019a, b, c; Willis 2019). Noteworthy are the four main strategic objectives for this period as outlined in the 2015 strategy. These include: (i) strengthening global peace, security and governance; (ii) strengthening resilience and response to crises; (iii) promoting global prosperity; and (iv) tackling extreme

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poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable. In implementing those strategies, the government approach is cross-governmental. This crossgovernmental approach could be more efficient, based on the Conservatives thinking, if the rules on the aid budget are lessened. This deserves further analysis. Cross-Governmental Approach In this period, the approach is cross-governmental in that aid budget is to be spent across departments in Whitehall, thus making DFID the primary international development department but not the sole one. In the light of the above strategic objectives, the aid budget will be disbursed through various departments including the FCO and the Department of Defence. There are three key cross-governmental funds, which are: (i) Conflict, Stability and Security Funds (CSSF); (ii) ODA crisis reserve; and (iii) Prosperity Funds. The CSSF, for example, will be managed under the National Security Council (NSC)—in the Security and Justice Department. The Conservatives’ argument for the cross-governmental approach is to further enhance ‘value for money’ as well as to cut waste and introduce greater transparency. This cross-governmental approach reflects the Conservatives’ core belief in aid as part of foreign policy. The crossgovernmental approach reduces the mandate of DFID, especially by not being in control of the entire aid budget neither aid policy. It also widened the use of aid beyond DFID, which is risking the amount of aid budget spent on poverty reduction. A number of charities in the UK have raised the alarm about this trend, as will be discussed in later chapters. As noted in earlier sections, up until when David Cameron came to lead the Conservatives and became the Prime Minister in 2010, the party had always put aid under the FCO as a unit. It is in this same spirit that in the current period, aid is linked with security and trade benefits. This is further demonstrated by the geographical focus of the areas prioritised by UK Aid distribution, which are: fragile and conflict areas (in particular the Middle East and North Africa-MENA region); the world’s poorest countries; and allies (those countries that have strong ties/relations with the UK). However, the 2015 strategy notes that the government will also be pragmatic (flexible) depending on the situation analysis. The UK government will also continue with the Bilateral Aid Review, which is based on updated country profiles. In relation to this, Brexit has brought in a situation through which the aid and international development agenda have

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to be rethought. This is for many reasons—both strategic and logistical, given the multilateral aid arrangements under the EU. Brexit The Conservative Party Election Manifesto of 2015 promised a referendum that would allow people to decide whether to remain in or leave the EU (straight in-out referendum) by December 2017 (Conservative Party 2015). The referendum took place on 23 June 2016, and the results were in favour of leaving with a 51.9 per cent vote share. The results led to a shaking up of the political space as manifested by the resignation of the Prime Minister David Cameron, the internal leadership contests in the Labour Party, the call for an election in 2017, trade issues and the shaking up of UK sterling pound currency value as well as reigniting Scottish independence feelings (Hobolt 2016; Brakman et al. 2018). Another election was called in December 2019. British overseas aid was also affected due to a change in currency value. In March 2017, the UK Prime Minister wrote to the EU informing them of the intention to leave. The process of leaving the EU (Brexit) has proven to be complicated. Media and academic scholarship has put forth analyses of politics surrounding Brexit; however, international development, in comparison with other sectors/agendas such as trade, has not received adequate attention (Lightfoot et al. 2017). The 599 pages of the withdrawal agreement that is posted on the government’s website do not feature international development policy—most of the focus includes: citizens’ rights, trade issues, judicial procedure, taxes and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol (HMG 2018). Even the parliamentary debates which followed the December 2019 elections and the vote on the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement Bill, which passed through with the new Conservative majority, focused on trade. Other issues being discussed include health and immigration. Nevertheless, the impact of Brexit on the British international development agenda is substantial. This will be expounded further in Chapter 6 but mention may be made here of a number of general aspects that will be affected. The UK aid budget allocates a substantial amount of aid to the EU international development budget. This has an impact because the UK has also provided leadership and been a major advocate of the EU’s policy, in particular with relation to trade policy, in delivering development—in African and Caribbean countries (Mendez-Parra et al. 2016). In connection with that, literature has predicted that Brexit will further accelerate

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the ‘aid for trade’ trend that has gradually re-emerged since 2010 (Lightfoot et al. 2017; Mendez-Parra et al. 2016) and pronounced further in 2015 due to the context and the need to justify aid spending to the British public who have been critical of the overseas budget. As noted above, in both the 2015 and 2017 election manifestos, as well as the 2015 aid strategy, international development has been linked with national interests—as reflected in geopolitical focus (fragile states and allies) as well as in creating wealth to ensure more business opportunities and trade links with the UK. Already DFID, together with the Foreign Office (FCO) and the Department for Trade, is planning a UK-Africa Investment Summit to be held in 2020 (Willis 2019). In the event of Brexit and the need to look for trade partners, the UK will use the soft power of aid to create more trade allies. In justifying this prediction, literature has cited Priti Patel’s, the former DFID Secretary of State (who was appointed immediately after the Brexit referendum), statement that (Quinn 2016): British soft power is exactly where DFID, and our aid and other relationships around the world, come together to deliver in our national interest and deliver for Britain when it comes to free trade agreements but also life post Brexit .

Moreover, it is to be understood that the UK’s global leadership is mostly derived from its relationship with the global south and in particular the Commonwealth countries. In connection with that, its position is also cemented in its multilateral seats such as being a member of the UN Security Council, NATO, G7, OECD and G20. It is in this respect, that various DFID cabinet secretaries have characterised British aid as the UK’s overseas power.11 It is thus arguable that Brexit will strengthen aid policy continuity as much as it promises changes in British international relations, in particular with the developing world. Nevertheless, the approach to using the aid budget will further move towards projects that are linked to national interests. To note and in relation to this, is the gradually emerging debate of whether or not DFID should be merged back with FCO to make aid more strategic. On one side, the Prime Minister Boris Johnson and a number of Conservative MPs are in favour of merging DFID and the Department for Trade (DIT) with the FCO, while a number of development organisations, some Conservative MPs (including the former DFID Secretary, Andrew Mitchell) and Labour MPs are in favour of keeping the independence of DFID (McVeigh 2019b, c; Willis 2019;

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Lightfoot et al. 2017). The debate is framed by the argument around making aid more strategic and in the national interest of the UK. Both sides claim that their position is more strategic. Those who are for a merger think that aid should directly be used to support UK investors and also be spent in other strategic geopolitical interests such as in defence, to enhance state power, while those for independence focus on the soft power derived from the UK and the competitive advantage of the UK as an aid superpower. The next section puts this discussion into the institutionalism theoretical framework for a systematic analysis to determine continuity and change in policy. Discussion: Historical Institutionalism Analysis In this chapter, the British international development agenda has been traced and mapped. Although the historical background from 1929 has been looked at, the main focus has been on the period after 1992. Following that, the major agenda has been identified that guided international development policies over a period of time, and then, the possible causes for their rise have been deduced. In the following paragraphs, there will be discussion of the findings in relation to the historical institutionalism framework outlined in Chapter 2. Institutional Stability From the above discussion, it is evident that the UK government has established institutional structures to give aid to developing countries. This path was established in 1929 when the first International Development Act was passed. Since then, the government has continued to give aid to poor countries. Since the budget for aid comes from taxpayers’ money, the UK government has had to justify the rationale for giving aid to poor nations. In this way, the importance of aid has always been linked to domestic interests. In the early period, between 1929 and the late 1950s, the justification for aid was the strengthening of the Sterling Area (colonies of Britain that used British currency) and the safeguarding of economic stability in the colonies. This was crucial for the British balance of payments, which was dependent on importing raw materials from the colonies and exporting manufactured goods to them and the rest of the world. In the early 1960s up to the late 1980s, the rationale for aid was for promoting trade (which explains the introduction of

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Aid and Trade Provision) and containing the communist threat. In the post-Cold War era, the case for aid has mostly been made on a security basis. The ‘new’ security threats such as immigration and ‘new terrorism’ can be partly dealt with through effective international development policies. Since 2010 and with the salience of Brexit politics from 2016, the aid agenda has gone back to being closely related to trade benefits and other UK national interests. Thus, although these reasons may differ, it has always been the case that aid has had to be justified by linking its importance to domestic affairs. Therefore, there must be a political will for giving aid. There has been a consistency in the placing of international aid as one of the means to exert British power and influence outside the UK for domestic benefits, the UK government has become one of the leading donor countries with regard to the global aid agenda and the direction of international development agenda. That position was especially cemented with the establishment of DFID in 1997 and the enshrining of the 0.7 per cent of GNI to aid into the Law. Institutional Change Through tracing the British international development policies between 1929 and 2019, it is clear that there are changes in institutions and institutional structure. This is demonstrated by periodic changes in legislation that are meant to direct international development in the direction that is appropriate to achieving current aims. The first Act was passed in 1929, followed by the 1940 Act. Another International Development Act was passed in the 1980s but repealed in 2002. The passing of Acts is a slow process that causes major institutional change, so the occurrence of these different Acts over a period of time shows that there have been significant changes in the international development agenda. There have been other supplementary Acts such as the Reporting and Transparency Act 2006 (HMG 2006), International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 (HMG 2014) and Official Development Assistance Target Act 2015 (HMG 2015). These were passed to supplement and facilitate the provisions in the 2002 Act, which put emphasis on poverty reduction and gives the mandate to the Development Secretary (i.e. DFID).12 Since historical institutionalism insists on institutional stability, how can the change in British international development policies be explained using its framework? Changes in British international development policies can be explained using historical institutionalism in two ways:

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incremental change and radical/abrupt change (which leads to critical junctures). In the abrupt changes, there will be an assessment of if there was or there has been a ‘critical moment’ or “window of opportunity” that did or did not lead to institutional change. Incremental Changes There is evidence of incremental change in British international development policies. This is especially apparent in the post-Cold War period, when there were discussions and reviews with the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) to change some policies. For example, since 1992 when the Pergau dam scandal broke out, discussions and reviews about untying aid from trade started. In part, these reviews led to the abolishment of the ATP in 1999. Similarly, increasing levels of poverty on a global scale led to reviews of international development policies both at a domestic level (i.e. involving bilateral policies) and at a multilateral level. These reviews led to a compilation of international development goals by the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 1996. These international development goals were later adopted by the UN and named the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The international development goals and the MDGs influenced the British international development policies to focus on poverty reduction and partnership. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—also known as global development goals 2030— were adopted to replace the MDGs. These goals have also informed the British international development agenda. For example, the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 is in alignment with SDG 5— Gender Equality. DFID has also funded research and other initiatives specifically for the purposes of achieving the global development goals by 2030.13 Furthermore, external factors such as the rise of terrorism and attacks such as the September 11th 2001 attack and the 7/7 2005 bombs in London led to incremental changes within policymaking. This included carrying out examinations of the link between poverty, grievances and terrorism, and how aid can be used effectively to prevent terrorism. This explains the rationale for emphasis on fragile states, which are often safe havens for terrorists. In connection with this, it is important to note that during the aid regime of political conditionality, aid would not be allocated to fragile states, especially those with poor human rights records

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and bad governments. However, with the rise of terrorism and the focus on poverty reduction, fragile states became the main focus of aid. This is for both humanitarian and for security reasons. However, there has been the re-emergence of aid linked to trade—in particular from 2010 but further pronounced from 2015. Brexit is potentially strengthening the idea of linking aid to trade. This could be the reason why the 2017 election manifesto for the Conservatives promised to look into changing international rules on aid spending and for the 2019 manifesto being silent on the issue of maintaining the status quo of DFID as an independent cabinet-level department. The above examples of incremental changes that became transformative led to a new path. The shift of focus from political conditionality in the early 1990s to partnership and poverty reduction in the late 1990s and 2000s was incremental, but transformative. However, with the Conservative Party holding on to power since 2010, as well as the Brexit issue, the re-emerging interest in aid for trade can be seen, which underscores path dependence. Most of these incremental changes were caused by both external and internal factors. External factors include: high global poverty levels, multilateral decisions (e.g. MDGs and SDGs) and the rise of terrorism. Internal factors include policy evaluations and reviews within the existing institutional structure as well as preferences of the political party in power. Radical Changes and Critical Junctures There is evidence of radical/abrupt change in British international development policies, e.g. upgrading the ODA to an independent ministry. In the history of the British international development agenda, the upgrade from being an agency within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to an independent ministry occurred whenever the Labour government was in power. For that reason, it is difficult to classify these changes as radical since it is the norm that the Labour government would prefer to manage international development in an independent ministry away from the FCO. However, this is an abrupt change because election results can never be 100 per cent predictable and thus, if the expected party (e.g. Labour) would not win the election and the existing government stayed in power (e.g. the Conservatives), it means the institutional structure would have remained the same. Arguably, this was the case in the 1992 elections. The Labour Party election manifesto was very clear

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that if Labour got into power, it would separate the ODA from the FCO and establish a department for international development with a cabinet minister (Labour Party 1992). But Labour did not get into power, and the ODA remained under the FCO until the 1997 elections when the Labour Party won and established DFID. That was a critical juncture in the sense that there was a sudden change in institutional structure. This institutional structural change led to many other incremental changes within the department. Since DFID is an independent and autonomous department, it can make its own decisions and change policy direction, free from foreign policy interests. In this way, change in institutional structures may speed up the process between incremental developments to transformation. For example, most of the partnership and poverty-reduction policies were considered before 1997, but it was the independence of DFID that enabled such policies to be taken on board, and for aid to be untied from trade, which was a foreign policy interest. Thus, elections may bring a critical moment that a party can utilise to make a critical juncture. Having an independent department for aid had been in the Labour Party agenda since long ago, but the election in 1997 was a critical moment that the Labour Party seized, and which led to a critical juncture in international development. In the same way, since 2005, the Conservatives have changed their standpoint on international development. Although most of its new policies do look similar to the Labour government’s policies (such as keeping DFID as an independent department [a cross-party shared interest up to 2019], and reaching the 0.7 per cent of GDP for aid by 2013), there are some significant differences in their policies and these have further been pronounced since 2015. While New Labour focused more on poverty reduction and partnerships, the Conservatives place more emphasis on ‘value for money’, quantified results for aid and now aid for trade. However, it was not until after the election that the Conservatives could implement their policies. That is why the Conservative-led coalition government and the Conservative government have been focusing on wealth creation and the promotion of the private sector. Thus, general elections are always critical moments, where the winning political party has the opportunity to bring forth significant changes that lead to a critical juncture. In this respect, the critical junctures and radical changes in international development policies are brought about by internal factors more than external factors. In Chapter 6, the impact of Brexit will be indicated and potential institutional changes discussed. There are

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those changes that will inevitably have happened such as a change to the aid allocation to the EU and other institutional relations between the UK and the EU with regard to international development—but the significance or extent of change will depend on whether there will be a Brexit with a deal or no-deal.

Conclusion This chapter has traced the UK’s international development agenda from 1929, when the first Colonial Development Act was passed. From this time, it is clear that British international development policies have changed over time due to various factors that can be divided into two categories. The first category is external/exogenous factors, which are the global poverty situation; threats such as terrorism and conflicts; and multilateral aid agency decisions. These multilateral agencies include the OECD, the G7, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU and the UN. The second category is the internal factors. These internal factors include political parties and to some extent political party leaders. However, party leaders can only transform their ideas into policy if their political party is in power. For example, David Cameron started to talk about the importance of international development and wealth creation in 2005 but it was only after he began leading the coalition government that he could implement those ideas and make institutional changes. Following his resignation in 2016, Theresa May and Boris Johnson have not had much influence on policy—at least not visibly. Nevertheless, the 2019 landslide electoral win for Boris Johnson will give him a chance to influence policy. An indication of this, as noted in the paragraphs above, is the December 2019 election manifesto, in which there is silence on the status of DFID as an independent department. The politics of Brexit seems to have had more influence and occupied their time, leaving less time to push for their personal preference/attitudes on international development issues. There is also evidence of behaviour constraints by institution—as exemplified by the wishes of Boris Johnson to merge DFID back with the FCO yet finding it difficult due to institutional constraints such as the Acts and party stance. Thus, it is often the political party more than the political leader who has power to cause institutional change within the international development agenda. Even the political party is constrained. For example, the Conservative government understands that to spread the use of the aid budget it needs to change the rules—both international

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and domestic. Out of those external and internal dynamics, it has been shown that British development policies have changed over a period of time. From 1992 to 1996, UK international development policies were guided by a political conditionality theme. Aid was tied to conditions of good governance, democracy and human rights. Although these aspects are useful in dealing with poverty, tying them as a part of the condition for providing aid did not prove successful. As a result, foreign aid could not tackle poverty issues in the global south; in contrast, poverty levels were on the increase, especially in Africa. Thus, at the end of the 1996, the political conditionality regime was fading out, allowing for better policies to respond to the increasing humanitarian crises as well as increasing poverty. These new policies were guided by the principle of partnership between the donor community, recipient countries and other international development stakeholders. In the period between 1997 and 2010, there were significant changes in the UK international development policies. The most remarkable change, which was mainly due to a change of government more than anything else, was that the ODA was upgraded into a full ministry (DFID). This change in the institutional structure as well as the cabinet position of DFID allowed international development to be the main agenda as opposed to a sub-agenda under foreign policy interests. Being the main agenda allowed for autonomy in policymaking, which focused only on poverty reduction. Partnership and poverty reduction became the major international development policy themes. In the period from 2010 to 2015, UK development policies focused more on ‘value for money’ and wealth creation. The coalition government put emphasis on results and output rather than input. For that matter, issues of transparency were placed at the forefront, to ensure that every penny was accounted for in terms of results or outputs. Thus, the Conservativeled coalition government changed focus from partnership and poverty reduction to ‘value for money’ and wealth creation. In the last period between 2015 and 2019, the focus has been on linking aid to trade and security—i.e. national interests—through cross-governmental aid budget management. This has further been strengthened by the emergence of Brexit politics, which is forcing the government to justify the significant aid budget and to use aid towards its “Global Britain” agenda. In the interest of this book, it is important to note that the aid policy regime may determine the existence of the government’s engagement with faith groups. ‘Political conditionality’, for example, directed

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aid towards bilateral arrangements, while ‘partnership’ brought in NGOs as partners to fight poverty. Value for money could be achieved in a number of ways: i.e. bilaterally (e.g. budgetary assistance) or through partners such as in the private sector. A cross-governmental aid spending approach might also have an impact on how the voluntary sector is brought in through different departments in Whitehall.

Notes 1. Such an agenda could have been set out by the UN (e.g. MDGs or SDGs), the World Bank or the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). DAC membership includes all major donor countries. 2. ‘International development’, ‘international aid’ and ‘foreign aid’ are synonymous phrases and used interchangeably in this book; however, their use can bring about different meanings. In the 1960s, the common phrase was ‘international aid’ or ‘foreign aid’, while in recent times donors prefer to use ‘international development’ more than ‘international aid’. 3. For example, Wilson, W. (1918, January). Speech on the Fourteen Points. 4. For a detailed discussion about the responsibility of each department in specific matters of aid, see Little, I. M. D. and Clifford, J. M. (1965). International Aid: A Discussion of the Flow of Public Resources from Rich to Poor Countries with Particular Reference to British Policy. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; and Chapter 3 of Jones, D. (1977). Aid and Development in Southern Africa: British Aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. London: Croom Helm and ODI. 5. For all speeches and statements made by John Major during his Premiership visit http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/speeches.html. Accessed 20 Oct 2019. 6. For more on Gordon Brown’s work, see https://gordonandsarahbrown. com/gordon-brown/. Accessed 9 Sept 2019. 7. For these statistics and more, see https://www.loc.gov/law/help/ foreign-aid/uk.php. Accessed 9 Sept 2019. 8. In their 2010 Election Manifesto, under the section titled ‘Your World’, the Liberal Democrats promised to enshrine the 0.7 per cent GDP for aid into law. 9. To understand how MPESA has been successful, see: Dunn L. (2015, January 1). What Leads to a Mobile Banking Program’s Success? A Comparison of M-PESA and EKO India Financial Services. Journal of Public & International Affairs (1).

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10. For these and other mobile money statistics in Tanzania, see Bank of Tanzania Statistics for Mobile Transactions: https://www.bot.go.tz/ PaymentSystem/paymentSystem.asp#Overview. Accessed 1 Aug 2019. 11. For example, Andrew Mitchell asserted that Britain would be an aid superpower. So did Penny Mordaunt, see McVeigh, K. (2019b, July 24). Trade and Foreign Aid: Will Boris Johnson Bring an End to DFID? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/ jul/24/trade-foreign-aid-boris-johnson-dfid. Accessed 7 Aug 2019. 12. For initial yet strong discussion on this, see Mitchell, I. (2018, January 23). What Does UK Law Say on Aid? How New Development Secretary Mordaunt Can Meet Her Aid Effectiveness Pledge. Commentary and Analysis: Centre for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-does-uk-law-say-aid-how-newdevelopment-secretary-mordaunt-can-meet-her-aid-effectiveness. Accessed 7 Aug 2019. 13. For example, see UK Aid Direct. https://www.ukaiddirect.org/about/. Accessed 7 Aug 2019.

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HMG. (2006). International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/31/pdfs/ukpga_ 20060031_en.pdf. Accessed 7 Aug 2019. HMG. (2010a). 2010–2015 government policy: Education in developing countries. Policy Paper. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 2010-to-2015-government-policy-education-in-developing-countries/2010to-2015-government-policy-education-in-developing-countries. Accessed 31 July 2019. HMG. (2010b). The coalition: Our programme for government—International development. HMG. (2014). International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014. HMG. (2015). International Development (Official Development Assistance) Act 2015. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/pdfs/ukpga_ 20150012_en.pdf. Accessed 7 Aug 2019. HMG. (2018, November 25). Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/ 25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_ Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_ European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf. Accessed 9 Sept 2019. Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1259–1277. House of Commons. (1993, October 29). Parliamentary debates between Mr.Lew Smith and Mr. Lennox-Boyd. Hansard. House of Lords. (1965, August 3). Oversees development. Parliamentary Debates. Hansard. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1965/aug/ 03/overseas-development. Accessed 20 Oct 2019. House of Lords. (1994, March 2). Debates: Overseas development aid. Hansard, 552, cc1034–1071. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Vol. 4). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Jones, D. (1977). Aid and development in Southern Africa-British aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Dundee: Croom Helm. Kampfner, J. (2004). Blair’s wars. London: Simon & Schuster UK. Kavanagh, D. (1990). Thatcherism and British politics: The end of consensus? (p. 221). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Killick, T. (2005). Policy autonomy and the history of British aid to Africa. Development Policy Review, 23(6), 665–681. Krueger, A. B., & Maleckova, J. (2002). Does poverty cause terrorism? The New Republic, 226(24), 27–33.

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PART II

Analysis of Religion at the Government Policy Making Level

CHAPTER 4

Faith-Based Organisations in the UK’s International Development Policy

Introduction This chapter traces and analyses the relationship between faith-based organisations (FBOs) and the UK government with regard to international development policies from 1992 to 2019. As noted in Chapter 1, FBOs are defined as international development NGOs that declare a faith identity in their vision and/or mission statements. This definition excludes NGOs that started out of religious motivation but ceased to maintain their faith identity or retain a formal link with any religious body. Examples of FBOs are Christian Aid and Islamic Relief. Both of these FBOs are informed and inspired by religious values, which are clearly expressed in their mission statements. They are also affiliated with their respective religious bodies. This chapter offers an empirical assessment of government’s engagement with FBOs in the field of international development. There may be various aspects through which the relationship between FBOs and the UK government, with regard to international development policies, could be charted: however, the focus here will be on funding and advocacy. Advocacy is aimed at improving government policies. This term, ‘advocacy’ will be explained in detail and defined later on in this chapter. With regard to funding, the government may provide financial support to FBOs to deliver and implement international development goals. While tracing the government’s engagement with FBOs in funding and © The Author(s) 2020 A. C. Kwayu, Religion and British International Development Policy, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0_4

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advocacy, the chapter’s aim is to explore the three propositions presented in Chapters 1 and 2. First of all, it explores and examines the correlation between funding and/or advocacy with a religious event(s) at an international level. For example, the chapter examines whether an event such as the September 11, 2001 attacks had an impact on the government’s funding or advocacy relations with FBOs. For the purpose of validity and reliability, the chapter analyses other factors that may have caused that outcome, i.e. a heightened or lessened relationship in either funding or advocacy, or both. Second, the chapter examines the impact of the attitudes of political parties and politicians on the relationship between the government and FBOs. This may not have a direct impact, but their actions or decisions may lead to an intensified or lessened relationship. For example, the Conservative-led coalition’s ‘big society’ (an agenda that aims at helping the third sector [voluntary and private sectors] to deliver some of the public policy) may encourage the government to support FBOs to implement international development policies. In connection with this, politicians may also have an impact on policy. However, as seen in Chapter 3, politicians are often able to influence international development policies when their political parties are in power. This has been the case since the time of Harold Wilson, when he was campaigning for better aid policies in the 1950s, to the time when David Cameron was campaigning for a change in his party’s international development standpoint in 2005. Both of these leaders were able to change policies when their political parties won the election (in 1964 and 2010, respectively). Third, in this chapter, there will be an examination of whether the evolution and rising prominence of the international development agenda in British politics have played a role in bringing FBOs closer to the government. Brexit comes in as an important factor in both propositions one and three. This is because, in the first proposition, Brexit may impact and lead to a review of international development policies from which there may be lessened or heightened relationships with FBOs depending on various factors as per the review. In the third proposition, Brexit might exacerbate or abate the prominence of the international development agenda in British politics. Either way, there will be an impact on the role of FBOs. In exploring each of these propositions, the following questions are asked: Are these the only factors that explain the relationship between the government and FBOs? Are there any other factors that may explain the relationship between FBOs on the one hand and the government on the other?

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In connection with the above, the chapter proceeds to a discussion of the findings by using the historical institutionalism analytical framework designed in Chapter 2. This particular section analyses policy stability and change with regard to the role of FBOs. Thus, it assesses whether these policy changes were radical or incremental, and whether they have led to a critical juncture or not. Critically, this section also examines whether historical institutionalism is helpful or not in assessing policy change and explaining the agency of who facilitates change. For the purpose of coherence, this chapter is structured based on the mapping time frame presented in Chapter 3. This is divided into four sections as follows. The first section examines the relationship between the government and FBOs from 1992 to 1997. The starting year, 1992 is not only the period after the Cold War, but also the year when the Bosnian conflict erupted, and also the year of a general election in the UK when the Conservative Party, under the leadership of John Major, won. The year 1997 marked the end of 18 years of Conservative Party government. The second section covers the period from 1997 to 2010. This is the time when New Labour was in power under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The third section covers the period from when the Conservative-led coalition government took office from 2010 to 2015. The fourth period covers the Conservative Party administration from 2015 to 2019 under the leadership of three prime ministers—David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson. This fourth section is interesting and provides evolving observable factors as a result of Brexit politics. In each of these sections, there will be two subsections discussing funding and advocacy. The sections are followed by a discussion on policy stability and change, and offer a critical analysis of the usefulness of historical institutionalism in examining the relationship between the government and FBOs. The chapter ends with a conclusion, which summarises the major findings with reference to the propositions.

First Period: The Relationship Between the FCO/ODA and FBOs (Conservative Government Under John Major) 1992--1997 This section traces and examines the relationship between the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), which was under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and FBOs from 1992 to 1997. It focuses

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on funding and advocacy. The funding part examines the ODA funding scheme that FBOs could apply to, and the share that FBOs got from that funding scheme. The second part focuses on advocacy and discusses FBOs’ initiatives and engagement with the government with regard to policy matters. Funding During this period, government funding to NGOs was allocated through the Joint Funding Scheme (JFS). The JFS was introduced in 1975 to provide support to British voluntary agencies that fund developmental projects to help the poor. The scheme was also known as ‘pound to pound’ because the government contributed only 50 per cent after the recipient organisation had collected the first 50 per cent of project funds from other donors. The “main purpose of JFS was to provide financial assistance to NGOs from the official aid budget in the form of matching grants for small-scale poverty-alleviation projects” (Robinson 1997: 161). In connection with this, it is important to understand that in the 1970s there was an emerging trend amongst donor countries to acknowledge the work of NGOs. Prior to that, both the donor countries and NGOs were suspicious of each other’s work. According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), “NGOs and official donors (governments) tended to pursue different development agendas in the 1950s and 60s and they were usually disinterested in each other’s activities and occasionally suspicious of the other’s motives. That began to change from the early 1970s when most donors followed the earlier example of countries such as the Scandinavian countries and Canada in directly supporting NGO development programmes” (ODI 1995). Sweden, for instance, started to fund NGOs in the 1960s. The UK government started to forge complementary relations with NGOs and other non-profit organisations in the 1980s (Young 2000). According to Salamon, complementary relations mean that the government finances NGOs and non-profit/voluntary organisations to deliver public services (Salamon 1995). In this light, the relationship/partnership can be contractual. This form of relationship became more entrenched from 1997 when the New Labour government introduced ‘third way’ policies. In ‘third way’ policies, the government could work with the ‘third sector’—including NGOs and the voluntary sector—in delivering public services. This reflected neoliberal ideas whereby the state minimises its

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direct engagement in certain areas without losing its control. The state can do so by engaging with the third sector such as NGOs, voluntary groups, and also the private sector. As seen in Chapter 3, there have been some ideas from the Thatcher administration that permeated New Labour thinking and their governance approach. Third way policies had a number of similarities with Thatcherite neoliberal ideals. Having contractual agreements with the third sector to deliver some of the public services is one of the examples of the shared ideals between the Thatcher administration and the Blair (New Labour) administration. Nevertheless, a note may be made that the ‘third way’ policies pronounced this relationship in a more vivid manner by forging partnerships with NGOs and the voluntary sector that were, arguably, beyond contractual relations. The devotion to “aid that focuses on poverty alleviation” that was initiated by the launching of the 1975 white paper ‘The Changing Emphasis of British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poor’ could also explain the introduction of the JFS, which underscored recognition of NGOs’ work and the need to support them. The white paper expressed the government’s acknowledgement of NGOs work. Indeed, there was an increase in NGO funding after 1975. The JFS rose from £291,407 in its first financial year (1976–1977) to £28,000,000 in the financial year of 1992–1993.1 This, according to the Bank of England’s inflation calculator, which shows that £291,401 in 1976 equalled £1,013,525 in 1992,2 indicates a significant increase in real value. Those NGOs eligible for the JFS had to be registered in the UK. Support was usually limited to projects lasting three years, but this could be extended to five years. In order to reduce administrative costs, the major recipients received block grants.3 This system of block grant was introduced in 1978. Only a few NGOs received block grants. These were those organisations that received a large proportion of JFS funds. The first three organisations to receive block grants were Oxfam, Christian Aid, and CAFOD. The block grant was later extended to Save the Children and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. These block grants were for developmental projects, which met the criteria laid down by the JFS and which conformed to the agreed strategic frameworks based on the ODA’s key objectives and guidelines. The guidelines for the JFS specified that “projects must be ‘developmental’ and the project objectives should be realistic and attainable, the economic and social benefits readily identifiable, that a clear indication should be provided of how the project would be sustained after the cessation of external support, and that it should

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be compatible with the beneficiaries’ own ideas and needs” (Bose and Burnell 1991: 163). Other NGOs that were not receiving block grants had to submit detailed project applications and effectively compete for funding (FCO/ODA 1994). Overall the JFS was “the single biggest financial contributor to British NGOs’ development projects” (Gibson 1993: 184). Two of the first three NGOs to receive block grants were FBOs; both were Christian. In the light of that, a few lessons can be outlined. First, although the process of allocating block grants was not clear, Christian Aid and CAFOD qualified for such funding due to their relatively large-scale operations as compared to many other UK NGOs at the time. However, funding Christian organisations was not only common in the block grants scheme but also in the JFS. The JFS statistics for 1994/1995 show that only two non-Christian FBOs received funding: Islamic Relief and the Aga Khan Foundation. In the same year, 17 Christian FBOs received JFS.4 The smaller number of non-Christian FBOs as compared to Christian FBOs in the UK might explain why there was more JFS funding to Christian FBOs than FBOs of other faiths. Although the practice of funding Christian organisations more than other faith’s organisations has been noted by several development scholars (Clarke 2006), it is fair to mention that non-Christian FBOs in the UK were relatively new and only carried out small-scale projects. Even Islamic Relief, which is the largest Islamic NGO in the UK, only started in 1984. This is new in comparison with, for example, Christian Aid, which started in the 1940s. Therefore, considering the competition that NGOs had to go through for JFS funds, Christian NGOs had a competitive advantage due to their experience and large operational scale. In connection with this, the ‘pound to pound’ concept offered more advantages to Christian NGOs since they could marshal funding from various sources acquired over many years of work. For their part, most Islamic organisations depend on alms, which they called Zakat, offered by believers as part of worship.5 Although Christian FBOs receive more donations and contributions from churches and other places, the Islamic Zakat offering is more systematic and coherent when compared with the voluntary donations that Christian FBOs expect from Christians. For Muslims, it is a religious duty to donate a certain percentage of personal earnings to charitable purposes. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam (the other four are faith, prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage [hajj]). A Muslim believer is obliged to donate one-fortieth of his/her assets every year. The list of people who receive Islamic aid in the form of Zakat

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includes: poor people; the destitute; those employed to administer the Zakat; those who might be converted to Islam, or assist in the cause; slaves; debtors; those committed to the ‘way of God’; and, finally, travellers in need (Benthall 2003). Islamic Relief, for example, has a software menu on its website through which a Muslim believer can calculate Zakat based on his/her income so he/she can give the right amount.6 In addition to the JFS, the government gave international development NGOs funds for relief and emergency work. These funds were given outside of the JFS and were only allocated in response to ad hoc events such as famine or floods. Since these funds depended on such events, the organisation that proved to be most effective in that particular situation would be the one to receive funding. Such an arrangement provided opportunities for FBOs to receive funding from the government as they could prove to be more effective in certain areas. Islamic Relief, for example, received funding from the government in the Bosnian conflict. This is because the organisation could prove its effectiveness and competitive advantage in delivering aid to Bosnia. In fact, the view that Islamic Relief was more effective in delivering aid and humanitarian relief in religiously sensitive areas such as Bosnia was also noted by other NGOs, including the Christian FBOs. To quote an interviewee (2011), “The Bosnian War was the beginning of formal engagement between Islamic Relief and the government. This was the first time when the government gave funds to carry out relief operations in Bosnia. Islamic Relief also works with other FBOs such as CAFOD and Christian Aid, which transferred some funds to us”. Moreover, Christian Aid collaborated with Islamic Relief in Croatia during the Balkan wars (Ghandour 2003). In connection with the observation above, there is evidence that, in some instances, FBOs would be more effective than other NGOs or multilateral and government aid agencies. This is especially true in cases where there is a religious element in the target situation. The 2011 famine in Somalia is an example of this observation. When the hunger crises and the subsequent famine broke out in Somalia in mid-2011, it was almost impossible for NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies such as the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) to deliver food aid to famine victims. This was because the Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which controlled parts of Somalia, had banned aid from Western donors, in particular the WFP (Rice 2011). However, Islamic Relief and the Somali Red Crescent Society did not face as much difficulty in delivering aid to Somalia. This was because of their Islamic identities, which earned them the trust and

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access of the Islamist leaders. For these reasons, the UK government and the WFP worked with these groups in order to ensure that food aid and other humanitarian relief assistance were delivered to the victims (Tran 2011a; Jehangir 2011). The UK government’s collaboration with Islamic Relief for that particular situation is further discussed in a later section covering the period between 2010 and 2015. Although the government channelled funds to NGOs, such as funds for relief operations, the JFS remained the main channel for funding NGOs. Funds to NGOs were thus competitive and limited. It is clear that the government of the time (1992–1996) did not give NGOs and civil society organisations priority, thus explaining the limited funding. JFS funding represented just over 1 per cent of the official aid budget (Bose and Burnell 1991: 162–163). In that light, it is possible to discern probable reasons that may explain the low funding to NGOs, which affected FBOs as well. One of the main reasons for low funding to NGOs can be explained by the ‘commercialisation’ of the aid budget, which was achieved through the ‘Aid and Trade Provision’ (ATP) scheme, introduced in 1977. In general, the “ATP was a scheme where aid was specifically used to support British exporters, mostly to middleincome countries” (Morrissey 2002: 11). With the ATP plan, the ODA allocated “about 5 per cent of UK aid to finance developmentally sound projects which also served a number of UK commercial purposes” (Toye 1991: 99–100). In comparison with the JFS, the ATP had an upper hand and received more attention from the government. That is explained by the difference in aid budget allocation—1 per cent for JFS and 5 per cent for ATP. In addition, the fact that the ATP was partly administered by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) along with its relations with foreign policy commercial interests meant that the scheme was more politically advantageous than the NGOs. The ATP reflected the legacy of Thatcherite ideals whereby trade and private sector interests were prioritised over the voluntary sectors. In fact, in February 1980, Neil Marten, the Minister for Overseas Development, proclaimed that he would “give greater weight in the allocation of our aid to political, industrial and commercial objectives alongside our basic developmental objectives” (Barder 2005: 8). Similarly, Margaret Thatcher, during the launching of the new soft loan facility for the ATP, stated that “the interests of British companies and British exporters are at the heart of our policies abroad” (White 1998: 155). The ATP was a Labour government initiative, begun in

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1977, but under the Conservative government the scheme was significantly widened. After 1979, writes Winpenny, “the ATP grew in size, aid was offered to new countries of commercial interest, and the influence of the Department of Trade and Industry on (non-ATP) programmes grew” (Winpenny 1991: 37). The budget allocated to ATP grew (though inconsistently)7 from about 5 per cent in 1977, when it was established, to 9.9 per cent of the aid budget by the financial year 1990/1991. Another reason behind the limited funding for NGOs during this period could be the fact that the FCO managed international development. The FCO had other pressing foreign policy issues apart from international development. The FCO accommodated trade and commercial interests in aid policy. Morrissey et al. (1992: 165) argued that “aid policy is determined within a policy-making process where development interests are weak relative to donor self-interests, government interests, and domestic economic interests”. In that way, a bias could easily exist against NGOs (and subsequently FBOs) in the allocation of aid funds. Finally, low funding to NGOs and consequently FBOs at this time could be attributed to the political conditionality policy agenda. This agenda, as discussed in Chapter 3, directed aid towards bilateral arrangements more than through NGOs. This is because the main objectives of aid were to ensure good government, rule of law, and human rights. For good government and rule of law, aid was allocated to countries to establish democratic institutions such as multiparty systems. For such objectives to be achieved, aid had to be given directly to the government in question. This arrangement partly explains why the government of Tanzania received large amounts of aid in the early 1990s and obtained the ‘donor darling’ title. The country received assistance to facilitate the shift from single-party system to multiparty system as well as to set up the National Electoral Commission. Apart from bilateral arrangements, the political conditionality focus directed aid to multilateral institutions such as the Bretton Woods Institutions that were also carrying out and facilitating a similar political agenda. Those countries that did not comply, such as Kenya, under President Daniel Moi, were punished by a suspension of aid. In connection with the above discussion, governments’ funding of FBOs was also limited due to a lack of interest in, or recognition of, the role of faith groups in international development. Although the Bosnian War highlighted the role religion might play in conflicts and the effectiveness of religious organisations to deliver assistance to those sensitive

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areas, there was no evidence of the UK government’s special recognition of faith groups to deliver assistance in Bosnia. This, as later sections will show, is different to 2011 when the UK government leaders met with the Islamic agencies to discuss the delivery of aid to sensitive areas in Somalia. The Bosnian conflict did not create sufficient pressure to trigger any significant institutional change within the international development department with regard to the role of faith groups. The conflict only highlighted the unique role of NGOs in general but not faith groups in particular. The analysis of the ‘Minutes of Evidence’ between the Overseas Development Parliamentary Committee and the ODA top officials, for example, shows that the ODA acknowledged the role of NGOs in delivering humanitarian relief assistance in Bosnia but there was no mention of religion. Religion was not the main concern for policymakers. In the ‘Examination of Witnesses’ from 1992 to 1993, 1993 to 1994, 1994 to 1995 and 1995 to 1996, religion or faith matters did not feature in any of those conversations. The role of FBOs was considered general to the whole NGO sector. For example, in 1994, the ODA defended the increase in bilateral aid through the UK-based NGOs, arguing that “NGOs are widely recognised and rightly respected as an effective channel for delivering aid to local communities and thereby contributing directly to poverty alleviation, and also largely because of funding of the emergency and refugee relief channelled through NGOs because of their existing presence on the ground and their local knowledge which provides the basis for a fast, appropriate and cost-effective response” (FCO/ODA 1994). All in all, although the ODA acknowledged the role of NGOs as a whole, it was a starting point towards recognising the unique role of FBOs, and indeed, Islamic FBOs got more recognition from the British government. As mentioned earlier, it was the first time that the government funded an Islamic organisation to carry out relief work. Advocacy In international development studies, the term advocacy is commonly defined as “efforts to change institutions’ policies in ways that are expected to favour the poor and marginalised communities, whose interests NGOs aim to promote” (Hudson 2001: 333). Alternatively, advocacy can also mean carrying out public education about development work that can in turn support and improve international development policies.

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It involves activities such as policy analysis, policy recommendations, lobbying and campaigning towards certain policies. Advocacy has become more and more important to NGOs in recent years (Edwards 1993; Bryer and Magrath 1999; Hudson 2001), and FBOs in particular have not been left out of this. Since advocacy was relatively new in international development discourse, there were few advocacy activities going on between FBOs and the UK government with regard to policy development in the early 1990s. There is no evidence to show that the government collaborated with FBOs in policy development, nor did the government fund FBOs to carry out advocacy activities in developing countries. This is ironic, since it might have been expected that the political conditionality aid agenda would encourage the government to fund NGOs so that they could raise awareness of human rights and boost the capacity of civil societies in order to establish democratic institutions. Political conditionality put more focus on bilateral arrangements through financing projects. In fact, as John Vereker, then Permanent Secretary for Overseas Development, put it “the core instrument of aid was project […] and projects were seen as enclaves, decontextualized from their political environment” (Vereker 2002). Although FBOs, along with other NGOs, engaged in campaigns against certain aid policies, they did not receive support or work in collaboration with the government. In this way, advocacy was a one-way initiative. This slowed the advocacy side of FBOs (and other NGOs) in the early 1990s. The FBO claimed that advocacy was ‘relatively new’ in their organisations (Interview 2011). The main advocacy activities in the early 1990s were in relation to environmental issues. Environmental NGOs and activities were very active in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The environmental campaigns by the Worldwide Fund for Nature, for example, were significantly successful and this is explained by their acceptance to receive block grants from the ODA. The Worldwide Fund for Nature became the 5th and the last NGO to be awarded the block grant. All in all, in this period there is no evidence suggesting that FBOs were actively engaging with the government on areas of policy development. There are a number of possible reasons, which may explain the low advocacy activities of NGOs in general and FBOs in particular. First of all, although NGOs were generally suspicious of government policies, they could not challenge the government’s policies because these NGOs could not easily secure funding to carry out policy development activities. Advocacy can be an expensive business and NGOs seek funds to conduct

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advocacy activities. As mentioned earlier, advocacy is meant to improve policy as well as securing public support for international development. However, during this time (1992–1996) and even in the 1980s, the government was reluctant to fund NGOs for such activities, as it did not wish to secure support for the international aid agenda. The budget for international development had already fallen from 0.51 per cent in 1979 to just over 0.3 per cent in 1990 (IDC 2002: 31). Thus “it is in the area of campaigning that relations between the ODA and the NGOs had been more strained […] the reduction in size of the official aid budget, a greater commercialisation of aid, and a perceived departure from povertyfocused concerns in favour of market-oriented adjustment policies had all been the target of campaigning by NGOs” (Bose and Burnell 1991: 174). However, there was a realisation in the mid-1990s that the world’s poverty situation had worsened (especially in Africa) and that the best way to deal with this was to have better policies, both in donor and recipient countries. International development stakeholders realised that some of the development issues were structural and could not be solved by delivering aid alone. For example, pressure started to mount for the need to untie aid from trade. Tying aid with trade was common to donor countries, and as seen earlier, the UK aid was tied to trade through the ATP scheme. In addition, the donor countries started to acknowledge the need to focus more on human development rather than economic development and trade. The OECD-Development Assistance Committee, as seen in Chapter 3, came up with the international development targets in 1996, which were later adopted by the UN as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In connection with this, it is important to note that the UK government was active in the process of deciding those goals. The Permanent Secretary for Overseas Development at that time, Sir John Vereker, was a member of the OECD small ‘Groupe de Reflexion’, which proposed the targets (Vereker 2002). Thus, there was an implicit consensus among key donor countries of the need to reflect development beyond economic projects. The targets and the subsequent MDGs reflected this shift towards human development and the importance of collective responsibility in fighting poverty. For those reasons, this is the beginning of active advocacy. Donor countries started to see the importance of changing their aid policies. In the light of this, the spirit of partnership, as discussed in Chapter 3, was embraced and donor governments started to partner with other donors and NGOs. The partners recognised the need to adopt new international development policies

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that would significantly reduce poverty levels. The NGOs also realised the potential power of mobilising and utilising public opinion to support their activities (Edwards 1993; Minear 1987; Mitchell 1991). As will be discussed in the next section, and in more detail in Chapter 5, faith groups in general and especially faith communities had started to organise a groundbreaking advocacy campaign towards the cancellation of all debts owed to donor countries by developing countries. The arrangements and organisation for this campaign started in the early 1990s and culminated in 1998 at the G8 meeting in Birmingham. The results of this campaign, as will be seen later, were significant, and some of the debts were cancelled. Overall, in the period between 1992 and 1996, the beginning of advocacy activities can be seen. The UK government carried out an aid review in 1994, which established four aims: (i) support for sound political and economic policies; (ii) promotion of stronger health and education services; (iii) encouragement of sustainable development; and (iv) a commitment to work with our international partners to alleviate poverty and to provide disaster relief (Goodlad 1998). These aims were echoed by the emerging trend towards emphasising poverty reduction and partnership. However, these activities were gradual and were progressing with time. As will be shown below, advocacy only became a key feature in the relationship between DFID and FBOs in the period between 1997 and 2010. The commitment to work with international partners started to open up more doors to working with FBOs.

Second Period: The Relationship Between DFID and FBOs (Labour Government Under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) 1997--2010 During this period, there was a swift change with regard to DFID’s funding of NGOs including FBOs. The efforts towards poverty reduction and commitment to work with international partners that started in the mid-1990s were strengthened by the white paper that was published in 1997.8 The paper expressed DFID’s intention of pursuing “new ways of working with the UK private and voluntary sectors” (DFID 1997: 6). These new ways were to be based on a partnership rather than ‘masterservant’ or ‘donor-recipient’ relationship. The partnership policy theme matched with New Labour’s ‘third way’ policies. Both ‘third way’ and

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‘partnership’ ways of working show a preference for working with voluntary groups in delivering policies. DFID translated and strengthened the partnership theme through various funding schemes, the main one being the Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs). In addition to funding, DFID partnered with FBOs in carrying out advocacy. However, there is contention concerning this advocacy partnership: one might ask to what extent FBOs can really challenge DFID, as it is the latter who is providing the former with funding. Furthermore, how does DFID fund or help FBOs’ advocacy activities that are supposed to carry out checks on DFID’s policies? These are questions that are considered throughout the analysis. Funding DFID abandoned the JFS and initiated other sources of funding to NGOs, which included providing funding to FBOs. These funds were channelled through either country offices or centrally managed funds. The latter included the PPAs, the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) and the Development Awareness Fund (DAF). This section will focus on these centrally managed funds, as they are the ones that the UK FBOs could apply for. In general, DFID’s support for UK NGOs increased by 32 per cent to £223 million between 1997 and the financial year 2002–2003 (HMG 2005). By the financial year 2009–2010, the support rose to £362 million (DFID 2010a), which, when adjusted by the Bank of England’s real value inflation rate, shows an increase of 74 per cent.9 The distribution of these funds in 2009–2010 was as follows: £129million to the PPA; £12million to the CSCF; £11 million to the GTF. The rest of the funds were given to NGOs for humanitarian assistance and other bilateral programmes (DFID 2010a). The PPAs were introduced in 2000 to improve funding arrangements with the 11 largest UK-based NGOs, five of which were the recipients of the previous block grants (DFID 2010b). These were CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. The block grants were automatically transferred to PPAs. The six new organisations that received the first round of PPA funding were Action Aid, International Service, Progressio, Voluntary Services Overseas, the World Wildlife Fund and Skillshare International. Only one of these, Progressio, is an FBO. Thus, by the financial year 2000–2001, there were

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three FBOs receiving PPAs out of ten organisations. These FBOs’ bids to get PPA were successful because they met the criteria for PPA application. The criteria for successful PPA application included the following: (i) sufficient consistency between NGO and DFID priorities; (ii) high standards of corporate governance; (iii) extensive ‘reach’ in poor countries and/or in the UK for building public support for development; and (iv) significant engagement in DFID policy formulation. In general, for an NGO to receive PPA funds, it had to have a working relationship with DFID, which was built upon a common ethos, vision and a strong match in priority areas (DFID 2010b). By 2010, the total PPA funding amounted to around £90 million a year. DFID had signed PPAs with 30 organisations (DFID 2010b). Six of these were FBOs: CAFOD, World Vision, Christian Aid, Progressio (formerly Catholic Institute for International Relations), Islamic Relief and the Aga Khan Foundation. Although it could be argued that the number of FBOs receiving funding had been proportionally reduced (i.e. there were two FBOs out of five receiving block grants, and FBOs out of 30 with a PPA), it is nevertheless an improvement to have more FBOs receiving funds from the government. In addition, PPAs were a far more generous funding scheme than the former block grants. It was a partnership with the government in which NGOs were funded to implement and participate in development policies, in the sense that whatever these NGOs use funding money for has to be in line with the DFID vision of poverty reduction. Also one of the criteria was to engage in DFID policy formulation. This kind of partnership was beyond contractual. It goes without saying that there were now non-Christian FBOs with PPAs. DFID had become more optimistic about partnering with nonChristian organisations, specifically Islamic organisations. In 2005, the International Development Minister Gareth Thomas hosted a seminar with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to improve the links between DFID and Islamic aid agencies in the UK. The Islamic agencies that were invited included: UK Islamic Mission, Interpal Palestinians’ Relief & Development, Islamic Relief, Ummah Welfare Trust, Muslim Hands International, Muslim Care, Human Appeal International, Human Aid, World Federation of KSIMC and Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK. The minister emphasised that “It’s essential that we build a stronger partnership between DFID and Islamic agencies” (DFID 2005a), because “Islamic agencies play a vital role in fighting world poverty” (DFID 2005a). The minister, on behalf of DFID, had wanted to encourage and support

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more Islamic agencies to partner with the government in fighting world poverty: “We already have good relations with the Muslim Council of Britain and Muslim Aid” (DFID 2005a). There was a need to encourage more Islamic agencies to partner with DFID and receive funds, as they were left out. Funding in DFID was very competitive and as such a seminar was important in order to encourage and provide basic information on how to make successful bids. Islamic Relief had also been encouraged by DFID officials to apply (Interview 2011). They only started to receive PPA in 2006, but the funding kept increasing in each year from £562,500 in 2005/2006; £750,000 in 2006/2007; £771,429 in 2007/2008, to £800,000 in 2009/2010 (DFID 2011c). Although in comparison with other FBOs such as Christian Aid, the amount was less, the percentage of increase was more. For instance, Christian Aid received funding through PPA from 2001, but the percentage of its PPA funding from 2005 to 2008 did not increase at all. In 2005/2006, Christian Aid received £5,030,000, and the same amount was given in the year 2006/2007 and 2007/2008. In 2008/2009 PPA, funds to Christian Aid rose to £5,580,000 and again increased to £7,640,000 in the year 2009/2010 (DFID 2010c). The motive behind DFID’s decision to support and encourage Islamic agencies to apply for funding could possibly be due to complaints and lobbying from the Islamic community. A group of Islamic leaders had been lobbying and talking with relevant MPs and ministers about funding Islamic agencies (Interview 2011). Such lobbying was important for Islamic agencies, as DFID had, at some points, been wary of funding Islamic agencies due to the fear that money might be misused or even play a part in radicalisation (Interview 2011). Associated with this was the problem that Islamic aid agencies faced worldwide in terms of funding after the September 11, 2001 attacks, which highlighted the problem of terrorist money laundering through Islamic organisations. There was increased scrutiny before the funding was offered to Islamic charities to make sure that the funds did not end up in the hands of extremists or Islamist groups/organisations. It is worth mentioning that Osama bin Laden himself had funded relief and development programmes in Sudan and Afghanistan in the 1990s (Benthall 2003). It is also known that terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah raised money and utilised Islamic charities for various reasons such as the anonymity of the Islamic donations (Zakat and Sadaqah—voluntary contributions for charitable causes), and hence, there

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was limited information for authorities and countries to scrutinise in relation to finances and their activities (Looney 2006). It is worth mentioning that it became increasingly difficult for authorities to distinguish between authentic Islamic charities and Islamist groups because some Islamist groups who provided the ideological inspiration to many of the terrorist groups were often involved in a lot of charitable work. The UK government was also wary of terrorism financing and took major steps to freeze suspicious accounts (HMT 2001). The then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, expressed the UK government’s awareness that Osama bin Laden’s main income to support his operations came from diversion of money from NGOs, and profits from drugs and businesses (HMT 2001). Consequently, the government took measures to control money laundering and terrorism financing. One measure that could have an impact to Islamic aid agencies in relation to Zakat and Sadaqah was the decision to “investigate how underground banking and informal money remittance systems may facilitate terrorist financing and that findings will be shared with international partners and new international standards built upon such findings” (HMT 2001). Muslim organisations, especially those based in North America, that deal in the international transfer of cash, goods and services overseas, came under relentless scrutiny, and several have had their assets frozen and operations effectively halted by the US and Canadian governments (Stoddard 2003). In the context of the UK, none of the registered Islamic aid agencies were found guilty (i.e. of having connections with financing terrorism) when they were investigated. In 2003, for example, the USA had listed Interpal UK (a relief and development NGO working with Palestinians) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organisation but after an investigation by the UK Charity Commission, no evidence of wrongdoing was found and Interpal was allowed to continue with its activities and operations in the UK (Howell 2006). The UK charity Muslim Aid was also accused of funding Islamist terrorist groups (Gilligan 2010), but the Charity Commission concluded that the allegations against it were unsubstantiated (Charity Commission 2010). Islamic Relief kept a low profile on these issues but the organisation managed to keep its good reputation and maintained the support of the government (Benthall 2003). From another angle, it could be argued that the ‘war on terror’ had actually brought some Islamic aid agencies closer to the British government. This is due to the argument that terrorism can be contained through international development in particular, as shown in Chapters 2

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and 3, by focusing on fragile states. Both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown believed that poverty provides an environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. In his speech at the US Congress in July 2003, for example, Blair linked poverty and terrorism, arguing that “The threat comes because, in another part of the globe, there is shadow and darkness where not all the world is free […] where a third of our planet lives in poverty […] and where a fanatical strain of religious extremism has arisen […] and because in the combination of these afflictions, a new and deadly virus has emerged […] that virus is terrorism […]” (Blair 2003). Similarly, in his speech titled, ‘Tackling Poverty: A Global New Deal—A Modern Marshall Plan for the Developing World’, Gordon Brown juxtaposed the war on terrorism, peace and poverty, arguing that, “The war that together we are fighting against terrorism - not as a war for territory but as a war for values - we will win. Of that I am confident. But the question I want to address today is how we will win the peace […] we need a comprehensive plan that goes beyond temporary relief to wholesale economic and social development […] to halve world poverty, cut child mortality by two thirds and guarantee every child a primary education” (Brown 2001). Although there is no evidence that directly links increased funding from the government to FBOs with the September 11, 2001 or July 7, 2005 bombings, there is a correlation with increased funding from the government to NGOs in general for the purposes of working in fragile states that are regarded as recruiting grounds for terrorists. In 2005, for example, the UK government published a paper, ‘Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states’, outlining ways to effectively deliver aid and humanitarian assistance to countries such as Somalia. In that paper, DFID argued that “fragile states are more likely to become unstable and fall prey to criminal and terrorist networks […] we will work through civil society where it seems that they can make better progress in improving health and education” (DFID 2005b). DFID reiterated this in its 2009 white paper: “In fragile countries, alternative mechanisms and deeper partnerships with civil society organisations and faith groups are needed to reach out to the poorest people where an effective state does not exist to build strong and better institutions and for holding those institutions accountable” (DFID 2009: 18). In addition, in the 2009 white paper, DFID promised to “double support to faith based groups recognising the unique contributions that they make in both delivering development on

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the ground and connecting with communities here and abroad” (DFID 2009: 134). However, there is no evidence to show that there was increased funding to FBOs, or even to NGOs, generally for them to deliver services in fragile states or to counter terrorism. This can be explained by the fact that there was an election in 2010, which brought in a different government and a change of approach to international development. Thus, it will become clear if this promise was carried on or not in the next section that covers the period of the Conservative-led coalition government. Nevertheless, it might be noted that, during this period 1997–2010, the UK government directly worked with and funded the activities of faith groups to prevent terrorism. This, however, is mostly at a domestic level. Since such funding was allocated through the Home Office and for the purpose of countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation at home, they are not discussed in detail here because this book has a focus on development policy at an international level. The PPA funding further strengthened the relationship between FBOs and DFID by assisting activities that are in line with the ‘faith and development’ agenda. Looking at PPA agreements between DFID and FBOs, it was found that some of the strategic outcomes were directly related to these organisations’ faith connections and the value added by their faith identity. For example, one of the agreed strategic outcomes in the 2005/2006 PPAs with Progressio was “to increase participation of partner faith based organisations in poverty-reduction through inter-faith initiatives” (Progressio 2006: 3–4). Similar objectives have also been part of the agreement with Christian Aid and DFID (DFID 2010c). For Islamic Relief 2008–2011 PPA strategic outcomes included: (i) increase awareness and commitment to international development by focusing on young people and Muslim-based communities within the UK; (ii) contribute an Islamic perspective to policy and research on range of humanitarian and development issues with specific focus on HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, debt, finance and gender justice (DFID 2011c). In addition, Islamic Relief has many of its operations in Muslim countries such as in the Horn of Africa (Somalia) and also in Pakistan and Bosnia. It was also found from the interviews that “if DFID wants to work with faith communities in the global south, they would do that through other FBOs, government, or any NGOs that could prove to have a good link with them” (Interview 2011).

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FBOs are praised for their good connections in developing countries. This is because religious communities are transnational and thus faithbased institutions in the developed world often have sister institutions or affiliates in developing countries. Christian Aid, for example, partners with churches in developing countries to tackle poverty. A good example of that has been the work that Christian Aid does with faith communities in tackling HIV/AIDS in South Africa. In fact, one of Christian Aid’s strategic objective indicators for the 6-year-long PPA agreement (started in 2005) states “by 2011, Christian Aid will have improved the capacity of at least eight faith based organisations in four fragile states/countries to tackle stigma and HIV”, which matches with some of DFID’s plan in its ‘Strategy for HIV/AIDS (Taking Action)’, which states that “we will support the engagement of faith-based organisations that are addressing stigma and discrimination” (DFID 2004: 228). Thus, having links with faith groups in the recipient country may lead to better relations between DFID and FBOs. DFID acknowledges “In some poor communities, faith groups are more effective in fighting poverty than any other groups” (Interview 2011). In the light of this, DFID “has worked with faith groups to deliver policies, for example to advocate for the polio vaccine in Northern Nigeria, DFID had to work with Islamic leaders/communities as they were the only groups that people would listen to and were able to convince parents to take their children for the vaccine” (Interview 2011). DFID, however, “did not work with these groups in Nigeria directly. They did so through FBOs or governments” (Interview 2011). Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that it had been easy for FBOs to receive PPA funding. Some FBO applications were refused. For instance, Tearfund was not able to secure a PPA. Also, the first World Vision application for PPA funding was unsuccessful. Both Tearfund and World Vision are relatively big FBOs in terms of operation, and they have done a reputable job in the area of international development. Thus, there was no guarantee that FBOs, which do good work, with an international reputation, would be granted a PPA. There were still apparent institutional constraints to working with some FBOs, such as the fear of proselytising. From the interviews, it was found that two FBOs (names are anonymous) prepared their PPA applications together in order to submit proper applications, but the results were different. One FBO’s application was successful while the other one was not. Although DFID gave the reason for refusal from a technical point of view (i.e. a weak application), officials in that particular FBO felt that the reason was that DFID was

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suspicious that the organisation might use the money for proselytising (Interview 2011). The second source of funding that FBOs could potentially access was the CSCF. The CSCF officially replaced the JFS in April 2000. It became the main way of supporting UK NGOs as well as small and medium-sized UK-based civil society organisations. The fund focused on empowering poor people in developing countries to become more actively involved in the decision-making processes that directly affect their lives, as well as supporting service delivery programmes in difficult contexts. The CSCF placed an emphasis on raising awareness of rights and entitlements as part of a process, which leads to changes in the developing countries’ governments’ policies and practices (DFID 2009). The fund also provided an opportunity for DFID to support small-scale and often innovative projects. Due to the restricted nature of PPA funds, organisations that received PPA funds could not apply for funding from the CSCF. In the period between 2000 and 2009, there were several FBOs that were in receipt of funding from CSCF. For example, by the financial year 2006/2007, there were five FBOs that received CSCF funds and the total number of organisations that received CSCF funding in that year was 35 (DFID 2007b). These included ADRA-UK, the Aga Khan Foundation, Islamic Relief, Tearfund and World Vision. By the year 2009/2010, there were only four FBOs, which were ADRA-UK, Habitat for Humanity, Trocaire and Tearfund, receiving CSCF funding (DFID 2010a). In connection with this, it is important to note that some of the CSCF recipients had managed to secure a PPA, which is a better funding scheme compared to the CSCF in terms of financial amounts as well as the level of engagement with the government. According to CSCF guidelines, applicants are not supposed to be in receipt of PPA funding and thus those FBOs that started to receive PPA funding were no longer eligible for CSCF. It is interesting to note that by the financial year 2009/2010, other FBOs, that had not received CSCF funding before, were now in receipt of it. These were Trocaire and Habitat for Humanity. Since in 2009/2010 there were 51 organisations that received CSCF funding, it still does not reflect a good picture of funding to FBOs: four organisations out of 51 represent only about 8 per cent. In general, it is worth noting that FBOs managed to secure funding from the government through both the above funding schemes. This shows that FBOs are able to engage with the government and present successful bids. Bids for government funds are competitive and the fact

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that FBOs have been able to secure funds shows that the government is ready to engage with faith groups as long as they meet the requirements. In connection with this, mention may be made that some of the biggest NGO recipients of government funding are FBOs. In year 2009/2010, Christian Aid was among the four largest recipients of PPA funding (DFID 2010d). The rest were Oxfam, Voluntary Services Overseas and Save the Children. In general, by the financial year 2009/2010, FBOs received approximately 14 per cent of the total PPA funding.10 The third DFID funding scheme for which FBOs could qualify was the GTF. Created in February 2007 with an initial budget of £100 million,11 the fund was designed to help citizens towards holding their governments accountable, through a strengthening of the wide range of groups that can empower and support them. It targets non-profit organisations. In order to be eligible, organisations applying as lead or as part of a consortium must be formal legal entities, although they need not be UK-based. Examples included: NGOs, faith-based groups, trade unions, cooperatives, media groups, women’s groups and other civil society groups, such as professional bodies; and umbrella bodies that have a membership of a range of smaller civil society or community-based groups.12 The Governance Transparency Fund was distributed in the financial year 2009/2010, in which two FBOs out of 16 organisations successfully obtained funds. These FBOs were CAFOD and Christian Aid (DFID 2010d). The other funding scheme to which FBOs could apply was the DAF introduced in 2002. The DAF supported DFID’s aims to build public support for development through generating greater levels of awareness and understanding of international development issues, across different audiences and geographical regions within the UK. The DAF provided funding to a wide variety of groups which included: Those working in formal education, youth work, the media, business, trade unions, the adult and community sector, Black and Minority Ethnic groups (BME) and faith groups.13 Like the CSCF, the DAF did not grant funds to organisations in receipt of PPA funding. In addition, the nature of this fund was most likely to attract communities rather than FBOs. Thus, there will be a detailed analysis of the DAF in the next chapter, which focuses on faith communities. Although only four funding schemes have been outlined here, there were other itemised arrangements through which DFID funded FBOs. DFID supported FBOs and other NGOs in humanitarian and relief

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operations. In the case of a humanitarian crisis, DFID would support NGOs that demonstrate the capacity to carry out rapid and effective relief operations. The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), which consisted of 14 NGOs, five of them FBOs, received funds from DFID in the event of a humanitarian crisis. In the wake of the Indonesian Tsunami in December 2004, for example, DFID helped in airlifting the DEC’s humanitarian goods to tsunami-hit areas in Indonesia. Funding the DEC and other NGOs during humanitarian crises is normal British government practice. In the financial year 2009/2010, DFID funds for humanitarian relief through NGOs totalled more than £50 million. These were distributed through 26 NGOs, four of them FBOs including CAFOD, Islamic Relief, Tearfund and World Vision (DFID 2010d: 96–97). Overall, the period from 1997 to 2010 saw an increase in government funding to NGOs—that in turn benefited FBOs. There were many factors that set the context for DFID’s increased funding to FBOs, as discussed below. Since its establishment in 1997, DFID’s mandate significantly expanded the British international development agenda. DFID became an independent Whitehall department capable of making and implementing its policies. DFID had a single goal, which was to ‘eliminate world poverty’. This goal was expressed in all the four white papers published during this period: 1997, 2000, 2006 and 2009. All these papers were titled after that goal. The 2002 International Development Act cemented and legalised the goal. To achieve such an ambitious goal, DFID had to work with various ‘partners’ that may contribute towards the efforts to eliminate world poverty. This is why DFID began forging partnerships with NGOs through schemes such as the PPAs. In connection with this, it is important to understand that ‘eliminating world poverty’ cannot be explained in isolation from what was happening at an international level. Fighting and reducing world poverty was a goal shared by the international donor community. The MDGs, declared and adopted by the UN in 2000, had at their core the ambition to reduce world poverty. The first goal of the MDGs was to halve the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. Central to the MDGs was the idea of collective responsibility, which encouraged partnership. For those reasons, partnership was emphasised by DFID and became the policy theme for DFID in this period. This led to increased engagement with FBOs. Another factor that may explain the increasing funding opportunities for FBOs was the ‘third way’ ideology, which matched with the partnership policy theme. New Labour’s ‘third way’ and the partnership policy

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theme contributed to DFID’s willingness to engage with FBOs, especially considering the fact that some of the key UK NGOs, such as Christian Aid and CAFOD, are FBOs. The partnership policy theme could also partly explain DFID’s interest in working with Islamic agencies, hence encouraging them to apply for funds. In the spirit of partnership, the government was willing to work not only with other governments and international organisations, but with many other organisations that were active and effective in the fight against poverty. Since FBOs were active bodies in the global fight against poverty, the department could not leave them out. Advocacy Advocacy is another aspect that forged the relationship between FBOs and DFID. In this period (1997–2010), DFID had considerable engagement with FBOs in matters of policy development. This engagement can be viewed in two ways: first of all, FBOs were carrying out advocacy activities that focused on influencing DFID policies towards a certain direction that they believed best, and second, DFID’s support for FBOs’ advocacy works in developing countries, as well as in the UK, supported international development. Considering the amount of funding DFID gives to FBOs, the first point is ironic, because one might ask how the FBOs can find fault with their donor. This is one of the questions that this section attempts to address. The imperative of policy advocacy in fighting global poverty was expressed by DFID in its first white paper (1997). The department planned to “Ensure that the full range of government policies affecting developing countries, including environment, trade, investment and agricultural policies, takes account of our sustainable development objective […] and increase public understanding of our mutual dependence and the need for international development” (DFID 1997: 7). In connection with these advocacy plans, DFID decided to work with the voluntary sector. It stated (DFID 1997: 47, 78): the Government plan to work in alliance with voluntary and non-profit making organisations to win stronger public and international support for poverty elimination and sustainable development […] and establish an annual Development Policy Forum […] to allow […] the voluntary sector, [and] the private sector to share thinking and ideas for development […]

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Clearly, DFID came to realise and accept that development goals would not be achieved by aid alone, but also through structural changes that involve making better policies (Edwards et al. 1999; Lewis and Wallace 2000). This realisation was further expressed in DFID’s third white paper (2006), which observed that “the fight against poverty cannot be won without good governance” (DFID 2006: 10). Good governance is related to having good policies that are democratically decided. The policies of the developing world have to be changed if development is to be achieved. Thus, advocacy work was needed alongside aid provision to ensure that development goals were achieved. In connection with this, mention may be made that while the goals of ensuring good governance in developing countries were similar to the ones the ODA stressed in the early 1990s, under the term ‘political conditionality’, DFID’s approach from 1997 to 2010 was rather different. In the earlier period of the 1990s, the ODA had ‘good government’ as a condition for receiving aid. Thus, if a country did not uphold good governance, it was offered less aid. However, after 1997, DFID was giving aid as an instrument to facilitate and to bring about good governance. Thus, significantly for this book, DFID realised the potential of FBOs in playing a positive role in attaining such policies. It is clearly stated in the second white paper (2000) that, “Good social policies are needed to help poor people […] these are likely to combine state supported actions […] and a range of activities of non-government organisations including faith organisations and charities” (DFID 2000: 32–33). Advocacy activities are also incorporated in the PPA programme. Partners (FBOs and NGOs with a PPA) signed development objectives, which involved advocacy, and were proud to report back on their success. For example, in Progressio’s first PPA report (2005/2006), the organisation reported on its work on governance processes in Nicaragua and legal changes in women’s participation in Namibia (Progressio 2006). PPA also encouraged advocacy within the UK through engagement in DFID policy formulation. There were several reasons for DFID to encourage its funded FBOs to challenge its own policies. First of all, DFID supported FBOs’ advocacy work because of the influence they could have in securing domestic support for international development policies. The international development budget uses taxpayers’ money, so public support for such policies was crucial. For FBOs to promote DFID’s work at a domestic level, they have to first be convinced about the policies before they can promote them to wider society. Second, there was a perception that FBOs were

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potentially better in carrying out advocacy work due to their faith identity and moral credibility in many societies. It is common sense to expect that an Islamic NGO, for example, would have more policy impact than a secular NGO in an Islamic society or country. This was why, for example, DFID funded Islamic Relief to carry out advocacy work, particularly focused on raising development awareness, among Muslim communities in the UK (DFID 2010e). Tearfund, for example, sought policy support from a number of churches in the UK. For instance, the Christian Centre Church in Nottingham received four sets of postcards from Tearfund annually to support certain international development policies. These postcards were to be signed by members of the congregation. The postcards were then addressed and sent to the Secretary of State for International Development. This was one way that an FBO could secure public support for international development policies. DFID also conducted public policy consultations that were meant to bring different ideas to international development policies. For example, in 2005/2006 DFID undertook six formal public policy consultations. The department developed guidance for staff on policy consultation, which built on relations between government and the voluntary and community sector (DFID 2007b). Although the guidance was for civil societies in general, it was a platform where FBOs could put forward their policy recommendations, which could either be accepted or rejected. In 2007, when speaking at the Bond Annual General Meeting, Douglas Alexander, then Secretary of State for International Development, acknowledged the importance of advocacy in shaping DFID policy. He said (DFID 2007a): Civil society’s role in advocating for policy innovation, presenting the evidence and challenging us, is important. Sometimes we will agree to disagree. But I assure you that we do listen and sometimes that leads to change as we have with Water Aid and Tearfund on the issue of water and sanitation.

Since 2001, Water Aid and Tearfund started discussions on how to improve the lack of access to water in many developing countries. The World Water Forum in The Hague inspired their discussions in 2000 (Water Aid and Tearfund 2003). In March 2007, Tearfund and Water Aid led a campaign by a coalition of organisations aiming to end water poverty. This campaign had an impact on governmental policymakers, and in October 2010, a secretariat was established with a title ‘Sanitation and Water for All: A Global Framework for All’. The UK government

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supported and launched the establishment of this framework of action. This, as will be discussed in detail in later sections, shows policy continuity. Although Tearfund and Water Aid started to engage with DFID in 2007 for this particular campaign, it was launched in September 2010 by DFID under the Conservative-led coalition government. Thus, some of the advocacy initiatives that started in this earlier period were carried over and taken on board by the Conservative-led coalition government, which took power in May 2010.

Third Period: The Relationship Between DFID and FBOs (Conservative-Led Coalition Government Under David Cameron) 2010--2015 In May 2010, a general election in the UK resulted in a coalition government led by the Conservative Party. The Labour Party that had been in power for 13 years was taken out of power. As seen in Chapter 3 and as will be seen in Chapter 6, the Conservatives’ agenda on international development had started to change since 2005 when David Cameron became party leader. The changes in the Conservatives’ international development agenda became not very different from Labour’s agenda. This is because there had developed a cross-party consensus to fight global poverty for both moral and British interests. Thus, at this time, there is continuity in many policies. Although there were considerable policy changes, there is also the evolution of many policies that were already in places before May 2010. With regard to changes, the Conservative-led coalition government, as shown in Chapter 3, directed the international development agenda towards wealth creation and put emphasis on that rather than poverty reduction. This does not mean that the agenda sidelined poverty elimination, but it had a different approach to fighting poverty, which was to create wealth. Alongside that, the Conservative-led coalition administration also put much focus on a results-based approach, private sector development and value for money. The private sectors such as businesses and firms were considered core players in creating wealth and we saw the establishment of the Private Sector Department within DFID in 2011. The Economic Development Strategy Framework was published in 2014 to cement the development of the private sector within DFID (DFID 2014). The department ensured understanding of the culture and creation of expertise in private sector within DFID. The

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focus was to encourage trade policies in developing countries, regulatory reforms, mid-level development of market systems and support to small enterprises and individuals (DFID 2014). Noteworthy, however, is the continuity that was evident in DFID from the previous Labour Party administration. Even the thinking towards the private sector approach in DFID could be traced from 2008 when a review was carried out leading to the publication of the ‘Private Sector Development Strategy: Prosperity for All: Making Markets Work’. DFID linked this to the achievement of the MDGs, in the sense that it wanted to bring the private sector on board to ensure that MDGs were achieved. Thus, the establishment of the Private Sector Development Department in 2011 built on the work done from 2008. Specific to the interests of this book, continuity can be seen with regard to special recognition of the role of faith in development. As noted in the previous section, the New Labour government recognised the role of faith groups in the fight against poverty. Almost all key documents (policies and strategies) published by DFID in the period between 1997 and 2010 mentioned faith groups as key stakeholders within civil society. That was why, when the green paper (i.e. the 2010 Conservative Party Election Manifesto for International Development) and the Conservative-led coalition government agenda did not mention faith groups, many complained about this omission—as will be seen later. That was an indication of change. Nevertheless, as this book argues through a historical institutionalist sub-theory, institutions are persistent and they take time to change. The presence and recognition of faith and development had not waned with the coming of the new government. In 2012, DFID published “Faith Partnership Principles: Working Effectively with Faith Groups to Fight Poverty” (DFID 2012). A policy strategy that was launched by the Secretary of State, Andrew Mitchel, at an interfaith forum hosted in Lambeth Palace. In this document, the government affirmed its recognition of faith groups in development observing that “in many countries, and for many people, faith and religion are central to development […] in virtually all ‘developing countries’ faith and religion have grown in importance over the past two decades” (DFID 2012: 2). In the light of that, they acknowledged that faith groups make an important contribution to poverty reduction through: (i) provision of services and humanitarian assistance; (ii) empowerment and accountability; (iii) building resilience and peaceful states and societies; (iv) changing beliefs and behaviours; and (v) building support for development and global advocacy (DFID 2012).

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To illustrate the change and continuity with regard to the relationship between DFID and faith groups, this section analyses the relationship between FBOs and DFID with a focus on funding and advocacy between 2010 and 2015. Funding As noted above, the Conservative green paper on international development (Conservative Party 2009), which became the major policy paper for coalition government, did not mention faith groups at all. Neither did the Coalition Agreement on International Development (HMG 2010) mention faith groups. This explicit absence of ‘faith groups’ was a shock to faith groups, especially because they were mentioned in all the international development white papers and most of the policy and strategy papers that DFID published between 1997 and 2010. Paul Cook, Director of Advocacy at Tearfund, complained that (Tearfund 2009): There are some glaring omissions in this green paper. While we welcome the opportunity to debate how best to deliver aid, it is astonishing to see a debate on international development without any recognition of the role of faith communities in the field […] it is facile to consider that it is possible to address need at a local level without engaging local faith-based organisations.

The failure to mention faith groups in the key policy papers is ironic because the Conservative Party and the coalition government embraced the concept of the ‘big society’, which supposedly supports private and voluntary sectors to deliver and implement public policies. Despite the fact that faith groups were not particularly mentioned in the coalition’s key papers on international development, there is evidence of continuity of policy and engagement with FBOs. There were also policy changes that had a direct impact on the funding of FBOs. In the paragraphs below, these policy continuities and changes will be looked at through the analysis of the main funding schemes that FBOs were eligible for. There were various DFID funding schemes in place that FBOs could apply to, although Conservative-led coalition government closed some of the funding schemes such as the DAF. These funding schemes included Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPA), humanitarian assistance, country and other programme funds, strategic grants, the CSCF, the Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) and the GTF.

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The PPAs, which were discussed earlier, were introduced by DFID in 2000. Most of the PPAs signed off in the financial year 2008/2009 were renewed and extended up to the financial year 2010/2011. There were still six FBOs receiving PPA funding in 2010/2011. These included: CAFOD, World Vision, Christian Aid, Progressio, Islamic Relief and the Aga Khan Foundation. In August 2010, DFID launched a call for PPA applications for the next three financial years (2011–2014), and after the application process, bids from 39 organisations were successful. Among the 39 organisations, there were five FBOs. These were the same as the FBOs previously funded through PPAs apart from the Aga Khan Foundation (DFID 2011d). From these statistics, it can be seen that the percentage of FBOs receiving PPA funding dropped. In the previous phase, 2008–2011, six out of 30 organisations (20 per cent) were FBOs. In 2011–2014, there are five FBOs out of 39, which means only 12 per cent of organisations receiving PPAs were FBOs. However, this does not necessarily give the whole picture, since there is no evidence for why the Aga Khan Foundation did not receive funding. In fact, statistics for the year 2012/2013 show that the Aga Khan Foundation did not receive any funding from DFID (DFID 2013a), while in 2011/2012, although it did not receive a PPA, it still received funds from DFID’s ‘Country and Other DFID Programme Funds’ (DFID 2012). In connection with this, it is important to note that since the time when PPAs were introduced, it was more or less the same FBOs that were receiving PPA funding. The FBOs who received PPA funding were large in operational scale and had much experience, not only in carrying out development projects but also in applying for government funding. Statistics show that Christian Aid was one of the largest PPA recipients receiving over £7 million consistently from 2010/2011 (DFID 2011e), 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 (DFID 2013a) from PPA alone not including other funds. In 2012/2013, the total funding Christian Aid received from DFID including PPA and others amounted to £21.7 million. This was significant. Christian Aid received more funds from DFID than the department allocated to one of its funding schemes, the CSCF, which had £10.5 million in the same year (DFID 2013a). Even if DFID does not fund an FBO entirely out of its faith identity, it speaks much about the trust it has in the organisation regardless of its strong faith identity. CAFOD and other FBOs such as Progressio, for example, were also receiving significant amounts of financial support. In specific, CAFOD and Christian Aid have a history of good relations with the government and they have been receiving funds

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from the government since the late 1970s under the JFS and the block grants scheme. Other FBOs’ funding shares in DFID’s support portfolio were consistently increasing. For example, Islamic Relief received PPA funding of £0.5 million in 2011/2012 and this jumped to £1.2 million in 2012/2013. The organisation has been the recipient of other DFID funding too including humanitarian assistance funding, of which in year 2011/2012 it received about £1.8 million. This speaks of Islamic Relief’s improving ability in providing humanitarian assistance in areas that other organisations might find difficult to access. In Chapter 3, it was seen that Islamic Relief had access to deliver humanitarian relief in the Somalian 2011 famine crisis whereas other organisations were not able to do so due to the presence of Al-Shabaab. There were many other FBOs in the UK that had not been able to secure huge government funding such with a PPA. Among the reasons for this is an inability to prepare successful bids, which explains the formation of the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF) to help small Islamic aid agencies to engage with the government through lobbying as well as accessing funds. It is worth noting that the PPA scheme was closed in 2015 and only a few CSOs (none of the FBOs) received an extension of nine months up to 2016, when the programme was completely closed. In this period, between 2011 and 2016, the overall amount given through PPAs to FBOs was as follows: CAFOD £24 million; Christian Aid £41.7 million; Islamic Relief £5.7 million; Progressio £11.6 million; and World Vision UK £22.6 million (DFID 2013b). The other DFID funding scheme available for NGOs was the CSCF, discussed earlier. Upon reviewing its international development agenda and funding schemes, the Conservative-led coalition government decided to close the CSCF but that closure was implemented in 2015. Thus, there were still allocations of funds to CSCF—of £13.3 million in 2010/2011; £13.5 million in 2011/2012; and £10.5 million in 2012/2013. In 2010/2011, four out of 29 successful organisations were FBOs. These were: ADRA, Habitat for Humanity, Trocaire and the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) (DFID 2011f). This was the same number as in the previous period. However, Tearfund is not successful in this round; instead, there is a new FBO—i.e. WACC. Since there were only 29 successful organisations, as opposed to 51 organisations in the previous period, it shows that there was an increase in percentage, i.e. from about 8 per cent to about 14 per cent. From this, it may be argued that the three relatively small FBOs (ADRA, Habitat for Humanity and Trocaire) were able to maintain their relationship with the government

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even in the wake of the regime change. It is worth noting that Tearfund managed to secure support from other funding arrangements from DFID. These include £2.8 million for humanitarian assistance in year 2010/2011 and £0.8 million from the ‘Country and Other Programmes Fund’ in 2011/2013. The Conservative-led coalition government introduced another funding scheme through which CSOs (hence FBOs) could apply. This was known as the Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF), which was introduced by the Conservative-led coalition government. The GPAF was a demand-led fund supporting projects focused on poverty reduction and pursuit of the MDGs through tangible changes to poor people’s lives in areas such as service delivery, empowerment, accountability and work on conflict, security and justice. Projects were to be selected on the basis of demonstrable impact on poverty, clarity of outputs and outcomes, and value for money. The aim was that the ‘Global Poverty Action Fund’ (GPAF) would replace the ‘Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF)’. The GPAF had two funding windows, which were: (i) the ‘innovative window’ with the purpose of encouraging innovative approaches to poverty reduction with an annual budget of £4 million and (ii) the ‘impact window’ to carry out projects that focus on off-track MDGs. That window had an annual budget of £36 million (DFID 2013c). Civil society organisations could apply to this fund but it was restricted to projects that were implemented in certain countries. The first round of applications was launched in October 2010. This was for the ‘innovative window’ and four organisations were successful. None of these organisations was an FBO. In August 2011, another call for application has been launched with a deadline of September 11. A call for the ‘impact window’ was launched in autumn 2011. Overall, FBOs that received GPAF funding in this period, through its different windows, were ADRA-UK and Samaritan Purse UK.14 It is important to mention that the Conservative-led coalition government introduced other funding schemes. One of these funding schemes was the ‘Responsible and Accountable Garment Sector Challenge Fund’ (RAGS). RAGS supported initiatives in poorer African and Asian countries supplying the UK market and was open to companies, trade unions and NGOs working to improve labour conditions in the garment sector (DFID 2011g). The calls for applications to this fund were launched in 2010 and 12 organisations were successful in the first round. None of them were FBOs. Interestingly, some of the recipients were non-traditional organisations (in terms of international development).

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For instance, funds were awarded to Tesco Stores Limited and Monsoon Accessorize Limited. The introduction of such funding echoed the Conservative-led coalition government’s international development agenda, which focused on the private sector and the role of businesses in wealth creation. There were many other funding schemes that were business-based. Another example was the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH), which awarded funds to Marks and Spencer, Waitrose, Sainsbury’s and Twin.15 Since the Conservative-led coalition government has highlighted ‘value for money’ and ‘wealth creation’ as major policy-guiding themes for international development policies, there was more emphasis on working with business/the private sector than voluntary groups. This was because the kinds of projects that DFID was promoting could be implemented by the private sector more easily than by the voluntary sector. Projects such as the M-Pesa and M-Kesho in East Africa (money transfer/banking services through mobile phones), for example, could best be implemented by companies such as Vodafone and/or banks (Mitchell 2010). The policy direction was further underscored by the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, when he stated, “it is my intention to recast DFID as a government department that understands the private sector, that has at its disposal the right tools to deliver and that it is equipped to support a vibrant, resilient and growing business sector in the poorest countries” (DFID 2011h). His words indicated the change of policy approach in DFID and the willingness to work with the private sector. The ‘value for money’ and ‘wealth creation’ policies attracted engagement with private/business sectors more than voluntary groups such as FBOs. This is the direction DFID started to move in, which is reflected in its reporting. Increasingly from 2014, reporting style focused more on results than input. Advocacy Because the Conservative-led coalition government had different approaches to international development as compared to the previous New Labour government, one of its first tasks in DFID was to review international development policies. These reviews were of the multilateral aid policy and the bilateral aid policy. Added to those, DFID commissioned Lord Paddy Ashdown to carry out a policy review of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Policy. The reviews were

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important in changing British aid to being based on ‘value for money’ and result-based outcomes. To collect as much information and as many ideas as possible, DFID invited various stakeholders to submit policy recommendations. Consultations were carried out between DFID officials and other stakeholders. FBOs also took advantage of this opportunity to participate through submitting their recommendations as well as participating in consultations. The FBOs joined other development NGOs under the auspices of Bond (a consortium/membership network organisation that brings together international development NGOs). Along with other NGOs, FBOs (in particular CAFOD, Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Tearfund, Progressio and World Vision) agreed on a number of recommendations for multilateral and bilateral aid policy reviews. Following that, Bond submitted letters and papers on these reviews to the Secretary of State for DFID.16 Also, in September 2010, Bond convened a consultation meeting with DFID officials in order to allow discussions of these policy recommendations with NGO representatives. To have an impact on governmental policies, a collective voice from many development NGOs was much stronger than an individual voice. That was why, FBOs joined other NGOs to send policy recommendations to the government. In connection with this, mention may be made that in 2009, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, FBOs combined efforts with faith communities to carry out consultations with DFID as well as submitting policy recommendations for the 2009 white paper. At that time, FBOs and faith communities worked together to have a collective voice from within faith groups. In 2010, FBOs were working with other NGOs to have a collective voice as NGOs or civil society organisations. It is with a collective voice that FBOs policies can influence the government. A question remains though, over how much of the particular FBOs’ recommendations were compromised within the structure of an NGO perspective. This is debatable. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that some of the FBOs such as Christian Aid and CAFOD are among the biggest NGOs in Bond. Thus, it is very likely that they will have a considerable say in such discussions due to their experiences in working for many years in different parts of the world. Also, as seen in the definition of FBOs in Chapter 1, FBOs have similar objectives to other NGOs. Although Bond was pleased with the concept of value for money, it was concerned with the fact that not everything in development can be quantified.17

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When we talk about development and projects that are associated with international development, there are aspects of development that cannot always be measured because of their strong qualitative dimensions. Some of the areas, which come under development, include the eradication of illiteracy and poverty, raising awareness of HIV, removing the stigma attached to the disease and change of attitudes. NGOs that work in these areas obviously have an impact on society, but this profound positive impact that they have cannot always be measured or quantified. We would sometimes like to see the direct outcome of development projects (especially when the funding and aid has been provided for such projects) but the outcome of some of these projects and activities cannot always be measured in quantitative terms. The pursuit of such impacts must not be rejected in an effort to better measure DFID’s achievements.

Bond also recommended that the reviews needed to put development and humanitarian need clearly at the heart of decisions around allocation ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable countries (including women and men) are the core focus of DFID’s work. DFID announced both its multilateral and bilateral aid reviews’ findings in parliament on 1 March 2011. These findings and decisions provoked heated debate in parliament, particularly from the Labour Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, Harriet Harman, and other Labour MPs such as David Blunkett and Tom Clarke (who was also a chair of the all-party friends of CAFOD group).18 FBOs also reacted to these new policies. Although each reacted separately, one common reaction was concern over the decision to stop giving aid to some of the poorest countries in the world, such as Niger. In addition, they were concerns about the use of quantitative methods to make aid decisions. Christian Aid, for example, argued that in development, “the most important transformational changes are often the hardest to quantify” (Christian Aid 2011) and so deciding international development policies on the basis of quantified results can result in neglecting many important factors of development. Development has to do with changing minds and attitudes, which is almost impossible to quantify on a short-term basis. Connected to this, FBOs were also concerned about the ‘value for money’ emphasis. Although most FBOs applauded the government’s commitment to aid despite economic hardship, and also supported the concept of ‘value for money’, most FBOs were concerned about ‘who’ the ‘value for money’ was for. World Vision went so far as to ask whether value for money was for the taxpayer, the government or the poor (World Vision 2011).

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The organisations were worried that if the concept of ‘value for money’ was based on taxpayers only, it could be achieved at the cost of the poor, and so the concept would be of no use in fighting poverty. As Tearfund argued, “the real value for money can only be achieved if the delivery of aid is driven by need and fully involves local people” (Tearfund 2011a). In relation to this, mention may be made that FBOs were pleased by certain policy reviews, as they matched with their development goals. For instance, Islamic Relief was impressed by the government’s decision to increase aid to countries such as Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan and Bangladesh (Islamic Relief 2011). This is because most of Islamic Relief’s projects were based in those countries. Similarly, Progressio was happy that the government decided to work in states affected by conflict or weak governance (fragile states) (Progressio 2011). On the other side, it is clear that some of the FBOs’ recommendations were not accepted. For example, Christian Aid had complained about DFID’s decision to continue funding the World Bank unconditionally. Christian Aid had lobbied for the government (through DFID) to apply pressure through a conditional funding agreement with the World Bank. Christian Aid was concerned about some of the World Bank’s projects that do not take into consideration issues of climate change and environment. This FBO thought that DFID had made the decision to continue supporting the World Bank partly because Andrew Mitchell, the Secretary of State for International Development, sat on the World Bank’s board (Christian Aid 2011). This example shows how policy can be influenced by various factors. It is hard to measure specific policy influences from various factors, but one thing that is clear is that the policymaking process can be influenced by different factors that act collectively and incrementally, and which may later become transformational and lead to policy change. The results of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Reviews (chaired by Lord Paddy Ashdown) gave specific recommendations regarding faith groups. The policy review report (DFID 2011j) states: Faith groups are another example of a growing NGO sector with potentially improved responses through their strong links with and access to local communities. They raise considerable donations from faith and diaspora communities outside the DEC appeal […] DFID should consider, either through consortia or individually, investing in NGOs with specialist response capabilities to ensure these can be deployed robustly.

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FBOs were very pleased with that policy recommendation. The executive management of CAFOD, for example, said that they were “pleased to note that the review recognises the central role of faith communities and organisations as providers of first response in a humanitarian crisis” (CAFOD 2011). The ongoing humanitarian crises in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have proven this to be the case. Due to its Islamic identity, Islamic Relief, more than many other international aid agencies, had been able to access and deliver humanitarian aid to the most dangerous places in Somalia (Malik 2011). Islamic Relief was able to work within a 30-mile radius of Mogadishu and travel deeper into central and southern Somalia on assessment missions (Tran 2011b). Because of that, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, convened a meeting with the organisation, as well as with the Somali community in the UK, to discuss the best ways to deal with the humanitarian issues in the country (DFID 2011i). Due to the accessibility of Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa to Islamic Relief, leaders such as the Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, Harriet Harman,19 were able to go with them in order to see and experience first hand what was happening on the ground. Overall, advocacy activities improved the relationship between DFID and FBOs. Although all NGOs and other civil society organisations were encouraged and supported to carry out advocacy, DFID had seen the unique role and potential of FBOs to carry out advocacy due to their rich local networks and trust on the ground. These advocacy activities in the beginning of the Conservative-led coalition government administration and the specific recommendations from policy reviews on faith groups, arguably, led to publication in 2012 of the Faith Partnership Principles discussed earlier. In the funding analysis, it can be seen that big FBOs maintained funding support from DFID throughout the living period of those funding schemes. There is also a reflection of the advocacy results on humanitarian assistance in that Islamic Relief continued to receive funding not only through PPAs but also for humanitarian assistance. It is, however, still difficult to determine the specific influence of FBOs on DFID’s policies. This is especially because all the international development NGOs were engaged in challenging and supporting DFID’s policies, and most of the time, they did it in partnership with each other. A certain advocacy or policy campaign may be launched by FBOs, but they will gather support from other NGOs in order to have a collective voice. For instance, Tearfund and

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Water Aid initially started ‘End Water Poverty’ but a coalition of members campaigning for it was formed which included many NGOs. To be effective, policy advocacy and campaign organisers have to bring in different groups so they can have a collective voice. The success of the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign is attributed to the fact that the organisers were able to form a coalition of members from various groups. FBOs were very active in those campaigns, but they were not the sole campaigners. Tearfund, for example, organised a policy campaign on climate change, which was finalised by demonstrations at the Conservative Party conference on October 1, 2011. This campaign was open for everyone to join, and Tearfund sent public invitations to people who might like to join. In addition, Tearfund, CAFOD and Christian Aid organised a church mass together at Manchester Cathedral before walking towards the venue of the Conservative Party conference (Tearfund 2011b). Nevertheless, the extent of the FBOs’ influence on DFID’s policies was arguably limited. The reason for this is that, despite their faith identity, FBOs were treated as any other NGOs. For example, the way CAFOD or Christian Aid is treated is not significantly different from the way Oxfam is treated. The amount of funding might differ but all these NGOs undergo similar procedures in securing DFID funds. Of course FBOs make use of their faith identity as an added advantage in carrying out certain development projects in developing countries, but that has not yet significantly changed DFID’s policies. One of the official interviewees said “we met with faith groups a number of times and they would tell us what they want or think should be done but most of the time we did not implement their ideas” (Interview 2011). The little influence that FBOs had in changing international development policies was manifested by the fact that there was no any special unit or faith that dealt with faith groups in DFID. This is not a strange observation, since there’s a Minister of State for Faith and Communities in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.20 In the FCO, there’s a Special Envoy of Religious Freedom.21 To note in this period is the introduction and passing of the Regulations of Lobbying Act in 2015.22 This Act regulates charity messages to the public during election time. It thus limits the extent to which organisations such as FBOs can participate in election campaigns. This is relevant to this book’s interest since this book looks at elections as a ‘window of opportunity’ and/or ‘critical moment’ through which policy change can occur. Bond as well as individual NGOs including FBOs has been complaining and advocate against this Act. Sheila McKechnie

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Foundation further underscored the impact of the Act in a report. Bond summarised the report in particular the areas that undermine the charities’ democratic right to campaign (Popplewell 2018). These include: silencing small as well as large charities—by the rules on joint campaigning which are not favourable for smaller organisations; making it harder for charities to achieve their mission, especially those working on politically sensitive issues; forcing charities to change how they campaign; and the ambiguity of the Act created further uncertainty (Popplewell 2018). The Lobbying Act further limits the advocacy capacity of NGOs and FBOs consequently.

Fourth Period: The Relationship Between DFID and FBOs (Conservative Government Under David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson) 2015--2019 This period is the most dynamic of all in terms of British politics in this book’s time frame. The politics of Brexit has disrupted the patterns of governance, not least because of the multiple changes in leadership (not only at the premier level), whereby for the last four years (2015– 2019) there have been three prime ministers—but also at the cabinet level. DFID has already been under four secretaries of state in the same four years. These changes of leadership are affecting aid effectiveness as David Miliband, who was the former Cabinet Secretary of State for the FCO, noted “the aid system is struggling to keep up with the scale and complexity of needs” and “constant ministerial turnover was challenging the UK’s ability to lead change in the global system” (DFID Media Team 2019). Given the consideration of politicians’ attitudes on international development in this book’s analysis, the constant change of leadership in this period comes as a challenge to analysis. Nevertheless, since institutions can be persistent and with the concept of path dependence, there is consistency in some policy aspects that were introduced during the Conservative-led coalition government and also in the beginning of 2015 under the Conservative government prior to the Brexit vote which occurred in 2016. The 2015, 2017 as well as the 2019 election manifestos for the Conservative Party indicated continuity in key areas such as the commitment to 0.7 per cent of GNI. Whereas the 2015 and 2017 manifestos promised the independence of DFID as a cabinet ministry, the 2019 manifesto is silent about this. All of the manifestos, however, subtly signposted the

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changes that became evident in the last period, in particular the focus on wealth creation and private sector development; it stated that ‘it would help people in the UK give or lend money directly to individuals and entrepreneurs in developing countries’. The 2015 manifesto did not mention civil society, the core interest in this book—since faith groups fall under that category, but it noted the government’s plan to support charities through ‘Aid Match’. Given the trend of allocating the aid budget across various departments of the government, the 2017 manifesto went further to maintain that the UK will seek to change international rules on development. The 2019 manifesto cements the link between aid and security and links with foreign policy interests such as fighting terrorism, strengthening relations with Europe, expanding influence, promoting British values through the BBC and the British Council, and promoting freedom to worship and the rights of marginalised groups. Thus, as noted in Chapter 3 and later on in Chapter 6, the 2017 manifesto’s desire to change international rules on development and the 2019 manifesto’s silence on the independence of DFID are for the purposes of allowing more flexibility in aid budget spending. The international rules include the OECD rules which emphasise that aid budgets should be strictly spent in line with the development agenda. Allocating the aid budget outside DFID risks the use of aid money for non-development projects. In the following sections, there will be an analysis of the relationship between FBOs and the government (DFID in particular) in two areas: funding and advocacy, as has been consistently done in this chapter. Funding The major funding schemes for CSOs (hence FBOs), as discussed in the previous period, were coming to a conclusion in the beginning of this period. In 2015, Justine Greening, who was the Secretary of State for DFID, announced the closing of PPAs and only awarded an extension to four think tanks, which meant none of them were FBOs (UK Parliament 2017). The think tanks that received the nine months PPA extension were the IDS, ODI, IIED and CGD (UK Parliament 2017). In this period, no FBO received major funding support from DFID. The closure of PPAs meant the end of the unrestricted and significant funding partnership with major FBOs—that had consistently received a significant amount of this funding for five or more years. It is noteworthy that one of the big FBOs, Progressio, that had been receiving PPA funding, had to close down in

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2017 following the closure of funding support from DFID (Progressio 2017). Progressio had been in operation for 76 years by the time of its closure. The impact of the closure of PPAs was further exacerbated by the lack of succession planning from DFID with its partners (UK Parliament 2017). To understand the closure of the PPAs, it’s crucial to discuss the Civil Society Partnership Review (CSPR) that was carried out, the results of which were released in 2017 (UK Parliament 2017). This review, which was commissioned by the Conservative government, received criticism from NGOs through Bond and also by individual NGOs (UK Parliament 2017). The closure and shrinking of partnership space between DFID and CSOs were partly attributed to the CSPR. One of the noticeable issues is how the review labelled CSOs as “suppliers” instead of “partners”. In the light of that, mention may be made of the efforts to change the thinking patterns within DFID policy process from partnership and poverty reduction to business culture with more focus on wealth creation, quantifiable results and value for money. This could have gradually led to conceptualisation of former partner as suppliers who could provide a service that could be measured by DFID instead of being partners in fighting poverty. Another explanation for reduced support for CSOs can be found in the spreading of aid distribution across Whitehall departments—a system that was introduced in 2015. The UK aid budget is implemented not only by DFID but by other departments too as shown in Chapter 3. This has had a major impact on how DFID works and aid allocation. This new trend of aid budget distribution and allocation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. However, DFID did not completely stop providing funding support to CSOs. It introduced other funding schemes for CSOs. These were: (i) UK Aid Match—which would match public appeals and donations to charities in the UK; (ii) UK Aid Direct—which supports small and mediumsized CSOs. It includes the Small Charities Challenge Fund (SCCF); (iii) UK Aid Connect—which is to support coalitions of CSOs for innovative initiatives; and (iv) UK Aid Volunteers (DFID 2018). The reporting system for DFID has also changed with more focus on results than input. Thus, the presentation of statistics is also different, making it difficult to gauge how much each charity has received. Nevertheless, the available data show that the UK Aid Direct and in particular the SCCF first round was called and among the 31 successful recipients, none of them were FBOs (DFID 2019a). Overall, the latest data (as of July 2019) shows

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that DFID has already distributed/spent 35.31 per cent of the planned budget, which is to end in August 2025. The amount spent is £56.7 million out of £160.7 million (DFID 2019b). Six UK FBOs including Tearfund, ADRA, CORD, Hagar UK, Samaritan Purse UK and SCIAF, out of 142 organisations worldwide have so far received funding (DFID 2019b). With regard to the UK Aid Match funding, by July 2019, 15.4 per cent had been spent (£25 million of £165.2 million) of the total budget, which is to end in 2023 (DFID 2019c). Among the 44 recipients worldwide, a number of UK FBOs have received these funds including Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Tearfund and CAFOD (DFID 2019c). Islamic Relief was successful in finding match funding for its Ramadan Appeal. CAFOD in 2018 received funding for its Lent Fast Day Appeal (CAFOD 2018). UK Aid Connect, which calls for consortium bidding, announced its first round of funding in 2017; three consortia were successful including the Bond Consortium, the Leonard Cheshire Disability Consortium and the Sightsavers Consortium (Bond 2018). By August 2019, UK Aid Connect, which has a planned budget of £148.3 million up to 2022, had spent/distributed 6 per cent of its total budget amounting to about £8.9 million (DFID 2019d). 18 organisations within various consortia have received the funding, two of them being FBOs including Christian Aid and World Vision UK (DFID 2019d). In 2018, a Christian Aid-led consortium received £1.2 million from UK Aid Connect (Christian Aid 2018). This proves that DFID still trusts FBOs. In commenting on this, the International Development Minister, Lord Bates (Christian Aid 2018) stated: UK aid is proud of its longstanding partnership with Christian Aid. Now through UK Aid Connect , Christian Aid will work with specialists, NGOs and the private sector, to gather better data to help civil society understand the needs of some of the world’s most marginalised people in Nigeria, Burma and Zimbabwe.

The funding, in comparison with the PPAs, is small. Christian Aid used to receive over £7 million PPA funding consistently for a number of years (as noted in the previous period analysis). £1.2 million is a small amount in comparison especially considering that the funding is for a consortium of organisations.23 Besides, PPAs allowed for flexibility, creativity and innovation since they were not restricted. As a result of these funding issues, in October 2019, Christian Aid announced its decision to close a number

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of its regional offices and roll back its aid program (Abrahams 2019b). A note may also be made that the various funding schemes, although small, have brought more FBOs to engage with DFID, in particular the smaller ones. This is with regard to UK Aid Direct. However, even within the new smaller FBOs that have been receiving support, we still see a dominance of Christian-based FBOs. This shows the need to further engage with small non-Christian FBOs. Overall, in examining the new funding schemes, there has been enormous criticism from CSOs24 as well as even from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), which has given a poor mark (Amber Red—unsatisfactory achievement in most areas, with some positive elements—and areas where improvements are required for UK aid to make a positive contribution)25 for DFID’s funding relations with CSOs and overall relations with CSOs in this period. In April 2019, the Commission argued, “DFID values civil society organisations (CSOs), but its funding and partnership practices do not fully support the long-term health of the civil society sector” (ICAI 2019). In respect of this shrinking space for support for CSOs, which in turn affect the relations with FBOs, CSOs in the UK engaged in advocacy activities in trying to save their space in terms of relations with DFID and their influence on the international development agenda. Advocacy As noted above, the relationship between DFID and FBOs is dependant on the relations between DFID and CSOs. This is also part of one of this book’s main propositions: that the political party in power and politician’s attitude towards civil society determine the relations between faith groups and the government in areas of international development. In this section, how CSOs have engaged in advocacy activities from 2016 onwards will be looked at, particularly in trying to bring back and maintain their close relations with DFID. Arguably, CSOs have done their advocacy through joint effort under the wing of Bond. However, individual FBOs, in particular the big ones, have also stepped up in advocating for better policies. Christian Aid, for example, has advocated against aid allocation to non-DFID departments. The head of Christian Aid Advocacy, Laura Taylor, argued, “…Increases to other government departments such as the Foreign Office should be frozen until they can prove they meet the same high standards in terms

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of quality and transparency as DFID” (Christian Aid 2017). Such DFID standards that she refers to here are related to those international rules that the Conservative government wish to change, as mentioned in their 2017 election manifesto. The argument by Christian Aid was in reaction to an announcement that the government will allocate 30 per cent of the aid budget to other non-DFID departments by 2020 (Christian Aid 2017). Other FBOs have complained about this. For example, CAFOD, along with other CSOs such as Oxfam GB, argued that “given that overseas development assistance is increasingly being spent outside DFID, yet the report (i.e. National Audit Office Report) notes a lack of clarity about which part of government is responsible for monitoring overall effectiveness, it’s imperative the government ensures all aid spending is being held to the same standards of transparency and effectiveness as money spent by DFID” (NAO: Stone 2017). Seemingly, the advocacy agenda of CSOs focuses on and reflects the main policy issue of the period. In this period, the introduction of the new system of distributing aid allocation and management among various departments in Whitehall has been the main concern. From another point of view, it could be said that CSOs are demanding and advocating for the maintenance of a powerful position and independence of DFID in Whitehall. Following the publication of the 2019 election manifesto, which comes with the possibility of merging DFID back to the foreign office (FCO), FBOs alongside other NGOs have been quick to condemn any such moves and are advocating against any attempts to reduce the status of DFID. In early December 2019, the Guardian Newspaper published an open letter signed by the heads of 49 NGOs including FBOs such as ADRA-UK, Christian Aid and Islamic Relief (The Guardian 2019). Apart from advocating towards claiming the space in DFID and in the international development agenda, CSOs and specifically FBOs have continued to engage with DFID in policy areas. For example, Muslim Aid has been engaging with DFID on areas of safeguarding to tackle exploitation (Muslim Aid 2018). A number of FBOs, together with other NGOs, have been extending their hands and welcoming new secretaries of state whenever a new one has been appointed.26 This is a strategy to forge relations with the new leader, which is always a key step for further dialogue. FBOs together with other CSOs have continued to make submissions to the government whenever consultations are called for. Also, they do advocacy to other ministries responsible for matters related to international development. For example, on November 9, 2018, CAFOD, Islamic Relief,

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Christian Aid and other NGOs such as Oxfam GB submitted a letter to the minister of the FCO with regard to the humanitarian situation in Yemen, arguing for the UK to push for peace through the UN resolution.27 As Brexit politics are emerging and rising in their prominence, there is a justifiable concern about the direction of the international development agenda. This is in particular with regard to access to EU funding. In Chapter 6, the impact of Brexit on the UK’s international development agenda will be looked at in more detail and there will be an analysis of possible outcomes of different scenarios—specifically if there is a deal or no deal. Mention may be made of the existing analysis of DFID policy process with regard to EU development arrangements. This is important because one of the multilateral recipients of UK aid is the EU. Also, the UK has been at the core of formulating the EU international development agenda and policy directions.

Discussion: Historical Institutionalism Analysis The above sections have traced and discussed the relationship between the government and FBOs in the implementation of international development policies. For analytical reasons, the chapter was structured into periods of time according to government regime. The periods were: 1992–1997; 1997–2010; 2010–2015; and 2015–2019. In each of these periods, two ways in which the government has engaged with FBOs were identified. These were funding and advocacy. Then, various government funding schemes for which FBOs could apply and how FBOs fared against other NGOs were discussed. With regard to advocacy, the government’s engagement with FBOs in matters of policy development and evolution was looked at. This section analyses the reasons for the government’s engagement with FBOs, in order to examine the book’s propositions. This book’s propositions are: i. The resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups. ii. The attitudes of the political parties and politicians towards the third sector (civil society organisations, voluntary organisations and

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the private sector) explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. iii. The increasing prominence of an international development agenda in British politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups. These propositions will be examined through the historical institutionalism analytical framework based on institutional stability and institutional change (episodic and incremental). Institutional Stability Although there are significant changes in the relationship between the government and FBOs in the field of international development, there is institutional stability that can be observed throughout this entire period. Historical institutionalists argue that once institutions establish a certain path, it is very difficult to change it. This concept, as discussed in Chapter 2, is known as path dependency. The ‘path’ that the UK government has been following with regard to its engagement with FBOs is that since 1992, FBOs have been treated in the same way as other NGOs. There has not been any special unit to deal specifically with FBOs due to their faith identity. All the funding schemes through which FBOs accessed government funding were designed for all NGOs and not only FBOs. This shows that faith identity has not significantly influenced government’s relationship with FBOs as compared to other international development NGOs. The faith identity of FBOs could have an added advantage in some circumstances but not to an extent that made them significantly distinct from other NGOs. The events of September 11, 2001 only raised suspicion on the flow of funds to Islamic agencies without significantly affecting the relationship between Islamic FBOs and DFID. In addition, analysis has indicated that there are only a certain number of FBOs that significantly engaged with the government. These are Christian Aid, CAFOD, Islamic Relief, Tearfund, ADRA, the Aga Khan Foundation, World Vision UK and Progressio. In connection with this, it is important to note that these FBOs are large in operational scale, and their objectives are very similar to other big NGOs such as Oxfam or Save the Children. There are other FBOs, such as Muslim Hands and Muslim Aid, that engage with the government, but this engagement happens only on an ad hoc basis. The extent to which the biggest FBOs

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became dependant on funding support, in particular between 1997 and 2010 when partnership, along with other NGOs, was forged with DFID, has proven heavy following the end of significant funding in 2016. Progressio, as seen in the previous section, closed down after 76 years of operations when PPA funding ended. Christian Aid announced its decision to close down some of its country offices. Publishing ‘Faith Partnership Principles’ in 2012 was a huge step in relations with FBOs but that did not manifest in material terms in particular with regard to funding. The relationship between DFID and FBOs is tightly linked to the relationship DFID has with the rest of the development NGOs. Certain trends (i.e. treating FBOs just like other NGOs, or dealing with FBOs with which the government is already familiar) have persisted in all three periods covered in this chapter. However, there have been changes in the relationship between the government and FBOs. These changes and the reasons behind them are discussed below. Institutional Change Historical institutionalism discusses institutional changes in two ways. These are episodic changes (radical changes that cause critical junctures and so begin a new ‘path’) and incremental changes, which may accumulate and become transformational. Episodic Changes Looking at the relationship between the UK government and FBOs from 1992 to 2019, there is no evidence of critical junctures. According to historical institutionalism, institutions change when external or internal crises/shocks compel institutions to move out of the path that has been followed. These external crises may force institutions to alter or abandon the existing path in order to deal with new challenges. This situation is called a critical juncture. There were definitely policy changes with regard to government engagement with FBOs, but these changes did not happen instantly. Even when the New Labour government came into power in 1997 and stepped up the relationship with FBOs, the process was not episodic. Even the 2016 Brexit vote and results did not bring abrupt change in the international development agenda. This leads next to what historical institutionalists call ‘critical moments’, whereby an opportunity may occur for institutions to change, but they do not. Such situations are also called ‘windows of opportunity’. Thus, elections and new regimes

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may open ‘windows of opportunity’ but these windows may only allow or speed up incremental changes. Critical Moments/Incremental Changes The changes seen with regard to the government’s engagement with FBOs are incremental and can be attributed to many factors. Most of these changes are seen in the period beginning in 1997 when DFID was established. In the first time period of this book (1992–1996), there was one source of funding that FBOs could apply to, while in the second time period (1997–2010) a number of funding schemes were introduced to which FBOs could apply. Although these funding schemes were not only available for FBOs but for all NGOs, there was an emerging interest in working with FBOs. This is evident in the ‘Partnership Programme Arrangements (PPAs)’ Self Assessment Reviews’ where FBOs set some of the objectives/policy outcomes based on their faith identity and connection with faith communities in the UK and in developing countries. Although, in the period since May 2010, the Conservative-led coalition government put greater emphasis on the private sector than NGOs, the government continued to engage with FBOs through funding them, as well as inviting them to engage in policy reviews. A major policy shift occurred after the elections in 2015 when the Conservative Party took over and changed the DFID funding scheme—abandoning PPAs and other schemes, introducing new ones. Furthermore, aid was to be distributed and managed by different departments in Whitehall. Aid has been more explicitly linked with national interests, including trade and security—with increased attention to the private sector—and has, arguably, taken a big chunk of attention away from CSOs, in particular NGOs and therefore FBOs. The conceptualisation has also changed from ‘partners’ to ‘suppliers’. There are a number of explanations for the overall positive changes (i.e. a closer relationship) between the government and FBOs especially from 1997 to 2010. First of all, the ‘partnership’ policies that started in the mid-1990s and the emphasis on ‘collective responsibility’ in fighting global poverty were ‘windows of opportunities’ for FBOs to engage with the government on the international development agenda. These policies were not only British but were shared internationally by donor countries and multilateral aid agencies such as the OECD. That thinking (i.e. partnership with the third sector) opened up further opportunities for NGOs precisely because they were not part of the public sector: they were seen to represent ‘civil

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society’, which is understood to be an important ingredient of the political pluralism which donors were promoting (Wallace 1997: 37). The partnership policies, as seen in Chapter 3, started in the mid-1990s but they were only effectively implemented in the UK when DFID was established in 1997. Thus, the establishment of DFID was a ‘critical moment’ and/or a ‘window of opportunity’ for FBOs to engage with government. In connection with this, it can be said that since DFID was an independent department focusing on international development policies it opened up spaces for the government to work with various groups/‘partners’ to collectively fight poverty. This first point explains the third proposition of this book: that the ‘rising prominence of international development in British politics can explain the relationship between the government and faith groups’. In fact, the proposition is further strengthened by the fact that as the independence of DFID in managing the aid budget is waning, so is the engagement with CSOs and subsequently FBOs. Thus, the prominence of international development in British politics and the presence of an independent department to ‘eliminate world poverty’ opened up a space for the government to engage with FBOs. Second, the closer relationship between the government and FBOs in the period between 1997 and 2010 was also because ‘partnership’ policies matched with the New Labour government’s ‘third way’ policies. The ‘third way’ policies brought the voluntary sector closer to the government. Thus, guided by ‘third way’ and ‘partnership’ ideals, DFID was designed to work with voluntary groups, which included FBOs. The combination of ‘third way’ and ‘partnership’ policies provoked the establishment of the PPAs. As seen in the previous sections, since PPAs were established, a number of FBOs were able to secure considerable funding from the government and maintained a closer relationship with DFID. The Conservative-led coalition government kept the PPAs until 2015 when the Conservative Party took over. Thus, there was a continuation of policy after the 2010 elections but there were underlying incremental policy changes that the Conservative-led coalition government was implementing, which came to have an effect on the relationship with FBOs. For example, when the CSCF closed in 2015 followed by PPAs in 2016 FBOs lost huge chunks of funds to the extent that one had to close down operations. Although the Conservative-led government adopted the concept of ‘big society’, which was supposed to bring both the private and voluntary sectors closer to the government, the Conservative-led coalition government was more interested in working with the private/business

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sector than the voluntary sector. This explained the introduction of various funding schemes that were meant to help the private sector to carry out ‘wealth creation’ projects with, and in, the developing world. The emphasis on ‘quantified outcomes and results’, as well as ‘wealth creation’, opened more opportunities to the private sector than FBOs. That policy direction was further enhanced after 2015 elections when the Conservative Party took power. With the Conservative majority win in 2019, this policy pattern will be exacerbated. This is where it can be seen how political parties and politicians play a role in the relationship between the government and FBOs. Although both Labour and Conservative parties are aiming to fight poverty, their approaches are different; this in turn affects their relationship with FBOs. The character of a politician also matters. It is not surprising, for example, to see a closer relationship between the government and FBOs during Tony Blair’s premiership. Tony Blair believed that religion had a role to play in international affairs, and this explains the rise of his foundation (the Tony Blair Faith Foundation). Also, the former Secretary of State for DFID during the New Labour government, Douglas Alexander, for instance, often cited his pride in volunteering for Christian Aid in his youth, and the fact that his father was a vicar who always talked about helping the poor. Thus, his background made him aware of the connection between faith and development. Andrew Mitchell, the former Secretary of State for DFID during the Conservative-led coalition government, was also very passionate about international development and the fight against poverty; he had a very different background. He had worked in the banking industry for many years and he sat on the board of the World Bank. Thus, his ideas on development were arguably linked with trade, growth and other quantifiable results. Between 2015 and 2019, when the turnover of secretaries of state was high, impact of the encumbant’s ideas and views on the international development agenda could be seen briefly. For example, Priti Patel (Wintour 2019) and Penny Mordaunt (Anders 2018) put a lot of emphasis on the role of aid to meet British foreign policy interests. While Rory Stewart, who had volunteered and worked in developing countries as well as having worked as a minister in DFID before, was considered more compassionate and sympathetic to the fight against poverty. The Bond CEO stated the following in welcoming him (Bond 2019b; Abrahams 2019a): We look forward to working with Rory Stewart who has been a strong supporter of aid and development for many years now. We hope DFID will

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continue to lead on safeguarding and disability inclusion, and also show leadership on a poverty-focused development agenda that champions the importance of the SDGs, both here in the UK and globally, and works to reach the world’s poorest and most marginalised people by prioritising good quality aid and development.

However, given their very short tenure, it’s difficult to gauge the impact of their views on policy, if at all. Rory Stewart was replaced after less than four months tenure following the change of leadership. Such differences may explain the varying relationship between government and FBOs during these two leaderships. All in all, it can be argued that although DFID acknowledges the unique role of FBOs and their access to sensitive areas/issues (such in the AIDS strategy, ‘Taking Action’ (DFID 2004), where DFID acknowledges the importance of FBOs and faith communities in developing countries in the fight against HIV/AIDS; in the 2012 Faith Principles; and also in the DFID Annual Reports, even the 2018–2019 report acknowledges faith groups), DFID still engages with FBOs in terms similar to other development NGOs. Institutional constraints are still striking, as one of the FBO officials remarked, “the agenda of ‘faith and development’ tends to be dominated with FBOs and it does not spill over …” (Interview 2011). In 2006, DFID developed a paper on faith and development that acknowledged the important role of faith groups, particularly with respect to providing services to vulnerable groups, providing humanitarian assistance, empowering the poor so that their voices are heard and helping to reduce conflict. However, this paper was not published (Taylor 2007: 9). The fact that the paper was not published is perhaps a reflection of institutional constraints meaning that DFID was not yet able to alter the existing path that places FBOs in the same category as other NGOs. In 2012, it published Faith Partnership Principles, yet no institutional structure was set to manage relations with faith groups. DFID also designed the ‘drivers of change’, which could be seen as ways of understanding the political economy of change and poverty reduction in developing countries.28 These ‘drivers of change’ were meant to guide international development policies’ attention to the structural and institutional factors that were likely to bring about change. In regard to this book’s focus, the ‘drivers of change’ did not reflect the importance of faith in DFID’s analysis of development, as one FBO official said: “DFID drivers of change have very little that could be linked to faith. This is a good litmus test of

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whether faith is being significantly considered in development thinking” (Interview 2011).

Conclusion From the above analysis of the relationship between the government and FBOs, the following can be concluded: The Resurgence of Religion in International Politics Explains the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups The evidence obtained from the analysis above shows that the resurgence of religion itself could not explain the relationship between the government and FBOs. The government engages with FBOs as with any other NGOs that can prove to be effective in delivering policies in certain areas. Just as Oxfam can prove to be effective in working for education in Tanzania due to its local connections and research, Islamic Relief can prove to be effective in Pakistan due to its faith identity. This is why FBOs have received funds from the schemes that are designed for all NGOs. In advocacy, FBOs often lobby and campaign in collaboration with other NGOs. Although the Bosnian conflict (1992–1995) highlighted the competitive advantage of faith organisations such as Islamic Relief, and that capacity was further underscored in the Somali humanitarian crisis (2011) when they were one of the few aid agencies granted access to areas controlled by the Islamist group, Al-Shabaab, still we have not yet seen any institutional change with regard to supporting FBOs specifically. What we see is acknowledgement from the government, but that does not necessarily mean institutional change with regard to working with FBOs. The events of September 11, 2011 and July 7, 2005 had a definite impact on the international development agenda. As discussed in Chapter 3, international development was securitised in such a way that development aid is increasingly directed to fragile states where the risk of terrorist recruitment and radicalisation is high. DFID was part of the Conflict Prevention Pool and National Security Council. These were Whitehall initiatives that brought three departments (the other two being the FCO and the Ministry of Defence) together to deal with security threats such as ‘new terrorism’. However, there was not a considerable institutional change with regard to the relationship between the government and FBOs. Of course, these events caught policymakers’ attention,

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and there was a scrutiny of funding to Islamic aid agencies, but that did not lead to an institutional change. There were incremental changes with regard to ‘financing’, but these did not lead to change in the relationship between the government and FBOs. The World Bank’s conference on faith and development in 1998, and the findings of the reports of the ‘Voices of the Poor’ study discussed in Chapter 3, also highlighted the role of ‘faith in development’. Although the ‘Voices of the Poor’ and nascent appreciation of ‘faith and development’ agenda in development influenced DFID’s leadership on the role of faith groups, the impact of that is less evident for FBOs and more for faith communities, which are the subject of the next chapter. Thus, the resurgence of religion in international politics has only contributed to incremental changes in the relationship between the government and FBOs. The rising salience of religion in international affairs could not in itself explain the relationship between the government and FBOs. This shows that the ‘faith and development’ agenda has a long way to go before creating a juncture in governmental policy. The Attitudes of Political Parties and Politicians Towards the Third Sector Explain the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups The sections above have shown that the political party in power and politicians have played a role in the government’s engagement with NGOs, which in turn impacts on the relationship with FBOs. New Labour’s ‘third way’ policies in the period between 1997 and 2010 further strengthened partnership policies, which brought voluntary groups (some of them FBOs) closer to the government. Although the Conservative-led coalition government’s ‘big society’ was meant to bring such groups closer to the government, it had not been possible due to various factors such as emphasis on ‘value for money’ and ‘quantified results/outcomes’. As a result, from the 2010 elections, and more so from 2015 and 2017, DFID has been giving more attention to the private/business sector and quantified results with increasing attitude to link aid to trade and other national interests. In connection with this, it is important to mention that the idea of ‘value for money’ began in the last years of the 1997–2010 period, for example, the 2009 white paper was explicit about the need for ‘value for money’ due to the economic recession, but in the same paper ‘funds to faith groups were to be doubled’. It is thus the approach of

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politicians towards whichever facet of the ‘third sector’ matters—whether private businesses or CSOs—which in turn has an impact on the relationship between the government and FBOs. The Increasing Prominence of the International Development Agenda in British Politics Explains the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups Since the mid-1990s, international development has become an important issue on the international stage. This explains the emergence of the ‘international development targets’ that were later adopted as the UN MDGs. The prominence of international development did not end with the international community, but it trickled down to domestic politics. DFID is established in 1997 and it is endorsed by the Conservative Party in 2005, when David Cameron promised to keep it as an independent department. In the wake of Brexit, international development also features prominently due to the ‘global Britain’ agenda—whereby the UK is planning to project its influence in the global sphere. These positive attitudes towards the need to fight poverty and its links to domestic politics opened up doors for international development NGOs to further engage with the government until after 2010 and increasingly in 2015 when the private sector and businesses are considered to be more effective in the new aid approach of wealth creation as opposed to poverty reduction. Thus, each of the three factors above plays a part in the relationship between the UK government and FBOs. None of the factors can explain the heightening or lessening of the relationship exclusively.

Notes 1. For this and other statistics see: House of Commons. (1994, February 11). Overseas Development-Non-governmental Organisations. Written Answers to Questions. 2. Calculated at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/ inflation/inflation-calculator. Accessed 3 Aug 2019. 3. For more information, please see https://webarchive.nationalarchives. gov.uk/20100512170016/https://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/ publications/evaluation/ev210s.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. 4. For more information, see House of Commons. (1996, January 15). Written Answers, Hansard. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/

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pa/cm199596/cmhansrd/vo950115/text/60115w07.htm#60115w07. html_sbhd5. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. For more discussion on Zakat and Islamic charities please see Benthall, J. (1999). Financial Worship: The Quranic Injunctions to Almsgiving. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 5(1), 27–42; Benthall, J. (2003). Humanitarianism and Islam After 11 September. In Macrae, J. and Harmer, A. (Eds.), Humanitarian Action and the Global War on Terrorism: A Review of Trends and Issues. London: Overseas Development Institute. See the menu at https://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/about-us/what-wedo/zakat/zakat-calculator/. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. For example, it grew from 5 per cent in 1979, to 9.3 per cent in 1982, and fell to 6.7 per cent in 1985. See Morrissey, O. (1991). An Evaluation of the Economic Effects of the Aid and Trade Provision. Journal of Development Studies, 28(1), 104–129. For instance, White (1998) has argued that there is continuity in policy, see his article: White, H. (1998). British Aid and the White Paper on International Development: Dressing A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing in the Emperor’s New Clothes. Journal for International Development, 10(2), 151–166. Refer to Note 2. Compiled by the author using data from: DFID. (2010, October). Statistics on International Development 2005/06–2009/10. National Statistics, 96–97. See DFID. Governance and Transparency Fund. https://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100610012626tf_/https://www.dfid.gov.uk/ Working-with-DFID/Funding-Schemes/Closed-funds/Governance-andTransparency-Fund-GTF-/. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. For more please see http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http: //www.dfid.gov.uk/funding/gtf-guidelines07.asp (Archived-Valid as of 20/06/2007). Accessed 21 Oct 2019. See https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100609172546tf_/ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding-opportunities/ Not-for-profit-organisations/DAFMG/. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/342703/Impact-Grant-Awardsaug2014.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. For all other business related funding schemes, please see DFID. Business. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123172831/http:/ /www.dfid.gov.uk/work-with-us/funding-opportunities/business/. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. For the letters and papers please visit http://www.bond.org.uk/ data/files/bond_letter_to_andrew_mitchell_re_dfid_multilateral_aid_

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review_13.08.10.pdf; http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/Bond_BAR_ Submission_Letter_4Oct2010.pdf; http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/ Bond_Submission_to_the_DFID_Bilateral_Aid_Review_30.09.2010.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug 2011. See http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/bond_letter_to_andrew_ mitchell_re_dfid_multilateral_aid_review_13.08.10.pdf; http://www. bond.org.uk/data/files/Bond_Submission_to_the_DFID_Bilateral_Aid_ Review_30.09.2010.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug 2011. For more on these debates see House of Commons. (2011, March 1). Parliamentary Debates: Official Report. Hansard, 167–183. Harman, H. (2011, August 30). Off to Horn of Africa Tomorrow with Islamic Relief to See Their Vital Work for Desperate People. Tweet. http://twitter.com/#!/HarrietHarman. Last accessed 30 Aug 2011. See https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/senior-minister-of-stateand-minister-for-faith-and-communities. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/5/enacted/en/print. html. Accessed 5 Oct 2019. See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/5/enacted/en/print. html. Accessed on 5 Oct 2019. The other members of the Consortium include: FEMNET, GNDR, International HIV/AIDS Alliance, Ipsos MORI, Maxwell Stamp, On our Radar, Social Development Direct, The Open University, and Womankind. See for example: Bond. (2019a, April 1). Ensuring Civil Society Is Heard: Principles and Practices to Improve Government Engagement with Civil Society. https://www.bond.org.uk/resources/ensuring-civilsociety-is-heard. Accessed 13 Sept 2019; Godfrey, C. and Wright, M. (2019, April 1). Empty Commitments: Is the UK Government Engaging with Civil Society? https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2019/04/emptycommitments-is-the-uk-government-engaging-with-civil-society. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. See ICAI. https://icai.independent.gov.uk/about-us/our-workplan/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. See for example Christian Aid and Islamic Relief, in Hamilton-Martin R. (2019, May 9). Aid Organisations Welcome New Development Chief. IPS. http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/05/aid-organisations-welcome-newdevelopment-chief/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. See the Letter here: https://cafod.org.uk/content/download/ 47543/575312/version/5/file/Yemen%20Open%20Letter_Foreign% 20Secretary_%20Final.pdf. Accessed 20 Sept 2019. For general details on this please see http://webarchive.nationalarchives. gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/ driversofchange.asp. Accessed 29 Oct 2019.

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DFID. (2019d). Development Tracker. UK Aid Connect funding mechanism. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300055. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. DFID Media Team. (2019, July 30). David Miliband on DFID’s independence and role in the global Britain. https://dfidnews.blog.gov.uk/2019/07/30/ david-miliband-on-dfids-independence-and-role-in-global-britain/. Accessed 6 Aug 2019. Edwards, M. (1993). ‘Does the doormat influence the boot?’: Critical thoughts on UK NGOs and international advocacy. Development in Practice, 3(3), 163–175. Edwards, M., Hulme, D., & Wallace, T. (1999). NGOs in a global future: Marrying local delivery to worldwide leverage. Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice, 19(2), 117–136. FCO/ODA. (1994). Departmental Report, Cm 2502. Ghandour, A. R. (2003, December). Humanitarianism, Islam and the West: Contest or cooperation? Humanitarian Exchange, 25, 14–17. Gibson, A. (1993). NGOs and income-generation projects: Lessons from the Joint Funding Scheme. Development in Practice, 3(3), 184–195. Gilligan, A. (2010). Muslim Aid: Hopeless Charity Commission whitewashes yet another Islamist group. The Telegraph, 17. Godfrey, C., & Wright, M. (2019, April 1). Empty commitments: Is the UK government engaging with civil society? https://www.bond.org.uk/news/ 2019/04/empty-commitments-is-the-uk-government-engaging-with-civilsociety. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. Goodlad MP, R. H. S. A. (1998). The view from the opposition benches. Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association, 10(2), 195–202. HMG. (2005). The UK’s contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. HMG. (2010). The Coalition: Our programme for government. London: Cabinet Office. HMT. (2001, October 15). Action against financing of terrorism. Statement by Chancellor of Exchequer. http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/speech/cx_151001. html. Accessed 6 Aug 2011. House of Commons. (1927). Journals of the House of Commons, Vol. 82. London: H.M. Stationary Office. Howell, J. (2006). The global war on terror, development and civil society. Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association, 18(1), 121–135. Hudson, A. (2001). NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: From ‘legitimacy’ to ‘political responsibility’? Global Networks, 1(4), 331–352.

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ICAI. (2019, April 10). DFID partnership with civil society organisations. https://icai.independent.gov.uk/report/csos/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. IDC. (2002). Financing for development: Finding the money to eliminate world poverty. House of Commons International Development Committee Fifth Report of Session 2001–02. Islamic Relief. (2011, March 2). Statement in response to DFID’s bilateral and multilateral aid reviews. Press Release. http://www.islamic-relief. com/NewsRoom/4-342-ir-statement-in-response-to-dfid-s-bilateral-aid-andmultilateral-aid-reviews.aspx. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. Jehangir, M. (2011, July 29). Somalia famine: Our agency is able to deliver aid. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2011/jul/29/somalia-famine-islamic-relief-response?INTCMP= SRCH. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Lewis, D., & Wallace, T. (2000). New roles and relevance: Development NGOs and the challenge of change. London: Kumarian Press. Looney, R. (2006, March). The mirage of terrorist financing: The case of Islamic charities. Strategic Insights, 5(3), 1. Malik, J. (2011). Somalia famine: Our agency is able to deliver aid. The Guardian, 29. Minear, L. (1987). The other missions of NGOs: Education and advocacy. World Development, 15, 201–211. Mitchell, J. (1991). Public campaigning on overseas aid in the 1980s. Britain’s overseas aid since 1979: Between idealism and self-interest (p. 146). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Mitchell, A. (2010, October 13). Wealth creation. Speech, London School of Economics. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123172251/ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-statements/2010/wealthcreation-speech/. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Morrissey, O. (2002). British aid policy since 1997: Is DFID the standard bearer for donors? (CREDIT Research Paper No. 02/23). Morrissey, O., Smith, B., & Horesh, E. (1992). British aid and international trade: Aid policy making, 1979–89. Buckingham: Open University Press. Muslim Aid. (2018, October 18). Muslim Aid renews its safeguarding commitments. https://www.muslimaid.org/media-centre/news/muslim-aid-renewsits-safeguarding-commitments/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. ODI. (1995). NGOs and official donors. Briefing Paper, 4. Popplewell, R. (2018, June 6). 6 ways the Lobbying Act restricts campaigning and undermines democracy. https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2018/06/6-waysthe-lobbying-act-restricts-campaigning-and-undermines-democracy. Accessed 5 Oct 2019. Progressio. (2006). Report to the DFID on Progressio Partnership Programme Agreement, First Year 2005/06.

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Progressio. (2011, March 2). Progressio welcomes UK’s renewed commitment to international aid. Press Release. http://www.progressio.org.uk/ blog/news/progressio-welcomes-uk%E2%80%99s-renewed-commitmentinternational-aid. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. Progressio. (2017, June 30). Progressio ceased trading on the 30th June 2017 after 76 years. http://www.progressio.org.uk/what/progressio-close-after75-years. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. Rice, X. (2011, August 4). Somalia famine relief effort hit harder by food aid delays than by rebels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2011/aug/04/somalia-famine-food-aid-unicef-al-shabab. Accessed 10 Sept 2011. Robinson, M. (1997). Privatizing the voluntary sector: NGOs as public service contractors. In D. Hulme & M. Edwards (Eds.), NGOs, states and donors: Too close for comfort? (pp. 59–78). New York: St. Martin’s Press. Salamon, L. M. (1995). Partners in public service: Government-Nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Stoddard, A. (2003). Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends (pp. 25–36). London: HPG. Stone, J. (2017, July 18). Overseas aid spending needs better scrutiny, watchdog warns. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/overseasaid-spending-scrutiny-monitoring-dfid-nao-report-amyas-morse-watchdoga7845996.html. Accessed 21 Oct 2019. Taylor, N. (2007). DFID, faith and AIDS: A review for the update of taking action. London: UK Consortium on AIDS and International Development. Tearfund. (2009, July 13). Response to Tory green paper. Press Release. http:// www.tearfund.org/News/Press+releases/Response+to+Tory+Green+Paper. htm. Accessed 14 July 2010. Tearfund. (2011a, March 1). Tearfund responds to aid review. Press Release. http://www.tearfund.org/News/Press_releases/Tearfund_responds_to_aid_ review. Accessed 9 Aug 2011. Tearfund. (2011b, October 1). Bearing witness. http://www.tearfund.org/en/ get_involved/campaign/climatechange/ccbearingwitness/. Accessed 9 Aug 2011. The Guardian. (2019, December 4). Let the UK continue to lead the world in global development. Letters. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2019/dec/04/let-the-uk-continue-to-lead-the-world-inglobal-development?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. Accessed 3 Jan 2020. Toye, J. (1991). The aid and trade provision of the British overseas aid programme. Bose and Burnell, 1991, 97–124. Tran, M. (2011a, July 28). Calls for aid agencies to channel famine relief through Somali NGOs. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-

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development/2011/jul/28/somalia-famine-aid-relief-insurgents. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Tran, M. (2011b, August 2018). Somalia famine: The problems of delivering aid. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 2011/aug/03/somalia-famine-aid-operations. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. UK Parliament. (2017, March 27). The development reviews. https:// publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmintdev/100/10006. htm. Accessed 13 Sept 2019. Vereker, J. (2002). Blazing the trail: Eight years of change in handling international development. Development Policy Review, 20(2), 133–140. Wallace, T. (1997). New development agendas: Changes in UK NGO policies & procedures. Review of African Political Economy, 24(71), 35–55. Water Aid, & Tearfund. (2003). New rules, new roles: Does private sector participation in water and sanitation benefit the poor? http://www.wateraid. org/documents/psp_case_study_summaries_2.pdf. Accessed 9 Aug 2011. White, H. (1998). British aid and the White Paper on International Development: Dressing a wolf in sheep’s clothing in the emperor’s new clothes? Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association, 10(2), 151–166. Winpenny, J. (1991). Efficiency and effectiveness in the Overseas Development Administration. In A. Bose & P. J. Burnell (Eds.), Britain’s overseas aid since 1979 (pp. 32–48). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Wintour, P. (2019, March 18). Priti Patel joins calls for radical shake-up of aid budget rules. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2019/mar/18/priti-patel-joins-calls-for-radical-shake-up-of-aid-budget-rules. Accessed 14 Sept 2019. World Vision. (2011, March 1). World Vision’s applauds Mitchell’s new aid package. Press Release. http://www.worldvision.org.uk/server.php?show=nav. 3810. Accessed 10 Aug 2011. Young, D. R. (2000). Alternative models of government-nonprofit sector relations: Theoretical and international perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 149–172.

CHAPTER 5

Faith Communities in the UK’s International Development Policies

Introduction This chapter presents an analysis of the relationship between the UK government and faith communities with regard to international development. Whereas the previous chapter presented the analysis of the relations between the government and faith-based organisations (FBOs), this chapter is distinct as it presents an analysis of the relations between the government and faith communities. In this book, faith communities, as defined in Chapter 1, refer to those forums, councils or organisations through which people of a certain faith may engage with government departments. For instance, the Church of England qualifies as a faith community in this book since it represents the Anglican community in the UK. Similarly, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is also analysed as a faith community in this book since it represents a certain Muslim community. The chapter offers an empirical assessment through documentary analysis of the government’s policy papers and strategies as well as faith communities’ publications in order to examine the relationship between the UK government and faith communities in the field of international development. This examination is followed by analyses of the ‘causes’ or ‘explanations’ of the status of this relationship. Thus, the question that is asked is: What explains the lessening or heightening of the relationship between the government and faith communities? According to the propositions, there are three possible explanations for this: © The Author(s) 2020 A. C. Kwayu, Religion and British International Development Policy, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0_5

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(1) the relationship between the government and faith communities depends on the resurgence of religion in international affairs; (2) the relationship between the government and faith communities depends on the attitude of political parties and politicians towards faith communities; and (3) the relationship between the government and faith communities depends on the status/prominence of international development in domestic politics. The findings and analysis in reference to these propositions are presented in the discussion section. For coherence and analytical purposes, this chapter, similar to previous ones, is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the period from 1992 to 1997 and covers the time when there was a Conservative government led by John Major; the second section looks at the period from 1997 to 2010 thus covering the New Labour government under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown; the third section explores the period from 2010 to 2015, which covers the Conservative-led coalition regime under the leadership of David Cameron; and finally the period between 2015 and 2019 covering the Conservative government under three Prime Ministers—David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson. The findings regarding the first period suggest that faith communities did not interact with the government in the area of international development. Although faith communities, such as the Church of England, were already engaging in matters of international development, it was on their own behalf and not in collaboration with the government. The traceable relationship between the government and faith communities at this time focused mainly on domestic issues. In the wake of the election of New Labour and the formation of DFID, the government started to partner with faith communities in the fight against poverty in the Global South. The government’s move to work with faith communities can be attributed to a number of factors including the organisational and campaigning skills of faith communities displayed in the Jubilee 2000 Debt campaign, the increasing international recognition of the role of faith in development (the ‘faith and development’ agenda), and perhaps more significantly the need for DFID to acquire public support for international development. From 2010, there was a weakening of the relationship between the government and faith communities. This is mainly due to the emphasis on ‘value for money’, which does not encourage the use of aid money to win public support. In addition, faith communities do not fit with the Conservative-led coalition government’s approach to international development, which includes a focus on quantified results, wealth

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creation and private investments. Between 2015 and 2019, there were opportunities for faith communities to engage through various UK aid funding schemes that encouraged consortia and matching aid through which faith communities could apply. Interestingly, there is more opportunity for faith communities in recipient countries than those in the UK. This is due to further emphasis on quantifiable results, which faith communities in developing countries can show better compared to those in the UK. Moreover, the funding schemes are accessible to faith communities beyond the UK. Nevertheless, the cross-department distribution of the aid budget is challenging the existing rules on aid budget spending. As will be seen in Chapter 6, with Brexit as well as the Conservative government approach to aid, there is more push towards diversification, which has steered discussions and concerns from various stakeholders. Following that, the chapter analyses the findings using the historical institutionalism analytical framework designed in Chapter 2. This section examines changes in policy such as the government’s engagement with faith communities, to see whether the changes were radical or incremental. The analysis of the findings indicates that there were gradual changes in the relationship between the government and faith communities in the matters of international development. Unlike FBOs, which have been working with the government since the first period of this book’s time framework, faith communities’ ability to participate in international development received government’s attention only in the second period. The chapter concludes by looking at the propositions to see which one of them answers the research question, and to what extent.

First Period: 1992--1997: UK Faith Communities’ Role in Humanitarian Relief and Campaigning for Fairer International Development Policies Humanitarian Relief The relationship between faith communities and the UK government with regard to the international development agenda between 1992 and 1997 was almost non-existent. This was in spite of the fact that faith communities carried out international development activities. The Muslim community in Nottingham, for example, organised itself to send humanitarian aid to Bosnia in the early 1990s.1 However, their activities were not conducted in collaboration with the Overseas Development Administration

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(ODA). Such activities by faith communities during this period were nevertheless crucial to their later engagement with the Department for International Development (DFID), as faith communities were brought into the government’s international development agenda. There was a gradual recognition by the government of the role of faith communities in matters of international development, since the potential for faith communities to participate in solving global poverty issues was becoming apparent. The role of faith communities in the fight against global poverty issues was clear in conflict situations. Faith communities have become more instrumental in addressing security issues identified in the ‘New Security Agenda’. These have included ethno-religious conflicts. The end of the Cold War created a power vacuum at an international level, which led to the escalation of civil and ethnic conflicts. This vacuum strengthened the neorealist argument that the bipolar world system was more stable than multipolar world, which was the result of the end of the Cold War. John Mearsheimer argued “the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends […] the next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century (i.e. 20th C), but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years” (Mearsheimer 1990). This argument by Mearsheimer is a strong one. However, it is biased in that it only discusses Europe. During the Cold War, there were proxy wars in non-European countries that led to massive atrocities. These include Zaire (now DRC) and Angola. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the world in the post-Cold War era has experienced some of the most brutal civil conflicts and violence against humanity. Some of these conflicts had religious dimensions, such as the Bosnian conflict and the Somali crisis of 1992–1993. Other civil/ethnic conflicts include the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Sierra Leone, which began in 1991. The Sierra Leone conflict ended in a truce in 1999 with the Lome Convention. This conflict was not a religious conflict, as it was mainly a conflict between the rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (Bellows and Miguel 2006). This conflict was extremely brutal with several human rights abuse; according to Human Rights Watch, at least 50,000 people were killed (Human Rights Watch 1999).

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The ODA had a development programme in Sierra Leone throughout the conflict period and there was an implicit consensus on the role of various actors on the ground. In 1996, Lynda Chalker, who was the Minister for International Development (1989–1997), stated that (Chalker 1996): The Development Programme can play an important complementary role through what has been called “citizen based” or informal diplomacy. In Sierra Leone, we encouraged the British NGO ‘Conciliation Resources’ to bring together church, labour and women’s groups to consider their practical contribution to peace-making. For many of them, this was the first time that they had been asked to participate at all [emphasis added].

As can be seen from this quote, a faith community (the church) is one of the groups that the British government was recognising. Recognition is an important stage towards forming a relationship. Thus, although no engagement can be seen between the government and faith communities during this time, there were underlying changes that were gradually directing the government towards a tangible relationship. During this time, a number of faith communities’ contributions towards the global fight against poverty can be seen. These activities further highlighted the potential roles of faith communities and have formed the context and basis for future relationships between the government and faith communities. Campaigning In the early 1990s, faith communities were concerned and active in the fight against global poverty, and other international development issues. As mentioned earlier, Muslim communities around the UK, such as the one in Nottingham, organised themselves to send aid to Bosnia.2 They were motivated by the perception that atrocities were directed at their fellow Muslims by members of other faiths (Khashan 1997). In connection with this, a number of things can be said in relation to religion and the literature of international politics. In his article, ‘If not Civilization, what?’, one of the examples that Huntington used to support his argument was the assistance from Muslims around the world to fellow Muslims in Bosnia during the war. He linked the following three points to support his argument: (1) the continuation and intensification of the fighting among Croats, Muslims and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia; (2) the failure of

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the West to provide meaningful support to the Bosnian Muslims; and (3) the offer of Iran and other Muslim nations to provide 18,000 troops to protect Bosnian Muslims (Huntington 1993). Although the UK Muslim communities may not have sent humanitarian assistance to Bosnia on the basis of a ‘clash of civilization’, or in order to help the Muslims fight back, there was a perception among Muslims that the West was not acting quickly enough to stop the massacre of Muslims. It was observed, “Serb atrocities and ethnic cleansing of the Muslims did not seem to move Western governments to take sufficient action to deter the increasingly aggressive Serbs. Muslims everywhere watched in horror at the Serbian excesses while the West did very little to stop them. The entrenched notion that the ‘West is irreconcilably hostile towards the Muslim world received a tremendous boost among Arab Muslims’” (Khashan 1997: 9). The UK government understands that there is a perceived notion that the West is unfair to the Muslim world and government officials have been rebutting it whenever they have a chance to do so. After the September 11th 2001 attacks, Tony Blair recognised the connection between such perceptions and terrorism. In his speech at the Labour Party conference in October 2001, he confronted such perceptions. He observed: “People say: we are only acting because it’s the USA that was attacked. Double standards, they say. But when Milosevic embarked on the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Kosovo, we acted” (Blair 2001). Similarly, a foreign office official, Frances Guy, who headed the ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ department within the FCO, rebutted similar claims that the West ignored the Bosnian conflict. In his speech to Chavening scholars, he explained the involvement and the amount of aid the UK, the EU and the USA give to the various countries in the Muslim world, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Pakistan, Palestine and Sudan.3 On the other hand, the actions of the Muslim community in Nottingham to send humanitarian aid to Bosnia resulted in the establishment of ‘Muslim Hands’, which became an FBO. Muslim Hands is based in Nottingham but its work, by 2019, encompasses 50 countries and has expanded to establish a separate and independent entity based in Canada.4 Its work has expanded to cover both humanitarian assistance and the fight against poverty. Muslim Hands belongs to the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF), which, as discussed in Chapter 4, has engaged with the government on various occasions. During this period (1992–1996), faith communities were also active in the fight against global poverty in various capacities, but perhaps the most significant contribution of faith communities was to the Jubilee 2000 debt

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cancellation campaign. The Jubilee Debt Campaign was a coalition of more than 80 civil societies, which demanded the cancellation of all debts owed by poor countries to rich countries. The campaign had its roots in the early 1990s. The purpose of the campaign was to lobby for debt relief. To understand the passion of faith communities in the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign, it is important to explain its religious roots. The idea of the Jubilee was derived from books in the Bible, Leviticus chapter 25 and Deuteronomy chapter 15. In Leviticus, the Bible reads: ‘But if he has not sufficient means to recover it, then what he sold shall remain in the hand of the buyer until the year of Jubilee. In the Jubilee it shall be released, and he shall return to his property’.5 A Lecturer in Politics at Keele University, Martin Dent, proposed this concept of the Jubilee in relation to international debt owed by poor countries in the early 1990s (Dent and Peters 2019). Many development partners who were campaigning against debts did not, at first, accept Dent’s ideas. The concept was regarded as ‘too religious’ for most (Pettifor 2006). Later on, these groups, particularly the Debt Crisis Network (DCN), reasoned that linking the theological concept of the Jubilee with debt cancelling campaigns at the Millennium would appeal to people of faith in Western countries, who were the creditors (Pettifor 2006). Their thinking proved correct, and the concept received enormous support from civil societies, trade unions, teachers’ unions and churches. Anglicans, Catholics and evangelical Christians in Britain organised under the umbrella of their respective aid agencies such as Christian Aid, CAFOD and Tearfund. Other faith communities such as the MCB also joined. The Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign became so strong a coalition that the former DCN was dissolved to form a Jubilee 2000 National Coalition. Faith communities became active in this campaign. The Church of England, for example, discussed the issues of debts and the concept of the Jubilee in the 1991 and 1996 General Synods. In these Synods, the Church of England debated and motioned on the Jubilee Principle regarding Third World debts.6 Although the UK government was already working with other donor countries under the auspices of the OECD, IMF and World Bank, towards combating international debts owed to poor countries,7 it was apparent that the specific reaction from the ODA to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign was not positive. Pettifor (2000), the co-founder of the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign, claimed that they “were only able to obtain information on debt owed to the UK on a piecemeal basis, through

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Parliamentary Questions”. This signalled the lack of cooperation the campaign received from the ODA. If the ODA had been cooperative, such data would not have been so difficult to obtain. The Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign threatened to expose the government. The 1980s and early 1990s were not very favourable times for international aid. Aid was linked with trade and later on with conditionality. Moreover, the aid books were not very pleasant. For example, the UK’s ODA/gross national income ratio had increased in the 1970s, reaching a peak of 0.51 per cent in 1979. It then fell through the 1980s and remained at around 0.30 per cent for the first half of the 1990s (DFID 2007). In the 1980s and up to the early 1990s, developing countries received aid that would go back to repaying the debts to the very countries that they were receiving aid from (Kanbur 2000). Thus, a campaign to unconditionally cancel all debts owed to poor countries was not likely to appeal to the government at such a time. It was a disruption that the government was not ready for. However, the ODA’s lack of support for the campaign may have been due to the fact that the campaign was not yet official. Although the Jubilee 2000 campaign started in the early 1990s, it was officially launched in April 1996. By this time, it had gained considerable momentum and support from various groups in society. Bono, the rock-star singer of the group U2, joined the campaign in 1998. His comment on the campaign indicates how convincing the idea was, not only to religious people, but also to other groups in society. He said (quoted from Donnelly 2007: 123): The most inspiring thought I bumped into last year was the concept of Jubilee 2000, a call to cancel third world debts going into the next millennium and to give crippled nations a chance to get up off their knees and walk again […] Without a real commitment to do something about the dire circumstances of a third of the population of the planet, all new year’s eve ‘99 will amount to is an up drawbridge scenario, a fancy dress ball at the castle where we all play Louis 14 pissing across a moat of champagne on the poor.

In the bigger picture, the Jubilee 2000 campaign rose from the positive international context in which international development was gaining more collective attention globally. As noted in Chapter 3, by the mid-1990s, the UK government together with other donors started to keenly examine the world poverty situation and look into ways that they could address the dire poverty levels in many countries of the world. The

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MDGs, although launched in 2000, had started with the international goals that were set around 1995. The effects of the Jubilee 2000 campaign particularly with regard to the government’s relationship with faith groups could be seen only in a few years after the launch in 1996.

Second Period: 1997--2010: UK Faith Communities’ Role in Assisting the Government to Raise Awareness and Build Support for the International Development Agenda The DFID started with an ambitious goal to eliminate world poverty. This was clear in its first white paper published in 1997, where it is stated that DFID shall “[r]efocus its international development efforts on the elimination of poverty and encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor” (DFID 1997: 6). There were various factors that led to that ambition. These included: (1) the desire in all international aid agencies to fight global poverty. This mood led to the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); (2) the Labour Party’s policy on international development; and (3) the subsequent establishment of an independent ministry with a cabinet seat to manage international development. These factors gave DFID autonomy to make international development policies without having to convince other departments such as the FCO. When international development was managed by the FCO, some of its priorities were in conflict with other foreign policy interests. This point is made clear by Tom Porteous’s explanation of UK policy towards Africa before and after DFID. He observed (Porteous 2005: 281–282): Africa became the top priority for the new ministry, whose main mission was to reduce poverty in the developing world. This prominence was not new: Africa had also been the top priority of DFID’s predecessor, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). But the ODA had been subordinate to the FCO, where Africa was low down the list of priorities. The ODA did not have much political clout, and traditional foreign policy concerns about British trade and arms sales had tended to trump its development mission. With the creation of DFID, development assistance was explicitly untied from the promotion of British commercial interests, and issues related to UK development policy in Africa got a hearing at cabinet level, a more strategic focus and a lot more cash.

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The focus from 1997, then, was on eliminating world poverty, as was apparent in all four white papers (1997, 2000, 2006, and 2009) published during this period. The subtitle for each of these white papers was: ‘Eliminating World Poverty’. In addition, the International Development Act that was passed in 2002 legally backed up the policies of DFID (HMG 2002). This Act replaced the 1980 Overseas Development and Corporation Act. The ‘core’ power provided by the 2002 Act is the “provision of development assistance which contributes to poverty reduction” (DFID 2002). Other powers provided by the 2002 Act are: the provision of development assistance to the UK Overseas Territories; the provision of humanitarian assistance; and contributions to multilateral development banks (DFID 2002). Nevertheless, DFID recognised that the budget and the legal backup also have limits. The department realised that eliminating world poverty requires a combined effort from various groups in society. The department also recognised the importance of gaining public support for international development, as they had to increase the aid budget to achieve their ambitious aims. This was expressed in the 1999 publication of the Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS). The BSDS mentioned faith groups as one of the four sectors that the government planned to work with in order to mobilise public support for their international development policies. The other three groups comprised the media, the education sector and trade unions. Why were faith communities selected as one of the four groups to build public support? Arguably, the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign was one of the factors that placed faith communities on the international development agenda. The strength of the campaign was demonstrated in 1998 in Birmingham, where the G7 meeting was to be held. Prior to that day, FBOs, particularly Christian Aid, CAFOD and Tearfund, arranged for their respective church halls to act as venues to educate people about the campaign.8 On the main day of the campaign, 16 May 1998, “the floodgates opened, and thousands of colourfully decked out supporters poured out of Birmingham station, waving banners, carrying chains, wearing silly top hats, and holding posters high…”.9 The number of demonstrators on that day was estimated to be around 70,000 people, with 3000 journalists to cover the story.10 The positive atmosphere of that campaigning day was captured well by Short (2004: 84–85), then-Secretary of State for International Development, who recalled that:

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…people came in their thousands from all over Britain and beyond as they gathered in the churches and cathedrals of central Birmingham to call for debt relief for the poorest countries. Then at the last minute, the agenda of the G7 was changed and the leaders of the richest countries bowed to [the] wishes of the people on the street and discussed what was to be done about debt relief.

Although the campaigners included non-religious people, the active participation of faith communities highlighted their potential role in supporting international development policies. Faith communities could be mobilised to support international development policies that otherwise may not have been so popular. The fact that Clare Short described the performance of the ‘Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign’ at the 1998 G7 summit so positively, is an indicator that the campaign might have contributed to the decision to include faith communities in the four groups targeted to build support for development. Clare Short was a keen and influential supporter of the DFID’s policies, and of its independence in deciding international development policies (Kampfner 2004: 64). There is evidence that she was directly and significantly involved in shaping these policies. In his diaries, Chris Mullin (Parliamentary Under-Secretary for international development in 2001) recalled: “never have I come across a politician so in love with her job. She believes that she has the best job in government. What’s more she had it long enough to make her mark. Her enthusiasm is infectious. So much so that it is difficult to say no to her […] with engaging frankness she describes herself as ‘policy greedy’ […] I am welcome to be involved in whatever interests me, but decisions will always be hers” (Mullin 2010: 168). In addition, Tony Blair, in his book, A Journey, wrote of Short: “Under her leadership, DFID led the way globally in terms of development policy […] I thought DFID worth it and it gave Britain huge reach into the developing world” (Blair 2011: 24). Furthermore, in a speech given to the General Synod of the Church of England, Clare Short stated that, “I have been greatly impressed by the contribution of the churches - all the churches - to the campaign for the relief of unpayable debt for the world’s poorest countries. I very much welcome the Lambeth Conference resolution and especially its linkage of debt relief to poverty reduction” (Short 1998). From these accounts by Clare Short herself and fellow politicians, there can be confidence that the positive perception that Clare Short had of faith communities may

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have significantly influenced the inclusion of these groups in the 1999 ‘Building Support for Development Strategy’. Another factor that illustrated the influence that faith communities could have in international development matters is the report from the World Bank-sponsored project known as ‘Voices of the Poor’. The Voices of the Poor project, as discussed in Chapter 2, was a project that aimed at collecting the views of poor people in order to understand their experiences and expectations. The project emphasised that “religion, its beliefs, rituals, practices, and institutions, is central to the social, cultural, and moral life of these communities” (Belshaw et al. 2001; Thomas 2007: 137). From that project, the World Bank concluded that “religious leaders and institutions were often the most trusted people and institutions in developing countries” (Narayan 2000: 137). It is this project’s report that further highlighted the energy of faith communities in the fight against poverty. DFID may have considered the findings of this project. As one official interviewee said “although the government had been working with faith based organisations such as Christian Aid and the Catholic organization (CAFOD), the World Bank’s ‘Voices of the Poor’ findings that poor people trusted faith leaders and faith organisations more than any other groups or government led me to think that was a very serious development and that we can do something about that- and that was to try and mobilise the energy and strengths of faith groups towards fighting global poverty” (Interview 2011). In general, the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project supported the faith and development agenda. The World Faith Development Dialogue (WFDD) forum, which arose from the Interfaith Conference on Poverty and Development co-chaired by the former World Bank President James Wolfensohn and the former Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey, had also underscored the importance of working with faith communities. In one interview with a key official, it was observed, “DFID key officials attended some of the WFDD meetings in Canterbury” (Interview 2011). It seems that the faith and development agenda was also embraced due to the personal convictions of some key leaders, who believed in the potential role of faith groups in the fight against poverty. One official interviewee said that “when Brown was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was interested in international development partly because of his own interests and convictions but also because of what he had seen DFID had done to fight international poverty, so he would meet with faith groups to discuss matters of international development and they would raise their

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agenda but DFID really never implemented many of the ideas they raised” (Interview 2011). Gordon Brown himself also confirmed that he held a number of meetings with faith communities when he was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In a lecture, ‘Faith and Politics’, that was hosted by the Archbishop of Canterbury in February 2011, Gordon Brown said “my arguments tonight are also the latest chapter in what has been a long conversation between us, because many of you here attended the regular events for faith groups and NGOs that I convened throughout my years at the Treasury” (Brown 2011). Another interviewee from an FBO echoed the sentiment that Gordon Brown’s conviction of the potential role of faith groups in development was a factor that may have brought faith groups into international development policies. He said, “the gift aid that was introduced by Gordon Brown has been very helpful to our organisations and it covers costs like salaries and so the actual funding goes to operations. Gordon Brown introduced gift aid out of his commitment to religious beliefs. We know he is a good Christian and he goes to church” (Interview 2011). Similar opinions were expressed at the launch of one of the Target 2015 documents, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter. In brief, however, Target 2015 saw documents published by DFID for each faith in the UK as a way of relating each faith’s doctrine to international development matters. When DFID was launching the Target 2015 for Muslim communities, the Secretary General of the MCB, Yousuf Bhailok, said that “We do genuinely believe that there is commitment from our Chancellor, the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown, and the Rt. Hon. Clare Short, Minister for International Development to do everything possible by the Government to achieve the stated objectives. The Muslim community is proud to be associated with this launch” (MCB 2002). The perception that Gordon Brown and other key leaders’ religious backgrounds had influenced relationship between DFID and faith communities was also held by a number of other FBO officials interviewed. One stated: “There are a number of Christians in the Cabinet […] Tony Blair is an active Christian, Gordon Brown is a son of a Scottish Christian Minister, and Douglas Alexander is a son of a vicar […] thus, there is personal conviction to the importance of faith in international development” (Interview 2011). The interviewee continued: “There are several religious voices - e.g. Lambeth Palace has good relations with Number 10 and their conversations centre around international development” (Interview 2011). Such perceptions cannot be ignored since they reflected the

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face that these leaders were presenting to faith groups. They also support the second proposition in this book with regard to the perception of leaders on the third sector—which includes faith groups. The biographies and activities of these leaders also testify to their religious convictions. For example, Tony Blair established the Tony Blair Faith Foundation immediately after he left office. The aim of this foundation was “to promote respect and understanding about the world’s major religions and show how faith is a powerful force for good in the modern world”.11 In A Journey, Blair further expresses his faith conviction and its connection to his foundation. He wrote: “I have always been more interested in religion than politics, but in the work my Faith Foundation does, the two overlap” (Blair 2011: 690). Furthermore in the autobiography, he explained how his foundation deals with international development, stating, “we have an action programme, which is to encourage those of different faiths to work together to implement the UN MDGs, and we have begun with the fight against malaria in Africa” (Blair 2011: 690). Although the Foundation, by 2019, had changed its name to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change—Peacemakers12 —it was established with that name in 1998; its vision, mission and also the explanations of Blair in his memoir spoke much about his conviction on the role of faith in development. In fact, the institute is still linked to faith matters through its ‘Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers’.13 Thus, it is possible that the perceived personal conviction of key leaders that faith is important to development has contributed to the placing of faith communities on the agenda. Now that the possible reasons have been looked at behind DFID’s decision to include faith communities as one of the key groups in helping to build support for development in the UK, the next section analyses how DFID operationalised their strategy to build support by working with faith communities. Building Support for Development The BSDS paper was published to devise a plan to mobilise and gather public support for international development. It is important to note that this strategy was published two years after the establishment of DFID. This indicates that the BSDS served to promote DFID itself to the public as a new institution. The BSDS identified ‘churches and faiths’ as one of their main priority areas (DFID 1999: 6). The strategy read:

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The Christian churches and all the other faiths have a strong tradition of concern with development issues. Their role in the Jubilee 2000 campaign on debt is an example of their potential reach and influence […] we want to build and support a worldwide alliance with the Christian church and other Faiths to eliminate poverty.

Thus, from the very early years of DFID, the role of faith communities, as distinct from FBOs, had been noticed. DFID had an ambitious plan for faith communities, which focused on “building a worldwide alliance with the Christian church and other faiths” (DFID 1999: 6). This was in recognition of the fact that “the churches are global/transnational institutions with civil societies that are self-sustaining” (Interview 2011). This relates to discussion in earlier chapters that the expansion of transnational religious influence in the globalisation era directly challenged the secularisation theory, which argued that as a society modernises, religion becomes a private matter. Indeed, the reverse of that has been happening: religion’s soft power has been penetrating and influencing both domestic and international affairs in the globalised world (Banchoff 2008). Apart from the BSDS, churches and other faiths were mentioned in almost every strategy or policy paper that DFID published from 1997 to 2010 (DFID 1997, 2000, 2005a, b, 2006). DFID also prepared seminars and visited faith communities in the UK to build support for development. There were times when DFID hosted or visited faith communities to discuss matters of international development. Clare Short addressed the General Synod on the World-Wide Alliance for the Elimination of Poverty in 1998. In her speech, she asked for the support of faith communities, saying, “I want to ask for the support of the people of faith across the world to take this message of hope to the people of the world […] I want to ask you today to join in a worldwide campaign to eliminate poverty. It is clear that this is possible. I can think of no finer way of marking the 2000th anniversary of the birth of Christ. One of his most lovable features was his love of the poor” (Short 1998). Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for International Development (2004–2005) also addressed the General Synod in 2004. He observed that “The Church of England’s leadership on development has been a beacon […] I was delighted to see that in the report you will be debating later today you have already responded to the Call for Action (DFID’s strategy for HIV/AIDs) […] and ask us to spend more. Let me assure you that the UK will play its

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part […] we will prioritise yet more HIV/AIDS work within the additional £320 million which will be spent on UK development aid to Africa in the next two years” (Benn 2004). In the same vein, in December 2005 the Minister of State for DFID, Gareth Thomas, invited the Evangelical Alliance to discuss matters of international development.14 In this meeting, there was a discussion of the role of churches and Christian charities in international development, especially in making poverty history. Such meetings were organised with the objective of mobilising support for the international development agenda with particular emphasis on the MDGs. In 2008, the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the International Development Secretary of State, Douglas Alexander, took part in the interfaith ‘Call for Action’ conference at Lambeth Palace. This conference marked the end of the ‘Walk of Witness’ rally that was headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams. The rally called for an end to world poverty and for more action towards the MDGs.15 Although such rallies and events were not new, what was unprecedented was the weight of attention they received from key government leaders and in this case, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for International Development. There were other initiatives that DFID implemented to step up its relationship with faith communities. These included policy consultations and seminars. In March 2009, Lambeth Palace hosted a consultation between faith communities and DFID on the white paper that was to be published in July 2009. The Minister for International Development, Ivan Lewis, attended the consultation and observed that (Church of England 2009): Today we stand at a critical juncture. We face a financial crisis, which could push 90 million more people into extreme poverty by the end of next year […]. We must come up with new solutions and new ways of working that address the development challenges we face in the 21st century. Faith groups are critical to that […] Faith is fundamental to understanding and relating to the world. It helps shape how we understand the opportunities and challenges of life – and how we respond to help those less fortunate than ourselves. Your voices are essential.

This comment highlighted the basis of the relationship between faith communities and DFID, which was to build support for development. In fact, an economic recession had begun and DFID had to find support for international development. The economic crises were looming, and in

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addition, calls for a general election were on the increase. The Conservative Party, as seen in previous chapters and again in Chapter 6 in more detail, had already changed its standpoint on international development and had promised to keep DFID as a department. In connection to this, it could be argued that one of the Labour Party’s strengths and a distinction from the Conservative Party was its international development agenda and since 1997, the establishment of DFID. The international development agenda is one of the Labour policies that have earned it a ‘more sympathetic and compassionate’ party image as compared to the Conservatives. There has always been a perception that the Labour Party cares more about global poverty than the Conservative Party does. However, the Conservative Party changed its international development policy since 2005 for the purposes of building a “compassionate” image for the party. David Cameron had that vision since he took over as the party leader. This rebranding strategy of the Conservative Party blurred the once distinct line between the two parties on the area of international development. Thus, the 2009 white paper was an important one to underscore Labour’s commitment to international development and the Labour Party needed support for this probably more than at any other time. Soon after the publication of the 2009 white paper, DFID together with the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Oxfam, World Vision and Islamic Relief, organised seminars, which were held between September and October 2009. The collective theme of these seminars was ‘New Perspectives on Faith and Development: Faith in the Marketplace?’ The event included a number of speeches given by policymakers, faith leaders and academics. Some of these key speakers included the former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the International Development Secretary of State, Douglas Alexander, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams. The fact that DFID participated in organising such a seminar series is an indication of the imperative it had placed on matters of faith and development. It can be seen in many policy papers that DFID had been expressing its willingness to work with faith groups, and through this series it is apparent how far they had gone in discussing ways in which faith could be incorporated into development.

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‘Target 15’: Understanding and Making Use of the Attitudes of Faith Communities to Build More Support In addition, DFID published documents that were specific to various faith communities. These publications came to be known as ‘Target 2015’. The ‘Target 2015’ publications were faith-specific documents published by DFID with the aim of building support for development. The main versions were for: the Christian and Jewish communities16 ; Sikh communities17 ; Muslim communities18 ; and Hindu communities.19 Accordingly, each version explained what the faith in question says about the international development agenda. For instance, the Hindu version reminded the Hindu community about what Krishna, the Hindu god, says about giving in the Bhagavad Gita. At the end of each version, a postcard was attached allowing community members to fill in their details both to express an interest and to indicate ways in which they wished to support the international development agenda. These postcards were then sent either directly to DFID or through their respective community organisations, such as the MCB or the Network of Sikh Organisations. Arguably, the Target 2015 publications were the outcome of the study commissioned by DFID to explore and assess the perceptions of faith communities regarding the development agenda. This study was carried out by Richard Bonney and Asaf Hussain from the Centre for the History of Religious and Political Pluralism, Leicester University and presented to DFID in 2001.20 The study began by summarising the attitudes of the world’s main faiths to the ethical issues relating to world poverty. This was followed by findings that were gathered from a set of questionnaires (with questions divided into eight categories) dealing with: knowledge of the development challenge; awareness of the Jubilee 2000; core issues of the development agenda; specific issues of the development agenda; general awareness of the development agenda; support for the development agenda; and the mobilisation of faith communities to support the development agenda. The study concluded that there was a high degree of motivation within the separate faith traditions towards addressing poverty, which is potentially available to support the development agenda. Recommendations were therefore made for DFID to tap this resource of highly motivated potential support within the faith communities.21 These findings and recommendations were reflected in the Target 2015 publications. With regard to funding, DFID set up various funding schemes through which faith communities, among other groups, could access funds from the government for international development purposes.

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Funding Faith Communities The first of these schemes was the Strategic Grant Agreements (SGAs) that were established in 2003 to develop a stronger, better-informed and more effective UK community for international development. The rationale behind the SGAs was to provide funds to groups that had traditionally not worked with DFID.22 As DFID23 put it: DFID have long standing links with traditional international development organisations. These groups remain important partners for us, but we are also keen to engage with new groups who have not already worked with DFID but have a particular strength they can bring to International Development.

In spite of the fact that the SGAs focused on groups that did not have international development as their primary concern, these groups had to display interest in, and potential to contribute towards achieving international development goals. Most UK faith communities have a mandate to work on domestic issues, such as issues within cities and social cohesion within UK communities, while those, such as the Church of England, that have always had an international scope for their concerns about poverty, used to do it on their own and not in partnership/collaboration with the government. But since 1997, DFID decided to work with various groups to build support for international development. Thus, faith communities were eligible for this fund. It is noteworthy that none of the agreed SGAs was specifically for faith communities. There were eight agreed SGAs, which started in 2004 for a period of three years. The list of recipients included the British Medical Association (BMA), Trades Union Congress (TUC), Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA), Connections for Development (CfD), Co-operative Movement, UK Local Government Alliance for International Development (LG Alliance), and National Union of Journalists (NUJ). This did not reflect a priority position for faith communities, despite them being mentioned as priority areas in the BSDS. However, SGAs were not the only scheme that was available for faith communities. The second funding scheme was the Global Development Engagement Fund (Awareness Projects). An illustration of the activities funded by this scheme is the Greenbelt Festival. This Christian initiative runs festivals that host a rich programme of visual and performing arts, spirituality, comedy, talks and discussion. This is a purely faith-related event, where

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Christians and interested people from other faiths are welcomed.24 In addition to the festivals, Greenbelt campaigns and conducts other events that link art, faith and justice. For instance, Greenbelt supported Trust Greenbelt, which is a programme to support “quirky, entrepreneurial and risky ideas […] and give voice to the marginalised, often supporting initiatives that wouldn’t make it into traditional funding reviews”.25 DFID supported Greenbelt from 2006 up to 2010. DFID’s financial support to this initiative was meant to help in raising awareness of international development among festivalgoers. In regard to funding of the Greenbelt Festival, one interviewee said, “Douglas Alexander is a very strong Christian and that is why such activities as Greenbelt could be supported” (Interview 2011). Although that might have contributed to the funding of Greenbelt, it is not the only reason that Greenbelt or even other similar organisations could get government funds. DFID funded activities and projects that could fit DFID goals at a particular time: DFID wanted to raise awareness and build support for international development from the UK citizens, so if Greenbelt could do that then they could secure the funding. The third funding scheme was the Development Awareness Fund (DAF), introduced in 2002. DAF was designed to support not-for-profit organisations to carry out projects that raise public awareness, understanding of global poverty and how it can be reduced.26 The nature of this fund qualified faith communities as long as they had commitments to raise awareness of international development and they had not received any other funds from DFID for the same project. Overall, the statistics for the approved projects since the DAF was set up in 2002 to 2010 did not reflect a promising picture for faith communities. In 2002/2003, none of the 32 organisations that received the grant was a faith community.27 Similarly, in 2003/2004, none of the 22 organisations that received a grant was a faith community. The same pattern is repeated for the following year, 2004/2005.28 In 2006/2007 among 32 projects approved to receive DAF funding, only one faith community, Hindu Aid, was approved.29 DAF funding was awarded to Hindu Aid for two years (2006–2008) so they could deliver a sustained and participatory development education programme to the British Hindu community and increase knowledge about global poverty, the MDGs, global interdependence and the plight of developing countries.30 While in the financial year 2007/2008, one faith group received an award, in both the year 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 no faith group received DAF funding.

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Under the DAF, there was a mini-grant scheme, aimed at organisations or networks with an interest in development education work in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales who wanted to undertake one- to three-year projects seeking to raise awareness and understanding.31 In the year 2006/2007, among the 31 organisations that received these grants, only one was a faith community, known as Chichester Inter-Diocesans West Africa Link.32 Given these statistics, it is difficult to analyse the reasons for selecting only one faith community among 32 organisations and networks. It is possible that less faith communities applied for the grant or for one reason or another they were unable to qualify for the fund. All in all, these statistics suggest that the relationship between the government and faith communities in the period from 1997 to 2010 was marked more by rhetoric and policy discussions than funding. This indicates a minimal role for faith communities in policy. Since DFID sought to work with faith communities mainly in the area of awareness raising, how did it expect these communities to raise awareness without supporting them through funding? Mentioning and expressing willingness to work with faith communities in politicians’ speeches and government papers is immaterial if there is no funding to back up those words. It could be argued that the 1999 BSDS facilitated discussions between the government and faith communities, but did not go beyond that. Ten years after the publication of this strategy, i.e. 2009, DFID assigned external consultants to review it. The consultancy report concluded that (Thornton and Hext 2009: 3): The faith-related BSD objective has not been effective and was clearly inappropriate at the time. However more substantive strategic engagement with faith communities was also not effectively developed. Faith communities continue to be amongst the strongest advocates of development and social justice. There has been increased engagement around the 2009 White Paper consultations and the current preparation of guidelines on DFID engagement, which could form the basis for more effective dialogue.

The guidelines on DFID engagement with faith communities were not published in this period. This was something that, arguably, hindered DFID’s substantial institutional engagement with faith communities. The difficulty of lacking any institutional or substantive guidelines specifically designed to guide the engagement between DFID and faith communities had been proved on many occasions. For instance, in 2001, DFID

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commissioned a study on faith communities and the development agenda (Bonney and Hussain 2001), which recommended the establishment of an intermediary group of specialists who “will provide the necessary new network to establish a more sophisticated and more effective relationship with the faith communities” (Bonney and Hussain 2001: 5), but DFID did not do this. Mention may be made, that out of this process (starting in 2009), ‘Faith Principles’ was published in 2012 and will be discussed in the next section that covers the period between 2010 and 2015. In spite of the weaknesses that were outlined in the review report, DFID continued to work with faith groups in more or less the same way. That is, there was no special unit or specific guidelines established to direct its dealings with faith communities in this particular period of New Labour government. Faith groups were treated just like any other group that could contribute something to the fight against global poverty in accordance with DFID’s plans. In March 2010, DFID launched a programme that was known as ‘Global Community Links’. This programme was set up to link communities in the UK with those in developing countries, with the goal of sharing understanding of global development issues and increasing awareness of them in the UK. The programme was funded by DFID and managed by the British Council, the Institute of Community Cohesion, Voluntary Services Organisations (VSO), and the Inter Faith Network. Faith communities with already established links in the developing world could be of good use to this programme. For example, Anglican Churches in the UK had already established a link with Anglican Churches in Zimbabwe, which matched the 1999 BSDS’s objective for Churches and Faith: ‘To build and support a worldwide alliance with the Christian church and other faiths to alleviate poverty’ (DFID 1999). According to one former official interviewee, “The Community Link programme was launched with the hope that faith communities will form links with other communities in the global south” (Interview 2011). The decision to establish a community link could be associated with the government’s recognition of the work of ‘communities’ in the Global South in dealing with poverty issues. In particular, faith communities in the Global South have been active in tackling diseases and stigma. DFID recognised this. The department worked with and assisted faith communities in the Global South. An interviewee (2011) who was a key official in DFID said:

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We worked with faith groups in South Africa in fighting HIV/AIDS because they were more effective than any other groups, and we also worked with Islamic organisations in Northern Nigeria because they were also effective and they could convince people that polio vaccination is not a Western medicine but an important vaccination that is good for people […] and in all these we did not work with them directly, we will work through UK-based NGOs that are not necessarily FBOs or even through governments.

Although this book focuses on UK faith communities, it is crucial to note that the government had started to see the importance of linking these communities with their counterparts in the Global South. This was the apparent drive behind the formation of the ‘Community Link’ programme. This path that was being established, could partly be the basis on which DFID started to work and support faith communities in the recipient countries through various funding schemes that are accessible to charities beyond the UK. Also, as will be seen in the next sections, with the focus on results, DFID appreciates the results that are achieved by faith communities in the developing countries, thus increasing their support to them.

Third Period: 2010--2015, Faith Communities vs. Private Sector in the “Big Society” One of the Conservative-led coalition government’s plans was the creation of the ‘big society’, which aimed to empower charities, enterprises, private and voluntary sectors, and other non-governmental bodies to deliver public services. The ‘big society’ was defined as “a massive transfer of power from Whitehall to local communities” (Cabinet Office 2010). David Cameron advocated for this concept since he became the leader of the Conservatives in 2005. It is noteworthy that Cameron had wanted to rebrand his party and make it progressive and compassionate. In his December 2005 interview with Andrew Rawnsley (2005) of the Observer, Cameron maintained: What I want to do with the Conservative party is to make it a more compassionate Conservative party, get it into the mainstream of British politics, broadly appeal as a party, talk about subjects that we haven’t talked about, change the face of the party, with more women and more representatives from black and ethnic minority communities, and get into the cities. It’s going to be a big theme of my leadership.

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This was one way of placing reliable competition against the Labour Party that was already in power from 1997 with Tony Blair. Even though there was a tarnished image of Blair’s government by then, mostly due to the Iraq war, the voluntary sector and civil society were appreciative of the support and collaboration they received in the Blair government through ‘third sector’ policies. As Stuart Etherington, who was the chair of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) later commented (Brindle 2019): …days of Blair government, from 1997 into the new century were golden years for NCVO and what was then termed the third sector […] money was flowing into public services, and charities were seen as key delivery partners, with seats at the top table and a voice in policy making.

In fact, Cameron himself admitted that he ‘wants to build on’ that which had been done well since 1997 (Rawnsley 2005). He had a large appreciation of Tony Blair’s politics, as he has narrated in his book For the Record, that “Tony Blair had understood that he needed to be the ‘heir of Thatcher’, so we needed to understand how to be ‘heirs to Blair’”. Cameron continued with efforts to remake the Conservative agenda compassionate with consideration for communities. In 2010, he won the election but without a majority, resulting in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. As noted in Chapter 3, the coalition agenda was mostly composed of conservative ideas as manifested in both the 2010 Conservative election manifestos. In the above context and with regard to the ‘big society’ programme, it was expected that the relationship between DFID and voluntary/community sector (hence faith communities) would be strong. However, due to budgetary cuts, it was not easy for the ‘big society’ ideas to be fully implemented. Stuart Etherington noted, “David Cameron’s big society vision was ill-fated and was a missed opportunity” (Brindle 2019). The Conservative-led coalition government took austerity measures across Whitehall, only ring-fencing the NHS and International Development budgets. Even ring-fencing the aid budget and the protection the pledge of reaching the 0.7 per cent GDP as a target was not easy. Cameron noted, “protection [for] the overseas aid budget was much more difficult to get agreement on […] there was unsurprisingly, a great deal of opposition to our commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of national income on development” (Cameron 2019: 189). It was thus

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not possible to provide adequate funding support to voluntary organisations and charities to carry out and deliver public services in other areas. The ‘False Economy’ survey, which published its findings in early August 2011, showed that more than 2000 charities and community groups were facing budget cuts as local authorities reduced their funding—or in some cases completely withdrew it (Jayanetti 2011; Ramesh 2011). Regarding the international development agenda, the concept of the ‘big society’ was more apparent in the relationship between DFID and private/business sector than in the voluntary sector or community groups. The Conservative-led coalition government believed in fighting poverty through enterprise, wealth creation and entrepreneurship based on results and outcomes that are quantifiable. In this light, the government started to engage more with the private sector because it could supposedly create wealth and generate quantifiable results. The green paper, as mentioned earlier, did not mention faith groups at all, which was an indication of policy change, especially when compared to previous DFID white papers and other policy papers in which every single one of them mentioned faith groups as important ‘partners’ in achieving the policy goals laid out. In the green paper, an emphasis was placed on private sector businesses, such as Vodafone and Unilever. The 2011–2015 DFID business plan, for ‘making DFID more privatesector’ friendly’ (DFID 2011a), further highlighted the plans to bring the private sector closer to DFID in preference to other groups. This was done through the creation of a dedicated private sector team to drive cultural change (DFID 2011a). This private sector team was created in January 2011 (DFID 2011b). In addition, DFID published a paper (in May 2011) titled ‘The engine of development: the private sector and prosperity for poor people’ (DFID 2011c), which detailed DFID’s new approach to working with the private sector. According to this paper, the new approach was about DFID doing more with, and for, private enterprise, extending its work in new areas, and doing it better. DFID wanted private sector thinking to become as much a part of its DNA as its work with charities and governments. The new approach was supposedly to deliver results for poor people: better job opportunities and incomes; more readily available and affordable finance for households and small businesses; and more accessible, better quality healthcare, schooling and basic services (DFID 2011c).

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Comparing the Third Period (New Labour Government) and the Fourth (Conservative-Led Coalition) Period In connection with the point above, it is worth highlighting the differences between New Labour and the Conservative-led coalition government with regard to their international development approaches. When the New Labour government published the 1997 white paper, it was clear that DFID would partner civil society organisations (e.g. NGOs, think tanks, faith groups, trade unions, social movements and community groups) to eliminate world poverty and achieve the MDGs. As a result of that, DFID established the Civil Society Department. The Conservative-led coalition government kept this department and prepared an operational plan for it from 2011 to 2015. The department had four responsibilities including: (i) programme management (administering central funding schemes); (ii) policy linkage (improving policy and practice through relationships with CSOs); (iii) relationship management; and (iv) promoting learning and improved practices (DFID 2012). Simultaneously, DFID created a new department for the private sector in order to strengthen its relationship with the private sector, to ensure ‘value for money’, transparency and account for every penny used to fight poverty through quantifiable results. That was the beginning of reflection on the different approaches to development that the Labour Party and the Conservative Party had even under the framework of an independent cabinet-level DFID. It could be argued that the Labour Party approach encouraged collective responsibility by various actors to fight poverty through qualitative and quantitative means, while the Conservative-led coalition government was hugely more focused on quantified results, which automatically brought the private sectors closer to the government. These different approaches have had an impact on how DFID engages with faith communities. The relationship between DFID and faith communities in the previous period was mainly for the purpose of creating and raising awareness for international development. This was basically under the framework of the BSDS. To implement that, DFID supported the activities of faith communities both by having policy discussions with them through consultations and by supporting their international development activities. Examples of this approach included the policy consultation sessions at Lambeth and the ‘faith in the marketplace’ seminar series in 2009. In

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addition, DFID also had a funding scheme for such activities known as the DFA. Although, as seen in the previous section, faith communities did not fare well in applying for these funds. At least there was an opportunity for them to engage, and some communities, such as the Hindu community, did receive funding. Such engagement changed with the coming of the new government. On July 5, 2010, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, announced that the £6.5 m Global Development Engagement Fund (DFID 2010a), the DAF and Mini-Grants would be scrapped (DFID 2011d). The reason given for this decision was that, ‘following an external review of the links between development awareness projects and reducing global poverty’, the Secretary of State concluded that there was insufficient evidence that these projects had a clear impact on the lives of the poorest (DFID 2011d). It could be argued that the reason why the government decided to scrap the awareness fund was because the government did not see the need to raise any more awareness for aid. The Conservative-led coalition government had already ring-fenced the aid budget in the budgetary spending cuts and they had promised to reach the 0.7 per cent of national income for aid by 2013. Thus, DFID did not need any public support anymore since the aid budget was already there and there was no need to persuade the taxpayers anymore. However, this argument was hardly convincing. The government, out of dynamic domestic politics, has to always justify to the taxpayers the reasons for aid. In fact, if anything given the austerity measures that were taken in other sectors across Whitehall, as well as the economic depression of the time, ring-fencing the aid budget was something that needed a lot of justification. In times of economic recession and budgetary cuts, it was very important to explain to taxpayers the reasons why the aid budget was ring-fenced. This chapter began with a quote from Brian Atwood, head of the OECD, suggesting that aid budgets need to be backed up by political will. Political will is strengthened by public support and popular opinion. As it will be shown in Chapter 6, in this period there was a political will to promote international development and an increasing of the aid budget, but the public and a number of politicians were yet to be convinced. In that light, the Conservative-led coalition government did not stop securing public support for development; it only devised other means of building this support. The new ways were different from the previous ‘Building Support for Development Strategy’. The Conservative-led coalition government believed support for aid could be obtained by showing people the ‘real’

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value of their taxes spent on aid. This matched with their ‘quantifiable outcomes’ focus. This approach has been evident in the reporting style, gradually changing to numerical explanations of the results achieved in different areas of intervention by DFID in different countries. For example, DFID believed that if you show British taxpayers that their aid went to build classrooms, and so 100 more girls were able to finish secondary school because of that aid, they would support the aid budget. This strategy was well summarised by Andrew Mitchell, the Secretary of State for International Development, when he addressed the Church of England’s General Synod in February 2011, saying: “we must never take for granted British support for our aid budget unless we can justify through a focus on results, what we are actually achieving” (Church of England 2011: 4). Furthermore, he explained that: If I were to go on television tonight and announce that Britain was to give £20 million to Ethiopia there would be many of my constituents, many of our constituents, who would want to string me up for making such an announcement; but if I go on and I say that we are going to get 200,000 more girls to school in Ethiopia then people can see how and why this money is being spent; and if I then make sure that there is independent evaluation – the commission which we have set up in the last few months will do just that, reporting not to ministers but to parliament, so that people can see independently that their aid is being well spent – then we have a chance not only to engage people up and down Britain in this generosity that they show on all occasions when there are humanitarian disasters but to engage them in what Britain is seeking to do in development by the efficacy of the results which we are achieving [emphasis added].

The Independent Evaluation Commission was the new device to ensure that UK citizens understand where UK aid goes and what it does. This fitted with the Conservative-led coalition government’s emphasis on ‘value for money’, which focused on results, i.e. how many classrooms have been built or how many girls have gone to school as a result of UK aid. From this, it is clear that the Conservative-led coalition government’s belief was that the results/outcomes would speak louder than words. Thus, the scrapping of funds such as the DAF and Mini-Grants was part of a new strategy for bolstering public support. The new approach had a direct impact on the relationship between DFID and faith communities. In fact, even before DFID closed the DAF and the awareness funds, the Secretary of State announced cancellation of five specific projects that were funded

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by DFID to raise development awareness in the UK. One of these projects was the Greenbelt Festival (DFID 2010b). Faith communities, especially those in Christian communities that were directly involved in Greenbelt, did not receive this news well. Greenbelt’s director, Gawain Hewitt, said that ‘DFID’s decision is extremely regrettable’ (Walker 2001). He continued, “It is our belief that development work is not solely about work in developing countries; it is also about changing attitudes and behaviour in developed countries […] we have educated and mobilised thousands of people to act on issues such as climate change and trade justice […] While that work will continue, it will be on a different scale to that previously possible through grants awarded by DFID” (Walker 2001). Such complaints (with particular reference to Greenbelt) were also raised directly with the Secretary of State at the General Synod (Church of England 2011: 8). Although faith communities may have been effective in building support for international development policies, it was obvious that the changed policy in DFID did not allow funding for awareness-raising activities, which were mostly carried out by voluntary groups such as faith communities. The Conservative-led coalition government’s approach was not compatible with the sorts of activities that faith communities could carry out. In this light, the Archbishop of Canterbury expressed his concern to the Secretary of State, saying (Church of England 2011: 13): My only question or doubt about some of the language which the government have been using here in relation to development is that, while I think we all understand the need as it were to reward the success, to look for evidence of delivery and work with the grain of that, I hope that that does not mean that there will be a sidelining of capacity-building because of course projects will not attain the level of success in delivery that government and electorate quite rightly look for without the building of capacity.

Although the Conservative-led coalition government slowed its engagement with faith communities, particularly in relation to raising awareness for international development, DFID showed respect for the work that faith communities do for international development. That was why Andrew Mitchell kept engaging with them through dialogue by attending their meetings. Moreover, in defending DFID’s decision to use £1.8 million to fund the Pope’s visit to the UK, for example, the Secretary of State for International Development said that (House of Commons 2011: 171):

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…the Catholic Church and its organisations deliver healthcare and education in some of the most difficult parts of the world, and DFID has a very strong relationship with the Church on that basis.

In addition, the reason the Secretary of State agreed to address the Church of England Synod in February 2011 was because DFID recognised the international development work done by faith communities. In his speech to the Synod, the Secretary of State started by explaining his first trip to Uganda, when he visited an HIV/AIDS hospital run by a faith community. He acknowledged the work of faith communities in the health and education sectors (Church of England 2011: 2). With this attitude and building on the existing relationship with the faith groups, DFID decided to create systematic guidance for work with faith groups.

Faith Partnership Principles As noted in Chapter 4, DFID published Faith Partnership Principles in 2012. This was a milestone given that DFID had no specific guiding institutional document in their relations with faith groups. The published principles were not only for FBOs but also for faith communities. In looking at how DFID categorised faith groups in this document, it can be seen that a number of them fall under the definition of faith communities as presented in Chapter 1. The Faith Partnership Principles outline faith groups to include: (i) congregational faith groups; (ii) representative faith organisations; (iii) faith-based development organisations; (iv) faith-based political organisations; (v) faith-based missionary organisations; (vi) interfaith groups; and (vii) other organisations in which faith plays an important role such as Guides and the Boys Brigade (DFID 2012: 3). In that categorisation, the conceptualisation in this book places (iii) as FBOs, and the rest (with the exception of (iv)) would fit well under the definition of faith communities. DFID stated that the purpose of setting and publishing the principles was to strengthen and guide DFID’s relationship and collaboration with faith groups on international development. The focus was on three main areas: transparency, mutual respect and understanding (DFID 2012: 6). Following the setting of these principles, a working group was formed, which included representatives from FBOs and faith communities: including the Quaker community, Guru Nanak community, Anglican Community (Church of England) and others (such as the Lambeth Palace and

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the Volunteer Missionary Movements). To understand beyond strategy, policy papers and rhetoric, it’s crucial to look into ‘material’ relationship with the faith communities.

Results and Value for Money in Dealing with Faith Communities It is clear from the ‘Faith Partnership Principles’, DFID was very clear that the relationship must align with its focus on results and value for money. In looking at the way forward, it acknowledged the contributions that faith communities are making in delivering public services and fighting poverty in developing countries. DFID maintained that it would support those faith communities (including smaller ones) in mapping their contribution, as that would be in line with the results and value for money approach. This focus gives a point of departure in that, as the analysis of this book deals with faith communities in the UK, it is out of this book’s scope to examine how DFID related to faith communities in developing countries. In this period, there was thus, no funding scheme that could attract faith communities. As noted the DAF, which supported ‘building support for development strategy’ was closed. This fund had increased with time from a budget of £1.5 million in year 1998/1999 to £24 million in year 2009/2010 (Dominy et al. 2011). The review of the fund in 2011 argued that there was little evidence that public opinion is vital for poverty reduction as it influences political commitment and that “on the contrary political commitment to aid [is] more a question of leadership than of following public opinion” (Dominy et al. 2011). The remaining available funding schemes from 2011 were mostly suitable for FBOs. As noted in the previous chapter, even those major funding schemes that benefitted FBOs such as PPAs waned and ended up being closed in 2016. The other funding schemes that faith communities could probably apply to were also waning. The Civil Society Challenge Funding (CSCF) spending, for example, fell from £11.8 million in year 2010/2011 to £0.9 million in year 2015/2016.33 In 2015, another election was called in the UK and the Conservative Party won by a majority. The following section analyses how DFID related to faith communities during the Conservative Party administration.

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Fourth Period: 2015--2019, Faith Communities in the Cross-Government Aid Spending Approach Observations in this period show both continuity and change from the previous period. Although the Conservative Party took over power with a majority thus leading the government on its own as opposed to in coalition, it is noted that, even in coalition, the party had much influence on the international development agenda. The focus on results and value for money is still on top of the DFID agenda in this period. This is continuity. However, there are changes in terms of budget allocation and also the introduction of new funding schemes in relation to supporting civil society organisations of which faith groups are part. More interestingly, as noted in Chapter 3, there was a new policy/strategy that was published in 2015. In that respect, a number of changes occurred in particular—the distribution of parts of the aid budget to other Whitehall departments including the FCO, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), Home Office, and Department of Health and Social Care. Arguably, the distribution of aid through non-DFID departments indicates that the government is willing to also distribute or widen the international development agenda to other departments. This, as will be seen in this section, may arguably impact the relations with faith communities in particular in two departments—FCO and Home Office—which have been working with faith communities in the UK on various aspects such as in countering terrorism and also on issues of human rights. These issues are also addressed through international development. Important to mention before moving into further examination of the relationship between faith communities and DFID in this period is the issue of Brexit. As this book has argued in earlier chapters, the politics of Brexit have created “critical moments” and “windows of change” in particular with regard to change of leadership in this period. However, as will be shown in Chapter 6, it is not yet certain as to what extent Brexit has led to a critical juncture in terms of policy change that would also affect the relationship with faith groups. On a global level, there were major changes with regard to phasing out the MDGs and introducing new global goals—also famously known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, SDGs were more inclusive in their making. In making the SDGs, the international community engaged faith groups in the process (Tomalin et al. 2019; Haustein and Tomalin 2019). The SDGs have had an impact

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on the UK’s international development policy—not least since the UK has come to be known as global champion for international development. Arguably (and partly as a result of the SDGs) there are institutional set-ups since 2015 that could facilitate more interaction with faith communities, in particular the establishment of the Department for Inclusive Societies. This department was established after 2015 and it, by and large, replaced the former Department of Civil Society. The Department for Inclusive Societies ensures that no one is left behind in making aid effective. Observation shows that the department, as much as it forges cohesion and inclusivity in pushing the aid agenda at home (in the UK), most of its focus is also in the recipient countries whereby it ensures that everyone is brought on board.34 The trend of working with groups outside the UK can be traced from the previous period and is reflected in the new funding schemes whereby faith communities outside the UK can also apply, as long as they are located in an aid priority country and deal with the DFID priority sector. It was observed that from 2015 there were major changes in DFID funding schemes to civil society, thus it’s crucial to examine whether the new funding schemes have further lessened or provided opportunity for engagement with faith communities. This is particularly relevant since DFID argued that the new funding schemes would provide opportunities for smaller organisations, and a wider variety of different organisations. As noted earlier, the previous major funding schemes for civil society organisations—such as the PPAs and the CSCF—with the exception of the DAF—were more in favour of FBOs than faith communities.

Funding Opportunities for Faith Communities in the UK The new funding schemes, as explained in Chapter 4, that DFID introduced from 2015 onwards are: UK Aid Match, UK Aid Direct (including the Small Charities Challenge Fund), UK Aid Connect, UK Aid Volunteers, and the Cross-Government Prosperity Fund. All of these schemes provide funding opportunities for faith communities. UK Aid Match, for example, can match any funds collected through appeals on a certain issue that is related to poverty reduction or humanitarian issues; UK Aid Direct can support international development initiatives by faith communities; UK Aid Connect allows faith communities to join in a consortium that

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can apply for the fund; and UK Aid Volunteers, which bring together volunteering agencies and the International Citizen Service programme. In 2018, for example, the government announced that it will commit £12 million of the UK Aid Connect fund to champion freedom of religion or belief worldwide. This is another manifestation of widening the international development agenda across Whitehall departments. Freedom of religion or belief has been championed mostly by the FCO. However, since the aid budget is being used to support such a policy it is relevant for the discussion here. One of the recipient consortia of UK Aid Connect was the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID) programme35 —which, although led by IDS (non-faith institution) included faith groups and other organisations to promote religious diversity. UK Aid Connect has also funded Emmanuel International UK,36 which helps churches serve the poor. Mention may be made that in paying more attention to inclusivity, religious freedom, a cross-departmental approach and results orientation—DFID is increasingly working with actors in recipient countries. Given the stronger role of faith groups in developing countries than in the UK—there has been a trend whereby the UK is providing more support to faith communities in developing countries to map and measure results in particular of their work and role in fighting poverty. Looking at DFID’s funding database, it is evident that they have funded a number of faith communities such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church (Mekane Yesus) and other faith communities in countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, India (Maharashtra), Pakistan and many others. In line with that, DFID funded the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI) to undertake a study on how it can work with faith leaders beyond the UK, the title of the study was “Working effectively with faith leaders to challenge harmful traditional practices” (Palm and Bartelink 2017). The study recommended that the government should engage faith actors as participants and not to shift the partnership approach away from a transactional use of faith, but to build transformational models that amplify development in a more authentic way (Palm and Bartelink 2017). UK faith communities—even without funding—have not stopped advocating for better international development policies. The section below briefly looks into their advocacy efforts during this period.

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Advocacy by Faith Communities in the UK As it has consistently been noted in this book, one of the main areas of influence of faith communities is in their moral authority. This is what gives faith communities access and capacity to engage with government and advocate change. The Conservative Party, as noted in the previous period, respects and acknowledges the role of faith communities in various policy aspects even if the funding does not correlate with this recognition. Faith communities, in turn, use this space to engage. In November 2018, for example, faith leaders called up the prime minister to establish an office and minister for SDGs so that there can be more specific effort to address this key issue (Cuff 2018). In their letter, addressed to the Prime Minister, Theresa May, 30 faith leaders insisted that the prime minister should appoint the SDG minister who would work with communities of faith and belief, as well as other organisations such as business and civil society to develop a coherent plan for implementing goals.37 Faith leaders have continued to use this strategy to engage leaders. Only a few days after Boris Johnson got into power, 100 faith leaders called on him, by letter, to honour the UK’s promise and take 10,000 refugees (Wyatt 2019). The issue of refugees is cross-cutting by nature and involves international development, foreign policy, and security. In the light of the cross-governmental implementation of the international development agenda, the FCO commissioned a faith leader, Bishop Philip Mounstephen, to examine the extent and nature of Christian persecution and assess the UK government’s response (Sherwood 2019). The 2019 election manifesto for the Conservative Party promised to take on board the recommendations of the Bishop Mounstephen Commission (Truro Commission).38 This is of interest and important to mention in terms of the discussion of this book as it has been shown that UK Aid Connect funds, for example, have been spent on the UK’s government policy decision to protect religious beliefs, and how FCOs are being supported by the aid budget to implement this particular policy agenda.

Discussion: Historical Institutionalism Analysis Looking into this book’s main area of concern—that is ‘what explains the lessening or heightening of the relationship between government and faith communities?’, an analysis of the causes of change needs to be carried out. This, as explained in Chapter 2 and as it has been carried out in the

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previous chapters, is done through an historical institutionalism analytical framework, which analyses policy stability and policy change. This analysis will help to examine the book’s propositions, which are: • The resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups • The attitudes of the political parties and politicians towards the third sector explain the relationship between the government and faith groups • The increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups

Institutional Stability Historical institutionalism argues that institutions are stable and they follow a path that was formed in their establishment. This concept is known as ‘path dependency’. In this chapter, faith communities have (at least since 1992) been shown to be concerned with issues of global poverty. Faith communities have been active in campaigning for certain international development policies. On their side, FBOs’ strength lies more in implementing policies on the ground, for example, through executing projects such as the provision of technical assistance to health centres, promotion of good governance, promotion of quality education and access to school for girls. Thus, the path that faith communities have been following is one of ‘awareness raising’ within the UK and advocating on behalf of international development to communities in the UK as well as to the government. With regard to the relationship between the government and UK faith communities, there have been changes over time. These changes are discussed in the next section.

Policy Change According to historical institutionalism, there are two types of institutional change: episodic change and incremental change. Episodic changes may be caused by an external shock that may lead to a critical juncture. A critical juncture forces institutions to abandon the path they had been following and start on a new path. On the other side,

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incremental changes refer to small changes within institutions. These small changes do not cause critical junctures but they may accumulate to become transformative. Also, in historical institutionalism, there is another concept known as a ‘critical moment’. A critical moment is a situation whereby there is an opportunity for institutions to change, but change may not necessarily occur. These critical moments are also known as ‘windows of opportunity’. In this section, changes in the relationship between government and faith communities will be examined and decisions made, whether these changes were episodic or incremental, or incremental-transformative. In addition, ‘critical moments’ will be explored and there will be an assessment of whether faith communities or the government took advantage of them to strengthen their relationships. Episodic changes: In 1997, there was a critical juncture in the institutional structure of UK international development. The UK government established a new DFID. The department was keen to analyse poverty and ways to fight it. There was a need to increase the aid budget, which brought with it the need to ensure public support for the increased international development budget and mandate. The need to bolster public support provided a critical moment, an opportunity for groups such as faith communities to seize. It also opened the way for the government to engage with various groups on matters of international development. For its part, DFID engaged only with those groups that it believed could contribute something new to its work. The ‘faith and development’ agenda, which included World Bank the study findings from initiatives such as ‘Voices of the Poor’ as well as the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, highlighted the potential of faith groups to not only fight poverty on the ground but also raise and create support for international development policies. As a result, the 1999 BSDS included faith communities as one of the key target groups. However, the implementation of BSDS did not especially engage faith communities with funds. For example, there was no agreement with faith communities in the SGA, which was intended for groups such as faith communities that had not worked with DFID before. Nevertheless, DFID funded faith communities through the DAF and more importantly, engaged with faith communities in various dialogues that led to publications such as ‘Target 2015’ for each faith denomination. All in all, although the formation of DFID was a critical juncture and provided ‘windows of opportunity’ for the government to engage with faith communities, the relationship that followed after DFID’s establishment progressed only at a gradual rate.

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Incremental changes: In 1999, faith communities are mentioned as one of only four groups targeted in DFID’s strategy to build support for development. Because of this, there were engagements between the government and faith communities through policy discussions and meetings. However, there was no single policy paper that was specifically designed to guide the relations between faith communities and DFID. This, to a certain extent, hindered an effective engagement between DFID and faith communities. In May 2005, DFID’s development committee admitted that something had to be done with regard to faith and development. The minutes of the meeting noted (DFID 2005c): Within DFID we need to recognise the importance of faith as a social, economic, political and cultural factor in development. Outside DFID, we need to pay attention to how we communicate with UK faith groups and communities and which representational faith groups we support and why […] the committee agreed that a consideration of faith groups should be incorporated into ‘drivers of change’ analyses.

Using ‘drivers of change’ analyses, DFID sought to understand the political economy of change and poverty reduction in developing countries.39 ‘Drivers of change’ were supposed to direct international development policy attention to the structural and institutional factors likely to steer change. ‘Drivers of change’, as one interviewee said, ‘have very little that could be linked to faith - this is the good litmus test of whether faith is being significantly considered in development thinking’ (Interview 2011). To implement the BSDS, DFID set up funding schemes to support awareness-raising activities. As seen earlier, faith communities did not fare well in applying for these funds. Only a few cases, such as the Greenbelt Festival and Hindu Aid, could get the funding for raising awareness. In the period after May 2010 when the Conservative-led coalition took over the government, there are changes in the relationship between DFID and faith communities. These were especially due to the closing of awareness funds. However, it is difficult to classify this change as a critical juncture. This is because the government in the previous period (1997– 2010) engaged with faith communities mainly through policy consultations, seminars and meetings as well as participating in their campaign activities. Andrew Mitchell attended and gave a speech to the Church of England General Synod. DFID under the Conservative-led coalition

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government continued to do so, and in 2012 a Faith Partnership Principles document was published. When the Conservative Party took power in 2015, a number of things changed with regard to funding opportunities—new funding schemes provided the opportunity for more diverse groups to apply, including small charities that could be categorised as faith communities. There is also continuity in listening to and engaging with faith leaders and communities through dialogue. In connection with this, it could be argued that the changes seen over the period from 1992 to 2019 are incremental. These changes are often due to the different approaches of different regimes to international development. The role of faith groups has been acknowledged throughout the period of analysis of this book. However, how a regime approaches international development matters in enhancing or lessening the relationship with faith communities. With the introduction of a cross-government approach to implementation of the aid budget, as well as the focus on results, there is more attention given to faith communities, but those in the recipient countries.

Conclusions From the above discussion, it has been seen that although faith communities were active in raising awareness and campaigning for international development matters from the early 1990s, the government started to recognise their potential in the mid-1990s. Lynda Chalker, who was the Minister of State for Overseas Development, commented on the role of the church in the Sierra Leone post-conflict reconciliation and expressed willingness to work with such groups. However, the Conservative Party lost power to New Labour in 1997. The New Labour government’s decision to establish DFID opened opportunities for faith communities to engage with the government towards fighting global poverty. Faith communities were among the four-targeted groups that DFID decided to work with in building support for development in the UK. But the question is—why were faith communities chosen? Faith communities have continued to be respected and engaged in dialogues by the various leaders of the different regimes over the period of analysis from 1992 to 2019. This chapter can best be concluded by looking at which of the three propositions best explains the relationship between the government and faith communities over a period of time.

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The following paragraphs link this discussion with each of the book’s three propositions. The Resurgence of Religion in International Politics Explains the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups From the analysis of the policy documents, speeches and interviews, it is evident that faith communities were considered handy to work with by DFID in raising awareness in the UK because of their work and activities on issues of global poverty. The Jubilee 2000 debt campaign in the 1990s showcased the role of faith in development matters. This was at a domestic level, but also at an international level, faith communities had been proven to be instrumental in fighting poverty. This was highlighted by the World Bank’s ‘Voices of the Poor’ project’s findings—which revealed that most poor people trust faith leaders and institutions more than other institutions. The findings of ‘Voices of the Poor’, and other international initiatives on ‘faith and development’ including the World’s Faiths Dialogue on Development (WFDD) led by the World Bank’s president, James Wolfensohn, and the former Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey. They are indicators of the resurgence of religion in international affairs. As seen in Chapter 2, the role of religion in international affairs has both negative and positive dimensions. One example of the positive side is the role of religion in international development matters. Since it is the activity of faith communities both at home and abroad that have influenced leaders such as Clare Short in bringing faith communities into the government’s international development agenda, it can be said that the resurgence of religion in international development explains the relationship between the government and faith communities. In the last period of the analysis (2015–2019), it has been noted how Christian persecution in different parts of the world has again brought the government to work with faith communities in an effort to protect freedom of worship and belief. However, the resurgence of religion in international development cannot explain the relationship in itself. This is why there are different levels of interaction at different points in time.

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The Attitudes of Political Parties and Politicians Towards the Third Sector Explain the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups The relationship between the government and faith communities, as seen in the discussion above, also depended on the approach of the political party in power towards development. Because the Conservative Party focuses on quantified outcomes, it has, arguably, slowed its engagement with faith communities in the UK. During the Conservative-led coalition regime, the government stopped the plan and subsequent funds to build support for international development, which involved faith communities. The evidence linking awareness raising in the UK and results in poverty reduction was only circumstantial thus did not fit with the quantifiable results focus. The Conservative Party believe that the public will support international development policies if they can see the ‘value for their tax money’ in quantified outcomes. This is why the Independent Aid Commission was established, for the purposes of scrutinising aid and showing where the money went and what the money did. This focus on value for money and results has led to further changes as seen from 2015 such as cross-departmental management of aid, and a focus on data/results which has moved the focus to faith communities in recipient countries. On the other side, New Labour’s strategy to build support for international development initiated and developed the relationship between faith communities and the government. In connection with this, mention may be made again of New Labour’s ‘third way’, which encouraged government partnership with faith communities in various policy areas. The Home Office, for example, worked with faith communities on community regeneration and social inclusion, as well as in preventing terrorism. The path that was established in 1997, of partnering with faith groups, has survived and faith communities have remained important in various departments. The idea of the ‘third way’ was somehow imitated in David Cameron’s ‘big society’. The Increasing Prominence of the International Development Agenda in British Politics Explains the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups Although the establishment of DFID in 1997 opened ‘windows of opportunities’ for faith communities to engage with the government, the

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prominence of international development in British politics cannot significantly explain the relationship between the government and faith communities. This is because both Labour and Conservatives governments have been promoting international development and have promised to reach the international aid target of 0.7 per cent of GDP. Although their approaches to implementing international development differ, both of them have made the same commitment to fighting global poverty. From the above discussion, it can be seen that the propositions with the most significant explanatory powers are the first and second. Although New Labour’s approach encouraged engagement with faith communities, faith communities proved they could do a good job due to their previous activities both at home and abroad. The recognition of the role of faith in development is still evident in the eyes of policymakers and leaders across parties.

Notes 1. See Our History, Muslim Hands at https://muslimhands.org.uk/aboutus/our-history. Accessed 28 Oct 2019. 2. See Note 3. 3. For details on the amount of aid and British involvement in humanitarian relief in different countries of the Muslim world, please see FCO. (2006, January 27). Speech to Chavening Scholars by Frances Guy on Policies of the West Towards the Muslim World. FCO Speeches. http:// collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco. gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c= Page&cid=1134650519501&a=KArticle&aid=1139991952999. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. 4. See Muslim Hands. Our Work. https://muslimhands.ca/our-work. Accessed 16 Sept 2019. 5. See The Holy Bible, Leviticus 25:28 (English Standard Version). 6. For more information on the Church of England and international development including campaigning on debt please visit http://www.cofe. anglican.org/info/socialpublic/international/internationaldevelopment/. Accessed 29 Apr 2010. 7. For more on this see Powell, R. (1990). UK Proposals to Reduce the Debt Burden of the Poorest Countries: The Trinidad Terms. Treasury Economic Bulletin, Autumn; Evans, H. (2002). Debt Relief for the Poorest Countries: Why Did It Take so Long? Development Policy Review, 17(3), 267–279.

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8. The Birth of Jubilee, A brief account of the origins of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=282. Accessed 31 Mar 2011. 9. See Pettifor, A. (1998, May 16). A personal view of the Jubilee 2000 ‘human chain’ demonstration on 16 May 1998, during the G8 summit in Birmingham. http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/16% 20May%201998+280.twl. Accessed 31 Mar 2011. 10. See Note 10. 11. See Tony Blair Faith Foundation. http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation. org/pages/our-aims. Accessed 14 Aug 2011. 12. See https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/about-us/vision-missionobjectives/. Accessed 16 Sept 2019. 13. See https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/about-us/vision-missionobjectives/. Accessed 16 Sept 2019. 14. For more on this meeting, please see http://www.eauk.org/publicaffairs/socialjustice/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=5062. Accessed 3 June 2010. 15. For more on this event see http://www.lambethconference.org/ daily/news.cfm/2008/7/24/ACNS4463. Accessed 30 June 2010. Also see DFID. (2008, July 25). Bishops Rally in London for Action on Poverty. Press Release. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/NewsStories/2008/Bishops-rally-in-London-for-action-on-poverty/. Accessed 21 Apr 2010. 16. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/Pubs/files/2015.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2010. 17. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/Pubs/files/2015_sikh.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2010. 18. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/Pubs/files/2015_muslim.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2010. 19. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/Pubs/files/2015_hindu.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2010. 20. For more details of this study (questionnaires and answers) see http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/ files/faith_report_appendices.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2010. 21. For the full report see http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/DFIDInUK/files/faith_communities_report. htm#I%20Executive%20Summary. Accessed 13 June 2010. 22. Traditionally, DFID and other International Development institutions have worked with NGOs, some of which are obviously faith-based organisations, but other groups in civil society such as faith communities had not been brought into the international development agenda. 23. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/AboutDFID/files/civilsociety/sga_mayflyer.htm. Accessed 31 Aug 2011.

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24. The Greenbelt Festival is a family-friendly celebration, inclusive and accepting of all, regardless of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, background or belief. For more information, please see https://www.greenbelt.org.uk/. Accessed 16 Sept 2019. 25. For this and more on Greenbelt and Trust Greenbelt, see http://www. greenbelt.org.uk/trust/about-trust-greenbelt. Accessed 5 June 2010. 26. For general information about DAF, please visit http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100423085705/dfid.gov.uk/working-withdfid/funding-opportunities/not-for-profit-organisations/daf/. Accessed 31 Aug 2011. 27. Islamic Relief received this funding but is not a faith community according to the criteria of this research (it is a faith-based organisation and was discussed in Chapter 4). 28. For these statistics, from 2002 to 2005, see http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/DFIDInUK/main. htm. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. 29. For this data and the list of other organisations that qualified please visit http://www.dfid.gov.uk/working-with-dfid/funding-opportunities/ not-for-profit-organisations/daf/development-awareness-fund---list-ofprojects-approved-200607-/. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. 30. See DFID DAF-Projects Approved 2006/2007. http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100423085705/dfid.gov.uk/workingwith-dfid/funding-opportunities/not-for-profit-organisations/daf/ development-awareness-fund---list-of-projects-approved-200607-/. Accessed 30 Aug 2011. 31. For general information and statistics on DAF mini-grant scheme please visit http://www.dfid.gov.uk/working-with-dfid/funding-opportunities/ not-for-profit-organisations/dafmg/. Accessed 13 June 2010. 32. For the list of all the organisations that receive these funds, please see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/working-with-dfid/funding-opportunities/notfor-profit-organisations/dafmg/development-awareness-fund-mini-grants0607/. Accessed 13 June 2010. 33. See CSCF. Development Tracker. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/ projects/GB-1-201242. Accessed 17 Sept 2019. 34. For more on DFID Inclusive Societies’ work and activities, please see: DFID. (2017, December 21). Inclusive Societies: Our Year in #GlobalDev—Celebrating Inclusive Societies Department’s Contribution in 2017. https://medium.com/@DFID_Inclusive/our-year-in-globaldevc45d7aaea963. Accessed 19 Sept 2019. 35. See https://www.ids.ac.uk/programme-and-centre/creid/. Accessed 18 Sept 2019. 36. For more on this see http://www.eiuk.org.uk/. Accessed 18 Sept 2019.

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37. See the letter here https://www.ukssd.co.uk/Handlers/Download. ashx?IDMF=fb27e90d-001c-449f-8539-d46f53642c04. Accessed 18 Sept 2019. 38. For more on Truro Commission, please see https://www.trurodiocese. org.uk/2019/07/government-accepts-in-full-the-recommendations-ofchristian-persecution-review/. Accessed 5 Jan 2020. 39. For general details on this see http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ +/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/driversofchange.asp. Accessed 30 Aug 2011.

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Short, C. (1998, November 18). Speech to the General Synod on the WorldWide Alliance for the elimination of poverty. http://www.clareshort.co.uk/ speeches/DFID/18%20Nov%201998.pdf. Accessed 15 Aug 2011. Short, C. (2004). An honourable deception?: New Labour, Iraq and the misuse of power London: Free Press. Thomas, S. M. (2007). How shall we then live? Rethinking religion, politics and communities in an age of global terrorism. In B. K. Goldewijk (Ed.), Religion, international relations and development cooperation (pp. 57–78). Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers. Thornton, P., & Hext S. (2009). Review of DFID’s Work to Build Support for Development through work with Businesses, Trades Unions, Faith Communities, Black and Minority Communities, and Diaspora Groups. Final Report. Verulam Associates. Tomalin, E., Haustein, J., & Kidy, S. (2019). Religion and the sustainable development goals. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 17 (2), 102–118. Walker, D. (2001, May 19). DFID withdraws sponsorship from the Greenbelt Festival, Methodist Church becomes new partner. Church Times. Wyatt, T. (2019, August 2). Faith leaders lobby new Prime Minister to take in 10,000 refugees to the UK. Church Times. https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/ articles/2019/2-august/news/uk/faith-leaders-lobby-new-prime-ministerto-take-in-10-000-refugees-to-the-uk. Accessed 19 Sept 2019.

CHAPTER 6

Brexit and UK International Development Policy: Implications for the Relationship Between the Government and Faith Groups

Introduction International development has become an important aspect in British politics and across the major political parties. As seen in Chapter 3, between the two major political parties, it was the Labour Party that was particularly keen to advance international development as a major priority. Whenever the Labour Party was in power, international development management would be separated from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in order to ensure that it had autonomy from other foreign policy interests. Since 2005 up to 2019, the Conservative Party’s standpoint on international development has been changing in particular on the issue of having an independent cabinet level department for international development. The prominence of the international development agenda is now a cross-party standpoint. The bi-partisan support has secured the recognition of international development in British politics regardless of any change in government. International development is now a defining feature in the projection of British influence on the world. In the wake of Brexit politics, there have been discussions both at an academic level (scholarly work) and policy level discussions about the future of the UK and in particular its position in the global future. Since the loss of its empire and the changing politics with regard to power dynamics since the end of the Second World War, the UK has been on

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constantly redefining its status in international affairs. To project its influence, arguably, the country has been more successful through its use of soft power than hard (in particular military power—which is relatively small in comparison with other major powers such as the USA, Russia and latterly China). Peter Wilding outlines the sources of British soft power to include: the BBC world service, football clubs, universities, the British Council, the idea that the UK parliament is the ‘mother of parliaments’, the royal family, London as a city and the attraction of foreign direct investments (Wilding 2017). It is interesting that he did not mention international development while, as seen in Chapters 1 and 3, Britain has been pushing for leadership and influence in the international development agenda among donor countries and institutions. This was especially after 1997 when DFID was established with follow up legislation, such as in 2002 ensuring aid is used for poverty reduction and the 2013 Act that ensured the promise of using 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid is protected in a legal framework. Although international development has not featured as much as other matters such as trade and freedom of movement in Brexit political discussions (Lightfoot et al. 2017), it is still an aspect that the country’s policymakers have taken seriously in thinking about how to project the British global agenda after Brexit (DFID and FCO 2019). In fact, when looking from a historical perspective, from the mid 1940s, Britain has heavily considered the Commonwealth block as one of its sources of power and spaces of influence (Marshall 2004). The Commonwealth was also one of the ‘majestic circles’ described by Churchill in his ‘three circles’ vision of future stability (Wilding 2017). The other two circles being the USA and Western Europe. These three circles have, to a large extent, determined British foreign policy direction and its agenda in the outer world. In relation to this, it can be said that what holds the Commonwealth membership together, among other aspects such as culture and language, is international development. This has been the case since the 1950s. In his analysis of British aid between 1950 and 1970, Tomlinson shows that 80 per cent of British aid was channelled bilaterally to Commonwealth countries (Tomlinson 2003). In this light, international development may be a crucial means through which the UK will further strengthen its position in the global sphere. This is important given the competing interests with other great power states such as China and Russia in the Commonwealth countries. This chapter traces and analyses the salience of the international development agenda in British politics. It does so with keen consideration

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of Brexit so future policy directions can be predicted based on the past trends and the context of global politics. To get a wider picture, this chapter explores the election manifestos (i.e. the sections on international development) of the two major parties, Conservative and Labour, between 1992 and 2019. Since the Liberal Democrats became part of the coalition government in 2010, the analysis also considers their manifesto for the 2010 elections, as well as the coalition agreement. Since the referendum on leaving the EU was held in March 2016, the chapter will also look through speeches and other coverage on international development from the period after the referendum result to September 2019. Literature on the same (Brexit and international development) is reviewed alongside other relevant documents. Thus, this chapter enriches the analysis by looking at major speeches made by key leaders, i.e. leaders concerned with international development. Since the objective of the chapter is also to analyse possible explanations for the prominence of international development in British politics, the chapter examines public opinion polls in order to gain insight into the public view and how it affects political parties and politicians’ views of international development. This also informs Brexit and how the public feeling and the need to “satisfy” is becoming integral to everyday politics in the UK. As foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, so is international development policy. It’s crucial to look into the domestic factors and politics so as to understand the international development agenda. Finally, this chapter uses the historical institutionalism analytical framework, explained in Chapter 2, to analyse the changes (in international development) that have been happening since 1992–2019. This informs the analysis from 1992 to 2015, and the post Brexit referendum period from 2016 to 2019.

The International Development Agenda of Britain’s Major Political Parties---1992--2015 (Pre-Brexit) This section traces and analyses the development of the international development agenda of each of the major political parties in the UK from 1992 to 2019. These are the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. However, since the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition with the Conservatives in 2010, their election manifesto for 2010 is analysed.

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International Development in Labour’s Political Agenda: 1992--2015 Looking at the Labour Party’s election manifestos of 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2015, it is clear that Labour’s international development agenda has, to a great extent, been consistent. International development has always been a priority of the Labour Party due to its ‘internationalism’ ideology. Internationalism, as defined by Rhiannon Vickers, is the desire to transcend national boundaries in order to find solutions to international issues (Vickers 2004). As seen in Chapter 3, since the 1950s, Labour’s key leaders such as James Callaghan and Harold Wilson advocated international aid in order to solve problems in the international sphere and project British influence in an increasingly competitive world. Thus, in all six election1 manifestos looked at here, the same line of argument for international development can be seen—particularly in relation to the internationalist perspective. For example, in the 2015 manifesto, the Labour Party poses “Labour is an internationalist party and believes Britain must engage with global challenges we face, but not try and solve them on our own” (Labour Party 2015). The differences among the manifestos are minor and often included to deal with issues of the time. This is most evident in the 2017 manifesto, after the Brexit referendum, in which the Labour Party maintained their stance on international development and working with others in addressing the world challenges. The focus, the manifesto maintained, should be on poverty reduction and not to make profit. However, the Labour Party also considered the reality of the post-Brexit political landscape and promised that the party’s administration would ensure that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have access to the UK Market. One of the international development policies that featured in the first five (1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010) manifestos was the plan to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) for international development. In 1992, the Labour Party had promised to meet the target within five years (Labour Party 1992). This timetable was not included in the 1997 manifesto. The party manifesto of 1997 was, arguably pragmatic, only mentioning the intention to meet the target, without giving a specific year (Labour Party 1997). This remained the case until 2005, when the party promised to reach the target by 2013 (Labour Party 2005). In 2010, the party went a step further and promised

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to enshrine this in law (Labour Party 2010). In 2015, the Conservativeled coalition government had already met the target and made it a legal requirement, thus the Labour Party mentioned it as an achievement that Labour is proud of. Another policy that had been mentioned in the 1992 manifesto was the plan to establish the Department For International Development with a cabinet minister. In connection with this, it is worth mentioning that the last Labour government prior to 1997, (i.e. 1974–1979), did not have a cabinet minister for international development, despite the fact that it had a separate (i.e. from the Foreign Office) ministry for international development. Promising the international development department together with a cabinet seat underscored the priority that the party had given to international development. Indeed when the Labour Party returned to government in 1997 it honoured this promise and established DFID with a cabinet minister. Thus by 1997, Labour’s international development agenda had advanced and this, as discussed in Chapter 3, was part of New Labour’s idealistic ‘ethical foreign policy’, which aimed at pursuing moral international policies that are good for the poorest in the world. The Labour Party promised to bring issues of international development into mainstream government’s decision-making and to reverse the decline in UK aid spending. However, the New Labour government was not able to do so immediately. It had to wait until 2000. In fact, the percentage of ODA/GNI from 1997 to 1999 was lower or just the same as the percentage in 1996. In 1996, the UK government gave 0.27 per cent, while in 1997 it was 0.26 per cent. In 1998 it rose slightly to be the same as in 1996, and in 1999 it dropped down to 0.24 per cent (HMG 2010). Nevertheless, from 1999 there can be seen to be a constant increase in the international development budget. By the financial year 2009/2010, the budget of international development stood at 0.52 per cent of GNI (HMG 2010). This trend led to the reaching of the target and enshrining it into law in 2011 and 2013, respectively, during the Conservative-led coalition administration. Following the establishment of DFID and from the 2001 manifesto onwards there is a considerable change of language in the Labour manifesto sections on international development. The manifestos talked about Britain as a leader in various aspects of international development. For example in the 2001 manifesto, it was written that ‘With strong UK leadership, the international development effort is now increasingly focused on poverty reduction’ (Labour Party 2001). Poverty reduction, as seen in

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Chapter 3, was the major theme of the UK’s international development policy in the years between 1997 and 2010. Similarly, in 2005, the Labour Party kept touting Britain as a leader, writing ‘globally we are pressing for a doubling of aid’. In connection with this, it should be mentioned that Britain was also chairing the G8 summit in 2005 and was the president of the EU summit in the same year. In both of these positions, the UK government put international development high on the agenda. By 2010, it was becoming clear that international development was shaping the UK’s international identity. This explains the launch of a new DFID logo, ‘the UK Aid’ logo in late 2009. The logo was introduced to help make it easier for people to see where Britain’s aid budget was being spent and how it is being used to tackle global poverty through physical labelling.2 The idea to have a clearer logo (than DFID, which was not known to many people) was brought about in the House of Commons by the International Development Select Committee. Malcolm Bruce, who was the chairman of the Committee, argued that “the problem is that the name DFID does not reflect the fact that this is a British organisation. It could be anything” (Stevenson 2009). In the same line, Douglas Alexander, then Secretary of State for DFID, maintained that the new logo would resonate with the British public in time. The new logo was thus a way of raising awareness of Britain’s work abroad and further underscoring the ‘Britishness’ of the UK’s aid to poor countries. Promotion of international development was moving beyond partisan politics. In fact, the Labour Party understood that associating Britain’s vision with international development had to be a cross-party initiative, as shown by the 2010 Labour Party manifesto: International commitments and a voice for Britain in global affairs are not an optional extra for Labour. They are central to our vision of a better Britain. We have strengthened our international alliance and will continue to do so in ways that speak to our deepest values as a nation.

Labour’s manifesto arguably contextualised this vision as national rather than party-political because the Conservative Party had changed its standpoint on international development, taking on board core principles in international development such as the need to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent GNI for aid. However, the Labour Party did not get into power in 2010. After 13 years of being out of power, the Conservative Party won the election but without a majority to form a government, thus

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they formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Another election was called in 2015. In the 2015 manifesto, the Labour Party showed continuity to the party’s approach to international development and indicated change that could arguably have been influenced by the performance of the Conservative-led coalition. With regard to continuity the Labour Party was proud that the 0.7 per cent target was reached. It kept the language with an emphasis on using international development to end extreme poverty. With regard to change, the manifesto mentioned value for money and also the importance of the private sector in international development. Another bi-partisan view of aid was also developing—in particular the value for money aspect. This is arguably due to the fact that allocating and reaching the 0.7 per cent target as well as enshrining it into law needs to be justified to UK citizens and the best way to do that is by ensuring value for money when the aid is spent.

International Development in the Conservative Party Political Agenda, 1992--2015 This section traces the Conservative Party agenda on international development. Since 2005, the party claimed that fighting world poverty would be ‘a key element of foreign policy under a Conservative government’ and set a firm date for achieving the UN objectives by 2013 (Conservative Party 2005a). Arguably, the party was finally catching up with Labour’s emphasis on international development. Indeed, the Conservatives acknowledged that the British aid programme had become the best in the world and promised it would work to further improve it (Kwayu 2011). David Cameron stated his desire to demonstrate that his party was ‘comfortable with modern Britain’ and that ‘our best days lie ahead’ (Cameron 2005). As part of his ‘detoxification’ of the party’s image, Cameron established the New Globalisation and Global Poverty Policy Group in December 2005. As seen in Chapter 3, the Conservative Party had a tendency to view international development as a low priority policy area and had it managed under the FCO. In this arrangement, international development was always subordinated to other foreign policy interests, such as commercial interests. Commercialisation of international aid was one thing, among many, that tarnished the image of the Conservative Party. Thus, as part

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of the effort to present the party as a ‘compassionate and modern’ political party, international development was also taken on board. To see how the Conservative Party agenda on international development has changed over time, this section examines and compares the Conservative Party election manifestos of 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. In the period between 1992 and April 1997, when the Conservative Party was still in power, the main international development policy theme was ‘political conditionality’ which included good governance and the promotion of democracy and human rights. This was also in line with the global political context whereby there was a “third wave of democratisation” and countries, in particular from Eastern Europe (formerly under the Soviet Union) and in Africa, were being democratised through the introduction of liberal policies and amendments of their constitutions to allow democratic institutions such as multiparty systems. The Conservative election manifesto of 1992 had a section that discussed international development issues with a title ‘our influence for good’. Britain was to lead and encourage democratic trends in the Commonwealth and in the rest of the developing world. There was a particular focus on ‘rule of law’ and respect for individual freedom. It is also important to note that the party accepted the UN target for aid (0.7 per cent of GNI) but it could ‘not set a timetable for this achievement’ (Conservative Party 1992). By the time of the 1997 general elections, the Conservative manifesto had a section titled ‘Europe and the World’ that talked about international development issues among other foreign policy issues. At that time there was a change in focus from ‘promotion of democracy and good governance’ to ‘securing peace and stability’. As discussed in Chapter 3, international development policies often reflect the atmosphere of the international community. Just prior to 1997, there was an escalation of civil wars in Europe and in other regions of the world. Although the promotion of democracy remained important, if the Conservative Party stayed in power it would have directed more international aid money to “securing peace in the former Yugoslavia, in Kashmir, in Cyprus, and in the Middle East” (Conservative Party 1997). Along with that, the Conservative Party mentioned again its aspiration to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent GNI for aid, but this was still described as ‘a long term objective’ (Conservative Party 1997). In the 2001 election, the Conservative election manifesto again expressed the importance of working towards the 0.7 per cent of GNI aid target (Conservative Party 2001). Significantly for this book, the party

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promised in the manifesto to ‘increase the involvement of charities and the voluntary sector’. This was a reflection of the influence of the ‘third way’ policies that the Labour government had introduced from 1997. Along with that, the Conservatives pledged to work more effectively on debt relief. Arguably, the promise to increase the involvement of charities and the voluntary sector as well as the focus on debt relief was also motivated by the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign. That campaign, organised by charities and the voluntary sector, focused on debt relief. The impact of that campaign became apparent in 1998, during the G8 meeting. Such factors may have influenced the Conservative manifesto, especially with regard to international development. The Conservative manifesto for the 2005 election expressed its international development agenda under the section titled ‘Defending Our Freedoms ’ (Conservative Party 2005a). At that time it was clear that the Conservative Party was still framing international development as simply one element of their foreign policy, as it stated, “a key element of foreign policy under a Conservative government will be fighting world poverty” (Conservative Party 2005a: 27). Nevertheless, there were major changes especially in regard to the timing for the UN target of 0.7 per cent GDP for aid. For the first time, the Conservative Party set a date for achieving that target (2013) (Conservative Party 2005a). As noted earlier, this could be seen as an attempt to compete with New Labour’s policies that had promoted the international development agenda since it gained power in 1997. The Conservative manifesto acknowledged that the British aid programme had become the best in the world and promised to work to further improve that, especially by ensuring that British aid money is controlled by Britain and not other agencies (presumably the EU and other multilateral aid agencies). The Conservative Party did not win the 2005 election and, having lost three elections in a row, the party saw the necessity of changing some of its policies to not only improve its image but to come up with new initiatives and policies to appeal to British voters. At the 2005 Conservative conference, David Cameron insisted on the need to change and modernise the party, saying “When I say change, I’m not talking about some slick rebranding exercise: what I’m talking about is fundamental change, so that when we fight the next election, street by street, house by house, flat by flat, we have a message that is relevant to people’s lives today, that shows we’re comfortable with modern Britain and that we believe our best days lie ahead” (Cameron 2005). Thus in the period

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between 2005 and 2010 there were a number of changes in regard to Conservative Party policies, and international development was not left out. The establishment of the New Globalisation and Global Poverty Policy Group marked the commencement of the Conservative policy change in regard to international development. David Cameron launched this group in December 2005. The group was chaired by Peter Lilley, a Conservative MP, and advised by singer and activist Bob Geldof. Other members of the group were experts on matters of international development. The composition of the group was based more on expertise than political affiliation. Its main purpose was to come up with policy recommendations that would help the future government in the fight against global poverty. Following that, Cameron gave a number of speeches on different occasions that further highlighted the Conservative change of attitude towards international development. Three key speeches given by David Cameron between 2005 and 2010 focused on international development.3 In June 2006, David Cameron delivered a speech to Oxfam titled ‘Fighting Global Poverty’. In that speech, the Conservative leader admitted that ‘Conservatives used to regard global poverty as a significant, but second-order subject’ (Cameron 2006). The speech was one of the first public expressions of change in the Conservatives’ agenda on international development. It is clear that the speech was also a reaction to what DFID was doing. In fact, Cameron acknowledged the Labour government’s work and the “personal commitment and leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown” (Cameron 2006). Perhaps the most important feature of that speech was the outline of the Conservative contribution to the fight against global poverty. The Conservative leader further emphasised the need to “work towards achieving the target of spending 0.7 per cent of GNI on aid by 2013 and every year between now and then, we should look to see if it is desirable and possible to go further and faster” (Cameron 2006). In the same speech, Cameron expressed his admiration for DFID and the plan to “build on its success and cement its reputation as the leading national aid agency” (Cameron 2006). Thus, the speech demonstrated the Conservatives changing international development agenda. Under the Conservative governments, international development had always been managed by the Foreign Office. The decision to keep DFID underlined a major change in the Conservatives’ international development agenda. David Cameron gave another major speech on international development at the Rwandan parliament in July 2007. Although this speech

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was delivered in Rwanda it was on the same day that the Globalisation and Global Poverty Policy Group report—‘In it together: the attack on global poverty’4 was launched. Thus, among other things, Cameron spoke about the recommendations that the report gave which will contribute to the Conservatives’ international development policies. In addition, the speech was also notable for the fact that some of its content reflected DFID’s strategies at the time. For example, Cameron talked about the ‘real trade’ campaigns, and his desire that it would reach “into the churches, the trade unions, the schools and every corner of society in every rich nation…”. This recalls DFID’s Build Support for Development Strategy, which targeted churches, trade unions, education and media sectors to publicise international development policies. However, the speech also distinguished the Conservatives’ agenda from Labour’s agenda on international development. In the speech, Cameron emphasised the need for transparency in aid allocation. This, as seen in Chapter 3, became one of the core themes of the Conservatives’ international development policy. The third relevant speech that Cameron gave in regard to international development was delivered in July 2009 at the Save the Children headquarters. The speech was titled ‘One World Conservatism’ (Cameron 2009), a title that alluded to the Conservative green paper on international development. In this speech, Cameron emphasised the need to continue giving aid in spite of the economic recession. He then talked about the Conservative Party’s plans for international development and its approach to fighting poverty. The speech was more or less a summary of the green paper, which was in the 2010 election manifesto and guided the international development agenda. Since the 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament (hence the need to form a coalition government) it’s crucial to look at the Liberal Democrat’s agenda for international development. Jointly the Conservative-Liberal coalition government came up with the coalition agenda. The Liberal Democrat manifesto of 2010 had a section, ‘your world’ that dealt with international development among other foreign policies. The policies that the party was promising were not very different from the policies of the other parties. These included the promise to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid by 2013. Like the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats also promised to enshrine this target in law. However, the Liberal Democrats placed more emphasis on working closely and in collaboration with the EU to deal with international development issues, with an emphasis on climate change. Their manifesto

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stated: “Liberal Democrats are committed to working towards a world free from poverty, inequality and injustice and meeting the Millennium Development Goals is a vital first step. But beyond this we will also ensure that action is taken to allow developing nations to grow and to prevent them suffering unfairly the effects of climate change inflicted by developed countries” (Liberal Democrats Party 2010: 57–68). The fact that the Liberal Democrat policies on international development were not far away from Labour and the Conservatives further underscores the argument that by the year 2010, fighting global poverty had become a crossparty British vision. Indeed, David Cameron insisted that it was difficult to ring-fence the aid budget to 0.7 per cent of GNI in a time when there was economic depression and budgetary cuts across other departments. Nevertheless, he recalled (Cameron 2019: 480), my view was simple: we shouldn’t make these promises and then break them. Britain should aspire to lead the world in aid and development. 0.7 per cent of GNI equates to less than two pence in every pound of tax paid.

This has underlined the core purpose of this chapter in analysing the increasing salience of the international development agenda in the British politics. The conceptualisation of aid prominence has been associated with projection of British leadership in the world. The reaching of 0.7 per cent of GNI aid budget has enhanced British ability to lead in certain global interventions. These include the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines, the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and the Ebola epidemic in West Africa (Cameron 2019: 532). In the 2015 election the Conservatives won by a majority, hence they formed their own government. In the 2015 Conservatives election manifesto agenda, on international development the party upheld DFID independence, they maintained the already achieved 0.7 per cent of GNI to aid, which was also enshrined into the law already. The manifesto also upheld the 2030 global goals (SDGs) and the adherence to the OECD rules on international aid. From the above paragraphs, it can be seen that by 2015 the Conservative Party agenda on international development had changed to the point that it was not very different from the Labour Party’s agenda. Two core factors had been agreed by both parties—the independence of DFID from FCO and 0.7 per cent of GNI funding to the aid budget. To note, there have been a number of stark differences between the Labour and

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the Conservative manifestos on the approach and the language used in describing international development. The Labour Party, for example, kept insisting on eradicating extreme poverty consistently while the Conservatives keep looking at the benefits. However, there are indications of “peer influence” in that elements of one party’s idea/approach can be seen in the other. For example, the Labour Party agreeing to the importance of the private sector in international development as well as the need to ensure value for money. Nevertheless, in dealing with the private sector, the Labour language was different, for example in the 2015 manifesto it was clear that it will ensure that tax information is shared with the developing countries as well as ensuring that companies are ethically responsible, in particular by avoiding slavery and unsustainable supply chains. Although the Conservative and Labour parties have different approaches to the problem of world poverty, they both agree that it is important to engage in the fight against global poverty.

The Public and International Development Like other governmental policies, international development policies have been the subject of a number of polls and surveys, with the aim of gathering public opinion on aid policies and budgets. These surveys and polls are carried out by a number of polling agencies such as the UK Public Opinion Monitor and Aid Attitude Tracker (AAT). DFID also used to commission annual public attitude surveys. One (commissioned since 1999) monitors the opinion of the UK adult population.5 The second (commissioned since 2000) monitors the opinion of schoolchildren and is undertaken by Market and Opinion Research International (MORI).6 In 2017, DFID was criticised for depending on newspapers’ view rather than evidence. In this book, public opinion is considered as gathered from polls as well as from the media. The aim is to gain insight on the UK public attitude and views on international development, since the aid budget is taxpayers’ money. In addition, the trend in public views to aid might influence the future aid budget and the overall British agenda on international development. Also important is how such public views are related, in one way or another, to the views that led to Brexit. As mentioned earlier, by the year 2010 the promotion of the international development agenda became an all-party vision for Britain. All the major political parties agreed to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for international aid by 2013 despite the economic difficulties

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and recession. Even when the coalition government took austerity measures, it still decided to ring-fence the international development budget despite cuts in all other Whitehall departments with the exception of the National Health Service (NHS). Given such austerity measures, which followed the economic recessions and the subsequent increasing levels of economic hardship within UK communities, it’s important to look at aid support and how the government has managed it. Generally, there has been decreasing support for the government’s decision to increase the international aid budget. The decision to ringfence the aid budget while cutting budgets in other departments had not received much support from the public. According to the UK Public Opinion Monitor taken from July to August 2010, 57.1 per cent disagreed with protecting aid to developing countries from cuts in government spending.7 Conversely, 82.7 per cent supported the ‘ring fencing’ of the NHS.8 This was not surprising, since in the same polls, 63 per cent of respondents expressed the view that spending on aid to developing countries should be reduced as part of efforts to address the budget deficit (Henson and Lindstrom 2010: 9). Only 28 per cent proposed no change in spending, while 8 per cent considered that spending should increase (Henson and Lindstrom 2010). The results of the DFID-commissioned survey conducted in February 2010, only a few months before the Public Opinion Monitor, are starkly different, showing that four in ten agreed that the government should increase spending on overseas aid to the poor (40 per cent), nearly three in ten (29 per cent) disagreed and the remainder (25 per cent) neither agreed nor disagreed (TNS 2010: 15). There was a significant decrease in the proportion strongly agreeing, from 15 per cent in September 2009 to 10 per cent in February 2010 and strong disagreement increased significantly from 10 per cent to 13 per cent over the same time period. As with support for increased government action, this is a long-term trend; support for increased government spending has decreased significantly since September 2007 (55 per cent in September 2007 compared to 40 per cent in February 2010) (TNS 2010). In the Public Opinion Monitor, it was understood that there were factors that might drive the attitudes of the general public towards aid spending, and specifically towards changes in aid spending in the context of the UK government’s budget deficit. Thus, the poll explored these issues. The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) analysed the survey data statistically in order to identify the specific impacts of a range of demographic and attitudinal factors (Henson and Lindstrom 2010: 11).

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The results showed that voting behaviour was a key driver of support for cutting the aid budget. Conservative voters were 12 per cent more likely to support such cuts than Labour voters. Liberal Democrat voters, however, were no more likely to support cutting the aid budget than Labour voters (Henson and Lindstrom 2010). In connection with this, it is important to mention that although David Cameron and other Conservative Party key figures, such as the former Prime Minister John Major, supported the promotion of international development as a key part of international development policy, apparently there were still opposing views within the party (Major 2011). Liam Fox, the Secretary of State for Defence (2010–2011), for example, opposed the increased aid budget (Kirkup 2011). Similarly, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a right-wing economic think tank responsible for influencing many Thatcher-era policies, argued that “Shrinking the size of the state by limiting overseas aid to humanitarian disasters could save £12bn a year […] this is because the overseas aid did not help reduce poverty” (Elliot 2011). On the day when the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, announced the findings of the bilateral and multilateral aid reviews, the IEA Director, Mark Littlewood, further argued that “the government is right to seek to focus the aid that it gives, and to focus more on outcomes rather than simply the amount of money given, but its decision to raise the overall international development budget lies in complete contradiction to the whole body of evidence regarding government foreign aid outcomes” (Littlewood 2011). The IDS analysis also highlighted that the idea that the UK should play a global leadership role in aid to developing countries reduced by 13 per cent the likelihood of proposing cuts in aid spending (Henson and Lindstrom 2010). Respondents holding the view that the UK should be prepared to share at least some of its wealth with the poor in developing countries were 16 per cent less likely to support cuts in aid spending. Respondents agreeing that the UK has a moral duty to help reduce poverty in developing countries were 8 per cent less likely to propose cuts in aid (Henson and Lindstrom 2010). The belief that ‘most aid given by the UK to developing countries is wasted’ was held by 52 per cent of respondents. Respondents agreeing with this statement were 15 per cent more likely to propose cuts in aid spending (Henson and Lindstrom 2010). The perception, held by 52 per cent of respondents, that most UK aid is wasted, in connection with the discussion in Chapter 5, could be the reason for the coalition government’s new strategy for winning

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public support by emphasising the ‘independent aid commission’ which scrutinises aid and presents findings to the public by showing quantifiable results from British aid spending. Fast forward to the 2014 polls, just before the 2015 general election, there was a further decrease of public support for aid. The Aid Attitude Tracker (AAT) showed that there was a decrease in public concern for global poverty from 70 per cent in 2011 to 46 per cent in 2014 (Bond 2014). This is a big problem since the absence of concern shows indifference to the outer world and it could be a manifestation of an increasing sense of nationalism. Nationalism and the associated feelings partly explain the Brexit referendum results. In line with that, the same AAT polls showed that the public wants lower government spending on overseas aid. 53 per cent of those surveyed by AAT believe that aid should be cut (Bond 2014). Despite these negative public feelings about the aid budget in the UK, all parties kept the same promise of 0.7 per cent of GNI for the aid budget and the Conservative Party honoured the promise and kept the budget at that target. Thus, the situation in Britain presented a mixed picture. While the polls showed that the public support for the increased aid budgets was decreasing, the government was still keeping and upholding its UN target of a 0.7 per cent GNI aid budget. Based on the institutional outlook of this book, this shows that there are institutional foundations on the international development agenda that have become established and difficult to change. Since institutions are prone to change when there’s a forceful factor either exogenous or indigenous, it’s crucial to see how the referendum result of March 2016 has had an impact on the UK’s international development agenda, if at all.

Brexit and the International Development Agenda Following the referendum results, there has been enormous discussion at different political levels on various policies and sectors of British government trying to redefine its future in Europe and also in the world. It is worth noting that such a process of redefining the role and position of the UK in the world has been a continuous aspect in British political aspiration. This process often reaches boiling point when a critical moment arises, such as the end of the First World War, the emergence of the Cold War, the establishment and expansion of the European Union over a period of time through different major treaties, the end

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of the Cold War and now Brexit. Looking at the manifesto, for example, of the two major parties from 1992 to 2015, the EU has been on the agenda of both parties. By looking at their manifestos, party thinking—hence the stretched politics around the EU—can be gauged and also the trend of thinking within the parties can be identified. This is done here through a basic comparison of the 1992 manifestos and 2015 manifestos of each of the two major parties. In 1992, the Labour Party expressed its approach to the EU, this was to keep pushing for negotiations and ensure the UK’s part in the EU in every process so as to safeguard British interests and enjoy the benefits of the single market arrangements (Labour Party 1992). In the same year, the Conservative Party maintained its position of “arguing when argument was necessary; but not wavered to change views” (Conservative Party 1992). That was in relation to opting out of the ‘social chapter’ of the Maastricht Treaty. These differences in approach to the EU, in particular in the expression of readiness to leave or keep pushing, were still vivid 23 years after—when EU issues became even more sensitive. In the 2015 manifesto, the Labour Party expressed and reiterated their willingness to re-engage with the EU to ensure British interests within the union and that is why the option for a referendum was only on issues related to the transfer of powers to the EU (Labour Party 2015); while in the same year, the Conservative Party manifesto promised an EU referendum for people to choose and have their say (Conservative Party 2015). The rhetoric around the EU in the manifesto showed that the Conservatives had already started to disengage with the EU, for example, they mentioned a budget allocation cut to the EU, taking the UK out of Eurozone bailouts, vetoing the EU treaty and further negativity about the EU (such as its bureaucratic problems). The 2015 manifesto highlighted the despair and waned interest in the EU by the Conservative Party. The campaign of leave vs. remains showed divisions and differences of ideas even within parties—in particular the Conservatives, but the general party thinking played a part in framing the EU agenda. For example, there were politicians within the Conservative Party who supported leaving and others who supported remaining. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, who had promised the referendum in the 2015 election manifesto campaigned for ‘remain’. The loss of his side led to his resignation following the vote results. In his autobiography, For the Record, Cameron (2019: xiv) narrated his regrets:

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And around the EU referendum I have many regrets. From the timing of the vote to the expectations I allowed to build about renegotiation, there are many things I would do differently […] I did not fully anticipate the strength of feeling that would be unleashed both during the referendum and afterwards, and I am truly sorry to have seen the country I love so much suffer uncertainty and division in the years since then.

Arguably, Brexit is a manifestation of the continuous national redefining process more than the process itself. Brexit has allowed for more raw expressions and underscored the national feelings of wanting to see the British more in control of their national affairs without losing its global prominence and influence. This is in line with the rise of extreme rightwing parties attracting followers hence pressuring mainstream parties and in particular some leaders within mainstream parties to fall into rhetoric that is not too far from the extreme right-wing politicians. The discussions and debates associated with Brexit prior to the vote and post the vote can be summarised into two camps—whether being in the EU helps or hinders British prospects at home and abroad. Following the vote that decided Britain will leave the EU, there has been discussion of the withdrawal agreement, the content of the deal, and even whether there should be a deal or ‘no deal’. The question is, how will Britain relate to the EU following its departure? The debates have seen tumultuous political events leading to changes in leadership. Although David Cameron was the one who promised the referendum and has been “blamed” for promoting rhetoric and policies that further triggered the nationalistic feelings against the EU (Rawnsley 2019), he campaigned for ‘remain’ as noted above. Following the result, he resigned and Theresa May took over in 2016. After failing to deliver Brexit, following some extensions, Theresa May resigned in 2019 and Boris Johnson took over the party leadership and the premiership. In December 2019, there was an election and Boris Johnson won a landslide majority. Literature shows that, in comparison with other policies/sectors, international development has featured low in Brexit discussions. The focus has been on aspects such as trade, the Irish border (backstop) and the customs union. Nevertheless, plans for international development post Brexit are under way. For example, DFID and the FCO published joint guidance on delivering international development if there is no deal. In this guidance, which is relevant to this book—the focus is mostly on CSOs with funding from the EU who have applications made up until the last day of UK

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membership to the EU—the government will then fill the gap in funding if the EU ceases to support the UK CSOs (DFID and FCO 2019). This guidance came as a relief as there was some alarm with regard to what would happen to UK humanitarian and relief NGOs that receive funding from the EU. In particular, there is the EU’s Humanitarian and Civil Protection Agency (ECHO) from which, in 2017, 214 million Euros were awarded to UK NGOs out of its 2.5 billion Euro budget (Bailey 2019). DFID, through a letter that was written by the Secretary of State for International Development Penny Mordaunt and a statement read in the Parliamentary committee,9 promised to fund the UK NGOs if there was no deal with regard to filling the gap left by ECHO funding.10 This announcement also helped the UK NGOs to continue applying as the EU had a criteria that for the UK NGOs to qualify for the funding they have to demonstrate that they will still be able to secure support if there is a no deal Brexit. ECHO funding is one demonstration of the impact of Brexit on international development. There are other areas that would be affected since the UK, as noted previously, contributes a significant amount of funding to the EU development budget. By 2018, 11 per cent of the UK’s aid budget was going to the EU, which amounted to £1.5 billion (Edwards 2018). If there is a deal, both the UK and the EU would have a chance to look into new ways of corporation. In fact, in negotiations, the UK proposed “aid accord” with EU in a white paper (HMG 2018) that it published in July 2018. It describes the UK preference for a strategic corporation and reciprocal exchange of which the UK and its institutions will continue to participate in the EU development agenda and its instruments while the UK will continue to contribute with an ability to influence and also to have oversight (Anders 2018). There are a lot of grey areas remaining since negotiations are ongoing. The problem is not so much on the financial contribution from the UK or receipts of financial support from the EU to the UK CSOs through either ECHO and/or DEVCO (European Commission Development Arm). The main concern is access for the UK to influence EU development agenda. In the light of that, the UK government—at least from observation—has been thinking of ways that it can manage and continue to influence global affairs through international development, among other areas. The thinking through of British international development agenda post Brexit is what is of interest here. To analyse the impact of Brexit on the international development agenda so far, the manifestos of the two major parties running in the

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2017 and 2019 elections need to be looked at, speeches of senior leaders in particular the four Secretaries of State for International Development from 2016 to 2019 including Priti Patel, Penny Mordaunt, Rory Stewart and Alok Sharma. The analysis is also enriched by various analyses in the media and literature.

Post-Brexit Political Party Manifestos on International Development Following the Brexit referendum result and the subsequent politics, an election was called in June 2017. The Conservatives won but not with an adequate majority, so they formed a government with a small party known as the Unionist party. The Conservative Party remained, however, with heavy presence in the government under Theresa May. The Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn managed to increase the number of Labour Party seats but there were not enough to form a government on its own. The election manifestos for both Labour and Conservative parties further proved the established importance of the international development agenda, even after the referendum. Both parties, as in the previous manifestos, promised to keep the 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid. They both acknowledged and promised to work with the international community on SDGs. Both parties also showed concern for modern day slavery as well as issues of climate change. The Labour Party maintained its focus on poverty reduction but acknowledged and promised the need for the recipient countries to access the UK market as well as the importance of implementing the SDGs across the government. The cross-government strategy of implementing international development is, arguably, getting established in the agenda. However, there is a major change in the Conservative Party manifesto from which they promise that they will challenge the international definitions of international development. By that, the Conservatives perhaps meant the OECD rules, which insist that aid should only be with the goal of poverty elimination. The OECD rules are aligned with the UK’s international development law (2002). With that understanding, the Conservative Party promised in their 2017 manifesto that if need be they will change the law. This indicate a change in thinking since in the 2015 manifesto, the party had acknowledged the OECD rules. Changing the law and also challenging the OECD rules is for the purposes of allowing the wider use and distribution of aid budget. Already,

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since 2015 with the cross-departmental use of aid budget, the Conservative government has been criticised by development stakeholders for directing the aid to places outside what the international rules and/or the Act (2002) allows. In 2018, the aid budget (Overseas Development Aid— ODA) was distributed to other department included FCO—4.4 per cent of total ODA; Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)—4.2 per cent of total ODA; Home Office—2.3 per cent of total ODA; and Department of Health and Social Care—1.3 per cent of total ODA (DFID 2018). Thus DFID, since 2016, is no longer the sole department within Whitehall that manages the international development budget. Arguably, the distribution of aid to other departments, in spite of the fact that DFID still gets to manage the majority of the aid budget, dilutes DFID’s independence on the overseas aid agenda. This shows institutional remnants of the Conservatives party’s outlook on international aid, which they historically link directly to foreign affairs. As seen in Chapter 3, historically the Conservative Party preference on managing international development was under the FCO. However, because of the performance of DFID since 1997 and the non-partisan consensus on the prominence of the international development agenda in British politics, the Conservatives kept DFID. Nevertheless, there have been internal party debates—as seen above i.e. politicians such as Liam Fox, on DFID’s independence and the increased aid budget. In period after the referendum, such debates begin to emanate. There have been concerns and discussions whether or not Prime Minister Boris Johnson would decrease DFID’s mandate by merging it with the FCO (McVeigh 2019a). These concerns are due to Johnson’s views that aid should serve the UK’s political and commercial interests (Wintour 2019a). Johnson, in his interview with the Financial Times argued that if ‘Global Britain’ is to achieve its ‘full and massive potential’ then DFID must be brought back into the Foreign Office—maintaining that “we can’t keep spending huge sums of British taxpayers’ money as though we were some independent Scandinavian NGO” (McVeigh 2019a). Other Conservatives politicians and their associated think tanks have expressed similar sentiments (Seely and Rogers 2019). Some Conservatives Secretaries of State for International Development have expressed similar views. Priti Patel, for example, who was the Secretary of State for International Development between July 2016 and November 2017 called for changes to the rules that define aid and consequently create

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tighter controls (Wintour 2019b). This wish to release UK aid from international rules was included in the 2017 Conservative election manifesto. Penny Mordaunt had a similar view; she took over the leadership of DFID from Priti Patel until May 2019. She expressed the view that DFID should become a fundraising department, rather than a spending department, as it is unsustainable to keep spending taxpayer’s money to meet the aid target (Elgot 2019). As indicated above, there is debate going on in the Conservative Party on the international development agenda. This means that there are Conservative politicians who believe in and support the independence of DFID. They were, arguably, instrumental in ensuring and supporting the change within the Conservatives towards DFID’s independence from the early to mid-2000s when the Conservative Party started to appreciate and acknowledge the performance of DFID. It can be seen in the election manifestos of the Conservatives that the independence of DFID has been honoured and the main difference between their policies and those of the Labour Party since the 2000s is not about DFID or the budget but about approaches to aid. From 2015 onwards, with the spreading of aid allocation to other departments, there is arguably a dilution of DFID power. The complaints about international rules from politicians such as Johnson and Patel, as well as expressed in the 2017 manifesto, are geared towards further reduction of the DFID mandate/control of aid and an increase in the ability of the government to widen the scope of aid budget spending to areas such as trade, investment, security and other national interests. Within the Conservative Party, however, there are politicians who support DFID’s independence and aid spending. Rory Stewart who took over from the Secretary of State for International Development from May 2019 to July 2019 supported the 0.7 per cent GNI to the aid budget arguing it is ‘hugely important’ even after Brexit for the purposes of becoming a ‘proud Britain’ (McVeigh 2019b). Alok Sharma who took over from Stewart in July 2019 has indicated that he will protect the aid budget and ensure that it will tackle challenges such as climate change, diseases and humanitarian disasters (Gulland and Newey 2019). Other Conservative politicians such as Andrew Mitchell, who was the former Secretary of State for International Development, have also warned against the UK’s losing its leadership in the global international development agenda if it tampers with the aid budget and DFID’s independence (McVeigh 2019b). The discussions and concerns about the maintenance of DFID’s status as an independent department have heightened with the

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silence in the 2019 Conservative Party election manifesto on the subject. This is alarming for stakeholders in the international development sector within and outside the UK. Apart from the Conservatives politicians who have been defending the aid budget, there are other stakeholders including those from opposition parties (such as politicians in the Labour Party) and also aid charities who have been supporting and advocating for the maintenance and increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics. In respect to the interest of this book, to look at faith groups, the section below will outline the efforts that faith groups have been making to support DFID’s independence and the aid budget, as well as the general promotion of the international development agenda in British politics over a period of time including the post referendum period.

The Role of Faith Groups on the Rising Salience of the International Development Agenda Within British Politics The fact that faith groups in the UK have been concerned with, and active in the fight against global poverty indicates their positive role in promoting international development within the UK. In Chapters 4 and 5, it has been seen how faith-based organizations (FBOs) and Faith Communities, respectively, have always been active in raising awareness about issues in the Global South. This has been conducted either on their own, or in collaboration with the government. The Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign (JDC), for example, started in early 1992 and reached its peak in 1998 when thousands of demonstrators showed up to “convince” the leaders of the richest nations in the world to discuss third world debt. In addition, the 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign is another event that promoted international development in the UK. Although the Make Poverty History campaign was not a faith-based campaign, faith groups were significantly active in this campaign. For example, in January 2005, 600 female clergy marched in London to deliver a white “Make Poverty History” band to Prime Minister Tony Blair. The positive role of faith groups was noticed, not only by the public, but also by politicians and the government of the time.11 The activities and events of the Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History campaigns have received considerable acknowledgement and their impact on British politics is uncontested. In

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one of his first speeches that signalled a change to the Conservative’s standpoint on international development, David Cameron mentioned the impact of these campaigns and the way in which they united the British people towards a common goal. For example, in the ‘Fighting Global Poverty’ speech (2006), Cameron maintained that ‘with the vital role played by campaigning organisations and the many thousands of individuals who rallied to the banner of Make Poverty History […] this has helped create something of which everyone in Britain can be incredibly proud’ (Cameron 2006). When launching the Globalisation and Global Poverty Action Groups, David Cameron said “this summer, millions of British people took part in the Make Poverty History campaign. A new generation of concerned citizens wants prosperity for themselves and progress for the poor—whether living on the other side of the street or the other side of the world. Modern, compassionate Conservatism means responding to their demands” (Conservative Party 2005b). From that statement, it is evident that the Make Poverty History campaign, which was actually organised by charities, faith groups and celebrities, partly inspired Cameron and the party at large to change its viewpoint on international development. FBOs also play a role in raising the awareness of the British public during humanitarian crises. In 2007, Islamic aid agencies and communities organised a concert known as ‘Muslim Live 8’, which raised awareness for the situation in Darfur. This event was a success and it helped to increase international attention of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. The concert was attended by the then International Development Minister, Shahid Malik, and the Secretary of State for International Development, Douglas Alexander. They acknowledged the impact of such a concert on the British public.12 The Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, also supported the concert through a live broadcast. Such activities by faith groups bring issues of international development into the public eye. In addition to ‘faith organised campaigns’ such as the Muslim Live 8, FBOs were also members of the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), which appealed for assistance whenever there was a major humanitarian disaster caused by natural tragedies. There were five FBOs in the DEC. These were the Christian Aid, CAFOD, Tearfund, Islamic Relief and World Vision. The DEC appeals highlighted and exposed humanitarian crises across the world to the British public. These appeals raised millions of pounds from the British people to help humanitarian crises. The government worked with the DEC and all the funds collected by the DEC

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and government funds were delivered as aid from the ‘British people’. This underscored the nascent British ‘identity’ as a leader in the fight against poverty. Apart from the major ‘issue-related’ campaigns such as those discussed above, FBOs have been pushing the international development agenda into the public eye through lobbying major political parties and the government to adopt certain international development policies. Although it is not clear if the major political parties solicited submissions or suggestions from FBOs for their election manifest sections on international development, it is evident that a number of FBOs tried to influence the major political parties’ agendas on international development. FBOs, alongside other NGOs, want to always be sure that an incoming government will take vital steps towards fighting poverty. With this in mind, FBOs, along with other NGOs and faith communities, for example, wrote an international development manifesto, ‘Vote Global’ (Bond 2010) in 2010, which set out the key political commitments necessary for Britain to play its full part in fighting global poverty and ensuring the world meets and exceeds the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were badly off-track (Bond 2010). There were more than ten FBOs that endorsed this manifesto and participated in the subsequent discussions with political party leaders. During the 2010 election campaigns, and in particular on ‘World Poverty Day’ (18 April 2010), the leaders of the three major parties used the opportunity to explain their international development agenda to voters (especially those who are interested in international development, such as faith communities). The Labour Party leader, Gordon Brown, wrote a letter to the directors of international development NGOs. This letter was sent through Bond (the networking organisation for international development NGOs). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, all FBOs discussed in this book are members of Bond. Thus, the letter from Gordon Brown targeted FBOs as well. In this letter, Brown urged the NGO directors to make sure not to miss ‘2010’ (ten years from Jubilee 2000, five years since Gleneagles and Make Poverty History and five years before promises to the world’s poor were due to be delivered) (Brown 2010). In connection with this letter, it could be argued that Gordon Brown understood the role of NGOs, including FBOs, in convincing the public about certain policies. Obviously, Brown mentioned what his government’s achievements on international development, and their future plans. Christian Aid also wrote its own ‘election manifesto’ for the 2010 elections. This manifesto

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urged the government to maintain DFID’s independence and cabinet seat, as well as ensuring that the target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid was reached by 2013 (Christian Aid 2010). Similarly, CAFOD and other Christian charities such as the Salvation Army and the Quakers reacted to the fact that none of the three major political parties had addressed the issue of a ‘Financial Transaction Tax’ in their manifestos’ sections on international development. The Financial Transaction Tax (also known as the ‘Robin Hood Tax’) was proposed as a tax on banks and hedge funds whenever they carried out international transactions. This tax, if charged and used properly, could have generated income for countries in the Global South that may be useful for their economic growth. Chris Bain, director of CAFOD, argued that “it would be morally bankrupt to miss this opportunity for a global tax on financial transactions. At a time when the financial crisis has pushed developing countries further back in their fight against poverty, we need financial markets that work for development and not against. A Robin Hood Tax is an important and symbolic step in the right direction.” The Robin Hood Tax campaign went on beyond the 2010 elections with the goal of lobbying and pressuring the government to take it on board as an international development policy. In connection with this, it can be mentioned that the sort of advocacy faith groups perform to influence government policy and the politics of international development is most effective when carried out collectively by members of different groups. As discussed in the previous chapter in 2014, a bill on lobbying was passed which became an Act in 2015. This Lobbying Act (2015) regulates and limits the extent to which charities can campaign. Based on various analyses through Bond, it is evident that NGOs including faith groups are not happy with such restrictions in place. Nevertheless, the faith groups have continued to lobby political parties. Even after the referendum, faith groups alongside other CSOs have continued to ensure international development remains in the radar in British politics. They do so through engagement in party politics such as having exhibition booths and events at party conferences. In the 2019 Labour Party Conference, Islamic Relief, Christian Aid and Tearfund held various events such as ‘faith in aid’, ‘faith reception’ and ‘faith fringe’ wherein they discussed various areas of faith and development including the role of faith in assisting refugees, in climate change and development at large. Similarly in the 2019 Conservative Party Conference, faith groups did similar activities such as ‘faith fringe’. Such events are carried out in all major political party conferences including at the Liberal

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Democrat conference. Various faith communities such as ‘Christians on the Left’13 support such receptions and events. The goal is to ensure that the parties discuss international development. Through experience, faith groups have come to realise that it is more effective for them to join forces with other groups whenever they are trying to influence policy. This is what they have been doing under the umbrella of Bond. As a result of this, the government interacts with faith groups just as it does with other voluntary groups. This is because faith groups, and especially FBOs, have similar operations to other NGOs. In the light of the above discussion, it could be argued that faith groups have been effective in raising the profile of the international development agenda in British public debate, which in turn has had an impact on British politics. Although faith groups often raise awareness for international development alongside other charities and voluntary groups in the UK, their specific role is still significant. Faith groups have their own defined constituencies, which they can directly impact. For example, Tearfund and Christian Aid are affiliated with evangelical and Anglican churches in the UK. Similarly, Islamic Relief is affiliated with Muslim communities. These communities are important in supporting the aid budget and the international development agenda.

Discussion: Historical Institutionalism Analysis From the above discussion, it can be seen that there have been changes in the major political parties’ agendas on international development. These changes have been mostly apparent in the Conservative Party, as David Cameron acknowledged, “Conservatives used to regard global poverty, as a significant, but second-order subject”. Why and how did this change happen within the Conservative Party? Historical institutionalism explains that change may happen sporadically, due to external shocks, or incrementally, often due to internal factors. The changes in the Conservative Party agenda on international development occurred as part of efforts to ‘modernise’ the Conservative Party in order to portray a ‘compassionate’ image. The Conservative government of Thatcher implemented policies that were unpopular with many citizens at that time and created an image that the Conservative Party is for capitalist and uncaring rich people. Thus, there have been efforts within the party to change this image and to ‘detoxify’ the party. These efforts mildly started with John Major, and continued, indeed,

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accelerated, under David Cameron. At the 2005 Conservative Party conference, Cameron argued: “When I say change, I’m not talking about some slick rebranding exercise: what I’m talking about is fundamental change […] that shows we’re comfortable with modern Britain and that we believe our best days lie ahead” (Cameron 2005). Thus, in the efforts to ‘rebrand’, and beyond them, as Cameron claimed, the party changed its standpoint on international development. As discussed earlier, for the first time the Conservative Party agreed to manage international development separately from the Foreign Office. Another possible reason for the Conservative Party’s raising of the profile of international development in its policies is the increasing level of global poverty and its impact on international security. Although the Conservative Party, like other parties, says that it is giving aid for moral purposes, they have also acknowledged that giving aid is about more than altruism. In the globalised world, problems in one country affect another country. This is related to the New Security Agenda discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Issues of immigration, terrorism, drug and human trafficking, conflicts and fragile states can partly be solved through effective international development policies. For example, poverty and state fragility produce fertile ground for terrorism. Thus, it is in the UK’s interest to deal with poverty situations in the Global South. The relationship between fighting poverty and home security, together with other interests such as international trade, can also explain the rising prominence of an international development agenda in British politics across all parties. Since the 2000s all the major political parties’ election manifestos have stated that fighting global poverty is not only moral but also crucial for British interests. This is partly why the government is still increasing its aid budget in spite of the decline in public support for international aid. The increasing salience of international development is an incremental process that is influenced by many factors both external and internal. Political events (like elections and changes in party leadership) serve as ‘windows of opportunities’ in which parties and politicians may further their agenda.

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Brexit: A “Window of Opportunity” or a “Critical Moment” for Change in the International Development Agenda? Given the prominence of the international development agenda in British politics over the last 23 years and from this book’s institutional perspective, what can be said about the possible impact of Brexit into the international development agenda? Have Brexit politics caused any change to the agenda? Upon the finalisation of Brexit, how will British international development change? These questions help in thinking through the impact of Brexit so far and to predict what may happen. The sentiments with regard to Brexit impact can be linked to the nationalistic feelings that have emerged in Britain and those which the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative governments have wanted to address since 2010. An earlier section illustrated how British public concern about international poverty issues had declined over a period of time and the public support for the aid budget is also decreasing. That correlated with the feeling that taxpayers’ money should first and foremost be spent in addressing domestic poverty and also issues such as health (e.g. the NHS). There are similar sentiments against the EU developing among the British citizens at this time. As a result of that, the Conservative government ensured that the aid budget was justifiable through links to domestic interests in particular working with the private sector. It also focused on showing results from aid implementation as well as value for money. From 2015, the government further widened the use of the aid budget by distributing it to other departments so that the budget can serve national interests too. Following the referendum in March 2016, there had been enormous discussions on different policy areas at different levels in politics and in society. Since this book has gauged the political interest in international development mainly through election manifestos, the 2017 and 2019 elections have been looked at—which took place after the referendum. In the election manifestos, it was seen that both of the two major parties kept the same promise of upholding the aid budget of 0.7 per cent of GNI and none of the parties promised to downgrade DFID. However, the 2019 Conservative Party manifesto kept silent about maintaining DFID’s independence. The referendum and the time afterwards (before the withdrawal from the EU) was thus a critical moment, in which the UK government has

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a chance to reformulate its policies and agenda. There are changes that are evident in the manifesto. For example when comparing the 2015 and 2017 election manifestos of the Conservative Party, one main change can be seen—the plan to challenge and redefine existing international rules on aid. It is arguable that the Conservative government wishes to do that in order to have the freedom to allocate the UK’s aid budget more freely than the current framework defined by the international rules in particular the OECD rules and the 2002 Development Act. Whereas the 2019 manifesto did not express the wish (as in the 2017 manifesto) to redefine the international rules, it did not mention the independence of DFID as something that the party will uphold. This should not come as a surprise as since 2015 the UK government had used the aid budget in other departments, but Brexit politics have provided a window of opportunity to push for institutional change that can further facilitate the plan. The extent to which Brexit will impact the international development agenda will be fathomed following the completion of Brexit and whether or not there will be deal. Nevertheless, from observation, it is arguable that the British government—whether Labour or Conservative—will keep the UN target of 0.7 per cent of its GNI as a budget for aid. The independence of DFID is debatable and there is an informed and justified concern that DFID’s independence will be diluted, or that it will be totally merged back as a unit within the FCO. The distribution of the aid budget to other departments will further increase if the Conservatives remain in power, as well as using aid to promote British trade and further influence in the global sphere. The UK government will continue to protect its place on the world stage as one of the most powerful leaders in the international development agenda. In the light of the analysis in this book, it is argued that the impact of Brexit on international development will be determined more by the political party in power (due to the party differences on aid budget spending approach) than by Brexit. The UK will keep its budget target and keep DFID independence (cabinet level status) even if it is just for symbolic purposes. Thus, even if DFID’s independence (cabinet level status) will be kept, it will be more for symbolic purposes.

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Conclusion The UK government met the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for aid and enshrined it in law. This showed that fighting global poverty has become a national agenda. In 2010, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, had a vision of making Britain an ‘aid superpower’. Seven years later in 2017, the Secretary of State for International Development, Penny Mordaunt, reiterated the same wish. This is an interesting vision because superpowers are defined by military capability. However, as seen in Chapter 3, international aid is becoming securitised due to its ability to deal with new security issues, including grievances that may lead to extremism, poverty that often leads to migration and other related issues such as endemic diseases. Military capabilities are no longer effective in winning wars and conflicts on their own. The US military has failed to attain peace in several places like Somalia (with the failure and death of 18 US soldiers in 1993), the insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Thus, to attain peace in the contemporary world, military capabilities have to be combined with development. Poverty is an enemy that ‘hosts’ other enemies. The British government understands this and it is fighting global poverty not only with a moral purpose and to gain recognition as a ‘power’, but also to ensure security for its people at home and abroad. With or without Brexit, the UK will continue to push its position as a global leader in international development.

Notes 1. These are the 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2015 elections. 2. See DFID. What Is UK Aid? http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/ Quick-guide-to-DFID/how-aid-is-spent/What-is-UKaid/. Accessed 22 Aug 2011. 3. The speeches are selected from the Conservative Party speech database, selected for relevant speeches given by David Cameron on International Development from 2005 to 2010. http://www.conservatives.com/ News/SpeechList.aspx?SearchType=NewsTopic&SearchTerm=3251c91486cf-467d-875e-82b8b00eb0b9&Cameron=true&page=1&take=10. Accessed 10 Apr 2011. 4. The report published in July 2007 titled “In it together: the attack on global poverty: Submission to the Shadow Cabinet” can be found at http://www.peterlilley.co.uk/pdf/GGPGCompleteReport.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2011.

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5. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/aboutdfid/intheuk/opinion.asp. Accessed 22 Aug 2011. 6. See Note 7. 7. Public Opinion Monitor (UK). (2010). Results of the July–August 2010 Survey. http://www.ukpublicmonitor.org/assets/files/UKPOM% 20results%203.pdf. Accessed 22 Aug 2011. 8. See Note 9. 9. Penny Mordaunt (2019, March 27). Contingent Liability: Financial Assurance. Written Statement HCWS1456 to the Parliament. https:// www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answersstatements/written-statement/Commons/2019-03-27/HCWS1456/. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. 10. See Note 11. 11. For example, the Labour Party’s Faith Groups’ webpage acknowledged the significant role of faith groups, see http://www.labour.org.uk/faith. Accessed 23 Aug 2011. 12. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov. uk/news/files/muslim-live8.asp. Accessed 23 Aug 2011. 13. See http://www.christiansontheleft.org.uk/splash_1?splash=1. Accessed 25 Sept 2019.

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development/2019/jul/24/trade-foreign-aid-boris-johnson-dfid. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. McVeigh, K. (2019b, May 2). Rory Stewart defends UK aid target and vows to tackle climate emergency. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2019/may/02/rory-stewart-defends-uk-aid-targetand-vows-to-tackle-climate-emergency-new-development-minister-pennymordaunt-dfid. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. Rawnsley, A. (2019, September 22). For the record by David Cameron review— The prime minister who fell short. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/books/2019/sep/22/for-the-record-david-cameron-review. Accessed 22 Feb 2020. Seely, B., & Rogers, J. (2019). Global Britain: A twenty-first century vision. HJS. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/global-britain-a-twentyfirst-century-vision/. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. Stevenson, A. (2009, June 6). UKAid to replace DFID overseas. Politics Newsletter. https://www.politics.co.uk/news/2009/07/06/ukaid-to-replace-dfidoverseas. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. TNS. (2010). UK public attitudes towards development. Report. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/67684/public-attitudes-april10.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Tomlinson, J. (2003). The Commonwealth, the balance of payments and the politics of international poverty: British aid policy, 1958–1971. Contemporary European History, 12(4), 413–429. Vickers, R. (2004). The Labour Party and the world: The evolution of Labour’s foreign policy, 1900–51. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Wilding, P. (2017). What next? Britain’s future in Europe. London: I.B. Taurus. Wintour, P. (2019a, February 11). Boris Johnson backs call for multibillion cut to UK aid budget. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2019/feb/10/boris-johnson-backs-call-for-multibillion-cut-to-ukaid-budget. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. Wintour, P. (2019b, March 18). Priti Patel joins calls for radical shake-up of aid budget rules. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2019/mar/18/priti-patel-joins-calls-for-radical-shake-up-of-aid-budget-rules. Accessed 29 Sept 2019.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Summary Although over the last three decades several international relations scholars have started to actively analyse the role of religion in international affairs, research on the role of religion in governmental policies is still under-researched. Both the positive and the negative perspectives of the role of religion in international affairs have been analysed (Appleby 1999).1 The positive role of religion includes the works of faith-based institutions and leaders in attaining domestic and international peace through mediation, fighting poverty and post-conflict reconciliation. On the other hand, religion can play a negative role such as inspiring extremism and radicalisation, acting as a source of identity and a mobilisation factor in ethno-religious conflicts. Studies of religion in international development have focused on the role of faith leaders and faith-based organisations in the fight against poverty2 but such studies did not extend to studying how the donor countries were working with faith groups in their international development agenda. In the UK, which is the main focus of this book, there have been studies of faith communities and UK government policies but most of these studies focus on domestic policies (Greg 2004; Lowndes and Chapman 2005). The studies on faith groups and international development in the UK also exist but they (i) do not categorise different types of faith groups and their analytical implications;

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(ii) do not focus on the policy level in particular examining the change process in policy with regard to opportunity for faith groups to engage. This book has sought to contribute to the study of the role of religion in international affairs by analysing the relationship between the UK government and faith groups with regard to the international development agenda. It focuses on the policy covering the period from 1992 to 2019. The Bosnian War (1992) marks the starting point, which was one event that reminded the world of the force of religion in international affairs in the post-Cold War era. In the same year, there was an election in the UK, which is also relevant to this book’s analytical framework. The analysis in this book considers elections as ‘critical moments’. The period covered in this book involves four governments: the Conservative government under the leadership of John Major (1992–1997); the New Labour government under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997–2010); the Conservative-led coalition government under the leadership of David Cameron (2010–2015); and finally the Conservative government under the leadership of David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson (2015–2019). To examine the relationship between the government and faith groups in each time-period, faith groups are placed into two groups: faith-based organisations (FBOs) such as Christian Aid and Islamic Relief; and faith communities such as the Church of England or the Muslim Council of Britain. The research drew on the theory of new institutionalism, in particular the historical institutionalism approach. An historical institutionalist analytical framework was designed to guide the analysis of policy continuity and change with regard to the government’s interaction with faith groups. The framework was designed in order to answer the research question: What explains the relationship between the UK government and faith groups in relation to international development policies? To answer this question, the book first sought to determine whether this relationship exists, and then moved on to determine what it entails. If there is a relationship, it can either be a bad or a good relationship. There are also times where this relationship deteriorates, and times when it improves. The analysis was framed through the following propositions: • The resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups

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• The attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector (e.g. civil society organisations, voluntary and private sectors) explain the relationship between the government and faith groups • The increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups The research for the book traced all expressed international development policies through documentary analysis. The documents included published policy papers, strategic papers, parliamentary debates (Hansard), legislation, speeches and the election manifestos of the major political parties. Documentary materials from faith groups were also analysed which included lobbying materials, annual reports, press releases and other publications. In addition, interviews were carried out with the former DFID officials and advocacy officers in some of the biggest Christian and NonChristian FBOs in the country. In the next section, the main findings are summarised. The summary begins with the findings regarding ‘faith and development’ as a concept, suggested as one of the indicators of the resurgence of religion in international affairs. This section describes the contribution of the book at a conceptual level and is the first step in the empirical research. This is followed by the findings from the empirical research, that is, the relationship between the government and faith groups (FBOs and faith communities). The theoretical contribution of the book is discussed in the section after that, in which the outcome of the analysis in relation to the propositions and the literature is discussed. Following that is the section that covers policy lessons, which recommend how a state can or should respond to the resurgence of religion in international affairs and to the issues of global poverty, through working with FBOs and faith communities. The section also suggests ways in which faith groups can effectively engage with the government in matters of international development. The last section poses potential future research questions and finally the chapter conclusion is presented.

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Summary of the Findings The ‘Faith and Development’ Agenda The role of religion in the fight against poverty and other international development issues is part of the emerging literature on international relations and religion. Religion, through religious institutions and communities, has been active in the fight against poverty as well as in finding solutions to other relatively new security issues such as civil conflicts, diseases, climate change and terrorism triggered by religion. Faith institutions and leaders have also been active in post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding. The role of religion in such matters might be labelled ‘faith and development’. One of the indicators of the resurgence of religion in international politics in the post-Cold War era is the fact that international organisations such as the UN and the World Bank are embracing the ‘faith and development’ concept by inviting religious institutions and leaders to work together on efforts to solve global poverty issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1998 the World Bank’s president co-chaired a ‘World Faiths Dialogue on Development’ meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury. In addition, one of its commissioned studies, ‘Voices of the Poor’ suggested that poor people have greater trust for religious organisations and leaders than other institutions, including governments. As a result of these findings, the Bank established a unit known as the ‘Directorate for Faith’, which later changed its name to ‘Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics’. This unit served as the World Bank’s focal point on the intersection of faith and development. One example of this unit’s work is the World Bank’s arrangement to work with faith groups. Other multilateral organisations, such as UN agencies, have made similar moves. During the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a task force (the interfaith working group) was formed to ensure inclusivity and active engagement of faith groups in developing the goals and in implementing them. Nevertheless, it is not only the multilateral agencies that have been bringing faith groups into their policies, but also individual countries in trying to engage faith in their development agenda. For this reason, this book sought to explore and analyse the UK government’s engagement with faith groups with regard to its international development agenda. The book separated faith groups into two categories: Faith-based organisations (FBOs) and faith communities. The studies that discuss the government’s engagement with faith groups on the UK international

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development agenda, such as the Gerard Clarke’s (2006, 2007), do not distinguish between different types of faith groups, referring rather to faith groups as a whole. There is a discrepancy between the ways in which the government deals with each of these groups according to their different nature in terms of operations and goals. In the light of this, Chapters 4 and 5 focused on an analysis of the government’s relationship with those groups, respectively. The main findings are summarised below. The Relationship Between the Government and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) Since the beginning of the period examined by this book (1992–2019), the UK government has had a relationship with FBOs. The relationship has mainly been based on funding and advocacy. DFID funds FBOs to deliver and carry out development projects in the global south. On their side, FBOs lobby and recommend policies to DFID on matters of international development. Although DFID does not always agree or accept FBO recommendations, it nevertheless respects their voice and invites them to submit recommendations and to participate in policy consultations. DFID can also support FBOs to carry out advocacy work in developing countries in order to bring about and ensure good governance and that other democratic ideals are respected by the recipient governments. The relationship between the government and FBOs fluctuated at different points of time due to a number of factors. In the first period (1992– 1997), the government-funded FBOs but the funds were limited and there was only one funding scheme, the Joint Fund Scheme, to which FBOs could apply. In addition, the government of the time focused on ‘political conditionality,’ including ‘democracy,’ ‘rule of law,’ and ‘good government’, which the state had to comply with in order to be eligible for British aid. In that way, the British government was working directly with recipient states, which in turn led to a diminished relationship with FBOs along with other NGOs. In the second period (1997–2010), the government’s relationship with FBOs heightened. This was due to a number of factors. First, the government embraced ‘partnership’ policies, which encouraged DFID to work with various aid agencies in the fight against poverty. The ‘partnership’ policies were encouraged both at international and domestic levels. At the international level, the UN adopted the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ in 2000, which called for ‘collective responsibility’. It was agreed

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that fighting poverty requires effort from various groups including state and non-state actors. For these reasons, FBOs were also recognised and invited to work with other aid agencies in order to reduce global poverty. At the domestic level, ‘partnership’ fit the New Labour government’s ‘third way’ ideology, which encouraged government partnerships with the third sector, including private and voluntary sectors, in delivering public services. In connection to this, the government started a partnership fund known as the Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs) by which a considerable number of FBOs received huge amounts of funding. Although PPA funding was not only granted to FBOs but to many other development NGOs, on some occasions, FBOs justified their funding application on the basis of their faith identity and its connection (partnership) with faith communities in the Global South. In the third period (2010–2015), the relationship between the government and FBOs was more or less the same as in the previous government. However, the Conservative-led coalition government changed its approach to development from ‘partnership and poverty reduction’ to ‘value for money, results and wealth creation’. Alongside that, the government favoured the private sector. DFID continued to work with FBOs as they did under the previous government. The PPA funding was still in operation and FBOs were still getting funds. However, the government started to phase out some of the core funding schemes. The phasing out process was incremental with more change seen in the next period. In the fourth period (2015–2019), the government relationship with FBOs was becoming more distant, together with other NGOs, because of its changing approach to funding. DFID ended the PPA funding schemes and closed other funding schemes such as the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF). These changes had a significant impact, leading to one of the biggest FBOs to shut down after 76 years of operations and another one to reduce its operations by closing down some of its country offices. In addition, the government approach to aid budget spending changed. It decided on cross-departmental aid budget spending, whereby the aid budget is allocated to other departments beyond DFID. Advocacy relations continued. FBOs continued to lobby and push for better policies while challenging new approaches of aid budget spending. The referendum and subsequent politics occurred in this period leading to uncertainty.

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The Relationship Between the Government and Faith Communities The UK government’s relationship with faith communities with regard to international development was mainly focused on ‘creating and building support’ for development. In the first period (1992–1997), this relationship was almost non-existent. Although faith communities such as the Church of England were already involved in international development issues, their activities were not in collaboration with the government. The Jubilee debt campaign, which was carried out by faith communities, was organised from the early 1990s. At that time, there was very little collaboration with the government. These campaigns were very effective and managed to mobilise many people to march on the G8 meeting in 1998. The G8 meeting agreed to discuss third world debt, which was a great step and, to an extent, an achievement by the Jubilee debt campaign. Although it was clear that the government and also DFID did not want the demonstration to happen, especially outside the G8 meeting,3 the turnout and the effectiveness of the campaign highlighted the strength of faith groups. It is difficult to know how many people who demonstrated were actually believers, but the main point is the fact that the campaign was, largely, organised by faith groups, and demonstrated the power they had to convince a huge number of people to turn out in order to tackle issues of world poverty. Following that, DFID recognised the energy and potential of faith groups to build support for international development within the UK. Partly as a result of this, a closer relationship between faith communities and the government can be seen in the second period (1997–2010). In 1999, DFID published a strategy paper known as ‘Building Support for Development Strategy’ (BSDS). In the BDSD, faith groups were among the four groups that were mentioned as key areas to build support for development in the UK. The other groups were the media, education, and trade unions. DFID, for example, funded a faith community event, known as Greenbelt, which is an annual Christian festival for the arts. The funding to Greenbelt was mainly for the purpose of raising awareness about international development issues among festivalgoers. In the third period (2010–2015), DFID ended the BDSD. The focus was on quantifiable results and value for money. DFID did not see the need to continue raising awareness. This could also be for the reason that the government had already decided, and it actually did, to spend 0.7 per cent of GNI to aid. A target set by

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the UN. However, DFID published Faith Partnership Principles in 2012, signalling its appreciation of the work of faith groups in pushing the international development agenda. In the fourth period (2015–2019), DFID introduced new funding schemes through which faith communities and other small charities stood a chance of accessing funding. With the crossdepartmental spending of the aid budget, faith communities stand both a chance and a risk. A chance because other departments such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Home Affairs have more established units and programmes with faith communities than DFID. For instance, already using the aid budget, the FCO is working with faith communities in addressing issues of freedom of religion and worship. On the other hand, it is a risk, since redistributing aid budget across different departments might reduce the capacity of DFID to choose various actors/stakeholders through which the department can work.

Comparative Discussion Theoretical Contribution Using the historical institutionalism analytical framework, as discussed in Chapter 2, this book has examined changes in policy, which in turn affect the relationship between the government and faith groups. For example, the analysis in Chapter 3 shows an incremental change in the mid-1990s, a change in policy focus from ‘political conditionality’ to ‘partnership’, which led to a heightened relationship between the government and faith groups. Similarly, the change in government in 1997, for example, led to the establishment of DFID, which opened ‘windows of opportunity’ for more funding for voluntary groups including faith groups. Along the same lines, the analysis also helped to show the changes in 2010 when the Conservative-led coalition took over government and there was a shift in policy focus which seems to have led to incremental changes in the government’s engagement with faith groups, and in particular faith communities. In 2015, with the fully fledged Conservative government further changes with regard to aid budget management (cross-governmental) were seen, as well as the closing off of former funding schemes and the introduction of new ones, with implications for faith groups funded by the government. Thus, historical institutionalism helps to determine and analyse a change of ‘policy path’ (i.e. from ‘political conditionality’ to ‘partnership

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and poverty reduction’ to ‘value for money’ and ‘cross-governmental’ aid budget management), ‘windows of opportunity’ and/or ‘critical moments’ such as elections and also Brexit, in which analysis can be made as to whether or not faith groups seized these moments to strengthen their relationship with the government, either by obtaining more funds or recommending policies. Historical institutionalism presents the notion that an outcome can be caused by various factors that incrementally accumulate. This book has shown that the government started to work with faith groups as a result of various factors, which individually could not have explained the outcome. This was particularly clear in the analysis of the government’s decision to engage with faith communities, which do not have international development as their primary goal (unlike the FBOs which have international development as their core goal). The government started to work with them for various reasons including: the ‘Voices of The Poor’ report, the desire to explicitly analyse what works best in international development, and to build support for international development. These various rationales for the government’s closer relationship with faith communities could best be identified by an historical institutionalism approach. This approach traces the policy process and identifies where and why policy changes happened. Furthermore, the historical institutionalism approach has enabled the research to evaluate the extent of the government’s reaction or policy change due to certain issues, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks. Thus, through the historical institutionalism analytical framework, this book has not only been able to assess which of the three propositions has more explanatory power but has also shown that none of the propositions can explain the relationship between the government and faith groups on its own. The three propositions are not mutually exclusive, and each one of them has contributed to a strengthening or weakening of the relationship between the government and faith groups at different points in time. With regard to the first proposition (that the resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups), the book shows that the government’s decision to include faith groups in the ‘Building Support for International Development Strategy’ was due to the ‘resurgence of religion in international affairs’. That was due to the international recognition of the role of religion in fighting global poverty—the ‘faith and development’ concept— which had influenced decision-makers in the UK government to consider

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faith groups as potential partners in achieving international development goals. As Scott Thomas writes, “the way culture, religion and spirituality increasingly impact on the debate over the meaning of international development is an aspect of the resurgence of religion” (Thomas 2004: 136). The findings of the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project had a particular impact on the UK government’s view on faith groups in matters of international development (Interview 2011): although the government had been working with faith based organisations such as Christian Aid and the Catholic organisation ( CAFOD), the World Bank’s ‘ Voices of the Poor’ findings, that poor people trusted faith leaders and faith organisations more than any other groups or government, led me to think that was a very serious development and that we can do something about that - and that was to try and mobilise the energy and strengths of faith groups towards fighting global poverty.

In addition, the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, which can also be described as an indicator of the resurgence of religion in international politics (as it was a campaign organised by religious groups that sought to influence the policies of the biggest economies (G8) of the world on the debts owed by poor countries) had an impact on the UK government’s relations with faith communities. In Chapter 5, it was shown how this campaign impressed key leaders, such as Clare Short, who would go on to consider the role that faith communities could play in helping to create and build support for DFID’s ambitious aim to ‘eliminate world poverty’. In Chapter 5, the analysis shows, again, that the attention to the widespread religious persecution and the need to protect the freedom of religion and worship is bringing the government back to working with faith communities in addressing this problem. This is further enhanced by the fact that the aid budget, since 2015, has been allocated to other departments including the FCO and Home Affairs, which have a more established framework for working with faith communities. Thus, in addressing the issue of religious persecution, the FCO is working with faith communities and the budget to do so is from the aid budget. In the 2019 Conservative Party election manifesto, the party promised to take on board all the recommendations given by the Bishop of Truro commission on ways to address religious persecution. The events of September 11, 2001 also had an impact on the relationship between the government and faith groups, in particular the Islamic

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aid agencies. As discussed in Chapter 4, funds to Islamic faith agencies were scrutinised more amid fears of money-laundering. However, none of the UK Islamic aid agencies were found guilty of this, and the relationship between the government and major Islamic aid agencies such as Islamic Relief was still good. On the other hand, it could be argued that the rise of new terrorism as a whole has strengthened the relationship between the government and some Islamic aid agencies. For example, Islamic Relief received funds to carry out projects in Pakistan. These projects have long-term goals of countering radicalisation and extremism. As the reviewed literature in Chapter 2 shows, policymakers have been linking poverty to terrorism particularly due to grievances and the creation of safe havens for terrorists in fragile states. Thus, international aid has been used to fight poverty partly in order to curb terrorism. This is why aid has been given to fragile countries to ensure that good governance and democratic ideals are strengthened so as to reduce the risk of radicalisation, extremism and recruitment of terrorists. This is without neglecting the nascent terrorist approach to recruitment from Western countries. Nevertheless, attention to fragile states—which are safe havens for terrorist organisations cannot be ignored. In most cases, it is the faith groups that can access such fragile states. Islamic Relief, for example, has good access to Palestine, Pakistan and Somalia. Nevertheless, the resurgence of religion alone cannot explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. The attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector also explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. The Bosnian War occurred between 1992 and 1995. Although this was an indicator of the resurgence of religion in international politics, no change in governmental policies was seen with regard to the engagement with faith groups. Faith groups, such as the Muslim community in Nottingham, were active in delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia but there was no governmental collaboration with them. Although the sending of humanitarian aid to Bosnia was the first time that Islamic Relief had received funding from the government, the government treated them as any other development NGO. The role of development NGOs was recognised but there was no specific expression of the uniqueness of faith groups in delivering aid to Bosnia.

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The Conservative government of the time placed great emphasis on the ‘political conditionality’ policies, which guided the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) to deal directly with the recipient state instead of working through NGOs. The ‘political conditionality’ policies were aimed at improving the ‘state institutions’ through the imposition of conditions such as the requirement to have a multi-party system, and other democratic ideals. In addition, the Conservative government was also more interested in the commercial interests of aid. In this period, as seen in Chapter 4, the ODA opened up more doors for the private sector, through Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), than they did for voluntary groups. In the period between 1997 and 2010, a closer relationship is seen, because the New Labour government embraced ‘third way’ ideas in which the government sought to partner with both the private and the voluntary sectors. In this respect, faith groups were also encouraged to engage with the government. This can be seen, not only in international development, but also in other domestic policies such as the ‘Faith Communities Unit’ within the Department for Communities and Local Governments. The combination of ‘third way’ and ‘partnership and poverty reduction’ arguably opened up more ‘windows of opportunity’ for faith groups as compared to the private sector. In connection with this, mention may be made of the link between the ‘third way’ and ‘communitarianism’. Communitarianism refers to a political agenda that promotes community inclusiveness in political, economic, and social processes to overcome the forces of individualism or authoritarianism (Etzioni 1995; Tam 1998; Miller et al. 1992). The New Labour ‘third way’ aimed at achieving a communitarian rather than individualistic vision of society in which individuals are embedded in social relations which give structure and meaning to people’s lives (Driver and Martell 2000: 149). In the period from 2010 to 2015, it was observed that the Conservative-led coalition government’s emphasis on ‘value for money’, being ‘results focused’ and ‘wealth creation’ brought the private sector closer to the government as compared to the voluntary groups, including faith groups. Although the coalition government had adopted the ‘big society’ concept (which includes giving communities more power such as giving neighbourhoods more power over the planning system, and supporting charities and social enterprises) (Pattie and Johnston 2011), the implementation of the ‘big society’ plans faced difficulty, not least due to the budget cuts and other austerity policies that the coalition government

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imposed in response to economic deficits. Even though the aid budget was ring-fenced, the spirit to work with the voluntary sector in partnership was not as strong as in the previous period. This was also evident when the Faith Partnership Principles were published, yet with no evidence of substantial engagement of faith groups in the policy formulation and implementation. That led to the conclusion that the coalition government’s international development approach (‘value for money’, ‘wealth creation’ and ‘quantifiable outcomes’) weakened the relationship between the government and faith groups. In the last period between 2015 and 2019, there is continuity in the coalition government approach but with a lot more change. This continuity is with regard to the focus on ‘value for money’, ‘quantifiable results’ as well as more interaction with the private sector. The changes with regard to the closing of core funding schemes that supported NGOs including FBOs as well as the decision to allocate aid budget across various departments in Whitehall. In this period, the relationship with faith groups became shaky alongside the rest of NGOs. There has been substantial concern from civil society and NGOs (which include FBOs) about the direction of the aid budget spending approach, which seems to be favouring non-traditional development stakeholders who may not adhere to existing international rules and standards of development assistance. This could be the reason why the Conservative government wants to change the international rules, as they promised in the 2017 election manifesto and dilute the independence of DFID since they did not promise to uphold it in their 2019 manifesto. The relationship between the government and faith groups can also be explained by the increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics. In Chapters 4 and 5, there was a heightening of this relationship from the second period starting in 1997. That was not only due to the ‘resurgence of religion in international politics’ or ‘the attitudes of New Labour towards the third sector’ but also due to the rising prominence of international development in British politics. The establishment of DFID in 1997 meant an increase in aid budget and the profile of international development in British politics, yet also meant that an increased budget needed increased public support. The 1999 Building Support for Development Strategy was meant to ensure that British taxpayers supported the department and the increasing budget. This strategy not only opened doors for faith groups to work with the government, but also strengthened their relationship.

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All in all, none of the propositions could explain the relationship between the government and faith groups exclusively. Each of these factors was necessary for the government’s engagement with faith groups but none of them is sufficient on its own.

Policy Lessons The primary policy implication of this book comes from the evidence that faith groups can be effective in the fight against poverty. Although the book focuses on faith groups that are registered in the UK, it is evident that the activities of faith groups in places outside the UK have contributed to the government’s recognition of the role of faith groups in international development, which has been explained as the ‘faith and development’ agenda. This explains why, with the focus on results from aid assistance, the Conservative government is able to work with faith groups in recipient countries due to their ability to produce results. Thus, this book puts forward an argument that faith groups, both in the UK and outside the UK have to be empowered if their potential role is to be fully realised. In this light, there are two major lessons that can be learnt by the government and faith groups. First, for DFID to effectively utilise the potential role of faith groups in the fight against global poverty and in the attempts to reach the 2030 Goals (the SDGs), DFID should establish a unit to deal with faith groups. This is not necessarily because faith groups are more effective than other groups, but because faith groups may have different thinking on some issues. The 2012 Faith Partnership Principles are not adequate if they remain on paper. For instance, tackling HIV/AIDS is a common goal for both DFID and faith groups, but some of the ways DFID has approached a reduction of the spread of HIV differs from the way some faith groups have approached it, especially with the use of condoms and debates about ‘abstinence’. Thus, if DFID wants to effectively engage with these groups there should be a special strategy or unit that is designed to work with them. Although the use of condoms is one effective way of reducing HIV infections, there are other ways of reducing the rate of infection that are offered by faith groups and have proven to be effective. In South Africa, as it was acknowledged in DFID’s 2004 HIV/AIDS strategy ‘Taking Action’, faith groups were working towards countering stigma against HIV/AIDS-infected people. In addition, faith groups provide health services to HIV/AIDS-infected people in Africa

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and many other places. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), at least 40 per cent of health services offered in sub-Saharan Africa are provided by faith-based organisations.4 In addition, one in five organisations working on HIV/AIDS programmes is faith-based (WHO 2004). For these reasons, the role of faith groups in fighting a killer disease cannot be ignored, even if they use different methods to the ‘conventional’ ones. It is thus important to have a guideline that will direct policymakers in their engagement with faith groups in order to utilise their strengths rather than sidelining them due to their different opinions. There are many other similar examples in which faith groups are more effective and reliable for sustainability purposes. Furthermore, a faith unit within DFID can facilitate dialogue between the government and faith groups in order to work together in solving issues in the Global South that the government cannot easily access. For example, the situation in Somalia proved to be difficult, as aid agencies could not deliver humanitarian aid. Islamic Relief, however, was there for a long time and had access to most parts of Somalia due to their Islamic identity. When the Somali famine was declared in July 2011, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, went to meet with Islamic Relief and the Muslim community of Somali origin in Birmingham to discuss the best ways to deal with the Somali situation. This was an excellent move, but should not have had to wait until the situation progressed from hunger to famine. If the government had a unit that deals with faith groups this issue might have been raised earlier, allowing greater coordination of aid delivery and so saving more lives. In addition, faith groups can be useful in international development areas such as in countering terrorism by working to support stable governments in fragile states to ensure that they do not become ‘safe havens’ for terrorists. Faith groups, for example, have access to countries like Syria and Pakistan. They can discourage support for terrorism. Also a faith unit can work with faith leaders and communities in the UK to prevent recruitment. For example, the proposed faith unit within DFID could have programmes such as faith-based volunteers from UK communities to work in implementing UK Aid in fragile states and to counter hate sermons and sentiments that are used to radicalise and recruit terrorists. It is therefore better to not only give funds to these groups, but to sit with them, discuss strategy and have a common plan. This could be sustainably and best be

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done through a unit that will be focused and consistent in working with faith groups. Second, faith groups have to adopt a number of approaches to strengthen their relationship with the government and make it more efficient. Faith groups need to understand how the government works in order to organise themselves in such a way as to allow the government to interact with them more significantly. For example, faith groups should be able to come together and raise their issues collectively with the government. Most of the time, FBOs join other development NGOs through Bond and submit policy recommendations to DFID. This practice has proved to be successful and should continue. However, they should also come together as faith groups and lobby the government rather than waiting for the government to invite them. Faith groups should make more efforts to inform policymakers about their strengths and access to poor countries. A good example of this is the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF), which is an initiative by Islamic aid agencies to come together in order to have a collective voice in trying to influence government policies. In addition, the MCF seeks to empower the smaller member organisations in matters such as funding applications. Other faith groups can learn from the MCF and form a multi-faith structure that is focused on dealing with the government in matters of international development. Big Christian FBOs should assist smaller Christian charities in order to widen their influence. This should also happen with the other FBOs. Having a consortium of faith groups for development regardless of their creed, will enhance the voice of faith groups in policy engagement. For example, FBOs should not have accepted their long-time fellow, Progressio, to shut down just because of the absence of funding from the government after 76 years of its operations. All in all, it is in the interest of both the government and faith groups to work together, especially in this era where religion is also posing a threat and there are a number of emerging moral issues that give religion a testing time—and further enhance its double-sided nature. Faith groups should be at the forefront of showing the positive side of religion. They should call on the moral obligations of leaders both in developed and developing countries. Contemporary political trends such as post-truth and post-shame politics are having an adverse impact on development, and faith groups should use their moral authority to counter such negative trends. Islamist groups (such as Al-Shaabab and ISIS) as well as

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other pariah leaders have, at times, prevented aid agencies from delivering humanitarian aid. These groups are hostile to the West. For example, Al-Shaabab claimed that the humanitarian aid was simply a means by which the West could enter Somalia (Rice 2011; Tran 2011). Another such example was the 2003 situation in Kano, Nigeria, where parents were reluctant to have their children vaccinated for reasons such as fear of sterilisation (Robbins 2011; Walsh 2007). The British government had to work through Muslim leaders in Kano to persuade the parents to let their children get vaccinated. This relates to the ‘Voices of the Poor’ finding that poor people sometimes trust faith leaders and institutions more than other institutions. Thus, it is important for the government and faith groups to work together in the fight against global poverty, especially in this era, where development aid is securitised to deal with new security issues that are partly brought about by the transnational negative side of religion. This is mainly because—much as religion can bring problems across borders, it can also solve problems across borders. Systematic engagement, instead of loose interaction, is what is needed between government and faith groups. DFID can do so within its result-based approach by documenting, assessing, monitoring and measuring the outcomes of its systematic engagement with faith groups.

Future Research Future research should first focus on disentangling religion and its role in international affairs further. This may include two things: First, future research can try to analyse the role of decision-makers’ personal faith on policy. The issue of decision-makers’ personal faith is apparent, but it is difficult to analyse the extent of such influences on policies. There are ‘cognitive decision making’ theories that could probably assist in analysing the role of personal faith in decision-making (Mintz 2003). Second, it would also be useful to look at other aspects of religion, for instance from its theological viewpoint and analyse its impact on policies and other matters of international affairs. This research analysed religion from its sociocultural point of view, but it is important to examine the doctrine side of religion in relation to issues in international affairs. This is especially important since faith groups are influenced by the theological doctrine of their faiths. In addition, analysis of the role of ‘theological doctrine’ on society and international affairs may shed more light on the increasingly

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topical debates on fundamentalism and extremism and how to deal with them. Extremism and radicalisation have more to do with the theological part of religion than the sociocultural part. That is why there are radicalised people not only in Muslim majority countries such as Pakistan but also in Muslim minority countries like Britain. In fact, research shows the current trend for ISIS is now to recruit in Western countries such as in the USA and Britain. Some of the recruits are newly converted people. Radicalised people on both sides of the world are inspired by the same theology. Another viable aspect for future research is to analyse the role of religion on other government policies. This book, for example, only looked at one government policy (successive UK international development policies), but in the future, one might look at other policies within the UK or even in other countries. Future scholars can systematically compare the relationship between the UK and other donor countries in their dealings with faith groups. The USA and in particular USAID can formulate a strong case for such an analysis. This could also form the basis for a comparative analysis between the UK and the USA particularly their aid departments—DFID and USAID. From that, research may benefit from understanding how other countries deal with faith groups and strengthen the case for working (or not working) with faith groups on international development policies.

Finally Analysing religion in international affairs is an imperative task that scholars of politics and international relations should not marginalise. There are increasing efforts to do so in particular with efforts to see how existing international relations theories can be useful in analysing religion as a variable. However, there is still a big gap in the literature and an existing bias against religion. Scholars need to rise above their expectations and frameworks. Religion needs to be considered for its explanatory power and not from its belief perspective. The relative newness of religion in international relations poses many questions that have yet to be answered. This book was an attempt to answer some of the questions and to contribute to the literature on the ‘faith and development agenda’. There are still many more questions that need attention. Although it seems that scholars have only shown interest in religion when there is an event, such as the rise of political Islam and the terrorist attacks, consistent analysis needs to be carried out. That will help to avoid surprises in international affairs. In

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1979 when the Iranian Revolution occurred, scholars analysed the religious factors but only for a short term. Religion was then forgotten until its forces became visible again in the post-Cold War era. This came at a cost. If religion receives attention like other elements in the discipline of international relations, scholars and policymakers will be able to tackle its negative side and capitalise on its good side.

Notes 1. Refer to discussion in Chapter 2. 2. Please refer to the ‘Faith and Development’ section in Chapter 2. 3. See the account of the event as narrated by Ann Pettifor, one of the key organisers of the Jubilee debt campaign, at http://www. jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/16%20May%201998+280.twl. Accessed 7 Mar 2011. 4. WHO, Faith-Based Organizations Consultation Towards Primary Health Care: Renewing Partnerships with Faith-Based Communities and Services, Report, Geneva, December 2007, available at http://www.chagghana. org/chag/assets/files/FBO%20Meeting%20report%20_2_.pdf. Accessed 29 Aug 2011.

References Appleby, S. R. (1999). The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Clarke, G. (2006). Faith matters: Faith based organisations, civil society and international development. Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association, 18(6), 835–848. Clarke, G. (2007). Agents of transformation? Donors, faith-based organisations and international development. Third World Quarterly, 28(1), 77–96. Driver, S., & Martell, L. (2000). Left, right and the third way. Policy & Politics, 28(2), 147–161. Etzioni, A. (1995). The spirit of community. London: Fontana. Greg, S. (2004). Faith in community and communities of faith? Government rhetoric and religious identity in Urban Britain. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19(2), 185–204. Lowndes, V., & Chapman, R. (2005). Faith, hope and clarity: Developing a model of faith group involvement in civil renewal (Civil Renewal Research Programme: Main Report). De Montfort University, Leicester. Miller, D., Avineri, S., & de-Shalit, A. (1992). Communitarianism and individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Mintz, A. (2003). Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy decision making. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pattie, C., & Johnston, R. (2011). How big is the big society? Parliamentary Affairs, 64(3), 403–424. Rice, X. (2011, July 22). Somali rebels deny lifting ban on foreign aid groups. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/22/ somali-rebels-deny-lifting-ban. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Robbins, M. (2011, July 15). Vaccines, the CIA, and how the war on terror helped spread polio in Nigeria. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/science/the-lay-scientist/2011/jul/15/1. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Tam, H. (1998). Communitarianism: A new agenda for politics and citizenship. London: Macmillan Press. Thomas, S. (2004). Building communities of character: Foreign aid policy and faith-based organizations. SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(2), 133– 148. Tran, M. (2011, July 28). Calls for aid agencies to channel famine relief through Somali NGOs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2011/jul/28/somalia-famine-aid-relief-insurgents. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Walsh, D. (2007, February 23). Polio cases rise after vaccination scare. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/23/ outlook.development1. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. WHO. (2004). Changing history. World Health Report. https://www.who.int/ whr/2004/en/report04_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2019.

Index

A ADRA, 175, 185, 186, 196, 200 Advocacy, 155, 164, 165, 178, 179, 183, 187, 197, 253, 310 Aga Khan Foundation, 160, 169, 175, 184, 200 Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), 109, 116, 123, 124, 139, 162, 166, 209, 316 Aid Attitude Tracker (ATT), 281, 284 Alexander, Douglas, 70, 180, 204, 231, 234, 235, 238, 274, 292 Alexandria Declaration of the Religious Leaders of the Holy Land, 72 Al Qaeda, 57, 170 Al-Shabaab, 53, 57, 64, 83, 185, 206 B Blair, Tony, 70, 98, 119, 121, 127, 157, 167, 172, 204, 220, 224, 229, 231, 232, 235, 242, 261, 278, 291, 306

Boko Haram, 53, 65 Bond, 12, 29, 180, 188, 189, 192, 195–197, 204, 210, 284, 293, 320 Bosnian conflict, 61, 83 Brexit, vii, 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 29, 32, 48, 65, 76, 78, 82, 83, 133–137, 139, 141–144, 156, 157, 193, 199, 201, 208, 221, 250, 269, 271, 272, 281, 284–288, 290, 297–299, 313 Brown, Gordon, 98, 119–121, 127, 145, 157, 167, 171, 172, 220, 231, 234, 278, 292, 293, 306 Buddhist, 36 Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS), 228, 230, 232, 239, 240, 244, 245, 255, 256, 311, 317 C CAFOD, 159–161, 168, 176–178, 184, 188, 189, 191, 192, 196,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. C. Kwayu, Religion and British International Development Policy, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38223-0

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326

INDEX

198, 200, 225, 228, 230, 292, 294, 314 Cameron, David, 18, 20, 23, 37, 98, 128–130, 133, 135, 136, 143, 156, 157, 181, 191, 193, 208, 220, 235, 241, 242, 259, 275, 277, 278, 280, 283, 285, 286, 292, 295, 296, 299, 306, 319 Christian Aid, 155, 159–161, 168, 170, 173, 174, 176, 178, 184, 188–190, 192, 196, 197, 199, 200, 204, 210, 225, 228, 230, 292, 293, 306, 314 Church of England, 8, 13, 67, 83, 107, 219, 220, 225, 229, 233, 234, 237, 246–248, 256, 260, 306, 311 Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF), 168, 175, 184–186, 310 Civil Society Partnership Review (CSPR), 195 Clash of civilisations, 63, 72 Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID), 252 Cold War, 3, 5, 15, 27, 48, 51, 55, 56, 62, 97, 106, 108–111, 114, 116, 120, 157, 222, 284, 308 Conservative-led coalition, 129, 156, 157, 173, 181–183, 185–187, 191, 193, 202, 203, 207, 220, 241, 242, 244–247, 256, 259, 273, 275, 297 Conservative Party, 105, 106, 112, 129, 131–133, 136, 182, 183, 275–277, 285, 292 CONTEST, 18, 19, 57 Critical juncture, 82 D Daesh, 17, 53, 64, 83

Debt Crisis Network (DCN), 225 Department for International Development (DFID), vii, 20, 21, 28, 29, 37, 70, 73, 77, 122–128, 130–133, 135, 137, 139, 140, 142–144, 146, 167–170, 172–195, 197–200, 202–209, 220, 222, 226–230, 232–252, 255–259, 261, 262, 270, 273, 278–281, 286, 289–291, 294, 297–299, 307, 309, 311, 312, 314, 317–321 Department of Technical Cooperation, 101, 103 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 162 Development Awareness Fund (DAF), 168, 176, 183, 238, 249, 255 Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics (DDVE), 31, 47

E European Union (EU), 12, 76, 116, 284

F Faith and Development, 47, 66, 67, 70, 235 Faith-Based Initiative, 68 Faith-based organisations (FBOs), 108, 221 Faith communities, 219, 291, 316 Faith groups, 182, 300 Faith leaders, 253 Faith Partnership Principles, 70, 182, 191, 201, 205, 248, 249, 312, 317, 318 Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH), 187

INDEX

G G8, 20, 126, 167, 261, 274, 277, 311, 314 Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF), 183, 186 Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF), 168, 176, 183 Greenbelt Festival, 237, 247, 256, 262 H Habitat for Humanity, 175, 185 Hindu, 10, 13, 36, 236, 238, 245, 256 Hindu Aid, 238, 256 Historical Institutionalism, 77, 81 I Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), 197 Institutional change, 82 Institutionalism, 74, 76, 77, 81 Institutional stability, 81 Interagency Task Force on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development, 70 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development, 70 International relations, 3, 6, 34, 48, 49, 169, 305 Iranian Revolution, 5, 7, 53, 56, 58, 323 ISIS, 57, 83, 320, 322 Islamic Relief, 70, 155, 160, 161, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 180, 184, 188, 190, 191, 196, 198, 200, 206, 210, 235, 262, 292, 294, 306, 315, 319 Islamism, 6, 8, 17–19, 24, 35, 54, 64

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J Jews, 13, 17 Johnson, Boris, 83, 98, 133, 137, 143, 146, 157, 193, 220, 253, 286, 289, 306 Joint Funding Scheme (JFS), 158, 159, 168 Jubilee 2000, 71, 220, 224–226, 228, 229, 233, 236, 255, 258, 261, 277, 291, 293, 314 July 7th 2005, 17, 57, 61, 172, 206

K Khomeni, Ayatollah, 86

L Labour Party, 102, 142, 272, 273, 285

M Malik, Shahid, 292 May, Theresa, 18, 23, 83, 98, 133, 143, 157, 193, 220, 253, 286, 288, 306 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 69, 115, 118, 124, 140, 166, 177, 186, 208, 227, 238, 244, 293 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 192 Mitchell, Andrew, 87, 130, 132, 137, 146, 187, 190, 191, 204, 245–247, 256, 283, 290, 299, 319 M-Pesa, 187 Muslim Aid, 170, 171, 198, 200 Muslim Care, 169 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 14, 169, 219, 225, 231, 236, 306

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Muslim Hands, 12, 72, 86, 169, 200, 224, 260

N National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), 242 National Security Council (NSC), 135, 206 National Security Strategy (NSS), 19, 21, 56 New Security Agenda, 5, 55, 222, 296 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 10

O Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 20, 29, 109, 115, 118, 124, 134, 137, 140, 143, 145, 166, 194, 202, 225, 245, 280, 288, 298 Overseas Development Administration (ODA), 22, 28, 104, 117, 140, 157, 162, 164, 222, 225, 227, 316 Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 29, 104, 158 Overseas Development Ministry (ODM), 105 Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS), 102

P Path dependency, 81 0.7 per cent, 21, 34, 37, 102, 109, 130, 133, 139, 145, 242, 245, 270, 272, 274–281, 284, 288, 290, 294, 297–299, 311 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 125

Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), 125 Prevent Strategy, 18, 37 Private Sector Development, 182 Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs), 168 Progressio, 11, 36, 168, 173, 179, 184, 188, 190, 194, 200, 320

Q Quakers, 59, 294

R Religion, 3, 6, 14, 17, 35, 36, 49, 52, 58–63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73, 164, 308, 322 Reporting and Transparency Act 2006, 139

S September 11th 2001, 7, 14, 57, 58, 61, 64, 83, 98, 126, 156, 170, 172, 200, 224 Sharma, Alok, 133, 288, 290 Short, Clare, 21, 67, 120, 121, 229, 231, 233, 258, 314 Sikh, 36, 236 Strategic Grant Agreements (SGAs), 237 Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP), 115

T Target 2015, 231, 236, 255 Tearfund, 174, 175, 177, 180, 183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 196, 200, 225, 228, 292, 294 Terrorism, 209 Thatcherism, 106, 107, 119, 120

INDEX

Third way, 316 Treaty of Westphalia, 3 Trocaire, 175, 185 U UK Aid, 131, 132, 135, 146, 195–197, 251–253, 274, 319 UK Aid Connect, 195, 196, 251–253 UK Aid Direct, 146, 195, 197, 251 UK Aid Match, 195, 251 UK Aid Volunteers, 195, 251 Ummah, 7, 63 Ummah Welfare Trust, 169 UN General Assembly Interfaith Meeting, 70 UN Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development, 70 USAID, 68, 70, 86 V Voices of the Poor, 37, 67, 68, 71, 83, 207, 230, 255, 258, 308, 314, 321

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W White paper, 239 Wolfensohn, James, 67, 68, 230, 258 World Association for Christian Communication (WACC), 185 World Bank, 22, 29, 31, 36, 37, 47, 67–69, 83, 98, 107, 109, 115–117, 124, 125, 143, 145, 190, 204, 207, 225, 230, 255, 258, 308, 314 World Faith Development Dialogue (WFDD), 67, 230 World Vision, 70, 169, 174, 175, 177, 184, 188, 189, 196, 200, 235, 292 Z Zakat, 160, 170, 171, 209