Re-evaluating Pico: Aristotelianism, Kabbalism, and Platonism in the Philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola [1st ed.] 9783030595807, 9783030595814

Citation preview

CRITICAL POLITICAL THEORY AND RADICAL PRACTICE

Re-evaluating Pico Aristotelianism, Kabbalism, and Platonism in the Philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola

Sophia Howlett

Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice

Series Editor Stephen Eric Bronner Department of Political Science Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ, USA

The series introduces new authors, unorthodox themes, critical interpretations of the classics and salient works by older and more established thinkers. A new generation of academics is becoming engaged with immanent critique, interdisciplinary work, actual political problems, and more broadly the link between theory and practice. Each in this series will, after his or her fashion, explore the ways in which political theory can enrich our understanding of the arts and social sciences. Criminal justice, psychology, sociology, theater and a host of other disciplines come into play for a critical political theory. The series also opens new avenues by engaging alternative traditions, animal rights, Islamic politics, mass movements, sovereignty, and the institutional problems of power. Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice thus fills an important niche. Innovatively blending tradition and experimentation, this intellectual enterprise with a political intent hopes to help reinvigorate what is fast becoming a petrified field of study and to perhaps provide a bit of inspiration for future scholars and activists.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14938

Sophia Howlett

Re-evaluating Pico Aristotelianism, Kabbalism, and Platonism in the Philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola

Sophia Howlett School for International Training Brattleboro, VT, USA

Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice ISBN 978-3-030-59580-7 ISBN 978-3-030-59581-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © Lior Mizrahi/Photodisc/Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Pico has been an interesting journey. I had written about Pico a little before while preparing my dissertation in the early 1990s. But then I had understood Pico as Ficino’s disciple, and part of the Platonic Academy of Florence. I had not spent time with the broader critical material of what I call here, ‘Pico Studies,’ which tends to avoid Ficino altogether. Coming back to Pico, everything had changed, from the Platonic Academic concept itself to the direction of ‘Pico Studies’ away from a focus on the ‘Dignity of Man’ (here referred to as the Oration) toward the impact of Kabbalism. I was also confused by the level of interest in Pico particularly in his homeland and France. As primarily a Ficino scholar, I had understood Ficino as ‘the titan’ and Pico as a relatively minor satellite (particularly because of his incomplete career). Of course, the Oration was an important text, but as a short expression of philosophical optimism, rather than the magnum opus of Ficino’s Platonic Theology. Yet it seemed that in popular culture many had heard of Pico, not so many of Ficino. So, part of the project became to understand Pico’s allure, introducing the theme of exceptionalism. After most of the research was complete, I had decided this book would focus on the theme of syncretism. An inevitable decision, no doubt, if trying to provide an overview of Pico’s philosophy. But then there was a halt. I was appointed to the leadership role at the School for International Training in Vermont. Returning to the writing process this past year, I realized that my relationship with Pico had become rather complicated: v

vi

PREFACE

highly judgmental, if not critical. During the research, I had come to see Pico in a very different way from our first introduction in the 1990s, and I was now forced to build some distance into the relationship. What had originated as a project to introduce Pico to a wider audience in the US and UK, rapidly became a reevaluation, including a comparison with Ficino. As with any academic endeavor, we stand on the work of others. In Pico’s case, there has been so much interesting new work in the twentyfirst century, particularly on his use of Kabbalism and Kabbalistic sources. The work of the Pico Project group (Pier Cesare Bori, Michael Papio, Massimo Riva, and Francesco Borghese, among others), of those working on Pico’s Kabbalistic Library (led by Giulio Busi and Michele Ciliberto), and of Moshe Idel and Brian Copenhaver has been particularly inspiring. When I started working on my dissertation in the UK, writing about Kabbalism seemed difficult, as if one would not be taken seriously as a scholar. Scholars such as Scholem, Idel, Wirszubski, Busi, and Copenhaver have transformed that conversation. There are more new editions coming soon; and a lot more to explore. Indeed, now we have moved beyond a focus on the dignity of man, the multiplicity of Pico’s sources combined with the brevity of his existing works makes ‘Pico studies’ even more alluring. We are faced with pages of puzzles, and the constant promise of real answers just out of present reach. Finishing a work, writing this preface, inevitably makes me appreciate how much more there is to explore. I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Prof. Stephen Bronner of Rutgers University, for suggesting that I work on another piece for the Critical Theory series. My thanks go to the librarians of Kean University, where the main research for this work was conducted, and those of SIT. And my colleagues at School for International Training, for leaving me a few hours on a Sunday (sometimes, not always!) to put the research into a coherent text. Brattleboro, USA

Sophia Howlett

Contents

1

Introduction A Contested Site Pico’s Contribution

2

Life and Works Family and Education The Rise and Fall of a Public Life A Private Life? Pico’s Death Building the Myth Works

3

Pico’s Intellectual Foundations: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Pico’s Syncretism The Question of Allegiance Aristotelianism Platonism Humanism Syncretism The Prisca Theologia and Mathematical Philosophical-Mysticism

1 1 5 11 12 16 23 25 27 29

53 55 58 63 72 74 77

vii

viii

CONTENTS

4

The Third Pillar: Pico and Kabbalism Introduction to Kabbalism The History of Kabbalism Key Texts Pico and Kabbalism

91 93 100 107 109

5

Pico’s Universe The Question of God God’s Love The Angelic Mind The Active Intellect Populating the Angelic Mind Celestial and Natural Worlds

135 139 146 149 153 155 157

6

The Way Home Mutability and Self-fashioning Our Anatomy Immortality of the Soul Ascent Love and Beauty Jacob’s Ladder

171 173 178 181 182 185 190

7

Conclusion

209

Bibliography of works consulted

215

Index

233

About the Author

Sophia Howlett obtained her M.A. from Cambridge University and her Ph.D. from the Medieval Studies Center of York University in the United Kingdom. Her field of expertise is Renaissance Philosophy and Literature, most recently publishing Marsilio Ficino and His World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). She taught at York University, was a permanent lecturer at the University of Teesside, and a visiting professor at the National University of Kiev Mohyla Academy, the National University of Kyiv, Taras Shevchenko and Kaliningrad State University, before moving to Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, as a dean and professor in the twin fields of literature/philosophy and comparative and international higher education policy. During this time, she was an Open Society Institute fellow and a visiting scholar at Harvard. In 2012, Dr. Howlett moved to Kean University, New Jersey as associate vice-president for academic affairs, and then in 2017 was appointed as president of School for International Training (SIT) in Vermont.

ix

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

A Contested Site Pico della Mirandola was a late fifteenth-century Italian noblemanphilosopher with an interest in religious reform who died young under mysterious circumstances. He is part of a milieu that we quickly recognize when we think of the Italian Renaissance whether historically or within the history of ideas. Pico lived and worked in places such as Florence, Padua, and Ferrara. He was friends with the great Platonist Marsilio Ficino, with the humanist and poet Angelo Poliziano, and the major Aristotelian reformers of his generation such as Augustino Nifo as well as the eminence grise of Christian reform, Girolamo Savonarola. He was close to Lorenzo de’ Medici, the Estes, the Sforzas, probably the King of France, and famously feuded with the pope. Pico’s use of Jewish Kabbalism introduced a new and ongoing strand to Christian esoterica. Obviously, Pico is so much more than this—but beyond basic facts, the story of Pico and his intellectual legacy is highly contested. Indeed, the level of Pico’s fame in Italy and France both then and now sometimes seems out of proportion to his limited output with multiple grandiose characterizations, whether in popular culture or academia: Pico the hero philosopher-prince,1 the count with the miraculous memory; St. Pico, the nobleman-penitent who gave everything away to die closer to God; in academic circles, Pico the lone genius whose work prefigures the modern individual: the philosopher who requires us to understand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_1

1

2

S. HOWLETT

‘the Renaissance’ as the precursor to ‘Enlightenment’; the shining star of Ficino’s Platonic Academy; or, much like Coleridge in England, the last person to know everything. Pico’s personality2 and ambition capture the grandiosity of the Italian Renaissance of our imagination. He loudly declared his intention to bring together the whole history of philosophy into one ‘concordance,’ used his wealth and status to challenge all-comers to debate him publicly at his own expense, sought a way to reconcile the humanities with theology and philosophy while pushing for radical religious change, and skirted danger and intrigue (fleeing the pope’s rage, abducting the object of his desire) eventually leading to his probable murder. He provides us with the glittering physical and intellectual spectacle of the Renaissance: if others were attempting to lead a revival of the Golden Age, Pico appears to embody that Age in his own person and his promised work. The ‘world’ of Pico is a place where young men are mythical demi-Gods, where the nobility read Plato, where the learned men of the past converse easily with each other, and where everybody has understood rationally, and through an act of faith, that Christ is their only savior. Pico himself promoted a certain vision of his career—self-fashioning his uniqueness, promising to be part of every intellectual ‘camp’ while principally of none, and while others’ accounts contest his self-fashioning, they do so only to claim him for their own. Inevitably his early death with most major projects unfinished deepens the fascination. We cannot know what he might have done and what marvels he may have produced. His work centers on three major projects: a poetic theology,3 an attempt to bring together the entire history of philosophy, and a concordance between Aristotle and Plato. These could have been three separate projects, or one to two that metamorphosed and were renamed as his thinking developed. Each project reflects central conflicts of the period that he wished to overcome between literary studies and philosophy; between Plato and Aristotle; and, most importantly, between faith and reason. He believed that a theological philosophy was possible, bringing faith and reason together to reinvigorate Christianity. But as most of this work was never completed, Pico’s vision must be in part assumed based on partial glimpses—whether on the nature of the Intellect, or the place of the human in his universe. The combination of a partially drawn vision, our complex perceptions of ‘Italian Renaissance,’ Pico’s unfulfilled promise, potent self-fashioning, and early and ongoing disagreement over his legacy inevitably makes ‘Pico

1

INTRODUCTION

3

the philosopher’ a contested domain. To re-evaluate his work and vision, we need to set aside at least part of the glitz, test historical readings, and re-explore his oeuvre and influences, while appreciating that there is no neutral perspective or single truth to be found. This work offers four related major re-evaluations. First Pico’s work is in the main coherent and contiguous (despite the fragments and occasional changes of direction),4 thereby making it at least possible to delineate his partial vision of the universe and our place within it. Secondly, Pico’s approach is based on three principle traditions— the three pillars for his universe: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Jewish Kabbalism.5 Thirdly, his attempt at concordance between these three pillars is successful when it builds on similarities/shared histories but inevitably reveals significant difference, so that creation is complicated by the comparison with emanation and the God of negative theology cannot be the pleroma. Fourthly, unlike Ficino with his mission of renovatio, Pico is an exceptionalist focused on a solitary ascetic mystical journey to a form of henosis with God but with no plan for return. The combination of Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Kabbalism require something more complex than Platonic henosis . This union is a ‘cleaving’ not with a wholly transcendent One, but with its active attribute/s within our universe, starting with those attributes associated with mind and understanding. In Pico, henosis can also be a noetic process, where our minds touch the mind of the Aristotelian active intellect. The nous , or mind, is reappropriated for mystical experience. The exceptionalism of Pico’s philosophy even excludes the importance of a knowledge network or academic entourage that he built around himself. Pico’s philosophy is a type of theological philosophy, similar to his colleague, Marsilio Ficino, but centered on the exceptionalism of the individual and even more ascetically mystical, occupying the borderlands between philosophy and mysticism. Alongside these reassessments, we will revisit other key assumptions around the critical reception of his work. Of these, a few examples here suffice. From a class perspective, Pico’s social position as a noble with a large personal fortune connected to the most prominent families in northern and central Italy both augmented his career and has obscured the contribution of others. Obviously, his status made his choice of career highly unusual: he was automatically important, and his interest in being a philosopher (rather than a statesman with scholarly hobbies) makes him unique.6 So he reconstructed the concept of philosopher for his own purposes arguing that a philosopher should be a gentleman who does not

4

S. HOWLETT

need to philosophize for money.7 The consequences of his social position are many. He was able to attempt a public launch of his career in Rome and when he came to a city, people remembered the brilliant young count. For Pico, his self-publicity tended toward solipsism, and those who continued the story of the brilliant count after his death utilized that publicity, from his extraordinary breadth of knowledge, his use of previously untranslated sources, to his intellectual reach. This was to a certain extent true but also ignores the contribution of those around him to the body of work he produced. His wealth and social standing allowed the purchase and fostering of translators, mentors, and teachers. Pico was not a solitary individual; he was the center of an academic court or entourage. Another ‘key assumption’: as part of the discourse of modernity, we have tended to look for the ‘modern’ or at least ‘proto-modern’ in our past in order to achieve a direct narrative (a linearity of cause and effect) that takes us from there to here. We want our story. The Romans are part of our conversation because they invented roads, aqueducts and concrete: they lead to us. Those ‘in-between’ are the Dark Ages—something murky, not understandable, to be ignored as external to the narrative of human development. The most popular and recognizable work of Pico’s oeuvre remains a speech that he wrote to preface his grand debate in Rome. The speech has become known as the ‘Oration on the Dignity of Man.’ In the twentieth century it was popularly read as a proto-modern announcement of the modern individual: a triumphant description of a new person that we could recognize as ourselves. But when reading Pico’s speech in this manner, we fail to recognize that the ‘Dignity of Man’ is not even the main topic of the speech. Rather, we are expressing a modernist desire to reappropriate the different and the foreign, and expand our notion of ‘modern’ to the point where the Renaissance propels us into or simply exists as the waiting room for modernity rather than as a liminal space or a coherent moment per se. What then occurs when we reread the Oration from multiple perspectives? Finally, an example from his contemporaries: Pico’s relationship with the religious reform movement led by Savonarola is a contested issue both then and now. In particular, there is a tension between the arrogance of young Pico in Rome and St. Pico of later years (including potentially joining the Dominican order) as described by his nephew and biographer, Gianfrancesco. Pico was clearly religious. He also spun daydreams of living eventually as the itinerant penniless sage. But he did not give away all his money or move into the religious life, and there is no evidence that he

1

INTRODUCTION

5

would have done so. The tension between his ambitions, his religiosity, and the mystical asceticism of his philosophy was present throughout his career—he started by wanting a public voice and was ambitious to make a big impact, but his philosophical approach was turned inward, was highly personalized, and eschewed communion with others. He became increasingly involved with religious reformers, including Savonarola, but whatever his religious beliefs, or vision of an ascetic life, it was ‘not yet.’ St. Pico was a construct of Gianfrancesco’s biography, Savonarola’s attempted appropriation of his famous friend, and a history of reception particularly through Thomas More.

Pico’s Contribution While there is much to set aside or re-examine, re-evaluation predominantly offers a new sense of Pico’s contribution to the history of thought. He is working at a specific time and place. This is a time of intellectual excitement generated by an influx of new ideas and old texts. Old texts ‘return’ to the Latin world during the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. Refugees, particularly from the Eastern Empire, bring access to Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic language. The rise of publishing supports dissemination of ideas and literacy encouraging a ‘return to text’ for biblical sources too, rather than reliance on church doctrine. But it was also (and it is difficult to know how much cause and effect may have been in play) a time of general anxiety in northern and central Italy around the end of the fifteenth century, with a consequent desire for change.8 Pico is surrounded by philosophical and spiritual revivals based on a ‘return to text’: he studies with the leaders of the Aristotelian Recovery, works throughout his life with Marsilio Ficino, responsible for the Platonic revival, and is friends with a variety of Christian reformers. He is surrounded by a desire for a new world based on growing anxiety and discontent with the old. This was not just a question of scholarship or theology. In Pico’s time, and partly through his agency, a Christian reform movement under the Dominican friar, Girolamo Savonarola, temporarily took over Florentine politics. Nineteen years after Savonarola was burnt as a heretic, Luther would publish his theses resulting in reformation and the splintering of the Catholic Church. These movements share many of the same characteristics and are born out of the same impetus: something has gone wrong, or we have taken a wrong turn, and we can make it better. For the optimistic, a new Golden Age could be born out of crisis;

6

S. HOWLETT

for the less so, the times required penitence and asceticism—a theocracy based on our sense of sin. Whatever his distinctive vision, Pico was also very much part of this milieu. He spent time in environments that fostered the primary intellectual movements of his era: whether the Aristotelians of Padua, the Platonist of Florence, or the proponents of the via moderna (the new branch of scholasticism) in Paris. He attempted a revival of both philosophy and theology at the center of church power in Rome. He was responsible for bringing Savonarola to Florence, and for unclear reasons, he was possibly mysteriously murdered—poisoned at a crisis point in Florence’s history as the King of France was marching into the city. But he was never part of any of these movements, philosophical groups, or religious orders. Rather he brought together Aristotelianism, Platonism and Kabbalism with his Christianity in a distinctive mix that set him ultimately outside of those with whom he connected. He was on a different journey. But characteristically, he combined Golden Age thinking, the sense of a crisis, and the ascetic sensibility into his work. For example, the closest point of comparison, Marsilio Ficino, is very much part of the collective desire for change. He was on a mission to renew the world: he sets out a blueprint for us to renew ourselves (a mystical path) in order to reform the world (an active path as the inspired magus ). He saw himself as at the center of this new potential community, that he would lead. He spoke often in the plural—which is one of the reasons why the phrase ‘academy’ is so often used in his work. Pico is part of this desire for change too, but for him, this was a journey of the self: an ascetic, personal journey of the individual soul developing its relationship to God. He provided a blueprint for the journey upward, but with no second step of return and reform. He certainly wanted, or originally wanted, to change his world, but through the provision and pursuit of his ideas, rather than the accrual and use of special abilities derived from touching the mind of God. Ficino uses the generic ‘man’ to talk about the movement upward to God (though ‘man’ is ultimately part of a collective—groups of chariots, the entourage of a particular planet, riding up to the firmament). But Ficino also has a way back. He wants to be the new Socrates: he wants to lead everybody else. Pico describes a lonely journey upward to God, and then…. Who knows? The end point appears to be death. His proposed new approach was not then the rebirth of a Golden Age, though he may have supported others’ work to this end, but the achievement of

1

INTRODUCTION

7

his version of henosis : the route to achieve communion and finally assimilation with God. He laid down the path of the mystic. An ascetic path. He engages in the milieu of community anxiety at multiple levels, but perhaps ultimately his anxiety is teleological: he is not looking for rebirth or revival, but an ending. Meanwhile, Pico worked to build his career and live up to his own promise as the ‘prince of concord’: bringing faith and reason, theology and philosophy, back together9 ; bringing the allegorical ‘truths’ of literature into the mix; and establishing a new foundation for philosophy. This was an ambitious agenda especially as that sense of division (faith from reason, for example) was very much part of the general anxiety. The next chapter will introduce that career and his agenda through the key works that survived him, presenting them as a mainly coherent and contiguous oeuvre. Chapters 3 and 4 introduce his three pillars within the context of their history and the broader intellectual movements of his day, including an introduction to his academic entourage. Inevitably, Kabbalism, an unusual addition to a work on philosophy, requires longer introduction. It has also become an important focus of contemporary scholarship on Pico. Research on Pico’s Kabbalistic sources and the introduction of Jewish scholars, among others, to Pico criticism has allowed what used to be a peripheral topic, difficult to touch as Christian esoterica, to become much more central to our understanding of his work. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 examine his vision in detail: first from a metaphysical perspective; and secondly as the journey of the individual soul to Pico’s specific form of henosis . There will always be mysteries around Pico, and the contortions he makes to bring together the three traditions on which he primarily relies are not always persuasive. But in bringing the history of thought as he knew it into conversation with itself, Pico challenges us and opens debate even as he aims to resolve conflict. A story of concord is ultimately also a story of ruptures. Perhaps this is his final contribution. He interrogated philosophical traditions, made clear those ruptures, the disconnects, and provoked further questions even as he attempted to consolidate. The final piece of Pico’s legacy ironically is what is unresolved: those questions that arise as he pushes us to look ‘otherwise.’

8

S. HOWLETT

Notes 1. For example: ‘He was the raw material of a poet, lacking in literary gift yet possessed of an inherent poetry of mind and character that illumines his life and breaks in veiled flashes through the inchoate clouds of his learning.’ Robb (1935, 2). 2. Garin (1972, 211) citing an eyewitness account: ‘On a trip to Ferrara in the company of the Cardinal of Aragon, the papal legate, I saw there this youth, who, although yet a novice, was clad in the robes of a protonotary and, to the profound admiration of the audience, was engaged in a debate with Leonardo Nugarolo.’ 3. Pico, Commentary (1986, 80). 4. The overall narrative arc of a person’s ‘complete works’ or central vision is normally seen from the distance of a lengthy career: what remained important, what remained central, where did the hallmarks of an original viewpoint begin? What occurred before that point is then juvenilia: opinions that are interesting and can allow insight into the developing mind but can also be dispensed with given later work. We can also discern stages to the career: genuine changes of viewpoint. With Pico, we cannot tell if or what might be juvenilia, and due to the interventions of those who shaped his legacy, we have no definitive external evidence of whether he might have been changing viewpoint around the time of his death. The direct result of these problems is that we are left with a series of short pieces, drafts, and letters, that may or may not be consistent as a body of work, may or may not represent views that changed later, may or may not be part of larger ambitious works. But as I will explore throughout this book, there really is a large degree of consistency across his lifetime, sufficient to be able to put these works together to form at least a partial picture of his vision. Viewpoints from other critics differ, for example, Garin who argues that ‘Attempts to unify his short and fragmented career produced “bias and distortions” – like the “alleged supremacy” of Kabbalah.’ (according to Copenhaver 2019, 127), or Valcke (2005, 377) who argues that Pico died too young to have a systematic philosophy, while Papio (2012, 92) suggests that a ‘profound change in Pico’s attitude took place after the failure of the projected disputation in Rome,’ specifically that he is more apologetic about his use of non-Christian sources. 5. Farmer (1998, 11 n30): Pico used the spelling, Cabala, but I will use Kabbalah/Kabbalism throughout. 6. Pico, Oration (2012, 186–87): ‘And I say all these things (not without the deepest grief and indignation) not against the lords of our times but against the philosophers who believe and openly declare that no one should pursue philosophy if only because there is no market for philosophers, no remuneration given to them, as if they did not reveal in this very word that they are

1

INTRODUCTION

9

not true philosophers. Hence insofar as their whole life has been dedicated to moneymaking and ambition they are incapable of embracing the knowledge of truth for its own sake.’ (‘Quae omnia ego non sine summo dolore et indignatione in huius temporis non principes, sed philosophos dico, qui ideo non esse philosophandum et credunt et praedicant, quod philosophis nulla merces, nulla sint praemia constituta; quasi non ostendant ipsi, hoc uno nomine, se non esse philosophos, quod cum tota eorum vita sit vel in questu, vel in ambitione posita, ipsam per se veritatis cognitionem non amplectuntur.’) 7. Pico, Oration (2012, 186–87 n184) Pico’s letter to Andrea Corneo: ‘Would it therefore be ignoble or wholly improper for a nobleman gratuitously to pursue wisdom?… No one who has practiced philosophy in such a way as to be able or unable to do so has ever truly been a philosopher. Such a man has engaged in commerce, not philosophy.’ 8. Garin (1983, 77): ‘the atmosphere of the 1480s and 1490s… was full of hermetic prophetism, of eschatological statements on the overthrow (de eversione) or the approach of Antichrist (de adventu Antichristi), no less than on renewal (de renovatio) and new eras, between conjunctions and fatal changes. These are the years of Mercurio da Correggio’s hermetic prediction, and of Arquato’s famous prophecy of the “destruction of Europe”.’ 9. Borghesi (2012, 62) argues that his aim was to build a new theology out of the past: ‘This “new” theology would be superior to those already in existence because it would give a richer understanding of Christian truths.’

CHAPTER 2

Life and Works

The question of Pico’s family is unusually important for a Renaissance philosopher. Pico was born into a wealthy noble family from EmiliaRomagna and inherited title and money as well as a complex geopolitical network of powerbrokers with whom he remained connected throughout his life. His membership of the Italian elite also shaped his intellectual life. It opened the door to grand enterprises that other philosophers could not have risked or attempted, such as challenging all-comers to a debate in front of the pope; and allowed him to conduct his own education wherever intellectual curiosity took him. It also gave him immediate access to the great courts of Europe. He did not need to climb his way up the benefice ladder. He was able to hire scholars to work for him when languages, for instance, were a barrier to moving forward quickly with his studies. The ‘Pico myth’ of the glittering young count, and the story of his career, are made possible as much by his status and money, as his actual output. It gave him a strong sense of entitlement and the dignity due to a nobleman, just as awareness of his status undoubtedly colored the reactions of those around him. He himself links his status and his work, taking on the title of ‘gentleman-philosopher’ and utilizing one of his aristocratic titles, Count of Concord, as his primary theme: he would singlehandedly take all of philosophy and bind it together with itself and with theology to take us back to the truth.1 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_2

11

12

S. HOWLETT

But there is a second network that surrounds Pico. Able to pursue his intellectual interests wherever and with whoever he chose, Pico gathered ideas and scholars around him. His polyphonous education and network of scholarly relations either inspired a desire to make sense of all that he had gathered, enjoyed, or thought important, or were part of a rapidly developing project to bring concordance. Either way, the body of scholars that came and went around him, summoned and used as needed, are the second network of Pico’s story: a knowledge network or (translated into the period) an academic entourage that facilitated his education and then facilitated his ongoing studies and written output. In many respects Pico remained the sum of his family and his educational parts.

Family and Education Pico was born in 1463 at the family castle at Mirandola in the Romagna region of Italy as the youngest member of a minor noble family. His father, Gianfrancesco I, was the Lord of Mirandola and Count of Concordia, but died in 1467 when Pico was young, and his mother Giulia Boiardo raised him. The family’s network was both with the local Mirandola-Ferrara region and the most important powerbrokers of Northern and Central Italy. The Pico family was obviously close to the Este family in Ferrara, one of the first great renaissance courts, but also to the Medici in Florence, and the Sforzas in Milan. All three families maintained a strong interest in Pico’s activities throughout his life. Pico’s sisters, Caterina and Lucrezia, were both married twice into different noble families extending the family network. The family’s humanist credentials were also strong and strengthened during Pico’s lifetime through his own activities, through his nephew, Alberto III Pio, his cousin, the poet Matteo Maria Boiardo, and eventually through his nephew and executor, Gianfrancesco, also a philosopher. Despite squabbling over the family fortune between Pico’s two older brothers, Galeotto and Anton Maria, the relationship appears strong between Pico and his siblings. After the death of his mother, Pico was left under the guardianship of Anton Maria, who also had a house in Rome tying Pico’s personal geography to the papal city. In sum, Pico did not grow up in a lonely castle, orphaned, which he then left to become a philosopher and live in Florence. He was part of a rich, elite network of friends and family and continued throughout his life to move between

2

LIFE AND WORKS

13

domiciles, including Rome, Florence, as well as his home region, with Ferrara as a second home. Originally destined for the church, Pico was sent to study canon law at Bologna University. After his mother’s death at around the age of 15, he left Bologna and started a ‘self-designed’ period of study, moving between very different academic environments. He went first to Ferrara University, the local center of humanism and situated next to the Este court. About 15 months later he went to Padua University, a center for Aristotelian philosophy. From there, he went to Pavia University, renowned for logic and mathematics. At various points, he spent time in Florence, where he certainly studied Platonism with the leader of the new Platonic revival, Marsilio Ficino. Finally, he spent time in Paris2 which was famous for the via moderna branch of scholasticism, confusingly what we think of as ‘medieval’ philosophy in this story of a Renaissance philosopher. Pico certainly utilized scholastic methodology but was more influenced in his work by the via antiqua and the work of Aquinas. However, he made alliances in Paris that remained with him during his Rome troubles and later flight to France. Pico also took classes from scholars on the periphery of these universities. From these academic environments, he built his first group of mentors, teachers, and researchers. These individuals came and went, but together they formed a loose ‘academic-court’ or entourage structure with Pico at the center as noble-patron. He was born into a ‘power network’ but built this second network to support his activities as a philosopher. The two combined helped him fashion his persona as the ‘gentleman-philosopher.’ It was not necessarily unusual for the ‘great’ to have scholars around them acting as secretaries, tutors, or some such or to be a gentleman or woman engaged in intellectual pursuits and surrounding oneself with interesting people. The difference with Pico was that he, not the others, was always the central academic point of this circle. This was not ‘dabbling’ or patronizing or having a secretary. Pico was able to bring scholars into his sphere specifically to support his own output. He drew on this knowledge network to support his work throughout his career. Pico gathered his circle as he progressed with his studies. It became increasingly significant to his intellectual life as formal education ended, but the network existed before that time. For instance, during the 1482 war between Ferrara and Venice,3 Pico retreated from Padua University and used the family castle as a personal ‘academy’ for his growing mentor group.4 So first in Ferrara, he was working on classics and the

14

S. HOWLETT

humanities, including rhetoric and ‘medieval’ philosophy (philosophy that uses scholastic methodology) (particularly the philosophers, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus),5 studying under Battista Guarini, the poet and dramatist, who became a close friend.6 It was possibly also at this time that he first became friends with the Dominician priest and preacher, Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498). Both were to play key roles in each other’s lives. At this time, he could also have visited Florence and met Marsilio Ficino, the poet, Girolamo Benivieni, the philologist and poet, Angelo Poliziano, and of course, Lorenzo de’ Medici, with whom he already a family relationship.7 All became lifelong friends and colleagues. Girolamo Benivieni (1453–1542) was also an early student of Ficinian Platonism.8 Benivieni tried to learn Hebrew with Flavius Mithridates while staying with Pico,9 and later, like Pico, came under the influence of Savonarola, attending his sermons with Pico by 1490.10 Poliziano and Benivieni may seem unlikely intellectual companions at first for a philosopher, but in Ferrara, Pico was also producing poetry in Latin and Tuscan, with ambitions to become an important poet, and Poliziano ‘crossed the lines’ between poetry and philosophy as a humanist philologist. The dichotomy between Pico’s interests as a poet and a philosopher continued for at least the early part of his career, and he seemingly belonged to a literary circle while at Padua University.11 His friendship with Poliziano at the beginning included asking him for a critique. Poliziano was not encouraging.12 Pico destroyed his efforts and turned away from poetry to philosophy,13 though he continued to write poetry throughout his life.14 He also clearly valued style in his prose and later, parallel interests in philosophy and literature15 would result in one of his declared major projects: to build a ‘poetic theology.’16 The concept of a poetic theology was current in Pico’s day (for instance, the Byzantine Platonist, Pletho, earlier looked to create such a work and the Florentine humanist, Cristoforo Landino, discusses the idea in his Commento sopra la Comedia 17 ). Pico left the humanist milieu of Ferrara for Padua, the home of Aristotelianism, or rather Aristotle as seen through the lens of his most famous medieval commentator, the Arabic philosopher, Averroes (the Christianised name of the philosopher, Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198). But Padua was also becoming the center of a new revolution in Aristotle studies, eventually to be at least partially equivalent to the Platonic revival in Florence. Pico met and worked with the leading Paduan Aristotelians

2

LIFE AND WORKS

15

and knew some of the leaders of the revolution, Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo. He also became close to Elijah del Medigo, a Jewish Averroist who taught privately. All three agreed on the need to go back to original texts—whether for Del Medigo, the original texts of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle in their Hebrew versions, or for Vernia and Nifo, a return to classical (rather than medieval) commentaries. Pico also became friends with Girolamo Ramusio, a future prominent Orientalist (Arabic and/or Hebrew studies), another ‘new’ area of study in the period. Ramusio learned Arabic and translated Arabic texts,18 just as Pico later attempted. Pico also maintained his literary interests in Padua, studying under Ermolao Barbaro, the great rhetorician,19 and taking advantage of the new fashion for Greek studies to learn Greek from a Cretan refugee from the Turks, Manuel Adramitteno, who was part of the Mirandola summer accademia. In Autumn 1482, Pico went to Pavia University where he stayed until 1483.20 Pavia was another center of scholastic philosophy, but with an excellent reputation in mathematics and logic. He continued to study philosophy and rhetoric, and possibly mathematics, again with an emphasis on Aristotle, while still studying Greek.21 In 1483, Pico inherited a substantial fortune of his own. It could be at this juncture that he went to Paris for a stay (autumn–winter 1483–84).22 Or it could have been from July 1485 until March 1486, or he could have visited twice, or both dates may be wrong. His time at the University of Paris (the Sorbonne) is difficult to verify as there are no records showing his presence.23 It could easily be that he was in Florence during 1485 and 1486 studying with Ficino, maybe also travelling home, perhaps visiting his brother in Rome too, as well as going to Paris.24 But somewhere between 1483 and early 1486 he did study for periods in both Paris and Florence, while also visiting family and friends. Pico’s relationship to the Platonic revival is complicated. After a strong foundation in Aristotle, Pico tells Barbaro that he ‘turned recently from Aristotle to the Academy, but not as a deserter, as that author says, but as a scout’.25 He went to explore Platonism with the master at the center of the Platonic revival, Ficino, but suggests that he is simply viewing Platonism as an Aristotelian. This may have been true at the beginning, but Platonism became a key part of his philosophical outlook. The relationship between Ficino and Pico was perplexing, inspiring for both and often antagonistic in ways that are difficult to understand from their correspondence and work. Ficino, a relentless optimist, tends to portray a deep

16

S. HOWLETT

friendship and love between the two, at least in retrospect, and Pico, the student who soon wishes to be the teacher, sees Ficino often as his philosophical archnemesis: the person to debate and prove wrong. Pico’s first extended piece of philosophy was a commentary on Plato’s love theory, directly challenging Ficino’s own recent work on Plato’s Symposium. But in challenging Ficino, he becomes deeply immersed in Plotinus, choosing as the lynchpin of his Platonism an author Ficino had only recently started to explore.26 The Paris stay/s are a mystery but had a profound impact on his life. Paris became part of both his knowledge and power networks. The Sorbonne was famous at the time both for its faculty of theology and its espousal of a branch of scholasticism known as the via moderna (as opposed to the other main branch, the via antiqua). Pico did not adopt this methodology, but he was obviously drawn to the Sorbonne’s considerable reputation and was perhaps exploring the via moderna. The approach to academic debate known as the ‘Paris style’ was also particularly in vogue during Pico’s potential stays27 and had been used recently to be critical of contemporary church doctrine: the priest, Jean Laillier, for instance, had attempted to dispute a series of controversial conclusions.28 Alongside his studies, Pico again made friends. Of particular note was his relationship with Jean Cordier, a professor of theology (who in 1499 became Rector of the University of Paris). Cordier protected Pico through the difficult year of his ‘coming out’ as a philosopher in Rome and subsequent escape to France. But Pico probably also met members of the French court who he was able to utilize during his exile as well. These ventures in Paris and Florence mark the end of his more formal education, and the beginning of his life as an independent ‘gentlemanphilosopher.’ This ‘turn’ is prolonged, for Pico developed an ambitious plan to launch himself into the pantheon of the great philosophers: those who changed their worlds.

The Rise and Fall of a Public Life The year 1486 was Pico’s annus mirabilis : his first burst of philosophical activity. He produced a draft commentary on Plato’s love theory, a skeleton for a grand ‘coming out’ debate (a set of assertions to be semi-publicly debated), and an introduction to that debate known now as the ‘Oration on the dignity of man’ (after the first section of the speech). Prior to 1486, the output we know today had been limited to

2

LIFE AND WORKS

17

several extended letters setting out his views on the relative merits of style and substance. There was also a pivotal life experience in early 1486: an attempt in the spring to abduct a (probably willing) woman in Perugia. This is the only record of any connection to a woman and was clearly a traumatic and profoundly humiliating experience. The commentary on Plato—a commentary emphasizing heavenly, non-physical, love— followed quickly after. The ‘skeleton’ of the debate project is known as Conclusions. It is unclear whether it was simply one of several grand ideas in development that year or the central project. He speaks of a variety of large-scale ideas from now until the end of his life including the poetic theology and a concordance of Plato and Aristotle, but Conclusions is the only ‘completed’ piece of Pico’s three grand projects. It was also Pico’s entry into his profession. Going out into the world anxious to make a mark can be replete with false starts and mistakes that mark us profoundly and may even impact the rest of our lives. Up until the proposed Rome debate, Pico seemingly dazzled those around him. He had enormous ambition, the financial means, and potentially the brains to match most of that ambition. He had a network of scholars around him, and a network of family relationships that could open doors. Ambitious to prove his superior talents and ready to change the world, he embarked on probably the most ambitious project in the history of philosophy.29 He tried to offer a new approach to the study of that history which would reveal the underlying ‘truth’ from which all philosophy springs, thereby transforming the study of philosophy and theology. This approach worked backward from present times with its multiple strands of scholastic debate, resolving historical and doctrinal contradictions as it proceeded, to reveal gradually the commonalities, until he reached Plato and Aristotle, and then beyond to arrive at ‘the truth’ underlying all philosophical ideas30 : the theological underpinnings of the universe. By doing so, he would reconnect philosophy to theology, and renew both. His Conclusions was a ‘skeleton’ because the publication is a series of 900 theses or conclusions rather than the actual summa or argument. The theses were to be debated with the whole complex argument emerging orally (the ‘Paris Style’). To add even more gravitas to this audacious project, he challenged the great and the wise (preferably both) to attend and debate him, and to do so in Rome at a special elite gathering of the pope, at that time Pope Innocent VIII, and his cardinals. We find a surprise as we proceed backward in time to ‘the truth.’ Understandably, the history of philosophy moves backward to Aristotle

18

S. HOWLETT

and Plato who had been key figures in Pico’s formal education, and he had worked with scholars revolutionizing Latin European understanding of classical philosophy. But then we have more unusual choices including Orphic Mysteries and Zoroastrianism; and at some point, Pico had also been introduced, perhaps through Del Medigo in Padua (despite Del Medigo’s apparent lack of interest in the field), to Jewish mysticism known as Kabbalism. In 1486, he had begun to understand Kabbalism, together with aspects of Aristotle and Plato, as the foundation of his theological-philosophical universe. Consequently, he also turned his attention in 1486 to Kabbalistic texts and to studying Hebrew. A series of Kabbalistic conclusions are the first result. Pico started 1486 primarily living in Paris or Florence. By March it is clear he is in Florence. At least one individual that he met in Paris was with him in Florence.31 There he probably met the Florentine, Margherita de’ Medici, and in May abducted her in Arezzo.32 He was caught, Margaret rescued, and Pico at least partially disgraced.33 The incident was commented on across his power network with Aldobrandino Guidoni, the Estes’ envoy to Florence, for example, providing an extended account of the ‘poor Count’ for Ferrara, and Stefano Taverno, the envoy of Milan to Florence, commenting that Pico had been ‘provocato da una femina formosa impazita di luy’ (‘provoked by a shapely woman who was mad about him’).34 But despite the support of his friends and family, Pico was disgraced by the incident and felt it keenly. Pico spent the rest of the year moving his household between Fratta and Perugia (avoiding plague in Perugia) until heading to Rome in late November. He worked, as usual, with his entourage of scholars, for instance in July his old teacher, Elijah Del Medigo came to him,35 but most famously he now had in his employ a new secretary, Flavius Mithridates, a convert to Christianity from Judaism, translator, and scholar with a healthy sense of ironic skepticism of his employer. Flavius was set to a major translation project of Kabbalistic texts so that Pico could read them, and he taught Pico Hebrew. By September Pico had advanced sufficiently to write a letter in the language.36 Pico did attempt some Arabic,37 and worked with Arabic texts (though it’s unclear whether he did all the translation work himself).38 The incident with Margherita, alongside his age, added a certain urgency to Pico’s work beyond his obvious ambition. He had pursued his studies for a long time. He had made an impact at various courts, such as Florence and Ferrara, potentially also the French royal court while in

2

LIFE AND WORKS

19

Paris, and with various members of the political elite. He had now also achieved a ‘reputation’ through the Margherita incident.39 His friends were wondering about his future. At least one, Andrea Corneo, thought he should be finding a major powerbroker as a patron and preparing for a public life in the complex geopolitical world of quattrocento Italy. Pico replied that he prefered the contemplative life of a philosopher to the active life. He was very aware of his status and the potential conflict between that status and his chosen career. He is not to be a ‘paid professor of philosophy’ but a gentleman scholar ‘as a man of his class, a prince.’40 But he cannot hold back his excitement and belief in the work he is about to bring into the public domain. He broadly hints that he is about to do great things. The pride and ambition are very clear. These hints rapidly develop in the fall into comments on the production of a grand list of Conclusions (theses) that he intends to debate with the cardinals and other philosophers in Rome. The number of theses kept growing reflecting the grandeur or hubris of the enterprise (depending on your perspective), and an overall vision emerged as he worked toward the mystical number of 900, finally arriving there in November.41 He stated he could have included more (unsurprisingly), but the mystical significance of 900 provided a frame for the entire enterprise.42 Having finished, he departed for Rome. In early December, the conclusions were published with an open invitation to take part in his planned great debate. He envisaged the debate as taking place at an assembly or congress, by which he may have meant the apostolic senate of cardinals with the pope as the judge.43 It was supposed to be a private–public affair—open to the elite of the church and the philosophical community—though no doubt everybody important in Pico’s world would hear about it through ambassadors and their own networks. He challenged all-comers for January 6th (Epiphany), 1487: ‘And if any philosopher or theologian, even from the ends of Italy, wishes to come to Rome for the sake of debating, the disputing lord himself promises to pay the travel expenses from his own funds’.44 Epiphany is the feast of the kings or magi, when the pagan world symbolically submitted to Jesus.45 Pico saw his argument as transformational to philosophers, Christians, and also to Jews, who would be brought back to the people of God. This was Pico’s ‘coming out’ as a philosopher, but he also had organized his debate as a revelatory and revolutionary enterprise to be enacted in the heart of the troubled powerbase of the Latin Church.

20

S. HOWLETT

Inevitably very soon after he arrived, the papal authorities took notice.46 In early January the pope suspended the event and appointed a commission of cardinals to review the conclusions for potential heretical sentiments. Consequent to this commission’s advice, Innocent appointed a ‘magisterial’ commission (made up of masters of theology) in February charging the Bishop of Tournai, Giovanni (Jean) Monisart, to review the conclusions more formally, in particular 13 of the 900 that increasingly seemed heretical.47 The commission consisted of at least one member of Pico’s knowledge network, Jean Cordier from Paris, who represented Paris’ point of view (the via moderna branch of scholasticism) and interestingly defended all the conclusions considered.48 Others were not sympathetic, particularly Pedro Garcia, Bishop of Ussel, and Marco de Miroldo, master of the Apostolic Palace.49 In early March, the commission found seven of the 13 conclusions problematic with Pico attending the meeting. After this he was not allowed to attend. In later March, they declared the remaining six under consideration censored, and the first seven now absolutely condemned.50 The published list of conclusions, Conclusiones, was pronounced to ‘deviate from the straight path of orthodox faith’.51 Garcia seems to have led much of the condemnation including the accusation of heresy,52 and wrote a review of the commission’s findings published in 1489.53 Pico’s ‘coming out’ had turned into an increasingly hostile debacle, leaving Pico angry, frustrated but still pursuing his scholarly activities in Rome.54 Pico’s attitude toward the commission complicated the situation55 : he published an Apology in late May which was largely a defence of the 13 assuming that if he clarified and explained more deeply, the commission would be enlightened.56 The proemium of the Apology was mainly taken from the oration he had originally prepared as an introduction to his public debate, but with added precise argumentation as to why the commission was wrong. Just like his Conclusions, the Apology uses the ‘Paris Style’ to argue his case. The work antagonized the pope further. Innocent was also increasingly hostile to the academic milieu in Paris57 and was inclined to see the Apology as a direct attack on his authority.58 It took less than a week after publication for Innocent to move the case over to the Inquisition.59 In late July, Lorenzo de’ Medici’s new ambassador, Giovanni Lanfredini, informed Lorenzo that 200–300 conclusions were now in question and that Pico ‘is so upset that he stays in bed, since he thinks they have

2

LIFE AND WORKS

21

imposed a huge burden on him’.60 At the end of July, when the Inquisition was bringing its own review to an end,61 Pico signed an act of submission, abjuring his work and allowing the publication to be burned at the stake. Innocent issued a Papal Bull, Et si ex iniuncto nobis, on August 4th condemning the whole book, but not the author.62 All copies were to be burned within three days. Anybody who now tried to print or copy the book, or even read the theses, could be excommunicated.63 For some reason, Innocent chose not to publicize his Bull for four months. Perhaps he had decided not to act directly but rather to leave the threat against Pico’s work ready and waiting, or perhaps there were a series of political manoeuvres that eventually failed.64 Whatever the reason, Innocent did issue the Bull publically in December and at the same time, in an apparent change of heart, issued a warrant for Pico’s arrest.65 Finally understanding his danger, Pico had fled Rome in November heading toward Paris in the company of Jean Cordier.66 Papal nuncios were dispatched to pursue and finally caught him between Grenoble and Lyons. The Count of Bresse arrested Pico on their behalf, he was imprisoned in Savoy and then taken to Paris. But the young King, Charles VIII, was sympathetic to Pico, and they may have already been acquainted. The Law Faculty of the University of Paris reviewed his case with Pico’s friend the jurist, Robert Gaguin, recording their response to the nuncios.67 Pico was subsequently ‘imprisoned’ at the royal palace of Vincennes, away from the papal nuncios.68 Pico’s power network of family and friends came to his aid, including Lorenzo de’Medici,69 Gian Galeozzo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, and his uncle, Ludovico Maria Sforza,70 and Ercole I d’Este (who asked his envoy to intercede for Pico as ‘nostro fratello’ (‘our brother’), expressing his sorrow ‘perche teneramente amamo epso magnifico conte Zohane’ (‘because I tenderly love this magnificent count Giovanni’) ‘che certo le sono cose che anche Salamone, che fuetanto sapientissimo, incorse anchora lui alcuna volta in simile trasgressione; si che, il gli è da havere compassione’ (‘for, in truth, even Solomon, for all his wisdom, sometimes committed similar misdeeds; thus, one should have compassion for him’).71 Lorenzo had followed the case throughout and used his ambassador to Rome to intervene on multiple occasions. In March 1488, the ambassador finally gained Innocent’s agreement that Pico could return to Italy with impunity.72 In May, Lorenzo sent word through Marsilio Ficino to the returning Pico that he should come and live in Florence, lending him a villa at Querceto near Fiesole.73 The next step was to try and obtain a

22

S. HOWLETT

pardon from the pope. Lorenzo never succeeded. Innocent died. Lorenzo died. Alexander VI finally absolved Pico in 1493. Pico found himself back and ‘at home’ in Florence but excommunicated and formally a heretic. What started as a private-public action with potentially severe consequences, became highly public, and then a longstanding feud between Innocent and Pico who exchanged insults with each other.74 However, none of this seems to have impacted his relationship with either his power or knowledge networks,75 and Innocent’s attempt to assert the authority of the church over Pico clearly shows the limitations of religious authority over a member of the elite. Alexander was more sympathetic perhaps because he needed new power relations for his own dynastic ambitions, but he also shared some of Pico’s interests in non-Christian sources, including Kabbalism.76 Why did Pico’s grand project fail so dramatically, and why has the whole venture lived on in popular myth? Conclusions was not the first printed book to be banned by the Catholic Church, but it was the first general ban and was the start of the Inquisition’s infamous Index of Prohibited Books.77 Perhaps it was the ambition of the enterprise or Pico’s personality, or his reputation as the dazzling young gentlemanphilosopher or simply his social class that makes the event stand out.78 It was also a large-scale act of either hubris or naivety: he took revolutionary non-Christian learning into the heart of papal power to confront the ideas that underpinned Christianity using a new debating method from the troublesome alternative power locale of France (even though this was not how he would have described the project!). By the time of Innocent VIII, papal power was attempting to restabilize after centuries of confrontation and schism. Innocent’s task was threefold: to ensure the position of the pope in Rome as the head of the Catholic Church (after an earlier period of schism), including power over dogma and theology; to consolidate the political power of the papacy in the Christian European arena; and finally, to build his own personal dynasty.79 Pico’s activities, as a member of both the Italian nobility and a problematic intellectual milieu, was a relatively minor irritant in the power games. But the situation was no doubt exacerbated by Pico’s decision to debate at the center of papal power and his attitude toward the commission’s questions: unwittingly or no, he directly challenged Innocent’s conservative views on the new learning80 that was emerging, and his papal power.81 Innocent had also recently issued the first major papal bull against witches.82 Pico’s intertwining of various philosophical and

2

LIFE AND WORKS

23

mystical traditions with an added hint of magical enterprise to show the commonalities between non-Christian and Christian wisdom was unlikely to please. Pico must have found these reactions confusing: his goal was to show that Christianity was the one true religion by taking theological and philosophical dispute back to its distilled mystical essence. But by doing so, he made himself (wittingly or not) a member of the groups and individuals around the Christian Church seeking to challenge, reform, and renew.

A Private Life? In 1489 Lorenzo wrote to Innocent saying that Pico was now living like a monk. It is hard to know what this might mean for a young nobleman with estates, money, and an entourage, but the return from Paris is the beginning of the story of St. Pico, the young man who chastened by his experiences turns to God and lives an increasingly religious lifestyle. Pico’s return to Florence is certainly the beginning of a new phase. In 1486 he saw himself choosing the contemplative life as a gentleman-philosopher but expressed this commitment by acting semi-publicly. His aim was to be an immediate star in his field through the production of an argument that could change philosophy, the Church, and theology, and that could be used as a tool for conversion. Having failed, he withdrew back into this ‘contemplative life’ as a more localized affair: studying, writing, moving around with his entourage, debating, and spending time with his network of friends and power relations. This is not living like a monk. He is simply keeping a relatively ‘low profile.’Much really did not change. Pico made a home in Florence upon his return but at least eventually he traveled and lived elsewhere too. For instance, in 1491 Poliziano and he went on a trip to the Romagna and Veneto buying for the Medici Library on Lorenzo’s behalf. While they were in Padua, Lorenzo asked them to bring Nicoletto Vernia to Florence.83 Gianfrancesco della Mirandola records that Pico sold him his patrimony in Mirandola and Concordia three years before his death (probably April 1491).84 With the money, Pico instead bought an estate in Corbala just outside of Ferrara, and close to Mirandola itself. According to Gianfrancesco, Pico never had a permanent home, but moved between Corbala, Ferrara, and Florence. He was a friend and neighbor of the court in Ferrara, and active within Lorenzo’s circle in Florence.85 His philosophical views do not substantially change either. In 1489 while apparently living as a monk, he published

24

S. HOWLETT

Heptaplus, which utilizes the same worldview as the Oration and relies on the same non-Christian sources, especially Kabbalism. Meanwhile Innocent had laid out terms to pardon Pico. In a letter to Lorenzo just after Heptaplus came out, Pico rejected them.86 Unsurprisingly, Innocent decided also to condemn Heptaplus to Lorenzo’s even more intense frustration.87 The St. Pico myth also suggests a repentant young man increasingly turning to religion. Pico was a religious individual and was increasingly inclined toward a religious life at various times in his short life. There were certainly no more women after Margherita (though Pico’s sexual identity is unclear) and intellectually at least he pursued, above all, the individual mystical experience of oneness with the divine. But Pico’s nephew, Gianfrancesco, introduces us to St. Pico in his Life of his uncle,88 with an important narrative of Pico’s strengthening religious conviction and call to religious orders, which may have culminated in him joining the Dominicans while sick and dying. He admits that Pico’s religiosity was never entirely conventional commenting that Pico was not fond of religious ceremony and the trappings of religious life: ‘But he pursued God with interior feelings of the most burning love.’89 Indeed, in his Commentary on the Psalms, Pico speaks of ‘the tepid people of our time who, under the pretext of ceremonies and devotion, feign holiness, distract the simple and honest at heart from the spirit and the truth and, bustling about, draw them into their own vanity.’90 Unsurprisingly then, Pico also continued to be engaged with Christian reformers most notably with his friend, Girolamo Savonarola, but also with the Carmelite Battista Spagnuoli, and later was increasingly in retreat in Fiesole with Matteo Bossi, the Abbot of the Badia.91 Gianfrancesco recalls walking in an orchard in Ferrara and Pico telling him a secret: once he had finished all his work, he would give his remaining wealth to the poor, and become a wandering barefoot preacher armed only with a crucifix. We cannot know if this was an earnest daydream or genuine intent for old age. But despite a growing interest in the religious life and a consistent engagement with mystical experience and Christian reform ideas, the story of St. Pico is at least partially a smoke screen for a privileged life that continued to be privileged. He most probably did defer joining religious orders even at his death and continued to place his writing and scholarship above whatever religious calling he might have felt he had. He clearly had ‘enthusiasms’ where he would be carried away by the vision of a penitential life and he lived an

2

LIFE AND WORKS

25

unusual existence for a wealthy nobleman dedicating himself primarily to scholarship and to a household not built on excess. He clearly was religious, and he clearly believed in personal noesis / henosis , but not to the extent, as yet, of completely changing his life. During these years, Pico was also part of the intellectual and cultural milieu of Lorenzo’s Florence. He published, continued working on his concord of Aristotle and Plato and the poetic theology, welcomed mentors and colleagues to his home, attended debates at Lorenzo’s house, and generally participated in both his family and knowledge networks. For instance, one well-sourced event was a disputation held at Lorenzo’s house in 1489 between a Franciscan theologian, Benigno Salviati, and the Dominican, De Mirabilibus with Pico, Ficino and Lorenzo apparently siding with the Franciscan.92 The next year, Pico became increasingly interested in seeing his old Dominican friend, Girolamo Savonarola, back in Florence and began to petition Lorenzo, even meeting with the Dominicans in Ferrara in 1492 to facilitate the return.93 But of everybody, his closest relationship seems to have been with Angelo Poliziano, the humanist, philologist, and poet, who had also studied with Ficino, and who also had a strong background in Aristotle. Poliziano and Pico are tied together intellectually, by their friendship and by their deaths.

Pico’s Death ‘Last November, on the day when great King Charles of France entered our city of Florence our Mirandola left us, afflicting the learned with grief nearly as great as the joy that the King meanwhile provided. It was with joy, then, that the guardian spirit of the place repaid the learned for their lament and, to replace a philosophical presence that had been extinguished, in the meantime he lit a royal light, lest Florence seem the darker on that day when, as I say, the light of Mirandola was put out on earth and returned to heaven. For Pico went happy from this shadow of a life, with this surety: that he seemed clearly to be returning from a kind of exile to his fatherland in heaven.’94 Pico died in 1494. He was probably murdered. By whom and to what purpose remains a mystery, but Florence had become a very complicated environment in which to live. Religious change had become bound up even further with politics and power,95 and Lorenzo’s heir and Pico may no longer have been ‘on the same side.’ Meanwhile, King Charles, Pico’s old ally, drew

26

S. HOWLETT

nearer. Poliziano died shortly before Pico, also probably murdered by hands unknown, potentially as part of the same plot. The Medici dynasty was in trouble. Lorenzo had died and his heir, Piero, was finding political management of Florence profoundly difficult eventually absconding under the pressure of Charles of France’s impending arrival. He had loosened Florence’s old ties with France, at a time when Charles of France was invading Italian lands to take on the Kingdom of Naples. Savonarola was Pico’s idea and obviously was not a friend to Piero. Savonarola supported Florence’s relationship with France. Pico knew Charles, who had helped him escape Innocent’s authority. Piero was surrounded by potential traitors including his cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de’ Medici who were in league with Charles. Piero’s own brother, the more able Giovanni (the future Pope Leo X), may not have been on his side either.96 The times were deeply unsettled,97 and Pico may have been seen as part of the problem. Savonarola had become increasingly influential politically as he advocated for a religious reformation based on penitence and poverty. He was able to exploit pre-existing frictions, for instance, the ongoing argument between church and university expressed in the faultlines of the ‘double truth’; new frictions among the populace which led to a crisis of faith;98 and ongoing very concrete power and land tensions as powerful families tried to solidify control over civic life while popes attempted to build individual dynastic interests.99 Savonarola had failed once to make a name for himself as a preacher in Florence, but his oratorical powers and the force of his message had improved dramatically since.100 In the final years of Pico’s life and after his death, Savonarola became the dominant political and religious force of Florence until 1497. He made himself Florence’s conscience, its prophet, and the eminence grise of its civic life, leading a city of sinners to penitence, and a city of penitents toward a great change. Savonarola dominated life. He usurped the Platonist Marsilio Ficino’s attempt to obtain a Golden Age based on love, and the broader notion of a Golden Age based on a civic republican ideal, replacing this idealism with a Christian asceticism based on sin, self-denial, and punishment. Savonarola’s crusade does share much with other movements of the time including a call to return to original texts (in this case, reading the Bible), and a desire to move away from old dynastic powers. The difference is that he is trying to build an ascetic theocracy rather than the Golden Age of enlightened revivification, or the marriage of the sacred and profane. No wonder Ficino disliked him so much.101 But leaving

2

LIFE AND WORKS

27

aside Gianfrancesco’s St. Pico, the extent to which Savonarola exerted influence over Pico’s thought and actions before or during Savonarola’s return to Florence remains an open question. All of Pico’s movable items were left to his brother, Anton Maria, including his famous library. Cardinal Domenico Grimani bought many of his books, some of which were then left to the monastery of San Antonio di Castello in Venice.102 Meanwhile, the month of Pico’s death was a turning point for Savonarola. The arrival of Charles fulfilled a prophecy that Savonarola had made.103 This was the crucial final piece of his self-fashioning as a prophet104 and thereby ordained leader to a new vision of Christianity based on scripture.105 As a prophet he accrued to himself the sole right to speak truth and foretell the future. From then onwards, he spoke for God.106 All those who disagreed were clearly in the wrong whether they were philosophers, poets, or astrologers.107 Despite Pico’s reputation in Florence, Savonarola was able to preach days after Pico’s death that he was consigned to purgatory, rather than in heaven.108 He even admitted that he had wanted God to strike Pico, so that he might re-examine his life. Savonarola thought that Pico had been given a mission by God to use his talents for the greater good, and he had not listened.109

Building the Myth Pico’s executor and primary heir was Gianfrancesco who acted as the trustee of Pico’s philosophical and literary estate. Given that much of Pico’s work is, according to Pico himself, fragments of larger projects that may or may not have been going on in the background, the role of trustee was complicated. Gianfrancesco was interested in theology intellectually and became a devotee of Savonarola, far more clearly so than Pico himself. He saw the revival of classical philosophy, especially the revival of Aristotle, as antithetical to the renewal of the Christian religion.110 His view of Plato was much less severe, perhaps having more sympathy for Ficino’s marriage of Platonism and theology.111 This was the individual now in charge of shaping Pico’s legacy. Gianfrancesco edited and published Pico’s collected works and fragments,112 finishing at least one important work himself (Disputations), leaving out the Conclusions and related works from Pico’s first great project completely,113 and writing a biography for the first volume that celebrated ‘St. Pico’: mythologising Pico’s life including adding miracles that supposedly occurred from his birth onwards.114 Obviously

28

S. HOWLETT

Pico’s argument with the pope, his heretical views, and the incident with Margherita, over-complicated his vision. Instead he tells a story that Savonarola would have approved. He tells us a story of slander, but also penitence and a turn to the religious life.115 The biography was popularized in England and beyond by Thomas More, who certainly seems to have treated it as a holy life. Gianfrancesco also starts the story of Pico as the man of prodigious memory,116 as well as underlining Pico’s originality. He portrays Pico’s work as a personal and solitary intellectual victory. Those around him that provided material, that debated with him, translated works so that he could use them, are absent.117 He was not the only one of Pico’s circle to want to control reception of his work. Ficino was busy editing out or ameliorating disagreements, for instance on Platonic love theory as outlined in Pico’s Commentary: ‘When still young and passionate, he wrote something about love, but he condemned it when his judgment ripened, and he wanted it completely effaced: it cannot be published without damage to him. For my part, I know what this pious man wanted in the end, for Pico was a a son to me in age, a brother in kinship and in love really another self’.118 Poliziano may have disagreed but was not there to help shape the legacy. So the issue of what was ‘canonical’ to Pico’s thought was immediately contested ground amidst a series of manuscripts that were never published, or apparently never finished, or that may have been embarrassing to his reputation, or outside of the framework of the Pico that Gianfrancesco or his friends wished to shape. This contestation over what is mainly a series of studies and skeletons of larger projects, together with the brevity of his life, has remained the hallmark of Pico Studies: what is Pico’s legacy, did his views change over time, is it possible to assess a philosophical legacy with this level of published output? Gianfrancesco’s influence shaped several centuries of reception: the most popular pieces of Pico’s work, until the ‘rediscovery’ of the Oration in the early twentieth century were the Letters that emphasized Pico’s religiosity.119 Ficino’s assertion of his close relationship also partially impacted reception for good and bad. Until recently, Pico Studies was divided into those researching Ficino and his ‘Academy,’ with Pico as Ficino’s intellectual lieutenant; and those writing about Pico alone with little to no mention of Ficino. There has been little middle ground. Meanwhile, the role of those around Pico—the entourage of translators, philosophers, commentators, mentors—was lost.

2

LIFE AND WORKS

29

Works Gianfrancesco’s volumes were the first attempt to produce a canon. They included works published or distributed by Pico during his lifetime such as Heptaplus, other pieces that were only published for the first time in these posthumous forms (and were therefore edited to some degree by Gianfrancesco) and excluded problematic publications such as the Conclusions. Whatever Gianfrancesco’s preferences, the task was difficult. Pico’s work is a mixture of significant letters, finished exercises, fragments of larger projects, and considered pieces that may have been planned as part of something more ambitious, such as the poetic theology and the concord of Aristotle and Plato. It is a difficult oeuvre to categorise conceptually into a coherent body. His output starts in 1485 with an extended letter on rhetoric and philosophy which was part of a debate with his friend, Ermolao Barbaro, but then comes the annus mirabilis of 1486 with the Commentary on a Canzone by Girolamo Benivieni (the commentary on Plato’s love theory which was not published in his lifetime or Gianfrancesco’s first edition), another such letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici on the relative merits of his poetry, and letters to friends such as Andreas Corneo and Marsilio Ficino, that show his intellectual journey during the year. The Conclusions followed, which Pico himself had published, with the Oration as his last work of 1486 written as a prologue to his debate. These are all very different types of text, but they already share certain fundamentals: particularly a belief that certain traditions provided a pathway for personal ascent to the divine.120 They also all lean on the work and support of his entourage of thinkers and translators whether from the texts translated by Flavius, to the poem of Pico’s friend, Benivieni, amended as necessary to fit Pico’s goals. In 1487 while in Rome, Pico wrote his Apology taking from the Oration for its introduction. This is a specific case of cannibalization of writing, but throughout his career he tended to repeat ideas or fragments from one work to another, perhaps because his career is so condensed, or because short pieces were supposed to be parts of greater works and also so much was unpublished and therefore not edited by Pico himself.121 There was then, unsurprisingly, a hiatus during his flight to France, but finally in 1489, settled back in Florence, Pico had a second productive phase. He first wrote possibly his most complete work, Heptaplus, a commentary on the first creation story in Genesis, which

30

S. HOWLETT

was published at that time. Heptaplus is also his first work on cosmology, providing an alternative or addendum (depending on your perspective) to Ficino’s description of the universe in his Commentary on Plato’s ‘Philebus’. Heptaplus was followed by his last full work, On Being and the One (1490), which seems to be more of a pamphlet, circulated rather than published, and again possibly meant as part of a larger work. On Being and the One was focused on a specific metaphysical point of contention between Plato and Aristotle. Alongside these writings, he was also drafting a Commentary on Psalms probably from 1488,122 part of a series of short spiritual pieces written in his last few years including a Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, Twelve Rules for the Spiritual Battle, and a Commentary on Job.123 These liturgical and biblical commentaries are devotional in nature rather than philosophical per se and were all published for the first time by Gianfrancesco after Pico’s death. But they do provide insight into Pico’s intense experience of his Christian identity. It is an intensely ascetic experience wherein he appears to deny the sensual life, just as he turns away from physical love in his Commentary (suggesting again that Pico’s beliefs also did not fundamentally change from the beginning of his career until the end). These pieces suggest an ascetic personality or perhaps rather a desire for the ascetic life seemingly at odds with his position, wealth and lifestyle. Finally, at least for the last year of his life, he was also working on a piece against astrology (Disputations). Not a complete work, it remains contentious, including the extent of Gianfrancesco’s role in editing the notes he found on Pico’s death. Pico’s two extended letters (to Barbaro in 1485 and Lorenzo in 1486 respectively) deal with the same debate: the question of style versus content. In his letter to Barbaro he formally opposes Barbaro’s defence of rhetoricians over philosophers.124 Pico sides with the philosophers against the hyperbole of rhetoricians (what is said is more important than how one says it). But his argument is itself expressed with considerable rhetorical flourish, carefully crafted beneath the veneer of rhetorical naivety. Pico proclaims the supremacy of the philosopher while at the same time extolling the virtues of the rhetorician through his style. As a philosopher who also had ambitions as a poet, the juxtaposition suggests that his argument is ironic.125 Pico always wanted to excel at both. Then in July 1486126 Pico wrote a letter to Lorenzo about his poetry: specifically, who is the better poet: the stylist, Petrarch, or the poet with profound

2

LIFE AND WORKS

31

content, Dante? Unsurprisingly, Lorenzo is found to have both style and content and therefore surpasses both Petrarch and Dante. Pico’s Commentary on a Canzone goes further than his letters, combining philosophical commentary with poetry. The Commentary is also in many respects a counterpoint to Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s ‘Symposium.’ It highlights Pico’s approach to Platonism, based rather more on Plotinus than Ficino’s at that period, and outlines for the first time his signature combination of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Kabbalism. The Commentary is based on Benivieni’s Canzone dell’Amor Divino (‘Song of Divine Love’) also apparently inspired by Ficino’s work, but based on a poem by Guido Cavalcanti, ‘Donna me prega’ written around 1285. Cavalcanti was the ancestor of a friend of Ficino’s featured in his own Commentary. But as with so much else he produced Pico saw his own commentary simply as part of something grander he was planning.127 My little commentary is nothing to get excited about. I wrote it when I was bored and had nothing else to do, as a way of relaxing my mind, not of exciting it. It is only a prologue to the Commentary on Plato’s Symposium which I am planning to write.128

The Commentary reads like both an apprentice piece and the first strike of the student against the teacher, Ficino. He apparently never returned to this project. As an apprentice piece, the argumentation is careful and labored. However, Pico lays out his methodology in detail, and it is the methodology that he will use throughout his career, providing an essential insight into Pico’s approach. As a strike against Ficino, Pico was setting himself up as a new, rival expert on Platonism to the father of the Platonic revival. He is suggesting he has an alternative, ‘truer’ understanding of Platonism (based on Plotinus). Pico is very clear that his work is at least in part a critique of Ficino. He even mentions Ficino throughout his text, and hardly in flattering terms: You can imagine, reader, how many mistakes our Marsilio makes in the first part of The Banquet; on this one score alone he completely confuses and invalidates what he says about love. But in addition to this, he has made mistakes on every subject in every part of his treatise, as I expect to show clearly later on.129

32

S. HOWLETT

He even requested Benivieni to change his poem so that he could score points against Ficino,130 with the commentary sometimes assuming changes to the poem that Benivieni never completed. Pico’s primary disagreement with Ficino in this text is with Ficino’s view of physical love and beauty. Gianfrancesco did not include the Commentary in his edition, perhaps to assuage Ficino’s feelings or Benivieni’s (who had become a devotee of Savonarola and was perhaps uncomfortable with love commentaries) or just simply because he viewed it as a piece of juvenilia. Benivieni stated that Pico and himself both rejected it in later life.131 It did though have a prominent later history in Italy, France, and England, rivalling Ficino’s philosophy of love,132 and Pico used aspects of the work for Heptaplus. There is also consistency between the Commentary and the Oration. The introduction to the debate has the same methodological approach and primary interests (mixing Platonism, Aristotelianism and a variety of non-Christian sources especially Kabbalism). The Conclusions consist of 900 theses divided into two main sections, with thematic groupings within each section. Section one consists of 402 conclusions or theses to be debated. They are organized historically, or at least in the history of thought as Pico understood it, beginning with the most recent philosophical schools and key scholars of the medieval period, and then moving back in time to ‘core thought’ from the past, as if philosophy is a palimpsest, and we remove the layers piece by piece until we are left with the underlying ‘truth’ or point of origin. Section two consists of 498 statements according to Pico’s own opinion (secundum opinionem propriam). They begin with the underlying ‘truth,’ move through a series of variations on the theme taking us finally to Kabbalism and related esoterica: keys to the religious mystery of the divine—not philosophy but a theological philosophy, secrets that will lead us to oneness with the divine. The Conclusions end with a practical application for this key to the mysteries: an attempt to convert the Jews with their own religious teachings. This is not simply an interesting byproduct of Pico’s argumentation. Traditionally, the conversion of the Jews was the precursor to the world’s end and the coming of God’s Kingdom.133 A list of assertions is a difficult structure to analyse.134 They are organized in the very particular scholastic tradition of quaestiones.135 There are also an overwhelming number.136 How do we know what Pico’s attitude was to each? Can we assume that all conclusions reflect Pico’s opinion or, at least, the position he intended to argue?137 But the Apology and

2

LIFE AND WORKS

33

Oration are available to support our understanding. He tells us in the Apology, for example, that the proposals are more than simply pieces for debate. They are meant to weave together and thereby resolve traditional historical disagreements or complexities of theology and philosophy,138 revealing to us step by step, a new understanding of both, made up of a union of Aristotle and Plato, and the mystical ‘truth’ of Kabbalism. The Oration is a formal introductory speech,139 both to his debate and to Pico himself as a prominent new philosopher on the stage of Latin Europe. Pico did not circulate it, nor was it given a title. In the later 1504 edition of his works it was first given the subtitle de hominis dignitate, referring to the apparent topic of the first part of the speech.140 As with the Commentary, the Oration became highly influential later, this time in the twentieth century when more than 50 versions were produced into the twenty-first century.141 It was probably written in four stages, beginning in September 1486 during the writing of the Conclusions, and finished in Rome awaiting the debate. The Oration contains separate themes including a substantial section defending philosophy and the contemplative life which could then be made into the Apology in May 1487 when a rapid defense of his work was needed.142 The Apology or Apologia tredecim quaestionum is not an apology per se, but in terms of its timing looks like a rapid, but extensive attempt to defend his work in the light of specific accusations.143 In his Life, Gianfrancesco claimed it as a major work (as opposed to the Oration)144 and recent scholarship has suggested that the Apology may be more important than a quick defence. Amos Edelheit has suggested that the Apology provides the rationale for Pico’s whole Rome project as a critique of contemporary scholastic methodology and its ongoing division of philosophy and faith.145 But the Apology, with its focus on defending the 13 (out of 900) theses questioned by the papal commission, is a restricted lens given Pico’s attention to so many other topics beyond scholasticism throughout his work. In the Apology, Pico asserts his belief that his Conclusions are orthodox suggesting that he knows things that the commission does not (the elitism of the esoteric symptomatic of his career), as if these people could not possibly understand what he is attempting and had missed the point.146 He dedicated the piece to Lorenzo, who accepted the dedication after having it checked for orthodoxy with his ‘tame theologian,’ Benigno Salviati.147

34

S. HOWLETT

After his return to Italy, Pico published Heptaplus in 1489,148 and wrote On Being and the One (as a manuscript for sharing) shortly afterward. Heptaplus is an intricate interpretation on multiple levels of the story of creation using the same core approaches as his earlier works. On Being was dedicated to Poliziano as part of an ongoing debate between Aristotelians and Platonists.149 On Being seems likely to have been part of the proposed concord between Aristotle and Plato. It was also a response to Ficino’s writing on Being and the One. But Pico’s ‘polemic’ was disputed not only by Ficino (from the Platonic perspective) but also by his friend, the Aristotelian, Antonio de Cittadini.150 Over a series of letters with Cittadini, Pico argues that he is genuinely attempting to do something new between Aristotle and Plato, leaving neither ‘side’ content. What both Heptaplus and On Being and the One show is that Pico’s philosophical views and his methodology do not significantly change pre and post his Roman adventure. The combination of specific forms of Platonism, with Aristotelianism and Kabbalism, found in the Commentary and Conclusions continues. His final work, the Disputations, was a major piece Pico was writing when he died. He had apparently composed 12 out of 13 books,151 though Gianfrancesco put much of it together.152 It appears to be a polemic against the use of astrology with a strong dose of religious sanctimony that could be connected to the Savonarolan movement, and the first time that Pico seems to contradict at least some of his earlier philosophical positions: ‘Let us not be deceived, as I was once deceived, when I was young, by the wisdom of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, which was renowned amongst the ancients, Plato included.’153 The critical debates around Disputations focus on its potential Aristotelianism (suggesting Pico to be at heart an Aristotelian), its antagonism toward Ficino, its religiosity, and the question of Gianfrancesco’s manipulation of the text.154 One of his peers, Lucio Bellanti, seemed to think Pico would have changed his mind had he lived,155 that he was under the influence of Savonarola and that the edition Gianfrancesco produced was even more under this influence.156 But it could be argued, for instance, that Pico was simply disputing against some forms of astrology, natal charts or prognostications of political events, that is judicial astrology, rather than Ficino’s magical astrology.157 Indeed, this critique of the use of astrology for political prognostication was an interesting and remarkably timely argument in a year when Savonarola was preparing his role as God’s anointed (and only) prophet. Pico was also connecting to a history

2

LIFE AND WORKS

35

of anti-astrology writings, like those of Nicolas Oresme and Henry of Hesse, the fourteenth-century physicists.158 Pico’s Aristotelianism here is linked to his interest in science and the lack of a scientific approach in some types of astrology. But Poliziano, who probably knew Pico best, thought that Pico’s views would contradict Ficino’s and the work could be read as part of an ongoing debate on the legitimacy of astrology and star magic that Ficino began in his Three Books on Life (De vita libri tres ).159 Astrology was partially promoted by Ficino. Savonarola also later wrote his own piece against astrology, Trattato contra li astrologi (1497). His views and Pico’s writing seem to go hand in hand. Pico began Disputations around 1493, and Savonarola gave his first sermon against astrology at Advent 1493.160 Savonarola is juxtaposing the false prophecy of astrologers with himself as the true prophet of Christianity.161 It is entirely consistent that Pico would have written a text arguing against a major work by Ficino, just as Ficino would have been in opposition to Savonarola (though wisely relatively silent on the subject).162 However there is no evidence that Pico was moving away from his other projects in preference for a new Savonarolan inspired agenda. He was still working to bring Aristotle and Plato together,163 and there is no evidence that he was rejecting Kabbalism. His final work may be problematic as a finished piece, but also shows considerable consistency with his primary ‘finished’ work. This is a small body of works, just as Pico’s life was foreshortened. Both life and works were fashioned by himself and his heirs as unique. He is the golden youth who became St. Pico, or the gentleman-philosopher dazzling with his abilities and ambition. More recently, it has been easy to read Pico as the ‘exceptional’ individual: the young genius, the last person who knew everything. This reading is encouraged by Pico’s writing which promotes the uniqueness of the individual (unique) experience: the journey of the mystic on a path to oneness with the divine. He outlines in fragments the shape of this pathway. Here too the lure of modern reinterpretation has been strong: we read the Oration and see there our own vision of human dignity—the freedom and ability of the individual to be whoever and whatever we wish. But in life and his work, Pico’s history is the product of a larger set of relations: groups that supported his ambitions as a scholar and actor in complex times. The work he produced with their support was also the product of multiple traditions, a combination of classical revivals, and

36

S. HOWLETT

non-Christian ideas. Most particularly, his pathway to oneness is made up of a signature combination of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Kabbalism. Pico brings people together to support his studies, and he brings ideas together to create a syncretic164 vision of the universe and the history of philosophy. This bringing together of philosophy and theology, this bringing together of scholars and translators, supports his life’s work as expressed in the Conclusions, his efforts to produce a concord of Aristotle and Plato, and a poetic theology. To understand Pico’s syncretic vision and the pathway toward God that he builds, we therefore need to understand those scholars and traditions that contribute to his vision. Pico was part of a long history of research on Aristotelianism. The history of Platonism had only re-emerged more recently. Pico focused on Plotinus and several later Platonists but was always mindful of the positions of his former teacher, Marsilio Ficino. Kabbalism was new to the Christian world. Often thought of as Pico’s especial contribution to the history of thought, we find under the surface an extraordinary story of scholarly engagement from his academic entourage. In the next chapter we will begin to explore these scholars and traditions beginning with the Aristotelian and Platonic elements, including his intellectual point and counterpoint with Ficino, his most important scholarly friend and rival.

Notes 1. S. Farmer (1998, 1 n1): Concordia was near Mirandola and part of the family’s holdings and ‘Both Pico and his contemporaries made much of his title as a divine sign of his holy mission as a reconciler.’ 2. L. Valcke (1994, 378). Valcke notes the different approaches to scholastic thought each of these institutions provided at the time. 3. G. Busi and R. Ebgi (2014, xii) suggest spring–summer 1483. 4. Busi and Ebgi (2014, xi–xii). Ebgi calls it an ‘accademia pichiana’ and notes the presence of Pico’s Greek teacher, Manuel Adramitteno, as well as the humanist and publisher, Aldo Manuzio. 5. P.O. Kristeller (1993a, 245). 6. C. Trinkaus (1987, 82). Kristeller (1993, 229 and 229 n3) notes Baptista Guarinus as a mentor and teacher, citing Garin on letters between Pico and Guarinus. 7. E. Garin (2008, 295). The Medici did business with Pico’s father, Gianfrancesco I, and his brother, Galeotto. Garin thinks Pico made a trip to Florence in 1479 and argues that Pico left Poliziano some of his poetry

2

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

LIFE AND WORKS

37

to read. Benivieni mentions Pico in his ‘Bucolica’ written between 1478 and 1480. S. Jayne (1984b, 18), Benivieni ‘dallied in the Academy of Plato’ (citing 62 n50 Biblioteca Riccardiana MS 2811, fol. 93 v). O. Zorzi Pugliese (1994, 477). B. Copenhaver (2011, 176). Kristeller (1993a, 234) further argues that Pico produced one of the first long literary works in Tuscan by a Northerner. L. Dorez and L. Thuasne (1897, 16–17). Pico sent Poliziano a series of poems to various women, perhaps reminiscent of Petrarch. See also Opera 1:372–73, 361–62, as cited by W. G. Craven (1981, 43 n81). All references to Pico’s Complete Works (Opera) are to the Basel 1572 edition (2 vols), ed. E. Garin (1971). Turin: Bottega D’Erasmo, but primarily individual editions of his works are used throughout. Trinkaus (1987, 82). Kristeller thinks Poliziano’s comments on Pico’s poetry indicate a strong interest in Ovid, Kristeller (1993a, 239), referencing Poliziano, Opera, 8–9, ‘Nasoni tuo’. See Roth (2017) for a detailed consideration of Pico’s sonnets. Also Copenhaver (2011, 164). Gianfrancesco tries to portray Pico as having stopped poetry when turning to the more serious business of philosophy. But Kristeller notes that when Innocent let Pico settle back in Italy, he suggested Lorenzo de’ Medici induce Pico to focus on poetry (1993a, 233 n18). This work eschews further consideration of Pico’s literary output in favor of his philosophy, though an examination of both in juxtaposition would make a fascinating study, particularly if it elucidated his notion of a poetic theology. Craven (1981, 43). Pico found the combination of poet and philosopher challenging. In a letter to Poliziano: ‘I… using my reputation for philosophizing to excuse myself among poets and rhetoricians, and among philosophers, the fact that I indulge in rhetoric and cultivate the Muses. The result, however, is far different [from Poliziano’s position] in my case. While, as they say, I am trying to sit on two stools at once, I miss both of them, and so it is that I am neither poet nor orator, nor yet a philosopher.’ (‘Simili et ego ut(o)r perfugio ut poetis, rhetoribusque me approbem, propterea quod philosophari dicar: philosophis quod rhetorissem, et musas colam, quanquam mihi longe aliter accidit atque tibi. Quippe ego dum geminis (ut aiut) sellis sedere volo, utraque excludor, fitque demum (ut dicam paucis) ut nec poeta, nec rhetor sim, neque philosophus’) Craven citing Opera, 1:364. Craven (1981, 68) cites Kristeller that a poetic theology is the deduction of philosophical truths from the contents of poetry. This ‘had been a common humanist allusion since the early fourteenth century.’ Eugenio Garin argues that the poetic theology idea was also found in Pletho, who

38

S. HOWLETT

17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

wished to combine poetry with classical narratives such as legends and myths, to build a theology (1965, 83). Busi and Ebgi (2014, xviii). Busi and Ebgi (2014, xi): ‘Girolamo Ramusio, amico e confidente di Pico, fu per esempio tra i primissimi, nel Quattrocento italiano, a intraprendere studi arabi. Dopo gli anni universitari, Ramusio partí per il Levante in cerca di fortuna, e trovò poi tragica fine in Siria.’ Trinkaus (1987, 82). Valcke argues it was only for a few winter months (1997, 328). F. Borghesi (2012, 38). He may have been reading late Aristotelian texts such as those on language and logic. His reading of calculators is ‘still evident’ in Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem (Disputations). Busi and Ebgi (2014, xii n17). Earlier Busi argues that the Paris trip dates of late summer 1485–March/April 1486 are ‘largely hypothetic and surely to be revised’. We just know from Pico’s Apologia (1487) that he had been to Paris. G. Busi (2006b, 182–83). Dorez and Thuasne (1897, 28 and 38): the student-registers for the faculties of arts and theology are missing and the Sorbonne library records (diarium) of borrowers (1402–1530) ‘unreadable’ during this period. But they argue he added to his group of strong relationships while there. Busi (2006b, 185): two letters sent from Florence on May 11th and 12th, state that Pico had been there for months. A third letter says he stayed there about two years. But he may have traveled elsewhere during this period. Busi (2009, 171) cites a letter, December 12th, 1485, from Lorenzo de’ Medici to Marquis Francesco Gonzago. Lorenzo asks the ruler of Mantua to support Pico in a dispute pending in Mantua. Lorenzo mentions that Pico lives in Florence. Aldobrandino Guidoni, in his letter to Eleonora d’Aragona, Duchess of Ferrara, from Florence, on May 12th, 1486 says that Pico had remained in the city for about two years. Michael Allen argues (2008, 81) that Pico was in Florence from spring 1484 to summer 1485, then in Paris July 1485 to March 1486. He cites the Aristotelian plan of the Conclusiones, and the use of what ‘would be in effect a grand Parisian disputatio’ to defend his perspective. Kristeller (1993a, 237): Pico is taking from Seneca’s epistles where the Stoic apologizes for his quotations from Epicurus. Letter to Barbaro, December 6th, 1484. ‘Diverti nuper ab Aristotele in Academiam, sed non transfuga ut inquit ille, verum explorator’ Opera 1:368. P.C. Bori (2012, 17 n24). Pico tells Ficino: ‘This I know: Plotinus has not left my thoughts. Not only do I have his works at hand, but I feel obliged to study him as well. I have always admired him just as I do now’ (‘Hoc scio, non excidisse mihi Plotinum, quem non in manibus

2

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

LIFE AND WORKS

39

habendum modo, sed discendum adeo mihi, et semper censui, et nunc quoque censeo’), Letter, Opera 1:368. Borghesi (2012, 40): Pico ‘often boasted of his skill at using the Paris disputative style’—‘celebratissimorum Parisiensium disputatorum.’ A. Brown (2006, 360): Jean Laillier’s conclusions were a cause célèbre in Paris 1485–86. Farmer (1998, 7): leading to imitators in the next century. Farmer (1998, 32), points out the number 500, symbolizing ‘eschatological return,’ suggesting that Pico was attempting to return ‘thought to its primal but now shattered unity.’ E. Garin (1972, 216): in spring 1486 Pico, Flavius Mithridates and Giovanni Mercurio da Correggio arrived in Florence together with French envoys. Bori (2012, 11). Bori (2012, 13): ‘And, truly, the nature of this event is such that the whole of this city is saddened, for this Count Giovanni had the reputation of being the most learned man that there had been in this city in a long time. He was deemed a saint; now he has lost his good name and position.’ (‘Et veramente questo caso è di natura che a tuta questa citta rencresce perche questo conte Zohanne havea in questa cita uno nome del piu docto homo che fusse uno buon pezo; et era reputato uno sancto; ora ha perso la reputatione et conditione sua.’) Letter, Aldobrandino to Ercole, cited by Garin (1972, 202). Bori (2012, 12–13). Del Medigo worked with Pico on philosophy, Arabic and Hebrew, and Jewish mysticism, Busi and Ebgi (2014, xxi). von K. Stuckrad (2007, 7 n13): In September, he wrote to Ficino that although his Hebrew was insufficient, he could now compose a simple letter (‘[…]in qua possum nondum quidem cum laude, sed citra culpam epistolam dictare’ Opera, 1:367). C. Wirszubski (1989, 3 n1) cites Pico: ‘El desiderio solo del quale [della Cabala] mi mosse all’assiduo studio della ebraica e caldaica lingua, sanza le quali alla cognizione di quella pervenire è al tutto impossibile.’ But argues Pico probably could not read much of the Kabbalistic texts he used before going to Rome, his knowledge of Kabbalism in 1486 ‘was not determined by his knowledge of Hebrew. Hence, even if he happens to quote or refer to untranslated books, we must not assume that Pico read them unless he could read them in translation’ (1989, 5). Though he could have worked through material with Flavius (1989, 9). Bori (2012, 17): Pico says he read ‘the letters of Mohammed of Toledo and Abulgal, who studied with Averroes, and the questions of a certain Adelando […] who philosophized under Ammonius, Plotinus’ teacher in Egypt.’

40

S. HOWLETT

38. Pico could be called one of the first orientalists of Latin Europe, see Kristeller (1993a, 227). 39. Bori (2012, 18) argues that regarding Rome, Pico thought ‘a triumph would follow his heroic and intellectual deeds and would erase the dishonour of the undertaking in Arezzo. This theme was frequent in the letters of the period.’ 40. Bori (2012, 20). Pico’s Letter of October 15th to Andrea Corneo. 41. Bori (2012, 28). Pico wrote to an unnamed friend on November 10th, 1486 that he had already put on hat and boots to go to Rome: ‘petasatus iam et caligatus’ (Opera, 1:385). 42. Bori (2012, 28–29): ‘If my doctrine of numbers is true, 900 is the symbol of the soul that recedes into itself, struck by the incitement of the Muses.’ (‘Est enim (si vera est nostra de numeris doctrina) symbolum animae in se ipsam oestro Musarum perciptae recurrentis.’) Letter from Fratta to Girolamo Benivieni. Citing, Dorez and Thuasne (1897, 358). 43. Farmer (1998, 4 and 4 n11): a debate ‘inter paucos et doctos secreto congressu’ (‘among few learned men, convened privately’). The apostolic senate comes from the Apologia. The term ‘council’ is only used in his writing before the proposed debate was attacked by the church. 44. M. V. Dougherty (2002, 219 n3): ‘Et siquis Philosophus aut Theologus etiam ab extrema Italia arguendi gratia Romam venire voluerit, pollicetur ipse Dominus disputaturus se viatici expensas illi soluturum de suo.’ Citing Farmer (1998, 552 n1) who also mentions that a copy was sent to Marsilio Ficino, alongside other prominent individuals (1998, 3). 45. Farmer (1998, 4). 46. By December 7th where ‘the publication of the Conclusiones immediately received very negative reactions.’ Bori (2012, 10). 47. Borghesi (2012, 41): papal brief ‘Cum injunctio nobis,’ February 20th, 1487. Craven (1981, 48): the so-called ‘objectionable theses’ were Christus non veraciter; peccato mortali; Nec crux Christi; Non assentior communi; Nulla est Scientia; Si teneatur communis; Rationabilius est credere; Dico probabiliter; Qui dixerit accidens; Illa verba, Hoc; Miracula Christi non; and Magis improprie dicitur de Deo; Nihil intelligit actu et distincte. 48. Brown (2006, 361) describing how ‘Jean Cordier, then in Rome, had helped Pico to return to his condemned theses and print them in many copies (presumably referring to the Apology defending the theses), and how the university, although agreeing to obey the pope and to capture Pico and Cordier, nevertheless wanted to know what the propositions were…. As this record suggests, Cordier warmly supported Pico.’ 49. Borghesi (2012, 41). 50. Borghesi (2012, 41).

2

LIFE AND WORKS

41

51. ‘(a recto tramite ortodoxe fidei deviare).’ Cited by Dougherty (2002, 220). 52. Craven argues that Garsias had to define heresy very broadly (1981, 54). 53. Farmer (1998, 1 n2): Determinationes magistrales contra Conclusiones apologales Joannis Pici Mirandulani Concordiae comitis (1489). According to Dulles (1941, 17), Garsias explains the Commission’s point of view ‘with considerable skill, and controverted Pico’s arguments by well-drawn scholastic distinctions.’ 54. Dorez and Thuasne (1897, 59) show some of Pico’s use of the Palatine Library during his stay. 55. Craven (1981, 72): Pico called the commission ‘barbarians and stammerers, accused them of heresy, mocked their ignorance of the meaning of “Kabbalah” and their scholarly shortcomings. His virulence was fueled by his conviction of their hostile prejudice against him. The actual ideas he proposed, however, were hardly daring.’ 56. Borghesi (2012, 41): ‘Exasperated and convinced of correctness of his own reasoning’ Pico quickly did apologise and ‘treated and clarified’ the 13. 57. J. Kraye (2008, 28): Kraye argues that the Parisian style was a lingua franca for philosophers and made sense for the conclusions. But the repetition of the style in the Apology was ‘a deliberate act of provocation, directed against the theologians of the papal commission.’ 58. Borghesi (2012, 41): The Vatican ‘viewed the publication of the Apologia on 31 May 1487 as an act of insubordination.’ 59. Dorez and Thuasne (1897, 66). 60. Brown (2006, 366). 61. Brown (2006, 358). 62. Borghesi (2012, 42). 63. Though it was republished in Ingolstadt, Bavaria, in 1487. Brown (2006, 358 n3). 64. See, for example, Brown (2006, 368). 65. Craven (1981, 74). Innocent VIII’s brief ‘Et si ex iniuncto nobis’ is very general and includes statements from the first group of conclusions, ‘secundum aliorum opinionem’ not mentioned by the commission and many others ‘which revived errors of pagan philosophers, favoured the falsehoods of the Jews, or tried to lend to forbidden arts the respectability of natural philosophy.’ 66. Brown (2006, 358). 67. Brown (2006, 360). Both Gaguin and Pico had been in Florence in May 1486. 68. Borghesi (2012, 42). Charles apparently placed him in Vincennes ‘lest he be turned over to the Vatican.’

42

S. HOWLETT

69. Brown (2006, 366): in early February Count Antonio della Mirandola had heard of Lorenzo’s support for his brother and asked him to persevere. 70. Dorez and Thuasne (1897, 75). 71. Bori (2012, 13), citing M. Del Piazzo (1993) ‘Nuovi documenti sull’incidente aretino di Pico della Mirandola nel 1486,’ Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato 23, 282. 72. Brown (2006, 366): Lorenzo’s ambassador, Lanfredini, wrote to him in mid-March with news that Innocent had agreed to Pico’s return. Lorenzo replied ‘with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction’ and with the intention to invite Pico to live in Florence (2006, 366–67, n30: ‘Con grandissimo piacere e satisfactione mia ho inteso della resolutione che avete facto con Nostro Signore del Conte Giovanni della Mirandola et su questo fondamento che mi scrivete farò intendere al Conte prefato che se ne vengha di qua’). 73. Allen (2008, 82). 74. P. R. Blum (2008, 37): ‘Misera Italia e tutta Europa intorno/ che ‘l tuo gran padre Papa iace e vende,’ Pico, poem 1488, Sonetto XLV 1–2 in Pico, Sonetti (1994, 91). 75. Garin (2008, 206): Alexander VI absolved Pico on the June 18th, 1493 after Lorenzo had died. In addition to getting him back to Florence, Lorenzo ordered books ‘for himself’ from the Vatican library for Pico, welcomed Savonarola back at Pico’s request and asked Pico to be at his side when he died. 76. M. A. Bertman (1986, 228): as shown in Pinturicchio’s paintings for Alexander’s apartment (Appartamento Borgia in the Vatican). 77. See Dougherty (2002, 220 and n5). 78. Bori (2012, 19) argues that the problem with the debate was not a debate per se, but ‘the number of the theses, the vastness and novelty of their themes, and the figure of Pico himself that attracted attention and rendered the episode exceptional in the eyes of his contemporaries.’ The commission did not originally focus on the magical issues, his use of pagan mysticism including Kabbalism generally (though Innocent does later). They focused on debates within scholasticism and the impact of Kabbalistic ideas on the central tenets of Christianity, though not in a broad way, see Craven (1981, 66–67). 79. Innocent had illegitimate children who needed a future. During 1487, Lorenzo de’ Medici and Innocent were negotiating a marriage for Innocent’s son, Franceschetto Cybo, to Lorenzo’s daughter, Maddalena. Innocent was also offering this marriage to Ferrante of Naples and trying to ally with Venice against Florence. The Medici were aiming to have Lorenzo’s second son, Giovanni, made a cardinal, securing Medici ambitions for the papacy. Lorenzo and Innocent eventually came to terms.

2

80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

88.

89. 90.

91. 92. 93.

LIFE AND WORKS

43

Giovanni became a cardinal at age 13, and later was elected Pope Leo X. Lorenzo’s letters to his ambassador, Lanfredini during 1487 were primarily focused on this negotiation. For instance, Innocent when simply Cardinal Lotharius had written that ‘man is a miserable creature saved solely by Christ; and, since salvation is the uppermost concern, non-Christian wisdom has little to offer.’ Pico’s work could be considered a response. Bertman (1986, 229). Fornaciari (1994, 576). Zambelli (2007, 21) ‘Summis desiderantes affectibus’, included as a preface to the Malleus maleficarum in 1487. Kraye (1996, 160), citing also R. Ribuoli (1981), La collazione poliziano del codice bambino di Terenzio, Rome’, Rome, 1, n1 (1996, 164 n71). Catani (2000, 48). Fioravanti (1997, 157): his letters show repeated and frequent trips to Ferrara. Craven (1981, 84): in a letter to Lorenzo, August 27th, 1489, ‘Pico rejected indignantly the condition laid down by Rome that he should admit to having contravened the papal prohibition against his theses. It would be most unjust, because he would be confessing to what he had never done. He insisted that the pope should declare his innocence, and even outlined the form the brief should take. He was adamant that reconciliation with the pope must be on his terms.’ Brown (2006, 366). Lorenzo commented that ‘I’m certain that if [Pico] said the Creed, those malign spirits would call it heretical’ (‘Sono certo, se costui dicessi il Credo, cotesti spiriti maligni direbbono che fussi una heresia’ 366 n29). Heptaplus, like the Apology, was dedicated to Lorenzo, and had therefore been checked by his theologian and approved by Lorenzo himself. Innocent’s behavior was consequently a double-strike. Gian. Pico della Mirandola (1997, 333). Gianfrancesco says that his increasingly religious uncle later decided to join the Dominicans but ‘In the meantime he was bringing to fruition and publishing the works that he had conceived and begun.’ Gian. Pico della Mirandola (1997, 330–31), ‘At internis affectibus ferventissimo deum amore prosequebatur.’ Bori (2012, 23): In his commentary on Psalm 10 (‘de nostri temporis tepid[e]s qui sub caerimoniarum religionisque praetextu sanctitatem mentiuntur et simplices et rectos corde, a spiritu et veritate deterrentes, ad propriam vanitatem trahere satagunt.’). There are similar sentiments in Psalm 11. Catani (2000, 48). Kraye (1996, 158). Copenhaver (2011, 168).

44

S. HOWLETT

94. Ficino, letter to Germain de Ganay, March 23rd 1495, cited by Copenhaver (2011, 173) citing Kristeller (1937, 91), Supplementum Ficinianum (Florence: Olschki). 95. Everson and Zancani (2000, 3): the 1490s were a ‘watershed decade’ with a sense of crisis throughout Italy, and particularly in Florence. 96. Brown (2000, 15–16). 97. Vanden Broecke (2003, 63). 98. Borghesi (2012a, 64 n33), citing Cantimori (1975, 145): ‘Dapprima è un’aspirazione. Per il Quattrocento italiano, e per gli uomini che vivono negli anni precedent il sacco di Roma, la riforma religiosa è una grande speranza che si formula istituzionalmente nelle critiche del Valla, ma sopratutto filosoficamente nello sforzo del Ficino per creare una nuova dottrina apologetic del cristianesimo […]. Questa aspirazione trova la sua espressione più viva e immediata nelle fervide speranze destate dal Concilio lateranense del 1512; ma la sua assieme al pensiero del Ficino costituisce la sostanza delle idee e delle suggestioni diffuse in tutta Europa da […] Erasmo da Rotterdom.’ 99. Hankins (2003, 477–78): ‘What moderns see as part of a larger crisis of faith, the popes themselves perceived as a breakdown in respect for the Holy See, caused in turn by the shrinking of its wealth and temporal power.’ 100. De Boer (2009, 56): Savonarola was the ‘third intellectual influence in his life after scholasticism and humanism.’ 101. Celenza (2004, 106) argues that in the 1470s and 1480s there had been a doxa (Bourdieu’s ‘realm of unarticulated assumptions that define the limits of the possible for historical actors’) of communal and courtly love (amor) which is represented, for example, in Botticelli’s ‘Primavera’. The turn of the decade into the 1490s strained the existing doxa as other potential doxas competed with and coexisted with love leading to tensions in society and eventual chaos when Savonarola voiced the underlying assumptions and in so doing ‘wreaked havoc by finding a name for what had up until then been lived namelessly…. The Savonarolan era helped create orthodoxy in late Quattrocento Florence, by defining a field of action as heterodox.’ 102. Kristeller (1993a, 101). The monastery was destroyed in the seventeenth century. But books had been disappearing from the library and reappearing elsewhere before that date: either sold or stolen. 103. Catani (1998, 75): at Lent he had repeated his prophecy of a king coming from beyond the mountains like Cyrus, and Charles had appeared in the fall. 104. Catani (1998, 76): third sermon on the Psalms, 13th January 1495, concerning the renewal of the church, and his first published sermon.

2

105.

106. 107.

108.

109.

110. 111. 112.

113.

LIFE AND WORKS

45

His predictions were laid out in Compendio di rivelazioni later in the year as he sought to establish himself as Florence’s prophet, chosen by God. Verde (Aranci 1994, 508) argues that Savonarola wanted to preach ‘new things in a new way’ and reconstruct the Church according to the New Testament. So he reformed his priory to the preaching and reading of the scriptures, and to cultivate study of original biblical languages. De Boer (2009, 59). Catani (1998, 75–76): in sermons on the ark for Lent 1494, Savonarola took aim at astrologers, poets, orators, and philosophers, most particularly ‘as usurpers of the true prophet’s exclusive right to foresee the future.’ Catani (2000, 53) argues that Savonarola was angry that he had never managed to gain complete control over Pico. He announced in the Duomo that Pico was in the flames of Purgatory and ‘was evidently incensed at his refusal to join the Dominican order.’ This suggests that Pico had not become a total devotee by the time of his death. Copenhaver (2011, 176), citing Savonarola: ‘this is why I threatened for two years that the scourge would come if he were negligent in carrying out the task that God gave him to complete. Again and again – I admit it – I asked God to give him a bit of a blow, […] though I did not request the one that struck him down.’ Schmitt (1989, 218). Schmitt (1965, 61): he thought Plato better suited for theologians, relying more on faith, unlike Aristotle who relies more on reason. Commentationes, Gianfrancesco’s edited volumes of Pico’s work, also known as the editio princeps, was published in Bologna by Benedetto Faelli on March 20th, 1496. The ‘Life’ was in volume one, Heptaplus, the Apology, On Being and the One, and Disputations in the second, with Pico’s letters and other extra elements, such as the Oration in the third. The second edition was published in Venice by Bernardino de’ Vitali in 1498, and the third in Strasbourg by Johann Prüss in 1504, etc. Copenhaver (2011, 153 and 173). In a letter to Germain de Ganay from Ficino (23 March 1495), Ficino says: ‘But Gianfrancesco, his loyal nephew and a writer of great talent, works daily at publishing these works and describing his uncle’s life and deeds’ (citing Kristeller (1937) Supplementum, vol. 2, 92–93). Copenhaver argues that Gianfrancesco had to blur Pico’s real life in order to replace it with his Life (2011, 185). Critical perception of Gianfrancesco’s approach vary from Farmer’s discussion of literary theft, to Schmitt’s view that he was simply trying to do his best for his uncle (2011, 187). The Conclusions were not added until later editions (Venice and Basel), Brown (2006, 358). Copenhaver (2011, 186) argues that Gianfrancesco treated the Oration as an ‘embarrassing piece of juvenilia.’

46

S. HOWLETT

114. More (1987, 296–97): ‘There was an extraordinary apparition before his birth. Above the bedroom where his mother was giving birth there stood a circular flame, which soon disappeared…’ (‘Prodigium haud paruum ante ipsius ortum apparuit. Visa enim circularis flamma est supra parientis matris astare cubiculum moxque evanesecere…’) 115. More (1987, 301–3): Buonfrancesco, bishop of Reggio was in Rome at the time of the intended debate as the papal ambassador from the duke of Ferrara. More remarks that ‘slander wrongly inflicted on him by malevolent men set him on the straight and narrow after his wanderings and, as he was straying in the darkness, shone upon him a dazzling beam of light so that he could see how far he had deviated from the path of truth. For previously he had been eager for glory and inflamed by illusory love and aroused by the enticements of of women.‘ (‘ut calumnia illa falso a malevolis irrogata verso errores corrigeret, eique in tenebris aberranti (ut quantum exorbitasset a tramite veritatis contueri posset) ceu splendidissimum iubar illucesceret. Prius enim & gloriae cupidus & amore vano succensus muliebribusque illecebris commotus fuerat.’) 116. More (1987, 296–97) ‘…when verses had been recited to him only once, he amazed everyone by repeating them either forward or backward, and he remembered them very retentively.’ (‘…ut audita semel a recitante carmina, & directo & retrograde ordine mira omnium admiration recenseret tenacissimaque retineret memoria.’) Farmer (1998, 135) argues that this was probably not true. 117. More (1987, 306–9): ‘But this especially was his underlying intention, this was his most basic aim in all the commentaries he undertook: not to adduce the teachings of others, since they were already possessed, read, understood, but rather to discuss only what he himself had discovered and thought out, so that with his own talents, not those of others, he could nourish to the best of his ability souls hungry for truth.’ (‘…sed hoc potissimum in eius mente consitum fuit, hoc de universis propositis quae in commentandi genere conceperat altius insedit: ut aliorum dogmata non adduceret, utpote quae iam haberentur, legerentur, noscerentur, sed sua prorsus inventa & meditate dissereret, ut propriis, non alienis facultatibus famelicas veritatis animas pro virile saturaret.’) 118. Copenhaver (2011, 173). Letter to Germain de Ganay from Ficino (23 March 1495). 119. Papio (2012, 50). 120. Busi (2010, 294): they all ‘share a metaphysical tension that is the desire to transcend physical reality, to reach the contemplation of the divine, and eventually to merge with it.’ 121. See for example his re-use of Asclepius from the opening of the Oration (2, 108–9) in Heptaplus (1965b, 135) or his description of us as at the centre of the universe (Oration 21, 117–18; Heptaplus 135).

2

LIFE AND WORKS

47

122. Borghesi (2012, 42): he mentions he is working on this commentary in a 1489 Letter to Andrea Corneo, and in his preface to Heptaplus. 123. Craven (1981, 85). There are also three substantial letters on moral issues (part of the story of St. Pico) to Gianfrancesco, written from Ferrara, the first on 15th May, second on 2nd July and third on 27th November 1492. See also Black (2006, 9). Copenhaver notes, however, that two of these letters may not have been in Pico’s handwriting (2011, 191 n130). 124. See Francesco Bausi on Pico’s correspondence with Barbaro (Bausi 1996). 125. Kraye (2008, 19–20) argues that Pico is being serious in his argument with Barbaro. Panizza (2000, 153) cites Kristeller as arguing the seriousness of Pico’s intent. Hanna Gray, Brian Vickers, Martin McLaughlin and Francesco Bausi hold diverse views. 126. Kraye (2008, 25): the letter to Lorenzo has been reassigned to July 15, 1486 citing Bausi who argues that Gianfrancesco changed the date to make Pico’s interest in love as early as possible. ‘L’epistola di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a Lorenzo de’ Medici: Testo, traduzione e commento,’ Interpres 17 (1998). 127. Dulles (1941, 13) argues that the Commentary is merely a ‘study’ (a practice work) not a polemic. 128. Jayne (1984b, 5, 58–59 n15): To Benivieni’s brother, Domenico, ‘Commentariolum nostrum non est quod admireris otiosi cum esse voluimus et omnino nihil agree id egimus, animum remittentes potiusque intendentes. Omnia praeludium est commentariorum quae in platonis symposium meditamur…. ex Fratta, 10 Novembris 1486.’ Cited from the 1506 edition of Pico’s Opera, fol. Yiiir. Jayne also points out that Pico never tried to revise or work on this commentary further. 129. Jayne (1984b, 6). 130. Aasdalen (2011, 74–75): Benivieni worked on changes with Pico in Perugia during spring 1486 making substantial changes to fit Pico’s desired description of Diotima’s Ladder. 131. Carmichael (1986, 4): ‘…In looking at this poem and commentary again later on, however, lacking some of that spirit and fervor which led me to compose it and him to interpret it, there was born in our minds a shadow of doubt as to whether it was fitting for any who professs the law of Christ and wish to talk about love, especially heavenly and divine love, to discuss it as Platonists and not as Christians, and we thought it would be well to suspend the publication of such a work at least until we saw whether, through any revision, it could be transformed from a Platonic work into a Christian one.’ Benivieni says Pico died ‘Soon after this deliberation…’

48

S. HOWLETT

132. An incomplete French edition, by Gabriel Chappuys, published in 1588 and an incomplete English version by Thomas Stanley, published in 1651, Jayne (1984, 49). Jayne suggests that the Commentary’s influence was greatest in England, including on Spenser (‘Fowre Hymnes’), Ben Jonson (his ‘Masques of Blacknesse and Beautie’), Chapman and Milton, Jayne (1984, 46–47 and 69 ns 17–18). 133. De Boer (2009, 77): ‘Pico planned to present himself as the quintessential man realizing all the seeds given by God and maybe – who could know – also inaugurating a new epoch in the history of salvation.’ See also, Farmer (1998, 43). 134. Black (2006, 7): The Conclusions ‘do not, despite the best efforts of ingenious commentators, form a single skeleton, let alone a coherent body’, unlike Heptaplus which has a ‘complete and perfected structure.’ 135. Farmer (1998, 211): 1st Preface Conclusiones, ‘…in quibus recitandis non Romanae linguae nitorem, sed celebratissimorum Parisiensium disputatorum dicendi genus est imitatus, propterea quod eo nostri temporis philosophi plerique omnes utuntur.’ 136. Busi (2010, 297): The Conclusions ‘reflect a culture of excess: their number is excessive, and excessive is the quantity of learned quotations that Pico proudly displays.’ 137. Dulles argues, for example, that Section 1 statements were those views of others that Pico would defend (1941, 13). 138. Farmer (1998, 8 and 11). 139. Borghesi (2012a, 63) cites Bausi arguing that the Oration ‘should be classified as belonging to the literary genre of the humanistic “prolusiones”.’ It was not meant as the key to the whole project. Dulles (1941, 15) agrees considering Conclusions as ‘Pico’s most inclusive philosophic work’ and the Oration as ‘one of the least important in content.’ 140. Papio (2012, 46–47): ‘as far as we know’ Pico never gave the Oration a specific name and Copenhaver argues that the Oration is ‘silent about human dignity’ (2019, 158). 141. Papio (2012, 45). 142. Bori (2012, 33–36): The Oration was begun in mid-September around the time of his letter to Ficino on Chaldean sources, the second phase was written from the middle of October and contemporaneous with his letter to Corneo. The third section dates from around Pico’s letter of November 12th to Benivieni, at the same time adding 200 theses taking the total from 700–900. The final section with its defense of his work was probably written in Rome (citing Bausi 1996). 143. Craven (1981, 66) calls his attempts ‘strained and over-ingenious.’ 144. Copenhaver (2019, 164). 145. Edelheit (2008, 289). Edelheit argues that what seems to be a hasty text is Pico’s ‘most important composition’ (281) turning his argument that

2

146.

147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152.

153.

154.

155.

156. 157.

LIFE AND WORKS

49

Pico’s Rome project is an anti-scholastic endeavor into Pico’s central philosophical mission. However, while a substantial text, the Apology inevitably focuses on those thirteen conclusions that had been deemed questionable by the papal theologians, and therefore equally inevitably confronts a series of contemporary debates between philosophy and theology. Pico’s arguments, for instance his discussion on Christ’s descent into hell, are meant to defend particular positions (13 out of 900 theses). This restricts the utility of the Apology as a wider lens to Pico’s thought. Farmer (1998, 1) citing Pico: ‘And so in all my conclusions, there is always a certain hidden connection, which they possibly do not notice.’ Apology 1487, Opera 1:235. Kraye (1996, 156). Paid for by Roberto Salviati. Translated into Italian in 1555 and French in 1578. Borghesi (2012, 43). Kristeller (1964b, 64). See also Toussaint (1995). Black (2006, 11). Though Catani (2000, 50) argues that people knew Pico was writing the work and had a sense of what he was saying, for example, Ficino mentions it to Poliziano in a letter in August 1494. Craven (1981, 149–50) citing Garin, Opera: ‘neque vero nos fallat, quod me quoque adolescentem olim fallebat, celebrata veteribus etiamque Platoni Aegyptiorum sapientia et Chaldaeorum…’ Dougherty (2011, 425) suggests that Pico distinguishes between different types of astrology and is only condemning the occult version, leaving a natural astrology that Ficino would espouse, for instance, intact. Catani (2000, 46) argues that Pico is examining astrology from an Aristotelian perspective. Vanden Broecke (2003, 56): ‘Even more perplexed was Pico’s opponent Lucio Bellanti, who – in spite of his veneration for the author was convinced that Pico would have burned the Disputations had he lived long enough to witness its publication.’ (citing Bellanti, De astrologica veritate 1502, fol. A1v). See also Catani (1998, 72). Rabin (2010, 175). Vanden Broecke (2003, 57 and 57 n11) argues that Disputations criticizes the practice of judicial astrology in late fifteenth-century Italy not whether it was possible to use the stars for this purpose. Pico was therefore attempting to modify current practice and provide a more scientific basis for astrology using Aristotelianism: ‘The perennial struggle to grasp Pico’s motives is symptomatic of the thoroughness and novelty of the proposal. Nevertheless, it directly inspired attempts at astrological reform in the sixteenth century.’ As Pico says, ‘If the

50

S. HOWLETT

158. 159.

160.

161.

162.

163.

whole of astrology founded itself upon these [reasons, experiences and authorities], and did not seek out more faithless foundations, I would not deem her wholly ruinous, but in need of support. In other words, my judgment would fail as much as it would waver.’ (‘Quibus si tota niteretur astrologia, nec infideliora sibi fundamenta locaret, non esset apud me penitus ruinosa, sed nitabunda, hoc est tam caderet illa mea sententia, quam vacillaret.’ Disputationes 1:422). His critique could also have been a result of the general tensions of the time with predictions of change everywhere (2003, 64). Dulles (1941, 43). Catani (1998, 72): Disputationes ‘emerged as the pivotal work of the time, and indeed of all astrological discussion that was to follow.’ Dulles argues that Pico is attempting a broad critique and is responding to Roger Bacon and Pierre d’Ailly (1941, 20–21). Catani (1998, 83): Garin comments that for ‘Savonarola astrology is the destruction of Christianity, of the sense of Christ, of the supernatural significance of faith; for Pico it is a mystification of science and philosophy, a fatalistic vision of the world, a religion masking a pseudo-rationality and disguised as science’ (1983, 78). Vanden Broecke (2003, 79) suggests that ‘There is strong evidence… that Pico’s concerns over the proper demarcation between supernatural and natural knowledge were indeed stimulated by his close contacts with Savonarola.’ But the fact that they were both interested in prognostication at similar times does not mean that they agreed with each other. Savonarola wanted to distinguish between himself as the prophet of God, and those who attempted to tell the future using the stars; Pico could be argued to be yet again providing the counterpoint to Ficino. Garin (1983, 78): For Ficino, Savonarola is the Antichrist prophesied by the heavens, for Pico he is the ‘Ferrarese Socrates, a saintly and wise man who wants to make Florence a new Jerusalem.’ Kristeller (1964a, 310–11): Ficino told Poliziano (who remained skeptical) that he agreed with Pico, trying to make De Vita seem consistent with Pico’s views. Ficino tended to want harmony between himself and Pico. For example, Schmitt (1965, 62 and 62 n32) cites Gianfrancesco: ‘Giovanni Pico, brother of my father Galeotto, as I have said in the First Book had taken on himself the conciliation of the two philosophies of Plato and Aristotle; and so great was the power and extent of his genius, so great was his learning that, unless he had been prevented by death, easily (in my opinion) the desire for this conciliation would no longer remain for those of the succeeding generations.’ (‘Joannes Picus Galeotti patris frater quod primo dixi libro utranque se conciliaturum philosophiam Platonis Aristotelisque receperat ac, ni morte praeventus

2

LIFE AND WORKS

51

fuisset, facile (ut arbitror) eius rei desiderium posteris non reliquisset, tanta erat illius ingenii vis atque dexteritas, tanta doctrina.’) 164. The term ‘syncretism’ will be explored further in Chapter 3, but broadly this work follows Paul Oskar Kristeller’s definition: ‘With respect to Pico, the term refers to his belief that all known philosophical and theological schools and thinkers contained certain true and valid insights that were compatible with each other and hence deserved to be restated and defended.’ Kristeller (1964b, 59) ‘His syncretism was more comprehensive than that of Ficino, and therefore came closer to subsequent efforts at formulating a universal religion’ (1964b, 69).

CHAPTER 3

Pico’s Intellectual Foundations: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Pico’s Syncretism

‘As for myself, however, I have resolved – in order not to swear by the words of another – to pore over all masters of philosophy, to examine every page, and to become acquainted with all schools.’1 Pico was a syncretist attempting to reconcile the various strands of the history of philosophy. His goal was to take us back to the deep structure of the universe and there, where philosophy and theology meet (one following the other), reveal the pathway home to God.2 His pathway is a Christian path to a Christian God, but as Christ’s revelation to us came after the formation and first communications of that deep structure, its fundamentally Christian nature was not apparent to those who went before. Pico is therefore also attempting through his syncretism to rectify and bring clarity to what was thought to be pagan or Jewish. The outcome is a ‘christo-syncretism’: an attempt at a cohesive philosophy, made up of classical, scholastic sources and other religious traditions, suffused with Christian sensibilities.3 This is a philosophical outlook that prepares for religious experience: Pico’s work is on the borderline between philosophy, theology and mysticism. His work was also part of a fifteenth-century Italian milieu. Others were seeking revolutionary moments within a general atmosphere of impending crisis. This is a moment of flux, and uncertainty, but also of big ideas and big thinkers who believed they could make a difference. It is a time of new ideas, new material, the emergence of new fields such © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_3

53

54

S. HOWLETT

as philology and oriental studies. Epistemology is central: querying where and how we can find knowledge; querying the limits of the use of that knowledge (the extent and purpose of reason). But the answers were often sought in the past. Ficino is seeking renovatio, for instance, a return to a new Golden Age away from this world of bronze. Pico shares much in common with these movements, revolutionary or not, including a desire for change. But as a change-maker, Pico also saw himself as an archaeologist of ideas. He was attempting to propel us forward into the new, but by uncovering the past. He takes us back to the deep structure and the secrets it contains. He was drawn to those sources whose promised age imply proximity to beginnings, or to the direct revelation of truth given by God. It is hardly surprising that one of his few published works, Heptaplus, is an analysis of the creation story. But despite the complexity of his endeavor, three principal traditions rapidly emerge as the foundations of this deep structure: Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Jewish Kabbalism. Pico believed Kabbalism to be the original revelation of that deep structure given to Moses by God. Aristotle and Plato lead us back to this original religious revelation. They also provide the philosophical (rational) foundations on which the individual mystical experience is based: philosophy takes us up toward God, until reason fails, and faith then takes us home. Pico’s universe always combines rationality with divinity until the point where words fail, and God becomes hidden in darkness. It brings together the Latin world’s preoccupation with the relationship between reason and faith, and its emphasis on kataphatic (positive) theology, with the negative or apophatic theology so important in Byzantine Orthodoxy, at a time of renewed interest in writers such as Pseudo-Dionysius. Pico, prince of Concord, reveals the harmony between philosophical traditions, and between those philosophies and the secrets of theology. In doing so, he pursues the path of exceptionalism. He is the gentleman-philosopher with the secrets to individual henosis . For he reveals that this deep structure of the universe is also a ladder: a ladder which brings angels down to us and take us up toward the divine. The ladder is built out of what God is—the positive (describable) attributes. Beyond the ladder, beyond our universe, is the realm of what God is not…. Pico’s henotic process is focused on the ladder. For it is also a noetic process, where first possible union or assimilation is between our

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

55

intellect (the upper level of our soul) and attributes of the divine related to the Aristotelian active intellect. Aristotelianism or more specifically Aristotelian logic and theory of causality provide the primary mode of argumentation. Pico applies this logic to both the act of concordance (to draw together the disparate threads of different traditions), and his attempts to describe the deep structure.4 Sometimes the sacred, the mystery with which the deep structure is imbued is more dominant, and at other times, Aristotle leads. Platonism is next. At the macro level, Pico’s deep structure is predominantly a Platonic universe inflected by Aristotle. Platonism also provides the ‘divine something’ that links the more scientific Aristotelianism to religious revelation. Kabbalism provides the skeleton, or the bones of the universe: the Tree of Life or divine lightning flash of the emanating/creative5 God provides the pathway home, and most particularly the ladder that links us on earth to the mysteries of the divine in our universe. Christianity, particularly the mystical tradition expressed through Pseudo-Dionysius and others, is the living spirit of his world, binding everything together. But there are complications. ‘Aristotle’ in the fifteenth century is not the same as today. This is also true of Platonism (do we mean Plato, or Plotinus, or Proclus, or the Christian Platonism of Ficino, for example). Aristotelianism and Platonism in the fifteenth century were already interconnected through commentaries drawing on both, revivals (particularly of Aristotle), and prior attempts at concordance by, for example, Boethius who used the Platonist Porphyry when commenting on Aristotelean logic. Both Aristotelianism and Platonism had also become part of other traditions that Pico thought to be distinctive, including within Christian and Jewish theology. For example, Platonism and Christianity are already combined in Pseudo-Dionysius’ version of henosis . We should assume that Pico was largely unaware of these connections. From his perspective, finding traces of Platonism in Kabbalism simply looked like proof that there is a deep structure underlying them all.

The Question of Allegiance Given the complexity of Pico’s project, it is unsurprising that his allegiances would be queried by contemporaries. Even now much of the modern critical debate has focused on the question of allegiance. Was he an Aristotelian or Platonist, and if an Aristotelian, a neo-Aristotelian,

56

S. HOWLETT

Averroist or proponent of the scholastic method (via antiqua or via moderna?).6 If a Platonist, a follower of Ficino, or a new thinker on the revived Platonism? Or did his position change over time, moving ever closer to a penitential ascetic Christianity? But Pico was genuinely interested in all positions. Much of his selffashioned education was focused on Aristotelianism whether in Padua, Pavia, or Paris. Many of his scholarly friends were Aristotelians. Aristotelianism provides his mode of argumentation (insistence on dividing causal from participatory being, for example); the importance he gives to the ‘natural’; his commitment to a rational, scientific universe; and his interest in the Aristotelian ‘intellect.’ Aristotle looks like his real intellectual home. But Platonism brings ‘that divine something’7 to Aristotle’s rational natural world. It is ‘the most sacred of all philosophies.’8 Pico’s life is deeply connected to the contemporary revival of Platonism and its founder, Marsilio Ficino.9 His structure of the universe is fundamentally Platonic and inadvertently, he also uses aspects of Platonism through the prisca magia, for instance, that ‘method of philosophizing (one that is carried out with numbers)’10 associated with Pythagoras. In his use of Kabbalism, Pico also consistently connects between traditions, linking Pythagorean mathematics with gematria, the mathematical side of Kabbalism, and so ‘philosophy’ with theology. When considering Pico’s position, there can be prejudices toward one approach over another when considering a particular aspect of his metaphysics, for example, but when examining his metaphysics as a whole, the broader picture of the three pillars emerges. He is attempting to bring traditions together rather than prove compatibility to a specific personal preference overall. Originally, he may even have considered writing about Plato and Aristotle alternately. He tells Ficino ‘My purpose was that with the full strength of my mind and my utmost perseverance and diligence, I might now compare Plato with Aristotle, and in turn Aristotle with Plato, in alternate studies.’11 But this impulse rapidly moved to the idea of providing a concordance. In his 1484 letter to Barbaro, he explains that while he may have begun working on Plato as an attempt to explore beyond Aristotle, he now had the overwhelming desire to show how the two philosophers are compatible.12 This desire does not go away. In 1490, we find him working ‘continuously on the Concordia of Plato and Aristotle.’13 But what does it mean to be a Platonist or an Aristotelian in the late fifteenth century? Ficino was the pre-eminent leader of the Platonic

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

57

revival, but in the early 1480s had not yet translated or published the complete works, nor worked through all the later Platonists. Pico’s use of Plotinus’ Enneads . In 1486, for example, occurred before Ficino had published a translation. So, when Pico talks about Platonism, he is talking about a revival in progress. Ficino represents a certain understanding of Platonic thought and was the authority in the field, but there is considerable latitude for new input: it is an evolving field. Confusingly, Ficino is not ‘purely’ a Platonist either. He is seeking to combine elements of Plato (and his followers) with Christianity; and inevitably is influenced by his historical milieu and antecedents, such as Aquinas. Indeed, to launch his Platonic revival, Ficino necessarily needs to engage with established authorities. This means that Pico could assert his Platonism in contradiction to Ficino’s, challenge Ficino’s authority by emphasizing alternative aspects of Plato and claim a ‘purer’ (rightly or wrongly) reading than Ficino’s in his use of Plotinus, for example. This challenge is so consistent that contradicting Ficino is arguably axiomatic to his work. Similar changes were occurring within Aristotelianism. Unlike Plato, Aristotle’s works had been available for centuries throughout Europe and were embedded in ongoing conversations about religion, science and philosophy. In the twelfth century, Averroes had translated Aristotle with his own commentaries appended. These entered Latin Europe renewing an understanding of Aristotle while making his works available to a new audience. Averroes’ filter to Aristotle was still important in the fifteenth century with Padua as the center of Averroism. But Pico’s Paduan colleagues were undertaking a second revolution in Aristotelian studies, embracing the humanist interest in textual studies and philology to return to the original Greek texts. Humanist Aristotelians also had a new ‘take’ on the old complexities of scholastic debate. As Ermolao Barbaro comments, his goal in his course on Aristotle was to bring him ‘to life and to make him take part in a human conversation.’14 Barbaro rejects Aquinas, for instance, in favor of his peers who knew Greek, or the original peripatetics.15 Pico was not on the same journey as his Paduan colleagues,16 but they were part of the same milieu. ‘Aristotle’ was a contested site made up of ongoing battles within scholastic circles, the Averroist legacy, and a new movement to humanize and retranslate. Pico’s personal position is clearly ‘complicated.’ He is an Aristotelian and a Platonist. He received a humanist education with an interest in rhetoric and translation. He also received a scholastic education. He

58

S. HOWLETT

gained an Averroist perspective on Aristotle and another from neoAristotelians. He had conversations on Kabbalism from an Aristotelian Jew and learned Platonism in large part from Ficino. He starts as an Averroist Aristotelian with a love of mathematics, and a strong interest in contemporary scholastic debates. He becomes interested in Kabbalism tending to prefer Kabbalistic commentaries that are influenced by the Jewish Averroist Aristotelian, Moses Maimonides. But he also rapidly understood the significance of the Platonic revival. His studies with Ficino deeply influenced his intellectual agenda and were underlined by the Platonic influences inherent in other material he used. He does not consistently challenge Ficino, for example, because he is an Aristotelian, but because he believes he is closer to the ‘real’ Plato, than Ficino. He also challenges Ficino because of his desire to assert his own abilities. Throughout his life Pico went his own way. More important than questions of positionality, Pico wished to be recognized as a significant philosopher in his own right.

Aristotelianism Late fifteenth-century Aristotelianism begins with a conversation around Averroes and key scholastic philosophers, such as William of Ockham and moves toward the new translation project of the neo-Aristotelians. Averroes attempted to marry Aristotelianism with Islam as part of a long-standing historical conversation between faith and reason. Following Averroes, Moses Maimonides, who impacted later Kabbalistic thought, attempted the same bridge between Aristotle and the Jewish faith. In Latin Europe, Averroism or the ‘recovery of Aristotle’ emerged as something different. It did not form a strong link between theology and philosophy. Instead, it embedded primarily within the universities where Aristotelian logic could provide a foundation for rational thinking at the philosophy faculty. The use of Aristotelianism thereby heightened the division between reason and faith and placed the faculties of philosophy and theology increasingly in opposition. The strands Pico would have seen coming out of Averroes’ work are therefore very particular: by the fifteenth century, ‘Averroism’ had come to mean an Aristotelianism focused purely on philosophy and unconnected, if not oppositional, to theology, even downright irreligious or at the most pejorative, atheistical.17

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

59

Scholasticism was the overall approach to philosophy developed within schools and universities from the twelfth-century renaissance (when university structures began) onwards. The universities of Italy were primarily focused on philosophy as opposed to theology.18 Inevitably institutions dedicated to the pursuit of learning focused on epistemological questions: what we can know, how we can know it, and how we should use that knowledge. Scholasticism was the institutional response to these questions, using methods such as logic, commentaries, and questions,19 that suited the new academic environment. Aristotelian logic is a type of reasoning that helps formulate and solve questions such as ‘what can we know and how can we know it.’ Given the importance of Aristotle to the schools of philosophy, scholasticism was imbued with Aristotelian ideas and methodology. Theology and philosophy had an uncomfortable history of coexistence. St Augustine had famously attempted to reinvigorate Christianity by marrying philosophy and faith (in his case between Platonism and Christianity), to provide a rational basis for belief. But unsurprisingly the divisions between the two became increasingly significant in the universities as the new faculties attempted to distinguish themselves, form their particular foundations, and thereby build their disciplines. Various solutions were proposed, for instance in the thirteenth century, Aquinas attempted to marry Aristotelianism with Christianity20 ; while Siger of Brabant was accused of proposing that a ‘double truth’ was sometimes required: one truth could be arrived at through logic, and another through faith, and both could be true ‘in their own way.’ Pico, and Ficino, were both seeking a reconciliation and, for their own reasons, a new union between faith and reason. Ficino followed St. Augustine, building his union on a revitalized relationship between Platonism and Christianity. Pico attempted something rather more ambitious, maintaining parts of scholasticism as well as Plato and other forms of ancient wisdom to build a grand concordance between philosophy and Christianity. But scholasticism was also not simply ‘Aristotelian.’ Beyond the question of methodology, two primary strands of scholasticism had emerged by the fifteenth century: realism and nominalism. Realism was known as the via antiqua and nominalism as the via moderna, a more contemporary strand based on the work of William of Ockham (also therefore known as Ockhamism). Though these are complex positions, one important differentiation is the discussion of universals and particulars: more specifically if a particular (an individual thing or being) derives from

60

S. HOWLETT

a separately existing universal or not. Plato, for instance, posits Ideas or Forms, such as Beauty, which are separately existing universals from which all particular (individual) beauty derives. Aristotle would reject the idea of a separately existing universal of Beauty, working from the individual examples of beauty to explore the concept instead. Nominalism tended toward the Aristotelian perspective. But there were also realists who would have considered themselves Aristotelian, especially as Plato’s works were sparse in Latin Europe until the fifteenth century. Aristotle provided what might be called a ‘moderate’ form of realism. Aquinas, for instance, a standard-bearer for the realist approach, called Aristotle ‘the philosopher,’ i.e., the ultimate authority. But by Pico’s time, the arguments between realism and nominalism had become increasingly obscure. Pico tended toward Aquinas and the via antiqua, however sympathetic he was to the conversations in Paris, the center for the via moderna.21 Humanism was at least in part a reaction to these obscurities. Humanists were attempting to break through convoluted, arcane argumentation by returning to original sources. Inevitably this return to sources involved exploration of the philological dimensions of historical texts. Conversations around rhetoric, style, translation, and the interplay of different literary forms, came to the fore. This new wave also inspired a revival of Aristotle. The revivification of ancient Greek as a language of study after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire allowed Italians to go back to Aristotle and the peripatetics (his followers) and retranslate them for themselves. Byzantine refugees ending up in Italy brought with them not only knowledge of Greek but also previously unavailable texts. The Byzantine John Argyropoulos translated Aristotle’s De Anima, De Caelo, Nicomachean Ethics, and Physics.22 Manuel Chrysoloras who ended up in Florence teaching Greek, taught one of the most prominent early Humanists, Leonardo Bruni, who in turn retranslated Nicomachean Ethics. Professors at the ‘Averroist’ University of Padua could clear aside the clutter of the centuries and read for themselves those closest to Aristotle. Pico studied with this new generation. At the same time, there was a last ‘hurrah’ of Averroism at the turn of the fifteenth century, with texts from Averroes newly available in Latin, for instance, translated from the Hebrew23 by one of Pico’s teachers, Elijah Del Medigo. Pico’s education in Aristotelianism would have begun early. Ferrara was probably the most traditionally ‘scholastic’ of the institutions he attended, though there was a strong interest in humanism there too. The

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

61

real hub of Aristotelian conversation was in Padua. This was an exciting time to be in the Veneto. Padua was changing with the arrival of emigres from the east, new perspectives, new texts, and the new press set-up by Aldo Manuzio (Manutius Press) stimulating further intellectual output.24 While in Padua, he built a circle of mentors, teachers, and colleagues with whom he corresponded or worked during his lifetime. Many of them were Aristotelians of different types. The first was Ermolao Barbaro, who was based in Venice. As with many who became involved in Greek Studies, he learned Greek from a Byzantine. Barbaro melded Aristotelianism with the new humanism culminating in a ‘campaign’ in the 1480s to ‘bring about a humanist reform of Aristotelianism’ by focusing on a philological and rhetorical study of Aristotle,25 for instance, translating into Latin Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica. Barbaro was at the forefront of ‘neo-Aristotelianism’ or the Aristotelian recovery with a particular focus on the early commentaries by Aristotle’s acolytes, Simplicius and Themistius.26 Many of those who came under Barbaro’s tutelage, such as Poliziano, agreed with this return to original sources.27 Despite probably not meeting when Pico was studying in Padua, Barbaro was Pico’s famous sparring partner in 1485 when Barbaro’s Aristotelian revolution was already underway,28 and their letters show a strong relationship, based on mutual respect. Barbaro can be considered part of Pico’s knowledge network. So too was Nicoletto Vernia (1420–1499), another neo-Aristotelian and a professor of philosophy at Padua. He taught Pico. Like Barbaro, he tried to bridge the gap between philosophy and rhetoric in an attempt to bring Aristotle back to life.29 Vernia was not originally a neo-Aristotelian. He had been a scholastic focusing on Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas, and was taught by the Ockhamist Paolo della Pergola.30 Probably influenced by Barbaro’s work on Themistius he started to rethink. He may even have been encouraged by Pico to do so,31 they certainly shared some views.32 In the 1480s and 90s, he turned to Simplicius and John Philoponus.33 A final influential member of this group was Augustino Nifo, also a professor at the University of Padua, and a student of Vernia. Nifo was later a favorite of Leo X’s (the Medici pope).34 As a student, Nifo was a colleague of Pico and had been influenced by him.35 There is evidence that Nifo used Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De anima found (whatever this might mean) by Pico.36 He went on to publish his own edition of Aristotle’s Complete Works in 1495–1496.

62

S. HOWLETT

Outside the neo-Aristotelians, Elijah del Medigo (c1460–1497), was the strongest intellectual influence of the Paduans on Pico. Del Medigo was a Cretan Jewish Averroist. Crete had originally been part of the Byzantine Empire and had a strong Jewish community significantly influenced by Byzantine philosophy. Crete came under Venetian rule in 1204 drawing Cretan Jews to the Veneto and introducing a Byzantine-inflected Judaism to Italian Judaisms.37 Del Medigo was in the Veneto by around 1480 and became acquainted with Barbaro and Pico.38 Unusually, Del Medigo also translated Jewish texts from Hebrew opening up Jewish philosophy and mysticism to the Christian world. His Averroism provided a specific ‘twist’ to Jewish thought that was attractive to Pico.39 He supported Pico’s studies in various ways. First as a teacher/mentor during Pico’s time at Padua University (Del Medigo taught logic at a Hebrew College in Padua around 1480).40 Later he was at different times part of Pico’s academic entourage, for instance, during Pico’s first flurry of scholarly production in 1486.41 He also wrote at Pico’s request two treatises on Averroes and the intellect,42 and translated for him, again on request, from various Arabic Aristotelian texts that could be found in medieval Hebrew but not in the original.43 For example, he was asked by Pico for material on Averroes’ thinking on Aristotelian physics (which led to Del Medigo writing, Annotationes ), may have translated Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s ‘Republic,’ which was available at that time in Hebrew but not Latin,44 and certainly translated extracts from a variety of other pieces that interested Pico. He later provided expanded versions of his treatises in Hebrew for his Jewish audience.45 As a former teacher, he continued to provide bibliographies, helping Pico with at least one reading list, especially for books in Hebrew that were not known in the Christian sphere, such as Kabbalistic and Arabic works. It is not known how Pico selected his Kabbalistic library, but Del Medigo’s guidance in the process is a strong possibility. But Del Medigo’s influence does not simply mean that Pico preferred Averroism. As a Jew, Del Medigo’s Aristotelianism came from the Jewish– Arabic Averroist tradition that sought to resolve dichotomies between reason and faith. For instance, Del Medigo argued that creation could be from within the world, as opposed to from the infinite.46 This different perspective may have allowed Pico to see Aristotle as part of a chain of thinking that could lead eventually to religious experience, when reason finally fails. But for all their engagement, Del Medigo was probably not

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

63

the only source of Pico’s interest in Kabbalism (for instance, his more Platonic-based Kabbalism must have come from elsewhere).47 This history of connections between Pico and his academic friends show not only the depth of the relationship, but also the mutual impact between Pico and his ‘entourage.’ His agenda in influencing others is unclear. Beyond intellectual camaraderie, he did suggest projects to gain a translation he wished to use for his own work. This ‘entourage’ contained a substantial number of Aristotelians, and his education also provided a strong background in Aristotelianism in various guises. He would have been trained in Aristotelian logic, had access to different forms of scholasticism, learned at the center of Latin Averroism, and become acquainted with Jewish–Arabic Averroism. He was familiar with the developing neo-Aristotelianism. But this is only one side of his knowledge network.

Platonism Marsilio Ficino, the force behind the Platonic revival, was Pico’s most important intellectual mentor. He was also the authority Pico chose to challenge again and again during his career. When considering Pico’s Platonism, Ficino and their relationship is the obvious place to begin. Pico’s challenges and their very public debates highlight their differences in opinion. These differences, as well as their similarities, allow a deeper understanding of Pico’s very particular interests in Platonism. Ficino and Pico began as teacher and student in the early 1480s. But their relationship was complex both in life and after Pico’s death. In the twentieth century it was easy to see Pico as a member of the Platonic Academy.48 Ficino refers to his Academy on multiple occasions. It was understood to be a group of protégé friends, thinkers and patrons who met regularly and whose work formed a relatively coherent opus within the shared context of Ficino’s Platonic revival. This story of the Academy had Ficino at the center, as leader of the Platonic revival, with Pico playing ‘heir-apparent,’ as the young philosopher-prince. Pico is the Princeps Concordiae of this Academy49 described by Ficino as a hero or demiGod.50 Ficino encouraged this story of their intellectual proximity for posterity crafting a narrative after Pico’s death which aligned the young hero’s birth with the beginnings of Ficino’s study of Platonism, and Pico’s arrival in Florence with Ficino’s publication of Plato’s works. According to Ficino, Pico was inspired by Cosimo (Lorenzo’s father) de’ Medici’s

64

S. HOWLETT

soul to come to Florence to inspire Ficino, in his turn, to study and translate Plotinus.51 This reading of Ficino and Pico portrays Pico as essentially a Platonist52 making Pico’s deviations from Ficino or outright contradictions very confusing. Even if we do not accept the stories of heroes and miracles, we would at least imagine Pico was Ficino’s most important and closest disciple within the Academy. But the other approach to their relationship comes from ‘Pico Studies’: those who focus only on Pico.53 These works tend to sideline Ficino almost completely, to the point where comparisons and influence disappear. It is almost as if Ficino does not exist in Pico’s story. As so often, the truth lies somewhere in-between. It is hard to pinpoint exactly as both Ficino and Pico are crafting their own self-narratives within which each plays a supporting role, whether as hero or stooge. Two resources give us a closer look: first their correspondence; and second, their debates. If we look at Ficino’s letters, Pico first appears from his late teens as the Aristotelian moving toward Plato. He is involved in more than a fifth of Ficino’s correspondence between 1484 and 1488,54 whether demanding books from Ficino’s library, or annoyed at Ficino’s constant mythologizing of their relationship. The picture from these letters is of Ficino as the benevolent teacher willing to guide and forgive all, and an occasionally tetchy, recalcitrant but brilliant pupil. Pico demands or antagonizes, Ficino responds with more praise, attempting to gloss over their disagreements. Ficino excuses Pico’s abduction of Margherita calling the couple ‘members of a superhuman race (he a hero and she a nymph) and therefore above morality.’55 There are signs of a similarly sometimes fractious relationship between Ficino and Angelo Poliziano. The debates between Ficino and Pico are the points of rupture—the places where they specifically and publicly engage with each other. Ficino is creating his ideal world peopled by heroes. In a letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici Ficino praises his patron for supporting Poliziano, that young Homeric scholar’56 and asks Lorenzo to continue to attract such artists, for ‘other painters adorn the walls for a time, but these render their inhabitants illustrious for ever.’57 Poliziano asks Ficino to stop calling him ‘Hercules’ (Pico was Ficino’s ‘Apollo’), as if embarrassed by Ficino. Poliziano ‘bristled at Ficino’s style when Ficino asked for his help in defending De vita (after 1489), and apparently found Ficino’s lectures boring.’58 Certainly Ficino self-fashions as the benevolent mentor, and it must have been at times tedious. But there is also repeated communication of greetings from Pico, and his friend, Poliziano,

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

65

to Ficino’s correspondents and vice versa: Jacopo Antiquari asks Ficino to commend him to Pico and Poliziano, as does Bernardo Michelozzi. Pico sends a draft of his Commentary to Ficino, and it is Ficino who Lorenzo asks to invite Pico to live in Florence upon his return to Italy.59 It is clearly a close relationship. The only major gap in their epistolary relationship is between 1493 and 94, when a curious silence falls.60 The relationship was no doubt complicated by Pico’s constant written disagreement with Ficino’s positions, but perhaps more importantly this is the period of Savonarola’s ascendance. Ficino remained on the sidelines whereas Pico was a close friend of Savonarola. Savonarola was seeking more direct influence over Pico’s future in the year leading up to his death. Up until 1493 it is as if Ficino and Pico are in a decade-long argument, expressed as a series of debates or ruptures whether on the position of Beauty in the universe or, right at the end, the influence of the stars on our lives. But Ficino was always close to Pico and had his own relationships with those within Pico’s academic entourage. For example, Barbaro interceded with the pope over Ficino’s potentially heretical views in De vita libri tres .61 It is in these points of disagreement between the two that we see most clearly their different readings of Platonism. The first disagreements are in Pico’s Commentary which parallels, often to contradict, Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s ‘Symposium’, republished in 1484 as De Amore. 62 Pico is pushing for the intellectual duel: ‘You can imagine, reader, how many mistakes our Marsilio makes in the first part of The Banquet….’63 Pico’s request to Benivieni to change his poem allowed him to make a more ‘true to the original’ reading of Plotinus than Ficino’s brand of Platonism at the time, asserting both the primacy of Plotinus and his own reading of Enneads . Pico’s comments were later smoothed over and Ficino claimed after his death that Pico ‘renounced’ this work. Pico had chosen to take on two of his mentors (Ficino and Barbaro) during this period (1485–1486). But the outcomes were very different. In the case of Barbaro, there is the widely admired interchange through extended letters. In the case of Ficino, there is essentially a ‘cover-up’ permitted in large part because Pico did not publish the Commentary and did not live long enough even to complete a self-fashioning of his career. The second controversy was over the nature of God. In 1491, Pico circulated On Being and the One. This is a short piece arguing that God

66

S. HOWLETT

is both singular (the One) and Being. He argues that Plato and Aristotle agree on this. Plato is normally understood to posit that the One is above Being, particularly in his dialogue Parmenides; differing from Aristotle who places the two together. On Being and the One was Pico’s last completed manuscript and it may have been meant to be part of his Concordance of Plato and Aristotle (or so he seems to indicate). To achieve concord in this case, he needed to remove several obstacles in Plato, particularly Parmenides. Pico argues that the dialogue is simply a rhetorical exercise, meaning that we should not take Plato at his word. In 1496, a few years after Pico’s death, Ficino published his Commentary on Plato’s ‘Parmenides’. Ficino had translated Parmenides around 1469 but had probably not yet written a commentary when Pico wrote On Being and the One. Between 1492 and 1494, while Pico was still living, he produced the commentary. It follows a sequence that specifically takes on Pico’s arguments section by section to refute him.64 Ficino himself holds with Platonic orthodoxy, deriving from Plotinus, often filtered through Proclus, that Plato argues the One is above Being. Ficino is providing a contemporaneous direct reply and counter to Pico. But On Being was already partly an attack on Ficino. Even before his commentary, Ficino had written about Being and the One and was consistently of the ‘orthodox’ Platonic view placing the two separately. The third and final major controversy is the least clear but perhaps most extensive. Disputations, Pico’s unfinished polemic against astrology, indirectly attacks Ficino’s comments on astrological magic in his third book of De vita libri tres , De vita coelitus comparanda (1489). Ficino argues that astrology can be used to draw down the influence of the stars. The Platonic idea of emanation means that each level in the universe reflects the others; particulars are therefore in ‘sympathy’ with each other across the levels. The planet Jupiter can be in ‘sympathy’ with certain gemstones, plants, and animals on earth. These sympathies can be exploited, by a doctor, for instance, to harness the power of the stars, as present in a plant for example, to heal the body of a patient. Pico appears to argue directly against the power of the stars on this world, particularly on events and people. Pico’s dispute with Ficino on astrology is different from their other disagreements (problematized further by questions around Disputations’ authorship). Pico was entering a conversation about astrology that had been going for centuries,65 unconnected to questions of Platonism against Aristotelianism or variations of the same. ‘Astrology’ in the

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

67

fifteenth century consisted of astrology as we might think of it today, and astronomy, which did not exist as a field apart. The first was called ‘divinatory astrology’ including natal charts and other divination approaches. This included astral magic: the use of the stars to make change here on earth by drawing upon sympathies or correspondences between the stars and related objects (stones, plants, etc.) on earth. Divinatory astrology was commonplace and using the stars for medical prognosis was a part of medical studies. Ficino the trained doctor would have used this type of astrology.66 The specific field of astral magic was more unusual, but Ficino was a proponent67 in his De vita coelitus comparanda. Divinatory astrology had a complex history with church authority further complicated by the feelings of crisis circulating during this period.68 Such feelings could and did emerge as prophecies and predictions of dramatic change69 which would destabilize political and religious structures. Pico could have studied astrology in its second guise as astronomy (in Pavia for instance, from Aristotle’s Physics) and he certainly knew of Plato’s examination of the influence of the movement of stars on our lives in The Symposium. The debate on astrology, and the relative merits of each type of astrology, was ongoing, complex and connected to numerous philosophical and theological debates, as well as the authority of the Church at a time of growing questioning. In February 1494, for example, around the time that Pico was writing Disputations, the faculty of theology in Paris had condemned divinatory astrology as opposed to ‘true astronomy’ that ‘Considers the magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their oppositions and motions, which predicts the conjunctions, oppositions and other conditions of sun, moon and other planets, and which conjectures some of their general natural effects in a probable and prudent manner (which we would honor as a liberal, noble, and useful art).’70 In Disputations, Pico is arguing between the more mathematical approaches and divinatory astrology71 ; questioning the boundaries between the divinatory (judicial) and the political, particularly when discussing the Church; and exploring the philosophical repercussions of the existence of divinatory astrology on questions such as freedom of the will.72 He also critiques Ficino’s use of astral magic in medicine.73 Ficino criticized aspects of judicial astrology during his career too,74 but his vision of sympathies between the celestial and the natural worlds that could be harnessed for our health is not only coherent with medical teaching, but is also coherent with his Platonic vision of the universe as a series of emanations.

68

S. HOWLETT

What is Pico precisely rejecting? It is tempting to think of Pico as more scientific here than Ficino, embracing astronomy but rejecting astrological charts, which we might categorize as ‘non-rational.’ But he does espouse the magical practice (from Pythagoras and Kabbalistic gematria) of using math to understand and manipulate the universe.75 He uses the theurgical Proclus in his work. It is also hard to distinguish between our understanding of science and ‘magic’ in the fifteenth century. He says he wishes to focus on ‘natural causes’76 but, for instance, he rejects as unscientific the idea that the moon can affect tides.77 Meanwhile, magical thinking that he can relate mentally with mystical Christianity is not, to him, magic but rather using the deep structural workings of God’s creation, so gematria is perfectly acceptable. Finally, Pico does use astrology elsewhere, for instance, in his Kabbalistic conclusions, he talks about vera astrologia which links the planets to the sefirot on the Tree of Life,78 suggesting the same theory of correspondence as used by Ficino. It is unclear whether he is inconsistent in his views, is making a particular point around his preconceived view of ‘science,’ has a specific message concerning political predictions (and other areas of astrology become partially ‘involved’ perhaps to contradict further Ficino) or whether Disputations is a patchwork of Pico and Gianfrancesco’s editing.79 There are other ongoing conflicts between Pico and Ficino, though less well explored, such as Pico’s discussion of human nature in his Heptaplus and Oration.80 But we have three major polemical moments here. Ficino writes his Commentary on Plato’s ‘Symposium,’ Pico counters with his Commentary. More loosely in time, Ficino clearly adopts and champions a traditional Platonic view of God as the One above Being. Pico responds with On Being and the One. Ficino counters with his Commentary on Plato’s ‘Parmenides.’ Ficino produces a work partially based on astrological magic. Pico starts a book denouncing the use of astrology. Two people living in close proximity, in the same intellectual circles, and apparently on close terms. The differences between them are clearer without the Platonic Academy framework. Coming to Pico from the perspective of the Academy there is considerable overlap between the two thinkers. Without the Academy perspective, Pico is no longer Ficino’s closest protege, bound to him as an acolyte and we can no longer assume the same goals. Within the Academy perspective, we needed to argue that Pico did not really mean to undermine Ficino’s work on astrology, but was attacking prophets, for instance, who used the stars; or that Pico was mistaken

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

69

in his argumentation in On Being and the One, and Ficino was gently correcting him. The Parmenides-On Being controversy,81 for example, raises some interesting specific questions that we will explore later. But there is a larger picture here. Pico wishes to take on Ficino. Ficino wishes to ‘correct’ Pico or smooth over the cracks. This is not simply an acrimonious personal relationship, a chance for the former student to ‘one-up’ his teacher, or two philosophers in the same town with very different views who are bound to disagree. This is part of an overall pattern of confrontation indicating a larger and more important disagreement—a disagreement of purpose between two philosophers whose sources and inclinations are not so very different, but whose purposes are. By purpose I do not mean Pico was a syncretist whereas Ficino is a Platonist. This is too simplistic, and not especially accurate. Rather there is the question of mission. This question of mission has become clearer in the case of Ficino in the past 20 years of scholarship through the concept of renovatio: using a Platonized Christianity he aims at the formation of a new Golden World through the return to God (marrying reason once again with faith). But in Pico’s case, such a mission has not been so defined. But Ficino and Pico also share at least three important similarities. First, both Ficino and Pico use Aristotle. Pico is utilizing Aristotelian argumentation. Ficino was against the Averroism of Padua (though he may never have taken on Aristotelianism directly),82 but, like Pico, he used an Aristotelian approach to argumentation in his Platonic Theology.83 He also never denies the importance of Aristotle, using both the philosopher and his later commentators, especially Aquinas, in his work, for instance the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of analogia entis, the Aristotelian example of act and potency, and most importantly often using the peripatetics in his theory of Being.84 There is an effort at concord here between Aristotle and Plato: an essential element if Ficino is to persuade his readers normalized to Aristotle to move with him toward Plato. Secondly, Ficino and Pico overlap in their use of specific types of Platonism. Pico uses Proclus more times than any other thinker in his Conclusions (100 out of 900 conclusions),85 and disputed with Ficino in his Commentary on Plotinian grounds. Ficino also uses Proclus’ Platonic Theology when discussing the attributes of God (God as Unity [book 1.20], Truth [1.21] and Beauty [1.24]) in his own Platonic Theology.86 Of course, he also worked with Plotinus. Pico’s use of Plotinus denotes an emphasis on Platonism as Neoplatonism or Late Platonism. Both Ficino

70

S. HOWLETT

and Pico are fundamentally ‘Neoplatonic’: despite the revival, much of the Platonic inheritance they grew up with, such as seen in the works of St. Augustine, was Neoplatonic or even already highly syncretic. It was Plato as understood after Plotinus, and after Christianity and other peoples of the Book (the Jews and Arabs) had reinterpreted. Ficino’s translation of Plato’s full works took Latin Europe for the first time back to the ‘original,’ but nevertheless as seen through the lens of Neoplatonic commentary and history. Pico is remarkable for his moment in that he went back to Plotinus, the point of origin for Neoplatonism emphasizing him at the time more than Ficino. Pico’s use of Proclus (c412–485 CE) suggests a love for the baroque and the marriage of philosophy and theology. The pagan Proclus led the Platonic Academy at a time when Christianity was becoming the norm. He continued a process within late Platonism to bring together faith and reason: combining various surviving pagan traditions with Greek philosophy (aspects of Platonism had already been combined with Aristotelianism) into an increasingly elaborate and arcane theological philosophy. Plotinus’ emphasis on the One, easily equitable with God, allowed Neoplatonism to develop into such a structure. Platonism became that most sacred of philosophies. It is unsurprising then that Proclus’ summa or key work was the Platonic Theology, from which Ficino took the title for his own summa. But Proclus was not just a philosopher with a predilection for theology. He was also vatic in his inclinations and enhanced a growing ceremonial (theurgical) strand within Neoplatonism. Proclus took Neoplatonism to its final stage within the Academy form: a theological philosophy assimilated with Gnosticism, among other traditions, baroque in its complexity with layers and layers of beings and substructures to the Platonic emanations, and with a ‘practicing’ arm.87 Both Pico and Ficino use Proclus, but Pico favors Proclus and a Plotinian ‘mysticism’ above all other forms of Platonism. Both Ficino and Pico also valued Timaeus and Phaedrus. Pico worked with Timaeus throughout his writing career in Conclusions, Heptaplus and Disputations. Only Phaedrus provided more material for the Conclusions.88 Phaedrus’ vision of Socrates on the Banks of Ilissus gave Ficino his own vision of the original Platonic Academy and is central to his work. Timaeus not only contains the important conversation on the existence of a demiurge (or creator who may be separate from God), but also underlines Pico and Ficino’s interest in math, particularly the sacred mathematics of Pythagoras.

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

71

In his use of Platonic sources, Pico is not an Aristotelian; nor is he rejecting Plato in his attempt at concordance: he is trying to place the two philosophers on equal ground, even if sometimes he veers more toward one than the other. This was a very difficult task in the fifteenth century as the two philosophers had become entwined in multiple traditions, and an equally difficult task to review from today. Finding the way back to points of origin and separation to then attempt concordance is all but impossible. But when judging Pico’s use of sources, to indicate a preference for Plato or Aristotle for example, we can consider two issues: what was truly (as far as we can discern today) from a predominantly Aristotelian as opposed to a Platonic source and most importantly what Pico thought was Aristotelian or Platonic. From the latter perspective, Pico uses what he knows to be Aristotelian argumentation in On Being and the One, his Commentary and indeed throughout his career. But the universe he describes, using Aristotle, is predominantly Platonic. The use of Plato and Aristotle in On Being and the One is awkward because he is attempting a change in the Platonic universe, but he does so in an effort, he claims, to return to an original understanding of Plato (perhaps thinking of the skepticism of the Middle Academy period). This claim includes his sidelining of Plato’s Parmenides as a rhetorical exercise: a surprising and odd argument. But this desire for or claim to ‘originalism’ is the third major similarity between Pico and Ficino, and a similarity shared by many of their peers: just like humanists and neo-Aristotelians, they both seek to go back to the original texts. Despite all the additional influences, Ficino spent his life reintroducing the original Platonists to the Latin world. Pico asserts he is even more militantly originalist than Ficino: part of his critique in the Commentary is that Ficino is utilizing intermediaries to discuss Plotinus and fails to go back to the source. In On Being and the One he argues he is going back to the real Plato rather than seeing him through the faulty lens of Proclus, for instance (despite his copious use of Proclus).89 There were genuine differences between them, and the debates were not simply provocations. Pico is using Aristotelianism in a distinctively different manner to Ficino and does attempt to balance between the two philosophers. Pico is also spoken of as a syncretist.90 He uses many of the same sources as Ficino including the prisca theologia (or prisca magia) the line of ancients who both thought brought the truth of God down from Adam to us. But Ficino tied these strands together through Platonism and creates a Platonic–Christian hybrid. Pico attempts to tie them all together within a Platonic understanding of the structure of the universe while

72

S. HOWLETT

using Aristotelian argumentation and Kabbalism, which he understands to be part of the prisca theologia. Ficino and Pico’s relationship was certainly idiosyncratic, and there are many disagreements. But as Kristeller argues, ‘There can be no doubt… as to Pico’s dependence on Ficino.’91 Whether in his Commentary, Oration, or Heptaplus, we see evidence of the Platonic revival, and just as with other aspects of Pico’s legacy, much of what Pico produced would not have been possible without Ficino’s translations and commentaries, including his ability to go back to this ‘real’ Plato. In many respects, Academy or no, Pico is the first heir to the extraordinary contribution of Ficino to our understanding of Plato and Platonism. Both Pico and Ficino are also exploring the same traditions and reviving original texts as Christians with an interest in religious reform. Both agreed—and this is a crucial part of their work—on the need to connect their metaphysics with theology, bringing faith and reason back together. This is a clear distinction between Ficino, Pico, and the scholastics, for example. But their goals in so doing are rather different. Ficino has a mission to lead the world back to a Golden Age. Pico begins with an interest in changing the world by embarking on his debate in Rome. Clearly, he also maintains an interest in reforming Christianity and tying together the key strands of philosophy with theology to reconcile faith and reason in service to that reform. Like Ficino, he also focuses on the ascent of the individual: the search for the way home to the divine. For Pico, however, there is no discussion of return to establish a renovatio.

Humanism While Ficino was his most important scholarly friend, Pico’s closest friend seems to have been the Florentine humanist, Angelo Poliziano. Like Pico, Poliziano struggled between the role of philosopher and homo literatus : ‘…while I want to sit, as they say, in two seats. I am excluded from both, and the end result is, in short, that I am neither a poet and an orator, on the one hand, nor a philosopher, on the other.’92 Unlike Pico, he was more successful within literature and philology, and was taught philology by Barbaro.93 He did however teach Aristotle in Florence between 1490 and 94, including a series of lectures on Aristotelian logic, the opening oration of which is known as Lamia. Lamia focuses on this dichotomy between the literary arts and philosophy.94 Poliziano is also an ‘originalist,’ taking apart the canons, removing the cobwebs of layers of

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

73

commentaries and scholastic convolutions, and returning as close to the original ‘meaning’ of the text as possible. To do this, he did need to be both a philologist and a philosopher,95 and to balance both roles despite feelings of falling ‘inbetween.’ Indeed, this idea of being ‘inbetween’ is one good definition of a humanist in Pico’s time. We tend to think of scholasticism as medieval, and humanism as a Renaissance movement. But they both coexisted in Italy many years before Pico. Petrarch (1304–1374) laid down the foundations of the humanistic enterprise. Scholasticism goes back to the twelfth century. Just as scholasticism could be considered on the ‘out’ in Pico’s time, so humanism had changed considerably from its Petrarchan beginnings, but is axiomatic to the period.96 Humanism is hard to define,97 one can be very concrete: it is the study of the humanities (Studia Humanitatis ), or even a specific study course in the humanities. But another, more complex, understanding would be the pursuit of philosophy and theology using philological analysis, and this gives a little more of the sense of the humanist enterprise. It is not simply a person of humanities versus a philosopher. But the person who falls ‘inbetween,’ like Poliziano. Humanism also clearly intersects with the primarily philosophical projects in Platonism and Aristotelianism in the late fifteenth century: the return to original texts through major translation projects that is a hallmark of the Platonic revival and the Aristotelian recovery among others.98 However, humanists were also part of civic life and most were committed to active engagement with the polis. This is yet another understanding of ‘humanism.’ Humanists provided an alternative to the traditional curriculum which could be more apposite to civic needs. For instance, Florence set up a studium within the city to connect to Florence’s requirements for civic management and engagement, aside from the actual university for the region in Pisa. Humanism provided a map for the ‘active life,’99 developing studies appropriate for young leaders including providing an ethical foundation for their role in society, in distinction from the traditional universities that were structured to provide young people for a profession—from law to medicine to theology. In this framework, humanism was about providing the ‘right stuff’ not changing everything around it.100 Despite this, humanism as an expression of Petrarchan optimism did also speak to the question of reform. We can say that ‘the Renaissance was born in Italy,’ but perhaps we should say that Renaissance is the name we give to the rebirth of Italy. It is a movement that emerges from

74

S. HOWLETT

Petrarch’s understanding (amongst others) that he is living in the Dark Ages (his own term)101 and revival or rebirth is required. Humanism is part of this Renaissance spirit: the declaration of a new age through the revival of the classical era or a return to the Golden Age102 (whichever way one wants to see this ‘return,’ but always with the ‘re-,’ the note of repetition). If there is a theme to the ‘Renaissance’ in the fifteenth century then inevitably it is in the building of such an age, or the feeling of being within one, or the search to achieve it. Of course, universities were controlled by the same elites as courts or civic life, and even though universities became famous for certain approaches (such as Averroism in Padua) and some faculties had better reputations than others in, say, medicine, scholars often moved between,103 could work on the peripheries or as the occasional part of an academic entourage such as Pico’s. This makes it hard to distinguish between a humanist, university professor or general ‘scholar.’ In other words, ‘humanists’ were scholars with a particular interest in civic life, often sat ‘inbetween’ the philological and philosophical arts due to a strong interest in points of origin, could also have larger goals for a ‘new age,’ and as part of such (and like other scholars) ‘increasingly appropriated the right to define for themselves, free from the tutelage of ecclesiastical authority, what it meant to be Christian.’104 There is much here that connects with Pico’s work. Pico was not a humanist.105 His focus is on the mystical experience, that is the contemplative life, rather than the active. We could argue he attempted to bridge the two, wanting to embrace both the humanities and philosophy, and in Rome he wants to be part of the ‘active life’ as a philosopher-reformer; but in his intellectual life (as opposed to any political intriguing in which he engaged),106 he lived a private, contemplative life after his Rome adventure. He also did not produce work oriented to humanist studies or education. He did espouse aspects of humanism, but had his own understanding of the key tenets,107 and mixed his interests, just as others did at the time.108 Instead, Pico’s specific mix is better expressed in terms of his ‘uniqueness’ or ‘exceptionalism’ and what we call his ‘syncretism.’

Syncretism Pico’s work and academic entourage included Aristotelians of differing types, Ficino and his Platonism, ‘humanists’ and Kabbalists (among others). His three known large-scale projects (if they are each distinct

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

75

from the other) all aim to bring different schools and strands of thought together whether between humanistic studies and theology for his poetic theology,109 between Aristotle and Plato for his concordance and, of course, between the different strands of the entire history of philosophy, taking philosophy backwards to the concord of Aristotle and Plato, and beyond to the deep structure of the universe in the Conclusions. Pico’s repeated goal during his career was to build concord between these differing strands, the major philosophical streams of the day, whether based on Plato or Aristotle, or a mixture thereof; and to re-establish the relationship between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, to provide a pathway home for the philosopher-mystic to God. He is a syncretist or ‘concordist’: an epithet encouraged by one of his actual titles, Prince of Concord. ‘Concordism’ as a term is particularly associated with forming agreement between Aristotle and Plato. It was espoused by Cardinal Bessarion, one of the earliest proponents of the new Greek Studies.110 Concordism can also be talked about as ‘perennial truth,’ or universalism. This takes us beyond Plato and Aristotle to the deeper question of the original truth underlying both. Pico did take his ‘concordism’ in this direction: consistently claiming that he had the key to deeper mysteries that could provide concordance to all things.111 Pico’s ‘concordism’ is part of a series of ongoing attempts to bring faith and reason back together, heightened by the atmosphere of crisis at the end of the fifteenth century and the related desire for reform in religious life and structures. For example, for a Christian, Aristotelianism suggests that philosophy alone can bring us at least close to God: if our intellect is active, it can and should be able to find its way toward God just by using its own resources. But Augustine argued that it cannot be done simply by using our intellect. God must reach down to us as well. But it was very easy for this reaching down simply to make us increasingly passive: relying on faith rather than using our intellects actively ourselves. If we want to bring about change, redefine our pathway to the divine, and connect our intellects to God’s (whether in a mutual reaching out or not), then religion and philosophy need each other. Pico is trying to bring together philosophy and theology, reason and faith, not just as two approaches to thinking about metaphysics, but also as two stages of the route to personal fulfillment. We need philosophy, which takes us to theology and then to religious faith, to echo Pseudo-Dionysius.112 Pico is taking us back to the very same issues that

76

S. HOWLETT

motivated St Augustine, Boethius, Averroes and Maimonides, and Ficino too: finding and setting out the bond between human reason and religious truth. It can be easy to forget that above all Pico is a Christian and his syncretism centers around Christianity: reverifying the truths of Christianity, and linking Christian truth to disparate philosophical schools, different times and places. Plato and Aristotle, with all their descendants, are being brought together for the greater good of Christianity, and Christian truths always come first.113 Indeed, Pico’s structure consistently hierarchizes the process of concordance: resolution can lean toward one argument over another.114 This is perhaps why the conversation between Pico’s Aristotelianism and Platonism is so complicated: sometimes he appears to favor Aristotelianism, and at other times gives a more Platonic answer. It depends what works to form that overall deep structure that can contain and express the religious mystery of an ‘expressed’ God (understanding the universe as the expression of the divine). We are sifting through each philosopher so that we end up not with who is right, but rather who writes the truth, and who will help us home. The hierarchical approach is also applied to time. Pico, and Ficino, believed that the earlier the knowledge, the more primary or ‘truer’ it is likely to be (when considering God, it is easy to conflate humanistic love of ‘the original’ with ‘the original’ as the truth). This implies that we began with truth and fell away from it, as time passed and truth became segmented and separated from the wellspring and history moved onward. The underlying deep structure, which looks to be a synchronic phenomenon, only becomes apparent through a movement back in time. Seen in reverse: the history of knowledge becomes a decline from a point of origin.115 Every element in the Conclusions can contain part of the truth, but it needs to be brought together (by going backward and inward at the same time) to create the grand narrative of a new theological philosophy, based on the unveiling of this deep structure, that would reunite reason and faith, and revivify Christianity.116 The Conclusions, for example, starts at the widest point of the philosophical funnel—Pico’s day—and works backward, drawing philosophical thought together, binding, dispelling, finding the ‘truth,’ and moving further back, until we reach Aristotle and Plato.117 In Conclusions, syncretism or concordism first appears to be a linguistic issue. Philosophical disagreements are bound up in the niceties of scholastic debate fussing over the intricacies of verbal disagreements

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

77

that can be overcome.118 As Pico says ‘There is no natural or divine question in which Aristotle and Plato do not agree in meaning and substance, although in their words they seem to disagree.’119 But then we move toward increasingly common underlying truths beyond linguistic niceties as we get closer to the point of origin. Pico thus practices an exclusive syncretism.120 He knows the underlying truth which he is drawing everything toward. Everything that has happened since the beginning; every being that has existed; every aspect of divinity, is contained in his deep structure. We arrive at the ‘revealed’ theological understanding of the universe which is also the proto-philosophy. Here Aristotle and Plato meet Kabbalism. Kabbalism is a frequently mathematical, philosophical-mysticism which takes us to the origin of the universe. Its central tropes of a Tree of Life or divine lightning flash with a central ladder provide a detailed structure or ‘skeleton’ to the Platonic emanations of the divine within the universe, with multiple echoes of Proclan Platonic theology and Aristotelianism. It is the third pillar of Pico’s signature approach, and Pico could use it as a means of rereading the history of philosophy.121 This pillar also connects Pico to other mathematical philosophical-mysticisms, such as Pythagoreanism. The philosophy of numbers is therefore a key part of his approach too.

The Prisca Theologia and Mathematical Philosophical-Mysticism Pico shared Ficino’s enthusiasm for the so-called prisca theologia (or prisca magia).122 This prisca was in many respects another form of concordism.123 As truth moves away from the point of origin, it becomes segmented and confused. It is in constant danger of being changed or even of disappearing. God’s truth however is preserved. The prisca theologia is a line of special individuals who were handed down in direct descent the secret wisdom left by God. It continued until the moment of Christ’s direct revelation, when such a line was no longer needed and included Plato, Moses, and Pythagoras among others. Ficino included individuals from different continents, such as Hermes Trismegistus, the mythical Egyptian, and Zoroaster of the Chaldeans, as part of a symbolic claim that the prisca covered all known parts of the world, God’s revelation coming to all, even if eventually it would specifically channel through Christianity.

78

S. HOWLETT

Pico was at heart an elitist—by birth, by attitude toward the world, in his approach to learning, in his view of his profession,124 and in his attitude toward philosophy generally which he understood as esoteric, individualistic, contemplative, and exclusive.125 The prisca magia promised hidden mysteries. Chosen individuals had special secrets, denied to the many, only allowed to the elect who could read the numbers, symbols, and hieroglyphs left behind. Flavius Mithridates, for instance, was drawing on this love of the special, the elite, when he promised Pico access to Chaldean, making him swear to keep it secret, and chasing away Benivieni as unfit to learn such a sacred language.126 Pico reminds us of elite secret knowledge on various occasions in the Oration,127 telling his audience that ‘…I have resolved through this congress of mine to demonstrate not so much that I know many things as that I know things that many do not know.’128 In the Commentary, he tells us that a poet can show ‘common people only the outer shell of the mysteries of love, keeping the kernel of the true sense only for more elevated and perfect intellects, a rule observed by all of the ancients who have written holy things.’129 Ficino uses the prisca theologia to access hidden or lost secrets that can be used to lead a renovatio: the transformation of our world into a new Platonic Christian Golden Age. Pico seeks the esoteric, individualistic, contemplative, and exclusive primarily, at least by the time of his death, for private revelation. There are other differences. Pico’s version can be traced clearly in the Conclusions, as we go from the scholastics, to the Arabs, to the Greeks, then the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and finally to the Kabbalists, understood as ancient Hebrews.130 Pico believed he had an original copy of the Chaldean Oracles of Zoroaster and so special access to that area (the Oracles were actually a late Greek miscellany of ideas and sayings).131 He also particularly emphasizes Pythagoras, the most obviously mathematical of the line. Finally, he emphasizes Kabbalism as part of the line (Kabbalism did not have such a distinctive role in Ficino). Taking from the prisca, the mathematical approach to philosophicalmysticism found in Pythagoreanism and Kabbalism became increasingly important to his work. For instance, he originally included Hermes Trismegistus in his prisca, mentioning Hermeticism in his Oration, though not in a distinguishing manner.132 Pico’s sixteenth-century fan, Sir Thomas More, comments that Pico thought Paul’s Letters were ‘crammed with the riches of the Egyuptians,’133 and he also may have used elements of Hermeticism in Heptaplus.134 But he focuses increasingly on math. Mathematical-mysticism suggests that the manipulation

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

79

of numbers and use of what we might call ‘sacred geometry’ can help us understand the universe and find our pathway home. Indeed, it could have been his interest in mathematics generally, and Pythagorean sacred geometry, that first led him to appreciate the mysteries of Kabbalism. The Conclusions shows us his three pillars clearly. Of all the conclusions in section one the majority are from medieval western philosophy, with a large Aristotelianism cohort, led by Aquinas. The second largest number are from Platonists led by Proclus, and the third from ancients led by Kabbalism. The largest number of individual sections belong to Proclus, then Kabbalism, then Aquinas, then Averroes. In section two, ‘according to his own opinion,’ most come from the section ‘dissenting from the common philosophy’ which again focuses on scholastic issues, followed by Kabbalism, then statements introducing his ‘philosophia nova.’135 But if you count parts 7 and 7a as one then the majority of conclusions in this ‘philosophia nova’ section are based on mathematics, specifically numerology. Further, the ‘philosophia nova’ is Kabbalistic. This emphasis on numbers is part of the whole plan of the Conclusions.136 When in 7a.1 he promises to prove God’s existence through his ‘way of numbers,’ we should see this statement within the overall structure of his Kabbalistic–Pythagorean mathematical philosophy. The point of mathematics here is that it forms a symbolic language that points us beyond. It points us to the interpretation of that structure. It is not simply ‘math,’ but a numerological approach that links philosophy with mystical experience. The third pillar of Kabbalism is where Pico’s love of mathematicalmysticism is seen most clearly, even though it is augmented by Pythagoreanism and other aspects of the prisca. But despite Kabbalism’s engagement in serious mathematical games, it is more than gematria; and whatever led Pico to Kabbalism, he used it for more than math. Kabbalism reveals the structure of the universe through the interplay of numbers, allegory and symbols, and therefore the pathway to mystical union: our pathway back home to the divine. Once engaged, Pico embraced the Kabbalah in much of its complexity as he knew and understood it. Math is combined with wordplay, symbolism, and all the diverse traditions that went into the formation of this alluring system. As a Christian, he entered this rarefied, hidden world as one of the first gentiles. In so doing, he and those around him, brought Kabbalah into Latin Europe for the first time.

80

S. HOWLETT

Notes 1. Pico, Oration (2012, 200–1, 180): ‘At ego ita me institui, ut, in nullius verba iuratus, me per omnes philosophiae magistros funderem, omnes scedas excuterem, omnes familias agnoscerem.’ 2. Despite Pico’s syncretism we can distinguish between philosophy and theology in his work: ‘That Pico is willing to distinguish discourse that proceeds theologically (theologice) from discourse in the mode of a philosopher (secundum philosophos ) is evidence that the formalities of the philosophical and theological disciplines are not called into question by the syncretic framework of Pico’s writing. A syncretic principle and a division of disciplines exist together within Pico’s universe of discourse.’ Dougherty (2002, 225). Kristeller argues that Pico did not believe in a ‘Christian philosophy’ but distinguished fundamentally between theology and philosophy, meaning he also could not commit to Ficino’s idea of Platonic theology, but he was interested in the idea of a ‘poetic theology’ (1993, 262). Toussaint refers to a ‘bilinguismo filosofico’, Bori (2012, 27 n47, citing Toussaint), ‘… da un lato avvolto nei misteri della Qabbala e delle teologie poetiche, dall’altro esposto alla cruda luce di una ragione che osava criticare l’astrologia così cara al Ficino’ (‘Pico’s philosophical bilingualism, on the one hand wrapped in the mysteries of the Cabala and in poetic theologies, and on the other hand, exposed to the harsh light of reason that dared to criticize the astrology that was so dear to Ficino’). 3. Sudduth (2008, 77–78). 4. He begins by defining his terms and moves forward by use of syllogisms, Jayne (1984a, 21). 5. We will explore the question of emanation vs creation in Chapter 5. 6. The modern critical conversation on Pico begins in the late nineteenth century. Eugenio Garin’s 1937 study argues for one majority point of view, presenting Pico as ‘an eclectic preeminently committed to the Scholastics… and by way of them to Aristotle and to Aristotle’s Greek and Arab commentators, especially Averroes.’ Allen (1997, 177). But Garin also thought Pico to be sometimes inconsistent, Craven (1981, 7). Schmitt (1983, 102) argues that all philosophers of the period were inevitably eclectic. Safa (2001, 9–10, 13) considers that his work is discontinuous by nature, evolving and imbued with an Ovidean paganism, recalling Pico’s interest in metamorphosis. Valcke sees Pico as going through a series of primary influences, from early Aristotelian scholasticism, via the prisca theologia and Platonism, especially Plotinus, before going back towards the end to his original position (Allen, 1997, 177 n10). Though Valcke also considers Pico’s viewpoint as very unfinished (2005, 377). Dulles understands Pico only within a scholastic

3

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

81

context and Stefano Caroti’s work on Pico’s medieval sources (2005) has certainly added to our appreciation of his use of scholastic thinkers. But in Dulles, Pico the syncretist or of changeable mind, disappears, Craven (1981, 11). From the alternative perspective, Kristeller highlights Pico’s use of Platonism and the connection between Ficino and Pico, though he recognizes Pico’s scholastic inheritance. (Allen, 1997, 177, n10). Contemporaries were also not in agreement over his primary allegiances. For instance, in his April 5th, 1485 letter, Barbaro addresses Pico as both an Aristotelian and Platonist, Dougherty (2002, 236). Farmer argues that contemporaries thought Pico was ‘platonizing’ Aristotle, and that in his critique of Ficino, he was ‘out-Platonizing’ him (1998, 26–27). Pico, Oration (2012, 210–11 190) ‘…that is, that divine something which is the distinctive mark of the Platonists.’ (‘…in quibus omnibus illud τò θεîoν, idest “divinum,” peculiare Platonicorum simbolum elucet semper’). Pico, Oration (2012, 214–15 195) ‘What point would there have been in dealing with natural things alongside the Peripatetics without also invoking the Platonic Academy? Their doctrine on divine things, as Augustine shows, has always been considered the most sacred of all philosophies…’ (‘Quid erat cum Peripateticis egisse de naturalibus, nisi et Platonicorum accersebatur Achademia, quorum doctrina et de divinis semper inter omnes philosophias, teste Augustino, habita est sanctissima…’). The frequent desire to challenge Ficino could be taken either as an Aristotelian reacting to the father of the Platonic revival, or as Pico’s desire to prove himself the superior of the leading authority in Platonism. We shall explore this later. Pico, Oration (2012, 222–23 208) ‘Est autem, et praeter illam, alia quam nos attulimus nova per numeros philosophandi institutio, antiqua illa quidem et a priscis theologis, a Pythagora presertim, ab Aglaophemo, a Philolao, a Platone prioribusque Platonicis observata; sed quae hac tempestate, ut preclara alia, posteriorum incuria sic exolevit, ut vix vestigia ipsius ulla reperiantur.’ Poliziano mentions this combination of interests in his notes, Hankins (2003, 219), found in lecture notes for Bruni’s Ethics (f.5r, at the beginning of Book 1). Dougherty (2008a, 182), Members (2003, 89) and Pico, Opera 1:373: ‘ut iam pro mei viribus ingenii, pro mea quanta maxima potest assiduitate et diligentia, Platonem cum Aristotele, et vicissim alternis studiis Aristotelem cum Platone conferrem.’ Dougherty (2008a, 182): For in examining the two, he finds that ‘if you examine the words (verba), nothing is more opposed; if you examine the substance (res ), nothing is more concordant.’ (Pico, Opera 1:369: ‘si verba spectes, nihil pugnantius, si res nihil concordius’).

82

S. HOWLETT

13. Dougherty (2008a, 191 n7): Letter to Baptista Mantuano: ‘I labor continuously on the Concordia of Plato and Aristotle. I give to it daily the whole morning’ (Opera 1:358–59, at 359: ‘Concordiam Platonis et Aristotelis assidue mollior. Do illi quotidie iustum matutinum.’ March 20th, 1490). 14. ‘ut cum ipso vivo et praesente loqui videamur.’ Cited by Garin (1965, 14). 15. Kristeller (1993b, 65). 16. Kristeller (1993a, 249) says Nifo thought Pico was Averroean in his views on the unity of the intellect. 17. Schmitt (1984, 121). 18. Schmitt (1975, 314): ‘As is well known but not always remembered, theology was little cultivated in pre-Tridentine Italian universities. Italians who wanted an advanced theological education almost inevitably went to the great northern European centres, throughout the Middle Ages and into the fifteenth century….’. 19. Schmitt (1983, 4). 20. Schmitt (1983, 29) and also argues that Aquinas was primarily in form Aristotelian, but in his metaphysics, Platonic, though distinguishing was difficult at the time (1983, 93). 21. See Trinkaus (1994, 347), Dulles (1941, 38) and Farmer (1998, 36) and Valcke (2005, 378). 22. Schmitt (1983, 70). 23. Schmitt (1983, 22–23). 24. Schmitt (1984, 110). 25. Kraye (2008, 14–15). 26. Lohr (1999, 25). Barbaro published a version of the Paraphrases of Themistius on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Physics and De anima which opened a new period of translations. He was himself inspired by Theodore Gaza who in 1452/3 had translated Problemata by another early Aristotelian commentator, Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias. Barbaro’s translations appeared only in 1481 but he had completed them during his years of study in philosophy at Padua in 1472/3. Panizza (2000, 154–55) cites Pico praising Barbaro’s translation of Paraphrases. 27. Lohr (1999, 16). 28. Mahoney (1997, 142). 29. Lohr (1988, 25–26): ‘Barbaro praised Vernia as a commentator on Aristotle who not only rejected that ‘most abhorrent manner of philosophizing’ (‘scelestissimum genus philosophandi’). 30. Dulles (1941, 29). 31. Mahoney (1997, 142). 32. Kessler (1988, 494).

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

83

33. Craven (1981, 139). 34. Kessler (1988, 496). 35. Mahoney (1997, 143–44) gives the example of the ‘one Idea of souls’ (‘una idea animarum’). 36. Grafton (1988, 790–91). 37. Ogren (2009b, 22). 38. Mahoney (1997, 127–28). 39. Garin (1972, 195): He was a highly religious Jewish scholar, and a translator and discussant for Pico, and ‘It is certain that Pico received from Elia his penchant, never abandoned, for Averroistic mysticism – for the idea of a conjunction of the human intellect with the absolute, achieved through knowledge.’ 40. Dulles (1941, 31). Mahoney argues that Pico may have been closer to Del Medigo than Vernia (1997, 127–28) during Pico’s years in Padua. But Pico may have helped Vernia change his position from ‘rigid Averroist’ to working on Aristotle’s early commentators such as Simplicius and Themistius. 41. Garin (2008, 303) states Medigo was with him in Perugia where they spent a lot of time ‘talking about being, essence, and unity.’ Mahoney (1972, 127–134). From the beginning of Del Medigo’s Quaestio de esse et essential et uno. He also notes that he translated for Pico from Book 9 of Averroes’ middle commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 42. Mahoney (1972, 127–30): At Pico’s request Del Medigo spent 1482 composing or completing in Latin a treatise on Averroes’ doctrine of the unity of the intellect, and a treatise on Averroes’ doctrine of the union or conjunction of the human being with the separate intellect. 43. Farmer (1998, 11): Pico also had Del Medigo collect and comment on a wide range of issues found in Arabic philosophy that Pico wanted to resolve at the debate in Rome, including Averroes’ De substantia orbis. See also, Trinkaus (1987, 82). 44. Mahoney (1972, 127–31). 45. Black (2006, 12). 46. Dulles (1941, 33): Del Medigo believed, for instance, in a single active intellect, but also differed from Averroes on some essential points, such as his insistence on creation in time, possibly due to his religious beliefs. See further Chapter 5 on the creation/emanation debate. 47. Mahoney (1972, 127–137): There is a question whether Del Medigo tried to point Pico away from more Platonic forms of Kabbalism. Andreatta (2014, 169) assumes that Del Medigo introduced Kabbalah to Pico but was not ready to go into more detail except to supply a list of relevant Hebrew writers and promising him a copy of Recanati’s Commentary on the Pentateuch.

84

S. HOWLETT

48. The question of the existence of a Platonic Academy in Florence led by Marsilio Ficino and including Pico, historically suggested by Armando della Torre, Storia dell’Accademia Platonica di Firenze (History of the Platonic Academy of Florence, Florence, 1902) and established as a scholarly norm during the twentieth century, was contested in a series of essays by James Hankins. For instance, ‘The myth of the Platonic Academy of Florence’ (1991) and later (for example, 2009). Hankins’ work required a full reconsideration of the Academy concept including Ficino’s usage of the term in his writings. For a fuller summary of the issue and debate, see Howlett (2016, 17–19). 49. Cassirer (1963, 2). 50. Jayne (1984b, 2). 51. Farmer (1998, 45) citing Ficino, Opera (Basel 1576), 1537 onwards. 52. Farmer (1998, 19) argues that ‘Pico’s “new philosophy” lay in a traditional, though exaggerated, Neo-Platonic framework, with special ties to those high-syncretic Platonic systems developed in antiquity after Plotinus….’ See Endnote 5 above. 53. Such as Valcke (2005) or Farmer (1998). 54. Copenhaver (2011, 170). 55. Jayne (1984a, 58 n11). 56. Members (1975, 56). 57. Members (1975, 56). 58. Rees (2011, 64 n72). 59. Allen (2008, 84). Replying to Ficino’s invitation to live in Florence, Pico addresses Ficino as ‘father of the Platonic family,’ his life’s ‘solace,’ his mind’s ‘delight,’ conduct’s ‘guide’ and learning’s ‘master’ (disciplinae magister). Allen is citing Ficino, Opera (Basel 1576), 889. 60. Copenhaver (2011, 172). Ficino also does not include any letters in his collected letters or mention of Pico’s On Being and the One. 61. Catani (2000, 43): Letter of Barbaro to Ficino, June 1490. 62. Aasdalen (2011, 74–75) citing Garin. 63. Jayne (1984a, 6). 64. Van Haelen (2009). 65. Guido Bonatti of Bologna University distinguished the two areas linguistically in his own textbook on astrology, with astrology as ‘a contemplative science of magnitude’ and what we now call astronomy ‘a practical science of judgement.’ But he also says that these two are frequently interchanged, Vanden Broecke (2003, 7–8). Historically distinctions between the two were often made. Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos, the primary guide to astrologers from the second century BCE onwards, distinguishes between mathematical astronomy and the influence of the stars on earth, Vanden Broecke (2003, 12). Isidore of Seville in the sixth century divides astronomy from astrology, but further distinguishes

3

66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71. 72.

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

85

between astrology that is ‘natural’ and that which is superstitious (divination etc.). Later conversations also introduced the question of free will into the discussion, after all, how can there be free will if the stars decide our fate? Solutions could get complicated, for instance Aquinas suggested that the stars work indirectly on us by influencing our senses, Vanden Broecke (2003, 9–10). At Padua, Pietro d’Abano distinguished between the science of motions and the science of judgements. In the science of judgements, he further distinguished between theory and practice, with practice divided into three areas: mundane astrology that looks at the world as a whole, natal astrology focusing on the individual (birth charts etc.), and horary astrology where direct answers are given to our questions focusing on specific events—what is going to happen when and what will be the result, Vanden Broecke (2003, 13). Vanden Broecke (2003, 13). Catani (1998, 71). Poppi (1988, 651) cites a long list of Florentine astrologers given by Luca Gaurico in an address at Ferrara, beginning with Ficino (De inventoribus et laudibus astronomiae 1507). Rabin (2002, 155): belief in celestial spirits or intelligences that move the heavens and affect earth are ‘not necessarily concomitant with a belief in astrology, although it certainly reinforced such a belief.’ ‘Although the Church had, across the centuries, come to a tacit accommodation with everyday astrologers, as long as they were seen to safeguard free will and divine providence, the upsurge of prognostications, and of fervent public interest in them, towards the end of the fifteenth century resulted in increased ecclesiastical censure and an intensification of the controversy.’ Catani (1998, 71–72). See for example, Cesare Vasoli, ‘Temi mistici e profetici alla fine del Quattrocento’: both elite and popular mentalities shared expectation of imminent social change, cited by Vanden Broecke (2003, 62). Vanden Broecke (2003, 10–11): ‘Veram Astronomiam, quae corporum coelestium magnitudinem, oppositiones, motusque considerat, quae solis & lunae aliorumque planetarum conjunctiones vel oppositiones caeterasve habitudines praedicit, quae item effectus quosdam eorum naturales probabiliter ac prudenter in universali conjicit (quam ut liberalem, nobilem, utilemque Artem veneramur).’ Similarly, Jean Gerson’s Trilogium astrologie theologizate 1419. See for instance, Rabin (2010, 176). Rabin (2002, 153) notes Tester’s argument that Disputations does not reject natural or physical astrology, which includes medical dealings and natural magic (S.J. Tester (1987) A History of Western Astrology. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 209, referring to Disputations 1:40). Rabin (2002,

86

S. HOWLETT

73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

81.

82.

83. 84. 85.

154) also notes Pico’s comment that ‘a general cause does not distinguish among its effects.’ (Disputations 1:188) meaning that ‘in a very real sense he made it impossible to practice or use astrology.’ Craven (1981, 137): D.P. Walker argues that Pico’s problem with astrology is the issue of human freedom (1958, 54–57), matching twentieth century critical desire to make Pico the pre-modern champion of the individual. But Craven argues rather that Pico is taking on Ficino’s use of magic. Kristeller (1993a, 254). See, for instance, Rutkin (2004, 497). Garin (1983, 81). Garin (1983, 80). Rutkin (2004, 495). Garin thinks Pico consistently rejected judicial astrology, Rabin (2002, 156). Walker argues that Pico and Ficino are in agreement on general issues even in De Vita and Disputations, Rabin (2002, 153), Walker (1958, 54–57). Rabin considers Pico to be against all astrology, and that Disputations is a break from previous positions in Heptaplus, for example, which she considers to be only against judicial astrology. This suggests Pico radicalized as he got older, potentially as part of a narrative of him moving towards the religious life and Savonarola. Rabin is not suggesting that these are Savonarola’s views however. Savonarola’s own work on astrology was published in 1495 though Rabin sees it as based on Pico (2002, 159–61). Vanden Broecke (2003, 65) asserts that Pico was not arguing against all astrology in Disputations but rather that some astrology was the wrong approach at the wrong time, causing social upheaval. Jayne (1984a, 42) remarks on how Pico liked to analyze myths and stories, an area which ‘he says Ficino either misunderstands or does not understand at all.’ This fits with Pico’s interest in poetic theology but is also an odd thought given Ficino’s equal interest in using myth and allegory. Pico probably simply disagreed with Ficino’s analyses. This particular conflict has been discussed often, for instance by Van Haelen (2009), Allen (1995, for example), and Salas (2014) who has taken apart some of the inconsistencies in Pico’s argumentation. Kristeller (1964a, 347) points out that the 15th book of Ficino’s Theologia Platonica is a refutation of Averroism. This refutation was vital to Ficino’s central thesis that the soul is immortal, for Averroes’ unity of intellect (i.e., one united intellect rather than individual ones) undermined the idea of individual immortality. Kristeller (1964a, 14). Kristeller (1964a, 46). Farmer (1998, 20).

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

87

86. Where they deviate is Ficino emphasizes one God rather than the Proclan baroque universe of henads, see Dillon (2011, 14–15), whereas Pico’s Kabbalism allows him to explore Proclus in all this complexity. 87. Howlett (2016, 35). 88. Allen (1997, 181). 89. Ironically so given Pico’s use of Proclus in the Conclusions, for example. Indeed, Farmer suggests that Ficino’s use of Proclus came after Pico’s Conclusions (1998, 20). 90. For instance, by Kristeller (1964b, 59). 91. Kristeller (1964a, 407). 92. Kraye (2008, 18 n24): ‘Quanquam mihi longe aliter accidit atque tibi, quippe ego dum geminis sellis (ut aiunt) sedere volo, utraque excludor, fitque demum, ut dicam paucis, ut nec poeta nec rhetor sim, neque philosophus.’ Modified version of Butler’s translation by Kraye: Poliziano (2006) Letters, ed. and trans. Shane Butler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, I:28–29. 93. Candido (2010, 119). 94. Candido (2010, 96, 97 and 101–3). 95. Candido (2010, 120). 96. De Boer (2009, 54) argues that ‘Renaissance humanism was in danger of becoming a tool for urban elites of the day to distinguish themselves from other social groups in Renaissance cities.’ But Kristeller saw them as both ‘in play’ throughout the period, Celenza (2004, 49). 97. We must also be self-aware of our contemporary re-readings of a past movement like humanism. See, for instance, Hankins (2003, 576, 579– 80) who argues that Garin used a Gramscian approach to his analysis: ‘Gramsci’s distinction between tradition and organic intellectuals and his notion of “cultural hegemony” are clearly behind Garin’s famous characterization of the fifteenth century as a period that saw an evolution from active participation of humanists like Leonardo Bruni in civic life to a politically quietist culture under the egemonia medicea, dominated by metaphysics, religion and Platonic “villa intellectuals”.’ Copenhaver goes further: ‘If experts on the Renaissance cannot agree on what a “humanist” might have been in those days, can more be asked of their critics – or their allies?…Whose humanism is it – a modern ideology, a secularism not found in premodern culture? Are the few people actually called “humanists” by sixteenth-century thinkers better seen as philologists or classicists…?… Experts today should know the old tools and their uses, realizing that the “humanist” label distorts the enterprise.’ (2019, 155) Indeed, he asks ‘if the Renaissance might be studied better without a word – “humanism” – which is now central to its lexicon.’ (154–55).

88

S. HOWLETT

98. See for instance Lorenzo Valla’s approach to humanist theology. Hankins (2003, 179) argues that the move to original texts was inevitable given that humanism is a philological movement, from what he terms the ‘ad verbum’ to ‘ad sententiam’ method (where a diachronic and contextual approach to examining language and translating work became more dominant). 99. Celenza (2004, 49). 100. Hankins (2003, 574). 101. Hankins (2003, 474). 102. Hankins (2003, 475). 103. Hankins (2003, 181): ‘…the tensions that existed were really between humanism and scholasticism as styles of inquiry, not between humanism and the institution of the university.’ 104. Hankins (2003, 472). 105. As Copenhaver remarks, ‘Whatever “humanism” signifies, the word has not clarified Pico’s story. Since the story has depended so much on the word – and vice versa – maybe we can do better.’ (2019, 157). 106. There is an alternative reading of Pico to be made here (though it is not substantiated right now in his writing): he provokes conflict, has a bad temper backed-up by at least one adventure involving combat, has been arrested, been in exile, is friends with the French court who just ‘happen’ to invade Florence on their way to Naples, gets Savonarola invited to Florence—a religious ‘firebrand’ with extreme views on reform—and is eventually possibly murdered. This hardly sounds like a contemplative life. 107. Copenhaver (1988a, 91) citing, for instance, a reading of Cicero ‘settling the thought (mens ) rather than the expression (diction), taking care to guide the reason (ratio), not the speech (oratio),’ but most other humanists took the opposite lesson from Cicero. 108. Aristotle was translated by Aristotelian humanists, and by those known more for their Platonism, like Valla, Leonardo Bruni or Cardinal Bessarion, Schmitt (1984, 136). 109. Hankins calls the ‘poetic theology’ concept ‘the most radical of all Renaissance attempts to heal the primordial estrangement of Christian from pagan. Since the late thirteenth century humanists had put forward the view – derived in part from ancient Christina apologists – that the best pagan poets had been secret monotheists.’ Hankins (2003, 487–88). 110. Malusa (1993, 26 and 29): Bessarion discusses agreements between Plato and Aristotle in In calumniatorem Platonis, but also argues that they did not agree with Christianity, and so ‘neither of them could truly be considered as precursors of revealed truth.’ 111. Ernst Cassirer describes Pico’s approach as ‘symbolic thought,’ Craven (1981, 19).

3

PICO’S INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS …

89

112. Trinkaus (1987, 520). 113. Pico ‘did not espouse the view that all philosophers were defending the same position using different terms and expressions; Pico privileges the claims of Christianity and sought external confirmations of them.’ Dougherty (2008a, 425 and 2002, 236). 114. De Boer (2009, 66) argues that Pico’s syncretism is hierarchical, so there is a clear approach here. 115. De Boer (2009, 66): ‘For Pico, the history of knowledge is a decline which has to be reversed. In the beginning, perfect harmony reigned among all kinds of knowledge, but the dispersal into different disciplines and Weltanschauungen ended the union of faith and reason.’ 116. Borghesi (2010, 221): ‘Pico held that every major theological tradition contained elements of truth and that these elements could be combined into a grand synthesis that was compatible with orthodox Christianity. His aim was to construct a new theology using material from existing historical theologies as building blocks.’ 117. Pico also placed topics from different thinkers in opposition to each other, Farmer (1998, 9–10). Farmer argues that his main approaches to ‘concord’ at each stage was threefold: first ‘deductive reconciliations’, secondly by going beyond potentially superficial linguistic disagreement, and thirdly, by reinterpreting one tradition through another (1998, 59– 61). 118. Borghesi (2010, 221). 119. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 364–65, 1 > 1): ‘Nullum est quaesitum naturale aut diuinum_in quo Aristoteles et Plato sensu et re non conueniant, quamuis uerbis dissentire uideantur.’ 120. Safa (2001, 220). 121. Malusa (1993, 29). Kabbalism becomes a ‘universal method of interpretation’ (1993, 31). 122. Trinkaus (1994, 354). 123. Borghesi (2012a, 58): Purnell argues that there are two main strands of concordism: the prisca theologia, and the comparatio of Plato and Aristotle. 124. Aasdalen (2000, 32): ‘Pico gives voice to this thought: Philosophers are more complete humans. Pico’s philosophical anthropology is not distinguished by his concept of freedom, but rather, by his boundless intellectual elitism, the extreme importance he places upon philosophical knowledge and wisdom.’ 125. See for instance, Copenhaver (1988a, 101). 126. Craven (1981, 105). ‘It shows in his rather smug statement near the end of the Oratio’ See endnote 129 below. 127. Karr (2012a, 6): The Oration ‘cites Ezra, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius and Origen concerning the two types of wisdom

90

S. HOWLETT

128.

129.

130. 131.

132. 133. 134. 135.

136.

handed down’ to us – one allowed to all, and one ‘reserved for the worthy.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 276–77, 267): ‘…volui hoc meo congressu fidem facere non tam quod multa scirem, quam quod scirem quae multi nesciunt.’ Dougherty (2008a, 185 and 193 n29), citing the Commentary: ‘vulgo de’ misterii amorosi solo la corteccia monstri riservando le midolle del vero senso agli intelletti più elevate e più perfetti, regula osservata da chiunque delle cose divine appresso gli antique ha scritto.’ See also the Oration 237: ‘But to make public to the populace the most secret mysteries and the profoundest arcana of divinity beneath the shell of the Law and the rough vestiture of words, what else could this have been but to give holy things to the dogs and to cast pearls before swine?’ (‘At mysteria secretiora et sub cortice legis rudique verborum pretext latitantia, altissimae divinitatis archana, plebi palam facere, quid erat aliud quam dare sanctum canibus et inter porcos spargere margaritas?’), Dougherty (2008a, 193 n30). Farmer (1998, 8). Farmer (1998, 13 and 486): Pico’s letter to Ficino about the Chaldean Oracles in his possession (Fall 1486, Opera 1:367). Pico speaks of ‘…libellus de dogmatis Chaldaicae theologiae, tum Persarum, Graecorum, et Chaldaeorum in illa divina et locupletissima enarratione’ (‘…a little book on the teachings of Chaldean theology in that divine and opulent exposition of the Persians, Greeks, and Chaldeans’). Farmer argues that he did use material that is not found in Psellus or Pletho’s versions. Copenhaver (2002b, 58). More (1987, 305): ‘Essentque (ut dicam breuius) Aegyptiorum opibus non consulto suffarcinatae.’ McKnight (1981, 69). Farmer (1998, 206 n3) argues that we should take these two latter sections as equal, for one was added while in press. Farmer also thinks that conclusions could have been moved between these two sections (1998, 207 n5). Farmer (1998, 37) suggests that we can trace the ages of the world, for instance, in the structure of the 900. He also argues that the language of the Conclusions moves from the specific and technical of scholasticism to the symbolic as we arrive at ideas that structure the universe.

CHAPTER 4

The Third Pillar: Pico and Kabbalism

Pico describes the origin of Kabbalism in the Oration. It was given to Moses orally alongside the Book of Laws, on Mount Sinai and later, through a vision, Esdras (Ezra), wrote it down in 70 books.1 These books contain ‘ineffable theology of the super-substantial deity – a font of wisdom that is the exact metaphysics of the intelligible and angelic forms, and the river of science that is the most steadfast philosophy of natural things.’2 Pico tells us that he has bought these books and found that what they actually describe is the Christian revelation3 : ‘Here is the mystery of the Trinity, here the Incarnation of the Word, here the divinity of the Messiah; here of original sin, of its expiation through Christ, of the heavenly Jerusalem, of the fall of the demons, of the hierarchy of the angels, of Purgatory, of the punishments in Hell. I saw the same things that we read every day in Paul, Dionysius, Jerome, and Augustine.’4 But in Kabbalism he found not only the Christian message but also classical philosophy, particularly the Platonic tradition: ‘As for those matters pertaining to philosophy, it truly seems you are hearing Pythagoras or Plato, whose conclusions bear such affinity to the Christian faith that our own Augustine pronounced immense gratitude to God that the Platonic books made their way into his hands.’5 Kabbalism offered Pico a powerful combination: the Christian message and the most theological classical philosophy represented within the exceptionalism of direct, secret revelation hidden for centuries, now available to the Christian world through Pico. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_4

91

92

S. HOWLETT

Mythically, Ezra’s 70 books were given by the Archangel Uriel in a vision and written down upon his return from the Jewish Exile in Babylon. These 70 books consisted of three components: the theology of God, the metaphysics of intelligible and angelic beings, and the philosophy of natural things.6 Historically, Kabbalism is a form of Jewish mysticism that developed in the thirteenth century, becoming relatively widespread by the fourteenth century in Jewish centers, around the time of the rise of humanism.7 It derives from a variety of trends in both Jewish and Greek thought, in particular Jewish Merkavah or Chariot mysticism and Greek Gnosticism. Greek Gnosticism, in turn, connects with Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and a variety of other mystical and philosophical traditions (particularly those of the prisca theologia) that later reappear in Pico’s philosophy. It is no coincidence or divine intervention that Pico recognizes so much in Ezra’s books. Kabbalism is based on a long line of mystical thought with similar if not shared roots to early Christian and Neoplatonic mystical traditions. Judaism is based on three principle sources. The first is the written canonical biblical texts themselves known as the Torah (the Book of Law), these were traditionally provided by Moses on Mount Sinai. The second is the so-called Oral Law or Talmud, which rapidly started to become written too. The Talmud is a series of commentaries providing detailed explanations of the Torah. As the commentaries became more extensive so the need to start writing them down became obvious. The third is the mystical interpretation of the books of the Hebrew Bible. Kabbalism belongs here. It explores these texts for ‘inner meaning,’ in the belief that they contain God’s instructions for the formation of the universe and everything in it. Those instructions can be found, for instance, through the manipulation of numbers and language. Understanding those instructions means being able to manipulate the universe and change one’s position within it. The manipulation of the building blocks of the universe are where Jewish mysticism meets magical thinking. Kabbalism as a coherent form begins in Languedoc, France at the end of the thirteenth century. It then spread to Girona in Catalonia, Spain, and further outwards to Italy, and to parts of the Byzantine Empire. As a form of mysticism, it is both contemplative (also known as ecstatic, speculative or theosophical Kabbalism) and theurgic, that is operational or magical.8 The first is traditionally associated with the use of gematria, temurah, and notarikon. Gematria is a type of numerology. It applies mathematical values to the Hebrew alphabet and script to determine the

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

93

inner truths hidden in scripture. Temurah manipulates letters in Hebrew words in the same texts as if the words are codes to be deciphered. Notarikon searches for abbreviations in the same way, so that a few letters at the beginning or the end of a word can be thought to ‘stand in’ for some new word. Each of these approaches searches for secrets thought to be embedded in the key Hebraic texts. Theurgic Kabbalah is more associated with understanding and utilizing the metaphysics of the universe, as the immanent expression of the divine. It focuses more on the trope of the Tree of Life made up of ten sefirot, though Pico, as many others, uses both approaches to examine the sefirot as ten expressions of the divine in our created/emanated world.9 Kabbalism is a distinctive component of Pico’s approach: the third pillar. He was also the first Christian philosopher to embrace Kabbalism, bringing the Jewish mystical tradition into Christian conversation, and beginning a new tradition of Christian Kabbalism that still exists today. Johannes Reuchlin was probably the second of this line, meeting Pico in 1490 and helping him with his work.10 For in the fifteenth-century Latin Europe, Kabbalism was a hidden ‘tradition’. Its works were only available in Hebrew. The first printed extracts of Kabbalistic texts were by Christians writing about Kabbalism, such as Reuchlin’s De Arte Cabalistica.11 However, there is another perspective here. Until relatively recently, Kabbalism was also the least well-researched part of Pico’s work.12 It has now become increasingly clear that Kabbalism’s introduction to the Christian world was enabled and shaped by Jewish scholars or Christian converts. Pico’s interest was the catalyst. Pico’s money enabled the work. Pico makes the first attempt to bring Christianity and Kabbalism together. But his work rests on the scholarship of others.

Introduction to Kabbalism The Kabbalism introduced to Pico uses emanation, just like Platonism. But as a part of the Jewish tradition, the universe that the divine enters is also ‘created.’ The Kabbalistic universe is formed by a retraction (to form a void) and an extension of the divine (the entry of the One into the void down to Earth itself), but is also created by an act: it is a contraction/ overflowing; and an action of the dynamic godhead. Emanation is described metaphorically as a divine lightning flash or, alternatively, as the Tree of Life. This Tree ‘expresses’ different attributes of the divine as it emanates. But if the Tree of Life is God’s emanation,

94

S. HOWLETT

then its highest point is seemingly not God as the Plotinian One: God apparently ceases to be One as soon as the universe is entered (emanation begins). The divine exists as a single entity only prior to entry into the known-universe. The Tree expresses all aspects of God, but God is more, above and beyond the Tree. We could argue in Plotinian terms that the Tree is the many, and the unity beyond the Tree, the One. This God beyond is hidden, unknowable, infinite, and formless. In Hebrew it is called the Ein-Sof .13 We cannot say what it is, we can only say what it is not, much as we would in Christian negative (apophatic) theology (such as in Pseudo-Dionysius), as opposed to the kataphatic theology of the Catholic church. Early on in medieval Kabbalism, the Ein-Sof becomes stabilized as ‘a technical, indeed artificial, term detached from all adverbial associations and serving as a noun designating God in all his inconceivability.’14 But the serious play of Kabbalism, complicates every core concept. As Kabbalah is also a mathematical vision of God and the universe, the Ein-Sof was called the Nought (for instance in the Girona Kabbalist, Nachmanides’ Commentary on Sefer Yesirah) or the ‘nothing’. It is also Being (potentially through Aristotelian influences), but indeterminate being as opposed to the active being we might see within creation.15 Entering the philosophical environment of Aristotelians vs Platonists, the Ein-Sof becomes part of the argument around Being and the One. If the Ein-Sof is indeterminate being, for example, we could argue that this nought is not God either, the divine is still hidden, but his nought is separately present as indeterminate being, or even is what God makes into being.16 Each point on the lightning flash or node on the tree is a sefira (plural sefirot ). There are ten such points. Each is an attribute or aspect of God. Together all ten make up the completeness of the divine. They express the Active Divinity17 that can be known, as opposed to the Ein-Sof , which is hidden. The Tree is God’s presence in the void. The sefirot together make up the face of God or Anpin Penima’in, ‘the hidden face of God, aspect of divine life turned towards us which despite its concealment, seeks to take on shape.’ 18 In this way, the Ein-Sof is ‘immediately present, in its full reality, in all stages of the process of emanation and creation, and in every imaginable shape.’19 The Tree can also be described as a person—the first man or Adam Kadmon—the heavenly Adam or Great Human (makroanthropos , in the language of Philo of Alexandria, the

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

95

Jewish philosopher). The Tree is the active hand of God in the world, a splintered reflection of God in its unity, beyond the void. The process of emanation is called asiluth.20 The lightning flash or Tree projects into a void called zimzum. The concept of zimzum is complex. It is the void into which God extends—the place in which the nought is not. But God is not there because the divine chose to withdraw itself from itself. The void is created by a process of retraction. After all, there can be nowhere originally where God is not. Pico describes this ‘solitary retraction.’21 Nachmanides’ Commentary which Flavius, Pico’s assistant, translated and Pico cites in Autumn 1486 talks of zimzum 22 : Nachmanides says that this ‘retraction’ produces a dense and unfathomable cloud (‘una caligine densa e insondabile’). Nachmanides’ zimzum makes ‘una sola merce’ something that cannot be known or limited to one place, it is hosheq, that is tenebra (dark).23 The Tree is hierarchical. Just as in Platonism, those attributes closer to the point of origin (in Platonism the world of Ideas, in Ficino’s Christian Platonism, ‘the Angelic Mind’) are most like the divine itself. Also like Platonism, the Tree is divided into ‘worlds’ or different levels representing the stages of emanation, each with a grouping of sefirot. The concept of the sefirot is a distinctive contribution of the medieval Kabbalists, though obviously they also connect to older mystical traditions and to Platonism. The highest sefira or the point on the tree closest to the Ein-Sof is Keter or the Crown. From Keter, the Tree or lightning flash zigzags downward to us. The end point at the root of the tree is called Malkut or the Kingdom. From Keter to Malkut, the flash passes through eight sefirot. We can also draw a straight line from Keter to Malkut. This is the central pillar of the Tree. The lightning flash begins on the central pillar, and passes through it twice as it zigzags through zimzum before staying in the center to go down to Malkut. So the zigzag also forms a left-hand pillar of three points, with the same on the right. As a Tree, it has a central trunk and then two lines, to left and right, out to which the branches reach. The left and right-hand pillars have three sefirot each and the central pillar has four (Keter and Malkut being two of these four). The journey upward for an enquirer, however, is not necessarily a zigzag as the sefirot are linked vertically and horizontally and to the worlds in which they are grouped. An early Kabbalistic work, the Book of Creation tells us that God created the world “with thirty-two wondrous paths of wisdom.’24 These thirtytwo are the number of the pathways (22) connecting the sefirot (10) on the Tree.

96

S. HOWLETT

We already have three key numbers from the tree: 32, 10, and 22. The 10 sefirot are 10 primal numbers.25 22 is also the number of letters in the Hebrew alphabet. As is quickly clear, Kabbalism is partially a numberand language-based mystical system. Indeed, sefira means ‘number’ in Hebrew and comes from ‘to count,’26 though as Kabbalism developed into the fourteenth century, the word became more connected to what it purported to describe: the attributes or emanations of the divine. Pico would still have made the link between ‘number’ and the attributes of God, however, as numeratio was used in Latin.27 Indeed, he speaks of ‘numerations.’ The ‘number’ approach allowed Kabbalists who wished to ‘operationalize’ the structure to learn new secrets, change their position on the tree, or manipulate the universe using mathematics. If Kabbalah is in part a number-based system, numbers make up our universe and mathematics is the key to understanding our world, inevitably connecting Jewish mysticism to Pythagoreanism. The left and right-hand pillars represent conflicting forces. The central pillar, the trunk of the tree, acts as the midpoint or balance between these conflicts. Nine of the sefirot are divided into triads: groups of three arranged in triangles. The three sefirot at the top of the Tree form a triangle as the highest emanated level or world: these are Keter (the crown) (known also as Ratson), followed by Hokmah or wisdom, and Binah which is insight, discernment, or understanding. These are the top but also the ‘roots’ of the emanation. The ‘world’ is the world of intellect. If the mystic can reach Hokmah, or divine wisdom, 28 they would arrive at the ‘cusp.’ Kabbalism embraces the concept of transmigration or metempsychosis (the movement of a soul from body to body in a cycle of rebirth). If one can reach divine wisdom, then transmigration ends. Transmigration is another shared view with Platonism as Ficino notes: ‘All of the kabbalists reckon that the world was created and that it will cease in motion, but that from the beginning the souls were created together, and they continuously change bodies until the end of motion.’29 Pico is highly ambiguous on the question of transmigration, defending the Church Father, Origen, who also shared this belief (a heretical viewpoint),30 but not definitively espousing the idea. The next three sefirot represent the moral forces. They are Hesed or grace or love, Din also known as Gevurah, which means severity or judgment, and finally back on the central pillar, Tiferet (beauty, or splendor or mercy). Tiferet therefore brings together love and judgment.31 Tiferet is also at the midpoint of the central pillar, and so represents the unity of

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

97

God.32 The final triad are Netsah (endurance), Hod (splendor or majesty) and back in the center, Yesod (foundation). Yesod, on the central pillar, is the binding point of the first two. They are thought of as creative forces related to sexuality. After the divine has emanated down through the three levels, triads or worlds, it ends in Malkut, our physical world. The aim of prayer and contemplation or theurgic manipulation is to take the mystic back from Malkut to Hokmah, though the normal endpoint is Binah (we will consider later why the mystic perhaps cannot go beyond Binah). This is performed in various ways, for instance by drawing down divine energy through the Tree and/or climbing the pathways using mathematical and linguistic methods to produce religious insights. The mystic then can draw themselves upward from Malkut, which is the physical Jerusalem, to Zion, which is Binah.33 But this structure is not simply the description of a flow of energy from Keter to Malkut (to Keter). The Tree is constantly created through this energy, binding together the universe. The sefirot, as attributes of the revealed divine, also interact with each other. So unlike a late Platonic (e.g. Proclan) emanation system, ‘The Sefiroth are… not a series of ten emanations of aeons emerging from one another; on the contrary, they constitute a well-structured form, in which every part of limb operates upon every other, and not just the higher ones on the lower….’ But like the Proclan baroque universe of endless repetition and reflection each of the sefira ‘repeats in itself the structure of the whole, and so on ad infinitum – a point elaborated by the later Kabbalah.’34 There are many ways of thinking about these ten sefirot and the mystical journey, which change with the various Kabbalistic schools and associated traditions (even in terms of their importance to the practice of Kabbalism). This is unsurprising: for many Kabbalists they are the blueprint of the universe, and the way home for those who can understand them fully. Their meanings inevitably multiply. For instance, if we consider Keter, Hokmah, and Binah as the first triad and the world of the intellect, then the seven that follow are the seven days of creation where ‘what is thought’ comes into being. The throne or crown, the entry point of the hidden God into the void as the active divine, sits in the middle balancing the two and from it comes wisdom and insight. Creation then begins with love (Hesed) and proceeds through severity or judgment (Din), perhaps as we would think of energy and form35 in Platonism.

98

S. HOWLETT

Adam Kadmon, the primal man, is the whole Tree, but is first embodied in the intellect (Hokmah).36 Hokmah can also be the materia prima or in Hebrew, the hyle. It is also the ‘giver of forms.’ So it can be both the bearer and giver,37 or in Platonism the place where the Platonic active God meets and imprints matter. The Girona School, thinking of Platonic forms, thought of the forms as being inherent in the hyle: ‘God did not produce the forms separately from formless matter in order to unite them subsequently, but he “drew them forth” from the hokmahhyle, in which they preexisted in pure potentiality, as still undifferentiated essences.’38 The connection between the intellect, the hyle and the primal or Great Adam means that our intellect is connected to divine wisdom, and the tsaddik or righteous man is related conceptually to the scholar.39 Adam can also be described as seven holy forms corresponding to the seven limbs of a human. These are the lower seven of the sefirot. The first three are either not part of the metaphor or are the intellectual powers of this Adam.40 Alongside Adam, certain biblical figures are central symbolically to Jewish mystical thought. Enoch from the book of Genesis is said not to have died but to have ‘walked with God’ (taken up bodily [whole]), placing him in a special category of individuals which also includes Elijah, who was physically taken up by God in a chariot. Elisha, his disciple, describes seeing this chariot of fire drawn by fiery horses taking Elijah up and away. These two biblical figures provide a pattern for the mystical approach to the divine, while remaining exceptional. Enoch is also synonymous with the Metatron, a high angelic power or the voice of God. By the middle of the thirteenth century, the Metatron had been divided into a higher or Great Metatron and a lower. Enoch’s role is connected to the active divinity, within creation, and its voice on the Tree of Life, whereas the Great Metatron is now a mystery above and beyond.41 In rabbinical (Talmudic) sources, Elijah is the guardian of sacred tradition.42 The chariot too is important. It is seen again by the prophet Ezekiel as part of a vision of God sitting on a throne on a chariot. Merkavah or ‘chariot’ mystical tradition derives from this vision. Moses also deals directly with God. On Mount Sinai, Moses is given the Torah, the Talmud, and the Kabbalah, so he learns not only the words of the Law, but all the meaning around and within those words. Finally, the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as the roots of the Jewish people often represent a triad on the Tree. Jacob can be Tiferet, standing on the middle pillar and at the center of the Tree. Tiferet controls the middle

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

99

pillar, the rapid, direct route from Malkut to Keter. This middle pillar is also known as Jacob’s ladder: recalling Jacob’s vision of a ladder up to God with angels passing up and down.43 Abraham is then Hesed (Love or Grace), Isaac is Din (judgment or fear), and Jacob (Truth, Peace, or Beauty).44 While each sefira is a divine attribute, God is also ‘present’ in the Tree as the shekinah, which exists in both a higher and lower level form. The ‘hidden’ shekinah is the throne or the glory of God as it was displayed to Ezekiel in the Old Testament, also described as the voice from the throne. The lower shekinah is Yesod or can also Malkut as the ultimate receptacle for the energy of the divine.45 The shekinah gives, providing shape, and receives all things. They enter without shape and emerge with shape, like a seal or a stamp upon them.46 This is an analogy very close to Ficino’s use of the stamp as a description of the emanated reflection of God imprinted on matter.47 The shekinah is sometimes portrayed as female, the divine female or feminine aspect of God, but it is also understandably a synonym for the Metatron as God’s presence or voice, so the shekinah can also be Enoch. The middle pillar is the direct path of the shekinah to earth. Jacob as Tiferet or beauty at the center of the Tree, is therefore sometimes described as the husband of the shekinah,48 though Keter is also the bridegroom of the shekinah reminding us that the Tree, just like Ficino’s emanatory universe is a hall of mirrors. The prophets are central in Judaism, as religious and often political leaders, and in Kabbalism through their prophetic experience. In Ficino’s Platonic revival, prophetic inspiration is part of the route toward God, but it is not the highest form of inspiration. In Kabbalism, Elijah and Ezekiel show that prophetic inspiration takes us to God, at least as far as we can go in our bodies: to Hesed and then up to Binah with a final possible stop at Hokmah. This moment of rising toward Hokmah, from Hesed to Binah is called debhequth. It provides us with a view of Keter (the throne).49 The soul who sees the vision is transfigured. This is Ezekiel’s experience when he sees the throne-chariot. The contemplative who wishes to achieve debhequth must use kawwanah, a meditative state of mind combined with the intent and focus required to take the contemplative upward. It is an ‘introversion of the will’: the will is distracted and is fragmented in multiplicity. It ‘collects’, concentrates, and purifies itself, before finally binding itself to the will of God, thereby achieving debhequth.50

100

S. HOWLETT

But this is a communion (communio) with God, not a mystical union. Both sides remain separate. The term derives from ‘dabhaq,’ to adhere, or to cleave to. The soul obtains a vision of God as the throne on a chariot, and then returns (rather like Ficino’s charioteer from his Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, who sees the World of Forms from the edge of the celestial sphere). Debhequth ‘always contains an element of distance despite its character of intimacy. Debhequth is not becoming one with God but entering into an infinitely close liaison with him, roughly corresponding to that called adhaeresis by medieval Christian mystics.’51 Meanwhile, God, the Ein-Sof , is hidden, behind the throne. However, Kabbalism is a diverse tradition that emerged from a variety of different mystical traditions. Even trying to explain the basic tenets as they existed in Pico’s time, such as the Tree of Life or the ways in which we might think of the first Adam, is complicated and Pico’s knowledge relies on the particular sources translated for him. Kabbalism in the fifteenth century consists of external influences, an entire history of Jewish mysticism and different schools of thought developing the tradition as independent sources of authority.

The History of Kabbalism The first such external influence is Gnosticism itself, a disputed set of religious movements from the early centuries ACE centered, at least partially, on Alexandria in Egypt. Gnosticism has aspects of Christianity, Platonism, and Judaism.52 Proclus’ Platonic theology combines gnostic ideas with Platonism, for example. Gnosticism had multiple connections with Platonism throughout both their histories. The influence of Platonism is clear, for instance, in Gnosticism’s use of emanation, while late Platonism in particular, took much from Gnosticism. Iamblichus and Proclus increasingly married the mystical with the philosophical creating a philosophy with elements of the ceremonial and practical as the divide between religion and philosophy blurred. Proclus used triads of henads , deanthropomorphized gods similar to the gnostic concept of aeons , and related them to the various worlds of the Platonic universe: so the first triad is made up of the intelligible trinity, intelligible-intellectual trinity and intellectual hebdomad, followed then by three inferior orders of supermundane gods in the next world, the twelve planetary gods of Plato’s Phaedrus and mundane gods. Below are orders of angels, demons, heroes, and souls. But this is not all, the triads repeat themselves within an

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

101

increasingly complex and crowded universe of the divine and semi-divine, all based on the rule of three. Both traditions separately and together influenced Kabbalism in various ways. For example, Philo of Alexandria combines Greek philosophy and Gnosticism with Jewish thought. Philo, also known as Philo Judaeus, was a Greek Jew living in the first century. Philo brought together Platonism, with its already embedded aspects of Aristotelianism and Pythagoreanism, with new religious ideas from his own tradition (including making Moses the father of all philosophy) mingled with gnostic structures. One of the foundational texts of Kabbalism, Bahir, as with other medieval Jewish mystical literature, uses language deriving from Philo, for instance describing God as the planter.53 Obviously late Platonists were not monotheists however this increasingly complex theocracy was open to reinterpretation as monotheistic. Plotinus posits the One, which for a Christian or a Jew is God; while sefirot, the Trinity, angels, and demons are all easily present in a Platonic/gnostic structure. Pico drew these connections54 ; while Proclus’ triadic repetitiveness is echoed both in medieval Kabbalism and throughout Pico’s work. In Kabbalism, Pico was able to find the Platonic universe (particularly of Proclus) that he already knew,55 but saw shared history rather as a common truth. Indeed, Philo was not the only ‘cross-over’ between Judaism, Platonism, and gnostic traditions. Scholem, the great scholar of the history of Kabbalism, connects the beginning of the Kabbalah to the Merkavah tradition,56 which in turn he considers to be a branch of Gnosticism.57 For example, just as in other forms of Gnosticism, in the Merkavah and other Kabbalistic traditions, the soul goes through different planets or significant nodes (described in Merkavah literature as heavens or palaces), ruled by angels and other rulers (rather than aeons ), to God. The ‘Chariot’ (Merkavah) refers to Ezekiel’s vision (Ezekiel 1) of God seated on a throne supported by four humanlike winged beings supported in turn by wheels. Ezekiel is attempting to describe what God looks like for the first time in the Bible. What he describes is a mystical experience: complex and mobile. There are energies around the chariot and constant movement as the ‘chariot’ emerges from a lightning filled cloud carried on a whirlwind. Ezekiel’s vision is an important moment in Jewish tradition. The Mishnah, the Oral Torah, recognizes the complexity, linking the vision with the first chapter of Genesis as the two most important

102

S. HOWLETT

mystical moments of the Torah. Indeed, they were considered so difficult and so important, that study of these two pieces was withheld from the masses58 (making Pico’s choice of subject for his first published work, the first chapter of Genesis, especially significant). It is also of note that these two key texts concern first the derivation of everything from the creator, God, and secondly, the return of the end point of that creation, here represented by Ezekiel, to its creator. There are other Jewish traditions concerning the ascent to a sight of God. There is the ‘question of Enoch,’ probably the oldest conversation around mystical ascent in Judaism, and later (probably at the same time as the emergence of the Merkavah tradition around the third century ACE) the so-called Hekhalot or ‘palaces’ literature which describes mystical visions of the palace of the divine. All three attempt to answer the question ‘how do I achieve a vision of God?’ In Hekhalot literature, mystical hymns describe the ascent, and take the mystic through seven heavens and seven palaces or temples.59 ‘Revelations are made to the voyager concerning celestial sphere and the secrets of creation, the hierarchy of the angels, and the magical practices of theurgy.’60 Finally, after passing through the palaces, the mystic arrives at the throne where he sees a vision of God as a man and learns the dimensions of his body (as described in the Midrashic text, Shi’ur Quomah): ‘an anthropomorphic description of the divinity, appearing as the primal man, but also as the lover of the Song of Songs, together with the mystical names of his limbs.’61 But this primal man, or anthropomorphized God in the Hebrew tradition is God as creator. The creator or demiurge figure is complicated in Gnosticism and Platonism. Plato’s demiurge from Timaeus is not necessarily the same as the mystical One, after all the demiurge creates from preexisting matter. In Gnosticism, the demiurge or creator figure could even be evil. If this life is a prison that we need to break free from, then the demiurge is the creator of our prison. But in early forms of Hebrew mysticism, the creator God is the one divine being above all others. It is God and therefore it is good. What the mystic meets at the end of their journey is God on his throne, in a Temple of Silence, and is entirely transcendent. The intertwining of monotheism and polytheism, philosophy and religion, creation and emanation, transcendence and dynamism are all ongoing problems as these traditions intertwine. The relationship between Gnosticism, Platonism and Hebrew mysticism continues into the medieval period in the Book of Creation or Sefer

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

103

Yesirah,62 the founding text of sefirotic Kabbalism which brings together aeons , henads, and palaces with Pythagorean mathematical principles.63 The book contains a series of statements which may not have been written as a formal narrative,64 and its exact history and point of origin are unknown.65 But whoever constructed the Book of Creation assembled different traditions from Hebrew Gnosticism with an additional focus on a new element, ‘Wisdom literature’ which here, at the birthplace of the sefirot, means Hokmah. In Christian Gnosticism, Wisdom is the female version of the divine, otherwise known as Sophia. Hebrew Wisdom literature also utilizes Hokmah as the Sophia, who then relates to the shekinah. In the Book of Creation, there are 32 paths of Wisdom (the ten sefirot and the pathways in-between), and the 32 are also paths of creation.66 The numbers of the Tree are ‘metaphysical principles of the universe or stages in the creation of the world.’67 The first sefira, Keter, is the breath of God (ruah elohim hayyim), or spirit. This breath condenses into ether, which is the second sefira, and then into water and fire, the third and fourth sefirot. Out of the breath of God comes the 22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet.68 The language in Sefer Yesirah is not one of creation, however, but of engraving or hewing,69 reminding us of the imprinting metaphor. The four sefirot at the roots of the tree are particularly important and close to the creator God who engraves or hews onto matter, the six others remain distinctive and more separated from God. We are not working in triads so much here, but rather 4 + 6. The Book of Creation is not dated but is a foundation of Kabbalah which, as a coherent tradition, appears to date from c1200 ACE.70 The term itself means ‘tradition.’ Scholem argues that Kabbalism emerged from Languedoc in France around the end of the twelfth century and early thirteenth.71 This was also the time and place of the Cathars. Catharism was itself a revival of various gnostic ideas, but within Christianity. From Languedoc, Kabbalism moved over the Pyrenees into Christian Spain. Unlike later Renaissance trends in philosophy, Kabbalism was a western European phenomenon at the beginning.72 It was also a closed phenomenon. It was developed and controlled by rabbis and held secrets that were not available to even the wider Jewish congregation, let alone the external world. The origins seem to coalesce around a circle at the Jewish school in Narbonne. The circle was a family of rabbis, the youngest of whom was known as Isaac the Blind. The ‘tradition’ solidifies around Isaac. Other

104

S. HOWLETT

Kabbalistic scholars of the period worked with Isaac, as did scholars from Spain who took the ideas of Narbonne back with them.73 Isaac and his family were using gnostic traditions and Platonism in their work, reuniting the two in a new variant of Jewish esotericism that took Jewish Gnosticism much further.74 For instance, Isaac emphasized the hidden God with the new term Ein-Sof beyond the Tree of Life, as beyond contemplation and above the divine thought expressed in the Tree. This is ‘the cause of Thought,’75 beyond being or thought. He emphasized the Bahir, the oldest known book of the Kabbalistic tradition as similar in importance to the works of the Merkavah tradition.76 Bahir also became central to the formation of Kabbalism in thirteenth-century Spain.77 The formation of Kabbalistic ideas was inevitably part of wider philosophical conversations in Jewish communities. Hebrew scholarship was disconnected by language from Latin or Greek scholarship, and Kabbalistic texts were held as part of sacred, hidden tradition within Jewish communities, some more so than others. But Jewish scholars who were not Kabbalists per se, often crossed over in their interests between the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew communities. Most famously, the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides controversially introduced Aristotelianism to Jewish thought in the Moorish part of Spain. The Aristotelianism of Averroes deeply influenced him. His seminal work, Guide for the Perplexed was translated into Hebrew from the original Arabic around 1205, the year after he died.78 Maimonides was Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, and crossed the border between philosophy and Jewish mysticism, to the point where he discussed the Merkavah tradition as ‘metaphysics’.79 This is the period of the so-called Jewish (sephardi) Golden Age in the Arabic and Moorish world. Maimonides’ Jewish Aristotelianism did eventually impact Kabbalism, but only later. There were dedicated attempts to marry philosophy to the ‘tradition,’ especially as some philosophical points of view were already derived from the same wellspring, to the point where Kabbalists could think of themselves as those who continue philosophy.80 Perhaps some thought they could even take philosophy to its more practical outcomes just as theurgic magic might be the practical outcome of the Renaissance revival of Platonism. But it is also provocative that a closed esoteric ‘tradition’ emerges at around the same time as the broadening out of Jewish thought and the engagement of Jewish thinkers in non-Jewish-specific scholarship. Is Kabbalism a conservative reaction? Or did it emerge separately as part

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

105

of an ongoing internal conversation, say from study of the Merkavah tradition?81 The Spanish school was at least in part a conservative reaction. It was based in Girona, then under the King of Aragon. Nahmanides (Moses ben Nachman) (c1194–1270) was the key figure and Girona’s main period as a Kabbalistic center was between 1210 and 126082 around the height of Nahmanides’ career. During this period, Jewish philosophers were hotly debating the acceptability of Moses Maimonides’ interjection of Aristotelianism into Jewish thought. Nahmanides wrote a commentary on the Sefer Yesirah discussing his concept of God. He relies on gnostic tradition including examining the doctrine of aeons and emanation; and he and his school were mystics with only a small place for such as Maimonides83 : The Kabbalah appeared in Gerona in the fully elaborated form of a contemplative mysticism that sought to draw all domains of Jewish existence into its sphere of influence and to embue them with its spirit. With its doctrines of debhequth as the highest value of the contemplative life and of kawwanah…. In the form it now assumed, the Kabbalah tied… roaming spirituality to the world of human action by means of mystical symbols that light up in all areas and that refer everything terrestrial back to the world of the deity as manifested in the sefiroth. It sets up a ladder for the elevation of meditative spirits, avoiding the perilous leaps of those who plunge unprepared and undisciplined into the sea of contemplation.’84

Pico had two copies of Nahmanides’ commentary on the Torah and he mentions Nahmanides in his work.85 Inspired by Nahmanides and the Girona School, Spanish Kabbalism developed over the years to focus on salvation and the individual’s relationship with God. But the thirteenth-century Spaniard, Abulafia, took the tradition in a different direction. He was the founder of ‘prophetic kabbalism’, combining Girona mystical contemplation with more practical Kabbalah86 : manipulating words and numbers to ascend the ladder with the goal of mystical union with the divine (unio mystica).87 He became an authority on the Sefer Yesirah even while living in Barcelona,88 but also, as so many others, had read Maimonides’ Aristotelian Averroean philosophy. For example, Abulafia uses Maimonides’ bridge between the Aristotelian Active Intellect and Jewish thought. Maimonides argued that prophecy itself was due to the Active Intellect’s influence on us,89 and that our ultimate aim in ascending to the divine was the Active Intellect itself, expressed as Hokmah, but also as Enoch, Metatron, and the

106

S. HOWLETT

Cherubic realm (in other words, the ‘higher’ Active Intellect).90 Abulafia sees such an ascent as an ascent of the mind (not the body) from the lower Active Intellect of the impregnated mind of the mystic to the Intellect using Jacob’s Ladder.91 For Abulafia, the mystic achieves this ascent through the use of divine names (a more theurgic route) than use of the sefirot per se.92 Through this relationship with the Active Intellect, Abulafia believed that we can become prophets (in the Jewish sense of the importance of the prophet) ourselves: assuming also a movement back down and the potential to bring received wisdom or abilities born of selftransformation back to others, much like Ficino’s blueprint for renovatio. Abulafia’s self-fashioning as prophet and sense of mission even became messianic in its scope. It is unsurprising that such a powerful voice would influence Pico’s own thinking. Abulafia can clearly be heard in Pico’s Kabbalistic conclusions, for example. Italy is more complicated as a site of Kabbalism. By Pico’s time, it had provided a home for Kabbalists from as far afield as Spain to the west and Crete and other parts of the Byzantine Empire to the east. There are three clear pillars of Italian Kabbalism from its introduction in the early thirteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth century: the first is rooted in Abulafia himself, who was from Spain but who produced most of his work in Italy; the second pillar is based on Menahem Recanati (1223–90), the first Italian to introduce thinking from the Spanish Kabbalistic text, the Zohar, attempting throughout his career to focus on the union of philosophy with Kabbalism. His influential Commentary on the Pentateuch was read by Pico just before writing the Conclusions and is the second main influence on the Kabbalistic conclusions. Finally, the influential work, Ma’arekhet ha-Elohut was highly systematic in its approach to Kabbalism.93 Overall, Italy is generally ‘more systematically speculative’ than Spain. It seems ‘to share a greater affinity with philosophy.’94 There was a fourth element from Crete connecting perhaps with the Recanati tradition when it entered Italy. Under Byzantine rule, there was a significant Jewish presence in Crete who had eventual access to Italy through Venetian citizenship. The Cretan approach to Kabbalism may have extended to a variety of Italian Jewish thinkers such as Johanan ben Isaac Alemanno (c1434–after 1504) who worked with Pico in his post-Rome period and obviously Del Medigo was from this community. The Cretans were part of the more rational, philosophical approach to Kabbalism. The Cretans and philosophical Kabbalists were focused on the

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

107

marriage between mysticism and philosophy, rather than seeing mysticism as a means to circumvent rationality and achieve a one-to-one ecstatic relationship with the divine.95

Key Texts Other than Sefer Yesirah, two texts inform early Kabbalism: the Bahir and the Zohar. The Bahir was traditionally attributed to Nehunya ben ha-Qanah, who supposedly wrote two other mystical works, Sefer haPeli’ah and the Sefer ha-Qanah.96 Its historical provenance remains very unclear especially as it utilizes a variety of mystical traditions including a lot of gnosticism.97 There are apparent medieval Kabbalistic influences suggesting authorship from within the ‘tradition’ but potentially very early in its development.98 The Bahir uses paradoxical parables to show that everything is a symbol leading us to buried secrets, including everything in the text. The text also suggests that every part of the Bible points us to an aeon or palace or place within the celestial world.99 The mystic who interprets these signs is the ascetic of the Merkavah tradition (‘He who withdraws from the world apprehends the name of God; he who wishes to possess “life” must reject the pleasure of the body…’), but the Bahir is not overtly ascetic.100 Indeed, Scholem argues that the God of the Bahir is very different to the aloof, transcendent God as King on his throne of the Merkavah and Hekalot schools.101 The Bahir repeats much of the Sefer Yesirah but does not entirely follow it. The sefirot are in both texts, but in Sefer Yesirah, the sefirot are especially ideal numbers containing the powers of creation, whereas in Bahir, they are the aeons of gnosticism, they are ‘the powers of God, which are also his attributes.’ The term sefira no longer connects with safar, to count, but sappir, sapphire, offering ‘sapphirine’ reflections of God.102 These increasingly complicated sefirot are therefore best described in parables: their interrelationships revealed through metaphors, such as parental relations, or even sexual attraction with ‘a mundane theater of kings and royal daughters, stupid soldiers and tricky administrators, passionate lovers and radiant brides in order to arouse emotions in the reader and thus to make him grasp in an analogical way the psychology of the invisible.’103 The sefirot in the Bahir are a means to read and interpret the universe, and therefore God. Through this reading, we can move upward through the sefirot and climb toward the divine. They are then ‘layers of a mystical

108

S. HOWLETT

ladder but also knots of aggregation where the energy of the emanation rests for a while before flowing again.’104 This changes the Merkavah and Hekhalot traditions. The palaces guarded by angels become a ‘path to contemplation,’ moving Jewish mysticism ‘from its traditional magical and sapiential features to a medieval theory of self-seclusion and search into mind depths.’105 Henceforward ‘the task of the mystic is to attain the innermost chambers of the heavenly palace through a lonely path of contemplation.’106 Regarding the specific sefira, the Bahir provides a dual definition of Keter107 : the crown is the crown of God, but also a metonym. If the crown represents God’s kingship, then Keter is the manifestation of this kingship.108 Binah is the place from which everything derives, the moment before creation. This is also the place everything needs to go back through, including us, in order to move beyond the physical world.109 Binah is a female principle, and here is connected to the mystic mother, she is the mother of the world with her seven children, the seven days of creation or the seven sefirot, coming after her.110 Binah also controls the ages of the world, that is the cosmic week consisting of 6000 years of history followed by the cosmic Sabbath (shabbat ) of 1000 years before history begins again.111 The shekinah is discussed within the gnostic tradition of Sophia112 and related to the Metatron, through one of its oldest names, the angel Yahoel.113 But even higher than this Sophia is the shabah tehorah a ‘primordial divine idea that precedes everything and embraces everything within itself. Within it, there existed, in potential and hidden, the two “highest principles” or “supreme roots,” that is, original matter and original form, until the divine will combined them.’114 There is an additional sefira from Bahir that sometimes appears on the Tree of Life: Da’at (knowledge or gnosis).115 It is described as an aeon in the Bahir. Da’at appears on the middle pillar, below Keter and above Tiferet. Depending on the definition of Keter, Da’at can connect to Binah and Din/Gevurah in a triad of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. The Zohar is a product of the Spanish strand of Kabbalism. The Bahir is a series of pieces that have been gathered together and reworked from many older texts. The Zohar is a personal coherent piece,116 though it continues the Bahir’s Gnosticism.117 Its impact on Pico’s Kabbalism is through Recanati, for example. But it was not available directly to Pico.

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

109

Pico and Kabbalism The beginning of Pico’s relationship with Kabbalism is unclear, but by 1486 it had become one of his three intellectual pillars, alongside Platonism and Aristotelianism. He was rapidly learning Kabbalistic concepts, studying Hebrew, and using both in his work. In the Conclusions, Kabbalism has become Pico’s Ladder, joining the pillars of Aristotelianism and Platonism. Pico eventually built a Kabbalistic library, including manuscripts described by his mentor, Elijah Del Medigo.118 Eugenio Garin argues that the attraction was the methodology that Kabbalism provides, the promise of a readymade hermeneutics to utilize in his study of philosophy and religion.119 But there is so much more to attract here. For instance, it was not just readymade hermeneutics; it was also secret hermeneutics, hidden from Latin thought and from most of the Hebrew community. Only the worthiest and the wisest could access and use Kabbalism. Pico was being given access to a secret methodology based on exceptionalism. He could be the ‘first’ to present this secret to the wisest in Italy. Pico the exceptional, the philosopher-noble, was opening up the secrets of the universe and, in so doing, marrying once again philosophy, theology, and religious experience. Three important scholars of Hebrew texts and ideas worked on this project, providing overall guidance, translations, and discussion of concepts. The first is Del Medigo himself,120 despite his personal views on the Kabbalah; secondly, Pico hired Flavius Mithridates to translate for him and to teach him Hebrew. Thirdly, after Pico’s return from France there was Johanan Alemanno.121 Flavius Mithridates was a Christian-convert, born a Jew (as Shmuel bin Nissim Abulfaraj) in Sicily,122 who went by a variety of names and led a checkered life. He was also a significant scholar and linguist. As a translator, he was part of a long tradition in Sicily. Sicily, like Moorish Spain for instance, was a crossroads, a place where cultures and languages met. It produced scholars who could act as mediators between worlds, like Henry Aristippus, part of the twelfth-century revival of classical studies. Flavius could translate from the Arabic, and from Hebrew. As a Jew who became a Christian, he could also mediate between the two religions. He studied theology and medicine at the Studium (humanist institute) in Naples, became a priest and found his first patron under the Bishop of Molfetta. He then followed an ecclesiastical route but seems primarily known as a translator, having worked in that capacity for various patrons, including

110

S. HOWLETT

Pope Sixtus IV123 and Federico, Duke of Montefeltro, for whom he translated from Arabic in the early 1480s.124 But he is also known to have been studying Arabic texts in the Vatican Library, and beyond his translation work, preached on behalf of Sixtus.125 Pico could have known Flavius from late Spring 1485 while in Florence,126 and potentially Pico asked him to start translating a major set of Kabbalist texts from Hebrew at that time.127 Flavius has no recorded prior interest in Kabbalism and so probably did not introduce it to Pico. Pico could have become acquainted with Kabbalism even back in Padua.128 Pico’s hiring of Flavius was not unusual. Hebrew and Arabic studies were emerging alongside Greek with all the interest in a ‘return to text.’ Jews and converts like Flavius were hired as teachers, translators, and secretaries. Flavius acted as Pico’s secretary and agreed to teach him Hebrew and Aramaic/Chaldean, a ‘secret’ language (perhaps appealing to Pico’s love of the hidden).129 Benivieni joined Pico to study Hebrew but Flavius would not allow him to join for Aramaic. But his primary work was translation. Flavius took a large part of the existing Kabbalist tradition, texts primarily only in Hebrew and relatively or completely inaccessible to the world outside of rabbinical schools, and translated them into Latin with his own ‘spin.’130 Flavius was able to bridge the Hebrew world with the Christian, and as such was a ‘mediating figure.’131 It is hard to overplay the extent of his enterprise, especially in the short time in which it apparently occurred. It could be argued that he, not Pico, brought Kabbalism into the Christian tradition.132 There was another side to Flavius that has undermined our understanding of his significance. For a long time, Flavius was seen as a clown rather than a serious scholar with suggestions that he even altered his translations to make Kabbalistic works appear more Christian to Pico’s eyes. But the past few decades of study on Pico’s Kabbalistic Library suggests that he was working for Pico as an honest and important scholar. Certainly, he was also sarcastic and lewd with an instinct for trouble. There were notes at the expense of his employer in the translations, touching on Margherita (‘a man should not attach himself to the wife of another, lest he commit fornication, as Pico with Margherita…’; ‘Admit it, Pico, neither you nor I have ever been perfect…’)133 and even on Pico’s abilities as a translator (‘Pico, do you think you can understand without Mithridates?’),134 and scholar (‘if Pico was poor, he wouldn’t get such honors from Rome’).135 It is unclear when Flavius left Pico’s service

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

111

but he writes about wanting to return to Rome, and of Pico’s problems there,136 and not all was friendly inside Pico’s academic entourage.137 By 1489 Flavius is in Viterbo, where he is arrested with books belonging to Pico that the authorities confiscate. Pico was more interested in getting the books back, than having Flavius released.138 Johanan Alemanno worked with Pico while in Florence, but whether before Pico’s Rome adventure or simply after is unclear.139 He was another product of the Paduan Aristotelian circle, and from the same region as Pico. Like Elijah Del Medigo, he had combined his love of Aristotelianism with Judaic and Hebraic studies, naturally gravitating toward Moses Maimonides, as the quintessential Aristotelian Jewish philosopher.140 Alemanno discusses working with Pico, but Pico does not mention Alemanno. We know about their relationship through Alemanno and Gianfrancesco.141 Alemanno continued Pico’s Hebrew studies,142 and lived in Florence until 1494.143 It is unclear whether he overlapped with Flavius Mithridates. Like Pico, he was writing a commentary on Genesis, and claimed that his commentary on Song of Songs was written at Pico’s suggestion.144 He also was engaged in Kabbalistic studies and would have known other Kabbalistic scholars, through the Arbabanel family, whose eldest son was known as Leone Ebreo.145 Alemanno’s Kabbalism was both magical and astrological and involved other traditions from the prisca theologia. He conceived the magical use of Kabbalah ‘as the apex of an ideal curriculum he composed as a Jewish form of the study of the humanities.’146 Alemanno’s Kabbalism belongs within an Italian strand that could have been around for two hundred years,147 with some aspects of the Spanish tradition added, stepping further than Flavius’ material to the borderlands of philosophy (on the one hand) and magic (on the other).148 It is focused, rather like Ficino, on the redemption of the human universe. Jacob’s Ladder is central to this vision: if it allows angels to move up and down, it can also be used by humans to move between the world of matter (at the bottom) to the world of mind at the top. Redemption is possible if living souls can go both up and down as an enlightened soul can help others upward, if not change the world. Jacob’s Ladder is also central to Pico’s Oration, and reiterated in Heptaplus, as the means to ascend toward God. The difference in Pico’s work is that the downward movement and the possibility of world-transformation through the work of an enlightened soul is missing. Alemanno could have introduced

112

S. HOWLETT

the concept of Jacob’s Ladder to Pico, meaning that they met before the Oration was written.149 There are others of significance to Pico’s Kabbalistic studies who no doubt came in and out of his life. But the entry of Kabbalism into Christian thought is to a large extent due to the extraordinary work of Flavius, Del Medigo, and Alemanno. Due to their contribution, Pico was able to reference Kabbalists widely, including Isaac the Blind, Nahmanides, and Recanati among others, and of course Maimonides and the Languedocian Aristotelian, Gersonides.150 But he did not necessarily have their texts. What he may have owned and how and by whom they were selected is a conundrum worth examining to understand the schools of Kabbalism he is using. While the emphasis seems to be on providing a cross-section, and neither Flavius nor Pico apparently preferred or emphasized a particular variant,151 they had direct access to certain texts, but not to others. Inevitably Pico was reading missing works, such as the Zohar, through the lens of commentaries that would have a preferred perspective.152 His first materials were the texts gathered (by whom it is not clear) and then translated by Flavius. One estimate suggests that Flavius translated 40 books representing a cross-section of different writers, times, and traditions.153 But there is also the inventory of Pico’s collection of Hebrew texts bought by Domenico Grimani.154 We know he had a text called The Great Parchment or ha-Yeri’ah ha-Gedolah deriving from an anonymous probably Italian author of the early fourteenth century.155 He also had Abulafia’s Book of the Secrets of the Torah (Sitre Torah), which was Abulafia’s Commentary on Maimonides’ ‘Guide to the Perplexed,’ and a work by Moseh de Leon, for example, known as Nefes ha-Hakamah.156 Flavius did not translate the Zohar or Sefer Yesirah, but Pico knew of them through commentaries at the very least: for instance, there is evidence of four commentaries on Sefer Yesirah in Flavius’ manuscripts,157 and Recanati’s Commentary on the Pentateuch, which Pico did own, used sections of the text.158 Recanati oriented more toward the Zohar and an exploration of the sefirot and their significance, but also attempted to provide an overview of ‘the tradition’ in his work.159 He could have been the most significant source for Pico’s Kabbalistic statements in section one of Conclusions, with about 25 of 47 and a possible further 12 deriving from his work.160 Section two has a different set of sources with Abulafia more dominant, aspects of Recanati, notes of Maimonides and the Sefer Yesirah.161 Pico’s movement from Recanati in section one to Abulafia in second two of Conclusions suggests that section one focuses more on

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

113

the Kabbalism of the sefirot, while second two focuses on practical or theurgic Kabbalah (its potential for transformation)162 in search of the unio mystica. The use of Abulafia and Recanati argue also for a significant use of Italian traditions in Pico’s work (Abulafia influencing through Sicily), with strong practical and gnostic trends.163 Pico knew the Bahir using it in his Conclusions, with that signature Platonic gnostic flavor and developed ideas on the sefirot.164 He is not the first Christian philosopher of his time to use it: Ficino references the work in his On the Christian Religion but through Paul of Burgos. Pico is the first to use the text directly165 (Ficino does know and use Kabbalah beyond Bahir. For instance, Samu’el Sarsa’s Sefer meqor hayyim from the Spanish tradition.166 This work is not in Flavius’ material or recorded as owned by Pico, so Ficino could have been accessing different entry points into ‘the tradition’). Pico refers to both the Bahir and the Zohar by name acknowledging their centrality to Kabbalistic tradition at that time.167 His use of Nahmanides is less clear and he possibly did not read him until after writing the Conclusions.168 In summary, Pico’s sources strongly suggest that the ‘ecstatic’ theurgical Kabbalism of Abulafia is primary,169 with Recanati also an important influence. The extent of the influence of other scholars or texts not read through Flavius’ translation is unclear to date,170 and Alemanno’s contribution remains under-researched especially as Pico’s Kabbalism and use of sources changes as we move from the Conclusions to Heptaplus. Meanwhile, Christianity had its own mystical writers and traditions. The highly influential, Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius) is probably the closest Christian forebear to Pico’s mysticism and provides a useful example of the interrelations between Christian traditions and Kabbalism, real or as understood by Pico at that time. There were two main approaches to the discussion of the divine in Christian thought: affirmative theology also known as kataphatike which works through initiation and ceremonies, and understanding what God ‘is,’ and negative theology, apophatike. Apophatic or negative theology works by understanding what God is not. It is the path of the mystic, the inward path. We can only ‘know’ the active agent of the divine, as the transcendent Unity is beyond our understanding. Reaching up to God in apophatic theology takes us to darkness. It is also the pathway beyond where kataphatic theology ends. At the end of the apophatic journey the soul has agnosia, understanding that God is unknowable, potentially

114

S. HOWLETT

leading to a Christian form of henosis where the soul becomes ‘lost’ in God.171 Pseudo-Dionyisus was writing in the fifth and early sixth century with a body of works (corpus areopagaticum) attributed to him, such as the Divine Names, Mystical Theology, and Celestial Hierarchy. In Latin Europe, he became influential in the twelfth century and influenced Aquinas as well as medieval mystics such as Meister Eckhart. In the fourteenth century he became even more popular though Ambrogio Traversari’s 1436 translation. Pico used him in Heptaplus in his description of angelic and celestial worlds, for instance, and throughout the Oration.172 Pseudo-Dionysius thought of henosis , the final stage, as ‘seeing’ God: so, the highest point is actually epopteia, or gazing, contemplating, perceiving, or learning (much like Plato’s charioteers, echoed by Ficino, or the Kabbalists gazing upward, though whether all three are looking at the same thing is less clear). But by the medieval period, Christian mysticism had moved from ‘seeing’ to the unio mystica, or ‘becoming one with God.’ This required a movement inward and upward: first removing oneself from the world and then from oneself as we become lost in God. We move beyond knowledge (wisdom or understanding, the end point of kataphatic theology), to a change in our being173 or, depending on the thinker, loss of our being in the One. We have moved beyond the Aristotelian Active Intellect, beyond Being itself, to Platonic henosis . Kabbalism presents us with both options. The Tree of Life is made up primarily of the ‘knowable’ expressed as particular active attributes of the divine. Debhequth is therefore not an apophatic ascent into the cloud of unknowing, but part of kataphatic theology. But the idea of the Ein-Sof takes us into the apophatic realm. Keter itself is more complicated. It stands in-between. It is the thought or breath of God. There is a tradition that we may ascend to Keter just like the congregation of Israel, as the bride to Keter’s bridegroom, and ‘crown’ the ‘head’ of God. But in combining Pseudo-Dionysius, with Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Jewish thought (as Pico is attempting to do), it is unclear what henosis would be in Kabbalism and what is the role of Keter or the Ein-Sof . We shall explore this further in Chapters 5 and 6. Elsewhere, where Pseudo-Dionysius and Kabbalism do not coincide, Pico tries hard to relate Pseudo-Dionysius to Kabbalism. For instance, Pico changes Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchy of angels from nine to ten, the number of the sefirot.174

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

115

But Pico has a specific purpose in studying the tradition. This heretofore missing aspect of God’s truth, not only enrichened Christianity175 but also showed that Judaism was part of the wider revelation: the dominant and primary revealed truth of Christianity. Pico’s use of Kabbalism and merger with Christianity is supposed first to prove to Jews that they must convert to Christianity, and secondly to prove to Christians that they are the ‘legitimate Israelites’ as he describes in Heptaplus.176 This is a crusade: ‘whatever we find holy and true we shall bear off from the synagogue, as from a wrongful possessor, to ourselves, the legitimate Israelites.’177 And if the Jews ‘agree with us anywhere, we shall order the Hebrews to stand by the ancient traditions of their fathers; if anywhere they disagree, then drawn up in Catholic legions we shall make an attack upon them.’178 The bringing together of Kabbalism with Christian mysticism thus serves two significant purposes: Christian access to secrets direct from God better enabling the ascent to the divine; and the conversion of the Jews, a requirement for Christ’s return and the end of days. Pico has started to create something new: ‘Christian Kabbalism,’179 whether inspired by Flavius or others. Its foundation is his belief that Kabbalism, along with the whole of Judaism, is a direct revelation. He does not distinguish between the different aspects of that revelation: Judaism itself holds a secret that has not yet been explored.180 This idea of a secret from God is ‘overpowering’ to Pico and those who came after him.181 Secondly, he uses ‘the tradition’s’ two branches: the mystical and the practical or magical.182 The mystical is the divinely revealed interpretation of the laws and the practical is connected to natural magic and is more of a ‘science.’183 The Conclusions is his first attempt to embed this Christian Kabbalism into the Latin conversation relating Judaism to Christianity, to Platonism and to Aristotelianism. These interrelationships distinguish Christian Kabbalism as it then continued to exist.184 If Pico’s Kabbalism is a hermeneutic tool, as Garin suggested, to read God’s revelation to Moses, then the books given to Moses hold all the secrets of the universe and the pathways for us to return to God, or as Pico says ‘Just as true astrology teaches us to read in the book of God, so the Cabala teaches us to read in the book of the Law.’185 This is an elitist pursuit: Moses has hidden the secrets of God, and certain rabbis have hidden them further from the broader populace: ‘it was a well-known practice of the sages of old either simply not to write on religious subjects or to write of them under some other guise. For this

116

S. HOWLETT

reason these subjects are called mysteries.’186 This elitism is familiar from his study of Platonism187 : ‘Plato himself concealed his doctrines beneath coverings of allegory, veils of myth, mathematical images, and unintelligible signs of fugitive meaning.’188 It is the nature of the esoteric: surrounded by silence and secrecy, obtained through flashes of intuition,189 the gentleman–philosopher, wise beyond his years,190 becomes the active interpreter. In medieval exegesis there are four levels of interpretation: literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical. In the Apology, Pico compares these with Jewish exegetical tradition: pesat (literal), midrash (allegorical), sechel (tropological/moral), and cabala (anagogical). He therefore uses the anagogical in his own exegesis, referencing ‘his various (reliable or unreliable) sources, all culminating in the anagogical (or cabalistic) meaning, the spiritual goal of man, or how man can become one with God.’191 In doing so, Pico’s use of the anagogical leans toward the mathematical, returning us to his love of combining mathematical philosophy and mysticism.192 Pico begins with the division between the mystical and the practical: ‘Whatever other Cabalists say, in a first division I distinguish the science of Cabala into the science of sefirot and shemot [names], as it were into practical and speculative science.’193 In doing so, he oddly associates practical Kabbalah with the use of the sefirot.194 He then divides speculative Kabbalah into four areas ‘corresponding to the four divisions of philosophy that I generally make. The first is what I call the science of the revolution of the alphabet, corresponding to the part of philosophy that I call universal philosophy. The second, third, and fourth is the threefold Merkavah [chariot], corresponding to the three parts of particular philosophy, concerning divine, middle, and sensible natures.’195 This is not necessarily very meaningful up close, as in practice Pico is using different ideas at different times, and moving between discussion of the sefirot, games with numbers and letters, and parables. But we can see Pico’s approach better by looking at his use of key concepts in Kabbalism. He chooses the most Platonic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian elements within the tradition, ensuring constant connection between the different pillars of his syncretic vision. For instance, Pico embraces the Ein-Sof concept as the unity beyond the sefirot,196 thereby combining Kabbalah and the Plotinian One using a Platonic version of Kabbalism espoused by the Girona School.197 But he also utilizes the connection between numbers and each sefira to make an interesting

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

117

distinction. The Ein-Sof is the nought, one as unity, but not one mathematically. One is the number given in Jewish mysticism to Keter as Pico acknowledges (Conclusions, 11 > 49 ‘…the first commandment corresponds to the first numeration…’).198 In the Conclusions (according to his own opinion) he describes the Ein-Sof as one: ‘If God is known in himself as infinite, as one, and as existing through himself, we recognize that nothing proceeds from him, but know his separation from things, and his total closure of himself in himself, and his extreme, profound, and solitary retraction in the remotest recess of his divinity; and to recognize him as he conceals himself inwardly in the abyss of his darkness, no way revealing himself in the dilation and profusion of his goodness and fontal splendor.’199 But Keter is one too. Keter as the first is ‘the inaccessible abyss of divinity’ within the universe.200 So when he connects attributes of the soul to the sefirot in conclusion 11 > 66, he asserts that Keter is also unity: ‘through its [the soul’s] unity it is with the first, through intellect with the second, through reason with the third.’201 Keter represents the Ein-Sof within the created universe. It is unity and it is one mathematically. Inevitably, this begs the question where the Plotinian One fits. Are there two Ones? (One outside of creation and One within). Is unity as nought above the One and the many? Or is the one within the universe simply the active part of the unity which is therefore comprised both of a nought and a one: the first apophatic, the second kataphatic; the first above, beyond, and inactive, the second, the creator/demiurge, the active thought of God? Pico is also particularly interested in the ten sefirot (‘From the preceding conclusion we can know why the Cabalists say that God dressed himself in ten garments when he created the world.’202 ), especially from a mathematical perspective—just as he has used the mathematical value of Keter to link Keter with one thereby emphasizing the Latin translation of numeratio. Understandably, given his interest in Pythagorean mathematical-mysticism, he was also attracted to gematria—the use of numerology in Kabbalism to reveal divine secrets and help us on our ascent. For example, he uses gematria in the Conclusions to calculate the seven ages of the world, each one symbolized by a god,203 and the very number of his conclusions (900) refers to the Hebrew letter tsade, which in turn can be read as pointing to the straight line of royalty from King David, which naturally results in Christ.204 Pico plays with language then as well as math in his use of practical Kabbalah,205 stating that ‘…the five books of the Mosaic law contain the entire knowledge of all arts and

118

S. HOWLETT

wisdom both divine and human. This knowledge is hidden and concealed, however, in the very letters of which the phrases of the law are composed.’ Providing as an example, the 103 letters of ‘And God saw the light, and it was good.’206 Triadism is everywhere.207 In Timaeus, Plato uses Pythagoras’ notion that the triangle is the essential ingredient of the five basic geometrical figures that compose our universe, as each of the five can be broken down into triangles,208 Pico embraces three as the first perfect number, linking it with the mystery of the Trinity, Aristotelian causality, and divine arithmetic as a whole, stocking his library with ancient Pythagoreans such as Speusippus, Nicomachus, Theon of Smyrna209 along with Kabbalistic texts, and philosophy. He even argues in threes (for instance in the Commentary and Oration), echoing also Proclus and gnostic sources, and plays with the Pythagorean tetraktys or triangle made of ten (one at the point, and four on the base). The ten can also be the sefirot, of course. The four levels of the tetraktys recall the One and the hypostases: two dots representing the realm of mind, three the celestial world, and four our world. Four then can also be our number, the number of the human. In Heptaplus, the fourth day is the day of Christ, set in the middle of the seven days of creation. Four is ‘the fullness of numbers, will not the fourth day be the fullness of days?’210 Four (the base of the tetraktys ) plus three (the first perfect number, Trinity, etc.) together make up the seven or heptad of creation. Seven is repeated in the planets among other elements of Pico’s mystical mathematical universe.211 Pico does connect magical or practical Kabbalism to other existing magical traditions. But the manipulation of math and letters in Kabbalism to bring about change within and outside ourselves212 is not the ‘magic’ of the theurgic magus found in Ficino: ‘The nature of that which is the horizon of temporal eternity is next to the magus, but above him, and proper to it is the Cabala’.213 This ‘horizon of temporal entity’ could be the intellectual world giving Pico the direct route into that world,214 but also suggests that Kabbalism is a different, higher form of magic to the gnostic/Platonic form, something more profound, and more connected to the Pythagorean use of math.215 He does not deny the use of natural magic, ‘Nothing is more effective in natural magic than the Orphic hymns, if there is added the due music, intention of the soul, and other circumstances known to the wise.’216 And he seems to believe in the correspondences and sympathy between related objects in different worlds which forms the basis of natural magic (as Ficino describes in De

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

119

vita libri tres ).217 But Kabbalism is something else. Scholem refers to the magic of inwardness: the mystical experience which changes consciousness rather than magic that acts on or tries to change the world.218 This is the form that Pico espoused. At the same time, he also adopts Maimonidean influences, the most Aristotelian aspects of Kabbalism: ‘Just as Aristotle disguised and concealed the more divine philosophy, which the ancient philosophers veiled under tales and fables, under the mask of philosophical speculation and in the brevity of words, so Rabbi Moses the Egyptian, in the book the Latins call the Guide for the Perplexed, while in the superficial shell of words appears to move with the philosophers, in hidden insights of a profound sense enfolds the mysteries of the Cabala.’219 The connection between Hokmah and the Active Intellect made from Maimonides and taken up by Abulafia is present. The Aristotelian First Cause can also be argued as Keter: explaining perhaps how there can be such a thing as an ‘unmoved mover’ for certainly the Ein-Sof does not act and does not move. Taken together, the first three sefirot can also comprise the Aristotelian First Cause,220 with then each triad on the Tree a reflection of the Aristotelian triad of intellection (cause), understanding of itself, and wisdom (the active passing on of attributes). Platonic emanatory repetition is also everywhere. The Merkavah itself comprises the first triad, but in emanatory fashion (where every world or level reflects the one above, and one proceeds from the other but simultaneously). He notes, for instance, a lower merkavah belonging to the celestial sphere as opposed to the intellectual (connected to Saturn and Venus).221 He also repeats/echoes the most important religious figures in different variants. Abraham becomes Christian pietas .222 Christ is introduced to the system appearing in four or five different places, as well as proven to be the Hebrew’s messiah too223 : for example in the second (Hokmah) as Wisdom (Sapientia or Principium).224 But he is anchored in Tiferet (the sixth sefira) as the Great Adam or Adam Kadmon. This is why the ‘sixth’ is called man,225 replacing or complimenting the role of Jacob as Tiferet. Jacob’s Ladder is then also Christ’s Ladder bought with his sacrifice. The number six too then becomes important: God created everything in six days; six is also the first perfect number, the symbol of completion, and so forth. 226 Tiferet is thus a ‘shining mirror.’227 The shining mirror directly reflects Keter, but shines downward to a mirror that does not shine, apparently Malkut (earth), as nothing reflects onward from Malkut. The mirror image is not only used by Ficino, it is also in

120

S. HOWLETT

the Talmud, referring to degrees of prophetic illumination: all prophets prophesy from a mirror that does not shine, but Moses speaks from one that does.228 Possibly through comments in Recanati, God’s first words in the Bible, ‘Let there be light,’ the act of creation, can be connected to both the shining mirror of Tiferet and the ‘mirror that does not shine’ of Malkut.229 Pico connects Kabbalism to other parts of the prisca theologia too. The Metatron is amalgamated with aspects of Orpheus’ Pallas, Zoroaster’s paternal mind, Hermes Trismegistus’ son of God, Pythagoras’ wisdom, and Parmenides’ intelligible sphere.230 In the Commentary, Pico links the Metatron to the ‘son of god’ more broadly.231 Kabbalism is used in four or perhaps five of the 15 Zoroastrian conclusions, and five of the magical conclusions.232 Night in the Orphic Hymns becomes the EinSof .233 The sefirot are the celestial sphere of the planets.234 The ten commandments too.235 The ‘guardians’ found in Orphism are ‘powers’ in Pseudo-Dionysius, and the sefira, Din, in Kabbalah. Din is also Egypt, or God’s power.236 Plato is the ‘Attic Moses.’237 But further, as the root, the direct revelation of God to the world, each tradition of thought is not simply connected to Kabbalism but derives from the Kabbalah, the most secret of secrets. So, the Platonists become ‘ever the imitators of Hebrew learning…’238 Pico’s intellectual foundations are complex. His syncretic system is too. Three pillars structure his vision: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and at the center, Christian Kabbalism. The three are bound together by multiple pathways and correspondences. The central pillar is also Pico’s Ladder: his path to the divine. The other pillars support his journey brought together by mystical-mathematics. His system is also based on exceptionalism: secret knowledge that required a very special mind to discover and use. The ‘tradition’ provided Pico with the key to the secrets; supporting his belief in the power of divine arithmetic; and connecting his philosophical interests with his religiosity. But to what end? While Pico may have had ambitions to convert the Jews and provide a path for the wise to God, he is not trying to find that path in order to return and change the world through magical powers or a renewed vision of ideal forms. He is examining, and aims to reveal, the individual path of the mystic to henosis . There are three pillars to his intellectual enterprise, but Pico believes that Kabbalism provides a deeper truth or structure to the universe than Platonism and Aristotelianism. We may appreciate that both philosophical traditions informed Kabbalism,

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

121

but the result is the same either way. All three are entwined together and connected to a series of other ‘actors’ in Pico’s universe. The three play out in two important arenas: first in the shape and composition of the universe itself; and second in the drama of the soul as it seeks mystical ascent. We will turn next to Pico’s metaphysics, as shown in his theory of being, and cosmology (a cosmology predominantly taken from Platonism). Together they provide the structure of the universe that the mystic will ascend through. Kabbalism may be central to the whole of his theological philosophy, but Pico’s metaphysics are a blend of classical philosophies with scholastic commentary, and mystical tradition, whilst his universe is predominantly Platonic. Still examination of this macro perspective provides a first example of how he takes from each tradition, combines or hierarchizes, and what is left ‘unsolved’ by his concordance. It is also the environment and regulated structure within which the mystic must work. In the next chapter we will focus on this structure and how the pillars do or do not work together. In the final chapter we will then explore the mystical journey itself.

Notes 1. Pico, Oration (2012, 261–65, 245–50). 2. Pico, Oration (2012, 264–65, 250): ‘…idest ineffabilem de supersubstantiali deitate theologiam, sapientiae fontem, idest de intelligibilibus angelicisque formis exactam metaphysicam, et scientiae flumen, idest de rebus naturalibus firmissimam philosophiam esse clara in primis voce pronuntiavit.’ 3. Pico, Oration (2012, 268–69, 253): ‘I purchased these books at no little cost to myself, and when I perused them with the greatest diligence and unstinting labour, I saw in them (as God is my witness) not so much the Mosaic as the Christian religion.’ ‘Hos ego libros non mediocri impensa mihi cum comparassem, summa diligentia indefessis laboribus cum perlegissem, vidi in illis (testis est Deus) religionem non tam Mosaycam, quam Christianam.’ 4. Pico, Oration (2012, 268–69, 254): ‘Ibi Trinitatis mysterium, ibi Verbi incarnatio, ibi Messiae divinitas; ibi de peccato originali, de illius per Christum expiatione, de caelesti Hyerusalem, de casu demonum, de ordinibus angelorum, de purgatoriis, de inferorum paenis eadem legi quae apud Paulum et Dionysium, apud Hieronymum et Augustinum quotidie legimus.’ 5. Pico, Oration (2012, 272–73, 255): ‘In his vero quae spectant ad philosophiam, Pythagoram prorsus audias et Platonem, quorum decreta

122

S. HOWLETT

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

ita sunt fidei Christianae affinia, ut Augustinus noster immensas Deo gratias agat quod ad eius manus pervenerint libri Platonicorum.’ Buzzetti (2012, 104). Buzzetti (2012, 104). Though potential connections are unexplored. Buzzetti (2012, 102 n63) citing Copenhaver (2002b, 76). I am more confident than Karr (2012, 8). Copenhaver (2006, 24). Buzzetti (2012, 104 n67). Wirszubski was one of the first to research Pico’s Kabbalistic usage more thoroughly, particularly focusing on the Conclusions. His notes were put together after his death and have provided the foundation for other studies, von Stuckrad (2003, 6). Busi and Michele Ciliberto have been conducting a comprehensive survey of Pico’s library to determine and analyze his Kabbalistic sources (see for instance, Busi [2004–2008]), von Stuckrad (2003, 7). Wirszubski estimated that Pico owned c5500 pages of Kabbalistic texts in his library. Busi has corrected the estimate to about 3000 pages (1500 folios), von Stuckrad (2003, 6 n10). Scholem (1991, 38). Scholem (1987, 431). Scholem (1987, 422–23). Scholem (1987, 425). Scholem (1991, 39): the Active Divinity is the dynamic unity of the sefirot, that is the tree or in its human form, Adam Kadmon. Scholem (1991, 39). Scholem (1991, 41). Scholem (1987, 446). Busi and Ebgi (2014, xxxiv): ‘Pico compie un passo ulteriore, e descrive il Dio che abbandona, Colui che s’eclissa in “solitaria retraction”. L’espressione val piú di cento indizi. A chiamarlo col suo nome, questo ritrarsi è lo .sims.um dei cabbalisti.’ ‘Sapienza. È la fine di quanto l’uomo può comprendere col pensiero. La tradizione, a questo riguardo, è solo per allusioni, poiché la corona superna, sia Egli benedetto, riempie piú di quanto il cuore possa intuire della sua gloria. Contrasse (s.ims.em) l’essenza della gloria secondo la misura della superficie della paroket e dello spazio di un palmo che vi è tra i due cherubini. Sulla superficie del tutto rimase l’oscurità, giacché la mancanza di luce è oscurità. Dalla fonte del tutto si diffuse poi la luce fulgida detta “sapienza”.’ Busi and Ebgi (2014, xxxiv). Busi and Ebgi (2014, xi). Wirszubski (1989, 145). Scholem (1991, 39). Scholem (1987, 26). Wirszubski (1989, 145).

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

123

28. The Great Parchment (2004, 39). 29. Ogren (2009b, 1 n1) citing Ficino (from late 1479/early 1480): ‘Omnes Kabaliste mundum creatum ponunt et motum cessaturum, sed animas ab initio simul create, et mutare corpora usque ad finem motus…’ The handwriting is Ficino’s personal secretary, Luca Fabiani, but Ogren argues it can be considered dictation. ‘Ficino’ uses uniquely Hebrew dating: ‘the world has lasted for 5240 years.’ (‘duravisse enim iam quinquies nulle atque ducentos quadraginta.’) 30. Ogren (2009b, 220) argues that Pico relies on Plotinus for his views on transmigration. Scholem points out Pico’s interest in Origen (1991, 198). 31. Scholem (1991, 42). 32. The Great Parchment (2004, 35). 33. The Great Parchment (2004, 40). 34. Scholem (1991, 43) and The Great Parchment (2004, 30–31). 35. Scholem (1991, 61). 36. Scholem (1987, 329). Scholem argues that Hokmah can also be associated with the Aristotelian active intellect (1987, 429). 37. Scholem (1987, 429). 38. Scholem (1987, 429). 39. Scholem (1991, 88). 40. Scholem (1987, 139). 41. Scholem (1987, 214) argues that two different traditions were combined to create this greater and lesser Metatron: the angel Yahoel, a lesser YHWH, and an Enochian tradition of Enoch becoming a scribe recording people’s actions. 42. Scholem (1987, 35). 43. Copenhaver (2002b, 70). Idel (1984, 88) argues that Pico is using Alemanno for his concept of the Ladder who in turn is using a medieval Judaeo-Arabic view, but Pico then adds Ficinian Platonism and elements of the prisca theologia, for instance the descent as the division of the God Osiris is hermetic, the ascent then becomes Isis’ intervention and collection of the body parts until Osiris is whole once again. 44. Scholem (1987, 144). 45. Scholem (1991, 151). 46. Scholem (1991, 178). 47. Howlett (2016, 77–79). 48. Copenhaver (2002b, 70). 49. Though as God’s chariot can also be considered as Keter (the throne) in combination with Hokmah and Binah, Ezekiel’s vision could also have been from Binah and this is as far as we can go. 50. Scholem (1987, 415).

124

S. HOWLETT

51. Scholem (1987, 302 and 413): this doctrine was common to both Kabbalists and Maimonideans. 52. Scholem argues for a Jewish Gnosticism. 53. Busi (2004, 25–26). 54. Farmer (1998, 70–71 and 341). 55. Anagnine’s observation, cited by Craven (1981, 9). Anagnine thinks of Kabbalism as Neoplatonism and so ‘Despite his orthodox intentions, Pico was in fact working towards a new, Neoplatonic religion.’ Craven (1981, 10). 56. Scholem (1987, 18–19): Kabbalism took on the Merkavah tradition and the ‘ancient esoteric doctrines of the Creation.’ Scholem considers the Merkavah tradition to be linked to the Talmud in a ‘genuine and unbroken chain of tradition.’ 57. Scholem (1987, 7 and 21). 58. Scholem (1991, 31). 59. Scholem (1987, 20). 60. Scholem (1987, 20). 61. Scholem (1987, 20). 62. Scholem (1991, 39) though he argues this is an older work. 63. Scholem (1987, 28) argues that the numerical mysticism of the sefirot probably originated in neo-Pythagoreanism, particularly Nikomachos of Gerasa c140CE. 64. They were originally ‘probably intended as acts of divine writing and were devoid of any precise determination.’ Busi (2004, 36). 65. Scholem (1987, 24). 66. Scholem (1987, 25–26). 67. Scholem (1987, 27). 68. Scholem (1987, 27). 69. Scholem (1987, 27). 70. Scholem (1987, 6). 71. Scholem (1987, 12). 72. Scholem (1987, 12). 73. Scholem (1987, 37–38): this first circle consisted of Abraham ben Isaac (d. c1179), president of the rabbinical court and master of a school in Narbonne, his son in law Abraham ben David of Posquières (d. 1198), his colleague, Jacob ha-Nazir (the Nazirite), as well as the son of Abraham ben David who became known as Isaac the Blind (d. c1232–1236). 74. Scholem (1987, 363). 75. Scholem (1987, 265). 76. Scholem (1987, 39). The introduction names the author as the second century master of the Mishnah, Rabbi Nehunya ben Haqqanah. Bahir means ‘bright’ from Job 37:21: ‘Now, then one cannot see the sun, though it be bright in the heavens.’

4

77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100. 101. 102.

103.

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

125

Scholem (1987, 39). Scholem (1987, 7). Copenhaver (2002b, 76). Scholem (1987, 403). Scholem (1987, 7–9): Graetz’s historical explanation of the rise of Kabbalism is that it was a reaction against the radical rationalism of Maimonides. Neumark’s theory (Geschichte der judischen Philosophie des Mittelalters ) is that it is the outcome of an internal Jewish conversation on philosophy with no elements of foreign sources: a ‘remythologising’ of philosophical concepts. Scholem (1987, 368–69). Scholem (1987, 408). Scholem (1987, 412–13). Ogren (2009b, 35). Buzzetti (2012, 102 n63). Ogren (2009b, 28). Scholem (1987, 45). Copenhaver (2019, 347). Copenhaver (2019, 422). Copenhaver (2019, 347) Copenhaver (2019, 349) Ogren (2009b, 29). Ogren (2009b, 28); Idel (1992, 109). Ogren (2009b, 22). Busi (2004, 9). There is ‘no trace’ of Aristotle here, Scholem (1987, 129). Busi (2004, 12–15) argues that linguistically it cannot be older than the middle of the twelfth century and must come from the Provence region, i.e. from the source, despite the assumption that it was already old at that time and place. Wirszubski (1989, 58) calls it the earliest extant text of Kabbalah ‘proper’: ‘Old Gnostic elements drew in it side by side with the incipient theosophical doctrine of the sefirot ’. Scholem (1987, 58–60). Scholem (1987, 62). Scholem (1987, 66–67). Scholem (1987, 81). Busi (2004, 36–37) argues that the sefirot here ‘attest to a much more developed theory and offer a kind of ethic description of the Godhead.’ They now become what they will continue to be ‘that is nearly psychological attributes of the mysterious divine soul.’ They are now attributes that ‘color the inner life of emanation and its never resting dynamics.’ Or the ‘invisible fight of supernal moods and inclinations….’ Busi (2004, 36–37).

126

S. HOWLETT

104. Busi (2004, 35). 105. Busi (2004, 38). 106. Busi (2004, 39): ‘Such a strong belief in the unlimited power of the mind is based on a symbolic parallelism between human and divine thinking.’ So in Bahir, the highest sefira is divine thought. ‘implying that the whole cosmos is nothing else than infinite self-contemplation.’ 107. Scholem (1987, 84 and 124) the supreme crown is keter elyon. 108. Scholem (1987, 125). 109. Scholem (1987, 74). 110. Scholem (1987, 133). 111. The Great Parchment (2004, 32). 112. Scholem (1987, 88). 113. Scholem (1987, 89). 114. Scholem (1987, 127). 115. Scholem (1987, 124). 116. Scholem (1991, 158). 117. Scholem (1987, 86). 118. Idel (2014, 21). 119. Garin calls Pico’s interest in Kabbalism a form of humanism, in its philological aspect, Craven (1981, 116–17). 120. Busi (2009, 174–75): Del Medigo was with Pico in Florence during 1485, after some time in Venice following their time in Padua: ‘Most probably Pico invited Eliyyahu to work for him.’ On July 15, 1485 in Florence, he finished a translation of Averroes. His activities ‘seem to imply’ Pico had started to collect materials for the Conclusions in 1485: ‘Eliyyahu delivered to Pico a corpus of philosophical translations in many respects similar to the kabbalistic ones prepared by Mithridates.’ Busi (2009, 180–81): it is possible that wealthy Jews in Florence were able to supply some of the texts they were looking for (whether Kabbalistic or not), for instance, the banker Vitale Da Pisa, who employed Alemanno at times. Some texts later used by Flavius were copied by a Jewish scribe called Abraam. This was truly a group effort. 121. Idel (2014, 22). 122. Andreatta (2014, 167). 123. Busi and Ebgi (2014, xxi–xxii): Already in 1478, Flavius was part of Sixtus IV’s entourage and was made professor of oriental linguistics at Sapienza. There was apparently a crime, potentially murder, and he needed to leave Rome, from where he went to Germany meeting with German humanists and spending a term at Cologne University. At some point on his return, he met Ficino and Pico, and was certainly in Florence in June 1486 but probably before. 124. Andreatta (2014, 167).

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

127

125. Busi (2006b, 175–76): In 1481 Sixtus allowed Flavius to preach Sermo de passione Domini, with a ‘strange personal version of Judeo-Christian “secrets.”’ 126. Busi (2006b, 175–76) cites a letter from Ficino to Domenico Benivieni regarding a debate in 1485 at Pico’s house between Mondego, Flavius and an ‘Avraham’ or Avraam, a Jewish physician, also Busi (2009, 173). 127. Busi (2006b, 188) argues that the translation project may have started in 1485. Though he also notes that Flavius knew nothing about Kabbalism in 1481 and so probably did not select the material to be translated (2006b, 179). 128. Busi (2006b, 166). 129. Busi (2006b, 190). 130. Karr (2012, 5): Wirszubski thought Flavius had altered his translations to ‘christianise’ Kabbalist texts, but Busi et al. have found this ‘not to be the case.’ See also Farmer (1998, 14). 131. Busi (2006a, 85): ‘This subtle and risky reading between and beyond the lines is precisely the kind of performance Mithridates could deliver.’ But Idel argues Flavius went further: ‘Genial as he was as a translator, far from being a neutral religious agent, Mithridates functioned much more as a filter with an agenda of his own.’ Idel (2014, 24). 132. Andreatta (2014, 171 n11): For instance, Pico’s knowledge of Arabic ‘likely never reached beyond the elementary level.’ But he could access the Arabic traditions through Flavius. The question of his Chaldean and/or Aramaic is less clear. Andreatta (2014, 174–75): Flavius’ marginalia suggest that ‘he can be reasonably acknowledged not only as the co-author of much of Pico’s interpretation of Judaism, but even as his forerunner in Christian Kabbalism.’ 133. Garin (1972, 218 and 215) is citing Ms. Angel. 1253 Tractatus de anima, f. 18r–19r. 134. Bori (2012, 13 n17): ‘putasne Pice sine Mithridate intelligere posse?’ cited by Wirszbuski (1989, 72). 135. Bori (2012, 13 n17): ‘si Picus esset pauper tot honores Romae non haberet’ 136. Bori (2012, 13 n17): ‘Pico was put in gaol in Castel Saint’ Angelo because he wished to reveal secrets that wisemen concealed in mystery and that are not to be given away to asses’ (‘Picus est carceratus in castri Sancti Angeli quia voluit revelare secreta non revelanda asinis que non sine misterio occultarunt sapientes’); ‘Think about it, Pico, and you’ll understand. I won’t teach you unless I go back to the city’ (‘Vide Pice et intellege. Ego autem noli tibi expondere nisi rediero ad urbem’). 137. Busi (2006b, 181): Flavius apparently disliked Pico’s relationship with Medigo, calling Medigo ‘imperfectus’ in some marginalia to a translation of Abulafia.

128

S. HOWLETT

138. Busi (2006b, 193–94): Flavius was teaching in Viterbo in January 1489 with Alessandro Farnese as a patron. In the spring he was arrested. Pico never got the books back. 139. Lelli (1994a, 410), among others, believes that they did not meet until 1489. Wirszubski (1989, 256–57) suggests they may have met earlier, as does Garin who thinks they knew each other in 1486 when Pico was writing the Commentary. 140. Lelli (1994a, 405): ‘Proprio la rivalutazione di questi ultimi e l’associazione di elementi aristotelici con la traduzione mistica ebraica medievalecostituiscono una delle peculiarita (grave accent) del pensiero di Alemanno…’ 141. Idel (2004, 40–41): Alemanno refers to Pico in his Commentary on Song of Songs (Pico is ‘ha-‘Adon, ‘Adoni Qonti Yo’ani Delmirandola’). Idel thinks that this absence of comment is part of a ‘norm’ of Christians failing to recognize Jewish colleagues. 142. Wirszubski (1989, 256): Gianfrancesco says to Sante Pagnini—‘Ego quidem (ut de me dicam) post Latinas et Graecas literas multis laboribus versatas… conducto Hebreo Isacio, Iochanae illius, quem Ioannes Picus patruus meus sibi magistrum ascivit, filio, eo usus sum praeceptore.’ 143. Lelli (1994a, 410). 144. Black (2006, 18). 145. Stuckrad (2007, 11): Alemanno was scholar-in-residence of the da Pisa family during the 1480s and early 1490s which put him in close contact with the Abarbanel family. 146. Idel (2000, 14); Ogren (2009b, 38). Idel (2004, 39): He had a ‘profound interest in magic, both natural and demonic’ and saw ‘the possibility of influencing the world as the highest human activity.’ 147. Ogren (2009b, 29) suggests that the Zohar was not an important part of this tradition as it was not widely available in Italy until the last decade of the fifteenth century. 148. Idel (2014, 24) argues that this mixture ‘transformed Kabbalah into a much more magical type of lore than we find in the Latin corpus translated by Mithridates.’ 149. Idel (1984, 86). 150. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 73). 151. Black (2006, 17) argues, ‘We have no reason to believe that any such perspective was available or of interest to Pico. His understanding was that the kabbalah had been handed down orally from Moses: the places and dates of composition of these texts were therefore of relative unimportance.’ He uses a variety of schools in the Conclusions and beyond. See for instance, Pico, Conclusions (1998, 526–27, 11 > 16). 152. Idel (2014, 22) finds a variety of other sources, for instance Pico copied a whole passage from the thirteenth-century Spanish Kabbalist, R.

4

153.

154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161.

162. 163.

164.

165.

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

129

Yishaq ben ‘Avraham ibn Latif’s work Sa’ar ha-samayim in Heptaplus, though it is never cited or found in his known sources. But this ‘rather marginal book’ was ‘widespread in Northern Italy’. Andreatta (2014, 177) notes Pico owned Gersonides’ Song of Songs, plus six more works: Commentary on the Torah, Commentary on Job, Commentary on Proverbs, possibly the Sefer ha-bekkesh ha-yashar, and then the astronomical tractate Sefer ha-tekhunah. Wirszubski (1989, 56–57) adds Ma’areket ha-‘Elohut and Joseph Gicatilla’s Portae Iustitiae. Wirszubski (1989, 11). Extant autographs of his translations are in the Vatican Library (Codices Vaticani Ebraici 189–91 and Codex Chigi A. VI. 190) but there are more. Three or four manuscripts show sign of losses, and a whole large MS is not recovered. Wirszubski argues that Flavius ‘performed a remarkable feat of translation’ creating a library of texts for Pico. Busi (2004–8) reviewed and refined Wirszubski’s estimates. Busi (2004, 63). The Great Parchment (2004, 21 and 23). The Great Parchment (2004, 21). Idel (2014, 25) describes such commentaries as a ‘literary genre’ comprised of several dozen such texts. Wirszubski (1989, 57). Stuckrad (2007, 7) and The Great Parchment (2004, 16 n7). Wirszubski (1989, 55). Wirszubski (1989, 55). Wirszubski (1989, 60–61, 64) identifies in this second group texts such as Recanati’s Commentary on the Pentateuch, Abulafia’s Summa Brevis Cabale, Azriel’s Quaestiones super Decem Numerationibus, Liber de Radicibus, Recanati’s Liber de Secretis Orationum, and Abulafia’s Liber de Secretis Legis. See also Wirszubski (1989, 62 and 137). Wirszubski (1989, 63). Idel (2014, 25) argues that ‘His selection of the Kabbalistic writings…reflects, in my opinion, the two first pillars of Italian Kabbalah, the writings of ‘Avraham Abulafia and Menahem Recanati….’ with ‘special appreciation’ for Abulafia. Farmer (1998, 64) agrees that Pico is using Abulafia considerably, including his commentators, particularly for Pico’s use of ‘anagrammatic manipulation’ connecting this ars combinandi to ars Raymundi (the work of Raymond Lull) in the Apology. Copenhaver (2002b, 75) calls Abulafia ‘aggressively theurgic.’ Wirszubski (1989, 58) comments that only Conclusion 29 is directly from the Bahir, other conclusions are from commentaries. Pico owned Expositio Decem Numerationum, for example, which is a systematic discussion of the symbols of the sefirot, so his grounding in sefirotic Kabbalism was relatively extensive. Busi (2004, 58–59).

130

S. HOWLETT

166. Idel (2014, 24). 167. Busi (2004, 43). 168. Wirszubski (1989, 213–14) who also does not believe him to be a major influence overall. There are traces of Nahmanides in Heptaplus but not earlier. 169. Idel (2014, 24); also Copenhaver (2019, 335). 170. Farmer (1998, 344), for instance, thinks that Pico was not completely reliant on Flavius. 171. Watts (1987, 282–83). These are in many ways ideas taken from Platonic theology. 172. Watts (1987, 290): Pico used him ‘heavily, though not exclusively.’ 173. Copenhaver (2002b, 66): ‘The aim of this experiential theology is to be something, not to know something.’ 174. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 346, 28 > 2). 175. Farmer (1998, 516–17), for instance as shown in this introduction: ‘Seventy-One Cabalistic Conclusions according to my own opinion, strongly confirming the Christian religion using the Hebrew wisemen’s own principles.’ ‘Conclusiones cabalisticae numero secundum opinionen propriam, ex ipsis hebreorum sapientum fundamentis christianam religionem maxime confirmantes.’ See also Wirszubski (1989, 10). 176. Ogren (2009b, 31). 177. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 107). 178. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 106). 179. Wirszubski (1989, 195): ‘Pico, by presenting Kabbala to the Christian world as a mystical theology that confirmed Christianity and, at the same time, as the powerful ally of natural magic, set Christian Kabbala on a new course. Henceforth a Christian Kabbalist might be a theologian, or a magus, or both.’ 180. Wirszubski (1989, 127): ‘At a stroke, Kabbala has become the sole embodiment, or at least the heart, of the divinely revealed tradition of the Jews, and Moses, the Master of the Prophets, is also, if I may say so, princeps cabalistarum.’ 181. Wirszubski (1989, 132). 182. Wirszubski (1989, 125) argues though that Pico needs to make a distinction between the Kabbalism of his Conclusions and magic per se. 183. Wirszubski (1989, 133). Craven (1981, 127): ‘est scientia et non est Theologia revelata’ Opera 167. 184. Wirszubski (1989, 200). 185. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 552–53, 11 > 72): ‘Sicut uera astrologia docet nos legere in libro dei, ita Cabala docet nos legere in libro legis.’ 186. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 68 and further 71) on Moses ‘if in any part of his work he buried the treasures of all true philosophy as in a field, he must have done so most of all in the part where avowedly and most

4

187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192.

193.

194.

195.

196.

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

131

loftily he philosophizes on the emanation of all things from God, and on the grade, number, and order of the parts of the world. On this account it was decreed by the ancient Hebrews, as Jerome records, that no one not of mature age should deal with this account of the creation of the world.’ Wirszubski (1989, 171) citing Pico ‘sub ipsis literarum characteribus et figuris, quibus nunc legem descriptam habemus’. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 69). Wirszubski (1989, 173). Jews were not supposed to approach the Kabbalah until they were 40, a rule that Pico decided to ignore, Copenhaver (2002b, 80). Riva (2012, 72). Farmer (1998, 466): for instance, there are 85 conclusions on math ‘according to my own opinion’. ‘He fuses neo-pythagoreanism and neoplatonism from Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus in which many unfold from one – with gematria and other formal and informal types of number symbolism in Scriptures, Kabbalah, patristic and scholastic sources plus elementary textbooks and a bunch of other things.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 518–9, 11 > 1): ‘Quicquid dicant caeteri Cabaliste, ego prima diuisione scientiam Cabalae in scientiam sephiroth et semot, tanquam in practicam /et speculatiuam, distinguerem.’ Farmer (1998, 518): ‘Indeed, a number of his theses explicitly associate practical or magical operations with the sefirot or emanated states of God. As so often in syncretic systems, however, such distinctions were not absolute: Since most of Pico’s magic was not concerned with material operations but with mystical issues, and since he represented the first stages of the mystical ascent as intellectualist in nature, it is impossible to divide his thought neatly into practical and speculative spheres; indeed, it is precisely through speculative processes that the mystic begins his practical ascent to God.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 520–21, 11 > 2): ‘Quicquid dicant alii cabaliste, ego partem speculatiuam cabalae quadruplicem diuiderem, conrespondenter quadruplici partitioni philosophiae quam ego solitus sum affere. Prima est scientia quam ego uoco alphabetariae reuolutionis, conrespondentem parti philosophiae quam ego philosophiam catholicam uoco. Secunda, tertia, et quarta pars est triplex merchiaua, conrespondentes triplici philosophiae particularis, de diuinis, de mediis, et sensibilibus naturis.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 520–21, 11 > 4): ‘the Ein-Sof should not be counted with the other numerations, because it is the abstract and uncommunicated unity of those numerations, not the coordinated unity.’ ‘Ensoph non est aliis numerationibus connumeranda, quia est

132

S. HOWLETT

197.

198. 199.

200. 201.

202.

203. 204. 205.

206. 207.

208. 209. 210. 211.

illarum numerationum unitas abstracta et incommunicata, non unitas coordinata.’ Rabbi Azriel of Girona, for instance, was ‘the outstanding Jewish representative of the Neoplatonic doctrine that all opposites coincide in God.’ Wirszubski (1989, 237–38 and 250) who also points to a strong relationship between Platonism and Kabbalism at the beginning of the Heptaplus. ‘…primum preceptum primae numerationi correspondere…’ (1998, 540–1). ‘Si deus in se ut infinitum, ut unum, et secundum se intelligatur, ut sic nihil intelligimus ab eo procedere, sed separationem a rebus, et omnimodam sui in seipso clausionem, et extremam in remotissimo suae diuinitatis recessu profundam ac solitariam retractionem, de eo intelligimus ipso penitissime in abysso suarum tenebrarum se contegente, et nullo modo in dilatatione ac profusione suarum bonitatum ac fontani splendoris se manifestante.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 534–35, 11 > 35) ‘inaccessibilis diuinitatis abyssus.’ Conclusions (1998, 546–47, 11 > 62). ‘Ego animam nostram sic decem sephirot adapto, ut per unitatem suam sit cum prima, per intellectum cum secunda, per rationem cum tertia,’ (1998, 548–49). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 534–35, 11 > 36): ‘Ex praecedent conclusion intelligi potest cur dicatur apud cabalistas quod deus induit se decem uestimentis quando creauit saeculum.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 129, 10 > 20 and 21). Copenhaver (2019, 354). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 500–501, 9 > 22): ‘No names that mean something, insofar as those names are singular and taken per se, can have power in a magical work, unless they are Hebrew names, or closely derived from Hebrew.’ ‘Nulla nomina ut significatiua, et inquantum nomina sunt singula et per se sumpta, in magico opere uirtutem habere possunt, nisi sint hebraica, uel inde proxime deriuata.’ Pico, Conclusions (1986, 170). For instance, seeing triadism in three kinds of proportions—arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic. These three are reflected in the symbols of judgment, justice, and peace, and also in the science of perspective (the triple function of rays as direct, reflective, and refractive). 4 and 10 share 3’s importance, in ‘undoubtedly a reference to Pythagoras’s tetraktys’, Joost-Gaugier (2009, 31). Joost-Gaugier (2009, 9). Joost-Gaugier (2009, 31). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 157). Joost-Gaugier (2009, 90).

4

THE THIRD PILLAR: PICO AND KABBALISM

133

212. See also Pico, Conclusions (1998, 502–3, 9 > 25): ‘Just as characters are proper to a magical work, so numbers are proper to a work of Cabala, with a medium existing between the two, appropriable by declination between the extremes through the use of letters.’ ‘Sicut caracteres sunt proprii operi magico, ita numeri sunt proprii operi cabalae, medio existente inter utrosque et appropriabili per declinationem ad extrema usu litterarum.’ 213. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 500–501, 9 > 18): ‘Illius natura quae est orizon aeternitatis temporalis est mago proxima, sed super eum, et ei propria est cabala.’ 214. Farmer (1998, 500). 215. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 502–3, 9 > 26): ‘Just as through the influence of the first agent, if that influence is individual and immediate, something is achieved that is not attained through the mediation of causes, so through a work of Cabala, if it is the pure and immediate Cabala, something is achieved to which no magic attains.’ ‘Sicut per primi agentis influxum, si sit specialis et immediatus, fit aliquid quod non attingitur per mediationem causarum, ita per opus cabale, si sit pura cabala et immediata, fit aliquid ad quod nulla magia attingit.’ 216. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 504–5, 10 > 2): ‘Nihil efficacius hymnis Orphei in naturali magia, si debita musica, animi intentio, et caeterae circumstantiae quas norunt sapientes, fuerint adhibitae.’ 217. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 506–7, 10 > 6): ‘For each natural or divine power the analogy of properties is the same, the name is the same, the hymn the same, the work the same, with proportion observed. And whoever tries to explain this will see the correspondence.’ ‘Quarumcunque uirtutum naturalium uel diuinarum eadem est proprietatis analogia, idem etiam nomen, idem hymnus, idem opus, seruata proportione. Et qui tentauerit exponere uidebit correspondentiam.’ 218. Wirszubski (1989, 261). 219. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 546–47, 11 > 63): ‘Sicut Aristoteles diuiniorem philosophiam, quam philosophi antiqui sub fabulis et apologis uelarunt, ipse sub philosophicae speculationis facie dissimulauit et uerborum breuitate obscurauit, ita Rabi Moyses aegyptius, in libro qui a latinis dicitur dux neutrorum, dum per superficialem uerborum corticem uidetur cum Philosophis ambulare, per latentes profundi sensus intelligentias, mysteria complectitur Cabalae.’ 220. Lelli (2014, 96 and 128): The first three sefira are ‘the intellect that intellectualizes itself, that which intellectualizes its cause, and that which intellectualizes (can understand) that distance from its cause to itself. There is then wisdom.’ 221. Farmer (1998, 540). See Wirszubski (1989, 187) for Pico’s use of Plato and Pythagoreanism.

134

S. HOWLETT

222. 223. 224. 225.

226. 227. 228. 229. 230.

231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236.

237. 238.

Farmer (1998, 352). See also Wirszubski (1989, 199). Farmer (1998, 347). Pico (1986, 158–165). Farmer (1998, 544 notes on 11 > 58). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 484–85, 7a > 67): ‘Quare sexta numeratio homo dicitur…’ Farmer (1998, 484) suggests alignment with the Great Adam. Idel (2014, 38) notes Wirszubski that Keter, Tiferet, and Malkut had been linked to the Trinity in late thirteenth-century Castilian Kabbalism. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 484–85): ‘Quare sex diebus dicitur deus omnia perfecisse…’ for instance. Farmer (1998, 542). Wirszubski (1989, 178). Wirszubski (1989, 216). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 524–25, 11 > 10): ‘That which among the Cabalists is called < Metatron > is without doubt that which is called Pallas by Orpheus, the paternal mind by Zoroaster, the son of God by Hermes, wisdom by Pythagoras, the intelligible sphere by Parmenides.’ ‘Illud quod apud Cabalistas dicitur < Hebrew for Metatron >, illud est sine dubio quod ab Orpheo Pallas, a Zoroastre paterna mens, a Mercurio dei filius, a Pythagora sapientia, a Parmenide sphere intelligibilis, nominator.’ Wirszubski (1989, 199). Wirszubski (1989, 194). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 510–11, 10 > 15): ‘Idem est nox apud Orpheum et ensoph in Cabala.’ Pico, Conclusions (1998, 540–41, 11 > 48). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 540–41, 11 > 49). Farmer (1998, 551, note on 11 > 71). Lelli (2008, 151) argues that this could have been a concerted attempt to reread Orphism through Kabbalah. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 68). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 89).

CHAPTER 5

Pico’s Universe

The structure of Pico’s universe is primarily Christian Platonic but with attempted concordance at critical points with Aristotelianism and Kabbalism. Ficino’s universe therefore provides a useful starting point from which to begin an analysis. Differences from Ficino are where we can see Pico’s unique contribution which in part relies on his strong preference for Proclus within Platonism, but primarily derives from his project of concordance. Concordance is important throughout his cosmology. But certain themes are consistently emphasized, such as creation (beginnings), ascent (endings), and the place of being. Consequently, two specific problems with concordance emerge: what is (or is not) God in his cosmology (as beginning and end); and what is the role of Hokmah or divine wisdom in these beginnings and endings. For in Pico’s concordance, Hokmah is also the Aristotelian active intellect and Christ (another potential end and the Ficinian home of ‘being’). Pico’s God emerges as single but somehow twofold: a God of apophatic or negative theology, and an active, creator from which emanation/creation occurs who can be at least partially described. Further, through these specific issues, the central problem with his project of concordance becomes very apparent. All three of his pillars share many similarities, interconnected as they are through shared histories. But bringing what is similar together brings what is different too. The result in each specific case is hard to define or demarcate, tempting us to choose © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_5

135

136

S. HOWLETT

one concept in one tradition as dominant while ignoring much of the rest, rather than grappling with Pico’s attempted concordance. Plotinus provides the basic Platonic cosmology as later understood by Ficino and Pico. In the Enneads, he describes an emanation from the One divided into levels or hypostases beginning with level one, the world of intellect, to level two, the world of soul, and finally level three, the world of nature. As the emanation extends from the One, it multiplies outward. Level one is the closest to the One, and therefore the most unified and most perfect of the hypostases. Level three is the furthest away where the One has become fully dispersed into the multiple. This is the least perfect hypostasis. Late Platonists, particularly Proclus, take this description and heighten it into a baroque structure full of being. This is the structure that incorporates aspects of Gnosticism becoming a theological philosophy akin to Kabbalism. Ficino’s version is in the main Christian Plotinian but takes from other Platonic variants. We emanate from the One or God. The first level is the angelic mind or intellectual or supracelestial world, combining the Christian sphere of the angels with the Plotinian intellect. This is followed by the celestial world or anima mundi (soul of the world) combining the realms of the fixed stars and planets with the Plotinian soul. Finally, the subcelestial world or ‘nature’ consists of everything below the moon. Each level is inhabited by commensurate beings: the intellectual world has angels, the subcelestial has visible, corporeal beings and bridging the two is a rational soul,1 with gods and daemons: ‘Every place was by then filled; all things had already been assigned to the highest, the middle, and the lowest orders.’2 Pico uses this basic Ficinian structure while inevitably emphasizing Proclus more and consequently the sacred geometry of the universe. The triad of worlds is echoed as triads throughout Pico’s cosmological structure—a three to a three to a three—reminiscent of the triads of the gnostic aeons and Pythagoras’ triangle. Pico uses the rule of three repeatedly in the Commentary, Oration, Heptaplus and beyond to describe the universe. For example: ‘In the first world, God, the primal unity, presides over nine orders of angels as if over as many spheres and, without moving, moves all toward himself. In the middle world, that is, the celestial, the empyrean heaven likewise presides like the commander of an army over nine heavenly spheres…There are also in the elemental world, after the prime matter which is its foundation, nine spheres of corruptive forms. There are three of bodies without life, which are the elements and the

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

137

mixtures, and then midway between them those things that are mixed but imperfect, like the storms that occur in the sky. There are three of vegetable nature, which is basically divided into the three genera of grasses, shrubs, and trees. There are three of sensitive souls….’3 Pico’s universe embraces Proclan baroque. Pico is also revising within each hypostasis to emphasize his Aristotelian and Kabbalistic interests. The Kabbalistic Tree and Platonic emanation both support interplay/repetition within and between levels: ‘Bound by the chains of concord, all these worlds exchange natures as well as names with mutual liberality.’4 For ‘these three worlds are one world, not only because they are all related by one beginning and to the same end, or because regulated by appropriate numbers they are bound together both by a certain harmonious kinship of nature and by a regular series of ranks, but because whatever is in any of the worlds is at the same time contained in each, and there is no one of them in which is not to be found whatever is in each of the others.’5 From this interconnectedness the ‘science of all allegorical interpretation’ comes: ‘The early Fathers could not properly represent some things by the images of others unless trained, as I have said, in the hidden alliances and affinities of all nature.’6 Indeed, allegory allows our minds to perceive at the most basic level the interconnectedness in each world and in each dimension of the world.7 We read and we understand if properly trained because ‘the scripture of Moses is the exact image of the world.’8 The allegory of Jacob’s ladder is a key symbol for this interconnectedness: an allegory but also then a ‘truth,’ a dream of a universe that allows movement between. Pico’s Heptaplus is an example of this application of anagogical allegory. It portrays the first creation myth in Genesis as a ‘theophanic cosmic code.’9 We and Pico are placed as readers not just of creation, but of our whole universe. We must read the text, decipher the code, to be able to approach God. But the reading is restricted to those who know, who understand. We must also be, like Pico, part of the elite. Pico’s universe has become a work of literature or a mathematical riddle which we interpret or solve. It is a place of metaphor, of signs, of hieroglyphs. It is a place of numbers. No wonder Pico marries poetry and theology and mathematics. He explains how this works in considerable detail. For example, ‘in the first place, whatever is written there we interpret in relation to the angelic and invisible world….’10 But this is not an entirely fluid situation (‘Although the natures are mutually contained by each other, they are nevertheless allotted their separate seats and certain

138

S. HOWLETT

peculiar rights.’11 ) just a highly complex and multilayered one. Multiple hierarchies in multiple worlds, all needing to be understood through the parsing and manipulation of Moses’ words as language and numbers, with the added revealed light of philosophy to reconstruct them. So, for example, in Heptaplus Pico takes the seven days of creation as outlined in Genesis 1–2 and examines them using his layered hermeneutics to anatomize God’s universe. He describes the intelligible or angelic world as unchanging and eternal. The celestial is ‘compounded of light and darkness’ with the ‘stability of life but change of activity and position’ ‘of the fire and water’ while the sublunary or natural world is the ‘world of darkness.’ It is ‘symbolized by water, a flowing and unstable substance,’ characterized by ‘alternation, of life and death’ and the ‘corruptible substance of bodies.’12 Of these the third world (the natural world) ‘is moved by the second,’ the celestial world, and ‘the second is governed by the first,’ that is the intellectual world. He acknowledges that ‘there are among them many further differences…’ but all are connected through numbers in a direct revelation from God to Moses, which Moses then places into allegory: ‘these three worlds were clearly diagrammed by Moses in the construction of his wonderful tabernacle. He divided the tabernacle into three parts…’ so the first part ‘open and exposed to showers, snow, sun, heat, cold’ represents the natural world, the second can be seen in the seven-branched candlestick of the menorah representing the seven planets, and finally the cherubim who are from the angelic sphere.13 Meanwhile, ‘although these natures are distinct, there is no multiplicity which is not a unity, and they are linked together by a certain discordant concord and bound by many kinds of interwoven chains.’14 The seventh day, the day of rest, brings everything back together. The seventh day is his specific addition to the well-trodden path of the hexaemeron or discussion of the six days of creation. The act of creation takes God from One, unity, to many, and then finally back to itself where it rests. Genesis takes us from beginning to end to beginning, embracing the circularity of emanation with the dynamism of the creative act. Pico’s God here is obviously the creator and just as with Kabbalists, the question of beginnings is clearly important to him, alongside the question of ascent or return. This is, of course, the focus of Heptaplus and he frequently refers to God as ‘Creator’ (for example in the Oration, 136–7, 56–57). But what else is this God? The Plotinian One is an atemporal unity, or singularity even, whereas Pico’s creator is specifically located in a temporal

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

139

framework (however metaphorical). The God of Kabbalism is the Ein-Sof or nought. It does not act and cannot be known in any way. The Aristotelian First Cause is an unmoved mover (‘that which moves without being moved’)15 which at least involves action commensurate with a creator God. Pico’s syncretic God inevitably is twofold and Kabbalism allows for this structure, for it posits both the Ein-Sof and the first sefira, Keter or crown. Keter is the closest representation to the divine within the universe. It participates at least partially in the Ein-Sof’ s apophatic qualities and is therefore partially hidden. But it is also the beginning of the emanatory/creative chain on the Tree of Life. It is the starting point of creation. It is also the Father (av). So, Pico can talk about ‘the solitary darkness of the Father,’16 which may sound like a description of the Ein-Sof but suggests rather that he is referring to this partially active principle of God as Keter. Finally, Keter is expressed mathematically as one: a singular, solitary unity. Pico’s God, One and First Cause is the Ein-Sof but is also Keter, as the partially revealed God. The problem is understanding which he is referring to and when.

The Question of God Pico’s description of God in the Conclusions recalls above all the Ein-Sof : ‘If God is known in himself as infinite, as one, and as existing through himself, we recognize that nothing proceeds from him, but know his separation from things, and his total closure of himself in himself, and his extreme profound, and solitary retraction in the remotest recess of his divinity….’17 This is the hidden God of darkness. It is also the God of ‘retraction’ who has removed itself from itself leaving the void or universe. It is also the God of Christian apophatic theology, which means it is impossible to say what this God is, as opposed to what it is not. Pico is taking us from Ficinian Platonism to the darkness of Pseudo-Dionysius where blindness and understanding meet.18 He is drawing us up the Tree of Life removing knowledge of God as he proceeds: ‘…God is being itself, the one itself, the good itself, and likewise truth itself. We have now advanced two steps, ascending to the darkness which God inhabits, purging from the divine names all blemish that is from the imperfection of the thing signified. There now remain two steps, of which one proves the deficiencies of names, the other reveals the infirmity of our intelligence. These names, being, true, one, good, mean something concrete, and, as it were, participated. Hence, we say that God is above being, above true,

140

S. HOWLETT

above one, above good, since he is existence itself, truth itself, unity itself, goodness itself. But we are still in light. God, however, has established his dwelling in darkness. Therefore, we have not yet reached God.’19 Until ‘…finally saying only this about God, that he is unintelligibly and ineffably above everything most perfect which we can either speak or conceive of him. Then we place God most eminently above even unity, goodness, truth, and existence, which we conceive.’20 So God is ‘existence itself, truth itself, unity itself…. But we are still in light.’ Above this is the unintelligible and ineffable Pseudo-Dionysian God who is ‘above even unity’ and lives in darkness. The former invites comparison with the Platonic gnostic pleroma, so full of attributes that it is ready to overflow and thereby emanate. For another potential way of understanding the difference is between what Pico calls the ‘abstract and uncommunicated unity’ of Ein-Sof and something he calls the ‘coordinated unity’ (a collection or plenitude of attributes in one) which I posit to be Keter.21 The Ein-Sof is the God of retraction. Keter is not, however, God per se. It is God revealed in the universe.22 It can even be described as ‘pure thought’ (mahashavah) or the thought of God that is before and contains all.23 We are dealing with one God that can only be talked about or understood in two different ways, depending on whether we are using apophatic theology or trying to explain (as a philosopher such as Pico must before ascending to mystical experience) what God is…. So inevitably it is hard to know to which ‘God,’ Pico is referring. Another example from Heptaplus: ‘God alone, who is derived from nothing and from whom all things are derived, is a wholly simple and individual essence. Whatever he has, he has from himself. For the same reason that he exists, he knows, wills, and is good and just. We cannot understand any reason why he exists except that he is being itself. Other things are not being itself but exist by means of it.’24 ‘derived from nothing’ can mean derived from the nought 25 or Ein-Sof ; ‘and from whom all things are derived’ suggests the creator God at the beginning of creation; ‘is a wholly simple and individual essence’ can refer to the singular or ‘one’ of Keter; ‘whatever he has, he has from himself’ can mean both that he is self-contained but also that Keter derives from Ein-Sof , himself from himself. Finally, but importantly, this God is ‘being itself’ which we will consider further below. Keter is the crown on the head of God. It had a long history within Jewish mysticism before becoming part of Kabbalism. The congregation of Israel would offer up prayers to God forming an ‘atarah or diadem.

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

141

This ‘atarah would be carried up by an angel and finally ascend as the crown or Keter ‘elyon on God’s head (in Kabbalism, Hokmah, or wisdom). Thus, Israel enacts daily an ‘ancient symbolic rite of coronation’26 and in so doing re-connects the people of God with God. In Bahir, the rising of the ‘atarah becomes linked with the lesser shekinah (presence of God) in Malkut (the kingdom).27 Indeed, it rapidly becomes ‘synonymous’ with the two and with the ascension of the bride, who crowns the head of her bridegroom.28 Keter thereby becomes the link between the Ein-Sof , on the one hand, and the people of God. Isaac ha-Kohen of Narbonne (writing between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) speaks of Keter as ‘a world hidden unto itself; all the others receive of its flow. It alone is hidden and joined to the root of all roots, which no thought can grasp. It is constantly and in utter silence receiving from that root. It causes its fullness to be poured out and emptied as blessing upon the other crowns, which remain ever close to its flow.’29 Indeed, the relationship between the Ein-Sof and Keter is so strong that early Kabbalism was unsure whether Keter should be considered as part of the Ein-Sof rather than as a sefira.30 But just as Keter participates in the hidden solitariness of the Ein-Sof , so Keter is (from a Plotinian perspective) the means for God or the One to have its kinetic energy in the universe, without actually being present31 : ‘There exist certainly both the nature of the true All and the representation (mimema) of the All, the nature of this visible universe. The really existent All is in nothing: for there is nothing prior to it. But that which comes after it must necessarily then exist in the All, being as much as possible dependent on it and unable either to move or to stay still without it.’32 So, Keter can be the creator, and also act as the link between God and God’s people. Further, as the ‘pure thought’ of God, by the law of mean terms of an emanatory universe, divine thought could be linked with human contemplation in Bahir.33 Judaism was not the only religion to relate a community of believers, prayer, and ascent. It is also core to Pseudo-Dionysius’ work and therefore familiar as a concept to Pico. Pseudo-Dionysius is also borrowing from Platonic gnostic traditions. So, however individualized ascent becomes in Pico’s work and others of his period, there is a common foundation here: a pathway that begins with prayer that takes the people of God back to God. But where then is the Plotinian One? Is it Keter or the EinSof ? And what of the First Cause? Pico has told us that God is ‘being itself,’ potentially an Aristotelian argument, whereas the Plotinian One is considered, by Plotinus and Ficino, to be above being. The question of

142

S. HOWLETT

being and God is the topic of Pico’s last finished work, Being and the One. There Pico outlines an apparently Aristotelian point of view that being and the One are the same, thereby equating the ‘One’ with the First Cause. But he argues that this is also Plato’s original perspective, later misinterpreted by his followers. As we have seen, he states that the One, being, truth, and the good are all in correspondence, and are the same in extent. He juxtaposes this with the received Platonic view that the One is prior to being meaning that ‘the one is more simple and more universal. For this reason they also say that God, whose is the highest simplicity, is one, but not that he is being.’34 The problem, simply stated, is how can the point of singularity, the unity, the undivided One, be more than one thing or is the One here (understood numerically) simply a misnomer for the ‘nought.’ More persuasively, this maybe another example of the Ein-Sof /Keter separation: there is a Plotinian One that is above being as ‘abstract’ unity or singularity, and a One that contains being and all other attributes of the divine as the creative, active principle (coordinated unity or pleroma) that necessarily must contain everything (as their cause) in order to overflow and become multiple. Plato’s Parmenides and The Sophist both state that being and the One are not the same. But Pico argues that in Parmenides, for example ‘Nothing in the whole dialogue is positively asserted. If anything is asserted, still nothing is clearly found by which we may ascribe this sort of teaching to Plato.’ Further, Pico asserts ‘That book is certainly not to be included among his doctrinal works, since it is nothing but a dialectical exercise. The words themselves of the dialogue are so far from refuting our opinion that there are no more arbitrary and forced commentaries than those brought in by persons wishing to interpret the Parmenides of Plato in another sense.’35 In other words, Pico sees Parmenides as a ‘red herring’ followed by later Platonists, but not Plato’s point of view. This is a weak parrying of an inconvenient text, but part of a series of arguments that examine the relationship between being and the One from a variety of different perspectives. His thesis is that Plato and Aristotle agree that the One contains being, making his One here a plenitude rather than the solitary, hidden nought. His first argument in support of the thesis begins ‘we understand all that which is outside nothing.’36 It follows that ‘since there is nothing outside all things except nothing itself, if being, understood in this way, excludes only nothing from itself, then without doubt being must include all things. For this reason the one cannot include more things than being

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

143

unless it includes nothing, which Plato denies in the Sophist, when he says that not-being or nothing cannot be called one. Nor does the one include fewer things than being, as they themselves admit. Therefore, being and the one are equals.’37 This suggests the One contains being and that the One is Keter, not nothing (the beginning, the Father, the numerical ‘one’). His second argument apparently contradicts his first: ‘Being has the aspect of a concrete noun. Being, and that which is, are the same in meaning. This word existence [esse] seems to be the abstract form of the preceding terms. That which participates existence [esse] is called being [ens ]…. Therefore, if we should look at this exact signification of being, we shall deny being not only to what is not, and to what is nothing, but to that which is to such a degree that it is existence [ipsum esse], which is of itself and from itself, and by participation in which all things are…. For God, who is the plenitude of all existence, is of this nature. He alone is of himself, and from him alone, with no interposing medium, all things proceed to existence. For this reason, we may truly say that God is not being, but is above being, and that something is higher than being, that is, God, and since the title one is given to God, we may consequently say that he is the one above being.’38 This is the Ein-Sof also as the Plotinian One—a God above all things. In the Conclusions, he reiterates the same perspective: ‘By the method of the extremes and the middle we can recognize that the grades of the universe can be appropriately divided like this in five ways: into that-above-being, truly-being, not-truly-being, not-truly-not-being, and truly-not-being.’ This is a conclusion from the group on Plato.39 There are inconsistencies here that are partially solved by the EinSof /Keter division: first, between a God above being (who is the atemporal Plotinian One) and One (one) that contains being. Even in this reading, the One as Keter should not contain being per se, but obviously Pico is attempting to attach being to the divine in some way and the notion of a ‘coordinated unity’ allows for the One to contain the many. Further, if we consider also the distinction he consistently makes between formal being and causal being in his work,40 then the riddle becomes even simpler. Causal being, suggesting Aristotle’s First Cause (though he refers also to Plotinus), is the cause of the abstract concept (being), as opposed to formal being, which is the abstract concept in and of itself. So two possible solutions emerge: either the One as Ein-Sof contains being but it does not contain being itself, which would be formal being, but rather

144

S. HOWLETT

being’s cause; or the same could be true of Keter (assuming that the EinSof cannot be said to contain anything). In the Commentary, Pico argues that Platonists view God as the cause of everything, ‘not a thing but the cause of all things, likewise that God is not intellect but is the source and principle of all intellect.’41 If causal being is in Keter, then formal being is in Hokmah, which is a more conventional Platonic approach. Either way, the Plotinian One can perhaps maintain its simplicity, be Plotinian, be the First Cause (unmoved and self-contemplative, but moving others) but also contain being, alongside good, truth, etc., as ‘cause.’ If God is the cause of everything, but is not formally anything, then God is both everything and nothing in and of itself. We move necessarily between kataphatic and apophatic theology, and Aristotelianism and Platonism are bound together by a rereading of Aristotle through the lens of later Platonism.42 This differentiation between the causal and the formal (and participatory, forming of course a triad) is at odds with Ficino’s understanding of Platonism: Pico says ‘These statements give great trouble to modern Platonists…. I remember that a distinguished Platonist once told me that he was much astonished at a statement by Plotinus, where he says that God understands nothing and knows nothing…. Plotinus means that God does not understand, which is simply than that this perfection of understanding is in God in the mode of causal being and not that of formal being.’43 Pico’s God/One/First Cause as Ein-Sof is so far above us, and beyond, that only apophatic or negative theology can apply. But the revealed divine within the void carrying the kinetic energy of God—the divine lightning flash of the emanated universe, the Tree of Life—this is part of kataphatic or positive theology. Everything within this void can be described minutely, layer by layer, symbolically, anagogically, with sacred geometry, etc. From Keter, the crown, downward, we can talk about God and the influence of the divine in our universe whether as merkavah or chariot, or shekinah or ‘divine’ presence or as the Metatron or voice of God. In Pico’s work there is always this double-understanding when talking of God. He can be talking about the Ein-Sof , that which does not and is not, and/or the active divine within the void. The Ein-Sof and Keter are paralleled in some respects by matter, though matter appears only to be present within the void. Matter is the ‘truly not being’ of Pico’s Platonic conclusion, the ‘hyle’ of Judaism that Ficino would call ‘prime matter.’ ‘Prime matter’ is ‘rough and unformed’ matter.44 It is from outside of God, but it does not ‘exist’ because it

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

145

does not have being. It is ‘nothing,’ but not in the same way as God is ‘nought.’ Pico suggests that Platonists think of ‘prime matter’ as being ‘within the limits of the one,’ but ‘outside the limits of being’45 as it does not exist. In Heptaplus, Pico explains prime matter further as ‘crude matter devoid of form, but capable of taking on all forms, though deprived of all by its nature.’ It is therefore ‘privation as well as matter.’ It is ‘not,’ but also ‘potentiality.’ It is ‘sometimes made something actual just as soft and unformed wax is transformed by the molding and twisting of the hands into various shapes at the will of the molder.’46 But ‘privation is not the essence of matter.’ It is rather something that somehow floats above matter. It is ‘the brooding darkness’ over the deep of Genesis.47 This prime matter therefore consists of two aspects: the nothing of privation and the everything of matter’s potentiality, much like (but also very different from) the Ein-Sof and Keter. Matter in potentia can be Genesis’ water of the deep ‘since water is in continuous flux and easily receptive to every form.’48 It is not clear where privation resides (though it could be the void itself), but ‘potentiality’ seems to be present in Keter as the home of both the hyle and of form.49 Pico provides us with a series of quasi-dualisms: between a ‘hidden God’ and the One of plenitude; between the Ein-Sof and Keter; between the prime matter of privation and that of potentiality; and between an emanatory universe and a created one. This last provides new challenges for concordance. Inevitably it is hard to understand ‘the beginning’ in Pico’s universe. There are many potential differences between Christianity or Judaism and classical philosophy. Divisions are at least partially resolved by the inheritance of more than a thousand years of attempted (consciously or not) syncretism. Ficino and Pico could build on Plotinus (who had read Aristotle and Alexander), Proclus, Augustine, Gnosticism, etc., as well as Jewish and Christian theologians and philosophers who had already worked on building connections, despite the scholastic movement away from the union between theology and philosophy. But key differences remained, and Pico’s attempted concordance reveals them clearly. So Pico’s universe is both emanated (Platonic) and created (JudaeoChristian).50 But the result is confusing. Creation is usually ex nihilo, out of nothing. It occurs very obviously within time: there is a day for each major act of creation; and there is a sequence (one thing comes after another). Creation is also an act of volition: God wills to create. Emanation is the emanation of God: an extending out. There is a sequence here and what is furthest away from

146

S. HOWLETT

God can be less perfect than what is closest, but it does not have to be a temporal sequence. The divine lightning flash and Genesis both portray a creation occurring in time, with a before and after; emanation occurs instantaneously. In the emanatory universe, every part is a part of the divine. But emanation does not have to be an act of volition. The Platonic-Christian world requires both creation and emanation, but the differences are problematic. Pico discusses the ‘before.’ It is a time before the birth of love, for instance, when ‘the ideas were still imperfect and disordered.’ There was ‘formless and material nature’ which is ‘the cause of every imperfection.’ This was the time of what Pico calls ‘necessity.’51 Pico also suggests in the Commentary that ‘before’ ‘[God] was creating worlds and then laying them waste.52 But there is an allegory at work in this story and he also knows that the Ein-Sof does not require such ‘being in time.’ Aristotelianism complicates further. The universe is also ‘caused’ and as such may not contain the divine throughout (unlike an emanated universe). For instance, we could argue that God, as First Cause, only participates in the first hypostasis, as its cause.53 In the Commentary, Pico portrays God as shining in the rational soul (the next level down) ‘by means of the Angelic nature in which it [the rational soul] participates.’54 In emanation God is present at every level. If we consider the triad of causal, formal, and participatory being with God as the First Cause, above and beyond the universe: there is causal being in the One, God has formal being in the angelic mind, which is why ‘being’ is present there, and then has participatory being in the rational soul or celestial world. Below that, does the divine disappear (‘beneath which no being can claim the term divine except by abuse.’55 ) or are the attributes of God truly separated throughout in emanatory fashion through a series of these triads?

God’s Love The self-sufficiency of Pico’s One as Ein-Sof (the hidden God) has several consequences. In Ficino’s Christian Platonic universe, God’s love forms a circuitus spiritualis —a circle of spirit based on love and responding desire—that connects God to us, and us to God. God’s love is the force or energy that binds the universe together. Everything is connected by God’s love for what is created, and their desire for God.56 Just as in Christianity, God’s love, as revealed through Jesus’ sacrifice, is central to the relationship between us and God. There are two forms of desire here:

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

147

God’s love; and the desire of others for God. But there is also a third type of love: the love between friends based on reciprocity where ‘each friend loves the other in the same way and for the same reason as he is loved by him.’57 Each type is distinctive. According to both Ficino and Pico, the desire of others for God is a desire for beauty. Ficino argues, and Pico agrees, that all created beings desire beauty.58 But in the Commentary, Pico argues that God does not have this desire: ‘It is enough for now to say that since God has no desire for anything outside Himself, being most perfect in everything and lacking nothing, this love of which we speak, the desire to possess the beauty of another, could not be more alien to Him.’ This is God as Aristotle’s self-contemplative unmoved mover. God therefore experiences a different form of love: ‘That love with which He loves His creatures arises from a precisely opposite cause. In the former he who loves needs the beloved thing and receives from it, the beloved, his own completion. In the latter, divine love, the beloved needs the lover, and he who loves gives rather than receives.’59 God’s love is an act of pure volition. He also argues that our love for God is more complicated than a desire for beauty. Pico defines desire as an impulse for the advantageous. As he explains in the Commentary ‘desire is nothing but the inclination and impulse of him who desires towards that which either is or seems to him to be advantageous to him. Such a thing is called good. Therefore, the object of desire is the good, either real or apparent.’ If God is the primary object of desire, then God is the good, and beauty and the good are synonymous. Indeed Pico equates desire with love when desire is for the ‘kind of good which is called the beautiful’ for ‘As there are different kinds of good, so there arise different kinds of desire’ and ‘From this we conclude that the beautiful is distinct from the good as a species is from its genus and not as an extrinsic thing is from an intrinsic thing, as Marsilio says.’60 In other words, for Pico, unlike Ficino, the beautiful is a subcategory of the good. God is both, but good here is primary and God is beauty because he is the good. Pico argues that Ficino’s Platonic God is both good and beauty equally, though Ficino places beauty below the good into the first emanation.61 Pico relates his own position to Aristotle’s description of the good in the Nicomachean Ethics: ‘From this you will understand how God is that good, of which Aristotle speaks in the beginning of his Ethics, which all things desire, and you will know from what is said there both how they desire it, although not knowing it, and how they do not desire anything impossible to them.’ 62

148

S. HOWLETT

But if our love for God is a desire for beauty, and beauty is a subcategory of the good which is God, then our love is not for God as Unity. Pico defines beauty as the ‘proper mixture and just proportion’ of a third thing out of the mixture of two others. It is the ‘elegance that results from this proportioned mingling….’ 63 ‘But it is an elegance born of the imperfection of being…composite.’ Meaning that ‘nothing simple can be beautiful’ and consequently that ‘there is no beauty in God.’64 Arising out of imperfection, the mingling means that beauty cannot be in the simplicity and unity that is God: ‘This is not at all suitable for the First Cause…’65 Beauty arises out of ‘contrariety’: ‘This contrariety and discord of diverse natures is not enough to constitute a creature unless through proper proportion the contrariety becomes unified and the discord concordant, which can be assigned as a true definition of beauty, that it is nothing other than a friendly enmity and a concordant discord.’66 Beauty cannot be in the One, or close to the point of origin within the void. It is already part of the multiplicity of the emanation as it expands outward. But the good is part of that first division in the One, as it has causal being in the One. Pico also discusses desire as appetite. This appetite is natural, which seems strange, because desire for the good is normally related to cognition: we need to know what is good in order to want it. But in Conclusions, Pico proposes a thesis that love is above intellect. 67 Pico connects the good to what makes us happy. In desiring what is good, we are desiring what makes us happy. We therefore have a natural desire for the good.68 Desire as appetite always wants the good and as a natural instinct cannot go wrong, whereas Pico argues that cognition can be wrong: poor judgment can make us desire something bad.69 The whole universe has this natural desire: ‘With this desire God is desired by all creatures, because, since every particular good is a vestige and instance of the first good, which is God Himself, in every good which is desired He is the first desideratum.’70 Subtracting cognition from desire, also means that we do not need to know God in order to love. Our love is born from desire, and desire is a natural appetite for what makes us happy, which ultimately is God. This also explains why apophatic theology is possible. But God’s love is different. God’s love is not based on desire and he has no need for our desire. He is self-sufficient.71 Pico’s hidden God is so locked up in its unity and simplicity that its only engagement is as First Cause. Love is not in God, but love as a cause is in God: ‘…love is the cause of the production of everything which proceeds from God….’72 So

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

149

much of what we see in Pico’s work, and overtly in the Commentary, is a Platonic universe but within that universe there are a variety of Aristotelian and Kabbalistic twists bound up with the Christian negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. In his Platonism, he disagrees with Ficino in aspects of his definitions of love, beauty, and the good, but espouses alternative Platonic viewpoints particularly based on Plotinus and Proclus.73 This also means that God’s beauty and the endpoint of our love for the divine is not in the Ein-Sof and also not in Keter as the unity. We are looking and finding divine beauty elsewhere. It must be in the first world of the emanated universe, Ficino’s angelic mind.

The Angelic Mind The First Cause moves, the One overflows, the creator acts on matter. Emanation occurs. God enters the void as Keter, the active force and the first level is created. This first ‘hypostasis’ is the supracelestial or intellectual world, also known in Ficino’s Christian Platonic universe as the angelic mind. In Kabbalism, this world consists of a triad of sefirot: Keter, the crown or throne of God; Hokmah, the incomprehensible wisdom of God; and Binah or the understanding of God (where wisdom is given shape or form). This first triad is the chariot from the Merkavah tradition that carries God into the universe. It is also for Pico the Trinity: Father (alef or av)74 ; Son (bet ), and Holy Ghost. This triad or Trinity is not the created world. It is the chain of three required to take God’s pure thought from thought to actualization as a result of understanding. However, the relationship between Keter and Hokmah is confusing. This is partially due to the law of mean terms in an emanatory universe where one sefira inevitably participates in the other; but there is also considerable disagreement between Kabbalists on the attributes of each. So, Keter/Hokmah can be as confusing as the Ein-Sof /Keter. The difference is important especially when considering the question of ‘return’ or ascent. The congregation of Israel’s prayers traditionally reach the crown. These prayers or directed thoughts can be redefined in Kabbalism as the human contemplation of the divine with the mystic ascension with the shekinah. However, there is also the suggestion contained within Hokmah (wisdom) traditions that we can only ascend as far as Hokmah. Further, that we may only be able to ascend to Binah and thereby gain a sight of divine wisdom. This understanding of Hokmah as the ‘limit’ of ascent or even sight is connected to its potential role as a beginning. Pico states

150

S. HOWLETT

in Conclusions (playing with the Hebrew letter bet and reshit meaning beginning) 28.25 ‘Bereshit, that is, in the beginning he created, is the same as if he had said, he created in wisdom.’75 And more explicitly in Heptaplus, Pico connects beginning, Christ and wisdom: ‘the Son of God, who is the beginning through which all things were made (for he is the wisdom of the Father)….’ 76 Hokmah has been associated with the beginning throughout early Kabbalism and prior Jewish mystical traditions. For example, Brian Ogren notes the early medieval Targum Yerushalmi (a translation of the Torah otherwise known as Targum [translation] Pseudo-Jonathan), which uses B’Hukhma (with Wisdom) for the first world of Genesis echoing or building on Psalm 111:10 (‘The fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom’ [reshit hokmah]).77 Nahmanides also describes Hokmah as the beginning, but adds that it is crowned with Bet,78 perhaps connecting bet with Keter (rather than alef ) and allowing Keter a role in the beginning. Ogren also argues that this idea of bet as a crown had ‘a profound influence’ on future Kabbalists, making bet the ‘real’ beginning. However, Bahir describes alef (which we have discussed as Keter) as the before all and bet as the beginning.79 Recanati, widely used by Pico, also refers the bet to Hokmah and alef to Keter.80 Alemanno, who worked with and potentially influenced Pico’s understanding of Kabbalism, discussed Hokmah as the ‘beginning of that which is attainable,’ whereas Keter is the bet preceding Hokmah as reshit and cannot be attained: ‘In this way, it partakes in the apophatism that characterizes the First Cause, and through the bet that gives shelter to the beginning that is Wisdom, also perhaps points beyond itself to that First Cause that is beyond even the first letter and the beginning of the Torah itself.’81 Either way, Keter is before the beginning (Hokmah as reshit ) but causally participates in the beginning, and Hokmah is the beginning. What remains open is whether we can go ‘beyond’ this beginning, and we will examine the question further in this chapter. This first triad of Keter, Hokmah, and Binah is also the Platonic Christian angelic mind and as such is the realm of the seraphim, cherubim, and thrones. It is the top of Jacob’s ladder and the level we try to reach from our starting point in Malkut. It is where the ‘higher’ shekinah resides (as opposed to the lower in Yesod or Malkut), and the place of the Metatron. It is the Platonic world of forms; and the world of formal being. Pico describes it as the ‘first world’ where ‘God, the primal unity, presides over nine orders of angels as if over as many spheres and, without moving,

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

151

moves all toward himself.’82 This ‘primal unity’ is God the One as the active presence in the void: Keter or the enthroned divine, seated on a chariot, not the hidden God beyond. Keter is the one plus nine (which in sacred mathematics is the One plus nine orders of angels or the One and the three triads of the sefirot ). If Keter is the active presence of the One on the Tree, then the first triad of sefirot is below Keter (Hokmah, Binah and Hesed) and could be considered part of or the whole of the angelic mind. Keter or Hokmah, but most persuasively Hokmah, are Aristotle’s Active Intellect. The ideas or forms, such as the good, come from God as their cause into the angelic mind, and there love is born—the love of intellectual beauty: ‘When Plato says that Love was born from the union of Poverty and Plenty in the garden of Jove, on the birthday of Venus while the gods feasted, he means only this, that then the first love, that is, the desire of beauty, was born in the angelic mind when in it the splendor of ideas, though imperfectly, began to shine.’83 This love is then expressed in the rational soul (anima mundi, or the celestial world) below.84 Indeed, Pico argues in the Commentary that ‘the Angelic Mind did not have its perfect natural being until Love was born, and he was the occasion of giving it that being, then however much by its turning to God those Ideas were made perfect, it can be said all the more of the other gods who came into existence after that Mind that Love existed before they had their perfect natural being, notwithstanding that they came before him in their imperfect ideal being.’85 God caused the creation of different levels of beings, but it was not until love, or desire for beauty, was born did God’s creations become perfect natural beings: they were not drawn and bound to God from which they derive perfection until then. So ‘…when the Mind is turned by Love towards God what was formerly imperfect in it becomes perfect.’86 The Platonic forms or universals are ‘In their essence’ in the angelic mind, ‘in which they are first produced by God.’87 They are in the rational soul too but ‘by participation.’ ‘The Form which God gives to the Angelic Mind is nothing but the Ideas, which, as we said, are the first beauty. Therefore the Ideas descend into the Angelic Mind from God, and because everything which moves away from its source and beginning and mixes with a contrary nature becomes less perfect, the Ideas, distancing themselves from God, their fount and beginning, and joining themselves to that formless nature, wholly unlike their own shapeliness,

152

S. HOWLETT

necessarily become imperfect.’88 So the ideas in the angelic mind are impacted by ‘the opacity of its own shadowy substance.’89 The beauty of the ideas is in the mind even though imperfectly, which means that love automatically arises there because it desires the perfection of beauty that is missing from itself: ‘From this there necessarily follows in it the desire to attain their perfection. This desire, being the desire for beauty, is the one which by us is called love, which would not arise if the Ideas either were not in the Angelic Mind at all or were there in any perfection.’90 This beauty found in the ideas is the heavenly Venus, the first of two kinds of beauty. The second is the corporeal and sensible beauty of the vulgar Venus. So there must also be two loves: vulgar and heavenly.91 Heavenly love is ‘the intellectual desire for ideal beauty.’92 Love is born when the Angelic Mind is still in formation, as the jumble of ideas in chaos that wish to be perfected93 : ‘On this account love, the desire to acquire this beauty, stirs and stimulates the Angelic Mind to turn towards God and to join itself to Him as closely as it can, because each thing achieves perfection to the extent that it rejoins its source.’: ‘When Love was young and Venus new, there arose in the Angelic Mind the desire to possess completely that beauty which in some sense it already had, and stimulated by this love it turned to God and from Him received the perfection of that ideal beauty. Since He had this completely in Himself, Venus in Him was already full-grown and come to her perfection.’94 This connection forms the ‘first circle,’ the first circuit between God and creation: a circle which proceeds ‘from the indivisible unity of God, completely returns there by a circular motion of intrinsic intelligence. Every nature which is able to do this is called a circle, because the circular figure returns to the same point from which it started.’ But this capacity is only in the angelic and rational worlds and souls as they contain divinity either in essence or by participation. These should be called ‘intelligible circles because they are not material.’95 So only these two worlds have ‘felicity’ as ‘felicity is nothing but coming to one’s highest good and ultimate end, and the ultimate end of everything is the same as its first beginning.’96 In Heptaplus, Pico defines felicity the same way: ‘…the return of each thing to its beginning. For felicity is the highest good, and the highest good is what all things seek; what all things, however, seek is that which is the beginning of all things…. Therefore the end of all things is the same as the beginning of all: one God, omnipotent and blessed, the best of all things

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

153

which can exist or be thought of; hence the two appellations used by the Pythagoreans, One and Good. He is called one since He is the beginning of all things, just as unity is the beginning of all numbers, and good since He is the end, rest, and absolute felicity of all things.’97

The Active Intellect In Ficino’s Christian Platonic universe, the angelic mind is the home of being, whereas Pico distinguishes between formal being in the angelic mind, and the locations of causal and participatory being. For both Ficino and Pico, the angelic mind is also Plato’s world of forms or ideas, and the intellectual and intelligible world—the place of divine mind and understanding (at least Hokmah and Binah, and potentially Keter too, in the Kabbalistic scheme). But Pico reorganizes Ficino’s hierarchy of forms or understands them in a different way, for instance beauty becomes a subspecies of the good. Further, the concept of a world of forms is problematic from an Aristotelian perspective. The Platonic world of forms contains the universals from which every particularity derives (e.g. the idea of beauty rather than the particular beautiful object). Plato argues that we recognize beauty in its particular form (a beautiful person or thing) because there is a universal or form, Beauty, much as we all recognize a particular circle because we are connecting that particular, probably mathematically inaccurate circle with the universal form of a Circle that actually exists. The world of forms is real in a way that our world is not…. We are in a cave watching shadows of the real on the rockface. Our senses, as the part of ourselves most closely connected to the world of matter, lie to us all the time, so we cannot use the evidence of our senses to deduce the existence of a universal from a particular example (the idea of beauty from a particular beautiful object). But we understand that a particular object is beautiful, because we already carry within us an understanding of what beauty is…. These universals are in the world closest to the One, as universals must be the first things emanated: the most perfect (unified) of things, the abstract concepts, before the emanative process multiplies into particularities. Just as Plato requires a world of forms where the forms (or ideas) exist, Christianity requires an angelic world created by God. Christian Platonists, such as St Augustine and Ficino put the two together. Aristotle starts from the particular. We see particular things in the material world and then we abstract from the particular. We do so by using the

154

S. HOWLETT

‘active intellect’ (intellectus agens ). The active intellect recognizes (illuminates) what is common between similar items, determining what is common between and what is particular to each individual, for example. Universals are what is in common, not ‘real’ things. They are thought by the active intellect, rather than having ‘being’ in and of themselves. This is based on Aristotle’s De Anima iii 5 where he introduces the active intellect. It can be distinguished from the passive ‘possible intellect’ (intellectus possibilis ) which simply takes information in from the senses. In summary, Aristotle says that the mind extrapolates universal truths from individual experiences, placing emphasis on our senses and the role of this active intellect; whereas Plato says that the mind knows universal truths because of the existence of universals a priori upon which each particular is based. However, the ‘active intellect’ was rapidly linked to a universal mind or intellect, suggesting a possible bridge to Plato’s forms, by connecting De Anima with Aristotle’s discussion of a divine intellectual being in Metaphysics xii. Alexander of Aphrodisias, one of Aristotle’s early commentators who also influenced Plotinus and late Platonism, argued that the active intellect was the agency of this divine intelligence and was universal, whereas the possible intellect belonged to each particular individual. This universal active intellect is external to the human mind and ‘illuminates’ us. St Augustine formed a correspondence between Platonism and Christianity, connecting the world of forms with the angelic sphere. He also forms a correspondence between Platonism and Aristotelianism (between an ontological conversation [a question of being] and an epistemological one [a question of knowing]), for instance in Confessions IV xv. The universal mind is thereby present in all three traditions and understandably so given the limitations of Aristotle’s original concept for our particular active intellects are not always able to encompass or see all the reasons behind a particular. This renders them unable to make the abstraction. The universal mind or One is required to see all reasons and understand everything. God creates or emanates, the reasons or forms exist within the divine, and God can understand all because they are all from within the divine. In Ficino’s Christian Platonism this link between the epistemological and ontological is maintained. The Platonic world of forms is combined with the mind of God (the intellectual world) which then can also be Aristotle’s agent or active intellect. The question of the existence of universals, and the role of the intellect, was central to scholasticism, and the primary divide between its two main

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

155

schools: realism and nominalism. The realists believed in the existence of universals. Nominalists thought of universals existing as words (nomina), and potentially only as words. There is no ‘reality’ within, before, or after to detect. A later variant, the conceptualists, saw universals only existing as concepts that we posit, though perhaps with reality of some sort through the human mind. Meanwhile, Averroes argued that both the active and the possible intellects are universal and unified98 : leaving us with no particular intellect of our own. Padua primarily followed Averroes, Aquinas disagreed (see Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, for example), arguing that the active intellect is a part of the individual mind. In Pico’s universe, the angelic mind is the world of forms, so there are universals. There is also an active intellect and it must be in the angelic mind too especially as Pico’s use of the Ein-Sof , places much of the dynamism of the One into the angelic mind (or in close proximity), relating intellect (whether as thought, wisdom, or understanding) to action, though not necessarily as the actor (perhaps supporting Ficino’s attempt to bring act and dynamism from intellect to the One).99 But both Ficino and Pico would agree that the reflective nature of an emanatory universe means that the ideas or forms are expressed in different ways on every level, including in our own intellect. Pico’s divine active intellect is therefore reflected in our own intellects: the ideas are ‘nothing but the exemplary Forms of the natures of things, and every intellect is full of them’ from the intellect of the angelic mind to the intellect of each individual soul.100 This is true of angels too: all things in the first level ‘have their causal being in the divinity as their original source and proceeding from Him immediately into the angelic nature have their second kind of being, formal.’101 They are then reflected downward, having participatory being in the next step down. For as well as forms, and being, and the divine mind or active intellect, this is the world of the angels.

Populating the Angelic Mind The angelic mind is home for a series of divine beings, including the angels. Christ is present above them.102 Indeed, the angelic mind can also be called the son of God, first because Christ is present, but secondly because it is what God causes: the most perfect effect that can be produced. In Kabbalism, it is the home of the Metatron, the transfigured Enoch,103 who can be a pre-figuring in the Old Testament of Christ.104 The Metatron also serves at times in Kabbalistic literature as a synonym

156

S. HOWLETT

for the active intellect, for instance Abulafia’s Commentary to the ‘Guide to the Perplexed,’ using Maimonides,105 describes the Metatron as the ‘thing that is actualizing our intellect from its potentiality’ which is ‘itself an intellect detached from any materiality.’ It is ‘the prince of the world… the angel of the [divine] Face… and its name is Sadday, like the name of its master and its cognomen is Metatron…and it is wise [and] speaking, the universal spirit, which has been called by the philosophers the Agent Intellect and “he sees but is not seen”….’ He is ‘the divine Spirit’ and ‘the divine presence’ (the shekinah), ‘the Kingdom of the Heaven.’106 But in this text the Metatron is not only the firstborn of God. The Platonic universe presents us with a hall of mirrors; a series of echoes extending outward; while Kabbalism’s sacred play with language, numbers and the sefirot extends the mirrorwork into possibilities of multiple understandings/meanings within each sefira, as well as between worlds. So, the Metatron can also be the ascended Enoch: thereby connecting God with the mystic, the seeker after God. The Metatron is the apotheosis of the seeker (much like Christ: St Augustine’s God who became man so that man might become God). This transference of the active intellect from son of God, the firstborn, to the ascended mystic further implies that the mystic ‘becomes also a son, by the dint of his actualized intellect.’107 There is then a ‘double intellectual sonship: that of the cosmic, who is the Agent Intellect, and an angel and son… and that of the mystic, who became a son by becoming an intellect in actu.’108 This suggests ‘a transformative understanding of the intellectual activity’ as in the Oration, where the intellectual man can be an angel and son of God.109 Pico was not the only person who made these links during his lifetime. Mercurio da Coreggio, called himself both the son of God and Enoch, as well as Mercurio, a name linked to Hermeticism (Mercury/Hermes).110 Below the Metatron (Christ or below Christ), there are three ranks of three groups of angels making nine different layers (again, nine plus one). Each of the three groups reflects a different level of the three worlds of the universe. In the angelic mind, the angels are the thrones, cherubims, and seraphim. For the second world, the celestial realm of planets, the angels are the principalities, archangels, and angels. The principalities oversee states, kings, and princes, the archangels oversee mysteries and holy ceremonies, and the angels are ‘assigned to men individually’ and deal with private affairs.111

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

157

But angels are at least partly imperfect in that they are at one remove from perfection, and so adulterated by matter. Pico speaks of a ‘double imperfection’: ‘the one, that it is not being itself but only an essence to which being comes by participation, so that it may be; the other, that it is not intelligence itself but only happens to understand, since by its nature it is an intellect capable of understanding.’112 So ‘the angels understand God only so far as His nature is made manifest in their own substance….’113 This is why we also need God’s active presence, or the transformative understanding provided by the active intellect. Even though we desire perfection, which gives us a natural desire for God, ‘nothing can rise above itself by relying on its own strength (otherwise it would be stronger than itself), so nothing relying on itself can attain a felicity any greater or more perfect than its own nature.’114 We attain God ‘either in the creatures in which he participates or in himself. Through their own powers, created things cannot achieve this ultimate felicity, but only that which is within its own nature. Attaining what is within its own nature is, if we look closely, rather the shadow of felicity than true felicity, just as the creature through which you touch God is not the highest good, but a meager shadow of that divine and highest good.’115 ‘Let it be added that through the former felicity, things are restored to themselves rather than to God, not achieving a return to their beginning, but only avoiding a departure from themselves. The true and perfect felicity, however, carries us back to the contemplation of the face of God, which is the whole of the good, as He himself said, and leads us to perfect union with the beginning from which we sprang. The angels can be raised to this, but they cannot ascend to it…. To this level man cannot go, but can be drawn; therefore Christ, who is felicity itself, said: “No man comes to me unless my Father has drawn him.” The brutes and things below man can neither go nor be drawn to that level.’116 We are reliant on God’s grace if we wish to rise above ourselves.

Celestial and Natural Worlds The second world is the celestial sphere, the world of the fixed stars and the planets. It consists of seven planets, an eighth level of the fixed stars, and a ninth level, the primum mobile (‘first moved’) ‘which is apprehended by reason, not by sense, and which is first among the bodies that move.’ Above these ‘there is believed to be a tenth heaven, fixed, quiet, and at rest, which does not participate in motion.’117 This tenth is

158

S. HOWLETT

‘the empyrean heaven’ which ‘likewise presides like the commander of an army over nine heavenly spheres, each of which revolves with an unceasing motion; yet in imitation of God it is itself unmoving.’118 For ‘…the heavenly bodies, although adapted to circular motion, are not in themselves sufficient to perform this motion, but need the divine mover to turn and revolve them. They are suited to perpetual revolution only insofar as they can receive it, not produce it.’119 As part of an emanatory universe, the celestial world reflects and refracts the angelic mind as well as the whole universe, within itself. The group of ten reflects the ten sefirot of the Tree of Life. In Heptaplus, Pico refers to the Jewish philosopher, Isaac,120 who relates the sefirot to the ten layers of the celestial world. For instance, the empyrean is the ‘tenth sphere’ or ‘sapphire in the likeness of a throne, since the color of the sapphire signifies the splendor of its light, the likeness to a throne its immobility.’121 The description reminds us once more of Keter and the Merkavah tradition. Isaac, Pico tells us, compares the ten to the prophet Zachariah’s ‘seven-branched golden candlestick, the lamp above it, and the two olive trees above the lamp.’ To continue ‘oil from the olives flows to the lamp and to the branches of the candlestick to feed the lights.’ But one of the two olive trees must ‘be the first principle of all light.’ The tenth heaven ‘is then the unity of lights, then the ninth may be first to receive the light with the whole essence of its substance.’122 In the Conclusions, Pico describes the relationship between these ten and the sefirot or what he calls the ‘ten numerations’: ‘Whatever other Cabalists say, I say that the ten spheres correspond to the ten numerations like this: so that, starting from the edifice, Jupiter corresponds to the fourth, Mars to the fifth, the sun to the sixth, Saturn to the seventh, Venus to the eighth, Mercury to the ninth, the moon the tenth. Then, above the edifice, the firmament to the third, the primum mobile to the second, the empyrean heaven to the tenth.’123 But only nine realms are active within this world reflecting the nine plus One variant of the Tree of Life. This nine obviously uses again the Platonic and gnostic triads just as they reflect the nine levels of angels. The planets also form triads that reflect aspects of divine architecture: for instance, Uranus is God, Saturn is the first mind, and Jupiter is the worldsoul, just as in Ficino.124 And just as the angelic mind is full of being, so too is the celestial sphere. But as the Plotinian rational soul, it is more apposite to describe the celestial world as full of soul. Of the nine active levels, there are eight rational souls, plus one: the planets and the fixed

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

159

stars, and the world-soul. The souls are represented in the nine muses. Calliope is the world-soul.125 The planets also have corresponding gods and troops of daemons that follow them. Both Ficino and Pico relate daemons to the pursuit of math and astrology.126 The last hypostasis is the world of nature, the world we inhabit, defined as anything below the moon. Just as in the angelic mind, and celestial world, there are also ten levels, divided into nine plus one. The one in this case is the opposite of the One. At the other end of emanation, at the bottom of the Tree of Life, is the opposite of the divine: prime matter. Pico describes in detail: ‘There are also in the elemental world, after the prime matter which is its foundation, nine spheres of corruptive forms. There are three of bodies without life, which are the elements and the mixtures, and then midway between them those things that are mixed but imperfect, like the storms that occur in the sky. There are three of vegetable nature, which is basically divided into the three genera of grasses, shrubs, and trees. There are three of sensitive souls, which are either imperfect as in the zoophytes, or perfect but within the limits of irrational phantasy, or what is highest among brutes, capable even of being instructed by men, a mean, as it were, between man and brute, just as the zoophyte is the mean between brute and plant.’127 The sublunary world is also a triad: ‘Some are above the middle region of the air, namely, the highest part of this element and the purest fire, which are jointly designated by the name of ether….’128 Below the ether is the firmament with the birds and ‘celestial phenomena’ such as rain and lightning.129 Below the firmament is the earth or matter itself. Another triad divides the world into the heavenly, earthly, and infernal.130 These levels are allegorized using classical myth (connecting the sublunary to the celestial world). Saturn represents unity or the One. Saturn has three sons, Jupiter , Neptune, and Pluto. Saturn is no longer One but divided into three. Jupiter is the ruler of the sky, Pluto of the infernal, and Neptune rules the middle which in the world of nature is earth. This seems counterintuitive given that Neptune traditionally rules the seas. But ‘Because this part [earth] is the one where generation and corruption chiefly occur, it is symbolized for theologians by water and the sea, which is in continual ebb and flow, so that by Heraclitus this continuous motion of generated and corruptible things is likened to the motion of a swift torrent. For this reason the poets say that the kingdom of the sea is ruled by Neptune, and by Neptune the theologians in their mysteries mean that

160

S. HOWLETT

power, or rather divinity, which presides over generation.’131 Pico reiterates this connection between Neptune, generation and the world of nature in Heptaplus.132 Our world mirrors the angelic mind and celestial world in all things ‘as perfect as its nature allows.’133 All sensible beings in nature are the ‘images and shadows’ of intelligible and spiritual things,134 just as in Plato’s cave. Each also, just as with being itself, has a causal, formal, and participatory being. The elements have their causal being in the celestial world, their formal being in the world of nature, and their participated being in the subterranean.135 Aristotelian twists are present throughout, also, for instance in the relationship between heaven and earth described in the Disputations,136 on heat as a cause of change in the world of nature,137 and potentially also in Pico’s idea of light.138 In an emanatory universe, every level relates to every other. What is in the world of nature, is a reflection and refraction of what exists in the celestial world. In a Platonic universe, we may expect to move from the world of forms (Angelic Mind), the universals, into particularity, as we descend through into the increasingly mobile, increasingly mortal worlds; we also may expect to move upward in the same manner. Things or beings in one world, are in ‘sympathy’ with things or beings in the next. These visible and invisible connections between our world and the celestial, invite attempts to read the stars, either to seek God, or to understand what is occurring or what might occur on earth. In Heptaplus, Pico agrees that the celestial world is a set of divine signs to be read, but not by astrologers: ‘the astrologers, who, from Moses’ statement that God placed the stars for signs, draw support for their science of divining by the stars and of foreknowing future events. This science not only has been sharply criticized by Christians like Basil, who rightly called it a busy deceit, and by Apollinarius, Cyril, and Diodorus, but also was spat upon by the good Peripatetics. Aristotle despised it and, what is more, according to Theodoretus, it was repudiated by Pythagoras and Plato and all the Stoics.’139 Astrology is not for the determination of individual events (divination, for example), or what might happen to individual people.140 Nor is it about occult powers giving us a special insight from the planets radiating down their influences. Disputations mocks not only those astrologers who allegorize their reading of the stars, but also those the Kabbalists who see Hebrew letters in the stars.141 Further, signs in the stars are not direct corollaries for events on earth. For example, signs of disaster in the celestial sphere would be literally ‘out of place.’

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

161

The world of nature is the closest world to prime matter. The relationship between celestial and sublunary worlds is impacted by this proximity. When thinking of calamity and crisis generally on the earth, then the cause must lie in the impact of matter. In the stars, in a higher sphere, we can find only order and greater perfection.142 He does not denounce all astrology. There were many aspects he despised for at least part of his career as pseudo-science,143 but astrology as a science (as it was seen then: determining where a planet will move or when an eclipse will occur, for instance) provides a hermeneutic key to the text of the heavens. But as Pico necessarily relies on the science of his day, this can be confusing as the ‘science’ is not always what we understand today to be true. Finally, the signs in the stars do mean something. But they are manifested not as drought or pestilence, but rather as ‘fate.’ The celestial world is the ‘middle world’—balanced between God and prime matter, the influence of both is felt. There is imperfection from below, and while the angelic mind is the world of divine providence, the celestial sphere is the world of fate. Providence can impact our souls, but we could argue that fate only impacts our bodies. This division between soul and body, providence and fate, is further complicated by free will. If each world has its rigid structure and everything is connected, then there must be a hierarchy of determination whereby the particular individual is restricted. If we believe this to be true, and we believe therefore that the stars can predict our future, then a human being can only be what they are, only act as they do, as determined by something above and beyond. This is the rule of fate. But at the same time, as we shall see in Chapter 6, we are supposed to have free will and souls that can participate in all worlds. Pico’s debate on astrology is not just about what is scientific and what is not. Inevitably it is also about free will and fate (in the classical sense). If the celestial world is a place of necessity, the realm of fate, then how can we be free?144 In Pico, astrology (outside of science) becomes a metonym for a fatalistic universe: a ‘general conception of reality.’145 In such a universe, is there room for people to change an outcome, to take charge of the future, whether on the large scale to change the Church, the fate of a city, or on the small scale of changing one’s own future? And should these fates impact us—as souls, rather than simply bodies? Understandably then Disputations’ critique of astrology has been read as a key moment in the assertion of human freedom, a foundational document for the scientific

162

S. HOWLETT

method, a piece that takes us beyond moribund religious superstition, with its belief in fate, to the world of free will.146 This is the story of Pico as one of the first moderns, placing us at the center of the universe, free to move wherever we will, free to be who we want to be, and free to use our judgment to get us there. But Pico’s vision of us is so much more complicated. His universe combines the mysticism of Platonic theology, Judaism, and Christianity with the science, based on causality, that is not quite science, of Aristotle.147 It is a baroque place reminiscent of Proclus, but updated with ornaments from across the history of theology and philosophy. It is also not modern. Pico is not denying fate, simply fate’s hold on us, especially as souls. Pico is not then modern. But we do find in his work a critical space, unintended or not. In this project for concord, we find contradictions, competing dualisms, multiplying questions. Of course, inconsistencies can be the result of other issues, for instance comparing texts from different points in Pico’s career when perhaps he really did change his views. They could be due to problems in his own argumentation or maybe we simply are seeing an incomplete project (dealing with a foreshortened career), or perhaps missing his point. But similar viewpoints between texts argue for Pico’s consistency (direct disagreement is rare) and while his concordance was never completed, texts such as Heptaplus are supposed to be finished statements on aspects of that concordance. More persuasively, inconsistencies inevitably emerge when attempting to put together what is partially similar and what is partially very different. Attempted concordance itself opens a space for interrogation. Simply, there is enough compatibility and connection between traditions, and then enough difference, to allow intense conversations. It is in Pico’s metaphysics that this space for interrogation is most obvious and the possibility of concord most alluring. We are forced to reconsider each tradition in and of itself and in juxtaposition. How can a hidden God ever ‘act’? Is the One part of apophatic or kataphatic theology? Does the divine presence only reside in the angelic mind, or does it truly extend to all worlds? How can emanation and creation co-exist? How can we be subject to fate and have free will? And most importantly, how can philosophy and theology - reason and faith - come together? For Pico’s attempted concordance is a part of this larger historical project to connect reason with faith. But the questions it raises also question the project itself: can we connect philosophy, theology and religious practice?

5

PICO’S UNIVERSE

163

For Pico the answer is ‘yes.’ There is no doubt that Pico believes he is answering the questions his concordance raises. He is especially sure as he believes the answers have always been present. His task is to reveal a pre-existing structure: a structure built into the fabric of his universe. It is a ladder from the root of the tree down to the earth. It is a ladder built from the combination of philosophy, theology and religious practice. It is revealed in Christianity, Jewish mysticism, Platonism, Aristotelianism and Pythagorean mystical-mathematics, and we can climb it to God. Indeed, we need that combination of reason and faith to make the climb. Through the practice of moral and natural philosophy, understanding of theology and the ardor of faith, we can achieve proximity to the root or crown. This is kataphatic mysticism: mystical experience based on the affirmative understanding of what God is. With the support of God’s grace, we can define and draw together the attributes of the divine until we arrive at a vision of God, perhaps even ‘cleaving’ to the divine forever. Pico’s structure is a puzzle, but it also a ladder; if we can but understand, we can find our way home.

Notes 1. Pico, Commentary (1986, 12). 2. Pico, Oration (2012, 114–15, 15): ‘Iam plena omnia; omnia summis, mediis infimisque ordinibus fuerant distributa.’ 3. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 78). 4. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 78). 5. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 77). ‘…magnopere observandum unde et nostra fere tota pendet intentio esse hos tres mundos mundum unum, non solum propterea quod ab uno principia et ad eundem finem omnes referant, aut quoniam debitis numeris temperati et harmonica quadam naturae cognatione atque ordinaria graduum serie colligent. Sed quoniam quicquid in omnibis simul est mundis, id et in singulis continetur, neque est aliquis unus est eis, in quo non omnia sint quae sunt in singulis,’ cited by Watts (1987, 290–91). 6. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 79). ‘Nec potuerunt antiqui patres aliis alia figuris decenter representare nisi occultas, ut ita dixerim, totius naturae et amicitias et affinitates edocti. Alioquin nulla esset ratio cur hoc potius hac imagine aliud alia quam conta repraesentassent. Sed gnari omnium rerum et acti spiritu illo qui haec omnia non solum novit, sed fecit naturas unius mundi, per ea quae illis in reliquis mundis noverant respondere aptissime figurabant. Quare eadem opus cognitione < nisi idem adsit et spiritus >

164

S. HOWLETT

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

his qui illorum figuras et allegoricos sensus interpretari recte voluerint...’ cited by Watts (1987, 291 n29). Levers (2012, 240). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 79). Watts, (1987, 291). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 80) Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 80) Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 75–76). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 76). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 80). Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, 1072a. ‘…in solitaria Patris caligine…,’ Oration (2012, 120–21, 30). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 534–35, 11 > 35) ‘Si deus in se ut infinitum, ut unum, et secundum se intelligatur, ut sic nihil intelligimus ab eo procedere, sed separationem a rebus, et omnimodam sui in seipso clausionem, et extremam in remotissimo suae diuinitatis recessu profundam ac solitariam retractionem…’ Riva (2012, 73). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 49). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 50). Pico, Conclusions: ‘Ein-Sof should not be counted with the other numerations, because it is the abstract and uncommunicated unity of those numerations, not the coordinated unity.’ (‘Ensoph non est aliis numerationibus connumeranda, quia est illarum numerationum unitas abstracta et incommunicata, non unitas coordinata.’) (1998, 520–21, 11 > 4). Scholem (1987, 357). Scholem (1987, 126–27) citing Abraham bar Hiyya, the eleventhcentury Jewish thinker, and Green (1997, 142). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 107). Copenhaver (2019, 375): Keter ‘manifests the No-End or Infinite.’ Green (1997, 151). Green (1997, 162). Green (1997, 151). Green (1997, 151). Green (1997, 153). Dillon (2011, 17): using ‘power’ (dynamis ) (citing Plotinus: ‘What happens when the hand holding the wood is not present, but the power of that hand is still experienced?’) Cited by Dillon (2011, 16). Green (1997, 147). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 34). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 39).

5

36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

PICO’S UNIVERSE

165

Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 42). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 43). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 44–45). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 442–43, 5 > 15) ‘Per extremorum et medii rationem cognoscere possumus conuenienter uniuersi gradus sic in quinque posse diuidi: In super ens, uere ens, non uere ens, non uere non ens, uere non ens.’ Lohr (1988, 583) argues that Pico is attacking Ficino through Aquinas’ distinction between these different types of being. Pico, Commentary (1986, 11). Trinkaus (1995a, 503–6). Pico, Commentary (1986, 11–12). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 38). Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 38). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 85). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 88). Pico, Commentary (1986, 52). Pico, Commentary (1986, 53). Craven (1981, 109) argues, for example, that in Heptaplus the worlds are not emanated but are direct acts of creation starting with the lower world. Pico, Commentary (1986, 57). Pico, Commentary (1986, 18). Farmer (1998, 20). Pico, Commentary (1986, 13). Pico, Commentary (1986, 13). Howlett (2016, 69). Pico, Commentary (1986, 33). Howlett (2016, see for example 71). Pico, Commentary (1986, 33). Pico, Commentary (1986, 34). Howlett (2016, 72). Pico, Commentary (1986, 35). Pico, Commentary (1986, 39). See Allen (2008, 91), for instance, though as he points out (2008, 87), perhaps unlike Ficino, Pico is concerned really with metaphysics rather than love. Benivieni’s poem is to help him make metaphysical points. Pico, Commentary (1986, 39). Pico, Commentary (1986, 39). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 438–39, 5 > 6): ‘Love is said by Orpheus to be without eyes, because it is above the intellect.’ ‘Ideo amor ab Orpheo sine oculis dicitur, quia est supra intellectum.’

166

S. HOWLETT

68. Pico, Commentary (1986, 32): ‘…the power of the soul which desires inclines towards what presents itself to it with the appearance of good, and withdraws and flees from what has the appearance of evil. That inclination is called love, that flight and withdrawal, hate.’ 69. Pico, Commentary (1986, 36). 70. Pico, Commentary (1986, 35). 71. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 444–45, 5 > 22): ‘The love of which Plato speaks in the Symposium can in no way exist in God.’ ‘Amor de quo in Symposio loquitur Plato, in deo nullo modo esse potest.’ Pico (1986, 90): ‘Therefore love is the cause of the production of everything which proceeds from God, understanding by love what Plato and our Poet understand, not love which might be in Him, as Marsilio believes, because then there would be imperfection in Him, but the love of his creatures for Him, as we have stated and in our fashion said.’ Allen (2008, 91–92) points out how strange Pico’s point of view is here, for instance that the soul’s love for God is not reciprocated, that God does not love us, because this would be an imperfection. 72. Pico, Commentary (1986, 90). 73. Pico, Commentary (1986, 34): ‘You can therefore consider, reader, how many errors our Marsilio committed in his first commentary under this head alone, perverting what Plato says of love, although in addition, in every part of his treatise, he has made mistakes on every subject, as I believe will be clearly shown in due course.’ 74. Pico, Commentary (1986, 82): ‘…the second sefiroth, that is, numbering, which proceeds from the First Father and is in itself the first ideal wisdom.’ 75. ‘Idem est bresith, id est in principio creauit, ac si dixisset in sapientia creauit.’ (1998, 356–57). 76. 1965a, 170. 77. Ogren (2016, 16). 78. Ogren (2016, 17): He describes Hokmah as ‘the beginning of all heads (or beginnings)… and the word is crowned with the crown of Bet.’ 79. Ogren (2016, 17). 80. Ogren (2016, 49), in Recanati’s commentary on Genesis that Pico used. 81. Ogren (2016, 43). 82. Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 78). 83. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 444–45, 5 > 21) ‘Cum dicit Plato Amorem natum ex congressu Peniae et Pori in ortis Iouis, in natalibus Veneris, diis discumbentibus, nihil aliud intelligit quam in angeli mente tunc primum amorem, id est desiderium pulchritudinis, esse natum cum in eo idearum splendor, imperfectius tamen, refulxit.’ This is from the Conclusions, but it is commensurate with his views in the Commentary. 84. Pico, Commentary (1986, 61).

5

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103.

104.

105.

106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

PICO’S UNIVERSE

167

Pico, Commentary (1986, 56). Pico, Commentary (1986, 57). Pico, Commentary (1986, 44). Pico, Commentary (1986, 44). Pico, Commentary (1986, 45). Pico, Commentary (1986, 45). Pico, Commentary (1986, 42). Pico, Commentary (1986, 43). Pico, Commentary (1986, 47). Pico, Commentary (1986, 50). Pico, Commentary (1986, 48). Pico, Commentary (1986, 48). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 148). Dulles (1941, 27). Lohr (1988, 583). Pico, Commentary (1986, 43). Pico, Commentary (1986, 12). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 115). Riva (2012, 74), from Abraham Abulafia’s Commentary to Maimonides’ ‘Guide to the Perplexed’ entitled Sitrè Toràh (The Secrets of the Law): ‘And they say that Enoch is Metatron and so says Ionethes Chaldeus […]’ (translation by Riva). Riva (2012, 75) ‘All these symbols, according to Farmer, would syncretically refer “to the intellectual nature of the angelic mind”’ (referencing Farmer 1998, 70). Though it is inevitably a mix, as Idel (2014, 29–30) notes: ‘Abulafia’s exercise is a combination of Ashkenazi esotericism, about an hypostatic son, who is the angel Metatron, with Neo-Aristotelian epistemology…’ Idel (2014, 26–27). Idel (2014, 29). Idel (2014, 32). Idel (2014, 32) also argues that this peculiar argument used in both texts likely comes from an ‘ecstatic Kabbalistic source.’ Idel (2014, 40). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 110–11). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 108). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 149). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 150). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 150). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 150–51). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 95). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 78). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151–52).

168

S. HOWLETT

120. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 96 n3): Isaac was probably Isaac ben Solomon Israeli, a North African Jew of the ninth century. 121. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 96 and n3). 122. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 96). 123. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 540–1, 11 > 48) ‘Quicquid dicant caeteri cabalistae, ego decem spheras sic decem numerationibus correspondere dico, ut ab aedificio incipiendo, Iupiter sit quartae, Mars quintae, Sol sextae, Saturnus septimae, Venus octauae, Mercurius nonae, Luna decimae; tum supra aedificium, firmamentum tertiae, Primum mobile secundae, caelum empyreum decimae.’ 124. Pico, Commentary (1986, 18 and 54). 125. Pico, Commentary (1986, 25). 126. Riva (2012, 77): ‘This seems to be Pico’s meaning as well, as though among the possibilities open to man there exists an imperfect metamorphosis into a celestial “demon,” provided he raises himself to the contemplation of the cosmos as the theatre of his metamorphosis, without reaching for a superior, intellectual, and spiritual dimension.’ 127. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 78). 128. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 90). 129. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 90). 130. Pico, Commentary (1986, 23). 131. Pico, Commentary (1986, 23). 132. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 90). 133. Pico, Commentary (1986, 17). 134. Pico, Commentary (1986, 81). 135. Pico, Commentary (1986, 22). 136. Vanden Broecke (2003, 66). 137. Vanden Broecke (2003, 67): Pico asserts an Aristotelian heat as the ‘efficient’ cause of sublunary change, which he suggests can be compared with Ficino’s notion of spirit, in which spirit connects together everything in the world of nature. 138. Vanden Broecke (2003, 67). 139. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 32). Trinkaus (1994, 350), who believes Pico’s views on astrology remained consistent, notes Heptaplus and mentions Pico’s ‘disdain for astrology, this makes clear that five years before his nearly completed Disputations against judicial astrology… he despised this pseudo-science.’ 140. Farmer (1998, 139) who also argues that Pico remains consistent in his views throughout his career. Garin (1983, 80) agrees, he was ‘always hostile to the theories of the conjunctions, far from ‘naturalistic’ interpretations of prophetic phenomena, convinced of the conflict between human liberty and astral determinism…’ He (1983, 1–2) argues that

5

141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147.

PICO’S UNIVERSE

169

Pico distinguishes in Ptolemaic fashion between religious and superstitious astrology, on the one hand, and analytical and scientific astrology on the other. Farmer (1998, 142). Ingegno (1988, 240). Trinkaus (1994, 350). Garin (1983, 92): ‘It is both the illusion of overcoming the connection between the world of necessity and the world of freedom with the appeal to the miraculum magnum, after having stressed the distance between matter and soul, between fate and free will.’ Garin (1983, 89). Garin (1983, 87–88). Garin (1965, 110–11): ‘We must insist that Pico… did not have the slightest intention of weakening the premises of the science of nature. On the contrary: he presented himself as the defender of an ordered and rigorously causal conception of the universe. He denounced not only the incessant scientific mistakes make by astrology but also the abuse of analogy and the arbitrary intrusion of religious influences upon the course of natural events. And finally, he exposed the disorder that had resulted from astrology’s application of the laws of physical causality to the realm of human consciousness. For these laws are only valid for attempts to determine the soul’s horizon; but are incapable of explaining free acts. At the threshold of the soul, the law of nature sistit pedem et receptui canit.’

CHAPTER 6

The Way Home

In this complex universe, we search for a way home, back to God. We seek the henosis of the Platonists: to ascend through the emanations and merge with the One. We seek noesis , our minds reaching out to the Active Intellect. We climb Jacob’s ladder for a vision of the throne. We seek the darkness beyond, where words and understanding fail. Reaching our spiritual home, potentially to rest forever, is the mission of the mystic: the would-be Enoch who desires to ‘walk with’ God. We, as humans, can be uniquely gifted to make this ascent, but not all are graced to do so. Pico speaks to those who can hear and understand the secrets he imparts; to the philosophically and spiritually open who are ready for change; to the mystic and those capable of the philosophical journey toward religious experience. The first step in our journey is to understand our own nature, what we might call our ‘human dignity,’ that allows us potentially to make our way back to God. The universe is a garden, and we are at its center.1 But we are also a smaller version of this garden: ‘The Father infused in man, at his birth, every sort of seed and all sprouts of every kind of life.’2 These seeds or semina are within us and we may use them to activate different states of being within ourselves: choosing through our growth of a particular seed what we will become. We contain every world of the universe within us. We can germinate a seed from the lower world or a higher one,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_6

171

172

S. HOWLETT

becoming either the psychic3 equivalent of that being or perhaps literally becoming that being through a transmigration process. We contain the whole universe within us—as the microcosm of the macrocosm—and so what is true of the universe, is true for us.4 We have access to all Pico’s versions of the different emanated worlds: the world of nature (from the elements: ‘Fire, water, air, and earth in the true peculiarity of their natures exist in this gross, earthly human body which we see.’ To vegetation: ‘There is also in man the life of the plants, performing all the same functions in him as in them – nutrition, growth, and reproduction.’ To the animals: ‘There is the sense of the brutes, inner and outer;’); the celestial (‘there is the soul, powerful in its heavenly reason;’) all the way to the supracelestial (in the soul ‘there is participation in the angelic mind’). Altogether ‘There is the truly divine, simultaneous possession of all these natures flowing together into one, so that we may exclaim with Mercury, “A great miracle, oh Asclepius, is man!”’5 This is an overwhelmingly positive view of our place and our potentiality.6 Only a few years before the rise of Savonarola, with his message of mass penitence, Pico celebrates our very special place in the universe. Indeed Pico’s celebration of humankind in the Oration seems like a philosophical precursor of a ‘modern’ understanding of ourselves: one short step from his description of ‘renaissance man’ to the selfdetermining individual with the innate creative and cognitive abilities to do what she, he, they wills. But his discussion of our dignity in the first part of the Oration, reinforced in Heptaplus, is a declaration of our ‘multipotentiality’ and ability to self-fashion reusing a very Renaissance trope.7 As Kristeller admits Pico’s words have ‘a modern ring’ but ‘I am not absolutely sure they were meant to be as modern as they sound….’8 We can go further than Kristeller. It is not a ‘modern’ text and it is not at all clear that Pico is celebrating humankind in Oration.9 Rather he celebrates how, because of our special place in the universe, particular philosophers who practice the right blend of philosophy, theology, and religious truth can ascend toward God. There is a history of essays on ‘human dignity’ before Pico. Giannozo Manetti’s De dignitate et excellentia hominis (1452) asserts that our dignity derives from God choosing a human within which to take up residence.10 But he was at least partially using Bartolommeo Facio’s De excellentia ac praestantia hominis (c1447).11 He also has little more to say than Facio on what dignitas really means,12 simply emphasizing a degree of human freedom in our ability to choose how we will act

6

THE WAY HOME

173

on earth, but not necessarily placing us at the center of the universe.13 Petrarch discusses dignitas briefly,14 and further back, Gregory of Nyssa shares many of Pico’s ideas on human freedom and potential, as does Nemesius of Emesa, and there is even a potential legacy in the work of Philo of Alexandria.15 The question of dignitas may be present in Pico’s text, but it is not the main topic and the Oration does not belong to an important distinctive tradition on human dignity.16 Rather Copenhaver argues that the Oration ‘was a call to transcend the human world – misread as a proclamation of human dignity. This modern idea, imposed on a premodern text, has given context to a “Renaissance philosophy of man” at the cost of confusing two “humanisms”.’17 But there is originality here in Pico’s ascetic ‘call to transcend,’ as a result of his syncretism. Alongside the use of various common tropes, Pico is using ‘revival’ material from the Platonic tradition in the Oration, whether through Plotinus on transmigration or Ficino’s work on mutability. He is introducing important elements from Kabbalism (particularly Jacob’s ladder as a central metaphor for ascension); and as with all his work, Aristotelian ideas are used throughout. Meanwhile, this human is a philosopher and would-be mystical ascetic; and under the apparent contemporary veneer of the ‘modern individual,’ lies a set of very ‘unmodern’ questions: how do we reach God? What does it mean to achieve that goal? And what is the role of death in our personal transformation?

Mutability and Self-fashioning Pico’s Oration begins with two metaphors (Proteus and the chameleon) for mutability. He asserts that we contain everything, are part of everything and have freedom of will (setting us apart from the rest of creation).18 This combination allows us to try to change ourselves (with God’s grace) or ‘self-fashion,’ thereby moving up or down (to angel, or down to beast). In Heptaplus Pico describes us as not so much something separate or outside (a ‘fourth world’19 ) but rather ‘the bond and union of the three…’ with God placing ‘man in the midst of it, formed to his own image and likeness.’20 Just as the cherubim are at the center of the angelic sphere, and able to move up toward the Godhead, and down to the world of action, so we are able to move up and down. This idea of the human as both mutable and the bond between worlds is a variant of older traditions of the microcosm of the macrocosm, and

174

S. HOWLETT

the chain of being (a medieval version of Jacob’s ladder). So in the Commentary, he describes us as ‘like a chain and knot for the world… placed in the middle of the universe.’21 And in Heptaplus, says, ‘…the difference between God and man is that God contains all things in Himself as their origin, and man contains all things in himself as their center. Hence in God all things are of better stamp than in themselves, whereas in man inferior things are of nobler mark and the superior are degenerate.’22 For ‘As it is written in the Alcibiades, man is not this weak and earthbound thing we see, but a soul, an intelligence, which transcends all the boundaries of heaven and all the passage of time.’23 Able to move between, we act as a bond. If we fulfill all our potential, we have ascended and are at our most Christ-like, just as he descended into a body to live as a human being. So, the fourth book of Heptaplus is both the book of Christ as human, and also our book.24 Our mutability is a necessary part of our uniqueness. We share every state with every other being because there is nothing that is specifically our own: ‘At length, the Master Creator decreed that the creature to whom He had been unable to give anything wholly his own should share in common whatever belonged to every other being.’25 More specifically, ‘We have made you neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you may, as the free and extraordinary shaper of yourself, fashion yourself in whatever form you prefer.’26 But it is not exactly that we are everything else and not anything of ourselves, but rather that we are an ‘indeterminate image’ or undecided image. We are a being that has no image because ‘‘he or she is called to become God, Who is beyond all representation.’27 We can therefore self-fashion: we are able to make ourselves, with God’s help. Standing at least partially outside makes us ‘the free… and honorary moulder and sculptor (plastes et factor) of himself, able to shape himself into whatever form (forma) he preferred.’28 The indeterminate image needs to make an image for itself and can choose what to try and make: ‘It will be in your power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Alternatively, you shall have the power, in accordance with the judgment of your soul, to be reborn into the higher orders, those that are divine.’29 As we have no specific nature that belongs to us alone, mobility is not in our nature. It is a product of our special ‘power’: our freedom of will. The celestial world must move because it is its nature to move. But we only move because we have the freedom/latitude to do so. This freedom is given to us by God and so our power to move toward God is a result of

6

THE WAY HOME

175

‘the motive power of grace’30 connecting our freedom of will with God’s grace: ‘The moving spirit knocks unremittingly at the door of your soul. If you fail to hear, you will be left wretched and unhappy in your own torpor and weakness. If you let it in, you will be carried back at once, full of God, along the orbit of religion to the Father, to the Lord, to possess life forever in him, in whom you always had life even before you were made.’31 Our mutability also does not necessarily disperse us into multiple states of being. Rather than dispersing or making a choice to be one thing or another, we can gradually unify by becoming one in proximity to God: ‘And if he – being dissatisfied with the lot assigned to any other creature – gathers himself into the centre of his own unity, thus becoming a single spirit with God in the solitary darkness of the Father, he, who had been placed above all things, will become superior to all things.’32 Metaphorically this is a journey upward, up Jacob’s ladder, but it is also the journey of the contemplative: an internal journey, a movement within. At the center of the Tree of Life is Christ as the Great Adam. Just as the divine withdraws into itself to form the void in which to emanate, so we do not move up to God, but withdraw into the divine, and further in, toward the solitary darkness of the Father, understood as Keter. Pico’s mystic thus rises with the shekinah, like the congregation of Israel, from Malkut to place the bridal crown on the head of the Great Adam.33 The human condition as Pico describes it is therefore characterized by mutability, our ability to change, much as Ficino argues.34 But also by our ability to self-fashion, and in so doing become more like the revealed God. Pico follows the two primary movements of Plotinian metaphysics: understanding the multiplicity of ourselves and our world; followed by the desire to become one and within the One, the ‘flight of the alone to the alone.’35 As he says ‘…from every imperfection of multiplicity we are brought back to unity by an indissoluble bond with him who is himself the One.’36 We can return up through the emanated/created universe because we can exist in different worlds, are connected to them internally, and because we have, through God’s grace, the freedom of will to be mobile. But we are only able to receive the motile power of God’s grace when our reason is under the control of our intellect, the highest part of our souls, the reflection of the angelic mind in our souls, and the closest part of our soul to God. So far this is not significantly different to Ficino and therefore a ‘Platonic revival’ vision of humankind. It also echoes Kabbalistic texts: Nissim

176

S. HOWLETT

Gerondi’s mid-fourteenth century Catalan sermon, for instance, discusses how we were not given a specific day in the creation as we are the midpoint between the lower and higher worlds.37 It could also be read anagogically. But Pico seems to go further, suggesting a degree of selffashioning that is almost literal. As God tells Adam in Heptaplus: ‘Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature.’38 Do we literally have the capacity to become animal or plant or angel? At face, this seems ridiculous. But there are indications that Pico is not referring only to an internal experience. In the Oration, he says ‘Not undeservedly, in Mosaic and Christian Scripture he [‘the human’] is sometimes called “all flesh” and sometimes “every creature,” insofar as he fashions, shapes, and transforms his own appearance into that of all flesh, his own character into that of every creature.’39 This literal reshaping suggests transmigration of the soul, a form of reincarnation familiar in Platonism, and in some Jewish traditions. Plotinus did espouse a form of transmigration: the movement of a soul from one body to another based on the reflections and coidentity of beings and things in each of the hypostases. Our souls are thus vehicles that can take us from one hypostasis to another.40 Pico certainly affirms the Plotinian idea of correspondence (coidentity) in the Commentary for instance when considering desire: ‘…between him who desires and the thing desired there is always a correspondence and likeness.’41 Pico may also have had access to conversations about transmigration in the Bahir and Recanati’s Commentary on the Torah, among others in Flavius’ translations.42 He also suggests that transmigration was part of the belief system of the Pythagoreans: ‘According to Pythagoreans, wicked men are deformed into brutes and, if Empedocles is to be believed, into plants as well.’43 And finally his appreciation of Origen suggests sympathy with transmigration as an idea.44 But how literal is Pico here? It can be literal, for example, if we are changing from a physical to an angelic form, such as Pico’s explanation of Enoch’s change into Metatron.45 But these changes could all be purely ‘symbolic’: we become ‘like’ a beast or an angel.46 For instance ‘if we do

6

THE WAY HOME

177

not know ourselves we have to follow the beasts as their lackeys…’47 that is we can become brutish if we focus only on the life of the senses.48 Or again, ‘It is not in fact the bark that makes the plant, but dull and insentient nature; not the hide that makes a beast of burden, but a brutish and sensuous soul; not the circular body that makes the heavens, but straightforward reason; not the separation from the body that makes an angel, but its spiritual intelligence.’49 So ‘…if you see someone who is enslaved by his own senses, blinded by the empty hallucinations brought on by fantasy (as if by Calypso herself) and entranced by their bedeviling spells, it is a brute animal you see, not a man.’50 Here Pico implies that ‘becoming an animal’ is an internal change not an external transmigration into an actual animal.51 But the truth could be both. Pico seems clear when he cites Plotinus (specifically Enneads I.II) in the Conclusions52 : ‘…the soul that sinned in either a terrestrial or aerial body lives the life of a beast after death.’53 (though given that this is one of his theses to be debated, we cannot know if he agrees with Plotinus).54 But we could become ‘brutish’ while living due to our behavior, or experience a brutish afterlife, and or then also be creating a future life for ourselves as an animal. Perhaps ascending or descending really means moving deeper internally, away from the world of the senses toward our reason and beyond, and moving between, from our position as human to a future potential life as another type of being. Either way, the mimetic process of emanation that forms the macrocosm is repeated in a second mimetic process of self-fashioning.55 What we become, whether an angel, a demon, or a beast, follows on from our creative action: a reversal of the scholastic operari sequitur esse. We are the indeterminate image of God, as expressed through the emanated/created universe; and have in our own particular way, God’s creative powers, expressed within us (by his grace) as freedom of choice. This is our ‘dignity’ as human beings, unlike any other beings in any other world: ‘We have made you neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you may, as the free and extraordinary shaper of yourself, fashion yourself in whatever form you prefer. It will be in your power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Alternatively, you shall have the power, in accordance with the judgment of your soul, to be reborn into the higher orders, those that are divine.’56

178

S. HOWLETT

Our Anatomy Made up of all, and able to become anything, we are sacred geometry, just like the universe in which we reside. We are a binary, a triad, a tetraktys , and the Tree of Life. We are made up of two parts, just like the world: the first part is eternal, our soul. The other part is corruptible, our body,57 which we can see with our physical eyes. There are also two types of free will. The first is false, belonging to the lower ‘soul’ of the senses. Influenced by our being in the world, we believe we are using free will when following our appetites or emotions. It is this type of will that takes us to the animals, for example. The other will uses our reason to overcome the lower soul’s opinions and appetites.58 We have three types of unity: first ‘unity in things whereby each is one to itself, remains the same as itself, and is in harmony with itself. Secondly, there is that through which one creature is united to another and through which all parts of the world are ultimately one world. The third and most important of all is that whereby the whole universe is one with its Maker, as an army is with its leader.’59 We are also made up of the triad of body, soul, and joining the two, spirit (as in Ficino); and a third triad of intelligence, reason, and senses: the soul is made up of reason ‘by virtue of which we are men, and all that is corporeal in us, whether it be gross or delicate and spiritual,’ below that an ‘intermediate sensual part which we share with the brutes;’ and above the intelligence which ‘we share no less with the angels….’60 Reason and intelligence are the higher soul, divided into lower and upper. The lower is the home of the reason, ‘which is peculiar to man.’61 The intellect is illuminated (in the Aristotelian sense) by a ‘greater, even divine, intellect… whether it be God (as some would have it) or a mind more nearly related to man’s…’ which we might call divine active intellect, the spirit of the lord or the Kabbalistic Metatron.62 Below the higher soul is the place of the senses and motion which is related to irrational animals; and below that sensibilities associated with plants, with appetite and growth. We are also four: made up of our senses (sensation or aisthesis ), opinion (doxa), knowledge (episteme), and contemplation (nous ).63 And finally in Disputations and Conclusions, Pico connects the parts of the soul to the ten sefirot, the whole of which is also Adam Kadmon, the Great Adam that is the Tree of Life. As a unified soul we are Keter, the Crown.64 Then comes our intellect, our reason, superior sensual passion, superior

6

THE WAY HOME

179

irrational passions, freedom of will, and so on.65 Abraham Abulafia uses the same conceit.66 The intelligence is connected to the angelic mind of the universe: ‘Intellects are eyes’ for ‘What the eye is among corporeal things, the mind is in the spiritual realm.’ Which means that light is needed so that the intellect can see. The ‘intelligible truth is light, and the intellect, itself intelligible, has a kind of inner light by which it can see itself but not other things. It needs the forms and ideas of things, like rays of invisible light, for the intelligible truth to be clearly discerned.’67 ‘…it is to be noted that there are two kinds of sight, the one corporeal and the other incorporeal. The first is that which is commonly called sight, which Aristotle says is loved by us above all the other senses. The other is that power of the soul in which… it was said that we are like the angels. This power is called sight by all the Platonists, and corporeal vision is nothing but a copy of it.… With this sight Moses, Paul, and many of the other elect saw the face of God. This is what our theologians call intellectual cognition, intuitive cognition. With this sight John the Evangelist says that the just will see God Almighty, and that this will be our whole reward.’68 The intelligence is ‘the pure contemplator’: ‘If you see a pure contemplator, oblivious to his body and absorbed in the recesses of his mind, this is neither an earthly nor a heavenly creature: this is a still more eminent spirit, clothed in human flesh.’69 Pico seems to suggest that our intelligence is active: we can see God and can choose to ascend toward the divine. If it is active, then it functions in the original Aristotelian manner. It abstracts from the particular to the universal, moving itself upward. However, he also argues that we are impelled to ascend through the motile power of God’s grace suggesting that our intelligence is at least partially passive (immobile until activated): relying on the existence of a universal active intellect to know and abstract everything. Further, if God is the only active intellect, then our minds need to be illuminated. God must reach down. We could also argue a third way. The upper level of the particular mind could become (mobilized as) an active intellect, understanding more about universals or reasons, and able to use its own energy to ascend, the closer it grows to God. The active intellect within each mind allows us to be open to the divine active intellect. God can illuminate us, touching the part of our mind that can abstract and see the truth. Our intellects can thus perhaps be ‘activated’ by God, giving us the power to abstract and move ourselves upward.

180

S. HOWLETT

Below the intelligence is the reason, the home of the rational soul. If we can disconnect our reason from our senses, then we will find ‘right reason,’ which connects our reason to our intelligence. We start to look upward toward the divine. This takes us from the animal toward the angelic sphere: ‘If you see a philosopher discerning things with right reason, worship him, for he is not an earthly creature, but divine.’70 Below reason there are both exterior and interior senses. The imagination is highest and ‘often corrects the mistakes of the outer senses. Reason administers the imagination and is illuminated by the intellect. It never falls into error except when either the imagination impudently withholds its faith from it or it trusts too much in its own strength in opposition to the intellect.’71 It is unclear whether he further distinguishes a lower form of the imagination, the phantasy. Phantasy in Ficino can lead you astray just like the senses.72 Pico’s phantasy might be the common sense (‘the inner sense which philosophers call the phantasy.’73 ) The potential lack of a deceptive imagination in Pico is however suggestive. Ficino considers the physical world, as brought to us by our senses, to be deceptive (Plato’s cave). The ‘real’ world is beyond, in the world of forms. For Aristotle, the senses provide the particulars from which we derive universals. They give us parts of the truth. We use our common sense to classify what we sense, and then take it on to the imagination,74 examine with our reason, and so on upward through the soul. The intelligible is abstracted by our active (activated) intellects from the sensible world (phantasmata). If the intellect is the Aristotelian active intellect, then Pico’s intellect, once activated, has a far stronger role than Ficino’s which tends to reflect somewhat passively the divine. Ficino’s distinction between the imagination and deceptive phantasy would also disappear. Epistemological concerns—what we can know, and how we can know it—become far more central in Pico’s philosophy in his effort to amalgamate Aristotelianism with other traditions. We make the effort of will to become what we wish to be, using the degree of freedom granted to us by God’s grace, but it is an effort of will based on knowledge. We are also potentially caught in a trap: we must understand in order to act, but potentially we cannot understand (take from the particular to the universal) until we are illuminated. The senses are the lowest part of the soul. Connecting body and soul is spirit. The soul itself is a circle and a ‘heaven’ ‘for Aristotle calls the heaven a self-moving living being, and our soul (as the Platonists prove) is a self-moving substance.’ When the reason looks upward and joins with

6

THE WAY HOME

181

the intellect, then the heavenly vehicle’s motion is ‘perfectly circular.’75 Further ‘Heaven is a circle, and the soul is also a circle, or rather, as Plotinus writes, heaven is a circle because its soul is a circle. Heaven moves in an orbit; a rational soul, going from causes to effects and returning again from effects to causes, revolves through an orbit of reasoning.’76 If the soul is heaven, then the body is earth ‘because it is an earthy and heavy substance. Made from dirt (humus ) as Moses writes, it gave its name to man (homo).’77 There is then a link between the earth of the body and the heaven of the soul as something needs to join these very different natures ‘to this task was assigned that delicate and airy body which physicians and philosophers call the spirit and which Aristotle says is of diviner nature than the elements and corresponds by analogy to heaven. This is called “light,” a term which could not better suit the opinion of physicians and philosopher s, who all agree that it is of a very bright substance and that nothing pleases, fosters, and refreshes it more than light. It may be added that just as every virtue of the heavens (as Avicenna writes) is conveyed to earth by the vehicle of light, so every virtue of the soul, which we have called heaven, every power – life, motion, and sense – joins and is transferred into this earthly body, which we have called earth, through the medium of the luminous spirit.’78

Immortality of the Soul Pico’s soul/body corresponds with the different worlds of the emanated universe, from the intelligence and the supracelestial world to the senses and the world of nature. We can symbolically or even literally become part of each world depending on whether we live in our sense, our reason, or look upward toward God. Of course, the question of literal ‘becoming’ is also reliant on the larger issue of the immortality of the soul which was an open question in Pico’s time. Ficino insists on the immortality of the soul in Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum, following Plato, who uses the argument of affinity in the Phaedo: as the soul can know the ideas, it must be like them, that is eternal and incorporeal.79 Aristotle was ambiguous, seeing the intellect as incorruptible but confusingly not clearly part of the individual soul. Alexander of Aphrodisias refers to the third book of Aristotle’s De anima 80 arguing that the active intellect is outside the individual soul, leaving the soul as mortal. Averroes removes all that could be considered immortal or incorruptible within our souls.

182

S. HOWLETT

We are simply connecting with the immortal intellect when we perform an abstraction.81 Immortality was not official church doctrine,82 and was not adopted as such until the Council of Trent in 1545, though the Lateran Council of 1512 began the process by denouncing the Averroist perspective. The idea of an immortal soul came from the Church Fathers, not the gospels, headed by Augustine who used Plato’s argument of affinity.83 Ficino’s defense of the immortality of the soul, following the Byzantine philosopher, George Gemistus Pletho, is ‘a conscious reaction against later medieval thought, a reaction that would quite properly claim to be a fight in the name of Plato (and of Augustine) against Aristotle or, at least, against his commentators.’84 In his consistent attempt to try and bridge the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, Pico is left potentially needing to bridge Averroism with the immortality of the soul, but this argument was left unmade.85 Pico discusses the question early in his Commentary as a debate among Platonists, but only as to which parts of the soul are mortal and which immortal: ‘Proclus and Porphyry will have it that only the rational part is immortal and all the others are corruptible. Xenocrates and Speusippus make the sensitive part immortal also. Numenius and Plotinus, adding even the vegetative part, conclude every soul to be immortal.’86 Pico essentially follows Ficino’s deeply held belief in our immortality. For instance, he places us as subject to providence rather than to fate (fate only rules that which exists in space and time whereas our souls are incorporeal). If we try to become free of providence, we simply become ‘slave to that fate of which it was formerly the master.’87 But crucially for his views on astrology, his distinction between fate and providence, body and soul, suggests that fate or the stars cannot impact our souls. But providence can, and as immortal souls, we have the potential for a larger, divine destiny.

Ascent Pico spends the first part of the Oration outlining an overall understanding of humankind, but in the second part he moves on to an encomium on what we can achieve: not an encomium on philosophy per se, but on the mystical ascent of the soul through the union of philosophy, theology, and religious practice. Pico tells us in the Oration to ‘disdain the celestial’ and go beyond: disregarding all the things of this world to go

6

THE WAY HOME

183

to the ‘otherworldly court that is near to the most eminent Destiny.’88 This is the court of the cherubim, seraphim and thrones, the sphere of the angels, the angelic mind, and reminiscent of Jewish palace literature. He tells us that ‘The seraph burns with the fire of love; the cherub shines with the splendor of intelligence; the throne stands in the steadfastness of judgement.’89 If we burn for God alone, with the love of charity, ‘we shall burst into flame in the likeness of the seraphim.’90 So ‘He who is a seraph, that is, a lover, is in God and God is in him; indeed, he and God are one.’91 It is this ascent that we pursue, the proper use of our free will.92 This ascent leads to Pico’s version of henosis , or ‘union’ with the divine. This version requires both a reaching up and a reaching down. Henosis is achieved by God’s grace (the Aristotelian ‘illumination’ of the Active Intellect) activating our will in a final revelation of understanding in Binah which bonds us to the divine presence. Grace is required here for we ‘cannot go, but can be drawn.’93 Of all beings that have been created in God’s universe, we and the angels alone can be drawn in this manner. Grace is also described as ‘rays’ which ‘makes men and angels pleasing to God.’94 Henosis itself is reaching felicity, a ‘supernatural’ felicity which is received from God, by his grace.95 God is felicity because felicity is the ‘highest good’ and God is the ‘best of all things which can exist or be thought of.’96 This is God as Plotinian One, but also as the ‘best’ of what can ‘be thought of’ meaning Keter, rather than beyond what can be thought or the Ein-Sof , or indeed the part of Keter that participates in the Ein-Sof . So, we cannot do this ascent alone. We need God’s grace. This grace is related to Christ: for at one time ‘grace did not yet exist, although it was to exist in the future.’97 The circularity of the system requires God’s active engagement because divine energy is the mover of our universe and of ourselves. The universe does not move in and of itself. There is an Aristotelian ‘divine mover to turn and revolve’ the heavens: ‘They are suited to perpetual revolution only insofar as they can receive it, not produce it.’98 We are built just like the celestial realm, we are built to move in a circle naturally but as we are also the indeterminate image of God ‘Our nature is such that we cannot go in a circle and come back upon ourselves, but we can be moved in a circle and brought back to God by the motive power of grace.’99 So ‘…from every imperfection of multiplicity we are brought back to unity by an indissoluble bond with him who is himself the One.’100 We need both desire and freedom to be able to make this

184

S. HOWLETT

move. The desire is innate, but we do not always take the freedom that is offered.101 This combination of desire, freedom, and the possibility for grace is our ‘dignity’ as humans. We have the innate desire for henosis , the freedom to seek for it and complete the circle and are given God’s grace to draw us up. Our ‘dignity’ or the dignity of those exceptional individuals who understand the working of the universe is the ‘mystical vocation.’ There are two ways through which we can reach up. The first is through love. God is then the good, the beauty that love desires. The second is a mystical ascent. Each is represented by a ladder that we must climb. The first is Diotima’s Ladder from Plato’s Symposium; the second is Jacob’s ladder. Ascent is not apparently complicated by original sin.102 Its absence is perhaps understandable in Heptaplus as the work addresses the original human, the pre-Fall Adam. He is Adam as Adam Kadmon: the elevated Adam that represents the whole Tree of Life, as well as each level. Pico is also talking to us in the post-Christ era: Christ has provided revelation, died for our sin, and is the new Adam.103 But also Pico, much like Ficino, celebrates humankind and tends to avoid the question of the Fall.104 The two ascents come together in Kabbalism and Christian thought, especially that of Pseudo-Dionysius. Charity or caritas is a specific form of Christian friendship or love which is translated by Pico into something more divine. It is friendship as the Aristotelian ‘general force of harmonious attraction’ (from Empedocles and Aristotle’s Metaphysics 985a 20–30) which ‘translates into that energy which encourages the soul towards its union with God.’105 A Kabbalistic story based on Genesis discusses the need to bring harmony between Hesed (mercy or love) and Gevurah (force). They are brought together to re-establish calm using the same steps as found in Pseudo-Dionysius: ‘This spiritual calm, produced not only through dialectics and natural philosophy but especially through the study of theology, is the loftiest goal of each individual and should be desired both for oneself and for all mankind. This is the Pythagorean “friendship” that characterizes the beginning and the end, the return of the soul from its mortal exile.’106 The firmament was formed between them to act as this calming counterbalance.

6

THE WAY HOME

185

Love and Beauty ‘From this prison and wretchedness we shall see below that love is a very potent means of escape, which through the beauty of physical and sensible things arouses in the soul a memory of its intellectual part and is the occasion for returning to it from earthly life, truly a dream of a shadow, as Pindar writes, bringing that soul to eternal life, where purged, as it were, by the fire of love, as we shall show in the following work, it is most happily transmuted into angelic form.’107 The ascent through love is primarily discussed in the Commentary though it is echoed in the Oration.108 This is unsurprising as the subject is integral to Plato’s Symposium, the inspiration of the Commentary. Benivieni’s poem was merely a convenient vehicle for a conversation on Plato: Pico uses only the first sections of the poem and specific lines/themes.109 The Commentary is divided into three books. The first two books are on Platonic philosophy generally, the third discusses the poem. Pico focuses on Diotima’s Ladder from the last section of Plato’s Symposium (much like Ficino in his own commentary). Diotima’s Ladder is a six-stage ascent process for the soul to the Celestial Venus or Idea of Beauty in the world of forms. For Pico, in stage one we love corporeal beauty and then relate that particular physical beauty to inner goodness (recognizing the link between beauty and the good, and also the link between body and soul). In stage two, the soul makes an internal image of the beloved more beautiful than the actual beloved because of the addition of internal virtue. Stage three is an Aristotelian abstraction from the particular to the more general: we move to contemplate the idea of corporeal beauty, rather than the particular body, by aid of the active intellect. ‘This is the last step reached by the soul dominated by the senses’110 that is in contact with matter. But the soul still ‘receives such knowledge from particular sensations and particular fancies, from which it comes about that whoever arrives at a knowledge of the nature of things in this way alone cannot see them plainly and without a veil of the greatest ambiguity.’111 Though this is an Aristotelian abstraction, the end point is still Platonic. We are ascending from the shadow of the body, to the ‘reality’ of beauty. Stage four is the second step of the abstraction and moves from the Aristotelian to the Platonic: the soul recognizes that beauty is a universal, not a particular. Indeed, the soul ‘realizes that everything which is founded upon matter is particular,’ and that the universal is not from

186

S. HOWLETT

this source but from the ‘inner light and power’ of the soul itself.112 The soul reasons that if it looks deeper, or higher, into the intellect, it will see beauty more clearly. In stage five, the soul has ascended from its senses to the upper level of the soul (mind) by using its reason finding that image of the Idea in the mirror of its intellect and there the ‘heavenly Venus shows herself to the soul in her true guise and not an imaginary one, though not in the complete plenitude of her beauty, for which in an individual intellect there is no room.’113 Filled with further desire and ‘Eager and thirsty’ for this ‘complete plenitude,’ ‘the soul tries to unite its individual and particular intellect with the primal and universal one, the first created thing, the ultimate and universal dwelling of ideal beauty.’ In stage six, the soul ascends from the image of the Idea in the intellect, to the Idea itself, the heavenly Venus, where it can rest for ever.114 This final movement is a drawing up. The soul that lives in its intellect, is ready to be drawn upward by God’s love. The resting-place is not a unio mystica, in the sense of union with the One itself: ‘Reaching this, the sixth step in the sequence, the soul ends its journey, and it is not allowed to move on to the seventh, the sabbath, as it were, of heavenly love. Here it should rest happily in its goal, at the side of the First Father, the fountain of beauty.’115 This final movement of stage six, the drawing up, requires the death of the body: for instance, in stanza four of the poem, Pico adds (changing Benivieni’s poem): ‘In those flames the heart burns to death, yet by burning grows.’116 Through love of beauty we ascend, leave our bodies, and come to the side of Keter, as First Father. Ficino and Pico’s ladder are not the same. First Pico moves immediately from any suggestion of earthly love as a final or even temporary end. His focus is on heavenly love.117 Heavenly love is more ‘properly directed towards males,’ leaving earthly love to women.118 He also considers ‘the spiritual beauty of the mind and intellect… much more perfect in men than in women, as is seen with every other perfection. On this account all those who have been kindled by this divine love have for the most part loved young men of noble character whose virtues have been as pleasing to others as the bodies in which they reside are handsome.’119 Though this should not take us back to earthly love: ‘It is not praiseworthy to delight in the figure of a handsome youth unless you use it as a means of looking within yourself at the proportion and fitting quality of that figure even apart from that gross and material body in which you have seen it.’ Looking at a ‘handsome youth’ should be ‘a means for contemplating with your reason the beauty which is universal in all bodies.’120

6

THE WAY HOME

187

His flight from corporeal beauty recurs in his poetry, for instance, ‘If, Lord, you elected me for heaven,/ Let Love no longer put me off from there,’ (Sonnet 32, 1–2) understanding ‘that pleasant scenes are happy for the senses,/ that I am weak, the adversary strong.’ (7–8).121 Pico’s understanding of the purpose of love is ascetic122 : it is a path to the divine, an intellectual journey. It is fiery, it is desire, but a desire that goes within and upward as soon as possible. It can never rest in the vision of our senses. Secondly, Pico changes Ficino’s (Platonic) approach that corporeal beauty reminds us of the embedded concept of real Beauty in our souls, for that more Aristotelian ‘abstraction’ while maintaining a Platonic Idea at the end of the ascent.123 He does so by introducing the middle point between corporeal and innate beauty: the abstraction made by our reason from the particulars of the sense. Finally, and most importantly, Pico changes the poem so that we cannot achieve ascension as far as God.124 This ascent is based on love as desire: our desire first for corporeal beauty, then our desire to look upward and finally our desire for the beauty close to God. Love enables our movement from the particular, through abstraction, to the reality of the form above. These are three different types of desire, just as they are based on three different types of knowledge of beauty. The first derives from knowledge of the corporeal, and is an appetite based on our senses. The second is based on knowledge from our reason, and is therefore born out of choice; and the third is based on knowledge from our intellect, and is based on our will, an angelic desire125 : ‘…every time that the thing desired is a corporeal and sensible thing the desire for it must be either an appetite following on sensation or a choice of reason inclined toward sensation. Every time that the thing desired is incorporeal and non-sensible the desire must be either an intellectual and angelic will or a rational choice raised and elevated to the sublimity of intellect.’ Love, as desire, can be ‘sensitive, rational, or intellectual,’ that is ‘bestial, human, or angelic.’ To know ‘what kind of desire love may be… it is necessary to see what beauty is, which is the object of such a desire.’126 This beauty is associated with Venus. Just as there are three types of love, so there are three Venuses or types of beauty: earthly, celestial, and heavenly. Corporeal beauty, like everything else has Aristotelian causal, formal, and participated being. Its cause is the visible heavens, and it is animated by the rational soul (whereas the cause of intelligible beauty is God): ‘Her formal and essential being is in the colors illuminated by the light of the visible sun, just as the Ideas are by the light of that first, invisible sun.

188

S. HOWLETT

Her participated being is in the quantitative arrangement of the beautiful thing, the figure which consists of such and such an ordering of its parts. This I call beauty by participation because, as we have said, beauty is the motivating object of sight, and since this quantitative arrangement is not adapted to moving our vision except in so far as it participates in colors and light, it does not really have virtue of its own nature but through the participation and merit of others, who in themselves and by their own nature are able to move our vision and generate in the spirit of whoever sees them love of the thing seen.’127 If we think the ‘source of this beauty to lie in the material body in which we see it placed… there will arise in us the appetite for coitus, which is nothing but joining oneself to that body in the most intimate way possible.’128 But it should return us to ourselves instead. To remain in our senses, engaging corporeally, is to descend to the animal. If we listen to our reason and not to our senses we realize that ‘material body is not the source and fount of this beauty but that it is of a nature wholly averse and detrimental to such beauty.’ This is for two reasons. First, there is a second quality to beauty: ‘a certain quality which cannot be called by a more appropriate name than grace, which appears and shines in beautiful things, and it seems to me that it properly claims for itself the name of Venus, or beauty, because it is this alone which lights the fire of love in human hearts….’ This quality must then come from our souls which ‘transfuses some ray of its own splendor even into the earthly body.’129 The beauty of an earthly body is due to the presence of a beautiful soul. Secondly, reason knows ‘the more it separates itself from the body and considers itself in isolation, the more it has of the proper dignity and excellence of its own nature, and therefore it tries not to resort to the body beyond the appearance received by the eyes, but to purify that appearance as much as it can if it sees any infection of corporeal and material nature left in it.’130 Ascending Diotima’s Ladder is therefore dependent on understanding that a beautiful body is about soul, not body. Ficino is more direct, arguing that heavenly beauty descending into a human body imprints itself on the body thereby making it beautiful: a direct reminder of heavenly beauty for the careful observer. Ficino’s imprint is somewhat equivalent to Pico’s ‘grace,’ though Pico does state that our souls ‘form’ our bodies when we descend into the world of nature,131 just that this is not a perfect process. We are always subject to the difficulties of matter.132

6

THE WAY HOME

189

Most rise no higher than rational love (which we could call ‘human love’). But ‘Some more perfect ones remember a more perfect beauty which their souls once saw before they were immersed in bodies, and then there surges up in them an incredible desire to behold it again…’ so ‘they separate themselves from the body as much as they can, so that their souls regain their pristine dignity, completely masters of their bodies and in no way subject to them. Then they are in that kind of love which is the image of heavenly love, and this can be called the perfect kind of human love and the other the fleeting and imperfect kind of human love.’ The soul that follows heavenly love is ‘completely united with the Intellect and from a man he becomes an angel, wholly inflamed by this angelic love, as matter kindled by fire and turned to flame rises to the upper part of the lower world. Thus purged of all the dullness of his earthly body and transmuted into spiritual flame by the power of love, soaring even to the intelligible heaven he rests happily in the arms of the Father of all.’133 On earth it is difficult to extrapolate ourselves from bodily concerns. We may all have an image of heavenly beauty in our intellect, but divorcing ourselves from the body is ‘a state to which, like those whom we call ecstatics, a man sometimes comes but in which he only briefly lingers.’134 Our soul is temporarily ‘separated from the body,’ but not our bodies from our souls. Our vegetative functions still continue.135 When we are in this ‘first death’ of temporary separation ‘the lover can see the beloved heavenly Venus, and, face to face with her, thinking of her divine image, happily feast his purified eyes.’ To go further requires a second, permanent death: ‘whoever wishes to possess her still more intimately and, not content with seeing and hearing her, be deemed worthy of her intimate embraces and panting kisses must totally separate himself from the body by the second death, and then he not only sees and hears the heavenly Venus but clasps her to himself in an indissoluble knot, and, transfusing their souls into each other with kisses, the more they change the more they are united together so perfectly that each of their two souls, and both, can be called one single soul. And notice that the most perfect and intimate union which the lover can have with his heavenly beloved is denoted by the union of a kiss….’136 We have to die to reside fully with intellectual beauty. If we love perfectly then we necessarily die,137 ‘separating not the body from the soul but the soul from the body.’138 The soul ‘burns with the fire of love’ and so ‘dies in that fierce heat, but in that dying it suffers no failure but rather grows, because consumed by that fire like the

190

S. HOWLETT

holiest holocaust, sacrificed to the First Father, the fount of beauty, it is happily conducted by ineffable grace to the temple of Solomon adorned with all spiritual richness, a true dwelling place of divinity. This is the inestimable gift of love which makes men equal to angels, an admirable faculty which through death gives one life.’139 This is true for all of us if we pass fully to the intellect away from the corporeal and so we are ‘transformed from man to angel.’ This was Enoch’s fate: ‘an intellectual rapture’140 ; a mystical and transformative movement upward to the beyond. But the Platonic Diotima’s Ladder is not the only means to move upward: Kabbalism provides Jacob’s ladder. But here already, we begin to see that Diotima’s Ladder is also the path of the ascetic mystic. Love and the ascetic path to the One of the mystic (henosis ) are simply different ways of telling the same story.

Jacob’s Ladder ‘Who will now give me the wings of a dove, wings covered with silver and yellow with the paleness of gold? I shall fly above the heavenly region to that of true repose, peace, and tranquility…. Unveil my eyes, you ultramundane spirits, and I shall contemplate the wonders of your city, where God has laid up for those who fear him, what the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard, nor the heart thought.’141 In Pico’s search for God, he is the Christian on a journey into the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum of the supracelestial world. The Bible tells us that before Christ only the High Priest was allowed once a year into the inner sanctum. The way to it had been ‘closed off by the laws of justice from the beginning because of the sin of the first father.’ But Christ’s sacrifice has torn the veil from the sanctum and the way has been opened: ‘the way to the supercelestial world, to communion with the angels, was opened for us by the cross and blood of Christ.’142 To be clearer, Christ opened an extra interpretative approach to the texts handed down from Moses, called in Heptaplus the seventh or ‘sabbatical exposition.’ This interpretation returns us to God. Return is our ‘felicity… which through Mosaic and Christian law was granted to man….’143 This is Pico’s second version of the ladder or the ascent of the soul to his form of henosis . Our first aim is to become cherubim,144 allowing us to move up toward the Godhead, the sphere of love, and potentially down again to the life of action.145 Our final apparent aim is to be seraphim, next to God.

6

THE WAY HOME

191

Pico’s approach to henosis is similar to Ficino’s, with more emphasis on Plotinus, 146 and in addition to Platonism, Kabbalism, more Christian mysticism and Aristotelianism. Pico uses Aristotelian Kabbalists and his own Aristotelian interests.147 The result is a potential division between henosis and noesis . So as in Ficino, our souls in our bodies go to the edge of the celestial world to see the angelic mind (gazing on the world of forms), but probably no further (if we are in our bodies as cherubim, then surely we are still attached to our bodies at the periphery of the angelic mind. But Pico could also be ‘playing’ with triads again: in the triad of cherubim, seraphim and thrones, cherubim could be representing the celestial world, as opposed to seraphim that represent the angelic mind). We certainly cannot arrive at a permanent angelic existence in the body.148 To reach ‘home,’ finishing our journey, we must completely leave our bodies. Then we reach either Hokmah or Keter. Pico’s ascent of the soul on the ladder is therefore a journey to death. But this death provides a ‘plenitude of life.’ Contemplation of the ascent is the study of philosophy: ‘[The Soul] …she will wish to die in herself so that she may live in her Spouse, in Whose sight the death of His saints is truly precious. This is the death, I say (if one must call the plenitude of life death), whose contemplation is, according to the sages, the study of philosophy.’149 But it also involves theology, and religious practice as Pico follows the threefold path of Pseudo-Dionysius: from purification, to contemplation, to illumination. Ficino’s focus is on return after temporary sight of the angelic mind. He portrays the journey as a ride on the chariot of the soul up through the heavens to the edge of the celestial sphere (the boundary with the angelic mind) where we can see the world of forms. We can then return carrying a vision of that world (or as much as we could see when the world was spread out before us as we jostled for position and tried to keep our horses and chariot under control). That vision is of the creative Ideas that we have glimpsed. They are the ‘source’: Beauty, Good, Truth etc. We carry these blueprints back into our bodies where we can use them to refresh and thereby transform the world around us. We can initiate renovatio, recreating our world to produce a new Golden Age.150 Pico may think of ascent as Jacob’s Ladder with angels going up and down, but his focus is on the movement up. Return or the practical outcomes of our experience are not his focus. So, Pico is interested in the movement up and the eventual transcendence of the contemplator as they achieve proximity to the divine and

192

S. HOWLETT

rest there.151 He emphasizes asceticism, poeticizes the mystical experience, and brings together philosophy, theology and religious experience (reason and faith) as necessary components of ascent, much as found in Pseudo-Dionysius, Iamblichus and Proclus. Indeed, Copenhaver asserts that the Oration is ‘a mystic’s manifesto for ascent, by way of magic and Kabbalah, to self-annihilating union with God.’152 While in Heptaplus, God’s speech to Adam in the Garden of Eden153 unexpectedly provides ‘no prohibition against approaching the Tree of Life’ but instead invites Adam ‘to direct knowledge, desire, and one’s whole being toward the highest goal….’ This is an invitation to attempt the climb and achieve transcendence. Our purpose is ‘not simply obedience to God’s commandments’154 : the ‘ultimate goal of man is the attainment of a reality that transcends every image of a nonimage.’155 We are invited, but how do we climb Jacob’s ladder? Obviously we need contemplation as you cannot judge or love something you do not know. Through contemplation we can see and therefore know.156 This is Pico as the philosopher. But there is a first step: cleansing or catharsis, or purification of the person. We take the ladder using the hands of the soul fighting our earthly desires and place our first foot on the rung. But our hands and feet need to be cleansed before we can start the ascent.157 This purification can be separated into two phases, purifying our lower selves, and then our higher selves (making the triad into Pythagoras’ tetraktys ). These are not unusual steps for Pico’s three pillars.158 We can talk about them in different ways.159 For example Pseudo-Dionysius’ three stage path (triplex via) from Celestial Hierarchy: cleansing, then illumination (through contemplation) and afterward perfection (purgatio, illuminatio, and unitio [or perfectio]).160 Or Iamblichus’ curriculum of moral philosophy, dialectics, natural philosophy and theology.161 The first is performed through the study of morality or ethics, as catharsis can also mean transforming ourselves through moral action. The second step is again that of the philosopher as it occurs through the study of natural philosophy,162 or as reflection through exercise of our reason.163 We are then taken into the world of faith or religious experience, when we are lifted by a state of ecstatic rapture which Pico relates in the Oration to the Platonic frenzies: ‘Let us be led away, fathers, let us be led away by the Socratic frenzies that will so lift us beyond our minds as to put our mind and ourselves in God!’164 Finally rapture leads us to Theology165 : ‘So, too, emulating the cherubic life on Earth, curbing the drive of the emotions through moral science, dispersing the darkness of reason

6

THE WAY HOME

193

through dialectics (as if washing away the squalor of ignorance and vice), may we purge our souls, lest our emotions run amok or our reason imprudently run off course at any time. Then may we imbue our purified and well-prepared soul with the light of natural philosophy so that afterward we may perfect it with the knowledge of things divine.’166 We ascend Jacob’s ladder just like Jacob167 : ‘The most wise father, asleep in the lower world and awake in the higher, will illuminate us. But he will teach us through a figure (in this way all things were known to them) that there is a ladder that stretches from the lowest earth to the highest Heavens and that is marked by a series of many rungs. God is at its height, and the contemplative angels move up and down it in turns.’168 Going up and down the ladder takes us from the many to the One: ‘…until at last, resting in the bosom of the Father Who is at the top of the ladder, we shall be made perfect in theological bliss.’169 Whoever can go up and down in this manner ‘we ought to follow like a god, a person truly divine, and earthly angel, fit to go up and down the ladder of Jacob as he wishes in company with the other contemplative angels.’170 But angelic descent is complicated. In the Commentary, Pico tells us that we should not understand it as a genuine movement downward because what is higher cannot place itself lower, ‘but rather that by its own power it draws us to itself. Its descent into us is a compulsion upon us to ascend to it, because otherwise there would result from such a conjunction only an imperfection for that virtue rather than perfection for the one who receives it.’171 This ‘descent’ is essential for ‘Human nature can promise itself little or nothing unless aided by a greater power, a divine one.’172 But the consequences for Pico are two-fold. First this concept of ‘descent’ suggests there is no return once the soul has left the body for residence in the angelic mind. Secondly, the philosopher must also be the ‘religious.’ We need God’s grace to move ourselves upward and religious practice and then experience is an essential part of our ascent: ‘If this is true, and acknowledged not only by Christians but by the philosophers, surely all our zeal ought to be so turned toward higher things that we seek strength for our weakness through holy religion, through sacred rites, through vows, and through hymns, prayers, and supplications. Thus the Platonic and Pythagorean discussions began and ended with sacred prayers….’173 Abulafia writes about Jacob’s ladder from an Aristotelian Kabbalistic perspective. As an Aristotelian he is interested in the role of the Active Intellect in ascent. He describes the Active Intellect as impregnating our

194

S. HOWLETT

souls with divine power so that we can achieve understanding (Binah) through gematria (numerology) and temurah (letter manipulation). In the Oration, Pico appears at times to agree, as the divine presence or shekinah couples with Binah. We do not ascend to the Active Intellect or Hokmah but are infused with the divine presence when we reach understanding (Binah).174 This is obviously different to residing by the side of the First Father. But working to understand the divine speech of the Active Intellect, and enabled by the achievement of Binah, the mystic ‘literally becomes the Agent Intellect. The dissolution of his merely human self in the bottomless pool of the Godhead is the reward awaiting the mystic at the top of the ladder.’175 This is henosis as noesis . Moshe Idel argues that Alemanno is distinguishing between the journey of the soul and that of the intellect, which would suggest that Pico can also allow for both: the intellect returns to be proximate to the Agent Intellect in Binah; whereas the soul can reach much further. Indeed, Idel also argues that both Pico and Alemanno believe that the soul can ‘cleave’ to the Ein-Sof .176 I see no evidence of this in Pico. However confusingly interconnected Keter and the Ein-Sof may be, Pico’s language suggests that the soul ‘cleaves’ to Keter when he speaks of ascending to the First Father. Which sefira is the Active Intellect is also clear. The obvious candidate is Hokmah as Divine Wisdom. Hokmah is also the next step from Binah. To re-explain: our intellects could reach Binah (understanding) while in our bodies. Rather than using what we see to return and achieve renovatio, we instead use the ‘illumination’ provided by the divine presence in Binah to go further. We die in our bodies and can move up to Hokmah and potentially cleave to Keter. In a system based on transmigration, this would be the end point of the soul as it steps off the cycle of return to reside forever in the Active Intellect or with the First Father or even cleaving to the First Father as the Active Intellect. But if the Active Intellect is our end point, this is not unio mystica with the hidden God, nor even with its highest point in the universe, Keter. It is a form of noesis with even a temporary sight of the Active Intellect possible if we stay in the body. But if we are ready to die then we can go further and achieve more permanent noesis or even a form of henosis .177 Pico uses the Kabbalistic trope of the ‘kiss of death’ (mors osculi, mittat neshikah in Hebrew, binsica in Pico’s Italian) for the moment of assimilation: the ‘ineffable union of the soul with God and its emancipation from materiality,’178 in both his Commentary and the Conclusions. He also uses the story of Job to portray the mors osculi citing Psalm 116 as his

6

THE WAY HOME

195

source.179 This ‘kiss of death’ is he claims the final end of the Kabbalist’s journey.180 In the Commentary, Pico talks of ‘the wise cabalists [who] believe many of the ancient patriarchs to have died in such a state of intellectual rapture, you will find them said to have died of binsica, which in our language means death from a kiss…. You will read nothing more in their books except that binsica, death from a kiss, occurs when the soul so unites itself in intellectual rapture to things separate from it that, uplifted from the body, it abandons it completely.’181 It is used in Gersonides’ Commentary on Song of Songs, deriving in turn from various Talmudic (Mishnah and Midrash) discussions of the Song of Songs 1:2 ‘let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth.’ Gersonides has God kissing man, an active divine reaching down to the human.182 Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed argues that the ‘kiss of death’ is an ‘allegory of ecstatic death’ deriving from Moses, Aaron, and Miriam. Maimonides may have been Pico’s source in Conclusions, but in the Commentary he includes Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as founders of the tradition, which could simply represent a triad of sefirot. The original mors osculi of the Talmud suggests the separation of the soul from the body through intellectual ecstasy inspired by God. This intellectual ecstasy echoes the Platonic furori, the inspirations or different types of madness found in Plato and Ficino, such as in Plato’s Symposium, the subject of Pico’s Commentary,183 it allows suggests noesis and not henosis. The kiss is another bridge between the two possible ascents to God. In the Commentary Pico agrees with Ficino that when two people kiss ‘Each transfers its own soul into the other with kisses; it is not so much that they exchange souls, as that they are so perfectly joined together that each of them can be called two souls, and both can be called a single soul.’184 But Pico’s kiss is never supposed to be given to another person. Eschewing even the exchange of souls, Pico looks only to noesis or henosis , or the union with the One, and even this union is never a full union of the two. If Pico is referring to henosis , it is ascetic185 and a ‘reaching across’ that perhaps simply underlines the distinction between human and divine, rather like a Renaissance portrayal of the annunciation. It is a solitary journey: the mystical journey home. This is where Pico ends. His mystical, ascetic, solitary journey ends in cleaving as henosis or noesis , the completion of the circle. What we do not see is the desire or plan to return. Unlike Ficino, Pico does not discuss returning to the world with the blueprint obtained from the glimpse of the divine, to change the world through the manipulation of the Tree.186

196

S. HOWLETT

His focus is beyond life. In Ficino, the returner is the ‘active’ ‘woke’ individual: a divine magician, able to change the world literally through knowledge of the relationship between the world of forms, the celestial sphere, and the natural world. Pico’s journey of the soul appears to end with theology, but there is a place for magic in the Oration.187 He first carefully distinguishes white or theurgic magic from ‘goetic’ or black magic which ‘depends entirely on the work and authority of demons, a thing to be abhorred and a monstrous thing.’188 Theurgic magic is described as natural philosophy: it ‘comprises the deepest contemplation of the most secret things and ultimately the knowledge of all nature.’189 It calls out ‘as it were, from their hiding places into the light the good powers sown and scattered here and there in the world by God’s beneficence’ and ‘does not so much perform miracles as sedulously act as the servant of nature, which in turn performs them.’190 The magician is a magus, from Porphyry: ‘For, as Porphyry says, in the Persian tongue “Magus” expresses the same idea as “interpreter” and “worshipper of the divine” with us.’191 The magus is the specialized reader of the text of the universe, who through his reading is able to perceive the immanence of the divine in the world and in himself. The magus ‘has quite profoundly probed into that harmony of the universe that the Greeks more expressively call sympatheia, and has discerned the mutual kinship that natures share. It assigns to each thing its innate charms (which are called the jugges of the magicians) and brings out into the open, as if it were itself their cause, the miracles lying hidden in the recesses of the world, in the womb of nature, in the mysterious storerooms of God. Just as the farmer marries elm to vine, so does the magus marry earth to heaven—that is, the lower things to the endowments and powers of the higher.’192 Pico’s use of magic can also be seen in his use of ritual Kabbalism. We could consider gematria, for instance, and the preparation of the spirit necessary to begin and continue ascent to be forms of magic, but his general use of magic after the bold assertions of his Rome phase is very limited, to the point where it simply seems like mysticism,193 as all focus is on ascent not on transformation of this world. The mystic or active Kabbalist moves up Jacob’s ladder, awakes and achieves the power to raise the world with us. We complete the circle in our return to the One by taking the universe with us and within us. But this is not really Pico’s goal.

6

THE WAY HOME

197

Pico reads and works to return to the One on a lonely journey. This is not the community closing the circuit between earth and heaven, God’s people and God. It is not the journey of the leader who aims to transform their world. In Pico, we are offered a shining vision of our possible journey if we are exceptional individuals. But it is up to each of us to pursue that vision. Whether he ever had a goal to change the world, bring about practical reform, transform the Church, or redeem the Jews is difficult to tell. But as a philosopher, he lays out the solitary journey of the exceptional individual. Perhaps this is what we glimpse in his vision of ‘our dignity.’ This individual is not the modern human. The individual is Pico, on a lone quest for enlightenment.

Notes 1. Busiand Ebgi (2014, xxxi). 2. Pico, Oration (2012, 120–21, 27): ‘Nascenti homini omnifaria semina et omnigenae vitae germina indidit Pater.’ 3. Dougherty (2002, 229 and 231): ‘There is strong evidence to view these features latent in human beings to be psychic states that are actualized by moral decisions. By emphasizing that a human being can choose which life to bring about, Pico emphasizes the moral dimension of his theory.’ In this way ‘Pico presents a moral ontology, for he considers the choice of life to be metaphysically constitutive of a human being.’ 4. Garin (1965, 110) sees Pico’s understanding of the place and role of the human as ‘an attack upon the idea of the microcosm, tritum in scholis …. He wanted to stand the theory that man is the centre of the universe on its head in order to arrive at the other theory that man extends into the universe.’ Kristeller (1964b, 67) argues Pico is placing us outside of the hierarchy of the macrocosm, and thus able to choose from any part of that hierarchy. The emphasis is on our freedom to choose and then becoming a part of the realm of our choice. 5. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 135). 6. Confusingly, in the Oration, Pico links our mutability to Proteus and the chameleon but Proteus is a monster and the chameleon often has negative connotations: Busi (2006b, 167 n1) relates that, beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics the chameleon was associated with inconstancy, for instance Plutarch uses the chameleon to describe the changeable Alcibiades (‘Life of Alcibiades” 23); Borghesi and Riva (2012, 73) note that Aristotle’s use of negative mutability comes from within the Ovidian tradition of metamorphosis. Idel (2004, 34) counters that Pico’s Ovidianism is a positive expression of self-fashioning also found in Jewish

198

S. HOWLETT

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

and Arabic traditions allowing a state of contingency. He discusses the Spanish Arabic philosopher, Ibn al-Sid al-Batalyawsi, author of the philosophical treatise, The Imaginary Circles (Kitab al-Hadaiq), and Sefer ha-‘Aggulot ha-Ra’yoniyot (in Hebrew), both emphasizing human contingency as one form of numerous forms in the substratum of the hyle, sometimes in potentia and sometimes in actu. This was a popular work amongst Jews in the period and could have been transmitted to Pico through Alemanno. Trinkaus (1994, 343). Kristeller (1964b, 67). Copenhaver (2019, 55). Dulles (1941, 107–8). Dulles (1941, 107). Copenhaver (2019, 32). He calls Manetti’s discussion of dignitas ‘sketchy in content, mainly rhetorical, and vacuous at bottom.’ (55). Garin (1965, 60). Copenhaver (2019, 32). Trinkaus (1995a, 507). Copenhaver argues that it was Burckhardt’s ‘anecdotes about Pico’ that resulted in scholars associating Pico’s work ‘with the dignity of man as a humanist ideal… and with the struggle against superstition as a step toward modernity.’ (2019, 90) rather than seeing the Oration and (for example) Disputations, within the context of Pico’s own syncretic and highly specific point of view. Though Copenhaver also notes that there was an agenda within Italian fascist scholarship, beginning with Giovanni Gentile, to favor the ‘ideology of dignity and humanism’. This agenda was promoted unintentionally by Eugenio Garin when he decided to sideline Kabbalism as central to Pico’s point of view (109): ‘Although Garin dealt with the larger compass of Pico’s occultism more persuasively than anyone before him, he sold Kabbalah short….’ (109–110) preferring to foreground Pseudo-Dionysius and Hermeticism (127). Unsurprisingly then, Garin also focused on the Oration as Pico’s masterpiece (110), downplaying the Conclusions. Further, Garin’s perceptions of Pico as extolling man as the self-fashioner reflects the rising interest of the times in existentialism (143). Indeed, Copenhaver argues that we are not talking about ‘dignity’ at all in the Oration, remarking that ‘Because Kant invented the modern concept, Pico could say nothing about it.’ (155). Copenhaver (2019, 153). Copenhaver (2002b, 58): Allen disagrees with Kristeller that Pico places us outside of the macrocosm. The freedom we have is freedom within the structure to move up or down, to self-fashion ourselves. Aasdalen (2000, 27) argues that Pico does change his mind. In the Oration, we

6

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

34.

THE WAY HOME

199

are heroic, self-determined and free, but in Heptaplus we are fixed in a hierarchy of being as sinful beings waiting for God’s grace. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 79). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 134). Pico, Commentary (1986, 26). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 135) Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 104). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 125–26). Pico, Oration (2012, 114–15, 17): ‘Statuit tandem optimus opifex ut cui dari nihil proprium poterat, ei commune esset quicquid privatum singulis fuerat.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 116–17, 22): ‘Nec te celestem neque terrenum, neque mortalem neque immortalem fecimus, ut, tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et fictor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 116–17, 18 and n17): ‘indiscretae opus imaginis’. Mahoney (1994, 363), Borghese and Riva (2012, 76) argue that Pico uses three ‘almost synonymous terms in order to articulate man’s specific and unique capability.’ including effingere from ex fingere—to form, to procreate with artifice; and to imitate or image. Pico, Oration (2012, 116–17, 23): ‘Poteris in inferiora, quae sunt bruta, degenerare; poteris in superiora, quae sunt divina, ex tui animi sententia regenerari.’ Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151): ‘Our nature is such that we cannot go in a circle and come back upon ourselves, but we can be moved in a circle and brought back to God by the motive power of grace….We differ from the heavens in that they are moved by the necessity of their nature and we in proportion to our freedom.’ Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151). Pico, Oration (2012, 120, 30): ‘Et si, nulla creaturarem sorte contentus, in unitatis centrum suae se receperit, unus cum Deo spiritus factus, in solitaria Patris caligine, qui est super omnia constitutus omnibus antestabit.’ In the Oration, Pico describes the soul as a bride: ‘she (clad in gold, as in a wedding toga, and surrounded by a diverse variety of sciences) will receive her handsome Guest not merely as a Guest but as a Bridegroom.’ This bride ‘she will wish to die in herself so that she may live in her Spouse,’ (‘deaurato vestitu quasi toga nuptiali, multiplici scientiarum circumdata varietate, speciosum hospitem, non ut hospitem iam, sed ut sponsum excipiet…. in se ipsa cupiet mori ut vivat in sponso’) (2012, 156–57, 97). Copenhaver (1999a, 17) suggests that it is Ficino who places us at the center, whereas Pico ‘liberated Adam from any such structure and set

200

S. HOWLETT

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50.

51.

him free to rise and fall as he chose’. Unlike Kristeller (1964a, 410) whose human is as if floating outside of the hierarchy: ‘…the doctrine of the universal character of man for Ficino is the final conclusion after a long series of considerations, while for Pico it is the starting point which he takes up and develops into independent significance. Hence, the congruence between Pico and Ficino is not merely a repetition; it is rather the expression of a living intellectual influence, the disciple leaving his own imprint upon the resulting philosophical conception.’ Allen (1997, 189). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151). Idel (2004, 35). Pico, Oration (1956, 224–25). Pico, Oration (2012, 132, 42): ‘Qui non immerito in sacris Litteris Mosaycis et Christianis nunc “omnis carnis,” nunc “omnis creaturae” appellatione designatur, quando se ipsum ipse in omnis carnis faciem, in omnis creaturae ingenium effingit, fabricat et transformat.’ Ogren (2009a, 229). Pico, Commentary (1986, 37). Ogren (2014, 123). Pico, Oration (2012, 126–27, 35): ‘Nam et Hebreorum theologia secretior nunc Enoch sanctum in angelum divinitatis, quem vocant [in Hebrew Metatron], nunc in alia alios numina reformant; et Pythagorici scelestos homines et in bruta deformant et, si Empedocli creditur, etiam in plantas.’ (2012, 187 n185). Mahoney (1994, 369). Schmidt-Biggemann (2004, 350) argues Pico agrees with Origen’s point of view. Pico, Commentary (1986, 86). Berger (1969, 196–97): ‘The ascensus of the mind is thus unequivocally internal, poetic, metaphoric – the movement “upward” is diagrammatically conceived as a movement inward. The Piconian metamorphoses through which “man becomes all things” and so creates his own nature are processes of imagination.’ Pico, On Being and the One (1965c, 118). Ogren (2009a, 221). Allen (1997, 188 n40) believes that the human as vegetable, animal or angel is symbolic. Pico, Oration (2012, 130–31, 37): ‘…neque enim plantam cortex, sed stupida et nihil sentiens natura; neque iumenta corium, sed bruta anima et sensualis; nec caelum orbiculatum corpus, sed recta ratio; nec sequestratio corporis, sed spiritalis intelligentia angelum facit.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 130–31, 38) ‘…si quem in phantasiae quasi Calipsus vanis praestigiis cecutientem et, subscalpenti delinitum illecebra, sensibus mancipatum, brutum est, non homo, quem vides.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 130–31, n37).

6

THE WAY HOME

201

52. Ogren (2009a, 221 and 224) interestingly argues that Pico leans more on Plotinus, Ficino on Kabbalism. 53. Ogren (2009a, 220) citing Pico, Conclusions (1998, 229): ‘Animae quae peccavit vel in terreno vel in aereo corpore post mortem bruti vitam vivit.’ 54. Copenhaver (2002b, 71) notes that the transmigration of souls was understood as our ability to take many forms. 55. Bertman (1986, 233) suggests that we are present to appreciate the craftsmanship of the universe. As such we have two ‘aesthetic functions’ that is to be the audience of an audience and to self-transform as artists ourselves. 56. Pico, Oration (2012, 116–17, 22–23): ‘Nec te celestem neque terrenum, neque mortalem neque immortalem fecimus, ut, tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et fictor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas. Poteris in inferiora, quae sunt bruta, degenerare; poteris in superiora, quae sunt divina, ex tui animi sententia regenerari.’ 57. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 118–19). 58. Trinkaus (1994, 346): Pico is agreeing with Aristotle’s distinction between imagination and opinion in De anima. Either way, ‘For Pico true freedom is based on the reasoned employment of the intellect to overcome the “tyranny of the will”. The will coming from the irrational part of the soul can be influenced by fear and other emotional persuasions.’ 59. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 139). 60. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 120). 61. Pico, Commentary (1986, 26). 62. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 120–21). 63. Copenhaver (2002b, 64). 64. For instance, in Conclusion 66, Rutkin (2004, 496). Farmer (1998, 24) argues that the primary correspondence between our souls and God is our unity—simple for God and extended for us. 65. Pico, Conclusions (1998, 548–49, 11 > 66): ‘Ego animam nostram sic decem sephirot adapto, ut per unitatem suam sit cum prima, per intellectum cum secunda, per rationem cum tertia, per superiorem concupiscibilem cum quarta, per superiorem irascibilem cum quinta, per liberum arbitrium cum sexta, et per hoc totum ut ad superiora se conuertitur cum septima, ut ad inferiora cum octaua, et mixtum ex utroque, potius per indifferentiam uel alternariam adhesionem quam simultaneam continentiam, cum nona, et per potentiam qua inhabitat primum habitaculum cum decima.’ 66. Idel (2004, 37). 67. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 128). 68. Pico, Commentary (1986, 41–42).

202

S. HOWLETT

69. Pico, Oration (2012, 132–33, 40): ‘Si purum contemplatorem corporis nescium, in penetralia mentis relegatum, hic non terrenum, non caeleste animal: hic augustius est numen, humana carne circumvestitum.’ 70. Pico, Oration (2012, 132–33, 39): ‘Si recta philosophum ratione omnia discernentem, hunc venereris; caeleste est animal, non terrenum.’ 71. Pico, Commentary (1986, 75). 72. Howlett (2016, 111–14). 73. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 124). 74. Dulles (1941, 134). 75. Ogren (2009a, 227). Pico (1998, 312–13, 23.6): ‘Cum excellenter ad intellectum assimilator anima, fit in vehiculo motus perfecte circularis.’ 76. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 118). 77. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 118–19). 78. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 119). 79. Kristeller (1972, 27). 80. Kristeller (1972, 27). 81. Kristeller (1972, 30). 82. Kristeller (1972, 29). 83. Kristeller (1972, 29): ‘Of the Neoplatonic doctrine of immortality, Augustine merely rejected what was incompatible with Christian doctrine: transmigration and preexistence. Thus modified, the concept of immortality without preexistence lost some of its inconsistency, and the argument from affinity, some of its force, but it became a part of standard medieval doctrine, more or less taken for granted by everybody… but it was rarely challenged or discussed in detail.’ 84. Kristeller (1972, 31). 85. Kristeller (1972, 36). 86. Pico, Commentary (1986, 27). 87. Pico, Commentary (1986, 59): ‘Here it can be understood that nothing is subject to fate but things in time, and these are corporeal. A rational soul, being incorporeal, is therefore not subject to fate but, on the contrary, dominates it, and is subject, rather, to Providence, and serves that whose service is perfect freedom. If our will obeys the law of Providence, it is led most wisely by it in the attainment of its desired end, and every time it wishes to free itself from this service, instead of becoming a free will it becomes a truly servile one, and it makes itself a slave to that fate of which it was formerly the master.’ 88. Pico, Oration (2012, 134–35): ‘disdain the celestial’ (‘caelestia contemnamus…. quicquid mundi est denique posthabentes, ultramundanam curiam eminentissimae divinitati proximam advolemus.). 89. Pico, Oration (2012, 136–37, 54) ‘Ardet Saraph charitatis igne; fulget Cherub intelligentiae splendore; stat Thronus iudicii firmitate.’ In Section 55 he states that Thrones focus on the active life.

6

THE WAY HOME

203

90. Pico, Oration (2012, 136–37, 57): ‘Si charitate ipsum opificem solum ardebimus, illius igne, qui edax est, in Saraphicam effigiem repente flammabimur.’ 91. Pico, Oration (2012, 138–39, 61): ‘Qui Saraph, idest amator est, in Deo est, et Deus in eo, immo et Deus et ipse unum sunt. 92. Pico, Oration (2012, 138–39, 62). 93. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151). 94. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151). 95. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151). See also Chapter 5. 96. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 148). See also Chapter 5. 97. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 147 and 151). 98. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 151–52). 99. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 152). 100. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 152). 101. Borghesi and Riva (2012, 70): Bori argues that the ‘dual emphasis on desire and free will is crucial for Pico’. 102. Craven (1981, 26): Garin thinks it significant that Pico does not emphasize Original Sin. 103. Trinkaus (1995a, 517). 104. See, for instance, Veenstra (2003, 294). Copenhaver (2011, 152) describes Pico as a Pelagian optimist. Craven (1981, 78–79) argues: ‘Man’s sinfulness was not an indelible stain on his nature, but merely the correlative of his freedom. Mutability was no longer a weakness or a proof of man’s fallen nature as it had been in the medieval-ascetical world-view.’ But believes that Cassirer also thought Pico a Pelagian. 105. Borghesi and Riva (2012, 86). 106. Borghesi and Riva (2012, 86). 107. Pico, Commentary (1986, 29). 108. Bori (2012, 27). Allen (2008, 87) argues that Pico is interested in metaphysics not love. In which case love is simply another way of discussing the mystical ascent. 109. Aasdalen (2011, 78): ‘It is as if he is trying to make a point with the very superficiality of his assessment.’ 110. Pico, Commentary (1986, 96). 111. Pico, Commentary (1986, 97). 112. Pico, Commentary (1986, 97). 113. Pico, Commentary (1986, 97) 114. Robb (1935, 121–22). 115. Pico, Commentary (1986, 97). As we have already seen in Chapter 5, beauty is not in the Ein Sof anyway. It is a sub-category of the good in the angelic mind. Allen (2008, 92) argues that this is because Pico does not have a real theory of God’s relationship to beauty. 116. See Jayne (1984a, 30).

204

S. HOWLETT

117. Aasdalen (2011, 70) points out that two fourteenth century commentators, Dino del Garbo and Giles of Rome, had considered Cavalcanti’s original as ‘a deeply disillusioned poem on the dangers of heterosexual love.’ Perhaps Pico was fleeing any potential connection with women. 118. Aasdalen (2011, 79). 119. Pico, Commentary (1986, 74). 120. Pico, Commentary (1986, 101). 121. Pico (2007a): ‘Se ellecto m’hai nel cel per tuo consorte,/ Segnor, fa’ non mi tenga Amore più a bada,’ ‘come un piacer terreno ai sensi agrada,/ Come io non fral, come ‘l nemico è forte.’ English cited by Copenhaver (2011, 164) Sonnet 32, from Pico, Sonetti (1994, 65–66). 122. Copenhaver (2011, 164) thinks of Pico’s whole life as a spiritual period, and all his works as based on asceticism. 123. Jayne (1984a, 30 and 41) argues that Ficino’s description of Diotima’s Ladder is only different from Aristotle’s at this third stage. ‘…instead of comparing the perfected image to an abstracted universal in the reason, the soul compares the image to an innate Idea in the intellect.’ This is the step Pico needs to resolve for concordance. 124. Jayne (1984a, 31) Benivieni keeps the phrase ‘To the uncreated Sun’ which identifies God as the last stage. Pico puts stress on ‘near’ the Sun. 125. Pico, Commentary (1986, 38). 126. Pico, Commentary (1986, 38). 127. Pico, Commentary (1986, 63). 128. Pico, Commentary (1986, 64). 129. Pico, Commentary (1986, 94). 130. Pico, Commentary (1986, 64). 131. Pico, Commentary (1986, 98): ‘…it should be known that since the soul immediately unites itself with its heavenly vehicle… and by means of that to the earthly and corruptive body, some, whose belief follows our author’s on this, will have it that the rational soul descending from its star does itself form the earthly body which it has to govern.’ 132. Pico, Commentary (1986, 99): ‘But because the lower matter is not always obedient to that which shapes and stamps it, the power of the soul cannot always express in the earthly body the appearance, it would like….’ 133. Pico, Commentary (1986, 65). 134. Pico, Commentary (1986, 67). 135. Pico, Commentary (1986, 88). 136. Pico, Commentary (1986, 88). 137. Pico, Commentary (1986, 86). 138. Pico, Commentary (1986, 87). 139. Pico, Commentary (1986, 86). 140. Pico, Commentary (1986, 89).

6

141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146.

147. 148.

149. 150. 151.

152. 153.

154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

THE WAY HOME

205

Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 106). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 77). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 81). Borghesi and Riva (2012, 80): the cherubim who guard the Tree of Life stand by God’s throne, but Papio argues that Pico follows St Augustine in using the cherubim as the ‘ideal role model for the contemplative man’ having ‘plenitudo scientiae’ (‘a fullness of knowledge’) representing the second step on the three stage process for mystical ascent. Copenhaver (2002b, 62–63). Kraye (1988, 351) Plato, Xenocrates and Plotinus all discussed temporary henosis through intense contemplative meditation (also described in Corinthians II 12). Copenhaver (2002b, 63 and 65–66). Jayne (1984a, 39): ‘One is the way of the trance, which is illustrated in the myth of Tiresias and in the story of Paul, who had to lose their physical sight in order to gain spiritual sight. The other is the way of physical death, which is illustrated in the myths of Alcestis and Orpheus.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 156–57, 97): ‘…illa, si dici mors debet plenitudo vitae, cuius meditationem esse studium philosophiae dixerunt sapientes.’ Howlett (2016, 135). ‘Pico’s asceticism… promotes inwardness, because it is mystical, but for the same reason it also encourages self-cancellation….’ Copenhaver (2019, 172). 2019, 335. A garden that is already a synthesis of various traditions. Borghesi and Riva (2012, 67), cite for instance the Garden of Zeus (from Plato’s Symposium) and the paradise of the angels (from Pseudo-Dionysius). Borghesi and Riva (2012, 67). Borghesi and Riva (2012, 67). Pico, Oration (2012, 138–39, 59, 62 and 64). Pico, Oration (2012, 144–45, 78–79 and 146–47, 80). Borghesi (2012b, 54) notes its use by Origen, and refers back to the scriptures traditionally associated with Solomon, such as ‘Song of Songs’; Borghesi and Riva (2012, 69) note its use by Proclus, Copenhaver (2002b, 63) notes Clement of Alexandria’s stages too: two ethical stages—historical and legislative—as represented in Israel’s difficulties and their resolution in law, then a third stage which is theurgic or ritual and the fourth, theological and mystical. Papio suggests (Borghesi and Riva 2012, 90) that Pseudo-Dionysius has taken aspects of the Greek Eleusinian mysteries linking the four frenzies to the three stages, and the three Delphic precepts (‘Nothing too much’, ‘Know thyself’ and ‘You are’) as well. Papio also points to three of the archangels to represent each stage (Raphael, Gabriel and Michael; God heals, God is strong and Who is like God?).

206

S. HOWLETT

159. Borghesi (2012b, 53). 160. Pico, Oration (2012, 140–41, 70): ‘Respondebit utique, Dyonisio interprete, purgari illos, tum illuminari, postremo perfici.’ See also 141 n64. 161. Copenhaver (2019, 360) describes Pico using moral philosophy for purification, ascending through to dialectics for clarification, natural philosophy for information and then onwards to theology for meditation, and finally what I have called religious practice but is perhaps best referred to as magic or theurgy leading to unification with God or ‘divinization’ described in the Oration as being ‘absolutely apart in the Father’s darkness’ to borrow from Pseudo-Dionysius. 162. Pico, Oration (2012, 142–43, 71–72). Ficino uses these three stages as well. But his ascended human also returns. Such a return is in keeping with Kabbalistic sources as well. So in Alemanno’s Commentary on Genesis, we perfect ourselves and perfect our world through our acts: ‘It seems that the two pairs can be conceived as complementary: only the perfect man, namely he who has attained his personal perfection by intellection and reproduction, can embark on the repairing or mending activity. If this gradation is correct, then the theurgical operation is to be conceived as the highest accomplishment of man. To put it differently: the perfect man has to attain philosophical perfection as a precondition for theurgical activity.’ Idel (1988, 205). 163. Borghesi (2012b, 53). 164. Pico, Oration (2012, 110): ‘Agamur, patres, agamur Socraticis furoribus, qui extra mentem ita nos ponant, ut mentem nostram et nos ponant in Deo!’ 165. Pico, Oration (2012, 166–67, 112 and 152–53, 92): ‘Thus, it is said that in philosophy true rest and stable peace cannot reveal themselves to us alone, that this is the duty and privilege of its mistress, that is, of the most holy Theology.’ (‘…idcirco in ea veram quietem et solidam pacem se nobis prestare non posse, esse hoc dominae suae, idest sanctissimae theologiae, munus et privilegium. Ad illam ipsa et viam monstrabit et comes ducet….’). 166. Pico, Oration (2012, 142–43, 71–72): ‘Ergo et nos, Cherubicam in terris vitam emulantes, per moralem scientiam affectuum impetus cohercentes, per dialecticam rationis caliginem discutientes, quasi ignorantiae et vitiorum eluentes sordes animam purgemus, ne aut affectus temere debacchentur, aut ratio imprudens quandoque deliret. Tum bene compositam ac expiatam animam naturalis philosophiae lumine perfundamus, ut postremo divinarum rerum eam cognitione perficiamus.’ 167. Pico, Oration (2012, 142–43, 72 and n67). 168. Pico, Oration (2012, 142–43, 74): ‘Admonebit nos pater sapientissimus in inferno dormiens, mundo in supero vigilans; sed admonebit

6

169.

170. 171.

172. 173.

174. 175. 176. 177.

178. 179. 180.

181.

THE WAY HOME

207

per figuram (ita eis omnia contingebant) esse scalas ab imo solo ad caeli summa protensas, multorum graduum serie distinctas, fastigio Dominum insidere, contemplatores angelos per eas vicibus alternantes ascendere et descendere.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 148–49, 82): ‘Once we, inspired by the cherubic spirit, have reached this point through the art of speaking or of reasoning – that is, philosophizing according to the grades of Nature, penetrating the whole from the center to the center – then shall we descend, dashing the one into many with Titanic force like Osiris, and ascend, drawing together with Phoebean might the many into one like Osiris’s limbs….’ Full quotation: ‘Quod cum per artem sermocinalem sive rationariam erimus consequuti, iam Cherubico spiritu animati, per scalarum idest naturae gradus philosophantes, a centro ad centrum omnia pervadentes, nunc unum quasi Osyrim in multitudinem vi Titanica discerpentes descendemus, nunc multitudinem quasi Osyridis membra in unum vi Phebea colligentes ascendemus…donec, in sinu Patris – qui super scalas est – tandem quiescentes, theologica foelicitate consumabimur.’ Pico, Commentary (1986, 96) and refers this idea to Plato. Pico, Commentary (1986, 76). This is also perhaps why Ficino’s soul can draw upwards the whole world upon ‘descent’ from a vision of the angelic mind. Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 143–44). Pico, Heptaplus (1965b, 144). See also Kristeller (1964b, 69): ‘At least at this stage of his thought [when writing On Being and the One] Pico is more “mystical” than Ficino, who carries the parallelism of philosophy and religion to its ultimate extreme, and for whom there is no limit to philosophical knowledge. For Pico, by contrast, religion seems to be a fulfillment of philosophy: religion helps us to attain that ultimate end for which philosophy can merely prepare us.’ Pico, Oration (2012, 156–57, 97 n104). Copenhaver (2006, 36). 1988, 206–7. Idel (2014, 34), this parallels the seventh stage of Pico’s elevation of man to God in Heptaplus. The ‘puer’ of the 13th Chaldaean Thesis in the Conclusions is then human intellect. Andreatta (2014, 187). Copenhaver (2002b, 71). Pico, Conclusions (1998, 524–25, 11 > 13): ‘Whoever operates in the Cabala without the mixture of anything extraneous, if he is long in the work, will die from binsica [the death of the kiss]….’ (‘Qui operator in Cabala sine admixtione extranei, si diu erit in opera, morietur ex binsica….’). Pico, Commentary (1986, 89).

208

S. HOWLETT

182. Andreatta (2014, 190–91). Gersonides is drawing from the Maimonidean Aristotelian-Hebrew tradition, so Pico would have found a confluence between his Aristotelianism and Gersonides’ Kabbalism. Andreatta considers the mors osculi as ‘exemplary’ of this confluence. 183. See further Wirszubski (1989, 153–54). 184. Pico, Commentary (1986, 150). 185. Copenhaver (2011, 160). Bori (2012, 28 n49): an allusion to Pico ‘as mystagogue and a new Hermes.’ 186. Trinkaus (1995a, 521) concludes that Pico’s idea of man is religious and poetic but not a ‘magus’ figure who can transform our world. However, Trinkaus also understands Pico’s human as able to lift themself upwards: ‘Man was a miracle and performed his miracles by a kind of self-hypnotic visionary experience in which he lifted himself by the wings of his imagination to the divine world beyond even the angelic one…’ 187. Pico, Oration (2012, 226–251, 214–233). 188. Pico, Oration (2012, 226–27). 189. Pico, Oration (2012, 244–45, 228): ‘…haec, altissimis plena mysteriis, profundissimam rerum secretissimarum contemplationem et demum totius naturae cognitionem complectitur.’ 190. Pico, Oration (2012, 244–45, 229): ‘Haec, intersparsas Dei beneficio et interseminatas mundo virtutes quasi de latebris evocans in lucem, non tam facit miranda, quam facienti naturae sedula famulatur.’ 191. Pico, Oration (2012, 226–27, 216) 192. Pico, Oration (2012, 246–47, 230): ‘Haec universi consensum, quem significantius Graeci sympatheia dicunt, introrsum perscrutatius rimata, et mutuam naturarum cognationem habens perspectatam, nativas adhibens unicuique rei et suas illecebras, quae magorum iugges nominantur, in mundi recessibus, in naturae gremio, in promptuariis archanisque Dei latitantia miracula, quasi ipsa sit artifex, promit in publicum; et sicut agricola ulmos vitibus, ita magus terram caelo, idest inferiora superiorum dotibus virtutibusque maritat.’ 193. Ingegno (1988, 239): ‘For Pico magic corresponded exactly, at the operative level, to a mystical and aristocratic conception of the highest form of knowledge.’

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Pico’s vision of a solitary journey home to God, with no return, sets him apart from his philosophical contemporaries whether Ficino’s Golden Wits searching for the new Golden Age or Savonarola’s piagnoni preparing for a communal end-time. He is the proponent of a theological philosophy based on exceptionalism and the mystical journey of the one to the One. Despite this, he was strongly connected to his milieu politically, philosophically, and religiously; and is part of a larger historical project to bring reason and faith, philosophy and religious belief, into conversation. His reputation can at times look over-blown in comparison to his output and his work does not always convince, requiring evaluation that sets aside at least part of the ‘glitz’ to test historical readings and reexplore his oeuvre. But the difficulties of his attempted concordance serve to both highlight the ruptures between different philosophical and theological traditions as well as the alluring possibility of compatibility just over the horizon. We wish to explore, and potentially finish, his thought. His signature syncretism of Christian belief, Aristotelianism, Kabbalism, and Platonism, presents us with multiple key strands in the history of thought and faith that could indicate a single truth, if only we could gather these multiple strands and tie them into One. Pico’s career was ended before his concordance was finalized: whether as a poetic theology or a concordance between Plato and Aristotle. However, he left us one finished project, Conclusions; a series of smaller © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4_7

209

210

S. HOWLETT

pieces probably meant to be part of the larger concordance; and an important ‘apprentice’ work, the Commentary. Obviously, views change, and arguments develop, but there is remarkable consistency between much of his earliest manuscript, the Commentary, and his methodology and views in On Being and the One. Even the contested Disputations does not appear to deviate substantially from his opinions expressed elsewhere on fate and providence, for example. He provided enough for us to understand his general points of emphasis within and between the four traditions (whether the use of Plotinus and Proclus, or the ongoing importance of the active intellect in his thought), and his methodology, as well as large parts of his vision of the deep structure of the universe. This tension between incomplete work with unfinished goals, and the need to circumscribe what was produced to draw some larger conclusions is the first complication of concluding any reevaluation of Pico. Further complications include that ‘glitz’ from both the critical conversation and popular imagination which can befog us: for instance, Pico’s and our sense of his personal exceptionalism has hidden the contribution of his academic entourage. Flavius Mithridates, for example, is in many respects the person who introduced Kabbalism into Latin thought. The ‘glitz’ is certainly connected to the theme of exceptionalism and is one of the primary reasons why Pico still appeals to the popular imagination, as well as to critics. He was the elitist wealthy nobleman who despised those who philosophize for money, creating the new category (a category of one) of ‘gentleman-philosopher,’ (according to Pico) the only ‘real’ philosopher. He was the arrogant youth who took what he wanted and believed he could challenge the papal courts with impunity. He was the scholar drawn into the learning of Aramaic as a ‘secret’ language, drawn to Kabbalah as a secret wisdom, seeking knowledge that nobody else in his milieu knew, seeking revelations that nobody else had. He was the daydreamer of a life of extreme asceticism, just ‘not yet’; the religious with a highly personal approach to religion: interested in religious reform, interested in personal henosis , but not a lover of the everyday requirements of communal worship. Critically, his syncretic attempts, especially given their semifragmentary nature, are experienced as a series of liminal spaces (spaces for play and debate) and sometimes as ruptures (clear gaps or inconsistencies between philosophical viewpoints). The interplay of philosophical traditions, philosophy, and religion, and especially philosophy and that expression of religious experiences that we describe as ‘mystical,’ challenge

7

CONCLUSION

211

us to query and explore, just as the sense of bricolage (in the literary sense as intertextuality) invites return to individual texts. It is the puzzles and sense of serious play that end up engaging us as scholars: following his analogies, his triads, his mythologizing, and allegorizing. Pico provides a serious intellectual game, a Renaissance glass bead game. This liminality is both unique in its mix to Pico, and characteristic of the period itself. The ‘Renaissance’ is liminal: one of those times that cannot be constituted clearly but have been necessary to construct our story of civilization, or to demarcate the themes through which we view the history of ideas. The Renaissance is a ‘period’ that is always queried as a period. It is a place where monastic medieval philosophers work alongside the princes of Renaissance thought; where historians talk about the ‘early modern,’ while literary scholars study Renaissance drama. Pico’s interplay of scholasticism, Averroism, humanism, and mysticism, for example, make him both unique and a trope for the period. His self-fashioning as the philosopher who tries to understand and explain everything, makes him unique and the quintessential ‘Renaissance man.’ Pico, as an ongoing location of scholarly interest, is in many ways a repository for our understandings of the Italian Renaissance. But despite these complications, there is a clear and consistent trajectory to Pico’s work: he is exploring, and attempting to show us, how the deep structures of the universe provide us with a ladder to the divine. Pico is a mystical philosopher, who could veer toward a ‘philosophical mysticism.’ This combination is his personal answer to the faith/reason divide. It differs greatly from Ficino’s, for example, who uses many of the same sources but who understands Christianity as coherent with Platonic philosophy (with a little encouragement), and thereby implicitly makes Platonism, a philosophy however mystical, central. Pico claimed to be resolving the questions of philosophy and theology from across scholasticism, the Church Fathers, classical philosophy and the prisca theologia. But his approach draws on three core traditions: Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Kabbalism. Within Platonism, he particularly favors Plotinus, and even more, the baroque gnostic structures of Proclus, but owes most to Ficino. His Proclan interests are unsurprising given the connection between Proclan/gnostic structures and the Kabbalah. He does not necessarily favor one of the three traditions over the others in his argumentation, but Kabbalism represents the foundation as the direct revelation by God to Moses. Two are philosophies,

212

S. HOWLETT

while the third is a secret hermeneutics (with a strong focus on mathematics) given by God, and fully ‘revealed’ by Christ’s sacrifice. This hermeneutics is the interpretative key to understanding the deep structure of the universe. Kabbalism is therefore often at the center, and even can be the hermeneutics for understanding Plato and Aristotle. But in turn, the two philosophical traditions support his exploration of Kabbalism: for instance, the overall structure of the universe, even in conjunction with the Tree of Life, is recognizably Platonic; much of the argumentation, and theory of causality are Aristotelian. He takes seriously his role as the prince of ‘concord’: aiming to show compatibility or basic agreement through his argumentation (not amalgamating, but showing how each tradition is consistent with the other), even in the strangest of cases (his use of Plato’s Parmenides, for example, in On Being and the One). Inevitably the results are sometimes tangled, but always they are intriguing which is why we are left with so many questions. As an example of questions, Platonism has historically connected to mystical experience. There is no mystical ascent per se in Aristotelianism. But the idea of the divine as an Aristotelian unmoved self-contemplative obviously influences negative theology. How do we bring together the ‘hidden God’ of apophatic theology and Kabbalism with the ‘unmoved mover/First Cause’ and the Plotinian One? God becomes both the unmoved mover, the completely unengaged God of privation and retraction, the One as unified, simple, and necessarily alone; and the One as overflowing with potentiality, the First Cause as the container of causal being, causal good. It is tempting within the structure of Kabbalism to consider two versions of God: the Ein-Sof above and beyond in the darkness of unknowing, and the active, dynamic presence of God within our universe (the One of potentiality) as figured in Keter. Beyond syncretism, his choice of traditions also reflects a passion for ‘fundamentals.’ Much of Renaissance philosophy is focused on recovery and renewal, a going backward to origins (which are then equated with ‘truth’) in order to move forward. I have described the structure of his universe synchronically. But he achieves this structure using the same general approach as others at the time: he goes backward to then reinterpret. Conclusions, for example, is an act of philosophicalarchaeology: the structure of the work suggests that Pico will uncover apparent dichotomies, resolve them, to take us back another step into the past to the next puzzle. At the end is the deep structure; the moment of revelation. He will show us what was lost and be the first to bring

7

CONCLUSION

213

back the truth. Just as Pico’s participation in questions around Church reform, and his engagement in the historical divide between faith and reason distinguish him as a Renaissance philosopher, so too does this interest in origins. Of course, his acceptance of mythological foundations (the Kabbalah was given to Moses on Mt Sinai, for example) changed his understanding of what was ‘true,’ as did his love of anagogical reading, assuming that text is allegory to be read esoterically with philosophical argumentation. This both deliberate and inadvertent mingling of the historical and the mythical is a crucial aspect of his new version of the reason and faith conversation. His efforts to bring traditions together by moving to a deep structure, creates the deep structure. It is not entirely coherent, but it is unique. Pico always searched for the unique (as unicus, from ‘one’). Where he so deviates from his colleagues, from Ficino and Savonarola, is in this desire for the unique and a desire to be unique. He does not seek renovatio: to lead a group transformation of our world or build a Golden Age. In Rome he clearly believed that introducing new, previously secret knowledge to the chosen few (the wise, the great) would change their understanding of Christianity and its relationship with philosophy, leading to change. But his answer to the question of how philosophy and religion can come together was always focused on individual ascent. He seeks understanding of the ascetic personal journey of redemption and assimilation into or cleaving with the divine: the one’s journey to the One. Pico is using philosophy and the hermeneutic key of Kabbalism, along with Christian mysticism, to explore the journey up the ladder to either a form of noesis or a form of unio mystica as henosis . He brings us a pathway to individual henosis or noesis based on a syncretic theological philosophy. He shows the way, he opens the door, but it is to each of us to hear and to understand. It is for each of us to go through the door and see the deep structure of the universe all around us. It is for each of us to take the first step on the ladder that leads home.

Bibliography of works consulted

2004. The Great Parchment, eds. G. Busi, S.M. Bondoni and S. Campanini, The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, vol 1. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Aasdalen, U.I. 2000.‘On the Dignity of Philosophers: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man’, Innovation and Tradition: Essays on Renaissance Art and Culture, eds. D.T. Andersson and R. Eriksen, 26–33. Rome: Edizioni Kappa. Aasdalen, U.I. 2011. ‘The First Pico-Ficino Controversy’, Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence, eds. S. Clucas, P.J. Forshaw and V. Rees, 67–88. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Aertsen, J.A. 2012. ‘The Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Renaissance Philosophy’, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Franscisco Suárez, 569–85. Leiden: Brill. Allen, D.C. 1966 rpt (1941). The Star-Crossed Renaissance: The Quarrel about Astrology and Its Influence in England. New York: Octagon Books. Allen, P. 2002. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494)’, The Concept of Woman Volume II: The Early Humanist Reformation, 1250–1500, 904–33. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing. Almási, Zs. 2004. ‘Fable or Philosophical Claim? Thomas of Aquinas in Pico’s Oratio’, Verbum Analecta Neolatina 6, 189–98. http://www.verbum-analec taneolatina.hu/pdf/6-1-15.pdf. Accessed June 29, 2019. Allen, M.J.B. ed. and trans. 1975. Marsilio Ficino: The ‘Philebus’ Commentary, Marsilio Ficino. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4

215

216

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Allen, M.J.B. 1989. ‘The Ficinian Sophist and the Controversy with Pico’, Icastes: Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s ‘Sophist ’, 9–48. Berkeley: University of California Press. Allen, M.J.B. 1986. ‘The Second Ficino-Pico Controversy: Parmenidean Poetry, Eristic, and the One’, Marsilio Ficino e il Ritorno di Platone: Studi e Documenti, ed. G.C. Garfagnini, vol. II, 417–55. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore. Allen, M.J.B. 1997. ‘Cultura Hominis: Giovanni Pico, Marsilio Ficino and the Idea of Man’, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Convegno internazionale di Studi nel Cinquecentesimo Anniversario della Morte (1494–1994), vol. 1, 173– 96, ed. G.C. Garfagnini. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore. Allen, M.J.B. 2008. ‘The Birth Day of Venus: Pico as Platonic Exegete in the Commento and the Heptaplus ’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty, 81–113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Andreatta, M. 2014. ‘Subverting Patronage in Translation: Flavius Mithridates, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Gersonides’ Commentary on the Song of Songs’, Patronage, Production, and Transmission of Texts in Medieval and Early Modern Jewish Cultures, eds. E. Alfonso and J. Decter, 165–98. Turnhout: Brepols. Aranci, G., De Marco, P. and Verdon, T. eds. 1994. Teologie a Firenze nell ’età di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: V centenario della morte di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Firenze 1494–1994). Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna. Bausi, F. 1996. Nec rhetor neque philosophus: Fonti, lingua e stile nelle prime opere latine di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1484-1487). Florence, Leo S. Olschki. Berger, Jr., H. 1969. ‘Pico and Neoplatonist Idealism: Philosophy as Escape’, Centennial Review 13, 38–83. Reprinted with additional footnotes in: H. Berger, Jr. 1988. Second World and Green World: Studies in Renaissance Fiction-Making, ed. J.P. Lynch, 189–228. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bertman, M.A. 1986. ‘Pico’s Intellectual Politics’, History of European Ideas 7, 227–36. Black, C. 2006. Pico’s Heptaplusand Biblical Hermeneutics. Leiden: Brill. Black, C. 2014. ‘Eucherius of Lyon, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Sixtus of Siena: Early Christian Exegesis and Kabbalah in the Bibliotheca sancta (1566)’, Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, ed. Fabrizio Lelli, 231–58. Florence: Leo S. Olschki editore. Blau, J.L. 1965 rpt (1944). The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press. Blau, J.L. 2010. Le origini della Cabala, ed. F. Lelli. Nardò: Besa Editrice. Blum, P.R. 2008. ‘Pico, Theology, and the Church’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty, 37–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

217

Blum, P.R. 2010. ‘Giovanni Pico Against Popular Platonism’, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance, 127–36. Farnham: Ashgate. Borghesi, F. 2008. ‘A Life in Works’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty, 202–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Borghesi, F. 2010. ‘For the Good of All. Notes on the Idea of Concordia during the late Middle Ages’, Italian Poetry Review 5, 215–38. Borghesi, F. 2012a. ‘Chronology’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, 37–44. New York: Cambridge University Press. Borghesi, F. 2012b. ‘Interpretations’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, 52–65. New York: Cambridge University Press. Borghesi, F. and Riva, M. 2012. ‘Overview of the Text’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, 66–106. New York: Cambridge University Press. This section is multiply authored in small sub-sections. Borghesi, F., Papio, M. and Riva, M. eds. and trans. 2012. Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, G. Pico della Mirandola. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bori, P.C. 2012. ‘The Historical and Biographical Background of the Oration’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, 10–36. New York: Cambridge University Press. Brehier, É. 1965. The History of Philosophy: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, trans. W. Baskin. Chicago. University of Chicago. Brown, A. 2000. ‘The revolution of 1494 in Florence and Its Aftermath: A Reassessment’, Italy in Crisis: 1494, eds. J. Everson and D. Zancani, 13–40. Oxford: Legenda: European Humanities Research Centre. Brown, A. 2006. ‘New Light on the Papal Condemnation of Pico’s Theses: Antonio Alabanti’s Letter to Niccolò Michelozzi in January 1487’, Rinascimento 46, 357–72. Busi, G. 2004. ‘A Renaissance Kabbalistic Workshop, Ha-Yeri’ah Ha-Gedolah: A Forgotten Masterpiece, Mithridates’ Translation for Pico, A Historical Note about the Latin Translation of the Great Parchment ’, The Great Parchment: Flavius Mithridates ’ Latin Translation, The Hebrew Text, and an English Version, eds. G. Busi with S.M. Bondini and S. Campanini. The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 1. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Busi, G. ed. 2004–8. The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, vol 1 (2004), vol 2 (2005), vol 3 (2008). Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Busi, G. ed. 2006a. Hebrew to Latin, Latin to Hebrew: The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism. Colloquium held at the Warburg Institute, London, October 18–19, 2004. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore.

218

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Busi, G. 2006b. ‘Who Does Not Wonder at This Chameleon? The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Hebrew to Latin, Latin to Hebrew: The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism. Colloquium Held at the Warburg Institute, London, October 18–19, 2004, ed. G. Busi, 167–96. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Busi, G. 2009. ‘Toward a New Evaluation of Pico’s Kabbalistic Sources’, Rinascimento 48, 165–83. Busi, G. 2010. ‘Giovanni Pico and the Ideal of Concordia Discors: Disharmony as a Way to Esoteric Wisdom’, Constructing Tradition: Means and Myths of Transmission in Western Esotericism, ed. A.B. Kilcher, 293–302. Leiden: Brill. Busi, G. and Ebgi, R. 2014. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Mito, Magia, Qabbalah. Italy: I milleni. Buzzetti, D. 2012. ‘Overview of the Text’ (co-contributor), Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. and trans. F. Borghesi, M. Papio, and M. Riva, 66–106. New York: Cambridge University Press. Campanini, S. 2005a. ‘Talmud, Philosophy, and Kabbalah: A Passage from Pico della Mirandola’s Apologia and Its Source’, “The Words of a Wise Man’s Mouth Are Gracious” (QOH 10, 12): Festschrift for Günter Stemberger on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. M. Perani, 429–447. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Campanini, S. 2005b. ‘Introduction’, The Book of Bahir: Flavius Mithridates’ Latin Translation, The Hebrew Text, and an English Version, ed. S. Campanini. The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, vol. II, 53–122. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Camporeale, S. 1996. ‘L’esegesi umanistica del Valla e il simposio teologico di Lorenzo il Magnifico a Palazzo Medici. L’intervento di Poliziano’, Poliziano nel suo tempo. Atti del VI convegno internazionale (Chianciano-Montepulciano 18–21 luglio 1994), ed. L.S. Tarugi, 283–95. Florence: Franco Cesati Editore. Candido, I. 2010. ‘The Role of the Philosopher in Late Quattrocento Florence: Poliziano’s Lamia and the Legacy of the Pico-Barbaro Epistolary Controversy’, Angelo Poliziano’s Lamia: Text, Translation, and Introductory Studies, ed. C.S. Celenza, 95–129. Leiden: Brill. Cantimori, D. 1975. Umanesimo e Religione Nel Rinascimento. Turin: G. Einaudi. Carmichael, D. ed. and trans. 1965. ‘Heptaplus’, On the Dignity of Man; On Being and the One; Heptaplus, G. Pico della Mirandola. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill. Caroti, S. 2005. ‘Note sulle fonti medievali di Pico della Mirandola’, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 84, 60–92. Cassirer, E. 1963. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. and introd. M. Domandi. Oxford: Blackwell.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

219

Cassirer, E. 1993 rpt (1942). ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas 3, 123–44, 319–46. Reprinted in Renaissance Essays, eds. P.O. Kristeller and P.P. Wiener, 11–60. New York: Harper and Row. Catana, L. 2005. ‘The Concept “System of Philosophy”: The Case of Jacob Brucker’s Historiography of Philosophy’, History and Theory 44, 72–92. Catani, R. 1998. ‘Girolamo Savonarola and Astrology’, The Italianist 18, 71–90. Catani, R. 2000. ‘Astrological Polemics in the Crisis of the 1490s’, Italy in Crisis: 1494, eds. J. Everson and D. Zancani, 41–62. Oxford: Legenda: European Humanities Research Centre. Celenza, C.S. 2004. The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Clucas, S., Forshaw, P.J. and Rees, V. eds. 2011. Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Copenhaver, B.P. 1988a. ‘Translation, Terminology and Style in Philosophical Discourse’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 75–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Copenhaver, B.P. 1988b. ‘Astrology and Magic’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye, 264–300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Copenhaver, B.P. 1999a. ‘Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni,’ Encyclopedia of the Renaissance 5, ed. P.F. Grendler, 16–20. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Copenhaver, B.P. 1999b. ‘Number, Shape, and Meaning in Pico’s Christian Cabala: The Upright Tsade, The Closed Mem, and the Gaping Jaws of Azazel ’, Natural Particulars: Nature and Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, eds. A. Grafton and N. Siraisi, 25–76. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Copenhaver, B.P. 2002a. ‘Magic and the Dignity of Man: De-Kanting Pico’s Oration’, The Italian Renaissance in the Twentieth Century: Acts of an International Conference. Florence, Villa I Tatti, June 9–11, 1999, eds. A.J. Grieco, M. Rocke and F.G. Superbi, 295–320. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore. Copenhaver, B.P. 2002b. ‘The Secret of Pico’s Oration: Cabala and Renaissance Philosophy’, Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy, eds. P.A. French, H.K. Wettstein and B. Silver, 56–81. Boston: Blackwell Publishing. Copenhaver, B.P. 2006. ‘Maimonides, Abulafia and Pico. A Secret Aristotle for the Renaissance’, Rinascimento 46, 23–51. Copenhaver, B.P. 2011. ‘Studied as an Oration: Readers of Pico’s Letters, Ancient and Modern,’ Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and his Influence, eds. S. Clucas, P.J. Forshaw and V. Rees, 151–98. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Copenhaver, B.P. 2012. ‘Pico della Mirandola’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. (Jun 6, 2012 Edition).

220

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Copenhaver, B.P. 2019. Magic and the Dignity of Man: Pico della Mirandola and His Orationin Modern Memory. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Copenhaver, B.P. and Schmitt, C.B. 1992. ‘Giovanni Pico and Nicholas of Cusa’, Renaissance Philosophy, A History of Western Philosophy, vol 3, 163–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Corazzol, G. ed. 2008. Commentary on the Daily Prayers, M. Recanati. The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, vol 3, ed. G. Busi. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Craven, W.G. 1981. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Symbol of his Age: Modern Interpretations of a Renaissance Philosopher. Geneva: Libraire Droz. Craven, W.G. 1987. ‘Picus and Pico: A Case of Perceptive Plagiarism’, Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 49, 615–19. Craven, W.G. 2005. ‘Style and Substance in the Early Writings of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Rituals, Images, and Words: Varieties of Cultural Expression in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, eds. F.W. Kent and C. Zika, 343–73. Turnhout: Brepols. Davies, T. 2008. Humanism (2nd edition). London: Routledge. De Boer, J.-H. 2009. ‘Faith and Knowledge in the Religion of the Renaissance: Nicholas of Cusa, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Savonarola’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83, 51–78. Deitz, L. 2005. ‘De omni re scibili—et de quibusdam aliis: A New Attempt at Understanding Pico’s ‘900 Theses’’, Neulateinisches Jahrbuch: Journal of Neo-Latin Language and Literature 7, 295–301. Dillon, J. 2011. ‘Ficino and the God of the Platonists’, Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence, eds. S. Clucas, P.J. Forshaw and V. Rees, 11–24. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Dorez, L. and Thuasne, L. 1897. Pic de la Mirandole en France (1485– 1488). Paris: Ernst Leroux. https://archive.org/details/picdelamirandol00t huagoog/page/n11. Accessed July 6, 2019. Dougherty, M.V. 2002. ‘Two Possible Sources for Pico’s Oratio’, Vivarium 40, 219–41. Dougherty, M. V. 2008a. ‘Three Precursors to Pico della Mirandola’s Roman Disputation and the Question of Human Nature in the Oratio,’ Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 114–51. Dougherty, M.V. ed. 2008b. Pico della Mirandola: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dougherty, M. V. 2011. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, ed. H. Lagerlund, vol 2: 423–26. Dordrecht: Springer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

221

Dougherty, M. V. 2013. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Renaissance and Reformation, ed. M. King. New York: Oxford University Press. Dougherty, M.V. 2015. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Concordia, and the Canon Law Tradition’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 88, 181–96. Dulles, A. 1941. Princeps Concordiae: Pico della Mirandola and the Scholastic Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edelheit, A. 2006. ‘Humanism and Theology in Renaissance Florence: Four Examples (Caroli, Savonarola, Ficino, and Pico)’, Verbum Analecta Neolatina 8, 271–90. Edelheit, Amos. 2008 rpt with revisions (2007). ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and His Theological Method: Between opinio and fides ’, Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2–1498, 279–367. Leiden: Brill. Originally published in Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 74, 523–70. Edelheit, Amos. 2008. Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/ –1498. Leiden: Brill. Edelheit, Amos. 2011. ‘Henry of Ghent and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Chapter on the Reception and Influence of Scholasticism in the Renaissance’, A Companion to Henry of Ghent, ed. G.A. Wilson, 369–98. Leiden: Brill. Egan, K.C. 1998. ‘On the Indignity of Man: The Quarrel between Boiardo and Pico della Mirandola’, Fortune and Romance: Boiardo in America, eds. J.A. Cavallo and C. Ross, 237–57. Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies. Everson, J. and D. Zancani. eds. 2000. Italy in Crisis: 1494. Oxford: Legenda: European Humanities Research Centre. Farmer, S.A. ed. and trans. 1998. Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses (1486): The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems, G. Pico della Mirandola. Tempe: MRTS. Ficino, M. 1975. Marsilio Ficino: The ‘Philebus’ Commentary, trans. and ed. M.J.B. Allen. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Ficino, M. 1985. Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love, trans., ed. and introd. S.R. Jayne. Irving: Spring Publications. Fioravanti G. 1997. ‘Pico e l‘ambiente ferrarese’, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Convegno internazionale di studi nel cinquecentesimo anniversario della morte (1494–1994). Mirandola, 4–8 ottobre 1994, ed. G.C. Garfagnini, vol. 1, 157– 72. Firenze: Olschki. Fornaciari, P.E. 1994. ‘L’Apologia di Arcangelo da Borgonovo in difesa delle “Conclusiones cabalisticae” di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Vivens Homo 4, 575–91.

222

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Forshaw, P.J. 2011. ‘Marsilio Ficino and the Chemical Art’, Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and his Influence, eds. S. Clucas, P.J. Forshaw and V. Rees, 250–71. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Garfagnini, G.C. ed. 1997. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, atti del convegno internazionale di studi nel cinque-centesimo anniversario della morte (1494– 1994), 2 vols. Firenze: Olschki. Garin, E. 1965. Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, trans. P. Munz. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Garin, E. 1971. Opera Omnia (Basel 1572), G. Pico della Mirandola. 2 vols. Turin: Bottega D’Erasmo. Garin, E. 1972. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Portraits from the Quattrocento, trans. V.A. Velen and E. Velen, 190–221. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Garin, E. 1983. Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life, trans. C. Jackson and J. Allen, revised by C. Robertson. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Garin, E. 2008. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, History of Italian Philosophy, ed. and trans. G. Pinton, 295–325. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Grafton, A. 1988. ‘The Availability of Ancient Works’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 763–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Green, A. 1997. Keter: The Crown of God in Early Jewish Mysticism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hanegraaf, W.J. 2012. ‘Secret Moses: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Christian Kabbalah’, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture, 53–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hankins, J. 1991. ‘The Myth of the Platonic Academy of Florence’, Renaissance Quarterly 44, 429–75. Hankins, J. 1994. Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. New York: Brill. Hankins, J. 1998. ‘Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni (1463–94)’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, vol. VII, 386–92. London: Routledge. Hankins, J. 2003–2004. Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. Hankins, J. 2009. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2936369. Accessed May 3, 2020. Also published as ‘Humanist Academies and the “Platonic Academy of Florence”’, Proceedings of the conference, From the Roman Academy to the Danish Academy in Rome, eds. H. Ragn Jensen and M. Pade. Copenhagen: Odense University Press. Herufek, ˚ J. 2011. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Intellectuals’, Acta Comeniana 25, 7–24. Howlett, S. 2016. Marsilio Ficino and His World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

223

Idel, M. 1977. ‘The Throne and the Seven-Branched Candlestick: Pico della Mirandola’s Hebrew Sources’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40, 290–92. Idel, M. 1984. ‘The Ladder of Ascension—The Reverberations of a Medieval Motif in the Renaissance’, Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. II, 83–93, ed. I. Twersky. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Idel, M. 1988. ‘The Anthropology of Yohanan Alemanno: Sources and Influences’, Topoi 7, 201–10. Idel, M. 1990. Kabbalah: New Perspectives. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Idel, M. 1992. ‘The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in the Renaissance’, Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. B.D. Cooperman, 186–242. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Idel, M. 2000. ‘”Book of God” and “Book of Law” in Late 15th Century Florence,’ Accademia: Revue de la Société Marsile Ficin 2, 7–17. Idel, M. 2001. ‘Kabbalah and Hermeticism in Dame Frances A. Yates’s Renaissance’, Ésotérisme, gnoses & imaginaire symbolique: Mélanges offerts à Antoine Faivre, eds. R. Caron, J. Godwin, W.J. Hanegraaff and J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, 71–90. Leuven: Peeters. Idel, M. 2002. Absorbing Perfections: Kaballah and Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Idel, M. 2004. ‘Man as the “Possible” Entity in Some Jewish and Renaissance Sources’, Hebraica Veritas? Christian Hebraists and the Study of Judaism in Early Modern Europe, eds. A.P. Coudert and J.S. Shoulson, 33–48. Philadelphia: University of Pennyslvania Press. Idel, M. 2007. La Cabbalà in Italia (1280–1510), ed. F. Lelli. Florence: Giuntina. Idel, M. 2014. ‘The Kabbalistic Backgrounds of the “Son of God” in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Thought’, Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, ed. F. Lelli, 19–45. Florence: Leo S. Olschki editore. Idel, M. and McGinn, B. Eds. 1996. Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: An Ecumenical Dialogue. New York: Continuum (Macmillan, 1989). Ingegno, A. 1988. ‘The New Philosophy of Nature’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye, 236–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jayne, S. 1984a. ‘Benivieni’s Christian Canzone’, Rinascimento 24, 153–79. Jayne, S. ed. and trans. 1984b. Commentary on a Canzone of Benivieni, G. Pico della Mirandola. New York: Lang. Joost-Gaugier, C.L. 2009. Pythagoras and Renaissance Europe: Finding Heaven. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

224

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Karr, D. 2012a. Knots & Spirals: Notes on the Emergence of Christian Cabala. http://www.digital-brilliance.com/contributed/Karr/KS/KnS.pdf. Accessed July 21, 2019. Karr, D. 2012b. The Study of Christian Cabala in English. http://www.digitalbrilliance.com/contributed/Karr/Biblios/ccinea.pdf. Accessed July 21, 2019. Kerrigan, W. and Braden, G. 1989. ‘Pico della Mirandola and Renaissance Ambition’, The Idea of the Renaissance, 117–33. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Kessler, E. 1988. ‘The intellective soul’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 485–534. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Klibansky, R. 1981. The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages, with a New Preface and Four Supplementary Chapters Together with, Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications. Kraye, J. 1988. ‘Moral philosophy’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 301–386. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kraye, J. 1996. ‘Lorenzo and the Philosophers’, Lorenzo the Magnificent: Culture and Politics, eds. M. Mallett and N. Mann, 151–66. London: The Warburg Institute. Kraye, J. 2008. ‘Pico on the Relationship of Rhetoric and Philosophy’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty, 13–36. Cambridge University Press. Kraye, J. and Stone, M.W.F. eds. 1999. Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy. London: Routledge. Kristeller, P.O. 1964a rpt (1943). The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. V. Conant. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Kristeller, P.O. 1964b. ‘Pico’, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, 54– 71. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kristeller, P.O. 1967. ‘Pico della Mirandola, Count Giovanni’, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, vol. 6, 307–11. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. Kristeller, P.O. 1972. Renaissance Concepts of Man and Other Essays. New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row. Kristeller, P.O. 1979. ‘The Dignity of Man’, Renaissance Thought and its Sources, ed. M. Mooney, 169–81. New York: Columbia University Press. Kristeller, P.O. 1993a. Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, vol. III. Rome: Edizione di storia e di letteratura. Kristeller, P.O. 1993b (1974). Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning: Three Essays (2nd edition) ed. and trans. E.P. Mahoney. New York: Columbia University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

225

Lelli, F. 1994. ‘Un Collaboratore Ebreo di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Yohanan Alemanno’, Vivens Homo 5, 401–30. Lelli, F. ed. 2007. La Cabbalà in Italia (1280–1510), M. Idel. Firenze: Giuntina. Lelli, F. 2008. ‘Poetic Theology and Jewish Kabbalah in Fifteenth-Century Florentine Speculation: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Elijah Hayyim ben Benjamin of Genazzano’, Studia Judiaca, 144–52. Lelli, F. ed. 2010. Le origini della Cabala, ed. L.J. Blau. Nardò: Besa Editrice. Lelli, F. 2014a. ‘Pico, I da Pisa E ‘Eliyya Hayyim Da Genazzano’, Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, ed. F. Lelli, 93–120. Florence: Leo S. Olschki editore. Lelli, F. ed. 2014b. Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà. Florence: Leo S. Olschki editore. Levers, T. 2012. ‘Harmony and Letter, Syncretism and Literalism’, New Worlds and the Italian Renaissance: Contributions to the History of European Intellectual Culture, eds. A. Moudarres and C. Purdy Moudarres, 225–47. Leiden: Brill. Lohr, C.H. 1988. ‘Metaphysics’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye, 537–638. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lohr, C.H. 1999. ‘Renaissance Latin translations of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle’, Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy, eds. J. Kraye and M.W.F. Stone, 24–40. London: Routledge. McKnight, S.A. 1981. ‘Ficino, Pico, and the New God: Anthropos’, Sacralizing the Secular: The Renaissance Origins of Modernity, 50–70. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Mahoney, E.P. 1994. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Origen on Humans, Choice, and Hierarchy’, Vivens Homo 5, 359–76. Mahoney, E.P. 1997. ‘Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola and Elia Del Medigo, Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo’, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Convegno internazionale di Studi nel Cinquecentesimo Anniversario della Morte (1494–1994) 1, ed. G.C. Garfagnini, 127–56. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore. Malusa, L. 1993. ‘The Renaissance Idea of Concordism in Philosophy’, Models of the History of Philosophy: From Its Origins in the Renaissance to the ‘Historia Philosophica’ 1, eds. C. W. T. Blackwell and P. Weller, 26–38. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Marcus, N. du B. 2001. Vico and Plato. New York: Peter Lang. Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London. eds and trans. 1975. Letters of Marsilio Ficino 1. London: Shepheard-Walwyn. Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London. eds. and trans. 2003. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola to Marsilio Ficino’, The Letters of Marsilio Ficino 7, 89-92. London: Shepheard-Walwyn.

226

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Miller, P. trans. 1965. ‘On Being and the One’, On the Dignity of Man; On Being and the One; Heptaplus, trans. C. Wallis, P. Miller and D. Carmichael, 35–62. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. More, T. 1987. The Complete Works of St. Thomas More 1, eds. A.S.G. Edwards, K.G. Rodgers and C.H. Miller. New Haven: Yale University Press. Nauert Jr., C.G. 1965. Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Nelson, J.C. 1958. Renaissance Theory of Love: The Context of Giorandao Bruno’s ‘Eroici Furori’. New York and London: Columbia University Press. North, J. 2009. ‘Types of Inconsistency in the Astrology of Ficino and Others’, Christian Humanism: Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt, eds. A.A. MacDonald, Z.R.W.M. von Martels and J.R. Veenstra, 281–302. Leiden: Brill. Ogren, B. 2009a. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the Allegorical Veridicality of Transmigration’, Renaissance and Rebirth: Reincarnation in Early Modern Italian Kabbalah, 212–37. Leiden: Brill. Ogren, B. 2009b. ‘The Forty-Nine Gates of Wisdom as Forty-Nine Ways to Christ: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Heptaplus and Nahmanidean Kabbalah’, Rinascimento 49, 27–43. Ogren, B. 2014. ‘The Law of Change and the Nature of the Chameleon: Yosef ben Šalom ’Aškenazi and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà, ed. F. Lelli, 121–34. Florence: Leo S. Olschki editore. Ogren, B. 2016. The Beginning of the World in Renaissance Jewish Thought: Ma’aseh Bereshit in Italian Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, 1492–1535. Leiden: Brill. Panizza, L. 2000. ‘Pico della Mirandola’s 1485 Parody of Scholastic “Barbarians”’, Italy in Crisis: 1494, eds. J. Everson and D. Zancani, 152–74. Oxford, Legenda: European Humanities Research Centre. Papio, M. 2012. ‘The Oration’s Printed Editions’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio, and M. Riva, 45–51. New York: Cambridge University Press. Park, K. and Kessler, E. 1988. ‘The Concept of Psychology’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 453–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. Archive of Digitized Original Manuscripts. https:// www.digitale-sammlungen.de/index.html?c=autoren_index&l=en&ab=Pico+ della+Mirandola%2C+Giovanni. Accessed June 29, 2019. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1519. Opera Omnia. Venice. https://books.google. com/books?id=G1o54HjFgJAC&printsec=frontcover&hl=en#v=onepage& q&f=false. Accessed June 29, 2019. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1557. Opera Omnia. Basel. https://babel.hathit rust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucm.5320777868&view=1up&seq=6. Accessed June 29, 2019.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

227

Pico della Mirandola, G. 1942. De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e scritti vari, ed. E. Garin. Florence: Vallechi. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1948. Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem (libri I-V), ed. E. Garin. Florence: Vallechi Editore. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1956 rpt (1948). Oration on the Dignity of Man, trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P.O. Kristeller and J.H. Randall Jr. Chicago: Phoenix Books, University of Chicago. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1965a. On the Dignity of Man; On Being and the One; Heptaplus, trans. C. Wallis, P. Miller and D. Carmichael. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1965b. Heptaplus, trans. D. Carmichael, 63–174. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1965c. On Being and the One, trans. P. Miller, 35–62. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. See Pico, 1965. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1971. Opera Omnia (Basel 1572), ed. E. Garin. 2 vols. Turin: Bottega D’Erasmo. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1972. ‘Praise of Lorenzo (And Critique of Dante and Petrarca)’, The Three Crowns of Florence: Humanist Assessments of Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio, eds. D. Thompson and A.F. Nagel, 148–52. New York: Harper & Row. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1984. Commentary on a Canzone of Benivieni, trans. S. Jayne. New York: Lang. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1986. Commentary on a Poem of Platonic Love, trans. D. Carmichael. Lanham: University Press of America. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1994. Sonetti, ed. G. Dilemmi. Turin: Einaudi. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1997a. Selected Letters, trans. C.H. Miller, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More 1: English Poems, Life of Pico, The Last Things, eds. A.S.G. Edwards, K.G. Rodgers and C.H. Miller, 340–63. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1997b. ‘Commentary on Psalm 15’, trans. C.H. Miller, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More 1: English Poems, Life of Pico, The Last Things, eds. A.S.G. Edwards, K.G. Rodgers and C.H. Miller, 362–71. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1998. Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses (1486): The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems, ed. and trans. S.A. Farmer. Tempe: MRTS. Pico della Mirandola, G. 1999. ‘Disputationes contra astrologiam divinatricem (1494): Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, The Problems with Astrology,’ ‘Disputationes contra astrologiam divinatricem (1494): Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Planets and Bile,’ ‘Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem (1496): Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Conjunctions and Major Religious

228

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Events,’ The Occult in Early Modern Europe: A Documentary History, ed. and trans. P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, 76–7, 97–8, 110–11. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2000. ‘Letter to Ermolao Barbaro’, trans. W.A. Rebhorn, Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, ed. W.A. Rebhorn, 58–67. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2003. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola to Marsilio Ficino’, The Letters of Marsilio Ficino 7, trans. Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London, 89–92. London: Shepheard-Walwyn. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2006. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola to Angelo Poliziano’, Letters, vol. I, ed. and trans. S. Butler, 16–17, 20–3, 26–31. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2007a rpt (1805). ‘[Selections]’, trans. W. Parr Greswell, in Memoirs of Angelus Politianus, Joannes Picus of Mirandula, Actius Sincerus Sannazarius, Petrus Bembus, Hieronymus Fracastorius, Marcus Antonius Flaminus, and the Amalthei, ed. W. Parr Greswell, 153–367. Manchester: R. and W. Dean. Electronic archive edition https://archive.org/details/mem oirsofangelus00gres/page/n3. Accessed June 29, 2019. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2007b. [Sonetto V] ‘Amor, focoso giacio e fredda face,’ [Sonetto VI] ‘Quando del sol la corruscante lampa,’ [Sonetto VII] ‘Un sguardo altero e vergognoso e vago,’ [Sonetto XVI] ‘Ecco doppo la nebia el cel sereno,’ [Sonetto XVII] ‘Che fai, alma? che pensi? Ragion, desta,’ [Sonetto XIX] ‘Che bisogna che piú nel mar si raspe,’ [Sonetto XXVI] ‘Se ’basso dir di mei suspir in rima,’ [Sonetto XXXII] ‘Se ellecto m’hai nel cel per tuo consorte,’ [Sonetto XXXVII] ‘Sí como del mondo umbra senza luce,’ [Sonetto XXXIX] ‘Chiara alma, chiara luce, chiaro onore,’ [Sonetto XLI] ‘Io me sento da quel che era en pria,’ [Sonetto XLV] ‘Misera Italia e tutta Europa intorno,’ Melancolia Poetica: A Dual Language Anthology of Italian Poetry 1160–1560, trans. M.A. Cirigliano, 245–55. Leicester: Troubador Publishing. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2010. Apologia: L’autodifesa di Pico di fronte al Tribunale dell’Inquisizione, ed. P.E. Fornaciari. Firenze: Sismel (Edizioni del Galluzzo). Pico della Mirandola, G. 2011. [Sonetto XXXII] ‘Se ellecto m’hai nel cel per tuo consorte,’ B.P. Copenhaver, ‘Studied as an Oration: Readers of Pico’s Letters, Ancient and Modern,’ Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence, eds. S. Clucas, P.J. Forshaw and V. Rees, 164. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2012. Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pico della Mirandola, G. 2018. Lettere, ed. F. Borghesi. Florence: Leo S. Olschki.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

229

Pico della Mirandola, Gian. 1997. The Life of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, trans. C. H. Miller, ‘Appendix A: More’s Latin Sources’, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More. vol. 1. English Poems, Life of Pico, the Last Things, 294– 341, eds. A.S.G. Edwards, K. Gardiner Rodgers and C.H. Miller. New Haven: Yale University Press. Poppi, A. 1988. ‘Fate, Fortune, Providence and Human Freedom’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye, 639–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quaquarelli, L. and Zanardi, Z. eds. 2005. Pichiana: Bibliografia delle edizioni e degli studi. Florence: Leo S. Olschski. Rabin, S.J. 2002. ‘Unholy Astrology: Did Pico Always View It That Way?’ Paracelsian Moments: Science, Medicine, and Astrology in Early Modern Europe, eds. G.S. Williams and C.D. Gunnoe, Jr., 151–62. Kirksville: Truman State University Press. Rabin, S.J. 2008. ‘Pico on Magic and Astrology’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty, 152–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rabin, S.J. 2010. ‘Pico and the Historiography of Renaissance Astrology’, Explorations in Renaissance Culture 36, 170–80. Rabin, S.J. 2011. ‘Whither Kabbalah? Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Kabbalah, and the Disputations Against Judicial Astrology’, Hebraic Aspects of the Renaissance: Sources and Encounters, eds. I. Zinguer, A. Melamed and Z. Shalev, 43–52. Leiden: Brill. Recanati, M. 2008. Commentary on the Daily Prayers, ed. G. Corazzol. The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 3, ed. G. Busi. Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. Reichert, K. 1995. ‘Pico della Mirandola and the Beginnings of Christian Kabbala’, Mysticism, Magic and Kabbalah in Ashkenazi Judaism: International Symposium Held in Frankfurt a. M. 1991, eds. K.E. Grözinger and J. Dan, 195–207. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Riva, M. 2012. ‘Preface’, Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, eds. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva, 3–9 (and contributes to ‘Overview’). New York: Cambridge University Press. Robb, N.A. 1935. Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance. London: George Allen S. Unwin. Roth, T. 2017. Die Sonetti Giovanni Pico della Mirandolas. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag. Rutkin, H.D. 2004. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Early Reform of Astrology: An Interpretation of vera astrologia in the Cabalistic Conclusions’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 10, 495–98.

230

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Rutkin, H.D. 2010. ‘Mysteries of Attraction: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Astrology and Desire’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41, 117–24. Safa, K. 2001. L’humanisme de Pic de la Mirandole: l’esprit en gloire de metamorphoses. Paris: Libraire Philosophiques J. Vrin Salas, V.M. 2014. ‘Pico della Mirandola on Being and Unity’, The Thomist 78, 351–77. Schmidt-Biggemann, W. 2004. ‘Christian Cabala I: Giovanni Pico (1463-1494), Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522), and Paulus Ricius (d. 1541)’ and ‘Giovanni Pico (1463-1491) [sic]: Pious Philosophy and the Dignity of Man’, Philosophia perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, 93–116, 169–73. Dordrecht: Springer. Schmitt, C.B. 1965. ‘Gianfrancesco Pico’s Attitude toward his Uncle’, L’Opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell’Umanismo, vol. 2, 305–13. Florence: Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento. Schmitt, C.B. 1966. ‘Perrenial [sic] Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz’, Journal of the History of Ideas 27, 505–32. Schmitt, C.B. 1975. ‘Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Italian Universities: Some Preliminary Comments’, The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, eds. J.E. Murdoch and E.D. Sylla, 485–537. Switzerland: Springer. Schmitt, C.B. 1983. Aristotle and the Renaissance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schmitt, C.B. 1984 rpt (1976). The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities. London: Variorum Reprints. Schmitt, C.B. 1989. Reappraisals in Renaissance Thought. London: Variorum Reprints. Schmitt, C.B., Kessler, E., Kraye, J. and Skinner, Q. eds. 1988. The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scholem, G. 1987. Origins of the Kabbalah, trans. Alan Arkush, ed. R.J. Zwi Werblowsky. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Scholem, G. 1991. On the Mystical Shape of the Godhead, trans. J. Neugroschel, ed. and rev. J. Chipman. New York: Schocken Books. Shumaker, Wayne. 1972. The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance: A Study in Intellectual Patterns. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stuckrad, K. von. 2007. ‘Christian Kabbalah and Anti Jewish Polemics: Pico in Context’, Polemical Encounters: Esoteric Discourse and Its Others, eds. O. Hammer and K. von Stuckrad, 1–23. Leiden: Brill. Sudduth, M. 2008. ‘Pico della Mirandola’s Philosophy of Religion’, Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M.V. Dougherty, 61–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thorndike, L. 1934. A History of Magic and Experimental Science, vol. 4. New York: Columbia University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

231

Toussaint, S. ed. 1995. L’esprit du Quattrocento: ‘De l’être et de l’un’ et ‘Réponses à Antonio Cittadini. Paris: Champion. Toussaint, S. 2010. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494): The Synthetic Reconciliation of All Philosophies’, Philosophers of the Renaissance, ed. P.R. Blum and trans. B. McNeil, 69–81. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Traister, B.H. 1984. Heavenly Necromancers: The Magician in English Renaissance Drama. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Trías, E. 1982. ‘Pico della Mirandola: Man in Proteus’s Likeness’, The Artist and the City, trans. K. Krabbenhoft, 42–8. New York: Columbia University Press. Trinkaus, C. 1987. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation 3, eds. P.G. Bietenholz and T.B. Deutscher, 81–4. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Trinkaus, C. 1994. ‘Cosmos and Man: Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico on the Structure of the Universe and the Freedom of Man’, Vivens Homo 5, 335–57. Trinkaus, C. 1995a rpt (1970). ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Place of Man in the Cosmos: Egidio da Viterbo on the Dignity of Men and Angels,’ In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought 2, 505–29. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Trinkaus, C. 1995b rpt (1970). ‘Pico’s Pursuit of Theological Concord,’ In our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, vol. 2, 753–60. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Valcke, L. 1997. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e il ritorno ad Aristotele’, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, ed. G.C. Garfagnini, 327–49. Firenze: Olschki. Valcke, L. 2005. Pic de la Mirandole. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Vanden Broecke, S. 2003. The Limits of Influence: Pico, Louvain, and the Crisis of Renaissance Astrology. Leiden: Brill. Van Haelen, M. 2009. ‘The Pico-Ficino Controversy: New Evidence in Ficino’s Commentary on the Parmenides ’, Rinascimento 49, 301–39. Vasoli, C. 1988. ‘The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 55–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vasoli, C. 1998. ‘John Pico della Mirandola’, History of Theology. Volume 3: The Renaissance, ed. G. D’Onofrio and trans. M.J. O’Connell, 224–32, 244–247. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press. Veenstra, J.R. 2003. ‘Self-Fashioning and Pragmatic Introspection: Reconsidering the Soul in the Renaissance (Some Remarks on Pico, Pomponazzi, and Machiavelli)’, Self-Fashioning: Personen(selbst)darstellung, eds. R. Suntrup and J.R. Veenstra, 285–308. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

232

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED

Von Stuckrad, K. 2007. ‘Christian Kabbalah and Anti-Jewish Polemics: Pico in Context’, Polemical Encounters: Esoteric Discourse and Its Others, eds. O. Hammer and K. von Stuckrad, 3–23. Leiden: Brill. Walker, D. P. 1958. Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella. London: Warburg Institute. Watts, P.M. 1987. ‘Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Three Renaissance Neoplatonists: Cusanus, Ficino, and Pico on Mind and Cosmos’, Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, eds. J. Hankins, J. Monfasani and F. Purnell Jr., 279–98. Binghamton and New York: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies. Wilmott, M.J. and Schmitt, C.B. 1988. ‘Bibliography’, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. C.B. Schmitt, E. Kessler, J. Kraye and Q. Skinner, 842–930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wirszubski, C. 1989. Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Yates, F.A. 1965. ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Magic’, L’Opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell’Umanismo 1, 159–204. Firenze: Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento. Yates, F.A. 1979. The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Yates, F.A. 2002 rpt (1964). Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. London: Routledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zambelli, P. 2007. White Magic, Black Magic in the European Renaissance: From Ficino, Pico, Della Porta to Trithemius, Agrippa, Bruno. Leiden: Brill. Zambelli, P. 2012. ‘”Creating Worlds and then Laying them Waste.” The Cyclical Nature of History: Notes on Historians and on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’, Astrology and Magic from the Medieval Latin and Islamic World to Renaissance Europe: Theories and Approaches, 1–26. Farnham: Ashgate Variorium. Zorzi Pugliese, O. 1994. ‘Il Commento di Girolamo Benivieni ai salmi penitenziali’, Vivens Homo 5, 475–93.

Index

A Abraham, 98, 195 as Christian pietas , 119 as Hesed, 99 Abulafia, Abraham, 105, 106, 112, 113, 119, 127, 129, 156, 167, 179, 193 Book of the Secrets of the Torah (Sitre Torah), 112 Conclusions (Pico), 106, 112, 113, 178 act, 2, 21, 22, 41, 55, 69, 93, 96, 109, 119, 120, 124, 138, 139, 141, 145–147, 149, 155, 161, 162, 165, 169, 172, 174, 180, 184, 196, 206, 212 Active (Agent) Intellect, 3, 55, 83, 105, 106, 114, 119, 123, 135, 151, 153–157, 171, 178–181, 183, 185, 193, 194, 210 intellectus agens , 154 Active Divinity. See also Adam Kadmon; God; Plato as creator, 94, 98

as demiurge, 94, 98 Adam, 71, 98, 100, 176, 184, 192, 199. See also Adam Kadmon Adam Kadmon, 122, 184. See also Tree of Life Great Adam, 98, 119, 134, 175, 178 heavenly Adam, 94 makroanthropos , 94 adhaeresis , 100 Adramitteno, Manuel, 15, 36 aeons , 97, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107, 136 agnosia, 113 Alemanno, Johanan (Johanan ben Isaac Alemanno), 106, 123, 128 Commentary on Genesis, 111, 206 Commentary on Song of Songs, 111, 128 Pico, 109, 111–113, 126, 128, 150, 194, 198, 206 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 82, 154, 181. See also peripatetics Alexander VI (pope), 22, 42

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Howlett, Re-evaluating Pico, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59581-4

233

234

INDEX

allegory, 7, 79, 116, 137, 138, 146, 160, 195, 211, 213 anagogical, 116, 137, 144, 176, 213 Angelic Mind, 95, 136, 146, 149– 153, 155, 156, 158–162, 167, 172, 175, 179, 183, 191, 193, 203, 207. See also Christ; Enoch; intellectual; Metatron; son of God; supracelestial divine providence, 161 angels, 54, 91, 99–102, 108, 111, 114, 136, 150, 151, 155–158, 178, 179, 183, 190, 191, 193. See also cherubim; Enoch; Metatron; Seraphim; Thrones (angels) animal, 66, 176–178, 180, 188, 200, 202 anima mundi, 136, 151 annus mirabilis , 16, 29 Anpin Penima’in (face of God), 94 Antiquari, Jacopo, 65 Apology (Pico) (Apologia tredecim quaestionum), 20, 29, 32, 33, 41, 43, 45, 49, 116, 129 apophatic theology, 54, 139, 140, 144, 148 apophatike, 113 negative theology, 3, 113, 135, 144, 149, 212 Aquinas, Thomas, 13, 14, 57, 59–61, 69, 79, 82, 85, 114, 165 Summa Theologiae, 155 Arabic, 14, 15, 39, 62, 63, 83, 104, 109, 110, 123, 127, 198 language, 5 texts, 15, 18, 110 Arezzo, 18, 40 Argyropoulos, John, 60 Aristippus, Henry, 109 Aristotelian, 3, 6, 14, 15, 34, 36, 38, 49, 55–64, 69, 71, 72, 74,

80–82, 94, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 123, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142, 149, 153, 160, 168, 173, 178–180, 182–185, 187, 191, 193, 208, 212. See also Del Medigo, Elijah; Nifo, Augustino, Vernia, Nicoletto humanism/humanists, 1, 13, 57, 71, 73, 74, 88 logic, 13, 55, 58, 59, 63, 72 Aristotelian abstraction, 185, 187 Aristotelianism, 3, 6, 14, 31, 32, 34–36, 49, 54–63, 66, 69–71, 73, 75–77, 79, 101, 104, 105, 109, 111, 114, 115, 120, 135, 144, 146, 154, 163, 180, 191, 208, 209, 211, 212 Aristotelian Recovery, 5, 61, 73 Aristotle. See also Active (Agent) Intellect; Aristotelian; Aristotelianism; Aristotelian Recovery; neo-Aristotelianism; peripatetics; Simplicius; Themistius Ars rhetorica, 61 Complete Works, 37, 61 De Anima,De Coelo, 60 Nicomachean Ethics, 60, 147, 197 Physics, 60, 62, 67, 82 and Plato, 2, 18, 25, 29, 33–36, 54, 69, 75–77, 81 ascent, 29, 102, 106, 114, 115, 117, 121, 135, 138, 141, 149, 171, 182–185, 187, 190–193, 195, 212. See also Jacob’s Ladder; soul and catharsis, 192 and purification, 191, 192 and ritual, 196 ascetic/asceticism, 3, 5–7, 26, 30, 56, 107, 173, 187, 190, 192, 195, 204, 205, 210, 213 asiluth, 95 astrology. See also vera astrologia

INDEX

and and and and and

Aristotle, 34, 49, 67, 160 astral magic, 67 astronomy, 67, 68, 84 determinism, 168 Disputations (Pico), 30, 34, 35, 49, 66–68, 85, 86, 160, 161 as divinatory, 67 and Ficino, 34, 35, 49, 66–68, 80, 85, 86, 159, 182 as judicial, 34, 49, 67, 86, 168 as magical, 34 and Pavia, 67 and Pico, 30, 34, 35, 49, 50, 66–68, 80, 86, 115, 161, 168, 169 and Plato, 34, 66–68, 80, 116, 160 as signs, 116, 160, 161 astronomy astrology, 66–68, 84 Pavia, 67 true, 67 Augustine. See St. Augustine authority, 20, 22, 26, 50, 57, 60, 63, 67, 74, 81, 100, 105, 111, 196 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), 14, 15, 39, 57, 58, 60, 62, 76, 79, 80, 83, 86, 104, 126, 155, 181. See also Averroism Commentary on Plato’s Republic, 62 Averroism/Averroist, 15, 56–58, 60, 62, 63, 69, 74, 86, 182, 211. See also Del Medigo, Elijah; Maimonides, Moses; Padua

B Bahir (Sefer ha-Bahir), 101, 104, 107, 108, 113, 126, 129, 141, 150, 176 Nehunya ben ha-Qanah, 107

235

Barbaro, Ermolao, 15, 29, 30, 38, 47, 56, 57, 61, 62, 65, 72, 81, 82, 84 beast, 173, 176, 177 beauty, 32, 60, 65, 69, 96, 99, 147–149, 151–153, 184–191, 203 as corporeal, 152, 185, 187 as heavenly, 152, 186–189 as innate, 187 as intellectual, 151, 152, 189 Being, 66, 68, 69, 94, 114, 143. See also God being, 39, 59, 73, 74, 77, 83, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 102, 104, 109, 114, 121, 135, 136, 139–148, 151–155, 157–161, 171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 188, 192 as causal, 56, 143, 144, 146, 148, 153, 155, 160, 187, 212 as formal, 143, 144, 146, 150, 153, 155, 160, 187 as participatory, 56, 146, 153, 155, 160 ben Gerson, Levi (Gersonides) [RaLBaG], 112, 129, 195, 208 Benivieni, Girolamo, 14, 29, 31, 32, 37, 40, 47, 48, 65, 78, 110, 127, 165, 185, 186, 204 Canzone dell’Amor Divino (‘Song of Divine Love’), 31 ben Nachman, Moses (Nahmanides), 105, 112, 113, 130, 150 Bessarion, Basilius (Basilios) (cardinal), 75, 88 Binah (understanding) [sefira], 108, 149, 183, 194 Hokmah, 96, 97, 99, 123, 149–151, 153, 194 Jerusalem, 97 Zion, 97

236

INDEX

biography, 5, 27, 28. See also Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco body, 4, 8, 12, 29, 35, 48, 66, 96, 102, 106, 107, 114, 123, 161, 172, 174, 176–182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193–195, 204 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus, 55, 76 Boiardo, Matteo Maria, 12 Bologna University, 13, 84 Borghese, Francesco, 199 Bori, Pier Cesare, 38–40, 42, 43, 48, 80, 127, 203, 208 Bossi, Matteo, 24 Bruni, Leonardo, 60, 81, 87, 88. See also humanists Busi, Giulio, 36, 38, 39, 46, 48, 122, 124–130, 197 Byzantine Empire, 5, 60, 62, 92, 106 C Cabala. See Kabbalah Catalonia, 92. See also Girona; Kabbalism; Nahmanides Cathars/Catharism, 103. See also Gnosticism Catholic, 115 Catholic Church, 5, 22, 94 celestial world, 107, 114, 118, 136, 138, 146, 151, 158–161, 174, 181, 191. See also anima mundi; fate ceremonial, 100 Chaldeans, 34, 77, 78, 90 chariot, 6, 98–101, 116, 123, 144, 149, 151, 191. See also Merkavah literature, 101 Charles VIII (King of France), 21 cherubim, 138, 150, 156, 173, 183, 190, 191, 205. See also angels Christ, 2, 43, 47, 49, 50, 53, 77, 91, 115, 117–119, 135, 150,

155–157, 174, 175, 183, 184, 190, 212. See also Adam Kadmon; Hokmah; Jesus; Tiferet Christian esoterica, 1, 7 Christianity, 2, 6, 18, 22, 23, 27, 35, 42, 50, 55–57, 59, 68–70, 72, 76, 77, 88, 89, 93, 100, 103, 113, 115, 130, 145, 146, 153, 154, 162, 163, 211, 213 Christian Kabbalism. See Kabbalism Christian Platonic/Platonism, 135, 146, 149, 153 Christian reform and Savonarola, Girolamo, 1, 5, 24, 25 Chrysoloras, Manuel, 60 Church Fathers, 96, 182, 211 Ciliberto, Michele, 122 circle, 1, 13, 23, 28, 57, 61, 68, 103, 111, 124, 146, 152, 153, 180, 181, 183, 184, 195, 196, 199 classical revival, 35 Commentary on a Canzone by Girolamo Benivieni (Commento), 29. See also Benivieni, Girolamo Commentary on Job (Pico), 30, 129 Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer (Pico), 30 Commentary on the Psalms (Pico), 24 Conclusions (Pico), 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 29, 32–34, 36, 45, 48, 69, 70, 75, 76, 78, 79, 87, 89, 90, 109, 112, 113, 115, 117, 122, 126, 128, 130–134, 139, 143, 148, 150, 158, 164–166, 168, 177, 194, 195, 198, 201, 207, 209, 212 concord/concordism/concordist, 7, 11, 25, 29, 34, 36, 54, 66, 69, 75–77, 89, 137, 138, 162, 212

INDEX

concordance, 2, 3, 12, 17, 55, 56, 59, 66, 71, 75, 76, 121, 135, 136, 145, 162, 163, 204, 209, 210 Concordia, 12, 23, 36, 56, 82 congregation of Israel, 114, 140, 149, 175 contemplation, 46, 97, 104, 105, 108, 141, 149, 157, 168, 178, 191, 192, 196 contemplative, 19, 23, 33, 74, 78, 84, 88, 92, 99, 105, 175, 193, 205 contemplator, 179, 191. See also intelligence Copenhaver, Brian, 8, 37, 43–48, 84, 87–90, 122, 123, 125, 129–132, 164, 173, 192, 198, 199, 201, 203–208 Corbala, 23 Cordier, Jean, 16, 20, 21, 40 Corneo, Andrea, 9, 19, 29, 40, 47, 48 cosmology, 30, 121, 135, 136. See also universe Council of Trent, 182 creation, 3, 29, 34, 54, 62, 68, 80, 83, 94, 97, 98, 102, 103, 107, 108, 117, 118, 120, 131, 135, 137–140, 145, 146, 151, 152, 162, 165, 173, 176. See also emanation Crete, 62, 106 Crown. See Keter D daemon/s. See demons Dante, 31 death, kiss of. See kiss debate, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 29, 30, 32–35, 40, 42, 46, 49, 55, 57, 58, 63–65, 67, 71, 76, 83, 84, 127, 161, 182, 210 Rome, 17, 72, 83

237

Debhequth, 99, 100, 105, 114 and kawwanah, 99, 105 and the will, 99 De ente et uno (Pico). See On Being and the One Del Medigo, Elijah (Elia), 15, 18, 39, 60, 62, 83, 106, 109, 111, 112, 126 Annotationes , 62 Averroism, 15, 60, 62 in Padua, 15, 18, 62, 83, 126 and Pico, 14, 18, 39, 60, 62, 83, 106, 109, 111, 112, 126 demons, 91, 100, 101, 196 descent, 49, 77, 123, 193, 207 desire, 2, 4–6, 12, 26, 30, 46, 50, 54, 56, 58, 71, 75, 81, 86, 146–148, 151, 152, 157, 171, 175, 176, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 195, 203, 213. See also beauty; love and cognition, 148 as appetite, 148, 187 object of, 2, 147, 187 dignity, 11, 35, 48, 171–173, 177, 184, 188, 189, 197, 198 of man, 4, 16, 198 Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius) and Ambrogio Traversari, 114 Celestial Hierarchy, 114, 192 corpus areopagaticum, 114 Divine Names, 114 and Meister Eckhart, 114 Mystical Theology, 114 and Pico, 55, 75, 113, 114, 120, 139, 141, 149, 184, 191, 192, 198, 206 Diotima’s Ladder, 47, 184, 185, 188, 190, 204 Disputations Against Astrology (Disputationes ) (Pico), 50

238

INDEX

Dominican/s, 4, 5, 24, 25, 43, 45 double truth, 26, 59 dynamism, 102, 138, 155

E earth/earthly, 25, 55, 66, 67, 84, 85, 99, 119, 159–161, 163, 172– 174, 177, 179–181, 185–189, 192, 193, 196, 197, 204 Ebreo, Leone, 111 ecstasy, 195 ecstatic, 167, 189, 192, 195 Kabbalah, 93 Kabbalism, 92, 106, 113 Ein-Sof (Eyn-sof ), 94, 95, 100, 104, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 131, 139–146, 149, 155, 164, 183, 194, 212. See also God and Being, 94, 139–144, 146, 212 as the nothing, 94, 117, 140, 141, 145 as the Nought, 94, 117, 139, 140, 142, 145 elements/elementals, 36, 45, 57, 78, 89, 100, 116, 118, 123, 125, 136, 159, 160, 172, 173, 181 Elijah, 98, 99 and chariot, 98 and Elisha, 98 emanation/emanatory, 3, 66, 67, 70, 77, 80, 83, 93–97, 99, 100, 102, 105, 108, 119, 125, 131, 135–139, 141, 145–149, 155, 158–160, 162, 171, 177. See also asiluth; hypostases; lightning flash; Plato; Tree of Life; universe Enlightenment, 2, 197 Enoch, 98, 99, 102, 105, 155, 156, 171, 176, 190, 200 as Metatron, 98, 99, 105, 123, 155, 156, 167, 176

epistemology/epistemological, 54, 59, 154, 167, 180 Esdras (Ezra), 89, 91, 92 Archangel Uriel, 92 esoteric/a/esotericism, 32, 33, 78, 104, 116, 124, 167 Este, 13 Ercole I, 21 Este family, 12 Ezekiel, 98, 99, 101, 102, 123. See also chariot; Merkavah F Facio, Bartolommeo De excellentia ac praestantia hominis , 172 faith, 2, 7, 20, 26, 44, 45, 50, 54, 58, 59, 62, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 89, 91, 162, 163, 180, 192, 209, 211, 213 fate, 85, 161, 162, 169, 182, 190, 202, 210 felicity, 152, 153, 157, 183, 190. See also God Ferrara, 1, 8, 12–14, 18, 23–25, 38, 43, 46, 47, 60, 85 Ficino, Marsilio. See also Platonic Academy of Florence; Platonic revival; Platonist, 67 and astral magic, 66, 67 and astrology, 34, 35, 49, 66–68, 80, 85, 86, 159, 182 and being, 66, 69, 77, 136, 141, 145, 147, 153, 158, 165, 178 Book of Life (De vita libri tres ), 35, 65, 66, 119 Commentary on Plato’s ‘Philebus’, 30 Commentary on Plato’s ‘Symposium’, 31, 65, 68 De vita coelitus comparanda, 66, 67

INDEX

and Golden Wits, 209 and Kabbalah, 113, 211 letters, 29, 31, 64, 65, 84 and magic, 35, 66, 68, 86, 111, 118 and medicine, 67 and On Being (Pico), 34, 66 On the Christian Religion, 113 and the One, 34, 66, 68, 70, 114, 136, 149, 153, 155, 175, 195 and Paul of Burgos, 113 and physical love, 32 and Pico, 3, 15, 16, 21, 25, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 50, 56, 57, 59, 63–65, 69, 70, 72, 81, 126, 136, 145, 147, 153, 159, 186 Platonic Theology (Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum), 69, 70 and sympathy, 27, 66, 118 and the Commentary (Pico), 28, 30–32, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 182, 195, 207 First Cause, 119, 139, 141–144, 146, 148–150, 212. See also Aristotle Florence, 1, 6, 12–16, 18, 21–23, 25–27, 29, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 60, 63–65, 72, 73, 84, 88, 110, 111, 126 forms, 29, 34, 59, 60, 63, 70, 79, 83, 91, 95, 98, 101, 102, 118, 120, 136, 145, 146, 151–155, 159, 174, 177, 179, 196, 198, 201. See also ideas and world of, 100, 150, 153–155, 160, 180, 185, 191, 196 France, 1, 6, 13, 16, 22, 29, 32, 109 and Charles, 25, 26 and Kabbalism, 1, 32, 92, 103 and Languedoc, 92, 103 and Pico, 32 Fratta, 18, 40, 47

239

freedom, 35, 67, 86, 89, 161, 169, 172–175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 197–199, 201–203 G Garcia, Pedro, 20 Bishop of Ussel, 20 Garin, Eugenio, 8, 9, 36, 37, 39, 42, 49, 50, 80, 82–84, 86, 87, 109, 115, 126–128, 168, 169, 197, 198, 203 and humanism, 37, 87, 126, 198 gematria, 56, 68, 79, 92, 117, 131, 194, 196. See also Kabbalism; mathematics; numbers; numerology Gerondi, Nissim, 176. See also Girona Gersonides (Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, RaLBaG), 112, 129, 195, 208 Girona, 105 and Kabbalism, 92, 94, 105, 116, 132 and Nahmanides, 105 Gnosticism, 70, 100–104, 107, 108, 124, 136, 145. See also aeons; chariot; Hekhalot (palaces) literature; Merkavah; mysticism, Proclus, sefirot Greek, 70, 92, 101 God. See also Active Divinity; Anpin Penima’in (face of God); beauty; being; Ein-Sof ; good; infinite chariot of, 98, 100, 101, 123, 144, 149, 151 communion with, 7, 100 as creator, 70, 102, 103, 117, 138–141 as darkness, 54, 113, 117, 138–140, 175 as demiurge, 70, 102, 117 the divine, 54, 55, 75, 76, 93–96, 98, 99, 102, 113–115, 135,

240

INDEX

139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 154, 155, 157–160, 163, 175, 178, 179, 193, 195 expression of, 76, 177 and grace, 99, 157, 163, 173, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 193 as hidden, image/likeness of, 54, 94, 97, 100, 104, 115, 139, 145, 146, 148, 151, 162, 174, 177, 183, 194, 212, 199 and love, 24, 146–149, 151, 166, 183, 186, 190 as the One, 66, 68, 101, 136, 141, 142, 145, 146, 151, 212 as plenitude, 140, 143, 145 and retraction, 95, 117, 139, 140, 212 as self-contemplative unmoved mover, 147 and shekinah, 99, 141, 144, 150, 156, 175 as Truth, 27, 54, 71, 77, 172, 179 throne of, 97–100, 102, 107, 123, 149, 205 union with, 183, 184, 192, 194 as Unity, 69, 95, 96, 136, 138, 140, 148, 150, 152, 175 gods, 2, 100, 136, 151, 159 Golden Age, 2, 5, 6, 26, 54, 72, 74, 78, 104, 191, 209, 213. See also reform; renovatio Golden World, 69 good, 27, 28, 39, 73, 76, 102, 118, 139, 140, 142, 144, 147–149, 151–153, 157, 160, 166, 183–185, 191, 196, 203, 212 The Great Parchment (ha-Yeri’ah ha-Gedolah), 112, 123, 126, 129 Greek (language), 5, 15, 36, 57, 60, 61, 75, 78, 80, 90, 92, 104, 110, 196, 205 Gregory of Nyssa, 173

Grimani, Antonio (cardinal), 27, 112 Guarini, Battista, 14 Guidoni, Aldobrandino, 18, 38 H Hebrew, 5, 14, 15, 18, 39, 60, 62, 78, 83, 93, 94, 96, 98, 102–104, 109–111, 115, 117, 119, 120, 123, 130–132, 150, 160, 194, 198, 208 alphabet, 92, 96, 103 Bible, 92 texts, 18, 62, 109, 110, 112 22, 96, 103 Hekhalot (palaces) literature, 102, 108 henosis/henotic, 3, 7, 25, 54, 55, 114, 120, 171, 183, 184, 190, 191, 194, 195, 205, 210, 213 Henry of Hesse, 35 Heptaplus (Pico), 24, 29, 30, 32, 34, 43, 45–48, 54, 68, 70, 72, 78, 86, 111, 113–115, 118, 128– 132, 134, 136–138, 140, 145, 150, 152, 158, 160, 162–165, 167, 168, 172–174, 176, 184, 190, 192, 197, 199–203, 205, 207 heresy, 20, 41 hermeneutics, 109, 138, 212 and secret, 109, 212 Hermes Trismegistus, 77, 78, 120 Hermeticism, 78, 156, 198 and Egyptians, 78 hexaemeron, 138 Hokmah (divine Wisdom) [sefira], 103, 105, 119, 123, 135, 141, 144, 149–151, 153, 166, 191, 194. See also Active (Agent) Intellect, Christ, materia prima and giver of forms, 98 and hyle, 98 and Principium, 119

INDEX

as Sapientia, 119 humanism. See also Aristotelian, humanists; philology and active life, 73, 74 and homo literatus , 72 Pico and, 12–14, 57, 60, 71–74, 76, 173, 211 Poliziano and, 1, 14, 25, 72, 73 and Renaissance, 73, 74, 87, 88, 211 humanists, 1, 12, 14, 25, 36, 37, 57, 60, 61, 71–74, 87, 88, 109, 126, 198 hypostases, 118, 136, 176. See also emanation I Iamblichus, 100, 131, 192 Ibn Rushd. See Averroes ideas, 1, 5, 6, 12, 17, 22, 24, 29, 36, 41, 42, 53, 54, 59, 60, 78, 90, 95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 113, 116, 130, 146, 151–153, 155, 173, 179, 181, 187, 191, 211. See also forms Idel, Moshe, 123, 125–130, 134, 167, 194, 197, 200, 201, 206, 207 illumination, 120, 183, 191, 192, 194 imagination, 2, 180, 200, 201, 208, 210 immanence, 196 immortality, 86, 181, 182, 202 individual, 1, 3, 4, 13, 18, 23, 24, 26, 27, 35, 37, 40, 54, 59, 60, 77–79, 86, 98, 105, 120, 133, 140, 154, 155, 160, 161, 172, 173, 184, 186, 196, 197, 211, 213 ascent, 72, 141, 213 journey, 6, 7, 35, 197 soul, 6, 7, 181, 186

241

infinite, 62, 94, 117, 126, 139 Innocent VIII (pope), 17, 22, 41. See also heresy; Medici, Lorenzo de’; poetry; Rome intellect, 2, 55, 56, 62, 75, 82, 83, 86, 96–98, 106, 117, 133, 136, 144, 148, 154–157, 165, 175, 178–182, 186, 187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 204, 207 Agent (or Active). See Active (Agent) Intellect intellectual, 1, 2, 4–7, 11–14, 22, 25, 28, 29, 36, 40, 44, 56, 58, 61–63, 65, 68, 74, 87, 89, 98, 100, 109, 119, 120, 136, 153, 154, 156, 167, 168, 179, 185, 187, 195, 200, 211 intellectual rapture, 190, 195 intellectual world, 118, 136, 138, 149, 154. See also Angelic Mind; supracelestial intelligence, 85, 139, 152, 154, 157, 174, 177–181, 183 Isaac, 98, 103, 104, 106, 158, 168, 195 as Din, 99 Isaac the Blind (Rabbi Yitzhak Saggi Nehor), 103, 112, 124. See also France; Gnosticism; Kabbalism Narbonne, 103, 124 Italian (language), 1, 11, 22, 26, 49, 53, 60, 62, 82, 106, 111–113, 129, 194, 198 Italy, 1, 12, 19, 21, 32, 34, 37, 44, 49, 59, 60, 65, 73, 92, 106, 109, 128 northern and central, 3, 5, 12

J Jacob, 98, 99, 193, 195

242

INDEX

Jacob’s Ladder, 99, 106, 111, 112, 119, 137, 150, 171, 173–175, 184, 190–193, 196 as Christ’s Ladder, 119 Jesus, 19, 146 Jewish faith, 58 Jewish Kabbalism, 1, 3, 54 Jews, 19, 32, 41, 62, 70, 110, 115, 120, 126, 130, 131, 197, 198 Job, 194 Judaism, 18, 62, 92, 99–102, 115, 127, 141, 144, 145, 162 K Kabbalah, 8, 41, 79, 83, 94, 96–98, 101, 103, 105, 109, 111, 113, 116, 117, 120, 125, 128, 129, 131, 134, 192, 198, 210, 213. See also Abulafia, Abraham; Conclusions (Pico); Idel, Moshe; magic; Scholem, Gershom; Wirszubski, Chaim Kabbalism, 3, 6–8, 18, 22, 24, 31–36, 39, 42, 54–56, 58, 63, 72, 77–79, 83, 87, 89, 91–94, 96, 97, 99–101, 103, 104, 106–120, 124–127, 129, 130, 132, 134–136, 139–141, 149, 150, 155, 156, 173, 184, 190, 191, 196, 198, 201, 208–213. See also Christian Kabbalism; gematria; Jewish Kabbalism; notarikon; temurah as contemplative, 92 as speculative, 92, 106 Kabbalistic library (Pico’s), 62, 109, 110 Kabbalistic sources, 7, 122, 206 Kabbalists, 74, 78, 94–97, 104, 106, 110, 112, 114, 124, 127, 130, 138, 149, 150, 160, 191, 195, 196. See also Abulafia, Abraham;

Ebreo, Leone; Gersonides; Isaac the Blind; Nahmanides; Recanati kataphatic theology (kataphatike), 113 as positive theology, 144 Keter (Crown or Ratson) [sefira], 95–97, 99, 103, 108, 114, 117, 119, 123, 134, 139–145, 149–151, 153, 158, 164, 175, 178, 183, 186, 191, 194, 212 breath of God (ruah elohim hayyim), 103, 114 spirit of God, 103 kiss, 189, 195, 207 binsica, 194, 207 mittat neshikah, 194 mors osculi, 194, 195, 208 knowledge, 4, 9, 39, 50, 54, 59, 60, 76, 78, 83, 89, 100, 108, 114, 117, 118, 120, 127, 138, 139, 178, 180, 185, 187, 192, 193, 196, 205, 207, 208, 210, 213 knowledge network, 20, 22, 25, 61 as academic court, 4, 13 as entourage, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 36, 62, 63, 65, 74, 111, 210 Kristeller, Paul Oskar, 36–38, 40, 44, 45, 47, 49–51, 72, 80–82, 86, 87, 172, 197, 198, 200, 202, 207 L ladder. See Jacob’s Ladder Laillier, Jean, 16, 39 Landino, Cristoforo commento sopra la Comedia, 14 Lanfredini, Giovanni, 20, 42, 43 late Platonism, 69, 70, 100, 154. See also Neoplatonism; Platonism Latin (language), 14, 60–63, 83, 96, 104, 109, 110, 115, 117, 119, 210 Kabbalah in, 79, 128

INDEX

Latin (place) Europe, 18, 33, 40, 57, 58, 60, 70, 79, 93, 114 world, 5, 54, 71 Letters, 87 Ficino’s, 28 and Germain de Ganay, 46 Pico’s, 28, 40 libraries, 27, 38, 44, 64, 118, 122, 129 Pico’s, 27, 122 Vatican Library, 42, 110, 129 Life (Pico) and Gianfrancesco, 24, 33, 45 More, 28 lightning flash, 55, 77, 93–95, 144, 146 divine, 55, 77, 93, 144, 146 literary, 2, 15, 27, 60, 72, 211 literary circle, 14 love, 16, 17, 21, 26, 28, 31, 32, 44, 46, 47, 58, 70, 76, 78, 79, 96, 97, 110, 111, 116, 146–149, 151, 152, 165, 166, 183–190, 192, 203, 204, 213. See also desire as circuitus spiritualis , 146 and divine, 147, 149, 186

M Ma’arekhet ha-Elohut , 106 magic/magical, 23, 42, 68, 85, 92, 102, 104, 108, 111, 115, 118–120, 128, 130–133, 192, 196, 206 astral, 67 goetic (black), 196 Kabbalism and, 42, 92, 111, 118, 130 Pico and, 22, 118, 196, 208. See also ceremonial, natural

243

philosophy; operational; theurgy/theurgic/theurgical magician, 196 as magus, 196 Magnus, Albertus, 14, 61 Maimonides, Moses [Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, Rambam], 58, 76, 104, 105, 111, 112, 119, 125, 156, 195 Guide for the Perplexed, 104, 119, 195 Maimonidean, 119, 124, 208 Rabbi Moses the Egyptian, 119 Malkut (Kingdom) [sefira], 95, 97, 99, 119, 120, 134, 141, 150, 175 Manetti, Giannozzo De dignitate et excellentia hominis (On Human Worth and Excellence), 172 on the body, 172 Manuzio, Aldo, 36 Manutius press, 61 materia prima, 98 mathematics, 13, 15, 58, 70, 79, 96, 120, 137, 151, 163, 212. See also gematria; numbers; numerology; Pythagorean mathematics Medici, Cosimo de’, 63 Medici, Giovanni de’ (Pope Leo X), 26, 43 Medici, Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de’, 26 Medici Library, 23 Medici, Lorenzo de’, 1, 14, 20–26, 29–31, 33, 37, 38, 42, 43, 47, 64, 65 Medici, Lorenzo de’ (brother to Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de’), 26 Medici, Margherita de’, 18 Medici, Piero de’, 26 Mercurio da Coreggio

244

INDEX

as Enoch, 156 and Hermeticism, 156 Merkavah, 92, 98, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 108, 116, 119, 124, 144, 149, 158 chariot mysticism, 92, 98, 191 metaphysics, 56, 72, 75, 82, 87, 91–93, 104, 121, 162, 165, 175, 203 Metatron, 120, 144, 150, 156, 167, 178. See also angels; shekinah as Enoch, 98, 99, 105, 123, 155, 156, 167, 176 Great, 98 lower, 98 as Yahoel, 108, 123 metempsychosis, 96. See also transmigration Michelozzi, Bernardo, 65 Midrash, 116, 195 Milan, 12, 18 mind, 3, 6, 8, 31, 34, 47, 56, 81, 99, 106, 108, 111, 118, 120, 126, 134, 137, 151–155, 158, 171, 178, 179, 186, 192, 198, 200. See also intellect Mirandola, 12, 15, 23, 36 Mishnah (Oral Torah), 101, 124, 195 Mithridates, Flavius (Shmuel bin Nissim Abulfaraj) (Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada). See also Benivieni, Girolamo; Greek; Kabbalism; Medici, Margherita de’ and Aramaic, 110, 127 and Hebrew, 14, 109, 110, 112 and Pico, 14, 18, 39, 95, 109–113, 115, 127, 129, 130, 210 Sicily, 109, 113 Sixtus IV [pope], 110, 126 mobility, 174. See also will

modern, 1, 4, 35, 55, 80, 87, 144, 162, 172, 173, 197, 198, 211 Moncada, Guglielmo Raimondo. See also Mithridates, Flavius Monisart, Giovanni (Jean) Bishop of Tournai, 20 monotheism, 102 More, Thomas, 46, 90 and Pico, 78 and Pico’s letters, 78 and St Pico, 5, 27 translation, 28 Moses, 77, 92, 115, 120, 128, 130, 137, 138, 160, 179, 181, 190, 213. See also Kabbalism; Torah (Book of Laws); Talmud (Oral Law) and Kabbalism, 54, 58, 91, 101, 105, 115, 211 and Mount Sinai, 91, 98 mutability, 173–175, 197, 203 mystic, 7, 35, 75, 96, 97, 102, 106–108, 113, 120, 121, 131, 149, 156, 171, 175, 190, 192, 194, 196 mysticism, 3, 42, 53, 78, 79, 83, 92, 102, 105, 107, 116, 117, 124, 162, 196, 211. See also apophatic theology; Dionysius the Areopagite; Gnosticism; Kabbalism; kataphatic theology Chariot, 92 Christian, 62, 113–115, 191, 213 Jewish, 18, 39, 62, 92, 96, 100, 104, 108, 117, 140, 163 Plotinian, 70 N Nahmanides (Moses ben Nachman, Ramban), 105, 112, 113, 130, 150. See also Catalonia; Girona; Kabbalists

INDEX

Commentary on Sefer Yesirah, 94 Commentary on the Torah, 105 nature/Nature, 2, 30, 39, 53, 65, 68, 80, 116, 118, 131, 136–138, 141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 159, 160, 167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 181, 183, 185, 188, 193, 196, 199, 200, 203, 207, 210. See also subcelestial world of, 136, 159–161, 168, 172, 181, 188 natural philosophy, 41, 163, 184, 192, 193, 196, 206 Nemesius of Emesa, 173 neo-Aristotelian, 55, 58, 61, 62, 71, 167 neo-Aristotelianism, 61, 63 Neoplatonism, 69, 70, 124. See also late Platonism; Platonism; Platonic Neoplatonic, 70, 92, 124, 132, 202 Nifo, Augustino, 1, 15, 61, 82. See also Aristotle; Aristotelian Recovery; Averroism; neo-Aristotelianism; Padua noesis/noetic, 3, 25, 54, 171, 191, 194, 195, 213 nominalism/nominalists, 59, 60, 155. See also Ockhamism; via moderna; William of Ockham notarikon, 92, 93. See also Kabbalism nous , 3, 178. See also mind numbers, 40, 56, 77–79, 92, 96, 103, 105, 107, 116, 118, 133, 137, 138, 153, 156. See also gematria; Kabbalism; mathematics; numerology numerology, 79, 92, 117, 194. See also gematria, Kabbalism, mathematics, numbers

245

O Ockhamism/Ockhamist, 59, 61. See also nominalism; via moderna; William of Ockham On Being and the One (Pico), 30, 34, 45, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 84, 164–166, 200, 207, 210, 212 operational, 92 Oration (Pico), 4, 8, 9, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 45, 46, 48, 68, 72, 78, 80, 81, 89–91, 111, 112, 114, 118, 121, 136, 138, 156, 163, 164, 172, 173, 176, 182, 185, 192, 194, 196–203, 205–208 dignity of man, 4, 16 oratio de hominis dignitate, 33 Oresme, Nicholas, 35 orientalist, 15, 40 Origen, 89, 96, 123, 176, 200, 205 original/originalism/originalist, 8, 15, 26, 45, 54, 57, 60–62, 65, 70–73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 88, 91, 104, 108, 142, 154, 155, 179, 184, 195, 204 Orpheus, 120, 134, 165, 205. See also Orphic Hymns Orphic Hymns, 118 Night, 120

P Padua (university), 1, 6, 13, 14, 60, 62 pagan, 19, 53, 70 Pallas, 120 Papio, Michael, 8, 46, 48, 205 Paris (place), 6, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 23, 56, 60, 67 Paris style, 16, 17, 20 Paris (university), 15, 16, 21. See also Sorbonne

246

INDEX

Parmenides (Plato), 66, 68, 71, 142, 212 paths pathway, 29, 35, 36, 53, 55, 75, 79, 95, 97, 103, 113, 115, 120, 141, 213 thirty-two (32), 95 Pavia (university), 13, 15 penitence, 6, 26, 28, 172 penitents (piagnoni), 1, 26 Pergola Paolo della, 61 peripatetics, 60, 81, 160. See also Aristotle; Aristotelians; Simplicius; Themistius Perugia, 17, 18 Petrarch, 30, 31, 73, 74, 173 Petrarchan, 73 phantasy, 159, 180. See also imagination philologist, 14, 25, 73 philology, 54, 57, 72 Philo of Alexandria (Philo Judaeus), 94, 101, 173. See also Gnosticism Philoponus, John, 61 philosopher, 14, 16, 19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 35, 54, 56, 58, 60, 63, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 93, 104, 111, 113, 116, 145, 156, 158, 172, 173, 180, 181, 197, 210, 213 and Pico, 1, 3, 11, 14, 33, 140, 192, 211 philosophia nova, 79 philosophical-mysticism, 77. See also mathematics philosophical theology, 17 philosophy and faith, 2, 7, 33, 58, 70, 75, 76, 162, 209

and religion, 57, 75, 100, 102, 109, 210, 213 and theology, 75, 162. See also natural philosophy; Renaissance philosophy physical love, 30, 32 Pico, Alberto III Pio, 12 Pico, Anton Maria, 12, 27 Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco. See also Life biography, 5, 27 and defense of Pico’s reputation, 27 and Ficino, 29, 30 and publication of Pico’s work, 29 and Savonarola, 4, 5 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. See also anagogical; Apology; Conclusions; Disputations; France; Heptaplus; knowledge network; Oration; philosopher; Platonic Academy of Florence; power network contribution, 5, 135 death of, 25 and dignity of man, 4 exceptionalism, 3, 210 and fame, 1 family, 12 and Ficino, 1, 27, 63, 64 as gentleman-philosopher, 11, 13, 35, 54, 116, 210 as hero, 63, 64 legacy, 1, 2, 7, 27, 72 murder, 2 myth, 11, 24 as a noble, 11, 12 Pico Studies, 28, 64 as prince of concord, 54, 75 princeps concordiae, 63 reception, 5, 28

INDEX

St Pico, vision, 5, 23, 24, 27, 35 Pico, Galeotto, 12 planets. See also Venus Jupiter, 66, 158, 159 Mercury, 158, 172 moon, 67, 68, 136, 158, 159 Saturn, 119, 158, 159 Uranus, 158 Plato. See also #Platonism; Platonist/s and Aristotle, 2, 17, 30, 50, 56, 66, 71, 75, 76, 82, 88, 89, 142, 209, 212 and cave, 160, 180 and love theory, 16, 28, 29 Parmenides, 66, 71, 134, 142, 212 Phaedo, 181 Phaedrus, 100 Sophist, 143 Symposium, 16, 31, 166, 184, 185, 195, 205 Timaeus, 102, 118 Platonic Academy of Florence, 2, 63, 68, 70, 81, 84. See also Ficino, Marsilio Platonic furori, 195 Platonic revival, 5, 13–15, 31, 57, 58, 63, 72, 73, 81, 99, 175. See also Ficino, Marsilio Platonism, 3, 6, 13–16, 27, 31, 32, 34, 36, 54–59, 63, 65, 66, 69–74, 76, 80, 81, 88, 92, 93, 95–98, 100, 101, 104, 109, 114–116, 120, 121, 123, 132, 135, 139, 144, 149, 154, 163, 176, 191, 209, 211, 212. See also late Platonism; Neoplatonism Platonist/s, 1, 6, 14, 26, 34, 36, 47, 55–57, 64, 69, 71, 79, 81, 94, 101, 120, 136, 142, 144, 145, 153, 171, 179, 180, 182. See also Ficino, Marsilio

247

Pletho, George Gemistus (George Gemistos Plethon), 14, 37, 90, 182 Plotinus, 16, 31, 36, 38, 39, 55, 57, 64–66, 69–71, 80, 84, 101, 123, 136, 141, 143–145, 149, 154, 164, 173, 176, 177, 181, 182, 191, 201, 205, 210, 211 Enneads , 57, 65, 136 Plotinian, 69, 94, 116, 117, 136, 138, 141–144, 158, 175, 176, 183, 212 poetic theology, 37, 80, 86, 88 Poliziano (Angelo Ambrogini) and Aristotelian logic, 72 death of, 23, 25 and Ficino, 35, 64 and humanism, 1, 14, 25, 72, 73 Lamia, 72 and philology, 72 and poetry, 14 relationship with Pico, 25 pope, 1, 2, 11, 17, 19, 20, 22, 26, 28, 40, 43, 44, 61. See also Alexander VI; Innocent VII; Leo X; Sixtus IV and Pico, 22, 65 possible intellect (intellectus possibilis ), 154, 155 power network, 13, 16, 18, 21 and elite, 11, 12 as geopolitical network, 11 and powerbrokers, 11, 12, 19 prima materia (prime matter), 136, 145, 159, 161 as potentiality, 145 as privation, 145 as truly not being, 144 prisca magia, 56, 71, 77, 78. See also prisca theologia

248

INDEX

prisca theologia, 71, 72, 77, 78, 80, 89, 92, 111, 120, 123, 211. See also prisca magia Proclus, 55, 66, 69–71, 79, 87, 100, 101, 118, 131, 135, 136, 145, 149, 162, 182, 192, 205, 210, 211. See also Gnosticism; mysticism and baroque, 70, 87, 136, 162, 211 and henads , 100 Platonic Theology, 69, 70, 100, 162 theurgical, 68 Proteus, 173, 197 providence, 85, 161, 182, 202, 210 Pseudo-Dionysius . See Dionysius the Areopagite purification, 191, 192, 206 Pythagoras, 56, 68, 70, 77, 78, 89, 91, 118, 120, 132, 134, 136, 160, 192. See also tetraktys Pythagorean, 79, 103, 116– 118, 153, 163, 176, 184, 193. See also mathematics; philosophical-mysticism Pythagorean mathematics, 56

R Ramusio, Girolamo, 15 realism, 59, 60, 155. See also via antiqua reason, 2, 6, 7, 21, 54, 58, 59, 62, 70, 72, 75, 76, 116, 117, 140, 142, 143, 147, 154, 157, 159, 162, 163, 172, 175, 177–181, 186–188, 192, 209–211, 213 Recanati, Menahem Commentary on the Pentateuch, 106. See also Conclusions (Pico)

reform, 1, 4–6, 23, 24, 49, 61, 72, 73, 75, 88, 197, 210, 213. See also renovatio Renaissance, 2, 4, 11, 13, 59, 73, 103, 104, 172, 195, 211 Italian, 1, 2, 211 renaissance court, 12 renaissance man, 172, 211 Renaissance philosophy, 173, 212 renovatio, 3, 54, 69, 72, 78, 106, 191, 194, 213. See also Golden Age; Golden World; reform Reuchlin, Johannes, 93 De Arte Cabalistica, 93 Riva, Massimo, 131, 164, 167, 168, 197, 199, 203, 205 Rome, 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 15–22, 29, 33, 39, 40, 43, 46, 48, 49, 72, 74, 83, 111, 126, 196, 204, 213 S Salviati, Benigno, 25, 33 Savonarola Trattato contra li astrologi, 35 scandals Pico’s abduction of Margherita, 64 scholastic/scholastics. See scholasticism scholasticism, 6, 13, 16, 20, 33, 59, 63, 73, 154, 211. See also nominalism; Ockhamism; realism; via antiqua; via moderna; William of Ockham Scholem, Gershom, 101, 103, 107, 119 science, 35, 57, 68, 91, 115, 116, 137, 160–162, 192 Scotus, Duns, 14 Sefer Yesirah (Book of Creation), 103, 105, 107, 112 Sefira/Sefirot. See also aeons; Keter; Hokmah; Tiferet; Binah; Active Divinity; apophatic theology;

INDEX

Gnosticism; Proclus; vera astrologia Da’at (knowledge or gnosis), 108 Gevurah/Din (severity or judgment), 108 Hesed (grace or love), 96 Hod (splendor or majesty), 97 Netsah (endurance), 97 numerations, 158 safar, sappir (sapphire), 107 ten, Yesod, 97 senses, 85, 153, 154, 177–181, 185–188 world of, 177 Seraphim, 150, 156, 183, 190, 191 Sforza, Ludovico Maria, 21 Sforzas (family), 1, 12 Shekinah (she who dwells) and gnostic Sophia, 108 as hidden, 99 higher, 99 lower, 99 as presence of God, 141 throne of, 99 as voice, 99 shem/shemot , 116 Sicily, 109, 113 Siger of Brabant, 59 Simplicius, 61 son of God, 120, 134, 150, 155, 156 Sorbonne (university). See Paris (university) soul. See also anima mundi; ascent; metempsychosis sensible, 185 sensitive, 137, 159 transmigration of, 176, 194 unity with God, 97, 117, 136, 138 world of, 136 Spagnuoli, Battista, 24 Speusippus, Nicomachus, 118

249

spirit, 24, 25, 55, 74, 105, 146, 156, 175, 178–181, 188, 190, 196 St. Augustine, 59, 70, 76, 153, 154, 156 Confessions, 154 studia humanitatis , 73 Studium, 73, 109 subcelestial, 136. See also nature supracelestial, 136, 149, 172, 190. See also Angelic Mind; intellectual world syncretism/syncretic, 36, 53, 69–71, 74–77, 116, 120, 139, 145, 173, 209, 210, 212, 213 T Talmud (oral law), 92. See also Moses Taverno, Stefano, 18 Temurah, 92, 194. See also Kabbalism tetraktys , 118, 178, 192 Themistius, 61. See also Aristotelian, peripatetics theology. See also mysticism; philosophical theology apophatic, 54, 94, 113, 135, 139, 140, 144, 148, 162 kataphatic, 54, 94, 113, 114, 144, 162 poetic, 2, 14, 17, 25, 29, 36, 75, 209 Theon of Smyrna, 118 theses. See also Apology; Conclusions; heresy; Innocent VIII; Kabbalah; Rome defense of, 33 and Kabbalah, 42 magical, 131 Pico’s, 17, 21, 32, 33, 40, 42, 43, 48 theurgy/theurgic/theurgical. See also magic/magical ceremonial, 70

250

INDEX

throne, 99–101, 150, 158, 171, 183, 191 God’s, 97, 99, 100, 102, 107, 123, 149, 205 Thrones (angels), 156 Tiferet (beauty or splendor or mercy) [sefira]. See also Christ and Jacob, 98, 99, 119 as shining mirror, 119 as six, 119 Torah (Book of Law), 92, 98. See also Moses transcendence, 102, 191 translations, 72, 109, 110, 176. See also Mithridates, Flavius; More, Thomas transmigration, 96, 172, 176, 177, 194. See also metempsychosis Tree of Life lightning flash, 55, 77, 93–95, 144. See also Adam Kadmon; Anpin Penima’in (face of God); Sefira/Sefirot triads/triadism, 96–98, 100, 103, 108, 118, 119, 132, 136, 146, 149–151, 158, 159, 178, 191, 195, 211 Trinity, 91, 100, 101, 118, 134, 149 truth, 3, 7, 9, 11, 17, 27, 32, 33, 37, 46, 54, 59, 64, 71, 75–77, 88, 89, 93, 101, 115, 120, 137, 139, 140, 142, 144, 154, 172, 177, 179, 180, 209, 212, 213 Turks, 15 Tuscan (language), 14 Twelve Rules for the Spiritual Battle (Pico), 30

U unio mystica, 105, 113, 114, 186, 213

universal/s, 59, 60, 116, 142, 151, 153–155, 160, 179, 180, 185, 186 universe. See also cosmology as garden, 171 as text, 196 university/universities, 13, 26, 40, 58, 59, 73, 74, 82, 88

V vegetable, 137, 159 Venice, 13, 27, 61 Venus. See also Beauty celestial, 185 earthly, 159 heavenly, 152, 186, 189 vulgar, 152 vera astrologia, 68 Vernia, Nicoletto, 15, 23, 61 via antiqua, 13, 16, 56, 59, 60. See also scholasticism via moderna, 6, 13, 16, 20, 56, 59, 60. See also scholasticism Visconti, Gian Galeozzo (Duke of Milan), 21 volition, 145–147

W will, free, 161, 162, 176, 178, 183 William of Ockham, 58, 59 Wirszubski, Chaim, 39, 122, 125, 127–134, 208 Wisdom literature. See also Gnosticism; Hokmah Sophia, 103, 108 World-soul. See also anima mundi; celestial world; soul as Calliope, 159 as Jupiter, 66, 158, 159

INDEX

Z Zachariah, 158 zimzum (void). See also Nahmanides and retraction, 95 Zohar, 107, 108, 112, 113, 128

spanish, 106, 108 Zoroaster Chaldean Oracles, 78 paternal mind, 120

251