National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International Politics 9789814377324

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre fo r scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focu sed on the many-faceted problems of development and moderniza· tion, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publica/ion rests exclusively with the author and his interpretalions do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication. or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS IN ASEAN Competition and Co-operation in International Politics

by

Russell H. Fifield

Occasional Paper No. 57 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1979

CONTENTS Page Preface

I:

TiiE EMERGENCE OF ASEAN The Interna tion al Climate Origins ASEAN's Decade o f Evolution (1967-77)

II :

Ill :

NATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1979 Problems o f Perceptio n, Priority and Permanence The Impact o f Decolonizatio n and o f Cold War-Detente The Natio nal Interests o f Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore a nd th e Philippines

REGIONAL INTERESTS IN 1979 Problems o f Institutio n and Integration 10 ASEAN The Impact o f the Fall o f Indochina, o f the Vietnamese Conquest o f Kampuche a, and o f Chin a's Invasion of Vietnam The Challenge o f Unity in Diversity fo r ASEAN as an Organization

IV :

PROSPECTS

A Bibliographical Note o n ASEAN Official Documentation

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1

3 6

19 19 23

25

45 45

52

62

75

81

Preface

The core problem facing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN} is the relationship of natio nal to regional interests. Competition and co-operation are two contrasting themes in ASEAN that cannot be submerged but must be recognized as facts of international life in Southeast Asia. They set definite limits to what• can be realistically achieved in regional development. The purpose o f this study is to analyse national and regional interests in the Association with an emphasis on competition and co-operation in the context of international politics. A r-egional organization like ASEAN is particularly conditioned in origins, evolution, and prospects by the international climate. In Chapter One, the emergence of ASEAN is traced in the perspective of the international environment and m terms of the organization's origins and first decade of development. Chapters Two and Three concentrate on national and regional interests in ASEAN once more in the context of politics among nations. No definite everlasting conclusions can be fonnulated on the national interests of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines as reflected in policy but sufficient data now exist t o merit some tentative efforts. At the same time, it may be a case of fools m academic gowns marching boldly in where angels fear to tread. At any rate the problems of perception, priority and pennanence in national interests are reviewed and th e impact of decolonization and of Cold War-dhente on them considered. In the chapters on regional interests, the issues o f institution and integration in ASEAN are realisticall y assessed. Special attention is given to the impact of the fall of Indochina in 1975 and o f the subsequent Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea and Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The section on regional interests concludes with a consideration of the challenge of unity in diversity for the Association as an organization. The prospects for ASEAN are analysed in the final chapter. It is easy to be critical about the record o f the Association in many respects but this criticism should be offset by a review of accomplishment in others. The spirit of ASEAN may well be its greatest asset, in the establishment of a better balance of regional and national interests. 15 June 1979

R.H.F.

1:

THE EMERGENCE OF ASEAN

The International Climate The Association of Southeast Asian Nations emerged from an international climate of crisis and change marked by events often of both regional and global significance. "Emerged" is a key word, for the year 1975 is a watershed in the evolution o f the Association from discussion to action. In the course o f that year two major developments ·· one, a bench mark in history but also a prelude to events of equal significatlce, and the other, more important in the perspective of history than a prelude to future events -- occurred in Southeast Asia. Indochina ·· first Kampuchea, then quickly South Vietnam and finally Laos -· feU under communist rule. It marked the end from Hanoi's viewpoint of a Thirty Years' War against Western dominance, centred in France and then the United States. 1 It also marked the decline of American power, prestige and influence, the extent, duration, and consequences of which could no t be predicted. The second development, Indonesia's military takeover of Portuguese Timor m December, sy mbolized the virtual completion o f formal decolonization of the W~tem empires in Southeast Asia. Only the British-pro tected sultanate of Brunei remained, but full independence in 1983 had been agreed upon by Great Britain and Brunei five years earlier. The virtual completion of formal decolonization in 1975 thus left the map o f Southeast Asia with only one dependency. Thailand, the sole independen t state before the Second World War, had been joined in only a few years by nine o thers -- the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Kampuchea, North and So uth Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore. At the same time the process o f decolonization with its various political, economic, military, cultural, and psychological dimensions would continue fo r many years.

The "periodiution" and "labdization" of the Thirty Years' War, 1945-75, Me difficult and controversial. The author believes that, from a Weatcrrn viewpoint, the Thirty Years' War can be broken down into the First lndochineae War (1946-54) fought by llo Chi Minh against the Freuch and the Second lndochineac War (1965-73) waged by Ho Chi Minh and his succ.essou againat the Auacricaus and South Vietnamese. These terms arc so used throughout tlw publication. See the autho r's "The Thirty Yean War in Indochina: A

Conceptual hamework.," A sum Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 9 (September 1977), pp. 85 7-79.

2

Against this background, ASEAN emerged in an international climate which can be characterized by multipolarity or equilibrium with respect to four major outside powers in Southeast Asia, by regionalism with regard to all the noncommunist states except Burma, and by polycentrism in communist Indochina. The U.S., the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have each their own interests and roles in Southeast Asia but all are united in opposition to the domination of the region by any of the othen. An uneasy, uneven balance of power has come into existence in the relationships o f the Big Four in the area. This multipolarity or equilibrium does not lend itself to embodiment in treaty form, and diplomacy remains th e best vehicle of policy. The ASEAN states individually and collectively relate to the major powen and to the equilibrium they represent in Southeast Asia. The development o f regionalism in the area focuses on the concept o f Southeast Asia as a region in international politics. Only within the last for ty years and only after the inputs of three wan (the Second World War and the First and Second Indochinese Wars), after the impact o f formal decolonization, and after the flourishing o f area studies with their intellectual dimension did the regional concept of Southeast Asia become ftrml y indigenous. ASEAN itself came to be the leading and most influential advocate. Within communist Southeast Asia, Indochina, polycentrism after 1975 became an important fluctuating characteristic of the international climate. After t he communist victory it was widely feared that monolithic communism directed from Hanoi would control Indochina. But historic rivalries and varying national interests between communist Kampuchea and communist Vietnam proved more influential than basic ideology, and the war between Phnom Penh and Hanoi became a living testament to polycentrism. It took a major military offensive for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to reduce Kampuchea to a client state like Laos. Polycentrism suffered a setback but the fmal verdict was not yet rendered . The communist rivalries within Indochina extended to Moscow and Peking (Beijing) who supported the Vietnamese regime and the Pol Pot leadership respectively, thus contributing in tum to the concept of polycentrism. ASEAN's relationship to the developments in Indochina represent a complex pattern of action and reaction, or move and countermove. Indeed, the Indochina connection is the most important external input in the Association.

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Origins In a book, Southeast Asia in United States Policy, published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1963, the author called for an Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. Near the conclusion of the inaugural meeting of the Association on 8 August 1967, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, as chairman, presented to the head of the Indonesian Delegation, Adam Malik, a memento calling attention to the author's services to ASEAN, ''the name of which was suggested by him".2 The professor's terminology was quickly forgotten, but ASEAN ·· with the creation of the Association ·· became in time a common expression in international politics. ASEAN has two direct antecedents -- the Association of Southeast Asia or ASA (1961 -67) and Maphilindo (1963). On the drawing board in late 1966 was the Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC). The idea of regional co-operation among the states of Southeast Asia dates from the early independence years and several abortive schemes were presented but ASA put considerable stress o n its indigenous foundations. ASA o riginated in 1959 when the then Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunk.u Abdul Rhaman, visited Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines in Manila. Although bo th men had expressed interest in regionalism, the Tunku was more active in promo ting the effort. After the Manila meeting, he started to circulate a plan fo r a regional o rganizatio n in Southeast Asia. Apart from the Philippines, only Thailand showed genuine interest, and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman became active in draft proposals for the new organization. A comparison of the main features o f the Thai, Philippine, and Malayan suggestions indicates, despite some difference of o pinion, common denominators uniting them. Thailand, ho wever, was particularly disappointed over the poor response of most Southeast Asian states to membership (North Vietnam was not invited), but in the end decided to be a participant in the new organization. ASA, embracing only Malaya, th e Philippines, and Thailand, was created on 31 July 1961, through the simple instrument of th e Bangkok Declaration approved by the Prime Minister of Malaya and the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines.

2 Association of South fait Asian Nations, Firat Ministerial Meeting, Bangsaen, Bangkok, 5-8 August 196 7, p. 24. Official documentation uses "Sout h-East", "South East ", and "Southeast" Aaia.

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The Bangkok Declaration stated clearly that ASA was "essentially a free association" of Southeast Asian countries to promote well-being and progress in the economic, social, and cultural fields in the region through joint endeavour. It stated that the organization was "in no way" associated with any external power or power bloc and was not directed against any other country. ASA's machinery was relatively simple; it included a yearly meeting of foreign ministers, a standing committee to consult on policy when the former were not meeting, national secretariats, and three permanent committees of experts in the socio· cultural, the economic, and the technical co-operation and research fields. The brief history of the subregional Association indicates the dependence of international organization in Southeast Asia on good relations between member states. The Philippines and Malaysia suspended diplomatic relations in 1963 when their dispute over North Borneo or Sabah reached fever pitch. It was not until 1966 when relations improved that ASA emerged from its doldrums and was revived. A meeting of foreign ministers was held in the summer of that year but events again soon overtook the organization. With ASEAN's formal creation a year later, the members of ASA decided to phase out their association but agreed to do this slowly as the new organization became capable of implementing ASA projects. What was the legacy of ASA? In the first place, it had not been given much time to prove itself. Even so, during the initial period of its existence, more pragmatic ideas emerged over the months on what could be accomplished, and Malayans, Filipinos, and Thais gained some important experience in co-operating with one another. Noticeable was the creation of the US$3 million ASA Fund (US$1 million for each member) whose purpose was to support joint research projects. Much of the effort of ASA came to focus on economic co-operation although rhetoric was extensive and accomplishment relatively little. In perspective, the most important legacy of ASA is probably the experience in co-operation it gave to ASEAN, experience which enabled the successor organization to move ahead somewhat faster than otherwise. Maphilindo, a loose organization of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, was very close to being stillborn at its very birth in 1963. It attracted much attention in the news media because of the meeting in Manila in the summer of the flamb oyant President Sukarno, the volatile Prime Minister Rahman, and the free-wheeling President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines and the possibility, illusory though it was, of a Malay Confederation embracing the large areas of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya.

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In the final analysis, Maphilindo was the consequence of IndonesianMalayan confrontation ·Over the planned incorporation of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia and o f the claim of the Philippines to North Borneo. President Macapagal had requested in early 1962 a ·study from the University of the Philippines o n the concept of a Greater Malaya. He was motivated in finding a way to sidetrack the planned federation o f Malaysia and to keep open as best as possible his claim to North Borneo. The study group at the University of the Philippines supported the President's interest in a Greater Malaya and recommended a confederation of the Philippines and Malaya. With Jakarta's confrontatio n o f Kuala Lumpur beginning in early 1963 over the planned creation of Malaysia, President Macapagal was interested in a broader version from his study group. A new plan, later kno wn as the Greater Malayan Confederation, embraced Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. With few changes, this "Macapagal Plan" emerged at the summit as Maphilindo. Sukamo backed it as a means o f encouraging President Macapagal in an anti-Kuala Lumpur policy and as part of Indonesia's confrontatio n with Malaya. The Tunku supported Maphilindo in an effort to appease his Malay colleagues. The summit of the three Malay "brothers" produced three key documents -- the Manila Accord actually reached in June by senior ministers but accepted by the three chief executives on 3I July, and the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement, bo th approved by the three leaders on 5 August. Essentially, at the summit Indo nesia and the Philippines agreed to welcome Malaysia if the Secretary ~neral o f the United Natio ns "ascertained" that the people o f Sarawak and No rth Borneo favo ured it. Also, the leaders agreed that the incorporation of North Borneo into the federation of Malaysia would not prejudice the right of Manila to pursue its claim to the territory . The creation of Maphilindo with its planned machinery for consultation was widely hailed at that time as a major development in the international relations o f Southeast Asia. Certain aspects o f the Manila Accord and of the J o int Statement attracted special attention. In the fo rmer the three countries proclaimed tha t they shared a "primary responsibility" to maintain the stability and security o f the area "from subversion in any form or manifestatio n" and in the latter they stated that foreign bases were "tempo rary in nature" and should not be employc:d " direc tly o r indirectly" to subvert the independence o f any one of them. T he influence o f Indonesia, especially in the drafting o f the Manila Declaration and J o int Statement, was clear while the willingness o f the Philippines and Malaya to go alo ng was evident. The final plenary session was ironically held in Luna Hall against a huge painting called the "Spoilarium".

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After the establishment of Malaysia with the inclusion of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore in September, Maphilindo for all practical purposes collapsed. Diplomatic relations were broken between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Sukarno intensified his confrontation under a "crush Malaysia" campaign. Manila, with diplomatic relations suspended with Kuala Lumpur, closely collaborated with Jakarta for a while. What was the legacy of Maphilindo? In the first place it weakened for a period the interests of Malaysia in regional co-operation (in the framework of Maphilindo more than of ASA). The Tunku believed he had burned his fingers and did not want to ex pose himself to further pain inflicted by Indonesia or the Philippines. On the other hand, Maphilindo did represent a brief change for Indonesia from stress on Afro-Asian co-operation to emphasis on regional association. It also pointed up the great importance of Jakarta to regionalism in Southeast Asia. Finally, Maphilindo illustrated the pitfalls to avoid in regional co-operation. The failure of the procommunist coup. in Indonesia in the early fall of 1965 and the decline in the power and influence of Sukarno were major considerations in the shift of Jakarta's foreign policy. Under General Suharto and Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Indonesia began to stress regional co-operation. Confrontation, for instance, was formally ended in talks with Malaysia in Bangkok during June 1966, held under the auspices of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. In the discussions the three countries considered regional co-operation in the future. But the reactions in Kuala Lumpur itself and Manila were not enthusiastic at the time while General Suharto had not yet consolidated his power base at home. In late 1966 Thanat Khoman sent to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines a draft proposal which became known as the Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC). Basically a combined ThaiIndonesian proposal, it embodied in essence the style of Maphilindo and the purposes of ASA. It became, in final version, ASEAN, a new regional organization, with ASA as the basic model. At long last the greater part of Southeast Asia over five-sixths of the land area and about four-fifths of the population -- was associated in a truly regional organization of marked potential.

ASEAN's Decade of Evolution, I967-77 ASEAN was created by a single joint declaration in Bangkok on 8 August

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196 7, signed by five ministers from Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. If brevity is a virtue, ASEAN merits an award, for the Bangkok or ASEAN Declaration can be quickly read with its preamble and operative articles succinctly expressed. Indeed, two of the items in the preamble on " primary responsibility" and on foreign bases are quite similar to those found in the Manila Accord and Joint Statement. Among the purposes reflecting the influence o f ASA is co-operation in the economic, cultural, and social, as well as the technical, administrative, and scientific fields. In fact, most of the purposes relate to co-operation meeting development needs. Both ASEAN and ASA, it should be noted, call for promoting Southeast Asian studies. The machinery envisioned by ASEAN in the Declaration is patterned on that of ASA. All states in the region accepting the aims, purposes, and principles of ASEAN are eligible for participation. In accelerating "economic growth, social progress, and cultural devdopment" in the area through joint endeavour, ASEAN hopes to strengthen the foundations for a peaceful, stable and prosperous community. The promotion of regional peace and the role of the rule of law are also stressed. It is noticeable that military co-operation is not included, and the only reference in the military field is to foreign bases. Also significant is the absence of the word democracy, indicating that political orientation is not at the forefront. On the other hand, numerous references are made to Southeast Asia as a region; "ties of history and culture", "existing bonds", "mutual interests", and "common problems" are mentioned ; and ASEAN is specifically tenned an "Association for Regional Cooperation". ASEAN is not a confederation, not to mention a federation, but simply an organization o f sovereign states preserving their "national identities", all equal partners with no leaders (in theory), freely associating with one another. The Bangkok Declaration does not have the binding effect of a treaty like the charter of the United Nations, and ASEAN itself is not legally able to make one. In fact , as o f 1979 the members of the Association had concluded only one treaty among themselves. ASEAN, by its very frame of reference and particularly by the character of its evolution, is an organization that calls for decisions at a high level at rather frequent intervals. In this sense, it is clearly political and cannot escape the vicissitudes o f the political climate in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the practice

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developed for the Foreign Ministers to meet periodically to consider international developments affecting the area. A number of other regional organizations involving Southeast Asia partly or exclusively are of a nature where high-level decisionmaking is not often needed, for bureaucrats and technicians can handle most of the problems as they arise. The reasons each of the five states agreed to partnership in ASEAN merit consideration. For Indonesia, membership was the greatest break with the past; Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines were continuing their co-operation in a new format; and Singapore had become an independent state only in 1965 and was establishing precedents. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who with his Thai counterpart, Thanat Khoman, particularly deserves recognition among the founders of the Association (if it meets its goals or a substantial part of them), has indicated that Indonesia was motivated by the precedent of Maphilindo, the facts of geography, and the pressures that are exerted by economic problems threatening in the enti the security of Southeast Asia. In addition, General Suharto was a pragmatist opposed to adventures abroad, and he, like Adam Malik, believed that Jakarta must give considerable priority to the region of which Indonesia was a key part. Sukarno's Afro-Asian and confrontation politics had failed; regional co-operation Furthermore, ASEAN could play a role in economic might pay dividends. development at the national level, a major objective of the Suharto regime. Indonesia also thought that active participation in a regional organization in Southeast Asia that was not associated with any power bloc could hdp Jakarta pursue its foreign policy of nonalignment between the Western alliance and the communist states. It could also provide an opportunity for Indonesian leadership in regional affairs although this aspect was not publicly trumpeted. Thailand's decision to support ASEAN reflected its basic interests in Southeast Asian regionalism. Bangkok backed many Asian co-operative endeavours and was the headquarters for several of them . Thanat Khoman proved himself an exponent of traditional Thai diplomatic skill through his role in trying to settle Malaysian-lndonesian and Malaysian·Philippine difficulties. In the international context of 1967, Bangkok was also eager to see the emergence of a strong Southeast Asian regional grouping as some kind of a counterweight to the Thai-American alliance. With a noncolonial tradition of independence, Thailand becomes concerned when it fears the country is leaning too heavily on an external major power. Although national security was not an immediate

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consideration in Bangkok's decision to JOm ASEAN, the Thais were well aware of their location in m ainland Southeast Asia, with Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea) to the east under communist pressure and Burma to the west facing communist aubversion. The Second Indochinese War was raging, the outcome was uncertain, and Bangkok was deeply involved in supporting the American war effort. Thanat Khoman believed that Western military presence in Southeast Asia was not permanent and that the Asians should fill the "vacuum". ASEAN might in time become a power base of its own and thus strengthen Thailand. Th e Republic of Singapore, only two years and one day old when ASEAN was created, was not so sympath etic to membership as Indonesia and Thailand. In the original SEAARC proposal in December 1966 Singapore was not included, but it soon became clear the republic would be welcome. Economic advantage is a major consideration in Singaporean participation. In 1975, for instance, onethird of the island republic's total trade was with ASEAN members. Without the benefit of the regional organizati_on the same trade figure might well have existed, but the prospects o f economic co-operation cannot be ignored. Singapore's flexibility about ASEAN m embership was limited when Indonesia and Malaysia decided to join. Participation in an organization that also includes Thailand and the Philippines can give Singapore more diplomatic manoeuvrability with Indonesia and Malaysia. Furtherm ore, a peaceful environment in Southeast Asia conducive to business fostered by A.S.EAN is very much in Singapore's interest. Malaysia was quite reluctant to join ASEAN' The Tunku's basic attitude was that ASA should be enlarged with the membership of Indonesia and Singapore. Jakarta, however, was very much opposed to partnership in an enlarged ASA; only a new organization was acceptable. In the end the urging of Thailand was influential in the decision of Malaysia to join ASEAN. Also, many leaders in the foreign ministry of Kuala Lumpur believed that Malaysia could not stand aloof from the trends in the international relations of Southeast Asia. They were convinced that Indonesia's membership in ASEAN would be a major development beneficial to ties with Malaysia and to the region as a whole. The Philippines, like Malaysia, was a reluc tant member of ASEAN . President Ferdinand E. Marcos was not an architect of the Association. He was well aware that two of his predecessors had played important roles in the creation of regional organizations in Southeast Asia -- Garcia in ASA and Macapagal in Maphilindo. Marcos also did not want to be closely identified in foreign policy with his immediate predecessor in .Malacaii,ang, President Macapagal. In the context of

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Philippine-American relations in 1967 it is also likely t hat Marcos was opposed to including a statement in ASEAN that "arrangements of collective defense" should not be employed for the particular benefit of any big power. The provision appeared in the SEAARC proposal of December 1966 but not in the final declaration of ASEAN. Finally, like Malaysia, the Philippines was sympathetic to ASA, believing that the organization merited support. In the end Manila went along with the creation of the new regional association in order to be more identified with Southeast Asia and for possible economic gains. Of the participants, its commitment in 1967 was the most questionable. The first decade of ASEAN was a period of testing. It may be divided for convenience into the period, 1967-75, when ASEAN was trying to establish itself and when for a while broken relations existed between two of its members, and the period, 1976-77, after the fall of Indochina to communism when suinmit diplomacy was the main characteristic. In long range terms the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971 may possibly be of increasing significance. Eight regular ministerial meetings were held in 1967-75, with none in 1970, the rotation of the annual meetings being in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. A comparison of the objectives in the Bangkok Declaration with the decisions reached at the ministerial meetings is revealing. Likewise noteworthy is the number of recommendations in the Annual Report and the number implemented. As the first meeting focused on the drafting of the Declaration, the ones held in the early years thereafter might be expected to be very fruitful. But the enmity between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah in 1968 and 1969 practically brought the work of ASEAN to a standstill from October 1968 through May 1969. A number of characteristics emerge from an analysis of the meetings. Even apart from the disrupting impact of the Sabah issue, for a while all of the first five years of the Association were particularly thin in achievement. In 1969 a joint ASEAN Fund was set up, with US$1 million from each member to fmance joint projects approved by the Foreign Ministers. Probably the greatest accomplishment of ASEAN was a better comprehension of the problems each member had faced. Consensus among the five partners was at a premium in consulting and planning, a consideration not conducive to action. During the next three years, particularly in 1974 and 1975, the ministerial conferences put more stress on achievement. In 1974, against a record of continuous concern, a definite attempt was made to strengthen the structural as well as the procedural aspects of ASEAN.

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In May 197 5, with a background of momentous events in Indochina, the decisions of the Ministerial Conference reflected the conviction that ASEAN must speed economic co-operation in terms o f real achievements, as a means of bolstering national resilience. In another direction, the Ministers signed an agreement to facilitate th e search for ships in distress and to rescue survivors of ship accidents, having made one relative to aircraft in April 1972. Although co-operation in trade and industry had long occupied the Association, nothing really significant resulted in the last years before the Bali summit. Too muc h progress in ASEAN with its rule of unanimity was nonessential. The number of recommendations in the Annual Report was impressive, but the implementation had lagged and the recommendations themselves often had little significance. In certain affairs outside the region, ASEAN had become a recognized entity - relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and with the Geneva Multilateral Trade Negotiations. ASEAN contacts with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada had been initiated and would later be more fruitful. At the United Nations, the members of the Association had taken similar stands on certain issues but there was no voice of ASEAN itself. The Association in the early yean, by stressing economic and social matters, avoided political questions that were divisive to a large ex tent. Yet in the cold dawn of reality the reasons for ASEAN co-operation, especially as it expanded in scope and influence, were political. Thus the rationale of the Association as a nonpolitical organization was increasingly no t really valid. Politics just cannot be separated from economics. The role o f the states of Indochina m ASEAN was from the very beginning controversial. Before the success of the communists there, the Kingdom of Laos and the Khmer Republic participated as observers in a number o f the public sessions of the ministerial meetings as guests of the host government, but the Republic o f Vietnam ceased to send an observer after 19 71. Burma and the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam , though often invited by the hos t country of the Ministerial Meeting, never accepted the invitation. Burma's basic policy towards regional co-operation m general and ASEAN m particular under General Ne Win called for bilateral ties with neighbours and with participants of international organizations or power groupings but not membership in them. It can be claimed that friendly relations with the partners of ASEAN in effect linked Rangoon to the Association but Burma did not view

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it that way. Although Ne Win wished ASEAN well he saw no inducements sufficiently strong for joining it. Rangoon does give support to a number of organizations, like the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP}, that include Southeast Asia. Yet there is a fundamental conviction that Burma should concentrate on home problems, and that some regional organizations are the products of powers outside the area. The disrupting impact of the Sabah issue between Kuala Lumpur and Manila in the early years of ASEAN merits particular attention. How the controversy was shelved was significant in the most serious dispute between two partners in the Association to date. After diplomatic relations were resumed between Malaysia and the Philippines in 1966, it was widely believed that the question of sovereignty over Sabah had been defused for good. But in early 1968, Kuala Lumpur accused Manila of threatening Malaysia's security by training infiltrators in Corregidor to operate in Sabah. Manila maintained that the subject was domestic. An impasse was reached on the issue and relations continued to deteriorate. Malaysia was particularly disturbed when the Congress of the Philippines passed a bill that defined the territorial boundaries of the republic to include Sabah. By late November the two partners in ASEAN had withdrawn their diplomatic missions in each other's capital. The 1968 Ministerial Meeting of the Association in Indonesia had occurred as planned in August. Malaysia and the Philippines supported Indonesia's call for a "cooling-off period". But during an ASEAN sponsored conference in Manila soon after, the Philippines questioned the competence or authority of the delegation from Malaysia to represent Sabah. An angry Kuala Lumpur announced Malaysia would not attend further meetings of ASEAN until -the Philippine reservation was withdrawn. As a result of the serious impasse, diplomats from various ASEAN members, especially Adam Malik and Thanat Khoman, tried to preserve the newly formed organization. Although ASEAN efforts launched in December failed, diplomatic attempts continued, and Manila in the spring of 1969 agreed not to invoke the controversial reservation at an ASEAN meeting planned in May. Kuala Lumpur agreed to attend!. At the third Ministerial Meeting of the Association, convened in Malaysia in Decembet:, Manila and Kuala Lumpur, significantly in an ASEAN context, resumed diplomatic relations. The Association had survived a major crisis and was not permanently damaged. Another regional quarrel, one between Indonesia and Singapore in late 1968, also threatened to have serious consequences for ASEAN. Fortunately

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the controversy was quickly defused. On 17 October Singapore had executed two Indonesian marines who had been convicted of sabotage committed in 1965 while confrontation was under way. Despite appeals from President Suharto and Malaysian leaders, Singapore had declined to reconsider the death penalty. Angry protests erupted in Indonesia, the Singaporean embassy in Jakarta was destroyed, and President Suharto had the marines buried with full military honours. Foreign Minister Malik regretted that the executions had occurred, tried to deemphasize the incident, and called for good relations with Singapore. S. Rajaratnam, Singapor~·s Foreign Minister , also remained calm in the crisis. President Suharto limited trade with Singapore but he was basically restrained in his attitude, and the restriction s were lifted within two weeks. Relations between the two neighbours soon improved. The potential for conflict between ASEAN members will exist for a long tim;>. Perhaps it is surprising that not more disputes reached boiling point in the first decade o f the organization . The constructive role of ASEAN in the controversy between the Philippines and Malaysia hopefully set a precedent for the future. In another field o f activity, representatives of the five members of the Association at a " political" gathering signed on 27 November 1971 the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, a possible blueprint of the future.3 The names of the signato ries, Adam Malik , Thanat Khoman, Carlos P. Romulo, S. Rajaratnam, and Tun Abdul Razak o f Malaysia, should be stressed; with the exception of the Philippine foreign minister, they had also signed the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. As Romulo became fo reign secretary early in the history of ASEAN, the men who signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration constituted a group of individuals who had come to know one ano th,e r and to work together in the ASEAN context. This backgro und of continuity in leadership ·· so important in th e formative years of an international organiz ation - is an input of significance in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Reduced to fundamentals, the five leaders agreed th at the "neutralization o f Southeast Asia" was a " desirable objective" and that they should "explore ways and means" o f realizing it. They proceeded to state that their five countries were "determined to exert initially necessary efforts" to bring about the " recognition o f, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality " , one that was free from interference in "any form or manner" by

5 Text in Malaysian Digest, SO November 1971 , Vol. 5 , No. 21, p. 4 .

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outside powers. (It came to be called ZOPFAN.) At the same time the five leaders stated that countries in Southeast Asia should make "concerted efforts" to widen areas of co-operation contributing to "strength, solidarity and closer relationship ". Reflecting very defmitdy Malaysian initiative, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was easier to state than implement. Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak at a press conference shortly after the signing indicated all the other countries in Southeast Asia would be approached to commit themselves to the principle of neutrality, and then the big powers, especially China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, would be approached to guarantee the neutrality. (The press reported the word guarantee; the Prime Minister at a plenary ASEAN session said " recognise and respect".) Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, Tun Razak hoped, would help ensure peace and stability. The Prime Minister believed that, when the big powers accepted neutralization, military bases and alliances would be phased ou t of existence. Furthermore, no security pact among the states of Southeast Asia would be necessary. It was clear from the statements Tun Razak made at the press conference and at a plenary session of ASEAN as well as from the varying statements of his four colleagues at the latter meeting that much work remained before the aspirations of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration could be translated into reality. Terms like neutrality and neutralization were tossed around as though they were synonymous. In order to make the Declaration effective, agreement would have to be reached not only among the five members of ASEAN but also with Kampuchea, Laos, North and South Vietnam (at the time), and Burma in Southeast Asia as well as with China, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and possibly other states like Japan. With a war raging in Indochina and with the competition among major outside powers in Southeast Asia, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was Olympian in scope. But the future might offer better opportunities. The PRC had very recently been seated in the United Nations and President Richard M. Nixon's trip to Peking was then impending. By the end of 1977, however, if not before, Malaysia for all practical purposes had given up the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as a pillar of foreign policy. But events in the communist world would revive the quest. The partners in ASEAN made progress in defining neutrality though they still did not agree on the presence of the major external powers. " Recognise and respect" had in effect replaced guarantee as the formula for their association with

15

the principles of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Indochina, whether divided between three noncommunist states and one communist state in the early years of the Declaration or just communist countries after 1975, was no t sympathetic. Nor was Burma. In th e summer of 1978, however, Hanoi supported by Vientiane would actively campaign for a variation of ASEAN's ZOPF AN. Phnom Penh, on the other hand, would not th en qualify its backing. Among the major external powers th e PRC first gave qualified and then real support. Moscow backed Hanoi's shift, and Washington favoured the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in principle and over the long term. Japan was silent. Exactly how ZOP FAN could become a reality remained elusive. T he dip lomacy of tht· summits m 1976 and 1977 marked the last two y ears o f ASEJ\.N's first decade. In fact, the latter part of 1975 was largely spent in preparing for the first summit. In early February 1976 the Foreign Ministers met to make final preparations for the conference of heads of government. The discussions o f thc: former were important, and different viewpoints on the future direc tion of ASEAN were clearly present. In the pleasant su rroundings o f Bali, on 23-24 February, Prt'sidents Suharto and Ferdinand E. Marcos an d Prime M.inisters Lee Kuan Yew o f Singapore, Da tuk Hussein Onn of Malaysia, and Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand with their advisers conferred on the problems of the Association. In the background was a communist Lndochina, with the regional objectives of Vietnam very much a subject of concern. Different approaches among the ASEAN powers on how to deal with the new Indoc hina werc: evident. The leaders at the summit agreed that economic rather than military co·opc:ra tiun was the key to stability in the region. Swift economic develo pment, it was widely believed , was necessary to cope with subversion. At the same time the d ocumentation o f thc Bali summit reveals much more public attention to political and security matters than usual, certainly more th an the la ter Kuala Lumpur summit. The chief ext:c utiVt:s signed thl' Treaty o f Am ity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, setting up a permanent High Council o f ministerial representatives from the fiv e countric:s " to se ttle di:.p utes through regional processes". The High Council could " take cognizance " of a dispute or a situation likely to disturb the peact: of the region and .. recommend " to the disputing parties "appropriate means of settlement" like good o ffict:s, inquiry, mediation or conciliation. Upon agreement of the contt:stants, the High Council could constitute itself as a committee of inquiry, conciliation, or mediation (arbitration is no t mentioned).

All parties to a dispute,

16

not just one, it was stressed, must agree before the application of the provisions just mentioned. The treaty was open to accession by other Southeast Asian states. The ASEAN powers viewed it as a step towards the realization of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on zonal neutrality. Another step in organization was taken at the summit when the Foreign Ministers signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. A Programme of Action was adopted in Bali by the heads of government m the Declaration of ASEAN Accord, widely heralded as one of the key agreements m the history of the Association. The six headings of the Bali Declaration are significant -- political, economic, social, cultural and information, security, and improvement of ASEAN machinery. In the "pursuit of political stability" each member was resolved to end threats of subversion to its own stability and thus to strengthen "national and ASEAN resilience", and all members would vigorously develop "regional identity" and a "strong ASEAN community" respected by all states and respecting all countries in accordance with sovereign equality, mutually advantageous relations, and noninterference in internal affairs (read Indochina) . In vague but not surprising terms under the political heading of the Programme of Action, the Bali Declaration called for consideration at once of "initial steps" in the direction of "recognition of and respect for" Southeast Asia as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible". The qualifying words relative to zonal neutrality revealed the continuing difficulties in implementing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. Under the economic heading, limited steps only towards the concept of a free trade area were taken. What were called for were industrial co-operation with the establishment of ASEAN plants meeting regional requirements in key commodities, co-operation in trade towards setting up preferential arrangements as a long term goal with step by step measures, co-operation on basic commodities especially food and energy and the strengthening of the joint efforts in improving markets outside ASEAN and the giving of pri ority in joint efforts in world commodity problems and other economic ones of a global nature. In the social category, suggestions for co-operation were very general indeed. mention being made of population growth, illegal traffic of drugs, social development, and the role of youth and women in development efforts. Cultural co-operation was not stressed. The important subject of security merited one short but significant sentence: continuation of co-operation between member states -- but not on an ASEAN basis -- in accordance with "mutual needs and interests". The Programme of Action, when all is said and done, was more hope and aspiration, one difficult to translate into reality.

17

Between the two summits, econom1c co-operation between members of the Association and also under its auspices made some headway. In January 19 77 Singapore and the Philippines and, in early February, Singapore and Thailand reached agreement on tariff reductions. In late February an ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements agreement was concluded with a broad overall frame of reference to expand trade but with limited initial application. Also, in the field of co-operation in basic commodities were two ASEAN agreements in principle: one on an Emergency Sharing Scheme in crude oil and/or oil products in times of shortage or abundance and another on Mutual Assistance in Rice in the event of shortage or excess supiPly. In the industrial complementation field, by August one feasibility study (Indonesia's) was completed and four were in progress for the hastily conceived five n:gional industrial projects ASEAN had agreed to establish. Prefeasibility studies on other possible ones were planned for the near future. Under the "socio -cultural dimension" of ASEAN, the Foreign Ministers signed in June the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs and the ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters. The s~ond summit against a background of less anxiety about communist Vietnam was held soon after the first. Following necessary preparation, it met on 4·5 August 1977, with the same heads of government except for a new Prime Minister from Thailand, Tanin Kraivixien. The Kuala Lumpur gathering did not have the novelty of the Bali one but the presence of the Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to discuss aid, on 6-8 August, with the ASEAN leaders after their summit drew widespread attention. Prime Minister Ta.keo Fukuda during his visit offered Japanese assistance to the amount of US$ 1 billion in the form of a line of credit to five industrial regional projects of ASEAN with the condition that Tokyo was satisfied with their viability. Japan also offered a loan, low posture in publicity, to finance cultural activities among ASEAN members. The Association in the discussion made some headway against Japanese protectionism. Tokyo's decision to support ASEAN with substantial economic aid could be a major step in the future of the organization. Previous J apanc:se assistance had been very modest, rdatc:d to rubber research and development. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia agreed to step up aid to ASEAN, and Prime Minister R.D. Muldoon of New Zealand also promised to increase assistance. The protectionist policies of both countries were clearly not appreciated in ASEAN circles.

The discussion at the: summit of the Association leaders on the five regional industrial projects promised conditional J apanesc loan support was a

18

barometer of the state of ASEAN economic co-operation. The package of projects consisted of diesel engines for Singapore, soda ash for Thailand, superphosphates for the Philippines, and urea fertilizer for Indonesia, and also for Malaysia. (Manila wanted a steel mill and Singapore a petrochemical complex.) Each project would be set up as a joint venture, all members participating in the equity and sharing the risks and profits. At Kuala Lumpur the governments reaffirmed their commitm ents to the five industrial projects but no definite decision about the launching of four of them was made. Also, the Indonesian project was not finalized, though going well; it had started as an internal undertaking. Political, technical, and economic -- not financial -- problems thus faced the ASEAN leaders. The summit ended with the expressed need for undertalcing further negotiations. It was clear that the Association's use of external leverage on getting aid was more effective than its ability to reach internal consensus. A number of other subjects at Kuala Lumpur merit attention. Much to the regret of Singapore, no major advances in preferential trade were made. Back again to the drawing board for certain ministers with once more Singapore's role in often setting the tone of the discussion. In another matter hopes were not realized. President Marcos publicly indicated that he was going to take concrete steps to drop the Philippine claim to Sabah. The announcement was made in the context of ASEAN unity, but inertia in Manila soon developed on the issue, and Marcos linked formal action to agreements with Malaysia on border crossing and joint patrols. As regards Indochina, the heads of government called for the development of "peaceful and mutually beneficial relations" with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos and stressed the importance in Southeast Asia of noninterference in the affairs of one another, along with respect o f sovereignty and territorial integrity for the "progress, peace and stability of the region". The Prime Minister of Thailand at the time, it might be noted, was not one who pursued a conciliatory or open door policy towards communist Indochina. Hanoi, for its part, refused an invitation to attend the public sessions of the Kuala Lumpur summit. The final communiqu~ of the second summit was lengthy in words but relatively short in substance. No new ground was broken on regional development as a whole or on zonal neutrality. Also, in economic co-operation, the heads of government called attention to accomplishments already reached, commending, for instance, the ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities for setting up an ASEAN reciprocal currency or "SWAP" arrangement involving immediate short term credit for emergency foreign exchange fmancing to an ASEAN member having temporary international liquidity difficulties. {The SWAP arrangement proved

19

abortive, at least in th e first year, for the fund was too small to attract takers.) References to co-operation in the social, cultural, and information fields in the communiqu~ were very nebulous. More concrete was the section on ASEAN's external relations prior t o the meetings with the Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia, and New Zeal and .

Th e two experiences m ASEAN summits ·· the first with more emphasis on internal matters and the second on external affairs ·· justified the effort. They stan d in contrast t o th e hasty Maphilindo meeting; the Association had been in existence almost nine years before a summit was held. At the same time, summits do generate expec tations and failure to substantially achieve can lead to disillusionment. In th e ten year evolution o f ASEAN perhaps the greatest accomplishment was its survival in the face of major changes in the region, in all East Asia, and in the world.

II : NATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1979

Problems of Perception, Priority and Permanence The identification of national interests is related to the problems of perception, priority and permanence. The task is subjective rather than objective, for the final evaluations based on the same available data can produce different conclusions. It is much easier to compile a list o f national interes ts than to test their existence. Despite the research o f sch olars and th e development o f m ethodology, the testing itself is more subj ective than objective. For instance, who decides the questions to ask and the criteria to be used? The concept o f interests has several dimensions depending upon the fram e of reference. They can be global or regional, permanent or transitory, and unilateral or multilateral . They can be classified in terms of functions like military and strategic, political and diplomatic, economic, social and cultu ral. The concept of th e national interest is particularly difficult to analyse. Just what is it? Can it stand the tes t o f time? Th e problem is complicated by the lack of

20

agreement on a scale of priorities for interests. Basically, the scale is often reduced to vital, important, and peripheral ones. The definition of these terms varies but all of them relate to national interests. In the end, actions are more important than theory and terminology. Vital interests, when all is said and done, are ones the goverrunent leaders of a country perceive in terms of national survival. Further compromise is considered impossible and the use of armed force justified. In a thermonuclea r age when the two major superpowers have the capability of devastating each other in a short period of time, the issue of survival must be considered overwhelming before the threshold of a thermonuclea r war is crossed or even the credible threat of it is employed. As for the partners in ASEAN, none of them has a nuclear capability at the present time and the threshold of conventional warfare might be crossed more easily. All, of course, have vital interests. At the other end of the scale are peripheral ones, and here the gradation lS unportant. In some respects, it might be argued that a state may have no interests in certain international matters. This consideration may hold for small powers but probably not for big or middle powers. For the latter, no action is in effect action; on occasion, silence gives consent. Peripheral interests -- basically where no threat to national security is involved -- can also range up to the borderline cases of important ones dependent upon the point in time and the circumstances of the situation. All Southeast Asian countries in ASEAN have peripheral interests, though the gradation varies from state to state. Important interests are major ones bounded on the one hand by vital interests and less clearly on the other by peripheral ones. If effective action ts not taken, the potential of serious harm exists to a country. Here also time and circumstance are important considerations . A state will not necessarily go to war for major interests unless it is certain that the benefits will offset the losses. The conflicts among the countries of Southeast Asia are apt to relate to important interests as perceived in the respective capitals. ASEAN as an international organization is probably located somewhere between a peripheral and an important interest of its member countries. The challenge of the Association is to move it clearly into the important category of interests. The perception o f national interests is of great significance to th e survival of the state. Involved are the time dimensions of the past, the present and the future. The history o f the country, the current problems confronting it on the

21

international stage, and the needs of the future are inputs which have to be combined in deciding just what are perceived to be the national in terests. The legacy o f the past may be interpreted in terms of lessons for th e present and the future, but here no o ne c an be sure about the lessons of history . At the o ther extreme o f th e time d imensio n, th e futu re and its needs fo r a state canno t be accurately predic ted. Even in th e best evaluation o f trends, the X fac to r like the assassination of a key per so n o r a relativel y insignificant inciden t escal ating in to a m ajo r crisis, can ctrastically al ter th e international firmam ent. Ano ther considerat io n in th e perceptio n o f natio nal interests m Southeast Asia anct elsewh ere that shoullc1tcs establish prio rities in natio nal interests th ey may also pay lip service:: to some concepts because these are widely po pular ami have nu emo tional appeal. Yet in the cold dawn o f reality the co ncrttc ac tio ns o f governments may give little suppo rt.

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Domestic conside rations can affect priorities in national interests. A government can deliberately embark on a foreign adventure in order to divert attention from serious problems at home. In the end the diversion can create a domestic crisis, particularly if the former is not successful, and becomes more serious than the problems previously existing. President Sukarno's confrontation of Malaysia (in part at least a diversion) destroyed hopes for an international effort supported by the U.S. at the time for the economic development of Indonesia. Confrontation itself was a failure, contributing to th e eventual downfall of Sukarno. In another illustration of domestic considerations, one of the main objectives in the foreign policy of Burma is the preservation of good relations with its giant neighbour, China. Yet a serious dispute over the Chinese minority in Rangoon in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution led General Ne Win to give priority to a domestic issue, and as a consequence, relations between Burma and China were seriously strained for a while. If the national interests of a state in Southeast Asia are classified as military and strategic, political, diplomatic, and economic, social, and cultural, only one category has clear-cut priority: the military and strategic one. All nine states would identify this category as basic to the national interest but they would not agree on how best to further it. Other priorities would be more difficult to establish, though political and economic interests would be higher on the scale than social and cultural ones.

Permanence in national interests focuses on the constants in a time framework rather than on the variables. Nothing is really external in international relations, as the Roman millennium so well proves, but the constants are relatively permanent. The geographical foundations of national interests like location, area, shape, climate, and terrain are subject to little change although how man uses his environment, like the gift of natural resources, greatly varies. The location of Southeast Asia between the Paci fic and Indian Oceans with its narrow water passageways so important to the world's maritime commerce and to sea power, coupled with location next t o the continental land masses of China and India to the north and northwest and the island continent of Australia to the southeast, affects the national interests of every state in Southeast Asia. All the countries of the region have interests in various aspects of the law of the sea: the archipelago concept, for instance, in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines; questions relating to the freedom of passage through the Straits o f Malacca as regards the littoral powers of Malaysia, Indonesia, and by

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extension Singapore and as regards no nlittoral powers; and the concern o f Laos, a landlocked state, for access to the sea. Prospecting for offshore petroleum adds ano ther impo rtant dimensio n of current concern related to national interests. The ex tension o f territo rial waters and the 200-mile coastal economic zone create intern atio nal pro blems. ln addition to the geographical foundations of permanence -- the earth -there is man 's creation, the state. Here, o f cou rse, relative permanence is an impo rtant qualificatio n, c reating vari ous pro blems o f its o wn. By 19 79 nine states existed in So uth east Asia . The fo rmal reuni fication o f Vietnam in 1976 had reduced th e numbe r by o ne. The territorial ex tent o f two others had been altered in majo r ways since they ac hieved independe nce, Indonesia having taken over West irian (Netherlands New Guinea ) and Portuguese East Timo r and Malaya having beco me Malaysia thro ugh merger with Sabah, Sarawak , and Singapo re (befo re its independence in 1965 ). In the fiture arc an independent Brunei and the possibility o f an Indochinese federati on . Desp ite the changes, the relative pennanencc of the states o f Southeast Asia o n th e map o f the wo rld and as members o f th e United Natio ns is a fact o f internatio nal life.

The impac t of Dcco lo ni:tatio u and o f Cold War-Dhente Nat io nal inte rests in So utheast Asia have been affected by the impac t of decolo ni.za tion a t ho me and th e impac t of Co ld War-detente abroad. Oecolonization , whe the r interpre ted as a fo rmal step or as a process, influenced national conto urs. The adjustm ent o f th e several newly independent states to the respec tive fo rmer colo nial ruler was often a priority. This adjustment varied fro m o ne country to ano the r in So utheast Asia and fro m one Western metro politan po wer to the next. Different dimensio ns in the independenc e se ttlem ents were involved, such as po li tical , military , economic, and c ultural relations . It is no t surprising that the revolutio nary road to indepe ndence in Vie tnam and indo nesia produced an alto ge ther different cl ima te for se ttlement than the evolu tio nary o ne in the Philippines and Malaya.

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All the independence arrangements conditioned the outlook of the new states of the region towards the respective former colonial sovereign and in some respects towards the West in general. The evolution of the arrangements would influence attitudes and alter ties reflecting the national interest in the capitals of the area. Another impact of decolonization on national interests is the marked pride the new states have in their recently won independence. This pride is reflected in the nationalism of the 'elites and even the masses, especially when issues involving the independence of the state are involved. This situation presents to nationalistic leaders a challenge for constructive behaviour and an opportunity for the worst demagoguery. The sovereignty of the new nation-state is jealousy cherished in the world today. Finally the relationship of decolonization, the national interest, and regional co-operation should be. mentioned. It is true that the impact of decolonization can be viewed as a deterrent to regional co-operation. The legacy of the past and the attitudes of the present on independenco point in this direction. Yet the degree of regional co-operation already achieved in ASEAN indicates that there are limits to the deterrent just cited. Progress, however, will and must be slow lest achievements won be destroyed by too big leaps forward. Time promises to blunt even more the effects of decolonization on the national interest as perceived by government aites. The impact of Cold War-d~tente on national interests in Southeast Asia represents another dimension of importance. In the first place, why the use of the terminology Cold War-detente? For many years beginning in the middle 1940s and extending into the early 1970s, the expression Cold War would not be qualified. The term itself was accurate since much of the Cold War was waged without military combat, but inaccurate since bloodshed on an extensive scale did occur as in a major war, possibly by proxy, in Korea. The risk of a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union with their respective allies was never absent with the examples of the Berlin airlift and the Cuban missile crises when tensions were particularly high. Force was truly applied in the relations between Moscow and Washington, but it was political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and even military pressure short of war. The Cold War presented a complex pattern of action and counteraction, of offence and defence, of thrust and parry. Detente was widely interpreted in the U.S. and the West as a relaxation of

25

tensions between Moscow and Washington. It is associated with the efforts of President Nixon and Secretary Henry A. Kissinger in the early 1970s to work out a settlement of outstanding problems with the Kremlin. Emphasis was placed on the limitation o f strategic arms but issues were linked by the administration. In the thinking at the White House and State Department, rapprochem ent between Comm unist China and the U.S. was the counterpart of dhente between the Russians and Americans. Indeed, the road to Moscow was believed to go via Peking. The Soviet Union viewed detente as a m eans of relaxing tensions in certain fields with the U.S. but no t acr oss the board . The Kremlin had no intention of weakening itself and actually used de tente to build up its military might on land, in the air, and on the sea. Nor did Moscow believe that dhente extended to Africa where in the wake of the American debcit le in Indochina the Russians with the aid o f Cuban forces scored significantly in Angola and Ethiopia. Under the circ umstances it cannot be conclusively argued that the Cold War is over. Nor can it be proved that detente i~ dead. The m os t apt terminology, therefore, is Cold War-dhente. The complex relations between the two superpowers reflec ting aspec ts o f both in contradiction to each other are not likely to change in the basic mixture in th e fo reseeable future. Cold War-di!tentc could not but have an impact on the national interests of the states in Sou theast Asia. After all, two major wars were fought in Indochina, one in th e years 1946-54 and the other 1965-73, mostly before detente entered the vocabulary in Russian-American relations. Furthermore, Moscow and Peking helped the Dem ocratic Republic o f Vietnam short o f armed force s even though the rela tio ns between the two major communist powers became strained. France and later the U.S. fought bitter, long, and costly wars with Communist Vietnam to prevent the vic tory of Ho Chi Minh or his successors. The fall o f Saigon in 19 75 was welcomed by Moscow and Peking in a somewhat subdued way, for the Russians did not want df!tente to collapse and the Chinese did not desire an e nd to rapproch ement . 1he Kremlin still had a deep respect for th e power o f the U.S. while Peking viewed Ame rica as a wounded rather than a paper tiger.

The National Interests of l11ailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singa ore and the Phili pines The national interests of Thailand are roo ted in the geographical and human

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foundations o f the kingdom. Its leaders have so managed foreign policy that Thailand across the centur ies escaped direct foreign rule. Great Britain and France never partitioned the country but viewed it as a buffer. Whether the national interests would h ave been different if the kingdom had become a Western dependency and then won independence is debatable. Possibly the Thais would h ave been more sen sitive to national sovereignty though they are certainly proud of their historical heritage and of keeping their independence. Possibly they also are more willing to co-operate in regional activities, not having undergone the colonial experience. Thailand is located in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia, a " frontline" state, directly exposed to the pressures of neighbours and the vicissitudes of their politics. Within a brief time span of less than forty years, Bangkok has had to cope with colonial neighbours, France and Britain, then with newly independent states, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaya, and finally with two noncommunis t and two communist countries across the borders. In the same period o f time, Thailand has had to deal with Japan as a military ruler in effect and with the U.S. as an overwhelming ally in practice, each of which militarily withdrew from mainland Southeast Asia as a result of respective reverses in the Pacific War and Second Indochinese War. Being on the losing side in both conflicts, Bangkok had to make a peace settlement with the victors. After the Second World War, this settlem ent involved agreements chiefly with Great Britain and France, for Thailand had expanded with J apanese approval into British territories in Burma and Malaya and French possessions in Laos and Cambodia. Following the victories of the communists in Indochina in 1975, Thailand had to work out peacetime arrangements with Hanoi and with Vientiane and Phnom Penh against a background of its relations with China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. Thai national interests are reflected in the present p olicies adopted in coping with the major external powers, especially in the security field , and with the countries of Southeast Asia bo th noncommunis t and communist. As a general rule, Bangkok is not given to broad pronounceme nts on foreign policy. An exception is a statement of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj to the Thai House of Representativ es on 19 March 1975, shortly after he assumed his o ffice and while communist advances in Indochina were ominous. Although the democratic r~girnes he and later his brother, Seni Pramoj, represented were exceptions to Thai military politics, the foreign policy statement of 19 March 19 7 5 was still basic.

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In the first place, the Prime Minister called for an "independent policy" that reckoned with the " national interests" based specifically on "economic and security considerations" . Next he asserted, obviously with reference to communist states, that Thailand would promote "peaceful coexistence" by making friends with all countries who are friendly, regardless of political systems or ideologies, but in the context of noninterference in domestic affairs and equality of relations. Then he called for recognition of Communist China and normalization of ties with Peking, and the withdrawal of "foreign troops", meaning American air force personnel, from Thailand within a year, bearing in mind the need for friendly negotiations on the matter and the "prevailing conditions in the region''. These steps were pointedl y in order to establish "a balance" in the relations with the superpowers. Finall y, the Prime Minister urged strengthening ties with neighbours and supporting co-operation with ASEAN in all ways while at the same time trying to have " constructive contacts" with Hanoi. As regards foreign assistance, he called for creating a "basis for economic and military self-reliance" just as far as possible and as quickly noting that obligations were vital. By 1979, three governments later, Bangkok's foreign policy was essentially what the statement o f March 1975 on foreign affairs specified. Thailand, more self-reliant, was pursuing an "independent policy", diplomatic relations existed between Bangkok and Peking, American forces apart from a small number of advisers had been withd rawn from Thailand, and "a balance" existed in relations with superpowers. Bangkok was giving support to ASEAN but relations with the communist countries o f Indochina were still in flux. At the same time, the security policy of Thailand had a certain finesse. On the one hand, the Manila Treaty allying Bangkok and Washington, remained with the Rusk-Thanat statement reaffirmed, and on the other, the American military presence was gone and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was phased out. United States military and economic assistance of several types continued, although in smaller dimensions and under different conditions. For instance, credits for military purchases and grants for training Thai military officers in America were provided. But bo th Bangkok and Washington indicated they had no desire to reestablish American bases on Thai soil. ln relations with the PRC, Thailand found a friend, in problems with the

Kremlin's satellites, Vietnam and Laos, and later the People's Republic of Kampuchea. At the same time, it is doubtful if Bangkok will want to foreclose its options with the Soviet Union, limited though they are, by ironclad ties with

28

Communist China. Meanwhile, Peking in its rivalry with Moscow supports cordial ties between Thailand and the U.S. The visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiao-ping (Teng Hsiao-ping) to Bangkok in November 1978, the first stop on his tour of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, was an index o f relations between Peking and Bangkok. The Chinese leader held to his position of state-to-state relations and communist party-to-party ties but did not want the latter to disturb the former. Bangkok did not like Peking's support o f the Communist Party of Thailand but preferred Chinese to Russian influence in it and hoped the support would not extend to arms in the future. During the visit, Thailand and China reached agreements relative to co-operation in trade, technical, and scientific matters. Japan presents a different set of problems for Bangkok . Pronounced in the kingdom are the investments, trade, aid and presence of the Japanese. Thailand is receptive bu t prefers its own terms, not always easy to establish. Thai sensitivity erupts at times causing open tension. The long range impact of Tokyo in Thai-Japanese r elations should not be minimized. But it is in regional relations in Southeast Asia that the national interests of Thailand face their direct challenge today. Although Bangkok has historically shown considerable adroitness in balancing off various pressures from the outside, Thailand is not a balance r in the communist-noncommunist context in Southeast Asia. Thai relations are essentially bilateral and cool with Hanoi, Vient iane, and Phnom Penh (considered in the next chapter), while collective with ASEAN as well as bilateral and cordial with neighbouring Kuala Lumpur and more distant Singapore, Jakarta and Manila. As regards Burma, Thai relations are bilateral and fairly good despite historical rivalry, marked differences in outlook and problems associated with a long boundary. If any state in Southeast Asia has developed principles in foreign policy across the years, it is Th ailand. None of the eight others has been independent long enough since the Second World War to test principles over time. Thailand possesses the important element of continuity in independence.

Kenneth T. Young, a former American Ambassador in Bangkok and later President of the Asia Society, once identified five Thai principles in foreign policy. Although they can be debated, they certainly merit consideration. One is self-reliance, the Thais believing their survival as a nation depends upon themselves. Ano ther is independence from outside domination, the freedom of the Thai nation -- o f Muang Thai. A third is multiplicity, manifested in Thailand's contacts with

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different governments over a long perio d of time and in Bangko k as a present international d iplomatic centre. Another principle is counterweight, calling for external support by a power to strengthen Thai efforts against another, but this counterweight must no t weigh too much or counter too far. The fifth is plasticity reflected in an ability to bend but no t break when faced with pressures. Other o bservers have characterized Thai fo reign policy as pragmatic and opportunistic. The Thais are said to concentrate on interests, with friends and enemies changing as fluid adjustments are made in terms of accommodation and balance. Be that as it m ay, the national interests of Thailand are reflected in the down-to-earth priority given in a time of regional and world tension to strategic and military o nes with others such as po litical and economic, social and cultural, following them. ln contrast to Thailand, o n the mainland facing non-ASEAN neighbours except Malaysia, is the island republic of Lndonesia. The national in terests of Indonesia, arising from ilts geographical and human foundations, reflect the legacy of th e past, the needs o f today, and the prospec ts of to morrow. Having won their independence only in the late 1940s, Ind onesians are very sensitive of their status in the family o f nations. At the same time, j akarta, less than twenty years later, began to play an active role in regional co-operation.

The legacy o f the past in Indonesia, bo th in foreign affairs and domestic politics, presents a record that has many discontinuities, making the identification of the national interest more d ifficult. Two men, contrastin g in background and outlook, have d ominated the country since independence ·· Sukarno and Suharto. President Sukamo was a living momument of Indo nesian nationalism, the architect of the independence and territorial unification o f the country. He was never able to make the transition from being a successful revolutionary to a peacetime leader in the social and economic development of Indonesia. Sukarno's foreign policy veered from no nalignment with good relations with the U.S. to alignment with the PRC and poo r relations with both Moscow and Washington. The communist-supported attempted coup d'etat in 1965 was one of the turning points in Indonesia, if not So utheast Asian, history. If the coup had succeeded, Indonesia would probably have become a People's Republic aligned with Peking. After it quickly failed and after an extended struggle for power, President Sukarno lost his inOuence, General Suharto with the army emerged as the main sou rce of power, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was

30

decimated with its key leaders killed. General Suharto proceeded to stress develop· ment at home and nonalignm ent abroad, leaning towards the U.S. and keeping a marked distance from Communist China. These discontinuities in Indonesia on the domestic and foreign fronts m ake it difficult to discern the trees from the forest or the forest from the trees in the republic. Fundam en tal in the national interest is Indonesia's location. It helps to explain the relative freedom Jakarta has in foreign policy, in comparison with Thailand. Indonesia h as n o nearby neighbours that could conceivably threaten it. Certainly Papua New Guinea that occupies the eastern part of the island of New Guinea is no threat, nor Australia to the southeast; the Philippines to the north and Malaysia and Singapore to the north and northwest are in the sam e category. Furthermore, none of the neighbours has been taken over by the communists with associations with Peking o r Moscow. Indonesia is thus relatively far removed from Indochina; in fact, location helped Jakarta to be an observer an d not a participant in the Second Indochinese War. It has also been important in reducing the effects of the communist victory on Indonesian national interests. T he Republic of Indonesia, being an archipelago of some 13,000 islands extending more than 3,000 miles east to west and almost 1,250 no rth to south, is particularly sensitive to sea power. Both the Pacific and Indian Oceans wash its shores with the American and Soviet fleets in the form er and, to a lesser extent in the latter. These are facts of international li fe. Through or bordering the Indonesian archipelago arc internationall y used water passageways o f present or potentially more significance like the Ombai, Sunda and Sumba Straits, the Lombok Strait and the Makassar Strait comprising the Lombok-Makassar route, and the Strait of Malacca and the adjoining Strait of Singapore shared with Malaysia and with Singapore. In 1960, Indonesia proclaimed in the interests of territorial integrity that the islands and waters between them were a "single unit" of the country. In 1971, both J akarta and Kuala Lumpur claiming a twelve mile limit of territorial waters announced that the Strait o f Malacca was no longer an international waterway and claimed joint control over international traffic. Singapore, as a major entrep8t, took " note"; the U.S., the Soviet Union and J apan rejected the Indonesian and Malaysian stance, but China was sympathetic to it. Involved, of course, is the question of international waters for the use of commercial ships like oil tankers and naval ships in peace and war. In its international outlook, Indonesia puts considerable emphasis on ''the doc trine o f national resilience and regional resilience", a doctrine which it first

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promo ted. Although th e concept is somewhat nebulous, it stresses th e dynamics of national perseverance and national determination. It is considered to include the components of ideological strength, political, economic and cultural might, and military strength. A majo r input in the process o f development, national resilience as it increases and reaches fulfilm ent helps the state to handle any threats at home and from abroad that might directly or indirec tly endanger securi ty and stabil ity. Presiden t Suharto has pointedly stressed the importance of national resilience in Indonesia's ability to oppose communism . Jakarta has also no ted that weakness at home invites the interference o f e-x ternal powers. It believes that, if the concep t o f national resilience is applied by o ther regional states, the resu lt will be modera tion in natio nal behaviour. The chances o f ex ternal interference will be le s, and regional resilience through functional co·operation and linkages at the internation al level will be enhanced. The national interests o f Indonesia arc refl ected in current policies towards the major ex ternal po wers and to wards the communist and noncommunist countries of Southeast Asia. Indon esia, amo ng th e ASEAN p artners, is the only one to have no alli ance or ecurity ties with any ex ternal state. In fact, no ne has existed in the chequered history of the country since independence. At the same time, the island repubh welcomes the mo dest military assistance provided by the U.S. and would like to have a larger am ount. Lndonesia also supports the existence o f American air and na al bases in the Philippines but want.s none o n its own soil. Jakarta is glad to have the Seventh Fleet o f the U.S. in the Western Pacific over the horizon. Alt hough political, diplom atic, milit ary and economic relations are cordial between Jakarta and Washington, ,despite some differences on human rights and other matters, neither Indonesia nor th e U.S. desires an alliance. Washington considers Indonesia a key country in Southeast Asia with a great potential and extends military and economic assistance both in an effort to assist th e island republic towards realizing its po tential and in th e important interests o f regional stability. Indo nesia is viewed in some Washingto n circles as a "New Influential " on international issues. Jakarta also has fri endly ties with Japan, the econom ic relatio nship being increasmgly cl ose. Tokyo has been interested in the oil o f Indonesia whether the 1slands were under colonial o r nationalist rule. Japan is also well aware o f th e strateg1 location of the island republic and o f the routes of oil tankers from the Middle East. In the p rio rity of South east Asian states, Indonesia ranks at the top o f the Japanese lis t. Tok yo's economic and technical aid to the republic is large, as arc Japanese trade and inves tments there. The impac t o f Tokyo in Indonesia can be orne too pronounced and cause friction as in the past, if caution is no t exercised on bo th sides.

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Towards the communist giants, the Soviet Union and the PRC, Indonesia has different attitudes. The anticommunist Suharto Government supports ties with Moscow but prefers to delay diplomatic relatio ns with the PRC just as long as possible. Jakarta was very critical of the refusal of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to give a nonsubversion pledge comparable to that of Prim e Minister Pham Van Dong during his tour of the ASEAN countries. Indonesia is concerned lest American military withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia to offshore positions creates a vacuum that could lead to Peking's or Moscow's filling it. Jakarta is well aware of the growing naval might of the Soviet Unio n in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and of its greater impact in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Russians (whose home country is far away) do not aro use the concern that the Chinese do, as the latter are much nearer. The large Chinese minori ty in Indonesia adds a domestic dimension to a fo reign one. The rivalry between Peking and Moscow for friends and influence in Southeast Asia does no t affect Indonesia as much as Thailand, but the island republic is not immune to any conflict or potential of it affecting the neighbourhood. Diplomatic relations between Jakarta and Peking were suspended in 1967 in the wake of the attempted com munist coup in 1965. Their resumption would be a significant development in Asian relations. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia has to deal with communist neighbours in Indochina and noncommunist ones in ASEAN and Burma. Basically , Jakarta would like to have good relations with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos but believes their membership in the Association would raise m ore problems than it would solve. Reflecting its anticommunist outlook and its geographical location, Indonesia does not take a leading role in cultivating ties with communist Indochina. It is cautious in policy despite its long diplomatic relations with Hanoi. Jakarta is well aware of Vietnam's alliance with Mosco w and of the implica tio ns of the recent Vietnamese-Kampuchean and Chinese-Vietnamese wars but these developments do not have the impact that they have in Bangkok. The establishment of a permanent Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam, threatening crucial sea lanes and affecting sea power in the South China Sea, would not be welcome in Jakarta or other ASEAN capitals, not to mentio n Washington, Peking, or Tokyo. Hanoi has allowed Soviet warships to visit Cam Ranh Bay but will it permit the establishment of a permanent Russian base there? It could come in stages. Indo nesia's bilateral relations with the o ther members o f ASEAN are influenced by co-operation with them in the Association. Here national resilience

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is viewed as the foundation for co-operative activity contributing to regional identity. Despite past ups and downs, in most cases Jakarta has good relations with Thailand, the Philippines, Mal aysia, and even Singapore at th e present time. The potential of friction is least with Thailand and most with Singapore. In its approach to many issues, Indonesia believes in Asian solutions for Asian problems. The possibilities fo r Jakarta's leadership in Southeast Asia, at least in maritime South east Asia,, cannot be ignored. The country with its population o f 141 million, the fifth in the world, its size and location, and its natural resources has the power potential of being a middle power with a regional role o f leadership like Brazil or Nigeria. At present Indonesia's power position is relatively weak in contrast to th at of Vietnam's, but J akarta's power potential is much greater than Hanoi's. Some analysts predict that maritime Indonesia and mainland Vietnam will eventually establish spheres of influence in Southeast Asia: Jakarta in Malaysia and Hanoi in Thailand. T his would involve expansionism by both Indonesia and Vietnam, though no t necessarily by military means. The current regime of General Suharto has not shown expansionist tendencies, if the occupation of Portuguese Timor is viewed as a special situation. Furthermore, it has not shown interest in military or polit ical hegemony in Southeast Asia. The various national interest of indonesia -- strategic and military, economic, political, and diplomatic, social and cultural -- will continue to be reflected in different policies, given different emphases as the domestic and international context requires. In geographic terms Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, the Third World, and the world itself will continue to mirror Jakarta's range of interests. Despite the aspec t o f discontinuity, an outline of the basic foreign policy of Indo nesia reflecting its national interests, as presented by Vice President Mohammad Ha tta in April 1953, is still essentially valid over two decades later. Hat ta stressed an "indept"ndcnt" and "active" policy between the power blocs, but no ted that th e U.S. had no "evil designs" o n Indonesia and wanted to see it "remain independent and become prosperous". Also, he observed that the PRC and the Soviet Union with no common boundaries were not a "direct threat" to the independence of Indo nesia and could not be in the future. Hatta, opposed to colonialism and racism, stressed preserving the safety of th e nation, getting aid from abroad, strength ening international law and working with the United Nations, developing cordial relation s with neighbours, and applying the principles of the Panchasiltl. He defined them as belief in Divine Omnipotence, nationalism, humanism, democracy, and social justice. The outline of the Vice President may well be valid for many years to come.

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Malaysia's national interests, like those of Indonesia and Thailand, reflect the natural and human environment. Since the independence of Malaya in 1957, Kuala Lumpur has experienced the vicissi tudes o f regional politics fu lly as much as its neighbours. Malaysia appeared in the early years of its independence less sensitive to being a state than most of the newly independent ones. This characteristic is substantially due to the following facts: Great Britain was eager to grant sovereignty, the transition was peaceful, and relations between London and Kuala Lumpur were very close for some time. Malaysia also was willing to participate in regional activities, though serious hila teral difficulties with its neighbours, at various times impeded the effort. In addition to major changes in the territorial extent of the state since its creation, there have been international developments of note sometimes related to the changes. In the p eriod 1948-60, before and after independence, Kuala Lumpur waged a successful effort under the Emergency against communist insurgency. This background helps to explain the strong anticommunist stance in Malaysia's foreign policy for many years. Then, essentially from 1963 to 1966, Kuala Lumpur stood up against Indonesia's confrontation, arising from the creation of Malaysia. In both the Emergency and confrontation Kuala Lumpur was given military assistance by Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, a fact of international relations that helps to explain the pro-Western foreign policy o f Malaysia for a long time. The Second Indochinese War did not affect Malaysia as much as Thailand but it did have more impact than in Indonesia. The sympathies o f Kuala Lumpur were clearly with Saigon until 1970, and President Lyndon B. Johnson was well received in the Malaysian capital in 1966. By the time of the fall of Indochina to the communists in 1975, the foreign policy of Malaysia had sufficiently veered so that Kuala Lumpur unlike Bangkok did not have to undergo the serious effects of Hanoi's ire. The continuity of Malaysia's foreign policy is marked in the period 1957-70 and from 1970 to the present. The year 1970 stands out as a break in continuity, for in August Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down as Prime Minister. He had been the key figure in the first thirteen years o f the country's independence. His proWestern and anticommunist attitudes were reflected in the foreign policies of the state. The break in continuity, however, was no t sharply defined at the time, but it gradually emerged under Tun Abdul Razak, the new Prime Minister. In 1967 Malaysia entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but after 1970 a number o f moves, like the establishment o f diplomatic ties with North Korea and

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and North Vietnam, led to the major step of the recognition of the PRC in May 1974. Malaysia was the first of the ASEAN powers to have normal relations with Peking. In the meantime, in November 1971, it should be recalled, Kuala Lumpur was the leader in the ASEAN declaration calling for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. No country in the region is probably more subject to the influence of sea power than Malaysia, with a front door on the Pacific Ocean and a back door on the Indian Ocean. Bisected by the South China Sea between East Malaysia in Borneo and West Malaysia on the peninsula, Kuala Lumpur as the capital of the current federation depends upon the goodwill of the navy or combination of navies that control the waters. The federation as a maritime state is very much concerned with the law of the sea, its attitudes towards such subjects as territorial waters and the Strait of Malacca beiing examples. As for land neighbours, Malaysia h as a border with Thailand to the north and with Indonesia and Brunei in Borneo; the causeway from Johore to the island of Singapore is both a link and a barrier. Apart from the long land boundary Indonesia and Malaysia have in Borneo, the Indonesian island of Sumatra across the Strait of Malacca is very close to West Malaysia. Also, the Philippines with the Sulu archipelago is sufficiently near Sabah to raise important issues of border crossing and border patrols as well as those related to perhaps 100,000 Filipino Muslim refugees. Since its independence Malaysia has had serious difficulties with all its present partners in ASEAN. Indonesia's confrontation over the creation of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to Sabah, questions relating to operations against the communists in the Thai·Malaysian border area, and the recurring friction with Singapore are cases in point. It is not surprising that these troubles have affected Kuala Lumpur's outlook on regionalism. Like all its associates in ASEAN, Malaysia has had to cope with the maj or outside powers with important interests in. Southeast Asia and with countries in the region having different outlooks on society. The defence of the national interest is not easy in circumstances as diverse and complex as those now existing. When it comes to international security, the Five-Power Defence Arrangements involving Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand have now lost much of their punch. The ANZUK. (Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom) forces have left the Malaysian-Singapore area except for a very small Australian-New

36

Zealand presence and British token assistance in air defence. In late 1978, it became clear that the New Zealand contingent would be withdrawn within three years from Singapore. British, Australian, and New Zealand naval ships occasionally call in the area. What remains in the relationship is to a large extent an obligation to consult at once in an emergency arising from an external armed attack on, or a threat of it to, Malaysia or Singapore. It is hard to visualize the return of British forces to Southeast Asia. Kuala Lumpur values the current Five-Power Defence Arrangements as an interim security measure while Malaysia builds up its armed forces and works towards the neutralization of Southeast Asia. Outside the Commonwealth Kuala Lumpur has friendly but not intimate relations with the U.S. and Japan. Economic ties are close with both countries in trade and investments. Japanese economic aid is extensive while Malaysia engages in selective purchases of arms from abroad. The American Peace Corps operates in Malaysia as well as in Thailand and the Philippines, but U.S. military assistance in training and credit sales to Malaysia is modest. Kuala Lumpur is opposed, under the current circumstances, t o a further reduction of the American role in the region lest it upset the equilibrium of power. Malaysia found to its discomfort that recognition of Peking in 1974 did not have any positive effect on the communist insurgency in the country. China still adhered to the state-to-state and p arty-to-party relationship. Even the clandestine radio broadcasts, presumably from Chinese soil, were not ended. At the government level, relations between Peking and Kuala Lumpur have not been intimate. The latter has defined them as "friendly, proper and correct". Malaysia welcomed Vice Premier Deng Xiao-ping in November 1978 but bluntly stressed it would not tolerate interference in its domestic affairs. The visit could not but direct attention to the large Chinese minority (35%} and to the insurgent role of the Communist Party of Malaya. Soviet-Malaysian ties are reserved; no major issues exist between the Kremlin and Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia would no t want to see either Moscow or Peking become a paramount power in Southeast Asia. As regards the communist states of Indochina, Kuala Lumpur in its leading role has not had success in establishing a genuine rapprochement between them and ASEAN. True, Malaysia's relations on a bilateral basis have been often good with its communist neighbours, but an Indochinese-ASEAN alignment even before the dramatic events in Indochina in late 1978 and early 1979 was probably out of the question. The Hanoi-Moscow alliance, the flight of refugees from Vietnam to Malaysia, and Hanoi's conquest of Kampuchea weakened Vietnamese-Malaysian relations.

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In its ties with th e noncommunist ASEAN countries of the region, Kuala Lumpur seeks to build upon the present good relations (in co ntrast to the past) basically existing with Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and even Singapore. Kuala Lumpur enjoys special bilateral relations with Burma in its overall foreign policy. Malaysia values ASEAN as a means o f further improving bilateral ties and of advancing regional interests. Kuala Lumpur's na tio nal interests, when all is said and done, focus on the preservation o f economic and military security. More o ften than not, the fed eration h as been motivated by indigenous forces and has shown a low profile in foreign policy. Malaysiia wants a climate a t ho me and abroad conducive to international commerce and national developmen t. It supports private foreign investment and backs a free economy. Greater economic development can help meet individual needs and further enhance the welfare o f the people already more prosperous in terms of per capita GNP than mos t countries in Southeas t Asia. A nonaligned state, favouring equidistance with the Great Powers, Malaysia seeks international security thro ugh sel f-reliance on stronger forces at home, a loose arrangement with old friends in the Commonwealth, and the strengthening of ASEAN in a Southeast Asia of peace, fre edom and neutrality. The national interests o f the Republic o f Singapore are closely related to th ose of Malaysia across the causeway. In 1959, two years after the independence of Malaya, the Sta te of Singapore was created. It was self-governing, with foreign affairs and defence in the hands o f Great Britain. In September 1963, Singapore of its own free will became a component o f the federation of Malaysia, but sh ort of two years later, in August 1965, it was forced to leave the federation. The first concern o f th e new state was just plain survival economically, politicalJ y and militaril y. Singapore was now literally a small island city-state in the famil y of nations. It had no natural hinterland after separation from Malaysia, it had no raw materials of no te, and it possessed only a limited domestic market. Singapore's population was largely Chinese in contrast to that fou nd in its neighbours. Its separation from Malaysia came suddenly, no t allowing tim e to work out a gradual transition . The legacy of the past fo r Singapore po inted up a fundamental principle The republic could no t count on any coun try in ·· self-reliance in the fu ture. Southeast Asia or any outside power to bail it o ut o f its difficulties. Malaysia was basically critical o f Singapore, and Great Britain though sympathetic had to

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think in terms of Malaysia and Singapore. Self-reliance put an emphasis on independence and limited the country's early interest in regionalism. In the relatively brief years of independence , the republic's foreign policy has occastionally shifted in priority and emphasis, but the m ajor premises have remained. At the beginning, Singapore stressed ties with the nonaligned and AfroAsian states and was highly critical o f the West in general and the U.S. in particular. It soon became clear, however, that an Afro-Asian image did not bring significant dividends, and Singapore shifted in 1966 and 1967 to a pro-Western posture, being motivated by economic and strategic considerations . With the liquidation by the British of their bases in Singapore on the horizon (accomplished between 1968 and 1971) and with the need to compensate for the economic impact of this development, the United States was viewed as the best source for a quick increase in investment and trade. Furthermore, America was seen as essential to a balance of power in Southeast Asia. Thus, from 1968 Singapore became preoccupied in foreign policy with the Western industrial states and Japan, seeking trade, investments and aid. This global policy was given priority at the expense of regional co-operation. Partly as a result of criticism from countries in and outside Southeast Asia about its "selfish attitude", Singapore initiated a more active regional policy in 1971, which became more pronounced over the next two years. The effort to balance global and regional interests was reflected in visits by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to several ASEAN capitals. Another shift in the foreign policy of Singapore came as a result of the oil crisis arising from the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. The republic, whose leaders had long been friendly to Israel and for a while had retained a significant number of Israeli military advisers, deliberately cultivated better ties with the Arab countries in the interests of a continuing oil supply to the important Singaporean refineries. This pro-Arab stance was considered in the national interest. During the course of the Second Indochinese War Prime Minister Lee, in a visit to the U.S., m oved from a neutral posture to a pro-American stance in October 196 7. The fall of Indochina to the communists and the American military withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia deeply worried the leaders in Singapore who feared the consequences would upset the power equilibrium in the area. A greater stress was placed on regional economic co-operation to check the spread of communism at home.

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The geographical foundations of Singapore underlie many of the assets and liabilities of the republic. It is located at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula with the causeway northward to the mainland, and with the Strait of Singapore southward separating the country from Indonesian territory. The highly important Strait of Malacca, it has been indicated, is continued in the Strait of Singapore. The country has an excdlent central location in Southeast Asia for shipping and trade. Added to these considerations are excellent port, banking, insurance, commercial, and communication facilities. Tariffs are low; industry is growing. The city's entrep$1: functions, relatively more important in the past in terms of total activities, sho~ld not be minimized. Under the fascinating concept of "the Global City" Singapore, linked with other such cities through modern technology in the fields of communication and transportation and through a global financial network and multinational corporations, will have access to the world as a hinterland and market. Singapore's only immediate neighbours are Malaysia and Indonesia, but its location and economy give it an interest not only in the region of Southeast Asia but also in East Asia and even the world. Gone, however, is the importance of Singapore in terms of a great naval base once significant in the naval strategy of the British Empire. The republic m its relations with the outside major powers and with its neighbours in Southeast ~ia has been realistic. At the same time its diplomacy with the U.S., J apan, the Soviet Union, and China, as well as the regional states, is bound to vary. On the whole Singapore's current relations with Washington are very good. They focus on economic ties; Singapore has purchased arms from the U.S., and services for American naval vessels are available in the republic. The island country in I 978 got no military assistance from the U.S. but a little economic aid under Public Law 480. Singapore values the American role as a stabilizing influence in power relationships affecting Southeast Asia. Japanese trade, investments, and aid are an important input in the friendly relations between Tokyo and Singapore. Japan is not viewed as a military threat; Tokyo's presence is not conspicuous, but its economic impact and future role in the region are not minimized. The island republic, it is believed, can be a link, to its economic ·advantage, between Japan and other ASEAN states. With the Soviet Union, Singapore also has good ties. Some 500 Russian merchant vessels visit ev·e ry year and services are available for bunkering and repairs; Soviet navy ships too visit Singapore for drydocking and repairs, though not in the glare of publjcity. Moscow has had a bank in the island republic

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since 1971; the two governments started a JOIDt venture in 1967, the SingaporeSoviet Shipping Company, and later Marissco, a Soviet-Singapore maritime company selling marine products caught by Russian ships. Although Prime Minister Lee made a visit to Peking in 1976, and the fact that two Chinese communist banks and two Chinese communist insurance companies are allowed to operate on the island, with modest trade between China and Singapore, the island state still has not taken the step of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Singapore cannot but wonder about the political effect on the large Chinese majority in the republic and on Indonesia to the south. If Jakarta resumes diplomatic relations with Peding, Singapore will probably soon establish diplomatic ties. Prime Minister Lee used the occasion of the visit of Deng Xiao-ping to stress that the Chinese in Singapore were truly Singaporean, in a state having its own national interests. As for the conflict between Moscow and Peking, the island republic realistically hopes the rivals will contain each other. In the region of Southeast Asia, the Republic of Singapore does not have

intimate relationships with commu nist Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, or with Burma. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew would like to see a genuine modus vivendi established with the communist states founded on noninterference and mutual co-existence. Security is the main consideration, and Vietnam is realistically viewed as a key to the future of the region. With its partners in ASEAN Singapore's relations vary in contacts and in degrees of cordiality. Despite the lapse of time since the Separation in 1965, contention still exists between Malaysia and Singapore, but it is held within bounds. Kuala Lumpur especially is reducing close economic links with its neighbour, links which are viewed as an indication of the former's dependency on the latter. Like Indonesia, Malaysia wants to develop its own trading facilities and ports in an effort to bypass Singapore as a middleman. Differences also exist over the Five-Power Defence Arrangements, and Kuala Lumpur, for instance, refuses to allow Singapore to use jungle warfare training facilities in J ohore. But the historical heritage cannot be forgotten, personal and business ties continue, and economic relations (including Singaporean investments in Malaysia) are important. Finally, the defence and security of Singapore and Malaysia are indivisible, a fact accepted and reflected particularly in the field of air defence and internal security. As for Indonesia, Singapore's relations with its giant neighbour have definitely improved in recent years, but they could still be better. Mutual

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suspicions are not dead and economic differences remain. Indonesia opposes Singapore's desire for an ASEAN free trade area. (The latter has most to gain from it.) Closer economic co-operation , however, is possible between the two countries, and already Singaporean investments in Indonesia are noteworthy. In a relatively short period of time, Singapore has established a number o f major premises upon which foreign policy is based. Prime Minister Lee and Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnarn have spoken and written frequently about them, and o ther Singaporeans in and out of government have made contributions. With survival the basic mo tivation, Singapore's foreign policy is rooted in the premise of nonalignment or " positive neutralism", so interpreted as to suit its national interests. Ano ther premise is making and keeping as many friends as possible and having as few enemies as possible. Under the concept o f "multilateral underpinning" Singapore wants a maximum number of countries to acquire a vested interest in the existence of the island state. A balanced role of the Great Powers in Southeast Asia is favoured rather than Malaysia's neutralization approach with guarantees from them. Another premise is recognition of the fact that the prosperity and even the economic survival of the country depend upon maximizing trade partners, attracting foreign investments, and diversifying overseas markets. A final premise is the realization that Singapore's relationships with Malaysia, formal and informal,impose For instance, in the Separation Agreement in certain restraints on foreign policy. 1965 each one agreed no t to make a treaty or agreement with a foreign power detrimental to the defence and independence of the other. The basic interests o f the Republic o f Singapore are national security and material prosperity. In giving expression to these interests, Singapore is self-reliant, pragmatic, realistic, fl ex ible, rugged, hard-nosed a nd successful. The Philippines, the first o f the dependencies in Southeast Asia to gam independence, developed policies tha t reflected its national interest. At the heart of the matter in Manila were two questions. just wh at should be the role of the U.S. in the national interest? And, on the other side o f the coin, j ust how Asian is the PhiHpp ines or, depending upon the answer, should it be? Despite fluctuations, the primacy of America in the external security o f the island republic has remained, the flu ctuations ranging from essentially full primacy to moderate to less primacy. At the same time, the Philippines is an Asian state with an Asian population and cannot ignore the impact of its environment. For some years, its newly independent neighbo urs viewed the republic as not a bona fide colleague because o f the American connection. This attitude troubled Manila which attempted to stress

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its Asian identity, perhaps to a degree detrimental to its own interests. These considerations help to ex plain the love-hate relationship still existing in PhilippineAmerican ties. As Manila acquired independence without having to fight for it and as the Commonwealth represented a transition period with sovereignty set at the end, once independence formally cam e on 4 July 1946, the Philippines was not as sensitive to national sovereignty in the early years as many other newly independent countries. In fact, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950 Manila reacted more in terms of supporting the U.S. than of the Philippines. Nationalism, however, was important in the road to independence, and within a few years thereafter it grew to dimensions that threatened to be more negative than positive. The background of Philippine independence is related to Manila's attitude towards regional co-operation in Southeast Asia. For a while the Philippines, as the senior new state in the area, sought a leadership role, one that met with little if any support from the other countries. Manila's backing for regionalism was strong on paper but weak in pr_actice, especially after the dreams of leadership faded. Philippine foreign policy reflecting national interests may be divided for convenience into two periods, 1946-75 and 1975 to the present. The year 1975, of course, is decisive, for the fall of Phnom Penh, Saigon, and eventually Laos to the communists and the collapse of American policy in Indochina stand out. At the same time, there were trends in Philippine foreign policy before 1975 that suggested later developments, and trends after 19 75 that were gradations of previous policy. The fall of Indochina did not have the early sharp effects for the U.S. in Manila th at it did in Bangkok. Philippine foreign policy b efore 1975 m ay be characterized as the maintenance of close security, political, economic, and cultural ties with the U.S. , genuine sympathy for noncommunist nationalist movements, cultivation of ties with a number of noncommunist Asian neighbours, loyalty to the principles of the U.N., and participation in regional activities. Upon independence Malacanang established diplomatic relations with no communist government, and communism abroad and at home was considered a threat to Philippine security. The development of the Cold War in Europe and then Asia confirmed the basic anticommunist proAmerican p osture in Manila. Philippine military forces participated in the United Nations effort in the Korean War, and later a Civic Action contingent with armed support was sent to Vietnam in the Second Indochinese War.

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Located well off the shores of the Asian mainland, the Republic of the Philippines, whose boundaries upon independence were well defined, faces communist Vietnam across the South China Sea to the west, has the Republic of China or Taiwan northward as a neighbour, and Malaysia and Indonesia, partners in ASEAN, to the south. Eastward stretch the vast reaches of the Pacific with the American Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls) whose future status is being altered. The location of the Philippines gives it a certain freedom of action not found in countries on mainland Southeast Asia. Manila has territorial claims to the Spratly Islands in the southern part of the South China Sea with military forces on some of them but, as already indicated, has given up in effect its efforts to acquire Sabah in Malaysia. Its support for the archipelago concept is controversial. The national interests of the republic at present are given concrete expression in relations with the major external powers and in relations with the states of Southeast Asia. President Marcos on 23 May 1975, within a month of the fall of S~gon, . proclaimed the guidelines of the future in Philippine foreign policy. He listed, first, the intensification and broadening of relations with ASEAN members; next, the acceleration of the establishment of diplomatic relations with socialist countries, particularly with Peking and Moscow; third, closer identification with the Third World; then continuation of beneficial relations with Japan; fifth, support for Arab states in their efforts for a just and l~ting peace in the Middle East; and finally a new foundation compatible with the realities emerging in Asia for the continuation of a healthy relationship with Washington. It is clear that President Marcos and his advisers had given careful thought to the guidelines, but were they rhetorical or were they substantive? Not often in the annals of foreign affairs has a country done almost exactly or at least very substantially what it said it planned to do. (The Thai statement of Kukrit Pramoj, also in 1975, has been cited.) Of course, the international environment has to be conducive, but the Philippine guidelines were realistic and essentially capable of fulfilment. Relations with the partners in ASEAN were strengthened on a bilateral basis, the climax coming with Manila's giving up for all practical purposes its claim to Sabah. As for ASEAN itself, the Philippines stressed the need for a limited free trade area, a regional payments union, an Asian Forum to settle Asian issues, and an ASEAN constitution. Diplomatic relations were established with the PRC in June 1975, with the Soviet Union in May 1976, and with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in July. A

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trade agreement had been made with Peking in September 19 74 and an accord on the exchange of sports groups, tourists, and scholars with Moscow in the same month. Closer identification with the Third World was pushed although this effort was not susceptible to spectacular results. Relations with J apan continued beneficial based on successful efforts to attract as much investment, trade, and aid as possible. Marcos did not really trust Tokyo and was apprehensive about its potential militarism, but he believed an economic relatio nship involving the Philippines with Japan and also with the U.S. was desirable. Suppo rt fo r the Arab countries, founded on the need to import petroleum (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ranked among the four m ajor suppliers of total imports in 1975), the desire for capital investment, and the hopes for Arab co-operation in the Muslim insurgency m the south, especially from Libya, brought so me success and the promise of mote. The new foundation for continuing health y Philippine-American relationships was not fully worked out by 19 79 but considerable handwriting was on the wall. When then President Gerald R. Ford visited President Marcos in Manila in December 1975, the chief executives reiterated the validity of the mutual defence treaty of 1951. Stressing the importance of bases in keeping an effective U.S. presence in the Western Pacific, they asserted that the negotiations on Washington's use of the Philippine bases should be conducted with full recognition of Manila's sovereignty. Primarily involved are the Subic Bay Naval complex, the home port of the American Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, and Clark Air Base in Pampanga, the headquarters of the American 13th Air Force. Washington considers the naval and .Ur bases important in the defence of its interests in Asia and the Pacific, and specifically in Southeast Asia. The long, complex negotiations over the bases focused on a number of issues such as Philippine and American roles in operations, U.S. paym ents as rent, and Philippine jurisdiction over Americans. Manila wanted the bases to stay, at least for a while. President Marcos realized the economic benefits they brought to the economy and the important role they played in the external defence of the archipelago. He was also aware that his partners in ASEAN as well as China and Japan, each in its own interests, wanted the bases to remain. In early J anuary 1979 an agreement on the bases was formall y concluded. Neither party was fully satisfied but at least a basic consensus was reached. In essence the U.S. agreed, subject to Congressional approval, to provide over the comiug five years up to US$500 million in additional aid to Manila (around threefifth s o f it military and the rest economic) for the continued "unhampered" usl·

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o f th e bases (much redu ced in area) . Clearer recognition was giVen to Philippine sovereignty over them , and d iscussio n on t heir lo nger range future would be reopened in 1984. Outside the security relatio nship are pro blems in the econom1c ties between Manila and Washingto n. The Laurel -Langley agreement expi red in 1974 and President Marcos wo uld like to h ave a special econo mic relatio nship with America favo urable to Manila. The U.S. is o pposed to special preference s, as indicated in the Trade Refo rm Ac t o f 1974. Manila has encouraged fo reign investments from th e U.S. and elsewhere while it welcomes and would like more Am erican econo mic aid . The World Bank has an internatio nal consu ltative group invo lved in finan cing Philippine develo pment. Po lit ical relatio ns bet ween Manila and Washing ton have been impaired by the end o f Philippine democracy in la te September 19 72 with the impositio n of martial law. So me ideal is ts in the U.S. had mistakenly viewed the islands as a "show windo w of Am erican democracy in Asia". Human rights violations in the Philippines have added to the diffi culties in rel ations with the U.S. A number of impo rtant Filipino refugees in America have raised th eir voices in pro test. The securi t , econo mic, and po litical relations Man ila has with Washington arc in so me flux bu t the basic assoc iation -- and these wo rd s are important -- between the two countries will rem ain for many years. The Philippines will continue to re fl ect th e cu ltural and religious influence o f its first Western master, Spain, the psyc ho logical impact o f its brief Asian conquero r, japan, and th e material influ ence of its las t Western ruler, the U.S . At the same time, the R epublic o f th e Philippines in its natio nal interests will seek a national ide nt ity tha t re flec ts a better balance in th e Western and Asian compo nen ts of its existence.

III :

REGIONAL INTERESTS IN 1979

Problems o f Institution and lntt:gra tio n in ASEAN The process of instituting in practice and th e task of integrating in theory

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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations pose challenges to the most astute leaders and most perceptive academicians. Foreign ministers and their associates have numerous examples o f international organizations to observe in different areas of the world and scholars can construct models and present theories of integration. In the final moment of truth, ASEAN has problems and dynamics of its own just as other comparabl e organizations. As for theories of integration, they represent hypotheses and their creators do not hesitate to alter them. What may be widely approved in one decade or less may be discarded within the next ten years. Models and theories of integration too o ften have little relevance to the world of reality. The structure and functions of ASEAN's institutions at the begtnnmg o f its second decade were undergoing particular challenge and change. An increase in functions was reflected in organization although changes in structu re did not necessarily mean progress. It is always easy in an organization to refer a complex subject to an ad hoc committee which may become a permanent committee even though the rationale for the creation of the original comm ittee no longer exists. Or, in other words, impressive offices can ex ist for officials complete with desks, rugs and flags but with the t elephones not connected. By the time of the Bali summit in February 1976, the organizational arrangements of ASEA.J'l to implement its stated purposes had proliferated to the point th at baffled everyone concerned. Not without reason, therefore, did the leaders a t Bali call for the restructuring of t he Association. The reorganizing was still under way in 19 79. Particularly confusing was the administrative implementatio n of the efforts of the Foreign Ministers to maintain t he appearance of an economic and sociocultural organization and at the same time to keep political discussions out of the regular ministerial and other gatherings. When the Foreign ~li nisters held "special" or separate meetings -- some very important -- to review international developments that concern the region, even though these discussions were considered political and "outside the purview of ASEAN", the same leaders as at ministerial meetings were present and the machinery of the Association was available to carry out recommendat io ns. A case in point is the Committee of Senior Officials, meeting over several years on the implementatio n of the highly political Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 19 7 1. An organizational chart of ASEAN at the time of the Bali summit was revealing of the purposes, structure and functions o f ASEAN. It does not explain procedures or mode o f operation, nor does it spell out in detail channels of authority.

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ASEAN's highest echelon is the Heads of Government who meet as and when considered necessary. No meetings were held from August 1967 u ntil the one in February 1976 at Bali. The second summit, in part to commemorate ASEAN's tenth anniversary, came quickly thereafter in August 1977 at Kuala Lumpur. No session took place in 1978, fo r the government heads did not consider it needed. The summits are not mentioned in the Bangkok Declaration. The Annual Meeting o f Fo reign Ministers is the highest con tinual decisionThe Ministerial Meetings formulate policy, making organ o f the Association. co-ordinate activities, adopt the Annual Report, review the decisions made by lower bodies and set forth the Recommended Programme o f Work. The meetings provide an opportunity for ASEAN official s at several levels to d iscuss common problems and for the Association to cui tivate public relatio ns. Just below the Ministerial Meeting o f Fo reign Ministers is the Standing Committee, a decisionma.king bo dy o f the Ambassado rs of ASEAN members in a given capital with the Chairman the Fo reign Minister of the host country. It meets several times each year, and subm its to the Fo reign Ministers only the recommendatio ns that have been approved b y bodies further down the ladder. The Standing Committee is the "policy arm" between the Annual Ministerial Meetings and is primarily responsible fo r conducting the external relations of ASEAN. Although not mentioned in the Bangko k Declaration o f 196 7, the Meetings of Secretaries General, one person for each member country who served as Head of the National Secretariat to implement ASEAN decisions in his country, came into exastence. Convening frequently, these meetings emerged as more important than the Standing Commilttee, for the five senio r officials were involved in the actual supervision of the Association's activi ties and screening of the recommendations of its technical com mittees. Exactly wh at will be the ro le o f these officials as a unit in the future remains to be seen with the creation o f the ASEAN Secretariat and the appointment of a Secretary General. Probably little change is in sight. Eleven Permanent Committees of experts and officials from the member coun tries served at the time o f the Bali summit the interests of the Association. Thear work was a significant component although some committees were more effective than o thers. The titles indicate the range of activities: food and agriculture, commu nications, air traffic services and meteorology, civil air transportation, finance, commerce and industry, transportation and telecommunications, tourism, shipping, mass media, science and techno logy, and sociolcultural activities.

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Duplication of functions came to exist in the Permanent Committees as they proliferated over the first decade. Solid programme recommendations and implementation of projects were not easy to come by. A large number of subsidiary or auxiliary bodies related to the Permanent Committees were also created like subcommittees, meetings of experts, and working groups. In another category of ASEAN machinery at the time of Bali were the several Special and Ad Hoc Committees and advisory bodies. Included were the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations or SCCAN, the ASEAN Brussels Committee, the Joint ASEAN-EEC Stu dy Group, the ASEAN Senior Trade Officials, the ASEAN Geneva Committee, the ASEAN Senior Officials on Synthetic Rubber, the Senior Officials on Sugar, the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities, and the -Senior Officials of ASEAN members' planning agencies, who served as an economic policy co-ordinating group. Among these organs, the most well-known was SCCAN with its ASEAN Brussels Committee of Ambassadors or representatives engaged in discussions with the EEC on commercial concessions. In another economic area of importance, the Meeting of ASEAN Senior Trade Officials was the body to whom the ASEAN Geneva Committee of ambassadors or representatives reported on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

By the early summer of 1978, the reorganization of ASEAN had led to major changes. At the same time, as specified by the Kuala Lumpur summit of August 1977, they were not to alter the status of the Bangkok Declaration ten years earlier as "the basic document". Yet, in an implicit way, the evolution of ASEAN's organization did alter the Declaration, giving the skeleton considerable flesh. Basically the changes relate to three areas -- the addition of meetings of other ministers apart from the Foreign Ministers, the regrouping of various committees, and the establishment in June 1976 of the ASEAN Secretariat with its own Secretary GeneraL Five new Ministerial Meetings have been officially established to consider co-operation in the Association in the respective fields of competence. The Meetings are held by ASEAN Economic Ministers, Labour Ministers, Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare, Ministers of Education and Information Ministers. The Permanent Committees have been abolished. In their place, as regards

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the important field of economic co-operation, arc five economic committees under the ASEAN Economic Ministers: Trade and Tourism, Industry, Minerals, Energy, Food, Agriculture, Forestry, Finance and Banking, and Communications and Transportation. Not only the relevant Permanent Committees but also the relevant Special and Ad Hoc Co mmittees -- with the working groups and o ther subordinate bodies -- were subject to merger with the respective ASEAN economic committees. Thus the mach mery for economic co-operation now consists of the Meetings of the ASEA!\ Econo mic Ministers, of the five Economic Committees, and of their various subcommittees, working groups, ad hoc bodies, expert groups, and others. The remaining Permanent Committees have now been changed into the Committees on Scien ce and Technology, Culture and Information, and Social Development, the th ree being responsible to the relevant ASEAN Ministers' Meetings. The AS E~ Secretariat in Jakarta under the Secretary General has three bureau direc tors -- one fo r economic affairs, the second for science and technology, and the third for social and cultural affairs -- as well as a foreign trade and economic relations officer, an administrative one, a public information officer, and an assistant to the Secretary General. The central Secretariat with the office of the Secretary General in Jakarta is very modest indeed in keeping with the consensus o f the Association. The Secretary General is not Secretary General o f ASEAN, only of its Secretariat. Indonesians have complained about the relative lack o f interest in the central organ in some ASEAN capitals. At the national level, the title " ASEAN National Secretariat" has been altered to "Office of the Director General, ASEAN- (name o f member state)" with the Secretary General now called Director General. The change in title is abou t the only change over three years after the central organ came into being. The five Directors General are more powerful than the Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat. The procedures or modes of operation of the Association have changed m various ways over th e years, despite a bedrock of continuity. As decisions are made by unanimous consent, the tendency to procrastinate, to postpone, is well established when unanimous consent is not possible and, in effect, the veto exists. The pace can be set by the slowest membet . On the other hand, the Association would not have survived if it had ridden roughshod over the national sovereignty o f its partners. Furthermo re, decisions can be made if in effect a minority does not vote in th e negative. Here silence gives consent, and decision by consensus can gloss over differences.

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It was unfortunate that little lateral contact existed among the Permanent

Committees. Their members were frequently frustrated because their recommendations were so often not implemented. The Special and Ad Hoc Committees were also weakened by lack of co-ordination, overlapping functions, and improvization of ad hoc measures. What the reorganization will do is a question. The ASEAN Secretariat now serves as the channel of formal communications in various respects. Critics are inclined to believe it is a case of new committee bottles for old wine with an ASEAN Secretariat too limited in resources to make much difference. At the country level -- which is still basic -- conflicts of opinion can weaken an ASEAN project. Channels of authority in the Association have often been cumbersome and inefficient. The Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the sessions of the Standing Committee, and the meetings of Secretaries General, or now Directors General, have represented the senior decisiorunaking groupings through which recommendations made lower down by committees and other bodies have had to pass. The institution of meetings of other ministers, particularly the Economic Ministers, has raised problems. Pride is involved; they prefer to report to Heads of Government rather than Foreign Ministers. Precedents are hard to establish. The central Secretariat, although a new element in ASEAN, has not really altered the channels of authority. Finally, at the lower level the consequences of reorganization are not certain. Lines of authority have not been clear in many, if not most, committees of the past. The multinational projects have often suffered from the failure to establish priorities and the lack of direction. Here again critics are pessimistic about the future. Another consideration should be entered into the record. What a tremendous amount of time and energy is involved in the full scope of ASEAN ration of ASEA N J ournalists to the ASEAN Bankers' Associatio n. No t witho ut reason did Tun Abdul Razak in 1975 n o te that a " consultative machinery' ' sho uld be established so me time in the future in o rder that the "po tentialities of private bodies " could be used to strengthen th e government activities o f the Assoc iatio n . T his rather dismal presen tatio n of th e administration of ASEAN should not lead t o abandon and despair. At the national level comparable examples are widespread in the world, and many inte rnatio nal o rganizations with far mo re years of precedents and experience do no t provide shining examples of efficiency. It is hoped that ASEAN in the second decade o f its existence will be able to streamline its structure and procedures to better carry ou t its o bjectives and give more meaning to its func tio ns. Perhaps the reorganizatio n will do so. The in tegrat io n of th e Association is related to its institutionalization. As the evidence indicates, the establishment of regional institutions that best meets the needs o f ASEAJ\ as an o rganizatio n o f sovereign states in Southeast Asia is still an ongoing co ncern . Fo r the Assoc iatio n to move in o ne leap or even a series of leaps from its present institutional framewo rk to integratio n in terms of uniting to form a transnatio nal policy wou ld be impossible. Furthermo re, the obj ectives of the Assoc iatio n do no t call fo r it and the members would not accept it. lJHegration wo uld involve the phased reduction of the attributes o f national sovereignty (onl y recentl y wo n by four of the members) and the gradual emergence of an expanding regio nal aut hority. In th eory, the development of regional transnati o nal institutio ns could represent a continuum towards integratio n with regional interests supplanting natio nal interests and centripetal fo rces o vercoming centrifugal o nes. ASEAN's integrative potential, ho wever, should no t be exaggerated; great expectatio ns could lead to disillusio nment. What can be realized at the po litical e lite lc:vel and later ho pefull y broadened u. th e expansion o f co-operation, a precondition fo r integration. The development o f a communit y o f interests and ~pira t io ns, a co nsensus relative to values, to o utlooks, and ways to handle common pro blems in terms o f co-o rdinatio n and co nsultation can be in the natio nal mt erest o f aJJ members o f the Asso ia tio n.

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The Impact of the Fall of Indochina, of the Vietnamese Conquest of Kampuchea, and of China's Invasion of Vietnam The greatest catalyst for ASEAN was the fall of Indochina to the communists in 1975. How long the effects of this catalyst will last depends upon developments in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, and in the Association itself. From the very beginning, Indochina had been of considerable interest to ASEAN and its partners. 1'he question of membership --before 1975 of Cambodia, Laos, the Republic of Vietnam, and even the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- and after 1975 of Democratic Kampuchea and later the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and, as of early July 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam -- simply would not go away. It is important, however, to stress at the outset that Indochinese attitudes towards ASEAN as an organization and towards its five members are different subjects just as the attitudes of the Association and its members towards the Indochinese st ates are different matters. When the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in May 1975 for their annual Ministerial Meeting, the rules of the game o f international politics in Indochina had changed. The dust had not yet settled after the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh to the communist victors. Nor was it certain how far American disengagement would go in Southeast Asia. The Association in the new international context was viewed by some observers as having a potential of providing a noncommunist alternative to Communist Indochina and Am erican disengagement. Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak in addressing the May meeting spoke in the words of the joint communique of the "testing times ahead" and of the "new changes and challenges of our time". Although the communique did not specifically refer to Indochina among its twenty-three items, the possible implications of the communist victories were in the background. In fact, the Foreign Ministers reviewed in one session recent events in Indochina, expressed a desire for friendly relations, but called for strengthening ASEAN. At the next Ministerial Meeting in June 1976 after the Bali summit, the Ministers specifically directed attention in the joint communique to "different economic and social systems within the region", praised increased bilateral contacts, but stressed the importance of "mutual sincerity" and "reciprocal initiatives". The meeting took place a few days before the formal reunification of Vietnam, and President Marcos in an opening address indicated that the peace o f the region depended substantially upon keeping a power equilibrium. (Apart from Indochina, the Foreign Ministers were

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concerned abou t East Timor. They reaffi rmed that its future ultimately remained in the hands of its people.) Shortly before the Kuala Lumpur summit the next year, the Foreign Ministers in their july meeting urged peaceful and benefi cial relations with Vie tnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, emphasizing mutual respect fo r sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of each other. At the heart o f the matter is Communist Vietnam. A new power equation in Southeast Asia had become a fact o f life. Th e power position of Communist Vietnam is now by far the strongest of any state in th e region. The power potential will be greater if and when the integration o f South Vietnam is completed. Hanoi rules a population of over 50 million people who are energetic and talented. At their disposal are abundant coal reserves in the north and an important rice potential in the south. In mass mobilization and regimentation, the collec tive leadership o f the Vietnamese communists with their party cadres excels. Hanoi's diplomatic and military record was remarkable in the Thirty Years War, with tenacity a major characteristic. 1l1e present military manpo wer almost exceeds or is comparable in number to that o f all the ASEAN countries toge ther. The armed forces are well trained, carefull y indoctrinated, experienced in battle, and mo tivated. They are also well armed, their weapons having come from the Soviet Union, the PRC, and, through capture, the U.S. At the same time corruption in Vietnam is a living reality, bureaucracy is inefficient, morale has reportedly declined in both civilian and military circles since the fall of Saigon, Laos and Kampuc hea are heavy burdens for Hanoi, and China's border war was costly for all concerned. The Vietnam people are tired of crises and wars. With a GNP in 1976 o f only US$6.5 billion and a per capita incom e of only US$140 they have a lo ng way to go. Hanoi's relations with ASEAN have presented a complex pattern of action and reaction. Communist Vietnam long rebuffed the efforts of ASEAN to extend the olive branch. The organ ization was considered a puppet o f American imperialism, a new version of SEATO, a militaristic association aimed at Hanoi. This opposition continued after its writ ex tended to Saigon in 1975, but was somewhat softened in 1977, possibly refl ecting a much more conciliatory a ttitude towards the members of ASEAN, beginning in the Summer of the previous year. By the Summer of 1978 Vietnam had clearly dropp ed its criticism of the organization, at least for a while. In February 1976, after a meeting o f the Association's Foreign Ministers, Hanoi accused th e U.S. of using th e Sout heast Asian noncommunist countries as well as J apan to keep the remaining American positions in Asia. Th e Bali summit later in the mon th produced one of the bluntest pronouncements o f Vietnam relative

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to the policies of its neighbours. Nhan Dan , the Communist Party daily, soon after the meeting, published an editorial, pointecUy broadcast by Radio Hanoi, noting the "unprecedented opportunity" now found in Southeast Asia, citing as a stimulating example the communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, and promising the full backing of Hanoi for the overthrow of established governments in the intensification of the "just struggle" on the part of the Southeast Asian peoples against these governments. Hanoi's response to the Kuala Lumpur summit in August 19 77, in contrast to the Bali one, was moderate expressing a desire to develop ties of friendship and different kinds of co-operation with the countries o f Southeast Asia. Meanwhile Vietnam significantly outlined to the Woodcock Commission of the U.S. in March its basic foreign policy towards the countries of the region. The Four Points of the Foreign Minister had been previously expressed but their presentation to the American Commission gave them even more weight. It is important to note that the word "region" was actually used in three of the Four Po ints suggesting that Hanoi accepted the regional concept of Southeast Asia. The first point, whose genesis is found in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence worked out in Sino-Indian correspondence, called for respect for sovereignty, independence, and territory integrity, noninterference and nonaggression, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. The second point which had appeared, for instance, in the Vietnamese-Philippine agreement of July 1976 on establishment of diplomatic relations forbade the use of one's territory by any outside state for either direct or indirect aggression and intervention against another country or other countries in the region. The third point urged that disputes in the region of Southeast Asia be settled through negotiations based on respect, equality , and mutual understanding. Good neighbourly relations, cultural exchanges and economic co-operation founded on mutual benefit and equality were stressed. The final point, coming nearest to ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration, called for co-operation among the countries of th e region to promote prosperity in accordance with the specific conditions of each one and for the sake o f "genuine independence, peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia", contributing thus to th e peace of the world. It is noticeable that the Four Points focused on bilateral relations, not international organizations. They were also platitudinous, but this characteristic is not restricted to Vietnamese statements of principles. How the Four Po ints were actually applied to Hanoi would be th e most important consideration.

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Communist Vietnam's bilateral relations with the five members of ASEAN merit special attention. Associated with the reunification of the country in early July 1976 was a clearly made effort to establish or fully normalize relations with all of them. Phan Hien, Deputy Foreign Minister, made a goodwill trip to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. By the end of the Summer, agreement had been reached on diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the last of th e members of ASEAN. Not long thereafter in the late Summer and early Fall of 1978 came the veritable diplomatic offensive of Hanoi towards the ASEAN countries. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited Bangkok, Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Undoubtedly influenced by its war with Kampuchea and even much more byt its tension with China, Vietnam sought to partially offset them by better ties with the ASEAN partners. Hanoi wanted economic and technical co-operation with them. It was also aware that the Maoist communist parties in various countries and the Hanoi-Peking split made Vietnamese nonsubversion pledges easier. The strategy in part called for common support for a variation of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, not membership in ASEAN. Here the last of the Four Points is relevant, "genuine independence, peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia" rather than "peace, freedom and neutrality" as stipulated in the zonal concept of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Neither the Vietnamese leader nor the ASEAN chief executives retreated from their viewpoints. Pham Van Dong noted in a press conference in Bangkok that more discussion was needed on the words "freedom" and "independence". In the joint communique, for instance, of President Suharto and Prime Minister Dong, Indonesia was committed to strive for the realization of the ASEAN concept in the sentence following the statement that the two leaders had expressed their views about the desirability o f Southeast Asia as an "area of peace, independence, freedom and neutrality as well as of stability and prosperity". (It should be reiterated that Peking supports the ASEAN concept. Also, Ieng Sary of Democratic Kampuchea pledged his support in an October visit in Manila.) The reaction in the capitals of the Association to the tour of the Vietnamese Prime Minister was generally the same. As he sought to make the trip, he would be given a polite but cautious welcome. ASEAN diplomats conferred on common policy and carefully watched the progress of the tour. The partners in the organization did not want to take sides in tihe communist controversies involving Peking, Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Moscow. There was much concern that Dong was a stalking horse for the Soviet Union. Formal treaties of friendship and nonaggression were not favoured (tht·y

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might alann China and he viewed as a move towards the Soviet Union's proposed collective security pact), but the comprehensi~e nonsubversion pledges (probably the highlight of the tour) made by Dong i~ ASEAN countries were welcomed. The visit also provided opportunity for bilateral discussions on particular problems in relations between Hanoi and the other five· capitals, and some agreements were made. Vietnam's membership in the Associati.o n was not an issue, ,for Hanoi did not request it and ASEAN would not have granted it. All members were aware that Vietnam as a partner under the present circumstances would be resented in China and might be viewed as a foot in the door of the Soviet Union. In the past Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia had been relatively sympathetic to Hanoi's admission, while Singapore and Indonesia had oppposed it. Prime Minister Lee held the viewpoint that the communist threat of insurgencies was only postponed not diminished by the conflict between Hanoi and Peking, which motivated the Vietnamese diplomatic offensive. Pham . Van Dong was not really trusted before his trip or after it. The Vietnamese-Soviet treaty of friendship and co-operation in early November confirmed many suspicions. Nor could Dong be certain that Hanoi's difficulties were not widely viewed as a blessing in disguise in many ASEAN circles. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, launched on 25 December and aimed at the overthrow of the Democratic Kampuchea of Prime Minister Pol Pot and the establishment of a regime subservient to Hanoi, sho'c ked ASEAN. Phnom Penh fell on 7 January, and within a few days Vietnamese forces were within eight miles of the Thai border. Reflecting the planning of General Van Tien Dung, anny chief of staff, who also was the mastermind behind the Spring offensive leading to the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in April 1975, Hanoi's Blitzkrieg in Kampuchea overran the cities, towns, main roads, airfields, and sea ports in a relatively short period of time. Probably over 100,000 Vietnamese troops and about 20,000 Kampucheans hostile to the regime of Pol Pot participated in the lightning offensive. A People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with a Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council under the presidency of Heng Samrin was installed in Phnom Penh. Neither he nor any of his Khmer colleagues was wellknown in Kampuchean politics, and the leaders of the new regime clearly held their positions on the basis of Vietnamese bayonets. The programme of the government was outlined on 2 December, before the military offensive began, when a Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) was proclaimed. The word "salvation" rather than "liberation" was purposely chosen.

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Despite the mil itary superiority of Han oi in Kampuchea, significant and widespread guerrill a n·sistance erupted. But would it have popular support? On the o ne hand , the Khmer people had suffered a holocaus t under one of the most infamous regimes in Asian history and the new government in Phnom Penh promised a moderate version of communism with a return to many o f the family, religious, and o ther value~ ex isting before th e Khmer Rou ge assumed power in April 19 75. On the oth er hand, Kampuchean nationalism is strong, the people fear and dislike th e Vietnamese, a11d no government in Phnom Penh can be popular if it is a puppet of the powerful neighbour to the east. The guerrillas th emselves were divided between those reflecting th e ex tremism of Pol Pot and the moderation of Son Sen, a former defence m inister for Pol Pot, and others. Entering into the Kampuchean dilemma was another vital consideration -- the supply and n ow of arms. Would China provide them ? To whom ? What -.vould be Thailand's role? And, over time, what would be the attitude of the Communist Party of Thailand? Hanoi suffered a diplomatic setback, through its Kampuchean policy, in Bangko k and the o ther ASEAN capitals, in a large part of the communist world, in the U.S. and j apan, in many of the nonaligned countries, and in the United Nations. That the Vietnamese communists were interested in an Indochina under their aegis wa:. widel y accepted, Hano i's relationship with the Lao People's Democratic Republic being an example for the People's Republic o f Kam puchea. The Vietnamese takeover o f Kampuchea by military means raised serious questions about Hanoi's ultimate objectives in Southeast Asia. Perhaps Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiao-ping was right when h e indicated they focused on "regional hegemony". Perhaps Prime Minister Pham Van Dong during his visits to the five ASEAN countries in 1978 was just paying lip service when he m ade his pledges to them about respecting their sovereignty , independence and territorial integrity. Hanoi took a calculated risk in its relatio ns with Peking and Moscow when the Kampuchean invasion was launc hed: it believed -- and correctly ·- that China would not at the time militarily intervt:ne in Kampuchea o r along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Furthermo re, Hanoi was prepared to face a delay in the normalization o f relations with Washington. It is quite possible, however, th at the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam did not anticipate such widespread condemnation in the United Nations and among the nonaligned countries. One of the earl y steps of the new government in Phnom Penh was to condemn the Pol Po t regime's extremism and brutality, an evaluation widely shared in the world. For tl1e Thai, the Vie tnamese takeover of Kampuc hea completed the eros1on of buffer territory between themselves and the Vietnamese. Hanoi was now paramount

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not only in Laos but also in Kampuchea. With the road to Bangkok only a relatively short distance from the Khmer border, ideal tank terrain, Thailand's claim of being the " fron tline" member of ASEAN was certainly valid. Bangko!< reacted by drawing closer to China but not to the point o f burning its bridges tv Hanoi and Indochina; Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan welcomed American sympathy but made it a point to carry out plans to visit both Washingto n and Moscow. Support for Thailand came from all its partners in ASEAN; Malaysia and Singapore were stronger in their attitudes than Indonesia and the Philippines. On 9 January Indo nesian Foreign Minister Moch tar Kusumaatmadja, as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee in J akarta, issued a statement deploring the escalation of the armed conflict between Hanoi and Phnom Penh . As a result of a Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Bangko k, 12-13 January, the ASEAN powers in a joint statement ·· the strongest political one ever issued to date ·· condemned the "armed intervention" in Kampuchea and urged the "immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces" from its soil. Although Vietnam was not men tioned in the clauses cited, there was no doubt that Vietnam was the culprit. The partners felt they had been let down by Pham Van Dong in his pledges relative to respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and they were encouraged by anticipated condemnation of Hanoi in the Security Council of the United Nations. The ASEAN Governments also took the position that, as regards recognition of the new Kampuchean regime, they would wait until the situation cleared and act only after consultation among themselves. The Vietnamese takeover of Kampuchea thus strengthened rather than weakened ASEAN and gave added momentum to it. The joint statement was not welcomed in Hanoi and Moscow but it was well received m Peking. As could be expected, the communist world divided sharply on socialist Vietnam's invasion of a socialist neighbour. Sho rtly after the establishment of the Heng Samrin Government thirteen states closely associated with Moscow, including Vietnam and Laos, of course, joined it in recognizing the new regime. Rumania and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, were sharply critical. It was widely believed that the support the Soviet Union gave Vietnam in weapons and diplomacy had strengthened the Kremlin in its rivalry with Peking and in Southeas t Asia. Another state in the region h ad jo ined the Moscow bloc, at least for a few years.

In contrast, China lost face as a result of the Vietnamese invasion. True, Peking did not commit combat forces to Kampuchea ·· as Washington once did to South Vietnam ·.. but Chinese arms and advisers were not insignificant, and Chinese

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diplomacy and propaganda were deeply engaged in the effort to prevent the fal l of the Khmer Rouge Government. Nor did Peking's military buildup and the various armed incidents along the fro ntier with Vietnam alter the course of events. Deputy Prime Minister Deng, however, refused to rule ou t the use of force in the future agai nst Hanoi, and Peking asser ted the war in Kam puchea had shifted into a guerrilla phase and that Chinese arms and materials would be fu rnished the guerrillas. It soon claimed the resupplying was und er way and indicated that T hailand was covertly facil itating the effort. Bangkok den ied such a role. Any hope of early normalization in relations be tween Hanoi and Washington was blasted by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The U.S. condemned Hanoi and called for it to withdraw its forces. Vietnam and th e Soviet Union were warned against any move against Thailand. President Jimm y Carter in a press conference on 17 January indicated that his country wanted the "integrity o f Thailand protected " and told Prime Minister Kriangsak on 16 Febru ary during th e latter's o fficial visit to Washington that the U.S. was "deeply committed' to the inviolability o f Thailand's border. The President made it a point to call attention to the Manila Treaty of 1954 under wh1ch Bangko k and \Vashington were alllies. J apan also criticized Hanoi's move against Phnom Penh, and Tokyo's economic aid programme to Vietnam was placed in jeopardy. At the Security Council of the United Nations the Soviet Union found itself largely isolated. Norodom Sihanouk, form er Kampuchean chief of state, had been allowed by the Pol Pot regime to leave Phnom Penh, fl y to Peking and New York, and present Democratic Kampuch ea's case against Vietnam. Seven nonaligned member of the Council presented a draft resolution calling in effe ct for Hano i to get its forces out o f Kampuchea. Chin a preferred a stronger resolution but supported that of the nonaligned countries. Tbe vo te on 15 J anuary was l 3-2 with the U.S., France, Great Britain, and the PRC in favour and th e Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia against. Moscow's negative vote was a veto. Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiao-ping during his visits in Washington and Tokyo in late January and early February was no t bluffing when he refused to rule out the use of force against Vietnam. Hanoi, he bel ieved, should be punished for its behaviour. It should not be allowed to become a Russian Cuba in Southeast Asia. Following the persecu tion of the Chinese in Vietnam, border difficulties and clashes, the establishment of Laos as a client state, an d th e alignment with Moscow shown in membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and in the treaty of friendship an d co-operation, Han oi's final step, in Peking's eyes, was the

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invasion and conquest of Kampuchea, a de facto ally. credibility of the PRC were at stake.

The prestige, honour, and

On 1 7 February Peking launched an invasion ·· what it called a "counterattack in self-defense" .. across a wide front of the long Sino-Vietnamese frontier. China, aware of the precedent of its limited border war with India in 1962, revealed the military action was limited in scope and duration. "Teaching Vietnam a good lesson", not the capture of Hanoi, nor the acquisition of its territory, was a stated objective. The reaction of the Soviet Union was to rush arms to its Vietnamese ally and to concentrate a naval force in the South China Sea. In the background was the possibility of a Soviet attack in Sinkiang or Manchuria. The U.S. linked Hanoi's· conquest of Kampuchea with Peking's invasion of Vietnam and condemned both. ASEAN quickly reacted. After an exchange of viewpoints the members issued a statement on 20 February through the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Foreign Minister Mochtcu· Kusumaatmadj a of Indonesia. It urgently called for the "conflicting parties" to end the fighting and for the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from "all the areas of conflict in Indo-China". It also appealed for restraint by external powers from steps that might escalate the fighting. Altl10ugh countries were not specifically named and no party was condemned, it was clear that the statement referred to the Vietnamese-Kamp uchean and the Chinese-Vietname se conflicts. The appeal for restraint from outside the region was directed at the Soviet Union. The statement, noticeably not the result of a meeting of Foreign Ministers, reflected somewh at less consensus in the Chinese-Vietnames~ con flict than in the Vietnamese-Karnp uchean one. (A number of bilateral summits were later held.) Both wars were pointedly linked in the ASEAN appeal. The U.S. which had been in consultation with the Association members believed that the statement might provide a broad base for a resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations that might escape a Russian or Chinese veto. ln the end such a resolution sponsored by the ASEAN powers was not approved, for Moscow stressing linkage vetoed it on 16 March. The vote was again 13-2. The ASEAN states themselves having different emphases in the crisis in attitudes towards China and Vietnam, wanted to avoid getting into a position in the United Nations where their stand would put them firmly on the side of Peking or Moscow. It would be easier to find themselves in the diplomatic manoeuvring lined up against the Kremlin.

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Military developments inside Vietnam -- twenty or so miles south of the border between Hanoi and Peking -- soon overtook the debate on an acceptable resolution in the Security Council. With the Chinese capture of Lang Son, a key location leading to Friendship Pass and China, following the fall of a few other provincial capitals, Peking announced on 5 March that it was starting as of that date the withdrawal of its armed forces from Vietnam, noting it had "attained the goals set for them". Hanoi indicated it would not harass the troops during the withdrawal and called for their return to their side of the "historical border". On 16 March Peking announced the completion of its troop withdrawal. ·Both China and Vietnam claimed victory in the short war. Certainly the evidence was not conclusive but it would seem to indicate that Peking in controlling events emerged with a stronger hand in both the tangible and intangible aspects of the conflict. Many Southeast As~ans in the ASEAN states were satisfied with the results but nervous about the future. For the other members of the Association, Thailand tended to set the pace when it came to dealing with Indochina, especially in the communist wars of late 19?8 and · early 1979. At the same time, the policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam towards the Kingdom of Thailand was a barometer, to a certain extent, of Hanoi's policies in noncommunist Southeast Asia. Communist insurgency in various Thai areas like the northeast, the north, and the south was real, opening opportunities when favourable conditions arose. The Thais themselves basically viewed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as their chief strategic threat. Bangkok believed that cordial relations with China would give the Thais a stronger base in relations with Hanoi. Thailand placed a lower priority on better ties with Moscow as compared with Peking. Bangkok also thought that trade could be developed with Vietnam and hoped the exchange of goods would serve as an inducement to closer relations. It was also believed that Thailand could have better ties with Laos if such existed with Hanoi. Bangkok like Peking did not favour seeing Indochina under Vietnam·'s rule. Probably Prime Minister Pham Van Dong accomplished more in his trip to Thailand than in any other ASEAN capital. Apart from Thai support for the positions of the Association and real but somewhat skeptical interest in the Vietnamese nonsubversion pledge (either direct or indirect), a number of bilateral accords were reached. Bangkok would provide a long term line of credit worth US$5 million; telecommunications links would be resumed; Thailand would return 5 captured Vietnamese servicemen and Vietnam 30 strayed Thai fishermen; and a special joint commission would meet in October to discuss the repatriation of some

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40,000 Vietnamese who had fled to Thailand from Indochina m the First Indochinese War. (When it met an impasse resulted.) Thai relations with neighbouring Laos and Kampuchea after the communist victories of 1975 reflected the dominant influence o f Hanoi first in Laos and later in Kampuchea. In July 1977 Vietnam signed an important treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Lao People 's Democratic Republic and in February 19 79 with the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Later in March, Vientiane and Phnom Penh formally reached agreement on economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation, thus completing the Indochinese triangle, though in less embracing terms. Thailand's relations with both Laos and Kampuchea, even before the communists assumed control, were often stormy but the erosion of the two buffers placed even more burdens on Thai diplomacy and indirectly on Bangkok's Southeast Asian associates. The relations of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and also the communist regimes in Vientiane and Phnom Penh varied but the similarities were greater than the differences. Clearly the fall of Indochina to communism, the Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam had a deep impact on all memb ers of ASEAN, an impact that accentuated the political and diplomatic dimension of the Association.

The Challenge of Unity in Diversity for ASEAN as an Organization The regional interests of ASEAN arise from a perception of regionalism as a viable principle in international relations. Involved are an evaluation of regional interests in the context of total interests in the capitals of Southeast Asia and arguments for regionalism in contrast to those against it in the area. The economic role of Japan as a potential catalyst for ASEAN, especially after the Kuala Lumpur summit in 1977, enters into the equation. On the other hand, the demise of SEATO provides at least some perspective for multilateral but not necessarily bilateral military co-operation in the region. Finally, the specific roles of the five members in ASEAN reveal the degree of priority, given regional interests. In many respects, the creation and nature of the permanent central Secretariat reflect the attitudes and commitment of the partners to regional co-operation.

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Although the national interests of the members of ASEAN are paramount, the regional ones are increasing in importance. But is the community of interests growing at a sufficient rate to sustain the Association over the long haul? What does ASEAN per se add to this community? States will make meaningful agreements only if they believe their own interests are best served by a real commitment. As has been noted, the ASEAN Declaration of 196 7 does not have the binding aspects of a treat . 1n another comideration, to what extent are the various interests -- economic, social, cultural, political and diplomatic ones -- compatible m the Association and to what degree docs the organization furth er these types as national interests? As of now, the military and strategic ones have not been associated in a multilateral framework in ASEAN. Common security interests in a military alliance can be the cement of an organization, but the threat can change and the alliance can wither on the vine. SEATO is an example. It may be that the current basket of interests in ASEAN gives promise of much more longevity and durability than the security ones of a formal military pact. In another consideration, is the distribution of benefits and responsibilities m the Association equitable and related to the actual capabilities of the partners? Obviously the rule of unanimity makes no distinction between a big country like Indonesia and a small one like Singapore, and the concept of one vote one member as in the General Assembly of the United Nations applies to all regardless of population, size, or other criteria. Furthermore, is ASEAN a legal and doctrinaire concept lacking political viability? The ability of many new states in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere in the world, to meet their obligations is sometimes limited and subject to change. Since the creation of the Association in 196 7 the only governments o f member states that have been altered by force are found in Thailand, but several other partners have been under the strong influence of a single leader, a situation which could change in the course of time. Finally, a multilateral agreement, as ASEAN represents, can make common interests more precise and explicit -- the Bangkok Declaration of 196 7 spells out purposes in some detail -- but the formu lation o f policies and programmes to implement objectives can falter. Few instances exist in history where an association somewhat like ASEAN has survived. But the unwritten British constitution on the national level has long been tested by the vicissitudes o f war and peace and ASEAN on the international level may surprise the pessimists. Basic to the regional interests of ASEAN is the premise that the arguments for regionalism in Southeast Asia on balance outweigh those against it. It is

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certainly true that faith in the intangibles of international relations, like the spirit of co-operation in a large part of the region, has to be taken into account. Some analysts already are stressing the political concept of two Southeast Asias, the three communist states of Indochina and the five noncommunist partners of ASEAN. Others are accentuating the two Southeast Asias in geographical terms, one mainland or peninsular and the other insular or maritime. The human diversity of the area -- ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural -- cannot be denied, a fact contributing to the poor development of regional consciousness. Problems of communication and transportation, related to geographic barriers, are manifold; mobility is very much limited. Old animosities and rivalries have surfaced, it should be stressed, and new controversies and jealousies have risen. Nationalism is strong and national resilience growing. At the same time Southeast Asia, as occasionally predicted, has not become the Balkans of the early twentieth century. In the economic dimension, ASEAN, for sure, is not a "natural regional market", rather several "distinct national markets". The economies of the region are essentiall y competitive for outside capital, skill, and markets, while intraregional trade is a relatively minor proportion of the total trade of the countries of the area. Except for Singapore the states are agricul turally based, with a per capita income of less than US$880 a year. The barriers that separated the dependencies of Southeast Asia in the colonial period -- physical, political and psychological -- are now less formidab le but still not yet obliterated among the new states. Furthermore, their political systems, foreign policies, national security outlooks, and power potential remain often disparate. The process of nationbuilding with all its great internal problems is not ye t complete. The arguments for regionalism m Southeast Asia reflect modern developments, m technology and intangibles like attitudes and trends, hopefully at least developing m international relations. Today's means of transportation and communication are breaking down the old barriers. The airplane, for instance, almost annihilates both time and distance. Faster and more efficient m eans of shipping imports and exports by sea, like oil tankers, have been developed. Manufacturing technology has better enabled the production of goods; its spread knows no boundaries. The Green Revolution with the development of miracle rice and o ther commodities is based on scientific agriculture. The research at the Los Banos campus of the University of the Philippines, supported by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, has national as well as regional implications.

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The new states of Southeast Asia before winning independence have had many common experiences. They were colonial dependencies of Western powers; they witnessed the defeat of these rulers and underwent Japanese Occupation in the Second World War; they achieved their independence within the same short span of time. Now they face and perceive numerous common problems in stability and security. Political power is still mainly under the control of a modernized ~ite group, the product of the impact of the West. The frequent meetings of leaders under bilateral and multilateral auspices across a relatively wide spectrum of interests have broken down barriers and created personal ties more conducive to tolerance and understanding. The leaders of ASEAN with a growing involvement m regional matten are becoming both professionally and personally committed to regionalism. They are more self-reliant and pragmatic in their outlooks. It may well be that the next generation of leadership will share a comparable viewpoint. A strong motivation for regional co-operation is to view it as an important if not necessary ingredient in carrying out rapid economic development at home. In other words, regional co-operation becomes not a substitute for but an important input in development at the national level. The imaginative Mekong Project of the United Nations to develop the resources of the Lower Mekong Basin and River in Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea. and Vietnam is a case in point, providing the Mekong Coordinating Committee or a variation of it can get the support of the four governments to co-operate for the common good, and providing adequate assistance is offered by international organizations and outside states. Extensive co-operation facilitates modernization while regional equilibrium with as little outside interference as possible contributes to local security and stability. The creation of new institutions in support of economic development and the role of bankers in tihe development process can work towards regional co-operation. Eugene R. Black, former head of the World Bank and President Johnson's Special Adviser on Asian Economic and Social Development, has stressed the importance of development bankers in the "art of diplomacy" in his Alterntltive in Southeast Asaa, published in 1969 in the midst of the Second Indochinese War. Examples of new institutions along the lines supported by Black are the Asian Development Bank in Manila which began operations in December 1966 and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of powers and international organizations, created in 1967 to assist in the economic development of the huge island state. The establishment of common services may become very significant in the future.

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The eleventh ASEAN Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held on 14-16 June 1978, ten months after the Kuala Lumpur summit, produced a joint communiqu~ that mirrored the expansion of co-operation in various fields. It noted that 755 items had been added to the 71 items accepted for preferential treatment under ASEAN's Preferential Trading Arrangements (a figure still small accompanied by too much red tape) and that the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects and the Supplementary Agreements for the ASEAN Urea Projects in Indonesia and Malaysia (somewhat . premature here) would be signed after the needed constitutional procedures were completed. (The ASEAN diesel engine project collapsed in September as Indonesia was not prepared to grant preferential tariff treatment and Singapore gave it up in favour of one of its own, undertaken by an American firm. As a result Singapore would only furnish 1% capital support in the other four projects so they could qualify for J apanese aid.) In the field of transport and communications, the Foreign Ministers noted significant progress towards the setting up of the ASEAN Submarine Cable Network planned to ljnk the members by 1982. The first segment was completed in August between Singapore and the Philippines. All the members of the Association had made investments in the "ASEAN P-S Cable". Also the Ministers were pleased with the proposed establishment of an ASEAN Regional Satellite System. In other areas, they called attention to agreement on the setting up in the future of "regionally coordinated national reserves for rice" in the member countries (a food security project that would take some time to meaningfully implement), and they approved the creation of an ASEAN Cultural Fund. As far back as December 1969, they had signed an agreement to promote co-operation in cultural and mass media activities. The Ministers also welcomed the establishment of the ASEAN Network of Development Education Centres and the carrying out of five education projects under it. The various steps in the Association's implementation of a population programme were praised. The newly established Social Development Committee would provide an "integrated strategy for social development for ASEAN" and the ASEAN Ministers of Labour would stress efforts on "human resources development". In addition to expressing "concern" about international events relative to

Indocruna, the Foreign Millisters were troubled by the flow of refugees from that area to ASEAN states. The leaders urged the "international community" to make a greater effort to resettle the refugees in third states and thus relieve a "heavy burden" on the members of the Association. (The following February-

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bilateral consultations by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia as Chainnan of the ASEAN Standing Committee with his four colleagues led to a statement on behalf of the Association directing attention to the seriousness of the Indochinese refugee situation ·· it even affected "national security" .. and suggesting the poaibility of a processing centre in · the ASEAN region. The conditions for it, however, as wdl as those of Indonesia and the Philippines for designating island territory rendered difficult such a solution to the problem. Hanoi itself in March agreed to allow the legal emigration of Vietnamese to countries ready to receive them, but Malaysia, Thailand and other ASEAN states were still worried about an exodus.) The Foreign Ministers of the Association do not have to ·convene a formal Ministerial Meeting to get together. All of them usually attend fox: a while the annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Considerable cohesion has developed in the positions of the five partners at the General Assembly. For example, in September 1978, the ASEAN pennanent representatives met to review the agenda and co-ordinate where possible a common stand. In Southeast Alia, East Timor and Brunei have on occasion caused problems. The concert of ASEAN powers in the General Assembly is a marked contrast to the disarray of the communist states.

If the fall of Indochina in 1975 speeded co-operation in ASEAN, the decision of Japan, announced at the Kuala Lumpur meeting in 1977, to provide substantial economic assistance under satisfactory conditions to certain projects of the Association, may possibly have given it a catalytic boost in future development. Three key adjectives relative to Japanese aid should be stressed ·· multilateral, economic and potential. Although Tokyo's bilateral aid to various countries is greater and they prefer it that way, the Japanese decision to help ASEAN as an organization in a substantial way is a new direction. The assistance is in support of economic development but the context of the decision is deeply political. Finally, Japanese aid to ASEAN projects depends upon their feasibility. Discussions between the Association and Tokyo have come a long way since those on the threat of Japanese synthetic rubber in 1973, and are certain to increase. In fact, the dialogue - ASEAN likes the word - between Tokyo and the Association was expanded with the creation of the ASEAN-japan Forum in March 1977 to recommend on a regular basis measures of co-operation. Here the "Fukuda Doctrine", as it came to be called, may be relevant in the future. It was announced by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in

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August 1977 on his way home after the meeting in Kuala Lumpur with the heads of government of ASEAN and after successful visits to several capitals. The Prime Minister chose Manila on 18 August, actually the last stop of' his tour, to make his statement. Although the Fukuda Doctrine was presented in terms of Asia. it had particular reference in time and place to Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister stressed several principles in Asian policy: Japan rejected the role of a military power and was committed to peace; economic and material relations between Tokyo and ASEAN should be motivated by sincere commitment to helping and complementing one another as "fellow Asians" advancing beyond "mere physical satisfaction" to "spiritual fulfllment"; the partnership should be equal or, in Fukuda's words, Tokyo "Will be an equal partner" of ASEAN and its members; and fmally a relationship of mutual understanding with the Indochinese states should be established. The principles of the Fukuda Doctrine are platitudinous but they are not vacuous. Their implementation by Japan itself and the ASEAN powers will not be easy and predictions are difficult. Just how can the right balance be struck in Tokyo's aid to ASEAN regional projects and to individual member countries? In 1976, before the summit at Kuala Lumpur, Japanese bilateral official development assistance to the five ASEAN partners accounted for 48% of the more than 56% for Southeast Asia. In the total figure, Asia accounted for 77%, showing well Japanese priorities. Also, to what extent can the Japanese market be opened to products, especially manufactured ones, from ASEAN states? What about the stabilization of the prices of the raw materials the states export there? Can the economic preponderance of Japan actually not result in a lasting economic sphere of influence in Southeast Asia? Fukuda's visit to the region did soften suspicions in the ASEAN countries but it was only the beginning. Equal in significance, if not more so, was the implication that Japan was going to play a political role in Southeast Asia mo re related to its economic impact. Tokyo was moving closer to a commitment to economic stability and regional peace in the area, in fact, a special relationship of several dimensions. Although no other outside source of support to ASEAN was comparable to that promised by Japan in 1977, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian backing of the Association should not be minimized. Following initial economic consultations between Australia and ASEAN in 1974, Canberra began to participate in joint Australian/ ASEAN projects and the co-operation has subsequently been increased. An ASEAN-Australia Forum is now the fonnat of the dialogue; discussions between them in the fall of 1978 and later were

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heated, over protectionism and aviation. New Zealand and the Association held a meeting in 1975 to begin discussion on regional problems in ASEAN ; a cordial relationship of mutual benefit has developed in the dialogue. In early 1977 formal Canadian/ASEAN economic consultations took place for the first time with lgi"CCment re.ched on four assistance projects and later ones foreseen. ASEAN's dialogue with the EEC began in 1972, aimed at better access of the former's exports in the Iauer's market, but has expanded to other economic fields of interest. In late November 1978, a dialogue at the ministerial level was held in Brussels. Politically the meeting was a success although concrete results in economic co-operation were very limited. The road was paved, however, at a very high level for future progress. In another direction the Association in 1968 requested a United Nations survey which would consider economic co·operation in the ASEAN area. The survey of the United Nations Team co-sponsored by several bodies including the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (the earlier name of ESCAP) was submitted to ASEAN in 1972 and later had considerable imp.ct. Technial assistance has also been provided the Association under the awpica of UNDP (United Nations Development Program)/ESCAP. In dealing with outsiders on economic matters, a custom developed in ASEAN for one of its members to take the leadership on behalf of ASEAN in the co-ordination. Indonesia, for instanc.e, was designated with reference to Japan, and the Philippines, the U.S. After preliminary steps, the first formal U.S./ ASEAN dialogue occurred in Manila on 8-10 September 1977. Subjects of regional interest rather than bilateral concern were considered. Among the topics were the development of ASEAN preferential trading arrangements, the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and questions of special interest to ASEAN arising in Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Commodity issues and policies were stressed. Other topics related to investment, issues between the North and South, and development co-operation.

Although the discussions were known in advance to be the beginning of further ones, the general reaction in the ASEAN countries was not very enthusiastic. The conviction was widespread that the Carter Administration was basically indifferent to the genuine importance of the Association and to its economic needa. Vague assurances of backing and glittering generalizations of support in education and human resource development, health and nutrition, agriculture and rural development, were considered at a premium. The Washington of President Jimmy Carter had not yet, it was believed, come to grips with ASEAN. Furthennore,

70

there was concern in high circles of the Association that the administration in the U.S. was occupied altogether too much with Vietnam in Southeast Asia at the expense of ASEAN. At the same time ASEAN circles believed the dialogue should indicate to Hanoi that the Association was not under American control. A second session of the dialogue between ASEAN and the U.S. was held at a higher level, on 2-4 August \978, in Washington. Fourteen cabinet ministers attended from members of the Association, and the Carter Administration headed by the President and Vice President with an official delegation of fwe cabinet members and a governor hosted the visitors. Economic issues were on the agenda but the discussions had political overtones. President Carter pledged strong support_ for ASEAN goals and promised continued co-operation. He observed that the ASEAN countries serve as examples to others in the area, noted that the U.S. has a strong and lasting interest in Southeast Asia, and stressed opportunities for co-operation in trade and investment. Foreign Minister Romulo called attention to the "great strategic importance, of the ASEAN region, and Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam observed that the Association in the struggle between the communist and noncommunist states was on the American side. Although the ASEAN ministers were not jubilant about the results of the Washington dialogue, they were basically pleased and considered it a defmite step forward. Among the concrete results, the U.S. pledged to "pursue actively, to an early successful conclusion the negotiations on the creation of the Common Fund, whose objective is to · promote stabilization in the prices of commodities produced in the developing countries, and to "play a constructive role, in the efforts 'to conclude fitting arrangements on individual commo4ities. In other directions, the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank would visit the countries of the Association, and the Bank would consider helping ASEAN industrial projects. Also, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation would organize an investment mission · of American businessmen to the ASEAN states. An ASEAN-U.S. Business Council under the auspices of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Industry would be established as quickly as possible. It was clear that business relations and private investments were very much a concern in Washington. Only a "generalized commitment, of increased American aid was made at the conference. Washington later indicated that, as a consequence of the Ministerial Meeting, the economic policy of the U.S. towards Southeast Asia was being shaped to take into account ASEAN. American aid to the Association itself in late 1978 took the form of technical assistance in the development field.

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In contrut to the dimensions of economic aid, both actual and potential, to ASEAN from external powen is the absence of any military assistance to it and of any military activities under its aegis. True, suggestions have been made at times by a high-ranking individual in one or another member country about an ASEAN role in the military field but nothing has come of them. In 1976 the Thai Prime Minister indicated the partners of the Association should assume some kind of mutual security guarantees; the idea fell on deaf ears. When Singapore and Thailand in 1978 decided on a joint venture in arms production it was stressed that the project had no link with ASEAN. Although it is agreed that military co-operation as an Association effort is not desirable but that bilateral military co-operation outside the ASEAN framework is desirable, no one could ignore the fact that the spirit of the Association is conducive to military relationships. The members agree on the nature of the common threat at the present time -iruurgency. However, the possibilities of external armed attack have received more comideration as a consequence of Vietnam's conquest of Kampuchea. The record of bilateral military co-operation with limited objectives involving partnen of the Association is impressive. Several instances should be cited beyond the exchange of intelligence. In 1977, Malaysia and Thailand conducted joint military operations against the Malayan Communist sanctuaries on Thai soil near the frontier. In East Malaysia in the same year joint military operations between Malaysia and Indonesia on the island of Borneo along the SarawakfEast Kalimantan border took place, and co-operation in internal security and defence was marked. In july Indonesia and the Philippines agreed that border troops could cross each other's territory when engaged in hot pursuit. Each country promised in a meeting to improve border patrol operations. Jakarta's ambassador to the Philippines suggested shortly thereafter a tripartite agreement of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia on border patrol and crossing. In 19 77 Jakarta also conducted separate naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Along with actual bilateral and probably increasing multilateral military co-operation among the ASEAN partners is the provision of military assistance in annJ and advice from outside. Each of them in its own national interests has its programme and no attempt is made to co-ordinate the efforts under an ASEAN label. The standardization of arms, all know, is a problem. Nor is there an attempt to broaden the security ties most of the ASEAN members have, once more in their own national interest&, with external powers to embrace all the partners of the Association.

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Finally the adding of a purely military dimension to ASEAN at the present time is not justified if the external threat to the national interests of each country is currently considered. Nor is the situation likely to change in the immediate, foreseeable future. Furthermore, tlie adding of a security dimension in terms of organization might create more problems than it would solve. Arguments over command relationships, differences over defence plans, disputes over budget, various conflicting political considerations as opposed to purely military ones, and other matters could enter into the defence picture. The formal demise of the multilateral SEATO on 30 June 1977, with its military training exercises and defence planning is not forgotten in Southeast Asia. After all, two of SEATO's former participants - Thailand and the Philippines are now members of ASEAN. What is the legacy of the organization which personified the Manila Pact? One point stands out, overwhelming in its significance: SEATO did not prevent the Second Indochinese War and did not insure the survival of South Vietnam. If the organization had met its objectives, the greater part of Indochina would not have fallen into communist hands. At the same time the tactical point can be made that SEATO was not formally invoked in the Indochinese crisis and that the war effort of the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and, in effect, the Philippines, was never made under the SEATO label. Another legacy of the organization is the fact that the U.S., which was essential to its success, failed to persevere in the ultimate test. The consequences of this failure in the short haul might be overcome by a resolute stance in Korea and other measures, but what about the long haul involving stamina among the American public and on Capitol Hill? Finally, the fate of SEATO indicated all too well that a security pact was not necessarily the answer to the prevention of aggression and the preservati·o n of peace, for indirect aggression, by burrowing under international borders through infiltration and subversion, created the same end result as direct aggression across them. Clearly the precedent of SEATO was not a shining example to be emulated in ASEAN. A better approach, in the consensus of its members, was to raise the standard of living at home in competition with that in Communist Indochina. ASEAN leaders noted that, despite their economic problems, the flood of refugees ·was not from their countries but from Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam. The roles of the five member states in the Association vary over time and upon circumstance. Their commitment to regional solutions in ASEAN depends upon their interpretation of the national interest as perceived by the ruling elite. The attitudes of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines

73

towards the

~ation

of a permanent central Secretariat for the Association were

indicative, at least to some extent, of national attitudes on regionalism in Southeast Asia. In the beginning, the concept of a central Secretariat was rejected, for a consensus existed that National Secretariats were sufficient for the tasks envisioned. After all, ASEAN only had secretariats in each of the three member states, and this type of organization had worked reasonably well. Furthermore, ASEAN in its early years was not prepared to support a supranational agency like a central pcnnanent Secretariat. The national interest would best be protected by National Secretariats in each capital. ~

the Association moved towards higher levels of co-operation, the members gradually realized that ASEAN machinery must be adapted to cope with the challenge. Increasing trade liberalization, a possible limited free trade area, · industrial complementarity, and other economic subjects were complex, requiring something more than the services of five National Secretariats located in five separated capitals across a large area. Although the national interest remained the primary consideration with each government, there waa a certain mellowing of outlook when the regional considerations of ASEAN were stressed. The members had learned through experience that enough safeguards had been built into the Association to preserve the national interest. After the fall of Indochina to the communists, there was somewhat of an apprehension, openly vague but yet rather visceral, that if the members of ASEAN did not hang together they would eventually hang separately. A supranational organization like a central Secretariat became more acceptable. The steps towards the creation of the new organ were slow and gradual. The Philippines was in the vanguard, for as early as 1968 Manila had called for a central Secretariat. Four years later, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers favoured exploring the possibility of one, but a Special Committee, composed of the five Secretaries General to study the matter and make recommendations, was not appointed until 1973. The report of the Committee on the controversial subject was sent the next year by t~e Foreign Ministers to the member governments of the Association for their consideration. It was not until 1975 that the Ministers approved the Draft Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. Further compromises were needed, however, before the new organ of ASEAN came into existence in 1976. The attitudes of the member states of the Association towards the type of central Secretariat, once the decision in principle had been made to have one, again reflected different national interests, to some degree at least, in regionalism.

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Thailand and the Philippines, in the perspective of their attitudes on the creation of ASEAN, proved t9 be rather surprising. Indonesia and the Philippines, especially Jakarta, supported a Secretariat that was policy-oriented and gave the Association genuine leadership. If their viewpoints were decisive, the Secretary General would serve from two to four years, giving him some time to play an important role. Both Indonesia and the Philippines wanted to have the ASEAN Secretariat located in their capital and to have the first Secretary General a national of their country. Jakarta won, marking Indonesia's special recognition in the Association. Singapore and Thailand -- particularly the former -- did not favour a strong Secretariat, and they envisioned the Secretary General more as a co-ordinator than a leader. Malaysia was closer in viewpoint to Singapore and Thailand, supporting a small Secretariat that can in time grow as and when needed for effective action. In the final compromise, the Secretary General and the ASEAN Secretariat reflect more the viewpoints of Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia than of Indonesia and the Philippines. The Secretary General, whose prerequisites are essentially those of a caretaker and whose functions are diffuse, is appointed for only two years by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, his nationality being determined by alphabetical rotation starting with Indonesia, and the individual being nominated by the government concerned. Despite these conditions, a strong personality as Secretary General still has opportunities to have an impact on the Associaion. As for the low profile and relatively inexpensive ASEAN Secretariat, it remains to be seen whether it will move beyond administration and co-ordination to develop a momentum of its own in regional efforts. Here the future role of the five offices of the Directors General of ASEAN affairs in the member countries will be important. Financing can also be a problem in J akaita in the years ahead. As the Association in the past has been flexible, the institution of the Secretary General and the ASEAN Secretariat may evolve in such a way as to challenge the pessimists and please the optimists. At any rate, the regional as against the national interests of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines will be reflected.

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IV: PROSPECTS

The contours of ASEAN will change during the second decade of its history. ASEAN could conceivably wither on the vine or grow into a robust plant. As an essentially unique institution, the Association has the advantage of much freedom from precedent and of genuine initiative in the directions chosen but, at the same time, has the disadvantage of not being able to profit to a measurable extent from the experience of other international organizations. Being an indigenous institution, ASEAN can chart its future without the psychological worries associated with close identification with a major foreign power, an asset of considerable value in the international climate of today. If ASEAN were subject to paramount external military or economic influence, it would lose its asset of being indigenous. Yet the Association cannot escape the impact and challenge of international developments in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the world. It can never be the sole architect of its destiny; Indochina is a sphinx casting a long shadow. The evolution of ASEAN will continue to mirror a complexity of interests, strategic and military, political and diplomatic, economic, social and cultural, in changing combinations of emphasis expressed in policies and roles. The image of the Association as an economic, social and cultural organization is likely to reflect the reality of the wider interests it has come to represent. A balance sheet of ASEAN reveals considerable achievement in the political and diplomatic fields of co-operation, limited accomplishment in economic (not to mention social and cultural) activities, an inconclusive record in the organization of the Association to implement its goals, and some progress in military co-operation outside the scope of ASEAN but facilitated by its existence. Based on the record to date ASEAN is faced with the need to preserve what it has already achieved and to move forward towards . much greater fulfilment of the goals of the Bangkok Declaration and the Bali Declaration of ASEAN Accord. The prospects for the Association cannot be removed from the foundation of national interests. Regional interests will grow in scope and importance but co-operation will not lead to integration characterized by a supranational authority replacing five national governments. For many years, the nucleus of regional co-operation in Southeast Asia will stay where it is today -- the subregional grouping of the charter members of ASEAN -- with the possible addition of Brunei in the 1980s. Even if mutually

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agreeable, the membership of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, or probably of Burma, would weaken for the foreseeable future the effectiveness of an association still trying to establish its rofe. The contributions of the communist governments of Indochina would not offset the · complications their membership would cause within the Association and in relationships with Moscow and Peking. The search for a modus vivendi between the members of ASEAN and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will continue with possible avenues existing in the creation of an Asian Forum for discussion, agreement on a zonal concept, an ASEAN role in the Mekong Project of tihe United Nations, and the adherence of Hanoi to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Regional resilience with its stress on self-reliance growing from national resilience with a comparable emphasis, though somewhat nebulous in terms of plans and programmes, and closely associated with Indonesia, may become a more important approach and theoretical underpinning to regionalism in Southeast Asia. Resilience is deeply related to development which will continue to be stressed m ASEAN. The linkage of national and regional development is valid but the cultivation of interlocking interests is difficult and progress will be slow. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 calling for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality through some type of neutralization is a worthy long term goal. Its formal implementation in a realistic way will continue to be elusive as a consequence of disagreements among the states of Southeast Asia and among external powers on the subject. At the same time a policy of equidistance towards outside countries by the governments of the region is theoretically possible, but also will be elusive in implementation, due to special ties most Southeast Asian states have with one or more of the external countries. Conducive to peace in Southeast Asia is a regional, indigenous balance of power. In concrete terms, this means that the power position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam should be roughly balanced by that of ASEAN. Power position and power potential are relative to time and circumstance and subject to varying interpretation, but much will depend upon the course of VietnameseChinese relations and of polycentrism in Communist Indochina, especially in Kampuchea. and upon the future cohesiveness of ASEAN. The dynamics of nationalism, the legacy of history, and the ramifications of the rivalry between Moscow and Peking favour polycentrism over the long haul in Indochina. Rivalries and disputes among the countries of Southeast Asia will continue to cause trouble but the prospects are good that the controversies can be kept under control among the members of ASEAN. The unexpected, however, can always happen.

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Directly influencing Southeast Asia in the future, as in recent yean, will be the multipolari ty or equilibrium existing among the PRC, the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Japan in the region. This multipolari ty reflects the contrasting power, interests, and roles of the Big Four. The uneasy balance of power among them in Southeast Asia could be upset if any one of them succeeded in acquiring a prepondera nce or a perceived prepondera nce of power. This development does not seem likely, at least in the near future. What types of co-operatio n can be expected over the second decade of ASEAN's existence? Political and diplomatic co-operation, despite the importance of national interests, will continue to grow in importance. Furthermor e, it will be more open with less effort to play it down. The joint statement of the Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Bangkok in January 1979 in connection with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuche a is a case in point. The political and diplomatic aspects of consultatio n and co-ordinati on inherent in co-operatio n are essential m the future of ASEAN. In the economic field, the prospects for regional co-operatio n are for slow progrea; vested interests will continue to apply pressure on governments, and present short term benefits will often outweigh possible future long term gains. Although the creation of a free trade area is desirable, the best that can be expected for some time is gradual movement towards a limited free trade area. Preferential tariffs on a product-by -product basis will increase but still reflect the dash of national and regional interests. The expansion of intraregional trade will be slow, as all the ASEAN partnen except semiindustrialized Singapore will produce and initially process for some time primary commoditi es. Rice and crude oil and/or oil products which merit special considerati on will continue to be major items in intraregional trade while the Association's efforts for a Common Fund and the Integrated Program for Commoditi es face decisions that are global in nature. ASEAN industrial projects, largely involving governmen t participatio n, will continue to lag in implement ation, and ASEAN industrial complemen tation projects based essentially on the private sector probably even more. Assistance for the Association's economic projects, Japan being a big potential partner, will not be at the expense of extensive bilateral aid. ASEAN will probably continue to cope more effectively in negotiations on economic matters with outside countries like Japan and the U.S. or organizations like the EEC than with its own membership on such subjects. At the same time the Association must be careful lest its record in economic co-operatio n become an Achilles' heel.

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Co-operation in the social field is still in its initial phase. Only in 1978 did the Foreign Ministers call for an "integrated strategy for social development for ASEAN... Achievements in this area are long range and closely related to other fields like the economic, cultural and technical. Efforts in population activities are a case in point. Cultural co-operation may be easier to organize and may bring quicker results. But, even here, very little that is substantial has been realized. For instance, the Bangkok Declaration calls for the promotion of Southeast Asian studies. Certainly needed is a sustained and substantial attempt by Southeast Asian scholars from the area itself to strengthen and widen the contours of the regional concept of Southeast Asia. Perhaps the establishment of a Cultural Fund with modest Japanese assistance will serve as an impetus in cultural co-operation. An ASEAN University is not currently feasible, but the linking of the Association and the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) should be considered. At present, the active membership in the region is the same for both organizations. ASEAN is not involved as an organization in military co-operation. The partnership of the five members in ASEAN, however, is conducive to military co-operation largely on a bilateral basis. It is doubtful if this activity will lead to a formal alliance; neither a Manila Treaty nor a SEATO is a desirable model. But the Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea in early 1979 set in motion concerns that will possibly make the ASEAN partners de facto though not de j ure allies. The intensification of various Association projects in current fields and expansion into other areas of interest will occur over ASEAN's second decade. The former is more needed than the latter. The exact mix of the intensification and expansion is not certain, though the general thrust of the Association has become clear. The possibilities of growth are many and the spectrum provides various options. But changing good ideas into concrete, feasible projects and meeting the challenge of national and regional interests will not be easy. Perhaps the service industries merit particular attention. The level of expectations, however, must not be raised beyond the threshold of reality. The streamlining of the Association in terms of structure and function to better carry out stated objectives will be a continuing challenge as the role of ASEAN increases. At issue will be the merits and demerits of centralization. The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta will probably be strengthened, and the stature, tenure and role of the Secretary General will probably be improved, but the

79

Association for the foreseeable future will depend more upon the organizational foundations of the five offices of the Directors General in the member countries. Decisionrnak.ing in ASEAN is not likely to change, and progress will be made at the pace of the least enthusiastic member. Without this aspect, the Association would not have survived and cannot survive in the future. The organization will need to acquire a broader but much more focused base of support. The potential is present, for the ASEAN identity is increasing in popularity, and public and private interlocking relationships are growing. The regional interests of the Association are chiefly found in a governing "elite. Since the organization now has a certain momentum, and political leaders profit by praising ASEAN, it is easy for a successor government to maintain support. The Association will need, however, to systematically cultivate firmer ties with the professions, business and the media. When all is said and done, the current spirit of ASEAN is probably its greatest asset. Keeping this spirit, not to mention strengthening it, will make possible in the years ahead accomplishments not possible in the years gone by. It will be necessary to keep competition within bounds by the judicious restraint of national interests and to strengthen co-operation so as to enhance the community of regional interests. In the world of today, effective regionalism is based on positive nationalism and reflects a high degree of political maturity. The road to regionalism lies through the perception of enlightened self-interest. The expansion of regional association in Southeast Asia will come through' the growing realization that the advantages of co-operation, as shown in practice, far outweigh those of not working with neighbours for the common welfare. Already ASEAN has made an important contribution to regional security and stability. Competition and co-operation are rivals in the affairs of ASEAN -- rivals which will not go away -- but their order can be reversed. Co-operation and competition, in that order, may characterize the ASEAN spectrum of 1987.

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A Bibliographkal Note on ASEAN Official Documentation

The official documentation of ASEAN is public and classified. The best collection of public documents is currently found in 10 Years ASEAN, published under the auspices of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta in 1978. Most of the key documents in the public domain are included although some are omitted, like the press statements of Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers. Among the key documents are those relating to the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits as well as the joint communiqu~s of the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and various declarations and agreements. The ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration of 1967 establishing the Association and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 calling for a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia merit particular note. The documentation on the Bali summit, reflecting attention to internal affairs, includes the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. The documentation relative to the Kuala Lumpur summit, reflecting attention to external relations, includes the joint statements of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Increasing in importance are the joint press releases of the Meetings of ASEAN Economic Ministers, beginning with the first in November 1975. Public official documentation is not restricted to 10 Years ASEAN, for the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits as well as the tenth anniversary particularly occasioned various contributions. For instance, Malaysia and Indonesia each published documents on their respective summits comparable to those cited: The Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 1977) and ASEAN Summit Meeting, Bali, 23-25 Feb. 1976 Uakarta: State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1976). The ASEAN journal produced a "lOth Anniversary Commemorative Issue" in November 1977 (Vol. 2, No. 4) with a small number of documents and the usual valuable section on "ASEAN Events". Thailand for its part published ASEAN Documents (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978), a good collection from the ASEAN Declaration of 8 August 1967, through the Joint Communique of the Tenth Ministerial Meeting, 8 July 1977. Other important official documentation may be found in various sources issued at different times. In the light of the evolution of the organization

82

particularly revealing is ASEAN, First Ministerial Meeting, Bangsaen-Bangkok, 5-8 August 1967, which contains the ASEAN Declaration, the Joint Press Release, and the Verbatim Record of the Inaugural Meeting of ASEAN held on 8 August 1967. Also helpful for the first eight years of the Association is A SEAN, 2nd ed., August 1975 Uakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, ASEAN National Secretariat of Indonesia, 1975) which includes some of the press statements of Special Ministerial Meetings (Foreign Ministers) and those of the Committee of Senior Officials on the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. With the important sources cited, the reader can keep abreast of basic official public ASEAN documentation by maintaining a file especially o f the joint communiques of the annual Ministerial Meetings (see, for instance, the Eleventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Pattaya, 14-16 June 1978), of the joint press releases of the Meetings of ASEAN Economic Ministers (see, for example, the Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, Jakarta, 5-7 June 1978) and of joint communiqu~s arising from various significant activities (note, for instance, the ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial Dialogue, Washington, D.C., 3-4 August 1978). Classified official ASEAN documentation is found essentially in the minutes and summary records of various bodies of the Association. For instance, what did the Heads of Government say at the summits? What did the Foreign Ministers reveal at their Ministerial Meetings? Or what did the members of the Committee of Senior Officials say at their sessions on the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 19 71? The Annual Report, now prepared by the Secretary General, with the list of recommendations made and implemented, is classified. It should be noted, however, that much of the work of the Association is essentially public. Indicative of documentation, now classified, is ASEAN, Minutes, Decisions and Summary R ecords of the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee and of the Second and Third Meetings of the Heads of the ASEAN National Secretan·ats, Vol. 11, Djakarta, May, July, 1968. The location of the official records of the Association reflects the decentralization of the organization even with the setting up of the ASEAN Secretariat in June 1976. The Secretary General, according to the agreement establishing the Secretariat, acts as "custodian of all ASEAN Documents", but the ftles are reportedly much more complete on activities since June 1976 than before. More extensive files are found in the Office of the Director General, ASEAN (the former ASEAN National Secretariat) of the member country. A particular problem in the location of documents arises from the rotation of the seats of the former

83

eleven Permanent Committees. The reorganization of this committee structure into five committees under the Economic Ministers and three others, with the rotation principle intact, adds a new dimeruion to the documentation problem. Moreover, the rotation principle is well entrenched in higher organs like the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and the Standing Committee. The 1~ number of ASEAN bodies also contributes to the complexity of documentation. Records were relatively simply in 196 7 when the Association was in its infancy. But in 1979 ASEAN had generated a structure that embraced, inter alia, the Heads of Government Meetings, the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and Special ones, the Standing Committee sessions, the Economic Ministers Meetings u well as those of the Labour, Social Welfare, Education and Information Ministers, the gatherings o f the Committee o f Senior Officials, the meetings of the eight committees reorganized from the former Permanent Committees, and the sessions of the Directors General of ASEAN off~ees in the five members. Furthermore, the ASEAN Secretariat with its Secretary General began in 1976 to generate records of its own. What a challenge to the o ff~eiall What a joy to the bibliographer! Special attention should be directed to Tan Sok Joo, ASEAN: A Bibliography {Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Library Bulletin No. 11, November 1976). The bibliography's approximate 1,500 entries contain both primary and secondary sources; it is compreheruive, not annotated, and well organized. A supplement is planned.

INSTITUfE OF SOuniEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE Occasional Paper Series 1

Harry J . Benda, R esearch in Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore , 1970. 1Opp. Gratis (Out of print)

2

P. Lim Pui Huen, Newspapers published in th e Mala ysian Area: With a union list of local holdings, 1970. 42pp. Gratis (Out of print)

3

Chan Heng Chee, Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: Th e Singapore Case, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

4

Eva Horakova, Problems of Filipino Settlers, 19 71.

5

Mochtar Nairn, Merantau: Causes and Effects of Minangkabau Voluntary Migration, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

6

Paul Pedersen, comp., Youth in Southeast Asia: A Bibliography. Modified and expanded by J oseph B. Tarnney and others, 1971. 69pp. S$4.00 (Out o f print)

7

J.L.S . Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk My ths, 19 71. 26pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

8

R.P. Dore, japanese Industrialization and th e Developing Countries: Model, Warning o r Source of Healthy Doubts? 197 1. 18pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

9

Michael Stenson, Th e 1948 Communist R evolt in Malaya : A Note of Hist orical Sources and Interpretation and A Reply by Gerald de Cruz, 1971. 30pp. S$3.00 (Out o f print)

10

Riaz Hassan, Social S tatus and Bureaucratic Contacts Among th e Public Housing Tenants in Singapore , 1971.

24pp . S$2.00 (Out of print)

16pp . S$2.00 (Out o f print )

11

Youth in Southeast Asia: Edited Proceedings of the Seminar of 5th-7th March 1971. Edited by J osep h B. Tarnney, 1972. 75pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

12

A. W. Stargardt, Problems of Neutrality in So uth East Asia : The Relevance of the Europ ean Experience, 1972. 29pp. S$3 .00 (Out o f print)

13

William R. Ro ff, Autobiography & Biograph y in Malay Historical Studies, 19 72. 21pp. S$2.00 (Out o f print)

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Regional Security : The Djakarta Conferettce on Cambodia, 1972. 20pp. S$3 .00 (Out o f print)

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1976: A Critique, 1972. 16pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

16

Harold E. Wilson, Educationa l Policy and Performanc e in Singapore, 1942-1945, 1973. 28pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

17

Richard L. Schwenk, Th e Potential for Rural Developme nt in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Preliminary Background Report, 1973. 39pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

18

Kunio Yoshihara, japanese Direct Investment s in Southeast Asra, 1973. S$4.00 (Out of print)

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter-insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency, 1974. 54pp. S$5.00

20

John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China, 1974. 31 pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethnic Marriage in Singapore: A Study of Interethnic Relations, 1974. 85pp. S$6.00 (Out of print)

22

Tatsumi Okabe, R evival of japanese Militarism? 1974. 26pp. S$3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership, 1974. 21pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

24

Peter Carey, The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteenth Century java: Dipanagara, a Case Study, 1974. 56pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

25

Chandrasekaran Pillay, The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia: A Post-Mortem , 1974. 20pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

26

I.W. Mabbett, Displaced Intellectuals in Twentieth Century China, 1975. 45pp. S$4.00

27

J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor: 1975. 28pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

28

M. Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand, 1975. 27pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

29

J oseph Camilleri, Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy, 1975. 37pp . S$5.00 (Out of print)

30

Wellington K.K. Chan, Politics and Industrialization in Late lmpenal China, 1975. 19pp. S$4.00

18pp.

Pangeran

Dilemmas and Opportunit ies,

The Revolution That

31

Leslie E. Bauzon, Philippine Agrarian R eform 1880-1965: Never Was, 197 5. 2lpp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

32

Paul H. Kratoska, The Chettiar and the Yeoman: British Cultural Categories and Rural Indebtedness in Malaya, 1975. 29pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

33

Morris I. Berkowitz, The Tenacity of Chinese Folk Tradition -- Two Studies of Hong Kong Chinese, 1975. 32pp. S$4.00 (Out o f print)

34

M. Rajaretnam, U.S. Energy-Security Interests in the In.d wn Ocean, 1975. 36pp. S$5.00 (Out of print)

35

Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malayswn Armed Forces, 1963-73: Some Foreign Press Reactions, 1975. 25pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

36

Peter Polomka, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of R egional Co-operation, 1975. 16pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

37

Sharon A. Carstens, Chinese Assocwtions in Singapore Society: An Examinatio n of Function and Meaning, 1975. 30pp. (Out of print)

38

Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, 1975. 62pp. S$5.00 (Out of print)

39

Robert 0 . Tilman, In Quest of Unity: The Centralization Theme in Malaysian Federal-State R elations, 1957-75, 1976. 69pp. S$7.00 (Out of print)

40

Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, 1976. 63pp. S$7.00 (Out of print)

41

Sompom Sangchai, Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Politics: A Thai Perspective, 1976. 26pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

42

Richard L. Slu.llni~, An Introduction to the Nation-wide Learning System of Singapore, 1976. lOOpp. S$7.00

43

Sompom Sangchai, Some Observations in the Elections and Coalition Formation in Thailand, 1976. 75pp. S$6.00 .

44

Robert Orr Whyte, The Asian Village as a Basis for Rural Modern ization, 19 76. 77pp. S$8.00 (Out of print)

45

Justus M. van der Kroef, The Lives of SEATO, 1976. 39pp. S$5.00

46

David Wurfel, Philippine Agrarwn Policy Today: Implementation and Political Impact, 1977. 4lpp. S$5.00

47

Roderick O'Brien, South China Sea Oil: Two Problems of Ownership and Development, 1977. 85pp. S$8.00

48

Khaw Guat Hoon, An Analysis of China's Attitudls Towards ASEAN, 1967-76, 1977. 63pp. S$7.00

49

Betty Jamie Chung and Ng Shui Meng, The Status of Women in Law: Comparison of Four Aswn Countries, 1977. 63pp. S$6.00

50

Robert F. Zimmerman, Reflections on the Collapse of Democracy in Thailand, 1978. 118pp. S$12.00

51

Clive T. Edwards, Rcstructun'ng Australian Manufacturing Industry: Trade the Only Answer? 1978. 37pp. S$4.00

52

Colin MacAndrews, Land Settlement Policies in Malaysia and Indonesia: Preliminary Analysis, 1978. 62pp. S$6.00

53

George K. Osborn III, Balances of Power in Southeast Asw, 1978. 44pp. S$5.00

A

Is Freer A

54 John R. Clammer, Th e Ambiguity of Identity : Ethnicity Maintenance and Clumge Among the Straits Chinese Community of Malaysia and Singapore, 1979. 19pp. S$4.00 55

David Y.H. Wu, Traditional Chinese Concepts of Food and Medicine in Singapore, 1979. 3 lpp. S$4.00

56

Michael T. Skully, ASEAN Regional Financial Co-operation: Banking and Finance, 1979. 78pp. S$8.00

57

Russell H. Fifield, National and Regional Interests in A SEAN: Competition and Co-operation in lntemational Politics, 1979. 83pp. S$8.00

Developments in

For further info rmation regarding ISEAS publications in series other than Occasional Papers please write to

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The Edito r Institute of So utheast Asian Studies Ouny Road Singapore 102 5 L_._________________________________________________________________ J

Publications Review Committee Kernial S. Sandhu (Chairman) Sharon Siddique (Co-ordinator) Huynh Kim Khanh Vichitvong na Pombhejara P. Lim Pui Huen Christine Tan

THE AUTHOR R ussell H. Fifield is currently Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann A rbor, Michigan. He was Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in the period September to December 1978. Formerly an American Foreign Service Officer and Consultant to the U.S. Department of State as well as Professor of Foreign Affairs at the National College in Washington, he has held research appointments at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and at the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University. Besides being the author of The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958 (1958), Southeast Asia in U.S. Policy (1963) and Americans in Southeast Asia (1973), he has also contributed to the Yale Review and Asian Survey.