Psychology Library Editions: Emotion, 12-Volume Set 9781848727809, 9781315739113, 9781138805774, 9781315751870, 0416359906

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PSYCHOLOGY LIBRARY EDITIONS: EMOTION

Volume 1

STRUCTURE IN THOUGHT AND FEELING

STRUCTURE IN THOUGHT AND FEELING

SUSAN AYLWIN

Psychology Press Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1985 This edition first published in 2015 by Psychology Press 27 Church Road, Hove BN3 2FA and by Psychology Press 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Psychology Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1985 Susan Aylwin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-84872-780-9 (Set) eISBN: 978-1-315-73911-3 (Set) ISBN: 978-1-138-80577-4 (Volume 1) eISBN: 978-1-315-75187-0 (Volume 1) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

SUSAN AYLWIN

Structure •

In

Thought and

Feeling METHUEN· London& New York

First publishedin 1985by Methuen& Co. Ltd 11 Ne.w FetterLane London EC4P4EE Publishedin the USA by Methuen& Co. in associationwith Methuen,Inc. 733 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017

British Library Cataloguingin PublicationData AylWin, Susan Structurein thoughtand feeling. 1. Consciousness I. Title 153 BF311 ISBN 0-416-35990-6

© 1985SusanAylwin Typesetby NenePhototypesetters Ltd Printedin GreatBritain at the University Press,Cambridge

All rights reserved.No part of this book may be reprintedor reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,mechanicalor othermeans, now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopyingand recording, or in any information storageor retrieval system,without permission in writing from the publishers.

Library of CongressCatalOgingin PublicationData AylWin, Susan. Structurein thoughtand feeling. Bibliography: p. Includesindex. 1. Emotions. 2. Thoughtand thinking. I. Title. BF531.A96 1985 152.4 84-20758 ISBN 0-416-35990-6

To RobertSchneider; andto the memoryof Karl Britton.

Contents

list of figures x list of tables xi Acknowledgements xiii Part 1 The three fonus of representation 1 Introduction An anchoringof terms 4 Cognitive style 5 Plan of the book 6

3

2 Preliminarysketchesof the threemodesof thought Inner speech 8 Visual imagery 11 Enactiveimagery 16 Summary 20

8

3 Freeassociativestructures Structuresin inner speech 23 Structuresin visual imagery 27 Structuresin enactiveimagery 32 Making up the mind: a triptych of meanings 38

21

Somethoughtson 'structure' 39 Summary 46 4 Day-dreams.fantasiesand otheridle thoughts Cognition and affect in day-dreaming 47 The studyof idle thoughts 49 Verbal idle thoughts:taxonomyand castigation 50 Visual idle thoughts:social spaceand the importanceof being seen 54 Enactiveidle thoughts:metamorphoses of being and feeling 58 Compositeforms: revenge,heroic lovers and missinglinks 61 Concludingremarks 63

47

5 A cognitiveinterlude:individual differencesin modesof thought The Modesof ThoughtQuestionnaire 66 Inner speech:a style for commerce 68 Visual imagery: a style for the arts and social sciences 69 Enactiveimagery: a style for engineering 70 In summary 71

65

6 Aspectsof identity On what makesthoughtgo 72 Structureand energyin cognitive style 73 Initial impressionsof identity: the portraitsstudy 75 A secondapproachto identity: the psychometricstudy 88 Conclusionand transitionto part two 91

72

Part 2 Particular evaluative issues

7 Valuesin inner speech:preferencefor categoricalclarity Horizontal and vertical dimensionsof categorizing 95 Favouritecreatures 96 Typicality and liking: eulogiZing the typical 99 Oppositionand stereotypy 106 Value conflict in taxonomicsystems 108 Individual differencesin preferencefor the typical 109 Summary 110

95

8 VisualiZing, the environmentand the sentimentsof self Objectiveself-awareness 112 Experiencesof seeingthe self from outside 113 Constitutinga persona 118 On holiday from the persona 121 The sentimentsof self 126 In conclusion 128

111

9 Emotionsandenactiverepresentation Someperspectiveson emotion 130 Emotion sequencesand commitmentscripts 133 Becoming 135 Othermodesof representationin emotion 148 Agent,experiencerand time 151 Synthesis 152

129

Part 3 Integrations 10 Mind andtime Metaphorsfor thought 158 Time as the form of inner sense 160 Modesof thoughtas waysof life 165 In summary 170 11

The psychologyof science The verbal stratum:objectivity and basicentities 172 The visual stratum:constitutionand metaphor 174 The enactivestratum:processand the subversionof identity 176 Equilibration versuscognitive mythology 178

157

171

Appendices AppendixA AppendixB AppendixC AppendixD AppendixE AppendixF Appendix G

The third free associationstudy The idle thoughtsstudy The Modesof ThoughtQuestionnaire Cognitivecorrelatesof the MOTQ Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ Animal favourites Studyon the phenomenologyof emotions

Notes References Index of names Index of subjects

185 187 191 203 206 221 225 229 239

262 267

List of figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3

Map of semanticterritory for verbalrepresentation Map of semanticterritory for visual imagery Map of semanticterritory for enactiveimagery A semantictriptych: the free-associativelives of dogs Relationshipsbetweencognitivestructuresand personality characteristicsfor verbalrepresentation Relationshipsbetweencognitivestructuresand personality characteristicsfor visual imagery Relationshipsbetweencognitivestructuresand personality characteristicsfor enactiveimagery The folk taxonomy The evaluativetaxonomy Relationshipsto the environment.and the sentimentsof self Somerelationshipsbetweencommitmentsandemotions Interrelationshipsin emotionsbetweenthe future. actionand bodily activation Temporaland constitutionalanalysisoffeelings

28 33 37 40

79 81 85 102 104 127 136

147 153

List of tables

Tablesin text 3.1 Freeassociativecharacteristicsof verbal, visual and enactive representations 24-5 4.1 Summaryof themesofidle thoughts 49 6.1 Unique correlatesof personalityadjectiveswith MOTQ modescales 76 6.2 Unique correlatesof personalityadjectiveswith MOTQ subscales 77 7.1 Evaluations:relationshipsbetweenratingsand reasons 97 100 7.2 Typicality: relationshipsbetweenratingsand reasons 7.3 Charactersin romanticfiction 107 8.1 Experiencesof seeingthe selffrom outside 114 8.2 Constituentsofliking 122 10.1 Socialand evaluativeworlds for the threemodesof thought 166-7 Tablesin appendices A.l Associationtypesin the third free-associationstudy B.l Analysis ofidle thoughts C.1 Reliabilities of the Modesof ThoughtQuestionnairesubscales C.2 Rotatedfactor matrix ofMOTQ subscales C.3 IntercorrelationsofMOTQ modescales C.4 MOTQ subscaleand modescores:meansand standarddeviations for men andwomen C.5 Cognitive biasesby faculty

186 188-9 200 201 201 202 202

D.1 E.1 E.2

F.1 G.1

Cognitive correlatesof the MOTQ scales 204-5 Correlatesof the MOTQ cross-modalsubscalein the portraitsstudy 207 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales i Cattell's16PF 208-11 ii The PersonalOrientationInventory 212-15 iii Othertests 216-19 Evaluations:reasonsevokedby speCificanimals 222-3 Constituentsof emotionalexperiences,for the total sampleand for particularemotions 226-8

Acknowledgements

Many peoplehavehelpedin the making of this book. My foremostdebtis to all the peoplewho willingly filled in questionnaires,talked into tape recorders,or kept diaries.Without their help therewould havebeenno book. I am grateful to a number of people who have acted as secondjudges in coding the qualitative data: BrendaShrensky,Chris Simms, SeanHammond, Richard Bird, Bob Michell, Gay 6 Crualaoich,SeamusFeehanand Elizabeth Dunne.I am grateful also to GeorgeDelafield, Des MacHale,GraceNeville and Tony O'Mahoney,who all helped in various ways with the MOTQ standardization work. ElizabethDunneand SeanHammondare includedamongthe secondjudges, but my debt to them extendswell beyond this: they were my co-workers on some of the studies of chapters5 and 6, and I have often had reasonto be thankful for their advice,expertiseand generalcivilizedness.The National Board for ScienceandTechnologyfinancedthis part of the work. Someof the writing was done while on sabbaticalin Australia. Alan Richardson, at the University of WesternAustralia,was especiallygenerouswith his time and thoughts,and I haveprofited greatlyfrom discussionswith him. Both he and Robin Winkler madeusefulsuggestionson somedraft chapters.I would alsolike to thank PeterSheehanfor arrangingmy sojournin Brisbane. At a later stageDavid SalterandJohnAntrobus read the entire manuscriptfor Methuen,and madea numberof sensibleand sensitivesuggestionsfor improvement. The writing has only beenthe final stageof a longer journey. On that journey

many peoplehave provided the right kind of academicstimulation, or support of more generalkinds: I am grateful in various ways to Roy Davis, John Brown, Peter Dempsey,Richard Donovan, Michael Howley, David Routh, Rom Harre, JudyKravis, Theo Dorgan,the Hardy family, my own family and to my colleagues andstudentsat Newcastleand Cork. SusanAylwin Reidhledn April 1984

Part

1

The threeforms of representation

1 Introduction

This book is aboutthe relationshipbetweenthoughtand feeling; which is not a simplematter. At their closest, thought and feeling are inextricably linked. Many cultures accountfor the beginningof all things by saying that first there was chaos,and thenthe chaoswas partitionedinto two: an upperpart calledsky or heaven,anda lower part calledearth.At a singlestrokethe universeacqUiredboth structureand value.The impositionof acognitiveoppositionhaddirect affectivecomplements: there was then a spatially higher part, which was also the spiritually better part, with humanbeings,for complicatedreasons,being confinedto the spatiallyand morally lower part. In suchmytholOgicalaccountsthe samestructure,opposition, hasboth cognitiveandaffective aspects. An equally close relationship betweenthought and feeling is found in the experienceof insight. Herethe excitementaccompanyingthe cognitivecontentis what tells the thinker the ideais a good one. At the momentof insight, truth is as much a matter of feeling as it is of thought. Polanyi (1958) assigns these 'intellectual passions' a vital role in science becausethey indicate what is SCientifically important. Unguidedby them, he says,researchwould spreadout into a desertof trivialities. The relationshipis not always so close. Often thought and feeling come far enough apart for one to be seenas the causeof the other. Some people tell themselveshow awful they are, and how hopelesstheir life is, and manageto think themselvesinto depression(Beck, 1963). The relationshipmay work both

4

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

ways here, and people can sometimesbe helped to think their way out of depressionagain,usingone of the techniquesof cognitivebehaviourtherapy. The thoughtscannotalways be assumedto lead the feelings however.Wolpe (1978a and b) describeshow some patientsremain phobic even though they know, rationally, that the object of their terror will not harm them. Here feeling is immune to cognitive interference,either becausethe feelings come first, or becausethought and feeling are simply separate.Zajonc (1980) has recently suggestedthat in manysituationsaffective processinghas primacyover cognitive processing,and that in somesituationsthe two may be virtually independentof eachother. Sometimesthought and feeling are the two inseparablefacets of a Single process;sometimesone causesthe other; sometimesthey are separate.When a number of accountscan be given of the relationshipbetweentwo things, it is safestto assumethat the relationshipis complex.Therearemanywaysof thinking and manyways of feeling, and theremay be manykinds of relationshipbetween them.

An anchoring of tenns Ryle (1949), in discussingthe word emotion, lets the term range freely over a numberof common-sense eqUivalents.In the presentwork the meaningof the term feeling is allowed to rangefreely in a similar way and over much of the same territory. Feeling may thus refer to evaluations, motives, personality traits, emotions; and generally to any of the loose aggregateof phenomenawhich psychologistsnormally classas 'affective'. In everydayspeechthe term thinking has almost as many usesas does feeling. However, with the meaningof one term left open it is as well to have some stringencyin the definition of the other.The empiricalwork that follows looks at thinking in terms of the different kinds of representationthat may be used in the thought process.This has the effect of anchOringthe cognitive end of the relationshipbetweenthoughtandfeeling in a substantialbody of researchon the topiC of representations. The developmentalevidence suggeststhat there are three main forms of representation:enactive,visual and verbal, eachoriginating in a different period of childhood. At first the child's world is known to him principally by the habitualactionshe usesfor coping with it. In time there is addeda techniqueof representation throughimagerythat is relatively free of action. Graduallythereis addeda new and powerful methodof translatingaction andimageinto language,providing still a third systemof representation.(Bruner, 1966,p. 1) The three systemsof representationbegin as ways of interactingwith the real world, and gradually become internalized, so that as adults we have three

INTRODUCTION

different though interconnectedforms of representationavailable to us: inner

speech,or verbal representation;visual imagery or 'picturesin the mind's eye'; and enactiveimagery,a kind ofimaginedactionor role play.! All three are availablefor a wide variety of tasks.When readinga novel some peoplewill mutterthe wordsto themselvesundertheir breathandrely mainly on inner speech;somewill follow the plot throughpicturesin their mind's eye; and someV\ill identifY with the hero or heroineandfollow the plot throughimagined action. Mostpeoplecanswitch their strategydependingon what they are reading: verbal representationfor abstract and technical matters; visual and enactive representations for goodescapistfiction. One of the advantagesof elaboratingthinking in terms of different forms of representationis that much of recent cognitive psychology has also been concernedwith the topic of representation.This cognitive work hasfocusedon the topiC at two different levels: an abstractlevel, concernedwith the representation of meaningin semanticmemory; and a phenomenalor holistic level, concernedwith the surfacepropertiesof the different forms of representation. Both theseapproacheswill tum out to be useful in explOring the relationships betweenthoughtandfeeling. The researchon representations at both levelshasbeenin a primarily cognitive 2 Someadditional tradition, with relatively little referenceto affectivephenomena. idea is therefore neededas an intellectual springboardto project an initial tentativelink betweenthoughtandfeeling. The notion of cognitivestyle is useful here. Cognitive style

The idea of cognitive style is rooted in the psychoanalytictradition, from which it aroseas a way of explaining how the impulsive and passionateid could be controlled by the more intellectual and reality-orientatedego. Klein (1958) describescognitive styles as involving particularpatternsof cognitive structures, with the structuresbeing responsibleboth for making senseof reality and for channellinginstinctualenergyinto it. Cognitive styles thus involve the idea of structural relationshipsbetweenthoughtand feeling. Within cognitive style researchitself. the structural componentremained rudimentary, and was never articulated further than Rapaport'sreferenceto 'information; habits; concepts;antiCipatory, grammatical,syntactic, and other lOgical patterns,etc.' (1959, p. 126). Many changeshave taken place in psycholOgical theory since he was writing, and it may now be possibleto interpretthe structuresunderlyingcognitivestylesin a newway, in termsof the structuresused to describethe organizationof semanticmemory. This provides the follOwing interrelatedsetof ideaswhich serveas the starting-pointfor the empiricalwork. Firstly: verbal.visual and enactivemodesof thoughtmay utilize different kinds of cognitivestructures.

5

6

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Secondly: if these structuresdo have the dual cognitive and affective role assignedto them in the cognitive style tradition, then the different cognitive structuresshould have particular kinds of affects and feelings associatedwith them. More generallythis meansthat there should be systematicand structural relationshipsbetweenthoughtandfeeling in the threeforms of representation. Thirdly: there may be 'representational styles'just as thereare cognitive styles of other kinds, with people shOwing biasesin the use theymake of the three forms of thought. Fourthly: these representationalbiasesshould be associatedwith particular styles in personality. Verbalizers, visualizers and enactive imagers should be different kinds of people,with distinct personalitycharacteristics. The empirical exploration of these interconnectedideas has required the detailedqualitative examinationof both cognitive representationsand affective experiences,using relatively simple observationaland descriptivetechniques.It has seemedimportant to observewhat there is first, and to quantifY it afterwards; and much of the work that follows thereforeuses initial qualitative analyses, followed by quantification.3 Plan of the book

The book is divided into three parts. Part one is mainly concernedwith comparisonsbetween verbal, visual and enactive representations:chapter 2 provides backgroundsketchesof some of the things already known about each mode of thought; and chapter 3 elucidatesthe characteristiccognitive structuresof each form of representation,using a modified free-association technique.It also examinesthe problematicnotion of structure,and suggeststhat structuresbe seenas describingpatternsof temporal organization.Chapter4 sketchesthe affective concomitantsof thesecognitive structuresby looking at day-dreamswhich occur in verbal, visual and enactivemodes.As a more formal approachto the samegeneraltopic, chapter5 describessomework with the representational biaseson the Modesof ThoughtQuestionnaire,which assesses basisof cognitive structures;and chapter6 usesthis questionnaireto relate the structuresto personality. Part two takes up affective issues specific to particular modes of thought. Chapter7 looks at evaluativeaspectsof the hierarchicalorganizationof inner of an important visual speech;chapter8 explores theaffective consequences structure - the relationship betweenobject and environment; and chapter9 examinesthe strongemotionsimportantin enactiveimagery. Part three returns to generalissuesand attemptsto integratethe findings. It consistsof two chapters.Chapter10 reviews what has been discoveredof the relationshipsbetweenthought and feeling in the three forms of representation, and makessome suggestionsabout how they can be accommodatedwithin a unified theory. The final chapterconsidersthe three forms of representationas

INTRODUCTION

integratedaspectsof a single cognitive system.It looks at the accountsof reality given by the threemodesof thought,andat how scienceequilibratesthemagainst eachother.

7

2 Preliminary sketchesof the three modesof thought

Speech, VISIon and action are the three main ways human beings have of interactingwith, making senseof. and contributingto their world. Verbal, visual andenactivemodesof thoughtare their internalizedversions. All threeforms of representationhavebeenproposed,at one time or another, as the main bearerof meaning,thoughit is only for languagethat thereexistsany detailed accountof semanticstructure.Within visual imagery there are heated debatesabout structure; and for enactive imagery there is no coherentbody of work at all. It may be that action, as the foundation of all later cognitive development,is buried deepestandis the mostdifficult to articulate. This chapterreviews someof the generalcharacteristicsof the threeforms of representation,fOCUSing wherepossibleon two kinds of properties:the affective aspectsof the representations,which usually emergein the context of psychotherapeuticwork; and the structural features,which will be important later in elaboratingthe notion of cognitive style. Thoughsomework has beendone on comparingthe three forms of thought, it is convenientat this stageto consider eachmodeof representationseparately.

Inner speech Intuition suggeststhat inner speechis quieter and often less polite than outer speech,but is fundamentallythe samesort of thing. Internalizedverbal representationis derived from externallanguage,and thus sharesmany of the same

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

properties.For example,inner speech,like the external form, can be seen as having a linear and sequentialorganization,which makes it useful for coding information organizedin the sameway (Paivio and Csapo,1969).It is alsoseenas beingconceptualand abstractin nature:internal words, like externalones,refer to generalclassesof objectsandevents,andcanbe usefulfor rememberingabstract information (Paivio and Foth, 1970). The internalizationof speechoccursat aboutschoolage.A transitionalstageis egocentricspeech,wherechildrentalk out loud, but to themselvesratherthanto anyoneelse (Piaget, 1959). It is a short step from talking to oneselfoutsidethe headto talking to oneselfinsideit. Inner speechhas an important self-directive function (Luria, 1961), in that peopleuseit to tell themselveswhat they oughtto do. Children also do this out loud. Adults only do it out loud if there is no one else listening, or if they are thinking aboutsomethingvery difficult. Adults may also talk to themselvesin negativeand non-copingways. Hollon and Kendall'swork (1980) indicatesthat many depressedpeopletell themselves suchthings as, 'I feel like I'm up againstthe world', 'I'm no good','I've let people down', 'I don't think I cango on'. and 'It's just not worth it'. On the positive side. modifYing what people say to themselvescan be therapeuticallyhelpful. The classictreatmentis Coue's'Every day. in every way. I am becomingbetterand better.' Formal training in self-instruction(Meichenbaum. 1976; Meichenbaumand Cameron.1974) is also useful in supplementing verbal controls over behaviour.It may be especiallyuseful for peopleliable to outbursts of anger. who can thus learn to talk themselvesinto self-restraint (Camp.1977; Novaco,1979).

Structurein language Vygotsky (1962) claimsthat thereare structuraldifferencesbetweeninner speech and speechdestinedfor others.The most noticeableof thesedifferencesis that innerspeechcharacteristicallyconsistsof predicateswithout subjects;a commentary on topics which themselvesare linguistically unspecified.Inner speechmay also occur in a highly contractedform, as Sokolov (1972) has confirmed. Only when thinking encountersproblemsdoesthe telegraphese needexpandinginto a semblanceof externalgrammar. Lacking a detailed grammar for inner speechitself, we must assume,provisionally. that its structuresarethoseoflanguage.thoughperhapsit includesonly someof them. or in simplified form. Although Chomsky first introducedcognitive psychologyto linguistic structures,the syntacticemphasisof his work makesit lessrelevantherethan systems whose concern extendsto semantics.One of the key figures here is Charles Fillmore (1968, 1971), who seessome important linguistic structuresas being both syntactic and semantic.His ideas have clear psychologicalrelevanceand

9

10

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

havebeenincorporatedinto severalmodelsof semanticmemory (e.g.: Kintsch, 1972;Rumelhart,LindsayandNorman,1972).Theyhavealsobeenwidely usedin developmentalpsycholinguistics(e.g.: Braine and Wells, 1978; Braine and Hardy, 1982; GleitmanandWanner,1982). For Fillmore, in orderto makesenseof the world we needto be able to make a small numberof key judgmentsabout it. If somethinghappens,we need to know who did it, where, what with, why, who to, and with what result. These judgmentsare reflectedin languagein particularcases.1 If the answerto Who did it? is Daniel did it, then Daniel, as the agentof the action, takesagentivecase;andhe takesit in bothDaniel plantedthe cabbagesandThe cabbages were planted by Daniel. Agency is thus a semanticrelationshipindependentof the particularsyntacticform of the sentence. The casesthat seemto be reqUired are given in the follOwing list, taken froin Fillmore (1971), with some modifications from Chafe (1970), and Braine and Hardy (1982). Agent- the animatebeingwho instigatesthe action. Instrument- the thing causallyinvolved in the action. Locative- wherethe action occurs,or moregenerally,wheresomethingis. Resultant- the resultof the action. Experiencer- the animatebeingwho feels or experiencessomething. Subjectof attribution- that to which qualities,locationsandintransitiveactionsare attributed. Objective - the case used for anything else, including things acted upon or experienced. Someexamples: Sean (agent) unlocked the car (objective) in the garage(locative) with a key (instrument). Jane (experiencer)was happy. She (agent) had just carved a wooden bowl (resultant). The pigeon(subjectof attribution) was sitting on the roof(locative).

Are linguistic structuresonly linguistic? One of the questionsthat needsto be raisedaboutcasegrammaris the extentto which the structuresit describesare speCifically linguistic. Fillmore seescase structuresas having both syntacticand semanticproperties,and as representing kinds of judgments people make about the world and events in it. Some developmentalpsycholinguists go further, and claim that the structuresseenin languageare largely derivative, originating in the structuresof perceptionor action (seeGleitmanandWanner,1982,for a recentreview). As long agoas 1971,Osgoodpointedout that the subject-verb-object structure oflanguagehasthe sameform, andmay be derivedfrom, the actor-action-object form of real actions. He maintains that the non-linguistic cognitive systemis

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

'where sentencescome from' in sentencecreating by speakers,and where sentences'go to' in being understoodby listeners.In similar vein, Bever (1970) providesa long list of featuresof linguistic processingwhich appearto be taken overfrom perception.2 On casecategoriesspecifically,Bruner(1975)suggeststhat theseoriginatein interactiverelationshipsbetweenmotherand child. Language structurewould thus havea socialorigin, at leastin part. Though the dependenceof languageon non-linguistic functioning is most visible in early childhood,it canalsobe spottedin adults.Occasionallypeopleuse language'magically' (Wernerand Kaplan, 1963), confusingsymbol and referent, andattributingthe propertiesof the objectto the word. Swearwordsmostclearly retainthis potency,andthe wordsthemselvesbecometabooalongwith whatever unmentionableit is that they refer to. Wernerand Kaplan discussspells,general invective and love talk in this context. They point out that ostenSiblyneutral words are also contaminatedby their referents.The word lowering, for example, tendsto be apprehended as lower in the visualfield thandoesthe word raising. The dependenceof language, even for its structure, on other modes of cognition, meansthat we cannotbe sure whether the structuresdescribedfor languageareits own, or borrowed.The medium(noise,words) is its own, but the structuresmay not be. I take the unravellingof which form of representationis responsiblefor which type of structureto be an empiricalmatter. Pendingthe evidence,I shall use verbal representationor inner speechto refer to what is peculiarly linguistic, to what words can do without the supportof other forms of representation;andlanguageor linguistic to refer to the full rangeof effects of which words are capable, including those cases where the effects are dependenton the presenceof somenon-verbalrepresentation. Visual imagery

To explain to a non-psychologistthat 'visual imagery' refers to 'pictures in the mind's eye' is enlightening. To explain the same thing to psycholOgistsis contentious.The difficulty is that, as with all metaphors,the idea of mental pictureshasa good deal of aptness,but it also haslimits, noticedonly when one haspassedbeyondthem andis well into nonsense.Nonsensein this casewould includethe ideathat thereis a placecalled'mind' which hasthingscalled 'images' in it. Ryle (1949) suggeststhat imagesdo not involve the real seeingof ephemeral 'pictures',but the as-if'seeing'of real ones.For him the differencebetweenimage andreality is not in the ontologicalstatusof the thing (or 'thing') perceived,but in the act of perceiving (or 'perceiving') itself Sarbin (1972) takes this further in describingimagining as 'hypotheticalinstantiation',or as-if behaviour.Neisser's (1976, 1978) analysisof imagery as the anticipationof perceivinga stateof affairs thoughwithout that stateof affairs actually arriving to be perceived,attemptsto tackle the sameproblem.

11

12

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Theseareimportantanalyses,but it still remainstrue that 'picturesin the mind's eye' providesa usefulmetaphorfor thosewishing to communicatewith ordinary mortals,and perhapsto enlist their aid as subjectsin imageryexperiments. The metaphoris useful too in pointing up parallelsbetweenthe processingof real picturesand the processingof imaginary ones. That the two use the same processingsystemis shownby the fact that imagesand picturesmay sometimes be mistaken for one another (Perky, 1910; Segal, 1971), and may sometimes interferewith oneanother(Brooks, 1968;Atwood, 1971). Oneof the mostimportantpropertiesof this sharedsystemis its spatial-parallel organization.This allows a number of items to be depictedSimultaneouslyin space,and haspowerful effectson learning(Paivio, 1971). The generaleffect has beenknown sincethe time of the poetSimonidesof Ceos,who, in about500 Be, was fortunate enoughto be called away from a banquetjust before the roof collapsed.According to FrancesYates's account, he managedto identifY the victims, althoughtheywerecrushedbeyondrecognition,by rememberingwhere they had beensitting. Thus was born the 'Method of Loci', wherebyitems to be rememberedare imagined as arranged in the mnemonic niches of some well-known place. That imageryis a spatialmediumis supportedby Kosslyn'swork (1973),which shows the resemblancebetweenscanningthe 'space'of mental pictures and scanningactual pictures.The greaterthe distancebetweenthe two parts of the 'picture',the longerit takesto scanbetweenthem. The spatialcapaCityof visual imageryis suchthat up to twenty items may all be imagedtogetherin on~ compositeimaginal scenewithout interfering with one composite another (Bower, 1972). Not surprisingly, when a mere two items have to be integrated together, as in paired-associatelearning, visual imagery has an equivalentlypowerful effect.

Imageryin psychotherapy The similarity betweenimaginary'seeing'andreal seeingallows imagesto be used as substitutesfor the real thing. This is importantin psychotherapy(Singer, 1974; Tower and Singer, 1981; Strosahland Ascough, 1981). If people show similar emotionalresponses to imagesasto real equivalents,thentreatmentmay proceed using convenientmentalrepresentationratherthan inconvenientand unwieldy reality. Thus in Wolpe's (1958) systematicdesensitizationof phobias,the spider phobiCimaginesasequenceof scenarioswhich areincreasinglyrelatedto spiders, and eventuallyimaginesspidersthemselves.In Cautela'S(1970) covertconditioning, positive reinforcementsfor imaginedhealthy conduct consist of imagined rewards(chosenfrom Cautelaand Kastenbaum'sreinforcementsurveyschedule (1967)); and imaginedundesirablebehaviouris covertly punishedwith images of nauseatingoccurrences(CautelaandWisocki, 1971). Where comparisonshave beenmade,imagesare not quite as good as the real

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

thing (see Bandura,1977; Dyckman and Cowan, 1978), but then real things are expensive,and may be difficult for even therapiststo manipulate(real snakes, real spiders,real nauseatingoccurrences). Imagerydoesnot only function in psychotherapyas a substitutefor reality. It is also used as a vehicle of communicationbetweenunconsciousand conscious parts of the mind. Visual imagesmay revealimportantinformation in much the sameway asdreams.Kanzer(1958) reportsthat in classicalpsychoanalysis, images cropping up during the free-associationprocesswere consideredas 'secret islands of repression'.This is partly becausethe free-associativeprocesswas supposedto be a matter of bringing things into words. When people are encouragedto make use of such imagesthey often reveal material less eaSily accessibleto language(Reyher,1963;ReyherandSmeltzer,1968). A number of techniques,including Leuner's (1977, 1978) guided affective imagery, systematically exploit the close relation between images and the unconsciousfor diagnostic and therapeuticpurposes.It is assumedthat if a person'sunconsciousprocessescan be tapped, they are the best source of information aboutwhat is wrong, and aboutwhat may heal it. Jaffe and Bresler (1980) refer to the 'Inner Advisor' as a personificationof this sourceof intuitive innerguidance,and Emmons's(1980) 'InnerSource'servessimilar functions.3

Role of vividness One of the more researchedcharacteristicsof visual imagery is its vividness. Vividness is often interpreted,if taCitly, as a measureof the extentto which the image approachesreality. The most frequently used instrument for assessing vividness, Sheehan's(1967) version of the Betts's (1909) Questionnaireupon Mental Imagery,askspeopleto rate the vividnessof their imagesin comparison with actualsensoryexperiences. how close an imageapproachesa 'percept',thenit stands If vividnessassesses to reasonthat a vivid imageis a first-class honourssort ofimage,anda faint image is a mere lower second.Whatevercan be done with imagesought to be done betterwith a vivid one. This assumptionhas been proved true in one area. In incidental learning, people with more vivid images are able to remember more. This is true particularly of pictorial material (Sheehanand Neisser, 1969) but is also found with words (Morris and Gale, 1974). As soon as we start looking at intentional learning the matter becomesconfused, with occasionalpositive relationships,but with the majority of studies shOwing that vividness does not have any Significant effect (Morelli and Lang, 1971; Rehm, 1973; Calvano, 1974). Imagery does promote learning, as many studiesusingimageryinstructionsshow,but it doesnot seemto matterhow vivid the imagesare. Bartlett (1921) suggestedthat vivid imagerymay in fact increasea person'sconfidencein their recall far more thanit increasestheir accuracy.

13

14

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

One source of the confusion may be that people who are capableof vivid imagery are not necessarilyusing it in the learning situation examined.This analysisis supportedby the fact that thereis a relationshipbetweenvividnessand intentional learning when they are assessedon the same task (Danaherand 1972; Thoresen,1972;Marks, 19T~b). The confusionsover the role of vividness in learning also arise in its role in psychotherapy.Vividness doesnot seemto relate to the emotionalintensity of imageryin phobics(Weertsand Lang, 1978; Lang, Melamedand Hart, 1970),nor doesit predictthe outcomeof systematicdesensitization(McLemore,1972). One of the problemsmay be that here,as in learning,peoplewho are capable of vivid imagerymay not be usingit in the therapysituation.If they do useit then the relationship between vividness and therapeutic improvement becomes stronger.WisQcki (1973) found that covert reinforcementwas more effective in changinganxiety level, the more vivid the reinforcing image.Similarly Dyckman andCowan(1978) found thatthe vividnessof the imageryactuallyusedin therapy was a betterpredictorof the outcomethan pretherapyvividnessratings.Phillips (1971) has tried training people in the use of imagery, with preliminary but hopefulresults. A further problem here is that the emotions beingtreated are not unitary phenomena,and imagerymight be impinging only on one aspectof them. Lang (1968)suggeststhatfear is represented in threesystems:the verbal(cognitive),the overt motor, and the somatic. Odom, Nelson and Wein (1978) found that different therapieshad different effects on thesethree systems(thoughimagery basedsystematicdesensitizationwas relatively ineffectivein all three).

Structuresin visual imagery Whether or not visual imagery has a structure, eqUivalent to the syntacticsemanticstructureoflanguage,hasbeena topiC of considerabledebate. The generalargumentcan be polarizedaroundtwo positions. One is representedby Paivio's (1971, 1976) dual-codinghypotheSiS.This supposesthat the meaningof a concreteword is the imageit refersto. The imagesderive Originally from perceptionandare storedin one half oflong-termmemory.The otherhalf of the dual-codinghypotheSiSis that the meaningof abstractwordsis represented in verbalform andstoredas suchin the verbalhalf oflong-termmemory. Paivio'saccountis relatedto a long philosophicaltradition of seeingmeaning as 'thing' rather than as relationship. Within such a generalview, structureis relatively unimportantand Paivio only talks about'associations'of rathergeneral kinds (e.g. betweenwords or betweenwords andimages). The other pole of the argumentis representedby Pylyshyn (1973, 1979), who maintainsthatimagesarenot storedin long-termmemory,beingthemselvesonly epiphenomena.The real phenomenaconsist of abstract and a-modal propositional structureswhich underlie images,and to which we haveno conscious

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

access.In other words, there are structuresrelated to imagery, but they are in abstractratherthan imagistic form. They are behind or beneathimagery, rather thanin it. We eitherhaveno structureto speakof, only mental'things' (images,pictures), or a structureindependentof imagery.An importantintermediatepositionis put by Kosslyn (1973. 1978; Kosslyn and Pomerantz,1977; Kosslyn, Pinker,Pinker, Sm~ and Schwartz, 1979) for whom imagery does have a structure, which may be representedin analogue(i.e. imagistic) form. The generaltendencynow is towards compromisepositions of one kind or another(e.g.: Marscharkand Paivio, 1977; Kieras, 1978; Anderson,1978; Palmer, 1978), with peopletendingto assumethat it may be expedientto include both imagistic and propositionalrepresentations. Evenwhen they both codethe same stateof affairs oneform may haveprocessingadvantages.For example,the image rotation data of Shepardand his colleagues(Shepardand Metzler, 1971; Cooper andShepard,1973) are more easilyaccountedfor by analoguerepresentations. The questionof why it has beena matterof so much contentionthat imagery mayhavea structure,andparticularlya structureof its own, is an interestingonein its own right. The problemoriginatesin the fact that the effectivenessof imagery as a mnemonicoccludedfor a long time the pOSSibility of any other role being envisagedfor it. This contrastswith work in linguistics, which has emphasized linguistic creativityas providing vital insightinto linguistic structure. Chomsky (1959) emphasizedthat we can all use languagecreatively, and, at least in prinCiple, producesentenceshitherto unheardin the universe.This is becauseany sentenceframework can be usedto generatean enormousnumber of different sentences.It is the exerciseof this creativity that revealsstructure, becauseit allows us to seethat the syntacticskeletonmay remainthe same,while the contents,the particular words, may vary. The constraintson what may be changedwhile we still get senserevealthe structuresgoverningthe sense. In classicalmemorystudiesit is accuracyratherthancreativitythat is important. Indeedcreativitywould be seenas responSibleonly for errors.If we focus on the information that remains unchangedbetweengoing into and coming out of memory,thennothing,not evenlanguage,would be seenashaving anystructure. A sentenceunchangedbetweeninput and output would be functioning as a structurelessunit, and not as languageas we know it. Not surpriSingly,the image that passesunchangedthroughmemorydoesnot showany structureeither. The memorytaskis simply not one conduciveto the exhibition of structure. In otherwords,we lack a grammarof the imagebecausethe tasksusedin much imageryresearchhavenot beensuchas to revealone. Linguistshavenotoriously stretched linguistic creativity to its limits in order to unravel its structure. Psychologistsworking with imageryhavebeendistinctly lessimaginative. That imagesdo have a structureis indicatedby the fact that there are certain things we can do, and others we cannot, even in imagination. We can, for example,changethe colour of an imagined swan to black, or green, or pink,

15

16

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

leavingthe restof the imageuntouched.We canprobablytakethe legsoffand put wheelson (at leastaftersomeexperienceof cartoonfilms). We haveto replacethe legs with somethingof a broadly similar sort, somethingthat will count as part-of-an-object,or as a means-of-Iocomotion.We cannotreplacethe legs with the pink, for legs are parts andpink is an attribute,and with different ontological statusesthesecannotreplaceoneanotherandyield visual sense. Further and more formal evidencethat it should be possibleto formulate a grammarof the image comes from two directions: from artificial intelligence work on scenerecognition (see D. J. McArthur, 1982); and from the elegant neurophysiologicalwork of Bubel and Wiesel (1979). Whetherthe specificsof work in theseareascan be transferredto a distinctly psychologicalaccountof imagingremainsa moot point. Enactive imagery

The studyof enactiverepresentationis not a well-definedarea,and the following sketchdraws on a rangeof sourceswhich usea variety of terminologies.At this stageassertingthat the variety may be comprehended undera singleheadingis a matterof intuitive judgment.

A foundationfor all knowledge In developmentalpsychology enactive representationsare taken to be the foundationof all subsequent intelligence,andthe meanswherebythe mostbasic aspectsof reahtyareconstructed(Piaget,1954;Bruner,1966).Space,time, the idea of an object, and the conceptof causality,all beginhere; and hereadult thought remainsrooted. Action hasalso beenseenas basicby somesociologists.. The 'generaltheory of action' of Parsonsand Shils (1951) seesaction as the foundation of the personalities of the actors; and of the social system; andof the wider cultural system. Following on from this notion therehasbeena gooddealof work on social action (e.g.: Brenner,1980;von Cranach,Kalbermatten,IndermiihleandGugler, 1982). The relative neglectof action in currentcognitive psychologycontrastsrather strongly with this developmentaland social emphasis.In the past, however, action has beenseenas epistemologicallyimportant for adults and individuals, andtherearesomesignsthat it is beginningto be so again. On the historical side therehavebeen numberof motor theoriesof thought and consciousness. Washburn(1916) assumedthat all consciousness depended upon 'tentativemovements'which were reducedand inhibited versionsof real actions.Similarly, Titchener(1909), saw action and bodily attitudeas being at the origin of meaning, with the sensationsderiving from how one physically confrontsa particularsituation being what gives that situation meaning.Be did, however, criticize motor theories in general for their lop-sidedness,and for

a

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

disregardingthe fact that we had developedmodesof thought apart from the motor. One of the problemswith motor theorieshas beenthe precisecontributionof the bodily component,and whetherthis is centrallyor peripherallyrepresented. Assumingparticularkinaestheticsensationsto representthe meaningof particular actionsis problematicin so far asfor manyactions(assassinating the president; going to the library) no specific muscularcontribution is necessarilyimplicated. It should be noted that not aH motor theoriesare entirely naIve on this point. Despitethe crude neurophysiologyof the times, Washburnspeculatedthat the cortex,not the muscles,wasthe organof the tentativemovementsresponsiblefor consciousness. Weimer (1974,1977)hasrecentlyarguedthat motor theoriesof the mind may be moreappropriateto cognitivephenomenathansomeof our currrent'sensory' conceptions.A motor theorywould hold that we representknowledgeof objects in terms of the actions we use in interactingwith them. A sensorytheory sees knowledgeas thing ratherthan process.Weimer'sconceptionof a motor theory is elaboratedin terms of both neurophysiologyand information processing.His stresson representingknowledgein termsof the proceduresusedto acquireit is similar to the recentinterestin 'proceduralsemantics'(e.g.:Winograd,1972,1975; Miller and Johnson-Laird,1976). Norman (1973) also holds that we represent knowledgein terms of 'plans', and suggeststhat someof theseare in sensorimotor form. Thus walking would be representedin terms of the sensorimotor routine used for performing it (and not in terms of an abstract semantic deSCription). All theserecenttrendsdo not tozetheramountto a newmotor theory, but they do suggesta renewedawarenessof the epistemologicalimportanceof actionand of the internalor centralrepresentation of action.

Action, agencyand the first person The relative neglect of action is grounded historically in the behaviourists' demotionof actionto objectivelyobservableandmeaninglessmuscletwitches.It is groundedmore recentlyin the dominanceof the computeras the epistemolOgical standardto which humanactivity mustbe compared,and which has been the unwitting hostof a new objectivism. The crucial featureof action is that, in the end, it is what eachindividual must do for him orinvolves her~elf. It involves a first-person-singularagent, who cannot be replacedby the second-person observer,or the third-personreporter.Watching someoneelse doing the action is not the sameas doing it; and hearingaboutit afterwardsis evenfurther removed.But accordingto the impersonallogic of the computer,theseare not Significantdifferences. For artificial intelligence, the propositionA does X remainstrue regardlessof whether1, my Sibling, or the man on the Claphamomnibushappensto be A, and

17

18

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

to do X. Organiclife, for betteror worse, doesnot offer this sereneimpartiality. Most of us must recall as children being the resentfulB when it was A who was gettingto ride the ponyor shootthe airgun.To individual humanbeingsit canbe a matterof enormoussignificancewho is involved in the action,who is watching, andwho is only told aboutit. It mattersalsoin law. There are somesigns, within cognitive psychology,of an awarenessthat the first-personSingularhasa uniqueepistemologicalposition.PichertandAnderson (1977) and Andersonand Pichert (1978) report work which shows the importance of taking a particular individual's viewpoint for rememberingdetails of a story only accessiblefrom that viewpoint. Bower (1978) extendsthis to memory for moodsand feelings: to rememberhow a characterwas feeling it is helpful to haveidentified with that characterduring learning. Agency is, however,more than a viewpoint, and thoughthe notion of agency may be philosophicallyproblematic,there can be no doubt of its psychological importance. Human beings denied agency and the freedom of action that supportsit, lapseinto helplessness, self-deprecationand other signs of depression, and even death(Seligman,1975; Maier and Seligman,1976; Bandura,1977, 1980). Conversely,people who feel they have some choice in what they do, expressgreatersatisfactionwith their lot, whetherthis be the lot of a university student(Uem, 1975) or that of an old personin an institution (Schulz,1976). A number of terms have been used to describewhat people are exercising when acting as agents.White (1959) calls it competence;de Charms(1968) calls it personal causation; Bandura (1977) calls it self-efficacy. Agency, under whatever heading, is complex. It includes an assumptionof motivation; that there are reasons(including emotionalones)for makingonedecisionratherthan another, or for wanting to exerciseone's competencein a particular way. Agency also involves the notion of purposeand intention, and envisagesa future in which it will be better if we do X than if we fail to do X or if we do Y. Agency, motive, purposeandthe future areinterrelatedconceptshere.

Kinaesthesisin psychotherapy Overt action and covertenactiveimagerymusthavea centralrepresentation,but they are alsoembodied.Action which is blockedcan lead to the chronic muscular tensionwhich is a featureof many forms of emotionalmaladjustment(Plutchik, 1954).It is sometimestherapeuticallyeffectiveto work directly on thesetensions. Jacobson(1938) found that attention,thought and emotion all diminish with progressiverelaxation;and becauseof this, relaxationtraining is often usedas a preludeto or in combinationwith otherforms of therapy.Work by Wolpin and Kirsch (1974), examining the effects of relaxation and tension in systematic desensitization,showedthat generalmusculartensionSignificantly increasesthe emotionalityof images,without havingany effect on their vividness. A similar divorce betweenvividnesson the onehand,andemotionandbodily

PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

involvementon the other,is found in Lang'swork (1979aandb). He distinguishes between images which represent 'stimulus propositions' and those which represent'responsepropositions'.The differenceis betweenthe representation of an event,suchas being trappedin an overheatedsauna,throughits objective properties (stimulus propositions: 'Thick clouds of white mist swirl round you.... The largewoodendooris tightly closed.'), andits representationthrough the effect on oneselfas the personinvolved (responsepropositions:'You sweat greatbucketsof perspiration.... You pull with all your strengthon the door.'). His distinction betweenstimuluspropositionsand responsepropositionsparallels the distinction betweenvisual and enactiveimagery.Enactiverepresentation is emotional representation,and is conceptuallydistinct from visual imagery which contributesvividness. Other bodily orientedtechniquesused in psychotherapyhave receivedless formal testingand are difficult to assess.Sometherapists(e.g.: Reich, 1968; Rolf. 1977) maintainthat physicalwork on particularmusclegroupsand their skeletal attachmentsmay be helpful. Others emphasizethe importanceof bodily expressionin a variety of dance and movementtherapies(e.g.: Danehy, 1980; Dendinger,1980; Dosamantes-Alperson, 1980). Imaginedrole play hasalso been used as a way of explOring the factual and the emotional possibilities of the future. In their counselling for decision making, Janis and Mann (1977) ask clients to imaginethat they havealreadydecidedon first oneandthenanotherof their possiblecoursesof action, and to explorethe consequences. They are then in a betterpositionto take the real decision.

Mental practiceand otherfunctions It is widely assumedthat internal enactiverepresentations sharesomecharacteristics with the real actionswhosecovertversionsthey are.This interrelationgains supportfrom the fact that mental practicecan lead to improvementof phYSical skills. If one lacks a private gymnasiumor swimming pool, mental practicecan be used as a convenient alternative. The technique has been used with considerableeffect in the coachingof a number of sports (Vandell, Davis and Clugston, 1943; Start, 1960; Jones, 1965; Richardson,1967a and b). Start and Richardson(1964) found no relationshipbetweenthe efficacy of mentalpractice and the vividnessof the imageryused,and Mahoney(1979), commentingon his interviews with OlympiC gymnasts,suggeststhat what is important here is a proprioceptivesenseof actually doing the action ratherthan any visual component. Two important functions have been discussedin the context of both visual One is spatialfleXibility. This has commonlybeen and enactive representations. assumedto be a visual ability, despiterepeatedfailures to show any relationship betweenit and imagery vividness (Ernest, 1977; Richardson,1977b; DiVesta, Ingersoll and Sunshine,1971; Forisha,1975; Neisser,1970). Piagetand Inhelder's

19

20 THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

(1971) developmentalwork on spatialflexibility showsthat while thereis a visual component,this alone is not sufficient, and the active principle derives from internalizedaction. Yuille and Catchpole(1977) use a Piagetianframework to separatethese two componentsinto the figurative (the visual image) and the operative(operationscarried out on the image). McGee (1979) suggestsa similar distinction betweenan orientation/locationcomponent,and a transformational one. Failuresto show empirical relations betweenspatial flexibility and purely visual imagerymay be becausethe taskin fact requiresan enactivecomponentto transformwhat is otherwiseonly a staticimage. Creativity has also beendiscussedin the contextof both forms of representation. Visual imageryis mentionedby McKellar (1957), Tauberand Green(1959), Forisha (1978), and Shepard (1978); and enactive representationsare also includedby Walkup (1965), andHarrington(1980). The evidencehereis largely anecdotal.Einstein(1954) wrote that his thinking tendedto consistof visual and muscularelements,and the theory of relativity originatedin his imagining what it would be like to travel at the speedof light alongSidea lightwave. S. T. Coleridge (quotedin Gerard, 1954) claimed that he would imaginehimselfidentified with anythingthat espeCiallytook his interest. Gordon (1961) follows up such anecdotesin his brainstorminggroups, and encouragespeopleto use what he calls 'personalanalogy'in thinking through problems.This consistsof getting people to imagine that they are physically identified with the problemthey aretrying to solve. Summary

The three modesof thought have uniquesetsof properties.Verbal representation is linear and sequential,adaptedto dealing with abstractand sequential information, and useful in a variety of self-instructionalways. Visual imagery is spatially organized,making it a very effective mnemonictool. It is also useful in psychotherapyfor both diagnosis and treatment,and sometimesserves as a therapeuticallyadequatesubstitutefor either pleasantor unpleasantrealities. Vividness is an important attribute of visual imagery, and one to which a good deal of researchhas been devoted, though its importance remains unclear. Enactive imagery is studied under a number of different headings.It involves covert action, a first-person-singularperspective,an agentand musculartension. It appearsto be the mostemotionalof the threeforms of representation. Semanticstructurehasonly beenfully articulatedfor language,butit is evident that someof its structuresmay haveoriginatedin non-linguisticrepresentations. Fillmore usesthe ideaof caseswhich havegeneralpsycholOgicalsignificance,and his casegrammaris a usefulgeneralstarting-pointfor describingrepresentational structures.

3 Free associativestructures

Of all the techniquesused in psychology,free associationis one of the most venerable.It has beenwidely usedby clinicians as a diagnostictool (e.g.: lung, 1918; Rapaport, Gill and Schafer, 1968); and it has also been employed by cognitive psychologistsas a way of elucidating associativeand semanticrelationshipsin memory (e.g.: Deese,1965; Cramer, 1968). Galton (1907) usedfree associationto investigate his own thought processesand even divided his associationsinto three representationaltypes; verbal, visual, and what he called 'histrionic'. This chapterlooks at how free associationcanbeusedto elucidatethe cognitive discussionis based structuresof verbal, visual and enactiverepresentations. The on the results of three studies; two of these have been published elsewhere (Aylwin, 1977 and 1981), and the technicaldetails of the third can be found in appendixA. In all threestudiesthe free associationtechniquewas usedin a modified form. Peoplewere given a stimulus item, askedto representit in a particularway - by sayingit to themselves,seeinga pictureof it in their mind'seye,or imaginingthey were it - and then reqUiredto free associateto their representation.By looking at how the responserelatesto the stimulusitem it is possibleto discernthe kind of cognitivestructurecharacterizingthe association. The need to use stimuli that could be representedin all three ways posed somethingof a problem. Any word at all can be said; most, and especiallythe concreteones,canbe visualized;but only the onesreferringto animatebeingscan

22 THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

easilybe identified with. Of the two availablekinds of animatebeing,humansand animals,animalsare the more interesting(as associativestimuli), and dominated the stimulus materials. The different kinds of animals have a range of visual appearancesand a range of behavioursfar in excessof that permitted to the different kinds of humanbeing. The first study (Aylwin, 1977) in fact used only animal stimuli: people were presentedwith individual animalnames,wereaskedto representthe stimulusin a particular way, and then to give a single word response.Here for examplethe stimulus parrot might evoke the associationbird (in which casethe association processexemplifiesan object-superordinate structure),or the stimulus reindeer might evokethe responsegrey (exemplifyingan object-attributestructure). The restrictionto individual stimulus and responsewords is limiting, and the secondstudy (Aylwin, 1981) usedsentencesas stimuli and allowed free-flOwing speechas response.The sentencestimuli were againaboutanimals,for example, parrot is in the sameforest as gorilla, or crocodile snapsat flamingo. Here peoplewere askedto representeachsentenceby eithersayingit to themselves(inner speech); or getting a picture in their mind's eye of the state of affairs describedby the sentence(visual imagery); or by imagining they were the first animal in the sentenceand that whateverthe sentencesaidaboutthat creatureappliedto them (enactiveimagery). The responsesto this were complex, and allowed a correspondinglycomplexcharacterizationof structuralfeatures. The third study (appendixA) revertedto Single word stimuli, but included words from the humanrealm, particularly kinship roles (e.g. uncle) and job roles (e.g. mechanicanddoctor), as well as a variety of abstractwords. As a general summary, the results of these studies indicate that the same stimulusrepresentedin different wayscanhavequite differentmeanings.In other words, verbal, visual and enactiveforms of representationeach lead thought alongparticularcognitivepathwaysandinto different semanticdomains;with the resultthat peoplemay makesenseof the samething in ratherdifferent ways. In brief. inner speechor verbal representationis concernedwith a relatively abstract domain, in which objects are categorizedor pigeon-holed into a hierarchicalclassificationsystem:tigers are a kind of cat, cats are a kind of animal. It is also concernedwith the acousticpropertiesof words,andthusresultsin rhyming associations geiger) and phrasecompletions by the tail). Visual imagery is concernedwith where things are (their environment),and with how things look (their parts and attributes):the tiger is in the forest, it is yellow with black stripesand long white whiskers. Enactiveimagery,imaginingbeingthe tiger, leadsto an awarenessof actionand affect. Interactionsare ve.ry important,both actual and potential,and there is an which awarenessof the motives which prompt action and the consequences follow: tiger is hungryand he goesand stalksa deerin the hopeof getting himself a meal. The same starting-point, tiger, can thus lead to quite different associative patterns,dependingon how it is represented.Table 3.1 summarizesin a more

(tiger~

(tiger~

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

formal way the characteristiccognitive structuresused by the three forms of representation.There are problemswith interpretingthe precisenature of the cognitive structuresreachedthroughthe free associationtechnique,but because it is easierto discussconcretefindings than abstractprinciples,a considerationof these difficulties is deferreduntil the end of the chapter (,Some thoughts on "structure"'). The following sectionsdiscussthe associativecharacteristicsin detail for each of the threeforms of representation in tum.

Structures in inner speech The instruction to representthe stimuli verbally resultedin a set of associations which indicate that inner speechhas three importantgeneralproperties.These are its propensity for hierarchical or taxonomic order; its focus on typical instances;and its dereferentialization(its tendencyto becomedetachedfrom what it refersto).

Taxonomicorganization Hierarchicalclassificationpresupposes two operations:the division of thingsinto superordinatecategories(which Rosch, 1978, calls the vertical dimension of categorizing),and differentiationbetweenclassesof objects(which shecalls the horizontaldimension).Inner speechinvolves both thesetypesof operation. The vertical dimensionof classifyingis seenin superordinateassociationssuch as lobster~ crustacean,andpeacock~ bird. The horizontaldimensionis seenin polar oppositions(study 3) and differences(study 2), which in many casesseemto be abstractand concreteversions of the samekind of operation.Abstract words encouragepolar oppositesof a dichotomoussort{as in fast ~ slow). Whendealing with concretecreaturesthe polaritiesarelessstarkand peopleusethe dimension betweenthe polesto makecomparisons(Antelopeis a deer, like gazelle~ but slower). Polaroppositeshavereceivedagooddealof discussionin the clinical literature. They requirelittle mentaleffort, andbecomemorefrequentundertime pressure (Siipola, Walker and Kolb, 1955) or conditionsof distractionOung, 1918).On the onehandthesecontrastresponses indicateability to think with a certaindegreeof abstractness,and they may thus be a predictorof 'normality' (Tendler, 1945) or evenof educationallevel Oung 1918).On the otherhandthey arewhat Rapaport, Gill andSchafer(1968) call 'stimulus-bound'.Theyare relativelysuperficial.andin stayingcloseto the stimulusword may be usedas a defenceagainstplumbing,or indeedagainstdrowningin, the psychiCdepths.

Focuson the typical Considerthe follOwing:

23

Characteristics*

Verbal superordinate opposite difference rhyme phrasecompletion assertionof falSityImeaningless

Visual environment part attribute instantiation(of abstractword) nominalization metaphor spatialrelation intransitiveaction - present-continuous tense -locativeadjunct

Study

1,3 3 2 1,3 1,3 2

2,3 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 ~ ~

~

~

reindeer~ peacock~ thought~ kangaroo~ lobster~

~

in the forest antlers colourful philosopher is a jumper like a manin armour behindthe rock walking is walking walking in the forest

lobster~ crustacean fast~ slow ~ live in different places parrot~ carrot April ~ showers ~ is not true

Examples

Table3.1 Freeassociativecharacteristicsof verbal,visual and enactiverepresentations

staticwithout direct interactionor temporalflow

vivid, picture-like qualities;absolutespatiality

dereferentializedlanguage

taxonomicorderingbased on prototypes

Generaldescription

*

Examples _ A bitesB _ sinks his teethinto _ is bitten by - bites - could, can, will bite _ could bite but doesn't _ wantsto bite _ becausehe doesn'tlike it _ andit makeshim fall over - which makeshim feel sad } - watching - proud, angry

Characteristics'

Enactive transitiveaction - instrumentaluseof body part - passive - ordinarypresenttense - future andconditionalmodes -negative - infinitives reasonfor action of action physicalconsequence emotionalconsequence of action mentalawareness personalitytraits and emotions

affectivity

awarenessof possiblefutures and of moral choice

direct interaction defining relative spatiality

Generaldescription

Significantly different (p < .05, two-tailed) from one,or more usually both,the othertwo modesof thoughtin oneor moreof the threestudies.

2,3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,3 2,3 2

1,2

Study

Table 3.1 Freeassociativecharacteristicsof verbal, visual andenactiverepresentations (continued)

26

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Camelcould spit at kangaroo~Again improbable, that'shighly improbable,er, they live in different areas. Wallaby feels inferior to bison~ This seemsgrosslyunlikely as wallabiescome from Australiaand bison comefrom America. Fair enough.In fact thesejudgmentsabout the truth of the stimulus sentences representa degreeof reality testingfar superiorto anythingfound in eithervisual or enactive imagery. Freud (1911) distinguishedbetween two principles of mentalfunctioning: thereis language,operatingaccordingto the reality principle in the functioningof the ego; andtherearenon-verbalrepresentations, operating accordingto the pleasureprinciple in the functioning of the more fantasticalid. The factual referenceframe of inner speechseesin fantasy only falsehood.It cannotcountenance whatmight implausiblybethe case,but only whattypically is the case. . Verbal representationfocuseson the typical becauseits taxonomiccategories are conceptually representedin terms of their prototypes. Rosch and her colleagues(Rosch, 1975aand b, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnsonand Boyes-Braem,1976) have shown that categorieshave an internal structureand are organizedwith respectto the prototypeat the centre. The prototypesumsup both what the membersof the categoryhavein common (their 'family resemblances').and how they differ from members of other categories.Thusfor Roschherselfan alsatianis a prototypicaldog. beingboth the most doggy sort of dog and the most different from membersof such contrast categoriesas cats.The focus on typical casesin verbal representationis a natural adjunctto the conceptualorder exhibitedin the superordinatesand differences.

Detachmentfrom referents The distanceof verbal representationfrom particular objects and eventsstarts with its conceptualnatureand its concernwith the typical ratherthan with the individual. Thereare two further stagesin this dereferentialization.The first is the production of phrasecompletions.as in freedom~ of speechand zebra~ crossing. These.like contrastresponses.are stimulus-boundassociations,basedthis time on well-known phrasesand sayings. which once triggered roll glibly off the tongue. The extremeof dereferentializationis seenin rhyming associations.such as weasel~ easel,andparrot~ carrot.Herewordsareno longerreferringsymbolsat all, but are taken as entities in their own right. their associationsbasedon acoustic ratherthansemanticproperties.Jung(1918) thoughtsuchresponsesto be highly defenSive.judgingby their unusuallylong associativereactiontimes.The remarks made by some of the participantsin the studiessuggestthat rhymes are more available as·responsesif the stimulus word is repeatedsub-vocallymore than

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

once. and that such repetition may be a deliberatestrategyto exclude images which otherwisenaturallyflood in. in associationto concretewords. The dereferentializationof languageis not somethingthat mestpeopleworry about. or even have a namefor. Thosewho do worry aboutit tend to be either poets or French intellectuals rather than psychologists).Barthes (1972) and Lefebvre (1971) haveboth discussedthe ideologicalconsequences of dereferentialization, and describehow a languagewhich losescontactwith its referentsis vulnerableto usefor propagandapurposes.The powerof this languageis seenin the fact that we can be seducedby patterlike 'the sunshinebreakfast'evenwhile eatingour bowl of soggycerealon the ninth day of unremittingdrizzle. The generalpropertiesof verbal representationare shownin figure 3.1, which may be readas a map of the associativetransitfonsthat inner speechaffords. Structures in visual imagery Many of the characteristicassociationtypes in visual imagery achieve their linguistic realizationthroughsomeform of the verbsto be and to have.The reindeer has antlers.(which have a metaphoricallikenessto certain Cladonialichens).the reindeeris brown. it is in the forest and in the favourite presentcontinuousverb tenseit is walking. Being and Having are sometimesseenas the great poles of HumanExistence.alternativewaysof standingbreastto breastwith the Universe. Linguistically they have no such grandiosestatus.IndeedLyons (1968) refers to them as mere 'dummy verbs' with no reality at a deep-structurelevel, and necessaryonly to carry information aboutnumber.personand tense.Lyons was writing when deep structures were supposedto be linguistic. Within the subsequentcognitive interpretationit is possibleto speculatethat relations of being and having arenot primarily linguistic at all. but visual in origin. The mapping from the visual representationinto languagehereis fixed only within very loose limits. A dog has four feet. but also is four-footed. It is brown. but might. if one wished to be pedanticabout it. be said to possessthe quality of brownness.Or one cansimply conjoin the wordsand talk aboutbrown dogs. In termsof casegrammarthereis a remarkableuniformity in the casestructures of all the visual associationtypes. In the versionof casegrammarusedby Braine (Braine and Wells. 1978; Braine and Hardy. 1982). the animal to which parts. attributes.locationsand intransitive actionsare attributedwould be the subjectof attribution. The semanticnatureof this subjectandwhat is attributedto it canbe discussed under three interrelatedheadings:the static spatiality of the visual image; its ontolOgicaldepth;andits propensityfor metaphor.

Staticspatiality Oneof the first thingsa typical visualizerdoeswith a stimulussentenceabouttwo

27

different from

realization realization

DOG

for

CATQ'NlNETAI[.';

FAT, BAT, HAT

MAMMAL (= superordinate)

ph,,",compl,t1on

Figure 3.1 Map of semanticterritory for verbal representation

CAT ( =category prototype)

acoustic realization

( CAT (=word)

rhyme

taxonomic structuring

dereferentialization

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

29

animals is to find an environmentthat will accommodateboth. This is what countsas makingsenseof the sentence.Oncefound, the environmentbecomes the referenceframe to which all elseis related.Animals arein it, their actionsarein it, on it, throughit, etc., and relationshipsbetweenthe two animalsare mediated throughtheir commonrelationto it: Jellyfish could stinggoat~ On a raft, the goatgoing acrossa raft on the river and jellyfish is up throughthe logs. Stallion is by the side ofleopard~ Paradise ... I just suddenlysawa stallion and a leopard drinking from the water, rather the way you see in the pictures, paradisemixture, you know, sunand dappledpool. These environmentsare often detailed and presumablytake up considerable processingcapacity, but they form in consciousnesswithout apparentmental effort. Mandler,Seegmillerand Day (1977) suggestthat the processingoflocative informationis automatic,unlike the processingof informationaboutthe internal constitutionof objects.It may be that the object-locativerelationshipis a version of the primitive figure-groundrelationship.That this operates'automatically'is shownin von Senden's(1960) work with congenitallyblind peoplewho first gain their Sight in adult life. They canat first makelittle senseof their new visual world beyondan awarenessof colour, and an awarenessthat there are some things, figures, that standout from the rest,the ground. In the free associationstudies,animals relate to their environmentsthrough spatialrelations,which may be elaboratedin terms of intransitive actions.These are actionslike running or sitting which do not 'carry over' to a direct object (in contrastto transitive actions like chaSingor eating somethingwhich do take a direct object).1 A beavermight be in the river, or, a little more elaborately,swimming in the river. Even when the environmentis not mentioned,the frequent use of spatial prepositionsindicatesthe continuing presenceof a spatialframework in which up, down, to the left of, and so on, continueto have meaning.One gets the impressionof a stageset,prosceniumarchandall: Zebrahasa roundbelly, like rhino ~ Theyareon the sameplain ... somewhere ... it's sort of my notion of Africa with flat treeson that, and zebrais on the left of the picture, looking left, and the rhino is sort of standinglooking vaguely towardsthe front. There are indicationsthat even when the intransitive verbs denoteenergetic happenings,the image itself fails to depict this, and consistsonly of snapshots which havecaughtthe actionin mid-air. Piagetand Inhelder (1971) maintain that purely visual imagery (as in children under 7) is itself static. It may representmovement,just as comic strips do, by using stanceand location as movementcues. The Mighty Thor, spreadeagled betweenbuildings,is seenas leapingbetweenthem, not as naileduncomfortably

30

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

to the sky. Visual imagesoperatesimilarly. To saythat somethingis flying is to say that it is apprehended with wings outspread,locatedagainsta backgroundof sky. The characteristicverb tensehere, the presentcontinuous,is what one would expectin a descriptionof arrestedmovement. The presenceof a detailedenvironmentin visual imagery cancauseproblems in trying to get animalsto interact: Donkey is kicking crocodile_I can't, I can't see, I can't imagine a donkey kicking a crocodile.I can seea sort of crosssectionof sky andgrassand a river bank;so blue sky, greengrassanda brown river bank,andsortof greeny-brown water. The donkeyis in fact on the river bankandit's kicking, it's got one of its hind legs up in kicking position, and the crocodileis just sort of submarining along the surface of the water but certainly the donkey isn't kicking the crocodile.

Ontol08icaldepth One of the striking featuresabout visual imageryis that it involves a numberof relationshipsbetweenentitiesof different ontolOgicaltypes: object and environment, whole and part, objectand attribute.The last two are especiallyimportant in the constitutionof an individual objectbecausethey ensurethat propertiesare The alternativeto a world of united in somethingand are not just concatenated. Being and Having is a world of And. It would perhapscontain the follOwing associativescenario:'Legs & ears& black & white & tail & hooves'.The world of Being and Having providesa morehospitablearrangement,andalso containsthe cowswhich manageto hold all thesepropertiestogether. The object-attributerelationship appearsto operatesymmetrically. Objects may be analysed in terms of their attributes, as in peacock_ colourful, and niece-little: and conversely, attributes may be instantiatedin objects, as in wide - river, andyellow _ daffodils. The other importantconstitutiverelationship,whole-part,plays a numberof roles in the semanticstructureof the image. Palmer(1977) suggeststhat it may serveas a backbonein the hierarchicalorganizationof perception.It can do this becausewhole and part are defined relative to eachother, so that parts may be wholes relative to other and smallerparts. A fish is whole in relation to its skin, which is a whole in relation to its scales,eachof which is a whole with regardto the cells which make it up, and so on. If the relationshipbetweentwo things is that of whole to part, then they count as being at different levels of discourse. ConfUSingthemleadsto category mistakes (Ryle, 1949),suchas assumingthat the fish's skin is hungryor its scalesareswimmingto theSargassosea.The whole-part relationship,as the GestaltpsycholOgistsrealized,is a braceagainstreductionism, not an invitation to it. As well as constituting the ontolOgical backbone along which levels of

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

descriptionare arranged,the whole-partrelationshiphasanothervital function: that of defining what kinds of physical action are possible.Anything at all may move, but only a thing with legs can walk or run; and only a thing with wings can fly. Body parts are the tacit instrumentsof the actionscarriedout by the whole. When albatrossesfly and swoop, they do so with wings. The wings are not explicitly mentionedas instrumentsin visual imagery, perhapsbecauseflying is 'marked' for wingedness,and needs no explicit statement.Perhapstoo, it would increasethe complexity of the image unduly to include whole and part simultaneously.There is evidencefrom developmentalstudies that this is a sophisticatedaccomplishment,achieved only during the period of concrete operations(Elkind, Koegler and Go, 1964). Before this, children are aware of eitherwhole or part, but not of both.

Metaphor I use the term 'metaphor'to cover a variety of associations,including casesof visual metamorphosis,whereonething actuallychangesinto another(as abadger into a zebra, or a camel into a toy camel on wheels); also substitutions,where somethingis representedby somethingelsewithout any actualmetamorphosis being involved (a kangaroorepresentedby a cartoon kangaroo); and similes, where a likeness betweentwo things is acknowledgedexplicitly (hedgehog'~ ofisomorphy spikesarelike zoo bars).Relationsofisomorphyarealwaysinvolved: ~ Stallion is by the side ofleopard... Stubbs Stallion is by the side ofleopard ofisomorphy ... yes,yes,Stubbspictureisn't it of a lion or is it horsesas well? Yes, that'swhat, a picture,I've a paintingin mind.

Camel could spit atofisomorphy kangaroo~ Well the first image I supposeis of a camel beingin a ... standingwith a frown on its face (laugh)beingof the ... no, I can't expressit ... feeling so angrythat he'scapableof spitting and there'sa subs... and the next image cameimmediatelyof a kind of bullet-shapedpieceof spit about a yard out of the camel'smouth, flying like a kind of rocket acrossthe horizon (laugh). lobster~ Oh, a scorpionand a lobster and an an Scorpionis segmentedlikeofisomorphy ideaof a man ... in ... a nice shiny red suitof armour.

Therehasbeena recentupsurgeofinterestin metaphor(seee.g. Ortony, 1979), which allows us to saythat while suchconcreteisomorphismsare only onekind of metaphor,many of the processesinvolved may hold true for the whole class. Lakoff and Johnson(1980) show that metaphoris an all-pervaSive cognitive phenomenon,but the idea that at least somemetaphorshave a visual origin is supportedby Paivio (1979) andMiller (1979). The importanceof similaritiesin metaphorhasbeenrecognizedsinceAristotle wrote about the topiC. The similarities involved in the metaphorsof visual

31

32

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

imagery are usually of parts, attributes, or spatial relationships. A possible mechanismhere is that in the transition from object to attribute, the whole becomesindistinct, andthe attributeis thenreinstantiatedin somethingdifferent. The shiny red suit of armourcasetakesoff from a lobster (boiled). The referenceto segmentedleads to a focus on just the hard and jointed exoskeleton.This image fragment is then instantiatedin a nice shiny red suit of armour, which is just as accommodatingto it as was lobster. Indeed, at the time, more accommodating: imagesmay havea refractoryperiod, and thoughtis more likely to go on than to go back.You cannot,to misquoteHeraclitus,look into the sameimagetwice. Not only becauseit is flOwing but becauseit is changedby the looking. The generalpropertiesof visual imageryare summarizedin figure 3.2.

Structures in enactiveimagery Enactive imagery relates animals together through the transltlve interactions possible between them, and theinstigators motive~ that legitimate these actions. The importantcasesare: agentive,for the instigatorsof the actions;instrumental,for the body partsusedin them; experiencer,for the subjectof the feelings; andobjective,for what is acted on (in fact, in many cases,patient, or even victim, would be more appropriateterms). The follOwing discussionseparateswhat are in vivo four interrelatedfeaturesof enactiveimagery: the agencyinvolved in transitive action; the relative spatiality determined by transitive action; the subjectivity which informs action in a numberof ways; andthe future towardswhich muchactionis oriented.

Agencyin transitiveaction In linguistics the distinction betweentransitive and intransitiveverbs is as much one of usageas of type. Someverbscanbe usedin both forms. Moved is transitive in somebodymovedthe stone,but intransitivein the stonemoved. In caseswhere verbs have a preferredform, transitive and intransitive verbs may belongto the sameverb family, and differ from one anotherin systematiC ways.2 In the large class of movementverbs, move is the nuclearform (Dixon's, 1971,term), beinga basickind of actionwhich may be doneby virtually anything. Non-nuclearverbs, which describemore specific kinds of moving, are derived from move by additional specifications:thus walking is moving with legs, running is moving fast with legs, andso on. An importantkind of additionalspecificationis with regard to intent, and Miller and Johnson-Laird(1976) suggestthat this is what makesthe differencebetweenan intransitiveaction and a transitive one. It is the difference between tiger is running after hyena, and tiger is chasing hyena. The intransitive running after could be just happeningto be running in the same direction, but slower, or later; or it could be running with malice aforethought.

RAINBOW

instantiation

metaphor

COLOURFUL ( =attribute)

is

PARROT (=subjectof attribution)

spatiallocation

intransitive metaph

has

IS FLYING

WINGS parts)

(=

Figure 3.2

Map of semanticterritory for visual imagery

IN THE FOREST

metaph metaph

34

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

The transitiveverb is not so neutralwith regardto why the runningis occurring. Transitiveverbshaveeatenof the treeof knowledge,andlost their innocence: Donkeyis kicking crocodile~ And he'sgoing to get quite a lot of moneywhen he managesto kill him andsell the skin to the white hunter. Only those without innocenceneed develop a morality; and in enactive imagery, to balance the potential for violent action there are a number of mechanismsfor controlling it. Theseincludethe fact that actiondoesnot happen without somelooselylegitimatingmotivation.As a moral stancethis is low grade, but it is a start. A little more sophisticatedis the ability to envisagepossible consequences,admittedly usually from the perspectiveof harm to self. One further control derivesfrom the morally moreadvancedability to empathizewith the victimsof one'sacts: Walrus'll Hedgehogsniffs at walrus~ Walrus'll get prickedby the spikes. This indicatesan intersubjectiveperspectivein so far as there is identification both with the actor, at least according to the enactive encodinginstructions, and with the victim of that actor's action, expressedin the passivevoice. This intersubjectiveperspectiveis an importantsocial prerequisitefor the emergence of moral agency,as distinct from the moreimpulsivekind.

Relativespatiality Most transitiveverbsinclude a surprisingamountof information aboutthe kind of spatialrelationshipinvolved in them. Considernibbling: Bulldog is in the samefield as stallion~ AND is about to aggreSSivelynibble the stallion'sankles.

Nibble tells us that it is being donewith teeth; that it involves severallittle bites ratherthanonebig one; andthat contactis necessaryto do it. Aboutto nibble tells us thereforethatit is the toothedendof bulldogthatis critically approachingstallion. The spatialrelation is further clarified by referenceto the stallion'sanklesas the portion most threatened.Motivating thesespatialarrangementsis the aggressive intent of the bulldog. Enactivespaceis thus relative in the sensethat bulldog and stallion arehereconsideredwholly in relationto oneanother,andwithout regard to the field mentionedin the stimulussentence;but it is also affective, structured by intent. In some casesthe instrumentinvolved in the action is made explicit, even thoughit is not semanticallynecessaryto do so. Everyoneknows thatpeckingis donewith beaks,but it may still makesenseto spellit out: Peacockdespisesjellyfish ~ And givesit a coupleof peckswith its beakto make surethe jellyfish knows that it's despised.

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

It is evident that visual and enactive representationsoperatewith different versions of spatiality. In visual imagery, space is absolute, organized with referenceto an environmentalframework; in enactive imagery it is relative, mediatedthroughtransitiveactionsandtheir complements.

Subjectivity Enactiveimageryis thoroughlypermeatedwith subjectiveawareness.This shows up in the intentfulnessof the transitiveverbs (running after can be perceivedfrom outside, but it takes inside information to realize that it is really chasing); it is revealedin desires,suchas wanting to bite; it showsup in referencesto sensoryand intellectual processessuch as watching and thinking about; and at its most strongly affective it emergesin personalitydispositionslike kindliness,and in emotionslike being scaredof or adoring. Thesesubjectiveoccurrencesare usually embeddedin the generalcontextof action, either actual or potential. Some actions are the fulfilment of affective intentions: Parrot is in the sameforest as gOrilla ~ (laugh) And it ... it's humiliating the gOrilla by perchinguponits head. Somepotential actionslack motivational justification and never achieveactuality. This causesmostof the negationsproducedin enactiveimagery: Badgercould bite wallaby~ But he'stoo fat andlazy to be botheredto. In fact it is often whenaction is not happeningthat subjectivityis most evident. This is what Freud would have predicted.For him the inhibition of impulSive actionwas the foundationof all later intellectualdevelopment.Compare: Crocodilesnapsat flamingo~ And breaksit in two where the action proceedswith a minimum of subjectivefuss, with the following, whereat first the action is conditionally suspendedpendingthe exploration onts possiblelegitimations: Elephantis fond of badger~ Yes and he could in foot, fact, put his foot on badgerand breakbadger'sback if it was necessary,or if it, or if he was feeling that way inclined ... there wouldn't have to be a real reason'causehe's very very big, and has got a very wide foot, with tremendouspower for crushing badgers'backs. Desireis also tied up with action that is as yet only potential.One cannotwant what one alreadyhas,and conversely,one may be busy with wanting to act only becausenot busyacting: Jackal could attack peacock~Has rabid a rabid desire to do so, all those poncey feathersmakehim sick.

35

36

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Sometimesactionis not mentionedat all and the relation betweenthe animals is affective. Howeverthe feelings only seemjustified by referenceto a prescience which foreseesprobablefuture interactions: Parrotis in the sameforest as gOrilla ~ It'd be frightened. of the fact that thosewho are The parrot'sparanoiahere may be a consequence not exercisingtheir own agencyare liable to becomethe victim of someone else's.

The future Enactive imagery has a temporal organization,with actions having beginnings (reasons),dynamiCmiddles (presenttense)and ends(consequences). As well as the simple present,distinctive verb tensesinclude a variety of modal auxiliaries, indicating potential action which for some reason or another hasn't actually happenedyet. The presenttensehas two uses.The most frequent is episodic, indicating dynamiC action: tiger chases the hyena describes movement, not a snapshotof movement.The other use is dispositional: tigers chasetheir prey as a matterof generaltiger-nature.Here chaseis similar to can chase. The future orientationof enactiveimageryis revealedminimally in the marking of transitiveverbsfor intent. Eventhe currentchasesis orientedtowardthe future, in being directedtowardssomegoal: elevenses,or tea. It is given more explicit linguistic realizationin avarietyof ways.Theseincludethe useof could, can andwill as auxiliaries; in the use of forms of the verb to go, as in he'sgoing to do something dreadful;andin the useof concatenativeconstructionslike hoping to, wanting to and trying to: Porcupineis bristling atalbatross, albatross~ Wantsto get the albatross,wantsto fix it on the endsof its spines. Looking towards the future extendsbeyondthe particular action itself. to its possible consequences.This prOvides the kind of moral foreSight discussed earlier,which may be importantin inhibiting foolish actions: Reindeerchargesat porcupine~ But realiZing that he'sgot sharpquills all over his body, slithersto a halt in the snowandwalks awayagain. In human beings too, a senseof future is considereddesirable.Delinquents havea ratherpoor future-timesense(Siegman,1961); and temporaldisturbances are involved in many emotionaldisorders(Minkowski, 1958; Ellenberger,1958; Wallaceand Rabin, 1960). Fillmore treats the future as external to case frameworks themselves.This makesthe future a kind of presentthat hasn'thappenedyet, which is clearly an inadequateaccount.The difficulty lies in formulating anythingbetter.3 The generalpropertiesof enactive representationaresummarizedin figure. 3.3.

has

TIGER ( = agent = experiencer)

>CLAWS (=instrumental parts)

afford action

CAN SCRATCH (in general)

action awareness

SEESVICTIM (= objective)

FEROCIOUS, HUNGRY

motive

FANCIES HIM FOR LUNCH

COULD ATTACK VICTIM (conditional)

but dire consequences

getson with it

DECIDES NOT TO ATTACKS VICTIM, DEVOURS, ETC.

Figure 3.3

Map of semanticterritory for enactiveimagery

38

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Some of the pathwayshere are more tentative than those for verbal or visual representations. Making up the mind: a triptych of meanings

Each mode of thought operatesover a distinct semanticterritory, and gives its own accountof reality. In inner speechthere are words and concepts;in visual imagerythereare environmentsand subjectsof attribution with properties;and in enactiveimagerythereareagents,actionsand experiencers. Each mode of thought has an internal equilibrium, balancinga way of taking things apartwith a way of holding them together.In inner speechthe fission of oppositesand differentiationsis balancedby fusion in superordinateclasses.In visual imagery parts and attributes are only analysedin the context of their co-ordinationin the whole. In enactiveimagerythe separateindividuals of agent and patientare broughttogetherthroughactionandfeeling. A possible interpretation of the differences between the three modes of thoughtwould be that they involve primarily differencesof complexity,reflecting the fact that there are different numbers of coding systems involved. The argumentwould be that the original stimuli in the free-associationstudiesare words, to which a visualizeraddsimages,and to which someoneusing enactive imagery addsalso internalizedaction. There are reasonsfor claiming that this is not true in a simplesense,thoughit may be partially true in a complexone. The compositionof inner speechis not like that of visual imageryminus the characteristicallyvisual bits. It is different. Enactive imagery is not just visual imagery plus internalized action. At the very least the addition of the action liberatesimagesof objectsfrom their environmentand convertsthem to agents or patients. Piaget and Inhelder'swork (1971) shows, however, that there are developmentalgroundsfor suggestingthat enactiveimagery does develop out of visual imagery and to that extent is an addition to it. A case grammatical interpretationof this developmentalsequenceis that visual imagery involves a basictwo-casesystem(with subjectof attributionandeitherlocativeor objective, but not both at once),andthat addinginternalaction convertsthis to a three-case system(agentplus instrumentplus eitherobjectiveor experiencer).4 The follOwing featuresof the datafrom the secondstudy can be accountedfor on the assumptionthat while enactiveimagerymay depict three-termed(threecase)relationships,visual imagerymay only depicttwo-termedones. 2 APartsandenvironments,thoughboth characteristicallyvisual, rarely co-occur. 2 A detailedenvironmentis inimical to the representationof transitiveaction. 3 The instrumentaluseof body partsis not mentionedin visualimagery,though the parts themselvesare. In enactiveimagery parts occur as instrumentalto transitiveactions,but not otherwise. Other kinds of structuralcontinuity are also evident,and it is generallythe case

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

that while verbal, visual and enactiverepresentationshave sufficient distinctivenessto justify their treatmentas separatesystems,thereare strongand important semanticconnectionsbetweenthem. Theseensurethat we have one mind, not three of it. There are connectionsin two generalregions: betweenverbal and visual domains,andbetweenvisual andenactive. Relationsbetweenverbalandvisual representations haveto do with the criteria by which concreteobjectsare assignedto abstractsuperordinatecategories,and the categoriesdifferentiatedfrom oneanother.Rosch,Mervis, Gray,Johnsonand Boyes-Braem(1976) talk aboutthe world and objectsin it exhibiting correlational structure: beings with feathers usuallyalso have wings. It is this correlational structurethat is encapsulated in the abstractprototypedefiningthe superordinate category.The abstractconceptionof bird is erecteduponthe concretefoundation of suchvisual propertiesas wings and feathers.The situationis complicatedby the fact that for low levels of abstraction(bird or dog) we canusea genericimageas an alternativeto an abstractrepresentation;and at higher levels of abstraction(like mammal)we canrepresentthe genericby a concreteexemplar.The fact thatverbal superordinates are generatedfrom visual propertiesresultsin the relatively poor differentiationbetweenverbalandvisual representations seenin the datahere. Attributes also playa role in verbal structures,particularly in differentiating classesof obj ectsfrom oneanother.Theattributesof the visual domainarematter for comparisonand polar oppositionin the verbal. The contactbetweenvisual and enactivemodesis through parts and action. The whole-partrelationshipis characteristicallyvisual, andtacitly determinesthe repertoireof possibleactions. Thesesameparts are the explicit instrumentsof enactivetransitiveactions.Furthermorethesetransitiveactionsfrequentlybelong to the same family of actions as the visual intransitive ones, differing in the additionalspecificationof intent. What thesecross-connections amountto is that the semanticterritory covered by the free-associationstudies is best describedas a triptych, in which visual structuresform the centralpanel,with verbal and enactive oneshingedon either side.A sampleof this arrangementis given in figure 3.4. Somethoughts on 'structure'

Thoughthe detailsmay vary, most of the kinds of structuresshownin the figure arefamiliar from a numberof memorymodels.What is different is that figure 3.4 is divided into three semantic domains, correspondingto verbal, visual and enactive representations. Eachdomaindepictsthe cognitive structurescharacteristic of the relevantform of representation. In the light of the empirical findings which have been discussed,it may not appearcontentiousto say that particular cognitive structuresrepresentations. are characteri~tic of particular forms of representation.In fact there is a considerabletangle of conceptualproblemslurking in this statement,which needto be pulled out and

39

DOG

ANIMAL

an

is

in

LARGE

is

completion)

(=phrase

D O G IN THE MANGER

habits

linguistic

synchronic

CAT

to

contrast

(=metaphor)

P L U M PUDDINGS

like

(=attribute)

SPOTTED

TEETH

action)

(=intransitive

IS R U N N I N G

(=part)

LEGS

(=location)

IN T H E G A R D E N

relation

spatial

attribution)

prototype) has

DOG (=subject o f

DOG

(=category

VISUAL

Figure 3.4 A semantictriptych: the free-associativelives of dogs

(=rhyme)

FOG, B O G

associations

acoustic

is a n

(=superordinate)

-

(=word)

VERBAL

instrument

DOG

motive

(=conditional)

(—withholds action!

THINKS BETTER O F I T

DOG

(^emotion)

CROSS

feels

(=experiencer)

action)

(=transitive

BITES B Y S T A N D E R

DOESN'T LIKE H I M

patient)

( = potential

BYSTANDER

SEES I N N O C E N T

awareness

C O U L D BITE H I M

consequences

negative

(in general)

• C A N BITE

repertoire

behavioural

( = agent)

ENACTIVE

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

unravelled.Theseproblemsinclude how the structuresare accessed;the nature of the relationshipbetweenthe structuresand the surfacerepresentations; and at bedrock,the very natureof the structuresthemselves. The only safegroundhere is given by the barefindings of the free-association studies.Thesecan be summarizedthus: the samestimulus,usedwith a different representationalinstruction, leads to structurally different associations.For example: parrot representedin inner speechmight evoke the superordinatebird; representedin visual imagery it might evoke the attribute green; representedin enactiveimageryit might evokethe transitiveactioncrackingnuts. A possibleinterpretationof thesefindings is to say that theseare just three different languagesamples,which shouldbe treatedas such,without referenceto internal happeningsof any sort. The difficulty with this interpretationis in the questionwhy the languagesamplesshouldbe different; and indeedthereseems to be no parsimoniousway of explainingthis. The alternative is to assumethat the external language refers to internal representationswhich themselvesmayor may not be linguistic in form. This raisesthe questionof the reliability of verbalreportson mentalprocesses. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) haveindicatedthat undersomecircumstancesverbal reports may be highly inaccurate,especiallywhen peopleare askedabout thecausesof their behaviour.Fortunatelyit seemsunlikely that the samedegreeof scepticism is warrantedby other,Simplerkinds of report.For examplethe useof the 'verbal report' of the items rememberedin a memory task may be liable to some suspicion,but total scepticismwould amountto sawingoff the methodological branchthat muchof psychologyis still Sitting on. The possibilityof inaccuraciesin verbal reports, whether of real-world events or of internal ones, is probably reducedby askingpeoplefor simpleexpressiveor descriptiveinformationrather thanfor complexinterpretations.For simplereportsit is difficult to seewhy I have an imageof a reindeeror I feel hungryshouldbe treatedwith muchgreaterscepticism than I went to the theatrelast night or I see a guillemot. Peoplemay sometimeslie or makemistakes,but they cannotbe assumedto do so all the time. If languagecan be usedto accessother and internal forms of representation, therethenarisesthe problemof the extentto which the propertiesof theseforms of representationhave been distorted becausethey have beenfiltered through the languageusedto expressthem. In someways this is not a peculiarlypsycholOgicalproblem,but one sharedby all scienceswhich have to accesstheir phenomenaindirectly, through instruments.All instruments'distort' what they access.The gaschromatographbreaks biological moleculesinto fragmentsunderhigh temperature,but still remainsa valuable instrument of biochemical analysis. Techniquesin atomic physics Similarly 'distort' the nature of the particles examinedin order to explore that nature.In the caseof accessinginternalrepresentations, to worry abouthow 'the phenomenaaccessed'are distortedby 'the meansof access'implies that under normal circumstancesmental phenomenahappenwithout ever beingaccessed.

41

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THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

This is not the case.People oftenexpressagooddealof what they arethinking, so that asking them to do this in psychologicalstudies is only tapping a natural process;it is not introducinga highly artefactualprocedureliable to twist thought out of any semblanceto its normalform. The content of thought, verbal and non-verbal,may be expressedthrough language,just as the propertiesof biological moleculesmay be 'expressed'in the recordings which form the output of gas chromatography,or the properties of subatomicparticles may be 'expressed'in their tracks in bubble chambers. Languageis a viable, if not a wholly transparent,meansof accessto mental representations. Thus if a personvisualizing a parrot producesthe associategreen, whereasa personverbalizingparrot neverproducesthe associategreen,it makes senseto say that the object-attributestructureinvolved here derives from the visualimage.It may be expressedthroughlanguagebut it did not originatethere. Interpreting the structuresas originating from the various forms of internal representationraisesa further problem: the problemof the preciserelationship of the cognitive structure,in this case the object-attributestructure, and the surfacerepresentation,the visual image. The discussionin chapter 2 mentioneda number of interpretationsof the relationshipbetweenstructuraland phenomenallevels, ranging from accounts which focus exclusivelyon onelevel (asPaivio, 1971,doeson the phenomenal,or representaPylyshyn, 1973, on the structural),to accountswhich accommodate tions at bothlevels (e.g.:Kosslynet al., 1979;Anderson,1978, 1983; Rosenbergand Simon, 1977); Glucksberg(1984) suggeststhat there is an emergingconsensus of somekind, evidentin a generalagreementthat the questionof whetherthere are only modality specific stores or whether there is in addition a common underlying propositional store, is not an issue to be decided by empirical evidence.Most investigatorsfind it usefulto includeboth kinds of store.This has led to structuralandsurfacerepresentations beingincludedindifferently; eitherin the senseof there being a network in which the elementsmay be indifferently visual, verbal or propositional (as in Anderson, 1983), or in the sense of underlying propositionsbeing indifferently instantiatedin any of a numberof surfacerepresentations(as in Rosenbergand Simon, 1977). The free-association data indicate a less arbitrary relationship, and show that particular surface representationshave specialized and characteristicstructural properties; or conversely, that particular structures cannot equally well be instantiated in different surfacerepresentations. One of the points that can be drawn from this structural division of labour betweenthe three forms of representationis that abstractstructureand surface content cannot be wholly separated.There is a non-arbitrary relationship betweenthem, and it is thereforenot sufficient to seethe structuresas entities separatefrom the surfacerepresentations, lying eitherbeneathor alongsidethese otherrepresentations. The key problem here is that traditionally the structureshave been seenas

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

distinct from modality specific or surfacerepresentations. Most theoristspreserve the distinctionitself. thoughthey defineit in different ways. Pylyshyn's(1973,1979)work providesa very clearversionof this 'autonomous structures'viewpoint. For him the structuresare abstracta-modalpropositions, inaccessibleto consciousness.It is these abstract structures that form the functional elementsin cognition, and not the surfaceconsciousrepresentations of which they are essentiallydeSCriptions.One of the criteria Pylyshyn usesfor distinguishingstructuresand surface representationsis that the structuresare inaccessibleto consciousness, while the surface representationsare accessible to it. This inaccessibilityclaim for structuresis an interestingone, given the source from which much of the original information about structuresis derived. The notion of structurein cognitive psychologyderives largely from discussionsin linguisticsaboutsyntacticandsemanticstructures.In fact thesestructuresare not at all inaccessibleto consciousness, being Originally discoveredby peopleusing only their linguistic intuition. Intuition revealedthe structuresjust sitting therein the language,apparentto anyonewho cared to look. The distinction between structuraland phenomenalthereforecannot be preservedby an appealto the inaccessibilityof the oneas opposedto the accessibilityof the other. Thereis, however,anotherimportantway of drawing the distinction. Kosslyn et al. (1979) and Snodgrass(1984) usethe initially appealing ideathat the abstract structureslie behind the surfaceones,and are distinguishedby virtue of being their causes.Structuresare generative;and surfacerepresentations are generated from them. To seewhy this accountcannotwork, and to seethe kind of ontolOgicalsleight of hand it involves, requiresanotherappealto psycholinguistichistory. Noam Chomsky, the linguist who brought the notion of structuresinto prominence, carefully statedthat he was interestedin a competencemodel oflanguagerather than a performanceone; and outlined a theory of transformationalgenerative grammarin which surfacestructureswere 'generated'from more abstractdeep structures.The choiceof wordswasperhapsunfortunate.In a competencemodel the fact that the symbol S (for sentence)can be rewritten as NP + VP (noun phrase+ verb phrase)meansthat whatis Sat the mostgenerallevel of deSCription may legitimately be analysedinto a noun phraseand a verb phraseat a more specific level. This is logical generativeness. It doesnot meanthat when we speak we actuallygeneratesentencesin the sameway, by startingwith deepandabstract form and working up to concreteand surfacecontent.The distinction between deep and surface structureshas gradually been erodedin linguistics (see e.g. Lakoff, 1971),thoughit lingersin otherareas,includingcognitivepsychology.The free-associationdata suggestthat to talk about structureis to say that there is a patternin phenomena;it is not to saythereis a patternand phenomena,with the patternlying behind. Linguistic structuresare conceptualpatternsdiscerniblein language;they do not lie behindand causethe language.Cognitive structuresare

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the conceptualpatternsdiscerniblein thinking; they do not lie behindand cause the thinking. Structuresare patternsevidentin phenomena,not the causesof thesepatterns. Structuresare in phenomena,not lurking behindthem. To seepreciselyhow they are in phenomenait is necessaryonly to go back to the data. If a personfree-associatesfeathersto their visual image of a parrot, it is going beyondthe evidenceto say that they are using a whole-partstructureto form their association.What the bare evidenceshowsis that when peoplefocus on their visual image of a parrot, the next thing that comesinto their focus of attentionis the feathers.Attention shifts from the imageof the parrotto the image of the feathers.Indeed,typically the mental representationof the parrot apparently evolves into the more close-up image of just the feathers. There is no mentalentity calleda cognitive structureevidenthere,but only a transitionfrom onethoughtto the next. The whole-partstructureis not an entity either'behind' or 'in' the image,it is a temporalpatterning,a transitionof attentionbetweenone imageandits successor. All the cognitive structures evident in the free-associationdata are in fact essentiallytemporal.Thereis no direct evidencefor structuresas independently existing entities, as quasi-things occupying the mind. There is only direct evidencefor temporalstructuring.In free-associating,peopleare making transitions, for examplefrom whole to part, or from object to superordinate,and the structuresare the pathwaysor transitionsthat thoughtmay take from one idea to the next in the associativeprocess.The structureswhich can be pickedout in the free associativedata are thus indicative of the pathways thought may take. Different forms of representationafford different pathways (to borrow a term from Gibson, 1977). In the process of making sense of a stimulus, people thereforemove their attentionaroundit in particularways, and this leadsto the different constructionsof meaningseenin the threeforms of representation. This view attributesto cognitive structuresa statussimilar to that of biochemical equations. The structure whole-+ part describesa metamorphosisof one mental representationinto another, just as the biochemical equations in a metabolic pathwaydescribehow one biolOgically important moleculeis metabolized into another. Structures are descriptions of processes,they are not entities participatingin thoseprocesses. One last problem remains. This is the type-token problem, which is a traditional philosophicalminefield. The type-tokenproblem is essentiallythe problem of the relationship between universal and particular. In cognitive psychologyit takes the form of the problem of the relationship betweenthe generic representationsof semantic memory (types), and their particular instancesin episodicconsciousness (tokens). It is useful here to compare the metabolic account with some recent 'spreadingactivation' models of memory (e.g.: Bower, 1981; Anderson, 1983), becausethe comparison makes it clear that the two views cope with the type-tokenproblemin ratherdifferent ways.

FREE ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURES

According to the spreadingactivation view, memory is representedin terms of a propositionallystructurednetwork, with associativelinkages betweenthe nodes(the conceptsor types) in the network providing the route along which activation spreadsto particular nodeswhen they are in use. The types (general concepts) are representedas nodes in the network. and tokens (particular events)are representedby the spreadingactivationwhich links and activatesthe set of conceptsinvolved in the event.For Bower the particulartoken Mary kissed me is representedby the activation of the generic types (the nodes),for Mary, kiss, and myself, by the passageof activation spreadingbetweenthem. Roughly speaking,the types are mental entities (nodesor concepts),and tokensrely on the structuresbetweenthem (these are the associativelinkages along which activation spreads;they are based on particular experiencesand give rise to whenactivated). particularrepresentations In the metabolic account the arrangementis different: roughly, the mental entities (the representations in consciousness, e.g. images)are particulartokens, and the structuresbetweenthem are types (i.e. generic kinds of transitions). Here the particular representationsin consciousnessdo not arise by the activation of any underlying generic representation,rather they arise from the precedingparticular representationin consciousness(this is not to preclude neural processing,which is presumablywhere they 'arise from' in another not (or at least sense).Particular representationsarise from their predecessors not solely) on the basis of particular experiencewith the transition which is being used,but becauseof generickinds of transitions,the cognitive structures, which mental processingrelies on. Experienceundoubtedly is important in determiningthe transitions,but generictypes of changemay overrideparticular experiencesof change. This is seen with especial force in the case of the 'metaphOrical'transitions of visual imagery. No one has ever actually seen a lobster turning into a man in a shiny red suit of armour, so there is no direct experienceto support or encourageso bizarre an occurrence,yet in terms of mentaleventsit is a simpleandcompellingkind of shift. The metabolic account, with its interpretation of cognitive structures as deSCriptiveof generickinds of transformationthat may occur betweenparticular mental representations, is in someways not greatly different from other models in cognitive psychology.But the small differenceshavelargeimplications.Where there are differencesthey may stem mainly from the reliance of the metabolic accountsolely on observationsof humanthoughtprocesses,in contrastto many information processingmodels whichhave a considerableinvestmentboth in memoryand in computermodelling. The shift from a metaphOricallyspatializednotion of structures(as particulariZing links betweengeneric concepts),to a temporal notion of structures (as generictransformationsthat may occur betweenparticular representations)has someimportant implications. The metabolic accountwill allow a dynamiC and attentional interpretation of the personality correlates of cognitive styles in

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chapter 6, and will allow a dynamic and temporal interpretation of the relationshipbetweenthoughtandfeeling in chapter10. Summary

This chapterhas been concernedwith the structural propertiesof the three modesof thought.It usesfree associationon the practicalside andcasegrammar on the theoreticalside, to articulate the different ways of making senseof the world that are afforded by verbal, visual and enactive representations.Inner speech is abstract and concernedwith words and hierarchically organized concepts.Visual imagery focuseson the parts and attributes,the environment andintransitiveactionsof its subjectof attribution. Enactiveimageryis organized affectively and with a future time perspective,and involves experiencersof feelings and agents who act transitively and with goals in mind. Figure 3.4 summarizesthe findings. This threefold distinction is not new. One of the Upanishadsputs the samemattermore tersely: this universeis a trinity and this is made of name,form and action. Each mode of thought may be said to involve different kinds of cognitive structures,prOvided that thesestructuresare interpretedas descriptive of the patternsof transformationthat occur betweenone thought and the next in the streamof consciousness.

4 Day-dreams,fantasiesand other idle thoughts

The free associationstudieswere concernedprimarily with the cognitivefeatures of verbal,visual andenactiverepresentations. This chapterinvolvesa preliminary andin vivo explorationof the affectiveaspects.It looks at day-dreams,fantasiesand other idle thoughts,and at how thought and feeling are interrelatedin them. Day-dreamsand kindred phenomenaare hereusedmore as a methodthrough which the relationshipsbetweenthoughtandfeeling canbe exploredthan as the focus of studyin their own right.

Cognition and affect in day-dreaming If dreamsare the royal road to the unconscious,day-dreamsaresurelyoneof the busierby-roads.They arelessdramaticand more plebeian,but appearto involve the samefundamentalprocesses(Freud, 1900, 1908b; Starker, 1974; Cartwright and Munroe, 1968). Night-dreams often have a symbolic grandeur which disguises their latent content and allows people to recount them over the breakfasttable without feeling unduly exposed.Day-dreamscome into consciousnesswearing flimsier symbolic cladding and sometimesreveal our needs and feelings with what Singer (1966) refers to as an embarrassingpropensityfor soap-operaandcliche. Freud (1908b) sawall day-dreams,like all night-dreams,as being attemptsto gratifY in fantasy wishes unmet by reality. Recent writers have tended to emphasizethat day-dreamingmay also have cognitivefunctions.

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Singerand Antrobus (1967) showthat at the very leastday-dreamingmay keep peopleawakewhen doing sometask that is otherwiseso boring that they might drop off to sleepover it. Rathermore productively, Klinger (1971) suggeststhat day-dreamingmay be a way of mulling over someof our 'currentconcerns';and Varendonck(1921) describessome of his day-dreamsequencesas being in a questionand answerformat, as if at eachstagethe day-dreamwere trying out possiblesolutionsto problems.Occasionallyour wool-gatheringmaybe of a high order, and Freud (1908a) and Singer (1966) both speculatethat many works of literatureare but reworkedday-dreams. In all theseinstancesa motivational componentis intimately intertwinedwith the cognitive. Fantasy-basedtherapies,such as Leuner's (1977, 1978) Guided Affective Imagery, assumethat the cognitive and affective aspectsare related sufficiently strongly at this level for the feelings to be modified through the thoughts,andprojectivetestssuchas the Rorschachandthe ThematicApperception Testalso tap this level. Thereis evidencethat day-dreamingis not a homogeneous phenomenon,and that there exist a numberof different day-dreaming'styles'.The most important work hereis that ofJeromeSingerandhis colleagues(SingerandMcCraven,1961; Singer and Antrobus, 1963, 1972). Their factor analytic work with the Imaginal ProcessesInventory suggeststhe existenceof three, or possibly four, main patternsof day-dreaming:1) anxious distractible day-dreaming;2) obsessional emotional day-dreaming;3) positive, vivid day-dreaming;and the final factor, which sometimesmergeswith the third, 4) controlled thoughtfulness.The last two patternsare typical of what Singer (1976) calls 'the happyday-dreamer',the personwho enjoysday-dreamingandwho canput it to positiveuse.The first two of negativeemotions.In a day-dreamingstyles involve a greaterpreponderance recentreanalysisof a large amountof data collectedon the Imaginal Processes Inventory, Giambra (1980) found thirty three factors. This greatly adds to the complexity of the Original picture whilefurthering the generalnotion that there are different kinds of day-dreamwith different affective atmospheres.Unfortunately thiswork doesnot give muchguidanceon whetherparticularaffectivetones are associatedwith day-dreamsin particular representationalforms, as the Inventoryconcentrates,thoughnot exclUSively, on visual day-dreams. The follOwing study used 'idle thoughts' as a general term, rather than 'day-dreams',in order to pre-emptany assumptionthat the only phenomenaof interest are visual fantasieswith reasonablyelaborateplots. Preliminary work showed that many purely verbal idle thoughts consist of brief phrases or sentences,which are too short to have anything like a plot, or even much temporal extension. Some purely enactive idle thoughts were of eqUivalent brevity, and it was often only when theseforms of representationappearedin conjunctionwith visual imagery that the idle thought approachedthe level of complexitythat mostpeopleassociatewith a properday-dream.

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

The study of idle thoughts The idle thoughtsstudyinvolved peoplekeepinga 'JournalofIdle Thoughts'over a period of ten days. The introductorypagesof theJournalindicatedthe general focus of the studyas beingon different forms of idle thought- verbal, visual and enactive- and the kinds of feelings and emotionsthat accompanythe different types.The notion of 'idle thoughts'was elaboratedas follows: Probablyall of us spendat least part of our time engagedin 'idle thought' when the stream of consciousnessis not focused on any particular task. Sometimestheseidle thoughtsmay interrupt our directedthought processes; sometimestheyareinterpolatedvery rapidly betweenonefocusedthoughtand the next; sometimeswe discovera fantasystreamthat has beengoing on in a subterranean way beneaththe moreconsciousprocesses. Idle thoughtsgenerallyarea kind of thinking that 'happensin me' ratherthan thinking that 'I do'.

Table4.1 Summaryof themesofidle thoughts

Verbal 1 Critical or belittling, especiallyof taxonomicmisfits. 2 Evokea senseof alienation,as if someoneelsewerespeakingthem. 3 May compensatefor unpleasantepisodesin real life.

Visual 1 Sometimessparkedoff by memories. Involve groupsor crowdsof people. 3 Concernwith sexandromance. 4 Preoccupationwith how othersview the self

i

Enactive 1 Usually sparkedoffby presentexperience. 2 Involve identifYing with peopleor objects. of morbid themes. 3 Preponderance 4 Strongemotions,both positiveandnegative. 5 Various mythologicalandsupernaturalthemes. Verbal-visualcomposites 1 Arise in compensationfor unsatisfactorypastexperience. 2 Themesof powerand pride. 3 Involve negativefeelingstoward others.

Visual-enactivecomposites 1 Predominanceof sexualand romanticthemes. 2 Generallypositiveaffective tone.

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The analysis of the idle thoughts collected by this procedureshowed that distinctive affective themes were indeed associatedwith different forms of representation.Characteristicfeaturesare shownin table 4.1, and fuller technical dataon the procedureandresultsaregiven in appendixB. There are some features which appearto be characteristicof idle thoughts generally, regardlessof form of representation,and which presumablydistinguish them from more directedthought processes.For example,the results showbroadagreementwith Singer's(1966) finding that day-dreaming mostoften occursin drowsy or undemandingsituations.This interpretationof the current resultsrequiresthe (reasonable)assumptionthat studyingsometimescountsas a drowsy or undemandingsituation. Interestingly, visual-enactiveday-dreams, which tendto be both elaborateand positively toned,were mostfrequentin the pre-sleepcontext particularly picked out by Singer. Pure enactiveidle thoughts never occurredin this kind of situation, perhapsbecausea pre-sleepmuscular relaxationprecludesthe kinaestheticcomponentof enactiveimagery. Singerfound that manyday-dreamswereorientatedtowardsthe future, a result which is not paralleledin the presentstudy. The discrepancyappearsto have arisenfor two reasons.One is that in so far as future-orientedthinking involves planning, it would not count as idle, and would thus not be recorded.The other hasto do with how oneinterpretsthe ideaof the future; from beforehand,or with the benefitof hindsight.If someoneseesa strangeron a train andwonderswhat it would be like to makelove to him or her, this seemsmorelike doing something in fantasy now than working towards doing somethingin reality later. Daydreamingmay incidentally serveas practiceof social and indeedof sexualskills which will be useful in the future, but this is not (at least phenomenologically) why it is done.Day-dreamingresembleschildren'splay here. Both are effortless fun at the time, but tum out to be useful learningwith the benefitof hindsight. The follOwing sectionsdiscussthe particularaffectivepropertiesof the different representationalforms of idle thought, including some of the more important compositeforms.

Verbal idle thoughts: taxonomy and castigation The idle thoughts which occur in purely verbal form are typically brief and isolatedcommentsratherthan elaboratenarratives.Their most striking featureis that they are highly critical. A Significant numberof thesecriticisms are directed towardsinnocentstrangerswho havedonenothingat all to justify castigation,but who areunfortunateenoughto be noticeablyodd: It is dark, I am walking acrosscampus.Approachingthe arch someonecomes up fast from behind, and precedesme through the arch. I notice a certain silhouetteand then: 'He's a darkie', the words spokenin an 'appropriate'tone of voice.

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

I think the immediatefeeling wasan appropriatefeeling - simply of prejudice! So it was very qUickly repressedand replacedby horror. Somewherebehindwas my fatherspeaking. Sometimesthe criticism is expressedin humorousterms: This afternoonwhile walking down a main streetin a city centreareaI saw a mananda womanwalking in front of me with handsjOined.SuddenlyI hearda voice from within saying, 'If shewas only two feet smaller,and he was aboutfour stonelighter, there may be somehope.'!!!! Type verbal N.B. The emotionherewas oneof extremejOviality. To be oversizedfor one'ssex, or overweight,or black in a white community,is to be peculiar,and, as if that were not enoughto copewith, it is evidentlyalso to be the butt of rude remarksinsidethe headsoflocal strangers. In the free-associationstudies, inner speech emerged as characteristically conceptualin nature, exhibiting a hierarchical organization based on typical instancesof categories.The focus of criticism in theseverbal thoughtsappearsto be preciselythoseentities which do not fit within this conventionalorder, and which thereforeconstitutea threat to it. Criticism is a way of coping with those objectsthat would unwittingly subvertthe foundationsof the semanticedifice. An awarenessof the impersonalbasisof thesecriticisms and of their manifold injustice, may underliethe senseof alienationpeoplefrequentlyfelt. The voices which spoke these idle thoughts were often experiencedas 'not me', as if emanatingfrom someoneelse. This may be partially a defenceagainst taking responsibilityfor the prejudicesthey express.The following occurredduring a visit to a unit for handicappedchildren. Some of the preamble, and some interpretationsare omitted: The first groupwe visited werethe severelyhandicapped.The minuteI entered the door to their room I felt a strangerand uncomfortable.The children gatheredaroundus, staredat us, pulled at us, touchedus and spokeincoherently to us. I felt very uncomfortable,afraid andsomehowsad.The room where they were staying was big, with a high ceiling, wooden seats- empty. The atmospherewas cold andstrange.But the childrenget to me. They didn't seem to like peopleand I was really afraid of them and wantedto get out. Then this thing startedgoing through my head- 'Hitler was right!' And I felt confused. 'Hitler was right!' And I repeatedit (or IT was repeated)again and again. (The experiencewas definitely VERBAL.) But the thing that got to me was that this was NOT ME. T thought I could neversay anythinglike that. That Hitler was right to kill all the handicappedand maimedchildren and adultsin GermanysomethingI have often condemnedand abused.But here I was in an unsure

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situationand all my high idealsand philosophymomentarilywere thrown out of the window whenin my headI was repeating'Hitler was right!' Much of the trauma of keeping the journal of idle thoughts derived from experiencesof this type, the Angst of which is very apparenthere. One person commentedon confrontationswith the Shadow(in lung's sense),as if there is a distinctly nasty part of ourselvesthat we can ignore until such times as we innocentlyagreeto recordour idle thoughtsfor researchpurposes.1 To mitigate the nastinessit should be said that there may be some validity beyondthat of simpledefensiveness in the claim thatthesecritidsmsarealien and that oneis thereforenot personallyresponsiblefor them. It could be arguedthat in orderto makesenseof the world at all we mustdraw conceptuallines acrossit, yet becauseof the natureof that world therewill alwaysbe someentitiesthat are marginal with regard to the lines we have drawn. Criticism is one strategyfor copingwith thesemarginalcases. That we do have difficulties in coping with ambiguousstimuli has long been known. Bruner and Postman(1949) show that perceptionbecomesextremely difficult, and may break down altogether,when people are tachistoscopically faced with suchunexpectedthings as playing cardsshOwingred spadesor black hearts.Pavlov's (1927) work on experimentalneurosisin dogs goes further, in shOwing how under some circumstancesbehaviourmay also disintegrate.The generativesemanticists(Korzybski, 1933; Hayakawa, 1965) maintain that both neurosisand authoritarianismcan be construedas unfortunateconsequences of efforts to preservea rigid conceptualsystemagainstthe perceivedthreat of entitiesthat fail to fit it. In anthropology also there is evidence that anomalousobjects get special treatment.Edmund Leach (1964, 1969) claims that objects which are marginal with respectto major categoryboundariestend to becometaboo. Blood, urine, faeces,spittle and nail and hair clippings, all start out as me but end up as not me, andarethusambiguouswith respectto the major categoryboundarybetweenself and world. Tabooedobjectsoften evokeboth dreadand respect,and are seenas imbued,whereculturally appropriate,with a magicalpotency.The speCialstatus of such ambiguousobj ects is also indicatedby the use of the languagereferring to them as a form of invective. One way of being rude consistsof shifting one's rather ordinary enemiesto marginal territory and proceedingto insult them thereon: When listening to a closerelation speakingI haveadoptedthe habit of drifting in thoughtsso asnot to hearwhat I do not needto hear.Today,however,whilst listeningto her prattle,without realiZing it, I went to reply but what I mumbled was in fact 'Kinky bitch'. This is completelyuncharacteristicof me and certainly had nothing to do with the conversation.Try as I might I simple could not rememberanythingof what I wasthinking to resultin suchwords 'Kinky bitch'.

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

The generalbackgroundof cultural and individual problemsin dealing with anomalousobjectsprovidesa contextwithin which the critical idle thoughtscan be understood.Criticism acknowledgesthe threat posedby the unusualto the conceptualorder,andattemptsto defuseit. Criticism phrasedin humorousterms (as in 'If she were only two feet smaller') may be particularly effective here, in belittling its objectwithout resortingto obviousinsult.2 Misfits are not the only focus for criticism. Another favourite butt is the self. Sometimesthe idle thought is in the voice of exasperatinglysweet reason, debunkingoverambitiousplans: The thoughtwas verbal. I was on the point of sleepand was planningsomework I had to do. I was worried aboutnot having finished the work and was trying to calm myselfby saying that I would do it the next night before I washedmy hair. Suddenlya voice which I knew not to be mine said 'You'd be surprised'just after I said 'I'd get it done in an hour'. I wouldn't get it done in an hour but I was trying to relievethe anxietywhich the voice succeededin turning backon me again. The emotionwas anxietyintrinsic in the situationbut only re-evokedby the voice. Quite often theseself-criticismscrop up in day-dreamswhich are attemptsto compensatefor unsatisfactorysocialencounters: When Chris was here I found myselfhaving lots of conversationsin my head but with no visual or really enactiveimages.I usedwhat I wassayingto myselfin fact about 60 per cent of the time. The conversationswere often of the simultaneoustalking type - going on in my headwhile I was sayingsomething else. Content-wisethey were phraSingsof what I wanted/shouldsay & there wasa fair amountof stuff like 'You fool, you shouldhavesaid.... ' Criticisms of the misfits appearto be on the basis of their divergencefrom the prototypical;criticismsof the selfappearto be on the basisof divergencefrom the ideal. In thesecasesthe hortatoryinner voicessoundremarkablylike a super-ego trying to call its personto order: I hada funny kind of thoughttoday. I play rugby in College.And my attitudetowardsit isn't very serious,unlike most of my team-mates.Many get very worked up aboutit beforegamesand during training-but I don't. It isn't an attitudeI expressvery muchduring team situationsbut I keepit to myself. I was talking to a friend of mine, who takeshis gamevery seriously,aboutthis last night. Today,while I was readinga book, I lost concentrationand my mind begandrifting. I cannotrememberthe trendor courseof my mind but the final result was that I said to myself 'I must take my rugby more seriously'... I did feel a little puzzledat the time at the way the ideaappeared.

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Its implications for me personallywere more serious I think ... I have a difficulty in applyingmyselfto something,especiallyin the face of adversity. This parallel betweenthe voice of the verbal idle thoughtsand the voice of the super-egois worth exploring further: the super-egodevelopsat aboutthe same time as inner speechbecomespossiblethrough the internalizationof language; the super-egois derivednot from what parentsdo but from what they say. The super-egois the cultural representativein the personality,and how bettercould the conventionsof a cultureinfiltrate a psychethanin the form oflanguage,itself an essentially cultural product. In fact Freud himself remarked upon the dependenceof the super-egoon 'word-presentations(.concepts,abstractions)' (1923, p. 52). This idea of a verbal-auditorysuper-egowas elaboratedfurther by Isakower(1939), andaccordswith what mostparentstell their childrenaboutthe conscience(which is part of the super-ego)being a little voice inside the head which is critical of badbehaviour. It may thereforebe that someaspectsof super-egofunctioning are manifestations of the conventionalconceptualstructuresembodiedin internalizedlanguage.It would thenmakesensethat the voicesexpressingthe criticismsin verbal idle thoughtsare less a matter of a personalvoice directed againsta personal enemy,thana public voice, a voice which is 'not mine', directedagainstan enemy which is also 'not mine', but which representsa threatto the cultural conventions found in the culture as a whole andin the languagewhich codesthem.3

* To summarizethe propertiesof verbal idle thoughts it can be said that they operatewith a conceptionof how thingsshouldbe, and criticize deviationsfrom this standard.In dealingwith objectsand peopleapartfrom the self. the standard is set by the norm of how things as a matter of fact are. Here it is the unconventional,the taxonomic misfit, that comesin for castigation.In dealing with the self the standardappearsto be a versionof the 'ideal self', and criticism is metedout for shortfalls.The frequentlyalien propertiesof both the taxonomically critical and the self-critical voices, along with their other characteristics, suggestsomesimilaritieswith the super-ego. Visual idle thoughts: socialspaceand the importance of beingseen Of the threepureforms, visual idle thoughtsareclosestto our normalconception of what aday-dreamshouldbe.Theyofteninvolve the largerthanlife-size selfand the predilectionfor a world seenthroughrose-tintedspectaclesthat are conventionally associatedwith day-dreaming.One aspect of the generally romantic constellation of visual day-dreamsis their tendency towards nostalgia. The follOwing exampleoccurredat a concert,andis almostpurememory:

DAY-DREAMS. FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

Pleasureat the fact agirl sitting by me was wearinga familiar-looking checkshirt (viyella or something),then realized that it reminded me of a similar, but differently colouredshirt worn - and not worn - by Elizabethduring several delightful daysbeforeChristmas. Visually evoked.Emotions-I suspectnoneintrinsic, but evokedan obvious delight at nice memoriesandalsoa pleasantsurpriseat suchclearresponseto a small visual detail (the person wearing the shirt bore not the slightest resemblanceto Elizabeth). An important feature of most visual day-dreams.as of this one, is their social orientation.This has a numberof manifestations,the most diffuse beingthe fact that theseday-dreamsfrequently refer to social environmentswhich constrain andsupportparticularsocialbehaviours.'The Honan'in the follOwing exampleis the CollegeChapel: In the homeof marriedfriends. theybeingout. I imaginemyselfmarryingin the Honan, a feast of music and friends. I am particularly pleasedwith my cream linen suit. Now my rule beginsandwill be wise andcarefree.Comment.Help! That referencesto environmentsshouldbe includedin visual day-dreamsis not surprising. What is noteworthy is the social characterof these environments. Physicalspaceis almost entirely subordinatedto the peoplecontainedwithin it, who prOvidean audiencebeforewhom one appears: I havebeenthinking of doing the H. Dip. once(if) I get my BA. I went recently to get my dip hours [the teachinghoursof a studentteacher].Having askedfor them and being told I would more than likely get them I beganon my way home to imagine myself teachingin the school. I could see the difficulties I would have and as the day-dreamcontinued I could feel the tension and nervousness beforehandandthe embarrassment at certainthings that could go wrong in the class.I could experiencethe relief at beingregardedas a teacher and the fun it would be to have someoneI knew in the class(the latter being quite possible). I think it is a way of preparing myself for the things that may happen.I know things don't alwaysgo the way you may want them to. Things go wrong and I mustpreparefor situationsI will haveto put up with. 'The class'here is as much audienceas place, and this social-spatialfusion is typical of visual day-dreams.The idea that spacemay havesocial connotationsis familiar from work on metaphor(e.g.: Asch, 1958; LakoffandJohnson,1980; De Soto, London and Handel, 1965). Lee (1981) usesthe exampleof a traditional courtroomto illustrate how spatialorganizationcan be usedto encodepreCisely the social roles and relationshipsinvolved in the legal drama.Within the visual day-dreamsalso, location may be an importantcue to social role: the one in the aisleis the bridegroom;the oneat the front of the classroomis the teacher.

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Within social spacemost of the realities are socially constructed(Berger and Luckman,1966).Of particularimportanceis the constructionof one'sown social persona,which is manifest as an appearancein the eyes of others. Groups of people are important in ratifying thesepersonae,particularly if newly acquired through status passage.The proper social constitution of bridegroomliness requiresa congregationof well-wishers, and the social constitutionof teacherlinessrequiresschoolchildlikebehaviourandattitudesto authOrity. One of the problems with SOCially constituted statusesis that one cannot manipulatethem directly. 'Social space'is as intransitiveas the visual spaceof the free-associationstudies.Peoplecannotinteractdirectly with SOciety-in-generalto induce its good opinion; they must instead mould their own appearanceor performancealongsocially approvedlines and hopethat the spectatorswill have the decencyto notice or, evenbetter,to applaud,or bestof all, to fall desperately in love. The follOwing mustbe a classic: The thoughtwas visual. I was simply listening to some songsby Olivia Newton-Johnand I beganto imaginemyselfsingingthosesongsdressedin a pure white dressandto a huge audience(aswell asbeingtelevised).I wasvery well receivedandafterwardsthe agentswerefighting to sign me but I alreadyhadan agentwho wasalsomadly in love with me. The whole episodewaslike the thingsyou would readaboutin a newspaperabouta starmarryinghermanager.Thesekind ofday-dreams,which I may have fairly often, are often fragmentedand brokenin that I seemto add new things asI go along. (Like I startsingingto an audiencethenaddthe TV and then the adOring managers ....) The dramatic points are very exaggeratedin thesetypesof day-dreams. The feelings are naturally pleasurableand make me feel comfortable. It is probablymy way of copingwith the lessromanticandsuccessfullife I lead. It is tempting to talk about 'social deSirability' here. While undoubtedly appropriate, such comfortable jargon should not dispose us to think that somethinghasbeenexplainedwhenit hasscarcelybeenpointedat. The language of existentialistphilosophycatchessomeof the compleXity involved in trying to be SOCially desirable.Sartre (1957) distinguishesbetweeenBeing-for-itself and Being-for-others,and seesa fundamentalhumandilemma arising from the split betweenthem. Part of the human condition is to be torn betweenhow we feel ourselvesto be and how we think othersview us, which is a schismthat manages to causeagoniesfor many during adolescence.There is a temptationto collude with the views of the other in order to be liked; and this is what is happeningin many of the visual day-dreams.Sartre saw this as 'bad faith', a moral defect to which humanity is irretrievably prone. But if we shift the discussionfrom the austereclimate of existentialismit can be seen as having some positive value: existentialists'badfaith is a lot of otherpeople'ssocialsensitivity.And oncewe are accustomedto the idea of having two selves,a private I and a SOCially constituted

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

me, their relationship can afford considerablepleasure. Here is a civilized encounterbetweenthe two:

That T am the personwho lives in this room, who hascollectedall thesebooks andcanbe seennext to them. 'Simply' a phenomenonof jotted noticing? reassertingthe familiar by introduCinga strangerwho is actually -I realize after the briefest momentof doubt - me. Emotion - immensesurprise,as if someonehad come into the room. Thenstill moresurprisewhenI realizethatno onehas.(This is recurrent, I like it. It's as if it releasesme from some penanceinside my own head. It usually happenswhen I'm sitting still in the room, pausingbetweendoing things.Histrionic self-identification- makinganotherselfcomein and point to the original, now momentarilydisplacedself-is CUriouslycheering.It givesyou a certainfreedom,but not so much as to causeterror. Self hasn'tvanished;it's merelyplayinggames.) The FrenchpsychoanalystLacan (1977) tracesthe origin of the I-me split to a periodhe termsthe 'mirror stage',occurringbetweentheagesof6monthsand18 months. In this period the child first learns to recognizethe image seenin the mirror as his or her own. The selfin the mirror, the me, alwaysremainssomewhat alienatedfrom the 1, sincethe me is on a parwith the selvesof otherswho are also presentto us primarily as visual appearances. However,it is only this eqUivalence of visible selvesthat allows us to empathizewith others,since the appropriative act linking the I to the me canbe extendedalso to the perceivedselvesof others. Mead (1934) also saw our capacityfor social empathyas relatedto the I-me split. For him however the relationship is the other way round, with social empathycomingfirst, andthe I-me distinction,alongwith the kind of consciousnessit allows, beingconsequences. While the speculationsof Lacanand Mead are difficult to test directly, thereis someexperimentalevidencewhich supportstheir commoncontentionthat the I-me distinction is SOCially important. This is work on objective self-awareness,and was initiated by Duval and Wicklund (1972) as an attemptto test someof Mead's ideas. People can be preCipitatedinto a state of objective self-awarenessin a numberof ways: for example,by seatingthem in front of a mirror, or by having them perform in front of an audience.Once aware of themselvesfrom the outside, people becomeacutely consciousof social evaluations,and tend to modifY their behaviourin SOcially desirabledirections.Visual day-dreamsfunction in a similar manner,also endOwingpeoplewith an objectiveself-awareness in which socialdeSirabilityis important. *

In summary,visual day-dreamsare predominantlysocial in tone. They depict social environmentswhich are peopledwith groupsof spectatorsbeforewhom

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the day-dreamerappears.Thereis a concernwith the goodopinion of others,and peoplemay trim their social personaeto encourageit. This collusion takes on romanticovertoneswhenthe audienceis of one.

Enactive idle thoughts: metamorphosesof beingand feeling Enactiveidle thoughtsare often fairly brief They are usuallytriggeredby noticing a personwho then becomesthe focus of identification; or noticing an object which then becomesthe targetof imaginedaction.Thereis often an intimatemix of fantasy and reality, with the imaginedelementsbeing projectedon to a real world. Enactiveidle thoughtsare similar in this regardto verbal ones,and both differ from the visual,which are moreself-containedlyinsidethe head. The casesinvolving imagined action are usually very simple, consistingof a briefimpulseto act,for no apparentreason,which the persondoesnot asa matter of fact carry out: Lastnight whenI waswatchingTV I suddenlygot this feeling I wasgoingto grab the chair I was sitting on and throw it throughthe TV. A split secondthought. For a brief second I felt like doing it. It was enactive but certainly nonemotional.A funny kind of thing. (I just got this ideathat the differencebetweenthe 'mad' and the 'normal' is that the normalcan smotherthe unsuitablethoughts.) This commenton the differencebetweenthe 'mad' and the 'normal' is in line with much psychologicalwork from Freudonwardswhich holds that the ability to restrain impulse is a sign of psychologicalhealth. Psychologistsapart, many parentsmust have tried to teachtheir offspring the social art of countingto ten beforeacting. Simpleimpulsesto act, perhapsbecauseso brief. area lessfrequentlyrecorded enactive theme than the slightly more elaboratedfantasies in which people identifY with somepersonor object. Identificationswith other peopleshow a markedbias in that thesepeopleare rarely the figures of poweror statuswhom onemight reasonablywish to emulate, but tend to be moreproperlyfigures of compassion;for example,a characterin a film who is beingdriven mad, a womanmentionedin a newspaperwho is dying of cancer, or a destitute figure seen on a night street. In imagination people identifY with theseunfortunatesandexperiencewhat their lives mustbe like: Blindness.We have a lecturer in the French departmentwho is going - has nearly gone - blind. I frequently see him (I don't really know him) at lunch time. I also havesometimesto counterstudents'criticisms of his teaching- he doggedlystruggleson at his lecturing, but is so blind that he sometimeswrites two setsof notesover the top of one anotheron the blackboard- the students naturally feel that they are not getting adequateteaching, but the situation inhibits themfrom any otherthanmutedandapologeticcriticism.

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59

One day I was at lunch when he walkedinto the comerof a table and nearly droppedhis tray - suddenlyI found myselfin the positionof a blind man. Obviouslyenactive. Emotions- intrinsic - fear, I think. and helplessness.Evoked- envy of the sighted,anger,sadnessat memoriesof pasttimes of sightedness. Verbal and enactivethoughtsevidentlycopewith misfits in very different ways: the handicappedpersonwho is the targetof criticism in verbalidle thoughtsmay be the subjectof empathyin enactiveones. Thesecompassionateprojectionsare not confined to the humanworld. The following is an example from a zoologist, showing equivalent empathyfor a unicellularorganism: Deathof a Paramecium.Cells die if they get too muchcalciuminsidethem.I have doneexperimentsin which I havelet too muchcalciumin Paramecium,a ciliated protozoan, and I have watched their death-throesunder the microscope. SuddenlyI found myselfin their position,feeling'discomfort'and'anguish'of a condemnedparameciummoving in an uncontrolledway aroundthe bottom of a petri dish. Enactive, the main evoked emotions a helplessness,and compassion, togetherwith a feeling of guilt for inflicting this 'suffering'. The generalemotivity of enactivefantasiesis underscoredby their I;;oncern with various morbid themes- disease,death, handicap,physical or emotional injury - andit may be that the relative rarity of enactivefantasiesis partly because not everyoneis interestedin subjectingthemselvesto the anguishconsequent uponsuchmorbid identifications.Beyondthe anguish,however,thereappearsto be a brighterprospect,asif explOringthe possibility of deathor illnesscanalso be cathartic, leading to a senseof acceptanceand a genuine cherishing of the existencewhich, in fantasyat least,is underthreat: Feelingvery fed up. Sitting in my room knOwing I have 1000things I ought to attend to. Thoughtsrevolve around all sorts of morbid ideas. Not so much connectedto death as to physical harm and violence. Try to imagine how women feel when they are being batteredby their husbands,and kids too theseideasprobablyhaveto do with an item I heardon the newstodaytalking about domestic brutality. Thinking perhapsis a way of relieving tension or something- having thought all that out makesme feel better (be thankful for small mercies). Thereis more, however,to theseenactiveidentificationsthan compassionatenessandcatharsis,sincethe sympathetiCandhumanwereonly oneendof a wide spectrum. In enactive fantasies people also imagined identifYing with a milk bottle, a bottle of SouthernComfort and a fish. While humanidentificationscan be construedas a laudableempathy,someof thesenon-humanonescannot;and

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they often have a bizarreflavour when what is countenanced in fantasyis not in any way possibleto humanbeingsin actuality: I rememberone day (few weeksago) sitting at the breakfasttable and, while looking at it, I tried to imaginewhat it is like to be a milk bottle. I really tried to imagineit. And would you believeit I did. For afew secondsI knewwhat it was like to be a milk bottle. ENACTIVE. No emotion"l content(milk bottlesdon't haveemotions). Such fantasiesinvolve what is a traditional mythological theme, that of the shapechanger,the personcapableof metamorphosinghis or her physicalform at will, and often capableof supernaturalpowersin the changedidentity. The supernatural element sometimes occurs without explicit translocations of identity: The white kitten vomits. In the vomit is a roundworm, thin but about4 inches long. I put it in the shit box with a cloth. Laterhavea histrionic fantasyof whatit would be like to eatthis worm - thing from inside anotherto living insideme. Immediate associations tothis one are worm as phallus, as pregnancy,life within, the conceptionof heroes(by mouth,not surewhetheror no by worm). Had had tea with Mary and the babies.(At the time no feelings of disgust, thoughawarethis would be normal, but a kind of wrapt wonder- at the thing, andthe feeling of living thing within. Enactive.) If visual fantasiesmanipulateappearancesin order to attract social esteem, enactiveonesseemto manipulatephysicalbeingin orderto expressactionsand, especially,feelings.As far as enactivefantasiesare concerned,the natureof one's physical self strongly determineswhat one does and feels with it. Thus the emotional form of a milk bottle is unconduciveto emotional reactions('milk bottlesdon't haveemotions').In otherenactiveday-dreamsthe physicalform of the bottle of Southern Comfort was conducive to, or possibly symbolic of. drunkenness;and the physical form of the fish added to the enjoyment of swimming. Within the human domain one personfound that imagining being mad was productive of a kind of serenity, and severalconfrontedfeelings of sadnessin identifYing with someonewith severe physical illness. Being and feeling, which were closely relatedin the free-associationstudies,maintain this link in enactivefantasy. It is unclear whether the primary motivation involved in the enactive idle thoughts is compassion,emotional self-indulgence, or sheer if sometimes sombreplayfulness.Whateverthe casemay be, enactiveday-dreamsshowthe full emotional range from despairto delight, with feelings being directedtowards othersin additionto (thoughslightly lessoften than) just beingfelt. An odd kind of decencyoperatesin the fact that other peopleare more often the recipientof positive emotionsthan of negativeones.Peoplefeel affectionatetowardsothers but keeptheir bluesto themselves.

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

Feelingsinclude a tacit evaluativedimension,and involve what Arnold (1960) calledan 'appraisal'of their object.In enactivefantasythe feeling is dominantand the appraisalor valuejudgmenttacit. I feel depressedpresupposes I don't think much of myself at the moment;andI am ecstaticaboutX involvesat leastX is rathergood. In verbal andvisual idle thoughtsthe balancebetweenvaluejudgmentandfeeling tendsto be the otherway up, with judgmentdominantandfeeling subdued.It is difficult to envisage what very palpable pleasure might accompanythe visual value judgmentof 'beingfamous',for example;and the verbal criticisms often just get on with the criticizing without botheringto dwell on the hostility that might be assumedto motivateit. A comparisonof the emotive aspectof the enactivefantasieswith the more muted affects of the visual ones suggeststhat emotions may be highly asymmetric relationships.In enactiveday-dreamspeopleare concernedwith lOving and caring, in visual onesthey are concernedwith being loved and being cared about. What is lOgically reversible(A loves B: B is loved by A) is not psychologically so, for the needs satisified by being the active lover or carer are very different from thosesatisfiedby beingthe passivebeloved. Enactiveidle thoughtsmay be part of a processof emotionaldigestionwhich people use to cope with some of the harsheraspectsof reality, and which involves a rather literal assimilation of emotional trauma to the self This emotionaldigestionappearsto be a form of low-level catharsisthat can take on other motivational guises,such as the self-indulgentand the pitying. Catharsis hereis not restrictedto painful occurrences,thoughthesepredominate;positive eventsmay also needto be workedover beforethey canbe assimilated. The catharticpotentialof enactiverepresentations is explOitedin a numberof therapeutictechniques.Gendlin's (1980) 'focusing' emphasizesthe importance of getting into bodily touch with one'sthoughts,and many therapistsuse role play, sometimescombinedwith overt action, to enableclients to work through feelingsin a mannernot possibleif morecerebraltechniquesare used. In summary,enactivefantasiesinvolve imaginedaction, and imaginedchanges of physical identity, with concomitantemotional changes.Some of the nonhuman identifications have a bizarre and supernaturalquality, and the human ones tend to focus on emotionally traumatic experiences.The wide range of emotionsexpressedsuggeststhe catharticpotentialof enactiverepresentations.

Compositefonns: revenge,heroic lovers and missing links The propertiesof the idle thoughtsincluding more than one form of representation can in generalbe accuratelypredictedfrom a knowledgeof their constituents.Someinterestingfeaturesdo, however,emergefrom the conjunctions. Day-dreamswhich containboth verbal and visual elementsretain the criticism theme of the pure verbal forms and the audiencetheme of visual ones. When the two are put togetherwe get a way of thinking that has a peculiarpotencyfor

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revenge- which is typically a matterof publicly humiliating one'svictim. Some personalor social power is necessaryto conductthe humiliation with panache, andan audienceis desirableto ratifY the humiliation andwatchthe victim grovel. An upsurgeof personalpride is an understandableconsequence.Sometimes simply being successful(and being seento be so) is sufficient to Causea due contrition in those who have evidently failed to show respectfor the daydreamerin real life. Negative feelings directed towards others are particularly associatedwith this form of day-dream. It is as if revengewere a boardgame,with the boarditself. the evaluativesocial environment,beingvisual; andthe moves,the changesof relativestatuswrought by the humiliation, beingverbal. Today I had a most enjoyablewallow in my traditional death-listfantasy.The holy orders were very much in evidenceand Bishop **** (of whom I know nothing except the name and some gossipy fragments) was sentencedto paraderound the city in his ecclesiasticalunderclothesuntil he died from exposure. The fantasymixes verbal and visual modes:the verbal elementaccountsfor the court hearing in which I eloquently refute his faith and bigotry and in which he refusesardentlyto acceptthat his credibility hasbeenso thoroughly compromised. Othersto feel the vengeanceof the revolutionarycommitteewere **** (an old favourite), the Pope,Khomeni, **** and**** (otherfavourites). The fantasy is a well-used one and sometimesseemsto be ritualistic occurring after a frustrating event. I can't rememberwhat brought it on but judging by the anti-churchelementit was somemoral dilemma.The emotions evokedare satisfactionand an intrinsic emotion,sometimesevokedas well, is quite often pity. This was presentin today'sexample. Day-dreamswhich have both visual and enactiveelementshavea generallyrosy affective tone, with feelings like happinessand pleasurepredominating.They combinethe larger than life-size version of the self characteristicof pure visual fantasieswith the propensityfor transitive action seenin someof the enactive ones. There is only one kind of transitive action that is worthy of this sort of day-dreamingtreatment:making love. To romanticfluff (visual) is addedsexual action (enactive).Not surprisingly, thesefantasiestend to occur in bed, before one falls asleep. The follOwing luscious example is an exception in that it occurredwhile hitch-hiking: Hitching from Dublin. I imagineenteringa room at a party, drink in hand. Few peoplein the dark room, music,mellow. In the comer,in an armchair,a youngwomanin a black dress;grey, sea-greyeyes,long blond hair. A greatstillnessin her, the stillness of containedpurpose.Sherises,crossesthe room, takesmy drink, then me by

DAY-DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OTHER IDLE THOUGHTS

the hand, leads me to a wide, carpetedstaircase.No words. Great ease.In a red-panelledroom, at twilight we makelove on a greenbed,soundlessly,with perfectunderstanding.It is like being in and underthe sea.After, we look and travel forever back and forth through eachother'seyes.My eyesare grey now and through them she seessky, clouds, infinite spaceblocked in by reassurance. No issue,no outcome,a forever. Day-dreamscombining verbal and enactiveelements,or containingall three forms of representation,occurredtoo infrequentlyfor adequateanalysis. Therewere only two verbal-enactiveexamplesin the entire corpus,as if these forms of representationnormally only cometogetherthroughthe mediationof visual imagery.This interpretationis coherentwith the semantic triptychelaborated in chapter3 where therewas little contact betweenverbal and enactive structures.It is also coherentwith the common-senseassumptionthat feelings can be remarkablydifficult to verbalize, certainly relative to perceptions.This difficulty reflects the problemsof acquiring an emotionalvocabularywhen the referentshaveto be interpretedfrom the more obvioussignsoffacial, bodily, or behaviouralexpression(Skinner, 1957). Somepeoplenever learn to label their feelings and somatizethem as psychosomaticailments, a syndromeknown as 'alexithymia' (Sifneos, 1975). Even normal people can manageto not attach words to feelings as a defence.Bucci (1982) showsthat being able to verbalize painful affect is the beginning of positive adaptationin depression,and the beginningof assertingself-controlafter stressfullife events.Shetalks of a 'needto name'feelingsas an adaptiveurgewe canmaladaptivelyinhibit. Day-dreamscontaining all three forms of representationwere a little more common, but the majority came from a small numberof people, sothat it is difficult to know to what extent the themesare biasedby individual characteristics. For what it is worth, a remarkable90 per cent of theseday-dreamsinvolved power themesof somekind, and over 50 per cent showedevidenceof physical violence, which was a power themerather rare elsewhere.Thesedaydreamsappearto combine therevengemotif of verbal-visualcompositesand add an enactivecomponentin the form of physical aggreSSionto supplement verbalcriticism. Concluding remarks

The idle-thoughtsstudy was undertakenas an enquiry into the affective and evaluativecomplementsof the threemodesof thought.As a resultof it the hope expressedin chapter I, that there would be structural relationshipsbetween thought and feeling, can be preliminarily unpackedinto what is alreadya quite complexpicture. The relationship between semantic organization and value judgments is

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simplestin inner speech.The taxonomicorganizationthat was an importantway of making cognitive senseof things in the free associationstudiesturns out also to be an important way of making evaluativesenseof them. The norm, that which fits neatly into the conventionalorder, is good (tacitly). The odd, the misfit which cannotbe eaSily categorized,threatensthe conventionalorder and is thereforebad.It is punishedby insult andprejudice. In visual day-dreams,mattersare more complex. While the emphasison the all show some environment,on intransitive relationsto it, and on appearances, continuity with the free-associationstudies,new featureshaveentered.Of major importanceis that spaceis now imbued with social meaningand social value. Within the social spacepeopleconstituteand evaluatetheir social personaeby referenceto how they appearin the eyesof others:to be beautifulis good, to be famous is good, to be beloved is good; and generally to be approvedby the socialenvironmentis good.To be repudiated,or ostracizedis bad. Enactiveidle thoughtsare most difficult to interpret.As in the free-association studies,action andmostof the strongeremotionsareconcentratedin this mode, and are intimately related to the imagined vicissitudesof Being. In enactive fantasies,however, doing and feeling tend to be divorced from each other, so that emotionsrarely havethe motivationalquality of the free-associationstudies. Someof the transformationsof being thatoccurin enactivefantasiesseemto be ways of evokingor releasingfeelings.This may be part of an emotionaldigestion process,involving a natural form of catharsis,throughwhich peoplecope with emotionallyimportantexperiences.While it is evidentthat value judgmentsare implicit in the emotionaltone of the enactiveday-dreams,it is not clear what prinCiplesunderliethesevaluejudgments.

5 A cognitive interlude: individual

differencesin modesof thought

Although adults evidently can use all threeways of thinking, it seemslikely that whenleft to their own devicesthey will usewhateverbestbalancestaskdemands with personalpreference.The idea that peopleshow somesystematicbiasesin their useof different forms of representation is aboutasold as the ideathatpeople useforms of representationat all. Galton (1880), having examinedhis own imagery, sent out a 'BreakfastTable Questionnaire'to his acquaintances;the responsesindicated that some could visualize their morning breakfasttable with extraordinaryvividness and clarity, while othersonly 'knew' that marmaladewason it becausemarmaladewasalways on it. By the tum of the centuryinterestin imagerydifferenceswas running high, but the matterhad becomeso confusedthat, accordingto Horowitz (1978), the AmericanPsychologicalAssociationcalledin JamesAngell to chaira committeeto clarifY the chaos. Angell's paper (1910) is still a useful compendiumboth of variousimageryassessment techniquesandof the problemsattendantupontheir use. Despite confusions about how to measurerepresentationalbiases, and despite the behaviourismwhich did little to encouragethe study of internal events,the interestin representational biasescontinuedintermittentlyandsoared in the 1970s,stimulatedby the publication of Sheehan's(1967) revision of the Betts (1909) Questionnaireupon Mental Imagery. In consequenceof this long history, there are numerous options now available for assessingindividual differences. There are testswhich look at one mode of representation(Marks, 1973a),at

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two (Paivio, 1971; Richardson,1977a;Riding andCalvey, 1981),at three (Spindler, 1907; Diehl and England, 1958), at six (Reing, 1978), or at seven (Betts, 1909; Sheehan,1967). Thereare testsof imagerycontrol (Gordon, 1949); ofimageelaboration(Slee, 1980); of vividness (Marks, 1973a; Sheehan,1967); and of dominance(Griffitts, 1925,1927;Diehl and England,1958; Leibovitz, LondQV, Cooperand Hart, 1972; Reing 1978). Most of thesetestsrely on subjectiveratingsor reports.It is also possibleto use objective measures,such as tests of spatial ability (Ernest and Paivio, 1971), or measuresof improvementin paired-associate learningafter imageryinstructions (HiscockandCohen,1973). To judge by the amountof experimentalenergydevotedto test development andtestuse,the ideaof individual differencesin cognitivebiaseshaslong beenan attractive one. The results of this work have, however, sometimesbeenrather disappointing,particularlyif imageryvividnessis the focal variable(seereviewsin White, SheehanandAshton, 1977;Ernest,1977).Testsinvolving vividnessusually correlatewith oneanother,but do not reliably relateto measuresof spatialability, to learning (unlessincidental), or to therapeuticimprovementin clinical situations using imagery techniques.Furthermore,ratings of vividness tend not to differentiatebetweendifferent forms of representation,as Betts (1909) was the first to note. This chapterlooks at an alternativeway of assessingrepresentationalbiases, through their characteristiccognitive structures. It then examines how this structural approach to individual differences relates to some of the other approachesthat havebeenusedto explorerepresentational biases. The Modes of ThoughtQuestionnaire

The Modes of Thought Questionnaire(MOTQ for short) was developedwith SeanHammondand ElizabethDunneas part of a project on cognitive style. It is basedon the free-associationwork of chapter3, but involves a radical modification of format. Insteadof giving people stimulus words and asking them to produce associativeresponses,it gives people items consisting of stimulusresponsepairs, and asksthem to rate how good the associationis. For example, the item:

say FAST-----slow... requiresthat the personsaysthe word fast to him or herself,and then rates,on a five-point scale,whetherslow is an immediateor a distantassociateto it. Itemsare chosento exemplifY particularcognitive structures,which in tum are characteristic of particularmodesof thought.Thereare in all thirteenstructuralsubscales, for which exampleitemsareas follows:

A COGNITIVE INTERLUDE

Verbal subscales say WlDE-----narrow say SCARLET----fever say REGAL ---- -legal say ALUMINIUM ----metal

(opposite) (phrasecompletion) (rhyme) (superordinate)

Visual subscales see BOAT ----harbour see HANDKERCHIEF ----square see PENSIONER----strolling see KETTLE ----spout

(environment) (attribute) (intransitiveaction) (part)

Enactive subscales be OBLITERATING ----gone be GREEDY ----tummy ache be TELEPHONIST----curious be LEOPARD ----catchesgazelle be SECRETARY----could kick boss

(consequence) (affectiveconsequence) (affective) (transitiveaction) (conditionalaction)

In all thesesubscales.the items are precededby an appropriaterepresentational instruction.There is one additionalsubscale.which is called the (russ-modalscale. becausein it items are precededby representationalinstructionsinappropriateto the modecharacteristicof the structureinvolved. For example.in

see WEASEL -----

easel

the associationinvolvesa rhymingresponse.which is characteristicallyverbal.but the instruction is visual. Someonefollowing instructionsshould give this a low rating as it would make a poor visual association.A high rating indicates the operationof responsebias effects.Thesemay derive from a numberof sources. such as carelessness in following instructions.or wanting to appearimaginative. or simple yea-saying.The cross-modalscalewas includedin the MOTQ because both the Betts Questionnaireupon Mental Imagery (DiVesta. Ingersoll and Sunshine.1971; but seeAshtonand White. 1980) and Marks'sVividnessof Visual Imagery Questionnaire(Berger and Gaunitz. 1977) have been shown to be contaminatedby responsebias effects.notablysocialdeSirability. The MOTQ itself can be found in appendix C. along with reliability and standardizationdata. The MOTQ doesnot seektG:Jdividepeopleinto verbal.visual andenactivetypes. but assumesthat each personuses all three forms of representation.with the balancevarying betweenindividuals. The three ways of thinking are not wholly independentof one another;in particularthe visual scalesrelate to both verbal and enactive in a rough mirroring of the triptych arrangementof the three semanticdomainsof chapter3. where visual imagery also occupieda conceptually centralposition.

67

68

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

A reliable instrumentfor measuringcognitivebiasesopensa numberof doors. It becomespossibleto look at measuring diff~rences betweenmen andwomen,to explore differences between people following different careers, and to look at the cognitive correlatesof the threeways of thinking. The following sectionsreview some of the findings for eachmode of thought in tum. The technical data on which thesediscussionsare basedaregiven in appendicesC andD. Inner speech:a style for commerce

One of the traditional placesto look for cognitive style differenceshas beenin different careers, or, more usually, in schoolchildren or students who are aspirantsto different Greers.It is assumedthat differentjobs makedifferent kinds of intellectual demands,and thus attract peoplewith different cognitive biases. For example,Hudson (1966, 1968) looked at the differing subject choicesin convergentand divergent schoolboys:he found that, roughly speaking, the convergersoptedto specializein sciences,with the divergerstendingto go for arts subjects.Witkin (1976)hasalsofound differentcareerpatternsin field-dependent andfield-independentpeople.Field-dependentpeople.thosewhoseperceptual and social judgmentsare sensitiveto. or influencedby. the perceptualor social environment. tend to go into socially orientated vocations such as clinical psychologyand nursing. Field-independentpeople.who separateperceptualor social figures from their respectivegrounds.are more likely to be found in the naturalsciences.engineeringandmathematics. The work of standardizingthe MOTQ involved studentsstudyinga variety of subjects.Of thesegroupstherewasa pronouncedbiastowardsinner speechonly in the commercestudents.indexedby their relatively high scoreon the MOTQ verbalscale.Thesearestudentswho areaimingfor careersin business.wherethe organizationand managementof other people will usually be an important responsibility.A verbal bias can be taken to be an advantagehere. becauseit is largely through speechthat people persuade.negotiate.requestor order the otherswith whom they interact in their commercialand administrativetransactions. Otherevidencewould supportthis interpretationof the MOTQ results.Harrell and Harrell (in a technicalreport cited by Pilkonis and Zimbardo.1979) showed that verbal fluency is the single best predictor of whethera Master in Business Administrationwill achievesuccessin the businessworld. Certainly high verbal fluency and a self-confidentdelivery are importantin persuadingotherstowards the speaker'sviewpoint in decision-makingsituations.andthis is independentof the contentof the speech(Scherer.1979). The MOTQ scale which best reflects the fluency of ordinary speechis the phrase completion subscale.The fact that this scale correlateswith a broad vocabulary(on the GeneralAptitude Test Battery or GATB) suggeststhat people with a pronouncedverbal bias have refined their speechto be a powerful and

A COGNITIVE INTERLUDE

effective socialtool. Thosewho useinner speecha lot also apparentlytend to use it ratherwell. It is unclear whether a verbal bias predisposesa persontowards a business career,or whethera careerchoice directs the person'sthinking into a particular cognitive channel.Developmentaldata on field dependenceindicate reciprocal effects (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson,Goodenoughand Karp, 1962) and the samemight reasonablybe expectedfor othercognitivestyles. Visual imagery: a style for the arts and socialsciences

Galton's (1880) assertionthat women have a greaterpower of visualizing than menhasgenerallybeenconfirmedin work on imageryvividness(White, Ashton and Brown, 1977; but seeAshton and White, 1980).The MOTQ findings point in the samedirection: here too women show a generalbias towards visualiZing, which is particularly strong on one of the visual subscales,that concernedwith object-attributerelationships.In termsof careerchoice,visualiZing is associated with the arts and social sciences(seealso Diehl and England,1958). Theseare of coursethe kinds of subjectswhich attractmanywomen,at leastat undergraduate level. and it is Significantherethat male arts and social-sciencestudentsshoweda muchweakervisual biasthandid the women.1 Therearetwo importantcognitivecorrelatesof a visual bias: the first is the kind of conceptualfleXibility measuredby the Pettigrew(1958) test of categorywidth; andthe secondis vividnessofimagery. Categorywidth is concernedwith a person'sability or willingnessto acknowledge that some objects may deviate markedly from their categorynorm. For example,the averagewindow might be 34 incheswide, but could there pOSSibly also exist windows only 1 inch wide? Somebodywith narrow categorieswill say no; somebodywith wide ones,and this includesvisualizers,will say yes. Richardson (1977b)also found a relationshipbetweenvisualizing (assessed by vividness) andcategorywidth, thoughonly for women. The relationship betweenvisualiZing assessedon the MOTQ, and imagery vividness as measuredon the Betts Questionnaireof Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967),is interestingpartly becausethe Bettshasbeenso widely usedin individual differencesresearch.All the MOTQ visual subscalesshowsomerelationshipwith imagery vividness, with the visual attributes subscaleshOwing the strongest relationship.This correlationbetweenimageryvividnessand the appreciationof object-attributestructuresis an interestingone. It may arise for a very simple reason:that vividnessis itself an attribute.To sayof an imagethat it is vivid is to usean object-attributestructure.Furthermore,many of the featuresfor which vivid is an appropriateadjectiveare themselvesattributesof objects. For example,colours may be vivid, and talk about colourful objects or even colourful imagesusesobjectattributerelationships.Vividnessis, as it were, an attributeof attributes. It can be conjecturedthat thesetwo major correlatesof visualiZing, broad

69

70

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

categoriesandvivid imagery,meetsomeof the cognitiverequirementsof beinga social scientist(and this typically meanttraining as a social worker), or being an arts student. The conceptualtoleranceindicated by wide categories,and the potential for imaginativenessand sensitivity indicated by vivid imagery, would havegeneralusefulnessin both areasof endeavour.

Enactive imagery: a style for engineering

Enactiveimageryas assessed by the MOTQ involves two main kinds of cognitive structures,thoseconcernedwith action, and thoseconcernedwith feeling. Men tend to be biased towards enactive imagery generally, though at the level of specific structures this bias is evident only for the action-oriented aspects (t:speciallytransitive action and physicalconsequences). For one of the affective subscales(affective consequences of action) women in fact show higher scores than men. in terms of careeraspirations,a bias towards enactiveimagery is evident in engineeringstudents.Interestingly, this is equally strong for engineersof both sexes,showingthat otherfactors, presumablyincluding interestand training, can overridethe moregeneralsexdifferenceshere. One of the cognitive abilities taken to be useful in engineeringis spatial flexibility, the ability to manipulatementally three-dimensionalobjectsin space. Spatial flexibility tasks typkally involve giving the person a picture of a twodimensionalshape,and in effect asking: if this shapewere transformedin some way (folded up, or reoriented),which of the following test figures would it then match?Men arenormally betterat thesetasksthanwomen(MaccobyandJacklin, 1974; McGee,1979). The fact that enactive representationsare important in engineering,and for men, pointstowardsa relationshipbetweenenactiveimageryand spatialflexibility. The MOTQ datasupportthis suggestion,with the particularenactivesubscales of importancebeingthe twowhich involve imaginedaction (transitiveactionand conditional action subscales).Thesefindings make the samepoint for adults as Piaget and Inhelder's work (1971) makes for children: that transformational imageryrequiresinternalizedaction,not just internalizedperception. The general relationship between spatial flexibility and enactive imagery supportsthe suggestionmootedin chapter3, that the transitive interactionsof enacciveimagery constitute a relative and therefore a more flexible form of spatialitythan the static and environmentalspaceof visual imagery. An importantrider must, however,be added: therelationshipbetweenspatial flexibility andenactiveimageryholdsonly for men.Womenshowa patternthatis difficult to interpret,and which, if anything,suggeststhat whereasmen are using internal action, women are using their famous intuition. For women spatial flexibility shows positive correlationswith primary-processkinds of thinking

A COGNITIVE INTERLUDE

(MOTQ affective and rhyme subscales),and negativecorrelationswith rational. conceptuallyorganizedthought(the superordinatesubscale). Thesesex differencessuggestthat the frequentlyreportedmale superiorityfor spatialtasksmay be a quantitativedifferencewhich hasqualitativeunderpinnings, 2 restingon the useof different cognitivestrategies. The possibility of strategydifferencesbetweenmen and womenindicatesthat we needto look more closely at what peopleare actually doing when they are trying to solve spatial-flexibility problems. There is some relevant work by Ashton, McFarland, Walsh and White (1978) which shows that people may possessan imageryability which they do not necessarilyusein spatialtasksunless they are expliCitly instructedto do so,·and ]. T. E. Richardson(1978) draws a related distinction for learning situations between coding ability and coding preference.The relatively low correlationsbetweenenactiveimagery and spatial "flexibility may be partly a result of some people possessingan enactive ability which they prefernot to use.3 The work on idle thoughtsindicatesthat enactive so imageryis the mostemotionallytraumaticof the threeforms of representation, it may be that somepeoplepreferto avoid usingit.

In summary The Modes of Thought Questionnaire,which assessescognitive biaseson the basisof characteristicstructuralfeatures,providesa way oflooking bothat general differencesin modeof representation,andat more specific differencesin the use of particularcognitive structures.Therearegeneraldifferencesbetweenmenand women,with men shOwingan enactivebias and womena visual one; and there arealsorepresentational differencesbetweenstudentsstudyingdifferent subjects, which may override the generalsex differences.Commercestudents,both men and women,tend towardsinner speech;arts and social-sciencestudents(especially if they arewomen)showa biastowardsvisual imagery;andengineersof both sexesshowa bias towardsenactiveimagery. Each mode of thought is related to speCific cognitive abilities which may interact positively with career choice: a verbal bias is related to an extensive vocabulary,useful in the persuasiveverbal fluency of thosegoing into business and management;a visual biasis relatedto the broadcategoriesand the vividness of imagerywhich maybeusefulin the artsandsocialsciences;andan enactivebias is relatedto the spatialfleXibility importantin engineering. Thesefindings lay a generalfoundation for the studiesof the next chapter, which extend the work on individual differences to the general area of personality.

71

6 Aspectsof identity

William James(1892) noted that consciousness is in constantchange,consisting of a streamof thought in which no state ever recurs or is identical with what precededit. It is easy to overlook how natural and effortless this continual changingis, and to assume,in theory at least, that the streamof consciousness consistsbaSically of static entities (,thoughts'),to which a dynamiC component must then somehowbe added. In practice (as distinct from theory), what is difficult is not making thoughtgo; this is effortless.The real difficulty is ratherin makingit stop.If onetries to hold an ideastaticin the mind, it rarelylastsfor more than about a secondand then managesto tum itself into somethingelse.There arein fact speCialexercises,calledmeditationexercises,for makingthoughtstop; but nobodyneedsexercisesto makethoughtgo: it doesit by itself 1

On what makesthought go A surveyof psychologicaltheorizingindicatesthreepossiblekinds of explanation of what makes thought go. There are, as it were, three prototype accounts,not necessarilyheld in their pure form by anyonetheorist,but permeatingmuch of the generaltheorizingaboutdynamicaspectsof psychology. First of all, there are energy accounts,which add energy (instinctual, psychic, drive, or spreadingactivation) to what are otherwisestatic constituents.Freudis an energy theorist, though of a very sophisticatedkind. Spreading-activation theoriesof memoryarealso energyaccounts.

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

Secondly,therearestructural-tensionaccounts,which get roundthe problemof an extrinsic energysourceby assumingthat it is the structural tensionwithin the cognitive representationsthemselvesthat providesthe motive force for change. Most Gestalttheoristsheld someversionof this view. Thirdly, therearewhat canbe called transformationalor metabolicaccounts,whereit is processthat is seenas fundamentalratherthan stability. Apter's (1982) view of motivation as intrinsically unstable, or the idea of a procedural semantics, approachsuchan account. To usean analogy:the questionof what makesa car go can be answeredat the first level by referenceto the petrol addedto it as an extrinsic sourceof energy.It canbe answeredat the secondlevel by referenceto the torsionsin the innards(or somethingof the sort); andit canbe answeredat the third level by referenceto the explosiveoxidationof hydrocarbons.The different kinds of accountareusefulfor different purposes,as each emphasizesa different aspectof what is after all a complexprocess. The threekinds of accountof what makesthoughtgo canbe usedto give three different interpretationsof the relationshipbetweenstructureand energyin the thought process.Theseinterpretationscontributetowardsan understandingof the notion of cognitive style, in which the relationshipbetweenstructureand energyis a centralconcept.

Structure and energyin cognitive style In the conceptionof cognitive styles formulated by the Menningergroup (e.g.: Klein, 1958; Gardner,Holzman, Klein, Linton and Spence,1959), thesestylesare seenas underlainby setsof cognitive structures,responsibleboth for representing reality (thought), and for channelling the dischargeof instinctual energy (emotionsand personality).The cognitive structuresthus provide the interface betweenthoughtand personality,with their mark beingvisible in both. For example,the cognitive style of field dependencehas both cognitive and personalityaspects:a field-dependentpersonhas difficulty both in picking out embeddedfigures from their visual context; and in separatingthemselvesfrom their social context, being therefore eaSily swayed by the opinions of others. Thereis clearly a structuralisomorphismbetweenthe cognitive and personality domainshere.What is not so clearis preCiselywhat it meansto saythat the same structuresunderlie both the cognitive and personality characteristics.This is wherethe threedifferent accountsof 'whatmakesthoughtgo' canbe broughtinto play. Theygive rise to threeratherdifferentconceptionsofthis structuralconnection. The energyaccountof what makesthoughtgo would seethe static structures underlying cognitive styles as conduits or sluices for controlling the flow of Originally instinctualenergy.This is roughly the accountgiven by David Rapaport (1959) in his attemptto systematizepsychoanalytictheory.The energyof the id is seenas basic,with all elsederivedfrom it. The structuresthemselveswould then

73

74

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

be regardedas a bound form of the originally free energiesof the libido. The structuresare indeed only able to control the discharge of libidinal energy of this becausetheyarethemselvesa boundform of that energy.The disadvantage account,as David Foulkes(1978) has pointedout, is that it involves an unnecessaryduplicationof conduitsand drives: the boundenergiesof the structuresonly duplicatethe Originally free energiesof the libido. A numberof cognitive-styletheoristshavepreferreda structural-tensionmodel which avoids this duplication. Here the energynecessaryto drive the systemis seenas a tension or force intrinsic to the cognitive structuresthemselves(e.g.: Klein, 1967; Rubinstein, 1967; Gardner, 1969; Schafer, 1975). The intrinsically energeticstructuresfunction as a kind of mentalclockwork, with tensionin the wound-up spring serving as a propulSive force. This account too runs into problems,this time over the ontolOgicalstatusof the structuresinvolved. These are in fact the samegeneralproblems as those encounteredin the section in chapter 3, which discussedthe notion of structuresin cognitive psychology ('Some thoughts on "structure"'). The mind is not a tangible mechanismwith tangiblestructures,evenif the brain is. The structuresunderlyingcognitive styles cannot therefore be actual things, only metaphOrical ones. Borrowing the leadsto smugglingin structuraltensionmodelfrom the world of real phenomena the speciousassumptionthat mind, like the real world, hasspatialextension,and may be occupiedby quasi-objects,suchas structures. This wasoneof the problemsencounteredin chapter3, whereit wassuggested that the notion of cognitivestructurescould bestbe interpretedin yet a third way: as deSCriptionsof the kinds of transitionsmade betweenone thought and the in otherwords as deSCriptionsof essentially next in the streamof consciousness; temporalpatterns.This interpretationties in with the third accountof what makes thoughtgo, the 'metabolic'account.Thoughtis metabolicin the sensethat one thoughtnaturallychangesinto the next in the streamof consciousness, just asin a metabolic system one biochemical entity changesinto another, or in the car engine the hydrocarbonsof petroleumchangeinto water vapour and carbon monoxidegasin a vigorous oxidation reaction.'Cognitive structures'amountto the 'equations'describingthe kinds of changesthat occur betweenone thought and the next, just as chemicalequationsdescribethe changesthat occur in the chemicalreactionswhich transformonekind of moleculeinto another. The metabolicaccountof the natureof cognitivestructures- as deSCriptionsof patternsof cognitive change- allows a reinterpretationof the notion of cognitive style. It leads to an essentiallyattentiona/accountof cognitive-styledifferences. Different modesof thought afford different kinds of transition in the streamof consciousness betweenone idea and the next and thus result in the shifting of attentionin characteristicways. Even startingfrom the samefocus of attention, internal or external,eachmodeof thoughtwill lead attentionoff down different pathways,throughdifferent cognitivetransitionsor transformations. This general perspectiveallows the follOwing initial interpretation of the

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

personalitydifferenceswhich accompanyparticularcognitive styles:how people attend to the world is one of the marks of their personality.Different people normally selectdifferent things to attendto, but evenif they attendto the same thing they do soin different ways,andthusendup makingdifferentkinds of sense of it. This was seenin the free-associationstudieswhere, for verbal representation, makingsenseincludedfinding what categorya thing belongedto; for visual imagery, it included what the thing looked like, and where it was; for enactive imagery, it included what it could do. That similar patternsof meaningmight emergewhen people are thinking about themselvesis suggestedboth by the idle-thoughtsstudyand by the finding that different careerchoicesare associated with different cognitivestyles. These findings do not say anything directly about the personality traits associatedwith different cognitive biases, though they do encouragesome speculationsin that direction. The two empirical studieswhich follow look in detail at theserelationshipsbetweenthoughtand personality. The first study is concernedwith gatheringinitial impressionsof the kind of personalitycharacteristicswhich peoplewith a verbal, visual or enactivebias in their thinking arelikely to have.The evidencehereis not particularlyformal, and usesan adjectiverating-scaletechniqueto generateimpressionisticandintuitively graspable'portraits' of the three personality styles. This loose work is then followed up by the more conventionalpsychometriCwork of the secondstudy. In both studiesthe Modes of ThoughtQuestionnaireis usedto allow particular personalitytraits to be relatedto the cognitivestructurescharacteristicof the three waysof thinking.

Initial impressionsofidentity: the portraits study The portraits study involved the use of the MOTQ togetherwith an adjective rating scale(seeappendixE). The correlatesof the threemodescalessketchin the initial outlines of the portraits,and are shown in table 6.1. The correlatesof the particularsubscalesflesh in theseoutlinesandareshownin table6.2. Thesetables show only the positive correlates,and only thoseuniqueto particularmodesor subscales.They thus exaggeratethe differencesbetweenthe personalityportraits associatedwith each cognitive style, but provide very clear pictures of the distinctive characterprofile associatedwith each. Eachtable includestwo levelsof correlation,straightforwardPearson'scorrelations, and partial correlations controlling for the cross-modal scores. The cross-modalscalefunctionsassomethingof an existentialwedge,which allows us to prise up the social veneer and peep beneath it. The correlates of the cross-modalscale itself are shown in appendix table E.1 and include friendly, dutiful, open, interested,and a numberof other attributesthat are SOCially desirable, especiallyfor women.Controllingfor the cross-modalscoresbypassesthis aspect of the persona,andrevealswhat is generallya ratherdarkerpersonalitybeneathit.

75

consistent generous religious nostalgic thoughtful dependent

peaceful gentle sentimental enthusiastic understanding sensual emotional

creative curious self-aware defensive open emotional artistic

all

sensitive

sensual

women

solitary

evasive

men

Enacrive

• The entriesin the tableareasin the original personalityquestionnaire.In the text their syntacticfonn is sometimesmodified forgrammaticalreasons.

involved sexual

content secure relaxed independent

b) Pearsoncorrelates

sexual

content involved

a) Controlling for cross-modalscores

argumentative romantic thoughtful

men

women

men

all

Visual

Unique correlatesof personalityadjectiveswith MOTQ modescales'

Verbal

Table 6.1

sad envious

all

hatred jealous disgusted annoyed different inferior gullible

guilty

women

shy

inventive

dominant

correlates interior

dislike

Rhymes

secure

all

evasive

antagonistic

antagonistic

men

Affective

dreamy

wonder

sense o f

sentimental

men

like risks

grateful

all

indignant

defensive

uJI

fntransime action

free

men

friendly

rational

solitary

women

expectation

sense o f

rational

romantic

women

secretive

religious

independent

women

' T h e entries in the table are as in the original personality questionnaire In the text their syntactic f o r m is sometimes m o d i f i e d for grammatical reasons

sad

calm

vulnerable

patient

Peurson

t o n i passionate

sexual feeling o f

calm

moody

inventive

cntical jealous

self-conscious

lonely

shy

women

apathetic

women

interested

isolated

londolfed

serious

all

men

women

effective consequence

all

men

insecure

apathetic

indecisive

humiliaied

all

Consequence

unsociable

gullible

unsociable

gullible

score

cross-modal

artistic

correlates

Enacnve subscales

reliable

Pearson

empty

gentle

self-aware

controlled

reliable

nervous

scores

disappointed

sympathetic

men

patriotic superior

excited

involved

free

relaxed

lucky

popular

like power

superior

women

sexual

Attribute

women

generous

men

all

consistent

sexual

involved

Environment

Visual subscales

suspicious

suspicious

content

uoss-mudul

correlates

Peurson

controlled

scores

cross-modal

men

all

Phrase completions

women

men

all

Opposites

Verbal subscales

Table 6.2 Unique correlatesof personalityadjectivesWilh MOTQ subscales'

Superordinates

stubborn

annoyed

men

Transitive action

dependent

men

Part

shame

sociable

ambitious

shame

men

intense

suicidal

cynical

aggressive

disgusted

inhibited

all

depressed

protective

all

afraid o f failure

fascinated

all

inhibited

women

sociable

women

fascinated

hopeless

women

feeling o i ]Oy

men

irrational

all

Conditional action

self-indulgent

regretful

depressed

women

78

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Before discussingthe particularstructuralrelationshipsbetweencognitive and personalitystylesthe questionneedsto be askedas to what theseportraitsare of The analysesare correlationaland thus do not divide peopleinto pure types. Sinceto a certainextentwe areall capableof usingall threewaysof thinking, these portraitscan be readas descriptionsof three aspectsof the self. which appearin different proportionsin different individuals.The verbalizerportrait takenalone, for example, is less a full description of any particular individual than an asymptoticprojectionof a verbal bias; and calling someonea verbalizerin what follows meansnot that they use only verbal representation,but that they use it a lot.

Verbalizersand the liking for power The personalitycharacteristicsof verbalizersmap on to their cognitive characteristics in quite preciseways, as is shown in figure 6.1. The verbalizer'portrait' is composedof threemain interconnectedfeatures,concernedwith: the role of the institutional hierarchy; the use of languageas a social tool; and superstition.All threerelateto the centraltheme,which is a generalconcernwith power. Verbalizers make sense of the world by fitting things into hierarchically organizedsetsof categories.They seemto makesenseof themselvesin the same way. The hierarchyis now an institutional structureratherthan a cognitive one, and the verbalizerdefineshim or herselfby referenceto a role within it. A social role in thebureaucraticsystemis the eqUivalentof a conceptin the cognitiveone.2 The role providesa senseof order and consistency,but it also allows for some vertical mobility. Verbalizersareambitiousto moveup the hierarchyandappearto be fascinatedby authOrity. Unfortunately,where promotion is possible,so is demotion,and verbalizers are awareof threatsto statusin their fear of failure, suspicionand shame(men), and hopelessness (women). The termsusedto describethe cognitivestructuresarealsousedto describethe institutional ones. In most large organizationsthere are literal superordinates, people who are in authOrity over individuals, and in many commercial and indeedotherorganizationsthereis a literal opposition- the groupor firm against whom one is competingfor markets,prestige,or successof other kinds. This competitivenessprovidesconsiderablerelish anda spurto achievementfor many people.Its disadvantage,and all ways of thinking appearto haveboth boonsand banesassociatedwith them,is that competitivethinking tendsto be pre-emptive, blinding the competitorsto the existenceof any alternativeway of thinking. Kelley and Stahelski (1970) found that if naturally competitive and naturally co-operativeindividualsinteract,the competitivedefinition of the situationtends to win the day, and the co-operatorsare also forced into taking a competitive stance. The verbalizers'definition of situationsmay be a Similarly influential one,partly

Figure 6.1

SELF

DIFFERENCES

+ OPPOSITIONS

HIERARCHIC ORDER

position in institutional hierarchy

for social influence

PHRASE COMPLETION

patriotic

patriotic patriotic

afraid offailure, ashamed(M), suspicious(M), hopeless(W)

content,consistent,sociable(M), generous(W)

fascinated,ambitious(M)

superior,liking power, popular, lucky, involved (M), sexual(M), free (W), excited (W), relaxed(W), patriotic (W)

secure,free (M), religious (W), secretive(W), independent(W)

Relationshipsbetweencognitivestructuresand personalitycharacteristicsfor verbal representation

social distinctions

content, consistent,

liking content,

forsupematural or ritual influence

----.;>~RHYME

80

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

becausethesepeoplehave a capacityto put their own viewpoint in a persuasive manner.The personalityadjectiveswhich correlatewith the phrasecompletion subscale,the mostspeech-likeof the MOTQ subscales,areall positive,reflectinga confident self-image. The spectrumof adjectiveshere appearsto be a consequenceof the fact that onceloosedfrom its referentslanguagebecomesavailable for more rhetorical functions. Verbalizers appear to use language as a very effective social instrument, adapting it to the businessof making friends and influencing people. In addition to their senseof superiority and liking for power, verbalizersdescribethemselvesasboth popularand lucky. Barthes (1972) sees dereferentializedlanguage as a tool of the politically conservative,who use it to preserveand bolsterthe statusquo. There are some suggestionsof conservatismin the verbalizer portrait, in the patriotism of the women;and perhapsalso in the sexualityof the men, which indicatesa traditional male stereotype. The third generalconstellationin the verbalportrait canbe interpreted,though tentatively, as relating to superstitionand to attemptsat supernaturalinfluence. This interpretationis prompted by the correlation of secureand religiOUS with the MOTQ rhyme subscale,and by the fact that rhyming structureshave the non-sensicalappeal of soothing mellifluence that characterizesmuch ritual language.Rhymesare satisfyingnot becausethey make meaningfulreferenceto anything, but becausethey have a musical quality which is satisfying in its own right. Much ritual and religiOUS languageexplOits this, and relies on an archaic language(as did the Church of Englanduntil recently) or an alien language(as CatholicismusedLatin until recently). Levi-Strauss(1968) seesmyth and ritual as beingin cultural equilibrium. Myth, which he seesasbasedon oppositionalstructures,takesthingsapart:virginity and marriage,life and death; and something- ritual - is neededto put them back togetheragain,andprovidea senseof continuity. Within the verbalcognitivestyle the ritual rhymesmay thereforebe balanCingthe mythical and divisive opposites. If there is one theme that permeatesthe verbalizerportrait it is the needfor power, the needto order and control eventsin the world. Powercan be gained and exercisedin manyways. Thereis powerof a basickind in the ability to name somethingand therebyto categorizeit. There is also power in criticizing those things which are difficult to categorize,as was seenin the verbal idle thoughtsof chapter4.3 Powerwith a more constructivesocial effect derivesfrom a person's position in the bureaucratichierarchy, with the responsibility attachedto that statusfor organizingother people.Statusmust of coursebe apparentto others, and accordingto McClelland andWinter (1971) thoseliking powerwill take care to form social allianceswhich enhancetheir prestige,and will spendmoneyon the possessions that exhibit it. Rathermore worrying is the finding of Kipnis and Vanderveer(1971) that thoseliking powerwill also give disproportionaterewards to thosewho ingratiatinglysupportthem. The exerciseof power in most organizationsrequiresthe effective useof talk:

ATTRIBUTES

PARTS

protective.sociable(W)

dreamy(M). sentimental(M). senseof wonder(M). senseof expectation(W). romantic(W). rational (W)

self.aware.sympathetic. artistic (M). reliable (M). gentle(M)

Figure 6.2 Relationshipsbetweencognitive structuresand personalitycharacteristicsfor visual imagery

feelings about appearance

SELF (subjectof attribution)

feelings about belonging

RELATIONSHIPS

INTRANSITIVE

ENVIRONME

NATURAL & SOCIAL

depressed.dependent(M)

humiliated.indecisive. apathetic.insecure. gullible (M). unsociable(M)

defensive.indignant

nervous.empty (W) . .disappointed(M)

82

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

to inform and persuade.and to participatein the polishedpatternofinteraction which attractsrespectand popularity. The evidencesuggeststhat peoplebiased towardsinner speechhavehonedtheir languageto makeit a fine tool capableof achievingtheseaims. The final aspectof power may have more importancein Ireland than elsewhere. It stemsfrom the power of ritual, especiallyreligious ritual, to control otherwiseincomprehensibleevents. While Freud did not talk about cognitive styles. he did suggestthat different peoplemay investmostof their libidinal energyin oneor otherof the domainsin the psyche.In chapter4 it was suggestedthat there was a relationshipbetween speechandthe super-ego;andofFreud'sdeSCriptionsof his three'libidinal types' (1931).itis the obsessionaltype. dominatedby the super-ego.that correspondsto the verbalizer. Freud saw such people as the upholdersof civilization. for the mostpart in a fairly traditionalspirit.

Visualizersand the needfor affiliation The relationshipsbetweenpersonalityand visual ways of cognitively construing reality are shown in figure 6.2. In the free-associationstudies. many of the importantvisual structures.whendescribedin termsof casegrammar.involved a subjectof attribution.to which parts.attributes.locationsandintransitiveactions. could be attributed. In the visualizer portrait. the self becomesthe subject of attribution (asopposed.for example.to an agentor an experiencer).This appears to involve an externalizedawarenessof the self, mediatedthroughsensitivity to the environment(and especiallythe social environment).and has motivational consequences. Relationshipsto environmentsare of an odd form in that one cannot do anythingdirectly aboutthem.At the mostonecanbe in. andperhapsactingin. the physicalenvironment;and.as shownby the idle-thoughtsstudy.onecanperform for the social one. If one has no hope of direct influence. a receptivity to the environment.and an ability to mould oneself, chameleon-like.to its requirementsbecomesuseful. The self is not an agentso much as a marionette.and it is the environmentthat pulls the strings. The receptivity of visualizers to the environmentgives the impressionthat they are Romantics.not in the limited. modem sense.but in the senseof the nineteenth-centuryartistic and social Romanticmovements.Visualizershavethe artistic emphaSiSof Romanticism.with its dreaminessand senseof wonder. and the self-awareness that such an attitudeto the world reciprocallyinvolves. They show too the humanitarianconcernsof many of the socialreformersof the Romanticperiod.beingsympathetic.gentleandreliable; and thereare suggestionsalso of someof the more maudlin aspectsof Romanticism in their sentimentalityand (small r) romanticism.4 A troublesomeconsequence of sensitivityto the environmentis a dependencyon it. Insteadof being driven from within. as erstwhile drive theory would haveit.

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

visualizersare 'called' from without, motivated by their responsiveness to the environment.In place of an inner awarenessof motives, their self-awareness appearsto be external, a matter of seeing themselvesfrom outside and of governingtheir behaviourfrom that perspective.This interpretationarisesfrom the correlationof self-awarewith the MOTQ environmentsubscale.Here,asin the visual day-dreams,peopleseemto seethemselvesfrom outsideand then worry abouttheir appearance. Bion (1962) refersto the developmentaltask confronting humanbeingsasthe 'resolutionof the conflict betweennarcissismandsocial-ism' (p. 309). Visualizers seemto solve the conflict by a subtleintegrationof the two, through an external self-awarenesswhich allows them to look at themselves while taking the viewpoint of otherpeople. The negativeaspectsof the visualizer'spersonalityfollow from the onus for motivation being located externally, which results in emptinessand apathy; and from the lack of direct control theseindividuals can exertover the environment, which resultsin nervousness,insecurityand indecision. The negativeaspectsof the visualizer portrait are a consequence of the same is usefulfor sensitivitythat underliesits positivefeatures.Objectiveself-awareness affiliative purposesbut it tends not to penetratethe skin, and the personis in with nothinginside. dangerof becomingan appearance The negative feelings about the self may be particularly poignant when the visualizer's dependencyis ab-used and she or especially he is rejected or otherwise ostracized. Then follow disappointment,defensiveness,humiliation and indignation.The unSOciabilityof male visualizersmay be both a responseto and an attemptto avoid this senseof social ostracism.It is not that other peopledo not matter,it is ratherthat they mattertoo much.Onecanonly be really humiliatedor indignantif one caresa gooddeal aboutthe opinionsof others.Indignantpeople arenot beinga-social;they are going offin a huff. which is different. The visualizer portrait can be summedup as reflecting a general need for affiliation. Visualizerslike otherpeopleand want to be liked by them. They have the characterof Freud'serotic type, who needsto be loved andwho is dependent on thosewho may withhold this love. The dynamiCSof this needof affiliation are complex,relying on an externalself-awareness and an ability to mould the persona to fit in with the needsof others.It is possiblethat this externalizedself-awareness originatesin the kind of joint attentionwe engagein with our friends, and which we engagedin with our mothersin infancy.Joint attentioninvolves the child follOwing the mother'sgaze,so that they areboth looking at the samething. This is a prerequisitefor learning language,as words must refer to the same thing for is an extensionof speakerand hearer.It may be that externalizedself-awareness this phenomenonof joint attentionto the situationwherethe gazeof the otheris on the self FollOwing their line of regardleadsto seeingoneselfas they do. The SOCially orientedstyle of the visualizeris coherentwith the visual bias of the social sciencegroup of chapter5 (psychologyand social-workstudents),and also with the fact that womentend to show a visual bias. Conventionalsex roles

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84

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

would seeboth nurturanceand socialdependencyas acceptablefor women,and would sanctionthe sociability that fulfils their affiliative needs.The samebehaviour in men would not universally meet with equivalentapproval, and the men, in contrastto the women,claim to be unsociable. There is nothing contradictory in the fact that two opposite tendencies, sociability and unsociability,may be part of the sameportrait. What this meansis that the dimensionof sOciability is alwayssalientfor visualizers.They havewhat Markus (1977; Markus andSentis,1982) would call a 'self-schemata'of sociability, which allows them to processinformation relevantto socialbelongingandsocial ostracismmore qUickly and effiCiently than peoplewho are 'aschematic'in this regard,that is, peoplewho do not careoneway or the other. Marcel Proustwas a schematicin this regard: In the caseof the solitary, his seclusion,evenwhereit is absoluteandendsonly with life itself, has often as its primary causea disorderedlove of the crowd, which so far overrulesevery otherfeeling that, not beingable to win, whenhe goes out, the admiration of the hall-porter, of the passers-by,of the cabman whom he hails, he prefersnot to be seenby them at all, and with that object abandonsevery activity which would force him to go out of doors. (Within a Budding Grove, part 2, p. 123)

Enactiveimagersand the needfor self-efficacy The portrait of the enactive imager can be divided into three broad aspects, involving the selfas agent,the selfas experiencer,andthe selfassolitary being.All three have a bearingon the dominantneedof the enactiveimager, the needfor self-efficacy.Figure 6.3 showsthe relationshipsbetweencognitive structuresand personalitycharacteristics. The enactiveportrait is of an individualist, driven to do what he or shehas to do, and ratherheedlessof what anyoneelse thinks aboutthe matter.The strong motivations for personalachievementare counteredby equally powerful (one fears, more powerful) frustrations.All threeportraitsinclude oppositeextremes, but differ in the dimensionsthey define. Forthe enactiveimagersthe polesareset by inventivenessat bestandsuicidaldepressionat worst. (the The most positiveaspectsemergewhenaction hasphysicalconsequences MOTQ consequences subscale).Then people are capableof calmnessand compassion;and show an inventivenessalong with a numberof traits that are probably its naturalcomplements- interest,seriousness,patienceand dominance. The inventivenessof the enactiveimagercontrastsin interestingways with the artistic orientationof the visualizer;andcreativityappearsto beimportantin both, thoughin different manifestations.(Creativeitself is correlatedwith a numberof visual and enactivesubscales,thoughonly with the visual modescale.Visualizers may be interestedin whethersomethingis creativein the senseof aesthetically

SELF

(as agent)

HYPOTHETICAL ACTION

TRANSITIVE ACTION

CONSEQUENCES

irrational. feeling of joy (M). self-indulgent(W). depressed(W). regretful (W)

intense. inhibited. disgusted. aggressive . cynical. annoyed(M). stubborn(M). suicidal

lonely (M). sad(M). isolated(M)

Figure 6.3 Relationshipsbetweencognitivestructuresand personalitycharacteristicsfor enactiveimagery

grateful.likes risks. antagonistic(M). evasive(M). friendly (W). rational (W). solitary (W)

AFFECTIVE

(as experiencer)

. AFFECTIVE CONSEQUENCES of actions

vulnerable. inventive. shy. critical (M). self-conscious(M). sexual(W). inferior (W). moody (W). jealous(W). feeling of dislike (W)

serious.patient. dominant. inventive (M). interested(M). compassionate (M). calm (M)

86

THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

pleasing; enactive imagers in whether somethingis creative in the sense of working effectively.) The darkestside of the enactivepersonalityemergesin connectionwith the MOTQ transitive action subscale.The best possibility here is intensity, which is probably a very positive attribute for its possessors,though it may not be everybodyelse'ssocialcup of tea. All the othercorrelatingadjectivesarenegative, ranging from inhibited, through disgusted, aggressiveand cynical, to suicidal. This suggestseitherthat actionis often frustratedby others,with the consequentanger beingdirectedboth towardsothersand towardsthe self; or that enactiveimagers have strong impulseswhich they have difficulty in controlling; or, more likely, both. The MOTQ conditional action subscale can be interpreted as reflecting attitudesto the future and to what could be.Its correlatesrangefrom the feeling of joy which can be derived from idle or whimsical (irrational) speculation,to the regretful feeling engenderedby the realization that the hypotheticalis not easily translatedinto the actual. Taking conditional and transitive subscales together thereis somebasisfor arguingthat men canmore easilydistinguishbetweenthe hypotheticalandthe actual,and that whenfrustratedin attemptsto achievesome personalgoal they tum their angeroutwardsand dig their toes in determinedly, becomingstubborn and annoyed; whereaswomen tum their anger inwards and becomeregretful, self-indulgentand depressed.This mayormay not be anymorethan in menthat are a reflection of society'stoleranceof somekinds of aggressiveness not normally acceptablein women. The two MOTQ subscaleswhich are concernedwith affectivity, the affective subscaleitself, and the affective consequences subscale,showattitudesto the self as an experiencer.The affective subscalegenerally prOvides a more positive picture than the affective consequences, which reveala painful vulnerability. The differenceis somethinglike that betweensimply feeling, and feeling in response to interactionwith others. When simply feeling, enactiveimagersshow themselvesto be grateful and to show liking for risks; this indicatessomezestfor living. They also showsomething more difficult to interpret within the context of an affective scale, and that is rationality. Since a similar relationshiprecursin the psychometriCwork reported later (where the affective subscalecorrelateswith emotionalstability on Cattell's 16PF) it is worth assumingthat this is no accident.One interpretationis that it is only unacknowledgedfeelings that subvertrationality. Acknowledgedones are incorporatedinto a kind of rationality in which feeling is important; in wisdom ratherthanstarklOgic. When the enactiveimageris respondingto interactionswith others,the zestful and hopeful picture disappears,and is replacedby vulnerability andvictimhood. Men describethemselvesasself-consciousandcritical, andwomenfeel themselvesto be inferior, moody, jealous,and capableof feelings of dislike. Sexual,for women,relates to this group, and provides a contrastto its correlation with the verbal phrase

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

completionsfor men. Sexualityrelatesto vulnerability for womenand to power for men. One personalitycharacteristicwhich is not confined to a particular MOTQ subscale,but which coloursthe entire enactiveportrait, is an evidentsolitariness. Many of the other traits of enactiveimagerssuggestan interestin things rather than people, and their social needsare probably better met by a few strong one-to-onerelationshipsthan through generalsociability. Enactiveimagersare capableof patience,compassion(men) and friendliness(women),indicatingthat they value some closenesswith others, but beyond this they appearto be natural loners:they aresolitary, shy, isolated,andlonely. A numberoffactorsappearto contributeto this. Intensitytendsnot to makefor easysocial relationships,let aloneaggressiveness, whetherdirectedoutwardlyor inwardly. Furthermore,invention of most kinds tends to be a solitary if not a positively lonely activity, as ofits natureit implies going beyondthe opinionsof other peopleand into a realm where consensusfails and one is sustainedby a sheerandpossiblybloody-mindedfaith thatwhat oneis doingis right. Innovation andsocialawarenessrarely coincidewith any ease,andto preservethe oneit may be necessaryto forfeit the other.Indeedthe role playedby otherpeoplein the life of the enactiveimager seemsto be a predominantlynegativeone, as they are probablythe sourceof mostof the frustrationsandinhibitionswhich standin the way of personalfulfilment. What enactiveimagersneedhasbeendescribedundera numberof headings. Bandura (1977) talks about 'self-efficacy', de Charms (1968) refers to 'personal causation',andWhite (1959)usesthe term 'competence'.Theactiveandinventive aspect,which is to sayroughly the positive and masculineaspect,of the enactive portrait, is appropriateto the engineersof chapter5, who were biasedtowards this way ofthinking.sEmotionsplayamotivationalrole in the needfor actionbut they may also havesomeimportancein their own right. Whetherthe predominantly tortured emotional tone of the enactive portrait reflects an emotional opennesswithout needof repression,or an anguishmuchin needof it, is unclear. The morbid tenor of the enactiveday-dreamsindicatesat least someopenness here, and enactive imagersmay have an ability to makeuse of strongemotional experiencesas a powerful componentin their psychic functioning. This ability may eventuallybe channelledinto their motivation and constructiveaction. On the negativeside, Plutchik (1954) noted that chronic muscle tension, resulting from a blocking of action,is a featureof mostforms of maladjustment. Freud's remarks on the third of his libidinal types, which he calls the narcissistic,arerelevantto the enactiveimager.Thesearepeoplewith a proneness to action and a weak super-ego.They are independentand not easily overawed. During periodsof cultural changethey may becomeleaders,but, he says,they are liable, iffrustrated,to psychosisand Criminality. Strongstuff

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THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

Conclusionto the portraits The portraits study shows how it is possible to relate particular aspectsof personalityto particularways of thinking. Eachmodeof thoughtemergesas a cognitivestyle in the true sense,a life style as well as a way of thinking. Eachfocusesthe person'sattentionon the world in a particularway andleadsto different ways of makingsenseof it andliving in it. 6 Eachmodeof thoughthasa way of beinga successanda way of beinga failure, and both are specific to the mode of thought and rather irrelevant outside it. Verbalizersareconcernedwith power,statusandorder,andthereforenecessarily also worried aboutfailures of power, lossesof status,and their associatedchaos. None of this is very important to the enactiveimager. The enactiveimager is concernedwith invention and despair, both of which probably look like self-indulgenceto the verbalizer.The visualizer has concernsmidway between the extremes,and worries about affiliation and rejection. Padgettand Wolosin (1980) have shown better dyadiC communicationin those who are cognitively similar, as both verbalizersand enactiveimagersare to visualizers;and the two extreme groups may need the social mediation of the visualizers just as, at a semanticlevel, verbal and enactivestructuresneededthe semanticmediationof the visual in the triptych arrangementdescribedin chapter3.

A secondapproach to identity: the psychometriC study

The adjective rating scale of the portraits study was effective in giving general impressionsof the personalitycharacteristicsassociatedwith the threecognitive styles.This sectiondiscussessomemoreformal work carriedout with SeanHammondandElizabethDunne,which wasaimedat treatingthe samephenomenain a different way. This psychometriCwork again usedthe MOTQ. along with the follOwing tests: Wilson-PattersonAttitude Inventory (WPAI), Rotter's InternalExternal Locus of Control Scale (IE), the Marlowe-CrowneSocial Desirability Scale, the Eysenck PersonalityQuestionnaire(EPQ), the PersonalOrientation Inventory (POI), Cattell's 16PF, and the CouchKeniston measureof Acquiescence.The technicaldetails for this work are given in appendixE, along with the resultsuponwhich the follOwing discussionis based. As a generaldeSCriptionof the resultsit is useful to borrow someterms from David Riesman'sThe Lonely Crowd (1950). He was concernedwith the importance of different personalitytypes at different stagesin cultural evolution, and talked about tradition-directedpeople, who have power during times of stability; otherdirected people, important during periods of cultural decline when social values dominateover thoseof personalachievement;and inner-directedpeople,who are importantas trailblazersduring periodsof social transition.when old structures have broken down. Theseterms can be lifted from Riesman'swork to prOvide useful and cogent labels for the three cognitive styles: the verbalizers are

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

tradition-directed,the \isualizersare other-directed,and the enactiveimagersare inner-directed.

Tradition-directedverbalizers The portraits study indicated that verbalizers are interestedin power. Power requiresto be exercisedandtendsto polarizethe world into the haves,thosewho haveit, and the others,the have-nots,over whom it is exercised. The psychometricdata indicate that women tend to be the have-nots,finding self-esteemin becoming the guardians of traditional morality. They show a religion-puritanismwhich, in generalconfirmation of the portraits data, correlates with the MOTQ rhyme subscale.They also believein the efficacy offorce, shown in their militarism-punitiveness.This correlateswith the MOTQ oppositessubscale, and can be interpretedas a physicalcounterpartof the verbal criticismsfound in the idle thoughts.In both casesadmonishment is deemedto be deservedby those \iolating conventions.Thesecharacteristicscombinedwith their conscientiousness, externallocus of control. humility and apprehensiveness portray the traditional woman, subservientto a man but wielding considerablemoral powerof her own. The men, thoughless clearly, occupythe traditionally dominantposition. The unclarity arisesfrom an asymmetryin the power relation: underdogshave no reasonto look for extra peopleto be subservientto. One bossis enough.Top dogs, however, do want to extend their suzerainty.For the men this quest is furthered by forthrightnessand spontaneityin expressingthemselvesand by their internal locus of control. all of which are presumablyharnessedto their persuasive powers.Phares(1965) hasshownthat peoplewith an internallocus of control are more effective than thosewith an extemallocusin getting othersto changetheir attitudes,even when adheringto a sCript. Interestingly men who claim to find verbalizingeasyor enjoyable(on the questionsat the end of the MOTQ) show a strong extraversion,which would fit this persuasiveand perhapsargumentative picture.Thereis somee\idencethat the verbalizermay sometimesbe hoist by his own persuasivepetard, as acquiescence(yea-saying) correlateswith the MOTQ phrasecompletionssubscale. The generalthemeof the verbal correlatesis a traditional one, of womenwho stay at home as moral guardians, while men go out and are assertive. The traditional picture is not necessarilya conservativeone (in the authoritariansense measuredby the WPAI), thoughverbalizersdo havea numberof traits associated with authoritarianism.Thereare positivecorrelationsofWPN conservatismwith the MOTQ questions about the ease and enjoyment of verbaliZing, and it may thereforebe that verbalizersare not typically authoritarian,but that authoritarianism representsoneof the dangersto which verbalizersare prone.

Other-directedvisualizers Visualizershave a constructiveview of humannature,do not acceptaggressionand are not

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THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

ethnocentric.This indicates a generaltender-mindedness which is supportedby negativecorrelationswith EPQ psychoticismand WPAI realism. Women also show an anti-hedonism,which is less a purely visualizer characteristicthan something typical of womenof all sorts (perhapsbecausea numberof the WPAI items are concernedwith a sexualhedonismwhich tendsto exploit women). The converseof this positive, tender-heartedview of othersis that visualizers (and women more strongly than men) also want to be liked by others,and are willing to presentthemselvesin sucha way as to encouragethis. Social desirability and the EPQ lie scale correlatemost strongly with the MOTQ visual scales,and sufficiently strongly in relation to the environmentalsubscaleto survive the partialling out of the cross-modalscore, which itself correlates with social desirability. The patternrevealedby the environmentsubscaleis telling. It also correlates with external locus of control and lack of spontaneity. These can be interpreted,along the lines of the visualizerportrait, in terms of an ability to see oneselfas othersdo, and to define oneselffrom that viewpoint. Not only do visualizerswant to be liked, they probablyareliked. They havethe kind of unabrasivepersonalitythat makesthem easyto get along with; they are relaxed, self-assured,happy-go-lucky,controlled (men), and emotionallystable (women). They may also have the great social skill of actually rememberingsocial information,as Swannand Miller (1982) found for their vivid imagers. The picture of the visualizeris of someonewho is sensitiveto andinterestedin others,andwho is sociallyawareratherthanSOCiallyboisterous.Men in particular showa strongintroversion,parallelingtheir unsociabilityin the portraitsdata. The literature on imagery and extraversionis confused.A number of other studieshave also found a relationshipbetweenvisualiZing (assessedin various ways) and introversion, for example Huckabee (1974); Gralton, Hayes and Richardson(1979); Riding and Dyer (1980); andStricklin and Penk(1980,though only for stable people). Others have found visual imagery to relate to extraversion, for exampleGale, Morris, Lucas and Richardson(1972, though only if they usedinappropriatestatistics);andStricklin andPenk(1980,for neurotics). The root of this confusion may be that the EPQ, like most psychometriC instruments,confounds saliency with polarity. It assumesthe dimensionsof introversionand extraversionto be equally salientfor all, and then proceedsto pOSition everyonesomewherebetweenthe two poles.This fails to take account of the complexityof the visualizer'ssocial concerns.Visualizersface a conflict in both needingthe good opinion of others and resentingtheir dependenceon them.The womenprobablyfind this conflict easierto resolvethanmen, perhaps becausethe nurturing visualizer role is a more effective and less problematic sourceof self-esteemfor women.Womenare the self-sufficientoneshere,andtum to otherswith somethingto offer in exchangefor social approval. Men cannot enterinto quite the samebargain.

ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

Inner-directedenactiveimagers Riesmandescribesinner-directedpeople as important during times of social transition,when new problemsarise which neednew solutions.At other times they are misfits, at best tolerated, or, in traditional societies,institutionalized in such roles as that of the shaman.Freud, in his description of the activjtyorientated narcissistic type, refers to a similarly extreme blend of charisma, psychosisand criminality. The personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ enactivescalesindicate that enactive imagers in current Irish society are irked by conventions,but are generally powerless,in the absenceof the appropriateZeitgeist,to do muchaboutthem. Enactive imagers show a muted version of the humanitarianismof the vjsualizers,though the capacityfor intimate contactshownby the men suggeststhat their relationships with others may be more personal than nurturing. The enactive imagers' rebelliousnessand non-conformity are uniquely their own. These show up in an anti-religion-puritanism(mostly for women: this has more significance in Ireland than it might have elsewhere)and a lack of acquiescence (mostly for men). As in the portraits data it is the transitive action subscalethat most strongly revealsthe frustrationsencounteredin being an enactiveimager, and a low self-regard. correlatingwith a lack of spontaneity,a low self-acceptance The women(thoughnot the men) showa distinct aloofness,beingself-sufficient, reserved,and shy. This may be partly a matter of preference,as solitarinesswould allow them to pursuethe dictatesof their own inner-directedness;and partly forced on them,as their undisCiplinedself-conflict is unlikely to makefor comfortable interactions.The positive sideof the enactiveimageremergesmoststronglywith the affectivesubscale,which suggeststhat if peoplecanacknowledgetheir strong feelings and see them as good and useful rather than the source of Angst and frustration,they canemergeto a relative emotionalstability.

Conclusion and transition to part two The findings of the portraits and psychometricstudies strongly support one another,and betweenthem richly reveal the personalitytraits associatedwith particular cognitive biases:the verbalizer'straditional orientationand need for power; the vjsualizer'sgeneralorientation towards others and need for social affiliation; andthe enactiveimager'sinner-directedness andneedfor self-efficacy. Within the overall modes, particular featuresof cognition can be related to specific featuresof personality.To have a particularway of thinking is to attend to andmakesenseof objects,eventsandpeople,in particularways.Thesewaysof attendingdeterminethe salient constructsin the person'slife world, and have concomitants (with no claims about which comes first) in how they see themselves,and in the generalstructureof their socialworld. Mischel (1968) has shown that how people see themselves,as assessedon

91

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THREE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

personalityquestionnaires,does not necessarilybear any strongrelationshipto actualbehaviour.This is not to dismisstheseaccountsof personalityas irrelevant. In its naturalcontexta 'personality'is asimportantas a vehiclefor communicating andbeingconvivial with one'sfellow humansas it is for predictingbehaviour. The two studiesof this chapter,in looking at how peopleconstruetheir own personalities,have taken an essentiallycognitive approachto personality.They havenonethe lessprovideda good deal of information aboutthe kinds of values andfeelings importantto eachcognitive bias: the value on powerand control in verbal representation,the value on social affiliation in visual imagery, and the emotionalintensityandvalue on beingan agentof one'sown destinyin enactive imagery. Thesefeelings and valuesclearly match the cognitive structuresassociatedwith the threeforms of representation;and yet this very matching,this very isomorphy,arousessuspicion.It is possiblethat insteadof touchingthe affective elementsthemselves,the work so far hasonly lookedat construalsof them,filtered throughthe now familiar cognitive structures.The chaptersof part two therefore look in greaterdetail at someof the evaluationsand feelings importantin eachof the threemodesof thought.

Part

2

Particularevaluativeissues

7 Values in inner speech:preference for categoricalclarity

Evidence from the precedingchaptersindicates that an important evaluative domain for verbal representationderives from its categoricaland hierarchical structuring.In the idle-thoughtsstudythe negativeaspectof theseevaluationswas evident. with criticisms being directed towards the misfits. the entities which wereatypicalwithin the conventionalorder.In the portraitsstudyit emergedthat self-evaluationsmay use the sameprinCiple. with verbalizersevaluatingthemselves within the context of what is now an institutional hierarchy. High self-esteemarisesfrom two things: the security of knowing one'srole; and the statusof havinga higherone. Horizontal and vertical dimensionsof categorizing

The two kinds of evaluationimportant to verbalizersmirror what Rosch(1978) describedas the two dimensionsof categorizing.the horizontalandthe vertical. The vertical dimensionis definedby superordinacy.It is the dimensionalong which rockers belong to the categoryof chairs. which belong to the category of furniture (in the conceptualorder); and schoolchildrenare subordinateto teacherswho are subordinateto head teachers(in the institutional one). The horizontal dimensionis marked by relations of opposition. or more broadly. differentiation.It is the dimensionalongwhich chairsdiffer from tables.andform 2A differs from form 2B. The quintessenceof the order which these two dimensions impose on

96 PARTICULAR EVALUATIVE ISSUES phenomenais caughtin the notion of prototypes.The prototypeof a categoryis that which maximizesboth similaritieswithin the group anddifferencesbetween groups (Rosch. 1975b; Rosch and Mervis. 1975). Prototypicality. the degreeto which an object resemblesthe prototypeat the categorycentre.hasa numberof importantconsequences for cognition; all of which suggestthat typical instances are more easily and better processedthan atypical ones. Prototypicalitems are moreeasilylearnt.morespeedilyclassifiedasbelongingto the category,andmore likely to be generatedin responseto the categorylabel than atypical ones(Rosch. Simpsonand Miller, 1976). Furthermore,in memory, prototypesexerta systematic biassuchthat, oncecategorized,objectsarerememberedasmoretypical than they reallyare (Cantorand Mischel. 1977. 1979;Tsujimoto. 1978).It hasalsobeen suggestedthat categoriesthemselvesarerepresentedcognitively in termsof their most typical exemplars(Andersonand McGaw. 1973; Anderson.Pichert. Goetz. Schallert,Stevensand Trolhp. 1976; Robbins.Barresi.Compton.Furst, Russoand Smith. 1978) thoughthereis disagreement here(Gumenik. 1979). The empiricalwork in this chapteris concernedspecificallywith the evaluative aspectsof categorizing.The first two studieslook at whetherprototypicahtyis also an evaluativeyardstick.asis suggestedby severalfeaturesof verbalrepresentation. It seemsunlikely that prototypicahtyis the only yardstickhere.and the first study setsprototypicality considerationsin perspectiveby looking at people'sgeneral waysof evaluatingthings. It looks at what peoplethink andfeel aboutmembersof the animalkingdom.

Favourite creatures The studyof favourite creaturesaskedfor bothquantitativeandqualitativedataon how peoplefelt about animals. For each of twenty four animals. ranging from donkeyto seagullandpig to spider.peoplewereaskedfirst of all to ratehow they felt about the animal (on a seven-pointscale); then to describehow they felt (interest.revulsion.or whatever);and then to give the reasonsfor feeling as they and the kinds of reasonswere relatedto did. The reasonswere content-analysed the evaluativeratings (regardlessof the particularanimal). Proceduraldetails and information on feelings aboutspecific animalsmay be found in appendixF. and moregeneralresultsaregiven in table 7.1 Peopleclearly use many criteria for evaluatinganimals.and most of theseare themselvesintrinsically evaluative.The locus of the value is often merely projectedfrom the eye of the beholderto the corpus of the animal (from 'I like it' to 'it is nice'). Peopleexplain their subjectiveliking for donkeysby referenceto their objective likeableness,which is evidencedby their possessionof intrinsically positive propertiessuchasbeauty,gentlenessanda tolerancefor children.In contrast.flies, vultures and rats are ugly, slimy scoundrels.and of coursepeople dislike them. Equally self-evidentis that peopleshouldvalue a numberof farm animalsfor

VALUES IN INNER SPEECH

Table 7.1 Evaluations:relationshipsbetweenratingsandreasons Reason*and example Nice body part -- it hasa nice face attribute--a beautifulcreature/theright size action-- graceful/wonderfullyfast character--I admireits cunninglitsgentleness environment-- it lives by the seaand I love the sea other (eulOgiesfor other/unspecifiedreasons) total (any of the above) Nasty part-- it's got an ugly face attribute-- it's slimy, I hateslimy things action-- it wriggles hOrribly character-- it's selfishandvicious environment-- it lives in a squalidplace other (dislikesfor other/unspecifiedreasons) total (any of the above) Dissonantpart-- too muchhair/noface attribute-- too big action-- movestoo closeto the ground other-- weird/outlandish total (any of the above) Understandable to people--I pity them/veryaffectionate Not understandable -- you can'ttalk to agoldfish Useful to humans--I love rashers seewhy they exist Not useful--uselesscreatures/can't Familiar-- seethemeveryday Not familiar --- neverseenone Symbolic,non-human-- scorpionis a zodiacsign human-- remindsme of my boyfriend Really harmful-- it bitesyour toes/kills people phobic-- it gives me the shiversup my spine Superordinate-- it's a birdlinsect

Spearman's rhoH p +.75 +.58 +.51 +.86 +.37 +.80 -.29 -.75 -.71

-.23

-.69 -.77 -.32 -.34 -.28 -.11

-.54

+.71 -.20 +.45

.001 .01 .02 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001

.01 .001 .05

+.27

-.23

+.20 +.33 -.61 -.49 -.46

.01 .02 .05

Interjudgeagreement,taking categoriesas subjects,Spearman'sfs = .96. Analysesusinganimalsas subjects,N = 24. :j: Absenceof an fs value indicatestoo little data. *

t

their utility in providing rashers,wool or haulageenergy,thoughutility appearsto be a second-rateevaluativecriterion. Only thosewho arenot beautifulneedto be useful. Peoplealsousea 'social'perspectivewhich measuresanimalsfor their fitnessto engagein social intercoursewith humans.It is importantto peopleto be able to as we readoneanother.This is 'read'animalsfor their intentionandcharacter, just possiblefor medium-sizedcreatureswith faces,and preferablybig brown eyes,

97

98

PARTICULAR EVALUATIVE ISSUES

throughwhich window the animalsoul canbe glimpsedand respondedto. Stray dogscapitalizemosteffectively on this:

stray dog (affection +3) Becausehe is hungry, lost, and becausehe has been abandonedby someone. straydog (pity him +3) He is experiencingsorrow,andthat'sall thereis for him to face. stray dog (I love stray dogs +3) Their eyesare so pathetic.They are faithfulthey will follow you around. Where animals cannotbe read from their faces, peopleuse the more molar criterion of action. The capacityto do harm by biting, stinging or infecting with disease,reduces an animal's likeableness;and some harmless actions may become.suspectif interpretedin human terms: touching the human person without permissionis particularly ill regarded.Even purely intransitive actions, where humansare only spectators,are construedin evaluative terms. Rapid scuttling, rarely innocentwhen done byhumans,is seenas being eqUivalently furtive when done by lizards, spidersand rats. Indeedreferencesto such nasty actionswere amongthe strongestpredictorsof negativeevaluations,andtended to be evokedby the samesetof animalsthat reapedthe phobicresponsesof 'the creeps'or 'the shivers':

rat (hate them -3) Becauseof their abrupt and quick run for whateverthey want. spider (hateand am afraid of them -3) 'Cosof their legs andhow fast they can move, andevenwhencrushedthey cansometimesget up again- ugh! WeertsandLang's(1978) work on small-animalphobiasalsoshowsmovementto be an importanttrigger of phobiCresponses.

Being nastyon conceptualwounds One fairly small group of evaluativereasonsdiffers from all the othersin making no appealto characteristicswhich are themselvesintrinsically evaluative.These arethe referencesto dissonantqualities. A characteristicwas taken to be dissonant when it was not intrinsically evaluative,but becameso when displayedby an animal. Smallness,for example, or hairlessness, is no reasonto dislike a matchboxor a teaspoon,but diminutive a reasonfor some sizeis a reasonfor somepeopledisliking rats,andhairlessness disliking pigs. Converselyhairinessis fine for donkeysand bulldogs but odd on gorillas; apparentlybecausepeople assimilatethem to a human category('reminds me of my boyfriend'), where biolOgically, if not culturally, the norm is nakedness. Crabsareso dissonantonewondershow theymanageto form a Gestalt at all:

VALUES IN INNER SPEECH

crab (hatethem -3) Horrible appearance, no real face, no apparentfeelings. crab (I don'tlike them - 2) They moveon the groundtotally. I like animalsthat are off theground.like dogs.horses.

crab (hatetheir eyes-3) Eyeson stalks,and 'sideways'walk - horrible - ugh. The negativeevaluationsjustified by thesedissonantor incongruouscharacteristics presupposethat there is an animal norm. which is good. and animal deviancefrom the norm, which is bad. The norm is apparently(and as Rosch supposed)a mammal,and the use of other superordinatelabels (suchas insect, reptile or bird) carriesnegativeevaluations. While referencesto dissonantcharacteristicsare relatively rare, they are important in cracking the faE) E>RV·... E>VE... V>RV'

(VE>E)

Vis-Enact Combined Stests

(VE)

Affective themes power; physicalor social pride; success,self-aggrandizement criticism, belittlingselfor others othersviews of the self - positive; beingloved, famous - negative;humiliated,ashamed - neutral; wonderingwhat othersthink secrets;kept or revealed

Contents people,oneor an enumerablefew groupsor crowds objects environments5 18.2 13.6 68.2 18.2 6.8 6.8 4.6 6.8

0

29.6 2.3 11.4

52.3 15.9

Simple/compensatory simple, just sparkedoff by something compensatingfor unpleasantevent

Verbal

Puremodes

18.0 14.0 4.0 30.0 20.0 13.0 5.0 8.0

40.0 27.0 28.0 49.0

62.0 5.0

(V)

Visual

Representational type1

(R)

Analysis ofidle thoughts(continued)

Codiny cateyories2

Table B.l

13.8 3.5 0 6.9 6.9 3.5 0 3.5

44.8 0 41.4 0

82.8 0

Enactive (E) (RV)

(R>E) R>V''', R>E'" V>E' (V>R)

V>R"*, V> E*" E>R*" V>R*'*, V>E*'*

E>R", (E>V) R>E*

Combined S tests'

61.8 44.1 61.8 38.2 29.4 14.7 0 23.5

58.8 35.3 38.2 41.2

44.1 32.4

(RV)

Ver-Vis

Composites

34.0 20.0 2.0 28.0 26.0 4.0 2.0 0

58.0 18.0 42.0 58.0

72.0 6.0

RV>E', RV>R', VE>E' RV>E', (RV> V), VE>E' RV> V''', RV>E*", R> VE'" RV>E', VE>E' VE>R'

(VE>R) RV>R*,RV>E" VE>R**, (RV>R) {RV>R*'*' RV>E* VE > RH ' , VE > E*"

E>RV* (RV>E), RV>V*.

Vis-Enact Combined (VE) S tests

Analysis of idle thoughts(continued)

31.8 11.4 15.9

9.1 13.6 0 0

22.7

4.0 22.0 12.0

6.9 10.3 20.7

R>V"*,R>E'

E>R"*, E> V*" E>V**',E>R**'

E>V' E>V'

E>V'*, (E>R) E>R*' (E>R)

8.8 35.3 5.9

26.5 20.6 14.7 47.1 14.7 14.7 2.9 38.2 20.6 26.5 0 0

E>R' V>R'*, (E>R)

15.0 27.0 5.0 42.0 28.0 19.0 8.0 17.0 10.0 5.0 0 7.0

2.3 11.4 9.1 31.8 11.4 11.4 4.6

37.9 27.6 0 65.5 41.4 24.1 17.2 37.9 27.6 10.3 31.0 37.9

Ver-Vis (RV)

Combined Stests3

Visual (V)

Verbal (R) Enactive (E)

Composites

Puremodes

Representational typeI

2.0 22.0 16.0

18.0 38.0 2.0 64.0 48.0 42.0 10.0 16.0 14.0 4.0 32.0 28.0

R>RV*, R> VE*"

RV>V', RV>E' VE > R'*', VE > V**', E > RV**' VE > R***, VE > V**, E > RV**

RV>R'

VE>R'*, VE> V"* 'yE>R'**, VE>V** VE>V', (VE>R)

RV>R*, VE>R' VE>R**

Vis-Enact Combined (VE) S tests

) p< .1; all teststwo-tailed. 1 Idle thoughttypes not analysedin the table were as follows: 2 verbal-enactivecomposites(0.7% of the total, denvingfrom two people); 16 verbal-visual-enactivecomposites(5.5% of the total, from 11 people);and 17 'others'(5.8% of the total, from 10 people). 2 All categorieswere scoredfrom the viewpoint of the ego. On the reliability of coding categories:two mdependentjudgesscoredrandomsamplesof 50 idle thoughtseach.Agreementon particularcategoriesaveraged96% and94% for eachjudgewith the author,with lowestvalues88% and 82%. Taking categoriesas 'subJects'gavevaluesfor Spearman's r, of .98 and .97. 3 From Leach(1979). 4 Figuresin the main body of the table show what overall percentageof a particularrepresentationaltype containedeachtheme.The unit of analysisis the idle thought, not the numberof occurrencesof theme.This accountsfor the non-additivity in the figures; e.g. if an idle thoughtcontamedboth positiveand negativefeelings it was still only scoredoncein the superordinate feelingscategory. 5 EnVIronmentsalso servedas a visual criterion; IdentifYing with other entities (the humanidentificanoncategory,and somemstancesof mythologicalthemes)also servedas enactivecriteria. Figuresare includedhereasthey are still of thematicinterest.

* p< .05;" p< .01; ••* p< .001; (

Evokedfeelings alienation;not my thought positive; enjoyment negative;depressed, guilty

morbidity; physicalor emotionalpain sexand romance badlanguageandscatologicalthemes feelings (a) positive - moods,e.g. happy - towardsothers,e.g. loving them (b) negative - moods,e.g. depressed - towardsothers,e.g. hatingthem humanidentification; empathy 5 mythological;supernaturalhappenings

Coding categories2

Table B.1

AppendixC The Modes of ThoughtQuestionnaire (MOTQ)

Whenwe try to hold an ideain our mindswe usuallyfind that it naturallyleadsto someother associatedidea. This questionnaireis on such associationsbetween ideas,andin particularlooks at whetherthinking aboutthe sameideain different ways will leadto different associations. The experimentconsistsof pairs of items; for eachpair you are askedto think aboutthe first item in oneof threeways- either (i) to seea picturein your mind's eye; (ii) to say the word or words to yourselfunderyour breath;or (iii) to be the thing - to imaginethat you are who or whateverthe idea expresses.You are then askedto assessthe likelihood of the secondideacoming alongsooneror later in associationto the first. Herearethreepracticepairs,with explanationsof what to do: (A)

see TRAIN-----station ...

Get a picture in your mind's eye of a train, allow ideas to come to mind in associationwith it, and then assessthe likelihood of station being amongthem. The rating scaleto useis as follows: (1) no likelihood - wouldn't havethoughtof the secondidea at all if it hadn't beensuggested. (2) unlikely - but it would perhapscomealongin the end. (3) eventually- not immediatebut it would comealongafter somethought. (4) likely- it would be in the first few ideas. (5) certain- it would be the first ideathat wouldcometo mind.

192 APPENDICES Enter a numberfrom 1 to 5 in the bracketsfollowing station to indicate your choice.Theseratingsare purely personal-t hereareno 'right' or 'wrong' answers, so just trust your intuition. (B) be

SCIENTIST-----

apparatus...

Imaginethat you area scientist,allow ideasto cometo mind in associationwith this imaginedrole play; thenrate apparatusfor its likelihood of beingamongthem.

(C) say TABLE-----chair ... Say the word table to yourselfunderyour breath,allow ideasto cometo mind in associationwith it, andthen rate chair for its likelihood of beingamongthem. Since the experimentis on different ways of thinking, it is importantthat you do your bestto follow the instructionsaboutsaying,seeingandbeing,evenif you sometimesfind it difficult. You may find that it helpsto close your eyesto think abouteachpair ofideas. Hereare threemore practicepairs: (D) be CLOWN ----laughter.. . (E) say LUGGAGE ----baggage.. . (F) see BUS - --- - bus stop ... You shouldnow be readyto go on to the main questionnaire. PLEASETRY NOT TO MISS ANY PAIRS OF ITEMS OUT. Many thanksfor your help. THE SCALE: no

unlikely

eventually

(1)

(2)

(3)

For the first group say the first item of eachpair

1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

6) 7) 8)

say SCARLET----fever ... say IN ----out ... say FLOPPY----rag doll ... say HAPPY -----sad.. . say. LEAP-----year.. . say FAT-----thin .. . say CORPORAL-----punishment ... say SOFT-----hard...

For the next group seethe first item in eachpair

9) 10)

see TRUCK-----reversing.. . see REINDEER-----forest.. .

likely

(4)

certain

(5)

APPENDIX C

11) see BOWL-----round... 12) see 13) see 14) see 15) see 16) see

DANCER ----pirouetting... LLAMA ----woolly ... ROLLING ----stone... GALLEON ----sailing ... GLASS ----transparent...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair

17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22)

be be be be be be 23) be 24) be

GREEDY----tummy ache... FOX ----calculating... CUMBING ----fall ... OSTRICH----foolish ... WAVES-----erosion... COCKROACH-----dark... SECRETARY----could kick boss... VULTURE ----culture ...

For the next groupseethe first item in eachpair

25) see BOAT -----mast... stretching... 26) see CAT ----27) 28) 29) 30) 31) 32)

see see see see see see

LAMP-POST----street... GOBLET ----doublet... PENSIONER----strolling ... ARMCHAIR ----living room ... HAIRBRUSH ----bristles... ELEPHANT ----grey ...

For the next group say the first item in eachpair

33) 34) 35) 36) 37) 38) 39)

say say say say say say say 40) say

SPIDER----insect... WIDE-----narrow... WHALE ----blow-hole ... BIG-----small ... HOUR-----time... UP-----down... SCHOOLCHILD ----fights friend ... GROCER-----green...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair

41) be 42) be 43) be 44) be

WIDOWER ---- -lost ... CRUMPLED----litter ... DROPPINGSOMETHING----GARDENER----gentle...

broken...

193

194

APPENDICES

45) 46) 47) 48)

be be be be

TASTING-----pleasure... SQUID ----could strangleprey ... STUMBLING ----embarrassment ... SWAN ----defendsnest...

For the next group saythe first item in eachpair

49) 50) 51) 52) 53) 54) 55) 56)

say say say say say say say say

COCKROACH----beetle... FAST-----slow... SOFT----cushion... WINTER-----tale ... ABSTRACT ----concrete... NIECE-----piece... GOLDFISH-----fish... NICE -----nasty...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair

57) 58) 59) 60) 61) 62) 63)

be be be be be be be 64) be

LUNATIC ----suspicious... CAUGHT-----guilty ... WORKMAN ----trudging ... SPIDER----industrious... SPOTTY----shyness... POURING-----full ... ALLIGATOR ----malevolent... LION ----stalksantelope...

For the next group seethe first item in eachpair

65) 66) 67) 68) 69) 70) 71)

see see see see see see see 72) see

POLICEMAN ----patrolling ... PAINTING ----gallery ... VULTURE ----swooping... TIGER-----cat... METAL-----shiny ... FLANNEL ----basin... LINER ----funnel ... LEAVES ----fluttering ...

For the next group saythe first item in eachpair

73) 74) 75) 76) 77) 78)

say say say say say say

BLUE ----blooded... JULY -----summer... FLEET -----meet... NORTH-----south... GRIN ----- bearit ... FATHER ----could carry daughter...

APPENDIX C

metal ... 79) say ALUMINIUM ----FUTURE-----past ... 80) say For the next groupseethe first item in eachpair

81) 82) 83) 84) 85) 86) 87) 88)

see see see see see see see see

COTTONWOOL-----flufI)r ... FACE-----nose... WEASEL ----easel... SEA ----grey-green... HEDGEHOG----foraging ... BUTTERFLY ----garden... KETTLE ----spout... TOWEL ----bathroom...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair

89) 90) 91) 92) 93) 94) 95) 96)

be be be be be be be be

PUSHING----topple ... EAGLE ----could cleaneyrie ... TIPPLING ----confused... TASTE-----waste... BEAR ----could rob bees'nest... TOY ----- sandpit... LEOPARD ----catchesgazelle... DRIVER ----could threatentraffic warden...

For the next groupseethe first item in eachpair

97) see TALL----- seeover ... square... 98) see HANDKERCHIEF ----99) see TREE-----twigs... 100) see PENCIL ----thin ... 101) see PONY ----trotting ... sheets... 102) see SMOOTH----103) see POLITICIAN ----worried ... turning ... 104) see WHEEL ----For the next group saythe first item in eachpair 105) 106) 107) 108) 109) 110) 111) 112)

say say say say say say say say

SPEECH----reach.. . WATER-----liquid .. . CALM ----turbulent .. . AIR-----tight ... DIRTY ----clean... DRUNKARD-----couldhuglamp-post... GROSS----negligence.. . SOUGHT----taught .. .

195

196 APPENDICES

For the next group be the first item in eachpair 113) 114) 115) 116) 117) 118) 119) 120)

be be be be be be be be

TRAVELLING-----arrived ... YELLOW ----banana... CYCLIST ----wary ... BEAVER ----gnawstreetrunk ... OBLITERATING ----gone... BEREFT----miserable... RACEHORSE----nervousness... JELLYFISH ----could tickle someone...

For the next group say the first item in eachpair 121) 122) 123) 124) 125) 126) 127) 128)

say say say say say say say say

ABLE----- bodied... CATCH-----hatch... BROWN -----jersey... HIGH-----low ... FREEDOM----of speech... DRY -----wet ... KILO-----weight ... REGAL-----legal ...

For the nextgroup seethe first item in eachpair 129) 130) 131) 132) 133) 134) 135) 136)

see see see see see see see see

BUSH-----green... JACKET ----- buttons... PIANIST ----concerthall ... SPARROW----nesting... SKYSCRAPER----tall ... GYMNAST ----bending... FALLING----- bruises... OCTOPUS----tentacles...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair 137) 138) 139) 140) 141) 142) 143) 144)

be be be be be be be

END ----beginning... SLICING ----small pieces... DONKEY ----carrieschildren ... ATHLETE ----determined... JACKAL ----tearscarcase... OX ----placidity ... SLAMMING ----noise ... arrogant... be CAMEL -----

For the next groupseethe first item in eachpair 145) see BOAT-----harbour...

APPENDIX C

146) 147) 148) 149) 150) 151) 152)

see see see see see see see

KANGAROO ----leapsfence ... BUSINESSMAN----office ... HEDGEHOG----snout... CHILDREN ----playing ... CAR ----steeringwheel ... CLIMB ----stairs ... BALL ----spherical...

For the next group be the first item in eachpair 153) 154) 155) 156) 157) 158) 159) 160) 161) 162)

be be be be be be be be be be

HAMSTER ----could nibble fingers ... SWIMMING ----shivering... TEACHER----chastizespupil ... FORCEDMARCH ----exhausted... SEAGULL ----could divebombpeople... WITCH ----emptiescauldron... SOPRANO----meccano... TELEPHONIST----curious ... LAZY ----failure ... STRONG-----carry...

For the next group say the first item in eachpair 163) 164) 165) 166) 167) 168) 169) 170)

say say say say say say say say

COAL-----fuel ... LOBSTER-----pot... SHARP-----blunt ... EAST ----direction ... SHEEP ----timidity ... FIT -- --- as a fiddle ... LONG-----short... TRADE ----economics...

pleaserate how easyyou found it, generally,to follow the instructionsas regards see,be and say. Circle the appropriatenumberson the scalesgiven below:

see:

be:

say:

very hard

quite hard

medium

quite easy

very easy

1 1 1

2 2 2

3 3 3

4 4 4

5 5 5

197

198

APPENDICES

And now, pleaseratehow enjoyableyou found thesethreeways of thinking:

see: be:

say:

very unpleasant

quite unpleasant

medium

quite enjoyable

very enjoyable

1 1 1

2 2 2

3 3 3

4 4 4

5 5 5

Scoringthe MOTQ The MOTQ takes20-30 minutesfor most people(students)to complete.It may not be appropriatefor muchyounger,or for lessintelligent people. It is scoredas follows: there are 13 structuralsubscales,where the items are precededby a representational instructionappropriateto the mode. Verbal subscales Phrasecompletion (thirteenitems) Questionnaireitem numbers:I, 5, 7, 40, 52, 73, 77,108,Ill, 121, 125, 164,168. Rhyme (six items) 54, 75, 105, 112,122, 128. Opposite(eighteenitems) 2, 4, 6, 8, 34, 36, 38, 50, 53, 56, 76, 80, 107, 109, 124, 126, 165,169. Superordinate(elevenitems) 33, 37,49, 55, 74, 79,106,127,163,166,170.

Visual subscales Environment(ten items) 10,27,30,66,70,86,88,131,145,147. Attribute (twelve items) 11, 13,16,32,69,81,84,98,100,129,133,152. Intransitiveaction (fourteenitems) 9, 12, 15,26,29,65,67,72,85,101,104, 132, 134, 149. Part (ten items) 25, 31, 71, 82, 87, 99,130,136,148,150. Enactivesubscales Consequence(nineitems)21,43,62,89,l13,117,138,143,162. Affective consequence (ten items) 17,45,47,58,61,91,118,154,156,161. Affective (fourteenitems) 18,20,22,41,44,57,60,63,115,119,140,142,144,160. Transitiveaction (eight items) 48, 64, 95,116,139,141,155,158. Conditionalaction (eight items) 23,46,90,93,96,120,153,157. Cross-modalscale The cross-modalscale,for usein controlling responsebias, usesrepresentational instructionscrossedwith cognitivestructures. Cross-modalscale(twenty four items) 14,28,68,83;24, 92,137,159; 3,35,51,123; 42, 59,94,114;39,78,110,167;97,103,135,146.

APPENDIX

c 199

Ease and enjoyment of the three ways of thinking are assessedby the last six questionnaireitems. Buffer items 19.102.151.

* Mode scales Sum of the meansof the relevantsubscalestimes 10. Thereis one exceptionto this. which is that we have normally omitted the superordinatesubscalefrom the verbal modescore.as it loadsalso on the visual factor. seetable C.2.

Developmentof the MOTQ The version of the MOTQ presentedhere is the successorto five previous versions.The immediatepredecessor involved twenty items on eachof fourteen structuralsubscales.One subscale(instantiations)was eliminatedas unreliable. andthe otherscut down by item analysisto their currentlengths.The cross-modal scalewas constructedat this stageby using the most reliable of the eliminated items (eightfrom verbal.eightfrom visual andeightfrom enactivesubscales).and systematicallychangingtheir representational instructions. The final version of the MOTQ was given to 358 people (181 men and 177 women)to assessinternalreliability.. Partof this sample(forty-eight people)took the MOTQ againafter a seven-weekinterval to assesstest-retestreliabilities. The resultsareshownin tableC.1. PrinCipalaxis factor analysison the subscaletotalsfor the sampleof 358 people (Varimax rotation. usingthe SPSSpackageofNie. Hull. Jenkins.Steinbrennerand Bent. 1975) gave only three factors with eigen values greaterthan one. which accountedbetweenthem for 66.2 per cent of the variance.The rotatedfactors could be clearlylabelledin representational terms(seetableC.2). The only major problemariseswith the superordinatesubscalewhich loadshigher on the visual factor than on the verbal one. This is presumablya reflectionof the fact that what superordinateclassan objectfalls into (verbal)is oftenjudgedon the basisof what parts and attributesit has (visual). It seemslikely that the superordinatesubscale assessessomethingunique to verbaliZing. along with somethingsharedwith visualizing. The relatively low test-retestreliability (.47) may indicate some drifting between modes over time. The superordinateitems use a verbal instruction. and the subscaleis treated as a verbal subscale when particular structuresare concerned;but it doesnot contributeto the generalverbal mode score. The factor analysisindicatesthat while the highest loading subscales on each factor are those appropriate to the relevant mode of representation.other subscalesalso load Significantly. particularly in the caseof visual and enactive subscales.A similar relationship emergesin the pattern of intercorrelations

verbal verbal verbal verbal visual visual visual visual enactive enactive enactive enactive enactive

opposite phrasecompletion rhyme superordinate environment attribute intransitiveaction part consequence affective consequence affective transitiveaction conditionalaction 24

10 9 10 14 8 8

14

10 12

11

18 13 6

say say say say see see see see be be be be be { say see be WIDE ----narrow SCARLET----fever REGAL ----legal ALUMINIUM ----metal BOAT - - - - - harbour HANDKERCHIEF ----square PENSIONER----strolling KETTLE ----spout OBLITERATING ----gone GREEDY ----tummy ache TELEPHONIST----curious LEOPARD ----catchesgazelle SECRETARY----could kick boss SHEEP-----timidity(affective) WEASEL ----easel(rhyme) TOY ----sandpit(environment)

Exampleitem

1 In calculatingmodescores,equalweight is given to the constituentsubscales.

verbal model = (opp'/18+phrase/13+ rhy./6) x 10 visual mode= (envir./lO +attrib./12+intrans./14+part/l0) x 10 enactivemode= (conseq./9+ aff conseq./lO+ affect.l14+ trans./8+ condit.l8) x 10

cross-modal

Instruction

Scaledescription

N of items

Table C.1 Reliabilities of the Modesof ThoughtQuestionnairesubscales

.73 .84 .69 .76

.78 .83 .88 .89

.72

.64

.74 .80 .69 .47 .55 .73 .63 .65 .58 .65 .67

Test- retest (7 -weekinterval N=48)

.91 .76 .82 .76 .69 .74 .71 .71 .69 .65 .74 .70 .53

Cronbach's alpha (N= 358)

APPENDIX

c 201

betweenthe modescores.with correlationsbeingreduced.thoughin the caseof the visual-enactiverelationshipnot eliminated.by partiallingout the cross-modal scores(seetable C.3). Sex differences on the MOTQ scales.and differences betweenstudents'in different faculties.areshownin tablesC.4 and C.5.

Table C.2 Rotatedfactor matrix ofMOTQ subscales(Varimax rotation. N = 358) Subscale

Factor 1 (Visual)

Factor2 (Enactive)

Factor3 (Verbal)

opposite phrasecompletion rhyme superordinate environment attribute intransitiveaction part consequence affective consequence affective transitiveaction conditionalaction cross-modal

.175 .239 -.009 .518 .761 .727 .708 .725 .455 .429 .362 .334 .232 .341

-.082 .216 .223 .232 .267 .325 .386 .296 .533 .598 .786 .683 .698 .514

.478 .553 .532 .269 .229 .080 .155 .228 .315 .167 .032 .166 .209 .570

Table C.3 IntercorrelationsofMOTQ modescales(N = 358) Pearsoncorrelations Verbal Verbal Visual

Visual

Enactive

.35***

.37*** .70***

Visual

Enactive

.07

.02 .52***

Controlling for cross-modalscores Verbal Verbal Visual *** p< .001.

Table C.4 MOTQ subscaleandmodesco,es:meansandstandarddeviationsfor men andwomen

All subscale

N of items

opposite phrasecompletion rhyme superordinate environment attribute intransitiveact part consequence affective conseq. affective transitiveaction conditionalaction cross-modal

18 13 6 11 10 12 14 10 9 10 14 8 8 24

Men (N= 181)

(N =358)

mean

mean

SD

Women (N= 177) SD

mean

t -testsbetween SD

70.2 43.1 12.7 39.2 37.0 43.2 50.0 35.3 30.0 31.7 40.3 23.8 17.9 61.4

12.2 8.0 4.8 6.5 5.3 7.0 6.8 5.8 5.5 5.9 8.3 5.5 4.9 10.6

69.2 42.9 12.3 39.3 36.5 42.2 49.1 34.8 30.1 30.8 40.0 24.6 18.2 61.0

11.8 6.8 4.5 6.4 4.8 6.8 6.5 5.4 5.1 5.8 8.3 5.3 4.6 9.3

71.2 43.4 13.0 39.1 37.5 44.3 50.2 35.7 28.9 32.6 40.6 23.1 17.7 61.9

12.6 9.0 5.2 6.5 5.8 7.1 7.0 6.1 5.7 5.9 8.2 5.7 5.2 11.7

93.2 143.8 145.3

15.5 18.9 25.6

91.9 141.6 146.1

13.4 17.5 24.5

94.7 146.0 144.5

17.3 20.1 26.7

sexes

women> men*'

men> women' women> men** men> women"

Mode scales Verbal (R) Visual (V) Enactive(E) pairedt -tests within sexes'

women> men'

V>E'

E>V'

, p< .05; " P < .01; all teststwo-tailed. 1 Paired(-testsbetweenmodescarriedout on standardizedscores. Table C.5 Cognitive biasesby faculty Total sample Men N=

181

Verbal (R) Visual (V) Enactive(E)

91.9 141.6 146.1

Arts (A)

Commerce

(c)

29

27

92.6 140.6 146.9

92.5 136.8 137.7

pairedt-tests within faculties' 172

Verbal Visual Enactive

94.7 146.0 144.5

pairedt -tests within faculties N=

Verbal Visual Enactive pairedt-tests within faculties

101 90.7 143.0 148.3

Soc. sci.

(S)

t-testsbetween faculties

24 95.2 142.4 145.0

G>C

E>R*'

Women N=

All

Engineer. (G)

94

13 17

94.2 146.3 143.6

100.1 133.6 134.8

V>E*'

R>E*

353

123

93.2 143.8 145.3

93.8 145.0 144.3

40 95.0 135.8 136.8

17

48

99.2 143.8 149.7

92.6 148.8 145.0

118 91.5 143.1 14R.5

R>V**

E>R'

R>E'

E>V'

A>C'

72 93.4 146.6 145.0

, p< .05; ,. p< .01; all teststwo-tailed. 1 PaIred comparisonson standardized scores.

A>C*', S>C', G>C G>C*'

AppendixD Cognitive correlates of the MOTQ

The tests used in conjunction with the MOTQ were as follows: the Betts Questionnaireupon Mental Imagery (the QMI, in Sheehan's1967 version); the GordonTest of Visual ImageryControl (the TVIC, in the modified form given by Richardson,1969); Pettigrew's(1958) test for categorywidth; Divergentthinking (usesof three objectsin 10 minutesand scoredfor fluency, takenfrom Hudson, 1966); the Spatial Ability sectionof the Differential Aptitudes Test (the DAT of Bennett.Seashoreand Wesman,1974; becauseof time limitations, only the first thirty items were used,with time proportionatelydecreased);and the General Aptitude TestBattery (the GATB; United StatesEmploymentService,1970)which containssevensubtests:1) Clerical speedandaccuracy,2) Computation,3) Space manipulation,4) Vocabulary.5) Tool matching,6) Arithmetic reasoning,and 7) Form matching. Parts 3 and 7 (Spacemanipulationand Form matching) both requirespatialtransformations,part 5 (Tool matching)usesvisual stimuli but is a straightforwardmatchingtaskthat doesnot requirespatialtransformations. Participants It was not possibleto give all the above tests to a Single group of people. and different subgroupscontributedto the total pool of resultsas follows: Commercestudents(27 men and 13 women): MOTQ with Betts QMl, Gordon's TVIC, Pettigrew's category width and Divergence. Arts (94 womenand 27 men): MOTQ with QMI, TVIC and Pettigrew. Engineers(101 menand 17 women):MOTQ with QMI and TVIC.

204

APPENDICES

Arts two (105womenand36 men): MOTQ with the DAT spatialabilities test. Managementtrainees(56 men and 17 women):MOTQ with the GATB.

Results Table D.l showsthe significant results of correlationsbetweenthe MOTQ scales and other cognitive variables,with the MOTQ cross-modalscorespartialledout. StraightforwardPearsoncorrelationsshoweda similar pattern of results, but at generallylower levelsof significance.The main body of the tableshowsresultsfor the total sample,aspreliminaryanalysesby sexshowedthat this did little violence to most of the data. However,thereare sex differenceson the spatial-abilitytests, and results of these are also shov.TI for men and women separately.Though statistically significant, many of the correlationsare low, and make most sense discussedas indicative of generalpatternsof cognitiveactivity.

Table D.I

Cognitive correlatesof the MOTQ scales(Controlling for cross-modalscores) Verbal subscales

Nt 2

Betts visual auditory touch action taste smell organic Bettstotal

223

GordonTVIC Pettigrew Divergence GATB clerical computation vocabulary tool matching arith. reason.

223 94 30 59

Opp.

Visual subscales

Phrase Rhyme

Super.

Envir.

-.23' _.20b -.15' -.17' -.22' -.19b (-.13) -.15'

Attrib.

-.26' -.25' -.22' -.16b -.19b -.16' -.19b (-.11) (-.12) -.24' -.19b -.19b -.15' (-.11) (-.13)

(-.12) (-.11) -.2i' -.24'

(.13) (.19)

.26"

Intrans. Part

-.18b (.13) .20' (.30) (.23)

(.23)

SpatialfleXibility tasks GATBspace men manipulation women all GATBfonn men matching women all DATspatial men abilities women all

46 13 59 46 13 59 27 90 117

.33' (.21)

.22'

(.23)

.39' -.26'

-.17' (.19)

APPENDIX D Table D.l

CognitIvecorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(Controlling for cross-modalscores)(continued) Mode scales

Enactlvesubscales

Aff.

Conseq. Aff. con.

Bettsvisual auditory touch action taste smell organic Bettstotal GordonTYIC Pettigrew Divergence GATB clerical computation vocabulary tool matching arith. reasoning

b

-.I9 -.16'

-.15' -.13' -.14'

-.14'

-.16'

_.22 0

Trans.

Condit. Verbal

Enactive

-.30' -.22b -.21' (-.12) -.18b -.26' -.15'

.16'

(-.11) -.14'

( -.12) -.25'

-.15'

-.16'

(.12) .25'

.23' (.24)

Visual

.26'

(-.23) (.24)

Spatialflexibility tasks GATBspace men manipulation women all GATBform men matching women all DATspatial men abilities women all

(25) .53'

.43'

.25' .40'

(.21) .29'

.35b (.33)

.28' (.35)

'p< .OS; b p< .01; C p< .001; ( ) p< .1; all teststwo-tailed. I N of casesis approxImate,assomepeoplehad missIngdataon somesubseales. 2 Note that lower scoreson the Betts mdlcate higher V1Vldness

205

AppendixE Personality correlates of the MOTQ

Theportraitsstudy This involved 110 people(63 womenand47 men) taking psychology,socialwork or commercecourses,who,completedthe MOTQ alongwith an adjectiverating scale. The adjective rating scale consistedof 169 adjectives (including a few phrases)selectedfrom dictionary and thesaurusfor potential relevanceto the three cognitive styles. (It might have been better to use the Gough Adjective CheckList, but we did not haveit in our test library at the time when this work seemedurgent.) Peoplewere askedto rate themselveson eachadjective on a 7-point scale: 1 = this adjectiveis much less (less often) true of me than of the averageperson;7 = this adjectiveis much more (more often) true of me than of the averageperson. Referenceto 'the averageperson' (which annoyedsome participants) was used in an attempt to circumvent the saints-and-sinners syndromewhich leads saintsto claim for themselvesa greatersinfulnessthan sinnerseverwould. The data were treated correlationally, using both straightforward Pearson correlatesand partial correlationscontrolling for the cross-modalscores.The positive correlates of the cross-modalscale itself are given in table E.l. In presentingthe rest of the data (tables6.1 and 6.2 in the text), two simplifications have been employed: the first is to exclude all the negative correlations;the secondis to include only those adjectiveswhich correlateduniquely with a particularscaleat a particularcorrelationallevel (Pearsonor partial). This involved first drawing up lists of correlatesfor men and women separately(adjectives

APPENDIX E

correlating significantly for the total group were assignedto both sexes);then cancellingout any adjectivethat appearedfor more than one modescalefor that sexat that correlationallevel; and finally reassemblingthe unique correlatesinto the format of table 6.1. A similar procedurewas then followed for the subscales, resultingin table6.2.

The psychometricstudy Participants Thesewerethe Arts (N=l23), Commerce(N=40), Engineering(N=118),Arts two (N=141), and Managementtrainee (N=73) groupsfrom appendixD, with each group taking the MOTQ alongwith a numberof other cognitive and personality tests. Procedureand instruments In addition to the MOTQ the follOwing tests were used: the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (the WPAI; Wilson, 1975); Rotter'sInternal-ExternalLocus of Control Scale(the IE; Rotter, 1966); the Marlowe-CrowneSocialDesirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), all of which were completedby the arts and TableE.1

Correlatesof the MOTQ cross-modalsubscalein the portraitsstudy

Men only

Total sample admiring hopeful romantic sociable happy compassionate friendly dutiful relaxed open enthusiastic excited sympathetic gentle interested elated feeling of anticipation grateful independent peaceful

unmotivated

Womenonly

happy compassionate friendly dutiful relaxed open enthusiastic excited sympathetic gentle interested elated feeling of anticipation grateful independent peaceful understanding

2IJ7

56

73

Cl

C14 self-sufficient (group dependent) C15 controlled (undiSciplinedself-conflict) C16 tense(relaxed)

C13 experimenting(conservative)

C12 apprehensive(self-assured)

Cll shrewd(forthright)

ClO imaginative(practical)

C9 suspicious(trusting)

C8 tenderminded(tough)

C7 venturesome(shy)

C6 conscientious(expedient)

C5 happy-go-lucky(sober)

C4 assertive(humble)

C3 emotionallystable (affectedby feelings)

C2 high IQ (low IQ)

outgoing(reserved)

men

N'

all

Factordescription (negativepore in parentheses)

Verbalsubscales

17

women all

opposite men

+.56"

-,26"

women all

-.28' -.31"

men

phrasecompletion

+,69"

+.24'

-.30b

women all

rhyme

+.34

b

+,31"

men

+.56' +.61"

-.69b -.67b

-.27'

women all

+.28' +.30"

men

superordinate

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,hght - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) i. Cattell's 16 PF

-.59'

women

outgoing

venturesome

-.29'

-.66b

women

all

+.28'

men

-.31'

-.27'

men

C16 tense

-.62'

women all

intransitiveaction

+.28'

-.24'

+.29'

men

attribute

CIS controlled

C14 self-sufficient

C13 experimenting

C12 apprehensive

Cll shrewd

C10 imaginative

C9 suspicious

C8 tenderminded

C7

C6 conscientious

C5 happy-go-lucky

C4 assertive

C3 emotionallystable

C2 highIQ

Cl

all

environment

Visual subscales

-.55'

-.24'

-.24'

women all

part

-.29'

+.32'

men

+.58'

women

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross·modalscorescontrolled) i. 16 PF (c6ntinued)

C16 tense

C15 controlled

C14 self-sufficient

C13 experimenting

C12 apprehensive

C11 shrewd

C10 imaginative

C9 suspicious

C8 tenderminded

C7 venturesome

C6 conscientious

C5 happy-go-lucky

C4 assertive

C3 emotionallystable

C2 highIQ

C1 outgoing

all

men

consequence

Enaclivesubscales

-.55'

-.52'

-.49'

women all

men

affective

+.n'

-.62' -.63'

women all

affective consequence

+.31'

men

+.55'

-.78C -.87e

+.59' +.55'

-Sl'

-.52'

women all

men

transitiveaction

+.59'

-.50' -.55'

-.30'

men

-.24' -.33'

-.29'

women all

conditionalaction

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates:below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) i. 16PF(continued)

-.48' -.60'

-.62b -.68b

women

outgoing

C16 tense

C15 controlled

C14 self-sufficient

C13 experimenting

C12 apprehensive

C11 shrewd

C10 imaginative

C9 suspicious

C8 tenderminded

C7 venturesome

C6 conscientious

C5 happy-go-lucky

C4 assertive

C3 emotionallystable

C2 highIQ

C1

all

men

cross-modalscale

-.62b

women all

-.29' -.34'

+.34'

men

verbal mode

Mode scales

+.54'

+.28'

men

-.26' -.31'

+.26'

women all

visual mode

+.63'

women all

men

enactivemode

+.73b

-.nb

-.62b

-.53' -.67b

women

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) i. 16 PF (continued)

Inner-directed

Spontaneity

Acceptaggression

Capacityfor intimate contact

A

C

Sy Synergy-- oppositesrelated

Nc Constructiveview of man

Sa Self-acceptance

Sr High self-regard

S

Fr Feelingreactivity

Ex Existentiality

SAV Self-~ctualizing values Feelingreactivity

11

Tc Time competence

women all

11

men

22

33

opposite

all

N

men

Verbal subscales

women all men

phrasecompletion women all

rhyme men

men

superordinate women all

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) ii. The PersonalOrientationInventory

+.71"

women

C

A

Sy

Nc

Sa

Sr

S

Fr

Ex

SAY

11

Tc

-.38'

-.38'

all

men

environment

Visual subseales

_.4(,b

-.39'

women all

attribute men

+.42'

women all

+.54'

men

intransitiveaction

-.42'

-.36'

women all

part

-.54'

men

women

TableE.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above.light - Pearsoncorrelates;below. bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled)

ii. The PersonalOrientationInventory (continued)

C

A

Sy

Nc

Sa

Sr

S

Fr

Ex

SAY

11

Tc

all

men

consequence

Enactivesubscales women all

+.48"

men

affective

women all

affective consequence men

-.40'

-.49b

women all

-.51"

-.48'

men

transitiveaction'

men

conditionalaction women all

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled)

ii. The PersonalOrientationInventory(continued)

women

c

A

Sy

Nc

Sa

Sr

S

Fr

Ex

SAY

11

Tc

-.37'

all

men

cross-modal

+.38'

+.48b

women all

+.48'

men

verbal mode

Mode scales

-.35'

women all men

visual mode women all men

enactivemode women

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light - Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) ii. The PersonalOrientationInventory (continued)

250

EPQ extraversion

CK acquiescence

lie

psychoticism

141

105

CM socialdesirability

neuroticism

121

123

IE scale(external)

religion-puritanism

ethnocentrism

anti-hedonism

militarism-punitiveness

realism

WPAI conservatism

all

N

36

148

44

50

48

men

105

102

61

71

75

women all

opposite men

Verbal subscales

+.23' +.25'

+.17'

women all men

phrasecompletion

+.14'

women all

rhyme

+.18'

-.31'

men

+.25'

+.16'

-.13'

+.21'

+.33c

-.25"

-.34c

+.18'

-.21'

women all

-.34'

men

superordinate

Table E.2 Personalitycorrelatesof the MOTQ scales(above,light- Pearsoncorrelates;below, bold - cross-modalscorescontrolled) iii. Othertests

+.23'

-.22'

-.35h -.27' +.44< +.27'

+.35b +.26'

women

CK acqUiescence

lie

psychoticism

neuroticism

EPQ extraversion

CM socialdeSirability

IE scale(external)

religion-puritanism

ethnocentrism

anti-hedonism

militarism-punitiveness

realism

WPAI conservatism

men

-.14' -.19b +.25c +.16b

_.20b

+ .20"

-.18'

-.25" +.30b

+.38b

-.nb

-.25'

+.29'

c

+.35 +.25'>

attribute

+.14'

+.22'

-.25b -.28b

-.n"

-.24'

women all

-.22'

+.17'

-.21' -.36' -.31"

all

environment

Visual subscales

-.34' -.36"

men

+.27' -.19" -.24b -.28b -.16' -.20b +.19b

men

-.13"

+.29" +.20"

women all

intransitiveaction

+.26b

-.20'

+.29'

+.19b

-.12' -.21
-

24 60

120

MEAN

.2

i=

u .

» ).>. );>.

material Forming theories Formulating general hypotheses Formalisation of theory From specific observations in stage one to general hypotheses ChoOSing constructs From general hypotheses to specific concrete, testable prediction Filling in constructs and predicting relationships between constructs The business of experimental, quasi-experimental, and descriptive studies Operationalisation of constructs Measurement Look for correlation between variables Establish worth, meaning of results in wider context. in context of theory from stage one, general hypotheses from stage 2, and specific predictions from stage 3. How do they interrelate? Do results support? Falsify? How strong is the evidence? Are the resu Its generalisable? What are the practical implications? Is there new input? Does it warrant changes in theory? Back to stage 1 !

The qualitative research techniques from School 1 are useful when constructs are most accurately operationalised using categorical variables. These techniques allow us to build models and test hypotheses using non-numerical data . These techniques lend themselves most to the fourth and fifth stages of the empirical cycle. They are usually used when research questions have been framed,

Box 4.2 continued

88

ADOLESCENCE, AFFECT, AND HEALTH

different different Bol ..;;.,I1' 4. _ ' :_School 1 is represented by statisticians such as Alan Agresti

constructs have been operationalised, and hypotheses are to some extent in place. In terms of de Groot's empirical cycle, these techniques are most useful in the fourth and fifth stages. The qualitative research techniques from School 2 are more suited to the first three stages of the empirical cycle. These techniques are ideal for generating theory, identifying important constructs, and filling in these constructs conceptually. In my research, I used interview techniques to see if my theoretical ideas had any resonance within the target group Qualitative research methods from School 2 can help to pinpoint and flesh out the constructs relevant to the research in the population of interest. For instance, i ndeveloping smoking prevention programmes for adolescents, Worden et al:s group (1988) conducted a preliminary round of focus group interviews to explore young people's needs for smoking prevention, their interests, and their lifestyles. Qualitative research techniques from School 2can be used to determine the breadth of a construct within and across populations (Knight, & Hill, 1998). They are thus extremely useful in cross-cultural research . They can be used very effectively to identify variables and frame hypotheses for quantitative research, bridging the gap between stages three and four of De Groot's empirical cycle (Weiss, 1994). Above and beyond these advantages, qualitative research methods from the second school offer an excellent opportunity to get to know your target group (Jessor, Colby, & Shewder, 1996).

Addressing the five goals ThefIrst goalof this round-appraisinghealth-relatedknowledge-wasleft entirely for the interview. SincespecifIc realmsof behaviouraddressedin the later phases of researchanddevelopmentwereto be chosenaccordingto the informationfrom this phase,I would not yet haveknown what questionsto ask. To coverthe second goal-taking inventory of common health complaints-existingquestionnaires were translatedand pilot tested. The third goal-assessinghealth and risk behaviours-wasaddressedwith open questionsabout behaviour. The fourth goal-havingto do with possiblecultural differences-wasaddressedby drawing a multi-cultural samplefor this phaseof the research. The fIfth goal, the study of determinantsof health-relatedbehaviour,remained central in this secondphaseof the research.No adequatetheory of adolescent health-relatedbehaviourhad emergedfrom the fIrst phaseof the research,and I was not far enoughalong in my conceptualisationof the meaningsof behaviour to use written measuresor open questions.However, several more descriptive constructsfrom theliteratureshowedpromiseaspossibledeterminantsof everyday health-relatedbehaviourin adolescents.It madesenseto pilot-testtheseconstructs for their possiblepredictive value in a small sample. This study focusedon four potential determinantsof health and risk behaviour: psychologicalwell-being, affectivity, family communications,and religious affIliation. Here is the rationale for thesechoices.

4. LETTING SUBJECTS SPEAK: TAKING INVENTORY

89

Researchhad shownthat psychologicalwell-being as expressedby measures suchas stress,lonelinessanddaily hassleshasa greatimpacton adolescenthealth (Hurrelmann,1990).In an attemptto further specify the natureof that impact, this preliminaryresearchexploredthe relationshipsbetweenpsychologicalwell-being, symptomreporting,healthand risk behaviours. Watsonand Pennebaker(1989) partition affectivity into two distinct concepts: positive affectivity and negative affectivity. Positive affectivity representsgood mood and high energy,while negativeaffectivity representsa generaldimension of sUbjective distress.Watson and Pennebakerfound that high levels of health complaints were related to negative affectivity, while positive affectivity was unrelatedto any of severalscalesfor physicalcomplaints.In this study, I choseto exploreconnectionsbetweennegativeaffectivity andexperiencingmoresymptoms amongDutch adolescents,and to investigatepossiblelinks betweenthe initiation of healthor risk behavioursand positive or negativeaffectivity. The relationship betweenfamily tensions and psychosomaticdisorders in adolescencehas beendiscussedrepeatedlyin the literature (Hurrelmann,Engel, Holler, & Nordlohne, 1988; Resnicket ai., 1997). Interpersonalcommunication skills havealso beenidentified as centralto preventivehealtheducation(Swisher, 1976). Here the relationshipbetweensymptomreporting, healthbehaviours,risk behavioursand the quality of family communicationswas examined. Interest in the buffering effects of religious affiliation against adolescents' involvementin risk behaviourhas grown exponentiallyin the United Statessince its inclusion in Jessor'sProblem Behaviour theory (Jessor, 1984). Religious affiliation has successfullypredictedthe performanceof fewer risk behaviours among American youths in severalstudies (Benson,& Donahue,1989; Jessor, 1984).It wasdecidedto explorethe valueofthis predictoramongthe Dutch youth.

METHODS Thereare severaladvantagesto using a small-scalequalitativetype questionnaire in conjunction with interviews. Gathering questionnaire-typedata alongside interview data provides convergentoperationalisationsof important constructs (Cook, & Campbell, 1979). In this research, the open-endedpart of the questionnaireallowed the adolescentsthemselvesto generaterelevantitems for later, quantitativephasesofthe research.Allowing thetargetgroupto generatetheir own questionnairesprovedto be a greatassetin the later phasesof the research. Another major advantageof using this convergent design was that extant questionnairescould be pilot testedfor their usefulnessand relevancewithin this particular group of adolescents.After respondingto the questionnaires,we discussedtheir reactionsin the group.This wasespeciallyusefulfor questionnaires translatedfrom other languagesor meant for other samples.Pilot testing also provides the opportunity to check the validity and reliability of wording and scalingof single items beforeusing them in a large-scalequantitativestudy. In an

90

ADOLESCENCE, AFFECT, AND HEALTH

interview situation,it canhappenthat someof the topicson the agendagetskipped if othertopics take off or new subjectscometo the fore. Using a questionnaireto complementthe interview protocol ensuresthat the topics on the questionnaire would be coveredin everygroup. Finally, in a groupinterview situation,not every participant will contribute to the discussionof all topics equally. Using the questionnairein conjunctionwith the interviews ensuredthat responsesfrom all group participantswere availablefor eachtopic on the questionnaire.

Subjects Fifty-three adolescentsbetweenthe agesof 12 and 16 participatedin this project: 36 Dutch adolescentsand 17 adolescentswith Turkish or Moroccanbackgrounds. The 36 Dutch adolescentscame from one large school community including college preparatoryas well as regular high-schoolclasses.They were askedto participate in the study during school hours. The parents received written informationon the projectand gaveformal permission.An equalnumberof boys and girls evenly coveringthe rangeof agesbetween12 and 16 were selected. The 17 Turkish and Moroccan adolescentswere either born in Turkey or Morocco, or first generationDutch (both parentsbeing immigrants).They were recruitedfrom homeworkhelp programmesin two communitycentres.Thesetwo cultural groupswereplacedtogetherin this study becausethey occurredso in the ad hoc sampling.Turkish and Moroccanpeopleliving in The Netherlandsoften sharethe sameneighbourhoods.They sharethe heritageof Islam, andtheir socioeconomic status is comparable.For these reasons,and consideringthe small samplesize it was consideredfeasibleto combinethe two groupsfor this study. The participantswere askedby the teachersto participatein their free time and receivedgift certificatesfor participation.

Procedure For the questionnaire/interviewphase,the main researcherand an observerwere presentat all times. We met with small groups of participants(5 to 7 in each group) in a room provided by the school, and at the two community centres. After a brief introduction to the research, the adolescentsfilled in the questionnaireindividually and subsequentlytook part in the focus group interview. The questionnairetook about 30 minutes to complete. The openendedquestionsrequiredsomethought.

Variables Generalquestions concerning demographicvariablesandreligious affiliationwere followed by a group of variables concerningpsychologicalwell-being affect, social network, symptoms,and health-relatedbehaviours.

4. LETIING SUBJECTS SPEAK: TAKING INVENTORY

91

Psychologicalwell-being. Perceived healthwas rated on a five-point scale, tirednessin the morning andlonelinesswere ratedon four-point scales.A 12 item 'worry list' madeup of statementssuchas "I worry aboutthe way I look", compiled from preliminary interviewsand otherexisting questionnaires, was filled in (Van Asselt, & Lanphen, 1990). The adolescentswere askedto chooseup to three relevantworries. Therewas also spaceprovidedto fill in their own most pressing worry or concern.For the quantitativeanalyses,the numberof timesthatthe various worries were chosenwas counted. The affectivityscale. Negativeor positiveaffectivity wasassessed with a threeitem scale (Cronbach'salpha .78) including frequency of bad moods, feeling lousy, and being nervous.The items were scoredfrom 1 (never) to 5 (often). The scalewas distilled from Watsonand Pennebaker's work (1989). Social network. Communicationwith the parentswas scoredon a four-point scalewherethe subjectsratehow easy(or difficult) it is to communicatewith each parentaboutthings that are botheringthem. Symptomreport. The Dutch version of the PennebakerInventory for Limbic Languidness(PILL) was included in the questionnaire(Cronbach'salpha .92) (Pennebaker,1982; Spruijt & Spruijt-Metz, 1994; Van Vliet, 1992). The respondentsrated the frequency with which they were botheredby each of 52 symptomson a five-point scale.This questionnairewas designedto measurethe tendency to report symptoms. Here, the PILL was also used to rank the symptoms according to prevalence among the adolescents.To check the understandingof (semi-) medical vocabulary,the participantswere requestedto underline any word that they did not understand.After underlining words they did not understand,help was available from the researchersfor filling in the PILL. The mean score of the items they understood (including those that requiredhelp) was usedin the analyses. Health andrisk behaviours. Healthbehavioursandrisk behavioursundertaken were inventoriedby asking the adolescentsto describein their own words what they did to stay healthyand what they did that they knew may be harmful for their health. They could nameas many health or risk behavioursundertakenthat they could think of. For the quantitativeanalyses,the numberof healthbehavioursand risk behavioursmentionedwas counted.

Statistical analyses: Proceed with caution Beforewe look at resultsfrom this preliminaryquestionnaire,it mustbe remarked that this was an exploratoryphaseof research.The small samplesize meantthat the powerof the testswas very low, so we needto be very circumspectwhen we

92

ADOLESCENCE, AFFECT, AND HEALTH

talk aboutsignificancein the statisticalsense(Cohen,1988).Why botherto do the analyses,might thenbe the question?This kind of preliminarydatacangive great insight into what works and what does not work within a population. The information from the statistical 'tests' gaveextra input that was collatedwith the informationgatheredfrom the interview dataandobservations.Thesepreliminary analyses(sometimescalled 'snoopingthe data') contributedto the building of a more valid questionnairefor the later large-scalesurvey by guiding decisions about the inclusion and exclusionof items and variables(resultsare reportedin Chapters6, 7, and 8). These analyseswere hypothesisgeneratingrather than hypothesistesting.They wereusedto helpprovideanswersto questionsthat would guide further researchquestions(such as which constructs shouldbe included?) and further researchdesign (such as which popUlations and what kind of manipulationsshouldbe included?).

RESULTS Table 4.3 showsthe ten highestscoredsymptomson the PILL, the healthandrisk behavioursmentionedin order of frequency,and the 10 most frequently chosen worries from the worry list in descendingorderof frequency. The worry most frequently addedto the worry list in the spaceprovided was 'worries aboutlove'. The scoreson the PILL showedthat headaches are frequent, with 78% of the samplereportingoccasionalto frequentheadaches.Most of the Dutch subjectsunderstoodall the items, and did not underlineany of them. The TurkishIMoroccanadolescentsgenerallyunderlinedbetweenone-third and onehalf of the list, so the medicalvocabularyseemedto differ betweenthe two groups. The PILL could thereforenot be usedfor both in a survey situation. TABLE 4.3

Symptoms, health behaviours, risk behaviours, and worries in descending order of importance Top ten symptomsin descendingorder of intensity

Health behavioursin descendingorder of frequency

Risk behavioursin descendingorder of frequency

Worries in descendingorder of frequency

Acne Headache Stuffy nose Blushing Coughing Sneezing Runny nose Oversensitiveteeth Back pain Sore throat

Sport Healthy eating habits Enoughsleep Warm clothing Vitamins Hygiene Not smoking/drinking Hobbies Having fun Dental hygiene

Not enoughsport Unhealthyeatinghabits Not enoughsleep No warm clothing Smoking/drinking Walkmantoo loud

The future Appearance Feelingsin a knot Being bored Grades Achievementsof goals Problemswith parents Wish I were different Problemswith friends Being alone Money Health

4. LETTING SUBJECTS SPEAK: TAKING INVENTORY

93

different different different Bol ..;;.,I1' 4. _ ' :_School 1 is represented by statisticians such as Alan Agresti For some of the readers of this book, statistics might be very intimidating and inaccessible. For other readers, however, results would be considered incomplete and difficult to interpret if they are presented verbally without the statistics. Indeed, statistics are an essential part of scientific argumentation. We use statistics to demonstrate how we came to our conclusions and to allow other scientists to check our conclusions and form their own opinions. Ihave chosen to leave the statistics in the text, because I feel that it is richer and more informative if they are included. Ihope the following remarks on reading statistics will be helpful for readers who might feel less comfortable w ith them. •

Reading it all7

In the f irst place, keep in m n i d that even scientists who are perfectly at home with statistical techniques do not customarily work through all the statistics in a result section in detail. They w ill most likely scan over the statistics and only delve deeply into a particular resu lt that interests them, or into an unfamiliar statistical technique that might be of use to them, or into a result that appears irregular in order to check it . So 'reading ' aresult section does not necessarily mean going over every table in detail. •

Tables and figures

Aside from the tables, which portray the statistics in numbers. there are also figures in most of the ensuing results sections. These represent the statistics graphically and are often easier to understand than the tables . The figures frequently portray the various group averages, which facilitates comparisons. If you begin with read ing the texts and glancing at the figures. you can always decide that a particular table is of interest and go back to study it. An excellent companion book is Using Multivariate Statistics (Tabachnick, & Fidell, 1996). •

Skipping the 'Results' sections

All the chapters that include statistics (Chapters 4, 6. 7. 8, and 9) end w ith a Discussion section. The discussion section always includes an interpretation of the statistical results. Some people skip the Results sections entirely and go directly from the Methods section to the Discussion section. While this approach is not uncommon, it severely limits your perspective. It does offer an interpretation of the statistical results, but it will not enable you to trace the origins of the interpretation or conclusions. Statistics are the epistemological anchor of empirical research. Statistics are the evidence of the empirical grounding of research in experience and observations. If you skip them entirely, it w ill be difficult to form an opinion on the validity of the research. •

A perspective on multivariate statistical techniques

Finally, the book as a whole covers a fa irly broad spectrum of multivariate statistics, each of them put into their particular place in the larger project. Fairly detailed descriptions of why particular tests are suitable for particular data, of how to deal w ti h messy data and of the strengths and weaknesses of particular analysiS techniques are regularly included. Hopefully, the result sections taken together w ill convey an idea of the various types of available techniques and how to fit them to different kinds of data and research questions.

94

ADOLESCENCE, AFFECT, AND HEALTH

Gender and cultural differences on symptom report, health behaviour, and risk behaviour ANOVAs (analysesof variance)were usedinsteadof t-testsbecausethey also test for interactionsbetweengenderand ethnicity, which would not be possibleusing a seriesof t-tests. ANOVAs were also preferablebecausethis techniquemakes multiple comparisonsusing only one test. Due to the small samplesize, it was important to get as much information as possibleusing as few tests as possible. In an analysisof varianceon the PILL scores,a trend for an interactioneffect betweengenderand cultural group was found (F = 3.83, df = 1, 48, p = .056). Figure 4.1 showsthis trend. A significant differencewas found on PILL scoresbetweenDutch boys and Dutch girls (t = -2.25, df = 33, p = .03) and betweenDutch girls and Turkish / Moroccangirls (t= 2.19, df= 25,p = .04). Dutch girls reportedmore symptomsthan Dutch boys. This is in keepingwith the vast literature on symptomreporting in Westernsocieties,which showsthat femalesof all agesreport more physical symptomsthan their male counterparts (Bush, Harkings, Harrington, & Price, 1993; Donovan, Jessor,& Costa, 1993; Kaufman, Brown, Graves,Henderson,& Revolinski, 1993; McGuire, Mitic, & Neumann,1987; Pennebaker,1982; Spruijt-Metz, & Spruijt, 1996). Figure 4.1 suggeststhat the roles seemedto be reversedin the Turkish-Moroccangroups.In this subsample,the boys tendedto report more symptomsthan the girls. Analysesof varianceon health and risk behaviourswere conductedto seeif there were any differencesin behavioursbetweenthe gendersor ethnic groups. Resultsfrom theseanalysesare presentedin Tables4.4aand 4.4b, 2

1.75

Mean

PILL

scores

1.5

Dutch (boys n = 18, girls n =17*)

1.75

Turkish, Morroccan (boys n =7, girls n =10)

1.75

Boys

FIG. 4.1

Girls

'For analyses involving the PILL, one incomplete questionnaire is omitted.

Interactionbetweengenderand ethnic group on PILL scores.

4. LETIING SUBJECTS SPEAK: TAKING INVENTORY

95

TABLE 4.4a

Analyses of variance on effects of gender and ethnicity on health behaviours Health behavioursundertaken Variable

Gender Ethnicity Sex * Ethnicity

F

df

p

.23 4.95 .17

1.49 1,49 1,49

.63 .03* .69

TABLE 4.4b

Analyses of variance on effects of gender and ethnicity on risk behaviours Health behavioursundertaken Variable

Gender Ethnicity Sex * Ethnicity

F

df

4.18 7.80 .09

1,49 1,49 1, 49

p

.05* .01* .77

No interactionswere found. There was a main effect of ethnicity on health behaviour,as shown in Fig. 4.4a. The Dutch youth report more healthbehaviour than the Turkish and Moroccanyouths. For risk behaviour,main effectswerefound for both genderandethnicity. Dutch and adolescents reportmorerisk behaviourthanTurkish or Moroccanadolescents, girls reportmorerisk behaviourthanboys.Figure4.3 offers a graphicrepresentation of the cell means.

3.75

4

Mean number

3.75

Dutch (boys n= 18, girls n = 17)

of

health behaviours

3.5

Turkish, Moroccan (boys n= 7, girls n 10)

=

3.25

3

Boys

Girls

FIG. 4.2 Mean numberof healthbehavioursreported.

96

ADOLESCENCE, AFFECT, AND HEALTH 2

1.5

Dutch (boys n =18, girls n =17)

Mean 3.75 number of risk behaviours

Turkish, Moroccan (boys n =7, girls n =10)

0.5-

o

I

Boys FIG. 4.3

Girls

Mean numberof risk behavioursreported.

Psychological well-being Cronbach'salphafor the variablesrepresentingpsychologicalwell-beingwas low (043), suggestingthatthe variablesmayrepresentdifferent aspectsof psychological well-being. Therefore, individual items were used for the analysesinstead of forcing theseitems into one 'scale'. No genderor ethnic differenceswere found in perceivedhealth or tiredness. The Dutch adolescentsscoredlower on loneliness(F = 1.82, df = 1, 48, p = 0040) thanthe TurkishIMoroccanadolescents.An interactionwasfound betweengender andethnicityon loneliness(F=4.83, df =1, 48,p =.03). Girls in bothethnicgroups reportedabout the samelevels of loneliness,while the TurkishIMoroccanboys scoredconsiderablyhigher than both groups of girls and the Dutch boys. Girls reportedconsistentlymore worries than boys (F = 5.94, df = 1,49,p = .02). The correlationsbetweenthe psychologicalwell-being variablesand symptom reporting, health behaviour,and risk behaviourare shown in Table 4.5. While lonelinessand tirednesscorrelatewith the PILL, worries and perceivedhealthdo not. TABLE 4.5 Correlations between the psychological well-being variables and PILL scores, health behaviours, and risk behaviours PILL Health behaviours Risk behaviours **p if)

2 co Ll J iD < X o

----------- Stress ----------- Nonstress

32

-

1

-

0L

FIG. 2 The effects of stress (S) and nonstress (NS) conditions on systolic blood pressure for good and poor premorbid subjects before (Period I) and after (Period II) administration of the experimental conditions.

238

ROGER L. PATTERSON 5 LjJ q: 3

if) if)

----- - Stress ----- - Nonstress

4

Poor -S

UJ (r Q_

3

Cl O o _l

2

m

Good-S

1

if) E < —

0

Q

if) UJ

Poor -NS Good-NS

-1

O < I o

-2

PERIOD

_l U

FIG. 3 The effects of stress (S) and nonstress (NS) conditions on diastolic blood pressure for good and poor premorbid subjects before (Period I) and after (Period II) administration of the experimental conditions.

The SBP and DBP change score data were analyzed in exactly the same way as the STAI A-State data. The ANOVA for the SBP measure yielded results that were similar to those obtained for the STAI A-state data. In this analysis, only the conditions main effect was significant (p < .01). The mean DBP difference scores, presented in Fig. 3, were similar to the results for the SBP measures. In the Stress condition the goods and the poors increased on the second measure, while the goods and the poors in the NS condition decreased. Again only the conditions main effect was significant (p < .01). Performance Measure

The results of the error count of the completed DS test revealed an extremely low error rate. Only four incorrect substitutions were found in the 128 DS protocols obtained in this study. Thus, the schizophrenic subjects were sufficiently in contact with the experimental conditions to perform well on the DS task. All of the experimental groups improved in performance from the first to the second DS measure, but the performance gains were somewhat different for the S and NS conditions. The performance change scores for the NS groups are

7. ANXIETY AND PERFORMANCE IN SCHIZOPHRENICS

239

FIG. 4 (a) Performance of high A-trait (HA) and low A-trait (LA) good and poor premorbid subjects in the nonstress condition before (Period I) and after (Period II) administration of the experimental conditions, (b) Performance of high A-trait (HA) and low A-trait (LA) goods and poors in the stress condition before (Period I) and after (Period II) administration of the experimental conditions.

presented in Fig. 4a; the changes for the S groups are presented in Fig. 4b. Improvements for the Nonstress groups were much more consistent than for the Stress groups. However, there was substantial variability in all groups, and none of the main effects or interactions were significant in the statistical analyses of these data. At this point in the analyses, the one fact that has been established is that the negative feedback was sufficiently stressful to increase the level of A state for both goods and poors, as compared with the Nonstress groups. The main evidence for this conclusion was the statistically significant Stress/Nonstress conditions main effect for both blood pressure measures. In addition, the results obtained in the analyses of the STAI A-state scores were similar to those obtained with the blood pressure variables, and the Stress conditions main effect on STAI A-state approached statistical significance (p < .10). Since the effects of the experimental variables on performance were of major interest in this study, the performance scores of individual subjects were closely examined. Interestingly, the two groups that showed a greater increase in A-state (the HA-trait Goods and the LA-trait Poors) also improved most in performance. Further analyses utilizing the PEI were designed to clarify the relationship between stress, A-state and performance. Postexperimental Interview

Interview data were obtained for 27 of the 32 subjects in the Stress condition; the remaining five subjects failed to give productive or meaningful interviews. The two raters agreed in their classifications of 26 of the 27 subjects; the

240

A trait A state SBP DBP Performance

S.D. 14.43 15.83 14.32 17.39 10.90

Mean

48.75 45.58 113.5 64.17 40.08

Period I Period II

53.92 119.00 67.83 47.42

Mean

Threatened

11.96 19.70 11.42 6.44

S.D. 36.13 36.86 112.80 70.80 42.20

Mean

Period I

11.90 14.90 13.96 13.09 8.58

S. D.

Period II

36.13 115.20 72.13 43.27

Mean

Nonthreatened

TABLE 1 Raw Score Means and Standard Deviations of A -T rait Scores, and A-State, SBP, DBP, and Performance Scores fo r the Threatened and Nonthreatened Groups Before (Period I) and A fte r (Period II) Censure

13.88 16.98 14.07 9.74

S.D.

7. ANXIETY AND PERFORMANCE IN SCHIZOPHRENICS

241

experimenter classified the single subject for which there was disagreement using the same material and criteria as the raters. Twelve subjects, 7 poors and 5 goods, were classified as threatened (T); 15 subjects, 6 poors and 9 goods, were categorized as nonthreatened (NT). The number of goods and poors in the T and NT groups was not significantly different, (x2 = 1.13,