Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa (Eastern Africa Series, 15) 9781847010582, 184701058X

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The contributors identify those factors that can foster integration, such as the proper management of equitable citizenship rights, as well as examine those that impede it, including the region’s largely ineffective integration scheme, IGAD. They explore how the former can be strengthened and the latter transformed; explain how regional integration can mitigate the conflicts; and examine how integration can help to energise the region’s economy. Kidane Mengisteab is Professor of African Studies and Political Science at Penn State University; Redie Bereketeab is a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden Cover photograph: A river runs through the mountainous landscape on the edge of the Dankalia Depression, Eritrea (© Andrew McConnell/Panos)

an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

MENGISTEAB Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship & BEREKETEAB in the Greater Horn of Africa

The Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) is a region engulfed by three interrelated crises: devastating conflicts, including inter-state wars, civil wars, and inter-communal conflicts; widespread debilitating poverty, chronic food insecurity, and frequent cycles of famine; and an alarming rate of environmental degradation that is ravaging the region. While it is apparent that the countries of the region are unlikely to be able to deal with the crises individually, there is consensus that their chances of doing so improve markedly with collective regional action.

Edited by Kidane Mengisteab & Redie Bereketeab

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Eastern Africa Series REGIONAL INTEGRATION, IDENTITY & CITIZENSHIP IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

Eastern Africa Series Women’s Land Rights & Privatization in Eastern Africa BIRGIT ENGLERT & ELIZABETH DALEY (EDS)

War & the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia KJETIL TRONVOLL

Moving People in Ethiopia ALULA PANKHURST & FRANÇOIS PIGUET (EDS)

Living Terraces in Ethiopia ELIZABETH E. WATSON

Eritrea GAIM KIBREAB Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa DEREJE FEYISSA & MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE (EDS)

After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ELKE GRAWERT (ED.)

Land, Governance, Conflict & the Nuba of Sudan GUMA KUNDA KOMEY

Ethiopia JOHN MARKAKIS Resurrecting Cannibals HEIKE BEHREND Pastoralism & Politics in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GŰNTHER SCHLEE & ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO

Islam & Ethnicity in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GŰNTHER SCHLEE with ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO

Foundations of an African Civilisation DAVID W. PHILLIPSON

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa KIDANE MENGISTEAB & REDIE BEREKETEAB (EDS)

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa KIDANE MENGISTEAB & REDIE BEREKETEAB (EDS)

in association with

James Currey is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) www.jamescurrey.com and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620–2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com © Contributors 2012 First published 2012 1 2 3 4 5 15 14 13 12 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-84701-058-2 (James Currey Cloth) Papers used by Boydell & Brewer are natural, recyclable products made from wood grown in sustainable forests

Typeset in 8.5/9.5pt Cordale by CPI Typesetting Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Tables, Figures & Appendices Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements List of Acronyms

vii ix xii xiii

Part One  RELEVANCE OF INTEGRATION TO IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP

1

1

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

3

2

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

25

A Diversity Perspective on Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn of Africa

51

Part Two  CRITICAL FACTORS IN INTEGRATION

67

4

Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region

69

5

Nationalist, Sub-nationalist, and Region-wide Narratives and the Quest for Integration-promoting Narratives in the Greater Horn Region

111

Infusion of Citizenship, Diversity and Tolerance in the Education Curriculum: Promoting Regional Integration and Peace in the Greater Horn Region

133

Radio and the Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia

143

KIDANE MENGISTEAB

REDIE BEREKETEAB

3

FOWSIA ABDULKADIR

GAIM KIBREAB

ASSEFAW BARIAGABER

6

ABDINUR MOHAMUD

7

ALI NOOR MOHAMED

v

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Part Three  LESSONS FROM SELECTED AFRICAN INTEGRATION SCHEMES 8

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

173

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

195

REDIE BEREKETEAB

9

FRANCIS A. S. T. MATAMBALYA

10 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

237

Index

255

CYRIL I. OBI

vi

171

List of Tables & Figures

Tables Table 1.1 Selected list of ethnic groups divided by national boundaries

8

Table 2.1 Theories and concepts of identity, citizenship and regional integration

30

Table 3.1

54

Mapping ethnic diversity in the Greater Horn Region

Table 5.1 Human development index, 2001–2007 (Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia)

121

Table 5.2 Ibrahim index of governance in Africa, 2001–2007 (Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia)

122

Table 9.1 Percentage shares of intra-regional trade of selected RTAs

208

Table 9.2 Clustering of the key convergence requirements at the various stages of integration

210

Table 9.3 Global export and import of EAC states by major product groups

213

Table 9.4 Selected investment performance indicators of EAC economies in 2006

216

Table 9.5

Selected output indicators of the EAC economies

217

Table 9.6

Selected monetary indicators of the EAC economies

218

Table 9.7 Selected indicators of endowment with and access to natural resources in EAC states

219

Table 9.8

220

Selected population statistics of the EAC countries

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Appendix Tables to Chapter 9 A 9.1 Notifications to GATT/WTO of RTAs involving African countries

227

A 9.2

Key milestones of the first iteration of the EAC

228

A 9.3

Key milestones of the second iteration of the EAC

230

Figures

viii

Figure 9.1 Cumulative notification of RTAs to the WTO, 1948 to 2006

201

Figure 9.2

201

Contiguous economic blocs notified to the WTO

Figure 9.3 Intra-EAC vis à vis global exports of the EAC states, 2002 to 2005

212

Figure 9.4 Global trade balances of the EAC states in US$ million, selected years, 1980 to 2005

214

Figure 9.5 Tanzania’s trade balance with Kenya and Uganda, 2000 to 2007

215

Figure 9.6 World Bank’s ranking of the political instability of EAC countries

221

Notes on Contributors

Ms Fowsia Abdulkadir is a policy analyst at the Public Health Agency of Canada, and is a Ph.D. student at Carleton University’s School of Canadian Studies, in Ottawa. Her research interests can be placed both in the international and national (Canadian) arenas. In the international context, her research interests are in the areas of gender-based analysis, gender mainstreaming, as well as the role of women in governance, democratization and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. In the Canadian national context, her research interests are in Canadian social policy analysis; public sector accountability; and immigrant and refugee women settlement issues, particularly exploring how these women re-negotiate their social identities in a context of intersecting issues of ethnicity, gender and race. Ms Abdulkadir volunteers with local community-based organizations on local issues facing the ethnically diverse communities of Ottawa. Assefaw Bariagaber is Professor and Chair at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Southern Illinois University Carbondale, and was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Dr Bariagaber is the author of Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa. He has published numerous articles on conflicts and refugees in such journals as the Journal of Modern African Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, International Migration, and the Journal of Black Studies. He has also written several policy-related papers for the UNHCR. He is a member of several professional associations, including the Association of Third World Studies, where he served as President during 2010–11. Redie Bereketeab holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Uppsala University, Sweden. Currently he is working at the Nordic Africa Institute as researcher on conflict and state building in the Horn of Africa. He also teaches, part-time, on African development and conflicts, state crisis and development in the Horn of Africa at the Department of Government at Uppsala University (Development Studies). His research interests include state, nation, nationalism, identity, conflict, democratization and governance. He is the author of several articles, book chapters and books. His latest book is State Building in Post-Liberation Eritrea: Challenges, Achievements and Potentials (2009). Gaim Kibreab studied law at Haile Selassie University, Addis Ababa. He earned a Ph.D. degree in Economic History at Uppsala University, Sweden. He held teaching and research positions at Uppsala University before moving to the United Kingdom. Currently he is Professor of Research and Director

ix

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

of Refugee Studies, Department of Social Science, London South Bank University. He has published widely on refugees, resettlement, repatriation, development, conflict, environment and resource management, post-conflict reconstruction, and gender. His recent publications include Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence; Eritrea: A Dream Deferred; ‘Forced Migration and Social Change: A Case Study of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan’ – Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies (2011); ‘Forced Labour in Eritrea’– Journal of Modern African Studies (2009); ‘Forced Migration and Social Change: A Case Study of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan’– Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies; ‘Climate Change and Human Migration: A Tenuous Relationship?’ – Fordham Environmental Law Review (2010). Francis Shasha Matambalya is a multi-skilled scholar with theoretical and practical competences in trade economics and business management, and is well-known as Professor of International Trade and Marketing at the University of Dar es Salaam, where he has taught for over 15 years. He has also been a visiting scholar at several institutions abroad, including the Nordic Africa Institute, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Center for Development Research at the University of Bonn, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, Lancaster University and Kiel Institute of World Economics. In addition, he has provided advisory services to several governments, regional and international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Mr Matambalya’s professional work rests largely on international trade and economic diplomacy, industrial development, and management. Overall, from his intensive research activities, he is the author of a total of nine books and editor of two. He is also the author of over twenty-five scholarly papers in professional journals, as well as many policy papers and reports, chapters in edited volumes, research reports, and discussion/working papers. From May 2008 to December 2010, Mr Matambalya worked as a Senior Development Consultant at UNIDO Headquarters, Vienna. In November 2011, he formally joined the Nordic Africa Institute as Senior Researcher, where he is a Lead Researcher on Africa-EU relations, international trade, and regional integration. Kidane Mengisteab is Professor of African Studies and Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. His current research interests range from the relevance of African ‘traditional’ institutions of governance and traditional judicial systems through conflict resolution and democratization in contemporary Africa to the socioeconomic implications of the expansion of extractive industries and commercial farming in Africa. He is author or editor of several books on Africa. His most recent book, with Okbazghi Yohannes, is Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea (2005). Mengisteab is currently completing a book entitled The Horn of Africa: A Hot Spot on the Global System, in which he examines the key internal and external factors that have rendered the Horn of Africa prone to chronic conflicts.

x

Ali N. Mohamed is Professor and Chair of the Department of Mass Communication at the United Arab Emirates University. His research interests include the effects of modern communication technologies on indigenous cultures – especially in sub-Saharan Africa and in Islamic countries. He is also interested in the role of the press in supporting or undermining constitutional and legal reforms aimed at addressing inequality in 19th- and 20th-century America. His research has appeared in Newspaper Research Journal, Media Asia, International

Notes on Contributors

Communication Gazette, Proteus, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, and Media Ethics Online. Abdinur S. Mohamud Ph.D. is an educational consultant with the Ohio Department of Education. Dr Mohamud also served as Minister of Education, Culture and Higher Education in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from 2010 to 2011. Cyril Obi recently joined the Social Science Research Council in New York where he directs the African Peacebuilding Network (APN). Prior to joining the Social Science Research Council he was a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala (2005–11) and an associate research professor at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.

xi

Acknowledgements

The editors express deep gratitude to UNESCO for supporting the establishment of the Greater Horn Horizon Forum, a forum of scholars from the Greater Horn Region, and for supporting the conception and early work of the manuscript. The editors are particularly grateful to M. Pierre Sané, former Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences of UNESCO, for his tireless work in building up the Forum as well as in providing critical comments on the concept note from which the manuscript emanated. The editors are also grateful to the Greater Horn Horizon Forum and its Executive Committee for supporting the publication of the manuscript. Finally, the editors are thankful to the scholars who reviewed and made very useful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. Their comments were helpful in improving the quality of the final text. Neither UNESCO nor the Greater Horn Horizon Forum is responsible for the views of the authors.

xii

List of Acronyms

AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia ARPCT Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (Somalia) ASF African Standby Force AU African Union CAP Common Agricultural Policy CBO Community-Based Organization CCD Convention to Combat Desertification (UN) CEAO See CEDEAO and ECOWAS CEDEAO Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa CM Common Market COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COR Commissioner’s Office for Refugees CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan) CPMR Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution CU Customs Union DoP Declaration of Principles (IGADD) DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community EC European Community EASBRIG Eastern African Standby Brigade EASBRICOM Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism ECCAS Economic Commission for Central African States ECCJ ECOWAS Community Court of Justice ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (see also CEDEAO) ECU Equatorial Customs Union EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Area ELF Eritrean Liberation Front EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRP Ethiopian people’s Revolutionary Party ERTA Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency EU Economic Union (Chapter 9) EU European Union

xiii

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

xiv

EU-ACP European Union – African, Caribbean and Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement FDI Foreign Direct Investment FRCN Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation GHHF Greater Horn Horizon Forum GHR Greater Horn Region GO Government Organization GRP Gross Regional Product ICPAT IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism ICU Islamic Courts Union IDPs Internally Displace Persons IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development (superseded IGADD) IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development IIT Intra-Industry Trade ISSP IGAD Security Sector Programme JAP Joint Agricultural Policy LRA Lord’s Resistance Army NCP National Congress Party (Sudan) NGO Non-Government Organization OAU Organization of African Unity OLF Oromo Liberation Front ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration (on the Ethiopian-Eritrea border dispute) PTA Preferential Trade Agreement PTCA Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement PU Political Union RTLM Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines SACU Southern African Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference SADEC Southern African Development Community SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SRAP Sub-regional Action Programme (IGAD) REC Regional Economic Community SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SNM Somali National Movement SRRC Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front TC Trade Creation TD Trade Diversion TEU Total Economic Union TFG Transitional Federal Government (Somalia) TFI Transitional Federation Institutions (Somalia) TFP Transitional Federal Parliament (Somalia) TNA Transitional National Assembly (Somalia) TNC Transitional National Charter (Somalia)

List of Acronyms

TNG Transitional National Government (Somalia) TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees USAFRICOM United States Africa Command USAID United States Agency for International Development USC United Somali Congress WTO World Trade Organization WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front

xv

Part One Relevance of Integration to Identity and Citizenship

1 Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region KIDANE MENGISTEAB

INTRODUCTION The Greater Horn of Africa Region (GHR) can be said to comprise eleven countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. However, for the purposes of the discussions in this book, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania are often omitted. The GHR is a region engulfed by three interrelated crises. One crisis comprises the various types of devastating conflicts, including inter-state wars, civil wars and inter-communal conflicts. The second is an economic crisis manifested in widespread debilitating poverty, chronic food insecurity and frequent cycles of famine. The third crisis is the alarming rate of environmental degradation that is ravaging the region. This environmental crisis is manifested by cyclical droughts, rising temperatures, deforestation, loss of vegetation and biodiversity, increased soil erosion, desiccation and desertification. The three types of crises are mutually reinforcing. The conflicts, in disrupting the production system, contribute to poverty. Deepening poverty, in turn, along with global climatic changes and rapid population growth, intensifies environmental degradation and the scarcity of vital resources, such as land and water. Such scarcities, of course, fuel more conflicts. The combined effects of the three-pronged crisis have turned the Greater Horn of Africa Region (GHR) into a zone of humanitarian crisis and a major source of refugees in the global system. The region’s refugees in 2008 were estimated at 1,248,565 while the figure of the internally displaced was estimated at about 8.5 million (World Bank, 2008; UNDP, 2007/8). It has also become apparent that the countries of the region are not likely to be able to cope with the crises and their effects individually. Collectively, however, their chances of bringing under control the crises of conflicts and poverty improve markedly and success with the first two crises is likely to enhance their ability to mitigate the effects of the environmental crisis and perhaps to reverse the degradation process. On 3

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

the basis of this general premise the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF)1 has identified the promotion of an effective integration of the GHR as one of its key goals. A detailed conceptualization of various forms of regional integration is provided in chapter 9. Here we briefly and broadly define it as a set of multidimensional formal and informal agreements that tie the component members of a given region in some form of cooperative partnership, creating new forms of supra-state organization, co-existing with the traditional state-led form of organization (de Lombaerde and van Langenhove, 2005). While the goals of informal integration may vary widely, depending on the interests of the non-governmental actors involved, the general goals of formal integration include (1) maintaining peace, (2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, (3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and (4) gaining a new self-image and role identity (Deutsch, 1968). There is a general consensus in the literature that, properly designed and implemented, regional integration has the potential to promote socioeconomic development of member countries, to foster both regional and internal peace and to enhance the collective capabilities of members. There is little doubt that the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa would benefit from properly functioning. Building an effective integration is thus an essential and timely endeavour for the region. Building an effective regional integration scheme under the socioeconomic conditions that currently exist in the GHR is a daunting task, however. The less than satisfactory performance of most of Africa’s regional integration schemes, including the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), the Horn of Africa’s regional integration scheme, attests to the difficulty of the task. The very factors that have the potential to foster integration, such as shared identities and cultures, have become sources of conflicts and major impediments to integration. The problems that integration is expected to overcome, such as lack of economic diversification and resource scarcity, also hinder integration. As pointed out in chapter 8 in this volume, lack of independence from external actors in policy making also undermines integration and perpetuates dependence. Leaders of states, who could be agents of regional integration, have also failed to champion it in earnest and often they have obstructed it for political expediency. Yet the countries of the region have little option but to invest more commitment and energy into building an effective integration scheme that would coordinate their efforts and resources against the challenges that threaten the security of their populations. Civil society organizations throughout the region, including scholars, businessmen, the media and many others, should also be allowed to become active participants in building up regional integration in order to help the region pull out  GHHF is an independent and autonomous forum of intellectuals from the Horn of Africa. The Forum’s mission is to foster dialogue on the future of the Horn of Africa in order to facilitate the formulation and implementation of policies conductive to mutual understanding, regional integration and peaceful socio-economic development in the region. 1

4

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

of the identified three-pronged crisis. The integration effort is not likely to succeed if it is confined to governments. This book aims to contribute to the effort of invigorating the integration of the region. Among its general objectives include (1) to identify the factors that can foster integration and the elements that impede it and to explore how to strengthen the former and transform the latter, (2) to explain how regional integration can contribute in mitigating the region’s various conflicts, and (3) to explain how integration can help in energizing and transforming the region’s economy. A more specific emphasis of the book is to explore the relations of regional integration with inter-identity relations and citizenship rights. The reason for this attention is that identity and citizenship rights, under certain conditions, elucidated in chapters 2 and 3, have the potential to become catalysts for integration. Unfortunately, due to their mismanagement, they have become major factors in the region’s various conflicts as well as in hindering its integration. This introductory chapter attempts to set the stage for the rest of the book by (1) conceptualizing key concepts, including identity and citizenship and explaining under what conditions identity and citizenship become sources of conflicts that hinder integration, and under what conditions they foster integration, (2) sketching the arguments as to why regional integration can become an effective mechanism for conflict resolution and prevention through more effective management of identity and how it can transform the nature of the state and the governance systems in the region, and (3) outlining the reasons why regional integration can contribute in enhancing the region’s collective capability to transform its economy and to cope with the ravaging effects of environmental degradation. The bulk of the rest of the chapter is organized into three parts, each dealing with one of the above-identified three tasks of the chapter. The first part attempts to conceptualize identity and citizenship and to describe the multiplicity of overlapping identities in the GHR. The second part examines how mismanagement of diversity of identities by the state fosters conflicts and undermines integration in the GHR and how integration can contribute in mitigating the challenges of management of diversity and transform the nature of the state and the governance systems in the region. One of the reasons for dealing with the nature of the state is that the state is the platform where the nature of inter-identity relations is largely determined. The third part examines the potential impacts of integration on the region’s economies as well as on the adverse impacts of the global system on the region. Among the many factors that impact the performance of a regional integration scheme is the composition of the region to be integrated and the socio-economic characteristics of its constituent parts. As Dosenrode (2006) notes, the geographic scope of the region must be characterized by a level of intensity of interactions that ensures that a change in one part affects other parts. If such intensity of interaction is not present and the prospects for developing it are not compelling, regional integration is not likely to be workable, as the motivation for it would be low. The level

5

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

of interaction within the GHR may not appear to be high enough at the present time, if one looks at the level of formal economic exchange among the national economies. However, if one looks at informal integration at community level, the level of interaction is likely to be considerable and the prospects of developing it further would also be bright, as chapter 4 ably demonstrates. The manner in which conflict in one part affects the others, the pattern of refugee flows and the interdependence among identities partitioned by national boundaries indicate that there is, indeed, a high potential for intensifying the interaction among the countries of the GHR. We now conceptualize identities and citizenship and examine their impacts on conflicts and implications for regional integration. The chapter finishes with a review of the structure of the book.

CONCEPTUALIZING IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP Identity markers and state boundaries

6

As discussed in greater detail in chapter 3 of this volume, mismanagement of diversity of identities has been a major source of various types of conflicts in the GHR and it is a problem that regional integration can help mitigate. We briefly conceptualize identity before discussing its implications for the region’s conflicts and integration. Identity refers to real or imagined (socially-constructed) markers that individuals or social groups attribute to themselves or to others in order to set themselves apart from others (we/they) and to distinguish others from one another. Although the boundaries between them are not always clear, the distinguishing markers of a social group can be classified in two categories. One category of identity markers is primordial markers, which constitute the network into which every child at birth finds itself to be a member. Such markers include race, ethnicity, kinship, clan, gender, language, religion, mode of production (peasant farming, nomadism, etc.), place of living (village, city, region), music and other cultural values and customary practices. Different identities may develop disparate cultures, which are essentially forms of expression or signifiers of identity, even though culture is often defined in different ways. Culture, as an identity signifier, generally encompasses a worldview, values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions. Political and economic systems and institutions are also often viewed as signifiers of an identity, although they may be shared with other identities. Many of the primordial markers of a given identity overlap with those of other identities, as linguistic and religious communities often extend far beyond the kinship or ethnic entity. Race, ethnicity, kinship and clan identities also do not necessarily constitute homogeneous groups, since people may practice different religions or operate under different modes of production with different institutional systems. Race, ethnic and religious identities also are not confined to the jurisdiction of a given state. Somalis, for example, live in four of the countries of the GHR. The Beja

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

live in Sudan (the northern state) and Eritrea. The Oromo live in Ethiopia and Kenya, the Afar live in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Luo peoples also live in Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, etc. (see Table 1.1 for a list of identity groups split by national boundaries). Moreover, some of these primordial markers are not rigid over time. Individuals or groups may change their modes of production, economic and political systems, institutions, cultural practices, religions and even their ethnic identities. The federal arrangement in Ethiopia, which allows self-governance of identities, has, for example, motivated some groups to change their identity. The Silte people have, for instance, claimed a separate identity from the Gurage (their original identity). The Tigrinya speakers in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia’s Tigray Regional State have also developed distinct identities largely due to their exposure to different historical experiences. The second category of markers may be referred to as Social Identity markers (Martin, 1995). This type of markers is expansive in the sense that they can be formed across the primordial identities and across national citizenships. These social identity markers are often based upon purposive choices, tactical necessity, common interest and/or incurred moral obligation (Geertz, 1963; Rex, 1995). Among such markers are occupation, social position, political affiliation, labour unions, academic associations, etc. The expansive social identity markers are more developed in countries where state building, socio-economic development and social capital (civic institutions that lie above the family and below the state) are more advanced. It also seems that the more the social identity markers develop, the more likely interdependence and peaceful interaction among primordial identities is promoted. With respect to primordial markers, the GHR countries are highly diverse. If we take language as proxy for identity, for example, the region is said to be home to some 340 languages. Sudan and South Sudan together are said to have 134 languages followed by Ethiopia with 89 languages, Kenya with 62 languages, Uganda with 43, Eritrea with 9 and Djibouti with 3 languages (Lewis, 2009). The countries of the region are also characterized by religious diversity with various denominations of Christianity and Islam co-existing, along with various forms of traditional religions. This composition of ethnic and religious identities shows two realities. On the one hand, the region as a whole constitutes a space, where a great number of identity groups overlap and people in the region encounter innumerable possibilities of identifying with several groups and adhering to several organizations. Identity groups in the region and their cultures are, thus, essentially hybrids and their connections and linkages allow the circulation of cultural traits among them. Under the circumstances, many identity markers (identifications) are compatible, or made compatible by rationalization processes allowing individuals to identify with one or several groups. Migrations and intermarriages intensify such rationalization processes. On the other hand, the countries of the region do not constitute monolithic cultures since they comprise multiple identities with multiple cultures.

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Table 1.1 Selected list of ethnic groups divided by national boundaries Names of Ethnic Groups Afar Somali Luo Luhya Beja, Hadendaw (Harendua), Rashaida, Tigre Tigrinya, Kunama, Shaho (Irob) Oromo Sebei/Sabaot, Pokot and Teso Kakwa, Sebei, Lugbwara, Madi, Acholi, Kaliko, Pojullo Anuak, Nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma, Shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichepo, Wetawit Daasanach

Countries of Habitation Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania Eritrea and Sudan (northern) Eritrea and Ethiopia Ethiopia and Kenya Kenya and Uganda Uganda and South Sudan Ethiopia and Sudan

Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan

Extracted from K. Mengisteab, The Horn of Africa: A Hot Spot in the Global System (forthcoming).

Citizenship levels

8

The concept of citizenship also needs expanding. It refers to a status, with specific sets of rights and obligations, extended to members of a given country or other entity, including territory, region, nation and ethnic group. The right of all members of that entity to participate in the political, economic and cultural life is the hallmark of citizenship. Denial of such a right or the uneven distribution of opportunities of such participation among diverse members signifies an absence of citizenship rights or uneven distribution of the same. For our purposes three levels of citizenship can be identified. The first level refers to sub-national citizenship or citizenship as membership of a given ethnic group, a nation, a religious entity or a local community (Ndegwa, 1997). This level of citizenship largely corresponds with the markers of primordial identities (e.g. an ethnic group). The second level refers to national citizenship. This level of citizenship can be viewed as a supra-identity marker common to all ethnic and religious identities within a given state’s (political) jurisdiction. It refers to a formal status that a state is expected to grant to all members of the population legally entitled to citizenship. In theory the status entitles all members of the population to specific universalized rights enshrined in law (Heater, 1999: 6). In reality the level of or access to citizenship extended to various identity groups within a country may differ, depending on the configuration of power within the various identities

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

and the neutrality or lack of neutrality of the state. In other words, an uneven configuration of power among identities, along with the lack of neutrality of the state, can produce different classes of citizens, reflecting the absence of a governance that properly manages diversity of identities. In stark contrast to the expected level of neutrality, the state in the GHR has in most cases failed to grant equitable citizenship rights to all identity groups under its jurisdiction. In some cases the leaders manifest characteristics to which Mazrui (1975) refers as ‘ethnocratic’. In such cases the state becomes an expression of the political, economic and cultural interests of a given identity or identities to the detriment of the interests of others. In some cases it privileges certain religious groups and at other times it advantages certain ethnic groups and creates different classes of citizens. Various civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda and even the post-election conflicts in Kenya reveal real or perceived lack of neutrality on the part of the state. The third level of citizenship is regional citizenship. A regional integration, which allows free mobility of labour and capital and extends other rights, creates an expansive regional citizenship. In so doing it may promote peaceful regional interdependence and development. It may also reduce inter-identity conflicts by expanding the interconnection among identities and reducing the need for identity-based citizenship and security, especially among identities partitioned by national boundaries.

Identity relations

Primordial identity markers can be classified as two types. One type comprises the exclusive markers, such as race, ethnicity, religion, language, kinship, clan and region. The second type comprises the inclusive markers, such as nationality or citizenship of a country, which distinguishes the citizens of a given country from those of others, while binding together the diverse identities within that country, as a community of citizens, depending on the level of development of nation-building. While the exclusive markers can lead to sub-nationalist narratives, which accentuate identity citizenship, the inclusive ones lead to narratives of national (country-wide) unity and national citizenship. The exclusive primordial identities, such as ethnic and religious groups, generally live in peace with each other as a community of citizens and cooperate to advance mutual wellbeing as well as national interests, provided they perceive that the terms of their incorporation into the state are beneficial and do not benefit some at the expense of others. No doubt, as political actors, they compete with each other over access to power, economic resources and cultural privileges but such competition is generally peaceful when governed by equitable legal systems and governance arrangements. However, when the governance arrangements are inequitable or perceived to be inequitable by some groups or when governance fails to address historical inequalities, identities can resort to violent conflicts. In other words, violent conflicts tend to arise under conditions of governance-deficit and real or perceived absence of equitable

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opportunities for access to citizenship rights, including access to power, resources and cultural privileges. However, governance-deficit and unevenness of access to opportunities spur conflicts not only between identities but also within identities, as Somalia’s civil wars amply demonstrate. Thus, diversity of identities, in itself, does not provide much insight in explaining the nature of inter-identity relations. The human sciences, in fact, seem to converge in suggesting that identity exists only in the form of identity narratives, which aim to mobilize the group by giving it consciousness of itself and of the situation it endures (socio-economic and physical environment). In other words, since identity groups are not homogeneous and identity markers are often social constructs, we see inter-identity differences largely through narrative identities, which can be both integrating or disintegrating. Narratives are continuously re-told, confirmed, adapted and reinforced through social interaction across generations and become deeply embedded among the members of the group (Tilley, 1997). As demonstrated in chapter 7, identity narratives blur intra-group differences and exaggerate the differences between groups that might be in conflict with each other. Often identity narratives are built with the intention of redressing or reversing a balance of power considered to be detrimental to the interests of a group. At other times they arise when a given identity is engaged in a competition with other identities for control of power or over dwindling resources, such as available land. In the latter case the objective of the narrative may be related to group survival and become highly polarizing. At the same time narratives serve as mechanisms for constructing and reconstructing an imagined community (Martin, 1995). While diversity of identities in itself does not cause conflicts, it nevertheless creates the challenges of managing it in a manner that would ensure equitable citizenship rights and opportunities to all identities. Diversity management has proven to be particularly challenging in countries where state-building and nation-building are in a formative stage and where a historical legacy of acute uneven development exists. It has also been extremely challenging in cases where ethnic identities are split into different countries and such identities aspire to form their own states. When states fail to manage it properly, diversity can become a source of violent conflicts with heavy human, material and social costs.

MISMANAGEMENT OF IDENTITIES AND CONFLICTS IN THE GREATER HORN

10

As noted above, the countries of the GHR are characterized by considerable diversity of identities. Every country in the region hosts a number of identity groups that are partitioned by national boundaries. Furthermore, the countries of the region inherited from pre-colonial empires and from the colonial-state-inter-identity relations marked by uneven and polarizing

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development. Unless addressed by policy, the inherited uneven development tends to worsen, due to a multiplier effect. The Abyssinian Empire, which expanded considerably by incorporating new territories in the late nineteenth century, for example, left behind deep disparities in access to political, economic and cultural rights among the country’s ethnic identities. The populations in the newly incorporated southern parts of the country were ravaged by slave raids, lootings and, in many cases, by large scale land appropriations during and in the aftermath of their incorporation into the empire. Those who lost their land were reduced into landless tenants, tilling the land for northern landlords (Pankhurst, 1968).2 The Empire also established a hierarchy of cultures where the non-Abyssinian cultures in the newly incorporated territories were placed in a subordinate position. Some of the legacies of the empire, like the landlessness created by land appropriation, have been largely removed by the 1975 land reform. The cultural inequalities have also been mitigated with the institution of a federal system by the country’s 1994 constitution. However, alleged lack of real devolution of power and disparities in access to political and economic power remain important sources of conflict, as evidenced by the rebellions led by the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Another pre-colonial empire in the region was the Mahdia state of Sudan. Like the Abyssinian state, this state also left behind lasting grievances among the populations in the southern parts of the country, who were subjected to slave raids and cultural, economic and political ­domination. The colonial state also left behind enormous regional and inter-identity inequalities in the region. Areas rich in mineral resources and those with fertile land in accessible locations were targets for investments, while areas deemed not profitable were generally marginalized. The Buganda area of Central Uganda was privileged relative to the rest of the country (Mutibwa, 2008). In Kenya the British colonial state identified central Kenya and the Rift Valley area as profitable, while the western and northeastern regions, which were viewed as unprofitable and troublesome, were marginalized (APRM, 2006; Mwaûra et al, 2002). Southern Sudan and northern Uganda were also areas that were left economically as well as politically marginalized by the colonial state. Such areas also had less access to public service, such as educational and health facilities. These areas remain largely marginalized still and many of them have become areas of conflicts.3

 The Abyssinian Empire played a double role in the slave trade. It curtailed the slave trade by the Oromo kingdoms, which it conquered in the late 1880s, giving relief to the victims of those kingdoms in the southern parts of the country. At the same time, however, it engaged in slave trading itself. 2

 There is a widespread argument that ethnic conflicts are essentially caused by entrepreneurial elites who mobilize ethnic groups to further their own political interests. The proponents of this 3

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Addressing the inherited structural inequalities and closing the opportunity gap among diverse identities are requisites for successful nation-building. Unfortunately, the states of the region have been unable to rectify the problem of uneven development for a variety of reasons. Among them are the adoption of nation-building and development strategies, which exacerbate rather than rectify the problem, and the capture of the state by self-serving and autocratic political elites. The nationbuilding strategies in the region, for instance, attempted to construct a single national culture instead of recognizing diversity. Sudan’s policy of unity-in-conformity (El-Battahani, 2007) and imperial Ethiopia’s strategy of assimilation, which denied certain groups – such as the Oromo – cultural expression (Hassen, 1999), are good examples. Identities may also rebel if their traditional institutions (customary laws or norms) clash with the institutions of the state or if they perceive the state’s institutions to be ineffective in promoting broad social interests. Land appropriations by the state that violate customary land ownership rights are, for example, risky measures that can incite identity-based rebellions. Identities partitioned by national boundaries and predominantly engaged in pastoral and subsistence farming economic systems have been the most marginalized in terms of access to economic resources and public services. Examples of such groups include the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya, the Afar in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea, the Nuer and Anuak in Ethiopia and Sudan, the identity groups in western and northern Kenya, the identity groups in western and northern Uganda (e.g. the Acholi Luos) and various identity groups in southern, western and eastern Sudan. The failure of the state to address the marginalization problem has often triggered grievances and rebellion by disadvantaged groups, especially those who are fragmented by national borders. In some cases the marginalized and fragmented identities have also opposed their incorporation into the states they find themselves in, setting off devastating irredentist and separatist civil wars. The Ogaden wars led by the Western Somali Liberation Front in the 1970s and the Ogaden National Liberation Front currently are good examples. The Eritrean war of independence was also often viewed as a separatist civil war, although the Eritrean case was more complicated.4 The SPLA rebellion has also resulted in South Sudan’s independence, although the original aim of the movement did not include independence. The de facto independence of Somaliland is also

argument, however, tend to overstate their case. In many cases ethnic groups rebel against the state because they face marginalization. In such cases the conflict cannot be simply attributed to political entrepreneurs, even though political elites often exploit the situation to advance their own interests. (Contd)

 Eritrean nationalists did not view their independence struggle as a separatist struggle since Eritrea was carved out by colonialism as a separate political entity. Eritrea is also not a single ethnic or religious identity but it fought the war of independence as a political identity that was formed by a shared colonial history and a shared grievance against Ethiopian rule. 4

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another case of civil wars that are triggered largely by mismanagement of ­identities.5 The region’s civil wars have had devastating human and socioeconomic impacts. The second North-South civil war in Sudan (1983–2005), for example, is said to have produced in the range of 2 million deaths. According to the United Nations and various human rights organizations, the casualty figures of the Darfur conflict are also estimated to be around 300,000 deaths and around 1.5 million displaced (BBC News, 2011; Quénivet, 2006).6 The ongoing civil war in Somalia, the various conflicts in Ethiopia (including the long war that culminated in Eritrea’s independence), the civil war that brought the country’s current regime to power and the ongoing conflict in the Ogaden have also caused unknown numbers of casualties. Uganda, Djibouti and Kenya, to a lesser extent, have also witnessed various state-identity conflicts resulting in large casualty figures, especially in Uganda between 1971 and 1986. Not surprisingly, the state-identity conflicts worsen the marginalization and poverty of the affected regions and identity groups and set forth a downward spiral in which marginalization leads to conflicts and conflicts worsen the marginalization and poverty by disrupting economic process and by destroying property. Often the state-identity conflicts also spill over and engender inter-identity (inter-communal) conflicts. These conflicts consist of violent inter-racial, inter-ethnic, inter-clan, inter-religious and inter-occupational (farmers vs. pastoralists) conflicts. Examples of such conflicts in the GHR include the inter-identity conflicts in Darfur, South Sudan, the Gambela region of Ethiopia, as well as the post2007-election violence in Kenya. Often the immediate trigger of many of the inter-communal conflicts is scarcity of vital resources, such as land, water and livestock. Resource shortages, exacerbated by environmental degradation and rapid demographic growth, undermine the customary property rights and resource-allocation mechanisms and trigger conflicts.7 However, marginalization and neglect of some identity groups by states remain the underlying cause of the problem. Inter-identity conflicts arising from perceived threats to group survival are likely to generate a zero-sum conflict, which is difficult to settle, due to the ‘non-realistic’ (uncompromising) nature of the claims and counterclaims. In this case, unless the conflict is brought under control quickly, the identity narratives can easily revert to dehumanization of adversaries and justification for their destruction or elimination. Since violence breeds further violence, the conflict also tends to become intractable, worsening the resource scarcity and environmental degradation. Inter-communal conflicts, however, also occur within identities, for example, among  Somaliland does not constitute a separate ethnic identity from the rest of Somalia. However, like Eritrea, it was created as a separate entity by colonialism. Unlike Eritrea, however, its union with the rest of Somalia at its independence was voluntary. 5

 The Government of Sudan strongly challenges such figures and its own figures are in the range of 1200 (BBC News, 14 September, 2011). 6

 The GHR’s population has grown 2.4 fold since the era of decolonization in the early 1960s.

7

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different clans or occupational groups (farmers, nomads) within an ethnic entity, often for similar reasons. The Somali clan conflicts and the landbased conflict between the Borona (or Boran) and Gujji of Ethiopia, who are both Oromo, are cases in point. While civil wars and identity-based rebellions have been perhaps the most devastating conflicts in the region, the mismanagement of diversity has also triggered a number of direct inter-state wars and numerous proxy conflicts. Partly because of the overlap of identities, the civil wars and state-identity conflicts often escalate into inter-state wars, such as those between Ethiopia and Somalia in the early 1960s and late 1970s. In an attempt to bring all Somali identities under one state, the governments of Somalia between 1960, when the country became independent and 1991 (the year of the collapse of the state), supported Somali insurgency groups in Ethiopia and Kenya. Such interventions led the country to wars against those two countries. Rebellions by disaffected identities have also led to a large number of proxy wars, as the states of the region engage in what Cliffe and White (2002: 54) call ‘mutual interference’ by supporting each other’s insurgency movements. The countries of the GHR have intervened in each other’s internal conflicts either by supporting insurgencies against regimes they have disagreements with or cooperating with friendly regimes in suppressing rebellions. Sudan, for example, supported Eritrea’s liberation movements and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front against the Mengistu regime of Ethiopia. Ethiopia in turn supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) against successive Sudanese regimes. Uganda’s support of the SPLM was also countered by Sudan’s support of Uganda’s rebel groups including the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Eritrea currently supports various Ethiopian insurgency groups against the Ethiopian regime, while the Ethiopian regime reciprocates by supporting some Eritrean opposition groups. Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in support of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government against the government constituted by the Islamic Courts Union was much more direct than proxy. Properly managed, the overlap of identities across the region could have served as a spring board for integrating the countries in the region. Instead it has become a factor for inter-state conflicts and a major hindrance of regional integration. At the informal level, however, the overlap of identities remains a significant economic, cultural and governance link between communities in different countries. In spite of international boundaries, it is, for instance, quite common to see traditional leaders of identities serving their communities, though they are split by national boundaries. Nuer leaders from South Sudan, for example, also serve as leaders of the Nuer community in Ethiopia’s Gambela region. Similarly, an Issa sultan would serve as a sultan of all Issa, whether they are in Djibouti, the Ogaden in Ethiopia or Somalia. The Aba Gada of the Borona in south-east Ethiopia is also the leader of the Borona in northern Kenya and the king of the Anuak also reigns over the Anuak in Sudan as well as in Ethiopia. All 14

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these links of overlapping identities are potential resources for integration that are under-utilized by states.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION Impacts of integration on conflicts

The foregoing discussion highlights two observations. One is that the inter-state direct and proxy conflicts are closely tied to the internal stateidentity conflicts facing each country in the region. The second is that marginalization of partitioned identities and the conflicts surrounding their citizenship are not likely to be resolved by individual states and, thus, require multilateral cooperation to resolve. A regional integration that allows open borders can be instrumental in addressing these intertwined problems, especially the latter. As Samatar and Machaka (2006) note, often the partition of ethnic groups involves not only the disruption of social and cultural ties but also of economic process, by hindering the movements of communities that rely on regional ecosystems for survival. Allowing free movement can benefit fragmented identities in a number of ways. Integration with open borders would enable these communities, especially pastoralists, to reduce their economic hardship by utilizing variations in regional ecosystems. More economic interaction and exchange would also be beneficial. Open borders would also allow communities to engage in greater interaction with their kinsmen across state lines and thereby to empower them both culturally and politically. Such improvements, if they take place, are also likely to reduce the grievances of fragmented identities against the state. It is also conceivable that improved management of fragmented identities, including policies of decentralization, would also have an impact in addressing the grievances of non-fragmented marginalized groups. A state that makes progress in managing one type of diversity is likely to make progress in managing other types of diversity also. Progress in dealing with the problems of both groups of identities (fragmented and non-fragmented marginalized) is likely to reduce both state-identity and inter-state conflicts. Fewer conflicts, in turn, are likely to generate economic dividends of peace. Arresting violent conflicts with identities improves state-society relations, enhances state legitimacy, and elevates the security and confidence of state functionaries. Such improvements in state-society relations can also transform the strategy of nation-building from one that aims to assimilate identities to a dominant culture, and relies on coercion to implement it, to an approach that recognizes cultural diversity and allows decentralized governance. In other words, an integration mechanism has the potential to become an effective mechanism for domestic peace and nation-building. By promoting peaceful nation-building, it also creates conditions that are conducive for democratization. It is rather hard to envision successful democratization under conditions of violent conflicts surrounding diversity management and nation-building.

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Another critical potential benefit of regional integration is the mitigation of direct and proxy inter-state conflicts by reducing domestic state-identity conflicts. If regional integration with open borders promotes diversity management and reduces state-identity conflicts, the opportunities for proxy conflicts would also be lower. Moreover, these benefits may also have spill-over effects and allow the supra-state organization that manages the integration scheme to develop effective mechanisms for managing border problems and other issues that have triggered many inter-state conflicts.

Potential impacts of regional integration on the economy and external relations

16

Another area where regional integration can have a transformative impact is in economic development. This potential impact of regional integration on economic development is well recognized in the literature. The large number of regional integration schemes worldwide is also indicative of the recognition of the benefits of integration. African regional integration schemes, however, have not produced the expected results, although there are some noteworthy differences among the performances of the various schemes. Some, including the Communauté Economique de l’Afrique Occidentale (CEAO), the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the East African Community (EAC) have performed relatively better than most others in the area of expanding trade among member countries (Oyejide, 2000). The Southern African Development Community (SADEC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also made some progress in the area of security cooperation. Overall, however, few of the African integration schemes have achieved sustainable robust economic growth. They have also rarely registered notable success in economic diversification or in raising the standard of living of the population within their members. Moreover, there is little evidence that African integration schemes have succeeded in sheltering their members from undue policy interferences by external actors. The explanations of the disparity between the expectations and results of regional integration schemes in Africa generally rely on two complementary hypotheses. One relates to the nature (inappropriateness) of the design of the integration arrangements. The other relates to lack of proper implementation, which is attributed partly to lack of commitment of leaders and partly to the absence of conditions conducive to successful integration (Oyejide, 2000; Fine and Yeo, 1997; Bourenane, 2002; Kritzinger-van  Niekerk, 2005). Draper and Qobo, for example, argue that ‘... regional economic integration in Africa is often poorly conceived and in some regions suffers from chronic duplication, whilst the economic and political bases for it are often woefully lacking’ (2007: 4). As noted above, building an effective integration scheme in Africa is a daunting endeavour. Among the problems that integration is expected to overcome are the various conflicts, lack of diversification of the economy,

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

poor transportation and communication infrastructures and the weak commitment of leaders, whose politics are often heavily influenced by foreign actors. These same problems are also the factors that impede the effectiveness of integration. Integration that lacks the essential requisites or does not command serious commitment of its architects in turn fails to fix the problems as expected. This vicious cycle is, however, expected to be broken through gradual improvement of the requisites for integration, including the commitment of leaders, the development of civil society and improvements in infrastructure. Such improvements would have the potential to establish the conditions for integration and thereby generate an upward spiral.8 For such an upward spiral to take off, however, the integration scheme needs to be designed in such a manner that it addresses the key problems of the region so that neglected problems do not undermine the solution of those that have received attention. In other words, an integration that attempts to build economic cooperation and neglects the security issues may be undermined by security problems. Integration that focuses on security while neglecting economic issues is also likely to remain fragile with a narrow constituency. Integration arrangements, thus, need to be tailored to the specific conditions that prevail in the region which is to be integrated. With respect to the design of integration arrangements, the literature, for the most part, is silent on the need to tailor integration arrangements on the basis of existing conditions in different regions. The silence perhaps suggests that there is an erroneous view that there is a universal design of integration that fits all conditions with perhaps minor adjustments. Even the part of the literature that discusses the nature of the design of integration in Africa has major limitations. One limitation is that it mostly deals with economic integration neglecting the conflict-resolution aspects of integration. Moreover, the debates tend to be grounded more on ideological conviction rather than on the realities in African countries. Some argue that regional integration schemes should be outward looking (open and export-promoting) to serve as a gateway for the integration of African economies with the global economic system (Kritzinger-van  Niekerk, 2005). Others view unregulated openness as endangering regional economic diversification and suggest that industrial-policy coordination along with measures to reduce transaction costs produce more appropriate designs (Olukoshi, 2003). With respect to the designs of African integration schemes, the two sides of the debate reflect the long-standing dispute about the appropriate roles of the market and policy. The first view represents the pro-market and openness position while the second view envisions a considerable role for government policy to regulate the market and its failures. No doubt,  The commitment of leaders, for example, may change for a number of reasons including resolution of conflicts that had blocked their motivation, or the desire to solve conflicts may induce them to be open for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Economic incentives may also convince them to invest in infrastructure and improve conditions for integration. 8

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18

the role of the market cannot be neglected but a comprehensive regional integration that deals with conflicts and the economy cannot be simply market-driven. Given the absence of diversification of the GHR economies, policy has also to coordinate industrial development to facilitate economic diversification and development. Some of the deregulation measures of the last three or so decades, including policies of trade liberalization that subjected the region’s economies to unequal competition with more advanced economies, have not helped the diversification of the region’s economies. Such policies often backfired by destroying potentially competitive local infant industry, such as textiles, by cheap imports. Lack of diversification of the economy, in turn, lowers the motivation for trade integration due to low complementarity of regional economies. Unless carefully designed, membership in external economic groupings, such as the European Union – African, Caribbean and Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-ACP) – and the USA’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) also has the potential to reduce the motivation and commitment of the states of the region to regional economic cooperation. Overlapping membership in other regional economic integration schemes, such as COMESA and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), also has advantages and potential disadvantages. On the positive side, by expanding the geographic scope of the integration, it expands the opportunities for economies of scale. On the negative side, by creating alternatives it may reduce the motivation and commitment of member countries to develop GHR integration, which is indispensable in dealing with the region’s conflicts. Given the resource limitations of the individual GHR countries, economic integration and collective self-reliance are likely to improve the region’s prospects for economic development that would alleviate the crushing poverty the region’s populations endure. As noted, the environmental crisis the region faces is unlikely to be addressed effectively by individual countries. It is often argued that lack of complementarity of economies undermines trade-based integration schemes in Africa. But integration, especially such that incorporates some level of regional industrial policy, can first promote economic diversification and, thereby, enhance the development of complementarity among the region’s economies. Moreover, although not fully studied yet, there are several economic sectors in the GHR, such as agriculture, energy, transportation and communication, and electricity and water supply that constitute areas of economic complementarities that would facilitate the region’s successful integration. Three of the countries of the region, Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan, are landlocked and can benefit from close integration in the areas of transportation and communication. The landlocked countries also have agricultural, water, electricity and oil resources that can benefit other countries in the region. Beyond the economic and security goals regional integration in the GHR needs to be designed to simultaneously address other critical objectives, including external interferences and developing mechanisms for

Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

coping with the environmental crisis that has ravaged the region. Due to their security and economic problems as well as their strategic location, the countries of the GHR have been targets of external intervention. Policy intervention by foreign actors has impacted both domestic and regional policy. The Cold War, the War on Terror, and even the unfolding global competition over energy and resources, have all brought notable external intervention into the region. The making of domestic and regional policy of the countries of the region, including the policy of regional integration, has been heavily influenced by foreign powers, as explained in chapter 8. The deeper the external influence is, the less likely the countries of the region will integrate internally or regionally, since external intervention, through various direct and indirect means, tends to dissuade conflicting parties from resolving conflicts. Conversely, the more the region integrates, the less susceptible it becomes to undue influence by external actors.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK This book is organized into three parts. Part I, which consists of this introductory chapter and chapters 2 and 3, examines relations between identity, citizenship and regional integration. Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of existing conceptions and theories of identity and citizenship. It then builds a strong argument on why a functional and lasting integration requires a clear understanding of the concepts of identity and citizenship. Building on the first two chapters, chapter 3 analyses why proper diversity management is critical both for national and regional integration. Part II consists of chapters 4 to 7 and examines different factors that facilitate and impede regional integration of the Greater Horn countries. Chapter 4 makes a compelling argument about the importance of ‘invisible’ integration that is taking place in the region facilitated by shared identity across boundaries. Chapter 5 identifies various historical links between the peoples of the region and argues that such links can serve as a basis for encouraging integration-promoting narratives throughout the region. Chapter 6 argues for a bottom-up grassroots approach to the region’s integration. It identifies education as a key vehicle for social change that can promote integration if the curriculum is appropriately designed to foster understanding and tolerance. The last chapter of Part II, chapter 7, examines the role of the mass media in promoting narratives that can both promote or hinder regional integration. Part III consists of three chapters that examine lessons from existing regional integration schemes. Chapter 8 provides a critical analysis of the experience of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Horn of Africa’s integration scheme. In addition to a critical assessment of the structures and decision-making mechanisms of IGAD, the chapter analyses the organization’s role in peace, security and mediations. It further examines the possible ways of making the organization more

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effective in meeting the hopes and challenges facing the people of the region. Chapters 9 and 10 examine the experiences of the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) respectively. These chapters analyse how the two regions have been impacted by their respective integration schemes, and provide some useful lessons for IGAD.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdoulahi, Mahamat. 2005. ‘Progress Report on Regional Integration Efforts in Africa towards the promotion of Intra-African Trade’, UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Trade Policy Centre, Work in Progress, No. 30, December, 2005. Available at www.uneca.org/ atpc/Work%20in%20progress/30.pdf (accessed 17 April 2012). African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 2006, May. Kenya, Report. Ayittey, George. 1998. Africa in Chaos. New York: St Martin’s Press. Ayoade, John A. A. 1985. ‘State without Citizens: An Emerging African Phenomenon’, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder CO: Westview Press. Bacharach, S. B. and E. J. Lawler. 1998. ‘Political Alignment in Organizations: Contextualization, Mobilization and Coordination’, in R. M. Kramer and M. A. Neale (eds), Power and Influence in Organizations. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications. Baldwin, Richard, E. 1993. ‘A Domino Theory of Regionalism’, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 857. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. – 1997. ‘Review of Theoretical Developments on Regional Integration’, in Oyejide et al. (eds), Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. 1. London: Macmillan. BBC News, 2011, 14 September. Bourenane, Naceur. 2002. ‘Regional Integration in Africa: Situation and prospects’, in Regional Integration in Africa. Development Centre Seminars, OECD. Cliffe, Lionel and Philip White. 2002. ‘Conflict Management and Resolution in the Horn of Africa’, in Cirû Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl (eds), Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press. Collier, P. 1998. ‘Globalization: Implications for Africa’, in Z. Iqbal and M.S. Khan (eds), Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa. Washington DC: IMF. de Lombaerde, Philippe and Luk van Langenhove. 2005, March. ‘Indicators of Regional Integration: Methodological Issues’, IIIS Discussion Paper No. 64. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=739711& (accessed 17 April 2012) 20

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Deutsch, Karl W. 1968. The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall. Dosenrode, Søren. 2006, April 27. ‘Is a Common Culture a Prerequisite for Regional Integration’? Paper presented at the joint CCIS-CSE Workshop, Aalborg. Draper, Peter and Mzukisi Qobo. 2007. ‘Rabbits Caught in the Headlights? Africa and the “Multilateralizing Regionalism” Paradigm’. Paper presented at the conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism, Sponsored and organized by WTO-HEI and the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Geneva, Switzerland, 10–12 September, 2007. El-Agraa, Ali M. 1999. Regional Integration: Experience, Theory and Measurement. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press. El-Battahani, Atta. 2007. ‘Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope: Competing Concepts on Sudan Identity and National Integration’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 7(2): 37–61. Fine, J. and S. Yeo. 1997. ‘Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dead End or a Fresh Start?’ in Oyejide et al. (eds), Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. 1. London: Macmillan. Geertz, C. 1963. Old Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. Glencoe IL: Free Press. Goldstein, Andrea and Carlos Quenan. 2002. ‘Regionalism and Development in Latin America: What Implications for sub-Saharan Africa?’ in Regional Integration in Africa. Development Centre Seminars, OECD. Hassen, Mohammed. 1999. Ethiopia: Missed Opportunities for Peaceful Democratic Process’, in K. Mengisteab and C. Daddieh (eds), State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope and Realities. Westport CT: Praeger. Heater, D. 1999. What is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity Press. Hettne, B. 1999. ‘Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation’, in B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. Sunkel (eds), Globalism and the New Regionalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Huntington, Samuel P. 2000. ‘Culture Counts’, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), Culture Matters – How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books. Jones, G. R. 2004. Organizational Theory, Design, and Change (4th edn). Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall. Keller, Edmund J. 1991. ‘The State in Contemporary Africa: A Critical Assessment of Theory and Practice’, in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson (eds), Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives. New York: HarperCollins. Kritzinger-van  Niekerk, Lolette. 2005. ‘Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience’, paper presented at a seminar in Maputo, organized by the Banco de Mocambique. World Bank. Available at www.sarpn.org/documents/ d0001249/index.php (accessed 17 April 2012).

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Lewis, M. Paul (ed.). 2009. Languages of the World (16th edn). Dallas TX: SIL International. Available at www.ethnologue.com/show_ country.asp?name=sd (accessed 17 May 2012). Martin, Denis-Constant. 1995. ‘The Choices of Identity’, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 1(1): 5–20. Mattli, Walter. 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mazrui, Ali. 1975. Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: the Making of a Military Ethnocracy. Beverly Hills CA: Sage. Morgan, G. 1998. Images of Organization. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. Mutasa, Charles. 2003, March. ‘Regional Integration and Debt in Africa: A Comparative Report of Africa’s Regional Groupings’, AFRODAD Research Series. Mutibwa, Phares. 2008. The Buganda Factor in Ugandan Politics. Kampala: Fountain. Mwaûra Ciru, Günther Baechler and Bethuel Kiplagat. 2002. ‘Background to Conflicts in the IGAD Region’, in Ciru Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl (eds), Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Lawrenceville NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Red Sea Press. Ndegwa, N. S. 1997. ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity; an Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics’, The American Political Science Review 91(3): 599–616. Olukoshi, O. A. 2003. ‘The Elusive Prince of Denmark: Structural Adjustment and the Crisis of Governance in Africa’, in Thandika Mkandawire and Charles C. Soludo (eds), African Voices on Structural Adjustment. Trenton NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. Oyejide, Ademola T. 2000. ‘Policies for Regional Integration in Africa’, African Development Bank, Economic Research Papers, No. 62. Oyejide, Ademola, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Paul Collier (eds). 1997. Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. I: Framework, Issues and Methodological Perspectives. London: Macmillan. Pankhurst, Richard. 1968. Economic History of Ethiopia: 1800–1935. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press. Quénivet, Noëlle. 2006. ‘The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: The Question of Genocide’, Human Rights Review 7(4): 38–68. Rex, John. 1995. ‘Ethnic Identity and the Nation State: the Political Sociology of Multi-Cultural Societies’, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 1(1): 21–34. Salih, M. 2009. ‘New Wine in Old Bottles: Tribal Militias and the Sudanese State’, Review of African Political Economy 16 (45/46): 168–74. Samatar, Ahmed and Abdi Samatar (eds). 2002. The African State: Reconsiderations. Portsmouth NH: Heinemann. Samatar, Abdi Ismail and Waqo Machaka (2006) ‘Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach’, in In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

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Sen, A. 2006. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. New York: W.W. Norton. Senghor, Jeggan C. 1990. ‘Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An Overview’, in Anyang’ P. Nyong’o (ed.), Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda. Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers. Tilley, V. 1997. ‘The Terms of the Debate: Untangling Language about Ethnicity and Ethnic Movements’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 20(3): 495–522. UNDP. Human Development Report 2007/2008. New York: United Nations development report, 2007. World Bank. World Development Indicators 2008. Washington, D.C.:, World Bank, 2008.

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2 Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region REDIE BEREKETEAB

INTRODUCTION Identity is one of the most contested issues in social sciences (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Voros, 2006). It is also one of the profound and powerful factors behind some of the cruel conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHR). Conflicts have been raging for several decades throughout the region that are thought to be stemming from real or imagined divisions and differences of identity. It is to be noted that the identity formation in the region is yet in the process of formation and transformation, thus both continuity and change are the defining features. This incompleteness of the formation process is one of the primary underlying causal factors for the identity-based conflicts and wars. How we define our identity and how we position and accommodate concomitant interests supposedly emanating from that perception determine relations between communities. The characterizing constituent identity features of the societies of the GHR region are poly-ethnic, polyglot and poly-religious. These social variables and pluralities in identities render the societies of the region ripe for potential conflict. To this could be added the predisposition of elites to utilize the multiplicity of identities constituting these societies for political expediency. All this coupled with other socio-economic factors have rendered the region the most conflict-ridden part of the continent (Shinn, 2008, 2009; Young, 2007; Cliffe, 2004; Woodward, 1994). We quite often tend to ignore and/or underestimate the importance of identity for local communities, or excessively inflate and exaggerate their meaning to these communities. Usually it is the absence of mutual recognition and acceptance of diversity of identities and parity in citizenship rights and obligations that brings about identity-based conflicts. It is argued at times that recognition may weigh much more than material interest for humans (Taylor, 1994). ‘While material resources – access to land, opportunities and jobs – are often at stake, these conflicts are potent and meaningful for their contestants because they are framed and understood in terms of identity and belonging’ (Dorman et al., 2007: 6). It is therefore of decisive significance to identify what divides us and what commonality there exists between us. Moreover, it is of great significance

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how we manage not only our differences but also our commonalities. Whether real or imagined, identity perceptions tend to define and delineate social boundaries leading to social categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Eriksen, 1993: 27). As one author notes, ‘We have reason to believe that identity is more influential (a) for the general public than for cognitive sophisticated individuals or functional interest groups, (b) for populist [traditionalism/authority/nationalism] tan parties than for radical left parties, and (c) when regional integration is political as well as economic’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 21). This chapter seeks to identify concepts and theories that aid us in identifying our differences and commonalities, the tools that are there to guide us to define and analyse identity. Further, the chapter focuses on identifying the fundamental concepts and theories that are in use in the general literature on identity and citizenship. It seeks then to analyse the relevance of these concepts and theories for the GHR, particularly in the dimension of regional integration. The point of departure adopted here is that in order to achieve functional and enduring integration it is of significant imperative to properly and adequately understand identity and citizenship. In other words, the assumption guiding the chapter is that there is a dialectical relation between how we perceive identity and citizenship on the one hand and regional integration on the other. Finally the chapter discusses some items that might have policy implication in achieving regional integration.

IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION DEFINED: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

26

The ambiguity and controversy surrounding the discourse of the concepts of identity and citizenship in social sciences is indeed baffling (Brubaker, 2002; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Voros, 2006). The scholarship on identity and citizenship is therefore highly divided. Broadly, three schools of thought or models are discerned. These are primordialism (scholars associated with this school are Edward Shils, Clifford Geertz, Pierre van den Berghe), constructivism (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass) and ethnosymbolism (Anthony D. Smith, John Armstrong, John Hutchinson) (Voros, 2006: 42–3). Further, as derivatives, two main conceptual and theoretical models dealing with identity and citizenship are also duly identified. These are the civic and the ethnic. The schools/theories are further identified as modernist/ constructivist/instrumentalist, on the one hand, and primordialist/essentialist/intrinsic, on the other (Werbner, 1997; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Brubaker, 2002; Voros, 2006). The modernist/constructivist/instrumentalist cluster (Voros 2006) has, for several decades now, particularly in sociology, political science and political anthropology, assumed the dominant model of identity analysis and theorizing. According to the ethnicist or primordialist model

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

(henceforth primordialist), the second set of the dichotomy, identity is perceived as a repository of collective memory, a manifestation of imagining that could assume various contours. The collective memory, in turn, is presumably spawned by constitutive variables such as descent, blood ties, linguistic affiliation, homestead, kinship, etc. The primordialist model distinguishes itself through repositing identity at the ethnic social store whose contours invariably may be real or imaginary common descent, shared speech, common cultural traits, defining specific or unique commonality (Teshome and Záhořík, 2008: 20; Johnson, 1997; van den Berghe, 1981; Horowitz, 1985; Connor, 1994). Identity and citizenship have increasingly come to be conflated. It would be analytically important to indicate the possible discernibility between identity and citizenship, however. Conceptually, citizenship is wrapped up in rights and obligations (Purvis and Hunt, 1999). This conception is certainly informed by legal and democratic theories. Citizenship is defined as arising from the premises of shared rights and obligations of a political community that imply equality (Purvis and Hunt, 1999). Peter Ekeh, drawing from T. H. Marshall’s and de Tocqueville’s conceptions of citizenship as elaborated by Bendix, notes, ‘The individual as a member of a political community has certain rights and privileges which he may claim from it. Similarly he has certain duties and obligations which he has to perform in the interest of the political community’ (Ekeh, 1975: 106). The concept of citizenship traditionally laid a claim of priority over other forms of identities. Citizenship status confers rights and benefits upon one. The rise of politics of identity in recent years has, however, increased tension between identity and citizenship. The tension arises from the actuality of a plurality of social identities and the singular identity implied by citizenship, that is, between the particularism of the former and the universalistic aspirations of the latter (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458). While driven by the politics of identity, identity itself is heading toward fragmentation, seeking to lift up the constituent units as separate and independent, the result of which is a proliferation of identities; citizenship on the other hand is perceived as an advance towards the opposite, that is, towards aggregation, unification and standardization. In this sense citizenship is presumed ‘to stand in opposition to, or is juxtaposed with, identity’ (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 462). Nevertheless, they go on to say that ‘citizenship itself implies an identity, but not, however, just any identity’. Citizenship connotes a distinctly political identity clearly indicating membership where rights and duties are stipulated. In this sense citizenship could be perceived as universal where individuals belonging to divergent communities are converging to configure the national political community. Individuals assume distinct relationship to the state, with concomitant social status and power relations. The conflation between citizenship and identity is also approached from the notion of membership. Will Kymlicka argues, ‘most liberal theorists have recognised that citizenship is not just a legal status defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an identity, an expression

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of one’s membership in a political community’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 192). In this conceptualization of membership an individual could be a member of (1) a political community (national), and (2) of a cultural community (sub-national). Through membership in one of these social categories the individual has rights and duties that are inherent characters of citizenship. Identity presupposes membership and citizenship requires fulfilling membership duties and enjoying rights. In conceptualizing citizenship and identity, it would be of interest to point out the dimension of the subjective-objective definition of identity and citizenship. While the former relates to the interiority dimension of definition, i.e. how the subjects themselves perceive and define their own identity and citizenship loyalty, the latter relates to the exteriority dimension of definition, i.e. how the external objective world perceives and defines a group’s identity and citizenship loyalty. Some scholars use the distinction of self-identification and self-representation (subjective), and identification and categorization by others (Voros, 2006: 31). This distinction is of fundamental significance, particularly in relation with what I have called elsewhere (Bereketeab, 2008) the ‘politics of domination’ versus the ‘politics of rights’. Quite often the politics of domination reflects the dominant or most powerful group’s understanding and interpretation of identity and citizenship. Integration, therefore, according to the dominant group’s perception, is articulated in a manner that suits its dominant status without paying due attention to the underdogs’ feelings and interests. Politics of rights, on the other hand, aims at undoing the politics of domination and levelling the political game and ground. While politics of domination and its representative elites wish to maintain the status quo, advocates of politics of rights strive to bring change on the politics of domination. This does not mean of course that all claims and grievances of politics of rights are legitimate and qualified. It is not rare that elite-manipulated claims of politics of rights may lie behind the vicious conflicts in the region. Power rivalry between ethnic elites, quite often driven by the urge to ascend to power, may account for the bloody conflicts. The second, the civic or modernist model, on the other hand, locates identity at the civic repository premises whose contours are invariably identified as territoriality, residence under common secular law, loyalty to and identifying with common national symbols (flag, national holidays, buildings, etc.), national institutions such as parliament, judiciary, loyalty to an overarching state (Smith, 1983, 1986; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 1991). The civic/modernist model, broadly understood as characterizing modern identity as well as citizenship, is therefore related with the modern state, that is, allegiance to the state. The third school of thought or model, ethnosymbolism, rejects premises of both primordialism and constructivism and arrives at the conclusion that there is a continuation between the two. It argues that primordial identity and citizenship is transformed to the modern one. Unlike the primordialist that claims that identity and citizenship is perennial, or the

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

modernist that claims it is a modern construction, the ethnosymbolist traces continuity and change (Smith, 1986; Armstrong, 1982; Hutchinson, 2000). Recently also another model that rejects constructivism, or rather deconstructs it, has emerged, notably the post-modernist. While constructivism in its analysis of identity and citizenship pursues methodological nationalism, deconstructivism pursues methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider, 2010). In the case of the former the unit of analysis is the collectivity (nation), whereas in the case of the latter the unit of analysis is the individual. For the post-modernist, identity is cosmopolitan, transnational, cross-cultural, trans-territorial, global, etc. (Clark, 2009; Beck and Sznaider, 2010). Citizenship that springs from the post-modernist identity-formation conception also raises citizenship to the global sphere. Here identity and citizenship is disaggregated to the individual, unlike the collectivity of the communal or national. This is the liberal or individualist conception of identity (Greenfield, 1992; Vincent, 1987: 26). This conception of identity and citizenship would most probably facilitate the perception of regional integration, since it transcends the local as well as the national. In addition, while the local (communal) and the national are collectivist the global is individualistic – and citizenship allegiance and affiliation rests on the global sphere. Integration in this perspective thus presupposes disaggregation of collective ethnic (local) or civic supra-ethnic (national) identities. This in turn, in the long run, would presuppose a certain degree of transformation that leads to the emergence of individualization, secularization, urbanization and cosmopolitanization that transfers citizenship to the global sphere (cf. Bendix, 1964; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 1991; Featherstone, 2002). Generally, the post-modern subject is seen as having no pre-existence, it is created in inter-subjectivity (Eriksen, 1993; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Voros, 2006; Beck and Sznaider, 2010). The ‘post-modern subject is therefore striving to exclude elements which it sees as obstructing a completeness of its individuality’ (Bull-Christiansen, 2004: 64). Arguably, the post-modernist model brings two things to the forefront. First, it is liberating to the individual. Second, it may also be an obstacle of shared identity grounding social solidarity (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 471). Pakulski and Trannter also argue that ‘Citizenship is typically universalistic, inclusive and blind to race, ethnic, gender and other ascriptive social ties and divisions’ (2000: 38). Featherstone also argues that cosmopolitan citizenship is supranational (2002: 3). Whereas identity for the primordialist is given, natural, constant and incontestable, for the modernist it is malleable, constructed, conditional (Lustick et al, 2004: 213; Voros, 2006; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), cont­ estable, narrative-based and susceptible to cultural and environmental impacts. For the post-modernist, identity is deconstructed, de-narrated, formless and shapeless, situational and inter-subjective, indeed it only exists in the interlocutory space of individuals. Here is stressed the fluidity of space and time. In this regard, individuals are presumed to

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be ­repositories of identity in as far as they are engaged in interlocutory activities. Further in elaboration of the notion of the individual as a repository of identity, it is claimed that individuals have multiple identities (McHenry, 1997). Identity in this sense is perceived as a toolkit where the individual would pick one at a time, contingent on the context and reflecting the very interlocutory space. She or he could select a primordial garment when operating in a rural communal social space, a modernist one in an urban milieu or yet further a post-modernist outfit when operating in a universal social space (Featherstone, 2002). Table 2.1  T  heories and concepts of identity, citizenship and regional integration

Identity

Ethnosymbolism

Modernism Post-Modernism Constructivism Deconstructivism

Ethnic

Ethnie

Civic

Civic

Community

Collective

Individual

Sub-nationalism

Nation

Post-Nation-State

Citizenship

Ethnic/ sub-nationalism

Nation-State

Supra-NationState

Methodology

Methodological Communalism

Methodological Methodological nationalism Cosmopolitanism

Regional Integration

30

Primordial communalism

National

Regional

Nevertheless, it is a grave mistake to perceive identity as well as citizenship to be rigid and fixed, given once and for all – a mistake committed by the school of primordialism. On the contrary, it manifests considerable variability and susceptibility to external influences. Over history it has undergone considerable transformation: from city states in ancient Greece and the ancient Roman Republic, to the nation-states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the current type of citizenship produced by globalization and multiculturalism (Bellamy, 2008: 2). Further, Bellamy notes that types of citizenship proliferate continuously, that it is possible to identify dual citizenship and transnational citizenship, corporate citizenship and global citizenship (2008:1). Furthermore, Bellamy argues that ‘Historically, citizenship has been linked to the privileges of membership of a particular kind of political community – one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in making the collective decisions that regulate social life’ (2008: 1). He argues that ‘Citizenship has traditionally referred to a particular set of political practices involving specific rights and duties with respect to a given political community’ (2008: 3). This is also notably manifested in the perception of identity in historical Ethiopia. As John Markakis notes, ‘according to tradition, Ethiopian nationality is theologically defined, its primary criterion being faith. A non-Christian could not be an Ethiopian, nor could an Ethiopian adhere to any other creed’ (1974: 30). Such conceptualization

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

and definition of a national identity in a country where more than half the populace are considered to be adherents of one or more different faiths would, with great certainty, negatively impact on that national identity and citizenship. Yet, historically this has been the rule rather than the exception, as Purvis and Hunt also note that ‘classical Greek conception held citizenship to be the only political identity that members of the polis had’ (1999: 463). ‘The self-determining nation became the social embodiment of the Athenian citizen: one who rules and is ruled.’ (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 464.) This indicates that the concept of citizenship is directly related to emergence of the idea of a nation and the institution of the modern state: the nation-state. While the citizen in Athens was able to rule and be ruled, in the Roman Empire citizens were ruled but did not rule. It is of significance to note that citizenship provides the identity that marks our common membership in a political community (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 464). Deriving from the above theoretical and conceptual analysis, would it be plausible to place one’s great hopes and wishes on the post-modernist subject in the GHR, while statistically the post-modernist subject is in a minority? From a normative theory perspective the post-modernist subjects could be said to be more adequately armed to accommodate regional integration because they transcend the primordial collectivist bond. As Clark also argues, the ‘global citizens or cosmopolitans are likely to be at the forefront of embracing values and lifestyles that are not embedded within the nation-state’ (2009: 28). The post-modernist subjects in the region are the ones hypothetically represented by the diaspora. The diaspora subjects, due to their transnational location and straddling between home origin and host community, share divided identity and citizenship. This transnationality of identity of the diaspora subjects is characterised by dubiousness, vagueness, ambivalence and precariousness. This is because localization-wise (from the perspective of permanency of residence) they are unable to resolve the contradictions on a permanent basis. The diaspora subject is ‘living between the local and global, otherwise known as “glocalization”’ (Clark, 2009: 29). Social exclusion and marginalization in the host society, however, drive the diaspora subjects to the edge of social oblivion which incurs a volatile personality upon them. Situations occurring in the host society remind them that they are intruders, if not entirely causing their rejection. This intruder stigma may invoke a wish to resettle in the society of origin. Yet the inability, in actuality, to do so frustrates them. This frustration has serious consequences for their relationship with the society of origin, but above all determines their perceptions of their identity and citizenship. The evolutionary social transformation process seems, albeit in back and forth and zigzag forms, to advance forward rather than stagnate or regress, which makes compelling argument for the pursuit of these theories and concepts. The pre-colonial identity and citizenship perceptions many not be equipped with the necessary analytical and explanatory tools. The endogenously-driven diversification and complexity of every

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political society (national society) and supra-national society (regional society) may compel us to revisit these concepts and theories. Exogenously driven factors, globalization in all its dimensions – political, economic, cultural, information, migration, etc., – are also making it necessary to critically examine the concepts of identity and citizenship. The long-term sociological implications of the ever-increasing flow of population from the rural space to the urban space are termed modernization, urbanization, secularization, individualization, cosmopolitanization, etc., by classical sociological tradition (James, 1996; Guibernau, 1996; Smith, 1998; McCrone, 1998). The characterizing identity and citizenship formation in the GHR thus could be described by an interrelated trinity of concepts. This could succinctly be represented as rural community-based (primordial), urban community-based (modernist) and transnational community-based (post-modernist). So far I have been talking about concepts and theoretical approaches that are primarily rooted in the western socio-cultural historiography, ontology, epistemology and that reflectively and appropriately depict western societies. A critical question to pose would be how relevant are these concepts and theories for the African setting. I will turn now to the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHR) itself.

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Let’s first analyse the manner by which the current nations in Greater Horn Region (GHR) came to existence. It is commonplace knowledge that the GHR nations are products of colonialism. Even the only country that evaded colonial rule, Ethiopia, was reconstituted in the era of colonialism. One of the reputations of colonialism with regard to the formation of nations was that it dissected communities, topographies and lifestyles without paying any attention to differences based on ethnicity, culture, language, religion, tradition, geography, etc. and constituted political units that are widely seen as artificial, and as a result of which the project of nation formation was rendered extremely precarious (Mazrui, 1983; Davidson, 1992; Young, 1994). The result of all this has been that the socio-political realities of the nations of the GHR are characterised by poly-ethnic, polyglot and multi-religious features. The biggest country in the continent, Sudan (before the separation of South Sudan), was said to consist of 57 ethno-linguistic groups (570 people-groups and 595 languages) (Harir, 1994: 18), Ethiopia comprises about 84 ethnolinguistic groups (Habtu, 2003), Eritrea has nine ethno-linguistic groups (Bereketeab, 2007), tiny Djibouti two (Abdallah, 2008), Kenya 42 (Alwy and Schech 2004: 267), etc. The identity and citizenship formations in these pluralist nations could be defined and analysed as deriving from dichotomous sets of variables. These defining sets are the formal and informal, the civic and ethnic, the official and unofficial, national and sub-national. This duality

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

or dichotomy in the identity and citizenship formation process could properly be expressed in the socio-political organizations characterised by a hierarchy where ethnic (community), civic (nation-state) – and probably with the creation of regional integration – supra-nation-state (trans-regional) will represent the stratified and hierarchised pluralist socio-political life of these nations. Alternatively these pluralist sociopolitical organizations could be represented by at least three levels, notably the micro-level, meso-level and macro-level. If we assume that there exists regional integration, the micro-socio-political structure will represent the local community (the primordial, ethnic), the meso-sociopolitical structure will represent the nation-state (civic, supra-ethnic) while the macro-socio-political structures will represent the regional (supra-nation-state, regional ‘cosmopolitan’). It can be argued then that these three levels would express and define identity and citizenship formation in the GHR. In respect to the current nation-states in the GHR, broadly defined, we could assume that the ethnic (sub-national) and the civic (national) are co-existing in intricately woven socio-political organizations. However, this co-existence has not always been harmonious and mutually reaffirming, but rather characterised by domination and marginalization. Nevertheless, albeit precariously, all-encompassing nation-states where individuals pay allegiance of membership to their particularistic ethnic identity and citizenship (Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Hawiye, Jaali, Kordufan, Fur, Nuer, Kikuyu, Luo, Masai, Beni Amer, Tigrayan/Tigrinya, etc.) and at the same time, pay allegiance to their universalistic civic national identity and citizenship (as Ugandans, Sudanese, Somalis, Kenyans, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Djiboutians) have existed since their creation by colonial powers (although Sudan and Ethiopia both divided). This duality of identity and citizenship as a defining feature of the socio-political entity of these nation-states may not by itself be a source of conflict and war, but its mismanagement and the politics of domination has become a source of the chronic identity-based inter-state and intra-state conflicts and wars. The defining identity and citizenship in the GHR in particular, and Africa in general, has always been at the centre of controversy and dispute among scholars of social sciences. It is not rare that scholars of Africa refute the existence of common supra-ethnic national civic identity and citizenship. Africans are quite often defined by their parochial, precolonial, communal (primordial) allegiances and affiliations. The traditional African notion of citizenship is that, no matter where you are born, you are the son or daughter of the original soil or homeland of the parent through whom you trace your descent. Ethnic citizenship is therefore the foundation for nationality in Africa, although it is also possible to acquire citizenship by naturalization (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007: 71). In this conception of citizenship, all descendants of those who can legitimately claim land are automatically conferred citizenship. Further, Nzongola-Ntalaja notes:

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How citizenship is defined by the state and by exclusivist political groupings has had disastrous consequences not only for people whom representatives of authentic inhabitants of a given territory seek to exclude as outsiders, but also for innocent, ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ who are caught up in the resulting political turmoil (NzongolaNtalaja, 2007: 69).

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This definition of citizenship and identity is only partly correct. It is correct in the sense that it may relate to only one category of the social space accounted for here – the rural space – and by definition also to the primordial. In only representing one part of the dichotomous constituency of identity and citizenship in Africa this notion therefore provides a half-baked reality. It fails to represent the emergent metropolitan citizens of Khartoum, Juba, Asmara, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala, etc., not to mention the diasporic sons and daughters of these societies. In no way could we deny or ignore the prevalence of two social spaces in the GHR. These spaces are duly represented, in time and space, by the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial conflated in one. Identity and citizenship formation of necessity needs to reflect the component elements. The reality of the socio-political life in the GHR today is to be described and explained by a state of transition. The characterizing features of the state of transition are rural (traditional), urban (modern) and transnational (post-modern), which require a complex set of approaching and perhaps defining citizenship and identity in a more complex and nuanced manner. Only such understanding would capture the complexity, diversity and variation of today’s citizenship and identity in the GHR. Colonialism created what Peter Ekeh (1975) called two publics, namely, the urban and rural. The urban public as the repository of the emerging modern industrial and service sectors drew people of divergent background, which in a way served as a melting pot. Out of this new configuration emerged new classes that extended across ethnic boundaries and represented a different identity formation from that which was commonly found in the rural public. This new class (identity group) assumed a dominant leadership role, while at the same time engaging in a power struggle where it manipulatively exploited ethnic and religious differences whenever it suited. By way of summation it has to be stressed that the approach taken here, interrogating validity and applying these concepts, models and theories to the conditions of the GHR, would be justified by the fact that the nations are embodying elements of the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial in their socio-political lives. The nations in the region contain within their bodies politic and social fabrics (1) the traditional/primordial (rural communities), (2) the modern/civic (urban communities), and (3) the post-modern (diaspora), albeit in an unbalanced proportionality. The traditional could be represented by the overwhelming majorityrural populations, the modern by the less overwhelming majority-urban populations and the post-modern by the again smaller proportion of diaspora (transnational, trans-territorial, cosmopolitan) populations. Lastly,

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

theories and concepts are useful because they help us to shape the way we perceive and interpret our surrounding world, having also analytical and prescriptive value. As such, therefore, they serve as lenses through which policies may be formulated and evaluated. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I will discuss some aspects of empirical dimension that have policy implications with relation to regional integration.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE GREATER HORN Any endeavour at regional integration is a challenge to the territory-based nation-state. From a theoretical point of view then, regional integration could be said to require a de-territorialization of identity and citizenship. De-territorialization in turn would mean designing other forms of identity and citizenship foundations. The rationale and logic of this argument is that any functional and sustainable regional integration presupposes a prevalence of some kind of common regional identity that transcends the ideology that confers upon territoriality a socio-politically-defining power. At least theoretically it could be plausible to claim that primordial perception of identity would pose a hindrance for regional integration while post-modernist perception would facilitate it. This contention stems from the assumption that primordial affiliation often tends to impose strict and closed membership premises where it becomes, mildly put, difficult for individual members to opt out or come in. Ethno-cultural conception limits identity to a narrowly-defined homogenous nation. Concomitantly, citizenship entitlement is confined to citizens who fulfil stringent criteria of combination of language and blood (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 465; Adam, 1994:17). According to this conception of identity and citizenship, primordial affiliation is necessarily characterised by enclosure and is exclusionary, which may make it hostile to regional integration. Post-modernist affiliation, on the other hand, which is presumed to be malleable and voluntary, open and inclusive, may facilitate regional integration, at least theoretically. Thus, in an ideal situation, by definition, post-modernist perception and affiliation would provide a more conducive ground for regional integration because, through its individualistic transnationality and inter-subjectivity, it breaks the bond of primordial (ethnic) or national (supra-ethnic, nation-state) boundaries. This in turn would facilitate the emergence of a common regional identity, citizenship and integration. A related strand of tradition in regard to breaking the bonds of ethnicity and/or the nation-state is represented by cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanization, it is argued, through its rejection of methodological nationalism, aims at engendering universal humanism that integrates the whole human race (Featherstone, 2002); perhaps this is too ambitious. All this then reinforces the assumption that how we define and perceive our identity and our position in the state as citizens has abundant implications for regional integration. The underlying precept for

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this assumption rests on the understanding that the creation of common supra-national, regional integration presupposes an individualistic, secular, identity formation, which at the same time requires the evolution of common regional identity. It is argued, for instance, that: A European identity is necessary for the European Union to avoid ‘fragmentation, chaos and conflict’ [Santer, 1995] of every kind (military, social, economic and political) and to help achieve cohesion, solidarity, subsidiarity, concertation and cooperation. Almost all potential sources of a European identity are welcome: political and ideological beliefs, economic theory, culture, history, geography, ethnic common destiny, etc. But they all have to be subjectively effective. As Hans Van Den Broek [1994] suggests, European identity has to crystallize. That is to say Europeans have to increase the feeling of belonging together, sharing a destiny and so on. Otherwise the threat of dissolution will come from both inside and outside (Delgado-Moreira, 1997: 7).

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This means that transcendence and convergence of identity and citizenship at a regional level is required. Regional integration therefore presupposes the development of regional identity and citizenship. In other words our affiliations and allegiances should be able to stretch beyond the strictures of the nation-state. Does this mean then that the nation-state is an obstacle to regional integration? Undoubtedly post-nation-state theorists will tell us that the nation-state is an obsolete and withered away concept, and as such constitutes an impediment to regional integration. Moreover, there is a growing consensus that the nation-state is encountering strong challenges from beneath, by mobilised ethnonationalist forces, and from above, by global forces as well. Nevertheless, the role of the nation-state in the GHR is of great importance. Indeed the nation-state would be a key player in the transitional process toward the creation of regional integration as the nation-state in Europe has been playing that role quite efficiently. Even those who see the nation-state as a transient phenomenon would not deny the salience of the role it can play in conjunction with the inevitable emergence of regional integration. Because the nation-state is a key socio-political actor therefore, as with any other socially responsible and purposive actor, it is expected to play a key role in consolidating its alternative or its replacement. Further, the reality in the region where non-nation-state actors such as civil society, traditional authorities, ethnic and cultural leaders, social, cultural and religious institutions are either non-existent or extremely weak, the role of the sole powerful actor, the nation-state, cannot be underestimated. In short the role of the nation-state in bringing about regional integration is indispensable. Discourses, narratives, myth construction and story-telling, as systematic approaches to identity and citizenship formation, are located in space and time. The nation-state as a specific spatial and temporal location has played a decisive role in the construction of national identity and citizenship. An endeavour that aspires to achieve a supra-nation-state integration ought therefore to shift the location of discourse from the

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

nation-state which is currently the repository and expression of identity and citizenship to a higher space in order to construct the regional identity and citizenship necessary to the configuration of a new identity and citizenship. The profoundly challenging task in creating function and structure fitting to the multiplicity of identities in the GHR is finding a formula that adequately and pragmatically generates a transcendent supra-national common regional identity and citizenship. This task is really daunting when appraised against the fact of the existing fractionalizing politics of identity that is reining in the current identity formation and citizenship allegiance in the region. Moreover, finding a workable formula is one thing, but maintaining it, converting it into a lasting currency, recurrently cultivating and reinforcing it, keeping the wheel in motion, so that at the end the common regional identity, the one and the only supra-national identity and citizenship par excellence, a prerequisite for the functionally and structurally sustainable regional integration, is achieved, is another thing altogether. When dictated by politics of identity, as long as, for instance, the Oromos, the Somalis, the South Sudanese grouping or others perceive their incorporation in the nation-states as forcibly effected and constituting an act of violation of their primordial identity (regardless of basic differences among themselves), and keep invoking primordial identity and mobilizing on the basis of those exclusive identity markers, an open and inclusive identity which is a presupposition for regional integration may be difficult to achieve; yet we need to develop it. Nevertheless, from a complementary point of view the very fact that these groups are to be found divided across the political boundaries may induce them to be open for greater more inclusive association. Therefore, the otherwise permeable nature of ethnonationalism that is dictated by the spread of ethnonationality across political borders may facilitate regional integration. In other words, a sustainable and functional regional integration presupposes laying down certain necessary building blocks. Such building blocks may entail commonly accepted definitions and formulations of identity and citizenship. Further, predicated on this common acceptance of, allegiance to, an affiliation with an overarching regional identity and citizenship would certainly thrust forward regional integration. In general terms regional integration is obligated to face collective problems with collective efforts. Whether in small or big ensembles, human beings always manifest the need to organise themselves in order to tackle collective problems created by nature or as a result of human activity. In this sense regional integration would be perceived as serving as a vehicle in meeting both the material and cognitive needs of those involved. Depending on the level of socio-economic development the objective and functionality of regional integration displays a degree of variation.

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BOTTOM-UP VERSUS TOP-DOWN INTEGRATION IN THE GREATER HORN

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The conceptual and theoretical analysis provided above unequivocally illustrates the preference of a bottom-up strategy of integration. The inference that could be drawn from the analysis and Table 2.1 is that to have a regional integration with a strategic orientation that is bottom-up would require understanding and analysis of the people’s perceptions of their identity and citizenship. Moreover, of more critical salience is the participatory process and content where the main stakeholders are involved in designing, implementing and sustaining the regional integration. This would set the functional conditions for a successful strategy of bottom-up integration. One of the critical challenges of the strategy of bottom-up integration would be its necessarily-prolonged process and long-term nature. This is so because it presupposes cognitive as well as cultural transformation, which is by nature time-demanding. What makes worthwhile taking this long journey is that the process, content and implementation, and end result comes into ownership of the general public, which gives it solid foundation. Otherwise it will be owned by a handful of elites, making it precarious. Fifty years on, the European integration project still, generally, remains an elite project (Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Delgado-Moreira, 1997; Kymlicka and Patten, 2003: 6, 7). The peoples of the union are asked randomly to give their verdict on this or that policy decision or legislation where it can happen that they reject it. The bottom-up strategy effectively requires establishing a common identity that transcends social and political boundaries, as well as transference of citizenship loyalty. The positive aspect of the strategy is that, if achieved, it would be enduring, being based on popular will. The certainty of this popular will may depend on the entrenchment of popular institutions, norms and values which the people perceive as their own and are prepared to defend at any cost. If these institutions, norms and values are detached from the people they may not be able to appeal to the general populace and hence could easily be rejected or not be defended. Institutions, norms and values take time to be hatched, matured and internalised. The futures studies, scenario building and anticipatory approaches presuppose a longer time of maturation (African Futures and Phylos IPE, 2002). The rate and pace of achievability may be extremely slow, in terms of durability, however, this strategy may be quite assured of ultimate success. Arguably, the serious drawback of the bottom-up strategy, taking into consideration the chronic and urgent problems the region is facing, is that it is excruciatingly slow. The top-down regional integration strategy, which is the most common practice, on the other hand, is more effective and faster. This strategy may only require common understanding between and commitment of selective elites from each unit. Consensual covenants among groups of political elites may do the magic. More than fifty years later what sustains the EU is the commitment of the political elites (Fanta, 2008). The disadvantages

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

of the top-down strategy are that it is entirely or partly dependent on the goodwill of the heads of states and government of the countries in the region (Fanta, 2008: 15). A typical example is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Salih, forthcoming). The palpability of the fragility of the strategy is, however, beyond doubt. Wherever there emerges disagreement between leaders of states the whole project may be paralysed or even may collapse. Absence of sustaining institutions and popular support that goes beyond the political elite renders it extremely fragile. In the current condition of relations of states of the region, the topdown strategy of regional integration undoubtedly would face veritable hurdles. Where heads of states find it difficult to sit and talk, it would be extremely difficult to realise a top-down regional integration strategy. The biggest downside of a top-down strategy as Fanta (2008) argues would be its predominantly elitist and technocratic nature. Neither would bottomup integration be easy, since communities are under the control of their national states. But also factionalism that has been going on for too long is a characterizing feature of the societies that may impede a smooth transition to cohesion in the region. But, as noted above, the bottleneck hurdle in the bottom-up strategy is the slowness of the process. It was suggested that a bottom-up-oriented regional integration would presuppose the creation of some sort of common regional identity. Since a common regional identity could only be produced through introducing common narratives, discourse, myth building and constructivism, and since this will take a very long time, there is then an obvious necessity and advantage with the strategy of top-down. Here it is indispensable that the nation-state would play a decisive role. For practical purposes and intentions the top-down strategy seems to be the most viable operational strategy. In terms of operationality, purely from a pragmatic point of view, it would establish the art of the possible. This is what almost all examples of regional integration seem either to have followed or are following in the top-down strategy of integration. Since it is by its very nature elitist it is very effective and practical. One of the successful regional integrations so far, the European Union (EU), in spite of its success, demonstrates a clear gap between elites and publics. The elites were the driving force behind the integration project from the very outset while the publics maintained a conservative position. There existed also variance between political parties: while mainstream parties supported integration, marginal parties were much more reserved; the radical left opposed the integration project from a distributional standpoint and from their objection to capital, while the populist right opposed it invoking community or national identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 15f). Another dimension of the debate around regional integration is whether the economic or the political should come first. Certainly economic activities such as cross-border trade, common agricultural projects, cross-border pastoral movements and exchanges, regional investments, exchanges of economic services (ports services, water resources, mineral and oil

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resources, etc.) and common markets could boost regional integration. The primary focus here, however, is on the cognitive and political drivers of integration as the economic aspect is dealt with by other contributors. Here I am interested in the way forward: economic vs political strategy to begin the integration process. The European regional integration began with market integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 5) which ultimately developed to a degree of political integration. Following the formation of the Council of Europe in 1949, it was proposed to set up a community to integrate the coal and steel industries of Europe1. As Emmanuel Fanta notes, ‘In Europe, it would be difficult to downplay the role that was played by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in launching the process that has given way to the European Union’ (Fanta, 2008: 14). From this account it is clear that economic integration was given priority. Where does integration in the GHR begin? Two models or schools of thought, for lack of labels we can call them the economist and political, inform the debate on regional integration. The economist school of thought’s approach is that identifying common economic interests and binding integration on those interests may not only be easily achievable but also can be sustainable. Therefore some of the economic mechanisms and instruments that are thought to contribute to regional integration may include building roads, railways and creating sea and air links, i.e., communications infrastructures that bring economic integration through linking different regions, and peoples who formerly lived in isolation leading to travel, migration, trade, etc. (cf. Kymlicka and Patten, 2003: 12). Further, the possibility of economic complementarity where there is differentiality in resource endowment constitutes reason enough for nations to aim at integration. In addition, economic integration is rationally and functionally presumed to be effectively induced, if predicated on selective high-value items like coal and steel in the European case. For the GHR it could be mentioned that there could be agricultural products, livestock, oil, water, port services, etc. that can serve as economic complementarity. The theory of economic complementarities is predicated on theories of endowment differentiality. Contiguous societies endowed with diverging resources may enter into cooperation in order to mutually compensate for some of the resources they lack. Since the cooperation is based on material that is produced externally, cooperation would be the preferable option, rather than competition that endangers integration. Nevertheless regional integration is context-contingent. Dictated by the specificity of the relations of the involved states, priorities could shift. States characterised by chronic inter-state conflict may need to prioritise security issues (Mills, 1995: 9). The validity of this argument is compelling for the region at hand. Security issues in the GHR may precede economic and political issues. The political school of thought of integration, on the other hand,  This gave way to the creation of European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 consisting of France, Italy, West Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, followed by the European Economic Community in 1957. 1

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focuses on superstructure where political integration through the creation of political institutions is presumed viable. The presumed political institutions that are needed to speed up regional political integration will include a regional parliament, a regional commission or authority, a regional president, common regional security forces, common regional defence, common foreign policy, etc. – a process on which the African Union (AU) seems to have embarked since February 2009 (cf. AU Strategic Plan, 2009– 12). These arrangements have the nature of supra-national statehood because they override national political institutions. In a supra-national arrangement states agree to exercise some of their sovereignty together (Matthews, 2003). In this sense political integration may be perceived as more advanced. Another difference featuring the two strategies while economic integration maybe associated with the bottom-up integration strategy, the political integration could be said to have close association with the topdown strategy. Economic integration may involve private and sectoral actors, and cross-border community transactions as well. The role of decision makers in this respect will be restricted to facilitating the integration through the provision of a conducive legal and political environment. Perhaps a third model could also be suggested. The third model is neither economic nor political but instead proposes a combination of both, that is the carrying out of a simultaneous process of economic and political integration. This synthetic model may offer a superior approach. Similarly a simultaneous process of top-down and bottom-up strategies of regional integration could also be considered as highly possible and even appropriate. In summation, the two strategies (bottom-up and top-down) could complement each other. The complementarities could operate in a manner such that the communities across the geo-political boundaries, from a bottom-up perspective, enhance regional integration, while decisionmakers, from a top-down perspective, facilitate regional integration through creating a conducive environment. In the end the convergence of both strategies will lead to functioning and lasting regional integration.

HISTORY AS A BURDEN OR AS A RESOURCE IN THE GREATER HORN? Historical experiences either facilitate or impede regional integration. Under certain circumstances history may facilitate or even speed up regional integration, while under other circumstances it may block it. The European experience is a good testimony to the fact that historical experience may serve as a facilitating agent. After several hundred years of intra-European wars, and two World Wars originating in Europe, European states set out to realise the project of European integration. Lessons of past horrific wars served to indicate to Europeans that regional integration could work to prevent future wars. ‘Never again to experience

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war’ in the European arena was the most potent instrument that brought Europeans together. Nevertheless the road to regional integration has not been smooth. Neither has it, after fifty years, become a popular project standing on popular democratic institutions, norms and values with which the common man could identify. Nevertheless, peace has been preserved and the process of integration has steadily advanced. So far history in the GHR has served as impediment. Ethio-Somali (see chapter 7) and Ethio-Eritrean (Bereketeab, 2012) relations demonstrate how bitter historical experiences may be real obstacles to achieving regional integration. The peculiar nature of the history of conflict and war in the GHR is that it is still continuing. It is argued that a running conflict would neither facilitate nor relieve the burden of history, nor would it help in a healing process and correcting historical injustices. Most of all, more concretely as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) put it: First, conflicts in any member of a regional economic community undermine economic integration and growth throughout the entire community. Countries in conflict cannot focus on integration. Second, conflicts create distrust. Third, conflicts divert resources that could be used to strengthen national economies and promote regional integration. Fourth, conflicts result in contraction of markets and erection of non-tariff barriers to regional trade (UNECA, 2006: 16).

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One of the legacies of historical experiences with a negative effect on regional integration is the mistrust and suspicion that may arise and haunt the parties for a long time. A common-sense-informed inference would be that, in order to achieve regional integration, it would be imperative to resolve pending conflicts and wars. All concerned stakeholders and researchers should pay due attention to conflicts and wars and their resolution. Those countries and communities that feel they have been subjected to historical injustices need assurances that such injustices will not recur again. Moreover, historical rivalries such as that between France and Germany may need to be settled in order to enable the regional integration to stand on solid ground. Ethiopia, the superpower of the region, needs to assure those peoples with a bitter historical experience that there is, in practice, nothing that they need to fear. It may also be wise for those victims to remember that dwelling too much on past history may not promote peace and stability. It is argued that a combination of a history of conflict and a hegemonic position may affect negatively the integration process. Alan Matthews, for instance, argues that ‘the presence of a regional hegemon undermines the stability of the grouping because of fears among the remaining members about the distribution of benefits and their concerns that the grouping is simply a mechanism for the hegemon to extend its economic and political influence’ (Matthews, 2003: 42). Just as ‘European integration can be regarded as an experiment in identity formation’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 23), in the end regional integration in the GHR can arguably be understood as a process of reformulating, redefining and re-strategizing identity and citizenship. Entrenched

Re-conceptualizing Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

identity and citizenship perception coupled with recent or current historical experience of conflicts and wars may constitute real stumbling blocks in the endeavour of regional integration in the GHR. What should be done then? As intimated earlier, the first step should be relieving the burden of history. Accordingly, healing wounds, correcting historical, social, cultural and economic injustices within and across political boundaries could be the necessary measures toward seeking remedies. The second step would be constructing a common supra-national identity, that is, a regional identity. Unless regional integration is founded on a common regional identity it will remain an elitist project, and as such it will be precarious and fragile. We have to be able to construct a narrative of common regional identity with which people would be able to identify, and where citizenship loyalty is transferred to a regional political authority upon which duties and rights are conferred. However, a critical question remains to be resolved, namely, should conflict resolution precede regional integration or could conflicts be resolved within regional integration? An import instrument in achieving all this will arguably be education. The history that has so far been taught in schools contributed to division, suspicion and mistrust among peoples of the region. It is time that history should be reappraised. Furthermore, schools, universities, learning establishments in general and mass media in particular need to coordinate, integrate and conciliate education and education systems in order to promote and sustain regional integration. The impact of education in constructing, reconstructing and deconstructing history and in socializing and re-socializing the human mind is of great significance. Schools in the region, in concrete terms, need to try to adjust and adapt school curricula to provide common history instruction that will thrust integration forward.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter set out to examine the regional integration possibilities stemming from the variables in identity and citizenship. A basic assumption underpinning the navigation through the examination of the process of regional integration in this chapter has been that how we perceive our identity and citizenship influences the success or failure of regional integration. In that regard the chapter briefly reviewed concepts and theories that deal with identity and citizenship. To that end three concepts and theories addressing identity and citizenship have been examined. These were primordialist, modernist and post-modernist theories. Based on the assumptions and conceptions each of these theoretical concepts makes, it was suggested that, while the primordialist school of thought through its focus on the communally featured and determined affiliation of identity would pose obstacles for regional integration, the modernist school of thought by its transcendence to modern civic criteria of identity and citizenship may be more accommodative to regional integration. The

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most ideal situation for regional integration to be achieved, it is argued, however, would be under the premises laid down by the post-modernist school of thought. The critical question posed in the chapter is how we relate or make relevant these concepts and theories whose spatio-temporal origin is ‘the West’. Bearing in mind the legitimacy of this question, we made efforts to examine the diversity and complexity of the societies of the GHR. This diversity and complexity was expressed in the social categories of the rural, urban and diaspora populations, an evolution that has been taking place over hundreds of years, including under European colonial influence. These social categories roughly correspond to the concepts of primordial, modern and post-modern, thus validating the use of the concepts and theories. The chapter also examined some variables of an empirical nature that have policy implications. These are bottom-up and top-down integration strategies and the implications of history. A bottom-up strategy of regional integration may require popular support and anchorage on public institutions. These characteristics, on the one hand, make it a long-term project that may take time to consolidate, while, on the other, they make it durable in that, once it is founded on public institutions, values and norms it will be functional and sustainable. It is also more people-based. A top-down strategy of regional integration could follow a breakneck pace since it is an enterprise carried out by the political powers. As an elitist project, however, it may be vulnerable. This vulnerability stems from the fact that it is contingent on the good will of political leaders. Taking into consideration the nature of the political leaders in the region, this strategy of regional integration is rendered precarious. Perhaps the last point that I want to mention here is the burden of history. The experiences from the region as well as from Europe indicate that historical experiences, particularly those permeated with conflicts and wars, may either facilitate or hinder regional integration. We have seen how in Europe the fatigue of wars led to the inception of the European Economic Community (EEC) that eventually advanced to the European Union (EU) with its more ambitious agenda. So far conflicts and wars in the GHR are playing the role of undermining the region’s integration efforts. Finally, a point of advice: as the lesson from Europe could be drawn, it is imperative that the region’s integration proceed gradually. Perhaps it would be wise to address first the conflicts and wars that are bedevilling the region. Whether we begin with economic and proceed to political integration, or the inception embraces both, priorities should be clearly articulated, planned, implemented and controlled.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdallah, A. A. 2008. ‘State Building, Independence and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Djibouti’, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), PostConflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa: A Report of the 6th Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa, August 24–26, 2007. Lund: Lund University. Adam, H. 1994. ‘Ethnic Versus Civic Nationalism; South Africa’s NonRacialism in Comparative Perspective’, South African Sociological Review 7(1). African Futures and Phylos IPE. 2002. A Guide to Conducting Futures Studies in Africa. Abidjan: African Futures; Cantley, Quebec: Phylos IPE. Available at www.wfsf.org/ocpr/interieurnew1-38.pdf (accessed 17 April 2012). African Union Commission (AUC). 2009. Strategic Plan 2009–2012. AUC Directorate for Strategic Planning Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation and Resource Mobilization. Available from www.au.int/en (accessed 17 April 2012). Alwy, A. and S. Schech. 2004. ‘Ethnic Inequalities in Education in Kenya’, International Education Journal 5(2): 266–74. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (revised edn). London and New York: Verso. Armstrong, J. 1982. Nations Before Nationalism. Chapel Hill NC: University of Northern Carolina Press. Beck, U. and N. Sznaider. 2010. ‘Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda’, The British Journal of Sociology 61 (Issue Supplement s1): 381–403. Available at http://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01250.x/full (accessed 17 April 2012). Bellamy, R. 2008. Citizenship: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bendix, R. 1964. Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order. New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons. Bereketeab, R. 2004. ‘Perilous Dualism: Language, religion and identity in polyethnic Eritrea’, in H. Englund and F. B. Nyamnjoh (eds), Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa. London and New York: Zed Books. – 2007. Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890–1991. Trenton NJ and Asmara: Red Sea Press. – 2008. ‘State-Building Project of Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa’, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa. Lund: Research Report in Social Anthropology. – 2009. ‘Ethnic and Civic Basis of Citizenship in the Horn of Africa’, in Sthlm Policy Group (ed.), Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace in the Horn of Africa. Lund: Lund University, Department of Social Anthropology and Department of Economic History. 45

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Bereketeab, R. 2012. ‘The Complex Roots of the Second Eritrea-Ethiopia War: Re-examining the Causes’, African Journal of International Affairs, CODESRIA, in press. Brubaker, R. 2002. ‘Ethnicity Without Groups’, European Journal of ­Sociology XLIII (2): 163–189. Brubaker, R. and F. Cooper. 2000. ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society 29: 1–47. Bull-Christiansen, L. 2004. ‘Tales of the Nation: Feminist Nationalism or Patriotic History? Defining National History and Identity in Zimbabwe’, Research Report 132. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Clark, J. 2009. ‘Nation-State Belonging among Asian Australians and the Question of Transnationalism’, Current Sociology 57(1): 27–46. Cliffe, L. 2004. ‘Regional Impact of the Eritrea-Ethiopia War’ in Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (eds), Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War. Trenton NJ and Asmara: Red Sea Press. Connor, W. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Davidson, B. 1992. The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. London: James Currey. Delgado-Moreira, J. M. 1997. ‘Cultural Citizenship and the Creation of European Identity’, Electronic Journal of Sociology. Available at www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado_d.html (accessed 17 April 2012). Dorman, S., D. Hammett and P. Nugent (eds). 2007. Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa. African Social Studies Series, 16. Leiden and Boston MA: Brill. Ekeh, P. P. 1975. ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 17(1): 91–112. Eriksen, T. H. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological perspective. London, East Haven: Pluto Press. Fanta, E. 2008. ‘Dynamics of Regional (non-) Integration in Eastern Africa’, UNU-CRIS Working Paper W-2008/2. Available at www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/Emmanuel.pdf (accessed 17 April 2012). Featherstone, M. 2002. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’, Theory, Culture & Society 19 (1–2): 1–16. Gellner, E. 1983. Nation and Nationalism. Cambridge MA and Oxford: Blackwell. Greenfield, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Guibernau, M. 1996. Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habtu, Alem. 2003. ‘Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background, Present Conditions and Future Prospects’. Paper submitted to the Second EAF International Symposium on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia, July 11–12, Addis Ababa. 46

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Harir, S. 1994. ‘Recycling the Past in the Sudan: An overview of political decay’, in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (eds), Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitet. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, and Sydney: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, L. and G. Marks. 2008. ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science 39(1): 1–23. Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Group in Conflict. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Hutchinson, J. 2000. ‘Ethnicity and Modern Nations’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(4): 651–69. James, P. 1996. Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community. London, Thousand Oaks CA, New Delhi: Sage. Johnson, G. R. 1997. ‘The Architecture of Ethnic Identity’, Politics and the Life Sciences 16(2): 257–62. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. and A. Patten. 2003. ‘Language Rights and Political Theory’, Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 23: 3–21. Lustick, I. S., D. Miodownik and R. Eidelson. 2004. ‘Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does sharing power prevent or encourage it?’ American Political Science Review 98(2): 209–29. Markakis, J. 1974. Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Matthews, A. 2003. Regional Integration and Food Security in Developing Countries. Rome: FAO (UN). Mazrui, A. A., 1983. ‘Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial ethnicity and African political formation’, in D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (eds), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder CO: Westview Press. McCrone, D. 1998. The Sociology of Nationalism. London and New York: Routledge. McHenry, D. E. 1997, November. ‘Federalism in Africa: Is it a solution to, or a cause of, ethnic problems?’ Presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Columbus OH. Mills, G. 1995. ‘South Africa and Africa: Regional Integration and Security Co-Operation’, Africa Security Review 4(2). Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2007. ‘The Politics of Citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in S. Dorman et al. (eds), Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa. Leiden and London: Brill. Pakulski, J. and B. Tranter. 2000. ‘Civic Identity in Australia’, Australian Journal of Social Issues 35(1): 35–51. Purvis, T. and A. Hunt. 1999. ‘Identity Versus Citizenship: Transformations in the discourses and practices of citizenship’, Social & Legal Studies 8(4): 457–82.

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Salih, M. A. Mohamed (ed.). Forthcoming. The Greater Horn of Africa: Livelihood, Institutions, Conflict and Peace. Santer, J. (President of the European Commission). 1995. Keynote Address to the World Telecommunications Forum Opening Ceremony, Geneva, 10/3/95). Shinn, D. 2008. ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea: Evaluating U.S. Policy on the HOA’. Testimony by David H. Shinn. Available at www.jimmatimes.com/ article.cfm?page=2&articleID=31211 (accessed 17 April 2012). – 2009 March 12. ‘Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations’, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations at The Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Available at http://elliott.gwu.edu/news/ testimony/shinn031209.cfm (accessed 17 April 2012). Smith, A. D. 1983. Theories of Nationalism (2nd edn). New York: Holmes & Meier. – 1986. The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Cambridge MA and Oxford: Basil Blackwell. – 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. London and New York: Routledge. Taylor, C. 1994. Multiculturalism: the Politics of Recognition. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Teshome, W. B. and Záhořík, J. 2008. ‘Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia’, International Journal of Human Sciences 5(2). Available at www.insanbilimleri.com (accessed 20 April 2012). UNECA, 2006. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities. Addis Ababa: UNECA. van den Berghe, P. L. 1981. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier. van den Broek, H. 1994, March 17. ‘The Challenge of a Wider Europe’. Speech delivered to the Institute for European Studies. Brussels: European Commission Press Release. Vincent, A. 1987. Theories of the State. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Voros, L. 2006. ‘Methodological and Theoretical Aspects of “Social identities” Research in Historiography’, in Lud’a Klusáková and Steven G.  Ellis (eds), Frontiers and Identities: Exploring the Research Area. Pisa: Pisa University Press. Werbner, P. 1997. ‘Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in the Construction of Racism and Ethnicity’, in Pnina Werbner and Tarig Modood (eds), Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of AntiRacism. London: Zed Books. Woodward, P. 1994. ‘Sudan: State Building and the Seeds of Conflicts’, in Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth (eds), Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its alternatives. Aldershot, Brookfield WI, Singapore, Sydney: Dartmouth Publishing. 48

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Young, C. 2007. ‘Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship: Dilemmas of democracy and civil order in Africa’, in S. Dorman et al. (eds), Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and citizenship in Africa. Leiden: Brill. Young, C. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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3 A Diversity Perspective on Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region FOWSIA ABDULKADIR

INTRODUCTION Integration, applied to any society, means the incorporation of disparate ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups of a population into a unified whole. In other words, an integrated society is one that provides equal opportunity for all groups, so that no one group is denied access to education, employment and ownership of property by reason of their ethnicity, religion or national origin (Encarta). Evidence abounds that integration, whether at country level, as in the example of the USA, or regional level, as in the example of the EU, can improve the socio-economic development of member groups. However, as Mengisteab points out in his Concept Paper, most African regional integration entities such as IGAD are not achieving their potential (Mengisteab, 2009: 1). This concept paper nicely underlines the complexity of regional integration within the context of the Greater Horn of Africa region. I would contend that to really enhance our depth of understanding of the factors underlying the complex context of the Horn of Africa, we need to examine how diversity dimensions, such as ethnic, gender, linguistic and religion, were exploited by all post-colonial African states, the Horn of Africa being no exception. At the dawn of independence, newly independent African states became replicas of the oppressive colonial state. These repressive states then embarked on nation-building agendas that were narrowly defined and created ethnic hierarchies within states, where one identity group heavily controls the executive arm of the state. This in turn leads to states that lack broadbased consensus from their various identity groups. This chapter will provide an overview of how diversity has never been appropriately addressed in the Horn of Africa’s post-colonial states, a history of how ethnic hierarchy as the model of addressing diversity threw this region into perpetual identity-based conflicts taking place between the state and its various marginalized identity groups. According to El-Battahani, identity groups may rebel to resist states enforcing singular national identity within their nation-building agendas (El-Battahani, 2007, cited in Mengisteab, 2009:11). The aim of this chapter is to examine

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how poor diversity management leads to conflicts and undermines country-level integration of diverse groups within the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa, and how mismanagement of diversity by the state in turn leads to tense socio-political relationships between the Greater Horn states and their diverse ethnic groups. The chapter will highlight the unstable history of this region to draw out lessons to be learned. As well, this study contends that, when reflecting on the concepts of regional integration and democratization for the Horn of Africa, it is critical to assess first how the different ethnic groups in these countries are integrated into the governing structures of these countries before we can essentially promote regional integration. Dahl put forward opportunities democracy provides which can serve as criteria to measure whether there are inclusive democratic processes in any ‘popular government’ system. These include, among others, ‘effective participation’ and ‘equality in voting’, two fundamental criteria which have been glaringly missing from some of the Greater Horn countries, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Dahl further posits that if any of the required criteria for democracy is violated, the members of that country cannot be considered equal citizens (Dahl, 2000:38). The Greater Horn of Africa is a region which has been marred in conflicts laced with colonial and post-colonial legacies (Geshekter, 1985). This reality, now more than ever, makes it necessary for the peoples of the Horn to persist and find lasting solutions for their region if they are not to be besieged by the constant dynamic global changes. According to Edmond Keller, the shift towards political democracy has ended up leading to heightened ethnic and other forms of social pressures. In certain places like Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), these domestic pressures have resulted in spilling over the border into neighbouring countries. Some of the current conflicts in the Horn of Africa, for instance, have resulted in flows of refugees crossing international borders, poverty and famine as well as conditions of gross human rights violations (Keller, 2002). We have seen how domestic conflicts in Somalia have spilled over borders and created regional insecurity issues. Given that domestic conflicts have the potential to destabilize the entire region, we need to think through regional- and sub-regional-based strategies and solutions focused on overcoming these domestic conflicts. Exploring regional integration in the Greater Horn Horizon Forum is not only timely, but it is needed, given the current geo-political global context. Keller posits that the African research agenda is wide open for researchers who approach political economy and international relations research issues through the prism of regional lenses (ibid.). Employing diversity lenses, this chapter will provide an assessment of ethnic-diversity mismanagement in the Greater Horn region and will contend that narrowly-defined nation-building processes need to be addressed before effective regional integration can be promoted in this region. Narrowly-defined nation-building agendas have led to ethnic

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hierarchies in the countries of the Greater Horn, where certain ethnic groups heavily control the resources of the country while certain others become alienated from the political and public policy-shaping processes. The following section will explore perspectives on how diversity was exploited under colonial rule.

DIVERSITY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE COLONIAL STATE The colonial state was historically formed as a ‘bifurcated state’, and it had certain fundamental features wherever it was established, be it in Africa, Asia, or Latin America (Mamdani, 1996). In responding and attempting to address the ‘native question’, European colonizers employed ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rule to rule over a majority of diverse populations across the globe. The origin of ‘direct rule’ was European countries’ first response to the administration issues of the colonies. At the core of it there is one single legal process articulated by the ‘civilized’ laws of Europe, hence rendering ‘native’ institutions ‘uncivilized’; only a privileged few ‘natives’ were folded into and accepted as ‘civilized’ citizens with similar rights.1 According to Mamdani (1996), for the majority of ‘natives’, who were excluded from the rights of citizenship, ‘direct rule’ stood for ‘centralized despotism’. On the other hand, ‘indirect rule’ was the process with which the ‘free’ masses or peasantry were documented. So for the colonized populations, ‘indirect rule’ stood for ‘decentralized despotism’. Mamdani further posits that direct and indirect rule eventually complemented each other in the manner in which they controlled ‘native’ populations. On the one hand, direct rule was the process of urban power, excluding the majority of colonized ‘natives’ from civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens of civilized society. On the other hand, indirect rule was signified in a rural tribal authority which incorporated the majority of colonized ‘natives’ into a state-enforced communal/tribal authority. It should be noted that the day-to-day violence and control of the colonial state was meted through the established tribal or ‘native’ authority, which was in turn backed up and reinforced by urban-based civil power; hence the colonial tyranny was highly decentralized yet very hierarchical (Mamdani, 1996). The important caveat to take from this is that the despotic colonial-state structure has permeated the traditional structures of the local communities, and introduced hierarchies to maintain control over large and diverse groups with limited presence. This colonial legacy brought into play an oppressive state approach to managing diversity within its borders. The  There is analysis put forward by authors such as Mahmood Mamdani on Africa’s experience which further elucidates the ways that power was organized in colonial Africa, and the manner in which it has fragmented resistance in contemporary Africa. By situating both the discourse of rights and that of culture in their historical and institutional context, Mamdani illuminates how parts of the African colonial institutional legacy continue to be reproduced through opposing social forces or concepts of state reform and popular resistance, a legacy that was formed and framed through colonial experience (Mamdani,1996). 1

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following section will look at the ethnic compositions of the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa.

DIVERSITY DIMENSIONS IN THE GREATER HORN Before delving into the concept of the integration within the context of the Greater Horn Region, it is important to look at the notion of cultural diversity within this region. This is defined by Will Kymlicka (2007) as: ‘the variety of human societies or cultures in a specific region’– such as the Greater Horn. In other words, a community is said to be culturally diverse if its residents include members of different groups. Cultural diversity is important insofar as it is an overarching concept which encompasses more than racial classification, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. Diversity in the Greater Horn Region includes cultural, ethnic, gender, linguistic and socio-economic diversity as well as diversity in livelihoods, e.g. agrarian, pastoral and agro-pastoral populations. Moreover, this region’s linguistic diversity is phenomenal: for instance, the smallest country in this region is Djibouti, and it has several language groups in its population. Prior to South Sudan splitting off, Sudan, one of the larger countries of the Greater Horn, was a multilingual country with Arabic dominating the North, and many other languages in the South. In the 2005 constitution of the Sudan, the official languages of Sudan are Standard Arabic and English. However, there are over hundred languages spoken across the Sudans: among the most-spoken languages in South Sudan are Dinka, Nuer, Acholi, Madi, Otuho, Bari, Lopit, Didinga, Zande, Avukaya, Murule, Toposa, Abuya, Shilluk, Anywak, and Lango (Lewis, 2009). Similarly, Uganda is another example of a multilingual country. Forty of its living indigenous languages fall into three major families of Bantu, Nilotic, and Sudanic with another two languages in the Kuliak family of languages (Ladefoged et al., 1972; Parry, 2000). A comprehensive listing of the interesting ethnic diversities in each of the Greater Horn countries, where there are several ethnic groups in each country, is shown in table 3.1. Table 3.1 Mapping ethnic diversity in the Greater Horn Region (based on Salih, 2009: 62) Country

Ethnic Groups

Djibouti Eritrea

Somali (60%), Afar (35%), Others (5%) Tigrinya (50%), Tigre and Kunama (40%), Afar (4%), Saho (3%), Others (3%) Oromo (40%), Amhara (30%), Sidamo (6%), Tigray (5%), Shankella (6%), Somali (6%), Afar (4%), Gurage (2%), Others (1%)

Ethiopia

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Country

Ethnic Groups

Kenya

Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Meru (6%), other African (15%), non-African origin – Asian, European and Arab (1%) Somali (85%), Bantu and other non-Somali (15%) Acholi, Anuak, Azande, Bari, Bongo, Buiri, Didinga, Dinka, Kakwa, Kuku, Landi, Lango, Mandar, Murle, Ndoga, Shilluk, Toposa, Others

Somalia South Sudan (population percentages not available) Sudan Uganda

Sudanese Arabs (70%), Fur, Beja, Nuba, Fallata and Others (30%) Baganda (17%), Bagisu (5%), Iteso (8%), Acholi (4%), Basoga (8%), Lugbara (4%), Banyankore (8%), Banyoro (3%), Banyaruanda, (6%), Batoro (3%), Bakiga (7%), Karamojong (2%), Lango (5%), Others (20%).

Compiled from various archives, including Infoplease, Highbeam and Library of Congress Country Studies (cited in Salih, 2009: 62–63), CIA World Factbook

Ethno-cultural diversity is real in the Greater Horn Region and given the fact that protracted ethnic-based conflicts plague this region, it can be said that ethnic diversity has proved to be a stubborn and difficult-to-manage reality in the face of the countries of the Horn. Hence it is important to dig deeper into the historical trajectories of these states in general, and how diversity was previously addressed within the boundaries of the countries of the Horn in particular. It is important to note that ethno-cultural diversity is not the cause of the prevalence of conflict which is rather due to how the colonial administrations and post-colonial nation-states have mismanaged and at times exploited diversity by granting or limiting access to social and material resources to certain groups while excluding others and relegating them to the periphery of society. The development of post-colonial autocratic nation-states, set on controlling production resources, provided to some ethno-cultural groups advantage over others. In Somalia, for instance, various clans and sub-clans being in competition for total control of the resources of the state and its military machinery have led to the total collapse of the state in this country.

DIVERSITY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN THE GREATER HORN There were varieties of post-colonial states that emerged after independence through reforms across the continent, which can be categorized into two main categories: the ‘conservative’ and the ‘radical’ (Salih, 2009). In the category of the ‘conservative’ African states, the colonial hierarchy

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of the local state machinery, from chiefs to headmen, continued into postindependence. In the ‘radical’ category of African states, there were some changes where a set of tribally-defined customary laws was replaced by another set deemed to be transcending tribal borders which were to be applicable to all, regardless of ethnic and cultural diversity. These ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ post-colonial states in Africa need to be understood as residual and at times replicas of the colonial state. To elaborate, the United Kingdom spearheaded a theory which claimed its special form of colonial domination, presented as an enlightened and permissive recognition of the ‘native’ culture; even though its control and power over the ‘natives’ grew through diffusion of its own power and creating hierarchies for social control, the colonial state claimed this process to be no more than a reverence to local tradition and customs (Salih, 2009). What we can take from the above observation of the post-colonial state and how it originated is that there is an entire discourse and colonial knowledge through which African ethno-cultural identities were shaped into ethnic hierarchies which in essence impeded inclusive democratization. To come to terms with this inherited colonial legacy in Africa, we need to comprehend and deconstruct the contradictions in the claims of the post-colonial state; we need structural analysis of the institutions within which formal customs and traditions were fabricated and reproduced in order to maintain control. Deconstructing colonial knowledge and discourses that shaped ethno-cultural identity hierarchies can assist in how we re-examine the socio-political relationship between the Greater Horn states and their diverse ethnic groups. Many groups of people try to find and desire to comprehend the origins of their suffering. In some instances, the search for the past can also be used as an approach to not only interpret the present but to also predict the future (Dugassa, 2006). Although there will never be complete agreement on past history, at least history can help us synthesize what happened, and how the past was shaped to lead to the events that occurred. These critical questions will deepen our understanding of how the past is, at times, redesigned and totally reshaped to create or recreate situations that fit into fabricated past events (ibid.). Said argues that colonialism and imperialism are interwoven with the practice, theory, and attitude of dominating a territory and its people; therefore the struggle against it is also about ideas (Said, 1994, cited in Dugassa, 2006). According to Frantz Fanon, colonialism is not about only holding groups of people in its grip, but it is also about emptying the ‘native’ brains of all forms and content of local knowledge; it does not stop until it turns people’s understanding of their history upside down, and devalues pre-colonial history (Fanon, 1996, cited in Dugassa, 2006). It is crucial to problematize colonial knowledge, and colonial education and the way it devalued indigenous knowledge, languages and cultures and emphasized the superiority of Eurocentric knowledge, language and history.

A Diversity Perspective on Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region

These shifts to adopting Eurocentric knowledge therefore led to colonized people adopting the colonizers’ world views and replicating their inherited social and cultural hierarchies. We need to decolonize knowledge and identity, and to that end we must critically assess the manner in which ideology reproduces and at times distorts the social and political truth, and its material and psychological bases, and the false consciousness that it represents (Dugassa, 2006). Paul Freire, addressing the impact of ideology, states that ‘the dominant ideology lives inside us and also controls society outside. If this domination inside and outside was complete, definitive, we could never think of social transformation.’ (Shor and Freire, 1987, cited in Dugassa, 2006) Within the context of the Horn of Africa and post-colonial states, it is imperative to understand these states as coming out of the colonial legacy, perhaps with the exception of Ethiopia. Colonialism is rooted in an ideology of dominance as opposed to a simple and straightforward process of wealth accumulation and acquisition (ibid.). Post-colonial Horn of Africa states, like many others in the continent, were replicas of that despotic colonial state, a colonial state that was built on the notion that in order to civilize certain people and territories, they needed to be conquered and dominated, therefore colonialism unleashed oppressive state apparatus that dominated groups if their worldviews were incompatible with the dominant group (Said, 1994). One of the many issues that the advents of colonialism, post-colonialism and neo-colonialism, brought to bear, is acute inequality, and its by-product of conflicts between the core and periphery regions is a prominent feature in most countries of the Greater Horn of Africa. Almost all of these countries’ diversity was mismanaged, whether ethno-cultural diversity, clan or tribal diversity. Ethnic identities were politicized in the Greater Horn countries, and political processes in these countries were not fair and equitable to each of their diverse groups. Elites from certain clan, ethnic, tribe, religious or linguistic groups dominated governance structures of these countries while others were marginalized from equitable access to and participation in those governance structures. For instance, the Amhara ethnic group dominated state control in Ethiopia for decades till they were replaced by a Tigray-dominated current political party in the early 1990s, which means that now political power is concentrated in the hands of the Tigray ethnic group in Ethiopia. In the Sudan, Arabic speaking northerners controlled the political arena and, in essence, marginalized the southern Sudanese and kept them in the periphery. To elaborate, the country was entrenched in a south/ north conflict for decades, and during this long-lasting conflict, ethnic, language and religious differences were exploited. Northerners dominated and controlled the government and managed public resources, and in the process marginalized the southern Sudanese and pushed them to resistance till they seceded and became a separate country in 2011. Somalia, the least diverse country in this region, also demonstrated diversity mismanagement, clanism and regionalism which created a situation

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of total dislocation where elites from three regional groupings, namely Puntland, Somaliland, and South Central Somalia have exploited clan and regional differences to the extent that it led to total collapse of the state (Roble, 2009). The Somalia case illustrates a country that does not have to contend with major diversity issues, such as ethnic/tribal, linguistic and religious differences; however, what minor differences existed in regional and livelihood patterns and variations have been so mismanaged and exploited by both the civilian regimes of the 1960s and the twenty-year military dictatorship of Siad Barre, that Somali regional and clan elites do not trust each other now and cannot agree on a coherent governance structure, whether it is centralized, federal or confederal. Applying the ‘core-periphery theory’ to the Somalia scene, it illustrates socio-cultural conflict which is the result of exacerbated economic and political inequality. According to the ‘core-periphery’ frame of analysis, such inequality can be addressed by minimizing economic, social and regional inequalities (ibid.) through inclusive processes of governance able to ensure equitable resource distribution/redistribution, and equitable participation in the socio-political structures of the country. Ethiopia provides another example of a country entrenched in protracted ethnic-based conflict. The monarchy, under the leadership of Menelik II and subsequently Haile Selassie, employed a nation-building agenda where every Ethiopian, regardless of ethnicity, had to learn Amharic, the language of the ruling elite. Hence, an ethnic and linguistic hierarchy was created in a very diverse country; this led to certain nonAmhara groups finding themselves at the bottom of the ‘food-chain’ in Ethiopia. What is interesting about the Ethiopian case is that it provides a trajectory of rulers and governments who established very stronghanded centralized governments, to the extent that it produced many large ethnically-based resistance movements. The current ruling elite has its origins in an ethnic-based resistance movement, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which was created to rebel against Amhara hegemony. Nevertheless, the current regime is accused of committing gross human rights violation against Oromos, Somalis, and the peoples of southern ethnic groups and nationalities. This is an example of repeating past historical errors in managing diversity in the Horn of Africa. To disentangle the ethnic-identity-based conflict in this region, we need to take into account that all these insidious despotic state apparatuses were inherited at the dawn of independence, and then subsequently embarked on narrowly defined programmes of nation-building. We need to find a way to make state institutions more inclusive and accommodating of the diverse groups of people within their borders before we can embark on regional integration processes in the Horn of Africa.

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TACKLING DIVERSITY MISMANAGEMENT AND ETHNICBASED CONFLICTS Much historical conventional wisdom about the trajectory of the African state was finally abandoned by academics and policy-makers alike by the end of the twentieth century (Dorman et al., 2007). In the way they evolved, post-independence African nations/states were moving away from the western model of a nation-state, and it was not clear what was taking its place. It seems that failure of statehood in Africa was exposed with regard to the type of strategies it used to integrate the different identity groups within their boundaries. Dorman et al. contend that even though there has been breakdown of order within many African countries, nationalism certainly has not become a thing of the past. But rather, there are a number of cases which have been noted with an increased presence and appeals to nationalism that cannot be ignored or regarded as opportunistic (ibid.). They state that the debates of nationalism and ethnicity have instead run in parallel within and across states, at times conflicting and at other times feeding off each other, the reason being that they occupy a great deal of common ground. It is contended that weak central authorities can lead to empowerment of certain actors at the margins to demand the refashioning of nationalism in a way that redefines who belongs and who does not, a particular form of the ‘politics of recognition’ (Englund and Nyamnjoh, 2004, cited in Dorman et al., 2007). It is important to acknowledge that Eurocentric concepts of ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘ethnic groups’ and other presumed social entities have unleashed ethnic hegemony in most parts of Africa, and the Horn is no exception. Moreover, diversity of ethnicity, and nationality, are a reality on the ground to grapple with in the Greater Horn countries. Given the number of ethnic-based conflicts in this region, ethno-cultural diversity cannot be ignored and needs to be addressed in a substantive manner, since it has proved to be a stubborn reality facing the countries of the Horn. Shedding light on the South African experience with these issues, Neville Alexander points to the fact that it is challenging to come up with strategies to enhance networking among various groups and/or integrate the population of the country. Kidane Mengisteab illustrates issues related to approaches to statebuilding within the context of the Horn. This author underlines problems with some of the strategies the states employ to integrate the different groups and territorial jurisdictions and to establish a community of citizens who share common institutions. Just like many other African states, the origins of the Greater Horn states and how they were formed influenced the approaches to state-building on which they embarked. Kidane also underlines, on the one hand, the fact that most states in the Greater Horn were established by colonialism and inherited a hierarchy of development needs corresponding to a hierarchy of identities cultivated and maintained through the colonial state. On the other hand, he points

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to the state of Ethiopia that was established through internal expansion, which led to winners and losers among its nationals, where the latter became subjects and the former citizens. In both of these instances oppressive policies of assimilation were employed as strategies of nationstate building without adequately dealing with diversity and inequalities (Mengisteab, 2009). Another major challenge facing these countries is that the states in this region have failed to transform and reform pastoral-nomadic and peasantry groups’ modes of production and establish viable economic development policies. Instead of endeavouring to ameliorate the plight of these traditional populations in their jurisdiction, the Greater Horn states have at times exacerbated the condition of these at-risk groups of their population by implementing, for the purposes of expansion of commercial farming and extractive industries, land-grabbing policies that dislocate them (Mengisteab, 2009). Kidane further identifies the challenges of fragmented institutions in post-colonial African states. A disconnect between urban and rural dwellers, and the fragmented institutions, is also a phenomenon largely inherited from the bifurcated colonial state. The post-colonial state operates with alien institutions in an urban setting, while rural dwellers operate on the basis of custom or traditional institutions. This disconnected institutional fragmentation leads to and/or compounds social instability (ibid.). These instabilities have the potential to lead to competition among the elite to vie for political control which in turn leads to controlling the limited resources, given that whoever controls the state power ends up exercising unlimited control of the resources of the country. The Greater Horn countries need to come to terms with their ethnic and cultural diversities. Viable conflict-management methods are required and workable approaches to ethnic differences, as opposed to attempts at ‘eliminating’ different groups, and/or marginalizing and oppressing them. According to Peter Evans, methods for managing ethnic differences within a country differ, from strategies of national leaders to the intervention of external actors (Evans, 1993). However, external intervention did not work in the case of Somalia. Lake and Rothchild identify four main trustbuilding options needed for nation leaders to be able to address conflict: (1) ‘Demonstration of respect for all groups and their culture’ – this is something that the Greater Horn states need to seriously consider as a trust-building approach, and ways to do that may be by the use of popular cultural education programmes that can be established to foster such respect; (2) ‘Formal or informal power sharing’; (3) ‘elections according to rules that ensure either power sharing or the minimal representation of all ethnic groups in national politics’; and (4) ‘federalism or regional autonomy’ (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 205–13). Power sharing is gaining popularity in Africa, with examples such as Burundi, Djibouti, and South Africa, where efforts were made to ensure that different ethnic groups are represented in the national government (Keller, 2002). Reflecting on the above-mentioned steps for conflict

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management, it important to note that the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ is a potentially useful concept for the countries of the Greater Horn. There are two interesting examples of this in North America from which to draw some lessons. These are the Canadian and American approaches to multiculturalism. For instance, Canada initially underscored the concept that it was a bilingual and bicultural country – Francophone and Anglophone Canada (Van Den Berghe, 2002). However, this was later expanded to include First Nations and more recent immigrants. The USA attempted allinclusive multiculturalism with particular emphases on ‘de-racializing and de-legitimizing the white-black divisions and redefining them as cultural distinctions’ (ibid.). Here multiculturalism was paired with ‘diversity’ to subsume both race and ethnicity. According to Pierre Van Den Berghe, multiculturalism is heavily represented in intellectual discourse as the solution to ethnic diversity, and ‘multicultural democracy’ as the answer to the quest for democracy (Van Den Berghe, 2002). Will Kymlicka points out that although theorists of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ mostly focus on Western democracies, there are some who suggest that liberal multiculturalism can provide solutions to post-colonial states with ethnic conflicts to overcome. The notion of employing liberal multiculturalism is argued to have the potential to better address ethnic relations in post-colonial and post-communist states (Kymlicka, 2007). Democracy, or to use Robert Dahl’s term ‘popular government’, is sought after as the preferred form of government because it generates a number of desirable results. For instance, actual democracy puts into place mechanisms allowing societies to avoid tyranny; it promotes essential rights for everyone, and in addition to general freedoms it fosters self-determination and, most importantly, it endorses political equality (Dahl, 2000). There are inherent challenges in any democratic system in achieving all the necessary elements that make ‘popular government’ processes work, and the Greater Horn countries’ experiments in this respect are bound to face their share of challenges, especially since there are opposing political perspectives within each country as well as leaders with particular political agendas. This in part is due, I would contend, to this region’s largely contested history. Moreover, there are inherent contradictions that will surface when attempts are made at democratic projects in this region. For instance, in the case of Ethiopia, the ethnic federalism experiment is put forth in a country entrenched in opposing values of unity and diversity. Ethnicbased federalism is a contested concept; however, it is a concept one can accept and expect to have a great deal of relevance for the countries of the Greater Horn Region, if properly piloted and implemented, given that many of these countries have large and diverse populations from different ethnic groups who have been historically marginalized (Turton, 2006). Dahl discusses democracy and puts forward several opportunities that democracy provides, which can serve as criteria to measure actually inclusive democratic processes in any ‘popular government’ system.

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These include among others effective participation and equality in voting (Dahl, 2000). These two fundamental criteria have been glaringly missing from some of the Greater Horn countries, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

CONCLUSION According to the modernization theory, the ‘nation-state’ is depicted as the only unit established to meet the various needs of the society. The ‘national identity’, as constructed by the nation-state elsewhere, by colonial states that implemented ‘indirect rule’ and the postcolonial African nation-state – both of which employed oppressive and coercive approaches to national identity building – has led to violence and oppression towards minority groups. The consequences of this authoritarian approach to state-building and state sovereignty have been tyrannical states in the post-colonial Horn of Africa, dogmatic about homogenizing different groups within their territories including ethnocultural, linguistic and religious diversity groups opposing their rule. To conclude, in addition to all the shortcomings of the states of the countries of the Greater Horn, there are also historical plunders of previous regimes and grievances from the masses of these countries rooted in these histories. This chapter set out to highlight how the countries of the Greater Horn were not only unable to substantively deal with diversity, but have actually mismanaged and exploited their cultural diversities, through their historical trajectories. Dysfunctional patterns of diversity management have prevailed in the Greater Horn Region’s political landscapes. Moreover, this chapter emphasized the need to be able to substantively address diversity within each country, so that governance structures and bureaucratization processes are inclusive and reflect cultural diversity. According to Dahl, if any of the required criteria for democracy are violated the members of that country cannot be considered politically equals (Dahl, 2000: 38). When we are looking at the Greater Horn countries, it is critical that these countries are assessed through the lenses of diversity. In other words, if we consider how cultural diversity was and still is mismanaged and how ethnic hierarchies were/are the norm, we need to ensure that our analysis critically examines the countrylevel integration of diverse groups in public institution processes before we can sincerely promote regional-level integration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander, Neville. 1989. Language Policy and National Unity in South Africa/Azania. Cape Town: Buchu Books. 62

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Berman, Bruce, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka (eds). 2004. Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa. Oxford: James Currey and Athens OH: Ohio University Press. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The World Factbook. Available at www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed 26 April 2012). Chambers, Simone and Will Kymlicka. 2002. Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Dahl, Robert A. 1998. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. –  2000. On Democracy. London and New Haven CT: Yale University Press. Dorman, Sara, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (eds). 2007. Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa. African Social Studies Series: 16. Dugassa, Begna F. 2006. ‘Knowledge, Identity and Power: The Case of Ethiopia and Ethiopianness’. The Journal of Oromo Studies 13(1): 57–81. El-Battahani, Atta. 2007. ‘Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope: Competing Concepts on Sudan Identity and National Integration’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 7(2): 37–61. Encarta Encyclopaedia (digital). 1993–2009. Microsoft Corporation (discontinued). Englund, Harri and Francis B. Nyamnjoh (eds). 2004. Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa. Postcolonial Encounters Series. London and New York: Zed Books. Evans, Peter B. 1993. ‘Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections’ in Peter B. Evans,  Harold Karan Jacobson  and Robert D. Putnam  (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. (Studies in International Political Economy). Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1996. ‘On National Culture’, in M. Asante and A. Abarry (eds), African Intellectual Heritage. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Fudge, Judy and Leah F. Vosko. 2001. ‘Gender, Segmentation, and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law and Policy’. Economic and Industrial Democracy 22(2): 271–310. Geshekter, Charles L. 1985. ‘Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 18(1):1–32. Kassam, Aneesa. 2005. ‘Religious Syncretism in a Gabra Ritual’. The Journal of Oromo Studies 12 (1&2): 100–19. Keller, Edmond J. 2002. ‘Culture, Politics and the Transnationalization of Ethnic Conflict in Africa: New Research Imperatives’. Cameroon Political Science Review 9 (Numéro Spécial). 63

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Kymlicka, Will. 2007. Multiculturalism Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 2002. Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Ladefoged, Peter, Ruth Glick, Clive Criper, Clifford H. Prator and Livingstone Walusimbi. 1972. Language in Uganda. Ford Foundation Language Surveys Vol. 1. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Lewis, M. Paul (ed.). 2009. ‘Languages of Sudan’ in Languages of the World (16th edn). Dallas TX: SIL International. Available at www. ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=sd (accessed 17  April 2012). Lyons, Terrence and Ahmed I. Samatar (1995). Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Brookings Occasional Papers. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. Mamdani, Mahmood. 1976. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. New York: Monthly Review Press. –  1973. From Citizen to Refugee: Uganda Asians come to Britain. London: Pinter. –  1996. Citizen and Subject; Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. – 2000. Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics of Rights and Culture. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mamdani, Mahmood, Thandika Mkandawire and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. 1988. Social Movements, Social Transformation, and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa. Dakar (Senegal): Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Mengisteab, Kidane. 2009. ‘Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa’. Greater Horn Horizon Forum Concept Paper. Menkhaus, Ken and Terrence Lyons. 1993, January. ‘What are the lessons to be learned from Somalia?’ CSIS African Notes, no. 144. Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Parry, Kate (ed.). 2000. Languages and Literacy in Uganda: towards a sustainable reading culture. Kampala: Fountain. Roble, Faisal A. 2009. ‘The Destruction of Somalia and the Question of Regionalism’. Wardheernews Group. Available at http:// w a r dhe e r n e ws . c om / Ar t i c le s _ 0 9 / No v/ F a isa l _Ro bl e/ Th e_ destruction_of_Somalia.pdf (accessed 17 April 2012). Said, E. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Salih, Mohamed M. A. 2009. ‘The Greater Horn of Africa: Livelihoods, Institutions, Conflict & Peace’. Paper for GHHI. UNESCO. 64

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– 2009a. ‘Democratic Traditions, Identity Politics’. Paper for Greater Horn Horizon Forum. Samatar, A. I. 1991. ‘The Exigencies of Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and Collective Self Reliance’, in Nzongola-Ntalaja (ed.), Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa. Atlanta, GA: African Studies Association. – (1994) ‘The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Somalia’, in Ahmed I. Samatar (ed.), The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. Shapiro, Ian and Will Kymlicka. 1996. Ethnicity and Group Rights. New York: New York University Press. Shor, Ira and Paulo Freire. 1987. A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education. Westport CT: Bergin & Garvey. Trimingham, J. S. 1965. Islam in Ethiopia. London: Frank Cass. Turton, David (ed.). 2006. Ethnic Federalism: the Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey; Athens OH: Ohio University Press; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. Van Den Berghe, Pierre L. 2002. ‘Multicultural Democracy: can it work?’ Nations and Nationalism 8(4): 433–49.

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Part Two Critical Factors in Integration

4 Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region GAIM KIBREAB

INTRODUCTION As noted in chapter 1, the Greater Horn Region (GHR) comprises eleven countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the GHR constitutes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The aim of this chapter is (1) to theorize the hitherto-neglected key concept of invisibility; (2) to present a typology of invisible populations in the region; (3) to analyse and evaluate how transmigrants (pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, cross-border traders, wage-labourers and the like), the multiple sub-categories of asylumseekers, as well as refugees and those who fail to ‘vote with their feet’ homewards after the cessation of the factors that prompted them to flee, deploy invisibility as a weapon to defy the sovereign power of the state in terms of determining who should enter into or exit from its territory and who should form bonds of community and on what terms and conditions within that territory; and (4) to identify the principal catalysts that facilitate informal integration of invisible populations in the GHR.

THEORISING INVISIBILITY The aim of this part is to theorize the concept of invisibility which has hitherto escaped the attention of analysts. It is a key concept employed in the chapter to explain the process and outcome of the informal integration that has been taking place throughout the GHR. Invisibility is a powerful weapon deployed by transmigrants and certain sections of forced migrants (for the categories see below) to access certain bundles of citizenship rights and privileges they are not formally entitled to, by diminishing the ability of the state, on the one hand, to exercise sovereignty over its borders and, on the other, diminishing its ability to accord differentiated bundles of rights of citizenship to diverse categories of people – citizens, denizens, migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and transmigrants – inhabiting its territory, on a sliding scale, depending on a

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particular individual’s or groups’ statuses vis-à-vis nationality, to which a variety of citizenship rights are closely aligned. The term transmigrants refers to immigrants ‘…whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relation to more than one nation’ (Glick Schiller et al., 1995: 48; see also Glick Schiller, 1999). Both the ability to control the right of exit and entry, as well as the right to confer differentiated rights of citizenship on those who reside within the territory of the state concerned, are fundamental to state sovereignty. This is because a state whose power of border control is diminished is unable to determine who should be granted or denied the right to enter and/or exit its territory. A state unable to accord disaggregated or differentiated rights of citizenship to citizens and outsiders residing within its territory cannot also exercise power over citizens’ and outsiders’ freedom of movement and residence, right to work, education, self-employment, as well as access to renewable resources, such as land, grazing, browsing and other resources, including firewood, construction materials, etc. As we shall see later, the potency of invisibility lies in the fact that it enables the outliers or outsiders – transmigrants, refugees, migrants, asylum-seekers – to diminish the power of the state to govern by applying different sets of rules of citizenship to citizens and aliens. One way by which the state exercises sovereignty is by conferring or denying certain sets of rules of citizenship to different categories of people living within its territory. Citizenship is therefore a tool of political categorization that enables the state to apply different sets of rules to different categories of people within its territory. Elizabeth Cohen’s innovative conceptualization of citizenship as a gradient category defined by ‘multiple and potentially shifting thresholds, rather than by a clear hard line that delineates it and demarcates a dichotomous relationship between insiders and outsiders’ (Cohen, 2009: 14) is critical in understanding the manner in which the state applies the gradated and multiple elements of citizenship to differentiate between citizens and aliens, as well as between the different categories of the latter – namely, migrants, refugees, asylumseekers and transmigrants, who live outside the framework of citizenship as defined by the state concerned. As Cohen states, ‘citizens have access to an intertwining set or “braid” of fundamental civil, political and social rights, along with rights of nationality. Semi-citizens are accorded only subsets of those rights. A semi-citizen may have no political rights at all. Numerous configurations are conceivable’ (ibid.: 6). She further observes: ‘Because rights create political relationship, it is crucial to state that they are able to disaggregate bundles of rights. The unbundling of the braid of citizenship rights has the effect of shaping and managing populations whose diverse elements could not be governed by a single set of rules’ (ibid.). More importantly for our purpose, she states, ‘In the absence of this capacity, states would have to do things like immediately and fully enfranchise all immigrants, and legally disown responsibility’ (ibid. emphasis added).

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That is precisely what invisibility has enabled many but not all migrants, transmigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and many others to do. Invisibility diminishes or in some cases stifles the power of the state to manage and shape the populations within its territory by applying different sets of rules of citizenship. Citizenship is an institution or practice through which ‘the state manages its members (including those in its territory) on a number of different planes’ (ibid.: 33). Invisibility, as noted above, is a weapon that enables transmigrants, migrants and forced migrants to immobilize the power of the state to manage those who live within its territory by pigeonholing them into different categories. Categorization, however, presupposes visibility. Unless the state is able to see and consequently label the people who live within its territory into different categories, e.g. citizens and outsiders and the latter into multiple sub-categories, e.g. denizens, immigrant labourers, illegal entrants, transmigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and others – it cannot accord differentiated citizenship rights on the basis of status. Those who are invisible for different reasons cannot be categorized and therefore cannot be subjected to the tyranny of being ‘othered’ or discriminated against. Ceteris paribus, one would expect subaltern groups such as the subjects of this study to struggle for citizenship rights in order to improve their conditions, as citizenship in a democratic polity is a status associated with membership of a particular community where every certified member is deemed to be equal in terms of the rights and duties associated with citizenship (Marshall, 1950). Ironically, in the GHR where transmigrants, unauthorized migrants, self-settling refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as those who stay put in countries of asylum after the cessation of the problems that prompted them to flee, are excluded from citizenship rights and where refugees in government-designated camps and settlements are accorded only a subset of the rights available to citizens, contrary to what seems to be common sense of struggling to make themselves visible, they leave no stone unturned to lead invisible lives. The reason for this, as noted earlier, is to disable the state from exercising its sovereign power of determining who should enter and live within the territory of the state, including who should have the right to work and move freely. Invisible migrants do not exist in the region legally and ‘legal nonexistence’, as Susan Coutin eloquently describes it, is a ‘spatial and temporal void’ (Coutin, 2003: 184). She describes undocumented migrants as ‘…characters who experience a temporal rift in a Star Trek episode, they come in and out of existence, and exist simultaneously in multiple ways, depending on the frame of reality being used’ (ibid.: 173). Although the subjects of her study are undocumented Salvadoran immigrants in the US, her description of their situation is to some extent similar to the situation of invisible populations in the GHR. In the latter, although they are considered non-existent, they engage in clandestine and illicit practices to gain access to false work, residence and travel permits, identity cards, passports and pay exorbitant bribes to government officials and smugglers to move illegally between places within and outside the countries

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concerned. The invisible populations in the GHR are able to work, to move freely, to engage in trade and commerce, to own property, etc. in spite of the legal prohibitions. Formally, the invisible populations in the region have no legal rights and if detected by the authorities risk being rounded up for arbitrary detention, eviction from cities and, in the worst case scenario, deportation to countries where their security and safety may be compromised. They can also be subjected to periodic harassment, extortion and payment of bribes to members of the immigration services, police and security forces. Many of the invisible populations, especially those in the cities, engage in clandestine, illicit practices, e.g. they assume false identities, pay smugglers and document forgers exorbitant fees to move within the countries or emigrate elsewhere illegally. They also tend to take high risks in terms of crossing deserts, such as the Sahara, and seas, such as the Red Sea (BBC, 2011), the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea using dilapidated or improvised boats where many perish en route to the ostensible nirvana (Marsh, 2011; Voice for the Voiceless, 2011; Times of Malta, 2011). A United Nations document, for example, states: ‘Many Somalis…have set out in a desperate search to find new lives elsewhere. Among them are some 170,000 Somali refugees in Yemen, many of whom made a perilous voyage across the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden in flimsy boats operated by ruthless smugglers. Thousands have perished attempting the dangerous journey. From January to October 2010, some 43,000 people – mainly Somalis and Ethiopians – made the trip.’ The invisible populations in the region hover between the realms of reality and non-existence and it is this state which engenders, on the one hand, vulnerability, and on the other, agential power. Georgio Agamben describes this luminal space as ‘…the ambiguous, grey zone between the inside and outside, the social condition of neither fully excluded nor fully recognised’ (Agamben, 1998: 40). The invisible populations in the region exist outside of the law and consequently have no legal existence and those without legal existence, as Susan Coutin opines, are ‘in a sense free’ (2003: 190). Referring to undocumented migrants in the US, she states: ‘Theirs may be the nebulous and “oppressive freedom” experienced by the homeless and the unemployed but it is nonetheless worthwhile to consider the subversiveness of the space that the undocumented occupy’ (ibid.). Mezzadra states: ‘The prevalence of undocumented migration is evidence of the presence of autonomy inherent in the act of migration, an autonomy that, in turn, defies the sovereign power of the state’ (2004: 189). To underscore the extent to which undocumented migrants are free from state control, Coutin states: ‘If they are not party to the social contract, the undocumented are not subject to legal obligations’ (2003: 190). In societies, such as the GHR, where there is dearth of rule of law and consequently the behaviour of the public authorities in the region is in the majority of cases arbitrary, corrupt and unpredictable, those who are able to either disentangle themselves from or avoid the litany of abuses and heavy-handedness are indeed free, although freedom seldom comes at no cost to those in the region.

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Neither the behaviour nor the activities of invisible populations, especially in the big cities of the region, can be monitored or regulated. For example, the state authorities cannot impose taxes or enforce municipal laws or regulations, e.g. licensing, customs duties, quality control, etc. The space of non-existence that the invisible populations inhabit in the region is not amenable to being disciplined (Foucault cited in Coutin, 2003; see also Mezzadra, 2004; Walters, 2008). Invisibility is intrinsically unknowable, unquantifiable, and illicit. The ‘legally non-existent’, as Coutin perceptively argues, are ‘subversive to authorities.’ As noted before, not only do the invisible populations in the GHR immobilize the state from exercising sovereignty in terms of controlling entry and exit into its territories but also in terms of who should reside and work within these territories. The invisible populations in the region – especially those who hail from the frontier regions – and these constitute a substantial proportion of the populations in the region – enter and leave the countries freely without documentation, in pursuit of different goals and unhindered by immigration laws as long as they are not detected. More often than not, they manage to avoid detection, e.g. by pulling the wool over the eyes of the public authorities (Kibreab, 2004a, 2010, 2011), including the police, security, immigration authorities and municipalities in the diverse cities of the region, e.g. Addis Ababa, Kampala, Djibouti City, Diredawa, Nairobi (Eastleigh), Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, Khartoum, etc. Invisible populations in the GHR, in spite of the institutional and structural constraints within which they eke out their existence, are ingenious agents who make meticulous and prudent calculations employing a multiplicity of strategies, inter alia, by adopting invisibility as a survival strategy. The fact that they are able to float in the grey and ambiguous luminal space, i.e. between existence and non-existence, in pursuit of different life projects without being detected or, if trapped, by being able to disentangle themselves by different means, is an ultimate manifestation of human agency. The fact that the invisible populations in the region have been able to negotiate and shape their circumstances by subverting and challenging the sovereign power of the states in the region is an indication of the transformative effect of displacement and migration. Although in the interest of brevity, I cannot dwell on these issues in depth, suffice to say that not only is invisibility an ingenious act of resistance and the ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985), but it also functions as an agency of social change and transformation (see Kibreab, 2004b, 2011). In the following, ten categories of invisible populations are identified in the GHR and a brief description of each is provided.

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TYPOLOGY OF INVISIBLE POPULATIONS IN THE GREATER HORN Some of the most fundamental questions policy-makers, analysts and aid agencies do not ask are the whereabouts of the people in the ten groups outlined below.

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(1) Thousands, if not millions, of people flee their countries of origin and cross the national borders within the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHR) to escape from inextricably linked multiplicities of factors, such as persecutory treatment at the hands of state authorities and/or non-state actors, war, drought, hunger and famine; but they neither report to the state authorities whose borders they cross into nor register in refugee camps or reception centres. Although their numbers are difficult to estimate, the large majority of those who flee to seek asylum due to being targeted by state and non-state actors because of their race, nationality, religion, political opinion or membership in a particular social group; those caught in cross-fire in violent conflict situations and who cross international borders in search of safety and security; and those who are driven out from their homes by the scourge of drought, hunger and famine and are consequently forced to cross international borders in search of succour and security – all these do not report to state authorities or join refugee camps unless the part of the country where they flee to or immigrate to is itself afflicted by drought, hunger or famine. (2) Hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers and refugees, after recuperating and staying for a limited period of time in refugee camps, ‘vote with their feet’ either because they find life in such places unbearably depressing or in anticipation of a better life elsewhere. Although the number of those who escape from refugee camps is difficult to estimate, there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have challenged the space of the camps and abandoned them. Some of these camps are: Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya; Kyangwali, Kasonga, Kiryandongo, Bundibugyo, Rhino, etc. in Uganda; Ali Sabieh and Ali Addeh in Djibouti; Berahle, My-Ayni, Shimelba, Asayta, Awbarre, Kibribeyah, Fugnido, Boqolmayo, etc. in Ethiopia; Shagarab 1, 2, 3, Wad Sherifey, Kilo 26, Kashm el Girba, the three camps in Es Suki (Awa es Sid, Fatah el Rahman and Kilo 7) and Fau; and Qoriole, Jalalqsi and the other more than 30 now-defunct refugee camps in Somalia prior to the demise of the Somali State. (3) Hundreds of thousands of refugees, both first and especially second and third generations, defy host government policies that require them to live in spatially-segregated sites – refugee settlements – and leave such sites under different contexts and by different means, including ‘illegally’. Before the consolidation of the refugee settlements in eastern Sudan, namely, Umsagata, Salmin, Umbrush, Dehema, Zurzur and Adingrar, Abu Rakham, Wad Awad, Mufaza, Hawata into two land-based settlements – Um Gargour and Abuda – in 2004, tens of thousands had abandoned the sites in response to diminishing land base and soil degradation due to

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continuous cultivation without fallow periods and fertilizer application (Kibreab, 1996a). For example, in 1984–85, the population of the three refugee settlements in Qala en Nahal, which was predominantly inhabited by the Saho and Asaorta refugees, namely, Adingrar, Zurzur and Dehema, was suddenly reduced dramatically and the Sudanese management of the settlements, the Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (COR) in Showak and Khartoum were deeply mystified by what had transpired. At that time, I was undertaking research in the area and when I approached COR representatives and asked, ‘where have all the refugees gone?’ they frankly admitted that they had no clue about where they were. However, they suspected that they had self-returned to Eritrea even though the conditions that had prompted them to flee were not eliminated. Several years after, I returned to Sudan to undertake research on Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum (see Kibreab, 1996b). I hired key informants from the different ethnic groups and spent several weeks trying to identify the main parts of the three towns – Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman – where there were concentrations of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees. One of the key informants, who was from the Saho ethnic group, informed me that there was a village about 20 km outside of Omdurman called Kalakla where there was heavy concentration of Eritrean refugees from the Saho ethnic group which COR did not know about. When I asked him to arrange a visit, he said, ‘I don’t think that is possible.’ When I asked for the reason, he said, ‘they are reluctant to admit to outsiders that they are from Eritrea.’ He further said: ‘The reason they have been able to live in the area when their compatriots are rounded up and subjected to maltreatment at the hands of the authorities is because the latter are not aware of their presence.’ I asked him to reassure them that I would under no circumstances reveal their presence to the Sudanese authorities. I also told him to inform the elders that, as an Eritrean, my instinct would be to protect them rather than to expose them. After protracted negotiations, the elders agreed to meet up with me. They subjected me to rigorous interrogation and it was only after I passed their test that they agreed to see me. When I met with the elders, they informed me that they fled by night over an extended period during the 1984 famine to avoid being detected. They were fully settled in the suburb without the knowledge and consent of the authorities. Even when there was a fierce clampdown on the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum during the months of February to April 1987 at the behest of the Governor of Khartoum State, Karam M. Karam, the Eritrean refugees in Kalakla were not affected as their presence was not known to the government. They had successfully rendered themselves invisible to outsiders. In a series of interviews with the Commissioner for Refugees and his deputies, I sought information about the whereabouts of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum. They mentioned many places, but none of them knew that there were thousands of Eritrean refugee families in Kalakla. (4) Some refugees leave the camps and settlements after securing travel permits to depart from such places temporarily and never return at

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the end of the duration of the permissions. Access to the latter is extremely limited and is granted under strict terms and conditions. The permits state the places where the holder is allowed to visit and they state clearly that they should return before the expiry date. Failure to do so is considered an offence punishable by imprisonment on a par with unauthorized departure (Kibreab, 1987). (5) Some stay put in countries of asylum instead of returning to their countries of origin after the cessation of the factors that prompted them to flee. For example, when Eritrea achieved its independence, de facto, in May 1991 and de jure in May 1993, there were nearly half a million Eritrean refugees in Sudan. These were people whose flight had nothing to do with the Eritrean State as it did not exist when they fled the country. Although displacement is multi-causal and the country’s achievement of national independence might have not eliminated all the factors that prompted the refugees to seek asylum, there was a general expectation that the overwhelming majority would ‘vote with their feet’ homewards in response to the political changes that had taken place in Eritrea. Although many had returned, a large proportion stayed put in Sudan even though there was clear evidence to show that the factors in connection with which they sought asylum were eliminated when Ethiopian rule came to an end (Kibreab, 1996c, 1996d; 2005). In spite of this, the number of the pre-independence refugees who are still in the country is estimated as of January 2011 at 138,700, of whom 96,000 are in camps and settlements (UNHCR, 2011). Although those who are invisible are not amenable to being counted, there is no doubt that the total number of people who fled Eritrea in connection with the war of independence and stayed put in Sudan, notwithstanding the elimination of the factors that prompted them to flee, is far greater than those identified by UNHCR. This is not only true in Sudan but is the same throughout the region. When the Derg was overthrown, it was generally expected that the Ethiopians who had fled from the tyranny of the military junta and sought asylum in Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan would return. Although many did return, there are still tens of thousands who remain in the said countries. The recent political changes in South Sudan undoubtedly triggered a wave of return movements, but it is naïve to think that all the refugees from South Sudan would return from the neighbouring countries – (northern) Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia – in response to the political changes. Many are likely to return but there will be many others, especially the selfsettled, who will stay put in the neighbouring countries as has been the discernible pattern throughout the GHR. The same was true for Rwandans in Uganda. When political changes occurred in Rwanda, many returned, but many others stayed put in spite of those changes. For example, in July 2010, the Ugandan government forcibly returned 1700 refugees from Nakivale and Kyaka refugee settlements to Rwanda. The way the forcible return was enforced was so brutal, that even the humanitarian refugee agency, UNHCR, not known for its forthrightness, condemned the manner in which the operation was conducted (UNHCR, 2010).

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(6) Although they may not run into tens of thousands, a substantial number of students who complete primary school in refugee camps and settlements migrate to the cities to pursue post-primary and some higher education levels. It is common knowledge and logical that these people never return to such places where they see no future. The question is: where are they? (7) Where are the hundreds of thousands or millions of pastoralists, who, following their customary migratory and transhumance routes, cross state borders and do not return either because the rains in their places of origin fail, war breaks out after their departure or the grasses are found to be greener across the border or what they regard as home straddles the state boundaries? (8) Where are those who cross the state borders in search of seasonal employment opportunities to tide over a crisis or to overcome shortages of income or supply of essential goods and stay put either because they are unable to save enough or they find a better life across the borders or the conditions they leave behind deteriorate? The latter could be due to worsening economic conditions or wars that break out after their departure. (9) What of the cross-border livestock and other commodities traders whose mobile livelihood systems defy the raison d’être of state borders? (10) What of the millions of frontier communities who never recognize the existence of borders and whose homelands straddle the state borders?

Hypotheses

The chapter is guided by the hypothesis that all these categories of invisible populations are informally integrated into the host societies of the GHR without the knowledge and/or sanction of the governments concerned. It is further hypothesized that their single most important weapon in their quest for survival in adversity is invisibility. In the following the factors that promote informal integration of invisible populations in the region are discussed.

Principal catalysts facilitating invisible integration

The factors that facilitate invisible integration in the GHR are multifaceted and inextricably interconnected, as well as mutually reinforcing. However, in the interest of brevity, only the two most salient factors, namely, mobile livelihood systems straddling the state borders and shared identities and belonging are considered. The other important factors will be examined later.

Mobile livelihood systems straddling states’ borders

One of the most important factors facilitating informal integration of the invisible populations identified in the preceding part of the chapter is the historically-grounded and socially-sanctioned livelihood systems developed in response to the harsh environmental constraints operative in the region. The livelihood systems, especially of pastoralists and agropastoralists, have always been mobile and this seems to have increased

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as a result of climate change and degradation of environmental resources. Arid plains and grazing grasslands cross national borderlines in nearly all countries in the region. Pastoral communities and tribes typically move across these lands, regardless of nationality, in the age-old quest to sustain their herds and livelihoods. Given the arid and semi-arid nature of the environment in the region, no community except a few, if any, could meet their material needs independently by relying solely on resources available within their traditional homelands. Hence mobility motivated by the need to utilise resources situated in locations straddling large swathes of land occupied by different ethnolinguistic groups has always been the defining and quintessential element in the diverse resource-management regimes that evolved over time to regulate access to and use of scarce resources. Throughout the region, economic, social and cultural interactions have been persistent since precolonial times (Markakis, 1993). As we shall see later, these continuous human and animal movements and the persistent interactions that accompanied them have had the effect of bringing the various populations inhabiting the different parts of the region into close contact with each other. These time-honoured and longstanding movements and contacts over time produced people of mixed origins connected through common or related languages, cultures and interwoven livelihood systems. Mobility has constituted the central plank or the edifice of the foundation on which the livelihoods of the majority of the populations in the region, especially of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, rest. In the GHR, mobility is a mode and quintessence of life and is consequently a powerful thread that integrates and interconnects communities across immense expanses of territories and the social cleavages of faith, ethnicity and culture. At a time when there was a dearth of any form of communications technology in use, the mobile livelihood systems that permeated the communities in the region interconnected disparate groups near and far. If it were not for the mobile livelihoods that underpinned social and economic life in the region, the groups inhabiting the different places would have been isolated and no meaningful economic, social or cultural interactions would have been possible. The mobile livelihood systems that pervade social, cultural and economic life in the region have been operating without being constrained by state boundaries and, as a result, constitute one of the key catalysts that have been facilitating the invisible integration of migrants, transmigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and climate-change-induced displacees throughout the region. Since pre-colonial times, the livelihood systems and the dominant ways of life in the region have been developed in response to the arid and semi-arid nature of the environment characterized by uncertainty, instability and capriciousness. The two building blocks of the livelihood systems in the region have been mobility and diversity of income sources. The need to diversify their sources of income, as well as the necessity to spread the risk of failure, has meant that different members of particular households engaged in different economic activities in different places

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building diverse and intricate webs of social, cultural and economic networks interconnecting their families and communities across different geographic landscapes and cultural domains. In the course of undertaking a series of research fieldwork among displaced and transmigrant communities in the Horn of Africa over a period of nearly three decades, I have seen many transmigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees who benefited from their pre-existing social networks with members of the ‘host’ communities (see Karadawi, 1977; Kibreab, 1987). For example, when about 27,000 Eritrean refugees from the Beni Amer tribe fled Eritrea and crossed the Sudan border during March and April 1967, not only were they received by their brethren, the Beni Amer, across the border, but when the capacity of the latter to provide for them began to wear out, they formed fund-raising committees who travelled to the towns in the Eastern region – Kassala, Kashm el Girba, New Halfa and Gedaref – to raise funds to meet the material needs of the Eritreans until outside help was brought to them by the UNHCR. Both the UNHCR and the government of Sudan were caught unawares by the sudden influx of refugees (see Karadawi, 1999; Kibreab, 1987). The UNHCR had no office in Sudan at that time nor did the government of Sudan have a department or a commission with a mandate to deal with refugees. If it were not for the pre-existing interconnections that engendered the values of solidarity and social networks, such collective action in pursuit of a good cause would have been difficult or impossible. The pre-existing mobile livelihood systems were instrumental in this. The border communities grazed and watered their animals in the Gash Valley and the networks and knowledge of each other were the result of such interactions. These benefits emanating from pre-existing social networks took multiple forms, such as provision of temporary succour and shelter, as well as access to necessary utensils, jobs, schools for children, land, pasture, etc. In cities, such as Kassala, Gedaref in Sudan, Kampala in Uganda, and the Eastleigh slum-suburb of Nairobi in Kenya, the pre-existing networks enabled many Eritreans, South Sudanese and Somalis to gain access to false or genuine ID cards or even passports and work permits informally. More importantly, the pre-existing social networks built over decades or even centuries functioned as impenetrable shields against being identified by the authorities for harassment, eviction, detention and extortion for being ‘illegal immigrants’. Both mobility and income diversity have been critical in the livelihood systems in the region, especially among those who live dangerously close to the margin of subsistence for whom a slight miscalculation in the allocation of scarce family resources may have calamitous consequences on the survival of families and communities. Pastoralism is a dominant mode of production in the GHR (Markakis, 1998, 2004). This is, inter alia, evidenced by the fact that four of the countries in the Horn of Africa, namely, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya represent the first, third, fifth and sixth, respectively in the world in terms of the magnitude of pastoralist populations (Markakis, 1993). Although statistics on the actual number of pastoralists in the region is difficult

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to come by, it is commonly agreed that they occupy massive land areas which enable them to utilise grazing, browsing and surface and borehole water resources scattered over a large expanse of territories. Available estimates suggest that in Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Somalia 52, 66, 72 and 75 per cent of the total areas respectively are occupied by pastoralists (Markakis, 1987, 1993, 1998, 2004). In the context of the arid nature of the environment and fodder resources dispersed over large tracts of land, the wide-ranging foraging needs of different species of animals would be difficult to meet without a mobile system of resource utilization. Mobility allows sustainable use of resources resulting from rotational grazing (Kibreab, 2002). For example, in the semi-desert of Western Sudan, camels can go without water for 10–11 days, sheep/goats for 5–7 days and cattle for 2–3 days. The corresponding figures in the semi-desert areas of Eastern Sudan were for camels 4–7 days, for sheep/goats 3–4 days, and for cattle 2–3 days (Harrison, 1955, cited in Kibreab, 2002: 255–6). The differentiated levels of resistance to thirst enabled the communities to ration the scarce resources – water, grazing and browsing – according to the particular needs of the different types of animals. This requires cooperation and mutual trust which is only possible in communities endowed with a substantial stock of social capital resulting from continuous and protracted interactions in the context of mobility. The theory of social capital postulates that where people interact repeatedly with each other, over time, they are able to know and trust one another, to interconnect with each other and share experiences, values and norms that encourage cooperation, openness and compromise (Widner and Mundt, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Kibreab, 2008a). James Coleman, for example, states that social capital facilitates ‘the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be achieved only at a higher cost’ (1990: 304). Human and animal lives would have been lost without such a stock of social capital. People endowed with social capital are able to engage in mutually beneficial cooperative activities in pursuit of goals that they could not achieve by themselves or could only achieve at greater costs (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Fukuyama, 2001; Kibreab, 2009). This should not be construed to imply that the communities in the region always cooperate to solve problems stemming from scarcity of resources, especially in view of the fact that mobile populations have a propensity of encroaching on resources belonging to others. Depending on the particular circumstances in question, mobility can be a glue that holds different communities together or can also be a solvent that dissolves pre-existing harmonious relations. Not only is the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflict highly contested (see Markakis, 1998; Di John, 2007; Mildner et al., 2011; Collier et al., 2004; Collier et al., 2009; Auty, 2005; Homer-Dixon, 2001), but also social relationships in the region have been permeated by cooperation and conflict. When it comes to providing safe haven and succour to people in distress, however, the preponderance of conflict and hostilities has been the exception rather

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than the rule. In the course of nearly three decades of fieldwork conducted intermittently in the region, I never came across or heard of any migrant community that had been received with hostility when seeking safe haven and succour within or across state borders. There have been a number of depraved incidents in which people fleeing from Somalia to north-eastern Kenya were subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of armed thugs. These incidents were the result of the breakdown of law and order and brutalization of Somali society reflected in the gradual erosion of the long-standing pastoral moral values and social norms that held the society together (see Lewis, 1961). This, however, is an aberration rather than a general rule. Given the arid and semi-arid nature of the environment in the region, especially the frontier areas where resources, including water, are scarce and scattered over large expanses of land, people would have been unable to cope with the adverse circumstances in the absence of cooperation with each other concerning rights of access to and use of scarce resources situated in different locations belonging to different groups of resource-rights holders. In some parts of the region, e.g. (northern) Sudan, the need to access resources belonging to neighbouring Dar rights holders led to the development of informal institutional arrangements that were strictly enforced by the traditional authorities (Harrison, 1955, cited in Kibreab, 2002; Hayes, 1960; Asad, 1970; Ahmed, 1974; Cunnison, 1954, 1963, 1966; Abu Sin, 1992; Kibreab, 2002). Institutions are the framework within which social interactions take place (North, 1990). They also set the rules, social norms and values that guide individual behaviour in their interactions with others within and outside their communities. Before their erosion or obliteration under the pressure of capitalist developments and hostile state interventions, these informal institutions were in most cases able to prevent or resolve potential conflicts before they degenerated into violence (see Harrison, 1955; Hayes, 1960; Kibreab, 2001, 2002; Lewis, 1961). The question of whether mobility functions as a glue that holds societies together or a solvent that dissolves pre-existing social harmony and cooperation cannot be determined a priori. Rather, this is an empirical question. An interesting question to ask is, in the light of the widely held view that the region’s proneness to conflict is inextricably linked to resource scarcity which engenders fierce competition over scarce resources, do the mobile livelihood systems in the region contribute to a preponderance of violent conflict? As mentioned above, the resource-scarcity-abundance violent conflict nexuses are highly contested. There has been a plethora of literature pertaining to the relationships, on the one hand, between resource scarcity and violent conflict: see, for example, Homer-Dixon, 2001; Markakis, 1998, 2004; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Urdal, 2008. For criticism of this point of view see Le Billon, 2001; Brown, 2010. On the other side, resource abundance and violent conflict, see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Le Billon, 2001; De Soysa, 2002. Although there has been a high propensity on the part of analysts to attribute the conflicts that

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have been afflicting sub-Saharan Africa to competition over resources, there is empirical evidence to show that resources alone account for a small percentage of the total. For example, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) Conflict Barometer for 2010 shows that only seven cases were caused by resources alone (referenced in Mildneret et al., 2011). However, the Conflict Barometer shows that resources represented the second-most-frequent cause in the 363 conflicts observed during 2010. The report shows that resources constituted contributory factors in combination with other conflict items, namely, ‘territory, regional predominance, system/ideology, autonomy and secession’ (quoted in ibid.). The link between resources and violent conflict is widely upheld by analysts but there has been contestation regarding the direction of the relationship, i.e. whether abundance or scarcity of resources is at the heart of the problem. A major weakness in the available literature concerning the resourcescarcity-violent conflict nexus is the undue emphasis placed on violence rather than peace. The linkages between resource scarcity and peace are rarely explored. There is no obvious reason why it should be assumed that rational people faced with acute resource scarcity will kill each other rather than cooperate with each other. When resource users face conditions of severe resource scarcity, they may either cooperate in search of a common solution to problems faced in common or may try to eliminate the other in order to gain exclusive access to a scarce resource. However, since the possibility of completely wiping out the ‘other’ is implausible, violence does not represent an efficient solution to resource scarcity. This is obvious common sense to people who survive on a knife-edge. Cooperation rather than violence is a more natural and efficient option in communities that live on the razor edge of survival. For example, a study in the Horn of Africa Bulletin rejects the notion that the violent conflicts that have been crippling the Horn of Africa are due to resource scarcity. The study argues: ‘Though the precarious ecological and economic position of pastoralists is a fact, the claim that natural resource scarcity induces conflicts has to be tested empirically. Evidence from analysis of inter-ethnic conflicts shows that the validity of this claim is questionable.’ (Adano et al, 2009: 1 – emphasis added.) The report argues that hitherto, the generalizations have been based on a few empirical studies of a few incidences of conflicts ‘making any claim weak in its approach and raising serious questions about the validity of the evidence’. The findings of the study show ‘a negative correlation between violent conflict and drought, as well as immediate post-drought periods, although those are the periods when scarcity is experienced most, and show most livelihood tensions in pastoral communities’ (ibid.: 3). The study reaches the following conclusion:

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There are clear indications that violent incidences occur much more often in rainy seasons and during relatively good years, than in dry seasons and during droughts. Further, the evidence shows twice as many persons are likely to be killed in a violent conflict during relatively rainy years (i.e. in

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a time of relative resource abundance) than in the drought (drier) years. This result also reflects herders’ viewpoints and explanations. They see droughts as difficult times when animals are weak, survival is hard and people are more inclined to stop fighting, patch up their differences, renegotiate access rules and rights, and reconcile to cooperate. These views suggest that when survival becomes difficult as during droughts, people decide to defer actions to raid until an appropriate time in the future. During the rainy seasons animals are in good condition and strong to withstand long distance trek, manpower demand is low, enhanced chance of rain to wash away tracks and rich vegetation cover, each or all in combination, enable raiding and increase the prospects of successful raiding (Adano et al, 2009: 3).

The inference one can draw from this is that whilst it is possible that the influx of transmigrants and asylum-seekers who take their animals with them would cause scarcity of resources – land, water, grazing and browsing – the effect of this is unlikely to be conflict rather than cooperation. Notwithstanding the fact that the new arrivals may cause scarcity, the receiving community is likely to cooperate rather fight. In spite of above empirical observations and many others, most of the literature tends to take for granted the link between resource scarcity and violent conflict by totally overlooking the possible nexus that may exist between resource scarcity and peace. If this is true, the reason why the region is conflict-ridden may not solely be due to resource scarcity resulting, inter alia, from the mobile livelihood systems which by their very nature lead to encroachment on other groups’ land, water and grazing rights. In the Horn of Africa, where livelihood systems straddle disparate geographical and cultural landscapes, people have always been facing resource scarcity due to the arid and semi-arid nature of the environment they inhabit. In the majority of cases these scarcities, instead of engendering violent conflict, have more often than not prompted cooperative solutions. This is logical in the sense that people who eke out meagre existences are forced to cooperate in order to overcome resource scarcity and consequently reduce the risk of violent conflict which may devastate the warring parties concerned. Had the populations of the Horn fought against each other to overcome resource scarcity, there would have probably been far fewer people in the region than is the case at present. A cautionary note is, however, in order. The proliferation of small arms made possible through economic openness in the rapidly-globalizing world and the thoughtless encroachments on or outright confiscations of pastoral and subsistence farmers’ lands by governments and powerful capitalist groups connected to the corridors of power from outside the societies concerned have had the deleterious effect of eroding the time-honoured traditional institutions of resource-based conflict prevention and resolution in the region (see Markakis, 1998, 2004, 2011; Kibreab, 1996a, 2002). The GHR is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Africa reflected, inter alia, in incessant inter-and intra-state violent wars (Markakis, 1987, 1998; Zartman, 1985; Doornbos et al., 1992; Love, 2009). However, it is important to guard against attributing the conflicts to resource scarcity. This is because the factors underlying violent conflicts in the region

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are multifaceted and interconnected (Cliffe, 1999; Kibreab, 2009). This interconnectedness emanates from many interrelated factors, such as the legacy of artificially-created colonial boundaries that dissect across communities and their sources of livelihoods, such as grazing areas and water sources, common ecological zones, and cultural affinities that are considered peculiar to the region (Love, 2009). Markakis argues that the incessant conflicts in the region are driven by competition over scarce resources caused by shortage of rainfall in the context of high livestock density, unsustainable land-use practices and ineffective regulatory institutions (Markakis, 1998). However, he also notes that what appears to be ethnic conflict in the region could be the result of underlying unequal power relations. To substantiate this point, he refers to the 1993 conflict between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin peoples in the Kenyan Rift Valley. Kikuyu peasants who migrated to the sparsely populated Rift Valley in the 1960s when Jomo Kenyatta, a member of their ethnic group, was in power were driven out by the Kalenjin during Daniel arap Moi’s rule in 1993 and 1994, which resulted in violent conflict (Markakis, 1998; see also Amisi, 1997). Notwithstanding the fact that the conflict had multiple causes, such as competition over scarce resources whose productive capability was reduced due to high population density, lack of investment in the improvement of productivity and dearth of effective regulatory institutions, the conflict was attributed to ‘tribal enmity inflated by political passion’ (Markakis, 1998: 5) and intermingling resulting from migration. It is important to underscore the fact that the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflict is not straightforward even in situations where the apparent nexus is considered to be obvious, such as in Darfur (see e.g. UNEP, 2007). Ian Brown’s empirical study in Northern and Western Darfur concerning violent conflict between farmers and pastoralists, ethnic conflict, rebellion against the government and intra-community conflict during the period 1981–2006, showed absence rather than presence of a relationship between resource scarcity (land degradation) and violent conflict. This was because the resource situation did not deteriorate in the immediate pre-conflict period. On the contrary, in Western Darfur State, the condition of the vegetation improved (Brown, 2010). An interesting question to ask is how the colonial boundaries, regarded as sacrosanct by the African states, affect the pre-existing social networks and relationships of the populations in the frontier regions. Although the division brought about by the establishment of the colonial borders undoubtedly had significant political impact – socially, economically and geographically – the partitioned communities continued to represent a single entity engaging in cross-border economic activities involving two or even more states. As we shall see later, these time-honoured economic relationships that pre-existed the state borders and which persisted unabated in spite of them provide the single most important building block for regional, especially invisible, integration in the region. The partition of the continent formally divided the pastoralist lands

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between different colonial states and Ethiopia (Markakis, 1993). Nearly all the pastoral communities were dismembered as the colonial borders cut across their traditional grazing lands. For example, the Somali pastoralists were divided among five states – namely, French (Djibouti), Ethiopian, British (Kenya and Somaliland) and Italian (Somalia). The Beni Amer and the Habab were divided between Italy (Eritrea) and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Afar were divided between Italian Eritrea, Ethiopia and French Djibouti. The Boran were dissected by the British (Kenyan) and Ethiopian border. The Kakwa were divided between Uganda and southern Sudan, the Luo speakers among southern Sudan, western Ethiopia, northern and eastern Uganda and Western Kenya. One of the measures the colonial powers introduced in the region was controlling the movement of the pastoralists not only across the newlyestablished state boundaries but also within the respective states through the introduction of tribal boundaries and rigorously monitored seasonal movements (see Kibreab, 2002). The purposes of the border-crossing control regime introduced by the colonial powers were to fight against smuggling, poaching, banditry, raiding, tax evasion and the spread of contagious animal diseases (Markakis, 1993). It is interesting to note that some of the problems the colonial powers tried to prevent were the direct result of the colonial borders. For example, the notion of smuggling of goods was unknown in pre-colonial times. As Fanso argues, the fluidity of political boundaries in the pre-colonial period gave rise to widespread trans-border trade which was frustrated by the restrictions introduced by the colonial powers. Smuggling of the contraband trade emerged to counter the restrictions (Fanso, 1985, cited in Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996). Nugent and Asiwaju also refer to smuggling as a new form of cross-border trade that emerged in response to the disappearance of the old pre-colonial trading systems (ibid.). What is interesting about these smuggling activities across borders is the trans-border social and economic networks that were created to subvert the sovereign power of colonialists and their successors in terms of determining what and who should be allowed or denied entry. These activities did not only rely upon pre-existing crossborder trade and social networks, but also effected the establishment of well-organized trans-border networks which interconnected people on both sides of the border. During the thirty years of war in Eritrea, the costs in terms of human suffering and loss of lives would have been much higher had it not been for the cross-border ‘illegal’ trade. The social networks created in the process also facilitated the informal integration of Eritrean transmigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, especially those who hail from the frontier areas. The same has been true in the frontier communities in the region. The arbitrarily-drawn colonial boundaries which dissect across the frontier communities have been easily circumvented by the populations of the region, especially pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and cross-border traders, as well as seasonal labourers. As Markakis argues, the administrative, security, fiscal and political imperatives underlying the colonialists’

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policies of border-control were defeated by ‘pastoralist peregrination’ (Markakis, 1993: 4). The frontier communities in the region had no notion of state boundaries and it is not surprising that they ignored them when they were established. The ideas of frontiers or state boundaries as conceived; on the one hand, by Europeans and by their successors, the African states, and on the other, by ordinary African frontier communities have been diametrically opposed to each other. For the former, a boundary is perceived as a point which separates neighbouring states, whilst for ordinary African border communities, a boundary is a zone, which connects and unites two or more neighbouring communities whose livelihood systems are interwoven (Fanso in Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Kopytoff, 1987; Asiwaju, 1985; Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Griffiths, 1996). Different analysts attribute different meanings to borders. Some view them as zones of barriers whilst others conceive of them as zones of opportunities. The traditional African, Fanso insightfully observes, … spoke of where his people ‘met’ with neighbouring people on the land, where they ‘shared’ the earth and not where they ‘separate.’ … unlike in the West where the boundary is defined in terms of pillars, posts and cairns fixed on the ground and traced on maps to separate nations, the African concept was rooted in ethnic and social contact. In other words, the former placed more emphasis on its role as a link or bond rather than as a point of separation (Fanso in Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 60).

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Asiwaju (1985) argues that border regions in Africa have always evolved as special zones of socio-political ambivalence. He conceptualizes borders as conduits or zones of opportunities rather than constraints. This view is shared by Fanso who notes that borders are zones of opportunities and interactions rather than barriers (1985). He views borders as extraterritorial precincts where state practices are colonized by non-state actors who pursue political and economic survival strategies (Fanso, 1985). Asiwaju argues that, notwithstanding the fact that the colonial powers and their successors resorted to different methods, including the use of ‘cover names’ to distinguish between the same people inhabiting different sides of the African countries’ borders, ‘…partitioned Africans have nevertheless tended in their normal activities to ignore the boundaries as dividing lines and to carry on social relations across them more or less as in the days before the partition’ (Asiwaju, 1985: 3). This is more manifestly true in the Greater Horn Region than anywhere else in the continent. As noted earlier, this is greatly facilitated on the one hand by the aridity of the region which necessitates mobility, and on the other by incessant violent conflicts which displace hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people in search of safety, dignity and sources of livelihoods. To this must be added weak state capacity which precludes effective enforcement of border control. Nugent and Asiwaju (1996) are right to state that overland movements, in spite of the African states’ attempt to stem them, have been relatively fluid and the borders which are supposed to separate communities are more imagined than

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fixed lines of demarcation. Owing to the underdeveloped infrastructure and the extensive and porous nature of the borders, the states in the region have been unable to stem border-crossing. In the GHR, borders, instead of representing physical barriers, have been functioning as channels for circulation of people, livestock and merchandise (Hussein, 2010). One of the reasons for this is that the frontier communities’ conception of territory and boundary is different. Fredrik Barth’s description of the conception of territory and territorial boundary among the Persian nomadic group, the Basseri, is similar to the perception of the nomads in the GHR. He debates: Do territorial boundaries play a salient role among them? Basseri are part of a larger society where plenty of attention is given to boundaries and boundary markers on land. But for the understanding and analysis of their concepts and cognition, the crucial question is how Basseri themselves know and experience their world. And all the evidence indicates that their salient nomadic experience makes territory the scene of movement, not a field for the demarcation of plots. Migrating caravans, and grazing herds, pass over the land. In the afternoon, tents were pitched in a camp, and sometimes corrals of thorn were made to keep predators out and animals in at night – but they did not appear to embody the idea of a boundary (Barth, 2000: 19).

Barth states that, although from a sedentary person’s perspective the world of the nomads may seem ‘scattered and disordered’ due to its unbounded nature, in spite of its appearance, … groups hold elaborate and clearly defined grazing rights. However, these grazing rights were conceptualized not as bounded territories, but as migration schedules, called il-rah i.e. tribal roads. Each such ‘road’ was composed of rights of pasture and of passage during particular time periods. […] land and place, and exclusive claims to particular lands and places, can be conceptualized in several ways by means of quite dissimilar cultural images… (ibid.).

The findings of a number of pioneering studies on Sudanese tribes (e.g. Harrison, 1955; Cunnison, 1966; Asad, 1970; Ahmed, 1974), show that the nomadic pastoralists’ conception of territories and boundaries are similar to those of the Basseri nomads. My own longitudinal study, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, 1889–1989 (2002), based on colonial and post-colonial archival data and covering many Sudanese tribes, such as the Ja’alin, Shukria, Hadendowa, Kababish, Jumuiya, Howawir, Malwal Dinka, Rizeigat, Meidob, Berti and Zayyadia, shows similar results. Sudanese tribes, e.g. the Humr, Shukri, Hadendowi, Kabbashi, Rizeigat, Baggara and many others, migrated seasonally to the different regions following the rules prescribed by custom and set by precedent. These rules were deeply understood and internalized by the members of each tribe (Kibreab, 2002: 361). Harrison observed the same cultural practice among several of the Baggara tribes in which he stated, The territorial separation of ‘Omodias’ is far less precise and rigid; so much so that it may superficially appear non-existent, but this is not

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in fact the case. Most people of each ‘omodia’ normally travel by the same routes each year to the same areas, while a ‘feriq’ often uses the same camp site as it did in previous years and spends the end part of the dry season often on the same watering point (Harrison, 1955: Appendix 6: 12; emphasis added).

Reginald Davies during his service as a colonial Inspector in Dar Kababish (Kordofan) also wrote: The word ‘roaming’, often applied to nomads, is inappropriate to describe the nushugh – that joyous exodus into a desert, which, for a few months, is green and blossoming like the rose. It is no haphazard scramble for water and grazing. The sections of the tribe taking part in it go out almost like the divisions of an army in line of battle, in an order established by precedent, modified by the instruction of the Nazir to suit the particular conditions of the year. This movement on an immensely wide front is carefully planned so as to leave grazing available for the return journey and for the following dry season. No section may loiter too long on the way or turn aside from its outward line of march to eat off the grass lying behind another section which is already farther out to the north-west (Davies, quoted in Kibreab 2002: 430–1).

Spatial variation in environmental resource endowments was the dominant common feature in the region and the management systems and conceptualizations of territory and boundaries were developed in response to this reality. These variations in environmental resource endowments have over time led to the development of trans-border economic and social cooperation underpinned by dense networks that transcend the arbitrarily-drawn artificial colonial borders. The values of solidarity, cooperation and mutual trust, and the dense social networks that were developed across the cleavages of ethnicity, religion and region buttressed by mobile livelihood systems have been critical to the informal integration of invisible populations in the region.

Shared identity and belonging

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The second most important catalyst that has been facilitating invisible integration in the region is shared plural identities that are irreducible to unitary statist models of social belonging. There are no differences between the people inhabiting either side of the state borders in the whole region and they can move in and out of the social and territorial boundaries unhindered by state boundaries because they are indistinguishable from the local inhabitants of the neighbouring countries. This includes: the Somali in Eastleigh, Nairobi and in north-eastern Kenya outside the spatially-segregated refugee camps, in Djibouti, the Ogaden, Addis Ababa, Diredawa and Somalia; the Boran straddling the Ethiopian-Kenyan-Somali borders; the Tigrinya-speaking peoples straddling the Eritrean-Ethiopian border; the Eritrean Afar and the Ethiopian Isa and Afar straddling the Djiboutian, Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean borders; the Habab, Rashaida, Hadandowa (known as Hedareb in Eritrea) and Beni Amer straddling the Eritrean-Sudan frontiers; the Kakwa inhabiting the West Nile region of north-western Uganda and Yei District of South Sudan; the Luo-speaking

Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region

Acholi straddling South Sudan and Northern Uganda; other Luo-speaking peoples stretching from South Sudan (Shilluk) and Ethiopia (Anuak) through eastern Uganda (Jopadhola) into Western Kenya (Luo); the Turkana of north-west Kenya bordering South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, together with the related Karamojong of north-east Uganda along the Kenya-Uganda border and with the Toposa and Didinga in Eastern Equatoria State of South Sudan; and the Luhya, Teso, Samia, Pokot, Sebei/ Sabot and Bagisu/Bakusu also along the Kenya-Uganda border. The large majority of the invisible populations identified earlier hail from these groups and are for all practical purposes indistinguishable from nationals. This has been one of the important weapons they deploy to subvert the logic of sovereignty in the region. As we shall see later, at least in the short term, the same is not true of those groups who are different from the receiving communities in terms of ethnicity, tribe, religion and even way of life. However, none of these is immutable and therefore they are likely to change over time. The second generation is unlikely to suffer from such constraints. The Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans and Ethiopians in Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti and the Amharic, Afan Oromospeaking Ethiopians and Arabic-speaking Sudanese in the said cities are the cases in point. The first generation among these groups cannot easily hide their ethnic identities and therefore, in spite of their creative attempts, it is not easy for the first generation to render themselves invisible. These categories are so distinct from the host populations in terms of their culture and their ways of living that they are too eye-catching to avoid detection. They are easily visible and therefore their ability to render themselves invisible is limited. As a result, they are routinely rounded up, arbitrarily detained, deported to camps and denied access to resources, labour and commodity markets, freedom of movement and residence. In such situations, power is a function of the ability to circumvent the demand of the state to make one or a group visible and compliant with its policies rather than the ability to demand to be seen. This is because in the reality within which most self-settled asylum-seekers and refugees eke out their meagre existence, visibility rather than invisibility is the cause of vulnerability. As noted earlier, in the GHR in the majority of cases, not only territorial but also social boundaries are malleable and porous. In spite of the relentless efforts of the nation states in the region to create and perpetuate differences between ‘nationals’ and ‘aliens,’ the project of naturalizing the link between national territory and identity still remains incomplete, unachievable or in some cases even stillborn. This is because what is regarded as home by the inhabitants of the region, especially the border communities, straddles the artificially created colonial boundaries. The intrinsically mobile livelihood systems we saw in the preceding part of the chapter that require utilization of resources scattered over a large expanse of territories straddling the homelands of disparate communities and states as well as the populations’ shared identities have been 89

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fundamentally at odds with the grand scheme of ‘nation-building’ based on exclusion of the ‘other’. Soon after independence, the single most important project of every state in the region became making or at least attempting to make the boundaries of nationality, identity and territory coincide. This was not an easy task given the fact that most of the groups that were lumped together in the artificially created states had more in common with the groups across the state boundaries than with their ‘compatriots’ in the artificially-constituted state entities. More importantly, their livelihood systems have been based on economic activities based on trans-border mobility. Soon after independence, there emerged a mismatch of perceptions which at times was fiercely contested. The ideology of the independent states saw the people within the territories of the respective former colonial states as belonging to one nation whilst the frontier communities saw themselves as being merged into each other notwithstanding the official lines of demarcation (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996). Without due regard to the edifice of foundations on which the multitudes of livelihood systems of the populations rested, the post-colonial states in the region considered control of entry and exit (immigration control) and exclusion of the so-called aliens as being an integral part of the development and consolidation of the modern nation-state. This was because the raison d’être of the nation-state was based on a perceived difference between nationals and ‘aliens’ and therefore immigration control and exclusion of those perceived to be different, i.e. aliens became a means by which the nascent nation-state asserted its statehood or its ostensibly distinct identity. The warehousing of refugees and asylumseekers and the discriminatory treatment migrants and transmigrants have been suffering at the hands of state authorities are clear cases of categorization and labelling designed to create and perpetuate difference and facilitate, on the one hand, the construction of national identity and, on the other, state control of immigration (Kibreab, 2000, 2007). In the ‘ideal project’ of nation-building in the various countries in the region, national identity was based on construction of difference and uniqueness in relation to others – ‘us’ compared to ‘them.’ The categorization or even the stigmatization of the ‘other,’ including asylum-seekers, refugees, migrants and transmigrants, who would have been welcomed as sojourning brethren in need in earlier times was in the eyes of the post-colonial state considered as constituting a constraint on the process of nation-building and distinct national identity construction. This process of ‘othering’ of the ostensible aliens from the neighbouring countries was accompanied by vigorous emphasis on the ‘commonality’ and ‘homogeneity’ of those who were lumped together by the respective colonial powers within the realm of the states in the region. The exclusion of the ‘alien’ regardless of the cultural, ethnic and livelihood bonds that tied them together with ‘nationals’ of the respective states was perceived to be beneficial for national unity, integration and national identity construction.

Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region

This in a sense was expedient as ethnicity, as well as national identity or any form of social identity, for that matter, is constructed in opposition to the ‘other’. As Eriksen perceptively notes, Nationalism stresses solidarity between the poor and the rich, between the propertyless and the capitalists. According to the nationalist ideology, the sole principle of political exclusion and inclusion follows the boundaries of the nation – that category of people defined as members of the same culture (Eriksen, 1993: 102, emphasis added).

More often than not, as was the case in the states of the Horn, this happened notwithstanding that the so-called distinct culture was shared by others inhabiting the different states in the region. After demonstrating the commonality of the process of ethnic and national identity formation and in-depth analysis of how Norwegian national identity was invented, including by alleging some ‘foreign’ cultural symbols as being ostensibly Norwegian, Eriksen states: We have earlier seen similar identity processes in discussions of other ethnic groups; what is peculiar to nationalism is its relationship to the state. With the help of the powers of the nation-state, nations can be invented where they do not exist …

Eriksen further argues, …the selection of symbols to be used in the nation’s [Norway’s] representation of itself was highly politically motivated. In many cases, the so-called ancient, typically Norwegian customs, folk tales, handicrafts and so on were neither ancient, typical, nor Norwegian (ibid.: 104).

This eloquent description was equally true of the process of construction of the so-called nation-states in the GHR. It is in this sense Benedict Anderson in his celebrated piece, Imagined Communities, observed that ‘every community based on wider links than face-to-face contact is imagined, and nations are neither more nor less “fraudulent” than other communities’ (Anderson, 1991 quoted in Eriksen, 1993: 103). Analysts seeking an answer to the question: ‘Who are the Djiboutians, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Kenyans, Somalis, Sudanese and Ugandans?’ are likely to face the same conundrum that faced Michael Moerman, who in his study of ethnic relations in Thailand tried to establish who the Lue were by identifying the boundaries that distinguished them from other ethnic groups. His listing of various objective criteria ‘such as language, political organisation and territorial congruity’ was of no avail: ‘Since language, culture, political organisation, etc., do not correlate completely, the units delimited by one criterion do not coincide with the units delimited by another’ (Moerman, 1965, cited in Eriksen, 1993: 11). The reality of the Lue is similar if not identical to those prevailing in the GHR’s frontiers communities. When Moerman asked the Lue to state their distinct characteristics that bounded them from other ethnic groups, they ‘would mention cultural traits which they in fact shared with other neighbouring groups. They lived in close interaction with other groups in the area; they had no exclusive livelihood, no exclusive language, no

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exclusive customs, no exclusive livelihood, no exclusive religion’ (ibid.: 11). Moerman therefore wondered, ‘Why was it appropriate to describe them as an ethnic group?’ Eriksen notes that ‘after posing these problems, Moerman was forced to conclude that “someone is Lue by virtue of believing and calling himself Lue and of acting in ways that validate his Lueness”’ (ibid.: 11). Inasmuch as Lueness is a function of one’s belief and conviction, so is Djiboutianness, Ethiopianness, Eritreanness, Somaliness, Ugandanness, etc. Immigration motivated by the need to make ends meet by bringing land and other renewable resources straddling the boundaries of the states into the production process was seen by the nascent post-colonial states in the region as the single most important threat to the nationalist project of nation-building and national identity construction based on exclusion of those who were perceived to fall outside the physical boundaries of the post-colonial state. This approach to state building and national identity invention or construction was further threatened by the arrival of hundreds of thousands or millions of displaced populations who settled among their kith and kin across the state borders, e.g. ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden, the Acholi from Southern Sudan, the Kakwa from Southern Sudan, ethnic Somalis in Djibouti and Ethiopia, etc. As Thomas Eriksen powerfully explains: At the identity level, nationhood is a matter of belief. The nation, that is the Volk imagined by nationalists, is a product of nationalist ideology; it is not the other way around. A nation exists from the moment a handful of influential people decide that it should be so, and it starts, in most cases, as an urban elite phenomenon (Eriksen, 1993: 105, emphasis added).

The following examples demonstrate that in the GHR, people, including migrants, transmigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and climate-changeinduced displacees and those who stay put instead of returning after the elimination of the factors that prompted them to flee, i.e. people in protracted refugee situations, invariably identify themselves situationally and innovatively depending on the particular goals they pursue at different times and places. In the light of the dominant shared identities that permeate social and cultural life in the region, the states, when they are confronted with such conundrums, are unable to enforce their exclusionary policies as they possess no ‘silver bullet’ that enables them to distinguish between ‘citizens’ and ‘aliens’, ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. As we saw earlier, these are questions of belief rather than results of innate features. In the Horn of Africa, and probably everywhere else, identity, besides having a temporal and spatial dimension, is a function of the particular project of the bearer. In a recent visit to Djibouti, I met an Afar waiter in one of the restaurants. He was an educated man. He also spoke fluent Amharic. After visiting the place several times, the waiter and I got acquainted and one day we had a long conversation. Among other things, I asked him the following questions: 92

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‘How do you identify yourself?’ He said, ‘What do you mean?’ I said, ‘What do you say, if asked “Where are you from?”’ He said, ‘It depends on who is asking and on what my intentions are.’ I said, ‘Are you suggesting that your identity changes depending on the identity of the person who asks and on what you expect to get from the outcome of the conversation?’ He said, ‘Not always, but often’ I said, ‘Is that not opportunistic?’ He said, ‘The aim is to survive and in reality we are the same people.’ I wondered, ‘Don’t you have a national identity that anchors you to a particular country in the region?’ He said, ‘Not to one but to four – I am a Djiboutian, Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali concurrently.’ I further asked him, ‘Don’t the authorities in the respective countries have a means of identifying your national identity?’ He said, ‘How could they do that? Laughingly, he said, ‘Do you see anything written on my forehead?’ I said, ‘I guess not.’1 In the course of a series of research fieldwork in the region, e.g. in Nairobi, Eldoret, Mogadishu, Eastleigh, Jalalaqsi, Qoryole, Jijiga, Kebridhar, Diredawa, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan and Khartoum, I have seen many pastoralists, migrants, transmigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees whose ethnic identities but not necessarily their ethnicities changed and shifted continuously and situationally depending on the particular circumstance they found themselves in. How an individual expresses his/her ethnic identity is dependent on the context of a situation. In March 1998, when I was conducting research along the Eritrean-Sudan frontier, I interviewed cross-border traders and pastoralists who regularly crossed the borders. When I asked them about whether they identified themselves in the same way on both sides of the border, all the interviewees who hailed from the frontier communities independently said, ‘In Sudan, I am Sudanese and in Eritrea, I am Eritrean’. The Eritrean highlanders’ ability to change their ethnic identity was substantially diminished by lack of knowledge of Arabic and unfamiliarity with the cultures of the frontier communities. Within these structural constraints, they tried their best to under-communicate their distinct ethnic identity, attempting to avoid standing out from the crowd. A Somali colleague from the diaspora said the same thing when I asked him how he identifies himself when he is in the region. In his case, besides being a British and Swedish citizen, he said, ‘depending on the particular circumstances, I identify myself as a Somali, Djiboutian, Ethiopian and Kenyan’. He said that his identity was not given or natural. It changes situationally depending on the different goals he pursues at different  Djibouti City, 15 June 2011.

1

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times and places. When asked whether he has ever used different identities in pursuit of different goals, he said, ‘Always. These days, the only asset no one can take away from Somalis is their malleable identity which they manipulate to their advantage without “moral constraints”.’2 Another example that demonstrates these multiple shared identities is the case of the three Somali brothers from the Gadaboursi clan who worked for three different governments, one as the Somali ambassador to the United Nations, another as the Ethiopian ambassador to Egypt, and the third as the Djiboutian ambassador to Egypt (Absieh and Botrol, 1986 cited in Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1992). The story is similar throughout the region. In November 2010, I was introduced to two men in Khartoum, who I was told were originally from Eritrea. I asked each of them independently how they identified themselves. Each said, ‘It depends.’ I was taken aback by the similarity of their answers even though the interviews took place at different places and times and each had no knowledge of my meeting with the other. Each said, ‘Sometimes, I am Sudanese and sometimes Eritrean.’ I asked each of them: ‘Don’t you have an identity?’ The one with a higher education degree from the University of Khartoum said, ‘My identity is not fixed. I change it according to situations. I make it up as I go along. I manufacture multitudes of identities as my situation is constantly changing and shifting. I identify myself differently when I am in Kassala, Port Sudan and Khartoum. When I was in Cairo last year, I never mentioned my Eritrean identity. I identified myself as Sudanese throughout my stay. Of course my Eritrean friends and relatives knew who I was, but that was a different matter.’3 It is equally important to underscore the fact that this luxury of changing one’s ethnic or national identity situationally was by no means readily available to all refugees in the region. Although identity is a dynamic and adaptive process in which individuals continuously establish, evaluate, re-evaluate, change, shift and re-establish who they are in relation to others around them, it is important to emphasize that in the short term, it is only groups who share certain traits, such as religion, language, dress, and general way of life who are able to do so with relative ease. The first-generation Tigrinya- and Amharic-speaking transmigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Kassala, Gedaref, Khartoum, Nairobi, Djibouti, Kampala, etc., no matter how much they tried to change their ethnic identity, were singled out for harassment, arrest, detention and exploitation. This suggests that identity can be a resource or a liability. However, since the contents of identity are dynamic and mutable, the second generation transmigrants and refugees will probably be able to assume such features with relative ease. I was conducting fieldwork when the democratically-elected Sadiq al Mahdi’s government unleashed a ferocious attack on the self-settled Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum under the guise of the  Personal Communication, Djibouti City, 14 June 2011.

2

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 Personal communication, Khartoum, 4 November 2010.

3

Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region

so-called Kesha campaign in 1987 (see Sudan Times, 18 March 1987). The aim was to ‘clear’ the Three Cities of Khartoum of refugees who were labelled as ‘illegal entrants’ (see Karadawi, 1999; Kibreab, 1996b). No Eritrean in Khartoum who could pass as Sudanese, and these were mainly Habab, the Beni Amer, the Maria and others who could assume those identities, such as the Muslim Blin and the Bet Juk, were affected by the vicious campaign in which people were rounded up, harassed, subjected to extortion, arbitrary detention and eviction from the Three Cities (Kibreab, 1996b). The regional authorities in Kassala and Port Sudan tried to emulate the infamous Kesha campaign but gave it up because they could not distinguish the Eritrean Beni Amer and Habab from the Sudanese Beni Amer and Habab. Most of the other Eritrean Muslims also assumed fictive Beni Amer and Habab identities through the direct or indirect collusion of the Eritrean Habab and Beni Amer. Although a few of the Eritrean Christian highlanders also managed to hide their identity by adopting an assumed identity of convenience, many were singled out for harassment. During fieldwork in November 1983, when we were driving from Gedaref via Mufaza and Hawata to the Qala en Nahal refugee settlements, we met a herder with a large flock of cattle. We stopped and my research assistant began to ask him in Arabic and the herder said, ‘Ana higyakum iamir’ – ‘I don’t understand your language.’ When asked for his language, he said, ‘Tigre.’ I asked him with my limited knowledge of the Tigre language, ‘adka aya tu?’ – ‘where are you from?’ He said, ‘I am from Western Eritrea and Eastern Sudan.’ I said, ‘You can’t belong to two countries simultaneously.’ He laughed and said, ‘Why not? We have always done so and we will do so in the future. We and our animals would not be able to survive by relying on the grazing and water resources in western Eritrea or eastern Sudan.’4 I asked him, ‘How about the border?’ He said, ‘We don’t recognize the borders and we don’t also know where they are. Borders are for the governments. Not for us.’5 At that time, the war between Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was at its peak and I asked him whether their movements across the borders were hampered by the war. He said, ‘We know the area better than the Ethiopian army and they can’t stop us.’ I asked him, ‘How about the EPLF?’ He said, ‘They don’t mind us moving in search of grazing and water. We are part of the struggle.’6 A Somali friend told me that his illiterate uncle, who was a trader and had his family in Arusha, Tanzania, when crossing the Kenyan border was asked by a Kenyan immigration officer, ‘Your passport, Sir?’ He said, ‘Which one?’ He took out of his pocket four passports one after the other – Tanzanian, Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian.7  Field notes, February 1983.

4

 Ibid.

5

 Ibid.

6

 Mohammad Farah, Uppsala, Sweden, 1990.

7

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Although one should guard against generalizing from these limited accounts, notwithstanding the fact that the narratives were recounted at different times and places independent of each other, taken together they weave a discernible pattern of social identity that changes situationally to blend into its surroundings. The nearest and most apposite metaphor I can think of to describe the ethnic identity of people in the GHR, especially those from the frontier regions, is the chameleon which is known for its unique ability to change colours to merge into its immediate environment. The way people in the Horn change their identities under changing circumstances may aptly be captured by this extract from Petur Jóhan Heinesen’s poem, Chameleon: Unrecognisable in the crowd Blending in with the surroundings Hearing an invisible shout See you one minute, the next you’re changing You’re everyone And no one You’re everything And nothing I look into your eyes Although I can’t see you A person in a disguise Impossible to see you.

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In spite of this reality on the ground where group and individual identities are constantly negotiated, denied, assumed, shifting and changing ingeniously in response to varying demands of everyday life, the exclusionary policies of the states in the region invariably conceive identities and citizenship as being natural and fixed or tied to bounded geographies or territories of the respective states. Consequently, they pigeonhole people into different fixed categories – ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ ‘nationals’ and ‘aliens’ ‘refugees’ ‘IDPs’ – and consequently expect distressed migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees to return to where they allegedly belong naturally once the conditions that forced them to flee are eliminated. The assumption of an immutable or natural link between people’s identity and a particular place, homeland, as well as the conception of return movements as being manifestations of the desire to belong to such places or countries, is theoretically flawed and empirically unproven. There are hundreds of thousands of transmigrants and forced migrants in the GHR, who have stayed put in countries of asylum notwithstanding the fact that the conditions that prompted them to flee are eliminated (Kibreab, 2008b). When political changes take place in countries of origin, some choose to return and others either decide to stay put in countries of asylum or emigrate to the global North by using global transnational networks (Horst, 2006). Contrary to the assumptions that underpin conventional solutions to the refugee problem, the only time the desire to belong to a specific place – homeland – becomes a powerful driver of the decision to ‘vote with one’s feet’ homewards is when the

Invisible Integration in the Greater Horn Region

opportunities to establish new homes in other places or to be integrated into host societies are blocked either by hostile host governments’ policies, unreceptive host societies and inauspicious structural factors, such as lack of land, drinking water for humans and animals, employment and self-employment opportunities, lack of access to business licences, housing, freedom of movement and residence, as well as adverse weather conditions (Kibreab, 2003). In the absence of manufactured differences, the states in the region would be unable to ‘legitimize’ the raison d’être for their separate existence, as well as ‘enforce’ their exclusionary policies designed to control and exclude the ‘other’ by applying discriminatory laws that deny the latter freedom of movement and residence and the right to work, engage in commerce and own movable and immovable property. This is matched by a tendency, on the one hand, to over-communicate the common ‘national identity’ of the so-called ‘citizens’ of the respective post-colonial states and, on the other, to under-communicate their past, including their shared identities with the ‘other’ – the brethren along the frontiers – that defies any form of demarcation and the refugees, asylum-seekers and transmigrants in the respective countries in the region. On the part of the states, ‘othering’ has been an integral part of the formal process of nation-building and national identity construction. As one specialist put it powerfully, ‘We know who we are by who we reject’. The irony in our region, however, is that those whom the states are trying to reject are integral parts of their own societies interconnected by thick social networks embedded in the history, culture and way of life of the region. Inadvertently, the states, by rejecting instead of embracing the entities that are constituent parts of the fabric of the societies, are indirectly denying ‘who they are’. However, this grand scheme of nation-building and national identity construction is continuously subverted by the inhabitants of the region who render themselves invisible in a quest for survival and self-assertion, as well as to avoid the tyranny of being ‘othered’.

Invisible integration and citizenship

In the global north, the use of variables, such as employment, housing, education, etc. are critical indicators in the measurement of integration (see Ager and Strang, 2004; Zetter et al., 2002; Berry, 1984, 1991; Portes, 1969). However, in the GHR, the significance of the conventional theoretical and methodological approaches on integration is limited for the following reasons. (1) The raison d’étre of host governments’ policies and practices, as seen before, is to prevent rather than promote integration (Kibreab, 1989, 1996a, 1996b; Malkki 1996; Karadawi, 1999). This is consistent, as seen before, with the grand scheme of the exclusionary project of nationbuilding and national-identity construction – hence the raison d’être of the warehousing of asylum-seekers and refugees in spatially-segregated sites – camps and settlements – where, if the authorities had it their way, there would be no freedom of movement and residence and consequently

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minimal or no interactions with nationals (Kibreab, 2008b). The goal of such policies is to exclude and marginalize rather than integrate transmigrants, migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees (Kibreab, 2003). (2)  Throughout the region, integration of transmigrants and forced migrants occurs informally rather than formally as all the governments in the region are hostile to the notion of formal integration of transmigrants, migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees (Kibreab, 1989, 1992, 1996c, 2008b; Bakewell, 2008; Polzer and Hammond, 2008). (3)  As seen before, informally-integrated forced migrants are invisible and invisibility is intrinsically defiant to any form of quantitative measurement. Those who are informally integrated adopt invisibility as a strategy for survival. (4)  Most informally-integrated refugees and transmigrants eke out meagre existences in the informal rather than the formal sector – an activity so elusive that it defies any attempt made to document or quantify it. (5)  There is a dearth of data on the invisible populations’ access to employment, housing, health care and education and therefore the possibility to use such measurements is limited or non-existent. As seen earlier, for our purpose invisible integration is defined as a situation in which transmigrants, migrants and forced migrants are able to merge into their surroundings by immobilising the ability of the state to exercise sovereignty in terms of determining who should enter the country concerned, who should form bonds of community within the country and on what terms and conditions. The achievement of such a goal is premised on the ability of the people concerned to defy or stifle one of the fundamental elements in the principle of sovereignty – control of borders and right of residence. Inasmuch as the states in the region have been unable to enforce their exclusionary policies, invisible migrants have been exercising the highest form of human agency. Without such agential power, they would not have been able to defy state control and consequently the sovereign power of the state. These actions turn on its head the myth of the so-called ‘helpless refugees and passive recipients of assistance and charity’ (see Kibreab 1993, 2004b).

Refugees in the urban areas of the Greater Horn

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Host governments’ policies, reception strategies and durable solutions in the region are underpinned by the assumption that distressed migrants and forced migrants in their territories will return home or will be made to return when the factors that forced them to flee, such as drought, hunger, famine, war and persecution, are eliminated. This is notwithstanding the fact that migration whether ‘voluntary’ or ‘forced’ is multi-causal and therefore the elimination of one factor may not necessarily imply that all the proximate and ultimate causes are removed. Notwithstanding the complexity and multiplicity of the drivers of migration, those affected by it are labelled as refugees and consequently placed in spatially-segregated sites – camps and settlements – where there is no freedom of movement

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and residence (Karadawi, 1999; Kibreab, 1987, 1996a, 1996b, 2005, 2007). The raison d’être of these policies is to perpetuate rather than eliminate refugee status by fixing the ‘other’ in a timeless present (Kibreab, 1989, 1996c, 2003). All the countries in the GHR have policies that prohibit asylum-seekers and refugees from settling in urban centres (see Kibreab, 1996c, 2005, 2008; Karadawi, 1999). These policies are ineffective and their consequences have been to drive forced migrants into invisibility (Kibreab, 2010). Although the countries in the Greater Horn do not allow forced migrants to live in cities and towns, there are tens of thousands who do so illegally (Kibreab, 1996c; Karadawi, 1999; Campbell, 2005a, 2006; Herz, 2008; Pavanello et al., 2010). All these groups lead invisible and hidden lives in large cities such as Kampala, Entebbe, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, Medeni, Senar, Girba, Showak, Halfa, Hargesa, Jijiga, Harar, Diredawa, Addis Ababa, Djibouti and the other regional and local towns in the region. Although their magnitude is difficult to estimate and their presence is conveniently denied by host governments and agencies, it may not be an exaggeration to postulate that the number of urban refugees is probably higher than the number of those who live in government-designated sites – camps and settlements. For example, in countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, where refugees and asylum-seekers are required by law to live in spatially-segregated sites, tens of thousands of them either ‘vote with their feet’ to abandon such locations or avoid them from the outset in favour of leading illegal and invisible lives in large cities. Those groups who are easily distinguishable from the local citizens lead precarious lives not only because of their defiance of government policies, but also due to their visibility. These groups are different from the host societies and therefore are routinely victimized by unscrupulous employers, landlords, security forces, politicians and municipal authorities (Clay, 1984; Gallagher and Forbes Martin, 1992; Kibreab, 1996b, 2004; Karadawi, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Pavanello et al., 2010; Jones, 2004; Karimi, 2002; Mushemeza, 2007). For example, according to UNHCR sources, at the end of 2010, there were 46,000 urban refugees in Nairobi who have been granted refugee status (Campbell et al., 2011). However, the total number of refugees and asylum-seekers living in Nairobi is estimated by UNHCR and NGOs to be between 80,000 and100,000 (ibid.). These estimates should be taken with a pinch of salt as there is no way they would be able to know the number of those who informally integrated in the city. Refugees in urban areas, as already stated, lead invisible lives. Those who share similar traits with the local population are indistinguishable and never admit that they are aliens. The large majority of the Somali refugees in Nairobi try to pass as Kenyan Somalis from the North Eastern Province. Throughout the 1990s [after the arrival of Somali refugees] Eastleigh [in Nairobi] has transformed from a residential community to the commercial centre of Eastlands, and increasingly much of Nairobi. Based on a land transfer policy known as ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ and with little

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to no governmental oversight, …largely Somali businessmen in Eastleigh bought up residential blocs and turned them into multi-million shilling retail malls and commercial enterprises of various sizes (Campbell, 2005b).

The influx of Somali refugees in Eastleigh after the collapse of the Somali State has brought business and social vibrancy to a part of Nairobi which, prior to their arrival, was inhabited by deprived and downtrodden residents of Nairobi. All this has changed thanks to the entrepreneurial acumen of the Somali refugees and their dense global networks (see Horst, 2006; Herz, 2008). Manuel Herz observes, ‘1st Avenue’ is the main street of Eastleigh, an area of Nairobi located two kilometers east of the city center. Shaped and influenced by the dominating presence of Somali refugees, it is one of the most intense and striking places in the Kenyan capital, and at the same time a center of a global trade network. Also coined ‘Small-Mogadishu’ for being a dislocated proxy seat of government of a disintegrated country, Eastleigh with its approximately 100,000 inhabitants represents one of the largest Somali cities, and the second largest contiguous Somali community outside of Somalia itself […] A major part of Somali trade is coordinated via Eastleigh, one of the few operating Somali banks has its headquarters in Eastleigh, it is a center of the Somali finance network and location for conferences and meetings of ministers and Somali politicians of various fractions [sic] to discuss the future of a tragic country. Populated predominantly by non-registered refugees who are not in possession of legal documents, living there informally or illegally, it is a part of Nairobi, located in its very heart, but ignored by the administration of the Kenyan capital, its population hidden in plain view (Herz, 2008: 1, emphasis added).

This clearly shows that, notwithstanding the fact that the Somali refugees as elsewhere in the region inhabit a space of liminality characterized by concurrent illegality/non-existence and presence, they have been able to craft a vivacious niche underpinned by dense transnational global networks that would have been unthinkable in the absence of powerful human agency and autonomy. The same is true of the pre-independence Eritrean Muslim refugees in Kassala, Port Sudan, Gedaref and Khartoum. On 8 May 2002, the UNHCR stated the following, in a press release headed, ‘UNHCR Declares Cessation of Refugee Status for Eritreans’: UNHCR announced …that it is ending refugee status for all Eritreans who fled their country as a result of the war of independence or the recent border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The world-wide cessation will take effect on December 31 and will affect hundreds of thousands of Eritreans in neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2002).

Eritrean refugees in Sudan were told to register for repatriation or to apply for reconsideration provided they had well-founded fear of being persecuted by the post-independence Eritrean state which did not exist at the time they fled the country. Notwithstanding the fact that there were over 350,000 pre-independence Eritrean refugees in the country, only about 27,000 heads of households representing about 95,000 individuals, 100 and all of them living in camps and settlements in eastern and central

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regions, applied to be considered for a new refugee status determination (Kibreab, 2008b). None of the pre-independence invisible Muslim refugees living in the towns and cities of Kassala, Port Sudan, Gedaref, Medeni, New Halfa and Khartoum came forward either to register for repatriation or apply for a new refugee status. This was because they were informally integrated in spite of the fact that integration of refugees is objectionable to the policy of the government. For example, Mr Hassan Attiyah, when he was a Commissioner for Refugees in Sudan, described the fundamental principles underlying the country’s refugee policy as follows: If you talk of integration as a sort of naturalisation, this is completely rejected in Sudan… Being a refugee in a country for 20, 30 or 100 years, I don’t think will deprive you of your own nationality, your own origin… That is why in Sudan you hear that refugees [read, the government has] have adopted this policy of local settlement, rather than local integration. … refugees should be given a certain place to live in, to continue their own sort of relations with their own people [i.e. not with Sudanese], not to forget their country, because we are not interested that they will forget their countries; they have to go back. We don’t want more population in this country: it is enough (Hassan Attiyah Musa, quoted in Kibreab 2000, emphasis added).

Most countries in the region try, but in vain, to keep asylum-seekers and refugees in spatially-segregated sites where ‘direct and continuous’ contacts with nationals are discouraged. The aim of warehousing refugees in camps is to prevent them from developing relations with the host populations so that they maintain their separate national identities and way of life until return to their countries in safety becomes possible. In spite of this hostile government policy, many of the pre-independence Muslim Eritrean refugees, the majority of whom hail from the frontier communities, acquired Sudanese nationality (al Jinsia) informally. Many of the Muslim refugees who could pass as Beni Amer, Habab, Hedareb and Maria have also managed to obtain the necessary documents by assuming fictive identities. However, the opportunity to acquire Sudanese nationality does not exist for the pre-independence Christian highlanders who lack ethnic and faith-based social networks that provide the necessary framework within which informal acquisition of the necessary documents and invisible integration take place. None of those who manage to obtain documentation through different informal means reveal their Eritrean national origin to the authorities when they file the application. They declare themselves to be Sudanese. However, their Eritreanness is an open secret to the authorities, who nevertheless turn a blind eye. There are greater political projects at stake on the part of the ruling elite of the country, such as counteracting the demographic, cultural and political influence of the large influxes of ‘Africans’ from southern and western Sudan into the eastern and central regions of the country. Not only do the ruling elite perceive the Eritrean Muslims as being racially identical with them, but also as important allies who could be manoeuvred and deployed in pursuit of their project of domination and subordination of the ‘other.’ Several informants have, for 101

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example, told the author that many of these ‘Eritreans’ routinely serve in the Sudanese defence and security forces. Although the demographic composition of the eastern towns in Sudan, such as Kassala and Port Sudan and to some extent Gedaref have ­dramatically changed during the last fifty to sixty years due to the presence of large numbers of Eritreans indistinguishable from nationals, it is still not possible to estimate their number. Not only are they indistinguishable from the Sudanese, but they are also reluctant to admit to outsiders their Eritrean national identity. A well-informed Eritrean Muslim in the diaspora, who is well familiar with the Eritrean and Sudanese communities in Sudan, for example, said: (1) The number of Eritreans in Sudan are by far more than those in Ethiopia – I am not talking about the refugees, but those who are recognised as legal residents and enjoy full citizenship (first and second generation). (2) The Minister of Interior in the Central Government (Khartoum) is an Eritrean (first generation). (3) The governor of Kassala Province is an Eritrean (first generation), ministers, high officials and civil servants in Red Sea and Kassala provinces are Eritreans – some of them were until recently members of the ELF and EPLF during the revolution era. (4) High military and security officers, successful businessmen, university lecturers and journalists – are Eritreans (first and second generation).8

Many Eritreans also hold key positions in the National Congress Party. The veracity of this information is confirmed by a number of Eritreans in London who have triple nationalities – British, Eritrean and Sudanese. The same is true in north-eastern Kenya, Eastleigh, northern Uganda, South Sudan, Djibouti and in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Behind the scenes, there is a widespread process of invisible integration taking place in the region. Formally, all the governments in the region, including that of Sudan, openly declare that they are opposed to integration of transmigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees into their societies. However, this does not necessarily mean that no de facto or informal integration is taking place. In most cases, the process of informal integration is invisible to host governments, scholars and international and national organizations because it takes place by circumventing formal institutional constraints. These are groups who successfully subvert and/or circumvent the formal institutional rules of the coercive apparatus of the state by assuming fictive identities in order, on the one hand, to avoid being detected and consequently warehoused in refugee camps and settlements, and on the other, to engage in life-sustaining economic activities outside government-designated sites – camps or settlements.

CONCLUSION The frontier communities in the Greater Horn of Africa have shared history, culture, ethnicity, religion, way of life and livelihood systems. 102

 Email message, 5 May 2010 (name withheld).

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These shared common resources have been instrumental in the process of informal integration of the different invisible populations in the region and have been the glue that holds the societies in the region together. In the absence of these shared resources, the lives of many of the groups among the transmigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers would have been subjected to state control and consequently to arrest, detention, exploitation and deportation. This should not be construed to imply that all the transmigrants, self-settling asylum-seekers, refugees and those who stay put subsequent to the elimination of the factors that prompted them to flee are able to render themselves invisible and therefore stifle the ability of the state in the receiving country to exercise sovereignty in terms of determining who should enter, reside and form a community within the bounded territory of the state concerned. There are groups among transmigrants, migrants and forced migrants in the urban areas of the region who are considered as undocumented and illegal entrants and consequently are subjected to discriminatory treatment, arrest, detention, exploitation and deportation to countries where their safety, security and dignity may be compromised. Even the safety and security of those who are indistinguishable from the local populations and are integrated informally cannot be guaranteed. Not only is invisibility the source of empowerment and freedom from state control, but it is also a source of vulnerability and marginalization. If anything goes wrong, for example inter-state wars, acts of terrorism, inter-communal strife, etc., those who are invisibly integrated may suddenly be exposed and subjected to harassment, arrest, detention and deportation. The unhappy scenario that unfolded during the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war is a case in point. The Ethiopians of Eritrean extraction born and raised in Ethiopia and the Eritreans of Ethiopian origin that were fully integrated into the two countries were subjected not only to state control but also to arbitrary expulsion. There is no guarantee against history repeating itself. The only way to guard against such dangers is for the governments in the region to develop criteria for a general amnesty with the intention of regularizing the status of the millions of people who are leading invisible lives throughout the region. Although, as seen throughout the chapter, invisibility is a powerful ‘weapon of the weak’, it does not provide universal immunity against abuse, exploitation and extortion. It is high time that the states in the region accept the fact that willy-nilly the hundreds of thousands or even millions who are informally integrated into their societies are there to stay.

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Hussein, A. M. 2010. Livestock Trade in the Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands. Chatham House Briefing Paper, September. Available at www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109448 (accessed 18 April 2012). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992, January. The Horn of Africa: Multiple Citizenship of the Ethnic Somalis. Available at www. unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a81120.html (accessed 4 April 2012). Jones, R. A. 2004. ‘Mitigating the Economic Impact of Refugees in Rwanda and Uganda’. Ph.D. Thesis, University of York. Karadawi, A. 1999. Refugee Policy in Sudan 1967–1984. Oxford: Berghahn. Karimi, M. (ed.). 2002. Conflict in Northern Kenya: a Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in Northern Kenya. Nairobi: ITDG. Kibreab, G. 1987. Refugees and Development in Africa: The Case of Eritrean Refugees. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press. – 1989. ‘Local Settlements in Africa: A Misconceived Option?’ Journal of Refugee Studies 2(4): 468–90. –  1991. ‘The State of the Art Review of Refugee Studies in Africa’, Uppsala Papers in Economic History, Research Report No.26, Uppsala University, Department of Economic History. – 1993. ‘The Myth of Dependency Among Camp Refugees in Somalia 1979–1989’, Journal of Refugee Studies 6 (4): 321–49 – 1996a. People on the Edge in the Horn: Displacement, Land Use and the Environment. Oxford: James Currey. –  1996b. ‘Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees in Khartoum: What the Eye Refuses to See’, African Studies Review 39(3): 131–78. – 1996c. ‘Left in Limbo: Prospects for Repatriation of Eritrean Refugees from the Sudan and the Responses of the International Donor Community’, in T. Allen (ed.), In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight & Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London: James Currey. –  1996d. Ready and Willing … but Still Waiting: Eritrean Refugees in Sudan and the Dilemmas of Return. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute. – 2000. ‘Resistance, Displacement and Identity: The Case of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 34(2): 249–96. – 2001. ‘Property Rights, Development Policy and Depletion of Resources: The Case of the Central Rainlands of Sudan, 1940s– 1980s’, Environment and History 1: 57–108. – 2002. State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, 1889–1989: the Demise of Communal Resource Management. Studies in African Economic and Social Development Vol. 18. Lewiston NY, Queenston ON, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen. – 2003. ‘Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees’, International Migration Review 37(1): 24–73. – 2004a. ‘Pulling the Wool over the Eyes of the Strangers: Refugee Deceit and Trickery in Institutionalised Settings’, Journal of Refugee Studies 17 (1): 1–26. 107

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Kibreab, G. 2004b. ‘Refugeehood, Loss and Social Change: Eritrean Refugees and Returnees’, in P. Essed, G. Frerks and J. Schrijvers (eds), Refugees and Transformations of Societies: Agency, Policies, Ethics and Politics. Oxford: Berghahn. – 2005. ‘Urban Eritrean Refugees in Sudan: Yearning for Home or the Diaspora?’ Eritrean Studies Review 4(2): 115–41. – 2007. ‘Why Governments Prefer Spatially-Segregated Settlement Sites for Urban Refugees’, Refugee, Special Issue, York University. – 2008a. Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence: Social Capital, Associational Life, Religion, Ethnicity, and Sowing Seeds of Dictatorship. Trenton NJ: Africa World Press and Red Sea Press. – 2008b. ‘Access to Economic and Social Rights in First Countries of Asylum and Repatriation: A Case Study of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan’, in Katarzyna Grabska and Lyla Mehta (eds), Problematising Rights and Policies in Forced Displacement: Whose Needs are Right? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. – 2009. ‘Eritrean-Sudanese Relations in a Historical Perspective’, in R. Reid (ed.), Eritrea’s External Relations: Understanding its Regional Role and Foreign Policy. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. – 2010, November 2–3. ‘Eritreans in Sudan Half a Century After: Are they  Refugees, Citizens or Denizens? What happens when Policies are at Odds with Reality?’ Keynote speech presented at the International Conference on Population Mobility in Sudan, Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, University of Khartoum. – 2011. ‘Forced Migration and Social Change: A Case Study of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan’, Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies 9(1): 95-124. Kopytoff, Igor (ed.). 1987. The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Le Billon, P. 2001. ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, Political Geography 20: 561–84. Lewis, I. M. 1961. A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London and New York: Oxford University Press. Love, R. 2009. ‘Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa’. Chatham House Briefing Paper, December. Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109208 (accessed 18 April 2012). Malkki, L. H. 1996. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. Markakis, J. 1987. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 1998. Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa. London: Sage. 108

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Markakis, J. 1993. Conflict and the decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa. Basingstoke: Macmillan. –  2004. ‘Pastoralism on the Margin’. Report, Minority Rights Group International. London: Minority Rights Group. – 2011. Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers. Oxford: James Currey. Marsh, Heather. 2011, April 8. 2011-04-07 African refugees murdered, drowned in the Mediterranean. Available at http://wlcentral.org/ node/1629 (accessed 3 April 2012). Marshall, T. H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mezzadra, S. 2004. ‘The Right to Escape’, Ephemera 4(3): 267–75. Mildner, S-A., G. Lauster and W. Wodni. 2011. ‘Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: a literature review of natural resources and conflict’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 5(1): 155–72. Moerman, Michael. 1965. Ethnic identification in a Complex Civilization: Who are the Lue? Center for Southeast Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Mushemeza, E. D. 2007. The Politics of Empowerment of Banyarwanda Refugees in Uganda 1959–2001. Kampala: Fountain Books. North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nugent, Paul and A. I. Asiwaju (eds). 1996. African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. London and New York: Pinter. Pavanello, S., S. Elhawary and S. Pantuliano. 2010. Hidden and Exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. HPG Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute. Polzer, T. and L. Hammond. 2008. ‘Invisible Displacement’, Journal of Refugee Studies 21(4): 417–31. Polzer, Tara. 2008. ‘Invisible Integration: How Bureaucratic, Academic and Social Categories Obscure Integrated Refugees’, Journal of Refugee Studies 21(4): 476–98. Portes, A. 1969. ‘Dilemmas of a Golden Exile: Integration of Cuban Refugee Families in Milwaukee’, American Sociological Review 34(4): 505–18. Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. – 1995. ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy 6(1): 65–78. – 2000. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Raleigh, C. and H. Urdal. 2007. ‘Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict’, Political Geography 26(6): 674–94. Scott, J. 1985. Weapon of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. Times of Malta. 2011, April 8. UNHCR calls on States to uphold principles of rescue-at-sea. www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110408/ local/unhcr-calls-on-states-to-uphold-principles-of-rescue-atsea.358906 (accessed 3 April 2012). 109

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UNEP. 2007. Sudan: Post-Conflict Environment Assessment. Available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan.pdf (accessed 18 April 2012). United Nations. (n.d.). Refugees: Faces Behind the Figures. Available at www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/refugees/ facesbehindthefigures.html (accessed 3 April 2012). UNHCR. 2002, May 8. ‘UNHCR Declares Cessation of Refugee Status for Eritreans’, Press Releases. Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/ NEWS/3cd9111e4.html (accessed 18 April 2012). – 2010, ‘UNHCR Condemns Forced Return of 1,700 Rwandans from Uganda’. News Stories. Available at: www.unhcr.org/4c406edb6. html (accessed 18 April 2012). – 2012. 2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Sudan. Available at www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483b76 (accessed 18 April 2012). UNHCR (2011) Sudan UNHCR Operation in 2011. Available at http:// www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/where-we-work/major-operations-worldwide/sudan.html (accessed 23 July 2012). Urdal, H. 2008. ‘Population, Resources and Political Violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(4): 590–617. Voice for the Voiceless, Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers. 10 April 2011. UN Says 350 Eritreans Feared Drowned In Mediterranean Sea by Boats that set out from Libya over a week ago and have disappeared. Available at http://eritrealibya.blogspot.com/2011/04/un-says350-eritreans-feared-drowned-in_10.html (02 (accessed 3 April 2012). Voice for the Voiceless Eritrean Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 25 May 2011. Available at http://eritrealibya.blogspot.co.uk (accessed 23 Jul. 12). Walters, W. 2008. ‘Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (Non)-Citizenship’. In E. F. Isin and G. Nielsen (eds), Acts of Citizenship. London: Zed Books. Widner, J. with A. Mundt. 1998. ‘Researching Social Capital in Africa’, Africa 68(1): 1–24. Zartman, I. W. 1985. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zetter, R., D. Griffiths, N. Sigona and M. Hauser. 2002. ‘Survey on Policy and Practice Related to Refugee Integration’. European Refugee Fund Community Actions 2001/2002. Oxford: School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University. Available from http://repository. forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5892 (accessed 18 April 2012).

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5 Nationalist, Sub-nationalist, and Region-wide Narratives and the Quest for Integration-promoting Narratives in the Greater Horn Region ASSEFAW BARIAGABER

INTRODUCTION Almost all countries, including the powerful ones, have now come to accept the tremendous power of the ongoing globalization and its impact on the re-alignment of political and economic forces on the globe. Its impact on countries has been differential: while some countries, especially the more economically advanced, may have benefitted from it, others, especially the less developed economies, have not. Therefore, many countries have vigorously pursued membership in regional economic organizations in order to survive and grow in an increasingly competitive world. Although regional integration blocs, such as the East African Economic Community and the European Common Market were born before the onset of the current globalization period – a time roughly taken to mean after the Cold War – it is only in the last twenty years that the world has seen a rapid growth in their numbers. A few of these have survived and flourished, while others have not fared well. But what makes some integration experiments more successful? It appears that some experiments, such as those of the European Union (EU), became huge successes because of the similar characteristics of their constituent units. These include: the closer inter-identity relations of their constituent states, their higher cultural compatibility, their democratic nature and equitable citizenship rights, the complementarities of their economies, their abundant manpower resources, and the absence of foreign military intervention in their internal affairs.1 With reference to the concept paper Mengisteab (2009) developed for the Greater Horizon Horn Forum (GHHF) on regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa, this chapter focuses on inter-identity relations, which, along with the nature of the state, occupies a central position in promoting or hindering regional integration. It is argued that identification and promotion of common identity markers among the various national, religious, and linguistic groups in the Horn of Africa, especially markers based on the distant past, is imperative because they will help create a  K. Mengisteab, 2009. ‘Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa’. Greater Horn Horizon Forum Concept Paper. 1

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more peaceful region based on its peoples’ historical and cultural links. On the positive side, the abundance of natural resources in the region – including oil, water and other energy sources, important sea lanes and ports, extensive agricultural land, abundant sources of fish along its long coastlines and large pastoral areas rich in livestock, all augur well for complementary national economies. On the negative side, its geographic location in important sea lanes has attracted foreign intervention and this has negatively affected its economic development. Also, the civilizational, cultural and religious histories of the peoples of the region have not been managed constructively and may have become sources of some conflicts. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the management of the historical and cultural commonalities of the peoples of the region. It is important to emphasize that, despite the abundance of resources and the noble historical and religious heritage of the peoples of the region, peace has been crucially missing. Partly because of this, the state has been exclusionary, authoritarian, and unable to guarantee equitable citizenship rights. The absence of peace, in turn, has created an environment that discourages narratives on cultural and other similarities, and has promoted an atmosphere where small differences are approvingly magnified to loom larger than they actually are. Michael Ignatieff has referred to such behaviour as ‘the narcissism of minor difference’, when describing how similar the Serbs and Croats were, but how they imagined they were very different.2 This chapter assumes that there can be no meaningful and lasting economic integration in the absence of peace. Therefore, it focuses on how to move away from nationalist (that is, nation/country as well as sub-national levels) narratives towards more region-inclusive narratives. The latter is expected to contribute to peace and thereby to regional integration. The specific questions raised are: (1) What are the nature and the sources of the conflicts in the region? (2) How can existing national and/or sub-national narratives change and give way to region-inclusive narratives? (3) What are the region-inclusive markers that are expected to promote peace and enhance economic integration? While I accept that important differences among the nations of the region exist, I also suggest that there are marked commonalities among them. These commonalities include (1) their historical experiences in the distant past; (2) their claim to Hamitic, Semitic, and/or Cushitic cultural antecedents; (3) their inheritance of religious traditions transferred from antiquity; and (4) their unenviable position at the lowest levels of the Human Development Index, the Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa, and other indicators. These commonalities are such that no nationalists, even the die-hard ones, have dared to challenge them and are, therefore, expected to provide a sound historical, cultural and social basis for regional integration. I propose that, the more region-inclusive narratives  A Freudian argument Ignatieff used to explain how the almost similar Croats and Serbs have come to see each other as enemies. Please consult M. Ignatieff, 1993. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux: 21–28. 2

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there are, the more peace is prevalent and, in turn, the higher the chances of an economic regional integration. In other words, to promote peace one has to move away from the existing national or sub-national narratives that dominate the political discourse in the Horn of Africa towards more region-wide narratives. This is not easy to achieve. But it is not impossible either, especially when one considers how virulent were the nationalist narratives in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and how they have now become a thing of the past.3 Indeed, there is no doubt that the extreme nationalism in various European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries far surpassed the nationalism that we now see in the Horn of Africa countries in terms of its virulence, including the heightened nationalism kindled by the Ethio-Eritrean border war and the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.

THE GREATER HORN REGION AS A VENUE OF CONFLICTS European colonization of parts of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHR) towards the end of the nineteenth century greatly affected the political, economic, and societal relationships among the peoples of the region. International borders were established where there were none – although no attempts to demarcate and delineate the borders were made, a new sense of belongingness to the newly-created country was introduced, differential and uneven economic systems between and within countries came into being and, as a consequence, some began to see themselves as different from and often better than their kith and kin across the borders. Then, when the Europeans left, the successor state had to deal with the negative consequences of the undemarcated and undelineated borders, the uneven economic under-development levels, and the (weak) sense of belonging to the newly-established and/or reconstructed state. As a result, conflicts between and within countries of the region began to emerge as early as 1960, the year some gained independence.4 One such conflict is that between Ethiopia and Eritrea. While Ethiopia remained independent (except for the 1936–41 brief occupation by the Italians), Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, a British  I refer here to the late nineteenth-century heated debate between two French scholars – Gratiolet and Broca – on the relationship between brain weight and intelligence. The former argued that, on average, the German brain was about 100 grams heavier than that of the French; however, there was no relationship between brain weight and intelligence. That is, the German was no more intelligent than the French. On the other hand, Broca argued that there was a direct relationship between brain weight and intelligence, and that the French brain was, on average, heavier than the German. Another French scholar, de Jouvencel, boldly stated that ‘… far from being superior to ours, [the German] appears to me, on the contrary, to be inferior’. See S. J. Gould, 1981 The Mismeasure of Man: 88–92. Although they did move closer to each other, their hatred of each other appeared to have had no limits, and not surprisingly, France and Germany have entered into highly destructive wars. 3

 I refer here to Somalia, although some have said that the conflict in Sudan started in 1955, one year before its independence. 4

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Protectorate from 1941 to 1952, and an autonomous unit within the EthioEritrean Federation from 1952 to 1962. It was formally incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962, which many Eritreans saw as illegal. To counteract this, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began a war of independence in the western lowlands of Eritrea in 1961. With the formation of the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF) in the early 1970s, the war escalated, especially after the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. Repeated attempts by Ethiopia to quell the drive for independence failed and the EPLF liberated most of Eritrea in the late 1980s. All of Eritrea came under the control of the EPLF in 1991 and, following the 1993 referendum, it became formally independent. For the first time in 30 years, Eritrea and Ethiopia were at peace with each other. However, the state of peace was short-lived because of contested borders. They went to war again during 1998–2000, and this culminated with Ethiopian control of large sectors of undisputed Eritrean territory. Active hostilities stopped with the signing of the Algiers Agreement in December 2000, where both agreed in advance on a binding territorial verdict by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission.5 As part of the settlement, the main flashpoint – the village of Badme – was awarded to Eritrea. Ethiopia accepted the decision ‘in principle’ but requested further negotiations with Eritrea, which Eritrea rejected outright based on the binding nature of the decision. At present, a state of uneasy stalemate at the border area exists, as both countries ‘have had no incentive to resolve the frozen border conflict’.6 The roots of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia may therefore be traced back to colonial penetration of the region. The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia may likewise be traced to the European partition of Somali-inhabited areas, and Ethiopia’s territorial expansion to the south-east in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7 When modern Somalia was established as a voluntary union of the former Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, it laid claim to what it considered its ‘lost territories’: the Ogaden of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and what is now Djibouti. It adopted a national flag with a five-pointed star as a symbolic expression of its determination to regain the ‘lost territories’. In particular, it vehemently refused to recognize the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty that ceded the Haud region to Ethiopia.8 Because of this, border incidents occurred in 1960, only a few months after the Somali Republic was established. These incidents  United Nations, Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2002, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/83-195.pdf. 5

 International Crisis Group. 2008. Africa Report, #141. Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War. 17 June: 10. 6

 A detailed account of Ethiopian expansion is found in H. Marcus, 2002. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press: 77–90. 7

 See S. Samatar, 1993. ‘Historical Settings’, in H. Metz, (ed.), Somalia: A Country Study. Washington DC: Library of Congress: 28–30. 8

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deteriorated further and full-scale border war took place in 1964. Although Sudan mediated a cease fire and a semblance of calm returned in the border areas, the issue of the ‘lost territories’ remained a constant feature of the foreign policy of the new Republic. For example, it provided active support to the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), an Ogadenbased movement dedicated to the liberation and possible unification of the region with Somalia. Both the Eritrean War of Independence and the Ethio-Somali conflict preceded the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. However, both escalated dramatically following it. Indeed, the Revolution provided Somalia and the WSLF in the south-east, and the ELF and EPLF in the north with an irresistible opportunity to liberate the Ogaden and Eritrea, respectively. In 1975, the two Eritrean liberation movements forced Ethiopian troops to retreat to the outskirts of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, while WSLF and Somali regular troops overran Ethiopian garrisons and liberated almost all of the Ogaden in 1977. Given the fast deteriorating security environment in both the northern and southern parts of the country, coupled with challenges to its authority in the interior, including Addis Ababa, the capital, the Ethiopian Government sought and obtained massive assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Yemen. It re-asserted its control of the Ogaden through the physical intervention of those parties.9 Ethiopian victory greatly weakened President Barre’s hold on power and various Ethiopian-backed opposition movements emerged within Somalia to challenge the Somali Government through force of arms. Prominent among them were the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the United Somali Congress (USC). After a bloody five-year conflict, they overthrew the Somali Government in 1991 but failed to form a national government. Consequently, Somalia descended into chaos: in the north, ‘Somaliland’ declared independence; in the north-east, an autonomous ‘Puntland’ emerged; and in the south various ‘warlords’ carved out feudal-like clanbased territories. The latter have been unable to establish a functioning state for the last 20 years, and the country has remained an infamous example of a failed state. According to the International Crisis Group (2008), successive transitional governments have failed and the ‘current one [was] on the brink of collapse, overtaken by an Islamist insurgency.’10 Not much has changed since then, and the present Transitional Government of Somalia is only able to control Mogadishu, the capital, thanks to the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The ‘incomplete’ Somalia of the 1960s, which aspired to ‘completeness’ by incorporating territories under the control of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, has now become more ‘incomplete’ because of the centrifugal forces acting upon it.  A discussion of this is found in D. Korn, 1986. Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press: 93. 9

 International Crisis Group. Africa Report, #147. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. 23 December 2008. 10

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The Ethiopian Revolution is also associated with various conflicts within Ethiopia. These include the conflicts between the Government and secular movements, such as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), as well as the more intense conflicts between the Government and various ethnic-based movements, including the powerful Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Many of the ethnic-based groups formed an umbrella organization – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – and finally overthrew the military regime in 1991. There was relative peace within Ethiopia, although the OLF and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) resumed their armed struggle a few years later on the pretext that the new government was unwilling to accommodate their national aspirations. Another large-scale conflict in the GHR is the North-South conflict in Sudan. This too has its roots in British colonialism and particularly in the way that Great Britain administered the North and the South. According to M. Khalid, the British had dual policies in Sudan. They sealed-off the South from the North and ‘left [administration of the South] in the hands of traditional institutions, cutting it off . . . from the rest of the country . . .’11 Hence, the South remained largely untouched and underdeveloped, while the North moved forward because of British-initiated development endeavours in the ‘riverian areas where relatively large sums were spent on infrastructure: railways, river transport, port facilities, etc.’12 Thus, when the process of decolonization began, the two units were brought together to negotiate with the British and to chart ways for independence as if they did not have radically different socio-economic formations. As a consequence, frictions between the northern and southern elites began to emerge immediately after independence. At their core, these frictions were based on distinct identities and contrasting visions for Sudan. Thus, the first Sudanese civil war – also known as Anya-Nya armed struggle – started in 1963 to press for a federal and secular state. The war ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, where the South would enjoy regional autonomy in a united Sudan.13 The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was, on the whole, successfully put into effect and peace reigned in Sudan from 1972 to 1983, although some Arab-Islamists, such as al Turabi and el Mahdi in the North, saw the ‘relative independence of the South as an impediment to the creation of an [Arab-oriented] religious state in a unified Sudan.’14 As a result, then-President Numeiri’s hold on power became increasingly tenuous, especially after the country suffered because of the high inflation and balanceof-trade deficits of the early 1980s. He promulgated the Sharia Law in September 1983, effectively ending the 1972 Addis Ababa ­Agreement.  M. Khalid, 2003. War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries. London: Kegan Paul: 19.

11

 Ibid.: 24.

12

 A full text of the Addis Ababa Agreement is available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/ UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf. 13

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 Ibid.: 152.

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As a consequence, the Second Sudanese Civil War started. After a highly destructive war for about 22 years, the central government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 under which the South would exercise a full measure of self-determination in 2011.15 It has now become independent as of 9 July 2011. The above cursory review of the various conflicts indicates that all have been enduring and resistant to attempts at conflict resolution. In terms of their spatial dimension, they have been expansive because each encompassed entire regions. In terms of their temporal dimension, they have each lasted for longer durations of time ranging from a minimum of about sixteen years to a maximum of about fifty years. In terms of their persistence, they have each been resistant to peaceful attempts at conflict resolution because of zero-sum calculations that left little or no zone of agreement. Put simply, each conflict has been intractable.16

EXPLANATIONS OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE GREATER HORN European penetration of the Horn of Africa, including the creation of arbitrary borders that put the same ethnicities across international borders, the imposition of different governance systems, the emergence of uneven economic under-development levels, and their departure without having demarcated and delimited the borders they had established, provide long-term contextual variables necessary for conflicts in the region. That is, these factors point to the potential for conflicts. To explain why the conflicts occurred the way they did, including their initiation and persistence, one has to establish sufficiency. This can only be done by appealing to short- and/or medium-term variables. To explain conflict intractability in the Horn, some scholars have appealed to the role of extra-regional powers, and have argued that the region was of so high a strategic value that foreign powers have found it hard to resist intervention.17 However, while it is true that the scale and intensity of the conflicts had increased because of foreign intervention,18 there is no evidence for conflict intractability because of foreign intervention. It may even be argued that Soviet and Soviet-allied intervention shortened the duration of the 1977–78 Ogaden War. Therefore, closer  A full text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is available at: http://www.aec-sudan.org/ docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf. 15

 I borrowed the characteristics of intractability from International Center for Complexity and Conflict (ICCC), Dynamics of Conflict, available at: www.dynamicsofconflict.iccc.edu.pl/index. php?page=intractable-conflict. 16

 See, for example, B. Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980. 17

 See, for example, A. Bariagaber, 1995. ‘Linking Political Violence and Refugee Situations in the Horn of Africa’, International Migration 33(2): 209–34. 18

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examination of the roles of neighbouring countries in the affairs of each other and how these gave extra-regional powers the opportunities to intervene is imperative. Given that the modern GHR state is inherently weak and unable to meet the political and economic demands of the populace, the range of options available to national leaders to meet popular demands has been limited. They have, therefore, looked for the easiest and most cost-effective way to keep peace at home by following a three-pronged approach. First, they create the wicked ‘other’ and assign blame for the ills of their respective countries on the next door neighbour and beyond. Indeed, if the in-group-out-group hypothesis – that the more the domestic instability in country, the more conflictual the country is – is true, and it is largely true for African countries,19 then it is plausible to expect leaders to look for an external enemy to rally the population behind them. Therefore, national leaders have used threats and retaliation directed at a neighbouring country to extract compliant behaviour by the target country. For example, Sudan has supported the Eritrean liberation movements on and off depending on Ethiopia’s retaliatory options, and Ethiopia has supported the SPLM/A in return for Sudan’s actual or alleged behaviour in support of Eritrean movements. Similarly, Ethiopia reciprocated Somalia’s support of the WSLF by supporting the Somali opposition, especially the Issaq-dominated SNM, and Ethiopia and Eritrea are now locked in their support of each other’s opposition. When such behaviour has failed to produce the desired compliant behaviour, the leaders have appealed for support from external actors, as the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in 1977 has shown. In other words, none of the conflicts reviewed earlier – save perhaps the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war – has been free of intervention by regional powers. Second, they accuse the opposition as traitors in the service of the neighbouring country in order to put into question the opposition’s legitimacy, and to make them appear less nationalist and less patriotic. Ethiopia presented the WSLF as nothing more than a front of the Somali army, while Somalia accused the SNM as an Ethiopian-controlled movement. Similarly, Eritrea accused the opposition as little more than a handful of Ethiopian-backed individuals with no popular support in Eritrea, while Ethiopia regarded the opposition as extremists in the service of Eritrea. Third, they have crafted and presented the conflicts in territorial terms because land-based conflicts tend to be more affective compared to others. The following observation about the psychological appeal of territory is especially instructive: ‘Territory is near and plain and evokes feelings and group sentiments’ because the ‘. . . revered ancestors, the authors of past grandeurs and the doers of heroic deeds, speak from their graves in its soil  .  .  .’; this gives territory its ‘mystical quality’ which makes conflicts

 See, for example, J. Collins, 1973. Foreign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa, in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics. New York: McKay: 286. 19

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based on territory difficult to resolve.20 It is no wonder that we have ‘irredentist’ nationalism in Somalia based on regaining the ‘lost territories’, ‘territorial’ nationalism in Eritrea (as John Sorenson has described it21) based on an undiminished and an untrimmed Colonia Eritrea, Ethiopian nationalism based on its past history and glory and its ‘legitimate and rightful access’ to the sea and Oromo nationalism based on ‘Oromia’ – a name given to a territory to make the struggle more concrete, etc. In conjunction with these, government as well as opposition leaders have adopted various nationalist symbols and narratives to contrast one from the other. These include an ‘Arab and Muslim Sudan’ versus an ‘inherently African’ southern Sudan;22 Ethiopia’s ‘past grandeur’ and the need for ‘Ethiopian Renaissance’ versus ‘colonized’ Oromia and Ogaden, and ‘deliberately impoverished’ Tigray, the rightful ‘inheritor’ of the Axumite civilization; Eritrea’s ‘exceptional unity and unparalleled fortitude’ versus the Christian-Muslim (or lowland-highland) cleavage; and Somalia’s five-pointed star (in its national flag) versus ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’. All of these symbols and narratives are meant to extend to a territory the same affective ties people have to village, clan, or family land because these have traditionally given people in the region their raison d’être – a source of identity, belongingness, and means of livelihood. As a result, it does not cost much to mobilize a people in the name of the territorial homeland to kill and die, endlessly if asked, because territorial attachment, especially when people with the same religion and ethnic affiliation call it home, has an overpowering coerciveness. In other words, territory is seen as ‘basic’ and ‘immutable’, although Huntington would probably use these words to describe civilizational attachments only.23 The ability of the leaders to craft and present the conflicts in territorial terms and to devise nationalist narratives linked to the homeland provides one of the most plausible explanations for the persistence of conflicts in the region. Therefore, as Ewing has stated, the Horn of Africa is a ‘regional security complex’, where each country has not hesitated to use all means necessary, including ‘proxy wars’, to advance its national security objectives.24 I suggest, therefore, the region be taken as the ‘unit of analysis’ when conducting study on the political, social and economic issues affecting the countries of the region. The need to consider region-wide markers, as  I. Bowman, 1946. ‘The Strategy of Territorial Decisions’. Foreign Affairs 24(2): 177–94.

20

 J. Sorenson, 1991. ‘Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity’. Journal of Modern African Studies 29(2): 301–17. 21

 The former phrase is based on el-Mahdi’s statement in 1966: ‘the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab’ and it will not have ‘its ‘prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.’ as quoted in A. Alier, The Southern Question, in D. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan and the Problem of National Integration. London: Frank Cass, 1973: 73. 22

 S. Huntington, 1993. ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72(3): 25–27.

23

 J. Ewing, 2008. Ethiopia and Eritrea in Turmoil: Implications for Peace and Security in a Troubled Region. Institute for Security Studies: 3, 8. 24

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this chapter sets out to do, is thus critical. First, however, it is important to discuss some the consequences of the intractable conflict(s) in the region.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE GREATER HORN REGION There is not enough space here to give a detailed account of the political, economic, social, and security costs of the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa. There are the quantifiable costs and the non-quantifiable. However, the brief summary below will suffice to capture the magnitude of the sacrifices and the costs the peoples have so far paid. The Eritrean war of independence is estimated to have left about 60,000 Eritreans dead, and many more wounded and maimed. Although no estimate of Ethiopian casualties is available, it is safe to assume that they were at least equal to Eritrea’s, whose forces often used hit and run guerrilla tactics during the war of independence. Out of an estimated three million Eritreans in 1984, more than 550,000 were exiled to Sudan and hundreds of thousands more in the Middle East, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia.25 By 1988, towards the close of the war, ‘about two in seven Eritreans had left the country’ because of the conflict.26 In Ethiopia, more than 1.7 million Ethiopians had fled the Ogaden and sought refuge in Somalia by 1980.27 All in all, there were an estimated ‘2,378,800 refugees and internally displaced persons from Ethiopia (including Eritrea) out of an estimated total of 4,045,200 in Africa’.28 This constituted about 58 per cent of all refugees and displaced persons on the continent. In addition, during the 1998–2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean border war, troop deaths from both countries were conservatively estimated at between 50,000 and 75,000. About 350,000 Ethiopians and 250,000 Eritreans were also displaced.29 Although the civil war in Somalia has a shorter history than that between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it has also been deadly. Active hostilities started only in the second half of the 1980s, and by 1991 there were an estimated 527,000 refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.30 Although the number of those who have died may not be known, there is no doubt that it ran into the tens of thousands, especially because of the cruelty with which the government conducted the war. For example, the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) reports that the fighting in the north had ‘left over 10,000 dead, the overwhelming majority of which were civilians’.31  A. Bariagaber. 2006. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Aldershot: Ashgate: 53.

25

 Ibid.

26

 United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) 1981. World Refugee Survey: 1980 In Review, Washington, DC: USCR. 27

 Ibid.

28

 T. Negash, and K. Tronvoll, 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Oxford: James Currey and Athens OH: Ohio University Press. 29

 Bariagaber: Conflict and the Refugee Experience: 65.

30

120

 USCR, 1989: 41.

31

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The killing, wounding, and suffering of civilians continue to this day, especially in the southern part of the country. The war statistics of Sudan are even more depressing. By the end of 2002, between 1 million and 1.5 million Sudanese had lost their lives as a direct or indirect consequence of the North-South war. Moreover, about ‘4,000,000 had been displaced internally, and between 300,000 and 400,000 had been exiled as refugees’.32 This did not take into account the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, which started in 2003. Unaccounted for in the above statistics are the amount of money spent and the infrastructure destroyed, including the destruction of crops, water wells, bridges, etc. in order to deprive the other side of any advantage in the conduct of war. Also unaccounted for are the social costs of the war: many lost not only their homes but also the social fabric that held intersocietal relationships together.33 For example, the deterioration in the relationships between the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia is an unquantifiable tragic consequence of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war.34 Finally, there is no doubt that large numbers of individuals, many of them highly skilled and educated, either died or left their countries because of the war. The following statistics (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) may, however, serve to illustrate the sorry state of affairs each of the countries found itself in over the last decades. Table 5.1 Human Development Index, 2001–2007 (Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia)  

Sudan

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Somalia

Year

Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0.503 0.505 0.512 0.516 0.526 0.526 0.531

138 139 141 141 147 146 150

0.446 0.439 0.444 0.454 0.483 0.442 0.472

155 156 161 157 157 164 165

0.376 0.359 0.376 0.371 0.406 0.389 0.414

169 170 170 170 169 169 171

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Total Countries 177 177 177 177 177 179 182

Source: Compiled from United Nations Development Programme, UN Human Development Reports (2001 to 2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics.  Bariagaber: Conflict and the Refugee Experience: 76.

32

 On the loss of social mores, including the breakdown of the household and the interdependent relationship among households in Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan, see J. Bascom, 1996. ‘Reconstituting Households and Reconstructing Home Areas: The Case of Returning Eritreans’, in T. Allen (ed.), In Search of Cool Ground: War, flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 33

 Compared to the 30-year war, the latest war had a much more devastating impact on the relationship between the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples. During the former, many Ethiopians sympathized with the Eritrean cause, and in turn, many Eritreans saw Ethiopian soldiers in Eritrea as reluctant participants, forcibly sent to war by the Ethiopian Government. That is, both saw each other as victims of an oppressive rule. During the latter, however, the indignities civilians suffered as a result of government action have strained people-to-people relationships. 34

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In Table 5.1, Somalia was not ranked because it did not have a functioning government. The other three countries, all ‘better’ than Somalia because they were included in the ranking, nevertheless find themselves at the lowest levels of the Human Development Index, with Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia in decreasing rank order. In 2007, Sudan ranked 150 (out of 182), despite its oil riches and expansive agricultural land, and Ethiopia ranked 171, although it is the largest producer of coffee in Africa and home to extensive arable land and water sources. Given that the Index is an aggregate of political, social, and economic indicators, the fact that all find themselves at these levels indicates the extent to which the non-ending conflicts have sapped not only their economic resources but also their ability and/or willingness to allocate the necessary attention to other non-economic areas associated with development. Table 5.2 Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa, 2001–2007 (Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia)  

Sudan

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Somalia

 Year

Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

33.53 33.17 33.33 34.34 35.00 35.31 33.45

47 48 47 46 48 48 49

40.68 41.42 40.63 42.23 41.23 39.62 36.96

39 38 40 40 41 44 46

45.36 44.39 45.47 45.76 46.04 45.95 45.59

30 33 32 32 32 34 37

17.52 17.97 17.86 17.90 17.21 15.20 15.24

53 53 53 53 53 53 53

Total Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 53

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2001 to 2007), available at www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en

Table 5.2 above is more telling of the state the Horn of Africa countries find themselves in because of the comparison with other African states the Ibrahim Index of Governance provides. For obvious reasons, out of 53 countries in Africa, Somalia is last in terms of good governance. But the others are not that far away. For example, in 2007, Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia ranked 49, 46, and 37, respectively. It is also important to observe that each of the three countries has been falling in rank over the last three years mentioned, as things have been progressively getting worse. In short, there is hardly anything positive the countries of the Horn of Africa can show the world, and this is due to the endemic conflicts (with the attendant economic, political, and social under-development) that pervasive nationalist narratives have fuelled. The need to contain virulent nationalist currents is, therefore, imperative. Are there region-inclusive narratives that may potentially facilitate peace and thereby regional integration? 122

Nationalist, Sub-nationalist, and Region-wide Narratives and the Quest for Integration-promoting Narratives in the Greater Horn Region

REGION-WIDE IDENTITY MARKERS AND THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION Do identities change? Are ethnic, national, religious attachments manipulable? In an attempt to address these questions, the literature on the politics of cultural pluralism provides two broad perspectives – primordialism and contextualism.35 The former advances the proposition that identities are part of human nature and a priori, therefore, they are not amenable to change. The latter, on the other hand, proposes that identities are a product of the confluence of historical, political, economic, and other factors; therefore, changes in these factors are expected to produce changes in attachments. The elite play a crucial role in this because they can selectively construct and/or reconstruct (and, at times, invent) the primordial past and adapt it to the existing environment, more often to advance their own material and other interests.36 Accordingly, attachments are subject to change because they are seen as ‘contingent, situational, and circumstantial’.37 Existing attachments may evolve into new attachments in two different ways: they may become broader and more inclusionary or they may become narrower and more exclusionary. The former Yugoslavia between the 1940s and the late 1980s is a case in point. In the early 1940s, pan-South-Slavism emerged as a common identity marker of the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc. in reaction to their subjugation by the Austrian Hapsburgs (Slovenia and Croatia), the Ottoman Turks (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and the threat of Nazi Germany in the 1940s. The role the League of Yugoslav Communists played under the leadership of its charismatic leader, Marshal Tito, was also important in rallying the people under a common pan-South-Slavic identity. The absence of the above, especially the vacuum the death of Tito created, was followed by narrow nationalist narratives that came out of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and from Croatian nationalists in the 1980s. This helped bring about the demise of the former Yugoslav Republic and the formation of intensely nationalist independent states.38 At present, panSouth-Slavism appears dead, and the people now identify themselves as Croatian, Serbian, etc. The same may be said of Somalia. The balkanization of Somali-inhabited territories by non-Somali-speaking powers in the late 1800s and their  J. Kellas, 1998. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Second Edition). New York: St. Martin’s Press: 44. 35

 A. Smith, 1991. ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20(3): 353–68. 36

 See C. Young, 1993. ‘The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality’, in C. Young (ed.), The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press: 22. 37

 See B. Denitch, 1996. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis MN and London: University of Minnesota Press: 104. 38

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negative colonial experiences in the first half of the twentieth century brought about a broader pan-Somali movement, only to be followed more recently by a much narrower conception of Somalia. Indeed, ‘Somaliland’ now bases its claim to an independent statehood on its colonial experience – a narrower and more recent marker as compared to the ageless language, tradition, etc. common to all Somalis. Hence, identities do change as a result of political, social, and economic forces, and the elite play critical roles in which direction the changes take place. Of special relevance to this chapter is, of course, the former – that is, changing/transforming narrower, exclusionary identity relations into region-wide, inclusionary identity relations in the Horn of Africa. The theoretical perspective presented above may help in examining changes in identity markers in the Horn of Africa, as some of the claims leaders make to seek support from their populace are based on factors that may be classified as primordial. These include linguistic, religious, and cultural attachments that are assumed to be innate and immutable. But, as stated earlier, primordial attachments provide only necessary conditions for the prevailing conflicts unless the elite articulate, construct, and/ or reconstruct the primordial past to build present nationalist sentiments. Therefore, while I accept that ethnic/religious differences among the nations of the Horn of Africa exist, and these became more sharp during the process of the formation of states at the end of the nineteenth century and with the role elites played in the second half of the twentieth century, I also suggest that the impact of these differences can be mitigated if enough focus is given to the marked commonalities that exist among them. And the elite must be co-opted to help reconstruct the primordial past in favour of region-wide markers. This co-option, however, may not be easily accomplished in Somalia. How and why would the elite that presided over the current narrow nationalisms now become more receptive to region-wide narratives? No one doubts now that the national pie has progressively become smaller as a result of the devastation and economic deterioration brought about by the wars. The educated elite has increasingly been looking to migration as the only alternative, and those who do not and remain at home continue to lose ground due to skyrocketing inflation, stagnant wages, and inability to find suitable work. Past confrontational policies are now seen as having been a liability. The role of international organizations will also have to be critical in this endeavour, as this is well within their mandates: they have the resources (an attraction to the elite) to support programmes (outlined in the last section), that will foster wider and more-inclusive narratives in the Horn. Also, it must be clear that the development of narratives based on region-wide markers is a long process, and to attempt to manipulate the variables to produce immediate results is near impossible. Indeed, this must be seen as a project that calls for nothing short of re-socialization and the development of a new way of thinking. As stated in the introductory section, the factors that will help 124 advance economic regional integration are: (1) their shared historical

Nationalist, Sub-nationalist, and Region-wide Narratives and the Quest for Integration-promoting Narratives in the Greater Horn Region

­ xperiences in the distant past, including legitimate claims to the Axumite e and Cushitic civilizations, and the famed ‘Land of Punt’; (2) their shared claim to Hamitic, Semitic, and/or Cushitic cultural antecedents; (3) their common inheritance of religious traditions transferred from antiquity; and (4) their unenviable position at the lowest levels of economic, political, and social indicators in a world fast establishing regional organizations to help cope with the shocks of contemporary globalization. I suggest that the elite, who have been instrumental in crafting narrower identity markers in the past, can play a critical role in crafting broader, more inclusive region-wide markers.

Shared historical experiences in the distant past

Identification with the ‘Land of Punt’ is one of the possible region-wide identity markers that may promote peace and foster regional economic integration. Ancient Egyptian records, dated roughly from 3500 to 1000 BC, speak of the fabled riches of the ‘Land of Punt’, which included myrrh, gold, ebony trees, ivory, etc. Although the Punts had tribal leaders, ancient Egyptians referred to them as ‘kings’ probably based on the ‘material attributes of their authority’.39 According to J. Phillips, ‘Punt has never been identified with certainty. Textual records that have survived … provide … enough information to suggest strongly a generalized area within the eastern coastal regions of modern Sudan, south of modern Port Sudan, Eritrea, and northern Ethiopia, or somewhere further inland’(emphasis added).40 But north-eastern Somalia has now called itself ‘Puntland’ – an autonomous region within Somalia established after the overthrow of President Barre – based on ancient Egyptian accounts of their trade with the peoples of the southern Red Sea region. Therefore, most of the peoples of the region may have legitimate claims to the marvels of the ‘Land of Punt’, similar to those made by the ‘Puntlanders’ of north-east Somalia. The Cushite Empire, as compared to the ‘Land of the Punt’, was a welldefined political entity that existed roughly between 1000 BC and 325 AD. According to Burstein, it encompassed ‘the whole of Nile Valley from near the southern border of contemporary Egypt … to a still undetermined point south of Khartoum . . .’.41 The achievements of the Cushites include irrigation systems, traditions of decorated pottery, traditions of iron metallurgy, and an ‘alphabet which is the only ancient one independent of the Phoenician alphabet that is the ancestor of all those that are now in use . . .’42 Despite such achievements, it finally succumbed to the ­invasion by the Axumites in the fourth century, and became a part of the more powerful empire. Cushitic traditions, such as the ‘facial scarring and the deliberate deformation of the horns of cattle’ are still practiced in the  Y. Kobishchanov, 1979. Axum. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 190.

39

 J. Phillips, 1997. ‘Punt and Aksum: Egypt and the Horn of Africa’. The Journal of African History 38(3): 438. 40

 S. Burstein, (ed.). 1998. Ancient African Civilizations: Kush and Axum. Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers: 4. 41

 Ibid.

42

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Republic of South Sudan today.43 It was no coincidence when the leaders of South Sudan entertained the idea of naming the newly independent country as the ‘Republic of Kush’ before finally settling on the present name. Therefore, large areas of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea were part of the Cushitic Empire, and this too may be enough to point some commonality derived from the past. While there is no doubt that the Axumite Empire was one of the four great empires contemporaneous with the Roman, Persian, and Chinese empires, its exact geographical boundaries are hard to establish. In what has commonly come to be referred to as the Adulis Inscription, an Axumite ruler ‘speaks about the subjugation of “all the peoples” . . . from the boundaries of the Ethiopian plateau to the Roman possessions in Egypt and Northern Nubia’.44 According to the Inscription, the territory the Axumites controlled included the following: ‘in the east right up to the Incense Land [Somalia] and in the west right up to the land of the Ethiopians [i.e. the Negroes] [sic] and Sasu’.45 According to Kobishchanov, Sasu was located in south-west Ethiopia, although Burstein assumes that Sasu referred to Somalia, which would place Somalia in the ‘southern portion of the Axumite Empire’.46 Burstein also lists the broad areas the Axumites controlled on the African side of the Red Sea: ‘north to the borders of Egypt, west to the Meroetic frontier [in Sudan], and south toward Somalia and the mouth of the Red Sea . . .’47 In terms of its coastal possessions, the Axumite Empire ‘stretched from [contemporary Suwakin (Sudan)] to the ‘rest of Berbera’ . . .’48 Thus, significant portions of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan constituted parts of the Axumite Empire. All of its territories, with the possible exception of the ‘town’ of Axum, Adulis, and the land in between, were conquered over time. These included many territories in Tigray, including Agame, only a few kilometres from Axum.49 In other words, while it is natural that some regions were closer to Axum, the heart of the Empire, and others were further away, it is also clear that all became part of the Empire by conquest. Therefore, a legitimate claim can be made that the Axumite Civilization is a common heritage of most of the peoples of the Horn of Africa, similar to the European claim that the Greek and Roman civilizations were part of the common heritage of Western civilization.50 It is also important to note that the roughly 900-year-old rock-hewn churches in Lalibela, built by the Cushitic Zagwe kings, have many of the characteristics of the  Ibid.: 13.

43

 Kobishchanov: 43.

44

 Ibid.: 45.

45

 Burstein: 147.

46

 Ibid.: 145.

47

 Kobishchanov: 58-9.

48

 For a partial list of peoples and regions forcibly incorporated into the empire, please see Kobishchanov: 43. 49

 The trading network of the empire extended well beyond the Horn of Africa and may have reached Zanzibar. See Phillips: 423–57. 50

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Axumite obelisks, including the half-moon, the closed windows, and the monk head. In other words, civilizations that followed had borrowed a lot from the achievements of civilizations that preceded them. Therefore, the Puntite, Cushite, and Axumite territorial possessions were, on the whole, spatially coterminous and temporally consecutive. Although the degree of their civilizational influence may vary depending on the distance of a region from the centre of power, there exists no compelling argument to suggest that most of the region’s population groups may not legitimately claim one civilization or the other. In fact, most of the hundreds of ethnic or national groups in the region speak Hamitic-Semitic or Cushitic languages, and this strongly suggests closeness of their heritage. It is also impossible to make the claim that the Axumite Civilization did not incorporate elements of the Cushite Civilization into its own, or the Puntite experience into the Cushite and Axumite civilizations. Indeed, to underscore civilizational continuity, Kobishchanov states that the ‘process of turning tribal leader [apparently referring to Punts] into a monarch, which began in the pre-Axumite period, was completed in the Axumite period.’51 If Europeans (and Americans, ­Canadians, etc.) can claim Greek Civilization as the foundation of Western Civilization of which they are part and can talk of an organic Greco-Roman Civilization, will it be far-fetched if the inhabitants of the region claim (and identify with) any of the region’s civilizations as part of their heritage?

Shared claim to Hamitic, Semitic, and Cushitic cultural antecedents

The linguistic and religious affiliations of the peoples of the Horn of Africa also point in the direction of more commonality. Because of continuous migrations of Semitic, Hamitic and Cushitic peoples to the region, and their incorporation into the Axumite, Cushitic, and Puntite civilizations and their intermarriages as a result of these, most of the peoples of the Horn of Africa have Hamitic-Semitic, Cushitic, or Nilo-Saharan linguistic antecedents.52 For example, Tigrinya is spoken in Eritrea and Ethiopia; Somali in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; Afar in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; and Anuak and Nuer in Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. In other words, in terms of linguistic traditions, each of the countries is similar to the other in a number of ways.

Inheritance of religious traditions transferred from antiquity

The Axumites were one of the first peoples to profess Christianity. They were also one of the earliest to profess Islam, perhaps as early as

 Kobishchanov: 190.

51

 For a brief summary on this, please consult R. Pankhurst, 1998. The Ethiopians. Oxford: Blackwell: 7–9. 52

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627 AD.53 At present, except for Somalia, all others in the region have significant populations who profess Islam or Christianity. As a result, followers of the two religions are not strange to each other. For example, it  is  not  uncommon for the followers of one religion to extend happy holiday wishes to the followers of the other religion during their holidays. It is also important to emphasize that, to a very remarkable degree not easy to find elsewhere, both religions have co-existed peacefully side by side in the region since antiquity, and this is an asset yet to be fully recognized and promoted.

Unenviable common position at the lowest levels of development

As I have indicated in the previous pages, the nations of the Horn of Africa share the ‘infamy’ of finding themselves at the lowest ranks of the development indices indicated earlier. When populations are conscious of their commonalities, such as the above, their leaders are expected to temper their nationalist narratives of the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’ It must be understood that one may not expect these region-wide identity markers to deter initiation of conflict or prevent escalatory reciprocal responses, especially when the leaders face serious threats to their rule. However, awareness of such commonalities may make it more difficult for the leaders to go all the way in the conduct of hostilities, or to treat innocent civilians the way they were treated, for example, during the 1998–2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea border war. That is, one would expect the degree of recognition of such commonalities among the peoples of the Horn to be directly correlated with the level of civility in the conduct of war if and when it occurs. One would also expect lower chances of resort to war in case of disagreements. Could the ‘unwanted’ Ethiopian-Eritrean border war have occurred and been conducted the way it was had the leaders recognized and appreciated such commonalities? I propose that the higher the internalization of region-inclusive identity markers, the better the chances of promoting peace and hence regional economic integration. There are also other factors that are expected to facilitate peace and regional economic integration. First, none of the countries of the region is internally homogeneous, and many ethnic or national groups straddle the borders of each country. As indicated earlier, Tigrinya and Somali speakers make a good portion of Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, respectively. The Afars are found in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, the Beja in Eritrea and Sudan, the Nuer in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan, etc. In other words, there exist cross-cutting cleavages among the populations of the region. Second, the economies of the individual countries are potentially complementary because each has the resources the other needs and from which it could gain. These include oil and agricultural land in Sudan and South Sudan, energy sources  See Kobishchanov: 112 for a discussion of a possible conversion to Islam of the Axumite king at the time. 53

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and agricultural land in Ethiopia, port facilities in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, fisheries in Somalia and Eritrea, and common river basins in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan, and in Ethiopia and Somalia. Third, as pointed out above, Muslims and Christians in the region have peacefully co-existed for millennia, except for shorter periods of time, where resource conflicts took religious dimensions. Religious tolerance in the region and the recognition that none is a ‘Muslim’ country (except for Somalia and perhaps Sudan) and none is a ‘Christian’ country is an important but an often overlooked resource that can potentially advance regional integration efforts.

CONCLUSION Based on the commonalities discussed above, it is critical to develop new region-encompassing narratives to serve as countervailing narratives to the existing nationalist currents in each country. The chances of developing such narratives are not insignificant because no leader or nationalist (past and present) in the region has had the courage to summarily reject the historical, cultural, and religious heritage of their people. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine the leaders of Eritrea stating that the Axumite Empire and its achievements were exclusively Ethiopian, or for Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea to concede that the Puntite Civilization concerns only Somalia. In fact, it should prove attractive to any die-hard nationalist for his nation to be included in the roster of ancient cultures and civilizations. Not doing so would be paradoxical because of what Benedict Anderson has referred to as the [presumed or] ‘subjective antiquity [of the nation] in the eyes of nationalists’.54 But what specific measures may be taken to transform existing nationalist narratives into region-inclusive narratives in the Horn of Africa and who will preside over these? Granted that government leaders may be reluctant and civil society organizations in the region remain weak, involvement of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations will be critical. These include international governmental organizations, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has been giving budgetary and other support on a bilateral basis for countries in the region to raise the quality of education, to enhance good governance, etc., and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), whose mandate is consistent with assisting and providing funds for the development and dissemination of knowledge.55 Non-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization  B. Anderson, 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso: 5. 54

 For the mandates of USAID and SIDA please consult their websites at www.usaid. gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/ethiopia and www.sida.se/English/About-us/ our-fields-of-work. 55

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(UNESCO), have also been supportive in cultural heritage preservation in the region and may be called upon to assist in providing funds for the production and dissemination of educational materials on the ancient history of the region. That is, securing support from such organizations is not expected to be difficult because it is within their mandate! What is difficult, however, is the question of who will develop the materials to be disseminated? One such possible organization is the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF), a body composed of intellectuals from the region. Given the interest GHHF has shown and is showing in the regional integration endeavour, it is expected that it will readily take up the challenge. The following are a few of the possibly many initiatives that may be taken. (1) (2) (3) (4)

Encourage research on region-inclusive markers, such as those discussed above; organize conferences and provide publication outlet for region-wide dissemination. Provide budgetary support for governments to include regioninclusive history into their educational curricula. Make periodic calls in the countries of the region for submissions by students of short competitive essays on region-wide themes that carry generous financial award. Invite civil society organizations (diaspora-led or not) to fora that sensitize the indignities the people of the region have gone through; publicize how the current rush to form regional economic organizations elsewhere in the world was a necessary response to avoid future indignities and to successfully compete in a fast globalizing world.

Admittedly, the above may not be of interest to some national leaders. Regardless, we have to start somewhere to stop the conflicts and to extricate the region from the quagmire in which it finds itself, and Europe’s integration efforts are instructive. Monetary incentives and adequate resources for leaders to implement programmes usually elicit cooperative behaviour, and cooperation usually pays off.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alier, A. 1973. ‘The Southern Sudan Question’, in D. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. London: Frank Cass. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso. Bariagaber, A. 1995. ‘Linking Political Violence and Refugee Situations in the Horn of Africa’, International Migration 33(2): 209–34. – 2006. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate. 130

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Bascom, J. 1996. ‘Reconstituting Households and Reconstructing Home Areas: The Case of Returning Eritreans’, in T. Allen (ed.), In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London: James Currey. Bowman, I. 1946. ‘The Strategy of Territorial Decisions’, Foreign Affairs 24(2): 177–94. Burstein, S. (ed.). 1998. Ancient African Civilizations: Kush and Axum. Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener. Collins, J. 1973. ‘Foreign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa’, in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics. New York: McKay. Denitch, B. 1996. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis MN and London: University of Minnesota Press. Ewing, J. 2008. Ethiopia and Eritrea in Turmoil: Implications for Peace and Security in a Troubled Region. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Gould, S. J. 1981. The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W. W. Norton. Habte Selassie, B. 1980. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press. Huntington, S. 1993. ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22–49. Ignatieff, M. 1999. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. International Crisis Group. 2008a. Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War. Africa Report, no. 141. Nairobi and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: www.crisisgroup. org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/141-beyondthe-fragile-peace-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea-averting-new-war. aspx (accessed 18 April 2012). International Crisis Group. 2008b. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report, no. 147. Nairobi and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/147-somalia-to-move-beyond-thefailed-state.aspx (accessed 18 April 2012). International Center for Complexity and Conflict (ICCC) n.d., Dynamics of Conflict. Available at: www.dynamicsofconflict.iccc.edu.pl/index. php?page=intractable-conflict (accessed 9 April 2012). Khalid, M. 2003. War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries. London: Kegan Paul International. Kellas, J. 1998. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (2nd edn). New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kobishchanov, Y. 1979. Axum. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Korn, D. 1986. Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Marcus, H. 2002. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. 131

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Mengisteab, K. 2009. ‘Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa’. Greater Horn Horizon Forum Concept Paper. Negash, T. and K. Tronvoll. 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Oxford: James Currey; Athens OH: Ohio University Press. Phillips, J. 1997. ‘Punt and Aksum: Egypt and the Horn of Africa’, Journal of African History 38(3): 423–57. Pankhurst, R. 1998. The Ethiopians: A History. The Peoples of Africa Series. Oxford: Blackwell. Samatar, S. 1993. ‘Historical Settings’, in H. Metz (ed.). Somalia: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Smith, A. 1991. ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20(3): 353–68. Sorenson, J. 1991. ‘Discourses on Eritrean Nationalism and Identity’. Journal of Modern African Studies 29(2): 301–17. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). n.d. Our Fields of Work. www.sida.se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work. (accessed 9 April 2012) United Nations 1972. Addis Ababa Agreement. Available at: www. usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/ somalia_01081993_gen.pdf (accessed 9 April 2012). United Nations 2002. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Available at: http:// untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/83-195.pdf (accessed 9 April 2012). United States Committee for Refugees (USCR). 1981. World Refugee Survey: 1980 In Review, Washington, DC: USCR. United States Committee for Refugees (USCR).1989. 1988 World Refugee Survey: Annual Review. Washington, DC: USCR. Young, C. 1993. ‘The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality’, in C. Young (ed.). The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The NationState at Bay? Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

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6 Infusion of Citizenship, Diversity and Tolerance in the Education Curriculum: Promoting Regional Integration and Peace in the Greater Horn Region ABDINUR MOHAMUD

INTRODUCTION The last five decades have been a significant time of challenge and change for many countries in Africa, and especially in the Horn. Most African countries gained independence from Western colonial powers, with territorial boundaries of various sizes and shapes. Some of these newly-created countries were too small, others too large or landlocked, and in the process divided various communities and culture areas, and lumped together peoples of diverse cultures who had little or no pre-colonial experience of shared governance. In addition, many countries have since experienced, however briefly, a combination of various forms of self-governance, including parliamentary democracy, military dictatorships, coups that led to civil wars, attempted secession, and the like. Since gaining independence, several countries have begun or are contemplating journeys of transformation to move away from dictatorships, oppressive regimes and violent conflict to participatory democracy, free and fair elections and human rights, while others remain engulfed in internal civil strife and statelessness. The ongoing crises in many parts of Africa and particularly in the Greater Horn Region (GHR) suggest that colonial boundaries have not laid out a stable basis for nationhood, peaceful co-existence and regional harmony. Institutional reform agenda driven from the top via state policies did not thus far produce meaningful change in real life experiences of citizens, be it social, economic or political. On the contrary, some state policies have directly contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic conflict and competition for scarce resources and power among various culture groups beset by natural disasters such as drought, shortage of water and conditions generally unfavourable for human survival (Lyons, 2006). This chapter proposes that a bottom-up grassroots approach with education as the vehicle for social change can be a useful tool to promote a culture of peace, inter-ethnic understanding, appreciation for cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, and tolerance to enhance the prospect for social integration and peaceful co-existence in the GHR. Globally, education is recognized as the great equalizer or the ‘balance 133

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wheel of society’ (Horace Mann) and for many countries in the GHR, education can become a vehicle to reshape society to develop the necessary knowledge, skills, values, attitudes, and identity that contribute to the formation of citizenship, harmony, diversity and regional integration. Current educational curricula and practice in the region do not appear to be contributing to the development of a culture of peace and tolerance that has the potential to diminish ethnic conflict or to ease human suffering. On the contrary, a review of current educational curricula is necessary to determine its role in potentially exacerbating misunderstanding through stereotypes, ethnic domination narratives, language and cultural bias, and national superiority among others that negatively fuel conflict and contribute to the escalation of a culture of violence. Once a review of the content of the curriculum is completed, a curriculum infusion model, integrating content with a culture of peace and concepts of citizenship, diversity and tolerance can be introduced in the educational system throughout the region. Curriculum Infusion is a process of weaving and integrating desired societal hot topics into courses that are regularly offered across the curriculum at all levels of education. Regional integration can be greatly enhanced by the quality of socially responsible education integrating desired knowledge, skills and values into the curriculum to effect positive social change. This kind of education is arguably more relevant to the lives of the peoples inhabiting the region than the out-dated systems simulating inherited colonial education.

A REGION OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY The Greater Horn of Africa region, comprising the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda is a region mired in a perpetual internal conflict stemming from prolonged droughts, water shortages, devastating famine, and inter-ethnic rivalries for resources and power which often leads to social unrest and political instability. The civil war in Somalia for most of the past two decades, the unresolved conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea which claimed the lives of thousands, the currently hibernating border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti, the Darfur conflict in Sudan, not to mention internal identity conflicts of the communities within the GHR nations, are but small manifestations of a region that faces considerable challenges. Left unresolved, these conflicts will no doubt hamper any prospect of human development and progress in a region that currently produces the largest per-capita number of refugees across the globe and internally displaced peoples (IDPs) within their own countries (CIA World Factbooks, 2007). On the other hand, if confronted strategically through education and collaboration between governments and other education and security stakeholders, the potential is there to transform the region into a peaceful and economi134 cally viable region.

Infusion of Citizenship, Diversity and Tolerance in the Education Curriculum: Promoting Regional Integration and Peace in the Greater Horn Region

Former President of the United States Bill Clinton recognized during his presidency that this region of Africa is indeed filled with endless conflict, and in 1994 proposed a plan of action to improve the economic, social and political conditions of the region (Kruger et al., 2000). The Greater Horn of Africa was thus created as a U.S. Initiative to address the recurring cycle of social and political crises, instability and famine by improving among other things food security and, through the establishment of a system for conflict early warning, prevention and response. Sadly, the initiative was discontinued before it reached its full potential (ibid.). Ongoing regional conflicts currently exist in Ethiopia/Eritrea (border conflict), Eritrea/Djibouti (border conflict), Somalia (clan-based/ sectarian), Sudan (civil conflict), Uganda (ethnic conflict) and the unresolved ethnic conflicts in Kenya that have the potential to erupt again if the agreements between the ruling party and the opposition groups do not last. Political conflicts in the region stem from harsh environmental conditions and scarcity of resources in the region. Some of the observed impacts of drought, famine and shortage of water in the Horn of Africa consist of increased stress migration to urban or food-secure areas, crop failure, the loss or sale of assets such as livestock, increased food prices coupled with decreased profits from assets, and tensions heightened by lack of basic resources (USAID, 2000). Wide research has shown that, as peoples in conflict know more about one another and engage in mutually productive trade and commerce, they will be less likely to engage in severe conflict (Craddock, 2005). Others argue that interactions between communities in conflict are not only beneficial to creating peace but are a necessary condition for the spread and development of civilization. Interconnectedness, therefore, provides opportunities for the dissemination of resources, peoples, and ideas necessary for the continual stimulation and growth of societies. Given the considerable social, economic and political realities facing the region, a two-track comprehensive strategy is warranted for consideration. The first track is a top-down approach, in which states as institutions that largely promote national identity and hegemony, often at the expense of opposing internal groups or neighbouring adversaries, desist the practice of dehumanizing opponents and their cultures for the sake of advancing and/or justifying its cause. Ironically, dehumanizing adversaries to justify national objectives seems to be an internationally agreed-upon practice that perpetuates conflict among the peoples of two nations even if the cause justifying the conflict is later found to be unjust (Greeley, 2006). To diffuse conflict within and among the states of the region requires a comprehensive strategy to resolve longstanding border disputes resulting from colonial boundaries, ethnic rivalries in pastoral and grazing lands and the introduction of good governance practices to diminish competition for power at any cost. This is a daunting task to achieve and is crucial if the GHR is to be considered a viable and secure region for trade and international development. However, a long-term strategy to enhance the region’s viability would be to convince member states to come together 135

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into a regional security pact similar to the accord reached in the Mediterranean region assuring mutual collaboration on regional identity and security, effectively devaluing the clash of cultures narrative. The second track which is the main focus of this chapter is to use education as a short-term measure to build and raise public awareness at the local, national and regional levels about the rich diversity of the communities living in the region, respecting differences in ethnicity, language, tradition and mode of production. Understanding about each other and respecting diversity of opinion leads to inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic and national tolerance and harmony among the peoples of the region, thereby diminishing conflict. A bottom-up approach using education as a vehicle for social change augmented by a long-term top-down approach in which the states of the GHR promote regional identity and integration through state policies, media and interaction between the nations will undoubtedly transform the region into a politically and economically viable region that can contribute to regional security and global peace. Donor communities such as the UN, EU and USA are heavily involved in education and social-welfare issues and have been implementing, albeit piecemeal, a culture of peace projects throughout the region. The purpose of these initiatives is clearly aimed at gradual social change, building skills and values necessary for tolerance and peaceful co-existence. In the absence of willing states and democratically-elected governmental institutions to collaborate and assume this responsibility, donor communities and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) may assume the role of change agents for the region that require member states to partake in the formulation of a new regional identity and introduce a comprehensive culture of peace-based education reform throughout the region.

CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL IDENTITY The GHR, whose peoples suffer from the effects of drought, scarcity of natural resources and famine as well as man-made political instabilities, needs the formation and construction of an all-inclusive regional identity that can promote the interests of the countries in the region and has the potential to become an umbrella whose shade spreads equally on the peoples of the Horn. Constructing a new identity for a region is not a new phenomenon and has been done successfully elsewhere. The Mediterranean region for example, addressing and confronting the impact of the ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and Islam is one good example that brought nations in the Mediterranean region from two continents under one banner (Adler et al., 2006). The formation of the European Union (EU) after the end of the Cold War, bringing along Eastern Europeans as part of a new Europe, is another. These newly-formed regions, mainly for the purpose of integration, security and economic prosperity, often create new identities 136 that bring once-rival nations together under one unifying umbrella.

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With the convergence of related ethnicities and identities in the GHR region, it seems a doable task to construct a new regional identity that promotes the interests and aspirations of the peoples of the region equally. There are numerous other examples of successful regional alliances and identities. The Gulf States in the Middle East, ASEAN countries, ECOWAS of West Africa are but a few of the examples of regional cooperation yielding benefits to the peoples of the member states. To complement the newly formed regional identity, a bottom-up culture of peace-education-reform to impart skills, knowledge and values of peaceful conflict resolution and co-existence is necessary if the peoples of the region are to appreciate and sustain an economically-viable and peaceful region.

EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE It is widely believed that education is principally identified with schooling – though in theory it extends to the realm of informal, non-formal and lifelong learning, and is particularly concerned with the intellectual, social and human development of the individual. Education means learning knowledge, skills and attitudes (Etling, 1993). In many communities and nations education has been particularly significant as an instrument of social policy, in the sense of not only advancing human welfare but also of being the vehicle that carries national policies intended to resolve societal problems. The dominant principle for providing education to the masses is generally a national pursuit of achieving equality among its citizens (Spicker, 2009). Education has been and continues to be used as a tool for social change, imparting desired values, norms, attitudes and skill sets necessary to meet national priorities for progress and development. Research indicates that education is the best antidote for intolerance, conflict and violence. It also suggests that adolescence is the critical age in which children develop support for democratic norms as well as developing negative attitudes toward non-conformist groups in society (Gilleran, 2002). A socially responsible educational curriculum developed for and implemented by the member states of the GHR would undoubtedly lead to a more wholesome society in the region by instilling in learners a sense of equality and shared regional identity necessary for integration and peaceful co-existence. Before introducing a comprehensive infusion model, one must first review the current educational curricula at all levels for any inherent cultural, ethnic, religious and gender biases and preferences, among a host of others. A curriculum bias review committee consisting of educational experts, cultural scholars and other educational stakeholders can be constituted to determine the extent of bias imparted by the existing national curriculum and to ensure that textbooks, educational materials and teaching aids do not contribute to exacerbating conflict (UNESCO, 2006). The recommendations of the curriculum bias committee will 137

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help neutralize the curriculum before infusing into it a culture-of-peace content. Reviewing the curriculum for ethnic and national biases is a difficult and a daunting task, for it involves questioning if not contesting deeply-held ethnic, group and national narratives imparted through poetry, fables and oral or written tradition.

CURRENT STATE OF PEACE EDUCATION IN THE HORN A review of regional curricula and literature indicates that sporadic efforts by both governmental and non-governmental initiatives exist to address elements of peace education in the curriculum throughout the region. In Uganda for example, peace education programmes exist within the syllabus, although under different appellations, such as gender studies, environmental education, and HIV/AIDS education. In the Kenyan curriculum, peace education takes the form of civics education, social ethics, agriculture, health science, religious and environmental education. In Kenya, special emphasis is placed on extra-curricular activities involving culture, sports and all types of creative arts. Educational initiatives focusing on the following components of peace education in the curriculum are found throughout the region: education for social justice, human rights education, multicultural education, sustainable development/environmental education, civics education, governance and leadership education, personal and inner peace education, gender education and education for nonviolent conflict transformation (Abebe et al., 2006). A civic education for peace and good governance project funded by the UNDP and implemented by UNESCO in Somalia in 1998 focuses on activities supporting the creation of a climate of public opinion and participation necessary for the development of a culture of peace, democracy and justice. The project established six peace resource centres throughout the country supporting the initiative (UNESCO PEER, 1999). In Ethiopia, on the other hand, an environmental education project piloted initially in Kenya developed materials and adapted them to the local conditions of the environment in western and eastern refugee camps with a view to strengthening content, pedagogy and language. In Sudan, UNHCR funded several environmental education projects that address land degradation and deforestation in refugeeaffected areas of its Eastern Region. Many of these donor-funded projects in the region seem to have recognized the crucial importance of infusing elements of peace education into the curriculum in order to enhance peace and security in the region. However, most of the projects target fragmented refugee and war-torn communities throughout the region, but have not seriously and meaningfully penetrated through to the state education curriculum. A serious commitment and a buy-in from these governments is necessary if these 138 reform programmes are to succeed throughout the region.

Infusion of Citizenship, Diversity and Tolerance in the Education Curriculum: Promoting Regional Integration and Peace in the Greater Horn Region

CURRICULUM INFUSION Curriculum infusion is a pedagogical tool in which peace education topics such as citizenship, diversity, and tolerance can be integrated into the curriculum. The course can be included in social studies (history, geography and environment), language and literature or other subjects taught to the learners. Curriculum infusion is ideal when the learner doesn’t simply receive instruction and information, but when the learner is able to make personal connections to what is being taught. By connecting the subject taught to their personal lives, surroundings and the larger community, the new material learned has the potential to challenge cultural narratives and stereotypes taken previously as a fact and thus effect positive behavioural changes in the learner that will influence discourse in and out of school. Research on engaged learning has shown that if the topics taught to the learner are connected to something that is emotionally engaging and beyond just passing the examination, they learn it better and retain the information longer – combining intellectual and emotional engagement. The success of this model hinges upon not only what students learn in the classroom, but how they apply this knowledge to their lives, practical experiences and their interactions with others in society. Examples of curriculum infusion models with the intent to transform communities of conflict into cultures of peace include: Project Citizen and Foundations of Democracy in Indonesia funded by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, emphasizing the implementation of primary-level Foundations of Democracy curricula in conflict-prone areas surrounding Aceh Darussalam (Civitas, 2009). Other similar projects include civic and citizenship education projects in Northern Ireland, Post-communist Romania and the Balkan region.

CONCLUSION The Greater Horn Region has become a region of conflict, rivalry and political instability stemming from competition for scarce regional resources at the communal, national and regional levels. These conflicts have caused the region to produce the largest per-capita human migration in the world in terms of refugees and internally displaced peoples within and outside the region. Governments in the region do not appear to muster the capacity to resolve the festering ethnic conflicts and rivalry for scarce resources that hamper development. In some cases, governments in the region themselves promote ethnic conflict for their own ulterior motives intended to consolidate and justify their hold on power. It has been said that conflict begets conflict and, in essence, the GHR needs a new strategy to halt the unending cycle of ethnic conflict and regional instability. Educating children about peace culture and the fruits of peaceful co-existence will lead them to productive and meaningful lives 139

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as adults. Teaching a culture of peace is not merely about lecturing citizenship, diversity and tolerance, but having learners experience, reflect upon or immerse themselves in various communities, cultures and nations. In doing so, learners will have first-hand knowledge about how others are made to feel and will grow as adults who respect others and appreciate diversity and cultural differences (Kobayashi, 2001). Teaching and learning a culture of peace are ongoing and lifelong processes. Learners must continue learning as part of their daily interactions with others throughout life. Every learned adult is a teacher for children and responsible for teaching them tolerance and building a peaceful society. Public institutions, media and other information channels can also promote lifelong learning and discourse on cultures of peace and peaceful co-existence among the peoples of the GHR. Interest- or ethnic-based conflicts are natural phenomena that will always arise when varying groups interact within a community, country or region. However, equipping society with the tools, skills and values necessary to understand the nature of the conflict, appreciate the concerns of all involved and develop the ability to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence requires a strong peace-education foundation learned in school and practiced in society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abebe, Tsion Tadesse, Assouan Gbesso and Phoebe Akinyi Nyawalo. 2006. Peace Education in Africa. Report of the Working Committee Meeting. Addis Ababa: University for Peace. Available at www. africa.upeace.org/documents/reports/Peace%20Education,%20 FInalReport.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). Adams, J. 2005. ‘Infusing diversity into the college/university curriculum’. Adult Development and Aging News. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Available at http://apadiv20.phhp.ufl. edu/Teachtips/Spring%202005%20Infusing%20Diversity.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). Adler, E., B. Crawford, F. Bicchi and R. Del Sarto. 2006. The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Blank, S. 1999. Mediterranean Security into the coming Millennium. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute. Available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub139.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). CIA World Factbooks. 2007. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: IDPs per capita 2007 by Country. Immigration Statistics. Retrieved 19 April 2012 from www.nationmaster.com/red/graph/imm_ref_and_int_ dis_per_idp_percap-displaced-persons-idps-per-capita&date=2007. Civitas. 2009. World Congress on Civic Education. Woodland Hills CA: Center for Civic Education. Available at www.civiced.org/index. 140

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php?p=111&&st=&&page=internationa_calendar&&eid=15281 (accessed 9 April 2012). Craddock, A. 2005. Political Education beyond National Borders: Teaching Democracy Abroad to Promote More Peaceful International Relations. Paper presented at the Responsible Citizenship, Education and the  Constitution Conference, Freiburg, Germany. International Democratic Education Institute Occasional Paper. Available at www.civiced.org/index.php?page=calendar&eid=13359 (accessed 19 April 2012). Etling, A. 1993. ‘What is Non-Formal Education?’ Journal of Agricul­ tural Education. 34(4): 72–6. Available at www.jae-online.org/ attachments/article/667/Etling,%20A_Vol34_4_72-76.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). Gbesso, Assouan and Christine MacAulay. 2007. Developing a Peace Education Strategy for Africa, Experts Review Meeting. Addis Ababa: University for Peace. Available at www.africa.upeace. org/documents/reports/Peace%20Education%20Experts%20 Meeting,December%202007.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). Gilleran, D. 2002. Teaching Tolerance in a Suburban Public School. Masters Thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit MI. Available at http://ted. coe.wayne.edu/sse/finding/gilleran.htm (accessed 23 April 2012). Greeley, A. 2006, August 4. ‘Dehumanizing Others is No Virtue’. Chicago Sun-Times. Kobayashi, M. 2001. Tolerance Teaching at Home and School. Available at www.coursehero.com/file/3109621/Kobayashi (accessed 19 April 2012). Kruger, M., D. Butler, B. Osborne. T. Bond, M. Midel and N. Woodward. 2000. Africa Resolution Paper: The Greater Horn of Africa. Murfreesboro TN: Middle Tennessee State University. Lyons, T. 2006. Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea. CSR No. 21. Washington DC: Center for Preventive Action. Council on Foreign Relations. Miller, K. and M. Sessions. 2005. ‘Infusing Tolerance, Diversity, and Social Personal Curriculum into Inclusive Social Studies Classes using Family Portraits and Contextual Teaching and Learning’. Teaching Exceptional Children Plus 1(3): article 1. Spicker, Paul. 2009. Education and Social Policy. Aberdeen: Robert Gordon University. Available at www2.rgu.ac.uk/publicpolicy/ introduction/education.htm (accessed 19 April 2012). Torney-Purta, Judith, Rainer Lehmann, Hans Oswald and Wolfram Schulz. 2001. Citizenship and Education in Twenty-eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. Available at www.iea.nl/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/ Electronic_versions/CIVED_Phase2_Age_Fourteen.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). UNESCO PEER. 1999. 1998 Annual Report. UNESCO Regional Program of Education for Emergencies, Communication and Culture of Peace. 141

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UNESCO. 2006. Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction: Curriculum content and review process. International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris. U.S. Agency for International Development. 2000, May 18. ‘East Africa; Information on the drought in the Horn of Africa’, Africa News, USAID.

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7 Radio and the Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia ALI NOOR MOHAMED

INTRODUCTION One of the major sources of political and social instability in the Horn of Africa region has been the historically precarious relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia.1 Experts agree that the most destructive conventional war between two independent African states was waged between these two neighbours in the 1977–78 Ogaden War.2 The conflict, which assumed global dimensions through the massive intervention of the former Soviet Union and Cuba on the Ethiopian side, and the United States, Italy, and Arab League nations on the Somali side, eventually led to the collapse of the Somali state as well as spawning the 20-year cycle of violence that has since defined that country.3 Somali-Ethiopian animosities have been fuelled by belligerent narratives that have been passed down through the generations for several centuries. These narratives, contained in folk tales, idioms, poems and proverbs, invariably demonize the other ethnic group and have kept the two peoples from realizing the mutual benefit of facing their common destiny together. Analysts such as Mengisteab4 and Tilley5 identify social narratives as a key criterion variable in determining mutual perceptions among identity groups that can, in turn, promote or undermine regional integration. After first explaining the origins of conflict between Somali and

 Paul Watson. 1986. ‘Arms and Aggression in the Horn of Africa’, Journal of International Affairs 40(1):159–76. 1

 Gebru Tareke. 2000. ‘The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 33(3): 635–67. 2

 Ken Menkhaus. 2008. Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare. Available from www. enoughproject.org/publications/Somalia-country-peril-policy-nightmare. Accessed 10 April, 2012. 3

 Kidane Mengisteab, ‘Identity, Citizenship, and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa’, Concept paper presented to the second GHH workshop on integration, Djibouti, November, 2008. 4

 Virginia Tilley. 1997. ‘The Terms of the Debate: Untangling Language and Ethnicity and Ethnic Movements’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 20(3): 495–522. 5

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Amhara ethnic groups, this chapter will focus on traditional and contemporary narratives that have defined inter-group and inter-state relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. The analysis will focus on indigenous means of communication in Somalia such as poetry, songs, bards, chants, lyrics, etc., as well as the use of modern media, especially radio, to propagate positive or negative narratives directed at the Amhara ethnic group of Ethiopia and at ‘Abyssinia’ as the institutional symbol of Amhara political and cultural dominance. The paper will argue that historical suspicions between ethnic identities in Somalia and Ethiopia can be overcome with narratives aimed at undermining false premises on which negative perceptions of others are based.

ORIGINS OF INTER-ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN SOMALI AND AMHARA ETHNIC GROUPS The eastern region of Ethiopia and much of Somalia’s territory are inhabited mainly by pastoralist nomads who roam freely with their herds across vast expanses of land covering the two countries. The land also supports sedentary farmers in communities along the two rivers that traverse the two countries. The identical socio-economic conditions and kinship bonds that tie groups across national boundaries have fostered a level of social interaction that favours the development of positive narratives that, in turn, can lay the groundwork for peaceful economic integration. But this possibility has stood little chance in the face of historical counter-narratives that defined power relations among identity groups in the region in terms of domination and oppression of some groups by others. This perception of a hierarchical power relationship between ethnic identities has lingered for centuries – and explains the reflexive reaction by many modern-day Somalis to Ethiopia’s intervention in their country in 2006 – notwithstanding the non-Amhara political leadership in today’s Ethiopia. The belligerent relationship between the two neighbours predates the onset of European colonialism and goes as far back as the early sixteenth century when a series of religious wars were fought between Muslim forces of the Sultanate of Awdal and the Christian Abyssinian Emperor, Lebna Dengel. Historians note that the ancient Sultanate of Awdal, whose principal centre was the current northern Somali coastal town of Zeila, remained a vibrant commercial centre linking the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula for more than a century during the 1400s and 1500s. Awdal was also a centre of Islamic learning frequently visited by traveling Islamic missionaries from Arabia, Turkey, and Persia.6 This vibrancy contributed to a population growth as neighbouring Muslim ethnic groups, including

144

 Richard Burton. 1966 [1856]. First Footsteps in East Africa. New York: Praeger.

6

Radio and Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia

the Galla (Oromo), the Danakil, and Arabs migrated to the Sultanate.7 Thus the early sixteenth century ‘was a period of intense unrest among the people of Awdal’ which triggered expansionist impulses in the political and military leadership of the Sultanate.8 The war with Abyssinia was preceded by shorter wars among rival chieftains within the Sultanate.9 The internecine wars served to establish the leadership of Imam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al Ghazi (1506–43), commonly known in Ethiopia as Ahmed Gran (Ahmed, the left-handed) or as Ahmed Gurrey (Ahmed the lefthanded) in Somalia. The ascendancy of Ahmed Gurrey raised tensions with the ruler of Abyssinia – hence the series of religious wars between Abyssinia and the Sultanate of Awdal that commenced in 1528. Emperor Lebna Dengel of Abyssinia lost several of these wars between 1528 and 1535, and the Muslim armies captured ‘considerable portions of the Ethiopian Empire in 1535’.10 Emperor Dengel retreated into the mountains and appealed for assistance from Portugal, at the time a prominent Christian power in the world. Portuguese reinforcements arrived in 1541 and fought pitched battles against Muslim forces who received help from Turkey, the main Muslim power of the period. Although the Portuguese commander, Cristovao da Gama, was killed by Imam Ahmed’s forces in 1542, the Abyssinians, nonetheless, were buoyed by Portugal’s help and won decisive victories against the Muslims in rapid succession.11 In 1543, Imam Ahmed Gurrey himself was killed in battle near Lake Tana and his army disintegrated in defeat. Meanwhile, Lebna Dengel’s son, Galowdewon, repossessed lost Abyssinian territories and established sovereignty over the inhabitants, a great proportion of whom had been converted to Islam following Imam Ahmed Gurrey’s conquests.12 Imam Ahmed Gurrey has since been immortalized in the Somali consciousness as a great freedom fighter who forestalled Christian Abyssinia’s hegemonic expansion into Muslim Somali territory. The Imam’s struggle is accorded a prominent status in Somali anti-colonialist narratives – including history textbooks on Somali nationalism through which school children learn of Imam Ahmed Gurrey as a pioneer freedom fighter. Renowned contemporary Somali poets routinely invoke his name to instil a sense of national pride in their audiences.

 Saadia Touvall. 1963. Somali Nationalism. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

7

 Ibid.

8

 Ibid.

9

 Ibid.

10

 Ibid.

11

 Ibid.

12

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The following lines from Abdulla Malin Dhodan’s poem of 1972, called Gardaro (Aggression), illustrate Ahmed Gurrey’s immortality in the Somali psyche:13 Somali

English

Iyadoon barwaaqadu gudhayn gu’ iyo jiilaalba Oo gayiga Soomaaliyeed Gureey u baaqaayo Gayigaanu joognaba wixii soo gashaad tahaye Gamuunkoo mariidliyo intuu waran ku googooyey Gaashaanka tii lagu dhuftayee gowda laga saaray Ee jeeray gacmaha hoorsadeen gaasku daba joogay Ee uu gabaabsiyey qabkii meesha daran geeyay.

With a life of plenty lasting throughout the seasons And Gurrey’s call (to arms) heard throughout the land Wherever we live, you’ve sought to occupy The poisoned arrows, the thrashing of the spears Those deflected by our shields, and beaten into submission Pursued by our brigades till they begged for mercy Bereft of common sense, they were betrayed by arrogance.

In addition to a monument built in his memory, several schools and major streets in towns and cities throughout Somalia have been named after Imam Ahmed Gurrey. But Ahmed Gran also lived on in the psyche of the Amhara ruling class – only this time he is remembered as a villain. During the European colonial conquest of Africa in the 1880s, and well over 300 years after Ahmed Gurrey’s death, the Muslim ruler of Harar, Abdulla Muhammed, killed a party of Italian explorers.14 In retaliation, Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II forcibly took over the Muslim city and appointed his own cousin, Ras Makonnen, as its governor. In a message to the British colonial administration in Eden, Menelik explained the significance of his actions. According to Lewis,15 Menelik made it clear that he regarded Abdulla Muhammed as a latterday successor to the sixteenth century Muslim conqueror, Ahmed Gran, and that Abdulla’s defeat, like Gran’s, was a vindication of Christian sovereignty.

Emperor Menelik used this incident as a pretext to launch a spate of Abyssinian expansionist moves in the nineteenth century that absorbed many ethnic groups in eastern Ethiopia – including the Somalis and

 Abdulla Dhodan. 1972. Gardaro. Available at www.doollo.com/mainpage/boggasuugaanta/ dhoodaan/gardaro.htm (accessed 9 April, 2012). 13

 I.M. Lewis. 1988. A Modern History of Somalia: National State in the Horn of Africa. Boulder CO: Westview. 14

146

 Ibid.

15

Radio and Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia

Oromos in the Ogaden region.16 He was able to do this because of his skilful cultivation of relations with the European powers of the day. Thus in 1890 ‘Italy sponsored Abyssinian membership of the Brussels Act which empowered her as a Christian state to import munitions legally’.17 In the European scramble for colonies and influence in Africa, Menelik played one European power off against others and thus obtained arms from several powers at the same time – including Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia.18 This military build-up facilitated the extension of Abyssinian hegemony over Somalis and other ethnic groups in eastern Ethiopia.19 The self-consciousness of Somalis about their own subjugation and domination, as expressed in poetry, melancholic songs, and other forms of oral discourses during the period gave rise to the second, and perhaps more significant, ‘war of liberation’ in Somali nationalist history. In 1899, the Dervish Movement, led by Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan (later dubbed ‘The Mad Mullah of Somaliland’ by the British) began in earnest with a declaration of war on the British and Ethiopian empires.20 The Sayyid’s movement, inspired by his prolific nationalist poetry and fiery oratory, was highly effective against British, and later, Italian colonialists.21 In 1920, the British came under such military pressure that they deployed a massive ground force and six fighter aircraft to bomb the Dervish forces and subdue the Sayyid’s anti-colonialist movement. Historians note that the Somali war of independence provided the first theatre in which a European power deployed fighter aircraft against an independence movement in sub-Saharan Africa.22 However, Sayyid Muhammed’s war against Ethiopia was greatly tempered by the peculiar saga of Emperor Lij Yasu who ascended the throne upon the death in 1913 of his grandfather, Menelik II. Within the emperor’s court, Lij Yasu was suspected of harbouring strong sympathies for Islam and ‘was therefore mistrusted by the Amhara nobility and by the Church.’23 In 1915, Lij Yasu reportedly converted to Islam and established clandestine relations with Turkey.24 More significantly for the Somalis, historians confirm that Lij Yasu ‘was in collusion with the Mullah’25 – a reference to Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan. In 1916, Lij Yasu went to  Lovise Aalen. 2006. ‘Ethnic Federalism and Self Determination for Nationalities in a SemiAuthoritarian State: The Case of Ethiopia’, International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 13: 243–61. 16

 Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: 50.

17

 Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia.

18

 Ibid.

19

 Ibid.

20

 Touvall.

21

 Abdi Sheikh Abdi. 1991. Divine Madness. London: Zed Books.

22

 Touvall.

23

 Ibid.

24

 Ibid.

25

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Jigjiga, a major town in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in order to ‘organize an army from among the Somali and Galla population of the region’.26 The young emperor’s activities provoked anger and resentment among the Christian establishment in Addis Ababa and a coup d’etat was quickly staged. Menelik’s daughter, Zauditu, was crowned Empress and her cousin, Haile Selassie, was named regent. Troops were dispatched to capture (or kill) Lij Yasu who initially sought sanctuary in Harar – in the heart of Muslim Ethiopia. When his Somali followers were massacred, he fled to the Danakil desert.27 This incident greatly deepened the mutual animosities between Somali and Amhara ethnic groups. As one historian noted,28 At a time of constitutional crisis, Somali-Ethiopian tensions did have serious political repercussions. The possibility that the Somalis might again be mobilized someday into a political force has affected Ethiopian policy ever since.

Meanwhile, the Dervish movement could not contribute significantly to the Muslim resistance in Ethiopia as both the British and Italian colonial administrations were mobilizing to defeat it. Nonetheless, the Sayyid’s resistance in Ethiopia following the fall of Lij Yasu proved important for its psychological, rather than military, significance. In his many poems and oral exhortations to his countrymen or to his detractors, the Sayyid routinely demonized ‘the Abyssinian heathens’ and predicted their eventual demise. The Amhara as an ‘enemy’ were so ingrained in Sayyid Muhammed’s mind that he made reference to them even in poetry about highly personal matters that were unrelated to his anti-colonialist movement. One of his most cherished poems in Somalia is named after the Sayyid’s favourite mare, Hin Finin. When he married his second wife, his new father-in-law demanded Hin Finin as part of the dowry. The Sayyid composed a poem to express the mental anguish caused by his dilemma. The poem contains the following lines in reference to Hin Finin and how she would have enabled him to chase the ‘Abyssinian enemy’: Somali

English

Xarbaddiyo jihaadkaan lahaa, xoogsi ugu fuule Xiniinyaha ku goo baan lahaa, gaalka xaylka lehe Xaqaygii maqnaa baan lahaa, xag ugu raacdeye Xujey-reebta reer Hagar anaan, xabashyadii ruubin Xaaqaamaquuqiyo haddaan, xaaluf laga yeelin

With anticipation I’d ride her in battle

 Ibid.

26

 Ibid.

27

148

 Ibid.

28

In order to castrate the bloody heathens I’d ride in pursuit of my missing portion In pursuit of the Amhara and the Hagar who rob pilgrims O how I would wipe them out and obliterate them

Radio and Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia

Barely a decade after the end of Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan’s anti-colonial struggle, the Somalis would happen upon another opportunity to even the score against the Amhara dynasty and their Abyssinian Empire. The Italian colonization of southern Somalia provided the setting, and the fascist government of Benito Mussolini’s aggressive designs on Ethiopian territory would provide a convenient outlet for pent-up frustrations about the Somalis’ own stifled nationalist ambitions. When the Italian invasion of Ethiopia got underway on October 3, 1935, many Somalis were only too eager to assist, and they comprised a significant component of the invading army.29 Prominent traditional clan elders in the Ogaden region, such as Olol Dinle, urged enthusiastic support for the Italians.30 Because of strong Amhara nationalist resistance, the Italians actively courted Muslim Ethiopians including Somalis and Oromos. By May 1936, the Italians had secured control over the entire country. Ethiopia would not regain its independence until 1941 – after World War II had been underway for two years.

THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD After Somalia gained her independence from Britain and Italy in 1960, the tensions between Somalis and Amharas shifted into high gear. British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland gained independence only five days apart (June 26, 1960 and July 1, 1960, respectively). The two united on July 1, 1960. For Somalis of the period, almost to a man, this was a union of two out of five ‘Somali lands’; the other three being the eastern region of Ethiopia (commonly known as the Ogaden), the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and the former French Somaliland (now Djibouti).31 The ‘five Somalias’, as this was commonly known, was represented by the pentagonal star on the Somali national flag. More significantly, it was enshrined in the constitution of the Somali Republic in 1960 that the liberation and eventual reunification of all Somali territories would be the primary nationalist goal for the new state.32 During 1963 and 1964, Somalia fought a border war against Ethiopia and actively supported a guerrilla war (commonly referred to as the ‘shifta war’) against Kenya, soon after the latter gained independence in 1963.33 When mediation efforts by the nascent Organization of African Unity ended in an impasse, Somalia resolved to build up a first-rate military by turning to the former Soviet Union for training and military hardware. Despite widespread poverty among her people, the Somali government  Lewis.

29

 Touvall.

30

 Lewis.

31

 Abdi Ismail Samatar. 2004. ‘Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy Versus Control in the Somali Region’. Third World Quarterly 25(6): 1131–54. 32

 Lewis.

33

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was spending about 13 per cent of GDP on military hardware in the 1960s and 1970s.34 The country was preparing for a fateful military showdown with her neighbour and sworn enemy, Ethiopia. The 1976 Ogaden War is rightfully blamed for the eventual collapse of the Somali state and for triggering the seemingly endless cycle of violence that has engulfed Somalia and her people for the last two decades.35 The flames of the Somali-Amhara conflict were also fanned by official mass media – especially radio – following Somalia’s independence. In both her post-independence wars against Ethiopia, Somalia unleashed powerful propaganda campaigns via the airwaves that inspired anti-Amhara narratives for generations of Somali children to latch on to.

ORALITY, THE CREATION OF NARRATIVES AND THE ROLE OF RADIO Like most of their African brethren, Somalis have been defined by their strong oral tradition. Their love of poetry and the spoken word has fascinated early explorers and social anthropologists who have written about Somali culture. In his book, First Footsteps in East Africa (1856), Sir Richard Burton described how impressed he was with the land that ‘teems with poets, poetasters, poetitos, poetaccios …’36 He marvelled at an unscripted language that would still ‘so abound in poetry and eloquence’.37 S. Samatar38 and the Andrzejewskis39 noted how Somali poetry was intimately linked to the human-life-world – which may explain the Somalis’ intense attachment to their poetry and the spoken word. As S. Samatar notes,40 Unlike Western poetry, which appears to be primarily a concern of a group of professionals dealing with, more often than not, a subjectmatter intended for the members of what seems a small, highly literate section of society, Somali pastoral verse is a living art affecting almost every aspect of life.

Somali poets have played the role of ‘traditional intellectuals’ – producing narratives that affect how their listeners perceive their environment as well as other important events that affect their lives directly.41 34  Ahmed I. Samatar. 1988. Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality. New York and London: Zed Books.

 Menkhaus, 2008:93.

35

 Burton.

36

 Ibid..

37

 Said S. Samatar. 1993. ‘The Politics of Poetry’, Africa Report 38(5): 16–17.

38

 B.W. Andrzejewski and Sheila Andrzejewski. 1993. An Anthology of Somali Poetry. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.

39

 Said S. Samatar. 1986. ‘Somali Verbal and Material Arts’, in Katheryn Loughran, John Loughran, John Johnson and Said Samatar (eds), Somalia in Word and Image. Washington DC: Foundation for Cross Cultural Understanding: 30. 40

150

 Samatar, ‘Somali Verbal and Material Arts’.

41

Radio and Propagation of Anti- and Pro-Ethiopian Narratives in Somalia

As one Somali historian noted, ‘The pastoralist poet is the public relations man of the clan, and through his craft he exercises a powerful influence in clan affairs’.42 When radio was first introduced in the early 1950s, it became an instantaneous hit with the public and was widely adopted.43 This was in part because radio offers interactive programming that invites and encourages participation by listeners. As this format closely approximated the traditional village assemblies and meetings of clan elders, it invigorated and expanded the role of traditional opinion leaders such as orators and poets.44 Another important reason for the popularity of radio in Africa’s oral societies is the fit between folk media and radio. According to AnsuKyeremeh,45 folk media are ‘any form of endogenous communication system which, by virtue of its origin serves as a channel for messages in a way and manner that requires the utilization of the values, symbols, institutions, and ethos of the host culture through its unique qualities and attributes’. Also referred to as ‘oramedia’ – folk media include storytelling, dramatic displays, songs, chants, poems, drumming, proverbs, etc. – African radio has extended the reach of folk media and expanded the influence of traditional intellectuals and other opinion leaders. Across Somalia, spontaneous radio listening groups form to discuss the contents of a poem, specific features in a news bulletin, or the importance of new government development projects. As one prominent Somali historian46 wrote: It is a common, if amusing thing to come upon a group of nomads huddled excitedly over a short-wave transistor, engaged in a heated discussion of the literary merits of poems that have just been broadcast while they keep watch over their camel herds grazing nearby.

INFLUENCE OF RADIO IN AFRICAN POLITICAL CULTURE Africa’s post-colonial leaders have invariably used radio to pursue two broad national objectives: (1) promote rural development programmes and (2) promote national integration by stressing a common national identity. High illiteracy rates and lack of electricity made radio the only medium by which to communicate with masses in both rural and urban areas. This aspect of radio was widely cited as justification for nationalizing broadcast services throughout the continent in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus  Said S. Samatar, ‘Somalia: A Nation’s Literary Death Tops its Political Demise’. Available at www.wardheernews.com/Articles_09/May/17_literary_death_samatar.pdf. 42

 Suleiman M. Adam. 1968. The Development of Broadcasting in Somalia. Mogadishu: Somali Ministry of Information. 43

 Samatar, ‘Somali Verbal and Material Arts’: 30.

44

 K. Ansu-Kyeremeh (ed.). 1988. Theory and Application: Perspectives in Indigenous Communication in Africa. Accra: University of Ghana Press. 45

 Samatar, ‘Somali Verbal and Material Arts’.

46

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from Senegal to Tanzania, the state used radio to organize ‘rural listening groups’ through which development ideas about farming, education, health, etc., would be widely disseminated.47 But economic and social progress for Africa’s rural populations was often stymied by daunting challenges presented by the sheer diversity of ethnic groups, some with a history of rivalry and belligerent relationships. Across sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, leaders used radio to promote national unity as well as political, social, and cultural integration. In Nigeria, for example, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), also known as Radio Nigeria, stressed content themes that the various ethnic groups could relate to in order to build a common sense of identity.48 The FRCN even sought to limit the proportion of non-African content in order to promote a common Nigerian identity. In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere and his Revolutionary African Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) promoted unity and national integration through radio by declaring Kiswahili as both the official and national language of Tanzania. Kiswahili was made compulsory in high schools in 1964 and members of parliament were obligated to speak in Kiswahili while campaigning for political office.49 Kiswahili became a more dominant language on radio as the use of other languages, including English, were cut back. In Somalia, the military government introduced a script in 1972. The following year, Italian and English were abolished as official languages in favour of Somali. During the 1974–75 school year, all secondary school students took one year off to serve in the rural literacy campaign aimed at teaching the new script to rural nomadic and agricultural communities. During the three years following the literacy campaign of 1974–75, daily lessons were offered to the newly literate masses over the airwaves through radio. In Ethiopia, Amharic has been the clear language of national unity used in broadcasting as well as by all state institutions to promote political and social integration. This policy of unity through a common language was instituted by Emperor Haile Selassie’s government but has been maintained by all successive military and civilian governments. Today, it is still strongly reflected in the national programming of the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA). But the influence of radio has cut both ways in Africa. Just as it has been used to promote integration and economic and social development, so has it been used to fan the flames of division, ethnic hatred, and war. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the use of radio for this purpose  Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (eds). 2000. African Broadcast Cultures. Westport CT: Praeger; Louise M. Bourgault. 1995. Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. 47

 Ali N. Mohamed. 2007. ‘Radio and Television Broadcasting in Africa’, in Gary Hoppenstand (ed.), Greenwood Encyclopedia of World Popular Cultures. London: Praeger. 48

 Ullamaija Kivikuru. 1989. ‘Communication in Transition: The Case of Tanzanian Villages’, Gazette 43(2): 109–30. 49

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is the case of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) of Rwanda. When the Arusha Accords were signed by rival political factions in the Rwandan conflict, it contained a provision that barred the Governmentowned Radio Rwanda from inciting hatred.50 So Hutu hardliners, supported by the former First Lady Madame Habyarimana, established their own private radio station (RTLM) that waged an openly vicious campaign over the airwaves to whip up hatred against the minority Tutsi ethnic group. According to an analysis of the ensuing genocide by Prof. Chalk,51 Radio RTLM severely damaged the bonds of solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi, people who lived and farmed together as neighbors on almost every one of Rwanda’s thousands of hills. When the genocide began, its exhortations to Hutu peasants and militias to go to work, to kill the snakes in the grass … were highly effective … in mobilizing and maneuvering killers.

The genocide wiped out more than 800,000 Tutsis – who constituted 11 per cent of Rwanda’s total population and about 80 per cent of her Tutsi population. While the consequences of incitement by Rwanda’s Radio RTLM may be the most drastic, other examples of the use of radio to promote hate have been recorded in civil wars in Nigeria, Congo, and Somalia. During the Biafran war, both sides used radio to sow distrust and suspicion of the other side. Some urban pogroms in which hundreds of Ibo civilians were killed have been blamed on misinformation campaigns over radio that spread panic with devastating effect.52 In Congo, rival factions in the civil war used radio as the propaganda arm of the military confrontation. Radio has been used to demonize opposition groups and to mobilize armed resistance. Some of the worst atrocities against civilians have been tied to exhortations over radio.53 In Somalia, the government of General Mohamed Siad Barre used its control over the official Radio Mogadishu to cast opposition groups and political dissidents as enemies of Somalia whose treasonous deeds merited ‘hanging without a court trial’.54 The license to violate and kill thousands of innocent civilians in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s by government security forces was literally provided over radio.55  Frank Chalk. 1997. ‘Radio Propaganda and Genocide’, paper presented at the Conference on Synergy in Early Warning. Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. 50

 Ibid.

51

 John C. Merriam.1968, November 12. ‘The Legacy of the Biafran War’, The Harvard Crimson.

52

 Claude Kabemba. 2005. ‘The State of the Media in the Democratic Republic of Congo’. EISA Occasional Paper No. 30. Available from www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP30.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). 53

 This phrase was the main chorus line of a “Revolutionary Song” of the same name in Somali – ‘Waa daldalaad aan dacwo lahayn’ which was frequently played on radio but also on loud speakers mounted on Land Rover pickup trucks that slowly drove through city streets in the 1970s and 1980s. 54

 David D. Laitin. 1999. ‘Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention’, in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press. 55

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MEDIA, SOCIAL NARRATIVES, AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF SOCIAL REALITY The function of media narratives in shaping popular perceptions about others may have close theoretical affinity with explanations of social reality by pragmatist philosophers and interactionist sociologists. The social-psychological theory of symbolic interaction emphasizes the relativity of what society perceives as ‘social reality’.56 Symbolic interactionist theorists contend that socially constructed narratives form the building blocks of social reality. But interactionist theorists owe their ideas to pragmatist philosophers of early-to-mid-twentieth-century America. Dewey,57 for example, argued that the perception of what we consider ‘our reality’ cannot be extricated from us – the possessors of the faculty of knowing. It was on this premise that Schiller58 held that ‘mere knowing always alters reality’, and Mead59 contended that ‘what a thing is in nature depends not simply on what it is in itself, but also on the observer’. The dose of relativist conception in pragmatist thought is, however, most pronounced in James’60 analogy between knowing and carving (in the sense of shaping or fashioning): In the field of sensation our minds exert a certain arbitrary choice. By our inclusions and our omissions we trace the field’s extent; by our emphasis we mark its foreground and its background; by our order we read it in this direction and that. We receive, in short, the block of marble, but we carve the statue ourselves.

Thus what we perceive as social reality is shaped by the words, actions and thought processes of individuals and cultural groups.

As a notion that bears direct relevance to our discussion of the influence of mass media, especially radio, we approach social reality from micro- and macro-sociological perspectives of interactionist sociology which offers a more contemporary analysis of the subject and one that extends from pragmatist themes.61 Social interaction consists primarily of processes of encoding and decoding meanings. And because of these processes, the rigors of human life revolve not so much around symbols and actions but around the meaning of the symbols and actions. In modern society, mass media have become powerful vehicles for strengthening the sense of cultural belonging that binds members of  Herbert Blumer. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. 56

 John Dewey. 1949. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover.

57

 F.S. Schiller. 1927. ‘William James and the Making of Pragmatism’, The Personalis, 8: 81–93. 58

 George Herbert Mead. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. 59

 William James. 1975 [1907]. Pragmatism. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

60

 Dmitri Shalin. 1986. ‘Pragmatism and Social Interactionism’. American Sociological Review 51(1); Dmitri Shalin. 1987. ‘The Pragmatic Origins of Symbolic Interactionism’. Paper presented at Conference on Symbolic Interaction, Champaign-Urbana IL. 61

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specific ethnic groups together through propagation of common cultural symbols. Media also serve as vehicles for defining situations and widely disseminating group narratives. As ‘frame analysis’ research has consistently demonstrated,62 media routinely frame events and situations from predictable perspectives – in accordance with the socialization of media practitioners, their values and beliefs systems, and their motivations. Budarick,63 for example, showed the wide discrepancy in how three Australian newspapers framed coverage of urban riots by Aborigines. He writes: The Daily Telegraph and the Sydney Morning Herald both draw on several common social concerns about law and order. The riot is described as an outbreak of aberrant and chaotic violence, re-enforcing the widely held myth of meaningless violence and expectations of Aboriginal irrationality in Australia. In contrast, the coverage of the Koori Mail hints to its use of history in its plot construction. The paper attributes a much higher status to a past of racism and injustice toward indigenous communities than either the Daily Telegraph or the Sydney Morning Herald.

Thus Gamson et al.64 note that, ‘We walk around with media-generated images of the world, using them to construct meaning about political and social issues’. In the 1930s, it was the ‘immediate, uniform, and powerful’ effects of radio that led communication scholars to outline the precepts of the ‘magic bullet’ theory of media effects.65 In both Europe and North America, social scientists became fascinated as well as alarmed by the power of radio in shaping public attitudes through propaganda campaigns of the pre- and post-World-War-II periods.66 In Africa’s oral cultures, where populations are defined largely by high illiteracy rates, radio has proven its worth in shaping public attitudes about important social, political, and economic issues.67 Radio can promote peace and stability by influencing the dynamics of inter-ethnic discourse as well as popular perceptions about motivations of others. In Somalia, radio has proven to be an effective tool for undermining long-held social prejudices against ‘lower caste’ groups and to change public attitudes. In a series of radio programmes over the past decade aimed at raising public awareness about the effects of prejudice on  Gaye Tuchman. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York: Free Press; Michael Schudson. 1978. Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers. New York: Basic Books; Pamela Shoemaker and E. Mayfield. 1987. ‘Building a Theory of News Content: A Synthesis of Current Approaches’, Journalism Monographs 103. 62

 John Budarick. 2011. ‘Media Narratives and Social Events: The Story of the Redfern Riot’, Journal of Communication Inquiry 35(1): 37–52. 63

 William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes and Theodore Sasson. 1992. ‘Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality’, Annual Review of Sociology 18: 373–93. 64

 Shearon Lowery and Melvin Defleur. 1983. Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects. New York: Longman. 65

 Ibid.

66

 Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie, and Folu Ogundimu (eds). 2003. Media and Democracy in Africa. Piscataway NJ: Transaction Books. 67

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individuals and families, participants debated the historical evolution of irrational social beliefs about the presumed superiority of some groups and the ­inferiority of others.68 The programmes, aired on local radio stations in Somalia as well as on the BBC and VOA Somali Service broadcasts, frequently featured the highly respected Somali poet, Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame Hadrawi. Hadrawi’s rational discourse intimidated supporters of the status quo, who are no longer willing to be on radio and publicly defend their prejudices. At the same time, the programmes have strengthened the position of supporters of social equality who are now much more vocal on the airwaves.

SOMALI RADIO AND PROPAGATION OF ANTI-ETHIOPIAN NARRATIVES The new Somali government in 1960 owned and operated the only two radio stations in the country that broadcast on short-wave meter bands. These were Radio Mogadishu in the capital, and Radio Hargeisa in the former British Somaliland. Given the strength of nationalist sentiment at independence, radio afforded an effective tool for boosting the government’s power to project nationalist propaganda in the form of songs, poetry, traditional chants, and stories throughout the territories inhabited by Somalis.69 During the 1964 border war, radio played a pivotal role in building and maintaining the nationalist spirit of the Somalis.70 Much of this came at the expense of the Amhara ethnic group who were demonized in songs, poetry, and chants. One such song contained the following lines:

Somali

English

Amxaaro intaan ishayno Intay ubadkeena layso Intaan oohinta maqlayno Miyuu isticmaar na loodin?

As long as we fight the Amhara As long as they murder our offspring And as long as screams fill our ears Can we let the colonialists subdue us?

 Mohamed Hagi Hussein, ‘Hadraawi oo ka hadlay qaraxyadii Hargeisa’, Nov. 7, 2008, available at www.bbc.co.uk/somali/news/story/2008/11/081107_hadrawi.shtml (accessed 10 April 2012); Voice of America Radio, ‘Djibouti: Shirkii hayb sooca oo soo xirmay’, March 23, 2011, available at www.voanews.com/somali/news/Djibouti-Shirkii-Hayb-Sooca-oo-sooXirmay-118551164.html (accessed 10 April 2012). 68

 I.M. Lewis. 1989. ‘The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism’, African Affairs 88 (353): 573–79. 69

156

 Ibid.

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These messages of hate for the Amhara transmitted over Somali airwaves may have spawned hate speech laden with anti-Amhara proverbs, idioms, and sayings. In routine daily interaction on the Somali street, schoolyard, or homestead, one hears such idiomatic sayings as: Nafta iyo Amxaarba meel xun bay ku dhigaan Axdi maleh Axmaar lagu aaminaaye; waa abees, abris iyo yaxaas afka kala haye Axmaaro iyo dameerba ooda u xigtay cunaan Axmaar afka uu kuugu qoslo ayuu kugu qaniinaa

Both life and an Amhara man can deal you a terrible fate Amharas are not to be trusted as they are snakes, serpents, and crocs with gaping mouths, ready to strike Amharas and donkeys eat the nearest shrubs meant to protect them The same Amhara mouth that smiles at you also bites you.

Demonization of the Amhara ethnic group reached fever-pitch levels on radio during the 1977–78 Somali-Ethiopian war as artists and wordsmiths at the Ministry of Information and National Guidance produced scores of songs and traditional chants intended to diminish the Amharas and exalt the Somalis. One of Somalia’s most popular radio personalities and arguably her most prolific living poet, Abdulla Ahmed Dhodan, composed one of his better known epic poems in 1976 in front of a platoon of Western Somali Liberation Front forces. The contingent had just completed military training and were to be dispatched and deployed to the front lines of the Ogaden war which was about to get underway at the time.71 The title of the poem, Xaajadii, literally means a common social issue or cause – a reference to the ‘liberation’ struggle of the people of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In this poem, Dhodan laments the unsatisfactory level of commitment to the cause by those who should lead it. He lays out the history of the movement – its high points and lowly moments. He enumerates the complete set of circumstances that have forestalled victory – and provides his own prescription for a successful ‘anti-colonial’ struggle. Dhodan cannot resist the temptation to include a reference to the ‘bloody’ Amhara along the way. The poem, which has been repeatedly aired on Somali radio, says in part: Xaajadii huluulaha gashee, haatuf ka adeegay

The elusive issue manipulated by evil spirits

 Ahmed Faarah Ali Idaajaa, ‘Hordhac’ (Preface), available at www.doollo.com/mainpage/ boggasuugaanta/dhoodaan/xaajadii.htm (accessed on 10 May 2012). 71

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Xaajadii halaagguba ka dhacay, ee huqdiga reebtay Xaajadii hurgumadeedu ay, heerka culus gaadhay Haw liicinaay waxaan hayoon, dhab u hanuunshaaba Marna Xabashi huura leh Lixlaha, kula haliilaaba Marna hagar u daayoon rasaas ka haqab waayaaba

It wrought destruction and brought suffering It percolated out of view and got serious I’ve warned against complacency and guided In the process threatened the filthy Amhara with the butt of a rifle And at times had to abandon the struggle for lack of munitions

When the Ogaden War broke out in 1977, Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeisa played continuous anti-Ethiopian and anti-Amhara songs that became popular with audiences.72 The lyrics of one of the songs described the ‘state of denial’ in which the ‘Amhara regime’ existed. It presented the grievances of the Somali people against ‘Abyssinia’ and demanded that it was time to seek redress: Talisyahow wareersani war li’idaa Walee war li’idaa Mengistoow war li’idaa Waxarihii aad layseen waa laisku haystaa Wanaankaad walwaasheen waa laisku haystaa.

O ye confused leader; how clueless you are You really have no clue O Mengistu how clueless you are We will try you for the flock of sheep you killed You will answer for the rams you stole.

Lyrics of Somali songs on radio also defined the contours of Somali territory by declaring ‘the rightful owner’ of Ogaden towns and cities mentioned in song: Geesiyaal quursi diidayoow Hubkaad manta qaadeen Ku qotomiya calankoo Qoraaxeey anaa iskaleh Qabridahare anaa iskaleh.

O our gallant ones who reject diminution With the arms you’ve lifted You should hoist our flag As Qorahey belongs to me As Qabridahare belongs to me.

Traditional Somali chants called dhaanto are more common in the Ogaden region than inside Somalia proper. Both during the Ogaden War and after, this genre has emerged as an important vehicle for anti-Amhara and anti-Ethiopian messages and narratives. Anti-Amhara dhaanto chants composed and played nowadays on FM radio stations in southern Somalia 158

 Joseph John. 1994. ‘World literature in Review: Somalia’, World Literature Today 68(2): 13–14.

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tend to focus on nostalgic images of Somali military successes during the early stages of the Ogaden War. One contemporary dhaanto singer says: Jaalayaloo aniga heegan ayaan ahoo Dhulka iyo calankaan u halgamahaya Cagma dhigow aniga hubka culus i sii Heegan ayaan ehe hubka culus i sii.

Oh comrades I salute to signal my readiness For I am in a struggle to free my land and defend the flag O Agmadige assign me to the heavy weaponry I am ready to fight with heavy weaponry.

But in a twist of supreme irony, the outcome of the Ogaden War would eventually break the seemingly interminable cycle of anti-Amhara prejudice borne by Somali social discourse and at least interrupt the steady flow of negative narratives.

THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR AND ITS ROLE IN REDUCING ANTI-ETHIOPIAN NARRATIVES The Somali civil war started in April 1978 after disgruntled military officers attempted to stage a coup against General Mohamed Siad Barre, Somalia’s long-time military ruler. In the wake of the abortive coup, ‘renegade’ officers who were captured were shot by firing squad. The rest escaped to Ethiopia and founded the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The rebels were led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed who, up to the moment of the coup, was commander of Somali forces fighting against Ethiopia on the southern frontlines. General Barre’s security forces immediately targeted Colonel Yusuf’s Majerten clan for special persecution and harassment. The ensuing civil war forced hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees to seek safety in Ethiopia. Somalia’s disintegration had begun with the main fault lines occurring along ethnic clan lines – the effect of what S. Samatar73 calls ‘lineage segmentation’. In pastoral nomadic settings, where families and clans are constantly on the move in search of pastures, there are no permanent enemies or friends. Those who camp together and form an alliance during the rainy season may lock horns a few months later, almost inevitably along clan or sub-clan lines. In the words of S. Samatar: This partially explains why Somali opponents of Siad Barre’s regime did not hesitate in crossing over to Ethiopia, the putative enemy of the Somalis. Ethiopia was treated by the Somali opposition as another clan

 Samatar, ‘The Politics of Poetry’.

73

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in temporary alliance in the interminable shifting coalitions of Somali pastoral politics.74

By 1980, the northern Isaq clans were drawn into the civil war and the government instituted ever more repressive measures in retaliation. In 1982, the Somali National Movement began a guerrilla war against the Somali government from training camps inside Ethiopia. By 1988, a majority of the Isaq clan were either internally displaced or were forced to flee to Ethiopia. The poor security situation in Somalia during the long civil war dictated the length of time refugees stayed inside Ethiopia. Many city dwellers from northern Somali towns chose to live in Ethiopian cities such as Addis Ababa, Harar, Dire Dawa, and Jigjiga where they were supported by remittances from relatives in the diaspora.75 These refugees and their experiences in Ethiopia would be instrumental in undermining the legitimacy of anti-Amhara and anti-Ethiopian narratives in Somali discourse.

DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE COUNTER NARRATIVES DURING AND AFTER THE 1990s There has been a whirlwind of change in the perceptions about Ethiopia and the Amhara people among a sizeable proportion of Somalis since the 1990s. The change may initially have been dictated by political expediency on the part of political elites in the breakaway Republic of Somaliland and the autonomous province of Puntland. But today, it is a more genuine feeling that has deeper roots in changed public attitudes. Arguably, Somalia’s most charismatic contemporary artist and performer, Maryan Mursal, captured this change in public sentiments toward Ethiopia in one of her newer songs called Qah (which means ‘refugee flight’). She says: Waxaan dhaco oon kufaba Itoobibiya miyaan dhex tegay? Dhoweynta kalgacalka badanleh hooy Dhalaankey noo rareenooy hooy Dhulkay dega nagu dhaheenooy hooy Inaan wada dhalanayoo Dadkaas isku dhaqan nahay Dharaartaas qirahayaa.

As I staggered forward and fell Didn’t I find myself in Ethiopia? O the kind and loving reception O how they lifted our children up And told us to settle the land That they are really our kith and kin With whom we share a common heritage I am made to admit that day.

When Somaliland declared its secession from Somalia in 1991, its economy was in a shambles and a large proportion of its population had  Ibid.: 16.

74

160

 ‘Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy Towards Somaliland & Somalia’, Somaliland Times, 26 February 2009. Available at http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/370/23.shtml (accessed 10 May 2012). 75

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sought refuge inside Ethiopia. The country desperately needed outside friends and its leaders looked to Ethiopia as potentially their first natural ally.76 Indeed, Ethiopia has done more than any other country to accommodate Somaliland, only stopping short of granting it full diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state. Ethiopia maintains an ‘economic interest’ section in Hargeisa, the only country to do so.77 After relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea soured, the government in Addis Ababa held negotiations with Somaliland over access to the port of Berbera. The Ethiopians want to use the port for import and export trade affecting eastern and southern regions of Ethiopia.78 In official negotiations, Ethiopia agreed to make substantial investments to build or repair roads along the Berbera corridor inside Somaliland territory.79 On the people-to-people level, the long exposure by hundreds of thousands of Somalis to life inside Ethiopia during the 1980s and early 1990s meant radical shifts in their perceptions about Ethiopia and her people. Returning refugees brought with them not only a different outlook on the country that gave them safe sanctuary, but also a new taste for Ethiopian food, Ethiopian music, Ethiopian dances, and Ethiopian traditional attire.80 In short, substantial numbers of ordinary Somalis brought important aspects of Ethiopian or Amhara culture with them back to Somalia.

THE ROLE OF RADIO AND OTHER MEDIA IN PROPAGATING POSITIVE NARRATIVES Today’s media in Somaliland routinely carry positive images and narratives about Ethiopian people, government, and country. All aspects of the friendly relations between the Somaliland administration and the government in Addis Ababa receive extensive coverage on radio, television, and in newspapers. The political and security arrangements between the two governments preclude the production and dissemination of the kind of negative narratives that were so common in the 1970s and 1960s.81 Some of the more remarkable indices of change in public attitudes may draw their cues from mass media. The government-owned Radio Hargeisa carries almost daily bulletins and features reports about the economic and  ‘Wasiir ka tirsan dawladda Itoobiya oo saadaaliyey in aanu fogayn ictiraafka JSL’, available at www.somalilandpatriots.com/news-414-0 (accessed 10 April 2012). 76

 Jawahir Ali Sh. Madar, ‘Itoobiya saaxiib run ah ayey la tahay dadka reer Soomaaliland’, Wargeyska Geeska Africa, August 2, 2007. 77

 ‘Heshiis labaad oo dhinaca xidhiidhka ganacsiga ee Soomaliland iyo Itoobiya oo ay kala saxeexdeen labada dal’. Qaran News (previously available via their website). 78

 Ibid.

79

 Shamis Gamute, personal interview. 2 July 2009.

80

 BBC. 2005, November 22. ‘Somaliland, Ethiopian Officials Upbeat about Launch of Trade Corridor’, BBC Monitoring International Reports. Available at: www.accessmylibrary.com/ article-1G1-139025502/somaliland-ethiopian-officials-upbeat.html (accessed 10 April 2012). 81

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commercial ties between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Other privately-owned and operated radio stations such as Radio Hadhwanag, Radio Horyaal, and Radio Hormud dispatch their own correspondents to Ethiopia to transmit reports about Ethiopian government policies that affect Somalia and Somaliland, and to report on Ethiopian society in general. For example, on July 26, 2007, Mustafe Ali Saleh, a broadcast journalist, filed a report for Radio Hargeisa from Addis Ababa based on a fortyfive-minute programme on Ethiopian national television that focused on Somaliland.82 The reporter said that the programme reflected ‘the brotherly relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland that are getting stronger by the day’. The television programme was produced as a backdrop to the July 2007 economic development agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland that was signed by Ethiopia’s minister of transport and telecommunications, Mr. Juneidi Sado in Hargeisa. In the television programme, Ethiopian narrators commended Somaliland’s struggle to get back on her feet following the devastation left in the wake of the aerial bombardments of Hargeisa and her civilian population during the waning years of General Siad Barre’s administration. The narrators included descriptions and images of Somaliland’s recovery – especially the meticulous process of maintaining peace while building a functional and indigenous democratic system of governance. Ethiopian audiences were also shown the warm reception accorded a fourteenmember Ethiopian government delegation that visited Hargeisa, Wajale, and Berbera. Perhaps more significantly, other radio stations in Somaliland such as Hadhwanaag and Horyaal play Amharic songs and routinely feature the work of Ethiopian artists.83 One of the more popular singer/songwriters in Somaliland is an Amhara artist called Asnake. He sings love duets with famous Somali female artists such as Khadija Hiran. Asnake’s more popular duet, named Ma’anow (my darling), is frequently played on radio by request from audience members. The symbolism of Somali-Ethiopian solidarity through cultural productions is also represented in the work of an Amhara female artist called Haimanot Girma who weaves Somali and Amharic together by singing alternating lines in the two languages. One of Girma’s more popular songs currently receiving plenty of air play in Somaliland is called Kaaley Jacaylkaygii (Come my Love, in Somali).84 Television, too, plays a significant role in projecting positive images about Ethiopia, its people, and culture to the Somalis. In addition to the official TV Somaliland Qaran, Somaliland is served by four privatelyowned television stations that are available to the public via cable service.  Mustafe Ali Saleh, ‘Xidhiidhka TV-ga Itoobiya iyo JSL’, available at www.somalilandpatriots. com/news-3505-0 (accessed 10 April 2012). 82

 www.hadhwanaagnews.com (accessed 23 April 2012).

83

 Haimanot Girma, ‘Kaaley Jacaylkaygii’. available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7xuzm1hGA (accessed 16 May 2012). 84

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These are Horn Cable Television (based in Hargeisa), Raad TV (London), Universal TV (London), and TV Somaliland Europe (Stockholm). In their regular programming, these stations promote Ethiopian culture to their Somali viewers by featuring Ethiopian music videos, traditional performances, and news programmes. These are remarkable for their lack of even a trace of the long history of bitterness and belligerent rhetoric. Instead, programming about Ethiopia emphasizes the common humanity of the people of the Horn of Africa. The effect is that Ethiopian culture and her people – including the Amhara – no longer evoke revulsion. They are no longer despised or feared. On the contrary, Somalis in Somaliland celebrate their newfound kinship with Ethiopians through conscious adoption of Ethiopian cultural symbols. For example, in Hargeisa and other Somaliland cities, the local menu now reflects a strong Ethiopian culinary influence. Somali households consume famous Ethiopian grains such a tef and rye which were not part of the regular Somali diet before the civil war.85 Women in Somaliland today prepare meals the same way their Ethiopian counterparts do. The Ethiopian staple, anjera, is now served in Somaliland households and is made to Ethiopian specifications.86 Although Somalis traditionally have had their own kind of anjera, the Somali anjera, smaller and with fewer ingredients, is losing ground to the popular import.87 A new item on the menu in Somaliland is the misir, which is an Amharic name for a daal-like stew served with anjera. Also, the traditional Somali porridge (shurbat) made from sorghum has now given way to the new Ethiopian influence which consists of a mix of three grains including rye and wheat – neither of which grows in Somalia.88 Positive narratives about Ethiopia are also produced on festive occasions such as weddings and reunion parties in Hargeisa and other Somaliland towns. Perhaps as a result of Ethiopian music videos played on Somali television, most city weddings feature both Somali and Ethiopian traditional dances by women. On occasion, popular Ethiopian videos are taped and played at wedding parties.89

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: APPLYING AN AFRICAN ETHICAL THEORY TO MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA Experts on the region consider belligerent inter-ethnic narratives as a powerful contributor to the atmosphere of hate that fuels conflicts between ethnic groups as well as between states of the Greater Horn  Ibado Hagi Good, personal interview. July 23, 2009.

85

 Ibid.

86

 Ibid.

87

 Abdullahi Mohamed Hassan, personal interview, September 4, 2009.

88

 Ibid.

89

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Region.90 Even minor conflicts that arise from competition for scarce resources are often exacerbated by negative inter-ethnic narratives. As Mengisteab91 has argued, the narratives tend to get more vitriolic over time and ‘can easily revert to dehumanization of adversaries and provide justification for their destruction or elimination’. The search for solutions has led to creation of regional organizations charged with seeking peace at various levels. The latest such organization is the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF) established through a UNESCO initiative in 2007. The Forum is a think tank of scholars devoted to ‘building a strong consensus on a long-term vision of stability, sustainable development, and regional integration’. In one of its first major initiatives in 2010, the GHHF called on media of the region to serve the cause of peace by resolving to fight negative inter-ethnic narratives. Media in the region were thus urged to adopt principles of the Social Responsibility Theory92 as a guide in fighting inter-ethnic prejudices. Some of the basic premises of the Social Responsibility Theory derive from universally salient human values. In a study involving more than a dozen countries in five continents, Christians and Traber93 noted the recurrence of certain fundamental ethical principles. They found that ‘the veneration of human life is consistently affirmed as bonding humans into an organic whole’ (emphasis added). Likewise, Peukert94 maintains that the idea of humanity itself is rooted in the principle that ‘we have inescapable claims on one another which cannot be renounced except at the cost of our humanity . . .’ Another universal principle is the value of truth-telling. This is a core tenet in all major faiths like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The social character of human civilization is predicated on truthful communication between individuals and groups. Indeed, Sissela Bok argued that falsehoods are unnatural strands in the fabric of human co-existence. She wrote: Imagine a society, no matter how ideal in other respects, where word and gesture could never be counted on. Questions asked, answers given, information exchanged – all would be worthless  .  .  . There must be a minimal degree of trust in communication for language and action to be more than stabs at the dark.95  Kidane Mengisteab, ‘Identity, Citizenship and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa’; Assefaw Bariagaber, ‘Transforming Nationalist Narratives into Region-Inclusive Narratives in the Horn of Africa’; and Ali Noor Mohamed, ‘Radio and the creation of positive inter-identity narratives in Somalia and Ethiopia’; all three papera presented to the Conference on Identity, Citizenship, and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, 7–11 November 2009. 90

 Kidane Mengisteab. 2009. ‘Concept paper on Identity, Citizenship, and Regional Integration’, presented at Conference on Identity, Citizenship, and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti. 91

 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm. 1956. Four Theories of the Press. Urbana IL: University of Illinois. 92

 Clifford Christians and Michael Traber (eds). 1997. Communication Ethics in Universal Values. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 93

 H. Peukert. 1981. ‘Universal Solidarity as the Goal of Communication’, Media Development 28(4).

94

164

 Sissela Bok. 1979. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage Books.

95

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A third universal ethical principle is nonviolence – as violence would simply be counter-intuitive in the broader paradigm of the sacredness of human life. Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King elevated this ethical principle to a philosophy of life. But it has been a cornerstone of JudeoChristian-Islamic tradition for centuries through the commandment in the Old Testament that Thou Shalt Not Kill. So Christians and Nordenstreng96 write that ‘out of nonviolence, we articulate ethical theories about not harming the innocent as an obligation that is cosmic and irrespective of our roles or ethnic origin’. The irony for Africans is that all the principles enunciated above – human dignity, truthfulness and nonviolence – are core values in indigenous African cultures, including those of the Greater Horn of Africa region. The people of the Greater Horn embody the triple heritage that Ali Mazrui said defined Africa’s people. This heritage represents the confluence of Christian, Islamic, and indigenous traditions. Indigenous African principles have been outlined in the moral theory of ubuntu. Roughly translated, the word ubuntu means ‘humanness’ in Zulu. As an idea, the word connotes the complex web of human inter­ connectedness that lends meaning to each individual’s humanity. As the African maxim says, ‘a person is a person through other persons’. In its pure form, the ubuntu moral code precludes killing, deceit, theft, violation of trust, authoritarian decision-making, and destructive competition for wealth. All these elements in the code point to consideration for others in communal settings. It’s a code that reaffirms the oneness of humanity and the sacredness of human co-existence. As one prominent African thinker97 put it: ‘At the centre of traditional African morality is human life … The promotion of life is therefore the determinant principle of African traditional morality . . .’ Through the influence of Islam and Christianity, the people of the Greater Horn Region have historically reaffirmed this traditional moral code that values community and co-existence. European travellers to nineteenth-century Ethiopia were struck by the importance of hospitality and sharing that were symbolized by both the Coptic Church and the Emperor’s Palace. Social anthropologists posit that large communal meals by Ethiopian monarchs were a form of redistribution of wealth at the same time that they served to cement human bonds across ethnic divisions. In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad set an example for his followers through the Medina Charter which was designed to forge a sense of community among warring tribes and between Muslims and Jews in the city of Medina. The Charter contained several principles instituted for the sake of building cohesion among rival ethnic groups. One such principle is called Islislah – which, in mediation processes, required decisions to be made ‘in the best interest of all neighbouring communities’.  Clifford Christians and Karle Nordenstreng. 2004. ‘Social Responsibility Worldwide’, Journal of Mass Media Ethics 19(1): 3–28. 96

 Godfrey Onah, ‘The Meaning of Peace in African Traditional Religion and Culture’. Available at www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/goddionah.htm (accessed 11 April 2012). 97

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The violence and divisions that have driven apart the people of the Greater Horn Region are therefore inconsistent with the core values that have defined their common heritage. The media in the region are called upon to promote these core principles in educational campaigns which they are well positioned to undertake. This would represent an important milestone in the disparate efforts of well-meaning individuals and groups to promote regional integration and peaceful co-existence among the diverse ethnic groups of the Horn of Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aalen, Lovise. 2006. ‘Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a Semi-Authoritarian State: The Case of Ethiopia’, International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 13 (2/3): 243–61. Abdi, Sheikh Abdi. 1991. Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan. London: Zed Books. Adam, Suleiman M. 1968. The Development of Broadcasting in Somalia. Mogadishu: Somali Ministry of Information. Andrzejewski, B.W. and Sheila Andrzejewski. 1993. An Anthology of Somali Poetry. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. Ansu-Kyeremeh, K. (ed.). 1998. Perspectives in Indigenous Communication in Africa. Vol. 1: Theory and application. Accra: University of Ghana Press. BBC. 2005, November 22. ‘Somaliland, Ethiopian Officials Upbeat about Launch of Trade Corridor, BBC Monitoring International reports, November 22, 2005. Available at: www.accessmylibrary.com/ article-1G1-139025502/Somaliland-ethiopian-officials-upbeat.html (accessed 10 April 2012). Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. Bok, Sissela. 1979. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage Books. Bourgault, Louise M. 1995. Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. Budarick, John. 2011. ‘Media Narratives and Social Events: The Story of the Redfern Riot’, Journal of Communication Inquiry 35(1): 37–52. Burton, Richard. 1966 [1856]. First Footsteps in East Africa. New York: Praeger. Chalk, Frank. 1997. ‘Radio propaganda and genocide’. Paper presented at the Conference on Synergy in Early Warning. Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. Christians, Clifford and Karle Nordenstreng. 2004. ‘Social responsibility worldwide’, Journal of Mass Media Ethics 19(1): 3–28. Christians, Clifford and Michael Traber (eds). 1997. Communication Ethics in Universal Values. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 166 Dewey, John. 1949. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover.

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Dhodan, Abdulla M. Gardaro. 1972. Available at www.doollo.com/­ mainpage/boggasuugaanta/dhoodaan/gardaro.htm (accessed April 19 2012). Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency. n.d. About ETRA. Available at www.ertagov.com/en/about-us.html (accessed 16 May, 2012). Fardon, Richard and Graham Furniss (eds). 2000. African Broadcast Cultures: Radio in Transition. Westport CT: Praeger and London: James Currey. Gamson, William A., David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Theodore Sasson. 1992. ‘Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality’, Annual Review of Sociology 18: 373–93. Geeska Afrika. ‘Wasiir ka tirsan dawladda Itoobiya oo saadaaliyey in aanu fogayn ictiraafka JSL’. Available at www.somalilandpatriots.com/ news-414-0 (accessed 10 April 2012). Hyden, Goran, Michael Leslie, and Folu Ogundimu (eds). 2003. Media and democracy in Africa. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books; London: Zed Books. Idaajaa, Ahmed Farah Ali. ‘Hordhac’ (Preface). Available at www.doollo. com/mainpage/boggasuugaanta/dhoodaan/xaajadii.htm. James, William. 1975 [1907]. Pragmatism. Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press. John, Joseph. 1994. ‘Review of an Anthology of Somali Poetry by B. W. and S Andrezejewski’, World Literature Today 68(2): 13–14. Kabemba, Claude. 2005. ‘The State of the Media in the Democratic Republic of Congo’. EISA Occasional Paper No. 30. Available at www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP30.pdf (accessed 19 April 2012). Kivikuru, Ullamaija.1989. ‘Communication in Transition: The Case of Tanzanian villages’, Gazette 43(2): 109–30. Laitin, David D. 1999. ‘Somalia: Intervention in Internal Conflict’, in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press. Lewis, I.M. 1988. A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Boulder CO: Westview. – 1989. ‘The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism’, African Affairs 88 (353): 573–79. Lowery, Shearon and Melvin DeFleur. 1983. Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects. New York: Longman. Madar, Jawahir Ali S. 2007, August 2. ‘Itoobiya saaxiib run ah ayey la tahay dadka reer Soomaaliland’, Wargeyska Geeska Africa. Mead, George H. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. Mengisteab, Kidane. 2009. ‘Identity, citizenship, and regional integration in the Horn of Africa’. Concept paper presented to the second GHH workshop on integration, Djibouti, November 2009.

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Menkhaus, Ken. 2008. ‘Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare’. Washington DC: Enough. Available from www.enoughproject. org/publications/Somalia-country-peril-policy-nightmare (accessed 19 April 2012). Merriam, John C. 1968, November 12. ‘The Legacy of the Biafran War’, The Harvard Crimson. Mohamed, Ali N. 2007. ‘Radio and Television Broadcasting in Africa’, in Gary Hoppenstand (ed.), Greenwood Encyclopedia of World Popular Cultures. Westport CT and London: Greenwood. Onah, Godfrey. ‘The Meaning of Peace in African Traditional Religion and Culture’. Available at www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/goddionah.htm (accessed 19 April 2012). Peukert, H. 1981. ‘Universal Solidarity as the Goal of Communication’, Media Development 28(4): 10–12. Saleh, Mustafe Ali. ‘Xidhiidhka TV-ga Itoobiya iyo JSL’. Available at www. somalilandpatriots.com/news-3505-0 (accessed 19 April 2012). Samatar, Abdi I. 2004. ‘Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region’, Third World Quarterly 25(6): 1131–54. Samatar, Ahmed I. 1989. Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality. N.Y.: Institute for African Alternatives. Samatar, Said S. 1986. ‘Somali Verbal and Material Arts’, in Katheryn Loughran, John Loughran, John Johnson, and Said Samatar (eds), Somalia in Word and Image. Washington DC: Foundation for Cross Cultural Understanding. – 2009. ‘Somalia: A Nation’s Literary Death Tops Its Political Demise’. Available at www.wardheernews.com/Articles_09/ May/17_Literary_death_samatar.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012). – 1993. ‘The Politics of Poetry’, Africa Report 38(5): 16–17. Schiller, F. S. 1927. ‘William James and the Making of Pragmatism’, The Personalist 8(2): 81–93. Schudson, Michael. 1978. Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers. New York: Basic Books. Shalin, Dmitri N. 1986. ‘Pragmatism and Social Interactionism’, American Sociological Review 51(1): 9–29. – 1987. ‘The Pragmatic Origins of Social Interactionism’. Paper presented to the conference on Symbolic Interaction, Champaign, IL. Shoemaker, Pamela with Elizabeth Mayfield. 1987. ‘Building a Theory of News Content: A Synthesis of Current Approaches’, Journalism & Communication Monographs, No. 103. Siebert, Fred, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm. 1956. Four Theories of the Press. Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press. Somaliland Times. 2009 February 26. ‘Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy towards Somaliland & Somalia’. Available at http://somalilandtimes.net/ sl/2009/370/23.shtml (accessed 19 April 2012). Tareke, Gebru. 2000. ‘The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 33(3): 635–67. Tilley,Virginia. 1997. ‘The terms of the debate: Untangling Language and Ethnicity and Ethnic movements’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 20(3): 497–522. 168

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Touvall, Saadia. 1963. Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York: Free Press. Voice of America Radio. 2011, March 23. ‘Djibouti: Shirkii hayb sooca oo soo xirmay’, March 23, 2011. Available at www.voanews. com/somali/news/Djibouti-Shirkii-Hayb-Sooca-oo-sooXirmay118551164.html (accessed 10 April 2012). Watson, Paul. 1986. ‘Arms and Aggression in the Horn of Africa’, Journal of International Affairs 40(1) 159–76.

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Part Three Lessons from Selected African Integration Schemes

8 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis REDIE BEREKETEAB

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was established in 1986 comprising Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The circumstances giving rise to the formation of IGADD were the rampant drought and desertification that was ravaging the region (IGAD, 1996). Since the early 1970s the region has been experiencing pervasive and severe droughts such as those of 1974 and 1984. These droughts inevitably generated extreme environmental degradation, desertification, deforestation and famine, making livelihoods in the region extremely precarious. The famine of 1984/85 which was of a cataclysmic magnitude wrought an unimaginable destruction of life in the form of death of animals and humans, huge internal displacement of people (IDPs), migration of others to neighbouring countries and immense human suffering (Woodward, 2004: 472; El-Affendi, 2001). The cataclysmic famine visited the region again in the summer of 2011, afflicting Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The foundation of the regional organization was motivated by the idea of resolving common problems through collective efforts, and was launched at a summit in Djibouti in January 1986. Driven by the immense hardships, the states of the six countries with the help of the United Nations (UN) and international donor groups, initiated the creation of an institutionalized action to control desertification and minimize the effects of droughts on life and induce development. Indeed ‘the states of the region were urged to form an intergovernmental authority to co-ordinate the fight against drought and famine. Several resolutions to this effect were passed by the UN General Assembly, starting with Resolution 35/90 of December 1980’ (El-Affendi, 2001: 582). It could be said therefore that the initiative was taken by the United Nations (Ameyo, 2010). A number of donor agencies joined the initiative. The international donor group that formed the Friends of IGADD also put pressure on the regional organization to undertake peacemaking and related matters seriously (El-Affendi, 2001: 583). The Friends of IGADD later assumed a formal role and was renamed the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF). The IPF consisted of 20 members (El-Affendi, 2009: 8). However, it 173

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took five years of negotiations before the regional body could be set up. Subsequently IGAD also adopted the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) that came into force in 1996, and set up the Sub-regional Action Programme (SRAP) (IGAD, 1998). The six founding members of IGADD were joined by Eritrea following its formal independence in 1993. The Agreement they signed stated their intention ‘to coordinate and supplement the efforts of Member States to combat the effects of drought and other related natural disasters’ (Article 7(a)). The supra-national organization’s responsibility was declared to be complementary to national efforts and thus aid national states in their endeavours to achieve national programmes. Apparently, the first step in establishing the regional organization was taken by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 38/216 of 20 December 1983 (Ameyo, 2010: 5). The Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti in January 1986 and signed an agreement which formally launched IGADD. IGADD was mandated to deal with desertification and to address the impact of drought on food security and rural livelihood; the focus was then on environmental and agricultural issues (Ameyo, 2010, Healy, 2009). It could be said that IGADD went operational with limited objectives and a high dependence on donors that would have serious implications for its independence. In the first period of its existence (1986–96) IGADD’s mandate was limited to environmental and agricultural issues. IGADD’s chief concern was combating desertification and drought, and consequently ensuring food security and rural livelihood (Ameyo, 2010). The year 1991 constituted a watershed in the history of IGADD when regime change took place in both Ethiopia and Somalia, opening new opportunities to breathe new life into the activity of the regional organization. The emergent regimes of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) played crucial roles in revitalizing IGADD (El-Affendi, 2001:582; Mengisteab and Yohannes, 2005: 230; Woodward, 2004). Djibouti became the permanent Headquarters of the regional organization. Nevertheless, IGADD found itself, beyond fighting drought and desertification, involved in efforts to resolve regional socio-economic and political problems (IGAD, 1996). The expanded mandate of IGADD, in addition to combating drought and desertification, included economic cooperation and integration. Eventually IGADD also moved from environmental, agricultural and economic cooperation and integration to political, security and peace concerns. IGADD, therefore, pursued a gradual and progressive expansion and elaboration of its mandates and programmes. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened an extraordinary summit on 18 April 1995 in Addis Ababa and issued a declaration stating the intention to expand the mandate of IGADD and revitalize cooperation among member states (IGAD, 1996). In March the following year the Assembly of Heads of State and Government signed a Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Agreement ‘establishing the revitalized IGADD 174 with a new name, “The Intergovernmental Authority on Development”’

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

(IGAD). The revitalized IGAD comprised seven member states, the original six plus Eritrea which joined it pursuant to its formal independence in 1993 (IGAD, 1996). The Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened on 25 November 1996 in the Republic of Djibouti and announced the launching of IGAD that was to assume ‘expanded areas of regional cooperation and a new organisational structure’. Conflict prevention and resolution was declared to be the region’s priority (El-Affendi, 2001: 584). The vision and mission of IGAD was redefined accordingly: Article 13A, Areas of Cooperation, details the areas where member states agreed to develop and expand cooperation. However, the mandate was critiqued by some as too broad and unattainable (Ameyo, 2001: 27). The revitalized IGAD vision was articulated as ‘achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region’. Nonetheless the main focus at this point of time was on economic cooperation and integration, although here and there other aspects were mentioned. The IGAD mission was now defined as achieving chiefly three overarching objectives: •• •• ••

Food security and environmental protection Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs Economic cooperation and integration (IGAD, 2007a, 2010a).

The revitalized IGAD therefore began with an expanded mission and objectives, though the core focus continued to be on environment, agriculture and rural livelihood. Further, gradually, IGAD has expanded its mandates to include issues of security, peace, conflicts, terrorism, maritime and piracy. Nevertheless the challenges IGAD faced in implementing the revitalized objectives were enormous. The demand for crucially needed resources, material and human, which were not readily available, and also the lack of clarity and precision in formulating, as well as the lack of implementing, controlling and monitoring mechanisms, rendered the tasks of IGAD extremely difficult. It is clear that environmental protection and rehabilitation, agricultural and economic development and cooperation, and regional integration which were pronounced to be objectives of the regional organization needed certain conditions to be fulfilled for their materialization. Of such requisite conditions are peace and security. Where there are running or potential conflicts, for instance, socio-economic development and regional integration would not be easy to achieve. That is why, in spite of IGAD being resolved to ‘promote free movement of goods, services, and people and establishment of residence’ (IGAD, 1996: 8), sixteen years later it still has not been able to achieve them. This is rather exacerbated by the confinement of the public sphere to political leaders. The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict is a good example of how running conflicts create obstacles in preserving and sustaining regional organization, but also shows how IGAD suffers from structural and embedded inherent challenges. As a manifestation of this Eritrea, charging that IGAD has become a rubberstamp of Ethiopia, suspended its 175

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membership in April 2007; IGAD membership has thus returned to the six original ones. Arguably, it could be said that the festering conflicts sabotage the development objectives of IGAD. This chapter provides a critical analysis of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It describes and analyzes the process of formation and the factors that underpinned the foundation of the regional organization. It also examines the challenges, potentials and possibilities IGAD faces. Overall, the chapter aims to provide a critical analysis where weaker and stronger sides of IGAD are highlighted in order to suggest how to enhance and vitalize it and make it structurally and functionally relevant to the rampant problems, aspirations and challenges of the people of the region. Consequently, it analyses the way forward of how to enhance and facilitate regional integration.

IGAD: STRUCTURES AND DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS Certainly the structures of IGAD impinge on its decision-making mechanisms. The decision-making mechanisms also impinge on the structures. This is to say structures and decision-making mechanisms are interlinked which in turn influences the behaviours, practices and functions of IGAD. The organs of IGAD that constitute its body and that are involved in decision making and implementations are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Assembly of Heads of State and Government Council of Ministers Committee of Ambassadors The IGAD Secretariat.

The Supreme organ of IGAD is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It consists of presidents and prime ministers of member states. Among its tasks are to make policy, direct and control the functions of the regional organization, set guidelines and programmes of cooperation; monitor political issues related to conflict prevention, management and resolution; and appoint the Executive Secretary (IGAD, 1996, Article 9). Decisions of Heads of State and Government are to be reached by consensus. If consensus is not reached, however, a ballot is to determine. The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other designated Minister from every member state. The Council is entrusted with a number of functions, the key ones of which include: to make recommendations to the Assembly on matters of policy; to approve the budget of IGAD and supervise the work of the Secretariat; to prepare agendas for the Assembly, monitor implementation of the Authority’s objectives, promote peace and security in the sub-region and make recommendations to the Assembly; to monitor and enhance humanitarian activities; and to follow up political and security affairs which include 176 conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post-conflict

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

peace building (IGAD, 1996: Article 10). The Council strives to reach decisions through consensus; if this fails a simple majority is required (El-Affendi, 2009: 8). The principle of consensus in reaching decisions of course has its drawbacks: it confers excessive powers on the leaders of member states, connoting the supremacy of individual states when withholding consent. It may also lead to informal dealings concerning controversial issues thereby putting unnecessary stress on the regional organization. Above all, however, reaching consensus, in an environment characterized by personal conflicts and rivalries of leaders, would pose formidable challenges. The third organ of IGAD is the Committee of Ambassadors. This body consists of ‘Member States’ Ambassadors or plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of the Headquarters of the Organization’. The two major functions of the Committee of Ambassadors are stated to be to advise the Executive Secretary to carry out his work approved by the Council of Ministers, and to guide the Executive Secretary on interpretation of policies and guidelines (IGAD, 1996: Article 11). The fourth organ, the Secretariat, in principle is supposed to function as the executive body of IGAD. Yet, due to the strong involvement of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, its role has been considerably reduced to technical administrative tasks (Ameyo, 2010: 19). The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Secretariat is the most important organ in terms of implementation. All decisions, policies and protocols are implemented by the Secretariat. Some of the responsibilities of the Secretariat include: implementing decisions of the Assembly and Council; preparing draft proposals and agreements that derive from decisions and recommendations of the Assembly and the Council; initiating, identifying and coordinating development programmes; preparing meetings of the Assembly, Council and other policy organs; preparing surveys, studies, information and guidelines on legal, political, economic, social, cultural and technical matters that are of interest for Member States (IGAD, 1996: Article 12). Yet, as mentioned earlier, due to responsibilities of decision-making, drawing guidelines and initiating programmes allocated to the Assembly, the importance of the Secretariat is relegated to secondary and technical matters. Article 13 of the statute of IGAD deals with the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary acts as the chief executive officer of the Secretariat and deals with all practical aspects of the Authority (IGAD, 1996: 12–13). The incumbent represents IGAD in official capacities. At the Eighth IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government, in 2000, a decision was taken to establish an IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union. The first meeting of the Speakers of Parliament and their representatives took places on 20 February 2004, in Addis Ababa. The speakers of parliaments signed a protocol establishing an IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The seat of the IGAD-IPU was set in Addis Ababa (IGAD 2007a: 50). This measure was an attempt to institute a regional legislative body. If properly 177

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institutionalized and popularly elected, it would move IGAD from an executive-centred organization to a more balanced or legislative-tilted one. The latter would make IGAD popularly based and a genuinely representative organization. This in turn would have the effect of empowering citizens. Nonetheless, when it comes to the decision-making mechanism, the hierarchical discretion where power is concentrated in the Heads of State and Government renders IGAD less amenable to popular scrutiny and therefore more rigid and less participatory. In principle, decision-making mechanisms could be referred to two diverging instrumentalities. The first would be the existence of an elected body that is accountable to its constituency. This of course would not only be an ideal democratic setting but also would require a radically different structure, arrangement and disposition for IGAD. The second relates to a non-elected body such as heads of state and government of IGAD member-countries or appointed technocrats who are accountable to those who pay their salaries. This is the current structure of IGAD in which the Assembly and the Council are the two important bodies when it comes to decision-making. While the Secretariat assumes the role of implementing and functions as the executive branch, the Assembly and the Council appear to function as a legislative body. Yet, as indicated above, the Secretariat carries out technical administrative functions. One of the profound challenges of IGAD relates to issues of implementation (Ameyo, 2010; Healy, 2009; El-Affendi, 2009). Unless there is monitoring of implementation by member states of regional decisions, endorsing a host of regional projects would not have any consequences. How this structure determines the transparency and accountability of IGAD as a regional organization is also a critical question that needs a thorough examination. Apparently, according to its structures, IGAD’s accountability is to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as to its funders. As testimony of its accountability to its donors, IGAD was subjected to their pressure on various occasions to deliver (El-Affendi, 2001; Healy, 2009; Ameyo, 2010). Lack of popular accountability is the major deficit of IGAD’s structure and decision-making mechanisms. Popular accountability could confer more legitimacy on IGAD and thereby enhance its relevance to the region. But also popular ownership would furnish a solid ground to regional organization. This popular ownership of IGAD could be secured through bringing into the political game popular societal forces which today are marked by their absolute absence. Popular forces that are to be found spread across the societal spectrum could be represented by various civil society groups, both traditional and modern: NGOs, GOs and CBOs would give IGAD popular basis. The current top-down process of regional integration needs to be supplemented by a bottom-up process if regional integration is to be meaningful, sustainable and democratic. The elitist nature of the project of regional integration may not serve in addressing the festering conflicts and other related problems from which the region is suffering since it 178 marginalizes many stakeholders.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

From the above accounts, the structures and decision-making mechanisms of IGAD display inherent systemic shortcomings. As indicated above, in addition to problems of translating structures, programmes, principles, hierarchies and policies into operational activities, there are no inbuilt safety mechanisms for converting inputs into outputs. For instance, what happens when there emerge differences between Heads of State and Government? Are there legal instruments and mechanisms for the settlement of disputes among member states? This question was clearly manifested in the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea regarding Somalia. Eritrea suspended its membership in 2008 stating that IGAD had become a tool for Ethiopia to dictate its own national and regional interests. Therefore the well-intended structures and decision-making mechanisms are not always translated into actions and implementations partly because of the absence of inbuilt mechanisms.

IGAD: PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA In its broader sense the Peace and Security programme consists of three sub-programmes. These are (i) the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR), (ii) Human Affairs, and (iii) Political Affairs. The IGAD peace and security sub-programme deals with one of the crucial dimensions that have increasingly come to define the region, notably conflict. It is concerned with conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution (IGAD 2007b: 45). Indeed, IGAD’s principles declare its intentions in ‘The peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-State conflicts through dialogue’ and the ‘Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security’ (IGAD, 1996: 7). In spite of rampant civil or intra-state and interstate wars ravaging the IGAD region, however, IGAD so far has shied away from developing protocols and programmes of actions to enable it to prevent, manage and resolve the chronic conflicts (Apuuli, 2004). The IGAD member states endorsed an amended Charter in 1996 that invested a mandate on the IGAD Secretariat to deal with peace and security matters (IGAD, 2007b: 2). The revitalized IGAD took on the task of peace-making in the Sudan and Somalia. To deal with conflicts IGAD established the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2000, run by the secretariat. CEWARN was mandated to collect information concerning the emergence and intensification of potentially violent conflicts in the IGAD countries. CEWARN went operational in 2002 and is believed to have harvested success in ‘softtarget’ conflicts particularly in prevention and mitigation of cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts (Apuuli, 2004). When it comes to ‘hard targets’, however, its success rate is believed to be limited. Such hard targets included the ‘no war no peace’ state of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the conflict that broke out between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2008. In both cases IGAD was proven to be incapable of doing anything. This is due to the fact that CEWARN’s mandate is narrowly defined as 179

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dealing with ‘livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, smuggling and illegal trade, nomadic movements, refugees, landmines and banditry’ (Apuuli, 2004: 179). The festering intra-state and inter-state conflicts are not priority areas for CEWARN. Therefore in spite of its ambitious CEWARN programme IGAD has had only modest achievement at micro-levels, such as tracking pastoral conflicts in the Karamoja and Somali Clusters (IGAD, 2007b:4). At the macro-level, such as dealing with the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, DjiboutiEritrea conflict, conflicts in Darfur, northern Uganda and eastern Ethiopia it has not been successful (Woodward, 2010; Healy, 2009; Apuuli, 2004). Some main objectives of the CEWARN programme are stated as: •• •• ••

enabling member states to prevent cross-border pastoral conflicts from developing into armed violent conflicts on a greater scale; enabling local communities to play an important part in preventing violent conflicts; enabling the IGAD Secretariat to pursue conflict-prevention initiatives and providing technical and financial support (IGAD 2007a: 45).

The reason why CEWARN, despite its declared objectives, has not been able to help prevent major conflicts that are ravaging the region from breaking out is that what is meant by ‘conflict’ is not intra-state and interstate conflict. As part of its CEWARN strategy IGAD also became involved in the creation of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) which is part of the African Standby Force (ASF) (IGAD 2007a: 49). The EASBRIG includes IGAD member states plus Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Burundi and Rwanda. Another development that has to do with IGAD security architecture is the presence of the only USAFRICOM (United States Africa Command) base in the continent based in IGAD’s headquarters in Djibouti. The predecessor of USAFRICOM, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), established in 2002, had as its original mission to hunt terrorist cells in East Africa (Melson, 2011). In 2006 it was transformed to a Navy-led force, with the declared aim of working for regional stability, capacity building and humanitarian missions. CJTF-HOA was converted to USAFRICOM in 2008 (Melson, 2011). It is not, however, clear whether USAFRICOM will be able to enhance IGAD’s security agenda; it may rather increase the sense of insecurity of the region in the long term. What is most obvious is that the involvement of USAFRICOM in the security architecture of the IGAD region demonstrates the lack of sovereignty of IGAD while also complicating inter-state relations in the region. What is the contribution of USAFRICOM to the peace and security of the IGAD region? USAFRICOM is believed to have been involved in the bombing on 7 January 2007 in Somalia that killed an unknown number 180 of Somalis. Military bases in eastern Ethiopia and Manda Bay in Kenya

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

were used for such operations (Keenan, 2010: 33). Furthermore the US proxy war in Somalia where Ethiopia and Uganda are deeply involved, has resulted in disastrous effects in terms of human costs, radicalization of Islamists and supporting undemocratic governments (Keenan, 2010: 35). The latest Kenyan invasion of Somalia (October 2011) is also widely believed to have the support of USAFRICOM. All this has an adverse effect on peace and security whereby it has increased tensions and insecurity in the IGAD region. There are those who argue that the USAFRICOM mission is less concerned with peace and security in the region than protecting US oil interests and imposing US global hegemony (Keenan, 2010: 37). This argument would gain validity when we take into consideration the fact that, in the name of combating piracy, virtually the whole world’s naval forces have converged in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with all the signs reminiscent of the Cold War era where East-West competition as well as East-East (China-India) is played out. This self-serving involvement certainly would heighten the security temperature in the region (Verhoeven, 2009) through, among other things, creating division among the states in the region.

IGAD AND PEACE PROCESSES The three main challenges facing IGAD in the area of peace and security were Sudan, Somalia and lately the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflicts. A summit in Djibouti in November 1996 declared the new priority of IGAD as conflict prevention and resolution. Simultaneously the status of the Friends of IGADD group was converted into a formal role and renamed the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF). In 1998 the IPF’s twenty-country membership consisted of major industrialized countries plus the EU and a number of UN agencies (El-Affendi, 2001: 584). It would appear, therefore, that effective regional co-operation in the realm of conflict resolution and prevention could succeed only if the relevant principles were implemented region-wide and not selectively. In this regard, the relative success of the Arian peace plan for Central America could be contrasted with the failure of the IGAD process precisely because the former incorporated a region-wide commitment to democracy and transparent co-operation … while the IGAD scheme was selective and in fact motivated in part by resistance to democracy (El-Affendi, 2001: 597).

Furnished with new ideas and commitments, and encouraged by its partners IGAD set out to put into action its strategy of conflict prevention and resolution. The revitalized IGAD’s first task therefore was trying to resolve the Sudanese conflict (Cliffe, 1999: 96).

Sudan

Before IGAD took over, several mediation attempts to resolve Sudan’s civil war had taken place. A formal peace initiative was endorsed at the Fourth 181

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IGAD summit in September 1993, held in Ethiopia. A Peace Committee consisting of the heads of state of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Eritrea were tasked with overseeing the process. The Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi became the chair; the actual mediation, however, was carried out by a Standing Committee comprising foreign ministers of the four countries (El-Affendi, 2001: 585). Serious talks, however, began with the IGAD Declaration of January 1994 following an agreement on an agenda (El-Affendi, 2001: 585; Ahmed, 2010: 7; Woodward, 2004: 472). In the Declaration of Principles (DoP) IGAD proposed that the South hold a referendum to determine its future which included a separation option (Woodward, 2004: 472). According to Peter Woodward, such a proposal could only have come from IGAD, since the OAU had been against separation. IGAD was able to play the positive role it did due to two factors. The first is the unflinching commitment of the USA to stand behind the negotiation process. The second is the good will shown by both the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Without the mutual agreement between the NCP government and SPLM/A to cooperate with IGAD both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and also the possibility of secession of the South would have not been possible. A unilateral SPLM declaration of secession would have encountered abundant legal hurdles. Formally, a Kenyan mediator representing IGAD led the peace process with the informal support of the troika of USA, UK and Norway (Woodward, 2004: 47). IGAD’s efforts only bore fruit following the attack on the USA of September 11, 2001, after which the George W. Bush administration developed a special interest in South Sudan. Accordingly, IGAD was joined by the USA, UK and Norway, known as the troika (Woodward, 2004: 475). Kenya set up a permanent office to facilitate mediation on behalf of IGAD. The Machakos Protocol, signed on 20 July 2002 (Woodward, 2004: 475) led, three years later, to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Nevertheless, it is to be noted that IGAD member states were highly divided when it came to the future of South Sudan. Whereas Kenya and Uganda preferred independence, Ethiopia and Eritrea were of the opinion that independence would be a disaster (El-Affendi, 2001: 595). Three factors could be mentioned as contributing to the success of the engagement of IGAD in the Sudan. These are: (i) the willingness of the two parties to the conflict, (ii) the commitment and determination of the international community, particularly the USA, in putting pressure on the parties, and (iii) the unity of purpose of the IGAD member states. The most outstanding factor that contributed to the success of the peace process between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A, leading to the signing of the CPA in 2005 under the auspices of IGAD, was the political will shown by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A, particularly the former. It could be also assumed that the New Sudan vision of John Garang induced the NCP to sign a peace agreement entailing 182 self-determination and including the possibility of secession (Deng, 2010).

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

Without the good will of the parties IGAD would not have been able to achieve anything. It is also widely recognized that the commitment and devotion of the international community, particularly the USA, was decisive in concluding the CPA. Indeed, according to Michael Gerson, ‘the Bush administration brokered the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)’ (Gerson, 2010). There is a widespread perception that ‘the whole process was one imposed on the Sudan by the international community, and specially the USA’ (Woodward, 2004: 477). This feeling is common among northern Sudanese where they claim that IGAD was simply used as a tool to fulfil the concern of the international community, particularly that of USA – the separation of the South (Ahmed, 2010). Therefore the issue of ownership of the peace process has certainly adversely affected the role of IGAD in the Sudan peace process. Echoing the common perception that IGAD played merely a formal role, El-Affendi notes, ‘While IGADD [sic] managed to formally broker a Sudanese peace deal in 2004–5, the more decisive role was that of the external actors, mainly the US, UK, Italy and Norway’ (El-Affendi, 2009: 10). The involvement of IGAD in the Darfur conflict has been nonexistent. IGAD’s reputation will probably be remembered for the constant shift of alliance of its member states rather than conflict prevention and resolution (El-Affendi, 2009; Healy, 2009).

Somalia

The Somali peace process was driven by IGAD. In 2000, Djibouti hosted a conference on behalf of IGAD that lasted four months. Known as the Arta Conference it produced the Transitional National Government (TNG), Transitional National Charter (TNC) and Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The Arta conference excluded many of the notorious warlords supported by Ethiopia and the USA (Verhoeven, 2009). The exclusion of the warlords proved to be lethal because it angered their strong ally, Ethiopia. Ethiopia hosted another conference on Somalia, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) which was headed by Abdulahi Yusuf (Muller, 2008; Healy, 2009; Elmi, 2010). The SRRC effectively undermined the TNG. The Ethiopian action created friction between Ethiopia and Djibouti. When it became clear that the TNG had failed, Ethiopia and Kenya persuaded IGAD to sponsor another peace conference. Led by Kenya, this next initiative began at Eldoret (in Kenya) in 2002, with the negotiations later moving to Nairobi. This peace process took two years to produce the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was headed by Abdulahi Yusuf from 2004 (Elmi, 2010) and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) (Woodward, 2004: 476). Yet the TFG government was not able to relocate itself to the capital of the country – Mogadishu. The TFG President Abdulahi Yusuf, unable to assert its authority, asked IGAD to authorize peacekeeping forces. IGAD agreed to establish an IGAD Peace Support Mission in January 2005. The Peace Support Mission was not realized; instead Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006, vanquishing the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and 183

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perpetuating another round of violence (Verhoeven, 2009). This Ethiopian intervention was a unilateral initiative supported by the USA, although it was later given IGAD/African Union backing (El-Affendi, 2009: 10). The endorsement of the Ethiopian invasion by IGAD generated outrage in many Somalis. It also created serious division among IGAD’s member states. President Abdulahi Yusuf also failed to bring reconciliation, peace and stability to the beleaguered nation and therefore had to go. He was replaced by the leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, in 2009 through what is known as the Djibouti Peace Process, another IGAD-sponsored round of negotiation. The tenure of the Western-supported TFG was to expire in August 2011. In contravention of its constitution, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), however, arbitrarily resolved to extend its tenure by another three years. The challenges of establishing a functioning state in Somalia, however, remain unanswered. The intention of Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in December 2006 was to get rid of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which it perceived as a threat to its security because of the ICU’s radical Islamic views. The routing of ICU, however, brought a more radical and extremist group known as Al Shebab (‘youth’ in Arabic). Al Shebab forced Ethiopia to withdraw from Somalia. When the Ethiopian occupation of Mogadishu was terminated in 2009 it was replaced by the African peace mission known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Mission initially consisted of Ugandan forces, but was later joined by Burundians. In its Fifteenth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 5 July 2010, IGAD passed resolutions in which it decided to raise the size of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2,000 to 8,100 peacekeepers and transform AMISOM into a UN peace mission, and reiterated that the Djibouti process is the sole peace process in Somalia. The IGAD Council of Ministers, in its Thirty-seventh Extra-Ordinary Session held on 22 September 2010, further defined the conflict in Somalia as between international terrorists and the Somali people, rather than a Somali-only conflict. The Extra-Ordinary Session also discussed its earlier idea to raise the number of troops in AMISOM to 20,000 and to change the nature of the AMISOM mission from defensive to offensive, so that a neighbouring state could send troops. Al Shebab was fighting against the AMISOM forces, causing huge casualties among the Ugandan forces. Instead of compelling their withdrawal, however, these casualties made Uganda more determined than ever to combat Al Shebab. Indeed, President Yoweri Museveni was known on a number of occasions to have expressed his readiness to dispatch 20,000 Ugandan soldiers to Somalia to vanquish Al Shebab, provided the international community would deliver the logistical requirements. The request by Museveni for the international community to bear the logistical burden epitomizes IGAD’s dependence on external support and the regional organization’s incapacity to deal on its 184 own with the complex problems ravaging the region.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

The redefinition of the Somali conflict as between international terrorists and the Somali people means there will not be any provision for negotiation between the insurgents and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Further, it also means the militarization of any solution of the Somali problem. The question is why there is an insistence on the part of the neighbouring countries, or rather IGAD, on a military solution. Moreover, would 20,000 AMISOM peacekeepers be able to pacify Somalia where approximately 50,000 Ethiopian forces failed to do so. If the experience of the last 20 years would provide a lesson it could be said that the militarization of the solution would not be in the interest of the Somali people, neither would it be in the interest of the region. Critics contend that the driving force behind militarization of the solution is the global strategic interest of the war on terror and piracy off the coasts of Somalia (Verhoeven, 2009). As a consequence of this the struggle for human rights and democratization in the region will suffer. As long as leaders of the countries are serving global strategic interests they will not be subjected to critical scrutiny: there is a trade-off here (El-Affendi 2009, Keenan 2010).

Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict

The most glaring failure of IGAD regarding peace and security concerns the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict (Healy, 2009: 12). In spite of the fact that Article 18A on Conflict Resolution states that Member States shall ‘accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations’ (IGAD, 2006: 16), IGAD has not been able to do anything. IGAD has not even been able to seriously, objectively and neutrally discuss the issue in spite of the fact that the conflict has been described as the epicentre of most of the conflicts in the region (ICG, 2007, 2008, 2010; Healy, 2009). Strangely, the IGAD conflict resolution mechanism was not even invoked (El-Affendi, 2009: 10). This is because IGAD lacks mechanisms that deal with either intra-state or inter-state conflict in its CEWARN protocol (Apuuli, 2004: 183). Moreover, the most conspicuous factor of this negligence can be found in the fact that Ethiopia occupies a dominant position in the regional organization. Therefore any discussion, let alone, decision that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained within IGAD. IGAD was caught between enforcing an International Court of Arbitration resolution and appeasing its dominant member state. In the way ‘Ethiopia cleverly manipulated US fears about terrorism in the Horn’ (Verhoeven, 2009: 420) and enabled it to elicit support to invade Somalia in 2006, Ethiopia persuaded IGAD to initiate a UN sanctions process against Eritrea. The initiative taken by IGAD to impose sanctions on Eritrea was for its alleged supply of arms to Al Shebab and its border dispute with Djibouti. This seriously taints the credibility and integrity of IGAD, since it has been deadly silent regarding the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the border dispute between Eritrea and 185

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Ethiopia which has been stalled for the last eight years due to Ethiopia’s rejection (ICG, 2010) while it invoked a border dispute with Djibouti to punish Eritrea. Eritrea suspended its membership in IGAD in April 2007 stating that IGAD had become a tool of Ethiopia (Woodward, 2010). Eritrea and Ethiopia were engaged in a proxy war in Somalia. IGAD’s backing gave legitimacy to Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia, while IGAD’s condemnation of Eritrea’s support to insurgent groups led to UN sanctions. This manipulation of IGAD would certainly become a source of tension and division among the member states. .  .  .  the peacemaking mandate of IGAD, instead of achieving its stated objective of enhancing stability, became a vehicle of destabilization for the whole region, as leaders exploited the mandate as a pretext to destabilize neighbours, and used the support it generated to repress domestic opponents or to wage wars against other neighbours (El-Affendi, 2001:598).

Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 which was legitimized by IGAD was a clear indication of how IGAD could be utilized to serve narrow interests.

IGAD, TERRORISM AND PIRACY Since 1990 the concern with terrorism has successively grown in the IGAD region. With the hosting of Osama bin Laden by the Islamic government in Khartoum and the emergence of the radical Islamic movement of Al Ithihad in Ethiopia (Woodward, 2004: 472; Muller, 2008: 110), the issue of terror has constituted a serious concern for IGAD. The bombing of the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 further sharpened the worry over terrorism in the IGAD region (Woodward, 2004: 473; Piombo, 2007). The statelessness and lawlessness of Somalia raised the fear that the country would be a breeding ground for terrorism (Piombo, 2007; Verhoeven, 2009). Pursuant to the September 11 2001 attack on the USA, the IGAD region became a theatre of the Global War on Terror (Woodward, 2004: 473). The US war on terror in Somalia underwent a sharp escalation in early 2006 with the formation of a loosely tied group of warlords, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). The CIA hastily brought together the warlords in order to curb the advance of the Islamists who they thought were increasingly coming under the influence of international terrorism (Muller, 2008: 111–13; Samatar, 2008: 180; Verhoeven, 2009: 411). The ARPCT were routed by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in June 2006 (Menkhaus, 2007: 369). The control of Mogadishu by the ICU spurred Ethiopia, with the backing of the US, to invade Somalia. The ICU were defeated in December 2006, but ironically, the occupation of Somalia driven by the war on terror only brought into play Al Shebab, a highly radicalized group, susceptible to international terrorism, so terrorism seemed to have been enhanced (Menkhaus, 2008: 186 7; Keenan, 2010: 35). With the ascendance of Al Shebab, the alleged

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

flow of international terrorists rather became a reality, thereby plunging Somalia into further carnage and turmoil. IGAD responded to the terror threat through the establishment of the IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) in 2006, located in Addis Ababa. ICPAT was to be phased out in December 2010 and replaced by the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP). The focus of ISSP was to be on ‘terrorism, maritime security, illicit arms control, money laundering, human trafficking and other cross-border organized crimes’ (Okubo, 2010: 12). This programme was considered as part of the broader security strategy of CEWARN. ICPAT’s focus includes establishing a regional approach to counter terrorism with a broader international strategy; acting against financing of terrorism; developing operational capacity to counter illegal cross border movements; expanding the capacity to record and share information; ensuring that human rights are protected in counterterrorism operations and promoting educational programs to enhance public support (IGAD, 2008: 3).

In 2003 a new phenomenon emerged off the Somali coast and Gulf of Aden, in which ships and fishing boats were attacked (Sörenson, 2008). In the following years piracy in the region steadily gained intensity. The threat of piracy to international trade in the Red Sea, through which annually 16,000 vessels pass, was considered very serious (Sörenson, 2008: 8). On January 30, 2009 a code of conduct was signed in Djibouti to enhance the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This cooperation agreement was signed by eight coastal countries including Ethiopia and the agreement covered the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean (AFP, 2009). The problem of piracy constitutes a very serious obstacle to international trade. In 2008 only 140 foreign vessels were reported to have been attacked by Somali pirates (AFP, 2009). This threat spurred practically the whole world1 to dispatch warships to the region. Yet this has not scared the pirates; indeed their activity has intensified both in terms of frequency and geographical area. The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) established a base in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and served as the focal point for the Unites States Department of Defense efforts in the region (Piombo, 2007). The CJTF-HOA at Camp Lemonnier was joined by the Japanese SelfDefense Force (Melson, 2011) to emphasize the global threat of piracy and terrorism. The EU also established Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta and dispatched it to the region to combat piracy (Sörenson, 2008: 16). It will be of interest to very briefly state the reasons that gave rise to the emergence of piracy off the shores of Somalia. Three factors are frequently cited as the underlying reasons for this, namely, illegal fishing by international companies in the Somali waters – fishing vessels from Spain, Denmark, South Korea, etc. have been illegally fishing for years (Sörenson, 2008: 15); dumping toxic wastes along the Somali coast; and  France, USA, UK, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Russia, China, Japan, India, Malaysia all have naval presence in the region as of early 2012. 1

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collapse of the Somali state. The last is also widely believed to have given rise to the first two factors. In defence of their actions the pirates have given themselves such names as ‘Somali Marines’ (Sörenson, 2008: 28) or ‘Somali Coastguards’ to indicate that they are tasked with protecting legitimate Somali interests. In the context of its security architecture a crucial question would be how could IGAD convert the massive naval force present in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to the benefit of security, peace and stability in the region? So far individual states have been trying to exploit the situation for their own selfish benefit, which rather has increased the degree of insecurity in the region. Further, the recent high concentration of the world naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean has nothing to do with terrorism and piracy but with domination and resource control, according to some observers. Some have even described it as the second scramble for African resources.

RELEVANCE OF IGAD In spite of fundamental flaws IGAD could be a useful tool in alleviating the multifaceted problems ravaging the region. For too long the region has been suffering of all sorts of problems that demand an integrated and collective response. The complex problems that have the hallmark of the region could only be faced through concerted efforts at regional integration. There are a number of factors that speak for the relevance of IGAD. One of these factors pertains to the requirement of the creation of the regional economic communities (REC) that has become a characteristic feature of the continent. Regionalism and regional organizations as a modus operandi for managing security and dealing with conflicts, political and economic cooperation and integration, have become popular worldwide (El-Affendi, 2009). Further, the UN vision of economic development presupposes invoking regional collective efforts and aggregations. In this sense IGAD could fulfil one of the provisions of the UN vision of regional development. Indisputably, IGAD could fulfil crucial functions and important goals. Nevertheless there are crucial structural deficiencies that define the regional organization that it needs to tackle if it is going to play the roles expected of it. Here are some of the chief causes of the weakness of IGAD: •• •• •• •• ••

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Rampant conflicts and political instability History of proxy wars Lack of involvement of all stakeholders Overlap of membership External interventions.

Each of these variables has an impact on the relations between individual member states as well as the integration and cohesion of IGAD as a

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

regional organization. So far IGAD only represents the sum total of its member states. Indeed, it is widely seen as a club of privileged members. The privileged members are the heads of state and government. This type of privileged membership renders IGAD highly dependent on the good personal relationships of its members and leaders and may constrain its ability to engage in serious conflict resolution, so as to bring peace, security, stability and socio-economic development in the region. If, for any reason, heads of state or government deem it expedient to ignore IGAD’s collective efforts to resolve inter-state conflicts, the effort fails. Various occasions have confirmed this constraint. The structures and decision-making mechanisms that allow privilege to heads of states and governments render IGAD extremely volatile. This is because the personal relations of leaders greatly affect the wellbeing of the regional organization. The real source of all this is the fact that IGAD is only the sum total of its member states. This in turn necessitates that national interests guide IGAD’s strategies and functions. So one of the major challenges IGAD faces is to transform itself from the sum total of its members to be metamorphosed and integrated into a regional organization that goes beyond this. As with any political organization, the functions of a regional organization such as IGAD could go either way. It could serve as a legitimization for intervention. In this sense it could be used as a Trojan horse for narrow political purposes. It could also become a genuine regional organization which provides ample space for its citizens in the process of designing, decision-making and the implementing of solutions to issues that are of interest to the people of the region. In fulfilling these functions and tasks IGAD would be owned by its people. Things that would illustrate these different functions of IGAD include Djibouti’s use of IGAD in providing the legitimacy of its bringing together the various factions of Somalia (Adelman, 2002: 116), leading to the emergence of the transitional national government (Samatar and Samatar, 2002). IGAD also served as a Trojan horse on at least three occasions. The first is in the case of Sudan where the regional organization was used as a front for the USA and EU, particularly the former, that seemed to be mainly interested in seeing the South secede. The second case is how IGAD served as initiator of the sanctions on Eritrea by the UN Security Council. A third case is Ethiopia’s invocation of IGAD’s decision in its ill-advised invasion of Somalia in December 2006 in support of the western-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Somalis have always been critical of IGAD’s role towards their country – ‘IGAD’s legacy will be a dark one – too fraudulent and inept to have a meaningful role in regional affairs’ (Samatar and Samatar, 2005: 8). Many Somalis are also highly critical of IGAD’s role because they see it as a front for their archenemy Ethiopia. The role of IGAD in the conflict-stricken countries of Somalia and Sudan, in both of which it has been involved, has been different. While, overall, IGAD’s involvement in Sudan has had a positive outcome, its involvement in Somalia has been less positive. This has of course to do, 189

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as it was earlier indicated, with the international community’s committed involvement. The treatment of leaders of IGAD states by the international community has been ambivalent in that, while friendly leaders are leniently criticized, those considered unfriendly are harshly criticized on their human rights records. In a policy that perhaps reminds us of the Cold War era, leaders who are willing to implement the global war on terror are excused or tolerated although their domestic policies on human rights and democratization demonstrate considerable deficiency from the international standard. Yet the most serious problem is that ‘IGAD has been seen as heavily dependent on the international community not only for its establishment and operating costs, but also as a reflection of the post-Cold War era’ (Woodward, 2010: 17). This seriously undermines its credibility in the eyes of its member states’ citizens. There are those who doubt IGAD’s regional nature. These critics see IGAD as comprising Ethiopia and its neighbours plus Uganda; ‘Uganda prefers to look south, Sudan to look north and Ethiopia has always been preoccupied with its own uniqueness’ (El-Affendi, 2001: 597). Nonetheless, despite all this legitimate scepticism, ‘Cooperation in key areas such as the environment and food security is being strengthened in spite of rising regional tensions, and IGAD summits and ministerial meetings are held on schedule’ (El-Affendi, 2001: 597). IGAD has formulated wide-ranging and ambitious social, economic, environmental, political, security and integration programmes; however: ‘Conflict in the IGAD region will continue to hinder any meaningful integration and development by curtailing economic activity, destroying infrastructure and remains a barrier to the flow of trade and investment’ (Ameyo, 2010: 15). IGAD therefore needs to be reformed and restructured, and its mission and mandate formulated not only in a concrete and practicable way but also with the aim of serving primarily its own peoples, in order to be a relevant regional organization.

CONCLUSION IGAD has the potential to become a potent and genuine regional organization whereby it could address the multifaceted needs and aspirations of the peoples of the region. To achieve this, a number of conditions need to be fulfilled. These conditions are both structural and systemic, in terms of IGAD’s structures and decision-making mechanisms, but also they pertain to practical political, security, economic and social dimensions. A regional organization invested with such important social responsibility needs to address the crucial issue of regional integration. Regional integration in this sense would mean fulfilling two necessary and alternating conditions. The first would be the establishment of absolute equality among member states and societies, thus giving it popular foundation. 190 The second, perhaps as a transitory phase, would be the emergence of a

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A Critical Analysis

benevolent hegemonic power that would transcend narrow national interests and possess the capacity as well as the moral authority to enforce regional integration in the interest of all the peoples of the region. So far none of these conditions exist in the IGAD region. As Lionel Cliffe notes, although Ethiopia could fulfil the demographic and military dominance of a hegemon, its involvement in conflict with its major neighbours – Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea – has undermined its capacity to play that role (Cliffe, 1999: 106). Advertently or inadvertently, Ethiopia is sabotaging its capacity for hegemonic stature by its aggressive inclinations toward its neighbours, particularly Somalia and Eritrea. Ethiopia is seen by many as representing global strategic interests rather than regional interests. The aggressiveness and complacency of successive Ethiopian leaders in relation to global strategic interests, particularly US geo-strategic interests, hinders the emergence of a hegemon in the region. Coercive means of seeking hegemony betrays the very essence of moral authority of hegemony. Some of the chief challenges IGAD encounters are realizing its declared objectives and programmes, particularly in the areas of conflict resolution, peace, stability and regional integration. In this sense IGAD suffers from a capacity deficiency with regard to enforcement and implementation. The obvious constriction IGAD encounters is developing mechanisms and institutions that enable the mobilization and participation of grassroots communities. This would mean moving the theatre of action from an exclusive space for the privileged club members to the larger public. This would shift IGAD from being a tool of implementation of the specific interests of certain dominant member states to a popularly-based genuine regional organization. Popular participation and interests would give priority to the region instead of to global strategic, economic and security interests. This would also redefine the ownership of IGAD, an IGAD that primarily depends on its own resources and empowers its own peoples. In terms of human capacity in running the regional organization, IGAD has been lacking the resources to be able to effectively run its activities. It has also displayed an inability to provide its personnel with the necessary privileges and immunities to facilitate its activities. There exists a high concentration of power on heads of state and government that renders the Secretariat impotent and powerless. Developing a culture where states exercise peaceful resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts is a strategy that IGAD needs to take seriously. To do this, regional and holistic approaches and involvement of all stakeholders are required, which requirement is currently featured by its notable absence. Another problem is an overlap of membership where loyalty and priorities are shared and divided. This may have the effect of undermining the cohesion and integration of the region. The rampant conflicts and chronic political instability ravaging the region are the chief causes that hinder IGAD from implementing its declared objectives, primarily that of socio-economic development. It is 191

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a proven fact that without peace, security and stability there cannot be sustained socio-economic development. Therefore the issue of peace and security ought to be given the utmost priority.

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Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 1996. Agreement establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Nairobi: IGAD/ SUM-96/AGRE-DOC. – 1998. Sub-regional Action Programme (SRAP) for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in the IGAD sub-region. – 2007a. Annual Report of IGAD Executive Secretariat for 2006 and Planned Activities for 2007. Djibouti: IGAD/CM-26/07/WP02. – 2007b. Preparation of Peace and Security Strategy for IGAD. Nairobi: Ramco Printing Works. – 2008. Peace and Security Architecture. Djibouti: IGAD Secretariat. Available from Trust Africa African Regional Organizations at http:// aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/Inter-Governmental_Authority_ on_Development_(IGAD)_%E2%80%93_Peace_and_Security_­ Architecture (accessed 16 April 2012). – 2010a, September 22. Communiqué of the 37th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers. New York. – 2010b. IGAD Minimum Regional Integration Plan (MIP). Djibouti: IGAD. International Crisis Group (ICG). 2007, January 26. ‘Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead’. Africa Briefing no. 45. – 2008, December 23. ‘Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State’. Africa Report No. 147. – 2010, May 18. ‘Somalia’s Divided Islamists’. Africa Briefing No. 74. Keenan, Jeremy H. 2010. ‘Africa Unsecured? The Role of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Securing US Imperialism Interests in Africa’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 3(1): 27–47. Melson, David. 2011. The Horn of Africa: Building the Future. Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. Available at www.africom.mil/ printStory.asp?art=5838 (accessed 11 April 2012). Mengisteab, Kidane and Okbazghi Yohannes. 2005. Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea. Trenton NJ and Asmara: Red Sea Press. Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. ‘The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts’, African Affairs 106 (204): 357–90. – 2008. ‘Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare’. Enough Strategy Paper. Muller, Björn. 2008. ‘The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror” with a Special Focus on Somalia’, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa, Research Report in Social Anthropology. Lund: Lund University and Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre. Okubo, Y. 2010, October 18. ‘Peace and Security Situation in the IGAD Region’. Paper presented at the UN in New York (on behalf of IGAD). Piombo, J. R. 2007. ‘Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview’, Strategic Insights 6(1). 193

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Samatar, Abdi Ismail. 2008. ‘Ethiopian Occupation and American Terror in Somalia’, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa, Research Report in Social Anthropology. Lund: Lund University and Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre. Samatar, Abdi Ismail and Samatar, Ahmed Ismail. 2002. ‘Somalis as Africa’s First Democrats: Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein and President Aden A. Osman’. Bildhaan 2: 1–83. – 2005. ‘Tradition and Leadership: An Editorial. Bildhaan 5. Sörenson, Karl. 2008. ‘State Failure on the High Seas – Reviewing the Somali Piracy’. FOI Somalia Papers: Report 3. Verhoeven, Harry. 2009. ‘The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 3(3): 405–25. Woodward, Peter. 2010. ‘IGAD and Regional Relations in the Horn of Africa’. Paper presented to the International Workshop on IntraState and Inter-State Conflicts and Security in the Horn of Africa, 25–26 May, 2010, at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. – Peter. 2004. ‘Somalia and Sudan: A Tale of Two Peace Processes’, The Round Table 93 (375): 469–82.

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9 The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process? FRANCIS A. S. T. MATAMBALYA

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT Africa has a long history of regional integration, being one of the pioneers of initiatives of this nature. To highlight with concrete examples: (a) (b) (c) (d)

The Congo Basin Treaty emerged from the Berlin conference of 1884. The seed of the first iteration of East African integration was sown in 1894 through the creation the Uganda-Kenya railway (see Appendix table 9.2). The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was first signed by South Africa, Basutoland (now Lesotho), Swaziland, and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) at Potchefstroom on 29 July 1910. The Southern Rhodesia Customs Union between South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe was formed in 1949.

Regional integration resonated well amongst post-colonial African leaders, who saw it as a vehicle for development. Hence, in a process that resulted in the dissolution of some earlier experiments (only to be resurrected later), while other schemes were transformed, and new ones were initiated, the net effect was the proliferation of integration schemes. Noteworthy attempts include the Trade Agreement between Ghana and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) of 1962; and the 1962 Equatorial Customs Union (ECU) that linked Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon (see UNECA, 2004).1 Generally, Africa has had more integration schemes than any other continent, with no fewer than twenty-four schemes being created or resurrected in the post-colonial era, of which six (see Appendix table 9.1) were also notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The enthusiasm for regional integration persists in Africa, despite the fact  This was the predecessor to the Customs Union of Central African States, which later turned into the Economic Commission for Central African States (ECCAS). 1

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that such ­initiatives have neither translated into the integration of the real ­economies,2 nor contributed significantly to economic development.3 Hence genuine questions arise: (a) (b)

Is the resurrected East African Community (EAC) likely to ‘post’ greater success than other regional integration schemes in Africa? Can it be a model for African integration?

This chapter examines these and related questions by surveying the EAC and comparator integration schemes.

Objective and coverage of the chapter

The decision to pursue regional integration amongst the member states of the EAC signifies the emergence of a new era of socio-economic development in East Africa. In line with the objective of this book, this chapter examines this new development, and attempts to shed light on the following issues: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

How have integration policies so far impacted on the integration of the real economies of the member states of the EAC? What are the prospects for the integration process to contribute to the promotion of local economic development and prosperity in the region? Which prospects exist for the EAC integration process to contribute to the promotion of intra-country and cross-border peace and security in the region? What are the prospects for EAC integration to facilitate the management of the various diversities: cultural, economic, ethnic, political, social? How do the various sections of the society (civil service, civil society, business community) perceive the EAC integration process?

Caveats of the chapter

Despite the popularity of the integration model of development, every integration scheme is unique. Due to this specificity, a study of this nature usually requires extensive field coverage. Thus, the main caveat of this study might be the geographic scope and depth of the analysis, which might not be fully permitted by the circumstances. For instance, due to resource limitations, a pilot survey of the opinions of the stakeholders from the five EAC states (henceforth EAC5) has so far only been undertaken in Tanzania.

 African economies largely maintained their colonial structure regarding production and trade links. 2

196

 African economies remain the least developed.

3

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Structure of the chapter

The following sections revisit the concept of regional integration, describe the legal anchor of trade-driven regional integration schemes and indicate lessons to be drawn from selected trade-driven regional integration schemes. This is followed by empirical assessment of the integration process of the EAC economies and a summary of the lessons that can be learnt by other African RTAs from the EAC integration experience. The final sections discuss a framework for the architecture of results-driven regional integration in Africa and sum up the conclusions.

REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION Simply expressed, regional integration is a special realization of a regionalized approach to the management of the development process. It signifies a deliberate and concerted undertaking, in which sovereign states agree to manage the development process through a shared regional development vision, supra-national regional institutions and institutional mechanisms, joint or harmonized regional rules, etc. It presents an alternative to the (narrower) model of managing the development process based on national efforts, as well as to the (broader) model driven by multilateral efforts.

ANCHORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE BROAD PHENOMENON OF REGIONALIZATION As highlighted above, regional integration is a special realization of a regionalized approach to the management of the development process. In practice, the regionalization schemes that have emerged in various regions of the world over time have tended to vary, sometimes quite substantially, in terms of their objectives, areas of joint action by member states (e.g. sector coverage), rules, institutional architecture, etc. Thus, in order to capture the diverse manifestations of regionalization schemes and simplify the analysis of the same, it is prudent to draw a distinction between the major stripes of joint actions by members of a regional bloc, which manifest the regionalization phenomenon. Deriving from literature on the subject, two major types of regionalization schemes can be differentiated, i.e. regional integration schemes and regional cooperation schemes.

Regional integration schemes

The term regional integration is used in reference to trade-driven regionalization. However, the ultimate goals of the process are usually more ambitious and tend to target broad-based deeper economic integration (hence economic-integration-led regionalization) in the sense delineated by such famous economists as Jacob Viner, Béla Balassa and others (see Viner, 1950; Balassa, 1976; etc.) and may even end in the formation of 197

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a single economy. Moreover, since a total economic union is one of the defining features of a single state, trade-driven integration may result in a political union.4 Most regionalization initiatives in Africa and elsewhere are of this nature (see figures 9.1 and 9.2, and Appendix tables 9.1 to 9.3).

Regional cooperation schemes

The term regional cooperation refers to regionalization efforts, which typically involve selective institutional co-ordination, selective policy co-ordination, selected joint infrastructure project(s), etc. Accordingly, the scheme may seek to promote various forms of sectoral collaboration (e.g. development of infrastructure, building structures for regional peace and security, etc.) or collaboration in cross-cutting issues, in which trade development may not be prominent. The predecessor of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), was a scheme of this category.

Popular approach to regionalization

Of the two major categories of regionalization initiatives, the trade-driven regional integration appears to have won the upper hand. Thus, in practice, it has become fashionable to predicate regionalization initiatives of the nature referred to herewith, to schemes in which commercial purposes are used as the means for achieving broader objectives (e.g. socio-integration, political integration, security, etc.). In terms of institutional mechanism to steer the integration process, the decision-making mechanisms are typically anchored into either a supra-national body, or intergovernmental decision-making arrangements, or on some combination of both.

RISE, FALL AND RENAISSANCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA First iteration of the East African Community

In East Africa, Kenya, Tanzania (i.e. Tanganyika, the mainland part of Tanzania), and Uganda first established a common internal market during the twentieth century. In a process that started in 1894, and over a seventy-three-year period, it systematically developed to become one of the most advanced integration schemes in the world, culminating in the East African Customs Union in 1967.

198

 This can be manifested by a federation, confederation, etc.

4

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

As per Appendix table 9.2, its evolution can be divided into five distinct logical phases: 1894–1917:  early colonial initiatives involving Kenya and Uganda. 1918–1960: later colonial initiatives involving Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. 1961–1967: Early post-colonial initiatives involving Kenya, Tanganyika (later Tanzania), and Uganda. 1967–1977: Later post-colonial developments involving the formation and collapse of the East African Common Market.5 1977–1983: Negotiations of the distribution of assets following the collapse of the first EAC iteration, which set the stage for the second EAC iteration.

Overlapping phase between iterations

The period from 1977 to 1983 has a special position in East Africa’s integration history. During this period, the negotiation of the distribution of assets following the collapse of the first EAC iteration was conducted and concluded. However, rather than burying integration efforts in East Africa, the mediation agreement did in effect set the stage for the second EAC iteration. Hence, this phase can rightfully be seen as an overlapping phase between the two iterations, signalling the end of the first, and the beginning of the latter.

Second iteration of the East African Community

The seed sown by the first iteration EAC proved hard to exterminate. In one of the provisions of the Mediation Agreement (for the division of assets and liabilities), negotiated and signed by the former member states in 1984, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania agreed to explore areas of and make concrete arrangements for future cooperation. This paved the process for rolling-over the EAC integration. Appendix table 9.3 summarizes the three key phases of the second iteration of the EAC: 1977–1983: Negotiations of the distribution of assets of the defunct EAC and setting the scene for the future of East African integration. 1992–1997: Re-launching the East African integration efforts ending in the establishment of the Commission for East African Cooperation. 1999–2001: Transformation of East African Cooperation into the East African Community.

 Its collapse in 1977 is attributed to unbridgeable differences (economic, ideological and political). 5

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As evidenced in Appendix table 9.1, the second iteration of the EAC was notified to the WTO on 11 November 2000, as a preferential trade agreement (PTA). Moreover, the membership of the revived EAC expanded to five states, when Burundi and Rwanda formally joined the group on 1 July 2007. Right from the beginning, the resurrected EAC bore the hallmark of a trade-driven scheme intended to pursue broader cooperation objectives, and expressed the urge to expand East African integration. The January 1999 EAC summit resolved, inter alia, to: (a)

(b)

(c)

Foster intra-regional trade liberalization. Initial plans foresaw adopting zero tariff rates for intra-regional trade by 1 July 1999, and the implementation of COMESA’s 80 percent tariff reduction objective at the same time. Broaden co-operation. This included: (i) Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on foreign policy co-ordination.6 (ii) Setting-up of a mechanism to deal with terrorism in the region. (iii) Consideration of forming a political federation, which was proposed by President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. In this connection, he suggested the formation of a regional assembly with limited powers. Open-up the vent for broader East African integration. This was underlined through reference to and recognition of ongoing work on procedures, which, when completed, would open the vent for the expansion of the block by admitting as members, non-member countries from the region that fulfil the membership criteria.7

MODEL OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION PURSUED BY THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY EAC as a trade-driven Regional Trading Agreement

The ongoing integration effort in East Africa is modelled on trade-driven regional integration. It mirrors a world-wide formation of regional groupings, which are driven by a trade-development agenda and are accordingly referred to as Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs). Because RTAs fundamentally change the trade relations between the bloc’s members and the rest of the world, they are notified to the WTO. RTAs have become one of the most popular and tested models of  Member states were to take a common stand at international fora and in consular and other diplomatic matters. 6

 At a preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers on 21 January 1999, Uganda wanted Rwanda to be admitted immediately to the group. However, Tanzania pointed out the un-timeliness of such a move, as the procedure for doing so was still being debated. Consequently, the proposal was vetoed by Tanzania and Kenya. 7

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The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

economic development since the end of World War II. Indeed, today, there are many regional blocs worldwide, and most countries belong to at least one such grouping. The total number of RTAs notified to the WTO since 1948 is close to 300 (see figure 9.1). Figure 9.1:  Cumulative notification of RTAs to the WTO, 1948 to 2006 250

No. of Notifications

200

150

100

50

0

Year (1948 to 2006)

Source: Author, using data from WTO.

However, the actual number of regional blocs is much smaller: most notifications refer to agreements between RTAs and a single beneficiary (e.g. a commercial union (CU) between the EU and Israel) or a group of beneficiaries (e.g. EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States). Figure 9.2:  Contiguous economic blocs notified to the WTO 40 34

35 30

30 25 20

17

10

1 1 0 0 1948-1958

4

6

7

3 0 1960-1970

3 0

0

1

10

8

8

5 0

17

14

15

1971-1980

4

1981-1990

Cumulative Notifications under Tokyo Rounds Enabling Clause Cumulative Notifications under GATS Article V

1991-2000

11 6

2001-2005

Cumulative Notifications under Article XXIV Total Cumulative Notifications

Source: Author, using data from WTO.

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Also, the ‘deepening’ of integration (through movement from one stage to another, e.g. from Free Trade Area (FTA) to CU) is typically notified to the WTO. Figure 9.2 depicts the notifications of RTAs that form contiguous economic blocs to the WTO.

Ambitious EAC integration agenda

The Treaty of the East African Community specifies a very ambitious integration scheme: (a)

(b)

Whereas the first iteration of the EAC took seventy-three years to reach the stage of a Customs Union (CU), article 5(2) of the rekindled integration stipulates the resolve of the member states to expedite the process, starting with a CU as the entry point, and becoming a Political Federation as the destination stage. A Common Market (CM) and a CM with a Monetary Union (MU) are stipulated as intermediate stages. The EAC has been implementing a CU since 2005, and started also the implementation of a CM in 2010. If all is to go according to plan and the milestones are fully (or at least substantially) met (in terms of both policy integration and integration of the real economies), the second iteration of the EAC would have achieved a CM in a world record time of seventeen years!

THEORETICAL EXPLICATIONS OF TRADE-DRIVEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION Trade-driven integration involves reducing trade barriers and increasing participation in a regional economy through trade. In the early stages, this involves integrating trade policy and strengthening trade-related institutions, so as to promote intra-regional trade. At later stages, tradedriven integration often goes well beyond trade and involves integrating other economic policies, social policies, and policies related to political governance. Trade-driven RTAs can be divided into four main phases, each relating to specific ‘policy convergence targets’. The four phases translate into six stages.8

Main phases and corresponding of trade-driven Regional Trading Agreements

The four RTA phases deal with four main issues, which are logically sequenced in order to facilitate smooth, systematic and (in terms of ambition) properly-scaled implementation schedules: trade policy convergence,  These stages are derived from the arguments of the 1950s by the Swiss economist Jacob Viner, which were based on what economists call the vent for surplus. They were later complemented by Béla Balassa’s scholarly work in the 1960s. 8

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The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

broader economic policy convergence, social policy convergence, and convergence in the systems of political organization and governance.

Phase 1: trade policy convergence

The main intention of trade policy convergence is to create the necessary environment for the integration of the region’s product markets, i.e. to attain greater freedom for intra-regional movements of goods and services by liberalizing ‘substantially all trade’. In order to meet trade policy convergence targets, it is necessary to create an appropriate trade policy framework, which guides the dismantling of barriers to intra-regional trade. This is done in a manner which does not prejudice the multilateral trading system (MTS). Technically, this phase can be divided into three distinct stages: a free trade area (FTA), a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) including its variant of Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement (PTCA), and a Customs Union (CU). However, its actual operationalization may not entail a sequential implementation of the specified stages, but may instead involve parallel implementation of the provisions of more than one stage.

Phase 2: broader economic policy convergence

In this phase, policy harmonization transcends trade and covers other economic policies. The main intention is the creation of the necessary environment for integrating the region’s factor markets. Hence, in addition to the product market integration (which is mainly achieved through trade policy harmonization), the members of the integration scheme work towards factor market integration (i.e. markets for capital and labour). Moreover, because of the widened scope and deepened degree of the integration of the economies participating in the RTAs, macro-economic policy convergence (covering, but not limited to, fiscal and monetary policy) becomes necessary. In principle, this phase translates into only one stage, the Common Market. A familiar variant of the same is Common Market with a Monetary Union (CM & MU). Moreover, though not explicitly recommended in theory, the actual creation of a CM is unlikely to happen in one step – a full-blown CM follows through a staged process.

Phase 3: social policy convergence

The departure point of social policy convergence is that social cohesion and stability are necessary conditions for facilitating competition, competitiveness, and the functioning of a common market. The main objectives of a social policy are to harmonize and improve living and working conditions, develop human resources, combat social exclusion and protect employment and fundamental social rights of workers through, inter alia, dialogue between management and labour. Technically, this phase also translates into only one stage, i.e. the Economic Union (EU). Also, though not explicitly recommended in theory, its implementation is also likely to follow a staged approach. 203

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Phase 4: convergence in the systems of political organization and governance

This phase is devoted to meeting political governance convergence targets. For instance, it is infeasible for a military regime or any other form of repressive regime to co-exist alongside a democratically elected regime inside the same political union. Hence, harmonized political governance standards are set and enforced. This may involve establishing joint (confederative or federative or intergovernmental) political organs. Technically, this phase translates into only one stage, a total economic union (TEU), which is also referred to as a Political Union (PU).

Evolution of RTAs in practice

The phases described in the previous subsection present a logical path towards building regional integration with a sound base, and in practice a phase may contain several stages as highlighted in the previous paragraphs. In the classical Vinerian approach, the higher the phase/ stage, the greater the depth of integration becomes. Trade-driven RTAs follow the theoretical model of phases and stages with modifications: (a) (b) (c)

RTAs differ in terms of specifics such as entry point, speed of ‘deepening’ of integration, speed of geographic expansion, strategy, etc. In fast-tracking: RTAs may choose parallel implementation of two or more stages, and/or skipping of some stages, and/or implementing features from a higher stage of RTA than the current stage. In gradual implementation: RTAs may resort to partial selective implementation, or implementation of the features of a given stage and/or bracketing some issues for later implementation.

Benefits of trade-driven regional integration Direct economic benefits

Customs union theory stands at the centre of the debate of the direct economic benefits attributed to trade-driven regional integration. This is because the first attempts to explain the economic utility of trade-driven regional integration in a scholarly way evolved through the customs union theory, whose seed was planted by the Swiss-American economist Jacob Viner in the 1950s. Since then, the original classic customs union theory by Viner has been refined to account for intra-industry trade (IIT), economy of scale, market size, and NTBs.

Static gains

Building on a set of simple assumptions, in what is referred to as the orthodox customs theory, Viner mainly explained the static effects of

204

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

regional integration.9 These are the welfare gains, which result from a one-time reallocation of resources like land, labour, and capital. These static effects depend on the relative trade size, trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD). TC occurs when, in the aftermath of tariff reduction in an RTA (which typically leads to the reduction of prices), imports from member states of a given RTA displace less efficient domestic production. TC is stimulated by the price and cost advantages of bigger markets.  Moreover, TD may happen, in the case of a member state switching consumption of lowercost products imported from outside the RTA to higher costs produced within the region (which can trade, because they face lower tariffs after integration). TD is generally welfare reducing, although this may not always be the case. The loss from TD is due to the reduction in government revenue as imports from outside the RTA (facing higher tariffs) are replaced by imports from within the region (facing lower or no tariffs) (see Radelet, 1997).

Dynamic effects of integration

The dynamic gains of integration stem from the impact an RTA has on productive capacities and output. Several studies give useful hints on how this happens (see Balassa, 1961; Robson, 1987; Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990; Radelet, 1997; de la Torre and Kelly 1992; Matambalya, 2011). These include: (a) (b)

Invigorating shifts in investments that enhance productive capacities and expand production. Therefore, gains are often manifested by a net increase in economic activity in the region. Because the integration process unifies the market for products (i.e. goods and services), and for factors of production (i.e. capital and labour), it encourages a process of equalization of factor prices10 and factor returns, due to free movement of factors of production. This makes the cost of factors of production cheaper.

Derivative gains of policy discipline and upwards convergence

An observation of successful integration schemes, particularly the EU and to a lesser extent, NAFTA, reveals that, apart from the conventional  The basic assumptions in Viner’s formulation are: (i) Perfect competition in the product and factor markets. (ii) Perfect intra-country factor mobility and imperfect inter-country factor mobility. (iii) Full employment and foreign trade equilibrium. (iv) Perfectly price-elastic supply in the world market. (v) Constant tariffs. Notably, Viner ignored transportation costs, as well as economies and/or diseconomies of scale. He assumed two integrating countries (which discriminate against the rest of the world through the creation of a CU) and used a partial equilibrium model to estimate the impact on trade. 9

 The integration of factor markets causes region-wise convergences of wages/salaries, and the cost of capital. Firms in the factor-deficient member state can source the factor inputs more cheaply from other members of the bloc, which in turn stimulates their ability to produce and trade. 10

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gains of static and dynamic gains, the economic benefits of integration include lock-in effects: policy discipline amongst the members of the RTA provides a stable investment environment, and improves the prospects for long-term capital formation, production, and economic growth. Likewise, there are gains in terms of upward convergence. Imperatively, the relatively less advanced amongst the participating economies will tend to benefit through convergence towards higher rates of growth and higher levels of output.

Net direct economic effects of integration In combination, the static and dynamic effects are directly associated with the following: (a) They stimulate the convergence of the growth rates of the member economies towards higher per capita incomes. (b) To the extent that they build local productive capacities, they enable the countries participating in the scheme to integrate more competitively in the global economy. (c) To the extent that they advocate local economic development, they enable the countries to integrate more meaningfully in the global economy.

Non-economic benefits or ‘indirect’ economic benefits

Literature (see Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990; Pomfret and Toren, 1980; Winters, 1992) recognizes also several other gains, which, though of a non-economic nature, can have an indirect economic benefit. Hence, regional integration can be leveraged for: (a) (b)

international negotiations; regional dialogue and discussion, which may help to pursue common objectives with regard to diverse matters: political governance, peace, security, and foreign policy.

LEGAL ANCHOR OF TRADE-DRIVEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES Because of their potential and real impact on international trade relations, WTO trade law regulates RTAs.11 This is because RTAs signify departure from the guiding principle of non-discrimination defined in Article  I of GATT and Article II of GATS. The main provisions allowing the formation of RTAs are specified in Article XXIV of GATT (on formation of RTAs for trade in goods), Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Enabling Clause on extension  That the GATT/WTO allows the formation of RTAs, is an exception to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination set out in the multilateral trade rules. 11

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The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

of preferences to developing countries, and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also on the formation of service RTAs. The treaties establishing every specific RTA provide a second legal anchor. Additionally, protocols clarify the individual stages of the RTA. For instance, the ‘Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community’ of 30 November 1999 established the EAC, while additionally the CU was established through the ‘Protocol of the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union’ of 2004 (EAC Secretariat, 2007d).

LESSONS FROM A SURVEY OF SELECTED TRADE-DRIVEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES Role of a common development philosophy

It is hard to imagine that an integration scheme will function if its member states do not share a common (socio-economic) development philosophy. I would refer to a common ideological thread as the defining characteristic of the broad development philosophy. The essence of a common development philosophy explains why, after World War II, while the capitalist-oriented West European countries formed the European Community (EC)12 and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the communist/socialist East European countries decided to pool their development efforts through another integration scheme, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).13 The examination of successful RTAs (e.g. COMECON EEC/EU, NAFTA), reveals that this broad development philosophy was provided through a common ideological link. Conversely, amongst the reasons to which the collapse of the first iteration of the EAC has been attributed are: contradictory economic systems (see McKay et al., 1998, official website of the EAC 2011), separate political policies (official website of the EAC secretariat).

Policy integration of trade-driven integration schemes

In both theory and practice, RTAs are driven by policy integration, which eventually leads to the integration of the real economies. Again, the EU provides the best example. Its integration process has seen systematic harmonization of trade policies, broader economic policies (fiscal, monetary and sectoral), social policies and political governance values.

Integration of laws and regulations

Another important lesson, which we learn from the EU integration process, is that proper functioning of RTAs is also aided by the laws and regulations. In this case as well, starting with trade, the harmonization  This is the predecessor of the European Union (EU).

12

 COMECON existed from 1949 to 1991. It was an economic organization of Eastern Bloc countries, along with a number of communist states elsewhere in the world. 13

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

of laws and regulations systematically expands to cover other relevant issues in ­accordance with the integration milestones: the functioning of the economy as a whole, social issues, and political governance and organization.

Impact of trade-driven regional integration schemes on economic performance

Because of the existence of substantial productive capacities, RTAs involving developed countries have the necessary ingredients for positively impacting on intra-regional investments flows, production and trade. Consequently, they develop deeper integration. Table 9.1 highlights the percentage shares of intra-regional trade of selected RTAs. Table 9.1:  Percentage shares of intra-regional trade of selected RTAs Year

COMESA

SADC

ASEAN

EU

1980

1.8%

0.4%

17.3%

62.2%

1995

5.9%

10.3%

24.4%

67.2%

2000

4.7%

11.8%

23.0%

67.7%

2005

4.6%

11.1%

25.3%

67.4%

2008

5.5%

11.4%

25.5%

67.3%

2009

6.8%

11.0%

24.3%

66.5%

Average of observed years

4.9%

9.3%

23.3%

66.4%

Notes: ASEAN – Association of South East Asian economies COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, EU – European Union, SADC – Southern African Development Community. Source: Author. Based on UN, 2010.

RTAs involving developed countries also consolidate better integration in the global economy through substantial shares of the global investments, production, and trade. The economic impact observed in developed countries could not be replicated by developing countries. The economies in African RTAs largely remained appended to their former colonial masters, and have maintained the colonial structures of production and trade links.

EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THE EAC ECONOMIES In order to provide a better understanding, the following subsections assess the state of policy convergence amongst EAC5. The aim of the analysis is to extract the initial clues regarding the prospects for an effec208 tive CM, given the pertaining circumstances.

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Degree of convergence of governance frameworks and common broad development philosophy

Contradictory ideologies (manifested particularly through sharp ideological differences between Kenya and Tanzania) were a key reason for the collapse of the first iteration of the EAC. Nevertheless, even in the current integration process, the EAC states have not defined and are not necessarily linked by a common ideological thread. For instance, officially, Tanzania is still committed to Ujamaa (family-hood) and self-reliance (although the reality looks quite different), while the other countries are observably capitalist (though probably none would be able to specify which brand of capitalism it is pursuing).

Frameworks of policies to promote regional integration

As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, a proper functioning of every stage of an RTA depends on policy co-ordination, harmonization and unification. Table 9.2 highlights a classic clustering of the focal points of policy convergence requirements at the various stages of integration.14 Legally these policies are anchored in: principles – non-discrimination by nationality, the four freedoms – goods, services, capital, and labour – , and instruments – treaties, protocols, regulations and directives. The EAC states have been implementing a CU since 1 January 2005. The CM protocol, which the EAC is implementing since 1 July 2010, brought extra requirements to harmonize more economic policies. However, the reality is that the EAC states are moving forward with policy harmonization in a situation where some are not well designed, and most are not fully implemented: (a) The major loopholes of the CU include: (i) Trade policy divergences, reflecting unfinished businesses of the FTA and CU: parallel existence with rules of origin (RoO) and certificate of origin (CoO), and the ‘uncommon’ common external tariff (CET). The application of RoO and CoO cause mandatory border checks and delays, and encourage corruption. The long list of Ugandan companies and imports that are excluded from the provisions of the CET defeats the idea of a CU. Even though the Ugandan companies may deserve support, the ‘Uganda list’ may constitute inappropriate measures to support companies. An analysis based on Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda revealed a long list of ‘sensitive products’ (totalling sixty tariff lines), on which the countries levy different duties. In total, the tariff levied  The policies that need to be brought under the rubric of a regional umbrella cover trade issues (e.g. tariffs, NTBs), competition issues (e.g. fair competition, abuse of dominant position, safeguard measures, etc.), sectoral issues (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, tourism, transport, etc.), regional development issues (e.g. policies to promote regional development, cohesion policies to reduce inter-regional disparities), social issues (e.g. non-discrimination on the basis of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, education, employment, health, social security, etc.), and system of political organization and governance (rule of law, freedom of media, freedom of speech, free and fair elections, etc.). 14

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Table 9.2:  Clustering of the key policy convergence requirements at the various stages of integration S/N Stage of RTAs

Focus of Policy Convergence

Specific Policy Areas

1.

PTA/PTCA Trade policy

Intra-regional tariffs

2.

FTA

Trade policy

Intra-regional tariffs

3.

CU

Trade policy

Intra-regional tariffs, common external tariffs (CETs)

4.

CM & CMU Broader coverage of economic policy (to facilitate the ‘four freedoms’: movements of goods, services, capital, and labour)

Intra-regional tariffs, common external trade policy (CETP – i.e. CET with joint regime of NTBs), competition policy, employment policy, fiscal policy, growth policy, industrial policy, monetary policy, science and technology policy, sectoral policy, structural policies, regional policy

5.

EU

Social Policy

Right to education, right to employment, rights to shelter/housing, health, rights to social security systems

6.

TEU/PU

System of Political Organization and Governance

Civil liberties (life, speech, movement, association), political liberties (system of elections), rule of law, etc.

Notes: FTA – Free Trade Area, PTCA – Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement, CMU – Common Market with a Monetary Union, TEU – Total Economic Union, Source: Author.

(b)

PTA – Preferential Trade Area, CM – Common Market, EU – Economic Union, PU – Political Union.

on the ‘sensitive list’ is ‘uncommon’ on forty-four tariff lines, which is around 75 per cent of all tariff lines included therein. (ii) Lack of an implementation strategy subjects the operations of the FTA to corruption, harassment (of entrepreneurs from one country, who attempt to trade in products from other EAC countries), forcing traders to use ‘local agents’ in their cross-border business transactions (instead of directly engaging in businesses), and high insecurity for entrepreneurs who engage in cross-border business transactions (with alleged cases of murder). Conditions in the five EAC countries do not provide equal encouragement for movement of people, as intra-country instabilities are high in most of them.

Laws and regulations to promote regional integration

Several laws essential for the functioning of the RTA are not yet integrated. For instance, lack of harmonization of company laws (or alternatively, enactment of common laws) to guarantee right of establishment of commercial entities hampers the functioning of a CM. Explicitly, the 210 launching of the CM was not preceded by adequate preparation, due to

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

the adoption of an ambitious implementation time table (see Matambalya, 2011).

Evolution of the real economies

The convergence of economic variables of the partner economies15 and the intensification of economic ties mirror the integration of the real economies. This sub-section uses selected indicators of endowment with and access to natural resources, and economic performance, to highlight the convergence vis á vis divergence of the EAC economies.

Indicators of trade performance at the macro-level

Macro trade indicators underline the differences in the levels of development of the EAC states. This is evidenced by trade flows (trading partners, and trade balances) and export structures (weighting of various product categories in export portfolio). Concerning trade partners, individual EAC countries and the region as a whole still conducts more trade with the rest of the world (ROW). From 2002 to 2005, on average intra-regional exports, as a share of aggregate exports of EAC economies, was only 18.99 per cent, compared to the ROW’s share of 81.015 per cent.16 Implicitly, there is still a long way to go to deepen intra-EAC trade (see figure 9.3). Figure 9.3 reflects the marginal role of EAC economies in global trade; which recorded huge negative trade balances with ROW. This underlines the fact that the region is less of an exporter and more of a destination market of the exports from ROW.

 The purpose of setting the criteria is to ascertain stable and balanced growth within the economic bloc. Members of the EU, for instance, had to fulfil four convergence criteria in order to participate in the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the Euro: (i) The inflation rate should not be more than1.5 percentage points higher than the three lowest inflation member states of the EU. (ii) Regarding government finance: (a) Ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3 per cent at the end of the preceding fiscal year. (b) Ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60 per cent at the end of the preceding fiscal year. (iii) Concerning the exchange rate, applicant countries should have joined the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) under the European Monetary System (EMS) for two consecutive years and should not have devalued their currencies during the period. (iv) On long-term interest rates: The nominal long-term interest rate must not be more than two percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation member states. 15

 The analysis does not cover Burundi and Rwanda.

16

211

212

2003

18.69

81.31

Intra-EAC Exports as % of total exports

2002

19.6

80.4

Source: Author, using data from UN, 2005 a,b.

0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

120.00%

2004

19.15

80.85

Average of the observed years

18.985

81.015

Exports to ROW as % of total EAC exports

2005

18.5

81.5

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Figure 9.3: Intra-EAC vis à vis global exports of the EAC states, 2002 to 2005

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Table 9.3:  Global export and import structures of the EAC states by major product groups Export Structure By Main Product Groups 2005 Product Group Burundi Kenya 1. All food items 45.1% 39.6% 2. Agricultural raw materials 2.2% 12.0% 3. Fuels 0.0% 22.9% 4 Ores and metals 1.3% 4.2% 5. Manufactures 3.2% 21.0% 6. Manufactured exports, 0.55 30.25 percentage in US$* Import Structure By Main Product Groups 2005 Product Group Burundi Kenya 1. All food items 6.5% 10.4% 2. Agricultural raw materials 1.4% 2.1% 3. Fuels 8.4% 24.3% 4. Ores and metals 0.8% 1.6% 5. Manufactures 82.4% 61.6%

Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 52.3% 37.2% 58.2% 7.3% 11.0% 10.6% 6.8% 0.1% 4.7% 23.3% 7.7% 2.1% 10.4% 9.5% 15.5% 2.97 3.78 4.41

Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 11.7% 11.9% 15.0% 4.0% 1.3% 1.5% 15.6% 9.9% 17.0% 2.0% 1.1% 1.2% 66.7% 75.8% 70.0%

Note: * – average of the years 1997, 2001 and 2005. Source: Author, using data from (1) UN, 2007b, (2) UN COMTRADE Data Base, and (3) World Bank, 2007c.

Figure 9.3, which highlights intra-EAC trade dynamics, underlines the fear that the other EAC countries are largely markets for Kenya’s exports. Also, the trade structures presented in table 9.3 underscore the underdevelopment of the EAC economies: they export mainly agricultural and mineral commodities to the world, meaning that the region needs to undergo economic transformation. In contrast, manufactured products and fuels dominate the EAC’s imports from ROW.

213

-1480

-213

-2856

2005 -1076

-159

-861

-98

-1371

2000 -595

-186

-993

-1112

-128

1995 -136

-178

-1033

-156

-1191

1990 -141

-747

-103

-880 52

1980 -100%

-80%

-60% Kenya

-40% Burundi

Source: Author, using data from UN, 2004; 2005a, b; 2006a, b; 2007b, c.

Tanzania

-20% Rwanda

Uganda

0%

20%

Figure 9.4:  Global trade balances of the EAC states in US$ million, selected years, 1980 to 2005

-308

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

214 -1032

15.2

-71.9 15

-79

-42.3

4.1

2004 -46.4 -35.7

2.1

2003 -37.8 -57.1 2002

2.8

-59.9 -63.9

-5.9

2001 -58 -58.3 2000

2.9

-61.2 -80

-60

-40

-20

Aggregate Trade Balance (with Kenya and Uganda) in million US$ Trade Balance with Uganda in Million US$

215

Trade Balance with Kenya in Million US$

Source: Author, using data from MPEE 2007.

0

20

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-64 2005

Figure 9.5:  Tanzania’s trade balance with Kenya and Uganda, 2000 to 2007

-56.7 2006

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Performance in relation to other macro-economic development indicators

The analysis of investment indicators (e.g. Foreign Direct Investment – FDI, Gross Fixed Capital Formation – GFCF), output indicators (e.g. Gross Domestic Product – GDP, Gross Regional Product – GRP, Manufacturing Value Added – MVA, etc.) clarify further the economic situation of the  EAC5. Also, fiscal and monetary indicators (government finance, interest rates, and lending rates), are imperative for a functional ­monetary union. Table 9.4 shows that the high ratios of FDI to GFCF (evidenced by Burundi and, to a significant extent, by Tanzania and Uganda) and FDI to GDP (clearly evidenced by Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, and to a significant extent by Rwanda) suggest that the EAC5 may be suffering from capital gaps and are excessively dependent on FDI. Likewise, since we are aware of the fact that EAC5 are developing countries with capital gaps, the low FDI to GFCF ratios (e.g. for Kenya and Rwanda) and FDI to GDI ratio (e.g. for Kenya) also do not necessarily reflect economic strength, but may be indicative of relative inability to attract FDI. Table 9.4:  Selected Investment Performance Indicators of the EAC Economies in 2006 Country

FDI/GDP Ratio 37% 5% 12% 48% 25%

FDI to GFCF

Share in Global Share in EAC FDI FDI 1. Burundi 128% 0.00239% 27.9% 2. Kenya 1.3% 0.0042% 4.90% 3. Rwanda 3.0% 0.0012% 1.44% 4. Tanzania 13% 0.031% 36.25% 5. Uganda 14.0% 0.0253% 29.52% Total EAC 0.0856% Notes: GDP – Gross Domestic Product, FDI – Foreign Direct Investments, GFCF – Gross Fixed Capital Formation Source: Author, using data from (1) World Bank, 2007c: 260–270, (2) UN, 2005b.

Table 9.5 portrays selected output indicators of the EAC5. Notably, in 2004, the combined GDP of the five EAC economies amounted to a GRP of US$ 36.7082 billion. By comparison Denmark’s GDP in the same year was €197 billion. This implies that the individual EAC economies are quite small (cf. UN 2006a and EUROSTAT). The structure of GDP reveals that only Kenya (the only country where services account for more than 60 per cent of GDP) has substantially reduced dependence on agriculture and diversified its economy more in

216

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Table 9.5:  Selected output indicators of the EAC economies Structure of GDP (2005)a

Deviation Country of country Share per capita MVA p.c.* Country GDP from in US$d Agriculture Industry Services of GRP (2004)b the regional averagec 1. Burundi 49% 19% 64% 0.18% -72.8% 16 2. Kenya 17% 19% 64% 43.4% +46.5% 26 3. Rwanda 41.6% 21.9% 36.5% 5.0% -37.2% 25 4. Tanzania 45% 16.4% 38.6% 28.1% -13.0% 14 5. Uganda 32% 21.2% 46.4% 21.2% -11.8% 26 Notes:  * – Average of the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 (at constant 1995 US$), GDP – Gross Domestic Product, GRP – Gross Regional Product, MVA – Manufacturing Value Added. Source:  Author, using data from (a) World Bank, 2007c (for Kenya, data for the year 2004 was used), (b) UN 2005a,b, (c) UN 2005b, (d) UNIDO, 2009.

line with competitive global developments. By comparison, Denmark’s GDP in 2004 was composed of agriculture (2.2 per cent), industry (25.5 per cent), and services (72.3 per cent). Concerning economic production, Kenya accounts for 43.3 per cent of the GRP, despite its share of regional population being only around 30 per cent. If the two small EAC economies (i.e. Burundi and Rwanda) are dropped from the analysis, then Kenya’s share rises to 47.1 per cent (despite its share in the population of the three remaining countries, i.e. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, being only 34.6 per cent). The deviation of country GDP per capita from the regional average demonstrates further imbalances and the domination of economic productivity by Kenya. In 2004, the average GDP per capita of EAC5 economies was US$331 (cf. UN, 2006a). Denmark’s GDP per capita in the same year was $32,200. Kenya’s GDP per capita was 46.5 per cent above the regional average GDP, implying that Kenyans account for and earn most of the wealth generated in East Africa, and are thereby substantially more affluent than their fellow EAC citizens. Under such circumstances, in the absence of flanking measures, deeper integration may increase the intra-regional inequalities, instead of promoting equitable growth among the member states of the EAC. If that happens, it might lead to instabilities. The other indicators giving useful clues about the economic strengths of the EAC countries, are fiscal and monetary indicators presented in table 9.6 (inflation rate, government finance, exchange rate, and interest rate). Although there is a relatively high convergence in terms of the inflation rates, the divergences revealed by the other ratios are too large for a CM to function properly. 217

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Table 9.6:  Selected monetary indicators of the EAC economies Country

Debt to GDP Ratioa

Inflation rate in Comparative lending 2006b rates in 2005c Country Deviation Country Deviation Country Deviation ratio from EAC rate from EAC average from EAC average** average** rate average** 1. Burundi 165.2% 89.1% 5.1% -0.22% 19,3% 2.5% 2. Kenya 32.0% -44.1% 6.0% 0.68% 12.88% -3.9% 3. Rwanda 70.5% -5.6% 4.2% -1.12% n.a. n.a. 4. Tanzania 61.7% -14.4% 5.9% 0.58% 15.1% 1.7% 5. Uganda 51.1% -25.0% 5.4% 0.08% 19.8% 3.0% EAC Average* 76.1% – 5.32% – 16.8% – Notes: GDP – Gross Domestic Product, * – excluding Rwanda, ** – in percentage points, n.a. – data not available. Source: Author, using data from World Bank, 2007a; IMF, 2007; USAID, 2006.

Inherent diversities: a challenge to the EAC integration process?

When compared with each other, the EAC countries exhibit huge diversities in terms of endowment with and access to natural economic resources, demography, political stability, social harmony, and cultural harmony. These diversities must be carefully managed, in order to ascertain a smooth and mutually beneficial regional integration scheme.

Endowment with and access to natural economic resources

Each one of the EAC5 economies is largely natural-resource-dependent, with most of the people rural-based. Through occupations like crop farming, fishing, pastoralism, hunting, etc., the majority of the population directly rely on land for livelihood security. However, as per table 9.7, the region’s countries are not equitably endowed with natural resources. EAC countries cover a total land area of approximately 1.82 million square kilometres. The underdevelopment economies are largely agrarian, with land as the key capital. Tanzania, which has the lowest population density, possesses over 50 per cent of the total land mass. The remaining four countries, with 70 per cent of the region’s population, share less than 50 per cent of the landmass. This has also a bearing on accessibility.

218

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Table 9.7:  Selected indicators of endowment with and access to natural resources in EAC states Total of five EAC Country’s share of the regional resources in % Countries Variable Sq. Km. Country Land Permanent Forests and Inland Mass Pasture Woodland Water Masses 1. Land massa 1,705,595 Burundi 1.6% 1.56% 2. Permanent 592245,20 Kenya 33.0% 35.56% pasture 3. Forests and 564157,36 Rwanda 1.5% 0% woodland 4. Inland water 112,350 Tanzania 50.2% 59.84% masses 1,817,945 Uganda 13.7% 3.03% Total Note: a – Excludes water masses Source: Author, using data from various sources

0.14% 30.27%

1.9% 11.9%

0%

1.2%

59.68%

52.6%

9.91%

32.3%

Also, due to differences in the evolvement of domestic economic policy, access to land and land-based economic resources is highly skewed. To highlight: (a)

(b)

According to the Kenya Land Alliance, while 13 per cent of the population have no access to land at all, only 20 per cent of Kenyans own over 50 per cent of the land, and the remaining 67 per cent own less than one acre (Namwaya, 2004). In Tanzania, literally everyone can access land at no or little cost.

As is with the case of general availability and access to land, the EAC5 states demonstrate huge disparities with regard to the availability of land for specific economic use. For instance, Tanzania possesses around 60 per cent of the region’s pastureland, and an equal percentage of forests and woodland. By comparison, Kenya, with a comparable population, possesses only 35.6 per cent of the region’s land under permanent pasture and 30.3 per cent of the region’s forests and woodland. In the case of inland water masses, with close to 63 per cent, Tanzania has the region’s largest share of the inland water masses.

Demography

According to World Bank statistics, EAC5 had a total population of approximately 117.9 million people in 2005 (cf. World Bank, 2007a). Using population as a proxy for market size, Tanzania is the largest market amongst the EAC5, with 32.5 per cent of East Africans being Tanzanians. 219

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Table 9.8:  Selected population statistics of the EAC countries Country

Fertility in 2005

Net migration in 2005

Regional and country populations Country Deviation Country Deviation rate of country share of of country rate from regional population the regional population density from average in 2005 the regional average in 2004 1. Burundi 7 1 191,600 6.4% 199 2. Kenya 5 -1 -21,519 29.1% -5 3. Rwanda 6 0 45,000 7.6% 274 4. Tanzania 5 -1 -345,000 32.5% -20 5. Uganda 7 1 -15,000 24.4% 52 EAC average 6 -28,984 Source: Author, using data from World Bank 2007a, and UN 2006a

In 2004, the average population density of EAC5 was 63 persons, and only Tanzania and Kenya (whose large part, approximately 80 per cent, of the land mass is arid) were below it.

Political outlook

Figure 9.6 presents the World Bank (WB)’s ranking of the EAC countries in terms of political stability, where -2.5 and +2.5 present the worst and best situations respectively. These rankings portray different degrees of political instability across the EAC5, in which Tanzania stands out as the relatively best performer. Indeed, at least three factors characterize the system of political organization and governance of the EAC countries: ethnicity, role of the army, void in shared values: (a) (b)

(c)

220

While in Tanzania and Kenya the military plays its traditional role of defence, there has been substantial militarization of political space in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Except for Tanzania, the governance systems of the EAC countries are essentially ‘ethnocracies’. Invariably, tribalism is practiced openly in private and even public life, leading to permanent conflicts. Some of these conflicts have eventually taken a political twist, making the EAC prone to civil wars and strife in general. The Treaty establishing the EAC does not commit its members to shared organization and governance values.

2.5

1

0 -0.17 -0.53

-1

-1.09

-1.18

-1.35

-2

-2.5 -3 Best (Case Scenario)

Tanzania

221

Source: Author, using data from World Bank, 2007a.

Rwanda

Kenya

Uganda

Burundi

Worst (Case Scenario)

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2

Figure 9.6:  World Bank’s ranking of the political instabilities of EAC countries

3

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Cultural outlook

The EAC5 are multi-ethnic. However, only Tanzania appears to have managed to build a substantial degree of inter-cultural cohesion and tolerance, while elsewhere the societies are still highly fragmented along largely ethnic/tribalistic lines. As a result, in a pilot study, Tanzanians expressed fears of gross discriminations in East Africa outside their own country. These discriminations (alongside insecurity and corruption) were cited as disincentives for Tanzanians to move to the other EAC states for career and occupation purposes, even if the EAC law would allow it. The Tanzanians expressed this as another reason for a uni-directional free movement: the existence of a greater incentive for citizens of the other EAC to move to the more ‘afropolitan’ and cosmopolitan Tanzania, than for Tanzanians to move to those countries.

Summary of implications for the East African integration initiative

As highlighted in this section, the EAC5 show substantial differences in all aspects of integration: economic policy convergence, convergence of real economies, cultural environment, political environment, demography and social environment. The EAC5 must eliminate these divergences, in order to be able to function as viable beacons of a ‘common’ and eventually ‘single’ EAC economy. Therefore, in essence, what the countries of the region have undertaken to do is the creation of a ‘union of the diverse’ for the common good of East Africa. To achieve this, there is a long way to go and careful planning and patience is needed.

WHICH LESSONS CAN BE LEARNT BY OTHER AFRICAN RTAs? Implications of the diversities of the economic outlook of EACs

Apart from the unfinished business of a CM, the concerns of economic nature that crystallize are underlined by endowment with and access to natural resources, levels of economic development, levels of country and individual affluence, trade, and cross-border investments. These differences embody risks of asymmetry in bearing the adjustment costs of integration, economic dominance and displacement, and economic migration.

Risk of asymmetry in bearing the adjustment costs of integration

Technically, the concerns of asymmetry in sharing the benefits of regional integration are paralleled by concerns about who will bear a greater burden of adjustment costs associated with deeper integration. 222 Such costs are associated with the response of the domestic industry to

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

increased competition, and may manifest themselves through the loss of markets, crowding out of domestic investments leading to loss of jobs and revenues, loss of the means of livelihood (such as land), etc. In fact, some of the concerns of this nature are alluded to also in the Wacko Report (EAC 2004a: 82–86). Notably, in the absence of appropriate flanking measures to ensure equitable distribution of the costs of integration, the same countries which reap the highest benefits of integration will also bear the smallest burden in terms of the costs of adjustment. Moreover, though a country may benefit significantly from regional integrations, individual stakeholders may become losers. This is because deeper integration is associated with dynamic shifts in the economy, leading to adjustments and shocks.17 Hence, there should be mechanisms to ensure equitable sharing of the costs of integration amongst the member states, as well as among the regions within each member state.

Fears of asymmetry in sharing the economic benefits of integration

The benefits associated with regional integration are strongly influenced by the level of development of the participating country, which reflects its preparedness to be exposed to intense competition. In its current form, the EAC is built by four Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) and a Non-LDC Developing Country (Kenya). Also, the countries differ extremely in terms of wealth in natural resources and in size. Despite these disparities, the integration programme lacks mechanisms to ensure equitable benefits, and promote balanced development. Already now, it is clear that the economic shares of the small states (Burundi and Rwanda) do not match their population. If left unattended, this situation is likely to promote dominance by some members.

Risk of economic displacement

The stark differences in purchasing power and other economic leverage suggest that the benefits derived from the CM may differ substantially across countries. Hence, in order to fend-off the risk of asymmetry in exploiting the benefits of a CM, relevant: (a) (b)

checks and balances through policies are needed; projects, programmes and financial instruments must be created.

In both cases, the EU provides a viable depository of knowledge.

 Notably, as a result of the 1994 establishment of NAFTA, some Canadian and US workers in such sectors as textiles, which employ low-cost, low-skilled labour, faced the prospect of losing their jobs as Canadian and US firms moved production to Mexico, where costs are even lower. 17

223

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa

Risk of economic migration

The observed risk of economic migration is echoed by the findings of the survey of stakeholders in Tanzania: (a)

(b)

(c)

There is a high possibility of unsustainable immigration from countries with poor prospects for access to resources. Two serious cases are Tanzania’s western neighbours, Burundi and Rwanda. These may be exacerbated by economic refugees from the lower social classes from Kenya and Uganda. Given the extreme diversities in terms of availability and access to land, the freedom of movement and settlement allowed by a CM might trigger economic migrants to intolerable extents and can lead to dangerous social instability. The countries with high degrees of economic inequality may use the CM to shade-off the dispute of internal economic injustices into those countries with less inequality. For instance, Tanzania may have to bear the consequences of Kenya’s historical economic injustices, because its land policies have created less inequality.

Therefore, relevant policies will be needed to address these challenges.

LESSONS REFLECTING CONCERNS AND INTERESTS OF NON-ECONOMIC NATURE In a CM, the non-economic dimensions (cultural, political, social) play a key role in the creation of a stable and sustainable scheme. They are crucial for cementing commonality, equality and equity, security, and solidarity within the region. Joint regional policies to address these issues are vital for a CM and subsequent stages of integration.

Lessons reflecting concerns and interests of demographic nature

At least two important issues arise from the demographic perspectives of the EAC states. First, the lager countries might marginalize the smaller ones. Invariably, without appropriate flanking measures, there is a likelihood of the larger economies drawing more economic benefits compared to the smaller ones. Second, in view of the population pressure (particularly in Burundi and Rwanda, but also in Kenya due to the skewed land distribution), unrestricted free movement of persons will most likely trigger unsustainable influxes of migrants into a country. This may in turn lead to conflicts with the local population. Thus, to evade the risk, some degree of regulation of migration is essential.

224

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Lessons reflecting concerns and interests of political nature

The concerns associated with the political landscape of EAC countries include the danger of internalization of political conflicts from the less stable to the more stable countries like Tanzania, fundamental differences in the systems of political organization and governance, and fears of erosion of national policy sovereignty: (a) (b) (c)

Unrestricted free movement of persons may result in ‘internalization’ of ethnic divisions as well as cultural discrimination. Increased mobility of persons may also ‘internalize’ political conflicts happening in other EAC states. The implicit shrinkage of the policy space due to integration gives rise to concerns about the erosion of the national policy sovereignty.

LESSONS ABOUT ADHERENCE TO THE ESTABLISHED TECHNICALITIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION Economic policy commitments of the member states

The EAC5 still demonstrate serious divergent economic policy commitments, with regard to both internally- and externally-oriented trade and overall economic policies: (a)

(b) (c)

(d)

Participation by Tanzania in SADC and the remaining countries in the COMESA creates uncertainties and complexities, exacerbated by some entrenched interests: (i) Kenya has traditionally been one of the leading beneficiaries of trade creation resulting from the COMESA integration scheme. (ii) Tanzania’s interests in the SADC bloc are underlined by the benefits in terms of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from South Africa, and the historical political solidarity with all the countries of Southern Africa. Though there have been efforts of harmonization, the policies of COMESA, EAC and SADC are not identical. Each regional bloc in which the EAC countries participate aspires to pursue deeper integration, and become a CU and beyond. Since a country may not belong to more than one CU at the same time, there may occur a shift in the memberships of these RTAs that may affect the EAC. The EAC5 still lack a comprehensive common external trade policy (CETP).

Concerns associated with the philosophy of the integration scheme

Amongst the most conspicuous shortcomings of the EAC integration scheme are the critical omissions. The programme lacks a comprehensive 225

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initiative of sectoral programmes, and measures against development ­asymmetries.18 Most notably, though, the EAC economies are essentially agrarian and the programme lacks a tailor-made and comprehensive Joint Agricultural Policy (JAP) or Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The built-in rigidities of the EAC integration scheme are manifested by the insufficient space for the sequencing and use of transition periods and ‘phase-ins’. This is clear through the overambitious protocols for the movements of goods, services, capital, labour and persons, which ignore the realities of socio-economic development in the member states. Also, supra-institutional structural anomalies are evidenced by lack of consideration of a country’s population and size in determining representation in supra-national institutions. For instance, Tanzania, a country with around 45 million people, is represented in the East African legislative assembly (EALA) by the same number of legislators as Burundi and Rwanda, both with less than ten million people. These arrangements are untenable.

Framework for the architecture of regional integration in Africa

Despite being a viable model for development, regional integration has neither translated into the integration of African economies, nor contributed significantly to economic development. Hence, there is little reason to expect significant gains from formal regional integration schemes in Africa if they are built on the basis of ‘business as usual’. As highlighted in Matambalya (2011), there is need for an essential paradigm shift in order to create results-driven regional integration in Africa through: (a)

(b) (c) (d)

 One of the reasons for the failure of the first iteration of the EAC was the disproportionate sharing of the benefits, and a lack of adequate policies to address the problem. Nevertheless, the current integration scheme does not foresee the creation of instruments for tackling asymmetries: structural funds (e.g. structural adjustment funds, regional structural funds, sectoral structural funds) and programmes (e.g. structural adjustment programmes, regional structural programmes, sectoral structural programmes) to complement and translate the ‘policy-based’ integration into reality. 18

226

Developing national capabilities for viable partnership. Developing productive capacities must become the priority issue number one, as without such capacities African countries will neither be able to integrate their real economies, nor meaningfully integrate in global value chains. Adopt a model based on incremental policy coherence. Pursue a multi-pronged approach, which combines an issue-based flexible mode of integration with an unambiguous distinction of EAC-wide issues and national issues. Differentiated integration strategy. This should recognize the uniqueness of each integration scheme, and the trade-off between ‘a la carte’ and ‘buffet’ menus.

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

CONCLUSION To sum up, as in the case of other African RTAs, the task ahead concerning the integration of the East African countries involves creating a functional and sustainable ‘union of the diverse’. To be able to do so, careful planning and patience are needed. Thus, while the potential gains make deepening EAC integration worthwhile, the major issues that may be worth being emulated by other African RTAs refer to the achievements associated with policy integration (as opposed to integration of the real economies). Most notably, to pave the way for the integration of the real economies, several critical issues need to be addressed along the way: policy coherence, and economic, demographic, political and cultural outlooks. The potential conflicts associated with these matters must be diffused for the members of an RTA to be able to function as viable beacons of a ‘common’ and eventually ‘single’ regional economy – eventually of a single state as envisaged by many integration schemes in Africa. Therefore, the planners of the architecture of the subsequent stages of the EAC and other African RTAs should bear in mind the fact that integration progresses from systematic policy coherence, complemented by flanking measures to ensure that the adopted policies deliver the targeted development goals, and can only then be the basis for the integration of the real economies. Explicitly, in practice this involves a protracted process, beginning with a few public policy areas and increasing them over time.

APPENDIX Appendix Table A9.1: Notifications to GATT/WTO of RTAs Involving African Countries Agreement Date of Entry into Force ECOWAS SADC TDCA EAC CEMAC WAEMU/ UEMOA COMESA

Date of Notification

Related Provisions

Type of Agreement

1993 1 Sept 2000 1 Jan 2000 7 July 2000 24 June 199

26 Sept. 2005 9 Aug 2004 21 Nov 2000 11 Oct. 2000 29 Sept. 2000

Enabling Clause GATT Art. XXIV GATT Art. XXIV Enabling Clause Enabling Clause

PA FTA FTA PA PA

1 Jan 2000

3 Feb 2000

Enabling Clause

PA

8 Dec. 1994

29 June 1995

Enabling Clause

PA

Notes:  ECOWAS – Economic Community for West African States, SADC – Southern African Development Community, TDCA – Trade and Development Co-operation Agreement between the EUand South Africa, EAC – East African Community, CEMAC – Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union, COMESA – Common Market forEastern and Southern Africa Source:  Author’s own table compiled using information from WTO.

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Appendix Table A9.2:  Key milestones of the first iteration of the EAC Phase & time frame 1st: 1894–1917 Colonial initiatives involving Kenya and Uganda

Key milestones 1894: Decision by British colonial authority to construct UgandaKenya Railway 1905: Establishment of East African currency board 1917: Formation of Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda

2nd: 1918–1960

1918: Tanganyika formally becomes trustee territory of the UK 1922: Tanganyika joins the East Colonial initiatives involving Kenya, African Customs Union Tanganyika, Uganda 1948: Formation of East African High Commission 3rd: 1961–1967 1960: Tanzania attains ‘Madaraka’ on 9 December Post-colonial initiatives involving Kenya, 1961: Tanzania becomes a republic on 9 December Tanganyika (later: Tanzania), Uganda 1961: East African Common Services Organisation created

4th: 1967–1977 Formation and collapse of EAC 5th: 1977–1983 Negotiations of the distribution of assets of the defunct EAC and setting the scene for the future of East African integration

1967: Formation of the East African Community 1977: Collapse of the East African Community 1984: Signing of a Mediation Agreement on the distribution of assets of the defunct EAC

Notes: EAC – East African Community, UK – United Kingdom. Source: Compiled by author using various sources.

228

Ke •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• ••

Al

Ta

Co

Th un

•• •• ••

Ea •• ••

n

s

gh

es

The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa’s Integration Process?

Key features •• Kenya is a crown colony •• Uganda is a protectorate •• Tanganyika (Tanzania mainland) is still under German rule •• Zanzibar is a Sultanate ruled by Arabs and protected by the UK •• Issue currency for Kenya and Uganda •• Measures aim at simplifying administrative procedures •• Customs Union •• Common currency •• Common postage •• Common transport and communications services •• Common research and education systems All key East African states now under British rule Tanganyika becomes part of trade-driven integration in the region Commission manages inter-territorial cooperation among members The EAC now comprises one independent state and two states which are still under British rule

••

The East African High Commission was reconstituted into the East African Common Services Organization, after Tanzania attained its independence from the UK •• Organization manages commercial and industrial relations of members •• The East African Common Services Organization is transformed into the East African Community Each former member state of the EAC develops its own services •• ••

Assets of the defunct EAC distributed among Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda The former member states commit themselves through Article 14 of the Mediation Agreement to ‘explore and identify further areas of cooperation’

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Appendix Table A9.3:  Key milestones of the second iteration of the EAC Phase & time frame 1st: 1977–1983 Negotiations of the distribution of assets of the defunct EAC and setting the scene for the future of East African integration

Key milestones Reaching and signing of a Mediation Agreement on the distribution of assets of the defunct EAC

2nd: 1992–1997 Re-launching the East African integration efforts ending in the establishment of the Commission for East African Cooperation

1992: Work to revive East African integration commenced 1993: Signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of the Permanent Tri­ par­tite Commission for East African Cooperation (30 November) 1996: Establishment of the secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission in Arusha (14 March) 1997: HoS of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda give a directive to the Permanent Tripartite Commission to initiate a process of upgrading the Agreement Establishing the Permanent Tripartite Commission into a Treaty (29 April) 1999: Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda sign the Treaty Establishing the East African Community in Arusha (22 January) 1999: HoS decide to re–establish the EAC by the end of 1999 2000: After going through the ratification process in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the Treaty Establishing the East African Community comes into force (7 July) 2001: East African Community is formally launched (15 January)

3rd: 1999–2001: Transformation is East African Cooperation into East African Community

Notes: EAC – East African Community, HoS – Heads of State Source: Compiled by author using various sources.

Key features • Mediation agreement on distribution of assets of the defunct EAC • The former member states commit themselves through Article 14 of the Agreement to ‘explore and identify further areas of cooperation’. 230

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10 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region? CYRIL I. OBI

INTRODUCTION This chapter explores the efforts so far made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) towards institutionalizing community citizenship encompassing nationals of its member states in the West African sub-region, and the lessons that can be learned from this by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHR)1. There is compelling evidence that ECOWAS as a regional organization has achieved considerable progress in promoting a concept of regional or supra-national identity or citizenship for the people of its member states through various protocols, agreements, and policies designed to promote West African integration, security and development. This can be gleaned from the goals of the revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993, and the recognition that one of the greatest challenges confronting the organization is that of its transformation from an ‘ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people’ (ECOWAS, 2009). What makes the ECOWAS case particularly instructive is the reality that while most of its member states are immersed in varying levels of the crisis of nation-statism, based largely on the unresolved struggles over citizenship rights, the regional organization has made some modest progress in terms of a notion of ECOWAS citizenship. Although several commentators have referred to West Africa as a belt of conflict in the 1990s due to the conflicts that ravaged the Mano River countries – Liberia, Sierra Leone, and then Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire – and the episodic outbursts of sectarian and ethnic-related violence in central Nigeria and the Niger Delta, it can be argued that in most cases these conflicts were partly related to the crisis of citizenship and national identity in these countries. These citizenship struggles were often driven by groups that either  Countries of the Greater Horn of Africa tend to overlap between three RECs: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea; the East African Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) comprising 19 countries, including some in the Horn. 1

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sought redress, inclusion or social justice in the face of deep grievances driven by perceptions of historically-constructed marginalization, discrimination, dispossession and oppression by hegemonic or dominant groups that had monopolized state power in various countries (NzongolaNtalaja, 2004; Manby, 2009; Obi, 2010). A lot of the explanations for such strong feelings of exclusion or marginalization (from access to power and resources) have often been based on the logic of ethnic, religious or regional difference(s) or cleavages that act as flashpoints for violent conflict. In such contexts, excluded groups usually retreat into the shells of their various identities, and from there challenge the legitimacy of the state that is perceived as not recognizing their collective rights and serving their interests. As Manby rightly notes, ‘the denial of a right to citizenship has been at the heart of many of the conflicts of post-colonial Africa’ (Manby, 2009:1). Two issues are critical in this regard: while the post-colonial state in West Africa has sought to impose a centralizing homogenous logic on multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies, nation-building, which has lagged behind state-making, has been contradicted by the reality of ethnic and religious diversities. Such diversities, often mediated by unequal power relations, have then become highly politicized and turned into fetters on the wheels of the nation-state project in various countries. As Adejumobi has observed, the post-colonial state by its nature and the character of the elites that dominate it has tended ‘towards the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements and privileges which create differentiated and unequal status of citizenship’ (Adejumobi, 2001: 148–70). Such perceptions of inequalities and inequities among those marginalized or excluded from their citizenship rights have been at the core of many intra-state conflicts. Thus, it is not surprising that the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and the insurgency in Nigeria’s ethnic-minority Niger Delta region partly have their roots in the agitation of marginalized or minority ethnic groups challenging the legitimacy of, or seeking to overthrow, governments regarded as denying them equal citizenship rights with other groups within the same nation-state. It is, however, important to note that there are other levels or types of identity that are relevant to the understanding of citizenship struggles, not often focused on, but which are nonetheless relevant, such as generational and gender identities, among others. The struggles for citizenship rights have therefore been linked to political violence in the various regions of Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 403–09; Manby, 2009). This has either taken the form of excluded groups seeking inclusion through the expansion of the democratic space and legitimate representation, and access to power and resources, or the attempts by incumbent power-holders to ‘use exclusionary notions of citizenship to bar their most challenging rivals from the electoral process’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 403). The latter case was writ large in the manipulation of the north-south cleavage and the differentiation between 238 ‘real’ Ivorians and migrants (outsiders) in the Ivorian conflict (Manby,

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

2009: 10–11), which dragged on for a decade and posed a major challenge to ECOWAS and the international community. It is also evident in the north-south cleavage that was a source of prolonged conflict in Sudan, culminating in a peace agreement that eventually opened the way for an independent South Sudan in July 2011. The central issue in the crisis of citizenship in West Africa remains the inability of the ‘post-colonial ruling elite to resolve the nation-state question, particularly as it relates to reaching a consensus on a just and inclusive basis for citizenship’ (Obi, 2007: 7). This non-resolution has contributed to social tensions, instability and sometimes violent conflict as various elites and groups jostle to dominate the nation-state project and make it serve their interests to the exclusion of others. It therefore means that the larger quest for regional peace, democracy, security and development must have to contend with the unresolved citizenship question which continues at varying levels of intensity to simmer in many countries. Thus, it is axiomatic that the measures that ECOWAS, as the regional organization with the most sophisticated mechanisms for regional integration, peace and security in Africa (Obi, 2009: 119), deployed since 1975 (when it was founded), but particularly after 1993 (when it revised its treaty), are relevant to the discussions on citizenship at a regional level. Apart from the fact that the organization’s mechanisms gave it considerable leverage to intervene in member states under certain conditions designed to promote conflict management, resolution and democracy, peace and security, they also gave citizens of member states an additional level of identity ‘above’ the national, at the regional level. It is also important to note that the vital role played by ECOWAS peacekeepers and peacekeepers from member states serving in UN Peace Missions in West Africa in bringing an end to conflicts within member states is devoid of accusations of being meddlers, but rather attracts praise for sacrificing so much for peace and security within the sub-region. At present, West Africa has returned to peace. The wars of the 1990s and the past decades have ended, largely through the combination of the efforts of ECOWAS and the international community, while military and one-party governments have also become a thing of the past, with ECOWAS playing a key role in this regard through its mediation efforts (along with the international community) and its policy of zero-tolerance of unconstitutional changes in government. This chapter explores the perspective that the experiences of the quest for regional citizenship in West Africa are relevant to developments in other African sub-regions, particularly the Greater Horn of Africa, one of Africa’s most conflict-affected sub-regions (Mengisteab, 2011: 7), where regional solutions to challenges of peace, development and security are critically important. There is no doubt that challenges confronting RECs are equally relevant to the analysis of the move towards regional citizenship. Examples of such challenges included the paucity of resources, lack of political will, poor harmonization of national policies with regional 239

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agreements, which are sometimes compounded by overlaps in terms of member states belonging to more than one REC, and concern linked to reported ambitious aspirations of hegemonic states, such as Nigeria in West Africa, and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. What the foregoing suggests is that underpinning ECOWAS’ objectives of regional integration, security and development, lies the issue of regional citizenship, granting citizens of ECOWAS member states certain freedoms, rights, obligations and a common identity by virtue of their membership of a regional organization. This movement towards regional citizenship in West Africa and the gradual consolidation of democracy and peace hold some significance for other regions of Africa. Of note in this regard is the Horn of Africa, Africa’s most-conflict-affected sub-region (Zewde, 2006: 13), and an arena of intra-state, trans-state, direct and proxy inter-state conflict. Given the disruptions in, and rather slower pace of regional integration in the Horn, and the challenges that such a project faces, the West African case becomes relevant in terms of its experiences so far and the possible lessons that can be drawn from a comparative perspective. In setting about this task, this chapter is divided into four broad parts; the introduction sets out the background for ECOWAS’ quest for regional citizenship and outlines its relevance to the situation in the GHR. Following is a conceptual section that explores the notions of citizenship, citizenship struggles and regional/community citizenship in West Africa. The third section provides insights into the various mechanisms and institutions through which the ECOWAS integration project has promoted and managed a common identity for West Africans based on their membership of a regional organization, and how this has contributed to peace, security and development. The concluding section draws lessons from the ECOWAS project for the situation in the GHR, and makes some recommendations aimed at promoting regional citizenship in that region.

IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP: A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION The notion of citizenship is one that is undergoing some transformation in a rapidly globalizing world. However, at the heart of this transformation is the nexus, or to a large extent the tensions, between identity and citizenship. Such tensions have resurged in Africa in the context of the crisis of the post-colonial nation-state, and assumed greater salience in a postCold War and globalizing world. Sub-national identities (ethnic/racial, religious/sectarian, regional, local/communal) have come to the fore in challenging the legitimacy of the post-colonial state in Africa, partly in protest against exclusion from socio-political and economic rights, the distribution of national resources and access to power, changing demographics and rising unemployment and poverty linked to economic crises. The notion of citizenship is usually defined by commitment, rights 240

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and obligations connected to the membership of a political community (Mullard, 2004: 47), usually a nation-state. It is associated with freedom, equality, and equal access to civil, political and socio-economic rights by virtue of such membership. In Adejumobi’s view, citizenship ‘is a form of social pact, constituted by the dual elements of reciprocity and exchange between the individual (citizen) and the state. The individual enjoys the rights and privileges which no other social or political organization offers, while in turn, he gives his obligations, loyalty and commitment to the state’ (2005: 21). It is important to note that within the context of global transformations, the notion of national citizenship can no longer be taken for granted and that citizenship is being ‘continuously contested and re-defined’ at various sites and levels (Mullard, 2004: 49). Of note is the observation that citizenship struggles can take the form of ‘resistance’, due to ‘contradictory processes of inclusion and exclusion, where some might gain rights and become the “in group” and others become the disadvantaged “out group”’ (Mullard, 2004: 49). What is not mentioned is the role of subnational and transnational non-state actors in seeking to reconstruct the notion of citizenship-based ‘reinvention’ of sovereignty outside of the purview of the state (Obi, 2011). This has become pertinent in some parts of Africa where sub-national identities have played a constructive or subversive role in the binding of citizenship to nation-statism. Some sub-national identity groups have challenged a hegemonic nation-state project that they perceived as unjust, alienating and exploitative, as the case of the Niger Delta insurgency aptly shows (Obi, 2010). This points to the tendency characterized by ‘ethnic nations’ contesting or challenging the legitimacy of a nation-state, or forcefully demanding the re-negotiation of the basis of their belonging to a nation-state based on a clear agreement of rights and obligations, including the right to secede. Mengisteab, drawing on the case of Ethiopia, aptly captures such intra-state flashpoints of conflict as the result of a ‘competition between national citizenship and ethno-national citizenship’(Mengisteab, 2007: 64). The result is that ethnic identity when mobilized in the pursuit of politics interrogates the very notion of nationhood and, by extension, national citizenship, and beyond that has implications for peace, security and development at the local, national and regional levels. The foregoing is further complicated by a situation where some non-state identity groups have found a rapidly changing global context, largely defined by globalization processes and forces that operate below, above and across the state, as being conducive to citizenship struggles as resistance in the quest for self-determination. This perhaps partly explains why in post-Cold war Africa the struggles for citizenship rights have been predominantly shaped by various forms of identity politics, which has in many cases been violent (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 403). This has led to the observation that ‘underlying the litany of identity-based conflicts in Africa is the issue of citizenship rights, a phenomenon that 241

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has been exacerbated by globalization’ (Adejumobi, 2005: 20). The same point is explored by Omotola who focused on the ways in which political globalization has tended to limit the ‘meaning, essence and substance of citizenship, even if the latter is defined from a minimalist perspective of duties-rights relationships’ (Omotola, 2008: 271). Citizenship rights’ struggles in Africa have their roots in the creation of colonial states in Africa by imperial European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when colonial boundaries were imposed upon Africa without regard to the nature of diverse pre-colonial social formations or the wishes and aspirations of the people. Part of the consequences of colonialism was the creation of ethnicity, and its manipulation by the colonial administration to ‘divide and rule’ their subjects and in the process introduce inequalities between and among groups, regions, and sometimes cultures and religious faiths. The inheritance of these interventionist colonial structures and boundaries by post-colonial governments meant that the post-colonial state sought among others to homogenize the diverse political communities it inherited in an attempt to reproduce the western nation-state model in Africa. More often than not, homogenization led to the exclusion of certain groups or entire regions from power, a situation exacerbated by repressive one-party or military rule and the economic crises of the 1970s/1980s culminating in pressures from below for democratic change. In many cases the nation-state which had been captured by a faction of the post-colonial ruling elite became a site of contestation, or an object of attack by excluded groups. Identity became a basis for mobilizing alliances at the clan/communal, local, or regional levels to contest the legitimacy of the state, resist its authority, and demand access, inclusion or the overthrow of an ‘old order’. It is in this regard that ‘the concept of national citizenship, of equal rights, benefits and duties for all citizens has been attenuated or bifurcated, with the state sunk in a cesspool of inter-group struggles and conflicts over the distribution of public goods’ (Adejumobi, 2005: 20). What this suggests also is that the post-colonial state is implicated in the denial of citizenship rights to those considered outsiders, non-citizens or less-than-citizens. While the literature is clear about the legal basis for citizenship, its political basis has been a point of contestation in Africa. Although it is important not to generalize all on-going conflicts on the continent as being completely rooted in the struggle for citizenship rights, the crisis of citizenship constitutes a major factor in intra-state conflicts, frictions and instability in most countries. This has been further complicated by globalization and transnationalization processes and forces that are changing the nature of states, transcending national borders and territories, and transforming the notion of citizenship. One of such processes that is transforming citizenship or imposing a ‘new’ layer on the crisis-ridden notion of national citizenship, is that of regional integration, which in the 242 West African context seeks among other things to create another level

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

of ­citizenship – at the supra-national level, or what may be considered regional ‘community citizenship’. The foregoing raises several issues. Fundamental to this is the prospect for success, given the unfinished business of national citizenship in member states, and the challenges facing the state-led regional integration project itself. If member states are in varying degrees immersed in citizenship struggles between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and the nation-building project continues to lag behind, or is antagonistic to the state-building project, what then should we expect? What kind of regional/community citizens are likely to emerge from such inherently complicated elite-led projects that are buffeted by internal as well as external pressures? It has already been observed that, while ECOWAS has achieved some success on the political and security fronts, it has done so in terms of the citizen’s participatory rights (Adejumobi, 2005: 149) with implications both for ECOWAS citizens and the overall goals of regional integration, including the consolidation and sustainability of peace, democracy and development. The lessons that the journey to regional citizenship in West Africa provides should not be lost on other sub-regions in Africa, particularly the GHR where the crisis of citizenship has been complicated by historical factors and intra- and inter-state conflict.

THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN WEST AFRICA: THE CASE OF ECOWAS The concept of West Africa as a unified sub-region in Africa has its historical parallels in earlier times when the area was roughly defined as the ‘Western Sudan’ or ‘land of the blacks’. At that time the area witnessed the rise and fall of great empires: old Ghana, Mali and Songhai whose influence spanned the southern termini of the trans-Sahara trade routes and cemented the migratory, trade, political and cultural ties between the peoples and social formations of the region. Even when colonialism was imposed on the sub-region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the territories often fell under ‘British’ or ‘French’ West Africa with common regional institutions, some of which have survived until this day. Although most colonized people were regarded as subjects, a few Africans were granted French citizenship. Thus West African people under French, British, and Portuguese colonialism were treated as subjects and had no citizenship rights. Even in the rare case of Senegal where such rights were extended to Africans in four communes – St. Louis, Dakar, Gorée and Rufisqué – it was on the basis of their acceptance of, and assimilation of, French cultural values, and commitment to the French Nation. Thus, the nationalist struggle in West Africa, particularly after the end of the Second World War, brought together the concepts of national freedom (from colonial subjugation) with the self-determination of erstwhile subjects of the French, British and Portuguese colonial empires. In fundamental terms the nationalist struggles were aimed at freeing West 243

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Africans from the yoke of colonial role, but within the confines of boundaries laid down by the colonial powers. The colonial federations in West Africa gradually dissolved first into colonial nation-states, and after the end of colonialism, these new or post-colonial nation-states formed the basis for the transformation of erstwhile colonial subjects into citizens of the newly-independent nation-states. As noted earlier, after the first decade of independence, the broad nationalist coalition that won independence began to disintegrate as the ruling elites consolidated their control of power and the state apparatus, and began to repress those opposed to its concentration of powers, often justified on the grounds of the primacy of national unity and development (Olukoshi, 2011). It was not long before this tendency in some West African countries led to the establishment of one-party states or military regimes that brooked no opposition, and in the process began to alienate sections of the citizenry along political, ethnic, religious, regional, generational and gender lines, thereby undermining the equal rights and opportunities that underpinned the very notion of citizenship and national belonging. It was against the foregoing background that ECOWAS was born in 1975.

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS IDENTITY FORMATION? ECOWAS was established in Lagos, Nigeria on May 28, 1975, when fifteen member states met to sign the ECOWAS Treaty, following the key roles played by two heads of State, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassigbe Eyadema of Togo (Obi, 2009: 120). At its inception ECOWAS’ focus was on a project of West African economic integration and cooperation. The founding fathers of the organization recognized the need to pool efforts in the attempt to achieve economic development through regional cooperation. There was, however, an early recognition of the connection between regional cooperation and development, peace and security in West Africa. Thus, the organization signed ‘two protocols on defence and security: the Protocol on Non-aggression (PNA 1978) and that on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD 1981)’ (Obi, 2009: 121). However the implications of internal pressures for democratic change as well as changes in the world order following the end of the Cold war, including globalization, were not lost on the organization which began, as well as its economic agenda, to take on board political and security issues, leading to the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. Thus, ECOWAS has evolved into a ‘multifaceted regional integration scheme equipped with political and security mechanisms to meet the challenges beyond those presented by a tariff-harmonization organization’ (Dapaah-Agyeman, 2003: 4). The role of ECOWAS in regional peace244 keeping, conflict management, peace and security has been well explored

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

and will not be dealt with in much detail here (but see Adebajo and Rashid, 2004; Aboagye, 1999; Aning, 2000, 2006; Olonisakin, 2004; Bah, 2005; Obi, 2009). Rather the focus will be on those activities and policies that impinge on regional or community citizenship. These include aspects of the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, the revised Treaty of 1993, the 1979 Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (supplementary Protocols in 1982, 1984, 1986, 1989 and 1990), the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Governance (ECOWAS website), the 1991 Protocol of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (additional Protocols of 2005, 2006) and the 1994 Protocol of ECOWAS Parliament (effective 2002). Both the original (1975) and revised (1993) ECOWAS Treaties allude to the notion of community citizenship. Although Ebobrah contends that Article 2(1)d of the 1975 Treaty which commits member states to ‘abolish obstacles to freedom of movement and residence of those regarded as “community citizens”’, did not state this as ‘a right of those citizens’ (Ebobrah, 2008: 10), he does note that the 1993 revised Treaty revolutionized the notion by granting community citizens ‘the right of entry, residence and establishment’. An important aspect of the 1979 Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons Residence and Establishment, relates to the conferment of ‘the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of member states’, and ‘calls on member states to exempt community citizens from holding visitor’s visa and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories’ (ECOWAS website). In this regard, ECOWAS launched a Travel Certificate Scheme for all ECOWAS citizens, and has since 2008 made available an ECOWAS e-Passport which has so far been implemented by ‘nine of its fifteen member states’ (Udo, 2011). The trend towards a ‘borderless ECOWAS’ underscores steps towards community citizenship. Admittedly this is a limited version of citizenship but as this chapter will later show it underscores the point of the close nexus between regional identity and integration. The spirit of community citizenship and identity also pervades all post-1993 ECOWAS Protocols. In particular, the 1999 and 2001 Protocols granted the organization the right to intervene in member countries whenever there was a breach of the provisions of the Protocols or a threat to peace and security in the region. It also meant that citizens of ECOWAS countries had citizenship rights by virtue of national membership of the organization and with regard to specific provisions of its protocols. However, the realization of those rights has tended to lag behind the institutional architecture, which is still subordinated to the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. In an instructive study on the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) in relation to human rights of ECOWAS citizens, Ebobrah notes that before 1993, the ECCJ had no real jurisdiction over human rights cases as they affected individual community citizens. At that point its 245

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jurisdiction was limited to the main principles of international law, to the exclusion of human rights. However, this situation changed by 2005 when the Protocol was amended to give the ECCJ jurisdiction over cases of the ‘violation of human rights that might occur in any member state’ (Ebobrah, 2008: 17). In addition ECOWAS citizens had the right to sue member states. Examples of individuals and organizations that have taken governments/member states to the ECCJ are well documented (Ebobrah, 2008: 16–17; Interrights, 2009). In a celebrated case the ECCJ ruled in 2008 that the Niger government had failed in its duties to protect a woman, Hadijatou Mani, from slavery, and asked that she be paid 10 million CFA Francs as compensation (Rice, 2008; Interrights, 2009). In the same vein, the court in its ruling in a case brought by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), a Nigerian NGO, against the Nigerian government ‘declared that all Nigerians are entitled to education as a legal and human right’ (SERAP, 2011; Odepeju, 2011). This trend provides concrete evidence that ECOWAS citizens can pursue the enforcement of their rights at a court of jurisdiction at a level above their nation states; what is, however, yet to be seen, is the extent of compliance by member states to rulings of the ECCJ. Exploring the issue further Ebobrah notes the existence of a gap between the ECCJ and the national courts of ECOWAS member states. Specifically, the ‘ECCJ has no direct relationship with the courts of member states and does not consider itself a court of appeal or a court of cassation over decisions of national courts’ (Ebobrah, 2008: 18). What this implies is a certain level of disconnect in the pursuit of citizenship rights at the community and national levels. It, however, suggests that some space still exists for connecting the national and community levels in West Africa, and that the citizenship project at the regional level still remains a work-in-progress. Another institution that is relevant to the community citizenship project is the ECOWAS parliament, which is ‘an Assembly of the peoples of the community’, and made up of their ‘representatives’ (ECOWAS, 2006: 6). The parliament is made up of 115 seats on the basis of population size, and is a consultative assembly for a range of issues including citizenship, civil and political rights, and other aspects of the integration project. Although it is conceived as a forum for discussions and representation of the people of West Africa in the context of regional integration, there are no direct elections from constituencies delineated in member states; rather, politicians in elected national parliaments elect members from among themselves into the ECOWAS parliament. What this implies is that, until a time when members of the ECOWAS parliament are directly elected, and the assembly assumes legislative powers, the effectiveness of the body and its ability to represent the citizens of the community will remain circumscribed. What the foregoing does confirm are the parallel processes of citizenship struggles at various levels in West Africa. Although all levels are 246 being impacted upon by globalization, the struggles for citizenship rights

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

have become more pertinent to regional peace, democracy, and development. If globalization is ‘rapidly redefining the notion of citizenship away from national frontiers to the supranational level’ (Adejumobi, 2005: 23) in other parts of the world, the picture that emerges from West Africa is more complex. Adejumobi also makes the point that it is ‘when citizenship rights and benefits are largely denied and the state seems out of reach, that pluralism may be subversive [to] the state’ (2001, 2005: 24). What is, however, important to note is that the state in West Africa remains central to the citizenship project at the various levels of struggle. There is evidence that civil society groups are playing a key role in the struggle for these rights and placing pressure on the states of the region. The prospects for progress in terms of citizenship will ultimately depend on democratic participation of the people in political and civil institutions and decision-making. In this regard citizenship rights cannot be divorced from the quest for freedom, equality and democratic development on an inclusive, socially just and equitable basis. It will require a new social contract based on dialogue between the diverse groups and countries that make up the region, and ultimately the democratization of ECOWAS from its current status where power is concentrated in the hands of the heads of state and government.

LESSONS FROM ECOWAS FOR THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA As earlier noted, the Horn of Africa is widely regarded as ‘Africa’s most conflict-prone region’ (Samatar and Machaka, 2006: 26; Mengisteab, 2011). Many commentators are of the view that these conflicts are linked to competing and conflicting identities and the unfinished business of nation building (Bereketeab, 2007; Mesfin, 2006; Ahmed, 2006). Zewde conceptualizes this as ‘embattled identity’, noting that ‘the question of identity – clan, ethnic, national/regional lies at the roots of all the conflicts’ (Zewde, 2006: 14). The history of the conflicts in the Horn has been well explored and will not be repeated here (see Zewde, 2006: 13–25; Samatar and Machaka, 2006: 26–55; Schlee and Watson, 2007). The nature and dimensions of conflict in the Horn have been identified broadly as ‘intra-state, inter-state and regional’ (Samatar and Machaka, 2006: 26–55; Mengisteab, 2011). Almost every country in the Greater Horn Region, perhaps with the exception of Kenya, has experienced large-scale internal conflict. Samatar and Machaka also identify the following cases or flashpoints of inter-state conflicts: Kenya-Somalia, Ethiopia-Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Eritrea-Sudan, Ethiopia-Sudan, and Uganda-Sudan. They also note, however, that these conflicts are all inter-linked and complex. Moving beyond the narrative of ‘embattled identities’, they point to the role of ruling elites as drivers of conflict, by noting that ‘despite the heavy human cost of hostilities, political leaders in the Horn seem unwilling to make compromises within and between 247

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countries that would result in a better future for the region’s citizens’ (Samatar and Machaka, 2006: 26). Thus, in some respects, the situation in the Horn is similar though not identical with that in West Africa in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. While the role of identity differences, competition and conflict are writ large in these complex conflicts, care must be taken not to foreclose the role of other critical factors both internal and external to the two regions. Indeed the fundamental issue may not be the conflict between different identity groups, but rather the histories, kinds of states and ruling elites, power relations, manipulation and global-local dialectics that drive conflict, which may assume an ethnic or religious appearance. The regional peace and security architecture of the Horn is very much work in progress. Indeed some commentators refer to it as ‘emerging’. Fentaw goes to the extent of quoting de Waal’s view that ‘the political conditions for … the building of a robust sub-regional architecture for peace and security have not existed and do not appear imminent’ (de Waal, 2007:1 cited in Fentaw, 2010: 1). Although the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) recorded some modest success regarding the facilitation of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 which marked the end of the Sudanese civil war, and has been instrumental in the talks leading to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, the Horn still has some way to go in institutionalizing virile peace and security mechanisms. The obstacles to building a strong basis for peace and security in the Horn of Africa has been identified by de Waal as ‘the lack of internal peace in most countries, the fact that internal conflicts are rarely contained within the borders of one country, the absence of a stable and consensual regional power order, the disputed legitimacy of states and governments and the inability of democratic processes to provide legitimacy, dependency on foreign financiers and especially the US (and EU), and the lack of autonomy of key multilateral institutions’ (de Waal, 2007, 12, cited in Fentaw, 2010: 2). The foregoing suggests that the picture of citizenship struggles in the countries of the GHR is much more complex, and that regional citizenship is yet at its early stages, for the time being.2 Yet, the proneness to violent conflict requires a strong move towards conflict prevention, management and resolution, while peace is necessary for development and security in the region. Both IGAD and the EAC have recently taken steps towards freedoms associated with regional citizenship; in this regard, the countries of the GHR can tap into some of the lessons from the ECOWAS experience.  The East African Community (EAC) on November 20, 2011, signed a Common Market Protocol (effective from July 2010) that among other things allows for the ‘free movement of Persons, Labour, Services and the Right of Establishment’, see East African Community website, www. eac.int/component/content/351.html?task=view (accessed 13 April 2012). In July 2011, IGAD announced the Terms of Reference for a study on free movement of persons in the IGAD region, www.eac.int/component/docman/doc_details/618-igad-eoi-development-of-the-protocolon-free-movement-of-persons-in-the-igad-region.htmlplugins/system/facebookXD.html and http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=63&It emid=159 (both accessed 26 April 2012). 2

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The factoring-in of regional/community citizenship into the regional integration project is an important lesson from the ECOWAS experience. Given the nature of intra- and inter-state conflicts in the Horn, the move towards community citizenship would reduce some of the tensions linked to colonially-inherited boundaries, ease mobility of people, goods and capital and foster development. Although it may raise security concerns, it will also likely lead to the building of mechanisms at the regional level to address such tensions. Some commentators have observed that part of the problem in the GHR is the lack of an ‘undisputed’ regional hegemon to provide leadership for the integration project as in the case of West Africa with Nigeria (Fentaw, 2010: 2), and Southern Africa with South Africa.3 Such commentators appear to focus on one side of the coin, without focusing on the costs of the so-called regional hegemon. The lesson from West Africa’s experience is that Nigeria, after certain difficulties connected with resistance by its Francophone neighbours (and the strategic interests of France),4 has learned to consult with, and build consensus with, the tacit agreement of other ECOWAS leaders (across the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone blocs), a process that can, admittedly with some challenges, be done in the GHR if the political will and openness required are imbibed by the regions’ leaders. It would to some extent require cooperation among states like Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan working hard to build a cohesive consensus on approaching the issues of regional citizenship, peace, development and security in the Greater Horn. It has also been noted that overlapping membership of regional economic communities – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Arab League – undermines the commitment of member states to the diverse goals of the organizations they belong to, and weakens the basis for cooperation (Fentaw, 2010: 2). This in a way is similar to the situation in West Africa in the first two decades of ECOWAS’ existence when it was seen as a largely Anglophone organization dominated by Nigeria, rivalled by the Francophone bloc’s Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO). The Francophone bloc was believed to be under the influence of its former colonial power, France, which was keen to retain its sphere of influence in the subregion. However, since the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, the Anglophone-Francophone divide has considerably narrowed, alongside the reduced perception of Nigerian dominance (Obi, 2009: 131; Adebajo, 2008: 198). In the same way integration projects in the GHR can close ranks and prioritize the main regional organization to act as the engine of  There are some that argue to the contrary, pointing to Ethiopia as an aspiring hegemon in the Horn of Africa. 3

 Recent developments such as the role of ECOWAS in the mediation of the Ivorian post-election crisis, and its role in ensuring the return to democratic rule in Guinea and Niger, show that the Anglophone-Francophone divide, including concerns about Nigerian domination of the region have considerably reduced. 4

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cooperation alongside the reduction of the influence of external powers in the region. Lastly, the notion of regional citizenship need not wait until the crisis linked to ‘competing citizenships’ at the national and sub-national levels is entirely resolved. A lot of benefits can accrue from taking incremental steps towards, for example, IGAD citizenship as a unifying policy initiative that would serve as a strong anchor for regional unity, peace, development and security. Just as ECOWAS has connected common citizenship to regional integration and development, the Horn can learn some lessons from the example of its West African counterpart, and adapt this to suit its own circumstances. A citizen-centred project of regional integration cannot be achieved overnight, as the West African case clearly shows, but it offers a potential basis for ‘reconfiguring identities’ (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007: 11), in ways that are likely to promote conflict prevention, resolution, democracy, peace, development and security in both regions.

CONCLUSION While the countries of both West Africa and the Greater Horn are facing citizenship struggles of varying intensities, West Africa has recorded some modest progress at the regional level and the Greater Horn countries have also commenced movement towards regional citizenship. This is with regard to regional citizenship through the enactment and updating of several Protocols. It should be underscored, however, that ECOWAS still faces formidable hurdles on its path to achieving community citizenship. As Adejumobi points out, ‘ECOWAS has become an over-centralised and over-politicised bureaucracy, alienating and widening, rather than closing the gaps between governments and the governed’. He further makes the point that the organization’s ‘success in the political and security spheres’ is not matched in terms of citizenship participation which remains ‘abysmally low’ (Adejumobi, 2005: 149). The fundamental question is, what lessons are there for the Greater Horn Region if West Africa with its reportedly sophisticated peace and security architecture still faces formidable challenges in its quest for community citizenship? Perhaps the question that should be posed is how can citizenship rights be extended equally to the people of African countries? In what ways can identities be connected to new equitable social contracts that also prioritize equal representation, participation, social justice and peace at the local, national and regional levels? The real challenge perhaps lies in the prospects for transforming identities away from politicized ethnic and cultural differences, and power relations that marginalize the ‘others’. There will be no easy answers and the project of regional community citizenship cannot really take root outside of the resolution of the 250 democratic and nation-state questions at all levels of African society.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?

The task of peeling back the identity layering of deep-seated grievances, contradictions and resistance that drive many of the citizenship strugglesas-resistance remains a challenging analytical endeavour that needs to be undertaken to get to the roots of the complex conflicts and tensions that divert energies and resources from progressive nation and state building, and towards often wasteful and unproductive ends. It is important to note that the democratic participation of citizens lies at the core of regional community participation. Given its rather turbulent history and the nature of the leadership in the countries of the Horn, the struggle for community citizenship will have to be waged from the grassroots requiring civil society and social movements mobilizing the necessary support, resources and ideas for change. In the final analysis the ruling elites in West Africa and the Horn need to develop the political will to cooperate in the pursuit of common interests, and build the capacity to serve, and respect the civil, political and socio-economic rights of the people. It is only through the democratic empowerment of the people that they can be transformed into true citizens at the various levels, which should ideally not be antagonistic to each other, but rather complementary, acting as a basis for connecting the ‘national’ to the ‘regional’ as a sustainable basis for a people-centred culture of democratic development, peace and development in Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aboagye, Festus (ed.). 1999. ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia. Accra: Sedco. Adebajo, Adekeye. 2008. ‘Mad Dogs and Glory: Nigeria’s Intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Raufu Mustapha (eds), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Adebajo, Adekeye and Ismail Rashid (eds). 2004. West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. Boulder CO and London: Lynne Rienner. Adejumobi, Said. 2001. ‘Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Internal Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa’, Human Rights Quarterly 23(1): 148–70. – 2005. ‘Identity, Citizenship and Conflict: The African Experience’, in W. Alade Fawole and Charles Ukeje (eds), The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, Dakar: CODESRIA. Ahmed, Khalifa. 2006. ‘Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State’, in Friedrich Boll Foundation (ed.), In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region: The Role of Intellectuals and Scholars. Nairobi: Friedrich Boll Foundation Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa. 251

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Aning, E. Kwesi. 2006. ‘Africa, Confronting Complex Threats: Coping with Crisis’, IPA Working Paper Series, New York: International Peace Academy. – 2000. ‘Towards the New Millennium: ECOWAS’s evolving conflict management system’, African Security Review 9 (5/6). Bah, M. 2005. ‘West Africa: From a Security Complex to a Complex Community’, African Security Review 14(2). Bereketeab, Redie. 2007. Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890–1991, Trenton NJ and Asmara: Red Sea Press. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), www. comesa.int. Dapaah-Agyeman, Joshua. 2003. ‘Transformation of ECOWAS as a Security Apparatus and Its Implications in Ghana’s Political Orientation, 1990–2000’, African and Asian Studies 2(1). de Waal, Alex. 2007. ‘In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the Horn of Africa’, in Report of the Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, organized jointly by CPRD and IAG, March 12–13, Addis Ababa. East African Community (EAC). www.eac.int. Ebobrah, Solomon. 2008. A Critical Analysis of the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. Copenhagen: The Danish Institute of Human Rights, Research Partnership. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ‘Discover ECOWAS’, www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=protocole& lang=en (accessed 19 April 2012). –  2006. ECOWAS Parliament: Protocols, Decisions and Regulation. Available at www.parl.ecowas.int/document/protocols.pdf (accessed 13 April 2012). –  2009, November 23–26. ‘Regional Report of Education, Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, Commission for Human Development and Gender’ (October 2009), for the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union (COMEDAF IV). Mombasa. Fentaw, Alemayehu. 2010. ‘A Nascent Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges’, Horn of Africa Bulletin 22(3). Hagg, Gerard and Peter Kagwanja. 2007. ‘Identity and Peace: Reconfiguring Conflict Resolution in Africa’, African Journal of Conflict Resolution 7(2). Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). http://igad.int. International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interrights). 2009, ‘Hadijatou Mani v Niger’. Available at www.interights. org/niger-slavery (accessed 19 April 2012). Manby, Bronwen. 2009. Struggles for Citizenship in Africa. London: Zed Books. Mengisteab, Kidane. 2007. ‘Identity Politics, Democratization and State building in Ethiopia’s Federal Arrangement’, African Journal of 252

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Conflict Resolution 7(2): 63–92. – 2011. ‘Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts’. NAI Discussion Paper 67. Mesfin, Dawit. 2006. ‘Africa’s forgotten human rights crisis: The Eritrean crisis’, in Friedrich Boll Foundation (ed.), In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region: The Role of Intellectuals and Scholars, Nairobi: Friedrich Boll Foundation Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa. Mullard, Maurice. 2004. The Politics of Globalisation and Polarisation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. 2004. ‘Citizenship, Political Violence, and Democratization in Africa’, Global Governance 10(4): 403–409. Obi, Cyril. 2007. ‘Perspectives on Côte d’Ivoire: Between Political Breakdown and Post-Conflict Peace’. Nordic Africa Institute Discussion Paper 39. – 2008. ‘Nigeria’s foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26(2): 213–22. – 2009. ‘Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte D’Ivoire’, African Security 2(2): 119–35. – 2010. ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies XXX (1–2). – 2011. ‘Oil, Transnational Energy Security and Contested Sovereignties in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Montreal March 16–19. Odepeju, Kola. 2011. ‘ECOWAS Court Judgment on Free Basic Education’, The Nation (Lagos). Available at www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/ index.php/editorial/opinion/7115-ecowas-court-judgment-onfree-basic-education.html (accessed 19 April 2012). Olonisakin, Funmi. 2004. ‘Windows of Opportunity for Conflict Prevention: Responding to Regional Conflict in West Africa’, Conflict, Security and Development 4(2): 181–98. Olukoshi. Adebayo. 2011. ‘Democratic Governance and Accountability in Africa: In Search of a Workable Framework’. NAI Discussion Paper 64. Omotola, J. Shola. 2008. ‘Political Globalisation and Citizenship: New Sources of Security Threats in Africa’, Journal of African Law 52(2): 268–83. Rice, Xan. 2008. ‘Court finds Niger Guilty of Slavery in Landmark Decision’, The Guardian, October 27. Available at www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2008/oct/27/niger-slavery-africa (accessed 19 April 2012). Samatar, Abdi and Waqo Machaka. 2006. ‘Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach’, in Friedrich Boll Foundation (ed.), In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region: The Role of Intellectuals and Scholars, Nairobi: Friedrich Boll Foundation Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa. 253

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Schlee, Günther and Elizabeth Watson (eds). 2007. Changing Identifications and Alliances in North East Africa. New York: Berghahn. Social-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) ‘ECOWAS Court to FG: Nigerians have a right to education’. Available at www. serap-nigeria.org/cover/ecowas-court-to-fg-nigerians-have-a-legalright-to-education (accessed 19 April 2012). Udo, Bassey. 2011, May 25 ‘ECOWAS Insists on Borderless Regional Protocol’, Next. Formerly (but no longer) available at http://234next. com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5555513147/ecowas_insists_on_ borderless_regional_protocol.csp (accessed May 25, 2011). Zewde, Bahru. 2006. ‘Embattled Identity in Northeast Africa: A Comparative Essay’, in Friedrich Boll Foundation (ed.), In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region: The Role of Intellectuals and Scholars. Nairobi: Friedrich Boll Foundation Regional Office, East and Horn of Africa.

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Index Abdallah, A.A. 32 Abdulkadir, Fowsia 51-65 Abdulla Muhammed 146 Abebe, Tsion Tadesse 138 Aboagye, Festus 245 Absieh, Omar Warsama 94 Abu Sin, M.E. 81 Abyssinia 11, 144-9 Acholi 8, 55, 88-9, 92 ACP 18, 201 Adam, H. 35 Adano, Wario Roba 82-3 Adebajo, Adekaye 245, 249 Adejumobi, Said 238, 241-3 passim, 247, 250 Adelman, Howard 189 Aden, Gulf of 181, 187, 188 Adler, E. 136 Afar 7, 8, 12, 54, 85, 88, 92-3, 128 African Futures 38 African Peer Review Mechanism 11 African Standby Force 180 African Union 41, 136, 184; Mission in Somalia 115, 184, 185 Agamben, G. 72 Agence France Presse 187 Ager, A. 97 agreements: Addis Ababa (1972) 116; Algiers (2000) 114; anti-piracy 187; Comprehensive Peace (2005) 117, 182-3, 239, 248; EU-ACP 18; Ghana-Upper Volta Trade (1962) 195; Mediation (1984) 199, 228, 229; preferential trade 200; Regional Trading 200-11, 222-7 passim agriculture 12, 18, 39, 40; policy 226 agro-pastoralism 77, 78, 85 Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar M. 182, 183 Ahmed, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf 159 Ahmed, Khalifa 247 Ahmed, M.A. 81, 87 Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 184

Alexander, Neville 59 Alliance for Restoration of Peace and CounterTerrorism 186 Alwy, Alwiyah 32 Ameyo, Dan K. 173-5, 177-9 passim Amhara 33, 54, 57, 58, 143-9, 156-63 passim Amisi, B.K. 84 Anderson, Benedict 26, 28, 29, 129 Andrzejewski, B.W. and Sheila 150 Aning, E. Kwasi 245 Ansu-Kyeremeh, K. 151 Anuak 12, 14, 55, 89 Anya-Nya 116 Apuuli, Kasaija P. 179, 180, 185 Arabs 55, 116, 145; - League 143, 249 Armstrong, John 26, 29 Arta conference 183 Asad, T. 81, 87 ASEAN 137, 208 Asiwaju, A.I. 85, 86, 90 asylum-seekers 69-71 passim, 74, 85, 94, 96-103 passim Attiyah, Hassan 101 Australia 120, 155 Auty, R.M. 80 Awdal, Sultanate of 144-5 Axumite Empire 119, 125-9 passim Baggara 87-8 Bah, M. 245 Bakewell, O. 98 Balassa, Béla 197, 205 Bariagaber, Assefaw 111-32 Barre, Siad 58, 115, 125, 153, 159 Barth, Fredrik 87 Basseri 87 BBC 13, 72 Beck, U. 29 Beja 6-8 passim, 55, 128 Bellamy, R. 30

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa belonging 88-97 Bendix, R. 29 Beni Amer 33, 79, 85, 88, 95, 101 Berbera 161 Bereketeab, Redie 25-49, 173-94, 247 Berry, J.W. 97 Bok, Sissela 164 Boran/Borona 14-15, 85, 88 Botrol, Maurice 94 boundaries 6-8, 12, 14-16 passim, 74, 77, 78, 84-90 passim, 93, 95, 113-17 passim, 133, 135, 144, 242, 244, 249; Ethiopia-Eritrea – Commission 114; social 6, 26, 89 Bourenane, Naceur 16 Brass, Paul R. 26 Breuilly, John 26 Britain/UK 56, 116, 147, 183, 195, 243; British Somaliland 114, 149, 156 Brown, I. 81, 84 Brubaker, R. 25, 26, 29 Budarick, John 155 Bull-Christiansen, L. 29 Burstein, S. 125, 126 Burton, Sir Richard 150 Burundi 3, 60, 180, 200, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 226

256

Campbell, E.H. 99-100 Canada 61, 120 capital 9, 206, 216; social 80 CEAO, 249 CEN-SAD 18 Chalk, Frank 153 Christianity 7, 127-9 passim, 164, 165 Christians, Clifford 164, 165 CIA World Factbooks 134 citizenship 5, 6, 8-9, 19, 25-35, 53-8, 70-3 passim, 97-8; community 237-51; definition 25-34 passim, 37; formation 33-7 passim, 134; rights 8-10 passim, 25, 27, 69-73 passim, 111, 112, 237, 238, 240-7 passim, 250 civil society organizations 4, 129, 130, 178, 247 Civitas 139 CJTF-HOA 180, 187 clans 6, 9, 14, 55, 159-60 see also individual entries Clark, J. 29, 31 Clay, J.W. 99 Cliffe, Lionel 14, 25, 84, 181, 190 Clinton, President Bill 135 Cohen, Elizabeth 70, 71

Coleman, James 80 Collier, Paul 80, 81 colonialism 10, 11, 32, 34, 51-60, 84-6 passim, 113, 116, 123-4, 133, 146-9, 199, 242; pre34, 85; post- 34, 51, 55-8, 149-50, 195, 199, 242-4 passim COMECON 207 COMESA 18, 200, 208, 225, 227, 249 common market 202, 203, 208, 209, 211, 217, 224 commonalities 26, 27, 112, 124, 127, 128 communications 17, 18, 40 conflicts 3-6, 9-16 passim, 25, 33, 42-4 passim, 51, 52, 55, 57-62 passim, 74, 81, 86, 112-22 passim, 133, 134, 139, 140, 175, 179-80, 220, 237-42, 247-50 passim see also war; CEWARN 179-80, 185, 187; HIIK Barometer 82; prevention 179-81 passim, 248, 250; resolution 5, 17, 42, 43, 83, 137, 179, 181, 185, 248, 250 Connor, W. 27 constructivism 26, 28-30 passim Cooper, F. 25, 26, 29 costs, of integration 222-3 Côte d’Ivoire 237-9 passim Coutin, Susan 71-3 passim Craddock, A. 135 Cuba 115, 143 culture 6, 7, 11, 91, 111, 112, 136, 163-6, 222; multiculturalism 61; pluralism 123-32 passim Cunnison, I. 81, 87 Cushite, Empire 125-7 passim Customs Union 195, 202-4 passim, 209-10, 225, 228; Equatorial (1962) 195; SACU 16, 195; Southern Rhodesia 195 see also EAC da Gama, Cristovao 145 Dahl, Robert A. 52, 61-2 Danakil 145 Dapaah-Agyeman, Joshua 244 Dar 81 Darfur 13, 84, 121, 134, 182, 183 Davidson, B. 32 Davies, Reginald 88 de Lombaerde, Philippe 4 de Soysa, J. 81 de la Torre, A. 225 de Waal, Alex 248 deconstructivism 29, 30 deforestation 3, 138, 173 degradation, environmental 3, 5, 13, 14, 19, 74, 78, 138, 173

Index Delgado-Moreira, J.M. 36, 38 democracy/democratization 15, 52, 61, 62, 66, 111, 189, 243, 247, 250 Democratic Republic of Congo 52, 153 Deng, Francis M. 182 Denmark 216, 217 Dervish movement 147-8 desertification 3, 173, 174; UN Convention to Combat 174 de-territorialization 35 Deutsche, Karl W. 4 development 11-12, 128-9, 175, 188, 195-7 passim, 207, 209, 222, 223, 226, 241, 243, 244, 248-50 passim Dewey, John 154 Dhodan, Abdulla M. 146, 157 Di John, J. 80 diaspora 31, 34 see also refugees Dinle, Olol 149 Diredawa 88 discrimination 222, 225, 238 displaced 3, 13, 79, 86, 92, 120, 121, 173; IDPs 3, 13, 134, 139, 173 diversity 15, 51-62, 133-42 passim, 238 Djibouti 7, 12, 13, 32, 54, 60, 85, 88, 89, 92-3, 99, 102, 114, 129, 134, 135, 173, 179, 183-6 passim; Peace Process 184 domination/ hegemony 15, 33, 57, 144, 249 donors 173, 174, 178 Doornbos, M. 83 Dorman, Sara 25, 59 Dosenrode, Soren 5 Draper, Peter 16 drought 3, 74, 82-3, 133-6 passim, 173, 174 Dugasse, Begna F. 56, 57 East African Community 16, 20, 195-202, 207-31, 248, 249; - Common Market 199, 202; - Common Services Organization 228, 229; - Cooperation 199, 230; - Customs Union 198, 202, 207, 209-10, 228; Economic Community 111; Free Trade Area 209, 210; Legislative Assembly 226; Permanent Tripartite Commission 230; Treaty 202, 207, 221, 230 Eastern African Standby Brigade 180 Ebobrah, Solomon 245-6 economic factors 5, 16-19 passim, 39-40, 111, 112, 128-9, 195-235 economic communities, regional 188, 237-51 Economic Union 203; Total 204 ECOWAS 16, 20, 137, 227, 237-51; Community Court of Justice 245-6; Parliament

246; Protocols 244, 245, 250; treaties 237, 244, 245 education 19, 43, 133-42; curriculum bias committee 137-8; infusion 139 Ekeh, Peter 27, 34 El-Affendi, Abdelwahab 173-5 passim, 177, 178, 181-6 passim, 188, 189 El-Battahani, Atta 12, 51 elites 12, 25, 28, 38, 39, 57-8, 60, 123-5 passim, 238, 239, 242, 244, 247-8, 251 Elmi, Afyar Abdi 183 Encarta Encyclopaedia 51 Englund, Harri 59 Eriksen, T.H. 26, 29, 91-2 passim Eritrea 7, 12-14 passim, 32, 42, 54, 75, 76, 79, 85, 94-5, 100-2, 113-15 passim, 118, 120-2, 129, 134, 135, 174, 179, 182, 185-6, 189; ELF 114, 115, 118, 119, 174-6 passim; EPLF 95, 114, 115, 118; war with Ethiopia 12, 103, 113-15 passim, 118, 120-1, 128, 180, 185-6 Ethiopia 7, 9, 11-15 passim, 18, 30, 32, 33, 42, 52, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61, 76, 79, 80, 85, 95, 99, 102, 113-22 passim, 129, 134, 135, 138, 143-66 passim, 173, 174, 182-6 passim, 189, 190, 240, 241, 249; Anglo-Ethiopian treaty (1954) 114; civil war in 9, 13, 14, 120; EPRDF 116, 174; EPRF 116; ERTA 152; Revolution 114, 115; war with Eritrea 12, 103, 113-15 passim, 118, 120-1, 128, 180, 185-6, with Somalia 114-15, 118, 144-66 passim ethnic groups 8, 9, 11, 32, 52-5, 88-9, 144-5,238 see also individual entries ethnicity 6-9 passim, 26-7, 242; ethnonationalism 37; ethnosymbolism 26, 28-30 passim Etling, A. 137 EURATOM 40 European Common Market 111; - Community 207; - Free Trade Area 207; - Union 18, 36, 38-42 passim, 44, 51, 111, 113, 136, 181, 187, 189, 201, 205, 207, 208, 223 Evans, Peter 60 Ewing, J. 119 exclusion 238, 240-2 passim Eyadema, Gnassigbe 244 famine 3, 74, 134-6 passim, 173 Fanon, Frantz 56 Fanso, V.G. 85, 86 Fanta, E. 38-40 passim Featherstone, M. 29, 30, 35

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa federalism, ethnic 61 Fentaw, Alemayehu, 248, 249 Fine, J. 16 food security/insecurity 3, 135, 174, 175 Forbes Martin, S. 99 Foucault, Michel 73 France 147, 243, 249; French Somaliland 149 Free Trade Areas 203, 205, 207, 209-10 Freire, Paul 57 Fukuyama, F. 80 Fur 33, 55 Galla 145 Gallagher, D. 99 Galowdewon 145 Gambela region 13, 14 Gamson, William A. 155 Gandhi, Mahatma 165 Garang, John 182 GATS 206, 207 GATT 206-7 Geertz, C. 7, 26 Gellner, Ernest 26, 28, 29 Gerson, Michael 183 Geshekter, Charles L. 52 al-Ghazi, Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim (Ahmed Gran/Gurrey) 145-6 GHHF 4, 52, 130, 164 Gilleran, D. 137 Girma, Haimanot 162 Glick Schiller, N. 70 globalization 30, 32, 111, 240-2 passim, 246-7 governance 9-10, 51-62 passim, 122, 135, 204, 209, 220; Ibrahim Index of 112, 122 Gowon, Yokubu 244 Greeley, A. 135 Greenfield, L. 29 Griffiths, I. 86 Guibernau, M. 32 Guinea Bissau 52, 237 Gujji 14 Gulf States 137 Gurage 7, 54

258

Habab 85, 88, 95, 101 Habtu, Alem 32 Hadandowa/Hedareb 88, 101 Hadrawi, Mohamad Ibrahim Warsame 156 Hagg, Gerard 250 Haile Selassie, Emperor 58, 148, 152 Hammond, L. 98 Hargeisa 156, 158, 161-3 passim Harir, S. 32

Harrison, M.N. 80, 81, 87-8 Hassan, Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle 147-8 Hassen, Mohammed 12 Haud area 114 Hawiye 33 Hayes, K. O’C. 81 Healy, Sally 174, 178, 180, 183, 185 Heater, D. 8 Heinesen, Peter Johan 96 Herz, M. 99, 100 Hiemenz, U. 205 hierarchies 51-3, 56-9 passim, 62, 144 history 41-4 passim, 62, 112, 124-7, 130, 144-9 Hobsbawm, Eric 26, 28, 29 Hoeffler, A. 81 Homer-Dixon, T. 80 Hooghe, L. 26, 38-40 passim, 42 Horn of Africa Bulletin 82-3 Horowitz, D. 27 Horst, C. 96, 100 Human Development Index 112, 121, 122 human rights 52, 58, 190, 245-6 Human Rights Watch 99 Hunt, A. 27, 29, 31, 35 Huntington, S. 119 Hussein, A.M. 87 Hutchinson, John 26, 29 identity 4-16, 25-44, 51-62, 88-97, 123-9, 237-51 passim; and citizenship 6-10, 27-35, 240-4 passim; definition 25-34 passim, 37; formation 33-7 passim, 42, 91, 92, 244-7 passim, inter-identity relations 111-30 passim; markers 6-10 passim, 111, 123-30; regional 43, 136-7, 245; subnational 241 ideology 17, 57, 90, 92, 207, 209 IGAD 4, 19-20, 39, 136, 173-94, 248-50 passim; CEWARN 179-80, 185, 187; Declaration of Principles 182; ICPAT/ISSP 187; InterParliamentary Union 177-8; objectives 175; Partners Forum 173, 181; Peace Support Mission 183; Secretariat 177-80 passim, 191; structure 176-9, 189; Subregional Action Plan 174 IGADD 173-4; Friends of 173, 181 Ignatieff, Michael 112 immigration 90, 224; - and Refugee Board of Canada 94 inclusion 241, 242 income 78, 79 Indian Ocean 188 Indonesia 139

Index inequalities 10-12 passim, 57, 58, 224, 238, 242 inflation 217-18 infrastructure 17, 40 instability 134-6, 139, 188, 210, 220-1, 242 institutions 6, 7, 12, 38, 41, 44, 60, 81, 84 see also individual entries integration, invisible 77-98, 102; national 52; regional 3-6, 15-19, 35-41, 111, 128-9, 175, 178, 188, 190-1,195-231 passim, 240, 242-3, 245, 249-50, bottom-up 38-41 passim, 44; top-down 38-9, 41, 44 International Crisis Group 115, 185, 186 Interrights 246 investment 39, 205, 206, 216, 222; FDI 216, 225 invisibility 69-73, 88-9, 98, 99, 103 Islam 7, 127-9 passim, 136, 144, 145, 164, 165, 184 Islamic Courts Union 14, 183, 184, 186 Israel 201 Issa/Isa 14, 88 Italy 143, 147, 149; Italian Somaliland 114, 149 Al Ithihad movement 186 Jaali 33 James, P. 32 James, William 154 Japanese Self-Defense Force 187 Johnson, G.R. 27 Jones, R.A. 99 Kagwanja, Peter 250 Kakwa 8, 85, 88, 92 Kalakla 75 Kalenjin 55, 84 Karadawi, A. 79, 95, 97, 99 Karam. Karam M. 75 Karamoja/Karamojong 55, 89, 181 Karimi, M. 99 Keenan, Jeremy H. 181, 185, 186 Keller, Edmund J. 52, 60 Kelly, M.R. 205 Kenya 7, 9, 12-14 passim, 32, 55, 79-81 passim, 84, 85, 88, 89, 95, 99-100, 102, 135, 138, 149, 173, 181-3 passim, 198, 199, 209, 215-20 passim, 224, 225, 249 Kenyatta, Jomo 84 Khalid, M. 116 Kibreab, Gaim 69-110 Kikuyu 33, 55, 84 King, Martin Luther 165

kinship 6, 9, 11, 15, 27, 144 knowledge, indigenous 56 Kobayashi, M. 140 Kobishchaniv, Y. 126, 127 Kopytoff, Igor 86 Kordufan 33 Kritzinger-van Niekerk, Lolette 16, 17 Kruger, M. 135 bin Laden, Osama 186 Ladefoged, Peter 54 Lake, David A. 60 land 3, 10-13 passim, 33, 60, 83, 84, 128-9, 135, 218-20 passim; grazing 80, 88, 135, 219 Langhammer, R. 205 language 6, 7, 9, 54, 127, 152; ethno-linguistic groups 32, 127 see also individual entries law, customary 56; trade 206-8 passim, 210-11 Le Billon, P, 81 Lebna Dengel, Emperor 144, 145 Lewis, I.M. 81, 146 Lewis, M. Paul 7, 54 Liberia 52, 237, 238 liberalization, trade 18, 200, 203 Lij Yasu, Emperor 147-8 livelihood systems 77-97 livestock 13, 40, 77, 79-80, 135 Love, R. 83, 84 Lue 91-2 Luo 7, 8, 12, 33, 55, 85 Lustick, I.S. 29 Lyons, T. 133 Machaka, Waqo 15, 247-8 Machakos Protocol 182 el Mahdi 116 Malkki, L.H. 97 Mamdani, Mahmood 53 Manby, Bronwen 238, 239 Mani, Hadijatou 246 Mann, Horace 134 marginalization 11-13 passim, 15, 33, 57, 61, 97, 103, 238 Maria 101 Markakis, John 30, 78-81, 83-6 passim markets 17-18, 40, 203 Marks, G. 26, 38-40 passim, 42 Marsh, Heather 72 Marshall, T.H. 27, 71 Martin, Denis-Constant 7, 10 Masai 33

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa Matambalya, Francis A.S.T. 195-235 Matthews, A. 41, 42 Mauritius 180 Mazrui, Ali 9, 32, 165 McCrone, D. 32 McHenry, D.E. 30 McKay, A. 207 Mead, George H. 154 media, folk 151; mass 19, 43, 154-6, 161-3 Mediterranean 72; region 136 Melson, David 180, 187 Menelik II, Emperor 58, 146-7 Mengisteab, Kidane 3-23, 51, 59-60, 111, 143, 164, 174, 239, 241, 247 Menkhaus, Ken 186 Mesfin, Dawit 247 Mezzadra, S. 72, 73 migration 7, 69-72, 96-9 passim, 103, 124, 135, 173, 220, 222, 224-5 Mildner, S.A. 80, 82 military 220, 242, 244 Mills, G. 40 mobility 77-98 see also migration modernism 26, 28-30 passim, 43, 44 Moerman, Michael 91-2 Mohamed, Ali Noor 143-69 Mohamud, Abdinur S. 133-42 Moi, Daniel arap 84, 182, 200 Monetary Union 203 Muhammed, Abdulla 146 Mullard, Maurice 241 Muller, Björn 183, 186 Mundt, A. 80 Mursal, Maryan 161 Museveni, President Yoweri 184 Mushemeza, E.D. 99 Mutibwa, Phares 11 Mwaura, Ciru 11

260

NAFTA 205 Namwaya, O. 219 narratives 10, 13, 112, 113, 119, 122-4 passim, 128, 129, 135, 138, 150-1, 154-66 passim nation-building 10, 12, 15-16, 32, 51-3, 58-60, 89-92 passim, 97, 238, 243, 247, 251 nation-states 36, 39, 55, 59, 62, 237, 239-44 passim, 250 nationalism 35, 59, 91, 92, 112, 113, 119, 122-4 passim, 128, 129, 145, 156 naturalization 33, 89 Ndegwa, N.S. 8 networks/networking 6, 59, 79, 84, 85, 88, 96, 97, 100

Niger 246 Niger Delta 237, 238, 241 Nigeria 152, 153, 237, 240, 246, 249; FRCN 152 Nordenstreng, Karle 165 North, D. 81 Norway 183 Nuer 8, 122, 14, 33, 128 Nugent, Paul 85, 86, 90 Numeiri, President 116 Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 59 Nyerere, President Julius 152 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 33-4, 238, 241 OAU 149, 182 Obi, Cyril 237-54 Odepeju, Kola 246 Ogaden 12, 13, 88, 114-15, 117, 119, 120, 147, 149, 158; National Liberation Front 11, 12; war 114-15, 117, 143, 150, 158-9 oil 18, 40, 128 Okubo, Y. 187 Olonisakin, Funmi 245 Olukoshi, O.A. 17, 244 Omotola, J. Shola 242 Onah, Godfrey 165 one-party rule 242, 244 orality 150-1 Oromo 7, 8, 12, 33, 37, 54, 58, 116, 119, 145, 147, 149; - Liberation Front 11, 116; National Liberation Front 116; Oromia 119 Oyejide, Ademola T. 16 Pakulski, J. 29 Pankhurst, Richard 11 Parry, Kate 54 pastoralism 12, 15, 39, 77-80, 84-6 passim, 144, 159-60 Patten, A. 38, 40 Pavanello, S. 99 peace, 4, 82, 112, 113, 128, 134, 136, 138-40, 179-86 passim, 239, 241, 243, 248, 250; processes 181-6; UN - Missions 239 Permanent Court of Arbitration 185 Peukert, H. 164 Phillips, J. 125 Phylos IPE 38 Piombo, J.R. 186, 187 piracy 181, 185, 187-8 politics 17, 40-1, 188, 220-2 passim, 225, 242; policy 204; Political Union 204 Polzer, T. 98 Pomfret, R. 206

Index population 3, 13, 218-20 passim, 224, 226; invisible 74-110 passim Portes, A. 97 Portugal 145, 243 post-modernism 29, 31, 32, 35, 43, 44 poverty 3, 13, 18, 240 power sharing 60-1 prices 135, 205 primordialism 26-7, 30, 32, 35, 43, 44 Punt, land of 125, 129 Puntland 58, 115, 119, 125, 161 Purvis, T. 27, 29, 31, 35 Putnam, R. 80 Qobo, Mzukisi 16 Quénivet, Noelle 13 Radelet, S. 205 radio 151-9, 161-3 passim Raleigh, C. 81 Rashaida 8, 88 Rashid, Ismail 245 reality, social 154-6 rebellions/insurgencies 12-14 passim; see also civil war Red Sea 181, 187, 188 refugees 3, 6, 52, 69-85 passim, 94, 96-103 passim, 120, 121, 134, 138, 139, 159-65 passim, 224; camps 74-6 passim, 99, 101, 138 see also UNHCR; US Committee for 120 regionalization 197-8 religion 6, 7, 9, 112, 125, 127-9 passim, 164, 165 see also individual entries resources 103, 218-20, 222, 240; scarcity 80-8, 135, 136, 139, 239 Rex, John 7 Rice, Xan 246 Roble, Faisal A. 58 Robson, P. 205 Rothchild, Donald 60 Russia 147 Rwanda 3,. 52, 76, 180, 200, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 226; RTLM 152-3 SACU 16, 195 SADC 198, 208, 225, 227 SADCC 198 SADEC 16 Sado, Juneidi 162 Saho 75 Said, E. 56 Saleh, Mustafe Ali 162

Salih, M.A. Mohamed 39, 55, 56 Samatar, Abdi Ismail 15, 186, 189, 247-8 Samatar, Ahmed Ismail 189 Samatar, S. 150-1, 159-60 sanctions 185, 186, 189 Santer, Jacques 36 Schech, Suzanne 32 Schiller, F.S. 154 Schlee, Gunther 247 secession 182, 241 security 16, 17, 40, 161,179-81 passim, 196, 239, 241, 244, 248-50 passim self-government/determination 7, 61, 133, 182, 241, 243 Senegal 243 SERAP 246 services, economic 39-40 Seychelles 180 Shankella 54 Al Shebab 184-6 passim Shilluk 55, 89 Shils, Edward 25 Shinn, D. 25 Shor, Ira 57 SIDA 129-30 Sidamo 54 Sierra Leone 52, 237 Silte 7 Smith, Anthony D. 26, 28, 29, 32 social policy 203 Social Responsibility Theory 164 Somalia 10, 12-14 passim, 42, 52, 55, 57-8, 60, 79-81 passim, 85, 88, 113-15, 118-27 passim, 129, 134, 135, 138, 149-66 passim, 173, 174, 179, 181, 183-6 passim, 248; African Union Mission in 115, 184, 185; civil war in 10, 13, 14, 120, 134, 159-60, 183-5; SNM 115, 118, 160; SRRC 183; SSDF 115, 159; TFG 183, 184, 189, 248; TFI 183; TFP 184; TNC 183; USC 115; war with Ethiopia 114-15, 118, 144-66 passim; WSLF 12, 115, 118 Somaliland 12-13, 58, 85, 114, 115, 119, 124, 160-3 passim; British 114, 149, 156; French 149; Italian 114, 149 Somalis 6, 8, 12, 14, 33, 37, 54, 55, 58, 79, 85, 88, 92-5 passim, 99-100, 128, 143-9 passim, 180, 189 Sorenson, John 119 Sorensen, Karl 187, 188 South Africa 60, 225, 249 South Sudan 7, 12-14 passim, 18, 37, 55, 76, 79, 88, 89, 102, 117, 119, 126-9 passim, 182, 239

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa South Yemen 115 sovereignty 70, 71, 73, 89, 93, 103, 225, 241 Soviet Union 115, 117, 143, 149 Spicker, Paul 137 Strang, A. 97 Sudan 7, 9, 11-15 passim, 32, 33, 52, 54, 55, 57, 75, 76, 79-81 passim, 85, 87, 89, 94-5, 99-102, 116-22, 127-9 passim, 128, 134, 135, 138, 173, 179, 181-3, 189, 239, 248, 249; civil war in 9, 12-13, 116-17, 120-1, 134, 181-3, 239. 248; Kesha campaign 94-5; Mahdia 11; NCP 182; SPLM/A 14, 117, 118, 182 Sudan Times 94 Sznaider, N. 29 Tanganyika 198, 199 Tanzania 5, 152, 180, 209, 210, 215, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224-6 passim tariffs 200, 205, 209-10 Taylor, C. 25 television 162-3 terrorism 180, 184-8 passim, 200 territoriality 35, 87-8, 118-19 Teshome, W.B. 27 Tigray 7, 33, 54, 57, 119; TPLF 14, 58, 116 Tigrinya-speakers 7, 8, 33, 54, 88, 89, 94, 127, 128 Tilley, V. 10, 143 Times of Malta 72 Tito, Marshal 123 de Tocqueville, A. 27 Toren, B. 206 Traber, Michael 164 trade 18, 39, 42, 77, 85, 187, 197-8, 200-15, 222, 225, 243; agreements 195, 200-11, 222-7 passim; Free – Areas 203, 205, 207, 209-10; Preferential – Area 203 transmigrants 69-71 passim, 76, 85, 94, 96-8 passim, 102, 103 transnationalization 242 transport 17, 18 Tranter, B. 29 treaties, Anglo-Ethiopian (1954) 114; Congo Basin 195; EAC 202, 207, 221, 230; ECOWAS 233, 244, 245; RTA 207 truth telling 164 al Turabi 116 Turkana 89 Turkey 145, 147 Turton, David 61

262

ubuntu 165

Udo, Bassey 245 UEMOA 16, 227 Uganda 7, 9, 11-14 passim, 18, 54, 55, 76, 85, 88, 89, 99, 102, 135, 138, 173, 182, 184, 198, 199, 209, 215, 216, 220, 224, 249; Buganda 11; civil war in 9, 13, 14; - Kenya Railway 195, 228; Lord’s Resistance Army 14 UN 13, 72, 136, 173, 181, 185, 186, 188, 189, 239; General Assembly Resolution 174 UNDP 3, 138 UNECA 42, 195 unemployment 240 UNEP 84 UNESCO 129-30, 137, 138; - PEER 138 UNHCR 76, 79, 99, 100, 138 urban areas 98-102 Urdal, H. 81 USA 18, 51, 61, 72, 120, 136, 143, 180-7 passim, 189; AGOA 18; CIA 186; Department of Defense 187; State Department 139; USAFRICOM 180-1; USAID 129, 135; USCR 120 van den Berghe, Pierre 26, 27, 61 van den Broek, Hans 36 van Langenhove, Luk 4 Verhoeven, Harry 181, 183-6 passim Vincent, Andrew 29 Viner, Jacob 197, 204-5 violence 13-14, 82, 134, 143, 238 visibility 89, 99 Voros, L. 25, 26, 28, 29 Walters, W. 73 war 3, 14, 16, 33, 41-4 passim, 74, 113-22, 144-9 passim, 238, 239 see also conflicts; civil 3, 9, 10, 12-14 passim, 116-17, 120-1, 134, 159-60, 181-5, 220; Eritrea-Ethiopia 12, 103, 113-15 passim, 118, 120-1, 128, 180, 185-6; Ethio-Somali 114-15, 118, 144-66 passim; Ogaden 114-15, 117, 143, 150, 158-9; proxy 14-16 passim, 119, 181, 186, 188; shifta 149; on Terror 19, 185, 186, 190 water 3, 13, 18, 40, 80, 134, 135, 219 Watson, Elizabeth 247 Werbner, P. 26 White, Philip 14 Widner, J. 80 Winters, A. 206 Woodward, Peter 25, 173, 174, 180, 182, 183, 186, 189

Index World Bank 3, 219-20 World Trade Organization 195, 200-2 passim, 206-7, 227 Yeo, S. 16 Yohannes, Okbazghi 174 Young, C. 25, 32 Yugoslavia 123

Yusuf, Abdulahi 183, 184 Záhorik, J. 27 Zanditu, Empress 148 Zartmann, I.W. 83 Zetter, R. 97 Zewde, Bahru 240, 247 Zimbabwe 195

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EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES

These titles published in the United States and Canada by Ohio University Press The Second Economy in Tanzania Revealing Prophets Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON T.L. MALIYAMKONO & M.S.D. BAGACHWA & DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON Ecology Control & Economic East African Expressions of Development in East African Christianity History Edited by THOMAS SPEAR HELGE KJEKSHUS & ISARIA N. KIMAMBO Siaya The Poor Are Not Us DAVID WILLIAM COHEN Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON & E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO & VIGDIS BROCH-DUE Uganda Now • Changing Uganda Potent Brews Developing Uganda • From Chaos JUSTIN WILLIS to Order • Religion & Politics in East Africa Swahili Origins Edited by HOLGER BERNT JAMES DE VERE ALLEN HANSEN & MICHAEL Being Maasai TWADDLE Edited by THOMAS SPEAR Kakungulu & the Creation of & RICHARD WALLER Uganda 1868-1928 MICHAEL TWADDLE Jua Kali Kerya KENNETH KING Controlling Anger SUZETTE HEALD Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya Kampala Women Getting By BRUCE BERMAN SANDRA WALLMAN Unhappy Valley Political Power in Pre-Colonial Book One: State & Class Buganda Book Two: Violence & Ethnicity RICHARD J. REID BRUCE BERMAN Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits & JOHN LONSDALE HEIKE BEHREND Mau Mau from Below Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar GREET KERSHAW ABDUL SHERIFF The Mau Mau War in Perspective Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule FRANK FUREDI Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF & ED FERGUSON Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau 1905-63 The History & Conservation of TABITHA KANOGO Zanzibar Stone Town Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF Economic & Social Origins of Mau Pastimes & Politics Mau 1945-53 LAURA FAIR DAVID W. THROUP Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn Multi-Party Politics in Kenya of Africa DAVID W. THROUP Edited by KATSUYOSHI FUKUI & CHARLES HORNSBY & JOHN MARKAKIS Empire State-Building Conflict, Age & Power in North JOANNA LEWIS East Africa Decolonization & Independence in Edited by EISEI KURIMOTO & SIMON SIMONSE Kenya 1940-93 Edited by B.A. OGOT Property Rights & Political Devel& WILLIAM R. OCHIENG’ opment in Ethiopia & Eritrea SANDRA FULLERTON Eroding the Commons JOIREMAN DAVID ANDERSON Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia Penetration & Protest in Tanzania ØYVIND M. EIDE ISARIA N. KIMAMBO Brothers at War TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL Custodians of the Land TRONVOLL Edited by GREGORY MADDOX, JAMES L. GIBLIN & ISARIA N. From Guerrillas to Government KIMAMBO DAVID POOL Mau Mau & Nationhood Education in the Development of Edited by E.S. ATIENO Tanzania 1919-1990 ODHIAMBO & JOHN LONSDALE LENE BUCHERT

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The contributors identify those factors that can foster integration, such as the proper management of equitable citizenship rights, as well as examine those that impede it, including the region’s largely ineffective integration scheme, IGAD. They explore how the former can be strengthened and the latter transformed; explain how regional integration can mitigate the conflicts; and examine how integration can help to energise the region’s economy. Kidane Mengisteab is Professor of African Studies and Political Science at Penn State University; Redie Bereketeab is a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden Cover photograph: A river runs through the mountainous landscape on the edge of the Dankalia Depression, Eritrea (© Andrew McConnell/Panos)

an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

MENGISTEAB Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship & BEREKETEAB in the Greater Horn of Africa

The Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) is a region engulfed by three interrelated crises: devastating conflicts, including inter-state wars, civil wars, and inter-communal conflicts; widespread debilitating poverty, chronic food insecurity, and frequent cycles of famine; and an alarming rate of environmental degradation that is ravaging the region. While it is apparent that the countries of the region are unlikely to be able to deal with the crises individually, there is consensus that their chances of doing so improve markedly with collective regional action.

Edited by Kidane Mengisteab & Redie Bereketeab

Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa