Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa 3030342956, 9783030342951

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Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa Edited by Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba

Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba Editor

Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa

Editor Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa Visiting Scholar, Institute of African Studies Carleton University Ottawa, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-030-34295-1    ISBN 978-3-030-34296-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book addresses the interrelated issues of Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa. Although Pan Africanism as an ideological force suffered some retreat with the end of official colonialism in Africa, there have been ebbs and flows of its currents in various forms over the past two decades. The Pan African Agenda that underpinned several initiatives, such as the New Partnership for African Development in 2001 in the late 1990s and early 2000s lost its team when the leaders of that era left the political stage in their respective countries. What emerged was the ascendance of leaders who are too pre-occupied with their domestic challenges to pursue any Pan African ideal. The exception to this was the emergence of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who worked assiduously towards the reform of the African Union. Since the change in the nomenclature from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union in 2002, the organization has worked towards the realization of the regional integration agenda of the continent as set out in the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The African Union recognized eight regional economic communities through which the integration of the continent will be realized. Despite setbacks and challenges, the process is on. The most recent manifestation of this was the coming into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area in May 2019. How these processes link with the realization of the development aspirations of the continent remains to be seen. The waves of xenophobia that continue to blow in different parts of the continent tend to undermine the wheel of Pan Africanism on which some countries on the continent rode to become liberated from the shackles of colonialism. The resurgence of nationalism, v

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nativism and the amplification of the politics of difference impact ­negatively on the prospects of an integrated continent. Notwithstanding the surge in populism in advanced countries, which is leading to the exclusion of those that are considered as the others, African countries can least afford to follow this self-defeating approach. The central argument of this book is the need for political, intellectual and citizenship re-engagement with the project of Pan Africanism and regional integration as a precursor to the socio-economic and political development of the continent. Although the challenges are numerous, they are not insurmountable. Many of the chapters in this volume were presented at a conference in honour of Professor Toyin Falola at the University of Ibadan, January 2018. We thank all the donors who contributed to the success of the conference. Special thanks go to the organizing committee of the conference, Aramide Bamitale who acted as editorial assistant. The editorial team at Palgrave deserves special appreciation for their meticulous handling of the manuscript. Lastly, I express my profound appreciation to my wife, Elizabeth, and my children, Oluwatobiloba, Abimbola and Oluwaseun-Nla, who endured my long absence from home throughout the time that I worked on this manuscript. Ottawa, ON, Canada 2019

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba

Contents

1 P  an-Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa  1 Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba Part I Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration in Africa  15 2 P  an-Africanism and Regionalism in Africa: The Journey So Far 17 Ernest Toochi Aniche 3 R  egional Cooperation for Development: The African Union Experience 39 Ebenezer Babajide Ishola 4 T  he African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of Al-Bashir’s International Arrest Warrant 59 ‘Tola Odubajo and Tunde Babawale 5 C  apacity Imperatives for the Realization of the African Continental Free Trade Area: Issues and Policy Options 77 Barassou Diawara, Thomas C. Munthali, and Robert Nantchouang

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6 R  egional Integration and the Political Economy of Morocco’s Desire for Membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 97 Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi 7 T  he Red Herring of Identity in Africa: Using Identity Conflicts to Capture State Power and Inculcate Economic Avarice in the Central African Republic125 Wendy Isaacs-Martin 8 M  ediatizing and Gendering Pan-Africanism for ‘Glocal’ Impacts149 Sharon Adetutu Omotoso Part II Dynamics of Global Development, Migration and Public Administration 163 9 T  he Politics of Paternalism and Implications of Global Governance on Africa: A Critique of the Sustainable Development Goals165 Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba 10 T  he Construction of African Immigrants in Contemporary South Africa and Social Cohesion: Reflections on the Role of the Media181 Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi 11 O  n Globalisation, a World Class City, Poverty and Security in Johannesburg’s Inner City199 Inocent Moyo 12 T  he State Bureaucracies and Development in Africa: Interrogating the Link215 Maryam O. Quadri and Vera Amaechi Uche

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13 B  ureaucracy and Crisis of Development in Prismatic Cum Post-Colonial African States: An Ethical Review231 Ifeanyichukwu Michael Abada, Nneka Ifeoma Okafor, and Paul Hezekiah Omeh 14 B  uilding Capacities for Border Administrators Along Nigeria’s International Boundaries247 Martin Terngu Kpoghul 15 E  xplaining Nigeria’s Diaspora Communities’ Transmogrification: From State Partners to Challengers261 Isiaka Abiodun Adams 16 D  iaspora Remittances and Sustainable Development in Africa: The Case Study of Nigeria279 Joseph Okwesili Nkwede, Kazeem O. Dauda, Ahmed O. Moliki, and Atanda O. Orija 17 I nternational Law and Violence Against Women301 Serges Djoyou Kamga Index319

Notes on Contributors

Ifeanyichukwu  Michael  Abada  holds his doctorate degree in Political Science from the University of Nigeria. He is the Head of Department (HOD) of Political Science in the same institution. His area of research includes public administration, international relations, African politics and comparative politics. Isiaka Abiodun Adams  holds a PhD in Political Science and is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria. Ernest Toochi Aniche  holds a BSc, MSc and PhD from the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN), with a bias in International Relations. His areas of research interest include African integration, international environmental politics, oil politics, energy politics, theories of international relations and international political economy. He has authored three books, co-authored two books, contributed chapters in books and contributed articles in scholarly journals. He is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Federal University Otuoke (FUO), Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Tunde Babawale  is of the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria. He is an accomplished university lecturer, researcher and administrator. Babawale has published extensively in the areas of international relations and political economy. He was appointed as the Director/ Chief Executive Officer of the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC) by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He served a two-term xi

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of fours each in the position. He teaches postgraduate classes and doubles as the Dean, Directorate of Students’ Affairs of the University of Lagos. Prof Babawale receives invitations to deliver keynote addresses and present research papers across the globe on a regular basis. He is a Commissioner with the Lagos State Independent Electoral Commission (LASIEC). Kazeem O. Dauda  is an education consultant, a researcher and a teacher. He is a graduate of Political Science from the Department of Political Science, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Ogun State, Nigeria. He is a new-generation trainer, a lover of education, peace and a youth advocator. He has attended various conferences both nationally and internationally. He has academic papers published in both local and international journals as well as chapters in books. He is highly active in research with interests in the peace-building process and conflict resolution, political communication, governance, Islamic civilization and development studies. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), and many others. He is with the Centre for Education Research and Human Development. Barassou  Diawara is a knowledge management expert at the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and coordinator of the Africa Think Tank Network housed at ACBF. Diawara is also a member of the Africa Capacity Report (ACR) team, which produces the ACBF Flagship Report— measuring and assessing capacities in relation to the development agenda of African countries. Diawara holds a master’s degree in Economics from Cheikh Anta Diop University in Senegal and a master’s and PhD in Economics from the Kyushu University Graduate School of Economics in Japan, where he was also a research fellow before joining ACBF. His areas of expertise include development economics, capacity development, education and poverty economics, where he has published a number of articles. Wendy  Isaacs-Martin is an associate professor at the Archie Mafeje Research Institute (AMRI) at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Her research focuses on identities—national, ethnic and racial—and scapegoating violence. She is conducting research on the state and the mythos of the Westphalian narrative that connects escalating conflict to the (re) enforcement of singular salient identifiers and the (de)construction and self-imposed marginalisation of communities in homogeneous societies. Ebenezer  Babajide  Ishola is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He is a young Nigerian spurred by the desire to leave indelible footprints in the sands of time wherever he

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finds himself. As an effervescent individual, he exudes infectious optimism in every situation he is confronted with. He is on a journey in academia, particularly in the discipline Political Science, specializing in Comparative Politics and International Political Economy. He is also on a brilliant run in the media space in Nigeria, which has been nurtured over the years having worked as a reporter, assistant editor-in-­chief and editor-in-chief in a number of media organizations. With days of learning from senior colleagues and diligence at his point of duties, he’s convinced the sky is his starting point. Serges Djoyou Kamga  is an associate professor at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), UNISA, where he teaches Thought Leadership for Africa’s Renewal and Good Governance. He obtained an LLD in International Human Rights Law from the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria. He was a visiting scholar at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe and at the University of Texas at Austin in the USA. He has published in journals and contributed book chapters. Kamga is the author, editor and co-editor of three books, including The Right to Development in the African Human Rights System (2018). He is a member of the ‘building committee’ of the Cross-cultural Human Rights Centre, a consortium of one European University, ten Chinese and four African universities aimed at bringing Southern concepts and ideas in the area of human rights to Northern audiences. His areas of interest include Leadership and African renaissance, development and human rights, human rights from a cross-cultural perspective and disability rights. He publishes in these areas. He is a co-editor of the African Disability Rights Yearbook. Martin  Terngu  Kpoghul is a lecturer at the Department of History at Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria. He is an emerging academic whose desire is to succeed. He has contributed book chapters and published journals. He is the author of Building Capacities for Border Administrative along Nigeria’s Post-colonial International Boundaries and Interrogating the Sources of Border Crisis in Africa: A Focus on Nigeria and Its Neighbours. Ahmed  O.  Moliki is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Tai Solarin University of Education (TASUED), Ijagun, Ogun State, Nigeria. He holds a BSc in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Benin, an MSc in Political Science from the University of Lagos and a PhD in Political Science from Babcock University. He is the Head of Department of Political Science. He was the

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immediate past Sub-Dean, College of Social and Management Sciences, and has occupied many sensitive positions in the university. He belongs to many professional bodies, including the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA). His research interests include Peace and Conflict Studies, International Relations, Governance and Sustainable Development Studies. Moliki is a community man who loves to see hope in the hopeless and smiles on the faces of the vulnerables. He is widely published in both national and international journals and has contributed chapters in several books. Inocent  Moyo is a lecturer in the Department of Geography and Environmental Science at the University of Zululand, South Africa. Moyo is a Human Geographer with a deep interest in the interface between people and the environment, particularly the broader fields of political geography, political economy, political ecology, migration, regional development, globalization and transnationalism, borders and borderlands and urban geography, among others. Moyo is committed to emancipatory research and the deployment of critical social theory in an attempt to understand the problems that affect humanity today and in the future and contribute towards solutions to the same. He has published and done international presentations on these topics. Moyo is the founding Chair of the IGU Commission on African Studies (IGU CAS). Thomas C. Munthali  is the Director-General of the National Planning Commission of Malawi. Prior to this, he was the Director of Knowledge and Learning at the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), a specialized agency of the African Union on capacity development, where he coordinated capacity development efforts across the African Union member countries. He is a renowned capacity development expert and holds a master’s and PhD in Economics from the University of Leeds, England. While at ACBF, he coordinated the publication of the Africa Capacity Report and the African Financial Governance Outlook (published jointly by ACBF and African Development Bank). He has also written several journal and workshop/conference papers and coordinated the production of tens of publications on capacity development, corporate governance, exchange rates, economic development, financial development, insurance and economic growth, population and development and climate change. He is the past President of the Economics Association of Malawi.

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Robert Nantchouang  is an economist and a statistician from Cameroon, and the Senior Knowledge Management Expert in the Knowledge and Learning Department, the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). A Certified Knowledge Manager (Washington), he holds a PhD in Economics from the Université de Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; an MSc in Economics from the University of Montreal; an MS in Statistics and Economic Modelling from the ENSAE Paris and the Ingénieur Statisticien Degree in statistics from the ISPEA, Yaoundé, Cameroon. Prior to joining the Foundation, he was a professor at the Catholic University of Central Africa and has taught at various higher institutions in Cameroon and in France. Nantchouang has written books on statistics and mathematics and articles on development economics. He spearheads the production of the ACBF annual Africa Capacity Reports (ACR) along with other critical ACBF knowledge products. He is the Director a.i. for the Knowledge and Learning Department. Joseph  Okwesili  Nkwede is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria. He started his career in the University as Administrative Staff and rose to the position of Senior Assistant Registrar (SAR) before joining academia. Nkwede is a member of many professional bodies such as the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Fellow Institute of Corporate Administration (FCAI), Fellow Institute of Policy Management Development (FIPMD), Fellow International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators (FIARSA), Member Development Studies Association (DSA) of the United Kingdom, Member Nigerian Institute of Management (NIM), Member Chartered Institute of Administration (CIA), and Member Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA). His research interest includes governance and development studies, public policy, political economy, environmental politics, political communication, electoral studies, peace and conflict studies and political theory. He has travelled widely in the pursuit and advancement of knowledge. He is neck-deep in research and has edited many books and journals, published well-researched articles widely in books, National and International reputable and peerreviewed journals and has presented commissioned papers at both local and international conferences. Christopher  Changwe  Nshimbi is Director and the Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation (DST/NRF) research fellow in the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation

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(GovInn), University of Pretoria. He researches migration, borders, regional integration, the informal economy and water. Besides teaching and supervising postgraduate research at the University of Pretoria, Nshimbi participates and sits on regional and international technical working groups on trade, labour, migration and water. His opinion pieces are occasionally published on THE CONVERSATION, Open Democracy and other media outlets. Before joining GovInn, he lectured at the Zambian Open University (ZOU) and was an associate consultant/lecturer with the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) in Lusaka, Zambia. He also consulted with local, business and government departments and international organizations. Temitayo  Isaac  Odeyemi teaches political science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, where he obtained a bachelor’s degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics and a master’s degree in Political Science. His areas of research interests are comparative politics, digital governance and sustainable development. ‘Tola  Odubajo  is a postdoctoral research fellow at the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) on African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Here, he publishes on African-themed issues, such as peace and conflict, democracy, and leadership. He is on ‘Leave of Absence’ from the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria, where he lectures and supervises undergraduate and postgraduate projects. Odubajo is a member of the Editorial Board of the UniLag Journal of Politics. Nneka Ifeoma Okafor  holds her PhD in Ethics from the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa. She is a lecturer in the Philosophy Department, University of Nigeria, and the international program executive at Strategic Contacts, Ethics and Publications (STRACEP) in the same institution. Her area of research includes but is not limited to professional ethics, environmental ethics, African ethics, gender studies, international and African politics. Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba  is Associate Professor and the Coordinator of the Research cluster on Innovation and Developmental Regionalism at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Political Science with a specialization in International Political Economy of Trade from the University

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of Lagos, Nigeria. He was previously a Visiting Scholar at the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, and a Fellow of Brown International Advanced Research Institute, Brown University, Rhode Island, United States of America. Oloruntoba is the author of Regionalism and Integration in Africa: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Euro-Nigeria Relations, published by Palgrave Macmillan, New  York, United States of America, in 2016. He is also the co-editor with Toyin Falola of the Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development, Palgrave, New York, 2018. Oloruntoba was the recipient of the Wangari Maathai Award of Innovative Research Leadership, University of Texas, Austin, United States of America, 2016. He is a rated researcher by the National Researcher Foundation of South Africa. Oloruntoba is a visiting scholar at the Institute of African Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Paul Hezekiah Omeh  holds his bachelor of science and master’s degrees from the University of Nigeria. Also, he has been certified as a professional teacher by the Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria (TRCN). His research interests are in the areas of local government, public policy, development studies, history of education and comparative education. He is pursuing his doctorate degree in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria. Sharon  Adetutu  Omotoso is with the Gender Studies Program at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, where she heads the Women’s Research and Documentation Centre (WORDOC) and serves as a member of the Institute’s Scientific Committee. Omotoso is an alumnus of the COADY Institute, St. Francis Xavier University Canada, a Chartered Mediator and Conciliator and a recipient of the p ­ restigious CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa) Meaning-Making Research Competition 2018–2019. She speaks at academic events on Applied Ethics, Media and Gender Studies, Political Communications, Philosophy of Education, Socio-­Political Philosophy and African Philosophy, where she has published significantly in reputable scholarly journals and books. She is editor of WORDOC’s bi-annual newsletter and co-editor of ‘Gender Based Violence in Nigeria and Beyond’ (2016) and Political Communication in Africa (2017). She has won travel grants across continents. Atanda  O.  Orija  is a socio-political analyst, political educationist and public servant. He holds a BSc (Ed) and MSc (Political Science) from Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Ogun State, and Obafemi

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Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria, respectively. His research interests include public management networks, politics of intergovernmental relations, local government administration and bottom-up collaborative governance. He has vast skills and capacity in didactic and pedagogic training methods and student-centred and collaborative learning processes. He has attended local and foreign conferences, and he has to his credit several journals published in  local and international outlets and chapters in published books. Maryam  O.  Quadri  is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos. A Commonwealth Professional Scholar, United Kingdom, 2012, and a Fellow of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Africa Workshop, 2014, her research focus is on health policy and politics, social protection, poverty and gender studies. Vera Amaechi Uche  is an assistant lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos. Her research interest is in comparative politics and gender politics in Africa. She is in her PhD programme in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos.

List of Charts

Chart 16.1 Chart 16.2

Remittances by Nigerians in Diaspora: amount remitted (USD billion). (Source: World Bank) Revenues accrued to the federal government and recorded remittance from Diaspora Nigerians in 2012. (Source: World Bank)

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 15.1 Table 16.1

Africa Capacity Index 2019 82 Key economic indicators of ECOWAS members vis-à-vis Morocco110 Overview of Nigeria’s economic influence in ECOWAS 114 Comparing key economic indicators of Nigeria and Morocco 115 Indicators and rank over a decade (2008–2018) in CAR 140 Nigeria migrants remittances inflow 269 Nigerian diaspora statistics 284

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CHAPTER 1

Pan-Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba

As Africa continues to grapple with the multiple challenges of achieving inclusive development and reclaiming its place in the global capitalist system, there are various ideas, actions and policies that have continued to shape these processes. Amongst these are Pan-Africanism and regional integration. Pan-Africanism is both an ideological force and theoretical foundation that underpins the desire and actions of Africans to protest, resist and champion the cause of freedom for Africans both on the continent and in the diaspora (Oloruntoba 2015). Although it started in the United States in the nineteenth century (Prah 1999; Thompson 1969; cited in Tondi 2005), it continues to shape thinking and undergird political and civil actions towards the realisation of Africa’s development. Pan-­ Africanism provided the rallying point and ideological blueprint on which Afro-Americans like William Dubois, Marcus Garvey and others rode to challenge the racial oppression of the black race in the United States. It also provided the basis of interaction between Africans in the diaspora and S. O. Oloruntoba (*) Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Visiting Scholar, Institute of African Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_1

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those on the continent through various conferences, which started with the Manchester Conference of 1900. The series of Pan-African ­conferences provided avenue for young Africans, who would later become the leaders of their respective countries, to strategise how Africa can gain political independence from the colonialists. The 1945 Pan-Africanism Conference in London provided a rallying point for decolonisation, which eventually laid the foundation for securing political independence across the breadth and length of the continent. With the independence of Ghana in 1957, came the independence of other African countries in quick successions, at least in East and West Africa. Political independence in the southern parts of the continent followed much later, but also with much support from the rest of Africa and its diaspora population. Pan-Africanism also provided the ideological foundation for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Although there was a general understanding that for the continent to escape the scourge of neo-colonisation, unity is paramount, leaders of the newly independent African countries were divided on the best way possible to achieving the unity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Thus, the leaders were divided into three groups: the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville group. The Casablanca group demanded immediate political and economic integration of the continent. Members of this group include Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco. They were mainly left-oriented leaders who correctly interpreted the dangers that neo-colonialism posed to the newly independent countries. This was particularly important in view of the Cold War, in which the superpowers in the West and East fought their wars through proxy. These leaders believed that Africa needed a common front to be able to resist the indirect control that the West still posed, despite conceding political freedom. But more importantly, they understood the centrality of economic power in sustaining political freedom. Although Mazrui (1999) criticises Nkrumah’s maxim of ‘seek ye the political kingdom and all other things will be added’, the Ghanaian leader did not display any ignorance of the importance of economic power as a necessary ingredient of stable political order. His idea was that given the historical trajectories of African relations with the West, a united approach was required to be able to negotiate on African terms and for Africa’s development (Nkrumah 1965). The Monrovia group was made up of 12 conservative countries who were also members of the Brazzaville group. The countries in both groups include Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d’lvoire,

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Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad. It is instructive that Duodu (2013) argues that these groups were labelled as radicals and conservatives by Western media because both Libya and Morocco, for instance, were cosy with the West, especially with the United States and France. Although Tunisia was regarded as conservative, the country provided for Algerian forces that fought against France in their bid to gain independence. A compromise between the two groups led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The organisation made it one of its central objectives to end political colonisation in all parts of the continent. To its credit, this goal was achieved with the end of apartheid rule in South Africa in 1994. The achievement of the OAU in the political realm was its deficit in other spheres, including economics, culture, language, education and borders. Starting with the last, the leaders of the OAU agreed at the Cairo Conference of 1964 to leave intact the borders created by the colonialists. They did this to avoid conflicts, but unfortunately borders have fuelled conflicts and wars more than any other thing in post-independent Africa. This happened because of the forceful separation of people of the same kith and kin to different countries, with some of them living at the borders of two countries (Moyo and Nshimbii 2019). At the economic level, Pan-Africanism has not succeeded in ensuring that African countries trade more with one another than with external countries. Unlike Asian countries where complete decolonisation took place in terms of language, culture and education, African countries continue in mimicry, straddling between modernism and traditionalism. While the continent aspires to Euro-American modernism or seeking ways to catch up with the West (Mkandawire 2011), pre-colonial forms of exchange, knowledge systems and practices have been relegated to the background. With the transformation of the OAU to the African Union (AU) in 2002, various efforts have been set afoot to realise the vision of building an African Economic Community (AEC) as encapsulated under the Abuja Treaty of 1991. Eight regional economic communities have been recognised to serve as the building bloc to realisation of continental integration (ECA 2016, 2017). The recent formation of the African Continental Free Trade Area was the crystallisation of a series of negotiations among African countries. Although there was the formation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area, comprising the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Central Africa (COMESA) and the East Africa Community, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement is more ambi-

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tious and cast within the search for structural transformation of the ­continent through industrialisation. Studies have shown that despite the challenges that may confront the continental free trade agreements, if well implemented, it can lead to higher volumes of intra-African trade, bolster regional value chains and enhance the participation of African companies and products in global value chains (ECA 2017; UNCTAD 2016). The link between Pan-Africanism, regional integration and development is located within the historical experiences and contemporary trajectories of Africa’s relations with other parts of the world. As Oloruntoba’s contribution to this volume shows, the nature and the character of the state in Africa naturally predispose it to serving external interests. It is not only weak and dependent, for many states there is sheer absence of capacity to negotiate meaningfully with other parts of the world. Thus, a Pan-­ Africanist project of regional integration that is focused not only on economic integration but also on people-to-people interactions, cultural exchanges and cooperation is needed to pave the way for the United States of Africa. This becomes compelling because, as Nkrumah (1963) argues in his book, the unity of Africa is necessary to push back the neo-colonial design which according to him is the last stage of imperialism (1965). Since independence in the late 1950s, inter-tribal wars, domestic conflicts and, increasingly, Afrophobia have tended to undermine Pan-Africanism. These internal contradictions undermine the collective resolve of Africans to unite and address their common problems. The club mentality of many of the post-colonial leaders and the similarity in their undue misappropriation of national resources have created socio-economic conditions that hinder transformation development. The struggle for resources and the need to escape harsh economic conditions have resulted in mass and sometimes forced movement of Africans from one part of the continent to the other. The resulting hostility from host countries has negatively affected unity in Africa. Besides, regional hegemons like Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt have for a long time been at loggerheads in their bids to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The African agenda that was so prominent in the 1990s during the presidencies of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal faded into insignificance when these leaders left office. Thus, the project of Pan-Africanism has suffered some setbacks in the past decade. The continent therefore needs new leaders who understand the imperative of forging a Pan-African front and

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are prepared to provide both the intellectual and material resources required to re-crystallise Pan-Africanism. Contrary to the earlier approach to regional integration, in which the state has always taken the lead, there are regionalisation processes in the cotemporary times that incorporate the voices of the people from below. The new regionalisation approach provides theoretical explanations to the involvement of non-state actors such as civil society organisations, informal cross-border traders as well as private sector organisations that are affecting or influencing the dynamics of regionalism in Africa and other parts of the world (Söderbaum 2004, 2016; Oloruntoba 2016). The success (or otherwise) of the regional integration agenda in Africa will be determined by the extent to which the benefits can be communicated to non-state actors. The African Union Agenda 2063 recognises the role of civil society organisations in its programming, through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. The Council needs to be more involved in working with other civil society organisations in Africa to promote regional integration (African Union n.d.). The African Union has recognised the African diaspora as the sixth region of Africa. The African diaspora contributes billions of dollars in annual remittances and the potential this group possesses for resource mobilisation is yet to be fully tapped (World Bank 2017). Scholars have shown that Africans in the diaspora run into hundreds of millions across generations (Zeleza 2008). This huge population should be mobilised to develop the continent, not only through remittances but also through knowledge exchange, through brain gain and brain circulation, Okeke (2008). Countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana, among others, have recognised the important roles that Africans in the diaspora can play in the revitalisation of their economies. Thus, some of these countries are establishing units within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—or even in the Presidency as in the case of Nigeria—to liaise with their nationals in the diaspora. Since Pan-Africanism started in the diaspora, the new approach to engaging the African diaspora population could help to reproduce socio-economic decolonisation in addition to the political decolonisation that ended in the late twentieth century. Lastly, Pan-Africanism locates the past and contemporary processes of regional integration within the theoretical and ideology underpinnings in which Africans seek to take a common approach to address their developmental challenges within a highly competitive and asymmetric global system of accumulation. Pan-Africanism offers a strong platform for fostering inclusive development through

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regional integration. However, such efforts must not be limited to ­economic integration, but include issues of cultural, linguistic and political integration, anchored on the strong consciousness of a Pan-African identity. The chapters in this volume engage with the regionalisation processes in Africa as well as with how bureaucracies at national level affect the realisation of developmental outcomes. The book is unique for bringing back the debate on Pan-Africanism and linking it with ongoing discourses and policies on regional integration in Africa. Other aspects of the book contain some of the most topical issues in our contemporary times, such as migration, border management and sustainable development goals. This relatively broad content offers readers fresh and innovative perspectives on various aspects of development in Africa. The book is divided into two parts, namely, Pan -Africanism and Regional Integration in Africa, and Dynamics of Global Development, Migration and Public Administration. Ernest Toochi Aniche traces the journey of the relationship between Pan-Africanism and regional integration. In this connection, he notes that modern Africa regionalism derives from the Pan-Africanist philosophical foundations of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe and others, culminating in the establishment of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, now the African Union (AU). He further notes that based on the historical trajectories of the evolution of regionalism—such as the 1979 Monrovia Strategy, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos, and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that gave birth to the African Economic Community (AEC—African regionalism is rooted in Pan-Africanism. Aniche categorises perspectives on Pan-Africanism into two broad groups, namely, Afro-pessimists, who see no merit in a united Africa or believe that given the challenges at the national level, there is little prospects of development under a united Africa, and Afro-optimists, who emphasise the benefits, opportunities and prospects of Pan-African regionalism. He departs from this typology by constructing what he calls Afro-realism, which analytically locates Pan-Africanism within considerations for the geostrategic interests of Africa in relations with other parts of the world. The Afro-realist perspective to Pan-Africanism and regionalism goes beyond romantisation with the concept to a reflective consideration of the challenges that Africa faces in achieving the goal of unity and the benefits that could accrue to the people of the continent. Ebenezer Babajide Ishola places the regional integration experiences in Africa within the African Union as the umbrella body formed for the purpose of promoting and ensuring peace, unity and development on the continent.

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Ishola interrogates the potentials of the African Union (AU) in resolving the crisis of underdevelopment and engendering development across the continent within the framework of regional cooperation for development. Using the dependency theoretical position on regional cooperation for development which sees it as a mechanism to stimulate and consolidate autocentric development, the chapter examines the institutions and policies of the AU as a basis of determining the organisation’s capability to provide an alternative developmental direction for African countries. The author concludes that there is an urgent need to ‘rejig’ the architecture of the AU to effectively reposition it as a mechanism to deliver on its mandate of engendering development for Africa. Scholars like Fagbayibo (2016, 2018) and Adebajo (2017) have provided insights into how the African Union can be reformed to serve the purpose for which it was created. ‘Tola Odubajo and Tunde Babawale interrogate the African Union and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the light of the warrant of arrest that was placed on Al-Bashir over his roles in the genocide that happened in Dafur when he was the president. The authors note that the philosophy of the International Criminal Court is embedded in the mandate to bring to justice senior government officials who must have been duly accused of involvement in the following four grave crimes; genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. They argue that prior to the coming into effect of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the international criminal justice system was usually structured into setting up special tribunals for the treatment of cases involving high-profile government officials. This method came with its attendant divisive and politicised outcomes. Most of the people that have been tried at ICC are former African leaders. The challenge is, however, that a major aspect of the mandate of the ICC contravenes the position of the African Union (the AU contributes the highest bloc of states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC) regarding immunity from prosecution for serving senior officials of government. Questions are therefore raised as to the motivation for the AU’s position. In the final analysis, the chapter examines, in part, the various options opened to Al-Bashir in an international system controlled by extra-African powers. The inability of the African Union to try erring leaders has predisposed them to subjecting them to trial by the ICC, which many times is cannon fodder for advancing the interests of powerful countries. Perhaps the failure of the African Union is being compensated for by the new drive towards regional integration in Africa. The issue of capacity towards the implementation of the newly signed African Continental Free Trade Area is the subject of the next chapter.

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Barassou Diawara, Thomas C. Munthali and Robert Nantchouang examine the capacity imperatives for the realisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, within the context of the main issues on this trade area and the policy options involved. This chapter is important because of recent developments around the signing and ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). They argue that while the AfCFTA offered advantages in terms of increased welfare and higher level of intraAfrican trade, some capacity issues need to be tackled to ensure successful implementation of the Agreement. The authors identify some of the challenges that could militate against the success of AfCFTA with regard to African countries’ ability and willingness to implement the Agreement domestically and support AU institutions for this purpose, failures in fulfilling countries’ obligations, and the availability and readiness of quality human and institutional capacities. They show that there is need to use and support existing continental bodies and Regional Economic Communities in order to ensure the successful implementation of the Agreement. They conclude by highlighting the importance of the private sector and partner institutions in supporting the Agreement. They enjoin these stakeholders to join efforts to strengthen the capacities in such areas as the ratification, domestication and development of national AfCFTA strategies; the implementation of the Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade and the Africa Mining Vision; and development of the critical mass of technical skills as well as institutional and ‘soft’ capacities. The next two chapters by Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi and Wendy Isaacs-­ Martin investigate regional perspectives on integration and identity in West Africa and Central Africa. Odeyemi examines the political economy of Morocco’s desire for membership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He notes that although Morocco is located in North Africa geographically, the country has expressed a desire to join the West African sub-regional organisation which has existed since 1975. Odeyemi provides an incisive analysis of the debates around this bid, with some government officials from a regional hegemon like Nigeria emphasising the economic benefits derivable from such membership, while civil society organisations and some intellectuals are against the move. While there may be merit in both sides of the debate, the historical link between Morocco and France, and increasingly the EU member countries, gives cause for concern as to the benefits that the country can bring to Africa. However, when placed within the larger Pan-African idea of a united Africa, it would worthwhile for ECOWAS to think in terms of the geostrategic

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advantage that such membership can bring to the s­ ub-­region and to Africa as a whole. But another question arises in the context of the monarchical governance architecture of the country, which runs counter to the agreements among ECOWAS countries to operate on the basis of democracy. Wendy Isaacs-Martin’s contribution strikes at the core of one of the main challenges of regional integration and development in Africa. A crisis of identity has led to conflicts not only in the Central African Republic (CAR), as Isaacs-Martin argues in this chapter, but in different parts of the continent. Religious and ethnic identities have been instrumentalised by both local and external power brokers to create disunity and fuel wars. The case of CAR remains a thorny one as the Muslims and Christian groups have formed militia organisations to fight against each other in their search for relevance and control. As Oloruntoba argues in his contribution to this volume, a crisis of identity has undermined the project of Pan-Africanism in Africa. Africans continue to define themselves along the lines of artificial borders designed by the colonialists, religions, languages and cultures that are in most instances foreign to the continent. The identity crisis has reinforced a politics of differences, which makes regional integration a difficult task to achieve. The next chapter by Sharon Adetutu Omotoso focuses on mediatising and gendering Pan-Africanism. She argues that the historical breakthroughs that have been attributed to Pan-Africanism, such as political decolonisation, are short-lived in contemporary times. Omotoso links lack of enthusiasm on Pan-Africanism to its unifocal outlook as a movement towards emancipation and self-government. She also argues that the manner with which Pan-Africanism is described as a legacy entrenches an impression that it is a relic. This, to a large extent, leads to questioning its relevance and the necessity of a continual pursuit of its tenets. Omotoso agrees with Falola and Essien’s 2014 work that “the appropriation and performance of Pan-­ Africanism on continental, national, regional, local and transatlantic levels offer an alternative solution for sustaining Pan-Africanism”. In the second part of the book, Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba starts by examining the politics of paternalism and implications of global governance on Africa through a critique of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He notes that following the self-conceited civilising missions of the colonialists, Africa has been a laboratory where all forms of development ­strategies have been experimented with. From the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s through the Millennium Development Goals to the nascent Sustainable Development Goals, the developed countries have

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taken a paternalistic posture to helping Africa escape poverty. Despite the failures of previous programmes, new ones are formulated with little or no input from the supposed beneficiaries. He examines the power asymmetry that defines the relationship, the contradictions within the Sustainable Development Goals and the imperative of self-reliance and ownership of development strategies on the continent. Oloruntoba concludes that the SDGs and associated anti-slavery, anti-trafficking and other humanitarian concerns in Goal 8.7, among others, neither address the structural problems and the inefficiency in the current global economic system that perpetuate poverty and inequality in Africa nor do they give enough space for the continent to plan its own future. Inocent Moyo places Johannesburg’s world class city status within the globalisation of poverty, especially in its inner city. He argues that globalisation has had serious impacts on the transformation of societies. With a focus on the impact of neoliberal economic activities in the form of urban renewal and regeneration projects aimed at creating a place and space for neoliberal capitalism, Moyo discusses the impacts of such on ordinary people such as street traders in Johannesburg inner city. He argues that such processes have constructed street traders as misfits in the space where private capital reigns supreme. The mere fact of depoliticising street traders in this manner has led to their evisceration through the means of evictions and clean up campaigns. Driving ordinary people out of the Johannesburg inner city in the name of the security of private investors and tourists actually increases the insecurity of the victims of such renewals in the sense that they become dislocated and their livelihoods are seriously disrupted. He concludes that not only has this led to a contest between the street traders and the City of Johannesburg, but also that it has bred illegal and nefarious activities which appear to thrive on the streets of Johannesburg inner city. This has serious security implications in terms of degenerating Johannesburg inner city into a dangerous place. Maryam Omolara Quadri and Vera Amaechi’s contribution touches on a very important part of development in Africa. The bureaucracy is a vital institution for implementing government policies. The authors note that the recurring failure of developmental policies in many African states has made the state and the role of its bureaucracy central to development discourse. Quadri and Amaechi argue that the majority of African public services have proved to be ineffective in implementing socio-economic development objectives. They premise their arguments on the perception that the political and social environments of African public services should

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form the basis for understanding why African bureaucracies have p ­ erformed below expectations. They conclude that African public services cannot be detached from the context that produced them. Seeking a better explanation of African public services’ ineptitude therefore requires an understanding of this context and its impact on their mode of operation and performance. The authors recommend that these realities should be taken into considerations when future reforms are being proposed. The next chapter by Michael Ifeanyichukwu Abada, Nneka Ifeoma Okafor and Paul Hezekiah Omeh interrogates an ethical review of bureaucracy and the crisis of development in post-colonial states in Africa. The authors argue that the continued and fragile existence of administrative states in Africa has been attributed to the government’s inability to deliver on the needs and demands of the constituents. Against the backdrop of the failures of developmental expectations of the state, the authors investigate the nexus between bureaucracy and development in Africa, and its role in the continued existence of post-colonial economies. They conclude by recommending an orientation, training and capacity-building programme for national growth and development. The need for a new orientation among bureaucrats in Africa cannot be overemphasised. The pervasive corruption and lax attitude towards work cannot engender development. Martin Terngu Kpoghul’s contribution focuses on the importance of building capacities for border administrators along Nigeria’s international boundaries. Kpoghul provides an historical narrative of how the colonialists partitioned Africa among themselves and created artificial boundaries which continue to constitute serious management problems in our contemporary times. He argues that peoples of common language, socio-­ cultural history and values were suddenly separated by artificial boundaries and placed under different spheres of influences, creating a paradoxical situation. It was within this scenario that Nigeria emerged as one of the African nation-state with its territorial boundaries. His chapter x-rays the challenges confronting effective administration of Nigeria’s international boundaries by border administrators, and suggests ways of improving the capacities of these administrators to perform their roles effectively. The abuse of informal cross-border traders by security operatives at the borders undermines Pan-Africanism and regional integration in Africa. Isiaka Abiodun Adams’ contribution focuses on Nigeria’s diaspora communities. The chapter problematises the securitisation of Nigeria’s diaspora communities in the United States, Western Europe and South-­East Asia, who were allegedly involved in the sponsorship of ‘terrorist’, irredentist and

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rebel organisations and serving as financial conduits for conflicts and interventions as well as secessionist struggles for self-­ determination targeted against the state. Adam asserts that prior to the recent transformation, Nigeria’s diasporic communities served as bridges between the national government and foreign countries by shaping the country’s foreign policies and international behaviour; they acted as agents of democratisation and economic support through robust repatriation of funds and technology transfer. He employs securitisation theory to argue that Nigeria’s diasporic communities’ recent morphing from perennial contributors in the areas of knowledge transfer and economy development to purveyors of threats to the states’ existence and survival is symptomatic of the state’s failure to address basic challenges of state formation. It also stems from the general disillusionment among Nigeria’s diaspora communities, the perceived inability to realise the Nigerian dream, which all contrived to serve as push factors for Nigerians to migrate. He concludes by recommending national dialogue, proper monitoring and harnessing of the potentials of the Nigerian diaspora communities to engender positive contributions to national development. The next chapter examines the inscrutable phenomenon of the diaspora population and how these groups of people have been sending remittances to relatives and friends in home countries. Joseph Okwesili Nkwede, Kazeem O. Dauda, Ahmed O. Moliki and Atanda O. Orija argue that remittances are capable of contributing to the realisation of sustainable development goals in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. Consequently, they conclude by inviting African countries to design various programmes to ensure that the African diaspora population and the remittances flows from these groups should be factored into the development plans of African countries. Nigeria and several countries in Africa are currently devising various means through which the African diaspora can contribute to fostering development through knowledge exchange, inflow of investment and building technical capacities of institutions on the continent. What the authors fail to highlight is the need to address the harsh conditions that force people to migrate out of their countries, sometimes through perilous journeys. The last chapter by Serges Djoyou Kamga examines the protection of women under international law. He notes that from time immemorial, women have suffered and still suffer numerous forms of violence including domestic abuse, rape, child marriages and female genital mutilation (FGM). Violence against women (VAW) is a violation of women’s rights. He concludes by recommending the implementation of various legal provisions against the abuse of women at both national and international levels.

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References Adebajo, A. (2017, September 4). Alchemist of AU reform. Business Day. African Union. (n.d.). Economic, social and cultural council. Available: https:// au.int/en/organs/ecosocc. Accessed 25 May 2019. Duodu, C. (2013). The birth of OAU. Available: https://www.modernghana. com/news/462788/the-birth-of-the-oau.html. Accessed 25 May 2019. Fagbayibo. (2016). Flexibility arrangements in the African union: A way out of the integration conundrum? Africa Review, 8(2), 156–170. https://doi.org/10.1 080/09744053.2016.1186870. Fagbayibo, B. (2018). Nkrumahism, Agenda 2063, and the role of intergovernmental institutions in fast-tracking continental unity. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53(4), 629–642. Mazrui, A. (1999). Seek Ye first the political kingdom. In A. Mazrui (Ed.), General history of Africa (pp. 105–126). Oxford: James Currey. Mkandawire, T. (2011). Running, while others walk. Knowledge and the challenge of Africa’s development. Africa Development, XXXVI(2), 1–36. Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C. (2019). Border practices at Beitbridge border and Johannesburg Inner City: Implications for the SADC regional integration project. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54(3), 309–330. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2013). Decolonial epistemic perspective and Pan-African Unity in the 21st century. In M. Munchie, P. Lukhele-Olorunju, & O. Akpor (Eds.), The African Union ten years after (pp.  385–409). Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa. Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa must unite. London: Panaf Books. Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. New  York: International Publishers. Okeke, G.  S. M. (2008). The uprooted immigrant: The impact of brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation on Africa’s development. In F.  Toyin & N. Afolabi (Eds.), Trans-Atlantic migration: The paradoxes of exile. New York: Routlege. Oloruntoba, S. O. (2015). Pan Africanism, knowledge production and the third liberation of Africa. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies, Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 10(1), 7–24. Oloruntoba, S. O. (2016). Regionalism and integration in Africa: EU-ACP economic partnership agreements and Euro-Nigeria relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Prah, K. (1999). African renaissance or warlordism? In W. Makgoba (Ed.), African Renaissance (pp. 37–61). Sandton/Cape Town: Mafebe and Tafelberg Publishing. Söderbaum, F. (2004). Theorizing the new regionalism approach. In The political economy of regionalism. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Söderbaum, F. (2016). Old, new, and comparative regionalism: The history and scholarly development of the field. In T. Borzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, V. (1969). Africa and unity: The evolution of Pan-Africanism. London: Longmans, Green and Company. Tondi, P. (2005). Pan-African thought and practice. Alternation, Special Edition 2, 301–328. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2016). African Continental Free Trade Area: Advancing Pan-African integration -some considerations. Available: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d5_ en.pdf. Accessed 3 June 2017. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). (2016). ECA urges Africa to push ahead with Continental Free Trade Area. Available: http://www. uneca.org/stories/eca-urges-africa-push-ahead-continental-free-trade-area. Accessed 4 June 2017. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). (2017). Assessing regional integration in Africa. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. World Bank. (2017). Migration and remittances. Washington, DC: World Bank. Zeleza, P. (2008). Africa and its diasporas: Dispersals and linkages. Dakar: CODESRIA.

PART I

Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration in Africa

CHAPTER 2

Pan-Africanism and Regionalism in Africa: The Journey So Far Ernest Toochi Aniche

Introduction Modern Africa regionalism derives directly from the Pan-Africanist philosophical foundations of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and others, culminating in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (now the African Union [AU] since 2001), the 1979 Monrovia Strategy, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that gave birth to the African Economic Community (AEC). African regionalism is thus rooted in Pan-­Africanism (Aniche 2015). But despite decades of Pan-African integration, some scholars (the Afropessimists or Afro-skeptics) have noted that numerous obstacles remain, making it difficult for Africa to achieve successful economic integration (Aniche 2015). Other scholars (the Afro-optimists) have emphasized the benefits, opportunities, and prospects of Pan-African regionalism (Okafor and Aniche 2017). This paper departs from both views by identifying with the third force or the via media—the Afro-realists.

E. T. Aniche (*) Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke, Otuoke, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_2

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However, the main objective of this chapter is to situate the historical context of the nexus between Pan-Africanism and regionalism in Africa from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial era. The chapter also evaluates the extent to which regional integration in Africa has been able to achieve its stated targets over the years amid various challenges and prospects. To do this, the chapter is partitioned into six parts. The first part introduces the discussion. The second part conceptualizes or clarifies Pan-Africanism within the context of African integration, while the third part situates the historical context of Pan-Africanism and African regionalism. The fourth part describes African regional architecture, while the objective of the fifth part is to assess regional integration in Africa. Lastly, the sixth part summarizes the chapter and recommends solutions to the problems of African integration.

Understanding Pan-Africanism in the Era of African Integration While Pan-Africanism served as an ideology for decolonization, anti-­ colonial and neo-colonial struggles, continental unity, and means of solving African developmental challenges, African regionalism has been a means of collective self-reliance or strategy for economic transformation and development framework. As a philosophy, Pan-Africanism represents and symbolizes the aggregation or collection of the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific, and philosophical legacies of Africans from past to the present. It promotes values that are the product of the African civilization and the struggles against slavery, racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Geiss (1974). However, modern Pan-Africanism began around the start of the twentieth century (Sherwood 2012). In the United States, the term is closely associated with Afro-centrism, an ideology of African-American identity politics that emerged during the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. But as originally conceived by Henry Sylvester-Williams and Edward Wilmot Blyden, Pan-Africanism referred to the unity of all continental Africa. Other Pan-Africanist organizations include Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League, Trans-Africa, and the International People’s Democratic Uhuru Movement. Even during apartheid South Africa, there was a Pan-Africanist Congress that dealt with the oppression of Africans in South Africa under Apartheid rule (Hooker 1975; Martin 1985; Sherwood 1995; Adi and Sherwood 2003; Walters 1997).

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Pan-Africanism, sometimes referred to as Black Nationalism or Afro-­ centrism, is an ideology or movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide, and sometimes tends to be opposed to external political and economic involvement on the continent. Indeed, an all-African alliance would empower African people globally (Nkrumah 1962; Nyerere 1963; Sherwood 1996; Makalani 2011). Pan-Africanism is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic, social, and political progress and aims to unify and uplift people of African descent. The ideology asserts that the fate of all African peoples and countries are intertwined. The core of Pan-Africanism is that African peoples share not merely a common history but a common destiny. Pan-Africanism therefore stresses the need for collective self-reliance (Legum 1965; Nkrumah 1965; Aniche 2018). The underlying theme of Pan-Africanism is the struggle for social and political equality, and freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination. Pan-Africanism is originally the perception by Africans in the diaspora and on the continent that they share common goals. Thus, the global dispersal of persons of African descent is partly responsible for the emergence of the Pan-African movement. The movement also emphasizes a celebration of ‘Africanness’, resistance to the exploitation and oppression of Africans and their kin in the diaspora as well as staunch opposition to the ideology of racial superiority in all its forms and manifestations (Murithi 2005). Essentially, Pan-Africanism is a recognition of the fragmented nature of the existence of Africans, and their marginalization and alienation both on their own continent and the rest of the world. Pan-Africanism seeks to respond to Africa’s under-development and exploitation and the culture of dependency on external assistance that unfortunately still prevails on the continent. Pan-Africanism calls upon Africans to look inward and draw from their own strengths and capacities to become self-reliant (Aniche 2018). Pan-Africanism is a recognition that Africans have been divided among themselves, that they constantly compete with each other, are deprived of true ownership of their own resources, and are inundated with paternalistic external actors. Pan-Africanism recognizes that the only way out of this existential socio-political crisis is by promoting greater solidarity amongst Africans. While dialogue and debate in Africa will not always generate consensus, it will at least be dialogue among Africans about possible resolutions to their problems. It holds out the belief that if ideas are not designed by the Africans themselves, it will rarely be in the interests of Africans (Murithi 2005).

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Also, Pan-Africanism is seen as an endeavor to return to singular, t­ raditional African concepts about culture, society, and values. Examples of this include Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Négritude movement, and Mobutu Sese Seko’s view of Authenticité. An important theme running through much Pan-Africanist literature concerns the historical links between different countries on the continent, and the benefits of cooperation as a way of resisting imperialism and colonialism (Campbell 2006; Shivji 2006). The realization of the Pan-African objective, therefore, would lead to power consolidation in Africa, which would compel a reallocation of global resources and unleash a fiercer psychological energy and political assertion that would unsettle social and political power structures of the world. United African states will have the economic, political, and social clout to act and compete on the world stage (Padmore 1956; Adi 2005; Aniche2018). Paradoxically, the idea of Pan-Africanism has long been used to defend the rights of African states against external interference—the principle of non-intervention—and the majority of African leaders still hold onto this norm, which is antithetical to the ultimate goal of neo-functionalist regional integration, or regional supranationalism. Thus, critics of Pan-­ Africanism argue that this movement or ideology did not in the past bring about any significant transformation of Africa, other than enabling “a trade union of dictators” in the form of the OAU Heads of State and Government to rule unjustly and harshly (Aniche 2018). But positively, the AU has departed from this tradition by including the right to responsible intervention akin to United Nations (UN) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) under certain conditions.

Pan-Africanism and African Regionalism in Historical Perspective It was Ake (1981) who rightly noted that the idea of regional integration as a means or strategies of collective self-reliance for promoting economic integration and cooperation has been around in Africa for a long time. Historically, therefore, integration in Africa preceded European ­colonialism and predated European integration. Africa has a long tradition of regional cooperation, its trade and monetary integration schemes being the oldest in the developing world. Chronologically, integration in Africa has undergone three important phases such as the first phase or phase one (the era of Islamization or Arab colonialism), the second phase or phase two (the era of diaspora Pan-Africanism or traditional Pan-Africanism), and the

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third phase or phase three (the era of European colonialism and the era of modern Pan-Africanism) (Aniche 2018). The first phase of integration in Africa started as early as the tenth century, or even earlier, with the gradual but steady Islamization of the continent under Arab colonialism. From the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas to the coasts of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans or from Saharan Africa (covering the whole of North Africa) to sub-Saharan Africa, the rampaging Arabs continued the conquest and Islamization of Africa. Thus, this first phase was more in the religious sphere, or rather was essentially though not exclusively in the religious realm. This was incidentally halted—or rather, curtailed—by European penetration or incursion into Africa between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the scramble for Africa, the various European powers defeated Arabs and both Islamized and yet to be Islamized African kingdoms, culminating in the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) and subsequent European colonialism (Okafor and Aniche 2017). The second phase of integration in Africa was the era of early or traditional Pan-Africanism during European colonialism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This was spearheaded or pioneered by diaspora Africans in the continents of the Americas and Europe like Henry Sylvester-Williams, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B du Bois, and Malcolm X, among others. Their aims were to unite all people of African descent, both those in Africa and those in the diaspora in American continents and Europe; tackle racial discrimination and segregation, racism, colonialism, imperialism, alien religion and slavery against blacks; and pursue freedom, self-determination, self-government, independence, and decolonization for Africa. Perhaps the bridge between traditional and modern Pan–Africanism, or the link between the second and third phases of African integration, is the formation of the African Association in 1897 (later renamed the Pan-African Association) by Henry Sylvester-Williams, who organized the First Pan-African Conference in London in 1900 (Hooker 1975; Adi and Sherwood 1995; Sherwood 2010). This phase two of integration in Africa, also known as Black Nationalism or Afro-centrism, is more in socio-cultural and political spheres (Aniche 2018). The third phase of African integration began in the early twentieth century, and can be classified into two eras, namely, the era of European colonialism and the era of modern Pan-Africanism. This shows that regional integration as part of Africa’s strategy for economic transformation has persisted for more than a century. The first experiment with integration in

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Africa began in 1910 during the period of European colonialism. Thus, regional integration in Africa in this phase dates back to 1910 with the formation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (UNECA 2004; Attuquayefio 2009). The pervasive influence of Europe on existing integration projects in Africa can also be traced to the colonial period when Britain and France made spirited efforts to amalgamate their respective colonial territories to enhance cost-effectiveness in their administration and exploitation. In what is generally regarded as the first economic integration scheme in the region, Britain created the West African Currency Board (WACB) in 1912 as the sole institution responsible for the issue and management of currency and charged with issuing the legal tender in the four colonies—Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—to ease trade transactions. The next schemes were the West African Airways Corporation (WAAC) set up to facilitate air transportation and the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) established to standardize examination for university admission in the four colonies. Also, the West African Cocoa Research Institute (WACRI) was established (Attuquayefio 2009; Sesay and Omotosho 2011; Agbonkhese and Adekola 2014). There were in existence similar common institutions and arrangement in the French colonies. France embarked on the same integration trajectory, albeit in a more inclusive manner, by creating a monetary union using the Communauté financière d’Afrique, popularly known as the CFA in 1945, among its colonial territories as legal tender with a Central Bank in Dakar, Senegal, which acts as a clearing house. But unlike their Anglophone counterparts, the French colonies retained the CFA as legal tender after independence, making it relatively easy, in theory at least, to promote trade among them (Sesay and Omotosho 2011; Agbonkhese and Adekola 2014). However, the era of modern Pan-Africanism in this third phase of African integration dates as far back as the days prior to decolonization. This was the period when the Manchester (Pan-Africanist) Conference of 1945 spelt out in detail the need for African unity. The struggle of decolonization saw the Pan-Africanist demands being strongly echoed (Anyang 1990; Saasa 1991; Antwi-Danso 2009). The Southern Rhodesia Customs Union emerged in 1949 between South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe. After independence regional integration became a pillar of Africa’s developmental strategy. Pan-­Africanism, an ideology which emphasizes continental unity and strong identification with ongoing anti-colonial struggles, was the leitmotif of Africa’s

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­ evelopmental framework. Regionalism in Africa began during this period, d spearheaded in large measured by the OAU and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), partly as a response to the last vestiges of colonialism as well as to spur political and economic progress on the continent, and partly as a political instrument to deal with the power imbalances in the international system (Mistry 2000; Qobo 2007). Thus, since independence, states in Africa have been involved in regional integration as a strategy for solving their developmental challenges. For example, following the inspiration of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana and Guinea announced on May 1, 1959 that they had formed a Union of African States. On May 30, 1959, Cote d’Ivoire (then Ivory Coast), Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Niger and Benin (then Dahomey) reacted immediately by forming the Counseil du l’Entente (all Francophone countries). Thus, in an address delivered to a meeting of the committee of African organizations held in London in August 1961, Nnamdi Azikiwe proposed a scheme for a West African Common Market as a strategy to achieving unity in the subregion (Adedeji 1970; Adetula 2009). Yet the Ghana-Upper Volta Trade Agreement between Ghana and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) started in 1962, as did the African Common Market linking Algeria, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco. In 1962 the Equatorial Customs Union, the predecessor to the Customs Union of Central African States, joined Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon (UNECA 2004; Aworawo 2016). This was followed by the unification of various blocs (Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia blocs), culminating in the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (now the AU since 2001), the 1980 Lagos Plan, and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that gave birth to the AEC. This was led by African leaders such as Haile Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Muammar Gaddafi, among others. Their aims were to achieve the unification of Africa and integration of the ­fragmented African economies through the fight against neo-colonialism, Apartheid, and white minority rule, especially in South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and so on; movement for African renaissance, African revivalism, revival of African culture, philosophy, religion, arts, science, technology, ideology, common heritage, African socialism, African democracy, and African welfarism; and the struggle for decolonization and independence of the remaining African territories under colonial rule such as Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and so on. It also condemns dependency and stresses the need for collective self-reliance (Sherwood 2012).

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Expectedly, there was a flurry of diplomatic initiatives and activities among the new states aimed at promoting collective self-reliance and regional integration. For example, in January 1964, President William Tubman of Liberia conveyed a meeting of four West African countries— Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone—to explore the feasibility of setting up a Free Trade Area. Almost a year later in February 1965, diplomats from the four states met again in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to draw up a document that would have led to the formation of what they called an Organization for West African Cooperation. However, these early initiatives did not materialize due to lack of sincerity on the part of the West African leaders and their strong adherence to their newly won political sovereignty (Sesay and Omotosho 2011). The East African Community (EAC), comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, began in 1967 as perhaps the most far-reaching of early integration attempts in Africa. Most of these early experiments have been dissolved or transformed. New groups have formed, reflecting African countries’ continued desire for economic cooperation and integration (UNECA 2004). The second decade of independence, however, witnessed an upsurge in the establishment of regional integration schemes, precisely with the formation of the French Speaking West African Economic Community or Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) in 1972. This was followed in 1975 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Attuquayefio 2009). Consequently, in West Africa alone, three economic communities emerged in four years, such as the Mano River Union in 1971 between Liberia and Sierra Leone to promote economic and political cooperation between their contiguous countries, joined by Guinea under Sekou Toure a decade later in 1983, the Community of West African States (which became the West African Economic and Monetary Union) in 1973, and the ECOWAS in 1975. Elsewhere, the Central African Economic and Customs Union was transformed in 1974 and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries in 1976 (UNECA 2004; Sesay and Omotosho 2011). The 1974 declaration by the UN of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) recognized regional economic cooperation among developing countries as the cornerstone for their future development. Subsequently, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) took up the challenge and convened a series of meetings in various parts of Africa to promote regional cooperation and integration (Agbonkhese and

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Adekola 2014). Prior to the 1980s, therefore, African leaders pursued regional integration schemes as part of the strategy of meeting the continent’s daunting development challenges, especially during the cold war era. After the 1980s, African regional integration received renewed attention through various summits and meetings, culminating in the Monrovia Declaration, the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Abuja Treaty (Ofei-­ Nkansah 2009). The impetus for the Abuja Treaty was largely attributed to the new wave of democratization in the continent. Thus, the second era of phase three of African integration (the era of modern Pan-Africanism) is different from the two previous phases of integration in Africa in many ways. One, it emanated from Africa and represents the first attempt by Africans to integrate its territories; phase one was imposed from outside (specifically by the Arabs) while phase two was spearheaded by diaspora Africans. Two, as a corollary from the above or because of it, the third phase is properly referred to as African integration in this chapter, unlike the first and second phases that were appropriately called ‘integration in Africa’. Three, phase three of African integration is more in the economic sphere, with the target of ultimately embracing other spheres like political, security, social, and so on, whereas the first and second phases were more on religious and socio-cultural cum political spheres, respectively. Four, from an African historical perspective, the third phase of African integration, as currently modeled after European integration, neo-functionalism, and civilization, is a modern integration or neo-­ integrationism, while the first phase of integration in Africa was based on the classical integrationism of Arabian Islamic tradition or civilization, just as the second phase of integration in Africa represented the neo-classical integrationism revolving around African cultural revival and civilization (Okafor and Aniche 2017). Consequently, African integration is today targeted at regionalism or continentalism through regional integration and democratic reforms, and through struggle against military rule and authoritarian regime types or  agitations for multiparty democracy modeled after neo-functionalism. However, neo-functionalism and its revised version, neo-neo-­functionalism, are essentially theories of European integration (Schmitter 1970; Gehring 1996; Mattli 1999; Haas 2001; McGowan 2007; Laursen 2008; Niemann and Schmitter 2009). Therefore, these theories are not apt to explain the defects, failures, and drawbacks of African integration. Most of European countries that adopted a neo-functional approach to regional integration that resulted in the European Union (EU) have transcended problems of

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national unity, de-industrialization, national insecurity, and the like (Aniche 2015). The explanatory value of neo-functionalism suffered a serious setback because of shortcomings or unpredictable trajectory of the upsurge of nationalism in the EU such that many of its proponents and exponents began to question it (Hoffmann 1966; Haas 1975; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Schmitter 2003). Thus, there is need to deconstruct them in the quest for a paradigm shift in African integration. The point is that neo-­ functionalism has many defects, and while assuming that regional integration is a gradual process, its conception of integration as a linear process makes explanation of setbacks or shortcomings impossible (Schmitter 1969; Haas 1976). Another of its defects is that neo-functionalism assumes that integration of states is an integration of interdependence, and therefore not adequate for explaining the incidence of dependence of African economies on Western economies and integration of dependence of African states on one another (Aniche 2014). This chapter contends, therefore, that there is need to evolve the fourth phase of African integration anchored on neo-neo-integrationism of post-­ neo-­functionalism or post-modern integrationism of post-neo-­nationalism. It emphasizes the initial integration on security matters through postnationalism, given the enormous security challenges confronting the continent, with the subsequent and gradual phase of integration on economic and political spheres. This phase of integration occurs after many years of nation-building, national integration, and national development through neo-nationalism or a combination of political and economic nationalism, driven by the people or private sector rather than the government or the public sector through humanism. Actually, post-neo-functionalism is a hybrid of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism, and humanism (Okafor and Aniche 2017).

Monrovia Strategy, Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty, and African Regional Architecture There were three main regional plans which triggered the need to fast-­track African regionalism in the second era of phase three of African integration (or the era of modern Pan-Africanism) as a strategy of African development and transformation. Thus, the narratives about modern African regionalism and Pan-Africanism cannot be complete without mentioning the 1979

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Monrovia Strategy, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), and the 1991 Abuja Treaty. The 1979 Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa— or the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Economic and Social Development for the Establishment of a New International Order—was the outcome of the African Heads of State and the Council of Ministers of the OAU meeting in their 16th Ordinary Session and 23rd Ordinary Session, respectively, in Monrovia, Liberia, from July 6 to 20, 1979 (Asuk 2011). The Monrovia Declaration set out to achieve a number of objectives which include establishment of self-sustaining, internally located process of development and economic growth; achievement of sub-regional and regional collective self-reliance in order to end external dependence; the physical integration of the continent through the expansion of a transport and communications network; the development of capabilities to maintain sovereignty over the region’s natural resources; establishment of mutually beneficial and equitable relations between Africa and the rest of the world; and the attainment of a substantial increase in the approximately 5% share of intra-African trade and the eventual establishment of an African Common Market leading to an African Economic Community (Sekgoma 1987; Asuk 2011). To consider concrete measures for the implementation of the Monrovia Declaration, the Summit resolved to hold the extraordinary session in Lagos, Nigeria, to be devoted to the economic problems of Africa (Adedeji 1991; Asuk 2011). Subsequently, at their first-ever economic summit held in Lagos from April 28 to 29, 1980, African leaders unanimously adopted the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000 (Adedeji 1970). Adedeji (1983) noted that this is the first time in the history of the continent and the entire international community that 50 independent and sovereign states which differ markedly in their levels of economic development, in their political ideologies, and in their social systems have subscribed to a common set of development objectives and goals and have adopted common development priorities and strategy. The document described as Africa’s economic Magna Carta committed Africa to establish, by the year 2000, an African Economic Community in order to foster the economic, social, and cultural integration of the continent. The LPA put emphasis on self-reliance and African ownership of and control over its own resources. It put forward a bold program of action

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based on regional building blocks that would eventually lead to the economic unity of the African continent (Ravenhill 1984). The Plan was therefore Africa’s regional approach to the economic decolonization of the continent, providing long-term socio-economic restructuring and development (Adedeji 1983; Benachenhon 1983). The Plan elaborated on the declared policy priorities stated in the Monrovia document. It set out to achieve institutional development at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels; development of an industrial sector for regional self-reliance; facilitation of the transport and communications system for regional integration, self-reliance, and increase in intra-­ African trade; the strengthening of intra-African institutions; the creation of regional linkages which would facilitate intra-African trade; the reduction of trade barriers among African states, minimization of the use of foreign exchange in regional trade; and policy reorientations of central and commercial banks in accordance with the needs of the individual national economies and regional linkages (Sekgoma 1987; Ravenhill 1996; Adedeji 1991). However, one major similarity in the policy thrusts of the Monrovia Strategy and the LPA was to accelerate the process of regional economic integration through cooperation. Also, both documents emerged on the African development agenda as a critique of development approaches derived from the modernization thesis, particularly the World Bank’s Berg Report (Shaw 1983; Browne and Cummings 1984; Sekgoma 1987; Asante 1991; Eyoh 1998). The major defect of the two documents was that they simply came out with a political declaration, a development strategy, a set of priorities, sectoral programs of action, and a blueprint for regional and sub-regional integration, and thus fell short of elaborate theoretical issues of development economics, political economy, and public policy (Adedeji 1991). The 1991 OAU Summit or meeting of African leaders in Abuja, Nigeria, which metamorphosed into the 1991 Abuja Treaty, was primarily and initially meant to assess the LPA that succeeded the Monrovia Strategy. The fallout of this Treaty adopted by the OAU at the meeting of Heads of State and Government in Abuja, Nigeria, on June 3, 1991 was the establishment of the AEC. This Treaty of the AEC, also known as Abuja Treaty, came into force after the requisite ratification of members in May 1994. It provided for the AEC to be set up through a gradual process (a neo-­ functional approach) which would be achieved by coordination, harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future

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Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa (Okeke and Aniche 2012). However, the AEC is now a program of action of AU, established in line with the Monrovia Declaration and the LPA to facilitate mutual economic development among the majority of African states with the following objectives as provided in the Article 4 of the Treaty: to promote economic, social, and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and indigenous and self-sustained development (Aniche 2015). To achieve these objectives the AEC has several organs in accordance with its Treaty. These goals are to be achieved in six stages, which are as follows: (i) creation of regional blocs in regions where such do not yet exist to be completed in 1999, (ii) strengthening of intra-REC integration and inter-­ REC harmonization to be completed in 2007, (iii) establishment of a free trade area (FTA) and customs union (CU) in each regional bloc to be completed in 2017, (iv) establishment of a continent-wide CU and also a FTA to be completed in 2019, (v) establishment of a continent-wide African Common Market (ACM) or single market (SM) to be completed in 2023, (vi) establishment of a continent-wide economic and monetary union (MU) and also a currency union and parliament (political union, PU) to be completed in 2028 (Aniche 2015; Okafor and Aniche 2017). There are multiple regional blocs in Africa known as RECs, many of which have overlapping memberships. The RECs consist primarily of trade blocs and, in some cases, political and military cooperation. Most of these RECs form the ‘pillars’ of AEC and several of these pillars also contain sub-groups with tighter customs and/or monetary unions. Some of these RECs include: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), established in February 1998; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), formed in December 1994, replacing the Preferential Trade Area which had existed since 1981; the Treaty establishing the new East African Community (EAC), signed on November 30, 1999 and which entered into force on July 7, 2000; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), established in 1985; ECOWAS, founded on May 28, 1975; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), founded in 1986; Southern African Development Community (SADC), formed on April 1, 1980; and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), formed in 1989 (Aniche 2014). Some of the RECs like ECCAS, ECOWAS, and SADC contain within them sub-groupings. For instance, CEMAC is a sub-bloc of ECCAS; the

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West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) are sub-groups of ECOWAS; and the South African Customs Union (SACU) is a sub-group of SADC (Aniche and Ukaegbu 2016; Aniche 2018).

Appraising Pan-African Integration Optimistically, a regional economic integration that embraces all the 54 AU member states endowed with human resources of a growing and youthful population of over a billion people, if it succeeds in dismantling all trade barriers (TBs) and non-trade barriers (NTBs) to intra-African trade, will unlock the continent’s immense development potentials, boost its trade performance and integration into the global trading system, and reduce the continent’s heavy dependence on aid for development. Thus, it has been noted that the achievement of a successful regional integration will require the removal of tariffs, the establishment of common rules of origin, the harmonization and simplification of customs regulations and procedures, and the elimination of NTBs to intra-African trade. This will lead to significant growth and sustainable development, just as the creation of the COMESA FTA led to a six-fold increase in intra-COMESA trade between 2000 and 2010. In summary, therefore, some of the benefits, opportunities, potentials, and prospects of regional integration in Africa include larger markets, economic cooperation, trade facilitation, and so on (Okafor and Aniche 2017). Regrettably, out of the six stages of accomplishing the goals of African integration, the only one that can be said to have been achieved satisfactorily is the creation of regional blocs in regions where such do not yet exist. Other stages have passed their proposed years of enforcement for the AEC and some of the RECs; for example, CEN-SAD was not able to enforce FTA in 2010, which was the proposed year. COMESA was only able to enforce FTA (though all members are yet to participate) but not able to enforce CU in the proposed year of 2008, and is thus very unlikely to achieve MU in 2018, the proposed year. EAC, on its part, claims to enforce FTA and CU, but was not able to meet the target years of SM and MU in 2009 and political unification (PU) in 2010. ECCAS claims to have enforced the Defense Pact but has not been able to enforce FTA and CU in the proposed years of 2007 and 2011, respectively. ECOWAS claims to be enforcing visa free movements and the Defense Pact but has not been able to enforce CU in 2007, the proposed year. SADC was not

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able to enforce FTA, CU, SM, and MU in the proposed years of 2008, 2010, 2015, and 2016, respectively. Finally, from all indications, AEC is very unlikely to achieve FTA and CU proposed for 2019 and SM proposed for 2023, as well as unlikely to meet the proposed target of 2028 for enforcing MU and PU (Okeke and Aniche 2012, 2017; Aniche 2015). Not surprisingly, intra-African trade has consistently remained low, approximately averaging 9% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, 14% of total exports, and 15% of total trade. The average African intra-­ RECs trade is 10% of their total trade with the rest of the world. Over 80% of imports and exports of African states are destined for markets outside the continent. While intra-regional trade of total exports in other regions of the world such as the EU (28) is 61%, North America is 49%, Latin America is 17%, and Asia is 62%, all much higher than in Africa (TRALAC 2015; UNECA 2015). The efforts of RECs in Africa, though substantial and laudable, have had limited or marginal impact on intra-African trade. It has been noted that Africa does not trade with itself because of differences in trade regimes, restrictive customs procedures; administrative, bureaucratic, and technical barriers; limited productive capacity; inadequate trade-related infrastructure, trade finance, and trade information; lack of factor market integration; and inadequate focus on internal market issues. But it is pertinent to point out that generally, the share of Africa in the global trade in 2010 is very poor at about 4% (Aniche 2018). Africa is currently facing several trade-related challenges such as low share in world exports and low intra-African trade, poor trade infrastructure and supply-side constraints, lack of export diversification, and tariff and non-tariff barriers. The share of Africa’s exports in total world exports is only about 4%. Essentially, African exports are directed outside the continent. The structure of Africa’s exports to the rest of the world reflects market concentration in primary product to just a few partners, the EU and the United States, receiving 42.8% and 18.1%, respectively, in 2010. For example, oil-exporting African countries like Angola, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, and others are among the least diversified African countries in terms of exports (Aniche 2015). The average protection rate of Africa is 8.7%; for example, Ethiopia imposes an average tariff of 13.3% on its imports coming from other African countries and faces an average tariff of 19.5% on its exports to the rest of Africa. This means that Ethiopia is on average more protectionist than the rest of Africa, adopting on average a 4.6% point higher tariff on its imports from the continent. Only about one-third of African ­countries—such as

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Burkina Faso, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia— imposed and faced protections that are on average lower than the relatively high averages for the continent. The rest of the African countries are on average more protectionist than the rest of Africa. A quarter of African countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Tunisia are on average more protectionist, and face on average more trade barriers than the rest of Africa (Okafor and Aniche 2017). With average protection rates of 9.5% faced by African countries on their exports to non-African partners and 12.4% on Africa’s exports to African countries, African countries face higher protection rates from one another than from non-African countries. At the country level, TBs imposed are considerably different and extremely complex and heterogeneous. For example, Swaziland faces the highest average tariff when exporting its agricultural products to non-African countries at 96.7%; Seychelles imposes the highest average tariff on agricultural products imported from Africa at 53.6%. Yet the higher intra-African trade protection rate partly explains the low level of intra-regional trade in Africa (Aniche 2018). Several reasons account for low intra-African trade. The production and export structures of most African economies are geared toward primary products such as minerals, timber, coffee, cocoa, and other raw materials for which demand is externally oriented. Inadequate infrastructure remains one of the chief obstacles to intra-African trade and investment, and private sector development. This limits the range of products African countries can trade among themselves. In other words, intra-­African trade is weak partly because fundamental aspects of trade logistics such as infrastructures like transport, energy, information and ­communication (ICT), and so on are compromised. Trade constraints such as poor infrastructure make trade physically difficult if not impossible, no matter the trade regime (Okafor and Aniche 2017). Therefore, apart from TBs, many NTBs limit African trade, such as lengthy/custom procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, product standards, anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, and licensing. The point being made is that TBs are not the sole constraints to trade in Africa. NTBs are usually more difficult to quantify. In other words, a major factor accounting for the low level of intra-African trade has been the numerous constraints associated with trade facilitation like complicated customs requirements and procedures; unfavorable domestic trade

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r­ egulatory environment; poor transport and logistic service provision and­ infrastructure networks; physical barriers, harassment, and corruption along trade and transit corridors; limited knowledge and understanding of trade facilitation instruments and measures by public sector officials, private sector operators, and other trade constituents. Besides contributing to delays and loss of time in conducting business, these constraints impose high transaction costs for African traded goods and services, thereby undermining their competitiveness in the international market (Aniche 2015). Also, poorly developed financial markets and lack of widely available trade and investment finance for African businesses have been major hindrances in boosting trade in Africa. The paucity of credit, finance, and insurance limits businesses’ liquidity and undermines their ability to obtain production inputs. In general, it limits the potential for intra-African trade and constrains diversification efforts in Africa. Africa faces serious infrastructural bottlenecks, thereby affecting the competitiveness of Africa’s exports and contributing to significantly low volumes of intra-African trade. For example, transport costs in Africa are among the highest in the world, and poor transport infrastructure is responsible for 40% of transport costs in coastal countries and 60% in landlocked countries in Africa. More so, many sub-Saharan African countries continue to experience crisis conditions in national energy supply, posing the biggest infrastructural challenge or trade-related constraints in Africa Aniche (2018). Furthermore, multiple membership has impeded economic integration in two ways. One, directly by generating inconsistencies and incompatibilities, and inhibiting coordination and harmonization of activities like customs union, free trade, single market, monetary union and single/common currency. Two, indirectly, by forcing member countries to ­ dissipate scarce human and financial resources in seeking to service different regional communities and implementing differing, contradicting, and conflicting treaties. In addition, multiple memberships have also bedeviled the long-running and still incomplete negotiations between several disparate groups of member states and the EU over the establishment of regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Overlapping membership of different trade regimes and instruments risk trade diversion, and dealing with them poses legal and administrative challenges to member states. Meanwhile, one major problem of proliferation and sub-­groupings in the African RECs is that it undermines the commitment and allegiance of those African states toward the regional bodies (Aniche 2015).

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In short, some of these challenges, constraints, obstacles, and difficulties militating against successful African integration include neo-colonial ties, politico-ideological differences, export-oriented primary products of African states; disparity in size and development of African states; fear of domination or monopolization of benefits; adverse activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Africa; historical, political, economic, and vertical linkages of African economies to Western economies; structural dependence of African economies on Western economies; intractable civil strife and the attendant refugee crises and internal displacements (Okafor and Aniche 2017). So far African regionalism has failed as a means of collective self-reliance, not to talk of solving African developmental challenges.

Conclusion A study of African integration has divided African scholars into two: the Afro-optimists, who believe that the prospects of African regionalism outweigh its challenges, and the Afro-pessimists or Afro-skeptics, who think otherwise. Those who belong to the former expect Africa to overcome its challenges, while those who align themselves with the latter think otherwise. We align ourselves with the emerging third force—the Afro-realists. The Afro-realism is the via media (middle) between Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism. It agrees with the latter that African regionalism as presently constituted cannot achieve its objectives but also, just like the former, recognizes the fact that there is still hope for African integration, although not with the current approach. Africa cannot be doing the same thing over and over and expect a different result. We therefore conclude that given the realities on the ground and the strategies being applied, African regionalism has so far failed as means of collective self-reliance, let alone solving African developmental challenges. In seeking a solution to the predicament of African integration, we insist that the solution should not be sought in the existing Euro-centric strategies or theories, but in a new theory—post-neo-functionalism or post-neonationalism—suitable for the African situation and capable of  solving its  problems. Post-neo-functionalism advocates for people-­ centered or human-centric or bottom-up integration rather than a top-­down approach to integration, or state-centric or inter-governmental integration of neofunctionalism. Therefore, integration should be people-­driven or privatesector-led rather than state-driven or public-sector-led. The role of the state

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should be regulatory or facilitative. Given the enormous security challenges in Africa, post-neo-functionalism suggests that African integration should begin with regional security integration—that is, creating regional security organization in Africa.

References Adedeji, A. (1970). Prospect of regional economic cooperation in West Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 8(2), 1–12. Adedeji, A. (1983). The evolution of the Monrovia strategy and the Lagos plan of action: A regional approach to economic decolonization. New York: United Nations. Adedeji, A. (1991). Preparing Africa for the twenty-first century: Agenda for the 1990s. Addis Ababa: ECA. Adetula, V.  A. O. (2009). The economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the challenges of integration in West Africa. In J. O. Ogwu & W.  O. Alli (Eds.), ECOWAS: Milestones in regional integration (pp.  15–58). Lagos: NIIA. Adi, H. (2005). Pan-Africanism and the politics of liberation. New York: African Holocaust. Adi, H., & Sherwood, M. (1995). The 1945 pan-African congress revisited. London: New Beacon. Adi, H., & Sherwood, M. (2003). Pan-African history: Political figures from Africa and the diaspora since 1787. London: Routledge. Agbonkhese, A. O., & Adekola, A. G. (2014). Regional economic integration in developing countries: A case study of Nigeria as a member of ECOWAS. European Scientific Journal, 10(19), 359–374. Ake, C. (1981). A political economy of Africa. Ibadan: Longman. Aniche, E. T. (2014). Problematizing neo-functionalism in the search for a new theory of African integration: The case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa. Developing Country Studies, 4(20), 128–142. Aniche, E. T. (2015). The ‘calculus’ of integration or differentiation in Africa: Postneo-functionalism and the future of African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). International Affairs and Global Strategy, 36, 41–52. Aniche, E. T. (2018). Post-neo-functionalism, pan-Africanism and regional integration in Africa: Prospects and challenges of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA). In S.  O. Oloruntoba & V.  Gumede (Eds.), State and development in post-independent Africa (pp.  155–174). Austin: Pan-African University Press. Aniche, E. T., & Ukaegbu, V. E. (2016). Structural dependence, vertical integration and regional economic cooperation in Africa: A study of Southern African Development Community. Africa Review, 8(2), 108–119.

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Antwi-Danso, V. (2009). Regionalism and regional integration: Prospects and challenges. In Ghana in search of regional integration agenda (pp.  67–87). Accra: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Anyang, N. P. (Ed.). (1990). Regional integration in Africa: Unfinished agenda. Nairobi: Academy of Science Publishers. Asante, S. K. B. (1991). African development: Adebayo Adedeji’s alternative strategies. Ibadan: Spectrum. Asuk, O. C. (2011). Resolving the African development sclerosis: Two strategies, no future. Africa Research Review: An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal, 5(3), 133–147. Attuquayefio, P. (2009). The role of youth organizations in accelerating the pace of regional integration in West Africa: The case of Ghana. In Ghana in search of regional integration agenda (pp. 87–105). Accra: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Aworawo, F. (2016). Regional integration and development in Africa: Between the rock and a hard place. Journal of International Studies, 12, 19–30. Benachenhon, A. (1983). South-South co-operation: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa’s independence. Africa Development, III(4), 1–13. Browne, R.  R., & Cummings, R. (1984). The Lagos Plan of Action vs the Berg report: Contemporary issues in African economic development. Washington, DC: Howard University Press. Campbell, C. Z. (2006). Sculpting a pan-African culture in the art of Négritude: a model for African artist. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 1(6), 28–41. Eyoh, D. (1998). African perspectives on democracy and the dilemmas of postcolonial intellectualism. Africa Today, 45(3–4), 281–306. Gehring, T. (1996). Integrating integration theory: Neo-functionalism and international regimes. Global Society, 10(3), 225–253. Geiss, I. (1974). The pan-African movement. London: Methuen. Haas, E. B. (1975). The obsolescence of regional integration theory. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research Series, No. 25. Haas, E.  B. (1976). Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration. International Organization, 30(2), 173–212. Haas, E.  B. (2001). Does constructivism subsume neo-functionalism? In T. Christiansen, K. E. Jørgensen, & A. Wiener (Eds.), The social construction of Europe (pp. 22–31). London: Sage. Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3), 862–915. Hooker, J.  R. (1975). Henry Sylvester Williams: Imperial pan-Africanist. London: Collings. Laursen, F. (2008). Theory and practice of regional integration. Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series, 8(3), 1–22. Legum, C. (1965). Pan-Africanism: A short political guide. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

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Makalani, M. (2011). Pan-Africanism. New York: Africana Age. Martin, T. (1985). Pan-African connection: From slavery to Garvey and beyond. Dover: The Majority Press. Mattli, W. (1999). The logic of regional integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McGowan, L. (2007). Theorizing European integration: Revisiting neo-­ functionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition policy? European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 11(3), 1–17. Mistry, P. (2000). Africa’s record of regional economic integration. African Affairs, 99, 553–573. Murithi, T. (2005). The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development. Aldershot: Ashgate. Niemann, A., & Schmitter, P. (2009). Neo-functionalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), Theories of European integration (pp.  45–66). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nkrumah, K. (1962). Towards colonial freedom. London: Heinemann. Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. London: Heinemann. Nyerere, J. (1963). A United States of Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 1(1), 1–6. Ofei-Nkansah, K. (2009). Organized labor and Ghana’s regional integration agenda for West Africa. In Ghana in search of regional integration agenda (pp. 139–157). Accra: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Okafor, J. C., & Aniche, E. T. (2017). Deconstructing neo-functionalism in the quest for a paradigm shift in African integration: Post-neo-functionalism and the prognostication of the proposed continental free trade area in Africa. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 22(2), 60–72. Okeke, V. O. S., & Aniche, E. T. (2012). Economic regionalism and dependency in Africa: A study of African Economic Community (AEC). Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1(11), 5–23. Padmore, G. (1956). Pan-Africanism or communism? London: Dobson. Qobo, M. (2007). The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalization and the prospects for a United States of Africa. ISS Paper 145. Institute for Security Studies. Ravenhill, J. (1984). The OAU and economic co-operation: Irresolute resolutions. In H. El-Ayouty & I. W. Zartman (Eds.), The OAU after twenty years. New York: Praeger. Ravenhill, J. (1996). Collective self-reliance or collective self-delusion: Is the Lagos Plan a viable alternative? In J. Ravenhill (Ed.), Africa in economic crisis. London: Macmillan. Saasa, O. S. (1991). Joining the future: Economic integration cooperation in Africa. Nairobi: ACD Press.

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Schmitter, P.  C. (1969). Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration. International Organization, 23(2), 161–166. Schmitter, P. C. (1970). A revised theory of regional integration. International Organization, 24(4), 836–868. Schmitter, P. C. (2003). Neo-neo-functionalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European integration theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sekgoma, G. A. (1987). The Lagos Plan of Action and some aspects of development in Sierra Leone. PUlA: Botswana Journal of African Studies, 8(2), 68–94. Sesay, A., & Omotosho, M. (2011). The politics of regional integration in West Africa. West Africa Civil Society Institute Series (WACSERIES), 2(2), 1–36. Shaw, T. M. (1983). The African crisis: Alternative development strategies for the continent. Alternatives, 1(1), 111–127. Sherwood, M. (1995). Manchester and the 1945 pan-African Congress. London: Savannah Press. Sherwood, M. (1996). Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad, 1935–1947. Legon: Freedom Publications. Sherwood, M. (2010). The origins of pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams and the African diaspora. London: Routledge. Sherwood, M. (2012). Pan-African conferences, 1900–1953: What did ‘Pan-­ Africanism’ mean? The Journal of Pan African Studies, 4(10), 106–126. Shivji, I. G. (2006). Pan-Africanism or imperialism? Unity and struggle towards a new democratic Africa. African Sociological Review, 10(1), 208–220. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991). Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of the new dynamism of the EC. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20(1), 1–22. UNECA. (2004). Assessing regional integration in Africa. Addis Ababa: UNECA. UNECA. (2015). Intra-African trade and Africa Regional Integration Index: Progress report on intra-African trade. Addis Ababa: UNECA. (E/ECA/ CRCI/9/3, September 22). Walters, R.  W. (1997). Pan Africanism in the African diaspora: An analysis of modern Afrocentric political movements. African American Life Series. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Regional Cooperation for Development: The African Union Experience Ebenezer Babajide Ishola

Introduction Developmental challenges facing the African continent are evident in rising levels of poverty, unemployment and hunger, poor infrastructural facilities, collapse of social welfare, debt crisis and expropriation of surplus, among others (Falola and Mbah 2014). There is the need to advance alternative solutions to this development crisis. A multiplicity of strategies, including a structural adjustment programme, import substitution industrialization and export promotion, have been adopted as the strategy to assure the development of African countries. This chapter, however, concerns itself with investigating regional cooperation for development within the context of the African Union (AU) as a veritable tool for engendering the development of the continent. The question of development is subject to different interpretations. Neoliberal scholars concern themselves with quantitative indices such as gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP), per capita income and inflation levels, among others, as measures of development.

E. B. Ishola (*) Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_3

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This school of thought further provides principles to guarantee development anchored on neoliberal tenets such as concentration of the means of production in the hand of private individuals as well as the restriction of the State to the maintenance of law and order, and the provision of enabling an environment for uninhibited economic activities to thrive. This position is, however, inherently defective because it fails to provide an exact reflection of the challenges of development and ignores the historical trajectory of Third World countries in the prescription of its strategy of development (Agugua 2018). This lacuna is evident in the crisis befalling Third World countries that have continued to anchor their strategy of development exclusively on the neoliberal paradigm, as the goal of development has remained far from feasible. The point of departure for any discourse on development must be the concern with the human condition. In other words, the impact on human lives must constitute the raison d’être of such definition. In this light, Sen (2000) argues that development is the removal of various forms of unfreedoms such as poverty, poor economic opportunities and increasing socio-­ economic inequalities, among others (p.  3). Donaldson (2008) in his contribution argues that the question of development must be clearly situated in terms of the eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequality in society. This, rather than economic growth and its indices (GDP, GNP, level of inflation), provide a more valid conception of development. Corroborating the human-centred ideal of development, Ninalowo (2007) asserts that the primary goal of any developmental enterprise in society must be the “amelioration of social life and conditions for living for the generality of the citizens” (p. 6). It is in this light that regional cooperation for development will be so interrogated. The succeeding section comprises a discussion of the central concept of regional cooperation and its dynamics, particularly in respect to Third World countries. Prior to the conclusion, the chapter interrogates the AU and its framework for regional cooperation for development, focusing on its institutions and policies over 15 years after the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act.

Understanding Regional Cooperation for Development An understanding of regional cooperation for development from an etymological perspective involves understanding its components, namely, ‘regional’ and ‘cooperation’. Regional, on the one hand, represents the involvement

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of two or more State entities that are contiguous (geography or experience) as actors or in a scope of operation, while cooperation, on the other hand, emphasizes collective efforts among the participants aimed at achieving a shared goal, in this regard development. Providing a succinct conception of regional cooperation, Börzel and Risse (2016) note that it refers to “intergovernmental relations that do not entail the transfer of authority to the respective regional organization” (p. 9), in contrast to regional integration distinguished by the transmission of the sovereign rights of member States in several spheres to the regional institution. Bechev (2011) posits that “regional cooperation is a type of a collective intergovernmental action that takes place within a geographically bounded setting, however vaguely defined or politically contestable” (p. 3). The expansive scope of regional cooperation traverses social, economic, political and other spheres including joint economic policies and regulations, collective security and purposeful projects, uninhibited trade access, institutional frameworks, united position on issues affecting the region and beyond (Bechev 2011, p. 3). The concern of this paper, however, is the role of regional cooperation as a panacea to developmental challenges that have escaped national institutions in the areas of trade, infrastructure, security agriculture and so on (Vanheukelom 2016, p. 1). The achievement of this objective for African countries has, however, been fundamentally weakened by vestiges of imperialism as evident in the disintegration and disarticulation of African economies (Ake 1981, p. 43; Amin 2011, p. 282). The understanding of regional cooperation for development has been subject to diverse theoretical considerations (Börzel 2016; Oloruntoba 2016). The neoliberal perspective conceives the ontological basis of regional cooperation as dependent on the prevailing power dynamics. This is evident in the rise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a means to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era (Tavares 2010, p. 71). Discussing regional cooperation for development, the political economy perspective examines the role of actors other than the State, such as the market, interest groups and the global capitalist system. The functionalist rationalist theoretical position in dissecting regional cooperation for development interrogates the objectives it is set to achieve, such as addressing security risks and consolidating power, among others. The peculiar nature of Third World countries, however, informs the need to x-ray regional cooperation for development from a more radical perspective provided by the dependency theory. Dependency theory, in historiciz-

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ing the conditions of Third World countries, notes that the interaction of their economies with imperialism has perpetuated a condition of dependency defined as a “situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” (Dos Santos 1970, p. 231). On this basis, dependency theorists are unanimous in asserting that the problem (the global capitalist system) can never be the solution for the development of Third World countries (Baran 1957; Frank 1970; Wallerstein 1974). The developmental successes of countries such as Cuba and China in the aftermath of socialist revolutions provide dependency theorists with empirical testimonial to the veracity of the recommendation provided for Third World countries to delink from the global capitalist system for their development to be assured So (2010, p. 313). This delinking involves the stimulation of autocentric growth momentum by focusing on producing the means of production and mass consumer goods (Amin 2011, pp. 229–230). The potency of the dependency theoretical position on the crisis of development and underdevelopment in Third World countries is, however, plagued by a number of criticisms. The emphasis by dependency theorists on external factors (the relationship among economies in the global capitalist system) and ignoring internal dynamics like domestic class struggle and social relations, stands as one of the major critics of its theoretical position (Angotti 1981, p. 129). These domestic factors have been identified as the stimulus for the development of the East Asian countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The development of these countries denoted as the “East Asian miracle” was driven by a strong state exploiting colonial legacies, directing export-oriented industrialization strategy encouraged by privileged access to the North American market after the Second World War, providing tax incentives for foreign investors and investment in technology (So 1986; Berger 1994, p. 267; Wu 2004). Similar industrialization efforts have, however, failed in other Third World countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia. This failure is explained by manifestations of dependencies such as monocultural economy, production of basic consumer goods, lack of market, finance and technology, among other factors (Onimode 1982; Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira, 2014). The dependencias conceive of regional cooperation for development as an effective panacea to the crisis of development confronting Third World countries. Amin (2011) argues that regional cooperation, if properly harnessed, constitutes a veritable tool to stimulate and consolidate autocentric

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development (p.  285). This is evident, for instance, in the capability of regional cooperation to boost the production capacity of the economies of Third World countries. Beyond stimulating autocentric growth momentum, regional cooperation constitutes a strategy for Third World countries to delink from the international capitalist system. The notion of delinking popularized by Amin (1990) is based on Third World countries renegotiating their hitherto subservient position in the global capitalist system individually and collectively. This can be done via restraining foreign investments and emphasizing the transfer of technology, among others, in order to reduce the dependency of the satellite economies on the metropoles. It is pertinent to mention that regional cooperation for development has the potential to provide a credible alternative to the global capitalist system and its exploitative relationship for Third World countries. It is against the preceding background that the AU as a representation of regional cooperation for development is discussed.

Historicizing the AU and the Objectives of Regional Cooperation for Development Focusing on AU, Vanheukelom (2016) describe it as “the continental champion on political cooperation and economic integration in Africa… With its 54-member States, the AU is the world’s largest and most diverse regional organization in terms of member income levels, populations and geographic features” (p. iv). The predecessor of the AU, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), established on May 25, 1963, was a product of ideological rivalry. The struggle was between the advocates of a more centralized united African State anchored on Pan-Africanism known as the Casablanca bloc (Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Algeria and Morocco) and those advocating for a confederate system known as the Monrovia bloc (Liberia, Senegal, Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria and Ivory Coast). In the end, OAU was established to fit the ideals of the latter more than the former. The OAU advanced objectives such as the promotion of African unity, to engender cooperation among African countries for the sake of development, the achievement of a better life for the people of Africa, the defence of sovereignty of the African States. Other objectives include the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, the promotion of regional cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Right, to guarantee and support the territorial integrity of member States and to exterminate all manifestations

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of colonialism on the continent, among others (Akinbobola 1999, pp. 354–355; OAU Charter 1963, p. 3). The achievement of these objectives is closely guided by a number of principles, namely respect for the sovereign equality of its members which ensures the regard for non-­ interference in the affairs of members, peaceful settlement of disputes among member States and non-alignment, among others (Akinbobola 1999, p. 355; OAU Charter 1963, p. 4). With supporting institutions like the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, specialized institutions such as the African Bureau for Educational Sciences, Pan-African Railway Union and so on, the OAU sought to achieve its stated objectives. However, in the light of failures such as the lack of conspicuous improvement in the lives of Africans, lack of unanimity among African countries in strategic areas such as peace and security, economy and trade, among others, there was a crucial need to reorganize the organization. The call for reforms led by former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who advocated the need for a stronger institution to deliver the dividends of development to Africans Steinberg (2001), necessitated the establishment of the AU. At the summit held in Durban, South Africa, with the theme “Peace, Development and Prosperity: The African Century”, between June 28 to July 10, 2002, the AU was formally launched with the first meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union as the climax of the two-­ week-­long event. At the launch of the AU in South Africa, the organization was described as the messiah to save the African continent from its devastating status (Mbeki 2002). The objectives of the AU are largely an improvement on the objectives of the defunct OAU, with new aspects introduced such as the need to advance a Pan-African position in matters of common concern in the international system, stimulate increased political-­cum-socio-economic integration among member States and to advance democratic tenets on the continent. Other objectives include promoting a more beneficial position for African countries in the global capitalist system, embarking on conscious efforts to promote development in the region and collaborating with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to achieve the goals of the AU, among others (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, pp. 5–6). More emphatically, objectives (j) and (k) of the AU particularly embodies the organization’s developmental goal as it asserts that the AU seeks to promote the overall development of the continent in terms of increased

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living standards of the people (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 6). The achievement of these objectives is based on a number of principles such as respect for the independence of member nations, right of intervention in member States under special circumstances, popular participation, promotion of democracy and the quest for a common defence policy for member States (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, pp.  6–7). Driving the AU is the New African Renaissance ideology which emphasizes a renewed perspective to solving Africa’s developmental challenges, with emphasis on regional cooperation, rule of law, democracy and development, and has as its goal the promotion of the socio-economic development of Africa (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 3). The latest developmental slogan of the AU ‘Agenda 2063’ adopted at the 24th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2015, anchors the development of Africa on the need for self-­ reliance and stimulating autocentric growth momentum on the continent.

AU and the Regional Cooperation for Development Experience In dissecting the experience of the AU in implementing regional cooperation for development, the institutions and policies of the AU constitute the focal point. The A U has as its major institutions the Assembly, Executive Council, AU Commission, Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Specialized Technical Committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC), the Peace and Security Committee and financial institutions (the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank). As the highest decision-making body of the organization, the Assembly is comprised of the Heads of State of all AU member countries. With statutory meeting once a year, decisions in the Assembly are arrived at by consensus or two-third majority. The primary responsibility of this organ is to consider and take decisions on policies as well as determine the policy direction of the organization (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, pp.  8–9). The powerful nature of the Assembly is further evident in its responsibility to determine the tenure of office of the judges of the Court of Justice and the top hierarchy of the AU Commission, as well as largely determine the operations of the Commission (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, pp. 10, 14). Its leadership comprises the Chairperson

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(President Alpha Conde, Republic of Guinea), Vice-Chairpersons (Yoweri Museveni, Uganda; Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria; King Mswati III, Swaziland) and a Rapporteur (Idriss Déby, Republic of Chad). The logic behind the replication of positions and titles for African leaders in the Assembly is unfathomable, as it in no way contributes to increasing the capacity of the organ to perform its functions more efficiently and effectively. The Executive Council which comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member States is another strategic organ of the AU. Largely responsible to the Assembly, its primary responsibility is to deliberate and arrive at decisions in areas such as foreign trade, transport and communication, and science and technology, among others, subject to the approval of the Assembly (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 12). The AU Commission, which acts as the secretariat of the organization, is another important component of the AU structure. Headed by a Chairman (Moussa Faki Mahamat) and assisted by a Deputy alongside eight Commissioners, the Commission’s major challenge over the years is that the commissioners direct their loyalties more towards advancing their respective national interests, rather than the common concern of the AU. Onunaiju (2017) notes that this is particularly common among citizens of more influential States such as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. This, alongside the complete subordination of the Commission to the directives of the Assembly, has to a large extent hampered the operations of the organ. The Pan-African Parliament as an organ of the AU is based on ensuring popular participation in the AU processes. Inaugurated in 2004, the 265-member parliament has its members elected by national parliaments of member States. It is a purely consultative and advisory arm. At the level of membership of the Pan-African Parliament, the principle of proportionality which is central to representative institutions like the parliament is ignored. A conspicuous example is that Nigeria with a population of over 182 million people has the same number of parliamentary representatives as Mauritius with a population of 1.3 million UNDP (2016, pp. 223–234). Furthermore, the parliament which stands as the legislative arm of the AU suffers extremely from lack of independence as its operations have constantly been hampered by the Assembly of the Heads of State. In another vein, Sesay (2008) questions the importance of an African parliament, particularly regarding popular participation, based on the inexcusable level of sophistication of most political systems in Africa.

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Other organs of the AU include: the Specialized Technical Committees who focus on numerous thematic areas such as monetary and financial affairs, transport, communications and tourism, trade, customs and immigrations and so on; the Permanent Representatives Committee, which is made up of ambassadors to the AU member countries, performs the vital function of preparing the groundwork for the Executive Council; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) comprises of two members from each AU member country, 24 representatives of transnational organizations and 20 representatives of the African diaspora population (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004, p. 142); the AU Court of Justice as well as the AU Peace and Security Council for conflict prevention and resolution. Yet to see the light of the day are a number of financial institutions, namely the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. A comprehensive examination of the institutions of the AU reveals that they owe their origin not to the nature and character of the African socio-­ political milieu; rather they have inorganic or juristic origin which ultimately has an adverse effect on the potential or functionality of these institutions, a problem that has constantly bedevilled the operations of the typical African State. A particular instance in this regard is the observation by Sesay (2008) on the illogicality of the multifarious institutions of the AU based on the scant consideration given to the potential of the member States to financially maintain the institutions (p. 21). It is also apposite to emphasize that the developmental function of the AU is plagued by the problem of superfluous duplication. This is evident in the lack of harmonization and synergy between the AU and RECs. This has to a large extent severely constituted an impediment to the complementary role the RECs ought to play in the achievement of the AU’s developmental goals. For instance, the activities of the South African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum and East Africa Legislative Assembly largely cover the scope of responsibility of the Pan-African Parliament region-wise (Kajee 2004, p. 133). To avoid unnecessary replication, the operations of these regional organizations should be synchronized with the continental organization. This will also increase popular participation in the AU process in the most effective and efficient way finance-wise. Summarizing the dilemma of the institutions of the AU, Sesay (2008) notes that they are a reflection of “political and institutional mimicry… because in Africa there is still what I can call a primacy of symbolism and form” (p. 21).

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At intergovernmental level, numerous policies have been advanced to curb the manifestation of developmental challenges. These challenges have resulted in increasing poverty level, lack of basic infrastructural facilities in all sectors of the economy, unemployment, high mortality rate, political instability and insecurity of lives and property, food crisis, deplorable mass poverty, pervasive illiteracy, technological backwardness, prostrate external dependence and mounting foreign debts, among other manifestations (Agupusi 2016, p. 2; Ikenna 2009, p. 354; Onimode 1988, p. 2). These include the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980, the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) of 1985, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP), among others. The LPA and Final Act of Lagos (1980), renowned for its anti-imperialistic basis (Taylor 2005, p. 20), sought to stimulate development in sectors such as industry, energy, agriculture and so on, through home-grown efforts. However, its potential was hampered because “ironically, no State adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) as countries succumbed to the lure of the Bretton Woods institutions and began the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This marked the beginning of an increasingly external interference by international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF” (Agupusi 2016, p.  5). The Berg Report by the World Bank was central to this, as it claimed in its characteristic neoliberal context that development cannot be assured by State intervention, hence the need to roll back the State (Olukoshi 2010, p. 47). This policy prescription formed the basis of the popular Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The succeeding section of this chapter examines the potentials of the policies of the AU in stimulating development for the continent at large.

New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) NEPAD was advanced primarily as a vehicle to transform the continent of Africa and deliver the dividends of liberation to its people in terms of the eradication of poverty, engendering sustainable goal and development on the continent (New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2001, p.  14). Over the years, it has assumed the anchor position on which the AU’s goal of development depends (African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014, p. 110; Paterson 2012, p. 23; Sesay 2008, p. 27). As a product of the interaction of previous initiatives

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such as the ‘Vision for an African Renaissance’, Millennium Africa Recovery Plan, Omega Plan and the New African Initiative (NAI), NEPAD was birthed in 2001 as a novel programme by African leaders to promote sustainable growth and development on the continent, increase intra-continental integration and eradicate poverty, among other objectives (NEPAD 2013, p. 3). The policy comprises a number of thematic areas such as agriculture and food security, climate change and natural resource management, regional integration and infrastructure, human development; economic and corporate governance; and cross-cutting issues—gender, ICT, capacity development and communications. Seventeen years down the line, NEPAD has largely failed in achieving its set developmental goals and objectives. The reasons for this are not farfetched. Luiz (2006) argues that the raison d’être for NEPAD’s failure is its ignorance of the patrimonial pathologies of African States (p. 10). The twin monsters of prebendalism and corruption, which like a cancer have ravaged most African States, have consistently impeded the developmental potential of NEPAD. It is also important to mention that a reflection of these crises is because having failed to “situate the development dilemma both within Africa’s historic past and the international environment within which we operate, NEPAD is lopsided in this regard and is to some extent ahistoric and static” (Aderemi 2002, p. 25). Hence, there is a disconnect between the NEPAD project and the African reality. As an indication of this disconnect, former Gambian President Yahya Jammeh once remarked: If it is an African project, why take it to the Westerners to approve it? Was it necessary to take it to the G8 Summit? That is why I am skeptical about it… If the problem is an African one, what I believe is that before talking to the G8… we should have gathered intellectuals and allowed them to debate it, as we did with the African project. (Quoted in New African, London, September 2002, p. 18)

It is also pertinent to state that the entire NEPAD policy reeks of neo-­ imperialism, particularly due to its glorification of liberalism and dependence on overseas development assistance. Hence, it mirrors an instrument to further globalization and its attendant contradictions for African countries (Luiz 2006, p.  5). Former Libyan leader Muammar Ghadafi once defined NEPAD as a racist tool of neo-colonialists and a repackaged version of SAP (The Herald [Harare], 18 June, 2002)]. The role of the

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United Nations Economic Commission for Africa as an agent of post-­ Washington consensus in the formation of NEPAD is instructive in this regard. As a reflection of the neo-imperialist basis of NEPAD, the NEPAD framework document notes: To achieve the estimated 7 per cent annual growth rate needed to meet the IDGs – particularly, the goal of reducing by half the proportion of Africans living in poverty by the year 2015 – Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12 per cent of its GDP, or US $64 billion. This will require increased domestic savings, as well as improvements in the public revenue collection systems. However, the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent. (New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2001, p. 37)

Based on the preceding, it is clear that the NEPAD project is squarely based on engendering dependency rather than ‘delinking’.

Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) As a flagship policy of the AU, CAADP embodies the efforts of the AU to address the continent’s developmental challenge in the agricultural sector in terms of generating revenue and providing food for its teeming population. The importance of the agricultural sector in Africa cannot be overemphasized, as it is the largest employer of labour (60%), biggest source of government revenue and provider of food (Vanheukelom 2016, p. 52). Launched in 2003 at the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique, CAADP core areas include land and water management, rural infrastructure for market access, agricultural research and increasing food supply. While a total figure of $251 billion was planned for CAADP between 2002 and 2015, the framers of the policy require African States to devote at least 10% of their national budget to agriculture. Focusing on the budget of Nigeria, a major AU member State, ₦75.8 billion was allocated to the agricultural sector in the 2016 budget, constituting a paltry 1.25% of the total expenditure. As an indication of State capacity, this raises question on the coherence of the country as well as other defaulting member States (Oloruntoba 2016, p. 149) to achieving the goals of the CAADP. Shedding light on the implementation of the CAADP, Vanheukelom (2016) notes that it is based on collaborative efforts among the AUC,

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RECs and the NEPAD Agency (p. 54). At the level of the formulation of the CAADP, Vanheukelom (2016) argues that external forces such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) impacted on the CAADP framework document (p.  3). Such influence raises questions as to the objectivity of the CAADP as an instrument to rescue the African continent from the abyss of underdevelopment from an agricultural point of view. The genuineness of the subscription of member States to the CAADP holds crucial implication for the success of the programme, particularly in terms of financial contribution and implementation of policies. However, the subscription of most AU member States is half-hearted, as it is done primarily because support for agriculture is a conditionality for some external donors (Vanheukelom 2016, p. vi).

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Statistics about the quantity and quality of productive economic activities on the African continent are grim. For instance, Sesay (2008) asserts that Africa’s share in the global trade and economic output is a paltry 2% and 1%, respectively (p. 15). Similarly, Paterson (2012) notes that intra-­African trade constitutes a measly 10% of the total trading activities on the continent (p. 18). The AfCFTA adopted in 2012 at the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, holds enormous prospect in improving the preceding grim statistics. At the inauguration of the policy, the year 2017 was set as the commencement date for the free trade area that incorporates over 50 countries of Africa. The formal launch of the AfCFTA programme was done at the 10th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Kigali, Rwanda, in March 2018. Forty-­ four members of the AU pledged commitment to the AfCFTA by signing the free trade agreement, with Nigeria conspicuously missing among the signatories (African Union 2018). Vital to the continental free trade programme is the Action Plan on Boosting Intra-Africa Trade (BIAT) which focuses on boosting the productive capacities of African economies, providing enabling infrastructures, harmonizing trade policies, integrating markets and boosting access to information, among others. The primary goal of the AfCFTA, like most regional integration programmes, is to create a seamless movement of human and material resources across the market, provide an enlarged

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market for goods and services, establish a Customs Union, boost economic activities and ultimately impact positively on development. However, the goal of a continental free trade area will continue to remain a mirage until the perennial challenges of intra-regional trade are confronted headlong. These challenges include poor productive capacities, as most African States are monocultural economies with little or no diversification of exports, loud rhetoric on policies without actions in terms of lowering of tariffs, lack of purchasing capacity for the majority of the African masses due to widespread inequality, overlapping regional trade agreements (RTAs), lack of requisite infrastructure in terms of transport, energy, ICT and uncomplimentary currencies in terms of conversion, among others.

Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) The PIDA is the conglomeration of the direction of infrastructural development in Africa as it “incorporates other continental infrastructure development initiatives and coordinates with other regional infrastructure development initiatives” (Vanheukelom 2016, p. 37). Following the launch of the PIDA in January 2012, at the 18th Summit of the African Heads of State and Government, 51 infrastructure projects at the cost of $68 billion have been identified to be provided by 2020. $360 billion has been budgeted for projects between 2012 and 2040. These projects which cut across sectors such as energy, transport, information and communication technology (ICT) and water resources include the Great Millennium Renaissance dam, Lesotho HWP phase II hydropower component, West Africa Power Transmission Corridor, Nigeria-Algeria pipeline, Djibouti-­Addis Corridor, Abidjan-Lagos Coastal Corridor, North-West Sahara Aquifer System and Internet Exchange Point (IXP) programme, among others (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 2017a, b, pp. 17–20). A diagrammatical representation of the sectoral and regional division of the projects is provided below – The scope of responsibility of the PIDA includes to providing the framework for infrastructure development, enforcing the implementation of projects, bridging the gap between the AU and RECs, boosting resource mobilization (finance, technical and manpower) for development (Vanheukelom 2016, pp. 48–49). At the helm of affairs of this programme are institutions such as the African Union Commission, NEPAD Agency,

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Africa Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The first two are saddled with formulation and implementation. Without doubt, the need to restructure and provide requisite infrastructure for Africa’s development cannot be overemphasized. As Ake (1981) succinctly argues, Africa’s infrastructural development hitherto has been shaped by colonialism and its vestiges (pp. 88–89). The success of the PIDA has, however, been hampered by a number of factors. One important Achilles heel of PIDA is its overreliance on finances to be provided by the private sector. The contradiction in this relationship is that the private sector was obscured in the policy formulation stage of the programme (Vanheukelom 2016, p.  41). It is important to state that as of 2017, 17.6% (9) of PIDA projects are at the conceptualization stage, 29.4% (15) at feasibility stage, 35.3% (18) at the level of finance mobilization and a paltry 17.6% (9) at the implementation stage (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 2017a, pp. 16–20). The PIDA also suffers from the problem of external influence, as evident in the role the G8 via the Infrastructure Consortium Africa played in the formulation of PIDA, particularly as regards the term of reference. Other external donors to the PIDA include the European Union (EU) and the Department for International Development (DfID), among others. Another problem is the fragmentation among the players in the quest for infrastructural development on the continent. The success or otherwise in the bid to establish intra-continental infrastructure largely depends on providing solution to the problem of standardization. Kajee (2004) describes the problem by noting that East African countries such as Uganda and Kenya, among others, use a rail track gauge of 1000  mm while Southern Africa countries use a measurement of 1067 mm (p. 133). This discrepancy will adversely affect attempts at building a regional infrastructure such as an intra-continental railway line. Vanheukelom (2016) argues that PIDA projects will continually be confronted with the proprietorial question, which makes accountability difficult (Vanheukelom 2016, p.  48). This will remain to constitute the problem in the absence of a strong and potent supranational organization to anchor and give cogent direction to the infrastructural development programme.

Conclusion This paper has examined the capacity and capability of the AU as a tool for regional cooperation for development. In doing this, we focus on the institutional component and policies of the organization in ultimately

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ameliorating the living conditions of the African citizenry (Ninalowo 2007). A major thread that runs through the institutions of the AU is that, standing as juristic innovations, the promoters of the institutions ignore the historical and empirical context of the African reality. To this end, Sesay (2008) asserts that the entire architecture of the AU smacks of impersonation devoid of a solid base in the continent’s historical and contemporary existence (p. 31). Like its component member States, the AU has continuously suffered from the crisis of dependence as evident in its finances and its policies formulation and implementation, calling into serious question its ability to stimulate the requisite development needed on the continent. This dependence is evident in the role of external actors providing as much as 55% of the AU’s budget for 2013 (Paterson 2012, p. 30), a point corroborated by the AU budget contribution statistics provided by African Union (2013). With the benefit of hindsight, it can be concluded that the AU has not been strategic about its goals and the modus operandi for them to be achieved. In line with the age-long proverb “the best time to bend an iron is when it is hot”, African leaders lost the rare opportunity to explicitly state in clear terms what the AU stands for, the stratagem through which the objectives of the association will be achieved, as well as evidence of conscious efforts in the direction of these goals. Babarinde (2007) succinctly emphasizes the problematic by noting that a prevalent problem among African leaders over the years is that they are “more content with launching new initiatives than delivering on results” (p. 3). The reason for the preceding is not far-fetched, as these programmes and policies in constant creation and implementation are conduit pipes to water the prebendal appetites of most African leaders. Little wonder that despite the enormity of funds allocated for these programmes and policies, they hardly yield the desired results. Conclusively, African States with their different appellation such as overdeveloped, weak, fragile and dependent are culpable for the failure of the AU in the achievement of its developmental objectives. The nature and character of African States gleaned from its historical basis (Gana 1985, p. 127) has ensured that they lack the requisite infrastructural and institutional capacity to maximally exploit the many benefits evident in regional cooperation for development. There is thus an imperative need to reorient the State from its present underdeveloped nature foisted on it by the continuous exploitative relationship defining its place in the global capitalist system.

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CHAPTER 4

The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of Al-Bashir’s International Arrest Warrant ‘Tola Odubajo and Tunde Babawale

Introduction On the strength of the emerging dynamics of international conflicts, and the sacred responsibility to preserve a secure and peaceful world, state actors in 2002 established the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a permanent court for the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian laws. Africa, with 34 states as members of Assembly of State Parties, contributes the highest number of states to have signed the ICC Treaty. The numerical preponderance of African states in the ICC may have rightfully generated the interest of the African Union (AU) in the composition, focus and processes of the ICC. On this score, the AU is of the firm belief that the Afro-centric focus of ICC prosecutorial engagements is against the interest of the African continent, and thus the AU is determined to

‘Tola Odubajo (*) SARChI: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa T. Babawale Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_4

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undermine the authority of the ICC on the continent. The international arrest warrant placed on former President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan provided a unique opportunity for the AU to stand firm on its avowed responsibility of protecting Africans and African states. The chapter situates the AU position within the context of Pan-­ Africanism. In other words, the AU predicates its position against the ICC on the Pan-African ideal of solidarity and the protection of the interests of the African continent. The chapter is divided into five parts, commencing with the introduction and followed by the framework of analysis, where the Du Bois’ philosophy of Pan-Africanism is explicated as the basis upon which the AU is launching its campaign against the ICC. The third part focuses on the context of the ICC/Al-Bashir face-off. The next part highlights the twin issues of AU-ICC relations, and of course, the context of Pan-Africanism in the AU’s stand against the ICC position.

Framework of Analysis: W.E.B. Du Bois’ Philosophy of Pan-Africanism Pan-Africanism is a philosophical idea that defines the struggle of the black race against the notion, thoughts and actions of white-supremacy. It evolved as the creed of the black race against the injustice, inequality, oppression and repression that was allowed to fester within the realm of race relations. Africa’s relative peripheral position during part of the modern era (sixteenth to nineteenth century) ensured the continent was at the receiving end of the injustices and inequalities in race relations. In realization of their collective ‘sub-human’ characterization in the New World of the early nineteenth century, freed former black slaves articulated a common position to confront the structural pattern that threatened to perpetually confine them to subservience. The initial response was a return to their homeland in Africa, preached by the ‘Back to Africa’ movement. The American Colonization Society (ACS) was at the vanguard of the campaign, and indeed was instrumental to the relocation and resettlement programs of the willing blacks to Liberia and Freetown, Sierra Leone, in the early part of the nineteenth century. This sensational approach to tackling racial discrimination and segregation against the blacks in America was confronted with numerous socio-psychological and logistical challenges that made its termination inevitable. Even in later years, Marcus Garvey’s attempt to revive the idea of the ‘Back to Africa’ movement was mired in controversies and eventually shunned by the blacks that were expected to grab the opportunity.

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As the interest in relocation and resettlement waned, the alternate idea of confronting the evils of segregation and discrimination within the New World gained momentum. W.E.B.  Du Bois was one of the prominent individuals that galvanized the people into action. Du Bois, an American Negro, was a charismatic intellectual who emphasized the restoration of the dignity of the black man (Broderick 1959: 123–132). The focus of his interventions was on the need to entrench solidarity and cooperation amongst the blacks in order to forge a common front in the battle for equality, justice and fairness. Du Bois was circumspect in thinking and clinical in execution. He brought the plight of the black race into sharper focus through his editorial writings and various conferences (Adi and Sherwood 2003: 50). Indeed, his personal exertions placed the issue of race relations on the front burner of global discourse at the time. Du Bois’ emphasis on solidarity was carried through the various developmental phases of the Pan-African ideals. In the first Pan-African Congress held in London in 1900, he implied in his writings that the major defining characteristic of the twentieth century was the challenge of race relations. Through his struggle for the emancipation and freedom of the black race, his efforts attracted the attention of a number of African-­based adherents that later emerged as the pillars of the decolonization struggle. After the London Congress, Du Bois organized a series of conferences in Europe to articulate the philosophy of Pan-Africanism (Thompson 1969: 23–27). In the process, more recruits, most of who turned out as African nationalists and post-independent political figures, were brought into the fray. Du Bois’ preachment of solidarity was anchored on the need for cooperation and collaboration among African states as the ideal route to political emancipation, economic empowerment and harmonious socio-­ cultural relations. By the time of Du Bois’ death in independent Ghana, his idea had become ingrained in the mindset of African leaders. President Nkrumah of Ghana described him as the ‘Father of modern Pan-Africanism’. It is important to note that while Africa’s political elites imbibed Du Bois’ mantra of solidarity, there were divisions regarding the manner of effectuating solidarity. This caused the emergence of two factions, the Casablanca and the Monrovia blocs of states. While the Casablanca bloc agitated for a political unification that would lead to the birth of the United States of Africa, the Monrovia bloc canvassed for integration and cooperation along political, economic and socio-cultural lines. Eventually, an overarching collaboration called the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was established in 1963. Through the platform of the OAU, Du

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Bois’ philosophy of African solidarity was pursued with vigor. In many respects, the OAU recorded remarkable achievements in the quest for political emancipation and economic integration on the continent. Indeed, the organization is credited for its commitment and determination to end settler colonialism and the apartheid policy in southern Africa. The OAU metamorphosed into the AU in 2002, and since inception the organization continues to agitate for the good of African states. In defense of African states, the AU engages the international community which “seeks to maintain a ‘master-servant’ relationship and does not really want to see the genuine empowerment and independence of thought in Africa” (Murithi 2014: 64). This engagement is embedded in the Pan-­ African ideal of solidarity. According to Murithi (2014: 64): “Pan-­ Africanism is a recognition that the only way out of this existential, social, political crisis is by promoting greater solidarity amongst Africans. If ideas are not designed by the Africans, then rarely can they be in the interests of Africans.” Invariably, this explains the AU’s rejection of the ICC ideas of the processes of the international criminal justice system as it concerns Africa and Africans.

The International Criminal Court and Former President Al-Bashir of Sudan The International Criminal Court sitting at The Hague is supposedly an independent treaty-based international organization established essentially as a permanent court with international jurisdiction, that dispenses justice on crimes that tend to affect the peace and harmony of the international system. As a court of last resort, the ICC aims to discourage impunity by prosecuting persons accused of violating international humanitarian laws. Specifically, the mandate of the ICC covers the following crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The Rome Statute upon which the activities of the ICC are legalized was adopted by an impressive 120 sovereign states in July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July, 2002. Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the international criminal justice system lacked a permanent international court to prosecute individuals that were accused of committing grievous infractions of international humanitarian laws. The first set of alternatives in place of a permanent court were the ad-hoc and special tribunals set up by the Allied Powers at

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the closing stages of the Second World War. This method was later adopted by the United Nations (UN) to prosecute cases against political and military officials that were accused of breaching international peace in their official capacities. The Allied Powers set up the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany (to prosecute the major war criminals of the European Axis) which prosecuted individuals charged for their roles in the Holocaust and other war crimes. Subsequently, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (to prosecute the major war criminals of the Far East Axis), better known as the Tokyo Trials, was instituted. The two tribunals focused on the following: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In ensuring that justice is served in cases of gross violation of international humanitarian laws, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), through Resolution 827 of May, 1993, acceded to the establishment of a tribunal called the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, also known as, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In a similar fashion, UNSC Resolution 955 of November 1994 created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute individuals responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, and by extension, prosecute Rwandans accused of genocide and other serious crimes in neighboring states between January and December 1994. In the Rwanda case, there was an outrage by a section of the international community, specifically international non-governmental organizations and the governments of African states for the seeming insensitivity of the Western world, and the United Nations in particular, to the carnage that took place in Rwanda. Before Rwanda, there were civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone that were prosecuted with disregard for international humanitarian laws, of which the Western world and the United Nations could be accused of criminal negligence. Indeed, the changing dynamics of international relations from the end of the Cold War had telling effects on contestations for political power within African states. Various wars of attrition devastated Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others. The obvious reluctance to decisively intervene in the various trouble-spots in Africa by the West and the UN led to a pervasive sentiment among African states of the diminished strategic importance of the continent at the end of the Cold War.

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The establishments of the ICTR and other special courts for Sierra Leone and Liberia were responses of the UN, and by extension, the Western world to the condemnation of the lack of interest against the violations of international humanitarian laws in Africa. The eventual response to the violent crisis in select African states and other parts of the world, such as Cambodia and Lebanon under the auspices of the UN, was a coordinated global effort aimed at establishing a permanent deterrence mechanism against the violation of international humanitarian laws, serve justice to the accused and also create an avenue through which the victims of such violations can be compensated. In effect, the ICC is following in line with the basis of previous ad-hoc arrangements in which individuals were held accountable for their misdeeds in violent crisis or war situations. Since the coming into force of the Rome Statute, the court has been fulfilling its legal obligation of bringing individuals that have presumably violated the dictates of international humanitarian law to justice. Articles 14 and 15 of the Statute state the manner in which the court is able to perform its functions in three major ways; first, any case referred by any member of the Assembly of States Parties; secondly, any case referred by the United Nations Security Council; thirdly, any case initiated by the ICC Chief Prosecutor. It was on the basis of the powers granted to the UNSC in the Rome Statute that the case of former President Al-Bashir’s role in the Darfur crisis was presented to the ICC for investigation and prosecution, despite the fact that Sudan is not a member of Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. Darfur is a region in the Western part of Sudan that is populated by majority black-African Sudanese and the minority Arab-African Sudanese. The two groups are devotees of the Islamic religion. Black-African Darfurians had always been critical of the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) administration as a result of decades of presumed marginalization, systemic neglect and disempowerment. This was interpreted as an ‘Arab Supremacist’ policy against the blacks. Black Darfurians therefore responded with the formation of both the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The main objective of these organizations was to “foil Arab supremacist policies in Darfur” (Flint and de Waal 2008: 76), cited in, Oluwadare (2013: 8); at this point, this could only be achieved through assaults on Sudanese interests. The first assault on the GoS was the attack on the Al Fashir airport. Aside from the human and material resources lost, the GoS’ military equally suffered huge damage to its image. The GoS responded by recruiting

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Arab-­Darfurians to repel the uprising. The Janjaweed, an Arab-Darfur militant group, made itself available for the use of the GoS. According to Oluwadare (2013): The technical and tactical collaboration between government forces and the Janjaweed resulted in severe agony for the black race in Darfur. On land and in the air, the government and Janjaweed destroyed villages, killed humans and livestock, destroyed farmlands, abused, assaulted and degraded a generation of black race in Darfur.

There is no better testimony to the GoS’ culpability in the devastation that befell black-Africans in Darfur than one of the revealed directives of the government to the Janjaweed authority. The directive reads in part: “You are informed that directives have been issued… to change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes” (Flint and de Wall 2008: 106), cited in Oluwadare (2013). At the end of the crisis, it was widely reported that 300,000 lives had been lost, and an estimated 2.7 million people had been displaced, ending up either as refugees in neighboring countries or becoming internally displaced. According to Hassan (2010: 22), “the issue in Darfur … reflects the crisis of internal state-­ building and introduces problems of identity, citizenship and the distribution role of the Sudanese state”. In response to the global outrage as a result of the media frenzy created about the conditions in Darfur, the UNSC eventually activated its power to refer cases to the ICC for investigation and prosecution. In this instance, the UNSC deemed former President Al-Bashir a central figure in the violations earlier mentioned and therefore referred his case to the ICC for prosecution. The ICC through its Pre-Trial Chamber I responded by issuing an international arrest warrant for the President of Sudan, so he could appear before the court at The Hague, to answer charges levied against him in respect of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The Africa Union, as a concerned international actor, through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), pointed out the dangers in the arrest warrant. A major factor that could not be wished away was the fact that former President Al-Bashir was a major actor in the peace and reconciliation process in Sudan at the time. His arrest and prosecution would definitely impact on the progress made that far in the process. For this purpose, “the PSC requested the UN Security Council to exercise its powers under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer the indictment and arrest of Al

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Bashir” (Murithi 2013: 3). Upon the refusal of the UNSC to accede to this request, the AU, at its 13th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, on 3 July, 2009, adopted the policy of non-cooperation in facilitating the arrest of Al-Bashir. This position was reaffirmed at the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Ethiopia, 30 January, 2012. Expectedly, the Government of Sudan dismissed the allegations and contended that the UNSC erred in accusing the former president of misdeeds and referring him to the ICC for prosecution. Firstly, the argument is that the allegations are wrong because what took place in Darfur was not genocide; instead, it was merely violent clashes between the two groups—the Arabs and the blacks—in Darfur (Hoile 2014: 280–281). In this case therefore, state officials could not be held accountable for the violent conflict that ensued. Furthermore, the GoS considered the position of the UNSC and the reaction of the ICC as an affront on Sudan which confers immunity from prosecution on its president. According to Hoile (2014: 296): “The Sudanese government stated from the start that it did not recognize the ICC. Khartoum correctly asserted that the court has no jurisdiction over its sovereignty or nationals.” Of note is the fact that despite the existence of the international arrest warrant, former President Al-Bashir won another term of office as President of Sudan. On the basis of the international arrest warrant, the ICC jurisdiction covers the territory of all members of Assembly of States Parties to the Statute. In effect, any of the members of the Assembly of States Parties must of necessity arrest former President Al-Bashir and hand him over to the ICC if he steps foot on the territory of the concerned State Party. However, despite the existence of the international arrest warrant, former President Al-Bashir visited a number of countries that are members of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute. These states, against the expectations of the ICC and the UNSC refused to arrest Al-Bashir. Although in some cases, due to intense international pressure and pressure from within, former President Al-Bashir departed ingloriously, and before the scheduled period of departure; the Nigeria and South Africa cases are examples. By implication therefore, African states that are members of Assembly of States Parties of the ICC were conscious and wary of the consequences of former President Al-Bashir’s visit to their territory, if they did not c­ oncede to the position of the ICC in respect of the international arrest warrant. For most of the states, such visits were not encouraged, and were sometimes

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declined when requests were made. The logic is that while they were conscious of being embroiled in the hue and cry that would follow the arrest of a brother-African Head of State, they also did not wish to be found violating the dictates of the Statute they had ratified. It is therefore more convenient to stay away from the complications and controversies that may be generated. On the other hand, the African Union vehemently supported former President Al-Bashir in discountenancing the ICC arrest warrant. The African Union is an international organization with no territory of its own, so whenever the organization invited former President Al-Bashir to its functions, he ran the risks of arrest within the shores of a member of Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. In effect, the African Union appears to be the most powerful international actor to back former President Al-Bashir against the ICC. What did this scenario indicate? It essentially meant that each state is entitled to its own position, as dictated by the national interest on the former President Al-Bashir versus ICC issue. Thus, the only guarantee of protection available to former President Al-Bashir aside from the protection of the Sudanese state was the one provided by the African Union. From all indications, the African Union’s opposition to the ICC position did not commence with former President Al-Bashir’s saga. The AU has always been opposed to the processes, composition and methods of the ICC. Gegout (2013: 802) highlights some of the critical deficiencies of the ICC thus: The contribution of the ICC to furthering the cause of justice and peace is limited by the fact that some states do not yet accept its legitimacy, by the tendency of certain states to seek to control and use it as an instrument to reinforce their own power, and by its own ability to pursue its investigations successfully.

Perhaps more importantly, the AU frowns at ICC’s over-concentration and biased focus on Africa. While there are series of cases around the world that may arguably fall within the purview of the ICC, the institution appears to have concentrated its attention on Africa. In this respect, Hoile (2014: 202) elaborates: The ICC’s interference in sub-Saharan Africa can only but recall the long history of foreign intervention on the continent. The ICC’s exclusively African indictments include the cases of, among others, four heads of state, a vice-president, a former vice-president from a fourth country and several

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other political leaders. The ICC’s actions have provoked furious debates over the court’s potential impact, its exclusive focus on Africa over other parts of the world, its selection of cases, and the effect of its indictments and prosecutions on peace processes on the African continent. It is jeopardizing the settlement of long-running civil wars in the pursuit of an often abstract, “hegemonic”, European “justice”- a “justice” selectively foisted upon Africa by Western governments and Western, “ivory tower” non-governmental organizations pursuing their own narrow agendas.

The AU prides itself as the protector of the continent against undue interference from extra-African powers. More importantly, the organization perceives itself as the custodian of the ideal of Pan-Africanism; as such, any organization that may be seemingly working to denigrate any of the member states of the AU is handled with disdain. The AU’s interpretation of the denigration of African states by the ICC has formed the basis of the relationship between both international actors.

The ICC and the AU: A Cat and Mouse Game? There are two critical factors that shape the character of relationship between the ICC and the AU.  The factors stem from the relationship between the ICC and individual African states and also the ICC and the UNSC. There are 34 African states that are members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which makes the African continent the highest contributing bloc to the ICC. Invariably therefore, the deluge of African states to be part of the birth of a permanent institution for international criminal justice system speaks volume of the yearnings of the continent for prosecuting culprits, and deterring prospective offenders of the rules of international humanitarian laws, among other benefits. The question therefore is why the volte-face of African states as reflected in the attitude of the AU toward the ICC? Murithi (2013: 1) provides a logical answer. According to him: While African countries were initially supportive of the ICC, the relationship degenerated in 2008 when President Omar Al Bashir was indicted by the Court. Following this move, the African Union (AU), which is r­ epresentative of virtually all countries on the continent, adopted a hostile posture towards the ICC.

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It appears the Al-Bashir case stirred up the ‘hornets’ nest’, judging from the reactions of the AU to the arrest warrant. Based on available facts, the ICC tends to disproportionately focus its judicial searchlight on Africa. For this purpose, the AU begins to perceive the ICC as a pro-­ Western judicial institution that is meant to further entrench the imperialist agenda of consigning Africa to the periphery of global reckoning. Furthermore, the ICC is seen as an institution bent on undermining the sovereignty of African states. As the pivotal continental organization which represents the symbol of Pan-Africanism, the AU insists on exposing the shenanigans of the West toward the continued subservience of Africa through the ICC.  Murithi (2013: 2) expressly avers that “the current Afro-centric focus of ICC prosecutorial interventions has created a distorted perception on the African continent about the intention behind the establishment of the Court”. In fairness to the AU, there are other trouble-spots around the globe that have not generated as much interest from the ICC as does the African continent. Some of these include the volatile situations in Chechnya, Gaza, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Syria. All of these should court the attention of an unbiased ICC. The Syrian case is perhaps the most damning indictment of the ICC, considering the level of infractions on international humanitarian laws and the potentials for war crimes in the country; yet, neither the UNSC nor the ICC prosecutor has deemed it fit to either refer or investigate accusations against principal actors in the case to the Court for prosecution. According to Mbaku (2014: 10): African governments argue that the ICC is practicing a form of “selective justice: and that it is avoiding diplomatically, economically, financially and politically strong countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, because these countries threaten the ICC’s existence.

The ICC has thus shown itself to be “very selective in its cases, and this goes against the principle of universal justice on the ground” (Gegout 2013: 801). Prosecutions against violations of international humanitarian laws may probably never happen in the Syrian case because of the complex dynamics of relationship within the UNSC. According to Gegout (2013: 801), the processes of the ICC “can be constrained by power politics”. It is a fact “that Russia and China, who are patrons of the Syrian regime in Damascus, would veto any UN Security Council resolution referring the situation in

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the country to the Court” (Murithi 2013: 5). Murithi (2013: 14) justifies the situation thus: “In the absence of an overarching system of global political administration or government, international criminal justice will always be subject to the political whims of individual nation states.” Indeed, the environment within which the ICC works and the functions it seeks to perform are challenging (Damask 2008: 331–360). Another grouse of the AU is the very important role of the UN Security Council in the prosecution of the cases of the ICC.  The Rome Statute gives the UNSC the power to refer cases within the purview and jurisdiction of the Court. In the collective thinking of the AU, and by extension for most African states, this provision of the Rome Statute is unacceptable. The argument is that a narrow-thinking body such as the UNSC should not be entrusted with the onerous responsibility of referring cases to the ICC. Basically, the UNSC is considered an undemocratic arm of the UN institution that only serves the interest of the members. Accordingly, African states have always contested the composition of the Council with agitations for a reform along the line of fair representation. It is logical to presume that with an African representation on the Council, the prospects of ‘decent’ considerations for prosecuting African cases may be quite high. Furthermore, the composition of the UNSC debate regarding the relationship between three of the members of the UNSC with the ICC calls for scrutiny. It is logically inexplicable that China, Russia and the United States are not signatories to the Rome Statute, yet each of their votes is crucial to decisions about referring cases to the Court for prosecution. Murithi (2013: 2) argues: From its inception, ‘the Court faced a strong challenge from the United States, which first signed the Statute and then “unsigned” it’. The failure of powerful countries, including Russia and China, to actively support the Court and subject themselves to its criminal jurisdiction, immediately sounded alarm bells about the reach – and ultimately the efficacy – of an ‘international’ court whose remit would essentially be confined to the middle and weaker powers within the international system.

On the basis of objectivity, the AU position of non-cooperation with the ICC is admissible. It is indefensible for an undemocratic UNSC to give directions to a global criminal justice system. Part of the consequence is that the ICC has only indicted Africans (Gegout 2013: 801). It is therefore understandable that the AU “does not agree with externally imposed

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strategies to fight these crimes on the continent” (Mbaku 2014: 10). Added to the plethora of contradictions is the fact that the UNSC does not have the power to report any of its members to the ICC, because such an attempt will be vetoed by, at least, the affected member. Indeed, the United States has made its position known as it concerns ICC prosecutorial powers against any of its citizens and those of its allies. In this regard, the United States seems to have ‘called the bluff’ of the pro-ICC world to the effect that it would not be subjected to ICC jurisdiction. Michael Pompeo (2019) asserts: Since 1998, the United States has declined to join the ICC because of its broad, unaccountable prosecutorial powers and the threat it poses to American national sovereignty. We are determined to protect the American and allied military and civilian personnel from living in fear of unjust prosecution for actions taken to defend our great action. We feared that the court could eventually pursue politically motivated prosecution of Americans, and our fears are warranted.

Another major point of disagreement between the AU and the ICC is the question of immunity for high-ranking officials of states that are not members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. Unlike other international criminal courts, Article 46A of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights states: No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other state senior officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.

This is in conflict with the dictates of the Rome Statute concerning immunity in Article 27 (1), which states: The Statute applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or government official shall in no case exempt a person from ­criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

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The conflicting provisions has led the AU to seek the advice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with respect to the position of international law on the issue of immunity for senior government officials, especially as it concerns a non-member of the Assembly of States Parties like Sudan.

The ICC: An Acid Test for Pan-African Solidarity As with every other international organization, membership of the AU is voluntary. With Morocco’s membership in January 2017, all African states are members of the AU, thus signifying that collective solutions to common problems is desired by states on the continent. This sense of collective solution is embedded in the Pan-Africanist ideal of solidarity. Granted that member states of the AU are independent, and therefore have individual relationships with the ICC, the AU remains the umbrella organization under which bloc interests can be defended. Coming on the heels of the AU’s perceptions of the ICC’s failure to institute genuine international criminal justice regime, the organization requested the member states “to implement a policy of non-compliance and non-cooperation with the ICC” Mbaku (2014: 9). There is a mixed bag of responses by African states to the AU directive. Since 2009 when the first arrest warrant was issued, former President Al-Bashir traveled to a couple of African states and was refused travel invitations to some others. The nature of this travel itinerary can be categorized into four groups of states. The first category is composed of African states that are not members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute and hosted former President Al-Bashir. These are Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania and South Sudan. For this category of states, there were no backlashes from the ICC.  The second category of states consists of African states that are members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute that granted former President Al-Bashir authority on their territory without complying with the ICC directive. The states in this category are Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa. The third category is composed of members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute on whose territories former President Al-Bashir had to make a quick and unceremonious departure because of the furor generated by his visit. The two states in this category are Nigeria and South Africa. The final category consists of members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute that never granted permission to former President Al-Bashir on their

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territory. This category includes Botswana, the Central African Republic, Uganda and Zambia. In pursuit of national interests, and by extension avoiding the wrath of the international community, most African members of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute have been indecisive about adopting the AU position. Botswana, Uganda and Zambia have bluntly refused to accept the position of the AU, while planning to uphold the decision of the ICC. Despite the disarray in the AU camp, the organization consistently and defiantly extended invitations to former President Al-Bashir to all events concerning Africa’s Heads of States and Heads of Governments. This is because, for the AU, the ICC position is an affront on the collective dignity of Africa; therefore, it must be treated without any iota of respect. Perhaps the most fundamental development from the AU/ICC saga is the ongoing plan of the AU to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Court of Justice of the African Union. The emergent court is the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which would prosecute cases of genocide and crimes against humanity within Africa. In essence, an African court for Africa would have been established and a domestication of the ICC mandate would be achieved. Agwu (2014: 30) is, however, concerned about the propriety of investing the African court with criminal jurisdiction. According to the author: The effort is an unnecessary duplication that can only at best give soft landing or shield tyrannical African leaders from international accountability for well-known impunity. The decision also underestimates the challenges in the onerous task of achieving international justice from a narrow African regional platform where conspiracy and collusion to undermine justice may be rife.

The suspicion of unwillingness by the AU to follow through with the prosecution of accused high-ranking officials of states was laid to rest with the prosecution and conviction of former Chadian president, Hissene Habre, for crimes against humanity (Maclean 2017). The AU is, however, of the firm belief that unless there are fundamental reformations in the workings, processes and organization of the ICC, the African continent must build its own criminal justice system. This accords with the submission: “For the court to remain a credible institution for the execution of international justice, it is important that there be reforms on how the ICC operates.” (Mbaku 2014: 9)

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Conclusion The AU’s rejection of the dictates of the ICC is basically born out of the need for solidarity, and the commitment to give African states the independence and authority they deserve in their own affairs. As alluded to in this piece, Du Bois’ Pan-Africanism is all about fairness, equity and justice in a world skewed in favor of the white race. Africa’s emancipation from domination can only be achieved through solidarity, based on collective defense through cooperation and collaboration among African states. The application of this philosophy contributed greatly in the decolonization process, and by extension, the integration approach that led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity ensured the success of the total political emancipation of African states. The ICC saga is a unique opportunity to show the rest of the world that Africa has the capability to handle its own affairs, particularly the issue of criminal justice. The AU’s desire “to establish a Pan-African criminal court with the same mandate as the ICC, thereby seeking to circumvent all future ICC interventions on the continent” (Murithi 2013: 7) is a welcome development. In the near future, African states are expected to pull out en bloc from the ICC, and on the strength of their number, the ICC may thereafter become moribund and extinct like the League of Nations.

References Adi, H., & Sherwood, M. (2003). Pan-African history: Political figures from Africa and the diaspora since 1787. London: Routledge. Agwu, F. (2014). The African court of justice and human rights: The future of international criminal justice in Africa. Africa Review, 6(1), 30–43. Broderick, F. (1959). W.E.B. DuBois: Negro leader in a time of crisis. California: Stanford University Press. Damask, M. (2008). What is the point of international criminal justice? Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1573. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_ papers/1573 Flint, J., & De Waal, A. (2008). Darfur: A new history of a long war. London: Zed Books Ltd. Gegout, C. (2013). The international criminal court: Limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of justice and peace. Third World Quarterly, 34(5), 800–818. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800737.

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Hassan, H. (2010). Dimensions of the Darfur crisis and its consequences: An Arab perspective. African Security Review, 19(1), 20–32. https://doi. org/10.1080/10246021003736609. Hoile, D. (2014). Justice denied: The reality of the international criminal court. London: The Africa Research Centre. International Criminal Court. Retrieved from: https://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_ Menus/ICC/Pages/default.aspx Maclean, R. (2017). Ex-Chad dictator’s conviction for crimes against humanity upheld by Dakar court. The Guardian. Available at https://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/apr/27/conviction-chad-hissene-habre-crimes-againsthumanity-upheld. Accessed 17 May 2019. Mbaku, J. (2014). International justice: The international criminal court and Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Murithi, T. (2013). The African union and the international criminal court: An embattled relationship? The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Number 8 March. Murithi, T. (2014). Pan-Africanism and the politicization of the international criminal court. Journal of African Union Studies., 3(1), 61–82. Oluwadare, A. (2013). Human security, the responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur. International Affairs and Global Strategy, 15. Pompeo, M. (2019). State Department Press Briefing on US position on the International Criminal Court. Available https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0CYj2b_Zr7gJ:https://www.state.gov/u-s-policy-on-theinternational-criminal-court-remains-unchanged/+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk& gl=ca Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Retrieved from: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792file-protocol_statute_african_court_justice_and_human_rights.pdf Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Retrieved from: https://www. icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be940a655eb30e16/0/rome_ statute_english.pdf Thompson, V. (1969). Africa and the unity: The evolution of Pan-Africanism. London: Longmans, Green and Co. U.S.  Department of State. Available at https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-thepress-6/. Accessed 17 May 2019.

CHAPTER 5

Capacity Imperatives for the Realization of the African Continental Free Trade Area: Issues and Policy Options Barassou Diawara, Thomas C. Munthali, and Robert Nantchouang

Introduction Trade has been the motor of economic, social and political integration of African countries since they gained independences. To put into action their ambition of boosting intra-African cooperation and integration, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union (AU) met on 21 March 2018  in Rwanda to launch the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) with the adoption and signing of the AfCFTA legal instruments. The AfCFTA consists of a framework agreement establishing the AfCFTA Agreement, the Protocol on Trade in Goods and Trade in Services, and the Protocol on Rules and Procedures B. Diawara (*) • R. Nantchouang Knowledge and Learning Department, The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] T. C. Munthali National Planning Commission of Malawi, Lilongwe, Malawi © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_5

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on the Settlement of Disputes. The AfCFTA signals the beginning of a new ­chapter for mega-regional trade relations on the African continent and enhanced efforts at regional integration. The AfCFTA is the first agreement of its kind to bring together all African countries under a single Free Trade Area, with a focus on creating a common market for goods, services and investment while allowing for the free movement of persons. Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the AU decided to establish the AfCFTA in 2012 at the 18th Ordinary Session of the AU, with negotiations formally starting in June 2015 based on the realization that intra-African trade is critically low and that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have not prioritized developing and enhancing regional trade. Estimates shows that the establishment of the AfCFTA will stimulate total African exports by 4 percent (US$25.3 billion) and result in an overall 52 percent (US$34.6 billion) increase in intra-African trade compared to the baseline of no trade reforms in 2022—with expansion covering a wide range of sectors, including agriculture and agro-processing, industry and services. Trade in industrial goods is expected to increase by 53 percent between 2010 and 2022 (ECA 2018; Valensisi et  al. 2016). The AfCFTA is expected to cover a market of 1.2 billion people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$2.5 trillion, being therefore the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organization (ATPC and ECA 2018). While the AfCFTA offers numerous opportunities in terms of enlarged regional markets, greater efficiency and competition, increased welfare, higher level of intra-African trade and diversification of products away from commodities, issues that can impede progress need to be tackled. Some of the key potential challenges which seem to be outstanding have to do with protracted negotiations, AU members’ ability and willingness to implement the AfCFTA domestically and support AU institutions for this purpose, and failures in fulfilling countries’ obligations (owing to potential national interests or rising levels of protectionism) (Parshotam 2018). However, as in other trade agreements, capacity challenges remain the missing link (ACBF and AUC 2016; Nnadozie et al. 2017) and ought to be tackled for successful implementation of the AfCFTA. Indeed, inadequate capacity is a perennial challenge that constrains programs and projects promoting inclusive economic growth, sustained development and integration. For Agenda 2063’s priority programs to be sustainably

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i­mplemented, capacity development must be placed at the core of the ­transformation process (AUC 2015; ACBF and AUC 2016). This chapter aims to highlight the capacity imperatives for successful implementation of the AfCFTA as African governments are moving forward in establishing this most-needed continent-wide free trade area. The methodology adopted to meet the objectives mostly consisted of desk reviews. To achieve the objectives of this chapter, the paper first presents the debate on the importance of the AfCFTA in the context of Africa’s recent development agendas, namely Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030. Next, the AfCFTA-related challenges on the continent are discussed. Thereafter, the conceptual framework for understanding and tackling the capacity challenges is analyzed. The chapter then proposes some priority actions that need to be taken, especially at the country level, to speed up the realization and implementation of the AfCFTA.  Finally, the chapter identifies some areas needing further research which could provide support in building/strengthening the capacities for effective implementation of the AfCFTA.

The African Continental Free Trade Area in the Context of Africa African countries are implementing Agenda 2063 which provides a long-­ term vision for a peaceful and prosperous continent, integrated regionally and into the global economy, and taking full advantage of its natural resources and people. The ten-year road map, known as the First Ten Year Implementation Plan, as well as the accompanying five-year Medium-­ Term Plan, is currently under implementation by African countries. Agenda 2063 places integration and intra-African trade at the heart of its vision and is integral to reducing poverty and achieving sustainable economic growth (African Union Commission 2015). The AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects and programs of Agenda 2063 considered as an urgent initiative whose immediate implementation would provide quick wins, impact on socio-economic development and enhance confidence and the commitment of Africans as the owners and drivers of the continental vision. The cumulative effect of the AfCFTA is to contribute to the achievement of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 as well as the United Nations 2030 Agenda by consolidating the continent into one trade area which

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provides great opportunities for trading enterprises, businesses and consumers across Africa (see below on the AfCFTA and Agenda 2063). AfCFTA within Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The AfCFTA is well in line with the objectives and goals set in Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The original vision for African countries which was still in line with the AfCFTA was contained in the Lagos Plan of Action, which was adopted by African Heads of State and Government in 1980. Thereafter in 1991, the Abuja Treaty established the African Economic Community followed by the much-­ celebrated Agenda 2063. A look at some major aspirations of Agenda 2063 demonstrates how attempts have been made to realize the age-old Pan-African vision: Aspiration 1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; Aspiration 2. An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism; Aspiration 7. Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global partner and player. This seventh aspiration is the one that is closely linked to the birth of the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA is also in line with and can contribute to the achievement of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, in particular to the SDGs, from targets for decent work and economic growth (Goal 8) and the promotion of industry (Goal 9), to food security (Goal 2) and affordable access to health services (Goal 3). By supporting African industrialization and economic development, the AfCFTA can support in reducing the continent’s reliance on external resources. This would allow Africa to better finance its own development, which is recognized under Goal 17. (Source: African Union Commission 2015; ATPC and ECA 2018)

The AfCFTA is established as a flagship project under Agenda 2063 with the view to significantly accelerate growth of intra-Africa trade and use trade more effectively as an engine of growth and sustainable development, through doubling of intra-Africa trade by 2022, and strengthening Africa’s common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations. In addition, through the AfCFTA, the following financial institutions are also to be established: the African Investment Bank and Pan-African Stock Exchange, the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank (African Union Commission 2015). Evidence shows that intra-African trade is still relatively low but increasing, the share rising from about 9 percent in 2000–2005 to 14 percent in 2010 and reaching 18 percent in 2015. Such performance shows some

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dynamism which brings positive news for boosting intra-African trade (BIAT) that could come from the AfCFTA (UNCTAD 2016). The AfCFTA, besides its welfare impact, is aimed at helping African countries to transform their economies and achieve Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The opportunities for the African countries include creating bigger and integrated regional market for African products; permitting producers to benefit from economies of scale and to access cheaper raw materials and intermediate inputs; improving conditions for forming regional value chains and integrating to global value chains; allowing consumers to have access to cheaper imported products from other African countries; leading to better allocation of resources and faster economic and trade growth; catalyzing the structural transformation of the countries from resourceand low-technology-based economies to more diversified knowledge-­ based economies; eliminating some challenges associated with multiple and overlapping trade agreements in Africa; encouraging both intra-­ African and external direct capital flows to African countries; and stimulating cooperation in other areas such as technology transfer, innovation, investment and continent-wide infrastructure development (Saygili et al. 2017).

Capacity Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area Overview of Capacity Issues in Africa The Africa Capacity Index (ACI) provides a snapshot of the state of capacity in Africa (ACBF 2017, 2019a). It is a composite index computed from a quantitative and qualitative assessment of four sub-indices or ‘clusters’. These are the policy environment cluster that considers the conditions that must be in place to make transformational change and development possible; the processes for implementation cluster that assesses the extent to which countries are prepared to deliver results and outcomes; the development results at country-level cluster that refers to tangible outputs that encourage development; and the capacity development outcomes cluster that measures change in the human condition. Evidence from the Africa Capacity Report 2019 shows that results in terms of capacity levels are generally satisfactory, largely driven by a strong policy environment. The ACI ranges from 70.8 for Mauritius to 24.0 for Guinea-Bissau (Table  5.1). There are no countries at the ‘very low’ or

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Table 5.1  Africa Capacity Index 2019 Rank

Country

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Mauritius Burkina Faso Malawi Ghana Tanzania Mali Tunisia Rwanda Namibia Morocco Nigeria Benin Liberia Democratic Republic of Congo Cote Ivoire Mozambique Guinea Burundi Niger Lesotho

21 22 23

Senegal Botswana South Africa

ACI 2019 value

Rank

Country

ACI 2019 value

70.8 67.0 66.2 65.2 64.5 64.1 63.8 63.3 61.1 60.5 59.6 58.4 57.8 57.1

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Djibouti Mauritania Zambia Ethiopia Comoros Uganda Gabon Kenya Zimbabwe Somalia Gambia Chad Congo Cameroon

52.1 51.7 51.2 51.2 51.0 48.5 48.4 46.3 46.1 45.4 43.9 42.9 42.5 42.4

56.2 55.9 55.8 53.9 53.8 53.7

38 39 40 41 42 43

42.2 41.3 40.2 40.1 39.9 37.0

53.6 53.1 52.2

44 45 46

Sierra Leone Swaziland Algeria Egypt Togo Central African Republic South Sudan Madagascar Guinea-Bissau

36.0 34.8 24.0

Notes: Index value of 0 to less than 20 means ‘very low capacity’; index value of 20 to less than 40 means ‘low capacity’; index value of 40 to less than 60 means ‘medium capacity’; index value of 60 to less than 80 means ‘high capacity’; and index value of 80 and above means ‘very high capacity’ Source: ACBF (2019a)

‘very high’ extremes of capacity. Ten countries are in the ‘high’ bracket and five in the ‘low’ bracket, but no country is in the ‘very low’ bracket. The bulk of countries have ‘medium’ capacity. Most countries (67.4 percent) fall within the ‘medium’ bracket, 21.7 percent are in the ‘high’ bracket and 10.9 percent are in the ‘low’ bracket (ACBF 2019a). The African Continental Free Trade Area-Related Capacities The Africa Capacity Reports and the Survey of African RECs’ capacity needs (ACBF 2014, 2017; ACBF and AUC 2016; ACBF and AfDB 2016)

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offer some evidence on the capacity challenges associated with regional integration and by extension those related to trade and the AfCFTA. In particular, the studies related to the implementation of Agenda 2063 and RECs highlighted cross-cutting capacity issues associated with the availability of human capital; implementation of policies; research, knowledge sharing, and monitoring and evaluation; diversity of integration levels; and financing. Availability of Human Capital  Across all RECs which are the building blocks of the African Economic Community under which the AfCFTA falls, the organograms indicate that the required number of personnel needed to execute the mandate of the various institutions is not readily available. In addition, the current and future staff require skills development and relevant training to better support the AfCFTA agenda and requirements. Successful implementation of the AfCFTA requires the necessary skills to produce and manage various types of equipment, machinery, vehicles, electricals and bituminous substances and manufacture highskilled technological products. But today Africa’s stock of graduates is still highly skewed toward the humanities and social sciences—the share of students enrolled in universities averages more than 75 percent. For instance, in 2015, more than 3 million African students enrolled in non-critical technical skills areas, but only 1.7 million in critical technical skills areas (ACBF and AUC 2016). Yet two-thirds of African countries have science, technology, and innovation policies and strategies, ACBF (2017). Evidence also shows that Africa currently only has around 55,000 engineers but needs an estimated 4.3 million engineers, so it needs to produce over 300,000 each year until 2023. Moreover, the continent currently only has around 21,000 geologists but needs an estimated 174,000 geologists, so needs to produce over 19,000 each year until 2023. In addition, the continent currently only has around 82,000 agricultural scientists but needs an estimated 152,000 agriculturalists, so there is need to produce over 8000 each year until 2023 (ACBF and AUC 2016).

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Capacity for the Implementation of Policies  A main concern raised is that the Agreement may follow several others that have not been effectively implemented, if implementation capacities are not addressed (Nnadozie 2018). Indeed, African countries face challenges in terms of actual implementation of their well-drafted strategies, as there are too many development policies in African countries still waiting for implementation. Africa’s development performance is partly associated with the poor capacity for implementation (Nnadozie et al. 2017). As an illustration, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources was adopted in Algiers, Algeria on 15 September 1968 and entered into force on 16 June 1969. However, while 45 countries have signed the Convention, only 32 have ratified/acceded to it. Another example among many others is the Constitution for the African Civil Aviation Commission adopted in Dakar, Senegal, on 16 December 2009. This Convention came into force provisionally on 11 May 2010, upon signature by 15 African states. It shall definitively enter into force upon ratification by 15 African states, but for now only eight countries have ratified/acceded to it (African Union Commission 2018a). The problem of low implementation of policies and agreements seems to be explained by the fact that while they describe the ‘what’ (of issues being faced), they do not respond to the ‘how’ to do things in a practical way. The policy-makers and driving actors of the AfCFTA agenda therefore need to explain the ‘how’, in the sense that the primary focus of strategies and agreements is putting policy into action and effect. As such, there needs to be course of action put into place in terms of how to go about implementing the Agreement (Nnadozie 2018). Research, Knowledge Sharing and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)  The implementation of the AfCFTA is a complex undertaking, needing continuous thinking about how data and evidence could play a role in improving the process. Research and knowledge sharing are needed to inform the integration and implementation processes. But unfortunately, African research is dominated by a few countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. During the period 2003–2012, sub-Saharan African countries doubled their annual research output and increased its quality, raising the region’s share of global research from 0.44 percent to 0.72 percent over the decade. Still, since Africa has 12 percent of the global population, a considerable gap remains (ACBF and AUC 2016).

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RECs which are the building blocks and key pillars of the AfCFTA still face challenges when it comes to research capacity and opportunities. For instance, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established a research unit (Economic Policy Research Unit) with ACBF support, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a senior level personnel working toward establishing such a unit. Moreover, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) does not have a research unit, and the East African Community (EAC) has a statistical unit but not a research unit (ACBF and AfDB 2016). Knowledge sharing in the context of the AfCFTA requires up-to-date and disaggregated data as well as concrete guidelines including new processes and new partnerships to provide countries with the know-how needed to successfully implement the Agreement while facing today’s global challenges and opportunities. Unfortunately, there are too few systems in place for regional and continental organizations to be ‘learning bodies’ (ACBF and AUC 2016). Moreover, M&E has to be an important component of the AfCFTA, representing an important area for consolidating gains made and guiding future plans and programs. However, there are still challenges as for many African countries and RECs, M&E units/ departments have developed an elaborate, user-friendly web-based monitoring system, but the culture and practice of ‘evaluation’ is weak (ACBF and AfDB 2016). In addition, though evaluation skills and experience are available on the African continent, a key challenge that remains is to strengthen local ownership of M&E and to link it to AfCFTA processes and the like. Diversity of Integration Levels Among Countries and RECs  Countries and RECs are at various stages of integration which could therefore affect the implementation of the AfCFTA.  As one REC moves from one stage of integration into another stage, there is a need to strengthen the capacity of staff to adapt to the new stage. Now that RECs are key bodies for the AfCFTA, the capacities (human and institutional) of all actors involved need to be enhanced at the continental, regional and national levels. For example, EAC is now moving to its third pillar, monetary union. Indeed, EAC Heads of States and Government of partner states signed the Monetary Union Protocol on 30 November 2013. This calls for a paradigm shift in the institution’s organization and operation, and that of partner states. Consequently, there is a great demand for additional resources (capital, human, etc.) at the regional and partner state levels.

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Among the RECs, for instance, the EAC is recognized as the community that has made the best performance concerning the different stages of regional integration. The EAC has fully achieved free trade agreement and customs union, has made good progress with respect to a common market and monetary union and is preparing for the process of economic and political union. Another REC that has made relatively good progress is the ECOWAS, especially in terms of free trade agreement, customs union and monetary union. RECs such as the UMA (also known as AMU) and the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), though active in the ground, still have to made efforts with respect to moving through the various stages of regional integration; they are just in preparation for the free trade agreement and have not yet started any of the other stages ACBF and AfDB (2016).

Framework for Tackling the Capacity Issues for the Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area The four-dimensional capacity-set conceptual framework proposed for the implementation of Agenda 2063 provides a good reference for understanding and addressing AfCFTA-related capacity issues. The main reason is that the AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063 (African Union Commission 2015; ACBF and AUC 2016). The proposed framework is underpinned by the understanding and agreement that inadequate capacity is a perennial challenge that constrains programs and projects promoting inclusive economic growth, sustained development and integration. For Agenda 2063’s priority programs, including the AfCFTA, to be sustainably implemented, capacity development must be placed at the core of the transformation process. The framework presented in Fig. 5.1 submits that the capacity required for successful implementation of the AfCFTA is clustered into four main categories (ACBF and AUC 2016). They are (1) operational capacity for holistic and effective results including institutional and human capacity as well as policies, systems and work processes to ensure that the AfCFTA is successfully implemented at the country, regional and continental levels; (2) change and transformative capacity which pays attention to transformative leadership, change readiness, ability for mind-set shifts and ability to innovate for successful AfCFTA; (3) composite capacity including strategic planning, results-based management as well as organizational and

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SET 1 Operational capacity [organizational set-up; human capacity (hard and soft skills); policies; work processes; and access to information and knowledge]

SET 4

SET 2

Composite capacity

Change and transformative capacity

[strategic planning; critical/strategic thinking and results-based management; program development; project planning and implementation; and partnership development and management]

[transformative leadership; change readiness (creating and maintaining the desire for change); mindset shifts; top leadership commitment and management; and ownership of decisions]

SET 3 Critical technical and sector-specific skills [science, technology and innovation/inventors; engineers; mining experts and specialists; financial specialists; and health specialists/experts including doctors and others]

Fig. 5.1  Capacity framework for the implementation of the AfCFTA. (Source: ACBF and AUC 2016)

coordination capability to ensure that the targets and objectives of the AfCFTA are achieved in a quality and timely manner, with accountability exercised at all levels and for all stakeholders; and (4) critical, technical and sector-specific skills for implementing the AfCFTA, which means having the required number of quality technical expertise in the public and private sectors as well as for non-state actors in areas such as trade, investment, technology and migration. Within this set of strategic capacity elements, the private sector remains one of the critical game-changing actors which is key for achieving the continent-wide free trade area and all its expected results. While the proposed capacity development framework is useful to tackle capacity issues in a holistic manner in the long term, it needs to be applied to the AU’s Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) which provides the architecture that African countries can use to prioritize the policy reforms required to derive the full benefits of the AfCFTA.

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Endorsed by the 18th Ordinary Session of the AU that decided to establish the AfCFTA, the BIAT Action Plan identifies key underlying policies such as trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related infrastructure and trade finance (Box 2). The implementation of the BIAT Action Plan therefore requires developing human and institutional capacities in various areas including (1) putting in place an implementing institutional structure, ensuring that there is no institutional duplication; (2) establishing a continental framework for monitoring and evaluation; and (3) mobilizing enough resources for the BIAT initiatives and projects (Luke and MacLeod 2017). Each of the seven clusters of the BIAT Action Plan therefore needs to be approached by paying attention to the operational capacity, change and transformative capacity, composite capacity, and critical, technical and sector-specific skills. The seven priority clusters of the Boosting Intra-African Trade Action Plan: Cluster 1. Trade policy Activities: Mainstream intra-African trade in national strategies; enhance participation by the private sector, women and the informal sector; boost intra-African trade in food products; undertake commitments to liberalize trade-related services; commit to harmonize rules of origin and trade regimes; and promote ‘Buy in Africa’ and ‘Made in Africa’. Cluster 2. Trade facilitation Activities: Reduce road blocks; harmonize and simplify customs and transit procedures and documentation; establish one-stop border posts; and adopt integrated border management processes. Cluster 3. Productive capacity Activities: Implement the program for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa, African Productive Capacity Initiative and Accelerated Agribusiness and Agro-industry Initiative (know commonly as 3ADI); establish integrated trade information systems; encourage investment; and establish regional centers of excellence. Cluster 4. Trade-related infrastructure Activities: Implement the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA); mobilize resources for multi-country projects; pursue high-­ quality multi-country projects; ensure an enabling environment for private sector participation; and develop innovative mechanisms (legal, financial, etc.) for multi-country projects. Cluster 5. Trade finance Activities: Improve payment systems; set the enabling environment for financial services to provide export credit and guarantees; speed up the

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establishment and strengthening of regional and continental financial institutions (AfreximBank, Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank and African Trade Insurance Agency). Cluster 6. Trade information Activities: Create interconnected centers of trade information exchange. Cluster 7. Factor market integration Activities: Operationalize existing protocols and policies; facilitate movement of businesspeople; harmonize rules on cross-border establishment; and conclude agreements on mutual recognition of qualifications. (Source: Luke and MacLeod 2017)

Proposed Actions for the Implementation Continental Free Trade Area Actions at the Continental, Regional and Country Levels

of the African

While support to continental bodies and RECs is important, most of the capacity for supporting the effective implementation of the AfCFTA rests at the country level. The private sector and partner institutions should therefore support strengthening of the capacities in such areas as domestication of the AfCFTA, implementation of BIAT and Africa Mining Vision (AMV), and development of infrastructure, soft and technical skills. Ratifying, Domesticating and Developing National AfCFTA Strategies, Including Sensitization  This will help complement the broader trade policy of each respective state party and enable the country to identify key trade opportunities, current constraints and steps required to take full advantage of the African market. AU Member States are expected to ‘domesticate’ the AfCFTA and other frameworks by anchoring their implementation in nationally tailored policies and programs (particularly within their National Development Plans where these exists). This is to strengthen mechanisms and other capabilities for sustaining achievements that would be made. In addition, mainstreaming the AfCFTA in national priorities and plans fosters stronger ownership, builds effective alliances and partnerships and promotes rational use of resources (ACBF 2019b). Implementing the BIAT and the AMV  The implementation of the BIAT programs and activities will help to address the key constraints and challenges of intra-African trade and enhance the size and benefits of such trade for the continent. To ensure that the BIAT initiative is fully and s­uccessful imple-

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mented, the High-Level African Trade Committee (HATC), c­ omprising of Heads of State and Government (the Chairs of the RECs), needs to play its facilitating role and unlock any blockages that might arise in the implementation of the AfCFTA and BIAT agenda. Moreover, as agreed at the AU Summit, the African Union Commission (AUC), in collaboration with the RECs and development partners, needs to now work on the action points of the implementation strategy for the Action Plan (African Union Commission 2018b). The effective implementation of the AMV will complement the AfCFTA by helping resource-based economies to strategically diversify their exports into other African markets. Coupled with Africa’s abundant mineral resources, trade liberalization and market integration under the AfCFTA will provide enormous sustainable advantages for mining and manufacturing companies that will produce intermediate and finished mining products. Moreover, the development of regional mineral value chains within the continent can rapidly accelerate as investors decided to take advantage of this emerging market with the huge growth potential offered by the AfCFTA (African Union Commission 2018c). Developing the Critical Mass of Technical Skills Africa lacks the critical technical skills which are indeed necessary for the successful implementation of the AfCFTA.  For instance, it is estimated that close to 500,000 engineering graduates are needed every year for Africa to achieve its set goal in 2023 with regard to supporting industrialization efforts which are central to value addition under the AfCFTA. Moreover, it is also estimated that Africa is short of an estimated 1,168,571 researchers and should aim to have 1,405,300 by 2023 (ACBF and AUC 2016). Infrastructure deficit is a key factor hampering Africa’s economic development and constraining trade and jobs creation. Skills therefore need to be developed on public-private partnerships as an important area of support by the private sector and development partners. Attention needs to be paid to transformative leadership (including visioning), change readiness, ability for mind-set shifts, information and communications technology and technological predisposition, innovation and invention commitments, all critical to the success of the AfCFTA.

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Development of Capacity Development Plans Capacity development plans contextualized to various key players’ needs are important in the effective implementation the AfCFTA. It is therefore crucial to develop a Capacity Development Plan for ratification and implementation of the AfCFTA targeted at key actors. In particular these include the private sector, public sector and civil society. The private sector should be involved in the negotiations and the planning of the key activities related to the implementation of the AfCFTA as they are the direct investors, the producers/manufacturers and the marketers/distributors. Based on the experience of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in developing and delivering capacity development projects and programs in Africa, a National Capacity Development Program for Private Sector is proposed in every country with the objective to empower the private sector so as to enable it to effectively contribute to the attainment of national development objectives within the African Union’s Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Implementation Plan. The specific objectives would be to (1) increase the private sector competitiveness in, and access to, local and international markets; (2) enhance the public-private interface for effective engagement of the private sector in the country; (3) develop national business development centers to improve their performance as effective one-stop business centers for the private sector; and (4) strengthen the human and institutional capacity of private sector federations. In implementing the National Capacity Development Program for Private Sector, attention would be paid to the competitiveness of the private sector; public-private partnerships; skills upgrading and knowledge building; policy studies, publication and dissemination; program for youth and women entrepreneurs; coordination and networking; knowledge and information management; and institutional and human resources strengthening of private sector federations. For the public sector, a National Capacity Development Program for Public Sector is proposed with the objective of building institutional capacity through support to training institutions, policy development, strategic planning and management, institutional restructuring and support to public sector reform aimed at improving the performance of the public sector to effectively support and coordinate AfCFTA-related interventions. This component targeting the public sector will also involve developing guidelines, training materials and popular versions of the AfCFTA for the various actors involved in the implementation of the Agreement. Given the ­technical

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issues associated with the implementation of the AfCFTA, there is need to produce popular versions targeting all Africans, especially those dealing with trade and related issues. More importantly, guidelines, tools and training materials would be needed for various actors such as parliamentarians, private sector actors, policy-­makers, students and common citizens to help unpack the AfCFTA for its effective and successful implementation. For the civil society, a National Capacity Development Program for Civil Society is proposed with the objective of building evidence-based engagement by civil society on promotion of AfCFTA-related interventions by governments as well as holding governments to account on progress through effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The program dedicated to the civil society will specifically strengthen the capacity of civil society networks to coordinate policy advocacy programs in the given country and improve the capability of civil society consortia to effectively engage in the policy-making in the targeted countries. To ensure effective support to the civil society, there is need for institutional development and strengthening, strengthening the capacity of human resources through training and institutional dialogue and interface.

Suggested Research Agenda Efforts toward effective and successful implementation of the AfCFTA need to be supported by the availability of knowledge as well as an adequate research agenda. Among other research areas, it would be important to pay attention to country readiness assessment studies and simulation on the costs and benefits associated with the AfCFTA. Conducting Country Readiness Assessment Studies for the Full Implementation of the AfCFTA  While the Agreement has been launched, the need remains to have countries define contextual priorities and capacity needs for the effective implementation of the AfCFTA. This entails conducing country capacity needs assessments to examine the potential benefits, challenges, priority sectors and ways of optimizing on benefits from the AfCFTA. A first critical step and priority would hence be conducting readiness assessment studies for assessing AfCFTA capacity development needs across the sectors and actors. Then, based on the assessments, there will be need to articulate a clear coordinated strategy to guide the interventions aimed at strengthening the identified capacity gaps. The readiness assessment is very important as it helps each of the countries to identify the potential challenges that might arise

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when implementing the AfCFTA. Moreover, through the identification of the gaps at the country level, the readiness assessment can propose on how to fill these gaps either before, or as part of, the implementation plan. Relatively few countries have undertaken such an exercise.1 Conducting a Simulation on the Costs and Benefits Associated with the AfCFTA  The main objective will be to evaluate the economic benefits and costs of the AfCFTA to each of the African economies looking at output, trade and welfare. Such a study conducted for each country will help to harness the perspectives of the private sector on the benefits and costs of the agreement to businesses in all sectors of each of the economies. Existing studies inform that the AfCFTA will promote industrialization, sustained growth and development in Africa, mainly because of its potential to boost intra-African trade, stimulate investment and innovation, ­foster structural transformation, improve food security, enhance economic growth and export diversification, and rationalize the overlapping trade regimes of the main regional economic communities (AU, ECA and AfDB 2017). However, country-specific studies are lacking which otherwise could provide evidence-based policy recommendations on how each country based on its context and specificities needs to approach the implementation of the AfCFTA.

Conclusion The AfCFTA has been launched with the aim to support Agenda 2063 and ensure that it contributes in tackling the different socio-economic challenges facing African countries. Considered as a great opportunity for African countries, the AfCFTA is set to facilitate intra-African trade; foster regional value chains that can facilitate integration into the global economy; and energize industrialization, competitiveness and innovation—and thereby contribute to African economic and social progress and development (AU, ECA and AfDB 2017). To ensure of its effective implementation, the required soft and hard capacities need to be built or strengthened. Capacities need therefore to be built around the four categories of operational capacity, change and transformative capacity, composite capacity, and critical, technical and 1  Nigeria did conduct a country-specific study entitled “An independent study on the potential benefits of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on Nigeria”.

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sector-­specific skills while ensuring that each of the seven clusters of the BIAT Action Plan (trade policy, trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related infrastructure, trade finance, trade information, and factor market integration) are addressed. This chapter proposes to develop Capacity Development Program for the successful implementation of the AfCFTA targeted at key actors including the private sector, public sector and civil society. The main idea underlying all programs is that the private sector should be involved in the negotiations and the planning of the key activities related to the implementation of the AfCFTA as they are the direct investors, the producers/ manufacturers and the marketers/distributors. All proposed capacity development interventions are aimed at ensuring an institutional development and strengthening of the capacity of all key actors involved, as well as strengthening the capacity of human resources while developing the institutional dialogue and interface. As a specialized agency of the African Union on Capacity Development in Africa, ACBF has expressed its willingness and readiness to build on its 28 years’ experience in building human and institutional capacity by scaling up its efforts around coordinating (1) country-level support in ratification and domesticating of the AfCFTA; and (2) interventions to build the requisite AfCFTA implementation, monitoring and evaluation capacities at continental, regional and country levels (having already understood such capacity needs at these levels). However, while ACBF is ready to develop a coordinated Capacity Development Plan for the successful implementation of the AfCFTA, it will require multi-stakeholder collaboration and support for its effective implementation. Indeed, building the requisite capacities will require political and financial support beginning with the African Union Member States themselves supported by the private sector, non-state actors and development partners.

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Corner. Blog of 12 March 2018. Available at: https://www.acbf-pact.org/executives-corner/blog/moving-beyond-signing-continental-free-trade-area-cftaagreement-building. Accessed 12 Sept 2018. Nnadozie, E., Munthali, T., Nantchouang, R., & Diawara, B. (2017). Domestic resource mobilization in Africa: State, capacity imperatives and policy actions. Africa Journal of Management, 3(2), 184–212. Parshotam, A. (2018). Can the African continental free trade area offer a new beginning for trade in Africa? Occasional Paper 280. The South African Institute of International Affairs. Saygili, M., Peters, R., & Knebel, C. (2017). African continental free trade area: Challenges and opportunities of tariff reductions. UNCTAD Research Paper No. 15. Geneva: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. UNCTAD. (2016). African continental free trade area: Policy and negotiation options for trade in goods. UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/7. Geneva: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Valensisi, G., Lisinge, R., & Karingi, S. (2016). The trade facilitation agreement and Africa’s regional integration. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), 239–259.

CHAPTER 6

Regional Integration and the Political Economy of Morocco’s Desire for Membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi

Introduction Nationalism, regional integration and globalization are different strands of related dominant ideas and concepts of the international political economy since the twentieth century (Paquin 2002). While nationalism evokes notions of adherence towards nation-states, globalization implicates the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across international boundaries (Mimiko 2012; Momodu 2018). Regional integration operates in between the two, in the sense that it promotes ideas of active and voluntary cooperation among nation-states within a specified geographic area towards removing or minimizing barriers to economic and political cooperation (Ravenhill 2016). It involves measures designed to remove discrimination between countries. T. I. Odeyemi (*) Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_6

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Scholars link the notion of regional integration to the period around the Second World War (Chandra 2004; Haas 1958; Thonke and Spliid 2012); it found deeper expression in the middle of the twentieth century with greater manifestation in the conduct of state affairs. Ever since, the idea and practice of integration in different regions have dominated relations between nation-states. This finds expression in the activities of the European Union (EU), an alliance that endures as the global ‘outlier’ of regionalism (Draper 2012; Ravenhill 2016). Equally prominent, although at much lesser scales, are different formations of regionalism across the world, including Africa. In post-colonial Africa, efforts at integration started with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) proposing the division of the continent into regions to accelerate development (Odinkalu 2008). The efforts resulted in the formation of various regional integration arrangements (RIAs) with different aims but with the overall aim of promoting multilateral cooperation towards development (Jordaan 2014; Tavares and Tang 2011; Thonke and Spliid 2012). Thonke and Spliid (2012) identified 17 major regional organizations, eight of which are officially recognized as central to the desired aim of an African Economic Community (AEC) in 2028. The extent to which the various RIAs have achieved their underlying motives and objectives, the broader aim of development and the drives towards broader pan-African integration remains a contentious issue (Draper 2012; Tavares and Tang 2011). However, when the poor state of the continent in the main indices of development is considered, it underscores limitations in attaining the desired levels of socio-political and economic advancements (Akinola 2019; Awofeso and Odeyemi 2014; Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016; Ravenhill 2016). Among the RIAs created to foster development-oriented cooperation is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which came into being through the Lagos Treaty of 1975, and is today Africa’s ‘oldest’ RIA (Akonor 2018, 40). The Treaty was revised in 1993 “to speed up integration and establish an economic and monetary union, but also to anchor security and conflict prevention in the organisation” (Thonke and Spliid 2012, 48). ECOWAS demonstrates efforts by member states to promote cooperation and integration. In almost 45  years of existence, ECOWAS has exuded mixed successes in attaining its development aim (Adedeji 2012; Adetula 2009; Akinola 2019; Oloruntoba 2016a). There are, thus, regular efforts shrouded in reforms aimed at strengthening the capacity of its various organs. For instance, the Revised Treaty introduced

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a sub-regional parliament to strengthen public involvement in the activities of the Commission and to underscore the increasing drive towards democratic governance (Adejumobi 2016; Alabi 2013; Odinkalu 2008). In terms of membership, ECOWAS has 15 member states, 8 of which are French speaking, 5 English speaking and 2 Portuguese speaking. Fourteen of the current members were founding members; Mauritania is a former member, having withdrawn its membership in 2000, while Cape Verde joined in 1977. The establishment treaty of ECOWAS made specific reference to West Africa, in a way that demonstrates the impression of an organization whose focus and catchment is the sub-region where it is equally expected to draw its members. The first major test of this geographic scope occurred in 2017 when Morocco, a North African country and traditionally a member of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), applied for full membership of ECOWAS in order to partake of all obligations, responsibilities and gains of the Commission (Akinyemi 2017; El Guili 2017), or, as diplomatic officials put it, “to crown the strong political, human, historical, religious and economic ties at all levels with ECOWAS member countries” (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Morocco’s desire has thrown up a major debate within the Community. Nigeria, the sub-regional “power-house” (Obi 2018, 313), appears to radiate a double-faced posture on the Moroccan question. Whereas the country was absent at the ECOWAS’ Authority of Heads of State and Government meeting that ratified Morocco’s application “in principle”, subsequent comments by state officials, especially in the executive arm, signify non-opposition to the idea on the part of the government (see, for instance, Elegbede 2017; Salau 2017; The Punch 2017). The story is different among non-state actors who have vehemently opposed the idea, despite some admission of benefits the bloc and ECOWAS could derive from a Moroccan membership (Abati 2018; Akinterinwa 2017; Elegbede 2017). The situation is similar in Senegal, where President Macky Sall’s support for Morocco’s desire runs contrary to the views held by non-state actors, including the Initiative Committee for Integration Monitoring (CISI), a coalition of businesses, labour unions, university professors and non-governmental bodies. The group reasons that such accession represents “unbalanced relations that would suffocate our economy, destroy whole pillars of our productive sector, and export our jobs to Morocco” (Lahsini 2017). This chapter discusses the unfolding views. It argues that the debate has centred on the propriety or otherwise of such cross-regional advances in

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line with established principles and treaties on the one hand, and the need to maintain sub-regional power configurations, including Nigeria’s hegemonic status, on the other hand. There appears to be little attempts at situating it within the nuances of existing theoretical notions on regionalism and integration, and exploring the political economy undertone of the discourse. This chapter takes this as a point of departure. Following this introduction, we examine some conceptual and theoretical issues relating to the theme. Further, we subject the activities of ECOWAS to empirical appraisal by exploring how studies have assessed the organization in relation to integration. We also inquire into how existing frameworks on ECOWAS and integration in Africa fit into the Moroccan membership debate. We conclude with the kernel of the discourse: linking of theory with praxis through the lens of intergovernmentalist, rational choice institutionalism and hegemonic stability theories of integration.

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues At the minimum, regional integration denotes efforts of states to interrelate with other states towards establishing a mechanism for addressing issues of joint concern. It suggests some form of cooperation between sovereign states on areas of shared interest, which can be economic, political, environmental or security oriented. This is underscored in Ginkel and Langenhove’s (2003, 1) description of regional integration as “the process by which states within a particular region increase their level of interaction with regard to economic, security and political issues”. It draws on the notion of integration which Haas (in Laursen, 2008, 4) refers to as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states”. This, notes Laursen (2008), is presupposes a process and an end product. As Thonke and Spliid (2012, 45) opine, integration in this form may not necessarily manifest in institutional form but can as well be in the form of “a loose cooperative regime”. Chandra (2004, 25) relates it to regional integration arrangements (RIAs) and simply as that which occurs “between nation-states, within a specified geographical area, to minimise barriers”. Such agreements focus on the economic, political and social dimensions, and are broadly targeted towards removing political boundaries between participating states. For instance, focusing on the economic dimension,

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Balassa (1961) identified six stages of integration: Preferential trade area (PTA), Free trade area (FTA), Customs union (CU), Common market (CM), Economic community (EC) and Political integration. This underscores the overarching political motive of integration. Evidence in the extant literature indicates links between related concepts of regions, regionalism and regionalization, which underscore, as Odinkalu (2008, 20) puts it, regional integration as “arguably the most recent evolution of regionalism”. Ravenhill (2016) describes regionalism as a form of intergovernmental collaboration on a geographically restricted scale and regionalization as a process of increased integration within a given geographical area. Wigström (2013, 16) sees region as a group of “geographically proximate states with some form of cultural, economic and/or political interdependence, the degree of which may vary over time”. Relatedly, regionalism is conceived as “a conscious policy by governments to cooperate in the pursuit of interests that can only be obtained through regional integration”, while regionalization implies “the organic process of transnational interaction between actors on all levels of society within the region” (Wigström 2013, 16). When viewed in this context, regionalization becomes spontaneous, with no end in sight. Regionalism, to quote Fawcett (2004, 433), encompasses the promotion of regional identities (“soft regionalism”) and the creation of formal regional institutions (“hard regionalism”). The basic point to illustrate in the foregoing descriptions is that while regionalism is often governmental in nature, regionalization is a fluid process involving state and non-state actors. Thus, as Neumann (1994) submits, state as well as non-state actors may have interests in actively shaping regions to include or exclude certain members. Regionalization, when viewed in this way, illustrates the contemporary thinking on regionalism, which, as Badie et al. (2011, 2244) note, is “characterised by an expanding cast of actors (states and non-states) operating in the regional arena and across several interrelated dimensions: security, development, trade, environment, identity, and so on”. This thinking has great import for the Moroccan question. Theoretically, extant ideas on integration had been originally developed to explain European integration (Laursen 2008). Haas (1958), for instance, had theorized using the idea of spill-over to explain how trade liberalization relating to the custom union would lead to better coordination of economic policies resulting in a larger political community. Several other theories had emerged following this neo-functionalist idea to

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enlighten the understanding of the nature, emergence, survival and stability of integration arrangements around the globe. Here, we single out intergovernmentalist, rational choice institutionalism and hegemonic stability theories. Intergovernmentalism underscores the roles of states as major actors in integration arrangements. The theory developed as a response to functionalism and neo-functionalism; and posits that whereas cooperation may be feasible in areas of lows politics (economic and functional units), it will encounter constraints if it tried to spill over to questions affecting key national interests such as foreign policy (Hoffmann 1966). State actors are presumed to steer the process of integration in accordance with their desires and would hold firmly to affecting the content of integration efforts. Hoffmann (1966) drew largely on the unfolding events in the making of the European Union to emphasize that the convergence of national interests and the will of participating states are central to integration. Integration deepens and flourishes when interests of member states converge, while the process of integration slows when interests diverge. The integration process, then, rests mainly on the control to which member states put it, in alignment with their own individual interests. Further ideas emerged with Andrew Moravcsik’s notion of liberal intergovernmentalism in the 1990s (Laursen 2008). Liberal intergovernmentalism draws on realist and neo-liberal thoughts in explaining how domestic interests, as in economics and geo-politics, compete to influence the national interests of a state. Subsequently, the outcomes of these struggles would inform the positions taken by governments in inter-state bargaining. The final point is the “institutional choice” where institutions emerge based on the commitment of governments of member states (Laursen 2008). Progress in integration is thus based on overlapping interests of member countries. Closely related to liberal intergovernmentalism is rational choice institutionalism which also emerged in the 1990s as a branch of neo-institutionalism to explain the place of institutions as agencies or frameworks for collective action in control of individual states’ actions. The theory posits that as rational actors, political actors act out of self (national) interest, and institutions emerge because of the interactions which are interdependent and strategic in nature. Political actors establish institutions, in the form of collective actions or contracting dilemma, to resolve coordination problems (Hall and Rosemary 1996). Also important to the explanation of the role of actors in integration is the hegemonic stability theory as propounded by Kindleberger (1973)

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and advanced by Ogunnubi (2013), Oloruntoba and Gumede (2016), among others. The theory posits that stability in international political economy is dependent on the presence of a single dominant hegemon that has “access to crucial raw materials, control[s] a major source of imports, maintain[s] a large market for imports, and hold[s] a comparative advantage in goods in high value, yielding relatively high wages and profits” (Keohane, in Ogunnubi 2013, 78). A hegemon must be able to provide a public good based on its resources and evolve actions that promote a liberal economic order. Significantly, it is taken that less powerful states derive more benefits than the hegemon in the sense that they consume public goods that are produced by the hegemon. The hegemon derives its major utility in seeing a stable world that helps advance its hegemonic interests. Strange (1987) suggests that away from the economic capabilities required to be a hegemon, a preponderant state must possess various structural powers: ability to threaten or protect other country’s physical security; ability to influence the global system of production of goods and services; ability to shape the international capital market of finance and credit; and the ability to direct the development, accumulation and transfer of knowledge. Hegemons, in this context, are “swing states” with the ability to “generate political and economic benefits beyond their borders”, thus acting as “engines of regional growth and stability” (McNamee 2016, 3). The economic and political factors are, in turn, critical to regulating and maintaining the position of the hegemon; however, political elements cannot function effectively without economic elements (Ogunnubi 2013; Oloruntoba and Gumede 2016). Taken together, the theoretical notions in the foregoing describe and explain the various configurations of regional integration, including that which relates to Africa and ECOWAS. The role of actors, at the state and non-state levels, influences the initiation of, and progress towards, regional integration. This particularly comes into focus in the African case where, as Sako (2006, 6) notes, “the Continent’s high enthusiasm for regional integration has not been matched by commensurate political will and commitment of member states to effectively implement agreements reached under various integration arrangements”. This results in what Wigström (2013, 3) refers to as “theatre regionalism”—governments, the main actors, often endorse integration agreements with no intention to implement them. Beyond governments, the importance of non-state actors is also highlighted. Taken to praxis, ECOWAS demonstrated this

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realization with the “shift from its exclusive focus on government to government, to involving the people, NGOs and private sector” (Odinkalu 2008, 128). The theories also underscore the role of regional “superpowers” in initiating and furthering RIAs. Concomitantly, such superpowers, or hegemons, also pursue arrangements that advance their interests within the overall framework of RIAs. Theoretical notions, such as those advanced in liberal intergovernmentalism, also highlight how non-state, largely economic interests, could also compete with geo-political considerations in the determination of what constitutes national interests.

ECOWAS and Integration: An Empirical Exploration The literature is inundated with critiques of efforts towards, and challenges of, integration in Africa. Oloruntoba (2016b), for instance, identified issues such as leadership ego, narrow nationalism, domestic problems, multiplicity of integration schemes and influence of external powers, as constraining Africa’s integration. Jiboku (2015) similarly identified governance and leadership failures, unfavourable terms and conditions associated with international trade and economic interactions; ill-advised economic policies implemented by African leaders; lack of financial resources, skilled manpower and infrastructure; weak institutions; political instability and insecurity resulting from intra and inter-state conflicts and economic disparities, as debilitating challenges. Relatedly, Tavares and Tang (2011, 218) highlighted “Africa’s many daunting challenges”, such as monocultural economies, insufficient financial resources, macroeconomic instability, bad governance, conflicts and war, diseases, as well as the existence of numerous and overlapping sub-regional organizations, as major issues. In the aspect of overlapping membership, for instance, [A]s at 2010, out of the 53 [now 54] African countries, 27 [were] members of two regional organizations, 18 [were] members of three and one (Democratic Republic of Congo) [was] a member of four. On average, 95% of the members of a regional economic community [belonged] to another community. (Tavares and Tang 2011, 225)

The foregoing notwithstanding, scholars also highlight benefits that multiple membership could give to countries with weak economic structures in the aspect of benefiting from gains in each group (see Mengistu 2015). However, Tavares and Tang (2011, 229) have documented that it m ­ anifests in “shal-

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low integration” underlined by multiple regulations, low complementary trade structure and diversification efforts, unequal and weak capacity and level of preparedness of member states. Also cited are the absence of collective agreement on rationalizing and harmonizing regional initiatives, inadequate institutional framework and ineffective political will and leadership. In addition to intra-African issues, studies have found external factors, such as those relating to the overreliance on Western, Euro-centric and market-led conceptions of regionalism, particularly those centred on the market integration approach, and Africa’s disadvantaged position in the international political economy as other factors that affect integration (see, for instance, Draper 2012; Gibb 2009; Oloruntoba 2016a, b); Ravenhill 2016). Africa accounts for less than 3 per cent of world trade; intra-African trade is 15 per cent, compared with similar situations in Europe (68 per cent), North America (37 per cent) and Latin America (20 per cent) The limitations of the different RIAs, or “Africa’s poor track record in this area” (Gibbs 2009, 705), in turn, pose threats to the larger aim of continental integration through the African Economic Community (AEC). The aims are contained in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and Article 3(c) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union which identifies one of the cardinal aims of the AU as to “accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent”. The AEC was fixated on six different stages to be achieved over the course of 34 years with the final goal of “[creating] a fully integrated area … with common structures, facilities and function, including a single African central bank, a single African currency, a pan-African parliament, and a pan-­ African economic and monetary union” (Tavares and Tang 2011, 222) by 2028. Evidences indicate that so far, none of the envisioned aspects has been completely attained, as the continent continues to carry the tag of “least integrated of the world’s major regions” (Jiboku 2015, 5). A critique of ECOWAS and its activities in its over four decades of existence can be substantially situated within the framework of Africa’s regionalism. The organization is often viewed as mirroring the challenges that confront Africa’s RIAs. Momodu (2018) and Oloruntoba (2016a, b) provide a broad picture of factors that have impeded ECOWAS’ progress towards cooperation and development. The authors found issues such as a troubled history of pan-regionalism and pan-Africanism, different levels and selective compliance of ECOWAS policies by member states, inadequate resources for execution of projects, overbearing influence of external forces (especially France), weak domestic structures of, and power differentials among, member states and ethnolinguistic divisions, as

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germane. For instance, vastly unequal size of the populations and economies of member states often precipitate mutual suspicion, with smaller entities exuding the orientation that bigger ones could negatively interfere with their (smaller countries’) economic growth if they (bigger countries) were allowed complete access to their (smaller countries’) markets. ECOWAS has also achieved limited results in the aspect of eliminating barriers to what Akonor (2018, 41) refers to as “four freedoms of goods, services, capital, and labor among its members”. The author further notes that progress in labour mobility had been slow and often subject to the country-level preferences. Also, the goal of providing a common market in 1990 and shared currency as enshrined in the 1975 Treaty has yet to materialize, owing largely to limited political will on the part of member states. The organization has also been unable to substantially improve on the volume of intra-ECOWAS trade which was 12 per cent of member states’ overall trade as of 2017. Ogbonna et al.’s (2013) study found two categories of limitations that confront ECOWAS: trade, infrastructural and regulatory challenges on the one hand, and the challenges of governance, conflicts and socio-­ culture on the other hand. From the aspect of the former, the trade factor and the economy of member states, financial sector disparities and poor payment system as well as infrastructure and regulatory regime further represent specific issues. Lack of political will, challenges of corruption and political instability, socio-cultural challenges emanating from colonial hang-over, the absence of integration culture and duplicity of regional organizations among member states constitute the latter. The various challenges combine to result in a situation where: Infrastructure, which should be a rudimentary fuel to development, is at its worst state in the community. Inter and intra-regional railings, road networks, energy, telecommunication facilities as well as expedient border ancillaries is still at an uncomfortable state. In the areas of telecommunication, ECOWAS’s proposed fused telecom network  – which will link the entire region is still an optical illusion as inter regional calls are charged at international rate while commuters bear the rage of roam tariff/charges. A modernized and expanded network which would have a direct bearing on business activities and trade is yet to be achieved. (Ogbonna et al. 2013, 107)

Nevertheless, the story is not all gloom as empirical evidence demonstrates relative gains that ECOWAS has achieved in important areas. These include:

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Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services (and citizens’ right of residence and establishment); the Community Passport (abolishing national visas in place of an ECOWAS-wide visa); the Community Biometric Identity Card (which abolished the need for a residency permit among member states); the Community Levy for financing regional integration; the self-­ financing and deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) since 1990 and the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and currently Guinea-Bissau; the development of many sectoral community policies and plans; and harmonized regional development policies. (Momodu 2018, 96)

The single passport enables citizens to travel across the sub-region without a visa. This represents “a great achievement in a region that has one of the most difficult visa regimes in the world” (Oloruntoba 2016a, 300). The gains of ECOWAS are also clear in the aspect of security and conflict management where the organization is credited with creating Africa’s “first truly robust interstate collective security regime” (Warner 2018, 11), starting with the 1990 intervention in Liberia. Remarkably, the AU has adopted a similar approach to peace initiatives (Warner 2018). Politically, ECOWAS continues to make progress through the establishment of relevant institutions such as the Community Parliament, Court of Justice, Bank for Investment and Development and West African Health Organization (Oloruntoba 2016a, b). These are factors that resulted in the tagging of ECOWAS as “one of the most successful regional groupings in Africa” (Abati 2018). Subsequently, we discuss the frameworks on RIA in Africa as captured in existing agreements vis-à-vis the Moroccan question.

Existing RIAs, Agreements and Plausibility of Morocco’s ECOWAS Membership As mentioned earlier, in terms of efforts at integration, the AEC represents Africa’s ambitious vision of an integrated continent, to be achieved in successive incremental stages in the years leading up to 2028. The framework guiding the AEC is the Abuja Treaty championed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU, the predecessor body to the AU). The Treaty builds on the Council of Ministers Resolution/Res 464 (XXVI) of the OAU, 1976, which divides Africa into five geo-political regions: Northern, Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The Heads of State and Government of 51 OAU member states built on this

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resolution by recognizing eight existing RIAs across the five regions as the building blocks of an AEC. As Thonke and Spliid (2012, 46) put it, “the idea is that the eight blocks should develop into regional economic and monetary unions, and thereafter harmonise into a single continental community”. Among the eight RIAs, or regional economic communities (RECs), so recognized are ECOWAS and the AMU. The AEC provides for 19 protocols to guide adherence of member countries. The provisions of the AEC and its ratification by subsequent regional bodies including the AU underscore the place of geography in the composition and activities of RIAs. As such, countries in West Africa are expected to channel their integration activities through ECOWAS. Although AMU did not ratify the AEC agreement, largely as a result of opposition from Morocco, countries in North Africa are expected to operate through the AMU. ECOWAS demonstrates this geographic orientation through Article 3 of the Revised Treaty: The aims of the Community are to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent. (ECOWAS 1993, 5)

The Revised Treaty differs from the founding Treaty which had stated that member states “shall be the States that ratify this Treaty and such other West African States as may accede to it”. As Touré (2017) argues, Cape Verde’s admission in 1976 to complete the list of all West African states made it unnecessary to include the strict criterion of geography in the Revised Treaty. The reference to West Africa as the focal point in the Revised Treaty, however, in simplistic terms, makes Moroccan membership “geographically and legally anathematic” (Pine 2017, 2). A similar situation had presented itself in 2012, when Sudan applied for membership of the East African Community (EAC), one of the eight RIAs recognized by the AU through the AEC. Sudan had applied almost at the same time as South Sudan. Whereas South Sudan’s application followed a ­process until it was formalized in 2016 as the sixth EAC member, Sudan’s desire was rejected because the country does not share a direct border with any EAC member state. The organization had relied on the provisions of its treaty which spelt out the requirement of geographic contiguity for membership (Thonke and Spliid 2012).

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Morocco and ECOWAS: Added Economic Utility or Unnecessary Encroachment? Evidently, ECOWAS has exuded mixed success in its operations. This necessitates further adjustments and reforms in its various processes and organs. Although the various provisions guiding its operations make little or no room for the kind of accession Morocco desires, it is still worth exploring the likely implications of such, especially for the quests at surmounting the stated economic challenges of the sub-region. This is basic to the understanding of the economic motives of integration, and the possibility of a spill-over to the socio-cultural and political aspects, as argued by some integrationists. As noted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2017), West Africa’s economic growth rate fell from 4.4 per cent in 2015 to 0.1 per cent in 2016, making it the slowest in Africa. This was largely as a result of excessive reliance on the Nigerian economy which also suffered serious decline (1.6 per cent contraction) within the same period. Morocco’s economy grew by 1.7 per cent in the same period. We begin by looking at the economic strength of member states vis-à-­ vis Morocco and selected countries across various regions. As the data in Table  6.1 show, member states of ECOWAS are among the most economically disadvantaged countries in the world. Including Nigeria, the largest economy in Africa, ECOWAS’ combined GDP of US$640.25 billion only constitutes just over half of the GDP of Spain, Europe’s sixth biggest economy as well as Morocco’s top export destination and import origin. The data support the impression put forward by Ogbonna et al. (2013) that 11 of the ECOWAS members are regarded as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with underwhelming per capita income. Intra-­ ECOWAS exports is 10.6 per cent as against 89.4 per cent with the rest of the world; imports stood at 9.4 per cent as against 90.6 per cent with the rest of the world (UNCTADstats 2018). Thus, to what extent can Morocco’s membership enlarge the combined economy of the bloc and promote intra-regional trade? The data presented in Table  6.1 further indicate that Morocco’s US$100.36 billion economy ranks only behind Nigeria’s US$494.58 billion economy and will help raise the combined economy by 15.7 per cent to US$740.6 billion. When viewed in terms of GDP per capita, measured by dividing the GDP by total population to show a country’s economic output that accounts for its number of people, Morocco’s US$2919 ranks above every individual ECOWAS member state, and will help raise the figure for the bloc by 5.4 per cent.

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Table 6.1  Key economic indicators of ECOWAS members vis-à-vis Morocco Country

Area (KM2)

Population (thousands)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Benin 114,763 11,176 Burkina Faso 272,967 19,193 Cape Verde 4033 546 Gambia 11,295 2101 Ghana 238,537 28,834 Guinea 245,857 12,717 Guinea-Bissau 36,125 1861 Ivory Coast 322,463 24,295 Liberia 111,369 4732 Mali 1,240,192 18,542 Niger 1,267,000 21,477 Nigeria 923,768 190,886 Senegal 196,712 15,851 Sierra Leone 72,300 7557 Togo 56,785 7798 Morocco 446, 550 35,740 Total without 5,114,166 367,566 Morocco Total with 5,560,716 403,306 Morocco Spain 505,944 46,354 Germany 357,376 82,114 South Korea 100,284 50,982 Malaysia 330,323 31,624 United States 9,833,517 324,460 China 9,600,000 1,409,517 India 3,287,263 1,339,180

Nominal GDP per International GDP (in capita trade balance million US$) (US$) (exports–imports, million US$) 8476 11,065 1603 942 37,156 8875 978 32,076 2053 13,100 7143 494,583 13,633 4483 4086 100,359 640,252

779.1 611.1 3082 473.2 1355 703.9 530 1412 455.9 744.3 359 2714 901.1 694.8 559.4 2919 1741.9

−2220 −1680 −455 −439 −4718 −329 673 2281 −86 520 −933 67,551 −2838 −492 −1001 −18,838 55,834

740,611

1836.4

36,996

1,192,955 3,363,600 1,377,873 296,284 18,036,648 11,158,457 2,116,239

25,865.4 41,686.2 27,396.7 9768.4 56,053.8 8109.1 1614.2

−20,762 280,080 89,236 21,039 −796,494 530,285 −96,378

Source: United Nations Data (2018; data.un.org)

As the data further show, Morocco is a largely importing country with a net trade balance of US$ -18.83 billion, far less than any ECOWAS member state. This could represent opportunities and challenges vis-à-vis intra-regional trading relations if Morocco joins ECOWAS.  Morocco sends 64 per cent of its exports to Europe, 16 per cent to Asia and a paltry 9.9 per cent to Africa. Likewise, 61 per cent of its imports originate from Europe, 25 per cent from Asia and only 4.1 per cent from Africa (OEC

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2018). However, Morocco’s trade relations with the rest of Africa have been on the increase. The country is the second largest African investor in Africa after South Africa; it is also the largest investor in the ECOWAS region, with its exports to West Africa tripling from 2006 to 2016 (EL Khattabi and Karim 2018; Touré 2017). Between 2008 and 2016, its intra-African exports grew an average of 9 per cent every year, while foreign direct investment (FDI) rose by 4.4 per cent; ECOWAS members such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria are among the highest importers of Moroccan goods (Fabiani 2018). Membership of ECOWAS could help give a supranational voice that further leverages on these in ways that could significantly improve on the poor state of intra-African trade. Morocco could also help provide a platform for diversification, away from the Nigeria-centric focus on oil, to other products including foodstuffs, machinery and chemical goods. Other arguments have emerged to counter the narrative on the economic logic. It is claimed that Morocco’s status as an associate of the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could translate into European companies setting up firms in Morocco to enjoy duty-free export to West Africa as provided for in the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS Treaty). This, it is argued, poses threats to the sustainability of businesses in a zone of largely uncompetitive economies and “consumption and import than production and export” (EL Khattabi and Karim 2018, 106). The ‘dumping ground’ argument is clearly demonstrated in the actions of two ECOWAS member states, including Nigeria, that have yet to ratify the European Partnership Agreement (EPA) aimed at facilitating trade between the EU and ECOWAS. The EPA, signed in July 2014, grants the EU 75 per cent access to the ECOWAS markets in exchange for full access to European markets, except for exports of rice and sugar (Rowden 2014). It is contended that admitting Morocco would translate to dragging the entire sub-region into the EPA by other means. These arguments wane in logic and utility as Africa continues to make advancements with the signing and ratification of the Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement.  When the processes are finally completed, AfCFTA will facilitate a single market for goods and services and free movement of people and investments among African countries, including Morocco and ECOWAS member states (Akonor 2018). Beyond economic consideration, there are arguments on the security implications of admitting Morocco (see Odinkalu 2018). It is claimed that the country’s rich history of faith, trade and demography with entities in

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West Africa could help ECOWAS leverage Morocco’s expertise, security and faith-based networks in the fight against deadly extremist organizations as represented by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram, which continue to constitute overwhelming threats to the sub-region. The advantage that religious networks could bring in counter-­ terror capabilities, when viewed in this context, runs contrary to other opinions that application for membership is in continuation of the drive towards “total Islamisation of Africa”, as other Arab countries will leverage on a Moroccan success to also seek full membership and subsequently dominate proceedings (Elegbede 2017). The next section considers how Moroccan membership could alter power configurations within ECOWAS and the sub-region.

Regional Hegemonic Contention and Morocco’s Quest: State Versus Non-state Preferences The new drive in Morocco’s pan-African engagement found expression in the adoption of a new constitution in 2011. The new constitution prioritizes a foreign policy drive that gives prominence to sub-Saharan Africa (Nickels 2013). This resonates in its activities through RIAs such as Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD, which it currently drives in the aftermath of the demise of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi), its return to the AU in 2017 (it had severed relations with the AU for more than 32 years) and its desire for membership of ECOWAS. Traditionally, Morocco belongs to, and houses the headquarters of, the AMU. The North African organization, which also has Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania as members, has been “the least advanced regional organisation of the formally recognized communities” (Thonke and Spliid 2012, 49), largely because of political and economic disputes between Morocco and Algeria, including issues of Western Sahara. Algeria supports formal independence of Western Sahara whereas Morocco continues to claim superintendence over the disputed territory. Morocco’s history of controversial multilateral engagements across Africa, including the Western Sahara question, activities within and with the AU, and relations with its neighbours and the larger AMU raise questions as to the propriety of its pan-African desires (Ibrahim 2017; Odinkalu 2018). As Pine (2017, 14) puts it, the country “has a reputation for fermenting trouble”. It has also been argued that Moroccan membership of

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ECOWAS poses significant threats to Nigeria’s position in the bloc as the North African country constitutes: a major assault on Nigeria’s diplomatic credentials and leadership position as a West African regional power. Nigeria has been at the forefront of an Afrocentric, anticolonial, anti-imperial, progressive and dynamic foreign policy. This foreign policy posture runs contrary to that of Morocco that is oriented towards the industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Asia and decidedly imperialistic as in the case of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic that prompted Morocco’s exit from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984. … By proposing to join ECOWAS, Morocco appears to be positioning itself more strategically to engage Nigeria. (Pine 2017, 2–3)

Impressions like the one highlighted in the foregoing have resulted in situations where in influential countries like Senegal and Nigeria, a plethora of non-state actors, including the organized private sector, labour leaders and leading diplomats, oppose the desire on economic and political grounds. In addition to how it could negatively affect local industries and locally made products in Nigeria’s ailing economy, the arguments proceed, on political grounds, as to how it could significantly affect Nigeria’s long held hegemonic prominence. It then becomes essential to discuss the political implications of a Moroccan membership of ECOWAS for existing power relations. In addition to being a major founding partner, Nigeria has operated as West Africa’s “swing state” (McNamee 2016) as well as the economic and political storehouse of ECOWAS (Akinyemi 2017; Obi 2018; Odinkalu 2018). The sheer weight of the country across different indicators, as reflected in Table 6.2, makes it the hegemon with which no other country in the sub-region, and very few in Africa, can compete. As alluded to by Obi (2018, 314), Nigeria’s activities within ECOWAS have been mainly premised on the notion that integration is critical in order “to reduce economic dependence on external powers and to bind the countries of the sub-region closer together, with attendant security benefits”. Nigeria has demonstrated this by providing leadership and resources to facilitate ECOWAS’ home-grown and African-led peace initiatives, starting with the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises in the 1990s. Nigeria has been a lead contributor and influencer in ECOWAS’ much vaunted “sophisticated mediation, peace, and security institutions” (Obi 2018, 316). As noted by Udo and Ekott (2013):

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Table 6.2  Overview of Nigeria’s economic influence in ECOWAS Population (thousands) ECOWAS without Nigeria Nigeria Total Percentage of Nigeria’s strength

Nominal GDP GDP per capita (in million US$) (US$)

176,680

145,669

190,886 367,566 51.93%

494,583 640,252 77.25%

824.5 2591 1741.9 –

International trade balance (exports– imports, million US$) −11,717 67,551 55,834 121%

Source: United Nations Data (2018; data.un.org); GDP Per Capita calculated by author from GDP and Population figures

Between 2003 and 2011 …, Nigeria contributed $918.7 million (N138 billion) to the running of the Community, followed at a distance by Ghana at $225.7 million (N34 billion), and Cote D’Ivoire at $107.5 million (N16.1 billion). For years, Nigeria’s funding to the 15-member body stood at three to six times what other nations contributed. That ratio rose recently to over 60 per cent of ECOWAS’ total revenues, with the introduction of community levies, according to data showing annual state-wide contributions. Even so, Nigeria hosts three of ECOWAS’ institutions  – the Commission, the Court and Parliament.

Beyond figures, Nigeria possesses “the military and economic resources as well as the international political support to act as an effective hegemon” (Adebajo 2008, 14) within ECOWAS; the country has equally contributed functional, structural and relational responsibilities to the organization (Oloruntoba and Gumede 2016). Over the years, however, there has been a pragmatic shift in Nigeria’s multilateral engagements with and within ECOWAS, away from spending and direct security intervention to reforms, as demonstrated in democratic norms and peace building (Table 6.3). Nigeria had contributed an estimated 70 per cent of ECOWAS’ finances; however, the country’s activities in the bloc has been “a mix of hits and misses” (Obi 2018, 322). There is considerable debate as to the extent to which the country has translated its huge engagements with ECOWAS member states into any actual influence within the sub-region (see, for instance, Warner 2018; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). Thus, actors have argued for the need to

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Table 6.3  Comparing key economic indicators of Nigeria and Morocco Country

Area (KM2)

1 Nigeria 923,768 2 Morocco 446,550

Population (thousands)

Nominal GDP (in million US$)

GDP per capita (US$)

International trade balance (exports– imports, million US$)

190,886 35,740

494,583 100,359

2714 2919

67,551 −18,838

Source: United Nations Data (2018; data.un.org)

safeguard Nigeria’s prevailing state of influence while further advancing hegemonic credentials. This has been a major plank from which Nigerian non-state actors vehemently argue for the prevention, with all possible capabilities, of Morocco’s intrusion into ECOWAS; this, they argue, will further erode Nigeria’s powers vis-à-vis other demerits. According to the president of Nigeria’s main labour union, the Nigeria Labour Congress, Ayuba Wabba: Our concern in the NLC is that Morocco has a record of quarrelling with its neighbours and even the entire continent. That’s why it stayed away from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), later AU for over 30 years. Similarly, we cannot be hobnobbing with a monarchy which is against the wish of the international community, the UN and the AU. To be specific, Morocco has continued to illegally occupy Western Sahara, and is holding it as a colony. (Nwagwu 2017)

While Wabba’s view would appear to be broadly focused, the Association of Retired Career Ambassadors of Nigeria (ARCAN) was more ­Nigerian-­centric. According to the Chairman of the body, John Shinkanye, admitting Morocco would: constitute serious challenges for peace and will particularly affect the current regional efforts to fight and defeat terrorism [it will be] one of the most humiliating moments of [Nigeria’s] foreign policy since Independence. … free movement of people, goods and services will further open up the corridor between North and West Africa to the proliferation of small arm weapons, human trafficking, increased nefarious terrorists and other non-state actors. (Anumba-Khaleel 2017)

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From among business interests in Nigeria, opposition also mounts against the idea. The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) argued that admitting Morocco would have negative effect on the drive towards economic diversification and the promotion of home-made goods. Similar perceptions of negative implications for Nigeria have also been expressed by top diplomats. According to Akinyemi (2017), admitting Morocco would undermine Nigeria’s influence as Nigeria’s status as a regional power is facilitated by its role in ECOWAS: When elective and appointive posts and resources are being allocated by international institutions, does Morocco now benefit from the West Africa quota? This is not just a theoretical issue. Elections to seats at the Security Council, the World Court, various Commissions of the United Nations are distributed on regional basis. Morocco, as a member of Arab League, will benefit from the Arab League quota, and then have another bite at the West African quota, without other West African states benefitting from Arab quota. (Akinyemi 2017, 14)

Similar views are expressed by a former Commonwealth Secretary-­General, Emeka Anyaoku: With the prospect of Morocco joining the ECOWAS, Nigeria would be risking a diminished influence in the sub region; it would also be opening itself up to Morocco’s inevitable determination to get its pound of flesh following Nigeria’s role in the admission of Western Sahara into the OAU/AU. And this is not to talk about the adverse economic consequences for Nigeria from Morocco’s membership of ECOWAS. (As quoted in James [2017])

The foregoing summarizes opposition on the part of non-state actors to the admission of Morocco. The anti-Morocco views are different from the ones expressed by some state actors in and outside Nigeria. Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, has been quoted as saying that Morocco’s accession would translate to economic benefits for Nigeria and the sub-region: “the reality is that trade with Morocco has been increasing, both with ECOWAS and Nigeria. So, we are looking at more trade, which will be a win-win for us … There are laws and rules in international trade that prevent dumping of goods or easy access to other markets. It is not something that will happen easily that the EU will dump goods here” (Elegbede 2017). Some other top state officials in the sub-­ region, including President Sall of Senegal and his Minister in charge of

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Budget, Ivorian Minister of Finance and Burkina Faso’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, have also expressed support for Morocco’s candidacy (Lahsini 2017; Salau 2017; The Punch 2017). There is also some contention as to the democratic credentials of Morocco and how admitting the country could reverse the role that Nigeria has played in promoting the enthronement of democracy in the sub-region. As Ibrahim (2017) noted, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance commits ECOWAS member states to democratic tenets and principles, including the prevention of the removal of term limits by heads of government. ‘Authoritarian’ Morocco, it is argued, may find it difficult to fit into the existing framework. However, this argument suffers limitations when put side by side with the 2011 constitutional reforms which transformed Morocco into a unitary parliamentary constitutional democracy with limited powers for the monarch. Morocco’s path towards institutionalizing democracy is evident in surveys of globally acclaimed think tanks. Among ECOWAS member states, only Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin and Liberia ranked above Morocco in the 2017 Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit. In fact, Morocco had the same score, “4.41”, as Nigeria in the aspect of civil liberties, better than five ECOWAS member states: Ivory Coast (4.12), Togo (3.53), Gambia, Guinea (2.94) and Guinea-Bissau (2.35). Only Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia and Benin were adjudged to be doing better than Morocco in the aspect of political participation among citizens (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017). Similarly, Morocco was ranked as “partly free” in Freedom in the World Annual Survey for 2018; 11 ECOWAS member states were likewise classified with only Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal rated higher as “free” (Freedom House 2018). Morocco has the same score, “5”, as Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria with respect to political rights.

Conclusion: Should Morocco Be Admitted into ECOWAS? Indeed, there exists a plethora of points and arguments in favour of, and against, Morocco’s desire to join ECOWAS.  But how do the roles of actors fit into the narrative? As theorists of intergovernmentalism would argue, state actors as represented by governments and their officials are important in steering the process of integration in accordance with their

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desires. State actors will only steer integration efforts if it aligns with their national interests. In this context, as can be deduced from the views expressed by state actors across influential member countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the preponderant perception is that admitting Morocco would pose no significant threats to the member states. The views expressed show that state actors place priority on how the sub-region would leverage the economic benefits that admitting Morocco could bring. Importantly, liberal intergovernmentalism explains the situation in Nigeria and Senegal, where non-state, largely economic interests are stoutly against allowing Moroccan incursion into ECOWAS. The contention between state and non-state preferences again brings to the fore the question of how citizen interests and views get factored into actions of states in bilateral and multilateral engagements. It remains to be seen how the sub-regional hegemon would negotiate the quandary in articulating its intra-ECOWAS bargaining. Perhaps, the major implications of the Moroccan question lie with the hegemonic stability theory. The reservations expressed by non-state actors partly rest on the perceived threat it poses to Nigeria’s influence in the region. This leaves Nigeria, as the region’s demographic, economic and political hegemon, on a perch. Outright and overt rejection of Morocco’s desire could have implications for the burgeoning Nigeria-Morocco relations, which has seen Nigeria supplying more than half of Moroccan imports from West Africa since 2008 (EL Khattabi and Karim 2018), among other bilateral engagements; it could also raise suspicions among other ECOWAS member states on Nigeria’s motives for such a position. It also remains to be seen if ECOWAS can shut out Morocco mainly on account of opposition from Nigeria. If this does not happen and ECOWAS admits Morocco, it will, for Nigeria, in turn, translate to a manifestation of what Adebajo (2008, 14) calls “hegemony on a shoestring”. It will further extend the impression already held by many in diplomatic circles of the weakening nature of Nigeria’s influence, as shown by the inability of the country to prevent ECOWAS from signing the EPA with the EU. As we have demonstrated with respect to various dimensions of the motives for integration and the place of actors, Morocco’s desire to join ECOWAS is largely problematic. In addition to the geographic and legal arguments which obviously forbid such Afro-imperialist advancement, bilateral engagements between Morocco and individual member states of ECOWAS on economic and other grounds can proceed without necessarily infringing on existing RIAs on the continent. On the multilateral level,

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ECOWAS as a bloc can further explore economic and politico-strategic benefits by also engaging Morocco in ways that help advance intra-regional trade, African-wide integration efforts and development.

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Rowden, R. (2014). Africa’s free trade hangover. http://foreignpolicy. com/2014/08/07/africas-free-trade-hangover/ Sako, S. (2006). Challenges facing African economic communities in capacity building. The African Capacity Building Foundation. Occasional Paper No. 5. Salau, A. (2017, July 13). Whose gain is Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS? Daily Trust Newspaper. https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/205261.html Strange, S. (1987). The persistent myth of lost hegemony. International Organization, 41, 560–575. Tavares, R., & Tang, V. (2011). Regional economic integration in Africa: Impediments to progress? South African Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 217–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2011.588826. The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2017). Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack. London/New York/Hong Kong: The Economist Intelligence Unit. The Punch. (2017, June 2). Burkina Faso welcomes Morocco’s bid to join ECOWAS. https://punchng.com/burkina-faso-welcomes-moroccos-bid-tojoin-ecowas/amp/ Thonke, O., & Spliid, A. (2012). What to expect from regional integration in Africa. African Security Review, 21(1), 42–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/102 46029.2011.629452. Touré, O. (2017). The accession of the kingdom of Morocco to the economic community of West African states  – ECOWAS. http://waiiao.ecowas.int/index. php/en/news-2017/281-the-accession-of-the-kingdom-of-morocco-tothe-economic-community-of-west-african-states Udo, B., & Ekott, I. (2013, February 4). Nigeria, ECOWAS’ largest donor, continually outsmarted by smaller West-African countries. Premium Times. http:// premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html UNCTADStats. (2018). http://unctadstat.unctad.org United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2017). Economic report on Africa 2017: Urbanization and industrialization for Africa’s transformation. Addis Ababa: UNECA. Warner, J. (2018). Introduction: African foreign policies and international organizations: The view from the twenty-first century. In J. Warner & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), African foreign policies in international institutions (pp.  1–18). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wigström, C. W. (2013). Beyond theatre regionalism: When does formal economic integration work in Africa? PhD thesis, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

CHAPTER 7

The Red Herring of Identity in Africa: Using Identity Conflicts to Capture State Power and Inculcate Economic Avarice in the Central African Republic Wendy Isaacs-Martin

Introduction The unlawful extraction of resources in Africa is commonplace. The post-­Cold War environment resulted in the loss of patronage finance that allowed for political leaders, specifically presidents, to maintain political control through the ‘purchase’ of allies in rural areas, neighbouring provinces/prefectures and other countries. Rather than attempt to gain the political support of the electorate, leaders found it easier to bypass voters than to deliver on services and opportunities that would strengthen state institutions and perceptions of good governance (Fanon 1963: 150). Instead creating patronage relations, and the use of ethnic affiliations, are much easier to sustain with external funds. However the end of the Cold War in 1991 resulted in the dramatic reduction of funds

W. Isaacs-Martin (*) Archie Mafeje Research Institute at UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_7

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available to governments firstly in terms of political alliance and, secondly, the ideology had moved from east-west aggression politics to one focused on growth that saw a move away from entrusting the state with social-communal decisions to rural ethnicity-based communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Geschiere 2009: 78–80). It has led to former clients of political leaders now being acknowledged, by external interests and stakeholders, and providing them with new opportunities for recognition as local political leaders as well as an alternative revenue for enrichment. Further, this grants external stakeholders an opportunity to bypass the central government, in order to gain traction in accessing natural resources. Such opportunities allow clients of former government patrons to determine the development of, and therefore new political patronage structures within, their areas (Adrien-Rongier 1981: 99). Issues of identity provide legitimacy to claims of and demands for stature, access to resources and ownership of certain assets. Control over and access to natural resources  impact the national and domestic economies through corruption, leading to illegitimate  claims to power and the erosion of state institutions. Instead poor unethical government, external stakeholders, ease of access to natural resources and finally the manipulation of identities as it relates to autochthony and collective national cohesion create a predatory environment of self-enrichment particularly in fragile and failing states such as the CAR. The CAR is a country, once having little strategic relevance, that is currently embroiled in recurring violence and conflict between warlords, communities, militias, rebels, soldiers, ex-soldiers and bandits (Lombard, 2016b). The country has lapsed into cycles of violence and equally cycles of ineffective and seldom applied peace agreements. These peace agreements meant to stabilise the state institutions in order to return sociopolitical stability to allow for economic stipulation and eventually social development allow for preferential treatment of warring parties and the exclusion of lesser significant warlords and combatants where both instances lead to further violence. Such bureaucratic bungling, intentional or not, leads the country and its neighbours into political instability and eventual chaos, as the state is unable to fulfil its role and protect the territory. Can there be viability for such a fragile state, particularly in relation to the Weberian notion of the ideal-type state and the developmental state historically? Is it reasonable to expect a state that was hastily constructed

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largely absent of the self-deterministic perspective of collective identity and historical experience to be successful, particularly from its former colonial power, France? We interrogate the ideal-type state of CAR to illustrate why the various stakeholders are intent on supporting this framework. The argument presented here is that news of ethnic conflicts in CAR is a partial red herring because defining conflicts as such is a simplistic approach to analysing any violence in Africa. Secondly such reporting directs attention away from complex dynamics that are economic, political and social, and often driven externally. This leads to misunderstanding the intentions of external stakeholders with regard to their narrowed interests that often differ significantly from the national development of the targeted state (Pouligny 2004). Finally, ongoing violence rooted in ethnicity, as reported by mainstream media, conveys an indirect message that normalises such conflicts within these environments to the extent that readers are desensitised and eventually lose interest. As a consequence, waves of violence are accepted without question, or further investigation, within this limited definition of ethnic conflict, and this desensitisation results in other actions being overlooked in favour of simplistic bipartisan violence. The mainstream media regards African conflict as simplistically bipartisan—conflict as violence between two dominant ethnic groups that are diametrically opposed ideologically and represented nationally. The nuances of the conflict are ignored; for example, other minorities are not included in the narrative. Rather than explore complexities in conflict, issues are reduced to identity located in a broad perspective to the exclusion of complex engagements. The economic exploitation of Africa has been written about as a universal singular experience that is often unrelated to violence in the various states. African experiences of violence are presented in a monolithic narrative in which conflict is reducible to ethnic strife. This distracts from other factors that are often primary reasons for violence where rightfully identity violence becomes secondary. Attention is directed away from economic, political and social complex relationships. Those reporting on ethnic identity seldom refer to the link between economic and business interests and the role of political leadership, bureaucracies and these influences on communities and greater society. Instead a focus is placed on warlords with direct access to resources rather than peace establishment and effective state building. External stakeholders help during peace processes but seldom are their interests interrogated. Within an environment of diplomats, international non-governmental

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organisations (INGOs) that have large internationally based budgets and often their own ideological initiatives, government employees, contractors and consultants each serve their own interests, which are often not complementary (Isaacs-Martin 2015: 30–31). Ongoing violence is linked to war economies and is often ignored in lieu of fixation on the binary ethnic conflict. Without understanding the complexities of conflict, the insistence that the state is separate from the violence and that conflict is only ethnic and localised reflects a failure to consider the intertwined socio-political and economic relations of poverty, misrule and marginalisation. Rather than identifying various groups as actors, it is the relations between these groups that give rise to violence, highlighting material inequalities, social hierarchies and uncertainties. While the findings in a single country, such as the CAR, cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the continent, there are patterns of similarities. The claim is that many African states only declined significantly after the Cold War but this in itself created an economic incentive for NGOs and other external stakeholders who can only exist when linked directly to state structures. The state becomes the concept upon which all the issues raised are located but which has little direction, resources and ideology. Therefore, to focus exclusively on ethnic violence is disingenuous and simplistic and excludes a myriad of actors that are economically benefitting from the strife in CAR and many other African states. The conclusion drawn is that economic incentives ranging from private security in various forms, humanitarian programmes, diplomatic consulting, state-­ bureaucratic outsourcing and civilian desperation all depend on CAR being a fragile state with poor management, large displaced populations and ongoing violence.

Bipartisan Conflict and the Ongoing Violence in CAR The violence demonstrated in the CAR is a cyclical process located in the inadequate management of the state structure. Since its independence in 1960, the CAR is a country perceived to have little strategic or economic significance in comparison to its neighbours. Landlocked with little, yet ineffective, institutional structures resulted in a persistent slide into illiberal behaviours. This was further mired by the lack of resources, human and financial, to effectively sustain state institutions. Rather than attempt to maintain these structures that would require significant financial resources that the state was and remains unable to generate, the political leadership sought to guard their personal positions to guarantee

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­concessions (Azam 2002: 142). Few people benefit from state largesse and identity politics, in order to restrict access, became a norm. This disintegration into identity politics, a ploy well-recognised by the French, in a country that formerly did not possess strong social cohesion or collective identity, became useful for certain interest groups. Since independence, all of CAR’s leaders were military personnel with little experience in understanding state bureaucracies and its efficiencies (Coleman 2016). This has resulted in an underdeveloped country with little, and failing, infrastructure and a high level of unemployment. Secondly an inability to develop the infrastructure and the economy has left the country with a poorly educated workforce and high social instability. This instability is located in tensions created by strongmen wishing to usurp political power and largesse but, equally, it has created a war economy in which citizens, and refugees, participate to secure a modicum of financial stability. Many individuals join the various militias in order to gain access to resources, particularly weapons that can assist them with personal security and to extort resources from civilians. Each government is faced with the challenge of restructuring the armed forces and its influence over the government. Disarming troops and rebel groups have proved very difficult for political leaders in order to curtail rebellions and reduce overall criminality. Money that is often pledged to the country, by external stakeholders, is instead directed and misused to prevent mutinies and pay civil servants rather than for infrastructural and economic development (Coleman 2016: 26–40). Government mismanagement is a persistent problem even during periods of relative political stability. Unemployed soldiers are problematic to the stability of governments and socio-political spaces. However, pledges made by stakeholders seldom materialise or when they do, it comes too late. Often soldiers and rebels return to arms to sustain themselves (re)joining militias and armed bandits (zaraguistas). These pledges are made during peace agreements, of which there are numerous made, often only including warlords who are powerful and have access to resources to the exclusion of many smaller parties who were active in the violence but not as influential (Pouligny 2004: 14–20). This creates a scenario in which excluded parties feel aggrieved and they return to fighting. While stakeholders perceive the peace agreements as an opportunity to return the country to peace and stability, the warlords and their fighters are seeking access to government leadership, natural resources that can be extracted and ordinary fighting seeking state employment. What was evident from the funding promises were that if the larger donors,

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such as the United States, did not contribute the funds then neither did others. Therefore, little of any of the promised funds would be collected and the various promises made in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes couldn’t be achieved. Due to the lack of financial assistance, economic recovery could not take place and the issue of renegade soldiers involved in criminal activity becomes a problem in terms of stability. Although leaders such as Patasse were elected peacefully, there is a belief amongst stakeholders that this always leads to renewed violence (Pouligny 2004: 36–38). This is due to opposition forces seeking access to the leadership themselves, belief that the elections were unfair or simply refusing to acknowledge the electoral process (Isaacs-Martin 2016: 26). For many it is a simpler process to use violence to accomplish aims, particularly if they wish to bypass popular support (Isaacs-Martin 2015: 27). Violence against civilians is commonplace, particularly from militias targeting who they perceive as supporters and then reprisals are taken against other groups of civilians. Often these militias are composed of foreign soldiers and fighters, from Congo, Libya and Chad, adding to increased tensions amongst civilians. Many citizens, although it is not always easy to ascertain who is a citizen in the CAR.  The concept of state formation and thus creating national identity was centred around the common use of the Sango language that was instrumental to the French administrators’ economic facilitation of the area. Due to the diversity of the country, it was considered easier to communicate in Sango rather than focus on educating Central Africans in French (Lombard 2016a, b: 56–62). In time, this led to perceived national social cohesion in terms of citizenship and led to the exclusion or suspicion of others. Particularly Muslims are considered outsiders that leads to further resentment as most are involved in the limited legitimate commerce in CAR. Universally, a state is defined in terms of a nation—singular as a cultural entity of shared religious and linguistic experience bounded by historical experience. Often, minorities within this socio-political space are regarded as marginal to the majority experience and viewed with suspicion. There is a common perception that Muslims, even if they have lived in the country for generations, are outsiders and work against the majority of citizens, leading to communal tensions and hostilities. The role of NGOs, external stakeholders and regional governments all operate within the context of the state to further their own agendas and not necessarily that of the CAR. While it may appear as if there is a com-

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monality in their objectives and aims, this is often an erroneous assumption. Each institution is answerable to its own executive and carries out its mandate independent of others. In irony, these initiatives seldom take the wellbeing of the civilians into account, and it often becomes a situation of appearing to do something within the global context. In the same vein. many citizens perceive that stakeholders offer them financial opportunities, in an environment in which resources and employment opportunities are scarce, coupled with corrupt administrators who wish to profit off any assistance. Those seeking to secure or maintain power learnt that coercion is more effective than elections; even if they are likely to be unsuccessful at the ballot, it is easier to utilise armed groups to challenge existing leadership. There is a consistent pattern of ‘leaders’ who have often been state employees and, overwhelmingly in the military, who have access to soldiers and rebel groups. Secondly, many have links in the rural areas where strongmen have greater influence than the government. In these areas, often and isolated from the administrative capital of Bangui, the government is considered absent and disinterested in the wellbeing of the population. Instead, the position of the strongman has greater legitimacy for villagers than a president, as the ‘physical proximity’ allows them to access the individuals and, therefore, by extension, employment opportunities and resources. The strongman is able to recruit fighters from villages offering them an opportunity to earn money, as the ability to secure resources is scarce in not only the rural but equally the urban area. Aid groups often withdraw their services due to clashes between rebel groups and government forces. Another reason is that these armed groups often hinder the services provided by the humanitarian agencies through theft and extortion of, and physical threats to, their staff. The staff, along with volunteers, are vulnerable to kidnapping by armed groups that claim that they want to force the government of France or the governments of Chad, Sudan and other regional countries to enter into negotiations with them. Whether this is true is debatable as groups always claim to have ideological interests for their actions rather than simply criminal behaviour. Militias, particularly coalitions such as the Seleka and anti-Balaka, appear to be groups that act without direction. While Djotodia, leader of the Seleka, attempted to disband the group in September 2013, he did not appear to possess the authority to do so. The group continued to pillage and destroy property now fighting under the banner of ex-Seleka. From December 2013 renewed escalated violence plagued the CAR with both

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coalitions targeting civilians in ethnic-religious reprisals targeting peace-­ keepers as well. Djotodia exercised little control over the various groups under the Seleka  coalition or any influence  regarding  the anti-Balaka groups aligned to former President Bozize that were fighting each other. Unable to quell violence or offer any real solutions for the conflict, Djotodia was pressured to resign in January 2014. The French ambassador to the UN noted of the violence that was widespread throughout the country, ‘we knew that there was some inter-­ sectarian violence, but we didn’t forecast such deep ingrained hatred’ (Lombard 2016a, b: 65–68). The Seleka demanded at peace negotiations in 2014 that it wanted the ‘highly desirable positions of power for its key membership’ to eventually seek partition of the country between Muslims and Christians. The agreement was eventually signed by Bozize and Djotodia in April 2015 but was rejected by the interim president Samba-­ Panza who was overseeing another peace process in the CAR. One of the concerns of the violence in CAR is linked to historical economics and its link to cultural, and particularly religious, identities. The Weberian notion of transcending historical time is pertinent to understanding the manner in which the society (gesellschaft) linked to social action over community (gemeinschaft). For Weber the notion of how society behaves is salient to how communities behave and whether this determines net benefit (Banton 2007: 19–35). Part of the issue with the social groups that were formed in CAR often formed around those who benefited and those excluded. Much of identity construction is imitation of those who monopolise social power and others would imitate these behaviours, rejecting those who are not considered members—an aspect that is social rather than biological, according to Weber (Banton 2007: 22). While the country has experienced tensions throughout its existence, the post-2013 conflict between the Seleka and the anti-Balaka coalitions has reduced the country to a humanitarian disaster and a displaced population. Various militias, all loosely aligned, have sought to benefit from the instability and improve their access to resources and potential future employment. Leaders within these rebel groups do not have the same ambitions as the rank-and-file recruits. Those in leadership positions seek promotion to government posts and authority while the rank and file seek employment possibly within the military, as they lack the skills for other bureaucratic positions and the status that accompanies such permanent employment (Lombard 2016a, b: 75–81).

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State Structure and Economic Development The CAR is a country of poor economic growth due to its poor infrastructure, limited transport network and an unskilled workforce. Institutional structures remain problematic particularly the armed forces including the police who commit their own violations against the population. An inability to protect its borders and territory resulted in militias from neighbouring countries to commit atrocities as it happened in 2004 with the movement de liberation du Congo (MLC) from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The argument of the ideal-state can be found in several theoretical discourses ranging from the Weberian style ideal-type, the Marxian perspective of the super- and substructures to the pluralists who argue that government is not a single authority entity but is supported by economic interests who also exert influence over leadership and drive policy (Berger and Weber 2006: 201). Similarly, statists argue that government and the state are linked and cannot be separated, resulting in the formation of ruling class structures. For the purpose of the discussion here, we will interrogate the Weberian ideal of the state and why it remains problematic in the CAR. Africa, in general, and the CAR, in particular, faces the complications of enacting the legal requirements for state structures as laid out in European treaties such as the Peace of Westphalia—the treaties of Osnabruk and Munster, the Concert of Europe, the Paris Declaration, the League of Nations and the United Nations. These treaties all envisioned political structures in which communities would be free to associate in terms of religious, economic and property rights absent of the interference of Papal and Empire influence. Later treaties would recognise the sovereignty of states, the rights of self-determination for ethnic groups with a territorial claim and the right to use force (Dusza 1989: 75–76). In examining the Weberian notion of the ideal-type state, the CAR does not meet any of the prescribed criteria for an effectively run state. It does not have the monopoly on the use of violence within its territory; there is a constant challenge to its authority as the state; it lacks an accountable effective qualified bureaucracy and a meaningful constitution. While these are Weberian notions of the ideal-type state, Weber argued that his interpretation of the state, while being applied as an abstract here, was located in a time-space continuum. Weber argued that his interpretation of the state was ensconced in a particular historical social moment, set apart from any other social organisation as a political entity (Dusza 1989:

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100). While the state was a projection of the organised political Weber asserted that it did not have ‘universal validity’. Weber argued that in order for the state to function effectively, it is positioned upon an economic discourse (Lachmann 2007). Such synergy is reliant on a democratic discourse of liberalism. Weber had argued that control over authoritarian power through the curbs put in place by groups with similar or equal power and authority would lower attempt to personal political power and centralisation for the benefit of a single person (Dusza 1989: 83–87). This ‘control’ by other concerned parties, which Weber had identified as part of the elite, would go on to create competition within the state apparatus and put forward ideas that would benefit everyone within the bureaucratic structure while buoyed by the stable economic framework. Economic liberalisation is a challenge in Africa due to the lack of democratic institutions and its politically volatile environment that is exposed to constant threats to political leadership, coups and coup attempts and civil violence and disobedience (Maiangwa 2017). The conflict in the country is indicative of a social reality in which the political leadership is unconcerned over the interests of civilians and little interest in the economic development of the state. Instead much of the violence is geared towards personal interests of enrichment, and access to government gives legitimacy to this behaviour of avarice. One of the characteristics of a state is its ability to defend the territory within its borders. However, in states that rely heavily on patronage and clientelism, the base of centralised power is eroded and indirectly transferred to various entities within the country. In the rural areas, where the central government has little influence and control, local strongmen are paid to secure support for presidents through their traditional influential roles. These strongmen can purchase armaments, and expertise, by exchanging the natural resources in their area (Reno 1997: 166–168). The ability to secure resources and create economies of war is central to securing power and authority even if it is initially deemed illegal by the state apparatus. However, external stakeholders can accept warlords as presidents in what is perceived to be creating stability, and often control, over the armed groups participating in the conflict. Fragile states, while attempting to use the electoral process favoured by NGOs and foreign Western governments, the social reality and therefore voting patterns correspond to the ‘pre-national forms of ethnic awareness’ so ‘ethnicity-based groups of interest’ complete to access the political system (Klosowicz 2016: 33). The notion of legitimate political leadership

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and illegitimate militia, acting outside the state structure and its sole right to the use of violence within its sovereign borders, is strongly enmeshed in CAR politics. For example, in the 2011 elections, several of the candidates were militia leaders, such as Demaforth, leader of the Peoples Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), Wilite, leader of the Central African Republic Congress for Renewal (CCR), Ziguele, former prime minister and leader of the Liberation of the Central African Republic’s People (MLPC), and Patasse, former president and ex-leader of the MLPC. This pattern of using violence to secure political position can be viewed in the voting results for these militia leader candidates. During the 2010 elections, Patasse, Demaforth and Ziguele secured 20.1 percent, 2.72 percent and 6.46 percent of the vote respectively (www.countrywatch.com). By February 2011, they denounced the election results as a ‘massive fraud’ in which Bozize, himself a one-time militia leader, was re-­elected as president. Yet it reaffirms the perspective that if candidates are unsuccessful in their political ambitions, they immediately denounce the elections and threaten violence—a position which has proven to be a successful political ploy in CAR. Later in 2013, Djotodia, himself a civil servant in Patasse’s government would become the leader of the Seleka coalition, and temporarily becoming president in 2014 before stepping aside due to the insistence of external stakeholders. This behaviour represents a common pattern in CAR politics in which individuals who cannot secure success during elections, due to corrupt patterns or simply a lack of popularity, use violence and the threat of armed groups to secure political power. Elections were to be held in 2015 with the hope that this exercise in democracy would stabilise the country but this seems problematic. Yet the contenders for power seemed to be the same people who had launched coups and violence within the country since independence except now it was the sons of Kolingba and Bokassa and former ministers. For the 2016 elections those who declared candidacy were three former prime ministers and sons of former presidents. The largest concern in CAR centres on elections. Opposition groups complain that there is a rush to hold elections that only serve to benefit those currently in power. As the country is often experiencing violence, it is difficult to host completely peaceful elections. In 2010 one of the concerns raised by opposition parties was that lists took a long time to confirm and that disarmament programmes took time to implement and be effective (Coleman 2016). This is one area where international funding is required in order to host elections and is often not available or significantly less than promised.

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It also demonstrates an inability amongst leaders in the country to reconcile their intended role as political leaders of the government and guardians of the state. There appears to be little interest in the organs/ institutions of the state or the purpose for which they were created. Although there is much rhetoric in terms of returning the country to democracy, whatever that may entail, the wanton use of violence and terror against civilians reveals a different truth in which the accumulation of power and authority is linked to personal acquisition distinct from the concerned running/management of a territory. The desperation with which elections, and particularly parliamentary seats, are fought over reflects a particular opinion that rebel leaders and their supporters have with regard to the state structures. Securing these positions translates into a steady income, status in being employed within the state apparatus, and access to state resources which are seldom regulated and controlled effectively. For those who are unsuccessful in securing such positions, there is an expectation of being employed within the military—it is unlikely that many rank-and-file fighters have the ability to work within the bureaucratic structures. Failure to secure such employment usually results in the financial incentive from external stakeholders in the DDR programmes but as Lombard (2016a) and Pouligny (2004) argue that the delay in these funds or the over-expectation from former fighters leads to renewed violence, as fighters refuse to surrender their weapons. They argued that Bozize had not honoured a 2007 peace agreement in which they would receive funding and thus the claim was used to oust Bozize from power under the Seleka coalition (Isaacs-Martin 2015: 28). Although African leaders often ask their former colonial administrators for military assistance against armed rebellions but often there is a reluctance to involve themselves in African conflicts. While rebels in March 2014 had killed South African peacekeepers, the common defence is that the armed groups are fighting on behalf of the population and wish to return the country to democracy. While acting as Minister of Defence under the peace agreement Djotodia remained the leader of the Seleka coalition, which was capturing towns while looting and destroying property. Regardless of the violence and the undermining of the state, the international community including the African Union were overwhelmingly concerned about holding new elections without addressing the reasons for the continuing violence and instability in the country.

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Rebellions lead to a crisis of government leading to various interest groups choosing to challenge the strength of government. Throughout the conflict in CAR the number of private security companies (PSCs) has increased. They offer services to various companies, humanitarian organisations, embassies, private medical facilities and mines (Boggero 2008: 15–27). The contracts are lucrative and often long-term lasting for decades with certain clients. The number of PSCs often outnumber the police in cities like Bangui. The increasing number of PSGs is attributed to the number of projects funded externally and staffed by expatriates in CAR such as the mining of diamonds and uranium and the telecoms industry. In CAR, the majority of the PSGs are domestic and high locals whereas international and foreign companies can be selective of their recruits. The assimilation of international norms and skills through PSGs is limited although the number of state forces, army and police personnel, has declined over time. The use of foreign troops to assist national armies and defend presidents is costly and the CAR has utilised armies from Libya, Chad and Congo. The escalation of such expenditure means that another area of security must be sacrificed, this is often public security. Boggero (2008) demonstrated that as Defence expenditure increased, that of public security decreased significantly (Boggero 2008: 19–21). In Africa, policing borders is extremely difficult due to the terrain and size of the countries. Scorched earth tactics are commonplace, leading to displacement and casualties. Of its road system only 3 percent are asphalt and during rain they are unsurpassable. Not only is it a landlocked country without direct access to foreign markets but then domestically the infrastructure is weak to encourage economic development—what Klosowicz (2016: 35) calls ‘double isolation’ (Klosowicz 2016: 35). The ease of movement for populations also translates into little recognition of state autonomy and government authority. Also the ease with which neighbouring states such as Libya and Chad have interfered in the autonomy, as well as France, has influenced the political and economic trajectory. While it can be argued that France has interfered extensively since independence in CAR’s affairs, the poor leadership demonstrated by its own leaders has further harmed the country. Further the use of divisive politics was commonplace in which leaders such as Kolingba appointed family members and those of his ethnic group—the Yacoma—into political and military positions (Maiangwa 2017: 190). This changed to the Sara-Kaba group under Patasse’s presidency. By the time of Bozize’s rule the majority living in the north of the country were disillusioned with his leadership and being politi-

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cally marginalised. Due to the abandonment of the rural areas, many civilians join the long-standing established militias such as the People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) in order to survive financially through stipends, receive protection through camaraderie and express their resentment of the government. The reason that fighters remain loyal to the militias is that employment options are limited. A militia offers access to resources, although limited, as well as a stipend. Fighters, although not professionally trained, can threaten civilians and extract ‘taxes’. Although peace agreements are meant to financially reimburse fighters and encourage them to return to their communities, these are seldom upheld leading to increased fighting and resentment. The leadership of many of these militias can be considered political-cum-military entrepreneurs as many seek to increase their financial incentives often to the exclusion of their rank-and-file fighters. Many seek to amass wealth and redistribute to their cronies, however, eventually the resources are spent and there isn’t more to distribute. However, these groups all have diverse interests; the anti-Balaka is most obvious here. This group formed from the many defence groups in CAR had diverse interests, some wanted to disarm the Seleka, others wanted to avenge attacks on Christian communities while others wanted Bozize to return to power. Even the transitional president Samba-Panza continued the pattern of looting and crony appointments. Even the current president Touadera, democratically elected although contested by competitors, experiences militia clashes and sporadic acts of violence. While the country is rich in natural resources, such as uranium, gold, diamonds and timber, these have never translated into improved social assistance and development for civilians although those appointed in state institutions have. Many fighters, considering a motley crew of gun totters, are amongst the most marginalised groups under successive governments and looting becomes a method of sustenance (Maiangwa 2017: 190). For the leadership, their personal grievances against the state increases a likelihood that orchestrated mutinies will occur (Theisen 2008). A lack of investment in the rural areas, coupled with a lack of government interest, also leads to sentiments of marginalisation. Increased levels of youth unemployment and rural population density heighten the incidence of conflict. Poor education exacerbated by non-payment of ­ teachers and declining standards in the single university in Bangui has resulted in a population with diminishing skills and 37 percent of the over

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15 years of age are illiterate (Klosowicz 2016: 42). It therefore remains improbable that an effective state can be created upon such a dysfunctional framework of corruption, lack of taxation and therefore an inability to create effective structures to sustain social development. Such a state remains vulnerable to predatory groups seeking access to financial largesse and ways to maintain that constant flow of revenue.

Economic Extraction, Political Leadership and Instability One of the defining aspects of a failed state is the desire by all parties, external stakeholders, investors, funders, non-profit organisations, neighbouring governments and the national government s to maintain the overall integrity—façade—of the state. For the majority of these entities, their relevance can only be established, and they can only operate, within the context of state as a structure. A fragile or failed state gives greater credibility to their existence and the ability to create an income stream. The political leadership views the state as an opportunity to secure, and entrench legitimacy, financial security through concessions. It is also the aim of many citizens to gain access to a constant salary and state employment guarantees this along with the perception of status (Malejacq 2016: 100; Liebenberg et al. 2015). Armed groups in CAR, and a sentiment shared in much of the continent, is that through the presence of the international organisations, take up arms as a way to gain access to state employment in the military. The state is viewed by the various parties, although each with different agendas with some having complementary roles whilst others are contradictory, for contracts, salaries, concessions, power and control. As a country that is largely agricultural, its exports are dependent on timber and diamonds, its economic situation has deteriorated due to persistent conflict coupled with mismanagement. In 2013 the country stood accused in trading blood diamonds leading to a collapse in public finances. Persistent instability undermined the agricultural output and livestock numbers had collapsed by 77 percent due to raids (Coleman 2016). This is disastrous when agriculture is the economic mainstay and the majority of the population is rural-based (Malejacq 2016: 90). Towns throughout the CAR are vulnerable to attack by rebels even with the presence of government troops. The constant threat forces inhabitants to flee into the forests for extended periods. Throughout the 2000s, CAR has been plagued with violence, displaced citizens and refugees from the DRC, Cameroon, Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda and Chad. It is claimed that Saudi Arabia sponsors

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Table 7.1  Indicators and rank over a decade (2008–2018) in CAR Year

Rank

Factionalised elites

Economy

Economic inequality

Group grievance

External intervention

2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008

5 3 3 3 3 9 10 8 8 8 10

9.7 9.7 10 10 9.7 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.4

8.8 9.1 9.3 8.3 8.2 7.7 8 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.4

9.8 10 9 9.7 8.5 9.2 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.1 8.8

8.8 9.1 9.9 9.6 9.5 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.9

9.5 9.8 9.5 9.8 9.9 9.4 9.3 9.6 9.6 9.1 9

Source: Fragile States Index Annul Report (2019) (https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/)

the Seleka in order to Islamicise CAR but this is a common accusation (Klosowicz 2016: 43). Mining areas are controlled by the two coalitions to finance their conflict through the sale of diamonds and gold (Table 7.1). Table 7.1 above represents three indicators with five categories; namely with cohesion indicators there is factionalised elites and group grievance. The second is economic indicators that include the economy and economic inequality and the third is social indicators that include external intervention. Regarding the ranking of the CAR over the period 2008–2018, the status of the state has remained fragile and had only reached its highest measure in 2008 when it was ranked at 10 and its lowest at 3 during the 2014–2017. Even when the state was not experiencing civil war, although conflict in one of the regions/prefectures seems continuous, it was still considered a fragile state. In terms of defining and characterising the fragile state the indicators represent in part the contributing factors to the erosion of the state institutions and its functions. The factionalised elites indicator highlights the division within state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial and religious identities. Further, it notes the application of brinkmanship amongst elites to achieve political, and often economic, goals. Amongst these practices is the use of nationalism, xenophobia and irredentism that raises social tensions and eventually leads to violence. The indicator measures political competition, elections and how power is acquired. The table highlights the high level of factionalised elites in politics in CAR over the decade represented here. In a

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country with between 68 and 80 ethnic groups, depending on the source, with sub-ethnic groups (Klosowicz 2016; Lombard 2016a, b; Isaacs-­ Martin 2017). For concern to this discussion is the notion of national identity, extremist rhetoric and stereotyping. Compounding issues of the factionalism is the lack of economic inclusion and distribution that plays into the concerns of fragmentation and extremist rhetoric. Linked to factionalised elites, as part of the cohesion indicators, are group grievances. The Fragile State Index defines the group grievance in the context of divisions and schisms between the various ethnic, religious and regional groups. These divisions can be attributed to resource distribution and access to political processes of exclusivity or inclusion. This influences the manner in which communities are formed and maintained and whether groups perceive themselves as victims of real or perceived atrocities. Groups may also feel that they alone are entitled to resources to the exclusion of others as well as spreading information that is detrimental to minorities or marginalised communities. From the table above, it is evident that there is a correlation between factionalised elites and group grievances. The measurements reveal high factionalism and group grievances and while consistently high, it was highest during the conflict between the ex-Seleka and the anti-Balaka coalitions. While politicians and strongmen were seeking access to political power and economic resources, the population existed within an environment of heightened fear and terror from fighters, youth gangs and vigilante mobs. During the period 2013 to present there is an escalation in factionalism amongst politicians and civilians due to the conflict and unstable socio-political environment. The economic indicator looks at economic decline and economic inequality. This indicator focuses on the formal economy in order to rank the CAR, but it includes illicit trade, illicit transactions and corruption levels. States often fail because of a lack of economic structure and thus revenue collection and institutional growth and accountability. A lack of accountability leads to predation on the state resources by those who are closest to it and their allies/cronies. This leads to economic inequality aspect that can be real or perceived and often fuels grievances between groups. As the Fragile State Index states, ‘…perceptions of economic inequality can reinforce communal tensions and nationalistic rhetoric’. Therefore, economic inequality must be considered structural or reinforcing. It is difficult to determine economic equality in a state that has virtually little formal education, regardless of the poor quality. There are few

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opportunities to gain skills which are important to financial wealth and socio-economic wellbeing. The state offers few resources and avenues in which people can improve their lives; it offers few paths to employment and for many such employment is not only a somewhat consistent, paycheque. Economic inequality throughout the decade remains very high, and the conflict has resulted in ghettos becoming sectarian (Reno 1999: 73–76; Pouligny 2005). Another indicator illustrated is a social indicator, as interpreted by the Fragile State Index. The measurement of external intervention is applied here. These externals include economic and security in its influence, over and covert, over the internal affairs of the state and how it affects the balance of power. In a country such as the CAR, the role of NGOs, private security, private armies, neighbouring armies, external stakeholders, regional governments, consultants, foreign entrepreneurs, private companies, including foreign aid, all exhibit influence over the government. All the indicators in the table reveal high levels of dysfunction and irregularity that contribute to the ranking of the state out of 178 states listed in the Index. The highest rank ‘stability’ was at 10  in 2008 and 2012, events that occurred before the election in 2011 and the 2013 conflict between state forces and the Seleka coalition. For a four-year period it was ranked 3 from 2014 to 2017, but it was improved to rank 5 in 2018 in the post-election in December 2016. Due to the high number of armed forces, private and state, militias, youth mobs, international forces and peacekeepers all contribute to an uneasy environment that exacerbates violence, communal tension, population flight, economic depression and war economies (Makki et al. 2001). The state and the government appear to be a single entity. Yet without successful institutions and effective laws, a country cannot be economically affluent and politically successful. An inability to pay salaries for civil servants is a constant problem. Many presidents also do not trust the existing army and hire private security to offer protection. It is argued that as much as one-third of the country is not controlled by the central government and rather by three rebel groups namely the UFDR, APRD and CPJP. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a heterodox Christian militia located in Uganda, extended attacks in South Sudan and the CAR, and the Janjaweed, said to be a militia based on religio-ethnic extremism in Chad, kidnapped children and youth  to populate their ranks with new fighters. The LRA and the Janjaweed although operating within the CAR as militias  have no overt  political interest in the country  other than to

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exploit the destabilised state and its vulnerable population. They operate in the south and northeast respectively with the basic motive of economic exploitation within a state without administered borders. The state army is weak, demoralised, poorly disciplined and often poorly paid. They lack proper equipment and training and are unable to protect the borders or maintain security within the country for civilians. Three presidents used to be military personnel and five came to power through coups assisted by armies, foreign and national, with the sometimes-covert support of foreign governments. The persistent violence and events that closely resemble civil war lead to the destruction of the state as well as the population (Klosowicz 2016: 45). The motley crew of fighters often with little commonality to the local population, many are from Sudan, Chad, DRC and so forth, makes it easier for them to harm and steal (Isaacs-Martin 2015). In order to legitimise many economic activities within a state, particularly one that is undermined by conflict, corruption and failing institutions, operating within and, therefore, acknowledging the existence of the state structure is central. CAR is a country in which the population has little faith but still relies on the Weberian definition of the state. Although there is a hatred for the apathy displayed by the political leadership, many citizens in the CAR have an expectation that the responsibility of the state structures is to provide them with services, opportunities and particularly employment. There is a common-held belief that state employment not only provides a consistent paycheque but also provides status for the individual. Due to the limited employment available in the state apparatus— limited to the institutional bureaucracies that often were the recourse for university graduates—most individuals without qualifications realised that conflict outside of the government could secure access to the military and in time new methods of financial assistance could be guaranteed through the various NGOs operating in the country.

Conclusion The notion of the ideal-type state serves as the template for legitimate socio-political formation in the world. The idea that it is the collective will of the population drives the self-determination for a particular group, strongly identified by their cultural/ethnic affinity, to seek political autonomy in the form of a self-governed autonomous bordered territory; often the use of ethnic identity serves as the foundational ‘desire to monopolise power and status’ (Banton 2007: 30; Malici 2009). However, the CAR

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was hastily ‘created’ in 1960. As an area that had little value for its former colonial authority, strategically or financially, and a population that had a scant sense of collective identity did not auger well for a strong autonomous state. Without a dedicated political class and bureaucratic elite the state lacked the ability to determine an ideal form or an established conflict resolution method. The lack of bureaucratic structure, often supported and buffered by a ruling or educational class, allowed for two precarious situations to develop. Firstly it allowed for the personalisation unchecked power of the president and secondly it led to the use of imported bureaucrats from France. Neither group was rule-bound and could use office to exercise power. As such, the state, without the support of an established stable economy, becomes the vehicle for employment, status and wealth accumulation. This creates a political struggle in the state structure. This is at odds with the ideal-type state in which the bureaucratic administrative apparatus is supposed to rely on effective, well-informed staff that have the interests of the state and its best functioning in mind. CAR, an ailing state bereft of assistance from humanitarian organisations, and run by a cabal of individuals who have little skill, competence or intention to organise and sustain a bureaucratic structure. The number of private security firms, private armies protecting presidents and militias supporting rural strongmen and politicians create instability within the country. None of the armed groups is responsible, or accountable, to the elected government. Instead the president appears to view himself as separate from the structure of government by allocating separate protection for himself that often is not reflected in the defence budget (Boggero 2008: 29). Further the number of independent groups of fighters allows for commercial networks, and ambitions, to be formed that could result in coalitions of fighters. While the government is unable to provide employment, the private security companies are; and the greater the instabilities, real or imagined, provides opportunities of employment to individuals with few skills. In certain areas of the country such as the north-west, private armed firms do not operate, as many remain in the cities, allowing militias to proliferate and assume autonomy over the area. Such developments undermine the position, and eventually the status, of the government forces. Many of the duties once undertaken by the army or protective services have been delegated to private securities and are foreign in origin. While offering protective services to the president, these armed groups also pillage and destroy infrastructure, government assets and private

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property. This demonstrates that they are immune from prosecution neither do they have an interest in civil protection. However, as commercial ventures, one has to question whether private companies drive the violence or the perception of instability or exaggerate the conflict so that their services can be used. The behaviour of these private firms exacerbates rogue soldiers, rebels and armed youth gangs. Due to their interests that are not in public security, and civil orderliness, it is easy for a state to descend into anarchy, that leads to greater employment of these private industries and therefore greater profitability particularly of the international companies that are wary of their assets being stolen or vandalised (Adebajo and Keen 2000: 8–10). There is a persistent decline in the state institutions and this impacts economic development (Klosowicz 2016: 46). There is a vibrant black economy particularly in raw materials like mineral extraction and timber and without a rail, or any effective transport, system, it is difficult to monitor the movement of resources within the state. For a country with persistent fragile state status, the myriad of entities involved in the running of the state apparatus will ensure that it remains as such. The economy of the CAR is predatory and extractive and not done in the interests of the civilian population. The state is seen as an opportunity for enrichment and not for the ideological purpose it was intended which is to provide a collective national identity for those within its borders. Instead conflict, which is the economy of sorts, ensures that the population remains misinformed, uneducated due to a lack of educational facilities, without social and health assistance, are at a disadvantage of supporting and staffing the bureaucracy or offer political resistance. Keeping a population in fear, displaced and unemployed creates an environment in which firms operate with impunity and are free to exploit resources and the population without monitoring or repercussions. Such an environment creates immense riches for a few but poverty for the majority of ­citizens. This leads to escalating tensions within the populations and the prevalence of criminal activities from bandits and fighters who harm with impunity. Due to the use of private security by firms as well as the government, to the exclusion of the army and police force, the civilian population is left to fend for itself. To create a legitimate economy in which civilians can prosper takes time to manifest and for its benefits to be experienced by most but the question remains as to why entities that have for so long benefited from instability be willing to give that up.

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References Adebajo, A., & Keen, D. (2000). Banquet for warlords. The World Today, 56(7), 8–10. Adrien-Rongier, M.-F. (1981). Les “kodro” de Bangui: un espace urbain “oublié” (Bangui’s ‘Kodro’: A forgotten urban space). Cahiers d’études africaines, 21, 93–110. Azam, J.-P. (2002). Looting and conflict between ethnoregional groups: Lessons for state formation in Africa. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 131–153. Banton, M. (2007). Max Weber on ‘ethnic communities’: A critique. Nations and Nationalism, 13(1), 19–35. Berger, M. T., & Weber, H. (2006). Beyond state-building: Global governance and the crisis of the nation-state system in the 21st century. Third World Quarterly, 27(1), 201–208. Boggero, M. (2008). Local dynamics of security in Africa: The Central African Republic and private security. African Security Studies, 17(2), 15–27. Coleman, D.  Y. (2016). Central African Republic: 2016 country review (pp. 1–310). Houston: Country Watch Publications. Dusza, K. (1989). Max Weber’s conception of the state. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 3(1), 71–105. Fanon, F. (1963). The pitfalls of national consciousness. In The wretched of the Earth (pp. 148–205). New York: Grove Press. Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019. (2019). The fund for peace. Edited by J.J. Messner. https://www.fragilestatesindex.org. Accessed 12 Aug 2019. Geschiere, P. (2009). The perils of belonging: Autochthony, citizenship, and exclusion in Africa and Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Isaacs-Martin, W. (2015). The motivations of warlords and the role of militias in the Central African Republic. Conflict Trends, 2015(4), 26–32. Isaacs-Martin, W. (2016). Political and ethnic identity in violent conflict: The case of Central African Republic. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 10(1), 26. Isaacs-Martin, W. (2017). The Séléka and anti-Balaka Rebel Movements in the Central African Republic. In C. Varin & D. Abubakar (Eds.), Violent non-state actors in Africa: Terrorists, rebels and warlords (pp. 131–161). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Klosowicz, R. (2016). Central African Republic: Portrait of a collapsed state after the last rebellion. Politeja, 13(42), 33. Lachmann, L. M. (2007). The legacy of max weber,. Ludwig von Mises Institute. Liebenberg, S., Haines, R., & Harris, G. (2015). A theory of war economies: Formation, maintenance and dismantling. African Security Review, 24(3), 307–323.

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Lombard, L. (2016a). State of rebellion: Violence and intervention in the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books. Lombard, L. (2016b). The threat of rebellion: Claiming entitled personhood in Central Africa. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 22(3), 552–569. Magnus Theisen, O. (2008). Blood and soil? Resource scarcity and internal armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 45(6), 801–818. Maiangwa, B. (2017). The ‘quasi-permanent crisis’: Understanding collective rebellion and sectarian violence in the CAR. Politikon, 44(2), 187–204. Makki, S., Meek, S., Musah, A.-F., Crowley, M.  J., & Lilly, D. (2001). Private military companies and the proliferation of small arms: Regulating the actors. London: Saferworld. Malejacq, R. (2016). Warlords, intervention, and state consolidation: A typology of political orders in weak and failed states. Security Studies, 25(1), 85–110. Malici, A. (2009). Rogue states: Enemies of our own making. Psicología Política, 39, 39–54. Pouligny, B. (2004). The politics and anti-politics of contemporary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs/Les Anciens Combattants d’aujourd’hui Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion. Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies. Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales Sciences Po/CNRS (CERI). Paris: Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale. Pouligny, B. (2005). Civil society and post-conflict peacebuilding: Ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building ‘new’ societies. Security Dialogue, 36(4), 495–510. Reno, W. (1997). African weak states and commercial alliances. African Affairs, 96, 165–185. Reno, W. (1999). Warlord politics and African states. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

CHAPTER 8

Mediatizing and Gendering Pan-Africanism for ‘Glocal’ Impacts Sharon Adetutu Omotoso

Introduction Pan-Africanism is laden with conceptual and ideological complexities which scholars have engaged with over decades (Shepperson and Thompson 1969; Langley 1973). Described variously as an ideology and/ or movement, as presented in the works of W.E.B.  Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Stokely Carmichael, among others, Esebede (1994: 3–4) highlights major component ideas of Pan-Africanism as that which recognizes: Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African origin, solidarity among people of African descent, belief in a distinct African personality, rehabilitation of Africa’s past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in church and state, the hope for a united and glorious future Africa.

A combination of these components hereby excludes any thought or movement which focuses only on its local or internal issues as against continental issues (Esebede 1994: 5). The foregoing thus justifies Pan-­ Africanism as an “ideology and movement that encourages the solidarity S. A. Omotoso (*) Women’s Research and Documentation Center, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_8

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of Africans worldwide” (Gelb 2004: 22). Arguing that the fate of all African peoples and countries is intertwined and that Africans both on the continent and in the diaspora share not merely a common history, but a common destiny, Pan-Africanism is aimed at unifying and uplifting people of African descent, via a commitment to unity for economic, social and political progress (Omotoso and Layode 2013; Minkah 2015). As to “unity of the African peoples in the struggle against imperialism, for abolition of the vestiges of colonialism, and for economic and social progress”, Potekhin (1964) opines that “Pan-Africanism deserves every support from the forces of progress”. A converse definition will only serve to strengthen imperialists’ “ideological influence and make it an instrument for retaining political control … essentially colonial, exploitation of Africa” (Potekhin 1964: 48). Although the historical emergence of Pan-­ Africanism had recorded some significant breakthroughs, today the hindsight of Pan-African ideals, which re-echoes the vibrancy of the movement as a philosophy of social action and African unity, is short-lived. The unifocal outlook on Pan-Africanism as a movement toward emancipation and self-government largely limits its relevance in the twenty-first century; similarly, the manner with which Pan-Africanism is described as a legacy entrenches an impression that it is a relic. This, to a large extent, leads to questioning its relevance and the necessity of a continual pursuit of its tenets. This chapter is inspired by Falola and Essien’s (2013) position that twenty-first century Africa is witnessing waning Pan-Africanism. They argue that “the appropriation and performance of Pan-Africanism on continental, national, regional, local and transatlantic levels offer an alternative solution for sustaining Pan-Africanism” (Falola and Essien 2013: 1). In an earlier work, I have noted that on regional and continental grounds, there is a high tendency for a slowdown in the pace of developing a regional or continental voice (as may be needed) to face the rest of the world, due largely “to the rate and manner with which media is gendering politics, how media and politics are reacting to new media…” (Omotoso 2018a: 563). Noting that “Pan-Africanism started as a political movement with its own ideological basis at the end of the nineteenth century and has since followed a very complicated, contradictory course” (Potekhin 1964: 37), this chapter seeks to appraise media and gender as two vital, yet hitherto underexplored, complicated and contradictory parts of Pan-Africanist movements: media, due to their roles in the cultivation and dissemination of Pan-African activities since inception; and gender, due to the murky positioning of women, thereby failing to produce a

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­ alanced system which considers and positions men and women as equally b important players in Pan-Africanism. This was succinctly examined by Mama and Abbas (2015: 2) as “present-day incarnations of pan Africanism as an elite men-only affair”, which corroborate a definition of Pan-­ Africanism as ‘African brotherhood’. This chapter hereby argues that Pan-­ African ideologies transcend the unifocal outlook of struggle for emancipation and self-governance, as it retains relevance in broader senses connective to the twenty-first century. Consequently, these two variables (media and gender), whose contributions to the cultivation and fostering of Pan-Africanism lack due recognition, must be critically examined and factored in if Africa is to make local as well as global impacts with its Pan-­ African ideologies now, and in the nearest future. The chapter is divided into five sections: first section is the “Introduction”; second section discusses “Media in Pan-Africanism”; third section discusses “Gender in Pan-­ Africanism”; fourth section is on “Mediatizing and Gendering Pan-Africanism”; fifth section presents Pan-Africanism and the global-­ local (glocal) question where media and gender will be presented as key indicators, closing with concluding remarks.

Media in Pan-Africanism Scholars have widely noted the roles of mass media in colonial and post-­ colonial African states, most of which were founded on nationalistic goals (Omu 1978; Faringer 1991; Bourgault 1995; Fatoyinbo 2000; Hyden and Leslie 2002; Omotoso 2015, 2018b). The media (also recognized as the press, in the persons of journalists and their vehicles of mass communication) in earlier periods of Pan-Africanism paid close attention to African oneness. Occiti (1999: 13) highlights the Pan-African roles of the media by noting that: the power associated with the media, politics and the press became complimentary to each other, with many journalists eventually ending up as politicians and thereby using their position as journalists to become the most vocal advocates for Africa’s political independence.

Potekhin (1964) recalls that Azikiwe like other Pan-Africanists believed in the necessity of black brotherhood and fraternity as a strategy to claim their dignity and rightful place in the world. Esebede also brought to the fore how Nigerian journalist and politician Anthony Enahoro insisted that

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Pan-Africanism should include economic, social and cultural development of the continent, the avoidance of conflict among African states, the promotion of African unity and influence in world affairs. Likewise, the Senegalese publicist Alioune Diop felt that Pan-Africanism was synonymous with the concept of “African personality” or “negritude”. It must be noted that Ghana’s Casely Hayford, a journalist and political leader whose writings (particularly columns in the Gold Coast Leader) helped to mobilize support from other West African States by creating racial awareness among the people of Gold Coast, helped in setting the tone for a Pan-­ African agenda. This effort was expanded by the likes of Kwame Nkrumah and, from Nigeria, the journalistic writings of Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo, among others who aided Pan-African ideals. Similarly, in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania, the colonial press was found useful in putting across its demands for freedom, justice and equality and, thereafter, was utilized by many aspiring political leaders to establish and maintain agitational political organizations which aided the realization of independence goals. The post-colonial press in this region was seen to mirror the political consciousness of newly independent states by reacting to the accompanying uncertainties of political articulations on the continent (Condon 1967; Ochilo 1993). Using Algeria and Morocco as examples in North Africa, Zaghlami (2016: 161–162) acknowledged the key roles played by political heroes like the Moroccan King Mohamed V and the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah in the Algerian Revolution against French occupation. These journalists, among others, described as “pen” and “voice” worked assiduously for freedom and independence. They became sources of inspiration and examples to follow for many African leaders, journalists, writers and lawyers. Furthermore, Zaghlami (2016) also recognizes substantive retention of relations by North African countries with sub-Saharan countries like Mali and Niger, in addition to their traditional and natural African identity. As for Southern Africa, the mass media played pivotal Pan-African roles, covering the conflicts and clashes, developing and circulating publications and the use of popular media such as comic strips and cartoons during colonial rule and in the wake of democracy in the region. Bosch (2015) denies a widespread perception of Southern Africa’s commitment to nationalist—as against Pan-African—projects by harping on the roles of popular media, including newspapers, magazines and their digital iterations, as vital literary outlets which helped, and still do help, to envision Africanness and blackness within a variety of overlapping spatial scales, from township to the diaspora.

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A core concept in Pan-African discourses which was promoted by the media in the recent past is homogeneity: a situation of shared systems, patterns and processes. Pan-African attempts by African media, in the spirit of continental integration, are overseen by “organizations such as PANA (Pan African News Agency) and URTNA (Union of African National Radio & TV Organizations) among other prominent bodies working on media homogenization in this regard” (Omotoso 2018a: 557). Media homogeneity in Africa is characterized by shared systems, patterns and processes of information gathering and dissemination. While these continental media bodies continue to work assiduously at promoting media homogeneity amidst growing media presence on the continent, most African media pursue heterogeneous goals which are largely nationalistic as against continental goals. This, for Omotoso and Layode (2013: 198), requires a concerted effort by African countries to re-awaken the spirit of Pan-Africanism by “re-ordering or changing this trend” and positioning “this important ideology in new perspectives to bring a fresh meaning to conversations and activities that relate” to it (Falola and Essien 2013: 8–9). Consequently, I argue here that raising Pan-African goals via continental media commitment requires mediatizing1 Pan-Africanism, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Gender in Pan-Africanism Falola has written significantly on women in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa (Falola 1995; Falola and Heaton 2006; Falola and Paddock 2011; Falola and Amponsah 2013; Falola and Nasong’o 2016), most of which are not directly connected with women in Pan-African movements. The crux of the matter here is that so far, Pan-Africanism has proceeded as a ‘brotherhood’ rather than a kinship project. With regards to pre-colonial gender relations in Africa, Sheldon (2013: 1) notes that: in many parts of West Africa, women were members of associations run by and for women, and which gave women the final say in disputes over markets or agriculture. The colonial agents, nearly always men, ignored that reality.

1  To mediatize is to annex an entity to another, so that the former retains its identity even though it has lost most of its power to the latter. See Omotoso S.A. (2018a) “Media and Politics in Africa” In: Oloruntoba S., Falola T. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. pp. 553–571.

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She further asserts that “women’s pre-colonial political activity was generally disregarded by the colonial authorities, who turned exclusively to men when they established local political offices” (Sheldon 2013: 1). Likewise, women’s liberation movements in the colonial era were not duly recognized as Pan-African. The prevalent argument is that colonialism with Christianity, the spread of Islam and the processes of modernization (which promoted the shift to patrilineal societies) introduced by external forces in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries significantly reconstructed gender relations in Africa (House-Soremekun 2002; Mari Tripp et  al. 2011; Stoeltje 2015). Depicted as docile, hence not worthy to participate or contribute to public and political life of their communities, colonialism relegated women and treated their concerns as less important, resulting in gender-blind policies and other forms of discrimination and abuse. As Africa moved into the post-colonial era, a large chunk of women’s movement and activisms began, most of which were tagged rebellious, particularly based on speculations that African women were infected for activism by their contact with Western feminism. These movements and activisms therefore also met with patriarchal hostilities and prejudices, although it marked the beginning of more constructive contributions of women to politics in Africa (Kadaga 2013). Until the post-colonial era, African women’s agitations, activism and scholarship did not gain due recognition in the Pan-African discourse; even at that, Pan-Africanism remains a ‘brotherhood’, recognizing women’s contribution as part of the pockets of commitments to African nationalism, but not necessarily an integral part of what would pass as Pan-African. Without over-generalizing and ignoring a few matriarchal communities in Africa, the political systems on the continent have remained largely male-centric, keeping women at the margin. One may also ascribe the ‘institutional masculinities’ of early post-colonial Africa to pervasive military rule, which itself was structurally built to edge out women. Since the mid to late 1990s, when most states in Africa moved into democratic rule, African leaders revitalized their pursuit of a renewed Pan-African agenda which includes reconfiguring the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002, exemplified in the African renaissance project aimed at decolonizing systems, structures and processes, thus seeking African solutions to African problems. It is considering recent Pan-Africanist agenda that a critical approach to gendering Pan-Africanism comes in view, to see if there would be a different voice when Pan-Africanism is de-masculinized.

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Mediatizing and Gendering Pan-Africanism Recent critiques, analyses, assessment and re-assessment of African media (Eribo et  al. 1993; Hydén et  al. 2002; Armah and Adu Amoah 2010; Khondker 2011; Isike and Omotoso 2017) foreground media power in Africa’s growing democracy; however, not much has been explored of media prospects in fostering continental goals. As far back as 1964 Potekhin averred that: Because the imperialists are seriously disturbed by the Africans’ determination to choose their own way forward without consulting them on the matter they are now more than ever supplementing economic fetters with ideological persuasion. Never before have they retained such a large staff of ideological servitors as in the independent African countries today. Never before have they dumped such a tremendous amount of propaganda material onto Africa. (Potekhin 1964: 37)

The above, as stated by Potekhin, was achieved through the media and it is still being sustained through the media; specifically, by the media in Africa2 and inadvertently by African media. Ogunsanwo puts it succinctly by recalling, at the commencement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now AU) in 1963, describing how Western media helped in concentrating attention on the immediate organic unity of all Africa championed by the Casablanca group…as well as on the functionalist/gradualist approach of the Monrovia powers…as if nothing else was important except to score points as to whose position was more acceptable. (Ogunsanwo 2015: 276)

Given the earlier noted roles of the media in the African nationalist movement, the current Pan-African agenda necessarily requires media support, hence the proposed mediatization of Pan-Africanism. Mediatizing here involves annexing Pan-Africanism to African media. Having recognized media power and influence at different epochs in Africa, the African media has assumed the status of an annexer, such that whatever it annexes 2  I have defined ‘media in Africa’ as all media organizations both local and foreign operating within Africa, while ‘African media’ are media organizations based in Africa, owned by Africans and operated to serve Africa. See Omotoso, S.A. (2018b) “Media, Society and the Post-Colonial State”. The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

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gains popularity and public acceptance. This will provide avenues for media organizations on the continent to propagate African values and Pan-African goals and objectives. The importance of mediatization has been noted as far back as 1962 when the Union of African National Television and Radio Organizations (URTNA) was established. With goals including fostering cooperation among its members (and by extension, member states), ensuring adherence to international and inter-­ African conventions and agreements relating to broadcasting and coordinating international coverage of national and international events, URTNA was renamed the African Union of Broadcasting (AUB) in 2006 with renewed commitment to improving the quality of life, projecting a real image of Africa, supporting the development of Africa through the dissemination of excellent programs and providing services for Africa and the African Diaspora. Likewise, the establishment of Pan African News Agency (PANA) in 1983 to decolonize information in Africa by promoting the aims and objectives of the African Union is a milestone in Africa’s mediatization process, aimed at consolidation of the independence, unity and solidarity of Africa, provision of information about and assistance in the liberation struggle of peoples against exploitation and oppression, and working for the integration of African countries to strengthen cooperation. Regrettably, recourse to the domestic objectives of African media in their individual states has hampered the achievement of continental objectives as laid out in Pan-African agenda. Once the African media prioritizes nurturing, propagating and embedding a Pan-African agenda, it becomes easier for all stakeholders to focus and pursue Pan-African goals as their primary goal. In fact, by this the masses are enlightened for constructive civic engagement, regional bodies are faced with pressure for accountability, and states would engage in the agenda with renewed commitment. In the same vein, an internally responsive media consciously cultivates the internal publics as they build resistance to external influences that could jeopardize the Pan-African agenda. Recognizing the double-edgedness of mediatization, I offer positive mediatization whereby the ‘annexer’ (African media) is willing to selflessly help or aid the ‘annexed’ (Pan-Africanism). An answer to the ‘how’ question here lies in selfless and continent-focused media practices, addressing “the struggles for oneness in the midst of diversities” (Omotoso 2018b), seeing that the achievement of continental goals will turn back to foster national development.

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Gendering involves associating or ascribing characteristics of masculinity or femininity to a phenomenon and examining how such plays out in goal setting, power relations and the achievement of group aspirations. In this chapter, gendering is aimed at calling attention to hitherto downplayed or neglected issues and contexts which would have provided a balanced outlook by taking into account the contributions and roles of women as well as men in the Pan-African agenda. This varies in disposition to the idea of feminizing Pan-Africanism. In feminizing Pan-Africanism, Mshai3 shares the familial support enjoyed in the diaspora, providing a care dimension to Pan-Africanism, which goes “beyond our different passports and histories” (2015: 88). This could be said to create a link between Pan-Africanism and feminist ethics of care by ascribing care-giving roles to women, and by extension reiterating that women owe one another the duty of care, as a Pan-African value, regardless of varying nationalities. Gendering PanAfricanism connects with the language of “weaving” which “is a foundational claim to our cultural traditions and legacies of women working and speaking together, of collaboration and co-­operation… to make something new” (Feminist Africa 2015: 86). This is closely connected with the proposed ‘hairy-hairless’4 synergy for Africa. While celebrating earlier attempts toward gendering Pan-Africanism, it is important to note the vigor dimension5 as an additional dimension to care, collaboration and cooperation in the Pan-Africanist agenda; these, in the context of this chapter, encapsulate both women and men. Recent efforts of the African Union to enforce and aid gender mainstreaming are evident: • The adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325  in 2000 which made provision for increased participation of women in peace and security decision-making, the prevention of violence against women and the protection of women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence.

 See Mshai, 2015 In Conversation: Feminist Africa Volume 20.  Omotoso in the work titled “Hairiness and Hairlessness: An African Feminist View of Poverty”, 2019 proposed that scholarly African feminists and Indigenous survivalist African feminists must symbiotically interact for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa. 5  See Omotoso, S.A. (2017) “Communicating Feminist Ethics in the Age of New Media in Africa” in Gendering Knowledge in Africa and the African Diaspora (pp.  64–84), eds. Toyin Falola, Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso. Routledge: USA. (USA) 3 4

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• The Maputo Protocol: The AU Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women (2003)6 which guarantees the rights of women to take part in political processes, to social and political equality with men, among others. • The AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) • The African Women’s Decade (2010–2020) focusing on ten thematic areas including promoting economic empowerment of women, fighting poverty, education, health, governance and legal protection, among others. Despite these commendable gender mainstreaming efforts, gendering Pan-Africanism sets out to highlight and address structural masculinities exhibited in Pan-African movements where women were and are exploited and instrumentalized (presented as the disempowered requiring urgent assistance) under the pretense of “women empowerment” (Kamwendo and Kamwendo 2015). For decades, women who have been maimed jailed and killed in the nationalist struggles; the recent past in Africa has also seen women transcend the so-called private sphere to venture as political aspirants, delegates to continental policy events and political office holders. The successes recorded have proven that raising the presence as well as voices of women is pertinent to gendering Pan-Africanism. Thus, the failures encountered by women in Pan-African causes are no justification for women’s incompetence or irrelevance to the struggle. The fact that women in scholarship, activism and policy-making continue to hold their own is an assurance of their unflinching vision of an egalitarian continent. Consequently, the vigor dimension underscores the resilience and tenacity of women and their capacity to re-awaken, strengthen and chart more practical courses in expanding the frontiers of the Pan-African agenda in the twenty-first century.

6  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted on July 1, 2003, and entered into force on November 25, 2005. Also, African Union Agenda 2063, Aspiration 6 and also items 1, 6, 13, 31, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 58 and 66d.

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Global-Local Impacts and Concluding Remarks The global-local is a bifocal outlook factoring internal and external variables, narrow and wider considerations, as two parts of the phenomena. Here, it rests on the notion that media as well as gender insights play vital roles in the cultivation of perception on Pan-Africanism in the domestic and international arena. Media in the form of films, musicals, documentaries and social media hold expansive communicative competence, unifying form and content, giving room for explorations as they harness traditional experiences with current trends across states. Currently, the roles of media and gender as portrayed by African films, musicals, documentaries and social media spaces are vital to political, socio-economic and intellectual Pan-Africanist agendas. This validates the necessity for local Pan-Africanist mobilization, representing continental moves and internal workings emergent in collaborations of African filmmakers to rewrite Africa by combining narratives from various regions. Global Pan-Africanist mobilization will focus on media-gender strategies aimed to “empower African peoples to control our political destiny, overcome imperialism, impoverishment, racial based oppression and the structural violence of global white supremacy” (Bunting 2017: 1). What then will the glocal impacts include or exclude in the twenty-first-century Pan-­ African agenda? It will include, though not limited to: • Massive support of states in fighting for justice, equity and peace as found in the North Africa • Participatory efforts in political stability and economic advancement of regions for a collective voice at transnational spheres It will exclude: • Xenophobic attacks which pervaded the last decade in Southern Africa • Internal slave trades in Libya and other North African states Without shying away from the fact that the African Union carries the weightiest responsibility of setting the Pan-African agenda, how mediatization and genderization of Pan-Africanism will be channeled depends largely on the ideologies of the bodies involved, which include the African Union and the various regional bodies, continental media agencies and

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the populace at large. This would require de-programming and re-­ programming of mindsets, priorities and values. With the challenges posed to media and gender by globalization (Omotoso 2017), promoting a Pan-African agenda in twenty-first-­century Africa is imperative. By this, mediatizing and gendering Pan-­Africanism become viable and pragmatic sense(s) in which Pan-Africanism provides a platform to engage communication strategies and gender experiences across African states. More than ever, “Pan-Africanism must remain at the core of African institution building, and institutionalizing it can only be achieved through the localization of norms and models” (Iroulo 2017: 4). These norms and models being constituents of media and gender must therefore be harnessed for the common good as Africa relates with other continents.

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PART II

Dynamics of Global Development, Migration and Public Administration

CHAPTER 9

The Politics of Paternalism and Implications of Global Governance on Africa: A Critique of the Sustainable Development Goals Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba

Introduction In a stark negation of the heroic history of encounters between Africa and the West, the patterns of relationship over the past 500 years have been marked by false narratives and claims of assistance, liberation and civilisation of the former by the latter. Whereas historical and anthropological evidences clearly show that pre-Trans-Atlantic Slave trade and pre-colonial Africa was home to powerful kingdoms and empires (see Mamdani 1996; Zeleza 1993), which, to certain degrees, engaged in mutually respecting diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, racist narratives from the seventeenth centuries from Eurocentric philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Hegel and journalists like Conrad, among others, indicate that Africa is not part of history. Thus, the people lack the innate

S. O. Oloruntoba (*) Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Visiting Scholar, Institute of African Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_9

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capacity to develop or effectively govern themselves (Hegel 1956). This subjective intellectual philosophy and the emergent changes in the economic structures and struggle for power and dominance among European powers provided justification for slavery, colonialism and postcolonialism as well as coloniality. Based on the self-conceited assumption of racial superiority, bolstered in part by the development of guns and other weapons of mass destruction, the West has taken over the design and direction of global politics and economy, in ways that suit its interests over the past 500 years. The ‘Africa-saving’ humanitarian and development agenda has recently found a voice in anti-trafficking and ‘neo-slavery’ campaigns. Indices such as the Global Slavery Index and the US Trafficking in Persons rankings have become the latest control and compliance mechanisms. This paper examines the politics of paternalism in Africa within this broad context. It examines the power asymmetry that defines the relationship, the contradictions within the sustainable development goals and the imperative of self-reliance and ownership of development strategies on the continent. The violence that characterised the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, the unparalleled exploitation that defines the era of imperialism down through the colonial and post-colonial era have combined to strike fear and psychological subjugation in the heart of an average African, not least the nationalist elites, who were educated in the West and who continue to see the West as the ultimate in everything. Paternalism in the relations between Africa and the West continues today in economic, social, political, military and technological dimensions. To elaborate, the West sees itself as the standard to which Africa must look up to both in terms of what it considers as development and modernisation (Mkandawire 2010). This assumption has led to the development of a White Saviour Industrial Complex and Rescue Industry, which though appears to be benign and humanitarian in nature, is a continuation of dominance, hegemony and control under the assumption of superiority. To sustain this system, a global structure of accumulation has been put in place through various organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and multinational corporations. These organisations design rules and policies that ensure that development outcomes mirror the interests of advanced capitalist economies. There has been a plethora of studies on the dire socioeconomic conditions of African countries, both from liberal and radical

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scholars (Collier 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018; Onimode 1988; Ake 1981; Rodney 1981). While some have attributed the problem of underdevelopment to the lack of developmental political elites and the absence of developed institutions, others established a link between these challenges and the pattern of exploitative r­elationships that have existed between African countries and the West over the past 500 years. This paper locates the subordinated position of Africa in the global capitalist system within the politics of paternalism, in which the same logic that informed slavery and imperialism still serve as a determinant of relations between the West and Africa today. Despite the failings of various intervention programmes such as structural adjustment programmes, official development assistance, technical aids and so on, the West continues to maintain what Wade (2013) calls ‘the art of power maintenance’, as not even the now-regular global financial crisis could force a change to the current system of accumulation (see also Moyo 2009; Easterly 2006). Paradoxically, African leaders continue to believe and expect that the West or even the East is benign enough to develop the continent. To further demonstrate their mastery in the rhetoric of benign benevolence and, in particular, due to pressures from international non-­governmental organisations, the West has continuously moved from one development strategy to the other to demonstrate some semblance of concern to the challenges of Africa that made Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister, describe Africa as the ‘scar in the conscience of the world’. Two of the most recent strategies were the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. I argue in this paper that the SDGs and associated antislavery, anti-trafficking and other humanitarian concerns in Goal 8.7, among others, neither address the structural problems and the inefficiency in the current global economic system that perpetuate poverty and inequality in Africa nor did they give enough space for the continent to plan its own future. The next section examines the origin and dimensions of paternalism, while the section: ‘Paternalism and the Sustainable Development Goals: Reflections on the White Saviour Industrial Complex’ places the SDGs and associated anti-slavery, anti-trafficking and other humanitarian concerns in the context of the past and present global structures of accumulations and their limitations to fostering sustainable development in Africa. Section: ‘Pan-Africanism and the Prospects of African Agency’ explicates on the imperative of a Pan-African approach to extricating Africa from the bondage of coloniality, while section: ‘Conclusion’ concludes.

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Paternalism in Africa: From the Past to the Present The paternalistic posturing and engagement of the West with Africa is ideologically, philosophically, systemically and historically constructed. Despite the various pretensions to the contrary, under the garb of civility, humanism, religion, modernisation or globalisation, these four dimensions of the relationship are inextricably linked. Even though there are many aspects to this relationship, the analysis is here limited to how paternalism has shaped economic and social development in relations between Africa and the West. For one, colonialism was conceived as a civilising mission to save the so-called savages and barbarians from themselves and link them to modernised societies. Modern-day apologists of the political economy of colonialism argue that it benefited Africa through the building of infrastructures and the political and even judicial system. However, scholars have argued that the colonial project was as exploitative and extractive as the slavery project that preceded it. Ake (1981) argues that apart from disrupting the evolutionary process of development and linking Africa to the West in a subordinate relationship, colonialism altered the political economy of Africa in ways that ensured that the metropoles derived nearly all the benefits. Colonial infrastructures were established to link the points of extraction of minerals to the ports of exports. Also, by forcefully imposing a wage economy, colonialism did not allow for an agrarian revolution in Africa. The worst is that the labour of Africans in building the infrastructures on which colonial apologists continue to take credit was not adequately compensated, if at all. The modernisation theories of the 1950s and early 1960s depicted the development concerns of Africa as a ‘white man’s burden’. Modernisation theorists, such as W.W. Rostow, Talcott Parsons, Sydney Verba and Daniel Lerner among others, felt that the rest of the world need to look up to the West and its model of modernity in order to make progress like them. The internal contradictions of the previously colonised societies and the enduring legacy of colonialism, which the Dependency, World System theories, effectively used to counter modernisation theory mattered little to the advocates. Modernisation theorists also felt that since the newly independent countries lack enough capacity for capital mobilisation, development assistance should be provided to assist the newly independent countries. But in the case of Africa, this assistance was remarkably different from the Marshall Plan, which the US designed to rescue and rebuild post-War Europe. As Easterly (2006) argues, despite having spent over $2.3 trillion

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in five decades, the West has not been able to address the various challenges that the poor face. The problem lies not in the amount of aid that has been provided but, in the logic that informs it as well as the mechanism for the implementation. In what Adedeji (2002) calls the Development Merchant System, the aid industry is suffused with politics, interests and re-allocation and the misapplication of resources in ways that ensured that the donors derive more benefits for themselves than the recipients. Moyo (2009) further argues that aid fosters dependency and stifle creative initiatives. In the case of Africa, it provides incentives for many of the political leaders to embezzle state funds. It also contributes to undermining the capacity of the state to take an independent course of action that can advance socio-economic development and build human capabilities of the citizens. Paternalism has informed the post-independent Africa experiences, in which economic policies have been designed in the headquarters of the advanced capitalist economics without inputs from the supposed beneficiaries of such policies. A case in point was the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas African leaders, with support from the Economic Commission for Africa, designed the Lagos Plan of Action and the Plan of Action of 1980 as a comprehensive blueprint for socio-economic development through self-reliance, industrialisation and state-directed development, the self-appointed high priests of development in Washington would rather follow the Berg report, which was sponsored by the World Bank. The two blueprints were markedly different in terms of the agency of the state and the market, indigenous or exogenous approach to development as well as the overall strategy for fostering inclusive development in Africa (Adebajo 2014; Adedeji 1989, 2002). In order to sustain dependency of Africans on the West, the World Bank would rather prefer to support the implementation of the Berg report, rather than the Lagos Plan of Action. The result of the adoption of the structural adjustment programme is higher debt burdens, inequality and unemployment (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). With the lost decades of the 1980s, after which Africa was described as the ‘scar in the conscience of the world’ (Blair 2001) came the Millennium Development Goals of 2000, through which world leaders, under the supervision of the global hegemons agreed to half the number of world people living in poverty by 2015. For a critique of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), see Oloruntoba (2017). The next section examines the Sustainable Development Goals as another paternalistic

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posturing. Although the United Nations (UN) would present it as a global pact for fostering development, as long as most of the funding is expected to come from outside the continent, it remains trapped in the old logic of accumulation on a large scale and disbursement of crumbs to those at the margins and periphery of the world. It is important to highlight that the ideological orientations of countries in the West inform the form of assistance that they provide to Africa. In other words, the West is not monolithic or homogenous when it comes to development assistance. Thus, Scandinavian countries, by their social democratic credentials have rendered development assistance with consideration for its human values than profit to corporations, building alliances or paternalistic posturing that underpin assistance from countries that operate on the basis of neoliberal capitalism. The Global Slavery Index trace the incidence of slavery across the world. The North-based Walk Free Organisation that produces the Index creates awareness about the number of people that are being forced into labour in different sectors of the global economy and calls on governments, corporations and consumers to stop such inhuman treatment of fellow human beings. In its 2016 reports, the Global Slavery Index shows that, An estimated 40.3 million men, women, and children were victims of modern slavery on any given day in 2016. Of these, 24.9 million people were in forced labour and 15.4 million people were living in a forced marriage. Women and girls are vastly over-represented, making up 71 percent of victims. Modern slavery is most prevalent in Africa, followed by the Asia and the Pacific region.

Another important finding from the report is that ‘developed countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, and the UK receive organs from most of the world’s developing countries, including India, China, the Philippines, and Pakistan’ (p. 2). The Walk Free Foundation also provides ‘data on state imposed forced labour in North Korea, risk factors in the fishing industry, and the prevalence of forced labour in the cocoa sector’. While there are few instances where organ transplant is legitimate as in the case of Iran, this is generally illegal in most of the developing world where organs are being imported into the developed countries.

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The US Trafficking in Persons Programme, which produces annual Trafficking in Persons Report is also concerned with eradicating all forms of human trafficking in the world. As the US Secretary of State, Pompeo (2018), said, Human trafficking deprives millions worldwide of their dignity and freedom. It undermines national security, distorts markets, and enriches transnational criminals and terrorists, and is an affront to the universal values we as Americans hold dear. The use of human trafficking by terrorist groups, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, not only reflects the brutality of these groups, but also acts as a means by which terrorist organizations recruit adherents and finance their operations. Combating human trafficking is not merely a moral issue or one that affects the interests of the American people; it is also an issue that threatens international peace and security.

He further notes that the US Government will engage diplomatically with governments of nations to end the challenge of insecurity and violation of the right to live that is associated with trafficking in persons. On a casual note, these are laudable objectives, which should warrant commendation. However, placing these interventions within their larger historical contexts as well as the ongoing contradictions between the benign humanitarianism that these represent, the cold calculation of geostrategic interests that emasculate voices of reason, when such is needed most, the participation of large corporations in one way or the other in the supply chains that aid slave labour, will show the White Saviour Industrial Complex that underpins such actions. For instance, while the US Government under President Trump has tried to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, issues of human rights violation, slave labour and general intolerance for opposing views in that country has not occupied a high priority in the agenda. To summarise, there are general political economy issues that make interventions of this nature to reflect the reproduction of the previous patterns of engagements of some of the developed countries with Africa. Issues of trade in fishing with European trawlers, mining firms using underage children, paying less than living wage for adult miners, looking away from conflict and its effects in the Democratic Republic of Congo so that precious minerals can be bought at give-away prices from criminal gangs and so on are clear indications that the fundamental factors that reproduce and reinforce the challenges of human trafficking have not been addressed.

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Paternalism and the Sustainable Development Goals: Reflections on the White Saviour Industrial Complex The imperative of African agency in their own development cannot be emphasised. This is particularly important due to the salience of interests that define inter-state relations. Realist theorists argue that maximisation of national interests is the ultimate aim of inter-state relations. The more power a state can project in the international system, the more the possibility of achieving such goals. The use of military power is central to the achievements of these objectives. On the other hand, Keohane (1984) introduce the concept of soft power as the use of a non-military option in achieving national interests. Africa’s relations with the West have been defined by these two dynamics of the projection of power. The use of military force undergirded previous regimes such as colonialism and the Cold War era and to some extent, the post-September 11, 2001, in which the war on terror has been used as a justifiable reason for the dronisation and securitisation of vast areas of the African continent. The increasing importance of digital security has also ensured that many lives are being monitored virtually (Chomsky and Barsamia 2017). The projection of hard and soft powers is designed within the context of the foreign policies of powerful countries under the hegemony of the US. Thus, paternalism manifests in the design of development strategies such as the Sustainable Development Goals through the logic of ‘help’, ‘foreign assistance’, ‘global pact’ or, sometimes, ‘partnership’. As argued elsewhere Oloruntoba (2017), regardless of the nomenclature of the development strategies, the interest of the powerful countries prevails (see also Wade 2013). Although there may be consultations, meetings, summits and conferences to give a semblance of consultation and legitimacy, it has been the case that such strategies make no pretence to effecting any fundamental changes in the global structure of accumulation, the underlying philosophy of capitalism (which is profit maximisation at the expense of nature and humans) (see Saul 2020, forthcoming). While the 17 goals under the SDGs contain all the nice things such as leaving no one behind, zero hunger, no poverty, decent work, economic growth and so on, the logic of accumulation that underpins the operations of multinational companies remain unaddressed. The continued casualisation of labour, increasing disparity between what workers and executives earn, the support for visionless political elites in Africa, whose only

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r­ elevance is being malleable to foreign interests, the free latitude to receive stolen money from developing countries, the absence of an international financial architecture to stem the tide of illicit financial flows, environmental pollutions being carried out by oil companies and building of walls to keep desperate refugees or migrants away, all points to the contradictions of development strategies and foreign policy objectives as well as economic orientation of the leading powerful countries. And this is not limited to the West. Despite the posturing of BRICS countries for a more equitable international order and advocacy for reforms within the current global governance architecture, Taylor (2014) argues that Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa are not seeking a fundamental change in the global capitalist economy. Rather, their objective is to be able to function more profitably within the same system, at the expense of weaker countries, especially in Africa, where BRICS represents another portfolio in the dependency basket of the continent. It is in the context of the above contradictions that Teju Cole, a Nigerian-American novelist, used the word White Saviour Industrial Complex in 2012. He argues, the White Savior Industrial Complex is a valve for releasing the unbearable pressures that build in a system built on pillage. We can participate in the economic destruction of Haiti over long years, but when the earthquake strikes it feels good to send $10 each to the rescue fund. I have no opposition, in principle, to such donations (I frequently make them myself), but we must do such things only with awareness of what else is involved. If we are going to interfere in the lives of others, a little due diligence is a minimum requirement. (p. 4)

From Nigeria to Egypt, Uganda to Haiti, and many more countries in the developing world, which he did not mention, Cole (2012) highlights that there is ‘money-driven villainy at the heart of American foreign policy’, which ensures that the government of that country interferes or look away from addressing structural problems in those countries, depending on where their interests lie. Cole was not alone in this line of thinking. In his White Man’s Burden, Easterly (2006) argues that the trillions of dollars spent on aid in Africa and by extension other developing world have not yielded the desired result because the supposed beneficiaries were not consulted on what is best for them before those interventions were made. In many instances, sizeable proportions of the foreign aid end up as consultancy fees to the nationals of the donor countries.

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The Sustainable Development Goals replaced the Millennium Development Goals in 2016. Although the MDGs fulfilled some of its goals, gaps exist on issues of poverty eradication, bridging the inequality gaps both between countries and in-country, access to education, water and sanitation and so on. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a set of 17 ‘Global Goals’ with 169 targets. The proposal contained 17 goals with 169 targets covering a broad range of sustainable development issues. Goal 8: 7 specifically focuses on eradicating forced labour, slavery and human trafficking by 2030 (UNDP 2018). Apart from the fact that these goals are too many, they are constructed within the contradictory regime of accumulation in which growth undermines the environment. Also, the expectation of global partnership for meeting the goals is misplaced. History teaches us that many of the developed countries are never committed to meeting their targets. Besides, as argued elsewhere (Oloruntoba 2016; see also Fioramonti 2013), when development is based on the Gross Domestic Product, it reinforces the satisfaction of the needs of the members of the Transnational Capitalist Class (Robinson 2004, 2010). Scholars have argued that the neoliberal capitalist order prioritises profit and accumulation at the expense of the welfare of society. The casualisation of labour, de-unionisation, contracting and wage freeze which is inherent in the current capitalism create contradictions in Africa and other regions of the world that lead to forced labour, slavery and human trafficking. Many of the over 200 million people that are trapped into forced labour, slavery and human trafficking are victims of the current economic system, which excludes the majority, especially in Africa. While the goals are ideal and desirable, nothing substantial can be achieved until the structural disarticulation and distortions in the current economic system is fundamentally changed. The global architecture of trade and finance, which perpetuates unequal rules in terms of access to markets, intellectual property rights, investments and control over the movement of capital, provides fertile conditions for people to endure forced labour, vulnerable to modern-day slavery and traffic in persons. The White Saviour Industrial Complex Industry and Rescue industry could appear to be working for the interests of the marginalised groups. However, the structural nature of the problem, coupled with the weakened capacity of the state in Africa to confront the underlying factors, reinforces paternalism and hegemonic control over the continent.

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Pan-Africanism and the Prospects of African Agency The philosophical foundation of the state in Africa is that of extraction and extraversion (Ake 1981, 1994). Extraction was the main purpose to which the colonialists subjected the colonial state. It is the same logic that informs the continued plunder that the majority of African leaders have subjected it since independence. Extraversion manifests in its continuous proclivity to look everywhere but within to chart development cause, mobilise domestic resources and trade more with other states on the continent. Other scholars have argued that the micro nature of the state in Africa, their lack of autonomy and rootedness in the society, absence of a developmental elite that is conscious of their mission of transforming the continent, make autonomous development at the national level almost impossible (Taylor 2014, 2018; Shivji 1980). Although early post-­ independent leaders made efforts to transform the continent under what Mkandawire (2010) calls developmentalism, such efforts were soon thwarted by both domestic internal contradictions and external interventions (Ki-Zerbo 2003). Thus, many of the states in Africa today remain trapped in debts, poverty, insecurity, conflicts and utter dependence on other countries for survival. To worsen the conditions, Africans have turned on themselves in the struggle for survival under what is increasingly gaining currency as Afrophobia. Although some scholars have argued that xenophobia or Afrophobia is informed by struggle over inadequate resources (Nyamjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2008), I have argued elsewhere that the challenge is more of the crisis of identity, in which lack of self-­ knowing and general ignorance of the salience of consideration for national interests and the maintenance of hegemony and privileges underpin the subordinate position that Africa occupies in the global hierarchy of power (Oloruntoba 2018). Pan-Africanism provides the rallying point for the realisation of political independence from the late 1950s. The formation of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union, was based on a Pan-African idea that no country in Africa can survive alone on its own (Nkrumah 1963). The achievements of the OAU in ending political colonisation on the continent was partly based on the shared commitment of all African countries. Despite the conceptual challenge of what constitutes Pan-Africanism, it remains imperative for socio-economic and political decolonisation of the continent today. Against the backdrop of the micro and dependent nature of the state, a common agenda of socio-­

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economic, political and technological transformation is needed. While the African Union is making various efforts in this regard, as evidenced for instance in Agenda 2063, the newly formed African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the establishment of the Pan-African University, African Mining Vision, much remains to be done. This is especially in relation to how Africa relates to other continents in terms of how mineral resources are extracted without processing, how capital leave the continent without control, how foreign companies operate without transfer of skills, how guns proliferate and sustain ongoing violence and how terms of trade are negotiated. Despite its limitations, as pointed out by Adebajo (2017), the African Union Reforms Agenda spearheaded under the Chairmanship of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda provides the starting point for a continental organisation that should once again lead the process of social-­ economic decolonisation as the predecessor did on political decolonisation. To achieve these objectives, a comprehensive programme of education that starts from the crèche to the university level is required that promotes the merits and necessity of Pan-African Unity for Development (PAUD). Such a programme will also incorporate tens of millions of Africans in the Diaspora, including the first generation of Africans, whose forefathers were forcefully carted into the new world. While the African Continental Free Trade Area represents a significant milestone in the journey towards an African Economic Community, it is imperative to mobilise resources to restructure the governance structure of each state to move towards a union of the African federation as the Casablanca group advocated in the 1960s. A well-communicated goal of achieving socio-economic transformation, where production, innovation, enterprise and welfare are assured under the PAUD initiative could help in mobilising the citizenry to pursue a common commitment that will reduce, if not totally obliterate, the ongoing fratricidal contestations and struggles.

Conclusion Paternalism manifests in different aspects of the relations between Africa and the West. Given the contradictions between a claim of independence and paternalism, it becomes imperative for a new thinking on how Africa can extricate herself from the control of the West and other parts of the world. Over the past five centuries, paternalism has reinforced a culture of dependency among African leaders and a certain tendency among the generality of the populace to look to the West as the ultimate in everything.

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The starting point towards real independence is decolonisation of the mind (Wathiogo 1981). Decolonisation of the mind could serve as the foundation for re-imagining the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world, in ways that will ensure the exercise of one’s agency, the reassertion of self-confidence and determination geared towards reconstruction of the self and the nations. Given the failure of the past paternalistic approach to bring about development outcomes, there should be little expectation that the SDGs contain any magic wand that can bring about transformation in the world. What is needed is a reconstruction of the global capitalist order in ways that consideration for shared humanity will be given precedence over the pursuit of profit and accumulation. The fight against forced labour, slavery and human trafficking cannot be carried out in isolation of the structural conditions that predisposed people and corporations to engage in such inhuman actions. Also, rather than designing intervention programmes from elsewhere to combat these societal challenges, government and non-governmental organisations in Africa should look inward to devise indigenous mechanisms and approaches to addressing them in ways that enhance the exercise of their agencies. Relying on external do-gooders to solve domestic problems always result in sub-­ optimal outcomes.

References Adebajo, A. (2014). Two prophets of regional integration: Raul Presbrich and Adebayo Adedeji. In B. Currie-Alder, R. Kanbur, D. M. Malone, & R. Medhora (Eds.), International development: Ideas, experience and prospects (pp.  1–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Adebajo, A. (2017, September 4). Alchemists of AU reform. Business Day. Available http://ipatc.jobureg/alchemists-of-au-reform. Accessed 28 May 2019. Adedeji, A. (1989). Africa in the nineteen-nineties: A decade for socio-economic recovery and transformation or another lost decade? Foundation Lecture, Lecture Series No: 68, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos: NIIA. Adedeji, A. (2002, April 26–29). From Lagos plan of action to the new partnership for African development and from the acts of Lagos to the constitute act: Wither Africa? Keynote address prepared for presentation at the African forum for envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya. Ake, C. (1981). The political economy of Africa. Harlow: Longman. Ake, C. (1994). Democratization of disempowerment in Africa. Lagos: Malthouse Press. Blair, T. (2001, October 2). Speech at the Labour Party Congress. The Guardian.

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Chomsky, N., & Barsamia, D. (2017). Global discontents: Conversations on the rising threats to democracy. Boston: Metropolitan Books. Cole, T. (2012). The white-savior industrial complex. The Atlantic, March 21, Available. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/ the-whitesavior-industrial-complex/254843/. Accessed December 18. Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion: Why nations are poor and what can be done about them. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Easterly, W. (2006). The white Man’s burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good (Vol. 367, p.  2060). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fioramonti, L. (2013). Gross domestic problem. The politics behind the world’s most powerful number. London/New York: Zed Books. Global Slavery Index. (2018). https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/global-findings/Global Hegel, G. (1956). The philosophy of history. Cambridge, UK: Dante Publication. Keohane, R. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ki-Zerbo, J. (2003). African intellectuals, nationalism and pan-Africanism: “A testimony”. In T.  Mkandawire (Ed.), African intellectuals- Rethinking politics, language, gender and development. Dakar: CODESRIA: 81. Mamdani, M. (1996). The citizen and the subject: Contemporary Africa and legacies of late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mkandawire, T. (2010). Running while others walk: Knowledge and the challenge of Africa’s development. Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School of Development, London. Mkandawire, T., & Soludo, C. (1999). Our continent, our future: African perspectives on structural adjustment (p. 45). Dakar: CODSSRIA. Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. London/New York: Allen Lanees. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2018). Epistemic freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and decolonization. London/New York: Routledge. Neocosmos, M. (2008). From ‘foreign natives’ to ‘native foreigners’: Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics. Dakar: CODESRIA. Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa must unite. London: Panaf Books. Nyamjoh, F. (2006). Insiders and outsiders. Citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary southern Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Oloruntoba, S. O. (2016). Democratization and poverty in Nigeria: Exploring the link between politics and poverty in middle income countries. In J.  May, G. Wright, & E. Breathen (Eds.), Poverty & inequality in middle income countries: Policy achievements, political obstacles (pp. 123–142). London/New York: Zed Books/CROP/University of Bergen.

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Oloruntoba, S. O. (2017). Global regulation and the quest for development post-­ 2015. In S. Zondi & T. Philani (Eds.), From millennium development goals to post-2015 sustainable development goals: The travails of international development (pp. 166–186). Cape Town: CTP Printers in Association with Institute for Global Dialogue. Oloruntonba, S. (2018). The crisis of identity and xenophobia in Africa: The imperative of thought liberation. In A. Akinola (Ed.), The poltiical economy of xenophobia in Africa. New York: Spirnger. Onimode, B. (1988). A political economy of the African crisis. London: Zed Books. Pompeo, M. (2018). Statement by the Secretary of State on Trafficking in Persons Report. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report-2018/. Accessed 21 May 2019. Robinson, W. (2004). A theory of global capitalism. Production, class and state in a transnational world. Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press. Robinson, W. (2010). Global capitalism theory and the emergence of transnational elites. Working Paper No. 2010/02, Finland: World Institute for Development Economics and Research, United Nations University. Rodney, W. (1981). How Europe underdeveloped Africa (2nd ed.). London/ Tanzania: L’Ouverture Publications. Saul, J. (2020, Forthcoming). Left, right and centre: On regrounding a progressive political economy of Africa for the 21st century. In S.  Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), The palgrave handbook of African political economy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shivji. (1980). The state in the dominated social formations in Africa: Some theoretical issues. International Social Science Journal, 32(4), 730–742. Taylor, I. (2014). Africa rising?: BRICS  - Diversifying dependency. New  York: James Currey. Taylor, I. (2018). Africa and the BRICS: In whose interest? In S. Olotruntoba & T.  Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of African politics, governance and development (pp. 723–736). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. UNDP. (2018). Human Development Index. New  York: United Nations Development Programme. Wade, R. (2013). The United States and the world-The art of power maintenance. Challenge, 56(1), 5–39. Wathiogo, N. (1981). Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature. Nairobi: Heinemann. Zeleza, P. (1993). A modern history of Africa vol.1  – The nineteenth century. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Limited in Association with Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa.

CHAPTER 10

The Construction of African Immigrants in Contemporary South Africa and Social Cohesion: Reflections on the Role of the Media Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction African migrants in contemporary South Africa are portrayed in a negative light. This depiction condenses into what Mbembe (2015) refers to as an ideology. Such an ideology feeds into and justifies xenophobic attitudes and attacks on African immigrants, as it is based on the projection of the immigrants as the other. That is, apart from originating from outside, the immigrants are said to be darker than South Africans, to steal jobs reserved for South Africans and to show no respect for their hosts (Mbembe 2015).

I. Moyo (*) Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa C. C. Nshimbi Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2020 181 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_10

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The immigrants are further said to come from poor and backward countries, suggesting that South Africa is an exception because it is more developed and “civilised” (Mamdani 1996). On the other hand, the ­ migrants are regarded as “uncivilised”, unable to speak properly and wanting to reap the gains of democracy, prosperity and the South African state and its patrimony (Nyamnjoh 2006). Way before they migrate to South Africa, African migrants are thus negatively labelled, and the perception is created that “Africa is in chaos and South Africa represents a haven of freedom, peace and prosperity for the continent’s destitute masses” (Crush and Williams 2001, p. 1). This negative labelling (Mamdani 1996) makes immigrants from poor African countries bear a label that explains attempts to restrict their immigration to South Africa, as posited by Peberdy (2009). When attempts to keep them out fail, the migrants deserve evisceration and interpellation in the form of a virulent xenophobic rage. Because of this, this paper argues that a contributing factor to xenophobia in South Africa includes the way in which African immigrants are constructed and/or portrayed. The chapter particularly investigates the role of the media in catalysing the ideology that African immigrants are undesirable and do not deserve to be in South Africa. The paper further posits that such a construction of immigrants destroys the basic fabric of social cohesion and discourages unity that acknowledges diversity, as immigrants share and/or occupy living spaces with locals. Several examples exist in other parts of the world such as the one concerning immigrants from outside the European Union (EU), who face stricter immigration regimes because “European countries display negative attitudes towards immigrants in general and immigration in particular” (Davidov and Meuleman 2012, p. 770). Also, immigration policies against immigrants from Africa have been generally tightened in Britain (Barou et al. 2012). A United Kingdom (UK) study of asylum and refugee regimes by Stewart and Mulvey (2013) suggests a generally exclusivist tendency. African immigrants in Britain experience “discrimination and prejudice in employment, education and everyday neighbourhood spaces” (Waite and Aigner 2012, p. 121) while in France, immigrants from sub-­ Saharan Africa “cannot enjoy the benefits of the French welfare system and instead depend on the solidarity of their countrymen” (Barou 2012, p. 89). Though immigrants are generally welcome to the United States of America (USA), immigration laws in the recent past have been tightened (Golash-Boza 2012; Wong 2012). This is evidenced by immigration raids, vigorous interior enforcement of immigration laws, militarisation of the

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border and home and work raids (Golash-Boza 2012). In 2010, the state of Arizona institutionalised the “criminalisation of undocumented migrants” through the Arizona Senate Bill SB 1070 “that made undocumented migration a crime of trespassing and carried a punishment that involved a fine and jail time” (Golash-Boza 2012, pp. 15–16). Additionally, the 27(g) programme mandates the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), “a federal agency under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to train local enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws as authorised through section 287 (g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)” (Wong 2012, p.  739). The general anti-­ immigration debate in the USA suggests that immigration is not good for the country, as “the concern for securing the border and protecting the US citizenry from predatory migrants has also become a more prominent feature of the public discourse on immigration” (Kretsedemas 2012, p. 5). These immigration debates have striking parallels with South Africa’s. However, the difference with South Africa is that African immigrants, whether enjoying legal status or not, are targeted for attacks by citizens. This is because the immigrants are viewed as not deserving to be in South Africa (Laher 2010) and have become threatening because also for the first time, they can become part of the nation (legally or otherwise) and therefore can be seen to have the potential to deprive entitled citizens of their hard-won rights and access to state resources that they are entitled to as members of the nation. Now that South Africa’s national vision encompasses all South Africans, it seems that Africans from the rest of the continent can threaten the nation and its resources. As the South African state has moved to construct a diverse, but inclusive nation, its immigration anxieties have become similarly inclusive. South Africa’s new national identity as constructed by the state while supposedly African, is actually firmly South African. (Peberdy 2009, p. 168)

Accordingly, “immigration legislation effectively portrays immigrants, especially immigrants from African countries, as a threat to the economic and social goals of the post-apartheid state” (Gordon 2011, p. 51). This arguably provides grounds for xenophobia and especially since the state sees African immigrants as “contaminators of the nation” (Peberdy 2009, p.  158) and “both competitors and consumers for scarce resources and opportunities” (Gordon 2011, p.  47). Hence, “black foreign nationals from Africa are not subject to the normal protections of constitutional

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democracy and human rights obligations. Instead, migrants are treated as an exception and as such relegated to a space outside the workings of the law” (Gordon 2011, p.  45). Notwithstanding, there have been some attempts to fight against xenophobia. For instance, in 2015, the Minister of Police launched the “We Are One Humanity” drive. The main objective of the campaign was to spread the message to the South African population concerning the need to celebrate diversity and difference based on the principle of one humanity (Stolley 2015). And in this way, cultivate the spirit of tolerance towards and an acceptance of migrants. Similarly, in 2017, non-governmental organisation (NGOS) marched to the South African parliament to protest against xenophobia. In particular, the march aimed to object to what they considered government incitement of xenophobia against and the scapegoating of African migrants (Clark 2017). As a result, the NGOs in question challenged the government to protect African migrants and refugees (Clark 2017). The uniquely selective nature of xenophobia in South Africa—targeting African migrants—makes it a compelling issue, as the migrants are blamed for problems afflicting South Africa. This is despite South Africa receiving migrants from other parts of the world as well. With the only exception of Zimbabwe and Nigeria, non-African countries including India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, recorded higher numbers of temporary residence permits (TRPs) issued by South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to their respective nationals than to those of African countries (Moyo et al. 2017). Out of all TRPs issued to foreigners by the DHA in 2013, 18.5 per cent were issued to Zimbabweans and 10.1 per cent to Nigerians, representing the top two recipients of this type of permits. India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the UK ranked third to seventh, representing 7.7 per cent, 6.7 per cent, 5.6 per cent, 4.0 per cent and 3.8 per cent, respectively, of the total TRPs issued, ahead of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho, which were issued 2.7 per cent, respectively, and Angola, 2.5 per cent of all TRPs. Among the top ten recipients of TRPs, African and overseas countries have more or less the same number of documented nationals on TRPs in South Africa. The actual figures were 37,324 and 35,851, respectively, reflecting a difference of only one, 473 more TRPs issued to African migrants (Moyo et al. 2017). The negative construction of African immigrants leading to xenophobia militates against social cohesion in South Africa, leading to questions regarding the role played by the media in the phenomenon.

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In attempting to understand this, the paper proceeds as follows. After this introduction, the paper briefly considers the conceptual framework, within which it situates the discussion and proceeds in the third section, to highlight, with the help of secondary sources and media reports, the ways in which the media may intentionally or unintentionally contribute towards a xenophobic mood. The section also highlights the important role that the media can play through balanced reporting and the recognition of contributions to South Africa by African immigrants. As this could help bridge the division between the perceived and/or actual threatening immigrants/outsiders and South African citizens, the fourth section suggests that this is fundamental to laying a foundation for social cohesion and, therefore, proposes a change in role for the media: to build a better image of the African migrant in South Africa.

The Media, Moral Panics and the Option for Social Cohesion Focusing on Slovenia, Erjavec (2003) explored how the media constructed a discourse of xenophobia through the use of cyclical moral panics. The media constructed negative images of immigrants. It “created” immigrants out of people who, in the past, had been neighbours in Slovenia. In the same manner, Kibreab (1999) comments that the former victims of apartheid have become victimisers of the vulnerable immigrants who come to South Africa. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) amplify this by highlighting that the hostility against immigrants is occurring among South Africans who are familiar with exile and in the past lived in relative peace with the immigrants. In Slovenia, the media promoted fear and distrust and mobilised citizens to a point where fear took over and the feeling of “we cannot live with them anymore” took hold (Vasic 1993, p. 8 as cited in Erjavec 2003, p.  83). Based on the seminal work by Cohen (2002) on moral panics, Erjavec’s (2003, pp. 83–87) analysis shows four ways in which the media constructs a negative image of immigrants. The first involves exaggerating the seriousness of immigration; the second, using melodramatic words to describe immigration; the third, predicting that more consequences are yet to come; and the fourth, stripping immigrants of their favourable characteristics through the symbolisation of immigrants as folk devils. When such a setting is created by the media, xenophobia and hostility become legitimate public discourses, which the media propagates in the name of

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the nation, “carrying the will of the nation” (Erjavec 2003, p. 85). The police and all arms of government respond to this with some responsibility of interpellating those who do not belong—the folk devils. Such a construction of immigrants destroys the basic fabric of social cohesion, as immigrants share and/or occupy living spaces with indigenes. It discourages unity that acknowledges diversity. This essay conceptualises social cohesion as the collective of efforts that place a “strong emphasis on the importance of inter-group relations—on overcoming perceptions of grievance held by social groups which can become the basis of conflict, and on actions which can help to overcome such perceptions e.g. by building citizen identities which cross-cut social difference or by conflict resolution approaches” (Norton and de Haan 2013, p.  4). Socially cohesive communities consist in and exhibit a shared sense of belonging and “we-­ ness” in which the population has the expectation of peaceful relations, as they are held together by the “glue” or bond that is social cohesion (Nshimbi 2016). The negative construction of the immigrant by the media, as demonstrated by Erjavec, robs communities of the social cohesion between migrants and hosts that could otherwise be optimised for its great potential to build peace and achieve development. Various studies have shown socially cohesive communities to not only be able to surmount differences in race, ethnicity, national or cultural background, and so on but to also tend to be healthy, safe, happy, act collectively and so on (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama 1999; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Grootaert and Bastelaer 2001; Nshimbi 2016). The empirical evidence we present from various reports, including the media, in the next section suggests that the media might be oblivious to the socioeconomic, developmental and potential of social cohesion to transform and hold society together or, indeed, just the contrary, if social cohesion is absent—the disintegration and disconnection of society and social structures (Putnam 2001).

The Media Framing of African Immigrants and Xenophobia Based on the (Erjavec 2003) conceptual framework, this section addresses the question regarding the way in which the media contributes towards the construction of a xenophobic discourse and xenophobia against African immigrants in South Africa. Firstly, regarding the media and the construction of xenophobia, therefore, is the exaggeration of the serious-

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ness of the threat of African immigrants to South Africa. Many scholars show that the South African media emphasises that over five-million people are illegally in the country, despite this figure being just an estimate that includes both documented and undocumented immigrants. Sinclair (1998) notes that estimates vary between five and eight million while Crush and Tevera (2010, p. 4) state that “the media makes up numbers”, which are “often highly exaggerated for alarmist effect, acquire a life of their own once they enter the public realm”. As presented by the media, these numbers thus give the impression that too many foreign nationals live in South Africa and in turn justify extreme measures to get rid of the foreigners before they overwhelm South Africa’s population. When the print media especially sustains this view that too many immigrants live in South Africa, it generates xenophobia and feelings of hostility, as it suggests that immigration should be stopped or minimised in view of the excessive numbers. A 17 April 2008 Daily Sun (p. 1) article with the heading “Bob’s Tsunami” suggested that Zimbabwean immigrants were hitting and flooding South Africa like a tsunami. By its very nature, a tsunami is destructive. Zimbabweans flooding South Africa like a tsunami was a problem which needed drastic action. The language of a tsunami coming from a daily newspaper with the highest circulation in South Africa and targeted at a black working class readership (Wasserman 2008) potentially generates feelings of hatred against Zimbabweans. If Zimbabweans were a human tsunami, it meant they were a disaster that needed mitigating and/or stopping, as is the case with natural tsunamis. If any South Africans attacked Zimbabweans in a xenophobic rage as a result of such reporting, they would be justified in the claim that they were dealing with a tsunami that was consuming South Africa. Such a xenophobic mood promoted and sustained by the media only needs an outlet to find violent expression and manifestation. Secondly, the media may use melodramatic and sensational words. Some South African media outlets use the words and language of war and natural disasters (Crush 2000; McDonald 2000a; Mawadza and Crush 2010), giving the impression that South Africa is under attack or invasion (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Landau 2006). The use of war language or of natural disasters such as invasion, influx, flooding (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Landau 2006; Mawadza and Crush 2010), creates a moral panic which solicits a response from the population, as it depicts the African immigrants as a problem—the threatening other which must be confronted. A comment by Crush (2000, p.  12) is relevant here:

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“unfortunately, South Africa’s long history of cross-border migrations seems to have faded from public view and myopia is everywhere evident, particularly in the more popular media with historical attention deficit”. This says a lot about how the media has sensationalised and overdramatised the invasion of South Africa by immigrants from other African countries. Examples of sensationalism and the overdramatising of the migration issue by the media abound: “They wait for darkness before they attack! Aliens use muthi to steal our cattle” (Daily Sun 2008b, p. 11)1; “War against aliens! Thousands forced to flee Alex” (Daily Sun 2008c, p. 2); “Blood and flames! Aliens killed and injured as new attacks stoke flames of hatred” (Daily Sun 2008d, p. 3) and “The Alien Terror! Helicopter chases warring crowds! Fleeing the mighty wind! Going home to Moz” (Daily Sun 2008e, p. 3). These reports propagate the idea that African immigrants deserve this terror and they deserve to be pushed out of South Africa for causing problems, ranging from the use of magical powers and operating in darkness to the theft of livestock (Daily Sun 2008b, p. 11). Linked to this is the third aspect of media, which highlights the perception that if the immigration of foreign nationals into South Africa is not restricted, the consequences will worsen than at the present. Articles from South Africa’s print media demonstrate this thinking. For example, an article in The Sowetan (2010a, p. 3) urged the government to “Control the borders”, highlighting and justifying the deployment of the army at the Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders with South Africa. This is because African immigrants were entering South Africa illegally and South African citizens and farmers in the affected areas needed protection from criminal activities. Again, The Sowetan (2011b, p.  9), in an article titled “Making sense of xenophobia”, argued that African immigrants were worsening the South African problems by stating that “South Africa has its own serious social and economic problems which include poverty, a high rate of unemployment, high levels of illiteracy, homelessness and a myriad of socio-economic challenges”. The tone of this article is basically that African immigrants pose a worsening problem to the country. This is more explicit in the reaction by the host of the popular 1  Muthi in Southern Africa generally refers to traditional medicine concocted from plants, animals and so on but would, in this sense (in the text), be used to refer to the dark side of traditional medicine bordering on the medicine used in witchcraft for magical powers to cast spells and so on.

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radio talk show, Redi Direko Show, which aired 2 June 2008, to the relocation of immigrants displaced by the 2008 xenophobic violence in Gauteng Province: Alright and eh… yeah we are in this together. Someone said how would you feel about it, Redi? Exactly the way those residents of Midrand are feeling this morning. I would not want to have a shack next to my house or a low cost housing and so on. And, it breaks my heart to be admitting to that but it’s the truth, it’s the truth. I put myself in a situation where I’m interrogated and I say ok fine I think government must be responsible for these people they must provide housing but do I have an idea of what I mean really? When I say they must provide housing where exactly? Is it in such a way that it is going to disrupt my own peace, my own calm world, my safe world that I have created for myself? It’s a very difficult one, it really is. And maybe we need to be bold and say and be sincere as well, Redi Direko Show, 2 June 2008.

Fourthly, the media engages in the symbolisation of immigrants (Cohen 2002; Erjavec 2003). In South Africa, African immigrants are a personification of all that is bad. The following examples are based on studies of the media in South Africa by the respective scholars. Muzondidya (2010) notes that in 2000, the Daily Sun newspaper claimed that Zimbabweans committed 70 per cent of the housebreaking offences in Gauteng. Landau (2006, 2009, 2010, 2012) observes that African foreign nationals are accused of a host of social ills that affect South Africa, including crime, drugs, promiscuity and many more other social pathologies. A Daily Sun (2008a, p. 3) article asserted, “many of us live in fear of foreign gangsters and conmen. Much terror has been caused by gangs of armed Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and others”, and a Sunday Times (2008, p.  6) editorial stated “Poor people feel the competition first-hand. They see the limited benefits of the liberation for which they struggled hard being usurped by newcomers”. Another article in the Sunday Times (2011) amplified this idea under the title “Our future needs tough calls” by arguing that: South Africa, like any other civilised country, must look after its own interests if it wants to guarantee its citizens prosperity and protect its national security. Given the poor state of many African economies, it is not surprising that large numbers of Africans have entered South Africa illegally. In this regard, South Africa—now and in the near future—will have to cope with three internal threats: over- extension of its limited human financial and

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other resources, social, political, economic and ecological instability and a renewed spate of xenophobia. The presence of many undocumented foreign nationals in the country surely exacerbates the problem of food security. These foreigners can threaten the national security on many fronts. Locally these foreign nationals form stakeholder organisations, which they use to demand their own rights in the country as per the dictates of our constitution. This is something that also requires decisive action from the government because South Africa could, in the long run, encounter situations similar to the one that led to civil strife in Ivory Coast. (Sunday Times 2011, p. 21)

Additionally, The Sowetan (2012), in an article titled “Foreigners do not benefit South Africa”, expressed the feeling that South Africans who engaged in civil and xenophobic unrest were justified: People engaged in civil unrest, service delivery protests or xenophobic attacks saying that foreigners are taking their jobs are not as wrong as many people would like to believe. Just go to any restaurant, supermarket, construction site, petrol station and any other work place to see this. For every unskilled job that a foreigner holds, the unemployment rate rises and crime by South Africans motivated by hunger increases. How can a Zimbabwean, Nigerian, Ethiopian or Mozambican be a refugee if there is no war in their countries? (The Sowetan 2012, p. 12)

This article, however, clearly misses the point that not all African immigrants are refugees. Should all African immigrants be in South Africa only when there is war in their countries? Can African immigrants not be allowed into South Africa for any reason other than fleeing persecution, poverty and hunger? The media in South Africa sustains the image that a deluge or tide of immigrants is flooding into South Africa (McDonald 2000b; Nyamnjoh 2010). Therefore, this representation or misrepresentation of African immigrants makes them a problem; they are a threat to South Africa. Linked to this media tendency, African immigrants are victimised for having foreign names (Nyamnjoh 2006). This victimisation extends to arresting people based on the suspicion that they were illegal and walking like Mozambicans (Nyamnjoh 2006). Three things can be said regarding the foregoing. Firstly, the depiction of African immigrants as the threatening other is clear from the cited reporting by the popular media. Secondly, the idea is widespread that South Africa is set apart from the rest of Africa (Mamdani 1996; Dyers and

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Wankah 2012), which yields dark-skinned (Nyamnjoh 2006) backward and primitive people (Muzondidya 2010) who are making efforts to attain civilisation (Nyamnjoh 2006). Thirdly, this insinuation amounts to the depersonalisation of these immigrants and relegating them to the subaltern. Also, two issues related to xenophobia arise in discussing the media construction of African immigrants: the first is how the media fails to be objective and the second is how the media exonerates the South African population from xenophobia. Regarding the first, “The media is distinctly uncomfortable with the reality that xenophobia is pervasive and deep rooted phenomenon in South Africa. The reason is not hard to see. It is impossible to answer the question ‘Why are South Africans xenophobic’ without addressing the issue of the culpability of the media, that the media are not simply responding to events but actively South African popular opinion on migration is incontrovertible” (Mawadza and Crush 2010, p. 372). It suggests that the media only reports on how bad immigration is, especially that of African immigrants, as suggested in this section. As a result, the role of the media in nurturing xenophobia remains strong, manages to construct African immigrants in a bad light and avoids grappling with the issue of xenophobia. This introduces the second point, namely, that the media tends to blame xenophobia on criminals and thus absolves the South African population. Two articles in The Sowetan (2010b, 2011a) suggest that there is no xenophobia in South Africa, but acts of criminals, giving the impression that the media is in a state of denial of the existence of xenophobia. This paper considers this to be problematic, as the issue of xenophobia is reduced to random cases of attacks on African immigrants and not a socially embedded angst amongst the South African citizenry, if not a construct of the state as argued or indeed a direct result of media reporting. If the media implies that xenophobia does not exist, the remaining issue then becomes that of African immigrants coming to South Africa. Unfortunately, they become victims of indiscriminate criminals; otherwise, there is no problem, except that South Africa must deal with a flood of African immigrants who complain after they have been attacked by criminal elements. In this, the media seems to suggest that African immigrants are in the wrong place and should not be in South Africa. Their presence in the country poses enough of a problem (as suggested by the way in which they are portrayed) and if they happen to be victims of crime that should not be an issue, as the rest of South Africa suffers the same fate. Thus, dealing with the invasion by African immigrants from this

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point of view is the issue and not xenophobia. This paper thus argues from such innuendo (with notions and perspectives affecting African immigrants) that the media might intentionally or unintentionally be creating a xenophobic discourse and mood. Unfortunately, such punning sometimes erupts into violent actions against foreign nationals from other African countries.

Conclusion Xenophobia is not a South African exceptionalism. However, the targeting of African immigrants in a xenophobic rage provides a compelling case. This is because South Africa is home to immigrants from different parts of the world who do not seem to suffer the same condemnation and virulent attacks. By deploying the concept of moral panics, which transmits the idea that African immigrants are the threatening other as the analytical frame, this paper has attempted to show that the creation and presentation of the image that African immigrants in contemporary South Africa constitute a problem and a threat that must be excluded, if not eliminated. It is in this view that the paper has contended that a contributory factor to xenophobia in contemporary South Africa relates to the construction and “othering” of African immigrants. This chapter that the discourse of exceptionalism based on the perception that South Africa is an exception on the African continent has elevated South Africanness and relegated immigrants from African countries to the subaltern, second classiness and third classiness. This othering of African immigrants has led to the promotion of indigeneity or the reconfiguration of an exclusivist South African identity. Through the propagation of anti-African immigrant tropes and imagery, the African immigrant has also been framed as the “suspect”— the problem which must be gotten rid of. Excluding the African immigrant may include hostility, discrimination, xenophobia and murder. This creates a divide between African immigrants and South Africans and thus militates against social cohesion. It does not help in uplifting “the elements of social progress which include human security and solidarity, [that] can be both constitutive to development, and instrumental to other elements of development, for example the ability of social groups to sustainably improve living standards, or the ability of representative institutions to facilitate economic reforms” (Norton and de Haan 2013, p. 4). These are essential elements of social cohesion, which rest among others, good inter-group relations.

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Contrary to good and positive inter-group relations, the events in post-­ apartheid South Africa up to April 2015 seem to be in tandem with how African immigrants have been constructed and consequently attacked in xenophobic outbursts. Way before they come to South Africa, they are already negatively labelled as primitive, very dark people who are only capable of bringing problems, ranging from magical powers of stealing money to constituting armed gangs who terrorise South African citizens. This construction suggests that the African immigrants are not valuable members of South African society and deserve interpellation and evisceration. Thus, a contributing factor to xenophobia in South Africa is the way in which African immigrants have been constructed. The first real step towards dealing with xenophobia does not, therefore, so much consist of renouncing it in the strongest possible terms. Neither is it for senior civil servants and ministers, among others, to merely engage in street marches. Rather, it is more necessary to clean up the South African perception of the African immigrant. Different sectors of the South African population, including the electronic media, such as South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC 1), campaign against xenophobia by playing Hugh Masekela’s song that encourages inclusivity after each show of the popular soap Generations. Other television stations like e-TV openly campaign against xenophobia too. These are positive steps. The print media and different arms of government must also help construct African immigrants as valuable members of the South African society. The observation by Neocosmos (2010) that during the liberation struggle, there was a discourse of inclusivity—citizenship was not based on indigeneity but on popular democratic activity—should ring a bell on what the government needs to fix about the projection of African immigrants in contemporary South Africa. Not all African immigrants are destructive. Not all of them import problems to South Africa. Some play important roles in science, education, commerce and industry and other sectors of South Africa. Their roles should be included in the construction and reconfiguration of citizenship in this age of increased migration and globalisation. In the same way that popular democratic activity was the rallying point in the struggle against apartheid, the role that African immigrants play in the development of post-apartheid South Africa should, among others, be the rallying point to show that they are still valuable members of the post colony just as they were during the fight against apartheid. A bad image of African immigrants has been intentionally or unintentionally constructed, and success-

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fully so, to incite xenophobia. A progressive alternative would be to decisively and intentionally construct a positive image of the immigrant, in order to inspire unity and a pan-African identity in the post colony.

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CHAPTER 11

On Globalisation, a World Class City, Poverty and Security in Johannesburg’s Inner City Inocent Moyo

Introduction Globalisation is a multifaceted phenomenon, which includes among others, the interconnectedness of countries economically, culturally and socially (Giddens 2011; Held McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 2000). The implication of this, is that globalisation “underpin a transformation in the organisation of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents”, which suggests that globalisation involves “a stretching of social, economic and political activities across frontiers, such that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individual and communities in distant regions of the globe” (Held et al. 2000: 15). The implication of this is that globalisation has ramifications on the everyday lives of individuals, their consumptions patterns, business, politics and security (Nieckarz 2008). If these are the ramifications of globalisation, it therefore suggests that the ubiquity of this phenomenon can also have an impact on cities in the sense that it “embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of

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social relations and transactions–assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact–generating transcontinental or inter regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (Held et al. 2000: 16). The mere fact that globalisation has consequences beyond the margins of a nations state actually means that the impact of globalisation in developed countries of Western Europe and North America can be felt in countries of the Global South. Concerning these countries of the global South, cities are an important unit of analysis in a discussion which focuses on globalisation. This is because a city is “one of the subterritorial units engaging in global relations that largely or fully bypass or rather pass through the nation state” (Nieckarz 2008: 5). It is for these reasons that the unit of analysis in this work is Johannesburg’s inner city, but it needs to be emphasised that, because globalisation is multidimensional (Beall 2002; Giddens 2011; Held et al. 2000), in this paper the focus is on the impact of the neoliberal economic developments and projects on Johannesburg’s inner city’s poor people such as street traders. This is because these neoliberal economic policies and the deregulation prescriptions integral to them have eroded the power of governments and the social democratic policies which they put in place (Gray 1996). The effect of all this is that market forces reign supreme at the expense of those institutions charged with social protection of the population (Mishra 1998). With this in mind, this contribution discusses the impact of globalisation on Johannesburg’s inner city, with a particular focus on poverty and security. Hence, the following questions arise: to what extent could the regeneration and/or redevelopment of Johannesburg’s inner city be seen as a direct product of globalisation, with an emphasis on private capital and investment? How does this affect the activities of ordinary people like street traders? What are the implications for security in such an urban setting? On the issue of security, it needs definition and contextualisation because the concept is open to controversy. It can “be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory. Security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment” (Ul Hag 1995: 115). If this is the case, the question of the impact of neoliberal economic policies on the security of ordinary people like street traders arises. This is important to raise because as a result of globalisation and urban entrepreneurism essential to it, security has focused on the creation and

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preservation of a conducive atmosphere and order for neoliberal economic growth to flourish (Samara 2010). This means that economic activities by poor people and the poor people themselves have become a security threat to the neoliberal economic order and thus deserve evisceration. By extension, this implies that the security of these people is no longer a human security issue. For instance, in a study of Cape Town, it has been shown that urban security has been linked to issues of the creation of space for neoliberal economic business to flourish (Samara 2010). This has led to urban renewal projects, which construct the urban poor and marginalised communities as a security threat to the neoliberal economic projects of the City of Cape Town. Consequently, urban security in Cape Town revolves around protecting economic growth driven by neoliberal economics and has “the literal or de facto privatisation of public space and the emergence or reemergence of an often racialised discourse of the poor as dangerous and criminal, all contributing to spatial fragmentation and a massive fortification of the spaces between rich and poor”, which, if nothing else, is emblematic of apartheid-era urban management and policing (Samara 2010: 199). The result of this is that urban security in Cape Town centres on the reduction of crime, which protects the market and neglects development (Samara 2010). Needless to say, this has led to the insecurity of the poor people and the informal economy actors who are targets in the policing operations, less or no true development in their communities and enduring crime vis-à-vis protected “entrepreneurial urbanism” (Samara 2010: 211). The definition and understanding of security, therefore, should of necessity transcend reference to the defence of the territorial sovereignty and borders of nation states to include among others, personal, civic and domestic matters (Heng 2016). Similarly, when globalisation results in changes in the local environment of people, it can result in fear and a sense of insecurity among the population (Heng 2016). I situate this work in this context and attempt to bring to the fore the implication of the market-­ led redevelopments in Johannesburg’s inner city on the security of poor people, particularly the street traders, based on a qualitative study of street traders in Johannesburg’s inner city between 2011 and 2015. The in-­ depth interviews with the street traders centred on their perception of and response to the various development projects in Johannesburg’s inner city. The reason for adopting a qualitative study was motivated by the need to grasp the experiential realities of the people involved (Titchen and Hobson 2005; Entrekin and Tepple 2006). To carry forward the ­discussion, this chapter is organised as follows. This introduction is fol-

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lowed by a consideration of the neoliberal developments in Johannesburg’s inner city. There is then a discussion of the issue of street traders in light of the issues of human security and the implication of the urban renewal programmes in Johannesburg’s inner city. I conclude by asserting that globalisation has had a negative impact on ordinary people such as street traders in Johannesburg’s inner city, precisely because market-led developments had ignored the needs of and relegated poor people like street traders to the margins of the city. They refuse to occupy the margins of Johannesburg’s inner city and thus continue to fight for insertion into Johannesburg inner city’s economic and social milieu, and this also raises serious security issues.

Neoliberal Developments in Johannesburg Inner City That Johannesburg’s inner city was a prominent commercial centre since the establishment of the city as a mining town in the 1880s is well-­ documented (see, e.g., Mapetla 2006; Olitzki and Luiz 2013; Making of Cities 2016). However, by the late 1990s, the area began to decline (Olitzki and Luiz 2013; Making of Cities 2016). This resulted in “capital and white flight”, which attracted and resulted in the growth in the informal economy (Winkler 2009: 26). Characteristic of this decline are dilapidated or bad buildings, which are run or managed by slumlords as well as poor residents many of whom rely on the informal economic sector to survive (Winkler 2009). These physical and environmental conditions have prompted the City of Johannesburg to implement programmes and activities which target renewal or regeneration of the inner city since the beginning of the millennium (Winkler 2009; Olitzki and Luiz 2013). This is how and why Johannesburg’s inner city was declared “an Urban Development Zone through public and private sector collaboration”, which has included the identification of “bad buildings” and incentivising the private sector to revamp these, a move called the Better Buildings Programme (BBP) (Winkler 2009: 26). In addition, City Improvement Districts were established so as to achieve the regeneration of the inner city (Winkler 2009; Olitzki and Luiz 2013). A broader framework for the regeneration of Johannesburg’s inner city is detailed in the Joburg 2030 vision, which is a plan which integrates all activities which will ultimately make Johannesburg a world class city by 2030 by attracting private sector investment and increasing the price of properties (Joburg 2030: Johannesburg’s Economic Development

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Strategy 2003). In this sense, the Johannesburg inner city gentrification and rehabilitation programmes are an essential part of the Joburg 2030 Vision and the refined Joburg 2040 GDS, “that sets its sights on a desired Johannesburg of the future – a Johannesburg in which all will aspire to live and work” (Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy 2011). Other efforts aimed at the regeneration of the inner city involved the formation of Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) in 2001 so as “to stimulate and support area-based economic development initiatives throughout the Johannesburg metropolitan area in support of Joburg 2030” (Luiz 2003: 4). At the same time as implementing these programmes of regeneration, the City of Johannesburg came up with the Inner City Regeneration Charter, in an attempt to respond to the needs of poor people (Winkler 2009). Nevertheless, these market-led developments have attracted significant commentary. For instance, some scholars argue that the inclusion of a Charter to cater to the needs of poor people is a façade to hide the intentions of creating a neoliberal city where the market determines how land is used. It is in this context that Winkler (2009) argues that poor people have not been considered in the redevelopments in Johannesburg’s inner city because the idea of creating a world class African city seems to take precedence, as clearly shown in the following declaration: through our regeneration, we are going to make millionaires out of a lot of people. What is happening is that a higher calibre of people is now moving in. They are taking up the penthouses and they are creating the world class city that we are taking about. (Interview, with Inner city Director 2004 cited in Winkler 2009: 27)

Further, the top-down approaches adopted by the City of Johannesburg are not pro-poor because “Johannesburg’s policy makers and politicians continue to be inspired by international renaissance precedents where market led redevelopments, tax incentives…[and]… flagship projects”, which do not consider the urban poor (Winkler 2009: 28). For this reason, the composition of the Johannesburg inner city dwellers is the one that prompted the City of Johannesburg to clean up the city of undesirable elements in line with the imagined city standards of the North and provide a conducive environment for neoliberal economic activities to blossom or, if nothing else, proliferate (Winkler 2009). Differently stated, neoliberal capitalism has taken “control over the social production of

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urban space and their city building prowess to a global scale, leaving the city behind as merely the container or canvas for capitalism’s inscriptions” (Soja 2000: 102). The brief commentary on the regeneration or renewal of Johannesburg’s inner city shows that the process of gentrification and its supposed consequences are always controversial; for instance, the issue of “whether it is necessary to destroy a community in order to save it” (Dennis 2008: 496) always arises. Besides, gentrification always embeds a class conflict between the rich and the poor. The former in the name of big businesses and investors who support renewal are regarded as taking over the space for the latter on the basis of financial strength (Dennis 2008). This is where I position this contribution, but instead of dwelling on a critique of gentrification, I focus on the implications of market-led developments and redevelopments in Johannesburg’s inner city on human security, particularly that of poor people. In this regard, I ask, if the regeneration and renewal in Johannesburg inner city prioritise neoliberal capital and businesses, how does this impact the security or insecurity of ordinary residents? Does the security of neoliberal developments and businesses increase the insecurity of poor people like street traders and with what consequences? Interview data, discussed in the following section, should shed light on these and other questions.

Johannesburg Inner City Renewal, the Fate of Street Traders and the Aftermath In many African countries, urban informality in its various manifestations, which include among others, street trading, is negatively viewed, and this is why many governments regularly engage in clean-up operations of the cities (Kamete 2006). In countries like Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, urban informality is not regarded as an integral part of the urbanisation process but as spatial deviance, which warrants interpellation so that the city conforms to the standards of those cities in Western Europe and North America (Kamete 2013). A classic and well-documented case is that of Zimbabwe. In May 2005, the Zimbabwean government implemented Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Clean Up) so as to clean up the cities in the country (Gumbo and Geyer 2011). This operation resulted in the total annihilation of the operations of street traders, but also shattered

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their livelihoods (Gumbo and Geyer 2011). There are suggestions that this move was also politically inspired in terms of punishing urban voters for supporting opposition political parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Bratton and Masunungure 2007). That said, in South Africa, urban informality is not viewed as an integral part of the economy and this is why it is referred to as the second economy (Aliber et al. 2006). This could be seen to justify all those attempts which purport to bring order to the city, perhaps because urban informality is seen as backward (Geertz 1963). This is important to raise because it is known that within the globalisation matrix, cities play an important role as conduits for neoliberal capitalism to strive (Nieckarz 2008). Even more instructive is the fact that “Johannesburg is part of the world city network, even if it is only a minor node. The city is the administrative center that facilitates the efficient resource extraction for much of Southern Africa. Whereas considerable degree of ownership of the resource industry is concentrated in Johannesburg, the city also functions as a node through which surplus is channelled to distant shareholders” (Surborg 2011: 131, cited in Rogerson and Rogerson 2015). Such shareholders would tend to want a conducive environment for their business for them to realise good profits. Consequently, the destruction or annihilation of the informal economy and street traders should, therefore, be seen as paving a way for the so-­ called progressive and modern forms of business, within the broader framework of globalisation. With this background in mind, it is then relevant to discuss the case of Johannesburg’s inner city in detail. One of the well-documented Johannesburg inner city renewal programmes was the operation called Operation Clean Sweep, which was implemented by the City of Johannesburg in September 2013 (see Moyo 2015). As an essential element of the project aimed at the rehabilitation of Johannesburg’s inner city to make it conducive for neoliberal economic activities, as described in the preceding sections, Operation Clean Sweep led to the destruction of street traders` trading stalls (Moyo 2015). As expected, this led to a fierce contest between the regulatory regimes in the form of the City of Johannesburg on the one hand and the street traders on the other (Moyo 2015). The street traders argued that the explanation by the City of Johannesburg that the operation was part of planning was a smokescreen that hid the sinister motives of pushing the street traders out of Johannesburg’s inner city and in this way open a space for neoliberal capitalism. Hence, one street trader asserted that:

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if it was about planning, they should have implemented the new measures without destroying the stalls. Why did they not plan around the stalls, when they built the stalls in the first place and then make the transition? I sell my clothes from this bag and if the police try to catch me, I evade them. In the final analysis I am back on the streets with or without a stall, legally or illegally. I will continue what I am doing. Well if they allocate us the trading stalls, which will be great. Either way, I will continue with my business. (Interview with a street trader, October 2013)

Further, this contest, as illuminated by interview data, brings to the fore the issue of urban security. For instance, one street trader argued that: these authorities are heartless because we were told that they were cleaning the city and making it safe. What are they cleaning? Are we trash? There are no jobs and for me this is a way of supporting my family. Who are they making the city clean for? This is wrong. What is clean about not being able to support my family and pay rent? Who needs the cleanliness except the rich and powerful people and tourists?. (Interview with a street trader, October 2013, Johannesburg inner city)

The sentiments above point to the fact that the City of Johannesburg engaged in the destruction of the stalls which belonged to street traders, because they wanted to create a clean environment for private investors and investment. This resulted in the construction of the street traders as dirt which needed to be cleaned off the streets. The rich investors may be representatives of rich and powerful international companies, Multinational Companies (MNCs) or Transnational Companies (TNCs) based in developed countries of North America and Western Europe and yet have an impact on the streets of inner-city Johannesburg. The views of the street trader actually suggest the triumph of neoliberal capitalism over institutions that should protect ordinary people. In addition, from the views of this street trader, we can detect that they are not happy that the City of Johannesburg considers them as dirt that needs to be cleaned. One can detect a security issue in that the street trader in question suffers from anxiety, fear and uncertainty. When the City of Johannesburg pushes them out of the streets will make their family starve and that has a security implication. It should be remembered that security is more than defending the territorial sovereignty of a country; it also involves individuals and communities (Ul Haq 1995). The street trader in question is troubled that they will not be able

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to buy food and pay rent, which means globalisation in this sense has led to the insecurity of these street traders in Johannesburg’s inner city. In this vein, the street traders argue that there is nothing clean about the City of Johannesburg removing them from the streets. In fact, the sentiments of the street trader imply that what is even dirtier is the fact that neoliberal capitalism has invaded their space and displaced them and, in the process of doing so, destabilised their livelihoods. Even more interesting is awareness by the street traders of the presence and power of international investors who are driving the urban renewal agenda, so that they appropriate the Johannesburg inner city space to themselves. One is reminded of the study of Cape Town by Samara (2010), in which similar moves amounted to the privatisation public space, so much so that those who are driven out of public space live on the edge and are constructed as criminals and a serious security issue. But, driving ordinary people out of Johannesburg’s inner city in the name of the security of private investors and tourists actually increases the insecurity of the victims of such renewals in the sense that they become dislocated from and their livelihoods are seriously disrupted. Therefore, from the point of view of the street traders, lack of food, income and starvation are directly linked to the globalisation of economic activities in Johannesburg inner city in so far as the City of Johannesburg acts at the best of the demands of big companies and investors. It should be noted that: most people whom you see on the streets are unemployed as a result of retrenchments from companies. Now that we have set up our businesses and trading stalls to take care of our families, the same companies or part of them are using the City of Johannesburg to chase us out of the trading space. So where must we go and what must we do to survive. (Interview with a street trader, November 2013)

These views seem to validate the well-known facts about some of the impacts of globalisation on the economy in many African countries. An interesting point is that the companies or their subsidiaries which led to their unemployment were now hounding them down even after they had engaged in the informal economy on the streets of Johannesburg’s inner city. In this, I see a security issue. The people have been destabilised, they are not secure and they do not live in peace. The street traders directly link and trace this to the globalisation of economic activities. However, in this regeneration programme, street traders who were interviewed should not

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be seen as helpless victims. They were prepared to fight and indeed fought back. The following views, which are representative of all the street traders who were interviewed, is striking: as long as there is no immediate plan for me to continue my business, I will illegally trade on the streets. I cannot postpone my ….. Life must go on. The buying of food for my children and the payment of their school fees and rent for where I stay is now; it cannot wait or be postponed. What this means is that I will continue to trade on the streets whether I have authority or not, they should be engaging a war against poverty and not a war against poor people who have taken matters into their own hands to provide for themselves. (Interview with a street trader, November 2013)

As a result of the renewal programmes, the street traders started operating illegally. This is or has a security implication. If the street traders illegally operate on the streets, this could lead to the trading in illegal goods. Most importantly this can lead to the proliferation of underground economic activities. This is precisely because those officials such as the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), who are charged with policing the streets and complementing the renewal activities, harassed the street traders, such that they had to resort to this mode of operation. Linked to this is that some of the street traders had to “bribe the JMPD so that they could continue to operate on the streets” (Interview with a street trader, December 2013). This means that as long as the street traders managed to pay bribes they could operate anyhow on the streets. As a result, all manner of people trade on the streets, including in undesignated trading zones; this provided fertile ground for the proliferation of dangerous and underground economic activities. The potential of these activities turning Johannesburg’s inner city into a dangerous place is a security issue to the extent that those street traders who afforded to bribe officials could literally do anything without being arrested. In this sense, the law only applied to those without money and was, therefore, weak. Nevertheless, there is no attempt to simplify the dynamics in Johannesburg inner city by only linking such developments to the growth of neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, it is accepted that urban informality could exhibit these characteristics as a result of the nature of the shortage of employment such that people are forced to engage in activities, which border on the illegal (Moyo 2015). In this regard, this discussion should be seen as illuminating the dynamic of neoliberal developments in

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Johannesburg but cognisant of other factors, which are not the focus of the present contribution. In this vein, studies in other parts of the worldhave shown that the nature and dynamics of uncontrolled urbanisation in developing countries complicate the issue of crime and urban security. This is because issues of security may be linked to or indeed emanate from the nature of urban infrastructure, lack of cohesion in the urban community, as well as inequalities regarding services, mixture of different people with differing value systems and cultures among other issues (UN Chronicle 2013). Beyond this heterogeneous collection of the strategies of resistance and contest by the street traders, which they engage in so as to maintain their livelihoods and the security integral to this, street traders have also resorted to law. For instance, in 2013, the street traders, through representation by the South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) and the South African Informal Traders Forum, took the matter of their eviction and removal from the streets of Johannesburg’s inner city to the Constitutional Court. This court ruled in their favour in December 2013 by allowing them to return to the streets to trade. Some trade legally and others do not, and this has security implications as described in the preceding sections. Some street traders will engage in illegal activities under the guise that the Constitutional Court allowed them to trade on the street. This actually shows how difficult, if nothing else, complex, it is to manage the street traders given the multilayered contest and struggle. For instance, how does one deal with legal and illegal street traders given that the former bribed the police officers and this earned the right to trade? Similarly, given that the Constitutional Courted ruled that the street traders had a right to trade on the streets, some who engage in illegal activities have used these lawful means to engage in nefarious activities. In this, I see a security issue in terms of the proliferation of illegal activities, which may endanger the lives of the street traders themselves. For instance, as a study by Moyo (2017) showed that some street traders in Johannesburg’s inner city sold drugs to people, including young children in the Johannesburg inner city, because they could easily bribe the police officers. In fact, this created a rift between the street traders themselves in that those who claimed to be honestly earning a living on the streets were unhappy with those who were accused of selling drugs. This is the source of accusations that street traders who sold drugs were migrants from other African countries and not South African citizens (Moyo 2017). Although there was an uneasy alliance between the South

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African and street traders from other African countries, on the streets of Johannesburg’s inner city, I see a security issue that has a potential for a xenophobic outburst. As a matter of fact, there have been such virulent xenophobic attacks against street traders from other African countries in some parts of Johannesburg. From May 2011 through to September 2013, South Africans attacked migrant business owners in Reiger Park (Ekurhuleni) and other townships around Johannesburg (Ivier 2013a, b, c, d; The Star, 19 May 2011a: 16). Included in these attacks were Somalis in the Ramaphosa informal settlement in Gauteng province (The Star, 2 June 2011b: 6). In 2011, Somali shops were burnt down and the victims were ordered to go back to Somalia (Pillai 2011). It was reported that in Johannesburg, Somalis suffered daily harassment (The Star 27 March 2012). Although there are continuing efforts to clean up the streets in Johannesburg’s inner city, there have been accusations that the current mayor Mr Herman Mashaba is fuelling xenophobic violence by claiming that he was resolute in his attempt to rescue the city from criminals and cleaning the city of so-called illegal migrants (Chaskalson 2017). Clearly the issue of urban renewal in Johannesburg’s inner city is multilayered and so are the issues of security.

Conclusion Insights from this contribution seem to suggest that in the case of Johannesburg’s inner city, economic globalisation in the form of neoliberal developments has led to attempts aimed at privatising public places. This has taken the form of urban renewal and regeneration so as to attract private investors and investments. This has negatively affected ordinary people such as the street traders who had their trading stalls demolished. These cleaning operations continue up to this day. From a globalisation and security point of view, the programmes of regeneration of Johannesburg’s inner city so as to create a space for private business has shattered the livelihoods of ordinary people such that they have no means of earning a living. As Samara (2010) in a study of Cape Town has shown, this is tantamount to the conversion of public space into a private zone, where private capital and neoliberal capitalism reign supreme and anything that does not align to this is criminalised and eviscerated. This has created instabilities in the lives of the people. As Heng (2016) and Ul Haq (1995) have observed, globalisation can have impacts at a personal and domestic level and in this case, the instabilities in the lives of street traders testify to

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this. These are people who are unemployed and trading on the streets is how best they earn a livelihood to support their families. This has led these street traders to fight the clean-up operations by the City of Johannesburg as they view these as symptomatic of the triumph of globalisation over social and political institutions that should protect such people in the first instance. But, because of globalisation, such institutions turn against and abandon the people that they must protect. In this sense, Gray (1996) was correct in the observation that neoliberal economic policies tend to erode the power of governments and the social democratic policies which must protect the citizenry. Not only has this led to a contest between the street traders and the City of Johannesburg but it has also bred illegal and nefarious activities which appear to thrive on the streets of Johannesburg’s inner city. This has serious security implications in degenerating Johannesburg’s inner city into a dangerous place. Nonetheless, there is no attempt to simplify the complex dynamics in Johannesburg’s inner city. First, cities are complex and so are the processes that they generate (UN Chronicle 2013), such that some of the security implications discussed in this contributed could occur as a result of the contribution of other factors. Second, while cognisance is taken of this, the discussions in this chapter should be viewed from the globalisation and security prism.

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CHAPTER 12

The State Bureaucracies and Development in Africa: Interrogating the Link Maryam O. Quadri and Vera Amaechi Uche

Introduction Modern governments have come to rely on the administrative apparatus as an instrument of delivering state objectives including socio-economic ones. Considered as a sine qua non in the process of development, a strong bureaucracy (public service) is imperative to the economic and social development of a state. The public service has always been the tool available to African governments for the implementation of developmental goals and objectives (ECA 2003). It is in essence the most important instrument of the state to translate its will into an actionable programme. The state needs specialized institutions for implementing public policy and employs large numbers of people who make it their career to serve it in a professional capacity. The bureaucracy thus refers to the public services and the organizations into which they are structured (Smith 2003). As the implementers of the objectives of the state, bureaucracy occupies a critical position in the political decision-making of governments. The connection between the state and public administration lies in the fact that it is through its administrative institutions that the state is able to

M. O. Quadri (*) • V. A. Uche Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria 215 © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_12

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construct and implement the policies which promote the common good in the exercise of its powers (Olaopa 2009, p. 113). As far as the state has been at the forefront of planning change in economy and society through programmes of investment, education, family planning, nutrition, sanitation and the like, it has been dependent for the success of those plans upon a powerful and effective administration (Smith 2003, p. 160). Bureaucracy (public service) is a powerful institution in modern society. It can increase or decrease the state’s capacity for effective performance. “Regardless of why the bureaucracy exists, and irrespective of why the number of bureaucrats has grown, the fact remains that the bureaucracy has power” (Henry 2001, p. 11). Their strength also stems from the permanent nature of their positions and their superior knowledge of government operations (Nhema 2016). The existence of an effective public service thus becomes necessary for efficient service delivery. Effective bureaucracies are supposed to ensure that goals are implemented (Lane 2000). An efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable in the process of development (Thovoethin 2014). The perception that public administration agencies are unresponsive and unproductive, therefore, hurts their ability to fully contribute to national development efforts (Bertucci 2001). According to Bertucci, this perception came with the failure of the public service in Africa to act as an agent of development as it concerns the implementation of development objectives. The dysfunction of public services in Africa had an implication for her economy as rightly observed by Lawanson and Adeoye (2013, p.  189), that the deterioration of public administration in Nigeria and other African countries, however, went on pari passu with the deterioration of the economy, which, to a large extent, was caused by the same set of factors like the growth of the public sector in response to political pressure for social services expansion and development following independence… Hence, many years after independence, Africa remains poor in relation to other continents. This is one of the reasons why Goldsmith (2001) avers that state bureaucracies are a problem in Africa but mostly because they underperform, not simply because they are over-expanded. At its core, Africa’s problem, according to Basheka (2015, p. 471), has remained that of underdevelopment where people are poor, resources are under-utilized and the institutions established are ineffective in facilitating the very individual and collective action needed to resolve the problems of society. More than ever before, and despite resource shrinkages, the public

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service is under pressure to find innovative solutions to wide-ranging socio-economic problems—unemployment, deterioration of educational and health facilities, worsening housing conditions and decaying infrastructure Proceeding of the Second Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Civil Service (1998). In order to improve their countries’ positions in the emerging world economy, governments in Africa and other developing countries have been forced to redefine their roles and strategies. In doing so, almost all have blamed the “dead hand” of bureaucracy: the poor performance of public bureaucracies, the daily annoyances of irksome restrictions, cumbersome red tape, unpleasant officials, poor service and corrupt practices (Ayee 2008, p. 8). We seek to explore in this paper the challenges of public service reforms in Africa by examining the context of reforms within the paradigms of public administration. The paper premises its arguments on the perception that the political and social environments of African public services should form the basis for understanding why African bureaucracies have performed below expectations. We argue that African public services cannot be detached from the context that produced them. Seeking a better explanation of African public services ineptitude, therefore, requires an understanding of this context and its impact on their mode of operation and performance. In an effort to achieve this, the paper historicizes Africa’s public administrative system and posits that public service performance should be analysed within the vortex of the prevailing political system. Studies by Goldsmith (2001) and King (1987) have shown that reforms of public service are continuous, and given the challenges that attended successive reform efforts in Africa public service, there should be a search for a workable system of administration to execute the governments’ policies.

Theoretical Foundation: Max Weber Bureaucracy Understanding public administration in Africa often takes as its point of departure the Weberian ideal bureaucracy. Bureaucracy for Weber was the most advanced form of human organization that society had devised and the most rational means for the performance of collective tasks, especially those requiring large-scale organization. McCourt as cited in Robinson (2015, p. 5) sets out the central features of this model:

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• A separation between politics and elected politicians on the one hand and administration and appointed administrators on the other; • Administration is continuous, predictable and rule-governed; • Administrators are appointed on the basis of qualifications, and are trained professionals; • There is a functional division of labour and a hierarchy of tasks and people; • Resources belong to the organization, not to the individuals who work in it; • Public servants serve the public rather than private interest. • This “command and control” approach to public administration was the reference point for bureaucratic systems introduced around the world under colonial rule and then after independence in most countries. Goldsmith (2001), however, observes that real countries only approximate the Weberian model of apolitical, technocratic public administration. The Weberian bureaucratic model has been the subject of criticisms. The first line of attack according to Goldsmith (2001, pp. 2–3) has to do with the fact that the government gets bigger for no good reason. The driving force is managers who want to improve their status by building up their staff, which leads to increases in positions that bear little relationship to the purpose or amount of work to be done. Each superfluous worker generates another, and offices and bureaus multiply over time without adding any value.  This has  led to over-bloated public service in many African countries with the attendants problem of ineptitude. The second main avenue for criticizing bureaucracy stresses the external factors behind bureaucratic enlargement. Public choice as an approach to understanding human behaviour assumes that political life is conceived as an exchange activity among self-interested individuals acting in the setting of market transactions (Schaff and Ingram n.d.). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that the individual will find it profitable to explore the possibility of organizing an activity collectively when he expects that he may increase his utility. Other public choice theorists (Downs, Olson, Riker and Becker) have further argued along this premise. The privileged groups of rent-seekers ask for advantageous government programmes, and those leaders are keen to say yes to maintain their hold on power. The bureaucrats hired to carry out these programmes develop alliances with the external constituency groups. All work together to protect their pet programmes and to secure more resources for them. An inexorable pro-

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cess of bureaucratic expansion follows. Such anti-bureaucratic arguments can be applied to Africa (Goldsmith 2001). African public sector employment exploded after independence, often as a means to provide patronage to groups of political supporters. Bates (cited in Goldsmith 2001, p. 3) points out that those bureaucrats are never perfect agents of their leaders’ will, and in Africa they corrupted significant aspects of government programmes and survived off the proceeds. Furthermore Guma (2012) observes that excessive observance and submission to rules and regulations, inefficiency, political interference, misuse of power, poor decision-­ making, corruption, job dissatisfaction, concentration of power, low creativity, managerial frustration, organizational conflict and many other dysfunctions have come to characterize the public sector throughout Africa. To this end, inefficient and ineffective service delivery became the bane of the African public bureaucracy.

Historicizing African Public Administrative System The trajectory of development of public administration in African countries reflects the inherited legacy of the colonial masters. In most African countries, public service is a product of the colonial masters transferred to the indigenes at independence and, of late, most African states have modified public service to suit their cultural diversity. In developing countries including African countries one of the most dominant features of state bureaucracy is its inherited colonial legacy, in spite of the post-colonial rehabilitation and reforms in the administrative superstructure (Haque 1997, p.  432). Colonialism bequeathed public service imbued with its own trappings which have continued to affect African public service in the implementation of states developmental objectives. As observed by Nhema (2016), the inherited public administration system emerged as the natural choice through which the struggle towards development and national building could be achieved. Haque further argues that the continuation of colonial legacy resulted from the fact that many of the post-colonial ruling elites themselves were products of colonial education and orientation. Even so when the colonized territories got independence from the shackles of colonial power, their bureaucracies were not completely different from the colonial bureaucracy. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014) in their historical studies on African public services locate the genesis of the specific operating modes of c­ ontemporary African state administrations and their articulation of formal and practical norms in the existing historical studies of African colonial administration.

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The modern bureaucratic state was introduced during the colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa. It combined bureaucratic modes of operation with despotic and intermediate ones. At the same time, it largely lacked the elements of citizenship and the legal form of administration that had marked authoritarian modes of government in the nineteenth century. Naturally the colonial state also delivered—albeit limited and selective—public goods and services: mainly infrastructure, but also education and vocational training, health services, animal health and so on. However, due to the special conditions of colonial domination, these public goods were delivered in a special form, wrapped in practices of patronage, privilegism, corruption, contempt of anonymous customers—practices that differed significantly from the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy and established lifestyle routines of officials that remain virulent to the present day (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014, p. 40). The formation of colonial administrative legacy involved certain historical stages: first, the pre-independence “preparation” for self-­ government based on colonial education and orientation; second, the post-colonial administrative “training” to modernize the public service; and third, the contemporary devices of administrative “reform” (Haque 1997, p.  433). Colonial administration exercised considerable control over administrative apparatuses. In his analysis of the impact of colonialism on the development of management in Nigeria, Duke (cited in Basheka 2015, p. 480) affirms how the administrative system, adopted in managing the Nigerian state by the British, essentially organized government apparatus along a centralized and hierarchical structure. He observed that this system emphasized direct and strong control, as it required that all personnel remained unquestionably subordinate to the top (colonial) authority, personified by the High Commissioner and his executive lieutenants. The local content of the administration—the native political agents, warrant chiefs, clerks, messengers and constables—were merely subordinate field executors or foot soldiers of colonial policies and decisions of the top hierarchy. The system took Africans as second-class citizens in their own country as nothing much was done during the period to settle the wide disparities, even the colonial reforms failed to place Africans in the administrative class of the civil service or the top policy-making positions of the colonial service. There were discriminatory personnel policies and practices between the colonial masters and Africans (blacks) (Aladegbola & Jaiyeola 2016).

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Many post-colonial states experienced a decline in the quality of governance and the effectiveness of public administration in subsequent years as neo-patrimonial pressures asserted themselves and state resources and public appointments were subject to the personal influence of political leaders and their followers (Robinson 2015). Governance and public service reform efforts in many developing countries from the 1980s continued to adopt the centralized, bureaucratic model of public administration as the point of departure for effective development. Re-establishing the conditions for a top-down and hierarchical model of development following years of predation and neo-­ patrimonial rule was the desired goal for many public management reforms (Robinson 2015).

Public Service Reforms in Africa Much of the public sector’s growth has been attributed to increases in the social and economic complexity of modern life. As society grows more complex, there is a greater demand for public services. The challenge then becomes how to manage big government with the attendant problems of increasing and greater demand for public services. Public service reform is a planned intervention to raise the level of public service performance. It must have carefully defined goals and a strategy to attain these goals. The ultimate aim of the public service reform is to see a remarkable improvement in public service outputs such as more effective and responsive service deliveries (Fatile and Adejuwon 2010). The objective for public service reform could result from a search for more efficiency in the way the government allocates public resources or more justice in income redistribution. The idea of reform is to ensure that an organization is repositioned to handle the dynamism in and around it and thus become more effective and efficient (Olaopa 2012, p. 18). Therkildsen (2001) argues that reform and the implementation of reform measures are basically about inducing changes in power relations between state and society, between politicians and bureaucrats, and between government organizations… Thus, the mechanisms through which public sectors are reformed go to the heart of who governs. In most countries in the region, the design and implementation of reforms are pushed by both internal and external forces. Adamolekun and Kiragu (2002) equally observe that the major recent public administration reforms in sub-Saharan Africa countries are inspired by or have parallels in the

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public administration reform experiences of other countries, industrialized, developing and transition, across five continents. The conception and implementation of reform are not, therefore, insulated from the political, social, economic and other factors in its environment. Van der Westhuizen (2005, p. 143) observes that some scholars are of the opinion that most of the public sector reform programmes that have been implemented in the last two decades have been motivated by pressures such as the economic/fiscal crises, political forces, existence of complex institutional mechanisms and influences from the Western world. Reforms of public service in Africa was aimed at their transformation to enable them to accommodate new developments goals. Caiden (as cited in Lamidi, Agboola and Taleat 2016, p.  3) argues that the old colonial bureaucracy with its rigid Max Weber-type of administration could not supply the needs of the post-colonial state. As King (1987, p. 209) observed: One of the first problems African countries tend to contend with came with the granting of independence. The colonial ‘law and order’ administrative structures were no longer adequate. The public services had to be made more responsive to the public demands which would accompany statehood. They had to be geared to dealing with the problems of nation building and associated new functions. Therefore the post-colonial bureaucracies had to be reformed in such a way that they would be capable of playing a leading role in the more intensive social reform and in the rapid changes accompanying development in the African region.

A dominant theme in the administrative reform exercise embarked upon by several African states since the late 1960s is the expressed desire of the ruling regimes to make their state bureaucracies “development oriented”. He observes that a development-oriented bureaucracy is one capable of bearing the major responsibility for promoting economic and social development (Adamolekun 2006, p. 94). This redefinition of development had important repercussions on public management. The centralized nature of public policy-making that had tended to characterize the new state had led to bureaucratic red tape and inability to perform the expected role of innovator (Hyden 1995). The need for administrative reform tailored towards achieving the new development orientation became inevitable for most African countries. African countries have long been trying to make their civil services do better at delivering these services (Goldsmith 2001). According to Nwokoma (2015), public sector reforms have been on the agenda for a

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number of years. For instance, Nigeria has had many reforms of her public service carried out. Some of these reforms included Morgan Salaries and Wages Commission in 1963, Adebo Commission in 1971, Public Service Review Commission in 1974 Presidential Task Force on the Implementation of the Civil Service Reforms 1988, Promulgation of Decree No. 43 of 1988, Civil Service Reforms and Review Panel on Civil Service Reforms (Ayida Report) 1995 among others. According to Ayeni (2007, pp.  96–97), of these reforms, the public service review commission of 1974 (Udoji Report) was the most comprehensive, in that, it did not only review salaries but also introduced measures to increase productivity, efficiency and make the service more effective. Unfortunately, the measures and the specific objectives of the reform were not fully implemented. The Promulgation of Decree No. 43 of 1988, Civil Service Reforms was also significant in the annals of reforms in Nigeria. The stated main aim of the reform was to make the civil service virile, dynamic and result-­ oriented. Other objectives of the reform included enhanced professionalism in the public service, decentralization and delegation of authority, the matching of authority with responsibility and the enhancement of effectiveness, and the efficiency and speed of operation (Ayeni 2007). These reforms were to ensure that Nigerian bureaucracy is strategically positioned for it to be able to live up to expectation consequent upon the increasing role of government in every human society. However, much was not achieved with the reforms in Nigeria and hence the continuous efforts of the state in seeking a better way of doing government business. While the public service reform efforts of the African countries are acknowledged, Ayee (2008) observes that: Trends in reforming the public sector in Africa show that they have been influenced by both economic liberalisation and democratisation. It is perceived that donors, rather than ‘home-grown’ forces have driven them. Each trend placed emphasis on accountability and improved service delivery. One significant outcome is that the reform trends show mixed results, mainly because public expectations of the state in Africa differ fundamentally, while the notions of public service ethos or civil service culture have not changed, as envisaged. (p. 74)

There have been three waves of public service reforms in Africa, namely, structural reforms—experienced in the early 1980s; capacity building— experienced in the 1990s and the on-going service delivery improvement which came into existence in the early 2000s (Olowu 2002; Afegbua and Ejalonibu 2015).

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The reason behind the 2000s reform was the need to demonstrate early results, public demands for transparency and accountability, influence of new public management, the need to support sector-wide approaches and an integrated systems approach. From the academics and policy practitioners perspective, “much emphasis was laid on measures for enforcing the accountability of the governors to the governed through increased transparency, openness, and citizen participation” (Mutahaba and Kiragu, cited in Okeke-Uzodike and Chitakunye 2014, p. 85). Models of public administration in developing countries have generally drawn on experience in advanced countries and public sector reforms have often mirrored reform initiatives originating in those countries (Robinson 2015). Many developing countries including African (our emphasis) have followed a similar trajectory of approaches and reforms to those in more advanced countries through broader governance agendas supported by aid donors which to a large extent determine the effectiveness or otherwise of those reforms. Other approaches to public sector reform have also featured in these countries, notably, decentralization, pay and employment reforms, integrity and anti-corruption reforms and “bottom-up” reforms, designed to improve the development effectiveness of government agencies as presented (Robinson 2015, p. 5). While various approaches adopted since post independence period to the present were responses to the needs of public service at various times, it is equally important to note that reforms of public services have continued to be influenced by varying paradigms (a framework used in thinking about and organizing an understanding of natural or social phenomena) in public administration. The progression from New Public Administration to New Public Management has stimulated intellectual debate amongst scholars, “the existence of competing paradigms in public administration strengthens, instead of erodes, the future of the field. Theoretical breakthroughs (reconstruction of new theories) may come more readily when competitive approaches are allowed to coexist” (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011, p. 235). He argues that:  NPM represents a “paradigmatic break from the traditional model of public administration”… It is a reformed public sector transformation that breaks away from the repressive, autocratic and conservative paradigm of public administration that followed top down hierarchies “underpinned by Weber’s (1946) bureaucracy, Wilson’s (1887) policy administration divide, and Taylor’s (1911) scientific management model of work organisation…” (Vyas-­ Doorgapersad 2011, p. 238).

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The New Public Management (NPM) emphasizes the centrality of the citizen or customer; accountability for results; decentralized authority and control; market orientation of cost recovery; competition between public and private agencies for service delivery contracts; and the creation of semi-autonomous agencies for service delivery (Ayee 2008 p. 36). The basic foundation of the NPM is the use of the economic market as a model for political and administrative relationships. The institutional aspects of the NPM are heavily influenced by the assumptions of public choice theory, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics. The NPM movement is driven to maximize productive and allocative efficiencies that are hampered by public agencies that are unresponsive to the demands of citizens and led by bureaucrats with the power and incentives to expand their administrative empires (Hope 2001). Reforming the civil service in Africa through NPM-style strategies is, ultimately, intended to make the civil service accountable, transparent and responsive to the public in the delivery of public goods and services (Manning cited in Hope 2001, p.  131). Some African countries have adopted some elements of NPM reforms to address their dysfunctional bureaucracies. Some of the new techniques under NPM include performance management systems in Botswana, South Africa. NPM reform is evident in pay and grading systems introduced in Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea and Tanzania. Operational and management control systems in South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius. Total quality management in subSaharan African countries and information and communication technologies in service delivery in many African countries (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011, p. 240). Since the adoption of NPM in Africa, the public sector has been reformed in terms of structure and process. The fundamental change is how African countries nowadays pursue development by moving to a new functional model in a way that public sectors operate more like the private sectors through reforms (Rubakula 2014). But according to Manning (cited in Hope 2001, p.  131), the lessons of experience of civil service reform in developing countries, including those in Africa, suggests some mixed results with the application of strategies from the NPM menu. The search and refinement in reform approaches continue. The New Public Service (NPS) approach according to Robinson (2015) is perhaps the most coherent of these approaches. NPS starts with the premise that the focus of public management should be citizens, community and civil society. In this conception the primary role of public servants is to help

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citizens articulate and meet their shared interests rather than to control or steer society (Denhardt and Denhardt in Robinson 2015, p. 10). In placing a fresh emphasis on the public interest and citizens as the focus of public service, the New Public Service model provides a useful corrective to prevailing notions of control and steering associated with earlier models of public administration and management. But it is still far from providing an all-encompassing paradigm that offers the comprehensive solutions which public sector reforms grounded in earlier approaches have failed to deliver. With its emphasis on engaging citizens as the primary focus of public management, the NPS framework is highly normative and value-driven. Other scholars also highlight the importance of integrating the inter-organizational dimensions of the new public service to capture the significance of the pluralization of service provision. Several other strands of the “post-New Public Management” perspective therefore merit attention in the pursuit of a more comprehensive approach (Robinson 2015, p. 11). The above argument underscores the crux of this discourse. That various public services reforms have been carried out in Africa is not in doubt. What is not in contention also is the fact that not all the reforms have been successful in bringing about growth and development in Africa. Public service reforms per se have had a higher rate of success than public service “developmental” efforts. They had the specificity that developmental projects lacked. But this was self-limiting and, even more crucially, imposed certain conceptual limitations on quite a number of the reforms. The emphasis has been on situations and organizations, resulting in increased formalism and ritualism and added centralization in administrative practices and processes, rather than an attempt to achieve a medium between structuralism and functionalism. The preoccupation with structures has meant political, cultural and human factors have been sidestepped (King 1987, pp. 210–211). In other words, the political, economic, socio-­ cultural contexts of reforms were not taken into consideration. Ayee (2008) is of the opinion that reforms focused mainly on technocratic and managerial fixes, without paying adequate attention to the politics of building state capacity: the political and institutional realities affecting the reforms. Pointedly, Aladegbola and Jaiyeola (2016) observe the challenge to be: …over the years, the public service, like any other dynamic social institution, appears to have been caught up in the web of dialectical process. While this is a general phenomenon, the developing world and indeed sub-Saharan African countries seem to have been most affected. The reason for this is not

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far-fetched, because a significant feature of the political systems of developing countries is the increasingly central role that their governments and bureaucracy have come to play in the programme of development (Aladegbola & Jaiyeola 2016, p. 155).

The changing role of the state necessitated the demands placed upon the bureaucracy to adapt to these changes in society. Encapsulated in various reforms targeted at reforming the public service, the challenge of achieving development objectives became imperatives for most African states. A review of African public administration shows clearly that most countries on the continent still need to “explore frameworks that might explain and sharpen understanding of efforts at reforming public bureaus. Calls for NPM and other reform movements aimed at changing administrative practices and thinking are evidence of the continuation of the search for working systems” (Otenyo cited in Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011, p.  241). NPM shifts the emphasis from traditional public administration to public management and pushes the state towards managerialism. The traditional model of the organization and delivery of public services, based on the principles of bureaucratic hierarchy, planning, centralization, direct control and self-sufficiency, is replaced by market-based public service management or “enterprise culture” (Ayee 2008, p.  54).  The  search for efficient and effective public service continues as the challenge of development in most African states continues. The suggestion on the continuation of the search for working systems is made more comprehensible by Adamolekun’s (2006) submission: According to the existing studies of the administrative reform exercises already carried out in most of the states, attention has largely been focused on some specific issues related to the following three broad problems area: structural reorganisation of the machinery of government, human problems with emphasis on manpower development, and management practices and techniques… whilst the search for effective solutions to the three categories of problems… can contribute to the creation of a development-oriented bureaucracy, this contribution will be of very limited significance until three critical conditions are fulfilled. The first is the existence of a strong and purposeful political leadership; the second is the articulation of a clear conception of public service which is internalised by all public officers; and the third is the establishment of permanent machinery for administrative reform. (p. 95)

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The challenge of having effective public service to implement the developmental objectives of the state may go unabated unless a solution to the problem of the ineffectiveness of government bureaucracies in Africa is addressed. Reforms may not achieve the desired results as evidenced by some African countries that have continuously searched for a workable bureaucracy.

Conclusion We have been able to establish in this work that African public service is yet to perform optimally given the various challenges trailing each reform. With the attendant implications of non-performance for the growth of the African continent, a suggestion for the search for a workable system of administration is justified. We establish that reform efforts have been driven primarily by the fact that state bureaucracies in Africa underperform; are invariably too large and corrupt; and lack a sense of responsibility and accountability. The call for a continuous search for a working solution is not out of place as new challenges arise with new roles of the state. There is therefore the need to broaden the reform agenda in Africa to sync with their developmental objectives. As the objectives of the state continue to widen, bureaucracy will need to seek a refinement in orientation that will be in tandem with state developmental objectives.  There is the need for African public service to continually adapt its objectives and structures to the changing role of the states. It should also be able to reorient itself in purpose and sense of mission as well as institute various measures that will engender its capability to implement changing states policies.

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Lawanson, O. I., & Adeoye, B. W. (2013). Public sector reforms: Implications for human resources management in Nigeria. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 13(2), 188–201. Nhema, A.  G. (2016). Public administration and the development of Africa: A critical assessment. Journal of Public Administration and Governance, 6(1), 6–19. Nwokoma, N.  I. (2015). Review, challenges and future prospects of reforms in African economies: An appraisal of the Nigerian situation. Journal of Economic Development Management, IT, Finance and Marketing, 7(1), 1–3. Okeke-Uzodike, E. O., & Chitakunye, P. (2014). Public sector management in Africa: Reforms, policies and strategies. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(26), 85–92. Olaopa, T. (2009). Public administration and civil service reforms in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press Plc. Olaopa, T. (2012). Innovation and best practices in public sector reforms: Ideas, strategies and conditions. Ibadan: Bookcraft. Olowu, D. (2002). “Introduction”. New public management: An African management reform paradigm? Africa Development. Special issue on “new public sector management approaches in Africa”, XXVII(3&4), 1–16. Proceeding of Second Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Civil Service on African Public Service: New challenges, Professionalism and Ethics. Hosted by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, in Rabat, 13–15 December 1998. Robinson, M. (2015). From old public administration to the new public service: Implications for public sector reform in developing societies. Singapore: UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence GCPSE. Rubakula, G. (2014). The new public management and its challenges in Africa. Public Policy and Administration Research, 4(4), 85–96. Scaff, L. A., & Ingram, H. M. (n.d.). Politics, policy and public choice: A critique and a proposal. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3234706 Smith, B.  C. (2003). Understanding third world politics  – Theories of political change and development (2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Therkildsen, O. (2001). Efficiency, accountability and implementation: Public sector reform in east and southern Africa. Democracy, governance and human rights programme paper number 3, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNIRSD). Thovoethin, P. (2014). Techno-bureaucratic governance and developmental state in Africa: Botswana and Nigeria in comparative perspective. European Scientific Journal. Special Edition. pp. 257–273. Van der Westhuizen, J. (2005). Public sector reform: A comparative perspective on selected countries in sub-saharan Africa. Adminstratio Publica, 13(2), 142–175. Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. (2011). Paradigm shift from new public administration to new public management: Theory and practice in Africa. Td the Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 7(2), 235–250.

CHAPTER 13

Bureaucracy and Crisis of Development in Prismatic Cum Post-Colonial African States: An Ethical Review Ifeanyichukwu Michael Abada, Nneka Ifeoma Okafor, and Paul Hezekiah Omeh

Introduction It is important to recollect the position and character orientation of the Africans during the colonial regimes. Even though colonial masters had pre-conceived plans for the expedition and partitioning in Africa, they were able to achieve their targeted political economy through the instrumentation of civil service. Also, Africa, despite her role in the social engineering of her continent during the early days of colonialism, helped and was seriously engaged in administering the day-to-day activities of the colonial government. In the early colonial regimes and ritualization of administration, the place and positions of bureaucracy were not left out, and the organizations of the government to achieve its fundamental objectives were designed to be enhanced by bureaucracy.

I. M. Abada • P. H. Omeh • N. I. Okafor (*) University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 231 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_13

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However, following the emergence and gaining of political independence by African states, the duties and functions of the state were to be continued and executed through its machinery. It was learnt that the continued existence of African states and their governments were attributed to assiduous functions of the early African civil service who worked together with the colonial officers. The bureaucracy maintained the continuous existence of states till the present age, and that is the reason why governments in the world are systematically charged with various degrees of functions and responsibilities, spanning from socio-economic, cultural, political and other development strides. It has been observed and noted that the only instrument and re-tooling factor for the development and achievement of public policies of government are achievable through public bureaucracy. No wonder Odegard (1954), observed inter alia: a government without bureaucracy is like a centipede without legs, unable to move, even to save itself, and powerless to accomplish any of the goals for which governments are instituted among men. For it is upon bureaucracy that we depend to see that goals or policies are realized in practical terms. Odegard (1954: 18).

The above extract depicts the indispensable and unique nature and role of bureaucracy. It is an institution through which the goodwill of state in the form of public policy and policy actions are achieved for national development. However, it is important to note that, despite the indispensability of public bureaucracy and its ritualization in Africa, there is still public outcry on the abysmal undertaken by the bureaucracy to deliver on the good promises of democracy and national development. The developmental states in Africa had plunged in a state of crises of development, caused by the bureaucracy with which the hope for achieving the promised land had been beckoned on. However, it is against this backdrop that the chapter wishes to examine conceptual meanings of bureaucracy and development in relation to post-colonial African states.

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Conceptual Clarification The tactical understanding of issue had always remained an appreciation of its phenomenon, which brings a clearer understanding of the study. However, it is paramount to investigate and explore the conceptual meanings of bureaucracy and development, which will be discussed one after the other.

The Concept of Bureaucracy Bureaucracy has no fixed or accepted conceptual meaning and has remained complex in its diagnosis. In the development of the classical formulation on bureaucracy, scholars such as Marx Weber, Karl Marx, Robert Mitchels, Gaetano Mosa, among other contemporary scholars, had significantly contributed to the understanding of the concept. Weber (1978) sees bureaucracy as a universal social phenomenon and the means of carrying community action over into rationally ordered societal action. Supporting the view of Weber, Heady (1992) defines bureaucracies as large-scale organizations that are common in both the public and private sectors. What is implied here is that bureaucracy is synonymous with organization. Also, Blau and Mayer (1966) conceived bureaucracy as an organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals. Likewise, Bata (1978) and Sharma and Sadana (2010) conceived bureaucracy in both developed and developing economies as an organization that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interest of administrative efficiency. However, according to Nweke (2006), in his contribution, instead of giving meaning to bureaucracy, he criticized bureaucracy as: a failure to allocate authority and responsibility clearly, rigid and impersonal rules and routines, blundering officials, slow performance, buck passing, conflict procedures and directives, duplication of efforts; empire building, too much power in the hands of the wrong person(s), wastage of resources and inertia

The above extract is a typical nature of public bureaucracy in Africa’s developmental and administrative states, and that is the reason why the processes of actualizing national development have simply turned to a crisis of development.

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Development There are a lot of literature which exist in the field of development studies and adequate attention had been given to the problematic nature of defining development, but the variety in the meaning seems to differ only in the use of semantics, as all the perspectives and definitions have lent their credence and support to the contemporary issues of sustainable ­development. However, Obikeze and Obi (2014) conceived of development as advancement, a change that would yield tremendous improvement in the overall living standards of a greater number of people in the society. It also means to bring out the capabilities or possibilities of, to bring to a more advanced or effective state. The definitions above imply that there is a lack in variables that needed to be filled as development. Addressing the lack and gap in development, Ali (1980) succinctly maintained that development is: one that is people oriented, involves the people at all levels and stages of planning and execution process and is committed to bring about significant qualitative changes in the lives of all the people.

The above extract denotes that development is all about the people; how the lives of the masses could be improved and their rights and sense of belonging guaranteed. Furthermore, Riggs (1964), in his own account on development, equates it with freedom, as he defines development as a qualitative increase in the level of autonomy and discretion of social systems. This line of thought connotes the publication of the United Nations (1963), which emphasized development as the process of allowing and encouraging people to meet their own aspiration. This implies that development is all about improving the potentials of the people, making progress and change for a better and higher standard of living.

Ritualization of Bureaucracy: Between Legitimatization or Crisis of Development in Africa In contemporary African societies, public bureaucracies had been seen as agents of development, while on the other hand, others had conceived the nexus between bureaucracy and development as one that brings crisis instead of legitimization to development in Africa. But, notwithstanding the sides of the coin on the issue of bureaucracy and development, Downs

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(1967) argues that bureaucracies are among the most essential institutions in every part of the world. He asserts that not only do they provide employment for a lot of people, but they also make critical decisions that shape the economic, educational, political, social, moral and even religious lives of nearly everyone on earth. Chapman and Dunsire (1971) emphasized the indispensability of bureaucracy in bringing about development in the administrative states of the world. Accordingly, they assert that: the great and increasing burden of public business could not be carried on without an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of minister, character, ability and experience to be able to advise, assist and to some extent to influence those who are from time set above them.

Corroborating the above assertion, Ogunna (2007) notes the vital role that bureaucracy plays in ensuring development. He maintained that the most important roles are the pursuit of socio-economic and political development. According to Obiora (2014), Okafor (2005) and Adeyemo and Osunyikanmi (2009), bureaucracy is one of the major drivers of sustainable development in modern societies. Aligning with the scheme of things, Adesopo and Aluko (2004) emphatically states that: every sphere of modern life has thus become very bureaucratic as people are born into bureaucracies; grow in it, live with it and even die in it

The above indicates that bureaucracy and development are in continuum, striving for the welfare and progress of the developmental states of Africa. Moreover, bureaucracy has always been considered an agent of social change and development, and this has been appreciated by scholars like Duru (2001), Olaniyi (2008), who believed that in advanced capitalist societies, such as Britain and the United States, bureaucracy is relatively effective and development-oriented and hence can be regarded as a catalyst for national development. This, they maintained was due to large homogeneity of the ruling class and relative autonomy of bureaucracy from the contending social forces. On the other hand, Ademolekun (1986), while interrogating the contributory roles of bureaucracy to development, doubts the nature and character of African bureaucracies in

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bringing appreciable dividends of democracy and development in transitional societies in Africa. Reacting to the poor roles and efficacy of bureaucracy, Olaniyi (2008) identified the subversive role of bureaucracy in activities relating to political development and social change. He asserts that public bureaucracy in transitional and developing countries participate actively in rigging elections, subverting the rule of law and even joined hands with the political class in disregarding the rules of the political game under both parliamentary and presidential governments. Furthermore, it is worthy to note scholars like Heady (1991) and Dube (1971) observed that the character and administrative behaviour exhibited by bureaucracy in the African bureaucratic arena has forced it to fail in accomplishing the desired development. No wonder, Heady (1991) and Olaniyi (2008) maintained that the inherited bureaucracy in developing countries were more elitist, authoritative, aloof and paternalistic and, therefore, not significantly conducive for the systematic accomplishment of developmental goals and promoting nation-building.

African Bureaucracy and Failed Economic Performance The emergence of the new developmental states in Africa and the institution for executing daily administrative activities of government had been criticized by myriad scholars. Bureaucracy known for its red-tapism, division of work, hierarchical arrangement of offices, formalism and adherent of rights to offices is considered misfit in the developing countries where speedy change is needed to bring about socio-economic transformation, Sharma and Sadana (2010). It is important to note that the failure of bureaucracy to contribute significantly to the development of African states, as was anticipated by many people, had necessitated the application of myriads of administrative reforms. Furthermore, corroborating the above argument, Dwivedi and Jain (1985) noted that despite the fact that public bureaucracies had been charged with ushering in developmental outcomes in Africa, they have engaged in the Weberian character of hierarchy, status and rigidity in the adherence of rules and concerned mainly with enforcement of law and order and collection of revenues. Thus, they are considered unfit to perform the duties expected in the changed situation of an administration geared to the task of development, Dwivedi and Jain (1985). In Africa,

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underscoring the tremendous accolades showered on the institution of public bureaucracy, African has continued to witness serial poor performance toward the achievement of economic and development goals. According to Enahoro (2016), World Bank (1995) and Adebayo (2001), they maintained that due to inefficient bureaucracy in many bazaar-­ canteen societies of Africa, government policies are marred by poor implementation strategies. Supporting the gesture, Adebayo, cited in ­ Enahoro (2016), claimed that employees entering the civil service through the spoils systems might lack the required technical skills for their positions and development, and it has adverse effects on the desired development of African economies. Moreover, according to Akume (2012) cited in Obiora (2014), one of the major impediments to the effective and efficient workings of public bureaucracies in the world over has been the continued serial gross misconduct and corruption. Buttressing the facts of misfits of African bureaucracy to the intractable crisis of economic development in Africa, Eme and Onwuka (2010) succinctly identified the inherent challenges of bureaucracies in the quest for economic development, which had brought about the crisis of development. They assert that, in Nigeria, bureaucratic ethos are unfamiliar and imperfect, clients of social provisioning express less support for their bureaucratic institutions than the government. The emphasis here remains the fact that, to adequately meet up the crisis of socio-economic development which bureaucracies in the post-colonial and emerging African states had ceased not to avert, the later. It has to significantly adjust and adapt itself in the new environment of reforms.

Bureaucracy, Ritualization and Bureau Pathetic Behaviour in Africa The attendant and subsequent neo-colonialization of African state by external forces of Europeans ushered in democracy and application of western theories and models on practices of bureaucracy and management of the affairs of the developmental states in Africa. It is worthy to recall that African bureaucrats who helped and worked together with the colonial masters had the set objectives to accomplish. But, the fact that cultural forces played out while discharging their duties immediately after the independence and even now had influenced the attainment of true democracy and growth of bureaucracy established upon it.

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The construct of bureau pathetic behaviour, which is associated with scholars like Victor Thompson (1961), Merton (1968) and Weber (1964), had in the scholarly times attracted a plethora of names and registers like bureaucratic dysfunction, Hicks and Ray (1995), bureau pathology, occupational psychosis and trained incapacity. Accordingly, bureau pathetic behaviour and trained incapacity refers to that state of affairs in which one’s abilities function as inadequacies and actions based upon training and skills, which have been successfully applied in the past, and resulted in inappropriate responses under changed conditions, Sharma and Sadana (2010) Moreover, according to Nwizu (1999), the nature of African bureaucracies and its inherent pathology has been tagged and labelled as a continental nuisance, a structural dinosaur and an impersonal monster. The bureaucracy and bureaucrats are nothing more than an organized system for not getting things done effectively and efficiently. All these dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy compelled scholars to dismiss bureaucracy as hopelessly outdated, irrelevant and an unwanted monster in the present-day changing world of technology and globalism, Nwachukwu (1988). Also, given the nature and character of the state in Africa, bureaucracies had continued to exhibit behaviours that are not in harmony with the ethos and credence of public administration. African bureaucracies had been aligned with serial corrupt practices by the civil service. And, it is of note that corruption, being a serious cankerworm, has been used by African bureaucrats to sabotage the achievement of development in the post-colonial African states. Moreover, Apter (1963) maintained that the African civil servants do always share the proceeds of their public offices with their families and relatives and serially exploit their positions of authority to generate undue benefits and advantages for themselves at the expense of the development of their nations and economies. Mbaku (1996), in his comparative study, acknowledged the fact that Nigeria is not the only country in Africa in which the apparatus of government has become an instrument for the enrichment of members of the politically dominant group. He observed that some countries in Africa, even at their level of their development, so engage in bureaucratic behaviour that obstructs the achievement of development in the continent. No wonder, scholars like Mbaku (1996); Hazlett (1988), Williams (1989), Doxey (1961) and Hutt (1964) were of the opinion that South Africa, which was then regarded by many scholars and explorers as the citadel of free enterprise in Africa has for many years now thwarted the favour, promoting the interests of the minority whites at the

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expense of the majority blacks. But, the reverse is the case now, following the emancipation of South Africa from the apartheid regime. Corroborating the above, Ademolekun (1986), Alam (1989) and Jabbra (1976) argued further that incompetence and inefficiency among the public bureaucrats in Africa contribute to crises of development. Hence, to effectively carry out national development plans and promote entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy, the bureaucracy must be responsive to the ends of the entrepreneurial class, and the implication is that the nation’s civil service must be competent and poses a significant level of professionalism (Mbaku 1996). Despite the scholarly contributions to the phenomenon of bureau pathetic behaviour, which arose from the continuous existence of defective cultural norms and behaviours exhibited by the bureaucrats in Africa, they did not cease from providing perceived remedies to the identified lapses. They devised strategies for eradicating corruption. In Nigeria, for instance, laws have been passed and established institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), as well as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), to tackle the menace of corruption in the public service. The institutionalization of economic financial crime commission and ICPC had displayed unflinching efforts in tracing and adequately prosecuting public officers found wanting while discharging his or her official duties. According to Gillespic and Okruhlik (1991), they advocated corruption clean-up exercises and strategies, a mechanism for instilling decency. The clean-up exercise for bureau pathology, he claimed, could be underscored, through societal, legal, market and political strategies. Accordingly, the political strategies for the corruption clean-up exercise in the developmental states of Africa emphasize the decentralization of the public sector but various factors like corruption, ethnicism and spoil system have limited the efficacy of these institutions Mbaku (1996), Wagner and Gwartney (1988).

Theoretical Framework of Analysis The theoretical framework utilized in this study is anchored on the Riggsian theory of prismatic society derived from ecological approach to the study of public administration. The theory was propounded and developed by Fred W. Riggs, leader of Comparative Administrative Group, in his Magun Opus: Public Administration in Developing Countries: The

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theory of prismatic society (1964). The theory significantly concerns with investigating the impacts of ecological factors in the environment, and cultural and historical experiences of societies on the needs and effectiveness of administrative systems in the management of development programmes. The ecological approach to the study of public administration is dated back as far as the time of John Gaius who initiated the concept of the ecological approach or perspective to the study of public administration in 1947. However, notable scholars have emerged to strengthen the postulation of Riggs in the study of public bureaucracy. These include Dahl, R.A. (1974); Martin, R. (1967); and Arora, K. (1979). According to them, the relationship between administrative systems and their environments is analogous with the symbiotic relationship between living organisms and environment. The point of departure here is the contention that administrative systems can better be appreciated or understood if the surrounding conditions, influences and forces that come into their shaping and modification are identified and classified in relation to their importance and influence (Abah 2009). Corroborating the above, Arora and Feror (1986) clearly maintained that the basic premise of ecological approach in comparative public administration is that public bureaucracy may be regarded as one of the basic social institutions in the society. Thus, in order to understand its structure and functions, it must be studied in the context of inter-relationships with other institutions. They continued to aver that bureaucracy as a social institution is continually interacting with, that is affected by and feeding back upon the economic, political and socio-cultural sub-systems, in a society. It is both a modifying influence on these systems as well as a system, which is modified by their activities. It has been recognized then that the knowledge of the ecological dimension of public administration in various settings can aid the scientific development of the study of bureaucracy. The practical significant lies in the insights it provides the policy formulation process in the areas of technical assistance and administrative development. However, public bureaucracy in Nigeria has continued to fail serially in bringing the needed development for quality service in the country. This is attributed to the nature and character of interplay between environment and the public bureaucracy in Nigeria’s social formation. The adoption and practice of prototype of administrative system of the west into Nigeria without an adequate investigation and appreciation of its effectiveness ren-

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dered its ritualization and operation ineffective, problematic and, finally, to an intractable crisis of development. Nigeria public bureaucracy as a social institution has refuted advice to switch to the indigenous system of administration, which is peculiar to the traditional institutions, norms and values, with little resemblance to the western model of Weberism. The underlying import here is that the inability of the nation’s bureaucracy to entrench development following several decades of her independence is something to worry about. The administrative is not working and characterized by all sorts of unholy practices, ethnic chauvinism, corruption, clientelism, spoilt system and deadwood bureaucrats. Therefore, it is high time Nigeria began to appreciate that the administrative systems of the west do not work in ours and, hence, Nigeria needs to exert her political will and refute exogenous forces and variables compromising her development. It is a conventional wisdom that the emergence of bureaucratic institution in the administrative states cannot be over-emphasized. It has in the recent past ensured the continuity of the emerging developmental states of Africa. The post-colonial states of Africa had always survived the intractable forces of both the indigenous quantum crisis and the exogenous influence attributed to the consolidated roles played out by bureaucrats, ensuring the continuous existence of states and the achievement of development in the peripheral states of Africa. However, it is important to recall that despite the enormous praises cherished by the institution of public service and bureaucracy, it has come under critique. Arising from a thorough investigation into the study, the chapter arrives at the findings that the inability of the various administrative states in post-colonial cum prismatic societies to accentuate developments was holistically associated and tied to variables of bureau pathetic behaviour. The identified administrative behaviour and corrupt acts of African bureaucracy have unleashed terror on the development of the continent. The lack in development or, better still, development crisis in Africa is due to the diagnosed disease of bureaucracy, which is yet to receive the needful treatment for its cure.

Conclusion and Recommendations The phenomenon of bureaucratic institution and the quest for development in Africa have been queried following the inabilities of public servants to ensure and accentuate perfect designs to improve the development

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of Africa in the areas of economic, social, political and other related areas. However, arising from the study, the chapter recommends the following: • There should be intense and proactive orientation and re-orientation of the public service in Africa. They should be aware that their diligent discharge of routine services is for the benefits of their f­ atherland. Also, the appropriate institution, such as the National Orientation Agency, as the case may be in Nigeria, should adequately strive to inculcate conventional and civic behaviour among the public service, enabling them to discharge their duties as contained in the general order. • Efforts should be geared towards training and re-training of officers in discharging their routine functions • The understanding of the workings of ecology of Africa administrative states will be of paramount advantage in combating the challenges of public administration in Africa. • Efforts should be enhanced to improve New Public Management, Public-Private Partnership and the inculcation of the principles of Management by Objective. All these help in integrating qualified private institutions and individuals to contribute to the development of Africa.

References Abah, N. C. (2009). Development administration: A multi-disciplinary approach. Enugu: John Jacob’s Classic Publishers. Adebayo, A. (2001). Principles and practices of public administration. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Ademolekun, L. (1986). Politics and administration in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Adesopo, A.  A., & Aluko, M.  A. O. (2004). An appraisal of the two faces of bureaucracy in relation to the Nigeria society. Journal of Social Sciences, 8(6), 13–21. Adeyemo, D. O., & Osunyikanmi, R. O. (2009). Political influence on bureaucratic growth and social responsiveness: A case of Ondo state, Nigeria. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, 1(6), 117–124. Akume, T. (2012). Focusing beyond the stigma of bureaucratic inefficiency to building a competence base bureaucracy in Nigeria. The imperative of training. Arabian Journal of Business and Management, 1(3), 81–96.

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Alam, M. S. (1989). Anatomy of corruption: An approach to the political economy of underdevelopment. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 48(4), 452. Ali, W. O. (1980). Popular participation and rural development. Journal of Public Administration and Local Government, 4(2), 27–33. Apter, D. E. (1963). Ghana in transition. New York: Antheneum. Arora, R.  K. (1979). Comparative administration. New Delhi: Associated Publishing House. Arora, R. K., & Feror, N. (1986). Comparative administration. An ecological perspective. New Delhi: Associated Publishing House. Bata, K. O. (1978). Bureaucracy, development and public management in India. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House. Blau, P. M., & Mayer, M. W. (1966). Bureaucracy in modern society. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. Chapman, R.  A., & Dunsire, N.  T. (1971). The high civil service in Britain. London: Constable. Dahl, R. (1974). The science of public administration: Three problems. New York: PAR Publisher. Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. London: Little Brown. Doxey, G.  V. (1961). The industrial colour bar in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Dube, J. C. (1971). The bureaucracy and nation building. In W. R. Gable (Ed.), Political development and social change. New York: Wiley. Duru, E. J. C. (2001). The bureaucratic set up and operations in Britain, France,the United States and Nigeria: A comparative analysis. In E.  J. C.  Duru, M.  O. Ikejiani-Clark, & D. O. Mbat (Eds.), Contemporary issues in public administration (pp.  30–40). Calabar/Benini: BAAJ International Company and The Atlantic Publishing Company. Dwivedi, O. P., & Jain, R. B. (1985). Indian’s administrative state. New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House. Eme, O., & Onwuka, C. (2010). Bureaucracy and challenges of good governance in Nigeria. Journal of Business and Organizational Development, 2(1), 37–50. Enahoro, N. I. (2016). The role of bureaucracy in good governance in Nigeria. International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance, 6(1), 46. Gillespic, K., & Okruhlik, G. (1991). The political dimensions of corruption cleanups: A framework of analysis. Journal Comparative politics, 24(1), 87–89. Hazlett, T.  W. (1988). Economic origin of apartheid. Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, 6(4), 85–104. Heady, F. (1991). Public administration, a comparative perspective (4th ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker. Heady, F. (1992). Bureaucracies, government and politics. London: Routledge.

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Hicks, H.  G., & Ray, G.  C. (1995). Organization, theory and behaviour. New Delhi: Mac Graw Hill International Book. Hutt, H.  W. (1964). The economics of the colour Bar. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Jabbra, J. G. (1976). Bureaucratic corruption in the third world: Causes and remedies. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 22(6), 18–24. Martin, R. (1967). The ecology of a squatter settlement. Architectural Review, 145, 233–214. Mbaku, J. M. (1996). Bureaucratic corruption in Africa: The futility of clean ups. The CATO Journal, 6(1), 4–11. Merton, R.  K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New Delhi: Amerind Publishing. Nwachukwu, C.  C. (1988). Management theory and practice. Onitsha: African FEP Publishers. Nweke, E. (2006). Public policy analysis: A strategic approach. Enugu: John Jacobs Publishers. Nwizu, G. (1999). Eminent administrative thinkers from Taylor to present day. Enugu: John Jacob’s Classic Publishers. Obikeze, S. O., & Obi, E. A. (2014). Public administration in Nigeria: A developmental approach. Onitsha: Book Point. Obiora, C. A. (2014). Reform process and the advancement of sustainable development in Nigeria: Rethinking the role of the public bureaucracy. Journal of Public Administration and Management, 3(6), 106–119. Odegard, P. H. (1954). Toward a responsible bureaucracy. American Academy of Political and Social Science, 292(1), 18–29.  Ogunna, A. E. C. (2007). Public administration in Nigeria: Theory and practice. Owerri: Versatile Publishers. Okafor, E. E. (2005). Public bureaucracy and development in Nigeria: A critical overview of impediments to public service delivery. CODESRIA Bulletin, 3&4, 67–69. Olaniyi, M. A. (2008). Public administration in South Africa: Changes and continuities. In E.  A. Obi, O.  S. A.  Obikeze, L.  C. Nwachuwu, & M.  I. Abada (Eds.), Readings on comparative public administration: Theory and select country studies. Onitsha: Book Point Educational. Riggs, F. W. (1964). Public administration in developing countries: The theory of prismatic society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Sharma, M. P., & Sadana, B. L. (2010). Public administration in theory and practice. Allahabael: Kitab Mahal. United Nations. (1963). Trade and development: Trends, needs and policies. New York: Department of Economics and Social Affairs. Victor, A. T. (1961). Modern organization. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

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Wagner, R. E., & Gwartney, J. D. (1988). Public choice and constitutional order. Greenwich: JAI Press. Weber, M. (1964). The theory of social and economic organization. New York: The Free Press. Weber, M. (1978). Bureaucracy. In J. M. Shfritz & P. H. Whitbeck (Eds.), Classics of organization theory. Oak Park: Moore Publishing. Williams, W. E. (1989). South Africa’s war against capitalism. Pretoria: Foundation for Economic Education. World Bank. (1995). Bureaucrats in business: The economics and politics of government ownership. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from World Bank Policy Research Report.

CHAPTER 14

Building Capacities for Border Administrators Along Nigeria’s International Boundaries Martin Terngu Kpoghul

Introduction Nigeria shares boundaries with five countries, namely, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Benin and Equatorial Guinea. Three of these countries also share maritime boundaries with Nigeria, namely, Cameroon, Benin and Equatorial Guinea. The totality of the length of these boundaries amount to several thousand kilometres and certain government security agencies are saddled with the onerous task of administering these boundaries. The major challenge that confronts border administrators is to come to terms with the paradoxes of boundaries and borderlands. They are expected to ensure the sovereignty of their countries while being conscious of those political, economic, social and environmental factors that limit the ­international sovereignty as well as to be guided by the principle of good

Series of interaction with border enforcement agents (Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Department of State Services) but for security reasons, I am constrained not to mention their names and duty posts. M. T. Kpoghul (*) Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 247 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_14

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neighbourliness, peaceful co-existence and co-operation, while striving to maintain their countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. The purpose of this chapter is thus to examine how the administration of Nigeria’s international boundaries can be improved upon in view of the challenges involved in performing the role effectively.

Conceptual Issues To address this subject matter, it is important to clarify some key concepts necessary for the comprehension of this study. These are “Boundary”, “Frontier”, “Borderlands” and “Border Administration”. A “boundary” presupposes the existence of at least two elements or objects. It is generally referred to as a dividing line, which separates one object from another. For Imobighe (1993), territorially, it is a line that separates one territorial entity from another, thus it is a line of demarcation, which delimits the scope of administrative jurisdiction of two or more territories. A boundary line could be imaginary or represented on the ground in the form of pathways with erected markers at regular intervals. Legally, it is an alignment or imaginary line that marks the legal termination of territory of one country or political unit which has an international status or role and the commencement of the territory of another country or political unit (Ajomo 1989: 37). Thus, a boundary functions primarily to separate, divide and restrict/control movement across. Although it is also said to perform the function of a contact and meeting point, this function is only secondary to that of separation and division (Anene 1970). A frontier is a phenomenon of history that is always unique. It is viewed as a zone of actual contact or separation from a political, geographical and economics sense. Adejuyigbe (1989) quotes House  in Kristof (1959) from a geographical perspective who described frontiers as borderlands or zones on either side of an international boundary suffering from the interruption effects of the boundary and in which territorial effect may be concentrated. This implies that frontiers are zones within which boundaries are located or, occasionally, where human hindrances are involved, the boundaries may be at the outer edge of the frontier. It is thus the features of the period/activities before boundaries are delimited or fixed. Borderlands, on the other hand, are those zones on both sides of a given bi-national boundary, which enjoy functional interaction with one another as well as with each of the sovereign states or nations in contact

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(Ajomo 1989: 38). More so, they are zones in which the cultures, politics and economic arrangements of the interrelated nation’s states interpenetrate and intermingle. From this definition, a borderland is simply a land close to the boundary. Thus, a boundary must be fixed before any associated borderland emerges, making it a post-boundary feature. As a territory or zone close to the boundary of a political unit, it means each political unit separated by a particular boundary has its own borderland in relation to that boundary (Akinyele 2007; Kpoghul 2009: 35).

What Is Border Administration? Border administration cannot be treated in isolation but rather within the larger context of nation-building and national security, power-sharing and good governance while recognizing its direct international implications for good neighbourly relations between adjoining sovereign states. Border areas are, therefore, expressions used descriptively to identify, generally, the localities and communities situated within the proximity of the international boundaries, which serve as points of contact between neighbouring countries. Border administration, in whatever form, is thus ultimately intended to assure peaceful relations along international boundaries as well as promote functional trust-boundary co-operation. These peaceful relations and co-operation may be viewed from the perspectives of Bilateral and Multilateral Trans-Border Agreements or Treaties as well as Special Frontier or Border Regions (Mackay 2008). It is instructive to note that the above distinction lies in the fact that sometimes, separate instruments (agreements or treaties) deal with specific areas of interstate relations across international boundaries. Furthermore, boundary treaties may make various provisions for the administration of the borderlands to deal with situations developing from some unpreventable local disturbances as well as for trans-frontier co-operation. The international boundaries of Nigeria, by their very nature, are territories of the Federal Government and, consequently, associated matters are the preservatives of the Federal Government. Border regions, that is, localities and communities situated near international boundaries, are matters of State and Local Governments. Issues of trans-border co-­ operation when raised in relation to border administration, because of its international dimension, Federal, State and Local Governments get involved. Therefore, border region administration should be treated as a specially designed programme to be jointly executed by Federal, State and

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Local Government agencies. The capacities of border administrations along Nigeria’s international boundaries are accordingly linked to this shared responsibility. The uniqueness of border regions must also be emphasized to highlight the dangers inherent in the marginalization or neglect of these sectors of the national territory since border regions are like double-edged swords, which can be beneficial or detrimental, depending on the circumstances and manners of their use.

Border Administrators Along Nigeria’s International Boundaries Several individuals and institutions are involved directly or indirectly and perpetually or occasionally in border administration. Sheidu (2003) describes international border administrators as those individuals and groups of people representing certain institutions that are primarily concerned with the processes, activities and tasks involved in ensuring that the sanctity of the sovereignty of their country is maintained, while ensuring that their actions are governed by relevant international laws, bilateral or multilateral agreements and the principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence. Asiwaju (2003) views border administrators of international boundaries as those groups of individuals/institutions who are physically present along the border areas and are involved in the day-to-day monitoring and regulation of activities along the borders in the pursuit of the nation’s sovereignty and maintenance of peace, security and good neighbourliness. This position, thus, suggests the presence of administrators within the border areas; specifically border enforcement agencies like Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Army, Navy and Police; Traditional Rulers/Leaders of Border Communities as custodians of the People’s Culture and Spokesmen of Border Populations; and Border Local Government Councils (LGCs) as the tier of formal administration closest to the border and also spokesmen for the border populations (the last two are included even though there is no legal instrument for them to mediate in trans-border matters but by virtue of the locations of their communities and Local Government Areas [LGAs], attending to border and trans-border problems is almost a daily affair).

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The Role of Border Administrators Along Nigeria’s International Boundaries The functions of administrators along international borders vary with the institutions they represent, however, the ultimate objective is to strive to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while maintaining peace and good neighbourliness and promoting co-operation. Border enforcement agencies like Customs and Immigration Services are backed by law and have their responsibilities along the borders clearly spelt out, while border Local Government Councils (LGCs) and traditional/community leaders do not have such roles spelt out, even though it is widely acknowledged that, in certain instances, they are more quickly able to resolve pending problems effectively than the Customs, and Immigration Services. The Border Enforcement Agencies are generally concerned with the maintenance of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the detection and prevention of crimes and the implementation of bilateral and regional agreements. Thus, in performing their functions, they, in effect, translate into reality the government’s political, economic and social policies at the border (Chukwurah 1993, 2003: 70). A close look at the specificity of functions of these border administrators indicates that Nigeria Customs Service maintains the movement of goods into and from the country through the borders for the purpose of enforcing prescribed duties on certain imports and exports and preventing the import or export of certain goods in accordance with the law. The Nigeria Immigration Services, on the other hand, is concerned with the movement of persons across the borders, ensuring that people crossing the borders either way have appropriate travel documents and undergo proper documentation (Chukwurah 2003: 70; Sheidu 2003: 78). It is instructive to note that most communities on both sides of the border have similarities in language, culture, religion, tradition, beliefs and history. Consequently, traditional rulers and leaders of border communities, in spite of the absence of legal instruments, play very important and dominant roles in maintaining cultural co-operation, security and peaceful co-existence, and good neighbourliness between their peoples and those of neighbouring communities on the other side of the border (Asiwaju 1984). As representatives of their peoples, traditional/community leaders wield enormous influence and command the respect of their subjects. Their activities in border administration range from exchange visits with col-

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leagues on the other side of the borders; invocation of local norms and institutions in resolving disputes, recovering stolen goods or tracking criminals across borders faster than the normal diplomatic routes, administration of border markets, cultural exchanges and many others. Even though these functions have not been constitutionally prescribed for traditional/ community leaders, the enormous benefits derived by both countries from their activities suggest that there need to be some form of recognition, formalization and encouragement by the governments of both countries. This situation can facilitate the full exploitation of the benefits of the activities of these actors (Chukwurah 2003: 70; Sheidu 2003: 78). Border Local Government Councils/Authorities (LGC or LGA) like the traditional/community leaders play enormous role in the day-to-day administration of the border. In the past, border areas have been deprived of basic social amenities like markets, roads, clinics, potable water and so on and were reduced to hide-outs and refuge centres for people of questionable and extreme characters. With the increased emphasis on rural development by successive Nigerian governments, these facilities are being gradually provided in some border towns. Local Government Councils manage these facilities, especially markets and clinics, which are often patronized by people from the other side of the border. In addition, as the tier of government closest to the people, they try to mediate, albeit informally, alongside with traditional/community leaders when there are inter-­ border problems and conflicts. (A visit to the border communities at Idiroko, Imeko, Ileila, Jibia, Mandara, Ikom, etc. confirms this situation.)

Challenges of Border Administrators The border administrators listed above during their daily activities are often confronted by several constraints. Many of these constriants are variously raised at several workshops and conferences like NBC Workshop and Report 1993 and 2000 respectively as well as  NIIA Workshop 1991. These include the following: (i) Ignorance about Laws/Agreements/Treaties Many border communities and Local Government Councils in Nigeria are not conversant with Nigerian Laws, relevant international laws, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty and the bilateral agreements that Nigeria has with neighbouring countries (Opanike et al. 2015: 44). Since some

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of the provisions of these laws and agreements affect the lives of border community dwellers daily, widespread ignorance of such provisions would negatively affect their implementation. Furthermore, some form of understanding is reached in some cases, between border State Governments in Nigeria and their counterparts across international boundaries, without the traditional/community leaders and Local Government Councils’ officials being informed or involved. Thus, formal meetings characterized by institutionalized channels of bilateral contacts may not make meaning to the common man, who is either unaware or ill-­informed and would shun all border protocols and formalities, by conducting illegal acts. (ii) Pressure to Provide Facilities Border Local Government Councils are often financially overstretched because of the pressure on them to provide facilities along the borders. Border towns are generally very busy with the movement of people and goods, often under pressure to provide and maintain some of them. However, major sources of income along the borders are within the Federal Government’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA), an agency created by the Federal Government to meet the Developmental Challenges of Border Communities is held back by a paucity of funds (www.bcda.gov.ng). (iii) Welfare Border enforcement agencies complain of many welfare challenges. These are irregular payment of salaries, occasioned by delays; non-promotion of deserving officers resulting in stagnation on ranks for several years; lack of proper insurance policies for staff of security agencies in line with international best practices; and the absence of welfare policy for staff on transfer. There is also an acute problem of accommodation; many border control posts lack accommodation facilities. This situation even affects the location of some border control posts far into the hinterland, creating problems of the porosity of the borders. For instance, the border control post manned by the Nigeria Immigration Services and Customs along the Nigeria–Cameroun boundaries in Benue State is about 25  Km away from the border. The sum total of these welfare issues has negative effects on the border enforcement ­ agents, resulting in dampened morale, lack of commitment and legitimization of corrupt practices.

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(iv) Job Requirements An effective border patrol requires adequate enforcement agents in terms of quantity, quality and necessary tool/facilities. The present number of enforcement agents is relatively inadequate compared with the length of Nigeria’s international boundaries to be covered. Many officers of Immigration and Customs, as well as other security agents, are ill-equipped and not adequately trained. All the countries bordering Nigeria are Francophone-speaking nations; however, only a few border administrators understand French. Furthermore, border enforcement agents are yet to fully embrace science and technology to facilitate job performance. This situation in some instances affects joint border patrols by enforcement agents with those of neighbouring countries (Akinyemi 2013). Additionally, some enforcement agents lack basic requirements like uniforms and accessories and are compelled to source them from the open market, contrary to operational guidelines and best practices. (v) Porous Borders Nigeria’s international borders with Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic are very porous. It is said that there are more than 1500 crossing points along Nigeria’s international boundaries and some of these crossing points are remotely located or with very rugged and difficult terrain like mountains, forests and rivers (Akinyemi 2013: 4). The inadequate personnel of enforcement agents as well as complementary facilities and equipment make it difficult for effective patrol and enforcement of policies (Nigeria Immigration Service and Nigeria Customs Service). This situation provides ready opportunities for extreme characters, who cross the border using relatively easy ways without passing through control posts. Nigeria is currently fighting a war against insurgence as exemplified by Boko Haram elements and who take maximum advantage of the porous nature of the borders. They hibernate in neighbouring countries, cross over to Nigeria, strike and go back to their bases. Similarly, the presence of border markets at key entry points along the border is exploited by local inhabitants who readily buy and sell contraband goods. Indeed, bigtime smugglers use these markets to create many illegal routes through which nefarious activities are perpetrated, sometimes unnoticed, and often with the

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ready connivance of such inhabitants whose identity can hardly be recognized because of their strong affinity across the borders. These activities are prevalent along the borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics. ( vi) Corruption The enormity of challenges outlined above, encountered by border enforcement agents, often give room and even attempt to legitimize some corrupt practices. Illegal aliens and people of questionable characters, as well as second-hand vehicles purchased from Benin, Togo and Niger, find their way through the border into the country. Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) and other petroleum products in Nigeria find their way through the borders to Benin and Niger conveniently because of higher prices. Enforcements agents who facilitate their activities do these for some considerations that are far from government policies and best practices. Another form of corruption is the continuous stay of some enforcement agents in some duty posts considered to be “juicy” over a long time because they have godfathers in service or are “good boys”. In some cases, directives are given from above for the release of seized contrabands or suspected aliens even when due process should be followed. Some of the inadequate machinery like patrol vans are often diverted to private use by some staff, while the official work suffers. The sum total of these activities and challenges affect the effective administration of Nigeria’s Border.

Enhancing Capacities of Border Administrators The analysis in the preceding parts of this work has outlined a series of challenges that significantly affect the job performance of border administrators. Therefore, the effective discharge of responsibilities by these administrators is predicated on the resolution of the constraints identified which hopefully are expected to result in improved job performance. The challenges can be addressed in the following ways: (i) Orientation on Laws/Treaties Border administrators should be given proper orientation on the relevant laws, bilateral agreements and mutual understanding between Nigeria and

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neighbouring countries. When native authorities/community leaders are properly oriented about relevant provisions of these laws and agreements, their effect on border communities and the roles of the community leaders, they shall in turn educate border community dwellers. Furthermore, adequate budgetary provision should be made for the provision and maintenance of facilities in border towns. (ii) Welfare of Enforcement Agents Improved welfare of enforcement agents is cardinal to effective job performance and the elimination of some corrupt practices. Salaries and other fringe benefits should be promptly paid, while issues of progression and carrier advancement should be facilitated through training and merit. Insurance cover for staff, as well as occupational hazard allowances, should be paid to motivate them. Adequate and standard accommodation should be provided for officers at border towns or close to border control posts to reduce hardship and facilitate job performance. (iii) Increased Manpower and Machinery In view of the long stretch and porosity of Nigeria’s international borders, the number of enforcement agents along the border must be increased for effective border surveillance to take place. This increased manpower should be complemented with basic work machinery like patrol vehicles— helicopters, boats, and modern forearms and communication gadgets (All Security Agencies). The Federal Government must support enforcement agents to take advantage of technological advancement in the acquisition of facilities and equipment to combat the ever-growing, sophisticated border-related crimes. Furthermore, authorities should ensure that the official uniforms of border enforcement agents, as is the case with other national security agencies, are centrally procured and distributed to ensure uniformity in colour, style and quality of clothing material. This will facilitate easy identification and elimination of quacks. (iv) Training There should be training and re-training of border enforcement agents. The training curricular may be two-fold, that is, (i) an integrated practical component and exposure to modern surveillance facilities and manage-

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ment; and (ii) a theoretical component that describes the scope and limit of Nigeria’s sovereignty—private and public international laws, bilateral and multilateral agreements between Nigeria and other countries; political and administrative structure of neighbouring countries; conflict management, and so on. Time limits should also be set for officers to attend training or refresher courses. (v) Synergy of Activities For the effective administration and policing of Nigeria’s international border areas, there must be a synergy of efforts among concerned administrators (enforcement agents, community leaders and Local Government Area Officials). Many footpaths, seasonal roads and other illegal border-­ crossing points exist, which are known mainly to border dwellers, thus ensuring the porosity of our borders. Enforcement agents are expected to enlist the support and synergize with community leaders as well as Local Government Area Officials in effecting border surveillance. Governmental authorities can also give legal backing to these efforts during trans-border co-operation efforts. (vi) Anti-Corruption Poor welfare and working conditions are critical factors in promoting corruption among border enforcement agents. Improved welfare of Officers is important as a way of mitigating the menace of corruption at the individual level of agents. At the organizational level, measures must be put in place by the government agencies to check corruption and reduce it to the barest minimum. These include, amongst many others, the enforcement of approved operational guidelines and rules of engagement; avoidance of undue interference in the discharge of responsibilities by field officers; the constant assessment of officers and the totality of performance of agencies. A major challenge that confronts effective border administration is the maintenance of peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness. The ability of border administrators to properly address this challenge can be facilitated through mutual co-operation between Nigeria and her neighbours, at different levels. At the top level, joint efforts through visits and inspections of border regions by high-level officials of the Nigerian government and those of neighbouring countries can assure border communities of the government’s concern for them, as well as

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demonstrate to the border enforcement agents of Nigeria and neighbours the commitment to trans-­border co-operation and respect for each other’s sovereignty and regulatory mechanism. This joint committee may also be able to handle issues that those on ground could not bear (Sheidu 2003: 84). Another level is that of Local Council Officials and community leaders of border regions visits, contacts and dialogue should be encouraged among the groups at this level to further strengthen the social, cultural and economic ties of the peoples. These officers and leaders should also exchange information which concern security of life and property, maintenance of peaceful co-existence and so on. Such fora can be backed by law and a channel be created for them to advise their respective governments on issues of mutual interests and concern. There is also another level of co-operation between the border enforcement agents of Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Regular joint patrols of the agencies and co-operation in the areas of communication and detection and prevention of crimes shall provide a conducive context and ­environment for the accomplishment of border enforcement tasks and the maintenance of peaceful co-existence/good neighbourliness (Akinyemi 2013: 6).

Conclusion Border administration is an aspect of the state that must be treated within the context of nation-building, national security, power-sharing and good governance. Consequently, border administrators have an obligation to be made to know that international boundaries could be a source of enmity and conflict between Nigeria and neighbouring countries. These boundaries could also be the bridge of friendship and cooperation if borders and trans-border issues are properly handled. Border administrators are thus challenged to maintain Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while, at the same time, being guided by the principle of peaceful co-existence, co-operation and good neighbourliness. To achieve these objectives, border administrators should be empowered with requisite capacities (knowledge, ability machinery and motivation) to do their jobs, while vices within the system of border administration must be termed.

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References Adejuyigbe, O. (1989). Identification and characteristics of borderlands in Africa. In A. I. Asiwaju & P. O. Adeniyi (Eds.), Borderlands in Africa, a multidisciplinary and comparative focus on Nigeria and West Africa. Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Ajomo, M. A. (1989). Legal perspective on border issues. In A. I. Asiwaju & P. O. Adeniyi (Eds.), Borderlands in Africa. Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Akinyele, R.  T. (2007). Academic discipline and border studies. Lagos: UNILAG Press. Akinyemi, O. (2013). Globalization and Nigeria border security: Issues and challenges. Journal of International Affairs and Global Strategy, 11, www.iiste.org. Anene, J.  C. (1970). The international boundaries of Nigeria 1885–1960: The framework of an emergent African state. London: Longman. Asiwaju, A. I. (Ed.). (1984). Partitioned Africans: Ethnic relations across Africans international boundaries. London: C. Hurst. Asiwaju, A. I. (2003). Boundaries and African integration: Essays in comparative history and policy analysis. Lagos: Panaf Publishing. Chukwurah, A. O. (1993). European outline convention on transfrontier cooperation between territorial authorities or communities. In A.  I. Asiwaju & B.  M. Barkindo (Eds.), The Nigeria  – Niger transborder cooperation. Ikeja: Malthouse Press. Chukwurah, A. O. (2003). Enhancing the capabilities of administrators and the emerging challenges of border administration. In S. Amdii & D. Bobbo (Eds.), The Nigeria  – Niger trans-border management co-operation. Abuja: National Boundary Commission. Communique on the National Workshop on “Cross-Border Security, Co-operation and Integration: Focus on Nigeria’s Immediate Neighbours in the North  – West Zone” organized by Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in collaboration with the Office of the Vice-President, and North-Western States of Sokoto, Zamfera, Kebbi and Jigawa (2000). Imobighe, T. A. (1993). Theories and functions of boundaries. In B. M. Barkindo (Ed.), Management of Nigeria’s internal boundary questions. Lagos: R & DC National Boundary Commission. Kpoghul, M. T. (2009). A history of tiv borderland communities on the Nigeria – Cameroon boundary: 1961–2001. PhD Thesis, Benue State University, Makurdi. Kristof, L.  K. C. (1959). The nature of frontiers and boundaries. Annals of the Association of American Geographers (AAAG), 49, 269–282. Mackay, A. (2008). Border management and gender. In M. Bastick & K. Valasek (Eds.), Gender and security reform toolkit. Geneva: DCAF UN-INSTRAW.

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National Boundary Commission Report of the Working Groups on Border Administration. A.I. Asiwaju and B.M. Barkindo “The Nigeria – Niger Trans-­ border Co-operation”, Ikeja, Malthouse Press Ltd, 1993. Opanike, A., Adeluju, A. A., & Adenipekun, L. O. (2015). ECOWAS protocol on free movement and trans-border security in West Africa. Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJAPIA), 3(1), 41–47. Sheidu, D. A. (2003). Enhancing the capabilities of administrators to cope with the emerging challenges of border administration along Nigeria  – Niger international border. In S. Amdii & D. Bobbo (Eds.), The Nigeria – Niger trans-­border management co-operation. Abuja: National Boundary Commission. Workshop report on Cross-border Armed Boundary in North-East Zone of Nigeria organized by the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Yola, 18th to 20th October, 1991.

CHAPTER 15

Explaining Nigeria’s Diaspora Communities’ Transmogrification: From State Partners to Challengers Isiaka Abiodun Adams

Introduction Nigerians are one of the world’s most itinerant human beings. They traverse every nook and cranny of the globe and in the process settle there. The United Nations estimates about 1.2 million Nigerian-born people live outside the country as of 2015. The population of Nigerians living abroad has rapidly increased in recent years due to social, economic and political factors. Although the actual number of Nigerians in the diaspora is debatable, some sources claim a 17 million diaspora population or less (Dabiri-­ Erewa 2017; Economist 2015). The largest population of Nigerians in foreign lands resides in the United Kingdom, United States, West Africa and South Africa. Census figures in the United States in 2010 estimated about 400,000 Nigerian diaspora population out of which 221,000 were Nigerian born. A UK Census in 2011 revealed that Nigerian-born British residents more than doubled to 191,000 in the past decade.

I. A. Adams (*) Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria 261 © The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_15

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Nigerian diaspora populations are highly skilled and educated but had been forced to seek greener pastures abroad due to a perennial economic and political crisis exacerbated by corruption at home. Nigerians in the United States are said to be the most educated ethnic group in 2010. The US Census 2010 put the average income of Nigerian households at $94,030. Their remittance of $12 billion in 2012 was more than the total contribution to the Gross Domestic Product by 34 out of the 36 states (excluding the Lagos and Rivers states) in the country. When compared to other diasporas and transnational communities, there is a dearth of studies on the impact of Nigerian diaspora on the security of their host country and Nigeria with often scanty information on their interests and characteristics. Therefore, Nigerians abroad are “secret weapons” (Economist 2015), who could be exploited for both positive and negative purposes, thus necessitating a detailed examination of the impact they pose to their host countries and Nigeria. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: what is a diaspora and how does it differ from the transnational community? What is the historical trajectory of the Nigerian diaspora? Are there developmental roles for Nigerian diasporic communities? Why did a section of the Nigerian diaspora transform into sponsors and patrons to state challengers? What measures could promote diaspora involvement in peacebuilding and national development in the homeland? The chapter is divided into five sections. After the introduction, the second section consists of conceptual clarifications of the key concepts in the chapter such as diaspora and transnational communities. The third section reviews existing literature and the theoretical framework on the issue. In the fourth section, an attempt is made to examine the Nigerian diaspora’s impact on national development by focusing on the economic, social and political dimensions of these contributions. The fifth section is an explanation of the factors responsible for the transformation of Nigeria’s diaspora from state partners to state challengers while the last section concludes the chapter with recommendations and suggestions for future research on the issue.

Conceptual Clarifications: Diaspora and Transnational Communities Diaspora is derived from the Greek, meaning “to sow over or scatter” (Vertovec 2005). It often exemplifies the Jewish experience of forced expulsion, dispersal, persecution, loss of homeland and a dream to return.

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It also refers to “that segment of people living outside the homeland” (Connor, cited by Safran 1991, p. 83). Relying on the constructivist approach, Demmers (2007, p. 8) posits that “diasporas, much like ethnic groups, are imagined (transnational) communities, and the product of interactive processes of identification and ascription.” Identification with the diasporic community stems from varied reasons which invariably affect the degree of commitment. Diaspora identities are often developed through inter-subjective construction. Martin Sökefeld (2006, p. 268) argues that diaspora is not an automatic outcome of migration but an abstract discursive construction of the community identity. He views diaspora as a “collection of individuals who identify themselves and are identified by others as part of an imagined community that has been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from its original homeland to two or more host countries and that is committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland” (Demmers 2007, p. 9). Therefore, there is no diaspora without feelings for the homeland, its cultures, history, development and advancement. However, William Safran (1991, p. 83) has suggested six checklists for defining diaspora: (1) they are expatriate minority communities that are dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to at least two ‘peripheral’ places; (2) they maintain a memory, vision or myth about their original homeland; (3) they believe they are not and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host country; (4) they see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) they are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) the group’s consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuing relation with the homeland. These checklists are mutually reinforcing, and one could be more potent than the other in any given diasporic population. It should be noted that the diasporic feeling or identity increases and decreases; it is either active or inactive depending on the unfolding events such as natural disasters, political crisis or change of government, which they interpret variedly as it affects the homeland. Transnational communities are often confused with diaspora although they are different. While diaspora maintains a single spiritual attachment to a distant land of origin, transnational communities transcend boundaries. As explained by Steven Vertovec (2005), these communities “belong to two or more societies at the same time…for identity maintenance and political mobilization” which are often promoted and sustained through a revolution in information technology.

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Review of Relevant Literature The voyage by Nigerians to foreign lands is as old as its people, although as Demmers (2007, p. 9) would argue, “the Palestinian diaspora is perhaps most over-stretched of all contemporary Diasporas.” Falola and Heaton (2008, pp.  239–240) divided the Nigerian diasporic population into three: first is the Hausa-Fulani diaspora, who often embarked on pilgrimages to Makkah, Saudi Arabia, through Sudan but ended up settling in Sudan and Chad due to their inability to complete the journey. In this vein, Nigerians from the North accounted for the majority of between 900,000 and three million West Africans who have permanently settled in these countries. Also, Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem, which began in recent times, have contributed to a burgeoning population of Nigerians who presently live in the Israeli city till date. The second category comprises an estimated two million Trans-Atlantic diaspora slaves. Migration out of Nigeria to Europe and the Americas began in the form of slave trading in the fifteenth century. This was preceded by the trans-Saharan, Red Sea and Indian Ocean slave trade, which altogether accounted for over 2 million Nigerians shipped out in 500 years, out of which 1.4 million landed in the Americas. Mberu and Pongou (2010) claim that the trans-Atlantic slaves were ferried through the Bight of Benin (1600–1867): 1.5 million through the Bight of Biafra (1650–1850). As a result, over 3.5 million ex-slaves, mostly of Yoruba and Igbo extraction, settled in the Caribbean, the United States and Brazil. The third category includes semi-permanent transnational communities mostly made up of former students and traders who travelled to Europe and other parts of West Africa and settled there. This set of Nigerian diaspora contributed immensely to the wave of nationalist and Pan-African movements, which led to the independence of many of the African colonies. In the 1950s, an estimated 6500 Nigerians moved to the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Cotonou (Benin), as Ghana was the preferred destination for many West Africans. By 1959, no fewer than 100,000 Nigerians lived in Ghana. They were later expelled under an Aliens Compliance Order issued in 1969 due to economic decline in the country. This order affected over 200,000 migrants who were mostly Nigerians but instead of returning home, the majority of these deportees, totalling about 140,000, moved to Cote d’Ivoire. But Nigeria is not only migrants sending. It also receives migrants and refugees from its neighbouring countries. Between 1980 and 2008, the country was home to many West African nationals from Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These asylum seekers and

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refugees fled civil strife and intrastate wars in their countries. Nigeria’s oil wealth attracted immigrants from West Africa, but after unfettered corruption and poor policies plunged it into economic crisis, Nigeria expelled many undocumented migrants including about one million low-­skilled Ghanaians (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, p. 12). About 1.5 million aliens comprising 700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 150,000 Chadians, 120,000 Cameroonians, 5000 Togolese and 5000 Beninois were affected by the Aliens Expulsion Order in 1983 and May 1985. As of 1978, an estimated 30,000 United Kingdom-trained Nigerian graduates lived outside Africa and this number increased to 100,000  in 1984. More Nigerians migrated to Spain, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Gulf States in the early 2000s through student, skill and lottery schemes. The forced eviction and displacement of over two million Nigerians between 2000 and 2007 due to inter-ethnic strife and political crisis also exacerbated emigration in Nigeria. Mberu and Pongou (2010) note that during this period, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettled over 13,863 Nigerians in the United States, 11,749 in the United Kingdom, 10,406 in Germany and 9378 in Canada. Recently, Nigeria’s economic migrants discovered the perilous and famished Senegal-Spain route to France and Italy. No fewer than 10,000 died between 1999 and 2002  in their failed attempt to reach Europe. These migrants, often with no travel documents, are usually stranded in North Africa and their population peaked at 59,000 in 2008 (Mberu and Pongou 2010). Studies focusing on the influence of the diaspora on national and international disputes are bourgeoning (Adamson et al. 2011; Azar 1990; Demmers 2007; Anderson 1992; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2000). Demmers (2007) examines the role of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka concerning the ethnic wars in those countries. These groups were designated as terrorist organizations by their home governments.  Demmers (2007, p. 11) claims that these groups used violence against non-­cooperative diaspora community members to compel support for the diasporic cause. Bercovitch (2007, p.  34) postulates that diaspora can “create (in their countries of origin) structures and mechanisms to ensure not only compliance with the terms of an agreement but a radical rebuilding of a more peaceful structure,” to prevent a reoccurrence of conflict. A study by Kathelen Newland (2010) found that distance and isolation are no longer hindrances to diaspora seeking to influence prominent

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groups and the private sector, international organizations, media, non-­ governmental organizations and non-state actors, although the government is their key target. The report highlights key issues of who participates in diaspora advocacy, their targets, the means employed by them and the focus and impacts of their activities. The report asserts that the focus of diaspora advocacy are overseas voting rights, dual nationality, caste, religious and ethnic rights, development and disaster relief and the economy. But what are the drivers of migration out of Africa? Flahaux and De Haas (2016, pp. 22–23) posit that unlike the conventional interpretations of emigration in Africa being driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, the real explanations for migration from Africa could be “explained from processes of development and social transformation which have increased young Africans’ capabilities and aspirations to migrate.” It is instructive that countries with a comparatively higher level of development as Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria and Ghana have a higher emigration rate when compared to poorer countries in Africa. A key developmental issue that shape migration is the role of states and policies. Here, xenophobic attacks and visa restrictions in former colonizing countries such as France and the United Kingdom often stimulate a quest for new destinations in North America, Asia and Oceania while at the same time increase the nostalgic feeling about the homeland. The transnational communities maintain close contact with the homeland, and they are usually concerned about its development. Flahaux and De Haas (2016, p.  3) conclude that “when societies become wealthy emigration decreases and immigration increase.” The role of development processes, state formation and policies, the rise of nationalism, interstate and intrastate tensions and violence and the ­tendency of states to guard their national borders, access to economic resources, development in communication and transportation transmigration have made the impact of the diaspora to be felt more across the world. The economic importance of diaspora and transnational communities cannot be overemphasized. Not surprisingly, there is a trend by states towards according much attention to their diasporic communities due to their economic value. Aminu (2016) enumerated what he termed “the intangible contributions of diaspora Nigerian professionals” to the development of the Nigerian state. These include scholarly, programmatic, public intellectual and inspirational contributions that often motivate their fellow citizens “to rise above their circumstances and emulate one of their own who equally rose from similar circumstances and achieved profes-

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sional distinction.” Specifically, they help in poverty reduction through remittances conflict prevention/reduction and post-conflict reconstruction and constitutional campaign for democratic reforms. For example, the United Democratic Front for Nigeria-Abroad (UDFN) and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) were very active in the 1990s for democracy promotion and constitutionalism in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework: Securitization and De-securitization of Diaspora Communities Three scholars from the Copenhagen School of Security: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) popularized the securitization theory in politics. These scholars’ works were reactions to the Critical Security Studies (CSS) label, which emerged from a 1994 conference in Toronto and was subsequently used as the title of the book produced from the conference. Securitization refers to “a complex societal process in which various issues are discursively constructed as existential threats” (Goldewijk and Frerks 2007, p. 275). Securitization points to the fact that threats are for a great deal socially and politically constructed. CSS is distinguished by its emphasis on the critical study of security as an orientation rather than as a unique theoretical perspective. The Copenhagen School (CS) represented by writings of Buzan, Waever, de Wilde and Weaver (2003) argues that security politics is involved in the securitization of an issue “out of the normal democratic realm into an exceptional realm, which accordingly legitimizes the breaking of rules and justifies a wide range of emergency measures and politics” (Goldewijk and Frerks 2007, p. 275). The CS’ major contributions to security studies include a critique of securitization and de-securitization. The CS explains that securitization entails the classification of an issue, for example, small arms and light weapons, secessionist agitations, mass protest, religion, or cultural practices as an existential threat to a referent object and having this discourse accepted by the media and the population. De-securitization entails “shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 4). The concepts of securitization and de-securitization offer analysts a broader lens of the conceptualization of security by identifying the securitizing actors, as well as the countermeasures adopted, it is easy to assess the impacts and effectiveness of the measures adopted on the perceived threat.

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Sheehan (2006, p. 57) argues that securitization “is simply a stronger instance of phenomenon of politicization” because for an issue to be designated as a security threat, a convincing argument must be made to elevate the issue above other contending ones on the political agenda, thereby attracting priority. One of the usefulness of the securitization approach to security analysis is that it affords the researcher the “possibility of comparing the importance of other sectors without privileging the military above all the others” (Herring 2007, p. 136). Securitization theory is a potent tool for social and political mobilization (Waever 1995, p. 63). The theory asserts that the way to study security is to study discourse and political constellations and that evidence of successful securitization depends on indicators being met. Mark Neocleous (2006, p.  366) explains that the theory treats security not as a clearly definable objective, nor as a specific state of affairs, but rather as the product of social processes. Securitization theory is, therefore, purposely selected as the framework to explain the transmogrification of Nigeria’s diaspora communities from state partners to state challengers.

Nigerian Diaspora Remittances and National Security Fiona Adamson (2006) provides a framework for studying the relationship between international migration and national security. The study examined how cross-border migration affects national security in three core areas of state sovereignty or state capacity and the autonomy of state actors, the attendant balance of powers among states and the nature of violent conflicts in the international system. Khalid Koser (2011) notes that “The perception of migration as a threat to national security has certainly heightened in recent years, in part in response to the rapid rise in the number of international migrants (…) and especially of ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ migrants.” From a modest $20 million and $500 million total remittances in 1977 and 1999, respectively, Nigeria’s share of global transfers hit $1.39 billion in 2000, and it has steadily increased. In 2004, the country recorded $2.270 billion, which increased sevenfold to $14.640 billion in 2005, $19.932 billion in 2006 and $18.011 billion in 2007. The value of remittances was $19.206 billion in 2008, $18.368 billion in 2009 and $19.75 billion in 2010. A whopping $20.617 billion was received in 2011, $20.543 billion in 2012, $20.797 billion in 2013 and $20.827 in 2014.

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The country received $21.060 billion in 2015, $20.112 billion in 2016 and $22.345 billion in 2017. The Nigerian in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) claims that the US and UK diaspora remitted $12.26 billion and $7.76 billion, respectively. The monies were received by 2.6 million adult Nigerians (Table 15.1). Generally, licit labour remittances from migrants can help stimulate economic development (Adams and Page 2003). In Egypt and Tunisia, labour remittances accounted for 51 per cent of capital inflows (IOM 2003b, p. 2) states that labour remittances contributed more than 10 per cent to the national economies of El Salvador, Eritrea, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua and Yemen. Ratha (2007) has enumerated the usefulness of remittances in national development. First, remittances tend to be more stable than private capital flows while being countercyclical relative to the recipient economy. More funds are remitted when economies face a downturn during recessions, Table 15.1 Nigeria migrants remittances inflow

Year

Remittances (US$ millions)

World total

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total

500 1,390 1,170 1,210 1,060 2,270 14,640 16,932 18,011 19,206 18,368 19,745 20,617 20,543 20,797 20,829 21,060 20,112 22,345

121,671 126,750 140,339 163,489 197,183 226,426 280,146 326,008 393,115 454,273 426,042 462,146 524,414 544,903 574,016 597,689 581,872 573,551 595,695

Source: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/ immigration)

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natural disasters or political conflicts to cushion the negative effects on families and friends. Second, remittances reduce poverty by augmenting the income of recipient households and improving their welfare. In this vein, there is tension between the senders’ expectation and the realities in the country. Third, remittances have been crucial in financing education, health and entrepreneurship, thereby increasing household investments and its attendant high social return on investment. Fourth, remittances may serve as a catalyst for currency appreciation in recipient countries by boosting the exchange rates and raising international prices of the country’s traditional exports. And making imports expensive. Lastly, remittance increases a country’s creditworthiness and open vistas of access to the international capital market as well as lowers the cost of international borrowings. To underscore this economic nexus, The Indian diaspora websites clearly states: “The Diaspora is very special to India. Residing in distant lands, its members have succeeded spectacularly in their chosen professions by dint of their single-minded dedication and hard work” (Vertovec 2005). However, proper regulations and monitoring must be put in place to ensure that remittances from the diaspora and transnational communities are not diverted to activities and programmes that threaten national security.

Explaining the Diaspora’s Transmogrification from State Partners to Challengers Diasporas are “communities of individuals who may possess resources and have access to international organizations, international media and powerful host governments,” thus posing great challenges to the homeland government (Bercovitch 2007, p.  2). It is advised that, “special attention should therefore be paid to opportunities for (them) to engage in programmes in the field good governance and democratization process in their countries of origin” (Bercovitch 2007, p.  21). The factors below explain the transformation of diaspora from state partners to challengers. Globalization The IOM in a report (2003b, p. 4) notes that: “Like other flows, whether financial or commercial, flows of ideas or information, the rising tide of people crossing frontiers is among the most reliable indicators of the

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intensity of globalization.” David Held et al. (2003, p. 297) averred that: “There is now almost no state or part of the world that is not importing or exporting labor.” In this vein, Demmers (2007) claims that “any meaningful analysis of contemporary conflict” should focus on the processes of internationalization and deterritorialization, which diaspora and transnational communities symbolize. As noted by Gabriel Sheffer (2003, p. 81), “the establishment of diaspora organizations and participation in those organizations can create the potential for dual authority, and consequently also for dual or divided loyalties or ambiguous loyalty vis-a-vis host countries. Development of such fragmented loyalties often result s in conflicts between diasporas and their host societies and governments.” Kaldor-Robinson (2002, p. 185) remarks that “as globalization increases interconnectedness and at the same time strengthens feelings of alienation, which in turn increase the popularity of fundamentalist ideologies, whether religious or ethno-­ nationalist, it is likely that diasporic networks will be of increasing importance both as actors in the “new wars” and in changing national narratives.” Remittances The Economist (2015) asserts that “Nigeria’s diaspora is a source of money, markets, skills and ideas,” but this money comes as a double-edged sword. Demmers (2007) posits that diasporas are emerging as critical in national and international security serving as catalysts and significant players in insurgencies, rebellion, war and terrorism. The World Bank (2003), cited in Demmers (2007, p. 4) postulates that “if a country which has recently ended a conflict has a large diaspora in the USA, its risk that the conflict will resume is sharply increased.” The Bank asserts that “diasporas tend to be more extreme than the population they have left behind.” The Minister of Information and Culture, Lai Mohammed asserts: “Let me tell you, the financial headquarters is in France. We know, but you see, can you as a government stop sending money to your parents? … It is incontrovertible that some people in the diaspora contribute money to IPOB” (Wakili 2017). The organization Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was formed in 2012 by a British-Nigerian, Nnamdi Kanu, to actualize an independent state for the old eastern region after a failed secessionist civil war between 1966 and 1970. The report quoted a source in the security circle as saying, “other countries from which IPOB also received huge cash inflows include

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Turkey, Senegal, Malaysia, Hong Kong, United Kingdom and the United States” (Mohammed 2017). It was alleged that “before his arrest, Nnamdi Kanu had appealed to people of Igbo extraction in some of these countries to provide him with funds which would be used in buying weapons and bringing down the Nigerian government.” But these countries denied the allegations (Lere 2017). However, diaspora remittance is a double-edged sword. While it might not be very difficult to ascertain the senders and recipients of the remittances, due to increasing financial transparency and the know your customer policy introduced by the apex bank, the purposes for which they were deployed cannot always be transparent. Identity Conflicts Edward Azar (1990) argues that contrary to focus on the Clausewitzean idea of states as the drivers of national security and most contemporary conflicts, identity groups such as ethnic, religious, cultural and other are at the core of what Mary Kaldor (2001) called “new wars.” Didier Bigo (1997, pp. 81–104) observes that “the end of the Cold War and bipolarity has helped to transform both the nature and the functions of national boundaries in ways that increasingly securitise migration.” There is a growing resurgence of agitations for self-determination and irredentist forces across the world. According to Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen (2005), out of the entire 118 armed conflicts counted worldwide, only seven were interstate. The remaining 111 were either intrastate (90) or internationalized interstate (21). New Media Generally, as a democratic instrument of political discourse and interaction, social media platforms allow the sharing of an overwhelming number of videos, photos, tweets and comments. Social media networks, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and WhatsApp, provide a platform for the creation and maintenance of weak ties. They are veritable bridges across social divides, and they produce dramatic effects on political systems by shaping democracies. Social networks also inform, mobilize, entertain, create communities, increase transparency and seek to hold governments accountable. More importantly, social media has revolutionized political communication

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from the need to ‘share it’ to the imperative to ‘share in it.’ The Nigerian government claims that IPOB finance headquarters is located in France, an accusation which France denied. It was alleged that IPOB gets money both from the diaspora and at home. Radio Biafra is located in the United Kingdom. Corruption and Government Policies Aiyede (2009, p. 262) postulates that certain characteristics have largely shaped the persistence of corrupt practices in Nigerian private and public lives. These are values of elite politics, which conflict with the demands of national prosperity. For example, the federal character principle and state creation, bifurcated citizenship that confounds commitment to government effectiveness and accountability by citizens and residents and encourages taxation without representation, and high levels of corruption, lack of accountability, poor levels of government performance, and a federation built on a “mono-mineral rentier state.” The prevalence of two public realms of primordial and civic public in Nigeria had tended to conflate self-service with public service. The primordial public represents the domain of modern social formations associated with ancient structures of ethnic and kinship relationships while the civic public realm exemplifies the political space within which the formal state operates. Peter Ekeh (1975) insists that the primordial public realm is governed by morality while the civic public realm is amoral and devoid of any sense of duty and accountability. Much as the Buhari administration has tried to tame the monster of corruption in Nigeria’s public life, the opposition political party in Nigeria, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was quick to blame the ruling All Progressives Party (APC) policies for the resurgence in the Biafra agitations led by IPOB. Although the party condemned separatist movements, it asserted that “the APC policies have been the catalyst for IPOB problem” (Jannah 2017). New Standards of Civilization: Human and People’s Rights Human civilizations and developments, in the post-Cold War era, are now assessed based on respect for human rights. While the Cold War lasted, human rights were sacrificed for ideological posturing. The great powers supported dictatorial military and civilian autocrats, so long as they carried

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out their dictates. Olonisakin (1998, pp.  98–99) argues that as human rights were non-existent at the state level, “international protection of human rights was near impossible” and at best ineffective due to “superpower politics.” The end of the Cold War foisted a new standard of civilization (SOC) that emphasizes the protection of human rights (Axtmann 2007; Fidler 2001; Bowden 2002; Mozaffari 2001; Diamond 2002). The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia in 1990 was reckoned as the first international humanitarian action to legitimize the changing view of sovereignty under the new world order, with its “preference to the issue of human rights, over ideology” (Olonisakin and Aning 1999, p. 17). Nigeria played a dominant role in the multinational regional peacekeeping initiative. The changing global political landscape elevated domestic human rights abuses to the international level and “human rights records of individual states now have tangible political weight” as a condition “to enter the club of influential states” (The Constitutional Rights Project 2008).

Conclusion and Recommendations From the above discourse, the emigration of Nigerians and diaspora populations has benefited the country. It has attracted highly skilled manpower and several billion-dollar remittances, which boosted the economy. A properly harnessed diaspora community would promote development through innovation, broad-based networks and outreach; it would support humanitarian emergencies during natural disasters such as flooding, drought and famine; engender bridges between Nigeria and non-­ Nigerians; provide new layers to the Nigerian narratives through the dissemination of Nigeria’s messages to the world; and it would also shape Western and regional foreign policy agendas and offer models of civic participation (Araia 2012). The recent transmogrification of the Nigerian diaspora can be explained through factors such as identity conflicts in a heterogeneous state (Nigeria’s diaspora is diverse, multi-generational and multi-faceted and straddles every continent and socio-economic status), corruption and government policies, the new media, globalization, remittances and new standards of civilization. The Senior Special Assistant to the President on Foreign Affairs and The Diaspora, Mrs Abike Dabiri-Erewa (2017) notes that: “We have

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Nigerians in different parts of the world. Although, we have the good, the bad and the ugly, Nigeria has proud stories to share of many of its Diaspora nationals. Let us always celebrate the good things that many of our globally celebrated Nigerians in the Diaspora are doing today.” The state’s failure to address the basic challenges of state formation, which stem from the general disillusionment among Nigeria’s diaspora communities and the perceived inability to realize the Nigerian dream, has all contrived to serve as push factors for Nigerians to migrate. The chapter suggests transparent national dialogue and the proper monitoring and harnessing of the potentials of the Nigerian diaspora communities to engender positive contributions to national development. The adoption of July 25 every year as Diaspora day should provide the opportunity to explore best practices for diaspora-state relations across the world such as is done in India, China, the Philippines, Italy, Ethiopia and Ghana.

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Newland, K. (2010, November). Report: Voice after exit: Diaspora advocacy. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved January 20, 2018, from http://migrationpolicy.org Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Van Hear, N., & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). The migration–development nexus evidence and policy options state–of–the–art overview. International Migration. Special Issue 2, 40(5), 3–7. Olonisakin, F. (1998). Changing perspectives on human rights in Africa. In S. Akinrinade & A. Sesay (Eds.), Africa in post-cold war international system (pp. 95–109). London: Pinter. Olonisakin, F., & Aning, E.  K. (1999). Humanitarian intervention and human rights: The contradictions in ECOMOG. The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(1), 16–39. Ratha, D. (2007, June). Leveraging remittances for development. Policy brief program on migration, Migration and Development. Migration Policy Institute. Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 1(1), 83–99. Sheehan, M. (2006). International security: An analytical survey. New Delhi: Viva Books Private. Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in transnational space: A social movement approach to the formation of diaspora. Global Networks, 6(3), 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00144.x. The Constitutional Rights Project (CRP). (2008, July 28). Nigeria and commitment to human rights. Punch Newspaper Advert, Monday. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from http://www.crpnigeria.org/nigeria_and _comm_to__hr.htm The Economist. (2015, June 18). Special report: Nigerians Abroad: Secret weapon. The Economist, Retrieved January 2, 2017, from https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21654360-nigerians-diaspora-source-monemarkets-skills-and-ideas-seret-weapon Vertovec, S. (2005). The political importance of diasporas. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Working paper no: 13, University of Oxford. Waever, O. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On security. New York: Columbia University Press. Wakili, I. (2017, September 20). FG unveils IPOB finance headquarters. Daily Trust, Abuja-Nigeria. Retrieved December 5, 2017, from http://www.dailytrust.com.ng

CHAPTER 16

Diaspora Remittances and Sustainable Development in Africa: The Case Study of Nigeria Joseph Okwesili Nkwede, Kazeem O. Dauda, Ahmed O. Moliki, and Atanda O. Orija

Introduction The concept of Diaspora has become very popular in academic and policy circles. This stems from the fact that the Diaspora phenomenon which had hitherto been exclusively used to describe Jewish dispersal outside modern Israel from 587–86 BC to the present, has been given a new interpretation (Mohamoud 2003). Today, the word “Diaspora” refers to migrants who settle in distant lands and produce new generations, and simultaneously maintain ties of affection with and make occasional visits to each other and

J. O. Nkwede (*) Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria K. O. Dauda • A. O. Moliki Department of Political Science, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijebu Ode, Nigeria A. O. Orija Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria © The Author(s) 2020 279 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_16

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their homeland (Hagher 2009). The African continent, the cradle of humanity, could be said to be the first place to record diasporization as human beings dispersed from Africa to the rest of the world for millennia. With increased advancement in science and technology, communication and transportation, the people of the world are being dispersed as never before and the migration of Africans to other countries of the world has astronomically and gradually increased since the late 1950s (van Kessel and Tellegen 2000; Akinrinada and Ajibewa 2003). In recent times, many governments of migrant-sending countries have recognized the potential of their citizens abroad and international development agencies are beginning to do likewise. Diaspora incentives to participate in home country development or reconstruction depend on the extent to which they feel they have a stake in their home countries as well as in the countries that host them. Apparently, with such factors in mind, and in partnership with developing countries and Diaspora, it is important to establish a link between Diaspora population and development in their home countries. Mohan (2002) considered the role of Diasporas in the development of the home country in three phases. First, development in the Diaspora, which deals with how diasporic communities utilize their localized diasporic connections to secure economic and social well-being and, as a by-product, contribute to the development of their locality. Second, development through the Diaspora, which focuses on how Diasporic communities utilize their diffused global connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social well-being. Third, development by the Diaspora, which stipulates how Diasporic flows and continued connections back home facilitate the development and sometimes the creation of these homelands. The salient point raised by Mohan is that the role of the Diaspora in development can be in the form of ethnic businesses in countries hosting migrant communities, the trade Diasporas that span countries, regions and continents, and flows of ideas, money and political support to the migrant’s home country, be it an existing home or one which nationalists would like to see come into being. Essentially, the link between African Diasporas and development in Africa is a critical issue that requires attention. This is because there is now more than ever, an urgent need to gain a clearer understanding of this Diaspora development initiative in their homeland, aware of the fact that African Diasporas have left Africa physically but not emotionally. This emotional attachment is the general characteristic share by all Diaspora populations that prompt the African Diaspora to maintain links with their countries

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of origin. Consequently, these emotional ties are translated into obligations and thus into concrete commitments, actions and activities. Implicitly, it includes transferring money (remittances), ideas, information, knowledge, skills and know-how back home. It also means helping to set up local businesses as well as private or voluntary development projects. Today, African countries are faced with challenges of building a strong economy, an enduring democracy, stable institutions and sustainable infrastructure. Given these challenges, the role of Africans in the Diaspora becomes even more crucial. It is against this backdrop that it became imperative to study the development activities sponsored and promoted by the African Diaspora and how this connects to development in their respective countries of origin. Using Nigeria as a case study, this chapter examines whether African Diaspora remittances have significantly facilitated sustainable development in the country. The chapter is divided into the following sections: “Introduction”, “Conceptual Framework”, “Theoretical Underpinning”, “Methodology”, “Diasporas and Remittance Flows in Nigeria, “Diagnoses of Nigerian Nigerian Diaspora in Sustainable Development” and finally, “Conclusion and Recommendations”.

Conceptual Framework Diaspora Scholars have offered various definitions of Diaspora depending on their perceptions and orientations. This is because the concept “Diaspora” to a large extent provokes a response of interest at mention. Hear, Pieke and Vertovec (2004) defined Diaspora as populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources; between the homeland and destination countries and among destination countries. For them, Diasporas include complex mixes of people who have arrived at different times, through different channels, through different means and with very different legal statuses. Mohamoud (2003:9) conceptualized Diaspora as a community of people living outside their country of origin. In this regard, Diaspora is seen as a group of people who live outside the area in which they had lived for a long time or in which their ancestors lived.

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Weinar (2010) set out six rules to distinguish Diasporas from migrant communities. These included criteria that the group maintains a myth or collective memory of their homeland; they regard their ancestral homeland as their true home, to which they will eventually return; remain committed to the restoration or maintenance of that homeland; and they relate “personally or vicariously” to the homeland to a point where it shapes their identity. While Weinar’s definition was influenced by the idea of the Jewish Diaspora, he indeed recognized the expanding use of the concept Brubaker (2005). Cohen (2008), noting the widening use of the phenomenon, suggests that one element of this expansion in use involves the application of the concept Diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases; essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space. Recently, scholars have continued to make distinction between kinds of Diaspora, based on its causes such as imperialism, trade or labour migrations, or by the kind of social coherence within the Diaspora community and its ties to the ancestral land. Some Diaspora communities maintain strong political ties with homeland. Other qualities that may be typical of many Diasporas are thoughts of return, relationships with other communities in the Diaspora and lack of full assimilation into the host country (Yossi 2007; Oonk 2007; Kelvin 2013). Essentially, in the context of this discourse, Diaspora can safely be defined as a scattered population with a common origin in a smaller geographical area. In this sense, it is the movement of the population from its original homeland. African Diaspora The problem of defining the term “African Diaspora” in very precise terms arises from the fact that different scholars have taken different views, with the result that its real meaning seems to hover from the perception of the scholar. The source of this difficulty lies in the fact that the concept is used in different senses since the African Diaspora is ascribed to different things on different grounds. Similarly, the African Diaspora has been defined through different epochs underlining varying standpoints. Indeed, the notion that the African Diaspora is homogeneous is both simplistic and unrealistic given both the temporal and spatial dimensions of African emigration to the rest of the world (Oucho 2008). The African Diaspora refers to the c­ ommunities

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throughout the world that have descended from the historic movement of the people from Africa, predominantly to the Americas, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, among other areas around the globe. The term has been historically applied to the descendants of the West and Central Africans who were enslaved and shipped to the Americas by way of the Atlantic slave trade (Ade 1998). Some scholars have argued that African Diaspora discourse is changing in recent times to include various other populations of African descent who have been displaced and dispersed due to enslavement or genocide, that theories about mythical homelands, collective memory, the experience of racism and the emergence of Pan-African sentiment are common among notions about the African Diaspora (Akyeampong 2000). Of course, the ever-increasing demand for labour accounts for the ongoing displacement of Africans (Harris 1993; Olson 2003). The African Union conceptualized the African Diaspora as consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union. From this standpoint, the African Diaspora has recently moved in the direction of understanding its role in modern times. This trend is in reaction to the traditional way in which Africans and its Diasporans have been placed in history books, notably as victims or people without historical agency. Essentially, Africans and their descendants are portrayed as representatives of primitive culture and slavery, but the current consensus is that viewing the contributions of the African Diaspora to the history of modernity gives us a more complete appreciation of global history. The effect of the African Diaspora on modernity can be viewed by the history and culture of the people from the African Diaspora. It could be this that made Manning argue that African descendants have kept their ties to the African continent, creating a global community in which they carried with them their culture, family values, views on government and their spiritual beliefs. Implicitly, the African Diaspora can safely be defined as the dispersal of Africans outside the African continent. Dispersal here suggests the actual process of dispersal and can also mean individuals residing in countries outside Africa who have been dispersed, either through choice or through force. Today, the African Diaspora has been formed by the movements of Africans and their descendants to regions throughout Europe, the Caribbean, North America, South America and Central Africa. Historically, some of the African Diaspora descends from individuals who were taken

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Table 16.1 Nigerian diaspora statistics

Country

Population

India Ireland Japan Netherlands Australia Canada Britain America Brazil Greece Total

9500 16,300 5018 9453 4519 19,520 174,000 227,631 5000 6000 476,941

Sources: White (2009); Cybriwsky (2011); Odafe (2011), and Office for National Statistics September (2011)

into slavery; however, we are witnessing an increase of voluntary immigrants and asylum-seekers. Below is a table illustrating the world’s top 12 countries hosting members of the African Diaspora (Table 16.1). Nigerian Diaspora: Towards Explanation According to Akinrinde and Ogen (2011), the Greek word Diaspora (scattering, dispersion) originally referred to the “movement migration, or scattering of people away from an established or ancestral homeland” or people “dispersed by whatever cause to more than one location” or “people settled far from their ancestral homelands”. To this context, the Nigerian Diaspora is restricted to mean Nigerians who have settled or live abroad (outside Nigeria) for reasons which are not limited to active conflict, poor government, pursuit of advanced degrees, economic inequality and quest for better opportunities (Akinrinde and Ogen 2011). The Nigerian Diaspora is two-fold: the involuntary Diasporas who left Nigeria as a corollary of Atlantic slave trade before Nigerian independence in 1960, and the voluntary Diasporas who left after independence (Soludo 2014). Our focus here is solely on the post-colonial Diaspora who voluntarily left Nigeria because of all kinds of hardships, in search of better opportunities.

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Statistics on Nigerians living outside Nigeria is highly difficult to know because of the changing nature of the population. For instance, millions of Nigerians that have emigrated from the country to other parts of the world are still arriving in different countries. These migrants and their descendants constitute the Nigerian Diaspora. The Nigerian Diaspora covers practically every part of the world but the largest populations of Nigerians can be found in the UK, the US and South Africa. Below is a table illustrating the world’s top 10 countries hosting members of the Nigerian Diaspora. Sustainable Development Sustainable development is a new and broad generic term which pegs specific application to distinct political economies. Eboh (1995) noted that only very few (if any) inter-disciplinary concepts presently pose a greater intellectual challenge for scholars and policy analysts than sustainable development. This, he explained, is because of the cross-disciplinary sensibilities which the concept involves, thereby making a universal definition far-fetched. The situation is not helped by the fact that countries in different stages of development and varying socio-political and economic structures cannot reasonably subscribe to the same definitional regime. Thus, definitional and paradigmatic differences characterize the intellectual discourse on sustainable development. The sustainability concept is a modern world concept which refers to long-term human and material sustenance. It ensures the continued existence of programmes long after their establishment (Abah 2003). Sustainability is central to all development efforts. Without it, investments in the development effort are short-lived and of no effect. It is the only global barometer for measuring resilient and enduring socio-economic system. A programme’s results are called sustainable if they are utilized by direct recipients after the completion of the programme without further external assistance (UNDP Management Programme 2001). In more and encompassing definitions, sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The definition, as expounded by the World Bank Commission on Environment and Development and cited by Nduanya (2001), builds development efforts on man, whom it was believed, should be the purveyor and end of development efforts.

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Sustainable development in this regard has to do with participatory development, human development and environmental protection. These components are measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). The Human Development Index combines a measure of purchasing power with measures of physical habit and educational attainment. The three components of HDI offer an alternative to Gross National Product (GNP) for measuring the relative socio-economic progress of nations. The HDI enables people and their governments to evaluate progress over time and to determine priorities for policy interventions (Nkwede and Udu 2014). It also permits instructive comparisons of experiences in different countries. Indeed, after the structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s which had moved development away from concerns for the people to concerns for macro-economic aggregates and stability, people became the real wealth of a nation, and the basic objective of development was to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. Thus, the HDI devised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has opened a new vista for measuring and evaluating development in a more human-centred rather than economistic manner. To this end, if sustainable development is participatory and human-­ centred among other aspects as noted above, its indicators for our use in this study is pigeonholed on the impacts of Diaspora remittances on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa and how these remittances have significantly affected the living standard of the people in the country of origin with special reference to Nigeria.

Theoretical Underpinning The study employed a political economy approach as the theoretical framework. Political economy has its roots in the classical works of Marx and Engel that derived their intellectual stands from the works of great economists such as Smith, Pye, and Mill. Political economy theory is concerned with the distribution of social wealth, class relations and conflicts as well as their impacts on the development of the society from one stage to another. The political economy approach tries to explain the social relations existing among people in the society in all the processes of production, exchange and consumption of goods and services. The political economy approach need not be mutually exclusive. A process as complex as the African Diaspora is obviously the result of equally complex forces operating at various levels in space and time. Diaspora remittance flows are

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determined by conditions in both the sending and receiving countries, including the state of the economy, political stability and freedom, and Diaspora laws, all of which are affected by broader forces in the global political economy. Every society has a peculiar economic system anchored on property relations. The political economy approach gives credence to material conditions, particularly economic factors in all social lives. Undoubtedly, economic needs are the most fundamental needs of human beings, because a person must eat before pursuing other things such as worship, culture, tourism and other social things. This approach gives primacy to material conditions, particularly economic factors in the explanation of social life (Ake 1981). He further maintained: Once we understand what the material assets and constraints of a society are, how the society produces goods to meet its material needs, how the goods are distributed and what type of social relations arise from the organization of production, we have come a long way to understanding the culture of that society; its laws, its religious system, its political system and even its modes of thought.

The political economy theory investigates the interconnection of phenomenon, programmes and policies, with the sole intention of discovering the class origin, character, composition and the logic of their existence and future. The methodological implication of this approach is that special attention must be paid to the economic structure of society and indeed, it must be used as the point of reference for studying other aspects of the society, be it the legal, political, religious, and the like (Odoziobodo 2013). Contemporary diasporization is a search for improved material conditions which should propel homeland and host land development.

Methodology A trend and content analytical approach was adopted for this study. Data were collected using documentary instruments and scholarly inputs from several libraries, internet sources, periodicals and journals. This method was suitable to the study because of its qualitative nature. Data generated were analysed to determine whether Diaspora remittances have significantly fuelled sustainable development in continental Africa particularly Nigeria.

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Diasporas and Remittance Flows in Nigeria Though Nigeria is bedevilled with severe financing gaps, remittances by Nigerians in Diaspora have become a veritable source of revenue to Nigeria and contribute significantly to the Nigerian economy. Remittances are largely personal transactions from immigrants to their friends and families. The World Bank reported that Nigerians in Diaspora officially remitted over US$21 billion to Nigeria in 2012. In real concrete terms, this US$21 billion is equivalent to about 9% of Nigeria’s GDP in the year 2012 (World Bank). The World Bank numbers also showed that remittances were the second largest forex inflow after crude petroleum. It should be noted that migrants use various methods to remit their money and many transfers are informal and unrecorded. The current statistics from CBN shows that the Diaspora has been remitting over US$10 billion yearly into the country. Nigerians living abroad ranked fifth among the top recipients of Diaspora transfer of funds. In the latest ranking, India led the pack, followed by China, the Philippines, Mexico and with Nigeria in the fifth position. Other countries that equally joined the top 10 include Egypt, the sixth largest, with about US$18 billion in remittance, suggesting that there has been an astronomical surge from US$9 billion in 2008. Perhaps, the surge is driven by increased support by migrants to their families in the face of political uncertainty and economic difficulties Essentially the remittances of US$530 billion in 2012 by the migrants outstripped the World Bank’s projection for the period, which were expected to reach US$406 billion in 2012, a growth of 6.5% over the previous years. These flows are expected to rise to 8% in 2013 and 10% in 2014 and to reach US$534 billion in 2015 (Obi 2013; Ikechi and Anayochukwu 2013). Analytically, the rise in remittances from Nigerians in Diaspora is not unconnected with their interest to subscribe to a Diaspora bond planned by the federal government of Nigeria with a view to securing alternative means of funding critical infrastructural projects in Nigeria. These remittances can be diagrammatically represented in the Chart 16.1 below. Apart from the information in chart one above, Diaspora remittances has constituted a major revenue sources in Nigeria. The World Bank also indicated that remittances were the second largest forex in low after crude petroleum in Chart 16.2.

289

Remittances in US dollar billion

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Countries

Revenue in billions of naira

Chart 16.1  Remittances by Nigerians in Diaspora: amount remitted (USD billion). (Source: World Bank)

Chart 16.2  Revenues accrued to the federal government and recorded remittance from Diaspora Nigerians in 2012. (Source: World Bank)

Imperatively, these remittances have drawn the attention of Nigerian governments to the Diaspora as potential development actors. The current global financial crisis may have reduced the volume of remittances for the moment, but generally the opportunities for securitizing these flows

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and using the funds raised to finance developmental activities remain sacrosanct (Madichie and Madichie 2017). This is largely so because the role of the Diaspora is easily noticeable at macro and meso levels of society, that of remittances cuts across the whole spectrum of societal development. Virtually all African countries including Nigeria with a large Diaspora perceive their contributions and their remittances as crucial for homeland development (Neil 2003; Orozco and Fedewa 2006; Nweke and Nyewusira 2015; Chand 2016). The general conclusion from previous studies show that the Diasporas use their wealth wisely, with remittances more than counterbalancing cost (Gunatilleke 1986; cited in Skeldon 2002). Relatedly, in sub-Saharan Africa where investment opportunities hardly exist, remittances have boosted the poverty gap to the extent that the majority of households are entrapped. This stems from the fact that in Nigeria, remittances have reduced poverty by providing families left at home with additional income, surpluses of which end in consumption as well as investments in education and health (IOM 2006). Two notable features of remittances need mentioning. These include: (i) they are largely unaffected by political or financial crises, tending to increase in times of difficulties; and (ii) they are more equally spread among developing countries than are other financial flows (Ratha 2003, in IOM 2006). Skeldon (2002:119) made a clear distinction between migration and poverty when he stated; Migration is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help; it helps well for the country to which they go; it helps to break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come. What is the perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good?

In this connection, the reciprocity between the Diaspora and remittances is highly appreciated but is hardly subjected to empirical analysis hence the preponderance of anecdotal evidence. In the words of a Salvadoran sociologist: “Migration and remittances are the true economic adjustment programmes of the poor in our country.” (Carlo Guillermo Ramos, in Portes 2008) Here “Migration” can be substituted with “The diaspora” and “our country” with “African countries”. Similarly, Skeldon

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(2002:80) argues that the main challenge for policy makers in African countries “is to facilitate the types of movements that are most likely to lead to development while protecting Diasporas from abuse and exploitation”. It is therefore reasonable to argue that remittances augment recipient households’ resources, smooth consumption, provide working capital and have multiplier effects through increased household spending. Remittances can also be integrated into a country’s economy, employ the macro-­ economic behaviour of remittances to influence responses to productive force—for instance, in investment and trade—and ascertain the impact of remittances on national economic growth (Oluyemi et al. 2015). Again, it has been noted by (Gupta et al. 2007, More 2005) that remittances may reduce infant mortality by improving housing conditions or access to public services such as water; that remittances boost growth in the countries with less developed financial systems because they provide an alternative way to finance investment, acting as a substitute for the domestic financial system; and that households receiving remittances tend to have better nutrition and access to health and educational services compared to those not receiving remittances.

Diagnoses of Nigerian Diaspora in Sustainable Development Importantly, Nigerians in Diaspora have made an impressionable impact in sustainable development. Indeed, without the receipt of remittances, without Diaspora-funded development projects and without the return of people committed to peace and prosperity in their homeland, marginalized and vulnerable people of Nigeria would have been worse off. Nigerians abroad have provided funding, leadership and publicity for activities in their homeland, often returning to take part in the work on the ground. The financial and material contributions from the Diaspora have helped to sustain the economy and served as a powerful antidote to the helplessness and disillusionment that prevailed in the wake of the global economic crisis. The sustainable development process is based not only on financial resources but also on social and political dialogue, advocacy and awareness of stability for development. Notable areas of Nigerians in Diaspora’s engagement in sustainable development are chronicled below.

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1. Partnership in Democratic Governance Nigerians in Diaspora are becoming significant players in building democratic institutions. As they are gaining more voice and recognition, they have begun demanding participation in the home country’s political processes. It is increasingly evident that great numbers of Nigerians abroad are seeking elected office at home, including as members of national legislatures and as state governors, and many of the major national political parties rely on the Diaspora’s financial contributions during electioneering campaigns. With the improvement in information and communication technology, Nigerians in Diaspora are now more informed about the activities of government at home. They not only criticize government policies and programmes or bad government officials but are now coming back to run for elective offices at home. Often, Diaspora groups support or sponsor candidates to win elections while some finance political parties in a bid to play a more active role in the politics of their country of origin. 2. Community Projects/Development Diaspora Nigerians often, through hometown associations, undertake philanthropic activities in their inherent social capital values to pool resources for extending basic infrastructure and services (classrooms and education facilities, health equipment and access to potable water and electricity) to communities. Thus, the greatest impact of Diaspora remittances is evident at the level of community development where the resources of the government are usually inadequate to provide roads, electricity, schools, hospitals and several other amenities required for decent living. In effect, Diaspora groups galvanize community-driven development through the promotion of collective decision-making, capacity enhancement, networking and social capital formation. 3. Thematic and Social Networks Often, Diaspora Nigerians establish some form of links with their home institutions such as universities and research centres, providing occasional face-to-face tutoring, collecting and distributing materials (books, computers, medical supplies etc.). For instance, the Vine Group, a New  York-based Association of Nigerian Professionals, has been sending on an annual basis books, computers and scholarships to higher institutions in Nigeria. In 2013, the group sent 10 scholarship awards to the Polytechnic Ibadan, 20 to

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the Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ogun State, and 300, 000 books and 50 computers to the Polytechnic Ibadan (Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation; Akanle and Adesina 2017). 4. Health and Education Through Professional Conferences Diaspora Nigerians often hold conferences in Nigeria with a view to raising awareness about new practices, to carry out vital services or to address grey areas that have not been the focus in existing domestic practice. The Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO), for example, as part of their 2007 Conference in Abuja, held a pain and arthritis clinic, training of trainers on emergency medical response and life-saving skills and organized a molecular science and technology show. Diaspora remittances have facilitated the provision of healthcare and education and have been instrumental in the reduction of both infant and maternal mortality in many Nigerian communities. They have provided health centres, free medication to the poor and built dispensaries and many other facilities required to enhance primary healthcare and basic education in their home communities. 5. Humanitarian Services Several Nigerian groups, churches and associations have been contributing their quota in national development in various forms to Nigerians at home, including medical missions by doctors and nurses. Recently, a group of Nigerian doctors led by a well-known and hugely successful Nigerian medical doctor in Chicago, Dr. Nurudeen Olowopopo, embarked on a medical mission to Lagos state called “Medical Mission of Mercy” where they treated several patients without charge. The mission was planned under the auspices of the strong and vibrant Association of Nigerian Physicians in Americas, whose membership numbers in the thousands both in the US and Canada (Anyim 2013). A group of Nigerian professionals based in the US and Britain also contributed money up to thousands of dollars to victims of the bomb blast that occurred at the Ikeja Military Cantonment in 2011. The same group of Nigerians had contributed similarly to the case of Bosede, the girl with a hole in the heart, under the auspices of website Nigeriaworld.com. This group was coordinated by the US-based Nigerian Leadership Forum, NLF (Anyim 2013). Again, some Diaspora groups from Nigeria known as Ibo Women

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in Diaspora (Umu-Ada Igbo in Diaspora) in 2017 embarked on a medical mission and distributed various medical equipment and other useful items to indigent patients in Nigerian hospitals. 6. Award of Scholarship NIDO, which is now embedded in the Nigerian National Volunteer Services (NNVS), has been raising substantial amount of money with which they fund projects in Nigeria or offer scholarships to needy Nigerian students. Simultaneously, some have engaged in some intellectual exercise to strategize on how to contribute to moving Nigeria forward. 7. Investment and Wealth Creation Nigerians in Diaspora have helped immensely in elevating the living standards of their families. Aside monetary remittances, they have invested profoundly in emerging industries in Nigeria, thereby alleviating the unemployment problem in the country (Ogboi and Ezike 2017). 8. Private Sector Growth and Value: Chain Extensions Nigerians in Diaspora have been active in establishing small businesses, particularly new home constructions that have impacted local real estate industry and artisanal groups regarding brick manufacturing, masonry and carpentry; such activities have implications for youth employment and income generation (Guo 2010). The Nigerian Diaspora supports the creation of small and medium businesses through their remittances which helps in creating jobs. Such small businesses include but are not limited to hair dressing, carpentry, car washing, masonry, mechanics, restaurants and the like. These small businesses constitute the real sector of the economy with multiplier effects that are quite humongous in various critical dimensions (Ugwu 2016). 9. Establishment of Real Estate and Mortgage Refinance Company Diaspora remittances have helped in no small measure in the areas of housing projects in Nigeria. Kumo (2014) maintained that US$2.5 billion of Diaspora money is being used in the housing sector for 200,000 housing units in the next five years with the nomenclature of Mortgage Refinance Company (MRC). It should be noted that a significant percentage of land and real estate developments in urban areas belong to Nigerians living abroad. Their investments in the purchase of land and houses as well as in the construction of new homes and rental property not only reduce

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10.

11.

12.

13.

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the deficiency the housing sector but also encourage the growth of ancillary businesses. Apart from the points enumerated above, Ugwu (2016) identified other multiple forms of Diaspora capital with implications for sustainable development: Financial Capital: This refers to the cash transfers which help to provide food, clothing, housing, health and education for millions of households who otherwise would not have been able to make it from one day to the next. Recipients put remittances to a variety of uses which include the creation of small businesses and the development of various income generating opportunities. Intellectual Capital: The Nigerian Diaspora also contributes to the development of Nigeria through the transfer of intellectual capital. Contemporaneously, the lamentations over “brain drain” have become less audible because of advancements in information and technologies which have created a platform that enable Nigerians to tap into the know-how and skills of the Diaspora in many flexible ways that do not even require them to return home. Political Capital: Members of the Nigerian Diaspora deploy their connections and influence towards the support of political transformations at home. They also support the growth of civil society movements and protests against political marginalization and discrimination. For instance, the resistances against the repressive regime of General Sani Abacha, as well as the attempt to elongate the tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo after 2007, received significant support from Nigerians in Diaspora. Cultural Transfer: Through their exposure to foreign cultures, values and norms, members of the Diaspora can bring fresh perspectives and global insights that drive innovation and transformations at home. In this regard, they serve as a bridge between their host countries and Nigeria by synthesizing and integrating the best values from both cultures into a unique “insider-outsider” approach to development. Social Capital and Technology Transfer: This refers to the resources inherent in the social ties, networks, channels obligations, trust, feedback and satisfaction that Nigerian Diasporas deploy towards the development of their homeland. Apart from cash remittances, Diaspora groups facilitate the transfer of knowledge from their host countries to their homeland. Many

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Nigerian experts living abroad contribute to the growth and development of research and technology at home through their technical and logistic support to various institutions and agencies. Some have built information and communications technology (ICT) networks and collaborative channels of exchange through which knowledge and information are transferred to Nigerian institutions, leading to breakthroughs in medicine, genetic agriculture, computer science and knowledge-based economic transformations. 5. Agriculture and Transportation: Apart from contributing 1 directly towards the development of agriculture and mechanized farming at home, Nigerian Diasporas also promote the growth of agricultural businesses through their increasing demands for ethnic foods in their host countries. This has led to better storage, packaging and processing of local foods and also to the growth of various businesses along the entire supply value chain. Through their ownership of many commercial vehicles and transportation businesses operating in Nigeria, the Diaspora contributes to the expansion and sustenance of various transportation networks which facilitates the easier movement of people and goods across the country. It should be noted that their investments in the transportation sector makes it easier for famers to move their produce to desired destinations at a reduced cost, which gives them more profit and makes their products even more affordable.

Conclusion and Recommendations In this chapter, it has been established that Diasporas are very important components of any country’s development. The contribution of the Diaspora to the development of the country goes far deeper and wider than mere cash transfers. The government has recognized the important contributions and positive roles that Nigerian professionals in the Nigerian Diaspora have played in the socio-economic development of the country and has identified health and education sectors as high priorities for national development. The Diaspora’s engagement is therefore a process that requires a sustained effort to support the Diaspora’s investment entrepreneurship, social remittances and knowledge transfers, all of which are a vibrant and integral part of African overall development agenda. It is

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also noted that Nigerians in Diaspora are indispensable resources and agents of change for economic development. In realization of the above, the chapter therefore recommends that for the Nigerian government to properly harness the Nigerian Diaspora and its remittances for the country’s development process, Nigeria should formulate policies which involve the Diaspora, improve the investment environment and which are constantly responsive to changes positively affecting utilization of the Diaspora resources. Similarly, it is recommended that the Nigerian government should appoint a Diaspora Liaison Officer at embassies and consulates all over the world. This officer will help those Diasporas desirous of coming home and would be in constant communications with the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Diaspora Affairs. The chapter also recommends the introduction of legislation that would give Diasporan communities voting rights as a way of enabling them to exercise their civic responsibility in the democratic process. This is because Diasporans should not just be considered sources of financing but also development partners. Finally, African countries should factor in the contribution of their Diaspora and its remittances to national development planning and programmes. This could be done through African countries’ sustained engagement with the African Diaspora on various development initiatives. Given the growing influence and relevance of Diaspora issues globally, Africa had no choice but to explore the opportunities available to it. For Africa’s economies to successfully transit from their current state of commodity-­ dominated production to high value-added production, Africa must design and implement strategies to harness its grossly underutilized Diaspora in developed countries.

References Abah, E. O. (2003). Nigeria’s human development programme and poverty eradication in Ebonyi State. A Paper presented at a Conference on Celebration of World Poverty Eradication Day at Abakaliki, 5th November. Ade, A. J. F. (1998). International scientific committee for the drafting of a general history of Africa. UNESCO. Akanle, O., & Adesina, J. O. (2017). International migrants remittances and kinship networks in Nigeria: The flip-side consequences. Journal of Anthropological Research, 37(1), 66–91.

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Ake, C. (1981). A political economy of Africa. New York: Longman Group Ltd. Akinrinada S., & Ajibewa, R. (2003, March 13–14). Migration, globalization and the new African Diaspora towards a framework of understanding. A paper presented at an international workshop on Migration and Poverty in West Africa at Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex. Akinrinde, S., & Ogen, O. (2011). Historicizing the Nigerian Migrant and homeland relations. Turkish Journal of Politics, 2(2). Akyeampong, E. (2000). Africans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora and Africans. African Affairs., 99, 183. Anyim, P.  A. (2013, July 12). Address by the Secretary to the Government of the Federation at a press briefing. Diaspora Day/Conference, Office of the Secretary of the Government of the Federation. Brubaker, R. (2005). The Diaspora. Diaspora Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1–19. Chand, M. (2016). Leveraging the Diaspora for Africa’s economic development. Journal of African Business, 17(3), 273–290. Cohen, R. (2008). Global Diasporas: An introduction (2nd ed.). Abingdon: Routledge. Cybriwsky, R.  A. (2011). Roppongi crossing: The demise of a Tokyo Night Club District and the reshaping of a global city, University of Georgia Press. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Eboh, E.  C. (1995). Sustainable development: The theory and implication for rural Nigeria. In Eboh et al. (Eds.), Rural development in Nigeria: Concepts, processes and prospects. Enugu: Auto-Century Publishing Company. Guo, J. (2010, March 1). How Africa Is Becoming the New Asia? Newsweek Magazine. Gupta, S., Pattillo, C., & Wagh, S. (2007). Making remittances work for Africa. Finance and Development, 44(2). Hagher, I. (2009, September 4–6). Nigerians in the Diaspora: Their roles as agents of change and development. Paper presented at the Regional Seminar of Heads of Missions of America’s and Caribbean, Ottawa. Harris, J. E. (1993). Introduction. In J. E. Harris (Ed.), Global dimensions of the African Diaspora. Hear N.  V, Pieke, F., & Vertovec, S. (2004). The contribution of UK-based Diasporas to development and poverty reduction. A report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of oxford for the Department for International Development. Ikechi, K. S., & Anayochukwu, O. B. (2013). Migrant remittances and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Nigeria and South Africa. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 4(10), 534–550. International Organization for Migration – IOM. (2006). Migration for development: Within and Beyond Frontiers. Geneva: IOM.

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Kelvin, K. (2013). Diaspora: A very short introduction. New  York: Oxford University Press. Kumo, G. Y. (2014). Statement of the Managing Director Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria at the 4th Nigeria Development Finance Forum held in Washington DC. Retrieved March 30, 2014. Madichie, N.O., & Madichie, C. (2017,November 30). Migration, remittances, African Diaspora and sustainable development goals. Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on Migration and Diaspora Entrepreneurship (MDE) on the theme: Exploring Creative Solutions to the Migrant Entrepreneurial Capacity. Bremen, Germany. Mohamoud A. A. (2003). African Diaspora and African Development. Background paper for Afroneth 5th December. Mohan, G. (2002). Diaspora and development. In J. Robinson (Ed.), Development and displacement. Oxford: Oup/the Open University. More, I. (2005). Remittances reduce poverty in sub-saharan africa, area: demography and population – ARI no. 136./2005 (Translated from Spanish). Real instituto Elcano. Nduanya, M. O. (2001). Development. Journal of Arts and Social Science Review, 1(1), 22–25. Neil, K. (2003). Using remittances and circular migration to drive development, migration information source. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Nkwede, J. O., & Udu, L. E. (2014). Tertiary Education Trust Fund interventions and sustainable development in Nigerian Universities: Evidence from Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki. Journal of Sustainable Development, 7(4), 191–205. Nweke, K., & Nyewusira, V. (2015). African Diaspora and poverty alleviation in Africa. OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(1), 61–68. Obi, P. (2013, February 1). Nigerian migrants remitted 21 billion US Dolla Home in 2012, Thisdaylive London. Odafe, O. O. (2011, June 18). Fall from Race. India Today. Odoziobodo, S. I. (2013). Africa and Her Diasporas: Building global partnerships for development (A case study of Nigeria). International Journal of Scientific and Technology Research, 2(9). Office for National statistics. Retrieved September, 2011. Ogboi, C., & Ezike, J.  E. (2017). Household inward remittances and banking sector development: The Nigerian experience (1977–2014). Archives of Business Research, 5(7), 30–46. Olson, S. (2003). Mapping Human History through culture. New York: Columbia University Press. Oluyemi, F., Azuh, D., & Ajayi, L. (2015). The impacts of remittances on Nigeria’s economic growth: A study of Nigerian Diaspora in Ghana. Journal of South African Business Research, 15, 1–12.

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CHAPTER 17

International Law and Violence Against Women Serges Djoyou Kamga

Introduction From time immemorial, women all over the world suffer numerous forms of violence, including domestic abuse, rape, child marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM). Violence against women (VAW) is a violation of women’s rights. This happens amid an arsenal of legal instruments to protect women against such abuse. The aim of this chapter is to examine the international law for the protection of women against violence. The chapter is divided into five parts, including this introduction. The second part examines non-binding instruments prohibiting VAW, the third part investigates the value of non-binding instruments, the fourth part focuses on binding instruments on VAW and the final part provides concluding remarks.

S. D. Kamga (*) Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 301 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8_17

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Non-Binding Instruments and Their Limitation Non-binding instruments prohibiting VAW comprises the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) (UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III)), the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1967, A/RES/226), the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (UN General Assembly resolution 3318 (XXIX) 1974), the 1985 UN Resolution 40/36, the 1990 UN Resolution 45/114, the 1994 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, the 2004 UN Resolution 58/147 and other UN non-binding initiatives. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights After the end of the second world war, members of the international community came together to adopt the UDHR in order to protect human rights in the world. Human rights here comprise the rights of men and women. Though the UDHR does not explicitly prohibit VAW, it affirms its ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women’ (Preamble, para 5). The protection of women’s dignity entails a full prohibition of VAW. This is also the substance of article 1 of the UDHR claiming that ‘[a]ll human beings [men and women] are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. Similarly men and women have an equal right to marry (UDHR, art 16). However, the prohibition of VAW is ‘implicit’, as it is contained in the principle of human dignity and equality. Nevertheless, an express condemnation and prohibition of VAW would have highlighted the problem and assisted in finding concrete solutions to it.

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1967) In the form of a preamble and 11 articles, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women stands for the principle of equality between men and women. It was the predecessor of the binding Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Though a mere political statement with no binding force, it raised awareness of women’s plight.

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Nevertheless, similar to the UDHR, it does not expressly prohibit VAW. Furthermore, its non-binding character did not really assist in eradicating VAW, apart from preparing the ground for the adoption of CEDAW.

Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974) Consisting of a preamble and six articles, the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict prohibits violence against women and children in times of war where the prospects for VAW and children are high. In fact in a war zone the ‘defenseless’ (Kuwali 2002) include the women and children that the Declaration seeks to protect. The latter prohibits ‘attacks and bombings on the civilian population including women and children’ (art 1) and forbids the use of chemical and biological weapons against the civilian population ‘including defenceless women and children’ (art 2). This protection of women could be extended to include the prohibition of rape, torture and other abuses as a weapon of war. Though non-­ binding, the Declaration raises awareness on the fact that war zones are the theaters of VAW.

The 1985 UN Resolution 40/36 on Domestic Violence Subsequent to the 1984 UN Economic and Social Council Resolution on violence on the family (UN Doc ESC Res 1984/14), the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 40/36 on domestic violence. Consisting of a preamble and seven articles, the Resolution urges states to urgently take appropriate actions to avoid domestic violence and assist victims (art 2). It also calls upon states not only to introduce, if not already in place, civil legislation on the issue but also to criminalize domestic violence (art 7(a)). It goes further in calling upon the international community to ‘intensify research on domestic violence from a criminological perspective to formulate distinct action-oriented strategies that could serve as a basis for policy formulation’ (art 3& 4). The Resolution should be commended not only for highlighting the responsibility of states in eradicating domestic violence but also for using a prescriptive approach.

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However, as correctly observed by Myersfeld (2010, 31), the resolution uses ‘permissive and not mandatory’ language, which highlights its non-binding character. It nevertheless yielded the establishment of the 1986 Expert Group Meeting on Violence in the Family, which, among others, adopted a recommendation pertaining ‘to legal reform, police, prosecutor and health sector training, social and resource support for victims’ (UN division on the advancement of women). In so doing, the Expert Group meeting set standards of states’ behavior in tackling domestic violence (UN division on the advancement of women).

The 1990 UN Resolution 45/114 on Domestic Violence Subsequent to the 1985 Resolution discussed above, in 1989, the UN released a report on Violence against Women in the Family, which presented VAW as a global problem affecting women’s health everywhere in the world. It also linked VAW to ‘subordination, inequality between women and men, and discrimination’ (UN division on the advancement of women), hence the characterization of VAW as a human rights issue (Meyersfeld 2010). The information provided by the report informed the adoption of the 1990 UN Resolution on domestic violence, which emphasizes the shortage of information and research pertaining to domestic violence. It therefore called for global cooperation in terms of: [p]olicies measures and strategies, within and outside of the criminal justice system, with respect to domestic violence in all its facets, including legal, law enforcement, judicial, societal, educational, psychological, economic, health-related and correctional aspects. (art1)

The resolution reiterated the call made by the 1985 UN Resolution 40/36 on domestic violence. Its only weakness was the softness of its language, which characterizes non-binding instruments.

The 1994 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women Adopted through the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/104, of 1993, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) attempts to shield women against violence. Its definition of VAW is based

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on CEDAW Committee general recommendation 19, which reads as follows (Preamble). For a clear and comprehensive definition of violence against women, a clear statement of the rights to be applied to ensure the elimination of violence against women in all its forms, a commitment by States in respect of their responsibilities, and a commitment by the international community at large to the elimination of violence against women.

Accordingly, DEVAW defines VAW to mean (art 1): any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

In this vein, VAW is prohibited in the family, in the public arena and should not be ‘perpetrated or condoned by state’ (art 2). DEVAW prescribes steps that states and the United Nations, its agencies and programs should take to tackle VAW (art 5). It also instructs states not to invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination (art 4). States should exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons (art 4). Although non-binding, the DEVAW is important, as it corrects the omission of the prohibition of VAW in the CEDAW, which only prohibits trafficking and prostitution (Merry 2003; Myersfield 2010, 27). Most importantly, DEVAW is perceived as ‘the manifestation of customary international law’ (Myersfield 2010, 38), which is binding on states. This will be further discussed while addressing the normative force of non-­ binding instruments. The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action Attended by 17,000 representatives from 189 countries, the fourth World Conference on women, held in Beijing (UN Doc A/CONF.177/20/ Rev.1), China, was an important moment in international women’s rights law. Through the Beijing Declaration, the international community reaf-

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firmed ‘the equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men’ (para 8), acknowledged ‘the human rights of women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all human rights’ (para 9). The international community also pledged to empower women in the area of education, poverty eradication, participation and sustainable development and so on… (para 17, 35 &36). In addition, the Declaration emphasized the need to ensure the availability of resources to uphold women’s rights (para 5). In terms of VAW specifically, the international community pledged to ‘[p]revent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls’ (para 29) including using them as a weapon of war (para 12). Though Beijing should be commended for ensuring the visibility of women’s rights and prohibiting VAW, it not only lacks enforcement mechanisms, but it also does not provide a monitoring mechanism (Meyersfeld 2010, 39; Neuwirth 2005, 43). However, the impact of Beijing cannot be underestimated, as it provided another giant step in terms of setting a standard for the eradication of VAW.

The 2004 UN Resolution 58/147 on the Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women The UN Resolution 58/147 of 19 February 2004 prohibits domestic violence against women. It underlines that domestic violence is a violation of human rights (Preamble). It also observes a link between domestic violence and discrimination against women and calls upon statutes to empower women in order to address domestic violence (para 7  m). Furthermore, it highlights the role of the states that should ‘protect victims and prevent domestic violence’ (para 1(d)) and ‘[r]eaffirms the commitment of States to establish legislation and/or strengthen appropriate mechanisms to handle criminal matters relating to all forms of domestic violence’ (para 6). However, similar to the previous resolution, 58/147 is not binding and has mere moral standing in international law. Other UN Non-Binding Initiatives Numerous other UN non-binding initiatives including the work of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the reports of the UN

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Special Rapporteur on the VAW, the resolutions of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, the work of the UN Secretary-General, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals play a significant role in eradicating VAW.

Normative Force of Non-Binding Instruments Pertaining to VAW The aim of this section is to examine the normative force of non-binding UN Resolutions and other initiatives on VAW. Non-binding instruments also known as ‘soft law’ are fundamental in testifying the state practice and proving the opinio juris or intention to be bound as proof of customary law. Maggio and Lynch (1997) and Kamga (2011, 71) argue that ‘…by legitimizing conduct which might diverge from the existing practices, soft law provides an alternative which can become a legally relevant crystallization for newly emerging customs or more explicit norms.’ Furthermore, the prohibition of VAW enjoys a general international recognition and is not short of general and consistent state practice to gain the status of customary law (Brownlie 2003, 7). And still, if the state practice was not consistent, it is argued that even one practice is enough to create international customary law (Cheng 1965, 23). In this perspective, Cheng sustained that a well-worded General Assembly Resolution can create ‘instant’ customary law (Cheng 1965, 23). Hence, the contention that the explosion of UN Resolutions on VAW has brought the issue in the sphere of customary international law. Nevertheless, General Assembly resolutions need a strong consensus because non-binding undertakings may be entered into in order to demonstrate the will of the international community to solve an urgent global matter over the objections of few states. Agreeing with such a perspective, Shelton is of the view that a resolution can be a parade to gather a consensus on an international urgent matter (Shelton 2006, 163). In such a case, the obligatory character or efficiency of the law remains questionable. It is, however, important to note that when a resolution of the UN General Assembly touches on subjects that concern the UN Charter, it may be regarded as an ‘authoritative interpretation of the Charter’ (Brownlie 2003, 15). From this angle, it can be claimed that UN Resolutions on VAW are binding because they deal with women’s rights protection, which is covered under the UN Charter through the prohibi-

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tion of discrimination on several grounds including sex. Therefore, it could be argued that the ‘jurispotency’ (Baxi 2007, 126) of non-binding instruments on VAW has survived and will transcend ‘the well-manicured scepticism’ (Baxi 2007, 126) and find a place in customary law. Unfortunately, however, the regulatory function of such ‘modern custom’ (Roberts 2001, 757; Steiner et al. 2008, 163) is uncertain because it simply ‘set aspirational aims rather than realistic requirements about action’ (Roberts 2001, 757; Steiner et al. 2008, 163). In this perspective, it is important to note that customs or ‘votes in general Assembly are generally not intended to become law’ (Roberts 2001, 757; Steiner et  al. 2008, 163). Therefore, UN resolutions including on VAW remain in principle non-binding in international law and as such, lack the universal legal backing needed to monitor states’ practice on the question of VAW. Nonetheless, the line between binding and non-binding instruments is not always clear. Treaty law includes soft obligations such as commitments to strive to cooperate whereas a non-binding instrument contains supervisory mechanisms found in hard or binding instruments (Shelton 2008, 166). As a result, there is an interplay between the two types of instruments, which become complementary to some extent. In this context, the non-binding law is used as a precursor for the binding one or is used to supplement the binding one (Shelton 2008, 166). For instance, it could be argued that the 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was the precursor of the CEDAW whereas the DEVAW supplements the CEDAW by correcting the omission of the prohibition of VAW. Overall, though non-binding, UN resolutions and resolutions on VAW, in particular, have an important impact on the international system of women’s rights protection.

Binding Instruments Beside non-binding instruments, VAW are the focus of several international binding instruments which include the 1945 United Nations Charter UN (Charter), the 1952–1962 Women’s Conventions comprising the 1952 Convention on the Political Rights of Women (General Assembly Resolution 640(VII)), the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (General Assembly resolution 1040 (XI)) and the 1962 Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages (Consent to marriage Convention) (General

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Assembly resolution 1763 A (XVII)). International law standards for the protection of women also include the two 1966 Covenants on civil and political rights (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights— ICCPR), General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (General Assembly Resolution 34/180) and its 1999 optional protocol (General Assembly Resolution by resolution A/RES/54/4).

The UN Charter The UN Charter calls for universal respect of human rights and fundamental freedom for all without discrimination based on race, sex, language or religion (At 1(3) and 55(c)). Furthermore, it emphasizes the equal rights of men and women (Preamble, art 8). From these provisions, VAW is prohibited only ‘implicitly’, as there is no express provision protecting women against violence. This shows that, originally, the UN Charter was tailored primarily to protect men and, incidentally, women. Engle argues that ‘human rights are structurally biased against women’ (Engle 2005, 47). It could, however, be argued that the importance of the UN Charter on VAW cannot be underestimated because it ‘set the stage for the current efforts at really getting to grips with challenges facing women in particular translating women’s rights as women Rights’ (Mooki and Hansungule 2010, 73).

The 1952–1962 Women’s Conventions Between 1952 and 1962, women’s rights were addressed through the Conventions on the Political Rights of Women and on the Nationality of Married Women and Consent to Marriage Convention mentioned earlier. Made of a preamble and 11 articles, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women was informed by the exclusion of women in political life. Therefore, the Convention provides for women’s right ‘to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination’ (art 1); for equal rights to run for political office (art 2), to access and exercise public functions in equal term with men (art 3). Unfortunately, the Convention is silent on VAW though women are victims of abuses in public spheres, especially when trying to exercise their right to participation in political life.

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As far as the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women is concerned, it comprises a preamble and 12 articles aiming to shield women from unwillingly losing their nationality upon marriage. The Convention subscribes to the UDHR principle that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’ (art 15) and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality’ (Preamble). The prohibition of VAW related to nationality is also secured in the convention through the disposition that ‘neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality by the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the wife’ (art 1). The Convention should be commended for protecting women against violence related to their nationality upon getting married. However, women are vulnerable to numerous types of violence and the Convention missed the opportunity to address most of them. Furthermore, there is no provision to monitor compliance with its provisions. As far as the Consent to Marriage Convention is concerned, consisting of a preamble and 10 articles, it protects women against forced marriages. Accordingly, ‘no marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as prescribed by law’ (art). It also shields girl children against forced marriage by making it compulsory to state to set ‘a minimum of marriage’ (art 2). However, like the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the Consent to Marriage Convention has only one specific focus (VAW related to consent to marriage) and lacks an implementation mechanism. This leads Mooki and Hansungule (2010, 76) to argue that what the 1952–1962 Women’s Conventions ‘have in common [is] the limitation of their scope, and the absence of provisions for international measures of implementation’.

The Two 1966 International Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) The ICCPR and the ICESCR follow the trend set by the UN Charter where women’s rights are protected implicitly under the equality and non-­ discrimination provisions (Reanda 1981, 11). Though there is no specific reference to women or to VAW in these instruments, the use of ‘every one shall’, ‘no one shall’ or ‘anyone shall’ is inclusive and protects women’s rights in the same way it does men’s rights.

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However, the setting up of human rights in the ICCPR is not conducive to the adequate protection of women’s rights. For example, the right to life in the ICCPR 9 (art 6), which is a norm of customary law is protected within the context of ‘the arbitrary deprivation of life through public action’ (Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993, 170). This approach does not cover women adequately, as most of them are killed through domestic violence, which happens in the privacy of their home. Furthermore, it forgets the practices of aborting female fetuses and female infanticide in some parts of the world due to the economic pressure to have boys (Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993, 170). A similar weak protection of women can be observed in the prohibition of torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of art 7 of the ICCPR. It assumes that these offenses happen in the public sphere under the instigation of an officer in the exercise of its official functions (Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993, 170). Though this can happen to women who are covered under article 7, torture or inhuman treatment against women also takes place within the confines of peoples’ homes. Such cases are not expressly covered by the covenant where several aspects of VAW are forgotten. The UN, however, through the work of its treaty monitoring body, has addressed the issues. First, in 2000, the Human Rights Committee (in charge of monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR) emphasized the equality between men and women (ICCPR, art 3) by obliging state parties to ‘ensure to men and women equally the enjoyment of all rights provided for in the Covenants’ (Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28, para 3). Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee clarified that domestic violence may well fall within the ambit of article 7 of the ICCPR or the right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28, para 11). Consequently, it calls upon states to supply information related to national law and practices linked to domestic violence, including rape (Myersfeld 2010, 76). In mid-January 2008, the General Comment No. 28 discussed above was supplemented by the second thematic report of Manfred Novak, the former UN Special Rapporteur, on torture (UN Doc A/HRC/7/3). The report clearly incorporated domestic violence in the ambit of torture and urged states to take preventive and punitive actions on torture, including ‘torturous conduct in private committed by non-state actors’ (Myersfeld

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2010, 77). This categorization of domestic violence including rape as torture helps to reduce the ‘stigma of shame’ suffered by rape victims and other victims of gender-based violence. This positive development can only help to tackle VAW. As far as the ICESCR is concerned, it inserts women’s rights protection in the equality provisions and clearly urges states to ‘ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights’ (art 3). Nevertheless, the silence on VAW is supplemented by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights through its General Comment No. 16 on article 3 of the Covenant (General Comment No. 16). The latter addresses women’s rights abuses that hinder women’s access to socio-economic rights. Acknowledging that ‘[w]omen are often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights, by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom in the forms of VAW’, (General Comment No. 16) the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights prohibits such violence. For example, in complying with ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’ (ICESCR, art 11(2)), state parties are obliged, among others, not only ‘to ensure women’s access to or control over means of food production’ but more importantly to ‘actively address customary practices under which women are not allowed to eat until the men are fully fed, or are only allowed less nutritious food’. (General Comment No. 16, para 28). This general comment expressly prohibits VAW that hinders women’s right to food and health. Similarly, the prohibition of female genital mutilation is provided for to ensure women’s right to health. Furthermore, in ensuring the right of a girl child to education (ICESCR, art 13), state parties are obliged to create appropriate conditions to ensure the safety of girls on their way to and from school. These conditions entail ensuring that girls are not raped or beaten on the path to school. Overall, it could be argued that though the two 1966 covenants do not address VAW directly, their committees do a good job to shield women from violence. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Twelve years after the adoption of its precursor (the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN (UN Doc.A/Res/34/180

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(1980). The CEDAW is made of a Preamble and 30 articles divided into six parts. The first part deals with general provisions with the articles defining ‘discrimination against women’. The second part provides for the political rights of women from articles 7 to 9; the third part made of articles 10 to 14 caters to the socio-economic rights of women, the fourth part focuses on issues law, marriage and family life through articles 15 and 16; the fifth part establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) and elaborates on the reporting mechanism through articles 17 to 22 and the final part deals with the treaty’s conclusion issues such as revision, entry into force, and reservation in article 23 to 30. The adoption and coming into force of the CEDAW was followed by a celebration in numerous circles. Some qualify the document as ‘the international bill of rights for women’ (Mooki and Hansungule 2010, 75; Hongju Koh 2002, 266; Shalev 2000, 43). For others, it is the only document looking at discrimination norms from a women’s standpoint (Cook 1993, 239) or the only document providing for substantive equality between men and women (Kathree 1995, 421). However, the categorization of CEDAW as the alpha and omega of women’s rights seems flawed. The question here should be to what extent the women’s treaty prohibits VAW. Apart from article 6 urging states to ‘suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation and prostitution of women’, there is no specific attention to VAW in the document. VAW is prohibited implicitly under equality and non-discrimination provisions that did not walk in other documents. Nevertheless, CEDAW in its article 5(a) calls upon states. [t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.

In other words, states should amend law, religion, culture and traditions that lead to VAW Hongju Koh (267). This provision enables states to forbid practices such as ‘honor killing’, female infanticide and FGM that occur for cultural or religious reasons. In this regard, not only does the CEDAW Committee (in charge of monitoring compliance with CEDAW) urge State parties ‘to act to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of social

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life’ (General Recommendation No. 12 of 1989). It also requests member states to [t]ake appropriate and effective measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision’ (General Recommendation No. 12 of 1989). Similarly, the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 of 1992 clearly prohibits VAW. Unfortunately, these Recommendations addressing VAW, as well as the CEDAW articles pertaining to substantives equality between men and women, are the subjects of most reservations (Myersfeld 2010, 27) entered by state parties on the ground of national laws, religions and culture. As correctly observed by Brandt and Kaplan, the real problem is that CEDAW does not indicate the ‘criteria for determining a reservation’s incompatibility’. This casts serious doubt on the efficiency of the CEDAW to tackle VAW. In fact, the adoption of the DEVAW in 1994 shows the recognition that VAW was not adequately covered by CEDAW. The other weakness of the CEDAW is that it is a ‘law without sanctions [as] it does not have the power to punish [states that do not comply]’ (Marry 2005, 72). Though this is a weakness of international law in general, CEDAW does an important work in terms of standard setting in prohibiting VAW. In fact, through the examination of state reports to the CEDAW Committee, whereby states are obliged to report on how they tackle VAW, ‘bad states’ are named and shamed by the international community (Myersfeld 2010, 30). These forms of sanctions are important in compelling states to implement CEDAW.

Concluding Remarks The aim of this chapter was to assess the extent to which international law prohibits VAW. The chapter argues that VAW is prohibited by non-­binding as well as binding instruments. As far as non-binding instruments are concerned, they include UDHR, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, UN Resolution 40/36, the UN Resolution 45/114, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), the Beijing Platform for Action, and the UN Resolution 58/147. The chapter argues that notwithstanding their non-binding character, these instruments enhance the prohibition of VAW, by setting standards of women’s rights, and by crystallizing VAW in the sphere of customary law.

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As far as binding instruments are concerned, they comprise the UN (Charter), the Women’s Conventions comprising the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women and the 1962 Convention on the Consent to marriage, the Consent to marriage Convention, the two 1966 Covenants the CEDAW and its optional protocol. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific treaty prohibiting VAW, the current binding instruments constitute good avenues to tackle VAW which is a violation of women’s rights.

References International Instruments Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28: Equality of rights between men and women (article 3) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2003. International covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976. International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force into force 23 March 1976. 2000 Millennium Development Goals. Report of the fourth World Conference on women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, UN Doc A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1. UN Charter signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, it entered into force on 24 October 1945. UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women adopted by General Assembly Resolution 640(VII) of 20 December 1952, entered into force on 7 July 1954. UN Convention on the Nationality of Married Women Adopted by General Assembly resolution 1040 (XI) of 29 January 1957, entered into force on 11 August 1958. UN Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages adopted by General Assembly resolution 1763 A (XVII), entered into force on 9 December 1964. UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 and entered into force and entered into force on 3 September 1980. (UN) CEDAW Optional Protocol adopted by General Assembly Resolution by resolution A/RES/54/4 of 6 October 1999 and entered into force on 22 December 2000. (UN) CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 12 of 1989. (UN) CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 of 1990.

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(UN) Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights through its General Comment no 16 on article 3 of the ICESCR. UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 1948-DEC-10. UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 7 November 1967, A/RES/226. UN General Assembly resolution 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/36 of 20 November 1985. UN General Assembly Resolution 45/114 (14 December 1990) A/RES/45/114. UN General Assembly Resolution 48/104, UN Doc A/RES/48/104 of 20 December 1993. UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak: Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. UN Doc A/HRC/7/3 (17 January 2008). UN Resolution 58/147 of 19 February 2004, UN Doc A/RES/58/147. UNESC Res 14 (24 May 1984) UN Doc ESC Res 1984/14, on violence in the family. Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.

References Baxi, U. (2007). Human rights in post human world: Critical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brownlie, I. (2003). Principles of public international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Charlesworth, H., & Chinkin, C. (1993). The gender of Jus Cogens. Human Rights Quarterly, 15, 63–76. Cheng, B. (1965). United Nations Resolutions on outer space: Instant customary law. Indian Journal of International Law, 5, 23–24. Cook, R. (1993). Women’s international human rights law: The way forward. Human Rights Quarterly, 15, 239. Djoyou Kamga, S. A. (2011) ‘Human rights in Africa: Prospects for the realisation of the right to development under The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’ unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria. Engle Merry, S. (2003). Constructing a global law – violence against women and the human rights system. Law and Social inquiry, 28, 941–952. Engle, S. (2005). Human rights and gender violence: Translating international law into local justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Hongju, H. (2002). Why America should ratify the women’s rights treaty (CEDAW). Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 34, 266. Kathree, F. (1995). Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. South African Journal on Human Rights, 11, 421. Kuwali, D. (2002). Defending the defenceless – The Quest for Adequate Protection for the Vulnerable Population in Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa Research Partnership, The Danish Centre for Human Rights. Maggio, G., & Lynch, O. J. (1997, November 15). Human rights, environment, and economic development: Emerging standards in international law and global society. Revised draft. Mooki, M. O. R., & Hansungule, M. (2010). Women’s rights in international law. In A. R. Chowdhury & J. H. Bhuiyan (Eds.), An introduction to international human rights law. Leiden, Boston: IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff publishers and VSP. Myersfeld, B. (2010). Domestic violence and international law. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Neuwirth, J. (2005). Inequality before the law: Holding the state accountable for sex discriminatory laws under the convention on the elimination of forms of discrimination against women and through the Beijing platform of action Harvard Human Rights Journal vol 18, 19, 43. Reanda, L. (1981). Human rights and women’s rights: The United Nations approach. Human Rights Quarterly, 3, 11. Roberts, J. (2001). Global Inequality and Climate Change June 2001. Society and Natural Resources 14(6):501–509. Shalev, C. (2000). Rights to sexual and reproductive health: The ICPD and the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Health and Human Rights, 4, 43. Shelton, D. (2006). International law and relative normativity. In Evans, M. (Ed.), International law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shelton, D. (2008). A human rights and the millennium development goals in general. Human Rights Quarterly, 30(2). Steiner, H. J., Alston, P., & Goodman, P. (2008). International human rights in context: Law politics and moral. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Websites For details reservations on CEDAW., http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ cedaw/reservations-country.htm. Accessed 17 Feb 2019. UN Division for the Advancement of Women Information note, the United Nations work on violence against women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ daw/news/unwvaw.html. (information note) Accessed 17 Feb 2019.

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 1979 Monrovia Strategy, 6, 17, 27 A Abada, Michael Ifeanyichkwu, 11 Abuja Treaty of 1991, v, 3, 6, 17, 23, 25–30, 80, 105, 107 Adams, Isiaka Abiodun, 11, 12 Adamson, Fiona, 265, 268 Adebo Commission in 1971, 223 Africa Capacity Reports (ACR), 81, 82 Africa Mining Vision (AMV), 8, 89–90 African-American identity politics, 18 African bureaucracy, 11, 217, 235–238, 241 African Bureau for Educational Sciences, 44 African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), 78, 79, 81–86, 89–91, 94

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), v, 3, 7, 8, 51–52, 77–94, 111, 176 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 73 African Economic Community (AEC), 3, 6, 17, 23, 27–31, 80, 83, 98, 105, 107, 108, 176 African Regional Architecture, 18, 26–30 African Union (AU), v, 3, 5–8, 17, 20, 23, 29, 30, 39–54, 59–74, 78, 88–90, 93, 94, 105, 107, 108, 112, 115, 116, 136, 154–159, 175, 176, 283 African Women’s Decade (2010–2020), 158 Afro-centrism, 18, 19, 21 Afro-optimists, 6, 17, 34 Afro-pessimists, 6, 17 Al-Bashir, Omar, 7, 59–74

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 S. O. Oloruntoba (ed.), Pan Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34296-8

319

320 

INDEX

Algeria, 2, 23, 43, 46, 84, 112, 152 Algerian Revolution, 152 Allied Powers, 62, 63 All Progressives Party (APC), 273 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 112 Amaechi, Vera, 10 American Colonization Society (ACS), 60 Angola, 23, 31, 184, 204 Aniche, Ernest Toochi, 6, 17, 19–21, 25, 26, 29–34 Anti-Balaka, 131, 132, 138, 141 Anti-colonial, 18, 22 Apartheid, 3, 18, 23, 62, 185, 193, 201, 239 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 29, 85, 99, 108, 112 Association of Retired Career Ambassadors of Nigeria (ARCAN), 115 AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), 158 Australia, 170 Azar, Edward, 265, 272 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 6, 17, 23, 151, 152 B Babawale, Tunde, 7 Belgium, 265 Benin, 3, 23, 117, 247, 254, 255, 264 Better Buildings Programme (BBP), 202 Bigo, Didier, 272 Black Nationalism, 19, 21 Blyden, Edward Wilmot, 18, 21 Boko Haram, 112, 171, 254 Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT), 8, 51, 81, 87–90, 94 Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA), 253 Brazil, 173, 264

Brazzaville Group, 2 BRICS, 173 Britain, 22, 182, 235, 293 Buhari administration, 273 Burkina Faso, 3, 23, 32 Buzan, Barry, 267 C Cairo Conference of 1964, 3 Cameroon, 2, 23, 32, 43, 139, 247, 254, 255 Canada, 170, 265, 293 Cape Town, 201, 207, 210 Cape Verde, 99, 108, 117 Capitalism, 10, 170, 172, 174, 203–208, 210 Caribbean, 264, 283 Carmichael, Stokely, 149 Casablanca, 2, 23, 43, 61, 155, 176 Casely Hayford, J. E., 152 Central African Republic (CAR), 3, 9, 23, 73, 125–145 Central African Republic Congress for Renewal (CCR), 135 Chad, 3, 23, 46, 72, 130, 131, 137, 139, 143, 247, 254, 255, 264 Charter of the United Nations, 43 China, 42, 69, 70, 170, 173, 184, 275, 288, 305 Christian, 9, 132, 138, 264 Civil rights movement, 18 Civil Service Reforms and Review Panel on Civil Service Reforms (Ayida Report) 1995, 223 Cold War, 2, 25, 63, 125, 128, 172, 272–274 Cole, Teju, 173 Colonialism, v, 18, 20–23, 43, 44, 53, 62, 150, 154, 166, 168, 172, 219, 220, 231 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), 306

 INDEX 

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), 305, 313 Common Market for Central Africa (COMESA), 3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 29, 30 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), 29, 30, 112 Comoros, 32 Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 50–51 Concert of Europe, 133 Congo, 2, 23, 63, 72, 104, 130, 137, 171, 264 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 302, 303, 305, 308, 309, 312–315 Copenhagen School (CS), 267 Cote d’lvoire, 2 Cuba, 42 D Dabiri-Erewa, Abike, 261, 274 Dafur, 7 Damascus, 69 de Wilde, Jaap, 267 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), 304, 314 Decolonization, 18, 21–23, 28, 61, 74 Department for International Development (DfID), 53 Development in Africa, v, 1–12, 52, 93, 167, 169, 215, 234–237, 241, 279–297 Diaspora, 1, 19, 47, 150, 176, 261–275, 279–297 Diawara, Barassou, 8

321

Diop, Alioune, 152 du Bois, W.E.B., 21, 60–62, 74, 149 Dubois, William, 1 Durban, 44 E East African Community (EAC), 24, 29, 30, 85, 86, 108 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 239 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 3, 4, 23, 78, 80, 93, 98, 169, 215 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 29, 30, 86 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 8, 24, 85, 252, 274 Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC), 5, 45, 47 ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), 107 Egypt, 2, 4, 23, 43, 46, 72, 84, 173, 269, 288 Ekeh, Peter, 273 Enahoro, Anthony, 151 Eritrea, 32, 72, 269 Ethiopia, 2, 5, 31, 32, 45, 51, 66, 72 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 111 European Partnership Agreement (EPA), 111, 118 European Union (EU), 8, 25, 26, 31, 33, 53, 98, 102, 111, 116, 118, 182 F Facebook, 272 Faki Mahamat, Moussa, 46 Falola, Toyin, vi, 9, 39, 150, 153, 153n1, 157n5, 264

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INDEX

Far East Axis, 63 Al Fashir airport, 64 Female genital mutilation (FGM), 12, 301, 312 Final Act of Lagos, 6, 48 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 51 France, 3, 8, 22, 105, 127, 137, 144, 182, 265, 266, 271, 273 Francophone, 23, 254 G Gabon, 3, 23, 31 Garvey, Marcus, 1, 18, 21, 60 Gender, 49, 150, 151, 153–154, 157–160, 305, 312 Germany, 63, 265 Ghadafi, Muammar, 4, 23, 44, 49, 112 Ghana, 2, 5, 22, 23, 32, 43, 61, 114, 117, 152, 225, 264, 266, 275 Globalization, 49, 97, 160, 270–271, 274 Guinea, 2, 23, 24, 32, 43, 46, 81, 107, 117, 225, 247 H Habre, Hissene, 73 The Hague, 62, 65 Harbom, Lotta, 272 Holocaust, 63 Hong Kong, 42, 272 I Igbo, 264, 272, 294 Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), 239 India, 170, 173, 184, 270, 275, 288 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 29

International Criminal Court (ICC), 7, 59, 60, 62, 64–74 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 63 International People’s Democratic Uhuru Movement, 18 International relations, 63 Internet Exchange Point (IXP), 52 Intra-African Trade, 4, 8, 27, 28, 30–33, 51, 78–80, 88, 89, 93, 105, 111 Iran, 170 Ireland, 265 Isaacs-Martin, Wendy, 8, 9, 128, 130, 136, 141, 143 Ishola, Ebenezer, 6, 7 Islam, 154 Italy, 265, 275 J Jammeh, Yahya, 49 Jerusalem, 264 Johannesburg, 10, 199–211 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), 208 K Kagame, Paul, v, 176 Kaldor, Mary, 272 Kamga, Serges Djoyou, 12, 307 Kenya, 24, 53, 72, 84, 152 King Mohamed V, 152 Kinshasa, 2 Koser, Khalid, 268 Kpoghul, Martin T., 11, 249 L Lagos, 27, 262, 293 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 6, 17, 25–30, 48, 80, 105, 169 League of Nations, 74, 133

 INDEX 

Lesotho, 23, 32, 52, 184, 204 Liberation of the Central African Republic’s People (MLPC), 135 Liberia, 2, 24, 27, 32, 43, 60, 63, 64, 107, 264, 274 Libya, 2–4, 31, 72, 112, 130, 137, 159 Local Government Councils/ Authorities (LGC/ LGA), 250–253 London, 2, 21, 23, 49, 61 M Madagascar, 3 Makkah, 264 Malawi, 32, 72 Malaysia, 272 Malcolm X, 21 Mali, 2, 23, 32, 43, 107, 117, 152 Manchester Conference of 1900, 2 Maputo Protocol, 158 Mauritania, 3, 72, 99, 112 Mbeki, Thabo, 4, 44 Mediterranean, 21 Migration, 6, 87, 183, 188, 191, 193, 263, 264, 266, 268, 272, 280, 282, 284, 290 Mohammed, Lai, 271, 272 Monrovia Declaration, 25, 27, 29 Monrovia group, 2 Monrovia Strategy, 6, 26–30 Morgan Salaries and Wages Commission in 1963, 223 Morocco, 2, 3, 8, 23, 32, 43, 72, 152, 266 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 205 Moyo, Inocent, 3, 10, 167, 169, 184, 205, 208, 209 Mozambique, 23, 32, 50, 204, 225 Multinational companies (MNCs), 34, 172, 206

323

Munster, 133 Munthali, Thomas C., 8 Muslims, 9, 130, 132 N Namibia, 23, 32 Nantchouang, Robert, 8 Neo-colonial, 4, 34 Neo-colonialism, 2, 23 Neo-liberal, 10, 39–41, 48, 102, 170, 174, 200–208, 210, 211 Netherlands, 265 New African Initiative (NAI), 49 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 24 Newland, Kathelen, 265 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 48–52 New Public Management (NPM), 224, 225, 227, 242 New Public Service (NPS), 225, 226 New Zealand, 48 Niger, 3, 23, 152, 247, 254, 255 Nigeria, 2, 22, 42, 66, 84, 99, 152, 173, 184, 216, 237, 247, 262, 279–297 Nkrumah, Kwame, 2, 4, 6, 17, 19, 23, 61, 149, 152, 175 Non-trade barriers (NTBs), 30, 32 North Africa, 8, 21, 108, 152, 159, 265 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 41 Nuremberg, 63 Nyerere, Julius, 6, 17, 19, 23, 149 O Odeyemi, Temitayo Isaac, 8, 98 Odubajo, Tola, 7 Okafor, Nneka, 11

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INDEX

Oloruntoba, Samuel Ojo, 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 41, 50, 98, 102–105, 107, 114, 153n1, 169, 172, 174, 175 Omeh, Paul Hezekiah, 11 Omotoso, Sharon, 9, 149–160 Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/Organization of African Unity (OAU), v, 2, 3, 6, 17, 20, 23, 27, 28, 43, 44, 61, 62, 107, 113, 115, 116, 155, 175 Osnabruk, 133

Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), 52–53, 88 Promulgation of Decree No. 43 of 1988, 223 Public Service Review Commission in 1974, 223

P Pakistan, 170, 184 Palestinian diaspora, 264 Pan-Africanism, v, vi, 1–12, 17–35, 43, 60–62, 68, 69, 74, 80, 105, 149–160, 175–176 Pan-Africanist Congress, 18 Pan African News Agency (PANA), 153, 156 Pan-African Railway Union, 44 Paris Declaration, 133 Paternalism, 9, 165–177 Peace and Security Council (PSC), 45, 47, 65, 137 Peace of Westphalia, 133 People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), 135, 138, 142 People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 273 Philippines, 170, 275, 288 Political economy, 8, 28, 41, 168, 171, 231, 285–287 Polytechnic Ibadan, 292, 293 Post-colonial, 4, 11, 18, 98, 151–154, 166, 219, 221, 222, 231–242, 284 Pre-colonial, 3, 18, 153, 154, 165 Presidential Task Force on the Implementation of the Civil Service Reforms 1988, 223

R Racism, 18, 21, 283 Radio Biafra, 273 Red Seas, 21, 264 Regional development, 107 Regional economic communities (RECs), v, 3, 8, 29–31, 33, 44, 47, 51, 52, 78, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 93, 104, 108 Regional integration, v, vi, 1–12, 18, 20–25, 28, 30, 41, 49, 51, 78, 83, 86 Rome Statute of the ICC, 7, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70–73 Russia, 69, 70, 173 Rwanda, v, 51, 63, 77, 139, 176

Q Quadri, Maryam Omolara, 10

S Saharan Africa, 21 Sall, Macky, 99, 116 Samba-Panza, Catherine (President), 132, 138 Sara-Kaba group, 137 Saudi Arabia, 139, 264 Second World War, 42, 63, 98, 302 Sekou Toure, Ahmed, 23, 24 Selassie, Haile, 23 Seleka, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138, 140, 142

 INDEX 

325

Senegal, 3, 4, 22, 32, 43, 84, 99, 111, 113, 116–118, 272 Seychelles, 32 Sheffer, Gabriel, 271 Shinkanye, John, 115 Sierra Leone, 2, 22, 24, 60, 63, 64, 107, 113, 264 Singapore, 42 Slavery, 18, 21, 166–168, 170, 174, 177, 283, 284 Slave trade, 159, 165, 283, 284 Socialist revolution, 42 Somalia, 2, 210 South Africa, 3, 4, 18, 22, 23, 44, 46, 66, 72, 84, 111, 173, 181–194, 204, 205, 225, 238, 239, 261, 285 South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA), 209 South-East Asia, 11 Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 22, 30 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 3, 29, 30, 47, 85 Southern Rhodesia Customs Union, 22 South Korea, 42 Soviet Union, 41 Spain, 109, 265 State power, 125–145 Sudan, 60, 62–68, 72, 108, 131, 139, 143, 264 Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), 64 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 6, 9, 10, 12, 80, 81, 157n4, 165–177, 307 Sylvester-Williams, Henry, 18, 21 Swaziland, 32, 46, 204

Thompson, Victor, 1, 61, 149, 238 Togo, 2, 32, 43, 255 Tokyo Trials, 63 Trans-Africa, 18 Transnational Companies (TNCs), 206 Tubman, William, 24 Tunisia, 2, 3, 32, 112, 266, 269 Turkey, 265, 272 Twitter, 272

T Taiwan, 42 Tanzania, 24, 32, 42, 152, 225

V Violence against women (VAW), 12, 157, 301–315

U Uganda, 24, 32, 46, 53, 73, 173 UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 22–24, 31, 48, 50, 53, 109 Union of African National Television and Radio Organizations (URTNA), 153, 156 United Kingdom (UK), 69, 170, 182, 184, 261, 265, 266, 269, 272, 273, 285 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, 157 United States (USA), 1, 3, 4, 11, 18, 31, 50, 61, 69–71, 130, 157n5, 166, 168, 170–172, 182, 183, 235, 261, 262, 264, 265, 269, 271, 272, 285, 293 Universal Declaration of Human Right, 43 Universal Negro Improvement Association-African Communities League, 18 Upper Volta, 3, 23 US Trafficking in Persons Programme, 171

326 

INDEX

W Wade, Abdoulaye, 4 Waever, Ole, 267, 268 Walk Free Foundation, 170 Wallensteen, Peter, 272 West Africa, 2, 8, 24, 99, 108, 109, 111–113, 115, 116, 118, 261, 264, 265 West African Currency Board (WACB), 22 West African Economic Community (Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, CEAO), 24 West African Examinations Council (WAEC), 22 Western Europe, 11, 200, 204

WhatsApp, 272 White Savior Industrial Complex, 172–174 World Bank, 5, 28, 48, 166, 169, 237, 271, 288 Y Yoruba, 264 YouTube, 272 Z Zambia, 32, 42, 73, 204 Zimbabwe, 22, 23, 184, 204