Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa: Networks of Civil Society Organizations and Alternative Regionalism 9789811593871, 9789811593888

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Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa Networks of Civil Society Organizations and Alternative Regionalism Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Inocent Moyo

Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa

Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka   Christopher Changwe Nshimbi   Inocent Moyo

Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa Networks of Civil Society Organizations and Alternative Regionalism

Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation/Department of Political Sciences University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation/Department of Political Sciences University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

Inocent Moyo Department of Geography & Environmental Studies University of Zululand KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

ISBN 978-981-15-9387-1    ISBN 978-981-15-9388-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Joerg Boethling / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

This book is dedicated to all engaged ordinary citizens, survivors of state-­ centric modes of governance in Africa and around the world

Foreword

Scholarly analysis of contemporary regionalism leaves many gaps, as too much emphasis has been put on states and markets as the sole main actors. The literature has demonstrated how rationalist schools of thought proclaim the alliance between the mainstream state-led and market-­ driven approaches as one mode of building regions. Consequently, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their capability to promote alternative regionalism have been minimised. However, with the emerging of new players and a shift from bipolar to multipolar centres of regional decisions in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the expansion of the focus of analysis in new regionalism came to the fore with the inclusion of non-state actors. New regionalism became conceptualised as an impetus to governance through civil society associations, strengthened by the capacity of non-state actors to deliver and drive policy in a way that is more attuned with the needs of the communities, compared to state-led development strategies. Consequently, civil society networks became crucial and active agents in the development processes in most of RECs and other transnational organisations. Despite the explosion of new regionalism throughout the world, the role of civil society and how they interact within various institutional settings remain ignored by scholars and by most government elites and policymakers. More than that, those few academics working on vii

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the new regionalism paradigm, who did include non-state actors in their conceptual analysis, failed to expand extensively enough on how non-­ state actors can stand in their own right in the process of region formation, with equal standing as other partners, without necessarily being accompanied by state and market. Alongside influencing policy in state-­ led settings, it has been evidenced that cross-border citizen associations may exercise citizenship and intellectual endeavours, among other things, as patterns of informal participation in political projects to form regions. Against this backdrop, this book contributes to the existing literature on contemporary regionalism debates in several ways. Firstly, by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. The SADC People’s Summit, the Civil Society Forum, Gender Links Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, have been consummate examples of how ordinary citizens across the Southern African region are also important active actors capable of mobilising themselves through both citizenship exercises and intellectual endeavours, in order to influence and/or shape the regional order for an alternative. Scholars focusing on the intensification of civil society influence in global governance agree that non-state actors become capable of filling a democratic deficit that has long plagued international institutions. This book establishes how Southern African civil society networks have chosen to fight, at different fronts of advocacy, against the democratic deficit manifested throughout the exclusion and restriction of civic spaces featuring the state-centric mode of SADC governance. Secondly, this book on the networks of civil society organisations and alternative regionalism in Southern Africa not only does theoretically contribute to the study of contemporary regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors, but also attempts to demonstrate empirically how regions can be constructed by non-state actors themselves outside the state-centric paradigm. Non-state actors across the Southern African region prefer to network among themselves within self-­ organised platforms where they are allowed to build coalitions and express themselves freely, sharing opportunities and lived experiences useful for their well-being. The intention is clearly to provide an important understanding of different kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by

 Foreword 

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civil society associations within two distinct institutional settings of interaction. The book proves that Southern African civil society networks have managed to build the SADC region from below in a way that is centred around and driven by cross-border ordinary citizens themselves. They did so also through their parallel activities, namely building solidarity and coalition by sharing best practices and aspirations among regional citizenry, use of capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance the popular critical consciousness, just to name a few. At the same time, these civil society entities connecting the existing SADC state-centred status quo across the region contest in a meaningful manner, through contestation and internalised norms, participation in self-­ regulated cluster meetings during the SADC People’s Summit and calling for full operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty for alternative agendas. The book shows how the procedural mechanisms developed by non-state actor associations are effective in building regions in their own right, beyond the state-centric paradigm, and demonstrates how regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. In short: there is a possibility to build regions through unconventional mechanisms, developed outside of the mainstream. Lastly, the book empirically contributes to the literature of alternative regionalisms with different kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks and how they have shaped their interactions in regionalisms. These institutional typologies can be useful as a point of reference to other similar studies in relation to unconventional institutions, developed by non-state actors for the construction of alternatives at both national and regional levels of society. The authors show that regional civil society networks interacting in SADC-created spaces exhibit different institutional arrangements compared to those in self-organised networks. The differences between these kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks—SADC-­ CNGO and SAPSN respectively—included cooperative versus contesting engagement strategies, complementing instead of detracting from the state-­ centric order, compliance to instead of ownership of the agenda, constrictive instead of expansive norms, elitist alliance instead of grassroots solidarity,

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and white-collar bureaucracy versus an authentic grassroots approach. More than that, a descriptive typology revealed that within SADC-created spaces, reformist civil society networks exhibit elitist collaboration and informal bargaining strategies, compliant norms and dependent rules, while, within self-organised civic spaces, ever-evolving civil society networks devise combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-­building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms and emancipatory grassroots rules. Given the remarkable difference between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they have devised, this book demonstrates how regional civil society networks interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms: SADC-created spaces, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society groupings and self-organised spaces created by ever-evolving civil society networks. In conclusion: if well-structured, informal institutions can function just like formal institutions and achieve the same objectives at all levels of society. This is crucial, at a time when we are faced with the limits of power centralisation and the globalisation of the economy. A new regionalism— participatory and inclusive—can certainly offer a better response to the needs of local citizens. It will have a natural predisposition in maintaining/creating well-being for people and protecting the environment when designing policies for the production and distribution of food, energy and goods, for the provision of social and health services, for the management of the local resources and for the creation of good-quality employment and sustainable development in general. Rome, Italy 31 July 2020

Lorenzo Fioramonti

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to many people and organisations whose assistance made this book possible. These include the various respondents and discussants from different backgrounds, who gave their full support in availing themselves for the interviews and focus group discussions. Likewise, the views of representatives of different civil society organisations and regional donor/partner institutions as well as the SADC Secretariat are acknowledged as they provided a useful context for this book. We are also grateful for the two anonymous reviewers whose critique assisted us to sharpen the analysis in this book. There is a long list of friends and colleagues at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria and University of Zululand and of course our precious and lovely families whose support is priceless. To Joshua Pitt, the Senior Commissioning Editor at Palgrave Macmillan, who was always available to provide the necessary guidance, we are equally grateful. And finally, to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and to God be the Glory. Pretoria, South Africa 31 July 2020

Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Inocent Moyo

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Contents

1 Regional Integration, Networks of Civil Society Organisations and Alternative Regionalism in Southern Africa: An Introduction  1 2 A Historical Background to Regional Integration in Africa and Southern Africa 33 3 Regional Integration in Africa and Southern Africa: An Appraisal of Conventional Approaches 47 4 New Institutionalism and New Regionalism Approaches to Understanding Regionalism in Southern Africa 77 5 The Formal-Alternative Regionalism Formal Interface: Interactions and Engagements of Southern African Civil Society Networks in SADC Regulatory Regimes115 6 Alternative and People Centred Approaches to Regional Integration153

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7 Typology of Institutional Arrangements of Southern African Civil Society Networks199 8 Towards a People-Centred Approach to Regionalism in Africa and Southern Africa237 Index257

Abbreviations

AfCFTA AIDC ANSA APF ASCCI ASEAN AU BOCONGO CBO CBTA CDD CEEAC CEN-SAD CNONGD COMESA CRNSA CSF CSO DIE DRC EAC EACSOF EASWN

African Continental Free Trade Area Alternative Information and Development Centre Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa Anti-Privatisation Forum Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations Community-Based Organisation Cross-Border Traders Association Centre for Democracy and Development Communauté economique des Etat de L’Afrique Centrale Communauté des Etats Sahelo-Sahariens National Council of Development NGOs of Congo Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Child Rights Network of Southern Africa Civil Society Forum Civil Society Organisation German Development Institute Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community East African Civil Society Organisations’ Forum East African Sustainability Watch Network xv

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ECCAS ECOWAS EISA

Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa EJN Economic Justice Network ELS Employment and Labour Sector EU European Union FBO Faith-Based Organisation FCES Foro Consultivo Económico-Social FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung FLS Frontline States FOCCISA Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa FTA Free Trade Area FTAA Free Trade Area of America GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation GO-NGO Government-Organised NGO HAS Hemispheric Social Alliance ICBT Informal Cross-Border Trade IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development IPE International Political Economy IR International Relations MDG Millennium Development Goal MEJN Malawi Economic Justice Network MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur MISA Media Institute for Southern Africa MoU Memorandum of Understanding MWENGO Mweleko wa Non-Governmental Organisation NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAPSAR+ Network of African People Living with HIV/AIDS in the Southern African Region NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCA Norwegian Church Aid NGO Nongovernmental Organisation NPA Norwegian People’s Aid NRA New Regionalism Approach OAU Organisation for African Unity OSISA Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa RCSN Regional Civil Society Network REC Regional Economic Community RIGO Regional Intergovernmental Organisation

 Abbreviations 

RISDP RO RPO SACAU SAGPA SACBTA SACCAR

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Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan Regional Organisation Regional Poverty Observatory Southern African Confederation of Agriculture Unions Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance Southern African Cross Border Traders Association Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research SACSN Southern African Civil Society Networks SACU Southern African Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference SADC-CNGO SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations SADC-PF SADC Parliamentary Forum SARDC Southern African Research and Documentation Centre SAFAIDS Southern African AIDS Service Organisation SAFOD Southern Africa Federation of the Disabled SALA SADC Lawyers Association SAMA Southern Africa Miners Association SANASO Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisation SAPSN Southern African People’s Solidarity Network SAT South African Trust SATUCC Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council SAYM Southern African Youth Movement SEATINI Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute SEG SADC Employers Group SNC SADC National Committee SNCP SADC National Contact Point TEIA Teia National Forum of Mozambican NGOs TRALAC Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa UN United Nations UNAC União Nacional de Camponeses UNDP United Nations Development Programme WACSOF West African Civil Society Forum WILSA Women in Law in Southern Africa WSF World Social Forum WTO World Trade Organization ZIMCODD Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Civil Society Forum organisational structure. (Source: Authors) Fig. 6.2 Stages of Civil Society Forum. (Source: Authors) Fig. 6.3 SAPSN Structure and thematic groups of the SADC People’s Summit. (Source: Authors) Fig. 6.4 Steps towards the holding of the SADC People’s Summit. (Source: Authors)

161 164 170 172

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Bertelsmann Transformations Index and Ibrahim Index of African Governance 136 Table 7.1 Comparison of interaction institutional arrangements devised by Southern African civil society networks 202 Table 7.2 Strategies, norms and rules developed within and outside formal institutional settings of regional interaction 214 Table 7.3 Typology of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within and outside SADC institutional settings 224 Table 7.4 Typology of Southern African civil society networks interactions in regionalisms based on strategies, norms and rules227

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1 Regional Integration, Networks of Civil Society Organisations and Alternative Regionalism in Southern Africa: An Introduction

Introduction The origins of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can be traced to a group of countries called the Frontline States (FLS) (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland (now Eswatini), Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) whose objective was to end colonial rule in the Southern African region. In 1980 the FLS was transformed into the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The SADCC aimed at assisting those countries in the region which were still fighting colonial and white minority rule and also sought to reduce its member states’ economic dependence on apartheid South Africa (Odhiambo et al. 2016; Schoeman 2013; Söderbaum 1996). The implication of this is that SADCC relied on a “project-based approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector focused attention on the coordination of members’ development initiatives rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy” (Schoeman 2002: 4). To the role of FLS and SADCC in the struggle against colonialism and the apartheid regime can be added that of the regional civil society © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_1

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networks, including trade unions like the Southern Africa Coordination Council (SATUCC) and faith-based organisations like the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA) (Asante 1997; Thompson 2009). Although mixed views exist on the church’s role, faith-­ based organisation (FBO) of churches like the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, spoke out against injustices during colonial rule, helped raise black intellectual currents and consciousness among subjugated peoples, and were important in cultural and political processes of decolonisation in Southern and other parts of Africa (Forster 2019). The view does, of course, also exist that the church or missionaries were actually agents of Africa’s colonisation (Falola 2002). Trade unions across Southern Africa, and in Africa in general too, not only collaborated with political parties but also autonomously played a critical role in the liberation movements and struggle for political independence (Sambureni 1996; Sandbrook and Cohen 1975; Beckman et al. 2010). Their engagement with the state continued in the post-independence period and extends from the 1990s to date in the struggle for democracy, which most Southern African countries have instituted. The changing global order and power relations like the end of the Cold War, the dethronement of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the rise of the neoliberal economic paradigm influenced the transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Differently stated, the attention or significance was regional integration and positioning the region to respond to the fierce offensive of economic globalisation (Schoeman 2002). Therefore, the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992)1 aims at regional integration in order to achieve economic development, peace, security, economic growth; alleviate poverty; improve people’s standards of living; and support those who are socially disadvantaged.

 The 16 member states include Angola, Botswana, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland (now Eswatini), the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 1

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 onventional Regionalism and Regional C Economic Integration: Adoption in Southern Africa In pursuit of its objectives, the SADC follows the rationalist and state-­ centric paradigm of regionalism. That paradigm defines conventional forms of regionalism pursued in regions of the global north such as Europe. A couple of points are noteworthy, and will be engaged further with later in this book, about the state-centric paradigm of regionalism in relation to the SADC region. Firstly, the perspective held by the member states fits well into the ideal conceptualisation that regionalism is and should be a state- or states-led project that seeks to reorganise certain regional spaces in ways that are politically and economically defined (Payne and Gamble 1996). That is, the respective member states are, together, not only responsible but also in charge of the process of regional integration. They, therefore, formulate policies to promote integration and actively drive and oversee the integration of the region. Secondly, the regionalism thus espoused places emphasis on economic aspects of integration. Not only so, the process of integration is held to follow a well-defined path and pattern in which capital, labour, goods and services increasingly freely flow across the borders of member states. That path and pattern of the integration is best depicted in Balassa’s (1961) model of regional economic integration. In his characterisation of economic integration, Balassa argued that it could assume various forms. Briefly, he presented regional integration as progressing from a free trade area (FTA), to a customs union (CU), to a common market, economic union, and finally, total integration. Thirdly, it is also worth emphasising that SADC members assumed the pursuit of this form of integration concurrently or in the aftermath of adopting neoliberal economic policies. This came about with the adoption of economic and structural adjustment policies in the 1990s imposed by international financial institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, economic integration premised on neoliberal economic theory informs the kind of regionalism that the SADC pursues. It informs

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the objectives that the SADC or its member states seek to achieve as outlined in the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC. Despite those lofty objectives, the promised regional development projects by SADC in the Southern Africa region have been criticised as not being inclusive because ordinary citizens are side-lined in decision-­ making processes. All this confirms that the SADC is a state-led regional institution. Being a strictly intergovernmental organisation with the preservation of state sovereignty at its heart (Godsäter 2015), SADC allows for limited opportunities for engagement of non-state actors and only via certain mechanisms. Like other top-down and controlled processes, SADC has tended to side-line its citizens in the crafting and implementation of policies and regional developmental projects (Godsäter 2013; Söderbaum 2007). There is also an increasingly growing disdain and suspicion of civil society among SADC member states, which has triggered the creation of self-organised avenues of participation by organisations in civil society as an alternative for the inclusion of non-state actors (Moyo et al. 2007). The point we are making here is that, after the political liberation of Southern Africa, the role played by civil society organisations has been ignored by political elites. Instigated by the end of apartheid and the democratic transition in South Africa, a desire to move on from solidarity politics towards economic development emerged among the SADC founding members. This has created a site for the marginalisation of civil society and the critical role that civil society organisations could play in regional integration drives, projects and programmes. We locate this book in this critical disjuncture and argue that relegating civil society organisations in the SADC regional integration project not only misses the very idea of integration but also loses out on the significant contribution that the neglected actors can make to successful integration. SADC has indeed been criticised by many for being one of the major African regional economic communities (RECs) least open to civil society (Odhiambo et al. 2016). This is due to its established state-­ driven regional integration model. It is also despite its established joint space of a regional governance system. Steered by its top-down system of regional integration, SADC has failed to deliver on its promises with regard to fully engaging in constant dialogue with civil society in

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decision-making processes as stipulated in article 23 of its treaty (SADC 1992; SADC-CNGO 2012; Söderbaum 2007). In contrast, civil society organisations have received limited attention by scholars of regional integration despite their critical role in strengthening the legitimacy of regional governance (Fioramonti 2012; Scholte 2015). Apart from influencing policy in formal settings, transnational civil society may informally participate in regional integration through self-sustaining socio-economic activities, and intellectual endeavours, and so on (Rhodes-Kubiak 2015: 50). Cross-border interactions between non-state actors have led scholars of transnational relations to call for an expansion of the traditional, state-bounded notions of civil society to account for a transnational public sphere (Guidry et al. 2000). The limited research on civil society organisations in relation to regional integration in the SADC is such that the mode of regional integration has been traditionally analysed through a top-down lens, with emphasis on the role of government elites, including their associates, technocrats or markets, but at the expense of the general citizenry (Fioramonti 2015).

Inclusive Regionalism: The Critical Place of Civil Society in Southern African Integration In this book we amplify the point that regional integration can and should be viewed as a socio-political reality, which can also be promoted by non-state actors. Regional civil society networks have self-organising capabilities through which they form regional alliances that can function just like formal processes driven by state actors and technocrats. In this regard, this book follows the growing debate in contemporary regionalism discourses on whether civil society has been, more often than not, intentionally side-lined in region-building processes (Fioramonti 2015). From Europe, to Africa, Asia and Latin America, civil society has largely been on the receiving end of region-building processes (Fioramonti 2013). Civil society has been occasionally invited through once-off forms of participation in state-established avenues where the scope is limited and defined in advance by elites, instead of through day-to-day coexistence and continual negotiation (Gaventa 2010; Gaventa and Mayo

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2009). Despite rhetorical references to the importance of civic participation, regional integration has largely developed without the citizens. These practices have not allowed ordinary citizens to fully participate in region-building decisions and have subsequently forced them to claim participation from the regional institution. At the same time, these citizens develop their own institutions of interaction outside of the mainstream, which is traditionally dominated by technocrats and lobbyists, for alternative regionalisms like what is happening among Southern African civil society networks. However, there seems to be a lack of clarity around the regional way in which non-state actors go about conducting their business and achieve their goals. Or how they interact with organisations that are formal or self-organised networks. This is despite the proliferation of transboundary civil society organisations and their interaction within formal and informal forms of regionalism. We examine this point in this book, through the deployment of New Institutionalism and the New Regionalism Approach (NRA). Therefore, the overarching aim of this book is to develop a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting within both networks outside of the mainstream—i.e. horizontal networks—and with the formal regional bodies like SADC, in order to understand their differences. This raises three critical questions, to which this book responds and these are: what are the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society groups when they interact within horizontal networks and with the SADC?; what are the differences between institutional arrangements in terms of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African regional civil society networks during their interaction within formal and self-organised regionalism?; and, is there a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalism in relation to the respective kinds of strategies, norms and rules they employ?

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 ew Institutionalism and the New N Regionalism Approach: Viable Applications for Successful Integration in Southern Africa We, here, argue that New Institutionalism and the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) constitute notions and approaches that explain a very functional form of regionalism that Southern Africa greatly needs, if regional integration is to succeed. As we demonstrate in this book, our suggestion can at least be gleaned from how the approaches/notions explain and apply to the manner in which networks of civil society organisations in Southern Africa successfully establish an alternative form of regionalism to the state-led initiative. Our motivation in making these suggestions is to contribute to the application of solutions that will lead to the success of the SADC integration project. Institutions are sets of norms, rules and procedures that enable and constrain actor behaviour with some predictability over time, and may also constitute the actors’ identities and preferences (March and Olsen 1984; Charles Plott in Ostrom 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996;). March and Olsen (1984) conceptualise institutions in such a way that the institutions tend to have a “logic of appropriateness” that influences behaviour rather than a “logic of consequentiality” that could also shape individual action. March and Olsen use firemen to illustrate the fact that they willingly enter blazing buildings because they have accepted that role as a function of occupational choice and training in the fire service. Institutions are mechanisms for adjusting behaviour in a situation that requires coordination among two or more agents or groups of individuals (Hurwicz 1994). Hall and Taylor (1996) define institutions, from a historical institutionalist point of view, as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity. In practice, however, historical institutionalists tend to narrow organisations down to institutions, rules and customs proclaimed by formal organisations. New Institutionalism posits that institutions evolve in very different ways which shape the behaviour of agents or individual members and produce change through rules, norms and other frameworks (Lecours 2005).

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In this view, institutions are not only material and formal structures— bureaucracies—as seen by Old Institutionalism, but ideational/normative and informal structures as cognitive scripts, norms and values (Hall and Taylor 1996). New Institutionalism gained prominence in International Relations/International Political Economy (IR/IPE) in the wake of dissatisfaction with the theoretical and conceptual understanding of informal organisations within international organisations, arising from Old Institutionalism placing emphasise on states, without stressing their interactions with other institutions like civil society organisations (Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001; Ostrom 2005). Old Institutionalists’ views are understandable if one considered the fact that the study of regionalism in IR/IPE continues to be dominated by rationalist, materialist or structuralist theories. These focus, firstly, on states and technocrats as the most important actors in regionalisation and, secondly, on formal inter-state frameworks and market-led processes of regional integration (Mansfield and Milner 1997; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). This implies that the realist approach to non-state actors in general, and civil society networks in particular, has been to dismiss them as marginal in world politics. Taking the centrality of the state as a premise, realist thinkers have argued that transnational organisations matter only at the fringes of world politics (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Again, this makes the point we made earlier about the manner in which SADC member states approach regionalism, coupled with the influence of neoliberalism in the way they conduct economic management. In view of the limitations that we hinted at in the foregoing associated with approaching regionalism from a state-centric perspective, this book utilises New Institutionalism as a lens through which to examine the strategies, norms and rules that civil society networks develop in order to build alternative regionalism. They develop the alternative because the states exclude or, in some instances, very minimally involve them in the formal processes of regional integration and regionalism. Through the new institutionalist lens, this book therefore undertakes a cross-sectional comparison of institutional arrangements in collective-choice situations. It does so in order to gauge differences in the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that civil society groupings develop in organisational settings. In this context, we operationalise strategies as practices and operating

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procedures that describe the behaviour of civil society networks in their interactions (Ostrom 2005); norms, as routines or collective representations of acceptable group conduct bound by some common purpose to achieve outcomes (Jackson 1965); and rules, as a set of instructions for creating an action situation in a particular environment (Allen 2005; Black 1962) or shared understanding by civil society networks about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, prohibited or permitted (Ostrom 1980). New Institutionalism provides an appropriate and meaningful theoretical perspective for the comprehensive study of institutions, the way they interact and the effects they have on society (March and Olsen 1984). The NRA conceptualises regionalism as a multidimensional process, which occurs in many sectors and on different levels simultaneously, and is driven by a variety of regionalising actors, broadly grouped in terms of states, markets and civil society (Söderbaum 2007). One basic assumption is that not only economic, but also social, cultural and environmental regional networks and projects are anticipated to develop more quickly than formal state-driven regionalist projects (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). This book utilises the NRA in order to illustrate the strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border non-state actors from an unconventional point of view. This is because NRA allows for the examination of regionalism as an unconventional social and political phenomenon, which can be promoted also by non-state actors (Hettne and Inotai 1994; Palmer 1991). In other words, NRA is used in this book to link the promotion of regional integration by non-state actors through bottom­up initiatives in Southern Africa. This is achieved by developing a typology of strategies, norms and rules which regional civil society networks adopt within both horizontal and vertical forms and levels of interaction in the SADC region. Based on a critical analysis of these strategies, norms and rules of alternative forms of or self-organised regionalism, the book projects the reality of alternative regionalism which is driven by ordinary people or civil society. In this way, the book thus expands the study of regionalism, and makes a significant and innovative contribution to the literature and studies of regionalism, as it brings a new perspective on issues that are absent from the literature on the subject. This is important to reiterate because, despite

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the explosion of new regionalism throughout the world, the role of civil society in regionalism remains neglected by political elites, academics and policy-makers. The study of regional integration globally, in Africa and, more specifically, in Southern Africa has been dominated by rationalist schools of thought praising the mainstream state-led and market-driven approach as the sole mode of regional cooperation. Such research on regionalism has focused on Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region, with Europe remaining an intellectual laboratory (Engel et  al. 2017), or so it is claimed. In this regard, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their capability to promote alternative regionalism have been minimised. Focusing on the increase of civil society influence in global governance, scholars increasingly agree that the latter fill a democratic deficit that has long plagued international institutions (Fogarty 2013; Godsäter 2015; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Scholte 2011; Tallberg et  al. 2013). Some empirical studies have also demonstrated that civil society is not only likely to build regionalism from below, but can also lead to meaningful contestations of existing regionalism paradigms and contribute to reshaping regions in line with alternative agendas (Fioramonti 2013; Godsäter 2014). The outside-led and top-down regionalism has become debatable because ordinary citizens have become second best in promoting integration (Söderbaum 2007). Although some forms of civil society engagement can strengthen the regional status quo and only produce marginal adjustments in terms of participation and openness, other forms of action exhibit a fundamental counterhegemonic character to the prevailing forms of state-led regionalism. For example, transnational activist organisations, such as Amnesty International, play a significant role in spreading and advancing the norms of human rights. Similarly, various environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, campaign to change norms in order to end the nuclear arms race and climate distortion (Keck and Sikkink 1998). According to Botto (2015), civil society actors in Latin America have built transnational networks, the Southern Cone Coordination of Union Federations (CCSCS), through innovative practices for regional involvement. Botto argues that these civic engagements seek to challenge the free trade area (FTA) agreement in that region. She further points out that civil society in that part of the world advances alternatives to the dominant models of regional

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integration within the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), among others. Botto underscores the fact that civil society is creating an identity that goes beyond particularity and sectorial interests (Botto 2015).

 ivil Society Organisations: C A Contextualisation and Conceptualisation for the SADC Region Civil society exists in the respective member states of the SADC. However, the extent to which civil society exercises freedom in each of these states and the level to which civil society organisations operate and are tolerated by the states vary. That discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this book. We focus instead on networks of civil society organisations that, though established within respective and some member states of the SADC, operate at the level of the region parallel to the regional organisations. In this regard, we use the term “regional civil society networks” (RCSNs) to refer to self-organised advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem to be the wider public interest (Edwards 2009; Florini 2000). RCSNs constitute important new avenues that promote collaboration and collective action around common agendas for the interest of non-state actors across state borders. Just like RCSNs, global civil society refers to a kind of social counterforce to state control, in which citizens organise themselves and their interests across national boundaries (Edwards 2011). The World Social Forum (WSF) and World Women’s Forums in general are both examples of global civil society, which actively influence international dynamics (Neubert 2014; Walk and Boehme 2002). For example, the WSF creates avenues of mobilisation for global citizenry awareness to contest the decisions of seven (states which are) leaders of the World

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Economic Forum (WEF). The WSF gathers alongside a group (the WEF) that decides the fate of the global economy (Della Porta et al. 2006). Given its cross-border interaction within regional formations, civil society becomes identified not simply as the voice of the underrepresented or the point of origin of their communicative power, but also as a new form of transformative power that is developed and exercised within the overall national or regional framework of governance. In this context, civil society creates associations beyond nation-state borders, which enables it to establish a people-centred approach to regionalism. Thus, it is paramount to conceptualise a people-centred approach to regionalism built on civil society or public participation, in order to illuminate the understanding of the reader. Thus, this book is conceptually focused on regional civil society networks encompassing structured and unstructured civil society organisations such as social movements, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), research institutions and trade unions actively involved in governance, democracy and socio-economic development at the regional level. The book does not include any unconventional organisations and movements such as terrorist movements or any other social organisations that deliberately and maliciously threaten human life, wildlife and nature in their daily activities (Scholte 2014; Edwards 2009, 2014). Rather, it focuses on institutional arrangements in Southern Africa developed by well-meaning regional civil society networks in regionalism and covers the period between 1989 and 2016. This period marks, on the one hand, the end of the Cold War, which triggered a drastic change in the global order from a bipolar to multipolar world. This introduced changes from a clearly structured confrontation between two blocs in the world to new complex global engagements, and from an imagined hierarchy of spatial configurations around the nation-­ state to a multiplicity of competing and overlapping regimes of territorialisation (Engel and Middell 2005). Subsequently, world politics witnessed the emergence of multiple actors, such as groupings of Southern African civil society organisations, alongside state actors within regional intergovernmental organisations like SADC. Such actors simultaneously collaborate and compete for the formation of regions through their respective involvement in regional political decisions (SADC 1992;

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Söderbaum 2007). On the other hand, the period in question coincides with the democratisation of political spaces in Southern Africa and the world, including the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their end in 2016. This saw the emergence of activism in regional civil society networks and the establishment of a regional governance system that provides a joint space for formal regionalism represented by the SADC and regional civil society networks. During this time, the Southern African region has registered a myriad of regional civil society groups that lobby for an inclusive regional institution. The lobbying occurs through formal and self-organised interactions and aims to build alternative regionalism. In terms of scope, some civil society groups operate at the grassroots level and shy away from engaging in activities that encompass entire nations or the region. Other civil society organisations operate at the national level. The South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), for example, is a national umbrella body of local NGOs that operate in South Africa (Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum 2007). Other national civil society organisations like the Economic Justice Network of South Africa (EJN) and a few research institutions have a regional mandate (Scholte 2015). Furthermore, some national chapters of civil society organisations that exist in several or all member states of the SADC create regional civil society networks based on their line of work. In this regard, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Gender Links, and the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN), among others, provide examples of regional civil society networks. Others operate in the form of cross-border non-state actor associations within a given region, like the informal cross-border traders (ICBTs) (SADC-­ CNGO 2012; Gender Links 2016; SAPSN 2012; Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2015; Zajontz and Leysens 2015). This book focuses on civil society networks operating at the regional level, comprising both grassroots and national civil society organisations as part of a regional network.

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 etworks of Civil Society Organisations N and Alternative Regionalism in Southern Africa A number of studies have been conducted that associate civil society with regionalism in Southern Africa. Although the questions they raise, their arguments and solutions they proffer to enhancing regionalism in Southern Africa differ from what we attempt to do in this book, some of those works serve as points of reference for the book. Among those studies are the ones conducted by Söderbaum (2004, 2007, 2015), Landsberg (2006, 2012), Godsäter and Söderbaum (2011, 2017), Collins (2008, 2013), Zajontz (2013), Godsäter (2014), Odhiambo et al. (2016), and Zajontz and Leysens (2015). These studies demonstrate various ways through which regional civil society networks have potential to either influence or shape political decisions of the SADC through transnational advocacy strategies. In Southern Africa, most models and practices of regionalism have tended to exclude the diversity of voices and roles in society that compete with the agendas of states (Söderbaum 2007). These practices have been criticised by many to often serve the specific interests of some ruling elites in Southern Africa, the ambitions of hegemonic actors or the agendas of industrial and financial powers (Fioramonti 2013). The state-led regionalism has been criticised by many for not helping citizens to fully participate in regional decision-making processes to form regions (Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum 2007). The quest for alternative regionalism reaches paramount importance through the creation of new collaborative avenues where interaction between and among stakeholders in regionalism becomes ultimate. Moreover, underdevelopment in the SADC region and the non-­ operationalised joint mode of regional governance have both engendered an excess of local and regional popular self-help and grouping initiatives in the form of civil society networks (Edwards 2009; Florini 2000; Wapner 2002; Warkentin and Mingst 2000) to counteract the predominant state-centred regionalism with a model of people-centred regionalism (Söderbaum 2007). These civil society networks function in the form of regional associations, regional networks, regional programmes, regional

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centres and regional non-profit service providers (Söderbaum 2004: 120). Since the 1990s, the Southern African region has seen the founding of citizens’ groups within different networks such as SAPSN, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), and Mweleko wa Non-Governmental Organisation (MWENGO), to name a few (Zajontz 2013; CIVICUS 2011; Söderbaum 2016;). These regional civil society groups participate either within state-invited or within self-­ created spaces, in order to reclaim SADC resources for people in Southern Africa through alternative regionalisms. Illustratively, SADC-CNGO interacts in SADC through formal avenues as key civil society partners, while SAPSN interacts in informal and self-organised settings outside of the mainstream. In their interaction either in SADC or outside SADC settings, these regional civil society networks seem to develop strategies, norms and rules that are of interest in this book. Such strategies, norms and rules also seem to be either different or similar, depending on the civil society network or organisation with which they interact, as this is the context within which the discussions in this book are located. State-­ established spaces of participation, in the case of Southern Africa, have not fully alleviated underdevelopment in the region despite engagement between some selected civil society networks and the SADC in decision-­ making (Söderbaum 2007). At the same time, other civil society groups have established popular spaces of interaction outside of the mainstream in the form of self-organised and informal regionalism where strategies, norms and rules are developed which this study seeks to investigate. A few attempts among the studies cited above exist that compare institutional arrangements—strategies, norms and rules—developed by Southern African regional civil society networks and their efforts (in interaction within both formal and self-organised regionalism) to establish successful regionalism. Although those studies tend to focus on civil society engagement in region-building processes in the Americas, Asia, Africa and specifically the Southern African region, they rather pay less attention to comparative understanding of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks as they engage in formal regionalism with the SADC or between themselves (only as civil society organisations) through self-organised interactions.

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This book, thus, differs from the cited studies in this way, and represents a modest attempt at closing this gap by answering the three questions posed in the preceding sections. As a result, the intention in doing so is to stimulate debate and bring out new lines of thought on the practice of regionalism in Southern Africa in particular, Africa as a whole and other parts of the world.

Methodological Considerations In order to attain its objectives, this book recognises the importance of the lived experience of people on the ground. It, therefore, does not apply universalist theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed from a different lived reality. This approach also fits in well with the new institutionalist lens, which underscores the need for recognising the people-centred approach to regionalism and regional integration. Unlike positivist and rationalist paradigms that claim that it is possible to separate facts from value, that research is value-free and that the researcher is independent, taking the role of an objective analyst (Blumberg et  al. 2005), post-positivism rejects the value-free position and claims that objective theories can be crafted in order to understand and explain reality or events. This book applied a qualitative comparative study research design that observed two cases that were selected on a most-similar-cases basis (Tilly 1984). This design was useful in the current study on institutions as it denotes the practice of comparing political institutions such as strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks within both formal and self-organised settings. Bearing in mind that a comparative design requires at least two facts or events, like two texts, two theories, two historical figures, two scientific processes, and so on (Pickvance 2005; Ragin 2014; Tilly 1984; Walk 1998), this comparison was focused on two sets of strategies, norms and rules developed within the region. In this regard, the book focused on the kinds of institutional arrangements developed within both horizontal networks and vis-à-vis SADC as two institutional settings by two categories of regional civil society networks, such as SAPSN and SADC-CNGO in the same region. Primary

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and secondary methods of data collection were used to conduct this study, as explained below. Relying on original semi-structured interviews and primary resources, this book developed a typology to identify and examine the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society groups while interacting in two institutional settings, such as horizontal networks and SADC. Through a comparative approach, the authors first separately identified the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that are developed by civil society networks when they interact in formal regionalism processes with formal institutions like the SADC and identified those that are developed by civil society networks when they interact in informal and self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream. Second, the authors then compared the kinds of strategies, norms and rules as institutional arrangements that were developed within formal regionalism and self-organised regionalisms outside the mainstream in order to work out the differences between them. Lastly, following the identification of differences in strategies, norms and rules, a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks interacting in two distinct institutional settings or environments was formulated. The target population in this book was the regional civil society networks active in the field of democracy and socio-economic development at the macro (regional) and meso (national) levels. The units of analysis were the regional civil society networks in Southern Africa, including the states as drivers of formal regionalism and the overall environment in which the study was conducted and against which people-centred approaches were contrasted. Thus, the Southern African region has become both a “paradox” case, for lack of operationalisation of its approved joint mode of governance, and, at same time, an “atypical” case compared to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC), both situated on the same continent, for the interaction of cross-border civil society associations within formal institutions. A desktop search revealed that the Southern African region is a bastion of networks of cross-border civil society actors undertaking citizenship that fulfils functions such as transnational advocacy, service provision, knowledge production, and mobilisation, to name a few, in different

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fronts of social, political, ecological, economic and environmental sectors (Söderbaum 2004; Moyo et al. 2009; Godsäter 2014, 2015). Among the foremost RCSNs, there is the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD); Child Rights Network of Southern Africa (CRNSA); Economic Justice Network (EJN); Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA); Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC); Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN); Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA); SADC Lawyers Association (SALA); Southern Africa Federation of the Disabled (SAFOD); Southern African AIDS Service Organisation (SAFAIDS); Southern African Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA); Southern African Confederation of Agriculture Unions (SACAU); Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (SAGPA); Southern African People’s Solidarity Networks (SAPSN); Southern African Youth Movement (SAYM); Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI); Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC); Women in Law in Southern Africa (WILSA); Gender Links; SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGO); Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA); Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), among others (Godsäter 2015; Odhiambo et  al. 2016; SADC-CNGO 2012; Söderbaum 2007). This book focuses on SAPSN and SADC-CNGO for civil society as elaborated in the preceding parts. That is, bearing in mind the risk of depending on one or two actors as a source of data collection, this book used the SAPSN and SADC-CNGO, as they encompass interlinked and affiliated civil society organisations and social movements from national levels within Southern African region. These civil society networks devise different kinds of strategies, norms and rules during their interactions within both horizontal networks and vertically with the state in the quest for an alternative regionalism that is centred and driven by ordinary people themselves in civil society and SADC. A combination of snowball- and cluster-sampling techniques was used to select research participants from the population. As mentioned by Silverman (2016), snowballing is a useful technique when conducting a study in which the target respondents are not easily accessible. Convenors and referrals were also used because of conditions in the field, such as the

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case of political tension in the DRC.  These sampling techniques were adopted because of the highly politicised debate around SADC institutions and civil society interactions. Participants were divided into three clusters representing members of (i) regional state actors, (ii) regional civil society and (iii) regional donors/partners all involved, in one way or the other, in the regional integration of Southern Africa. A total number of 40 people participated in this study as explained in the following parts. These comprised 28 respondents who participated in face-to-face semi-­ structured interviews, and 12 discussants in two separate focus group discussions. The separation of these two categories of participants was done for triangulating the data. The number of 28 semi-structured interviews was achieved through the following specific criteria: eight state actors from the SADC Secretariat, the SADC Parliament Forum and the SADC National Committees from Botswana, the DRC, Mozambique and South Africa, as research sites and each of these was purposively chosen. Regional civil society constituted the second category of 14 respondents from organisations affiliated with SAPSN, SATUCC, Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA), Gender Links and SADC-CNGO, including ordinary citizens in the region. The third category comprised six respondents from major partners/donors or external regional actors in the region such as the EU Delegation to SADC, the Open Society Foundation, the German Development Cooperation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Norwegian People’s Aid. Respondents were demographically represented by gender, youth, people with disabilities, and all of whom were between 18 and 60 years old. The book adopted semi-structured interviews which were conducted with the 28 respondents, who were clustered into three categories based on country as indicated above. Semi-structured interviews were well-­ suited to the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and also enabled probing for more information and clarification of answers (Louise Barriball and While 1994). Responses from the regional state actors’ category enabled the authors to address the issue on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks in formal settings of interaction with the SADC. The regional civil society actor category of

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respondents enabled the authors to highlight the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when interacting in formal or self-­ organised regionalisms. The third category of regional donors assisted enabled the authors to attain balanced responses about the status of the interaction of Southern African civil society networks in the region. Additionally, two focus group discussions were held and comprised six discussants each (Dilsha and Latif 2013), chosen through simple random sampling. The discussions took place in Gaborone, Botswana, in March 2018 and were necessitated by the availability of discussants in that country which hosts the SADC Secretariat. Focus group 1 comprised civil society groupings affiliated to SADC-CNGO. Focus group 2 comprised discussants from civil society groups which interact within self-organised networks, for example SAPSN. Discussants included male, female, young people and people with disabilities, for a satisfactory demographic representation. All of these were snowballed based on their association to a regional civil society network and experience in interacting either in formal or self-organised regionalism. Discussions in group 1 enabled the authors to understand the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that are developed respectively within SADC-led forums. Those in group 2 helped the authors to grasp the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. By providing insight on the perceptions, beliefs and opinions of a group of people in relation to the study questions, focus group discussions helped the authors to triangulate the data collected from semi-structured interviews, observations and literature review (Silverman 2016). The abovementioned techniques of data collection were augmented by observational notes through participant observation (Johnson et  al. 2006) of the authors on strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during their interaction within the 13th Civil Society Forum held from 14 to 16 August 2017 prior to the 37th Heads of State Summit from 19 to 20 August 2017 at the OR Tambo Building in Pretoria, South Africa (SADC 2017). More than that, we have observed the interaction between civil society networks and SADC elites during the Gender Links Summit and Awards held in Gaborone, Botswana, on 6 and 7 March 2018. The technique enabled us to grasp the way self-organised forums were held through strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society

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during their interaction with the SADC elites and among themselves outside of the formal forums. As for data analysis, it was done through qualitative thematic content analysis, which is a tool for analysis that provides a descriptive presentation of qualitative data sets. Thematic content analysis has been used to develop the recurring themes from the narratives of the lived experiences of the study participants (Braun and Clarke 2006; Yin 2016). These qualitative data sets are analysed by identifying the recurring patterns within data and grouping them into themes (Braun and Clarke 2006). These themes are patterns of thought that capture the perceptions of research participants on various phenomena in relation to the research questions (Babbie 2005). In a nutshell, these include the transcribing of all recorded interviews and observation notes taken during the data collection process, the coding of data collected, creation of key themes and categories, and discussion of findings (Creswell 2013). For the sake of anonymity, the book assigned pseudonyms to the participants in the data presentation and analysis process to protect their identity and ensure consistency. The book categorised them under regional state actors for representatives from the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SNC and SNCP. Regional civil society actors constituted a category of respondents representing civil society groupings affiliated to SADC-CNGO, SAPSN, SATUCC, FOCCISA, BOCONGO, Gender Links and SAT, to name a few, as well as the regional citizenry. Finally, the regional donors’ category included respondents from the donors/partners like GIZ, FES, OSISA, EU Delegation to SADC, German Cooperation and so forth. All participants were allocated and identified as respondents with a number from 1 to 8 for the regional state actors’ category, 9–22 for regional civil society actors and 23–28 for the regional donors’ category. As for the two focus group discussions, participants were identified as discussants allocated numbers from 1 to 6 for discussants representing civil society representatives who interact in formal settings of regionalism and 7–12 for civil society actors interacting in self-organised regionalism outside of the SADC. The book used qualitative differentiating comparative analysis as a modelling approach in order to gauge differences in the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society groupings in two institutional settings of interaction (Pickvance 2005; Tilly 1984). Based on the

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findings, the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks within two distinct institutional settings were compared by the authors in order to gauge whether their differences were useful for typology-building.

Structure of the Book The book is organised into eight chapters as follows; Chap. 1 provides an introduction to this book by outlining the key issues theoretical perspectives as well as the contents of this book. Chapter 2 presents the historical background and conventional approaches to regional integration in Africa and the SADC. This is achieved by locating the SADC regional integration drive within the African Union (AU) continental integration project as immortalised in The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) (1991). On the basis of the Abuja Treaty, the AU is working towards establishing an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 and regional economic communities (RECs) are the foundation for this. As a result, regionalism and the move towards regionalisation on the African continent is an ongoing project. This is the context for examining the logic behind regional integration from a broader continental context and then narrowing down to the SADC. In doing so, this chapter attempts to show the state-centric and rationalist blueprint for and inspiration of regional integration. By these means, the chapter locates the gap which this book occupies. The chapter suggests moving beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field and practice of regional integration and, above all, understanding integration as processes that are much more than state- or market-­driven and formal phenomena. Chapter 3 critiques the conventional approaches to regional integration in Africa and Southern Africa. The chapter reveals that the state-­ centred approach to regional integration engenders a formal type of regionalism centred around formal institutional arrangements driven by state members and their allies. In other words, the realist approach to non-state actors in general, and civil society networks in particular, has been to dismiss them as marginal in world politics. Perceived by many as

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the conventional mode of building regions, state-centred approaches to regionalism have partly formed the basis for governing political projects aimed at the formation of regions, like the SADC. This chapter argues that state members typically deployed these approaches explicitly established by government elites, seconded by allied technocrats and lobbyists as sole actors, and discharged through a state-centred and hierarchical model of governance. The state-centred approach views the state as the dominant organisational structure attempting to control a problematic international and domestic environment, thereby restructuring the society over which it claims to rule. The chapter suggests moving beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism and, above all, understanding regionalism as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena. Chapter 4 discusses New Institutionalism and New Regionalism Approach to regional integration as theoretical lenses of the book. This chapter deploys New Intuitionalism as the core lens through which strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal and self-organised regional integration schemes are analysed. In addition, the chapter discusses how the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) as a notion is utilised in this book in order to understand the formation of regions from below—that regional integration is an alternative social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. The argument of this chapter is that institutionalism helps understand that informal institutions are as important as formal institutions in regionalism, and how these institutions can serve as bottom-up and alternative platforms for regional integration. In Chap. 5, Southern African civil society networks’ interaction in the SADC regulatory regimes by emphasising the established mechanisms of formal interface is analysed. This chapter argues that the exclusive features of the state-centric and mainstream mode of integration in the SADC region have triggered two settings within which civil society interact for alternative regionalisms. The chapter demonstrates that despite the existence of Article 23 in the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC that establishes the joint governance system between government elites and non-state actors in decision-making processes, this still lacks full

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operationalisation in important sectors of regional integration. The main argument in Chap. 5 is that, normatively, SADC has a strong framework for involving civil society, but operationalisation is still problematic among stakeholders. Alternative and people-centred approaches to regional integration are analysed in Chap. 6. This chapter identifies and discusses the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks interacting within formal settings. The formal settings include Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, SADC Secretariat, SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF), SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of Ministers, and Heads of State Summit. The chapter also examines civil society networks interacting within self-organised initiatives. The settings in this regard include Civil Society Forum and the SADC People’s Summit, among others. The chapter argues that, despite being informal, the strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regional gatherings are also as important as state-led formal institutions. They are also capable of influencing and forming regions outside of the mainstream or formal. Chapter 7 develops a typology of institutional arrangements of Southern African civil society networks. This chapter argues that, while interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, Southern African civil society networks devise distinct institutional arrangements that inform a typology of their interaction in the region. The horizontal networks of civil society organisations exhibit distinct strategies, norms and rules compared to those involved in formal interaction with SADC. The strategies include competing with the existing status quo instead of complementing it, for fear of being excluded; developing a common agenda instead of a state-led agenda; ownership of debates by civil society instead of stateoriented debate; inclusive and flexible debates in place of selective and more bureaucratic debates; building regional solidarity and networks through shared lived experiences instead of friendship-building with SADC elites behind the scenes; collective action sanctioned by a shared communiqué instead of a collective people’s declaration. Southern African civil society networks interact within both formal regionalisms, where they legitimise the existing status quo through cooperation, and with selforganised regionalisms, where they challenge the status quo through

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self-organised initiatives that aggrssively push for change. Thus, these informal institutions are considered, by many, to constitute alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions. More than that, they build community, increase participation, promote diversity, and strengthen civic engagement. In this regard, regionalism has become an alternative social and political phenomenon that can be promoted by non-state actors too. A shift towards a people-centred approach to regionalism is advocated for in Chap. 8, which provides a conclusion. In this chapter, it is asserted that regional integration can be viewed as an unconventional socio-­ political phenomenon that can be promoted by non-state actors too. The chapter proposes a conceptual expansion of regional integration that does not only understand non-state actors as dependent units of formal regional organisations but also consider them actors in their own right. This should stimulate continued debate on and provide a foundation for discussions around alternate regionalism and the kinds of strategies, norms and rules which are developed by regional civil society networks in their quest for alternative regionalisms in the SADC region.

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2 A Historical Background to Regional Integration in Africa and Southern Africa

Introduction The move towards integrating Africa can be traced to the period before the independence of African countries. A case in point is the 1930s and 1940s period when Pan-Africanist leaders and liberation movements declared the aspiration for and commitment towards the independence, political and economic integration of the African continent (Dinka and Kennes, 2007). A good example of this is the 1945 Pan-African Congress which was held in Manchester, United Kingdom, in which a clarion call was made for the independence and unity of all African countries. When Ghana gained its independence from Britain on 6 March 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, the calls for a united Africa predicated on a Pan-African identity gathered traction. In particular Kwame Nkrumah asserted that the whole of Africa needed to be independent for the independence of Ghana to be meaningful. To this effect, Kwame Nkrumah called a meeting of African Heads of State (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) in April 1958 to assert the need for African unity. This was followed in December of the same year by the All-African Peoples Conference, which was also held in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_2

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Ghana. In the December 1958 meeting Kwame Nkrumah encouraged the fight for independence in many African states that were still colonised and a vigilance against other forms of European colonialism (Yaw 2018). Several meetings took place and divisions occurred between African countries after and as a direct product of the December 1958 All-African Peoples Conference. For instance, in January 1961, the Casablanca gathering of Heads of State was convened. This got itself the name, the Casablanca Group, and is considered by many to have been revolutionary and more Pan-Africanist because of the critical stance against the situation in the Congo in which Western interference had contributed to the instability of the country (Cervenka 1977; Söderbaum 1996). This is evidenced by that an agreement on the Casablanca Charter was reached with the aim to establish an African military command and African common market. Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco together with the provisional governments of Algeria and Libya were all part of the Casablanca Group led by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah who had already been closely involved in the Pan-African movement; and together with the others associated their own achievement of independence with broader aspirations for continental liberation and union (Amate 1986; Clapham 1996). In response to the Casablanca Group, there was on the one hand, the Brazzaville Group that also emerged between 1960 and 1961 mainly composed of the former Francophone colonies, namely the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, the People’s Republic of Congo, Dahomey (present-day Benin), Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), Senegal, Niger, Chad and Madagascar. During that period, the Brazzaville Group managed to establish the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), then later turned into the Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne (OCAM), which dissolved in 1985 (Söderbaum 1996). Another plan for African integration was initiated from Liberia by then President William Tubman. The Brazzaville Group would be joined by several other countries to discuss the Tubman Plan to integrate Africa at the 1959 Saniquellie Conference, the 1960 Addis Ababa Conference and the May 1961 Monrovia Conference, respectively. The Monrovia Group, as it came to be known, thus discussed the Tubman Plan. The following year, the Monrovia Group came up with a draft treaty for the

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Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy States in Lagos. The group followed this up by establishing a permanent secretariat and standing committee of finance ministers. This is the broad backdrop upon which efforts to integrate Africa are founded. This chapter provides a broad overview of the moves towards continental and especially regional integration in Africa, from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The overarching aim in this regard is to show that continental and regional integration drives in Africa are as historical as they are current and this is the context within which this book is located. In situating the book within these debates, the effort is made to amplify the fact that at both continental and regional levels, it seems as if the participation of civil society organisations is not promoted. Not only so, it also seems as if civil society organisations are hardly accorded the opportunity to enter formal settings to participate in integration either. However, civil society organisations do aspire to contribute to continental and regional integration. Thus, it is the implications and consequences of their exclusion or oversight, which provides a site for debates in this book.

 he Organisation of African Unity T and Framework for Regional Integration in Africa It was only in May 1963 that African political leaders from the 32 independent states at the time came together, thanks to Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (Söderbaum 1996). Consequently, the two associations, the Casablanca and Brazzaville Groups, merged and formed the Organisation of African Unity. The charter of the newly formed organisation was ratified by 30 Heads of State and Government. The OAU fought for the ending of colonialism and apartheid through collective support to liberation movements, like the Frontline States in Southern Africa. The final dissolution of the specialised agencies of the OAU that had been established to fight colonialism and apartheid, including the Coordinating

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Committee for the Liberation of Africa and the African Anti-Apartheid Committee represented the epitome of these achievements. Beyond the political matters of independence and self-determination, it should be understood that African countries during this time were also concerned about the economic independence of the continent too. There was a growing feeling that, despite its success in eliminating colonialism and apartheid, the OAU had failed to promote regional socio-economic integration that directly contributed to continental transformation and the well-being of Africans. This led to the renewed emphasis on the need for Africa’s economic development, self-reliance, eradication of poverty and the betterment of people’s standards of living. For example, in 1973, at the Tenth Anniversary of the OAU, the Addis Ababa Declaration was made denouncing the inability of the international community to create favourable conditions for promoting Africa’s development (Cervenka 1977). Thus self-reliance, inward looking and self-sustaining growth was recommended during the Third Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1975. In 1976, the then President of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) Mobutu Sese Seko hosted the 11th Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU on Economic Development and Cooperation, which cemented the quest for self-reliance and regional integration in Africa, through the Kinshasa Declaration. The Kinshasa Declaration emphasised African ownership and full control of its natural resources by Africans. The declaration additionally included the establishment of multinational companies, the African common market, the African Energy Commission, and the African Economic Community within a period of 15–20 years. Later, between February and March 1977, the Revised Master Plan for a New International Economic Order in Africa was adopted. The Kinshasa Declaration and the Revised Master Plan were both finally adopted during the Libreville OAU Summit in July 1977. The slow progress in achieving economic integration made African countries realise that they needed a framework to speed up integration focused on fully enhancing unity and economic development of the continent (Cervenka 1977). Hence, at the 1979 Monrovia Summit, African leaders committed to achieving African economic development through vibrant regional integration by the year 2000 (Dinka and Kennes 2007;

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Söderbaum 1996). This led OAU member states to crafting and signing the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the Treaty for Establishing the African Economic Community or the Abuja Treaty in 1991. Through these instruments, OAU member states aimed to integrate the African continent by establishing the African Economic Communities (AEC) by 2028. The Lagos Plan of Action set out the continental economic union to emanate from economic cooperation in the continent’s regional economic blocs (Schoeman 2002; Söderbaum 1996). It is these regions, like the SADC, for example, which provide a foundation for the AEC. In fact, this book focuses on the SADC and a brief overview of the regional economic bloc’s origins and aims will be discussed after the next section. Thereafter, the rest of the book will engage in a full discussion of the important place of civil society networks in the integration of the SADC region.

 he Treaty Establishing the African T Economic Community The 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community or Abuja Treaty, through its objectives, structures and content, constituted a historic framework for African countries to promote their economic activities (Amate 1986). Its aims are to: promote economic, social and cultural development as well as African economic integration with a view to increasing economic self-sufficiency and promoting endogenous and self-supporting development; create a continent-wide framework for development, mobilisation and utilisation of Africa’s human and material resources, with a view to self-sufficient development; promote cooperation and development in all spheres of human activity with a view to raising the living standards of the African people, maintaining and promoting economic stability, establishing close and peaceful relations among member states, and contributing to ensuring the continent’s progress, development and economic integration; and to coordinate and harmonise policies among the existing and future economic communities, with a view to the gradual establishment of the community (OAU 1991). Through Resolution CM/Res.464 (XXVI), the OAU Council of Ministers decided Africa should be divided into five regions, namely Northern

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Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and Central Africa. These are the same regions in which eight regional economic communities (RECs) for establishing the AEC, in six phases over 34 years (1994–2028) (OAU 1991), are located. The eight RECs comprise the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Communauté economque des Etat de L’Afrique Centale (CEEAC); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Communauté des Etats Sahelo-Sahariens (CEN-SAD); and the East African Community (EAC). These RECs should provide building blocks or the foundation for establishing the AEC. The foundation of the RECs to African integration is evident in that the six successive phases which should lead to the AEC in 2028 comprise, first, strengthening those RECs in existence and in the case of regions in which these do not exist, set them up, over a period of five years (OAU 1991). The second stage involves the removal of trade restrictions within the RECs in a period of not more than eight years. In the third stage, there is the establishment of free trade areas (FTA) within RECs, in a period of not more than ten years. Fourth is the formation of a Customs Union over a period of not more than two years and this involves the “coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems” within RECs (OAU 1991: 14). The fifth stage involved the formation of a continental common market over a period of four years. The sixth and final stage should include the consolidation of the African common market through the free movement of people, goods, capital and services; the integration of the economic, political, social and cultural sectors; the establishment of a single internal market as well as a Pan-African economic and monetary union; the completion of an African Monetary Fund; the establishment of an African Central Bank; the creation of an African currency and completion of the Pan-African Parliament with the election of its members by universal suffrage at the continental level (OAU 1991: 14). Therefore, the 1991 Abuja Treaty assigns Africa’s RECs as the building blocks for continental integration and the eventual creation of the African Economic Community. However, these RECs need to be substantially

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strengthened and given clearer operational guidelines in order to achieve this huge mandate. For example, even though the African Union only recognises eight RECs, the continent currently has 14 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), working on regional integration issues, with numerous treaties and protocols governing relations among them, and between them and the member states. This proliferation of institutions and protocols means that out of the 55 member states of the AU, about 26 belong to two of the 14 IGOs, 20 belong to three of them, and one country belongs to four (Ross-Larson 2006). The AU’s initiative to divide the continent into five major regions and then recognise only eight of the very many RECs, therefore, makes sense because that reduces complications, makes coordination easier and fosters continental integration (Nshimbi 2019). When the OAU was transformed into the AU in 2002, the idea was to deepen political and economic integration of African countries. The Constitutive Act of the AU thus empowers the continental body to play an active role in RECs, as well as in member states. Added to this, the AU would spearhead the implementation of common continental policies and superintend over it (Fagbayibo 2018). Unlike the type of regional integration spearheaded by the AU, this book focuses on alternative regionalism at the hands of civil society. However, the arena is broader and the context within which this form of regional integration occurs is actually alongside the formalised regional integration defined by the type recognised by the AU in the eight major RECs of the continent. The progress that each one of those eight RECs makes in accomplishing the goals of regional integration impacts on continental integration (Moyo and Nshimbi 2019, 2020; Nshimbi and Moyo 2017). Because of this and likewise, in this book we assume that the progress made in the alternative initiatives by civil society organisations (which establish regionalism outside of the formal processes) towards accomplishing viable alternative regionalisms impacts similar civil society initiatives in other regions of the continent and at continental level. It is for this reason that, in this book, we focus on alternative regionalisms in only one of the same eight RECs recognised by the AU, namely the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

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 he Southern African T Development Community The origins of the SADC can be traced back to the Frontline States (FLS) movement, and then the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was in operation from 1980 to 1992 when the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC was signed. This implies that the FLS, SADCC and SADC constitute a trajectory of the development of regionalism in the Southern Africa region and a comment on each is necessary. The Frontline States, was an alliance of a few Southern African countries that came together and whose objective was the political liberation of Southern Africa (Söderbaum 1996; Schoeman 2013; Odhiambo et al. 2016: 96). It was formed in 1975 as an informally constituted political grouping, composed of Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and—from 1980—Zimbabwe, “with the objective of forcing an end to white minority rule in Southern Africa” (Lee 2003: 65). This implies that the FLS was established as a focal point for the anti-colonial struggle in Southern Africa. The FLS was led by Tanzania under President Julius Nyerere. Afterwards, Zimbabwe promoted sub-regional political cohesion, thanks to President Robert Mugabe, which fostered close people-to-­ people integration with Angola, Mozambique and Zambia, and maintained friendly relations with Tanzania, Lesotho and Swaziland (now Eswatini) (le Pere and Tjønneland 2005). Consequently, Zimbabwe became a leading country of the FLS in its subsequent existence. Being a loose grouping, the FLS acted in an ad hoc fashion, responding to political needs and crises as these arose—its main focus was the anti-apartheid struggle and pre-1980 the struggle against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, which is now Zimbabwe (Schoeman 1998). As a loose organisation, the FLS played a politico-security role in the Southern Africa region (Anglin 1983). During this anti-apartheid struggle, South Africa and the DRC (then Zaire) were respectively denied membership. On the one hand, South Africa under the apartheid regime was one of the main reasons for the formation of the FLS and, therefore, it was almost impossible to associate with the country when strategising to liberate Southern Africa. As for Zaire, it was denied membership because it

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supported and cooperated with the apartheid regime in South Africa, and Zaire’s President Mobutu also supported and was friends with Dr Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola. It is noteworthy that, though part of the FLS, even countries like Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (now Eswatini) found themselves in a difficult position because they could not easily free themselves from South Africa’s economic influence and hegemony based on their long-term acquaintance with South Africa and membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which dated back to 1910 and 1969, respectively (Schoeman 2007). The nine FLS members—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland (now Eswatini), Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi— went on to establish the SADCC in 1980. SADCC was thus considered a brainchild of the FLS and an economic pillar of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the Southern African region (Schoeman 2002). Established in terms of the Lusaka Declaration, SADCC focused on the economic liberation of Southern Africa from apartheid South Africa’s hegemony (le Pere and Tjønneland 2005). The aim was to reduce economic dependence on and vulnerability to apartheid South Africa. In order to achieve its objective, SADCC established economic and infrastructural security cooperation as the foundation of development of its member states. Thus, solidarity for liberation was the driving force behind the creation of SADCC instead of strict economic, legal or formalised conventional regional integration. Hence, the organisation was also structured in a sort of decentralised bureaucratic form (le Pere and Tjønneland 2005). This decentralised approach gave the independent member states the responsibility to implement common objectives that promoted inter-­ state economic and infrastructure projects, the mobilisation of resources for development, and securing international understanding of and support for the group’s goals. This means that SADCC functioned on a project-­based approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector. The SADCC thus paid more attention on the coordination of members’ development initiatives rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy. That is, the idea was to promote national activities of each state with regard to infrastructure and

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production, such as mining and agriculture. Subsequently, establishment and/or promotion of regional economic integration was not the aim of the SADCC until the 1980s (Schoeman 2002). This rendered SADCC to be a service organisation rather than an institutional lead of member states (Ostergaard 1990; Schoeman 2002). This mode of cross-border cooperation was viewed by many to yield equality among member states regardless of the size or politico-economic power. On one hand, this equality engendered equal worth, that may have enabled even smaller states and with less power to stand in good stead to voice out their aspirations during regional negotiations in line with benefits and other relevant policies regarding distribution of opportunities, resources and capacity for themselves at the regional level. On the other hand, there was the promotion of collective identity and collective responsibility with every member state, regardless of size or relative power, having a role to play (Schoeman 2002). Additionally, SADCC member states were required to fund their coordinating activities on behalf of the SADCC. However, the levels of development and financial challenges experienced in most of the member states made them neglect some important sectors such as human resources development, which was under the responsibility of the then Swaziland (now Eswatini). The SADCC was actually donor dependent because it lacked financial capacities. Underdevelopment in member states also contributed to SADCC’s ineffectiveness. The dependence on donors also raised the possibility for the donors to dominate over and/or manipulate the regional development policies of the SADCC. But, it was the new changes in the world such as changing global power relations due to the end of the Cold War, the rise of the neoliberal economic order and the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa that had a significant role in raising the need to transform SADCC towards regional economic integration (Schoeman 2002). As a result, the SADC Treaty, signed in August 1992, transformed SADCC into SADC, and seeks regional economic integration through formal regional institutions (SADC 1992). SADC includes 16 member states: Angola, Botswana, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eswatini (then Swaziland), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,

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Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC 2020). The aim of SADC is to promote regional development and enhance well-being of ordinary citizens of its member states, that is, the promotion of deeper economic cooperation and integration to help address many of the factors that made it difficult to sustain economic growth and socio-economic development, such as continued dependence on the export of a few primary commodities (Schoeman 2002; Nagar and Mutasa 2017). This represents a shift from the traditional military-­ political security approach of the FLS and SADCC to focus more on a much broader definition of security that includes economic, environmental and societal security. One of the major steps that SADC took after its transformation was to combine market liberalisation and development integration in order to achieve deeper economic integration as reiterated in the 2000 SADC Regional Human Development Report. The number of member states of the SADC has also increased since 1992 with countries like Mauritius, the DRC and the Comoros, for example, joining the organisation in 1995, 1997 and 2017, respectively, and bringing the total membership to 16. Despite the benefits of a large membership, a major challenge that faces the SADC, like many other RECs in Africa is that most SADC member states have multiple and overlapping memberships in other RECs. This negatively affects the effectiveness of the RECs. More than that, the SADC, like most other African RECs, constitutes a regional project in which member states take precedence over issues of integration, to the neglect and near exclusion of other regional stakeholders, which are otherwise significant to regional integration.

Conclusion This chapter engaged with a historical overview of regional integration in Africa and Southern Africa. SADC is not only presented as the offspring of the 1992 Declaration and Treaty of the SADC which established it, but also as a significant part of the aspirations of the AU’s 1991 Abuja Treaty which envisaged effective integration of the continent through

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regional economic blocks. Thus, the integration process should occur at two levels, regional and continental. The focus of this book is SADC, one of the RECs which should provide the pillar to build the continental African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. By highlighting the logic behind the Abuja Treaty and the Declaration and Treaty of SADC, which promote continental and regional integration respectively, the intention was to highlight and introduce two things, which are discussed in detail in Chap. 3. First, the assumption that both regional and continental integration should be achieved only through formalised engagements and processes in the form of the harmonisation of markets through formal institutions. In other words, there is the state-centric and rationalist blueprint for and inspiration of regional integration in that there is the emphasis of a top-down and state-driven regional integration model. Second was to situate the debates in this book within the ongoing regional integration debates. That is, in promoting top-down and market-­led approaches to regional integration, the question of the space for civil society organisations in regional integration arises and this is the site which this book occupies. These are debates which are examined in-depth in the following chapters so as to clearly define the gap which this book occupies.

References Amate, C. O. (1986). Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice: COC Amate. Macmillan Publishers. Anglin, D. (1983). Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA. International Organization, 37(4), 68. Cervenka, Z. (1977). The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU. Friedmann; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (p. 120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dinka, T., & Kennes, W. (2007). Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements. Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements, History and Challenges. ECDPM Discussion Paper 74. Maastricht.

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Fagbayibo, B. (2018). From OAU to AU: Rethinking Supranational Governance in Africa. In S.  Oloruntoba & T.  Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. le Pere, G., & Tjønneland, E. N. (2005). SADC: Establishment, and Changing Objectives. Advancing Co-Operation and Integration in Southern Africa. Institute for Global Dialogue. Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C. C. (2019). Border Practices at Beitbridge Border and Johannesburg Inner City: Implications for the SADC Regional Integration Project. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54(3), 309–330. Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C.  C. (2020). Of Borders and Fortresses: Attitudes Towards Immigrants from the SADC Region in South Africa as a Critical Factor in the Integration of Southern Africa. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 35(1), 131–146. Nagar, D., & Mutasa, C. (2017). The Implementation Gap of the Regional Integration Agenda in SADC/Seminar Report. Nshimbi, C. C. (2019). Pan-African Aspirations Drive a New Free Trade Pact. Current History, 118(808), 188–193. Nshimbi, C., & Moyo, I. (Eds.). (2017). Migration, Cross-Border Trade and Development in Africa. Palgrave Studies of Sustainable Business in Africa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. OAU. (1991). The Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Retrieved from https://au.int/sites/default/files/ treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_ community_e.pdf. Odhiambo, M., Chitiga, R., & Ebobrah, S. (2016). The Civil Society Guide to Regional Economic Communities in Africa. Cape Town: African Minds. Ostergaard, T. (1990). SADCC: A Political and Economic Survey. Copenhagen: DANIDA. Ross-Larson, B. C. (2006). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities (Vol. 2). United Nations Publications. SADC. (1992). Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. Gaberone: SADC Secretariat. SADC. (2020). The Member States. Retrieved April 12, 2020, from https://www. sadc.int/member-­states/. Schoeman, M. (1998). Building a Secure Community in Southern Africa: The Case of SADC. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales.

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Schoeman, M. (2002). From SADCC to SADC and Beyond: The Politics of Economic Integration (pp. 1–12). Buenos Aires: Congress of the International Economic History Organisation. Schoeman, M. (2007). South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner or ‘Just Another Kid On The Block’. In South Africa in Africa: The Post-­ Apartheid Decade. Schoeman, M. (2013). Regional Integration, Regionalism and Regionalisation in Africa: An Imagined Reality? In P.  Lang (Ed.), Regional Integration and Social Cohesion: Perspectives from the Developing World RISC 2011. Brussels: Editions Scientifiques Internationales. Söderbaum, F. (1996). Handbook of Regional Organizations in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Yaw, A.-G. (2018). Commemorating the 60th anniversary of the All African People’s Conference. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://thisisafrica.me/ politics-­and-­society/60th-­anniversary-­of-­the-­all-­african-­peoples-­conference/.

3 Regional Integration in Africa and Southern Africa: An Appraisal of Conventional Approaches

Introduction Regionalism in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) remains highly dominated by rationalist, materialist or structuralist theories. The approaches predominantly focus on states and technocrats as the most important actors in regional integration and on formal inter-state and market-led processes of integration (Mansfield and Milner 1997; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). According to neorealists, for example, this is because the international system is marked by anarchy, and the most important actors are thus rational egoists and unitary states whose outward behaviour is dependent on their pre-defined interests (Smith 2002; Ruggie 1998). The state-centred model of integration is thus driven by top-down decisions imposed on citizens (Fioramonti 2015). The model engenders a formal type of regionalism or integration centred on institutional arrangements driven by member states and their allies (Söderbaum 2016). In this sense, the state-centred approach views the state as the dominant organisational structure attempting to control problematic international and domestic environments, thereby

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restructuring the society over which it claims to rule (Skocpol 1985; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Neorealists and intergovernmentalists point to the importance of states and emphasise sovereignty and power in regionalism. Taking the centrality of the state as a premise, realist thinkers have argued that transnational organisations matter only at the fringes of world politics (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). They posit that any effort to build a community beyond the nation-state will be challenging and may even intensify the differences and conflicts between states (Cini 2003; Söderbaum and Grant 2017). The neorealists theorise that there is convergence of interests and benefits as states interact and cooperate either at the regional or at the international level (Keohane 1984; Oloruntoba 2016). In this case, non-state actors may pressurise their governments, but power is performed within the framework of formal regional institutions driven by states. In other words, the realist view of non-state actors in general, and civil society networks in particular, has been to dismiss them as marginal in (world) politics. As a result, state-led decisions side-line many citizens who are supposed to drive and own political decisions that affect their daily lives. In Gilpin’s (2004) reading, groupings of non-state actors are acknowledged by neorealists, provided they helped hegemonic states to further their goals. However, “the state continues to be the principal actor in both economic and political affairs” (Gilpin 2004: 238). Citizens are treated as beneficiaries, and not as active agents and owners, of political projects to form regions. In most cases, these state-driven regional groupings are centred around the state promoting regional growth through free trade, and building peace and security among member states of regional organisations. This implies that regional agendas are purely an expression of the economic and political aspirations of states. When they form regional blocks, states become more concerned with consolidating their mutual political power and economic ties in respect of their sovereignty. Thus, the epitome of conventional state-led approaches to regional integration is the creation of common markets in which transnational economic interests take centre stage (Rosamond 2000; Moravcsik 1998; Oloruntoba 2016).

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In the name of sovereignty, states dictate regional policies and oversee other organs of regional bodies. Such is the case in regions like the SADC, which dictates its agenda to a SADC Secretariat that has no enforcement mechanisms (SADC 1992). State-centred approaches to regional integration are operationalised through formal state-established and state-driven regional organisations or intergovernmental organisations, like the UN, EU, AU and SADC, which are perceived to be purely groupings of states who willingly share their common agenda, deemed to be a priority for their respective countries. In keeping with the general outlook of this book, this chapter takes a different view and challenges conventional approaches to regional integration in Africa and Southern Africa. We advance and bring to the fore how non-state actors and institutions are of paramount importance for inclusive regional integration that allows civil society actors to be not only important, but also independent, active agents in the formation of regions. Thus, the chapter critiques conventional approaches to regional integration and provides a context for the argument which we progressively build in the book: that there is a need to move beyond the state-­ centric and top-down perspectives that dominate the research field of regional integration and, above all, to understand regional integration as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena. This is an important issue to raise because, in this globalised world, there is an increased interest in transboundary activities that seek transnational responses. States have shown their inability to handle, together, cross-border issues like financial crises, terrorism, disease pandemics, migration, civil wars and climate change, among others. Thus, regional integration beyond state-centric parameters becomes an appealing mode of governance in order to respond to cross-border problems. In that regard, there is a need to understand which template or approach (and the challenges of such templates) states apply in their daily endeavours of regional integration.

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 arly, Old and New/Alternative Regionalism: E An Overview A wealth of literature exists on the evolution of regional integration and regionalism (see e.g. Panikkar 1948; Hurrell 1995; Mittelman 2004; Jönsson et al. 2000; Hettne 2000; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003; Hettne 1994; Söderbaum 2004, 2016; Fawcett 2005; Scholte 2009; Fioramonti 2012, 2013; Godsäter 2014; Botto 2015; Kim and Fiori 2015). Without delving too much into the historical trajectories of regionalism and their comparison, there is considerable misunderstanding, misuse and confusion about what is “old” and what is “new” regionalism (Söderbaum 2016). This book acknowledges the existence of the early premodern exchange systems between communities and cooperation, especially during the era of Ancient Greek cooperation (Jönsson et  al. 2000). This would generally fall within the category of early regionalism. Old regionalism first emerged in the 1950s and stagnated in the 1970s (Söderbaum 2004) due to the slowdown of Western European integration and free trade areas (FTAs) in developing countries (Hettne 2000), and the multitude of interrelated structural transformations of the global system. Old regionalism was initially modelled on Europe as the intellectual laboratory of regional integration (Hettne 2000). Europe established and justified closed and protectionist trading blocs as a way of managing economic policy and providing for development within the bloc (Jönsson et  al. 2000; Väyrynen 2003). Old regionalism generally ended with the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order, in which the East and West were dominant superpowers and this led to new regionalism (Mittelman 2000). New regionalism emerged in the mid-1980s and has been described as an open, multidimensional societal process that takes shape in a multipolar world order in which a variety of non-state players are also operating at several levels of the global system (Hettne 2000; Söderbaum 2004). To be distinguished from old regionalism, new regionalism reflects the need for states to make a response to the global trend away from protectionism (Väyrynen 2003). Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, political projects to form a region, i.e. regionalisms, have become an essential object of

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research in world politics. The world has witnessed a radical change in the global order, from bipolar to multipolar, from a world clearly structured by blocs to new complexity, and from an imagined hierarchy of spatial configurations around the nation-state to a multiplicity of competing and overlapping regimes of territorialisation (Engel and Middell 2005; Engel et al. 2017). With this development, new regionalism inaugurates a new era of interaction between multidimensional actors at the multipolar centres of political decision-making about the formation of regions. Thus, world politics has witnessed collaboration between states and civil society as regional players. New regionalism refers to the processes by which public or private actors engage in activities across state boundaries or in which they develop conscious policies of integration with other states (Hettne et al. 1999). It is an essential space within which civil society actors too connect, exchange information, and debate, contest and contribute to the norms that govern politics and policy-making within states and across regions (Grugel 2004). Mittelman (2000) talks of the emergence of regionalism from below, conceptualised as an outcome of the agency of grassroots movements and NGOs as well as more traditional subaltern social actors such as trade unions, as groups connect and work together across state boundaries. New regionalism is seen as a regional system of governance, a regional trade regulator among member states and an avenue where citizens across the regions exercise their citizenship (Grugel 2004). Building on Grugel’s insights, this book views regionalism not only as an arena where formal regional governance is exercised but also as an arena of citizenship for alternative regionalisms (Grugel 2004). This entails that alternative regionalism is associated with the move from the old regionalism to the new regionalism, where it now takes place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character and involves multidimensional processes (Hettne et  al. 1999; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Hettne 2005). Alternative regionalisms are regarded as an attempt to specify non-traditional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures involved in the making and re-making of regions across the globe (Icaza 2009). This book will use the terms new regionalism and alternative regionalism interchangeably to refer to such reformist or transformative efforts to

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improve existing values, norms, institutions and systems that exist outside the traditional, established or mainstream systems and institutions of regionalism (Chandra 2009). Alternative regionalism highlights different paradigms that inform physical-geographical, political-economic or ideational-regional constructs. In so doing it shows that state-centric and capital-centric explanations of regionalism can be contested because they have major limitations. Reference to building alternative regionalisms in the Southern African region, as used in this book, implies the improvement and/or expansion of SADC’s existing integration initiatives to build regions that can also be driven by civil society. Therefore, if regionalism and regional integration are viewed through the lenses of new or alternative regionalism, it is then possible to analyse or critique the current logic of integration at the level of the African continent cascading down to RECs, like the SADC, which is the focus of this book.

Integration at Continental Level in Africa The post-colonial era in Africa has informed the debates on regional integration and regionalism, despite being influenced both by European integration theory and practice and by intellectual debates in Latin America (Fioramonti and Mattheis 2016). Importantly, nationalism and Pan-­ Africanism were both general ideological foundations of African integration, which first and foremost informed the visions and series of treaties developed within what was then the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and now the African Union (AU) (Asante 1997; Taylor 2005). The core aim of these nationalist ideologies was to guard the continent against external interference in respect of the ideas of the founding fathers of the OAU in 1963 (Nanjira 2010; Schoeman 2013) in the post-­colonial era. On that note, African regionalism became similar to that of East Asia, but different from the European model, which is based on breaking off nationalist thinking in favour of global or regional thinking, despite being a source of inspiration to the former and latter regional integration models.

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Overall, the African continent has experienced two waves of regional integration with significant mutual differences (Bøås 2001). The first one emerged in the 1960s through to the 1980s and was associated with decolonisation and Pan-Africanism, manifested by the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Bøås 2001; Söderbaum 2016). During this period, a range of regional schemes was established in order to combat the ongoing exploitation of people and the continent’s resources and achieve political unity. Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and protecting Africa’s resources from another Western invasion were all drivers of a call for unity of Africa. Since most of them concerned economic cooperation, they were often referred to as regional economic communities (RECs) (Bøås 2001). During this period, African regional integration was driven by strategies centred around state-led industrialisation, import substitution and collective self-reliance (Söderbaum 2016). For instance, the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said to be the earliest RECs in this regard (Ajulu 2005; Godsäter 2013) were formed in 1967 and 1975, respectively. Another significant attribute of the first wave was the strong focus on state actors (Grant and Söderbaum 2003). This implies that neorealist approaches that are solely an expression of economic and political aspirations of states and their allies were drivers of African integration strategies during that period. These top-down and state-driven approaches were used to promote state hegemonies that imposed the political will of elites as regional agendas in the continent. At that stage, the neorealist approaches and Pan-Africanist sentiments both nurtured the intergovernmental design of the OAU epitomised by the primacy of member states over the institutions. This was strengthened by the non-interference of the organisation or member states in the affairs of other member states (OAU Charter 1963, art III). Illustratively, the OAU Secretariat did not have a coercive power to enforce any resolutions on member states without their consent or to bring them to book in case of any infringements (Fagbayibo 2018). Decision-making powers only resided in intergovernmental structures such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers (OAU Charter 1963, art. VII). Consequently, the OAU was incapable of meaningfully dealing with intra-African conflicts, curtailing the deluge of gross human

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rights violations or confronting contemporary challenges ravaging the African continent (Fagbayibo 2018). In line with this first wave, emphasis was on the quest for independence of African states by fighting against colonialism and apartheid in South Africa (Packer and Rukare 2002: 366). Thus, deepening regional integration of African continent was relegated to the periphery. The second wave of regional integration on the African continent started in the early 1990s, partly as a counterforce to the uncertainties of economic globalisation (Bøås 2001). One crucial concrete incentive to integration in Africa during this period was the Abuja Treaty, adopted at the 27th summit of the OAU in 1991, which called for a strengthening of existing RECs and the establishment of new ones on the continent (Ajulu 2005). The ultimate aim is to establish an African economic community by 2028. This means that African political elites are pushing to integrate the continent economically through formal institutions as a way of dealing with economic uncertainties and stake claim in global trade and investment worthy of its size and strategic importance in the world (Ncube et  al. 2015). We will not repeat the aims of the Abuja Treaty and its programmes, targets and activities as this was achieved in Chap. 1. But, we emphasise that it follows a state-centric approach in which the state is the main player in the continental integration drive. The role of non-state actors is marginal in the move towards transforming Africa into an AEC. But progress towards establishing the AEC by 2028 has actually been very slow. Policy incoherence and language barriers among African countries are among the many obstacles to the operationalisation of the continent’s integration agenda (Ncube et al. 2015). The 1990s also saw the rise of neoliberalism as the predominant development paradigm (Womack 2006). In Africa, this mainly came in through the influence of international financial institutions and their so-­ called Washington Consensus and donor countries that imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on most of the countries on the continent (Nshimbi 2019). The African countries were urged to pursue market liberalisation policies as strategies for promoting development. From a regional and continental perspective, the main vehicle for these theoretical assumptions was to be translated into actual practice by entering into free trade agreements and establishing free trade areas (FTAs).

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FTAs are applauded to attract foreign direct investment, promote technology transfers and enhance regional competition (Mijiyawa 2017; Duong et al. 2020). Further, FTAs help to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers, reduce distortions and raise economic welfare (Ncube et  al. 2015) for countries that enter into those arrangements. The role of state was transformed due to the influence of the neoliberal dogma on politics. There was a conformity of states and formal laws to the global market requirements through deregulation of markets. Neoliberalism has inaugurated the prevalence of economic rationalisation, competitiveness and efficiency in a range of policy areas far removed from core economic policy-making (Burchell et al. 2005). Under neoliberalist approaches, capitalism was enabled to increasingly function in interconnected ways. This entails that global markets were nurtured by the neoliberal approach that also informed governments and created the need for disaggregated forms of political direction within and beyond the nation-state (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). The rising influence of neoliberal governance has developed a context where economic outcomes took over the social outcomes, and global market processes have increasingly trumped over local interests and democratic impulses. On that note, the imposed “one size fits all development policies” did not serve the intended aim to enhance national development through market liberation and demise of the state in national economy regulation including privatisation (Slaughter 2005; Gill 2012). Instead, it has plunged the majority of ordinary citizens into abject poverty by exacerbating the existing vulnerable conditions and widening the gap of inequalities among African citizens (Caffentzis 2002; Bond 2014). Nonetheless, neoliberalism was incorporated into the national mode of contemporary regional integration epitomised by top-down approaches. The neoliberal mode of economic governance at the national level has been translated into the regional mode of governance, shaping mainstream regional negotiations at the continental level (Bevir 2011; Gill 2012; Slaughter 2005). The embedded neoliberal policy into state-led approaches to regional integration has not helped the African continent to fully integrate despite many attempts to institute free trade policies. Against this backdrop, the pursuit of neorealist and neoliberal Eurocentric approaches has characterised the two waves of regional integration in

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Africa (Jenkins and Thomas 2001; Söderbaum 2016). Eurocentrism has materialised through the design of AU institutions after the EU model (Fioramonti and Mattheis 2016). More than that, global and regional politico-economic dynamics have influenced the African regional integration to continue to be state-centric. This can be demonstrated by the example of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was first introduced through the AfCFTA Agreement in 2018. Briefly, on 21 March 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda, 44 out of the 55 AU member states signed the agreement to establish the AfCFTA (African Union 2018). As of July 2019, the agreement had signatories from 54 out of 55 African countries. Eritrea was the only country which had not signed the agreement. As discussed in Chap. 2, it should be remembered that the formation of the AfCFTA fulfils the drive towards the establishment of the AEC in 2028 (see chapter for a detailed discussion). Hence it has been declared that the AfCFTA fulfils the “aspirations of Agenda 2063 for a continental market with the free movement of persons, capital, goods and services, which are crucial for deepening economic integration, and promoting agricultural development, food security, industrialisation and structural economic transformation” (African Union 2018: 1). As of March 2020, 30 countries had ratified the agreement and 28 countries had deposited their instruments of AfCFTA ratification with the AU (Tralac 2020). This has been described as both historic and momentous in terms of positioning Africa to develop economically and also compete globally (Cloete 2019). The quick summary of the AfCFTA Agreement is that it is constituted of two protocols, which are the Protocol on Trade in Goods and the Protocol on Trade in Services. The main aim of the former is the liberalisation of the market and the gradual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers between African countries, enhancement of trade through efficient customs procedures and transit, cooperation, development and enhancement of value chains regionally and continentally (African Union 2018). The latter targets the establishment of a single and liberalised market for trade in services and removal of barriers to trade in services in Africa as well as strengthening domestic and foreign investment and also increasing social and economic development (African Union 2018). In addition to these two protocols, some AU member states also signed the AU Protocol on Free Movement

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of People. The Protocol on the Free Movement of People offers visa-free travel, the right of residency and business or professional establishment for citizens of African countries which signed the protocol (Africa Union 2018). The point we want to make by invoking the case of the AfCFTA, while accepting that it is indeed both momentous and historic, is that it follows neoclassical integration logic in which the state is the main player. A careful reading of the Protocols on Trade in Goods and Services appears to show the dominance of views of the state as opposed to non-state actors. In other words, the enhancement of trade in Africa should be developed through states and formal institutions, and those which are informal become marginal and peripheral. If this is viewed through the lenses of alternative regionalism, we see it as problematic. This is why, we posit that African integration as pursued by the AU towards the setting up of the AEC is an elitist affair. It follows neoclassical logic, which abandons rather than embracing all people in meaningful integration, politically, socially, economically and culturally, among others. In any case, this is what integration demands. This is the site on which this book is located and by these means launches and advances a debate for an African integration which departs from only state-led Eurocentric and rationalist approaches to those which are reformist and inclusive of all non-state actors such as civic society organisations, among others.

Integration at Regional Level in Southern Africa In Chap. 2, we highlighted that the establishment of the AU is predicated on RECs which must provide building blocks. SADC is one of eight such RECs which must provide a foundation for the AEC.  This essentially means that the SADC regional integration processes are driven by the same ideological paradigms that drive the continental integration dynamics. Thus, SADC member states are obliged to conform to the conditionalities of the global market, at the same time, nationalist and Pan-Africanist regional political economy dynamics. That is, SADC has increasingly

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adopted a free market approach to regional integration to the degree of neoliberal tenets, exacerbating the existing inequalities and vulnerabilities (Tripp 2001). Two issues need commentary and these are the genesis of SADC as well as the post 1992 trajectories. First, SADC transformed from being a conference, i.e. SADCC (1980–1992), into a community, i.e., SADC (in 1992). As SADCC, it had favoured a dirigiste strategy of import-substitution industrialisation coupled with a fair distribution of costs and benefits (Schoeman 2013). In practice, however, SADCC was limited to being a structure for project coordination and implementation, funded mainly by donors from Europe and the Nordics in particular (Godsäter 2013). One of the fundamental problems with the radical and structuralist approaches of SADCC was that they became politically irrelevant due to the increasing importance of SAPs brought about by neoliberalism in the late 1980s. In line with new regionalism in African countries, one crucial novelty is that the institutional agendas and strategies assigned to sub-regional institutions broadened to include social, politico-strategic and other concerns besides traditional economic integration (Bach 2005). In the case of Southern Africa, there was an emergence of interaction between African Frontline States and regional civil society networks in the form of trade unions, particularly, the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), and faith-based organisations, specifically, the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA) during the liberation struggle to actively fight against colonial rule and apartheid. But, this relationship between these non-state actors and FLS did not last after the attainment of their objectives of fighting for political independence. Second, since its transformation into a community in 1992, SADC experienced a shift in its integration agenda and ideological stance. This was in order to align with the global economy after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and also due to the strengthening of neoliberalism as a global agenda, and the regional geopolitical transformations following the end of apartheid in South Africa. A shift from a bipolar to a multipolar and multidimensional world constituted, among others, transformative tools of state-led agenda of regional integration in SADC region. As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, the embrace of a neoliberal

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stance has nurtured several sub-regional processes that have made the prospects for the successful consolidation of political projects to enhance regional integration intricate. Given its realist and Pan-Africanist orthodoxy, like the rest of the RECs on the continent, SADC embraces intergovernmentalist instead of supranational approaches in order to advance regional integration (Fagbayibo 2018). The intergovernmentalist paradigm remains the dominant approach on the African continent and encourages the primacy of member states over the organs of the regional institutions to which they belong. In Schemers and Blokker’s (1995) reading, there are two features of intergovernmental institutions. The first is that decision-making resides solely with representatives of member states. The second is that decisions are arrived at through consensus amongst member states, with regional institutions playing a markedly subsidiary role (Schemers and Blokker 1995). The supranational approach, however, is viewed as “the development of authoritative institutions and network of policy-making activity above the nation state” (Rosamond 2000: 204; Fagbayibo 2018). Pescatore (1974: 51–52) has even identified three elements of supranationalism, including the recognition of common values and interests; the creation of an effective power and the autonomy of these powers. No regional institution is purely supranational without applying the intergovernmentalist approach. SADC is considered to be an intergovernmentalist institution as its member states hold the primacy over its organs, including the Secretariat and Parliament Forum, and constitutional documents such as the SADC Treaty and Protocols. That is, the organisation is not above the member states. It does not dictate what should happen in the respective internal political economy affairs of member states. Consequently, SADC was designed as an arena of interaction and collaboration between and amongst Heads of State and Ministers of Governments. SADC decision-­ making processes are criticised to be highly state-centred, and to some extent even ritualised (Söderbaum 2004). Image-boosting approaches are reportedly to be at centre of SADC summits whereby political regimes within member states can express their loyalty to each other, praise their undemocratic practices and, at the same time, the values and goals of their regional intergovernmental institutions (Söderbaum 2004).

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This image-boosting practices become norms and highly institutionalised at a large number of ministerial and summit meetings, which in reality involves no real debate and no wider consultation within or between SADC member states (Simon 2003: 71; Grant and Söderbaum 2003). The state-centred approaches to regional integration are operationalised through formal state-established and state-driven regional organisations or international organisations, like the UN, EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, AU, and SADC, among others, perceived to be purely groupings of states who willingly share their common agenda deemed to be a priority for their respective countries (Söderbaum 2016; Grugel 2004). For the study at hand, SADC’s states coexist based on associations often defined by their shared common interests converted into social, political, or economic interrelationships and driven by mutual forbearance and respect and a willingness of all parties to abide by the basic rules of the game (Robertson 1969; Mayall in Fawcett and Hurell 1995; Abass 2004). Although it has adopted state-centred approaches and top-down intergovernmentalist institutions, SADC seems to be normatively committed to full inclusion of its ordinary citizens into decision-making processes as stated in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty of 1992. This treaty aims at achieving common approaches and policies through protocols in areas of cooperation (SADC Treaty 1992; OSISA 2015). Starting from its preamble, the SADC Treaty states that Heads of State and Government should be mindful of the need to involve the people of the region in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law. Article 23 of the treaty stipulates that: In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organizations in the process of regional integration. SADC shall co-operate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and nongovernmental organizations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the region. (SADC Treaty 1992: 17)

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More than that, Article 5.1 and Article 5.2(b) of the same treaty clearly assert that SADC will “encourage the people of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC” (SADC Treaty 1992: 5–6). However, this legal effect given to SADC and civil society collaboration is not mandatory, as there are no sanctions attached to this joint mode of governance, as pointed out by respondents (2, 19 and 25, in March 2018 in Gaborone) during our fieldwork. Member states are not forced to include civil society in all decision-making processes to form the region. The treaty seeks to coordinate and harmonise policies through protocols in various areas of cooperation. The treaty emphasises the sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and rule of law; as well as balance and mutual benefit. Significantly, Article 6.5 of the treaty requires member states to domesticate the treaty by taking “all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of national law” (SADC 1992: 7). Subsidiary documents such as protocols, charters and declarations complement the legal and political provisions outlined in the SADC Treaty. Furthermore, SADC (2015) has developed 26 protocols that provide the legal framework for cooperation and collaboration among member states in several areas such as defence, development, illicit drug trade, free trade, gender, the facilitation and movement of persons and legal affairs. Yet only 10 out of these protocols highlight SADC’s willingness to interact with civil society. Article 4(i) on the preventative measures of the Protocol Against Corruption (2001a: 6) states that “Mechanisms to encourage participation by the media, civil society and non-­governmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption” should be put in place. Article 7 titled “Drug Demand Reduction” of the Protocol Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking (1999: 7) stipulates that member states shall “ (b) Establish mechanisms to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the demand reduction efforts of government and non-governmental organisations (c) Call upon the public, private, business and NGO sectors to give higher priority in their programmes to combating drug abuse and the demand for drugs”.

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Article 16.5 titled “Copyright and Neighbouring Rights” and Article 18 (1) and (4) titled “Information Policies” and the whole of the Protocol on Culture, Information and Sports (2006: 11–13) respectively outline that “State Parties shall encourage and facilitate the formation of copyright societies or associations in the interest of involving non-­governmental stakeholders in matters pertaining to the protection of copyright and intellectual property; formulate and harmonise information policies after thorough consultations involving appropriate stakeholders and civil society; …[and] create political and economic environment conducive to the growth of ethical, diverse and pluralistic media”. Article 4.12 titled “Guiding Principles” of the Protocol on Forestry (2002: 8) records that “State Parties shall be encouraged to operate in partnership with non-­ governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and other entities and institutions”. Sections (1) and (2) of Article 10 titled “Co-operation with Non-state Parties and International Organisations” of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation of 2004 and as amended in 2009 respectively state that “(1) In recognition of the fact that political, defence and security matters transcend national and regional boundaries, cooperation agreement on these matters between State Parties, and other organisations other than SADC shall be accepted provided that such agreements shall not: (a) be inconsistent with the objectives and other provisions of the treaty and this protocol, (b) impose obligations upon a State Party that is not a party to such cooperation agreement, and (c) impede a State Party from fulfilling its obligations under the treaty and this protocol; (2) Any agreement between the organ and a non-State Party, or between the organ and an international organisation, shall be subject to approval by the Summit” (2009: 10). Article 10 titled “Non-governmental Organizations” in the Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation (2008: 10) asserts that “for the purpose of implementing this Protocol, Member States shall promote the participation of non-governmental organisations and the private sector, in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty”. Article 12 titled “Cooperation with Other Organisations” in the Protocol on Mining (2000: 10) underscores that “In accordance with article 23 of the SADC Treaty, the Mining Coordinating Unit shall co-operate with other organisations provided that the objectives and activities are not at variance with the objectives of

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the Protocol. The Mining Coordinating Unit shall establish working relationships with such organisations and entities and make such arrangements as may be necessary to ensure effective cooperation”. Article 13 titled “Composition and Functions of the Technical Committees” of the Protocol on Education and Training (1997: 23–24) outlines that “the Technical Committees established by Article 11 shall [include] the following: … non-governmental organisations with a key stake in basic education … [and] private sector”. Article 3(2)(a) titled “Principles” and Article 5(8)(d) and (e) titled “Institutional Arrangements” of the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (2004: 4–7) record respectively that “State Parties shall (a) ensure co-operation at the national level among government authorities, non-governmental organisations … and the private sector; … [and] the WSTCU [Wildlife Sector Technical Coordinating Unit] shall (d) support the efforts of Member States and non-governmental organizations to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife and the involvement of local communities in such efforts; (e) Promote such cooperation between the national wildlife law enforcement authorities, communities and by non-governmental organisations on all issues related to enforcement”. Article 4(1)(c)(v) and (6)(f ) titled “Institutional Mechanisms”, including Article 8 titled “Non-governmental organisations” and Article 9(5) titled “Research Development and Training” of the 1998 Protocol on Energy stipulate respectively that “the commission shall have the following functions: (c) (v) liaise, with other SADC sectors and with national, regional and international organisations”. And “relevant stakeholders may include government departments, parastatals, private sector organisations, institutes, communities, etc. Those who are unable to adequately represent themselves e.g. rural communities should be consulted and assisted and may be represented by government bodies, NGOs etc.”; (8) “In accordance with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as the business and industrial communities provided that their objectives and activities are not at variance with the objectives of the Protocol. The commission shall establish working relationships with such NGOs and communities and make such arrangements as may be necessary to ensure effective co-operation”; and (9) “Member States shall cooperate with and involve relevant NGOs in the Region in energy related scientific research

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and development” (1998: 9–20). In addition to the protocols detailed above, interaction between civil society and SADC is also encouraged in Chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP 2001a), including the objectives and strategies for sustainability of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO). Nevertheless, the references suggesting the importance of civil society cited above seem to be rather rhetorical. Regional integration in Southern Africa has largely developed without the ordinary citizens. Nonetheless, the detailed overview of the SADC Protocols that relate to or on the involvement of non-state actors in regionalism in the foregoing discussion provides a background for the rest of the discussion in the book. This is, in terms of showing that non-state actors were not involved in SADC regional integration beyond the level of tokenism, a violation of the principles and foundations of the SADC Treaty as discussed in this section. This means that regional integration in the SADC remains a state-centric affair. For instance, civil society has been occasionally invited through once-off forms of participation in state-established avenues where the scope is limited and defined in advance by elites, instead of through day-­ to-­day coexistence and continual negotiation (Gaventa and Mayo 2009; Gaventa 2010). This firms up the status quo and political interests of Heads of State and Government. However, at both transnational and domestic levels, most of these SADC Heads of State and Government are reportedly engaged in a rather intense diplomatic and at the same time symbolic game, whereby they applaud regional integration and sign treaties, such as Free Trade Agreements and sector protocols. This is done so as to create the impression that they promoted the overall projects of regional integration and regionalism, which, enables them to raise the profile and image of their repeatedly criticised homeland authoritarian regimes (Söderbaum 2004). On that note, the institutional structure of the SADC seems to promote political and rhetorical rather than economic developments (SADC 1997: 63; Isaksen and Tjønneland 2001). These practices have not allowed ordinary citizens to fully participate in region-building decisions and have subsequently forced them to claim participation from the regional institutions. This means that the SADC model and practices

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of regional integration and regionalism have tended to exclude the diversity of voices and roles in society that compete with the agendas of states (Söderbaum 2007). These practices have been criticised by many to often serve the specific interests of some SADC ruling elites, the ambitions of hegemonic actors or the agendas of industrial and financial powers (Fioramonti 2013). The state-led regional governance has been criticised by many for not helping citizens to fully participate in the regional decision-­making processes to form regions (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2014). The quest for alternative regionalisms reaches paramount importance through creation of new collaborative avenues where interaction between and among stakeholders in regionalism becomes ultimate.

Integration outside Formalised Structures at Regional Level in Southern Africa Thus, despite being left out in most of the formalised forms of engagement in regional processes, non-state actors in the SADC region seem to be very innovative in their desire to participate in regional integration. More than that SADC’s underdevelopment and non-operationalised joint mode of regional governance have both engendered an excess of local and regional popular self-help and grouping initiatives in the form of civil society networks (Florini 2000; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Wapner 2002; Edwards 2009) to counteract the predominant state-­ centred regional integration and regionalism with a people-centred regionalism model (Söderbaum 2007). These civil society networks function in the form of regional associations, regional networks, regional programmes, regional centres and regional non-profit service providers (Söderbaum 2004: 120). Since the 1990s, the Southern African region has seen the founding of groupings of its citizens within different networks such as the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN), SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), and Mweleko wa Non-Governmental Organisation (MWENGO), to name a few (Zajontz 2013; CIVICUS 2011; Söderbaum 2016). These regional

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civil groupings participate either within state-invited or within self-­ created spaces, in order to reclaim SADC resources for SADC’s people through alternative regionalisms. The nature and dynamic of this make up the subject of this book. In pursuit of this, we analyse, for example how SADC-CNGO interacts in SADC through formal avenues as key civil society partners and how SAPSN interacts in informal and self-­ organised settings outside of the mainstream. In the analysis of the interaction of civic society organisations either within or outside SADC settings, our interest is on the strategies, norms and rules which these organisations have developed and how these are either different or similar and the factors which determine this. This is important to raise because there are a few attempts to compare differences of institutional arrangements—strategies, norms and rules—developed by Southern African regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal and self-organised regionalisms for alternatives.

Conclusion Following the end of colonialism, there was an impulse to integrate the African continent driven by the founding fathers and/or pioneers of the African liberation struggle movements in order to protect the post-­ independent states from another potential Western invasion. In doing so, they adopted conventional approaches dictated by different schools of thought shaping the integration processes of transnational political economy. Thus, conventional approaches to regional integration in Africa on the whole and Southern Africa in particular were influenced by the neorealist approaches and emergence of global political economy. That is, the exogenous pressures of the global political economy, which have respectively shaped the trajectories of integration processes of the African continent and Southern African region, together with their endogenous nationalist and Pan-Africanist sentiments have all nurtured state-centred approaches to regional integration of the AU and the SADC. Influenced by neorealist theories, these state-centred approaches have been criticised to promote the primacy of state actors with regard to decision-­making processes on regional integration. On the one side,

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consolidation of political power and political regime-boosting through top-down approaches are at the centre of regional political leaders’ summits. In these settings, other African and SADC leaders have been criticised for being much concerned about the promotion of political development rather than the economic development. Thus, the majority of ordinary citizens in SADC are side-lined by domestic authoritarian political regimes and the mainstream of regional negotiations to integration. Further, the perceived “one size fits all” neoliberal policies employed by political elites on the African continent and in SADC region did not curb the existing inequalities or help them to successfully deliver basic services. Instead, they plunged the majority of the citizens into abject poverty instead. Against this backdrop, conventional approaches to regional integration employed by the African political leaders did not enhance economic development and consequently triggered self-organised regionalism driven by non-state actors who were left, either intentionally or unintentionally, outside of the mainstream of regional negotiations. To sum up, this chapter critiqued the adoption of neoliberal dogmas, through global political economy influence and neoliberal policies delivered through structural adjustment programmes, by member states that did not foster integration of both the African continent and SADC region. As a result, we assert that there is a need to move beyond conventional paradigms centred around the primacy of states to an alternative approach that is more inclusive and driven by ordinary citizens within unconventional paradigms. These are matters with which we engage in-depth in the following chapters.

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Schemers, H., & Blokker, N. (1995). International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity. Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague. Schoeman, M. (2013). Regional Integration, Regionalism and Regionalisation in Africa: An Imagined Reality? In P.  Lang (Ed.), Regional Integration and Social Cohesion: Perspectives from the Developing World RISC 2011. Brussels: Editions Scientifiques Internationales. Scholte, J. A. (2009). Defining Globalisation. In D. Greenaway (Ed.), The World Economy: Global Trade Policy 2008 (pp. 91–122). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. Simon, D. (2003). Regional Development-Environment Discourses, Policies and Practices in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. In A. Grant & F. Söderbaum (Eds.), The New Regionalism in Africa (p. 71). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back (pp. 3–43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slaughter, S. (2005). Liberty Beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age. In Springer. Smith, S. (2002). Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory. In S. Hobden & J. M. Hobson (Eds.), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Vol. 1, pp. 223–243). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Söderbaum, F. (2004). The Political Economy of Regionalism: The case of Southern Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, F. (2007). Regionalism and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa. New Political Economy, 12(3), 319–337. Goteborg University, Goteborg, Sweden. Söderbaum, F. (2016). Rethinking Regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, F., & Grant, A. J. (2017). The New Regionalism in Africa. London: Routledge. Taylor, I. (2005). NEPAD. Toward Africa’s Development or Another False Start? Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Tralac. (2020). Status of AfCFTA Ratification. Retrieved June 5, 2020, from https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/13795-­s tatus-­o f-­a fcfta-­ ratification.html#:~:text=The%2030%20countries%20that%20 have,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20Saharawi%20Republic%2C. Tripp, A. (2001). Non-Formal Institutions, Informal Economies, and the Politics of Inclusion. Discussion Paper No.2001/108, World Institute for Development Economics Research. United Nations University.

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4 New Institutionalism and New Regionalism Approaches to Understanding Regionalism in Southern Africa

Introduction In globalised world politics, political decisions to form regions are no longer dictated by single groups of lone players like government elites, their allies, and technocrats at the expense of excluded majority of ordinary citizens who are relegated to merely be beneficiaries of state-driven decisions. More than that, prescriptions devised by states in formal settings are no longer considered by New Institutionalist scholars (e.g., Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001; Ostrom 2005a) to be sole determinants of the way political institutions should be designed. There are also other types of institutions which are informal as developed outside of formal institutional contexts such as uncodified traditional customs, clientelism, corruption and civil society practices, which are all capable of shaping behaviours and influence political outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). It is in this context, that this book utilises New Institutionalism as a core theoretical framework in order to examine how regional integration can also be unconventionally constructed through informal institutions developed by non-state actors within conventional settings. The growth of New Institutionalism was triggered by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_4

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dissatisfaction with theoretical and conceptual understanding of informal institutions within international institutions by Old Institutionalism which placed more emphasis on states, but to a less extent on their interactions with other institutions, like civil society in the context of IR and IPE (Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001; Ostrom 2005a). The book additionally borrows some elements of the New Regionalism Approach to empirically view how regional integration can be constructed also by non-state actors from the bottom-up as an unconventional socio-­ political phenomenon. In other words, there was a need, in this book, for a reflectivist approach to regionalism that focuses on how inter-subjective practices between actors, rather than states only, result in how interests, ideas and identities are developed in the process of social interaction, rather than rationalist approaches which are based on rational choice and take the interests, ideas and identities of actors as given (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). Reflectivist approaches to regionalism challenge core rationalist assumptions, such as the separation of subject and object, fact and value, the state-centred ontology of most rationalist approaches as well as the role of norms and identities in the formation of informal and formal regions (Söderbaum 2016). Some rationalist scholars focus on pre-given regional delimitations and regional organisations. Unlike the rationalists, reflectivists and constructivists are concerned more with how regions are constituted and constructed (Murphy 1991; Neumann 1994; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). This implies that the constructivist perspective is necessary in a book of this nature, which targets a more comprehensive understanding of processes of regionalism, regionalisation and regionness in a globalising world. As for the constructivist theorists, they tone down the importance of materialist incentives and instrumental strategies associated with many of the IR and IPE theoretical perspectives. They instead point to the importance of subjective aspects of identity, interests, learning, communication, shared knowledge and ideational forces as well as how cooperation and communities emerge (Söderbaum and Grant 2017; Godsäter 2015).

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 ew Institutionalists and the Interpretation N of Institutions Building on the definition of institutions by Kasper and Streit (1998), Scott (2001), and Vatn (2005), the concept was also defined by Elinor Ostrom (2005b) as the prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales. This implies these institutional arrangements are deliberately crafted, sometimes circumvented, by individuals and groups in order to make the interaction more predictable. The aim is to remove uncertainty and reduce risk. In this vein, institutions are sets of norms, rules and procedures that enable and constrain actor behaviour with some predictability over time, and may also constitute their identities and preferences (March and Olsen 1984; Charles Plott in Ostrom 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996). To March and Olsen (1989), institutions tend to have a “logic of appropriateness” that influences behaviour more than a “logic of consequentiality” that might also shape individual action. They illustrate the above through firemen who willingly enter blazing buildings because that is the role they have accepted as a function of their occupational choice and their training in the fire service. Institutions are mechanisms for adjusting behaviour in a situation that requires coordination among two or more individuals or groups of individuals (Hurwicz 1994). Hall and Taylor (1996) define institutions from a Historical Institutionalist point of view as, formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity. In practice, however, Historical Institutionalists (as shown shortly below) tend to narrow institutions down to organisations and rules and customs proclaimed by formal organisations. March and Olsen (1989) contend that institutions should rather be understood as a collection of norms, rules and understandings, and perhaps most importantly, routines. At the same time, political institutions, if viewed through the lens of New Institutionalism (with which we engage shortly below), should not be equated with political organisations; rather they are the sets of

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rules that guide and constrain actors’ behaviour (Peters 1999; Lowndes 2001). Institutions are not only material and formal structures—i.e., bureaucracies—as seen by Old Institutionalism (as elaborated shortly below), but ideational/normative and informal structures as cognitive scripts, norms and values (Hall and Taylor 1996). On that note, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define institutions as both formal and informal rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling the behaviour of actors. For example, there are treaties, protocols and other codified constitutional documents that regulate cooperation between states within regional organisations like the SADC as well as networks of civil society organisations. Collective mutual trust among civil society groupings that meet on the side lines of the SADC’s People’s Summit constitutes another example of uncodified institutions (SAPSN 2012). Sometimes, uncodified norms like the Ubuntu spirit guides informal dialogues between African states during official meetings of the African Union (AU). Some social movements, like the Arab Spring and the 2014 Burkina-Faso Uprising, among others, did not need codified rules, like a treaty or a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to coordinate their protests (Pinfari in Fioramonti 2015). In this vein, Crawford and Ostrom (1995) define an institution as a widely understood rule, norm, or strategy that creates incentives for behaviour in repetitive situations (see also Ostrom 2005a). This book conceptualises institutions as both formal and informal or codified and non-codified collections of rules, norms, or strategies that structure social interaction and create incentives for actors’ behaviour in repetitive situations. This is evident in such arenas of human interaction provided by civil society actors such as the World Social Forum (WSF), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Open Society Foundation (OSF). This definition fits in well with the objectives of this book, which mainly focuses on informal institutions developed during interactions by civil society organisations. Firstly, it enables us to explain how the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during their interaction in regionalisms may not be necessarily codified in a bureaucratic way, but they still form part of institutions without overlooking the formal institutions they are interacting with. Secondly, this book is mostly interested in the strategies, norms and rules developed by

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civil society in line with their interactions within both formal and peer or self-organised regionalism settings. Finally, this definition enables us to situate behaviours of civil society networks in an institutional context that triggers the development of institutional arrangements during interactions in regionalisms. It is of paramount importance to illuminate the shadow around formal and informal institutions in discourses on New Institutionalism. Firstly, the structural feature of society and the polity is the most important element of an institution. According to Peters (1999), that structure may be formal—i.e., a legal framework, legislature, or an agency in the public bureaucracy—or it may be informal—i.e., a network of interacting organisations, like civil society groupings, or a set of shared norms. It is about transcending individuals in order to involve associations of people within designed interactions sanctioned by specified relationships among them. Stability constitutes the second feature of an institution. However, there is a debate over this second feature in which some versions of institutionalism argue that some features of institutions are extremely stable and then predict behaviour on that basis, while others make institutions more mutable while they all require some degree of stability (Peters 1999). The third feature of an institution is that it must affect individual behaviour. This implies that an institution should in some way constrain the behaviour of its members, the way civil society associations do before, during and after they exercise their citizenship. More than that, these constraints can be either formal or informal, as long as there is an institution in place and some sense of shared values and meaning among the members of the institution. This constraining feature of institutions is shared by a few versions of institutionalism such as the normative, sociological and international (March and Olsen 1989; Peters 1999). Institutions constitute the rules of the game, while organisations and individuals are players in that game (Goodin 1996). Institutions shape how political actors define their interests and structure relations of power with other groups (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Having said this, institutions delimit the capacity for social change. These institutions are important precisely because they are intentional constructions that structure information and create incentives to act or not to act in a particular

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situation and a particular way. Thus, they impose constraints on the range of possible behaviours and feasible reforms. The key role of institutions lies in the need to create the preconditions for the establishment of a stable structure of human interaction by reducing uncertainty between actors in society (Lekovic 2011). In sum, institutions shape actors’ behaviours and, subsequently, political outcomes.

Typology of Institutions and Social Interaction Typology of Institutions In comparative politics, institutions are clustered into two distinct forms, namely formal and informal, with descriptions such as codified and uncodified or, to some extent, conventional and unconventional. Without delving too much into contradictory conceptualisations of informal institutions equated to traditional culture, personal networks, clientelism, corruption, clan and mafia organisations, civil society, and a myriad of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms, several authors define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (see, e.g., Böröcz 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Institutions include a variety of social and moral norms that influence people’s behaviour, allowing for coordination of expectations in social and economic interactions (Lekovic 2011). However, despite their non-­ codification, it is possible to identify and describe informal institutions on an analytical level as they possess distinct functional logic and identities as well as mechanisms of incentives and sanctions. Still problematic to some extent, the difference between formal and informal institutions, in line with this book, can be distinguished through three approaches, according to Helmke and Levitsky (2002). First of all, formal institutions are state institutions or rules enforced by the state, while informal institutions are established by society. Secondly, most of the time formal rules are enforced by the state as the third party, while informal institutions have self-enforcing mechanisms.

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Thirdly, formal rules are written and codified, while informal rules are unwritten (Helmke and Levitsky 2002; Lekovic 2011). Generally, the clear demarcation between formal and informal is essential for analytical purposes, but in practice, it is quite ambiguous (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). For instance, formal rules can be interpreted and applied in different ways by administrative units so that they transform into differing informal rules. While in the political system, formal institutions are codified by constitutions and laws, informal institutions are not fixed in formal documents but gain their relevance through the actual impact on structures and functions of the political process. These entail that not all social interactions constitute informal institutions. They have to serve the basic elements of the definition of an institution, which means they have to possess a certain minimal legitimacy and continuity and be distinguishable as structures (Liebert and Lauth 1999; Lauth 2000; Merkel and Croissant 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). It is important to note that the line of demarcation between the two sets of institutions is not the basis of tradition and modern realities. Currently, some traditional institutions can be written and at the same time codified in law. The same applies to modern rules, like the funding criteria of development agencies, clientelism or corruption, that can get the status of informal institutions.

Institutional Interactions and Settings Institutional interaction highlights the observation that the social practices that emerge in the implementation of one institution may also be shaped by other institutions (Gehring and Oberthür 2008). Institutional interaction is of paramount importance due to the fact that the effectiveness of specific institutions often depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions with other institutions (Young et al. (2005). It is part of the broader consequences of international institutions occurring beyond their own domains (Underdal and Young 2004). The study of such interaction supplements the traditional inquiry into the development, establishment and effectiveness of individual international institutions (Gehring and Oberthür 2008). In this respect, the development of

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international institutions has drawn our attention. These institutional developments corroborate the book focus centred on the understanding of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African cross-border civil society associations during their interaction with both SADC elites and self-organised networks of peers outside of the mainstream. However, institutional interaction also creates new institutional structures that are difficult to design rationally, because they evolve gradually from, and are continuously shaped and reshaped by, numerous decentralised interaction occurrences. Additionally, there are horizontal and vertical interactions within institutions. Vertical interaction addresses the influence of institutions across different levels of social organisation or administration (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). For example, the institutional design of domestic political systems shapes state interests and thus exerts influence on the design of international and European institutional arrangements (Héritier 1999). Horizontal interaction occurs among institutions at the same level of social organisation or the same point on the administrative scale. Interaction among ordinary citizens at the national or cross-border level within the Southern African region constitutes a consummative example of horizontal interaction as an institutional setting. This type of horizontal interaction enabled us to understand how ordinary citizens within regional civil society networks interact within self-organised regionalisms and the kinds of alternative institutions they develop while sharing common experiences through collective action at the regional level. In this book, we do not intend to expand on causal mechanisms of institutional interaction or delve too much into the types of classification of institutional interactions like political linkages, whether intentional or deliberate, and functional linkages, which are a fact of life (Young 1996, 2002). Such causal mechanisms and classifications are all important, but not useful in this case. In a similar vein, some studies in comparative politics have demonstrated how an exclusive focus on formal institutions risks missing many of the real incentives and constraints that underlie political behaviour. Referring to the two schools of thought on the role of informal institutions, in order to analyse their interaction, Helmke and Levitsky (2002) firstly distinguish the studies by Edna Ullman-Margalit, Robert Axelrod,

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and Donald Matthiews, which treat informal institutions as playing a functional or problem-solving role. This school of thought casts norms as solutions to problems of social interaction and coordination, and informal rules are seen to enhance the efficiency or performance of complex institutions (Ullman-Margalit 1978; Axelrod 1986; Matthews 1959). Secondly, informal institutions are cast as primarily dysfunctional or problem-creating. This set of studies puts more emphasis on phenomena such as clientelism, corruption, patrimonialism, and clan politics, which undermine the performance of markets, states, democratic regimes, and other institutions (O’Donnell 1996; Böröcz 2000; Lauth 2000; Collins 2002). More than that, more studies still put more emphasis on how informal institutions at times reinforce or substitute for the formal institutions they appear to undermine (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). During their interaction within formal or vertical settings, civil society actors may develop complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive institutions considered as informal institutions. Complementary informal institutions emerge when the rules in formal institutions become enforced and the gaps left by formal institutions are filled accordingly by these complementary informal institutions without any violation of established formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). For example, conformist civil society networks may develop complementary norms, routines, and operating procedures that allow regional bureaucracies and other complex organisations within the regional decision-making framework to function effectively (Godsäter 2014). Accommodative informal institutions are viewed as second-best institutions developed by actors that can change the outcomes of formal rules with which they were previously discontented through modification of the effects by violating the spirit but not the letter of the formal rules (Lekovic 2011). These institutions are equated to those developed by reformist civil society networks, for example, who lobby inside the formal institutions by accepting the status quo (Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum and Grant 2017). Competing informal institutions emerge in the case of weak formal institutions and antagonistic objectives. These institutions shape actors’ incentives to be incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate another (Lekovic 2011). In this book, for

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example, transformist civil society networks resolve to allow even nonspecialised epistemic communities to share experiences and join discussions during their regional forum within self-organised initiatives alongside the formal summits (SAPSN 2015). Substitutive informal institutions are devised by actors seeking to achieve outcomes that formal institutions were expected, but failed, to generate. For example, the Southern African civil society networks develop their own strategies, norms and rules in civic spaces created to strengthen citizenry and promote democratic culture. This is done by engaging ordinary citizens on different issues which SADC has failed to address (SADC-CNGO 2012). This correlates with the central argument of New Institutionalism that institutions shape action (Lecours 2005) and that as formal institutions weaken, vibrant informal networks grow and expand (MacLean 2010). Building on MacLean’s (2010) comments, we examine how other institutional mechanisms are able to construct new forms of regions which are people-­centred, with non-state actors as new players. These alternative institutional arrangements developed by non-state actors are aimed at either reforming or transforming ongoing formal institutions, like SADC.

 evisiting New Institutionalism to Examine R Regionalism in Southern Africa For many decades, studies on political institutions focused merely on formal rules. Yet contemporary studies suggest that an exclusive focus on formal rules is often insufficient, and that informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, often have a profound and systematic effect on political outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). We use New Institutionalism in this book to explain how to move informal institutions from the margins to the mainstream of comparative politics. At the same time, NRA complements New Institutionalism (for us) with empirical evidence in order to highlight the development of informal institutions formed by civil society networks during their interactions in formal and informal institutional environments and, thus, build alternative regionalisms. We use

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New Institutionalism in order to focus specifically on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks capable of constructing regions rather than just formal institutions. This book does not intend to provide a comprehensive outline of the history of New Institutionalism. Such accounts are available elsewhere (see, e.g., Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001; Ostrom 2005a). Instead, the purpose as we show in this section is to draw out the major currents of this vast body of literature on political institutions in order to develop a line of thinking that facilitates the identification of the kinds of new institutions developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction in regionalisms. Before understanding why the new version of institutionalism, rather than its older version, is useful for this book, it is important to explain what constituted Old Institutionalism, which reflects some features and characteristics of the newer approach in understanding politics. Political life and further research of political institutions were inspired by variations of Old Institutionalism as the foundation (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The focal point of Old Institutionalists, like John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Selznick, Gouldner and Dalton (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), was to analyse the nature of institutions of governance capable of structuring the behaviour of individuals for better outcomes and collective purposes (Peters 1999). Old Institutionalism considers political science as the study of the state and an exercise in formal-legal analysis and it inspired many political science scholars of the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries to be a basis of their research (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Peters 1999). This being said, Old Institutionalism was viewed as normative, structuralist, historicist, legalist and holistic (Peters 1998: 11), characteristics which fuelled more criticisms from behaviouralists and rational choice theorists (Storing 1962; Bates 1998). Without delving too much into those criticisms, Old Institutionalism was focused upon formal rules and organisations rather than informal conventions, and upon official structures of government rather than broader institutional constraints on governance in public, private and civil spheres (Peters 2005). Because of this, it has been criticised for its descriptive method and disdain for theory. In that regard, the

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Old Institutionalism lens could not be useful in this book which uses an understanding of informal institutions as a focal point. But New Institutionalism offers a better and more effective tool for generating understanding about how institutions affect organisations (Ohanyan 2012). In order to understand the New Institutionalists, one needs to appreciate not only the Old Institutionalists but also the schools of thought that emerged between them, at which point the two flourished. Two that are particularly worth mentioning are the behaviouralist and rational choice theory (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001). Both of these approaches assume that individuals act autonomously as individuals, based on either socio-psychological characteristics or on rational calculation of their personal utility. In either theory, individuals were not constrained by either formal or informal institutions but would make their own choices; in both views, preferences are exogenous to the political process (Peters 1998). The latter challenge to the formalism of the Old Institutionalism proved that politics evolved around more than just formal arrangements for representation, decision-making and policy implementation, but also informalism, which draws the attention of this book. Although they criticised Old Institutionalism and at the same time influenced the development of New Institutionalism, the behaviouralists and rational choice theorists did not influence the theoretical background of this current book for the following few reasons. First of all, the behavioural revolution of the late 1950s challenged the Old Institutionalism by questioning what lay beneath the formalisms of politics and the use of empirical investigation to find out who really governs in different contexts (Sanders 2010; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In the meantime, behaviouralists underline that social collectives such as political parties, interest groups and legislatures do not make decisions but people within those collectives do. Goodin (1996) contends that what matters is not what people are supposed to do, but what they actually do. This implies behaviouralists’ denial of the importance of formal institutions in determining the outputs of government, which position does not corroborate the position of this book, which also acknowledges formal institutions. We agree with Peters (1999) that the same people would make different choices depending upon the nature of the institution within which they are operating at the time. In order to build a typology of how civil

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society networks interact in regionalisms, in this context, there is a need to understand, through a comparative approach, the nature and context of institutional arrangements in which regional civil society networks interact before identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they develop during those distinct interactions. Both formal and informal institutions are crucial for shedding light on the current analysis of the typology of civil society network interactions in the Southern African region. Secondly, rational choice theorists explain politics in terms of the interaction of self-interests of individuals (Hindmoor 2006). They do not admit that institutions do possess some influence over participants because institutional rules establish the parameters for individual behaviour (Peters 1999), but still deny their significance in shaping the preferences of participants (Peters 1999). In this case, rational choice theorists would not be solely helpful, because collective behaviour has been reduced to the individuals, which is contrary to the focal point of this book because it rather points at collective behaviour of regional civil society networks in interaction within peers or horizontal networks and with the SADC. Nevertheless, behavioural and rational choice analyses were criticised by institutionalists to be contextualist, reductionist, utilitarian, functionalist, and instrumentalist (March and Olsen 1984). Due to the internal limitations of these paradigms, New Institutionalism emerged in the late 1980s again with some features of Old Institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984). During this era, institutionalism was viewed as an area where political institutions remained important but changed due to the de-institutionalisation of politics and government with the break-up of large-scale bureaucracies and the growth of soft processes like networking, collaboration or steering (Rhodes 1997; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). In the 1990s, New Institutionalism emerged in a response to the under-socialised character of dominant approaches in the discipline, in which institutions were, at best, seen as no more than the simple aggregation of individual preferences (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). New Institutionalism is a prominent social theory that focuses on developing a comprehensive study of institutions, both formal and informal, the way they interact, and the effects of institutions on individuals and society at large (Peters 1999; Lecours 2005). Lowndes (2001) adds that New

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Institutionalists concern themselves with informal conventions as well as formal rules and structures. They pay attention to the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships, and not just the impact of institutions upon behaviour. Thy examine the interaction between individuals and institutions. In other words, New Institutionalism provides a way of viewing how institutions shape the behaviour of individuals and produce change (Vielba 2006). In Lowndes and Roberts’ (2013) readings, there is an increasing role of markets and networks alongside hierarchy and bureaucracy. In this hybridity, existing and emerging institutions overlap and recombine in context-dependent ways. At the same time, informal conventions can be as binding as formal constitutions, and difficult to change (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). There is also a double life of institutions sanctioned by mutual influence between institutions and actors (Grafstein 1988). The difference between Old and New Institutionalism is sanctioned by analytical shifts. These include shifts from a focus on organisations to a focus on rules; from a formal to an informal conception of institutions; from a static to a dynamic conception of institutions; from submerged values to a value-­ critical stance; from a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions; and from independence to embeddedness (Lowndes 2001). New Institutionalism is suitable for use in this book because it provides a comprehensive study of new institutions, the way they develop and interact, and the effects they have on society. New Institutionalism assisted us to explain the development of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules used by the Southern African civil society networks during their interactions within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. At the same time, New Institutionalism provides a lens that helps to look at the context as the institutional environment in which these competing new institutions were developed outside formal institutions like SADC’s rules, norms and standard operating procedures. This corroborates Lecours’ (2005) view of New Institutionalism which sets out an understanding of how institutions evolve in very different ways and how they shape the behaviour of agents or individual members and produce change through rules, norms, and other frameworks.

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New Institutionalism New Institutionalism consists of three main traditional analytical approaches, including Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. The approaches emphasise external rule-following structures that serve primarily as constraints on actors, whether as rationalist incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1998). Strictly speaking, New Institutionalism does not constitute a unified body of thought. Peters (2001), for example, distinguishes six schools of New Institutionalism in political science. All of them stress the importance of institutions for social, economic and political outcomes. They mainly differ in their definition of institutions, the assessment of the relationship between institutions and actors/behaviour, and the explanation of the genesis and change of institutions, which is not the purpose of this book. However, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. But Hall and Taylor (1996) and March and Olsen (2008) identify three main analytical approaches, all respectively called New Institutionalism. These three complementary approaches of New Institutionalism have interested us as they make one hybrid approach for this book.

Rational Choice Institutionalism Rational choice institutionalism in political science is closest to new institutional economics, from which it has adopted the concept of the Homo economicus (Peters 1999). In this view, institutions exist because they reduce insecurities, enhance the possibility to anticipate the behaviour of other actors, and hence allow for strategic interaction. They provide a framework that directs expectations, limits the range of choices an actor can make and offers sanctions and incentives. For this approach, institutions constitute systems of rules and inducements to behaviour in which individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities (Weingast 1996; Peters 1999). The orientation to institutional norms is the result of an individual rational cost-benefit equation as it is perceived as cost-­reducing (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999). While this approach is useful to

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grasp strategic behaviour, it has been criticised for neglecting the social construction of preferences and cannot explain the persistence of dysfunctional institutions (March and Olsen 2008).

Sociological Institutionalism Sociological Institutionalism argues that it is not possible to explain the existence and persistence of institutions with effectiveness or rationality, and rejects models of rational actors and behaviouralism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Peters 1999). Rather, it seeks to understand how institutions influence orientations, preferences and perceptions, anticipations, interests, and objectives of actors and, therefore, the ways solutions to problems are sought before concrete incentives become effective. Sociological Institutionalism became especially powerful in organisational theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Sociological Institutionalism aims at bringing society back in (Friedland and Alford 1991), as it places emphasis on the cultural context in which organisations operate and the values that actors hold. It is primarily concerned with the interaction of political institutions and politics in order to explain policy as outcomes and is, therefore, often used in policy analysis. In this case, the state is conceptualised as a complex set of institutions that interacts with other societal and political institutions such as regional civil society networks.

Historical Institutionalism Historical Institutionalism on its part aims to bring the state back in (Evans et  al. 1985) especially because it emphasises choices of venues. Historical Institutionalism expands the conventional understanding of institutional effects on behaviour by including informal institutions and clarifying which institutions matter and how (Ma 2007). This approach generates a structuralist understanding of political behaviour, as it shows how institutional systems structure individual and collective action (Peters 1998). Besides choices of venues, Historical Institutionalism is also importantly based on the assumption that development is

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path-dependent, meaning that institutional designs once established, stay the course for a long time because they constrain the possibilities and options for change (Ma 2007). Hence, even specific efforts to shape institutions are limited by these path dependencies. Political ambitions to change institutions are often not feasible as it is impossible to change the path. In this manner, powerful actors that benefit from certain institutions and hence have an interest in their persistence or change also play a role (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 2002). Historical Institutionalism combines actor-specific and institutional factors. While actors are not as much constrained by institutions as in the sociological variant, their strategies, objectives, and norms still are shaped by the institutional setting. Institutions are only one set of factors influencing policy outcomes beside others like economic development or the spread of political ideas. Although Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism refer to distinct meta-­ theoretical approaches and their distinction is important, they also share basic assumptions and can be regarded as supplementary rather than exclusionary. Therefore, we combine them in this book. In addition to these three traditional approaches, there is also Discursive Institutionalism, coined to be a fourth, newest approach (Schmidt 2010) and some of whose assumptions we use in this book.

Discursive Institutionalism Discursive Institutionalism is concerned with both the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in an institutional context. Some scholars deem Discursive Institutionalism to have the greatest potential for providing insight into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors (Schmidt 2010). Yet, for the above indicated three approaches to New Institutionalism, institutions are structures that are external to agents that constitute rules about acting in the world that serve mainly as constraints—whether by way of rationalist incentives that structure action, historical paths that shape action or cultural norms that

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frame action (Peters 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996). Unlike the three preceding approaches to New Institutionalism, institutions to Discursive Institutionalism are internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures of thinking and acting that constrain action and as constructs of thinking and acting created and changed by those actors (Schmidt 2010). Overall, despite their distinct analysis of world politics, the three traditional approaches of New Institutionalism, plus Discursive Institutionalism, grew in reaction to the behavioural perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s and seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). These traditional complementary approaches of New Institutionalism have interested us, as explained below.

J ustification for Using a Hybrid Form of New Institutionalism to Examine Regionalism in Southern Africa In this book, more emphasis is put on combined elements of Historical and Sociological Institutionalism in the basic understanding of institutions and institutional change without totally rejecting rational choice assumptions. The latter are partly integrated into Historical Institutionalism, also including power (and hence strategic behaviour) as a factor in institutional change. Thus, elements of Rational Choice Institutionalism are used in order to understand and explain the strategic and power-seeking behaviour of actors, albeit with their preferences not being fixed but shaped by the institutional context. At the same time, Sociological Institutionalism is the second variant of New Institutionalism that enables us to capture the linking practices that characterise regional civil society networks’ engagement in world politics, especially in SADC. Concerning the focal point of this book, which is an understanding of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when they interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, the book combines the three intertwined and complemented approaches of New Institutionalism, thus engendering a hybrid form of New

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Institutionalism. The reason is that we could not look at these informal institutions in Southern Africa without digging into the historical paths that shaped the newly emerged informal institutions, strategies, norms and rules, developed by regional self-organised networks of non-state actors that carry the label of regional civil society networks. Equally, rationalist incentives structuring the collective action of the Southern African civil society networks constituted factual elements that should not be neglected, even though not in line with the objective of this book that is focused on comparative political institutions, meaning what kinds of institutional arrangements are developed in different institutional environments. More than that, cultural norms that frame collective action of civil society networks in the Southern African region are of paramount importance in order to shed more light on the understanding of the kinds of institutional arrangements they develop during social interactions, whether within formal or informal regionalisms. Yet, we are aware of the limitations of New Institutionalism. We know that it is criticised for not representing a coherent and unified school, but rather a cumulative result of three distinct intellectual traditions embodying different methodological and epistemological positions, as well as separate ontologies and interpretations of political processes (Vielba 2006). However, in line with the aim of this book, we combined the approaches of New Institutionalism—notably Rational Choice, Sociological and Historical Institutionalism—to transcend their respective limitations and in order to engender a clear hybrid form of New Institutionalism that is useful to enable us to focus on the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by non-state actors within peer or horizontal networks and with SADC. We join New Institutionalists by arguing that theorising in political science should take into account that action does not occur in an institutional vacuum (North 1990; Lecours 2005). The actions of civil society networks as unplanned and unforeseen institutions by state actors need to be considered, not ignored, by political elites in the process of region-building and integration projects with reference to the Southern African region. Drawing from New Institutionalism, this book puts forward the idea that institutions represent an autonomous force in politics, and that their weight is felt in actions and outcomes, contrary to an instrumentalist reading and societal reflection perspectives that ignore

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the possibility that institutions themselves can have effects on political outcomes.

 he New Regionalism Approach and Pragmatic T Regional Integration from Below The New Regionalism Approach provides a unique multidimensional perspective into interactions between various actors operating in multipolar centres of political decisions in relation to formations that aim to achieve regional integration. The world has witnessed collaboration between states and cross-border groupings of civil society and other actors as regional players. Thus, this book uses New Institutionalism as the core theoretical approach for examining the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that such actors and particularly non-state actors develop to form regions. As explained in the preceding part, this is in order to reveal the shortcomings and normative tenets of conventional theories and institutions and to account for the complexity and multidimensionality of political projects of region formation. In addition to New Institutionalism, we deploy the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) as a complementary approach to analyse the formation of regions by non-state actors in the quest for alternative regionalisms. The NRA is a cogent approach that enables scholars of contemporary regionalism to understand how different interactions occur in multipolar settings, in which non-state actors too interact both within state-led formal setting as co-actors in the formation of regions and also in self-organised settings outside of the mainstream, where they are actors on their own in order to build alternative regionalisms. This being said, the NRA is important in this book to the extent that it brings empirical evidence that illuminates the fact that there are no natural regions, but that regions are made, remade and unmade in the process of global transformation, by collective human action and identity formation through interactions and mutual understanding (Söderbaum 2004). In this case, regionalism in the post-Cold War era is characterised by multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-­ conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state

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actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). For example, in Southern Africa, political decisions to form regions are no longer confined to one centre of decision-making, like the SADC or its constitutive member states. There is an emergence of cross-border non-state associations which interact with the states and at the same time among themselves within self-organised networks committed to advocating for a common agenda which is not state-driven. A clear example of this is the World Social Forum (WSF), the Southern Africa Coordination Council (SATUCC) and the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN). These civil society groupings operate alongside regional formal institutions. Thus, regionalism emerges as a spontaneous process, like ad hoc social movements, which do not necessarily need to be properly structured or sophisticated systems of organisation, like intergovernmental organisations, to emerge. For example, in the name of regional solidarity, citizen groupings within the Arab world during the Arab Spring demonstrated how spontaneous processes can ignite a regional social movement, advancing a cause that is deemed to be a regional concern. In this case, the SADC People’s Summit provides a striking example of spontaneous mobilisation through SAPSN that leads to regional collective actions that challenge the regional status quo of SADC through self-help initiatives. In this regard, regionalism becomes open and outward in character, and is founded on a pyramid of regionalising actors, broadly grouped in terms of states, markets and civil society interaction (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Consequently, regionalism in the Southern African region, like in other parts of the world, has become a joint regional governance which is open to non-state actors. The latter are engaging within a multiplicity of relationships with states and among themselves (Godsäter 2016; Söderbaum 2016; Zajontz and Leysens 2015). The full meaning of all this is that regionalism evolves around multidimensional processes as it is not limited to one sector, like trade or regional security, but is involved in all sectors such as the economic, social, political, environmental and cultural sectors, which contribute to the well-being of the people of SADC. Thus, neither does regionalism any longer follow, nor is it based on, the Western or European model. It is rather more culturally, socially

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and politically sensitive. It transcends state-centric and Eurocentric perspectives on regionalism that emphasise political unification and sovereignty transfer within state-led regional organisations (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011; Söderbaum 2016).

 ivil Society Networks and Arenas C of Participation in Regionalism The study of civil society networks owes a lot to the pioneers in the field, including Cohen and Arato (1992), Barber (1998), Putnam (1993), Hettne (2000), Florini (2000), Scholte (2000, 2009, 2014), Salamon et  al. (2004), Edwards (2009, 2011, 2014), Fioramonti (2015), Söderbaum (2015), Godsäter (2014), Castells (2009, 2012), Gaventa (2011), Steffek et  al. (2008) and Armstrong et  al. (2011). This book acknowledges that the concept of civil society remains highly contested among scholars who hold divergent views. There are different meanings attached to the concept of civil society depending on people from different schools of thought at different epochs (Armstrong and Gilson 2010; Edwards 2004; Weiss 2008). Such debates, however, are not the focus of and are beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, without overlooking different perspectives on civil society, the book adopts liberal views in order to deconstruct the perceived role of civil society in mobilising to enhance active citizen participation in decision-­making concerning their daily life. This book concurs with Edwards (2011), Fioramonti (2015) and Scholte (2002) that civil society is an arena of participation located outside of the state and the market. It is an arena where individuals and groups voluntarily associate to pursue common objectives and are animated by a variety of values and interests. This characterisation of civil society is found to be balanced in this case, not only because it allows one to look at civil society comprehensively and exclusively, but because it also helps one to understand how voluntary groupings of citizens participate in an arena outside the state and market in order to influence or shape political institutions that they deem to be of collective value and interest during those interactions.

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In this book, the emphasis is on the views of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and the American political scientist Larry Diamond, who respectively view civil society as a democratising agent and public sphere of discourse and interaction that is crucial for the development and strengthening of democracy (Diamond 1994; Kellner 2000). They describe civil society as the breeding ground of new issues and demands, which are received and re-elaborated by the public and are finally translated into policies and law-making norms or into rights. At the same time, different kinds of civil society are also to be found outside the traditional NGOs. Such entities exist according to assigned mandates and the work or activities in which they engage. In addition to different types of civil society entities, there also exist civil society networks which work on various sectors of society such as the physical and natural environment, the consolidation of democracy, poverty reduction, social justice and human rights, research and youth, human security, gender and women rights, labour and employment, anti-corruption and good governance, development and HIV/AIDS (Söderbaum 2007; Scholte 2015; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). This book takes particular interest in regional civil society networks that work in the field of regional social justice and democratic governance at national and regional levels in Southern Africa and are linked within regional networks like the SADC-CNGO and SAPSN (SADC-CNGO 2012; SAPSN 2012; Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2015). An analysis of these regional civil society networks illuminates how non-state actors within those networks strive for participation in order to fill a deficit that characterises decision-making processes in forming regions by developing alternative strategies, norms, rules that seek alternative regionalisms (Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Tallberg et al. 2013; Godsäter 2015). Civil society groupings fulfil diverse functions, be it at local or regional level. But the emphasis in our context is on functions related to strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during interactions that occur within formal and self-organised networks that operate outside of state spaces.

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F unctional Types and Categories of Civil Society Networks in Regionalism The functions of civil society groupings at national or regional level constitute key drivers that determine the institutional settings within which they are entitled to engage in formal or self-organised regionalisms and the existing types of organisations. This includes civil society as partner, legitimator/reformist, manipulator, and transformer/counterforce (Fioramonti 2015; Godsäter 2014; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011; Söderbaum 2016). Bearing in mind that the list of functions of civil society is not exhaustive, we have classified them according to function into five main categories, namely watchdog, service delivery, mobilisation, knowledge production and issue framing coupled with agenda setting (Edwards 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk 2010; Scholte 2012; Godsäter 2014). Civil society acts as a check, monitor and vital partner in the quest for a positive relationship between the state and its citizens.

Watchdog Civil Society as Transformist Counterforce By fulfilling the function of a watchdog, civil society checks, monitors, evaluates and restrains the power of government elites and their allies by demanding for accountability and transparency (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010; Edwards 2014). In exercising its watchdog function, civil society raises public awareness by reporting to the general public findings on the status of day-to-day governance of public affairs and implemented policies (Godsäter 2014). Even so, civil society is viewed by many as being misrepresentative and without legitimacy and transparent internal governance for the people it claims to represent (Scholte 2004; Edwards 2009). Nonetheless, watchdog civil society groupings are deemed to be a counterforce that comes into competition with states and sometimes challenges the existing status quo for radical change at both local and regional levels (Fioramonti 2015; Söderbaum 2016). States view such types of civil society with scepticism and exclude them from decision-making processes. In the regional context, these types of civil society contest the existing deficiencies of state-led regional policy

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and lobby in favour of transparent and people-driven political decisions (Millstein 2015). A plethora of pro-democracy forces, women’s movements and environmentalists exist that fulfil this transformative and counterforce function (Söderbaum 2016). The Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN) is one of the striking examples of counterforce regional civil grouping that challenges SADC as a state-driven organisation which uses neoliberal dogmas. Another one is the Anti-­ Privatisation Forum (APF), which contests the privatisation of water, electricity, education and housing in the SADC region.

 ervice Delivery Civil Society as Partner S and Legitimator Civil society has always been considered as service delivery agents or a helpful hand where states have failed to deliver. In this sense, civil society fills the gap in services that is intentionally or negligently left by the state (Edwards 2009; Godsäter 2013). It is thus often contracted by other actors at national or international level to fill the gap in services either on their behalf or on behalf of donors for the improvement of lives or the environment as they legitimise the actions of national or international institutions. Illustratively, the UN, international development agencies and philanthropist organisations all, to some extent, target civil society especially from developing countries and task them to implement existing regional policies in line with their respective agendas. In this context, civil society is simultaneously partner and legitimator, as it accepts the existing status quo by engaging in state-invented spaces of participation (Fioramonti 2015; Söderbaum 2016).

 obiliser Civil Society as Partner, Manipulator M and Counterforce Civil society creates new terrains for ordinary citizens that create comprehensive and ample democratic debate of public policies aimed at improving their living and environmental conditions. Thus, it functions as an

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avenue of participation and mobilisation of social forces. It takes on a mobilisation function for public deliberation on common pressing issues in order to either solve them or seek alternatives. Civil society acts through social capital, the capacity of people to act together willingly in their common long-term interest, enabling social cohesion among citizens who share collective identities and goals (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Civil society networks may facilitate collaboration, solidarity and sometimes the movement of members across countries, and in some cases work actively against rising intolerance (Millstein 2015). Through its mobilisation function, civil society may be a transformist/counterforce institution when it undertakes activities that enhance awareness and self-­ consciousness of the discontented epistemic communities and ultimately trigger citizenship in many forms such as boycotts, protests and self-help initiatives (Godsäter 2013; Söderbaum 2016). In this context, civil society is an agitator on behalf of aggrieved citizens. Unstructured and informal civil societies, like grassroots movements, provide examples of this mobilisation function. There is another scenario where civil society mobilises ordinary citizens for awareness in favour of state-led policies deemed to enhance health or alert the public when faced with threats such as disease pandemics or terrorist attacks. In this case, civil society becomes the legitimator while mobilising for state interest. It can even mobilise citizens to approve state-initiated reforms that civil society considers to be useful for the betterment of the population at the local and regional level. More than that, civil society can also mobilise to manipulate people in favour of the state, not because the cause is good but just because it is a government-organised nongovernmental organisation (GONGO) itself or a ‘briefcase organisation’ hunting for funds as a survival strategy (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

Knowledge-Production Civil Society as Reformist Civil society may also carry out activities that aim at knowledge production for both states and non-state actors at local and international level. Through its knowledge-production function, civil society undertakes

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empirical studies, investigations, capacity-building, and dissemination of edited and filtered information. This arena of participation provides essential empirical local knowledge that is vital to the policy process, and that gives voice to the opinions and experiences of the ordinary citizens. For example, research institutions may provide background research to member states of a regional organisation as well as the general public (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011; Godsäter 2013). The knowledge-­ production function enables civil society actors to be seen as performing the role of organic intellectuals and understood as critical agents that serve to clarify the political thinking of social groups, leading the members of these groups to understand their existing situation in society (Fioramonti 2015). In that case, civil society becomes reformist, striving for reform of the status quo. Regional networks of civil society may strengthen civil society organisations in their role of holding national and local governments accountable and democratic (Millstein 2015).

Issue-Framing and Agenda-Setting Civil Society as Transformist and Counterforce Civil society also plays the key function of issue framing and agenda setting. Civil society organisations thus participate in processes of persuasion that ideally culminate in agenda setting at the regional level in intergovernmental organisations. They seek to maximise their influence or leverage in order to achieve their objectives (Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). To achieve this, regional civil society networks engage in framing activities that aim at rendering issues meaningful to targeted policy-makers by providing meanings and collective action for issues at stake. Civil society network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates and serve as sources of information and testimony. They also promote the implementation of norms, by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In order to successfully enter the agenda of policy-makers, issues need to be framed in a way that resonates with the established norms of regional organisations or that identifies a problem of relevance or topicality (Fioramonti 2015). In this

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regard, regional civil society networks contribute to shaping political and policy debates about inclusive regional integration as they are simultaneously principled and strategic actors that frame issues (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001). The potential transformative capabilities of these regional civil society networks arise from their capacity to use their assets to advantage in the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and accountability. In Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) readings, transnational advocacy networks affect state behaviour by acting simultaneously as principled and strategic actors that frame issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to fit with favourable institutional venues. In doing so they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behaviour (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001; Söderbaum and Grant 2017). The five main functions fulfilled by regional civil society have generated different attributes of regional civil society networks as part of their interaction typology in regionalisms.

Conclusion The rationalist, materialist and/or structuralist theories with which we have engaged in this chapter show their tenacious prevalence in contemporary regional integration and regionalism debates that focus on states and their allies, and technocrats as the most important actors in regional integration. They show their prevalence in formal inter-state frameworks and market-led processes of regional integration too. As a result, states and technocrats continue to be the principal drivers in both economic and political affairs despite the pressures that may arise from non-state actors. Many studies in IR and IPE have pushed the realist approach to non-state actors in general, and civil society networks in particular, to the periphery. Given the centrality of the state in the study of regional integration and regionalism, state-centred approaches are criticised by many because they promote state supremacy that underpins a top-down regional integration and a regionalism driven by states and technocrats as

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sole actors in decision-making processes. Because of this, New Institutionalists demonstrate that political projects to build regions for regional integration cannot be driven only by formal institutions shaped by states and in a conventional manner, but also by informal institutions such as cross-border civil society networks as well as in unconventional circumstances. In this, New Institutionalism, in its hybrid form, is deployed as a core lens to: firstly, understand the way rational incentives structure the actions of civil society; secondly, the historical paths that shape their strategies, norms and rules; and thirdly, which cultural norms frame their collective action. Thus, New Institutionalism provides an analytical framework to achieve a deeper analysis of, and illuminate, the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks when they engage in interaction within both SADC-led forums and peer or self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. On the basis of the NRA, we have suggested the salience of an unconventional view of regional integration and regionalism which takes place in a multipolar world order, which emerges as a spontaneous process, and is open and outward in character, and involves multidimensional processes and is driven by actors outside state mainstream. Differently stated, in this book we advance the need to conceptualise institutions to include, but also go beyond, the state-centric model and include strategies, norms and rules developed by non-state actors. This would then allow a deeper examination of how non-state actors function in these institutions and in the process of doing so articulate alternative regionalism. In this sense, New Institutionalism suggests other institutions, beyond those which are state-centric, and the NRA advances that it is in these institutions that the role and efficacy of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks in Southern Africa, in order to build alternative regionalisms, become manifest and, if nothing else, self-evident. In the following chapter, we focus on the formal context of these interactions by regional civil society networks in the SADC region.

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5 The Formal-Alternative Regionalism Formal Interface: Interactions and Engagements of Southern African Civil Society Networks in SADC Regulatory Regimes

Introduction From the national to global levels, reforms in governance have generated many new spaces for citizen engagement. This is due to the changing forms of power and new realms of authority driven by global phenomena such as terrorism, global warming, migration, and disease pandemics. Globalisation has meant that national civil society groupings increasingly build links across state borders in order to create transnational networks. The increased transnational advocacy has contributed to higher demands for legitimacy on the part of international organisations, and they have responded by widening the scope for civil society engagement in region-­ building processes. Regional civil society networks can also play a valuable role in bringing about change at a national level (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Van der Vleuten 2005). Transnational civil society is, to an extent, helping influence or reshape formal institutions and is transforming livelihoods (Scholte 2015; Kim and Fiori 2015 in Fioramonti 2015). For example, transnational activist organisations, such as Amnesty International, have played a significant role in spreading and advancing the norms of human rights and various environmental groups, such as © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_5

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Greenpeace, are campaigning to change norms in order to end the nuclear arms race and address climate change and related problems (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In that regard, civil society has emerged as an alternative and collaborative avenue for citizen mobilisation on shared goals in order to promote the citizens’ participation in public affairs that affect them. This is the context within which in this chapter we engage with how Regional Civil Society Networks (RCSNs) in the SADC region interact or operate within and with formal and officially recognised structures. We refer to this as the formal interface between alternative and formal regionalisms. In this chapter, we also present and discuss some primary data which we collected in personal face-to-face interviews with respondents and during the research fieldwork that is elaborated in Chap. 1. We start with a brief explanation of regional networks.

 egional Civil Society Networks R in the SADC Region Sociologists have forcefully argued that modern technologies have broken down territorial boundaries of communication and greatly facilitated social exchanges over long distances and across borders (Castells in Kaiser et al. 2010). Regional networks1 encompass the importance of social relationships and ways of forming and maintaining communication, cooperation and trust across borders. They are conceived as relationship structures in all sectors of regions that activate and coordinate the different partners and partner groups in order to spark impulses or to tackle common and shared problems whereby the people affected become participants (Sprenger 2001). Building on Manuel Castells’ (1996) insights, rapidly changing communicative spaces and practices have resulted in the formation of what he terms “a network society”. Apart from being more loosely structured and less hierarchical, regional networks are less formalised than regional economic integration organisations such as the  Regional networks are defined as channels of cooperation between businesses, government agencies, educational and research institutions, intermediary institutions and other social groups (Sprenger 2001). 1

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SADC. They come in many varieties, with different structures, functions, objectives and types of participants which may be physical and tangible, institutional and organisational, or socio-cultural (Castells 1996). Even though some networks are not concerned with policy formulation and project implementation, they are focused on increasing communication and interaction or getting cooperation started (Johnson et  al. 2000). They weaken the control by state institutions over expert knowledge and other policy-relevant information. They also strengthen non-state actors who can pool resources, form coalitions and influence media reporting and public communication more efficiently within and beyond nation-­ states (Kaiser et al. 2010). Compared to organisations, networks are more decentralised and horizontally structured. Their flexibility in structure may be more adaptable in a turbulent, rapidly changing environment, in situations where progress depends on accommodative, flexible cooperation and more informal and inclusive relationships and communication. Some network-based social structures usually lack clear-cut internal divisions, and often people are allowed to join or exit with relative ease. According to Söderbaum (2016), such networks are open, extroverted, and inclusive, capable of expanding without formal limitations and interacting with new nodes and other networks as long as the members can communicate among themselves, like in the case of regional civil society networks. In that case, networks and organisations may interact and merge like the case of hybrid network organisations. Networks facilitate overlapping and multiple patterns of actor identity, and changing patterns of social communication, and information exchange also facilitate cooperation between different sets of state and non-state actors in politics and policy-making (Castells 1996). Like regional organisations, in Söderbaum’s reading (Söderbaum 2016), regional networks are categorised into single-purpose and multipurpose networks. First of all, single-purpose regional networks have a specific task, or they focus on and undertake a single activity. Such specific-­purpose regional networks can: take the form of research entities, like the Southern African Research Institute; provide training, like the well-known Southern Africa-based nongovernmental organisations (NGO) called Gender Links and African Sex Workers Alliance; or engage in business, like the Southern African Chambers of Commerce; or they

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might be civil society organisations like the Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations (SANASO). Secondly, multipurpose regional networks concomitantly undertake different activities covering various sectors that affect social life and nature. In line with this book, emphasis is put on regional civil society networks like the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (SADC-CNGO) and the Southern African People’s Solidarity Networks (SAPSN) as multipurpose regional networks whose range of activities span all sectors of life that affect the citizens of Southern African countries (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2014; Zajontz and Leysens 2015; SADC-CNGO 2015).

 n Overview of Formal Interactions A and Engagements between SADC and Southern African Civil Society Networks The mode of regional cooperation and integration adopted by a given regional economic community establishes distinct spaces of interaction that may either include or exclude non-state actors in decisions that form and affect regions. Normatively, interaction of regional civil society networks within state-centric spaces of engagement in regional intergovernmental organisations (RIGOs) is anchored on mechanisms such as regional treaties, protocols and other constitutive documents. In this, the Southern African region is not an exception. In this case, Article 23 of the SADC Treaty constitutes the SADC-led provision tailoring formal engagement between state actors and non-state actors in a joint space of regional governance (SADC 1992; Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2013). Often, this joint space of governance has been criticised for legitimising the existing status quo and responding to donors’ demands to incorporate civil society in different projects of development (Söderbaum 2007). These state-led provisions of participation determine the modalities of engagement and status of civil society during their engagement, like the case of the SADC Treaty and established institutions or spaces of interaction (SADC 1992).

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The strategies, norms and rules of engagement developed by states in this formal setting of interaction are mostly detailed in these regional treaties and at the same time devised by member states themselves without the full involvement of ordinary citizens. Often, civil society networks are invited by states to the table of regional negotiations on either an observer or consultation basis in selective sectors only, provided they are not acting as transformists but conformists to the status quo (Söderbaum 2007; Fioramonti 2015). At the same time, civil society networks are expected to provide united and organised citizen voices for this manner of participation. Consultation of civil society within RIGOs is in line with the emphasis of New Institutionalism on the behaviour shaped through the interaction of actors involved in collective action. In this regard, the emphasis on civil society consultation within RIGOs stems from the realisation that states in a globalising world cannot solely undertake important developmental responsibilities (Odhiambo 2010). Therefore, the participation of civil society is seen as crucial in augmenting the roles of states. Many RECs now create room for civil society participation from the time they are formed. Evidence shows that some civil society groupings in Southern Africa, such as the SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, Gender Links and Southern African Trust (SAT), to name a few, to some extent have respectively entered into interaction with government elites within SADC organisational structures (Moyo et al. 2007; Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2015). Among them are the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF), SADC regional policy dialogues, and the Council of Ministers and Heads of State Summit where a few representatives of Regional Civil Society Networks (RCSN) are respectively invited as observers and sometimes allowed to read a communiqué or declaration from their forums. Some selected regional civil society networks have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the SADC Secretariat (SADC-CNGO 2012). These allow for them to provide evidence-based information, including arguments, to SADC and to also engage in governance by, for example, participating in the elaboration of protocols. At the same time, a few SADC officials attend side events, like the Civil Society Forum, held by SADC-CNGO before SADC summits.

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Nevertheless, power politics and sovereignty concerns play an important role within SADC, and power is rarely given up for the sake of RCSN engagement in regional governance (Godsäter 2015). For example, SATUCC is part of the governance apex with SADC-CNGO but only participates as an observer on a few SADC Ministerial Committees, especially on labour-related matters, at SADC’s invitation. SATUCC is accorded a seat in the Employment and Labour Sector (ELS) meetings of the SADC. It participates in those meetings in its capacity as a member of the SADC Tripartite Meeting of the ELS. The ELS meeting gathers relevant SADC Ministers, social partners and SATUCC within employment and labour areas for policy formulation discussions (Osei-Hwedie 2009; SATUCC 2011; Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2013; Respondent 17, 2018). During these yearly ELS meetings, SATUCC has influenced the design of various labour codes, labour standards, declarations and charters (Respondent 17, 2018). Hence, SATUCC has in the past contributed to the reform of labour protocols on the rights of workers in the SADC region: the SADC Declaration on Productivity and Social Security; the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons; and the Protocol on Gender and Development (Godsäter 2013; SATUCC 2016). To second that interaction with non-state actors, SADC has granted diplomatic status to members of the General Secretariat of SATUCC, as confirmed by personal interview, Respondents 2, 19 and 27 in Gaborone (2018). Due to this diplomatic status, SATUCC was accused by eight discussants out of 12 participants in two focus group discussions held in March 2018 in Gaborone, of being an extension of the “club of presidents” that claims to fight for the rights of workers in Southern Africa. This view was shared by 80 per cent of 28 other respondents interviewed in face-to-face interviews conducted from February to March 2018  in Gaborone, Maputo, Johannesburg and Kinshasa respectively. Consequently, this suggests that the effectiveness of civic participation in these high-profile meetings still raises many doubts. “It is one thing to participate, but more importantly, it is another thing to influence and be heard”, lamented one representative of SADC-CNGO (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). Gender Links has in the past set a positive example of civil society interaction within formal regionalism with the SADC too, by contributing to the SADC Protocol on Gender after working side by

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side with the Gender Unit of the SADC (Godsäter 2015; Gender Links 2016; SADC 2016). Thus, it seems many regional civil society networks are side-lined by SADC and, yet, those that interact with the organisation in formal settings are criticised for not having a significant and influential voice. The exclusion has led civil society to foray into horizontal networks among themselves, outside of the mainstream. This is a theme with which we engage in-depth in Chap. 6. For the present purpose, there is need to understand how Southern African civil society networks interact within the SADC regulatory regimes.

 escription of the SADC Legal and Regulatory D Framework of Interaction for Regional Civil Society Networks There is need to understand the joint mode of governance provided by SADC for the involvement of civil society through Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, the SADC Secretariat, the SADC Heads of State Summit, the SADC Council of Ministers and the Troika, SADC National Committees and National Contact Points, and the SADC Parliament Forum, among others.

SADC Secretariat With more than 150 members of staff, the SADC Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC and is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes (SADC 2016). It is headed by the Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the summit and charged with the task of implementing decisions made by the summit and the Council of Ministers. Situated at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, the Secretariat organises and manages SADC meetings and is responsible for the financial and general administration of the Community. It undertakes diplomatic representation and promotion of SADC. Notwithstanding its six directorates, the SADC Secretariat does

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not implement SADC decisions or has an enforcement mechanism to force the member states to ratify and domestically execute the signed protocols, as mentioned respectively by two representatives from regional civil society and regional donors in Gaborone: SADC Secretariat is just a coordinating body at the service of member states’ will. This Secretariat does not have decision-making powers to dictate to the member states. (Respondents 18 and 25, in Gaborone 2018)

Additionally, Tjonneland (2005: 170) observes that the SADC Secretariat, the organisation’s central executive institution, is primarily an administrative body with no formal political power. Member states have been reluctant since 1980 to establish a supranational organisation (Buzdugan 2007). In line with regional spaces of engagement, the regional civil society networks see the SADC Secretariat as a key entry point. The Secretariat and its various departments are important places as focal points and gatekeepers for activities of regional civil society networks. The SADC Secretariat is particularly important for such issues as information on priorities for SADC, the calendar of events, invitations and accreditation to participate in specific processes, among others. It plays a key role in influencing the framing of discourses and decisions as a better place to recommend regional civil society networks to participate in specific spaces controlled by member states (SADC-CNGO 2015). Illustratively, the Directorate on Policy Planning and Resource Mobilisation has a focal-point person that helps regional civil society networks understand the operations of SADC. Regional civil society networks have interests in being linked up with the SADC Secretariat for their engagement in formal avenues of interaction. According to some respondents (2 and 3, 2018) at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, there are several ways regional civil society networks can engage the SADC Secretariat. These include offering to provide expert guidance and input on specific topics; offering to write short briefing papers; presenting research and policy papers and publicising these at the regional and member state levels; requesting a seat at the table as is the case with the Regional Poverty Observatory; offering alternative

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policy positions; partnering with the Secretariat in conducting specific activities; volunteering to draft reports of meetings; seeking an invitation to be part of the SADC delegation to continental and other relevant meetings; engaging in social accountability initiatives such as the Protocol Tracker to hold SADC member states accountable; and so forth (SADC-­ CNGO 2015; SADC 2016).

 he SADC Heads of State T and Government Summit SADC is a very political intergovernmental organisation driven by the Heads of State and Government of its member states, which limits direct non-state actor engagement (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2015). Thus, the summit is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC, gathering the Heads of State and Government of all member states at least once a year around August/September in a member state at which a new chairperson and deputy are elected. The summit is responsible for regional policy direction and control of functions of the organisation (Godsäter 2013; SADC 2015). It is the ultimate decision-making institution that oversees the overall political direction of SADC. The collective decisions of the summit, which may include amendments to the SADC Treaty or respective SADC protocols, are taken by consensus and are binding for all member states (SADC Treaty 2009). Civil society interaction within this space is very limited, as only a few representatives of RCSNs, like SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, have formal relationships with the SADC Secretariat through MoUs of which one benefit is the invitation to attend the SADC Summit as observers or partners in which they are sometimes allowed to read their collective communiqués or declarations after submission to the Secretariat (the reading of these communiqués or declarations before the Heads of State constitutes the mechanism of interaction of regional civil society networks within this supreme elitist policy decision-­making space, the SADC Summit).

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The SADC Council of Ministers and the Troika The Council of Ministers, which consists mainly of Ministers of Foreign or External Affairs from each member state, advises the summit on questions of general policy and any other matters related to the smooth functioning and future development of SADC (SADC Treaty 2009). Further bodies, including the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees (SAMCOST) as well as the SADC Secretariat, have coordinating and implementing functions. The Troika consists of the current, the outgoing and the incoming chairs of SADC institutions. Since its establishment in Maputo in 1999, the Troika enables SADC to execute tasks and implement decisions expeditiously as well as provide direction to SADC institutions in periods between regular SADC meetings (SADC 2016). It applies to institutions such as the summit, the organ, the council, the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees, and the Standing Committee of Officials. These are sites that are normally utilised by RCSNs and yet play significant roles in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring. For instance, the council is the organ that prepares discussions for the summit. More than that, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation is of paramount importance in that regard (SADC 2016). Again, here RCSNs have had minimal engagement due to restrictions encountered. And yet issues of peace and security, including development, are at the heart of why citizens within RCSNs must engage with SADC in general and the organ in particular.

 ADC National Committees and National S Contact Points Established by the amended SADC Treaty of 2001, SADC National Committees (SNC) constitute a key national and state-led entry point in which civil society can be involved in decision-making processes that contribute to regional integration at domestic level. Semi-structured interviews and observations made by representatives from the SADC Secretariat and the Mozambique SNC (Respondents 2 and 6, in Gaborone

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and Maputo 2018) revealed that, prior to influencing policy at the regional level, civil society was expected to be part of the whole cycle of regional policy formulation at the domestic level by engaging member states through SNCs and the integrated Committees of Ministries in their respective countries. According to the amended SADC Treaty (2001), SNC should be composed of government, the private sector and civil society as stakeholders in each member state for the establishment of SNCs. In a thorough manner, the SNCs are thus constituted of government, the private sector, civil society, NGOs, and workers’ and employers’ organisations (Oosthuizen 2006; Moyo et  al. 2007). These ensure that all stakeholders, including state actors, market and non-state actors, effectively participate in the affairs and decision-making processes of SADC to derive maximum benefits from the process of regional integration and cooperation. Literature confirms that the SNCs serve as the vehicle through which stakeholders, including civil society, should participate in the formulation and implementation of regional policies and strategies but also points to the constraints that the SNCs face in delivering on their goals (Tjønneland 2005; Saurombe 2009, 2012; van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014). Van der Vleuten and Hulse (2014), for example, question whether SNCs ever hold meeting at all and point out that the SNCs lack autonomy from governments, depend on donor funding and fail to fulfil women’s organisations’ expectations. Still, SNCs are meant to fulfil the following functions: (i) promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in member states; (ii) facilitate information flow and communication between member states and the SADC Secretariat; (iii) provide input at the national level in the formulation of regional policies, strategies, programmes and projects; (iv) coordinate and oversee the implementation of regional policies, strategies, programmes and projects at the national level; (v) coordinate the provision of input at the national level for the development and review of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and monitor its implementation at the national level through relevant sub-­committees; and lastly (vi) serve as a forum for consultations among key stakeholders in member states on SADC matters (SADC Treaty 2001). The committees are ideally also responsible for the initiation of SADC projects and issue papers as an input into the preparation of the regional strategies.

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There are also SADC National Contact Points (SNCPs) in each member state that are responsible to chairs of the SNCs at the country level. Member states are expected to establish sub-committees and technical committees that deal with issues in line with the approved core areas of regional integration and cooperation such as infrastructure and services, trade, industry, finance and investment, social and human development, and food, agriculture and natural resources (FANR), including special programmes. Furthermore, these SNCPs are located in the ministries responsible for SADC matters at the country level. They are responsible for initiating constant engagement and briefings of relevant government institutions, civil society, the private sector (stakeholders) and the media on matters pertaining to the SADC mandate (SADC 1992, 2009; SADCCNGO 2015). As spaces of civil interaction, the Integrated Committees of Ministers, including the SADC National Committees, enable national wings of regional civil society networks to influence policies at an early stage. For instance, SADC-CNGO and SATUCC both have observer status in the Integrated Committee of Ministers and occasionally attend other SADC senior officials’ meetings on an invitation basis (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). Ideally, SNCs are formal national settings that enable civil societies at the country level to voice their aspirations, which can be incorporated into regional policies. Although SNCs are supposed to serve as the entry points for civil societies at the country level in SADC’s programmes, several challenges exist as most of them are not functioning optimally as pointed out above. Furthermore, in some member states, SNCs are almost non-existent, except in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, where they seem to function because they are propelled by several factors whose discussion is beyond the scope of this book. Botswana, which is also the seat of the SADC Secretariat, has a functional national committee, which, according to the Botswana Council of Non-­ Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), serves as an information-­ sharing forum on the implementation of SADC policies (Respondent 11, in Gaborone 2018). According to interview Respondent 2, the effectiveness of the SNCs depends on the interests of each member state fund in creating and funding a national secretariat to facilitate its operationalisation (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). There is an ambiguity in the

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function and reporting line of the SNCs. Oosthuizen (2006) laments that, while SNCs are supposed to be located in National Contact Points (NCPs), “it is less clear whether SNC national secretariats are meant to report directly to the SADC Secretariat, or via NCPs”. Moreover, the functions of NCPs in the restructured SADC, and the exact relationship between them and the SNC structures, are also unclear, as pointed out by interview Respondents 19 and 27, in Gaborone 2018.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum Established in 1996, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) aims to bring together the respective national parliaments and parliamentarians of SADC member states, to support regional integration processes in Southern Africa. The SADC-PF, however, is an inter-parliamentary institution that has only deliberative and consultative powers and is not a fully functioning regional parliament (SADC-PF 2015). It provides a formal avenue for civil society to participate in region-building projects. With a mandate to serve communities in Southern Africa, the SADC-PF seeks to enable the interaction of citizens of SADC member states in integration processes through elected representatives from the national parliaments of member states (SADC-PF 2015). The SADC-PF complements the SADC and helps it fulfil its political and socio-economic aims and objectives, including informing and familiarising the people of the region with the aims and objectives of SADC (Moyo et  al. 2007; SADC-PF 2015). More than that, SADC-PF promotes the participation of civil society, businesses, and intellectual communities in the activities of SADC. Participation through democratic electoral processes in respective member states is considered to be a focal entry point of civil society engagement in the SADC-PF from which representatives are elected. The SADC-PF has the potential to provide useful entry points for policy engagements in priority programme areas and could be a means of injecting a more active role for civil society into regional integration processes. There are formal provisions for civil society engagement with the SADC-PF.  These include firstly seeking invitations to interact in the Bi-annual Plenary Assemblies of the Forum, which is its policy-making

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and deliberative body constituted of speakers and four representatives elected by each National Parliament (SADC 2001). The Plenary Assembly meets twice a year in a member state on a rotational basis and representatives serve for a five-year period. The Plenary Assembly advises the SADC Summit on matters of regional policy and promotes the objectives and programmes of SADC (SADC-CNGO 2015). Secondly, civil society may seek invitations to interact in meetings of standing committees which include (i) Legal Committees, (ii) Regional Integration and Development, (iii) Women’s Parliamentary Caucus, (iv) HIV/AIDS, and (v) Democratization, Governance and Gender Equality. Thirdly, interaction may occur through supporting parliamentary outreaches or hearings. Civil society can jointly convene these with specific standing committees. Fourthly, civil society may invite parliamentarians to participate in its self-organised events and engage with them at the national level (SADC-PF 2015).

 ADC-Instituted Spaces for Regional Civil S Society Network Interactions: The SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) Formed in 1998, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) is the lead apex NGO and umbrella body of NGOs operating in all 16 member states of the SADC (SADC-CNGO 2012; Odhiambo et al. 2016). However, it took the organisation until 2007 to gain sufficient financial resources and staff and become fully operational, with its own secretariat in Gaborone (Respondents 10 and 23, in Gaborone 2008). According to Article 3.1.1 of its founding constitution, SADC-CNGO’s core objective is to “contribute towards the creation and sustenance of an enabling environment for NGOs at national and regional levels” (SADC-CNGO 1998: 3). The purpose of SADC-CNGO is to facilitate effective and meaningful engagement between national umbrella bodies of NGOs in the region and SADC institutions (SADC-­ CNGO 1998, 2012). The vision of SADC-CNGO is to see “an

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integrated regional community living in peace with itself and neighbours; characterised by a meaningful people’s participation in all aspects of development; committed to ending poverty, hunger, conflict; and ensure peace, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights in a constitutionally protected environment” (SADC-CNGO 2012:2). In December 2003, SADC-CNGO entered into an MoU with the SADC Secretariat that defines the need for and framework of cooperation between NGOs and SADC in the process of regional integration and development. The spirit of the above MoU aligned with the assigned objective of the SADC-CNGO to collaborate with the state through SADC-led forum as stipulated by the Article 3.1.4 of its Constitution: The objects of the SADC-CNGO shall be to collaborate with governments through the forum of SADC in identifying issues and development challenges which should be addressed by NGOs with the necessary support of government. (SADC-CNGO 1998:3)

According to Matlosa and Lotshwao (2010: 40–41), the MoU foresees close collaboration between the inter-state body and civil society, officially among other things in order to “contribute to the improvement of the standard of living for the peoples of the region through eradication of poverty and creation of employment opportunities”. The organisation is registered and based in Botswana in order to allow for continuous engagement with the SADC Secretariat, which is headquartered in Gaborone. In relation to its space for civic interaction in region-building processes, SADC-CNGO coordinates the Southern African Civil Society Forum, which holds alongside the SADC Heads of State Summit to capture civil society perspectives on issues of concern. More than that, SADC-CNGO constitutes clusters and sectors, based on themes which also mirror the directorates of SADC. Then, NGOs are facilitated in each cluster to conduct a joint analysis of issues, develop common positions, and ultimately engage with SADC and its structures. All in all, SADC-CNGO seeks to be a space and platform that any NGO in the region can use in order to understand and feed into SADC processes (SADC-CNGO 2012). The strategic development objective of the SADC-CNGO is to promote and support sustainable human-centred regional development characterised

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by good governance, democratic processes and institutions, and people’s meaningful participation in all aspects of development that affect common lives and destinies (SADC-CNGO 2012). Godsäter (2013, 2015) confirms that SADC-CNGO seeks to influence development policies in the SADC. This includes accelerating their implementation and advancing NGO interests and perspectives, and more specifically creating conditions that favour people-centred regional economic integration. In order to achieve its strategic objectives, SADC-­ CNGO has four focus areas, namely Governance, Peace and Security (GPS) Programme; Poverty and Development (P&D) Programme; The Regional Economic Integration (REI) Programme; and Civil Society Mobilisation and Strengthening (CSMS) Programme (SADC-CNGO 2012). Thus, SADC-CNGO is an encompassing organisation of respective national civil society organisations from each of the member states of the SADC that are also eligible for election to the SADC-CNGO Regional Executive Committee (SADC-CNGO 2012). The respective national civil society organisations of SADC member states include the Forum of Angolan NGOs (FONGA); Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO); Conseil National des ONG de Développement de la RDC (CNONGD); Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN); National Platform of Civil Society Organisations in Madagascar (PFNOSCM); TEIA in Mozambique; Namibian Non-Governmental Forum Trust (NANGOF Trust); Liaison Unit of Non-Governmental Organisations Seychelles (LUNGOS); Council of NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA); Mauritius Council for Social Services (MACOSS); South Africa National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO); Coordinating Assembly of NGOs in Swaziland (CANGO); Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO); Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD); and National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2013; SADC-CNGO 2012). Additionally, three representatives from the regional civil society actors underscore respectively that SADC-CNGO in 2010 signed the alliance pact of regional apex organisations with other regional civil society networks, SATUCC and FOCCISA, in order to institute a united framework to influence SADC institutions (Respondents 9, 10 and 18, in Gaborone 2018).

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According to Article 6 of the SADC-CNGO constitution (SADC-­ CNGO 1998), the governance structure of SADC-CNGO comprises the Regional Assembly, Regional Council and Executive Committee. Coined as the General Assembly, the Regional Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of SADC-CNGO. It is composed of all members of the Regional Council, three representatives from each SADC-CNGO member countries. It meets every two years and elects the Executive Committee (EXCO). The Regional Council is the second highest decision-­making organ after the Regional Assembly. It meets once a year and decides on general SADC-CNGO policies and strategic direction. As for the Executive Committee, it is the executive organ of the SADC-­ CNGO. The EXCO is composed of seven members: the President, First Vice President, Second Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary and two committee members. The coordination and facilitation of the activities of the council are done through a Secretariat, headed by the executive director, and is based in Gaborone, Botswana. In terms of membership, the abovementioned full members are entitled to vote at the General Assembly provided they are fully paid-up members. In addition to full members, there are associate members. These include Gender Links, the Southern African Youth Movement (SAYM), the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) as well as apex organisations of other civil societies, regional thematic organisations and specialised networks who add value to the activities of the council (Respondents 11 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). Associate members cannot be voted into the Regional Executive Committee (SADC-CNGO 2012).

 ccessibility of the SADC to Regional Civil A Society Networks SADC constitutes the organisational context in which the patterns of interaction of regional civil society networks in Southern African regionalisms are shaped. A few themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews that we conducted pertaining to the institutional permeability of

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the SADC. These included: SADC as a shrinking space for civic interaction; how national political regime types shape interaction at a regional level; how and why non-political sectors are tolerated in civil engagement by SADC; and why there is a rivalry between member states and RCSNs in the region. From these, it seems that the notions of sovereignty, nationalism and Pan-Africanist ideologies have all triggered the inaccessibility to non-state actors of state-led regional decision-making processes to form regions (Asante 1997; Taylor 2005; Scholte 2014). Yet, SADC and its embedded institutions are considered as a key focal point, but not as sole player, by RCSNs, among other stakeholders in regional development, responsible for the well-being of the livelihood of Southern African people, and therefore an important advocacy target to access (Godsäter 2015). Access by non-state actors to regional decision-making spaces depends on how permeable the regional intergovernmental institution is in the first place. Clark (2000) and other scholars view permeability as the degree to which elements from other domains may enter (Jacobides and Billinger 2006; Hall and Richter 1988; Piotrkowski 1978). As for Bolsover et  al. (2004), it is the ability to move spontaneously across a barrier. In this context, there are three dimensions defining the institutional permeability of a regional organisation or network, namely range of access, level of access and transparency (Hawkins 2008). At the same time, Odhiambo et al. (2016) posit that there is a variation in institutional permeability between different regional organisations. Firstly, the range of access determines the spectrum of civil society that can produce needed knowledge for the regional organisation through both formal and informal settings of consultations. Secondly, the level of access entails the level of decision-making at which access is granted to RCSNs. This implies, at the lower end of the spectrum, RCSNs may be granted permission to access some of the early stages of decision-making but are excluded from the highest-level decision-making settings. For instance, a national branch of civil society can be granted access to the SADC National Committee at the country level, which is not a decision-­making platform. But it will see its regional umbrella excluded from high-level forums. At the higher end of the spectrum, third parties or external actors are allowed to contribute with information or

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arguments at the most important decision-making settings, like in the case of the Heads of State Summit and Ministerial Meetings. Lastly, transparency relates to how and the extent to which the information disseminated to RCSNs is transparent. At the lower end of the spectrum, regional organisations may provide little access to the reasoning behind a decision, nor an explanation of how a particular decision was reached, based on the spectrum, after access to the information they hold, and allow RCSNs to observe government positions during negotiation processes (Respondents 2 and 23, in Gaborone 2018). Our observation based on the fieldwork we conducted, in the case of SADC, seems to suggest that access to different levels of SADC-led spaces of interaction by RCSNs has been facing a myriad of challenges due to the shrinking status of these spaces. Civil groupings within impermeable regional organisations, like the SADC seems to present itself to be, are less likely to play a substantial role in regionalism. However, there is likely to be some variation across different policy sectors, even among regional organisations with a generally low level of permeability. In particular, informal permeability—a quiet diplomacy epitomised by a bargaining process behind the scenes—may vary a great deal depending on the outlook of individual actors within regional secretariats, like the SADC Secretariat, and the extent to which they are aware of and participate in transnational advocacy networks.

SADC as a Shrinking Space for Civic Interaction It is important to note that the SADC Treaty provides for full involvement of the people of the region, among other players, to participate in the region-building process. Yet, civil society groupings still find it very difficult to engage, especially with government elites, as stakeholders with equal participative rights (Mukumba and Musiwa 2016). During semi-­ structured interviews and focus group discussions in Gaborone, Johannesburg, Maputo and Kinshasa, 80 per cent of the 28 respondents as well as 12 discussants in focus group discussions expressed the view that the space in the SADC when it comes to civic interaction was shrinking. This compares to 20 per cent of the 28 respondents from among the

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regional state actors as per our research sites—Botswana, the DRC, Mozambique and South Africa—who contended that SADC was an open institution to all regional stakeholders including regional civil society networks. They disclosed that this was the case, provided the stakeholders contributed constructively with sectorial expertise in line with the SADC regional agenda. But a respondent from regional civil society (Respondent 20, in Gaborone 2018) complained that, “SADC is strictly a club of authoritarian elites who waste their time to discuss how to conserve political powers”. While it is noteworthy that the SADC Council of Ministers meeting in Luanda in 2011 declared that key stakeholders should participate in the SADC integration agenda through the SADC National Committees, this appears to block off direct participation at the regional level, apart from existing arrangements which may be detailed in MoUs (Odhiambo et al. 2016). Moreover, most of the SADC National Committees at the country level within the region seem to be almost non-existent and not functioning (van Schalkwyk and Cilliers 2004; Saurombe 2009, 2012; van der Vleuten and Hulse 2014; Motsamai 2014). This, consequently, leads to non-participation of national branches of regional civil society in decision-­making processes that relate and contribute to regionalism. The shrinking of civic space at the SADC National Committee level severely impedes the participation of civil society at the highest formal forums at the regional level, the summit. Consequently, the Heads of State Summit, which is the supreme platform of decision-making, is open only to SADC Heads of State, government officials and their allies to the exclusion of the majority of regional civil society networks. More than that, based on information drawn from a focused group discussion, there seems to be no adequate transparency when it comes to access to information for civil society groupings about decisions made by the Heads of State (Discussant 2, in Gaborone 2018). The above situation confirms that the range of access, level of access and transparency of the institutional permeability of SADC are shrinking for civic interaction in formal decision-making processes, which consequently opens the way for self-organised avenues of civic interaction. Sanders (2010) seconds the above statement that solidarity among the former liberation movements in the region reinforces the perception of

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SADC as an “old boys club”, in which governments are in charge of affairs without sufficiently considering the views of non-state actors. As a result, perceptions abound or persist in civil society circles that SADC is also a “highly elite-driven club” since the inception of the old SADCC in 1978 (Landsberg and Mackay 2004:18). Consequently, this has abstracted the fight of civil society to advocate for a state–civil society nexus in the formation of regions (Ditlhake 2006). One representative from regional donors/partners lamented that, “SADC is indeed a closed space of civic engagement. Engagement of CSO with SADC for the moment is limited to few organisations that manage to have a personal connection with people in power in SADC (either at the Secretariat or member states) and thus have access. Without personal access, CSOs are not invited to participate, to share opinions or to contribute” (Respondent 23, in Gaborone 2018). However, one representative from the regional state category contended that “SADC doors are closed to regional civil society networks who do not have an MoU with the Secretariat. Even those who have access are confronted by a lack of capacity to contribute constructively to the formation of regions with concrete and evidence-based needed expertise; instead, they just make empty noise” (Respondent 1, 2018). Chitiga (2015) confirms that the opportunities for interaction of civil society groupings within SADC policy-making are very limited compared to other regional organisations around the world. This corroborates what another regional donor representative argued, that: “The reluctance to give up sovereignty is definitely an issue. These governments like to keep as much power as possible, and there is very little opposition to that” (Respondent 22, 2018). The shutting down of the SADC Tribunal in 2012 illustrated the state-centric and sovereignty-preserving concerns of SADC (Godsäter 2015). Accordingly, the policy process in SADC is hierarchical and top-down, and the ultimate decision-making power lies in the hands of the summit. The fieldwork and participant observations we made, as well as reviewed literature, revealed that despite the existence of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, which establishes the joint governance system between government elites and non-state actors in decision-­ making processes, it is still not fully operational in essential sectors of regional integration and cooperation.

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Influence of National Political Regime Type on Interaction at Regional Level With a few exceptions, most countries in the Southern African region are characterised by centralised governments led by cohesive state institutions exercising their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision-­making. Because of this, African states are generally criticised to be driven by authoritarianism and far from being a bastion of democracy (Nwabueze 2003; Godsäter 2013). It is thus argued that many states in Southern Africa have fostered a regional political culture of authoritarian rule and that the dominance of personal rulers is strong (Peters 2011). According to data provided in Table 5.1, despite the political transition away from authoritarian regimes to participatory democratic systems, political regimes within SADC member states still range from autocracies like in Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe, to consolidating democracies in Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, and defective democracies in Malawi and Tanzania (Matlosa 2007; BTI 2016; Mo Ibrahim 2016). According to Söderbaum and Taylor (2008), this authoritarian mode of governance has created rent-seeking political elites at all levels of society in SADC member countries, dominating and monopolising formal politics. Table 5.1  Bertelsmann Transformations Index and Ibrahim Index of African Governance Country

BTI Regime Classification 2016

IIAG 2016

Angola Democratic Republic of Congo Zimbabwe Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Tanzania Zambia Botswana Mauritius Namibia South Africa

Autocracy Autocracy Autocracy Defective Democracy Defective Democracy Defective Democracy Defective Democracy Defective Democracy Defective Democracy Consolidating Democracy Consolidating Democracy Consolidating Democracy Consolidating Democracy

26.3/100 25.3/100 31.7/100 67.0/100 81.0/100 64.8/100 53.8/100 57.4/100 58.8/100 83.3/100 88.1/100 83.3/100 80.1/100

Source: Authors, adapted from BTI (2016) and Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016)

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It has distorted the true sense of pluralist democracy, making it an instrument to confiscate or gain power for self-enrichment (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008; Thomson 2010; Godsäter 2013). Subsequently, neopatrimonialism—a political hierarchy system where leaders use state resources for their selfish gains (Erdmann and Engel 2006)—is said to have invaded African political regimes whereby political power is manipulated and tailored to cater to the personal enrichment of Heads of State and their allies at the expense of suppressed ordinary citizens (Thomson 2010). Through this concentration of power, neopatrimonial leaders manipulate civil society by co-opting them in order to serve the agenda of the political elites. These statist and state-centric types of domestic political regimes shape and influence the neoliberal regional order and, consequently, interaction between regional state actors and regional non-state actors, to the detriment of regional civil society networks (Godsäter 2015, Respondents 10 and 27, 2018). In most cases, several SADC member states do not welcome collaboration with civil society organisations as a result of SADC’s being influenced by the character and personality of particular Heads of State who may be chairing the institution (Respondent 25, 2018, Ndumbaro and Kiondo 2007; Sachikonye 2007). Political leaders use regional governance to strengthen the sovereignty of their own states (Söderbaum 2004). In addition, Youngs (2015) posits that the shrinking of space for civic interaction in some member states of the region is manifested in the tightened restrictions on the registration processes of civil society organisations at both local and regional levels. This can be compared to the case of SADC-CNGO, which the government of Botswana denies registration as a regional NGO in Gaborone, if there is no recommendation from the SADC Secretariat (Respondent 10, in Gaborone 2018). Representatives of both regional civil society and regional donors/partners confirmed that civic participation and variation seem to be strong in consolidated democratic regimes; at the same time, they face serious restrictions in defective democratic regimes and of course grave shelving in autocratic regimes (Respondents 13 and 26, 2018). The four member states visited as research sites for this book constituted showcases of how domestic political regime type influences the regional context of

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interaction, as displayed in Table 5.1. From the table, it is clear that the civil society–enabling environment in South Africa is quite open as per respondents’ views. This is due to the consolidation of democracy in that country. Despite being a consolidating democracy like South Africa, Botswana shows a slight shrinking space for the effectiveness of civic interaction whereby executive board members of the Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO) are on the state payroll (Respondents 17 and 26, 2018). If these claims are true, then the situation restricts the independence of the activities of BOCONGO to provide alternative opinions. In that vein, civil society organisations in Mozambique are said to have experienced break-ins and intimidation tactics from political elites, which have impeded civil society participation in decision-making processes in Mozambique (Respondent 15, 2018). This is despite the fact that the SADC National Committee is well established in the country (Respondent 15, in Maputo 2018). Two civil society representatives in the DRC and Botswana respectively lamented that autocratic elites accuse civil society of “being the puppets of imperialism in the quest to destabilise legitimate institutions through regime change in order to plunder mineral resources” (Respondents 10 and 16, 2018). It is argued that the exclusive features of the state-centric mode of governance in most SADC member states have triggered two settings of engagement within which civil society interacts and, consequently, establishes alternative regionalisms (Söderbaum 2007, 2016). This is confirmed in Table 5.1, which shows how state governance in the SADC region is driven and the mosaic of political regimes in the region that range from autocracy to democracies undergoing consolidation. This has implications for the nature of civic space at both local and regional levels. Linking political regimes to civic participation, the 2018 CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks civic spaces in Africa, confirms that SADC is far from being an open region (CIVICUS 2018). Instead, it houses different types of shrinking civic spaces that oscillate between narrowed and closed civic spaces (Mo Ibrahim 2016). Narrowed civic spaces entail government elites who tolerate the exercise of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, but violations of these rights also take place at the same time. People can form associations to pursue a wide range of interests, but full enjoyment of this right is impeded by occasional

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harassment. Civic spaces are closed when there is a complete closure—in law and in practice—of the public sphere (Mo Ibrahim 2016; CIVICUS 2018). Fear and terror prevail in place of human rights promotion, where members of opposition political parties and activists are all routinely imprisoned, harassed or killed without a fair and redistributive justice to bring to book the culprits (CIVICUS 2018). Civil society participation trends in Southern Africa between 2006 and 2016 show how SADC member states feature as far as enabling civic space is concerned, from increasing improvement to increasing deterioration as a result of the types of their political regimes (Mo Ibrahim 2016). For example, countries like Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia seem to house an increasing deterioration of civil society participation, as they range between autocratic and defective democracies in those trends (Mo Ibrahim 2016). Civil society participation in Madagascar, Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe seems to show increasing improvement as a result of trends that suggest defecting and consolidating democracies. Despite its autocratic regime, Zimbabwe, as indicated in Table  5.1, experienced an increase of civic participation during the period of political turmoil fuelled by the deterioration of socio-economic conditions and a discontented population which resolved to hold protests and demonstrations for better living conditions. Botswana and Namibia bounced back from the annual average decline over the decade with improvement in the last five years as a result of a consolidating democratic regime, as shown in Table 5.1. More than that, it was reported that SADC member states use legislations such as anti-terrorism laws, cyber-security and telecommunication laws, and anti–money laundering laws to justify the shrinking of civic spaces and restrictions of freedom of assembly, association and expression (CIVICUS 2018).

 ectors Tolerated by SADC for Civic Engagement S in Southern Africa Normatively, the SADC Secretariat has sought to engage non-state actors in various ways that would allow them to interact with SADC

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institutions on several issues related to regional policy development, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. However, SADC is driven mainly by power politics and logically does not voluntarily give up that power to the benefit of CSOs (Godsäter 2015). It is widely recognised by civil society actors, regional partners and some scholars, and even some SADC officials, that civil society is generally deliberately marginalised in SADC-led regionalism and that consultation with CSOs in most sectors is very minimal (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011; Zajontz 2013). The reason for this, as argued respectively by one discussant and one respondent from regional donors, is that government elites tolerate interacting only with regional civil society networks that actively operate in the non-political realm and approach those that fight for a new regional order with consternation (Discussant 11, 2018 and Respondent 28, 2018). Regional civil society networks that are tolerated include those that fulfil the functions of service provision, mobilisation on behalf of SADC, and knowledge production through the provision of background research to member states. They are tolerated to interact in formal regionalism provided they conform to the existing status quo as partners or problem solvers. Conformist and manipulator civil society organisations (Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2013) are, thus, the most welcome at the state-led table of interaction. In the words of one respondent from regional donors: “For example, I perceive gender issues to not be a big threat to the power politics of the member states of SADC. […] that is why Gender Links has been granted opportunities to interact with SADC through its Gender Unit discussions and Gender Summit. Consequently, Gender Links managed to influence the SADC Gender Protocol even though its ratification and domestication by all member states are still debatable” (Respondent 11, in Gaborone 2018). However, SADC member states criticise some regional civil society networks for being illegitimate and ironically concerned about regional order that they do not understand much due to the lack of capacity needed for practical expertise to advance region-building projects. According to one respondent from the regional state actors: “SADC has no time to waste with people who make noise without contributing with constructive expertise to shape its regional agenda. […] we are not discriminating against anyone” (Respondent 1,

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in Gaborone 2018). In a nutshell, SADC is criticised for using discriminatory mechanisms to select civil society institutions to engage with, and this has consequently led to the formation of horizontal networks of interaction by side-lined civil groupings outside of the SADC.

 ivalry between Member States and Regional Civil R Society Networks in the SADC Region Fieldwork demonstrates that there is a rivalry between SADC elites and RCSNs that are supposed to work jointly in the formation of regions. All discussants from the two focus groups, held in Gaborone, alluded to the fact that SADC officials and regional civil actors approach each other with suspicion fuelled by their respective motives. On the one hand, civil engagement with regional decision-making is not a priority for SADC member states, especially for those from authoritarian and defected democracy regimes. They criticise civil society for a lack of capacity to contribute constructively with the needed expertise to policy formulation at the country level within SADC National Committees. To most SADC Heads of State, civil society organisations are puppets of Western donors working for the regime change in the Southern African region by pushing for Westernised policy and culture (Respondents 16 and 27, in Kinshasa and Gaborone 2018). They do not master how SADC functions and its protocols (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). SADC representatives reproach RCSNs for not being representatives of cross-border grassroots communities they claim to represent (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2013). More than that, RCSNs lack a clear and common vision about the development of the region, apart from the empty slogan of “The SADC We Want”, lamented one regional state actor representative (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). On the other hand, RCSNs criticise SADC for not having the intention of constant engagement with epistemic communities. There is the perception of SADC that RCSNs satisfy donors’ demands. But the reality is that, as external actors, donors are playing a role of rapprochement to unite two relatives (RCSNs and SADC) who seem unable to tolerate each other in order to make a cake called regional integration (Respondent 25,

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in Gaborone 2018). More than that, RCSNs criticise Southern African Heads of State as being autocratic, obstructing the operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. As one respondent from the regional civil society argues: “These autocratic presidents are afraid of a boomerang effect of regional engagement of civil society in their respective countries. They do not like us as we have been demonised to be threats to their national political regimes which take hostage their own citizens, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Respondent 9, in Gaborone 2018). It is clear that the joint space of engagement in the Southern African region seems to be hampered by finger-pointing that has erupted between the stakeholders, state and civil society, who are supposed to work jointly on the formation of the region. Because of this rivalry, some civil society organisations seek an alternative space of engagement outside of the mainstream, the SADC.

Institutional Legitimacy of the SADC From a general point of view, a legitimate institution has means and ends that conform to social norms, values, and expectations (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 in Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: 17). It is socially accepted by its members and should provide normative quality, efficiency and performance to its constituency (Epstein and Votaw 1978). This book is interested in the legitimacy of regional institutions that truly reflect the aspirations and will of ordinary cross-border citizens in order to build alternative regionalisms, where the acquisition of legitimacy transcends vote-casting. Legitimacy is no longer confined only to the credibility and rights acquired through reciprocity mechanisms from voters or ordinary citizens to the institutions that claim to represent them. It is mainly the combination of the efficient delivery of results that are in the public interest of the regional community and institutional arrangements allowing citizens to exercise their citizenship to political decision-makers or to initiate self-organised activities in the collective interests, values and preferences (Steffek 2014). These corroborate what Heiskanen (2001) alludes to when he says that people’s sovereignty should prevail over that of the state. As for Samuel (2002), legitimacy derives from a deep commitment,

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accountability, communicability and action. The absence of the latter always leads to a loss of legitimacy. In the case of Southern Africa, fieldwork findings reveal that people have lost confidence in their political leaders, reproaching them for working for their political interests and those of their allies, marginalising many ordinary citizens. SADC is a cohort of 16 Heads of State and Government, some of whom were controversially elected, that makes political decisions to form a region on behalf of the people of the region (SADC 1992; SADC-CNGO 2015; SATUCC 2016; Badza 2010; Dorman 2005). There is always an issue surrounding the institutional legitimacy of SADC regarding translating the aspirations of the people it claims to help into regional politics, lamented a regional donor representative (Respondent 24, in Gaborone 2018). This entails that Heads of State affiliated to the organisation are repeatedly criticised for not representing the aspirations and interests of the Southern African citizens who put them in power. The established consensual mode of decision-making attributes one vote equally to each member state, a system which was allegedly criticised for not necessarily representing the aspirations of the citizens of each member country despite how the countries differ in terms of the size of their economies and populations (SAPSN 2015). For example, the vote of a country like Lesotho, with a population of 1.2 million, carries the same weight as that of the Democratic Republic of Congo, with a population of more than 80 million, commented one participant in the second focus group (Discussant 9, in Gaborone 2018). More than that, the Namibian-based SADC Parliamentary Forum, which comprises elected parliamentarians from member states, has been criticised for not playing a meaningful role in regional integration, mainly because it is devoid of any legislative or oversight powers (Karuuombe 2008; SADC-PF 2015). Despite the inexistence of the SADC-PF as a fully fledged regional legislature, the suspension of the SADC Tribunal implies that there are no regional mechanisms for checks and balances to enhance accountability and transparency within the SADC structures of decision-making. Consequently, SADC is portrayed, by many citizens of the region, as a club of government elites and their allies with a mandate to protect themselves in order to conserve their political power rather

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than serving their voters in the region (Respondents 11 and 20, in Gaborone 2018). This corroborates what Söderbaum (2004) asserts, that authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes in Southern Africa have established a regime-­ boosting and/or regime-survival regionalism that is more exclusivist and centralised on the selfish interests of political elites, built on patronage and in some instances even resembling postmodern mafia syndicates. Given that legitimate institutions represent the voices, interests and values of countries and their citizens, the lack of the latter always leads to a loss of legitimacy or a legitimacy deficit. Therefore, this deficit of SADC legitimacy has triggered a quest for alternative avenues of interaction by actors in civil society, through the creation of self-organised regionalisms that promote inclusive participation outside of the SADC.

Conclusion Although built on neoliberal and the state-centred mode of governance, SADC’s integration project allows for a joint space of governance that includes non-state actors in decision-making processes. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty makes the provision for the formal engagement of cross-­ border non-state actors through a state-led interface. In addition to this legal framework, a number of constituted organs and instruments—such as the SADC Secretariat, Heads of State Summit, Council of Ministers and the Troika, SADC National Committees and National Contact Points, and the SADC Parliament Forum, Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of Ministers and Heads of State Summit—were established to allow for formal civil society engagement within this interface. However, after a thorough examination of what constitutes the permeability and legitimacy of the SADC and its institutions in relation to civil society engagement in regional integration processes, it has been found that a few representatives of RCSNs are invited only on a consultant or an observer basis, without the power to challenge state authorities. That is, despite its legal provision and regulatory framework for civil interaction in region-building

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projects, SADC has difficulty allowing regional civil society to openly interact in the political decisions to form regions. At the same time, regional civil society actors are consulted on a service delivery basis by SADC elites. State actors accuse civil society of lacking the capacity and technical expertise to engage in and address pressing issues at both national and regional levels. Therefore, there seems to be a sense of mistrust between member states of the SADC and civil society actors. Consequently, the exclusivity of the SADC-led formal regional integration interface triggers a self-organised and horizontal setting of engagement outside of the mainstream within which civil society interacts for alternative regionalisms. Against this backdrop, normatively SADC has a strong framework of involvement of civil society, but operationalisation is still problematic for some stakeholders. SADC should institute measures to operationalise Article 23 of the SADC Treaty and develop a clear policy on how it engages civil society in pursuance of the treaty provision in order to allow non-state actors to own the processes of region formation in Southern Africa. On that note, it is paramount to understand how engagement is undertaken within the self-organised interface that occurs outside of the formal paradigm of interaction discussed in this chapter. This is the focus of the next chapter.

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6 Alternative and People Centred Approaches to Regional Integration

Introduction Self-organisation in regionalism and regional integration refers to the degree to which collective cross-border actors through regional civil society networks are capable of independently organising or mobilising their resources and making their own choices to engage in regionalism. In other words, it refers to cross-border actors’ self-determination in matters concerning regional integration. This is critical since engaging the states carries risks that regional integration will be governed by only a few (elites), goal displacement and even outright co-optation. Civil society organisations may be said to be dependent when they cannot self-­organise without external support or to be autonomous when they can self-­ organise and self-determine (Baiocchi et al. 2008). Regional civil society groups may not wait for invitations from formal regional economic communities to engage in regionalism but go on to create their own spaces and modalities for collaboration (Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum 2007), leading to alternative regionalism. In this regard, fully fledged cross-­ border civil society networks, whose dominant form of collective action goes beyond information exchange to mount joint mobilisation across © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_6

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national boundaries, attract ordinary citizen activists committed to more comprehensive goals of providing a counterforce to the prevailing social order (McAdam 1996; Khagra et al. 2002; Fioramonti 2015). Such regional civil society groupings constitute a parallel arrangement of political interaction focused on the self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action by decentralised local actors that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there (Lipschutz 1992; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001). Thus, these invented or created spaces of interaction by citizens themselves outside of the mainstream for alternative regionalism are referred to, in this book, as self-organised regionalisms. Building transnational civil society networks is not easy due to the complexity and diversity of identities, cultural backgrounds, interests and needs of epistemic communities across the borders (Gerard 2014). Even where transnational social movement actors consciously work to incorporate more diverse peoples and issues, actually doing so can require exceptional costs and risks, and localised organising is cheaper and more manageable in many ways (Liebowitz 2002; Tarrow 2001a, b, 2005; Smith 2001, 2002). Voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of exchange and communication are the main characteristics of these regional civil society networks representing organisational forms that are more distinct from either bureaucratic hierarchies or markets (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

 n the Emergence of Alternative Regionalisms O in the SADC Region Several factors explain the emergence of regional civil society networks in Southern Africa. For instance, the legal provisions of the SADC protocols like Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, dealing with the joint space for regional governance between state and non-state actors, have encouraged a burgeoning of civil society group coalitions beyond national borders, which open out to encompass more and more voices from epistemic communities. In this vein, the democratic transition in most of the SADC member states has motivated the formation of civil society

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coalitions beyond borders to fight for the implementation of democratic principles and human rights such as good governance, free and fair elections, gender equality, and women’s rights, among others. SADC-CNGO and SAPSN constitute striking examples of civil society organisations formed respectively in 1998 and 1999 to influence regional affairs in that regard. The declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 too saw the emergence of various anti-poverty transnational advocacy movements which widened the scope of operation of civil society organisations in line with the MDGs (MDG 2015). Poverty eradication, social justice and environmental justice became the most exploited sectors by Southern African civil society networks. Since then, the SADC-­ CNGO, SATUCC and SAPSN, among others, have aligned themselves as pro-poor self-organised networks operating at different layers and in different fields for the well-being of the ordinary citizens in the region. In addition, the rise of the neoliberal economic order resulted in a myriad of cross-border civil society coalitions which emerged to fight on the socio-economic front, challenging that order, which was established in the region by post-independence states (Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2013). The cross-border civil society coalition argued that the neoliberal order had plunged the people of the Southern African region into abject poverty and drastic inequalities, exacerbating vulnerability of people and worsening their living conditions (Kanyenze et al. 2006). Therefore, the empowerment of the people to determine the direction and content of development came to the fore. Consequently, these socio-economic crises have triggered the emergence of survival strategies and citizenship through the creation of cross-border citizen links to tackle common problems that threaten people’s livelihoods. Apart from the Union of Cross-border Miners, for example, there are other trade union coalitions, like SATUCC, which emerged to fight for the rights of workers against arbitrary retrenchment and unfair labour practices established in favour of multinational companies (SATUCC 2015). Further, ordinary citizens see the opportunity of creating cross-border links when channels between local groups and national government elites are hampered to the extent that they are ineffective for resolving pressing societal issues. This implies that the organisational culture of the SADC is dominated by the types of national political regimes which do not

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condone ordinary citizens’ direct access to formal institutions. Therefore, the ordinary people decide to advocate regionally in order to create a boomerang effect at the national level through regional solidarity and social cohesion within a multi-cultural society characterised by complexity and diversity of identities, cultural background, interests and needs of ordinary citizens within the borders of the Southern African region (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Liebowitz 2002; Tarrow 2001a, b). Inspiration from other global and regional civil society networks such as the World Social Forum, Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA), and the ASEAN Coalition of Civil Society has led to the formation of regional civil society networks in Southern Africa (Grugel 2005; Della Porta et al. 2006). The regional context within which Southern African civil society interacts demonstrates how the general citizenry can be practically excluded though included symbolically in regional decision-making processes to form regions.

Interactions of Regional Civil Society Networks within Self-Organised Regionalisms: The Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN) Formed in 1999 by a number of Southern African civil society organisations working on issues such as debt, poverty, trade, structural adjustment and globalisation, the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN) is involved in trade, social justice for labour and the fight for an alternative development and regional integration agenda (SAPSN 2003, 2015; Godsäter 2013; Odhiambo et  al. 2016). It envisions economic, environmental, social and political equity and justice in order to mobilise regional solidarity, build members’ capacities and support people-based regional cooperation, integration and unity in the fight against debt crises, global trade injustices and neoliberal policies in Southern Africa (Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2015; SAPSN 2015). SAPSN has created space for epistemic communities such as rural activists, mining activists, women’s movements and small-scale farmers within the region in order

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to add their collective voice on the SADC agenda and ensure that their issues are heard by the Heads of State. It is, however, not affiliated to SADC-CNGO or SATUCC. SAPSN creates a stronger, more united force in advocating for peace, democracy, gender equality and human rights for all. Through its members at the national level of SADC member countries, ordinary people are mobilised to air their views at the regional level. SAPSN perceives itself as a regional low grassroots-oriented social movement with a slightly different approach compared to other regional civil society networks like the apex organisations SAT and Gender Links, deemed by many to be “white collar organisations eating from the same neoliberal dish with government elites, as described by respondents” (Respondents 9 and 22, in Gaborone and Maputo 2018). Its membership is at the same time diverse and open to individuals, local and regional NGOs that subscribe to the objectives of the network and are highly sceptical of neoliberal globalisation dogmas and market-driven regionalism (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). SAPSN comprises a network of civil society organisations and social movements which are autonomous and not bound by any formal constitution but a common understanding and guiding principles (SAPSN 2003). According to SAPSN guiding principles, the governance structure is composed as follows: Regional Coordinating Committee, General Assembly and Secretariat (SAPSN 2003). Inspired by the SADC Troika, the Regional Coordinating Committee is constituted by former, current and incoming General Secretary Generals of SAPSN. It has a mission to, once a year, give the political direction of SAPSN work and give administrative support to the Secretariat. As for the General Assembly, it is the supreme decision-making body of SAPSN and meets once in five years. The General Assembly is tasked to plan SAPSN’s annual activities and endorses them; adopts Annual General meeting minutes; and selects the organisation’s Secretariat when required. The annual general meeting is attended by all SAPSN members. The SAPSN Secretariat was housed at the South African-based Alternative Information Development Centre (AIDC) between 2000 and 2003 on a rotational basis. Since then, the SAPSN Secretariat was hosted by ZIMCODD in Zimbabwe until 2011 when it moved to Malawi to be hosted by the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and then moved to Lesotho

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in 2016. Currently, the SAPSN Secretariat is housed back at ZIMCODD in Zimbabwe. The General Secretary is the overall head of the network and, at the same time, responsible for effective profiling in relation to the campaign and lobbying activities. It deals with programme implementation, assisting in fundraising, organising workshops and information dissemination to member organisations including clearing house for networks activities (SAPSN 2003). Annually, since 2006, SAPSN has held what is known as the People’s Summit, which is an open space for citizens of SADC member countries to meet and discuss issues that affect the people of the region. The People’s Summit Programme has also sought to consolidate and deepen the cooperation and solidarity that the people of the Southern African region had developed during the fight for the liberation of the region (SAPSN 2012; Odhiambo et al. 2016). It was ordinary people’s support, sacrifices and solidarity that furthered the political independence of the region, culminating in the fall of the apartheid state in South Africa (Respondents 18 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). Much as the root that led to the creation of regional CSO forums is the same, which is to fight for space in SADC development discussions, and as much as one would expect that CSOs would have been one SADC CSO Network, the AIDC-led group felt that the SADC-CNGO was more focused on democracy, human rights and gender equality. They also felt that the strategies taken by the SADC-CNGO Network were more of cooperation and collaboration with the SADC structures to reach the Heads of State and Government (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). SAPSN’s concern is that there is no room for civil society participation in SADC structures. This exclusion leads the organisation to take a confrontational approach against the SADC-implemented neoliberal regional order, which “pushes for regional economic integration driven by the selfish interests of a network of state elites and multinational institutions, to the detriment of ordinary citizens of the region whose voices needed to be heard” (Respondent 9, in Gaborone 2018). In pursuance of this goal, SAPSN considers itself a new avenue of sharing evidence-based experiences and information, creating awareness and a mass movement through social mobilisation (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). The biggest and longest lasting campaign of SAPSN has been “Reclaiming SADC for the Citizens”. The same notion in the SADC

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CNGO Civil Society Forum is branded as “The SADC We Want” campaign (SADC-CNGO 2015). In other words, both the Civil Society Forum (CSF) and SAPSN have been fighting for a new type of regionalism, a people-centred regionalism that is different from the formal and much more structural state-led regionalism that SADC is espousing (Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2013; SAPSN 2012, Respondent 18, in Gaborone 2018). Since then, SAPSN has quickly become one of the nodes for civil society resistance in Southern Africa (Söderbaum 2004). The network is extremely critical of the “establishment” and sees itself as being part of the worldwide anti-globalisation movement. SAPSN has built a SADC grassroots movement across SADC member states for women activists, small-scale farmers, informal cross-border traders, labour movements, university students and many other social movements (Respondents 9, 17 and 13, in Gaborone and Pretoria 2018). In other words, SAPSN has become the alternative connection for citizens within SADC around issues and challenges that come with the implementation or non-implementation of SADC protocols. It is an informal voice and vehicle for sharing information, empowerment and regional connectivity. The ideology of SAPSN is informed by its founding organisations, like AIDC among others, which has had and still has a leftist approach to engagement, especially fighting neoliberalism and the perceived unfair trade agreements that SADC member states were entering into with multinational companies.

 n Interaction Processes of Regional Civil O Society Networks in Alternative Regionalism in Southern Africa Prominent examples of self-organised activities parallel to the existing regional order include the SADC’s People’s Summit, the Alternative Mining Indaba and the Civil Society Forum (Respondents 17 and 19, in Gaborone 2018; Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2015). For example, the Alternative Mining Indaba is a yearly self-organised parallel forum to the SADC Mining Indaba organised by the Economic Justice Forum,

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gathering cross-border grassroots associations of SADC member countries whose members live in mining areas and where many human rights abuses are perpetrated by multinational corporations (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). In the following part we examine how the Civil Society Forum and SADC People’s Summit, as self-organised parallel avenues for citizens’ self-organised interaction among themselves and within region-­ building projects outside of the SADC mainstream, operate.

The Civil Society Forum The CSF is an annual event that brings together various civil society stakeholders, mostly NGOs with similar interests, to discuss and lobby SADC on matters concerning regional integration focusing on socio-­ economic, political and environmental reforms (SADC-CNGO 2012, Respondents 10 and 18, in Gaborone 2018). It creates a bridge between the official and governmental regional leadership and civil society. Since 2005, SADC-CNGO, the regional umbrella body for NGOs in SADC, has spearheaded the forum. The CSF is held as a joint venture by the apex alliance partners consisting of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA), Southern Africa Trade Unions Coordinating Council (SATUCC) and SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (Söderbaum 2004; SADC-CNGO 2015). Our observations reveal that the annual forums have been held under different themes based on emerging pressing regional issues but also resonating with the official annual themes of the SADC Heads of State and Council of Ministers. The forum creates an opportunity for civil society organisations from the region to (i) analyse, reflect and dialogue on the critical issues facing the region; (ii) contribute to and create synergy with the agenda of SADC; (iii) impact on the Summit of Heads of State and Government; and (iv) plan and develop independent actions and priorities for regional civil society for the coming year, including identifying key campaigns, movement-building and areas of collaboration (SADC-­ CNGO 2015, Respondent 18, 2018).

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Organising the Civil Society Forum The organisational structure of the Civil Society Forum as depicted in Fig. 6.1 consists of five levels. Level 1 at the top is made up of networks of civil society which are involved in organising the forum, SADC-­ CNGO Board, FOCCISA Steering Committee and SATUCC Board. Level 2 constitutes one Apex Bodies Steering Committee of the self-­ organised institutions in Level 1, which come together to call for the CSF that is indicated at Level 3 (see Fig. 6.1). Level 4 consists of five clusters of CSF including Commissions, Thematic Group Meetings, Side Events, Plenary Sessions and Network. Level 5 in Fig. 6.1 describes in a thorough manner the above five components of the CSF. The Civil Society Forum is one of the self-organised spaces of interaction created by SADC-CNGO in order to participate in region-building projects outside of SADC spaces in the quest for alternative regionalisms. However, its processes and procedures are formalised and guided by rules of operation. Even though it seems to be an informal space, the Civil

SADC-CNGO Board

SATUCC Board

FOCCISA Steering Committee

Apex Bodies Stering Committee SATUCC: SADC-CNGO & FOCCISA

Civil Society Forum

Network

These are organized by regional networks such as AFRODAD,EJN,Tax Justice,Gender Links and so forth.

Plenary Sessions

This is the main discussion forum at the CSF which all participants including observers attend.

Side Events

These are organized by interested regional groups who want to use the forum to discuss specific issues.

Thematic Group meetings

These are meetings of regional bodies or networks that are not part of the Apex Bodies but share in the philosphy of the CSF, e.g. SAFOD, SACBTA

These are the main breakaway groups in which all members participate.

Commissions

Fig. 6.1  Civil Society Forum organisational structure. (Source: Authors)

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Society Forum is still viewed as a recognised space by SADC, as emphasised by a representative from SADC-CNGO (Respondent 14, in Gaborone 2018). More than that, affiliated members from SAPSN criticise the Civil Society Forum for being a semi-formal platform which to some extent cajoles SADC elites into inviting apex body representatives to engage within SADC’s formal spaces. Sometimes, SADC elites are invited to speak at the Civil Society Forum on a particular matter in line with the annual regional agenda (Respondents 14 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). Also, research findings revealed that the CSF Meetings were meticulously structured to follow the SADC-CNGO constitution and the structure of the CSF. A clear programme with an agenda is developed and sent to all participating members in advance for comments and suggestions for improvement. The programme, with defined content, is controlled and timed. Often the meetings are opened by the chairpersons of the three apex bodies, followed by speeches from the three executive directors of SATUCC, SADC-CNGO and FOCCISA/EJN.  In some meetings, delegates have complained about the protocol and the number of speeches, saying that the forum has become a copycat of the official SADC Heads of State Summits (Respondents 17 and 23, in Gaborone 2018).

Preparation and Logistics for Hosting the Civil Society Forum According to respondents in the SADC-CNGO, preparations to hold the CSF meeting begins around May/June of each year. The preparation of the forum is conducted the same way as the SADC Summit is prepared, from the identification of the venue, to setting the agenda, as commented upon by civil society representatives. This implies the venue of the next forum has been identified as being in the same country as the deputising chair of the SADC. A series of preparatory meetings by the apex bodies are held. The purpose of these meetings is to plan for logistics, a common agenda and also financing of the forum. One of the meetings is held in Gaborone, Botswana, where the three organisations interface with the Executive Secretary of SADC or any other designated

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official from the SADC Secretariat. The aim for this meeting is to get a feel for the issues that might be discussed in that year’s SADC Heads of State Summit, although the official SADC Summit Agenda will not be ready for circulation to the public at this stage. The meeting is also an occasion at which the regional civil society networks air anything that they deem important to the Secretariat (Respondents 11 and 14, in Gaborone 2018). This is often done in two ways: first, there are logistics that are taken care of by the respective apex bodies, for example deciding on how many participants they must invite to the forum depending on finances from the Economic Justice Network, a wing of FOCCISA. Secondly, the matter of who attends the forum is governed by the respective organisational procedures. Often, attendees are the chairpersons of NGOs; executive directors of NGOs or general secretaries, in the case of FOCCISA and SATUCC; and some important key officers identified by the apex bodies. The apex bodies pay for the travel and sometimes accommodation costs and per diems for their people. However, the bulk of the logistics are handled by SADC-CNGO (Respondents 11 and 14, in Gaborone 2018). SADC-CNGO creates a team to prepare and plan in order to ensure that all logistics are met accordingly. The team often meets weekly and sometimes as often as it is required, especially when the meeting draws closer. These meetings continue daily in the evenings to ascertain that all is progressing according to plan, and that if there is any need for amendments, these are done correctly. There are also times when the apex bodies’ team leaders meet formally or informally on various matters related to the forum in order to assist in guiding the proceedings of the forum, as confirmed by Respondents 11 and 14 (in Gaborone 2018).

Steps towards the Holding of the Civil Society Forum Based on focus group discussions held in Gaborone, it was discovered that there were close to 12 steps leading up to holding the Civil Society Forum (CSF). Although not exhaustive and sometimes not true to the logical progression, Fig. 6.2 attempts to illustrate the 12 stages towards the holding of the CSF. These stages are identified in an ascending order

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Call is made for the year’s CSF, giving tentative dates and venue

A5 Final participant list is drawn up as advised by apex bodies

A9 CSF held 3 days prior to official SADC Summit. CS collective declaration and Action Plan as its Outcomes

A2 Apex bodies preparatory meeting with potential donors for the CSF

A3 Concept note & programme for CSF are developed and circulated for comments.

A6 Logistics & travel arrangement confirmed. Visit of the SADC-CNGO to the venue and meeting the host team

A7 Setting of the final programme: speakers, commissions, parallel & thematic meetings. Sent to all participants and in the CSE folder

A10 Declaration is circulated to all participantds, medias, CSOs in SADC. CSF closes, delegates return to their respective countries

A11 Declaration shared with SADC-SEC at the official SADC Summit by respresentative of CSF from apex bodies

A4 CSF Concept note sent out to partners, registration form circulated

A8 Travel to CSF venue from all the member states

A12 CSF postmortem, Review meeting between representative from apex bodies and some selected CSOs

Fig. 6.2  Stages of Civil Society Forum. (Source: Authors)

in Fig. 6.2, from A1 to A12. Thus, the first stage, A1, shows how a call is made by the apex bodies’ Steering Committee from SADC-CNGO, FOCCISA and SATUCC for the holding of the CSF by giving tentative dates and venue. The call is followed by preparatory meeting of the apex bodies with potential donors as indicated in the second stage, A2, of Fig. 6.2. After that, this preparatory meeting develops a concept note and programme of the CSF to be circulated to affiliated members for comments as shown in A3. Looking at Fig. 6.2, there is an indication that the preparatory process of the CSF goes through interconnected stages till the holding of the CSF three days prior to the SADC Heads of State Summit reproduced in stage A9 before the sharing of a collective declaration as the eleventh stage, A11, in Fig. 6.2. Dissemination of a collective declaration is followed by the CSF post-mortem, which is the last stage, A12, of the process as indicated in Fig. 6.2. This CSF post-mortem is a review meeting between representatives of apex bodies to CSF and some selected CSOs for further orientations and improvement. Discussants during focus group discussions in Gaborone revealed that the CSF is organised by three apex bodies, comprising SADC-CNGO, SATUCC and FOCCISA. It is sanctioned by the governing arms of the three bodies, which together design and devise a common engagement mechanism with SADC structures. However, the three bodies each may

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also engage SADC structures on individual issues relating to their fields, namely faith issues (FOCCISA), unionism and labour (SATUCC) and civil society work (SADC-CNGO). The three bodies create a steering committee whose main function is to plan, review and evaluate the activities of the CSF. There is a general view among respondents from regional civil society that hosting the annual CSF is the main activity of the apex bodies. Although the CSF is led by the three apex organisations, SADC-CNGO is often prominent. This is largely because it is the founder of the CSF and its proximity to the SADC Secretariat, since it is based in Gaborone, Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat is situated. Often, SADC-CNGO pays most of the bills at the CSF. There have been cases where SADC-CNGO solely financed the forum, especially when the other two apex organisations encountered difficulties in financing their participants to attend the forum (Respondent 11, in Gaborone 2018). While the venue of the CSF 135 corresponds to where the SADC Summit takes place, it is also a procedure that the national NGO umbrella organisation of the country where the official SADC Summit is being hosted becomes the de facto host organisation for the CSF forum. The umbrella body then works closely with the apex bodies, especially the SADC-CNGO, to ensure that visas, accommodation and local travel arrangements are taken care of. If there is a need to identify speakers from the hosting government to speak at the CSF, the hosting NGO is asked to make such arrangements (Respondent 15, in Maputo 2018). In return, SADC-CNGO provides subsidy to cushion the extra work the national umbrella body would be required to do. The CSF itself is divided into five sections, namely (i) commissions, which are guided meetings with designated key speakers; (ii) plenary sessions, which are the main gatherings for all participants, delegates or observers (iii) network meetings, which are meetings for regional organisations that are not part of the apex bodies but share in the philosophy of the CSF; (iv) thematic meetings, which are meetings organised at the forum for regional bodies that are closely affiliated to the CSF—these are for example SAFOD and SACBTA; and (v) side events, which are meetings or sessions organised by interest groups such as Gender Links and others (Respondents 11 and 13, in Gaborone and Johannesburg 2018).

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Participants in this civil forum are classified as delegates, participants or observers. Delegates are those that come from within the local NGO sector, and are selected and identified to attend by the national umbrella NGOs. Often, these are the chairpersons of the umbrella bodies or their representatives, including the executive directors of the organisations. These have voting powers and all their expenses in line with the forum are covered by the apex body members. Participants are people that have been paid by the apex bodies to participate in the forum but do not have any voting powers. These could also be people that have been brought to the forum by interest groups to attend parallel sessions during the summit. Expenses for such people are met by the interest groups. As for observers, they are often members of the donor community, or any other persons. These two have no voting powers and are not obliged to stay for the entire period. They are free to attend any session of their interest, explains one representative of SADC-CNGO (Respondent 10, in Gaborone 2018).

Programme of the Civil Society Forum The proceedings of the rest of the programme include presentations on specific agreed-upon topics by carefully selected speakers known for their particular expertise on SADC processes. After that, groups break away into commissions in which members discuss topics that could converge into collecting points to be used in the development of a final collective declaration. Side events are also held soon after the opening ceremony. There are also thematic group meetings for visitors to the CSF that are not in the apex bodies. These are organised for regional networks such as the Southern African Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) and the Southern Africa Federation of the Disabled (SAFOD), among others. There are also network meetings in parallel sessions organised and paid for by interest groups who bring their own people to the forum (Respondents 11 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). The following steps detail the programme according to interview responses provided by representatives of the apex bodies in Gaborone and Pretoria:

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(i). Pre-Forum Events: These events take place one or two days prior to the Civil Society Forum (CSF). These are special meetings arranged and paid for by SADC-CNGO or other affiliated CSOs. They are often capacity-building events evolving around specially selected topics related to the governance of SADC and the social development of the region. These events may also include sectoral meetings and sometimes end in a launch of a relevant research report or a book. (ii). Day 1: Opening ceremony attended by all delegates, participants and observers. Chairpersons from the three apex bodies all give speeches. A government official from the hosting SADC member state is also invited to give a speech. There are also cultural events just like at the SADC Summit at the opening ceremony. The opening session is followed by the plenary session where designated speakers deliver their keynote addresses in order to set the tone of the discussions of the Civil Society Forum. The Executive Secretary of SADC or any representative is also among the guests to speak on a specified topic in line with the forum agenda. There are also several presentations on selected topics from affiliated civil society organisation members of the SADC-CNGO on the SADC political projects to form regions in different sectors. There are reports made by thematic networks such as on children, disability, elderly, gender and development, media, youth, the informal sector and others. Day 1 is also characterised by side events which often take place from 6:00 PM and are self-organised by interest groups. People are often provided with meals or snacks to encourage them to come and remain interested in the meetings. (iii). Day 2: The CSF is clustered into commissions, which are guided sessions aimed at discussing key issues of great concern for the region and formulating a concrete plan of action for implementation. There are often four to five commissions and these act as arena for discussing SADC protocols. For example, in 2016 the commission topics were: (a) Democratising our Democracies; (b) Inclusive and Sustainable Development; (c) Human Security and Development in SADC; (d) Civil Society Engagement Mechanism; and (e) Strategies and Tactics for Social Mobilisation. The main

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issues are noted from each commission. After discussions within the commissions, participants are gathered again to interact within commissions for the plenary session. This is a guided session in which a consolidated report from the commissions is presented to the plenary for comments, validation and approval. This forms the basis for the collective declaration. There are other side events that are self-organised sessions by respective regional or international civil society organisations on selected topics of concern stemming from work they do in the region with their membership. (iv). Day 3: Participants engage through plenary sessions in which presentation and final adoption of a plan of action take place. This outlines strategies, tactics, mobilisation and campaigns to be run in the SADC member states. For example, “The SADC We Want” campaign, which is a highly acclaimed SADC-CNGO brand, has been officially adopted by the SADC through the SADC Heads of State and Government Extraordinary Summits of 18 March 2017 at Lozitha Palace in Eswatini, the then Swaziland (SADC 2017). As one respondent lamented, “SADC has stolen our brand, The SADC We Want, without acknowledging our collective efforts” (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). Day 3 is marked by the presentation of a collective declaration during the plenary session by the drafting team leader who is the consolidator of the declaration based on the outcomes from abovementioned commissions. The presentation of the declaration is sanctioned by the closure of the forum through the culmination of the forum deliberations. A plan of action is presented and adopted collectively followed by a vote of thanks given by the three apex bodies. The chairperson of the hosting SADC-­CNGO national umbrella organisation gives concluding remarks. Afterwards, participants return to their respective countries. (v). Post-CSF Attendance at Official SADC Summit: A selected team of representatives of the CSF from the apex bodies attend the official opening ceremony of the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit by invitation to submit and present the collective declaration coming from the civil forum.

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The SADC People’s Summit Another parallel event of Southern African civil society networks is the SADC People’s Summit. It is a horizontal network of Southern African civil society organisations that meets parallel to the annual SADC Heads of State and Government Summit (Söderbaum 2009; Zajontz and Leysens 2015; SAPSN 2012; Godsäter 2015). The SADC People’s Summit is a key annual open activity of SAPSN that brings together the ordinary SADC citizenry who use the summit to voice their concerns on pressing issues that affect their daily lives under the current neoliberal order to reclaim SADC for the people of the region (Respondents 9 and 17, in Gaborone 2018). As a network of mainly grassroots movements, SAPSN’s bottom-up structure facilitates the participation of SADC citizenry in a self-organised regional agenda with great potential to influence policy at the SADC level. Like the CSF, the SADC People’s Summit is held on a rotational basis in each of the member states where the Heads of State Summit is held. The idea was engendered in 2000 when SAPSN organised a workshop parallel to the Heads of State Summit held in Windhoek in Namibia, seeking to build alternatives through the people’s voice, and this was followed by the 2006 and 2007 summits in Maseru and Lusaka respectively (SAPSN 2012). The 2008 People’s Summit was held in South Africa, while the DRC, Namibia and Angola respectively hosted the 2009, 2010 and 2011 summits. Mozambique joined the queue by hosting the 2012 summit, and Malawi in 2013, Zimbabwe in 2014, Botswana in 2015, and Swaziland (now Eswatini) in 2016  in Manzini (AIDC 2016). Research findings revealed that the SADC People’s Summit has a General Assembly made up of 13 representatives from SADC member states which are supposed to meet at least once a year to give strategic policy and direction for citizen engagement in the region. Due to financial constraints, however, SAPSN annual general meetings (AGMs) are held erratically. The second layer is the SAPSN Regional Steering Committee which comprises national SAPSN contact/focal points in the 13 member states except for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

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Madagascar and Seychelles where SAPSN is yet to have representation (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018).

Structure and Thematic Groups of the SADC People’s Summit Figure 6.3 attempts to depict the structure of SAPSN and the SADC People’s Summit, in five levels labelled in logical order from A1 to D4. Thus, the first level, A1, presents the SAPSN General Assembly which is the supreme decision-making body and tasked to plan SAPSN annual activities and endorses them in accordance with SAPSN guiding principles (SAPSN 2003). It is followed by the Regional Steering Committee which is composed of National Contact Points as presented in the second level, B1 and B2, in order to call for the SADC People’s Summit, which is displayed as occurring at level D4 in Fig. 6.3. The above two organs work hand in hand with the SAPSN Regional Secretariat, as indicated in the third level, C3. The fourth level, D4, shows how the SADC People’s A1 SAPSN General Assembly

B2 National SAPSN Contact Points

B1 Regional Steering Committee

C3 SAPSN Regional Secretariat

D4.11 People’s Tribunal

D4.10 Free Movement of Peoples

D4.9 Trade Justice Campaign

D4.8 Climate Justice Alliance

D4.7 Tax Justice & Extractives

D4.6 Youth and Unemployment

D4.5 Small Scale famers

D4.4 Rural Women’s Assembly

D4.3 Unemployed Peoples Assembly

D4.2 Gross-border informal traders

D4.1 Landless People

D4 SADC People’s Summit

Fig. 6.3  SAPSN Structure and thematic groups of the SADC People’s Summit. (Source: Authors)

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Summit is clustered in 11 non-exhaustive thematic areas ranging from Landless People, D4.1, to the People’s Tribunal, D4.11, as displayed in Fig. 6.3.

Organising the SADC People’s Summit The SAPSN Steering Committee (SSC) appoints, on a rotational basis, a host country where the Secretariat is to be hosted. The Secretariat drives the implementation of the activities of SAPSN and is responsible for fundraising, reporting to donors and, most importantly, holding the SADC People’s Summit. AIDC was the first to host the Secretariat, in Cape Town, South Africa; it then moved to the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) in Harare, Zimbabwe, then to the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) in Malawi until 2015. The Foundation for Social Economic Justice (FSEJ) of Swaziland (now Eswatini) took over the hosting until 2017, when Lesotho, with Development for Peace Education (DPE), took over (SAPSN 2012; AIDC 2016). During the SADC People’s Summit, regional epistemic communities are clustered according to available thematic groups in line with different lived experiences they want to share among themselves. These include landless people, the cross-border informal sector, the Unemployed People’s Assembly, the Rural Women’s Assembly, small-scale farmers, youth and unemployment, tax justice and extractives, the Climate Justice Alliance, Trade Justice Campaign, Permanent People’s Tribunal, and the Migrant People’s Assembly (SAPSN 2012, Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). These thematic groups create forums where different aspects of political projects to form regions are discussed. It is from these thematic group meetings that points are generated for the collective communiqué.

Steps towards the Holding of the SADC People’s Summit Focus group discussions confirmed that there were close to 12 steps leading up to holding the SADC People’s Summit. Figure 6.4, although not

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A1 Call for SAPSN regional meeting is made its Steering Committe. Hosting organisation sends out a call to SAPSN member groups

A5 Steering Commitee in conjunction with SAPSN member in host country identify venue for People’s Summit. Always held in school or hostel

A9 Travelling starts from all corners of SADC. people put on T-shirts to display messages or stick banners on buses

SAPSN Streering Committee planning meeting with potential funders, Budget is agreed upon and how much will be allocated per country

A6 Steering Committee visits host country to ascertain logistic like accommodation, venue to be in proximity to offical SADC Summit

A10 Holding of SPS often in 2/3 days concurrently with CSF, but at different venue. Collective communiqué is drawn up

A3 programme of events if drawn up is sent around for comments and improvements

A4 Identification of participants, strating with member participating organisations, movements then associations.

A8

A7 List of participants is drawn up per country. logistics & road transportation arrangements to carry more people

Participants are briefed on people’s Summit rules and norms through a day of capacity building for the newcomers to cope

A11 SAPSN Steering Committee (outgoing and incoming chair with SPS hosting organisation leaders remain to submit a communiqué

A12 SAPSN Steering committee held to review proceedings of that year’s People Summit and make recommendations

Fig. 6.4  Steps towards the holding of the SADC People’s Summit. (Source: Authors)

exhaustive and sometimes exactly according to the logical progression, illustrates the 12 steps towards the holding of the SADC People’s Summit. These steps are identified in Fig. 6.4 through ascending numerical order from A1 to A12. The first step, A1, presents a call for People’s Summit made by SAPSN Steering Committee. The call is followed by a planning meeting between SAPSN Steering Committee and potential funders where a budget is agreed upon as indicated in the second step, A2. Following the planning meeting, the third step, A3, shows that a summit programme is drawn up and sent out for comments and improvement by participants from social movements and organisations. The setting of the programme is followed by identification of all participants as indicated in the fourth step, A4, till the holding day of the People’s Summit concurrently with the CSF in step A10 without neglecting other steps presented in Fig.  6.4. Reading the Fig.  6.4, this is to show that holding of the People’s Summit is meticulously planned through interlinked steps till to the last step, A12, whereby the SSC held back to review proceedings of that year’s People’s Summit and make recommendations for further improvement.

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SADC People’s Summit Programme An observation made during fieldwork was that SAPSN’s programme is drawn up before the holding of the SADC People’s Summit. This is done in a consultative way among the member state representatives and also drawing from the SADC agenda of the year disclosed to the civil society organisations prior to the summit. The SAPSN steering committee requests programmes of the CSF as well as the official SADC Summit programme. However, it is important to indicate that the SADC People’s Summit programme remains flexible, semi-structured and almost unstructured in order to accommodate in-depth engagement of the regional citizenry through shared lived experiences (Respondents 9 and 17, in Gaborone 2018). The following steps shed light on the People’s Summit’s programme as per responses from SAPSN representatives: (i). Pre-Summit Activities: These include member state briefings to keep participants abreast of events at the summit. Information materials are disseminated and displayed at the summit. The media is briefed at the country level for publicity. The regional programme is finalised and circulated in advance, confirms Respondent 17 (in Gaborone 2018). (ii). Day 1: There are three activities on the programme, namely registration of participants and opening ceremony, keynote address and solidarity messages. The opening of the SADC People’s Summit is conducted by the chair of the Steering Committee, and the host country of the SAPSN member welcomes the participants to the Summit. This is punctuated by dancing and chanting of solidarity songs. Sometimes, a representative of a government official of the host country can be invited to speak as a guest of honour, which the discussants reported in the focus groups, but the latter does not show up in most of the cases. Opening remarks are also made by the SAPSN Secretariat. As for the keynote address, it is given to meticulously selected speakers who are known for mobilising the general citizenry for action in order to set the tone. Solidarity messages are given by participating SAPSN member chairpersons. They share the outlook of pressing issues challenging citizens in their respective

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countries in order to raise a regional solidarity awareness among the participants. (iii). Day 2: It is characterised by self-organised events, starting with a plenary session, then clustered into people’s assemblies and parallel workshops and seminars, followed by a common dinner and cultural exhibition events. Respondents reveal that the plenary session begins with input on topics aimed at guiding the self-organised events of the day. Sometimes this could be a documentary or an educational visit. People’s Assemblies are self-organised events grouping participants at the Summit clustered into different thematic groups. For example, these include the Rural Women’s Assembly, the Permanent People’s Tribunal, the Migrant People’s Assembly and the Unemployed People’s Assembly, among others. Parallel workshops and seminars include topical workshops such as tertiary debates on SADC and the Youth; Women Building Power around SADC Gender and Development Protocol; the Role of Transnational Corporations and International Financial Institutions Such as BRICS and Others; Tax Justice; Combating Illicit Financial Flow from SADC and Building a Sustainable Solidarity Movement in the SADC Region. There are always scribers who are tasked to take notes of critical emerging issues from discussions within these parallel sessions. At the end of the day, these notes are collected and collated to inform collective communiqué development. After taking part in the plenary session, people’s assemblies and parallel workshops and seminar, participants have dinner together and entertain themselves by cultural dance performances. Sharing arts informs capacity-building on the diversity of culture in the region for solidarity-building among regional citizenry. (iv). Day 3: Participants gather again in order to march and close the summit. Beforehand, all participants interact within the plenary session with the drafting team which presents the collective communiqué for comments and validation. Once the collective communiqué has been approved and validated by the plenary, it is printed for dissemination to members and a copy is be taken to the official SADC Summit venue. The validation of the People’s S­ ummit communiqué is followed by marching and the handover of the col-

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lective communiqué to officials of the SADC Secretariat. A team comprising the outgoing chairperson, incoming chairperson and People’s Summit host country chair is tasked to hand over the communiqué to the SADC Secretariat. Depending on the distance between the two venues hosting the People’s Summit and the SADC Summit, often participants accompany the selected team to the SADC venue and a march is organised accordingly. The feasibility of this march depends on the type of political regime of the host country. Law enforcement agencies in the host country are mobilised for mob control and to deal with any breach of national security and public order. After the march, participants return to the venue and collectively draw up a 12 months’ common agenda and action plan leading to the next SADC People’s Summit. This is meant to drive National SAPSN activities over the 12 months. The closing ceremony of the People’s Summit is often done by the SAPSN Secretariat and the hosting country SAPSN member. A solidarity message on a particular issue is read out to the plenary. In the evening there is often a get-together dinner depending on availability of funds. The following day participants leave for their respective countries. (v). SAPSN Forum Review Meeting: This is held around December of each year depending on availability of funds. The Steering Committee members meet to evaluate the proceedings of the SADC People’s Summit for improvement in subsequent People’s Summits. Sometimes donors take part in these meetings. This serves as a planning meeting for the next people’s forum. In addition to the above-presented engagement procedures of ordinary citizens within self-organised and horizontal networks, there was a need to understand different kinds of strategies, norms and rules they developed during their two distinct institutional settings of interaction.

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 trategies, Norms and Rules Developed by S Southern African Civil Society Networks for Interacting in Formal Regionalism Reformist civil society networks in Southern Africa have sought to influence the SADC’s reform agenda by interacting within formal forums that have been established by SADC. In this part of the chapter, we discuss some of the themes that emerged from the semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and participant observations during fieldwork we conducted with respondents from the regional state actors, regional civil society and regional donors/partners as indicated in Chap. 1. These themes emanate from recurring answers to the question related to the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by reformist civil society actors affiliated to SADC-CNGO when they interact within state-led regional arena such as the Regional Thematic Meetings of Ministers or Senior Officials, Statutory Meetings, SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF and SADC Regional Policy Dialogues, as well as engagement with other regional institutions, Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO) and the Heads of State Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012).

Strategies This book views strategies as part of institutional arrangements alongside norms and rules developed by non-state actors during interaction, in formal settings. Primary data reveals that participation in the state-created regional arena of engagement indicated above with civil society networks is undertaken by invitation from SADC or governed by an MoU or through recognition, especially at the programme implementation level (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). As such, SADC-CNGO is expected to conduct itself in a way that SADC would approve of so that they are invited again to SADC meetings. Below are some strategies developed by SADC-CNGO representatives when they interacted within the above SADC-created spaces of interaction:

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 ollaboration with SADC Elites through C Cooperative Engagement Ninety per cent of the 20 respondents from both regional civil society and regional donor categories that were interviewed for this book confirmed that some Southern African civil society networks, especially those that have entered into an MoU with the SADC Secretariat, like SADC-­ CNGO and SATUCC, among others, employ cooperative engagement while interacting within SADC-created spaces. In this regard, RCSNs openly collaborate with SADC elites during the Council of Ministers meetings, where they may be requested to give their collective view or contribution on the development of protocols, like the case of SATUCC vis-à-vis the SADC Trade and Labour Protocol and other labour-related issues (Respondents 19 and 25, in Gaborone 2018). Cooperative engagement is translated through tolerance and adaptation of civil society to a SADC-led framework. SADC-CNGO interacts within the Regional Thematic Meetings of Ministers or Senior Officials, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, and SADC regional policy dialogues on a consultative and partnership basis as stipulated in the MoU between stakeholders. In high-level meetings, the apex bodies are invited as observers, not as delegates, unless stipulated otherwise. Often Civil Society Forum officials attending SADC meetings are the chairpersons of the apex bodies and their executive directors. Besides cooperating with SADC, SADC-CNGO would also collaborate with member states or with SADC institutions at large. There is a close affinity among officials, a complementary relationship and partnership. The collaboration is a strategy that allows SADC to build mutual trust, albeit feeble, among members of the Southern African civil society network. At the same time, civil society representatives use cooperative engagement to gain trust from SADC delegates for informal bargaining behind the scenes. It is in this context that one of the representatives from SADC-CNGO stated that, “if we do not cooperate with them, it will be difficult to gain their trust and convince them to dance to our tune within behind the scenes interaction. During the breaks between sessions, we always remind them how we are all brothers and sisters of the African

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continent at the service of our people” (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). In contrast, another discussant during focus group discussions asserted that most of the civil society groupings collaborating with SADC end up losing their autonomy by being, most of the time, driven by a pre-set agenda (Discussant 10, in Gaborone 2018). There is also the risk of these Southern African civil society groupings in cooperative engagement compromising their reformist agenda and becoming co-opted into the SADC mainstream.

 uiet Diplomacy through Behind-the-Scenes Q Informal Bargaining Cooperative engagement engenders a quiet diplomacy featuring informal bargaining behind the scenes, during formal negotiations. This entails that Southern African civil society networks, be it SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, SAT, or Gender Links, cannot just raise dissenting views in the official meetings, but they would rather diplomatically express their opinion to influence the decision-making processes without causing prejudice to precedence established by the SADC (Respondents 3, 14 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). It is up to the official meeting to accept the views or not. In this case, informal lobbying in the form of informal bargaining during formal meetings becomes a key strategy to influence the decision-­ making processes. Here, at certain junctures, Southern African civil society networks make larger gains by engaging SADC agencies quietly and behind the scenes. This is linked to the strategy cited above on cooperative engagement. However, here, civil society representatives would raise important issues informally during such times as tea/health breaks or after working hours, that were not raised during the formal meetings due to several reasons stipulated in the MoU, like respect for precedence (Respondents 2 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). For instance, civil society representatives in formal settings may target representatives from a member state with a consolidating democratic regime like South Africa or has regional influence like Angola, to informally lobby for the impact of some of the SADC-proposed decisions that need to be amended in favour of the epistemic communities of the entire

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region. “To some, we invite them for a proper dinner after working hours. With others, we drink together after hours during the night just for us to bargain for what was discussed during the official meetings. It is not corruption, but elite’s alliance seeking”, confirms one representative from the regional civil society category (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). These sympathisers would then take up the matter into the official SADC meetings to influence outcomes. Sometimes, this is accompanied by researched position papers on SADC protocols by members of SADC-­ CNGO, which illustrate the impact gathered from research on a position proposed by SADC. SADC-CNGO has in fact over the years produced numerous position papers and research documents on SADC protocol implementation and how people in the region have been affected (SADC-­ CNGO 2015, Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). This quiet diplomacy is followed by submission of collective declarations.

 ubmission of Collective Declaration for the SADC S Heads of State Summits Our research findings show that submission of a collective declaration as a representation of shared aspirations of the Southern African epistemic communities constitutes another key strategy developed by SADC-­ CNGO within vertical settings of interaction with SADC. Since 2005, when the first Civil Society Forum was held, the apex bodies have been submitting declarations to every subsequent Heads of State and Government Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012). The declaration is a condensation of issues emerging from the two-day Civil Society Forum, but also aligned to the theme and agenda of the Heads of State and Government Summit held each year. The purpose of submission of these collective declarations is to remotely make known the shared views of Southern African civil society networks on both regional and national matters that require the attention of the whole region and then possibly influence the outcomes of the formal meetings. However, this collective declaration has been criticised by some SADC elites for lacking constructive substance and evidence-based solutions useful for the development of the region. In light of this, one SADC representative asserted that “it

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does not incarnate any innovation from its template to its content. We know how that declaration has always been written and influenced by few individuals who claim to advocate for people of the region without their mandate” (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). As for respondents from the regional donors’ category, they were not convinced that SADC elites consider the impact of these collective declarations from the Civil Society Forum (Respondents 23 and 28, in Gaborone 2018). Submission of the declaration is a tool for making demands of RCSNs.

Norms In their responses, most of the respondents from all three categories that were interviewed for this book confirmed that Southern African civil society networks (RCSNs) developed certain kinds of norms of interaction within frameworks established by the SADC that facilitate their debatable collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement strategies. These include conforming to the existing status quo through respect of the precedence, concomitantly reinforcing existing formal norms and invoking alternative norms and the fact that norms developed by civil society are only influential, not enforceable.

 onforming to the Existing SADC Status Quo through C Respect of Precedence Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO, are expected to align themselves, when formally interacting with SADC elites, to meeting the agenda set by the elites, the mode of conducting the business of the day in accordance with legal framework of the SADC as indicated earlier. By interacting within forums of negotiation driven by the SADC to achieve progressive reforms, representatives of Southern African civil society networks find themselves unintentionally legitimising state-­ centric SADC institutions. The insider influence strategy obligates Southern African civil groupings to conform to established SADC state-­ led norms (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). Often, at the end of the

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second day of the CSF, the chairpersons of the apex bodies are all selected to submit collective declarations during the Heads of State Summit. When the selected delegates go into the official meetings, they are expected to conform to the established status quo at the meeting, for example, by speaking only when the occasion is given by elites, by dressing formally if the dress code at the Summit requires it and by registering with the SADC Secretariat for security vetting. During Regional Thematic Meetings of Ministers or Senior Officials, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, and sometimes the Heads of State Summit official SADC meetings, invited civil society association representatives respect the precedence by abiding by the differentiation of clearly defined status: delegates, participants and observers, and so forth. They only intervene if a chance is given to them to comment on a particular matter, like while attending SADC-PF. Most of the time they are quiet and observe the protocol, lamented one civil society representative (Respondents 11and 19, in Gaborone 2018).

 imultaneous Application of Formal S and Alternative Norms When an opportunity is given to voice their aspirations during official summits, Southern African civil society networks do not just reinforce existing SADC collective representations that promote desired formal regional integration and cooperation, but they invoke alternative norms to create new transformative policy opportunities. For example, SADC-­ CNGO and other regional networks proposed the inclusion of more civil society networks in the region-building projects through the insertion of a formal mechanism of civil society engagement in the SADC to second Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. The NGO Southern African Trust was tasked by the SADC Secretariat to consult all stakeholders for the formulation of that formal mechanism, as respectively commented on by two representatives from SAT and GIZ (Respondents 13 and 25, in Johannesburg and Gaborone 2018).

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Influential but Unenforceable Civil Society Norms Most of the discussants during focus group discussions underlined that the collective declarations from the Civil Society Forum presented to the Council of Ministers and the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit were only influential and not binding since the Civil Society Forum was not a SADC-binding entity. It is for that reason that civil society representatives at the formal Summit are always keen to identify, behind the scenes, sympathisers among SADC elites for informal bargaining in order to act as entry points of influence in regional decision-­ making processes (Discussant 9, in Gaborone 2018).

Rules Our fieldwork findings demonstrate that Southern African civil society networks respected the SADC legal framework of engagement in the interaction spaces established by SADC and refrained from radical and aggressive attitudes during formal SADC sessions.

 ubmitting to the SADC Legal Framework S of Engagement Submitting to the legal framework established by SADC constitutes a golden rule for Southern African civil society networks interacting within mainstream regionalism in the SADC region. Even though Article 23 of the SADC Treaty is not fully operationalised, stakeholders still consider it as a legal framework for interaction for civic involvement in political projects of regionalism in the SADC region. The MoU signed with the SADC Secretariat constitutes a key tool granting legal entry to the SADC-CNGO representatives into cooperative engagement with SADC elites at the decision-making table. The “MoU is a discriminatory mechanism that SADC has instituted to grant access to, in a selective manner, only its allies claiming to be civil society organisations by excluding those who are really fighting for the right cause in the region”, lamented a

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SAPSN representative (Discussant 9, in Gaborone 2018). In this regard, civil society representatives speak the same language to that of SADC member states and technocrats. In order to gain access to the table of negotiation, invited civil society coalitions are forcibly obliged to abide by the legal instruments for civil engagement provided by SADC. If they behave contrary to the MoU and code of conduct during summits, they are denied entry (Respondent 11, in Gaborone 2018). This is all about respect for established chains of command that delineate responsibilities within formal interaction, where debates are driven by SADC member states and technocrats.

 rohibition of Radical and Aggressive Attitudes P in Formal Sessions Southern African civil society networks have developed friendly and cooperative attitudes towards SADC member states in formal SADC sessions. By respecting the MoU and code of conduct, cross-border civil society coalitions set themselves rules of tolerance by avoiding radical and aggressive language in formal meetings. This is why one SADC representative stated that, “we work with those who have an MoU with us because it helps us to avoid unforeseen chaos to be perpetrated by antagonistic attitudes from other uninvited people who always use violence and unfriendly behaviour as means to express their grievances” (Respondent 2, in Gaborone 2018). Although the civil society networks are not happy about the official position adopted by member states, their contestation mechanisms are not necessarily ruthless and fierce, but instead tolerant, with room for negotiation behind the scenes (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018). However, this rule regarding attitude in formal interactions was criticised by SAPSN representatives, as coercive tactics that compromise transformational strivings in order to win favour with, and obtain regular access to spaces created by, the SADC (Discussants 7 and 10, in Gaborone 2018).

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 trategies, Norms and Rules Developed by S Southern African Civil Society Networks for Interacting in Self-Organised Regionalisms In response to the shrinking civic space at both national and regional levels, civil society networks in Southern Africa have developed spaces for organising themselves in order to pursue a political activity that bypasses regional and state actors. Within these horizontal networks, they also develop various kinds of institutional arrangements aimed at building alternative regionalisms. Based on responses from respondents during fieldwork, this section presents the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, develop when they interact within horizontal networks as well as their main parallel activities such as the Civil Society Forum and the People’s Summit, outside of the SADC in a quest for alternatives. The SADC People’s Summit includes, among others, the Permanent People’s Tribunal, a major global campaign to fight the exploitation of land, ecosystems and labour by big corporates acting together with powerful states; the Migrant People’s Assembly which fights against xenophobia and for the free movement of peoples in the region; and the Assembly of the Unemployed (AIDC 2016, Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). Through thematic analysis, a few themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, which show the institutional arrangements developed by cross-border citizens’ groupings in self-organised regionalisms.

Strategies The strategies which were used by civil society networks in self-organised activities included the following:

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 onfronting SADC Elites with Transnational C Citizenship and Submission of Collective Communiqué Unlike interaction within vertical networks, Southern African civil society networks confront and contest SADC elites in settings of self-­ organised interaction. Empirical findings demonstrate that the confrontation strategy employed by Southern African civil society networks intends to make SADC elites aware of how they perceive the spaces of interaction provided by the SADC, in the hope that this strategy may influence region-building projects (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). Confrontation with SADC elites constitutes a key strategy of the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network, as a counterforce and transformist civil society network, to confront SADC’s established structural power, in an effort to reinvent the regional order in Southern Africa. It is about a process in which this horizontal network, in this case, engages in critical reflection on its counterhegemonic stance and actions in relation to the wider SADC and its structures of power. This confrontation is, firstly, characterised by parallel activities in the margin with SADC forums. Among them, there are the SADC People’s Summit and the Civil Society Forum, as indicated earlier. For example, in 2012 the SADC People’s Summit was held in the Marracuene District of Maputo, in parallel with the Heads of State Summit, under the theme “Reclaiming SADC for People’s Development  – A People’s SADC: Myth or Reality?”, which gathered more than a thousand delegates with the aim to improve participation of the general citizenry in the policy-making processes of the SADC by ensuring that the people’s voices are registered at the regional level (SAPSN 2012). Although these self-organised forums are confrontational to SADC, they are still modelled after the latter. Calling for people-­centred mining against land grabbing and corporate social irresponsibility through the Alternative Mining Indaba alongside the formal Mining Indaba every year within the SADC region constitutes another confrontational strategy of Southern African civil society network, like FOCCISA (Respondent 18, in Gaborone 2018). Secondly, protests and marches accompanied by revolutionary songs always engage in street marches during these parallel activities. Flyers and other communication

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materials reflecting civil society’s counterforce stance against the regional order have always been part of civic contestation (Discussants 1 and 12, in Gaborone 2018). After these parallel activities, the hosting country of SAPSN and the incoming host country and some members of the steering group remain behind to polish the communiqué and then submit it to the SADC official meeting, as confirmed by one civil society representative (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). Representatives of the SAPSN have seldom attended the Heads of State Summit, for apparent reasons.

 uilding Solidarity and Coalition by Sharing Lived B Experiences and Aspirations among Regional Citizenry Solidarity- and coalition-building among regional citizenry is one of the main strategies developed by Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, during their interaction within horizontal networks. SAPSN builds solidarity by allowing epistemic communities from SADC member states to share their day-to-day lived experiences in their respective member states in order to enact regional cohesion and mutual trust around collective identity among themselves. Participants in the SADC People’s Summit, for example, come to showcase the impact of a lack of, or weak, implementation of the SADC Protocols (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). In that way they strengthen each other’s stance on these cross-country experiences. These participants, who might not have an education or who might not have been informed, are trained on how to speak out in their respective countries; they are taken to the forum to share their lived experiences with others and become learning points to other members. During the Permanent People’s Tribunal, for example, victims of corporate abuses and injustice are expected to openly testify during the People’s Summit sessions against the land grabbing, forced relocations or socio-economic injustices perpetrated by multinational companies operating in their communities. Then, regional citizenry within SAPSN organise marches and protests in solidarity with their counterparts, comments one civil society representative (Respondent 9, in Gaborone 2018).

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More than that, SAPSN enters into coalition-building with national grassroots social movements from the SADC member states and beyond Southern African borders, like SATUCC, EJN, FOCCISA, EACSOF, EASWN, WACSOF and the World Social Forum, among others (Respondents 9, 17 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). This coalition-building allows SAPSN to strategise on how to create a united front of side-lined people in the fight against poverty and global injustices, and, at the same time, to contest at the SADC level against the neoliberal dogmas by forcibly creating alternative avenues of citizen participation in the region-­ building projects (Discussants 2 and 11, in Gaborone 2018). The solidarity-building comes more in terms of working shoulder to shoulder across the region on similar issues. For example, groups like the Eastern and Southern Africa Farmers’ Forum, La Via Campesina and the Rural Women’s Assembly share experiences and strategies on how to strengthen campaigns on food security and agriculture. They also agree on how to engage their respective governments once they return to base (Respondents 17 and 21, in Gaborone 2018). Solidarity-building is undertaken horizontally between people country to country and beyond, across sectors and inter-sectorally. Participants in the forum are carefully selected to include affected or infected people.

 se of Capacity-Building and Media Platforms U to Enhance Popular Critical Consciousness Popular conscientisation is one of the golden norms of counterforce cross-border citizen links, like SAPSN. But these would not be possible without building the capacity of the epistemic communities involved in self-organised interaction. During capacity-building workshops, the Paulo Freire Model1 of capacity-building is used to enable civil society– critical consciousness for collective actions in order to end the culture of silence in which the socially dispossessed internalise the negative images of themselves created and propagated by the SADC state, centred in situations of extreme poverty (Mustakova-Possardt 2003). The motives of  A concept used by Paulo Freire in capacity-building that consists of developing a critical awareness of citizens’ social reality through collective reflection and action (Mustakova-Possardt 2003). 1

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critical consciousness were to unleash the ability in grassroots communities to intervene in the SADC-established order in order to change it. Borrowing from Freire’s insights, the idea is to get people to achieve an in-depth understanding of the Southern African region, allow for the perception and exposure of social and political contradictions, and be able to take action against the oppressive elements in their lives that are illuminated by that understanding (Freire 2005). In these meetings, carefully selected and planned topics are presented with the aim of awakening participants on the fundamental or root causes of challenges being faced in the region. To SAPSN, this capacity-building training helps to liberate epistemic communities from the elitist SADC system of governance and encourage a mutual support among them, especially when they become aware of regional challenges and how these affect fellow citizens in the region, as pointed out by discussants during the focus group 1  in Gaborone (Discussants 4 and 12, in Gaborone 2018). Field observations revealed that the People’s Summit is not just an annual event but is instead seen as the culmination of a year’s programme of regional campaigning. When participants gather at the forum, before departure an action plan is drawn up for implementation across the participating member states. SAPSN always has a media desk which liaises with conventional media houses and social media to convey the daily outcomes of the deliberations. These messages are disseminated far and wide with the hope that they would also be distributed by the mainstream media and reach SADC structures. Additionally, there is the use of petitions which constitute brief messages with a human face to it. They are often produced to be circulated for people to link impact and human beings. These are also shared with SADC technocrats in order to influence their thinking on particularly pressing issues. These are the products of action research at the member state level and then condensed to briefs for circulation.

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Norms Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, have developed a number of internalised norms such as common understanding, shared beliefs and mutual trust that all challenge the SADC status quo that obstructs desired regional integration.

Internalising Norms in Contestation with Existing SADC Status Quo In advancing an agenda for change, civil society interactions in self-­ organised settings have developed norms that constitute common understanding around shared lived experiences by the regional citizenry. These norms are collectively triggered by many human insecurities, which lead to contestation thereafter. This has awakened ordinary citizens to exercise their citizenship through collective actions. Consequently, people of the region share the same beliefs built on mutual trust by organising themselves and at the same time continuing to put more pressure on SADC elites to abandon their elitist mode of regional governance. In the light of this, a member of SAPSN stated that “we always have a common understanding around the strategies to employ during our citizenship and expected outcomes of the People’s Summit” (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). More than that, public-spiritedness and moral duty together have all become part of internalising norms’ processes for all members of SAPSN to express their contestation against the SADC status quo publicly. This is done through public marches and protests by following the shared code of conduct enabling them to voice out their aspirations in the manner that can be heard by SADC officials. For example, protesters are aware of how to exercise their citizenship outside of the venue where the formal Heads of State and Government Summit is held. Exercise of citizenship is monitored by law enforcement of the host country in respect of the designated place and itinerary to avert any intruders. In this regard, educated and non-educated members are all welcome to exercise their citizenship during the SADC People’s Summit without any hindrances.

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 articipation in Self-Regulated Cluster Meetings P during the People’s Summit Regional self-organised spaces of civil interaction, like the SADC People’s Summit and the Civil Society Forum, among others, are always self-­ regulated and clustered into different sessions. For example, during the People’s Summit, there are the Permanent People’s Tribunal dealing with regional injustice and abuses caused by irresponsible corporates under the blessing of the authoritarian elites. Victims of socio-economic injustice by multinational companies are encouraged to testify publicly to their counterparts within this self-organised legal forum. At the same time, there is the Migrant People’s Assembly where issues related to bad migration governance, for instance, restricting the free movement of people and turning a blind eye to xenophobic attacks, are brought to the fore by regional citizens. As for the Assembly of the Unemployed, it is a gathering of unemployed youth from the whole region expressing their grievances against the SADC labour protocol which is not materialised in their respective countries (Respondents 9, 17 and 21, in Gaborone 2018).

 all for Full Operationalisation of Article 23 C of the SADC Treaty Setting in motion the operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty has all along been part of the norms of the Southern African civil society networks while interacting in self-organised spaces like the People’s Summit, the Civil Society Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty gives impetus to civil society groupings within the region to interact outside of the mainstream using different avenues, despite the shrinking of the civic space of SADC. To them, this SADC legal framework of interaction is not yet practically materialised by the elites. It is in this light that one regional civil society representative stated that, “how do you expect us to engage with leaders who are not prepared to abide by the rules and norms that they have created themselves?” (Respondent 9, in Gaborone 2018). In this regard, calling for the operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC

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Treaty becomes a moral norm driving cross-border citizenship of regional citizenry in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

Rules This part discusses some of the rules which govern civil society networks in their self-organised interactions.

Identification of Participants to the People’s Summit through National Contact Points In each SADC member state, there is a contact point for SAPSN. The contact point is an NGO/CSO group that is officially affiliated to the SAPSN Secretariat as that country’s SAPSN focal point. A few months prior to holding the summit, an open call is made by the SAPSN steering committee through the SAPSN Secretariat. The call comprises of a concept note and registration form. The country focal point has the legitimacy to identify participants to go to the summit. When the open call is made, the country focal point, in turn, circulates that call to country SAPSN members, known as Chapter Members, as well as to new interested members. Names of participants are then collated at the country level, and a national SAPSN meeting is called at which the participants are briefed about SAPSN and the People’s Summit. A final list is then drawn up, logistics are arranged for travel and accommodation, and then the participants travel to the venue where the conference is held. As indicated earlier on, national SAPSN chapters get funding from the SAPSN Solidarity Budget; this is supplemented by any local funding that might come from the participants. Selection of participants is also guided by the thematic groups at the People’s Summit. After holding the summit, the National SAPSN chapters return to their respective countries where they also hold feedback SAPSN meetings with the rest of the country. Other members of SAPSN who did not attend and the rest of the citizens in the country are informed through sharing of the collective communiqué using local media, social media as

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well as dissemination of the hard copies of the declaration. They also collectively discuss the regional programme developed for the next 12 months and how they could localise the planned activities.

 ollective Commitment to Uncodified Rules C and Culture of Belonging SAPSN has no written rules, but participants are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical manner resonating with balanced African customs. There is an unwritten culture that is shared through a community of practice. When participants gather for the People’s Summit, on the first day of the summit, people are briefed as to what is expected of them by the organising Steering Committees. Participants are verbally briefed on the rules of interaction. For instance, to have a frank and open debate that allows open-minded participation, only one person at a time can speak, an arrangement which is driven by mutual respect and a common understanding, especially during testimony time at the People’s Tribunal. Participants are requested to conduct themselves decently during the breakaway sessions and report to their respective representatives in case of any needs. They are also free to express themselves through chanting and singing solidarity songs (Respondents 9 and 17, in Gaborone 2018). Participants were told to share their lived experience during the People’s Summit with others who did not attend in order to encourage more attendance. This then informs new participants about what to expect when they go to the summit in the following year. Travel to the meetings is often by road and people are expected to support one another and share resources in the spirit of solidarity. There is a Solidarity Budget which is supported by donors, especially Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Southern African Trust (SAT), and Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), among others, from which the respective SAPSN participating countries get funded. Accommodation and food are modest, with people often sharing rooms and offering space to those who do not have accommodation. Often, the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People’s Summit are not white-collar meetings; people are expected to put on

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attire that is expressive of what they are in solidarity with. Hence participants wear attire that expresses their life experiences. Participants are expected to actively participate in all meetings, including breakaway sessions. In this regard, despite being informal, the strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regionalism constellations are also important as state-led formal institutions capable not only of influencing but also of forming regions outside of the formal mainstream.

Conclusion Cross-border collective actions characterise the self-organisation of actors in region-building and regional integration projects. Cross-border civil society groupings become capable of independent organisation and self-­ determination through collective transnational coalition. In the quest for an alternative, regional civil society networks have transcended the established regional order and created new parallel avenues of collaboration shaped by new rules, norms and strategies in order to establish a new regional order. In the case of the Southern African region, the shrinking space for civil society in arenas created by SADC has isolated the majority of ordinary citizens across the region by preventing them from participating in political projects to form regions. This exclusion has consequently triggered scepticism within the epistemic communities across the borders of the region towards the established autocratic and neoliberal approaches driving the SADC regional order. Consequently, citizens across the Southern African region are involved in self-organised regionalism in the form of new collaborative avenues of participation to build solidarity among themselves through collective actions in order to build alternatives centred on people’s aspirations. The Southern African People’s Solidarity Networks (SAPSN) and SADC-­ CNGO, among other regional civil groupings, constitute a myriad of striking examples of the desire of ordinary citizens to make their voices heard in an arena of engagement outside of the SADC for an alternative. The empirical findings presented in this chapter resonate with the assertion that region formation cannot be attained only through formal

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structures where there is the exclusion of regional citizenry in favour of state officials and markets. It is evident that SADC and its institutions of interaction have been struggling over the years to fully deliver on their promises to include epistemic communities in the regional political projects to form regions. Moreover, through the self-organised institutional settings of interaction, SAPSN attempts to single out many citizens informally through the creation of horizontal networks in which the general citizenry across the region come to participate and share both opportunities and pressing issues affecting them on the ground. These cross-border ordinary citizens developed various kinds of strategies, norms and rules guiding their interactions in two distinct institutional settings of regional integration. This implies that confrontational institutional arrangements are developed in self-organised spaces instead of the conforming/collaborative developed in formal spaces created by the SADC. More than that, these institutional arrangements developed within self-organised spaces demonstrate how possibly these new spaces of participation of ordinary citizens can function just like formal institutions and, if well managed, are able to build alternative regionalisms in the region. There is a need to consider other initiatives and structures which are self-organised and not necessarily formal in the formation of regions. In order to build a typology of institutional arrangements of Southern African civil society networks, the following chapter compares different kinds of strategies, norms and rules they developed when interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms.

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7 Typology of Institutional Arrangements of Southern African Civil Society Networks

Introduction While interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, Southern African civil society networks devise distinct institutional arrangements that inform a typology of their interaction in the region. The existing literature and empirical data collected during fieldwork on how civil society organisations interact in distinct institutional environments have all nurtured our understanding on how to develop a typology on how Southern African regional civil society networks interact in formal and self-organised regionalism in that region. The works of Young (2002) on vertical and horizontal institutional interplay and that of Helmke and Levitsky (2002) on the four-fold typology on interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions both help to locate the principal concern about developing a typology on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction in regionalisms within the SADC region. In line with this book, emphasis was put on institutional arrangements that were developed by regional civil society networks within both vertical and horizontal interactions. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_7

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Organisations that are accommodative and those that are substitutive informal both corroborate the book’s purpose to compare the institutional arrangements developed by reformist regional civil society networks such as SATUCC and SADC-CNGO and transformist ones like SAPSN and FOCCISA and their respective interactions within both formal and self-organised regionalisms to establish an alternative to the status quo (SADC-CNGO 2015). Informal institutions, which interest our current focus on alternative and/or people-centred approaches to regionalism, constitute norms of conduct, historical traditional rules and procedures that manifest themselves in shared beliefs and common knowledge among groups of actors as well as in behavioural practices (North 1990; Borzel and Risse 2016). The horizontal networks of civil society organisations exhibit more distinct strategies, norms and rules compared to those involved in formal interaction with SADC. The strategies include competing with the existing status quo instead of complementing it for fear of being excluded; developing a common agenda instead of a state-led agenda; ownership of debates by civil society instead of state-oriented debate; a collective attitude rather than one that is state-driven; inclusive and flexible debates in place of selective and more bureaucratic debates; building regional solidarity and networks through shared lived experiences instead of friendship-­building with SADC elites behind the scenes; collective action sanctioned by a shared communiqué instead of a collective people’s declaration. Southern African civil society networks interact within both formal regionalisms, where it legitimises the existing status quo through cooperation, and with self-organised regionalisms, where it challenges the status quo through self-organised initiatives for radical change. Thus, these informal institutions constitute alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions. More than that, they build community, increase participation, promote diversity, and strengthen civic engagement. Against this backdrop, this chapter builds a typology that reveals different institutional arrangements within distinct settings of interaction by comparing the two distinct sets of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks as presented in the preceding chapters. That is, the chapter represents an epitome of empirical evidence that substantiates our argument

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in this book that regionalism and regional integration in Southern Africa can be considered an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors.

 trategies, Norms and Rules Used by Southern S African Civil Society Networks in Regionalism-Related Interactions Table 7.1 summarises the comparative analysis of institutional arrangements respectively devised by the two sets of Southern African civil society networks during regionalism-related interactions. The first column in the table represents institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks, including strategies, norms and rules, while the second and third columns detail the institutional settings within which the networks operate and the last column contains remarks on the interactions between the institutional arrangements and institutional settings. Thus, the first “Frame of Reference” description cell in Table 7.1, for example, depicts the strategies that civil society networks in the region deploy in SADC-led institutional settings. These comprise cooperation/collaboration with SADC elites; quiet diplomacy; submission of collective communiqué; informal bargaining behind the scenes; building elitist alliance; and desktop search. Similarly, the fourth cell shows the norms that define the operational procedures of Southern African civil society networks when interacting in a self-organised institutional setting within the SADC region. These norms comprise: contestation of the SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People’s Summit; claiming of rights to be included in regional decision-making processes; and popular and collective debates. The fifth cell shows which rules guide Southern African civil society networks when they engage in interactions within formal institutional settings: respect of chain of command delineating responsibilities within SADC; prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions; moderation and tolerance; formal dress

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Table 7.1 Comparison of interaction institutional arrangements devised by Southern African civil society networks Institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs

Institutional settings (Frame of Reference)

Strategies

– Cooperation/ collaboration with SADC elites – Quiet diplomacy – Submission of collective communiqué – Informal bargaining behind the scenes – Building elitist alliance – Desktop search – Conforming to the existing status quo – Respect of precedence – Reinforcing formal norms while invoking alternative norms – Compliance to SADC–driven debates by SADC elites or technocrats – Civil norms are not enforceable, but influential

Norms

SADC-led setting

Self-organised setting – Confrontation/ competition – Building solidarity and coalitions – Popular conscientization – Submission of a collective declaration – Sharing opportunities and lived experiences – Parallel activities

Remarks On the one hand, SACSNs lobby for change inside SADC framework through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. On the other hand, SACSNs build solidarity and coalition in self-­ organised settings outside the mainstream of the SADC

SACSNs in vertical – Contestation of interaction the SADC status respect SADC-created quo through norms through internalised conforming to the norms status quo. In – Participation in contrast, SACSNs in self-regulated horizontal cluster meetings interaction oppose during the and contest the People’s Summit status quo through – Claiming rights shared beliefs, to be included in regional decision-­ common understanding and making processes collective actions – Popular and collective debates

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs

Institutional settings (Frame of Reference)

Rules

– Respect of chain of command delineating responsibilities within SADC – Prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions – Moderation and tolerance – Formal dress code and only qualified elite class participate – Respect of MoU with the SADC Secretariat

SADC-led setting

Self-organised setting

Remarks

– Identification of In formal settings SACSNs comply with participants to SADC-provided legal the People’s framework in the Summit through form of a treaty, national contact protocol, or MoU points delineating – Collective responsibilities. commitment to While in self-­ abide by organised uncodified rules interaction, SACSNs and culture of develop fair and belonging block uncodified – T-shirt or cultural rules in line with dress code grassroots expressing lived circumstances experiences – Both illiterate and literate participate

Source: Authors

code and only qualified elite class participate; and respect of MoU with the SADC Secretariat. The last column in the table is made up of remarks that emerge from the settings in the previous two columns as well as their interaction with the institutional arrangements listed in the first column. For example, one remark that emerged from the strategies devised by Southern African civil society networks within and outside SADC-led institutional settings is that reformist civil society networks lobby for change inside SADC institutional framework through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. However, transformist civil society networks build solidarity and coalitions in self-organised settings outside the mainstream of the SADC as indicated in the Strategies-Remarks cell of Table 7.1. In the political

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projects to form regions, Southern African civil society networks like the SADC-CNGO and SAPSN find it difficult to be included by the SADC member states in decision-making processes with the same rights as states and the markets. The civil society networks view SADC as a shrinking space for civil participation and subsequently employ various kinds of strategies, norms and rules in order to build an alternative regional order that allows for the inclusion and participation of Southern African epistemic communities. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the two sets of institutional arrangements devised by these regional networks is of paramount importance to address the overarching aim of this book. The comparative analysis is based on an explanation of the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks in two distinct institutional settings as a frame of reference for this comparison. Although both SADC-CNGO and SAPSN advocate for the inclusion and participation of the regional citizenry in the regional political projects to form regions, the strategies they respectively use and their respective norms and rules differ significantly. Even though SADC-­ CNGO can be sceptical of SADC’s state-centric mode of governance, it still ensures cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with SADC elites in order to lobby for reform within the formal spaces of the SADC. SAPSN allows the regional citizenry to contest the SADC status quo and confront SADC elites outside of the mainstream institutional setting, in self-organised spaces through solidarity- and coalition-­building among themselves.

 ariations in Civil Society Network Strategies, Norms V and Rules of Interaction When comparing the two sets of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within both formal and self-­ organised regionalisms, as shown in Table 7.1, it is clear that there is a variation between them, and this is useful in the construction of a typology of institutional arrangements deployed by these networks to engage in regionalism.

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Variations in Civil Society–Developed Strategies of Interaction Firstly, in line with strategies developed, on the one hand, some Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO, collaborate with SADC elites and employ quiet diplomacy behind the scenes in order to lobby for regional reform during interaction inside spaces established by the SADC, as showed in the first “Frame of Reference” description cell of Table 7.1. On the other hand, other regional civil society networks like SAPSN enter into competition and contestation with SADC elites for an alternative regional order through solidarity- and coalition-building in self-organised and parallel activities outside of the mainstream SADC institutional framework, as displayed in the second cell. Given the above argument, SATUCC provides a striking example of a regional civil society network that uses cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes to lobby for reform inside the interactive institutional framework provided by the SADC. SATUCC engages with SADC elites cooperatively by respecting precedence during the development and adoption of SADC protocols and similar regional instruments. Examples of such instruments in whose development it has participated include the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People, the SADC Employment Protocol, the SADC Social Security Code, and the SADC Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment (Respondent 19, in Gaborone 2018; SATUCC 2013). In relation to the collaboration strategy, in 2004 SADC-CNGO entered into a partnership with SADC through an MoU aimed at promoting cooperation and collaboration in order to implement the SADC-­ CNGO programmes on poverty eradication and sustainable development (SADC-CNGO 2012; Gods 2013). More than that, Gender Links, through the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance, collaborated and cooperated with the SADC Gender Unit within the SADC Secretariat in 2016 for the development of the Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting (MER) framework for the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Gender Links 2016). However, although devised as strategies by some civil society networks in the SADC region in order to seek reform inside spaces of interaction provided by SADC, such cooperative engagement and

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collaboration are criticised as exhibiting traits of affiliate organisations to SADC, like the case of the SADC Employment Group (SEG), SATUCC and the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI), among others (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018; Ncube 2009; Gods 2013). These civil organisations are accused by other regional civil groupings of building elitist alliances with SADC officials in order to get their attention, which translates into invitations to various high-profile SADC meetings (Respondents 9 and 23, in Gaborone 2018). As emphasised by Gods (2013), SEG, for example, has been present in the SADC Employment and Labour Task Force. Similarly, apart from the MoU with SADC on promoting business in Southern Africa, ASCCI arranges meetings between government and SADC officials and business representatives with regional trade on the agenda (Gods 2013). Despite the interaction within SADC institutions, Southern African civil society networks have not succeeded in pushing for inclusive and transparent debates among stakeholders in the formation of the Southern African region. The above argument is empirically manifested through the unending SADC-centred regional order driven by the will of the member states rather than the aspirations of the people. In that regard, new strategies were developed by the regional citizenry in contestation of the order established by SADC in self-organised institutional settings outside of the SADC mainstream and claim their rights of inclusion in regional decision-making processes as stipulated by Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. The emergence of self-organised arenas of civil participation alongside SADC institutions fills the gaps left by cooperative engagement, quiet diplomacy, elitist alliance-building behind the scenes and collaboration with SADC elites as strategies developed by regional civil society networks in formal settings of interaction. Our research findings reveal again that strategies developed by Southern African civil society networks within self-organised settings of interaction outside of the SADC framework are not moderate to SADC elites and tolerant of a state-centric mode of governance but enhance person-to-­ person integration. In 2016, for example, from 17 to 19 August more than 450 cross-border civil society representatives drawn from grassroots organisations, youth and student movements, economic justice and

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human rights networks, labour movements, community-based organisations, women and gender-based movements, and faith-based organisations, among others, were all gathered at the SADC People’s Summit in Manzini, Swaziland (now Eswatini) as a parallel activity alongside the SADC Heads of State Summit (Action Support 2016). There was a general belief among respondents that solidarity-building strategies employed among side-lined epistemic communities during the SADC People’s Summit in Manzini enabled the 450 civil society delegates to speak a collective language in line with the contestation against SADC elites. They collectively put more pressure on SADC elites outside of the SADC mainstream gathering to call for radical change by expressing their discontent against established undemocratic practices and human rights abuses. The practices and abuses in question include, according to Action Support (2016), shrinking space for public participation in key national and regional decision-making spaces, exceptional rising levels of corruption, land grabbing and farmer-related challenges, lack of adjusting to climate change and condoning corporate abuses, among other issues affecting people’s livelihood daily. The SADC People’s Tribunal strategically allows citizens across the region to share their lived experiences and opportunities in a quest for regional solidarity-building. Consequently, networks are built on shared values and common identities as drivers of cross-border interaction within horizontal networks. However, although predominant among grassroots citizens in self-­ organised settings, coalition-building is not an exclusive strategy to them. It also happens among those who interact in SADC spaces, even though this interaction is between elites rather than ordinary citizens. For example, SADC-CNGO recognises the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance as a key strategic partner and considers Gender Links its expert or reference organisation on gender architecture (Ditlhake in Gender Links 2016: 22). Sometimes, SADC-CNGO and its allies invite SADC officials as guest speakers during their Civil Society Forums. In other words, Southern African civil society networks enter into coalitions among themselves even though operating differently as insiders and outsiders. Hence, one civil society respondent stated that, “we are not in contradiction to each other as civil society in the region but still we are using different approaches to enfeeble the SADC-established neoliberal order”

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(Respondent 11, in Gaborone 2018). Occasionally, SATUCC and SAPSN, for example, join forces in order to put more pressure on SADC elites during the marches organised by the SADC People’s Summit.

Variations in Civil Society–Developed Norms of Interaction Secondly, as the third and fourth “Frame of Reference” description cells in Table 7.1 show, the comparative differentiating analysis between norms developed in the two distinct institutional settings reveals that Southern African civil society networks interacting within SADC institutions complement and conform themselves to the existing status quo. They achieve this through respect of precedence, compared to those interacting within self-organised settings that challenge and contest the status quo through shared beliefs and a common understanding that shapes their common identities and at the same time driving their collective actions. This implies that once invited to participate as observers in official SADC meetings, SADC-CNGO, SATUCC and Gender Links, among others, have an obligation not to challenge but also to respect the SADC-­ established formal agenda set by an outsider, and their collective declaration is expected to conform to the SADC regional integration mandate to avoid exclusion from subsequent forums. In contrast, in self-organised settings, the agenda is not set by outside players but is instead set collectively by ordinary insider citizens through their respective representatives after circulation for comments and approval before the SADC People’s Summit. Self-organisation is about the willingness of the regional citizenry to overcome collective problems through collective action without imposition by outside players. For instance, Gods (2013) criticises SADC-CNGO for conforming to SADC’s neoliberal view of regional integration by reiterating its support for the aims and ideals of the SADC Treaty in relation to regional cooperation and development in their statement during the 5th SADC Civil Society Forum in Kinshasa, DRC, in September 2009. Unlike in the formal setting, in the collective declaration during the SADC People’s Summit in September 2009 in Kinshasa, the regional citizenry contested the SADC status quo and opposed member states by accusing them of

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implementing neo-colonial and capitalist policies that plunged the region into abject poverty and high unemployment instead of enabling citizens to own resources useful for security and justice (SAPSN 2009; Congo Forum 2009). Interestingly, the abovementioned also help obtain declarations from both the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People’s Summit that complement and oppose the SADC’s agenda. Participants in the SADC People’s Summit often take to the streets in the SADC Summit’s host country, in the form of a peaceful march, to contest the established regional order by calling on the member states to respect their commitment to open up civic spaces to allow civil participation at both national and regional levels.

Variations in Civil Society–Developed Rules of Interaction Regarding the rules developed by Southern African civil society networks for interaction with SADC elites and among themselves in self-organised settings, the fifth and sixth “Frame of Reference” description cells of Table 7.1 show that within formal settings, Southern African civil society networks comply with the top-down rules established by SADC such as treaties, protocols, and MoUs which delineate responsibilities among regional stakeholders. Here, tolerance and open-mindedness are required during the formal interfaces and are translated into the prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes from invited regional civil society participants. Compared to self-organised interaction, Southern African civil society networks create bottom-up fair and joint uncodified rules in line with local circumstances as rules-in-use. In this case, civil society within self-organised platforms becomes hostile to the attitude of SADC elites, accusing them of dragging their feet to operationalise Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. Consequently, rules-in-use are applied in the form of uncodified collective commitments to abide by the culture of belonging whereby ordinary citizens discuss the optimal joint strategies and norms to extract promises from one another through frank debates. Internalised rules within these self-organised interactions enable civil society actors to be tolerant of one another and conscious of the plurality and diversity of culture among them.

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 roblematising Civil Society’s Institutional P Arrangements Developed in Formal Spaces as an Impediment to Alternative Regionalisms In addition to the above-gauged variations, institutional arrangements developed within spaces created by the SADC were viewed by many interview respondents as an impediment to the construction of alternative regionalisms which were supposed to be spontaneously driven by the aspirations of the epistemic communities themselves at multiple levels. This being said, these strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within spaces created by the SADC contribute, to some extent, to the persistence of the state-centric status quo which undermines full inclusion of the epistemic communities in decision-­making processes to form Southern African regions. This state-centric status quo puts more emphasis on member states and their technocrats as sole players in regional political decisions, to the detriment of epistemic communities who are deemed to be only beneficiaries. There was a general view among respondents that these strategies, norms and rules devised by Southern African civil society networks in formal settings of interaction constitute an impediment to people-­centred regionalism as they spark the legitimisation of the existent SADC status quo, which continues to exclude the majority of the regional citizenry in the formal formation of regions. Yet, according to Samuel (2002), legitimacy, communication, participation and representativeness of ordinary citizens constitute the integrating principles of people-centred regionalism. An alternative to state-centred regionalism has no meaning without some degree of direct involvement of the general citizenry in decision-­ making that affects their daily lives. Respondents from SADC-CNGO and SATUCC all believe that conforming to the order established by the SADC, coupled with quiet diplomacy and bargaining behind the scenes between breakaway sessions, has helped Southern African civil society networks to influence a reform of the SADC protocols in favour of the regional citizenry in different areas of their lives, for example, the case of Gender Links, SATUCC and SAT, among others, that manage to influence SADC protocols in their respective fields through bargaining for

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reform within spaces created by the SADC (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011; Gods 2013; Godsäter 2015; SATUCC 2013; Gender Links 2016). At the same time, they alert obstinate SADC member states to the drawbacks or shortcomings of some protocols and political projects that they implement to form the region. In a nutshell, these strategies, norms and rules employed by Southern African civil society networks within spaces provided by the SADC can be an impediment to people-centred regionalisms if they are meant to only legitimise state-centred mode of SADC governance. In contrast, public conscientisation, contestation of the SADC status quo within parallel activities, claiming rights to be included in the formal spaces by protesting and demonstrating, and sharing lived experiences through collective commitment to uncodified rules and culture of belonging, developed by Southern African civil society networks within self-­ organised settings of interaction outside of the mainstream SADC settings, were all viewed by many respondents to be the basis of alternative regionalisms that are not only conventional phenomena, but also unconventional phenomena centred around non-state actors and driven by themselves. The majority of respondents from the regional civil society category believe that these strategies, norms and rules employed within the SADC People’s Summit and Civil Society Forums allow regional citizenry engagement whereby ordinary cross-border citizens participate freely and in a collective manner in the formation of regions in multidimensional forms. Collective decisions are made through free expression of self-reliant non-state actors, including the marginalised, through open and frank debates driven by self-consciousness of the desire to be active agents in the formation of regions translated into collective communiqués seeking alternatives. For example, within the SADC People’s Tribunal, survivors of corporate abuse were allowed to share their lived experiences and testimonies before their peers or other survivors for collective action against any malpractice by multinationals. These resonate with what Gaventa and McGee (2013) highlight, namely that citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states, and inclusive and cohesive societies. In other words, these strategies, norms and rules of civil society

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networks devised within self-organised interaction corroborate the integrating principles of people-centred approaches such as legitimacy, communication and participation (Samuel 2002). However, the legitimacy and representativeness of some Southern African civil society networks like SATUCC and SADC-CNGO have been criticised by several SADC elites and regional donors/partners as indicated in Chap. 6. To some, the SATUCC leadership has been elected by a few affiliated members who contributed their membership fee in order to vote. This financial prerequisite of affiliation has side-lined many national trade union umbrellas who were unable to vote for the SATUCC leadership. Consequently, one regional donor representative complained that the inclusion and legitimacy of SATUCC were debatable (Respondent 27, in Gaborone 2018). Some reproached these Southern African civil society networks for being driven by the will of a club of elites excluding ordinary citizens they claim to represent and help (Respondents 2 and 24, in Gaborone 2018). Consequently, one donor representative argued that their institutional arrangements may be portrayed to be inclusive but are still far from building true alternative regionalisms genuinely centred around ordinary citizens in the SADC region (Respondent 23, in Gaborone 2018). The above claims are dismissed by regional civil society respondents by indicating the way they built regional solidarity through public conscientisation on human rights abuses and regional political regime discrepancies which were stripping Southern African citizens’ dignity. They allowed the voices of ordinary citizens to be listened to, through self-organised platforms or sometimes through their national representatives, and after that merged them into a collective communiqué. Although conforming to SADC’s state-centric status quo, it also needs to be emphasised that some strategies, norms and rules developed in spaces created by the SADC may be useful in the construction of alternative regionalisms. For instance, cooperative engagement is a good entry point into a shrinking civic space like the one observed in the SADC region. It is useful once it is joined with quiet diplomacy in the form of informal bargaining behind the scenes between breakaway sessions, like in the case of SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, to convince obstinate SADC elites to opt for reform and

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abandon their radical attitudes against full inclusion of ordinary citizens in regional decision-making processes. It is therefore possible for this cooperative engagement of civil society networks associated with informal bargaining to complement the other strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised interaction outside of spaces created by the SADC for an alternative. In vertical interaction, the latter strategies help to influence the conscience of the SADC elites and intangibly weaken the order established by the SADC thanks to the MoU allowing their interaction with SADC elites. For instance, a desktop search conducted on the SADC region by SADC-CNGO, SAT, SATUCC and Gender Links, among others, can be made available to citizen associations within SAPSN for public conscientisation and capacity-­building during the SADC People’s Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012, Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). Based on the above comparison, it is of paramount importance to argue that, despite a few shortcomings, strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within self-organised interaction are likely to facilitate the formation of people-centred regionalism. At the same time, a few of the institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks within spaces created by the SADC can complement those employed within self-organised spaces in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

Institutional Arrangements for Civil Society Interaction in Formal and Self-Organised Settings In this section, we provide a detailed account of the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society when they interact within both spaces created by the SADC and among themselves in horizontal networks outside of the SADC mainstream. Table 7.2 displays the difference between strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within

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Table 7.2  Strategies, norms and rules developed within and outside formal institutional settings of regional interaction A1 SACSNs within Formal Interaction B1 Strategies B2 Norms B3 Rules

A2 Self-Organised Interaction

Complementing the status quo Contesting the status quo Compliance agenda Ownership of agenda Constrictive/Moderate

Expansive/Confrontational

White-collar bureaucracy (Codified)

Authentic grassroots approach (partly codified)

Source: Authors

and outside SADC institutional settings. The table depicts institutions (B1, B2 and B3) in the first column and the formal and self-organised institutional settings (A1 and A2) in which interactions occur, in the second and third columns. Cell B1A1 shows the different kinds of strategies devised by Southern African civil society networks during their interaction within a formal institutional setting of interaction while cell B1A2 shows the kinds of strategies devised in self-organised settings. For example, complementing the status quo and compliance agenda constitute strategies devised in formal settings compared to contesting the status quo and ownership of an agenda in a self-organised setting. These differences in institutional arrangements developed within two distinct institutional setting is depicted in Table 7.2 in relation to norms and rules as presented in cell B2A1 compared to cell B2A2, and cell B3A1 versus cell B3A2. A differentiating comparative analysis reveals that Southern African civil society networks that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism engage in different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation that challenges formal regionalism. The differences between the two kinds of institutional arrangements include contesting versus complementing the status quo; ownership versus imposition of agenda; capacious versus constrictive; and grassroots solidarity versus elitist alliance.

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 ontesting Versus Complementing C the State-Centric Order Information gathered from interview discussions with respondents showed that the difference between the overall strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within horizontal networks and those exhibited in vertical interaction with SADC elites lies in the fact that, on the one hand, they are confrontational and, on the other, they complement the SADC status quo. A differentiating comparative approach reveals, first of all, confronting SADC elites through parallel summits, solidarity-building among ordinary regional citizens, and sharing lived experiences outside of the SADC mainstream all endorse the competition in which self-organised interaction goes up against the SADC status quo. Secondly, conforming in cooperative engagement and respect for precedence during meetings guided by an MoU with the SADC Secretariat demonstrates how Southern African civil society networks complement the SADC status quo while interacting within SADC institutions. Based on the findings presented in Chap. 6, the difference is that civil society groupings interacting within horizontal networks compete with the SADC status quo rather than complement it, for not being invited to interact within spaces established by the SADC.  In fact, SAPSN and other transformist civil society organisations all compete, on various fronts, with SADC institutions through parallel activities, like the SADC People’s Summit and the Alternative Mining Indaba, with the aim to enhance person-to-person integration followed by their inclusion in decision-­making processes to build alternative regionalisms, compared to SADC-CNGO, for example, that complements SADC’s state-centred mode of governance, while abiding by the MoU within spaces of interaction created by the SADC. Although lobbying either within formal or self-organised settings of interaction, Southern African civil society networks should not abandon their assigned goals, which constitute fighting for the inclusion of ordinary citizens in decision-making processes to form regions.

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Ownership Versus Compliance to Agenda A repeated theme in the responses of discussants during focus group discussions was that there was difference between the way civil society networks were engaging in debates within the formal SADC forums and self-organised forums like the SADC People’s Summit (Discussants 4 and 6, in Gaborone 2018). As presented in Chap. 6, participants at clustered thematic sessions, like those on Landless People, the Cross-Border Informal Sector, the Unemployed People’s Assembly, the Rural Women’s Assembly, Small-Scale Farmers, Youth and Unemployment, Tax Justice and Extractives, the Climate Justice Alliance, the Trade Justice Campaign, the Permanent People’s Tribunal and the Migrant People’s Assembly (Respondents 9and 17, in Gaborone 2018), were all given opportunities to freely debate their lived experiences. In this case, apart from the SADC agenda that circulated prior to the convening regional citizenry within the People’s Summit, debates were driven by shared lived experiences and opportunities from the participants without being necessarily steered by an outside agenda. The collective agenda was constructed during popular interaction. Instead, within spaces established by the SADC, as indicated in Chap. 6, the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC Regional Policy Dialogues, and the Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit invited regional civil society participants to a debate of which the agenda has been set by SADC elites. For the sake of respect for precedence, civil society representatives, in this formal setting, become obligated to argue in line with the member states agenda by sharing their views. Against this backdrop, there is strong ownership of debates driven by collective attitudes of epistemic communities within self-organised settings compared to state-oriented debates driven by the political attitudes of SADC elites.

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Expansive Versus Constrictive Norms It is evident from the findings presented in Chap. 6 that self-organised avenues of civil society interaction, like the SADC People’s Summit, have developed participatory norms that abide by the principles of a people-­ centred approach to regionalism. Those inclusive and flexible norms allowed numerous people from different parts and levels of society, including gender and age groups, to freely participate in the debates, advancing a range of economic, environmental, political and social causes. For instance, before the SADC People’s Summit, participants were mobilised at the national level among grassroots communities and survivors of any forms of abuse who were willing to share their lived experiences or testimonies within different thematic groups. Once identified, no one was left behind among those who were interested in participating (Respondents 17 and 21, in Gaborone 2018), compared to formal interaction, where civil society representatives reinforce the established selective and bureaucratic norms of participation cautioned by invitations and MoUs with SADC institutions. In this case, only invited civil society representatives can participate as observers in the SADC official forums. For example, SATUCC representatives cannot participate in the Council of the Ministers on regional labour-related matters without a formal invitation from the SADC Secretariat. At the same time, other trade unions not affiliated with SATUCC, for the reasons indicated above, might find themselves denied access to SADC forums on labour issues even though the matter might concern regional workers (Respondent 17, in Gaborone 2018). In this regard, there is a wide scope for participation within self-organised settings that is driven by inclusive and flexible norms, as opposed to the constrictive character and greater bureaucracy of the official SADC forums.

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Grassroots Solidarity Versus Elitist Alliance Although many civil society organisations operating within the Southern African region, like SADC-CNGO, FOCCISA, SATUCC, Gender Links, ICBT and SAPSN, claimed to build solidarity and coalitions among the general citizenry across the region and to be at the centre of their formation, some of these acclaimed regional representations had fallen short of inclusion, according to one respondent from the general public (Respondent 21, in Gaborone 2018). As indicated in Chap. 6, it was noted that the SAPSN has successfully enhanced solidarity and coalitions among grassroots and vulnerable people across the region through its strategy of sharing lived experiences during the SADC People’s Summit. These have helped the people of SADC to have a common understanding of what their challenges are and to identify themselves through a collective agenda in order to think collectively on how to solve their problems through collective actions (Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2015). Unlike the SAPSN, the apex bodies of civil society (SADC-CNGO, SATUCC and FOCCISA) were much more interested in affiliated members who paid their membership fees. Similarly, focus group discussants disclosed that these apex bodies were interested in building an elitist alliance with SADC elites to gain greater entry into SADC formal forums. For instance, SAT was criticised by most discussants for having privileged access to the SADC Secretariat because of its link to its former member, who at the time of interview was working in the SADC Secretariat. An elitist alliance with the apex bodies is allegedly for personal profit between the parties in alliance and overlooks enhancing solidarity among the cross-border epistemic communities they claim to mobilise and unite to reclaim SADC for the people (Discussant 11, in Gaborone 2018).

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 uthentic Grassroots Approach Versus A White-Collar Bureaucracy Responses from respondents during semi-structured interviews revealed that during self-organised interaction, civil society associations used an authentic grassroots approach to express themselves. These included wearing T-shirts conveying their aspirations and at the same time carrying placards disseminating the message concerning their lived experiences and expectations from SADC elites during the People’s Summit, compared to SADC forums where invited participants were obliged to be in formal attire and abide by formalised state-led proceedings. More than that, there was attire worn during performances, dance exhibitions of each representative groups demonstrating cultural diversity and slogans and chanting of liberation struggle songs during the People’s Summit. But, focus group discussants suggested that this was different from the vertical interaction which was highly hierarchical and militarised during the SADC forums, compared to the venues of horizontal networks, where people in solidarity have developed mutual trust enabling them to guard themselves during the SADC People’s Summit. The collective declaration derived from collective resolutions of civil society actors during the SADC People’s Summit comprises diverse aspirations and grievances of all participants. In contrast, during their interaction within SADC forums as observers, representatives of civil society associations endorsed some of the official SADC resolutions and read their collective communiqué from their Civil Society Forum which, often, share the views of SADC officials.

 ivil Society Strategies, Norms and Rules C within and outside SADC in a People-Centredness Perspective In this section we analyse the findings presented above on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within and outside SADC institutional arrangements,

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according to principles of participation and legitimacy as principles of integration of a people-centred approach to regionalism. The goal is to find out how differently these two sets of institutional arrangements developed by ordinary citizens in two distinct interaction settings speak to the principles of integration of a people-centred approach.

Participation As argued in the preceding sections, people-centredness requires full and continuous involvement of the general public in decision-making that affects their daily lives. In this case, participation has not only become part of the rights of citizenship but also one of the principles of democratic governance (Dahl 1998; Pateman 1970; Samuel 2002). There is an indication that citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states, and inclusive and cohesive societies (Gaventa and McGee 2013). The examination revolved around how different the two sets of procedural mechanisms developed by civil society networks focused on active participation and representation based on inclusive moral choice, self-reliance and ownership by epistemic communities (De Beer 2012). Firstly, our research findings revealed that the majority of respondents and participants believed in strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised spaces of interaction to encourage in-depth involvement of cross-border epistemic communities in political decisions to form regions. However, strategies, norms and rules developed within formal interaction encourage weak involvement of ordinary citizens. For example, building solidarity and coalitions, and sharing lived experiences through open debates as strategies within clustered thematic groups, encouraged marginalised citizens within the region to be fully involved in the formation of region processes. However, collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement as a result of an MoU encourages passive participation translated into weak civil involvement, as only a few invited civil society representatives took part in the SADC formal forums. This implies there is a difference in terms of the number of participants within the two

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distinct spaces of interaction, which impacts the level of representation featuring an absolute participatory mechanism (Respondents 17 and 22, in Gaborone 2018). Secondly, discussants argued that parallel activities, popular conscientisation and mutual trust, among other procedural mechanisms developed within horizontal networks, enabled epistemic communities across the SADC region to become self-reliant vis-à-vis the member states. The regional citizenry become capable of exercising their citizenship in order to intervene collectively in pressing issues affecting their lives. In contrast, respect of an MoU with SADC elites and quiet diplomacy as developed by insider civil society networks were all criticised by most respondents and participants for yielding dependent citizens acting as beneficiaries but not as active agents in decision-making processes. Lastly, findings demonstrated that open debates through lived experiences and sharing opportunities within clustered thematic groups during the SADC People’s Summit encourage ownership of both the summit agenda and decisions incorporated into a collective declaration. Citizens get involved with their voices being heard within civil horizontal networks. Compared to conforming to the SADC status quo, respect of the precedence, compliance to SADC-driven debates developed by reformist civil society networks within SADC-created spaces, most discussants from focus group lamented that these institutions did not encourage ownership either of the agenda or the formal summit (Discussants 11 and 12, in Gaborone 2018). As a result, there was weak involvement with barely a voice within formal interaction. Against this backdrop, it has been found that strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within self-organised settings outside of SADC promote in-depth participation of epistemic communities across the region.

Legitimacy A focus group discussion, held in March 2018  in Gaborone, showed dichotomies and tensions in the way respondents perceive and experience the legitimacy of collective actions of Southern African civil society

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networks in interaction within and outside the SADC sphere. Although legitimacy is the right to govern and defines the basis on which the right to rule rests, it is not merely about legality; it is both about ethics and politics (Williams 1998, Coicaud 2002; Edwards 2010 in Lis 2011). More than that, Steffek (2014) classifies output legitimacy and input legitimacy within global studies. Output legitimacy implies the efficient delivery of results that are in the public interest of the particular community. As for input legitimacy, it constitutes institutional arrangements that allow citizens to communicate their interests, values, and preferences to political decision-makers or to take decisions by themselves in the case of direct democracy (Steffek 2014). This book considered institutions as legitimate that truly reflect the aspirations of the ordinary citizens across the region in the quest for alternative regionalism, in which voter legitimacy itself is not enough. In this regard, legitimacy is about the credibility and rights acquired from the general public to the national and international institutions that claim to represent them, like the case of Southern African civil society networks (Steffek 2014). Against this backdrop, findings revealed that Southern African civil society networks are composed of a regional body affiliated with national chapters. The aspirations of grassroots communities seem to be channelled into the regional forums through the existing representative networks in the name of public interests. Apart from their associational life, there was a general view among respondents that the strategies, norms and rules of cross-border civil society associations within the SADC People’s Summit, the Civil Society Forum, Gender Links Forums and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, represent the collective aspirations of most epistemic communities (Respondents 10, 17 and 19, in Gaborone 2018). Most of the respondents from civil society claimed that the collective actions undertaken became legitimate because they were conducted in the public interest and their resolutions during clustered thematic groups were consolidated into a collective declaration. Yet, referring to rights acquired from votes of ordinary citizens, some regional donors and SADC elites criticised Southern African civil society networks for being illegitimate, as they did not receive any mandate from the people they claimed to represent. Regional representation of citizens within both formal and

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self-organised forums was criticised by other stakeholders to be very selective by a club of elites claiming to be leaders (Respondents 2 and 26, in Gaborone 2018). In this regard, parallel activities, solidarity- and coalition-building, embody the legitimacy of regional epistemic communities as they are undertaken to advance the public interests in the region.

 ypologies of Institutions According T to Institutional Settings of Interaction of Civil Society Groups We created a cross-tabulation to group the variables we were examining into categories that describe the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that civil society networks deploy in regionalisms represented by spaces created by either the SADC or self-organised networks outside of the mainstream SADC institutional setting. We construct the typologies based on the model of institutional interaction developed by Young (2002) and the typology of institutions by Helmke and Levitsky (2002) as alluded to in preceding sections and chapters.

 ypology of Strategies, Norms and Rules T Developed by Civil Society Networks within and outside SADC Institutional Settings Against this backdrop, we constructed a typology of the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed within two distinct institutional settings of interaction in which civil society networks operate (Table 7.3). This typology categorises strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks according to their respective institutional settings in which interactions occur, namely spaces created by the SADC and the self-organised horizontal networks as indicated in rows B1 and B2, respectively, of Table 7.3. Thus, on the one hand, cell B1A1 labels the strategies most devised by civil society associations, which conform to the existing SADC status quo, within spaces of

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Table 7.3   Typology of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within and outside SADC institutional settings Developed Civil Institutional Arrangements SACSNs within

A1 Strategies

A2 Norms

A3 Rules

Regional Interaction Settings Elitist collaboration/ Compliant Dependent rules B1 Informal bargaining norms SADC-provided spaces (Reformists) Contesting/ Emancipatory Confrontational/ B2 grassroots Mobilising Grassroots Self-organised civic rules Norms solidarity-building spaces (Transformists) Source: Authors

interaction created by the SADC, as Elitist Collaboration/Informal Bargaining Strategies. Because representatives of civil associations are most likely to cooperate with SADC elites within the spaces created by the SADC during their interaction through cooperative engagement, closeness to officials, quiet diplomacy, informal bargaining behind the scenes and seeking an alliance with elites. The overall norms guiding the interaction of civil society networks within SADC-led forums, which legitimise the existing SADC status quo, are labelled Compliant Norms, as shown in cell B1A2 of Table 7.3. The findings presented above stress that Southern African civil society networks interacting within formal SADC forums conform themselves to the established mode of regional governance by SADC. They abide by the spirit and letter of the elitist SADC communiqué despite their involvement in the dialogue as observers or partners. Conforming to the SADC status quo is, sometimes, visible in the Southern African civil society networks’ collective declaration during their Civil Society Forums. Moreover, the rules most often developed by insider civil society networks in Southern Africa, that reinforce and abide by the existing SADC-­ provided legal framework through respect of precedence, are labelled Dependent Rules as disclosed by cell B1A3 in Table 7.3. Here, reformist civil society networks, like SATUCC and SADC-CNGO, respect the SADC-established chain of command defining tasks during SADC

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forums. At the same time, they respect the precedence established by the SADC legal framework of civil interaction. This category of reformist civil society networks in the Southern African region makes sure any institutional arrangements they develop do not infringe on the order established by the SADC for fear of being excluded from the official forums. On the other hand, cell B2A1 of Table 7.3 presents the strategies most devised by transformist civil society networks in the Southern African region, like SAPSN, which enter into competition with SADC elites outside of the SADC mainstream through solidarity- and coalition-­ building within parallel activities like the SADC People’s Summit, the Civil Society Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, which are labelled Confrontational and Grassroots Solidarity-Building Strategies. Within parallel activities outside of SADC institutions, civil society associations seek to build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through sharing lived experiences and popular conscientisation. As indicated earlier, cross-border civil society associations share lived experiences and opportunities in self-organised platforms, like the SADC People’s Summit. As displayed in cell B2A2 of Table 7.3, the customary norms guiding procedural mechanisms of transformist civil society groupings within horizontal networks, that enter into contestation with the SADC status quo, are described as Contesting and Mobilising Norms. Because the regional citizenry in SADC exercises citizenship and claims their rights to be included in the SADC discussion forums through demonstrations, protests and popular debates in the quest for alternative regionalisms. They are guided by common beliefs, identity and mutual trust among themselves. Finally, the rules most developed within civil horizontal networks by transformist civil groupings, which regulate a collective commitment, a common understanding and mutual trust, are labelled Grassroots Emancipatory Rules as shown in cell B2A3 of Table 7.3. During interaction in clustered popular debates, participants across the region abide by both partly codified and uncodified rules that consider the cultural diversity and level of literacy of all participants. In this regard, this typology is constructed based on the examination of these two dimensions, spaces provided by the SADC and self-organised civic spaces, combined with dependent variables, strategies, norms and rules.

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The discussion above demonstrates that these strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised spaces outside of the mainstream are considered, by many, to constitute alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions that are centred around and driven by aspirations of cross-border epistemic communities. More than that, findings demonstrate how these self-devised institutional arrangements build community, increase participation, promote diversity and strengthen the legitimacy and civic engagement, which are of paramount importance for people-centred regionalisms. In this regard, regionalism has become an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors.

 ypology of Southern African Civil Society T Interactions within Regionalisms The literature, discussions with respondents and the findings presented in the previous chapters of this book suggest that the way strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks during their interaction has informed a typology of how associations of cross-border non-state actors interact within regionalisms in the Southern African region. Based on the foregoing discussion of empirical findings, we can say that Southern African civil society networks interact within three spaces, in the quest for alternative regionalisms. In addition to what is presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 brings in the emergence of a new intermediate space of interaction created by reformist civil society, like SADC-CNGO. Table  7.4 presents a typology of Southern African civil society networks’ interaction in three settings of regionalism based on their strategies, norms and rules. It is constituted of both strategies, norms and rules, developed in civil institutional arrangements on the one hand, as shown in columns A1, A2 and A3, and regional interaction settings, including the spaces provided by the SADC, intermediate spaces and self-organised spaces on the other hand, as listed in rows B1, B2 and B3 respectively. Table 7.4 demonstrates that based on the different strategies, norms and rules that they developed, Southern

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Table 7.4  Typology of Southern African civil society networks interactions in regionalisms based on strategies, norms and rules Developed Civil Institutional Arrangements SACSNs within

A1 Strategies

Regional Interaction Settings Elitist collaboration/ B1 Informal bargaining SADC-provided spaces (SADC institutions) Cooperative/Rivalry B2 strategies Intermediate spaces (Reformist spaces) Confrontational/ B3 Grassroots Self-organised solidarity-building spaces (Transformist spaces)

A2 Norms

A3 Rules

Compliant norms

Dependent rules

Mobilising/ Compliant norms

Internalised/ Dependent rules

Contesting/ Mobilising norms

Emancipatory grassroots rules

Source: Authors

African civil society networks interact within three institutional settings instead of the two displayed in Table 7.3. The row B2 of Table 7.4 presents the intermediate or reformist spaces of interaction. This intermediate space is worth emphasising as not being SADC space but created by reformist Southern African civil society networks as an additional space to existing formal and self-organised spaces. Interestingly, cells B2A1, B2A2 and B2A3 demonstrate how Southern African civil society networks in intermediate spaces devise hybrid strategies, norms and rules. These constitute a combination of institutional arrangements devised in both formal settings and self-organised settings. For example, cell B2A1 shows hybrid strategies such as cooperative and rivalry strategies which are reproduced respectively in cells B1A1 and B3A1. Our findings, firstly, demonstrate that Southern African civil society networks collaborate with SADC elites through cooperative engagement

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within spaces created by the SADC called formal forums. Within this setting of interaction, ordinary citizens’ cross-border associations exhibit elitist collaboration, informal bargaining and compliant norms, including dependent rules, all as procedural mechanisms of their interaction within SADC institutions as indicated in cells B1A1, B1A2 and B1A3  in Table 7.4. Secondly, the literature on the typology of Southern African civil society interactions within regionalisms remains silent on the intermediate spaces of interaction created by reformist Southern African civil society networks, like the SADC-CNGO. These intermediate spaces of interaction exist between the two regional spaces of interaction, notably one created by the SADC called formal and another by civil society networks themselves known as informal or self-organised spaces. These intermediate spaces allow cross-border civil society associations that were granted limited access to formal settings of interaction, like the spaces created by the SADC, to express themselves freely within their own spaces, which they created. However, this still happens without civil society offending SADC elites, who become special guest speakers, neither infringing on the regulations provided by the MoU. In other words, these intermediate spaces still unite the two partners of formal forums whose talks seem to be relegated to a different institutional environment, like the Civil Society Forum and Gender Links Forum. The guests who were once invited to formal forums set the agenda and become organisers in the intermediate spaces. SADC elites are invited to speak in a collaborative manner in order to be acquainted with the aspirations of the regional citizenry and strengthen their working alliance with regional civil society organisations, like SADC-CNGO, for a cooperative engagement in SADC-created spaces. The Civil Society Forum is a good example of intermediate space between spaces created by the SADC and those by transformists like SAPSN. Southern African civil society networks, within these intermediate spaces of interaction, adopt a dual approach to procedural mechanisms. This entails cross-border civil associations exhibiting hybrid institutional arrangements guiding their interaction. These include cooperative with rivalry strategies, combined mobilising and compliant norms and internalised coupled with dependent rules in order to maintain their partnership feelings as indicated in cells B2A1, B2A2 and B2A3 in Table 7.4. There was a general view among respondents that

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Southern African civil society networks cooperate with SADC elites, but with rivalry within both formal and intermediate spaces as they are striving to maintain their alliance and at the same time lobbying for reforms by voicing their aspirations through decentring the negotiation spaces. Lastly, findings reveal that transformist Southern African civil society networks emerge out of contestation, challenging formal regionalism for inclusion within self-organised spaces outside of SADC. Within these transformist spaces, cross-border civil society agglomerations in the Southern region mobilise themselves to contest the SADC-established state-centric mode of governance and at the same time foster coalitions among themselves to combine forces in order to build alternative regionalisms outside the SADC mainstream. Within these self-organised spaces, civil society networks exhibit distinct institutional arrangements compared to formal and intermediate spaces. These include combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms and emancipatory grassroots rules as indicated in cells B3A1, B3A2 and B3A3 of Table 7.4. In the final analysis and based on the empirical findings, this typology was constructed using the three dimensions of interaction settings labelled as spaces provided by the SADC, intermediates spaces and self-organised spaces combined with different kinds of strategies, norms and rules as parameters of differentiating between various types of Southern African civil society interactions within the Southern African region in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

 rospects for Alternative Regionalism P and Regional Integration in the Southern African Region Alternative regionalism is associated with regionalism that is taking place in a multipolar world order, emerging as a spontaneous process, open and outward in character and involving multidimensional processes (Hettne et  al. 1999; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). Through the study of this people-centred approach to regionalism, we have found that beyond state-centred or conventional arrangements of building regions, there is

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another possibility of building regions through unconventional arrangements devised and promoted my non-state actors themselves, bearing in mind that alternative regionalism is an endeavour to specify unconventional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures involved in the making and re-making of regions across the globe (Icaza 2009). Therefore, thinking of the state-centric approach as a one-size-fits-­ all approach to regionalism is inadequate. Our analysis shows that if well-structured, strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised settings of interaction by non-state actors themselves can function just as well as the formal institutional arrangements in the quest for the formation of a South African region. This corroborates what Chandra (2009) points out, that alternative regionalism refers to institutional arrangements and systems that exist outside the traditional, established or mainstream system and institution. First of all, as indicated in this and the previous chapter, interaction within self-­ organised settings enables ordinary citizens across the Southern African region to fully participate in the political decision-making processes to form regions, from the setting of the agenda to the drafting of a collective declaration. In this regard, ordinary citizens own the agenda of meetings, guided by open and honest debates that are far from being manipulated or driven by the few and imposed on the many by outsiders, as is the case in the formal settings of interaction established by the SADC. Forms of discrimination seemed to be minimised in these self-organised spaces to the extent that all voices from diverse cultural, gender and educational backgrounds are represented, like during the SADC People’s Summit. As argued in this chapter, participation builds on a deep respect for plurality, tolerance, and dissent, and it also involves an ability to understand and appreciate differences (Samuel 2002). During clustered thematic groups, for example, ordinary citizens were encouraged to freely collaborate with their fellows by sharing lived experiences and opportunities that embody their respective countries, which are useful for collective decisions shaping their aspirations for the region’s integration. Mutual communication among ordinary citizens becomes enhanced within these new collaborative avenues. It should be remembered that participation is about developing mechanisms and approaches that encourage voices to be sounded and ensure that those voices will be

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heard and receive a response in region-building processes (Cornwall and Coelho 2004). To decentre the space of political decisions is seconded by what Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter (2006) label a paradigmatic shift from the top-down to the bottom-up where there is a relocation of the centre of political decisions to form regions. There was a general view among respondents that self-organised meetings enhance person-to-person integration through deployed solidarity- and coalition-­ building strategies, as indicated in preceding sections of this chapter. Active frontline regional citizenry become self-reliant and active agents in the formation processes of their regions rather than beneficiaries of political decisions made by the member states and technocrats. Secondly, our findings show how strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised networks embody substantial popular legitimacy and, of course, bearing in mind that legitimate institutions represent the voices, interests and values of countries and their citizens, as indicated in Chap. 1. Failing to cater to the needs of ordinary citizens across the region, SADC institutions have been described by Southern African civil society networks as having lost their legitimacy. Self-organised networks are deemed to gain more popular legitimacy as they are militating for the aspirations of the epistemic communities composing the networks. However, SADC elites claim to receive legitimacy from the votes of the people and criticise Southern African civil society networks for being illegitimate. Efforts deployed by cross-border non-state actors to build alternative regionalisms through their own self-organised spaces of interaction cannot be overlooked. But, there is a need for more attention by other peers and stakeholders involved in the formation of regions, including scholars and policy-makers in the field of contemporary regionalism. Against this backdrop, there is the possibility of having an alternative regionalism in the Southern African region.

Conclusion We identified the need to discuss the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks when they interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, in order to gauge the

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differences through a typology. A comparison of two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks within two distinct interaction settings has led us to constructing a descriptive typology. We have found that while interacting within SADC-­ created spaces, reformist cross-border civil society associations exhibit different strategies, norms and rules compared to those interacting within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream regional arrangements. Firstly, our findings reveal that Southern African civil society networks interacting within the SADC framework lobby for change through cooperative engagement with SADC elites, while Southern African civil society networks within self-organised settings build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through parallel activities in contestation with SADC elites for an alternative. Secondly, we have found that Southern African civil society networks in vertical interaction respect norms created by the SADC by conforming to the status quo, compared to those in horizontal networks that stand in contestation against the status quo established by the SADC through shared beliefs, common understanding and collective actions. Lastly, differentiating comparative analysis showed that in formal settings, Southern African civil society networks comply with legal frameworks provided by the SADC in the form of treaties, protocols and MoUs, which delineating responsibilities in the region. In self-organised interaction, however, Southern African civil society networks draw up fair and uncodified rules in line with grassroots circumstances. Succinctly, the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules include detracting from instead of complementing the state-­ centric order; ownership instead of compliance to agendas; expansive instead of constrictive norms; grassroots solidarity instead of elitist alliance; and the use of authentic grassroots approaches against white-collar bureaucracy. A descriptive typology of these kinds of institutional arrangements reveals that Southern African civil society networks exhibit elitist collaboration, informal bargaining strategies, compliant norms and dependent rules within spaces created by the SADC, while within self-­ organised civic spaces, the civil society networks devise combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms, and emancipatory grassroots rules.

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We also see that institutional arrangements developed by both transformist and reformist civil society networks in the Southern African region inform the construction of a descriptive typology of their interaction. Based on the differences between the strategies, norms and rules they developed, we thus built, in this chapter, a descriptive typology that demonstrates how Southern African civil society networks interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These comprise spaces created by the SADC, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society networks and self-organised spaces created by transformist civil groupings. We observed that these strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised spaces outside of the mainstream are considered by many to establish alternative avenues of collaboration for citizens to mobilise and fully participate in the formation of regions that are driven by the people themselves across the Southern African region. Thus, regionalism and regional integration can be viewed as an unconventional socio-economic phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. More than that, the findings in this chapter show that if well structured, informal institutions can function just like formal institutions in the formation of regions. This implies that there is another possibility to build regions for regional integration through unconventional mechanisms developed outside of the mainstream.

References Action Support Centre. (2016). Towards SADC People’s SUMMIT. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from https://www.asc.org.za/2016/09/27/towards-sadcpeoples-summit/. Borzel, T.  A., & Risse, T. (2016). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Chandra, A. C. (2009). Civil Society in Search of an Alternative Regionalism in ASEAN. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Coicaud, J. M. (2002). Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.

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Congo Forum. (2009). SADC Peoples’ Summit Declaration of 5–6 September 2009 Shaumba Center, Kinshasa, DRC. Retrieved May 2, 2020, from http:// www.congoforum.be/en/nieuwsdetail.asp?subitem=41&newsid=161416&A ctualiteit=selected. Cornwall, A., & Coelho, V. S. P. (2004). New Democratic Spaces? In Cornwall, A. & Coelho, V. S. P. (Eds.), IDS Bulletin, 35(2), 1–10. Dahl, R. A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven and London: Google Scholar. De Beer, F. (2012). Participation, Empowerment and Development. In C. Reagan (Ed.), 80:20 Development in an Equal World. 80:20 Educating and Acting for a Better World, Bray, Ireland (6th ed.). Pretoria: UNISA Press. Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L., & Reiter, H. (2006). Globalization from Below. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ditlhake. (2006, August 14–16). Lessons & Experiences from the 1st SADC CSO Forum. Keynote at Proceedings Report the Second SADC Civil Society Forum hosted by SATUCC. Maseru. Retrieved May 12, 2020, from https:// sarpn.org/documents/d0002190/2nd_SADC_Forum_Proceeding-­report_ Aug2006.pdf. Edwards, M. (2010). Organizational Transformation for Sustainability: An Integral Metatheory. New York: Routledge. Gaventa, J., & McGee, R. (2013). The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Development Policy Review, 31, s3–s28. Gender Links. (2016). Annual Report Gender Links for Quality and Justice. Retrieved May 12, 2020, from http://genderlinks.org.za/who-­we-­are/annual-­ reports/annual-­report-­2016/. Godsäter, A. (2013). Civil Society Regionalism in Southern Africa: The Cases of Trade and HIV/AIDS. Doctoral Dissertation in Peace and Development, School of Global Studies University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden. Godsäter, A. (2015). Civil Society and Regional Governance: Knowledge Production and Issue-Framing Around SADC. Journal of Civil Society, 11(1), 100–116. Godsäter, A., & Söderbaum, F. (2011). Civil Society in Regional Governance in Eastern and Southern Africa. In D. Armstrong et al. (Eds.), Civil Society and International Governance. New York: Routledge. Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2002, August 28–31). Informal Institutions and Comparative politics: A Research Agenda. Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Boston, MA. Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2000). Theorising the Rise of Regionness. New Political Economy, 5(3), 457–473.

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Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (1999/2001). The New Regionalism Series (Vol. IV, pp. 41–49). London: Macmillan Press. Icaza, R. (2009). Alternative Regionalisms and Civil Society: Setting a Research Agenda. Pensamiento Propio, 29(4), 1–7. Lis, L.M., (2011). Rethinking Legitimacy: Grassroots Climate Change Movements. Master of Arts Dissertation in Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Ncube, J. (2009). The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society in the Implementation of NEPAD. Presentation at the NEPAD Secretariat, AUC & UNECA Meeting, May 28–29, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. SADC-CNGO. (2012). A Hand Book on Engaging SADC Guide for Civil Society in Southern Africa. Gaborone: SADC-CNGO. SADC-CNGO. (2015, August 11–14). Together Making SADC Better: Achieving Justice, Peace & Equitable Development for All. 11th Southern African Civil Society Forum Statement. Gaborone. Retrieved April 17, 2020, from http://www.sadc-­cngo.org/images/news/11thcsf_declaration_14_ august2015_signed.pdf. Samuel, J. (2002). What is People-Centred Advocacy? PLA Notes, 43, 9–12. SAPSN. (2009). SADC Peoples’ Summit Declaration of 5–6 September 2009 at Shaumba Center in Kinshasa/DRCongo. SATUCC. (2013). Strategic Plan 2014–2018. Gaborone. Retrieved April 25, 2020, from http://www.satucc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/SATUCC_ STRATEGICPLAN_FINAL.pdf. Söderbaum, F. (2007). Regionalism and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa. New Political Economy, 12(3), 319–337. Steffek, J. (2014). The Democratic Output Legitimacy of International Organizations (No. SP IV 2014-101). WZB Discussion Paper. Williams, H. (1998). Property Reform and Legitimacy. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 28(2), 159–174. Young, O. R. (2002). Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions. In The Drama of the Commons, Vol(1) 263–291. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Ostrom, E, ...[et al], editors. National Research Council, Washington, DC: National Academic Press.

8 Towards a People-Centred Approach to Regionalism in Africa and Southern Africa

Introduction We started this book by providing a historical background on conventional approaches to regional integration in Africa and the SADC region in particular. We noted that, starting with the establishment of the OAU in 1963 by nationalists who were influenced by Pan-Africanist ideologies which were instituted by the pioneers of the African liberation struggle, to the AU in 2002 following a shift in the global political economy after the end of the cold war in 1989. Alongside these developments in the world, the OAU drafted and ratified the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community of 1991 or the Abuja Treaty. The Abuja Treaty essentially provides a template for the integration of the African continent following neoclassical integration theory in which regional integration is led by the state through its institutions in a top-down approach, if not Procrustean style. It is on this basis that regional economic communities on the continent provide a foundation for the African Economic Community (AEC), which is set for establishment in 2028. The neoliberal approach and road towards the AEC witnessed the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement in Kigali, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8_8

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Rwanda, in 2018. And in all this, respective member states of the AU and the markets reign supreme. If the establishment of the OAU was founded on a Pan-African identity, which identity can be expanded to include the involvement of all actors in inclusive development, then the continent seems to have encountered a problem along the way. This is precisely because the valorisation to the status of sanctity the conventional/neoliberal theories as a guide to regionalism and regional integration has marginalised non-state actors in world politics. In the context of regional integration, we see this as a call to inclusive regionalism in Africa as a whole and Southern Africa in particular, which some regional civil society organisations seem to have taken upon themselves to achieve.

 he Quest for Inclusive Regionalism T in Southern Africa It is in this context that in this book we have critiqued state-centric and top-down paradigms to regional integration in the SADC region, which have endorsed state actors and technocrats as dominant players in the formation of regions with a primacy to solely shape (formal) institutional arrangements and impose them on ordinary citizens (Chap. 3). This is because state-centredness and neorealist approaches to regional integration have been perceived by many as conventional modes of building regions in various regional economic communities (RECs), like the SADC. In our critique, we have suggested moving beyond top-down and state-centred paradigms dominating the research field of regionalism and regional integration in order to understand that region-building processes are much more than state-driven and/or market-led and formal phenomena. We did so by locating the theoretical locus of the book around the notion of New Institutionalism (Chap. 4), in an attempt to provide a theoretical framework around the debates in the study of people-­centred approaches to regionalism and regional integration. By deploying the lenses of New Institutionalism, it was possible to theoretically frame how people in self-organised institutions were proficient in forming regions. The overall idea was to demonstrate how informal

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institutions, strategies, norms and rules employed by the regional citizenry, could contribute to the construction of an alternative regionalism promoted by the people themselves. This is why we argued in Chap. 4 and demonstrated in Chap. 7 that if well-designed, there are other institutional mechanisms devised outside the state and/or its institutional settings by non-state actors that may equally work or function like those established by state actors only. In other words, regions can also be built from below through the construction of strategies, norms and rules by non-state actors. In addition to New Institutionalism, we also utilised the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) as evidence of unconventional processes in the formation of regions (Chap. 4). The NRA is associated with the move from the state-­ led and bipolar old regionalism to a new form of regionalism taking place in a multipolar world order, and emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character, and involves multidimensional processes and a wide variety of state and non-state actors. Therefore, the deployment of New Institutionalism and the NRA provided a context of understanding how, in this book we have utilised hybrid forms of the New Institutionalist lens to focus on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society associations in the SADC region while interacting within both SADC institutional settings and self-­ organised horizontal networks outside of the mainstream. In this way we amplified the attempts made by New Institutionalist scholars to understand how non-state institutions work and are paramount for an inclusive regionalism that allows civil society actors to be not only important, but also independent active agents in their own right in the formation of regions (Chaps. 4 and 7). I doing all this, our quest was for inclusive regionalism in Africa and Southern Africa.

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Interactions Involving Southern African Civil Society Networks within and outside SADC Regulatory Regimes In order to fully grasp, through the lenses of New Institutionalism and NRA, how civil society networks actually contribute to the formation of regions, there was a need to demonstrate how they operated in interfaces led by the SADC (Chap. 5). This was deemed important so as to demonstrate the strategies, norms and rules employed by civil society networks and how the processes led by the SADC were state-led, which led to regional civil society networks organising and interacting outside and in contestation of the SADC frameworks (Chaps. 6 and 7). We comment on these issues in following parts. First, in Chap. 5, we examined the formal interface of regulatory regimes established by the SADC within which Southern African civil society networks interact in the quest for alternative regionalisms. Apart from the SADC Treaty, formal settings of interaction include the Regional Thematic Meetings of Ministers or Senior Officials, Statutory Meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of the Ministers and the Heads of State Summit. Additionally, themes were discussed that showed how SADC constituted an impermeable and shrinking space for civil society organisations characterised by a state-centric and top-down model of regional integration. These included the influence of national political regimes on patterns of interaction at a regional level; the fact that only non-political sectors were tolerated for civic engagement; and the rivalry between SADC elites and regional civil society networks during interaction. More than that, we demonstrated that despite its legal provision and regulatory framework for civil interaction in region-building projects, the SADC has difficulty allowing regional citizenry through their respective organisations to openly interact in the political decisions to form regions. Instead, SADC elites embark on a blame game to justify the non-inclusion approach in the SADC’s mode of governance. Consequently, regional civil society organisations in the region lost confidence in SADC elites, leading to the institutional legitimacy deficit of the SADC. As a result, we concluded by illuminating

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the point that normatively SADC has a strong framework encouraging the involvement of civil society, but operationalisation is still problematic among stakeholders. Second, Chap. 6 analysed how people-centred approaches to regionalism have become an alternative to the conventional mode of building regions in the SADC. After an understanding of the formation of regional networks, the chapter identified other opportunities leading to the formation of regional civil society networks in the SADC region. But, in the main, the chapter was devoted to a discussion of key findings from fieldwork on the institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interaction vis-à-vis regionalism. This essentially focused on identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks (SACSNs) interacting within self-organised interactions, like the Civil Society Forum, and the SADC People’s Summit. On the basis of this, we argued that, despite being informal, strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regionalism constellations are also as crucial as state-led formal institutions, capable not only of influencing but forming regions outside of the formal mainstream. In such a discussion, we revealed the two sets of strategies, norms and rules exhibited by Southern African civil society networks in two distinct institutional settings of interaction, which were discussed in-depth in Chap. 7.

 ypology of Institutional Arrangements T of Civil Society Networks in Southern Africa To carry forward the discussion from Chaps. 5 and 6, Chap. 7 compared the two kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks in two distinct institutional settings of interaction: that is, SADC spaces of interaction and self-organised networks/spaces of interaction. Through a differentiating comparative analysis, in Chap. 7, we compared the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks within these two distinct interaction settings and then went on to build a descriptive

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typology of the institutional arrangements. We argued that, while interacting within spaces created by the SADC, reformist cross-border civil society associations exhibit different strategies, norms and rules compared to those that interact within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. Firstly, we highlighted that Southern African civil society networks interacting within the SADC framework lobby for change through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. However, Southern African civil society networks within self-organised settings build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through parallel activities in opposition with SADC elites for an alternative. Secondly, it was revealed in Chap. 7 that Southern African civil society networks in vertical interaction respect norms created by the SADC by conforming to the status quo, compared to those in horizontal networks that stand in opposition and contestation to the status quo established by the SADC by sharing beliefs, holding a common understanding and collective actions. Thirdly, through the differentiating comparative analysis, we revealed that in formal settings Southern African civil society networks comply with the legal framework provided by the SADC in the form of the SADC Treaty, Protocols and MoUs that delineate responsibilities. Consequently, regional civil society networks interacting within formal regionalism exhibit complementing strategies, norms and rules which are assimilative to the status quo established by the state and do not infringe on the spirit and letter of the MoU.  These institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks within spaces created by the state are centred around building elitist alliances in order to deter their exclusion from attending formal forums. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty allows full involvement of ordinary citizens of the region to participate in decision-making processes that advance regional integration. Yet this legal framework of a joint space of governance has not been fully operationalised. This is despite the existence of institutions of interaction established by the SADC like the SADC Secretariat, the SADC National Committees, the SADC Parliamentarian Forum, the SADC regional policy dialogues, and the Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit. In order to answer the regional donor demands to include civil society within its activities, SADC, being a highly donor-dependent institution, seems to have had no choice but to include a few regional

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civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, Gender Links, and FOCCISA. It has signed an MoU with some of these, steering their mutual working relationship and partnership at the early stage of regional decision-making processes. On that note, these recognised regional civil society networks within spaces of interaction established by the SADC have become more concerned with how to lobby as insiders without contesting the spirit and letter of the MoU for fear of being excluded from vertical interaction. On that note, some Southern African civil society networks like the SADC-CNGO and SATUCC develop strategies, norms and rules that help to maintain the status quo while interacting within spaces provided by the SADC on a consultative and partnership basis as stipulated in the MoU that they sign with the regional organisation. As a result, such Southern African civil society networks have developed the following institutional arrangements: collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement, quiet diplomacy through informal bargaining behind the scenes, and submission of a collective declaration to the SADC Heads of State Summits, conforming to the existing SADC status quo through respect of the precedence, concomitantly reinforcing formal norms. The result is that the norms developed by such civil society networks are influential but not enforceable, submitting to the legal framework of engagement provided by the SADC and preventing a radical and aggressive attitude during formal engagements with the regional body. In this book, we have used the example of the SADC-CNGO and SATUCC as constituting striking examples of civil society networks that use cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes to lobby for reform inside the interactive framework provided by the SADC to cooperatively engage with SADC elites through respect of precedence during the development and adoption of regional protocols and programmes. Examples of protocols developed in this manner include the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People, the SADC Employment Protocol, the SADC Social Security Code, and the SADC Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment. More than that, the NGO called Gender Links, through the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance, was shown to have collaborated and cooperated with the SADC Gender Unit within the SADC Secretariat in 2016 for the development of the Monitoring, Evaluation

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and Results framework for the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SATUCC 2015). As a further example, despite being excluded from many SADC policy-making forums, in 2008 SADC-­ CNGO managed to influence the launch of the SADC Free Trade Area by exhorting SADC member states to improve the implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol (Pressend 2010; Godsäter 2015). However, these strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society associations within formal institutional settings were criticised by many respondents in the research that we conducted for not encouraging active participation of regional epistemic communities in regional policy-­ making processes. For this reason, it has been argued that SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, among others, interacting within formal SADC forums were viewed as rubber stamps or legitimising the SADC state-centric model of regional governance to the detriment of ordinary citizens. These strategies, norms and rules were also characterised as reformist to the extent that the Southern African civil society networks that operated within the formal institutional settings went into begging mode, rather than bargaining within SADC forums in order to convince SADC elites to align their decisions with the pressing issues threatening the well-being of the regional citizenry. Thus, the elitist alliance-seeking becomes one of the strategies within formal interaction in order to gain the elites’ trust for informal bargaining behind the scenes. It has been found that these simulative strategies, norms and rules developed within formal institutional settings were different compared to those exhibited in self-­organised networks, which are confrontational towards SADC institutions. Thus, in self-organised interaction, Southern African civil society networks draw up fair and uncodified rules in line with circumstances at the grassroots. In this regard, the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules include detracting from instead of complementing state-­ centric order, ownership instead of compliance to the agenda set up by the status quo, expansive instead of constrictive norms, grassroots solidarity instead of an elitist alliance, and authentic grassroots approach against white-collar bureaucracy. In other words, given the lack of operationalisation of the SADC Treaty and protocols aimed at including regional citizenry in the decision-making processes to form regions, discontented civil society networks group themselves up through

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self-organised initiatives. Building on Young’s typology of institutional interaction, we viewed these self-organised civil society groupings as horizontal interactions. These horizontal networks entailed deliberate interactions among institutions at the same level of social organisation, like ordinary citizens, for collective goals (Young 2002). This essentially means that cross-border epistemic communities in the Southern Africa region (like the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People’s Summit) that are excluded from formal institutional settings and interactions undertake parallel activities outside of SADC settings in order to voice their aspirations and at the same time demand inclusivity in the civic spaces created by the SADC. Thus, through the People’s Summit, SAPSN exhibits the following: confronting SADC elites with transnational citizenship and submission of a collective communiqué; building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among the regional citizenry; using capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance the popular critical consciousness; contestation of the existing SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People’s Summit; calling for full operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty; selection of participants to the People’s Summit through national contact points; and sharing commitments using uncodified rules and culture. Based on the typology of institutions built by Helmke and Levitsky (2002), competing informal institutions emerge in the case of weak formal institutions and antagonistic objectives. Helmke and Levitsky (2002) allude to the fact that these institutions shape incentives of actors to be incompatible with the formal rules under the principle that to follow one rule, actors must violate another (Lekovic 2011). Southern African civil society networks within self-­ organised settings exercise citizenship through parallel activities on the margins of the SADC Heads of State Summits in order to contest the state-centred mode of regional governance, which is criticised for being neoliberalist and exclusive. There was a general view among respondents during the fieldwork research exercise conducted for this book that the institutional arrangements developed within these self-organised settings foster, to some extent, active participation of ordinary cross-border citizens in political

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projects to form the Southern African region. For example, the clustered thematic groups of the SADC People’s Tribunal held during the SADC People’s Summit allows survivors of human rights abuses and the recklessness of multinationals in the member countries of the SADC to testify in front of their fellow participants who team up in search of social justice. More than that, ordinary cross-border citizens express themselves freely on common pressing issues and opportunities characterising the SADC region considered as drivers of coalitions and solidarity-building. There was an observation during fieldwork that Southern African citizens have culturally and economically been integrated, sharing lived experiences and developed partnerships for trade and other socio-economic endeavours within self-organised networks. However, there were accusations particularly by the SADC that these cross-border civil society associations were fund hunters and donor-driven, exclusive to and led by small teams of elites that claim to represent the aspirations of the entire regional citizenry. But, in this book, we assert that transformist Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, interacting within self-­ organised networks, devise contesting strategies, confrontational norms and authentic grassroots approaches in order to build an alternative regionalism that is more inclusive and driven by ordinary citizens themselves. The above findings demonstrate that if well-structured, self-organised regionalisms can function just as well as formal regionalisms with equal standing. Back to the issue of remarkable differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they developed, the chapter built a descriptive typology demonstrating how Southern African civil society networks interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These include spaces created by the SADC, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society networks, and self-organised spaces created by transformist civil society groupings.

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 egionalism and Regional Integration R as Unconventional Socio-Political Phenomena This book has dealt with the strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interactions in regionalisms in order to build an alternative to the prevailing conventional form of regional integration. The general idea was to develop a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalisms based on a comparison of the institutional arrangements they have developed. Hence, the focus was on understanding the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks like the SADC-­ CNGO and SAPSN when they are respectively interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. The overall argument of the book was that regionalism and regional integration can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-­ state actors. The argument draws on the question we asked at the outset, namely, what kinds of strategies, norms and rules do regional civil society networks develop in their quest for alternative regionalisms? To answer the question and meet the objective of the book, we then set out on a review of and building on the existing literature on civil society regionalisms, followed by the collection of empirical data through semi-­structured interviews, participant observation and focus group discussions in selected countries in the Southern African region. A differentiating comparative approach revealed that regional civil society networks that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism exhibit different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation in opposition to formal regionalism. Following the empirical findings, this book proposed a conceptual expansion of regionalism that not only does understand non-state actors as dependent units of formal regional organisations but considers the actors in their own right. In all this our main argument is that scholarly analysis of regionalism puts more emphasis on states and markets as the main actors. Consequently, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their capability to promote alternative regionalism have been minimised. However, with the emergence of new players and a shift from

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bipolar to multipolar centres of regional decisions as the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the expansion of the focus of analysis in new regionalism came to the fore with the inclusion of non-state actors (Hettne et al. 1999; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Zajontz and Leysens 2015; Scholte 2014). New regionalism became conceptualised as an impetus to governance through civil society associations, strengthened by a dependence on non-state actors to deliver and drive policy, compared to state-led development strategies (Grugel 2004). Consequently, civil society networks become crucial and active agents in the development processes in the EU, ASEAN, Mercosur, AU, ECOWAS, EAC and SADC (Söderbaum 2007; Tussie and Botto 2002), among other regions. Despite the explosion of new regionalism throughout the world, the role of civil society and how they interact within various institutional settings remain ignored by scholars and mainly by politicians, government elites and policymakers. More than that, those few scholars from the new regionalism paradigm who attempt to include non-state actors in their conceptual analysis do not extensively expand on how non-state actors cannot just be actors among other partners in the processes of region formation, but they can also stand in their own right without necessarily being accompanied by states and markets as stakeholders with equal standing. In this sense this book, firstly, contributes to the existing literature on contemporary regionalism debates by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. This thus represents a theoretical contribution to the study of regionalism vis-à-vis non-state actors or civil society. The SADC People’s Summit, the Civil Society Forum, Gender Links Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, are in this respect, consummate examples of how ordinary citizens across the Southern African region are also important active actors capable of mobilising themselves through both citizenship exercises and intellectual endeavours in order to influence and/or shape the regional order for an alternative. Scholars focusing on the intensification of civil society influence in global governance agree that non-state actors are capable of filling a democratic deficit that has long plagued international institutions (Fogarty 2013; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Scholte 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013; Godsäter 2015). This book established how Southern African civil society networks

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like SADC-CNGO, SAPSN, SATUCC, to name a few, chose to fight, at different fronts of advocacy, against the democratic deficit manifested throughout the exclusion and restriction of civic spaces featuring the state-centric mode of SADC regional governance. Secondly and through an analysis of people-centred approaches to regionalism, this book also attempts to demonstrate empirically how regions can be constructed by non-state actors themselves outside the state-centric paradigm. Non-state actors across the Southern African region prefer to network among themselves within self-organised institutional settings, platforms and forums where they have the freedom to build coalitions and express themselves freely by sharing opportunities and lived experiences useful for their well-being. This book contributes to the contemporary regionalism debate by providing an important understanding of different kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society associations within two distinct institutional settings of interaction. We have demonstrated that Southern African civil society networks through their parallel activities, namely building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among regional citizenry, use of capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance the popular critical consciousness, to name a few, have managed to build the SADC region from below in a way that is centred around and driven by cross-border ordinary citizens themselves. At the same time, these civil society links across the region contest, in a meaningful manner, the existing SADC state-centred status quo through contestation and internalised norms, participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the SADC People’s Summits and calling for full operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty (in which the SADC commits to cooperating with, involving and supporting the initiatives of NGOs and the people of the region in processes of regional integration) for alternative agendas. We have shown how the procedural mechanisms developed by non-state actor associations, in their own right, are capable of building regions beyond the state-centric paradigm. Thirdly, we have empirically contributed to the literature on alternative regionalisms with institutional typologies of different kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks and how they

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have shaped their interactions in regionalisms. These typologies can provide a useful point of reference to other similar studies in relation to unconventional institutions developed by non-state actors for the construction of regional alternatives at both national and regional levels of society. By these means, we have shown that regional civil society networks interacting in institutional and interaction spaces created by SADC exhibit different institutional arrangements compared to those in self-­ organised networks. These differences between kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, respectively, included cooperative versus contesting engagement strategies, complementing instead of detracting from the state-centric order, compliance to instead of ownership of the agenda, constrictive instead of expansive norms, elitist alliance instead of grassroots solidarity, and white-collar bureaucracy versus an authentic grassroots approach. More than that, the descriptive typology we developed revealed that within spaces created by the SADC, reformist civil society networks exhibit elitist collaboration and informal bargaining strategies, compliant norms and dependent rules. But, within self-organised civic spaces, transformist civil society networks devised combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms and emancipatory grassroots rules. Given the remarkable difference between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they devise, the contribution of this book constitutes a descriptive typology that demonstrates how regional civil society networks interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These include spaces created by the SADC, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society groupings and self-organised spaces created by transformist civil society networks. These institutional typologies of the institutional arrangements of civil society networks demonstrate that if well-structured, informal institutions can function just like formal institutions and achieve the same objectives as formal institutions at all levels of society. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the challenges encountered by Southern African civil society networks during their interactions within both institutions led by the SADC and self-organised networks among themselves. These include a lack of funds to conduct proper mobilisation within the region and undertake the activities deemed important to achieve their

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assigned goals. This lack of self-funded mechanisms has been a great impediment to the credibility of the Southern African civil society networks, causing SADC elites to accuse them of being donor-driven and agents of the West deployed to instigate political regime change in the region (Söderbaum 2007; Zajontz and Leysens 2015; Godsäter 2014, 2015). In addition, cross-border civil society associations have been criticised by SADC elites for not being equipped with the necessary expertise and skills in technical matters to transform the region instead of claiming more political participation. Moreover, regional donors have allegedly criticised Southern African civil society networks for not being inclusive themselves, even though they give lessons in inclusivity to SADC elites (Söderbaum 2007; Zajontz and Leysens 2015; Godsäter 2014, 2015).

 lternative Regionalism and the Limits A of State-Centric and Market-Driven Explanations of Regionalisms Alternative regionalisms remain an attempt to specify non-traditional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, structures, processes and agents involved in the making and re-making of regions across the world from below, outside of the state-centric paradigm. Given that alternative regionalisms seek to highlight that different paradigms inform physical-­ geographical, political economic and/or ideational regional constructs, in so doing they also expose key limitations of state-centric and market-­ driven explanations of regionalisms that could be addressed and contested. More than that, alternative regionalism is associated with the move from the old regionalism to the new regionalism, where regionalism now takes place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character and involves multidimensional processes and actors. Building alternative regionalisms in the Southern African region encompasses transcending the existing state-led SADC model of regional governance by building regions with institutional mechanisms driven by civil society themselves. Different kinds of strategies, norms and rules

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developed by cross-border civil society associations within both formal and self-organised institutional settings and networks are as important as formal approaches in the formation of regions. Civil society networks within self-organised regionalisms are capable of fostering inclusion and full participation with voices of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes to build regions from below, outside of the mainstream. In this regard, regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. If well-­ governed, regional civil society networks, as self-organised regionalisms, can also function equally well as formal regionalisms that are driven by state actors and technocrats. However, there is still a long way to go as Southern African civil society networks are still mired in a myriad of challenges before they can fully function in their own right as regions. This provides an opportunity for scholars and policymakers, SADC elites, donors, and civil society actors to expand the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. Political decisions to form regions should consider informal institutions developed by non-state actors that are useful in influencing or shaping world regions. SADC needs to fully establish democratic principles and actually operationalise Article 23 of its treaty to avoid any ambiguity in its initiated joint mode of regional governance. In other words, SADC should consider non-state actors, not only as service delivery or monitoring and evaluating agents, but more so as important evidence-based knowledge brokers, contributors and stakeholders with equal rights, by allowing them access at all stages of the decision-making processes in the formation of the region. This means that, SADC should accelerate the adoption of the proposed SADC Mechanisms for Engagement with Non-State Actors1 for equal treatment among stakeholders. SADC should ensure that shared norms are truly implemented on the ground through this mechanism to advance fair inclusion and equal treatment among stakeholders. Likewise, donors to the region should play a fair game in terms of collaboration and information exchange with civil society associations across the region by  Kasambala, T., & Zakeyo, M. (2014). Draft Proposal on SADC Mechanisms for Engagement with Non-State Actors. Johannesburg, South Africa: Southern Africa Trust. 1

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considering them important key players in regionalisms with equal standing with states and markets. The donors should continue to push for the adoption of the proposed mechanism, where civil societies should be on the same page as businesses or technocrats. Further, donors should avoid political manipulation of regional institutions but pay attention to their diversity and heterogeneity. The issue of donors requires further research in terms of analysing how regional donors promote civic engagement in SADC institutions. Being donor-dependent, SADC and civil society are forced to respond to donors’ demands by coexisting despite rivalry among them. It would be interesting to establish who owns the narrative of regionalism and regional integration in Southern Africa and for whose interests. Further research is also needed to find out what could be the formal and informal strategies employed by regional donors to convince SADC elites to allow civil participation in SADC decision-making processes, knowing that the civic space in the SADC region seems to be shrinking. In this vein, there is a need to research how to free civil society citizenship in Africa from long-held and traditional conceptualisations and prescriptions that civil society citizenship can only be considered to be such if it conforms to certain established standards that are largely brought in from outside of Africa. It is the regional citizenry of, or the people at the grassroots in, Southern Africa themselves who should speak and voice out their aspirations to be whom they want to be and to create the SADC they really want. In this vein, the regional civil society networks too should strive for inclusivity by discouraging any discriminatory attempts in order to preach by example. More than that, civil society should build more coalitions with other non-state actors and organisations around the world for more global awareness and visibility. But, in all this, it is evident that alternative regionalism is efficacious and this exposes and lays bare the limits of state-­ centric and market-driven approaches to and explanations of regionalisms in the contemporaneity of this multipolar world.

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References Fogarty, E. (2013). States, Nonstate Actors, and Global Governance: Projecting Polities. London/New York: Routledge. Godsäter, A. (2014). Regionalization “From Below” in southern Africa: The Role of Civil Society in Regional Trade and HIV/AIDS Policy Making. Civil Society and World Regions: How citizens are Reshaping Regional Governance in Times of Crisis. Maryland, Lexington Books. Godsäter, A. (2015). Civil Society and Regional Governance: Knowledge Production and Issue- Framing Around SADC. Journal of Civil Society, 11(1), 100–116. Grugel, J. (2004). New Regionalism and Modes of Governance—Comparing US and EU Strategies in Latin America. European Journal of International Relations, 10(4), 603–626. Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2002, August 28–31). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Boston, MA. Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (1999/2001). The New Regionalism Series (Vol. IV, pp. 41–49). London: Macmillan Press. Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2000). Theorising the Rise of Regionness. New Political Economy, 5(3), 457–473. Jönsson, C., & Tallberg, J. (Eds.). (2010). Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations and Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lekovic, V. (2011). Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions–Impact on Economic Success. Economics and Organization, 8(4), 357–370. Pressend, M. (2010). 30 Years of the Southern African Development Community: What’s to Celebrate? The South African Civil Society Information Service. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/536.1 SATUCC. (2015). SATUCC Campaign towards the Ratification of Protocol on Employment and Labour. Retrieved May 25, 2020, from http://www.satucc. org/wp-­content/uploads/2013/12/satucc-­brochure-­2015.pdf. Scholte, J. A. (Ed.). (2011). Building Global Democracy: CIVIL Society and Accountable Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scholte, J.  A. (2014). Reinventing Global Democracy. European Journal of International Relations, 20(1), 3–28. Söderbaum, F. (2007). Regionalism and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa. New Political Economy, 12(3), 319–337.

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Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., & Jönsson, C. (2013). The Opening Up of International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tussie, D. and M. Botto (2002) ‘La agenda del ALCA: patrones nacionales y tendencias regionales’, in Anuario Social y Politico de America Latina y el Caribe 2002, pp. 73–83. Buenos Aires: Nueva Sociedad and FLACSO. Young, O. (2002). Institutional interplay: The environmental consequences of cross-scale linkages. In T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom, P. Stern, S. Stonich, & E. Weber (Eds.), The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: NAS Press. Zajontz, T., & Leysens, A. (2015). Civil Society in Southern Africa-Transformers from Below? Journal of Southern African Studies, 41(4), 887–904.

Index1

A

Abide by uncodified rules and culture of belonging, 209 Abuja Treaty of 1991, 237 Accommodating informal institutions, 85 Africa, 33–44, 47–67 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 56, 57, 237 African Economic Community (AEC), 36–39, 44 African Union (AU), 49, 52, 56, 57, 60, 66 Alternative Information Development Centre (AIDC), 157–159, 169, 171, 184 Alternative Mining Indaba, 159, 185, 190, 248

Alternative regionalism, 1–25, 50–52, 57, 65, 66, 153–156, 159–161, 184, 191, 194, 210–213, 239, 240, 246, 247, 249–253 Apex alliance partners, 160 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 38 Article 23 of SADC Treaty and Protocols, 118, 121, 135, 142, 144, 145 Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, 242, 245, 249 ASEAN Coalition of Civil Society, 156 Authentic grassroots approach, 219, 232 Authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes, 144

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 L. M. Tshimpaka et al., Regional Economic Communities and Integration in Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9388-8

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258 Index B

Behaviouralists, 87, 88 Boomerang effect, 156 Building regional solidarity and networks, 200 Building solidarity and coalition, 186–187 C

Calling for full operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, 190–191, 209 Civil mobilisation function, 102 Civil society, 77, 78, 80–82, 84, 85, 94, 96–105 Civil Society Forum (CSF), 119, 129, 159–169, 172, 173, 177, 179–182, 184, 185, 190, 192, 241, 245, 248 Civil society networks, 48, 58, 65, 66, 81, 84–87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 98–100, 102–105 Civil society organisation, 1–25, 57, 66 Collaboration with SADC elites, 177–178, 180, 201, 206, 220 Collective action sanctioned, 200 Collective attitude, 200, 216 Collective commitment, 192–193, 209, 211, 225 Collective people’s declaration, 200 Combined mobilising and compliant norms, 228 Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), 38 Communauté des Etats Sahelo-­ Sahariens (CEN-SAD), 38 Communauté economque des Etat de L’Afrique Centale (CEEAC), 38

Competing informal institutions, 85 Competing with the existing status quo, 200 Complementary informal institutions, 85 Concomitantly reinforcing formal norms, 180 Conforming to the existing SADC status quo, 180–181, 223 Conformist civil society organisations, 140 Confrontational approach, 158 Confrontational strategies, 225, 229, 232 Confronting SADC elites, 185–186, 215 Consensual mode of decision-­ making, 143 Consolidated democratic regimes, 137 Contestation of the SADC status quo, 201, 211 Contesting and mobilising norms, 225, 229, 232 Contesting vs. complementing state-centric order, 215 Conventional approaches to regional integration, 49, 66, 67, 237 Conventional regionalism, 3–5 Cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, 204, 205 Cooperative engagement, 177–178, 180, 182, 203, 205, 206, 212, 213, 215, 220, 224, 227, 228, 232 Cooperative with rivalry strategies, 227, 228 Council of the Ministers, 240, 242

 Index 

259

D

H

Decentre the space of political decisions, 231 Defective democratic regimes, 137 Differentiating comparative analysis, 214, 232, 241, 242 Discursive Institutionalism, 93–94

Heads of State Summit, 240, 242, 243, 245 Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA), 156 Historical background, 237 Historical Institutionalism, 91–95 Horizontal interaction, 84 Horizontal networks, 239, 242, 245 Hybrid form of New Institutionalism, 94–96

E

East African Community (EAC), 38 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 38 Elitist alliance-seeking, 244 Elitist collaboration, 224, 228, 232 Emancipatory grassroots rules, 229, 232 Enhance popular critical consciousness, 187–188 Evidence-based knowledge, 252 Expansive vs. constricting norms, 217 F

Features of institution, 81 Formal institutional setting, 244, 245 Formal institutions, 77, 80–90, 97, 105, 241, 245, 250 Friendship-building with SADC elites behind the scenes, 200 G

Gender Links Forum, 248 Grassroots-oriented social movement, 157 Grassroots solidarity-building strategies, 225, 229, 232 Grassroots solidarity vs. elitist alliance, 214, 218

I

Identification of participants to the People’s Summit, 191–192 Including dependent rules, 228 Inclusive and flexible debates, 200 Inclusive regionalism, 5–6, 238–239 Influential but unenforceable civil society norms, 182 Informal bargaining and compliant norms, 228 Informal bargaining behind the scenes, 177, 178, 201, 212, 224 Informal institutions, 77, 78, 80–86, 88, 89, 92, 95, 105, 238–239, 245, 250, 252 Institutional arrangements, 199–233 Institutional interaction, 83–86 Institutional settings/environments, 199, 201, 203, 204, 206, 208, 214, 223–228 Institutional typologies, 249, 250 Institutions, 77–96, 101–103, 105 Integrating from below, 96–98 Integration, 47–67 Intergovernmental, 49, 53, 59, 62

260 Index

Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), 38 Internalised coupled with dependent rules, 228 Internalising norms in contestation with existing SADC status quo, 189 International Political Economy (IPE), 47 International Relations (IR), 47 Invoking alternative norms, 180 Issue Framer and Agenda-setting Function, 103–104 J

Joint regional governance, 97 Joint space of governance, 242 K

Knowledge production function, 100, 102–103 L

Legitimacy, 210, 212, 220–223, 226, 231 Legitimator civil society, 100–102 Legitimises the existing status quo, 200 Level of access, 132, 134 Logistics for hosting the Civil Society Forum, 162–163 M

Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), 157, 171 Manipulator civil society organisations, 140

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 155 Multidimensionality of regionalism, 96 Multipurpose regional networks, 117, 118 Mutual communication, 230 N

National political regimes, 155, 240 Neoliberal economic order, 155 Networks, 115–145 Networks of Civil Society Organisations, 1–25 New Institutionalism, 6–11, 23, 77–105, 238–240 New regionalism, 50, 51, 58, 248, 251 New Regionalism Approach (NRA), 6–11, 23, 77–105, 239, 240 Non-state actors, 48, 49, 54, 57, 58, 64, 65, 67 Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 192 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 192 O

Old Institutionalism, 78, 80, 87–89 Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), 192 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 35–39 Organising the SADC People’s Summit, 171 Ownership of debates, 200, 216 Ownership vs. compliance to agenda, 216

 Index  P

Participation, 200, 201, 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 217, 220–221, 226, 230 Participation in self-regulated cluster meetings, 190, 201 Partner civil society, 100–102 People centred approaches to regional integration, 153–194 People-centred approach to regionalism, 237–253 Political institutions, 77, 79, 87, 89, 92, 95, 98 Political regime type, 132, 136–139 Preparation for hosting the Civil Society Forum, 162–163 Programme of the Civil Society Forum, 166–168 Prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes, 183, 201, 209 Protocols, 56, 57, 60–64 Q

261

Reformist civil society networks, 85, 203, 221, 224, 225, 233 Regional check and balance mechanisms, 143 Regional civil society networks (RCSNs), 87, 99, 104, 115–119, 121–124, 126, 128–135, 137, 140–142, 144, 153, 154, 156–160, 163, 193 Regional Coordinating Committee, 157 Regional donors, 242, 251, 253 Regional Economic Communities (RECs), 38, 39, 43, 44 Regional economic integration, 3–5 Regional integration, 1–25, 33–44, 201, 208, 229–231, 233 Regional networks, 116, 116n1, 117 Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, 119, 144 Respect of the precedence, 180, 221 Rivalry, 132, 141–142

Quiet diplomacy, 178–179 S R

Range of access, 132, 134 Rational choice institutionalism, 91–94 Rational choice theorists, 87–89 Rationalist approaches to regionalism, 78 Reclaiming SADC for the Citizens, 158 Reflectivist approaches to regionalism, 78

SADC-CNGO associate members, 131 SADC-CNGO full members, 131 SADC Council of Non-­ Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), 118–120, 122, 123, 126, 128–131, 137, 143, 155, 157–168, 176–182, 184, 193, 200, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213, 215, 218, 224, 226, 228, 243, 244, 247, 249, 250

262 Index

SADC Council of the Ministers and Troika, 121, 124, 144 SADC-created spaces, 221, 228, 232, 245, 246, 250 SADC Heads of State Summit, 119, 121, 129, 133, 134, 144 SADC institutional legitimacy, 142–144 SADC institutional permeability, 131, 132, 134 SADC institutions, 118, 121–124, 128, 130, 132, 134, 137, 139–141, 144 SADC interface, 115–145 SADC National Committees (SNC), 121, 124–127, 132, 134, 138, 141, 144, 242 SADC National Contact Points (SNCP), 121, 124–127, 144 SADC Parliament Forum (SADC-PF), 119, 121, 127–128, 143, 144, 242 SADC People’s Summit, 158, 207–209, 211, 213, 215–219, 221, 222, 225, 230, 241, 245, 246, 248, 249 SADC People’s Summit Programme, 173–175 SADC People’s Tribunal, 207, 211 SADC regional policy dialogues, 119, 144, 240, 242 SADC Secretariat, 119, 121–126, 129, 133, 135, 137, 139, 144, 240, 242, 243 SADC Tribunal, 135, 143 The SADC We Want, 159, 168 SAPSN General Assembly, 170 SAPSN National Contact Points, 170

SAPSN Secretariat, 157, 158, 173, 175, 191 Sectors tolerated by SADC, 139–141 Selective and more bureaucratic debates, 200 Self-organised regionalisms, 154, 156–159, 184, 193, 246, 247, 252 Self-organised settings, 242, 245 Service delivery function, 100, 101 Shared communiqué, 200 Sharing lived experiences and aspirations, 186–187 Shrinking civic space, 134, 138, 139, 253 Single-purpose regional networks, 117 Sociological Institutionalism, 91, 92, 94 Southern Africa, 1–25, 33–44, 47–67 Southern African civil society networks (SACSN), 199–233 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 1–9, 11–25, 35, 37–43 Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), 1, 2, 40–43 Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN), 155–159, 162, 169–173, 175, 183–189, 191–194, 200, 204, 205, 208, 209, 213, 215, 218, 225, 228, 245–247, 249, 250 Southern African Trust (SAT), 157, 178, 181, 192 Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), 119, 120, 123,

 Index 

126, 130, 143, 155, 157, 160–165, 177, 178, 187, 243, 244, 249 State-centred approaches, 47, 49, 60, 66 State-centric, 49, 52, 54, 56, 64 State-centric spaces, 118 Statutory meetings, 119, 144 Steps toward the holding of the Civil Society Forum, 163–166 Steps toward the holding of the SADC People’s Summit, 171–172 Strategies, norms and rules, 80, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94–96, 99, 105, 199–204, 210–215, 219–227, 229–233, 239–244, 246, 247, 249–251 Structure of the SADC People’s Summit, 170 Submission of a collective communiqué, 185–186, 201 Submission of a collective declaration, 179 Submitting to the SADC-provided legal framework of engagement, 182–183 Substitutive informal institutions, 86 Supranational, 59 T

Thematic groups of the SADC People’s Summit, 170 Top-down paradigms to regional integration, 238 Traditional analytical approaches of New institutionalism, 91

263

Transformist civil society, 86, 100–101, 103–104 Transformist civil society networks, 119, 203, 225 Transnational advocacy, 115, 133 Transparency, 132–134, 143 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), 37–39 The 2018 CIVICUS Monitor tracking civic space in Africa, 138 Typology of institutional arrangements, 199–233, 241–246 Typology of institutions, 82–83 U

Use of capacity building training and media platforms, 187–188 V

Vertical interaction, 84, 242, 243 W

Watchdog function, 100 White collar organisations, 157 White-collar bureaucracy, 219, 232 World Social Forum, 156, 187 Z

Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), 157, 158, 171