Regional Environmental Politics in Northeast Asia: Conflict and Cooperation [1 ed.] 1138302376, 9781138302372

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Regional Environmental Politics in Northeast Asia

The share of global CO2 emissions from the core Northeast Asian (NEA) countries in 2015 was estimated to be as high as 33.63 percent. Representing 28.21, 3.67, and 1.75 percent of total global emissions, China, Japan, and South Korea were ranked the first, fifth, and seventh largest contributors, respectively. Some parts of China, the Republic of Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and Southeast Asia have long been on serious alert due to accelerated deforestation. With their rapid population growth and economic development, the core countries of Northeast Asia are responsible both directly and indirectly for numerous environmental problems. Urgent individual and collective action is required from the region’s governments. Against the backdrop of debate on how to understand Northeast Asia as a “region,” Park focuses on the major regional economies of China, Japan, and South Korea, along with Russia, North Korea, and the Republic of Mongolia, due to both their geopolitical proximity and their significance to the region. The author attempts to answer the questions: “How far has regional environmental cooperation progressed in Northeast Asia?”; and “Why are Northeast Asian countries reluctant to cooperate further on urgent transboundary and regional environmental issues?” JeongWon Bourdais Park is Associate Professor of International Relations at KIMEP University, Republic of Kazakhstan.

Politics in Asia Series

Reimagining Nation and Nationalism in Multicultural East Asia Edited by Sungmoon Kim and Hsin-­wen Lee New Media Political Engagement and Participation in Malaysia Sara Chinnasamy China and Transboundary Water Politics in Asia Edited by Hongzhou Zhang and Mingjiang Li The Road to Federalism in Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka Finding the Middle Ground Michael G Breen US–China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes Edited by Huiyun Feng and Kai He National Identity and Great-­Power Status in Russia and Japan Non-­Western Challengers to the Liberal International Order Tadashi Anno Distributive Politics in Malaysia Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance Hidekuni Washida Japan’s Island Troubles with China and Korea Prospects and Challenges for Resolution Victor Teo and Haruko Satoh Regional Environmental Politics in Northeast Asia Conflict and Cooperation JeongWon Bourdais Park For the full list of titles in the series, visit: www.routledge.com/Politics-­in-Asia/ book-­series/PIA

Regional Environmental Politics in Northeast Asia Conflict and Cooperation

JeongWon Bourdais Park

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 JeongWon Bourdais Park The right of JeongWon Bourdais Park to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-30237-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-73179-6 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

For monk Hyé-moon

Contents

List of illustrations Preface

ix xi

1 Setting the scene

1



Raising research questions  1 Why does environmental cooperation matter in Northeast Asia?   7 Emerging security dynamism, multilateralism, and the rise of environmentalism  16 Explanations of the structure of the book  21 2 Environmental politics and regional cooperation

26

Regionalism, regional politics, and environmental affairs  26 Inter-­state environmental affairs in international relations theories  28 Analytical framework: the synergy between securitization, development, and environmentalism  53 Conclusion  61 3 Regional reaction to trans-­boundary air pollution and climate change in Northeast Asia Regional issues and the NEA’s interaction with the global climate regime  67 The evolution of institutionalized regional cooperation  73 Ongoing disputes and the possibility of governance strengthening  90 Development opportunities and ecological challenges  101 Theoretical implications  104

67

viii   Contents 4 Northeast Asia’s responses to biodiversity loss and the formation of regional biodiversity governance

112

Environmental security and trans-­boundary affairs concerning biodiversity  112 Evolution of the NEA’s institutionalized cooperation  117 A green paradox: the security dilemma in the DPRK and ecological implications  130 Positive politicization of environmental conflicts for cooperation  145 Bypassing the region and globalizing regionalism  147 5 Regional political dynamics and the marine environment in Northeast Asia

156

Ocean-­induced environmental issues in Northeast Asia  156 Evolution of regional institutional development  164 Destructive environmental conflicts: fishery disputes  171 Pollution, trans-­boundary harm, and dispute settlement  176 Territorial sovereignty, disputes, and land reclamation in the ocean  183 Mutual reinforcement between bilateralism and multilateralism  186 Policy implications  195 6 Greening regional politics

203

Responding to the main research questions  203 Where does the Northeastern region stand? Applying the REDM  206 Minding the gap: responding to theoretical categorization  215 Bridging the gap: policy implications  217 Concluding remarks  219

Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 Index

221 228 231 241

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 2.2 4.1 6.1

Regional level interactions and cooperation scenario Regional Ecological Development Model Spectrum of the security and environment conjuncture Regionalism as a process

53 56 114 215

Tables 1.1 Regional environment-­related institutions and organizations 2.1 Level of nationalized interests in terms of “priority/ preference” 2.2 An example of costs and benefits analysis 2.3 Linking motivations with elements of regional affairs 3.1 Signatories to international climate-­related laws (signed/ ratified) 3.2 Major domestic legal frameworks governing environmental protection 3.3 Basic information on the TEMM and member countries’ policy framework 3.4 TEMM’s attention and response to air pollution and climate change at three levels 3.5 Application of theories to regional climate change-­related issues 4.1 Convention on Biodiversity: status of the NEA Six 4.2 Environmental projects in the DPRK supported by international organizations 4.3 Major cooperation projects related to biodiversity 4.4 Biodiversity-­related issues of conflicts, cooperation, and compromise (“regional context”) 5.1 Categorization of fishery stocks 5.2 Membership of international fishery conventions 5.3 Linkage between theoretical accounts and regional ocean environment-­related issues

10 32 33 54 73 75 76 90 105 121 131 132 148 163 165 196

x   Illustrations 6.1 Challenges to multilateral environmental cooperation in the NEA context

205

Boxes 3.1 Process of building a global climate regime 4.1 Changing focus on environment-­related cooperation with the DPRK 5.1 Selected fisheries conservation milestones (global)

70 133 160

Preface

This book concerns inter-­state affairs in the Northeastern Asia region, with special attention to environmental problems. It provides how state-­driven conflict and cooperative endeavors interact with each other in the environmental field, either aggravating regional security and power disparity or generating a symbiosis, inter-­connecting fundamental security, ecological improvement, and qualitative development. Compared with the amount of academic research on conflict and the history of confrontation in this region, studies highlighting and scrutinizing cooperation processes are relatively rare, particularly focusing on environmental affairs from a political scientist’s perspective. Yet, at this moment of finalizing the manuscript, leaving all my initial ambitions behind, I feel that what I have done is only learn that there are still huge gaps in academia in this field; especially in-­depth case analyses on each country involved; comparisons with other regions; and scrutinizing inter-­regional projects with an evaluation of their outcomes and effectiveness, which were mostly beyond the scope of the current project as it focuses on a supranational sphere rather than comparative studies of individual member countries. In this regard, I should admit that this project is only a tiny step toward filling such a gap in academic research on regional environmental cooperation. The professional experience that I acquired a decade ago at the Environment Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, was the seed of this project and stimulated me to explore more related subjects. It finally led me, after having obtained a doctoral degree in Political Science, to pursue another postgraduate degree in Environmental Policy at the University of Cambridge in the U.K. I am greatly indebted to the well-­organized program offered by the Department of Land Economy, and to the inspiring guidance provided by the selfless and dedicated academics I encountered. Many have directly and indirectly supported me in my continued work on this project. First of all, my deep appreciation goes to the Division of International and Area Studies at Pukyong National University (Pusan, South Korea) and the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University (Almaty, Kazakhstan), for kindly and promptly accommodating me to prolong my career in academia during a crucial period for me to finalize this research project.

xii   Preface Over the past ten years, teaching courses on environmental studies, regional politics and international relations in Paris, Hong Kong, and Pusan has allowed me to develop and consolidate my ideas in this field. Finally, my students, together with all my colleagues stimulated me the most, in making me intellectually awaken, constantly urging me to provide innovative ways of thinking and communicating. In addition, while I was teaching, through luck, I had quite a few occasions to be engaged in direct, relevant external collaborative projects with several governmental and inter-­governmental bodies, such as the European Union, the Korean Environmental Institute, and the OECD. Policy communications with professionals in this field inspired me enormously and allowed me to rethink what academics, especially social scientists may contribute to the collective process of improving ecological conditions in every corner of the world. Among many, my special thanks go to my colleagues and experts in public environmental policy: Dr. Kim JongRyool, Dr. Peter Kearns, and Dr. Lee Jeong­Rim, who were ready to support me, offering sincere comments and precious advice whenever I needed it. I would like to pass my grateful thanks to the publisher, Routledge, for accepting my manuscript for publication and its editors for their professional and efficient support. Also, I would like to acknowledge that Mr. Christopher Alan Price has kindly helped me out in providing the initial stage of editing services. However, all errors and shortcomings that readers may find in this book are solely mine. June 2018, Pusan

1 Setting the scene

Use your property so as not to injure that of another. (Roman law bc 449, the origin of modern tort law)

Raising research questions The ecosystem does not share the same construct model as human beings, which incorporates the nation-­state, class, society, ideology, bureaucracy, social hierarchy, political systems, and so on.1 Although human communities and the natural world coexist, human-­created regional borders and national boundaries may have little meaning to non-­human populations and communities. Environmental goods and harms are fundamentally non-­excludable and non-­rivalry by nature. While humans extract and require more and more services from the ecosystem (food, timber, water, fresh air, recreation, spiritual comfort, minerals, energy, etc.), countries’ efforts to delay anthropogenic ecosystem disruption caused by human activities have not yet been effective despite prevalent beliefs and evidence of technological optimism. Although the world shares more or less common environmental problems today, regions – as a cluster of countries – have more reasons to deal with many problems “collectively” due to their geographical proximity and ecological connectivity. Northeast Asia (NEA afterwards), as a fast industrialized or industrializing zone, suffers enormously from severe environmental degradation and is facing a variety of existing, emerging, and unknown environmental problems and associated risks. Many problems become regional rather than remaining as domestic problems or being loosely connected with global issues. Accordingly, a regional level approach would be essential as a unit of analysis in dealing with shared environmental harm that in turn may affect wider regions across the globe. Although unsatisfactory in terms of outcome effectiveness, there is a considerable amount of ongoing environmental cooperation. Such cooperation requires a great deal of exchanges in technology, information, data, experts, financial aid, and administrative support among the countries involved. Geographically and historically, the six countries in the NEA under this study (namely, China, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East (RFE)) are closely interconnected, with four of them having a

2   Setting the scene border with China, and the adjacent Koreas being technically at war. Although it is, a priori, arbitrary or insignificant to study the countries in the NEA as a cluster when considering the great disparities between them from various aspects, environmental problems paradoxically continue to bind these countries together to cooperate. Reflecting this, various forms of environmental cooperation in the region is increasing. This project on environmental politics of the NEA region, as a subfield of political science, international relations, and environmental studies, focuses on “regional” environmental affairs, inter-­state competition and conflicts over exhaustible resources, and the patterns and motivations for institutionalized cooperation over environmental issues. The recent decades have witnessed a large and thriving body of literature on the environment in all of the social sciences disciplines. Thus, regarding the question of “determining what to observe” in this growing interdisciplinary area of study, various research topics and angles have generated a plethora of combinations of conceptual and analytical contributions to this field. Employing an interdisciplinary approach, to date, much research has been conducted (depending on the trends of world politics and environmental issues) by expanding the existing scope of key political science concepts or by mainstreaming (internalizing/addressing) ecological constraints into existing political science subjects. As a result, such interfaces concern “security and the environment” (Maddock 1995); “governance and the environment”; “trade and the environment (international political economy of environment)” (e.g., Ekins 2003); “the philosophy of ecologism”; “green parties and green movements” (e.g., Almeida and Stearns 1998; Burchell 2002; Folke 2014; Frankland et al. 2008; Kalland and Persoon 1998; Tranter and Western 2009). A great deal of in-­depth sociopolitical studies have been conducted focusing on environmentalism and post-­material movements in Asia (e.g., Lam 1999; Lee and So 1999; Mason 1999; Pierce et al. 1987; Wilkening 1999). In addition, more interfaces include “governance and social institutions for the environment” (e.g., Young, 1994; VanDeveer and Steinberg 2015), “public environmental policy and regulations”; “diplomacy and the environment including green aid” (Sagar and VanDeveer 2005); “theories and cases of political systems and the environment (e.g., green state)” (Dryzek et al. 2003; Schreurs 2002); “modernity and rise environmentalism” (Beck 1995); “ecology and sociopolitical ideologies” (e.g., eco-­nationalism, green imperialism); and so on. If the question is confined to “regional” politics (in other words, what “regional” politics may contribute to environmental studies and environmental improvements), the core and crucial subjects intersecting between environmental affairs and regional politics would be security, development and region-­wide environmentalism (both as ideology and action).2 Relating closely to environmental affairs, security has been dealt within an extended framework of “state/political security and human/communities security”; development concerns in the context of the conflict between growthism in quantity and sustainability accompanying equity; and environmentalism embracing multi-­layered consistency beyond nationalized

Setting the scene   3 NINBY-­ism (Not-­In-My-­Backyard). It is quite clear that today’s regional politics, as part of international affairs, consist of diverse actors’ continuous and simultaneous actions of competition, conflict and cooperation. An additional inquiry can be made on how, why and under what circumstances in a specific regional context on a certain subject, states and/or other major actors interact while forming a tangible regional-­level cooperative entity beyond national boundaries. Such a question might become more intriguing (and more meaningful) when the region under question demonstrates a high level of tension in terms of security, is equipped with a high potential in economic development, and yet faces a variety of challenges due to historically irreconcilable conflicting collective identities. The NEA, as a loosely-­defined “region,” well meets those initial grounds to stand as an intriguing and significant field of inquiry. Main disciplinary approaches As an academic field, political studies of a region can be positioned in between political science and international relations. There has been a rise and fall of regional studies in the academic trends of international relations reflecting the dynamism of international affairs (Groom and Taylor 1990). Within the discipline of international relations, a number of studies have been produced dealing with environmental “cooperation” across countries by scholars who take a liberalist position. These studies focus on the functions of institutions and organizations, the role of non-­governmental actors, the rise of and interplay of governances at various levels, the effectiveness of cooperation, and international laws, norms and principles. The environmental field seemingly provided a perfect example for testing these theories, implying an optimistic vision on “cooperation beyond national or regional boundaries” with the view of resolving common problems. Constructivism also contributed to mainstreaming environmental issues into politics and political science through research on risk construction, securitization of non-­conventional social risks, and the link between modernity and risks. Realism and its derivatives provide insights on states’ fierce zero-­sum competition over scarce natural resources, perceiving these as part of essential elements to secure political and economic power at the expense of other players’ nationalized interests, rather than public environmental goods that need protection. Against this background, one purpose of this book is to suggest, in terms of methodology, a way that political science can contribute to existing interdisciplinary studies on the environment, by providing a broader context of regional cooperation, but at the same time shedding light upon less visible conflicting relationships across nations in regional environmental affairs. National security and state sovereignty are used as conventional shields and legitimacy for member countries’ selective participation within a loose and flexible regional identity of the NEA.

4   Setting the scene Main questions and the scope of the project It is clear that over the past two decades or so, the region (the NEA and the wider East Asia) has witnessed the expansion of multilateralism with an increasing number of regional organizations, institutions, fora, inter-­regional cooperation and other forms of communication at all levels. The major three NEA players (China, Japan, and South Korea) took a strong leadership (or hegemonic) position in almost all such regional processes. Environment-­related themes became one of the core areas of the regionalism and regionalization process. Yet, puzzling questions remain: first of all, these cooperative processes do not necessarily mitigate fundamental region-­wide tensions and conflicts as much as neo-­functionalism would expect; second, in spite of issue-­focused regional cooperation in the field of the environment, the overall environmental degradation has not been controlled by regional cooperative regimes as much as liberal regime theorists might expect; third, in spite of widespread realist skepticism on regionalism and institutional cooperation, regional processes and multilateralism continue to grow in the NEA, particularly faster in the environment-­related field. The rest of this book intends to disentangle these puzzles by exploring the evolution of regional environmental cooperation, interlinking the process with growing regional security tensions. In doing so, it intends to suggest a way to enhance the quality of cooperation (policy-­wise) and contribute to environmental studies (methodological and theoretical). In this regard, questions arise regarding how far, for what motivations, and under what circumstances major players in the NEA would choose to participate in cooperation process, particularly in the environmental field. To reiterate, this book explores primarily the following question: “How far, for what motivations, and under what circumstances do major players in the NEA choose to cooperate and how are other aspects of regional affairs, competition and conflict linked with those cooperation efforts?” While investigating this main question throughout the remaining chapters, it also explores the related questions: “To what extent has regionalized cooperation successfully evolved and been strengthened in view of, first, resolving region-­ wide environmental issues (in what specific areas and under what conditions), and further to contribute to global environmental governance?” “If regional environmental cooperation is necessary and beneficial in certain areas, how do conflicts over security issues in the related fields interact with such cooperative efforts, to what degree, on what level, and under what conditions?” Finally “Whether there has been negative or positive symbiosis between the above-­ explained three pillars of environment-­related regional affairs (the rise of environmentalism, the broader sense of securitization, and development) that is generated by the regionalization process?” In doing so, this book provides both sector-­specific (across the three environmental fields) and region-­specific analyses to suggest “to what extent a regionalized approach reinforces environmentalism” and “how regional security dynamics can have both constraints and opportunities,” generating a synergetic

Setting the scene   5 effect across related regional issues. The fundamental purpose of this research is to examine and suggest possibilities of enhancing environmental conditions both on anthropogenic and ecological grounds, and at the same time reconsidering the concept of “environmental security” in the wider context of contributing to ongoing academic efforts of mainstreaming environmentalism into political science and international relations. Environmental studies require an interdisciplinary approach, and there still remains much room for political scientists and scholars of international affairs to contribute. Although all social science disciplines have been engaged in environmental studies with a range of contributions, there is still a dearth of research providing a wider picture of environmental affairs looking into the nature of the participating countries’ cooperation and conflicts in the regional context. Accordingly, environmental politics closely linked to conventional security have not been adequately scrutinized. This is partly because conventional state-­ centered realism-­dominated analyses on regional politics of the NEA heavily concentrate on (and firmly legitimize) state security with a reluctance to accept the environment as a significant subfield of politics, while trivializing its problems as being socially and culturally based, thus being categorized as soft issues in international relations, and therefore taking a lower priority as a welfare issue in domestic politics. This is particularly true in most countries in East Asia. This analysis is focused on the major regional economies due to both their geopolitical proximity and their significance in the region. As mentioned, it investigates the approaches to environmental cooperation of the major NEA economies, namely China, Japan, and the ROK (Republic of Korea) as core players and the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), the Republic of Mongolia, and Russia as additional actors. Strictly speaking, cooperation refers to that among the four (China, Japan, South Korea, and the RFE), whereas the framework of environmental aid (as part of development aid) is more relevant to describe the cooperative activities of the four vis-­à-vis Mongolia and the DPRK. The environmental relationship between Russia and the NEA has often been neglected in previous studies, and global warming in the RFE3 has rarely been regarded as a security threat to the region (BBC News, August 2, 2016).4 “The impact of transnational and trans-­border factors on the ecology of the Russian Far East is considerable,” as the region shares borders or proximity with China (see Zabelina and Klevaki 2012), the ROK, the DRPK, and Japan. Meanwhile, the DPRK “poses a potential threat to the environmental security of the region” because of its insatiable nuclear ambitions, “which, in the worst case scenario, could lead to violent armed conflict or the use of weapons of mass destruction” (Lukin 2007: p. 24). The gravity of environmental degradation in the DPRK over the last few decades has received little attention in previous research, with the exception of a few studies by international non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) and Western ecologists.5 In the epistemic community of regional politics, subjects relating to conventional security or those of immediate national interest tend to predominate in academic and policy discourse. The aim of the current research is to fill this gap, suggesting methodological and analytical

6   Setting the scene tools for investigating the inseparable link between the conventional concept of national/regional security and the environment as, often called “non-­ conventional” security, through empirical studies of regional environmental affairs. Environmental degradation has become a real threat to individuals, society and the ecological system alike, which is beyond the mere construction of risk discourses. In this regard, when prioritizing policy actions, it may be less meaningful to provide a purely quantified balance sheet only comparing the level of the threat based on a dichotomized framework of “conventional versus non-­conventional” or “soft versus hard security” issues. Considering the fast changing security dynamic in the NEA, focusing only on institutionalized cooperation may result in missing the fuller picture of the nature, patterns, and direction of cooperative actions in the field of the environment. This adds significance to the study of environmental affairs through the political science lens. In all three dimensions of environmental affairs, major actors are engaged in competitive and conflicting situations, but a certain level of cooperation has also been fairly constant, with the view of achieving environmental improvements and aligning with the agenda of the global sustainable development goals. Cooperation in the climate-­change induced field could be motivated by, on the surface, solving regional problems associated with ever-­aggravating transboundary air pollution. However, other motivations are also deeply involved, depending on many variables such as individual countries leadership change, national priorities, level of public awareness on environmental issues, the degree of global pressure and so on. Cooperative regional procedures on biodiversity have also been undertaken, primarily to resolve the issues of biodiversity loss but also severe competition and conflicts that occur in parallel: competition over bio-­resources, conflicts arising from the intersection of trade and the environment, and exploitative relationships between members. Likewise, on the one hand, ocean environmental protection has emerged as a cooperative regional issue but on the other, it still remains as mere diplomatic rhetoric. Competition and conflicts over maritime resources, territories and exclusive navigation rights directly and indirectly affect the aggravation of the ocean environment rather than improving it. Empirical investigation of this project particularly focuses on the core field of environmental governance: broadly dividing it into three parts – climate change, biodiversity (including water/river-­related issues), and the ocean environment. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (The Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 marked a significant milestone in the history of international environmental cooperation producing a tangible outcome including Agenda 21 (the 700 page-­long non-­binding action plan, together with the Rio Declaration consisting of 27 Principles). By dint of this water-­shedding event, countries agreed to advance the three major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), namely the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which accelerated the process of establishing global environmental regimes and governance under this

Setting the scene   7 broad categorization of work areas. Compared with the two other Conventions, the UNCCD attracted less attention from decision-­makers due to various reasons although it is directly linked with “environmental security” in conflict-­ prone countries (UNCCD 2017: pp.  98–99). As this current research focuses on the NEA, where desertification issues are less urgent and overlap with land use and biodiversity loss, the main chapters in this book are dedicated to climate change and biodiversity. Adding to the two areas, the ocean environment is included as a separate chapter, as it is one issue that has been relatively neglected.

Why does environmental cooperation matter in Northeast Asia? The share of global CO2 emissions from the core NEA countries in 2016 is estimated to be as high as 33.63 percent. At 28.21, 3.67, and 1.75 percent of total global emissions, China, Japan, and South Korea were ranked the first, fifth, and seventh largest contributors, respectively (Statista 2018). Some parts of China, the Republic of Mongolia, RFE, and Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos) have long been seriously aware of accelerated deforestation.6 With their rapid population growth and economic development, the core countries of the NEA are responsible both directly and indirectly for growing environmental problems. Meanwhile, challenges and hurdles will increase due to strong developmental forces in East Asia (home to six of the top 20 exporters in the globe: China 1st; ROK 7th; Hong Kong 9th; Taiwan 20th; Singapore 14th; and Japan 4th), that include the fast rise of societal-­level environmentalism as part of post-­materialism and with rising security tension. Also, China, Japan, and South Korea are among the most natural resources-­ needy: all are included in the top ten importers and consumers list for natural gas, crude oil and valuable timber. From an economic point of view, East Asia has become the most important engine for global economic growth, while being economically interdependent; although politically, diverse and culturally lacking mutual trust, and is thus unwilling to pool sovereignty or establish security alliances (e.g., Yahuda, 2014). Paradoxically, all these challenges and barriers have required more intense interactions and cooperation. Urgent individual and collective actions are required from the region’s governments. Skeptics may argue that regionalism is not a panacea; a number of studies focusing either on regionalism in general (Amako et al. 2013) or on regional environmental cooperation in particular have demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of regionalized responses to global issues. “How then should a region be defined to yield meaningful outcomes in terms of contributing to the academic field of environmental politics and enhancing the welfare of citizens in the region?” Different views and understanding of regionalism often originate from the difference between, “What is it?” and “What should it look like?” Balsiger and VanDeveer (2012) illuminate the rationale of a regional approach (regional environmental governance (REG) initiatives) in this field. Comparative strengths can be achieved in finding “commonalities in a

8   Setting the scene ­ articular environmental challenge, greater familiarity with key actors, and the p ability to tailor mitigating action to a smaller than global constituency” (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012: p. 3). The quote below helps further understanding. Mainstream work in international relations has periodically produced state-­ of-the-­art assessments of regional politics, yet their thematic focus has been dominated by regional economic integration and security dynamics. Research on international environmental politics has generated a significant body of case studies, particularly on regional seas and river basins, but overviews and comparative analyses are rare. Moreover, standard texts in international environmental politics scarcely make a mention of regional dynamics and typically lump “global,” “international,” “multilateral” and “regional” agreements together. (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012: p. 3) Although recently there has been a great deal of studies on regional environmental cooperation, such work still remains episodic with their focus mostly on specific fields of environment, or nationalized policy leaning, rather than universal communicability with other regions (mostly funded by state agencies of a member country). Adding to the above-­explained rationales at a general level, all agreements are regional in their origin, if “region” can be defined extensively beyond geographical limit. In a way, the word “regional” itself connotes bias, framing “universal versus regional.” Some agreements and institutions remain “regional” among their original initiators (founders and those of a like-­mind), while others may become more extensive and inclusive. In the East Asian context, “[t]he wave of new regionalism that emerged in the early 1990s reached Northeast Asia in the late 1990s” (Yoshimatsu 2010: p.  3). In 2001, East Asian countries increasingly became members of various regional organizations, frameworks and agreements, many overlapping but mostly with these countries playing as core players. Core cooperation among the three NEA in the environmental field is far more tangible than the rest, whereas there is rarely regular multi-­party cooperation that is comprehensive in embracing all six countries. In particular, North Korea’s multilateral environmental cooperation focuses on external regional organizations, rather than within the region, apart from a bilateral aid relationship mostly with China. Likewise, Mongolia’s participation within the region is limited although its cooperation or aid relationship has been established bilaterally with South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. Meanwhile, each of the core NEA three have been keen to cooperate with Russia, especially in the field of energy and forest-­related industries. Therefore, except for the core three NEA’s cooperation, “regional cooperation” as such is hard to grasp. A more accurate way to describe the inter-­governmental environmental relationship in this region would be “multi-­lateral [mini-­lateral] cooperation among the three” and in parallel, individual countries’ “bilateral cooperative or aid relationship” with Mongolia and the DPRK,7 although there has been an effort of establishing an inclusive institution such as the NEASPEC (Northeast

Setting the scene   9 Asia Subregional Program for Environmental Cooperation) which was established in 1993 with all six countries. The engagement of the RFE is highly fluid and irregular although, for its geopolitical significance and ecological connectivity, it remains an important part of the NEA. To the extent necessary, my analysis is extended to the region’s external relationship with other regions through regional regimes and governances in this field, such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations); APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation); ASEM (Asia-­Europe Meeting); the APT (ASEAN Plus Three), and other subsidiary bodies. Direct relevant institutionalized cooperation among the core NEA members includes the regular Tripartite Summit Meeting with the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (see Table 1.1). In the NEA in particular, Beijing’s agenda of strengthening multilateralism via regional cooperation and institutions generates both concerns and hope for opportunities in this region. Given China’s growing influence, China’s regionalizing multilateralism (or globalizing sinicization) has multiple implications for politics, environmental improvement and policies. Concerning the question whether regionalism can be an alternative to an international process of consolidating environmental norms would depend on the status of each state involved, and their particular relationship with regional players; thus this is hard to generalize. In this sense, China has become of utmost importance, yet is still an unpredictable variable in the rise of multilateralism and regionalization in the NEA. As opposed to a bilateral or multilateral approach to development assistance, bilateral cooperation and regional cooperation are the other two main modalities of assistance, apart from IOs-­level aid. Regional geopolitics enormously hampers any further long-­term quality cooperation among neighboring countries. Only identifying a few, these are China-­DPRK, China-­ROK, ROK-­Japan, Mongolia-­ China, Russia-­Japan, and inter-­Korean relations. Although there was the phenomenon of a mushrooming of regional institutions (see Table 1.1) concerning environmental cooperation for various purposes, including NEASPEC (Northeast Asia Subregional Program of Environmental Cooperation), NOWPOP (Northwest Pacific Action Plan), and TEMM, together with sub-­bodies of APEC, ASEAN, and ASEM; none of which include the DPRK constantly as a member, and only the TEMM exclusively addressed environmental issues. The most important political reason why the DPRK preferred a direct network bypassing regional multilateral actors would be avoidance of the ROK as an explicit diplomatic partner as officially, the DPRK wants to be the sole representative of the peninsula. However, ecological peril in North Korea needs more attention beyond intermittent bilateral aid. North Korea has been hiding something. Something beyond its prison camps, its nuclear facilities, its pervasive poverty, its aching famine, its lack of energy, electrical, fossil, or otherwise. What the hermit kingdom has been covering up is perhaps more fundamental than all of those: an environmental collapse so severe it could destabilize the entire country. Or at least, it was hiding it. (PBS, March 6, 2013)8

10   Setting the scene Table 1.1  Regional environment-related institutions and organizations Institutions

Short description

TEMM (TriPartite Environment Ministers Meeting)

It is an annual ministerial-level meeting among the three Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) established in 1999. It aims to promote environmental management, to take a leading role in regional environmental management, and also to contribute to global environmental improvement, through voluntary sharing of information on implementation and achievements. Official website: www.temm.org In the face of financial crisis, in November 1999 after the December 1997 1st ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the 1st TCS held at the APT meeting represented by the foreign ministries of three countries. In 2009, the members agreed to establish a permanent secretariat at the 2nd Trilateral Summit (Beijing, China), and in 2011, TCS was officially established in Seoul Korea on the basis of equal participation, each government shares 1/3 of total operational budget. Under this umbrella body, the three countries have developed 18 ministerial meetings, over 50 inter-governmental meetings, over 100 cooperative projects, and many actors from private sectors. Official website: www.tcs-asia.org As an annual inter-governmental meeting among senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the auspice of ESCAP, its participating countries include China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, Russia, and International Organizations (UNEP, UNDP, ADB, the World Bank, as well as ESCAP). Established in February 1993, it mainly functioned as a projectbasis with limited funding from the ADB. At the 2000 meeting, it was agreed on the establishment of a core fund with voluntary contribution from governments, inter-governmental organizations, and donor countries. NEASPEC’s activities were acknowledged and re-emphasized during TEMM, notably in 2017 at the 19th TEMM. Source: www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/english/dialogue/ mechanism_neaspec.html At the TEMM15 in May 2013, the Ministers agreed to discuss the establishment of a trilateral policy dialogue and technical cooperation platform on green economy to effectively boost information sharing and green technology cooperation among the three countries (China, Japan, and South Korea), and to accelerate the progress towards sustainable development. During a Post-TEMM15 Working Level Meeting in December, 2013, the three countries agreed to combine the Business Forum with the Tripartite Roundtable Meeting on Environmental Industry. The merged meeting, the Tripartite Roundtable on Environmental Business, continues to be a mechanism for the meeting of environmental enterprises under the TEMM. (Refer to the Meeting Minute of the 1st Tripartite Roundtable on Environmental Business, Shanghai, April 28–29, 2015).

TCS (Tri-lateral Cooperation Secretariat for the Summit)

NEASPEC (Northeast Asia Subregional Program of Environmental Cooperation NEA SIX)

Tripartite Roundtable on Environmental Business

Setting the scene   11 Institutions

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In December 2006, at the 8th TEMM, members discussed strengthening cooperation on chemicals management, agreed to proceed information exchange regarding policies and regulations on chemicals management. In 2012, the Ministers recognized the Dialogue as the effective platform towards harmonization of chemicals management, acknowledged the outcome of the 6th Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management in October 2012 in Hangzhou, China, and encouraged continuous efforts for further cooperation on chemicals management and policy information exchange. Source: www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/temm.html; TEMM15 Joint Communiqué ProSPER.NET The Asian universities network was established in order to find a cooperative way of Environmental Education for low carbon growth. It was acknowledged by the Ministers of the three NEA core countries during TEMM10, 2008. It served as an important driving force for building epistemic The Northeast Asia communities in NEA (started in Seoul in 1992) with the and North Pacific membership of the NEA six. Its main purpose is to link Environmental environmental leaders in the region; to strengthen NGO’s overall Forum capacity; to promote constructive engagement among NGOs, national local governments and business corporations. It is annually held in each six member countries and it became a standing network of participating experts at its 6th meeting in 1998, which set up an executive committee consisting of a representative from each country and a permanent secretariat at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, a Japanese governmental body in Kanagawa. EABRN (East Asian Launched in 1994, this network consists of China, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and the Russian Federation. The Biosphere Reserve Secretariat of EABRN is provided by the UNESCO Office in Network) – Beijing. UNESCO initiated See, www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ network ecological-sciences/man-and-biosphere-programme/networks/ eabrn/ ESCAP-ENEA Wider The ENEA Office bridges the developing and developed Asia beyond NEA countries in the sub-region and works with six member States of ESCAP in the sub-region, namely China, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and the Russian Federation, and two associate members, Hong Kong and Macau. APEC Green Supply This body is operational under the framework of the APEC which Chain Network includes annual conferences and capacity building workshops. It was recognized and supported by the NEA three countries, particularly during TEMM17 in 2017. Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management among the three countries

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12   Setting the scene Table 1.1  Continued Institutions

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GTI (Greater Tumen Established in 1991 initially as the Tumen River Area Initiative) Development Programme (TRADP), originally involving North Korea’s Ra-Seon Special Economic Zone, Eastern Mongolia, northeast China, the Russian Far East, and eastern part of South Korea. The GTI, as the new name for the sub-regional project being conferred in 2006, as its main sectors, include trade/ investment, transport, tourism, energy, and environment. The TumenNET (1995) was one of those projects under the GTI, started from 1995 in collaboration with the UNDP and other multi-stakeholders including private corporations from the six countries. The Ministers of the NEA Three in 2017 during TEMM19 TEEN (Tripartite acknowledged that enhancing environmental education, raising Environmental Education Network) public awareness, and encouraging public participation are essential to promote environmental protection. They welcomed the substantial outcomes of the 17th Tripartite Environmental Education Network (TEEN) symposium and workshop held in September 2016 in Shenzhen, China, with the theme of “Strengthening engagement for environmental education and sustainable development.” It was established in November 1993. It attempted to revitalize OEAED economic activities and inter-city exchanges; form new economic (Organization for East Asian Economic zones in the Yellow Sea Rim Districts; contribute to development of the East Asian Economic Zone. Development) Inaugurated in Vientiane, Lao PDR in 2002, the body held ASEAN PLUS annual conferences for the purpose of promoting environmental THREE cooperation among the ASEAN countries, and the three countries Environment of Japan, China, and South Korea. Ministers Meeting EAS (East Asia It was initiated in December 2005 and its first meeting was held Summit) in Kuala Lumpur. It is a forum held annually by leaders of, initially, 16 countries (Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), but later expanded to 18 including Russia and the United States. EAS EMM (The East Under the EAS, EAS EMM aims to follow-up on the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment Asia Summit issued at the 3rd EAS held in Singapore (November 2007). The Environment Inaugural EAS EMM was held in October, 2008, well attended Ministers Meeting) by representatives from the ten ASEAN Member countries and representatives from Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, United States, and Russia, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Source: The Japanese Ministry of the Environment. Funded by the Korean National Institute of Environmental LTP (Long-range Research, it covers not only the NEA six but the wider East Asian Transboundary Air region. LTP has been active in research and technological Pollutants in exchange among scientist groups in those countries involved. Due Northeast Asia) to the aggravating situation, recently it has been more active and was urged to promote cooperation during TEMM19 in 2017.

Setting the scene   13 Institutions

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Initiated by Japan, four expert meetings between 1993 and 1997 were established to discuss the state of acid deposition in the region, effects on ecosystems, and future steps toward regional cooperation in this issue. The expert meetings agreed on the necessity for establishing a regional monitoring network with standardized monitoring methods and analytical techniques. At the 9th Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG9), subsidiary bodies were established under the Scientific Advisory Committee of EANET, including a Task Force on Monitoring Instrumentation, Task Force on Research Coordination, Expert Group on Dry Deposition Flux Estimation under the Task Force on Dry Deposition Monitoring, Expert Group on Revision of Technical Manual on Wet Deposition Monitoring, Expert Group on Revision of Technical Manual on Inland Aquatic Environment Monitoring, Expert Group on Preparation of the Second Periodic Report on the State of Acid Deposition in East Asia. (For membership, see www.eanet.asia/country/index.html.) All the NEA six countries are members of the NEACAP. The The Northeast Asia Clean Air Partnership activities were recognized by TEMM19 (2017); emphasis and acknowledgement was made. (NEACAP) ANEA (Atmosphere All the NEA six countries along with Hong Kong and Taiwan are Action Network East the members of the ANEA. As the only standing environmental NGO network in the Northeast Asian region, it was established in Asia) 1995, with financial assistance from the Japanese Fund for Global Environment. APP-CC (Asia-Pacific As a US-initiated six countries’ partnership (Australia, Japan, China, India, South Korea, and the U.S.) and established in Partnership on 2005, the APP-CC focuses on clean energy development, climate Climate Change) change mitigation, technology transfer, and sustainable energy supply. The partnership was formally concluded April 5, 2011. The core mechanism was to provide technological advice to China and India for their Power Sector Restructuring. The APP-CC’s main goal was to accelerate the use of more energy efficient and cleaner technologies and mitigate climate change without undermining economic development. AAP has approved eight public-private sector task forces covering aluminum, buildings and appliances, cement, cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and transmission, renewable energy and distributed generation, and steel. Source: https://aric.adb.org/initiative/asia-pacific-partnershipon-clean-development-and-climate. EANET (Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia)

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14   Setting the scene Table 1.1  Continued Institutions

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Asia Carbon Footprint Network (ACFN)

The United Nations ESCAP East and Northeast Asia Office and the Korea Environmental Industry and Technology Institute (KEITI), as co-secretariats, jointly organized the Asia Carbon Footprint Network (ACFN) Annual Network Meeting, Seminar, and Working Group Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea from May 25–26, 2017. The Network Meeting, attended by 22 representatives from 13 member organizations and four observers, was briefed on the past and current activities, particularly the joint research work with the Carbon Trust on “Common Product Carbon Footprinting Framework for Asia” and the pilot project on “Developing Common Product Category Rules for Carbon Footprint.” It also reviewed the Terms of Reference and agreed with the revisions made except the article of the Financial Resources. An institution of Mayors Forum, called “Northeast Asian Institute of Capitals Cooperative” dealing with air quality and climate change was established (October 2017). This was endorsed by Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and Ulanbataar. A high-level governmental policy dialogue established through the collaboration of the Ministry of the Environment of Japan and UNCRD (United Nations Centre for Regional Development) toward the realization of EST (Environmentally Sustainable Transport) in the Asian region. The Forum is comprised of government representatives from both environment and transport ministries from Japan and Asian countries, and experts in the transportation and environment fields. The first meeting of the Regional EST Forum in Asia was held in Nagoya, Japan in August 2005, Ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and Mongolia, in total 13 countries, joined the meeting. Source: www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/english/dialogue/ mechanism_asiaest.html. The Network facilitates the exchange and dissemination of information on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and selected used/secondhand equipment among Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, and assists participating countries in formulating appropriate legislative response to such movements under each country’s system, taking into consideration necessary procedures required by the Basel Convention. A project for the establishment of the Asian Network was proposed by the Government of Japan, and acknowledged by Parties at the First Session of the Open-ended Working Group of the Basel Convention (OEWG 1, held in Geneva from April 28 to May 2, 2003). The current participating countries include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China (including Hong Kong SAR), Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Source: www.env.go.jp/en/recycle/asian_net/.

Northeast Asian Institute of Capitals Cooperative Regional EST (Environmentally Sustainable Transport) Forum in Asia

The Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes

Setting the scene   15 Institutions

Short description

Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy

Since 1996, the conservation of migratory waterbirds and their habitats in the Asia-Pacific region has been promoted through the Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy, which is an international cooperative initiative. The Ministries of the Environment have actively supported the Strategy and three flyway networks in cooperation with NGOs and relevant governments in the region. Central Asian Indian Flyway, West Pacific Flyway, East Asia-Australian Flyway. Source: www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/english/dialogue/ mechanism_waterfowl.html. The Plan was adopted in 1994 by the four Member States, namely the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation as a part of the UNEP Regional Seas Program. The implementation of NOWPAP is financed mainly by contributions from the Members. The Intergovernmental Meeting (IGM) is the high-level governing body of NOWPAP that provides policy guidance and makes decisions. Hosted annually, it is made up of senior representatives of the NOWPAP Members. In accordance with the IGM decisions, Regional Activity Centers (RACs) were established between 2000 and 2002 to start their activities afterwards. Regional Coordinating Unit (RCU) was set up in Toyama, Japan and Busan, South Korea, in November 2004. Other subsidiary bodies include DINRC (Data and Information Network Regional Activity Center) in Beijing; MERRAC (Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response Regional Activity Center) in Korea; CEARC (Special Monitoring and Coastal Environmental Assessment Regional Activity Centre) in Japan, and POMRAC (Pollution Monitoring Regional Activity Center) in Russia. Source: www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/english/dialogue/ mechanism_nowpap.html. Proposed by Japan, it was launched to promote environmental cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN. The first JapanASEAN Dialogue on Environmental Cooperation was held in Hanoi, Vietnam in March 2008. Source: The Japanese Ministry of Environment. Started in 1994, initiated by Japan to promote working-level policy dialogue on their respective environmental policies and bilateral and multilateral environmental cooperation; at the first Dialogue in 1994 in Beijing, agreed to make acid rain problem a priority area of cooperation and to launch nine new projects, including Biological Global Chemical Research on Pollution and Other Impacts of Acidic Contaminants upon Ecosystems. Source: The Japanese Ministry of Environment. Started in 1993, it was initiated by Japan. The committee meets on a periodical basis to promote working-level policy dialogue on their respective environmental policies and bilateral and multilateral environmental cooperation. Source: The Japanese Ministry of Environment.

NOWPAP (Northwest Pacific Action Plan)

Japan-ASEAN Dialogue on Environmental Cooperation China-Japan Joint Committee on Environmental Conservation

Japan-Korea Joint Committee on Environmental Conservation Cooperation

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Started in 2007, it was initiated by Japan. The Japanese Ministry Japan-Mongolia Environmental Policy of Environment and the Mongolian Ministry of Natural Environment (recently renamed as the Ministry of Natural Dialogue Environment and Tourism) meet annually for the purpose of exchanging information and discussing the direction of cooperation in the field of environment. Collated by author from various sources.

Nevertheless, “regional” environmental institutions shun incorporating DPRK issues into the agendas outlined by major regional groupings, particularly under the UN and U.S.-led international sanctions.

Emerging security dynamism, multilateralism, and the rise of environmentalism The dynamics of regionalism is being revitalized thanks to the fast development of China, and the changing roles in this region. By dint of China’s growing power, its participation in previously categorized “regional” organizations became “regional organizations with global implications” (e.g., One Belt One Road, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, The New Development Bank, The Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank). The duality of the East Asian countries’ position toward the U.S. often stems from their long time disappointment with U.S. leadership, and expecting an alternative power. Some may expect that China could create an alternative model of multilateralism, as China claims. As part of such efforts, Chinese authorities recently published a collection of President Xi Jinping’s public discourses on ecological improvement as a guidance document hinting the government’s determination to redirect society (Xinhua, September 29, 2017),9 published by the Central Party Literature Press. The 259 pieces of discourses were extracted from over 80 speeches, instructions, congratulatory letters, and other sources dating from November 15, 2012 to September 11, 2017. The document has seven sections, which include the significance of ecological progress for the people and the country’s future, environmentally-­friendly development modes and lifestyles; and international cooperation to improve the Earth’s ecosystems. Some of the discourses are being published for the first time (Xinhua News Agency September 29, 2017). China’s determination for ecological improvement is in line with its security policies toward the region. Beijing recently announced that it has confirmed through various diplomatic channels and during a Sino-­ROK Summit in January 2018 that China’s stance to the DPRK is firmly grounded on the four principles: (1) War on the Korean Peninsula can never be tolerated. (2) The principle of

Setting the scene   17 denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be firmly maintained. (3) All issues, including the denuclearization of North Korea, will be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations. (4) Improvement in inter-­Korean relations will be ultimately helpful in resolving issues involving the Korean Peninsula (The Diplomat, February 27, 2018).10 Since Moon Jae-­In’s presidency, inter-­Korean relations have rapidly improved even to the extent to successfully persuade, in the midst of full-­scale economic sanctions against the DPRK, the U.S. and the international community’s support to invite the DPRK as a unified sports team with South Korea during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and subsequent exchanges of cultural events. As soon as Moon was elected, the new government’s most urgent agenda was to pacify aggravating political tensions in the NEA following the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test and inter-­continental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests that sparked dangerous tension and a volatile tug of war with the Trump Administration. The ROK government promptly established the presidential committee for economic cooperation with northern countries in order to promote a cooperative mechanism, keeping a closer relationship with China, the DPRK, Russia and Mongolia. The head of the presidential committee, Song Young-­gil recently made a three-­day visit to China to meet officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Charhar Institute. “Song highlighted that China’s vision for its One Belt, One Road development policy can be shared with South Korea’s New North policy, contending that cooperation between the two countries can create more opportunities” (Yonhap News Agency, April 15, 2018).11 However, in parallel with strengthening multilateralism, an arms race in the NEA and the arms trade with related countries has been growing (The South China Morning Post, March 12, 2018).12 In response to the confrontation between the Trump Administration and Kim Jong-­un, and a growing U.S. pivot over the South China Sea, both Japan and China have swiftly relocated military forces for emergency deployment (The South China Morning Post, February 10, 2018).13 In South Korea, with the THAAD issue, the country’s defense capability was under debate, and the conservative camp suggested that the country should reconsider developing nuclear weapons although this feasibility would be rather low (APPS Policy Forum, December 13, 2017).14 Security risks today are inextricably linked with environmental risks due to the high density of populations in the NEA, the vulnerable natural environment, and peoples’ higher risk perception on environmental damage. Regardless of the political system, ordinary people today have begun to take “immediate” environmental and health risks far more seriously than abstract state security threats since environment-­induced risks threaten their daily lives. This is evidenced by people’s growing concern and discontent regarding the environmental consequences of the DPRK’s nuclear tests on border areas in Northeast China, and fatal health problems among people living around nuclear testing sites in the DPRK; and protests against THAAD (The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) deployment for environmental reasons in Seongju,

18   Setting the scene South Korea, where people in the surrounding communities worry more about water contamination, air pollution, noise level increases, the quality of agricultural products, the changing landscape, and property values. The growing Chinese population in RFE also brought security, territorial development and environmental issues (relating to unsustainable use of natural resources) to the fore at the same time, as seen in the text below: Alexander Shaikin, in charge of controlling the Russian-­Chinese border, said on June 29 that 1.5 million people from China have illegally entered the Russian Far East over the past 18 months. Reported by The Moscow Times, Shaikin’s claim is likely exaggerated, but increased Chinese migration is marking a return of Chinese influence to these territories. And any territorial dispute could disrupt relations between Asia’s largest continental powers. It’s impossible to know the exact level of Chinese migration into the Russian Far East; Russia has not run a census in over a decade. But by all indications, a significant river of people is surging across the border. The Moscow Carnegie Center, the only organization to launch an independent study, claimed that there were about 250,000 Chinese in Russia in 1997. The Interior Ministry has claimed that there are 2 million. Other estimates place the Chinese population at 5 million. Regardless, the Federal Migration Service fears a flood. The service has repeatedly warned that the Chinese could become the dominant ethnic group in the Russian Far East in 20 to 30 years. Such an occurrence would require an annual influx of about 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese, less than one-­third the rate that Shaikin currently claims. (ABC News Analysis, July 14, 2017)15 Sino-­Russian environmental cooperation is one example of how unintentional people-­to-people bottom-­up interaction may spur government-­level efforts to build a regime for environmental cooperation. “The truly revealing moment was when Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao attended Saint Petersburg’s Economic Forum in May 2014. His speech on the prospects for Russian-­Chinese economic collaboration stressing the role of the RFE” (Lee and Lukin, 2016: pp.  179–180). A series of political events and transboundary environmental accidents (and potentially conflicting issues) triggered closer cooperation between the two giants in the NEA. In the process of bilateral regime building, Russia required China to agree to stricter environmental standards.16 Apart from the geographical proximity, the population-­resources asymmetry between the two parties caused natural evolution of cooperation among many other reasons for cooperation: China as naturally resource-­hungry with an explosion of its population, and the RFE as a place of under-­exploited natural resources with a decreasing local population (7.4 million Russians with 1.3 people per kilometer). Other political (Russia’s isolation from the western powers) and economic (valuable ports and resources) factors, with structural and contextual grounds, explain relatively smoother negotiations and cooperation compared

Setting the scene   19 with other bilateral agreements among the NEA. This is more detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of regional cooperation for biodiversity preservation and water-­related issues focusing on logging, land misuse, deforestation, illegal hunting and trade. Creation of constructive conflicts for positive environmental politics Conflicts may manifest both destructive and constructive elements. Conflicts could mean the conflict between “nature and human society” and, in the regional politics context, conflict among actors over common, shared, or nationally owned natural resources. At times, conflicts are inevitable but the question is whether these develop into cooperation based on sufficient public discourse, communication, institutions and negotiations from the view of establishing referable norms and principles. In the environmental field, inter-­ state competition, conflicts and cooperation on the same issues may develop simultaneously. Quality cooperation dealing with real and urgent issues is an outcome of conflict on the same issues. However, cooperation could be limited when conventional security issues become predominant, thus the areas and agendas of non-­conventional issues over which countries can more easily cooperate becomes even narrower. “Cooperation” in the meantime, being different from integration, connotes the process of positive interaction accepting less institutionalized forms of integration in regional politics. In East Asia, as many scholars in this field have argued, this looser process-based cooperation justifies a highly selective manner in a country’s commitment to avoiding a longer-­term closed-­model of comprehensive commitment. The history of relationships among nations tells us of the experience of more conflicts and confrontation than cooperation, given the history of wars, colonial relationships, violent invasions and occupation by military forces, partitions, non-­regional power’s continuous pivots, and so on. However, if historical resentment is the real barrier, there will be very few countries and regions that have any reason to cooperate. Conflicts and confrontations today are not barriers; contrariwise they provide the fundamental grounds to cooperate. Security concerns were the primary motivation for the earlier institutional form of the European Union (the European Coal and Steel Community), which was set in force for fear of brutal wars among Europe’s post-­war nations and took the form of gradual integration since 1945 via trade liberalization, but above all through setting up a cooperative monitoring and management system for natural resources that were used in the munitions industry sector (coal, steel, and iron ore). Most experts in NEA multilateralism often point out strong national identity and a firm national sovereignty consciousness as barriers to further cooperation. However, the question appears to be not the existence of strong nationalism and sovereignty consciousness per se, but the absence of confidence in nationalism and rigid state sovereignty hampering the building of de-­ territorialized institutional institutions and regionally usefully regimes. Enjoyment of sovereignty has been a fundamental problem in East Asian

20   Setting the scene countries, even the most powerful (regional) countries such as Japan and China. It has been only recently that China gained full sovereignty but even today it is still insecure about full sovereignty over some ethnic and/or territorial minority regions – Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macao) and Taiwan. Besides, the U.S. presence in the region makes regional powers’ calculations more complicated. Cooperation is naturally loose with fundamental mistrust and a zero-­sum game is sought more often than a win-­win situation. Cooperation is still very much viewed as a means to gain hegemonic power to play a (near) zero-­sum game. It is true that an issue-­based problem-­solving approach in regional affairs in the NEA represents many limitations and challenges under conditions where state securityand territorial sovereignty-­obsessed power politics with authoritarian governance predominantly occupies the culture and politics in the region. This is because such a paradigm shift is considered as interrupting the hierarchy between issues where a vertical order is embedded in regional politics between conventional hard core security and non-­conventional security. Consequently, a fundamentally different approach is necessary to find areas of common interest for cooperation as opposed to highlighting areas of conflict to secure stronger leverage to pursue nationalized interests at the expense of other countries. The key issue in the environmental field would be positive interactions between conflict and cooperation (as opposed to conflict avoidance). In this respect, more historical data, embracing regional affairs focusing both on conflict and cooperation among NEA neighboring countries, need to be systematically documented. Insufficient region-­wide environmental communication (together with power politics) de-­securitizes actual and potential “regionally linked-­risks” attributed to environmental degradation. Solid and useful regional environmental cooperation can be generated from constructive tension and open discussions on sensitive problems including (potential) conflict that has environmental implications. Identifying core denominators and broadening the common sphere itself for the historically accumulated collective activities of parties in diagnosing and recognizing environmental harm, require much longer time than other functional and technical issues in the process of cooperation. This clearly contrasts with the current NEA way of environmental agenda-­setting for inter-­ governmental, multilateral environmental cooperation, which has been superficial in prioritizing issues. Such differences may be called “thick cooperation” for the former as opposed to “thin cooperation” for the latter that makes a cooperation process as mere a diplomatic forum. Within the environmental domain, common core issues can be confined to “trans-­boundary, deplete-­able, non-­renewable resources at the same time as regional issues with global implications.” At a general level, one useful categorization by Young is to some extent applicable to the NEA (Young 1994: pp.  20–26) as a way to classify inter-­state environmental matters. The first category represents the “international commons,” meaning “physical or biological systems that lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction of any of the individual members of a society but that are valued resources for many segments of society” (p. 20). (Examples include Antarctica, the high seas, deep seabed

Setting the scene   21 minerals, the stratospheric ozone layer, the global climate system and outer space). The second category is shared natural resources;  physical or biological systems that extend into or across the jurisdiction of two or more members of international society, for example non-­renewable resources (e.g. pools of oil that underlie areas subject to the jurisdiction of adjacent or opposite states), renewable sources (e.g. straddling stocks of fish or migratory stocks of wild animals), or complex ecosystems that transcend the boundaries of national jurisdictions (e.g. regional seas or river basins). (Young 1994: pp. 21–22) The transboundary externalities can be a third category of the issues, which “arise when activities that occur wholly within the jurisdiction of individual states produce results that affect the welfare of those residing in other jurisdictions,” caused by environmental accidents, nuclear incidents, river contamination, transnational air pollution or the loss of biodiversity as a consequence of the destruction of tropical forests and species extinction. Lastly, there are also linked issues, “unintended consequences affecting other regimes and vice versa” (Young 1994: pp. 23–25). Each category requires differentiated policy approaches and actions. However, all categories are closely interconnected and continuously co-­ influencing. Depending on the region, more urgent issues and ones with clearer evidence of human and ecological impacts may take priority.

Explanations on the structure of the book Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 first discusses in detail various perspectives and accounts on inter-­state environmental cooperation within the academic discipline of international relations and political science in general. It focuses on how those various accounts answer the question why countries would advance environmental cooperation. It also explores how regionalism and regionalization (as an idea, action, and process) may reinforce the symbiosis of the three pillars of regional (from a neutral geographical sense) environmental affairs, “security, development, and environmentalism.” Based on this general-­ level theoretical discussion, the chapter outlines an analytical framework that helps an understanding of the dynamic features of regional environmental development. The subsequent chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) explore, focusing on each area of environmental governance, the question of how far the NEA countries have been cooperating. The main body chapters are written, according to a similar logical sequence. Each of the three main chapters consists of first, addressing/identifying regional environmental issues, the particular ecological issues focusing on the NEA region but in the context of cooperation in relevant, inter-­regional and global environmental regimes. The second part of each chapter includes a detailed exploration of the evolution of the core visible and

22   Setting the scene tangible “regional” regimes (institutions, organizations, principles, norms and practices) and visible institutionalization of regionalized cooperation in the environmental field, applying the methods of a three-­level effectiveness test taking the TEMM as the core institution of the NEA. The third part discusses the main contradictions (overlooked and deliberately omitted) often revealed as potential or real “conflicts” in the environmental field from the view of analyzing the degree of mutual interactions between conflict and cooperation. This part provides case illustrations followed by an in-­depth analysis on the fundamental causes and political implications of such two seemingly separate domains of conventional and non-­conventional security issues in environmental negotiations. The fourth section concludes its respective chapter with theoretical implications in connection with each regional environmental governance/ regime under this study. The final chapter concludes the book, summarizing major findings while providing a comparative analysis on the three areas of governance. This comparison intends to reiterate the countries’ behavior in dealing with different environmental problems facing the NEA.

Notes   1 The ecosystem can be defined as the community of things and the biosphere, including the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, and lithosphere (“the upper region of rocks and soil”), whereas the environment is a much broader term referring to any surroundings including human and social as well as natural systems. In this book, the term environment, is used exclusively for a natural environment in order to avoid any confusion (see, for example, Harper 2013: Chapter 1).   2 Environmentalism  denoting a set of beliefs about desirable action…. But ideologies are not only abstract beliefs and models about how the world works.… Environmentalists have produced social, economic and philosophical literature of remarkable breath, depth and variety that significantly shapes the political values and agendas – if not the actual operation – of most nations today.  (Harper 2013: p. 225)   3 The REF  encompasses the nine provinces or subjects of the federation that make up the Far Eastern District (Dalnevostochny federalny okrug), one of eight such administrative districts that comprise the Russian state. The provinces of the RFE (with their designations of oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, krai and republic) are the Amur Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Jewish Autonomous Oblast (JAO), Kamchatka Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Magadan Oblast, Primorsky Krai Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and Sakhalin Oblast.  (Lee and Lukin 2016: p. 7)   4 Among many, the recent anthrax incidence in North Siberia demonstrates one of the related emerging concerns. It was reported that for the first time since 1941, an anthrax outbreak affected 90 people and killed more than 2,300 reindeer due to high temperatures in the face of climate change. “Russia anthrax outbreak affects dozens in north Siberia,” www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-36951542. (Accessed August 10, 2016).

Setting the scene   23   5 After being initiated by the North Korean defectors diaspora community, a few NGOs combined with news information services on North Korea have become increasingly active, targeting an international audience.   6 One of the widely-­cited environmental performance indices is one produced annually called the “Yale University-­led EPI.” Refer to the EPI 2016 result, at: http://epi. yale.edu/. However, there are numerous environmental performance indicators developed by scholars (usually environmental and ecological economists, and environmental scientists), related environmental organizations and other research institutions, reflecting a wide ranging spectrum of environmental values within those expert groups. They include, inter alia, Green National Accounts (EANP), Genuine Savings Indicator (GSI), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP), I=PAT, Ecological Footprint (EF ). See, for example, UNEP and UNU-­IHDP (International Human Dimensions Program) (2012), for a comprehensive research on indicators.   7 Since the mid-­1990s, the world’s most significant recipient of environmental Official Development Assistance was China, among which, the highest amount flew via bilateral Sino-­Japan bilateral environmental institutions and projects. Counting only the 1990s, over 10 billion Japanese yen was transferred in support of China’s environmental capacity building (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s ODA Annual Report 1999).   8 “Inside North Korea’s environmental collapse” by Phil McKenna, www.pbs.org/wgbh/ nova/next/nature/inside-­north-koreas-­environmental-collapse/. (Accessed January 10, 2017).   9 “China publishes the book of Xi’s discourses on ecological improvement,” www.­ xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/29/c_136648927.htm. (Accessed September 30, 2017). 10 “China–South Korea relations: a delicate détente” by Kristian McGuire, https:// thediplomat.com/2018/02/china-­south-korea-­relations-a-­delicate-detente/. (Accessed April 21, 2018). 11 “S. Korea promotes New North policy in China,” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/na tional/2018/04/15/0301000000AEN20180415003000320.html. (Accessed April 15, 2018). 12 “China’s arms sales rise as it vies with US for influence on the world stage,” www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2136877/chinas-­arms-sales-­riseit-­vies-us-­influence-world-­stage. (Accessed March 20, 2018). 13 “China’s J-­20 stealth fighter jet lines up for combat duty, boosting firepower in the sky,” www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2132777/chinas-­j20-stealth-­fighter-jet-­lines-combat-­duty. (Accessed March 20, 2018). 14 “A nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia?: A race with six competitors would not be like the Cold War” by Brendan Taylor and David Envall, Asia Pacific Policy Society (APPS) Policy Forum, Australian National University (December 13, 2017), www. policyforum.net/nuclear-­arms-race-­northeast-asia. (Accessed April 15, 2018). 15 “Analysis: Russia’s Far East turning Chinese: The Chinese are invading Russia, not with tanks, but with suitcases,” https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id= 82969&page=1. (Accessed March 31, 2018). 16 Russia took the territory in 1858 (the Treaties of Aigun) and 1860 (the Treaties of Peking). Beijing has never formally accepted the Aigun and Peking treaties, and China and Russia signed a border agreement in 1999.

References Almeida, Paul and Linda B. Stearns (1998) Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata. Social Problems, 45(1): 37–60

24   Setting the scene Amako, Satoshi, Shunji Matsuoka, and Kenji Horiuchi (eds.) (2013) Regional Integration in East Asia: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Tokyo: UN University Press) Balsiger, Jörg and Stacy D. VanDeveer (2012) Navigating Regional Environmental Governance. Global Environmental Politics, 12(3): 1–17 Beck, Ulrich (1995) Ecological Enlightenment (California: Humanities Press) Burchell, Jon (2002) The Evolution of Green Politics: Development and Change Within European Green Parties (London: Earthscan Publications) Dryzek, John S., David Downes, Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, and Hans-­Kristian Hernes (2003) Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway (New York: Oxford University Press) Ekins, Paul (2003) Trade and Environment, Internet Encyclopedia of Ecological Economics (International Society for Ecological Environment) Folke, Olle (2014) Shades of Brown and Green: Party Effects in Proportional Election Systems. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(5): 1361–1395 Frankland, E. Gene, Paul Lucardie, and Benoît Rihoux (eds.) (2008) Green Parties in Transition: the End of Grass-­Roots Democracy? (Farnham: Ashgate) Groom, A. J. R. and Paul Taylor (eds.) (1990) Frameworks for International Cooperation (London: Pinter) Harper, Charles (2013) “Environmentalism: ideology and collective action,” in Environment and Society: Human Perspectives on Environmental Issues (London: Routledge) Kalland, Arne and Gerard Persoon (ed.) (1998) Environmental Movements in Asia (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Curzon) Lam, Peng-­Er (1999) Green Politics in Japan (London: Routledge) Lee, Rensselaer and Artyom Lukin (2016) Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific and Beyond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) Lee, Yok-­shiu F. and Alvin Y. So (eds.) (1999) Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspective (New York: M. E. Sharp) Lukin, Artyoml (2007) Environmental Security of Northeast Asia: A Case of the Russian Far East. Asian Affairs, 34(1): 23–35 Maddock, R. T. (1995) Environmental Security in East Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 17(1): 20–37 Mason, Robert J. (1999) Whither Japan’s Environmental Movement? An Assessment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level. Pacific Affairs, 72(2): 187–207 Pierce, John C., Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Taketsugu Tsurutani, and Takematsu Abe (1987) Culture, Politics and Mass Publics: Traditional and Modern Supporters of the New Environmental Paradigm in Japan and the United States. Journal of Politics, 49(1): 54–79 Sagar, Ambuj D. and Stacy D. VanDeveer (2005) Capacity Development for the Environment: Broadening the Scope. Global Environmental Politics, 5(3): 14–22 Schreurs, Miranda A. (2002) Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Statista (2018) “Statista statistics,” www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-­largestemitters-­of-co2-in-­the-world/ (Accessed August 16, 2018) Tranter, Bruce and Mark Western (2009) The Influence of Green Parties on Postmaterialist Values. British Journal of Sociology 60(1): 145–167 UNCCD (UN Convention to Combat Desertification) (2017) Global Land Outlook (United Nations) UNEP and UNU-­IHDP (International Human Dimensions Program) (2012) Inclusive Wealth Report 2012: Measuring Progress towards Sustainability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Setting the scene   25 VanDeveer, Stacy D. and Paul F. Steinberg (2015) “Comparative environmental politics: domestic institutions and actors,” in Paul G. Harris (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, pp. 150–163 (London: Routledge) Wilkening, Kenneth E. (1999) Culture and Japanese Citizen Influence on the Transboundary Air Pollution Issue in Northeast Asia. Political Psychology, 20(4): 701–723 Yahuda, Michael (2014) “Looking ahead: A new Asian order?,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (eds.) International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield) Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka (2010) Regional Governance and Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Cases of the Environment and IT. Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, RCAPS Working Paper No. 09, March 9 Young, Oran R. (1994) International Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) Zabelina, I. A. and E. A. Klevaki (2012) Environmental and Economic Aspects of Natural Resource Use and Problems of Cross-­Border Cooperation in Regions of Siberia. Problems of Economic Transition, 55(7): 39–48

2 Environmental politics and regional cooperation

Regionalism, regional politics, and environmental affairs As a first step to deal with the main inquiry of this project, “How far, for what motivations, and under what circumstances do major players in the NEA choose to cooperate and how are other aspects of regional affairs, competition and conflict linked with those cooperation efforts?,” this chapter, after discussions on the concept of regionalism, explores the general level of discussions concerning: “Why and to what extent would countries cooperate over environmental issues?” Further, the main purpose of this chapter is, built upon the conceptual connectivity between environmental affairs and regional politics, to provide an analytical framework to understand the dynamic and interactive mechanisms generated by the conjuncture between security/securitization, development and environmentalism, primarily, in application to the NEA context. In this research, “region” or “regional” refers to neutral geographical terms, whereas “regionalism” refers to both a driver of societal change and an outcome of actions and movements that can be a continuous phenomenon as a process of political, economic, and sociocultural regionalization. The natural world of the region and the ecosystem objectively exist regardless of human society’s delimiting geographical boundaries. The terms such as “ecologism” and “environmentalism” have arisen to connect the ecosystem and society in general. Accordingly, regionalized environmentalism also occurs from society’s complex and diverse perspectives on how to create borders between regions with the continuous process of regionalization through the political exercise of inclusion and exclusion until it constitutes fairly stable membership. This exercise evolves in parallel with localized communitarian environmentalism, nationalized environmentalism, and global environmentalism. In the real world, these interconnected processes might not only be overlapping or complementary, but also mutually exclusive at times, and more often than not, conflicting. If following a traditional functionalist premise on regionalism, the underlying assumption of studies should aim to reach a higher stage of institutionalized integration. Some research uses the term “integration” more loosely describing interconnectivity, interactions, and cooperation, especially in the East Asian context (e.g., Amako et al. 2013).

Environmental politics and cooperation   27 Some traditional views may take a more rigid exclusive form of regional integration as regionalism where the final goal could include a single monetary group with supranational institutions based on fairly-­fixed shared values, beliefs and identity. In this context, scholars in this field have argued that the so-­called Asian approach to regional cooperation is process-­oriented (functional) rather than a form of norm-­based regionalism as manifested in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in which the process of regional cooperation per se is often emphasized. Consequently, expectations on regional cooperation are usually low as long as it produces loose and non-­binding soft laws, and members adhere to the bottom-­line principle of political non-­interventionism (non-­intervention in state sovereignty). Samuel Kim (2004) defined a region as a combination of “geographical-­ psychological-behavioral characteristics” distinguished by a few shared features and linked by geographical proximity/contiguity and various forms of political, economic, social, cultural and/or institutional affinities (Kim 2004). Nye also recognized the hybrid nature of regionalism, defining a region as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence,” and “differentiated according to the level and scope of exchange, formal organizations and political interdependence” (Connors et al. 2011: pp.  184–185). These explanations provide an open and flexible understanding of the diverse forms of regional cooperation and integration occurring in different continents. The NEA is often evaluated as a region lacking a sense of regionalism or regionality based on shared values, solidarity, a sense of belonging and collective goals (Baldwin 2008; Calder and Ye 2010). Strong nationalism is often considered as a fundamental hindrance to long-­lasting cooperation, and making interactions between states result in more competition and conflict than cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperative efforts continue through institutionalization. Nationalism and globalism may in theory hamper an advancing more coherent form of regionalism, but numerous counter-­examples exist and in fact they may reinforce regionalism. Many agendas in the process of environmental cooperation reflect countries’ efforts for alignment with global environmental standards and norms. Nationalism and consciousness of state sovereignty can be a strong driver in enhancing regional cooperation. For example, “the sovereignty of the European Union member states has not been transferred in the permanent, non-­refundable way” (Jackson 1999: p.  453). In this respect, the “regional” aspects that are affected by “national” and “global” regimes are also touched upon in this book although research is centered around the “region” as a core. “Whether or not a regional analysis is significant” would depend on the question of what is the proper level of analysis in the political science and IR disciplines. Although opting a region as a meaningful level of unit is not always clear in analyzing certain political phenomena, it may contribute to both IR and comparative politics by establishing an analytical building bloc, connecting domestic politics and international affairs. It allows a multidimensional system approach such as interactions between regimes at all levels, while state behavior can also be

28   Environmental politics and cooperation scrutinized. The regional approach for political analysis on environmental affairs allows a close examination on how countries react collectively on an imminent trans-­national nature on certain environmental issues that are inevitably ecologically inter-­connected across national boundaries. For such issues, a state is insufficient as a unit to analyze. Likewise, a global governance study would be too general and vague to address region-­specific environmental problems.

Inter-­state environmental affairs in international relations theories With the emergence of a global environmental regime in the early 1990s, studying the environment as part of academic disciplines rapidly gained momentum in almost all areas of social sciences. Adding to my brief discussion offered in the previous chapter, as an issue-­based and problem-­solving kind of area, environmental studies typically require an interdisciplinary approach. While the division of labor is still ongoing between disciplines with new methods and approaches, each has its own contributions to make to environmental studies (research and education) and to actual environmental performance in the real world. For example, environmental economists have made visible contributions to environmental studies with measuring environmental values and internalizing externalities (Pearce 2002; United Nations 1997).1 Meanwhile, the role of political science and IR could be a more comprehensive coordination, providing macro-­analyses, compared with other related academic disciplines within the social sciences. In doing so, one of their distinguishable roles would be mainstreaming environment-­related discussions into the domain of politics and political science which can be conceived as politicization of environmentalism. Citing Schmitt’s (1996) The Concept of the Political, the article by Kenis and Lievens (2014) clarifies the meaning of politicization in its application to environmental affairs. [T]he political cannot be defined in terms of the state, as it usually is, but that the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political. The latter, therefore, needs its own criterion, which, according to Schmitt, is the distinction between friend and enemy. He coins his concept of the political in order to analyze de-­politicisation, which he sees as the result of discourses or symbolisations that conceal conflicts, decisions, and power. For Schmitt, (re)politicisation is about openly declaring and disclosing friend/ enemy distinctions: only when conflict is acknowledged and given a place can it be fought in a more or less orderly way. (Kenis and Lievens 2014: p. 535) Cooperation is not avoidance of conflicts. Avoidance as a strategic choice makes cooperation superficial. Cooperation should actively deal with potential or existing conflicting issues in inter-­state environmental affairs. In such a way, real and urgent regional issues are sufficiently reflected in the process of building regional

Environmental politics and cooperation   29 governance. Conflicts are resolved through cooperation, but those conflicting issues need to be transparently exposed in the first place. The emergence of environmentalism is closely related to the development of post-­materialism, which somehow connotes a fundamental priority shift of postindustrial society but such a shift does not evolve from de-­politicization (beyond politics). The point is “how politics are utilized” in the post-­material era: whether politics effectively manages individuals and societal welfare, reflecting the major shifts on the concept of “security” in new politics (Lam 1999). The ultimate goal of politics in the post-­modern era is not to seize power, govern/ influence people, or abuse it, but to respond promptly and manage fundamentally a broader range of manufactured or perceived risks for fundamental security, notably certain risks associated with a changing environment (Giddens 1999; Beck 1992). In this regard, through projecting conventional political science and IR subjects (e.g., security, conflicts, and sovereignty) into environmental studies seems crucial both for policy adjustment and methodological revision (de Ville 2008; Häyrynen 2003; Funke 2011; Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Mason and Zeitoun 2013). Against this backdrop, the notion of sustainable development, the most widely accepted international principle so far, is built around the three pillars that are economic, environmental, and societal (WCED 1987). On the surface, there is little room for political science or IR specialists to contribute but, in fact, the very establishment of such a principle, a cornerstone of any global environmental regime, is an outcome of international relations based on decades of political negotiations. The final decisions on adoption are made by state leaders. Besides, processes such as negotiations and decision-­making continue to evolve in the political domain. Coordination and implementation also often belong to the sphere of politics and public administration. Politics coordinates across stakeholders, thus filling the gap in the sustainable development principle. As the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) indicates: “above all … political will” is the most important driver. Managers and experts who are engaged in international regimes (organizations, secretariats and national delegations, experts, and technocrats) are usually very keen to organize high-­level fora to ensure close attention from influential decision-­makers. Nonconventional seemingly non-­political social issues need political attention from high level government officials, in order to continue generating and preserving international and regional regimes. Regionalism may reinforce countries’ will for environmental cooperation. Regional environmental politics include studying both conflicting nature of state affairs and necessity of cooperation, thus cooperation is only part of state affairs. As much as realist approach in IR misses many aspects of cooperative procedure and synergies between societies, liberal optimism provides limited explanations on how conflicts and security concerns lead to further level of quality cooperation, reflecting the region’s particular but common interests. Previous research offers valuable and insightful explanations. Comprehensive research work on this subject includes collections of diverse authors’ different

30   Environmental politics and cooperation approaches and research foci, rather than a coherent thematic research monograph (Harris 2002; 2003) and a useful handbook on environmental subjects in Asia (Harris and Lang 2015). The special edition of the journal Global Environmental Politics (published in 2012) also offers a valuable conceptual and analytical framework to connect regionalism and environmental affairs (Conca 2012; Debarbieux 2012; Balsiger 2012; Klinke 2012) with discussion of various conceptual issues and case studies relating to regional environmental governance. Although the contributing authors do not directly address the NEA, the edition provides useful guidance for conceptualizing, scoping and building an analytical framework for research on region-­wide environmental cooperation. Besides academic research, a government-­led think-­tank in South Korea named the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) published comprehensive empirical policy papers providing reviews of the effectiveness of regional environmental cooperation in the NEA, with a detailed survey of relevant existing institutions (KEI 2005; 2013; 2017). As a matter of fact, lacking “cooperative” background research in this field among the countries involved to date evidences the absence of consistent multilateralism in the NEA. All three environmental fields covered in this book exhibit diverse phenomenon of interaction between conflict and cooperation. Thus, theoretical explanations per each domain are greatly different. However, their core messages have pursuing “green regional politics” in common. Green politics is for cooperation and peace rather than destructive conflict, although some level of confrontation between extreme ecologists and government authorities have existed and may become violent at times. No matter what theoretical stance one insists, ultimate goals of states’ relations is more or less to pursue the status of peaceful coexistence of nations, rather than aiming at justifying or encouraging warfare, which should be considered as a failure of politics and diplomacy. Historically, trans-­boundary nuisance (externalities) created cooperative regimes in some regions, notably in Europe and North America under, for example, Convention on Long Range Air Pollution (CLRTAP), implemented by the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP), and directed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). In addition, many customary laws established based on the cases in those regions, and implementation of initiatives were backed by a relatively solid vision of regional integration. Today, environmental risks have become increasingly difficult to tackle by a single nation. Accordingly, environmental problems and related issues have increasingly invited more states to cooperate. This is due partly to globalization that interconnects countries closer and faster, which makes trans-­boundary harm travel more easily across nations causing actual and potential disputes. Why do countries cooperate for the environment? The question regarding the reasons/motivations for countries’ participating in cooperation to tackle regional environmental problems may sound simple, but motivations could be diverse, fluctuating and highly complicated. If countries

Environmental politics and cooperation   31 cooperate mainly for the purpose of resolving trans-­boundary environmental harm, the cooperative process will face very few barriers and easily reach a ­consensus on prioritizing more urgent “environmental” problems. In reality, motivations for countries’ participating in regional environmental cooperation are multidimensional, dynamic and often inconsistent. In order to explain ­participating countries’ complicated motivations, this section explores the way to set a theoretical framework answering the question: “How would IR theories respond to inter-­state relationships evolving around regional environmental cooperation as opposed to conflict?” Below are explanations provided under each category in order to suggest different views on regional interaction for environmental development, either of/both cooperative or/and conflicting. However, they are not strictly mutually exclusive. Within the discipline of environmental philosophy, the dichotomy, “anthropogenic versus eco-­centrism,” is often used as an analytical framework (see, e.g., Carter 2007; Keller 2010). As a human being and a social scientist, there seems a fundamental limitation to determine what stage of human value would be close enough to nature’s system to claim as an “eco-­centrist,” completely isolating or sacrificing any human needs for the sake of protecting and restoring the eco-­system to a pre-­industrial condition. The final goal of social scientists’ approach to environmental studies could be seeking a reasonable harmonious stage between the human system and the ecosystem, so that people can “continuously” benefit from many ecosystem services (what nature can provide to humans) in an equitable way. As long as the research agents are humans, researchers can only attempt to provide more extensive and diverse versions of anthropogenic viewpoints. Thus, research by social scientists can only provide approaches to responding to the question of “how to ensure such harmony,” as humans (including research agents) have been living within the human-­made structure which is inseparably influenced by customs, communities, culture, ideology, perspectives, social stratification, and political systems. Even within a domestic politics context, a clear consensus on a desirable stage of “human-­ nature harmony” can rarely be made. In this respect, coordinating and managing different views are important tasks for those engaged in the political field including leaders, decision-­makers, scholars, and other practitioners. Environment as a secondary means Rational calculations One hypothesis would be a political choice based on strict rational calculation (mostly a zero-­sum basis) leading to the assumption that, regardless of specific fields or regions, countries may decide to cooperate (including cooperative gestures) strictly based on rational calculations seeking narrowly-­defined national interests. According to this hypothesis, only when all participating countries are satisfied with the expected outcome of cooperation, would they act. One

High/low High/high

Mitigation Adaptation

Reforestation Trade-related

Over-fishing Protection Conversion

Climate change

Biodiversity

Marine environment

High/high High/high High/low

High/high High/high

High/high High/high

Japan

High/high Low/low High/low

Low/low High/high

High/high High/high

South Korea

High/low Low/low Low/low

High/low High/low

Low/low High/high

North Korea

Neutral Neutral Neutral

High/high High/high

High/high High/high

Republic of Mongolia

Low/low Low/low Neutral

High/high High/high

Neutral Neutral

Russian Far East

Note “Priority” here means the level of the governments’ prioritization on “domestic environmental problems” regardless of ecological or regional urgency. “Preference” means preference to regional cooperation concerning the particular issues for various reasons not alone with ecological concerns of the said issue.

Low/low Low/low High/low

Low/low High/high

China

Environmental issues

Table 2.1  Level of nationalized interests in terms of “priority/preference”

Enhanced transparency in existing bilateral relationship with China and Mongolia

North Korea’s participation both as an opportunity and a challenge due to dynamic changes in inter-Korean relationship and U.S. involvement

Financial aid; participating in regional affairs Political risks by opening the society; as a normal state; ancillary benefits for pressure of de-nuclearization and/or other non-environmental pressures; often rejecting overall development South Korea’s participation in regional regime as taking North as the sole representative of the peninsula

Multiple sources of green financial aid may cause fragmentation; higher environmental standards that limiting economic growth

Unsustainable development due to multiple Regional development; managing emerging players’ engagement in developmental issues environmental issues and natural resources management; engagement in regional politics such as security issues concerning North Korea

Japan

South Korea

North Korea

Republic of Mongolia

Russian Far East

Political and geographical isolation (with relatively lack of coherent attention in development priority) from the central government that lacking stronger enthusiasm for taking region-wide initiatives and leadership

Keen to cooperate through green structural adjustment; aspiration to connect more closely to the global environmental regime

Note 1 Comparing costs and benefits of NEA multilateral regional environmental cooperation under the nationalized environmentalism assumption/scenario.

Financial aid; enhancing transparency in trade of natural resources; technological transfer

Keen to participate in all aspects of multilateral environment cooperation; strong beliefs in spillover function of regional cooperation

Sharing information; monitoring and engaging North Korea for security reasons; collaborative development opportunities

Extremely cautious about participating in multilateral cooperation, but less cautious about environmental cooperation taking it as non-political issues

Preference to larger pool of membership to contain China and regain leadership supported by more like-minded members in terms of level of environmentalism, economic development and political system

Higher benefits through strengthening bilateralism while excluding/limiting other players; but gradually and selectively participate in multilateralism with the country’s rapid environmental development

Outcome

Upward harmonization of environmental standards; collective participation in global regimes; securing regional and global leadership in environmental fields

Opportunities for receiving green aid; technological transfer; access to green industry value chain; securing green industry market; securing regional leadership for institutional power

Enhanced transparency in existing bilateral relationships with Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea, and RFE; pressure of higher environmental standards that may limit economic growth

China

Benefits from participation

Cost/risks of participation

Countries

Table 2.2  An example of costs and benefits analysis1

34   Environmental politics and cooperation example of comparison of each participant’s way to rationalize is indicated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. There should be a guarantee that the expectation on the benefits of the outcome of cooperation should evenly meet each member’s rational calculation on its maximum interest at all times. In reality, this hardly occurs, thus countries will have very limited grounds for cooperation in theory. Besides, the concepts of national interests are highly controversial because their core concepts can be too broad, abstract, and fluid. In connection with environmental affairs, realist perspectives on the environment can be clearly traced in the two prominent views on nature in today’s world politics: natural resources as an object for extraction and climate skepticism. Traditional realists regard nature as something (resources) to be conquered through state power at all costs. According to the neo-­realism perspective, environmental constraints as part of international forces are an important source of disruption to the international system of governance. Under this view, linking security with environmental concerns (environmental security) would mean to strictly confine it to “nationalized state security.” Accordingly, any actions of external intervention on natural resources within their own territory would be regarded as an infringement of state sovereignty. Its implications are twofold that are contradicting and yet may well be justified under a realist approach. Environmental resources “within the country’s own national boundary” should be protected, whereas rampant resource extraction in other countries’ territories could be justified since acceptance of power disparity and unequal sovereignty represent the reality of international politics. This view is criticized as post-­colonial vision that is embodied in trade relationships and ossifies the imbalanced world (or regional) economic structure. Such state behavior can be understood as praxis of exclusive eco-­nationalism, implementing state-­level NIMBY-­ism (Not-­In-My-­Backyard). Targeting environmental resources in other countries can be seen less problematic as witnessed in wars in the Middle East where military forces targeted water resources and oil plants (e.g., Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991) (Park 2010: p. 110), and political factions in African countries target and seize lucrative mines with military force as soon as conflicts occur or, from the beginning, instigate internal conflicts in order to secure monopolized access to natural resources extraction. Within this conventional view, only those environment-­related issues that are directly linked with conventional security issues may draw political attention. Natural disasters (while denying any possible links with climate change), or over-­heated violent competition over natural resources occur mainly in conflict-­ prone areas. Also, civil wars threaten the essential resources required for a nation’s survival, such as water, oil, forests, fisheries, and agricultural crops (e.g., Loring et al. 2013). Both neo- and classical realism provide important insights into the realpolitik of environmental conflicts and the regional dynamics of state-­to-state affairs – especially in the NEA where state and territorial sovereignty issues are of utmost importance in all fields of diplomacy. In this region, therefore, comprehensive welfare issues such as environmental protection are regarded as secondary and supplementary (or threats) to security concerns. “Realists acknowledge the creation of many multi-­national bodies, but they

Environmental politics and cooperation   35 deny that such bodies have an impact on states’ behavior.” Accordingly, neither environmental affairs nor regional cooperation through institutionalization could be the primary concerns of realism. “Military alliances may be viewed as institutions, broadly-­defined. But they are of a special sort in that they form the foundation for what many realists hold to be foreign policy strategies to protect national security” (Chernoff 2007: pp. 46–64). From this perspective, environmental affairs are dealt with strictly under state-­centered matters, and cooperative processes will be effectively controlled by the state and the changing leadership. Accordingly, “environmental security” is one of those least popular terms within the academic circle of conventional national security. Some IR scholars have suggested theoretical groupings that are very useful but limited to the extent those frameworks serve each scholar’s own research question, focus and scope (e.g., Kütting 2011: Chapter 1). Conservatives and republicans are usually reluctant to accept environmental issues as part of conventional political problems and hardly make an effort to integrate them into their political agenda. An analogy could be the field of cyber security as a new domain of security. It took decades for leading countries to accept cyberattacks as one of the most serious real security threats in the future of world politics. Such a delay is usually caused by the conservative nature of state bureaucracy and procrastinated policy procedures that are not proactive for ex-­ante policy measures. Meanwhile, discourse on the possibility of war can easily dominate the NEA region as noticed ever since President Trump’s inauguration and the chaotic period due to the political vacuum caused by ex-­President Park’s scandal in South Korea, which has been reinforced by creations and reproductions of security risks. However, in the environmental field, if resting upon such notions of exclusive eco-­nationalism, the narrow concept of state security and state level-­ NIMBY, it has been revealed that state actors are incapable of dealing with fundamental problems caused by mismanagement of “trans-­boundary harm” and “regionally and/or globally shared ecosystems.” Relying on this view, there seems little room to find any values to explore the process of cooperation in more detail. Cooperation is considered only a diplomatic venue where power politics strenuously dominate; accordingly, countries usually prefer bilateralism to multilateral negotiations. In this regard, a neo-­ realism perspective may miss the gravity of the roles of institutions and information-­sharing. There is a critical difference between “politics on natural resources” and “environmental politics,” that can be understood referring to the conceptual difference between resource economics and ecological economics (Dietz and Neumayer 2009). The former investigates how effectively a country can secure, use and distribute natural resources. It tends to take exploitation and increase wealth as the state’s natural behavior, driven by man’s desire to conquer nature at all costs. The latter broadens their research spectrum and looks into ways to negotiate to “protect” ecosystems, seeking sustainability (as opposed to optimality) and a better harmony between communities, through efforts of adjusting peoples’ predominant valuing of nature and ecosystems exclusively through using anthropogenic and instrumental policy tools.

36   Environmental politics and cooperation The history of environmental studies reflects changing views on the nature– human relationship. Realism-­leaning approaches comfortably accommodate the former category of thinking. Risks may augment, often producing an incoherent green paradox justifying a “greening inside and polluting outside” logic while rhetorically using environmentalism both as a shield to protect national interests and as a tool to control other countries’ resources. In IR, such an approach has long been practiced, often being described and conceptualized, by critical commentators, as green imperialism, green interventionism, green protectionism, carbon leakage, pollution heaven, and a race to the bottom. The zero-­sum based rational approach (usually by offensive nationalized republican realism) explains to some degree why countries will “not” more enthusiastically initiate or participate in the process of environmental cooperation (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). This also somehow explains the high flexibility, selective commitment and non-­intervention in some cooperation models as opposed to closed comprehensive cooperative deals which can be possibly developed to a stage of integration. However, apart from the difficulties in rationally defining what “rationality” would mean in state affairs dealing with environmental problems, this approach underestimates countries’ enthusiasm for seemingly irrational choices of cooperation for a variety of other reasons than what is claimed by state leaders and decision-­makers. One reason is the degree of benefits out of regionalized cooperation may be beyond immediately available quantifiable calculation. In this regard, if taking a more eco-­centrismleaning perspective, the national priority listed in Table 2.1 needs adjusting, mostly urgent issues taking a higher priority in the agenda-­setting (Dietz and Neumayer 2009; Small et al. 2017). Search for hegemonic leadership States may cooperate in the environmental field to secure a hegemonic (or leadership) position in the region under question, using multilateral diplomatic gestures and tools. It is a common view that issues such as environmental protection and climate change often serve diplomatic fora for those ambitious political leaders to use as softening their states’ image. Some argue that Japan’s enthusiasm in promoting multilateral environmental cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s was not only to secure regional power taking a firm leadership in the significant arena of global issues, but at the same time to soften the country’s image as an aggressive colonizer of Asia. The state’s desire for hegemonism often creates a leadership position in regional and international affairs. The rise of China with Beijing’s growing interest in shaping regional order can be well understood under this category. It can be argued that the state’s nature of seeking hegemonism could be one of the barriers to advancing the process of building an environmental regime. To a certain degree, the absence of U.S. hegemonism in the trilateral environmental cooperation in the NEA explains: on the one hand, why regional (potential) and trans-­boundary (direct) environmental harm are not categorized as a

Environmental politics and cooperation   37 security issue: and on the other, why such an absence may have helped the core NEA countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) being continuously motivated to play a real role with a good level of ownership in regional environmental development. All three parties may also have the ambition to retake regional hegemonism of various sorts. In the process of institutionalized cooperation, examples of the U.S.’ pivot in the NEA are numerous especially under the previous liberal democrat administrations. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) under Japan’s leadership, rather than the proposed North East Asian Development Bank (NEADB) was successfully put into force and the U.S. approval and support were most crucial. The U.S. explicitly opposed the East Asian Summit (EAS) led by Japan and Australia. In 1966, the South Korea-­led Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) also failed due to, inter alia, Washington’s cautious approach to accepting any “regional” clusters and cooperation processes of other nations unless the U.S. was positioned in them in the early stages. A state taking a leadership position is important in shaping the rules and directions of cooperation while controlling membership and agenda. Although regional and global environment issues are not the primary interests of the state, countries may at times actively lead and support building regional organizations and institutions. Under this hypothesis, countries may change their positions from lead to veto, or vice versa. It explains the shifting roles between the U.S. under the Trump administration and Xi’s China in the domain of the global climate change regime (Park 2018). Recently, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was advanced rather quickly in the vacuum of the U.S., with the Comprehensive and Progress Agreement for Trans-­Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) replacing it, excluding both the U.S. and China, and Japan has been effectively using multilateralism as a diplomatic tool to regain wider regional hegemony excusing this regional rivalry (Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 8, 2018).2 If following the logic of realism, especially offensive realism, “the ultimate aim of a great power is to become a hegemon,” for the international balance of power and its survival in an anarchic environment, that, according to Mearsheimer, inevitably produces continuous competition and war (see Mearsheimer’s interview concerning North Korea and the NEA region. Yonhap News Agency, March 20, 2018).3  To become a hegemon, a state must meet three conditions: it must become a regional hegemon, acquire wealth and land power, and develop nuclear weapons.… Mearsheimer paints the international system as a bleak world filled with states constantly seeking hegemony, a status they cannot acquire.  (Valeriano 2009: p. 181) However, the tools to seek a hegemonic power have been diversified. With the combination of other motivations, if other conditions being met, regional powers may also exhibit a strong will to promote and advance regional

38   Environmental politics and cooperation environmental cooperation in certain areas due to internal and external pressure of improving environmental conditions. It was the case for Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, followed by South Korea’s enthusiasm in the 2000s with advocating the Green Growth Strategy. Such leadership enthusiasm in this field has slowly shifted to China since the late 2000s. The image of an “environmental leader” that Japan created during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, cannot be understood without … quest for Japan’s normalization after the war. The “environmental identity” that Japan constructed has largely been symbolic. Rather than building on a long tradition of Japanese nature-­respecting culture and society, the diplomatic leadership of the country used the environmental status of Japan in order to recreate the identity of Japan as a proactive contributor to world affairs. Simply, the constructed image of an “environmental Japan” is farce and only the symbolism of a proactive country forced Tokyo to overcome the pressure of industrial lobby and ratify the Protocol nevertheless the withdrawal of the United States. (Kolmass 2017: p. 474) What states realistically pursue is “to become a true hegemon in their own region and to develop military and economic means to prevent any other state from becoming a hegemon in any other region” (Mearsheimer 2001). At the same time, those hegemonic powers prevent any other states from becoming a hegemon in that or any other region. Accordingly, as long as China wishes to become a hegemon, the U.S. will continue generating conflicts in the Asia Pacific region (Bernstein and Munro 1997; Friedberg 2006; Copper 2006; Tammen and Kugler 2006; Mosher 2000; Terrill 2003). Competition over regional hegemonism can be materialized via explicit military threats or pressures on trade deals. But once peaceful ambient is constructed, even in hardcore security issues, countries may be eager to participate in multilateral talks for fear of being excluded in important deals across the region. During the period of fast escalation of confrontation between the U.S. and the DPRK, China kept rather silent, claiming that the tension was entirely a bilateral concern between the two parties, and sent confusing signals, neither supporting nor opposing the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions and often mentioning that the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons was not “problematic” from its point of view. The Abe administration actively utilized the security threats as a fundamental cause of destabilizing not only the region but Japan’s domestic security. Neither Japan nor China had positively acted to bring the DPRK and ROK to the multilateral diplomatic field for re-­stabilize the region. Nevertheless, once the possibility arose for resuming peace talks between the two Koreas and between the U.S. and the DPRK, all four other countries in the NEA, China, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia, showed their interest in actively participating in any talks bilaterally with the DPRK first and then developing a multilateral relationship via an SPT (Six-­Party Talks) kind of security institution.

Environmental politics and cooperation   39 China swiftly invited Kim Jong-­un in the middle of the reconciliation mood on the Korean peninsula, supporting him to make the first diplomatic trip to a foreign country on his terms (Guardian, March 28, 2018).4 Kim’s meeting with President Xi was followed by a considerable amount of material rewards. For example, China reopened the labor market for North Korean workers and 400 North Korean workers re-­entered Yanbian in northeast China in early April (Radio Free Asia, April 4, 2018).5 Japan also promptly reacted when the U.S.’ action toward the Korean peninsula did not exactly fall in line with what it would have expected from the changing geopolitics (The South China Morning Post, June 4, 2018).6 Japan’s Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, quickly paid an official visit to South Korea. Russia and Mongolia also expressed great interest in playing a certain role. While each country has different way of calculating their national interests, none of the countries overlook the rest of the members in the region establishing institutionalized negotiation and cooperation processes. Whether opposing or supporting, countries tend to maintain their share in the regional cooperative process, which sustains some level of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Creating a market and advancing cooperation for green growth Peace-­prone liberal leaning views also maintain that states act based on a rational calculation seeking national interests, but such a calculation is neither inevitably on a zero-­sum basis nor based on single-­factor motivation. Broadly, liberalism can be explained in its dual aspects, commercial liberalism, and republican liberalism. Regarding environmental cooperation in the IR arena, the latter takes a similar view with realism. The former takes an active position to shape the market opportunity combining neoliberalism and the rise of environmentalism at all levels: national, regional and global. Republic liberalism  stresses the importance of self-­determination and democracy within well-­ defined boundaries, so that the public can exercise effective control over self-­seeking private actors. From the standpoint of commercial liberalism, sovereignty is a problem; from the standpoint of republican liberalism, it is an essential guarantee.  (Keohane 2002: pp. 10–11) The theoretical and conceptual foundations of this approach were laid by scholars of regional politics with a functional neoliberalist perspective on international relations (Keohane 1982; for green détente, see Ryle and Soper 1989: pp. 287–306; Tai et al. 2002). A neoliberalism approach to understand regional affairs in the NEA has rapidly emerged since the late 2000s in parallel with institutional development, and the region has been heavily influenced by the international intellectual trends of environmental economics. The governments of the core NEA three countries have progressively endorsed the neoliberal approach; particular enthusiasm was expressed by former ROK President Lee Myung-­bak, as evidenced by the

40   Environmental politics and cooperation government’s promotion of the Green Growth Strategy agenda (based on the principle of environmental protection for economic development),7 successfully leading and hosting the permanent secretariats of global environmental organizations, such as the Global Climate Fund (GCF ) and Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). The adoption of neoliberalism by governments in the NEA has helped to enhance environmental cooperation in areas such as eco-­innovation (Ekins 2010), renewable energy, green industries, environmental aid, and green technological cooperation. The neoliberal approach is often criticized as a top-­down environmental policy led by heavily market-­leaning governments. However, together with technical cooperation, agendas that combine environment and economic growth have attracted many members binding them to participate. Most of the regional economic organizations in the NEA more or less cover issues related (directly or indirectly) to the environment, including APEC, ASEAN, ASEM, and TSC. It also easily generated not only intra-­regional but also inter-­regional cooperation covering trade, green technology, ETS, PES, and other market-­oriented economic instruments to resolve environmental problems. It also contributed to diversifying stakeholders especially by promoting private sector participants. While these economic incentives vitalize some level of environmental cooperation in the region, a fundamental limit is the fact that countries will cease interactions when cooperation is insufficient and not constantly lucrative (economic incentives for environmentalism), and thus they are selective in choosing areas of the environment rather than following an ecological priority. Green growth advocates ensuring continuous economic growth without sacrificing the quality of ecosystems, through innovatively and radically enhancing resource efficiency. Nevertheless, a number of research and actual practices have proven that higher resource efficiency and lower carbon intensity do not automatically bring a decrease in use of natural resources or better protection of the environment (e.g., Harper 2013). Nationalism as a motivation The fourth category is related to an analysis using the features of nationalism in the NEA that is reflected in regionalism (e.g., Na 2012). Strong nationalism could be both a constraint and an opportunity. Conventional functional integration theorists argue that the NEA has a lack of regionalism as a social ideology that can bind together the nations involved. This might be due to historically accumulated animosity and immaturity in managing collective emotive memories of inter-­state relationships. However, some also argue that nationalism could be a positive driver to mobilize neighboring countries to act. This is often considered as “peace building” as the fundamental goal of cooperation could start from nationalism but develop into East Asian regionalism. The South Korean government’s agenda of “green détente” is a relevant example of combining the peace process and environmentalism. This movement is interpreted as “nationalism-­motivated” that seeks reconciliation with North Korea, while, from the South Korean government’s perspective, as regional peace through promoting universal pacifism and regionalism using environmental issues (as a

Environmental politics and cooperation   41 non-­political soft issue). Some argue that cooperation through institutionalized environmental fora is a soft policy tool that will eventually help to mitigate political tension and secure the engagement of hostile partners (e.g., Russia and the DPRK) in regional politics and diplomacy (see, for example, Courmont 2015). One of the many attempts includes an emerging region-­wide agenda, a collaborative research project on the Jangbai/Baekdu volcano (on the border between the DPRK, China, and Russia), which has been put forward by the ROK government in an effort of substantiating a green-­détente vision. According to experts, this project has the potential to benefit all of the affected border countries, from which it requires intense scientific and institutional cooperation, and may represent a significant step toward unification through trust building and consensus generating (KEI 2013: p. 233, footnote no. 98.). From a slightly different angle, nationalism can be taken as a positive force/ motivation (e.g., Na 2012). By looking at Korean nationalism along with such factors as leadership and epistemic community, a case study around the East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (EABRN), a project under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), can be an appropriate illustration. Another illustration of how national identity formation would be linked with a rise of environmentalism is the case of Japan (e.g., Wilkening 1999). Such views are theorized by constructivism-­oriented anthropological analyses on the evolution of environmentalism in Japan around the time of negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. However, further elaboration would be required as constructivism entails both positivism and pessimism, thus functioning either as a motivation or as a barrier for/to cooperation. The constructivist view contrasts with the previous three theoretical orientations: realism, hegemonic theory, and neoliberalism. Quoting Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007: p.  71), Kolmass’ recently published article provides an analysis using the Japanese construction of environmentalism:  embedded symbolism was the main driver that mobilized Japanese citizens to support the Kyoto Protocol, while such symbolism was “reinforced by media discourse, public opinion and bureaucratic actions” – helped to build the Kyoto Protocol into a symbol of Japan’s new political identity (and thus) constrained the ability of anti-­Kyoto forces to get their concerns onto the political agenda. The author argues that the main reason why Japan supported so strongly and continuously the Kyoto Protocol even after the U.S. withdrawal from the ratification process in 2001 was due to “the strong domestically created environmental identity” (Kolmass 2017: pp.  464–465). Further to this constructivist approach, the author in this article stresses more on external influences in the process of environmental identity by showing the close interactive constitution between domestic identity building and foreign policy options. Following the similar logic of constructivism at regional level, creation of environmental identity across the region may influence states’ behavior in

42   Environmental politics and cooperation making related decisions. Since region’s particularities are critical elements in dealing with ecological problems, the question of culture and historical approaches to regional politics in the NEA gained popularity. Cultural nationalism is not an area that political realists would be interested in but when nationalism is used as a governing tool to maximize state power, nationalism would mean a state’s official nationalism as a political program. This is often presented as soft power for cultural expansion in foreign affairs, which in turn serves to consolidate internal domestic collective pride and loyalty to the state. In such a case, nationalism becomes a powerful and useful foreign policy tool even within the realist’s visionary realm. Under this theoretical tradition, scholars often implicitly compare the NEA with a model of regional integration (notably, the European Union). While an integration model provides a useful pattern of countries’ interaction in a certain region, starting from such a full-­fledged integration model may only produce frustration and a pessimistic vision on regional cooperation in the regions outside Europe, and make scholars’ ending up with a not-­so-useful long list of barriers to cooperation in the NEA. Scholars of regional studies have examined regionalisms under this frame and provided a typology distinguishing the early twentieth century model of functionalism, neo-­functionalism, neo-­federalism, and inter-­ governmentalism (Dent 2016: pp. 11–12). Meanwhile, theorists in the subgroup of constructivist international relations have addressed environmental issues as part of a broad and non-­conventional definition of human security (although the environment is not their main focus) (notably, Buzan et al. 1998). This approach tends to be highly anthropocentric, but its premises are closely interconnected between human welfare and a healthy ecosystem, and thus it is difficult to employ the dichotomized framework between human exceptionalism and eco-­centrism. Accordingly, “securitization” may, to some extent, explain and guide reconsideration of the inter-­connectivity of human security and ecosystem stability, as well as security of the state, society, and communities. For this reason, recent applications of constructivism to environmental matters are highly diverse.8 One example is the argument for constructing a green discourse between regions to build green regionalism. Just as the term “regionalism” is premised on the positive role of constructivism, “green regionalism” emphasizes the process of building a regionalized discourse for ecological improvement. The use of constructivist principles to promote ecological development in the NEA tends to provide an optimistic view to enhance cooperation, via education, communication, or a benign leadership with an open and forward-­thinking vision of regional affairs, despite many challenges being involved, fundamentally due to the different stages of ecological modernization in each country in the NEA. Institutional optimism: an environment for regional and global regime building Linked with a liberalism-­leaning tradition, discussions on international environmental cooperation have evolved around regime-­centered institutional

Environmental politics and cooperation   43 approaches (Ruggie and Haas 1975;9 Krasner 1983; Young 2002) and institutional optimism. The main research foci of these studies include detailed research on the process of regime building – negotiation and agreements – theorizing how to achieve environmental goals through harmonized rules, principles, and establishing workable laws via effective institutions and organizations through constant reforms. Although reaching agreement on how to manage the problem is in a state’s best interest, so is gaining as much as possible while giving up as little as possible. Nevertheless, the expected value of the outcome to each state, and hence the total value of the outcome, must be positive (or at least neutral), or else there would be no incentive to negotiate or to accept the outcome. In multilateral negotiations, states will not come to an agreement unless they believe they will be better off in some way than they would be with no agreement. (Chasek et al. 2017: p. 22) A regime-­centered liberal institutionalist approach provided useful insights to comprehend the floods of Multilateral Environmental Agreements during the 1980s and 1990s, uncovering states’ self-­interested reasons and/or collective-­ minded grounds to cooperate. It also helped to expand the analytical horizon to include not only resting upon the existence of international legal rules and formal organizations but upon sets of more intangible principles and norms – key characteristic of a regime – as well as various actors who may influence the process. Institutional optimism has been employed to explain how countries deal with trans-­boundary environmental affairs and cooperation processes mainly “testing” how (beyond state actors) participants’ set of behavior, rules, and practices can produce usable collective agreements on harmonized norms and principles, thus ultimately imbuing the international structure with an order (governance) by establishing organizations and institutions. Institutions are defined, in Oran Young, as “sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide the interactions among occupants of these roles.” Moreover, “[i]nstitutions affect the behaviour of these actors by defining social practices and spelling out codes of conduct appropriate to them, but they are not actors in their own right” (Young 1994: pp. 3–4). The end of the Cold War witnessed the rapid rise of governance and environmental studies at the same time. Neoliberalism-­oriented theories bolstered studying non-­state actors such as non-­governmental organizations and other civic society members including corporation and other private sector actors. The rising field of regional environmental governance (as a subfield of environmental politics) under governance theory, to a certain degree, enabled researchers to make useful distinctions among the complex and conflicting interests of key actors at various levels – national, inter-­governmental, inter-­organizational and between stakeholders. Complementing other approaches, these environmental-­ governance theories aided an analysis of region-­wide dynamics with various

44   Environmental politics and cooperation levels of participants. By governance, Keohane clarifies as “the process and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group,” which is not “necessarily [be] conducted exclusively by governments and the international organizations to which they delegate authority” (Keohane 2002: p. 202). Therefore, [g]overnance involves the establishment and operation of social institutions (in the sense of rules of the game that serve to define social practices, assign roles, and guide interactions among the occupants of these roles) capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, alleviating collective-­action problems in a world of interdependent actors. (Young 1994: p. 15) Cases in the NEA also provided rich materials to strengthen or exceptionalize those academic and research theorization (e.g., comparative environmental studies, green state theories, environmental NGOs). However, those comparative studies examine individual cases (China, Japan, and South Korea) separately rather than focusing on trans-­boundary issues or region-­wide cooperative processes. Relatively speaking, insufficient research has been conducted on NGO-­initiated regional environmental cooperation in the NEA. This reflects the fundamental limits of civic society’s systematic participation in “regional” environmental matters mobilizing environmentalism across the region. Major environmental NGOs, in spite of active communication via hundreds of fora, meetings, travel, and exchanges, see their activities strictly remain as horizontal actor-­to-actor cooperation rather than vertical multi-­stakeholder communication. This accurately reflects the reality of a region in which environmental protection is rarely understood as a fundamental human security issue and efforts to integrate environmental concerns with security policy-­making are rarely explicit. In this sense, the distinction between interdependence and globalism (if replacing it with regionalism in this context) provides a useful reference to understand the state of regionalism in the NEA. “Globalization moves beyond linkages between separate societies to the reorganization of social life on a transnational basis.” However, there exist semantic differences between globalization (regionalization in this context) and interdependence. Interdependence refers to a state of the world, whereas globalization describes a trend of increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence.… globalism … describes a state of the world. Both interdependence and globalism can be viewed as matters of degree; both can increase or decline over time. (Keohane 2002: p. 15) Accordingly, the process of globalization and regionalization continues, whereas globalism or regionalism may wane or surge. Similarly, a relationship is a status whereas interaction is an active bargaining process connecting actors. In such a

Environmental politics and cooperation   45 way, Young (1994) expounds how governance is built through undergoing bargaining leverage as opposed to structural power with the view of forming governance systems (Young 1994: Chapter 5). The sources of bargaining leverage means constitutive principles – set goals, values, social changes – negotiation arithmetic, the force of ideas, internal dissent, integrating bargaining, strategic positions, bargaining skill, the dangers of becoming a bully, the strength of weakness, equity, and ownership. The outcome of such governance formation is an effective regime either reforming existing models (realists or neo-­realists’ state-­centered utilitarian models) or creating alternative models (institutional bargaining) (Young 1994: pp.  82–106). Nevertheless, many conditions are enlisted to lead such an institutionalization to success. Regime theorists and institutional optimism (when all those conditions being met) acknowledge the roles of regional-­level regimes that after all contribute to the global regime in the same field as an important building bloc. It also positively views that interactions between global regional and national governance will mutually influence and may lead to harmonization and alignment between disparities in rules and practices. Further, neo-­functional integration theories defend the possibility of an extended form of functionalism. “Earnst Haas argued that focusing ‘exclusively’ on regional encapsulation had become inadequate for addressing new turbulent issue areas of IR characterised by high degrees of complexity, interdependence and competing national interests” (Chasek et al. 2017: pp. 21–22). While I agree with the main point regarding the risk of “exclusiveness,” adding to that, almost all international norms and principles started from geopolitically “regional” basis anyhow, regardless of its original form, either as a process or as an integrated entity. All treaties and agreements start from regional issues in the process of international cooperation, conflicts – constructive conflicts – and negotiation. All processes of MEA (Multilateral Environmental Agreements) making begin with a small group of like-­minded, mini-­lateral get-­ togethers that encourage more states to join instigating their fear of isolation. In this regard, throughout the following main chapters, I emphasize the potential role of the Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM). Criticisms of a regime analysis approach could come from those critical political economists in line with pessimistic globalists, or realists as explained in the earlier section of this chapter. However, as I discuss further below, all the skeptical grounds that may be considered as barriers to cooperation (either due to international systems or due to a state’s nationalized interests-­seeking nature), both in theory and practice, could also function as strong motivations and drivers for further cooperation. For example, contrary to what realists or international system theorists argue, China has changed its attitude, taking a cooperative and even a leading role in the global climate change regime due to a mixture of multifarious grounds that used to be considered as factors that would prevent it from multilateral participation (Kobayashi 2002; Li 2015). Those factors include China’s rational policy strategies, growth-­oriented economic policy, export-­oriented green technology (especially renewable energy sector), centralized management on internal pressure (oppressive top-­down

46   Environmental politics and cooperation approach), lack of a regulatory system in the environmental field, and ineffective control of local government. All these challenges have been transformed into motivations for China to reform and interact further with regional and global environmental regimes at least in the climate-­related process at present. Academics and policy experts in this domain generally agree that the weak regionalism in the NEA for historical and security-­related reasons fundamentally hampers further cooperation. This view inevitably entails some degree of comparison with regions that have established clearer regional clusters of political and administrative entities. The same logic applies to the environment, as this is a less prioritized field in regional politics and foreign policy domain. Nevertheless, research in this area has advanced over the last decade or so, with efforts to record the current level of cooperation; an emphasis has been placed on searching for an efficient way to cooperate through multilateral institutions and agreements. Establishing a concrete definition of “regionality” seems a somewhat arbitrary task in the absence of a fixed, universalized understanding of the term. Such a definition must offer criteria for marking a supranational boundary among certain political entities as “exclusively” regionally binding. In this research, to capture an environmentally meaningful and appropriate geographical space, regionality describes a case in which a group of political entities share trans-­ boundary environmental problems due to geopolitical proximity and have already established some form of institutionalized cooperation that in some way reflects the will of the governments involved to act collectively to solve trans-­ boundary environmental problems. Similar with other regions, the NEA was heavily influenced by the 1992 Rio Declaration, which led the region to join the competition of establishing various environmental institutions and organizations. The 1993 Northeast Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) is a relevant example, as its participants initially included all six in the region under this study; however, the program was not sustained in its original form, and was ultimately reduced to cooperation between only the three core members – Japan, China, and South Korea – following the establishment of the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 1999. Other regional environmental institutions are analyzed and discussed in detail in the main chapters corresponding to the environmental topics under study. It is true that a crucial feature of the development of the NEA is its insufficiency in coherent “regionality” in the sense that countries’ positions are not too clear on whether to agree or disagree with the continuation of all existing institutions. The agenda and implementation of cooperative activities, as well as follow-­up policies, show a lack of cohesion; many ad hoc cooperative activities are shaped by “global” political and economic trends and environmental agenda, often neglect more “regionally” urgent agenda. This lack of cohesion is also reflected in countries’ preference for bilateralism, although governments may still be willing to preserve regional multilateral institutions under the condition that they are only loosely binding. One example is China, Japan, and

Environmental politics and cooperation   47 South Korea’s strong preference for bilateralisms with individual Southeast Asian countries or ASEAN (subsequently the ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). The same applies to Japan and China’s relationship with North Korea. Even the TEMM often serve as an opportunity for bilateral meetings between participating countries. Nonetheless, bilateralism may contribute to both region-­divergent and region-­convergent mechanisms at the same time (Dent 2016). Bilateralism and multilateralism may mutually reinforce if certain conditions are met. Environment for survival through green structural adjustment Participation in environmental cooperation may be motivated for imminent survival in a globalizing world. Many swing countries (usually followers and less powerful countries in negotiations) are only passively motivated without clearly set national goals concerning environmental issues, and yet they are ready to adjust flexibly to what is required to implement environmentalism, which I describe as “green structural adjustment.” Countries in this category are highly motivated to seek the opportunities of attracting financial and technological aid but under the condition of structural alignment to absorb globalized environmental agenda. Depending on their major concerns and cooperation agreements, countries in the NEA have been variously more loosely or more tightly interconnected. Formerly cooperating countries have at other times played completely the opposite roles, discouraging multilateral activities. Therefore, individual countries are not analyzed in a separate section; rather, an in-­depth analysis of a given country is incorporated whenever necessary, shedding light upon their regional-­ level interactions than offering a fragmented comparative analysis on domestic green politics and policies. For example, North Korea and Mongolia should be analyzed more in the context of managing natural resources in the chapter on biodiversity, while Japan, South Korea, and China have been more closely inter-­ connected over the issues of yellow dust and acid rain, and are thus discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. According to offensive realism, the most important states in the system are the great powers. It may also be suggested that the opposite may be true. Minor powers could be just as conflict prone as great powers.… However, minor powers do not (and cannot) seek global or regional hegemony. Although minor powers or swing countries – neither in a supporting or opposing position – in regime theory are not necessarily playing a passive role, “[m]inor powers do not take actions in relation to power concerns, but mainly in relation to issue concerns such as the stability of borders, the flow of refugees, or resource allocation” (Valeriano 2009: p.  184). Mongolia and North Korea were no exception and they have been steadily participating in most of the major existing global environmental regimes including global climate change and biodiversity regimes.

48   Environmental politics and cooperation Considering the level of environmentalism and national priorities, small and weak countries’ (the Global South) participation and interaction in/with global environmental governance more actively demonstrates efforts to align national policy frameworks with global governance. Environmental adjustment to the global regime is at times used as a diplomatic tool by more powerful countries who wish to make a deal with weaker countries to secure enough supporters in the negotiation process. For example, Russia’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol was led by Japan and the E.U. in the face of the U.S.’ veto. In addition, regardless of their ecological vision and status in the international whaling regime, small countries’ membership of the International Whaling Commission is enthusiastically maintained and it is known that Japan constantly supports those members who vote in favor of traditional whaling countries’ interests. Whatever their motivation it may be, post-­positivist discussions of how smaller and weaker countries may become active agents in the post-­modern world provide an insight into the world where anarchy and hierarchy coexist in the globalizing and yet structured world system (Mattern and Zarakol 2016), given that usually, including the NEA case, all those theoretical perspectives coexist and inter-­play in real politics: namely, regime theory, hegemonic stability theory and theories of global governance. Ecological protection as the ultimate goal Marxist-­leaning ecological structuralists would negatively comment on any closer economic interconnectivity caused by globalized capitalism due to aggravating environmental degradation. According to this perspective, economic globalism is considered one of the fundamental causes of environmental degradation. Defenders of this view are usually grounded on localism and communitarianism, advocated by (not limited to) local NGOs, community-­based deep ecologists (e.g., animalists), green protectionism activists for whom regionalism may also serve to accelerate the aggravation of environmental degradation as long as regional cooperation is primarily to facilitate trade liberalization. They are in line with those communitarianism-­inspired groups rooted in the history of environmental movements combined with anti-­conservative governments and anti-­industrial post-­material movements (e.g., Japan’s grass root environmental movements). There are also radical protectionists who tend to consider that inter-­ connectivity is essential regardless of territorial boundaries (de-­territorialized ecologism). Radical ecologists may view that political intervention in environmental protection harms rather than assists in preserving ecosystems. However, for them, the ecosystem is an integral asset to human and community life, regardless of national boundaries, naturally geographically and ecologically inter-­linked between countries and regions. From this point of view, regional cooperation is emphasized as much as neoliberalists but for differentiated purposes, one for protection (inherent or intrinsic value), the other for continuous use (instrumental value). Some radicals oppose any political means to be involved in their activities

Environmental politics and cooperation   49 (de-­politicization of environmentalism), whereas others believe that in order to achieve a better harmony between ecosystems and human/social systems, politics becomes an even more powerful and necessary means, which explains how activism and movements become institutionalized as green parties (politicization/ integration of environmentalism) forming a new arena of politics. This argument is in concert with post-­structuralism in IR concerning the importance of an issue-­ based approach to understand today’s world politics. Forming governance itself is highly political, involving political decisions at every stage of the process: selection of issues, data collection methods, research agents, scientist groups and experts, NGOs and INGOs, partnership organizations, and funds for recipients. Having undergone these continuous political decisions, the current global governance is shaped with the division of green, brown, grey, and blue environmental issues. Green conservation regime is built through politicization of animals and plants (political selection of both endangered and lucrative species); brown issues through politicization of drylands and poverty; and grey issues through climate regime politicizing pollutants especially carbon dioxide. Building the blue global regime concerns maritime issues, politicizing or commercializing (privatizing) the ocean. If a country takes this view, it is a much less puzzling question: “Why countries sharing geographical proximity must cooperate regardless of geopolitical conditions?” A number of trans-­boundary environmental issues can rarely be effectively dealt with by a single country’s effort in the affected zone in international community. People’s perception of environmental risks may be raised with modernization (food security, air and water quality, chemical accidents and municipal waste treatment). Actual environmental degradation worsens with economic development, and unknown and unexpected natural disasters become uncontrollable. Due to those increasing risks natural resources become more scarce, costs become higher to clean-­up environmental problems, and environmental inequality destabilizes society. All these problems today cannot be contained within a national boundary as any single country not powerful enough to control the growing ecological interconnectivity. Accordingly, answering the question, “Why do countries still cooperate?” does not give a full picture for the query of why countries cooperate particularly in the “environmental” field. Thus, next questions deal with the remaining part of the main question, “what extent/under what conditions/for what specific goals?” Taking this view, the environment is something to be protected as common goods for its own sake as a specific field in policy-­making, and thus environmental improvement is taken as an ultimate goal, beyond the concept of national sovereignty or national interests-­focused security concerns. Regional or global level cooperation is not optional. In this regard, a paradigm shift is envisaged, citizens may increasingly require environmentalism, in view of making socially mobilized environmentalism, to be embedded in the policy field at all levels that require environmental risk communications in various senses (vertical and horizontal between multi-­stakeholders). From a conservative viewpoint, at least in most East Asian countries, whichever their regime type is (democracy, communism, or authoritarian), it is a common tendency that green

50   Environmental politics and cooperation movements and politics are perceived as green idealism or communitarian radical ecology with a hint of anti-­governmental anarchism. Any efforts of greening “politics” is often criticized by skeptical conservatives. Nevertheless, in the long-­run, society can develop a consensus toward a greener civilization, without any fantasies about having the right leaders (at individual level moralism) who have non-­material green moralism to govern a peaceful regional regime. Comparative studies of each individual country, focusing on the evolution of environmentalism, are beyond the scope of this current book. In all three core NEA countries, collective environmental movements have been linked with certain issues that governments and conservative political leaders do not yet welcome. Those issues include anti-­nuclear peace movements, regulating car manufacturing, radical transformation of the energy sector, reforming subsidies that go to unsustainable economic activities, regulating the construction sector, campaigns against the government’s development projects, and reforming the legal system to open environmental litigation against state authorities across nations. In any of these countries under this research, green parties have not yet been successful even in Japan and South Korea where a multi-­party democratic system is well established. Citizens’ collectivized movements are strictly banned (in the case of China and North Korea) and effectively controlled in the remaining four countries; although to a lesser degree in Japan and South Korea. This demonstrates that environmentalism has not been sufficiently integrated into the political sphere in a widely acceptable manner. Consequently, the bottom-­up process of building green politics is also limited and environmental problems are dealt as non-­political ancillary welfare issues that are tackled primarily by the state authorities. Environmental activists and movements have limited opportunities to grow indigenously in the political domain, and yet, ironically, are often criticized for being highly politicized and threatening the social order in search of a political opportunity. Indicatively, the relationship between governmental and societal environmental actors are conflicting rather than mutually assisting each other. Societal environmental actors criticize governments’ using the environment as a tool to achieve state power in the diplomatic arena or secure more natural resources rather than adopting environmental protection for its own sake. Paradoxically, as mentioned earlier, environmental questions are hard to resolve unless such non-­conventional political issues are under the attention of political power and mainstreamed into the political domain, particularly in countries where state power is relatively stronger than civic society. In this regard, an additional question would be, “How and to what extent is environmentalism incorporated into the political domain?” rather than whether politicization of the environment is desirable for society or not. In this sense, interactions between conservative politics and non-­conventional political will (“new politics” in Lam’s categorization) reduce the fraction within domestic or regional environmental governance. After all, risks perception combined with modernity and fear for unknown environmental changes would be the most fundamental motivation to explain

Environmental politics and cooperation   51 the rise of regional environmental cooperation, a rise of “a desire for risk ­management” (Yoshimatsu 2010: p. 7). The author’s analysis is insightful as a general level motivation in parallel with another example of cooperation in the field of information technology. Adding more from an ecological viewpoint, a stronger emphasis is needed on the field-­specific features that require inevitable, not optional cooperative management. Theoretical accounts and real world development evolved at the same time in the sense that neoliberalism began to gain momentum in tandem with the rapid development of institutions and organizations. Such development has been more or less linked with environmental affairs, particularly around the time the Rio Earth Summit took place in 1992. Throughout the 2000s and afterwards, theoretical development and rapidly emerging global environmental regimes in the real world mutually reinforced each other, and the environmental field provided liberal institutionalists a great deal of convincing examples to test and elaborate their theories of interdependence. As a consequence of such interaction between theory and practice, during this time, the world witnessed a massive amount of international environmental laws and agreements both hard and soft laws. Today, regime strengthening at the global level is ongoing, while at the same time, conflicts and tensions that have environmental implications also grow. Each participant’s perception on environmentalism and the societal level of environmental development matters the most. Political leaders, international practitioners, and liberal thinkers are interested in establishing a coherent and long lasting global human rights regime but its core is humanitarianism and then harmonizing it across nations. Quite clearly, if the ideological core entails fewer disparities between societies, a functional approach for cooperation would work more smoothly. In addition, confidence on sovereignty and mutual trust on sovereignty would be essential to advance negotiations. This conflict is embodied in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, often cited as one of the most important foundations of modern international environmental law. It reads, “States have in accordance with the Charter of the UN and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” This principle later became Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, but with the words “and developmental” inserted before “policies” making it even more self-­ contradictory. (Chasek et al. 2017: p. 262) While tensions and interactions between global regimes and eco-­nationalism(s) continue, the evolution of a more solid regime can be achieved. Sovereignty and cooperation are not inherently conflicting. As seen from the EU experience, strengthening regional regime(s) is unrelated with a demise of

52   Environmental politics and cooperation state power or disturbing of national sovereignty. Not “rigid state sovereignty” per se but the absence of mutual respect about sovereignty is the barrier to regional environmental cooperation. Once established, supranational regimes stand as their own independent sphere that contributes to stabilizing regional politics through continuous interactions between different levels/kinds of regimes (regime-­to-regime interaction) and between regimes and individual states. (See for example, Jackson (1999: pp. 449–453) on the EU’s supranational sovereignty as an extra sphere): [s]overeignty is an institution created for international society; like other institutions, it undergoes change in response to environmental conditions. In the OECD area, characterized by […] complex interdependence (Nye and Keohane 1977), sovereignty is changing from a territorially-­defined barrier to a bargaining resource. The notion of “sovereignty” (as the most important and well-­accepted principle of international affairs), a priori in inherent conflict with the less universally accepted principle of “sustainable development” if one considers only the part on the rights that sovereign states practice, apart from the historical transformation of sovereignty itself (embracing King’s sovereignty as guaranteed autonomy from God or Christianity, colonizers’ sovereignty, sovereignty of people in the colonized, state’s sovereignty in international affairs, etc.). Reciprocal sovereignty and mutual responsibility accompany to make it work: “activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,” based on the basic and minimum norm of domestic tort law concerning nuisance. Considering the singularities of environmental issues, a cooperative approach is often the only option in dealing with international or global environmental issues given that most environmental problems transcend narrowly-­defined nationalized concept on sovereignty. Eco-­nationalism in this context is often justified by liberal republicanism (commercial or political) but extensively recognizing the fact that nationalism as one of the core values of states’ inconsistent behavior in environmental affairs collective failure of managing the earth’s environment. The environmental field requires a reinterpretation of “sovereignty” (somehow necessity diluting “eco-­nationalism”), to a less rigid way due to the trans-­ boundary nature of environmental problems. Regionalism perspectives are also particularly relevant due to the immediate ecological interconnectivity sharing same trans-­boundary pollution problems. There can be various aspects of sovereignty including “political and territorial,” “economic and trade-­wise,” “cultural,” or “administrative/procedural.” In the real world, albeit unofficially, giving up part of sovereignty involuntarily at times happens in world politics and economic relationships when smaller and powerless countries face hegemonic powers in the process due to a lack of bargaining power. This should be distinguished from voluntary yielding part of sovereignty among participants to achieve collective goals. The former occurs

Environmental politics and cooperation   53 for the sake of the more powerful partner’s gain at the expense of the weaker partners, whereas the latter is for the sake of the creation of larger sum of benefits through creating synergetic effects. A society and region where the notion of “environmental security” is well accepted and incorporated should naturally prefer “peace to violence” and “cooperation to conflicts” considering the destructive dimension of warfare and ecological costs of conflict. Figure 2.1 expresses the conceptual space of the regional environmental regime that forms an extra sphere rather than entirely overlapping with individual states. In taking this integration approach, constraints can be explained as motivation for further cooperation. As much as the origins of environmentalism are hard to grasp, one single theoretical view cannot adequately explain what is actually going on in the field of inter-­state environmental affairs and trans-­ boundary environmental degradation, although those views that I have explained so far are considerably applicable to the NEA (see Table 2.3).

Analytical framework: the synergy between securitization, development, and environmentalism Although coherent regionalism appears to be weak, the NEA as a region entails many reasons to proceed with a cooperative regime in environmental field.

1st scenario: limited cooperation

Security

Development

Environmentalism

Under the 1st scenario, there remains more room to go conflictual than cooperative not only among the nations involved but also between the three areas where the conflicting nature of final goals for each sphere may be justified, thus limited cooperation is accepted and consequently, cooperation remains superficial and little positive synergy can be created.

2nd scenario: further interaction

Security

Development

Environmentalism

Under the 2nd scenario, a higher possibility can be expected for countries’ moving on to the efforts of ensuring further coherence and consistency across related sectors and aligning related policy with other nations involved, in view of achieving environmental improvements at all levels when goals are better aligned.

Figure 2.1  Regional level interactions and cooperation scenario.

(–) Risk of exploitation (sovereignty over natural resources)

(++) Extensive concept of sovereignty and security

Green for survival

Ecological development as a goal

Notes (++) Strongly positively interconnected. (+) Loosely concerned. (∆) Unrelated/neutral. (–) Negatively connected.

(++) Multilateralism via existing or new institutions and organizations and optimism for enhancing effectiveness

(+) “Environmental field” as a significant case study

(+) Mission of aligning regional governance with global regimes

Regime and governance building

(++) Putting environmental (++) Emphasis on interconnectedness advocating improvement as a high “global commons” priority area

Ecologists’ environmental movements in various types

(–) Structural adjustment to (–) Passive participation as a North Korea and Mongolia swing country global environmental regimes

Active IOs in NEA; regime interplays (e.g., trade and the environment, development aid and the environment)

Agenda of green-détente

(++) Multilateral security negotiations

Peace and security

(∆) à (+) Linking environment and peaceful coexistence

(+) Due to proximity, and higher level efficiency

Market opportunity

Japan’s leadership in Kyoto Protocol; China’s representing developing world in global regimes

(∆) à (+) Establishing new (+)(–) Variable means to rules and practices use, including military options

(++) Primary issue and significant unit for interaction

(++) Seizing hegemonic power in the region under question

Regional hegemony

China’s changing status in global climate change regime (from veto to lead nation)

Examples

(∆) Secondary non-political (+)(–) Flexible and issue changeable depending on national priority

Cooperation

(+) Multilateral negotiation Green growth; agreement on for green market the list of environmental goods and services in an effort of greening trade

(∆) State-centered; narrow and limited national interests

Comprehensive rational calculation

Environment

(–) à (+) Possibility of green market

Regionalism

Motivations

Table 2.3  Linking motivations with elements of regional affairs

Environmental politics and cooperation   55 Adding to the generic theoretical framework discussed in the previous section, the NEA faces its particularities in terms of regional identity and the nature of problems that serve as drivers for the concerned countries to cooperate. First of all, the most polluting countries are concentrated in the NEA in terms of emission levels, consumption, and production of fossil fuels, overexploitation of natural resources from the ocean, highest level of manufacturing and growing number of polluting industries, largest investment in infrastructure and construction work, rapid urbanization, fastest deforestation process and biodiversity loss, severe water stress, and a high reliance on mining industry in the case of Mongolia and North Korea. Second, all countries have a strong motivation for economic development including North Korea and Russia,10 which is a close indication for further environmental degradation that is inevitably coupled with economic growth. In the foreseeable future, large-­scale development projects will be carried out at regional levels which further aggravate the environmental situation, especially trans-­boundary harm. A positive side would be the fact that the core NEA three are all very keen on developing green technology that have led to relatively solid cooperative institutions in a variety of areas linked to the expansion of the green market including biotech and climate mitigation technology. The states in Northeast Asia have a long tradition of the developmental state, which is characterised by strong and direct intervention in the market. Japan and South Korea were the most typical exemplars of the developmental state. It is controversial whether China is a developmental state or not (Howell, 2006). However, China has actively embraced elements of the developmental state (Beeson, 2009). The tradition of the developmental state encourages the governments to pursue regional policy with a strong orientation of developmentalism. However, in promoting cooperation in specific policy fields, the governments of the three countries gradually incorporate the elements of regulatory governance by pursuing the harmonisation of domestic standards and other regulatory policies. (Yoshimatsu 2010: p. 6) Third, countries have a strong aspiration to play a certain visible role in the globalization process thus linking the country with the international system. This has brought a higher degree of engagement and interaction in/with global environmental regimes, and multilateralism (e.g., the One Belt One Road) has been an important diplomatic tool for all countries (including even North Korea although sanctioned and thus frustrated most of the time). Fourth, relatively encapsulated weak countries, such as Mongolia and North Korea have been the victims of aggravating regional level inequality in the area of interaction between trade and the environment (natural resources extraction, environmental health, and the rise of environmental justice issues). In the core NEA, reliance on nuclear power as an energy source is high and China has rapidly increased nuclear plants alongside the country’s southeast coastline.

56   Environmental politics and cooperation Moreover, territorial disputes are ongoing in shared oceans, preventing the establishment of regional cooperative regimes to deal with maritime affairs (Valencia 1996; 2000). Meanwhile, at the societal level, due to the higher level of pollution and environmental accidents, the public’s awareness has been raised rapidly, which at times mobilizes collective action against local and central governments. For this reason, the rise of environmentalism is regarded as a source of destabilizing social order. Liberal democracies like Japan and South Korea have problems of high risk perceptions. Authoritarian states like North Korea, Russia, and China have been anxious about social uprisings over environment-­ related issues, and about the rising power of civic society represented by various environmental NGOs and particularly alliances with international activists. And yet, all core NEA countries have some level of ambition for playing a leadership (hegemonic) role in the global regimes. Concerning environmental regimes, Japan started playing such a role earlier than the two others, and is still keen to continue. Today, China focuses on climate change whereas Japan does across all the different regimes recently, especially maritime affairs including ocean environmental improvements. Finally, the NEA region has been surrounded by already established wider regional multilateralism with multiple institutions and organizations focusing on finance, monetary, technology, trade and economic cooperation. Although they are criticized for being ineffective, experiences in regional level institutional cooperation are significant. A conceptual framework is established, zooming into the interface between  (re)securitization, development and the environment (Figure 2.2).

1. Total absence of environmentalism

2. Asymmetry in environmentalism(s) and blame games 3. Recognizing and internalizing regional externalities

4. Regional harmonization and spillovers

5. Multidimensional global and inter-regional spillovers

Overall lack of awareness on environmental risks and consequences even at domestic level

Uneven ecological modernization between countries; non-recognition on trans-boundary harms; unclear rules on liability Rise of environmentalism domestically; concerned parties’ recognizing trans-boundary harms and search for policy measures through referring to other regional or global regimes

Implementation of regionalized cooperative measures and collective management; further coordination across affected sectors

Regional collective actions may become reference for setting a new or strengthening existing global environmental regimes with inputs of applicable norms and principles

Figure 2.2  Regional Ecological Development Model.

Environmental politics and cooperation   57 The figure intends to conceptualize the argument that regional interactions can reinforce the synergetic consequences on the members’ environmental development while mitigating security confrontation. In an ideal world, the overlapping areas in the circle would be larger as it means the harmonization (environmental standards and norms) level is higher. Only when the common denominator (the overlapping part of the three major domains/pillars of regional affairs related to environmental cooperation at the regional scale) is considered to be worthwhile to be expanded for national interests, countries may further proceed with regionalization through institutionalization efforts. In doing so, regionalism can be reinforced then, in turn, the area of common denominator becomes bigger and a positive synergetic outcome could be expected. This is explained in the cases of regional cooperation for climate change issues, preserving biodiversity and protecting the ocean environment in the following chapters. Each chapter explains the interaction between the three pillars in regional environmental affairs For analysis, the stage of the evolution of a cooperative regime in the NEA is explained under the suggested framework of Regional Ecological Modernization, partly applying the ecological modernization theory with some modification to address regional issues more directly (Barrett 2005: pp. 16–20). Adding to Barrrett’s model in explaining the Japanese case, Harper explains ecological modernization (EM) as the following (Harper: pp.  177–178). First, EM does not imply a diminution of human well-­being as many allege about the proposed “limit to growth” reforms. Rather, EM means “re-­rationalizing the division of labor of modern industrialism” to be less ecologically destructive, and to internalize costs and impacts that are currently externalized (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). Second, illustrations of EM come from diverse places, and are manifest at different levels. Some involve political policy change (e.g., EU green incentives). Third, EM involves sub-­political institutional (e.g., corporate) change, and other examples involve cultural and behavioral change through the operation of collective action and social movements (Mol 2002). As part of the tasks of this project, to examine “to what extent countries cooperate in the environmental field,” a three level test/analysis of maturity of regional cooperation can be considered. Each chapter looks into the three levels of regionalism in the environmental field including intraregional cooperation as the minimum level of regional cooperation, responses to prominent interregional issues, and regionalized responses to global environmental problems, further to this, incorporating the interruption by conflicts into the interactions). This analytical framework is connected with the three subsequent chapters on the major environmental areas that are simultaneously regional and global by nature. First, at the regional level, an analysis is offered to determine the extent to which the countries under the current study cooperate on trans-­boundary pollution issues. Second, the selected the NEA regions are investigated vis-­à-vis other immediately affected regions, particularly those of ASEAN, due to its “ecological shadow” (Dauvergne 1997) and the carbon leakage caused by economic

58   Environmental politics and cooperation activities in the NEA countries. Third, the countries’ collective actions are examined relative to global trends to determine the extent to which they cooperate as a region in response to global environmental challenges. Stages of regional environmental development Combining the domestic level sociological EM theory with the changing sovereignty concept in inter-­state and global environmental affairs (from the rigid Harmon Doctrine to collective management), the regional evolution of environmentalism in the NEA can be projected to the analytical framework. As a result, the following five stages can be established: (1) the stage of total absence of environmentalism (based on rigid state sovereignty); (2) the stage of asymmetry in environmentalism(s) and subsequent blame games (based on non-­ reciprocal eco-­nationalism and negative politicization of environmental affairs with a combination of non-­reciprocal sovereignty); (3) the stage of recognizing trans-­boundary harm and internalizing regional externalities (based on reciprocal eco-­nationalism and recognition of “economic autonomy” in a liberal sense); (4) the stage of regional harmonization and spillovers with increase in risk communication (based on normative regionalism and positive constructivism with an acceptance of a de-­territorialized post-­modern sovereignty); (5) the stage of multidimensional global and inter-­regional spillovers (based on ecological communitarian cosmopolitanism and acceptance of shifting concept of sovereignty including non-­human communities). The stages are formulated reflecting historical dynamism, which can be labeled as the Regional Environmental Development Model (REDM). Total absence of environmentalism The first stage would be where no country in the region developed fully fledged environmentalism, thus both states and the public lack awareness of the risks associated with environmental degradation. Under this condition, it would be hard to expect region-­wide environmental cooperation regardless of international influence. It was Japan where such social movements first emerged and environmental externalities were problematized, especially local communities against domestic industrialists, starting from 1950s (e.g., Minamata Chiso cases). However, such changes remain within the national boundary and treated as domestic problems. Under this stage, although there might be some level of cooperation, such process remains superficial and diplomatic only, often selective and ad hoc basis. Asymmetry in environmentalism(s) and subsequent blame games A second level of interaction would be “active” denial of regional common environmental issues and bi- or multilateral trans-­boundary issues. Such issues are potentially highly conflicting but countries are consciously reluctant to take

Environmental politics and cooperation   59 actions. Some of the member countries within the region may have developed a certain level of environmentalism (either top-­down or bottom-­up) and well-­ established legal and regulatory frameworks for environmental protection but such environmentalism at this stage would be limited to the domestic level. Societal understanding of environmental goods and harms are exclusive. Consequently, most of society would stay at the stage of defensive denial of regional trans-­boundary or common good/bad problems and yet due to the noticeably worsening problem, blame games continue for a certain time period between the countries in question. This situation occurs partly due to a lower level of scientific advancement and subsequently lack in relevant data (or, reluctance to share information). Under this situation, the region can hardly expect transparent identification of problems, cooperative investigation, and collective management. Regional level carbon leakage would be commonly noticed as countries’ calculation and would still be based on a zero-­sum perspective. Although there is a rapid rise of criticism against suspect polluters and negligent regulators (state authorities), the border between polluters and victims are still obscure and hardly clearly identified. With rising internal and external pressures, countries at this stage begin to find solutions through investigating (individually) the problems, invest in green technology for pollution mitigation, and make some efforts to interact with established global environmental regimes. Alternatively, countries constantly deny responsibilities, refuse to share any information and data, and keep a distance from relevant global environmental regimes. However, all countries under this project became active in the global process of major environmental negotiations, particularly in climate change and biodiversity. At a regional level, countries only selectively participate, opting out of their own priority areas only, concerning narrowly-­defined nationalized environmental development. In the NEA context, such behavior is often described as “flexibility” and process-­oriented firmly based on “non-­interventionism.” Consequently, the type and pattern of regional cooperation are discursive lacking coherence without an effort of building core environmental principles. However, in the NEA, there is a tendency that less contentious cooperation is undergoing on technological issues between various agencies and the government actors positively accommodated and facilitated such cooperation. Recognizing and internalizing regional externalities Countries gradually begin to recognize explicitly the causes of pollution and other environmental issues, and make further efforts to find collaborative solutions by sharing data and information and meeting regularly to establish a coherent regime. Conflicting issues are exposed and discussed explicitly to find a way to solve collectively. In this way, tensions are also incorporated into the negotiation process, so that the outcome of the negotiation process adequately reflects region-­specific real problems. Security in this region is a shield/excuse for not cooperating (or over cautious barriers), similarly in the environment arena, security connotes state security against neighboring countries thus,

60   Environmental politics and cooperation decoupling, by-passing, and avoidance rather than “incorporating and mainstreaming” occurs. Since the late 2000s, China’s acceptance of trans-­boundary air pollution in the region helped fast advance the cooperative process. There are numerous motivations and grounds for confidence in each case but usually such a changing position is based on a certain level of technological advance, stricter regulatory measures on polluters within their territory, confidence in mitigation (e.g., via reform in energy structure, changing laws and regulations, effective control over polluters), and pressure both from domestic politics and international actors. At this stage, the regional actors begin to harmonize with other regions by referring to already existing regional and global principles and practices (e.g., sustainable development, polluter pay principle) but with a certain degree of regional adaptation. Regional harmonization and spillovers Fourth, (region-­wide) internalizing externalities occur, while absorbing them within the sphere through existing regional institutions and organizations. At this stage, countries start mainstreaming environmentalism into other fields of cooperation by restructuring domestic governance in line with the global sustainable development agenda which is far broader than environmental protection and green growth. When the collective goal (e.g., comprehensive sustainable development) is clear, such an extended cooperation process naturally embraces comprehensive and fundamental peace because ecologism as a social value and environmentalism as an ideology cannot be implemented in a physically destructive political-­setting. Accordingly, cooperation at this stage naturally includes (e.g., linking conventional and non-­conventional security beyond a dichotomy) actors’ endeavor of equitable environmental development across region, overcoming eco-­nationalism-based domestic level environmentalism. More integral cooperation can be processed although this is not necessarily “integration” at the political level but at least in environment-­related areas (technology, energy, regulatory framework, education, investment, trade, health, finance, urban planning, transportation, industries, and so on). Multidimensional global and inter-­regional spillovers Finally, intra-­regional cooperation is the core, and such a cooperative regional pattern/modality influences other regions in their similar negotiation process, if relevant, by actively sharing experience (data, information, and policies). This establishes a building bloc in existing regimes by filling in the gaps. Such collective regional cooperation may further contribute to a global environmental regime by adding real cases and influencing rule- and norm-­making, playing as active and responsible members of the global community beyond nations and/ or regions. Such regional regimes’ contribution to global ones is different from one single powerful state’s ambition to reshape existing norms and rules without regional collectivity (a historically accumulated cooperative process) and

Environmental politics and cooperation   61 alternative or upgraded core values. In the field of inter-­states’ environmental affairs, bypassing regions may generate miscommunication between members, and the outcome of negotiations (conventions, norms, principles, treaties, etc.) may turn out to be less useful and hard to implement at a regional level. At this stage, as green regionalism would be based on a real historical accumulation of success and failure in environmental cooperation, the experience itself is a valuable regional input as global public good. This will enhance the region’s negotiation power in the international process of modifying existing regimes and establishing new ones at global level that will in turn bind back all nations more effectively and voluntarily, and possibly cover other regions.

Conclusion The above-­listed steps and further conceptualization provide a blueprint of environmentally sustainable and economically viable growth in the NEA region. However, more deviations than regularities have been noticed to date, thus those stages may coexist irregularly for the time being. In biodiversity-­related issues, since they are closely interlinked with contentious problems such as deforestation, land conversion, mining, logging, trade of endangered animals, access to precious bio-­resources, a realist approach (comfortably justifying exploitation of natural resources if meeting national interests) will only further aggravate environmental problems and generate conflicts between connected nations and states. Neoliberal understanding of a market-­oriented solution to environmental problems, to a certain stage, may encourage states to cooperate as such an approach is immediately relevant to economic growth. Nonetheless, for relatively weaker countries within the regional cooperation setting, there could be little to gain through deeper interaction because the invisible unequal trade structure may reinforce environmental deterioration which is explained by the Marxist globalism approach. According to Barrett’s ecological modernization theory, the core NEA has probably already passed the stage of recognition/accepting the issue. However, the process remains “domestic” and “national.” The theory offers some insights for inter-­state level but it explains that such external issues stimulate the society to interact with external world only at the latest stage. For the NEA, the region arrived at the same time with the earlier stage of awareness and recognition. However at a regional level, the next stage is problematic as measures and priorities are not directly immediately reflecting the conflicting “regional common goods and trans-­boundary harm.” Many levels of barriers are discussed as a mixture of various levels, but on the other hand, those can be changed when circumstances change (structural or domestic). Thus, what is discussed as constraints may function as cooperative drivers at a later stage. In this sense, some level of core institutional continuity seems important to build visualizing and materializing the collective accumulation of regional experience for cooperation, as such states have a written history of conflicts and disputes. Not all efforts failed but were merely lacking the level and density of “incorporation,” that signifies

62   Environmental politics and cooperation conflict for a deeper level of cooperation for selected issues. Quite a few relevant examples support the neo-­functionalist’s spillover assumption, in this case, from regional to global institutions. One good example is the “2016 Water Convention.” Some region-­specific achievements (in terms of building a regime) would include the “ASEAN Agreement on Trans-­boundary Haze Pollution” (2014); “The Asia-­Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate” (2005), and regional or bilateral trade agreements containing environmental regulations (e.g., Euro-­MED Agreements, Thailand-­Australia FTA, Japan-­Thailand FTA; Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and Chile).

Notes   1

Environmental externalities refer to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of production and consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the market mechanism. As a consequence of negative externalities, private costs of production tend to be lower than its “social” cost (environmental harms to humans and ecosystem). It is the aim of the “polluter/ user-­pays” principle to prompt households and enterprises to internalise externalities in their plans and budgets.”  (United Nations 1997)

  2 “From TPP to CPTPP” by Matthew P. Goodman, www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-­cptpp (Accessed March 20, 2018).   3 “N. Korea will not give up nuclear weapons: Mearsheimer” (Yonhap News interview with Mearsheimer), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/03/20/020000 0000AEN20180320010200315.html (Accessed March 10, 2018).   4 “Kim Jong-­un’s visit to China fails to hide strain in relations,” www.theguardian. com/world/2018/mar/28/kim-­jong-uns-­visit-to-­china-fails-­to-hide-­strain-in-­relations (Accessed March 28, 2018).   5 “North Korean workers return to China in defiance of UN restrictions,” www.rfa. org/english/news/korea/workers-­04042018134944.html (Accessed April 5, 2018).   6 “Japan fears being sidelined as dealmaker Donald Trump prepares to meet North Korea’s Kim Jong-­un: there are concerns in Tokyo that the US leader is prepared to walk away from the Singapore summit with an agreement that ignores Japanese demands,” www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-­asia/article/2149197/japan-­fears-being­sidelined-trumps-­deal-north-­korea (Accessed June 5, 2018).   7 For criticisms of the neoliberal approach to environmental issues, see Fuentes-­George 2013; Buck-­Buck 2013; Macneil and Paterson 2012.   8 Eckersley’s (2016) research focuses on national identity and legitimization of policy by comparing Germany and Norway as a case of domestic level of constructing the eco-­friendly image of a nation.   9 Special volume of International Organization 29(4) (Autumn, 1975), edited by John G. Ruggie and Ernst B. Haas. 10 In the case of Russia, at least the ruling elites have constructed clear aspiration to move up to the core democratic part from the current semi-­peripherality in the neoliberal world system playing as a globally significant economy, while the Russian mass’ reluctance to change is seen as an obstacle by the elites. (see Hopf 2013).

Environmental politics and cooperation   63

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3 Regional reaction to trans-­ boundary air pollution and climate change in Northeast Asia

Regional issues and the NEA’s interaction with the global climate regime In Asia, trans-­boundary air pollution has been an unprecedentedly fatal regional threat to air quality and human health; due in particular to high acidified rainfall (consisting of sulphur and nitrogen oxides) and concentrated fine dust, which is comprised of particulate matter (PM) with a diameter of 10 micro-­millimeters and PM with a diameter of 2.5 micro-­millimeters, or ultrafine particles. These pollutants are known as one of the major sources of air pollution in the Northeast Asian region; and China and Mongolia have long been blamed for large Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Only very recently did the Chinese government officially recognize the urgent need to deal with air pollutants caused by various unsustainable practices linked to its major development activities including deforestation and land conversion, construction, industrialization, and rapid urbanization, especially in major cities (The South China Morning Post, December 6, 2016).1 China has gradually become more engaged in tackling trans-­boundary pollution problems through various regional institutions, notably the Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM). Although politically-­ sensitive issues are excluded from the TEMM agenda, regional mini-­lateral institutionalization in this field has achieved visible advancements (KEI 2017: pp. 41–44). This chapter investigates the patterns and motivations of NEA countries in addressing climate-­related trans-­boundary issues as part of the main research question of this project: “Why (i.e., motivations and conditions) and to what extent (i.e., forms) do countries in the NEA participate in cooperative processes in the field of environmental development?” In addition, “How far is ecological civilization their primary concern, going beyond national boundaries?” In dealing with climate-­related issues, unlike two other environmental fields addressed in the subsequent two chapters of this book, the interactions among NEA countries are relatively more cooperative than explicitly conflicting. Evidence is provided through analyzing the operation of the TEMM, a relatively long-­lasting and high-­level decision-­making umbrella institution, in comparison with that of other institutions with similar functions. Further evidence is offered

68   Regional air pollution and climate change of the changing attitudes (from leadership competition to leadership sharing via division of labor) of the core three NEA countries in dealing with trans-­ boundary air pollution, specifically efforts to rein in GHG emissions. Any issues connected with climate change became the prevailing topic of environmental discussion, encompassing almost all related environmental concerns. In meteorological terms, there is only one atmosphere, unconstrained by national boundaries; however, even in the most successful trans-­boundarypollution regimes, such as those of Northern Europe and North America, such air pollution has created obstacles to international environmental cooperation (e.g., Lofstedt and Sjostedt 2001).2 Unlike changes in weather, climatic alteration is attributed to numerous interacting variables, such as sunlight, ocean currents, precipitation, fires, volcanic eruptions, topography, human industrial emissions, and the respiration of living things, to name but a few. Together, these factors produce the complicated phenomenon of climate change, “megaproblems” that are unique in their scope and not directly experienced by human senses (Harper 2013: p. 63). Consequently, numerous unanswered questions and large data gaps impede discussion of regional cooperation on strategies for resolving the problem of climate-­related trans-­boundary pollution. The global community has gradually reached a consensus on the need for collaborative scientific research on climate issues and closer cooperation between natural scientists and policy/decision-­ makers. Further scientific evidence is required to fill the remaining gaps in our understanding of trans-­boundary air pollution and climate change, such as the contribution of the former from each country to overall global warming and climate change at various levels (domestic, regional and global). However, what becomes clearer is that air pollution is seriously affecting more and more people and an increasing range of ecosystems in the NEA. All countries in the region under this research face high level emissions of Kyoto Protocol listed pollutants (the four greenhouse gases including CO2 and two groups of other gases).3 In recent statistics presented using the Environmental Performance Indicator (EPI) all countries in East Asia, with the exception of Singapore (ranked 16/184), recorded a very low level of performance. For example, Japan ranked 39, Malaysia 63, South Korea 80 (173, in terms of average exposure to PM 2.5, while China marked the lowest 184/184) (Yonhap News Agency, May 16, 2016; Yonhap News Agency, January 7, 2018).4 Also, according to 2015 UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) data, in terms of CO2 tons per capita, countries in the NEA under this study mark high emission levels (Russia, 12.28; South Korea, 11.78; Japan, 9.25; China, 6.18(9.7);5 Hong Kong, 5.15; Mongolia, 4.18, and North Korea, 2.94). Statistics on a less highlighted issue, mercury emissions (distribution of anthropogenic mercury emissions) in 2010 also showed the highest level of emissions in the NEA compared with other regions; almost double compared with Southeast Asia or South Asia (UNEP 2015: p.  2). Another significant indicator to estimate carbon emissions includes the rate of inter-­continental transportation, which also demonstrates that East Asia marked the highest level

Regional air pollution and climate change   69 among all regions. Such a record is closely coupled with impressive economic development and the subsequently rising volume and flow of trading goods and people. Countries in the NEA have long faced the sustainability dilemma, and chose the path of continuous and aggressive growth at the expense of environmental quality. Since the U.S. under the current Trump administration announced its position against the Paris Accord by withdrawing from it, China has taken the opportunity to augment its role in global climate negotiations.  United Nations Secretary-­General, António Guterres received a notification from the delegation of the United States expressing the country’s intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change as soon as it is eligible to do so, his spokesman has confirmed.6  A few months earlier, President Xi pledged to protect the Paris Agreement during a phone call with the then French President-­elect Emmanuel Macron. “China and France ‘should protect the achievements of global governance, including the Paris Agreement,’ Xi told Macron, according to the foreign ministry.”7 Given that China together with other emerging economies (notably, India and Brazil) had formed a powerful veto bloc threatening the existence of the Kyoto Protocol itself over the last few decades, China’s changing attitude toward interaction with global climate governance is considered the most important triggering factor to enhance regional cooperation at present, resulting in the leadership shift (from Japan) in multilateral negotiations. Morton’s (2008) analysis offers an insight on how issues on climate change in China has regional and global security threats. Global climate change is now one of the biggest challenges facing humankind in the twenty-­first century. It is occurring at a time when China’s economic rise is leading to substantial environmental problems combined with escalating demands on global resources.… It is not only China’s modernisation drive that is at stake. The spill-­over effects across borders also present security concerns at the regional and global levels. From a global security perspective, the emerging environmental crisis is generally cast in highly negative terms.… In the case of climate change this is now an urgent task. On the Qinghai–Tibetan plateau climate impacts pose significant security risks for China and the Asia region. The ability to adapt is of critical importance to the future sustainability of these ecosystems as well as the millions of people they serve. (Morton 2008) In the climate diplomacy of the NEA, a wide gulf is often revealed between foreign environmental policy and domestic or regional environmental policies, due to main factors including, but not limited to, states’ implicitly pursuing eco­nationalism, and natural resource-­seeking environmental diplomacy (e.g.,

70   Regional air pollution and climate change Box 3.1  Process of building a global climate regime  1992 1997 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011

2012 2014 2015 2017

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  Kyoto Protocol (COP3)  Montreal, Canada (COP11) The 1st after the Kyoto Protocol took force Bali Action Plan (COP13) (Annex I parties’ commitment; ensuring two track process Kyoto + Post-­Kyoto) Copenhagen Accord (COP15) (Calling on specific actions e.g., voluntary mitigation target and financing)  Cancun Mexico (COP16) (GCF for developing countries (Financing climate change)  Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) (COP17) (Possibility of a legally binding protocol for all parties; technology transfer for climate mitigation and adaptation) The Doha Climate Gateway (Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol with a 2nd commitment period as 2013–2020) Lima Peru (COP20) (Adoption of IPCC 5th Assessment Report; Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs))  Paris Agreement (COP21) 1st universal legally (partially) binding climate agreement  Bonne UNFCCC Meeting (COP23)

President Lee Myung Bak’s explicit term of “Natural Resources Diplomacy” combining with his “Green Growth Strategy” agenda, vision of environmental aid and aspirations to lead global affairs. In the case of Japan, for example, it was in the late 1980s when the external influence of environmentalism began to reshape both its domestic and foreign environmental policy, according to Barrett’s explanation on the four stages of ecological modernization of a political entity (Barrett 2005: pp. 16–20). The international community persistently urged countries like China, India, and Russia to take more positive roles on global environmental issues. This discourse became prominent following the internationally agreed extension of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to give the Kyoto Protocol (clearly dividing the global north and south) in the wake of COP21, and the adoption of the Paris Agreement as a step toward practically eradicating the outdated dichotomy between the Annex I and non-­ Annex I countries’ differentiated responsibilities. Indeed, the Chinese government has increasingly indicated its willingness to participate in such international efforts, although many uncertainties remain, as nothing has yet been substantively implemented. Amid much global spotlight, China ratified the Paris Agreement, just a few days prior to the Group of 20 Summit in Hangzhou. China had multiple purposes (The South China Morning Post, September 4, 2016).8 First, the ratification demonstrated China’s status as a responsible international leader eager to   tackle one of today’s most prominent global problems. Second, climate is

Regional air pollution and climate change   71 considered a realm in which China and the U.S. occupy at least superficially “common ground,” mitigating the potential uneasiness caused by the resurgence of the South China Sea Islands dispute. Third, in terms of domestic matters, the Beijing government is seeking to lay the foundations for advancing a strategic national plan for an “ecological civilization,” a stated goal of the 13th Five-­Year Plan (2016–2020), supported by a series of strategies such as trade increases in green technology, strict reforms of environmental laws and regulations and an increase in nuclear-­energy capacity (Schreurs 2016). Kobayashi’s earlier research (Kobayashi 2002: pp. 86–108) highlighted that although China was not obliged to take part in Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects as a non-­Annex I country, Beijing was “not” reluctant to participate while officially opposing (together with the G77) the cooperative framework. Kobayashi asks why, and suggested that China is a practitioner of realpolitik, adopting an anti-­North approach vis-­à-vis developing countries endorsing the common rhetoric of being a developing country. More revealingly, even the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been cooperative, to an impressive degree, with global environmental institutions (Habib 2015). “North Korea joined the UNFCCC on March 5th, 1995 and submitted the country’s First National Communication under the Framework Convention in 2000.”9 The First National Communication provided an inventory of the DPRK’s GHG emissions, along with a summary of the country’s emissions-­abatement measures and adaptation strategies. The DPRK is a member and signatory of a number of major international organizations and conventions either directly or indirectly related to the environment. It is a member of the World Health Organization (1973); the UN Conference on Trade and Development (1973); the UN Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (1974); the World Meteorological Organization (1975); the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (1977); and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (1986). It is a signatory to (apart from the 1994 UNFCCC) the Convention on Biological Diversity (1994), the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depletion (1985), and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (2005) (KEI 2013: p. 247). The establishment of the Green Climate Fund and its recognition at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015 have encouraged less developed countries with vulnerable climates to cooperate with international climate mitigation and adaptation efforts to ensure their eligibility as recipients of fast-­track funds. At a global level, all NEA countries under this study are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, which in each case has been ratified as domestic law (except Russia, see Table 3.1), for a variety of reasons that were discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, cooperation in this area is significantly impeded by the differences in status of the six countries in the international environmental arena. Under the UNFCCC regime, these nations are categorized variously as signatories to Annex I, non-­Annex I advanced economies or economies of the “developing South” (Karlsson-­Vinkhuyzen and

72   Regional air pollution and climate change McGee 2013). Japan, which hosted the conference at which the Kyoto Protocol was established, has been one of the leading Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC over the last two decades. Annex I parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development) in 1992, and the countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties) including Russia, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Annex II parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but excluding the EIT Parties. In contrast, South Korea had been criticized for being a non-­Annex I Party with the greatest emissions levels; however, it is excluded from the category of “developing-­world countries,” to which China belongs. Therefore, China has been categorized as the most significant emitter in the developing world. Non-­Annex I parties are mostly developing countries. They are recognized by the Convention either as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, or being vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. In addition, 49 parties classified as least developed countries (LDCs) by the UN are given special consideration under the Convention. Russia was not on board in the negotiation process at the beginning, however, other leading nations successfully persuaded it to take part through incentivizing the country with other measures that could critically affect Russian national interests. By mid-­2004, Russia had become the focus of attention. With more than 120 countries having ratified already – incl. more than 30 Annex I parties, representing 44% of that group’s 1990 emissions – the 55% was not tantalisingly close, even without US involvement. If Russia which represented 17.4% of the 1990 emissions of Annex I countries, signed on, the treaty would enter into force. In the end it was Russia’s desire for admission into the WTO that provided the final incentives. The EU had told Moscow that it would support Russia’s admission only after it ratified Kyoto. On November 18, 2004 Russia ratified the protocol, which then entered into force on February 16, 2005. (Chasek et al. 2017: p. 171) This is one of the illustrations clearly demonstrating that supportive countries’ main reason for joining the process of strengthening the climate regime may not necessarily be their deep concern over environmental improvement per se. Complicated calculations behind actors’ decisions may be involved. One convincing categorization of the divisive feature of the regime is one based on energy sources (Chasek et al. 2017: p.  166). The first group are those “states with few indigenous fossil-­fuel resources and relatively dependent on imported energy.” Japan and South Korea, like many EU countries belong to this group. The second group are those “states with large supplies of cheap energy resources and a culture of highly inefficient energy use.” In the NEA cases under this study, China and Russia (and Mongolia to some extent) belong to this group, together with the U.S., Canada, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Finally, there are

Regional air pollution and climate change   73 Table 3.1  Signatories to international climate-related laws (signed/ratified) Countries

Convention (1992)

Kyoto (1997)

Paris (2015)

China

Jan. 5, 1993/ Mar. 21, 1994 May 28, 1993/ Mar. 21, 1994 Dec. 14, 1993/ Mar. 21, 1994 Dec. 5, 1994/ Mar. 5, 1995 Sept. 30, 1993/ Mar. 21, 1994 Dec. 28, 1994/ Mar. 28, 1995

Aug. 30, 2002/ Feb. 16, 2005 Jun. 4, 2002/ Feb. 16, 2005 Jun. 4, 2002/ Feb. 16, 2005 Apr. 27, 2005/ Jul. 26, 2005 Dec. 15, 1999/ Feb. 16, 2005 Nov. 18, 2004/ Feb. 16, 2005

Apr. 22, 2016/ Sept. 3, 2016 Apr. 22, 2016/ Nov. 8, 2016 Apr. 22, 2016/ Nov. 3, 2016 Apr. 22, 2016/ Aug. 1, 2016 Apr. 22, 2016/ Sept. 21, 2016 Apr. 22, 2016/ –

Japan Korea (South) Korea (North) Mongolia Russia

Sources: Status of UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ ratification/items/2631.php. Paris Agreement, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485. php. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter =27&clang=_en (Accessed June 5, 2017).

those “highly dependent on fossil-­fuel exports for income” such as the Arab oil states and Australia. North Korea does not fit into any of these categorizations, although remaining as signatory to the UNFCCC. Given the great disparities within the NEA from this aspect, one may argue that there is a higher possibility that countries would prefer cooperation under non-­binding short-­term flexible conditions, through which national gains can be maximized in relative terms.

The evolution of institutionalized regional cooperation As briefly mentioned, TEMM is the first trilateral ministerial meeting of the NEA. The risks resulting from trans-­boundary air pollutants triggered its founding. TEMM was realized by South Korea’s positive commitment. The country originally had serious concerns about dust and sandstorms (DSS) coming from China. When Korean President Kim Dae-­jung made an official visit to Tokyo and Beijing in the fall of 1998, he expressed a strong interest on environmental issues, and got an accord to hold a meeting designed to discuss ways of working together to reduce environmental hazards in Northeast Asia. At the first TEMM, South Korea asked China to prevent its pollutants reaching the Korean Peninsula via the Yellow Sea, and encouraged Japan to transfer advanced technology required to prevent environmental pollution (Quoted from The Korea Times, 15 January 1999). Thus, DSS was a risk that required systemic joint efforts at the Northeast Asian level, not a single national level. Korea’s perception of such a risk encouraged it to initiate trilateral cooperation to search for collective measures to alleviate the risk. (Yoshimatsu 2010: p. 9)

74   Regional air pollution and climate change While the first three meetings were concentrated on procedural matters, following the 2002 decision at the 4th TEMM, members agreed to set up a monitoring network with financial support from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF ). As a result, the NEA together with the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the region established the system of early alert for DSS (SDS-­NET). It is a widely accepted view that as DSS is closely linked with the desertification process, closer cooperation with China and Mongolia has been raised as a critical issue for all affected East Asian states although Mongolia is not a member of TEMM. Region-­wide environmental cooperation in the climate field has a relatively longer history than other regional environmental governance. If institutions are taken as a significant barometer of the positive construction of regional environmental governance, quite a few successfully established institutions came into existence and are still somehow operational. Through constant institutionalization, if other conditions are met, region-­wide norms can be set as an outcome of interactions between members and stakeholders. Some examples include the ASEAN Agreement on Trans-­boundary Haze Pollution; and the Asia-­Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate, an international, voluntary, public–private partnership among Australia, Canada, India, Japan, China, South Korea, and the U.S. (July 28, 2005). The possibility of building the APP was first discussed at an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting and launched in 2006. Its main agenda was focused on cooperation for climate-­ related technology in which all the three core NEA members expressed strong interests. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), formed in 1989, has played a significant inter-­regional institutional role. While it broadly concerns economic cooperation, long related to economic growth and development, environment-­ related issues have drawn its members’ attention. The current framework includes three broad categories concerning the environment: air, atmospheric and water pollution. As a result of continuous discussions “The Declaration on Climate Change Energy Security and Clean Development” was adopted in 2007. And finally, in 2011,  members pledged to reduce carbon intensity in the region by 45 percent by 2030. In 2012 in Vladivostok Russia, reducing tariffs were agreed concerning 54 environmental products to 5 percent or less by the end of 2015 (solar panels, wind turbines … that account for $600 billion in world trade volume). In addition, in 2014, members agreed to work toward doubling the share of renewables in APEC’s energy mix by 2030 including in power generation, and they have endorsed phasing out fossil-­fuel subsidies. Funded by a multiyear project

Regional air pollution and climate change   75 under the APEC Energy Working Group, urban planners received assistance to develop low-­carbon model town plans for a series of cities throughout the Asia Pacific region and supporting smart electricity grid development.  (Chasek et al. 2017: pp. 87–88) As part of governance building in 2017, city-­to-city cooperation emerged as a new modality among NEA countries. Initiated by the Seoul Metropolitan Government as part of the city’s ten-­policy framework to solve the problems of PM that are partially caused by China and Mongolia, a Mayors Forum institution, the “Northeast Asian Institute of Capitals Cooperative,” dealing with air quality and climate change was established in October 2017. This was endorsed by Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Ulanbataar. Nonetheless, domestic environmental laws greatly differ between countries, and the chemical substances legally recognized as contributing to global warming vary accordingly. This reflects differences in the level of risk perception between societies (e.g., the recognition of manufactured risk as distinct from external risk, in Giddens’ words) (Giddens 1999; Beck 1992); along with disparities in governments’ willingness to comply with international multilateral environmental agreements on climate change. The scope, approaches, frameworks, and priorities of nationwide climate policies differ considerably between countries. (For different regulatory framework and policy guidance, refer to Tables 3.2 and 3.3.) Yet climate issues are not always nationally confined; whole regions may suffer similar adverse effects due to geographical proximity. Considering many structural conditions including political and economic factors, the cooperative trend in the NEA in this field has been gradually moving Table 3.2  Major domestic legal frameworks governing environmental protection Countries

Legal frameworks

China

Energy Conservation Law (2005); Renewable Energy Law (2005); 13th 5-Year Plan (2016–2020) Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures (1998, 2013); Fourth Basic Environment Plan (2012) Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth (2009); Energy Use Rationalization Act; Electricity Business Act Law of Environmental Protection (1986); Enforcement Decree of Environmental Protection Law (1995) Law on Air (1995, 2012); Energy Law (2001); Disaster Prevention Law (2003); Action Programme to Protect Air Quality; National Action Programme on Climate Change (2011) Federal Laws on Ambient Air Protection (1999); Federal Law on Environmental Protection (2002)

Japan South Korea North Korea Mongolia Russia

Sources: Graham Institute, London School of Economics, www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/­ legislation/countries/. East Asia Forum, www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/26/north-koreas-­ changing-climate-of-environmental-cooperation/.

Member countries’ major policy framework1 Not mentioned

Not mentioned

Establishment of the Ministry of the Environment of Japan (January 2001)

Not mentioned

Not mentioned

The Ministers exchanged views regarding recent progress in each country regarding the sound material-cycle society and/or circular economy, and especially welcomed that the Chinese national 11th Five-Year Plan will incorporate the idea of a circular economy covering the 3R activities of reduce, reuse and recycle. The Ministers reaffirmed that 3R activities are vital to building a sound material-cycle for sustainable development. The Ministers confirmed their will to have a cooperative relationship within the Asian region. In this connection, the Ministers recognized the importance of the “3R Initiative” proposed by Japan and of the ministerial conference on the 3R Initiative to be hosted by Japan in Tokyo in April 2005 aimed at promoting 3R activities on a worldwide basis. Further, the Ministers supported the proposal raised by China that a tripartite symposium or seminar be held on the matter, with details to be confirmed at the official level

Leadership

Jiang Zemin Keizo Obuchi Kim Dae-Joong

Jiang Zemin Keizo Obuchi Kim Dae-Joong

Jiang Zemin Yoshiro Mori Kim Dae-Joong

Jiang Zemin Junichiro Koizumi Kim Dae-Joong

Hu Jintao Junichiro Koizumi Rho Moo Hyun

Hu Jintao Junichiro Koizumi Rho Moo Hyun

Year and place

TEMM1 January 13,1999 Seoul, Korea

TEMM2 February 26–27, 2000 Beijing, China

TEMM3 April 7–8, 2001 Tokyo, Japan

TEMM4 April 20–21, 2002 Seoul, Korea

TEMM5 December 13–14, 2003 Beijing, China

TEMM6 December 4–5, 2004 Tokyo, Japan

Table 3.3  Basic information on the TEMM and member countries’ policy framework

They welcomed the Three Transformations for China’s Environmental Protection under the New Situation put forward by China, Integrated Improvement of the Environment, Economy and Society by Japan and the Comprehensive National Environmental Plan by Korea that clearly express the intention to integrate environmental protection into economic and social development The three Ministers welcomed the “Environmental Strategy for the 21st Century” (Japan); “National Strategy for Sustainable Development” (Korea); the “applying Scientific Outlook on Development to build up an environmentally-friendly society” (China) They welcomed the “Environmental Policy Directions & Tasks for Green Growth & Higher Quality of life” (Korea); the efforts of “pollution abatement” and “rehabilitating the ecologically vulnerable rivers and lakes” guided by the “Scientific Outlook on Development” (China); “Clean Asia Initiative” and the “Action Plan for Low-Carbon Society” (Japan) Not mentioned

The Ministers shared their views on the recent progress in each country regarding environmental policies after TEMM11. They welcomed the statements by each country on Domestic Policy Progress on Global Warming Countermeasures and Measures toward Integrating the Environment into Economy by Japan; Accelerating the Shift of Economic Development Pattern and Exploring A Chinese New Road toward Environmental Protection by China; and Koreas Green Growth Policies by Korea. The three Ministers shared their recognition that these measures meet the important direction of clear intention to integrate environmental measures into economic and social development, and become a driving force for solving environmental problems in Northeast Asia as well as on the globe

Hu Jintao Junichiro Koizumi Rho Moo Hyun

Hu Jintao Yasuo Fukuda Rho Moo Hyun

Hu Jintao Taro Aso Lee Myung Bak

Hu Jintao Taro Aso Lee Myung Bak

Hu Jintao Yukio Hatoyama Lee Myung Bak

TEMM8 December 2–3, 2006 Beijing, China

TEMM9 December 4–6, 2007 Toyama, Japan

TEMM10 December 1–3, 2008 Jeju, Korea

TEMM11 13 June 2009 Beijing, China

TEMM12 May 22–23, 2010 Hokkaido, Japan

continued

Not mentioned

Hu Jintao Junichiro Koizumi Rho Moo Hyun

TEMM7 October 22–23, 2005 Seoul, Korea

Member countries’ major policy framework1 Korea introduced low-carbon, green policies to realize the vision of Green Korea, such as green card, Me First movement and GHG emissions target management system; Four Major Rivers Restoration Project; environmental policies for daily life such as noise, indoor air pollution, artificial light, odor, and asbestos management. China explained its environmental achievement during the 11th Five-Year Plan period from 2005 to 2010, environmental improvement targets of the 12th Five-Year Plan from 2011 to 2015, emissions reduction indices of major pollutants including SO2 and so forth. Japan noted the damage from the earthquake and tsunami that occurred in March, 2011 and its countermeasures, as well as major environmental policies on Green Innovation, technological development to address global warming, enactment of environmental impact assessment act and so forth They welcomed the statements that introduced the main environmental efforts in 2011 and key environmental tasks in 2012 by China, titled “Latest Domestic Environmental Policies in Japan” by Japan and “Distribute Fruits of Green Growth Policy to the Entire Society: Major Environmental Policies in 2012” by Korea, which all stressed the importance of integrating environmental protection into economic and social development The Ministers introduced and welcomed the environmental visions and strategies for the new era that are outlined by “Integrated approach that pursues low-carbon and sound material-cycle society that is in harmony with nature” by Japan; “High Quality Environmental Welfare to Realize the Happiness of all People” by Korea; and “Ecological Civilization As the Sustainable Development Strategy to be Integrated Into Every Aspect of Economic, Political, Cultural, and Social Progress” by China Statements: “Realizing sustainable environmental welfare and creating new value from the environment” (ROK); “Strengthening environmental legal system and promoting ecological civilization to make new achievements with an emphasis on air pollution treatment” (China); “Comprehensive measures on PM2.5 and development of climate change mitigation” (Japan)

Leadership

Hu Jintao Naoto Kan Lee Myung Bak

Hu Jintao Yoshihiko Noda Lee Myung Bak

Xi Jin Ping Shinzon Abe Lee Myung Bak

Xi Jin Ping Shinzon Abe Park Geun Hye

Year and place

TEMM13 April 28–29, 2011 Busan, Korea

TEMM14 May 3–4, 2012 Beijing, China

TEMM15 May 5–6, 2013 Kitakyushu, Japan

TEMM16 April 28–29, 2014 Daegu, Korea

Table 3.3  continued

Regional initiatives for sustainable development, such as Belt and Road Initiative (China); Euroasia Initiative (ROK); and High Level Seminar on Environmentally Sustainable Cities (Japan) Minister KIM presented “Major Environmental Policies of the New Government”; Minister LI presented “Strive to Win the Tough Fight for Environmental Protection and Accelerate the Creation of Green Development Pattern and Lifestyle”; and Minister NAKAGAWA presented “Latest Development of National Environmental Policies.” The Ministers welcomed the progress and shared the view that these environmental policies would contribute to the sustainable development in Northeast Asia, and would lay the foundation for solving regional and global environmental challenges

Xi Jin Ping Shinzon Abe Park Geun Hye

Xi Jin Ping Shinzon Abe Mun Jae In

TEMM18 April 26–27, 2016 Shizuoka, Japan

TEMM 19 August 24–25, 2017 Suwon, Korea

Note 1 “Member countries’ major policy framework” includes only the policies that were presented at the TEMM meetings. Under the leadership (president, chairman, or prime minister), relevant ministers participated as representatives.

Delivered speeches: “Sharing ecological civilization concept, deepening environmental protection cooperation” (China); “Introduction of latest environmental policy development” (Japan); “High quality environmental welfare policies including addressing of life surrounding environmental issues” (ROK)

Xi Jin Ping Shinzon Abe Park Geun Hye

TEMM17 April 29–30, 2015 Shanghai, China

80   Regional air pollution and climate change toward liberal institutional optimism as opposed to conservative neo-­classical climate skepticism. Despite the unsatisfactory implementation of environmental agenda due to the complexities and uncertainties of regional politics, governments in the NEA (or at least those of the three core countries) have demonstrated a growing collective willingness to cooperate on climate-­related measures, as evidenced by numerous related meetings and the increasingly comprehensive coverage of agenda on climate change. While the tendency for “institutional optimism for green détente” is growing among liberals and nationalists alike, a general conservative skepticism prevails among experts investigating the NEA, due to high expectations (generally based on other models of high-­level integration and cooperative mechanisms) and/or to the traditional predominance of skepticism in climate discourse. Closer examination of the development of various climate-­related institutions in the NEA offers a more realistic picture. Although practical limitations exist, there are increasing grounds for arguing that environmental cooperation is likely to increase or at least to be maintained in the region in the coming decades. At the core of the NEA, including China, a high level of environmentalism has been elicited among ordinary citizens. Air pollution is perceived as a critical problem that significantly reduces quality of life. However, the countries under this study exhibit stark disparities in their level of environmental development, particularly their domestic democratic environmental governance, and in the participation of civic society. Risk perception and responses, along with the instigators of such responses differ between these core countries depending on the issues at stake. Japan’s civic society took the initiative in advancing cooperation on efforts to deal with acid rain. Today, the Korean peninsula is affected most severely by DSS originating in China. Due to China’s economic development and the special political and economic relationship between China and the DPRK, ecological conditions in the DPRK have significantly deteriorated, mainly through the illegal trade of endangered species, trade in minerals below market prices, rampant mining and fishing, deforestation, and trade in hazardous waste. Together, these factors have led to climate-­related disasters in the DPRK (see Habib 2015; Nam 2003; KEI 2013; Lee 2013). Occasional international sanctions have only aggravated the post-­colonial ecological relationship between China and the DPRK. Reilly (2014a; 2014b) has researched the conjuncture of trade and sanctions in this region. Also, quite a few recent news releases have highlighted the same issues (The South China Morning Post, September 3, 2016).10 However, the statistical evidence required to gain an overall picture of the country’s climatic deterioration is either unavailable or inaccurate, as the DPRK’s government has made very little information on its environmental situation available. There is a dearth of research on the China-­DPRK trade relationship from an environmental perspective. The following chapters of this book deal with this area of concern in greater detail. Officials from the South Korean Ministry of Environment admit that, ironically, the DPRK is regarded as the country most distant from the ROK in

Regional air pollution and climate change   81 most areas including the environment. For political reasons, any significant information concerning the DPRK (including environment-­related information) was categorized as a hard security issue, and was thus dealt with by the Ministry of Unification or the Korean National Intelligence Service (author’s interview, August 2016). Notably, the DPRK is one of the important illustrations showing why and how environmental protection and hard security issues are inseparable in this region. Nuclear-­related issues provide evidence. In the NEA, the potential environmental risk is much higher than the risk perceived or estimated at present, due to growing competition over the development of nuclear power for various political and economic reasons. According to a think-­tank run by the Dutch government, the world’s nuclear projects are concentrated in the NEA, specifically in China, Japan, the ROK, Russia, and the DPRK, which are expected to use increasing amounts of nuclear power for energy in the coming years (NEAA 2015). A rise in nuclear-­based energy production may reduce CO2 emissions (calculated only partially on their full life span), which explains the confidence of the three core NEA governments in achieving their internationally mandated targets of reducing emissions by 2020. However, due to the multiple potential environmental risks associated with nuclear energy development (e.g., construction, waste disposal, accidents, maintenance and phase-­out processes), a short-­term reduction in overall CO2 emissions via the increased use of nuclear power will not automatically lead to greater longer-­term sustainability. Different stages in the lifecycle of a nuclear power plant entail different levels of risks varying by project and by region. Usually during the first 4–6 years of the lifecycle, only construction costs may occur, while in the 40–60 years of operation, costs become higher. Environmentally significant consequences arrive at a later stage. The risk of accidents, waste disposal, and decommissioning costs also need to be taken into account (IEA 2014: p. 364). It is estimated that China, India, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (together with Germany) are the largest importers of coal, with a continuous increase in the amount imported (IEA 2016). Outside the core NEA, Mongolia is currently experiencing a serious livelihood and food crisis arising from a slow-­burning but deadly climate disaster unique to the country, known as a “dzud.” A dzud consists of a summer drought followed by heavy winter snow and particularly cold temperatures during winter and spring. Like the DPRK, Mongolia is suffering due to unsustainable mining (and resource over-­exploitation), which is directly linked to various types of pollution, including air pollution, and contributes directly to global warming and climate change (The Diplomats August 31, 2016).11 Unsurprisingly, Inner Mongolia has the highest level of outdoor air pollution of all of China’s territories, and the adjacent Mongolia is severely affected by trans-­boundary pollution. As discussed in the previous chapter, a green détente has not reached all areas of the NEA yet and remains as political rhetoric. The reality of the wider NEA region exhibits, to a certain degree, a regional version of the North-­South division structure enforcing the pollution-­haven phenomenon that accompanies competitive de-­regulation to ensure survival in the current structure of the international “political

82   Regional air pollution and climate change economy.”12 For this reason, inter alia, the core of the NEA would prefer bilateralism with the relatively poorer regions of Mongolia and North Korea while preserving TEMM. Cooperation on climate-­related issues between the three NEA core countries has gradually strengthened. Japan and South Korea closely cooperated more on climate-­related issues in the 2000s influenced by the overall reconciliation mood between the two nations. Both the Japanese and the ROK governments recognized that engaging China in institutional climate cooperation itself represented progress, given the past refusal of China to discuss any issues related to “trans-­boundary” pollution, and its tendency to regard such discourse as an accusation of primary culpability (author’s interviews, in December 2015 and in August 2016). The Chinese government was so reluctant to admit it emitted the majority of trans-­boundary air pollutants that the use of the term “trans-­ boundary pollution” was regarded as sensitive for a decade or so, and thus it was highly cautious when opting the agenda for TEMM. It is understood among officials that the Chinese government was uncomfortable with China being held directly responsible for the pollution by the ROK and Japan; therefore, regional long-­range air pollution was discussed only obliquely, leaving it as a vague area of cooperation relating only to action on global warming and global climate change. Although the “polluter-­pays” principle (PPP: paying for the damage) has been broadly accepted as an international environmental norm, some regional and international legal cases concerning trans-­boundary environmental conflicts in the NEA had not been filed until the recent case of symbolic litigation claimed by a well-­known environmental activist and an NGO (Korea Green Foundation) leader against the states of China and South Korea (HanGyoRae Shimnun, April 5, 2018).13 In this sense, victims and potential victims have shared the cost of mitigating environmental harm and yet having no other choice but to cooperate as the price of non-­cooperation might become even higher at a later stage. This explains why the NEA, in this particular field of cooperation, barely reached the second stage of in the REDM (the Regional Environmental Development Model), as explained in Chapter 2. Returning to the question of “the polluter pays principle,” it is one of the two important principles of the UNFCCC together with the “common but differentiated responsibilities,” which are inherently conflicting and legitimize major developing countries becoming evasive in the negotiation process. Potential conflict is often avoided at the expense of the installation of tangible regional trans-­boundary regimes; trans-­ boundary disputes are usually resolved through negotiations and based on historical legal cases. A government official commented in interview as follows:  [e]xperts in the field of trans-­boundary pollution often note the lack of a legal mechanism to control trans-­boundary pollution in the NEA. But the Asian way is historically and culturally different from that of the West. We don’t meet to fight; we meet to cooperate. Also, unlike the countries of Western Europe and North America, the territories of China, ROK and Japan are not directly adjacent but divided by seas; therefore,

Regional air pollution and climate change   83 t­ rans-­boundary pollution matters much less and the nature of trans-­ boundary issues should be understood differently. (Author’s interview) This quotation raises the intriguing point that within the ROK’s structure of public administration, responsibility for all maritime affairs (including environment-­related affairs) has been transferred to the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries starting from the Roh Moo-­hyun administration. Therefore, the oceans demarcating the territories are understood as security buffer zones rather than common goods for protection. The recent change in the Chinese government’s attitude toward global climate negotiations reflects its increased willingness to enhance regional cooperation, albeit dependent on the continuation of its current financially favorable situation, and a guarantee of green technology transfer in line with its national interests. This shift stems from a combination of the domestic pressure of mitigation (Wu 2013);14 the government’s new political and diplomatic emphasis on playing a greater role in global politics; economic and trade incentives to adopt green technology and pursue industrial development; and direct financial benefits from various bilateral green-­aid programs offered by Japan and the ROK, as well as from international or regional organizations and banks, notably the GEF, UNEP Asia (regional office), UNESCAP, and the ADB. With the development of environmental governance over the last two or three decades, the number of institutions, organizations, international conventions and agreements, platforms, partnerships, and memoranda of understanding in the environmental arena has rapidly increased. The NEA is no exception. Until today, however, most of the institutions, agreements, and partnerships established are non-­binding and fluid; easy to emerge and quick to disappear. While political agenda respond only slowly to ecological demands, agenda responding to political changes promptly accommodate changing national priorities, which are mostly due to leadership changes and the dynamics of regional politics. In addition to TEMM, the major institutions established to promote regional environmental cooperation include the Northeast Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC), a meeting of senior officials from the ministries of foreign affairs, the Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEACEC),15 the Northeast Asian Centre for Environmental Data and Training, and the Northeast Asian Training Center for Pollution Reduction in Coal-­Fired Power Plants (managed by ESCAP since 2000). A collaborative research project on long-­range trans-­boundary air pollutants (the LTP project) undertaken by representatives of the NEA core countries was reactivated in 1995, and has been relatively operational in the aspect of the “process” of cooperation. Japan also initiated the establishment of the Asia Science Panel on Air and Climate which secured TEMM approval. In addition, institutions and projects with specific environmental purposes were either established under TEMM or suggested during TEMM, such as the Tripartite

84   Regional air pollution and climate change Environmental Education Network, the 2008 DSS Collaborative Research Group (with ten members per country), the Ecological Conservation Project in Northwest China, and the Korean National Environmental Technology and Information Centre (designated as the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation Virtual Centre for Environmental Technology Exchange, APEC-­VS). In the wider Asian context, several forms of regional cooperation initiated or coordinated by the above-­mentioned international organizations have been established. Examples include the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER), Action Network East Asia (ANEA), the Northeast Asia and North Pacific Environmental Forum, the UNESCO-­initiated East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (EABRN), the East Asian Summit Environmental Minister Meeting, the Acid Rain and Emission Reductions in Asia project, and the Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (ECO Asia) that was initiated by Japan in 1991 but short-­lived only until 2007. Despite this rapid rise in the number of institutions for regional cooperation, scientists investigating trans-­boundary air pollution regimes often comment that existing cooperative monitoring and evaluation schemes are highly inefficient due to the considerable overlap in their activities, unhealthy hegemonic competition, non-­transparent budget allocation, and cultural incompatibility of different agencies with similar initiatives. Analysis of TEMM The evolution of TEMM indicates that regional environmental cooperation in the field of climate change among core NEA countries exhibits a mixture of institutional optimism, controlled regional hegemonism (in the absence of the U.S.) and gradually increasing “ecologism.” The TEMM process has recently been disrupted by overlapping institutional exits, unsustainable funding mechanisms, the absence of a permanent secretariat and the limited agency in Asia of its international inter-­governmental members. Although most scholars are skeptical about regional environmental cooperation in the NEA, the results of interviews with experts and government officials and analyses of public policy documents suggest that cautious optimism is warranted regarding the success of TEMM as a core institution in the NEA’s environment­specific cooperation model. NEASPEC is also considered to have successfully addressed a variety of environmental and sustainable-­development issues. However, the central agency for TEMM in each country is the Ministry of the Environment, while that for NEASPEC is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas the environmental ministries of Japan and the ROK play the main roles in TEMM, in China both NEASPEC and TEMM are strictly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, communicating with relevant officials takes much longer in China than in Japan or South Korea, and the administrative and bureaucratic process of establishing agreements is far more cumbersome (author’s interview). Internal tension between ministries is also

Regional air pollution and climate change   85 quite common, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to play a more influential role as a control tower by clearly locating TEMM under the jurisdiction of NEASPEC. When TEMMs are held, the hierarchy of related institutions and initiatives may also be rearranged. Representatives of TEMM regularly and officially acknowledge the progress of EANET and the LTP project, and recognize their contributions to science-­based regional environmental cooperation. With China’s changing attitude toward policy making on air pollution and global climate governance, the relevant question today is not “Why do Northeast Asian countries fail to cooperate?” but “When and what motivates Northeast Asian countries to cooperate despite the many political and technical barriers to this?” The latter question is more broadly linked with the question of why/how an industrialized or industrializing state begins to transition to a greener state, readily pursuing transnational harmonization of environmental standards and regulations. Although there are stark differences between Japan and China, like Japan in the 1980s, China is to some degree stimulated both by the pressure to reduce internal pollution and the diplomatic necessity of accepting China’s new position within a global framework of environmental governance. TEMM has benefited from Beijing’s changing diplomatic strategy, resulting in some visible progress in advancing its agenda. TEMM, as the only trilateral institution, has not been cancelled even during periods of diplomatic tension in the region, for example, during the Sino-­Japan tension over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and more recently Sino-­Korean tension over the THAAD (The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) issue. Exogenous factors play a certain role, notably, the U.S. role in East Asia but TEMM is U.S.-free. In this regard, it is worth noting that the argument for a culturally and attitudinally “Asian” approach to regional cooperation overlooks the U.S. influence in the region. U.S. involvement was somehow considered as a significant barrier in building the NEA region. The absence of the U.S. presence and consequent superpower rivalry in the TEMM process explains the continuity of the institutionalization of environmental regionalism in Asia. In the establishment of other regional institutions and cooperation efforts in Asia, the U.S. has played a decisive role, both directly and indirectly. The process of environmental cooperation has been less influenced by diplomatic whims, and more likely to seek immediate and concrete results. The Chinese government feels fairly comfortable with this relatively exclusive mini-­lateral U.S.-free environmental zone, although Beijing concern has occasionally surfaced about the China-­ostracizing U.S.-ROK-­Japan security alliance until recently. It is also true that the three countries still somehow consider environment-­related issues a non-­political “soft” matter. However, if one country becomes predominant, the other two are likely to discontinue their efforts. In the development of a cooperative regime to resolve the risk of acid rain in the late 1980s, Japan played an important role as an initiator, and took the leadership to shape the earlier form of a regional climate regime. It was around this time the Japanese

86   Regional air pollution and climate change government started to see that positive engagement in environmental development would be beneficial for national interests in various ways. Japan’s turn from an inactive participant to a strong supporter of the Montreal Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer can also be understood in this context. Japan’s road to multilateral environmental negotiations was, …, a significantly bumpy one.… Indeed, Japan for instance did not sign the 1985 Vienna Convention on the protection of the ozone layer, and only after strong international pressure caved in to sign the Montreal Protocol in 1987. Similarly, Japan came under strong European criticism for its responses to international environmental problems, due to the attitude it displayed when participating in groups such as the International Whaling Commission. During the 1989 ministerial conference held in Noordwijk, to which around 70 countries came to discuss climate change, Japan opposed the notion of some developed countries including the Netherlands and Sweden to reduce CO2 emissions by an agreed rate. Only after a political initiative by European countries including the United Kingdom, which established emissions targets, did Japan step down from its initial reluctance and began to seriously consider setting numerical targets for CO2 emissions as a national objective. (Kolmass 2017: pp. 464–465) Further to this constructivist approach, Kolmass stresses external influences more in the process of environmental identity by showing the close interactive constitution between domestic identity building and foreign policy options (pp. 464–465). Suffice it to say that TEMM has functioned with “relative” success as an overarching umbrella institution responsible for controlling and prioritizing regional environmental agenda and selectively recognizing existing projects, institutions, programs, fora, and networks. This indicates that a closed institute such as TEMM can be sustained if all three countries take equal responsibility (leadership sharing and a division of labor) to fulfill its initiatives. None of the three core governments wishes the other two to become closer in any aspect of environmental affairs. In this sense, the leadership of TEMM is not under debate, unlike that of the ROK-­led LTP project and the Japan-­led EANET. TEMM’s recent recognition of and support for the LTP project gradually encouraged China to engage actively in it. China took TEMM as a means of obtaining capital aid and technological transfer (KEI 2005: p. 116). The discussion of “policy infusion” (Biedenkopf et al. 2017), in the context of China’s adoption of the Emission Trading Scheme, shows that “the mirror-­inverted process of policy diffusion – namely, a process through which a mixture of external experiences is infused into the domestic policy process of one specific jurisdiction” (Biedenkopf et al. 2017: pp.  91–114). Through TEMM also, China has shown a successful case of green technology leapfrogging through

Regional air pollution and climate change   87 active interaction not only with the global climate regime but also with regional climate related institutions, effectively absorbing international standards for environmental development. Apart from the leadership balance, the second reason for the relative success and increasing significance of TEMM is linked with rise of environmentalism in China, which arose from both internal and external pressures. Internally, local governments in China are forced to deal with thousands of environment-­related complaints per week from local residents (Shapiro 2012; Economy 2010; Sze 2015; Wills 2010; Womack 2010; Yao 2010; Zhang and Barr 2013; Zeng and Eastin 2011; Carter and Mol 2007; Day 2005). Diplomatic face-­saving has also, albeit temporarily, motivated Beijing to implement more stringent controls on air quality. When the Chinese government was questioned about pollution prior to the Beijing Olympics and more recently during APEC (in November 2014), it expressed an eagerness to ameliorate atmospheric air quality, and implemented every available measure to do so. These measures included coercion to halt the operation of factories near Beijing, the banning of cars entering the city, especially high-­emissions vehicles, and the imposition of harsh fines for violating these mandates. Japan and South Korea took the opportunity to engage China further in pushing forwards cooperation on emissions reduction, pledging green aid for reforestation, data collection and scientific research. This change led to growing institutional optimism about China’s new role within the global climate scene, which was perceived to be aligned with China’s turn toward international multilateralism. The Ministers acknowledged the progress achieved in ongoing cooperative activities in this field, such as EANET and LTP and recognized the need to further expand and intensify the collaborative activities of these mechanisms. They [Members] envisioned that TEMM would play a more active role in promoting regional air pollution control cooperation so as to achieve sustainable development in Northeast Asia. They agreed to share the good practice and efforts on improving regional air quality through the discussion at TPDAP [the Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Air Pollution]. Understanding the significance of the Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) issue as a major environmental challenge in the region, the Ministers urged to strengthen collaboration in the field of DSS. (TEMM7 JC 2015: para. 7) Government officials commented that representatives of the three countries have maintained a close relationship and become much more open in their discussion of the potential for cooperation, due to the Chinese government’s increasing confidence and economic power. “We meet often during the preparation period and all agree that environmental cooperation is the most successful of all kinds of cooperation among the three countries.” However, the officials also mentioned that the fundamental condition for cooperation is that none of the three countries insist on an agenda likely to be rejected by another

88   Regional air pollution and climate change country (author’s interview). Past TEMM agenda and outcome documents reveal that until 2014 (in the 16th TEMM), climate issues were defined vaguely as “domestic” or broadly as “global” environmental issues, rather than linked directly with intra-­regional trans-­boundary air pollution. We expressed our concerns on the negative impact of climate change on sustainable development, ecosystem and the environment. We emphasized the need of making joint efforts to tackle this global challenge by promoting green growth and low carbon society. We recognized that the three countries should strengthen research on co-­benefits, low-­carbon products certification, carbon market and technology development and transfer in the GHG high emitting industries for emissions reductions of the three countries which contribute to addressing global climate change issues as well as achieving the target of the pollution reduction. we also expressed our determination that three countries will work continuously on reaching a fair and effective international climate change arrangement beyond 2012 at the United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark at the end of 2009. (TEMM11 JC 2009: para. 8) However, these priorities changed with the political leaders in the region. During TEMM17 in April 2015, China circulated new and much more comprehensive and strict environmental laws. This also explains China’s growing confidence in participating in TEMM, as its environmental standards are now closer to those of Japan and the ROK, which is essential in ensuring a higher degree of harmonization. It is often pointed out that there is a lack of shared knowledge of and common interest in climate change and other environmental problems in the NEA. ROK and Japanese experts discovered that China was responsible for half of the region’s anthropogenic wet sulphur deposition, but the Chinese government refused to acknowledge these findings, instead pointing out methodological problems with the research. Although the significance of collaborative research on DSS has been consistently acknowledged in TEMM (since the 4th TEMM), a proposal for actual collaborative research was only recently put forward. The Chinese government also recognizes the urgent need to deal with deforestation, which causes not only trans-­boundary long range DSS but domestic pollution. This positive attitude may persist for several years or more as China would still benefit from outside financial and technological contributions. The Ministers noted the importance of researching the measures to control DSS generation from desertified areas and identifying the paths of DSS, and encouraged to exchange relevant data, including hourly PM2.5 monitoring data. For early DSS warning, they agreed to link each country’s DSS forecasting website to the TEMM website. They also encouraged the publication

Regional air pollution and climate change   89 of the significant outcomes produced throughout the cooperation process and the collaboration between the two WGs [Working Groups] to enhance the two groups’ research activities and create synergetic effects. (TEMM16 JC 2014: para.12) Based on the agenda, outcomes, press releases and meetings documented by TEMM (1999–2017), significant positive changes have occurred since the 16th TEMM in 2014. The main developments relating to climate change and air pollution are as follows. Specific pollutants contributing to trans-­boundary air pollution (e.g., fine PM, ozone and volatile organic compounds) have been articulated. Concrete cooperative measures have been identified, with methodological details established for scientific approaches (data collection, information sharing, monitoring and assessment). The potential for partnerships with non-­governmental stakeholders, especially from the business community, has been acknowledged. Finally, specific market-­oriented emission control mechanisms, in line with international standards (carbon capture and storage, the Joint Crediting Mechanism and emissions trading systems), have been acknowledged as effective tools, which has been reassured during the last TEMM in 2017. The Ministers recognized the importance of pursuing greenhouse gas mitigation through market mechanisms, and noted the three countries’ efforts in this respect including the Emission Trading Schemes being operated in Korea, the national emission trading system started in 2017 in China and the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) initiated by Japan. (TEMM19 JC 2017: para. 19) Countries also started to stress the importance of private sector’s engagement, taking a greater responsibility: “Having noted the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the environment, the Ministers agreed to promote cooperation on environmental CSR at the TREB in the future” (TEMM19 JC 2017: para. 24). In the past, the allocation of the financial burden was not an easy task. Budget-­wise, the Japanese government officially favored the principle of equal responsibility and equal contribution. The Chinese government stressed the principles of “voluntary contribution” and “common but differentiated responsibility.” For this reason, countries preferred project-­based format of cooperation at the beginning. “The Ministers … expressed their wishes to have more concrete project-­style cooperation among their three countries in the abovementioned priority areas (TEMM2 JC 2000: para. 5).”16 As a compromise, the ROK government supported “common participation and shared responsibility,” based on the capacity to pay. Apart from the core three NEA, in the cases of wider NEA cooperation, the Russian government favored voluntary payment and an option to pay in kind (UNEP 1996 and 1998). Today, the NEA contains the world’s largest aid donor (Japan), a significant new donor

90   Regional air pollution and climate change Table 3.4 TEMM’s attention and response to air pollution and climate change at three levels

Meeting

Level I: intra-regional

Level II: inter-regional

Level III: global

TEMM4; TEMM5; TEMM7, TEMM10; TEMM11; TEMM15; TEMM16; TEMM17; TEMM18; TEMM19

TEMM9;1 TEMM172

TEMM4; TEMM10; TEMM11; TEMM16; TEMM17; TEMM18; TEMM19

Notes 1 In 2007, at the 9th TEMM, the Ministers “shared the common view that TEMM could contribute to ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. In this regard, they reaffirmed that they will follow-up on the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment” (para. 16). 2 In 2015, at the 17th TEMM, “The Ministers also confirmed their intention to cooperate on [a] green supply chain as a response to the APEC Cooperation Network on Green Supply Chain agreed to be established by APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 2014” (para. 15).

(South Korea) and the most influential emerging unofficial aid donor (China); yet all are to some extent reluctant to contribute to wider “regional” air pollution control. Another irony is that all three governments are among the most enthusiastic in providing development aid in environment-­related fields elsewhere in the world, such as China’s generous provision of aid for hydroelectric dam construction in certain ASEAN countries. My analysis of TEMM agenda and major discussions (Table 3.4) clearly indicates the tendency of all three countries to bypass wider Asian environmental affairs (including those of North Korea, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia); keeping their agenda limited to the three nations. Only very few times to date has a region-­wide environmental issue been mentioned at TEMM. Institution-­wise, there is much room to develop. No permanent secretariat is responsible for coordinating TEMM-­related administration; a simple series of websites has only recently been created. Each participating country has built a website containing some information on TEMM, but the websites are run by different divisions of nations’ ministries, so information on TEMM has not been effectively documented. Slowly, recent years have surely witnessed the phenomenal growth in the number and frequency of collaborative meetings, conferences, fora and workshops in the climate field.

Ongoing disputes and the possibility of governance strengthening Most of the major cities in the NEA have been suffering from PMs over the last few decades. Overall environmental degradation in China due to deforestation, fossil fuel combustion, and other pollutants has been considered as the main cause. However, since 2017 scientists have revealed that although PM from China remains one of the largest contributors (approximately 35 percent) to air pollution in South Korea, coal-­fired power plants generate enormous amounts

Regional air pollution and climate change   91 of pollutants. With the turn of a socialist-­leaning government in South Korea, the general public’s welfare and quality of life have been re-­emphasized and enhancing environmental quality has become a crucial issue. The city of Seoul recognized the PM issue as a “disaster.” In June 2017, the city government announced that, benchmarking French Minister Segolene Royale’s policy, when PM levels rise to a certain level (average density over 50 µg/m3 at average density), public transportation within the city during peak time would be free of charge, starting from July 2017. The policy was to be extended to include Seoul metropolitan areas linking Gyeonggi Province and the Incheon rail link. However, these measures can be categorized only as an adaptation more than a fundamental mitigation, similarly with a variety of other adaptation policies such as providing protective masks, air purifiers and the exemption of class attendance for pre-­school children. With great pressure and criticism from citizens, for mitigation, the government recently lowered levels for PM alerts from 9 µg/m3 to over 75 µg/m3 continuing longer than two hours, in tandem with the implementation of harsher restrictions on high emitting automobiles, gradually phasing them out in a newly set scale of environment-­friendly cars. The city will also apply harsher standards on industrial sites, and in collaboration with major cities (Boryong, Taean, Dangjin, Secheon) where coal-­fired plants operate the metropolitan government plans to examine and control emissions (Chosun Ilbo, June 1, 2017).17 If applying the REDM (explained in Chapter 2), members stayed in Stage II until very recently, asserting that China was the sole major cause of PMs. In so much as Beijing puts a high priority on any agenda of greening the state, more accurate scientific analyses are required on the origin of trans-­boundary PMs, beyond abstract blame games between members. The NEA’s cooperation level moves toward Stage III where countries recognize and accept the problem and make efforts to internalize externalities. The important condition for this transition from Stage II to Stage III would be at least all participating countries to have more or less an equal level of awareness of risks and confidence in dealing with trans-­boundary issues “collaboratively.” Reflecting such a change, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently indicated Beijing’s extended concern over non-­traditional security issues including nuclear safety disaster management.18 The politics of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia If higher standards for regional cooperation are set by defining cooperation more narrowly and using results-­based, rather than process-­based assessments, environmental cooperation in the NEA could be considered simply “unsuccessful.” Previous research in this field has provided much ground for skepticism regarding future cooperation in the region; some (if not all) of which is valid. Among the most frequently cited barriers to regional cooperation are the geopolitics of the NEA and countries’ differing political interests. The founding

92   Regional air pollution and climate change of EANET offers a useful illustration. Whereas Japan was enthusiastic from the outset, China and South Korea were initially reluctant. Japan and South Korea have normally been the instigators of such institutions, but the Japanese government prefers broader regional cooperation (such as with countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region), whereas the South Korean government favors a more closed, within-­region model. Japan exercises its leadership as the main financial contributor to Southeast Asian countries, making its activities more visible in wider regional fora, although the government of South Korea has aspired to act as a leader, initially mediating between China and Japan. Nam (2002) observed that Japan was at the beginning reluctant to cooperate through TEMM due to leadership competition, as it exercised greater influence in partnerships including ASEAN countries (Harris 2002: p. 185). However, the situation has since changed rapidly. China’s influence on ASEAN countries (as well as other Asian regions, such as Central Asia, Mongolia and the Russian Far East) today has become stronger than that of Japan. Among the important, albeit implicit, issues raised in the environmental arena are the allocation of responsibility for trans-­boundary air pollution, and the cost to each country of cooperation and mitigation. While South Korea is the country that is most affected by air pollution originating in China, it has the weakest bargaining power; it is victimized by and disconnected from North Korea due to critical information asymmetry. Although North Korea is even more severely affected by trans-­boundary pollution, the South Korean government has more incentive to cooperate and thus is more willing to pay. Such a pattern is not explicable if using rationalist calculations of costs (especially transaction costs in the field of cooperation) as many intangible motivations are involved apart from calculable national interests such as nationalism, aspirations for fundamental peace or purely ecological believes. This is one of the reasons why environmental economists’ analyses on state’s action for climate change have often turned out to be lowest among other agenda. Even if considering transaction costs involved in cooperative process, “regionalism” helps reducing costs for participation in global environmental regimes if institutions are well designed, effectively filtering those duplicated tasks when individual countries are bilaterally connected with international actors or playing insignificant roles in global regime strengthening. Unlike other areas of regional cooperation, environmental cooperation in a given region requires scientific and statistical data on environmental damage, which is followed by agreements (with strong commitment) on data exchange, the establishment of institutions to take follow-­up action, the involvement of relevant international organizations to provide neutral assistance, and cost calculation and risk distribution. All of these processes demand “political” decision-­making. For geopolitical and ecological reasons, the South Korean government is more enthusiastic than that of North Korea about institutionalized environmental cooperation. The ROK’s endeavors to initiate collaborative research on the Jangbai/Baekdu mountain volcano, which naturally requires the involvement of the DPRK, can be understood in this context (KEI 2013: p. 233). Similarly, the recent introduction

Regional air pollution and climate change   93 of adaptation activities, such as the cooperative management of natural disasters, to TEMM agenda supported by all three members indicates that the region’s approach to climate change is balancing global abstract diplomatic rhetoric with localized substantive concerns. Climate-­security discourse has broadly developed from abstract to concrete as a result of China’s recognition of the problem of trans­boundary air pollution. With official recognition and support, sublevel climate-­ related institutions have also begun to function. Previous researchers investigating environmental cooperation within the NEA have tended to demonstrate either excessive optimism or excessive skepticism; meanwhile, related political-­science research is largely detached from environmental concerns. As mentioned earlier, if the standard norm of cooperation involves democratic governance and a high degree of integration, similar to cooperation efforts in the EU or North America, there should be myriad reasons for the NEA’s apparent failure to cooperate relative to the ideal case, which itself can never be realized. Definitions of cooperation involve the high possibility of ad hoc, issue-­specific processes, whereas governance implies more of a procedural phenomenon by multi-­layered players. On the other hand, regime connotes government-­led (government-­to-government) entities, while the government itself signifies a conventional political entity (governing body of state). Lastly, integration usually means a process resulting from a further degree of cooperation. The competing priorities of different nations are a widely cited reason for the absence of cooperation. Almost all researchers in this field have discussed this problem in a great detail, highlighting differences in the level of economic development, political systems, environmentalism, environmental governance, NGO participation and communication, the maturity of nationalism and the presence of a common regional identity and solidarity (Rozman 2007: pp. 221–227; Katzenstein 1997; Nam 2002). Yet it remains unclear why attempts at cooperation persist in the NEA. All three core countries strive to limit the effects of political turmoil on the activities of TEMM, and officials have built a good level of mutual trust, reaching an implicit consensus that the institution should be retained regardless of political and diplomatic changes (author’s interview). The deputy minister rather than the environment minister of China participated in the 15th and 16th TEMMs, as the government was displeased with the Japanese government’s purchasing of Senkaku/ Diaoyu in September 2012. However, as mentioned briefly in the previous section, this in fact demonstrates the willingness of the Chinese government to maintain environmental cooperation separate from political concerns. It establishes a good contrast with the event that the 2013 and 2014 meetings of the Trilateral Summit19 were cancelled for the same reason during that period. Although the replacement of ministers symbolically demonstrated China’s disapproval of the Japanese government’s behavior, substantial environmental cooperation took place during this period. It is commonly believed that individual countries in the NEA lack the will to cooperate, due to conflicting political agenda. On the contrary, motivation to cooperate and awareness of the need for cooperation are high in the region

94   Regional air pollution and climate change (which is ecologically well-­informed). Although all three core governments would deny this proposition, hegemonism plays a key role in the process of regional environment-­related institutionalization (the geopolitics of governance) in the absence of consensual leadership. Related to this, competition between the three NEA core countries is much more noticeable than cooperation, potentially giving a false impression in the international environmental arena. In East Asia, political rhetoric linking the environment to security can be traced back to the late 1990s, when Japan’s foreign minister and later Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, emphasized human security in many of his speeches. This relationship became especially prominent in the context of regional problems: the haze crisis of 1997–1998, arising from hazardous forest fires in Indonesia, generated diplomatic quarrels between the governments of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, leading to a US$9.3 billion loss in the region (during the Asian financial crisis). As a result, several countries agreed to look beyond the traditional notion of security (Connors et al. 2011: p.  63). Likewise, the difficulties created by the DPRK constitute both an opportunity for and a constraint on regional cooperation; security is simultaneously a barrier to and motivation for cooperation. Conflict cooperation and integration for synergy: from a loose nexus to thick symbiosis The title of this book states “Conflict and Cooperation,” assuming their close interaction. In the NEA, conflict and cooperation in regional environmental affairs are not sufficiently integrated with each other. This prevents opportunities for vigorous and transparent ways of searching for solutions based on what are the real environmental issues beyond national boundaries. Concerning the cooperative sides of the environment and security, Kütting (2011) argues that “security” is likewise advanced if successful cooperation resolves a particular environmental dispute, which may contribute to instability or reduce the well-­ being of countries. It continues arguing that “[i]f cooperation (like conflict) is to become an important analytical concept in the subfield of environmental security, then we must better understand how and when scarcity and degradation affect inter-­state coordination and how environmental negotiations succeed or fail” (Kütting 2011: p. 56, cited from Ostrom 1999; Young 1989, 1994; Barrett 2005). In order for the NEA to play a significant role as a cluster and building bloc in the process of global regime strengthening (REDM Stage V), harmonization of regional standards as a first step over region-­specific issues and patterns of cooperation is needed. Examples include the areas of emerging nuclear energy-­ related technology and risk management based on accidents, dealing with trans-­ boundary PMs overcoming power disparities among states, managing natural resources between regional North and regional South, dealing with the evaluation of the impact of China’s changing status in climate-­induced issues, adapting to the prevalent top-­down way of policy-­making reflected in regional

Regional air pollution and climate change   95 governance, and trade and commercial interests as means to achieve ecological improvements. Nuclear issues related both to weapons and to energy sources are predominant across NEA nations. North Korea, a nuclear-­weapons state, is a country most suffering from the lack of an electricity supply for industries and people’s daily use, relying for 90 percent of its resources from exports. While the nuclear issue is one of the most crucial linked matters between the environment and security (Häyrynen 2003) in the NEA region, any DPRK-­ related issues have hardly been mentioned at the regional cooperation table. Recently, it was reported that “North Korea’s nuclear test site has collapsed” causing massive ecological consequences due to the mountain’s collapse (The South China Morning Post, April 25, 2018),20 which certainly puts all neighboring countries under a severe risk of radioactive exposure not only the people in the affected areas in the community. On the question of how far TEMM would be interested in including any prominent issues related to the DPRK-­caused environmental risks, an official answered that such issues had never been included on the agenda for security reasons. He added his own personal view, intriguingly saying that such issues would become a sovereignty issue as the DPRK is part of Korea and thus should be regarded as a domestic problem. However, bypassing urgent “regional issues” (in terms of impact on the NEA) can be easily noticed not only with the DPRK but with other resource-­rich neighboring countries surrounding the NEA. Although the harm to ASEAN from the NEA, for example, air pollution is not an exclusive harm on the NEA, it is an important trans-­boundary harm for the region of Asia. Deforestation and rampant logging are caused by those countries’ mismanagement of their own natural resources. However, the three members of the NEA, as main importers of timber and other forest extracted goods, have established this regional economic system. Meanwhile, South Korea is also undergoing a transitory period in terms of energy transformation, from heavy reliance on fossil fuels to alternative or renewable sources. Given that society is not fully ready for a smooth transition to a dramatic increase in renewable sources, nuclear power remains as a crucial resource, in spite of rapidly rising anti-­nuclear power groups within the country. Notably, nuclear power in this region cannot be purely an environmental issue inevitably linked with conventional security issues. Some liberal-­leaning scholars and experts warn the ROK not to give up nuclear energy development for the sake of striking a balance of retaining uranium and plutonium that might be spread to non-­liberal states that have the will to develop nuclear technology, which might cause further disasters for the world, breaking the current balance (The Economist, September 7, 2017).21 Emerging discourse has divided society among radical ecologists, in-­betweens, weapon-­energy rationalist and conservatives, similar to that regarding the THAAD. The THAAD system is another area that reflects the security dilemma and contradictions between security and the environment, which has emerged in ROK society over the past years. In the midst of Beijing’s pressure on the ROK government, the then

96   Regional air pollution and climate change newly established Moon Jae-­in government delayed a deployment decision because of an insufficient environmental impact analysis. Yet, even today people in Seongju, South Korea, strongly oppose the installation over environmental risks. Limitations on democratic regional environmental governance Social-­level ecologism is rooted in collective peace movements, more specifically linked with anti-­nuclear and anti-­war campaigns witnessed in the U.S., Germany, France, and Japan in the 1960s. Whereas such movements in Europe generated coalitions and regional networks among neighboring countries, in East Asia regionally collective social movements among civic society actors is rare. When discussing the extent to which environmental cooperation can be achieved, another issue of note is the inclusion of civic society. A lack of participation by non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) is often cited as a barrier to the construction of a multilateral cooperative regime. Region-­wide NGOs in the NEA have established networks since the 1990s. In 1995, NGOs from seven countries – China, South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Russia – established the Atmospheric Action Network East Asia. Another network, the Asia-­Pacific NGO’s Environmental Conference (APNEC), has also connected civic society in the Asia-­Pacific region since 1991, with annual conferences held in major cities. Among the relevant NGOs in the NEA are the Northeast Asian Forest Forum, the Eco-­Peace Network in East Asia, the ROK-­China Future Forest Centre, the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement, the Japan Foundation Asia Centre (Korea-­Japan River Restoration Project), and the Federation of Northeast Asia Environmental Culture (initiated by members of the ROK’s National Assembly). In 2000, members of NEACEC and NEASPEC decided to promote the participation of NGOs, but the contribution of civic society to official regional environmental cooperation is generally still strictly and selectively guided by governments. In contrast with the North Amer­ican Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) under the North Amer­ican Free Trade Agreement, TEMM lacks a permanent secretariat. This limits the establishment of democratic environmental governance, as a permanent secretariat may help to coordinate multi-­stakeholders’ participation beyond the intervention of national governments (Goldschmidt 2002). In this regard, the ongoing litigation cases raised by Korean NGO representatives against the Chinese and South Korean governments over their inaction or ineffective action on PM problems that kill millions of people per year in the region is instructive. Cases had been dismissed in several courts over one-­and-a-­half years before finally getting a first trial hearing (Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 2018).22 There is little plausibility that the Chinese court will admit the blunders or negligence of the Chinese authorities to protect non-­Chinese citizens. Nevertheless, this kind of action (filing such a case per se) is symbolically important as part of a campaign process; by raising the public’s awareness, enhancing communication between the government and

Regional air pollution and climate change   97 civic societies beyond national boundaries, and urging governments to reform the litigation process for similar environmental cases. With the exception of the input of a few civic-­society organizations, NGOs contribute little to the “official” process of regional environmental cooperation. Given that there are several hundreds of environment-­related NGOs in the NEA three countries, only carefully selected representatives of large environmental NGOs are often invited to certain minor events. Therefore, their participation is nominal, and NEA governments are generally sensitive about the possibility of NGOs’ forming alliances and organizing spill-­over activities on region-­wide issues (author’s interview). Consequently, the region-­wide non-­governmental environmental network still remains weak. Increasing transparency and public participation may lead to more cooperative agreements on long-­term environmental initiatives. The NAAEC is often considered a good example of the establishment of regional environmental cooperation by building democratic governance. Through the NAAEC, individual citizens can file complaints with the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, and NGOs can mobilize citizens to exert pressure on governments and communicate worldwide (Goldschmidt 2002). However, the interaction between state and civic society in East Asia is still governed in an authoritarian manner both nationally and regionally. Japan and South Korea underwent rapid industrialization much earlier than China, and their respective governments encountered strong opposition from the public over environmental-­health issues that directly affected social welfare, such as hazardous industrial pollution. Consequently, environmental activism continued to grow within both Japan and South Korea, and environmental issues now receive widespread public attention (Mason 1999; Schreurs 2002). Particularly in Japan, civic society played a crucial role in raising the issue of acid rain, which causes ecological damage and human illnesses. Indeed, this challenge motivated “regional” trans-­boundary pollution control by pushing the government to react, finally leading to the establishment of EANET in 1998 (see Wilkening 1999).23 This is often cited as a good model of regional cooperation in the NEA. Meanwhile, Japan provided China with generous financial assistance to develop its energy sector and to encourage the government to engage in multilateral cooperation with bilateral assistance, for example the Sino-­Japan Environmental Protection Cooperation Agreement of 1994. More recently, the ROK contributed environmental aid to China, and was listed as an official donor country by the OECD Development Committee. This accelerated cooperative projects in various environmental fields, notably reforestation in selected regions in China. More recently, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster and consistent with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s agenda, the participation of Japan’s civic society has been renewed, promulgating anti-­nuclear and pacifist activities, and encouraging major international NGOs to make wider Asian connections on nuclear issues.24 This discussion on the development of civic society in the environmental field reveals that awareness of environmental issues is not lacking in the NEA. Instead, governments have been insufficient in accommodating NGOs as partners in

98   Regional air pollution and climate change decision-­making on regional issues, regarding their activities as a potential source of conflict rather than cooperation (Kalland and Persoon 1998; Barrett 2005: pp. 16–20; Dobson and Saiz 2005; Callison 2015). A gulf in communication exists not only between the government and civic society but between international environmental NGOs dispatched to Asia and indigenous environmental NGOs, as the former have their own mission agenda to fulfill, whereas the latter are concerned with more immediate local or regional issues. A gap in communication also exists between state bureaucrats and the science community. Climate scientists have commented that far more research is required on trans-­boundary pollutants and the effects of individual pollutants on ecological environments and human health. There is still a lack of systematic scientific knowledge on region-­specific climate change in the NEA. The scientists involved often seem frustrated by the incoherent and inefficient policies governing information exchange, which make it impossible to systematically build and share knowledge. As the NEA has various political systems, and an authoritarian culture continues to govern public administration, such as in environmental decision-­making, overcoming the barriers to research under the current top-­down institutional system of environmental cooperation could be a very daunting task. The quest for balanced “democratization” may affect regionalism in the long term. The current institutional system and neoliberal market approach in the NEA are not conducive to the democratization of governance, due to an odd hybrid of authoritarianism and pluralism; therefore, rigid sovereignty-­based realpolitik and increasing neoliberalism coexist in various areas of environmental affairs. The traditional non-­interventionist logic has been partly superseded, but is still deployed depending on the national interest to ensure that cooperation does not incur conflict in the environmental arena. Inter-­dependency and cooperation in this region are not structural but political: controlled by the will of various governments.25 Recently, cities as substate actors have been active. This has been modeled after the worldwide movements of mayors’ coalition (the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement), given that major cities are the most significant sources of pollution. In July 2014, 17 cities formed the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, a coalition of global cities committed and actively working to reducing GHG emissions by at least 80 percent by 2050 (Chasek et al. 2017: pp. 58–61). Among the 17 cities, Yokohama is also included, the only East Asian city in the group. Taking this modality, connecting more cities within the NEA region could help enormously in reducing carbon emissions. This becomes more plausible given that, although it is still rudimentary, all three core NEA members have introduced the Emission Trading System (ETS). Increasing the participating cities together with efforts to harmonize rules during the earlier stages of set up would be one efficient way to go further. Is bilateralism a barrier or a facilitator? Whatever their underlying motivation, the six NEA countries have made individual bilateral environmental agreements with other countries. The Russia-­Japan

Regional air pollution and climate change   99 (1991), China-­DPRK (1992), and ROK-­Japan (1993) agreements involve annual meetings for cooperation on the protection of migratory birds, and joint projects on endocrine-­disrupting chemicals and water-­quality improvement. The ROK-­ Russia (1994) and ROK-­China agreements involve joint research and information exchange on the Yellow Sea and acid rain. In addition, a China-­Russia agreement has been established. In May 2014, when Putin came to China to attend the fourth summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), he and President Xi signed the China–Russia Joint Statement on a New Stage of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination, … promising a broad range of measures of economic cooperation in fields including energy, electricity, aviation, communication and local government cooperation. The single most significant achievement to emerge from Putin’s first trip to China after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis is a 30-year deal for the supply of Russian natural gas to China. Talks about this deal had been going on for about ten years and had repeatedly stalled over pricing issues. The ultimate conclusion of this agreement is therefore regarded as a marker of strategic progress in Sino-­Russian relations. (Wu 2016: p. 859) Bilateral, “mini-­lateral” and multilateral forms of cooperation on environmental projects are also inextricably linked with the flow of environmental official development assistance (ODA). Japan has a long history of pursuing environmental projects through ODA, starting with the 1991 Green Aid Plan, which effectively consolidated Japan’s bilateral environmental cooperation with Russia and China in the 1990s. In 1998, 10 billion yen was allocated to a program for technical-­capacity building in China in the broadly-­defined environmental field. The international community is increasingly concerned that China and South Korea might follow Japan’s pattern of linking environmental ODA with natural-­resource extraction and large infrastructure projects (Brettell and Kawashima 1998: pp. 98–102). An increasing number of ad hoc collaborative projects and agreements have been established bilaterally, not only between government agencies but between quasi-­public agencies, members of the science community, national think-­tanks and non-­profit research institutes. Among these projects/agreements are the following: Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection (1993); the Korea-­Japan Environmental Cooperation Joint Committee (signed by representatives of Korea’s National Institute of Environmental Research and Japan’s National Institute for Environmental Studies); the Seoul Declaration on Environmental Ethics; Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Government of the ROK and the Government of the PRC (1993); the Korea-­China Joint Environmental Cooperation Committee; Environmental Agreement between Japan and China (1994), from which

100   Regional air pollution and climate change originated an Environmental Cooperation Treaty and an agreement to pursue joint research and exchange observational data on acid rain; Global Atmospheric Chemistry in Kosan 2000; and the Steering Committee for the Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem, which is also open to North Korea. Existing bilateral institutions can serve as building block for wider regional level cooperation, enlarging networks not only in quantity but also in quality as more concrete issues could establish the basis for further cooperation. Bypassing regions and responding to global environmental regimes Given the seriousness of air pollution in numerous regions worldwide, the three levels of response (domestic, bilateral, and global) are insufficient. While the core NEA countries are making efforts to strengthen their cooperation, in the past few years the EU has been active in searching for opportunities to expand inter-­regional networks, mobilizing all levels of stakeholders with the view to launching an EU-­ Korea regional platform to implement the EU’s Low Carbon Economy initiative, in addition to the similar previously established platforms, such as the China-­EU and Japan-­EU platforms. The relationship between individual NEA countries and other regions, notably ASEAN, are governed by a similar logic. At the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum, many environmental issues are dealt with, such as haze, the marine environment, forest management, coral, fresh water, environmental education, technology, and clean production. At present, considering the REDM stage of the NEA, while the three core NEA governments are willing to retain the umbrella institution of TEMM as the minimum institutionalization, all three would prefer to cooperate with other regions (e.g., North America, the EU, Central Asia, and ASEAN) on a hybrid basis (one country to one region) rather than according to a “region to region model.” However, in the future, inter-­regional institutionalization may also help in reinforcing intra-­regional level cooperation. An example of multi-­level hybrid (actor-­wise) cooperation would be with the EU through, for example, the Asia Europe Environmental Forum 2017 (ASEM). Some level of inter-­regional environmental cooperation has evolved, for example, the EU-­Asia cooperation, case study (ICLEI Energy-­safe Cities initiatives by the EU). ICLEI, the initiative of Local Governments for Sustainability, located in Bonn, Germany has launched different programmes, such as the Green Climate Cities (GCC) program, the Urban Low Emission Development Strategies (Urban-­LEDS), and the Energy-­safe Cities Initiative. The ICLEI Energy-­safe Cities Initiative aims at initiating a rapid transformation to low-­carbon, resilient, and safe urban energy systems with East Asian local governments. Through this multi-­year, multi-­stage program, local governments from the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia and the Republic of Korea shall explore locally specific and sustainable pathways for attaining 100% renewable energy supply systems by the year 2030. (Local Governments for Sustainability 2015)

Regional air pollution and climate change   101 The above-­indicated EU-­funded initiative takes a non-­governmental multi-­ stakeholder approach to mobilize a green economy (carbon market). Although the EU is governmental institution, the Commission particularly searched a way to cooperate with the private sector rather than government-­to-government cooperation, excluding from the projects all government agencies or quasi-­ governmental agencies. The EU sees the NEA market as an economic dynamic for green technology and market expansion (The Economist, March 15, 2018).26 While I myself was participating in the project, interviews have revealed that EU-­side actors are ready to actively participate, but the Korean-­side actors were rather reluctant and at times uncomfortable about the intention, as if information was being leaked to the EU for its expansion into the domestic market. Such concerns are much less in the case of China as a more centralized state. China effectively controlled the channel of cooperation, concentrating on in-­bound projects to a few state-­designated institutions. Closer cooperation between relevant EU institutions and the NEA may bring more benefits in the future, as the NEA has produced models of EU institutions such as the CLRTAP, EMEP, ESPOO Convention, and NAAEC.

Development opportunities and ecological challenges Broadly, inter-­state cooperation can be divided into three aspects, forms of cooperation, procedures, and substances. Expectation on outcomes would vary depending on which aspect of cooperation is considered. Forms usually refer to various fora, platforms, institutions, non-­binding agreements, and monitoring mechanisms. The procedural aspect includes various types of communication, meetings and subsequent documentation of outcomes, negotiations, information/ data exchanges, region-­wide collective action, reporting and target indication. The substantial aspect of cooperation would mean materialized results such as “binding” treaties, harmonization of standards, domestication and policy implementation, and finally regionally accepted concrete principles. Spillover phenomena (in terms of membership, issues and actors) could occur in any of the aspects until a regional core is established. If the regional core in substance is firm, spillovers become more significant and influential, reaching the final stage of the REDM. For this reason, the NEA’s pattern of cooperation can be described as regionalization as opposed to a solid form of regionalism. Erroneously, “flexibility, inclusiveness, or non-­interventionism” are often discussed as if they are widely accepted region-­specific principles in East Asia. Those may explain the “features” of NEA countries’ inter-­state cooperation, not to be understood as “principles” as such, by which countries nurture regionalism with a view of achieving a better stage of regional environmental development. In this regard, flexibility is often used as evasive justification for non-­compliance, comfortably opting-­out agenda items. In the NEA, inclusiveness has been practiced as a means to expand hegemonic power without forming a substantial core between members. Non-­ interventionism has been a tool to protect eco-­nationalism (nationwide NIMBY), overlooking inter-­linked trans-­boundary ecological issues.

102   Regional air pollution and climate change In Japan and South Korea, environmental policy and regulations are highly developed; likewise, green technology is advanced and green R&D together with green industries is flourishing. However, emissions levels and use of natural resources (oil and gas) still remain high, which proves that raising energy efficiency backed by green technology does not necessarily lead society to a more sustainable economic growth, contrary to what technological optimism would argue (Greenstone and Looney 2012). “Policy outcome” forms another story when discussing actual achievements in environmental performance. Government-­led policy outcomes are often used as a green shield to escape from internal pressure and external criticism. If taking into account only the list of environmental policy frameworks, legislations, and laws, the three NEA states should be the greenest states on the planet. “Without a fundamental societal level of indigenous environmentalism,” these neoliberal green states may need to go mining outside their country more, construct and export more nuclear plants and technology, increasing distance fishing, and so on. China’s rising role in the global climate change regime and ecological implications With Beijing’s increasing role in the developing world, China’s environmental laws have become more aligned with international standards, becoming definitely tighter and stricter domestically, particularly since the 2014 reform.27 The basic principles behind the Environmental Protection Law underwent major revisions as the underlying legal concept was transformed. This new law will establish the principle that environmental protection comes first. This stands in contrast to the previous requirement that environmental protection work be coordinated with economic and social development, and the current regulation requiring economic development to be coordinated with environmental protection. The instruction to “hold fast to the ecological red line” made at the 18th National People’s Congress was written into the current draft of the law, reflecting the government’s intention to hold onto “ecological security” baselines. This allows for the legalisation, institutionalisation and specification of the propositions made by the 18th NPC. (China Dialogue, April 23, 2014) However, similar to any other advanced economy, domestic environmental reform does not automatically guarantee China’s ecological performance outside its territory, and rather there is a growing concern about worsening current disparities (the clean-­inside pollute-­outside logic of eco-­nationalism and internal regional disparity). China’s practice of development outside its territory has been criticized for its aggressive neo-­mercantilist approach in natural resources diplomacy, which can be described, at this stage, as selective use of green rhetoric. In order to meet

Regional air pollution and climate change   103 reduction targets by 2020, tightening domestic regulations are insufficient, thus, scholars (e.g., Reilly 2011) raised related concerns on the consequences of China’s efforts to green itself. The implications of China’s confidence of meeting the target would mean: first, increased mining in developing countries for more aggressive natural resources extraction across continents. Adding to that, this may intensify carbon leakage within the region, combined with strong eco-­nationalism while “considering national ecological development” and ignoring possible adverse effects of trans-­boundary harm to other countries. Another rising disparity stems from the selective and flexible use of green imperialism rhetoric (dual environmental standards), spreading environmentalism ideology across developing countries in order to maximize the country’s own national interest. This is more applicable to biodiversity-­related issues. In the field of the global biodiversity regime, China still plays the dual role of being a powerful developing country backed by a large veto group, biodiversity-­rich strong-­sovereignty advocators. Raising nuclear power capacity in the NEA would not be deterred by its civic society given that, in China, society’s risk perception of nuclear development is far lower than other major nuclear power countries in terms of energy generation. In Japan and South Korea, societal anti-­nuclear movements have not yet been powerful enough to influence government policies. Increasing hydroelectric-­dam constructions with ever-­growing infrastructure projects both inside and outside China also causes massive ecological damage. In addition, there is a danger of abusing the environment as an additional dominance tool, both internally and externally, to selectively control industries, not only domestic firms but also foreign firms operating on Chinese soil. For example, carbon taxing and ETS within the Chinese market can also be a governing tool to control, selectively and effectively, certain private enterprises whenever necessary, often linking this with trade and security issues in the case of foreign firms (e.g., Chinese government authorities’ accusing Korean cosmetic companies for the level of chemical concentrations in the midst of a THAAD-­induced dispute). Equity issues are also involved, since China’s newly operating ETS is in fact implemented only in affluent major cities. As a result, the state’s stricter regulations imposed on these areas would connote only already developed urban areas will be better protected from environmental pollution. Another negative scenario would be that polluting industries would not have the burden of government legal pressure or bear the cost of emissions reductions as market measures (based on mutual consensus or agreements), meaning the carbon market would not be fully internalized in a stable manner. Thus, polluting industries will be indirectly encouraged to relocate to the countryside, mostly poorer areas where regulations are disproportionately looser, or poorer countries outside China (in a “race to the bottom” both at a country and global level), overlooking regulations and selectively following international norms. In this respect, China’s use of multilateralism in the environmental arena has been selective and is revealing contradictions, being employed as a tool to build the state’s indirect “institutional power” (see, for example, Barnett and Duvall 2005, for conceptualization of various types of state power).

104   Regional air pollution and climate change In order to avoid this, restrictions need to be imposed evenly across the nation. Scholars (Gilley 2012) often point out, in regard to policy failure, that China adopts the mechanism of “a centralized policy outcome with de-­ centralized policy implementation.” Nevertheless, China has become sufficiently centralized with legal mechanisms that can control local governments more effectively, thus undoubtedly, developing an environmental design will enhance equitable distribution of environmental goods (Bättig and Bernauer 2009). Some Australian commentators also raise issue with Beijing’s arbitrary “supply chain emissions control,” based on internationally recognized ethical justifications for sustainable development. China may more easily control the import quantity of natural resources from certain countries and vice versa (e.g., rare earth disputes with Japan and South Korea in the early 2010s). Also, regionally, China’s entering the ETS zone together with the Japan and South Korea covers the largest amount of CO2 globally, competing with the EU ETS. For this reason since 2015, the EU has been working on the above explained inter-­regional projects in view of integrating the South Korean ETS with the EU ETS. This could generate more complicated competition in this new world carbon market. However, if carefully designed, such partial integration may help intra- and inter-­regional environmental cooperation through harmonization of mechanisms.

Theoretical implications In focusing on the theoretical implications of the functional effect of global regimes, regime theories are useful to explain China’s changing role to some extent. The interaction between China and the global climate regime could be a success story, engaging Beijing into internationalized environmentalism. Regime theories and neoliberalism, to some extent, explain China’s changing role in global climate negotiations. International pressure and China’s well planned interactions between the global climate regime (through capacity building) shaped its climate policy and effectively changed its role. This in turn influenced Chinese society and raised environmental awareness, while trade also contributed to the private sector playing a significant role in the global green market (see, e.g., Zeng and Eastin 2011; Wagner 2004; Ekins 2003). According to ecological modernization theory (e.g., Barrett), the stage of “international pressure” (policy diffusion) occurs in the final stage of evolution, after undergoing periods of “laissez-­faire,” “denial of the externalities” and “acceptance of constraints and implementation of ecological modernization.” Contrarily, the Chinese model, similar to Japan’s case, ecological modernization has been proceeded with as a top-­town phenomenon showing a reversed process. In addition, as functionalist regime theory may explain, some level of spillover effects occurred concurrently across different regimes or in spillovers to other member countries (persuasion of swing countries such as India and Brazil). In global aid governance, China played a great role of generating a new modality of aid partnership (e.g., South-­South cooperation, or triangular

Compromise (focusing on economic interests)

Cooperation (focusing on regime building and institutions)

Conflicts (focusing on politics and conventional security)

Carbon leakage; anti-globalism; anti-trade; anti-growth (e.g., de-growth movements)

Marxist view on global divisions with ecological implications of equity in resource-sharing

Procedural reforms; risk communication; inter-connecting regimes; rise of environmentalism as a social and cultural movement State’s active intervention in designing regulatory policy creating green markets; diversifying actors and mobilizing networks to harmonize environmental standards to facilitate economic development Technological development; technology transfer for mitigation

Neo-functionalist CF constructivism (spillovers across issues)

Neo-liberal middle-of-road approach (sustainable development enforced by green growth and blue economy)

“Active” technological optimism (innovation, green technology transfer)

Classical liberal functionalist (ecological integration under Green industry; transferring environmental standards regional/global norms) through trade; eco-innovation; promoting green growth; developing and expanding the ETS

Energy transition to renewables; nuclear risks; human health

Issues related to climate change

Republican realism-oriented view (NIMBY and green protectionism)

Theoretical orientation (region as a political unit)

Table 3.5  Application of theories to regional climate change-related issues

106   Regional air pollution and climate change partnerships). In this sense, China has certainly reshaped some aspect of world order, creating a Chinese way in the international aid community. Some experts observe (e.g., Shapiro 2001, 2012; Zhang and Barr 2013) that non-­participatory top-­down government-­imposed environmental policy options (in the absence of full-­fledged societal-­level ecologism) may create wider disparities, contradictions, and unpredictability in the course of implementing such policy options. The aim of this chapter was to assess the extent to which NEA countries cooperate in tackling air pollution and climate change by analyzing institutionalized cooperation efforts and the evolution of environmental governance in the region. In addition, it explored the question of why institutions such as TEMM continue to exist despite many political, financial, and other barriers. The core NEA countries cooperate continuously, particularly on climate change-­related issues (see Table 3.5 for theoretical frames and categorization of the regional climate issues). Climate change is regarded as a global problem with significant adverse effects in many aspects of our life. Evidence is becoming clear that industrial pollution incurs high economic and social costs, including damage to a state’s image. As a result, all three countries have become keen to play greater roles in global environmental governance. Increased awareness of the ecological consequences of trans-­boundary pollution and the visible and invisible benefits of regional cooperation has motivated collaboration between the three core countries.

Notes   1 “China tops world for air pollution and carbon emissions, officials admit Beijing-­Tianjin-Hebei one of planet’s most polluted regions, but lack of funding hampers  progress on 2017 clean-­up targets,” www.scmp.com/news/china/ policies-­politics/article/2051914/china-­tops-world-­air-pollution-­and-carbon-­emissions (Accessed January 7, 2017).   2 The authors emphasize the difference in perception and concerns of the countries in question and explain environmental risk as construction depending on history, cultural worldview, ideologies, and national interests.   3 The target pollutants include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), and two groups of gases, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). They are translated into CO equivalents in measuring emission level. Apart from them, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer targets chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).   4 “Air quality in South Korea, one of the worst in the world, ranking 173 out of 180 [Hanguk gong-­gi-jil, saegyue choe-­ak sujun],” http://news.chosun.com/site/data/ html_dir/2016/05/16/2016051600453.html “OECD says S. Korea has worst air quality among its member states,” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/ 2603000000.html?cid=AEN20180107002100320 (Accessed January 10, 2018).   5 The number in parenthesis refers to the OECD estimation (OECD 2017: p. 8).   6 “UN officially notified of US intention to withdraw from Paris climate pact,” UN News Centre, August 4, 2017, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57314 (Accessed March 30, 2018).   7 “China’s Xi vows to defend climate pact in call with Macron” (May 9, 2017), www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2093656/chinas-­xi-vows-­defendclimate-­pact-call-­macron.

Regional air pollution and climate change   107   8 “China, US climate deal endorsement sets stage for Xi-­Obama meeting,” www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2014284/china-­us-climate-­dealendorsement-­sets-stage-­xi-obama (Accessed September 4, 2016).   9 See the article on DPRK and UNFCCC North Korea, and Benjamin Habib “Climate mitigation and the global commons,” Sino-­North Korea (September 8, 2012), http://sinonk.com/2012/09/08/north-­korea-climate-­mitigation-and-­the-global-­ atmospheric-commons/. 10 See news report, for example, “Sanctions, what sanctions? Inside the Chinese border town doing business with North Korea.” 11 Bittner, Peter “Pollution like snow: a Mongolian winter: Mongolia’s true wintertime foe isn’t the cold or the snow. It’s the horrendous air pollution in Ulaanbaatar,” http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/pollution-­like-snow-­a-mongolian-­winter/ (Accessed September 1, 2016). 12 Statistics from the Asian Development Bank website, www.adb.org/themes/environment/environment-­climate-change-­facts-figures. 13 “Compensate for fine dust caused damages, legal action against the ROK and the PRC governments,” www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/area/789410.html (Accessed June 6, 2018). However, there will be little possibility for the claimants to win the case in the absence of a binding regional convention that regulates trans-­boundary air pollution in NEA unlike in Europe and North America where under, e.g., CLRTAP (Convention on Long Range Air Pollution (implemented by the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP)) and directed by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Within the EU, apart from the Convention, intra-­regional trans-­boundary problems are governed by established customary laws that were developed based on actual cases in the region. At the same time, a market-­oriented approach has been implemented and the EU Emission Trading System is one of the examples. Moreover, all those policies and legal framework are supported implemented and monitored by the supranational EU government. 14 Fengshi Wu argues that the relative backwardness in China’s environmental movement led by NGOs is not because of oppressive policy (external factor) but because of the lack of networking and horizontal connectivity among NGOs (internal factor). The article compared Guandzhou (steady growth in environmental NGOs) and Guangxi, showing the evidence such as government changed its attitude and approaches thanks to protests. The article concludes that “environmental NGO’s had now become a nationwide phenomenon, and spread to all provinces in the country” (pp. 91–94). 15 An annual meeting of working level officials of environmental ministries NEA (China, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and Russia) except North Korea. 16 The priority areas include raising awareness that the three countries are in the same environmental community; activating information exchange; strengthening cooperation in environmental research; fostering cooperation in the field of environmental industry and on environmental technology; pursuing appropriate measures to prevent air pollution and to protect the marine environment; and strengthening cooperation on addressing global environmental issues such as biodiversity and climate change (TEMM1 JC 1999: para. 3). 17 “If the concentration of fine dust worsened, free public transportation offered during rush hour.… The city of Seoul announced 10 policy options [Misaemeonji shimhamyeon chultoigeun daejung gyotong gongjja],” http://news.chosun.com/site/ data/html_dir/2017/06/01/2017060102267.html (Accessed June 1, 2017). 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://search.me.go. kr/search/totalSearch/search.jsp?q=%ED%99%98%EA%B2%BD%EC%9E%A5%EA%B 4%80%ED%9A%8C%EC%9D%98 www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_ 665393/t930436.shtml.

108   Regional air pollution and climate change 19 In Northeast Asia Trilateral level, there are 20 Ministerial Level Meetings and 60 related subsidiary bodies, among which under TEMM there are ten subsidiary bodies, which takes the largest number of such bodies under Trilateral Cooperation. 20 “North Korea’s nuclear test site has collapsed. The mountain’s collapse after a fifth blast last fall has led to the creation of a massive ‘chimney’ that could leak radioactive fallout into the air, researchers have found,” www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy­defence/article/2143171/north-­koreas-nuclear-­test-site-­has-collapsed-­and-may-­bewhy-­kim-jong-­un. 21 A bomb for a bomb: North Korea’s nuclear test has left the South wanting nukes too. 22 “Litigation on fine dust, even more suffocating [Misaemeonji sosongeun deo dapdap],” http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/03/27/2018032701540.html (Accessed March 29, 2018). 23 See Wilkening (1999) for an anthropological analysis on foreign policy. Culture and Japanese Citizen Influence on the Transboundary Air Pollution Issue in Northeast Asia. Political Psychology, 20(4): 701–772. The author deals with the question of how culture is linked with foreign policy decision on the environment through influence on policy making process. Acid rain is illustrated in detail explaining the Japanese people’s shared affinity for the morning glory. 24 “Greenpeace campaigners compare Fukushima with Gori,” Korea Times (April 8,  2016), www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/04/116_202213.html (Accessed April 20, 2016). See also a relevant article “Koizumi: Abe’s Fukushima ‘under control’ pledge was a lie” (Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2016) (Accessed September 7, 2016), www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609070073.html. 25 Andreas Klinke (2012) Democratizing Regional Environmental Governance: Public Deliberation and Participation in Transboundary Ecoregions. Global Environmental Politics 12(3): 79–99. The article represents a good contrast and is complimentary with this present project on Northeast Asia, as Klinke’s research concerns the grass root approach to institutionalization or hope for it and issue-­ based governance. 26 “The East is green: China is rapidly developing its clean-­energy technology: There is plenty of room for international co-­operation on the environment,” www.economist. com/news/special-­report/21738578-there-­plenty-room-­international-co-­operationenvironment-­china-rapidly (Accessed May 30, 2018). 27 “China’s revised environmental protection law ‘better than expected.’ ” An interview with Cao Mingde, one of the authors of China’s new environmental protection law and a law professor at the China University of Politics and Law, www.chinadialogue. net/blog/6935-China-­s-revised-­environmental-protection-­law-better-­than-expected-/ en (Accessed May 27, 2016).

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4 Northeast Asia’s responses to biodiversity loss and the formation of regional biodiversity governance

Environmental security and trans-­boundary affairs concerning biodiversity “Biodiversity” is associated with the Earth’s vast variety of flora, fauna, and microorganisms, but the term encompasses diversity at all levels, from genes to species to ecosystems to landscapes. Approximately 1.75 million species have been identified, but it is believed that there could be as many as 13 million species, although individual estimates range from 3 million to 100 million. Bio-­ resources are used for a variety of industrial purposes including pharmaceuticals, agriculture, horticulture, cosmetics, material science, and biotechnology. Northeast Asia is an important hub of biodiversity. Two countries, China and Russia, are included in the list of the five most forest-­rich countries in the world together with Brazil, Canada, and the U.S., accounting for over half of the total global forest areas. Moreover, three of the six cases under this study represent the three largest timber importers in the world, namely Japan, South Korea, and China. State-­led rampant large-­scale engineering work and land conversion resulted in deforestation and habitat loss for living creatures (forests, wetlands, mountains, deserts, and rivers) that is the largest and direct contributor to biodiversity loss. In terms of biodiversity loss indicator published by the World Bank in 2016, East Asia and the Pacific region (6,000–6,500) are threatened to loss of species as seriously and fast as the other two most threatening regions in the globe, the regions of Latin America and Caribbean (between 7,500~8,000) and Sub-­Saharan Africa (6,000~6,500) whereas the rest of regions by the categorization of the report mark below 2,500 as the number of the loss of animals. (World Bank 2016: p. 33) Land (mis)use within a country’s own territory is, a priori, domestic than a trans-­boundary issue. However, indirect environmental harm through trade when directly and indirectly related to biodiversity loss is far more fatal to the

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   113 partner countries’ environment and bio-­resources. One symbolic case of restoring nature through cooperation is the species Japonese Japon that usually was found across China, Japan, and the Korean peninsula. The species had been almost extinguished, thus being categorized as one of those many endangered species before the three countries agreed to cooperate with long-­term policy intervention. It has been evaluated as a successful case of cooperation in the protection of the natural environment in this region. Another good modality of cooperation would be the case of rescuing Siberian tigers with the help of the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention. While China and Russia took the lead, the Ramsar Secretariat and other relevant organizations provided financial and technical support. The common trend of the government’s policy in this field has been in favor of national industries’ commercial interests, subsidizing them for economic growth. In the NEA, due to a stronger growth force and subsequent rise in demand for natural resources and a trade structure within the region, deforestation and unsustainable land use will likely intensify further biodiversity loss in the coming decades. It is also notable that the top coal importers since 2006 include China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Germany. China’s fast rise in coal imports from below 50 million tons (the late 2000s) to over 300 million tons (2012–2013) (IEA 2016) has largely contributed to reshaping the global mining industry with enormous ecological implications in terms of transnational carbon transfer that include NEA neighboring countries, particularly North Korea and Russian Far East (RFE). “China’s Heilunjiang Province, which borders Primorsky Krai, saw a five-­fold reduction of forest area over the past century” (Lukin 2007: p.  31). Also, a closely linked issue is mercury emissions caused by unsustainable mining. One related statistic shows that “50% of the global anthropogenic mercury emissions to the atmosphere comes from Asia. China accounts for one third of the global total” (UNEP 2015: p. 25; see also UNIDO 2014). It is predicted that mining will keep increasing involving major Asian countries in future. “Southeast Asia’s appetite for coal has spurred a new geopolitical rivalry between China and Japan as the two countries race to provide high-­efficiency, low-­ emission technology” (The South China Morning Post, April 2, 2018).1 Unsurprisingly, all members of the NEA (Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, and China) and most of Asia suffer from a high level ecological footprint (The South China Morning Post, November 5, 2016).2 Each country under this study exhibits its own issues: Mongolia (also linked with severe environmental degradation in Inner Mongolia, China) suffering most with over-­mining and desertification; the RFE with fast deforestation; and Japan and Korea (South) with the experience of fast industrialization, heavily relying on the imports of natural resources. Meanwhile, China has been aggressively implementing a development agenda with the exploitation of natural resources domestically and internationally. In particular, North Korea has been suffering from natural disasters, and soil and water contamination due to unregulated mining and deforestation by foreign

114   Regional biodiversity loss and governance enterprises, but these issues have long been ignored and rarely discussed at multilateral venues. For this reason, compared with other chapters, this chapter offers a greater detail on ecological questions in North Korea, linked with security dilemma in the region. Starting from late 2017, North Korea received greater attention due to its alleged claim of success in a sixth nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing. As one of the most dangerous spots, subsequent tension (real and constructed) was quickly escalated until it was dramatically mitigated, starting from the Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang in early 2018. Recently, inter-­Korean relationship has been developing toward an unprecedented ambient of detente. The NEA region once again, since the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, became a testing bed to see whether regional actors were mature enough to handle conflicts and associated risks, building a preventive security regime for sustainable and equitable development. As the suggested conceptual spectrum in Figure 4.1 portrays, conflicting situations inevitably destroy ecological systems and negotiations for peace positively influence ecological stability. In the biodiversity field; none of the three important aspects or purpose of a biodiversity regime: preservation, efficient use, and equitable sharing will be put on the inter-­state negotiation table, although environmental risks associated with biodiversity loss (as a comprehensive indicator of ecological stability) could be an imminent and fundamental threat to human lives and society as a whole across the region. The stage of extreme conflicts connotes here not only physical warfare with options of military action but war-­like hostile economic relationship between the resource-­rich Global South and the resource-­destitute Global North, mostly via unjust way of the distribution and transaction of environmental goods (natural resources) and harm (externalities). Decreasing natural resources and political tensions (conflicts and wars) are naturally co-­influencing. During peace time, such tensions are usually exposed through heated competitions via liberal institutions, notably the trade system. A wider gap between politics and ecologism in society would mean a lower level of integration between politics and security; resting upon a narrow definition of security. This in turn confines the region to “a path dependent development model” in spite of the enormous potential that the NEA possesses to establish a more innovative cooperation ideal. In the NEA, it is still the case that ecological degradation (sustainability issues) has a lower priority in regional affairs (regardless of stricter regulations,

Severe conflicts Total destruction of ecology

Absolute peace Ecological stability Cooperative negotiation process for sustainable use and fair share of ecological benefits

Figure 4.1  Spectrum of the security and environment conjuncture.

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   115 domestically). State security, non-­reciprocal absolute sovereignty, and nationalism (a state-­centered narrowly-­defined official version of nationalism) take priority as principles in regional inter-­governmental affairs. These conventional approaches may still “mobilize” society to implement environmental policies to some extent, but such policies entail fundamental limitations to developing regionalized environmental governance that often requires a paradigm shift – from abstract state-­centered security to a concrete welfare for society/communities (including non-­human communities). Compared with security tensions and conflicts, writing a history of regional politics has rarely focused on cooperation, thus lacking systematic documentation. Regional organizations’ permanent secretariat’s activities such as the collation of documents including conferences minutes, the accumulation of the systemic retrieval of statistics, and questionnaire surveys in the proper form of templates could serve as meaningful activities of accumulating historical archives of regional cooperation in the view of forming a supranational sphere, as much as writing histories of warfare and conflicts. The value of cooperation cannot be sufficiently analyzed and theorized with economic calculations alone, which requires a need to put a greater emphasis on quantifiable values for efficiency. Certain values may hardly be measurable. A cooperative process in this field involves pursuing better harmony between human and natural systems, the prevention of conflict, solving region-­wide inequitable resource distribution, protecting trans-­boundary environmental goods, and ensuring sustainable ecological services for the region. Enhancing efficiency and the capacity of inter-­governmental organizations is another issue that looks to how to reform institutions and such organizations for maximum performance. Officials from individual countries may play the same role as the secretariat: however there is a fundamental limitation due to their own mission to prioritize their national interests. To sum up, regionalism multiplies symbiotic effects out of the structure, and the interaction between the three pillars of regional environmental affairs discussed in Chapter 2, “(re-)securitization, development, and environmentalism.” Even if governments’ decisions on regional environmental affairs are not strictly based on accurate cost–benefit calculations for economic gains, one cannot comfortably conclude that such economically inefficient government actions are politically and socially unjustifiable. Economic models measuring environmental values often turn out to be ecologically unsustainable. Regional cooperation in the environmental field requires a more comprehensive macro framework to fulfill complementary tasks. This is because major economic policy drivers such as efficiency, technological innovation, and growth-­oriented development plans will not fundamentally improve current ecological conditions. Environmental security and preserving biodiversity The core theme underpinning this project is an attempt to disentangle/clarify “security and environment” connectivity. To do so, an essential question needs to be posed. “How far has the process of building the current regional

116   Regional biodiversity loss and governance environmental governance, accommodated the tension and interaction between ‘conventional narrowly-­defined regional security’ and ‘ecological expansion to the political domain’ through region-­wide institutions and cooperation?” This co-­evolution of the environment and security takes a holistic view. The clear dichotomy between human rights (extreme anthropogenic perspective) and nature’s right (extreme eco-­centric perspective) has proven to be not too useful in resolving urgent environmental problems due to the increasing awareness and scientific evidence of the inseparable co-­benefits. And yet, similarly with the field of climate change, in biodiversity-­related discussions, many potential and real tensions have come into existence. Speaking of environmental security relating to the competition over natural resources, Paul Harris (Harris 2002: Chapter 2) articulates: Without doubt, governments consider economic security to be in the national interest. The depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation, and habitat fragmentation undermine the viability of a range of economic activity and contribute to the loss of future wealth and productivity. Ecologically unsustainable development can therefore contribute to insecurities if opportunities for economic interdependence are compromised through the slowing or even reversing of economic growth. The “threat” is therefore understood to arise from the externalities associated with market failure, the economic costs of environmental scarcity within states, and the complex relationship among unsustainable development, poverty, and insecurity. Yet the kinds of neoliberal economic policies mandated by such an approach have themselves been indicated as a major cause of both environmental decline and the growing global gap between rich and poor. The assumption that the benefits of national economic security will trickle down to ensure local economic and environmental security are vulnerable. Experts have directly and indirectly discussed environmental security although their conceptualization differs greatly (Allenby 2000; Hulme 2009; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Mason and Zeitoun 2013; Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Häyrynen 2003). If categorizing existing work dealing with subjects related to “environmental security,” the following categories can be induced: •

• •

Direct and intentional harm (e.g., warfare): actors involved directly destroy society’s resources not only indirectly ruining ecosystems but also specifically targeting environmental facilities and natural resources such as reservoirs during military conflicts. Direct and unintentional harm (e.g., natural disasters): once unexpected disasters occur, enormous ecological damage inevitably follows. Potential and intentional harm: when society is preoccupied with conventional security, militarism is reinforced and security threats are constructed together with the growing trend of the large scale deployment

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   117

•

•

of weapons and expanding military bases, which are one of the most unsustainable way of using land, water and resources but are normally exempted from environmental scrutiny. Narrow environmentalist concept: limited scope of environmental security is post-­ante based policy action than ex-­ante precautionary action, which results in passive and smaller-­scale cooperation over trans-­boundary harm. Unless harm is accurately measurable, countries are reluctant to react to potential risks. Under this view, environmental security is still an obscure term, thus in the IR field remains as a soft issue. An associated danger remains due to the political misuse of environmental security (negative politicization of environmentalism) for unsustainable natural resource extraction, destroying biodiversity in resource-­rich areas, using legal means such as trade and ODA. Due to increasing domestic pressure of enhancing environmental quality at home with the burden of continuous growth, advanced economies tend to move to mercantilist nationalism-­driven “resource extraction activity,” in partner countries while extending, at the same time, a “security tie” as a means of “securing” natural resources and even intervening in civil wars and internal conflicts that are often combined with the seizure of environmental resources, e.g., oil tanks or mines). From a Marxist-­leaning globalism position, this can be viewed as a modern euphemism for colonialism. Comprehensive environmental security: with consistently equitable trans-­ boundary environmentalism beyond eco-­nationalism, environmental security connotes a broader and extended scope of “environmental cooperation,” which also generates the conjuncture of regime interplays between human rights (e.g., rights to fresh air, fresh water, and the community’s livelihood), development, and conventional security.

Evolution of the NEA’s institutionalized cooperation The NEA is demonstrating a paramount increase in institutions and organizations. TEMM remains an all-­encompassing high-­level institution, as discussed in the previous chapter. The TEMM has constantly included regional biodiversity issues on its annual agenda. Apart from this, the TEMM Trilateral Cooperation Summit (TCS) was established between the three NEA countries following a meeting of foreign ministers in November 1999 after the first (in December 1997) ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meeting after the Asian financial crisis. In 2010, the body endorsed the “Adoption of Vision 2020,” and in 2010 established the TSC Secretariat. Under this umbrella body, three countries have developed 18 ministerial meetings, over 50 inter-­governmental meetings, over 100 cooperative projects, and countless actors from the private sector. Another umbrella institution, the Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEACEC or NEAC), was initiated by Japan in 1992. More biodiversity-­specific organizations, initiatives, and institutions including the ROK-­initiated North East Asian Forest Network (NEAFN) with membership of

118   Regional biodiversity loss and governance the NEA six and the UNCCD’s (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification) participation, pursue the prevention of deforestation and desertification, and collectively react to yellow dust through exchanging data, technology and experts. The Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Biodiversity was also proposed by the government of South Korea, and supported by the other two governments. Beyond this, the NEA three also “agreed to reinforce a network of research institutions such as AP-­BON and/or a biodiversity center network and facilitate cooperation and/or information sharing in common areas discussed in the dialogue” (TEMM16 Joint Communiqué: para. 25). The East and Southeast Asia Biodiversity Information Initiative (ESABII) concerns wider Asia, beyond the NEA, along with the Bio-­Bridge Initiative (BBI), and the East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (EABRN) with its Secretariat in Beijing, which was a UNESCO-­initiated network among the NEA six and Kazakhstan. The seven members have actively cooperated since the group was founded in 1994. The UNESCO regional offices particularly the one in Korea have been active in coordinating annual meetings and monitoring processes, linking relevant ministries and other governmental agencies across member countries. At the twenty-­seventh session of UNESCO’s General Conference, held in Paris during October and November 1993, South Korea proposed a draft resolution that would strengthen cooperation in the implementation of the Action Plan for Biosphere Reserves. The resolution proposed to extend the Man and the Biosphere Programme by adding members and reinforcing those already existing in the Asia-­Pacific region; a new regional biosphere reserve network was also proposed. South Korea’s suggestion was adopted by the General Conference. (Na 2012: pp. 84–86) As a wider cooperation model for development (a subregional growth polygons), the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) is one of those categories with membership of the NEA six. It was started from 1991 in collaboration with the UNDP and other multi-­stakeholders including private corporations from the six countries, originally involved DPRK (Kaesong and Rajin-­Sonbong Economic and Trade Zones), Eastern Mongolia, northeast China, the Russian Far East and eastern ROK. Later in 2006, TRADP was re-­ organized as Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), as the new name for the subregional project. Main actors included city and regional governments from the subregion forming a Consultative Commission, and the five priority areas were agreed as trade/investment, transport, tourism, energy, and environment. With the event of rising inter-­Korean peace, there is a high possibility of revitalizing some of the existing institutions and this may accelerate developing North Korea and its connected regions. Resuming cooperation in infrastructure building would be of one of the essential steps for launching development projects. Reflecting this, on April 27, 2018, the two Koreas announced the

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   119 resuming of the construction of cross-­border roads and railways. (Yonhap Agency, April 27, 2018).3 In addition, although it is indirectly relevant, trade-­related issues are dealt via mechanisms such as the “Tripartite Roundtable Meeting on the Environmental Industry” (mentioned and acknowledged in the TEMM15, “Trilateral Policy Dialogue and Technical Cooperation Platform on Green Economy”) and discussed during the TEMM15, “Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management” among the three countries (started from the TEMM10 in 2008). The ministers recognized the Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management as an effective platform toward harmonization of chemicals management, and acknowledged the outcome of the sixth Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management in October 2012 in Hangzhou, China. The TEMM members agreed on continuous efforts for further cooperation on chemicals management and policy information exchanges (TEMM15 JC: para. 13). In addition, further harmonization efforts were made through the “Agreement on Multifunctional Devices Common Certification Rule of Eco-­labeling among China, Japan and Korea,” “Operation Rules of Mutual Recognition among China, Japan and Korea,” and an Asia-­wide “APEC Green Supply Chain Network” beyond the NEA that has been established and is active in annual conferences and capacity building workshops (mentioned in the TEMM17 in 2017). Concerns over the preservation of biological diversity are broadly divided into conservation and use. Depending on organizations and actors’ perspectives involved, the evolution of global biodiversity regimes expose some level of tension. Such tension is usually traceable when observing the Ramsar Convention and Convention on Biodiversity. The former’s main purpose is to preserve wetlands and habitats of bio-­organisms; the latter was established to strike a balance between preservation and sustainable “utilization” of biological resources, although without conservation, effective use of biological resources becomes increasingly limited. Thus, severe tension has arisen between ecologists and economic actors, with governments’ support not alone in the harsh competition and escalated tension among governments with various conflicting national interests. Ecologists criticize that the process of biodiversity discussions predominantly focus on commercial, economic and instrumental values of biological resources as a unit rather than pursuing ways of preserving their habitats to ensure the “diversity” of organisms. Fundamentally, such debates again concern how one views and determines the desirable point of keeping harmony between ecosystems and human systems. Positioning the NEA within the process of strengthening a global biodiversity regime In a word, global biodiversity regimes have evolved as a politicization of biogenes, animals, and plants. The nature of division among members exhibit a stark difference compared with the other two regimes under this study, climate and ocean governance. The sharp division between lead countries is made along

120   Regional biodiversity loss and governance the line of the so-­called “providers of genetic resources,” and the veto coalition made up of major user countries. Such a division has both contributed and, at times, hampered the process of regime strengthening. The core issues of the countries with direct interests, centered around the question of access and benefit-­sharing negotiations. Resulting from harsh negotiations over the past decades, the Group of Like-­Minded Mega-­diverse Countries (LMMC) was formed in 2002. They have represented the provider countries, consisting of tropical countries with biodiversity- and resource-­richness, possessing 70 percent of the world’s biological diversity. In East Asia, China together with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines belong to this group, only among the six under this study in the region. The rest of this group consists of Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Democratic Rep. of Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Venezuela. This explains conflicting interests among the six particularly among the core three NEA, China, Japan, and South Korea, although they have more grounds to cooperate. Specifically, user countries refer to those industrialized countries with high technology and capital to commercialize genetic resources. However, the division of lead versus veto countries may often be fluid in grouping, as the  interests of members could change in accordance with many variables and the changing of external forces. Industrialized countries do not necessarily prefer free access to genetic resources as it is not the best way to preserve their habitats. The issues are as complicated as two other global regimes, given that less than 10 percent of bio-­organisms are known to humanity so far and as much as they disappear, new organisms are also being discovered. With technological innovation, the use and market value of each biomaterial also keeps changing. Biodiversity is the area where the ecosystem and human systems are inextricably interconnected, that may easily drive countries’ negotiations to stalemates. This is one reason why the Convention on Biological Diversity and subsequent protocols are harshly criticized as comprehensive but least useful. “The Nagoya Protocol Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization” was adopted in October 2010 (COP10) in Nagoya, Japan, and pushed the global biodiversity regime a step forward to discussing essential points for negotiations. Adopted in October 2010, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) marks an important step in the international governance of “access and benefit sharing” (ABS). The protocol elaborates and clarifies the CBD’s regulatory framework for access to genetic resources (GRs) and associated traditional knowledge and for fair sharing of the benefits resulting from the utilization of these resources and knowledge. It forms part of the broader Nagoya outcome, which also includes a strategic plan for biodiversity 2011–2020 (including the so-­called “Aichi Biodiversity Targets”) and a strategy for resource mobilization. After the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   121 in December 2009 and several years with reduced legislative activity in global environmental governance, this Nagoya outcome was a major achievement. (Oberthur and Pozarowska 2013: p. 100) For implementation, the “International Partnership for the Satoyama Initiative (IPSI)” was established, and promoted collaboration in the conservation and restoration of sustainable human-­influenced natural environments. Also, the Agreement stipulates the importance of regional cooperation, stating that coordination should take place at the international, regional, subregional and national levels. Japan and South Korea have been enthusiastic in leading the process of global biodiversity negotiations,4 cooperating with each other, and hosting COP meetings in Nagoya (2010 COP10) and Pyeongchang (2014 COP12), the first COP meetings for the Nagoya Protocol, respectively. The Japanese COP presidency in Nagoya was both praised and criticized. On the one hand, Japan took a strong leadership as a host country, to quickly conclude the agreement; on the other hand, such a hasty conclusion (what the veto group argues) enraged the Like-­Minded Asia Pacific and Latin Amer­ican and Caribbean group members. China also became active, although as a resource-­rich country, China takes a different position from Japan and South Korea. In fact, all six of the NEA countries are parties to the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the Nagoya Protocol (see Table 4.1). In 2017, the Ministers of Japan and South Korea welcomed the decision of China to host the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) to the CBD, and “expressed their willingness to share experiences and cooperate with China for the success of the COP15” (TEMM19 JC 2017: para. 7). However, their cooperation on biodiversity is impeded by a fundamental region-­specific difficulty: as explained, the two countries leading such cooperation are the two with the most scarcity in natural resources, whereas natural resource-­rich areas in East Asia are ruled by “extractive regimes” (Milne 2015), categorized at the lowest level of ecological modernization. Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea belong to the latter, together with other Asian

Table 4.1  Convention on Biodiversity, status of the NEA Six Countries

Signed

Ratified

Party

China Japan ROK DPRK Mongolia Russian Federation

June 11, 1992 June 13, 1992 June 13, 1992 June 11,1992 June 12, 1992 June 13, 1992

January 5, 1993 May 28, 1993 October 3, 1994 October 26, 1994 September 30, 1993 April 5, 1995

December 29, 1993 December 29, 1993 January 1, 1995 January 24, 1995 December 29, 1993 July 4, 1995

122   Regional biodiversity loss and governance countries including Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, where it is easy for national and local governments to build coalitions with agencies for foreign capital supply to pursue economic activities, and businesses that usually do not pay much attention to global standards of environmental sustainability. Accordingly, such as the climate regime (discussed in Chapter 3) the region itself possesses a mirror image of the global division of a rich North and a poorer South. Mongolia remains highly donor-­dependent and this has shaped the country’s economic and environmental policies. “Beijing has identified Mongolia as a first destination for its Go Out policy (Zou Chuqu Zhanlue), by which Beijing hopes to secure access to natural resources while expanding China’s political influence” (Reeves 2011: p. 454). However, Mongolia has been cautious about the heavy influence from Russia and China, which has brought the country to seek multilateral cooperation opportunities. The industries that are related to natural resource extraction take up 16.7 percent of Mongolia’s total GDP, and 74 percent of total export. Over 80 types of minerals are under extraction. Particularly, it is estimated that Mongolia’s rare earths retention takes up 16 percent of the world’s total reserves. It is said that the country’s industry heavily relies on three Cs (coal, copper, and China) as well as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Historically, Russia and Japan made a secret agreement in April 1912, thereby the two parties cross-­recognized Russia’s exclusive interests in Outer Mongolia and Japan’s special relationship with Inner Mongolia. Until today, Mongolia is heavily dependent on Official Development Assistance (ODA) (14 percent of GDP), most of which (87 percent) comes from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Similar with North Korea, chemical accidents occur frequently that threaten both human health and the environment. The recent case of a large spill of a solution containing sodium-­cyanide and mercury in Khongor soum of Darkhan Uul aimag has revealed lack of national capacity to respond to such emergencies which are very new to Mongolia. It is commonly accepted that under the rapid expansion of the mining sector, the transport and use of large quantity of chemicals will continue to expand in Mongolia. This will inevitably also increase the probability of chemical accidents with significant consequences to the population and the environment.  (National Chemicals Management Profile, Mongolia, June 2008 published by the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and Tourism 2008: pp. 108–109) Today, compared with North Korea, Mongolia is better connected with global governances including environment-­related ones. Mongolia is a member of numerous international programs and agreements, for example, Agenda21, FAO Code of Conduct, Montreal Protocol, Basel Convention, Stockholm Convention, Vienna Convention and

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   123 GATT/WTO agreements, ILO Convention. It has good linkages with international organizations such as IFCS, IPCS, UNEP, WHO, FAO, UNIDO, ILO, WTO, ADB and UNITAR. Mongolia is participating in international/regional SAICM meetings, and has a National SAICM Focal Point and in the QSP Pilot Project and QSPTF Project. (…) Assistance has been provided by various organizations, such as GEF, UNIDO, UNITAR, Netherlands Government, Government of Luxemburg and WHO. Mongolia has long committed to work for global chemical safety, since the establishment of IFCS in 1994. (See National Chemicals Management Profile, Mongolia, June 2008 published by the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and Tourism 2008: pp. 127–128) However, problems still prevail fundamentally due to the country’s industrial structure. [I]t is difficult to define total contaminated area due to chemicals, State of Environment in 2007 prepared by MNE, has described that totally 120 illegal site in the 36 soums of 11 aimags are operating in gold extraction field and 203508.8 m3 of tailings were contaminated by mercury and 53.5 hec of area under risk of giving contamination to the human and biodiversity. After all that facts in Mongolia, there is no appropriate monitoring system in chemical management, particularly in chemical transportation, storage and disposal. In addition comprehensive research and analysis of chemical lifecycle management is needed. Data collecting mechanism is very difficult and not under integrated management. (See National Chemicals Management Profile, Mongolia, June 2008 published by the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and Tourism 2008: p. 33) It is known that the “majority of Mongolia’s area has unsuitable and risky environment for farming.” According to land usage statistics, 73.8 percent of Mongolia’s total area is used for agriculture, however only 0.5 percent of that (or 600,000 thousand hectares) is farmed. Compared to the 1990s, where almost 1.2 million hectares of land was used with crop rotation, total farmed land has almost halved, the main reason being the shift to the market economy leading to the breaking up of farming collectives. This has led to fragmented utilization of farmland, soil deterioration, loss of soil fertility and fallowing of farmlands. As of 2013, about 40 thousand hectares of farmland are deemed to be degraded. (National Statistical Yearbook 2013 quoted in National Biodiversity Program 2015–2025, published by the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and Tourism 2015: p. 30)

124   Regional biodiversity loss and governance Besides, due to its geographical proximity and twin industrial structure, Mongolia’s aggravating environmental situation is intertwined with pollution, desertification and biodiversity loss in Inner Mongolia. Climate change, overgrazing and pollution from mines and factories have led to severe degradation of the grasslands – and even desertification some places – over the past two decades, pushing the once lush Mongolian areas to the brink of an ecological crisis.… Power plants, chemical factories, coal mines and others producing gold, copper or molybdenum are using up groundwater and drying up rivers and creeks which previously replenished the wetlands which nourish the Mongolian grasslands. (The South China Morning Post, October 15, 2016)5 Suiseeya (2014: p. 113) describes the division among participants by grouping them into eight key groups of delegates that emerged to shape the Nagoya Protocol: ILCs, the Africa Group (Africa), the Like-­Minded Mega-­diverse Countries (LMMCs; e.g., provider countries), NGOs, users (including user countries, research organizations and related businesses such as the pharmaceutical industry), donors, IGOs, the secretariat, and the host nation (Japan). Adding to that, Chasek et al. (2017: pp. 197–198) provide more detail of the division. Sharp divisions between the lead countries (the providers of genetic resources) and the veto coalition (user countries) plagued the access and benefit­sharing negotiations. The LMMC, formed in 2002, took the lead on behalf of provider countries. The mega-­diverse countries, as a home for 70 percent of the world’s biological diversity, are primarily tropical countries that possess rich varieties of animal and plant species, habitats and ecosystems. Among the NEA, China belongs to this group together with Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela. The LMMC, with the African Group, claimed that the current distribution of benefits was unfair and sought to change it. Suiseeya further analyses the specific interests of each group: ILCs in search for self-­determination to ensure their community’s livelihood security, NGOs to seize an opportunity for legitimacy and to raise visibility and reputation, and the state participants prioritizing sovereignty and acquiring/maintaining power (Suiseeya 2014: p. 114, Table 3). In a nutshell, representatives from the resource-­rich areas hope to raise the value of their genetic resources adhering to the notion of natural resource sovereignty as their theoretical shield for fighting “bio-­piracy,” whereas those from industrialized resource-­poor countries prefer the status quo (open access), often using the “global common goods” justification. China became at odds with developing countries as it became highly industrialized. However, all parties have common interests of commercializing more genetic resources for economic benefit, although the division raises the question of how to share the benefits. The raison-­d’etre of the Convention on Biodiversity is threefold: protection, sustainable use and equitable benefit sharing. In the process of negotiations, the

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   125 “protection” aspect is hardly highlighted, and in fact the significance has been diminished. If taking the ecologically communitarian cosmopolitanism viewpoint, the most important stakeholder in the discussion are those who are most severely affected by biodiversity loss, namely non-­human communities and indigenous people. However, leading nations are usually powerful industrialized countries. Making a full use of the process of the convention to include or exclude certain bio-­resources is a highly political action. Although on the surface all parties are endowed an equal chance to influence the process, less powerful members do not enjoy the same degree of benefits from its onset. Participation in the process itself could be extremely onerous as there are many preconditions, including investigating their bio-­resources, identifying issues per species with scientific evidence, pricing those resources in view of industrial development, reporting a country’s situation using a standard format, negotiating in the international arena using much professional jargon built by the cooperating industries, reforming domestic public administrative systems including budget priorities, setting up a policy framework, and legislating environmental laws. Quite a few developing countries have quickly adapted such processes through their efforts for green structural adjustment (as explained in Chapter 2). For this reason, global biodiversity negotiations are highly politicized and commercialized by nature, becoming less ecologically advanced. Weak countries may helplessly and systematically lose sovereignty to their own right to preservation of biodiversity, if the country’s overall capacity is low without accurate knowledge of bio-­resources, measurement of sustainability and technological support. In the NEA context, while Mongolia is relatively well-­ connected with global biodiversity governance that helps the national process of green structural adjustment, North Korea’s political isolation has aggravated the country’s ecological damage, being excluded from regional and international negotiations. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises have enjoyed, without any interruption even being more intensified during international sanctions, the extraction of valuable bio-­resources including precious timbers, minerals, and endangered animal species at low cost. Poor and corrupt officials in the country have been effortlessly coaxed to participate in the illegal trade of natural resources including bio-­resources. The most serious problems regarding biodiversity loss in this region include the fast rate of deforestation (land conversion), overfishing, illegal trade of CITIES listed animals, and related products. Real ecological issues include “deforestation, degraded forest cover, segmented or destroyed ecosystems, soil erosion, and sedimentation and eutrophication in aquatic ecosystems” (Fuentes-­George 2013: p. 149). But CBD COP’s discussions have been narrowed down to those on the commercial value of nature and sharing access to such resources. The TEMM broadly touches upon biodiversity issues. Nevertheless, the agenda on biodiversity is not specific enough and mostly bypasses region-­specific issues, often simply recognizing international efforts without articulating “regional” contributions to such global efforts (REDM Stage V). This is also understood as the category of “irrelevance” or “conflicts” as opposed to “cooperation” or harmonic relations”

126   Regional biodiversity loss and governance according to Kacowicz’s (2018) taxonomy that helps exploring different nature of co-­relationship between regional and global governances (pp. 67–71). Although insufficient, good signs in useful and relevant fields of cooperation include responses to alien species, which have been recently notified as a trend. During TEMM19 in 2017: The Ministers shared the recognition that invasive alien species pose an urgent issue in East Asia, and confirmed to share within the Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Biodiversity the current status of invasive alien species, their countermeasures and their impact in each country, as well as the best practices of the countermeasures. (TEMM19 JC 2017: para. 11) An effective method of mainstreaming, as recommended by experts in this field, involves incorporating multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or other environmental clauses into bilateral or regional (mini-­lateral) FTA negotiations. This is based on the experience of the North Amer­ican Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC 1993) under the 1992 North Amer­ican FTA between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., which exemplified the effective use of existing trade institutions for environmental improvement. Some argue that economic tools, notably trade mechanisms, should be used to motivate East Asian governments to engage in environmental improvement. Indirect trans-­boundary harm: the interplay between trade and the environment Another somewhat separate category of regional environmental issues concerns the interface between “trade and the environment” that has been adequately studied by experts in the field, thanks to which analyses and policy implications are well documented as an established area of “regime interplay.” Focusing on the NEA, broadly-­related problems with potential or actual conflicts include fishery and rare earth disputes, radioactive-­contaminated seafood products, trans-­boundary movements of toxic waste and so on, and they involve trans-­ boundary harm but in an indirect rather than a direct way by generating environmental externalities across national boundaries. If mismanaged, trade intensifies environmental externalities. The aspect of “exchange” is added to the common category of environmental problems, namely pollution, overuse, and conversion. While the biodiversity field entails potential conflicts, trade has been considered as a powerful tool by which cooperation can be continued. Prominent neoliberal environmental economists (Ekins 2003; Baughen 2007; Hock 2001) and theorists concerned with regime interplay (Neumayer 2001), together with the national governments of advanced economies and leading intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the WTO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development), have firmly established the interface

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   127 between trade and the environment as both an academic and policy field, with the aim of minimizing the environmental externalities caused by the increasing volume and unsustainability of injurious trade practices (OECD 2012; Dosch 2011; Zeng and Eastin 2011). The evolution of this subfield of environmental studies has greatly benefited from actual disputes in which environmental and legal approaches to settling trans-­boundary problems have been inextricably linked (e.g., the 1992 tuna/ dolphin case under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO’s 2001 shrimp/turtle case and the 2001 European Communities asbestos case). Some cases involving countries in East Asia have arisen primarily due to disparities in domestic environmental standards and regulations. Although ecological tension in the NEA is no less intense than in any other regions, legal claims relying on international procedures are rare (Linnerooth-­Bayer et al. 2001). As a result, customary international law is currently only limitedly relevant to the discussion of potential trans-­boundary disputes in the NEA. However, with their increasing volume of inter-­regional trade and the development of environmentalism, countries in East Asia have – albeit passively – begun to engage with the trend of incorporating environmental-­protection measures into mainstream trade practices. In this regard, how to mitigate environmental externalities caused by trade has been a significant issue both among experts in trade and those in the environmental field. Relating to the interface between trade and the environment, some other stimulating region-­specific endeavors include two illustrations that, to a degree, show the possibility of future cooperation within and beyond the region. Under APEC’s environmental committee’s initiative, countries began the task of making a clear list of Environmental Goods and Services (EGS), although this has been rather stagnated. The other was on mainstreaming the environmental conditions in FTAs: given the rise of FTAs as a regional phenomenon, this effort could also be an effective way to ensure trade does not aggravate environmental degradation. The significance of regime or governance interplay between trade and the environment in this region is manifold. First, it indirectly encourages the private sector’s awareness and participation in greening industry naturally combining (to a certain degree) market mechanisms with environmental cooperation, otherwise this remains purely political and diplomatic rhetoric without actual interests involved. Second, due to harsher competition, more conflicts can be generated but at the same time, this is a field where conflicts can be openly discussed with a view to finding ways to cooperate. Third, relatively well-­ established global and international regimes can govern and influence the region. Fourth, as trade is directly linked with the economic interests of partners, binding agreements and principles are well established so that new issues can be further mainstreamed. One example is the effort and relative success of incorporating MEAs into newly negotiated FTAs or other green clauses. Newly adopted Regional Trade Agreements bear accommodation of

128   Regional biodiversity loss and governance global norms and standards. Fifth, given its direct link with immediate national interests, environmental awareness through trade mechanisms guarantees member countries’ more serious and constant participation, which can be an opportunity. Trade disputes filed under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body on trade and the environment have in fact established useful and referable cases, which may be called constructive conflicts, adding actual cases that have gradually but surely urged countries to act on green economic practices that may affect trade to the extent possible. Compared with other regions, East Asian cases are rarely highlighted. Finally, given the NEA and wider East Asia’s economic dynamism, economic innovation force, trade infrastructure, and institutionalized cooperation mechanisms, the region may contribute further to strengthening global regime interplay. Regionalized efforts to synergize trade and environmental measures via other inclusive regional institutions are also noticeable. These efforts comprise the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Asia-­ Europe Meeting (ASEM), and European Union (EU)-Asia cooperation, along with relevant case studies (e.g., the EU’s International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives Energy-­safe Cities project) (Harrison 2013). One relevant example is a recent Sino-­Russia economic cooperation pact that articulated environmental issues as an important element prior to trade related economic agreements. Russia (led by delegate Rustam Makarov) strongly indicated that the transfer of China’s manufacturing firms to the RFE should mean: first, China should fully comply with Russia’s domestic environmental law. Second, Chinese firms must hire more than 80 percent of its employees from Russia. The Russian Authorities further clarified that this measure does not mean to exclude other countries giving priority to China’s investment; contrarily, Russia will consider equally other trading partners including South Korea, Japan, Australia, and India. Nonetheless, Russian media criticized that the government, regarding the RFE development authority, was pressed to produce a policy outcome in the region of TOR and Vladivostok and for this reason the decision-­ makers hastily bore unfair terms vis-­à-vis China’s counterparts (KOTRA Global Window, May 31, 2016).6 A turning point in Sino-­Russian relations occurred in 2014, when Moscow confronted the West over the issue of Ukraine’s potential membership in the European Union and NATO by annexing Crimea and supporting rebel movements in eastern Ukraine. Under the impact of Western sanctions, Russia set aside the reservations that had limited its cooperation with China in areas such as energy, regional infrastructure development, security in Central and South Asia, and the sale of advanced weaponry.… Indicative of this shift, after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia agreed to sell China the S-­400 air and missile defense system, which it had earlier been reluctant to provide; endorsed Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative; and concluded energy deals with Beijing that had long been held in abeyance. The two sides also held joint military exercises in Northeast Asia and the South China Sea.

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   129 Russian leaders are grateful for China’s willingness to stand by them in the face of NATO pressure, but they are less comfortable than their Chinese counterparts at moving into this closer embrace. (Roy 2018: p. 2) The closer economic partnership between Russia and China was strategically timely and politically significant for both parties, but it evokes many environmental concerns in the NEA region. Before this strengthened Sino-­Russian partnership, especially in the energy and development sector, Russian interest in the NEA was limited to a political rather than economic scenario. Even up to today, Moscow’s interests in the NEA as a region manifests itself in “attempting to resolve territorial disputes with Japan” and the “avoidance of a U.S.-backed unified Korea” (Roy 2018: p. 6). Russia has recently sent a signal to the region that the country will be eager to participate in security cooperation in the NEA with the possibility of restoring the Six-­Party Talks. Russia had not been an initiator of such multilateral security talks in the NEA, but constantly maintained an interest for fear of exclusion and a complete loss of influence and opportunity over/in the DPRK (Kim and Blank 2010). Meanwhile, APEC could have played a greater role in implementing a green growth agenda in the region up until the Beijing APEC meeting in 2014, although its role had dramatically declined with China’s renewed multidimensional multilateralism. In 2011 at the Honolulu U.S. meeting, for example, countries reached a concrete agreement. APEC leaders issue the Honolulu Declaration in which they commit to taking concrete steps toward a seamless regional economy; addressing shared green growth objectives; and advancing regulatory cooperation and convergence. To reach these goals, APEC resolves to reduce, by the end of 2015, applied tariff rates of environmental goods to 5 percent or less, taking into account economies’ economic circumstances, without prejudice to APEC economies’ positions in the WTO. APEC sets the goal to reduce aggregate energy intensity by 45 percent by 2035. (Official website of the APEC) In 2012 at Vladivostok, the Russia APEC meeting reconfirmed regional support for greening economies. APEC economies endorse a ground-­breaking APEC List of Environmental Goods that directly and positively contribute to green growth and sustainable development objectives. APEC seeks to address transparency as a new next generation trade and investment issue, and Leaders endorse the APEC Model Chapter on Transparency for RTAs/FTAs to be used as a guide by APEC economies. In 2015 at the TEMM17, “The ministers also confirmed their intention to cooperate on a green supply chain as a response to the APEC Cooperation

130   Regional biodiversity loss and governance Network on Green Supply Chain agreed to be established by APEC Economic Leaders.” During the TEMM 2014, ministers welcomed High-­level Roundtable on Green Development in May 2014 in Tianjin, China.

A green paradox: the security dilemma in the DPRK and ecological implications North Korea is a typical case of how security intensifies environmental degradation, and also in turn threatens human and ecological life. Moreover, unbalanced regional politics aggravate both security and the environment. In the global biodiversity regime, certain animal species are extremely precious for the North Korean regime. The Siberian tiger and migratory birds have successfully attracted international epistemic communities’ attention especially from scientists and ecological activists. The chosen migratory birds of international importance include five species: the black-­faced spoonbill, spoonbilled sandpiper, crane, scaly-­sided merganser and swan goose. Siberian tigers and leopard tigers also drew attention to North Korea both on the governmental and civic sides. Regional attention has been gradually rising, which offers North Korea opportunities for environmental cooperation and aid from China and South Korea (indirectly). However, illegal poaching of wild animals in the border areas of the NEA is beyond central government control, and materials are smuggled over the borders between China, North Korea and Russia. The stricter the terms of the UN sanctions, the wider the range of demand for nature conservation elevated from the North Korean government becomes more comprehensive and explicit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Nature Conservation and Environmental Protection of the DPRK have impressed many multilateral donors for their knowledge, manner and preparation in participating in the process of international environmental cooperation. Their delegations meticulously prepared technical papers, setting up national priorities, and clearly indicating a budget for each purpose. Such a process is an important part of the country’s “green structural adjustment,” which is backed by financial support for green capacity building during peace time. (See Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for illustrations of cooperation with international organizations.) Likewise, the conservation of migratory birds has its own benefits for the DPRK as it directly links an even wider geographical range of countries to be involved, as philanthropic ecologists’ common global approach fits well with the DPRK’s promotion of tourism. For example, the Bird Watch project has been successfully installed in designated national parks and mountain areas with financial and technical support. Relevant organizations have assessed that this intervention has been relatively successful, and have agreed to continue to support it if political and financial conditions are met. The DPRK has learned how to negotiate with international multilateral donors concerning environmental protection. Recently, eco-­tourism has been used to comprehensively attract donor institutions’ attention. In one effort with international organizations’ assistance, the DPRK has put forward the idea of

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   131 Table 4.2  Environmental projects in the DPRK supported by international organizations Year

Activities

Cooperating organizations

1995

Ozone layer protection projects

UNIDO, UNEP

1998

Preparation of biodiversity strategy

UNDP, WWF

1999

Asia Least-Cost GHGs Abatement Strategy

GEF, ESCAP, UNDP

2000

Preparation of first communication under the UNFCCC

UNEP, UNFCCC

2002

Project for biodiversity protection in Mount MyoHyang

UNDP, WWF

2003

Capacity-building for the state of Environment report preparation

UNDP, UNEP

2006

National action plan for land degradation/ desertification and drought protection (2006–2010)

UNEP

2006

Strengthening environmental monitoring and information technologies towards sustainable decision-making

UNDP, UNEP

2008

National implementation plan for POPs management

UNITAR

2010

Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) management UNITAR plan

Sources: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Environment and Climate Change Outlook (PyongYang, 2012); [hereinafter Environment and Climate Change Outlook] (quoted in Kim and Ali 2016).

putting Mt. Kumgang on the UNESCO’s biosphere reserve list (Yonhap News Agency, August 7, 2017).7 Also, four mountains have been registered as protective zones and natural heritages (including Mts. Baekdu, Guwol, Myohyang, and Chilbo). A North Korean official in charge explained that such an effort is to preserve natural resources following international norms by introducing scientific technology for managing and monitoring the areas, making them serve as part of the eco-­ tourism industry. Ramsar Trans-boundary Sites (applicable to the DPRK) officials, in protecting trans-­boundary biological diversity, say activity has been relatively consistent in promoting projects that designate trans-­boundary sites as protective zones. In August 2001, the first Ramsar Trans-­boundary Sites were designated in Hungary and Slovakia, who agreed on the collaborative management of the Baradla Cave System and Domica, respectively. On October 1, 2008, the tenth Ramsar Trans-­boundary Site was established when Gambia and Senegal agreed on the collaborative management of “Niumi-­Saloum.” This was the first site outside Europe. Ramsar’s work programs have attracted South Korea’s attention

132   Regional biodiversity loss and governance Table 4.3  Major cooperation projects related to biodiversity Project title

Duration

Supporting organization

Enabling activity for the preparation of the 4th national biodiversity report to CBD

2012

UNEP

Watershed management planning

2010–2012

UNDP

Sustainable rural energy development (SRED)

2010–2014

UNDP

Small wind energy development and promotion in rural areas (SWEDPRA)

2010–2013

UNDP

Agriculture and natural resource management

2010–2011

EU

Food security and improvement of people’s livelihood in slope land

2009–2011

EU

Capacity building for supporting integrated environment, public health, and farming materials supply

2010–2013

EU

Building up the database on flora and fauna of reserves in DPRK

2010–2011

UNESCO

Environmental protection of alternative feed for stockbreeding by cultivation of high-value protein-grass in sewage

2011

UNESCO

Assessment on fresh water fish resource in DPRK

2013

UNESCO

Establishment of purification system of dyeing waste by fly ash

2013

UNESCO

Improved seed production for sustainable agriculture (ISPSA)

2011–2014

UNDP/FAO

Support for socioeconomic development in rural area

2012–2014

UNDP

Restoration of ecosystem impacted by climate change and capacity building of local people

2012–2015

UNDP

Reducing disastrous risk by afforestation

2013–2015

UNDP

Source: 5th National Report on Biodiversity of DPR Korea (2012): pp. 35–36.

as they often fit in with the national agenda for reunification through achieving ecological integrity. Contradictions can be found in the IOs’ contributions to eco-­tourism in the DPRK, the protection of habitats in accordance with the Ramsar Convention, and the South Korean government’s funding for DMZ ecological restoration. In the DMZ, mine laying has increased, and tourism programs include observing hunting birds and animals. The DPRK’s cooperation with IOs increased especially when sanctions imposed by the international community became harsher. For the DPRK, environmental aid (as part of development aid) serves as a useful path to communicate with the outside world in the absence of

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   133 Box 4.1  Changing focus on environment-­related cooperation with the DPRK

1990s: Focusing on humanitarian issues (not explicitly linked to the environment)*  • Starting from 1995, flood and food crises led to humanitarian aid  • Infrastructure aid with economic cooperation  • Natural disasters prevention (food security issues) • Agricultural sector capacity building 

2000s–2007: From brown to green conservations issues  • Stockholm Convention Secretariat’s activities  • Greater attention to protection • Conservation of natural heritage • Inter-­linked issue: ecological aid for peace • Rising research projects  • NGOs’ participation 

2008–2016:  • Green Détente  • Rigid security link (denuclearization as conditional aid)  • Rise of trans-­boundary ecological concerns (migratory birds, disease control in the DMZ)

2017 onwards: Shifting (or explicitly re-­interlinking) to inter-­linking broad issues  • Natural disaster intervention • Eco-­tourism/Green growth  • Inter-­linked issues: humanitarian and ecological aid combined (water, environmental health such as malaria that can be a trans-­boundary issue, food, and agriculture)  Note *  The list of international governmental and non-­governmental organizations that have interests and experience in humanitarian aid: (active until 2007) (either Korean-­based; or run by overseas Koreans to be identified as non-­Korean INGOs: The ROK National Red Cross (since 1971), Caritas Corea, Joint Together Society, Korean Food for Hungry International, Korean Sharing Movement. They cooperate mostly with WFP, UNICEF, WHO, IFRC (International Federation for Red Cross), UNICEF, FAO.

other official diplomatic channels. The limited number of international actors has been highly competitive to hold ownership over information on the DPRK. IOs still remain a rare source of distributing information on the situation in the DPRK to the outside world although each organization has its own purpose. Inter-­linked issues in the environmental field connote their own risks unless PCD are implemented at levels for synergy: “between environment (sustainable development) and security,” “between environment (sustainable development) and humanitarian aid (poverty),” and “between security and humanitarian aid (poverty, etc.).” Security issues still involved controversies. A typical

134   Regional biodiversity loss and governance contradiction is IOs’ efforts in phasing out mercury and DDT in the DPRK, while the government spent financial resources and efforts to produce internationally banned chemical and biochemical weapons. The use of the concept of environmental security has been multiplied as much as the concept of security itself entails a wide range of meanings.  INTERPOL’s General Assembly emphasized the concept of environmental security in its 2014 resolution by recognizing the impact that environmental crime can have on a country, from the environmental implications to the political and economic consequences. By integrating environmental security in their activities, INTERPOL and UN Environment see environmental crime as a collective term, enabling both agencies to address it through a broad approach, encompassing other criminal activities, such as financial crime, organized crime, or terrorism.  (UNEP 2016: p. 11) Possible environmental justifications for the UN’s intervention in the DPRK that could be legitimized would be: (1) Human Rights Protection over environmental conditions (food, water, natural disasters, human health, environment-­ related epidemic disease); (2) Protection of the environment for its own sake (environmental security) as it will fundamentally cause a threat to people’s lives (deforestation, over-­logging, chemical management); (3) Part of secondary economic sanctions in cooperation with the international community through sabotage of illegal or conflict supporting natural resources in the global market (continuous bilateral trade relationships with a few countries such as Switzerland, Czech Republic, China, and Russia who can be blamed by the international community); (4) Purely ecological motivation (habitat conservation, migratory birds, animals, biodiversity), e.g., UNFCCC’s CDM. While there is dearth of academic research on the DPRK’s ecology, Milne’s (2015) paper on Cambodia shows a great deal of similarity giving a useful analogy to the North Korean case. Regarding the role of international actors: after the United Nations-­backed transition of the 1990s, and in light of the ongoing presence of donor agencies and international non-­governmental organisations (NGOs), observers have noted Cambodia’s heavy dependence on aid. Yet the government has maintained significant autonomy in the face of normative international pressures – or, a remarkable capacity to maintain the facade of reform while pursuing its own agenda, as noted in the land and forestry sectors, as well as in relation to electoral reform. Alongside this recalcitrance, the government has also embraced less stringent aid and support from China, especially for the development of infrastructure. Foreign investment too has been welcomed, especially in the form of agricultural and mining concessions: an opportunity that Cambodia’s resource-­ hungry neighbors have jumped on with zeal. (Milne 2015: p. 207)

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   135 North Korea may soon be in a similar situation with Cambodia and regional cooperation mechanisms could manage the country’s transition in a sustainable manner, not repeating the same errors in that development pattern. The DPRK’s transition would be the most crucial issue in the field of environmental security in the NEA in the coming years. Trust building between the two Koreas would help as the first step, and the current South Korean government’s “New Inter-­Korean Economic Map” has spurred cooperative projects. The two Korea’s national agendas of territorial reunification is not only nurtured by constructive ideas of nationalistic discourse, but also built upon “imagined ecological integrity.” Although the nation has been divided into two, for more than half a century, people’s and leaders’ psychological maps do not end at the 38 degree latitude demilitarized zone. The relevant ministries in South Korea have made efforts to conduct research on general ecological conditions in North Korea, covering areas such as natural resources assets, deforestation, desertification, food supply, agricultural productivity, irrigation, and energy. They have discovered that the situation has been rapidly aggravated in all aspects. The forestry agency had already noticed and warned in 1999 that deforestation in North Korea was at an alarming stage and has been the cause of frequent natural disasters. Experts have suggested to resolve a total ecological crisis by implementing the CDM mechanism combined with the REDD (Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) under the Kyoto Protocol. Sporadic reforestation programs have been operating via NGOs and government agencies but fundamental green structural adjustment will be needed due to linking issues, all of which are trans-­ boundary problems. In fact, the idea of inter-­Korean collaboration for natural resources stemming from unification nationalism is not new, and some examples can be seen as a harbinger of EABRN. For instance, Glenn D. Paige (1989) suggested that one of the nonviolent approaches to Korean reunification was preserving and enhancing the biosphere in the spirit of the United Nations World Charter for Nature, based on the conviction that recognition of the environmental unity of the Korean peninsula contributes to recognition of the ecological unity of the world. (Na 2012: pp. 91–92) I also argue that constructivism explains well enough the motivation for cooperation by dint of nationalistic spawned reunification discourse, although of course it is not by any means sufficient. Concrete scenarios and roadmaps to implement ecological integrity have been developed by many actors including governmental and non-­governmental agencies. These are reflected in a series of policy suggestions and programs regarding environmental cooperation under the policy agenda of “Green Détente.” For example, the Korean Environmental Institute (KEI 2013: p.  233, footnote no. 98.), a government think-­tank, has conducted detailed research on the possibilities and impacts of cooperative

136   Regional biodiversity loss and governance research on the volcanoes Mts. Baekdu/Changbai. The mountains demark the border between China and North Korea and yet the ecological value of the development of the mountains and adjacent areas would be immeasurably huge, affecting not only risk management of the volatile volcanoes, but also habitat restoration, reforestation, biodiversity, ecotourism and other economic benefits that can be shared by all participants. North Korea has expressed strong interest in this project. The delegation mentioned that the government of the DPRK very much welcomes this project as it also implies symbolic significance due to the DPRK’s national historical and emotive attachment to the mountain (Workshop in Hong Kong, March 2017). China–DPRK trade relationship and rising ecological concerns Interviews with and testimony from North Korean defectors reveal how the regime has failed to manage its natural resources especially valuable timber and minerals. North Korea ranks as the 20th largest timber exporter in the world but most of it is exported to China at cheap prices. The central government’s policy strictly bans cutting trees and smuggling timber but such guidelines do not effectively reach local communities. A symbolic case was the 2007 incident of Oh Mun Hyuk. Oh Mun Hyuk is the name of the person who was brutally executed being shot 99 times in North HamGyong Province after being accused of smuggling relief trees to China. Chinese trading companies which were actively engaged in North Korea were China Minmetals Corporation (CMC), Tonghua Iron and Steel, and Wanxiang Group. They have been under scrutiny due to the international community’s sanctions after North Korea’s sixth nuclear and multiple ICBM tests (see, for example, Hastings and Wang 2017). After that event, although people in North Korea were aware of the risk of execution and understood state policy well enough, authorized logging and timber extraction continued in a highly unsustainable manner and smuggling has not been stopped by people in forest areas (even selling precious timber from oak trees for a handful of corn). While increasing Chinese investment influenced North Korea’s economic changes that offered benefits to some groups of people in society, from an ecological point of view, the country has had not much choice but to continue an unsustainable and even destructive path of development. With growing interest in North Korea’s natural resources and cheap labour, North Korea has since the mid-­2000s been somewhat successful in attracting investment from China. PyongYang has viewed SEZs as a central means of attracting further foreign investment. In 2011, China and North Korea formulated a joint development plan for the SEZs of RaSeon in the northeast and HwangGumPyong Island near Sinuiju in the northwest. In October 2013, PyongYang announced plans for 13 new provincial-­level SEZs around the country. This has involved the decentralization of powers from the central government to the provincial level so that each SEZ can be

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   137 developed in line with the competitive strengths of each region. With the exception of RaSeon and KaeSeong, however, these new SEZs have to date seen little visible success in attracting foreign investment, reflecting North Korea’s widely perceived investment risks alongside the inhibiting role of international sanctions. As such, if PyongYang is unable to improve its foreign relations, the objectives of establishing viable SEZs are unlikely to be realized. (Gray and Lee 2017: p. 67) Each year, China and North Korea have renewed bilateral cooperation agreements, gradually broadening their scope, among which ones with environmental implications include, for example: Food Safety Inspections and Standards (2002); Ocean Shipping Cooperation (2002); Economic and Technological Cooperation (2005); Promotion and Protection of Investment (2005); Joint Development of Maritime Oil Resources (2005); Establishing Joint Ventures in the DPRK’s Coal Industry (2005); Mutual Assistance for Customs (2008); Air Transportation (2008); Vehicle Transformation (2008); Joint Development and Management of the Rason Economic and Trade Zone; and Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa Island Economic Zones (2010) (Reilly 2014: p. 919). China’s increasing role in the regional environmental regime In this region, at present, conflicts and cooperation are only loosely inter-­ connected. According to KOTRA’s (Korea Trade Promotion Corporation initially, Korea Trade-­Investment Promotion Agency) assessment on the fast development of China’s green industry, for example, in 2013, China marked a 39.7 percent increase (compared with 2012) in the production of electric and hybrid cars, and sales also marked a 37.9 percent increase. Steady increases in this field have been possible due to the government’s emphasis on environmental improvements backed by strict regulations. As many analysts had predicted, China’s market dominance in green technology has increased at a fast pace. Aggressive mergers or the forming of consortia with foreign firms with capital, to absorb frontier green technologies and effectively use environmental aid through a centralized political system, have contributed to such development in the environmental field. Foreign firms see consortia with Chinese firms beneficial given the size and scale of the domestic market in China. For this reason, many governments have concerns over the issue of intellectual/­industrial property rights when trading with China given that within the country, IP protection levels are much lower than other industrialized countries. Another barometer on China’s active incorporation of environmentalism into trade would be its policy of foreign investment (green investment). Vis-­à-vis South Korea, China has altered its priority in investments including the following four features: first, finance, real estate, and the services sector as high value added areas (the medical industry, investing in Jeju Island for a green zone with a medical

138   Regional biodiversity loss and governance industrial complex). The second is industry using China’s supply chain; an example is the Dalian Zhangzidao Group, which invested in the aquaculture business, processing fishery goods in South Korea and selling them back on the Chinese market. The third is investing in the field of renewable energy generation (e.g., Yingauang Futai Taiyangneng Youxian Gongsi) including solar energy equipment, plants and production plants. The fourth represents China’s inclusion of a third country for trilateral investment and business models.8 The trends somehow indicate China’s leaning toward clean industry and such a pattern shows a possibility of environmental cooperation via the private sector, which is an important cornerstone of multi-­stakeholder environmental governance building. Urgent trans-­boundary environmental threats are excluded from meeting agendas and thus rarely discussed at a multilateral level. Among these issues though are conflicts and disputes related to illegal logging, the loss of biodiversity attributed to deforestation, water contamination and changes in its characteristics due to unsuitable dam construction (Biba 2012), unsustainable mining and resource extraction, and the habitual violation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The lack of a multi-­stakeholder governance structure in environmental affairs causes inconsistency in policy implementation. Examples are numerous. Inter-­ governmental reforestation projects are undertaken in parallel with deforestation by the private sector. Likewise, regional governmental cooperation to restore ecosystems for endangered wild animals including Siberian tigers in the Northeastern border area of China, RFE, and North Korea may fail due to illegal poaching and trafficking linked with trans-­boundary criminal networks spread over China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong), North Korea and Mongolia. The ivory trade has been an issue for a long time in Asia. As it involves intercontinental illegal trade and the violation of CITES, it has long been an international issue. However, cultural sovereignty clashes with international sustainable development norms. Similar to the international community’s pressure on Japan for its whaling practice, stakeholders in countries involved in the ivory industry have argued that such ivory crafts practice should be protected as part of tradition and the nation’s cultural heritage, and further the livelihood of artists and businesses engaged in this industry. Consequently, governments (central and/or local) at times are reluctant to impose stricter regulations on those trading against MEAs (The Global Times, July 28, 2016).9 Around the time Prince Charles made an official visit to Beijing in 2014, China temporarily, or at least showing a gesture of cooperation with international regimes, strictly banned the ivory trade. Until the end of 2017, carved elephant tusks were still sold legally in China. International trade in ivory had been banned by the government since 1990, but not domestic transactions. At a shop in a glitzy mall in Beijing, the manager showed off his prize exhibit: a carving the size of a football of

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   139 30 ivory spheres, one inside the other, each moving separately and intricately carved. It was an example of an ancient craftsmanship, and one that has no future. On January 1st China banned ivory sales. The last ivory-­ carving factories and shops (including the one in Beijing) closed. (The Economist, January 4, 2018)10 Most environmental crimes are related with Asia, either as final destination or through transit. “An analysis of the circulation routes used to traffic in environmental commodities reveals that they are smuggled not only trans-­ nationally, but also trans-­continentally.” Although the flows vary depending on the commodity, transits are made mainly via airports or seaports: in Africa via Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar (Tanzania), Entebbe (Uganda), Kenyatta and Mombasa (Kenya), in Asia via Hong Kong and Singapore, in Europe via Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), and Rotterdam (the Netherlands), in North America via San Diego and Houston (the U.S.). However, the final destination is mainly concentrated in East Asia (UNEP 2016: pp. 41–47, p. 61). Although not directly involved, Japan and South Korea in the NEA are major consumers of many of the environmentally sensitive goods. It was Japan however not the African states, that determined the viability of the regime. In 1989: the worldwide ivory market was worth an estimated 50$ million to 60$ million annually. Japan dominated this market, importing more than 80$ million of all African ivory products, making it the potential leader of an effective veto coalition. As the major consumer nation, Japan had been expected to enter a reservation, allowing a significant portion of the ivory market to remain viable and effectively vetoing the ban.… However, facing heavy pressure from the US, the EC and national and international NGOs, Japan eventually decided not to oppose the ban. World prices for was ivory eventually plunged by 90%. (Chasek et al. 2017: p. 209) Leadership shift and China’s growing responsibilities in the global environmental regime China’s rising top-­down environmentalism passes on mixed consequences on environmental development in the region. China has been often criticized for the its negligence on strict compliance with international environmental norms and overlooking the black market for the trafficking of parts of endangered species; not only the question on ivory (as already discussed) but on many other issues including timber, fish, hazardous waste, and chemicals. Hong Kong provides a transitory place (storage and shipment) for illegal transactions on waste and toxic waste shipping. The past century witnessed three periods of excessive timber harvesting. The first phase took place from 1896 to 1945 when Russia and then Japan

140   Regional biodiversity loss and governance invaded and “controlled” part of China. Yu names the period as “harvesting without cultivation.” This was followed by a period from 1950 to 1977 during which the main goal of forestry was to produce timber, and excessive harvesting was actively encouraged. They continue to explain that “[t] he third phase occurred from 1978 to 1998 in conjunction with national economic reforms and the broadening of international relations, which together triggered deep and lasting changes in Chinese society.” The authors argue that excessive logging and neglected cultivation of forests resulted in the current situation “which together nearly exhausted exploitable forest reserves in the region.” Such degradation “was accompanied by severe disruption of stand structure and serious degradation of overall forest quality and function. Soil erosion, biodiversity decline, and timber/non-­ timber forest product shortages all became more serious concerns.” The authors also illuminate that “[t]he capacity to support sustainable economic development was dramatically weakened and the gap in living standards between the people in forested areas and the rest of the society was expanded.” (Yu et al. 2011: pp. 1122–1123) During the Mao years, tremendous damage was done to the natural environment as the regime tried to use China’s massive population to conquer nature and rationalize agricultural and industrial production. There was a considerable loss of forest cover during this period as land was converted to agricultural use and forests were used for fuel wood. One thing a communist government can do more easily than a democratic one is to introduce campaigns and mobilize society into action. Recognizing the ill-­conceived deforestation efforts, there are now major nationwide tree planting campaigns. The hills surrounding Beijing now have tens of thousands of tiny trees on them, planted and cared for by local villagers. Recently, Beijing also introduced a logging ban to address the rapid loss of forests in China’s west. The difficulty with an all-­out logging ban, however, is that incurs heavy costs on communities that depend on logging for their livelihood and it also shifts the problem of logging to other regions, and in this case neighboring Southeast Asian countries (Schreurs 2005: p. 122). Among sustainable development experts and commentators, it is true that they have been more worried and cautious than optimistic about China’s expanding multilateralism with sinicization (The South China Morning Post, September 3, 2016 and May 17, 2017; Tracy et al. 2017).11 Environmentalists’ concern are grounded in the following: first, China’s establishing new multilateral organizations involve large scale infrastructure construction (road, ports, bridges and extraction industries) (The South China Morning Post, December 5, 2017)12 that inevitably produces ecosystem disturbance and biodiversity loss. Second, in connection with the first point, these large scale engineering projects are undertaken in less developed countries where environmental standards are relatively looser than international standards, and yet, environmental harm caused by large-­scale engineering work irreversibly

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   141 affects the ecosystem and nearby communities’ livelihoods that, once built, are not easily recoverable. Third, in the process of negotiating over multilateral cooperation, China has been evasive on issues concerning environmental protection and ecologically safer development. For example, during U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration, the region witnessed a clash between two multilateralism(s) reflecting the rivalry between the U.S. and China. Compared with the U.S.-backed TPP, Beijing’s RCEP has no provisions on the environment. Fourth, related to the third point, in the case of the Mekong River development China established a new China-­led regional organization, the Lancang-­Mekong Cooperation, in 2015 that obviously overlaps with an already existing organization, the 60-year-­old Mekong River Commission (China was not a member), that has the same function and focuses on equitable and sustainable development of the wider Mekong communities of all riparian countries. Over “60 million people depend on the river and its tributaries for food, water, transport and many other aspects of their daily lives” (The South China Morning Post, January 9, 2018). China intends to reshuffle the membership and accelerate the building of hydropower dams and other projects for the region, while emphasizing its importance in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) infrastructure plan. Such actions are interpreted as Beijing’s insincere way of dealing with environmental issues, only bolstering China’s influence in the region. The basin is home to 1,200–1,700 fish species, making it the most diverse basin after the Amazon and Congo.… Led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Prak Sokhonn, Cambodia signed a new cooperation agreement with China in December, receiving more than US$7 million to fund various projects, including monitoring water quality, restoring forests and combating land degradation. Last year, China pledged US$400 million to support small and medium-­sized enterprise projects along the river.… Environmentalists and government officials have expressed concern over damage caused by China’s dam construction. When Vietnam experienced its worst drought in 90 years in 2016, experts said China was partly responsible because its reservoir dams had increased evaporation rates upstream. China also plans to blast open the sections of the Mekong between Thailand and Laos to allow passage of bigger cargo ships. The plan has triggered opposition from residents and conservation groups in Thailand, who have complained that the plan would destroy the Mekong, killing fish breeding grounds and disrupting migrating birds. Protests against the plan have been staged since December. (The South China Morning Post, January 9, 2018)13 Until President Moon Jae-­in was elected, the relationship between China and South Korea had been aggravated over the issue of the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which the U.S. had pushed for. As soon as Moon was in power, the decision was reviewed and an environmental impact study was used as a reason for the delay of full

142   Regional biodiversity loss and governance deployment. Various issues were involved relating to the process and regulations on environmental impact assessments that have been often exempted or loosely applied in the case of security related facilities. When it became a public issue, it was also revealed that the size of zone was wrongly announced, shrunk from 700,000m2 to 320,000m2 in order to avoid a stricter assessment. Meanwhile, China also used environment-­related issues (chemical concentrations in trade goods) as a tool to ban imports of South Korean cosmetic products during the period of tension, by raising standards without prior notification or by delaying approval (Chosun Ilbo, January 11, 2017).14 Like Japan’s implicit cooperation with China’s OBOR, President Moon has also sent a signal that Korea would be cooperative, particularly after the first summit between the two countries (Chosun Ilbo, December 18, 2017). As China has emphasized OBOR on every occasion including at the TEMM, it has become a barometer for Beijing to discern supporters from foes.15 Since 2015, during the TEMM process, global issues have been mentioned more frequently, compared with previous years. Particularly, ministers commonly showed interest in implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals expressing “their expectations that the post-­2015 development agenda scheduled to be adopted in September 2015 will play a pivotal role in global development cooperation for the next 15 years” (TEMM17 JC 2015: para. 16). It was repeatedly mentioned in the following years: “The ministers recognized the importance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and agreed to launch the Tripartite Joint Research on the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals from the Environmental Dimension” (TEMM19 JC 2017: para 27). The China-­initiated OBOR is mentioned in line with the global sustainable development agenda although the OBOR has little significance in the discussion of environmental performance. The ministers confirmed that they are willing to build capacity for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the regional level by sharing the three countries’ examples and information. In addition, the ministers exchanged opinions, including climate change response and regional initiatives for sustainable development such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Euroasia Initiative and High Level Seminar on Environmentally Sustainable Cities. (TEMM18 2016) Although the EU and western countries doubt it, the NEA including Japan with Russia and the DPRK is quite ready to cooperate. As long as China can address emerging issues that are not against existing principles (reciprocal sovereignty in trade, and equitable and quality development), for the NEA, China’s development drive is regarded as an opportunity rather than a threat, thus an NEA-­led regional cooperation model can be developed in the field of regional ecological development.

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   143 Rising concerns on trans-­boundary moves of e-­waste (neoliberal policy failure) Neighboring countries were not prepared to follow China’s fast policy implementation, which was caused by the clash between a state-­centered top-­down environmental policy and a neoliberal market-­reliant policy on trans-­boundary environmental issues. This typically proves once again the importance of inter-­ state level cooperation and the positive politicization of environmental affairs in this region of hybrid political systems with an inconsistent mixture of policy tools. The TEMM has taken efforts to align its agenda with global biodiversity regimes, and at the same time, it has begun to include regional-­specific issues such as invasive organisms and e-­waste (including how to deal with toxic chemicals and managing chemical safety). At the TEMM10 in 2008, ministers pledged to enhance their collaboration to implement “The Basel Convention” to meet the objectives set out therein.  In addition, the ministers welcomed the tripartite workshop on e-­waste management policy held in Beijing in November 2008. The ministers agreed to continue their efforts against the illegal trans-­boundary movement of hazardous wastes, especially e-­waste, through continued dialogue among the three countries as well as concerted efforts in Asia on the Environmentally Sound Management of E-­waste under the Basel Convention. (TEMM11 2009) Global level responses may mean the members’ determination to interact with global governance toward REDM Stage IV, as explained in Chapter 2 (for example, urging collective responses to the 2009 UNFCCC Copenhagen COP meeting during TEMM10), but at the same time the subject may become abstract diluting real regional issues. In the recent past, discussions at the TEMM clearly demonstrate that despite the countries’ changing (especially China) determination to player a great role in the global environmental regimes, however, it may seek only loosely common ground by passing more urgent direct intra-­regional issues. Beijing’s actual implementation of the dramatic total ban on the import of e-­waste (electronic and plastics) was only recently stimulated by the documentary film, Plastic China (2016), although the government had long been aware of the gravity of the issue. In 2012, at the 14th TEMM meeting, China brought out this issue as an agenda item and expressed strong interest in cooperating in the field in view of eradicating the illegal trans-­ boundary transfer of e-­waste, cooperation in the ABS (Access and Benefit Sharing over Bio resources), and further cooperation on environmental industry and technology transfer. Given that, the DSS issue, and ABS and e-­waste are areas that China’s determination and leadership are essential in, as it is a polluter at the same time as playing a “sink country” in the regional and global life cycle

144   Regional biodiversity loss and governance of waste. At the meeting, China also agreed that in order to resolve the problem of DSS, members should utilize existing multilateral institutions such as ADB and GEF. In Japan, several environmental NGOs organized a citizen’s platform focusing on waste problems in the region beyond Japan. They include the East Asia Environmental Information Express Messenger (EAEIEM), the Study Group for a Sustainable Society (SGSS), Friends of the Earth Japan, and the Asia Waste Watch, in order to prevent environmental pollution caused by waste in Asia, through networking and cooperation among domestic and international citizen groups. These NGOs have made policy proposals on waste surveys and the revision of the Japanese Home Appliances Recycle Act. In China, the Greenpeace China conducted a survey on health damage from e-­waste, and organized a campaign on appealing the e-­waste problem and suspension of e-­waste trade. (Hicks et al. 2005: pp. 461–462) Yoshimatsu explored the process how relevant NGOs have taken initiatives. In South Korea, the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) and Korea Zero Waste Movement Networks (KZWMN) are representative NGOs regarding waste problems.… The NGOs in the three countries have organized trans-­boundary activities on the e-­waste problem in Asia, especially in China. In November 2005, the EAEIEM, SGSS, KZWMN and KFEM, in support of Greenpeace China, conducted a survey on e-­waste recycling practices at Taizhou in Zhejiang Province, China. Moreover, these NGOs organized the Asian Citizens’ 3R Forum on October 29, 2006, and issued the NGO Appeal to the Asia 3R Conference in Tokyo. This appeal aimed to reflect demands from NGOs at discussions at the Asia 3R Conference, a Japanese government-­initiated international conference that would begin the following day. The trans-­boundary activities by NGOs created background factors encouraging the governments to focus on the e-­waste issue seriously. (Yoshimatsu 2010: p. 13) The e-­waste issue was formally raised by the Chinese government at the 9th TEMM in December 2007, and government officials agreed to adopt concrete actions to tackle this issue. However, the South Korean response was limited to domestic trends overlooking the huge risk transfers originating from Beijing’s policy turn, and failed to timely manage the amount of waste that it used to export to China. This proves the danger of a heavy reliance on a single type of environmental policy instrument, in the case of South Korea, which is heavily market-­oriented, relying on private sector operators that have limited capacity to handle China’s state level abrupt policy reform. Although China is certainly a

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   145 “marketized” political system, as a highly centralized state, the effectiveness of state-­centered top-­down environmental policy can be a risk for the neighboring countries when they are not prepared to respond. In this sector, compared with South Korea, Japan has a well-­established policy mix mobilizing all parties, the state, market, and civic society. The recent waste crisis in South Korea caused by China’s shift to stricter environmental policy implementation established a significant case for the region taking a step forward to consider how to design domestic policy incorporating “regional risks,” and how to cooperate more effectively in developing a pattern of regional environmental cooperation, especially under the hybrid political systems and yet economically highly industrialized marketized economies.

Positive politicization of environmental conflicts for cooperation Regional development models and the possibility of building a cooperative regime (toward the REDM Stage IV) Domestically, the NEA six are all at various stages with diversified paths and motivations for ecological modernization (Barrett 2012; Economy 2010; Shapiro 2001). If applying the REDM, the biodiversity field demonstrates the region is still in Stage II. However, as explained in detail in Chapter 2, the fourth phase may interplay with phases two and three, being influenced by external (global) pressure on pollution mitigation. Ecologically less developed countries may benefit from interaction with global environmental regimes. One optimistic note would be the fact that all six may at some point reach a fuller degree of transition to ecological modernization, regardless of different political systems. Regionalism, if well mobilized, certainly serves as an important catalyst in contributing to enhancing and facilitating cooperation for further environmental development (in theory). In the NEA, at present, (potential) conflicts and eco-­nationalistic competition hampers a deeper degree of cooperative engagement, reducing the opportunity to create regional synergy to improve environmental quality across nations. Meanwhile, bilateralism is also an important variable adding both positive and negative aspects to the NEA’s strong eco-­nationalism and strict sovereignty notion applied in the cooperative process. The following incident, the Songhua River Chemical Accident, demonstrates how bilateralism can enhance positive ecological ties resulting in institutionalized cooperation, which can be referred to in similar cases for further consolidation of institutionalization. The Songhua River accident and environmental cooperation A chemical explosion occurred on November 13, 2005, at a petrochemical plant owned by Petro China of the Jilin Petrochemical Corporation in Jilin Province, China.

146   Regional biodiversity loss and governance UNEP described the accident as one of the largest trans-­boundary chemical spills into a river system. The damage affected the nearby ecosystem for years, and pollution developed emitting heavy smoke and dust in the air above Jilin Province, with 100 tons of toxic substances (mixtures of benzene and nitrobenzene) being spilled into the upper stream of the Songhua River. The river is the third largest in China, joining the Heilong River after flowing through Harbin City which is a natural border with the RFE. The river runs into Russia (the Amur River) and then through Khabarovsk. Therefore, the chemical accident affected the Songhua, Heilong and Amur rivers (the main water supply source for the cities and regions) before finally running into the sea (Linnerooth-­Bayer et al. 2001: p. 273). It was also reported that other companies alongside the river had habitually dumped toxic industrial waste into the waters even before the accident. At the beginning of the accident, high-­ranking local government officials kept any information from the public in the communities, and consequently delayed prompt action including an investigation and clean-­up. This accident revealed a general problem with environmental accidents such as regulatory bodies’ negligence in implementing environmental laws, the firm’s inability to handle chemical accidents (non-­compliance with legal obligations on safety), and the lack of risk communication channels between central and local governments, in addition to China’s environmental governance system. It provided important momentum for China to upgrade its disaster management and environmental protection. China invited international organizations, UNEP and ADB, to investigate the situation thoroughly (UNEP 2005). Laws were either newly legislated or reformed. One important development was to pass the Water Pollution Control Act that also stipulated emergency responses. The damage to the ecosystem and human health has not been accurately estimated. Due to the chemical sediment at the bottom of the river, whenever flooding occurred, chemicals surged into water currents and further contaminated water resources. Reforming the disaster governance system was in fact stimulated by important external pressure from the Russian government’s complaints due to the downstream trans-­boundary harm affecting its territory. Although it was not immediate, on December 4, China alerted Russia to the possible damage as the two countries share the basin of the river and ground water sources. China admitted mismanagement of the disaster and took responsibility, expressing its interest in building a cooperative mechanism. A year later, the two governments signed a bilateral agreement and set up a joint monitoring system to check on water quality of their shared water resources (rivers and lakes). This case can be understood as a relevant illustration of a dispute (conflicting situation) that was sufficiently incorporated into cooperation. Such a process was beneficial for both parties in developing the overall enhancement of public awareness and corporate responsibility, setting up a liability scheme, establishing legal and regulatory mechanisms, adopting contingency plans, and communicating for international cooperation. If countries wish to resolve the case legally (apart from the bilateral 1992 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the two countries), referable

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   147 multilateral customary and written laws in this field are well developed; naming just a few of them: the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration (US vs. Canada); 1949 Corfu Channel case ICJ; 1957 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France vs. Spain); 1972 Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration; 1974 Nuclear Test Case (Australia vs. France); 1992 Principle 18 of the Rio Declaration; and the 2001 Article of the Draft of Prevention of Trans-­boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (ILC Prevention Draft). In addition, there are more than enough referable principles and subsidiary principles in international laws (either accepted or candidate) taking “equitable utilization” (instrumental) and “no appreciable harm” (some limits) as their core, “obligation to protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses,” “sustainable development,” “precautionary principle,” “polluter pays principle and intergenerational equity,” “sustainable utilization,” “notification, consultation and negotiation,” and “collective management involving information exchange, emergency cooperation and cooperation in joint management institutions” (principle of progressive international law). In the Songhua case, although many civil and public lawsuits followed, all possible litigation, in reality, did not even make it as cases in the Russian and Chinese context due to their legal systems and the degree of domestic adoption of international laws. Accordingly, political negotiations and social awareness will remain as the most functional tools of the NEA. In practice, international trends reflect the loosened flexible application of the notion of sovereignty in the field of trans-­boundary water management: shifting from “absolute territorial sovereignty” (upstream-­focused), “territorial integrity” (downstream-­focused half-­half rule), “limited territorial sovereignty” (equitable utilization, termed following the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention that is established based on the above-­mentioned cases such as the River Oder case (1929), The Trail Smelter Case (1937), The Corfu Channel Case (1949), Lac Lanoux Disputes (1957), and finally moving to “common management” (the community theory) (Birnie and Boyle 2002; Sands 2012). The trend encourages states to resolve trans-­boundary pollution problems “regionally” using political negotiation tools while fully addressing the affected local communities.

Bypassing the region and globalizing regionalism This chapter mainly argued that, due to rigid concepts of sovereignty, and competition over natural resources (as opposed to approaches based on the public interest and the commonality of goods), governments in the NEA are, at this stage, reluctant to cooperate under the integrated framework of the CBD, and that the selection of agendas for regional cooperation has consequently been limited to areas in which the regions hold shared commercial interests (thin cooperation). Relative to their economic development, even the supposedly environmentally leading countries in the NEA still exhibit a lower level of “ecological industrialization.” (Refer to Table 4.4 for theoretical frames and categorization of the regional biodiversity issues.)

148   Regional biodiversity loss and governance Table 4.4 Biodiversity-related issues (“regional” context)

of

conflicts,

cooperation,

and

compromise

Theoretical orientation (region as a political unit)

Issues/foci under biodiversity

Conflicts (focusing on Republican realism oriented view (ecological implication: NIMBY politics and conventional security) and green protectionism)

Securing natural resources Extraction and maximum use and trade of natural resources, deforestation

Marxist view on global division (ecological implications: equity in resource sharing)

Communitarian Marxism combined with radical ecologism (cf. anarchism)

Rectification of illegality Cooperation (focusing Classical liberal functionalist (ecological implications: ecological (logging and organized on regime building integration under regional/global crime) via regime building and institutions) norms) Neo-functionalist cf. constructivism(ecological implications: spillovers across issues) Compromise (focusing Neo-liberal middle of the road on economic interests) approach (ecological implications: sustainable development enforced by green growth and blue economy) “Active” technological optimism (ecological implications: innovation, green technology transfer)

Setting principles (e.g., CDM, credit transfer) via participatory governance building Industrial opportunity, securing natural resources

Equitable access to bioresources using economic tools

If applying the REDM, in terms of degree of cooperation on biodiversity-­ related issues, the region demonstrates largely a mixture of Stage II and Stage V. In agenda setting, biodiversity-­associated issues are still considered highly selectively, often overlooking urgent regional issues. Recently, there is a tendency that the TEMM process in dealing with biodiversity has moved focus onto more global contributions (from introducing and publicizing individual countries’ domestic policy) without a concrete agenda on how “regional” governance may contribute to the global biodiversity regime “regionally” thus “collectively.” Countries are reluctant to discuss the overall package of the CBD and only highly selective issues are opted for and discussed during the TEMM process. Some level of actions indicate their reaching Stage III, but only concerning extremely selective issues as explained in the previous sections. In reality due to the different level of approach to regionalism, all the five stages coexist although the core NEA, in certain areas (e.g., information-­sharing, commercial interests, some of the global agendas and technological cooperation) countries are keen to cooperate and to take stronger leadership.

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   149 As I stress throughout this book, conflicting issues are not sufficiently incorporated into the arena of cooperation. A more thorough examination on the causes of problems (including accidents and policy failures) will resolve urgent trans-­boundary environmental tension. Naturally, at this stage in the NEA, discussions on trans-­boundary issues blur (rather than clarify) the distinction between primary polluters, contributors, and victims. Moreover, the entire process of cooperation may easily end in a stalemate when players are not ready to accept the basic international norm of Polluter Pays Principle (no matter historical or current polluters). As the NEA has established only a very thin intersection between the two fields of inter-­state affairs, cooperation and conflicts (dealing with thorny questions), the institutionalization of cooperative processes has been limited. Adding to that, tensions and conflicts in the environmental field are caused not only by material scarcity over natural resources, but also a lack of awareness on the necessity of protecting “the environment as extensive public goods.” Eco-­nationalism (a country-­level NIMBY rather than “Not-­InAnybody’s-Backyard (NIAB)) worsens such tensions. Therefore, even passive cooperation such as capturing externalities (e.g., air pollution) is hard to resolve. Fundamental causes of externalities can be addressed only by “active” protection (particularly in biodiversity-­related problems), which has taken a lower priority in the list of collective actions mainly due to its less direct “trans-­national” feature. Inside the bureaucracy of domestic environmental governance, in all countries, the staff circulation rate is very high inside relevant ministries and other government bodies. Besides, an integrated approach is rare, meaning officials in charge, and contact points, change constantly. In this situation, it is hard to expect systematic coordination across members dealing with trans-­boundary environmental issues to be established. This naturally results in inconsistent follow-­ups, ruptured cooperative memories, duplications of project, and finally losing many opportunities for better regional synergy in producing complementary environmental effects. What role then has the TEMM played? The meetings usually begin with each minister introducing their own country’s major environmental policy framework and explaining any changes and updates (policy communication and information exchange). Countries take notes to learn from each other (peer-­learning and pressure) and to make national strategy to respond and cooperate (harmonization). Once shared interests are confirmed, each country’s relevant agencies, bodies, and divisions take subsequent cooperative actions (implementation). Prior to each meeting, officials from relevant agencies meet several times to set the agenda and exchange reports on achievements following up discussions made in the previous meeting. The overall goals of the TEMM have been reiterated and developed an ambitious vision which was well established from the onset of the emergence of global environmental governance: The ministers observed that environmental protection will be a central momentum shaping the course of the 21st century. In this vein, they anticipated that the international community will make significant efforts to

150   Regional biodiversity loss and governance achieve sustainable development. The Ministers communicated their intention to contribute to these efforts and agreed that providing information on TEMM to other regional and global environmental meetings would prove valuable to the international environmental endeavor. They shared the view that for this purpose, strengthening of linkages with other Northeast Asian environmental programmes is necessary. (TEMM4 JC 2002: para. 3) In regards to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the ministers recognized the historical significance it carries in the global efforts to revive the environment. The ministers observed that China, Japan and Korea should make constructive contributions to the process and have the regional considerations integrated into the final outcome. In particular, they shared the view that TEMM is an outstanding model of regional cooperation among the countries with different economic and social conditions. They hence agreed to forward the activities of TEMM to the Summit process. The Ministers underscored the importance of incorporating environmental considerations into the development schemes of Asian countries, and maintained that the Summit should serve as an opportunity to highlight this issue. Lastly, they pointed out that continual stakeholder dialogues among the three countries are essential for the success of the WSSD and sustainable development. (TEMM4 JC 2002: para. 6) Despite the prevalent skepticism, in the coming years there is a high chance for the meetings to be run more smoothly as the region has just turned to a mood for peace with the mitigation of the DPRK’s security threats. The cost of participation in inter-­state cooperation is often considered high due to the transaction costs for administration. However, inter-­state cooperation may reduce the duplication of work and create synergy. Participating countries keep weighing several factors, but basically balance between the “cost of participation” and “fear of exclusion,” which are not always measurable. The last meeting also reconfirmed TEMM’s broader vision which should be in line with the global development agenda. Noting the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets submitted to the UN General Assembly by the Open Working Group, the ministers expressed their expectations that the post-­2015 development agenda scheduled to be adopted in September 2015 will play a pivotal role in global development cooperation for the next 15 years. (TEMM 17 JC 2015: para. 16) Compared with the term “regional environmental governance or regime,” environmental politics is more useful and significant in East Asia, given that the democratic way of building regional governance or a regime will face too many

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   151 practical difficulties. Political solutions can be more effective considering the authoritarian way of dealing with environmental problems, and the relative weakness of non-­state actors’ coalitions in regional political fields. China has impressed the world over the past few decades in almost all fields. It is the country that has impressively preserved an almost extinct panda population. The panda today plays a great diplomatic role. Beyond a soft power image, behind the national agenda of saving the panda (to use them as diplomats), enormous efforts were followed by investment and restoring vast habitats with strict regulations. Major Chinese cities go greener; green technology is impressively developing rapidly. During the APEC meeting, Beijing successfully demonstrated the state’s strong determination and effective power on how promptly major cities can be made clean; and played a timely leadership role in the global climate regime as U.S. President Trump trivializes climate discourse. Beijing is also ambitiously implementing development plans with enormous investments in many countries. China’s ambition to reshape the world (a revision of Western-­led globalization) is welcomed by many non-­Western countries. In terms of an ecological civilization, Western-­led development practices have turned out to be total disaster, and over the past three decades of sustainable governance efforts to correct this have achieved little. This is the field and the right time (before it is too late) for China to play a greater role in greening the world, rather than representing developing countries’ protecting their rights to pollute for a fair share of pollution sovereignty. The alternative is not to claim for a fair share of an erroneous path, but to find a different (better) path. Leapfrogging in green technology was a huge benefit and the world market (regional and global citizens) provided China with an opportunity to grow. Advancing to an innovative, sustainable growth path would help China’s renewed ambition of globalizing “Chinese-­ness” in the development field. The quality of today’s world development seems very much dependent on Beijing’s policy directions in the coming decades. Environmentally sensitive development is an effective option to achieve this. In doing so, NEA countries remain significant partners for China. As much as the volume and scale of investment and infrastructure projects impress the world, China is in an advantageous position to implement green projects by implementing a higher standard of EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) and South-­South or trilateral cooperation models. In addition, China’s policy diffusion experience can positively influence developing countries by effectively sharing its experience of GSA (green structural adjustment) for the effective use of green aid, absorption of green technology, and policy frameworks. Reaching Stage V, in a way, Japan and South Korea have shown only limited capacity. Leadership is shifting to China, which may potentially be capable of accelerating regional environmental development.

152   Regional biodiversity loss and governance

Notes   1 “A new coal war frontier emerges as China and Japan compete for energy projects in Southeast Asia,” www.scmp.com/comment/insight-­opinion/article/2139667/new-­ coal-war-­frontier-emerges-­china-and-­japan-compete-­energy (Accessed May 27, 2018).   2 “How many earths do we need, if the rest of the world consumed as much as Hong Kong?,” www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/health-­environment/article/2043119/ how-­many-earths-­do-we-­need-if-­rest-world-­consumed (Accessed November 10, 2016).   3 “Two Koreas to resume construction of cross-­border roads, railways,” http://english. yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2018/04/27/0503000000AEN20180427013351320. html.   4 In case of South Korea, out of total 41,483 species, 2,038 species are designated for legal managements. These species are the ones which need special attention for the conservation, or which should be controlled by necessary measures due to their extant or potential threats to ecosystem or human living. (The Fifth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Republic of Korea 2014: p. 1).   5 “Why grass now costs more than sheep on China’s vast Inner Mongolian prairie,” www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-­politics/article/2025219/why-­grass-now-­costsmore-­sheep-chinas-­vast-inner.   6 Global FDI Briefing, http://125.131.31.47/Solars7DMME/004/162016Global FDIBriefing.pdf. (Accessed January 23, 2018).   7 “N.K. seeks to put Mt. Kumgang on UNESCO biosphere reserve list,” www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/08/07/0200000000AKR20170807020100014.HTML) (Accessed January 29, 2018).   8 KOTRA, https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/4/globalBbsDataView. do?setIdx=243&dataIdx=137750 (Accessed January 28, 2016).   9 Zhao Yusha “Legalization of tiger product trade slammed by environmentalists,” www.globaltimes.cn/content/997092.shtml. 10 “Tusks, skins and waste recycling for the natural world, China’s rise may not be so worrisome: look what the new year has brought,” www.economist.com/news/ china/21734024-look-­what-new-­year-has-­brought-natural-­world-chinas-­rise-may-­notbe-­so-worrisome. 11 See, for example, Jonathan Holslag’s commentary, “Why tensions are inevitable on China’s new silk road,” www.scmp.com/week-­asia/politics/article/2013133/why-­ tensions-are-­inevitable-chinas-­new-silk-­road); and “Why China’s belt and road must be a pathway to sustainable development,” www.scmp.com/comment/insight-­ opinion/article/2094611/why-­chinas-belt-­and-road-­must-be-­pathway-sustainable (Accessed June 15, 2017). 12 “China, Uzbek joint natural gas project ready to start pumping: phase one set to deliver 1 billion cubic metres of fuel per year via Central-­Asian pipeline grid,” www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2122933/china-­uzbek-joint-­ natural-gas-­project-ready-­start (Accessed January 17, 2018). 13 “Five things to know about the Lancang-­Mekong Cooperation summit,” www.asian-­ migrants.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=67 (Accessed May 24, 2018). 14 “Trade restrictions on cosmetics and food: setback of hallyu marketing [huajangpum, shikpum tongguan byok nopajeo … hallyu marketing-­do chajil],” http://news.donga. com/Main/3/all/20170111/82314149/1#csidx1343f5521e62d02a6336119769b 0b49 (Accessed March 29, 2017). 15 “President Mun urged Korean Embassies abroad to speed up cooperation plans for China’s Belt and Road [Mun daetongryong, jaeoegongguan-­e jung ildaeil-­lo gusanggua yeonngae-­e sokdo nae-­dalla],” http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/12/ 18/2017121802685.html (Accessed May 17, 2018).

Regional biodiversity loss and governance   153

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5 Regional political dynamics and the marine environment in Northeast Asia

Ocean-­induced environmental issues in Northeast Asia The conceptualization of environmental security has contributed to extending the notion of inclusively focusing on indirect and longer-­term harm to “humans”. Yet, the underlying assumption is that such threats should draw full attention only to the extent that ecosystem (ecosystem as material assets) interrupts “human” life; in other words, a strictly anthropogenic view. The fundamental limit is the fact that “security” cannot be guaranteed unless participants in multilateral negotiations and domestic politics change, otherwise no common grounds can be established. Regional environmental politics require a broader and revolutionary paradigm shift. Even without extending the coverage of “security,” the simple fact that a failure of regional politics directly or indirectly may destroy ecological assets connotes a security threat no matter that such acts directly harm humans life or not. Taking the intrinsic value of ecosystems more seriously, ecosystem destruction itself is a security concern. Accordingly, it is meaningful to focus research on the interaction between conventional core principles of inter-­state relations, notably, the security of humans and ecosystems as opposed to rigid state security (IR aspect as a foe of implementing the sustainable development agenda), and supranational cosmopolitan sovereignty as opposed to territorialized sovereignty (domestic politics level as a foe of implementation of sustainable development), which are embedded/realized/ implemented through inter-­state tools/mechanism like warfare, trade, other types of communications, and their interactions with ecological consequences. For warfare, weapons are of the utmost importance; for trade, institutions and laws are required; for other communications, common beliefs, trust, identity are required. However, in all three areas of inter-­state relations, in practice, they coexist with ups and downs, in due course: competition, cooperation, coordination, and conflicts are naturally and inextricably intertwined. In the examination of climate cooperation in Northeast Asia (see Chapter 3), and barriers to such cooperation, the link between environmental regionalism and security (the main theme of this book) is shown to have some fundamental limitations, given that cooperation has been sustained in an increasingly politics-­ free and business-­oriented approach to resolving environmental problems. The

Political dynamics and marine environment   157 lack of regionalism is partly due to the prominent national agendas of individual countries that conflict directly with green agendas (e.g., developmentalism and/ or militarism). In addition, (potential) territorial disputes over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and Dokdo/Takeshima further limit environmental cooperation on issues related to the ocean and maritime environment. In light of these factors, this chapter helps to consolidate the main contributions of this book to understanding environmental security in the NEA. Above all, this section explores the major maritime environmental affairs that closely affect the NEA as a region. Some of them are bilateral in nature but clearly entail regional implications. Conventionally, maritime affairs in international relations usually concern limited issues regarding how to ensure a nation’s safe and effective “use” of the ocean surface (e.g., navigation rights) and sovereign rights to extract natural resources (Valencia 1996; Griffiths 2014). Therefore, ecological protection of the marine environment in a collective manner has a very low priority, and cooperation on environmental issues has been rare in the territorial or shared due to overlapping EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) and “wasters” in the Pacific Ocean. Mounting concerns, including all three broadly categorized environmental problems, namely, pollution, overuse (over fishing), and conversion (in all seas surrounding the NEA, namely the East Siberia section of the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan/East Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk), are aggravated by the absence of a multilateral collaborative approach (Goldstein 2013; Kang 2003; Kim 2003; Zou 2003), while existing cooperative schemes are highly fragmented. Moreover, the territorial waters in this region are strategically significant as most confrontational “rim-­lands” at dispute are also located there. Referring to the below-­mentioned use of related terms, the key ones; ocean, marine, and maritime; are employed depending on their context. A usual working definition based on customary use is provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) below: “Ocean” is usually used in Ireland and the United States, whereas “marine” is widely used in Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. “Maritime” is frequently used by the European Union, Norway and Spain. Often terminologies are also translated differently into English when they are taken from Japanese, Korean or Mandarin.… “[M]aritime” will be understood as “being connected with the sea, especially in relation to seafaring, commercial or military activity,” while “marine” will be understood as “of, found in, or produced by the sea, marine plants; and marine biology.” (OECD 2016: p. 21) Other factors that contribute to the degradation of freshwater ecosystems, and thus their ability to process contaminants, include the introduction of invasive alien species and anthropogenic modifications to river systems. 

158   Political dynamics and marine environment According to the IUCN, invasive alien species constitute the second most severe threat to freshwater fish species, and the spread of invasive alien species is projected to increase due to a combination of increasing trade and climate change. Changes in the natural morphology of water bodies (e.g. channelized rivers, dams, canals) can also affect the ability of ecosystems to process and retain pollutants. The deterioration of water quality also has subsequent knock-­on impacts on the functioning of in-­stream invertebrates, fish and aquatic plant communities, which causes negative feedbacks, particularly the ability of ecosystems to process contaminants, thereby causing pollutants to accumulate in the environment and cause further damage. (OECD 2017: p. 42) Internationally, due to the issue of the invasion of alien species, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has set up the Technical Cooperation on Marine Environment, and after decades of long discussions, in 2017 the BWM (Ballast Water Management) Convention finally went into force on September 8, 2017. In addition, the “Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-­based Activities,” as a global inter-­governmental institution, plays a role to interconnect the problems between land use and marine pollution. There is no dearth of international hard and soft laws on regulating the ocean environment but the sources are underused by NEA governments. The Yellow Sea, which China and the two Koreas share is categorized as one of those most polluted. Similarly with any other water pollution causes, anthropogenic measures take up a higher proportion and pollutants enter water systems from lands (pesticides and manufacturing sites among others). Polluted waters run from China’s Yellow River alongside pollution caused by crude oil leaking from oil drilling plants in the gulf of Pohai. Regional factors have aggravated the situation, resulting from: (1) geographical closure in the region; (2) frequent military drills and exercises; (3) heavy use of navigation and trade routes due to fast economic development; (4) influx of land-­based pollutants coming from industrial sites; (5) unsustainable agriculture, and groundwater pollution; (6) land reclamation for security and economic reasons resulting in destroying west coast tidelands, lowering its self-­purification capacity; (7) frequent oil spills that are underreported (UNEP 2015; Baird 2012; Bateman 2015). All these factors have combined to contribute to a suffering of the offshore environment adjacent to NEA countries. Overexploitation and heated competition hampers a peaceful equitable and sustainable way of using the ocean environment in this region. The problematic features comprise overfishing, an absence of cooperative mechanisms, distance fishing with the use of high technology, changing consumption patterns in connection with the rise of the middle class and subsequent higher demand for high quality food such as fishery products. All these factors affect not only NEA countries but wider neighboring countries in East Asia. According to 2012 statistics, in terms of major producers’ marine fisheries capture, China reached the top, followed by Indonesia and the U.S. Russia took the 5th followed by

Political dynamics and marine environment   159 Japan and India, Vietnam (9th), Myanmar (10th), the Philippines (12th), South Korea (13th), Thailand (14th), and Malaysia (15th) (FAO 2014).  In principle, the higher the income generated by domestic fisheries, the lower the incentive for fishers in those fisheries to engage in IUU [Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated] activities. Hence, countries with weak and poorly enforced management regimes may be a likely source of vessels for IUU operations.  (Gallic and Cox 2006: p. 690) Receiving harsh criticism from the international community for the first time, the Chinese authorities announced they would cut shipping emissions in April 2017. Every year, over 60% of the world’s seaborne cargo and 30% of the world’s shipping containers pass through China’s ports. Shipping has become an increasingly significant industry in China as home of seven of the world’s ten largest ports; and pollution from shipping has heavily affected major coastal cities, notably Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai. (Climate Home News, April 20, 2017)1 Globally, environmental regulations for ships are overseen by the IMO. However,  while the IMO contributed to cutting pollution by implementing special emission control zones in America and Europe (where low sulphur marine fuels are used as standard), Asia has been left untouched. The concern is that Chinese ports will be reluctant to implement pollution controls for fear of any possible loss in trade.  (Reuters, October 29, 2014)2 More and more, China’s private sector will be engaged in ocean-­related industries but it is not yet clear whether and how the Chinese government will effectively regulate unsustainable business activities, responding to paramount environmental concerns. Situating the NEA in the global maritime regime Compared with climate change or biodiversity, global maritime governance demonstrates an even higher level of fragmentation, lacking coherence in strengthening regimes. Nonetheless, common interests at a global level have been continuously dealt with under a large number of established institutions and organizations. Also, conventions, principles, and norms are not less developed than the other two domains (climate and biodiversity regimes). The emphasis and focus of international norms regulating water resources have also

160   Political dynamics and marine environment Box 5.1  Selected fisheries conservation milestones (global)  1992

1993 1995 1995 1999

2001 2001 2006 2010 2016

UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) calls for negotiation of an agreement to conserve highly migratory fish stocks and straddling fish  UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks  UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;  Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)’s adoption of the International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries FAO’s adoption of three international plans of action on reducing incidental catch of Seabirds in longline fisheries, conservation and management of sharks, and the management of fishing capacity  Fish Stocks Agreement enters into force  FAO’s adoption of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing  First review conference for the Fish Stocks Agreement  Second review conference for the Fish Stocks Agreement Third review conference for the Fish Stocks Agreement Source: Adopted from Chasek et al. 2017

been shifting: from exclusive “rights of use” to “common obligation for sustainable use,” and finally toward “collective management.” There are more than an adequate number of regional governmental and non­governmental organizations that can comprehensively tackle maritime affairs (see Table 5.2 for membership to fishery conventions). International regimes addressing the ocean environment are highly divisive and governing approaches to pollution, territorial disputes, use of watercourses, and fisheries have not been integrated under concepts such as “global water governance.” Given that commercial fishing has drawn much attention from countries across the world due to its urgency, the global fisheries regime has been relatively more developed than other aspects concerning the ocean environment. Dissimilar to the other two global environmental regimes discussed in previous chapters, decisions made during major international negotiations in the process of building a global ocean regime encouraged concerned countries to cooperate “regionally,” and to establish “regional” regimes that can reflect geographical features better. As discussed in the previous two chapters, China has changed its stance in the global environmental regime. Regarding the motivation for such a change (by what forces a country turns its status from a veto to a lead country), one study explains that in global environmental negotiations, it usually results from one or more of the following five developments (Chasek et al. 2017: p. 253): a veto state’s understanding of the problem (because of new scientific evidence),

Political dynamics and marine environment   161 its changing economic interests, a change of government and subsequent policy change, effective domestic political pressure, and fears if negative reactions from outside actors (other governments or the international community). In the case of China, by and large, all of the above-­listed factors led the country to gradually change its attitude. However, most members in the process are not so much spotlighted as China and the U.S. There are more swing countries than veto or lead nations. Most of the time, countries’ changing attitudes are unnoticed unless they are highly influential in shaping world politics. In fact, the international epistemic community’s focus on Beijing’s environmental policy (with pressure) itself proves that China’s gaining leadership and high expectations for China as a powerful and influential economy. Although the above-­given example is not an exhaustible list, China’s changing roles and attitudes are not sufficiently understandable within the above framework. Global fisheries governance represents a trend of shifting from binding to non-­binding agreements, and while “global” level governance building continues at the same time, a “regionalized” approach has also been strengthened since the 1990s (OECD 2010a: p.  115). Reflecting neoliberal influences, global environmental governance has begun to embrace the policy trends of private sector involvement and a heavy reliance on market-­oriented instruments, combined with voluntary rules in regulating industries. Fisheries governance typically provides credit to the argument to the role of “regionalism,” questioning whether a regionalized approach reinforces or hampers globalized universal level harmonization. Due to the fast and dynamic growth in East Asia, “region-­global” interaction has also been noticed. For example, in 1999, a GEF (Global Environmental Fund) launched a program together with the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) and the IMO’s Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, whose partner countries included Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, South Korea, North Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Although the degree of participation varies, by sharing information, learning global or other region’s standards, exchanging experts and establishing networks, countries can reap the benefits of various modalities of multilateral cooperation. International standards (Regional Fishery Management Organizations and IO consistency) Some Regional Fishery Management Organizations have developed exponentially over the past two decades or so. All of them are open for membership and there is much room for the NEA countries to participate. These Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) include the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), the

162   Political dynamics and marine environment North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), and the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). “Each of these RFMOs has undergone significant change in recent years, with varying degrees of success in terms of improved management of fisheries” (OECD 2009a: p. 18). The objectives of the RFMOs are governed by the UNCLOS and UNFSA principles. The UN General Assembly Resolutions also set standards including detailed guidelines for REFMOs. The main agreed principles can be encapsulated as: “a stable cooperative agreement with time consistency,” “sustainability of the resource stock over time,” and “optimum utilization of the resource (including maximizing resource rent from the resource).” However, the evolution of such fishery regimes does not integrate other related factors that constantly hamper countries’ agreements on stability (resource security), sustainability, and optimality. I mention the shifting regulatory trends, from “right of use” to “common responsibilities for sustainable use of water and ocean resources.” The latter embraces diverse philosophical, political, legal, and other practical difficulties in implementation globally or regionally, involving questions of: “Whose responsibility?” “What does it mean by sustainable use depending on whose calculation?” and “What resources at what costs?” and so on. Many related organizations, scholars, and policy experts have accumulated their insight to scientifically categorize and put market prices on ocean resources (notably, fisheries products). In spite of the remarkable progress, the number of unresolved questions increases as unknown risks become augmented. One aspect of such difficulties would be how to define and group fishery stocks (OECD 2010b: p.  280). One typology, resulting from decades-­long collaborative work among concerned stakeholders (particularly, the FAO the OECD, and the EU) made an effort of filling such information and knowledge gaps, between existing conventions and praxis based on the definitions either clarified or implied in the UNCLOS (see Table 5.1). In regards to new membership and conflicts between global and regional standards, comprehensive policy research conducted by the OECD explains the fundamental difficulties: In the absence of a clear, publicly available policy on accession to the Convention and allocation of quota, negotiations with prospective new members (for example, China) are likely to be as protracted and difficult as with previous new members. However, it is acknowledged that the articulation of such a policy would not be easy given the provisions of Article 116 of the UNCLOS and Article 8 of the UNFSA which provide an expectation that freedom to fish on the high seas will be accommodated in existing or new RFMOs for those that have a real interest in the fisheries concerned. It remains unclear as to how real interest, should be interpreted and accommodated. It should be noted that there appears to be an inherent tension between provisions which provide for real interest and the global community’s desire for healthy fisheries and ecosystems. (OECD 2009a: p. 39)

Political dynamics and marine environment   163 Table 5.1  Categorization of fishery stocks Fishery

Location

Stocks targeted

Definition

High seas

High seas

Discrete

Living resources of the high seas in general (Part VII of the UNCLOS), excluding the stocks of migratory or straddling

Straddling

High seas and EEZ

Trans-boundary

The same stock or stocks of associated species which occur both within the EEZ and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone (UNCLOS Art.63.2)

Migratory

High seas and EEZ

Migratory transboundary

Capable of migrating relatively long distances, and stocks of such species are likely to occur within EEZs and on high seas. (Listed as “highly migratory species” in the UNCLOS Annex I)

Source: adopted from the OECD (OECD 2010b: p. 280).

Recently developed soft laws reflect the epistemic community’s endeavors to incorporate more “protective common management” rules to the predominant conventional directions of regulating water resources, namely a property-­right approach based on the strict Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty (Park 2010). Some water-­related, global scale, soft laws establish good examples of how a regional regime can contribute to an integrated “global” harmonization of principles and norms. As a matter of fact, UNCLOS III also stipulates the “integration of waters” approach under one convention: over the past decades many new international fisheries instruments have been agreed to and implemented, including the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement. There is also considerable work in progress related to port state and market state measures, and flag state responsibility. There are a number of other areas where the international governance architecture can give further impetus to create additional benefits from fisheries. These include frameworks related to trade (e.g. WTO, CITES), food safety (e.g. Codex Alimentarius), investment and corporate social responsibility (e.g. OECD) and labour (e.g. ILO). These frameworks are not unique to fisheries and their further development will, in all likelihood, not only be based on new challenges and issues created by fisheries globalisation but imperatives from

164   Political dynamics and marine environment other policy domains will be mixed. This underscores the need to consider policy coherence across a number of domestic policy areas. (OECD 2010a: p. 97) The continuous and strenuous efforts of experts (scientists and legal communities) in this field demonstrate that there is no dearth of readily referable standards, norms or principles to translate into localized (regionalized) policy frameworks. The root cause of barriers to accelerating efforts of mitigating tensions and disputes is political ambience and the state’s calculations based on a nationalized and securitized approach to ocean and water resources. Scientific uncertainty is often used as an excuse in remaining unclear with potential tension (Kwiatkowska 2013).

Evolution of regional institutional development All three core NEA have strong aspirations to become a powerful player in ocean affairs. Whereas, Japan and South Korea’s membership to relevant international and regional fisheries agreements overlap, the rest may need more alignment if the countries intend to pursue cooperation with some level of harmonization on essential trans-­boundary matters. Historically, Japan exercised a strong leadership position in maritime affairs including the environmental sector. While pursuing bilateral agreements with South Korea, Japan also made efforts to bring South Korea in to participate more in the concerned IOs and conventions. Alignment efforts with relevant international standards may reinforce regional-­level harmonization and compliance. Although regional agreements and norms are not necessarily consistent with ones reiterated by global environmental governance, regional and global level harmonization may mutually reinforce these through more vigorous communication. In the arena of world maritime environmental governance, it is also true that Japan’s enthusiasm has been at times frustrated by ecological groups’ anti-­commercial whaling activities and their persistent criticism of Japanese governments (both central and local). These pro-­conservation groups include the governments of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. (Miller and Dolšak 2007: p. 74). Nevertheless, compared with China and South Korea, Japan maximizes multilateral sources. Indicatively, Japan has been a home for and the origin of many regional fishery-­ related institutions and regional agreements, including the North Pacific Fisheries Commission, the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization, the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, and South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization. Japan’s policy turn, “from inertia to proactive” in redesigning maritime policy is explained by a scholar, Manicom, using Kent Calder’s “reactive state paradigm” in foreign policy. It informatively takes the examples of external pressure-­driven occasions of ratifying UNCLOS and noticeable changes since the mid-­2000s, but is still believed as a reaction to

Political dynamics and marine environment   165 Table 5.2  Membership of international fishery conventions Countries

Membership (parties) to conventions

China

UNCLOS, ICCAT, IOTC, WCPFC

Japan

UNCLOS, UNFSA, FAOCA, CCA(MLR), CCSBT, GFCM, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, WCPFC

ROK

UNCLOS, UNFSA, FAOCA, CCA(MLR), CCSBT, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, WCPFC

Russia

UNCLOS, UNFSA, CCA(MLR), ICCAT, NAFO, NEAFC

Abbreviations CCA(MLR): Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine. CCSBT: Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. FAOCA: FAO Conservation Agriculture. GFCM: General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean. IATTC: Inter-Amer­ican Tropical Tuna Commission. ICCAT: International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. IOTC: Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. NEAFC: North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. NAFO: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. UNFSA: United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. WCPFC: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.

external pressure. Adding to that, China’s aggressive ocean policy also stimulated Japan’s policy cycle of inertia in this particular domain of maritime affairs, which the author contrasts with Japan’s proactive initiative-­taking roles in other areas, notably economic policy (Manicom 2010: p. 309). Priority to sign up to basic rules As the below-­cited OECD document analyzes, the well-­developed RFMOs are under-­utilized in the NEA context. Without a common commitment to the basic principles underlying RFMOs, and without ratification, many members will continue to have no legal obligation to apply basic principles such as the precautionary approach. Support for change will be enhanced if all parties agree on the basic rules of engagement within the negotiations, some of which are defined by UNFSA and related instruments. (OECD 2009a: p. 62) In April 2007, over ten years after it ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Japan passed the Basic Ocean Law that created a new ministry. Asian countries had already marked the top five in the world aquaculture production in 2012; China on top was followed by India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. In the ranking, more major Asian countries are included with

166   Political dynamics and marine environment Thailand (7th), Myanmar (10th), the Philippines (11th), and Japan and South Korea (13th and 14th, respectively) (OECD 2015: pp. 15–16). Apart from the overarching regional organizations and institutions, notably the TEMM as a core, the Trilateral Cooperation Summit (TCS), and the Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEACEC or NEAC) have also been operational. In addition, institution-­wise development on waterand ocean-­related cooperative issues are handled via regional venues, such as the Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA), Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter (RAP MALI), and Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (YSLME). As explained in the previous chapter on biodiversity, the Tumen River Development Project once considered as a significant comprehensive cooperative development model during a time of détente, which was started in 1995 involving all six NEA countries and the UNDP along with other stakeholders. Its development plans included a variety of environmentally friendly development programs, such as ecological preservation of the Tumen River areas, raising environmental awareness, monitoring the DMZ zone and establishing strategic plans. Some of them have the potential to be reactivated. The WEPA, for example, was initiated by the Ministry of the Environment of Japan. Partner countries include three NEA countries, most of the ASEAN countries, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Also, the NOWPAP was originally initiated by the UNEP in 1989 but first launched in 1994 with the membership of the “NEA three” and Russia, while North Korea was invited as an observer. In 2004, South Korea and Japan established a co-­running secretariat, financed by member countries’ trust funds. Marine litter has been a recent issue and the TEMM also organized a joint workshop. “The Ministers welcomed that the 2nd TEMM-­NOWPAP Joint Workshop on Marine Litter held in September 2016 in Russia shared the results of marine litter studies and related policies of the three countries” (TEMM19 JC 2017: para. 21). The NOWPAP has been slowly but steadily taking part in molding a region-­wide maritime cooperative mechanism since its establishment and TEMM has recognized it at several occasions in the previous meetings including TEMM 2001 (JC: para.13), TEMM 2002 (JC: para. 11), and 2003 (JC: para. 12). One noticeable pattern is that Japanese initiated organizations include wider Asia, whereas South Korean initiated ones tend to show a keen interest to include North Korea. For Japan, multilateralism is often used to expand its influence while mitigating tensions with its two core NEA counterparts, whereas, for South Korea, one of the most important motivations for multilateral regional cooperation has been to induce North Korea into the diplomatic arena to seize an opportunity for security talks. In addition, more institutions came into existence, such as the Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), which includes 11 official member countries, which include the NEA core, with North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Timor-­ Leste. It is concerned with environmental issues of coasts, oceans, communities,

Political dynamics and marine environment   167 and economies across the seas of East Asia through integrated management solutions and wide partnership. The PEMSEA has built a wider partnership, including: the Asian Centre for Biodiversity (ACB); the Coastal Management Centre (CMC); the Conservation International (CI); the International Environmental Management of Enclosed Coastal Seas Center (EMECS); the UNEP/GPA (Global Program of Action); the IOC Sub-­Commission for the Western Pacific (IOC-­WESTPAC); the International Ocean Institute (IOI); the International Union for Conservation of Nature-­Asia Regional Office (IPIECA); Korea Environment Institute (KEI); the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology (KIOST);3 the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI); the Korea Environment Management Corporation (KOEM); the National Marine Biodiversity Institute of Korea (MABIK); the Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI);4 the NOWPAP, the Oil Spill Response (OSR);5 the Plymouth Marine Laboratory (PML); the PNLG for Sustainable Coastal Development (the first of its kind in the East Asian Seas region); the PEMSEA Network of Local Governments (PNLG) for Sustainable Coastal Development; the UNDPGEF Small Grants Programme (SGP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); and the UNDP/GEF YSLME. The YSLME is evaluated to be relatively effective, which established a referable model for trilateral environment-­related cooperation: Each country in the PYSR has established a similar public organization which aims exclusively to support the internalisation and trans-­border co-­ operation of its local governments. In Japan, the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) was established in 1988. China subsequently formed the Chinese International Friendship Cities Association (CIFCA) in 1992, while Korea created the Korean Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations (KLAFIR) later in 1994. As a joint association of local authorities, these organisations were founded as a collaborative effort by both upper-­tier and lower-­tier local governments across their own country with substantial financial assistance from central government. In the case of KLAFIR, for instance, of a total annual budget of EUR 6 million in 2007, the upper-­tier and lower-­tier local governments contributed 40% and 33% respectively, while the Ministry Of Home Affairs and Security (MOHAS) provided the remaining. In addition, these three organisations have alternately hosted annual trilateral conferences on local government since their inception in 1999 in order to strengthen networks and address common agendas for co-­operation. (OECD 2009b: p. 179) The YSLME signifies some conditions or elements that may increase the possibility of making a transnational cooperation project advance. They include specific and development-­oriented goal setting, sufficient financial support and local governments’ participation as main actors. The NOWPAP /Regional Coordinating Unit (NOWPAP/RCU) is one of the regional models of seas conventions and action plans that has established a

168   Political dynamics and marine environment permanent secretariat. Adding to this, the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA) Secretariat is also relevant to the region to refer, as COBSEA is one of the global efforts for regionalizing ocean regimes by establishing similar kinds of bodies in other regions, for example, the Caribbean Regional Coordinating Unit/Cartagena Convention (CAR/RCU), the East African Regional Coordinating Unit/Nairobi Convention (EAF/RCU), the Mediterranean Action Plan/Barcelona Convention (MAP/RCU), and the West and Central Africa Regional Coordinating/Abidjan Convention (WACAF/ RCU). Choi (2007, unpublished conference paper) rightly alerted that due to fast economic development, the volume of transportation has increased rapidly, and the region encounters more accidents and oil spills. Because of half-­closed geographical features, oil spills are hard to clean and produce more severe ecological damage. The six NEA countries, together, will need to establish a monitoring and emergency response system to share information and react collectively. In this regard, Choi stressed the importance of institutionalized cooperation the through NOWPAP and the UNDP/GEF ’s YSLME, which are also useful tools to induce North Korea’s participation (p. 35).6 As the main characteristic of the NEA’s cooperation is “procedure-­heavy” without substantive harmonization efforts, studies on institutions are also heavily concentrated on procedural matters, and successful institutionalization itself seems often taken as a relative success, as revealed in my interviews with government officials. Considering the NEA’s absence of comprehensive integral and overarching regional organization, the conditions for relative “institutional-­ level” success of multilateralism includes the following three conditions: a concrete and immediate issue-­based approach (e.g., development of a relatively smaller-­scale region with common interests), sub-­state level governments’ coalitions (cities alliance or local level governments’ participation), and a portfolio of financial support (diversified financial sources for risk distribution such as IO, central governments and local governments). With the absence of a coherent world maritime organization that focuses on sustainable ocean affairs including fisheries, the FAO functions as a supporter of various RFBs in a number of ways, and quite a few RFBs have been established within the FAO’s policy guidance framework. Some mandate binding rules among members (those established in accordance with Article XIV of the FAO Constitution, e.g., GFCM). Others have established an advisory mandate (those established in accordance with Article VI of the FAO Constitution, e.g., CECF, WECAFC). For those RFBs outside the FAO’s framework, the FAO supports the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network (RSN), provides technical assistance, and provides secretariat services for those RFBs under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. Nevertheless, the NEA countries are reluctant to closely be linked with such a framework and in the TEMM process, the NEA members hardly articulate ocean related issues except on very few occasions. The main task for political leaders and experts in this region in the coming years will be reducing the widening gaps between domestic, regional and

Political dynamics and marine environment   169 international norms and standards in this field. In this regard, major bilateral negotiations are used as case studies including the 1974 Korean-­Japan Agreement on Joint Continental Shelf Development. Article 31 of the Bilateral Agreement clarifies that the Agreement is valid for fifty years between 1978 and 2028, thereby negotiation over territorial demarcation is temporarily delayed (pp. 33–35). Although co-­exploration had been initially agreed in the area of the 7th mine lot, Japan refuses from proceeding because Japan prefers to wait till the end of the Agreement in 2028 for re-­negotiation over the territorial demarcation first in a more favourable condition for Japan. (Kim 2013: pp. 30–56) Bilateralism may both contribute to and/or hamper further region-­wide environmental cooperation depending on specific issues, parties and the nature of agreements, particularly the level of and room for compliance with similar regional and international standards. Although existing bilateral agreements and regional initiatives sufficiently provide reasonable grounds for further cooperation, practical and political barriers interrupt countries’ pursuing longer term goals. The First APEC Ocean-­related Ministerial Meeting (AOMM1) was held in Seoul, Korea in 2002. The key outcome of this meeting was the Seoul Oceans Declaration (SOD). SOD underscored the importance of oceans for the food security and sustainable economic and social development of the region, noting that APEC economies accounted for 75% of all capture fisheries and 90% of all aquaculture fisheries in the world. Further, SOD noted that APEC economies consumed 70% of global fish products and that ocean products and the ocean way of life were crucial to the social and economic development of the APEC region. Based on these understandings, the SOD committed economies to a range of domestic, regional and international actions that would foster integrated, ecosystem-­based management of marine-­related activities within the respective APEC economies. (APEC MRC05/2005 project Draft Final Report, “The Seoul Oceans Declaration Implementation across APEC Economies”: A Study for Use at the 2nd APEC Ocean Ministerial Meeting [16–17 September 2005]) The current Moon Administration in South Korea recently reaffirmed the country’s will to play a stronger role in maritime affairs, mainly linked with security alerts but in an inclusive and comprehensive manner. China has been the most threatening power in the South China Sea, though there are a sufficient number of organizations and regulatory bodies. The TEMM has built a certain level of regional trust between participants. All three core countries have reached a more or less similar level of green technology. Also, all three have faced growing internal pressure due to the rise of environmentalism at the

170   Political dynamics and marine environment societal level. East Asia may develop a green development model keeping the TEMM as the center, but inclusive in terms of agenda-­setting, joint actions with other already established organizations within the NEA or wider Asia, and playing a role in inter-­regional cooperation while ensuring consistency between regional and global environmental standards. The evolution of institutions, organizations, initiatives, and cooperative actions unequivocally demonstrates that there exists more than sufficient development efforts and quantity. But it lacks a consistent manner of strengthening existing regimes (regime itself, not alone with impacts on real environmental affairs) for building core principles in the region. In maritime affairs, countries in the region tend to believe that international/global legal schemes are not readily applicable to Asian cases, either because they are universally incomplete or unfit particularly for the NEA region. The case in this region implies both strengths and weaknesses for both liberal optimistic institutionalism and realist(s) perspectives. For the former, the NEA region demonstrates that sheer quantity does not “strengthen” the regime to materialize useful principles and norms, although some degree of cooperation has been ongoing and institutional history has some coherence. However, whether such an absence of a quality regime itself sufficiently explains the current anarchy in maritime affairs or not is not empirically testable yet. If applying the latter (realist-­leaning perspective) to the NEA, “the phenomenon of increasing cooperative governance-­like organs” per se cannot be sufficiently explained although partial explanation on the motivation (i.e., aspiration for hegemonism as a state’s power-­seeking nature) can be employed. But then, it is still unclear why in the environment particular, countries would aspire to raise their influence? Economic liberalism takes “competition over fisheries and natural resources” as a crucial factor for countries being interconnected to set rules, but it is only part of the larger picture of maritime affairs in this region. The NEA has been driven to a far more complex structure of maritime affairs with a mixture of rigid territorial sovereignty, expansionist ambitions, historical resentments, material security and gains, and a means to gain power and influence. In addition to which, most relevant to the field of environmental studies, what is fundamentally missing seems to be a sufficiently coordinated coherent level of integration between ecology and politics (especially concerning security). Ecological modernization has been undertaken rather unevenly between members but this could also be an opportunity. This is because regionalism (together with globalism) may positively reinforce ecological modernization in order to accelerate and shorten the period of (region-­wide) intra-­regional adoption of such social ideology. In fact, this is possible in this region considering its economic dynamics. One obvious common interest in East Asia (including Russia, at least from an elite viewpoint) would be the state’s aspiration for economic development, endorsing the importance of neo-­liberal force and active engagement in the world economy (Hopf 2013) notably via trade even including the DPRK. In this regard, I argue that existing IR theories in general do not adequately embrace

Political dynamics and marine environment   171 “ecological concerns” although they all to a certain degree explain the reality (albeit different dimensions) of current political use of environmental issues.

Destructive environmental conflicts: fishery disputes This part discusses heated competition and (potential and actual) conflicts more than cooperation. While fast development of cooperative efforts are not to be ignored, unless tensions are sufficiently discussed, real regional environmental issues will inevitably be under-­discussed. To a greater degree, whenever issues go deeper, conventional security is used to halt further cooperation. Although pollution is closely linked with conventional political issues (security, sovereignty, nationalism), including the TEMM, regional environmental cooperation thinly deals with very few common denominators. Such problems are explored in this section by dividing them into three aspects of environmental problems, namely overuse (describing competition, conflicts, and ecological damage); land misuse (describing conflicts and securitization, and ecological damage); and pollution (political rhetoric and lack of cooperative mechanism, e.g., oil spills etc. and actual ecological problems in the region). The issues discussed under this section are rarely explicitly included in the TEMM agenda, although they are core regional trans-­boundary environmental problems. This explains the lack of environmental politics (positive politicization: mainstreaming environmental issues into political discussions and negotiation process). State officials involved in the process believe that any thorny issues in this region should be categorized as inappropriate “political” issues that may cause “problems” of security and sovereignty questions that are untouchable and beyond the environmental domain (author’s interview). As the REDM informs, recognizing and identifying trans-­boundary environmental externalities is the first step toward a cooperative regime. Highly fragmented, with great potential for conflict (or, already under dispute), steadily and surely competition over hegemonism is harsh using all means (military, economic, institutional, legal, business means such as shipping and fisheries). All three core NEA countries are increasingly keen to enhance their capability in maritime affairs. Among the six countries, Japan has the longest history of being engaged in international cooperation in the related field, and thus is advanced in oceanology and prefers solving any disputes through legal and scientific methods supported by financial resources. Japan’s longtime resistance to the international community’s pressure on banning commercial whaling demonstrates Japan’s endeavor to use as much as possible scientific evidence. Some may believe that Japan’s struggle is to protect traditional business but the more important aspect is the determination to preserve culture and tradition surrounding whaling activities that are regarded as a crucial sovereignty issue, although other gains (including economic autonomy) in the course of developing (defending) the industry cannot be ignored. Contrarily, China has taken an explicitly militant approach to secure resources harvested from the ocean, dauntingly violating agreements and ignoring

172   Political dynamics and marine environment international norms. Many countries in East Asia have been threatened by China’s aggressive overfishing practices. Although the coordination level is low, regional governance has been built with the establishment of numerous research-­oriented institutions. These institutions are a priori for collaboration but are often supported and funded by individual governments. Consequently, research fields are duplicated and guided by national government, and are thus hardly impartial. The establishment of such institutions and initiatives itself has become highly competitive among members especially the NEA three. Japan has been one of the significant maritime powers in the IR since the Meiji Reformation. Korea has also developed a growing aspiration to become an important player in maritime affairs. China has aggressively demonstrated growing power in maritime affairs in all aspects (explicit land reclamation, resource extraction capacity, active multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to secure maritime resources). To the NEA countries, oceans become highly complex sites both for volatile security concerns and not-­ yet-explored opportunities. Competition and tension became harsher, but the rational calculation for the national interest (prior to cooperation) is ongoing due to complicated political (territorial sovereignty), economic (natural resources), historical (nationalism attached to disputed islands), and ecological (scientific data) difficulties involved in regional maritime affairs. Besides, bilateral fishery regimes are provisional in nature due to incomplete EEZ negotiations. The establishment of EEZs by the three states has brought about new tensions. With the widespread acceptance of the EEZ regime, the China Seas states established their respective EEZs of up to 200 nm. However, the entire Yellow Sea and most of the East China Sea are less than 400 nm in width, resulting in disputed claims and substantial overlaps between them. The overlapping claims, in addition to the longstanding disputes over the ownership of some uninhabited islands, have not only generated tension between the nations but also obstructed the development of fisheries cooperation. (Xue 2005: pp. 365–367) Xue had too optimistically interpreted the three countries’ ratification of UNCLOS as it contains some referable clauses on collective fishery management, although they have turned out to be ineffective as of today. Overuse: disputes over resources Experts warn of increasingly unsustainable fisheries practices in the region and elsewhere caused by the NEA countries. Japan and South Korea were heavily criticized in the 1990s, but today China receives global attention. “Catches have remained at an unsustainable 10–12 million tons per year for decades,” which could be doubled if illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is

Political dynamics and marine environment   173 included. In addition, more and more destructive practices are used combined with technological innovation, “including the use of coral-­damaging bottom trawlers, muro-­ami nets, even dynamite and cyanide are often employed to squeeze more from dwindling fisheries” (The Diplomat, July 20, 2016).7  China has been sending fishing vessels manned with armed crews – called the Maritiae Liberation Army Militia – to waters around Japan’s Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. But such actions should be understood not only for their political purpose of highlighting China’s territorial claim over the islands, but as part of the global fisheries warfare waged by Beijing.  (The Japan Times, October 30, 2017) Citing Zhang Hongzhou, a senior research fellow at Nangyang Technological University of Singapore, the article continues, “the Chinese government provided the domestic fishing industry with $22 billion in subsidies over the five years from 2011 to 2015.”8 China’s aggressive expansion in fishing activities have menaced and upset all neighboring countries particularly in Asia (including Japan, the two Koreas, Vietnam, and the Philippines) and is now expanding to other parts of the world. This area is one of the typical fields to which the concept of environmental security is quite explicit, thus countries will increasingly need to apply a comprehensive policy mix of “security and the environment” in an integrated manner. Changing fishing activities in this region basically concerns the issues of changing existing food culture, consumption patterns and people’s nutrition. However, issues become highly political, generating many trans-­boundary issues leading the region to witness countries’ “policy failures” in dealing with the fast changing circumstances, while responding to the growing need for sustainable fishery practices both regionally and globally. The states involved have only used undesirable policy tactics such as negligence (knowingly), intentional inaction, avoidance of risk communication, strategical duality, selective use of international principles (with omissions), and indirect support of unsustainable fishing practices (e.g., subsides or other financial support). Reporters have drawn connections between the string of South Korean skirmishes and political tension around the South China Sea (China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia all have claims over parts of this body of water). But it’s also clear Chinese fishermen are desperate for new sources of fresh catch. Within China’s own exclusive economic zone, the nation has lost one-­half of its coastal wetlands, 57% of mangroves, and 80% of coral reefs, most of which are critical spawning, nursing, or feeding grounds for fish. (From a 2016 study undertaken by a team of international experts) Over-­fishing is closely linked with the unregulated fishing methods and equipment, for example trawling where fishermen drag – 

174   Political dynamics and marine environment long nets along the ocean floor and kill practically any living thing in their path. In addition to destroying coral reefs and the habitats necessary for healthy ocean wildlife populations, fishermen discard the bycatch, the sea creatures accidentally trapped in their nets. While trawling is banned in many countries and bycatches are strictly regulated in Europe and North America, even endangered species like sea turtles are traded and can be sold through the black market in China. According to the FAO, “the world’s commercial fish stocks that exist at biologically sustainable levels have declined from 90% in 1974 to 68.6% in 2013.” In other words, nearly one-­third of global commercial fish stocks are already being overfished. The total number of Chinese fishing boats sailing on the high seas and in other countries’ coastal areas runs at just under 2,500. The government encourages rather than regulates unsustainable fishing practices. During a 2013 visit to Tanmen, a fishing village on Hainan Island in the South China Sea, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged his nation’s fishermen to build bigger ships and venture even farther into the oceans and catch bigger fish. According to a 2016 report by the environmental watchdog organization Greenpeace, the Middle Kingdom’s total number of fishing boats sailing on the high seas and in other countries’ coastal areas runs just under 2,500. That’s approximately 10 times the size of the entire U.S. distant water commercial fishing fleet.9 Similar to the value of biodiversity, the value of water and ocean resources is countless and immeasurable. Asian oceans surround countries of high production and consumption of fishery stocks. China’s ever rising fishing industry and use of aggressive and unsustainable fishing threatens related industries in neighboring countries and the ecosystem in the region. In the wake of the creation of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (LOSC or the LOS Convention), which codified coastal states’ rights and responsibilities with regard to claims of up to 200 nautical miles (nm) of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a further extension – up to 350 nm – of their claims to the continental shelf from the baselines, Northeast Asian countries have pursued the extension of their maritime jurisdiction beyond their traditional 3 nm of territorial waters. (Kim 2008: p. 215) In spite of ongoing negotiations on FTAs between countries, fisheries or other ocean resources agreements are linked with EEZs. Although, except North Korea (not ratified but a signatory country to the Convention), five other countries are parties to the UNLCOS, none of the NEA countries have concluded agreements on this matter. It still remains unclear and there is much

Political dynamics and marine environment   175 room left to negotiate in the future. Given that diplomatic normalization itself has a relatively short history in most cases (except China-­DPRK and China-­ Mongolia), establishing a comprehensive multilateral cooperative regime faces many barriers. As has been revealed from the hasty Japan-­Korea fisheries agreement (renegotiation) in 1998, during the Kim Young-­sam presidency, it was an extremely tough task for governments to draw a clear line. Although there are many agreements for regulating quantity (per species, per vessels, size of vessels, fishing methods and equipment, periods, or zone) bilaterally, unless all countries including China are involved in negotiations, quantity control does not help sustainability, as a country with relaxed regulations will catch those saved by others where stricter regulations are imposed. Having been accused by many concerned countries around the world including Japan and the two Koreas, in August 2016, for the first time, China announced stricter policy and legal measures to reduce and regulate unsustainable fishing practices and reinforced them more firmly in September 2017 (China Daily, September 6, 2017).10 However, at present, expectation on effective regulation and monitoring has been rather low. Currently, China’s overfishing and illegal invasive fishing practices have still caused physical confrontations with neighboring countries. On December 20, 2017, having failed at warning them in a peaceful way, Korean maritime police fired more than 200 rounds to drive out 44 Chinese fishing vessels that were within the Korean EEZ (Northwest 53 nautical mile, approx. 98 km). In fact, the Chinese government implemented some policy measures such as moratorium/licensing (since mid-­1990s), no growth policy since 1999 (total quantity control), and limiting the number of vessels since 2003. However, the governments’ restriction on catching periods and quantity apply only to Chinese territory and ironically, such restrictions in China’s coastal areas encourage Chinese vessels to travel further out to sea. The Chinese government has been thus criticized for deliberately overlooking illicit fishing in distant oceans. Moreover, not only has the government put an emphasis on the importance of providing fresh fish for peoples’ nutrition, it has also provided fuel subsidies for the fisheries industry since 2016, which encouraged fishermen to change their vessels for bigger ones with more powerful engines. Under these circumstances, a single country’s sustainable fishing practice will not be effective as fish are highly migratory regardless of territorial demarcations, and transgressions are hard to stop. Similar events have occurred repeatedly. On November 14, 2016, Korean maritime police fired 95 rounds in the South West Sea 68 km offshore at 30 Chinese vessels, most over 100 tons. Countries affected have consumed many resources to protect their maritime boundaries against “invasions” by Chinese civilian vessels. Confrontation has often developed into more serious conflicts. Japan has also protested about Chinese ships, especially when more than 200 Chinese fishing boats, escorted by armed coast guard vessels, sailed close to disputed islands, causing tensions to rise (Taipei Times, August 7, 2016).11 Also in the Russian Far East, illegal fishing has been an issue for over a decade. 

176   Political dynamics and marine environment Illegal catches in the Russian Far East are many times bigger than officially and environmentally approved quotas. In 2004, for instance, Russian fishing companies sold more than 30,000 tons of crab to Japan, although the total quota allocated for the Russian Far East amounted to only 1,500 tons. Instead of annual quotas of 4,000 or 5,000 tons, the “nerka” catches exceed 15,000 tons.… Annual Russian budget losses from illicit fish exports in the Russian Far East are assessed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs at $70 million to $100 million. The main destination for illegal fish exports is Japan. The Russian Border Guard Service estimates the volume of fish smuggling from Russia to Japan at $700 million annually.  (Lukin 2007: p. 28) In the coming years, the greening of China may see fishing in even more distant rather than coastal waters due to stricter domestic regulations on fishing, combined with higher technology in equipment supported by government subsidies to the industry for fuel and ship-­building in line with the country’s bigger scale agenda of globalizing industries and providing high quality seafood to its people. “The China Sea is among the world’s most productive fishing grounds. However, as coastal urban populations have grown and as fishing technology has improved, competition for the shared fish stocks of the China Sea has intensified considerably” (Rosenberg 2005: p. 1). Regional problems associated with fishing clearly demonstrate that stricter environment-­related regulations and technological and financial support at the domestic level do not either solve trans-­boundary disputes or produce ecological development. This is because such environmental policy intervention is strictly based on a nationalized sovereignty notion without association with any notion of obligations to mitigating trans-­boundary harm. Countries’ policy frameworks and fundamental conceptual approaches to the maritime environment need reshaping inclusively considering trans-­boundary issues, especially when dealing with highly migratory and exhaustible natural resources.

Pollution, trans-­boundary harm, and dispute settlement Pollution Sources of marine litter include both sea-­based and land-­based. Examples of the former are fishing vessels (e.g., nets), merchant ships (e.g., accidents with primary/secondary plastics containers), ferry boats, cruise ships, naval vessels, fishing farming facilities, and offshore oil or gas platforms. Land-­based pollution caused by coastal touristic activities (e.g., littering on beaches), transport of waste by river flows (sewage, run-­off, smaller inland waterways), sewage and storm water directly discharged into the sea, dumpsites (and engineered landfills) sited on the coastline, managed residues from industrial facilities, and wind-­blown litter.

Political dynamics and marine environment   177 Regarding marine litter: The Ministers appreciated the joint efforts made by the three countries within the framework of Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) including the progress of Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter (RAP MALI) containing the coastal clean-­up activities, and agreed to cooperate closely while making efforts for fiscal stability, involving the remaining country, to enhance RAP MALI activities, inter alia, to strengthen joint-­workshops and activities to raise awareness and promote research cooperation for sharing the scientific knowledge, including that which would improve the understanding of all countries in the region regarding the marine litter generation mechanism, with a view to managing the generation of marine litter. They also noted that an appropriate management of wastes and relevant materials in land and coastal areas in each country plays a crucial role in addressing the problems of marine litter. They recognized the need to enhance such joint efforts with a view to enhancing concrete measures in each country to prevent outflow of marine litter including appropriate management of wastes and relevant materials. (TEMM15 JC: para. 10) While ocean and water pollution sources are countless, the most serious ecological questions come from the frequent (but mostly under-­reported) oil spill cases and pollutants from accidents (e.g., radioactive water contamination). Together with the 1989 Exxon Valdez (Alaska, U.S.) and Deep Water Horizon (the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill) incidents in 2010, the Sanchi accident once again alerted the region to set up a collective monitoring system. The Sanchi Iranian oil tanker collision occurred on January 6, 201812 when the Panamanian-­flagged tanker with a full natural-­gas condensate cargo of 136,000 tonnes (960,000 barrels), sailing from Iran to South Korea, collided with the Hong Kong-­flagged cargo ship, CF Crystal, 160 nautical miles (300 km) off Shanghai, China. The Sanchi caught fire shortly after the collision; and after burning and drifting for over a week, it sank on January 14, 2018. Beijing promptly announced the accident, while openly inviting external help such as international organizations and international experts’ participation in investigation and finding solutions. This demonstrated China’s growing confidence in its capacity to deal with large scale environmental accidents, and somehow showing a readiness to comply with international standards and norms similar to the country’s reaction to climate change arena. This case also demonstrated how environmental conflicts and tension may contribute to cooperation. And this is the domain of environmental politics as in the NEA region: what governments decide take priority in this case whether openly announcing such an oil spill accident via the media and whether to apply referring existing rules openly, before being pressured by the private sector and NGOs.

178   Political dynamics and marine environment Japan promptly reacted.  The Cabinet Office announced Friday it had established a branch to monitor information about oil spilled by the Iranian-­flagged tanker Sanchi on January 14 when it collided with a cargo ship.… The central government’s action comes a day after the Japan Coast Guard and Kagoshima Prefecture confirmed that black oily substances were found drifting ashore on the small island of Takarajima, which lies between Amami Oshima and Yakushima, a world heritage site famous for its ancient cedar trees.  (The Japan Times, February 2, 2018)13 Compared with past oil spill cases in the NEA, more and quicker attention was paid. “Japan and South Korea each sent one ship, and the United States Navy sent a P-­8A Poseidon aircraft from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa” (New York Times, February 12, 2018).14 As in the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Sanchi accident also raised public concern on food and water contamination. Scientists warned that “consumers should be wary of buying any seafood that may have passed through the area until the toxic impact of the spill has been assessed” (Guardian, January 18, 2018).15 Experts warned of the possibility of oil contamination from the incident reaching the southernmost, Jeju Island (The Korea Times, January 29, 2018),16 and yet, detailed pollution risks were not sufficiently spread and communicated to/with the public in the region. Miguel Quintana, a Tokyo-­based freelance journalist … says there has been little to no local news coverage in Japan of the potential dangers. A quick internet search will show little reporting by the major Yomiuri or Mainichi Shimbun newspapers. Also, reports from the Asahi and Japan Times have been sparse, save for earlier, smaller spill estimates and a an article about an anonymous official in the country’s environmental ministry who claimed the spill would not reach Japanese shores. To be fair, initial reports hadn’t even noticed a leak, but days later it was measured as covering 4 square kilometers, then 10, then 58, and by mid-­January, the amount of oil spilled covered 101 square kilometers – about the size of Paris. (Asia Media International, February 8, 2018)17 Other similar and major accidents dealing with maritime pollution in the NEA include the following. In December 2007, the MT Hebei Spirit oil spill occurred near the port of Daesan on the Yellow Sea Coast of Taean County in South Korea involving 260,000 tons of crude oil. In July 2010, Xingang Harbor oil spill happened in Dalian, Liaoning Province China with the explosion of two pipelines carrying 60,000–90,000 metric tons of heavy crude oil. The most fatal incident happened in May 2011 – one of the worst manmade natural disasters in the world – the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster.

Political dynamics and marine environment   179 As seen from the list of organizations listed earlier in this chapter, there are plethoras of regional level organizations and yet it is hard to judge that cooperative processes have been institutionalized led by region-­specific initiatives (e.g., written codes of conduct, bilateral fishery agreements, bilateral EEZ negotiations, collaborative research and information exchange systems, ministerial meetings). Ideally, the best scenario would be a case where regional level institutionalization co-­evolves with an effort of aligning bilateral negotiations with wider regional and global standards, including those essential referable international maritime regimes related to the ocean environment. Such standards notably include the 1954 London Oil Pollution Convention to control dumping oil, nuclear waste or toxic chemicals (OILPOL 1954) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and Aircraft (MARPOL 1973/1978). Also, international norms and standards are referable from the UNCLOS, IMO Conventions, the London Dumping Convention, the Montreal Guidelines, as well as environmental initiatives within the APEC, and other marine scientific research initiatives include WESTPAC, PICES, and the UNDP/GEF Program (see the Bateman 2005, symposium paper). Although the previous cases share similar patterns and require collective action to set regional mechanism and norms, these are not yet fully developed. Fishery-­imports ban due to radiation contamination A recent case shows actual or potential disputes resulting in a diplomatic quarrel or legal complaints filed to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO concerning environment-­related issues; namely Japan vs. South Korea (2013), regarding the ROK’s fishery-­imports ban due to radiation contamination in some areas of the region affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan (Reuter, September 6, 2013).18 The TEMM, as a core environmental institution, only superficially dealt with the question, paying limited attention to accident prevention and natural disasters without discussing any possible consequences such as trans-­boundary radioactive water pollution and its possible consequences on trade, economic benefits, and human health. The meltdown of three out of six nuclear reactors at Fukushima occurred when the plant was hit by a tsunami triggered by a Magnitude 9 earthquake. Subsequently, the site released substantial amounts of radioactive material on March 12, making it the largest nuclear incident since the Chernobyl disaster. In August 2013, the massive amount of radioactive water made the cleanup process extremely difficult. Experts view that clean-­up will take several decades. Spills continued and some contaminated water ran into the ocean. The Korean authorities imposed immediate and partial bans (Food Sanitation Act) on imports of 76 fishery and agricultural products from the eight counties in the coastal areas of Fukushima, and then all fishery goods from the eight counties from September 2013 until today, although black markets and illegal trade could not be totally controlled, and many cases of violations have been reported with traders penalized by fines or imprisonment (Yonhap News Agency, December 25, 2016).19

180   Political dynamics and marine environment In the meantime, in China, illegal trades became more lucrative under the ban.  As much as 5,000 tonnes of expensive seafood such as king crab and scallops, worth a total of 230 million yuan (HK$269 million), were illegally imported by a company based in Shandong Province and sold across the country over the past two years, the CCTV report said.  (The South China Morning Post, August 22, 2016)20 This explains a consequence of non-­cooperation in obvious trans-­boundary issues. Although the most important stakeholder countries were those neighboring countries, Japan preferred international bodies to be engaged. Relevant South Korean authorities suggested a collaborative investigation with Japan on the environmental impact of the incident but it was repeatedly refused (author’s interview). Instead, the Japanese government released its own assessment results. However, many including the Japanese public doubted their scientific accuracy (Reuters, September 7, 2016).21 Japan filed a petition to the WTO on South Korea’s trade measure that banned products from Fukushima and other regions. Upon Japan’s request for the establishment of a panel on August 20, 2015, on September 28, 2015, the panel was established. China, the European Union, Guatemala, India, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, and the United States reserved third-­party rights. Recently, in February 2018, the WTO’s decision, Report of the Panel concerning the dispute case of “Korea-­Import Bans, and Testing and Certification Requirements for Radionuclides” (WT/DS495/R) was released in favor of Japan over Korea’s failure to provide scientific grounds of radioactive contamination of seafood products from the eight counties including Fukushima, thus the trade measure violated the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. However, due to higher alert on food safety and growing risk perception in Korea, the government confirmed that until the outcome of an appeal, the current ban will not be withdrawn. There was criticism from the Korean public that the concerned government bodies failed to respond properly to Japan’s filing in 2015, lacking preparation to secure sufficient evidence and logical and reasonable grounds for introducing cumbersome extra procedures of radioactive testing for selected fishery goods and for extending the ban period after 2013 (ChosunBiz, February 23, 2018).22 South Korea was the only country that Japan filed a complaint against with the WTO, among over 20 other countries where similar trade measures were imposed. This is a rare case of an NEA country filing a case against another with the WTO dispute settlement body for environment and health related reasons. In dealing with this incident, there were many chances for the two countries to collaborate throughout the process (investigation, risk communication, public persuasion, exchanging information on policy changes, etc.). Nevertheless, both

Political dynamics and marine environment   181 parties failed to incorporate such an experience (with rich lessons to learn) into the process of building a cooperative mechanism for collective management. In the structure of cooperation, expectations are important. International institutions may therefore be significant, since institutions embody, and affect, actors’ expectations. Thus, institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues. The principles and rules of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents, increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors. In this way, international regimes help to link the future with the present. That is as true of arms control agreements, in which willingness to make future agreements depends on others’ compliance with previous arrangements, as it is in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which embodies norms and rules against which the behavior of members can be judged. By sanctioning retaliation for those who violate rules, regimes create expectations that a given violation will be treated not as an isolated case but as one in a series of interrelated actions. (Oye and Keohane 1985: p. 234) South Korea’s trade ministry announced that the country has filed an appeal to the appellate body against the ruling by the WTO arguing that:  According to the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, 46 nations adopted import restrictions on Japanese foods following the 2011 nuclear disaster, and those measures are still in place in 24 nations, including the United States, Russia, Lebanon and Argentina. Among them, nine nations have specially designated prefectures near the nuclear power plant so they can ban imports of seafood, but Japan filed the WTO complaint only against South Korea. Japan has exported a total of 708,566 tons of seafood to South Korea since March 2011, and South Korea has returned 0.03 percent of those exports asking for radiation level tests, the ministry said.  (Yonhap New Agency, April 9, 2018)23 Although such a legal approach could serve as an opportunity for the parties to re-­establish a more workable cooperative scheme in future, at present the two countries’ relationship in ocean affairs are once again in a stalemate, having difficulties in the renewal of a bilateral fishery agreement to decide the fishing quota together with other related terms for each other’s exclusive waters. In contrast to European countries’ response to a nuclear disaster in a neighboring country (even responding to the Fukushima case), such an incident did not sufficiently mobilize public awareness in the region regarding the operational risks associated with nuclear plants. Sporadic environmental civil movements against nuclear-­associated risks hardly developed into a “regional” coalition in a constant form in spite of the experience of nuclear waste dumping.

182   Political dynamics and marine environment Nuclear waste disposal has been a sensitive political and environmental issue in Northeast Asia since the revelation of the fact in 1993 that both Russia and Japan have dumped large quantity of radioactive waste into the East Sea. The former Soviet and Russian Navy was reported to have dumped decommissioned nuclear reactors and vast amount of nuclear waste into the East Sea, and Japan also admitted that the Tokyo Electric Power Company dumped about 9,000 tons of radioactive waste into the East Sea every year. South and North Koreas strongly protested the dumping by Russia and Japan, and many civilian organizations in Japan and South Korea organized protest movements. (Lee 1998: p. 11) The increasing construction of nuclear plants in the southeastern coastal areas of China is also increasing risks with a shortage of technical experts to handle associated problems (The South China Morning Post, June 12, 2017).24 Thirty-­seven nuclear reactors are in operation, with 20 more under construction and more about to start. The reactors under construction include some of the world’s most advanced, to give a 70 percent increase in nuclear capacity to 58 GWe by 2020–2021. Plans are for up to 150 GWe by 2030, and much more by 2050. Becoming largely self-­sufficient in reactor design and construction, as well as other aspects of the fuel cycle, a “Go global” policy in exporting nuclear technology including heavy components in the supply chain is evident.25 Another recently emerging risk of accidents and pollution of ocean and coastal areas is China’s plan to build hundreds of more incineration facilities along its east coast in the coming years. Toxic haze from China is worsening amid Chinese plans to build hundreds of more garbage incinerators along the east coast, where the deathly fine dust particles will be safely carried abroad by the wind, possibly to Korea.… The eastern coastal region of China has a massive concentration of factories and coal-­fired power plants, and Beijing is building or authorizing waste incinerators in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces, which are close to Korea. According to data submitted to the Environment Ministry by Ajou University professor Kim Soon-­tae, China’s waste incineration volume soared from 80 million tons in 2005 to 180 million tons in 2015. (Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 2017)26 Due to population growth and a shortage of landfills, the Chinese government plans to double the capacity of trash incineration by 2020. According to Kim, in addition to 244 existing incinerators, 121 more are currently being built, while another 106 are earmarked for construction. This will make the ultrafine dust flying into Korea even worse. The number of days that the government issued ultrafine dust warnings has risen from just one in 2013 to ten in 2017 and already to 13 so far in 2018. Seoul is doing very little to deal with the problem. “As China develops economically, it is shifting from burying trash to

Political dynamics and marine environment   183 incinerating it, but there is no way of concluding that the incinerators are all being built along its east coast,” a government official claimed.

Territorial sovereignty, disputes, and land reclamation in the ocean A misleading analysis stems from the fixed dichotomy in the analytical framework suggested by existing literature on territorial disputes, juxtaposing “Korean’s anti-­colonial nationalism versus the Japanese realist approach” to explain the two nations different ways of responding, usually describing the former as irrational, emotive, historically-­rooted and uncontrollable; whereas the latter is explained as a realist approach to sovereignty, and rationally calculated national-­interest seeking, state-­led, concerted and coherent diplomacy employing a universal legal approach. However, Japan’s emotive reaction to territorial issues has equally been nurtured by dint of political programs and ideological tools. The question is how leaders effectively mobilize and bring this mass sentiment into the field of diplomacy and negotiations (see Bukh 2015; Suzuki 2014; Lai 2014). In this process, historically, compared with China and Korea, Japan put more efforts and resources in meticulous planning to firmly secure and claim sovereignty over ocean resources. Such efforts include scientific research, public education, policy framework, use of international sources, and so on. State policy has been consistently balancing security, material interests, sovereignty claims, use of historical archives, and mobilizing public emotion. Significance of the disputes over the islets in regional affairs is not only the value of the islets themselves, but also their use as important leverage when negotiating over other inter-­state deals. For example, immediately after the trilateral summit in 2015, China leaked an unofficial remark on Ieodo, which was context-­less but insinuating China’s claim over it as ongoing. In the same way, Dokdo/Takeshima has been mentioned linked with other issues during bilateral negotiations over unrelated issues. Apart from territorial disputes, other procrastinated problems include strategically incomplete EEZ negotiations between countries, fierce competition over lucrative oil and gas reserves, abundant fisheries, and pollution and security issues associated with increasing waterways for shipments. “The South China Sea alone accommodates one-­third of global maritime traffic with an estimated $5 trillion in annual trade volume” (Voice of America, “Disputed Waters”).27 “The key to finding the cause of any war is investigating what the dyad is fighting over. Territorial issues are the most common cause of war.” Furthermore, territorial disputes have the most salience for either member of the disputing party and are least likely to be easily divisible. Hensel suggests that “territory is often seen as highly salient for three reasons: its tangible contents or attributes, its intangible or psychological value, and its effects on a state’s reputation.” Territoriality is important in that states fight over territorial issues, not just because they are neighbors and constantly interact, but because “the

184   Political dynamics and marine environment territorial explanation of war assumes that human territoriality is a key to understanding much of inter-­state conflict and war in the modern global system” (see Valeriano 2009: p. 187). Land (mis-)use, security, and the environment Illegal, unregulated, and unsustainable fishing practices and competition over unexploited potential natural resources evoke high security alerts. Tension has been progressively escalating in all territorial waters of the six countries and the East China Sea in particular has long been a battlefield caused by China’s provoking illegal fishing practices. There is a web of bilateral fisheries arrangements but they are insufficient, fragmented and outdated. Between China and Japan, a provisional bilateral agreement was made in 1997 (terminated in 2012). Japan and South Korea reached an agreement in 1965, and renewed agreement was made in 1998 and 2000. This year, two countries have been negotiating a renewal of the existing agreements. Bilateral fishery practices between China and South Korea were governed by the provisional bilateral fishery agreement that covered the period of 2000 up until 2005 (Sumaila et al. 2006; Blythea et al. 2017; Chen and Chang 2017; Lejano and Ocampo-­Salvador 2006; Dubbink and van Vliet 1996; Pinkerton 2017). A comprehensive marine environmental management regime would address these problems and embody an increased sharing of both the capacity and responsibility for managing the sea’s environment. Unlike the regionalist approach, some scholars argue that Japan and the United States should play a greater role in developing such a comprehensive regime for the region (Valencia 1998). The heated competition over natural resources and security risks in turn lead to countries’ land reclamation races on the (potential or actual) disputed waters (The Diplomat, March 7, 2016).28 Examples include China’s island-­ building campaign. “Some 1,300 hectares of tiny islets have been landfilled to sustain mostly military infrastructure, including runways long enough to accommodate bombers – low-­level skirmishes between Chinese naval patrols and civilian fishing fleets from neighboring countries could spark international conflict” (Voice of America, “Disputed Waters”).29 Other examples include, South Korea’s construction of the Ieodo Ocean Research Station and Japan’s concrete encasings and platform-­building on the Okinotori Atoll, although countries have different views on those activities. These actual conflicts and potential disputes over maritime territories need to be dealt with through an integrated approach comprehensively combining conventional and non-­ conventional security issues. China has occasionally provoked South Korea by entering the Korean air defense identification zone (KADIZ) in a highly threatening manner, three times in 2017 (January 29, February 27, and April 28). At the recently resumed bilateral security talks which took place on May 7, 2018 between China and South Korea, “the first working-­level defense talks in over two years,” Seoul demanded China take measures to prevent it (Yonhap New Agency, May 7, 2018).30

Political dynamics and marine environment   185 This allows a clearer understanding of the nature of conflicts and acute ocean environmental problems of pollution, over-­exploitation and the misuse of common resources (Beckman et al. 2013). More recently, the U.S., with the Trump administration’s hard line military strategy in response to the DPRK’s nuclear development projects, fiercely instigated public fear and insecurity prior to the recently completed Xi-­Trump Summit. This led to raising the security alert in this region through exchanging violent and menacing words between the involved nations, even leaking allegedly disguisable information of the U.S. deploying nuclear submarines and the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the territorial waters of the ROK. Recently, various media sources (e.g., Asahi Shimbun, Yonhap Agency, and Voice of America) reported that during the second week of April 2017, the U.S. positioned two destroyers capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles in the region, one of them 300 miles from the North Korean nuclear test site. U.S. heavy bombers were also positioned in Guam to attack the North if necessary, and the Pentagon announced that the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier strike group was redirected to the area, but later revealed that wrong information had been spread (The Korea Times, April 19, 2017).31 Moreover, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, in the three NEA countries, building nuclear reactors is competitively taking a higher priority on the national agenda, mostly concentrated alongside the coastal areas adjacent to the Sea of Japan/East Sea, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea with the risks of radioactive waste, water pollution, and terrestrial disturbance, let alone the disastrous risk of an explosion. Returning to the land reclamation issue, China has been most aggressive, provoking all other stakeholders and the U.S.  Beijing has sought to consolidate its position in the region by conducting land reclamation and construction work on islets and reefs under its control, turning them into new and bigger islands on which harbors, airstrips and large buildings have been constructed.… Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated that “China’s determination to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity is rock-­hard and unquestionable.  General Fan Changlong, Vice-­Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, reassured that: “those construction projects [in the South China Sea] are mainly carried out for civil purposes” and “will not affect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Instead, they will enable us to provide better public services to aid navigation and production in the South China Sea” (Wu 2016: p. 855). Nevertheless, it has been known that president Xi is personally behind island-­building in the South China Sea (The South China Morning Post, July 28, 2017). All countries except Mongolia are involved in on-­going or potential territorial disputes: Sekaky/Diaoyu between Japan and China; Dokdo/Takeshima between Korea (possibly two Koreas) and Japan; and four islands in Southern

186   Political dynamics and marine environment Kurils/Nothern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai, Shikotan) between Russia and Japan (Selden 2015: pp. 150–160). Scrutinizing all the dispute cases are out of the scope of this current project. Mentioning only environment-­ relevant issues, not only the ambition of territorial expansion but also competition over natural resources adds to the complication of the disputes in those areas. All countries are keen to explore ocean resources (Baird 2012; Bateman 2015; Manicom 2014; Nomura et al. 2017; Rosenberg and Chung 2008). However, as the common ground is not to protect or equitably share but for the exclusion of other participants, development issues are highly political and left as security issues. This situation has hampered further constructive discussions on incorporating the environment into politics, resulting in a further distancing of the norm of conventional security from ecological security. This also means creating a wider gap between nationalized sovereignty and functional sovereignty occasionally accepting a diminished state’s role. Despite some efforts made at bilateral levels, tension and potential conflicts have escalated. So far, I have presented and analyzed such tension and conflicts in three dimensions: conflicts over resources (i.e., fisheries), tension against land reclamations over territories under dispute, and unregulated ocean pollution issues in the region. With the absence of a regional collective mechanism, conflicts have increased rather than decreased in parallel with some level of evolution of institutionalized development for the purpose of cooperation.

Mutual reinforcement between bilateralism and multilateralism Regional politics related to the ocean are much more chaotic and anarchical than the other two governances discussed in the previous chapters. In the absence of a solid, core regional institution that concerns environmental affairs including pollution control, protection, monitoring extraction, extra regional factors penetrate more easily and together with indigenous tensions reinforce conventional security, which has further raised political tensions, and the loss of economic opportunities of a blue economy (ocean eco-­park), that has lead regional seas and coastal areas to become one of the most polluted zones in the globe. Regional political hot spots provide grounds for countries’ further misuse of oceans and islands inviting more military forces, bases and drills. The DPRK has been the most uncontrollable risk in the region. Historically, confrontations and security threats in the region have invited superpowers’ deep engagement in regional affairs, which has continued until today. Japan’s pace of expansion, volatile security problems on the Korean peninsula and China’s renewed ambition of implementing sino-­ centrism continuously attract external powers and preserve the U.S. interest in the region. Tensions are growing and (de-)securitization processes will continue and yet, it seems a critical moment for the countries in the NEA to be more cooperative and responsible to build a regional model of sustainable development as all members repeatedly urged during the TEMM over the past few years.

Political dynamics and marine environment   187 DPRK risks in the ocean North Korea conducted a missile test that flew over Japan in 2017, which was similar to Pyongyang’s recently aborted plan to fire a missile near the U.S. territory of Guam. The launch was believed to be the second successful [after the one in May 2017] test of the Hwasong 12 intermediate-­range ballistic missile that can reach distances between 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers (1,800 to 3,100 miles).  (Quoted from Jeffrey Lewis, the Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California) “The missile passed high above Japan about 10 minutes after launch, split into three pieces and splashed into the Pacific Ocean, east of the northern main Japanese island of Hokkaido” (Voice of America, August 29, 2017).32 With the tension growing, Washington took the step to make the region a conflict zone, intensifying the situation. The U.S. then made the timely suggestion that the Korean territorial seas needed to be used as a permanent base for U.S. maritime forces in order to bolster a closer connection with its base in Okinawa, Japan. Afterwards, within a decade or so, the waters once again developed into a conflict-prone zone in 2017. The U.S.-ROK periodic military drills in the Yellow Sea provided China with an excuse to demonstrate its clout over the peninsula using its naval power. Responding to Pyongyang’s July 28 missile test, Chinese naval forces announced it would: conduct more than 10 kinds of drills and launch dozens of types of missiles during four days of live-­fire exercises off the Korean peninsula, according to state media. The drills would mirror real combat conditions and test the troops’ tactical, combat and weapons training, the report said. The exercises included aerial interception and assaults by land and sea, it said. The drills were taking place in the waters between the coast of Qingdao in Shandong province and Lianyungang in Jiangsu province, according to notices from the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet and the Shandong Maritime Safety Administration. They come after a three-­day naval exercise in the Yellow Sea late last month ahead of the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army. (The South China Morning Post, August 8, 2017)33 In the meantime, the U.S. pushed with the tool of UN sanctions to keep pressure on the North Korean regime and provoking the leader. “The international sanctions ban an estimated 90 percent of the country’s external trade” (Voice of America, May 3, 2018).34 The comprehensive UN sanctions on the DPRK included maritime interdiction operations (as in Libya) (CF naval blockade operated against Cuba). The important purpose was to monitor any trade shipments flowing from/to the DPRK. However, unlike Beijing’s pledge to comply with UN sanctions, China’s trade with North Korea did not decrease.

188   Political dynamics and marine environment Form an ecological point of view, such economic sanctions make the situation even worse. To survive, the North Korean people have no other option but to continue trading with China against the international sanctions and let Chinese enterprises extract resources including fish stocks (e.g., hairy crabs) in North Korean territorial waters at fluctuating prices. In 2016, it was reported that the government of North Korea made a deal with China for cash, allowing Chinese fishing boats to freely enter both the East and West seas (Chosun Ilbo, August 12, 2016).35 This evoked more violent conflicts between Chinese fishing boats and the South Korean Coast Guard, as the number of boats radically increased and easily entered South Korean waters. As the sanctions turned out to be ineffective particularly in monitoring and controlling shipments, the UNSC announced additional measures to isolate the country by adding specific names of large ships and shipping companies to the list (Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 2018).36 Such a decision came a few months after the revelation that China-­origin and Chinese-­run shipping companies in Taiwan exporting crude oil via Hong Kong to the DPRK were monitored by the U.S. monitoring system. Beijing’s explanation was that those private enterprises were out of government control. To date, debates over the state’s role in China’s overseas economic expansion have been split between liberal (market-­based) drivers versus mercantilist (state-­driven) explanations for firm behavior (Cited Holslag 2010). In reality, both are right. The government plays a central role in China’s overseas economic interactions and firms are driven largely by profit motives.  (Reilly 2014: p. 933) Nonetheless, commentators point out that no matter private or public, the Chinese firms need to be controlled by China’s domestic law in line with the agreement on the sanctions as a signatory. Trump imposed a secondary boycott allowing the U.S. direct intervention on foreign (China) private enterprises, which was a major Trump’s policy. Russia also showed a gesture of cooperation with the U.S. and recently cancelled renewals of visas for the labor force from North Korea working in Russia. Abrupt de-­securitization occurred with the inter-­Korean Détente, starting from cultural exchanges between Pyongyang and Seoul through the 2018 Winter Olympics, concerts and other friendly events prior to offering the world a historical moment of inter-­Korean reconciliation (the first inter-­Korean summit in 11 years). The series of cultural events gradually reopened North Korea and legitimately helped the country to act as a normal state in the regional diplomatic arena. All the NEA countries indirectly, but quickly, expressed their interest in participating in the process of transforming North Korea. Bilateral summit meetings have been quickly scheduled to confirm their own national interests in the security cooperation process with the DRPK before entering a possible new era of multilateral security dialogue with DPRK. Relating to ocean cooperation, a notable outcome of the April 27 Inter-­ Korean Summit in the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjeom would be their

Political dynamics and marine environment   189 promise of pursuing recognition of the de facto maritime boundary, the Northern Limit Line (the disputed maritime demarcation in the West [Yellow] Sea), and both parties agreeing to manage fishery together. This implies that Seoul will return to the 2007 inter-­Korean agreement (under the Roh Moo Hyun presidency) on collective fishery management in the disputed EEZ claim overlapping zones, creating a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju Harbor. The South China Sea and China’s search for new leadership Although the South China Sea is not a direct concern of NEA affairs, China’s rivalry with the U.S. over any matters has constantly invited external forces. The U.S. pivot to Asia has aggravated military tensions. For this, Beijing has “accused America of ‘muddying the waters’ and ‘making the Asia-­Pacific a second Middle East’ ” (The Economist, March 26, 2016).37 China’s interests are manifold: one explicit interest is natural resources. The promising new energy source Beijing is tapping from the South China Sea and why it matters. With its successful collection of methane gas from icy methane hydrate, China joined other nations exploring a potential and abundant clean energy resource. (The South China Morning Post, May 19, 2017) Welcome to the South China Sea, the geographic commons of Southeast Asia’s navigable rimland. Its 3.5 million square kilometers of underlying bedrock contain oil and natural gas deposits that, by official U.S. estimates, are at least equal to Mexico’s and, by some contested Chinese estimates, might be second only to Saudi Arabia’s. Also home to lucrative fisheries and supply routes that carry 80 percent of China’s crude imports, the territorially disputed region may be the most strategically important waterway of the 21st century. (Voice of America, website on the “Disputed Waters – Conflict and Diplomacy on the High Seas”)38 Exploring and securing natural resources in the ocean has been accompanied by military expansion. As a result, Beijing and Washington have constantly generated tension. Chinese jets intercept U.S. military planes over the East China Sea. The U.S. says these intercepts are “unprofessional” and has raised the issue with China. Japan meanwhile, protests a Chinese drone flight in disputed waters (The South China Morning Post, May 19, 2017). Land reclamation to reinforce territorial demarcations combined with air defense over disputed waters has led to Chinese jets intercepting U.S. military planes flying over the East China Sea. The U.S. says these intercepts were “unprofessional” and has raised the issue with China. Japan meanwhile protests a Chinese drone flight in disputed waters

190   Political dynamics and marine environment (The South China Morning Post, May 19, 2017). Navigational rights, and incomplete EEZ negotiations (between all countries involved), make loosened sovereignty for regional cooperation very difficult. Only when countries have a stable and firm and clear notion of sovereignty with recognition, etc. can members cooperate and temporarily yield sovereignty on certain cooperative issues. Recently, the U.K. announced its participation in the U.S.-led strategy for navigational freedom (Guardian, February 13, 2018): “Britain to sail warship through disputed South China Sea,” the U.K.’s Defence Secretary, Gavin Williamson, announced:  A British warship will sail from Australia through the disputed South China Sea next month to assert freedom of navigation rights. She’ll be sailing through the South China Sea (on the way home) and making it clear our navy has a right to do that after a two-­day visit to Sydney and Canberra. China in December defended its construction on disputed islands, which are also claimed by Southeast Asian neighbors, as “normal” after a U.S. think-­tank released new satellite images showing the deployment of radar and other equipment. “Australia and Britain see China as a country of great opportunities, but we shouldn’t be blind to the ambition that China has, and we’ve got to defend our national security interests.” Responding to this, China sent a warning signal to the U.K., given that this was the first time that another country rather than the U.S. had participated in this affair (see commentary, “US, Japan, Australia still troublemakers in South China Sea” by Jia Xiudong, People’s Daily Online, August 11, 2017). While tension in the South China Sea rises between the U.S. and China, Beijing’s approach is strengthening bilateralism with concerned Asian neighbors. Although China officially dismissed the ruling of the Hague-­based arbitral tribunal filed by Manila against it in 2013, such an occasion generated a somewhat positive outcome in the process of building cooperative governance. Tensions had been rising in the South China Sea with the countries involved, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. In 2016, “China opened a new fishing port – the largest in the southern province of Hainan and the nearest to the disputed Spratly Islands – in a move analysts said would help expand its presence in the South China Sea.” With persistent resistance, China showed that it could negotiate with the Philippines, by partially accepting Philippine fishing boats accessing the disputed area, reopening the “Hotly Disputed Fishing Spot” (the Scarborough Shoal, a 150-square-­ kilometer (93 mile) feature with a lagoon west of the Philippine island of Luzon) to Philippine Boats (The South China Morning Post, August 6, 2016; Voice of America, August 28, 2017).39 As a matter of fact, Beijing had paid much attention on South China Sea over the last decades, through investigation, institutionalization, legal, and administrative supports. 

Political dynamics and marine environment   191 The creation of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) is a prime example of this development. This institute’s predecessor was the Hainan South China Sea Research Center, a small research institute established in 1996 and affiliated with the Foreign Affairs Office of Hainan Province. Following the increased attention to the South China Sea and the amplified tensions, this small institute grew quickly. In July 2004, the State Council upgraded it to a national-­level institute. Currently, NISCSS works directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and receives instructions from the State Oceanic Administration. Yet it remains affiliated with the Hainan provincial government. Support from two national agencies and one provincial government provides NISCSS with access to substantial resources.  (Wang 2015: p. 509) With rising attention and help from international actors, there have been efforts to build a multi-­stakeholder governance to respond to China’s expansion in the South China Sea. Many private bodies have been established around the case submitted by the Philippines (e.g., the Philippines-­based private non-­ governmental, Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs). It actively leads public opinion and provides a venue for discussions and information-­sharing. Although the exposed dispute has not yet entered mainstream negotiations for the future direction of cooperation (Stage IV of the REDM), some developments have been noticed. Although effectiveness needs monitoring in the coming years, China led to setting regional rules through agreements and guidelines, which is necessary for it to defend from, and react more to, outside criticism effectively. Such agreements include “The Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines (21 October 2016)”; “Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN Member States and China in Response to Maritime Emergencies in the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (8 September 2016)”; “The Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea (8 September 2016)”; “The Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (25 July 2016)”; and “The Declaration of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Promotion of International Law (26 June 2016).” Regional development models and the possibility of building a cooperative regime Spillover models may include not only membership or geographical expansion but inclusive “functional” expansion (e.g., from economic development to include sustainable development like APEC or ASEAN), or Environmental

192   Political dynamics and marine environment Conservation and trans-­boundary cooperation in the Yellow Sea, which I have already discussed. Bilateralism for multilateralism If bilateralism can serve as a coherent base for multilateralism, increasing the quantity of bilateralism in the ocean field could serve as a positive development driver. At present, however, bilateralism is used only to expand each country’s influence and dominance over relatively weaker states while using it as leverage against each other. For example, even vis-­à-vis ASEAN, the core three NEA countries have been involved in harsh competition to strengthen bilateralism with individual ASEAN member countries. It is particularly so, especially on issues concerning maritime security, the use of watercourses and access to natural resources in those countries’ territorial waters. China has invested heavily in tapping Myanmar’s natural resources in order to meet China’s growing domestic demand. The recently completed Sino-­ Myanmar oil and gas pipelines connecting China’s Yunnan Province and Myanmar’s Indian Ocean ports provide China with a more convenient and economical energy supply route. Moreover, as China seeks to enhance its economic access to the Indian Ocean, Myanmar is viewed in Beijing as a significant piece in the jigsaw. (Wu 2016: p. 857) Japan has put a great deal of emphasis on consolidating bilateral relationships with smaller South and Southeast Asian countries in order to counterbalance China’s expansion in the oceans, typically with offering a generous amount of financial aid. This reflects Japan’s strategic turn to Indo-­Pacific cooperation in line with the current U.S. foreign policy framework. The recently developed new format of the Quadrilateral Meeting between the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia (“The likeminded Asia-­Pacific democracies to balance China”) also reflects such a policy (The Diplomat, November 13, 2017).40 Japan pledged to help strengthen Sri Lanka’s Coast Guard capabilities as part of moves to counter China’s advances in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met April 12 with visiting Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The two leaders issued a joint statement that called for further cooperation in the maritime field. It said Japan will provide Sri Lanka with two cutter boats and support efforts to train personnel so Sri Lanka can improve its coast guard capabilities. The statement also called for strengthening exchanges between defense officials of the two nations. Japan will also provide 1 billion yen ($9 million) for the construction of port facilities in northeastern Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is located strategically along the sea lanes that link Japan with petroleum-­producing nations in the Middle East. During his meeting with Wickremesinghe, Abe urged Sri Lanka to

Political dynamics and marine environment   193 participate in joint training between the coast guards of Japan and India. In a joint news conference after the meeting, Abe said: “In order to establish free and open Indian-­Pacific waters, it is indispensable that Sri Lanka serve as a hub with port facilities open to all.” Wickremesinghe said that open and free waters are a requirement for regional prosperity and social stability.41 The U.S.’s strategic regional grouping in the Indo-­Pacific era is in a way a reaction to China’s growing interests and influence in India. China has been keen to consolidate another mini-­lateral institution, the trilateral meeting with Russia and India. Represented by the three countries’ foreign ministers, its 15th meeting was held in New Delhi in December 2017. For China, the meeting was an important venue for the purpose of ensuring Russia and India’s support for South China Sea disputes whereas India’s interest was to ensure “freedom of navigation and international law in Asia’s maritime commons,” explicitly articulating the previous year’s outcome document (The Diplomat, December 13, 2017).42 South Korea also began to join the race. “South Korea, Indonesia discuss ways to strengthen marine cooperation” (The Korea Times, April 24, 2018).43 The three NEA’s competition over ASEAN countries, both individually and collectively, is not a novel phenomenon. However such competition becomes tougher with strategic expansion of the coverage of issues such as rivers, oceans and ports, involving a wide range of engineering work including infrastructure and construction projects. Meanwhile, such a regional development dynamism can be an opportunity for the region to develop a region-­wide standardized environmental impact assessment. From the NEA governments’ point of view, such a regional standard will help effectively responding to external concerns and criticism about an unsustainable development pattern in East Asia, and concurrently pacify anti-­growth ecologists domestically in all three countries. From an ecological point of view, this is worrisome as the NEA countries themselves have not yet reached the mature stage of REDM, moving from the narrowly-­defined eco-­nationalism approach to an inclusive regional development model. A new global maritime order or Sinicization? Beijing’s renewed attention on its good neighbor diplomacy,  has taken shape in new initiatives for regional security cooperation and new proposals for regional economic cooperation, such as the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-­first Century Maritime Silk Road …, the Sino-­Pakistan economic corridor, the Bangladesh-­China-India-­Myanmar economic corridor and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  (Wu 2016: p. 850) China has recently sent signals both to South Korea and Japan to join the process of implementing China-­led regionalism. One example is regarding

194   Political dynamics and marine environment ­ ossible cooperation in building a cross-­border submarine tunnel, suggesting a p 325 kilometer underwater tunnel between China and Korea, linking roads and railways to as far as central Asia (Chosun Ilbo, March 21, 2018).44 Another example is suggesting Japan and South Korea cooperate in China’s Arctic policy as part of fulfilling China’s dream of the 21st maritime silk road expanding it to ice silk road where Russia and France have been participating together with China (called the Yamaha project) mainly exploring for natural gas extraction. China believes that there is much room to cooperate between the NEA three in technological aspects (e.g., icebreaker shipbuilding) (Xia Liping 2018).45 China tends to believe that traditional Arctic countries (western advanced economies) have monopolized rights to access natural resources since the Arctic Council only includes the NEA three as participating observers. The current Moon government’s maritime policy agenda also shows some room to cooperate. President Moon Jae-­in, declaring that South Korea cannot give up on being a global shipbuilding leader, set out a plan in January to support the industry. This included ordering icebreakers, patrol vessels and offshore wind farms. His push to boost the minimum wage by 16.4% this year elicits little more than passing interest among workers; they worry whether they will have jobs at all. (The Economist, February 1, 2018)46 Meanwhile, middle-­power countries generally have limited options between participation and non-­participation thus usually taking regional cooperation as a better option due to their relatively heavier reliance on, and vulnerability to, a geopolitically confined situation. However, how far the other NEA countries, particularly Japan, would be cooperative with the OBOR-­related China national agenda is not yet too clear. How far the Chinese way will be realigned with international norms in the maritime environment has been under question, and most analysts have made negative predictions so far. China embraces some Western rules, but also seems to be drafting a parallel system of its own. Take the Belt and Road Initiative, which promises to invest over $1tn in markets abroad, ultimately dwarfing the Marshall plan. This is partly a scheme to develop China’s troubled west, but it also creates a Chinese-­funded web of influence that includes pretty much any country willing to sign up. The initiative asks countries to accept Chinese-­based dispute-­resolution.… As China’s economic clout grows, so could this sort of pressure. This “sharp power” in commerce is a complement to the hard power of armed force. Here, China behaves as a regional superpower bent on driving America out of East Asia. (The Economist, March 1, 2018)47 Environmental problems in the ocean exhibit all problematic aspects including pollution (deregulation), conversion (land reclamation) and overuse (fisheries).

Political dynamics and marine environment   195 Making things worse is the escalation of hardcore security tension, and the increasing frequency and scale of military drills that have occupied all territorial and shared waters in East Asia.

Policy implications This chapter provided an in-­depth analysis taking China’s changing multilateralism (Wuthnow et al. 2012) as a significant variable that redirects regional cooperation. During the period of China’s peaceful rise, an optimistic view on the higher possibility of regional cooperation was predominant. Nonetheless, the main players in this region today have less optimism about China’s leadership due to its aggressive and unsustainable ways of dealing with maritime affairs, and subsequently leading to a growing rivalry with the U.S. and Japan. While China has put much energy into the OBOR project, concerns have been multiplied mainly because the agenda inadequately addresses comprehensive aspects of development. China’s official statements have demonstrated that OBOR is initiated not only to fulfil political and economic necessities but also to achieve a norm-­ making ambition “through regionalized cooperation.” In this sense, China’s expanding role at present simultaneously entails both challenges (environmental enhancement) and opportunities (advancing regionalism) in East Asia. “The version of globalization led by the East and the West are different. The West tends to be more aggressive, while the East emphasizes inclusiveness. That makes homogeneity, one of the key factors in cooperation, but we are trying to show that heterogeneity does not necessarily get in the way of cooperation,” Ren Jingjing an expert of government think-­tank CASS (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). (Global Times, April 12, 2017) As part of preventing disputes and conflicts, sufficient communication about changes in domestic policy and regulations are essential to advance steps toward cooperation. Further, introducing the concept and policy framework of blue economies (the E.U.-initiated version) in an innovative path can naturally attract private sector participation that may interconnect society, the market and government players. Examples may include cooperation in the field of offshore renewable energy development, maritime eco-­park building and collaborative research on natural resources in the ocean. It will be also important to reconsider the value of the ocean that can be multiplied by cooperation. In order to reestablish a common ground for mutually beneficial gains, it will be important to create a consensus on the value of marine and coastal ecosystem services. One example of valuing ocean environment is that: They are divided into four categories: supporting (photosynthesis, nutrient cycling, soil, sediment, sand formation); regulating (carbon sequestration,

196   Political dynamics and marine environment water regulation, natural hazardous weather regulation); provisioning (raw materials, food production, energy); and cultural (tourism, recreation, aesthetics, spiritual values). (OECD 2016: p. 49) The NEA three is a cluster of leading industrialized countries with impressive achievements in many aspects in terms of economic growth, education level, human resources, green technology and innovation, capital, and relatively Table 5.3 Linkage between theoretical accounts and regional ocean environment-related issues Theoretical orientation (region as a political unit)

Ocean environment-related issues and policy

Conflicts (focusing on politics Republican realism-oriented Exploitation of natural resources (fisheries, natural and conventional security) view (NIMBY and green gas, territories) based on protectionism) zero-sum game

Cooperation (focusing on regime building and institutions)

Compromise (focusing on sustainable growth)

Marxist view on global division (Critical view on inequality in resource and benefit sharing)

Criticizing neo-colonial nature in world trade; emphasis on benefit-sharing and other distributional issues; community-based approach; anti-capitalism; protection of local communities

Classical liberal functionalist (ecological integration under regional/global norms)

Search for binding regulatory regimes; emphasis on regional institutions, collective management for sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystem

Neo-functionalist cf. constructivism (spillovers across issues)

Emphasis on interconnectivity, peer-pressure, global environmental governance, multistakeholder participation

Neo-liberal middle-of-road approach (sustainable development enforced by green growth and blue economy)

Emphasis on economic value of ocean environment (e.g., blue economy as a policy tool)

“Active” technological optimism (innovation, green technology transfer)

Less emphasis on regulatory approach and proactive environmental policy; emphasis on R&D support

Political dynamics and marine environment   197 ­ ell-­functioning government systems. However, with regard to the aspect of w managing oceans there has been a total failure despite each country’s endeavors to develop effective regulatory systems of their own. The surrounding oceans have become highly polluted with growing competition to build military bases and conduct military drills, overlooking destructive fishing, prevalent oil spills, and destroying coral reefs that fundamentally irrevocably destroy entire ecosystems. The involved states’ rational calculation for defending “state security” have chosen this path. The development dynamism in the NEA will need to accommodate an integral approach to the ocean environment, connecting with all other related environment issues, and to find region-­specific concrete areas of cooperation in the view of generating positive synergetic effects. Although in general neoliberalism is not the best option for an ultimate ecological civilization, “in the NEA,” “for the time being,” especially in the field of the ocean environment, neoliberal policy tools (a government-­led/ designed market-­oriented approach) may help mitigate tensions by creating a multi-­stake holder governance (see Table 5.3).

Notes   1 “China’s plan to cut shipping emissions,” www.climatechangenews.com/2017/04/20/ chinas-­plan-cut-­shipping-emissions/ (Accessed January 9, 2018).   2 “China shipping delivers toxic pollution cocktail-­report,” www.reuters.com/article/ us-­china-environment-­shipping/china-­shipping-delivers-­toxic-pollution-­cocktailreport-­idUSKBN0II07W20141029 (Accessed January 27, 2017).   3 Formerly the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute (KORDI), it is a comprehensive ocean research organization that is leading development in national ocean science and technology.   4 This was established as the “Japan Foundation for Shipbuilding Advancement” in 1975. At the outset, its aim was to promote the shipbuilding industry and related manufacturing industries through activities such as conducting management diagnosis, financing business operations, supporting technology development and taking measures to prevent marine oil pollution. Subsequently, in response to a number of problems related to the ocean, which is the lifeblood of shipbuilding, the foundation’s activities expanded to include research into and study of ocean affairs overall.   5 This is a non-­profit corporation with expertise on building capacity to respond to oil spills and is capable of providing training and technical support in oil spill preparedness and response both at the regional, national, and local level and capacity building through drills and exercises.   6 Choi, Jae-­Yong (2007) “Environmental Cooperation in North-­East Asia: Here and the Hereafter,” Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), unpublished conference paper.   7 “The South China Sea is really a fishery dispute: the hidden cause of the South China Sea disputes: there aren’t enough fish in the sea,” by Adam Greer, https://thediplomat. com/2016/07/the-­south-china-­sea-is-­really-a-­fishery-dispute/ (Accessed January 15, 2018).   8 “China is waging a global fisheries war: pelagic fishing has become an important part  of Beijing’s national policy,” www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/10/30/ commentary/world-­commentary/china-­waging-global-­fisheries-war/#.WuwtUIiFM2w (Accessed January 15, 2018).

198   Political dynamics and marine environment   9 Quartz “Red fish, coup fish China has fished itself out of its own waters, so Chinese fishermen are now sticking their rods in other nations’ seas,” https://qz. com/948980/china-­has-fished-­itself-out-­of-its-­own-waters-­so-chinese-­fishermen-are-­ now-sticking-­their-rods-­in-other-­nations-seas/ (Accessed January 15, 2018). 10 “China cracks down on illegal fishing to protect marine environment,” www.china daily.com.cn/china/2017–09/06/content_31641604.htm (Accessed January 15, 2018). 11 “Japan protests over Chinese ships,” www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/ 2016/08/07/2003652607) (Accessed January 15, 2018). 12 “Huge oil spill spreads in East China Sea, stirring environmental fears” (New York Times January 15, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/world/asia/oil-­tankerspill-­sanchi-east-­china-sea.html (Accessed January 15, 2018). 13 “Tokyo takes more steps to deal with Sanchi oil spill,” www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2018/02/02/national/tokyo-­takes-steps-­deal-sanchi-­oil-spill/#.WuwpDoiFM2w (Accessed May 15, 2018). 14 “A nearly invisible oil spill threatens some of Asia’s richest fisheries,” www.nytimes. com/2018/02/12/world/asia/china-­c ondensate-oil-­s pill-tanker-­c leanup.html (Accessed May 15, 2018). 15 “China oil spill: warning over seafood contamination,” www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/jan/18/oil-­from-sunken-­iranian-tanker-­spreads-over-­100-sq-­km-of-­eastchina-­sea (Accessed May 15, 2018). 16 “Oil spill could reach Jeju in one month,” www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/ nation/2018/01/371_243229.html (Accessed May 15, 2018). 17 “East Asia: oil spill in East Asia – a quiet disaster,” http://asiamedia.lmu. edu/2018/02/08/east-­asia-oil-­spill-in-­east-sea-­a-quiet-­disaster/ (Accessed May 15, 2018). 18 “South Korea extends Japan fisheries ban as Fukushima concerns grow,” www.reuters. com/article/us-­fishery-korea-­japan-idUSBRE9850A420130906) (Accessed January 15, 2016). 19 “Court orders two-­year imprisonment for trafficking in young pollack, caught around Fukushima, with the wrong label [Fukushima wonjeon jubyon nogari wonsanji sokyeo guknae panmae … jingyeok 2 nyon],” www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/12/25/ 0200000000AKR20161225018700051.HTML (Accessed February 10, 2017). 20 “Smugglers brought seafood into China from waters off Fukushima, report says,” www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2007575/smugglers-­broughtseafood-­china-waters-­fukushima-report (Accessed January 15, 2018). 21 “Koizumi: Abe’s Fukushima ‘under control’ pledge was a lie,” www.asahi.com/ajw/ articles/AJ201609070073.html (Accessed January 15, 2018). 22 “The defence failed due to insufficient scientific evidence: South Korea, failed to provide grounds for an import ban on fishery products from Fukushima, WTO says [Guahakjeok jeunggeo eopneun busil daeeung-­i naeun paeso],” http://biz.chosun. com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/23/2018022301805.html#csidx032ae9782c94 26da5a0fba3caa1f9b7 (Accessed June 10, 2018). 23 “S. Korea files appeal against WTO ruling on Fukushima seafood ban,” http:// english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000. html?cid=AEN20180409009100320 (Accessed May 30, 2018). 24 “Technician shortage in China ‘threatens nuclear plant safety,’ ” www.scmp.com/ news/china/policies-­politics/article/2000147/technician-­shortage-china-­threatensnuclear-­plant (Accessed April 15, 2018). 25 World Nuclear Association, www.world-­nuclear.org/information-­library/country-­ profiles/countries-­a-f/china-­nuclear-power.aspx (Accessed January 15, 2018). 26 “China to build hundreds more polluting incinerators on east Coast,” http://english. chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/03/27/2018032701345.html (Accessed June 13, 2018).

Political dynamics and marine environment   199 27 “Conflict and diplomacy on the high seas,” by Pete Cobus, http://projects.voanews. com/south-­china-sea/ (Accessed May 18, 2018). 28 “Satellite imagery: China expands land filling at North Island in the Paracels,” by Victor Robert Lee, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/satellite-­imagery-china-­ expands-land-­filling-at-­north-island-­in-the-­paracels/ (Accessed July 28, 2017). 29 “Conflict and diplomacy on the high seas,” by Pete Cobus, http://projects.voanews. com/south-­china-sea/ (Accessed May 18, 2018). 30 “S. Korea, China resume defense policy talks,” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/ search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20180507002751315. 31 “US lied about carrier strike group,” www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/ 04/120_227815.html (Accessed April 22, 2018). 32 “North Korea fires missile over Japan,” www.voanews.com/a/north-­korea-missile-­ japan/4004272.html (Accessed June 13, 2017). 33 “China ‘fires warning’ with navy drills off Korean peninsula,” www.scmp.com/news/ china/diplomacy-­defence/article/2105832/china-­fires-warning-­array-navy-­drillskorean-­peninsula (Accessed June 13, 2017). 34 “South Korea developing economic projects for North Korea,” www.voanews. com/a/south-­korea-developing-­economic-projects-­for-north-­korea/4375667.html (Accessed May 29, 2018). 35 “Chinese boats fishing illegally in Korea’s East and West seas confront South Korean police [Jung, eoseondeul dong seo hae neomnadeulmyo hangukgua machal],” http:// news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/08/12/2016081200335.html (Accessed November 18, 2017). 36 “UN Security Council added a list of 27 ships and 21 enterprises to sanctions against North Korea [UN anbori, daebuk jaejae myongdanae seonbak 27 cheok, hoisa 21 got],” http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/03/31/2018033100732.html (Accessed March 18, 2018). 37 “The South China Sea, China v the rest: as the sea becomes more militarized, the risks of conflict grow,” March 26, 2016, The Economist. 38 Voice of America, https://projects.voanews.com/south-­china-sea/. 39 “China reopens hotly disputed fishing spot to Philippine Boat,” www.voanews. com/a/china-­reopens-hotly-­disputed-fishing-­spot-to-­philippine-boats/4003392.html (Accessed December 22, 2017); “New Hainan fishing port to extend China’s maritime reach in South China Sea: analysts,” www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-­ defence/article/1999794/new-­hainan-fishing-­port-extend-­chinas-maritime-­reach (Accessed December 22, 2017). 40 “US, Japan, India, and Australia hold working-­level quadrilateral meeting on regional cooperation,” by Ankit Panda, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-­japanindia-­and-australia-­hold-working-­level-quadrilateral-­meeting-on-­regional-cooperation/ (Accessed June 13, 2018). 41 South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-­politics/ article/2094906/promising-­new-energy-­source-beijing-­tapping-south-­china; The Asahi Shimbun, www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201704130030.html (Accessed December 13, 2017). 42 “What the Russia-­India-China Trilateral Meeting Means: trilateralism between Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi produces lengthy statements, but divergences remain,” https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-­the-russia-­india-china-­trilateralmeeting-­means/ (Accessed August 7, 2018). 43 The Korea Times, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/205_247784.html. 44 “The longest in the world, a 325 km China-­Korea maritime tunnel, can it be possible? [Saegyue choidae 325 km han-­jung haejeo tunnel jeongmal ttul-­lilkka],” http://news. chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/03/20/2018032002388.html. 45 Presentation at the 3rd Trans-­Pacific International Conference, Pukyong National University (January 2018).

200   Political dynamics and marine environment 46 The Economist, “Setting a new course: why South Korea is growing wary of China: Its biggest trading partner is fast turning into its biggest competitor.”  47 The Economist, “How the West got China wrong: It bet that China would head towards democracy and the market economy. The gamble has failed,” (online edition), www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/01/how-­the-west-­got-china-­wrong (Accessed June 13, 2018).

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6 Greening regional politics

Responding to the main research questions I explored the main inquiry of the project through studying the three major areas of environmental issues in Northeast Asia, namely climate change, biodiversity loss, and maritime environment-­related issues. Returning to the main research question: “How far, for what motivations, and under what circumstances do major players in the NEA choose to cooperate and how are other aspects of regional affairs, competition and conflict linked with those cooperation efforts?” Having provided lengthy answers in each area of the environmental problems in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, a shorter version of response to the question can be summarized as the following. As previous studies on related issues have sufficiently revealed and reiterated, the region has developed a relatively weak regional collective identity (some kind of solidarity among, or a sense of belonging to, the NEA nations and region) despite aggravating regional environmental problems, directly and indirectly affecting each other’s ecosystems. In the process of environmental cooperation in the NEA, although regional institutions and organizations have mushroomed since the 1990s, consequent outcomes of cooperative processes remain rather superficial (thin cooperation), overlooking urgent “NEA-­specific regional” issues. In such a manner, countries either try to use multilateral venues to promote and dominate other countries or vaguely (diplomatically) touch upon abstract global environmental goals. I described such a feature as “thin cooperation” as opposed to “thick cooperation,” a cooperative process of mainstreaming regional environmental problems into a regime building process with the view of producing “referable” region-­wide concrete approaches, guidance, strategies, standards, and norms, without departing from established global targets and norms. Previous studies contributed to this field of NEA environmental cooperation by examining institutionalization processes, and after that, listing the many barriers to further cooperation, covering various aspects (political, economic, and cultural). Nevertheless, particular features of the NEA region are erroneously mixed up with barriers to cooperation. The underlying assumption that particular feature of the NEA region, per se, to establish barriers to

204   Greening regional politics regionalism, might imply that there should be a fixed ideal form of regionalism. Under this hypothesis, if regional conditions are not identical with the ideal form, cooperation can hardly be expected, and will only result in heated rivalry and competition with increasing risks of conflict. Instead, one aspect of the analytical methods in this research was distinguishing regional features from barriers, and discussing how these features (notably, strong growth-­oriented aspiration for development) could motivate cooperation to overcome these barriers to some extent. For this reason, the theoretical framework that I discussed in Chapter 2 primarily concerned: “Why do (or should, depending on perspectives) countries cooperate?” and then, I turned attention to: “What are the barriers to further cooperation in the NEA context?” Environmental issues add their own particular barriers to general level discussions on the limitation of developing regionalism in the NEA. Accordingly, I narrowed down the theoretical discussions to cooperation in the “environmental field.” I argued that, having analyzed countries’ motivation and patterns of participation and interactions, most of the constraints in fact can be interpreted as “reasons to cooperate,” “the main features of the NEA region,” and “the opportunities to cooperate albeit challenging,” strictly speaking, rather than barriers to cooperation.” For example, power struggles, competition over hegemonism or conflicting national interests are not barriers to cooperation as they are the fundamental nature that one can find in any inter-­state relationship. The question is how a conflicting “political” nature is compromised or temporarily overcome for synergetic achievements in certain fields, particularly in ecological development. Thus, I regrouped those constraining variables under challenges (Table 6.1) that the region faces. By providing detailed case examples on what the NEA regional approach is to resolving environment-­related conflicts as seen in such cases as the Songhua River pollution case (Chapter 4), oil spill cases (Chapter 4), and trade disputes over seafood products between Japan and South Korea (Chapter 5). I also argued that constraints (tension, competition, and conflict) need to be exposed for open discussion and then sufficiently reflected and incorporated into the subsequent cooperation processes. In this way, the outcome of cooperation (binding or not) adequately contains referable region-­specific approaches and agreement to problem-­solving that can be applied to similar cases in the future. To go further methodologically, this research aimed to disentangle the questions of why and how regional multilateral cooperation still continues with ever-­increasing numbers of institutions, organizations, multilateral platforms, dialogues, and networks with a wide range of functional spillovers. Also, how heated competition and conflicts in environmental affairs un-­problematically co-­ evolve with cooperative processes. In this regard, methodologically, a political approach is used offering an in-­depth analysis on the wider structure of regional affairs and how environmental issues are politicized both positively and negatively. In the process of mainstreaming environmental problems into the political domain, conceptual contradictions and tensions are inevitably exposed. A framework can be created reflecting the division between “the conventional

Greening regional politics   205 Table 6.1  Challenges to multilateral1 environmental cooperation in the NEA context Categories

Challenging variables

Political

Disparities in political systems; competition and rivalry over initiatives lacking mutual recognition; bureaucracy in public administration; authoritarian governance and hierarchies between ministries involved; conflicting policy frameworks; frequent rotation of officials in charge; procedural disagreements on establishing secretariats; adopting rigid conventional concepts of state-centered sovereignty, lacking flexibility in negotiations for trans-boundary issues; lacking transparency in data sharing and disagreements on methodology of collecting data (e.g., harmonization of inventory and mandate reporting) that delay progress; a lack of horizontal policy coherence between environmental issues and other related fields

Economic

The level of economic development; ambitious growth-driven economies; disparities in carbon emission levels; disparities in the degree of biodiversity and the amount of natural resources; increasing energy and other natural resources consumption; aid relationships; disparities in practicing economic autonomy (sovereignty) in trade relationships; the limitation in employing coherent market-oriented policy with harmonization

Social and cultural

The level of environmental awareness; the degree of environmental education; the experience of environmental movement and other collective actions; disparities in green technology and R&D levels; mistrust and historical animosity; changing nutritional appetites and consumption patterns; the fast rise of the middle-class leading to increasing material production and infrastructure construction; exclusive nationalism combined with national level NIMBY; low level development in regional multi-stakeholder environmental governance; a lack of systematic historical documentation of regional environmental cases (i.e., the lack of collective memory of cooperation and collective problemsolving); disparities in communication skills in the process of intercultural negotiations (both formal and informal); limited authority given to officials in the field due to top-down centralized decision-making and authoritarian culture (e.g., relationships between the capital and delegations in the negotiation field)

External factors (beyond the NEA)

Heterogeneous climate-related geopolitics and the different status in the global environmental regime (e.g., climate and biodiversity regimes); the rise of China and a subsequent Sino-U.S. rivalry; the U.S. pivot; the periodic securitization of North Korea, Taiwan, and maritime disputes; the leadership competition in global environmental regime building; parties’ growing bilateralism and multilateralism with other regions than the NEA (China’s rapid expansion with multilateralism in other regions, and Japan’s preference for non-NEA coalitions (e.g., ASEAN, India, Russia, U.S., Australia, and the greater Pacific region); various views on Korea’s national unification agenda; competition over international visibility, and green image-making in soft diplomacy (de-politicizing hard environmental issues)

Note 1 Multilateral cooperation here refers to the cooperative bodies with more than three parties, thus including trilateral and quadrilateral relationships, which could also be called “mini-lateral.”

206   Greening regional politics statism (backed by rigid state sovereignty, state-­led official nationalism, and state/political security)” and “non-­conventional human and community-­ centered security (advocating sustainability, collective management of societal risks, and development).” Such tensions are embedded with today’s politics in almost all of society, and will likely continue until society re-­establishes a cooperative synergy in the enlarged supra-­national domain (which is not necessarily giving up sovereignty), where regionalism can fuel positive interactions between the three core pillars of regional environmental affairs, namely (re-­defined) security, development and environmentalism (as an idea and action/movements).

Where does the Northeastern region stand? Applying the REDM In Chapter 2, an analytical tool was suggested in order to explain the historical and contextual dynamism of evolution of region-­wide ecological development. The reason why the term “ecological modernization” is used instead of sustainable development was from the onset of its adoption, the concept of sustainable development was not exclusively concerning “environmental protection,” nor concerning how to incorporate environmental issues to the rest of the pillars, society, and the economy, thus heavily leaning on an anthropogenic vision. In suggesting a more balanced and harmonized view embracing eco-­centrism and techno-­centrism, the term “ecological development” was used. The five stages refer to, respectively: “total absence of environmentalism (Stage I)”; “asymmetry in environmentalism(s) and participants’ blame games (Stage II)”; “recognizing and internalizing externalities (externalities that affecting market, society and security) (Stage III)”; and “region-­wide harmonization and some level of spillovers (Stage IV)”; and finally “multi-­dimensional global and inter-­regional spillovers (Stage V).” Having examined climate change (Chapter 3), biodiversity loss (Chapter 4), and maritime environmental affairs (Chapter 5) as case studies, when attempting to apply the REDM as an evolutionary process to environmental issues, each demonstrated various stages. The NEA’s regional cooperation for dealing with climate change is reaching Stage III with the aspiration of reaching Stage V. In regard to the biodiversity regime, in terms of regulatory development, the level of NEA cooperation demonstrates also Stage III among the NEA three, and yet Stage II is noticeable if including the NEA six, particularly due to the huge disparities in countries’ possession/volume of natural resources and bio-­ resources of commercial value. Compared with climate change, in the field of biodiversity, the level of institutionalization of regional governance is still rather low, and issues related to biodiversity loss have been handled in a highly fragmented way. One reason is due to the nature of issues associated with biodiversity, which is seemingly more territorially confined, compared with trans-­boundary air pollution. As emphasized in the previous two chapters, only eco-­nationalism is nurtured when

Greening regional politics   207 environmentalism is developed in a confined national boundary, generating only multiple levels of NIMBY-­ism and exhibiting disparities between environmental concerns and regulations. As seen in all three cases in the region, when region-­ wide environmental regimes are not firmly based on societal level “environmentalism,” and only use the environment as a means to achieve “nationalized” interests, the regime has no core value and will easily disintegrate, making it hard to build any consensus on regionalized interests (shifting from nationalized environmentalism). As demonstrated through explaining the rising tensions in NEA-­involved maritime affairs, in the field of the ocean environment (pollution, overuse, and misuse), if speaking of “regional” affairs (no matter how far ecologically modernized domestically), the NEA demonstrates that their regionalization level has been in a stalemate in Stages I and II, and consequently a wider gap can be found in this field between regional and global principles and standards. I argued that “security concerns” are not the fundamental barrier to environmental cooperation; but the question is how far countries can re-­define “security,” and how far conflicting issues can be internalized/incorporated into the cooperation process. As such, it becomes a process of mitigating conflicts, while at the same time establishing a type of regional regime. Given the wide disparities in the political/economy paradigm (state-­market interaction) between states in the NEA, policy intervention with regulatory reforms is inevitable to advance a region-­wide collective norm-­making (positive politicization, accommodating conflicts for cooperation, as opposed to ecologically destructive conflicts). In this regard, the politicization of environmental issue is inevitable. Having discussed in detail in Chapter 2, post-­ material societal shifts do not necessarily mean the de-­politicization of issues regarding individuals’ quality of life and communities’ well-­being, particularly in this region. More politicization would be accompanied by wider attention and a search for a solution, and the incorporation of problems into regional governance. Nonetheless, the danger of politicization may be revealed in a less democratic mechanism, where the environment is used as a means for power politics: hegemonism (in the case of climate diplomacy), economic/commercial expansion (in cases of biodiversity-­related negotiations), or strengthened militarism (in maritime affairs). In the NEA, the politicization of environmental problems will continue depending on the shifting enthusiasm of the initiating parties; first initiated by Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, later by South Korea in the 2000s, and today it is China who ambitiously seeks a leadership position in a China-­led multilateralism. China will remain active in multilateral networking in the foreseeable future. If external pressure is an important factor of stimulating a society to raise green standards in Asia, optimism may gain credit, as such pressure will likely continue insomuch as China takes a more responsible role in building global environmental governance. However, at present, without coherent regionalism in the NEA (either the NEA three or six), the possibility of generating inter-­regional synergy is low in

208   Greening regional politics responding collectively to urgent environmental problems in neighboring countries (Stage IV of the REDM) beyond intra-­regional cooperation. Accordingly, in spite of each individual NEA countries’ aspirations for global reach, “regionalized” contributions to the process of global environmental regimes (Stage V of the REDM) will rarely occur. Accordingly, global participation is sporadic and global norms only vaguely cover the NEA cases. A vicious cycle continues; with insufficient input from the region, no applicable norms or policy guidelines can be produced for the region in their interactions with global regimes. When regionalism is not sufficiently used as a building bloc toward global regimes, global targets, guidelines, and norms, principles may remain abstract, only remotely relevant to the region. Conflicts are far more explicit in maritime affairs compared with the other two. This is one of the reasons that the TEMM hardly sets an agenda regarding thorny maritime problems. Government officials believe that such issues should not be on multilateral meeting agendas as these are to cooperate, not dispute. At the beginning of agenda-­setting, if there are any subjects which any of the three countries are uncomfortable with, such issues have been excluded (author’s interview). Each region may have its own historical dynamism and final goals of integration. Its evolution is based on historical and cultural contexts, and each region should have its own way of developing particular schemes with looser or tighter governance (see, for example, Hayes and Knox-­ Hayes 2014). On the other hand, ignoring relatively well-­established global environmental principles may also delay ecological development affecting all countries. Reaching a global agreement would include passive compliance, active contributions, and taking a leadership role. “The region” as a collective unit may aggravate (as a veto group) or mitigate environmental problems in global processes. The NEA is weaker at overcoming political and social/cultural barriers, whereas it is relatively more motivated to overcome economic barriers. Summary of findings: general analysis on the trends in the TEMM The TEMM does not provide the entire picture of regional cooperation, and yet still remains significant. In addition to the barriers/challenges explained in relevant chapters and summarized in Table 6.1, the following describes the summary of challenges (applicable to all three sectors: climate, biodiversity, and oceans) specifically referring to the TEMM process. As sector-­specific issues linked with the TEMM are discussed in relevant chapters, the following provides only general issues that support explanations on recent changes in the NEA three’s meetings. Regarding climate-­related processes, from the beginning, the initial purpose of the TEMM was to solve transboundary pollution issues, thus naturally it deals more with issues on climate than the rest. However, countries have not explicitly discussed any clear principles (e.g., the polluter-pays principle, the victim-­pays principle, or collective management). Biodiversity-­ related discussions often bypass regional issues beyond the NEA three, although

Greening regional politics   209 biodiversity loss caused by deforestation is one of the most critical reasons for trans-­boundary pollution. Meanwhile, ocean environmental issues are hardly mentioned. Having discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the main environmental problems related to maritime affairs (pollution, overuse, and reclamation) are closely interlinked with hardcore security. However, in any of the three countries, domestic governance (state bureaucracies and government bodies and agencies) do not reflect any attempt at policy coordination, which also somehow reflects the relatively chaotic situation in global maritime governance. Global maritime governance itself is also lacking in coordination between utilization (watercourses and resources), protection (marine ecosystem), and benefit-­ sharing (mitigating tensions). Common features of NEA cooperation based on my analysis of the TEMM process show both constraints to and opportunities for furthering cooperation. First, there is limited development in democratic governance in the way the process includes various stakeholders in important decision-­making. Only recently has TEMM mentioned multi-­stakeholder participation. [The Ministers] welcomed collaboration among various stakeholders including local governments, businesses and research institutions and encouraged to strengthen and facilitate such partnership to promote implementation of effective measures. (TEMM16 JC 2014: para. 9) All three countries put much energy into research and technological development. However, information and technology sharing among the three has been somewhat limited. Governance does not merely mean increasing the number of participants or diversifying sectors. Beyond that, not only horizontal stakeholder communication (intra-­stakeholder communication within the same-­ level players) but vertical communication (multi-­level hybrid inter-­stakeholder communication) seems equally important to ensure the outcome of the TEMM reaches society as a whole (Klinke 2012). Around the time for the annual TEMM, many side meetings are organized, however, vertical communication is hardly effectively incorporated into the process (Bell 2005; Stern 2013; Kalland and Persoon 1998; Schreurs 2002; Zhang and Barr 2013). Second, strong leadership is the key factor to initiate and implement regional agenda. Nevertheless, the overall lack of mutual recognition discourages enthusiastic leadership, often taking it as an ambitious hegemon that may be regarded as a threat to state sovereignty. One country’s strong leadership makes the other two retreat and control the pace of integrity, rather than further advance cooperation. In spite of numerous policy initiatives and frameworks that exist for transnational cooperation, similar to ones repeatedly suggested, they often duplicate work and consequently delay advancement. Climate scientists who are involved in the inter-­governmental cooperation process in this region often mention that reaching an agreement even on less significant procedural matters and approaches (collecting data, use of inventory, etc.) is difficult in practice, as

210   Greening regional politics countries take seriously which one initiated the procedure and power struggle may be involved. On the other hand, competition for taking the lead and initiative can also be interpreted as efforts for re-­institutionalization and revitalizing existing initiatives as regime theorists would view it desirable as an effort to reform institutions to find a way to make the system function more effectively. Competition over hegemony to take the leadership in the environmental field is not something to criticize as long as such motivation is ecologically leaning. It will produce more opportunities to contribute as a building bloc in the global process as Japan did during climate negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, and the Nagoya Protocol. South Korean enthusiasm to implement a state-­led green growth agenda would be another example. To some extent, the regionalization of the NEA itself is considered as a ROK-­ centered construction, since, geopolitically, the Korean peninsula is situated in the middle. This explains the reason why China puts more emphasis on trilateralism with other like-­minded countries in west or central Asia. Japan also prefers including more players from south and pacific Asia. However, the NEA has developed a certain collectivity as a region in international affairs, mainly due to the issues surrounding North Korea, the U.S. pivot, the undying Cold War, and the rest of the NEA’s various strategic interests on the Korean peninsula. Third, while the NEA countries are not particularly enthusiastic about aligning their policies with international norms, ironically, external trends dominate the regional agenda. Agenda-­setting becomes more globalized (taking into consideration global trends rather than region-­specific issues), which entails a risk of driving NEA cooperation toward a more rhetorical and abstract direction, rather than finding indigenously urgent environmental problems. Meanwhile, there is a tendency that environment-­related areas (e.g., environmental interface with finance, trade, tax reform, Foreign Direct Investment, Official Development Assistance, technological transfer) that guarantee concrete outcomes and immediate interests have more effectively been embraced by all participants. I discovered through my interviews that at the present stage of the REDM, the participating governments do not believe that at some point the TEMM could respond collectively to building global environmental governance in areas where the NEA has a comparative advantage and experience to share. Last year’s adoption of the international agreement on the Convention on Minamata would establish a model that demonstrates “how a region specific-­issue may establish a global norm,” although the entire process took more than a half a century. This represents the typical cycle of a domestic ecological modernization process: starting from the state’s negation of the existence of a risk (in the 1950s), individuals’ action and society’s collective action against pollutants (industries) and the governments (continued until recently), an increasing amount of litigation, the government and scientific community’s investigations and evidence finding efforts, the development of compensation and liability schemes, establishing a risk management regime, and finally developing a regulatory system. At the regional level, such an experience can be shared and is

Greening regional politics   211 also applicable to regions in a similar situation that in turn contributes to building a global regime with concrete binding norms. While the convention was being negotiated, the TEMM agreed on early recognition and urged action for ratification (including North Korea). The ministers welcomed the agreement of the Minamata Convention on Mercury to protect human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds at the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Prepare a Global Legally Binding Instrument on Mercury (INC5) held in January 2013, in Geneva, Switzerland. They also agreed to cooperate for the success of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries for the adoption of the convention to be held in October this year in Kumamoto and Minamata, Japan. With the objective of early entry into force of the treaty, they confirmed that they would proceed with the domestic preparations to fulfill the obligations under the treaty and make efforts to sign, and ratify, accept, or approve the treaty promptly insofar as possible. (TEMM15 JC 2013: para. 21) Another positive sign would be that the TEMM discussed a concrete aim toward adopting a common standard in the field of chemicals management. In this process, regional inputs modify and consolidate existing global standards, which in turn contribute to global environmental governance. The Ministers reviewed the outcome of the Seventh Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management held in November 2013 in Kyoto, Japan, and encouraged continuous efforts for further cooperation in the field of chemical management such as conducting joint research on ecotoxicity and sharing information on chemical risk assessment. (TEMM16 JC 2014: para.14) In this regard, institutional integration is not necessarily a precondition to make regionalism function. The NEA’s regionalism pertains to a high potential in effectively and coherently contributing to global environmental governance, including making international MEAs more regionally adaptable. Fourth, power disparity was revealed between China, and Japan and South Korea until the late 2000s, which has gradually shifted to China’s active engagement aimed at taking a leading role in cooperation. As discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, such a trend has been in China’s political interest of using multilateralism as a foreign policy tool in line with the fast development of China-­initiated regional organizations. Other countries cast a wary eye on China’s expansion in the supra-­national arena, however, as Beijing becomes an influential globalizing power state. To a greater extent, China will also need to increasingly accommodate existing norms and principles that are acceptable to international society.

212   Greening regional politics The rise of China as a global power does not mean that the region becomes less important; to the contrary, multilateralism at all levels is increasingly significant for China. With the rise of China’s interests in promoting multilateralism (“regionalizing/sinicization” of existing organizations), the level of integrity in the TEMM has increased and become more balanced among the three, thus more cooperation and competition can be expected. As I argued in Chapter 3 in the context of climate change, the TEMM has hardly paid attention to immediate neighboring countries that affect the NEA three (notably, Mongolia and the DPRK). Under the nine priority areas (adopted at the TEMM16 in 2014), ecological problems in the poorer NEA zone were not discussed. Cooperation with Mongolia was only briefly mentioned for the first time during the TEMM15 (para. 11) in 2013 encouraging cooperation. Without special attention to regional disparity, regionalism may only generate a regional version of an exploitative world economic system in which disparities can become wider. Finally, sharing financial support for cooperation has been a crucial issue. China used to be the beneficiary of a large amount of green aid that was flown in from Japan and South Korea for a decade or so, thus within the environmental sector, the past few years have witnessed a balance of leadership capacity, interests, and the level of development among the three. For example, Japan and Korea’s financial and technological contribution and China’s in-­kind contributions helped the cooperative system operate. For this reason, in the past years, China had a defensive and passive stance in dealing with trans-­boundary regional pollution issues. A predominant reasoning regarding carbon was the argument that it has been foreign firms (including Japanese and South Korean) that contributed hugely to increasing carbon emission levels. Thus, compensation should come from the original polluters (root causes). This is in line with China’s claim against traditional/historical polluters in global climate governance. However, China has developed regulatory measures to sufficiently control polluting industries within its territory, no matter whether they be foreign or domestic firms, unless deregulation is voluntarily chosen for economic gain. Another argument among policy makers in China is that if China improves environmental quality domestically, then there will be no regional environmental externalities, and regional environmental cooperation would not be necessary. Such an argument shows, overall, a relatively lower level of understanding of “supra-­national” domain of environmental issues, mixing up “regional” issues with “domestic” environmental issues (eco-­nationalism approach based on a realist view). While achieving the domestic goal of mitigation, if a country keeps producing trans-­boundary harm to neighboring countries, priorities need adjusting. In the NEA cooperation in general, China tends to believe that in terms of size, it is not comparable with its counterparts, Japan and South Korea. This somehow reflects China’s eco-­nationalism-leaning view of lacking mutual respect of sovereignty. Regardless of size, people suffer from pollution. Cooperation is not about comparing individual country’s

Greening regional politics   213 capacity but looking into the problems that domestic governments have fundamental limits in tackling effectively and sufficiently. In Chapter 1, detailed categorizations with examples provided regarding trans-­boundary environmental issues. In the coming years, the TEMM could be re-­shaped (active or less active) depending very much on China’s priority on the environment, interests in the region, and strategic use of multilateralism for comprehensive calculation. Do NEA countries still need to cooperate? In March 2016, a pair of pandas, named Aibao and Lebao, President Xi’s state gift (a leasing for scientific cooperation) arrived in South Korea (The Korea Times, “China’s living symbol of friendship arrives in Korea,” March 5, 2016). It was approximately a week before Beijing started a two year-­long hiatus in bilateralism, pressing Seoul to withdraw the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system by using trade measures. The pandas somehow temporarily masked the unforeseen tension. As an example of the use of symbolic environmental cooperation as a “soft power” diplomatic tool, it showed the coexistence of environmental cooperation and security conflicts in the NEA (and elsewhere); two important aspects of today’s inter-­governmental regional affairs. All six countries of the NEA were involved in restoring the dying Siberian tiger population, saving the endangered Amur tiger and leopard species, with the help of international governmental organizations and science groups (the category of “ecological development as a goal” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2), but experts are still deeply concerned that, with the absence of a long-­term consistent cooperative protective regime, those saved animals are put at risk of being caught by illegal networks from the poaching industry in North Korea, to trade their “products” to other Asian countries. Under severe international economic sanctions, North Korea had shown enthusiasm in participating in the collaborative protection project, which was an example of “environment for aid.” The category of “green for survival” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2. Returning to the question: “Do the NEA countries still need to continue governmental-­level cooperation for the purpose of environmental protection; for example saving tigers and leopards inhabiting border areas?,” a simple answer would be “yes, because those animals, like any other endangered species (and externalities including pollutants), are not required to possess passports to cross around their habitats in the borders of several countries in the NEA. However, the answer becomes much more complicated if one asks further ­questions such as: “Why is saving a tiger so important?” How can we measure such importance? If monetary value is less important, then how do we value animals and in terms of what? Why do governments spend more efforts to save certain species than others? In such a way, there will be a variety of different responses to the seemingly straightforward question due to wide gaps in human society fractured by

214   Greening regional politics ­ hilosophical, disciplinary, and practical divergences. Unfortunately, society has p not come up with a clear consensus on these questions. Regime theorists and neoliberal scholars who are engaged in environmental studies often stress the importance of multi-­stakeholder participation (especially with scientific groups) and wider environmental governance to resolve these problems. One example may be global whaling governance, which after all was created to attempt systematically, scientifically, and collectively answer the question: “Why should certain whaling practices be banned?” Governance itself is highly developed (the category of “regime and governance building” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2), with flourishing tangible institutions (organizations, hard and soft laws, adoption of scientific evidence), thousands of professional staff to operate the International Whaling Commission and other subsidiary bodies, organizing countless meetings, raising massive amounts of finance, and mobilizing scientists for further scientific evidence either to defend or oppose. International negotiations still continue. In this regard, the comprehensive list of conditions (e.g., well-­designed institutions, multi-­stakeholder participation, communication, and funding) to make institutions functional does not always guarantee ecological effectiveness. In terms of risks associated with climate and air pollution, in the NEA, most days in the daily life of ordinary people in major cities have seen them long been deprived of their fundamental right to breathe comfortably, and they can hardly walk around the streets without facemasks, being exposed to many unknown risks from pollutants. Asian countries are losing forests at a fast rate. Living organisms lose habitats and people lose green spaces, although they are compensated with more manufactured assets. The NEA countries are surrounded by valuable oceans but their territorial waters have become the dirtiest sink, building up the largest volume of marine litter in the world. In addition, the ocean adjacent to the NEA countries has become the spot of high-­risk military confrontation due to uncontrolled competition over a wide range of resources including natural resources. The category of “comprehensive rational calculation” or simply to seize “regional hegemonism” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2. Japan and South Korea’s fishery agreement has recently been put in a stalemate. Even if it is renewed, it will again be only temporary without a clear conclusion on the delimitation of EEZs, which involves disputes over islets. Not many people know that toxic e-­waste is piled up in poor areas in Hong Kong as storage (Lopez et al. 2011) before being shipped to the poorest areas in the world. The category of “market opportunity” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2, with an emphasis on the nature of deregulation and pollution heaven. Even each country’s high ranking officials, who have been involved in the environmental field, would still ask why the three need to spend time, efforts and resources on regional cooperation, which involves high transaction costs if resting upon environmental economists’ cost–benefit analysis. Ecosystem destruction occurs without pause and is faster than decision-­makers’ procedures of researching the most rationalized calculation for action. The question is about the widening gap between “the growing political distance among the

Greening regional politics   215 NEA nations” and “the rapidly developing ecological (both benefits and harms) proximity and interconnectivity,” resulting in immediate or latent impacts due to technological and economic interdependence. This project is limited to “regional” environmental issues. The purpose of this project was not to test the general integrationist view on the significance of regionalism, as opposed to nationalism or internationalism in solving prominent issues in IR. If concerning nationalism, the scope of this book was limited to the question: whether a regionalized approach reinforces the process of solving environmental problems (domestic or beyond) that are in nature trans-­boundary (potential and existing). Accordingly, my answer, in a nutshell, is there are no other better options than a regionalized approach to addressing a supra-­national level of environmental harm and to discussing ways of sharing benefits from the collective creation of environmental goods. I am not inclined to endorse the argument that environmentalism solves regional or international political problems (the category of “peace and security” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2). Instead, what I have argued throughout this research is that regionalism (“state-­led” or not) greatly helps in solving a wide range of urgent environmental problems that states and society are facing. Further, such region-­ wide collective action helps enlarging the overlapping sphere among “comprehensive security,” “development” and “environmentalism.” In Figure 6.1, if one frames a region emphasizing only B in case studies, no visible cooperation is happening in the NEA. This will easily lead to a jump to the conclusion that no effective regionalism has been built, and there will be no such thing as regionality in the region. It is true that cooperation in the NEA has been sporadic, fragmented, and often interrupted. I have provided a lengthy discussion on cooperative efforts (e.g., some level of institutionalization), bearing in mind that observing and writing on area A might be equally significant, although B is much more open, thus uncertain in the NEA. And yet, the region has a higher potential (and responsibility as much as traditional/ historical polluters) to reshape the process before being too late through positive construction of securitization. The category of “peace and security” in the theories of motivation is explained in Chapter 2.

Minding the gap: responding to theoretical categorization Chapter 2 provided theoretical accounts that help in understanding why countries would/should continue cooperating with increasing institutionalization in selected environmental fields, by dividing them broadly into seven categories of explanations.  A B Region ---------------------------------- ----------------------------- Successful regionalism(s) Regionalization

Figure 6.1  Regionalism as a process.

216   Greening regional politics By explaining different theoretical perspectives, the question arises: “What are the motivations for countries to continue cooperating or furthering existing cooperative schemes?” It has been found that countries’ motivations can be altered rather than being static depending on a time period, specific environmental problems at issue, domestic political pressure, social and economic circumstances, negotiation partners, and external pressure. Thus, all seven groups of theoretical explanations are somehow valid but do not neatly fit into explaining the, “Why question,” in purely theoretical terms. Then, is motivation so important? The answer can be both positive and negative. Even if the fundamental motivation is not entirely based on ecologism, participation regardless of motivation, would still be better than no participation at all, but enthusiasm may fluctuate depending on external conditions. In this sense, motivation matters to the extent that it affects the patterns (consistency and continuity), degrees (protectionism) and attitudes (vision on ecosystem) toward long-­lasting goal-­setting, in the view of building a coherent regional environmental regime. Hence, motivation may matter a great deal. Cooperation will be intensified with fewer disagreements on prioritizing issues, as ecological urgency takes priority. It is true that emphasis on security (realist) and economic development (neoliberalist) outweigh citizens’ and individual welfare (Human Rights and constructivism/securitization) in the regional politics of the NEA; and yet re-­ coupling security with environmental improvement (as seen from a good model of collaborative adaptation responses) and “decoupling economic development and environmental degradation” could well be achieved if environmentalism is imbued to all aspects of society. The democratization of decision-­making and administrative transparency may also contribute, beyond superficial content-­less institutionalization (excessive optimism on institutional bubbles), leading to a green bubble somehow created by a neoliberal approach to green marketing. At a society level, it is quite clear that domestic-­regional-global regimes and governance may actively interact and mutually reinforce each other. The degree of consolidation in each areas demonstrate that a more strengthened global regime can accelerate regional-­level regimes also. In this regard, regional regimes in the maritime field reflect a global level chaotic fragmentation compared with the other two. In some cases, regional regimes reinforce the global regime (with enriched cases of conflicts-­cooperation incorporated) (i.e., Stage V of the REDM). However, in the NEA, it has been discovered that the influence from the global level (external pressure) is a stronger driver than the “regional” one. This should also be based on the domestic development of environmentalism with multi-­level environmental securitization, which was explained as a positive politicization of environmental affairs.

Greening regional politics   217

Bridging the gap: policy implications During the period, it was also revealed that the region reacted faster and more positively when immediate economic opportunities were tangible through creating a green market. It was agreed to discuss on establishing trilateral policy dialogue and technical cooperation platform on green economy to effectively boost information sharing and green technology cooperation among the three countries, and accelerate the progress towards sustainable development. (TEMM15 JC 2013: para. 14) The three countries’ endeavor to seek new bilateral, trilateral, or quadrilateral forms of cooperation covering various aspects of regional affairs could reinforce NEA environmental cooperation if certain conditions are met. When dealing with environmental matters, if an influential party does not have a determination to raise environmental standards, and prefers further deregulation, regionalism will only serve as a tool for “downward harmonization” (forming a collective veto group) below globally-­set MEAs. Contrarily, competition over initiatives could be healthier if such efforts do not attempt at collectively lowering global standards using, for example, retrospective historical claims over developing countries’ right to pollute at least during the catch-­up time during fast industrialization. China seems in a transitory period of using its traditional foreign policy principle of “flexibility.” Meanwhile, it employs both a developed country’s tactic vis-­à-vis less least developed countries “and” a developing country’s claim vis-­à-vis developed economies in global environmental governance. In this regard, the TEMM plays a unique role providing a venue for China to play a role of a well-­developed ecologically advanced country. Thanks to China’s fast catching up with green technology (green leapfrogging) with overall green capacity, it has become an equal (even surpassing) partner with the other two partners, Japan and South Korea. Considering China’s enormous influence on the other three partners in the NEA six and other East Asian countries, in every field including environmentally sustainable development, China’s role becomes even greater in the TEMM, which potentially produces positive spillovers in order to reach Stage V of the REDM. Otherwise, increasing competition will only lead to empty institutionalization without achieving any tangible goals in environmental improvement. I mentioned opportunities for further cooperation in spite of the many challenges due to the fast-­changing dynamism of regional politics. China may have fewer reasons to cooperate due to technological development and sufficient capital, however, motivations shift since the sources of pressure change (from external to domestic). Moreover, although Japan and Russia seem less enthusiastic, countries do not usually patiently overlook other neighbors’ exclusive alliances for a long period. Again if other structural conditions are met, more and renewed motivation to cooperate may be generated (as risks also change) and such motivation can be constructed in a collective way.

218   Greening regional politics In the NEA, overall, setting agendas should be approached extremely cautiously so as not to touch upon any politically sensitive areas of cooperation. As seen in the areas of cooperation regarding the marine environment, issues are strictly limited to clean-­up without discussing any fundamental and comprehensive root causes such as land reclamation, fisheries, in-­land pollution, eco-­dumping, and so on. In this sense, security can be said to be a fundamental limit, but depending on how narrowly we define “environmental problems” among the three countries, different levels of cooperation can be expected. Clearly, to date, the TEMM’s definition of the environment is narrow, strictly confined to pollution; but this is far more open to discussion in adopting economic tools for improvement. A closer interaction between regionalism and environmental cooperation is imminent, but until today, countries have not been interacting in positive ways, thus generating many skeptical evaluations. Having examined the evolution of regional cooperation in the NEA, there are grounds both for optimism and skepticism, and motivations keep changing organically. A silver lining in the cloud The form of regionalism in the NEA is flexible but highly dynamic. Even seemingly dormant organizations at times reflect such dynamism that are a result of ambitious leadership in the environmental field, political and economic rivalry, external pressure, fast adoption of global standards, fast growing post materialism, and overall green capacity building. In the field of environmental cooperation, Japan and South Korean leadership has not been sufficient, and Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea have been rather passive. Beijing’s active engagement has been reshaping regional affairs, affecting all aspects of development in the region. Facing opportune timing, the region will need an adjusted visionary and strategic approach to environmentally sustainable development that is not separable from political security. Policy options are numerous if the region focuses on less contentious areas to begin with. The TEMM agenda has been developed to entail some concrete points where the NEA can go further in harmonization; for example, in the sectors that are immediately linked with industrial and economic growth, such as cooperation on industrial chemical standards, green construction materials, and developing eco-­tourism. Beyond that, the TEMM have already been discussing cooperative regimes dealing with urgent natural and human-­caused disasters (e.g., nuclear fallout, oil spills, chemical explosions, accidents in the process of mining, and flood control). This field has more room and reason to include all other NEA countries. Beijing has repeatedly stressed, at the occasions of the TEMM, cooperation China’s national agenda of One Belt, One Road. Taking this as an opportunity, the region can mobilize technological and regulatory knowhow to build commonly referable regional Environmental Impact Assessment Tools to apply to highly polluting, large engineering infrastructural work that will be an area of contention in the coming era.

Greening regional politics   219

Concluding remarks The most important regional characteristic of the NEA, “the development and innovate dynamism,” can be mobilized both positively and negatively, and I have discussed both sides. The feature can serve as an innovative exit from the path of dependency, but at the same time an innovative way of resisting change for the sake of higher efficiency, convenience, and material comfort, thus becoming even more path dependent. However, it has been sufficiently proven that the way the world has grown since the First Industrial Revolution and subsequent industrialization has been more disastrous than harmonious. Growth is a quantitative increase in physical dimensions; development is a qualitative improvement in non-­physical characteristics (Daly 1987). Growth dynamism in the NEA has been an important challenge that endows society with a stronger resistance to changes. A research article (Barry et al. 2013, cited from Lord Puttnam 2007) regarding climate ethics provides an interesting analogy between the conservative reluctance to adopting a new Bill (e.g., the 2007 Climate Act in the U.K.) and the nation’s resistance to abolishing the slavery trade: [the Climate Change Bill] bears a quite uncanny resemblance to another piece of legislation which also addressed what was primarily a moral issue, but one which at the time appeared to have immense economic repercussions. It was a Bill, the 200th anniversary of which we unanimously celebrated earlier this year, which led to the abolition of the slave trade. As much as aspirations for further growth in favor of efficiency and optimality become stronger in the NEA, resistance to ecological transformation will also be more robust. This explains why the NEA can achieve faster implementation of such environmental policies as green growth (primarily investment and innovation) and a green economy. At the same time, a risk may also grow for the time being with strong resistance against a fundamental green societal transformation.

References Barry, John, Arthur P. J. Molb, and Anthony R. Zitoc (2013) Climate Change Ethics, Rights, and Policies: an Introduction. Environmental Politics 22(3): 361–376 Bell, Derek R. (2005) “Liberal environmental citizenship,” in Andrew Dobson and Angel V. Saiz (eds.) Citizenship Environment Economy, pp. 179–194 (London: Routledge)  Daly, Herman E. (1987) The Economic Growth Debate: What Some Economists Have Learned But Many Have Not. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (14): 323–336 Hayes, Jarrod and Janelle Knox-­Hayes (2014) Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy. Global Environmental Politics 14(2): 82–101 Kalland, Arne and Gerard Persoon (eds.) (1998) Environmental Movements in Asia (Surrey: Curzon Press)

220   Greening regional politics Klinke, Andreas (2012) Democratizing Regional Environmental Governance: Public Deliberation and Participation in Transboundary Ecoregions. Global Environmental Politics, 12(3): 79–99 Lopez, Brenda Natalia, Yu Bon Man, Yin Ge Zhao, Jin Shu Zheng, Anna Oi Wah Leung, Jun Yao, and Ming Hung Wong (2011) Major Pollutants in Soils of Abandoned Agricultural Land Contaminated by e-­Waste Activities in Hong Kong. Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, 61: 101–111 Schreurs, Miranda A. (2002) Democratic Transition and Environmental Civil Society: Japan and South Korea Compared. The Good Society, 11(2): 57–64 Stern, Rachel E. (2013) Environmental Litigation in China: a Study in Political Ambivalence (New York: Cambridge University Press) Zhang, Joy Y. and Michael Barr (2013) Green Politics in China: Environmental Governance and State-­Society Relations (London: Pluto Press)

Annex 1

Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea Bali, Indonesia, October 7, 2003 WE, the heads of Government/State of Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea met during the ASEAN+3 Summit held in Bali, Indonesia on October 7th, 2003. We reviewed and acknowledged the positive progress in the development of our bilateral relationships and trilateral cooperation. For the further promotion and strengthening of our tripartite cooperation in the new century, we hereby issue a joint declaration as follows:

I With geographical proximity, economic complementarity, growing economic cooperation and increasing people-­to-people exchanges, the three countries have become important economic and trade partners to one another, and have continuously strengthened their coordination and cooperation in regional and international affairs. The cooperation among the three countries demonstrates the gratifying momentum for the development of their relations. Their leaders have held regular informal meetings since 1999. Their departments of various areas have established mechanisms for meetings at the ministerial, senior official and working levels. The three countries have developed fruitful and effective cooperation in priority areas such as economy and trade, information, environmental protection, human resources development and culture. The three countries have actively supported and participated in various forms of regional cooperation such as Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia-­Europe Meeting (ASEM). As a major driving force for cooperation under the 10+3 framework, the three countries have taken an active part in implementing the projects recommended by the East Asia Study Group (EASG)

222   Annex 1 Final Report, furthered Mekong sub-­regional cooperation, and made positive contributions to the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). In this context, we, the Leaders of the three countries recognized that a solid foundation has been laid for the promotion of the tripartite cooperation among Japan, China and Korea. We were convinced that advancing and deepening the tripartite cooperation will not only serve to further promote the stable development of bilateral relations between Japan-­China, Japan-­Korea and China-­Korea but also contribute to the realization of peace, stability and prosperity throughout East Asia.

II The advent of globalization and informationalization era has brought with it huge opportunities for development as well as many new challenges to all countries in the world. As important countries in Asia and the whole world, Japan, China and Korea share responsibilities to maintain regional peace and stability and promote common development for all countries. The tripartite cooperation is aimed at boosting development, strengthening East Asian cooperation and safeguarding peace and prosperity at the regional and global levels. To this end, we, the Leaders of the three countries shared the following fundamental views: 1

2

3

4

5

The tripartite cooperation will be pursued in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. On the basis of mutual trust and respect, equality and mutual benefit and with a view to securing a win-­win result for all, the three countries will seek ways to strengthen their across-­the-board and future-­oriented cooperation in a variety of areas, including economic relations and trade, investment, finance, transport, tourism, politics, security, culture, information and communication technology (ICT), science and technology and environmental protection. With the governments of the three countries being the main players in the tripartite cooperation, they will encourage business and academic communities and various non-­governmental organizations to play their parts. The tripartite cooperation is an essential part of East Asian cooperation. The three countries will, through regional cooperation in diversified forms such as ASEAN+3, continue to strengthen coordination and support the process of ASEAN integration. The three countries will promote economic cooperation and peace dialogue in Northeast Asia for the stability and prosperity in the region. The tripartite cooperation will be carried out in a transparent, open, non-­ exclusive and non-­discriminatory manner. The three countries will maintain

Annex 1   223 their respective mechanisms for cooperation with other countries so as to benefit from one another’s experience in the interests of their mutual development.

III To promote substantial progress in cooperation among our countries, we, the Leaders of Japan, China and Korea stressed the need to expand and deepen the tripartite cooperation in the following areas in a steadfast manner, starting with easier projects and gradually expanding the scope and depth of cooperation. 1

Cooperation in trade and investment. The three countries will develop economic cooperation and trade marked by mutual trust and complementarity in order to maximize the growth potentiality of all countries in the region and eventually to achieve common prosperity. The three countries will also endeavor, in consistence with related WTO rules, to strengthen coordination with a view to creating an attractive environment for trade and investment. The three countries will make joint efforts to push forward the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations with a view to improving market access and strengthening the rules in a well-­balanced manner, such as strengthening discipline on anti-­dumping. The three countries will endeavor to prevent abusive and arbitrary application of WTO rules. The three countries will strengthen dialogue and cooperation on trade facilitation among their customs and transport authorities and continue exchange and cooperation between their quality supervision, inspection and quarantine authorities through the existing channels. They also emphasize the importance of food safety and animal and plant health in trade, in conformity with relevant WTO agreements. The three countries will strengthen cooperation and protection of intellectual property rights including through the promotion of public awareness, personnel exchanges, experience sharing and law enforcement. Appreciating the progress of the joint study on the economic impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) conducted by their respective research institutes, the three countries will explore, in a timely manner, the direction of a closer future economic partnership among the three countries. To facilitate trade and investment as well as to promote exchange of people in Northeast Asia, the three countries will promote existing dialogue and cooperation with a view to developing international civil air transport among the aeronautical authorities of the three countries. The three countries recognize the importance of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) for the enhancement of each domestic economy and welcome the various efforts that have been made for the promotion of IFDI. They confirm their intention to take further steps to promote IFDI including addressing specific issues raised by their investors in a fair and

224   Annex 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

transparent manner. In this light, they will launch an informal joint study on the possible modality of trilateral investment arrangements. The three countries will make full use of the existing bilateral and trilateral consultations while strengthening exchange of information and prior consultations so as to minimize the possibility of any trade dispute. Cooperation among information and communication technology (ICT) industries. The three countries will enhance, as a priority, exchange and cooperation in broadband communications, mobile communications and e-­business. They will continue to advance high-­tech communication R&D and promote exchanges in such areas as new generation communications network and the third generation mobile communications. They will also expand the application of ICT in all sectors of society while ensuring its security. Meanwhile the three countries will seek to play a positive role in building a broadband network throughout Asia, accelerate the development of internet industry and facilitate the flow of information within Asia. Cooperation in environmental protection. The three countries will, under various frameworks such as the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM), intensify cooperation in addressing common environment concerns, such as dust and sandstorms and their monitoring and early warning, acid deposition monitoring, air, water and marine pollution, and climate change. They will also expand exchange and cooperation in green industries and technology and facilitate dialogue and cooperation on water resources management, forest conservation, reforestation and conservation of biodiversity. In order to promote sustainable development, the three countries will strengthen consultations and cooperation on major regional and global environmental issues. Cooperation in disaster prevention and management. The three countries will promote cooperation and dialogue in this field with a view to preventing or mitigating the damage from disasters such as storms, typhoons, floods and earthquakes. Cooperation in energy. The three countries will expand their mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of energy and work together to strengthen regional and global energy security. Financial cooperation. To promote financial stability in the region, the three countries will continue to strengthen dialogue on economic policies and implement the Chiang Mai Initiative. They will deepen regional financial cooperation in the future, including the exploration of the possibility of establishing a regional financing and stability mechanism and developing the regional bond market. The three countries will strengthen their cooperation and coordination in international financial institutions with a view to attaining well-­balanced economic development in the region and the Millennium Development Goals. Cooperation in science and technology. The three countries will promote and facilitate scientific and technological cooperation at various levels, including in such areas as succeeding in ITER Project, to strengthen

Annex 1   225

8

9

capacities to deal with issues of common concern and advance new technologies with a view to opening up new industry sectors. Cooperation in tourism. The three countries will further boost the tourism industry, encouraging expansion of tourism among the three countries through appropriate measures, and strengthen exchange and cooperation among tourism authorities and industries in such areas as development of tourism infrastructure and circular tours going around the three countries for residents outside of the three countries, for example, residents of Europe or North America. Cooperation in fishery resource conservation. The three countries will cooperate, bilaterally or trilaterally, to promote the sustainable use and conservation of fishery resources through effective fishery management.

IV 10 For the purpose of enhancing mutual understanding and trust and expanding diverse channels for exchanges for better trilateral cooperation in the future, the three countries will strengthen cooperation in a variety of areas, such as people-­to-people contacts, culture, education and human resources development, news media, public health and sports. The three countries will continue to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges to increase contacts among youth and young leaders. They will also vigorously develop cultural exchange and cooperation to enhance cooperation in such areas as the preservation and development of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, cultural diversity and dialogue among civilizations. The three countries will continue to support the tripartite cooperation in the field of education. They will enhance cooperation to expand student exchanges among their institutions of higher education, promote mutual institutions’ recognition of academic records, degrees and credits, and encourage language teaching and cultural exchange among the three countries. The three countries will encourage communication and cooperation among their media organizations through joint seminars or in other forms with close communication among the three governments. The three countries will expand exchange and cooperation among local governments by arranging sister cities among the three countries or by other means. For the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship among their peoples, the three countries will encourage diversified forms of exchange and cooperation among the sports communities of the three countries such as organizing football and table tennis matches.

226   Annex 1

V 11 The three countries will strengthen cooperation in international affairs and continue to support the core role of the United Nations in maintaining world peace and stability. They will promote dialogue and consultations on UN related issues, including the strengthening and reforms of the UN. 12 The three countries will make concerted efforts to press ahead with Asian regional cooperation in various forms. They will step up the process of implementing the measures put forward in the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, promote the 10+3 cooperation in the direction of East Asia cooperation, and support ASEAN’s key role in this process. They will further enhance cooperation within such mechanisms as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ), Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia-­ Europe Meeting (ASEM). 13 The three countries will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries. The three countries will strengthen exchange of views and cooperation in disarmament, as well as prevent and curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, based on international regimes, through political, diplomatic and administrative measures including effective export controls, while recognizing the importance of complying with the related international norms. The three countries reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while addressing all the concerns of the parties and working together to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula. 14 The three countries will reinforce their cooperation in preventing infectious diseases including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and combating crimes and terrorism, sea piracy, people smuggling, trafficking in illegal drugs and related crimes, money laundering, international economic crimes, cyber-­crimes and other transnational crimes through effective cooperation among their respective authorities.

VI WE, the Leaders of Japan, China and Korea shared the view that it was essential to have a wide range of channels for an effective tripartite cooperation. Accordingly, we decided to hold our summit meetings continuously. We will support the effective operation of on-­going meetings at the ministerial level in foreign affairs, economy and trade, finance, environmental protection, information and telecommunications, and patents, and endeavor to hold similar meetings in other areas. We also decided to set up a three-­party committee to

Annex 1   227 study, plan, coordinate and monitor the cooperation activities currently under way or envisaged by this Joint Declaration. The committee will submit progress reports to the annual summit meeting. WEN Jiabao Premier of the State Council People’s Republic of China KOIZUMI Junichiro Prime Minister Japan ROH Moo-­hyun President Republic of Korea Signed at Bali, Indonesia this 7th day of October 2003 in tripartite in the English language.

Annex 2

Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea Beijing, China, 10 October 2009 2009/10/10 On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of China-­Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation, we, the heads of Government/State of the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea met in Beijing, China on 10 October 2009. We reviewed the course of trilateral cooperation in the past and drew up plans for its future development. We reached the common understanding that since the launch of the trilateral cooperation in 1999, the common interests of the three countries have continuously grown, the mechanisms for dialogue have been further broadened and the cooperation in a whole range of fields has been promoted, yielding highly fruitful results. The three countries have enhanced political mutual trust through the forging of a future-­oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership. With the rapid increase in trilateral economic cooperation as well as trade and investment, the three countries have emerged as important trading partners to one another. Cultural and people-­to-people exchanges were dynamic and close, which greatly enhanced the mutual understanding and friendship among the peoples. The three countries remained committed to the development of an East Asia community based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness as a long term goal, and to regional cooperation, while maintaining increased trilateral communication and coordination on regional and international affairs. We expressed the common recognition that the achievements over the past decade proved that to reinforce cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK serves the fundamental interests of the three countries and peoples, and moreover, contributes to regional peace, stability and prosperity. In this context, the three countries also recognized the significance of the “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership” issued at the first trilateral Summit in Fukuoka, Japan.

Annex 2   229 We believe that as the world undergoes major changes and adjustments, China-­Japan-ROK cooperation will have many opportunities for development in the coming decade. We will view and approach the trilateral cooperative relationship from a strategic point of view, and will constantly aim to bring our cooperation to higher levels. We believe that mutual respect, equality, common interests, openness, transparency and respect for our diverse cultures constitute the foundation and guarantee for trilateral cooperation, and these principles should be followed in future trilateral cooperation. In the spirit of facing history squarely and advancing toward the future, the three countries will explore the potential and expand the areas of cooperation. We will push the trilateral relations forward in the direction of good-­neighborliness, mutual trust, comprehensive cooperation, mutual benefit and common development. We are convinced that this will contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity. With this in mind, we have agreed to: 1

2

3

Build up mutual trust in the political field. We will step up high-­level contacts and strategic dialogues, strengthen mutual understanding, expand common ground and build solid strategic mutual trust. We will regard one another as partners of win-­win cooperation. We will support one another’s peaceful development and regard it as an opportunity. We will respect one another’s major concerns and core interests. We will properly address sensitive issues and seek settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultation. We will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries. Deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. We will make full use of the high complementarities and great potential of the three economies and bring to higher levels our cooperation in key areas such as business, trade, finance, investment, logistics, intellectual property, customs, information, science and technology, energy conservation, environmental protection and circular economy. We will step up our efforts to develop green economy, improve the quality of economic development, oppose trade protectionism in all forms, uphold a fair, free and open global trading and investment system. We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Development Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalities. By making full use of existing fora, including ASEAN+3, EAS, APEC and G20, we will continuously inject fresh vitality into the recovery and stable development of the economy of Asia and the world. Expand people-­to-people exchanges. We will continue to conduct exchanges among all sectors of the three countries, particularly friendly youth exchanges and exchanges among universities. We will consider establishing a long-­term mechanism for youth and media exchanges, encourage academic institutions and local authorities, and promote closer

230   Annex 2

4

5

trilateral cooperation in areas such as disaster management, healthcare, tourism, human resources, education and sports. We will carry forward the spirit of peace and friendship and promote affinity among our three peoples while respecting each culture so as to enhance popular support for the stable, healthy and friendly development of the trilateral relations. Promote peace, stability and prosperity of Asia. We will further strengthen cooperation so as to promote development of regional and sub-­regional cooperation of various mechanisms such as ASEAN integration and community-­building, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. We will remain committed to dialogue and consultation and continue to work through peaceful means to pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We will make joint efforts with other parties for an early resumption of the Six-­Party Talks, so as to safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and thereby to build an Asia of peace, harmony, openness and prosperity. Actively respond to global issues. We will strengthen communication and consultation on regional and international affairs such as climate change, financial risks, energy security, public health, natural disasters, terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non-­proliferation, and UN reform. We will actively participate in reforms in the international political, economic and financial fields and join the rest of the international community to work unremittingly for global peace, development and prosperity.

Looking ahead to the next decade, we are full of confidence and hope for the consolidation of the tripartite partnership and comprehensive cooperation. We firmly believe that in keeping with the calling of the times and with the development of our three countries, cooperation among China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea will embrace an even brighter future, benefiting not only the three countries but also indeed the world.

Annex 3

A summary of the main outcome of the TEMM Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM1 (1999) Seoul, Korea

As an inauguration meeting, the ministers shared the view that the following areas of cooperation should be given priority: raising awareness that the three countries are in the same environmental community; activating information exchange; strengthening cooperation in environmental research; fostering cooperation in the field of environmental industry and on environmental technology; pursuing appropriate measures to prevent air pollution and to protect the marine environment; and strengthening cooperation on addressing global environmental issues such as biodiversity and climate change. The Ministers decided to hold the TEMM every year in turn.

TEMM2 (2000) Beijing, China

The three Ministers reaffirmed the TEMM as an important forum for fostering regional environmental cooperation and sustainable development. Shared views that they should contribute to the success of important regional and global environmental meetings, including the 4th Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (MCED), and the comprehensive review of Agenda 21 to be scheduled in 2002. The ministers also expressed their wishes to have more concrete project-style cooperation among their three countries in the priority areas. To do so, they reaffirmed their wishes to continue developing projects at working level, in particular projects to raise consciousness of the environmental community, fresh water (lake) pollution and landbased marine pollution prevention and cooperation in the field of environmental industry, about which the three countries have already initiated concept project proposals for cooperation. continued

232   Annex 3 Continued Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM3 (2001) Tokyo, Japan

Particularly on the air pollution issue, the Ministers recognized that acid deposition is a common concern among the three countries. The Ministers commended the commencement of activities of the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) on a regular basis from January 2001 and reaffirmed their intention to continue efforts to strengthen the basis of EANET and to discuss future EANET activities. They also recognized that monitoring capacity for acid deposition should be strengthened and possible ways to conduct a cooperative program. In addition, the Ministers recognized the positive role played by the Northeast Asian Subregional Programme of Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) in the field of air pollution management at an inter-governmental level. They also noted with appreciation the progress made since the 2nd TEMM with regard to the three countries’ joint research project on Longrange Transboundary Air Pollutants (LTP) and the North East Asian Centre for Environmental Data and Training (NEACEDT), and expressed their intention to continue cooperation for the further promotion of these programs.

TEMM4 (2002) Seoul, Korea

The Ministers shared the view that strengthening of TEMM organizational and financial mechanisms is important. The three Ministers observed that environmental protection will be key to shaping the course of the twenty-first century. In this vein, they anticipated that the international community will make significant efforts to achieve sustainable development. The three Ministers agreed that providing information on TEMM to other regional and global environmental meetings would prove valuable to the international environmental endeavor.

TEMM5 (2003) Beijing, China

The three Ministers are encouraged by the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of the Tripartite Cooperation among the three countries, signed by leaders of the three countries in Bali, October 2003 (see Annex 1 to this book). They also recalled the significance attached to TEMM for its leading role in the field of regional environmental cooperation by the leaders of the three countries at the 2001 Trilateral Summit. The three Ministers agreed that TEMM should play more important role for enhancing regional and global environmental cooperation in order to realize the contents of the Declaration.

TEMM6 (2004) Tokyo, Japan

The three Ministers re-emphasized their common view that TEMM was an important meeting for encouraging regional environmental cooperation and sustainable development. The Ministers noted that acid deposition is a serious problem faced by Korea, China, and Japan, and reaffirmed their commitment to promote actively the activities of the EANET and joint research on LTP. The Ministers confirmed that the three countries would continue to take concrete actions to preserve biodiversity, including the implementation of conservation action plans and the expansion of habitat networks based on the Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy.

Annex 3   233 Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM7 (2005) Seoul, Korea

The three Ministers welcomed the outline of China’s next five-year plan that clearly expresses the intention to establish an environmentally-friendly society based on the concept of scientific development. The Ministers paid attention to dust and sandstorm (DSS) issues in Northeast Asia. They recognized the necessity of capacity building for environmental management and monitoring as well as the necessity of promoting a monitoring network and information sharing of data obtained through national monitoring and related bilateral projects. They welcomed the outputs of the ADB-GEF DSS regional technical assistance (RETA) project in Northeast Asia region and agreed to make joint efforts to develop related projects to take further actions. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the result of the first expert meeting on design of regional network for Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia held in August in Tsukuba, Japan, and the adoption of the arrangement on ground monitoring and information exchange for DSS between Korea and China in June, to provide the basis for further action.

TEMM8 (2006) Beijing, China

The three Ministers welcomed the “Three Transformations for China’s Environmental Protection under the New Situation” put forward by China, “Integrated Improvement of the Environment, Economy and Society” by Japan, and “the Comprehensive National Environmental Plan” by Korea that clearly express the intention to integrate environmental protection into economic and social development. Introduced progress made on environmental policies in each country. Exchanged opinions on global environmental issues such as climate change and other environmental issues in the Northeast Asian region including dust and sandstorm as well as acid deposition. Discussion of the future course of TEMM. continued

234   Annex 3 Continued Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM9 (2007) Toyama, Japan

The Ministers exchanged opinions on global environmental issues, such as climate change and other environmental issues in the Northeast Asian region, such as dust and sandstorms as well as photochemical smog. Appreciating the initiatives, such as Low Carbon Society and noting the efforts in proposing a long-term global goal, the Ministers reiterated their support for the successful outcome of the 13th session of the COP to the UNFCCC and the 3rd MOP to the Kyoto Protocol. The Ministers noted the Declaration for Environmental Partnership in Toyama made on December 4. In this regard, they shared the view that cooperation among local governments, academia and private entities in Northeast Asia is important. During the Special Session for Dust and Sandstorm (DSS), the Ministers appreciated the outcome of the two Tripartite Directors General Meetings on DSS held in March in Korea and in September 2007 in Japan. Also, they welcomed the efforts to implement the ADB GEF DSS Regional Technical Assistance (RETA) project, which is to facilitate capacity building, and monitoring data sharing for the regional DSS monitoring in Northeast Asia. They concurred to hold the first Steering Committee to discuss important matters, such as Terms of Reference of Working Groups in Japan in January 2008, and to start joint research on DSS in a cooperative manner in order to establish the monitoring and early warning network on DSS and promote measures to mitigate DSS in the region, subject to the availability of financial resources. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to TEMM and envisioned that TEMM would play more active role in promoting regional environmental cooperation and achieving sustainable development in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, they shared the common view that TEMM could contribute to ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. In this regard, they reaffirmed that they will follow-up on the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment.

Annex 3   235 Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM10 (2008) Jeju, Korea

The Ministers welcomed the progress of information exchange on chemicals management and the outcome of the Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management among China, Japan, and Korea held in Seoul in September 2008. They recommended making continuous efforts for further cooperation in chemicals management through this dialogue, including responses to the Globally Harmonized System for Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS) among the three nations and cooperating in the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR). The Ministers welcomed the first PRTR workshop, which would be held in December, in China. They also agreed to consider the need for information-sharing among the three countries on utilizing the Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship (QSAR) and implementing the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). Three Ministers applauded the very success of Beijing Olympics and appreciated that China honored its commitment to “Green Olympics.” As host countries of Olympic Games in East Asia, tripartite countries will learn from each other, make good use of the legacy for urban environmental management and work together to promote the sustainable development of urban area in this region. In the area of marine litter, the Ministers appreciated the joint efforts made by the three countries within the framework of Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), including the progress of Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter (RAP MALI). The Ministers highlighted the importance of efforts on protecting marine environment and noted related activities, such as developing Marine Protected Area Network in the region. Concerning water management, the Ministers recognized the importance of cooperation among the three countries in conserving and managing water environment in the region. The Ministers appreciated the activities of the Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA) for providing an information platform and capacity building on water environment conservation, with the aim of strengthening governance in water environmental management through international WEPA forums and WEPA workshop.    The Ministers recognized that TEMM projects had been outcomeoriented and are being implemented effectively and efficiently. They welcomed the implementation of 2008 joint research plan of the Joint Research on Dust and Sandstorm (DSS) among Korea, China, and Japan and shared the view that the three countries should make more efforts for addressing DSS in Northeast Asia. They reaffirmed the importance of the “Tripartite Environmental Education Network (TEEN)” and noted the Asian universities network titled “ProSPER. NET” in order to find a cooperative way of Environmental Education for low carbon growth. continued

236   Annex 3 Continued Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM11 (2009) Beijing, China

The Ministers reviewed of the past ten years of TEMM, and agreed to launch environmental education programs and to implement the green growth agenda. The three Ministers reached consensus that TEMM was of vital importance in promoting regional environmental cooperation and achieving sustainable development in the Region. They also discussed direction of environmental policies in facing global financial crisis, priority areas of environmental cooperation for the three countries as well as the future role of the ministerial meeting.    The following areas are approved as priority cooperation areas in the coming five years in accordance with the new situation and our common concern: Environmental Education, Environmental Awareness and Public Participation; Climate Change (Co-benefits Approaches, Low Carbon Society, Green Growth, etc.); Biodiversity Conservation; DSS (Dust and Sandstorms); Pollution Control (Air, Water, Marine Environment, etc.); Environment-Friendly Society/3R/Sound Resource Recycle Society; Transboundary Movement of E-Waste; Sound Management of Chemicals; Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia; Environmental Industries and Technology.

TEMM12 (2010) Hokkaido, Japan

The three Ministers reconfirmed that TEMM was of vital importance in promoting regional environmental cooperation and achieving sustainable development in the Northeast Asian region. They adopted the “Tripartite Joint Action Plan on Environmental Cooperation”, and decided ten priority areas and approved as prioritized cooperation areas over the next five years. The Ministers noted the commitment made by the leaders in the Joint Statement on Sustainable Development among the three countries at the Trilateral Summit in Beijing, China in October 2009 (see Annex 2 to this book), and adopted the Tripartite Joint Action Plan on Environmental Cooperation, which states the goals and joint actions among the three countries from 2010 in the ten priority areas that were approved at TEMM11.

Annex 3   237 Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM13 (2011) Busan, Korea

The Ministers took note of huge impact of massive earthquake and tsunami in the Northeastern part of Japan in March and subsequent radioactive pollution, the Joint Communiqué contained cooperative measures, such as information sharing and capacity building with a view to preventing and overcoming environmental damage originating from such disasters. Japan expressed regret for having negatively affected Korea, as the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 resulted in a nuclear incidence and subsequently diffusion of radioactive substance. Korea suggested Japan to host workshops regarding managing radioactive substances surrounding nuclear power plants in case of accident, in order to disseminate relevant information to the international community. Minister LEE remarked that the meeting provided an important opportunity to come up with cooperative measures in order to prevent and address possible environmental damage caused by various disasters in NEA.

TEMM14 (2012) Beijing, China

The Ministers agreement on implementation of environmental labelling, and shared views on the progress of the domestic environmental policies of the three countries and discussed environmental issues including climate change, trans-boundary air pollution, such as dust and sandstorms (DSS) and environmental impacts of disasters on the basis of the lessons learnt from the Great East Japan Earthquake, also discussed the results of the TEMM forums. They welcomed Japan’s proposal to hold the Seminar on countermeasures against disasters, based on the experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake. They agreed to commend people who contributed to environmental cooperation among three countries in the TEMM15. The Ministers exchanged their views on global and regional environmental issues such as illegal transboundary movement of e-waste, biodiversity including access and benefit sharing of genetic resources (ABS), green economy, green growth and low-carbon development, cooperation on disaster response, trans-boundary air pollution, and DSS response policy, and so forth. The Ministers agreed that tripartite cooperation is essential in addressing these global and regional environmental challenges and also recognized that TEMM played an important role in promoting regional environmental cooperation in NEA. continued

238   Annex 3 Continued Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM15 (2013) Kitakyushu, Japan

The three countries agreed to newly establish a policy dialogue on air pollution (TPDAP). In addition, in light of the importance of the issue of air pollution to the sustainable development of not only Japan, China, and Korea, but to Asia as a whole, the three countries agreed to promote cooperation to further utilize existing regional programs and measures. The Ministers exchanged their views on global and regional environmental issues such as trans-boundary air pollution including PM2.5, dust and sandstorms (DSS), climate change, and biodiversity. They agreed that tripartite cooperation is essential in addressing these global and regional environmental challenges and also recognized that TEMM played an important role in promoting regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia. They agreed to continue cooperation on the control of transboundary movement of e-waste through information exchange and capacity building, etc., considering the environmental pollution and health risks caused by the unsound treatment of e-waste at the destination of trans-boundary movement. They also agreed to ensure smooth operation of the tripartite hotline to combat illegal trans-boundary movement of waste, and continuously work on the control of transboundary movement of e-waste. In view of efforts to enforce the Basel Convention, the three countries need to make good use of Basel Convention Regional Center for Asia and Pacific to provide necessary support. 

TEMM16 (2014) Daegu, Korea

The Ministers shared the concerns of the risks posed by air pollution on human health and the environment, and underscored the compelling need of tackling air pollution caused by fine particulate matters, ozone (O3), Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) and other pollutants in a prompt and effective manner. They agreed on further strengthening of joint efforts in prevention and control of air pollution in this region. The Ministers welcomed the progress made at the Working Group I (WGI) Meeting held in Incheon, Korea in November 2013 and at the Working Group II (WGII) Meeting held in Xian, China in October 2013. They also appreciated the results of the joint field survey conducted by WGII in Hulunbeier, China in July 2013. The Ministers shared the view on GCF as an important mechanism to tackle climate change and move forward to a climateresilient society. They confirmed the need to keep cooperating so as for GCF to take into its stride at an earlier time. In particular, they agreed to support the efforts of GCF in utilizing the Climate Summit 2014 scheduled to be held in New York in September 2014 as an important momentum in raising the fund. Agreement was made on identifying the nine most urgent areas of cooperation, including air quality improvement; biodiversity; chemical management and environmental emergency response; circulative management of resources/3R/transboundary movement of e-Waste; climate change response; conservation of water and marine environment; environmental education; public awareness and corporate social responsibility; rural environmental management; transition to green economy.

Annex 3   239 Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM17 (2015) Shanghai, China

The Ministers confirmed to formulate and promote trilateral joint actions such as cooperative research on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity through collaborative initiatives in international and regional platforms, such as the Satoyama Initiative, Asia-Pacific Biodiversity Observation Network (AP-BON), and East and Southeast Asia Biodiversity Information Initiative (ESABII) to deepen cooperation in the area of biodiversity conservation. The Ministers adopted and committed to steadily implement the Tripartite Joint Action Plan on Environmental Cooperation (2015–2019), to be submitted to the Trilateral Summit Meeting and which states the goals and joint actions among the three countries and in the following nine priority areas adopted at TEMM16, including Air Quality Improvement; Biodiversity; Chemical Management and Environmental Emergency Response; Circulative Management of Resources/3R/Transboundary Movement of E-Waste; Climate Change Response; Conservation of Water and Marine Environment; Environmental Education, Public Awareness and Corporate Social Responsibility; Rural Environmental Management; Transition to Green Economy.

While acknowledging the progress made by activities of the EANET TEMM18 and the LTP, the Ministers recognized the need to further expand (2016) Shizuoka, Japan and intensify the collaborative activities of these mechanisms. The three countries agreed to take concrete actions and work tirelessly to implement the Paris Agreement and underlined the need for further development of an enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement building on collective experience, in order to establish mutual trust and confidence and promote effective implementation including through reporting and review of action and support, with flexibility to developing countries that need it in light of their capacities. The Ministers confirmed to exchange information, knowledge and best practices in regard to their policies and experiences. They also recalled that the COP21 decision recognized the important role of providing incentives for emission reduction activities, including tools such as domestic policies and carbon pricing. continued

240   Annex 3 Continued Year and place

Policy outcome in the climate change field

TEMM19 (2017) Suwon, Korea

The Ministers recognized the importance of pursuing greenhouse gas mitigation through market mechanisms, and noted the three countries’ efforts in this respect including the Emission Trading Schemes being operated in Korea, the national emission trading system started in 2017 in China and the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) initiated by Japan. The Ministers welcomed the results of the Consultation Meeting on General Public Awareness held in June 2016 in Seoul, Korea in collaboration with the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS). They expressed appreciation to the TCS for supporting the arrangement of the Consultation Meeting and implementing the Trilateral Teachers’ Exchange Program on Public Awareness. The Ministers encouraged continued efforts of the three countries and TCS in implementing publication of a promotional booklet. The Ministers recognized the importance of rural environment quality improvement and took note of the ongoing domestic efforts of the three countries that are Model Region of Regional Revitalization of Japan, Eco Energy Town of Korea and Eco Village of China. They welcomed that the 2nd Tripartite Rural Environment Policy Dialogue will be held during the second half of 2017 in Japan.

Source: adapted from the summaries provided by the Japanese Ministry of Environment and the TEMM minutes. See also www.temm.org.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italics denote figures. ABC News Analysis 18 Abe, Shinzo 38, 97, 192–3 Abidjan Convention 168 access and benefit sharing (ABS) 120, 124, 143 Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) 13, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 97 acid rain 67, 80, 97 Acid Rain and Emission Reductions in Asia project 84 Action Network East Asia (ANEA) 84 Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects 71 ADB see Asian Development Bank (ADB) Africa 34 Agenda 21, 6 aid: environmental 89–90, 97, 99, 104–6, 132–3; see also Official Development Assistance (ODA) air pollution and climate change 6, 67–106, 206, 214; bilateralism 98–100; China’s increasing role 69, 102–4; civic society involvement 96–8; domestic legal frameworks 75, 75, 102–3; evolution of institutionalized regional cooperation 73–90, 90; global climate regime 37, 45–6, 48, 69–73, 73, 83, 151; inter-regional cooperation 100–1, 104; limitations on democratization of governance 96–8; politics of environmental cooperation 91–4; science community involvement 97; security and environment 94–6; theoretical perspectives 105; trash incineration 182–3; Trilateral/Tripartite Environment Ministerial Meeting

(TEMM) 67, 73–4, 76–9, 82, 83, 84–90, 90, 93, 100 anarchism 50 anthrax 134 anti-nuclear campaigns 95, 96, 97, 103 anti-war campaigns 96, 97 APEC see Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) aquaculture production 165–6 Arctic 194 arms race 17 ASEAN see Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 9, 12, 47, 100, 117 Asia 3R Conference 144 Asia Carbon Footprint Network (ACFN) 14 Asia Media International 178 Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) 37 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 9, 27, 74–5, 127, 128, 129, 151, 179; Green Supply Chain Network 11, 119, 129–30; Ocean-related Ministerial Meeting (AOMM1) 169; Virtual Centre for Environmental Technology Exchange 84 Asia Science Panel on Air and Climate 83 Asia Waste Watch 144 Asia-Europe Environment Forum 100, 128 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 9 Asian Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) 167 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 37, 74, 122, 144, 146 Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 14

242   Index Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy 15 Asia-Pacific NGO’s Environmental Conference (APNEC) 96 Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate 74 Asia-Pacific Partnership on Climate Change (APP-CC) 13 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 9, 27, 47, 92, 166, 191, 192–3; Agreement on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution 74; see also ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (ANEA) 13, 96 Australia 192 Baekdu/Changbai volcano 41, 92, 136 Balsiger, Jörg 7–8 Bangladesh 165 Barcelona Convention 168 bargaining leverage 45 Barrett, Brendan F.D. 57, 61, 70, 104 Basel Convention 143 Basic Ocean Law, Japan 165 Belgium 139 Belt and Road Initiative, China 141, 142 bilateralism 8–9, 46–7, 98–100, 145–7, 169, 190, 192–3 Bio-Bridge Initiative (BBI) 118 biodiversity and natural resources 6, 112–51, 206–7; bilateralism 145–7; China’s increasing role 137–42; civic society involvement 144; evolution of institutionalized regional cooperation 117–30; global biodiversity regime 103, 119–26, 121, 130–6, 131, 132; globalizing regionalism 147–51; security and environment 112–17, 114, 130–6; Songhua River accident 145–7; theoretical perspectives 148; trade and environment 126–30, 136–7; transboundary e-waste issues 143–5; Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) 117, 118, 119, 125–6, 129–30, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149–50 biological weapons 134 Bird Watch project, North Korea 130 birds, migratory 130 Bolivia 120 Brazil 112, 120 Brundtland Report 29 Brunei Darussalam 161

Calder, Kent 164 Cambodia 122, 134, 161, 166 Canada 112, 126 carbon capture and storage 89 carbon emissions 7, 67, 68–9, 98, 104 carbon markets 86, 89, 98, 103, 104 Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance 97 carbon taxing 103 Cartagena Convention 168 CDM mechanism 135 Changbai/Baekdu volcano 41, 92, 136 Charles, Prince of Wales 138 Chasek, Pamela S. 43, 45, 51, 72, 74–5, 124, 139, 160 chemical accidents 122, 145–7 chemical weapons 134 Chernoff, Fred 34–5 China 1–2, 5, 8–9; air pollution 75, 82–3, 90; aquaculture production 165; bilateralism 46–7, 99, 192; biodiversity 120; carbon emissions 7, 68; chemical accidents 145–7; civic society 96; coal imports 81, 113; cooperation with European Union 100; deforestation 7; desire for hegemonic leadership 36, 38–9; domestic environmental laws 75, 102–3; environmental aid 90, 97, 99, 104–6, 212; environmental crimes 138–9; environmental degradation 90, 113, 139–40; e-waste issues 143–5; financial contributions 89–90, 212; fisheries 158, 172–3, 174, 175, 184, 188, 190; fishery-imports ban 180; forests 112; global biodiversity regime and 121, 121, 125; global climate regime and 45–6, 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 83, 151; global maritime regime and 161; green industry 137–8; green investment 137–8; increasing role in environmental regimes 9, 16, 45–6, 69, 102–4, 137–42, 151, 160–1, 193–4; ivory trade 138–9; land reclamation 184, 185, 189, 190; maritime policy 164, 166, 171–2, 193–4; mercury emissions 113; North Korea’s missile testing and 187; nuclear power 81, 103, 182; One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR) 17, 141, 142, 193–4, 195, 218; policy on North Korea 16–17; politics of environmental cooperation 92; rational calculations 32, 33; relations with Russia 18–19, 99, 128–9; Sanchi oil tanker accident 177–8; shipping emissions 159; Songhua River accident 145–7; South

Index   243 China Sea and 169, 173, 174, 183, 185, 189–91; sovereignty 20; territorial disputes 184, 185–6, 189–91; THAAD system and 85, 95–6, 141–2, 213; timber imports 112; trade with North Korea 80, 136–7, 187–8; trash incineration 182–3; see also Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) China Dialogue 102 China Minmetals Corporation (CMC) 136 China-Japan Joint Committee on Environmental Conservation 15 Chinese International Friendship Cities Association (CIFCA) 167 Choi, Jae-Yong 168 Chosun Ilbo 182 CITES see Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) cities 97 civic society 43–4, 49–50, 96–8, 103, 144 classical liberal functionalism 105, 148, 196 climate change see air pollution and climate change Climate Home News 159 coal imports 81, 113 Coastal Management Centre (CMC) 167 Columbia 120 commercial liberalism 39 Commission for Environmental Cooperation 97 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 161, 165 common but differentiated responsibilities principle 82, 89 communitarianism 48, 50 Comprehensive and Progress Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) 37 Conservation International (CI) 167 constructive conflicts 19–21 constructivism 3, 41–2, 105, 135, 148, 196 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 6–7, 71, 119, 120–1, 121 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 138 Convention on Long Range Air Pollution (CLRTAP) 30

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 165 Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA) 168 Corfu Channel Case 147 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 89 Costa Rica 120 Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), Japan 167 Cox, Anthony 159 Crimea 128 cultural nationalism 42 Dalian Zhangzidao Group 138 Deep Water Horizon 177 deforestation 95, 112, 135, 138 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea see North Korea Democratic Republic of Congo 120 détente, green 40–2, 135–6 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 85, 93, 157, 185 Diplomat, The 173, 192, 193 Dispute Settlement Body, WTO 179, 180–1 Dokdo/Takeshima 157, 183, 185 DPRK see North Korea DSS Collaborative Research Group 84 dust and sandstorms (DSS) 73, 74, 80, 144 dzud 81 EABRN see East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (EABRN) EANET see Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) Earth Summit 6, 51 East and Southeast Asia Biodiversity Information Initiative (ESABII) 118 East Asia Environmental Information Express Messenger (EAEIEM) 144 East Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (EABRN) 11, 41, 84, 118 East Asian Summit (EAS) 12, 37 East Asian Summit Environmental Minister Meeting 84 East China Sea 172, 173, 184, 189 eco-centrism 31, 42 Ecological Conservation Project in Northwest China 84 ecological modernization theory 57, 61, 70, 104, 145, 170 ecologism 84, 96

244   Index eco-nationalism 34–5, 52, 58, 69, 101, 103, 149, 193, 206–7 Economist, The 138–9, 189, 194 Eco-Peace Network in East Asia 96 ecosystem services 31, 195–6 eco-tourism 130–1, 132 Ecuador 120 EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) 157, 163, 172, 174, 175, 183 Emission Trading Schemes 86, 89, 98, 103, 104 Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (ECO Asia) 84 environmental activism 96–8 environmental aid 89–90, 97, 99, 104–6, 132–3, 212; see also Official Development Assistance (ODA) environmental crimes 138–9 Environmental Goods and Services (EGS) 127 Environmental Impact Assessment Tools 218 Environmental Performance Indicator (EPI) 68 environmental philosophy 31 environmental security 17–18, 34, 53, 53, 94–6, 112–17, 114, 130–6, 156–7 environmental-governance theories 43–4 environmentalism 29, 48–53, 53; see also Regional Environmental Development Model (REDM) equitable utilization principles 147 ESCAP see United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP) 30 European Union 19, 48, 51–2, 100–1, 104, 128, 132, 142 e-waste issues 143–5, 214 extractive regimes 121–2 Exxon Valdez accident 177 Fan Changlong 185 FAO see Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Federation of Northeast Asia Environmental Culture 96 fisheries 158–9, 188, 189, 190, 214; bilateral agreements 184; fishery disputes 171–6; global fisheries regime 160, 161–4, 163, 165; imports ban 179–81; overfishing 158–9, 172, 175; trawling 173–4

flexibility 36, 59, 101 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 71, 160, 165, 168, 174 forest fires 94 France 69, 96 free trade agreements (FTAs) 96, 126, 127–8 freshwater ecosystems 157–8 Friends of the Earth Japan 144 FTAs see free trade agreements (FTAs) Fuentes-George, Kemi 125 Fukushima nuclear disaster 97, 178, 179–81 functionalist regime theory 104 Future Forest 96 Gallic, Bertrand Le 159 Gambia 131 GEF see Global Environmental Facility (GEF) General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) 165 genetic resources 120–1, 124–5 Germany 96, 113, 122, 139 GHG see greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions global biodiversity regime 103, 119–26, 121, 130–6, 131, 132 Global Climate Fund (GCF) 40 global climate regime 37, 45–6, 48, 69–73, 73, 83, 151 Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 74, 131, 144, 161 Global Environmental Politics (journal) 29–30 global fisheries regime 160, 161–4, 163, 165 Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) 40 global maritime regime 159–64, 163, 165 Global Times 195 globalism 27, 44 globalization 44 governance building 42–7, 54 governance theory 43–4 Gray, Kevin 136–7 Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) 12, 118 green aid see environmental aid Green Aid Plan 99 Green Climate Fund 71 green détente 40–2, 135–6 green growth 37–8, 39–40, 70, 129 green idealism 50 green imperialism rhetoric 103 green industry 137–8

Index   245 green investment 137–8 green movements 49–50 green parties 50 green politics 49–50 green regionalism 42, 61 green structural adjustment 47–8, 135 green supply chains 119, 129–30 green technology 102, 137–8, 151, 169 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 7, 67, 68–9, 98, 104 Greenpeace China 144 growth, green 37–8, 39–40, 70, 129 Guam 185 Guardian 178 Haas, Earnst 45 Hainan South China Sea Research Center 191 Harper, Charles 57 Harris, Paul 116 haze crisis (1997–1998) 94 hegemonism 36–9, 54, 94 Hensel 183 Hicks, C. 144 Hong Kong 20, 96, 138, 139, 188 Honolulu Declaration 129 human exceptionalism 42 human security 42, 94, 156 Hungary 131 hydroelectric-dam construction 103 ICBM see inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests ICLEI Energy-safe Cities Initiative 100 idealism, green 50 illegal poaching and trafficking 130, 138–9, 213 IMO see International Maritime Organization (IMO) imperialism rhetoric, green 103 incinerators 182–3 inclusiveness 101 India 81, 113, 120, 159, 165, 192, 193 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 165 Indonesia 94, 120, 158, 161, 165, 166 Inner Mongolia 81, 113 institutional optimism 42–7 intellectual property rights 137 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) 165 inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests 17, 114, 136, 187 intergenerational equity 147

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) 161, 165 international commons 20–1 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and Aircraft (MARPOL) 179 International Environmental Management of Enclosed Coastal Seas Center (EMECS) 167 International Fund for Agricultural Development 71 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 158, 159, 161, 179 International Ocean Institute (IOI) 167 International Partnership for the Satoyama Initiative (IPSI) 121 international relations theories 3, 27, 28–30, 170–1; see also motivations for regional environmental cooperation international sanctions, against North Korea 16, 80, 130, 132, 187–8 International Union for Conservation of Nature-Asia Regional Office (IPIECA) 167 International Whaling Commission 48, 214 INTERPOL 134 inter-regional cooperation 100–1, 104 invasive alien species 157–8 investment, green 137–8 IOC Sub-Commission for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) 167, 179 island building 184, 190 ivory trade 138–9 Jackson, Robert 52 Jangbai/Baekdu volcano 41, 92, 136 Japan 1–2, 5, 8–9, 70; air pollution 82–3; anti-nuclear campaigns 96; aquaculture production 166; bilateralism 46–7, 98–9, 192; carbon emissions 7, 68; civic society 80, 96, 97, 103; coal imports 81, 113; cooperation with European Union 100; desire for hegemonic leadership 36, 37, 38, 39; domestic environmental laws 75; environmental aid 89–90, 99, 212; environmental crimes 139; environmental degradation 113; e-waste issues 144, 145; financial contributions 89–90, 212; fisheries 159, 172, 175, 184; fishery-imports ban 179–81; global biodiversity regime and 121, 121; global climate regime and 48,

246   Index Japan continued 73; green technology 102; ivory trade 139; maritime policy 164–5, 166, 171; nuclear power 81; nuclear waste disposal 182; Official Development Assistance 99, 122; politics of environmental cooperation 92, 94; rational calculations 32, 33; rise of environmentalism 41; Sanchi oil tanker accident 178; territorial disputes 183, 185–6, 189; timber imports 112; whaling 48, 138, 171; see also Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) Japan Foundation Asia Centre 96 Japan Times, The 173, 178 Japan-ASEAN Dialogue on Environmental Cooperation 15 Japan-Korea Joint Committee on Environmental Conservation Cooperation 15 Japan-Mongolia Environmental Policy Dialogue 16 Jia Xiudong 190 Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) 89 Kacowicz, Arie M. 125–6 Kazakhstan 118 Kenis, Anneleen 28 Kenya 120, 139 Keohane, Robert O. 39, 44, 181 Kim, Byong-Ryol 169 Kim, Samuel 27 Kim, Suk Kyoon 174 Kim Jong-un 17, 38–9 Kim Soon-tae 182 Kim Young-sam 175 Kobayashi, Yuka 71 Kolmass, Michael 38, 41, 86 Kono, Taro 39 Korea see North Korea; South Korea Korea Environment Institute (KEI) 30, 167 Korea Environment Management Corporation (KOEM) 167 Korea Federation for Environmental Movement 96 Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) 144 Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology (KIOST) 167 Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) 167 Korea Times, The 178 Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) 137

Korea Zero Waste Movement Networks (KZWMN) 144 Korea-China Joint Environmental Cooperation Committee 99 Korea-Japan Environmental Cooperation Joint Committee 99 Korea-Japan River Restoration Project 96 Korean Environmental Institute (KEI) 135–6 Korean Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations (KLAFIR) 167 Korean National Environmental Technology and Information Centre 84 Korean-Japan Agreement on Joint Continental Shelf Development 169 Kütting, Gabriela 94 Kyoto Protocol 48, 69, 70, 71, 72, 135 Lac Lanoux Disputes 147 Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 141 land reclamation 184, 185, 189, 190 Laos 122, 166 Lee, Geun 182 Lee, Rensselaer 18 Lee Jong-Woon 136–7 Lee Myung Bak 70 Lee Myung-bak 39–40 Lewis, Jeffrey 187 Li Yuanchao 18 liberalism 3, 39–40, 42–3, 105, 148, 170, 196 Lievens, Matthias 28 Like-Minded Mega-diverse Countries (LMMC) 120, 124 Local Governments for Sustainability 100 localism 48 logging and timber extraction 95, 136, 138, 139–40 London Dumping Convention 179 London Oil Pollution Convention 179 Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) project 12, 83, 85, 86, 87 Low Carbon Economy initiative, EU 100 Lukin, Artyom 18 Lukin, Artyom L. 5, 176 Macao 20 Macron, Emmanuel 69 Madagascar 120 mainstreaming 126 Makarov, Rustam 128 Malaysia 94, 120, 159, 161 Manicom, James 164

Index   247 marine environment 6, 156–97, 207, 214; bilateralism 169, 190, 192–3; China’s increasing role 193–4; evolution of regional institutional development 164–71; fisheries 158–9, 160, 161–4, 163, 165, 171–6, 184, 188, 189, 190, 214; fishery disputes 171–6; fisheryimports ban 179–81; global maritime regime 159–64, 163, 165; land reclamation 184, 185, 189, 190; nuclear waste disposal 181–2; policy implications 195–7; pollution 158, 176–83; radioactive contamination 179–82; regional politics and 186–95; territorial disputes 183–6, 189–91; theoretical perspectives 196; Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) 166, 169–70, 171, 177; whaling 48, 138, 171, 214 marine litter 166, 176, 177 market-oriented emission control mechanisms 89 Marxism 48, 105, 148, 196 Mayors Climate Protection Agreement 97 Mearsheimer, John J. 37, 38 MEAs see multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) Mekong River 141 Mekong River Commission 141 mercury emissions 68, 113, 123, 134, 211 Mexico 120, 126 Middle East 34 migratory birds 130 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 68 Milne, Sarah 134 Minamata Convention on Mercury 211 mining 113 missile testing, North Korea 17, 114, 136, 187 Mongolia 1–2, 5, 8–9; air pollution 75; carbon emissions 68; chemical accidents 122; civic society 96; deforestation 7; domestic environmental laws 75; dzud 81; environmental crimes 138; environmental degradation 81, 113, 122, 123–4; farming 123; global biodiversity regime and 121, 122–4, 125; global climate regime and 73; natural resource extraction 122; Official Development Assistance 122; rational calculations 32, 33 Montreal Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 86

Montreal Guidelines 179 Moon Jae-in 17, 96, 141–2, 169 Morton, Katherine 69 motivations for regional environmental cooperation 30–53, 53, 54; ecological protection 48–53, 54; environment for survival 47–8, 54; hegemonic leadership 36–9, 54; institutional optimism 42–7; market opportunity and green growth 39–40, 54; nationalism 40–2; peace and security 40–2, 54; rational calculations 31–6, 32, 33, 54; regime and governance building 42–7, 54 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 6–7, 43, 126, 127, 138 Myanmar 122, 159, 166, 192 Na, Hang Ryeol 118, 135 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization 120–1, 124 Nairobi Convention 168 National Chemicals Management Profile, Mongolia 122–3 National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) 191 National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) 84 National Marine Biodiversity Institute of Korea (MABIK) 167 nationalism 19–20, 27, 40–2; see also econationalism natural resource sovereignty 124–5 natural resources see biodiversity and natural resources NEACEC see Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEACEC) NEASPEC see Northeast Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) neo-functionalism 105, 148, 196 neoliberalism 39–40, 43, 51, 104, 105, 126, 148, 196, 214 neo-realism 34, 35 Nepal 166 Netherlands 139 New York Times 178 NGOs see non-governmental organizations (NGOs) NIMBY-ism (Not-In-My-Backyard), statelevel 34–5, 101, 149

248   Index no appreciable harm principles 147 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 43–4, 96–8, 144 non-interventionism 27, 36, 59, 98, 101 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 96, 97, 126 North American Free Trade Agreement 96, 126 North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 162, 165 North East Asian Development Bank (NEADB) 37 North East Asian Forest Network (NEAFN) 117–18 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 161–2, 165 North Korea 1–2, 5, 8–9, 136; bilateralism 99; carbon emissions 68; climate-related disaster 80; demilitarized zone 132; domestic environmental laws 75; environmental aid 132–3; environmental crimes 138; environmental degradation 80, 113–14, 135; fisheries 175, 188, 189; global biodiversity regime and 121, 125, 130–6, 131, 132; global climate regime and 71, 73, 73; global maritime regime and 161; interKorean relations 9, 17, 80–1, 114, 118–19, 135, 188–9; international environmental cooperation 71, 130–6; international sanctions against 16, 80, 130, 132, 187–8; maritime policy 166, 188–9; missile testing 17, 114, 136, 187; nuclear power 81; nuclear weapons 95, 114, 136; politics of environmental cooperation 92; rational calculations 32, 33; regional hegemonism and 38–9; security and environment 130–6; trade with China 80, 136–7, 187–8; United States and 17, 38, 185, 187 North Pacific Fisheries Commission 164 Northeast Asia and North Pacific Environmental Forum 11, 84 Northeast Asia Clean Air Partnership (NEACAP) 13 Northeast Asian Centre for Environmental Data and Training 83 Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEACEC) 83, 96, 117, 166 Northeast Asian Forest Forum 96

Northeast Asian Institute of Capitals Cooperative 14 Northeast Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) 9, 10, 46, 83, 84–5, 96 Northeast Asian Training Center for Pollution Reduction in Coal-Fired Power Plants 83 Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) 15, 166, 167–8, 177 nuclear power 81, 95, 103, 182, 185 nuclear waste disposal 181–2 nuclear weapons 95, 114, 136 Nye, Joseph 27 Obama, Barack 141 Oberthur, Sebastian 120–1 OBOR see One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR), China Obuchi, Keizo 94 ocean environment see marine environment Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI) 167 ODA see Official Development Assistance (ODA) OECD see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Official Development Assistance (ODA) 97, 99, 122 Oh Mun Hyuk 136 Oil Spill Response (OSR) 167 oil spills 158, 177–8 One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR), China 17, 141, 142, 193–4, 195, 218 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 97, 126, 157, 158, 162, 163–4, 165, 167, 195–6 Organization for East Asian Economic Development (OEAED) 12 overfishing 158–9, 172, 175 Oye, Kenneth 181 Paige, Glenn D. 135 pandas 151, 213 Paris Agreement 69, 70–1 Park Geun Hye 35 particulate matter (PM) 67, 90–1, 96–7 Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) 166–7 peace movements 96, 97 People’s Daily Online 190

Index   249 Peru 120 Philippines 120, 159, 161, 166, 190, 191 Plastic China (documentary film) 143 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (PML) 167 PM see particulate matter (PM) poaching 130, 138–9, 213 Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management 11, 119, 211 policy implications 195–7, 217–18 policy outcomes, as green shield 102 politics, green 49–50 polluter pays principle (PPP) 82, 147, 149 pollution: marine 158, 176–83; see also air pollution and climate change population growth 7 post-structuralism 49 Pozarowska, Justyna 120–1 precautionary principle 147 ProSPER.NET 11 protective zones, North Korea 130–2 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics 17, 114, 188 Quadrilateral Meeting 192 radical ecology 48–9, 50 radioactive contamination 95, 179–82 radioactive waste 181–2 Ramsar Convention 113, 119, 131–2 Ramsar Trans-boundary Sites 131–2 rare earth minerals 122 rational calculations 31–6, 32, 33, 54 reactive state paradigm 164 realism 3, 34–6, 37 REDM see Regional Environmental Development Model (REDM) Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) 135 reforestation projects 135, 138 regime building 42–7, 54 regime theories 45, 47, 48, 104, 214 Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter (RAP MALI) 166, 177 Regional Environmental Development Model (REDM) 53–61, 56, 82, 90, 100, 101, 143, 145, 148, 191–3, 206–8 regional environmental governance theory 43–4 Regional Environmentally Sustainable Transport (EST) Forum in Asia 14 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) 161–2, 165 Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network (RSN) 168

regional hegemonism 36–9, 54, 94 regional politics approach 27–8 regional studies 3 regionalism 7–8, 9, 26–7, 29–30, 40–1, 42, 44, 46, 52, 54, 57, 101, 145, 161, 170, 215, 215; globalizing 147–51; green 42, 61 regionality 46 regionalization 26, 44, 101, 215 Reilly, James 80, 188 renewable energy generation 138 Republic of Korea see South Korea republican liberalism 39 republican realism 36, 105, 148, 196 research questions 1–7 Reuters 159 Rio Declaration 6, 46, 51, 147 river systems 157–8 ROK see South Korea Rosenberg, David 176 Russia 1–2, 5, 8–9; bilateralism 98–9, 193; carbon emissions 68; Chinese migration to 18; civic society 96; deforestation 7; domestic environmental laws 75; environmental degradation 113; financial contributions 89; fisheries 158, 175–6; forests 112; global biodiversity regime and 121; global climate regime and 48, 72, 73; maritime policy 166; nuclear power 81; nuclear waste disposal 182; rational calculations 32, 33; relations with China 18–19, 99, 128–9; Songhua River accident and 146; territorial disputes 185–6 Sanchi oil tanker accident 177–8 sanctions, against North Korea 16, 80, 130, 132, 187–8 Schreurs, Miranda 41 security: environment and 17–18, 34, 53, 53, 94–6, 112–17, 114, 130–6, 156–7; motivation for regional environmental cooperation 40–2, 54 Senegal 131 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 85, 93, 157, 185 Seoul 75, 91 Seoul Declaration on Environmental Ethics 99 Seoul Oceans Declaration 169 Shaikin, Alexander 18 shared natural resources 21 shipping emissions 159 Siberian tiger 113, 130, 138, 213 Singapore 94, 139, 161, 166

250   Index Sino-Japan Environmental Protection Cooperation Agreement 97, 99–100 Six-Party Talks 129 slave trade 219 Slovakia 131 social movements 49–50, 96 soft power 42, 151, 213 solar energy 138 Song Young-gil 17 Songhua River accident, China 145–7 South Africa 120 South China Morning Post, The 124, 140, 141, 180, 187, 189, 190, 192–3 South China Sea 169, 173, 174, 183, 185, 189–91 South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization 164 South Korea 1–2, 5, 8–9; air pollution 75, 82–3, 90–1; aquaculture production 166; bilateralism 47, 99, 193; carbon emissions 7, 68, 72; civic society 96, 97, 103; coal imports 81, 113; cooperation with European Union 100; demilitarized zone 132; desire for hegemonic leadership 37–8; domestic environmental laws 75; energy transformation 95; environmental aid 89–90, 97, 212; environmental crimes 139; environmental degradation 113; e-waste issues 144, 145; financial contributions 89–90, 212; fisheries 159, 172, 175, 184, 189; fishery-imports ban 179–81; global biodiversity regime and 121, 121; global climate regime and 72, 73; global maritime regime and 161; green détente 40; Green Growth Strategy 37–8, 39–40, 70; green technology 102; inter-Korean relations 9, 17, 80–1, 114, 118–19, 135, 188–9; maritime policy 164, 166, 172, 188–9; nuclear power 81, 95; politics of environmental cooperation 92; rational calculations 32, 33; territorial disputes 184, 185–6; THAAD system 17–18, 85, 95–6, 141–2, 213; timber imports 112; see also Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) South Korean Coast Guard 188 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization 164 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 164 sovereignty 19–20, 27, 34, 51–3, 58, 124–5, 147, 156, 183

Sri Lanka 166, 192–3 state-level NIMBY-ism (Not-In-MyBackyard) 34–5, 101, 149 Stockholm Declaration 51, 147 structural adjustment, green 47–8, 135 Study Group for a Sustainable Society (SGSS) 144 Suiseeya, Kimberly R. Marion 124 supply chains, green 119, 129–30 supranational sovereignty 51–2, 156 sustainable development 29 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 142, 150 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 167 Taiwan 20, 81, 96, 113, 138, 188 Takeshima/Dokdo 157, 183, 185 Tanzania 139 TCS see Trilateral Cooperation Summit (TCS) technological optimism 105, 148, 196 technology, green 102, 137–8, 151, 169 TEMM see Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 17–18, 85, 95–6, 141–2, 213 territorial disputes 183–6, 189–91 THAAD system see Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system Thailand 159, 161, 166 theoretical perspectives 215–16; air pollution and climate change 105; biodiversity and natural resources 148; marine environment 196 Tiberghien, Yves 41 tiger, Siberian 113, 130, 138, 213 timber extraction and logging 95, 136, 138, 139–40 timber imports 112 Timor-Leste 166 Tonghua Iron and Steel 136 TPP see Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade: China-North Korea 80, 136–7, 187–8; environment and 126–30, 136–7 trafficking, illegal 130, 138–9, 213 Trail Smelter Case 147 Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 37, 141 trans-boundary air pollution see air pollution and climate change trans-boundary e-waste issues 143–5 transboundary externalities 21

Index   251 trash incineration 182–3 trawling 173–4 Trilateral Cooperation Summit (TCS) 10, 117, 166 Trilateral Environment Ministerial Meeting (TEMM) 9, 10, 46, 217, 218; air pollution and climate change 67, 73–4, 76–9, 82, 83, 84–90, 90, 93, 100; analysis of trends 208–13; biodiversity and natural resources 117, 118, 119, 125–6, 129–30, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149–50; Joint Declaration on the Promotion of the Tripartite Cooperation 221–7; Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation 228–30; marine environment 166, 169–70, 171, 177; summary of policy outcomes 231–40 Tripartite Environmental Education Network (TEEN) 12, 83–4 Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Biodiversity 118 Tripartite Roundtable on Environmental Business 10, 119 Trump, Donald 17, 35, 37, 69, 151, 185 Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) 118, 166 Uganda 139 Ukraine 128 UNCCD see United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) UNCLOS see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) UNDP see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) UNEP see United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) UNESCO 41, 71, 118, 131, 132 UNFCCC see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) UNFSA see United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) United Kingdom 190 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 6, 51, 160 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 71, 126 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 6–7, 71, 119, 120–1, 121

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 162, 163–4, 163, 165, 165, 174, 179 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 6–7, 71, 118 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 118, 131, 132, 161, 166, 167 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 11, 74, 83, 131 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 30 United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 41, 71, 118, 131, 132 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 74, 131, 132, 134, 146, 166 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) 160, 162, 165 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 6–7, 70, 71–3, 73, 82, 131, 143 United Nations General Assembly 162 United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) 131 United Nations Security Council 188 United Nations Watercourse Convention 147 United States 37, 38, 85, 96, 112, 122, 126, 139, 141, 189–90, 192; climate change 69, 151; North Korea and 17, 38, 185, 187 Valeriano, Brandon 37, 47 VanDeveer, Stacy D. 7–8 Venezuela 120 Vienna Convention on Ozone Depletion 71 Vietnam 159, 161, 165, 166, 190 Voice of America 183, 184, 187, 189, 190 Wang, Zheng 191 Wanxiang Group 136 waste: e-waste issues 143–5, 214; nuclear waste disposal 181–2 Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA) 166 water pollution 158, 176–83 Water Pollution Control Act, China 146 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 165 whaling 48, 138, 171, 214 Wickremesinghe, Ranil 192–3

252   Index Williamson, Gavin 190 Winter Olympic Games, Pyeongchang 17, 114, 188 World Bank 112, 122 World Health Organization (WHO) 71 World Meteorological Organization 71 World Summit on Sustainable Development 150 World Trade Organization (WTO) 126, 128, 179, 180–1 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 131 Wu, Xinbo 99, 192, 193 Xi Jinping 16, 37, 39, 69, 185, 213 Xue, Guifang Julia 172

Yellow Sea 99, 158, 178, 187 Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (YSLME) project 100, 166, 167 Yokohama 97 Yonhap News Agency 17, 179, 181, 184 Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka 50–1, 55, 73, 144 Young, Oran R. 20–1, 43, 44, 45 Yu, Dapao 139–40 zero-sum based rational approach 31–6, 32, 33, 54 Zhang Hongzhou 173