Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity 9811571139, 9789811571138

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Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity Edited by Ananta Kumar Giri

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society

Ananta Kumar Giri Editor

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity

Editor Ananta Kumar Giri Madras Institute of Development Studies Chennai, India

ISBN 978-981-15-7113-8 ISBN 978-981-15-7114-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For Arvind Sharma, Peter Heehs and Paul Schwartzentruber who have helped us in finding new relationships between pragmatism and spirituality and cultivate creative pathways of consciousness, freedom and solidarity.

Foreword

Economic and technological forces connected to globalization have made us, inhabitants of the earth, an increasingly interconnected people. Thanks to the Internet, boundaries of time and space that held sway for centuries are now much more fluid and permeable, so that people in one part of the world can instantly be in communication with people everywhere and can access information globally. This fact of interconnection now runs up against the horizon of real ecological crisis and tangible threats to our planetary survival. These two fundamental features of our contemporary world, interconnection on the one hand and environmental danger on the other, transform the way we look at life and its organizing principles. In combination, they demand of us an ecological responsibility that issues in new ways of thinking about fundamental issues. This volume with its many insights and provocations is fully up to that challenge. Among its multiple riches and offerings, I want to highlight four central contributions. First, it deals at length and from many different directions with themes that are central to an ecological age: consciousness, freedom, and solidarity and their interconnections. It approaches each of these multifaceted themes from a variety of directions: philosophy, science and spirituality as seen in both the West and in the long, 4000-year-old Indian tradition, with their many branches. Consciousness, both as an ontological feature of reality and as a phenomenological fact, has deservedly got much attention in contemporary research and day-to-day discussion.

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Philosophy, science and spirituality have different methods and approaches to the study of consciousness, and it is a real boon to have them brought into encounter with one another. Freedom, likewise, has many different meanings and significations. It is clear, however, that freedom, both negative and positive, is central to an ecological perspective. We have to free ourselves from deleterious modes of thought and living and for thought, experience and action that fosters universal harmony. Finally, it is good to see the idea of solidarity given its due in this volume. Many political and spiritual leaders from Antonio Guterres, the current UN SecretaryGeneral, to the Dalai Lama have rightly called for the cultivation of universal responsibility. Solidarity is the virtue and social disposition that underlies such responsibility. Second, it is good to have in this volume a genuine cross-cultural philosophical conversation. For too long, at least in the West, philosophy has been seen as an exclusively occidental preoccupation with its roots in Greece. This is both a distortion of history and an impoverishment. It ignores the two other major centers of philosophy, India and China, which have longer and more variegated philosophical traditions than the West. Moreover, there is much evidence that documents the influence that the Indian tradition had on the ancient Greeks. That this neglect is also an impoverishment is shown by the rich dialogue that is portrayed here, where William James, Martin Heidegger, Levi-Strauss, Jordan Peterson and Slavoj Zizek are brought into discussion with Swami Vivekananda, R. Balasubramanian and various Indian traditions to the mutual benefit of all parties. One instance, among many, of such benefit is to see the practical and performative character of philosophy, which has been a time-honored emphasis of Indian traditions being taken seriously by engaged (in the Sartrean sense) and action-oriented schools of Western philosophy, like Marxism and pragmatism with their emphasis on praxis. Third, it is both refreshing and valuable to be presented with a volume that is truly and rigorously interdisciplinary in nature and scope. The modern university has also devolved into a multiversity, where various specialized disciplines exist and work in silos that have little to do with one other. One example, among many, of such fragmentation is how the idea of cosmology which, in the Indian traditions and in Dante, dealt with the order of things and the place of humans in the cosmos has now shrunk to a narrow scientific investigation within physics. The harmful consequence of such shrinkage is documented at length in the literature around the idea of the Anthropocene, where an exaggerated and unbalanced view of

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the status and role of humans in the cosmos is at the root of climate change and other environmental disasters. What is as perturbing is the change in the very conception of the modern university from a center of broad learning, knowledge and research into an instrumental and functional space primarily responsible to the demands of the economy and the job market—hence the great prestige of the so-called STEM disciplines of science, technology, engineering and mathematics to the neglect of the humanities and social sciences. In sharp contrast, this volume concretely demonstrates the value of good interdisciplinary discussion. Reference is made in one of the essays of a “spiritual economy” and an “economics of solidarity,” ideas that are largely absent in most of the technical literature of present-day economics and yet which were part and parcel of the discipline through much of its history. It is instructive to be reminded that Adam Smith, widely considered the father of modern economics, was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Fourth, this volume presents us with different varieties of pragmatism. Running through them are the common themes of uniting thought and action in the world, inquiry and participatory agency. Jurgen Habermas, for example, emphasizes the linkage of knowledge with social interests and thematizes social agency as communicative action. Here, he follows the lead of the American pragmatist, John Dewey, who speaks of the importance of “a common faith.” On the Indian side, both Swami Vivekananda and Gandhi see the potential of spirituality as a binding force for social cohesion, even though both of them are also aware of how divisive, and sometimes violent, institutional religion can be. This too is a vital question for our times. How does one go beyond the factionalism, tribalism and exclusivism of much contemporary religion, which has resulted in violence and strife, to a common faith and purpose in protecting and nurturing our planetary home? Oddly enough, mystics of different traditions point the way. By going deep into the wisdom and richness of different religious traditions, one touches a spiritual foundation that is shared, even though the traditions may describe that foundation differently with names like God, The Absolute, Buddha-nature, Emptiness, Ground-of-our-being, to mention a few. This is not to say that these terms are synonymous in any straightforward sense. They are rather what the Spanish-Indian philosopher-theologian Raimon Panikkar calls “homeomorphic equivalents,” that is terms that have a similar function in their

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respective systems. This social and communicative aspect of spiritual practice serves as a corrective to the tendency to see spirituality in overly individualistic and private terms, and allows for a richer connection between a spiritual pragmatism and social solidarity, with consciousness acting as a mediating force. It is my hope that this volume will be read and studied for these and other reasons. It is a timely book that not only contains essays of intrinsic interest, but which also equips us for our ecological responsibility. It is appropriate to congratulate the publisher, editor and contributors for a genuinely interesting and valuable volume. Heidegger, who in his important work charted aspects of being as seen from a Western perspective, was fond of quoting the German poet, Hoelderlin: “But where the danger is, there grows the saving power also.” This book illumines facets of both the danger and the saving power. Joseph Prabhu

Preface

Pragmatism is an important aspect of intellectual movements in nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States which had had an influence on rethinking and transforming theory and practice in other parts of the world. It has both spiritual and pragmatic dimensions. We explored different dimensions of pragmatism, spirituality and society in the companion volume to this book from Palgrave Macmillan entitled Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realization. In this volume, we explore issues of consciousness, freedom and solidarity as these relate to both pragmatism and spirituality. This book has been long in the making. I am grateful to all the contributors to this volume for their kindness and patience. I am grateful to my dear and respected friend Professor Joseph Prabhu for his insightful Foreword. I am grateful to Connie, Li and Sara Crowley Vigneau of Palgrave Macmillan for their kind encouragement and support. I thank Vishnu Varatharajan for his kind help and support in preparing this volume. We dedicate this book to Arvind Sharma, Peter Heehs and Paul Schwartzentruber—three creative seekers and scholars of our times. Arvind Sharma is a border-crossing scholar, thinker and seeker whose works into many fields of philosophy and spirituality are truly inspiring. I have been inspired by a work of him Hinduism for our Times almost two decades ago which had helped me to think of creative and non-dogmatic ways of travelling with our faith, religion and spirituality (Sharma 1996).

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Peter Heehs is a dedicated, creative and silent seeker of our times whose life and work are a challenge and inspiration to many of us. Peter explored spiritual pathways of life which brought him to Sri Aurobindo and the Mother. He nurtured the Archives in Sri Aurobindo Ashram. He also wrote books of poetry. He has written insightfully about modern Indian history and the freedom struggle. Then, he wrote a book called The Lives of Sri Aurobindo in 2008. Some of the devotees of Sri Aurobindo felt offended at one or two lines in the book and took him to court but finally the Supreme Court of India dismissed the case against him. His life became mired in pain and suffering with so much anger unleashed at him in the name of Sri Aurobindo but he has lived a life of equanimity and dedication to knowledge with and beyond it. His two books after this, Writing the Self: Diaries, Memoirs and the History of the Self and Spirituality Without God help us charting new pathways of relationship between practice, courage to life and truth and spirituality in a creative and silent manner (see Heehs 2013, 2019). In his Spirituality Without God, Heehs helps to realize that it is possible to be spiritual without believing in God which has a deep resonance in many creative paths of pragmatism such as nurtured by American pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty. Heehs argues how an element of skepticism is essential for spiritual practice and here what he writes about Martin Luther is deeply significant: “Luther was as good a Greek and Latin scholar as most of the humanists of his time, but he opposed a central humanist idea: that philosophical scepticism was a usual way of dealing with contending dogmas. Yet scepticism was part of the fabric of the times, and Luther owed more to it than he was ready to admit” (Heehs 2019: 136). Both pragmatism and spirituality deal with the perennial and contemporary challenges of closure, absolutism and fundamentalism and here Heehs also challenges us to realize how our task is to be ever mindful in our each step not to fall a prey to closed-minded absolutism in thinking, practice and social organization. Here again what he writes in his Spirituality Without God helps us cultivate our journey with pragmatism and spirituality with creativity and courage: To my mind the danger is not that individuals practicing spiritual disciplines will destroy whatever “integuments” may be holding society together but that society will reabsorb all nonconfirming individuals into its undifferentiated mass. It is remarkable and disheartening, that many of those who call themselves “spiritual but not religious” end up becoming as intolerantly religious as any fundamentalist Muslim or Christian. [..] Kierkegaard,

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an extremely nonfundamentalist Christian, waged a lifelong battle against the Danish state church and, in more general terms, against what he called “the crowd.” He viewed the conflict between the individual and the crowd in black-and-white terms: “There is a view of life that holds that truth is where the crowd is” and another view “that holds that wherever the crowd is, untruth is.” He himself insisted that “The crowd is untruth” and the link between the two was so strong that people who had found some truth came together in a crowd, “untruth would promptly be present there.” The instruments of the crowd, in particular the press, could never “run down the lies and the errors.” (Fake news was just as slippery in nineteenthcentury Copenhagen as it is in twenty-first century Washington.) The only suggestion he could offer was for individuals to form themselves into voluntary communities instead of amorphous crowds. The crowd, he said, is a collection of numbers summing up to zero. The community on the other hand is “a sum of ones” and also “more than a sum.” Both Tolstoy and Kierkegaard were theists, but they were my kind of theists: dedicated to individual effort, at odds with institutions, suspicious of the mob. They are the theists I can learn from, though I still respond better to the ideas of nontheists such as Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. Finally, however, the crucial distinction is not between nontheists and theists, but between people who are open-minded and people who think that they have all the answers. The universe is large and full of surprises. The answers served up by the closed-minded today will look ridiculous tomorrow. (Heehs 2019: 236–237)

Paul Schwartzentruber is a creative scholar and seeker from Canada who has been engaged with many creative experiments in thinking and practice and voluntary open communities in the sense Heehs talks about in the above paragraph and what contributors such as Jacqueline Kigley and Julie M. Geredien in our volume call beloved community building on the works of Josiah Royce, John Dewey and Martin Luther King Jr. He has been a friend of Gandhi and India and has taken part in the Gandhian movement of Ekta Parishad. He has written insightfully on many issues in spirituality, social action and critical philosophy inviting us to realize both practice and spirituality as an ever wakeful walk with friendship . Pauls’ work, as well as those of Arvind Sharma and Peter Heehs, helps us finding new relationship between practice and spirituality and envisioning and embodying spiritual pragmatism creatively and differently. Finally, I hope this book helps us cultivate new pathways of pragmatism, spirituality, consciousness, freedom and solidarity. I offer this poem which hopefully can be a companion in our journey:

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A Million Moses and a Million Savitri Ananta Kumar Giri A Million Moses A Million Savitri Moses floating in the river The soul taking him in Is Savitri But Savitri also receives the dead child in the shore Now in the Mediterranean sea On European shores Children drowning and floating in the shores Savitri doing a new Earth yoga To receive them Bring new life Moses gets a commandment from God He creates ten commandments These commandments became commands Mosaic distinction Between Jews and Gentiles Violence and arrogance of the chosen The Chosen people Our people Mosaic distinctions create death Savitri overcomes death By creating new humus of life Where Jews and Gentiles Israelites and Palestinians Dissolve their fences And eat humus together Seeing hearts in the walls Creating a new temple A temple, mosque, and synagogue And a church of care For the whole of humanity Savitri sings to Moses A new dance of Freedom, Consciousness and Solidarity A new life A new eternity Moses dancing with Savitri

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A Million Moses A Million Savitri Dancing for a new symphony of life.1

I also offer the following lines from Sri Aurobindo’s epic Savitri where Sri Aurobindo challenges to us to cultivate “pragmatism of the transcendent truth” and wisdom in our works: Her pragmatism of the transcendent Truth Fills silence with the voices of the gods [..] For all the depth and beauty of her work A wisdom lacks that sets the spirit free (Sri Aurobindo 1993: 196).

Chennai, India 21 February 2020

Ananta Kumar Giri Maha Sivaratri

References Heehs, Peter. 2008. Lives of Sri Aurobindo. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 2013. Writing the Self: Diaries, Memoirs and the History of the Self . London: Bloomsbury. ———. 2019. Spirituality without God: A Global History of Thought and Practice. New Delhi et al.: Bloomsbury. Sharma, Arvind. 1996. Hinduism for Our Times. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Sri Aurobindo. 1993 [1951–1952]. Savitri: A Legend and Symbol. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.

1 This is from my forthcoming book of poems, Alphabets of Creation: Taking God to Bed. This was composed in the home of my friend David Sarnoff, James Island, Charleston, June 14, 2017. For David Sarnoff, friend and psychologist, who first told me about his idea of creating a million Moses.

Contents

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Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: An Introduction and Invitation to New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity Ananta Kumar Giri

Part I

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Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity 17

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Pragmatism and Belief Nishant Alphonse Irudayadason

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Pragmatism, Consciousness and Spirituality: William James and Rudolf Steiner Robert McDermott

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Pragmatic Non-Duality in William James, Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda and Trika Shaivism Sarah Louise Gates

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Peterson vs. Žižek on the Evolution of Consciousness and Happiness: From Pragmatism to Sarkar’s Tantra Justin M. Hewitson

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CONTENTS

Spirituality, Pragmatism, Vedanta and Universal Consciousness: A Study of the Philosophy of R. Balasubramanian Ramesh Chandra Pradhan A Quantum Bridge Between Science and Spirituality: Toward a New Geometry of Consciousness Subhash Sharma

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Freedom, Spiritual Praxis and Categorical Imperative Meera Chakravorty

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Spiritual Pragmatism and an Economics of Solidarity John Clammer

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Pragmatism and Socio-Political Movement Toward Solidarity Julie M. Geredien

Part II

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Pragmatism and Spirituality: Reconstructing Language, Self and the World

‘Pragmatic Metaphysics: Language as a Battlefield Between Truth and Darkness’: An Interpretive Approach to the View on Language, Truth and World ´ in the Philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta—In the Light of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ Mikael Stamm Monistic Elements in Lévi-Strauss’s Structuralism: New Pathways of Consciousness, Pragmatism and Spirituality Rafaela Campos de Carvalho

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Action, Language, Art, and Mysticism as Reflection-Levels of an Alternative Semiotics and the Spiritual Perspective of a Value-Levels-Democracy Johannes Heinrichs Paul Valéry “Mystique sans Dieu”: Writing as a Spiritual Practice? Benedetta Zaccarello Spirituality of Action: Reading O. V. Vijayan’s Khasakkinte Ithihasam and Gurusagaram Through William James’ Concept of Religion Vinod Balakrishnan and Shintu Dennis

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Is Homing Spiritual Praxis? Nirmal Selvamony

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Performative as the Language of Pragmatism: A Reading of Indian Spirituality Ranjan Kumar Panda

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Gardens of God: Spiritual Pragmatism and Transformation of Religion, Politics, Self and Society Ananta Kumar Giri

Index

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Notes on Editor and Contributors

Editor Ananta Kumar Giri is a Professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. He has taught and done research in many universities in India and abroad, including Aalborg University (Denmark), Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris (France), the University of Kentucky (USA), University of Freiburg & Humboldt University (Germany), Jagiellonian University (Poland) and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has an abiding interest in social movements and cultural change, criticism, creativity and contemporary dialectics of transformation, theories of self, culture and society, and creative streams in education, philosophy and literature. Dr. Giri has written and edited around two dozen books in Odia and English, including Global Transformations: Postmodernity and Beyond (1998); Sameekhya o Purodrusti (Criticism and Vision of the Future, 1999); Patha Prantara Nrutattwa (Anthropology of the Street Corner, 2000); Conversations and Transformations: Toward a New Ethics of Self and Society (2002); Self-Development and Social Transformations? The Vision and Practice of Self-Study Mobilization of Swadhyaya (2008); Mochi o Darshanika (The Cobbler and the Philosopher, 2009); Sociology and Beyond: Windows and Horizons (2012), Knowledge and Human Liberation: Towards Planetary Realizations (2013); Philosophy and Anthropology: Border-Crossing and Transformations (co-edited with John Clammer, 2013); New Horizons of Human

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Development (editor, 2015); Pathways of Creative Research: Towards a Festival of Dialogues (editor, 2017); Cultivating Pathways of Creative Research: New Horizons of Transformative Practice and Collaborative Imagination (editor, 2017); Research as Realization: Science, Spirituality and Harmony (editor, 2017); Beyond Cosmopolitanism: Towards Planetary Transformations (editor, 2017); The Aesthetics of Development; Art, Culture and Social Transformations (co-editor, 2017); Beyond Sociology (editor, 2018); Social Theory and Asian Dialogues: Cultivating Planetary Conversations (editor, 2018); Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations in Religions and Societies (editor, 2018); Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Alternative Experiments for Creative Futures (editor, 2019) and Transformative Harmony (editor, 2019); The Calling of Global Responsibility: New Initiatives in Justice, Dialogues and Planetary Realizations (forthcoming); Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations (editor, forthcoming); Cross-Fertilizing Roots and Routes: Identities, Social Creativity, Cultural Regeneration and Planetary Realizations (editor, forthcoming); Roots, Routes and A New Awakening: Beyond One and Many and Alternative Planetary Futures (editor, forthcoming); Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo (editor, forthcoming); Learning the Art of Wholeness: Integral Education and Beyond (forthcoming); and Cultivating Integral Development (forthcoming). Website: www.mids.ac. in/ananta.htm.

Contributors Vinod Balakrishnan is a Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli (2007–). He has also taught at St. Berchmans College, Changanacherry (1991–1998) and Alagappa Government Arts College, Karaikudi. He is a practicing poet, motivational speaker and yoga enthusiast. He teaches literary theory, creative writing and communication skills. His areas of interest include life writing, history, language and classical literature, especially, Tamil and Sanskrit. He is also the general editor of the 12-volume Encyclopaedia of World Mythology (2013) (in Malayalam) published by DC Books, Kottayam. Meera Chakravorty is a Research Faculty in the Department of Cultural Studies, Jain University, Bangalore. She has been a member of the

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Karnataka State Women’s Commission, Bangalore, and was member of the Tagore Chair Committee chaired by Dr. U. R. Ananthamurthy. Her engagement has been with philosophy, women’s studies, cultural studies consciousness studies and translation projects. She has translated some award-winning literary works of renowned authors published by Sahitya Akademi (National Academy of Letters, India). She has recently edited the volume Dynamics of Dissent with co-editors Profs. John Clammer, Marcus Bussey and Dr. Tanmayee Banerjee. She was awarded for her writing on “Time” by University of Interdisciplinary Studies, Paris, sponsored by John Templeton Foundation. She has also been awarded for her literary work by the Tagore Cultural Centre, Bangalore. Since over four decades, she has been associated with women’s issues and continues to be involved in women’s struggle. One may visit thirdcitizens.com for the details. John Clammer is currently Professor in the Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, and Professor of Sociology in the Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Delhi, India. He has long experience of teaching and researching in and on Asia. After completing his Doctorate at Oxford University, he taught in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology and the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Hull (UK), before moving to the University of Singapore (later the National University), and later to the chair of Comparative Sociology and Asian Studies at Sophia University in Tokyo. In 2006, he moved to the United Nations University also in Tokyo as Advisor to the Rector and Professor of Development Sociology. In August 2016, he retired from the UNU to take up his current position at the O.P. Jindal Global University. He has been a visiting fellow or professor at a number of universities around the world, including the University of the South Pacific (Suva, Fiji), the University of Tokyo, the University of Kent at Canterbury, Murdoch University, the Australian National University, the University of Essex, Oxford University, Handong University (South Korea), the University of Buenos Aires, the Bauhaus Universitat Weimar, Pondicherry Central University and Kanda University of Foreign Studies. He has published widely on a range of subjects, including most recently issues of culture and development, art and society and the dialogue between Western social theory and Asian societies. Among his recent books are Culture, Development and Social Theory: Towards an

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Integrated Social Development (Zed Books) 2012; Art, Culture and International Development: Humanizing Social Transformation (Routledge, 2015); Cultures of Transition and Sustainability (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Cultural Rights and Justice: Sustainable Development, The Arts and the Body (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), and the recently co-edited volume (with A. K. Giri) The Aesthetics of Development: Art, Culture and Social Transformation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). He is the author of over 185 peer reviewed journal and book essays, numerous book reviews, newspaper articles and other publications, and is the editor of fifteen edited or co-edited books and one more in press. Rafaela Campos de Carvalho is graduate in Social Sciences and has a Master’s degree in Social Anthropology from the State University of Campinas, Brazil, in which she studied concepts of animality and flora, its limits to the idea of human and the historical social interactions between them. Currently, she is a Ph.D. student in Religious Studies at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil, where she was also an Assistant Professor of Legal Anthropology. The main themes that Rafaela develops in her writing are the notion of person and the construction of corporeality, especially in intersection with the tantric strands of Indian philosophy. Shintu Dennis is an Assistant Professor at Marian College Kuttikkanam (Autonomous). She completed her Ph.D. on theme of pragmatism, truth and literature, and the title of her thesis is The Concept of Truth: An Analysis of O. V. Vijayan’s Fiction through William James’ Pragmatism from the National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli. Her areas of interest include regional literature, philosophy of pragmatic truth, feminism, spirituality, logotherapy and swadhyaya. She has completed her M.A. and M.Phil. in English Literature. Sarah Louise Gates is a final year Critical Cultural Studies Ph.D. candidate at Edith Cowan University with a long-term interest in Shaivite Hinduism, indigenous cultural heritage and the cultural impacts of colonialism and settler invasions. She has contributed chapters to several edited collections. Sarah’s broader work seeks to highlight human-natural interconnectedness, cultural change, social and ecological justice, drawing on yogic and environmental philosophies.

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Julie M. Geredien is an independent scholar living in Annapolis, Maryland, USA, currently completing several book projects related to citizenship and social change. She has published chapters in anthologies, on topics like gender, community, democracy, social and environmental justice movement and social healing. Her background experience is in the arts, mind-body practices, public education and service work with youth. She holds a B.S. from the School of Speech at Northwestern University, an M.F.A. from the Center for Excellence at University of WisconsinMilwaukee and an M.S. from the College of New Jersey, formerly the Teacher’s College at Trenton State. Johannes Heinrichs (born in 1942 in Duisburg/Rhine, Germany) studied philosophy, theology and social sciences at various German universities and in Paris. He lectured philosophy in Frankfort and Bonn, and social ecology in Berlin. He developed the social and political system of “Value-Levels-Democracy” (short English version Auroville 2019). His social theory of ontological reflection and his semiotics of the reflexive levels action, language, art and mystics are parts of a general reflectionsystem theory which is a creative up-to-date development of German “idealism,” essentially understood as reflection theory. He spent many months in India, esp. at Auroville, and in spiritual (although not methodical) respect, he is nearest to Sri Aurobindo. An English summary of some 40 books by him appeared 2018 as “Integral Philosophy” (ibidem Stuttgart/Columbia University Press, New York). www.johannesheinric hs.de. Justin M. Hewitson is a researcher of comparative literature and philosophy whose research integrates Indo and Sino spiritual traditions into ancient and modern Western philosophy. He seeks to bridge Tantra-Yoga, Buddhism, Daoism and Sarkarian studies. He is an Assistant Professor at the Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, National YangMing University in Taiwan. His lectures and writing encompass historical meditative praxes and understanding the ontology of consciousness as a path to transcendental realization as they are presented in Sanskrit, Mandarin and English works. Dr. Hewitson’s essays have been published in Comparative and Continental Philosophy, CLC Web’s Comparative Literature and Culture; more articles are forthcoming in the Wenshan Review of Literature and Culture, and Palgrave Macmillan.

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Nishant Alphonse Irudayadason is a Professor of Philosophy at JnanaDeepa Vidyapeeth: Pontifical Institute of Philosophy and Religion (JDV), Pune, India. After having obtained two doctorates on Ethics and Postmodernity from Université Paris-Est and from Institut catholique de Paris, France, he has been actively pursuing academic life. He has authored two books and over 50 scholarly articles in both national and international journals and has presented papers in many academic conferences both in India and abroad. He is also a visiting faculty in many colleges and universities in India. He is a regular contributor to contemporary political analysis in “Light of Truth,” a bimonthly published from Kochi. Robert McDermott was president of CIIS from 1990 to 1999. Except for eleven years as a higher education administrator, he has been teaching philosophy and comparative religion since 1964. He has published extensively on Sri Aurobindo and Rudolf Steiner, including The Essential Aurobindo, The New Essential Steiner, The Bhagavad Gita and the West and Steiner and Kindred Spirits (2015). He was Secretary of the American Academy of Religion, Senior Fulbright Lecturer at the Open University and Director of a National Endowment for the Humanities Project for the Study of Hinduism and Buddhism. For 14 years, he was chair of the board of Sophia Project (two homes in Oakland for mothers and children at risk of homelessness). He has been president and board chair of many other institutions. With Debashish Banerji, he is co-authoring Sri Aurobindo and Modern Thought and co-editing Philo-Sophia. Website address: www.ciis.edu.pcc.faculty. Ranjan Kumar Panda is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai. His areas of interest include philosophy of mind and language, philosophical moral psychology and education. He has published a book titled Mind, Language and Intentionality (2008) and also edited a volume of essays in honor of Professor R.C. Pradhan titled Language, Mind and the Reality: Philosophical Thoughts of R. C. Pradhan (2015). Currently, he is working on an edited volume titled Self-Knowledge and Moral Identity. Joseph Prabhu is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles, and Adjunct Professor of Religion at Claremont Graduate University. He is the editor of The Intercultural Challenge of Raimon Panikkar (Orbis Books, 1996) and the co-editor of the

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two-volume Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges (Ashgate, 2007). He is also the editor of the forthcoming Raimon Panikkar as a Modern Spiritual Master (Orbis Books, 2020) and the author of the forthcoming Liberating Gandhi: Gandhi’s Legacy for the 21st Century and Beyond. He has been a Consultant to the UN Human Rights Commission and has been both a Trustee and an Executive Committee Member of the Parliament of the World’s Religions. He has lectured in more than eighty universities around the world and was honored by his university with an annual lecture series in his name. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan is at present a National Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. He was formerly Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad. He was awarded the Commonwealth Academic Fellowship at the University of Oxford during 1990–1991. He was Member-Secretary of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, during 2000–2003. His field of specialization includes philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He has published and edited books and contributed many papers to philosophy journals. His recent book is Mind, Meaning and World (Springer, 2019). He has participated and presented papers in many national and international conferences. Nirmal Selvamony is former Professor and Head of the Department of English Studies & Dean, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, at Central University of Tamil Nadu. Major areas of interest, for the past thirty-five years, have been tin.ai studies, tolk¯appiyam, ecocriticism, poetics, theory and ecomusicology. Introduced an ecocriticism course in the Indian university system and founded a forum now known as tin.ai (formerly, OSLE-India) and also a journal (Indian Journal of Ecocriticism) to promote this course. He introduced the courses “Tamil Poetics,” Tamil Musicology” and “Music and Literature” in Madras Christian College (affiliated to the University of Madras), and developed a new area of study known as tin.ai musicology. He revived the traditional Indian philosophical tradition called “k¯at.ci” (in a publication titled tamiz kaaTci neRiyiyal, 1996 [The Methodology of Tamil Philosophy]; ), which precedes the darshanas and formulated a theory of neo-tin.ai poetics (formerly, oikopoetics). He edited the section on “Logic in Tamil” in Handbook of Logical Thought in India (Springer, 2019; https://link.spr

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inger.com/referencework/10.1007/978-81-322-1812-8). He published ten books, forty-five essays in journals and more than sixty-five chapters in books. He taught courses and performed music abroad. He directed plays, played the guitar professionally and composed music for plays. Subhash Sharma is well known in the management education world both in India and abroad. He holds Post-Graduate Diploma in Management (PGDM) from Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad, and Ph. D. from the University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles, USA. He is author of well-known books such as Management in New Age: Western Windows Eastern Doors and New Mantras in Corporate Corridors and New Earth Sastra. His writings have been considered as “thought provoking contribution” with “quite a few revolutionary points of view” (Business Standards). He has made significant contributions to institution building as founding member of Women’s Institute for Studies in Development Oriented Management (WISDOM) at Banasthali University, Banasthali, Rajasthan; Founding Director, Indian Institute of Plantation Management, Bangalore; and founding member Indus Business Academy (IBA), Bangalore. He is currently Director, Indus Business Academy, Bangalore. He is also a recipient of excellence, achievement and leadership awards. Mikael Stamm is born in Denmark 1957. Though originally educated and working in the field of IT-business, he finished his B.A. in Western Philosophy in 2010 at the University of Copenhagen, followed by an M.A. in Indian Philosophy in 2012 at University of Madras. He is currently doing his Ph.D. project in Bangkok, Thailand. Mikael Stamm ´ ´ has specialized in Saiva Siddh¯anta, which today is the dominant Saiva cult in Tamil Nadu. He investigates the philosophical and religious expressions ´ of Saiva Siddh¯anta, by employing a hermeneutical/phenomenological method of interpretation. He insists on existence and language as necessary aspects of evaluation of any possible human activity, insight or relation: Nothing is without action, action is never speechless, and no word ´ is without being. He has published a book on Saiva Siddh¯anta titled: ´ “Sacred Sound and Language in Saiva Siddh¯anta,” available through Amazon. Benedetta Zaccarello is a Senior Researcher at “Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique” (CNRS, France). Benedetta Zaccarello works

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on contemporary philosophy through the study of its manuscript documents and archives. Her research aims at understanding the part played by writing in the process of conceptual creation. Indeed, such approach enables to uncover the existential, historical and cultural foundations of the protean set of thinking practices that form contemporary philosophy. It thus also aims to better understand texts and ideas themselves, for such a perspective shows the philosopher as a writer too. Such dynamic, diachronic and genetic approach of the writing of philosophy has led Benedetta Zaccarello to study the forms, genres and even literary strategies working through abstract texts, so to grasp the epistemic limits, the ambitions and the self-images built up by conceptual research in our contemporary times. After working on Paul Valéry’s manuscripts (of which she has edited within an international research team the Cahiers 1894–1914 for Gallimard publishing house), as well on the manuscripts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage, Genève, MetisPresses, 2013), Marguerite Duras and Michel Foucault, Benedetta Zaccarello has started to study emblematic transcultural “mediator” philosophers such as Jan Patoˇcka and Aurobindo Ghose, considering that codes, styles and cultural traditions constantly interact in contemporary philosophical writing. She coordinates with Kannan M. an international seminar “What is an archive in India and Europe?” in collaboration with the French Institute of Pondicherry and she is the principal investigator of the project “AITIA—Archives of International Theory An Intercultural Approach to Theoretical Manuscripts” (2020–2024), an international network financed by CNRS.

List of Figures

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2

Fig. 13.3 Fig. 13.4 Fig. 13.5

Fig. 13.6

T symbol as a symbol of vertical, horizontal and integrative perspective Shunya, matrix and spiral inter-relationships The sense-elements which are present in every mental activity and action-situation The hierarchy of semiotic levels or dimensions. A Actions resp. basic self-experience. B Language as meta-action (essentially an action of mind). C Arts as meta-languages. D Mystic as meta-art, where action is lifted in pure receptivity The overlap between action and language The house (Oikos) of society, organized in a state The hierarchic aspect of the partial parliaments, framework legislation. 4 = basic value chamber, 3 = culture chamber, 2 = chamber of politics, 1 = chamber of economics The circular aspect of the differentiated parliamentary system

106 109 221

223 225 238

240 241

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List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Colors of consciousness From fight to fullness Symbols from science and spirituality

107 108 111

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CHAPTER 1

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: An Introduction and Invitation to New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity Ananta Kumar Giri

Pragmatism invites us to cultivate new relationship between practice and consciousness, practice and spirituality, freedom and solidarity. This book explores different dimensions of pragmatism, spirituality, consciousness, freedom and solidarity. In our related volume on Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations, I had discussed how Sri Aurobindo wants to transform pragmatism into a nobler vision and practice of pragmatism. In this volume as we deal with consciousness, freedom and solidarity the following thoughts of Sri Aurobindo are helpful to walk and mediate together with: A pragmatic mentalism would not be in its essential principle other than the attempt already made by the race to make the intellectual Reason the

A. K. Giri (B) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_1

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governor of life, but this has been done hitherto by a reason preoccupied with the external fact and subjected to it; mind has attempted to read the law of life and its possibilities and organize anew within those limits by invention, device, regulation, mechanisms of many kinds, or it has attempted to govern life by mental ideas of an abstract order, such as democracy or socialism, and devise an appropriate machinery materializing that mental abstraction so as to make the dominance of the idea practical and viable. A subjectivistic pragmatic mentalism would try to act more subtly and plastically on life; it would seek for “truth of being,” some idea or ideal of its perfection or practice or efficiency, right way of being or living, and attempt to let that grow in the individual and govern his nature, grow in the collective life and govern its formations. Or it would place the development and organization of the mental life of man as the primary consideration and life and society as a convenience for this true aim of human existence. A new civilization no longer vitalistic or mainly political and economic, but intellectual, cultural, idealistic, taking up the ancient ideal of man, the perfected mental being in an ennobled life and sound body, a great expansion of human mind and intellect, a mankind more mentally alive, even a human race grown capable of culture and not only of a greater external civilization, thus fulfilling on a large human and universal scale the tendencies which in the past appeared only in a few favored countries and epochs and even then imperfectly and mostly in a cultured class, might be the consequence of this change. That prospect has its attractions, and for the humanist and the intellectual it is in one form another their utopia of the future. But this would not really carry the human evolution farther; it would only give it for a time a larger, finer and freer movement in its widest attainable circle. If the mentality remained too pragmatic, too eager to rationalize or organise life according to the idea, the peril of mechanisation and standardization would be there. If the mental ideas governing the individual and social life took a settled form, became a cultural system of the mind, this system would after a time exhaust its possibilities and human life would settle down into a groove, satisfied and non-evolutive, as happened in the Graeco-Roman world or in China or elsewhere where the mental intellect became the predominant power of life. If this arrest were avoided either by the multiplication of different cultures – different peoples acting upon each other but escaping the tendency to replication and standardization which is the tendency of the human collective mind or by a free progressiveness of the human intelligence making constantly new ideas, new ideals, still the movement would eventually be in a circle or an ellipsis which could be a constant description of a new-old movement in the same field. In fact our external mind moving on the surface tends always to exhaust itself rapidly; if it expends

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itself slowly, conservatively, at a leisure pace, it can create a civilization and culture which will last for centuries or even for one or more thousands of years; but that too will exhaust itself in time; if it throws itself into a brilliant or rapid movement as in ancient Greece or in modern Europe a few centuries are likely to see the end of this flaming up as of a new star. Afterwards there must be stagnation, decline and a renewal of the mental circle. This is because mind and thought are not the sovereign principle or highest term of our existence; mind and thought therefore can to a certain extent fulfill themselves, but they cannot fulfill life nor can they give to man his complete self. Mind is an instrument, not the self of man; nor the complete reality or highest reality of his being. It is a mediator between the being and life; it seeks to know truth of being and truth of life and bring them together. Truth of idea therefore is effective only so far as it can interpret truth of spirit and truth of life, it has itself no essential existence; when it erects itself as a mental abstraction, it has no reality and no effective power; it is only an index, a figure. It can become effective only by taking up life and catching hold of some vital force to effectuate it, but usually it ends by[…], exhausting or stereotyping and sterilizing the forces it uses; or it can become effective only when it canalises and brings out into action of mind and life an inner truth of being, a truth of spirit and it is then powerful only so long as it replenishes itself from its spiritual source and so keep itself true and alive. (Sri Aurobindo 1997: 415–417; italics added)

In the above passages, Sri Aurobindo deals with important themes with regard to the work of pragmatism and mind what he calls “pragmatic mentalism.” For Sri Aurobindo, even a “subjective pragmatic mentalism” working more subtly on life and “seeking for truth of being” is not enough unless it realizes that “mind and thought are not the sovereign principle or highest term of our existence.” Our journey with action, thinking, pragmatism, mind and consciousness has to bring out “an inner truth of being, a truth of spirit.” This inner truth has to be understood and realized going beyond the linguistic and conventional boundaries between the outer and the inner and spirit and matter, body and mind, and mind and spirit and as part of unfolding non-dual realizations of relationships. Consciousness also refers to dynamic movements of establishing and weaving threads of relationships across and is not bound to any of the fixed terms of dualism such as body and mind, mind and spirit (Ingold 1986). Our book, Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity, deals with a new pragmatics of consciousness work which simultaneously deals with body, mind, spirit,

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and action in new ways. It also involves new visions and practices of consciousness meditation. It also involves rethinking and transforming freedom and solidarity involving both freedom of being and spirit of interbeing together. As Sri Aurobindo writes in the following epochal lines in his epic Savitri: A lonely freedom cannot satisfy A heart that has grown one with every heart: I am a deputy of the aspiring world, My spirit’s liberty I ask for all.

With this prelude and continuing the journey with our book, it begins with Part One of the book, “Pragmatism and Spirituality: Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity.” This begins with Nishant Alphonse Irudayadason’s essay, “Pragmatism and Belief” in which Irudayadason discusses the many sided relationship between pragmatism and belief including religious belief. Irudayadason discusses the significance of Kant in being open both to belief beyond scientific verification as well as being interested in putting belief to creative use and practice. Irudayadason then discusses the works of classical pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey and contemporary pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Irudayadason tells us how pragmatist thinkers help us “approach belief as a choice of existence, the concept of God as an ideal social value, and the analysis of religious experience in psychological terms” but this does not mean that “they renounce all forms of transcendence.” For Irudayadason, the significance of pragmatism and belief lies in the fact that the conventional transcendence in the field of religion is realized as a “human transcendence, situated on the moral, psychological, sociological level.” Irudayadason’s essay is followed by Robert McDermott’s essay, “Pragmatism, Consciousness and Spirituality: William James and Rudolf Steiner” in which McDermott discuses approaches of William James and Rudolf Steiner with regard to methods of understanding religious and mystical experience as well as consciousness. McDermott tells us how James and Steiner shared “a critique of belief as a way to overcome the limits on religious knowledge set by science and naturalistic philosophy.” For McDermott, “Their case, again in different terms, rested on privileged, and highly transformative, experience, not on a belief system oblivious to the demands for validation and discernible positive effects. James sought evidence for the source of religious experience, for

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the ‘Something More’ to which large segments of the human community—some quite demonstrably— have access, and Steiner looked to the tradition of mystics, gnostics, and theosophists as evidence on behalf of the case for knowledge of the spiritual world.” McDermott also tells us how Steiner’s vantage point differs sharply from James’s in three important respects: (I) James wrote typically as an observer, whereas Steiner wrote as one who regards his experience as authoritative, although Steiner did not intend the results of his spiritual scientific research to be considered infallible; (2) the evolution of consciousness informs all of Steiner’s philosophic and esoteric descriptions, whereas James, despite his acceptance of Darwinian evolution, paid little attention to the evolution of consciousness as an interpretive category; and (3) both James and Steiner are thoroughgoing empiricists with an eye to the consequences of experience, but Steiner’s empiricism is better described as transformational than as pragmatic.

In his pragmatism and approaches to religious experience, James valued the significance of experience and he was open to experiences beyond the known empirical and sensible means. But James did not develop the spiritual discipline of opening oneself to realms of experiences beyond the sensible and the empirical thus deepening the project of deep and radical empiricism that Jamesian pragmatism sought to realize. Steiner did not consider his experiences born of spiritual discipline as infallible and here what McDermott writes deserves our careful consideration for our project of cultivating new pathways of pragmatism, consciousness and spirituality: Steiner acknowledges the limits of his knowledge concerning the process of transformation in individual cases, but the intent of his spiritual scientific method is to penetrate such mysteries, beginning with one’s own experience. Such knowledge, of course, requires disciplined effort, or spiritual practice. What would seem to be missing in James’s work is precisely such a practice that might have enabled him to see deeper into the subjects who so intrigued him and on whose transformative experiences he tried to build a genuinely radical empiricism, that is, a philosophy that grants primacy to individual experience. It might be time to supplement, and perhaps transform, James’s philosophical and religious insights by means of the kind of spiritual discipline that Steiner exemplified and explained.

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McDermott’s essay is followed by Sarah Louise Gates’ essay, “Pragmatic Non-Duality in William James, Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda and Trika Shaivism” which cultivates creative dialogues between pragmatism and Indic philosophical and spiritual traditions. Gates explores the vision and practice of non-duality what she calls pragmatic non-duality in William James, Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda and Trika Shaivism. Gates tells us that “Rather than dwelling on absolutes, [..] Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda agrees in practice, if not overarching methodology, with James, that binary choices between absolute unity or absolute plurality can not of themselves, in theory, make of us good people or shift humanity toward any kind of substantial ‘betterment’.” Gates also tells us: “In spiritual life, there is a need to bear in mind the absolute toward which the yogi aims, without losing sight of the part, the individual self, and its continuity with other parts, which make up systems. The cultivation of self toward the higher Self, means integrating into the scope of practical application, matters we may not initially be able to fully expand upon with empirical evidence or reason due to the subjectivity of experience. That there is a higher Self, an aspect beyond the limited ego, might be accepted as a matter of faith until there is evidence to the contrary. In doing so, Karma Yoga is one of many yogic paths transforming ordinary activities to increase meritorious action by concern, not only for things we can see, but with awareness that we cannot see all things, nor can we know the degree to which our actions will contribute to the destiny of humanity.” Here Trika Saivism challenges us to realize our internal bondage and for realization of creative practice in pragmatism we need to overcome our internal bondage. As Gates writes: “Spiritually, if persons are internally bound, they cannot fully unfold as beings, and must be perpetually shaped by outer forces into becoming what culture demands of them. [..] Knowing in Advaita Ved¯anta and Trika demands ‘seeing’ directly, as insight, in the same way as the ‘seeing’ thread that James imagines unifies the entire universe. In aligning with that universal vision, the identity trappings that govern our actions are cast off to reveal that the same self that sees through our own eyes, also sees through those of others. And serving others is, in this way, also serves our-selves both toward and following liberation. In this way the parts are harmonised with the whole in non-linear ways, with openended outcomes, where rewards and failings are viewed concurrently and evenly, where maximising pleasure and minimising pain for oneself, cease to be the primary agenda.”

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Gates’ essay is followed by Justin M. Hewitson’s essay, “Peterson vs. Žižek on the Evolution of Consciousness and Happiness: From Pragmatism to Sarkar’s Tantra.” This chapter insightfully deepens and broadens our engagement with pragmatism and spirituality by bringing new contemporary interlocutors to our field such as psychologist Jordan B. Peterson and philosopher Slavoj Žižek. Hewitson begins with a discussion of their perspectives on the nature of happiness. Hewitson first details how the capitalist and Marxist framework of the discussion is transformed by Peterson and Žižek’s ultimate critique of Christian religious and Indian spiritual approaches to happiness. By examining the influences of William James’s pragmatism on Peterson and Žižek’s engagement with the biblical fall of consciousness, Hewitson shows how both thinkers’ appraisal of the duality inherent in Christian ideology and ontology makes permanent happiness beyond the scope of human realization. He then examines Žižek’s Marxist concerns with the negative effects of Indian mysticism presented in the Bhagavad Git¯ a as contrasted with the Indian philosopher P. R. Sarkar’s Tantric exegeses of the classic spiritual text and presents a spiritual account of happiness that arises from pragmatic approaches to understanding consciousness. Here, Hewitson simplifies complex Tantric and Vedic accounts of permanent happiness as the realization of consciousness of Oneness that arises through profound meditative states. It is fitting that Hewitson’s essay is followed by Ramesh Chandra Pradhan’s essay, “Spirituality, Pragmatism, Vedanta and Universal Consciousness: A Study of the Philosophy of R. Balasubramanian,” which also continues the dialogue between pragmatism and Indian philosophical and spiritual traditions. In his essay, Pradhan makes creative dialogues between pragmatism and Vedanta especially as it has been nurtured by R. Balasubramanian, a philosopher from contemporary India. Pradhan discusses the nature of spirituality and pragmatism in the philosophy of Professor R. Balasubramanian (in short, RB). For Pradhan, “RB [is] the greatest Advaitin of our times who not only commented on many Advaita texts, but also outlined in an original way the Advaitic philosophy of man and the world. RB championed the spiritual view of man and the world as he believed not only that man is a spiritual being but also that the world itself is ultimately spiritual in nature.” RB strives to make bridges between the empirical and the transcendental and cultivates pathways of integral spiritualism which helps us in our journey of cultivating creative border

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crossing between pragmatism and spirituality. To understand this the following thought of S. Radhakrishnan, the deep philosopher of our times who also draws upon Vedantic sources are helpful: “Spiritual values are realized on Earth through the empirical means of family love and friendship which blossom in loyalty and reverence” (Radhakrishnan quoted in Anand 2016: 12). Pradhan’s essay is followed by Subhash Sharma’s essay, “A Quantum Bridge Between Science and Spirituality: Towards A New Geometry of Consciousness,” which also continues dialogue between pragmatism and Indic thought and spiritual traditions. In this essay, Sharma argues that broadly there are two approaches to consciousness viz. Scientific and Spiritual. In scientific approach, consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter. This can be referred to as matter route to consciousness. In spiritual route, consciousness is an infused phenomenon wherein matter is infused with spirit. In scientific approach, consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter. This can be referred to as matter route to consciousness. In spiritual route, consciousness is an infused phenomenon wherein matter is infused with spirit. Now there is a need to combine the two approaches to consciousness. This can be done by building a quantum bridge between science and spirituality and border crossing between pragmatism and spirituality can facilitate this. Sharma’s essay is followed by Meera Chakraborty’s essay, “Freedom, Spiritual Praxis and Categorical Imperative.” In her essay, Chakroborty discusses paths of freedom and spiritual practice with a focus on the vision and the works of the mystics who challenge human beings to experience the rich tapestry of human experience including the supra-rational mystical dimensions of life and reality. The mystics have shown that when they offer their rich experiences subsuming these within the versatile activities of people aimed at freedom it can help people find a way out of their conflicts through the practice of spiritual praxis. This way mystics make people aware of their original freedom, a prerogative, they believed, inherent in human beings though they are not aware of this and therefore surrender it willingly as they are indecisive about life’s priority of cherishing freedom. What appears to have evolved from the practice of spiritual praxis is a transforming process by which people from any strata could be empowered to achieve the freedom in order to evolve meaningfully. This is not to say that this is an abstract theorization of an imagined behavior. The very practice by mystics such as Chaitanya, Ramakrishna and others involving themselves against the traditional caste equations and similar discriminations was from the premise that all are born equal and since in God’s

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kingdom there are no such things as caste, class and other barriers it is the prerogative of everyone to be included in all activities of life. Chakraborty’s essay is followed by John Clammer’s who in his essay “Spiritual Pragmatism and an Economics of Solidarity” explores limits of mainstream of economic thinking and practice and discusses the vision and practice of solidarity economics. He also explores different aspects of spiritual economics. Here what Clammer writes deserves our careful consideration: A “spiritual economics” points us in several essential directions at once: undermining the psychological assumptions of the dominant economic model, recognizing the multi-dimensionality of human beings as social, spiritual, aesthetic, moral, erotic, and cultural beings as well as economic ones driven by narrowly materialistic motives, and recognizing that an ideal economy is one that is entirely ecologically responsible and caring while promoting conviviality, mutual affection and encouraging the cultivation of what a generation ago Herbert Marcuse called the “education of desire” along lines that are not only congruent with the preservation of our beautiful planet, but which encourage fraternity not competition and point us collectively towards fuller conception of our human potential. A just, psychically, spiritually and ecologically sound economy is an essential prerequisite of any such move towards a new society and must be the space in which our social imagination is given full rein to devise forms of life that enhance and do not diminish the total quality of life for all beings, human or otherwise, who co-inhabit this Earth.

It is quite fitting that Clammer’s essay on economics of solidarity is followed by Julie M. Geredien’s essay on pragmatism and solidarity. Solidarity is at the heart of vision and practice of pragmatism as Richard Rorty suggests and as Vattimo (2011) argues that solidarity needs to be accompanied by caritas-mercy and charity. Julie M. Geredien’s essay embodies both the concerns. She also tells us how organizations within civic society such as LiKEN in Appalachia, USA and FUNDAEC in rural Colombia are building solidarity and countering the space-time frames of global capitalism by engaging in spiritual pragmatism. For Geredien, “both organizations cultivate fluency in their work addressing human needs and the real-world consequences of human actions.” Geredien also discusses and analyzes “the creative tension that exists between structure and agency” and makes “a beginning theoretical account of how social entities, like LiKEN and

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FUNDAEC, address problematic power complexes and global contradictions.” Geredien outlines a mode of development in which “different publics may likewise recognize their ability: to interact with the causal powers within structure and agency, and to manifest the virtue of intellectual solidarity.” In our contemporary worlds of brokenness, fragility and isolation especially on the wake of the recent and ongoing COVID pandemic, this focus on solidarity across boundaries especially intellectual solidarity involving the knowing publics and those who are in need has an urgent need and an epochal salience now. With these, we come to the second and final Part of our book “Pragmatism and Spirituality: Reconstructing Language, Self and the World.” This begins with Mikael Stamm’s insightful essay, “Pragmatic Metaphysics: Language as a Battlefield Between Truth and Darkness.” This ´ attempts to interpret a central text of the South Indian Saiva Siddh¯anta through a kind of linguistic Gnosticism. In this cross-cultural experiment, Stamm views the force of darkness, ¯ an.avamala, as an existential hardening in which we perceive ourselves and our environment as utilities. But still, he claims, our fundamental openness is expressed in a continual strife or contradictions in our understanding implemented in the configuration of our language. And furthermore, that this configuration reveals fragments of the Absolute present in us, emerging through the connection between materiality and ideality. Thus, Stamm concludes, this points toward a pragmatic or material spirituality, redefining what we really are, as opposed to what we think we are. Stamm’s essay is followed by a related but different engagement with spirituality and pragmatism in Rafaela Campos de Carvalho’s essay, “Monistic Elements in LeviStrauss’s Structuralism: New Pathways of Consciousness, Pragmatism and Solidarity.” In her essay, Campos de Carvalho discusses the structuralist engagement of Levi-Strauss which is concerned with discovering patterns of unity and analogy between nature and culture. Campos de Carvalho finds similarity between such as structuralism and spiritual practices and philosophies such as Tantra from India. Campos de Carvalho essay is followed by Johannes Heinrichs’ essay, “Action, Language, Art and Mysticism As Reflection-Levels of an Alternative Semiotics and the Spiritual Perspective of a Value-Levels-Democracy,” which explores the challenges of action, language, art, mysticism and democracy. It engages with semiotics, pragmatism and systems theory. His insights emerge from his reflection-system-theory comprising as well of society as well as of individual activities. The notion of an inner, ontological or constitutive

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reflection is what was lacking in Parsons’ at his time famous theory of social systems. Therefore in the early seventies, there was a break and fight between individual action-theory and theory of social systems, represented mainly by Jurgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, respectively. Heinrichs claims to have overcome this gap by deepening the epistemological reflection theory of Kant and German idealism to a constitutive and ontological reflection, already intended, but not yet clearly developed by Hegel whose dialectic was not yet a dialogical one. From the individual point of view, the ontological levels of reflection are “pragmatic” in form of action, language, art and mysticism. From the intersubjective (collective) point of view, the social reflection shapes subsystems of society the insight of which results in a new model of a value-levels-democracy, including very practical postulates. Heinrich’s essay is followed by Benedetta Zaccarello’s, “Paul Valéry ‘Mystique sans Dieu/: writing as a spiritual practice?” in which Zaccarello discusses the life and work Paul Valery, the great French poet, and its implication for rethinking spirituality and pragmatism. Zaccarello discusses his work Notebooks which emerged from Valery’s early morning writing everyday before sunrise for more than fifty years (1871–1945). From such daily exercises of love and labor, Valery had produced some tens of thousands of pages and though he did not want to publish these he considered this work the most important part of his legacy. Zaccarello discusses how such writing is simultaneously literary, philosophical and spiritual. Writing here combines practice and spirituality in a creative way embodying a unique form of spiritual pragmatism. For Zaccarello, the goal of such writing practice was to “enhance selfawareness in the writing and thinking subject and to formulate a language suitable for the translation of consciousness into words.” As Zaccarello tells us: “Beside quoting and questioning authors and practices belonging to the Western spiritual tradition, Valéry often describes himself as the ‘mystique sans Dieu’, revealing in this way a surprising interest for spirituality, given his skeptical, analytical and phenomenological approach. Transcending the individual self is a crucial goal of Valéry’s philosophical and literary aim, and in this goal ‘spirituality’, philosophy and even literature seem to converge from the point of view of the French poet and thinker.” It is quite appropriate and fitting that Zaccarello’s engagement with Valery is followed by Vinod Balakrishnan and Shintu Dennis’ essay on another great literary and spiritual seeker O. V. Vijayan whose literary work embodies deep spiritual quest. The essay by Balakrishnan

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and Dennis “Spirituality of Action” examines the surface in relation to the depth in their reading of William James together with the Malayalam writer, O. V. Vijayan. There is a definite sympathy in James for eastern philosophy and its spiritual way of life which is not visible on the surface. The fictional universe of O. V. Vijayan has pragmatic depths which, on the surface, appears to be the simple spiritualism of the quotidian. The authors invite us to walk and meditate with James and Vijayan as exemplars of a shared space called spiritual pragmatism. Balakrishnan and Dennis’s essay is followed by Nirmal Selvamony’s essay, “Is Homing Spiritual Praxis?” which explores the relationship among homing as coming home and pragmatism and spirituality. Selvamony argues that homing is the ultimate human praxis which is not exclusively spiritual. It is at once sacro-naturo-human and he presents the idea of tin.ai from Tamil cultural, philosophical and spiritual traditions where it embodies love-based kin relation of all the three members of home, namely, humans, nature and supernature. Reinterpreting home in light of the theory of tin.ai in tolk¯ appiyam, the most ancient grammatical treatise in the world, Selvamony shows how human praxis which privileges one of the three members of tin.ai (to the exclusion of the others) disrupts the love-based kin relation among the three members of home. If spiritual praxis, which consists in questing after truth, entails abandonment of home or exhoming, nature-centered praxis such as biological invasion, and exclusive human enterprises like state formation, development and colonialism result in dehoming. The urgent need, in Selvamony’s view, is homing, which will effectively counter the impact of the state societies we live in and usher in the holistic home or tin.ai. Homing also becomes an act of spiritual pragmatism. Selvamony’s essay is followed by Ranjan Kumar Panda’s who in his essay, “Performative as the Language of Pragmatism: A Reading of Indian Spirituality,” delves into the normativity of philosophical dialogues and conversations to show that spirituality is one of the central themes of Indian philosophy. The chapter opens up with a dialogue between Y¯ajñavalkya and his wife Maitreyi from Brihad¯ aranyaka Upanishad to draw a difference between the materiality of life and the spirituality of life. A spiritual seeker must be contemplative and critical for developing a sense of self -knowledge. The self is not just a source of action, but also a source of articulation of knowledge. The author in this connection refers to dualism embedded in the very nature of knowing —is an act itself and logically connected to the knower. The basic urge here is to grasp

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this logical relation (dharma) to understand the immortality of the self. The self is identified through the act of addressing. The identification is construed non-descriptively, though the conversational relationship which itself is descriptive and dialogical. The language of spirituality transcends the realm of the dialogical. In this regard, the cultivation of contemplative spiritual thinking and practice—sadhana is a prima facie condition of knowing oneself—atmajnana. The author highlights that there is a culture of spirituality and it is well reflected in the contemporary Indian philosophers like S. Radhakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, et al. who have critiqued the language of spirituality and have shown the future of humanity needs to cultivate the spirituality for collective wellbeing. In his subsequent and the final essay to the volume, Ananta Kumar Giri explores the challenge of rethinking an important language of religion and politics, i.e., the language of Kingdom of God. In his essay, “Gardens of God: Spiritual Pragmatism and Transformation of Religion, Politics, Self and Society,” Giri tries to rethink and reconstitute the language of God and cultivate and generate a language and relationship of Garden of God animated by visions and practices of mutual love, labor and care in gardening our lives together rather than being preoccupied with rules and regulations and using the name of God to justify unjust powers in self, culture, society and history. Giri explores the transformation of religion, politics, pragmatism and spirituality implicated in this journey from Kingdom of God to Gardens of God. Thus, our book explores different dimensions of works of consciousness, freedom and solidarity which hopefully can help us in cultivating new and creative pathways of spiritual pragmatism to come to terms with our contemporary challenges of crises such as Corona virus and the rise of nationalistic jingoism and xenophobia. Spiritual pragmatism can help us listen to each other including our fear and anger and cultivate new pathways of consciousness, freedom and solidarity. Spiritual pragmatism can help us become apostles of ears rather than apostles of fear. Here we can conclude provisionally with this poem as an invitation for new adventures of relationship and consciousness: Apostle of Ears Apostasy Apostle of Fear Where are Apostles of Ears? Marching in the Name of Kingdom of God On the Way

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Sacrificing Innocents as Lambs Where are your tears? Where are your Ears? (Giri forthcoming)

References Giri, A. K. (forthcoming). Alphabets of Creation: Taking God to Bed. Delhi: Studera Press. Vattimo, G. (2011). A Farewell to Truth. New York: Columbia U. Press.

PART I

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity

CHAPTER 2

Pragmatism and Belief Nishant Alphonse Irudayadason

Introduction We intend to explore the relationships between pragmatism and religion, and more specifically religious belief. In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1998), Kant makes a point that is doubly surprising. On the one hand, he highlights the limits of what we can know while the thinkers of Enlightenment adulate the idea of an infinitely expanding knowledge. On the other hand, he values a certain use of belief in a period that was exposed to the risk of fanaticism and obscurantism. According to Kant, we need to believe because we cannot be satisfied with the finite, limited and measurable phenomena quantified by science. We yearn for the unlimited and that is the underlying reason for belief. Under certain conditions, belief even turns out what Kant calls the regulatory use of the ideas of reason. Our belief can regulate our effort to know, to live and to progress. However, we should not confuse belief with knowledge. To believe is to believe in a possibility, not in a demonstrated reality. We need to believe so that we can see beyond the limits of what is known or proved. From this perspective, belief manifests an intellectual curiosity which is helpful to gain knowledge. Hence the famous claim of Kant that

N. A. Irudayadason (B) Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_2

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he had to restrict knowledge to make for belief. We may also add that making room for belief is necessary because it can open new avenues to knowledge and life. It is difficult to establish a perfectly homogeneous pragmatist doctrine of belief, but we will give a general overview on the thought of the main pragmatist philosophers. Born in the end of the nineteenth century in the United States, pragmatism is a deeply humanist philosophical current. From the Greek pragmata which designates human affairs and more generally action, its epistemology places human considerations at the center, and belief— whether religious or not—plays an important role in it. William James even wrote in The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (1902) that pragmatism is the best attitude toward religion. He strongly opposed idealism, which shows excessive abstraction, distancing us from the concrete real that we can experience in natural sciences. The abstract concepts are empty thoughts because they mean nothing and do nothing useful for a good living. The resolutely empirical pragmatist approach studies religion in the light of experience and action, and the various authors of the pragmatist movement have offered an insightful response. This criticism of dominant philosophy of idealism echoes the development of technical and scientific means. In natural sciences, the real is atomized; reality is fragmented into the infinitely small. Pragmatists draw inspiration from these discoveries in their theory advocating pluralism in which each part of the real is linked to a whole. We also observe the development of statistical methods, the idea of plurality of causes and the intervention of chance. Focusing less on knowledge and more on belief or hypothesis challenges scientism, agnosticism and determinism. Against these theses, pragmatists defend an indeterminate universe and an epistemology which no longer opposes belief and knowledge. In particular, the theory of evolution and Darwinism permeates the pragmatist current. This theory challenges the notion of finality, especially that of metaphysical determinism by observing small variations of organisms that adapt to their environment. The pragmatists make a particular reading of this scientific theory, which can reduce the magnitude of the opposition between religious belief and scientific knowledge. From the point of view of humanities and social sciences, these scientific and technical advances have favored the emergence of humanism: the confidence of human being in his or her own means of action, his or her power to act, thus creating a scope for human freedom and emphasizing

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effective useful action. It is from this perspective that pragmatism can be seen as a committed movement that contributes to the moral progress of humanity. It also challenges the negative side of technical and economic progress, which include problems like consumerist materialism and social misery to which pragmatism tries to give an answer. Finally, pragmatism especially as developed by James contributed to the development of a new science called experimental psychology. It is an attempt at discovering how the human person apprehends his or her environment and interacts with it. Having experience both as the starting point and the end result, religion is also viewed from the empirical point of view to show how our beliefs are shaped by our experience. Pragmatists go beyond empiricists like John Stuart Mill, David Hume and John Locke, whose thinking is steeped in intellectualism. Empiricists apprehend mental states as cognitive elements that do not take into account the biological aspects of the human person. In light of evolutionary theories, pragmatism takes into account human experience coupled with physical and social environment. This renews the classical question of the relationship between science and faith within a new epistemological paradigm. Historically, there are three periods of pragmatism: classical pragmatism (1871–1925) embodied by Charles Senders Peirce, William James (both members of the Cambridge “Metaphysical Club”) and later John Dewey. Then in the 1930s, the movement experienced a certain setback in the face of the emergence of logical positivism and the development of analytical philosophy which it finally incorporated from the 1960s. Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam are the most famous representatives of contemporary pragmatism in its analytical version, and their rereading of classical pragmatism allows them to take a certain distance from analytical philosophy and logical positivism.

The Pioneers of Pragmatism Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) published two articles: “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). Peirce defends the pragmatist maxim: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce 1878, CP 5.402). A concept is form of knowledge which is not scientific or at least not yet scientific. The

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meaning of a concept is measured by its effects. Thus, pragmatism deals more with clarifying the meaning of concepts than determining their truth. Pragmatism also recognizes the existence of a connection between rational knowledge and rational end—which is practical and ethical—of the human person, and the need to act as if there was a possible harmony between our goals and the world. The validity of beliefs, whether religious or not, is thus to be measured by their effects which involve the conduct of the human person, from moral, religious, political points of view. To correctly establish a belief, it is necessary not only to measure its effects but also to compare it with other points of view, which constitute a “community of researchers”. This pragmatist test makes it possible to review beliefs, in particular, religious beliefs, and to question their viability. Among the few writings of Peirce on religion, his essay “Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God” (1906), in response to Hume’s question on belief in a supreme being in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, attempts to clarify the meaning of the concept which God. His last article “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908) deals with the concepts of Reality (reality of God in particular) and Experience, and finally exposes his position as “pragmaticism,” which he distinguishes from the term pragmatism employed by Giovanni Papini and William James. William James (1842–1910) took turns opposing scientism, agnosticism of his time, and also the intellectualism of theology, without opposing faith and science. He put forward the study of religion in a particular way, which was also the starting point for a theory of truth. Indeed, the question of justification of religious beliefs is linked to the origins of his pragmatism. In the 1898 Gifford Lecture “Philosophical Principles and Practical Results” (during which James professes for the first time his principle of pragmatism), he poses a link between the truth of belief in God and the functional value of religious experiences. In The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), James approaches religion in an unprecedented way, starting not from the dogmatic content of instituted religions, but from individual religious experiences, in particular mystical ones, as a set of physical and psychological sensations interpreted as the index of presence of the divine. James intends to defend the value (in the sense of validity and legitimacy) of religious ideas not by a priori reasoning of theological type, which would be sterile, or by a materialist psychological description, which would be reductionist, but by the effects

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that religious beliefs produce in the life of an individual, which in turn cause other beliefs. While speaking of religious experience, James insists on the intentional aspect of consciousness to rediscover the constructive activity of consciousness vis-à-vis the given, as an expression of our fundamental interests, and therefore the empirical basis of our thought reaches its final and ethical basis without commenting on the nature of the object thus given. In The Will to Believe (1897), James puts forward the reasonableness of religious beliefs with regard to life choices. For James, a concept has no meaning; one can attribute to it the predicate of “truth” only if it has practical consequences. In the case of religious or moral beliefs, the concept is true only if its practical consequences are good, as long as they satisfy the moral and emotional requirements necessary for action. More generally, James notes the fact that to have meaning for their actions, human beings need to believe that the world shows consistency in order. Believing in a supernatural order would make the natural order within which it acts intelligible, and belief in the immortality of soul or in the existence of a benevolent God offers hope and gives moral energy to face hardship. Pragmatism was criticized as moral and epistemological relativism. In fact, it does not renounce the concept of objectivism, which must be revisited as a pluralist ideal and can be associated with democratic values defended by James. The pragmatist justification of the truth of religious beliefs appeared in 1898 is an alternative theory to the theory of the idealist of the absolute of Josiah Royce. It is based on empirical experiences as facts, while leaving aside the question of determining the object of experience. However, the question of truth itself does not disappear in James when he measures the relationship between the truth of belief in God and the functional value of this belief, thereby referring to the pragmatism of Peirce. It is the causal link between the concept of the object of belief and what it produces (its consequences) in practice. In A Pluralist Universe (1909), James concludes with a form of self-transcendence of experience, notably religious, maintaining a possible continuity with a wider experience, thus creating a form of identity. Experience is therefore never an isolated fact of consciousness, but contributes well to a continuity of experiences as underlined by Romain Mollard. This theory of belief and truth has won James a famous controversy with the mathematician and philosopher William Clifford, analyzed by Benoit Gaultier explains how Clifford was misunderstood by James in the

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debate. This controversy highlights the morally problematic nature of the pragmatist justification of beliefs, the aim of which is not so much to reach the truth as to satisfy our needs and desires, or even the confusion between what we believe to be true and what we desire to be true (wishful thinking). Aiming for a sure truth as the goal of belief seems rigorous, useless and futile for the pragmatist, especially in matters of religious beliefs, the truth of which is not clearly established, but whose moral benefits are particularly high. What we must understand in Clifford, from the point of view of an ethics of belief, is that we have the duty to investigate our beliefs, not to let gullibility settle as bad intellectual and moral habit, which is all the more necessary in the case of religious beliefs, by virtue of the same qualities like desirability and unsure truth that James attributes to them. On the subject of truth arises the question of subjectivation of beliefs and their relevance as representations of reality. Christophe Bouriau (2016) clarifies this point by contrasting the theological factionalism of Hans Vaihinger with the religious pragmatism of William James though the former is often wrongly regarded as a simple variant of the latter. Vaihinger draws on certain ideas from his thesis director Friedrich Albert Lange, who distinguishes two types of truth: scientific truth which is universally valid, and religious truth specific to a community or an individual level. Lange believes that the religious idea experienced as emotionally intense and stimulating for action can be declared true (1866). This does not mean that emotion proves truth, but that a believer, convinced by his or her emotions, is justified in presenting his beliefs as true publicly; the criteria of logical coherence and empirical verification are relevant only for scientific truths. Truth and practicality of a belief are two separate concepts for Vaihinger, unlike James. To act as if God existed is to act according to the values that the idea of God conveys regardless of its practicality. As Bouriau notes, we find cases of beliefs today whose faith is not dictated by adherence to a dogma, but characterized by a specific kind of attitude toward existence. John Dewey (1859–1952) is more involved in secular dynamics than his predecessors. He exerted a lasting influence on American thought, in philosophy but also in politics and education. Contemporary pragmatist thinkers like Richard Rorty would resume his work. The development of science has undermined the traditional metaphysical concepts of the great religions, such as the idea of Creation, biblical characters in their historical reality, or the existence of life after death. Educated people are

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at the risk of abandoning religion and its supernatural categories which have become obsolete. Dewey proposes a secularized recasting of religion, that is in terms of values and not of metaphysical speculation. For example, the word God no longer refers to a transcendent being but to the unity of ideal ends which provoke desire and action, the ideal taking root in concrete facts of life. Dewey brings together the values of Christianity with those of democracy, including altruism and solidarity that they have in common. Religion would then be an expression of the social relations of the community, a symbolic form of the worldview of individuals. It is therefore a means of bringing a community together around some ideals. In his conception of democracy, freedom of dialogue gives way to a plurality of points of view; and religious belief is a private thought of the believer who is free to engage in dialogue with other points of view. Dewey’s approach, however, is not a psychological or physiological explanation of religion, but an affirmation of religious experience as a general attitude to existence. The value of a religious experience is defined according to its consequences: what it does in life to better accommodate to conditions of life. Dewey’s project is therefore to naturalize religion, to humanize it completely, to bring it back to earth, to make it a natural fact as a component of human experience. The goal is to ensure that it reaches its fullness in individual and social dimensions. Thanks to modernity, the challenge is to remedy a form of secularist devaluation of religion as a remnant of obscurantism. Dewey’s thought can be useful in this case because he wishes to secularize religion while at the same time integrates a form of religious faith into this secularism. In this sense, it is a question of reassessing religious semantics, profane contents of truth such as values like solidarity which one finds in the practices of communities of faith. Dewey also takes up the moral dimension in religion, more precisely its commitment to moral ideals. For Dewey, what is religious is not its institutional aspect which he consistently criticizes. Indeed, Dewey was also openly hostile to the established religion, which he perceived as an obstacle to the moral progress of humanity and to the development of democracy. Religions have produced attitudes contrary to the ones required for maintaining democracy (Dewey 1939). All religions are suspect as soon as they are based on supernaturalism and show hostility toward the method of investigation. Pragmatism makes it possible to refuse dogmatism which consists in locating truths beyond doubt because of faith in a supernatural authority, which results in the depreciation of knowledge (Stavo-Debauge 2018).

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Contemporary Pragmatism Representatives of contemporary pragmatism are marked by the “linguistic turn” in the 1950s. This school of thought is essentially characterized by analysis of language. Philosophical inquiry becomes inseparable from the study of public language, logical and linguistic structures whose intersubjective dimension occupies a predominant place. Philosophy is no longer a reflection on the relation between the subject and the object. Epistemology is no longer the study of the structure of knowledge. The representative philosophers of this movement are the Wittgenstein, Russell, GE Moore, Frege, Carnap to name only a few. It is also difficult to propose a unified doctrine for this movement. We can however identify certain theses for their innovative character. According to these theories, the notion of truth as an adequation between the knowing mind and known reality gives way to the notion of truth as an assertion within an articulated and coherent language, and as an experience of the world. Part of what is called contemporary analytical philosophy is the continuity of this linguistic turn that redefines a possible agreement between our ideas and reality. Contemporary pragmatism is mainly represented by Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Insofar as pragmatism has been influenced by the linguistic turn, the study of religion requires an analysis of religious language, as a Wittgensteinian “language game,” but always in light of the action of the individual. The central notions which pragmatism emphasizes today are those of plurality and intersubjectivity, from an antifoundationalist perspective which would consist in basing truth solely on certain and definitive beliefs. For Richard Rorty (1999), the criteria for justifying our beliefs are no longer epistemological but anthropological and political. Religions are presented as different languages that express the same idea. Pluralism of perspectives offers us the freedom to choose between several systems of religious, moral or political beliefs from a democratic perspective, while remaining in our private sphere. Together with the pioneers of the movement, he holds that admitting a true belief, whether religious or not, is admitting that its consequences make a real difference in practice (it has meaning), and also admitting that it could guide us in the most effective way possible to our goals.

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According to Putnam in his Reason, Truth and History (1981), the issue is not to prove that everything is equal, but only to reconcile objectivity and subjectivity, to replace the point of view of God. Objectivity is relative to a community and history. In this perspective, philosophical pragmatism is associated with the empirical study of religions.

Some Concluding Thoughts In light of the above discussion, we can appreciate the significance of pragmatism for understanding religion, religious beliefs and beliefs in general. Pragmatism is particularly relevant for thinking about our religious contemporaneity. An understanding of religion as a phenomenon cannot ignore a study of the practices of modern or post-modern believers who now choose freely what they believe in, according to their personal trajectory. The pluralism of values, the subjectivation of beliefs and religious experience as benchmarks for thinking about the authenticity of religion have aroused renewed interest in the works of James or Dewey. Sociology of religion made it possible to use philosophical concepts to describe, understand and explain—not to evaluate—individual experience of religion. In connection to the hermeneutics of religious belief, which lays emphasis on the notion of meaning, it is important to recall Michel de Certeau who centers the analysis of belief on the act of faith situated in a language game. Sociological studies will retain the importance of this aspect of religion as a belief in action. More than a philosophical movement, pragmatism is a manner of experiencing and thinking all forms of expression of life. It is this adaptability that has earned it many re-readings. If pragmatist thinkers can approach belief as a choice of existence, the concept of God as an ideal social value, the analysis of religious experience in psychological terms, it is not to say that they renounce all forms of transcendence. On the contrary, this transcendence is sometimes displaced from the place assigned it by religion, to a paradoxically human transcendence, situated on the moral, psychological, sociological level, thereby favoring interdisciplinary approach to the study of the religious phenomenon.

References Bouriau, Christophe. 2016. “Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophy of as if: Pragmatism or Fictionalism?” Philosophia Scientiæ 1/20–1: 77–93.

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Dewey, John. 1939. Freedom and Culture. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Gaultier, Benoit. 2018. “Comment défendre l’anti-pragmatisme de Clifford à propos des croyances en général et des croyances religieuses en particulier.” ThéoRèmes 13. https://doi.org/10.4000/theoremes.1855. James, William. 1897. The Will to Believe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ———. 1902. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York: Longmans. ———. 1909. A Pluralist Universe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1998. The Critique of Pure Reason, ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lange, Friedrich Albert. 1881. History of Materialism and Critique of Its Contemporary Significance. London: Trübner & Company. Mollard, Romain. 2018. “Les sirènes de l’absolu: William James et Josiah Royce en Perspective.” ThéoRèmes 13. https://doi.org/10.4000/theoremes.1975. Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1877. “The Fixation of Belief.” Popular Science Monthly 12: 1–15. ———. 1878. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” Popular Science Monthly 12: 286–302. ———. 1906. “Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God.” In Collected Papers, Vol VI. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ———. 1908. “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.” In Collected Papers, Vol VI. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin. Stavo-Debauge, Joan. 2018. “Le naturalisme de John Dewey: un antidote au post-sécularisme contemporain.” ThéoRèmes 13. https://doi.org/10.4000/ theoremes.2030.

CHAPTER 3

Pragmatism, Consciousness and Spirituality: William James and Rudolf Steiner Robert McDermott

This essay discusses the philosophical method of William James (1842– 1910) in relation to the Spiritual Science of Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925). James’s religious thought is most explicitly developed in his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902); Steiner’s Spiritual Science, including his spiritual epistemology and his presentation of the evolution of consciousness, is developed in his first two philosophical works, Truth and Knowledge (1892) and The Philosophy of Freedom, or Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path (1894) and his three foundational works: How to Know Higher Worlds (1904), Theosophy (1904), and An Outline of Esoteric Science (1909). James and Steiner lived barely a generation apart and wrote their major philosophical works during the same two decades before and after the turn of the century. It is almost certain that James was unfamiliar

This builds upon the author’s introduction to Robert McDermott. American Philosophy and Rudolf Steiner, ed. and intro. (Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books, 2012). R. McDermott (B) San Francisco, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_3

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with Steiner’s writings, and Steiner’s only reference to James shows that he knew only James’s Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (both 1907) and “The Will to Believe” (1897). It falls to us to arrange this dialogue on their behalf. Consequently, this chapter offers a comparison of the account of religious experiences and religious knowledge that James presents in his Varieties with the account of spiritual-scientific discipline that Steiner presents throughout his writings and lectures and most systematically in three works cited above. Religious experience and religious knowledge were central concerns for both James and Steiner, and the differences between their approaches provide a revealing perspective on the possible role of spiritual and esoteric discipline in relation not only to James’s thought but to American culture. Perhaps the most immediately obvious difference between James and Steiner is that James is “one of us”—he, too, is looking through a glass darkly, desperately trying to get a glimpse of something, anything, that will suggest “something more,” some connection to a Source, to Reality, or even a reality. James wrestled with his nominalism, from which he never fully escaped—and, in this defining fact, we experience him again as one of us. To read James is to swim in the American psyche and to experience its characteristic split between the richness of its religious life and the limitations of its interpretive frame. James enables us to confront the variety and power of religious “experts”—examples of conversion, saintliness, and mysticism—and their collective ability to break the hold of dogmatism and skepticism. James shows us how to widen the research, sharpen the eye, and speculate on the source(s) of such rich transformative fare. James emphasizes the surprising and idiosyncratic character of religious experience and Steiner focuses on many additional ways by which religious and spiritual experience can be rendered more intelligible. For an astonishingly broad array of individual and cultural experiences, or modes of consciousness, Steiner develops elaborate interpretive frameworks, including the biographical-karmic, bodily, planetary, linguistic, and historical-cultural. Steiner also offers a detailed discipline by which others can better understand and actually attain the kinds of transformative experience that James so prized. In works such as How to Know Higher Worlds, which has no analogy in James’s writings, Steiner insists that every individual can develop a spiritual, transformed, consciousness:

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There slumber in every human being faculties by means of which one can acquire for oneself a knowledge of higher worlds. Mystics, gnostics, theosophists—all speak of a world of soul and spirit which for them is just as real as the world we see with our physical eyes and touch with our physical hands. At every moment the listener may say to himself: that of which they speak I, too, can learn if I develop within myself certain powers which today still slumber within me. (p. 1)

In this respect, Steiner’s approach to spiritual and transformative experience has something of a democratic quality that might be understood as closer to yoga or to a Roman Catholic emphasis on effort, all of which stands in contrast to James’s attitude, which shows the influence of the Protestant experience of grace. If we survey the contents of his thirty books and more than three hundred volumes of lectures, we will find that, in effect, Steiner wrote James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience many times over, but Steiner’s vantage point differs sharply from James’s in three important respects: (I) James wrote typically as an observer, whereas Steiner wrote as one who regards his experience as authoritative, although Steiner did not intend the results of his spiritual-scientific research to be considered infallible; (2) the evolution of consciousness informs all of Steiner’s philosophic and esoteric descriptions, whereas James, despite his acceptance of Darwinian evolution, paid little attention to the evolution of consciousness as an interpretive category; and (3) both James and Steiner are thoroughgoing empiricists with an eye to the consequences of experience, but Steiner’s empiricism is better described as transformational than as pragmatic.

James’s Pragmatic Approach to Religious and Psychic Experience One of the surest introductions to a philosopher is a glance at his or her opponents. James’s opponents can be gathered into two groups: dogmatically skeptical scientific empiricists (the mentality that expressed itself subsequently as logical positivism and logical empiricism); and two forms of anti-empiricists—orthodox believers and philosophical idealists. Against these three opponents on two sides, James argued for a pragmatic, experiential empiricism, one that would faithfully observe and interpret the fullest imaginable range of human experience. It was this commitment that led James to serve as the first president of the Society for

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Psychical Research and to support the cause of parapsychological research throughout the entire three decades of his philosophical career. In the conclusion of A Pluralistic Universe (1909), his last work, and his only systematic philosophic work, James expressed his hope for his distinctive brand of empiricism: Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin. (p. 142)

This version of empiricism seemed to James not only the most fruitful approach to religion and to psychical phenomena, but the proper philosophical corrective to the science-inspired narrowing of the model of knowledge or what in recent terminology is referred to as scientism. Against all extreme, or overconfident, claims to truth, James insisted that truth and meaning are personal, provisional, processive—that is, in the stream or flow of consciousness. In Pragmatism and again in The Meaning of Truth, he gives a classic account of this perspective and philosophical method: Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once and for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of finality in truth. (p. 31)

He continues: No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, “categories,” supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts. (p. 32)

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Nowhere is the effect of his opponents on his philosophy more apparent than in his pragmatic method: against the dogmatism and skepticism concerning the varieties of human experience that had limited the empiricist temper, and against a dogmatic religious and idealist position, James proposed a method that aims to study the outer reaches of consciousness in his research concerning both religious experience psychic phenome. James sought to show facts and consequences to be more diverse—and more remarkably revealing—than scientific, philosophic, and conventional religious investigators seemed capable of imagining. Although the work of so productive, complex, and original a thinker as William James cannot easily or confidently be identified with one characteristic or culminating insight, his double affirmation of “Something More” and a “wider self” as discussed in the Varieties seems to represent the furthest reaches of his philosophic imagination: “The conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come” (p. 405). James refers to this “wider self” as “a Something More.” The case can be made that James’s thought, in the end, is more accurately characterized by pluralism, or by pragmatism, or by process, or by the will to believe, but I think it can be shown that this concept of “Something More” is not only characteristic and defining. It is the end point of James’s philosophical striving, what we ought to consider his ultimate, and most life sustaining, philosophical achievement. This “wider self” or “Something More” is an insight that carries the imprint of James’s philosophical attitude, hopes, and method. As a philosophical empiricist, James was a sympathetic observer, a patient and probing inquirer, a tough-minded data- collector (“data” here being the varied experiences of all possible subjects) and, as such, was on the lookout for news from the farthest, and most revealing, outposts. He sought out those whom he regarded as experts in the hope that they would confirm the reality of the “Something More.” In search of living evidence on behalf of this “Something More,” or of what we might call a “Something More kind of knowledge,” William James spent more than thirty years as a psychical researcher. He longed to find “one white crow” that would prove, finally, that not all human beings are forever separated from spiritual or psychic knowledge, such as knowledge of the afterlife. James remained committed throughout his philosophical career to “potential forms of consciousness” that are “discontinuous with ordinary consciousness.” In a line often quoted from Varieties of Religious Experience, James reminds us that these exceptional

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states of consciousness “forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality” (p. 308). We can only imagine how James would have assessed the clairvoyant capacity of Rudolf Steiner. We know that on secondhand information he was not impressed by H. P. Blavatsky. After a thirty-year search for a subject who convincingly exhibited the kind of special consciousness that produced reliable knowledge of the Suprasensory, James settled on one candidate, Mrs. Piper, as his “white crow,” and, in Essays in Psychical Research (1986), concluded undramatically: I find myself believing that there is “something in” these never-ending reports of physical phenomena, although I haven’t yet the least positive notion of the something. It becomes to my mind simply a very worthy problem for investigation. Either I or the scientist is of course a fool, with our opposite views of probability here; and I only wish he might feel the ability, as cordially as I do, to pertain to both of us. (pp. 271–272)

Mrs. Piper’s disclosures might appear at first glance to be more dramatic than Steiner’s, but as they dealt with trivial matters, none were as significant for knowledge of spiritual or psychic realms. Steiner was disinterested in displaying his occult powers and instead concentrated on knowledge of spiritual beings and guidance of humankind. Particularly, he sought to develop an epistemology by which others could attain such knowledge. Steiner’s most significant insight in philosophy (he made original contributions in many other areas) would seem to be the epistemological method, which stands at the base of all of his extraordinary research. This method can be referred to as imaginal thinking and, in the form that would enable us to experience and evaluate it, can be understood as a method for generating spiritual (including philosophical and moral) insights that can be known to be simultaneously individual and universal. Steiner’s insight, then, issues from, calls for, and confirms a new capacity, namely the ability to establish a cognitive link between the spiritual dimension of the moral self and the spiritual dimension of the universe—in this case, the moral-spiritual universe. Steiner exemplifies and recommends the same capacity for the sciences, the arts, and other areas of inquiry. It is easy to miss the significance of Steiner’s philosophic work because the body of his writings that can properly be classified as philosophical— approximately three to five volumes—constitutes a minute portion of

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his entire corpus, consisting as it does of approximately three hundred volumes, forty books and two hundred and sixty volumes of lectures. Further, the same sociology of the field that hides the philosophy in the writings of medieval Christian thinkers such as Aquinas, or classical Indian philosophers such as Sankara, would similarly lead philosophical inquirers (assuming they looked in Steiner’s direction) to fold the philosophical into the spiritual. Given the probability of this predisposition, it might be useful to look at Steiner’s spiritual position before turning to his philosophical position per se, though it is important to note that Steiner’s first two books, his doctoral dissertation and his major philosophical treatise, are technical, carefully argued epistemic- logical treatises that he intended to be evaluated by philosophical (albeit highly introspective) criteria. Steiner’s massive body of writings, his entire teaching, evidences spiritual and esoteric development yet is definitely a unified whole: there is no early/late dichotomy. His Philosophy of Freedom predates the spiritual experience of 1899 that resulted in his viewing the deeds of Christ as the central transformative event in human history. After 1900, Steiner’s writings typically contained esoteric and spiritual-scientific disclosures. Whether we approach The Philosophy of Freedom from the perspective of subsequent writings or entirely on its own, it is clear that at its core this work is a spiritual epistemology. Using a teleological principle characteristic of Steiner’s worldview, we might say that the following definition of his teaching, referred to alternately as Spiritual Science and Anthroposophy, is the end toward which his early epistemological writings were aiming—and toward which he was intending to lead his reader. In the first of a series of letters to members of the Anthroposophical Society (in Anthroposophical Leading Thoughts ), written in the last year of his life, Steiner defined Anthroposophy (or Spiritual Science) as follows: Anthroposophy is a path of knowledge leading the spiritual in the individual to the spiritual in the universe. It arises as a need of the heart and justifies itself to the extent that it answers that need. (p. 415)

From the perspective of philosophy (temporarily ignoring Steiner’s role at the end of his life as the founder of a spiritual-esoteric school and the author of an incomparable body of occult revelations), this statement would seem to occupy a place in Steiner’s thought comparable to James’s

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“Something More.” It is the end point, or the full expression, of that lifedefining insight that was striving to come forth in his earliest writings. It is also—as it is the purpose of this essay to show—a call to a thoroughgoing empiricism, a method of philosophy that can significantly advance the American philosophical and cultural agenda. Philosophy, in this teaching, comes to mean a heart-filled, warm and willful, imaginative reflection on, and by, the deepest level of the self in relation to the entire universe—from stars to soil, including gender, the economy, history, language, ethics, education, and myriad other areas of inquiry—far more, in fact, than any American philosopher, including Dewey, attempted to illumine. Even when Steiner is at his most explicitly spiritual—as in his description of Anthroposophy quoted in the passage above—he is calling for a mode of thinking that, while spiritual, is not based on belief. In these words, written for the Anthroposophical Society, members of a new mystery center and a community of spiritual seekers, he advocates the path of spiritual thinking. Steiner’s emphasis on the feeling dimension of thinking should not be mistaken for softness and sentimentality: whether expressed in spiritual terms (as in the passage quoted above) or in terms of concepts and precepts (the terminology of The Philosophy of Freedom), Steiner consistently strives to show, by example and precept, that the thinking “I” can be the source and instrument of a self-generated, perfectly adequate and essentially true grasp of reality—including the concept and reality of the self as a moral agent. Steiner’s basic philosophic text, The Philosophy of Freedom, offers an epistemology and a moral philosophy as a way of solving the most fundamental problems of modern life. With James, Steiner was intrigued by and sought to provide a way out of the impasse of philosophical disputes. But whereas James sought primarily to remove the sting from philosophical conflicts by removing their pretense of adequacy or finality and, secondarily, to establish the attitude and value of philosophic pluralism, Steiner offers an epistemological discipline to be developed in order to move past conflicts to a pluralism of ideally adequate perspectives. More important, and more radically, Steiner chronicled the history of philosophy as a series of appropriate, or symptomatic, expressions of the evolution of consciousness. Whereas James rests in a pluralism of partial versions of the truth, Steiner affirms a pluralism of positions that are simultaneously harmonious and individual. This process seems perfectly plausible to Steiner

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because he is convinced that true ideas live harmoniously in a spiritual realm and can be accessed through one’s highly disciplined, individual spiritual effort. To a degree quite foreign to James, Steiner depicts all such individual efforts in historical, or evolutionary, contexts. For Steiner, it makes all the difference when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—or St. Paul, or Descartes—impressed their vision of reality on the consciousness of subsequent centuries.

Concluding Comparisons and Contrasts In addition to the contrasts just developed between the religious thought of James and Steiner, it is worth noting some commonalities. Specifically, they share determination to establish their positions between scientific rationalism on one side and traditional religious belief on the other. Of the first of these two excesses, both James and Steiner forcefully opposed the negative implications of nineteenth-century scientific thought. They both struggled with the realization that their immediate scientific and philosophical predecessors precluded an easy affirmation of what James refers to as “the religious hypothesis.” Yet in quite different but entirely compatible ways, James and Steiner begin with the recognition that Humean skepticism (or its later version—positivism) and Kant’s critical philosophy fail to account for the depth and varieties of religious experience. James and Steiner also shared a critique of belief as a way to overcome the limits on religious knowledge set by science and naturalistic philosophy. Their case, again in different terms, rested on privileged, and highly transformative, experience, not on a belief system oblivious to the demands for validation and discernible positive effects. James sought evidence for the source of religious experience, for the “Something More” to which large segments of the human community—some quite demonstrably—have access, and Steiner looked to the tradition of mystics, gnostics, and theosophists as evidence on behalf of the case for knowledge of the spiritual world. Almost all of the contrasts that could be explored between James and Steiner fall under three general headings: (1) individual experience, (2) evolution of consciousness, and (3) spiritual discipline. The first point of comparison concerns the role of individual experience. In the two years during which James delivered the Gifford Lectures, published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience, Steiner wrote several chapters on

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nineteenth-century thought (published as part of The Riddles of Philosophy ([1914]2009), lectured on Goethe and Nietzsche, and delivered two series of lectures published as Mystics after Modernism: Discovering the Seeds of a New Science in the Renaissance ([1901]2000) and Christianity as Mystical Fact: And the Mysteries of Antiquity ([1902]2006). All of these lectures and publications presage the distinctively twentieth-century fascination with religious experience(s) of paradigmatic individuals. Both James and Steiner point to the transformative experience of figures such as Buddha, Augustine, Eckhart, and Luther, as evidence for a spiritual reality as the source of the kinds of religious experience that James refers to as conversion, saintliness, and mysticism.

Although James himself had little to report in the way of personal experience—the lone exception being the autobiographical passage that he inserted in The Varieties, with attribution to a “French Correspondent” (pp. 134–135), he did recognize the primacy of personal, and particularly autobiographical, perspectives for the fashioning of an adequate worldview. But because his own experience seems to have been undeveloped, or at least lacking confidence relative to those whom he referred to as “experts” and on whom he relied for religious insight, he remained an observer and interpreter. While his reach toward the psychic and spiritual may be more adventuresome than any major American philosopher, there is scant original or autobiographical religious reflection in James’s writings, considerably less so than in the writings of Josiah Royce, his primary philosophical and religious foil. James’s “circumspection of the topic” of religion in The Varieties of Religious Experience, in terms of individual experience without regard to what he acknowledges as the institutional (and historical) half of the topic, must be seen as a limiting device entirely characteristic of his psychology, philosophy, and view of religion. Steiner similarly did not focus on the institutional dimension of religion, but he invariably emphasized the historical and cultural context of all individuals, including those with highly idiosyncratic experience. More to the point, for Steiner, all experience, and particularly transformative spiritual experience, must be understood in the double context of individual and cultural evolution. For Steiner, a transformative experience—whether conversion, enlightenment, or salvation—has its place in the destiny of individuals who, in turn, have their places in the destiny of cultures. In this respect, Steiner’s view is closer to Royce, who offers a profound account of individual ideals

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in relation to one’s community; it was against Royce’s view—and, indirectly, Steiner’s—that James delivered and published his Varieties. In his emphasis on the evolution of consciousness, Steiner goes against James and beyond Royce: he insists that in pre-Christian times an experience such as mysticism was nearly ordinary and is considered extraordinary in the modern West because of the radical trans- formation wrought by modern Western rational and scientific consciousness. Or rather, the rarity of mysticism is due to the transformation of consciousness that produced both rational scientific consciousness and the gap between the experiential self and the spiritual world. This leads to the second major difference between James and Steiner, namely, Steiner’s comprehensive use of the evolution of consciousness. Steiner emphasizes the historical and cultural con- text of individual biographies, as well as their cultures, in the light of the evolution of consciousness. Although James was committed to an evolutionary and radically processive view of human experience, his view of religious experience is not as evolutionary as Steiner’s. References to religious personalities throughout Varieties of Religious Experience pay little or no attention to the century or culture that provided the distinctive character of the religious qualities for which James provides such shrewd and memorable phenomenological analyses. For Steiner, the exact place of every religious experience in the evolution of consciousness—including the particular language, folk soul (or psyche of the people), religious beliefs and practices, and many other influential factors—accounts for the essential meaning of each experience. In Steiner’s grid, the individual and the culture of the original experience are interdependent. The third general contrast between James’s view and Steiner’s centers on the significance for Steiner of spiritual discipline. In his Varieties, James explains two types of conversion—volitional and self-surrender— but nevertheless allows the impression that life-transforming experiences, saintliness, and mysticism just happen. Throughout The Varieties of Religious Experience and his thirty years devoted to psychical research, James generally ignored the preparation, particularly deliberate and disciplined preparation, for religious transformation and focused instead on the fruits of exceptional experiences: If the grace of God operates miraculously, it probably operates through the subliminal door, then. But just how anything operates in this region is

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still unexplained, and we shall do well now to say good-bye to the process of transformation altogether— leaving it, if you like, a good deal of a psychological and theological mystery—and to turn our attention to the fruits of the religious condition, no matter in what way they have been produced. (p. 218)

Steiner acknowledges the limits of his knowledge concerning the process of transformation in individual cases, but the intent of his spiritual scientific method is to penetrate such mysteries, beginning with one’s own experience. Such knowledge, of course, requires disciplined effort, or spiritual practice. What would seem to be missing in James’s work is precisely such a practice that might have enabled him to see deeper into the subjects who so intrigued him and on whose transformative experiences he tried to build a genuinely radical empiricism, that is, a philosophy that grants primacy to individual experience. It might be time to supplement, and perhaps transform, James’s philosophical and religious insights by means of the kind of spiritual discipline that Steiner exemplified and explained.

References William James ———. 1986. Essays in Psychical Research, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers. Intro. Robert McDermott. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. [1909] 1977. “A Pluralistic Universe.” In The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. [1907] 1975. “Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth.” In The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. [1902] 1985. “Varieties of Religious Experience.” In The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. [1897] 1979. “The Will to Believe.” In The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rudolf Steiner ———. [1984] 2007. The Essential Steiner: Basic Writings of Rudolf Steiner, ed. and intro. R. McDermott. Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books. ———. [1904] 1994. How to Know Higher Worlds: A Modern Path of Initiation, trans. Christopher Bamford. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press.

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———. [1894] 1995. Intuitive Thinking as a Spiritual Path: A Philosophy of Freedom, trans. Michael Lipson. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press. ———. 2009. The New Essential Steiner: An Introduction to Rudolf Steiner for the 21st Century, ed. and intro. R. McDermott. Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books. ———. [1909] 1997. An Outline of Esoteric Science, trans. C. E. Creeger. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press. ———. [1894] 2012. The Philosophy of Freedom: The Basis for a Modern World Conception, trans. Michael Wilson. London: Rudolf Steiner Press. ———. [1904] 1994. Theosophy: An Introduction to the Spiritual Processes in Human Life and in the Cosmos, trans. Catherine E. Creeger. Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press. ———. [1892] 2007. Truth and Knowledge: Introduction to Philosophy of Spiritual Activity, trans. Rita Stebbing. Great Barrington, MA: Steiner Books.

CHAPTER 4

Pragmatic Non-Duality in William James, Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda and Trika Shaivism Sarah Louise Gates

The emphasis on non-dualism to blend science and spirituality in the contemporary discourse often draws on Advaita Ved¯anta concepts. The philosophically hybrid ‘roots of yoga’, are gaining more traction in the academic discourse though rarely discussed are how the Advaita ´ ı Ved¯anta teachings of Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda were influenced by his guru, Sr¯ R¯amakr.s.n.a, who had a remarkable ability to draw parallels between apparently contradictory spiritual systems, as streams towards the one goal. This approach, employed to explain why Hinduism has not historically persecuted other religions, is evident in The Complete Works of Sw¯ am¯ı Vivek¯ ananda (Vivekananda, 1965 [1907]). William James (1907) refers to the absolute and universal mind as a model of monistic pantheism in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. He cites and dismisses Advaita Ved¯anta as not sufficiently pragmatic due to alleged “mysticism”, referring to it as “absolute monism”. By first separating out matters he deems of little pragmatic value, James settles into the problem of a “seeing force” rather than a blind one that “runs through things”

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to focus on the relation between the Absolute and its parts, drawing into discussion the puzzle of agency. The core contention, whether one is determined or free, for James (1907), must rest upon the possibility of betterment, since in his thought experiment, any freedom of will in a perfect world can only be to worsen it. James (Lecture III, 1907) envisages pragmatism as likely to displace former philosophical authorities by inviting less abstract and more scientific minds into a reformation of the discipline in which “The Earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the upper ether, must resume its rights”. A century later, the phrase strikes a chord with ecological thought, bringing James’ theories into contemporary relevance. It is worth noting the term ‘resume’, which affirms recourse to a former status, prior to the dominance of the ‘old paradigm’ of spirit-matter, mind-body dualism. James (1907), without agreeing to it, characterises spiritualism and materialism as opposing forces, where one has primacy over the other: Matter is gross, coarse, crass, muddy; spirit is pure, elevated, noble; and since it is more consonant with the dignity of the universe to give the primacy in it to what appears superior, spirit must be affirmed as the ruling principle. To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which our intellects may come to rest in a state of admiring contemplation, is the great rationalist failure …

In this characterisation, it is not a fact of spirit being a priori, but due to its perceived ‘superior’ qualities that the transcendent is reified, demoting matter to inferiority by opposition. Offering the view of Herbert Spencer, James (1907) prefers that: …matter so infinitely subtle, and performing motions as inconceivably quick and fine as those which modern science postulates in her explanations, has no trace of grossness left…both terms, are but symbols, pointing to that one unknowable reality in which their oppositions cease…

Spencer’s understanding of matter as subtle, similar in this respect to ‘immaterial things’ of spirit and consciousness, things known by their effects rather than substances, is applicable to matter that now appears to transcend space and time and which no doubt, would have once appeared magical. Consider today’s ‘face time’ that, to employ the terms of James, takes ‘connexions’ to new levels of ‘acquaintance’, allowing

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invisible parts otherwise separated by distance to ‘hang together’ over the net. It allows infinitesimally small things, digital bits and bytes, to as if instantly appear like entangled quanta, becoming ‘lines of influence’ upon one another, as cyber-mediated interpersonal relationships. Android and information communication technology, continued James’ observation, that modernity would “unify the world more and more in systematic ways”, through (once) “colonial, postal, consular, commercial systems” so that “innumerable little hangings together” can become “little worlds, not only of discourse but of operation within the wider universe” (James 1907, Lecture IV). The colonial is now neo-colonial, the postal became email and social media platforms, commercial systems like free trade are neoliberal and the consular, a diplomatic sector, would include the United Nations as well as politically active non-governmental organisations. As science and technology uncover and learn to manipulate smaller and smaller ‘things’, moving into the subatomic realm of quantum computing, changes, like proverbial butterfly wings, unfold like storms across globalised society. The problem with small things, as chaos theory predicts, is they are unpredictable, non-linear, easily destabilising larger systems in ways we can’t see. Like antibiotic-resistant bugs, particulates in cloud seeding, the miniscule tweaking of genes, microplastics or depleted uranium, the erasure of a voice—powerful, ‘subtle’ things, can quickly alter the trajectory of the planet, humanity and life as we know it. What we see in James’ (1907) pragmatism, is as he suggests, the continuity of the ancient desiderata of the One and the Many, as per his Lecture IV . Whilst Indian philosophy readily intersects throughout James’ work, it is largely missing there, and here, potential correlations cannot be given justice. Cultural and historical contexts are rich sources for background into textual analysis, particularly the Victorian Era active interest in Indian philosophical concepts, whilst simultaneously viewing postural yogis as fakirs. Attitudes then grew into those of today, and although we still see active interest in both aspects of yoga, by far the most popular is the carnivalesque. Academic research has investigated the intersections of James, Vivek¯ananda, western esotericism and Christian Science with regard to ‘modern yoga’, with some argument that Vivek¯ananda’s work is more influenced by James than authentic, due to use of modern English terms and employment of ‘like concepts’ (De Michelis 2014; Singleton 2005). The studies do not speak directly to the questions raised of pragmatism in James and offer little of James’ influences. One is John Stuart Mill to whom James’ (1907) dedicated Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old

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Ways of Thinking, as the person from “whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today”. Mill is rigorously criticised for his role in India’s colonisation, promoting ‘tolerant imperialism’ to justify the administration of India during the East-India Company Era. This was along paternalistic and infantilising lines, despite defences made in Tunick (2006). It is worthy of attention that Mill did not propose the conversion of Indians from Hinduism to Christianity and objected to the model of ‘administration’ that meant the British forced “English ideas down the throats of the natives, by measures of proselytism, or acts intentionally or unintentionally offensive to the religious feelings of the people” (Mill 1957 [1910], p. 384). It was his view that the best the British could offer was good governance, which he did not see, according to his matrix, among the establishment, especially once the East-India Company was replaced with Colonial Administrators, upon which he took his leave in 1858. He is described as a “leader or at least exponent of the philosophical radicals” (Mill 1957 [1910], p. vii), raised to take up the utilitarian school of Jeremy Bentham, to which he made significant modifications. Although not explicit in James (2014 [1907]), pragmatism and utilitarianism deserve a thorough comparative reading for their political uses and abuses, which must for now be reserved. The attitude of James towards Vivek¯ananda, where he draws from, refutes his relevance to discourse, and then substitutes what is already well thought out from Hinduism with ideas of his own, resembles the quick to diminish and replace approach of the Raj toward Hindu traditional knowledge during the Colonial Era. Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda (1965 [1907], p. 201) brought mind and matter together in many ways, during one of which he also cites Mill. “Matter is the permanent possibility of sensations,” said John Stuart Mill…[Vivek¯ananda continues] The real man is behind the mind; the mind is the instrument in his hands; it is only his intelligence that is percolating through the mind…Thus you understand what is meant by Chitta.i It is the mind-stuff, and vrittis are the waves and ripples rising in it when external causes impinge on it. These vrittis are our universe.

Subtle matter, or mind, is recognised in Hindu philosophy as belonging to and effected by the forces of the material world as well as under the control of the individual or ‘j¯ıva’. This occurs once the yogi can withdraw

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from the limitations of discursive mind, intellect and aham . k¯ara. Feuerstein (1997) defines aham . k¯ara as the ‘ego’ along with most contemporary authors; however, it is important to stress, ego in the context of Hindu philosophy is nothing like that of Freud. Individuation is not something to yogis that is generated in childhood, but carries across lifetimes, an intrinsic, and necessary aspect of incarnation. It means, in its lower state the aspect of the I that identifies itself through misplaced association with the phenomenal world, such as the body, mind and conditions, in which the individual self, or ‘j¯ıva’ is located. It is also in higher aspects the self attached to, and identifying with, the divine. In the supreme state, at least in Trika Shaivism,ii the ultimate reality is pure subjectivity. Citing R¯amakan.t.ha, Dyczkowski (2004, p. 33)writes: (Although) the notion of I (ahampratyaya) ˙ is (distinct from the Self) which is the object of ascertainment, it is perceived concomitantly with it because it is a reflective awareness of the persisting perceiving subject and has the Self as its object (vis.aya). Thus, both are true as they are established to exist by their (common nature) as consciousness. Thus, there is no nonexistence of the Self.

´ ı R¯amakr.s.n.a (Nikhilananda, 1942) repeatedly distinguished between Sr¯ different forms of ego, stating that those who defer complete liberation in order to teach, retain traces, among other forms of “harmless” ego. It is in any case the continuity of the universal Self with the individual self that enables the smooth transition from perceiving consciousness as limited, to withdrawing from that state and comprehending its unbound essential nature as universal. Consciousness could be thought of as a kind of thread upon which a yogi affixes attention to expand awareness to the level of mind free of thought constructs or ‘vritt¯ı’. Depending upon where the yogi is habituated in relation to that thread, aham . k¯ara will tend to function by reiteration of the I in relation to its attachments. If it is trapped in the heavy emotions and sensations of dense matter, then the mind state will be afflicted by intensely pouring thought constructs like ‘why is this happening to me?’, ‘I am my body’, ‘I am suffering’, etc. If there is unbroken awareness of that part of this thread of consciousness, above thought, then the awareness of consciousness is expansive and permeates matter also, taking different forms, whilst ‘underneath’ them, remaining unchanged. James (1907, chapter IV) tells us that:

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…to interpret absolute monism worthily, be a mystic…the paragon of all monistic systems is the Ved¯anta philosophy of Hindostan, and the paragon of Vedantist missionaries was the late Swami Vivekananda who visited our shores some years ago. The method of Vedantism is the mystical method. You do not reason, but after going through a certain discipline YOU SEE, and having seen, you report the truth.

There are a few points to raise in this summary, which are later affirmed in the synopsis of James on Advaita Ved¯anta’s potential contribution to his model of pragmatism. Those identity associations which give rise to the individual’s ‘universe’ as Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda calls it, define our ‘worldview’, a point of vital importance to the discourse on the unified ‘whole’, in relation to the individual ‘parts’. For Advaita Ved¯anta, Tantra and S¯am . khya, the mind is an instrument, something also attributed to nonhuman sentient life. What the mind experiences of consciousness depends on the level of awareness available to that individual mind. Yoga expands that awareness, whether it is via intellectual, devotional or ritual s¯adhana so to encompass all levels as divine, including, from a tantric perspective, all things in the sphere of universal consciousness. Advaita Ved¯anta contra to James’ assessment does employ reason to obtain awareness of that which is beyond it. Although James sets out from a positionality of acknowledging Oneness in principle, he concludes from sources like Christian Science and his understanding of Advaita Ved¯anta that: With her criterion of the practical differences that theories make, we see that she must equally abjure absolute monism and absolute pluralism. The world is one just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain. And finally, it is growing more and more unified by those systems of connexion at least which human energy keeps framing as time goes on.

The connections between things, James notes, were growing then as they are now, through industrialisation of capitalist production. It is not foreseen that their impacts would weigh so heavily upon the planet to become ecopalyptic. For James, philosophy only makes sense if it has pragmatic outcomes, rather than existing for its own sake. It may seem counterintuitive to argue against pragmatism, although it is noteworthy that the production of knowledge, if only to rearrange the elements with it, concurs with attitudes that underpin the present ecological crisis. If

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civilisation, seen from a oneness hypothesis, was a natural unfoldment of creative power, simply for the sake of it, because it can be so, or even marvelled at because it is beyond our ken, then the serious matter of economic bottom lines could take a backseat. Confusing appreciation and even elation at viewing the grandeur of life with mysticism, and with seeing the absolute ground of being as impractical, despite benefits James (1907) cites from Vivek¯ananda, sets James on the same slippery trajectory as the ‘economic growth’ model, i.e. that things should be known for their practical uses, and those which are not, do not warrant investment since they bring little economic return. Knowledge for knowledge’s sake provides intellectual and cultural capital just as art for art’s sake, a liberal concept today’s corporate university has largely defunded. That the universe is already manifesting in spectacular ways without human intervention might suffice to fill our cups, but the reality is, being, and nature alone, are not enough for humanity. We too are urged to become, and this, rather than the relative ideals of ‘betterment’, is perhaps the more crucial question. The impulse to become, to outpour creative energy or work, need not contradict the experience of simply being. Karma yoga, in the Bhagavad G¯ıt¯a (Lakshmanjoo, 2013), outlines the yogic model of action as service to the divine without expectation. Ordinary activities as meditative practice are throughout the Vijñ¯ana Bhairava Tantra (Lakshmanjoo, 2011) of the Trika system. Placing awareness in the crucible of universal consciousness whilst going about everyday life complements rather than detracts from productive endeavour. Selfcultivation becomes self-destructive if it means the relinquishment of being, as it is, in the moment, resulting not in ‘betterment’, but deflection from the real, an avoidance of what is, as it is, towards a never-ending cycle of what should, could or would be, were the world more as we’d like it. Acting from the narrow confine of lower ahamk¯ara enables the type of self-serving attitude behind capitalist industrialism and the affluenza it promotes. This problem is not easily spotted inside a paradigm of endless economic development which demands individuals feel insufficient as they are, to improve status, lifestyle or productivity, by excessive consumption. The globalised yoga industry is criticised for participating in this model by reductionist packaging of traditional knowledge into feel good self-development products for wealthy white women. If being and becoming are out of balance, the becoming rushes faster towards its assumed terminus only to remain unsatisfied, failing to appreciate what is, as it is. If being content means sitting in a plush studio surrounded by

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designer lycra and taut flesh, then yoga cannot truly contribute to appreciation of being, or its recognition. On broader application, the model of neoliberal consumption decimates the natural world, which, unable to keep up with the human impulse to improve its own conditions, daily shrinks to become products of temporal pleasure and comfort, with those who defend it increasingly labelled terrorists. The single most important contribution to ecological theory from Tantra and Yoga is the concept of tattwam asi, “I am that”. It is not a process of ‘becoming’, in terms of identity, even as yogic theory employs notions like siddhi, or perfection, but it is ‘seeing we are that’, as James (1907) calls it ‘the absolute’. If there is, as James posits, a “seeing force” that threads through all of creation, it is not a hard leap to imagine we see through that same thread, albeit in a limited capacity. Contra to augmentative motives for yoga practice, traditionally, it is not to perfect our bodies, minds or worlds, but to practice realisation of the inherent perfection that we are. It is a carrot on a stick to promise perfection and have a series of perfected masters to follow, but this is to appeal to minds bound by means-end mentality. In this, there is no striving for ‘betterment’ in an evolutionary schema, but to decondition the mind, to remove barriers to the bliss of simply ‘being’. In this sense, from a yogic view, siddhas, or perfected ones, were already perfected before they set out but did not see it. Yoga and Tantra are non-linear in directionality even if it may seem that the practitioner is rising and falling from states of consciousness: if there is nowhere else to be, and nothing else to become, then there is no terminal ‘state’ to ‘attain’ but the end of beginnings and ends, of means and goals, of living or dying, bound or free. Thus, it is liberation from duality. Take for example the classic Shanti Mantra in ¯I´s¯av¯asyopanis.ad ´ ananda, u.d, p. 3): (Sarv¯ This [is] infinite, that [is] infinite. From the infinite the whole has come out. Of the infinite the whole having [been] taken, the infinite alone remains.

If the universe is already perfect, being undiminished despite its explication, what then for evil? To a grub, it is irrelevant to think in terms of evolution or creation, though James (1907) argues, the perfected ‘fitness’ of a woodpecker’s bill would certainly appear to it as intrinsically evil by design and, assuming the grub thinks as humans do, then it’s maker shares in evil too. Anthropocentrically measuring the absolute as good and evil,

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by its allowance of suffering and sin, projects upon God or nature the face of man’s mentality and interests, both occluding and affirming by recourse to the human, rather than godlike condition, the divine’s absolute otherliness. It is the otherliness, the transcendent qualities, available but not assumed by humanity that seem to offer hope of redemption and with it, a scale of morality or righteousness from which to elevate humanity from the fall, or towards its ascent as a species. The discussion reiterates the ancient debate between the creator and his images, spiritualism and materialism, sacred and profane, with increasingly complex arguments for and against intelligent design, purpose, means, ends and their absences. To avoid matters unresolvable by reason, pragmatism, rather than dogmatism or idealism, James argues, should define the relevance of consideration on God, the Absolute, spirit and design. These concepts he claims, if “taken abstractly” have no “inner contents”—unless applied in terms of practicality upon an assumed imperfect world. Without delving deeper into the implications of this potentially being a perfect ‘enough’ world despite its perceived imperfections, James reveals the preoccupation with abstract premises for problem-solving in ethics, one of which he tacitly reinforces. Whether or not it is the soul or the individual consciousness that should be subjected to punishment by either God or law, for what reasons, in which manner and to what ends—the central premise is that this world, and those inhabiting it, are indeed imperfect, at least to our minds, and constraints to actions need be imposed to maintain both cosmic and civil order. For this reason, things need not be accepted as they are, for to do so would bring social decline. It is a world, without straying too far into theology, tainted by a fall from grace, or, for materialists, a work in progress. Whether creationism or evolutionary theory, the trajectory of nature seems trended towards salvation or perfection. These impulses are embedded too in theories like the ´ ı Aurobindo (Cornelissen 2012). As James evolution of consciousness in Sr¯ (1907) points out, countless species become extinct without descendants, and therefore, it would be difficult to locate reason and purpose for those life forms from this view alone. It is also impossible to assess our own status as organisms if other ‘pinnacles’ of creation have made way on the chain of being for new apex species. The premise of an imperfect world presupposes, to the degree it is clutched, denial of perfection in present tense. Further, each view leaves room for the possibility of a terminus where the goal is attained and, according to James (1907), the only option would be to worsen it.

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Perhaps that is more the mentality we find ourselves, if there ever was a ‘garden’ from which to diverge or return to. And it is in this contradictory ‘decline’ that humanity is at its most technologically advanced, with the same tools that have destroyed the planet, potentially employed to save it. Much of the sustainability literature hopes to reverse this by calling humanity to adopt an interconnected worldview which understands, put simply, that we are all part of the web of life, that each strand affects the others. It is not that we are so much ‘one’, to be pragmatic about this, but that we are accountable for our impact on others as individuals, groups and a species. To be interconnected after all, requires parts within the whole to interact with one another, and this factor, in contrast to the push toward wholeness, is stressed in James (1907), much to his credit, in seeking to find a balance between the unity and separations of the universal and individual. Whilst he admits that the feeling of being one soothes us, it cannot of itself provide meaningful practical answers to relative concerns. Similarly, through realising oneness, we cannot expect a Buddha to be a doctor, lawyer, astronaut and relationship counsellor, just because he is enlightened. This need not prevent others from applying the teachings to their discipline. If oneness of itself, as an abstract theory, cannot solve practical problems, then in response, the stages of development towards that status and the findings from realising it as opposed to merely abstracting, can be applied to social or ecological concerns. The qualities of this realisation are described differently according to which soteriology is followed, therefore, without thorough critical analysis of the countless examples of the non-dual or monistic worldview within the scriptures and teachings of the Indian canon, it is reasonable to begin in the relational sphere for pragmatism. Whether oneness makes of humans efficient recyclers and conscious consumers has more to do with their relational modes rather than the level of absolute union within which all is perfect as it is. What we put out returns to us, for example, plastics which pollute the ocean, and are ingested by sea creatures are also ingested as microplastics in drinking water. It is not realisation of oneness that protects against these fruits of actions, but attendance to the chain of causality. Viewing reality as imperfect contradicts at first the oneness implied of the interconnectedness thesis. It is possible, that nature, God or man, really does know best, and that the assumed decline of civilisation is just one such epic blip across an eternity of possible tales. In the grand scheme

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of infinite universal things, what should it matter what humanity are doing in this tiny bubble, unless of course, we are to consider a preferred existence whether that is for ourselves as individuals, for others, for the Earth, or for the divine. That is, we perpetually seek, to use James’ terms, a ‘better’ world, an improved quality of life, one that is not constrained by human, natural or cosmic limitations, including our more beastly qualities. If there are to be salvic claims of non-duality to relieve intersecting worldly oppressions, then first matters would stem from an overarching wholeness to the world order—exactly as it is—with room for recalibration to harmonise the relations of parts with the whole, by the exercise of free will, or agency. Agency and free will are not necessarily agreed upon, although if it is up to humans to change problems that humans have created, then it is necessary to accept from the outset, we are the ones to choose how the chariot of the individual self, regardless of its later cessation or illusory nature, is driven. Since this interconnectedness as worldview is the basis for such arguments, any implication of it being other, compromises the conclusion, unless we are to negotiate each worldview as steps, in the manner of Ved¯anta, and Tantra, from dual to non-dual. It is, as James implies, irrelevant that we “see” the universe as an undivided whole before comprehending the relations of the parts. This model also sets aside, as James (1907) does, their ‘more than’ sum for the time being. The argument, to be congruent and pragmatic, must accept this a-priori wholeness as a matter of faith, or reject it, as James does, to first recognise variable aggregates of parts, or systems within systems, that we can work with on multiple levels. This is a middle ground to both bottom-up absolute pluralism, and the top-down absolute monism James identifies. It is not, contrary to James, so far removed from the ‘non-dual’ framework of Ved¯anta, nor Tantra. It begins with recognition of dualism and ends with holism. Yoga, often defined as union, is a means and an end, which would seem amenable to uncover the inner potentials of individual selves who would in sum, benefit the greater selves of ecological community, culture, society and polity. Taking its name on face-value, it seems paradoxical that yoga unites by initial separation. Engaging intimately with the realm of duality, watching the body-mind and senses closely, controlling actions, moderating breath and concentrating the mind are all worldly activities. Yoga can be spontaneously attained, though most every practitioner takes a sequential path from awareness of the gross material body to the subtle

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body, into transmental consciousness. It is not then about ‘all things’ forming a synthetic unity, partly because they already are unified, but also because it involves discipline, including distinguishing between and selectively braiding into the worldview or lifestyle certain things, not just anything, in accord with the precepts of each yoga tradition’s spiritual practice and the conditions imposed. This separates the ‘true’ from the ‘untrue’, the ‘individual self’ from that which is not in accord with, or obstructs the vision, of the ‘higher Self’. One of the most refreshing aspects of William James’ (1907) work is that he rejects the concepts he cites from Christian Science, and albeit his confused parallel with Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda’s Advaita by assuming it to be monism and that it must throw the immanent out for the transcendent. This is a frequent problem in non-dual debates, and it reiterates dualist mentality: ‘if it is not dual, it must be non-dual, and if it is non-dual it must erase the content of the dual as illusory’. Ved¯anta has three forms: non-dual, theistic qualified non-dual and dual. And although the claim is supported by a citation of Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda, it is one of the more radical in tone. In the same way as the Upanisads declare their aims before establishing the means to them, yoga teachings frequently begin with the highest stage first, then when it isn’t comprehended offer a logical argument, and if that isn’t understood, metaphors, analogies and illustration. If that isn’t understood, there are practices of preparation for higher teachings such as concentration. All of these elements are contained in Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda’s yogic models. Counter to James’ argument of absolute monism, Advaita Ved¯anta leaves space for the ‘relatively real’, a world in which the j¯ıvanmukta must abide until karmas accrued in the present life are expired. The concept of the world as absolute illusion is, for pragmatic sake, a distraction from the experience before and after liberation. What occurs after death is not necessary to dwell upon. The stereotype of the world as illusion is an extension of dualistic mentality of either/or. If it was the case, that diversity ‘ceases to exist’ once unity of the Absolute is realised, then the liberated while living would be incapacitated, not capable of navigating time, space, names or forms. What Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda says is that separation ceases. To explain the state of joy experienced, it is about being ´ independent from the fluctuations that lead to suffering. From Trika, Siva S¯utra verse 3/34 says (Dyczkowski 2007, p. 150):

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sukh¯asukhayorbabhirmananam (The yogi’s) feeling of pleasure and pain is external.

The commentary of Ks.emar¯aja (ibid.) explains: Pleasure is defined as the blissful state (¯anandavr.tti) the perceiving subject experiences by obtaining some worldly object he finds extremely desirable. Pain (on the contrary) is the miserable state (an¯anandavr.tti) that arises if one fails to get it or (worse), if the opposite happens (and one loses something one likes). (Pain) is of many kinds according to whether it is spiritual (mental or physical). But neither of these two can obscure (the liberated yogi’s) true nature (svar¯upa) because he maintains a constant and steady awareness (vimar´sa, of it) so that when they arise he does not feel that they have anything to do with him (an¯aham . amat¯a) but experiences them as he does (the colour) blue or any other (external sensation) and not as does the fettered, whose subjective awareness (ahant¯a) is affected by it.

From a worldly view, absolute unity is not so far reached a concept. That all things are connected into a seamless whole upon the backdrop of time and space is self-evident. That one thing and another are connected by the same ‘thing’ that separates them is another example. What Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda said is that all these forms are made of the same substance of the Absolute. He did not say the forms have disappeared in substance, because they are all reflections of the Brahman upon which their appearance is dependent, but the delusion of them being independent entities, is over. If it were not so he would not have listed the things united nor would he care about how others are affected by his own conduct since none of it would exist at all, including himself as manifest Self (Vivekananda 1965 [1907], pp. 385, 388): This expression is what we call love and sympathy, and it is the basis of all our ethics and morality. This is summed up in the Vedanta philosophy by the celebrated aphorism, Tat Tvam Asi, “Thou art That”. To every man, this is taught: Thou art one with this Universal Being, and, as such, every soul that exists is your soul; and everybody that exists is your body; and in hurting anyone, you hurt yourself, in loving anyone, you love yourself. As soon as a current of hatred is thrown outside, whomsoever else is hurt, it also hurts yourself; and if love comes out from you, it is bound to come back to you. For I am the universe; this universe is my body. I am the Infinite, only I am not conscious of it now; but I am

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struggling to get this consciousness of the Infinite, and perfection will be reached when full consciousness of the Infinite comes.

The citation of Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda mirrors the content of the ¯I´s¯av¯asyopanis.ad. The conclusion that differentiation is an illusion from the view of absolute unity is like how Earth is seen as a sphere from space, but the horizon from the seashore still looks like a straight line. What it means is once we know the Earth is a sphere, the horizon’s appearance as flat rather than curved does not give conflicting realities, like Flat Earth society which must cast out the sphere for the horizon line. There is an aspect of being that does not ‘become’, but which is eternal, and we share that as our inner ‘self’ with everything else. This is the sameness referred to in Vivek¯ananda and conceptualised in Vedantic, ´ ı R¯amakr.s.n.a, recognising different paths Tantric and Vaishnava terms by Sr¯ suited different temperaments. For example, some of R¯amakr.s.n.a’s many descriptions (Nikhilananda 1942, pp. 148–150): No one can say with finality that God is only ‘this’ and nothing else. He is formless, and again He has forms. For the bhakta He assumes forms. But He is formless for the jñ¯ani, that is, for him who looks on the world as a mere dream. The bhakta feels that he is one entity and the world another. Therefore, God reveals Himself to him as a Person. But the jñ¯ani – the Ved¯antist – for instance, always reasons, applying the process of ‘Not this, Not this’. Through this discrimination he realises, by his inner perceptions that the ego and the universe are both illusory, like a dream…[…] The Saguna Brahman is meant for the bhaktas. In other words, a bhakta believes that God has attributes and reveals Himself to men as a Person, assuming forms… One can see His forms, and His formless aspect as well…[…] God has attributes, then again, He has none. Only the man who lives under the tree knows that the chameleon can appear in various colours, and he knows further, that the animal at times has no colour at all. It is the others who suffer from the agony of futile arguments.

Just as we are not our toes, the view of each yogic system, is we are not as beings, our bodies, minds or their contents, but consciousness. Already it is evident when discussing ‘consciousness’, that Indian philosophers have defined its different forms and grades which explain how the universal operates with regard to the relative. The lack of taxonomy otherwise makes it easy to mistake universal consciousness for psychological

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concepts like ordinary waking states. For example, to infer its absence due to contrast between the alert waking state to dreaming, deep sleep or coma. Or to think of the experience of universal consciousness as a product of psychotropic chemicals. Universal consciousness is not a kind of altered reality, rather the most ordinary thing of all, being always present even though it is not noticed, and the single continuity that enables all forms of biological, mental and transmental consciousness to occur. M¯ay¯a, according to Trika, is not only ignorance, but conceals and reveals the universal Self by reflecting the light of pure subjective selfawareness into ‘other’ and ‘Self’. It is another metaphor to think of this as a kind of filtration process where undivided immaterial consciousness becomes opaque or transparent to the self in accord with the purity of the awareness, or clarity of vision. A muddy mind will see turbidity or vrittis, whereas a clear mind will see pure ‘unrefined’ consciousness and/or/as the variegated manifestations of consciousness. In doing so, it is claimed that the consciousness intrinsic to all life forms is recognised within them. Here is where the citation of Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda, in James (1907) ties in: Where is any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the universe…this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything?…This separation between man and man, man and woman, man and child, nation from nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation between atom and atom is really the cause of all the misery, and the Ved¯anta says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It is merely apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is Unity still. If you go inside you find that Unity between man and man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor, the gods and men: all are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough, and he who has attained that has no more delusion…

James (1907) responds to the more extensive citation, with his analysis: Observe how radical the character of monism here is. Separation is not simply overcome by the One, it is denied to exist. There is no many. We are not parts of the One; it has no parts; and since in a sense we undeniably ARE, it must be that each of us is the One, indivisibly and total…surely, we have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has a high pragmatic value, it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of security […]

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The world’s oneness has generally been affirmed abstractly only, and as if anyone who questioned it must be an idiot. The temper of monists has been so vehement, as almost at times to be convulsive; and this way of holding a doctrine does not easily go with reasonable discussion and the drawing of distinctions. The theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to be an article of faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively. The One and All, first in the order of being and knowing, logically necessary to itself, and uniting all lesser things in the bonds of mutual necessity, how could it allow of any mitigation in its inner rigidity? The slightest suspicion of pluralism, the minutest wiggle of independence of any one of its parts from the control of totality, would ruin it […]

Radical is not an insult for James, author of Radical Empiricism. The problem is, the synopsis doesn’t properly represent the view of the cited, and the conclusion is that those who accept diversity or agency in unity corrupt the entire doctrine. Timalsina (2013, p. 197) explains the position ´ nkara of Sa ˙ in Advaita Ved¯anta: ´ nkara At the level of the Brahman, Sa ˙ wastes no time in discarding this “autonomous” agent, as the very concept of agency is a product of ignorance (avidy¯a) that needs to be shunned. The paradox generated by this view is apparent: when you are free (i.e., self-realized) you have no will to act, and when you have the will, your autonomy is compromised by avidy¯a and karma. As an agent in the form of the phenomenal self (j¯ıv¯atman), the subject is under its own spell and its powers are limited, while, from the position of the Brahman, there is just the non-dual awareness that does not retain any agency or action.

It matters for practical sake whether individuals act upon feeling that the divine acts through them, as them, does not act at all, or that they act alone, because if it were, for example the divine writing this and not an individual, then it would be, according to some, pre-ordained and not by personal choice. If the Brahman doesn’t act, then for those who perceive themselves as the Brahman, who act, like those who teach Advaita Ved¯anta, then is there any real philosophy? There is no rope or snake, nor real words, names and forms. What then is the use in talking? It is a method of negation, where what is not is pointed out, helping to whittle down what is, which is beyond words. The identity of the agent and actions it performs, or does not, depends entirely on the individual’s qualities, if attached to limited ahamk¯ara

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acting as a limited agent, and if not, those ascribed to the Self. In Trika, like Ved¯anta, the Self is fundamentally perfectly free, unobscured by differentiation. The agency of the liberated is by acting knowing one is the divine whilst incarnated in the form of a human being. For both, it is the divine, but in Trika, that includes phenomenon as manifest divinity because a real Self gives rise to a real world, even if it is a projection of consciousness, it is a real projection. What this means is the universal is free to act ‘as if’ an individual with personal free will of its ‘own being’ to determine one’s own destiny, employing the mind, perceptions and actions, although the choices made extend from a totally different level of awareness. When liberated individuals act, despite applying their own mortal faculties, the divine acts with them, as them and each experience of the objective world is just revelation of the divine. There is no separation and therefore, just as we can move our left foot without moving the right, the divine can act as individual and remain unchanged as the universal without altering the congruity of its universal status as absolutely free. Trika is integral monism and differs from the static conception of the absolute discussed in Advaita Ved¯anta. There is contention over whether ´ nkara the Brahman of Sa ˙ and that of Trika are identical. Pandey (1954, pp. 342–343) says they agree, but there is a dispute over words: The Universal Consciousness is purely subjective. Objectivity cannot be attributed to it, because such an attribution presupposes the existence of another knower, as different from and independent of it…The individual selves are mere manifestations of it and their acts of knowledge are wholly dependent on it. It is this very Universal Self which sees and knows through the innumerable bodies and as such is called the individual…On this point there is perfect agreement between the Pratiyabhijña and the Ved¯anta.

With respect to Advaita Ved¯anta, although the Absolute is deemed the state of perfect unity, that there is dualism, and dualistic perception is not denied, even if it is viewed as an ultimately incorrect worldview, like a rope seen as a snake. In Ved¯antas¯ara of S¯adananda (2006), Nikhilananda says: According to the monistic system of Ved¯anta, the world is not an actual, but apparent modification of Brahman. It has not actually changed into the world [i.e. it is a superimposition]…But the school of qualified monism, of which Ram¯anuja is the chief exponent, holds the universe to be an actual

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modification of Brahman. The entire universe and all individual selves are part and parcel of Brahman.

All who do not perceive the unity of totality, which means those who are not self-realised beings, are not, as James’ states, regarded as idiots, nor did Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda reject any other religion or worldview, seeing each as rivers flowing towards the same goal at various stages of spiritual development. There are many systems of evaluating students and gurus. ´ nkar¯ The Tattva Bodha (Sa ˙ acarya, Circa 9th C) lists three different types of jñ¯ana student: those with mind like a hot pan, upon which knowledge is poured only to become dissipated as steam; those with mind like a lotus leaf, where knowledge pools up for a little while only to fall out; and those with the mind of mother of pearl, where knowledge is absorbed, contemplated and emerges as a precious gem. None of these minds understand totality until they are Self-realised, and only one of them is an idiot. As for the alleged inability to reasonably discuss or draw distinctions, Advaita Ved¯anta has its critics, although it does rely upon both, albeit, not for realisation of Brahman which is beyond intellect. The same can be said for any other system of yoga which seeks the transmental. For an overview, Torella (2011, pp. 112–113) situates the still living tradition at around the fifth century and describes its texts as a polemic between Ved¯anta, S¯am . khya, Buddhism and Ny¯aya. Describing the absolute monism of Gaud.ap¯ada, in a manner consistent with James’ understanding of Ved¯anta, which is absolute monism, the ‘non-dual’ view ´ nkara of Sa ˙ is described in contrast: The world of duality is not pure nothingness, but the fruit of erroneous conceptual superimposition (adhy¯asa), which attributes to the sole absolute reality – the Brahman – features that are not proper to it…[…] The attempt to define the status of the world that appears to ordinary experience ends up absorbing most of the speculative effort of Ved¯anta thinkers. A general acceptation of two levels of reality and truth – abso´ nkara) lute (p¯aram¯arthika) and relative (vy¯avaharika) (as in the case of Sa ˙ or even of three with Gaud.ap¯ada… – involves a differentiation of methods and objectives. Rational argument is deemed incapable of leading to the absolute Brahman, access to which is given only by intimate experience wholly lacking any discursive representation…the affirmative parts of Ved¯anta doctrine provide almost exclusive exegesis of scriptural passages, while the use of reason is reserved for polemics with other schools.

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Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda’s teachings were not just those of Gaud.ap¯ada, nor ´ nkara. Sa ˙ He expressed the divine in numerous ways with many paths. By the revival of Advaita Ved¯anta after the sixteenth century, incorporation of elements from S¯am . khya and Yoga, including bhakti, and with it, deity worship are (Torella 2011, pp. 115–116) found in the work of Vijñ¯anabhiks.u, who offered an antidote to the more extreme posi´ nkar¯ tion of Sa ˙ acarya. This meant that the divine increased its presence in the phenomenal world, proximity to its devotees and clearly did not rely solely on scripture and viveka alone for realisation of the Brahman. Both ´ ı R¯amakrishna and Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda were devotees of the Goddess Sr¯ M¯a K¯al¯ı. It is this confluence in which modern Ved¯anta finds itself, having ´ ı Vidy¯a. incorporated from early days elements of other systems such as Sr¯ ´ In Pandey (1954, p. 151), Sankara ˙ is said to have accepted the authority of 64 Shaiva Tantras and to concur in effect with the doctrine of recognition called Pratyabhijñ¯a. What each system describes as the qualities of the absolute are not identical though. A static or dynamic Brahman being a major contention. Whilst James (1907) speaks highly of Advaita Ved¯anta for its ‘emotionally pragmatic value’, this description would be more suited to the bhakta, devotional model of oneness than the intellectual pursuit of jñ¯ana yoga in Ved¯anta which pays little heed to emotion, relying almost entirely on scripture and intellectual discrimination. Had James the opportunity to read The Complete Works of Sw¯ am¯ıVivek¯ ananda published the same year as his Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, it may have been possible to extend from those findings a well-defined, practical application of Indian Philosophy that might have mitigated issues foreseen by each of western modernity. Karma Yoga, the yoga of action, is a subject to which Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda devoted eight chapters. What it says of the pragmatism of spirituality is summed up here: You will find various classes of men in this world. First, there are the God-men, whose self-abnegation is complete, and who do only good to others even at the sacrifice of their own lives. These are the highest of men…Then there are the good men who do good to others so long as it does not injure themselves. And there is a third class who, to do good to themselves, injure others. It is said by a Sanskrit poet that there is a fourth unnameable class of people who injure others merely for injury’s sake…They do not gain anything thereby but it is their nature to do evil. […]

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Although a man has not studied a single system of philosophy, although he does not believe in any god, and never has believed, although he has not prayed even once in his life, if the simple power of good action has brought him to that state where he is ready to give up his life and all else for others, he has arrived at the same point to which the religious man will come through his prayers and the philosopher through his knowledge…so you may find that the philosopher, the worker and the devotee, all meet at one point, that one point being self-abnegation.

If there is no application of knowledge upon lived experience, it is incomplete, reproductive rather than genuine knowing. There are those with knowledge who deliberately hurt others, and those without it who are peaceful and giving. What is good and bad cannot be simplified. Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda (1965 [1907], p. 83) said: To take the nearest example: I am talking to you, and some of you perhaps think I am doing good; and at the same time I am perhaps killing thousands of microbes in the atmosphere; I am thus doing evil to something else…you may call my speaking to you very good, but the microbes will not; the microbes you do not see, but you yourselves you do see…He who in good action sees that there is something evil in it, and in the midst of evil sees that there is something good in it somewhere, has known the secret of work.

Compare this to how simple things cause widescale change in the phenomenon of emergence (Melchert, 2011): Emergence refers to the way that complex patterns rise out from the multiplicity of simple interactions in complex systems… “An emergent phenomenon is one whose characteristics or behaviors cannot be explained in terms of the sum of its parts; if mind is emergent, then it cannot be explained by the brain.”

Let’s say for pragmatic appeal we include concern for micro-organisms in the human body and the “evil” done to them unawares, to show how hurting ‘others’ we can’t see, can impact on our health, including the mind: …viruses and bacteria, by virtue of inflammatory processes being activated, and the downstream actions on many hormones, brain neurotransmitters, and growth factors, may contribute to several psychological disturbances

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as well as a great number of physical disorders. To a significant extent, common mechanisms account for these varied conditions, and may be responsible for the frequent comorbidities that are seen amongst illnesses. Increasingly, the significance of infection in relation to mental illnesses has been acknowledged. Methods to prevent or control infection are thus essential in this capacity, but as we’ll see, the very best treatments to ameliorate bacterial infection may destroy commensal gut bacteria, leading to the emergence or exacerbation of other illnesses. Clearly, the sword cuts both ways. (Anisman et al. 2018, pp. 78–79)

In conclusion, there is merit to seeing between wholes and parts as well as being challenged to intuit their “more than sums” while directly facing the middle ground. In spiritual life, there is a need to bear in mind the absolute toward which the yogi aims, without losing sight of the part, the individual self, and its continuity with other parts, which make up systems. The cultivation of self toward the higher Self, means integrating into the scope of practical application, matters we may not initially be able to fully expand upon with empirical evidence or reason due to the subjectivity of experience. That there is a higher Self, an aspect beyond the limited ego, might be accepted as a matter of faith until there is evidence to the contrary. In doing so, Karma Yoga is one of many yogic paths transforming ordinary activities to increase meritorious action by concern, not only for things we can see, but with awareness that we cannot see all things, nor can we know the degree to which our actions will contribute to the destiny of humanity. Sw¯ami Vivek¯ananda (1965 [1907], p. 82) said “..in doing evil, first we open ourselves up to all the evil forces surrounding us; secondly we create evil which affects others, may be hundreds of years hence”. In the same way, good actions, carefully measured so that their trajectories are aligned within the parameters we have agency to control, can benefit others too, hundreds of years hence. It is important to understand the self and its instruments, which is always the start point of the arrow we shoot toward the future. Taking care of words, actions and thoughts with awareness that these can alter conditions for others, that culture and nature return our pollutants back to us in time, and for future generations for all beings. Thinking about tiny things, unseen things and imagining greatness beyond our perceptual capacity cannot be relegated to the non-pragmatic simply on the account James employs that it isn’t tangibly accessible on face value to non-mystics. Training the eyes to see that ‘seeing thread’ James refers

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to is the pragmatic solution to the verbal convolutions entailed in rationally describing highly complex orders of reality. Metaphors and analogies can help us to imagine complexity, but we know that non-linear complex systems, living things, like the self, the mind, the body, consciousness and the agency of individuals acting in invariable ways, are irreducible to their linear, atomic and molecular parts and sums. Rather than dwelling on absolutes, therefore Sw¯am¯ı Vivek¯ananda agrees in practice, if not overarching methodology, with James, that binary choices between absolute unity or absolute plurality can not of themselves, in theory, make of us good people or shift humanity toward any kind of substantial “betterment”. Even when Mill did not intend to do so, his role in extending the concept of “good” by promoting certain, but not all aspects of British Administration upon India, urges reflection on how oversight of harms increases confidence in application of “goodness” via excessive ‘rationalism’. Liberal theories can benefit from the notion of freedom within yogic theory by adding to the exterior freedoms of civil society, the realm of spiritual practice towards inner freedom. Spiritually, if persons are internally bound, they cannot fully unfold as beings, and must be perpetually shaped by outer forces into becoming what culture demands of them. By neglecting spiritual pragmatism in these examples, Mill and James have unwittingly contributed to an attitude of infantilization towards the east. Knowing, in each Advaita Ved¯anta and Trika, demands ‘seeing’ directly, as insight, in the same way as the ‘seeing’ thread that James imagines unifies the entire universe. In aligning with that universal vision, the identity trappings that govern our actions are cast off to reveal that the same self that sees through our own eyes, also sees through those of others. And serving others is, in this way, also serves ourselves both toward and following liberation. In this way, the parts are harmonised with the whole in non-linear ways, with open-ended outcomes, where rewards and failings are viewed concurrently and evenly, where maximising pleasure and minimising pain for oneself, cease to be the primary agenda.

Notes i. “Chitta: ‘Mind or consciousness…to be conscious’… Self-realisation presupposes the involution of the primary constituents of qualities of prakriti [‘insentient’ matter]. Like all other aspects of the insentient cosmos, consciousness undergoes continual change, and from the yogic viewpoint its

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most important modifications are the five kids of fluctuation (vritti): accurate cognition, erroneous knowledge, conceptualisation, sleep and memory. These must be stopped in order to actualise higher states of awareness (Feuerstein 1997, pp. 92–93).” ´ ı Abhinavagupta (10–11th C) of Kashmir ii. Trika is generally attributed to Sr¯ and forms the apex system of monistic Shaivism developed in that region drawing and expanding from texts that established concepts like spanda and pratiyabhijñ¯a. Scholars renamed this system Kashmir Shaivism, although this is not the name given by its authors. Citing Abhinavagupta’s epic synthesis, the Tantr¯aloka, Pandey (1954, pp. 295–296) explains: It is called Trika for the following reasons:-¯ 1. In all, there are ninety-two Agamas recognised by this system. Of these the triad, (Trika) consisting of the Siddh¯a, the N¯amaka and the M¯alin¯ı, is the most important. The system is called Trika because its chief authority is this triad. 2. According to this system, there are three triads, the higher, the lower ´ and the combined (Para, Apara and Par¯apara). The first consists of Siva, ´Sakti and their union; the second of Siva, ´ ´Sakti and Nara; and the third of three goddesses Par¯a, Apar¯a and Par¯apar¯a. It is called Trika because it deals with all three of these triads. 3. It is called so for another reason also, names that it explains all the three aspects of knowledge, viz. absolute oneness (abheda), predominantly oneness (bhed¯abheda), and duality (bheda) in the light of its monistic theory (abhedav¯ada). Further the word “Trika” is used for the Kula system also which is also ´ astra… called S.ad.ardha S¯

References Anisman, H., S. Hayley, and A. Kusnecov. 2018. “Chapter 3—Bacteria, Viruses, and the Microbiome.” In The Immune System and Mental Health, edited by H. Anisman, S. Hayley, and A. Kusnecov, 77–102. San Diego: Academic Press. Cornelissen, M. 2012. “Sri Aurobindo’s Evolutionary Ontology of Consciousness.” In Consciousness, Indian Psychology and Yoga, edited by K. C. Joshi, Matthijs Cornelissen, and A. K. Sen Gupta, vol. XI. New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilisations. De Michelis, E. 2014. History of Modern Yoga: Patanjali and Western Esotericism. Retrieved from http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullre cord.aspx?p=564231.

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Dyczkowski, M. 2004. Self Awareness, Own Being and Egoity. In A Journey in the World of the Tantras. Varanasi: Indica. ´ ´ ———., ed. 2007. The Aphorisms of Siva: The Siva S¯ utra with Bh¯ askara’s Commentary, the V¯ arttika. Varanasi, India: Indica. Feuerstein, G. 1997. The Encyclopedia of Yoga and Tantra, 2nd ed. London: Shambhala. James, W. 2014 [1907]. Pragmatism: A New Name For Some Old Ways of Thinking. From University of Adelaide. https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/j/ james/william/pragmatism/lecture4.html. Lakshmanjoo, S. 2011. The Vijñ¯ ana Bhairava Tantra. Edited by J. Hughes. New Delhi, India: Munshiram Manoharlal. ———., ed. 2013. Bhagavad Gita In the Light of Kashmir Shaivism: Revealed by Swami Laksmanjoo. Delhi, India: Ishwar Ashram Trust. Melchert, T. P. 2011. “5—The Biopsychosocial Approach: General Systems, Nonlinear Dynamical Systems, and Complexity Theory.” In Foundations of Professional Psychology, edited by T. P. Melchert, 57–76. London: Elsevier. Mill, J. S. 1957 [1910]. Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government. London: J.M. Dent and Sons. Nikhilananda, S. 1942. The Gospel of Ramakrishna: Translated into English with and Introduction by Swami Nikhilananda. Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math. Nikhilananda, S. 2006. Ved¯ antas¯ ara of S¯ adananda. Uttaranchal: Advaita Ashram. Pandey, K. C. 1954. Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. ´ nkar¯ Sa ˙ acarya, A. (Circa 9th C). Tattwa Bodha. Tiruvannamalai: Samvit Sagar. ´ ananda, S. (u.d). ¯ Sarv¯ I´s¯ av¯ asyopanis.ad. Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math. Singleton, M. 2005. Salvation Through Relaxation: Proprioceptive Therapy and its Relationship to Yoga. Journal of Contemporary Religion 20 (3): 289–304. ´ nkara.” Timalsina, S. 2013. “Self, Causation, and Agency in the Advaita of Sa ˙ In Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, 186–209. New York: Oxford University Press. Torella, R. 2011. The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal. Varanasi: Indica. Tunick, M. 2006. Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill’s Defense of British Rule in India. The Review of Politics 68 (4): 586–611. Vivekananda, S. 1965 [1907]. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. Calcutta, India: Advaita Ashram.

CHAPTER 5

Peterson vs. Žižek on the Evolution of Consciousness and Happiness: From Pragmatism to Sarkar’s Tantra Justin M. Hewitson

Mystics and philosophers across the ages have interrogated ideological systems in search of truth and the good life. Although the human desire for less suffering and more happiness stems from over a million years of our evolving consciousness, the empirical sciences have failed to quantify consciousness or uncover a source of permanent happiness. Objective studies struggle with the epiphenomenal subjectivity of consciousness even as the postmodern reification of a decentered, culturally constructed dualistic subjectivity has devalued mystical ontologies of consciousness. This episteme is changing as contemporary debates about happiness reinvoke our ancestral religious and spiritual philosophies. The sold-out 2019 debate, “Happiness: Marxism vs Capitalism,” between Slavoj Žižek and

J. M. Hewitson (B) Education Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_5

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Jordan Peterson exemplifies the re-engagement of postmodern philosophers and social critics with the dialectical and spiritual spectrum of consciousness. Peterson is an evolutionary clinical psychologist and the bestselling author of 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos. His book offers a pragmatic psychological guide to implementing ancient Western ideas about “virtues” that Aristotle, amongst other ancient thinkers, held “most conducive to happiness in life” (Peterson et al. 2018: xx). Žižek, the other party to the debate, is the most interviewed and polemical Marxist lecturer of psychoanalysis alive. Terry Eagleton has called Žižek the most “brilliant” and formidable “exponent of psychoanalysis, indeed of cultural theory in general, to have emerged in Europe for some decades” (2003: xiv). Attendees paid up to US$1500 to hear these high-profile academics debate the economics of happiness. The critique of economic theory turned towards religious belief when Žižek described the tragic diremption of human consciousness from God consciousness. The shift from economic culturalism to individual responsibility and religiosity occurs after he expresses doubts about people living under repressive regimes being able to apply Peterson’s maxim, “Set your house in perfect order before you criticize the world” (2018: 147). Peterson’s response is a pragmatic psychological deconstruction of the Judeo-Christian fall of consciousness as a model of suffering and redemption and an archetypal story about the separation of human consciousness (ipseity) from God consciousness (Aseity). He argues the idealized (but ultimately impossible) objective of Christian religiosity is to reunite with Aseity. This purpose guides individuals to make spiritually centered ethical decisions that grant occasional happiness in a world filled with suffering. Millions consider Peterson’s strategy for happiness compelling, but few recognize that William James’s pragmatic philosophy and religious argument in The Will to Believe greatly influenced Peterson’s religious pragmatism. James argues that religious intuition should not be blindly discarded by philosophers and that “our belief in truth itself … that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other” entails considering “passional” religious belief because abandoning the question, as materialists decree, “is attended with the same risk of losing the truth” (1896: 832). Peterson states in one of his university lectures that “Pragmatism is the most sophisticated branch of philosophy” because it makes

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minimal claims about ultimate knowledge of truth; rather, our knowledge of truth is commensurate with ideas that successfully predict the outcome of particular actions — until we discover a better predictor” (2016). Across the eons people have cared most about those predictions which minimize suffering and maximize happiness. From this perspective, all epistemic disciplines are essentially pragmatic attempts to increase knowledge that can counter the challenges of human existence. As a pragmatic thinker who follows James’s religious hypothesis, Peterson is less of an apologist for Christian doctrine than his public persona suggests: his vision of ultimate truth echoes ideas about Indian monism that James inherited from his godfather as the founder of American Transcendentalism, Ralph Waldo Emerson. Žižek mostly ignores Peterson’s pragmatic religious argument; instead, he raises the ghost of totalitarian ideologues that distorted Tantra-Yoga and Zen Buddhism to cause some of World War II’s worst horrors. Heinrich Himmler used the Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a ’s philosophy to encourage Nazi brutalities, and Zen Buddhists supported Japan’s wartime aggression by training Japanese soldiers to detach from the act of killing. If Žižek’s closing exemplars of abusing spirituality convinced his audience (many applauded), it was not his philosophical rigor but uninformed fear that overwhelmed a rational response. Although Peterson and Žižek are globally recognized experts in psychoanalysis, neither of them are Indologists. Peterson has briefly considered Buddhism and Yoga in his earliest book, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief , and Žižek’s anecdote about Nazi Germany’s interest in Indian spirituality is historically accurate. Nevertheless, Žižek’s Marxist outlook and self-avowed pessimism about the totalitarian use of spirituality, Indian or otherwise, is used to suggest that deep engagement with spiritual philosophy and its praxes will only increase suffering. The tensions between Žižek’s atheism and Peterson’s pragmatic JudeoChristian philosophy parallel James’s argument with W. K. Clifford 124 years earlier about transcendental versus empirical epistemes. As a logical positivist, Clifford denounced religious belief in “The Ethics of Belief,” claiming that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (James 1896: 830). James responded in The Will to Believe that Clifford’s criticism of “religious faith as scientifically unprovable, therefore erroneous” was simply another form of bias. James was profoundly disturbed about the negative consequences

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of abandoning the propensity to religious belief that “resides deep in one’s nature and involves a tenacious ‘passional need’” (Brown 2000: 39, 41). In this regard, Žižek and materialists consider metaphysical systems like those taught by Krishna to Arjuna in the Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a to be baseless because they are empirically unquantifiable, so prone to error. However, spiritual pragmatists caution against the blind dismissal of “belief” states given their “important effect on intellectual inquiry itself” (Brown 2000: ´ 7). For example, Siva Tantra recognizes that religious inclinations may guide seekers towards practicing more disciplined spiritual meditations that potentially reveal the fundamental connection between expanding their consciousness and permanent peace. Considering this pragmatic spiritual argument, I respond to Žižek’s criticism of Indian spirituality ´ by examining P. R. Sarkar’s Siva Tantra. Its monistic ontology offers a theory of causal consciousness that succeeds where Christian, Marxist, and empirical theory fail by defining permanent happiness in terms of consciousness itself. Tantra provides a pragmatic answer to what Michael Schwartz eloquently describes as the “rub between non-dual perfection and dualistic imperfection, igniting the holy sparks: an incessant murmur that ‘there ought to be something better, something more’” (2015: 382). tantra constructs a life of increasing happiness that flows from the gradual illumination of consciousness as it expands beyond ideological materialism and religious beliefs to enter its transcendental apotheosis in Metaseity. As the endless quest for philosophical praxes that accurately represent truth and actualize happiness remains our primary concern, this essay first deconstructs Peterson’s responses to Žižek regarding the biblical devolution of consciousness and religious belief. By linking Peterson’s psychological appraisal of consciousness to James’s religious pragmatism, it is demonstrated that Christianity’s orthodox separation of the individual from God entrenches Cartesian duality, thus suffering. The second half of this essay addresses Žižek’s appraisal of Indian mysticism per the Nazis regime’s misuse of the Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a contrasted with P. R. Sarkar’s exegesis of the text’s Tantric philosophy. Sarkar clarifies the spiritual symbolism of Krishna’s Sanskrit name in the G¯ıt¯ a. He explains that Krishna was a Tantric avatar who taught the s¯ adhan¯ as (meditations) and ethics that lead to moks.a—the complete liberation of consciousness from all desire by attaining the infinity of Nirgun.a Brahma (my term for this

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is Metaseity).1 Sarkar’s soteriology sees each particle of the universe as a modified form of consciousness, and ipseity’s intrinsic propensity of expansion sets it on a gradual evolutionary path that returns ipsiety to its infinite state in Metaseity. Ipseity’s inherent motility is the cause of the mind’s ceaseless desire to perceive new phenomena, which humans associate with temporary happiness. For Sarkar, the process of realizing any human desire is also “the story of a journey” into consciousness ¯ itself (Anandam¯ urti 2010: 205).2 I conclude that as the Christian narrative denies spiritual transcendence (humanity is irrevocably separated from perfection), it struggles to stand the philosophical test of James’s spiritual pragmatism. I also propose that Sarkar’s Tantric ontology succeeds as a pragmatic monistic philosophy because it is grounded in meditative experiences that validate ipseity’s innate capacity to expand and fully transcend suffering.

Peterson’s Christian Pragmatism and the Devolution of Consciousness The religious discussion between Peterson and Žižek highlights Richard Rorty’s concern in “Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture” about the negative changes to American philosophy when philosophers distanced themselves from transcendentalism. American “social scientists and philosophers” tried to demonstrate “that they could be as thoroughly and exclusively professional, and preferably mathematical, as the natural scientists” (emphasis added, 1982: 63). On the one hand, Peterson follows Rorty’s example of George Santayana’s Kantian “transcendentalism” and the philosophy of “relativity and open possibility” that Santayana admired in Emerson. Santayana wanted to take “both scientific truth and religious truth with full seriousness and weave them together into something new — transcendental philosophy — which was higher than science, purer than religion, and truer than both” (68). On the other hand, Žižek’s opposition to spiritual transcendentalism shadows John Dewey and Bertrand Russell’s admonition against “idealistic speculations,” which led to the form of “cultural criticism” present in literature studies today (68). Rorty argues that postmodern social sciences have 1 Sanskrit translations are mine unless referenced. 2 P. R Sarkar also published under Anandam¯ ¯ urti.

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become primarily concerned with teaching the “presentness of the past, because history, philosophy and religion have withdrawn as agents from the Scene of Instruction” (68). Žižek’s cultural criticism betrays this divorce of the “agonized conscience” from “transcendentalist culture,” since examining the transcendental may be construed as “metaphysical comfort,” rather than science or professionalized philosophy. Rorty argues it is preferable not to reject possibilities even if they stem from transcendental sources. As such, Peterson’s pragmatic psychology imbibes the spirit of Sidney Hook’s pragmatism as a “theory and practice of enlarging human freedom in a precarious and tragic world by the arts of intelligent social control” that may lead to unity when there is a “culture which is transcendentalist through and through, whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere” (69–70). Reading Peterson’s evolutionary analysis of the Christian archetypal religious narrative reveals Indian transcendental systems that historically examined the ethical ramifications of human desire. When Žižek references G. K. Chesterton’s Orthodoxy in connection with the biblical fall, the debate shifts from cultural Marxism and capitalism towards religion and spirituality. Althoug he ignores Chesterton’s thesis supporting Christian belief, Žižek’s subsequent comments suggest he sides with Chesterton’s analysis of the variances between JudeoChristian and Indian traditions. Chesterton claims the difference between Buddhist and Christian art reveals the gap between their ideology and methodology: paintings of Christian and Buddhist saints depict the latter looking with a “peculiar intentness inwards” while “the Christian is staring with a frantic intentness outwards” (1909: 241). Chesterton claims that Buddhism seeks the ultimate union of the fractured cosmos into one—a concept that he sees siding with “modern pantheism and immanence.” Christianity, however, sides with “humanity and liberty and love” because “love desires personality; therefore love desires division” (emphasis added, 243). The greatest breach between Buddhist and Christian ontology is that “for the Buddhist or Theosophist, personality is the fall of man” but for the “Christian it is the purpose of God, the whole point of his cosmic idea.” This demarcation is clearly articulated in the fall and the crucifixion. When God creates humanity, he separates it “in order that he might love it” (emphasis added, 243). Žižek takes this cue when says that “other religions” describe how humanity “falls from God” and how humanity attempts to re-ascend the vertical “through spirituality,

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training, good deeds and so on” (2:11:53). Žižek does not articulate the process of restoration, but subsequent references suggest he considers the evolution of consciousness as something akin to Tantra’s transcendental theory. Žižek also borrows from Chesterton by stating that Christianity mainly differs from other religions as its disciples are freed only when they “discover” that their “distance” from “God is inscribed into God himself” (2:12:18). The crucifixion is therefore “absolutely unique,” for when Jesus asks, “Father why have you abandoned me? God becomes an atheist himself” (2:12:42). Chesterton says that “when the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven” it was not caused by the crucifixion but by the “cry from the cross: the cry which confessed that God was forsaken of God” (254). Perhaps the Judeo-Christian perspective that “happiness is not some blissful union but the very struggle and fall, itself” resonates with Žižek’s Marxist dialecticism because Žižek notes his horror at the idea of Ray Kurzweil’s “singularity” (2:13:15). In “Four Discourses, Four Subjects,” he also articulates the “well known opposition between” two ideas about God: God who is the ruler of creation versus a God who is the sole reality (Žižek 1998: 84). It is worthwhile interjecting here that Tantra offers an alternative that is discussed in the final section of this essay: Aseity’s supreme “Advaita” or monistic subjectivity includes ´ the “eternal coexistence of Siva and Shakti [Prakriti] which constitute the ´ Absolute” (Singh 2010: xi). Siva consciousness (Metaseity) is unqualified consciousness and Shakti (prakriti) is its potential force that qualifies consciousness. Like the appearance of fire with heat, the Absolute and its property are inseparable. The illusion of duality is due to our limited consciousness not a de facto state. Religious belief and transcendental monism necessarily disturb the hysteresis of postmodern constructivism that seeks to fossilize consciousness in plurality. This interaction exposes the key difference between Žižek’s Marxist understanding of self-realization and happiness on the one hand versus Petersons or Sarkar’s on the other. Marxism denies all paths to singularity: “Western Marxism,” Žižek states, has constantly searched for “other social actors who could play the role of the revolutionary agent” to allow “the working class” to “complete the passage from in-itself to for-itself” (Žižek 2018). Žižek’s observations about the biblical devolution of consciousness segue into his question about Peterson’s emphasis on “personal change.” Is it not true that a “North

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Korean” will discover their personal problems and unhappiness are due to social forces? (2:14:26). At the heart of this question is the Marxist construction of identity in terms of socio-historical forces. If Marxism claims any notion about happiness, it likely stems from the individual’s recognition of the pervasive material and social forces shaping their amorphous identity, Marxismt philosophy therefore repress any and all transcendental ideologies that deny its vision of duality. Tantra refutes the possibility of lasting happiness when social theories are allowed to repress religious or spiritual inclinations. These longings are nothing less than the byproducts of ipseity’s quintessential capacity to expand, and mysticism is the dharma (innate nature) of consciousness to evolve toward Metaseity. Our experiences of temporality in combination with intuitional meditations that train ipseity to exceed the boundaries of mind and social identity indicate that all limitations—including Marxist dualisms—are impermanent. While ipseity certainly exists in and encounters the phenomenal world through mind, its ultimate source of consciousness is not generated by duality. Rather, Metaseity is simultaneously container and contained, the absolute perfection of infinity and the imperfection of duality. Tantric philosophy proposes that if understanding truth decides the quality of lasting human happiness, our collective philosophical responsibility is to elevate spiritually pragmatic ideologies that mediate suffering by presenting ipseity with its true source. In this vein, Peterson argues that this imperative is the source of archetypal religious narratives as historical representations of how humanity fashions meaning from chaos through the intuition of a greater divine permanence. And his response to Žižek’s question about individual responsibility is based on the outlines of James’s pragmatic religious argument in The Will to Believe. Peterson’s psychological interpretation of the biblical fall is influenced by James’s polemical religious hypothesis that the best things are eternal, and belief in the eternal can measurably enrich human life in the present (James 1896: 843). Many of James’s critics ignored the intellectual basis of his claims and charged him with “wishful thinking” (Brown 2000: 7). Charles Sanders Pierce and John Dewey, the two other founders of American Pragmatism, attacked The Will to Believe for its seeming unphilosophical reification of temporary or palliative good over the actual truth of propositions (2000: 31). Still more logicians saw James’s hypothesis that truth is opaque to human experience as unreasonably justifying accepting any expedient belief without enough reflection. James felt these

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criticisms misconstrued his message. He upheld Plato’s teachings in the Gorgias that there was always “the possibility of knowledge being no more than true belief” in instances where the a priori evidence was not fully understood (Santas 1990: 45–46). In said instances, philosophers must follow reason, including examining the “intellectual root for religious belief” and religious claims themselves (Brown 2000: 36). Moreover, Hunter Brown argues that James wanted to highlight “the significance of abandoning or prohibiting the development of certain existing beliefs or propensities to believe, not in creating them” when he contested Clifford’s claim in “The Ethics of Belief” that religious belief was dangerous (2000: 39). James therefore analyzed the potentialities of religious beliefs, regardless of their empirical status, vis-à-vis the real possibility of greater good whenever important ethical decisions were at stake. First of all, he said that empiricists who insisted on adopting skepticism towards belief in the eternal without quantifiable evidence entertained a more debilitating kind of irrationalism than religious thinkers as materialists considered it “better [to] risk loss of truth than chance of error” in all things. The dread of error from the “religious hypothesis” did not reflect an empirical “intellect against all passions” but an “intellect with one passion laying down its law” (1896: 844). James’s critique of empirical ideology is equally pertinent to contemporary scientific hypotheses that argue the electrochemical responses of the brain as create consciousness yet ignore the intangible subjectivity of the consciousness that induces these responses. In short, the effect becomes the cause and vice versa. It is also worth considering Richard H. Robinson suggestion that we might “suspend judgment on the thesis that the structure of right thought and the structure of reality [consciousness] are identical” because all claims to objectivity in the sense of the “modern logician’s use of ‘logic’” are senseless when discussing a “logic of nature” (1967: 12). Robinson also notes there has long been a “peculiar logic of mystical discourse that contradicts or abrogates the logic of rational discourse” (13). The status quo is that scientists are unable to directly examine the mental phenomena of a conscious subject nor scientifically disprove non-dual states of consciousness in meditators. Peterson’s pragmatic methodology to this dilemma is to seek a balance between dialectical and transcendental discourses by directly appealing to the effect of religious belief on our experiences of happiness.

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Peterson’s deconstruction of Žižek’s description of Christ’s atheism on the cross exemplifies James’s motivations; his concern is not the historical accuracy of Christ’s passion but the value derived from believing in it. Here I attempt to streamline the somewhat disjointed structure of his necessarily extemporaneous argument in the debate. Peterson first proposes that God’s moment of doubt on the cross is remarkably merciful as an “archetypal story” of the unbearable “burden of life,” so even “God” despairs about the essential quality of being (2:17:39). He continues that the story of humanity’s separation from God is the fall of human consciousness that catalyzes our knowledge of good and evil. Embedded within the narrative of the fall is a psycho-religious map to new meaning that mitigates the suffering of our permanent separation from God. He suggests that all psychotherapies (much like religions) help individuals develop resilience to suffering by conceiving of something better and confronting obstacles to that end. Christianity sees all individuals in a “fallen state” striving for some “higher” being (2:18:55). The “central psychological message of the Fall” is that “knowledge of good and evil” open a route to “maximum meaning” as “part of the process of redemption” through absolute “individual responsibility.” He also derives an answer to Žižek from Carl Jung: “if you take a personal problem seriously enough you will simultaneously solve the social problem” (2:20:33). When our unconditional “instinct for meaning” seeks a way out of the chaos of existence, it creates archetypal religious beliefs that are “guided by truth.” He closes with the statement that that “the pathway to that [truth] is the phenomenology of meaning,” and the “secondary consequence” of following such a path is occasional happiness. (Peterson 2019). This shows that Peterson adopts James’s idea that our instinct for truth is contingent on the meaning we attribute to consciousness itself . The effects of spiritual pragmatism and ancient Greek ideas on Peterson’s preceding perspective appear in his first book, Maps of Meaning. He notes that every new idea originates from ancient myths that “prepare the ground for explicit understanding” (1999: 234). The book also reflects James’s argument that as “certain existing beliefs or propensities to believe” are infrangibly a part of human psyche, one can “defend the intellectual integrity” of examining the “evidential merits” for such beliefs in the “pursuit of truth” (Brown 2000: 40–41). Since objective truth transcends empirical understanding, the more relevant question for most people is what should be done in ethical situations—something

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that science “by its very methodologies refuses to answer (2016).” For Peterson, “our most fundamental maps of experience” have a “narrative structure” which reveal “the motivational value of our current state” contrasted with “a hypothetical ideal.” This is “accompanied by plans of action, which are all pragmatic notions about how to get what we want” (1999: 30). Religious narratives serve this purpose by linking present actions to a future mythic union whereby “consciousness and unconsciousness” and “all conceivable pairs of opposites and contradictory forces exist together – within the … omnipotent and altogether mysterious God.” Moreover, religious stories articulate the route to the “fountainhead of everything” that is simultaneously “the resting-place and destination point for all” (1999: 116). Although Žižek and Peterson seem to agree that Christianity considers this fountainhead unreachable, Peterson’s reference in Maps of Meaning to one of James’s poems suggests otherwise. The poem, inspired by Emerson, resonates with Tantric monism introduced earlier in this chapter not Christian duality. Hunter Brown states that James was “deeply countercultural in his understanding of religion and its consequences,” (2000: 8). Like Emerson, he believed that all spiritual experiences point to a hidden transcendence. The intimate familial and philosophical relationship James inherited from Emerson should not be underestimated. Eugene Taylor’s “The Spiritual Roots of James’s Varieties of Religious Experience” reminds us that Emerson was James’s godfather. Emerson’s transcendental philosophy was remarkably eclectic, and he believed that Boston Unitarianism could be reinvigorated by Indian and Neoplatonic philosophy. Unsurprisingly, the spiritual sources of “William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, a work first published in 1902, begins with the first salvo of the transcendentalist movement, launched in 1821.” Emerson’s ideas are not only present in the “literary and intellectual origins of the work” but also “the genesis in James’s mind” of a “perspective” on “the nature of human experience.” And his intuition has many similarities with Sarkar’s source of mysticism: James writes, “God, or whatever we take to be the divine, comes to us not through what is above and outside, but through our innards — through our spiritual interiors; through what is highest and most holy in ourselves” (2002: xv). Peterson notes that James felt compelled to poeticize this inner truth: “No verbiage can give it, because the verbiage is other, Incoherent, coherent — same. And it fades! And its infinite! AND it’s infinite! …” His poem ends with the line, “Every attempt at betterment, — every attempt at otherment — is — It

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fades forever and forever as we move” (quoted in Peterson 1999: 116). This transcendental sentiment echoes Emerson’s earlier writing: “Man is a stream whose source is hidden … we live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silent; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE” (Emerson and Atkinson 2000: 237). Perhaps these lines mean that all understanding of Metaseity is necessarily subjective never substantive because mind’s temporal experiences of change stem from phenomenal duality. However, those who merge with Metaseity instantaneously surpass phenomenal reality and have no access to thought or language. Peterson supports his position on archetypical myths about the fall of consciousness that describe “the development of self-consciousness as voluntary, though prearranged, in a sense, by the gods” via a discussion of Buddhism (1999: 239). I question his claim that the Buddha’s story is the “greatest ‘literary’ production of the East.” Nevertheless, Peterson’s idea that its “theme” parallels Genesis’s “Judeo-Christian tale of redemption” following the Fall of Adam and Eve does reflect a pragmatic argument. He describes how Gautama Buddha decided to meditate in a forest while seeking “a truth that would serve life, that would redeem human experience” or die trying. Gautma’s experience of Nirv¯ an.a produced his four noble truths about suffering and freedom. For Peterson, the Buddha became a true “revolutionary hero” by refusing to remain in that liberated state and returning the world to “disseminate the knowledge” of his realization about the self. While the biblical fall “informs the most fundamental levels of Western sensibility,” this Western idea of the self is compatible with some Buddhist theory: ipseity is a flawed image of divinity for Christians and an illusion of ´s¯ unyat¯ a (Metaseity) for Buddhists (1999: 233). In this manner, Indian and Western religious myths and spiritual accounts become the “birthplace of conscious abstract knowledge.” They establish the basis for a “description of the subject of experience” that is “essentially incomprehensible,” and in so doing, different cultures gather “metaphoric representations” of the noumenal cause to satisfy our desire for purpose (234). Given the foregoing argument, I will set aside my hesitation regarding Peterson’s understanding of Buddhist teleology, although later Buddhist schools do reference deities, and now turn to Tantra’s explanation of ipseity’s innate expansive quality in relation to mysticism and suffering. Researchers or practitioners might also question Peterson’s idea that the

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Buddha lost access to Nirv¯ an.a as he could enter asamprajñ¯ atasam¯ adhi or “unqualified trance” during meditation, but I agree with Peterson’s seminal proposition that recognizing the fall of consciousness is “the same process that rebuilds out of [life’s] wreckage, something stronger” (240). Moving forward, this essay responds to Žižek’s Marxist critique of Indian spirituality in the Bhagavad Git¯ a by examining the Git¯ a ’sTantra-based philosophy of consciousness and happiness.

ˇ zek’s ˇ Tantra’s Response to Zi Critique of Indian Spirituality I noted earlier that Peterson and Žižek are undeniably high-profile psychoanalysts but are not indologists. While the collision of American pragmatism and Marxism highlights the interaction between religious belief, consciousness, and truth, Žižek does not use philosophical reason to counter Peterson’s argument but instead offers an anecdote about Nazi appropriation of the G¯ıt¯ a ’s philosophy. Žižek’s reference is historically relevant yet entirely ignores millennia of canonical literature and emic commentary that speak to Tantra-Yogic philosophy and praxes. He concludes the debate after Peterson’s analysis of the fall by pointing out that spirituality has historically enabled totalitarian ideologies. His commentary begins around two hours and thirty-six minutes into the official video. First, he notes that religious belief and even the “highest” Indian spiritual realizations have been historically distorted by totalitarian ideologues who claim that “the true greatness is to do what you individually think is wrong for the higher cause.” For example, Heinrich Himmler of the SS understood the challenge of getting Germans to commit wholesale genocide. His initial solution was to proclaim that anybody could do bad things to serve the state, but only “a truly great man” would willingly “lose his soul and do horrible things for his country.” German officers and later communist leaders were taught that their “highest ethical duty” was to overcome any hesitation as “bourgeois sentimentality.” Žižek’s worries about marrying political and religious ideology to create “false meaning or narratives” to cover up atrocities are undeniable, yet by critiquing Himmler’s second solution vis-à-vis Indian spirituality and the Bhagavad Git¯ a ’s spiritual war, he detracts from serious philosophical engagement with Tantra’s pragmatic approaches to ontology.

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Žižek mentions that Himmler pocketed the G¯ıt¯ a whose “oriental wisdom” became his guide for getting SS officers to do “horrible things” without actually “becoming horrible people themselves.” SS officers were exhorted to “act from a distance — I am not really there.” It is likely Žižek sees Himmler explaining the G¯ıt¯ a ’s dharma yuddha (righteous war) to SS soldiers to encourage them to spiritually detach from the moral consequences of murder and violence. Žižek’s second anecdote justifies this reading. He mentions his horror at reading the Zen Buddhist scholar D. T. Suzuki’s description of why Japanese officers would feel responsible for killing if they remained “in the illusory self.” Suzuki said that soldiers “enlightened by Zen Buddhism” would be able to observe their life “as a flow of phenomena” and detach from killing in the “cosmic dance of phenomena.” These instructions entirely ignore the Buddha’s canonical requirements for selfless compassion and nonviolence before attaining Nirv¯ an.a. Finally, Žižek notes that he does not dispute “some spiritual greatness of Zen Buddhism,” but “even the most enlightened spiritual experience” can serve a terrible cause (Peterson 2019). His conclusion to the debate suggests that the Nazi and Zen Buddhists’ ideological misrepresentation (what contemporary political discourse terms “alternative facts”) should trump philosophical engagement with Indian spirituality. Eric Kurlander’s Hitler’s Monsters: a Supernatural History of the Third Reich closely investigates the actions of “Nazi Indologists” who followed the work of “Adolph Holtzman senior and Holtzman junior” to project “fantasies of a heroic ‘Indo Germanic epic’ (‘Ur-Epos’) on Indian religious texts such as the Mah¯ abh¯ arata and Bhagavad Gita that were largely detached from the textual and philological evidence” (2017: 9). Kurlander’s observation is equally pertinent to much of the early etic research into Vedic and Tantric traditions because many Western researchers ignored India’s foundational esoteric oral transmissions. By the time Himmler was a young adult, he passionately believed that “Christianity” was suffocating the “Edda and Nibelungenlied, ‘the magical world of Thor, Freya, Loki, and other Nordic divinities.” He began to invest “heavily in Eastern religion and esotericism as well, carrying around with him, alongside the Edda, the Vedas and Bhagavad Gita, and the speeches of Buddha” (53). Himmler accepted that his “own efforts” in the next life could alter the negative ramifications of his

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actions in the present (192). His confidence in a positive reincarnation was obviously ill founded. Sarkar explains that commitment in this life to Patañjali’s “Yogashcittavrttinirodhah”—the merging of ipseity with Metaseity by suspending all extroversial mental propensities—is the cause of a favorable rebirth That allows the secret to continue ¯ along a spiritual path (Anandam¯ urti 2010: 1). At any rate, we have no evidence that Himmler adhered to the spiritual praxes of the “Asiatic mythologies, philosophies and religious practices such as Vedism, yoga, Buddhism, and Zen” that the Nazis mashed together. Nazi scholars studied the “Vedas, Bhagavadgita and Hindu tantrism” and “the teachings of Tibetan lamism” as well as “Japanese Shinto … Zen Buddhism and Bushhido” primarily to aid the Third Reich’s expression of its “Aryanspirit,” while establishing “the ideological and religious foundation for a Greater Empire” (193). Žižek simply ignores that nationalists can (and have) leveraged any ideology—including spiritual philosophies aimed at reducing suffering—to enforce collective belief in their mandate to rule. Marxist leaders and socialist states have also instituted disastrous economic policies and programs that have killed tens of millions, just as religious identity has expedited political killings. Kristen Ghodsee notes how even the egalitarian “ideals” of European communism were co-opted and deformed by Joseph Stalin (2017: 71). Buddhist identity politics have also been the cause of “bloody conflict between the majority Sinhala Buddhist government and the minority Hindu Tamils” in Sri Lanka for decades (Hewitson 2019).i P. D. Premasiri states that Buddhist nationalists ignore that there is not a single instance in the P¯ali Canon where “violence is advocated” as a cause of “perfect inner peace” (2006: 79). Paradoxically, these “Buddhists” see no contradiction in “a religion well known for its teachings about love and compassion” being used to “advocate war as a solution” to maintaining the state (2006: 78). Premasiri also points out the political interpretation of certain “Hindu scriptures, like the Bhagavadg¯ıt¯ a,” which include the “concept of a ‘righteous war’” (79). Tantra construes this righteous war within its paradigm of spiritual praxes that include the individual’s psychic struggle against material attachments and a physical fight against those external forces that limit the expansion of ipseity. Miracea Eliade’s groundbreaking Yoga: Immortality and Freedom explains that the “Yoga that Kr.s.n.a expounds and recommends” in the “masterpiece of Indian spirituality,” the G¯ıt¯ a, is nothing other than “a method whose end is to gain the uniomystica.” Its yoga can be “understood as a mystical discipline whose goal” is uniting

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human consciousness with divinity (1990: 153). From this perspective, the G¯ıt¯ a ’s righteous war is an extended allegory of the struggle that every practitioner engages in to overcome duality. Western postmodern thinkers and Marxists may be risk-averse to engaging with the G¯ıt¯ a ’s transcendental examination of ipseity, yet this aversion is problematic given postmodern attempts by Foucault and Derrida to unsuccessfully replace Cartesian ipseity as the epistemic agent. Ipseity is the first simultaneously immanent and transcendent experiencer of its own subjectivity and phenomenal experience. The Cartesian evidence for ipseity’s transcendent embodiment is that it is the unquantifiable ground zero of all our mental perception. In this regard, modern science denies the possibility of any subject objectively studying itself. Natalia Depraz et al. state in their introduction to On Becoming Aware: a Pragmatics of Experiencing that “experience is always that which a singular subject is subjected to at any given time and place” and is “that to which s/he has access in the first person” (2003: 2). The authors argue there is an increasing need for “first-person data in the cognitive neurosciences,” “phenomenology,” introspective “cognitive psychology,” and “various spiritual practices which highlight the ‘examination of consciousness’” (3). Tantra drives such developments through its first pragmatic truth of human experience: ipseity is an embodied consciousness that witnesses all mental activity and, contrary to Western thought, can reflect on its own sense of being. Given that as subjective experience grounds all suffering and happiness, I suggest that understanding Tantra’s ontology per Krishna’s message in the G¯ıt¯ a it is possible to transcends the limits of Judeo-Christian consciousness. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’s introduction to the G¯ıt¯ a relates that Krishna’s teachings contain “the science of reality and the art of union with reality.” Spiritual unity can only be attained by seekers who engage with “rigorous discipline” and “cleanse the mind of all distractions and purge the heart from all corruption, to acquire spiritual wisdom” (2004: 12). The G¯ıt¯ a recognizes the “problem of human action” by touching on two “closely related” dimensions of reality: “the transcendent and the empirical” (p. 13). This intersection highlights my pragmatic Tantric thesis that attaining lasting peace requires examining the interconnectedness of ipseity’s initial singularity with the subsequent duality of mental perception. Put another way, anthropical consciousness is the spontaneous existential feeling of “Iness ”—the Cartesian “I am”—before mental epiphenomena

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relativize and obscure this un-objectified state. Ipseity witnesses the fluctuating waves of interoceptive and phenotypic phenomena that give rise to the quotidian experience of duality. From the first spark of ipseity’s awareness, the mind’s consistent interaction with an external objectified reality make it impossible to experience pure subjectivity without disciplined meditation. Tantric meditations reverse the interference of external phenomena by concentrating the mind on ipseity to ultimately uncover noumenal Metaseity. This can be related to Sarkar’s contention that related transcendental praxis are implied in the Sanskrit meaning of Kr´sna ´ (Krishna), the Tantric Sadguru (divine avatar) disguised as Arjuna’s charioteer in the G¯ıt¯ a. Kr´sna’s ´ name actually symbolizes mystical longing. The Sanskrit word’s polyvalent meaning is derived from the Sanskrit verb “kr´s” which means “to do research,” “to find out.” The entity who is attained by refining the mind through “sádhaná … is called “Kr´sna.” ´ Its second meaning is “to attract, to draw everything to one’s own self,” and Kr´sna ´ is the “greatest force of attraction in the universe.” Kr´sna ´ is also the term for the spiritual point in the “sahasrára” chakra that controls all mental propensities (Shrii Prabh¯at Ranjan Sarkar 2006). Moreover, Kr´sna’s ´ existential denotation is carried by the “root verb Kr´s ”—“the feeling I am.” A further derivative “krsibhuh” has the root verb bhuh, “to be,” so Kr´sna’s ´ ontological meaning is “I am because He is ” (emphasis added, Sarkar 2000: 3). Tantric philosophy sees Kr´sna ´ as the supreme macrocosmic subjectivity with all microcosmic entities reflecting this consciousness in a qualified form. When Tantrics meditate on ipseity, they raise the latent spiritual force (kundalinii) ´ from the base of the spine in the m¯ ul¯ adh¯ ara cakra to ultimately unite ipseity with Metaseity in the sahasrára cakra. This supreme attainment is also called Kr´sna ´ or “Shiva” in Tantra (2000: 22). Thus the heart of Tantric mysticism reflects our desire for infinity, yet egological mind conflates its awareness of countless “mental objects” and temporary “perception and assimilation for true expansion” (Hewitson 2014: 22). Mind becomes stuck in an unwinnable fight against objectified impermanence. In the Git¯ a, Kr´sna ´ explains the nature of this dilemma to Arjuna: m¯ atr¯ apar´s¯ astukaunteya s´¯ıtos.n.asukhaduh.khad¯ ah. ¯ agam¯ ap¯ ayino ’nity¯ as t¯ amstitiks ˙ arata . asvabh¯

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Radhakrishnan’s translation follows: “contacts with their objects, O son of Kunt¯ı (Arjuna), give rise to cold and heat, pleasure and pain. They come and go and do not last forever, these learn to endure, O Bh¯arata (Arjuna)” (2004: 105). So, Tantra trains practitioners to detach from mental dualities by ideating on the “subtler mystic aspect of human life” that is our “underlying” singular consciousness. Seekers who pragmatically coordinate their mental propensities and actions with this spiritual ideation discover the inner path to ever-increasing “expansion” which “finally establishes that person in the supreme pervasiveness” (S. P. R. Sarkar 1981). Put another way, if suffering fuels our religious narratives, wonder invokes our mystical longing for infinity. European Romantic and Transcendentalists believed that immersion in nature sets “the subject … endlessly oscillat[ing] between the opposing elements that constitute the universe,” commencing the journey from immanence to mysticism. Justin Prystash notes that the early Victorian Thomas Carlyle believed that becoming “heroic” required recognizing and negotiating “the most wondrous dualism of all, time and eternity” (2010: 89). When mind relinquishes its egocentric stance to silently marvel at nature, subject and object become permeable, and we intimate a greater unity. Likewise, Sarkar claims that the ancient “natural landscape of Rá´rh” awakened Bengal’s indigenous people to proto-Tantric thought. Moved by the beauty of nature, “their entire beings quivered for the great unknown entity”; this “made the people of Rá´rh mystical.” Mysticism, born from our wonder is humanity’s “never-ending endeavor” to discover a “link between finite and infinite” (1981: 81). To conclude this section, while Žižek’s postmodernism treats religiosity as a cultural relic, Tantra’s pragmatic understanding of spiritual consciousness meshes with the individual and collective experiences of fear and wonder in a world that offers both.

Sarkar’s Tantric Evolution of Consciousness: A Pragmatic Understanding of Happiness Peterson sees religious narratives as our “central stories,” which “provide a dramatic record of the historically predicated transformation of human intent,” embodying “history’s cumulative effect on action.” He again quotes James on the relationship between the individual’s urge for spiritual transformation and the collective good: “the community

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stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community” (p. 199). Tantra sees mysticism as the pinnacled expression of each person’s conscious longing to move beyond belief toward spiritual expansion. Consequently, Sarkar offers the pragmatic prediction that either the lash of suffering or the caress of inspiration will cause all beings to long “for peace” by spiritually elevating ¯ their “own sense of being an individual entity” (Anandam¯ urti 2010: 205). Both Peterson and Sarkar acknowledge that this process entails intrapersonal spiritual transformation and commitment to ethical actions that improve life around us. However, Tantra’s theory of a monistic causal consciousness offers a pragmatic philosophy of consciousness that differs from the Christian belief in the irrevocable separation of creator and created. Intriguingly, Peterson’s Christian ontology in Maps of Meaning is less limited than his debate with Žižek suggests: he adheres to pragmatic caution when he says that “the totality of all things – might be regarded as the objective world, in the absence of the subject,” but then qualifies this statement by saying that the “primordial chaos [Metaseity] also contains that which ‘evolves into’ the subject, when it is differentiated” (1999: 116). This aside, Peterson’s explanation of Christian duality fails to substantiate the paradox of its supreme cognitive subject (God) dividing creation from itself while also being present in creation itself. On the other hand, Tantra rejects the idea that infinite consciousness can remain infinite in the presence of a second transcendental subject or object. Christian thinkers attempt to silence their ontological paradox by appealing to belief in mystery; however, in doing so they fall short of the spirit of James’s pragmatic philosophy that seeks to encourage deeper spiritual inquiry into belief not to suspend reason. In contrast, Sarkar’s metaphysical account of Tantric monism is a coherent ontology of the (d)evolution of consciousness that elucidates the spiritual and ethical praxes that establish greater happiness and does not fall prey to metaphysical paradoxes. In Idea and Ideology, Sarkar explains that “Puru´sa [Metaseity] or Citishakti is pure consciousness, so its activation without the presence of a second principle is impossible. Action results only when Prakriti, the inherent tendency of the transcendental Puru´sa, get scope of expression.” These “two factors, Puru´sa and prakriti though dual in theory, are singular in spirit” (1993: 1). The question of how something singular generates duality, like the Big Bang theory, plagues philosophy and modern cosmology. While Metaseity is non-dual, its single attribute of Prakriti is an amalgam of three sentient, static, and mutative properties

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or forces called gun.as. A change in the homeostasis of these creative properties causes the expansion, stasis, and contraction of a portion of infinite Metaseity. When Prakriti’s sentient property increases in magnitude, the previous harmony becomes destabilized, and this creates the first, subtlest duality called Aseity or God consciousness. Aseity is cosmic mind which actively engages the qualifying static and mutative properties of the gun.as to further manifest the physical universe Aseity’s noumenal vibrational expressions become energy and matter. Complex biochemical structures evolve out of the collision, separation, contraction, and expansion of energy which express increasing levels of their source consciousness. A decrease in the mutative principle is concomitant with expanding sentience in unicellular and subsequent multicellular minds. The sentient principle reaches its embodied apex in human ipseity, and it drives our desire for freedom. By adhering to practices that reveal our highest nature, we find true happiness in becoming infinite. For this reason Tantra offers pragmatic meditations that rebalance the gun.as by first merging ipseity with Aseity and then merging with the ultimate transcendence of Metaseity. The successful rebalancing of the gun.as through meditation and selfless service is moks.a as the permanent liberation from all causal desire. The process of Tantric liberation known as “Bh¯ agavata dharma” is a way of living in the world and apprehending truth through vist¯ ara (expansion of consciousness), rasa (flow toward the supreme cause), sev¯ a (service to all), and tadsthiti (merging ipseity with cosmic consciousness) ¯ (Anandam¯ urti 2010: 9–10). Tantrics must actively engage in expansion of ipseity by selflessly serving creation and doing s¯ adhan¯ a, meditation. S¯adhan¯a’s etymological root is the Sanskrit s¯ adh—the term “s¯ adhya” literally means “goal” (152). As all human activities are geared towards increasing happiness (peace), our essential nature is to “seek happiness,” which is to struggle for expansion. On this point, Sarkar rejects postmodern relativism. In “What Is Dharma?,” he claims that the only “dharma of humanity” is to “realize the Infinite or Cosmic Entity” ¯ (Anandam¯ urti 1998). Tantric meditation also enables seekers to overcome their psychic attachments to dogma and sensory duality and to act in ways that benefit society. Sarkar’s socio-psycho-spiritual paradigm of Bh¯ agavata Dharma supports individual and collective expansion because each person’s quest for limitlessness makes them personally responsible for ameliorating “the poverty and distress” of people they encounter ¯ (Anandam¯ urti 2010: 13). Tantra gives social service important pragmatic

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value in expediting the elimination of egological attachments, developing impartial benevolence, and sensitizing meditators to their infinite “duty towards” all creation (2006: 2). External responsibility is simply a reflection of our internal ontological quest for liberation: “only when one takes full responsibility for one’s spiritual life can one attain the peak of spiritual progress and become fully established on the solid ground of spirituality” (163). I would like to conclude this essay’s overarching pragmatic analysis of Christianity’s belief in the irredeemable duality of consciousness versus Tantra’s spiritual monism by acknowledging that both traditions move between narrative and philosophy while tackling real suffering and the potential for happiness. Both Žižek and Peterson address the positive elements of Christian duality while Žižek raises doubts about the G¯ıt¯ a ’s spiritual monism. A genuinely pragmatic philosophical evaluation of Christianity or Tantra’s understanding of reality and happiness demands that we deconstruct their respective ontologies. Surely a pragmatic theory of happiness should successfully predict actions that increase happiness? Sarkar’s monism does this by peeling away the layers of phenomena via practical meditations that reveal and explain the nature of consciousness yet remain sensitive to subjective experiences. Sohail Inayatullah’s statement that Tantra sees the relationship between truth and suffering “not so much as accuracy or fidelity to the empirical but as therapy, as that which reduces suffering” reflects this stance (1999: 79). I belive that James, the religious pragmatist, would have agreed that studying our desire for expansion through Tantric meditations is not a “gamble” that forgoes the search for evidence replaced with “wishful thinking.” It is a “prerequisite of responsibly pursuing truth” that may “turn out to involve a commensurateness between persons and world of wider scope than we presently understand” (2000: 137). Although postmodern thinkers are averse to forgoing their dialectical bread-andbutter for meditative praxes, any fear of transcendental encounters or potential error stemming from spiritual explorations have no place in the philosophy of happiness. Tantrics have long intuited that lasting spiritual bliss is realized by recovering pure consciousness despite ideologies or external forces that deny this possibility. If the monistic perspective is valid, the ongoing evolution of human consciousness and our undeniable search for peace offer some compelling reasons to consider spiritual pragmatism as a viable path to transcendence.

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Note i. This article, published in September 2019, is a Buddhist and Tantric reading of suffering and victimhood.

References ¯ ¯ Anandam¯ urti, S.S. 1998. Ananda M¯ arga Elementary Philosophy, 5th ed. Calcutta: Ananda Marga Publications. ———. 2010. Yoga S¯ adhan¯ a. Kolkata: Ananda Marga Publications. Brown, H. 2000. “The Will to Believe.” In William James On Radical Empiricism and Religion, 29–65. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Chesterton, G.K. 1909. Orthodoxy. London: The Bodley Head. Depraz, N., F.J. Varela, and P. Vermersch. 2003. On Becoming Aware. A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Eliade, M. 1990. Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. Trans. W.R. Trask. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Emerson, R.W., and B. Atkinson. 2000. The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 2000 Modern Library Pbk. ed. New York: Modern Library. Ghodsee, K.R. 2017. Red Hangover: Legacies of Twentieth-Century Communism. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Hewitson, J.M. 2014. Sarkar’s Tantra: A Comparative and Historical Review of Transcendental Praxis, Ph.D. National Taiwan University, Taipei. ———. 2019. “Mediating Suffering: Buddhist Detachment and Tantric Responsibility in Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost.” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21 (5). https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.3196. Inayatullah, S. 1999. Situating Sarkar: Tantra, Macrohistory and Alternative Futures. Maleny, QLD: Gurukula Press. James, W. 1896. “The Will to Believe.” The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religion Ethics and Theology V : 827–847. ———. 2002. Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, Centenary ed. London and New York: Routledge. Kurlander, E. 2017. Hitler’s Monsters: A Supernatural History of the Third Reich. New Haven: Yale University Press. Myers, T. 2003. Slavoj Žižek. London and New York: Routledge. Peterson, J.B. 1999. Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief . New York: Routledge. ———. (Producer). 2016. “2016 Lecture 01 Maps of Meaning: Introduction and Overview.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjnvtR gpg6g.

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———. 2019. “Marxism: Zizek/Peterson: Official Video.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsWndfzuOc4. Peterson, J.B., N. Doidge, and E. Van Sciver. 2018. Twelve Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos. Toronto: Random House Canada. Premasiri, P.D. 2006. “A ‘Righteous War’ in Buddhism?” In Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, ed. M. Deegalle. New York: Routledge. Prystash, J. 2010. “‘The Grand Still Mirror of Eternity’: Temporal Dualism and Subjectification in Carlyle and Dickens.” Victorian Literature and Culture 38 (1): 89–106. Radhakrishnan, S. 2004. The Bhagavadgita. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers. Robinson, R.H. 1967. Early M¯ adhyamika in India and China, thesis. University of London, Madison. Rorty, R. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972–1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Santas, G. 1990. “Knowledge and Belief in Plato’s Republic.” In Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 121, ed. P. Nicolacopoulos. Dordrecht: Springer. Sarkar, P.R. 1981. Rá´rh: The Cradle of Civilization. ———. 1993. Idea and Ideology: A Collection of Speeches Delivered to Higher Ta’ Ttvika Trainees from 27 May 1959 to June 5, 1959, 7th ed. Calcutta: Ánanda Márga Pracáraka Samgha. ´ ———. 2000. Discourses on Kr´sna ´ and the Giitá. Calcutta: Ananda Marga Publications. ———. 2006. “Three Interpretations of the Word ‘Kr.s.n.a’.” In The Electronic Edition of the Works of P.R. Sarkar, ed. S. G. a. Á. A. Avt. Schwartz, M. 2015. “MetaReality and the Dynamic Calling of the Good.” Journal of Critical Realism 14 (4): 381–396. Singh, L.P. 2010. Tantra: Its Mystic and Scientific Basis. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Žižek, S. 1998. “Four Discourses, Four Subjects.” In Cogito and the Unconscious, ed. S. Žižek. Durham and London: Duke University Press. ———. 2018. “Marx Today: The End Is near … Only Not the Way We Imagined It.” Retrieved from http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/marx-today-theend-is-near-only-not-the-way-we-imagined-it/.

CHAPTER 6

Spirituality, Pragmatism, Vedanta and Universal Consciousness: A Study of the Philosophy of R. Balasubramanian Ramesh Chandra Pradhan

In this chapter, I will discuss the nature of spirituality and pragmatism in the philosophy of Professor R. Balasubramanian (in short, RB), the greatest Advaitin of our times who not only commented on many Advaita texts,i but also outlined in an original way the Advaitic philosophy of man and the world.ii . RB championed the spiritual view of man and the world as he believed not only that man is a spiritual being but also that the world itself is ultimately spiritual in nature. As an Advaitin, RB interpreted human life as a manifestation of the Spirit or Brahman that pervades the entire universe. The Spirit is the Being or Brahman which is the ultimate Reality and is the underlying principle of all existence. The spiritual point of view which is the core of the Advaita philosophy is based on the idea that the individual human being or the jiva is identical with Brahman when considered from the transcendental point of view.iii From this, it follows that the ultimate nature of man is Brahman or the Spirit. Man cannot be understood in terms of the material body alone and

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that is the reason why we must adopt a spiritual point of view according to which man’s consciousness can rise to the level of universal consciousness which is the true nature Brahman or the Spirit. RB believed that human consciousness is only a manifestation of the universal consciousness or Brahman and that man’s transformation is possible if we take into consideration the possibility of the realization of Brahman as man’s ultimate concern.

Advaita Vedanta and the Metaphysics of Spirituality Vedanta which constitutes the philosophical part of the Vedas contains the quintessence of the philosophy of spirituality. The Vedas belong to the early spiritual literature of the mankind in view of the fact that they bear the imprint of the early man’s search for the Divine in the form of nature and its diverse forces such as Agni, Vayu, Varuna, Indra and so on. The Vedic deities were the earliest symbols of the Divinity which constitutes the ultimate Truth and Power above all natural forces. This is what RB calls the primal spirituality of the Vedas suggesting thereby that Vedic spirituality is pre-axial.iv Thus, there is a continuous development of the spiritual understanding of man and nature from the early Vedic period to the later stages of Upanishads. RB writes: The transition from primal mythology of the early Vedic period to the philosophia perennis of the Upanishadic age must have taken place over a fairly long period of not less than one thousand years, through a deepening of the concept of Being, spiritualization of nature, and divinization of man.v

The Vedic religion grew out of the demand of the early man to propitiate the deities to have peace and happiness in the world. The Vedic man was a poet and philosopher of nature and wanted a cosmic vision of the union of man and the universe. This natural philosophy of the Vedic hymns and poetic compositions laid the foundation of the spiritual philosophy of the Upanishads. The Upanishads constitute the philosophical part of the Vedas and since they constitute the last portion of the Vedas, they are called “Vedanta”.vi The Vedantic literature built around the Aranyakas and the Upanishads is the most ancient philosophical literature in the history of

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mankind. It is the Vedantic literature which has given rise to different schools of Vedanta in the later period when the systemization of the Vedantic ideas was undertaken.vii The philosophy of the Upanishads which is so profound and deep has been unparalleled in the history of human thought because of its emphasis on the spiritual nature of man and the universe. The grand spiritual vision of Reality as a whole is the core of the Upanishadic thought. In the words of RB: The Upanishad, which inherited the concept of Being from the early period of primal spirituality, developed it into a full-fledged philosophia perennis in three ways—by deepening the concept of Being, by spiritualizing nature, and by divinizing man. Though the focus of the spiritual consciousness of the Upanisadic period was on Being, man and nature were not outside its scope. Since its thinking was holistic, it endeavoured and succeeded in relating both man and nature with Being.viii

The idea of one Reality which is Brahman is the central message of the Advaita Vedanta which is reflected in the above passage. RB has spelt out the Advaitic message with perfect clarity and precision in the quoted passage as he finds that in the assertion of the Reality of Brahman, Advaita Vedanta had carried the message of the Upanishads. According to RB, Advaita Vedanta has laid the foundation of monistic metaphysics, i.e., the metaphysics of spiritual oneness of mankind by it famous declaration of the identity of the jiva and Brahman. The Upanishads bring out the main principle of Advaita because in them we find the idea of Atman-Brahman as the only Reality or Being that underlies all phenomenal existence. This is clear in such Upanishadic statements as “All this is Brahman” (Sarvam khalu idam brahman)ix and “That you are” (tat tvam asi).x Such declarations by the Upanishadic sages make it clear that there is one Reality or Being which is the source of all beings in the world including the human beings. RB explains this in the following eloquent passage: The world of name and form derives its existence (satta) from Brahman which is its cause. Being an effect, it does not have a being of its own. Whatever being it has, is derived from Brahman. According to Advaita, every effect is an appearance (kalpita), which derives its being, or existence, or essence from its substratum (adhisthana), which is the reality.xi

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Here what is spelt out is the non-duality of the ultimate Reality or Brahman, because based on this principle, it has been shown that every other being than Brahman is derived from Brahman because from Brahman alone every other being comes into existence. Both the world and human beings are ultimately dependent on Brahman for their existence. The oneness of Reality is the hallmark of the Advaitic metaphysics. RB considers Advaita as the only metaphysics acceptable on the basis of logic and experience. It is because if we follow the Upanishads and also Sankara’s commentary on them, we cannot but accept that Brahman alone is real and that jiva and Brahman are ultimately one. Brahman is immanent in the world because the world is nothing other than Brahman and that the human self is nothing other than the Atman. Because of this, RB considers Brahman as immanent in the world and in the human self. As he says: Brahman-Atman which is the reality we are searching for is immanent in the world and not transcendent to it having its location elsewhere in a far off realm. The metaphysics of Advaita is immanent and not transcendent.xii

Thus, Advaita can be shown to have advocated the oneness of all Reality as being Brahman from the ultimate metaphysical point of view. Brahman is immanent in the universe and is the principle that makes the universe possible. The spiritual metaphysics of Advaita is based on the fact that man’s existence is ultimately found it to be spiritual in nature because man is identical with Brahman. Man’s self is ultimately the Universal Self or Atman-Brahman. This is to say that the human existence is basically a spiritual existence because of the fact that man can realize his own identity with the Reality of Brahman. Such knowledge of oneself is the highest self-knowledge because thereby one gets liberated from bondage. Man alone has the capacity to realize Brahman and to get liberation from ignorance. That is why, as RB says, “the human being who has the capacity for getting knowledge through intellect occupies a privileged status among all beings in the world. The human being is the house of Brahman, because Brahman dwells in the intellect of the human being”.xiii Thus, human beings are spiritual by nature because they alone house Brahman in their own self. RB has in this sense made Advaita the fountain head of the metaphysics of spirituality.

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Spirituality and Pragmatics Spirituality is concerned with life and its meaning by taking into account the place of man in the cosmic order of things. Man’s inner life and its improvement in its totality is the central philosophy of spirituality. In that sense, spirituality is a part of the pragmatics of life for the reason that life’s own dynamics is changed in the course of the spiritual practices embodied in one’s pursuit of spiritual and moral values. Spirituality and pragmatics make a single whole in which theory and practice, thoughts and actions, and above all, life and its various aspects get integrated. Advaita Vedanta has been in the forefront of the philosophy of spirituality and pragmatics in the sense that it makes every effort to shape the practical life of man in the model of the Brahman-Atman identity such that man is declared as the spiritual being capable of realizing Brahman. Advaita is a practical Vedanta as Swami Vivekananda has proclaimed in his writings.xiv Swami Vivekananda, the monk and philosopher, is well known as the advocate of the spiritual unity of mankind and of the ideal of spiritual perfection as laid down in the Upanishads. He represents the Spirit of the ancient sages who inquired into the nature of Brahman as the primal Being and the primal source of life itself. He lived as a monk for the service of mankind and for their spiritual uplift. RB has taken Swami Vivekananda as one of the great spiritual leaders of mankind because the latter has made the spiritual message of the Vedanta universally known by his global spiritual mission. In RB’s words: According to Swami Vivekananda, Vedanta is not an abstruse philosophy intended only for the practices of the ascetics and the intellectual exercise of the academics. On the contrary, it is a philosophy and religion for everyone. It must find expression in the everyday life of the all human beings.xv

For Swami Vivekananda and RB, spirituality is open to everybody and is relevant to all aspects of life. Vedanta as a spiritual philosophy is for everybody, both saint and sinner, and is applicable in every sphere of life from the small to the big and from the personal to the social. No aspect of life is beyond the purview of the spiritual philosophy of the Vedanta. As RB holds: Vedanta… covers the entire life of a human being. If so, ritual action and meditation, worship and devotion, are as important as knowledge and

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contemplation. It means that the Vedanta in its scheme of discipline has to admit the validity of the karma-kanda with all that it implies.xvi

Vedanta thus admits the pragmatic dynamics of spirituality because it takes life as a whole as the field of action for applying the spiritual ideals. Now the question arises: How can we make spirituality and pragmatism meet in the life of the human beings? This question has been answered by Indian philosophy in general and Vedantic philosophy in particular when they view spirituality as a matter of knowledge (jnana), emotion (bhakti) and action (karma). These three strands of spiritual life are fully explained in the Vedantic texts.xvii The Bhagavadgita makes it amply clear that a spiritually enlightened person must combine in himself the knowledge of Brahman, the devotion to the ultimate Godhood and action done in the Spirit of sacrifice to the Lord. The Gita does not make a difference between the three ways of being spiritual because knowledge, devotion and action constitute one integral spiritual life.xviii The pragmatic spirituality of the Vedanta as presented in the Gita is a marvelous example of integral spiritualism which is in conformity with the Vedantic principles.

Integral Spiritualism The idea of integral spiritualism is a part of the Vedantic notion of a complete man who has realized Brahman and has internalized the Spirit of the world within himself. The complete spiritual man is the man who is one with Brahman and is yet in the world thus making life the meeting point of the cosmic and acosmic forces acting at tandem. The spiritual life, as Sri Aurobindoxix has described it, embodies the individual and the universal, the divine and the mundane and also the cosmic and acosmic. Such a life is an integral life combing within itself the so-called material and the spiritual and the mental and the supramental.xx RB has spelt out the nature of integral spiritualism in his description of the “spirituality of matter and the materiality of Spirit.”xxi In this description, RB has given the essence of matter as Spirit and the essence of the Spirit as its material embodiment. Thus, both matter and Spirit are involved with each other in such a way that nothing can be said about matter and Spirit without taking them together. Advaita Vedanta claims that the difference between matter and Brahman is based on a wrong perception and therefore we must accept their non-difference based on the right perception. RB writes:

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According to Advaita, the world as Brahman is real; however, when it is viewed as unrelated to Brahman, it is false. Advaita has not done any damage to the world by characterizing it as vyavaharika. Inasmuch as the world appearance takes place with the support of the reality of Brahman, admission of the vyavaharika status of the world is tantamount to the acceptance of the spiritual basis of the world.xxii

The non-difference between Brahman and the world is a fundamental truth according to Sankara which is accepted by RB. Sankara’s argument is that there can be no two realities in the ultimate sense because of which Brahman is said to be non-dual. “In the language of Sankara, the Real which is self-luminous (svaprakasa) shows itself when the false ideas of distinction about it caused by avidya are removed through the help of language, through the words of scripture”.xxiii That is to say, the idea of difference between world and Brahman is due to avidya and so it can be removed by the knowledge of Brahman. Sankara has proved the nonduality of Brahman as opposed to the dualism of the Dvaita Vedantins and the qualified monism of the Visistadvaitins. RB follows Sankara in affirming the spiritual Reality of the world because the world is rooted in Brahman and is none other than Brahman from the transcendental point of view. It is the very nature of the world to be a manifestation of Brahman because there is no way we can explain its existence. The world as a separate entity belies its own existence as a non-entity because without Brahman the existence of anything is impossible. The world is intelligible only as rooted in Brahman. This shows that the world cannot but be spiritual in its essence. It is the Spirit manifest in matter. The world becomes the home of the Spirit because of the fact that the world is none other than the Spirit. RB writes: … just as jiva is embodied spirit, so is Brahman. The point to be noted is that, since the body can never be separated from the soul, the jiva and the physical world can never be separated from Brahman. Nor does Brahman exist in splendid isolation from the jiva and the world.xxiv

Thus, the inseparable relation between Brahman and the world is established without admitting any kind of difference between the two. This amounts to supporting the claim that man and Brahman are so related that human life cannot be conceived except in term of the Spirit which is manifest in it.

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Integral spiritualism takes into account the spiritual nature of man and the world in a holistic framework. This framework is the inclusive framework within which man, nature and Brahman are posited together such that there could be no way of separating man and nature from Brahman. Advaita is a comprehensive account of integral spiritualism.

The Spiritual Man Now the question is: Who is a spiritual man and what are the ways in which he lives? This question has been answered by Advaita in terms of moksa or liberation. The Vedantic thinking from the time of the Upanishads till today is concerned with the problem of liberation or moksa as the ultimate problem of life. There is no doubt that the idea of liberation has many dimensions which are not easy to unfold in a theoretical way. Liberation is the release of the jiva from bondage at one level and it is the realization of Brahman at another. Though both mean the same in the sense that knowledge of Brahman itself is moksa, yet many think that knowledge is only a way to moksa and not moksa itself. RB has refuted this view by showing that in Advaita moksa means knowledge of Brahman. RB writes: Liberation, according to Advaita, is the realization of Brahman-Atman which is real, knowledge, and infinite, which is ever free, non-dual, and eternal bliss.xxv

He further adds: Liberation is freedom from the limiting conditions of individual human existence. It is freedom from subjection to time and space, freedom from transitory existence. It is not mere cessation of sorrow and suffering. It must be understood positively as the state of supreme bliss.xxvi

Thus, liberation or moksa can be viewed both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is the cessation of sorrow and suffering and thus the removal of bondage due to ignorance. Positively, it can be viewed as the state of supreme bliss. Thus, the liberated man is not only free from bondage to time and the world but also he becomes one with Brahman. This identity with Brahman makes the liberated man the knower of Brahman. Advaita

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calls the liberated man the jivanmukta. Such a man is free from attachment to the world even while he is living in the world. RB has explained the state of jivan-mukti in explicit terms by showing that to be free from bondage does not bring an end to the life in the world. He says: Since the jivanmukta is a person who possesses true knowledge, the worldshow which he witnesses as a result of the body does not delude him and cannot bind him even as it appears to him.xxvii

Thus, the jivanmukta does not get away from the worldly activities but remains detached to the world as such being completely free from any delusion and ignorance. The Gita describes the jivanmukta as the sthitaprajna because the latter is the state of spiritual equanimity and poise which is a state of complete freedom.xxviii Spiritual life and life in the world go together because spirituality is an inner state of being, and thus, it does not contradict whatever one does, if one does it with detachment.xix

Spirituality and Universal Consciousness The spiritual man is the universal man because in him the individual self (jiva) becomes one with the universal self (atman). Advaita proclaims the identity between the individual and the universal self in its famous statement “Tattvamasi”xxx (Thou Art That) which means that the individual jiva is really the universal Atman or Brahman. This declaration is the foundation of the Advaitic spirituality. This in a way declares that Brahman which is the universal consciousness assimilates the individual consciousness of the jiva in its ultimate form. Thus, Advaita spirituality takes the form of universal consciousness. Advaita takes Brahman as sat-cit-ananda in the sense that the ultimate Reality is of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. This is the highest form of Reality because ultimately everything is dependent on this Reality. Everything is ultimately Brahman (sarvam khalu idam brahman). This is the metaphysical theory of Advaita that everything is ultimately consciousness. However, it is only in human consciousness that the universal consciousness can be manifested. In the words of RB: The Advaita theory of consciousness is not restricted to the analysis of epistemological issues alone. It has also bearing on metaphysics. Consciousness, which is one and homogeneous, indivisible and eternal, is also referred to as the Self or Atman. I addition to the mind, the senses„

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and the body, there is the Self or consciousness in every human being.xxxi Thus the Advaita theory of consciousness does not stop at the level of the individual human being but goes beyond it to make it universal consciousness which is the same the universal Self or Atman-Brahman. There is thus no doubt that the individual consciousness ultimately gets absorbed in the universal consciousness in the sense that the individual consciousness when freed from the limiting conditions becomes the conditioned universal consciousness. The universal consciousness is the cosmic consciousness that includes all forms of consciousness in the world. It is what makes the cosmic Reality of consciousness universally present in all its manifestations. Brahman as the universal consciousness is cosmic because it is immanent in all forms of consciousness. The universal consciousness is infinite, eternal and indivisble.xxxii RB argues that the universal consciousness is not only immanent but also transcendent because it goes beyond the particular manifestations in the world. Thus, consciousness is both immanent and transcendent because it is not only found in the world but also is beyond the world as the universal Self or Brahman. Consciousness is not opposed to the world in its essential nature, but apparently the Self and not-Self are opposed to each other from a natural point of view. But from a transcendental point of view, the world itself is a form of consciousness. RB explains this dialectical relation between the Self and no-Self in the following passage: The Self by its nature is consciousness which is impartite, eternal and self-luminous and which is, therefore, not an object of knowledge. It is real (paramartha). The not-Self, on the contrary, is composite and perishable. It is always an object of knowledge. It is, therefore, not real (aparamartha).xxxiii

Thus, the universal Self or consciousness becomes particularized as the individual consciousness because of the limiting adjuncts. When the adjuncts are removed, the individual consciousness becomes the universal consciousness.

Empirical Pluralism and Transcendental Monism The metaphysics of consciousness proposed by Advaita is characterized by RB as a move from empirical pluralism to transcendental monism.xxxiv

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This theory holds that at the empirical level we have a plurality of conscious beings (jivas ), and at the transcendental level, we have one universal consciousness (Brahman). This duality between the empirical and transcendental is reflected in the Advaita distinction between vyavahara and parmartha. The vyavahara implies what is given in our empirical experience and the paramartha means what is beyond this. In RB’s words: The term “vyavaharika” refers to the empirical realm of duality whereas the term “paramarthika” signifies that which is free from, or transcends, the world of duality.xxxv

This distinction is unique to Sankara’s metaphysics because this explains how the world of duality (dvaita) can be reconciled with the world of non-duality (advaita). For Sankara, as for RB, the world of plurality is real from the empirical point of view, but from the transcendental point of view, there is no plurality; there is only the oneness of Brahman. While the empirical world has many conscious beings, there is only one universal consciousness at the transcendental level. The plurality of conscious jivas is empirically real but transcendentally not real. The empirical Reality is only an appearance at the transcendental level. There has been a debate as to whether the world is real or not in Advaita metaphysics. Those who follow the teachings of the Upanishads as interpreted by Sankara believe that since Brahman is the only Reality, there is no question of the Reality of the world. The world has only vyavaharika satta and not the paramarthika satta. Therefore, we cannot treat Brahman and the world on par. Hence, Advaitins following Sankara accept vivartavada regarding the origination of the world since the world is only an appearance of Brahman. The snake-rope analogy is given by Sankara to explain the relation between Brahman and the world. RB explains: The implication of the theory of vivarta is of great consequence. While the cause and effect have the same ontological status (sama-sattaka) in parinama vada, they have different ontological status (visama-sattaka) in the theory of vivarta.xxxvi

Thus, Brahman as the cause of the world has a higher status being the transcendent Reality, whereas the world being the effect has a lower

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status. This explains that there is no real causal relation between Brahman and the world, the latter being only a vivarta due avidya or maya. The above distinction between the empirical and the transcendental also applies to consciousness. The transcendental consciousness is one and indivisible, while the empirical consciousness is plural and divided. This is because the empirical consciousness is divided into different centers of consciousness since there are many selves as conscious beings. The latter are embodied beings, they being in the world and in space and time. The transcendental consciousness is beyond space and time. We cannot explain it in terms of the categories like cause, effect, time, substance, attribute, etc. The universal consciousness can only be indicated rather than described because there is no way we can describe what is beyond language and mind. The consciousness in the transcendental sense is not in space and time and is beyond the descriptive power of language.xxxvii What is significant in the Advaita theory of consciousness is that it does not deny the empirical consciousness which is embodied and can be understood only in terms of the body and senses including the brain. This is perfectly within the purview of the naturalistic theories of consciousness. But transcendental consciousness cannot be studied by the objective methods of science in general. That explains why Adavita talks of the universal consciousness as the gateway to spirituality and liberation from bondage. Man is spiritual only when he attains universal consciousness and gives up his limited consciousness.

Conclusion Professor RB has been a consistent Advaitin in all his writings and has given a contemporary account of the philosophy of Advaita by making the latter respond to the problems facing mankind such as the spiritual and moral crisis and the fall of mankind from the cherished ideals of the seers and savants. For RB, Advaita can solve the moral and spiritual problems of man if we understand it in the context of social and the human problems. The Advaitic notion that man is a spiritual being by nature and that he inherits the universal consciousness in his own self can be foundation of the new spiritual humanity which the Upanishadic thinkers dreamt of. Professor RB is the spokesperson of the new spiritual humanity and the ideal of pragmatic spiritualism which is the need of the hour. His philosophy is part of the universal philosophy embodied in the Advaitic tradition.xxxviii

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Notes i. R. Balasubramanian, A Study of Brahmasiddhi of Mandan Misra (Chaukhambha Amarabharati Prakashan, Varanasi, 1983). See also his The Taittiriyopanishad Bhasya-Vartika of Suresvara (Radhakrishan Institute of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras, 1984). ii. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas: Its Renewal and Renaissance (PHISPC and ICPR, New Delhi, 1996). Also his The Self as Seer and the Seen (Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady, 2008). iii. Ibid. iv. Ibid. v. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, p. 7. vi. “Vedanta” literally means the final portion of the Vedas which are otherwise known as the Upanishads. However, in the wider sense it is the philosophy based on the prasthanatrayas, namely the Upanishads, Brahmasutras and Bhagavadgita. vii. The different schools of Vedanta are based on the different interpretations of the prasthanatrayas. viii. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, p. 10. ix. Ibid. x. Chhandogyopanishad, VI. 11–12. xi. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, p. 38. xii. Ibid., p. 34. xiii. Ibid., p. 43. xiv. See, Swami Vivekananda, The Collected Works, Vol. II. (Advaita Ashrama, Kolkata, 1989). xv. R.Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, p. 147. xvi. Ibid., p. 147. xvii. Bhagavadgita, I–V. xviii. See Sri Aurobindo, Essays on the Gita (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 2000). See also his The Synthesis of Yoga (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 2000). xix. Ibid. xx. Ibid. xxi. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, Chapter 5. xxii. Ibid., p. 105. xxiii. R. Balasubramanian, The Self as Seer and the Seen, p. 154. xxiv. R. Balasubramanian, Primal Spirituality of the Vedas, 107. xxv. R. Balasubramanian, The Self as Seer and the Seen, p. 207. xxvi. Ibid., pp. 210–211. xvii. Ibid., p. 233.

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xvii. xix. xxx. xxxi. xxxii. xxxiii. xxxiv. xxxv. xxxvi. xxxvii. xxxviii.

Bhagavadgita, II. 55–72. Ibid., III. Chhandogyopanishad, VI. 11–12. R. Balasubramanian, The Self as Seer and the Seen, p. 33. Ibid. Ibid., p. 151. Ibid., Chapter 4. Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., pp. 138. Ibid. This essay is dedicated to the revered memory of late Professor R. Balasubramanian who passed away after leading a very spiritually enlightened and academically creative life.

CHAPTER 7

A Quantum Bridge Between Science and Spirituality: Toward a New Geometry of Consciousness Subhash Sharma

Broadly, there are two approaches to consciousness, viz. Scientific and Rishi. In scientific approach, consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter. This can be referred to as matter route to consciousness. In rishi route, consciousness is an infused phenomenon wherein matter is infused with spirit. ¯ı´s¯ av¯ asyamidam am . sarvam . , yatkiñcajagaty¯ . jaga, Ishopanishad declares. It implies all matter is infused with consciousness. This can be referred to as spirit route to consciousness. Now there is a need to combine the two approaches to consciousness. It implies recognizing the impact of consciousness on Space and Time and on Energy and Matter. This also implies viewing the world through the lens of STC (Space Time Consciousness) and EMC (Energy Matter Consciousness). David Bohm (1980) proposed the idea of Implicate and Explicate order. He further suggests the triad of EMI (Energy Matter Information) to understand the linkage between implicate and explicate order.

S. Sharma (B) Indus Business Academy, Bangalore, Karnataka, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_7

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Bohm’s EMI triad can be viewed as EMC triad wherein consciousness represents the implicate order that finds its expression in the explicate order in terms of matter and energy. We can also represent this idea in terms of AUM (All Unmanifest& Manifest). AUM finds its expression in the form of EMC triad and a general relationship in terms of E = MCn (Sharma 1999). This AUM expression can also be represented in terms of ‘Geometry of Divinity’ (GOD) that we observe in nature through ‘Great Order & Disorder’ (GOD). In ancient times, ‘Geometry of Divinity’ was represented through yantras. In fact, yantras can be considered as an ancient geometry of consciousness because consciousness was represented through various yantras, i.e., geometrical figures. With the advent of science, a new geometry of consciousness is needed to integrate two routes, viz. scientific route/scientific formulations and rishi route/spiritual formulations. This requires a new approach, viz. re-see approach wherein we re-see both science and spirituality in new ways and provide new interpretations to symbols used in science and spirituality. Above discussion can also be viewed in terms of a historical perspective. Ancient India explored consciousness and gave Upanishads to the world. Modern science focused on the exploration of matter. Now both these traditions are finding a new convergence in consciousness studies. This historical perspective can be represented as USCS flow: Upanishads (U) Science (S) Consciousness Studies (CS)

(Rishis)

(ScienƟsts)

(ScienƟsts-Rishis/ Modern Rishis)

Some Symbols of New Geometry New geometry of consciousness can be represented through symbols that are widely in use both in science and spirituality. A brief discussion on such symbols is as follows: Plus, Multiplication and Spiral (+, X, Spiral) Three symbols, viz. +, x and spiral can be considered as fundamental symbols of the new geometry of consciousness. These three symbols are interrelated, and a number of phenomenon of nature can be explained

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with the help of these symbols. When + is rotated, we arrive at X and when X is rotated at a very high speed, it generates an upward moving force of spiral like a tornado. In nature, we observe following three types of changes: i. Changes that are incremental in nature represented by + symbol; ii. Changes that are multiplier in nature and therefore lead to multiplier effect represented by X; iii. Changes that are spiral in nature and lead to fundamental change in the configuration, e.g., revolutions in societies. An event in a society can influence the entire nation and can even change the course of history. Like the changes in nature, changes in organizations and societies can also be viewed in terms of these three symbols of the new geometry of consciousness. Organizations and societies experience incremental changes, radical changes and disruptive/revolutionary changes arising from spiral like effects. Languages as Geometry of Consciousness It may be indicated that geometry of consciousness also finds its expression through various languages. An illustration of geometry of consciousness is the very first letter (∞) of Devanagari script which is a combination of symbol of infinity (∞) and the symbol T. It is a symbol of infinity combined with vertical and horizontal lines. As a symbol of new geometry of consciousness, it represents the idea of consciousness as infinite and unbounded in its vertical and horizontal expanses. This Devnagri letter can also serve as an analytical model of dialectical synthesis wherein symbol of infinity represents thesis and anti-synthesis intertwined. This illustration from the Devnagri script leads us to a general view that alphabets of various languages represent a geometry of consciousness. Popular usage of the phrase, From Alpha to Omega can also be interpreted in terms of evolution of consciousness from Alpha state to Omega state. In fact, all languages can be considered as expressions of nature’s geometry of consciousness. In view of the same, there is an underlying unity of all languages. A unity in diversity can be experienced

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Fig. 7.1 T symbol as a symbol of vertical, horizontal and integrative perspective

when languages are considered as different expressions of geometry of consciousness. T as a symbol is indicative of vertical and horizontal dimensions of knowledge and consciousness. T letter symbolizes vertical and horizontal dimensions of knowledge. When included within a circle, it acquires a new meaning and represents three views of knowledge and consciousness, viz. vertical, horizontal and integrative. For example, ‘scientific precision’/domain specialization can be represented by vertical dimension and ‘creative art’ approach by horizontal. These two are balanced by including them in a circle. Thus, T within a circle is a metaphor of vertical, horizontal and integrative approaches to knowledge creation, decision making and problem solving. Many universities are now recognizing the need for these three dimensions of knowledge in the development of curriculum. Figure 7.1 presents this symbol as a symbol of a new geometry of consciousness. Above illustrations indicate that the shapes of letters from different languages across the world can provide us some new insights to the geometry of consciousness. Seven Tempers of Mind: Rainbow Model of Consciousness—from Awareness to Awakening Full circle rainbow is another illustration of new geometry of consciousness. Full circle rainbow in the outer sky has a mirror image as an inner rainbow with ROYGBIV circles representing seven expanding circles of

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Table 7.1 Colors of consciousness Red (R)

Orange (O)

Yellow (Y)

Green (G)

Blue (B)

Indigo (I)

Violet (V)

Reason Scientific temper

Intuition

Wisdom

Insight

Revelation

Imagination Vision Transcendental vision

Source Wisdom & Consciousness from the East, Subhash Sharma, IBA Publications, Bangalore, 2013, p. 119

consciousness. Sharma (2013) suggests rainbow model of consciousness by providing new interpretations of the rainbow colors. Table 7.1 provides interpretations to various colors of consciousness: In the above-presented interpretation, scientific temper is the starting point of awareness and as awareness increases we finally reach the stage of awakening leading to transcendental vision. Visionaries operate from higher levels of consciousness, and thereby, they provide transcendental vision to the society. Prophets, philosophers, poets, saints, sages and wise gurus operate from higher levels of consciousness and therefore provide new insights based on their transcendental vision of reality. Expressions of Consciousness in Human Society: From Fight to Fullness In the context of human society, we find expression of consciousness in terms of 5 F model of Fight, Flow, Fly, Float and Fullness. Geometry of this evolutionary model of human consciousness can be represented by various symbols as presented in Table 7.2. In this geometry of human consciousness, rectangle represents Fight consciousness as it represents territory for which human beings fight in their survival. Triangle represents flow like the flow of river from the top of the mountain. Circle represents the fly like the flight of the bird and ∞ represents the floating like floating of the cloud and shunya (dot) represents the fullness state of consciousness. It may be indicated that fullness state of consciousness is also represented by many phrases such as Fanna, Nirvana and Moksha. These phrases represent the ‘fullness experiences’ in different languages. As more and more human beings evolve on this ladder of consciousness (from fight to fullness), we can visualize a shift

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Table 7.2 From fight to fullness

Fullness

.

Float

∞

Fly

Flow Fight

in consciousness from Darwinian existence to Enlightened existence with dignity and divinity oriented worldview. Π φ ψ Sky  φ ψ are three well-known symbols that can also be considered as symbols of the geometry of consciousness. We can find their equivalence in Body, Mind and Spirit as well as in energy chakras. Further in terms of their meaning in social sciences, they are considered as symbols of Politics (), Philosophy (φ) and Psychology (ψ). As symbols of consciousness, they represent evolution of consciousness from Body to Mind to Spirit. Further, beyond  φ ψ, there is fourth level, viz. sky level representing the cosmic consciousness. Sky is also a metaphor for spirituality. As an individual’s consciousness evolves, it reaches the sky level, i.e., yoking with cosmic consciousness. This four levels consciousness model has implications for individual, collective and organizational consciousness. Dialectical Chakra, Horizontal-Vertical Analytics and Whirlpool/Spiral Geometry Three concepts that capture the essence of the geometry of consciousness and its application to society’s analysis include dialectical chakra, horizontal-vertical analytics (analyzing horizontal & vertical axes of an

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issue) and whirlpool geometry. A dialectical chakra arises from the multiplicity of dialectics that we observe in society. This multiplicity could arise from caste, class, gender, culture, religion, etc. Dialectical chakra can also take the shape of horizontal and vertical axes, and as a result, its rotation whirlpool/spiral is generated. Thus, small events in society turn into huge spirals and influence the whole society through the process of the dialectical chakra turning into horizontal-vertical axes and then becoming a whirlpool/spiral. This process can be seen in communal and other types of riots in the society. Social media has also speeded up this process as information is communicated instantaneously. Thus, we can find a large number of examples of ‘local event’ having ‘global impact’. These have created new challenges for the modern State. Social sciences have not yet grasped a proper understanding of this geometry of consciousness as many tools of social sciences are rooted in models drawn from natural sciences. An understanding of three tools viz. dialectical chakra, horizontal-vertical analytics and spiral analytics can lead to new insights and thereby new solutions for the social and managerial problems and issues. Shunya, Matrix and Spiral Popularized by Harvard Business School, 2 × 2 matrix is widely used as an analytic tool in management. The dynamic aspect of 2 × 2 matrix is revealed when the matrix is viewed in terms of its origin from shunya and its transformation through rapid rotation into a spiral. Figure 7.2 presents this view of the 2 × 2 matrix. Thus, 2 × 2 matrix does not represent a static phenomenon as inherent within the matrix is a spiral. As the matrix rotates, it can become a spiral. Further, 2 × 2 matrix is hidden in shunya. When shunya expands in terms of horizontal and vertical axes, a 2 × 2 matrix is generated with a hidden spiral in it. Thus, there is shunya and spiral connectivity via a matrix. In

Shunya

Matrix

Fig. 7.2 Shunya, matrix and spiral inter-relationships

Spiral

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essence, the geometry of shunya (shunya matrix) finds it expression in many forms such as matrix and spirals. In ‘creations from shunya’, we can feel the presence of this geometry in varying forms. Western Windows, Eastern Doors and Consciousness Corridors New geometry of consciousness also leads us to a new architecture of consciousness in terms of ‘Western windows, Eastern doors and Consciousness corridors’. Sharma (1996) suggests the metaphor of Western windows and Eastern doors as two approaches to see reality around us. Western windows represent the Western enlightenment tradition reflected in scientific approach to knowledge creation wherein we look at the outer reality through the windows. Eastern doors represent the Eastern awakening tradition wherein we experience inner reality through the doors. Consciousness corridors provide us opportunity to study reality from both perspectives and thereby integrate the two approaches. Sharma (1999, 2001) connects the outer and inner perspectives through the ideas of Quantum Rope and Arrows of Time.

Science and Spirituality Connections Through Geometry of Consciousness: Toward a Bridge Between ‘God Particle’ and the ‘Shunya Particle’ Geometry of consciousness helps us in seeing connectivity between science and spirituality. While science is ‘matter’ (outer search) route to reality, spirituality is ‘spirit’ (inner search) route to reality. It is indeed interesting that while the two routes are different in its approach, there are interesting parallels. Capra (1976) provides many interesting parallels. Chandrankunnel (2008) takes us in the direction of ‘quantum holism’ and ‘cosmic holism’. Wilber (2000) suggests the need for ‘Integral Psychology’. In the discussion below, we point out parallels between some well-known symbols from science and spirituality. These include symbol of atomic power and atmik power, double helix symbol of DNA and Kundalini symbol, medical symbol of intertwined snakes and Kundalini structure, symbol of psychology and symbol of trident. etc. These are presented in Table 7.3. Thus, we observe interesting connectivity with some primordial symbols that are common across cultures. This indicates that ancient

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Table 7.3 Symbols from science and spirituality Symbols from Science

Symbols from Spirituality

Heart Chakra hexagon/ diamond (Atomic power)

(Double helix)

(A symbol of Atmik power)

(Kundalini double helix)

(Medical symbol)

(Kundalini structure)

(Psychology)

(Trident: Spirituality)

geometry of consciousness is being rediscovered through the route of science. This is bridging the gap between science and spirituality. Science has recently discovered the ‘God particle’; in spirituality, ‘shunya particle’ represents the ‘inner spirit’ of the matter leading to Creation from

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Shunya (Sharma 1993). In future, we may discover the bridge between the ‘God particle’ and the ‘shunya particle’, i.e., between the ‘atom’ and the ‘atma’. Such a discovery could come from the scientific route or the rishi route or a combination of both approaches.

END to END Connectivity Through Quantum Bridge Sharma (2013) suggests full spectrum approach (END to END) to understand cosmic reality through science and spirituality in terms of the following ideas: 1. Einstein (E) to Eternity (E); 2. Newton (N) to Nirvana (N); 3. Darwin (D) to Divinity (D). Ideas of the spiritual END have been explored in the East by Mahavira, Buddha and Aurobindo. We can imagine a river and tits two sides representing two END. Left side representing END of science represented by Einstein, Newton and Darwin and right side representing END of spirituality represented by Mahavira, Buddha and Aurobindo who can be referred to as Spiritual ‘MBA’. Quantum bridge over the river connects the two sides and facilitates the dialogue between the two sides (Sharma 2018). Time has come to undertake such a dialogue to connect the two sides for the benefit of humanity.

Application to Social and Management Thought To understand application of the geometry of consciousness to social sciences & social studies and management thought, we consider the following four-stage model of evolution of knowledge creation approaches in the field of social and management thought: Natural sciences (I)

Social sciences (II)

Neuro sciences (III)

Consciousness sciences (IV)

Methodology of the natural sciences deeply influenced the development of social sciences. However, with the development of neurosciences, social sciences are undergoing a transformation. Further with the impact of ‘consciousness sciences’/‘consciousness studies’, many fields of human

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knowledge are finding some new directions. In particular, geometry of consciousness can lead to new directions of research in social studies, management studies and management thought. In social contexts, geometry of consciousness finds its expression through individual and collective consciousness. An individual’s consciousness can transform a society, e.g., Gandhi’s impact on society through the combined effect of +, x and spirals of awakening created by him. Similarly, collective consciousness of a society can also transform a society, e.g., French Revolution and Russian Revolution. Revolutions can be considered as ‘tornadoes of collective consciousness’ leading to fundamental change in the society and its structure. A better understanding of geometry of consciousness can provide us some lessons in understanding disruptions and transformations in society and nations. Giri (2012) suggests the need for ‘Planetary realizations’ for social transformation that can be facilitated through the new geometry of consciousness. Sharma (1996, 2006) and Chakravorty (2012) outline contours of the ‘colors of mind’ for individuals, society and organizations. Further, Sharma and Albuquerque (2012) explore implications of consciousness approach in the context of corporations.

References Bohm‚ David. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge. Capra, Fritzof. 1976. Tao of Physics. Toronto: Bantam Books. Chandrenkunnel, Mathew. 2008. Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics—Quantum Holism to Cosmic Holism: Physics and Metaphysics of Bohm. New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House. Chakravorty, Meera. 2012. Colours of Mind and Other Essays. Delhi: New Bhartiya Corporation. Giri, Ananta. 2012. Knowledge Ad Liberation: Towards Planetary Realization. London: Anthem Press. Sharma, Subhash. 1993. Creation from Shunya. Anand: Anand Press. Sharma, Subhash. 1996. Management in New Age: Western Windows Eastern Doors. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers. Sharma, Subhash. 1999. Quantum Rope: Science, Mysticism and Management. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers. Sharma, Subhash. 2001. Arrows of Time: From the Black holes to Nirvana Point. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers.

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Sharma‚ Subhash. 2006. Vedanta As Ved-Ananta: A New Unfolding of Universal Spiritual Consciousness (USC), Chinmaya Management Review, January, 5(1)‚ 26–32. Sharma, Subhash, and Daniel Albuquerque. 2012. Consciousness in Corporate Corridors: Management, Leadership, Spirituality. Bangalore: IBA Publications. Sharma, Subhash. 2013. Wisdom and Consciousness from the East: Life, Living and Leadership. Bangalore: IBA Publications. Sharma, Subhash. 2018. Quantum Bridge Between Science & Spirituality. Beau Bassin: Lambert Academic Publishing. Wilber, Ken. 2000. Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy. London: Shambala.

CHAPTER 8

Freedom, Spiritual Praxis and Categorical Imperative Meera Chakravorty

In his introductory note to this book, Ananta Kumar Giri has mentioned that there is need for dialogue between varieties of pragmatism and also for exploring spiritual horizons of pragmatism. Keeping this dimension in view, we may see how C.S Pierce intended the meanings of words and concepts according to their practical significance, as a major and important factor. From this, it is believed, must have emerged the theory of meaning which turned into a General Theory of Truth later culminating in William James’s version of Pragmatism which considers that thoughts are tools to do things, and truth is then practical because it can be used. For James, as Will Durant mentions, “Truth is the cash-value of an idea” while he quotes him thus: “The true …is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving…The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief” (Durant 1967).i While explaining the Pragmatic Theory of Truth, James speculates that “anything knowable must be true. But what does it mean to call a proposition or belief ‘true’ from the perspective of pragmatism? He begins with a standard dictionary analysis of truth

M. Chakravorty (B) Jain University, Bangalore, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_8

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as agreement with reality. Accepting this, he warns that pragmatists and intellectualists will disagree over how to interpret the concepts of ‘agreement’ and ‘reality’, the latter thinking that ideas copy what is fixed and independent of us”.ii It is interesting to find the epistemological explanation of the school of Indian logic known as Nyaya School on the concept of truth similar to that of James’s idea which explains that knowledge is significant as it grasps reality or truth termed as Arthavatiii (in Sanskrit), and that the knowledge acquired through the means of knowledge has validity. Explicating further it says, if there were not a world that could be experienced, then dream states could not be explained.iv But before we proceed further, it is important to reflect on the concept or theory of truth believed to be applicable to worldly practice as explained in the Indian wisdom, or to be specific in the Upanishads to understand whether this is the implication in the texts of the Upanishad where ‘truth’ is explained. In the Upanishad, the term ‘Sat’ in Sanskrit is the root of ‘Satya’, translated as ‘truth’ because it is believed to be the only truth and nothing else. However, Sat also stands for ‘Existence’, ‘Consciousness’ or ‘Being’, hence, satya derived from the word sat suggests the existential reality. It is further explained that any other thing other than this has no existential reality and hence, not to be taken as truth. Interestingly, the other important dimension of this term which needs to be noted is that satya interpreted as truth, however, is not negation of ‘Mithya’ (In Sanskrit), which is popularly interpreted as ‘incorrectness or a lie’. The term ‘asat’ is the negation of sat which is contrary to sat as described in Indian philosophical context (Chandogya Upanishad).v The term falsehood or incorrect or mithya is a construct. While satya is not so since sat is the very existence itself. Thus, ‘Satyam, Jnanam Anantam Brahma’,vi in the Upanishad, describes the term sat or Consciousness or Being as immeasurable, besides associating it with the meanings of knowledge and existence. If we contrast this Being with the ‘Being’ in Sartre’s thought which is also an existential reality, we find that the idea of ‘Being’ in ‘Being and Nothingness’ appears to partially support this position though there is much difference when Sartre says: “For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears. Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for example, in the “phenomenology” of Husserl or of Heidegger—the phenomenon of the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for “to appear” supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant’s (1724–1804) Erscheinung. * It does not

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point over its shoulder to a true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself” (Sartre 1956).vii Importantly, the discourse on ‘truth’ in the ancient Indian wisdom also points out to yet another space where truth in its functional aspect can be referred to those constructs and thus can have truth value as it is with these constructs that we interact in the world. For instance, the references to ‘my body’, ‘my complexion’, and so on appear to have a truth value while in reality they are just constructs and can be deconstructed unlike the fact of existence (sat). This may also point out to a similarity with the concept of truth, explained by Martin Heidegger. He says: “Truth means today and has long meant the agreement or conformity of knowledge and fact. However, the fact must show itself to be fact if knowledge and the proposition that forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to the fact” (Hofstadter 1971).viii Explaining further, he says: “In other words, how could there be any perception of the correspondence of a judgment and things unless ‘truth’ in another, deeper sense were not already available to us, unnoticed. The point is simple. We could not judge if the proposition ‘x is y’ were either true or false if neither x nor y were not made apparent to us, unconcealed in some way as such or such, and this disclosure is a necessary condition for any correlation of objects and judgments about them” (idem).ix Shankara’s (788–836) views in this context appear to justify a new epistemology which is that the essence proves the ontology which is existence. Commenting on this idea of Consciousness or Being as satya or the truth, this rationalist scholar and philosopher appears to maintain that while in the study of Consciousness (on the Sanskrit text Brahmasutra),x where consciousness is explained as ‘truth’ or the only reality, it still can be pragmatically approached. For instance, the request of the individual which says: “lead me to the path of truth” (presented through Sanskrit terms asato ma sadgamaya),xi shows an avenue that brings an awareness of a fair and moral path to live a life. This raises a question: like Shankara, do the pragmatists intensely hold to an absolute truth or reality and prescribe like him truth’s functional aspect with which to interact in the world and also explain this as having a pragmatic value? If we suppose so, then the theory of truth would be a construct equally with a limited function to serve. How would the pragmatists explain this? If the theory of meaning is predicated upon the ontology of existence/being, then one has to explore that ontology to explain further as Shankara does. It is noteworthy to

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point out here that the position of Existentialism may appear similar to that extent to which the point of departure in that thought process is also ‘being’ and the ‘essence’ are the constructs added to it later, hence ‘existence precedes essence’ becomes the expression. Thus, in view of this, is it possible to comprehend how the concept of truth has possibly been practical in life, how its practical aspect could possibly respond to its theoretical aspect. If according to the explanation of the Upanishad, truth is Being then it may be possible to sustain the Being in a way which may define its relationship to the worldly behaviour as Shankara explains. He further suggests that one way of looking at its ramifications is, if the source or the root of everything is Being, then the latter as ‘Beingness’ encompasses every other existence which is the rudimentary explanation in the Upanishad. Thus, this beingness is in every transaction and relation with every other existence and as practice it can then possesses the truth value. Besides the philosophical explanation, there is the other mundane way of conceiving the transient relationships to be seen as functional truth like the physical qualities or for that matter any other which are merely constructed yet considered as pragmatic in nature. The concern then will be to understand how far the pragmatist idea, in actual life-situations, for instance, has been reduced by rudimentary welfare schemes to help people like containment of suicidal tendencies in the peasants in the context of agriculture in India and has to be reflected seriously. This leads to the question how thoughts as tools have influenced to affect people’s life which may provoke us to explore the implications of this theory and similar others to push the debate in a new direction. The idea that truth is practical and can help people out of crisis has not often remained a doctrinaire interpretation with many Indian spiritual leaders who did not use a binary model that pitted a learned against an illiterate but have worked for people’s freedom through their struggle taken to streets. To quote an instance: the struggle for freedom is amply evident in the Gandhian movement that happened in the twentieth century in India. Therefore, the question of knowing a theory well before applying it to actual field may appear impractical many a time, because if the struggle is of practical significance to achieve freedom, then the concept of freedom does not merely remain a theory any more, it becomes a practical truth. The arena of truth thence extends to freedom and beyond, to justice. This view may most definitively link James to John Rawls, yet another pragmatist and his important work, A Theory of Justice (1971), in which his concerns with people’s rights and his idea of ‘justice

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as fairness’ provide important insights. Considering this, it would therefore be logical to think that the concern for truth as a process leading to freedom and justice can launch the idea of Praxis which may appear as the criterion of the transition from a dehumanizing condition to a dignified survival. We constantly witness how in the society in modern times, the attempts to turn human beings into a machine are being tried which is presented effectively by the Hollywood film ‘The Matrix’. Under such circumstances, freedom becomes a revolutionary concept. Therefore, it is this concern for truth which makes us realize how freedom should be seen as the Praxis and appears to play a central role as its travails to show the ‘revolutionary change’ and the emergence of a transformed being, not deprived of freedom or liberty. Thus, it must be considered a ‘Categorical Imperative’, as in Kant. In this context, it is important to mention that the Democratic Socialist Party of Sweden in its manifesto during the 1990s had mentioned the importance of Kant’s categorical imperative justifying its standpoint on liberty and freedom. “Supporters of the idea of a more equal society referred to various political theorists, such as Karl Marx (1818-1883), Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) amongst others…. As the interrelated ideas freedom, equality, justice and solidarity are relatively open to interpretations, institutions which declare them as their values must likewise define them. Such definitions constitute the theoretical framework which is the basis for political action. Social democratic parties or organizations, therefore have to find ways to put freedom, equality, justice and solidarity into practice. This is hardly possible without international cooperation, as this world becomes more and more globalized. The call for freedom, equality, justice and solidarity originates in old humanistic thoughts. It is central for the Christian idea of man, it has been the battle-cry of the French Revolution, it is reflected in the legal foundations of the United Nations, the UN’s two Human Covenants 1966 and finally it also forms the core values of social democracy” (Tilton 1979).xii This has an ethical implication for our peaceful coexistence with each other. Why follow truth? Because it has a moral value, to follow truth which leads us to freedom then becomes a categorical imperative. Because “All rational beings recognize the distinction between knowing the truth and knowing what to do about it. Judgments and decisions may each be based on, and amended through, reason, but only the first can be true or false. Hence there must be an employment of our rational faculties that does not have truth, but something else, as its aim. What is this

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something else? Aristotle said happiness; Kant says duty. It is in the analysis of the idea of duty that Kant’s distinctive moral vision is expressed” (Scruton 2001).xiii In that case, our modest attempt should be to realize how truth leads to freedom and further to liberation (moksha) and we must try to perceive rather envisage how they connect to give a vision of justice. If knowing the truth is being in coexistence then knowing what to do about it will be to explore how a state of liberation can be achieved when these are perceived as ‘movements’. Henry Bergson conceives intermingling of both material and spiritual as an important perception. He says: “ Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with it’s freedom” (Bergson 1988).xiv From this perspective the pragmatic aspect we can see how the non-violent movement, the socialreform movement of Chaitanya (1486–1534), the mystic, saint and social reformer of Bengal, (the eastern India), and similar other social-spiritual movements make deep sense. However, this realization is not very easy when questions like “John Locke’s theory was mainly criticized on the question of how freedom can be realized. How can freedom be guaranteed for everyone? What exactly is meant by a social contract? In a less philosophical way, these questions remain part of the public dialogue in every democracy. Fundamental freedoms like the freedoms of religion, expression and association are nowadays in most countries guaranteed by a constitution. Constitutions are a written form of social contract. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) questioned to which extent freedom depends on one’s wealth, power, faculties and education. He took a radical stand and said that a society without any social inequalities, combined with broad democratic participation, is the prerequisite of freedom” (Tilton 1970).xv This implies that a human being cannot be assigned the role of a mere cog in the wheel of his system; she/he is capable of acting and participating, pursuing his/her freedom which can lead to praxis. It is desirable to mention that Praxis is a Greek term, rendered as an activity which has its goal within itself, contrasted with ‘poiesis’ or production which aims at bringing into existence something apart from the activity itself. Marx has used this concept to elaborate and: “What Marx calls Praxis is the meaning which works itself out spontaneously in the intercrossing of those activities by which man organized his relations with nature and with other men….It is… the analysis of the past and the present which enables us to perceive in outline a logic in the course of things which

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does not so much guide it from the outside as emanate from within it, and which will be achieved only if men understand their experience and will to change it” (Merleau Ponty 1963). xvi As praxis is revolutionary to Marx in the political context, in the same way it may find an apt expression justifying its emergence in the spiritual context too. It is significant that the visionaries of political economy, of philosophy, of culture and social justice and related areas have cherished freedom as of practical and spiritual importance, and as protective of liberty of soul. Be it from the material bondage or physical, freedom is enthralling as always and invaluable for our own growth. It is from this dimension that the richness of spiritual praxis is viewed to propose to be the innovative alternatives to the dilemma of existence, freedom and its relation to ethics and the world. There are though, possibilities that ideas concerning freedom and ethics may appear contradictory on another level, discussed later. While focusing on the importance of spiritual praxis as speculated by Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Vivekananda, Tagore, Kabir, Allamaprabhu, Gibran, Kant and others, besides raising the complexities of Self/Soul and its relation to freedom, we find the inter-dependence of ethics and freedom as a categorical imperative interesting. Roger Scruton gives us this perspective from Kant describing how: “The starting point of Kant’s ethics is the concept of freedom. According to his famous maxim that ‘ought to implies can’, the right action must always be possible: which is to say, I must always be free to perform it. The moral agent judges that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free, a fact which, but for moral law, he would never have known. In other words, the practice of morality forces the idea of freedom upon us” (Scruton 2001).xvii Philosophers across the world have been perplexed by the question of how this freedom is related to Soul/Self, and possibly its connection with the existential ego. Indian philosophy’s engagement with ego is interesting as it shows how less confident the ego is when juxtaposed to situations that raise questions like, is there an objective knowledge to discern the related facts, if so, what are these? What happens if the Descartian position of ‘cogito ergo sum’— ‘I think therefore I exist’, is readily adopted. Is this I an objective existence? However: “Kant’s contemporary Litchenberg pointed out that Descartes ought not to have drawn this conclusion. The ‘cogito’ shows that there is a thought, but not that there is an ‘I’ who thinks it. Kant, similarly dissatisfied… with the doctrine of the soul that flowed from it, felt that the certainty of self-knowledge had been wrongly described. It is

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true that, however skeptical I may be about the world, I cannot extend my skepticism into the subjective sphere (the sphere of consciousness): so I can be immediately certain of my present mental states. But I cannot be immediately certain of what I am, or of whether, indeed, there is an ‘I’, to whom these states belong” (idem).xviii This ‘I’ takes itself to be the knower, described as ‘manas’ in the school of Sankhya philosophy, does not have freedom and appears uncertain about itself. It cannot possibly declare itself as Soul, ‘the sphere of pure consciousness’. It is then possibly related to ‘ahankara’, the existentialego which will not like to be quiet unless the freedom from this dilemma is found. This fact of restlessness adhering to the ego is found in every state of living (life) and appears so natural that it is taken as the right to be with such states. The Sankhya further suggests that this bizarre position is assumed by the ego and remains to be an ongoing complexity, till freedom is attained. It is the dream of the ego to think of itself as the agent who can’ freely’ act. It also persuades itself as the knower since it is tied up with the ‘trigunas’ the three entanglements of ‘sattwa, rajas and tamas, the positive, the restless and the negative aspects, respectively, which help create the personality of an individual. However, its idea of freedom is false since the premise itself is false. Though this premise may not in any way help us to understand what the subjective sphere is, yet how the ego may be related to the objective sphere as its desire to know the world the jurisdiction of knowledge, cannot be denied and remains to be understood. Thus, it may be a privilege readily claimed by the ‘knower’ for it must ever be the ‘right’ of the knower to have presumed the reasons to know whatever is presented to it. And how does that happen. The Kantian position tries to explain it this way: “What is the character of this immediate and certain knowledge? The distinguishing feature of my present mental states is that they are as they seem to me and seem as they are. In the subjective sphere, being and seeming collapse into each other. In the objective sphere, they diverge. The world is objective because it can be other than it seems to me. So the true question of objective knowledge is: how can I know the world as it is? I can have the knowledge of the world as it seems, since that is merely knowledge of my present perceptions, memories, thoughts, and feelings. But can I have knowledge of the world that is not just knowledge of how it seems? To put the question in slightly more general form: can I have knowledge of the world that is not just knowledge of my own point of view?” (idem).xix

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But it is the knowledge of the world and its relation to the existential ego that enables a seeker to be aware of the fact that his freedom is misplaced, rationalizes the Advaita teacher Shankara in his commentary on Brahamasutra. It becomes of utmost importance therefore, that this dilemma is explored to discover something like spiritual praxis which may bring in a transformation in those who seek not a temporary relief but absolute freedom. Freedom from the world and its complexities has been considered of high prerogative in the context of Indian philosophy so much so that it is claimed as the natural right of an individual to be free and to render it imperative for people to go after it. The term ‘moksha’ is used to epitomize this. Reason is used to explain the state of freedom from all kinds of complexities. Though both Kant and Shankara use ‘reason’, they are aware of its limitation. Shankara in his commentary on ‘Brahmasutra’ declares in no uncertain terms: ‘Tarkah apratishthanat’, i.e., reason is equally destabilizing in nature. Hence, it cannot comprehend what is absolute freedom. Kant’s idea of freedom cannot be contemplation in luxury too. Vivekananda, on the other hand, was aware of this. Being convinced about this imperative he was equally apprehensive about losing his freedom yet he ventured into that unknown where it was crucial to make people aware of the relation between freedom and ethics. Romain Rolland the French scholar and savant describe how after his victory in Parliament of Religions he saw: “… that his free solitary life with God was at end….But there was always the other inner voice, which said to him, ‘Renounce’ ! Live in God! He never could satisfy the one without partially denying the other. Hence, the periodic cries traversed by this stormy genius and the torments which apparently contradictory but really logical, can never be understood by single-minded spirits, by those who, having only one thought in their hearts, make of their poverty an obligatory virtue, and who call the mighty and pathetic struggling towards harmony of souls, too richly endowed, either confusion or duplicity” (Rolland 2010).xx However, for this harmony of souls he followed his inner voice that showed him the freedom of self responsible for his existential transformation. Much to the chagrin of his fellow monks who thought spiritualism was only meditation and more meditation, Vivekananda reconstructed the idea of spiritualism through actually serving people especially those who were marginalized. Despite being an educated person, he did not bother to search for the epistemological roots or pedantic explanations of spiritualism but from his grass-root experiences inspired an action that can

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be viewed as an act of spiritual praxis. An illustration from Vivekananda’s life may show how his journey to revolutionize human existence can be understood as an act of praxis. As Rolland describes: “His great Periplus of two years through India and then of three years around the world… was the adequate reply of his instinct to the double exigencies of his nature: independence and service. He wandered, free from plan, caste, home, constantly alone with God. And there was no single hour of his life when he was not brought into contact with the sorrows, the desires, the abuses, the misery, and the feverishness of living men, rich and poor, in town and field; he became one with their lives; the great Book of Life revealed to him what all the books in the libraries could not have done….” (idem).xxi Kahlil Gibran talks of a similar journey. But if there is incessant misery with a few moments of happiness only to look forward how an individual can continue with his/her agonized existential dilemma, how authentic is his/her agency and subjectivity to challenge or escape the complexities of life to be free. Gibran addresses this issue of agony: “The God separated a spirit from Himself and fashioned it into beauty. He showered upon her all the blessings of gracefulness and kindness. He gave her a cup of happiness and said, Drink not from this cup unless you forget the past and the future, for happiness is naught but the moment. And he also gave her a cup of sorrow and said, Drink from this cup and you will understand the fleeting instants of the joy of life, for sorrow ever abounds” (Gibran 2004).xxii If this is the state of affairs, then the power to change a given situation has to be astonishingly revolutionary. Though the prerogative to create the world lies in God, the belief is that human beings only act to bring change which they could attribute to their versatile perceptions of justifiable consequences and for this they could appeal to God for a favourable change. Satirically, Gibran further says: “And the God laughed and cried. He felt an overwhelming love and pity for Man, and sheltered him beneath His guidance” (idem).xxiii While, on the one hand, this poses deep questions like if God has freedom why is he in agony, and also about human intelligibility to understand one’s Self, on the other, it also provokes one to transcend the worldly activities through a spiritual praxis since that is supposed to bring the real freedom. The sufis in one way and the Bauls of Bengal, yet in another way, have attempted to offer a kind of answer to this dilemma. For these wayfarers, freedom is not bound by a particular space and time. These people are the followers of the theory of self-abnagation. In Indian philosophy, some of the schools

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of thought advocate the theory of self-abnegation which explains that detachment can be adhered to as well as lived as a way of life. Bauls are enamoured with statuslessness, absence of wealth and fame and anything that ordinarily a person may desire. Hence, they adopt a mobile lifestyle never having to settle down in a permanent residence, and cannot think of adapting themselves to life’s mundane conditionality since they think that this would bind them to a particular space and time. In their ideology, they are diverse and non-structural if it can be expressed through a metaphor of a forest: “In the silence of the forest certain events are unaccommodated and cannot be placed in time. Being like this they both disconcert and entice the observer’s imagination: for they are like another creature’s experience of duration. We feel them occurring, we feel their presence, yet we cannot confront them, for they are occurring for us, somewhere between past, present and future” (Berger 2007).xxiv While, on the other hand, there are possibilities that ideas concerning freedom and ethics may appear contradictory on another level, like the description of the Peepal tree in the Bhagavadgita which has its root not on the ground but as spreading in the sky,xv the Baul’s philosophy is not bound by the conventional foundation, and therefore, it is flexible and plural in its approach. What is also interesting is that unlike the perception that ethics and freedom are interdependent the Bauls violate the norms of conventional ethics to bring in the considerations of multiplicity for which they have been often alienated in past by the traditional societies. Their paradigm of interpretation of love for the Soul is not an expression of a passive concept of a rigorous philosophical thought but is rather a behaviour to determine how to understand the events and processes which are responsible for bondage and how these can be transformed into conditions for freedom since freedom is immanent to these processes. One such investigation follows with arguments not based on religious appeals but that which enhances the right to freedom as the Baul asks “why is this unknown bird in the cage….” (Khanchar bhitar achin paakhi…),xvi implying the Soul bound in the cage which is the body and the cage being imposed on it captures a critical significance of ‘transcendence’ once the cage is broken. Religion was sought in India not as ritualism but as ‘facts of experience’ to understand this transcendence, to bring in a transformation to the individual as evidenced through the lives led by Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Tagore, Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Kabir, Basavanna and may more. Strengthening this argument, Rolland comments that: “…Religious historians who seek only to discover the

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intellectual inter-dependence of systems, forget the vital point: the knowledge that religions are not ordinary matter of intellectual dialect, but facts of experience. Hence, the facts must first be discovered and studied….The first result of an objective study of Comparative Metaphysics and Mysticism would be to demonstrate the universality and perennial occurrence of the great facts of religious experience, their close resemblance under the diverse costumes of race and time, attesting to the persistent unity of the human spirit, which is itself obliged to delve for it — to the identity of the materials constituting humanity” (Rolland 2010).xvii So, the mystics as mentioned above and their tribes have consistently shown that when they offer their rich experiences subsuming these within the versatile activities of people aimed at freedom, it can help people find a way out of their conflicts through the practice of spiritual praxis. This strategy, rather an extraordinary one was primarily to make people aware of their original freedom, a prerogative, they believed, inherent in human beings though they are not aware of this and therefore surrender it willingly as they are indecisive about life’s priority of cherishing freedom. What appears to have evolved from the practice of spiritual praxis is a transforming process by which people from any strata could be empowered to achieve the freedom in order to evolve meaningfully. This is not to say that this is an abstract theorization of an imagined behaviour. The very practice by mystics like Chaitanya, Ramakrishna and others involving themselves against the traditional cast equations and similar discriminations was from the premise that all are born equal and since in God’s kingdom there are no such things as caste, class and other barriers it is the prerogative of everyone to be included in all activities of life. Thus, the theory and practice of exclusionism is merely an imagination of some sections of people for more and more unethical way of living, if that is their choice unfortunately. While the lives and activities of these saints are stories of resilience on the one hand, these are also stories of love and freedom for humanity, on the other, which further symbolizes how these can change the collective pain of the people and bring in social action that would not let a person confine another in any way. Swami Vivekananda is one with Chaitanya when he articulates this position emphatically: “Although a man has not studied a single system of philosophy, although he does not believe in any God, and never has believed, although he has not prayed even once in his whole life, if the simple power of good actions has brought him to that state where he is ready to give up his life and all else for others, he has arrived at the same point to which the

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religious man will come through his prayers and the philosopher through his knowledge: and so you may find that the philosopher, the worker, and the devotee all meet at one point, that one point being self-abnegation. However much their systems of philosophy and religion may differ, all mankind stand in reverence and awe before the man who is ready to sacrifice himself for others” (Complete Works 1997).xviii This self-abnegation is possible because of the transformation or spiritual praxis that a person can hail as the great freedom which releases him/her from all worldly bondages and guide to exercise this freedom for a cause. The instances of self-abnegation are many in Indian culture and thought which has influenced great writers in all parts of the country. To give a glimpse of this one can see how Tagore’s remarkable expression on earth and its beauty as part of sheer joy is a kind of warning to people not to exploit since God has merely authorized human beings to use the materials of earth for their need and therefore they must never ever think that they are the owners of the earth, which suggests conservation of environment: Fill your eyes with the colours that ripple on beauty’s stream, vain is your struggle to clutch them. That which you chase with your desire is a shadow, that which thrills your life-chords is music. The wine they drink at the assembly of gods has no body, no measure. It is in rushing brooks, in flowering trees, in the smile that dances at the corner of dark eyes. Enjoy it in freedom. (Tagore 2002)xix

This suggests that a sense of existence entwined with a spiritual space appears to propel them to live an alternate existence, to live with freedom. It also suggests that the theory fortifies a sort of action which is spiritualized, in other words, it calls for a ‘spiritualized activity’,xxx the validity of which would lay down provisionally more such actions. While an act which is spiritualized would indicate that one becomes eventually free from worldly affaires and therefore freedom would ordinarily follow, any selfish act however, would not pave way for this freedom because it would not lead one to be in union with higher cause which is also the actual meaning of Yoga (‘yujir yoge’, which means union with higher cause), as Swami Vivekananda says: “That which is selfish

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is immoral, and that which is unselfish is moral” (Complete Works 1997).xxxi Vivekananda continues to explain how this is the ideology of Karmayoga which prohibits all agency to action de-relating it with any worldly desire thus ‘Nishkama’ or an action without selfish intentions or desires. It is to be noted that this standpoint of interrelation between morality and freedom is already mentioned in the beginning of this paper as a perspective from Kant. Commenting on this, Scruton says: “It may be noted how essential it is for one to know that …all thought is an exercise of freedom ….In which case the certainty of my freedom is as great as the certainty of anything. This argument occurs, in more rhetorical form, in the writings of Sartre, whose existentialist doctrine of the moral life owes much to Kant. If this is true, then of course the antinomy of freedom becomes acute: we are compelled by practical reason to accept that we are free, and by understanding to deny it… Kant is sometimes content to argue merely that I must think of myself as free. It is a presupposition of all action in the world—and hence of reasoned decisions— that the agent is the originator of what he does. And, Kant suggests, I cannot forsake this idea without losing the sense of myself as agent. The very perspective of reason that sees the world as bound in chains of necessity also sees it as containing freedom” (Scruton 2001).xxxii This would notably be the practice followed in the case of those who chose a life of freedom. In the Indian context, the school of Sankhya thought declares its goal to be absolutely free of sorrow or ‘Dukkhatraya’– the threefold miseriesxxxiii and talks about exploring (or jijnasa) the idea of freedom otherwise, it warns, the consequences would be unpleasant. This unpleasantness occurs, as we are aware of when unrestrained power is used to suspend the operation of moral law both in its inner and outer expressions of living life because it is important to remember that freedom is associated with both mental and physical plane. As Rolland points out: “ Without going outside the plane of observable and probable, it has actually been proved that sovereign control of inner life is able to put into our hands (partially if not entirely our unconscious or subconscious life” (Rolland 2010).xxxiv Freedom thus becomes an imperative whether in the Samkhya-Yoga thought or in Kantian philosophy to ask people to pursue his/her action to arrive at truth, hence: “Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason was preceded by a brilliant resume of his moral viewpoint, the Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals. These works treat of ‘practical reason’: in using this expression Kant was consciously reviving the ancient contrast between theoretical and practical knowledge” (Scruton

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2001).xxxv This reflection appears to justify the importance of freedom that can be put to moral use thus supporting its cause in favour of spiritual praxis. People who perfected their moral life often came to be the champions of freedom and in this context Mahatma Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, Vivekananda, Kabir and others have been mentioned earlier whose activities can be termed as spiritualized actions. The entire approach of Gandhian freedom movement based its insight on a sound understanding of the interrelationship of morality and freedom and reflected on the issue that ‘there are right and wrong answers to question of human values’ (LRB 2012).xxxvi Besides, this concept of freedom is also based on a distinct social identity. Gandhi often talked of ‘Atmashakti’ or power of soul/consciousness, the idea which he derives from the Upanishads. However, the Upanishads also explains that the Self expresses itself as transcendental freedom, that the Self expresses itself both empirically and non-empirically. In this context, Kant’s views make one think as if he had foreseen this issue, as it is evident from the following: “Practical reason, however, not being concerned in the discovery of truths, imposes no concepts on its objects. It will never, therefore, lead us into the error of forming a positive conception of the transcendental self. While we cannot translate this knowledge into judgment about our nature, we can translate it into some other thing. This other thing is given by the laws of practical reason, which are the synthetic a priori principles of action. Just as there are a priori laws of nature that can be derived from the unity of consciousness, so too there are a priori laws of reason that can be derived from the perspective of transcendental freedom….They will be practical laws, concerning what to do” (Scruton 2001).xxxvii Related to this is the argument found in the Indian epic, the Mahabharata, which says that the human being happens to be the priority in life, that he has the agency, the subjectivity as the free human being, that he is the legitimate agent of moral action and is defined and redefined constantly by actions. The Mahabharata claims that despite the abyss created by the dehumanizing war, it is the humanity that still continues to exist as the human beings do not live by war, they live inspired by humanity. This perspective Gandhi’s movement can be seen as the praxis which has much of the spiritual quotient inherent in it. While the ramifications of the theory of spiritual praxis can be debated further, it can be at the same time proposed that this theory can be the basis of a new ontology, a new insight to living life bringing out the importance of freedom related to humanity and not just its mere

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survival instincts that can provide a hopeful solution leading to profound consequences for all existence. Also, instead of treating it as a metaphysical position it is possible to show how there are empirical results that can be derived from its insights because as Deluze points out that: “….Philosophical concepts and philosophical positions lie not with the truth or falsity of their claims but with the vistas for thinking and living they open for us” (May 2005).xxxviii The other consideration is that it may not be merely taken as some principle good to remain in the books, as spiritual praxis is an application attempted by the visionaries who related this to living relations and thus it has evolved as an important experience. This is what is exactly reminded to us by Kabir in the following translation of his sayings by Tagore: “Teerath me to sab paani hai…” which means as follows:

There is nothing but water at the holy bathing places; and I knew that they are useless, for I have bathed in them. The images are all lifeless, they cannot speak; I knew. for I have cried aloud to them…. Kabir gives utterance to the words of experience, and he knows very well that all other things are untrue”. (Tagore 2002)xxxix

It is interesting to know, says Lewis Kraus, that researchers in neuroscience like Sam Harris in his book “The Fair Society: The Science of Human Nature and the Pursuit of Social Justice” believes: “….that questions about values, about meaning, morality and life’s larger purpose— are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures. Our advancing understanding of the brain will, he believes, help us to arrive at enduring answers” (Kraus 2012).xl In view of the above therefore, two movements can be mentioned that facilitated a climate of spiritual praxis. For instance, it is important to note that the movement led by Kabir was that of spiritual praxis, and it is equally significant to note that this legacy was recognized by Tagore who urged Pandit Kshitimohan Sen. who had painfully collected the sayings of many such visionaries like Kabir, to evaluate and publish the same to save them from being lost forever. In this context, let us remember that Kabir occupies a preeminent position in the history of

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movements that have transformed people’s life as he is ever green and alive in the songs and sayings which people have been continuously using as an expression of their subjectivity. One could perhaps argue therefore that Kabir had the capability to bring in a spiritual praxis to the understanding of humanity that could further bring in transformation in peoples’ consciousness. Indeed, Shri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa too in a similar effort had been responsible for a new transformation in people’s existence. Though it may seem that he led apparently a religious life and though he was not a scholar/academician like Chaitanya, he neither based his knowledge premised upon any kind of exclusionism nor for that matter on any abstract category. He never cared to justify his actions by some kind of religious sanction and thus became vulnerable to attacks and was often dismissed by people from different strata. Crossing the barriers of class, caste and religion his praxis is grounded on transforming people with love which was to become the real sustenance for human beings thus changing the meaning of human existence. He knew that as this love nurtures physical health, mental health and social relationships, it consequently can afford to take one to the transcendental love, love for God and thus pave the way for freedom and truth. It must also be realized in this context that before this love culminates to the knowledge of the Absolute truth, it makes a radical way for the vision of a fair society. What becomes truly important then is the experience people can have in actually living in fair relation(s) without confronting exclusivity, a relation which can be shared. It may not then be too much to claim that the experience from such shared knowledge is of universal relevance hence, this new ontology may be an imperative to pursue freedom.

Notes i. Durant, Will. 1967. The Story of Philosophy. New York, NY: Washington Square Press, p. 512. ii. https//www.iep.utm.edu. iii. Nyaya-bhashya, ii.1 (8–19). iv. Ibid., iv.2. v. CHandogya Upanishad. 6.2.1. Ed. By S Radhakrishnan. 1953. The Principal Upanishads. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. vi. Tattiriya Upanishad. 2.1.1., idem. vii. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. Being and Nothingness. New York, NY, Washington Square Press Edition (1966), p. 4.

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viii. Hofstadter, Albert. 1971. Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. New York, NY: Harper & Row, p. 51. ix. Idem. x. Shankaracharya, commentary on Brahmasutrashankarabhasya. 1. 1966. Ed. Varanasi, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan. xi. Tattiriya Upanishad, 2.1.1. Ed. Radhakrishnan. xii. Timothy A. Tilton. 1979. A Swedish Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy. The American Political Science Review Vol. 73, No. 2 (June 1979), pp. 505–520. xiii. Scruton, Roger. 2001. Kant: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press,. p. 73 xiv. Bergson, Henry. 1988. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New York. xv. Tilton (1979). xvi. Mereleau Ponty, Maurice. 1963. In Praise of Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, pp. 50–51. xvii. Scruton, p. 74. xviii. Scruton, pp. 17–19. xix. Idem., p. 19. xx. Rolland, Romain. 2010.The Life of Vivekananda and the Universal Gospel. Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, pp. 32–33. xxi. Rolland, p. 16. xxii. Gibran, Kahlil, 2004. Tears and Laughter. New Delhi: UBS Publishers, p. 1. xxiii. Gibran, p. 2. xxiv. Berger, John. 2007. Dryads of the Deep Forest. In Asking We Walk. Ed. Corinne Kumar, Book two. Bangalore: Streelekha, pp. 217–219. xxv. Bhagavadgita, chap. 15.1. xxvi. One of the popular Baul songs from Oral Tradition. xxvii. Ibid., pp. 289–290. xxviii. Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, 9 Vols. 1–8, 1989, 9- 1997. Calcutta Advaita Ashrama, p. 1.86 xxix. Tagore, R. 2002. Selected Poems V . New Delhi, Rupa and Co, p. 19. xxx. This term is used by Swami Girishananda. 2011.Prabuddha Bharata, Vol. 116, No. 9. (September) Kolkata, pp. 571–574. xxxi. Complete Works. 1. 110. xxxii. Scruton, pp. 74–75. xxxiii. Ishwarakrishna. ‘Sankhyakarika’. 1. xxxiv. Rolland, p. 194. xxxv. Scruton, p. 73. xxxvi. London Review of Books. 2012. 9 February. London, p. 36. xxxvii. Ibid., p. 77.

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xxxviii. May, Todd. 2005. Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 22. xxxix. Selected Poems, 43 xl. Kraus- Lewis, Gideon. 2012. London. LRB.9 February, p. 36. * Appearance.

CHAPTER 9

Spiritual Pragmatism and an Economics of Solidarity John Clammer

One of the most persistent dualisms that have bedeviled thought and analysis for a very long time has been that of the material and the spiritual. One of the many effects of this has been to assign economics to the realm of the material, and of course religion to the realm of the spiritual. But in fact, the slightest acquaintance with economics shows that it is the social science that most enshrines values. Deconstruct any economic concept— money, interest, consumption or what you will, and one immediately finds values, cultural preferences and choices, themselves not economic in the narrow sense at all, but relating rather to ideas of social status, identity, immortality (Bauman 1992), hopes, future expectations, power and prestige. That we tend today to measure these things in economic terms says much about our culture and civilization, and actually very little about the supposed “objectivity” of conventional economic concepts and assumptions, and indeed assumes, rather than proves, the nature of that illegitimate dualism.

J. Clammer (B) O.P. Jindal Global University, Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_9

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Indeed, the feeling has been arising in numerous quarters that it is precisely those assumptions that need serious pragmatic and theoretical questioning. Such critiques have arisen from a number of quarters—analyses of the inadequacies of neo-liberal economic theory, of the many negative effects of globalization, of the poverty of such conventional concepts as GNP for measuring actual progress in material well-being, of the destructive effects of capitalist economies on the environment and their ultimate un-sustainability given finite resources on a finite planet, of the tendency of consumerist societies to enhance rather than diminish social and economic inequalities, and the deeper and perhaps more inchoate feeling that our present economic arrangements do not deliver the happiness, sense of spiritual or aesthetic satisfaction or fulfillment that we might hope for from our economic and social arrangements. Framing all these forms of critique is the sense that conventional economics is in any case a “virtual science”—one which creates categories for explaining the world (and practical economic, financial and industrial policies, and indeed development policies too)—that are so hegemonic that we come to believe that they do in fact describe reality when in fact all that they do is create models of it, but models so powerful that they come to take on a life of their own and actually determine behavior (Carrier and Miller 1998). Seen in this light, conventional neo-classical or neoliberal economics is a profound and immensely damaging form of false consciousness. Given the influence of economic thinking on everyday life, livelihoods, development practices, political policies and its impact on the environment, it is in fact the major determinant of global trends. In this respect at least, Marx was right. But only in part, for among the absences of Marxist thought is the presence of spirituality, other than as the famous or infamous “opium of the people”. But yet in this respect Marx was only foreshadowing what has become a commonplace: that economics has nothing to do with the spiritual life, and indeed may work against it. The idea of a “spiritual economics” or one that embodies and promotes spiritual values and forms of life and institutions that support and render concrete such values is quite inconceivable to most economists, or indeed to most “spiritual workers” too—be they thinkers, practitioners of a religious or spiritual tradition, or simply seekers for ways of living compatible with an ecologically sound and socially just existence on this Earth and one that points toward rather than away from the fulfillment of extraordinary possibilities and potentialities of a fully human life. Yet when one looks at the

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many emerging “alternative” views on the possibility of a new form of economic life, one almost invariably finds that they also embody, if often in a very implicit and concealed way, what is in fact a program of spiritual regeneration: a denial in fact of the separation of the material and the spiritual. Some of these ideas come from the rapidly increasing realization of the intimate connections between ecology, economy and human futures, found increasingly in the burgeoning literature of sustainability as well as in sources coming from deep ecology and from the fast-growing interest of theologians, Buddhist practitioners and religious adherents in the connections between their religious traditions and the environment, a concern that immediately spills over into confrontation with the nature of our currently dominant economy (e.g., see Gottlieb 2006). It is in response to the growing perception of the inadequacies of conventional economics as both a correct theory or set of practices for managing the real world, and as a spiritually impoverished discipline largely devoid of any real insight into the depths of human nature that numerous alternative and oppositional forms of economic thinking have begun to emerge. Some of these now have almost classical status— the highly influential “small is beautiful” ideas of Ernst Schumacher (Schumacher 1979), the alternative economic ideas of Hazel Henderson (Henderson 1978), the notions of “steady state” economies and the associated idea of “Buddhist economics” (Daly 1973), largely deriving from Schumacher’s work, Islamic economics (e.g., Jomos 1993), the persistence of Gandhian thinking, the emergence of ideas of localism and locally rooted economies of both production and consumption (McKibben 2007; Schuman 2000), subsistence perspectives (Mies and BennholdtThomsen 1999), anti-globalization movements and associated attempts to conceptualize socially just economic practices (e.g., Schroyer 1997), the emergence of ecological economics as a serious approach to economic theory and practice, and movements such as the Progressive Utilization Theory or PROUT, suggesting a form of economic life embedded in social life and serving it, not dominating it, and in which a spiritual dimension is paramount (Maheshvarananda 2003). Among these ideas, and one that is becoming more and more visible, is the idea of solidarity economy, and it is to this particular example that I now wish to turn, partly because it encapsulates many of the initiatives of the aforementioned varieties of alternative economics, and partly because of its holism: its attempts to integrate economics with the whole of social life, including issues of culture, gender, equality, sustainability and happiness and harmony.

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The Nature of Solidarity Economy The current groundswell of interest in solidarity economy internationally is a heartening sign of change and fresh avenues of engagement with the pressing environmental, social justice, resource and sustainability crises that the globe is now facing in unprecedented ways. If we accept that the basis for many if not most of the abuses directed at the Earth and its human and biotic communities is a deeply distorted and distorting economic system, then whatever adjustments we may make at other levels (political, cultural, spiritual) will not fundamentally touch our rapidly deteriorating condition unless we also address is basic and unequivocal ways the nature and operation of that economic system, and propose workable alternatives to it. It is to fill this gap that the notion of “Solidarity Economics” has emerged—an economics devoted not to the expansion of private profit regardless to ecological and human cost, but one devoted to the promotion of human solidarity, the achievement of social, economic and ecological justice, care for the Earth and the creation of sustainable, humane and culturally rich futures for the inhabitants of our planet. A substantial body of literature is now emerging that attempts to define the notion of solidarity economy and its cognates or associated concepts such as “social economy”, “social entrepreneurship”, to analyze means by which such an economy might be brought into being, and indeed is already emerging in numerous experiments, new forms of business practices, social movements and in the non-profit sector globally. This energy and the huge range of practical experience, new forms of managerial skills and existing and emergent models now needs to be systematized to some degree, not in an attempt to control or direct this large and diverse and inherently democratic movement, but to assist it in scaling up to become a truly viable alternative to the dominant neo-liberal system that is at the root of our ecological crisis and the huge social inequalities and unequal globalization that are among its major social expressions. What then is “Solidarity Economy”? It has been nicely characterized by one of its leading Latin American promoters as follows: “Solidarity Economy is a socio-economic order and new way of life that deliberately chooses serving the needs of people and ecological sustainability as the goal of economic activity rather than maximization of profits under the unfettered rule of the market. It places economic and technological development at the service of social and human development rather than the

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pursuit of narrow, individual self-interest” (Quinones 2009: 19). As such it has many distinctive characteristics: opposition to the extreme individualism of market-based economies, the prioritizing of the development of communities, that it is democratic in its decision-making structures and procedures, it gives priority to people over capital and property, it is based on principles of participation, empowerment and individual and collective responsibility, adopts “conscious altruism and solidarity, not extreme individualism, as the core of the new socioeconomic culture. It tends to favor cooperation, not competition, as the main form of relationship among humans and between them and nature” (Quinones 2009: 21). It is noteworthy that solidarity economy is seen not simply as an economy, but as a culture: as a total way of life in which the economic is fully embedded in every other aspect of human social existence, including religion, the arts, relationships to nature, forms of housing, gender and kinship relationships and political institutions. Seen from this perspective, it is evident that economics is a subset of spirituality and of life in general, not its master or hegemonic theoretical frame. This brief paper suggests some of the steps that might be taken to expand these ideas, and the proposals made here are offered in the spirit of debate and with the intention not of stifling other proposals, but to begin to create a common agenda around which those of us committed to the achievement of a solidarity economy can perhaps start to mobilize. This idea is nicely captured by Alfonso Cotera Fretel who has written “The vast scale of these solidarity economy practices shows the enormous potential they could have to reorient economic and political processes…Unfortunately, however they are dispersed and isolated, many not even recognizing themselves as expressions of new economic relations and quite unable to project their capacity to confront sub-national, national or regional processes. Efforts to produce theory expressing the reality and proposals of the solidarity economy are still limited” (Fretel 2009). This latter point is extremely important: while we can endlessly produce more and more examples of innovative social enterprises, each no doubt valuable in its own right and local context, we cannot confront the dominant system without a theoretical basis to solidarity economics every bit as convincing as the theoretical underpinnings of classical economics. A major priority for solidarity economics is thus to build a body of theory that can confront the assumptions of neo-liberal theory at all levels, including its psychological ones, and can be the basis for the just and sustainable future economy toward which we are working, and can answer

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the inevitable objections that will be directed toward it by the conventional economics industry and their many academic supporters who have a huge personal investment in not seeing the neo-liberal model fail. The comments that follow are designed to provide a starting point for the creation of just such an economics, and I believe capture the key issues that will need to be confronted. Economics while purporting to be a value-free form of enquiry in fact is riddled with assumptions about human nature. Neo-liberal economics (hereafter NLE) is based on a strange and self-fulfilling psychology that does not stand up to serious scrutiny. NLE, as was suggested above, is in many respects a “virtual science” that creates what it purports to describe. In other words, it actually creates through mechanisms such as advertising and commodification the very characteristics that it claims are universally true of human nature and on which it then bases its own marketing and desire-creating strategies. As such, NLE fails to answer basic questions such as why human beings desire things in the first place. Status seeking is only one of these, when in fact material objects fulfill many cultural functions such as identity formation, memory, exchange and gifts as is apparent from the studies of economic anthropologists. In fact, economic anthropology itself, a very neglected field in relation to alternative economics, has much to offer here. Economic anthropology is the study of actually existing economic systems alternative to those of the dominant neo-liberal model, and furthermore is concerned not with economies as abstract or autonomous systems, but as embedded in social, cultural, kinship, religious and ecological networks. It potentially has much to offer the study of economic alternatives (Clammer 2012, 2013). In so far as NLE fails to adequately create a model of the linkages between the macro and the micro, this anthropological insight and data is absolutely necessary if the articulation of different levels of the economy/society/culture is to be correctly understood as it must be if a genuinely holistic alternative theory is to be established. Any economic system creates subjectivities: ways of understanding the world, the self and others. Capitalism has created what in historical or comparative terms are very strange subjectivities. The very low quality of most “popular culture” in capitalist economies, a form of culture in fact created and generated by that very economic system itself and only being “popular” in terms of its consumption, testifies to this. Most people in other words live their lives in a cultural world populated by images generated by the neo-liberal system itself and which in turn tie them into that

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system in terms of their consumption habits and entertainment choices (if any such really exist). Neo-liberalism attempts to be a hegemonic system culturally as well as economically and as such is a form of totalitarianism, using disguising itself as a culture of “choice” and as a democratic one. The result has been, for the first time in history, the almost total colonization of our life-worlds by the economic: our tools have consequently become our masters. This can be seen in certain fundamental but usually unexamined concepts which give NLE its apparent power. These include such terms as “efficiency” and “productivity”, “profit” and “money”. All these terms however are highly ideological and require systematic deconstruction by solidarity economists, in which case their self-serving and biased nature will rapidly become apparent. They are all value terms in fact and as such, except in a totally “virtual economy”, are rooted in culture, of which the economy should be the servant, not the master. Furthermore, as is now well known, NLE does not represent a true economy in that it does not account for the true costs of its activities. “Externalities” such as air, water, bio-system services, long-term environmental cost of waste and the use of non-renewable natural resources are not accounted for in the NLE model. These common resources however are the heritage of all of humankind and of our fellow creatures. Critiques are now emerging of the use of such conventional indicators of economic “progress” by such measures as GNP, and proposals now abound for more accurate assessment tools such as genuine progress indicator (GPI) which do factor in ecological costs and other externalities missing from the NLE model. As a consequence, its actual impact and the damage that it is doing to the planet and its inhabitants is not measured and so the full significance of the negative qualities of the NLE model and practice are not holistically grasped. This inevitably brings us back to the question of values: What kind of society do we want to create? The issue of values, other than ones defined in a circular manner as “economic” in the NLE model, is normally of course excluded by that model as irrelevant to the construction of economic models. This is fundamentally untrue however and represents the inversion of standards in the NLE model in which economics drives out non-economic values, rather than values defining what it is that we want from the economy and how we might best organize that economy to achieve those values and their social and cultural expression. This is in turn related to the articulation of the global and the local. While the localization movement is now a powerful force internationally, it still has

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many questions to answer—about trade between localities, movement of citizens, responsibilities for common services, the future nature of travel and communication, etc. The significant aspects of the localization movement need to be strengthened by more systematic thinking of how the model might work as a total economic and social model compatible with not necessarily identical to the solidarity economy movement, and how the relationship between the two models might be clarified. Substantial work now exists in the “Economics of Happiness”. This needs to be related to the parallel and overlapping work going on in solidarity economics. Much the same might be said of the interesting work going on in faith-based economic thinking, particularly Islamic economics, but not confined to it. Similarly a strong articulation needs to be made between solidarity economics and the emerging field of Ecological Economics. Clearly any form of solidarity economy has to be sustainable and must include ecological factors as being of a priority as high as that of social justice: indeed, the relationship between the two must be worked out in much greater detail. Transition to any future economy will be complex and almost certainly painful. Very little thinking however is going into the issue of transition (but for some good exceptions, see Edwards 2010; Raskin et al. 2002; Heinberg and Lerch 2010). Solidarity economy needs to begin work on models of how to actually achieve such an economy and how to manage the transition. Such transition is going to be wrenching in many ways—materially and spiritually. The transition to a post oil society and economy will bring huge changes in lifestyles, technology, patterns of travel, energy generation and use and a myriad other radical upheavals. It will also have deep psychological and spiritual implications—a sense of loss as the old world passes away, as new forms of hope, identity, expectations for the future, images of the planet and the possibility of moving around on it emerge, factors which at the moment we are ill-equipped to deal with or even envisage (Baker 2009). This area, hardly addressed in the existing literature on what a post-capitalist society and economy might look like, should be a priority area in our thinking at this historical juncture. Possibly the area in which this is happening most is in the burgeoning field of sustainability studies, a field by its very nature having to be cross-disciplinary and involving economics, design and architecture, urban planning, ecology, agriculture, waste management and other related areas.

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Where these sustainability studies are weakest however are along two dimensions: the first is the current inability to unify these different areas into a holistic field of analysis and application. There are many excellent individual initiatives in other words, but they have not yet been linked together in a way that constitute what might be termed a unified opposition to the hegemony of the NLE model and the way in which it currently dominates and structures our world, both externally and in terms of our individual life worlds. The second is the absence of culture, sociology, art and spirituality in the conception of both how to achieve sustainability and what a future sustainable society might look like. But these are absolutely necessary elements and need to be given center stage, not banished to the periphery of “serious” thinking about the potential new world. It is significant for example that a recent and very comprehensive synthesis of work on sustainability studies and its large literature (Robertson 2014) manages in over 350 pages, to make just one passing reference to art and none at all to other cultural forms and virtually nothing on social sustainability. A broad conception of solidarity economy—as economics as an aspect of a total sociocultural and ecological whole—is one potential means through which these gaps and lacunae might be addressed. A holistic economics then is one that goes far beyond the boundaries of conventional neo-classical economics. It requires a much more rounded view of what constitutes human nature—in both its positive and its negative aspects; it must necessarily be ecological; it must dissolve the ancient distinction between the material and the spiritual and recognize that they are aspects of a larger whole; it must be deeply concerned, as Irene van Staveren has so cogently argued, with care, of others and with the larger environment (Van Staveren 1999); it must be seen as an aspect of values enquiry and not as an objective “science” operating in some mythical realm of value neutrality; and it must show its ability to expand and not to narrow moral capabilities. Indeed, in the last analysis I would suggest that economics, properly conceived, is a branch of ethics, and as such linked intimately with broader philosophical and spiritual discourses, by which it should have the humility to be illuminated. These issues are not then simply “academic”: they relate directly to the future of our planet and the common destiny of humankind. As such sound theory-building is not just a scholarly pursuit: it is to create the basis for a sustainable and just future rather than one of chaos, conflict and destruction on a scale never before witnessed. A “spiritual economics”

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points us in several essential directions at once: undermining the psychological assumptions of the dominant economic model, recognizing the multi-dimensionality of human beings as social, spiritual, aesthetic, moral, erotic and cultural beings as well as economic ones driven by narrowly materialistic motives, and recognizing that an ideal economy is one that is entirely ecologically responsible and caring while promoting conviviality, mutual affection and encouraging the cultivation of what a generation ago Herbert Marcuse called the “education of desire” along lines that are not only congruent with the preservation of our beautiful planet, but which encourage fraternity not competition and point us collectively toward fuller conception of our human potential. A just, psychically, spiritually and ecologically sound economy is an essential prerequisite of any such move toward a new society and must be the space in which our social imagination is given full rein to devise forms of life that enhance and do not diminish the total quality of life for all beings, human or otherwise, who co-inhabit this Earth.

References Baker, Carolyn. 2009. Sacred Demise: Walking the Spiritual Path of Industrial Civilization’s Collapse. New York: iUniverse. Bauman, Zygmunt. 1992. Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies. Cambridge: Polity Press. Carrier, James G., and Daniel Miller (eds.). 1998. Virtualism: A New Political Economy. Oxford and New York: Berg. Clammer, John. 2012. Culture, Development and Social Theory: Towards an Integrated Social Development. London and New York: Zed Books. Clammer, John. 2013. Learning from Experience: Economic Anthropology and Solidarity Economics. In Developments in Solidarity Economy in Asia, ed. Dension Jayasooria, 64–70. Kuala Lumpur: Asian Solidarity Economy Council and Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, Binary University. Daly, Herman E. (ed.). 1973. Toward a Steady-State Economy. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company. Edwards, Andres, R. 2010. Thriving Beyond Sustainability: Pathways to a Resilient Society. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers. Fretel, Alfonso Cotera. 2009. “Visions of a Responsible, Plural, Solidarity Economy in Latin America and the Caribbean”. In A Non-Patriarchal Economy Is Possible: Looking at Solidarity Economy from Different Cultural Facets, ed. Marcos Arruda, 87–142. Rio de Janeiro, ALOE, and Paris: Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer.

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Gottlieb, Roger S. 2006. A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism and Our Planet’s Future. New York: Oxford University Press. Heinberg, Richard, and Daniel Lerch (eds.). 2010. The Post-Carbon Reader: Managing the 21st Century’s Sustainability Crises. Berkeley: University of California Press. Henderson, Hazel. 1978. Creating Alternative Futures. New York: Putnam. Jomos, K.S. (ed.). 1993. Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives and New Directions. Kuala Lumpur: Ikraq. Maheshvarananda, Dada (ed.). 2003. After Capitalism: Prout’s Vision for a New World. Copenhagen and Washington, DC: Proutist International Publications. McKibben, Bill. 2007. Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Mies, Maria‚ and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen. 1999. The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalized Economy. London and New York: Zed Books. Quinones, Benjamin R. Jr. 2009. “Facets of Solidarity Economy”. In A NonPatriarchal Economy is Possible: Looking at Solidarity Economy from Different Cultural Facets, ed. Marcos Arruda, 17–85. Rio de Janeiro, ALOE, and Paris: Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer. Raskin, Paul, Tariq Banuri, Gilberto Gallopin, Pablo Gutman, and Al Hammond. 2002. Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead. Boston: Stockholm Environmental Institute. Robertson, Margaret. 2014. Sustainability: Principles and Practice. New York and Abingdon: Routledge. Schroyer, Trent. (ed.). 1997. A World That Works: Building Blocks for a Just and Sustainable World. New York: The Bootstrap Press. Schuman, Michael H. 2000. Going Local: Creating Self-Reliant Communities in a Global Age. New York: Routledge. Schumacher, E.F. 1979. Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered. London: Abacus. Van Staveren, Irene. 1999. Caring for Economics: An Aristotelian Perspective. London and New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 10

Pragmatism and Socio-Political Movement Toward Solidarity Julie M. Geredien

Establishing the Pragmatist’s Account of Rationality American pragmatism assists in the processes of individual and collective maturation needed for a more evolved, spiritual and intellectual democracy, by mediating between the requirements of liberalism and those of community. The obligations of liberalism emerged through the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, deepening and broadening earlier interest in confessional freedom; they respond to the “strenuous demand for liberty of mind- the freedom of thought and its expression in speech, writing, print and assemblage” (Dewey, LW 11: 290; James 1978). They are often associated with political and civic rights. The necessities of community, in contrast, locate one’s constitutive sense of self in the collective; they provoke individuals to develop critical consciousness and to resist the advance of the modern state (Mustakova-Possardt 2003; Phelan 1996: 235). These necessities are in large part, considerably older than those of liberalism, dating back, to our small band hunter-gatherer ancestors who called strongly upon human caregiving and engagement systems

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to nurture the quality of relationships necessary for individual and collective survival (Narvaez 2014). Yet, they are as relevant now to the stability of everyday life as ever. Ignatieff views the requirements of community as “recurrent essentials of our common life”, writing that: “We are moral beings because we have no choice—our survival and our success as social beings depends on [ordinary] virtue”; the obligations of community are “not an option, but a necessity” (2017: 222). Unlike the requirements of liberalism, community essentials are often related to social, economic and cultural rights. The interrelating of the two political and social orientations within pragmatism is evidenced in a genealogical approach to community, in which provisionally fixed identities provide a middle ground: between the socio-historical specificity of the identitarian politics that characterize “old-fashioned interest group liberalism” and the expanded, unitary sense of being and common self, which is promoted in the voluntary association of “strong community” (Phelan 1994: 96; italics my own). In spiritual pragmatism, the movement between these two—liberalism and community—generates a creativity of “critical intelligence and social action” that, because of its integrity both to a particular self and a common self, resists the human tendency to solve problems through homogenizing or de-contextualizing ways of thinking. Instead, pragmatic creativity is “always embedded in a situation; i.e., on human being’s ‘situated freedom’” (Joas 1993: 4–5). Its commitments to mediation obligate it to remain committed to: anti-skepticism, fallibilism, holism and the primacy of practice (Festenstein 2002). Its fruits therefore are more diverse, practical and just, responding to an intuitive understanding of the moral and spiritual promises of democratic life. Psychologically and intellectually, the benefits of pragmatism’s mediating movement far outweigh the outcomes of a one-sided acceptance of the dominant paradigms of liberal political and economic democratic life; these rely upon narrow mindsets and epistemological stances that maintain norms of partisanship, competition and aggregation. As Touraine explains: “the social cost of these economic and political mechanisms for development is very high…They mobilize economies and armies which divide, challenge and conquer before they integrate and convince” (1995: 259). In twenty-first-century post-modern life, spiritual pragmatism protects public intelligence from the hegemonic forces operating within liberal democracy by re-connecting humans to more ancient sources of wisdom; these offer insight regarding the nature of

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human security and paths to restorative justice. In this way, spiritual pragmatism safeguards the concept of the public as an entity distinct from State and market—a social structure with normative law-making powers and transformational potentials in its own right. In Discovery of the State, John Dewey provided the following clarification as to what pragmatists in liberal society are actually in search of when they seek to understand the meaning of the public, and how it might commit responsibly to strategic political actions. There are many answers to the question: What is the public? Unfortunately many of them are only testaments of the question. … a community as a whole involves not merely a variety of associative ties which hold persons together in diverse ways, but an organization of all elements by an integrated principle. And this is precisely what we are in search of. (LW 2 1988a: 259)

Dewey described the challenge involved in “discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests” as an “intellectual” challenge, as well as a psychological and social one (LW 2 1988a: 327). It entails: “the search for conditions under which the Great Society may become the Great Community” (327; italics my own). Once in place, these conditions are able to continue to “make their own forms” (ibid.: 327). Realization of a communal body then is not the final aim of the public once it has been found and identified itself. Instead, the conditions of community life are sustained by members, so that the ultimate goal of realizing ethical social creativity can be achieved. The constituents of the public ultimately become “a medium for generating public structures of spacetime schema that permit work on common concerns, allowing decisions without closing debate” (Reid and Taylor 2010: 141). Arising out of civil society, as a morally coherent social structure, publics manifest their creative political and legal potentials in media res (Fung 2012: 610). Guided by a pragmatic conception of democracy and emerging out of the complexity of actual conditions as they exist presently, in the real world, public intelligence can overcome habitual bias and expose the disjuncture between norm (the ideals of constitutional law) and reality (the unequal distribution of social power) (Habermas 1996: 304). Pragmatism, as a mode of developing the new public structures needed to work on common concerns, provides the rational

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intellectual foundation for the virtue of human solidarity by promoting open-mindedness and a wholehearted commitment to inquiry: For pragmatists, the nerve of its account of rationality is a ‘radical holism’ which … does not privilege or prejudice any domain of inquiry … It does not pronounce that there are separate orders of fact and value or of the causal and the normative and then go on to glorify the factual/causal and denigrate the evaluative/normative. (Misak 2000: 86; Festenstein 2004: 292)

This genuinely egalitarian approach to inquiry requires an intellectuality that is grounded in emotional rationality. Ronald de Sousa writes in his investigation of this rationality: “the idea of an emotional integrity that would apprehend and celebrate the fullness of what it is to be human” can be viewed as “the equivalent of a mystical ideal in a secular context” (1987: 352). For de Sousa the emotional rationality that underlies the intellectual dimension of human solidarity includes the ability to approach even difficult emotions like revulsion, or horror, without prejudice; through such an acceptance of pluralism, it becomes possible to study value itself and to contribute to the creative formation of knowledge, ethics and new social forms (de Sousa 1987). This occurs as humans seek agreement, on a global scale, about ways of life, and kinds of human relationships—within and across the human and non-human world, living and non-living systems—that are in humankind’s highest interests. A key to this encompassing ontological-epistemic project is developing the appropriate quality of intentionality. When well-conceived and planned, institutional design can protect the social stability and consistency associated with “ordinary virtues” and through right rolemodeling, it can even begin to facilitate within citizens the emergence of a greater pervasive attentional intelligence and quality of caring. Ignatieff comments on the importance of tending to institutional life today, that “…the ordinary virtues struggle wherever honest, non-collusive, responsive institutions are lacking. [They] cannot flourish in an environment of organized injustice toward immigrants, minorities, and the poor” (2017: 219). The championing of universal human rights as a theoretical ideal is not enough. One’s way of being and feeling in everyday situations like schools and social service agencies, and in moments of interaction with governing authorities, like police, directly impacts one’s way of understanding and becoming.

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Acknowledging that such [desperate and defenseless] people have rights based on international law is a necessary condition for decency, but it is not sufficient to sustain a public culture of welcome. Such a public culture must replicate the virtues of the private realm, the virtues of compassion and generosity, so that citizens see, in the actions of their government, a version of their better natures. (216)

Ignatieff warns that without the ability to “count on equal protection of the laws” in daily life, the “private virtues” of those from “poor and disadvantaged families” will “languish” (2017: 219). The reality is that, without foresight and critical regard for intentionality, human attention is easily manipulated and diverted, and this impacts paths of moral and intellectual development. An example of this problem, which reflects the overly dominant emphasis today on liberalism, is found in the rise of the Internet. The Internet came into being as a publically funded infrastructure. It hosts a vast number of emergent communicative community spaces. But these “portals” lack what Habermas has referred to, as “an inclusive bind, the inclusive force of a public sphere highlighting what things are actually important”; the “concentration” that is required for this highlight of morally and intellectually significant content can only be achieved when citizens “know how to choose – know and comment on – relevant contributions, information and issues” (Schwering 2014). The way information proliferates on the Internet often heightens human interest in a topic, but it also disperses and sometimes misdirects it, through misinformation, lack of accessibility or sensationalism. This is just one example of how innovations and infrastructures influenced by the liberalism of the political economy threaten public intelligence and institutional life, even while often creating the illusion of bolstering it, by making new platforms of opportunity for social participation. On this theme, Ignatieff writes: Just as ordinary virtue, as Montaigne said, is in constant struggle with the ordinary vices, so liberal institutions are constantly at risk from corruption, predation, and abuse. (2017: 219)

But the promising fact remains, that with the right kind of intentionality within institutional life, people’s experience of “living attention” in intraand inter-personal relations can nurture their inner comprehension, critical thought and capacity for problem-solving, even across cultural and

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historical differences (Bion 1959; Jardine 2007). There is no reason to rule out the possibility that, as structural violence is eradicated, and the virtue of intellectual solidarity tended to within institutions, innovations like the Internet can both: make accessible the energies and information that constitute a radically holistic approach to inquiry; and function optimally as a vehicle for political freedom through their inclusion in epistemic endeavor that is grounded in a coherent moral ontology. In his writing on virtue and democracy, David Hollenbach reminds that solidarity as that most essential conscious bond of mutual responsibility is not counted as one of the Greek and Roman cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude), nor is it a Christian theological virtue (faith, hope and love); nevertheless, Pope John Paul II proposed to add solidarity as a chief virtue “needed to address the problems of our world” (ibid.: 150). The emotional integrity required to apprehend and celebrate the fullness of what it is to be human, not privileging or prejudicing against any domain of inquiry, requires a kind of determination that is only achievable when one has dedicated oneself to the common good of humanity (ibid.: 150; John Paul II 1987). It is this integrity, and the persevering quality that results from this degree of commitment, that brings forth the gifts of an intellectual solidarity and guides the mediating movement of spiritual pragmatism. Alain LeRoy Locke listed three moral imperatives of a new world order organized by solidarity that support the Pope’s claim that this virtue is crucial for addressing the problems of today’s world. They are: “an internationally limited idea of national sovereignty, a non-monopolistic and culturally tolerant concept of race and religious loyalties freed of sectarian bigotry” (1989: 152). On this last point, he provided the following example of how important intellectual agreements rooted in emotional rationality require a willingness to perceive functional equivalences; these correspondences most likely cannot be truly recognized and internalized until one has dedicated oneself to the common good of humanity: If the Confucian expression of a Commandment means the same as the Christian expression, then it is the truth also and should so be recognized. It is in this way alone that Christianity or any other enlightened religion can vindicate its claims to Universality; and so bring about moral and spiritual brotherhood. (ibid.: 152)

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Furthermore, as value types are appreciated as expressions of different embodied and context-specific modes of feeling, as Locke understood them to be, spiritual pragmatism can work on two levels. It can mediate differences between opposing political and social orientations, clarifying citizens’ political power; it can align law and institutional design with scientific understandings, like the role of dynamic systems and variability in human development, for example, thereby illuminating citizens’ legal power (Fischer and Biddel 2006). The recognition of virtue “across the differences of race, religion, language, and culture” may indicate recognition of “a universal Good, a common core of moral practice, grounded in our natures and shared by all human beings” (Ignatieff 2017: 206). But Ignatieff adopts a pragmatist’s account of rationality when he asserts that “it seems equally plausible to think” that, in everyday life, what is ultimately being recognized in the functional equivalence of the Confucian and Christian expression cited by Locke, for instance, is “not the Good, in its universal, unchanging form, but goodness, in all its astonishingly contextual singularity” (2017: 206). The challenge today is that the partnering of capitalism and liberalism has normalized how classical liberalism protects social stability by connecting individuals to one another, not through an inwardly shared yet particularized sense of obligation, deep understanding and conscience, but rather, primarily through the cohesive power of overarching, rationalizing structures (Reid and Taylor 2010: 31). Agreements structured by contract law, the logic of the market, and technocratic standards of security and excellence may appear superficially to be reasonable; however, they are not (ibid.: 31). These methods of rationalizing human relations reflect the spatiotemporal distortions and limitations of global capitalism. They also often require literally outlandish amounts of time, money and labor to maintain (ibid.). In contrast, the quality of reasonableness that arises through public intelligence, and a guiding pragmatic conception of democracy, is based on social organization achieved through functional, moral or ethical integration within the community sector. Rather than reliance upon fixed social contract agreements, integration is made possible as citizens engage flexibly in the kind of perception of functional equivalences extolled by Locke, and elaborated upon in the statement by Ignatieff. It is facilitated as they insist upon reconciling the dissonance between, on the one side, privileged and often times prejudiced, validity suppositions within constitutional democracy, and, on the other side, how

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things actually wind up happening in the political process (Habermas 1996: 320). The striving toward this higher degree of reasonableness and more culturally sensitive and pluralist moral agreeability is supported in those domains of civil society that are “the primary bearers of cultural meaning and value” like education (citizenship schools of the civil rights movement in the US), religion (interfaith organizations like Parliament of World Religions), arts (the “velvet revolution” initiated in Prague’s Magic Lantern Theater) and journalism (Bill Moyers Journal in the USA) for example; generally speaking, a much more creditable quality of reasonableness arises in those places where more intensive and sincere learning and inquiry regarding “the meaning of the good life” occurs and a sense of mutual responsibility is taken up (Hollenbach 1995: 151). The pragmatist’s account of rationality upholds this more penetrating perception of goodness and higher standard of reasonableness. In the striving toward greater functional, moral or ethical integration within the community sector, the spiritual pragmatist disrupts customary and chronic attempts to conflate citizens’ political and legal power. The awakening of universal compassion, and the internalization of a pragmatic conception of democracy, serves as a more discerning moral compass: it challenges citizens’ reliance on rationalizing structures and social contractual agreements and it questions their identification with social power fueled by the media. Spiritual pragmatism points to the human capacity to engage in algebraic and scientific, inductive reasoning that is nevertheless, personalized and humanizing. Respect for this capacity empowers citizens politically and intellectually, supporting processes of social and systemic integration (Hayward 2011). It encourages their direct critical engagement in social problem-solving and in law-making processes.

An Overview of What’s Ahead In this essay, I will review how two organizations within civic society— LiKEN in Appalachia and FUNDAEC in rural Colombia—are developing intellectual solidarity and an improved higher quality of reasonableness, by engaging in spiritual pragmatism and actively countering the space-time frames of global capitalism. Both organizations cultivate fluency in their work addressing human needs and the real-world consequences of human actions. Defined by Betsy Taylor and Herbert Reid, fluency involves the ability to flow with lucidity from one perspective to another, and to shift

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spatial and temporal frameworks. When developed thoroughly, the first ability works to “ensure that a question is deliberated upon in an openended and egalitarian way”; and the second helps both to “consider past and future impacts and consequences across multiple sites (not just the powerful and privileged sites that have made themselves central)” and to “re-center… within the particular situations what is at stake in particular debates” (Reid and Taylor 2010: 13). Following this review of the two organizations is a sociological analysis of the creative tension that exists between structure and agency. A beginning theoretical account is provided, of how social entities, like LiKEN and FUNDAEC, generate the coherence and the capacity for transformation needed to address problematic power complexes and global contradictions. The organization of the relations between parts into a complex whole, in both biological and social entities, creates an experience of emergence (Elder-Vass 2010). In both of the cited groups, the interaction between the causal powers of agency and social structure enlivens capacity for self-organization; this indicates the possibility for the relational emergence of a greater collective wisdom and “conscious bond of mutual responsibility” within and across such social entities. Unlike the “ordinary virtues” and assertions of “equality of voice” supported by liberal democracy (Ignatieff 2017) and by unconscious reliance upon social contractarianism (Baka 2016), the bond of mutual responsibility that arises represents a uniquely integral realization of self-determination: one that is at once individual, particular to local place, group and circumstance; and collective, universal to the most passionate human experiences of embodied morality, and generative of insights and dispositional stances akin to those found in other groups responding to the same reality of “structural and global contradictions” (Reid and Taylor 2010: 75). As intellectual solidarity is better understood and nurtured, one perceives how this relational emergence can bring forth morally coherent national and trans-national publics. Finally, I discuss how this emergence is central to the birth of a “public audience” (Strydom 1999). The logic of social thought and action in groups like LiKEN and FUNDAEC is common to social and political movements around the world, though not necessarily well represented in mainstream learning forums. It represents a mode of development through which the public audience may recognize itself as a social structure in its own right. Citizens and their institutions must become able to recognize and name objective deprivations and losses that various

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peoples struggle to endure and must be encouraged and better prepared to respond in a fully empathic, compassionate and corrective way to these (Baka 2016). As inter-dependent peoples and groups in different locations forge a far more unifying sense of co-responsibility and begin to manifest the virtue of intellectual solidarity, they can become a collective voice for restorative justice challenging the conceptual foundations of both the local and global societies (Hollenbach 1995). This concluding section affirms that intellectual solidarity as a democratic virtue achieved through pragmatism is uniquely able to transform the cognitive order within both municipal and international domains. It overcomes the intellectual limitations and moral divides associated with legal positivism, that generate a schism between these two domains (Baka 2016); and it facilitates the transformation of citizens’ social power into political power, signaling the rightful reclamation of their legal power. LiKEN The Appalachian group LiKEN, which stands for Livelihoods Knowledge Exchange Network, calls itself a “link-tank” rather than a “thinktank”. Rather than generating ideas in self-enclosure, it seeks actively to serve and support necessary learning and transformation within lives in community. It accomplishes this by working across generations and other common divides to engage a multitude of diverse values and perspectives, nurturing social integration by engaging in projects that “connect local knowledge with specialized expertise” for instance. LiKEN works in an active and responsive way to: educate for community-based; asset-based development; evaluate development scenarios and outcomes; monitor government and scholarly systems for assessing quality of life; and translate between communities, experts and policy-makers, and between local and trans-local. Members believe that “people understand their own places, environments, and communities in ways that are essential to good public policy and good science” (www.likenknowledge). Here, citizens’ local knowledge is not perceived as anti-scientific. Instead, it is recognized to be often more scientific than expert knowledge, in that it can lead to empirical questions about what is happening in an actual location of concern. Official management systems, that follow their own bureaucratic protocols, rather than responding to real-life needs in context, are removed from this level of factual insight (Reid and Taylor 2010: 161).

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LiKEN focuses on deliberative dialogue and alignment so that individuals and institutions can mutually influence one another. Agendas within institutions influence citizens’ action plans; likewise, reference to the deliberative and contestatory work of citizens needs to guide the vision and efforts of institutions. Nussbaum describes this same logic of reciprocity in her writing on compassion and public life, writing that: The relationship between compassion and social institutions is and should be a two-way street: compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine; and institutions, in turn, influence the development of compassion in individuals. (2001: 405)

A founding member of the LiKEN group, Betsy Taylor further explains: By introducing deliberative dialogue and alignment, communities can engage the organizations or institutions in their interrelated networks to create new solutions to their problems and strengthen public life. (www. likenknowledge)

Here, how deliberative dialogue and alignment work to “strengthen public life” can be translated as, how they serve to create intentional regularities through new biological and social structures within the individual and community life. These are created as participants manage conflict and difference through deliberative politics that support collective moral endeavor. They include life-affirming biological regularities, within the brain-body circuitries related to optimal vagal tone, for instance, which supports relational attunement, neural integration and regulation of emotion and thought (Hass-Cohen and Findlay 2015; Siegel 2012); these regularities support the maturation level needed to engage in “imagination ethics” that expand the field of possibilities through a metacognitive awareness of moral consciousness (Narvaez 2014: 193), and they function to help integrate, rather than habitually avoid or suppress, communication that is unruly in that it contests dominant norms. The emergent regularities also support social conditions that stabilize cognitive endowment through shared reflection, increasing human understanding across borders and established boundaries. A dynamic stabilization process that is conducive to healthy ongoing social growth is therefore set in motion. Biological and social regularities, in turn, serve to strengthen,

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refine and sustain these inner and outer world structures so that openmindedness and the ability to negotiate more fluently across different perspectives can improve overall social health and ethical creativity. An example of this is the partnership LiKEN has developed with the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research/National Center for Atmospheric Research (UCAR/NCAR) and Haskell Indian Nation University to support the organization of a new group, Rising Voices, which has a cross-cultural approach to environmental and climate issues, and a pragmatic, genealogical approach to community-making. Rising Voices includes Indigenous communities, Tribal nations, earth and climate scientists, practitioners, academics and researchers from around the world. Relationships between diverse students and federal and state government representatives are described as being founded on a “platform of respect” that protects participants as they voice concerns, thereby allowing an ongoing belief-evaluation relational shift to occur within and across participants from different backgrounds. In their sixth gathering in 2018, Dan Wildcat of Tribal Haskell Indian Nation University urged for a shift in political discourse, toward the inalienable responsibilities that humans have as “members of larger systems and communities” in which the importance of relationships, respect and responsibility become key to cultivating resilience (risingvoices.ucar.edu; 5). Institutions should outgrow “anthropogenic notions of progress” and become more Indigenized in this sense, he averred, with Indigenous people leading the way toward a human solidarity in which it is understood that: “We are all part of the larger global community, and there is work for everyone” (6): Relationships matter (pau n¯ a mea pili pili) The power of one (ka mana o kekahi’) The power of partnerships (ka mana o na hui)

Participants have noted that, at these intensive three-day annual meetings, “nothing is swept under the rug for cooperation”; and they have described the trust and nurturing social-emotional ecology they feel present at Rising Voices, in which both the specificity of needs within identitarian politics and the universality of needs for belonging within a voluntary association with global vision are recognized and mediated between:

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It is a place for Indigenous community members to speak of their struggles, their fights, their need for Western science to acknowledge them and their knowledge….I found the representation and empowerment from people of color who could be my mentors – people I do not often see in an educational system that is predominantly white. (Flores Castillo)

In LiKEN’s “linking” communicative projects, needs for goods of respect, love and activity, which are often viewed asymmetrically in relation to one another, or as separate and distinct needs, are approached instead through the paradigms of reciprocity and social and systemic integration (Harris 1999). These goods, which directly support participation in the radical holism of pragmatic inquiry, include needs for: confidence, self-respect and understanding; mutual affection and particular appreciation of unique identity; and engagement as well as aesthetic pleasure (1999). The spiritual pragmatism modeled in Rising Voices has resulted in the emergence of the Indigenous Phenology Network (IPN); input to the US National Climate Assessment; disaster preparedness training for participating communities and representatives; recommendations to the President’s State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience; and in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) accommodating fellowship opportunities for the needs, and increased inclusion, of tribal college students (risingvoices.ucar.edu). Diverse and plural human goods, and the value imperatives they generate, can be perceived in dialogue with one another, regulating and structuring each other mutually and symmetrically to bring about meaningful outcomes and change (Harris 1999). Coherence is created within individual moral personality, local community and the broader movement toward global moral consciousness, countering the fragmenting effects of the rationalizing structures of liberal democracy and contributing significantly to both individual and collective maturation processes. FUNDAEC Another example of this kind of movement toward coherence, knowledge-sharing and communication across domains of real-life concern is the organization FUNDAEC. FUNDAEC (Fundación Para la Aplicación y Enseñanza de las Ciencias) was founded as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in 1974 by an interdisciplinary group

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of scholars from the Universidad del Valle who were concerned that development projects in rural Columbia were being conceived of only as a product. The development paradigm of modernization and industrialization left people in these areas used and dependent rather than empowered and with dignity. The Foundation created a university for integral development, called UDI (Universidad Para el Desarrollo Integral ), which was defined as “a social space in which the inhabitants of a given region learn to choose and walk the paths of their own communities’ development”; these social spaces are now present and active not only in Columbia, but also in many other Latin American countries (www.fundaec.org). Today, FUNDAEC’s “Sistema de Aprendizaje Tutorial”, SAT, focuses on capacity development. One of its guiding beliefs is that catalysts for change are located within rural populations themselves and are able to instigate meaningful transformation as knowledge already within the community is developed and shared. The program is organized in functional phases so that practical results are achieved whether students complete or not. Many students can complete all three correlated phases though. This is because the model counters the dominant global spacetime framework for development, by remaining flexibly adapted to rural student time frame needs, which include the need to leave school during harvest seasons, or to attend to home duties. Rather than running on a fixed schedule planned by administrators, students and their tutor arrange scheduling together. The tutor is a guide rather than an authority, and a community resident, rather than an outsider. The result is a much more participative and cooperative educational experience. FUNDAEC’s fundamental programs are listed as (1) Sustainable Production Systems in Small Farms; (2) Small-scale production processes for Families and Groups that have poor access to land; and (3) Opening and strengthening Support (www.fundaec.org). These programs overcome the dominant paradigm of development as product; development as co-participatory process is able to prevail, creating a foundation for organic growth that is based on an expanding network of relationships across different organizations, and ongoing inclusion and outreach, especially to youth. Rather than relying upon technocratic legal pacts to gain security, FUNDAEC and regional or local institutions sign SAT Covenants to realize a dynamic stability in their growth together. These represent not only a contractual agreement but an alliance between organizations and persons that share the same vision of development (www. fundaec.org).

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A founder of FUNDAEC, Farzam Arbab, who was a professor of physics at Universidad del Valle when the initiative began, makes a critical point about the need to continuously articulate and improve the shared vision of development, so that more comprehensive value integration can occur. The intense challenge of meeting real-world needs for development demands inner processes of ongoing self-improvement. For FUNDAEC, that improvement is deeply rooted in structured scientific learning. Furthermore, it requires being open to guiding “moral and spiritual principles emanating from religion” while also scrutinizing proposals from this domain: The process [of self-improvement] is not advanced by the mere application of technology, even when it is supported by political will, and must be intimately connected to structured scientific learning. But while science can offer the methods and tools of inquiry and learning, it alone cannot set the direction; the goal of development cannot come from within the process itself. The path of development must be illumined by the light of moral and spiritual principles emanating from religion, but religion willing to submit its proposals to the scrutiny of science. (Arbab 2000: 136; italics my own)

This statement has a serious implication for the scope, or horizon, of that development which counters the closed logic of global capitalist spacetime frames. At a certain point, a commitment to development that is driven by the sincere desire to “exercise the powers that characterize the parties as moral persons” (Galston 1991: 496) leads to the need to initiate another, more expansive sociocultural moral project: to work out more specifically and systematically, how people in both local and global communities can advance an operational understanding of social health that calls upon Our capacity to function in an inter-participatory way within our own person, interpersonally with others, and institutionally in systems of others. (Mustakova-Possardt et al. 2014: 106)

Arbab concludes that this expansive project requires the integration of values and guidance from both science and religion. Improved fluency in this instance allows participants to “re-center… within the particular situations what is at stake in particular debates” (Reid and Taylor 2010: 13; italics my own), which is critical, because as Arbab has noted, “the goal of development cannot come from within the process” itself. This

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recognition of an emotional and intellectual re-centering process, and of the importance of a group’s relationship to otherness, is in contrast to the more adversarial or defensive relationship to the Other that have been observed around the globe in the twenty-first century; for example, in places where one hears the liberal democratic assertion of “equality of voice” a positivist belief in human rights is represented, that is not at all necessarily inclusive of the other, and that is indeed separated from any universal claim (Ignatieff 2017). By participating in the search for moral and spiritual principles and engaging in scientific scrutiny of them, FUNDAEC members become active and creative agents of organic widescale, structural change: that is, not just “think-tank” members, locked into one discipline or way of thinking, but “link-tank” members, people who are not afraid to extend communication across boundaries like this, and to expand contemplation, in order to counter the space-time frames of global capitalism and to address real-world consequences that generate in one domain and spread, uncontrollably and unintentionally, to so many others. Emergence, Structure and Agency Groups like LiKEN and FUNDAEC bring to the forefront the creative tension existing between structure and agency, by: exposing issues involved in both local-municipal and global-international aspects of the right to self-determination; and, actively, addressing the problem of overreliance upon conventional social contract. This second area of concern is implicated in how positivist constructions of law continually generate and maintain the gap between the two aspects of the right to selfdetermination. A better understanding of the significance of the creative tension between structure and agency must begin with definitions of the terms. Structure includes established frameworks of meaning, social roles and agreements about organizational development and communication. Agency is an expression of the emotional integrity and persevering determination needed to follow through on social actions; ultimately, in an integrated human experience of agency, these actions are inwardly organized by one’s dedication to the larger interests of humankind, or the ‘common good’. As actions, they are therefore able to transform “the de facto interdependence of persons and groups into a conscious bond of mutual responsibility” (Hollenbach 1995: 150). The difference between structure and agency and how they interact with one another, represents a

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central dilemma in understanding how causal power works in the realization of self-determination and formation of human solidarity. It also can reveal something about the difference between political and legal power, and their necessary intertwinement in authentic law-making processes (Baka 2016). The problem can be pondered like this: Is there something social—like members of civil society, who become constituents of emerging publics that address real-world issues and needs—that could be causally effective in its own right? If so, how exactly is this causal power generated so that the influence that group members exert upon the world and within people’s hearts and minds is not deemed merely ‘a side-effect’ of the behavior of different individual agents in that assembly? Instead, it is a direct result of the generative mechanisms inherent within processes of interaction among members, indicating that the social structures developing organically out of the self-organizing potentials within the community sector are a major source of that causal power (Elder-Vass 2010: 23). But how is that self-organizing potential activated and how is it sustained within processes of interaction? Clearly, the causal power of agency must play a major role. Which then is the more relevant, or dominant, factor in the evolution of social change guided by the larger core virtue of intellectual solidarity: agency or social structure? Which is more primary or fundamental to the public’s acknowledgment of mutual responsibility? Which is more important for its recognition of itself as a living whole capable of authoring new forms, and of altering the cognitive order that organizes social life? Generally speaking, there are two basic camps of belief in this creative tension. One holds that the causal power of agency overrides the influences of social structure; the other asserts the converse that the causal effectiveness of social structure dominates over human capacities for agency (Elder-Vass 2010). Methodological individualists are like “voluntarist thinkers” who dismiss social factors arising out of social structures and elevate the role of agency and conscious decision-making in human social behavior. “Determinists”, on the other hand, view behaviors and decisions as arising unthinkingly out of social conditioning that occurs within social contexts and therefore regard social structure as the influential force shaping these (ibid.). If this second view were entirely true, then social institutions like schools and legal courts could so condition individuals as to make impossible recognition that members of civil society have the capacity to self-organize social structure with causal power in its own

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right. Indeed, the negative feedback loops maintained by these types of deterministic relations to dominant social entities are why Dewey (1927) proclaimed the public to be in eclipse, and bereft of its intelligence. Elder-Vass summarizes these two schools of thought like this: Individualists about structure, it would seem, must be voluntarists about agency, while it is often believed that those who attribute causal significance to social structure must be determinists about agency. (ibid.: 2)

The disagreements between the two seem to offer only a binary framework through which to consider the ways in which causal power operates. For this reason, these kinds of disputes and the paradoxes they raise are said to be central in “a battle for the heart and soul of sociology” (ibid.: 3). A person is left uncertain as to whether it would ever be possible for the public to recognize itself as a social structure, or for its individual constituents to realize the causal power of their agency to the extent that their normative law-making power is recognized and authentic public action made feasible. This uncertainty is why Habermas inquired into how systemic error, which accumulates in social subsystems like hospitals, prisons and schools, for instance, can be remedied through a better alignment of morality and law that makes possible the coordination of right action (Habermas 1996). The problem of social inertia, referred to by him and Teresa Brennan as well, is enmeshed in the problem of “unavoidable inertial features” which are accounted for in the formal structure of the constitutional state. Nevertheless, they become “a point where illegitimate power complexes that are independent of the democratic process can crystallize” and can be abetted by the systemic infrastructure that circulates normatively regulated power (Habermas 1996: 328; Brennan 2000). The interrelation of law and deliberative politics needs to be aligned first and foremost, then, not with an unspecified ideal of communication, but with a pre-determined practical means of discerning how and when illegitimate power complexes crystallize and are unofficially circulated. Habermas affirms this when he writes: For nothing appears less probable to the enlightened sociologist than the claim that the integrative achievements of modern law are nourished solely, or even in the first instance, by a normative consensus whether already

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existing or achieved, and hence by the communicative sources of solidarity. (Habermas 1996: 34; italics my own)

A genealogical approach to community that encourages contestation and uses the mediating movement of pragmatism to address real-world power differentials while problem-solving provides insight into the kind of pre-determined practical means needed to discern the unofficially circulated, illegitimate power, referred to by Habermas. LiKEN’s stance, that locals be included in the “official” management of land and resources in Appalachia, because of their more specific and vital factual insight regarding where and how social inertia is creating stress and harm, is an example of how an intentionally pragmatic interrelation of law and deliberative politics can unleash new sources of causal power capable of transforming inter-agentive and systemic forms of domination (Hayward 2011). Because of its commitment to emotional integrity and willingness to hold a vision of the greater common good, the pragmatic, genealogical approach to human interaction nurtures intellectual solidarity. Participants develop the courage to adopt fully the rationality of a radical holism, so that one’s approach to inquiry is not constrained by the categorization of “separate orders of fact and value or of the causal and the normative”; the factual/causal is not elevated nor is the evaluative/normative degraded (Festenstein 2004: 292). Another way to say this is that, the descriptive science of values associated with politics, and the normative science of virtues associated with ancient philosophical approaches to law, are able to sustain dynamic interactions with one another (Baka 2016: 12; Kelsen 1971: 358). The science of ethics or virtue depends today upon the high degree of reasonableness that distinguishes the pragmatist’s account of rationality. It is the pragmatist’s insistence upon reconciling the dissonance between norm and reality that makes for a necessary creative dialogical intertwining of morality and legality. Elder-Vass himself observes that neither position in the agencystructure divide can dispense with that side of the dualism that it would depreciate, thereby reflecting something of that same underlying unbiased and egalitarian logic of holism. The schism between structure and agency is reconciled through a “relational emergentist” account of how new realities come into being. When structure and agency are in dynamic relation with one another, the new reality that emerges can unify morality with human law-making power (Elder-Vass 2010: 66). Emergent properties are those properties

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and powers of the whole that cannot be found in the parts alone (ibid.: 16). Elder-Vass views wholes and parts as descriptor terms for the roles that particular entities play in a given circumstance. An entity is basically an object or thing like a cell, flower, person or institution that consists within itself of multiple organizational levels of entities. For instance, a cell is made of molecules made of atoms, or as a school is usually made of administrative leaders, teachers, support staff and students (ibid.). Relational emergence refers to particular organizational patterns within the multiple levels of entities that comprise a larger entity, like a cell or school; as new structural organization is realized, new properties emerge that are distinct to the entity as a whole (ibid.: 19). As individuals activate their agency to form participatory citizen groups and as these groups operate as social structures to connect creatively with other diverse groups, both locally and globally, for problem-solving, as FUNDAEC, LiKEN and Rising Voices are doing for example, an organic movement of multidimensional organization begins. This socio-political movement relies not only upon the inner experience of solidarity. It also affirms the complexity of difference within the interaction of the causal powers that exist in both agency and social structure. These synergistically exert themselves against “unavoidable inertial features” in the society, so that an organizational intelligence and resilience emerges out of both individual and collective experiences of oppression, need and resistance. Relational emergence accounts for change in both biological and social entities creating an overlap in the “philosophical ontology” between the two that is worth reflecting upon in order to better understand the nature of the self-organizing forces at work in these groups (Elder-Vass 2010: 198). First however, it is helpful to discern the differences in the accounts of change these two provide. A biological organism like a cell retains its basic compositional consistency while it is alive so that as long as it is surviving, it maintains its status as an entity; over time it morphs beyond the formal bounds of its original composition or loses that composition entirely as it either evolves dies or is killed. Another attribute unique to biological entities, studied in natural science, is that they rely structurally upon their parts having relatively fixed spatial relationships to one another; and internal parts are differentiated from the external environment usually by clear spatial boundaries. A social entity, like a college, on the other hand, shares many natural features with the biological entity, but to achieve status as an entity requires that there be some organization of the individual human parts

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that is generated and maintained internally and psychologically through, for instance, shared language and cultural agreement. The members of any kind of school must in some way share the common project of learning and maintaining the learning environment and activities. This permits interaction organized around a shared goal to occur across diverse members and makes possible not only the organization of the constituents into a whole that is greater than the parts, but also the dynamic reorganization of relationships over time so that new properties pertaining to the whole can emerge continually and structural evolution occur. Social entities rely upon the beliefs and dispositions of constituents to produce the mechanisms needed for the emergence of new properties that secure the survival and evolution of a social structure. In addition, unlike biological organisms, social entities, studied in social science, do not depend on the kind of spatial stability found in the former in order to maintain their structure as an entity. Elder-Vass observes how a school building may spatially constrain the constituents of the school, yet, school activities persist outside of the building, during field trips, for example. This allows social roles to grow and transform and permits the entity itself to defy the spatial boundary of the building. Businesses with global reach seem to have an unlimited capacity for this kind of extension, although in other ways, they rely on the stability of compositional consistency that limits the quality of reasonableness that characterizes their inwardly generated binding agreements to the logic of rationalizing structures. Still, their capacity to extend and transform their boundaries gives hope that with an improved understanding of the intellectual solidarity and spiritual functioning, publics can also be extended trans-nationally and dedicated to a larger common good (ibid.: 200). Intellectual solidarity continuously expands, integrates and refines how the common project unifying a social entity is envisioned and shared. The social entity’s capacity for extension indicates the possibility for transforming different forms of systemic and inter-agentive domination (Hayward 2011), which are related to different particular spatial and temporal arrangements. It is those particular socially encoded arrangements that hinder realization of political freedom worldwide. Having outlined the differences between the biological and social, it is time to return to the subject of their overlap. Elder-Vass perceives a problematic ambiguity in the combination of naturalistic and anti-naturalistic elements in social entities. In terms of the philosophical ontology related to emergence, he perceives that a form of naturalism can be advocated

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for. And although differences exist in the methodologies needed to study emergence in the social and natural sciences, the need for interpretive elements in the study of social entities cannot alone be made the grounds for anti-naturalism; this is because variations in methodologies exist also across the varieties of natural sciences. That said, one must admit that, though it does not “license anthropocentric denials of the causal powers of social structures”, the fact that humans, who constitute the parts of social entities, have beliefs and dispositions (i.e., a political nature that can positively assert the separation of legality from morality), introduces a distinction from natural biological entities that is so complex and vast as to approach the anti-natural (Elder-Vass 2010: 199). The main point for now though is that an entity, whether biological or social, is more than a set of internally coherent parts. As an entity, it is structured in such a way that relations between the constituting parts are “more than merely aggregative” (ibid.: 16). Collections of parts might more accurately be termed “arbitrary constructs” like “all the rice in China” (Collier 1989: 193; Elder-Vass 2010: 16). Diverse parts that share a few basic similarities may accumulate to make a quantity that can be impressive, but they do not form entities: a collection of people who all reside in a particular nation-state or who all share the same planet does not have the moral coherence or intelligence of a truly democratic public guided by a far more profound emergent collective wisdom. It is the organization of the relations between parts into a complex whole that creates emergence (Elder-Vass 2010: 45). But emergence is by no means limited to that single temporal event when an entity first arises as a coherent whole. New properties of the whole, that the parts alone do not possess, can arise continually out of multiple levels of organization that shift and change within the entity; emergence here is understood to stem from the generative mechanisms of nature and the causal powers of things (Elder-Vass 2010). And it is the interaction between the causal powers of agency and social structure, rather than the dominance of one over the other, that enlivens this organization. This relational emergentist account of change in individuals and society is able to describe with considerable complexity ongoing processes of creative evolution, as well as the underlying power dynamics implicated in social ills; and it provides an explanation as to how the public, as individuals in a vast social group, might arise in its most self-determining and morally coherent sense and survive over time.

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Elder-Vass explains the nature of this change in terms of morphogenetic and morphostatic factors that make up the causal history of entities. While morphogenetic factors are involved in how an entity arises, morphostatic ones help to sustain its existence over time, maintaining its characteristic set of “compositional consistency requirements” thereby keeping a higher level entity “in continuous existence from moment to moment” (Buckley 1967: 58; Elder-Vass 2010: 32; 35). The latter is witnessed in the “ordinary virtues” described by Ignatieff, like “trust, tolerance, forgiveness, reconciliation and resilience”; he observed that these are constitutive of the unconscious “moral operating systems” that allow groups of people to survive together (2017: 26). In his far-ranging empirical research into how people in different locations around the globe actually make sense of change and respond to the physical and moral events that unfold in their own local context, it was the morphostatic consistencies generated by unconscious reliance on “ordinary virtues” that proved most important (2017). Crisis itself can be a contributor to morphogenetic factors. In the community-making process described by Scott M. Peck and taught and practiced by the Foundation for Community Encouragement, the emergence of “genuine community” is an example of this: it is, in actuality, a response to the crisis generated in earlier stages of the process, that are related to group experiences of “chaos” and “emptiness” (Geredien 2018). Morphogenetic factors are able to alter the form of an entity but its existence is contingent upon not being overcome by causal factors, like the crises of environmental degradation or terrorism, that can end it outright (Elder-Vass 2010: 67). This means that in order to survive, the public, once it is freed from the forces of its obscuration, will need not only to sustain itself through the support of multiple morphostatic causes, (i.e., substantive changes in institutional and community life that stably support the moral ontology of genuine citizenship) but also to recognize itself as “the outcome of an ongoing interplay between morphostatic causes, morphogenetic causes and structural possibilities” (36). Ignatieff has concluded that aligning the assertion of equality of voice with a universal claim that extends the horizon of caring involved, ultimately to include concern for all sentient beings and for the planet as a whole, cannot be achieved by the mere counter-assertion of the universal validity of human rights, as this concept is constructed in elite discourses (2017). Instead, the realization of universality he refers to must be attained through the moral transformation of

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institutional life and the practical embodied striving of individual citizens and groups like LiKEN and FUNDAEC, for a higher degree of reasonableness. The emotional rationality that makes possible the radical holism of pragmatic inquiry supports a world-embracing humanism that reconnects morality and legality. In this, citizens’ capacity to care for the well-being of all fellow humans and to protect the integrity and welfare of all life is awakened as they transform the dissonance between norm and reality. It is further affirmed as new social ethical paths to knowledge formation are realized and as citizens intentionally strive to end the suffering that arises out of human ignorance. Therefore, in managing the interplay of causes and possibilities outlined by Elder-Vass, one can appreciate the wisdom in Farzam Arbab’s statement that science alone cannot set the direction for development. Its goal “must be illumined by the light of moral and spiritual principles emanating from religion, but religion willing to submit its proposals to the scrutiny of science” (Arbab 2000: 136; italics my own). Movement Toward Intellectual Solidarity Ultimately, in projects like LiKEN and FUNDAEC, what makes the moral good as an endeavor distinct, on the one hand, from a philosophical academic exercise, and on the other, from journalistic reporting on the outcome of real-world events, is the fact that one’s “philosophical” contemplation is attuned and organized around “real-world” consequences—and one does not back down, or turn around, when exposed empirical facts or inner psychological and moral truths come to light. Betsy Taylor refers to the pragmatist’s pursuit of the moral good as “THE WORK!”. She describes the sense of unity of conscience across peoples, as an evolutionary convergence brought about by shared commitment to respond to “similar structural and global contradictions” (2010: 75); these contradictions consist of ubiquitous problematic power complexes and illegitimate constitutionally regulated sources of power. Referred to by Habermas, these complexes are at the root of various forms of human domination and social inertia. One can discover people who do “THE WORK!” in various work roles – activists, academic, government, media—working on various issues— health, environment, empowerment, income generation, human rights, culture,—but somehow one senses that one is on the same path. There

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are uncanny resemblances between grassroots efforts in quite different places—as if this is convergent evolution, different communities responding to similar structural and global contradictions. (Reid and Taylor 2010: 75; italics my own)

All over the world, in different circumstances, coherence in public consciousness arises as moral impulse is vitalized and willingness to engage in social change comes to a head because there is “a conflict of social customs of such a nature” that the only way to proceed is by working out “the proper mode of action” (Koch 1991: xxxviii; quote by Dewey on 101). The challenge of determining what that action should be and then engaging in it, presents an opportunity for the most vital human development to occur. This is because the tension within the interactions of structure and agency provokes the rise of new properties within the whole, through relational emergence. In the possible resulting discovery of solidarity across borders one recognizes also the integrative and unifying power of human conscience. But it is important to remember that it is the “conflict of social customs” and the need to work out “the proper mode of action” that invigorates this power and that can mobilize morally coherent social and systemic integration. As Ignatieff writes: Moral globalization is best understood not as a tide of convergence in which we are swept together into a single modernity, but instead as a site of struggle over whether, and to what extent, the cash nexus can be made to serve moral imperatives of equity and justice and which civilizational model… will define the political and moral order of the twenty-first century. (2017: 16; italics my own)

The experience of the conscience is the most internal source of human beliefs about right or wrong and of moral disposition. As Elder-Vass informs, the role of beliefs and dispositions in human development distinguishes the organizing power of social entities from that of biological organisms; nonetheless, when conscience itself is made their common source, the anti-naturalism associated with their complexity and vast nature is to some degree, restored to a natural phenomenon. Hence, Taylor’s seemingly anti-natural observation of “convergent evolution” signals a much deeper natural convergence in how moral disposition is being developed internally. Objective validity and empirical stances regarding social health or illness are being aligned with the “fruit of

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authentic subjectivity” (Helminiak 1998: 17; quote by Lonergan 1972: 292; Macy 1991). Strydom refers to the problem-solving, world-creating domain of the public sphere that arises through critical need and the power of conscience as the “public audience”. The constituents of the public audience can be thought of as public eyewitnesses who respond scientifically and creatively to real-world consequences. As friends bound together by their inner commitment to fulfill human moral heritage, they seek to supervise and regulate these consequences. It is the task of the public audience to recognize the distinct resonance structures used for communication in any one domain of the public sphere and to overcome the limitations inherent to it, thereby increasing the human capacity for fluency (Strydom 1999, 2001). Dewey perceived that the “supervision and regulation” of consequences “cannot be effected by the primary grouping themselves” (Dewey LW 2 1988a: 252). The natural or biological conditions through which, for example, religious, scientific, sporting or artistic group associations and actions have arisen from local contiguity, produces “distinctive consequences- that is, consequences which differ in kind from those of isolated behavior” (252). The public as public audience is called into being by the “essence of the consequences”, by the fact that these consequences, by their very nature, “expand beyond those directly engaged in producing them” (253). It is the interrelated, extensive nature of the consequences produced by seemingly discrete social entities that practically speaking has the creative moral power to beget a public consciousness. Public intelligence is found in the felt awareness of unity that underlies the human relationship to life matrix. This idea, of people coming to accept the interrelational nature of the consequences of human action, and of initiating new paths of development and problem-solving that respond to an understanding of mutual responsibility, resonates with the Islamic concept of din. Din has three main aspects pertaining to: indebtedness; the nature of the cosmopolis; and the action of refining, building or civilizing. Din is the “foundation and motivation” for the Islamic approach to science and development (Baharuddin 2000: 113). When respected in all its aspects, it provides the vital insight and reminder that social responsibility does not arise only out of social thought, but also out of one’s responsibility, as a created and dependent being, to fulfill one’s intellectual and spiritual capacities. In the Islamic understanding, if one is in debt (a da’in), then one is obligated (dayn) to tend to those regulations and laws that would govern

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that debt (ibid.: 115). This process involves cultivation of the wisdom ethic (daynuya), so that considered judgment and justice can be realized by each person. By focusing on what Dewey called the “essence of the consequences”, members of the public audience are working with the concept of debt and development both internally and externally, negotiating the creative tension within the interactions of agency and social structure. By engaging with empirical data, and by examining the disjuncture between legal norms and the way things actually are on the ground, the objective deprivations and losses that various peoples experience are felt and known at a deeper level of being (Baka 2016). Old cognitive order assumptions that have been projected onto society can finally be identified and uprooted. In brief, by focusing this way on the “essence of the consequences”, members of the public audience are helping to secure social conditions in which human dignity within genealogical community can truly be realized. Hollenbach defines this emergent intellectual solidarity as a spirit of willingness to take other persons and groups seriously enough to engage them in conversation and debate about how the interdependent world we share should be shaped and structured…[it] calls for engagement with the other through both listening and speaking, in the hope that understanding might replace incomprehension and that perhaps even agreement could result. (1995: 150)

Pragmatism as action-oriented philosophy and mediating movement empowers this progress toward engagement, better understanding and renewal. For those who are willing to engage dynamically with the intellectual challenges inherent to new processes of knowledge formation and who accept the border-crossing nature of “THE WORK!” pragmatism establishes relationship to an integrative principle. Manifesting through the particular new properties that arise out of relational emergence, this living principle advances movement toward an “organization of all elements” (Dewey LW 2 1988a: 259). It is found in the “site of struggle” referenced by Ignatieff and evidenced in the emergent “convergent evolution” referred to by Taylor, in which different communities respond to similar structural and global contradictions. Through their civilizing actions, members of those communities may better discern and appreciate the nuances and complexities that characterize one’s inner relationship to conscience. They may collectively realize the deeper structural

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legal significances that link debt to morally coherent social development and to a global movement for restorative justice. These significances are associated with the concept of din and with the mutual sense of political responsibility and obligation that characterizes the virtue of intellectual solidarity.

References Arbab, Farzam. 2000. “Promoting a Discourse on Science, Religion, and Development.” In The Lab, The Temple, and The Market: Reflections at the Intersection of Science, Religion, and Development, ed. Sharon Harper. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Bahruddin, Azizan. 2000. “Rediscovering the Resources of Religion.” In The Lab, The Temple, and The Market: Reflections at the Intersection of Science, Religion, and Development, ed. Sharon Harper. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Baka, A.E. 2016. The Dialectic of the Cave: Self-Determination, Constitution and the Phenomenology of Deprivation, thesis. University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5731083. Bion, W.R. 1959. Experiences in Groups and Other Papers. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Brennan, Teresa. 2000. Exhausting Modernity: Grounds for a New Economy. London: Routledge. Buckley, Walter. 1967. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Collier, Andrew. 1989. Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. De Sousa, Ronald. 1987. The Rationality of Emotion Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dewey, John. 1988a. The Later Works, 1925–1953 Volume 2: 1925–1927. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston, textual ed. Bridget A. Walsh. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1988b.The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 11, 1925–1953: Essays, Reviews, Trotsky Inquiry, Miscellany, and Liberalism and Social Action (Collected Works of John Dewey). Ed. Jo Ann Boydston, textual ed. Bridget A. Walsh. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Holt. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2010. The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. Festenstein, M. 2002. “Pragmatism’s Boundaries.” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 31 (3): 549–571.

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———. 2004. “Pragmatism and Two Models of Democracy.” European Journal of Social Theory 7 (3): 291–306. Findlay, J.C., and N. Hass-Cohen. 2015. Art Therapy and the Neuroscience of Relationships, Creativity, and Resiliency: Skills and Practices. New York: W. W. Norton. Fischer, K., and T. Biddel. 2006. Dynamic Development of Action, Thought and Emotion. In Theoretical Models of Human Development. Handbook of Child Psychology, 6th ed., Vol. 1, ed. W. Damon and R.M. Lerner, 313–399. New York: Wiley. Fung, Archon. 2012. “Continuous Institutional Innovation and the Pragmatic Conception of Democracy.” Polity 4 (44) (October): 609–624. Galston, William A. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geredien, Julie. 2018. “Transformative Harmony and the Community-Making Process.” In Transformative Harmony, ed. Ananta Giri. New Delhi: Studera Press. Habermass, J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Harris, George. 1999. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hayward, Clarissa Rile. 2011. “What Can Political Freedom Mean in a Multicultural Democracy?: On Deliberation, Difference, and Democratic Governance.” Political Theory 39 (4): 468–497. Hollenbach, David. 1995. “Virtues and Democracy.” In New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions and Communities, ed. Amitai Etzioni. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. Ignatieff, Michael. 2017. The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. James, William. 1978. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jardine, Alice. 2007. A Surplus of Living Attention: Celebrating the Life and Ideas of Teresa Brennan, Ed. Alice Jardine, Shannon Lundeen, and Kelly Oliver. New York: State University of New York Press. Joas, Hans. 1993. Pragmatism and Social Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. John, Paul II. 1987. “Solicitudo Rei Socialis: To the Bishops, Priests Religious Families, sons and daughters of the Church and all people of good will for the twentieth anniversary of Populorum Progressio” found at www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html. Kelsen, Hans. 1971. What Is Justice: Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essay by Hans Kelsen. Berkeley: University of California Press. Keil, Charles. 1979. Tiv Song: The Sociology of Art in a Classless Society. Chicago: Chicago University of Chicago Press.

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Koch, Donald. 1991. “Introduction.” In Lectures on Ethics, 1900–1901: John Dewey. Ed. Donald F Koch. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Locke, Alain LeRoy. 1989. The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond. Ed. Leonard Harris. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lonergan, Bernard J. F. 1972. “Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.” Method in Theology, 3–25. New York: Seabury. Macy, Joanna. 1991. Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural Systems. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Misak, Cheryl. 2000. Truth, Morality and Politics: Pragmatism and Deliberation. London: Routledge. Mustakova-Possardt, E. 2003. Critical Consciousness: A Study of Morality in Global, Historical Context. Westport, CT: Praeger. Mustakova-Possardt, et al. 2014. Toward a Socially Responsible Psychology for a Global Era. New York: Springer. Narvaez, Darcia. 2014. Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture and Wisdom. New York: W. W. Norton. Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Phelan, S. 1994. Getting Specific: Postmodern Lesbian Politics. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 1996. Revisioning the Political: Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory. Ed. Nancy J. Hirschmann and Christine DiStefano. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Reid, Herbert, and Betsy Taylor. 2010. Recovering the Commons: Democracy, Place, and Global Justice. Springfield: University of Illinois Press. Schwering, Markus. 2014, 24 July. “Internet and Public Sphere: What the Web Can’t Do” Reset Dialogues on Civilizations found at www.resetdoc.org/story/internet-and-public-sphere-what-the-web-cant-do/. Siegel, Daniel. 2012. The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are, Second Edition. London: Guilford Press. Strydom, Piet. 1999. “Triple Contingency: The Theoretical Problem of the Public in Communication Societies.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (2): 1–25. ———. 2001. Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology. Oxon: Routledge. Taylor, Betsy. 2010. “Pollution, Subsistence, Sustainability in USA Nationalism: The Symbolic Construction of ‘Appalachia’ as America’s ‘trash’ People.” In Interrogating Development: Insights from Margins, 62–82. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Touraine, Alain. 1995. Critique of Modernity. Cambridge: Blackwell, Ltd.

PART II

Pragmatism and Spirituality: Reconstructing Language, Self and the World

CHAPTER 11

‘Pragmatic Metaphysics: Language as a Battlefield Between Truth and Darkness’: An Interpretive Approach to the View on Language, Truth and World ´ in the Philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta—In the Light of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ Mikael Stamm

Introduction In this essay, I intend to draw the reader’s attention to the significance of the field of metaphysics for the study of language—by employing a hermeneutical method to bring forth the characteristics of the role of ´ language and Being in the philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta. The view on language as an instrument of communication or objectrepresentation leaves out the metaphysical aspect, in fact reduced to the field of epistemology. It is the view of this author that language is not to be regarded only as an instrument of communication or objectified

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truth, but rather as something which defines our fundamental openness towards reality, i.e. as an expression and upholder of our understanding of everything there is, including ourselves and the nature that surrounds us. ´ In the philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta, it is stated that in the very core of ourselves is embedded a relation expressing an original darkness. This darkness in us signifies a potency which gives rise to phenomena not derivable from any form of positive being. Within us exists an ever present Being that escapes the ability of our objectifying cognitive faculties. ´ According to Saiva Siddh¯anta our mode of being includes within itself an absolute beyond. This mode of being points to something different which cannot be defined as any form of being or positive phenomenon— thus introducing a dynamic factor within us, an indefinable horizon of an ever-changing phenomenal world within and outside us. This relation to otherness implies in turn that our striving for freedom from ignorance essentially is a struggle fought against an active force at work in our very being. This struggle for uncovering truth in the midst of distortion and darkness connects to the question of language and Being: Language expresses a reality in which we are grounded, and we can only be open for this reality if we are open for the meanings hidden in language. As we will see, language is the medium in which Being is manifested, and because being and truth are to be regarded as two sides of the same coin, truth can only be recovered if we free ourselves from the force that makes us think, speak and act in the mode of inauthenticity guided by an anonymous principle from the beginning of time. ´ This modified mode of openness is the work of the Saiva Siddh¯antic root-impurity ¯ an.ava-mala, which we will devote a closer study in this chapter. In the phenomenon of projection of the ideal knowledge into this our current state of bondage, language plays a crucial role: In so far language manifests in the gross world it reflects the limitations inherent in this, but in so far it has its source in the higher subtle aspect of the worlds it also has the potential of liberation from darkness.

Heidegger: Hermeneutics of Being Heidegger (1889–1976) was deeply influenced by Husser’s phenomenology, and he accepts to a certain degree Husserl’s concept of a pure phenomenon.1 The Husserlian concept of pure phenomenon is

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something which has to be uncovered in the stream of immanent data in consciousness without any intermediate layer of false apprehension, that is, without any objectifying or psychological prejudice. Heidegger, though, does not believe in Husserl’s concept of a neutral descriptive position of phenomenology, but insists that every form of cognition is a form of interpretation, and this is also true in relation to the fundamental structure of reality. Thus Heidegger in his early work Being and Time (1927) posits a hermeneutical metaphysics (fundamental ontologie) as the inner core of philosophy, and that any enquiry into metaphysics must be founded on a study of the being of the enquirer, the human being or being-there (Dasein).2 Heidegger uses a phenomenological methodology to show that metaphysics is possible within the framework of the Western philosophy in a renewal of the tradition of hermeneutics. In opposition to Husserl, Heidegger stated that consciousness and human being are only understandable through a new dynamic metaphysics. This form of ontology made a rethinking of the traditional concept of Being and human existence in Western philosophy necessary. It is in this context that Heidegger focuses on the difference of beings (objects), and Being (that which makes appearance of beings/objects possible), expressed in the concept of ‘the ontological difference’. In this difference lies a crucial significance as it implies a critique of modern Western philosophy, as well as the past interpretations of metaphysics.3 In the history of philosophy metaphysics has generally been interpreted as the science of the highest and most exemplary ‘thing’ which represented a model for what a true being was. Heidegger’s point is that the concept of such a ‘thing’ must be kept out of the question of Being, as Being is not a static substance but rather something that happens when a ‘thing’ appears—a timely horizon within which our world of activities appear, guided by interpretations and meanings, structured as language. The concept of this dynamic Being, originally exposed by the pre-Socratic thinkers, is a form of understanding which makes everything that is and possible can be to show themselves to us as pure phenomena. So as to reveal itself to us in a mode in which they can be determined as such and such a ‘thing’.4 In this way, Being hides behind objects. That is why the objects have become a model of reality, so we are able to falsely determine a ‘real thing’ as having objective qualities, disregarding both our own way of

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being as interpretive transcendence, and the Being as such, as the condition of apprehension of objects. In this way, Heidegger is able to put a ‘diagnosis’ on a tendency to objectify in modern science and technology, as a distortion of an original authentic way of being, affecting our concept of what is real as such. This conception of fundamental ontology (the condition of any possible ontology) makes Heidegger interpret phenomena such as consciousness, time, world, things in the context of the special being of human being, which essentially is transcendence of itself in terms of a timely being. In this transcendence of ours, we are able to in-authentically understand ourselves and reality as such as objects; this is not a false knowledge but an inherent tendency in our being with others that makes us misinterpret reality. From these preliminary considerations of characterisations of language and truth, and a short note on Heidegger, we will now turn to the philos´ ophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta as it is presented in the textual sources which I have chosen for the purpose of this paper.

´ ¯ Saiva Siddhanta as a Distinct Philosophy Within Indian Philosophy ´ Here I will focus on some salient features of the school of Saiva Siddh¯anta, especially the distinguished role of the root-impurity ¯ an.ava mal.a in this system of thought. ´ agamas which were written in Sanskrit The oldest source available Saiv¯ ´ ´ and not distinctly Saiva Siddhantic was regarded by Saiva devotees as possessing at least as much authoritativeness as the Vedas. In the ´ ´ ´ agamas it is stated that it is Siva Saiv¯ who revealed the Vedas, it is Siva who is the ultimate being, that the creation is in some sense real, and that the three fundamental kind of substances are God (pati), the individual selves (pa´su) and bondage (p¯ a´sa). ´ The early philosophical exposition of Saiva Siddh¯anta was inclined to a dualistic perspective in the form of philosophical manuals, most notably ´ ıkum¯ King Bhoja of Dh¯ ara (11. century), commented upon by Sr¯ ara ´ and Aghora Siva (12. century). A rivalling interpretation is the view of ´ advaita advocated by Sr¯ ´ ıkan..tha (12. century) in a famous commenSiv¯ tary on Brahmas¯ utra.

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´ The most important work which made Tamil Saiva Siddhanta known as ´ a distinct philosophical school is Sivajn¯ ˇ anabodha by Meykandadeva who ´ lived in the thirteenth century. Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha stands forth as a represent ´ of a development of Tamil Saiva Siddh¯anta in a non-dualistic framework, opposed to the previous early and classical phases which was written in Sanskrit and not distinctly Tamil in style, belonging to a dualistic view.5 ´ Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha, a text by Meykandadeva, is meant to be an ´ agamas.6 exegetic evaluation of the philosophical content of the Saiv¯ ´ Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha consists of twelve short verses or ‘threads’ (s¯ utras ), which is said to have their origin in the ancient time of the sages (ri´sis ). In this ´ agamas, form, the s¯ utras represent the quintessence of the Vedas and Saiv¯ ´ as it was taught to Meykandadeva who wrote Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha in Tamil language and added an elusive commentary to clarify the message. Thus ´ it is regarded by Saiva Siddh¯anta to be a divine word heard by Meykandadeva (not memorised or created) which makes this Tamil scripture on ´ agamas as an authoritative source in the the level with the Vedas and Saiv¯ traditional mind. ´ Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha is a systematic philosophical account expressing the ´ doctrines of moderate non-dualism in post-classical Saiva Siddhanta, deals with the existence and nature of God (pati), individual self (pa´su) and bondage (p¯ a´sa), the means of release and the individual self in the liberated state. ´ Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha is commented upon by several authors, but the most important among the commentaries and tractates is consid´ ered to be Sivaj n¯ ˇ anasiddhi¯ ar and Irup¯ avirupathu by Arunanti (an immediate disciple of Meykandadeva); San.kalpanir¯ akaranam, ´ Sivaprak¯ a´sam and Paus.karabha¯ asya by Um¯apati (14. century); ´ ´ n¯ ˙ a.sya, Vistarabh¯ a.sya, and a classical Saiva Sivaj ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ´ ´ Siddhanta manual Saivaparibh¯ as¯ a by Siv¯agrayogin (16. century); and ´ Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam by Sivagnanamunivar (18. century). I have chosen ´ to follow the late eighteenth-century commentator Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar’s ´ Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam which draws heavily on Saiv¯ agamas and earlier commentaries in the refutation of other schools of philosophy, both within and outside the Saiva tradition, heterodox (n¯ astika) as well as orthodox (¯ astika) philosophies. ´ I intend to supplement the exposition of Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar ´ ´ with Sivagrayogin’s Saivaparibh¯ a.s¯ a, Sivajn¯ ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ˙ a.sya and

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Laghut.¯ık¯ a, all of which is written in Sanskrit, as opposed to the Tamil ´ scripture Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam by Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar.

Creation of the World of Objects and Words Below follows s¯utra 1 which is the so-called existence-s¯ utras (pram¯ anaiyal ) about world and God as part of the general exposition7 : The world which is of the form, he, she and it, is subject to the three operations and hence it is an entity produced. Because of impurity it comes into Being from the agent of dissolution. So the wise say that the end alone is the beginning.8

First part of the s¯ utra dealing with the nature of the universe is paraphrased in a statement (adhikarana) by the commentator9 : ‘The universe is subject to three changes’. This kind of statements which ´ Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar makes use of in his commentary supports a system´ atisation of the content of the s¯ utra. Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar continues to elaborate the sutra, stating that it is held that the universe as a whole with everything in it is an insentient entity (object) and therefore is subject to the three changes of origination, development and decay.10 This means that the universe has constituent parts, i.e. is inert and manifold. These three changes must apply for all individual existent things as well as for the ´ universe as a whole. Sivaj n¯ ˇ anamunivar states that the view concerning objects as something having qualities subject to changes can be applied to the world of words (´sabda) also, referring to the gender of masculine, ´ further points out the intimate feminine or neuter nouns.11 Sivagrayogin relationship between words, nouns and existent objects, arguing that entities like objects has similar attributes as nouns, and that they share the fundamental principle of male, female and neuter principles.12 Things are not to be separated from language because they share the same attributes. The expression ‘having parts’ means that which is male, female or neuter, and what is denoted as any of the three genders must be an object which is a part of the world. Word and an referential object are two sides of the same coin, partaking in the same reality, subject to the three changes of appearances. By what feature is the nature of words and objects said to be similar? The answer is that it is the nature of having parts or being effects of a cause. Language and world reflects each other because they have a

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common source, and this common source is connected to the working ´ ´ of the Sakti of Siva through the hierarchy of evolutes (tattvas ).

´ ¯ Saiva Siddhanta: Being, Non-being and ‘Nothingness’ In this chapter, we will go through the three fundamental substances relevant for this paper: Primal Being, the complex phenomenal world and the ultimate cause of the world, the complete ‘other’ of darkness or absence of knowledge. Different Aspect of Being From the analysis of Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam, we can collect what is meant ´ by the term ‘Being’ (sat ). We know that according to Saiva Siddh¯anta ‘Being’ is a concept of reality, as that which truly is. Being in this sense is characterised as: One, changeless, independent, without parts and pure consciousness. The problem with this definition of as Being is that it cannot be defined adequately in the context of an object, nonetheless we will attempt to categorise how to understand the different aspects of the concept of Being ´ in terms of Saiva Siddh¯anta: (1) Primal Being or Pati: This substance shares some of the characteristics with the two other substances mentioned (pa´su and pa´sa): Being one, without parts, unchanging, independent and causal. The two last-mentioned qualities are to be understood only in a relative sense, as there ultimately are only two truly independent entities: the Primal Being and the root-impurity, ¯ an.ava mal.a. (2) Pure consciousness: In this sense, it is the quality which separates the Primal Being from the world (and unites it with the being of the selves), that is, the quality of sentience. (3) Cause of the world: In this form is implied that Being must possess potency and that it must be present in some form in what it is not, that is, within the phenomenal world. How are we then to understand what is not, that is, non-being (asat )?

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The World of Non-being From the concept of being we naturally arrive at the negative concept of non-being (asat ). This is not considered to be a simple negation of Being, but rather signifying: That which is ‘something’, but still not a true being. Or more precise: Non-being is not a global negation of being, rather a local negation in which only some of the characteristics of being is denied, but not all. Now, if being is eternal, one and changeless; what then is non-being? In the first s¯ utra, we were told that the manifest world and everything in it, is subject to the three changes: Origination, development and decay, and that they have names and gender, and is therefore to be regarded as produced by causes, originally one root-cause, which is the Primal Being, ´ by way of His Power, Sakti. In other words: The material cause of the ´ world is m¯ ay¯ a , and the instrumental cause is the Lord’s Sakti. In the dualism of S¯ankhya, ˙ the constitutive event of the world is purus.a’s proximity to m¯ ulaprakr.ti, originally the material principle in a seed-form from which spring forth the realm of the manifested world. ´ This scheme is in many way preserved in the philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta, but never the less modified on some very decisive points concerning Prakr.ti, the material principle in S¯ankhya ˙ philosophy: (1) Prakr.ti is not the root-cause of the world, but an intermediate cause which itself is an effect of some more original cause. (2) Prakr.ti is not a self-contained entity with inherent powers, but is guided, sustained and pervaded by the Primal Being. (3) Prakr.ti is a result of the working of three different mal.as (anava, karma and maya), two of which are instruments of the Lord, one of which is completely devoid of the Primal Being. The working of karma mal.a has m¯ ay¯ a mal.a as its substratum, and m¯ ay¯ a is the material cause of the world, both are considered as substances, and both are instrumental in respect of the working of the Primal Being to liberate the selves from a state of bondage. From the pure m¯ ay¯ a (´suddha a ) evolves the pure body of the Primal Being or the subtle world, m¯ ay¯ where the liberated pure selves dwell—and from which evolves the impure m¯ ay¯ a (a´suddha m¯ ay¯ a ) through five manifestations which enable the selves to experience in a general way, and furthermore the following five evolutes

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manifesting the five infirmities of the selves which qualifies purus.a; then only follows the m¯ ulaprakr.ti and the 24 tattvas known in S¯ankhya. ˙ The Opening of Time Let us take a closer look at the first evolute of the impure m¯ ay¯ a, Time (k¯ ala), which causes the entire range of beings and powers in the gross world. From time evolves destiny (nyati), limited agency (kal¯ a ), knowledge (vidy¯ a ) and attachment (r¯ agha), which together forms the precondition of the selves’ potencies of volition, cognition and conation in the world, making the experiences and enjoyments performed by the individual selves possible.13 As time is the necessary condition of a sequential ordered causal relation, it means that time causes the entire manifested world and the experience of this. As the Primal Being (pati) transcends time and other limitations He will not be subject to these, but the experiencing selves (pa´su) and the world is only manifested within the horizon of time. It thus follows that time in the form of evolute of the impure material principle (a´suddha m¯ ay¯ a ) must be an echo of the time connected to the pure material principle (´suddha m¯ ay¯ a ) within which the powers of the Primal Being manifests, making the experience of liberated souls possible in the manifesting of pure m¯ ay¯ a . The impure world is different from pure world, but it still bears its imprint as a symmetrical similarity of this ideal ay¯ a is determined by the existence.14 Though the structure of impure m¯ immediate causal conditions, it also mirrors the higher form of itself in the condition of the pure m¯ ay¯ a. Prakr.ti manifests the quality of origination, development and decay, making the worldly existence of birth and death possible. Time makes the unfolding of existence possible in the three divisions of time as past, present and future, which transforms any possible phenomenon from its potential state to the manifest, and back to the unmanifested state again, as it causes new phenomenon to arise. Within the unfolding of time (k¯ ala), destiny (nyati) is the next evolutes, thus establishing the framework of experiences in a restricted time-space continuum; from this follows the limited agency or volition (kal¯ a ), and from agency follows knowledge (vidy¯ a ) and attachment (r¯ agha), respectively. By these evolutes the worldly experiences of the individual selves are possible with the awakening of their cognitive, volitional and conational potencies, which makes the connection between

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action and experience effective, thereby driving the mechanism of karma mal.a in the world.15 The last of the five evolutes or restrictors (pancakancuka) ˇ which completes the timely experience, is attachment (r¯ aga); this conative potency makes it possible for the individual selves to be attached to the object presented, or rather the object can be presented fully in the light of attachment, to secure the world of objects as meaningful and as something with which the self can identify with the help of the ego. Through the instrumental conative potency, the intellect is objectified by the self including this activity of disposition of the intellect which is an integral part of the form of the object.16 This important aspect exposes the ‘why’ of the special directedness of the consciousness as a general potency, as well as the specific attention in our field of possible objects, and it also makes the decision-making of the volitional power conceivable. It is not the pleasurable quality of a thing which makes it desirable; it is the experiential cognition of the particular self which constitute the attraction, repulsion or indifference in relation to a given object.17 The meaning of the being of the world is primary time, brought about as a remedy of the Primal Being for the workings of the root-mal.a on one side, and constituting the very power of ignorance in the world on the other hand. Time comes into being as ¯ an.ava mal.a is touched by Primal Being through His potency, making the world come into existence; the world is not nothing, but rather timely existence perceived as impermanence, non-being. But if this existence is non-being (asat ), what then is ¯ an.ava mal.a which causes the world as timely existence to be? ¯ ava Mala: The Cause of Non-being An . . ´ We will now take a closer look at sixth s¯ utra in Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha which states the nature of Being (sat ) and non-being (asat ) on account of being known; the nature of being and non-being is derived from the way we perceive them. Due to the phenomenal world of non-being as caused, changing and timely, then the world in which we perceive objects, can only appear beings of that nature, i.e. impermanence. Being, then, must be that which is eternal, one and changeless, and a substratum, and one of the two necessary conditions of non-being; we know non-being because of its support in Being, but at the same time we do not know Primal Being because of bondage. Being cannot be known through the world;

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only in a transcendent state guided by the Primal Being’s force in a divine intuition, detached from that objectification of the world. ´ The meaning of being is, according to Saiva Siddh¯anta, connected to ¯ an.ava mal.a, as non-being (or phenomena) only makes sense in connection to ¯ an.ava mal.a, in opposition to Being. In its pure form the root-impurity is the appearance of an absolute absence of Being (and nonbeing) in relation to the selves. In the fourth s¯utra, it is mentioned that the self is from the beginning of time in a relation to ¯ an.ava mal.a, which causes the appearance of the self to be devoid of knowledge as such.18 Pure ¯ an.ava mal.a (as in a state of world-sleep) means the appearance of absolute absence of consciousness (kevala), in which the self appears as if it does not know anything at all, not even itself. This aspect of nothingness 19 or spiritual darkness conceals the self from itself and is therefore the root-cause of the phenomenal world.20 ¯ . ava mal.a, then, when it is associated with the evolutes of m¯ An ay¯ a and karma, causes the five states of consciousness (sakala).21 As ¯ an.ava mal.a is a substance, one, eternal, pervasive and possessing potencies in relation to the self, it is an active entity which are able to obscure the consciousness of the selves because of the nature of the self to identify with entities with which is associated. Even in the partially pierced absence of knowledge which is the cognition generated in the phenomenal world, our limited consciousness can only comprehend through identification, which means that we are always intentionally directed outwards towards objects in the world due to this darkness in our hearts, and therefore, we cannot know ourselves as the self can never be comprehended within the framework of an object.22 Thus the limited objectifying consciousness is on the one hand a mark of the self under the influence of darkness, ¯ an.ava mal.a, but on the other hand can also be seen as piercing the darkness in the form of perceiving objects. In this penetrating light of the objectifying consciousness lies the activity of the pervasive awareness as the source of all forms of cognition. Our consciousness is given a world within the horizon of time, as a partially concealment of the pervasive awareness without which no objectifying cognition would be possible. With this understanding of Being, non-being and nothingness (the appearance of negation in the world) we now have an understanding of the meaning of the phenomenal world: Being is that which truly is, and this keeps the darkness away by sustaining the fleeting phenomenal world. The world is that which the self experiences within time—as a product

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of its simultaneous (incompatible) relations to darkness and Being. With other words: The world is the time and place in which beings appears in the form of objects—not as an illusion, but as a real event within the horizon of the two driving forces.

´ Sakti---The Potency Between Being and Nothingness In the previous section, we focused on the definition and interpretation of Primal Being, nothingness and non-being (world). But if the Primal Being manages to manifest evolutes from the pure m¯ ay¯ a and subtle potencies descending in a hierarchy of beings to the gross matter, how is this creation accomplished knowing that the Primal Being is eternal, one and changeless? The answer to this question is given in the fourth s¯ utra: He, being one with selves and other than they, abides in implicit union with his consciousness-force that they experience going and coming, because of the two fold works.23

´ The reference to Conscious-force is Siva’s Sakti which dwells as His potency in the selves, as their capability to will, cognise and desire, that is, experience the fruit of actions from previous existences, and undergoing deaths and births in the journey towards liberation. ´ ´ Lord Siva’s Sakti is thus the instrumental cause of the universe as well as the actions and the experiences of the selves, while m¯ ay¯ a is the material cause, moved by means of karma mal.a which qualifies m¯ ay¯ a as its ´ ´ medium, but ultimate moved by Siva’s Sakti. This is expressed in the fivefold function of the Lord where the two (obscuration and grace), means, respectively, the screening the powers of ´ ¯ an.ava mal.a, and the potency of Siva to work in the selves, ultimately to help the selves to transcend the objectifying knowledge of the world to ava) is thus the power a level of divine vision.24 The obscuration (tirobh¯ to direct the three impurities to function as a whole for the sake of the liberations of the selves, and Grace is the ascending power inherent in the selves which is necessary to attain liberation. Between the Primal Being and ¯ an.ava mal.a there can be no relation, as being cannot know the root-cause of the world, but His potencies can work as a bridge between to incompatible entities—Being and ¯ an.ava mal.a—thereby making the world as non-being possible as a field of activity for the sake of the selves.

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The particular effect of ¯ an.ava mal.a is only limited to the individual selves which means that it cannot have any effect on the universal or pervasive aspect of the self, only the appearance of self as individual. The individual selves are always in the presence of the pervasive self, even in the states of complete isolation.25 That is why the working of the powers of the Primal Being is still active while the self is under the influence of ¯ an.ava mal.a. The seventh s¯ utra touches upon the three modes of Beings: In the presence of Sat, all are empty and it knows not. Asat is insentient; so it cannot know. The knower of both is the self which is neither.26

The impermanent being of the manifested world is caused by the three mal.as, is not from an absolute viewpoint to be regarded as true being, that is, as a separate, changeless, partless Being, though certainly defined as substance as both ¯ an.ava, karma and m¯ ay¯ a are uncreated substances, but their manifested effect is only known by the objectifying relative knowledge which is us, and not through the absolute knowledge. It is further said that the self is neither pure Being nor non-being, making the existence of the self a peculiar kind of existence who knows both, though, in two different ways; ¯ an.ava mal.a is related to the individual self, whereas the knowledge of the Primal Being as related to in the form of pervasive universal self, due to its inherent ability which makes it necessarily to form relations, and of identifying with the nature of the things it apprehends. These specific abilities produce the self-awareness in the world as the consciousness of knowing that it knows. This kind of understanding constitute our Being as a distance to ourselves, as continuing delay of the presence of the individual self, and therefore an ability by which we are able to escape the world. Thus the worldly consciousness is showing itself as intentional, that is, directedness towards objects, by means of a series of modification of a pure awareness, in the world. The ability to tie this directedness together in a unifying self is performed by the synthetic function of pure apperception. In the fifth s¯ utra, it is said that the self only can cognise through the five senses by identifying with them and thus know the object.27 This is a clear statement of the inclusiveness of the self in terms of identification or inseparable relation, which is contrary to the position held by the S¯ankhyas ˙ in which the self, purus.a, is absolute passive and untouched

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by the evolutes of prakr.ti, thus making the intellect (buddhi) the active ´ part in the ignorance of purus.a. In Saiva Siddh¯anta, the self is part in the cognitive process and the misconception of its own nature. It is said in seventh sutra that the cause of ignorance cannot affect cit´sakti; only the individual selves can have a relation to ¯ an.ava mal.a. The self remains identified with both sat and asat, which in turn defines the individual self in its existence, that is, its mode of being in the world.28 When the senses, mind and intellect show the self objects, and the self is shown this by way of identification with the shown, then the self cannot be taught of its own true nature by the intellect or the other internal cognitive organs, as they only know of their own designated object. Thus the self cannot by itself learn of its own nature by discriminating between self and non-self—which lies at the root of ignorance; it has to have a higher level of understanding to escape ignorance.29

The Being of Self as Openness The self is a being that identifies with objects and is pervaded by the power of cit´sakti, which is capable of having relations to both Being and concealment of Being, and which knows each of the two kinds of beings through fundamentally different modes of relations. The pervasive awareness is a power emerging from the source of the Primal Being, but is subject to the limited objectifying knowledge as a modification of that power by the three mal.as. Pa´su, the self in the state of bondage, is thus a creature related to both Being and non-being, and it can therefore be characterised as noncomplete or indeterminate, that is, open. It has a potential for Being, but none the less actual in relation to ¯ an.ava mal.a; therefore, we can also characterise the self as something which is subject to a movement in time: As being not yet realised. What is the cause of this strange actuality? The existence of ¯ an.ava mal.a or the concealment of consciousness is here not a satisfying answer, because we are not a being which is accidentally confined by ¯ an.ava mal.a as a quality which is added to the self, but we are such creatures which essentially are left in the darkness from a beginningless time, preventing us from knowing that we pervade the ´ world and are pervaded by Siva, the Supreme God. We are pervaded ´ by Siva and His Grace in a unrealised form, and this unrealised relation makes us capable of a relation to an obscurity which we can only be liberated from by the benevolent forces in the state of bondages. We

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are defined by what we have not yet become, and therefore, necessary is a timely being, as we can only be realised from within the unfolding of time. This means that releasing the intentionality of our consciousness can be viewed from in two perspectives: (1) As not yet realised liberation; in our unrealised non-separable ´ relation with Siva (2) As actual bondage; in our realised non-separable relation to objects, caused by our relation with ¯ an.ava mal.a. In these two aspects, our condition is viewed in two different ways: That of potentiality and that of actuality. In the field between potentiality for liberation and actuality of bondage, there is a potential relation to be actualised. Openness lies in the non-realisation of what is hidden; in a striving towards a state which is a negation of everything we think we know. Only in the realisation lies the completeness. This purpose is expressed in the world in the phenomenon of Language. Our timely relational being is openness, and our openness is expressed in the timely directedness of consciousness towards the world—and in the ambiguity of language which is a part of both our striving for completion and our actual state of ignorance.

Truth in the State of Bondage The self-consciousness serves the function as that which makes it possible for us to transcend our empirical existence. The necessary condition is that we have a pure self-consciousness which constitutes the empirical consciousness, and which is derived from the working of cit´sakti in our being. But how are we able to cognise the existence of a pure selfconsciousness and the realisation of its potential when we are in the condition of bondage? Which features or structures in our worldly existence make it possible to talk meaningful about the absolute, pervasive truth? By posing such a question we ask for the meaning of the pervasive awareness as reflected in the state of ignorance; in other words: We try to conceive the absolute in terms of the objectifying knowledge. This is done by way of the pure self-consciousness because of which we are able to

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turn our consciousness towards itself in a conscious reflection. In terms ´ ´ ´ of Saiva Siddh¯anta, this can only be done with the help of Siva’s Sakti or ´ His Grace. In this section, we try to interpret this activity of Siva in terms of the world. With our self’s identification with the evolutes of m¯ ay¯ a , we have the opportunity to be guided to gradually remove obstacles to truth in identification with ever more subtle objects, in reflection of what we in our heart longs to become. In this way, we indeed have a relation to our possible future: In the movement of realising the pervasive knowledge in the seemingly incompatible world, we here and now transcends our empirical limitations. Therefore, truth can exist in the scriptures and testimonies as a truth transcending the three forms of time, and we are able to long for liberation and envision and embrace what is given as only possible. Because we exist in a timely world of unfolding possibilities we ourselves can realise that possibility f ollowing the directedness towards the Primal Being through the three modus of time: Facticity, actuality and possibility (as not yet realised). Truth is thus connected to being in pure form, but has to be expressed in a gross form, in the medium of language. The connection of meaning to an expression, and the idea in the mind, is defined in relation to an ideal truth. The reflection of this pure ideal in the language, that is, the communication of knowledge inflicted with the gross world, is countered ´ by the working of the ideal form of the word in Sruti, Smr.ti, and the practice of yoga and mantra which stills the mind and reminds us of our divine nature. Language shows us the way out of bondage by mediating between ideal eternal meaning and the ever-changing gross form of the world. Our ambiguous situation is a reflection of the projected ideal of absolute truth back in our timely existence: Like the mirroring of the existence and powers of the pure m¯ ay¯ a into the evolutes of the impure m¯ ay¯ a in the metaphysical aspect, so also the ideal of truth is mirrored back in the world of deceptions, as a theory of knowledge. By way of identifying with what is not yet, we assimilate this ideal state of absolute truth:

The relation between ignorance and the pervasive absolute knowledge works both ways:

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(1) The projection of the state of ignorance into a possible state of negation of ignorance and (2) The projection of their possible state back onto the world as that which can be attained in spite of our condition. ´ In the commentary to ninth sutra in Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha, there is proposed a shift of perspective: In the process of transformation towards liberation, the self is ‘leaving the service of the self ’ to the state of ‘standing in the service of the Lord’.30 Here the self mirrors the Primal Being by which he is pervaded, thereby destroying the individual self and accepting the pure being as the highest principle of its self. In the eleventh s¯utra, it is said that: As God knows His own Bliss, through the mirror of the self, it cannot be considered to be tarnished by the fallacy of atmasrya as what is seen as the image in the mirror is really the object.31

Here it is stated the reverse of the above mentioned is also true: That of the movement of the absolute to the state of the realised self replacing the individual self with its own universal self, and experiencing itself through this self . When the self’s sacrifices itself, its associated body and its actions to the Lord, the self becomes a mirror to the absolute: The being of the self has become a being of a mirror of the absolute. As language belongs to the limited knowledge and objects of the world, what is the role of this medium by which all our thoughts and actions are inflicted? Towards what kind of objects do the words in the scriptures point to—in the midst of the world of ignorance?

Sphota: The Potency of Language ´ ´ In this section dealing with Siva’s Sakti and the evolutes of pure m¯ ay¯ a, we mentioned that this pure m¯ ay¯ a has two natures, that of words and that of substances. The evolutes of the pure m¯ ay¯ a constitute the pure world in which the unembodied souls (vijn¯ ˇ an¯ akalas and pralay¯ akalas ) dwell, while the impure delusionary m¯ ay¯ a constitutes the world of selves in bondage. In a previous paragraph, we mentioned the pure material principle (´suddha m¯ ay¯ a ) and its lower symmetrical form, the impure material principle (´suddha m¯ ay¯ a ).32 Both play a crucial role as elements in channelling

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the Primal Beings potency to the phenomenal world of non-being. In its origin, the pure m¯ ay¯ a has two natures, that of words and that of substances. The form of pure cognitive potency of the Primal Being, ´ named Siva or N¯ ada, experienced by the released selves. ´ The five forms of Sakti operating on the pure m¯ ay¯ a , which are the cause of the manifestations in respect of the pure m¯ ay¯ a: N¯ ada (sound), bindu (conative potency), sada´siva (absorbs and activates), ¯ısvara (subtle activity) and vidy¯ a (state of gross activity). The definition of cause and effect in this context is that the cause is in the form of potency, and the effect is the form of manifestation. This is also true of the manifestation of language that derives its nature from the pure m¯ ay¯ a .33 The conceptual potency having its origin in the power of subtle sound or vibration (n¯ ada) which in turn is the cause of manifestation of all kinds of cognition. In respect to the language, this makes the expression of words (vaikhari) to be able to manifest their ideal meaning, in spite of that their gross expressions are composed of individual letters and syllables; this is due to the conceptual potency of the words, named sphota. This means that the root of language in subtle sound and ideal meanings presides the language as a phenomenon in the world. The source and subtle form of language is intimately connected to the highest Being and therefore to be considered as a part of the path of freedom from ignorance. When the syllables of the word are uttered, the potency of this word is activated and the ideal meaning of the word is activated and revealed to us in a unitary experience; this meaning springs forth in our mind by the power of sphota, and this potency is operating in the purest realms of creation. The objects that a word points to, is revealed to us by n¯ ada, but this pure source of language due to the expressions in the gross world and the fact that words points to objects, can only reveal the appropriate objects which the potency connects to this particular word. The nadi-´sakti as a conceptual potency is the cause of the expression of language in the gross world, so that in the pronunciation of which the potency is able to manifest meanings, thus revealing the objective reality which is connected to the world since the beginning of time. This is said to be a partially manifestation on the side of the expression, so that this partial transformation of potency into the expression as effect makes the utterance of the expression to be quite different from other kinds of sounds, in that they perform the revealing of the meaning pointing to an

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object through the causal potency which was not transformed into that expression.34 ´ In this way, Saiva Siddh¯anta accounts for the expressions of language as conveying an ideal meaning manifesting as a whole, in the minds of the speakers and the hearers, in spite of the limited and gradual forming of syllables, words, sentences and the entire body of a text or a series of ´ utterances. By the Sakti of the Primal Being the ideality of language is retained even in the world of gross objects, making language a unique manifestation of God in midst of ignorance—in a modified way, though, as the language is directed towards objects bringing these from the state of obscurance to be partially revealed in the light of the cit´sakti. Language is the link between us and the absolute, which is accessible in the world and operated by way of a subtle web of meanings and expressions in a multiplicity of connected dimensions. Metaphysics of Language We have seen in that the difference on indeterminate and determinate cognition; indeterminate cognition based on the pure perception of an object, and determinate knowledge based on conceptual knowledge, which is preceded by the activity of the memory, examination of the mind, and fully presented by the intellect to the self. In examination, classifying and judging the concepts are used as necessary instruments; this is not to be regarded as an additional layer added to a pure perception; as such a perception cannot be separated from the determination; they are really one act. The object as such is fit for the conceptualisation in its very being, as it is created in the very same manifestation as the potencies of language. The transformation from the ideal meaning in the pure m¯ ay¯ a to the actual expression in the spoken or written language, that is, in the grossest form of impure m¯ay¯a, is running through some intermediate stages: Subtle (s¯ uks.ma), gross (pasyanti), impression (madhyama) and expression (vaikhari).35 It is because of this common ground in the initial creation of the pure m¯ ay¯ a , and the perfect symmetry of cause and effects in the realms of pure and impure m¯ ay¯ a, that there is a fundamental metaphysical cohesion between words and things, and that the activation of specific sounds has a both revealing and active impact on the world of object. As the revealing

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effect of words it is capable to remove the veil of cognising objects; as an active power capable of affecting the objects through sound vibration. Thus it is said in Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam, in the commentary to ninth s¯utra, statement three, that the utterance of the five holy syllables will purify the candidate if repeated and meditated upon.36 In this level, it is the basic power of sound as the first creational power which is activated, while the utterance of words with a definite meaning is an ambiguous phenomenon as this meaning may be obscured in the process of cognition. The Fall: Closing of Openness Avidy¯ a, ignorance, is not a simple case of erroneous knowledge, but a false identification which makes the self appear as nothing, and objects appear as the exemplary being in respect to which every other kind of being has to be measured, if it is to be true. Now, how is this alienation in respect to being as such, including our own self, to be understood in the light of the previous interpretation of our being as openness? What truly is, is seen as nothing, and that which do not possess genuine being (impermanence), is seen as the only existent form of being. This means a movement towards the closing of our original openness. We are defined as individual selves in the state of bondage, and in this condition we think, communicate and interact through social relations; our openness is in these relations actualised in the world and in the language makes the selves subject to anonymous forces of ignorance, unfolding in the medium of language and actions. The might be in a state of openness, but mostly realised in the modus of ignorance which determines the selves in terms of objects: The possibility of openness is in the state of bondage seemingly replaced with objective determinations and appears not to be anymore.37 This movement within the structure of ignorance may be characterised as a fall.38 This fall is a metaphor signifying that aspect of existence which is conditioned by ignorance, and which is characterised by a movement in a limitless downward direction. The self is caught up in ignorance existing in a transcendence of a fundamental openness, that is, defined as a being in a non-complete relation, then our state of ignorance must be characterised as without limit. And because our being is dependent on a non-realised possibility (liberation), our understanding of our true aim is also modified as our sense of possibility is affected. Heidegger’s point is

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that the Fall is an inherent existential condition with no beginning or end. Its mechanism, though, is essentially supported through the language, which is an expression of the structure of our being and our world. The fate of our being is interconnected to the fate of language; we are structured as language. In this way, our potential for inauthentic understanding is expressed and promoted by language, as a disinterested curiosity and objectification isolated from our mode of being in a phenomenal world.39 This analysis of Heidegger is of course not directly applicable to ´ the metaphysics of the philosophy of Saiva Siddh¯anta, but in my view gives a hermeneutical framework for an interpretation of an aspect of this complex philosophy which also draws heavily on the metaphysics of traditional classical Indian philosophy.

Conclusion Through the metaphysical concepts of Being, non-being and nothingness, we arrived at the phenomenon of language, which ties this metaphysical web together in the phenomenal world. Language was the place of the connection between ideal meaning and sensual expression which exhibit the creational level of pure and impure m¯ay¯a, as in the coexistence of universal and limited consciousness. The priorities of actuality above possibility lead us to the characterisation of the mechanism of ignorance as a fall, given the actuality of the historical specific condition at the present state. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the two different contexts of individual and universal aspects make possible two different kind of understanding of ignorance possible. From the question of ignorance we now arrive at a significant point in the course of reasoning and phenomenological descriptions: (1) The phenomenon of ignorance in the world is not of the nature of erroneous knowledge reducible to an epistemological problem, but is to be interpreted as a pervasive structure of our fundamental Being. (2) The principle in our being accessible in the state of ignorance which makes liberation possible is found in the pure apperception, the selfconsciousness which is aware of itself, and which is in an inseparable relation to the Primal Being. (3) The meaning of our being is relational, a dynamic transcendence in a relation to the Primal Being and darkness on two different

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levels with essentially different natures. Thus we are in a constant existential movement within the dynamic horizons of truth and darkness. (4) The orientation in the world is structured as language as it expresses both the ideal and actual pragmatic dimension of our situation. We exist in a pragmatic defined world in which we must access the spiritual principle to be guided according to our factual situation. (5) The possibility of overcoming of inauthenticity is rooted in our relation to the Universal Being, which must be actualised in a concrete experimental practice within a dynamic horizon of possible actions. These five statements are intimately connected to each other, as it is the concept of ignorance which is to be found in the concrete world, but which as metaphysically founded is a coherent linguistically structured phenomenon present everywhere in the world. ´ Meykandadeva’s Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha shows that metaphysics as referring to a universal realm which cannot and must not be commanded or statically defined, is necessary, but even more important: It points to a pragmatic spirituality which connects philosophy to both a morally and spiritually commitment without which philosophy cannot be. The lesson for Western philosophy is to recognise the link between ethics, truth and being; an insight which were the fruitful source of Western philosophy in the beginning of its time.

Notes 1. pp. 27–39, Heidegger, Martin: “Sein und Zeit ”, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967). 2. pp. 2–11, and pp. 41–63, Heidegger, Martin: “Sein und Zeit ”, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967). 3. pp. 188–223, J.L Mehta: “The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger”, Harper Torchbooks, Y.N. (1971). 4. pp. 8–15, Heidegger, Martin: “Sein und Zeit ”, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967). 5. p. 33, Sivaraman: “Saivism in Philosophical Perspective” (2001). ´ ´ agrayogin” 6. p. xiiv, Jayamma: “The Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ˙ a.sya of Siv¯ (1993).

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7. This and the following chapters will mainly draw on—Mudaliar, Vajravely, K.: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam”, Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai ´ (1985), and Jayammal, K.: “The Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ˙ a.sya of ´ agrayogin”, University of Madras, Madras (1993). Siv¯ 8. p. 88, Mudaliar, Vajravely, K.: “Sivajnˇ ¯anam¯ap¯adiyam”, Madurai Kamaraj University, Madurai (1985). 9. pp. 92–124, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 10. pp. 92–98, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 11. p. 97, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). ´ 12. pp. 8–9, Jayammal, K: “The Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ˙ a.sya of ´ agrayogin”, University of Madras, Madras (1993). Siv¯ 13. p. 187f.f., Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 14. The sequence of evolutes has to be mediated by the modification of pure evolutes in the impure m¯ ay¯ a , as, for example, pure time cannot be the cause of the effect of the impure m¯ ay¯ a ; therefore the impure time is a necessary evolute. The two evolutes though essentially different share the identity class of temporality, connecting the pure time to be instrumental in the forthcoming of the impure time. p. 188, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 15. pp. 187–207, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 16. p. 202, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ 17. Some of these formulations intentionally implicate a certain similarity with Kant’s critical transcendental philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology in Western philosophy. The differences, though, in the contextual setting of Western and Indian philosophy must certainly not be underestimated. 18. p. 246, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 19. The concept of ‘nothingness’ may seem a bit out of a context as it usually is connected to the transcendent being of human being in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. This aspect of our Being, though, might give an understanding of a form of negation which affect our empirical world of objects, as manifesting the difference between Being and non-being. 20. p. 67, Arunachalam, Thiru M.: “The Concept of Consciousness in SaivaSiddhanta”, pp. 65–74, in Indian Philosophical Annual, Volume eleven, The Dr. S Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy University of Madras (1976). 21. pp. 257–260, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 22. p. 71, Arunachalam.: “The Concept of Consciousness in Saiva-Siddhanta” (1976). 23. p. 125, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 24. p.131, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 25. p. 266, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). 26. p. 325, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985).

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27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

pp. 281–282, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 335, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 354, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 361, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 390, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). pp. 181–186, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). pp. 246/21–246/22, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 246/25, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 177, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). p. 360, Mudaliar: “Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam” (1985). This appearance brought about by ignorance is beautifully described by Heidegger as a fall, in a chapter in his early work; pp. 114–180, §25–§38, Heidegger: “Sein und Zeit ” (1967). 38. p. 346, Another word to translate the German word ‘verfall’ would be the movement of ‘decay’. Heidegger, Martin: “Sein und Zeit ”, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967). 39. pp. 334–370, This paragraph is dealing with the phenomenon of time and the mode of daily existence. Heidegger, Martin: “Sein und Zeit ”, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1967).

References Arunachalam, Thiru M. 1976. “The Concept of Consciousness in SaivaSiddhanta”. In Indian Philosophical Annual, 65–74. Chennai: University of Madras: The Dr. S Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy. ´ Bilimoria, Purushottama. 2008. Sabdapram¯ an.a. Word and Knowledge as Testimony in Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld. ´ Devasenapathi, V.A. 1986–1987. “Sivaj nˇ a¯nayogin”. In Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. 19, ed. R. Balasubramanian, 1–21. University of Madras. ´ ´ agrayogi. Ganesan, Dr. T. 2003. Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodha - with the Laghut.¯ık¯ a of Siv¯ ´ ı Aghora´siv¯ac¯arya Trust. Chennai: Sr¯ Heidegger, Martin. 1967. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. ´ ´ agrayogin. Madras: Jayammal, K. 1993. The Sivaj n¯ ˇ anabodhasangrahabh¯ ˙ a.sya of Siv¯ University of Madras. Krishnan, P. 1986–1987. “The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and ´ Sivaj nˇ ¯anamunivar”. In Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. 19, ed. R. Balasubramanian, 61–70. University of Madras. Larson, Gerald James. 1969. Classical S¯ am . khya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Mudaliar, Vajravely K. 1985. Sivajn¯ ˇ anam¯ ap¯ adiyam. Madurai: Madurai Kamaraj University.

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Panneerselvam, S. 1986–1987. Philosophy of Language in ´ Sivaj nˇ ¯anayogin’s M¯ap¯ad.iyam. In Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. 19, ed. R. Balasubramanian, 71–80. University of Madras. ´ Schomerus, H.W. 2000. Saiva Siddh¯ anta—An Indian School of Mystical Thought. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Sivaraman, K. 2001. Saivism in Philosophical Perspective. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. ´ agrayogin. Suryanarayana Sastri, S.S., trans. 1982. The Saivaparibh¯ a.s¯ a of Siv¯ Madras: University of Madras. ´ Thirugnanasambandhan, P. 1980–1981 “The Bearing of Saiva Siddhanta Epistomology on Its Metaphysics”. In Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. 14, ed. R. Balasubramanian, 101–116. University of Madras. ´ agrayogi and ———. 1986–1987. “A Comparative Study of Siv¯ ´Sivajnˇ a¯namunivar”. In Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. 19, ed. R. Balasubramanian, 22–31. University of Madras.

CHAPTER 12

Monistic Elements in Lévi-Strauss’s Structuralism: New Pathways of Consciousness, Pragmatism and Spirituality Rafaela Campos de Carvalho

Introduction and Invitation In this chapter, I discuss works of Levi-Strauss especially his structuralist method which invite new co-thinking and co-walking with pragmatic and spiritual ways especially that of monism in Indian philosophical traditions. I here especially discuss the works of contemporary Indian philosopher and spiritual teacher Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar. The first part of this chapter begins with an engagement with the structuralist project of Lévi-Strauss and the second part deals with themes of pragmatism, spirituality and monism with special reference to the works of Sarkar.

Understanding Lévi-Strauss’s Structuralism Our investigation begins with the question: What is structure for LéviStrauss? To understand this we can begin with these two paragraphs of thought:

R. C. de Carvalho (B) State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_12

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There is a discontinuity between nature and culture but is bridged by a kind of mirroring of mental and material structures. (Wiseman 2009: 303) Everything in this universe is a metamorphosed form of Consciousness. (Sarkar 1955)

The anthropologist Mauro Almeida, in his article “Symmetry and Entropy” (1999), states that Lévi-Strauss not only sought explanatory models of human facts in the schemes concerning communication theories (such as the exchange, games or different modes of language). Lévi-Strauss was also based on natural patterns, invariant structures that can be found in the relationships between any objects. More than a study of its own qualities or essences, structural analysis is based on relationships, so that the invariants in the analysis of relations mold the structures. And as such, they are models that can be applied to different groups of objects. Invariants are, therefore, stable relations between objects, which instead of being understood through their properties, are understood in their relation by formulating a structure. However, how to recognize a structure or models? Mauro Almeida (1999) reveals some keys to this, using parallels with the exact sciences. To recognize a structure, one must necessarily look for it through what is called a group of transformations. To exemplify what a group of transformations is, and how to recognize a structure through it, Almeida manipulates the image of a square: a square, or any other geometric shape, can be melted, moved, translated, expanded, diminished, seen from different angles, and at different times. But there is something in the figure that tells us about its squareness. There is something in the form that can be recognized as square despite all the changes that have been made. That is, there is something invariant about the structure, shape of the square, which concerns it being recognized by the observer as square rather than as a circle. But in order to be able to recognize it, we need to go through a group of transformations—there needs to be comparison. For if there is no change, there is no invariant thing that can be recognized as an invariant: “Describing the identity of an object is then equivalent to describing its symmetries, that is, the group of transformations to which it belongs” (Almeida 1999). A structure is recognized for its constancy through change. Identity, therefore, is not found through substances, but through relational properties. It is the same coordinate system that remains despite changes of different orders. Symmetry is something that remains in

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something despite the transformations to which it undergoes. It is the characteristics that remain despite the changes; temporal, spatial, of observer, of scale; these are the points dear to structuralism, the recognizable sense-producing point of human facts. Constancy, the reaffirmation of something, means something; they are readings about the real, it is the grammar of the worlds that can be inhabited. The invariants are therefore the footprints, the smell of the wind, the broken branches that lead us to these other worlds, traceable to meaning-hunters. However, it is the invariants of a structure that do not vary, not itself. The coordinates are the same, and indicate the same terrain, lead us along the same path, but the territory suffers the action of the world, of time, of intervention, of deforestation, or as best said by Almeida: “Myths die too. One myth that transforms into another respects the invariants of the transformation group to which it belongs until it gets tired. Similar to waves that the stone created in the lake: the circular shape dims with distance and time, until it is no longer distinguishable in the movement of water in the morning breeze” (Almeida 1999). There is no kind of abstract staticity that hangs over the social. There is romantic fate rather than oppression of forms. Structures die, systems degrade, the combinations within the elements that compose the structure lose strength, the boundaries that surround it and give it identity degrade—the entropic part of the structural argument. Therefore, there is no way to find a structure without observing the changes, because its tracks are found by movement, differentiation is made through contact, or, as Lévi-Strauss says: Now, the notion of transformation is inherent in structural analysis. I would even say that all errors, all abuses committed, on or with the notion of structure, come from the fact that its authors did not understand that it is impossible to conceive of it apart from the notion of transformation. Structure is not reduced to the system: a set composed of elements and relations that unite them. In order to speak of structure, it is necessary that between the elements and relationships of various sets invariant relationships arise, so that one can move from one set to another through a transformation. (Lévi-Strauss 1990: 147)i

A theoretical consequence of the fact that structuralism is concerned with invariance is the possibility of affirming the existence of a common sole for all human beings, as an irreducible group to another form, a

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minimum qualified formula. Whether the way the human mind works is the same for all human beings, whether: “The properties that characterize the human mind are invariant along the transformations that lead from one society to another” (Almeida 1999), then what is emphasized are the similarities between human beings, not their differences. Cultural diversity is not, therefore, celebrated in its omnipotence and incommensurability. Being it on the common ground of what is the human being, what defines it is not the property of the elements chosen by different cultures to differentiate themselves, but rather, the different forms of distribution of these elements. For if the elements of nature are the same for everyone, just as the ability to organize them in different ways is the same for everyone, cultural differentiation is the result of different ways of allocating the same objects, these decisions being political rather than essentialist in nature. I have tried to outline some aspects concerning the functioning of structures for Lévi-Strauss. We shall return now to the epigraph, the statement that in Lévi-Strauss’s work a discontinuity between nature and culture is present, but it is overcome through a mirroring of mental and material structures. However, what is this mirroring? This reflection is made in the “Totemism Today” (2003), in which it is discussed how a relationship between elements of nature is analogous to a relationship between human groups. In totemism, Lévi-Strauss argues, the differences apprehended in the sensible world are used to think of differences of another kind, the cultural ones, and hence the maxim, that species diversity is the support for social differentiation. The mind thus discovers, in the already existing operations of the world, its own making. This is the mirroring between material structures of the sensible world and mental structures. The human mind is thus understood as an apparatus for creating cognitive systems from the sensory apprehension of the world, hence: “The aim of structural analysis is not to separate structures from the sensible, or to impose pre-existing structures (mathematical, linguistic) on it, but to discover them immanent in the material world” (Wiseman 2009: 303). The form, the measure of the structures and the creation of the human mind come from structures that already exist in nature: the shape of a shell, the differentiation between birds and the rhythm of the waves. The human intellect is part of nature, it is its synthetic repetition, it is the rearrangement of existing elements from already given models. In this way, it is possible to understand Lévi-Strauss’s statement in the Preface to the Second Edition of The Elementary Structures of Kinship:

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By this hypothesis, the contrast of nature and culture would be neither a primeval fact, nor a concrete aspect of universal order. Rather it should be seen as an artificial creation of culture, a protective rampart thrown up around it because it only felt able to assert its existence and uniqueness by destroying all the links that lead back to its original association with other manifestations of life. Consequently, to understand culture in its essence, we would have to trace it back to its source and run counter to its forward trend, to retie all the broken threads by seeking out their loose ends in other animal and even vegetable families. Ultimately we shall perhaps discover that the interrelationship between nature and culture does not favour culture to the extent of being hierarchically superimposed on nature and irreducible to it. Rather it takes the form of a synthetic duplication of mechanisms already in existence but which the animal kingdom shows only in disjointed form and dispersed variously among its members – a duplication, moreover, permitted by the emergence of certain cerebral structures which themselves belong to nature. (Lévi-Strauss 1969: xxix–xxx)

If the brain is nature, if the matter of which the brain is made is the same as that which composes all other things in existence, the human mental structure is not disconnect from nature, but it rather works in a manner analogous to it. Synthesis, as a biological process, is to produce something from previous information. So, to say that culture is a synthetic repetition of nature is to say that, from elements given in the natural world, it repeats them, creating new products of another kind, derived from the information of nature. Human beings are different because they produce things of different orders, even though they produce them from the same elements. The method for ascertaining such mental structures is the visualization obtained through the groups of transformations: It is the same square in nature that exists in culture, which can be used by mental structures as coordinates to create new elements. Which brings the reader to Goethe. Jean Petitot (2009) demonstrates how Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is more connected to a naturalistic perspective of structuralism than to a formalist one. For, to Lévi-Strauss, differences between species, or between animals and plants within the same genus, are interpreted as transformations, an elaboration also made by Goethe. The immense amount of studies and analogies made by Lévi-Strauss among the zoological, botanical and geological fields are no coincidence, the cultural structures are connected to those of nature. The structures assembled by reason are identical to the structures of the

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natural world. From geology to superstructure, to molecules, to atoms, to stars: All contain the same structures. The universe is similarly structured, follows homologies, shares the same principles. These are modified and identified by groups of transformations, and this fact makes the world intelligible to humans, because they share the same symmetries, due to culture being a mirroring of nature. Therefore: Today, no science can consider the structure with which it has to deal as being no more than a haphazard arrangement of just any parts. An arrangement is structured which meets but two conditions: that it be a system ruled by an internal cohesiveness and that this cohesiveness, inaccessible to observation in an isolated system, be revealed in the study of transformations through which similar properties are recognized in apparently different systems. As Goethe wrote, ‘All forms are similar, and none is like the others. So that their chorus points the way to a hidden law’. (Lévi-Strauss quoted in Petitot 2009: 277)

Which leads us again to Almeida’s analysis of transformations as the method by which invariants can be found, which in turn reveal structure. Petitot correlates Lévi-Strauss’s notion of structure and transformations with Goethe’s writings—all forms are similar, and none are like the others, so their repetition points the way to a hidden law. Lévi-Strauss would thus reproduce Goethe’s central thesis: “the theory of forms is the theory of transformations”ii (Petitot 2009: 277). Behind the diversity of the elements of the natural environment (for Goethe) and including in them the social elements (for Lévi-Strauss), are invariant structures, that is, there is something that unites, that brings symmetry, or in a more poetic and spiritual way, as Goethe might say, there is a mystery. Petitot thus states that the concomitance between the concept of structure and the concept of natural forms runs through all Lévi-Strauss writings. Returning to the motive of this argument, there is something that overcomes the disconnection between nature and culture in LéviStrauss’s work, expressed by a mirroring of material and mental structures. About this apparent disconnection, Descola argues contrarily, claiming to be only a “misunderstanding”: Lévi-Strauss did not convert to monism belatedly and under the influence of neurosciences, as the Gildersleeve Conference might have supposed. It was an early intuition that he relentlessly reformulated over time and which the discoveries of biology confirmed in a timely manner, giving it

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an impulse of empirical legitimacy. Since Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, the idea that the roots of culture must be sought in nature, in the organic principles of the functioning of thought, which do not differ from the laws of physical and social reality, was very present. But this profession of faith was formulated in a philosophical language still so tributary to the dualistic categories that many hasty readers did not realize that the principle distinction between nature and culture by which the book begins was merely an artifice of exposition allowing one to refuse any substantive opposition between the twodomains. (Descola 2011: 39)iii

In “The Elementary Structures of Kinship” it is possible, amid the (artificial) distinctions created by Lévi-Strauss to oppose nature and culture, to find the following sentence: “Culture is not merely juxtaposed to life nor it is superimposed upon it, but in one way serves as a substitute for life, and in the other, uses and transforms it, to bring about the synthesis of a new order” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 4). Thereon is already noticeable the idea of culture as a synthetic reproduction of nature. Therefore, later in Descola’s article, he states: […] whoever wants examples of the literal use of the nature/culture opposition should not look for them in Lévi-Strauss, but in the authors who were influenced by him, applying as recipes certain elementary procedures of structural analysis without actually measuring the extent to which it was inseparable from a monistic theory of knowledge that partially annulled the dualism of method. (Descola 2011: 46)

That is why it is possible to state that among the western anthropological theory Lévi-Strauss is the only one who can theoretically embrace nature today, since he has never denied its existence outside of us. From this monism there are serious theoretical consequences, the nonseparation of man and nature allows an environmental critique based on anthropology, a non-anthropocentric anthropology, which was already outlined by Lévi-Strauss in one of his last texts produced (“Lesson in Wisdom from Mad Cows” 2004). In it, humanity is removed from the center of the universe, as it is understood as only one, of many, of the transformations of natural forms, and therefore, man is not the measure of nature, as already mentioned in the author’s previous works, for example from the foregoing, “Preface to the Second Edition of The Elementary Structures of Kinship”:

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The question then is just how far the contrast between nature and culture may be pushed. Its simplicity would be illusory if it had been largely the work of the genus Homo (antiphrastically called sapiens ), savagely devoted to eliminating doubtful forms believed to border on the animal; inspired as it presumably was some hundreds of thousands of years or more ago by the same obtuse and destructive spirit which today impels it to destroy other living forms, having annihilated so many human societies which had been wrongly relegated to the side of nature simply because they themselves did not repudiate it (Naturvölkern); as if from the first it alone had claimed to personify culture as opposed to nature, and to remain now, except for those cases where it can totally bend it to its will, the sole embodiment of life as opposed to inanimate matter. (Lévi-Strauss 1969: xxix)

Thus, one can think of the topicality of structural anthropology in what concerns the discussions in the field nature and culture in contemporary anthropology and other areas of knowledge. By the same method proposed by Lévi-Strauss for thinking the human, it is possible to think not only what is invariable, and thus defines, the human, but also what is invariant among beings of different species. Although metamorphoses, or transformations, are limited to certain species, in Goethe’s and LéviStrauss’s thought, and on a snail shell analogies can be made, once the same pattern can be found in the shape of galaxies, this cannot be affirmed about it and a starfish. In other words, there are irreducibilities, minimal structures upon which nature creates patterns. Still, the logical movement of this thinking can be used and expanded: unity over separation as theory and, as a method, the pursuit of differences only to validate the existence of a single principle. This is the philosophical basis of an anthropology that sought similarities, such as the Maussian project to find what is stable in man, the categories of the human spirit, and which is also in the political project of Lévi-Strauss’s work. This, however, is not the contemporary research plan of the humanities, which establishes men as a sovereign condition, as a fact to be analyzed, not as a reality to be questioned. As such, the condition of humanity is delimited by antagonisms, of the animal condition, of feelings, empathy, and others diverse capacities. What Descola locates merely as an “artifice of exposition,” the language used by Lévi-Strauss of a dualism between nature and culture, however, has been insistently reified throughout the history of the social sciences, so that it has become a problem to be deconstructed.

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Monism, Pragmatism and Spirituality It is not the current theoretical paradigm that has openness to debate with philosophies that never made the rupture between these common fields of opposition. I resumed so far, the strand of an anthropological theory that did not sever the possibility of a common ground among beings, and therefore, did not fall into chasms without reconnection. I intend to continue the debate on a methodological monism opened by Lévi-Strauss, which even might call itself a spiritual pragmatism, leading it to the logic of a fruitful philosophy, which has much to contribute to this debate: the non-dualistic Indian philosophies. Indian monistic philosophies share the precept of a principle of totality, in general named Brahman, which is understood to be an efficient and material cause of existence (Sarkar 1959). This concept also corresponds to what ethnographies seeks to locate as the notion of substance and the notion of self of those societies. But more than scrutinizing its symbolic effectiveness for its social group, I intend here to grant philosophical status to it and merely delineate parallels of this notion with that of minimum patterns sought by Lévi-Strauss. The use of thought forms of philosophies of an otherness becomes relevant for the contributions that they can provide to our questions, to our objects. Modern western science hitherto dealt with them as an object to be unraveled and interpreted in its own way, usually through an orientalist projection reading on the other. Nevertheless, the native is often not taken seriously, even less their contribution to our theoretical thinking system, generally interpreting them as a subjective elaboration opposed to the technical objectivity of our own science. Our ethno-science, our ethno-thinking, to be able to answer their own questions could do the movement of leaving itself, of refusing itself, and through this mechanism of alterity, seeing itself by the inference made available by the presence of one other. This method of knowledge that embraces the other, this pessimism that initiates an epistemological alterity, is the foundation of the anthropology as defined by Lévi-Strauss in “Jean-Jacques Rousseau, fundador das ciências do homem” (1993). Therefore, if the western science is bound to a reasoning that operates by ruptures and oppositions, between nature and culture, man and animal, objective and subjective, sensitive and intelligible, to seek answers in societies whose thinking has never been modern (Latour 1994), and finding resonating echoes in its own philosophy, it is the same as finding

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in oneself answers to present issues. Thus, the main contribution of a monist thinking, which was indicated in Lévi-Strauss theory as well as long formulated in the history of Indian philosophy, is a reasoning that operates by what could be interpreted as progressive transformations, rather than one of fixed opposition pairs. For Indian philosophy, and although it is referred here in particular ¯ to the strand of Tantra Yoga Ananda M¯arga this can be generalized to all non-dualist philosophies (advaita), all phenomenological beings are splits of the same consciousness (Brahman). That is, it is from the body of this consciousness that different forms emerge successively, each one being a partial transformation from its previous. This principle of wholeness is not a static principle, just as the principle of structure is not. Its way of being is one of constant transformations, an eternal disguise in appearances, as set ¯ ¯ forth in Ananda M¯arga’s book of aphorisms, the Ananda S¯utram . (Sarkar 1992): 2.14:Brahman is the absolute truth, the universe is also a truth, but relative [Brahma satyam apeks.ikam] . jagadapi satyam¯

The principle of totality that constitutes all beings, and from which all beings derive, Brahman, is thus understood as the only invariance between them, that is, the absolute truth (satya), that which does not undergo any metamorphosis. To state that Brahman is unchanging (aparin.¯ am¯ı) it must also be stated that there are entities that are not, that go through transformations (Sarkar 1980). It is propagated by this philosophy that is by the change of forms in other things that Brahman’s immutability can be located (Sarkar 1980). Thereby, the manifest universe is a relative truth (¯ apeks.ika satya) comparatively, being subjected to constant change the beings appear to be unchanging, but suffers the variations of its group of transformations, that is, the relations of time, space and person (Sarkar 1955). The structuralist notion of transformation compared to the Indian philosophical notion of metamorphosis of consciousness also presupposes something that remains, a structure that can be revealed, through a coordinate system to be found by the invariants. The invariants of structuralism are reducible to a limited number of forms, of patterns. The invariant of Indian philosophy is only one, the One, the monistic consciousness pervasive in all forms (Brahman). As well as the clarity provided by the structuralism that the phenomenon that is being observed

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stems from an already known pattern, the observer based on Indian philosophy is just as sure. The structuralist and Goethean conclusion was drawn by observation of the natural world and could accuse Indian philosophy of not doing the same. Both are, however, constructions that could be called “philosophies of nature,” somewhat as conceptualized by Peter Harrison (2007), without necessarily locating them in the historically constructed categories science or religion. The method of constructing the philosophical theory of the Indian strands of thought is based on constant observation, discussion, refutation and restructuring of its theories, being a world categorization system that privileges direct experience as proof. Like the student learns a set of theories from his teachers and is indicated to do experiments to prove them himself, the Indian monist theory indicates a set of practices for its realization. These methods are of different orders, from a rationalistic analysis to a bodily practice, these are comprehensive methodologies to attest a continuity between levels. This scope is intended as proof of itself, for whether there is a monist principle that permeates all things it can necessarily be found in any instance. The discovery of these immanent structures in the world presupposes the anteriority of something to the men, being an assertion against the anthropocentrism of western philosophy, and can be an opening to the “philosophies of meaning.” A pragmatic seeking in the material world, in the phenomena that is known as external to the human mind, becomes a basis of explaining how the mind works. We can call this a pragmatic spirituality, since it is possible to derive from worldly objects the spiritualist logic; a search for sense of something that transcends one’s own experience. The structuralist method of knowledge thus allows us a first step; that of the decentralization of the ego. It’s not the human mind in its omnipotence that creates itself from itself. It creates shapes to itself from predetermined patterns. In a second step, the structuralist method allows us an openness to spirituality because it states that these predetermined patterns follow the same form, that they follow a homomorphism despite its changes, that is an invariance that can be pursued. The complement of Indian soteriological philosophy is that this invariance is only one, the substrate of all beings. This naturalistic method supposes a pre-existence of structures in the world, supposes a world anteriority to theory, being thus a pragmatic method. Consciousness (Brahman) or the minimal elementary forms are a fact. This does not definitively solve the problem of technique; it merely

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places a shared foundation between the levels of knowledge. The theory of invariance thus allows the assertion of a homogeneous continuity between human beings among themselves and among beings in general, thus opposing to both the absolute cultural relativism and to speciesism, in which there is no shared ground. What the monism of forms indicates is that while diversity is a datum, due changes being the fundamental laws of the substance, equality is also a datum to be considered, which precedes diversity. This theoretical factual equality also opens the way for the possibility of an ethic. I argue in this chapter, therefore, the methodological relevance of similarity, given the weight placed on the study of difference in the researches on otherness, based on both Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism and Indian philosophical monism as inspiration.

Notes i. This is a free translation by me of the Portuguese version. ii. Petitot thus translates Goethe’s originally in German: “Gestaltungslehre ist Verwandlungslehre”, but another possible translation would be: “The learning of forms is the learning of transformations.” For the word lehre refers to theory, but in a more dynamic way it can be seen as something that can be learned (contribution from my friend and philosopher, Alexandre Scoqui). iii. This is a free translation by me of the Portuguese version.

References Almeida, Mauro W.B. 1999. Simetria e entropia: sobre a noção de estrutura de Lévi-Strauss. São Paulo: Revista de Antropologia, vol. 42, no. 1–2. Available from: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid= S0034-77011999000100010&lng=en&nrm=iso. Accessed on November 14, 2013. Descola, Phillippe. 2011. As duas naturezas de Lévi-Strauss. Sociologia & Antropologia 1 (2): 35–51. Harrison, Peter. 2007. “‘Ciência’ e ‘Religião’: construindo os limites.” In Rever(Revista de Estudos da Religião), 1–33. Março: PUCSP. Latour, Bruno. 1994. Jamais fomos modernos: ensaio de Antropologia simétrica. Rio de Janeiro: Ed.34. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1969. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon Press. ———. 1990. De perto e de Longe. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira.

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———. 1993. “Jean-Jacques Rousseau, fundador das ciências do homem.” In Antropologia Estrutural II . Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro. ———. 2003. O Totemismo Hoje. Lisboa: Edições 70. ———. 2004. A lição de sabedoria das vacas loucas. Novos Estudos Cebrap 70: 79–84. Petitot, Jean. 2009. “Morphology and Structural Aesthetics: From Goethe to Lévi-Strauss.” In The Cambridge Companion to Lévi-Strauss, ed. Boris Wiseman (org.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sarkar, Prabhat Ranjan. 1955. Subhá´sita Samgraha. ´ vol. 1–24. Electronic Edition 2009, version 7.5. ———. 1959. Idea and Ideology. Electronic Edition 2009, versão 7.5. ———. 1980. Namámi Kr´snasundaram. ´ Electronic Edition 2009, versão 7.5. ———. 1992. Ánanda Sútram. Electronic Edition 2009, versão 7.5. Wiseman, Boris. 2009. “Structure and Sensation.” In The Cambridge Companion to Lévi-Strauss, ed. Boris Wiseman (org.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 13

Action, Language, Art, and Mysticism as Reflection-Levels of an Alternative Semiotics and the Spiritual Perspective of a Value-Levels-Democracy Johannes Heinrichs

Semiotics and Action Theory Semiotics is the doctrine of signs. Human signs (in difference to natural signs) are philosophically (epistemologically) no “first data,” but created by and embedded in actions. But we must distinguish actions of the mind (sense-activities) from real actions. In the wake of Kant’s “Copernicanian revolution,” actions of the mind (“Handlungen des Verstandes,” of which he speaks several times in his Critique of Pure Reason) have become the principle of modern philosophy, which is essentially reflection on what is implied in actions of the mind. Charles S. Peirce, one of the founders of semiotics as a new discipline, was inspired by that action theory of the mind. Also for the author of this essay actions of the mind are the issue of a philosophical semiotics,

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in difference to special empirical and sometimes only fashionable kinds of semiotics. But what about real actions in relation to those “mere” actions of the mind? They undoubtedly became the principle of contemporary sociology and social philosophy. It is not the place here to deal largely about the origin of both of these two disciplines (the former one more empirical, the latter one more theoretical) in that very “Copernicanian revolution” and in the development of philosophy (in so-called German idealism, which essentially was a theory of human self-reflection) toward an action-theoretical and relational way of thinking. At any rate, it is a consequence of that action-theoretical and relation-theoretical departure of Kant’s “transcendental” turn that with Fichte, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx philosophy became theory of human actions in general and social actions in particular, opening the door as well to empirical sociology as to the semiotics as that of Peirce. In spite of that evident development you will rarely find a clear definition of real actions in difference to actions of the mind. But such a demarcation is needed if we want clarify the relation between semiotics and social theory as well as a clear concept of pragmatics. With the great founders of American “pragmatism” like Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and William James in the field of psychology, pragmatisme was always methodically more than the “philosophical doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests” (Oxford Illustrated Dictionary. 1984. Oxford University Press; cf. F.C.S. Schiller 1929). Even Max Weber, known for his precise definitions, in contrast to most contemporary sociologists, gives only a definition of social actions (“orientation on the behavior of others,” §1 of his Economy and Society, Weber Weber 1978), but no general definition of actions, in difference to “mere” activity of the mind. Therefore in Handlungen (Heinrichs 2007), I defined real actions as those human activities which change something in reality. The main division of actions results then from the sense-elementsi which constitute all general kinds of reality and of human action-situations (Fig. 13.1). According to these four general sense-elements, we can distinguish four main types of human action: 1. Objective-physical actions 2. Inner-subjective actions (e.g. decisions) 3. Social actions (as Weber defined them) 4. Expression-actions

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Fig. 13.1 The sense-elements which are present in every mental activity and action-situation

Here is not the place to enumerate or even to explain all subtypes of action which fall under these main types. The subdivision goes to 44 = 256 subtypes! It may be sufficient just to understand the method of the reflection-logical division. This method is called dialectical subsumption: the repeated division of the subdivisions by the main types. The whole is, so to speak, subordinated and “holographically” present in every division. Contemporary mathematics speaks of “fractal” division. But it is an old method of “harmonic thinking,” which can be found in Indian and Western astrology, in the Chinese I Ching and in many old scriptures, in Plato, and in Hegel. In an implicit manner, you find it also in Sri Aurobindo’s main-works. What sometimes seems simple repetition, is mostly analogous, modified “repetition” on a new level. Today such an integral systemic method is unknown or rejected as nearly all systematics in Western philosophy, in the wake of so-called language analysis. After the apparent break down of German idealism, the mainstream

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of Western philosophy does not dare to systematically improve Hegel’s thinking and method by a new reflection logic,ii but prefers miniatures or witty arbitrariness. This method is not a purely deductive one. The distinction of “induction” (1) and “deduction” (2) is not at all complete. It must be completed by “reconstruction” (3) which means a methodical dialogue of conceptual elements and experience. Reconstruction is the leading method in Integral Philosophy. This one must be completed by the method of systemic design (4), which means to find the logical place of each concept and division in an integral architecture of thought. Only by distinguishing and disposing of all these basic methods can you speak of integral thinking. The result of the method of reconstruction and systemic design in the field of action theory can be called a periodic system of actions, in analogy to the known periodic system of chemical elements (Heinrichs 2007). Mankind has succeeded in systemizing the chemical elements and (approximately) the world of fauna and flora—but not an agreement on its own action-types. That makes communication about them rather difficult and often confusing! But is such an action theory part of semiotics, as it was suggested in the above headline “Semiotics and Action Theory”? For the following hypothesis, it is essential to look on actions, even in the proper sense of real actions, as semiotic processes. Signs in general are, according to the traditional understanding, entities which stand for something other what they indicate or “signalize.” In every action, there is the dialectical duality of process (activity) and content, dialectical in the sense of their inseparability in spite of their opposition. These two dialectical elements of every intentional action can be understood as being signs for one another: The respective content stands for the activity in which it is content; the activity signals a content, an intention by which it is moved.

The Hypothesis of Four Great Semiotic Levels The big hypothesis which binds the following paragraphs together can now be illustrated. If all semiotic processes in the human sphere are activities or actions in the broad sense of actions of the mind, real actions in the defined sense are the first level of those. On the same level are to be placed the passive counterparts of actions, the basic self-experiences (Erleben).iii Both the active as the passive form of sense-activities have the implicit self -reflection which is constitutive for human self-consciousness.

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This very fundamental point cannot be discussed here largely (see for that Heinrichs 2018, chap. 1). But there are higher reflected levels of mental activities. The following scheme must be read from below, according to the great reflection-levels of semiotic processes (Fig. 13.2). The proof of this very comprehensive and integral view is given step by step in the following outline of the corresponding chapters of the book Integral Philosophy (Heinrichs 2018) which in its turn is a summary of a series of books on Action and Social System, Language and Art, and Spirituality. Here we have the privilege of overview without proving each step in detail. What is possible and the most important at first, is to show the transition from the sphere of actions into the sphere of language. This transition is made by sign-actions, more specifically by meta-signs. Sign-action belongs to the fourth big sphere of expression-actions (see above). An expressionaction is, e.g., waving for farewell. It becomes a sign-action, if the vague meaning of this waving gets a clearly defined meaning; e.g., if the waving in traffic means a very specific intention of action. (The waving by hand can be replaced by lights, by indicators. These are technical substitutes of

Fig. 13.2 The hierarchy of semiotic levels or dimensions. A Actions resp. basic self-experience. B Language as meta-action (essentially an action of mind). C Arts as meta-languages. D Mystic as meta-art, where action is lifted in pure receptivity

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human actions.) A sign-action is a class of expression-actions with welldefined meanings. These sign-actions can be regulated by meta-signs, e.g., if a policeman indicates that certain rules are changed. This policeman can eventually be made of cardboard. It is a meta-sign saying that signs have changed. Now, language is a system of signs which regulates itself, in the very process of speaking, by its own meta-signs, the grammatical rules. This is a semiotic definition of language as self -regulating meta-action! This definition enables one, by the way, to distinguish clearly the astonishing animal “languages” from human language. Only a self-conscious being can develop self-regulating action-rules. (The animals have consciousness, but not self-consciousness with a full implicit self-reflection and the resulting possibility of self-regulation.)

A New Deal of Linguistics and Philosophy: Reflection-Logical Universal Deep Structures In current language theory, such a semiotic definition does not exist. So the relation between actions and language is rather obscure in the contemporary “discourse,” as even the meaning of “discourse” is obscure: Is it ratio discursiva = argumentation or discourse in the general sense of the English language? There are theorists of “discourse-theory” of society and of discourse-ethics (like J. Habermas) which play more or less consciously with this ambiguity. But here we have to deal with another important ambiguity, that of “pragmatics.” It is right that all actual language-use is action, because it is an interpersonal action. But this does not mean that language as a whole is only one special kind of action, as it appears in most books on “pragmatics.” Language is meta-action. That means that there are dimensions of language which are not real actions —even if all dimensions are the result of human activity (actions of the mind) and should be analyzed as such. But psychic activity and real actions are not the same, as our above definition of action states clear. Real action must change anything, and language changes only in the interpersonal dimension of speech acts. What is meant by the dimensions of language, which are not action, but mere mind activity, may become clearer by the following Fig. 13.3. From the perspective of action, speaking is a special action type: social action by sign-acting. From the perspective of language, real action is only

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Fig. 13.3 The overlap between action and language

one of its constant dimensions. Only this is what can correctly called pragmatic dimension of language, i.e., language as interpersonal action. In spite of the boom of linguistic pragmatics, I do not know any publication, where this relation between real action and language is sufficiently clarified. Mostly language is seen as just one type of (social) action. So the relation between language and action and the nature of language remains unclear—as does most speaking of “pragmatics.” Does it deal with actions of the mind, what is the general standard of post-Kantian thinking and what is necessary for an understanding of all dimensions of language—or does it refer to real actions, which is only one aspect of language, the pragmatic one in the sense of interpersonal action? This definition of “pragmatic dimension” as interpersonal action (speech act in this sense) is very important because it differs essentially from that of Charles Morris, who has the merit of having first introduced the so-called semiotic dimensions, as there are, in his eyes, the syntactic, pragmatic and semantic dimensions (Morris 1937). His concept of the pragmatic dimension needs correction, with him and his many followers which are blind on this eye (see the enormous and influential compendium of Posner 2003). Being a behavioristic psychologist, Morris

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did not distinguish psychic activities from proper actions. Only in the interpersonal dimension is language real action! Only this deserves the name “pragmatic dimension,” because in the wider sense of mind activity all the above linguistic dimensions are pragmatic and must be understood as actions of the mind! Due to his too wide and unspecifical concept of pragmatics, Morris and his followers do not know a sigmatic dimension,iv the primary relation between signs and objects, and confuses this relation with the semantic dimension, which means the disposition of the sign-user (subject) on already established language-signs. But these differences become only visible from the reflection-logical point of view which is leading here. We can define the semiotic dimension of language in analogy to the main types of actions: Main types of action → semiotic dimensions of language objective-physical → sigmatic: object-related introduction of words inner-subjective → semantic: subjective disposing of known words inter-subjective → pragmatic: speaking as interpersonal acting expression → syntax: connection of the word-signs The main function of the sigmatic dimension is the introduction of wordmeanings, like a child learns them by showing, also in an illustrated book. Here is the first place of the so-called language games of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The main function of the semantic dimension is word-memory and the use of words for predications. Instead of an illustrated book for children, a normal dictionary is sufficient which explains unknown words with known words. The function of the pragmatic dimension is acting by speaking (also by writing). Here we can also speak of “language games,” but in a very different understanding from the introduction-games, what Wittgenstein confused (compare Philosophical Investigations §7 with §23). It is like confusing car-production with car-driving! Can we call both activities “use of cars”? This confusion of two totally different meanings of “language games” is comparable to that of Morris’ confusion of behavioristic psychology of the sigmatic dimension with interpersonal speech acts, both called “pragmatic”. Due to this confusion, the relation of semiotics (the

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line Peirce and Morris) to speech act theory (the line Wittgenstein, J. Austin, J. Searle) was longtime not seen. The function of the syntactical dimension is the connection between the primary signs, which connection was correctly defined by Morris as syntactical, and thus the self-regulation of language by meta-signs (the latter one not being in the scope of Morris). To each of these four dimensions, the author has written proper books (5 tomes under the title Sprache, because the fourth dimension, the syntax, results in a meta-syntax of stylistic figures which are dealt with in a proper tome). There is everywhere an impressive reflection-logical order, for example in the semantics of word-classes and predication types, also in the types of verbal actions (pragmatic). There is also a hidden universal syntax in the languages of the world. Sri Aurobindo spoke of a common original language of mankind (Aurobindo 1971: 550s). To the author’s mind, however, this common language is not so much founded in sounds and word-roots, it is rather founded in the common reflection-logical structures, which are the same anywhere. Those are nevertheless deeply hidden under the innumerable varieties of the single mother languages. A really fruitful comparison of languages will be possible only by going back to the common structures and discovering how they are varied. Actual linguistics sees only the varieties and hasn’t any idea of the deep structures, with the prominent exception of Noam Chomsky, for whom the common deep structures (due to which a child can learn “the” language so quickly) are however of a genetic nature. To my mind, they are not more of genetic nature than mathematical laws are a matter of genes. Those common deep structures are rather founded in the common reflection logic of human mind. In the eyes of the author, language and languages constitute a whole which is gripped so quickly by children because all languages are nothing else but the interpersonal expression-system of human self -conscience itself : All general linguistic structures cannot be deduced, but reconstructed from this sole source! These common structures can only be found by an integral reflection logic, not by starting with the varieties of any given language. What nowadays is called “language analysis” refers only to the storage of single mother languages. This is an endless as well as mostly fruitless “business” (providing academic prestige and money). Instead of linguistic business as usual, we need integral reflection departing from the fundamental sense-structures, as very shortly outlined here.

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Art: The Meta-Language Beyond the Languages As already mentioned above, the integral, reflection-logical languagetheory is completed by a stylistic of tropes, which is nothing else than a meta-syntax: qualitatively and quantitatively beyond the boundaries of normal phrase syntax. In difference to idioms, linguistic tropes are figurative ways of using the words, which follow unconsciously, yet paradoxically, a logical order. Here again we meet four reflexive levels: 1. Figures of repetition: from simple iterations of sounds or meanings to syntactical parallelism and chiasmus, which is a crossing of words: “The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon” (K. Marx, Introduction into the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right). 2. Figures of analogy: metaphors, etc. “weapon of criticism” is also a metaphor (a short comparison), whereas “criticism of the weapon” constitutes a metonymy, namely the expansion of the concept “criticism.” Metaphors, metonymies, symbols, and allegories are the main types of the analogy-figures. 3. Figures of play with truth: i.e., understatement/exaggeration, euphemism/emphasis, irony/joke, undercover statements, that uses a different grammatical form, e.g., a question for a strong statement. 4. Word plays in the formal sense: “For example, Joyce’s phrase ‘they were young and easily freudened’ clearly implies the more conventional ‘they were young and easily frightened;’ however, the former also makes an apt pun on the names of two famous psychoanalysts, Jung and Freud” (see Wikipedia, Wordplay). Also in this field of style-figures the logic of reflection is proving its fertility in sorting not only the traditional figures, but even of detecting and naming many unknown ones. These figures are far from being only a matter of traditional rhetoric. They are essential for modern literature as well as for publicity. Even if their analysis belongs to an integral language theory, they constitute also the transition from ordinary language to literal language and to art in general. It is the sense-generating power of style-figures and other stylefeatures, that makes the inner fertility of form for the content, thus determining its artistic value. It is this sense-generating quality of form

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that transcends the sphere of “simple” or even rhetorical language, transforming it into art. This transition is as big as that from action to the meta-action of language, because it is a meta-language which is found in all the arts. Pantomime is an illuminating example: Why does the pantomimic let away the words? Because he will show another level of expression beyond the words. All art has this pantomimic character, as all art presupposes language, and for transcending it, “we need art, not to go broke on the truth”—of mere language (F. Nietzsche). The arts form a new semiotic level of sense-transportation, higher than language. Juri Lotman spoke rightly of a secondary language (Lotman 1990) without analyzing the reflexive relation between language and arts. The meta-language of art is not a meta-language in the linguistic sense of speaking about an object-language. This one is only a form of subsequent reflection. But art constitutes an inner, higher form of lived reflection. No wonder the arts can be sorted in subsequent reflection through a logical manner. The following distinctions of the main kinds of art are wellknown, but not in their reflection-theoretical order, not to speak of the resulting subdivisions, according to the method of dialectical subsumption. These subdivisions can also not be indicated in this context, as well as the combinatorial or mixed forms, e.g., the opera as combination of music, language art (sometimes) and moving art. 1. Visual arts, such as drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, and garden art. Their common denominator is object-shaping or creation of sign-objects. Their medium of expression is stationary objects. 2. Moving arts, such as dance or mime, scenic representations without language, hang gliding, animal games (where not only a sportive or acrobatic intention is leading). The common medium of expression in these arts is not only human movement but any movement at all, the sign or analogy for liveliness, for spirit-led life. 3. Literature (language art): For this, it is most evident that it internally requires the common language. There is no doubt that every poet uses an ordinary, everyday language as his “material” and is shaping this material in a special way. Just this shaping is therefore the meta-language syntax, or link art. (Remember: Syntax is a semiotic view of the dimension of connection between signs). Language art logically presupposes the moving arts, as in reflexive division each

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level presupposes the previous one. As was previously mentioned, the vocal language must be understood as acoustic gestures of the tongue, accompanied by multiple motion gestures. On the other hand, the language arts become music, first by the singing of words. 4. Music is sound design, no longer bound to standardized semantic meanings, which is singing of words still. Not yet in the so-called program music, but finally in absolute music, do language and semantics separate. Music becomes the syntactically designed silence in relation to words, an evocative silence totally beyond the words. Music is shaped silence beyond the words in crafted relationship to the richness of sound elements in time and space. Music is the most syntactical art. All elements, such as the relationships of the pitch, the harmony, and rhythm, are nothing more than laws of relations: syntax. Seen or heard as absolute music, it has no semantics of its own. Its semantics exist mainly through connection with the language in the vocals, except in the case of onomatopoetic program music. Concluding this paragraph on art, we should realize that the understanding of art as meta-language does not recur in the concept of beauty which is traditionally firmly associated with art, even with Sri Aurobindo in his Letters on Art, and in The Future Poetry. To this reference Aurobindo belongs, with all his enormous knowledge of contemporary and ancient literature, still to a generation for which the arts are automatically Fine Arts, that means, defined by beauty. Also the art-theories of Kant, Hegel, and all nineteenth-century thinkers could not leave this frame, by a lack of this semiotic conception of the arts. Modern art has practically shown that the area of beauty is transgressed by the arts—even if the theoretical foundation of this step was not yet clear. For a reflective theoretical concept of art, it is not beauty alone which defines it but the power of expression. The concept of expression is wider than beauty alone, and it corresponds better to the understanding of art as a meta-language. Evidently, this must not always be beautiful, but expressive—powerful in the expression of all reality which touches the humans, and that is just All, including the fascinating as well as the terrifying Infinite.

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Mysticism and Spiritual Philosophy: Making the Infinity-Relation Explicit In the beginning the hypothesis of four great semiotic levels has been proposed: action—language as meta-action—art as meta-language— mysticism as meta-art. A structural concept of mysticism is unusual, even unknown hitherto. It results by analogy, more specifically by the fact that the level of art is analogous to the level of communication in the interpersonal relations (which I will propose here afterward in the context of democracy-development), and that we must ask for a conclusion of that leveling. This conclusion is only given if the unilaterality of action is totally overcome. It is already lifted on the language level, by the reciprocal receptivity of the whole language system. On the art level, the artist must be still more receptive to what there is to express, aware of its technical means—and when what we call “inspiration” arises, to what touches mystic receptivity. Hence, it must be underlined that “mysticism” has not the meaning of a psychic attitude or a cultural area, but a precise action-theoretical signification (In German “Mystik,” not “Mystizismus”!). The borders between art and spiritual experience were always very open. In pre-modern times, there was mostly sacral art which was not only imposed by religious institutions but came from the neighborhood of art and mysticism. Only the modern differentiations (of religion and its basic universal values from culture as conditional and regional values, both from politics and all that from economics) led to our modern concept of autonomous art. If this one is spiritual nevertheless by the free expression of the artists, it is all the more credulous. The central mystic phenomenon is the experience that the infinite medium of Sense becomes active itself , whereas the part of the human subject is pure receptivity. This insight provides a structural understanding of mysticism, which is independent of any specific religious and denominational contents! Paradoxically, this receptivity is the most “ambitious” achievement of the human individual. It is exactly the same paradox which we find in Aurobindo’s concept of “Supramental”! This part must be trained anyhow, though it goes beyond the proper human faculties. Often the mystic does not know how he/she merits this grace, maybe more in the course of his reincarnations (if we adopt this hypothesis here) than in his actual life. Anyway, this phenomenon is visible in all history of religions,

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the real origin and core of which is always mystical, as well as in the life of many of us. Christians name this the experience of “grace,” in spite of the fact that grace is said not to be a matter of experience in official theology. But here we speak about mystical experience. Types of mystic result from the different empirical elements, which serve as expression-media of the self-revelation of the infinite Sense. Evidently, these empirical elements correspond to the known sense-elements: 1. Objectivity or nature: Many people have the mystical experience of the Divine in nature, more or less clearly, more or less continuously. There are also poets in most languages, who are nature-mystics and have the additional artistic gift to bring their experiences into language, although there is a tension between the experience of the shapeless Divine and the shaping in words of literature. The same applies to other arts. 2. Subjectivity: The inner of the subject is itself the medium of mystical experience. This form of mystic self-contemplation is fundamental for most of the Eastern religions. In the West it was just the impulse of the philosophy of self-reflection, which made the romantic poet Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), student of J. G. Fichte, exclaim: “We dream of traveling through space: is the universe not in us? We do not know the depth of our mind. The mysterious path goes inward.” Most forms of meditation and yoga will be helpful to go this way inward. It is the inner self-reflection in the activity-experience of the subject which is the starting point of Integral Philosophy, and what is sought in meditation, possibly on higher levels. At any rate, the mystical experience is “nothing but” an increase of that elementary experience of self-awareness, the high level of lived reflection. 3. Community-experience is another field of mystical experience. The so-called revelation-religions of the West (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are not to understand (in their dynamism and dangers of power degeneration) without the intense community-experience at their origin, as well as in their historical development. What is said about self-awareness before, applies here also, but with the mirroring of the Medium of a community. 4. The sign mystic or medial mystic uses as sign-figures: runes, image writing, letter writing, secret emblems, cards, rites, and many symbols, which shall evoke messages of the invisible Divine or its

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helpers. The ancient reading of fate or of the will of the gods from the bird’s flight or entrails belong here. Today, the traditional Tarot cards or even Scat cards can become, for some gifted clairvoyants, the medium of their messages, which are only real, if there is mystical experience. Those media are never simple techniques for the use of everybody! The starry sky is one of the oldest natural sign systems, requiring interpretation. The sign mystic can easily degrade to sign magic, i.e. an effort, using characters not only to understand the reality, but to arbitrarily change, to manipulate. When it comes to the question of how to understand the Divine—is it a “personal God” or the pantheistic Universe?—our way of thinking provides an answer, in all humility and firmness. Can this universe of selfreflexive structures, which emerge in the human self-conscience, can it be without proper self-reflection or self-reference? Would the evolution of nature to human self-conscience be possible without an underlying self-reference, and that means self-conscience? The sober philosopher, undisturbed by so many religious and anti-religious prejudices, says firmly: no, that would be impossible! At the same time, he will be humble, because that insight will remain a mere postulate, as long as there is no proper experience. And this experience can only be the mystical one. It is more or less available to everybody, not only to the “professional” mystic. Everybody is a mystic (to modify a famous dictum of the German artist Joseph Beuys: “Everyone is an artist”). There is only the question in which grade and clarity. As to the mystic, everyone has that relation to the Infinite which we called the medium of Sense. Only the clarity and explicitness of that consciousness is very different. It is one task of philosophy to help the implicit consciousness become clearer in going the way of theoretical explicitness. But there are other ways to make the implicit infinity-relation explicit than theoretical reflection, among them yoga and all that we call spirituality. Spirituality comprises all ways to make the implicit infinity-relation of the human being more explicit. Explicit mystic is more than one of the many ways, it is the accomplishment of that (non-theoretical) explicitness. The formula of philosophical reflection-theory “Self-conscience of the Universe” can be an important help on the spiritual way. It shows the way between a traditional Theism of a “personal” God and a pantheism which is lacking just the possibility to address the Divine. The discourse

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of a “personal” God remains, as long a rather childish anthropomorphism as, firstly, “person” in general is not understood as the structure of selfreference (self-conscience) and as, secondly, this notion is not primarily related to the universe, namely as its very self-reflection. In a less conceptual manner, that is the philosophical understanding, e.g., of the Gospel of St. John: The Logos was with God and all that is made is made of Him (Jo 1, 1–3). There is no “creation out of nothing,” only one out of the Logos—that is a remarkable difference which was unfortunately not understood by traditional Christianity. Evidently, that “self-conscience of the universe” is the same as what Sri Aurobindo and the Mother address as “the Divine” and as Supermind. In this latter name, the relation to the universe as well as the distinction from it (and from a pure pantheism) is expressed. Therefore, it comes nearest to the formula “Self-conscience of the universe.” However, it is not easy to keep away any reification (objectification) for a “supreme being” above all others. The Self-conscience of the universe is not above all others, but the Innermost of a holographic universe, the most noble holographic mirror-points of which are the self-conscious, but finite human beings. Whether the Divine is manly or female (the Divine Mother, or Shakti), is a question of religious psychology and the reception of the Indian myths. Only if they are consciously taken as that (as is the case with Aurobindo and “the Divine Mother”), they are more than anthropomorphisms which today rather hinder on the spiritual way. Devotees of the Human Mother, Aurobindo’s collaborator, may be reminded by her own words: You must not confuse a religious teaching with a spiritual one. Religious teaching belongs to the past and halts progress. Spiritual teaching is the teaching of the future – it illumines the consciousness and prepares it for the future realisation. Spiritual teaching is above religions and strives towards a global Truth. It teaches us to enter into direct relations with the Divine.vi

What about belief? Must we believe, at least if we are not professional philosophers, but spiritual ones? The author distinguishes four kinds of belief in a reflexive order: 1. Belief as acceptance of doctrines on the authority of someone or an institution (the traditional belief, e.g., in Catholicism).

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2. Belief as total trust in the presupposed Deity (e.g., the Lutheran form). 3. Belief as being open for a message, which I can verify only in the long run. (“The belief comes from hearing,” Paul, Romans 10, 17.) 4. Belief as “courage to be” (Paul Tillich) and the courage to stand by one’s own peak experiences: the Sense-belief . Evidently, only the last two of these “beliefs” can be recommended by a philosopher and for a philosophical mind. For these forms, the traditional contradiction between belief and one’s own insight is totally overcome. More in the Western than in the Eastern and Indian world, it has always been but an instrument of institutional power plays. In the Eastern hemisphere, there was not so much a contradiction felt, but the need of critical thinking, the epistemologically scientific approach without traditional prejudices was less cultivated. We need that severe kind of approach today, in a world which is so much shaped by the sciences. It should be demonstrated in the above outlined philosophical semiotics that a spiritual mind has nothing to fear from such a scientific approach. To deny its severity and to declare any traditional doctrine a “science” without a modern epistemological fundamental means to create that appearing contradiction between belief and scientific thinking which worked for some centuries so destructively in the West.

The Model of a Value-Levels-Democracy It would be possible now to evaluate that semiotic approach for a general ontology, an orientation in the fields of “being,” and also for an ethical value reflection, as it is done in “Integral Philosophy” (Heinrichs 2018). But under the general title of this book, with the keywords Pragmatism, Spirituality, and Society, it seems adequate to add a short outline on the value-levels of society and an essentially further developed democracy, in the sense of a communicative and ontologically self-reflected society. This rather new view on democracy is based on the analogous reflection-levels as the semiotic levels dealt with in the above. The interpersonal reflection and its levels constitute even the original context of discovery for the four reflection-levels. It happens rarely, if at all, that the organization of our societies is dealt with as a general philosophical issue, or as one of fundamentally ontological and spiritual importance. (I do not speak of the traditional

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religious identification of religion and society which today has become fundamentalist!) “Political philosophy” seems a mere application, not a basic dimension of philosophy. This is due to the fact that most traditional philosophies are monologist in their departure. But if the interpersonal relation, the dialogue with other persons, is constitutive for a subject, there results a dialogical thinking which is expressed in the famous sentences of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), pupil of Hegel: “True dialectic is not the monologue of thinker with himself, but the dialogue between I and You.”- “The first object of man is man himself. The sense of nature (…) is a comparably future product. The other person is the bond between me and the world. I am and feel myself depending on the world, because I first feel myself dependent on other humans.”vii

In the interpersonal or social relation to the other persons, the reflection, which is so constitutive for self-consciousness, reaches a totally different dimension which Feuerbach didn’t still see as such: The interpersonal reflection becomes practical or pragmatic just by itself —that means really changing the interpersonal relations and changing the persons themselves. This practical or pragmatic character of social reflection has rarely been recognized and never been systematically analyzed. The social reflection is much more than a theoretical “exchange of perspectives.” There are four levels of interpersonal reflection, which constitute, in my eyes, even the basis of proving (the epistemological basis) of the fourfold semiotic dimensions dealt with aboveviii : 1. Instrumental action with reference to the other (and handling of the other), e.g., treatment by a doctor or pre-personal business, where the other is only seen in the context of things or of money.—In the look: I see the other person just as an object, for example, as an obstacle in traffic. 2. Strategic action takes into account the actions of the other for one’s own interests.—I see the other person as an entity which is looking himself/herself. I take her/him into account knowing that he may or certainly will take into account me and my behavior likewise. In traffic a very important new level compared with a simple obstacle on level 2. 3. Communicative action responds to the expectations and desires of the Other, not just with strategic intention, the track of self-interest

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(2), but for the Other’s own sake; called also “altruistic” (derived from “alter, the other”). This communicative approach does not mean a particular altruistic attitude, but that a reciprocity is recognized and somehow realized. The reciprocity of looking is the most basic pattern communication. It is a reciprocal and double reflection which works here: I reflect the Other in his ability to reflect me and vice versa. (This goes far beyond the objectification by the “regard” of the Other what J. P. Sartre speaks about as the basic character of social relation! This objectification belongs to level 1.) The subjective attitudes and acts become elements of that reciprocal recognition, which is qualified communication. Successful communication goes beyond any subjective attitudes! It is possible that a partner wants to stay in communication, and the other does not, or that the current communication ceases. Then only the individual’s more or less “altruistic” or strategic attitudes remain. 4. Meta-Communication means to take position to the communicative reciprocity, another reflexive step. This can be first realized in subjective acts of the individuals taking part in communication. But a new social reality becomes meta-communication by the reciprocity of that position taking. This means to create appointments or common norms of social behavior. Meta-communicative actions or attitudes and their resulting norms respond to the requirements and standards of social coexistence. Standards of behavior are mutually recognized, partly put again into question, and are more or less regulated anew: the everlasting process of social shaping of norms. The social action was “classically” defined by Max Weber as an “orientation on the actions of others.”ix If we think this orientation as practical reflection with the above leveling, the decisive structural constant is revealed: the four levels of social action. The reflection-levels shown above are the predominant components of social action. On the meta-communicative level, the interpersonal relation becomes a social system, dynamic and self-regulating with an ontological status.x Systemic thinking means then that the relations are no longer seen from the view-point of the individual actors, but from “above,” from the community as such. And now, we look at the same levels of personal interaction as system levels of a big community, as that of a state, and find differentiations which we all know well—but normally without systemic understanding (Fig. 13.4).

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Fig. 13.4 The house (Oikos) of society, organized in a state

The four great levels of any society are called subsystems. They are nothing else than the reflection-levels we know already from the direct interpersonal relation. The second division (subdivision) is given for understanding the method of fractal division and for illustrating the richness of the subsystems. On the political level 2, we could also insert (as is done in Heinrichs 2018, 2019) the formal distinctions of the so-called political powers, traditionally legislative, executive, and judiciary power. Within the executive power, we must distinguish, for logical as well as for practical reasons, the kind of executive, which has only to apply the existing laws, which is the administration in the proper sense (e.g., police, financial offices, etc.), from the political executive, which has the task and power to act and to decide for the community, which is the government. So we

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have not three but four powers or functions of the state in this logical succession: administrative (objective application), governmental (subjective power), legislative (inter-subjective, communicative consulting), and judiciary (meta-communicative control). We see that this division of powers must be applied on each system level. Therefore, it is already put at the right side of the house, in the graphic. (But it is not a multiplication of the four powers but only the respective applications of the four on each system level.) This is the first theory of social systems which is directly derived from the nature of the individual and the interpersonal relations! There can be no satisfying social system theory which doesn’t take fully into account the constitutive principle of social reflection.xi Now let us briefly draw the conclusions for an integral theory of democracy. 1. In our existing democracies, the whole system is governed from below, from the economic sphere and from a “capitalist” money-system, which is quite dubious. Even if this money-system was in order, the governing of the system from below (“money rules the world”) cannot be accepted. Everybody knows that, but nobody knows how to change it—except many fanatics of another money-system. Even if they are right in their economic field, they are very wrong from an integral point of view. The whole of a society cannot be changed from the economic field alone! To try that means to repeat the historical mistakes of Marxists as well as of liberals and neo-liberals. 2. In our existing democracies around the world, the political parties are decisive. These parties bundle all problems (basic values of culture, foreign issues, inner politics, and the economy) and are chosen by their electors for all this—that means for nothing. Apart from many other weaknesses of the parliamentary system, these seem to be the most general and crucial ones. Now, the remedy of these weaknesses is not at all the abolishment (or a further weakening) of parliament (e.g., by direct democracy of plebiscites, which is either only an additional element or totally inept for a big state), but on the very contrary, the further development and inner synthesis of direct and parliamentary democracy. Let us briefly come to serious solutions which follow logically and rather simply from the above system analysis.

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Ad 1: Governing from above, from the basic values instead of from below is possible by the differentiation of the parliament according to the system levels. That means four chambers of the parliaments with a hierarchical legislation-power. Ad 2: The representatives must be elected for each chamber independently. In this way, the elections become at the same time matter-decisions. The parties (federations of candidates with the same aims) become matterspecific parties instead of the traditional power-parties which claim to cover all issues.

The decisions of the upper parliaments are binding for the lower ones. The existing second chambers, the House of Lords, the Senate, or the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), could constitute the third level, safeguarding the cultural diversity of the partial states (Fig. 13.5). There must also be a circular feedback from the “lower” chambers to the upper ones. This can easily be provided by several parliamentary “lectures” in which the representatives of each chamber can publicly give their statements to any legislative project. Taking into account the vote of the other chambers—as well as that of extra-parliamentarian social groups—contains the circular feedback. If a clear majority of all three other chambers presents converging concerns against a bill, it would be factually as well as tactically unwise to ignore these concerns, even if by the hierarchical point of view this would be

Fig. 13.5 The hierarchic aspect of the partial parliaments, framework legislation. 4 = basic value chamber, 3 = culture chamber, 2 = chamber of politics, 1 = chamber of economics

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legal. So the votes of the chambers 1 and 2 undoubtedly have influence on the deputies in chambers 3 and 4 and vice versa. As the members of parliament must all four years (for example) face re-election, although not all at the same time, there is a feedback-circuit (Fig. 13.6). There are many practical questions concerning the rhythm of independent elections for each chamber, concerning the number of parliamentarians (which must not increase, on the contrary!), and concerning a possible corresponding division of the government and the administration in the proper sense, etc. The practical main question is: How to win the minds and hearts of people, especially the members of the political and economic class? Besides an already rather numerous agreement among “normal” people, there must be forerunners among the elite, people of influence, which have not only the intellectual capacity to recognize the unique value of this model, but above all the spiritual drive or motivation to stand for it. Still more than for truth-finding alone, it needs spiritual qualities for the realization of truth and justice. For there are too many privileged circles which are against such a big change, even though it would be for the wealth of all. It may be allowed to quote Alice A. Bailey responding to her Tibetan Master before World War II (1936): “Take for instance the emergence into manifestation of the egoic ray of the German nation. Its lower expression is that of architectural construction and can be seen at this time making its presence felt in the new and modern style in building. Its higher expression is not yet to be noted, but Germany some day will give out to the world a sound form of hierarchical government.”xii

Fig. 13.6 The circular aspect of the differentiated parliamentary system

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It may also be allowed to remark that India has a special responsibility and perhaps ability for the installment of a fourfold value-democracy, because the caste system seems to be a degenerated or perverted version of what the old seers intuitively intended without formulating it enough in rational terms: a value-based society. India is the biggest democracy in the world and the most adaptable (with many changes of Constitution). It could become the most developed one, upon its philosophical and spiritual fundaments, perhaps together with Germany out of whose reflection-theoretical tradition (with the so-called German idealism) the above model stems from. By the way: It would be false to speak of a Platonic “republic of philosophers.” The role of philosophy is only to detect the basic structures which enable the participation of everybody in the concrete decisionmaking. Before everybody can participate, a philosophical and at the same time spiritual elite must go ahead. Democracy must be gripped as a spiritual task, as part of an integral spirituality in the sense of Sri Aurobindo. There can be no Integral Philosophy which doesn’t include a whole philosophy of society and democracy, as it must include a psychology.

The Indispensable Spiritual Dimension of Integral Democratic Institutions But unfortunately and paradoxically, Sri Aurobindo does not yet provide such a social philosophy (in spite of his spiritual and intuitive way of speaking of the “soul of nations”), which today must be a structural and systemic-ontological theory of the social system. There is the important difference of the individual perspective or reference where individual ethics and spirituality play their evident traditional roles, and the collective or systemic perspective or reference where the ethic and spirituality are the matter of intelligent institutions what is not yet recognized. That is this last paragraph about. When Ananta Kumar Giri discusses the “discourse ethics” of Jürgen Habermas in his important article, “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: From Discourse Ethics to Spiritual Transformations ” (Giri 2012), he is totally right to criticize that discourse in the sense of rational argumentation is much too narrow. To my mind, he even goes not far enough in his critique. Discourse ethics is firstly not open for the emotional values—and most cultural values of the above level 3 are matter of emotional and intuitive, not only rational cognition. Therefore,

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Habermas has little understanding for cultural and national values which are not universal as those of a universalistic ethic. Therefore, my critique concerning a reciprocal “hospitality of cultures” (Heinrichs 2017) which the moralizing universalist Habermas doesn’t recognize at all in its importance. But Giri’s objection concerns mainly the basic values (level 4 in the above) and Habermas’ rationalism in the field of morality, which rationalism results in his eyes from a lack of spirituality. Nevertheless we can distinguish moral and spiritual values. Here it is Sri Aurobindo, who is right to emphasize the superiority of spiritual over moral values (as it is implied also in Fig. 13.4): Morality is a question of man’s mind and vitality, it belongs to a lower plane of consciousness. A spiritual life therefore cannot be founded on a moral basis, it must be founded on a spiritual basis. This does not mean that a spiritual man must be immoral – as if there were no other law of conduct than the moral. The law of action of the spiritual consciousness is higher, not lower than the moral – it is founded on union with the Divine and living in the Divine Consciousness and its action is founded of the exuberance of the obedience to the Divine Will.xiii

Even if I strongly agree with Giri’s critique of Habermas’ “linguistification of the sacred” (Giri 2012: 83), which is part of the so-called linguistic turn and its general inherent rationalism (as if language would comprise all human cognition!), I have a certain reservation against Giri’s (and even Sri Aurobindo’s) opposition of rationality and spirituality because even the spiritual processes or actions of the mind have their structural rationality, as was shown in the semiotic sketch above, particularly by the concept of mysticism. To my mind, there is no opposition of the rational and the spiritual, if we see the general borders of rationality which are likewise evident already in the field of sensual perception: Nowhere ratio can provide the contents which are structured by her. Everywhere we must distinguish structures and general structural cognition from specific contents as values are. Apart from this distinction, I fully agree with Giri’s noble and relevant critique of Habermas. Only, my point is another one and goes farther: Habermas has failed to find the synthesis with his counterpart Niklas Luhmann, disciple of Talcott Parsons in social system’s theory. The synthesis shown above between action and system by the principle of interpersonal or social reflection is no academic luxury but indispensable

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for contemporary social thinking of “beyond sociology” (cf. Giri 2012), at least the contemporary one! Therefore, I lay much emphasis on the evolutionary need for a theoretically elaborated social ethics in the sense of a structural system theory and institutional fairness doctrine, which means something completely different than individual ethics—even than spiritually enlightened ethics of the individual. The individual remains a necessary but not at all the sufficient condition for a structural change and for the wise installation of spirituality in the public institutions. This is possible in a democratic way primarily by a basic value parliament (or chamber), but also of a cultural parliament (or chamber). These are conditions sine qua non for a liberal and democratic implementation of ethics and spirituality as well as corresponding cultural values in the public! We must not and cannot wait for the enlightenment or at least for the spiritual progress of a majority of individuals! We cannot and must not wait for a majority of supermen and superwomen in that sense! It is sufficient and necessary to create institutions which provide valuerealization on the cultural as well as on the basic value level of ethics and of spirituality. Value-communication is not primary a discursive, rational argumentation, but more than that: a lived (ontological) community process with much emotion and intuition at all levels of the system, particularly the “high” levels 3 and 4. But this community process needs the help of institutions to become effective and fair. Whereas a prescriptive individual ethics is widely superfluous (mostly in the rationalistic form of Habermas ambiguous “discourse”), because self-evident for rather cultivated people, the creation of institutional conditions of a “communication society,” is the most urgent socio-ethical and spiritual task of our time. This sociological postulate of the reflection system theory is something very different from the intellectual plays of an individualistic ethics without real consequences. Surely, we need also an innovative sense of responsibility of the individuals. Thinking and responsibility can and must make the connection between social-ethical insights and their realization. But without institutionalizing, all the goodwill of most individuals, no deep change is possible. Herein lies the tremendous, over-summative power of the United Individuals, by which the opposition “from below / from above” lies slapped, as a subterfuge and means of blocking.

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The wrong opposition of structural changes from above and organization of society from below must stop finally. “Civil Society” must overcome its anti-institutional affects, and in particular the historically survived opposition of parliamentary and direct democracy. For elections which refer to one of the value-levels are matter-oriented, and that is the very essence of direct democracy. So a value-levels-democracy provides a new synthesis of both historical forms of democracy, and democracy becomes the epitome of a “communicative society,” reproducing the value-levels of human communication in an institutional way. There are tons of existing goodwill of the great majority of people in all countries, often overlooked by many academic as well as nonacademic moral apostles because they don’t want to recognize to what high degree even the individual ethos has institutional and structural conditions. Simply said: People cannot be as good and act as well as they would like to, because the institutional conditions are destructive. All the more people are flooded with useless prescriptive ethics. Reflection system theory means not at all new endless epistemological external “reflections” on the surface, but the useful, not at least spiritually useful installation of insights in the nature of the internally reflexive life of society—which is something totally different from a society of “discourse” in a rationalistic and at the same time populist sense.

Notes i. I took the term “sense-elements” from Paul Tillich’s early writings (Tillich 1989), but in a more generalized sense, because Tillich distinguishes only two elements: mind activity (Vollzug) and their contents (Gehalt). ii. The term “reflection logics” has a special place in Hegel’s Science of Logic, but in a more general sense of philosophical history it is first used by Gotthard Günther 1976. It means—in my further interpretation—the logic of entities which are constituted by inner or implicit reflection, in difference to a merely outer or subsequent reflection of the thinker. The implicit or lived reflection is an ontological one, not only an epistemological one. iii. The opposition of action (Handeln) und self-experience (Erleben) plays a fundamental role in Niklas Luhmann’s early and important article Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie (Sense as Basic Concept of Sociology) in: Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 25–100.

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iv. I use this term for a fourth semiotic dimension of language (logically the first one) in the wake of GDR-philosopher Georg Klaus who recognized the need of this dimension even without reflection-logic. v. This differentiation constitutes, in my eyes the essence of a future democracy with separate parliamentary and executive institutions for each of these value-levels. See the end of this article and Heinrichs (2019). vi. Alfasa, Mira. 2003, On Education, vol. 12 of the Collected Works of the Mother, Reprint Pondicherry 2003, p. 120. vii. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity. This main work of Feuerbach from 1842 has been, because of his religious criticism, less appreciated in its positive, spiritual substance. viii. I take here some expressions of Jürgen Habermas (1987), although the decisive principle of their connection, the interpersonal or practical reflection, it not seen by him. ix Max Weber, Economy and Society, §1. x. Ananta K. Giri is very right to postulate a sociology which disposes on a social ontology, e.g., in Sociology and Beyond: The Calling of an Ontological Epistemology of Participation, in: Giri 2012. The reflection system theory which I propose includes a social ontology, because social systems in this view are real systems, not only theoretical ones! Their ontological “stuff” is lived interpersonal reflection: a tissue of reciprocal reflexive actions. “Lived reflection” can also be called “ontological reflection.” xi. The author has been much inspired by the theory of social systems of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), which could not preserve its former popularity and could not become more “pragmatic” in the sense of shaping political praxis, because the basic principle of his system-levels (the interpersonal reflection) was not found by him. Nor was it by the following system-thinker Niklas Luhmann the high reflexivity of whom is restrained to the external (not ontological) reflection. xii. Treatise on the Seven Rays I , Geneva 1987, p. 389.—Online edition: https://www.lucistrust.org/online_books/esoteric_psychology_volume_ i/section_two_chapter_iii_the_rays_andman/6_the_nations_and_the_ rays. xiii. Sri Aurobindo (1999: 99s).

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———. 1997. The Human Cycle. The Ideal of Human Unity. War and SelfDetermination. Pondicherry Ashram. ———. 1999. One Himself. In Collected Works, vol. 26. Pondicherry Ashram. ———. 2000. The Future Poetry. Pondicherry Ashram. Austin, John L. 1955. How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., [reprint.] ed. Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press. Print 1999. Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2004. The Essence of Christianity. Mumbai: Prometheus Books. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2012. Sociology and Beyond: Windows and Horizons. Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Günther, Gotthard. 1976–1980. Beiträge zur Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen Dialektik. 3 vols. Hamburg: Meiner (partly in English). Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. A Theory of Communicative Action. 2 vol. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jürgen, and Niklas Luhmann. 1971. Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Francfort: Suhrkamp. Heinrichs, Johannes. 2017. Gastfreundschaft der Kulturen (Hospitality of Cultures. The Way Between Multiculturalisme and New Nationalisme) Stuttgart. Ibidem. ———. 2018. Integral Philosophy: The Common Logical Roots of Anthropology, Politics, Language, and Spirituality. Stuttgart. Ibidem and New York: Columbia University Press (This book outlines a series of books of the author which appeared in German language, so Handlungen (2007), Sprache, 5 vol. (2008/9)). ———. 2019. Value-Levels-Democracy: The Reflection-System-Theory of FourSegmentation. Auroville: Prisma. Klaus, Georg 1973. Semiotik und Erkenntnistheorie. Munich: Fink. Lotman, Juri M. 1990. Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. Tauris: London. Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Morris, Charles W. 1937. Foundation of the Theory of Signs. Chicago. 12. Impr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970 Print. ———. 1955. Signs, Language, and Behavior. New York. Prentice-Hall. Peirce, Charles S. 1992. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. 2 vol. 1st ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Print. Posner, Roland. 2003. Pragmatics, in: Semiotik/Semiotics. A Handbook in the Sign-Theoretic Foundations of Nature and Culture. 4 vols. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter. Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott. 1929. Pragmatism. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Searle, John. 1976. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Colonial Press. Tillich, Paul. 1989. Main Works 1: Philosophical Writings. Berlin: De Gruyter.

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Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed. P.M.S. Hacker ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

CHAPTER 14

Paul Valéry “Mystique sans Dieu”: Writing as a Spiritual Practice? Benedetta Zaccarello

From Existential Crisis to Writing: A Spiritual Scenario Trained as a philosopher, I’ve been often dealing with textual studies and the theory of literature and writing along my career. On the base of such experience, I started to consider philosophy not only as conceptual creation, but as well as a field of creativity whose medium is language and literary exercise of the human potentials, ruled by its forms, codes and traditions. From such perspective, I try to understand the goal of philosophy, as that of practicing doubt and questioning words and idea: a task that, just like the art of writing, requires training and exercise, perseverance and patience. Seen from such perspective, philosophy appears to be an inner experience taking shape in the long run and requiring a good number of practical tools. The following pages are to be considered an attempt to understand the work and the “method” of French writer Paul Valéry as a quite peculiar example of a living practice and inner exercise embodying uncommon

B. Zaccarello (B) Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut des Textes et Manuscrits Modernes (ITEM), Paris, France © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_14

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ways both to pragmatism and to spirituality. Doing so, my hope is to deepen the question about the manifold meanings of these two notions— pragmatism and spirituality—rather than to observe them in the evolution of the history of ideas. I am aware that—at a first glimpse at least—the work of Paul Valéry might seem very far both from the canon of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and from the vast field of spirituality. Born in the south of France in 1871, he moved to Paris in its early twenties and, while studying law, he became acquainted with several of the intellectual circles that were multiplying in the capital at that time. Notably, he started to attend the famous “Tuesdays” at Stéphane Mallarmé’s house, the uncontested maître of the French Symbolism, and he became his favorite disciple. Valéry, who had started composing poems as a teenager and had submitted to Mallarmé some of his texts, receiving from the master encouraging blessings, decided nevertheless to suddenly stop writing verses after a night of inner and outer storm related to have happened in October 1892 and later mythologized by the young author himself as “La Nuit de Gênes ” and “the night of Genoa”.i This acute existential crisis, said to have been originated by his suffering for the impossible love for an aristocratic Genoese lady, goes far beyond a simple matter of romance, at least as it is described by Valéry himself: through the Genoa outbreak, Valéry assesses to have realized the necessity of taking an attitude of critical distance and detachment from his own states of mind, in order to interrupt the emotional reaction caused by those and come out of the unbearable sensation of overwhelming anguish he was encountering at the time. It is easy to observe that, leaving aside any doubt that could be reasonably casted on this literary legend, the description of the night of storm and inner crisis as formulated by Valéry shows some striking similarities with the so-called Ulm’s night of Réné Descartes, described by the seventeenth-century French philosopher as a turning point in the evolution of his thinking and writing, precisely as it will be for Valéry, but rather presented by Descartes as a spiritual crisis, rather than an existential, literary and philosophical point of no return. From such perspective, the myth created by Valéry seems to adopt a philosophical and literary model in what concerns a vivid living experience and to translate the spiritual crisis in a dramatic change of… method! It is useful for our present purposes to remind here that Valéry would keep on using the figure of Descartes as an alter ego for his own theoretical approach, portraying

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the French philosopher per antonomasia, borrowing to the great thinker aspects of his own method, writing fragments of the biography of the hero of classical French thought overlapping with his own memories, and paraphrasing constantly the more-than-known cogito by Descartes.ii But let’s go back to the Genoa crisis, described by Valéry as an emotional, existential and cognitive turning point in its life and work. For Valéry himself, such episode would have had two major consequences. First of all, pars destruens, (1) the interruption of all poetical activity for several years and the complete withdrawn from the literary scene: precisely such a choice of retirement would have made of Valéry one of the idols of the uprising surrealism. In the eyes of André Breton, who claimed to be Valéry disciple for some years just before founding his own movement, Valéry renouncing to poetry but not to his intellectual and existential mission became, as Jacques Vaché, the model of the poet with no work. That’s why Breton would have taken so bad the coming back to Valéry to poetry some twenty-five years later, in 1917, when La Jeune Parque was published making of his author possibly the most famous poet of his time.iii Nonetheless, the study of the manuscripts reveals that Valéry had never stopped writing, actually limiting his interest to prose till 1913–1914. Indeed, Valéry had even published in the meanwhile some considered-tobe very obscure of his masterpieces, such as L’Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci or Monsieur Teste, that rather dealt with aesthetics and the idea of self-consciousness that would have happily obsessed him throughout his life. The “silence”—as this long gap in between the Night of Genoa and the publication of La Jeune Parque is often called—seems to label rather a distance taken from the literary scene of his time and a shift toward a more abstract work, as we are about to see. The second consequence can be understood as the pars construens. (2) After the Genoa crisis, Valéry turns himself toward a completely different kind of writing that instead of being based on the form of its result focuses quite clearly on the process of writing and on the inner experience related to this process itself. Few months after the “Crisis of Genoa”, Valéry begins to attend the writing of what would have been called later his Cahiers, the “Notebooks”. While the (non-)title, absolutely neutral, merely refers to the kind of paper used as a support of the writing, the composition of the work or (anti-)work, as I would like to define it echoing Valéry’s definition of himself as an “anti-philosopher”, is

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rather structured around some methodological rules given by the author to himself in a sort of writing performance that would have last 51 years. As I mentioned it, Valéry came back to publishing and even to poetry, mainly from 1917 on, and quite quickly he became one of the bestknown intellectuals of his time, especially in what concerns aesthetics, and certainly the most respected poet of his time. Still, he fell totally out of fashion as soon as he died, partially due to the raise of a new paradigm of literature that was proposed in that same year 1945 by Jean Paul Sartre in his famous essay Qu’est-ce que la literature? You can make yourselves an idea of the success of Valéry considering the fact that the street where he was living was given his name during his lifetime, and that some of his verses were carved on the walls of the Trocadéro building as a commemoration, right after his State funeral. Despite his extremely busy life as a famous poet and intellectual, constantly invited to give speeches, write prefaces, and attend public events, he never stopped attending his Cahiers, according to the “protocol” of writing decided at the beginning of this intellectual enterprise. The notebook was composed every day from 1894 to 1945, early morning, generally from 5 to 8, in the form of purely abstract fragments, never relating about facts of events and never continuing for more than a page. This procedure produces some 29,000 in the in folio edition in facsimile that was edited by CNRS in the 70s, more than 20 years after the author’s death. Of this immense production, Valéry extracted some compilations, and even published a whole notebook “such as”, in the 1920s. He constantly tried to organize such hyper-text ante litteram according to a system of thematic labels organized in indexes that never stopped to change, but also gived orientation to the development of some major lines of his own research: “psy” (for psychology); “phi” (for philosophy); “theta” (for theology and God-related issues); “eros” and “ego scriptor” (for the reflections upon his experiences as a writer)… According to his own affirmations, composing one notebook after the other, Valéry wanted to pen down sketches of a completely abstract “portrait” of himself as a transcendental subject, attempting to formulate a language capable of describing the functioning and structures shaping the inner life of a consciousness.iv Nevertheless, it remains extremely controversial among the scholars if Valéry had ever really considered publishing the Cahiers as a work of his during his lifev : a positive result of the existential, intellectual and literary crisis of the “Night of Genoa”, the Notebooks seem to remain

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the “esoteric” part of the work of Valéry, so to say, the hidden laboratory withdrawn from the market of literature and produced by an author almost with no name, caught by himself in the silence of the beginnings of the day, before being shaped as a personality by the social living and necessities. Moreover, the language of the Cahiers aims at a universal neutrality, in a dialogue with one’s self that seems to forget the existence of any addressed reader out of the room, as the page would be the mirror of an author inquiring about his deeper self, beyond the phenomenal details of a biography amongst infinite others, subject and object of the exercise of writing. What we know for certain, as the author stated this frequently, both publicly and in the Notebooks themselves, Valéry considered this “monstrous” work his most important and essential achievement. Valéry identified himself with this “ghost-work” so much that not only he attended this task daily till the very end of his life, but he would carry around with him some more than two hundred notebooks during the Word War II, as he was pushed to move around the French territories by the ongoing tragic events.

Language, esprit, Creation Valéry describes often the crisis we have been discussing above and that would have pushed him to start writing the Cahiers as a sudden loss of trust in language, suddenly perceived as a misleading tool and an ineluctable lie: a too tricky set of ambiguities. This can partially explain why, especially in the first years, Valéry conveys all sort of languages in the composition of his “Notebooks”. Getting inspired by mathematics, chemistry, physics but also by aesthetics and biology, Valéry tries in the first years to find out an algebra to describe the pure activity of consciousness, portrayed in its dynamics rather than in its faculties and observed in its potentials rather than in its essence. In a sort of negative theology of the self, Valéry is rather inclined to describe the source of all consciousness by the famous formula: “Moi=0”.vi From the point of view of the author, such equation comes to nothing but a function, a relationship, a ratio of variables that constantly change in the becoming of what exists in consciousness. Still, it synthetically provides the reader with a sort of algebraic image of the void and potential at the core of the self, a sort of negative ontology that seems somehow to allude to the mysteries of the individual self, as negative theology tries to

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enhance our knowledge of the divine abolishing mystifications and telling the only truth that can be told: what God is not. As I mentioned above, the choice of writing daily at early morning hours, such as a monk or a yogi starting the day with their prayers or exercises, is affirmed by Valéry to be dictated by the belief that the individual as a “personnalité” is a social and cultural construct: a sheer fiction, whose attributes are but simple contingencies,vii and a mask, that serves the mere purpose of inter-subjective relations, a character in the illusory play that we all collectively compose. At the sunrise, before we enter the common field of our ordinary lives, Valéry hopes to be able to portray the subject in its transcendental structure, observing by fragments its functions, virgin of all uses and purposes we can give to our own capacities. Such quest for the source or mold of all our experiences calls for the creation of new concepts and models of writing and work appropriate to it, as a journal can report of ordinary life. From the skeptical perspective that characterizes Valéry’s approach, only the esprit exists, being this grounding of whatever we can conceive the source of both language and experience.viii From such point of view, truth is a twofold concept which in Valéry’s work can both refer to a social construct, the ground of consensus, the convergence of credited opinions; and to a quality of the experience of an introspective insight. As what we call “true” or “real” is but a convention for Valéry, any proper use of such words should relate to the only object given by the French philosopher an ontological value—consciousness— or, at least, with the only human faculty capable of veracity in the eyes of this author: self-reflecting intuition. For the skeptical French philosopher, only a glimpse of the functionalities and dynamics structuring our consciousness and our representation of the word can ground statements unworthy to be demistified. In any case, all is a creation of the esprit, according to the fully holistic, post-romantic approach of Valéry: individual and collective, material and immaterial, whatever falls under the lens of our observation is understood through polarities and dimensions, yet remains a product of the infinite creativity of the esprit. Rather to be understood as Geist than mind, as the word is often translated, “esprit” doesn’t correspond neither to the concept of soul. A force and a faculty, it is both receptiveness and creativity and it embodies their synthesis as sensibilité, a term which in Valéry’s work names the self-adapting and evolving capacity to sense, as the creative potential implicit in any structure of representation. This

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source transcending the individualix can be only approached by a selftransformation happening in the individual, by trying precisely to take a step back from all the beliefs and habits imposed by culture. To resume, in the theoretical vocabulary of Paul Valéry’s work, “esprit” is this field of unity, where gnosiological polarities such as subjectivity/objectivity or receptiveness/creativity are transcended and to whose dynamic structure the self-enquiry of his “anti-philosophy” is dedicated. There’s no need of much knowledge of Latin to understand that esprit and “spirituality” share the same etymology (“spiritus ”) and thus refer to the same faculty. Still, it is important to remind here that, during Valéry’s lifetime, the French term “spiritualité” would have been easily associated with Spiritualisme—id est “spiritualism”—a French philosophical school quite popular at that time and that despite the Jewish roots of its most popular thinker, Henri Bergson, spiritualism was often tainted with Catholic influences that Valéry would have certainly disliked. Despite being very close to Bergson, who sponsored Valéry’s election at Collège de France and for whom Valéry pronounced a dramatic eulogy, Valéry kept his distances from spiritualism as from any philosophical trend of his time. In what concerns religion and Catholicism in particular, Valéry’s position is always respectful but corrosively critical at the same time. Such an attitude could account for the fact that Valéry, despite dedicating all his research to the esprit, seems to consciously avoid the use of terms such as spiritualité and even spirituel and spiritualisme. To his eyes, such words are already loaded with the memory of attitudes and practices that Valéry observes and respectfully criticizes. Still, we have to underline that such field of human experience takes an important place in Valéry’s analysis: not only the general notion used to label belief-related phenomena, “fiducia”, is a key notion for Valéry’s thought,x but a whole thematic section of the Cahiers is specifically dedicated to “Theta” (i.e., religionrelated and spirituality-related issues). As a matter of fact, Valéry was really not fond of religion: in regard to religious behaviors, he sees no more than a fertile field of observation for the dynamics of belief that anyway structure and ground all social or cultural community from his point of view. Nonetheless, it can be underlined that Valéry worked for a long time on a work finally left unacheived, a dialogue titled “On the Divine” (“Petì ton tou théou”xi in the original title in ancient Greek) whose drafts are conserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. While Valéry seems eager to take distance from the vague mysticism implicit to his contemporary notion of spirituality, he appropriates

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certain attitudes and practices related to mysticism, though emptied of the belief traditionally involved in it. In a fragment from the Cahiers, Valéry dresses an intellectual self-portrait depicting his own mission in terms of “spirituality”: Spiritualité - Je me décrirai en quelque manière en disant que je suis doué de sensibilité intellectuelle. J’entends par là que je suis sensible aux choses de l’intellect comme d’autres le sont aux couleurs, aux sentiments, aux sons. Je réagis fortement aux idées, aux types; j’ai les passions intellectuelles, - le vice de la compréhension, le penchant à définir, à construire et les affections qui en procèdent, qui sont mal connues, peu décrites, mais qui ont une intensité et un empire presque aussi grands que celles qui proviennent de causes sensorielles ou sentimentales - et qui sont plus constantes. Cette manière d’être peut s’appeler spiritualité -, si l’on veut…xii

Moreover, Valéry seems to associate his peculiar interpretation of “spirituality” as a practice and a mission with his own aversion to “metaphysics”. Though such critical target is far from being uncommon in Western contemporary philosophy, Valéry’s arguments are often expressed, anti-metaphysically!, in the terms of a personal repulsion or spontaneous and idiosyncratic mistrust toward metaphysics. In at least one fragment from the Notebooks, Valéry calls precisely “spirituality” his own strategy against metaphysics: here the poet and thinker comes to define the notion as a set of “functional abilities” such as “instability”, “transitivity” and “proteism” (the capacity of becoming anything): Je n’ai jamais rencontré personne de moins métaphysique que Votre Serviteur – c’est-à-dire de moins disposé à donner aux choses qui se passent dans l’esprit une existence ou à leur supposer des propriétés autres que mentales. Pour moi ce que j’ai dans l’esprit n’est qu’esprit, jusqu’à preuve du contraire. Il y a présomption générale et intense de spiritualité – c’est-à-dire d’instabilité, transitivité, protéisme) - En somme un ensemble de propriétés fonctionnelles.xiii

As his idea of the consciousness seems to be built on the model of negative theology, such self-discovery path is described as based on not knowing. Indeed, Valéry’s own way and practice of “spirituality” seem to be keen to an intellectual enterprise, being guided by a fundamental curiosity, a determination to impersonally observe and an undeniable wish

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to know, though not only through mind. And at the same time, the condition of such quest is the acknowledgment of not knowing that in the history of Western thought can’t but be associated with the figure of Socrates as the father of the European philosophical tradition. Valéry, who curiously enough wrote several platonic dialogues where the character of Socrates is brought back to life and given (part of) Valéry’s own theoretical arguments, would seem here to contradict his own claim to be an “anti-philosopher” rooted in his vehement mistrust in regard to discipline. But in the age of Socrates, philosophy is still a practice of questioning and rather a critical exercise for the sake of self-knowledge (“Gnoti se autòn”). Such a paradigm must be admitted to be compatible with both Valéry’s method and a… pragmatic spirituality intended as a solitary quest exploring the inner unknown, leading to nothing but transformation and taking the form of an “activity”: J’ai cru et j’ai posé en principe que mes idées n’étaient bonnes que pour moi – car elles étaient nées de mon impuissance, de mon ignorance, de mes besoins réels et non de problèmes étrangers. La plupart des problèmes de la philos[ophie] m’apparaissaient non-miens, lointains, et même insignifiants, sans nécessité - sans vérifications […] Je ne consentais pas à la confusion des idées avec l’expérience […] La pensée est un procès de transformation, qui substitue un être ordonné pour une activité particulière, organisé, prêt - à un être désorganisé ou non adapté - - etc.xiv

Though apparently “abstract” and universal, ideas, as contents of consciousness, are born out of our contingent needs: they can’t be but arbitrary and biased. But the observation of one’s own cosmos and inner “island”xv as conditioned by culture and contingencies unfolds precisely the awareness of such a condition in all “spiritual” productions (“les oeuvres de l’esprit ” in Valéry’s terminology). A new degree or order of universality is attained by that achievement: we could call it the general individual, the abstract self. It’s what the genius-nobody of the eponymous Monsieur Teste in Valéry’s literary universe comes to illustrate. To come to know oneself as the only source of one’s (and our) mental, cultural and even poetic (latu sensu) productions means to finally face, as Narcisse in a mirror, the uncatchable matrix of all we are as cognitive and experiencing beings. The universal is within and consists essentially in the discovery of one’s self as pure potential, as capacity of self-consciousness, sensitiveness and creation. Such a radical change of

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perspective and appreciation of one’s deep nature involves the rejection of existential contingencies, as of preconceived ideas and cultural commonplaces. It can’t be achieved but by building new habits. And the only way to build new habits is to practice them with no concern about the results of this exercise. As we know, the etymology of the word “pragmatism” is to be found in the Greek verb prasso. Prattein refers to an action as a process rather than as the creation of a result. We tend to associate instead of “pragmatism” with “facts”, pragma, but in the same way the network of meanings of the root could evoke in our mind praxis, the repeated action or exercise leading to the transformation of its subject. We are not that far from the notion of “spiritual exercise” so dear to the Western mystic tradition and notably to Ignacio de Loyola, which Valéry reads and quotes here and there in his notes. It seems quite clear to me, although this is quite controversial among scholars, that Valéry implicitly refers to this tradition, removing from it any aspect related to belief or metaphysics. As he quotes and studies Ignacio de Loyola in his Notebooks,xvi Valéry show interest in the techniques employed by Loyola to build inner images for contemplation, more than in the faith of the Christian saint. From such perspective, the meaning of the apparently paradoxical epithet of “Mystique sans Dieu” (“the Godless mystic”), often employed by Valéry to describe himself as the author of the Notebooks, appears quite clear and consequent: it appears to refer to the choice of the inner experience-based observation against belief as well as to that of the application of the paradigm of the spiritual exercise to a traditionally non-spiritual activity such as writing.xvii Paradoxe en profondeur. (Mystique sans dieu) La mystique entendue au sens de l’existence - valeur - spécificité du « Subjectif » - (de recherche d’équations, relations transcendantes entre sub et ob, in et ex -) ne pourra […] se déployer - progresser - se préciser […] que quand on ne croira pas - ou bien […] - quand la « foi » sera considérée sans objet - « relativée » -xviii

Rather than a cult of art, or a religion of literature, both quite common at the end of the nineteenth century when he started to write, we can understand the “anti-conventional” mysticism of Paul Valéry as witnessed by his Notebooks as the attempt to dynamically represent a selfknowledge quest based on the philosophical attitude of accepting not to

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know through the literary practice and spiritual exercise of repeatedly and recurrently writing the self: a “faith […] without an object”.

Notes i. Cf. M. Jarrety, Paul Valéry, Fayard, 2008. ii. Valéry wrote several essays dedicated to Descartes. In the Notebooks as well as in his works, he proposes variations of the “Cogito ergo sum”, such as “Sometimes I think, sometimes I am” in P. Valéry, Œuvres, Vol. II, Paris, Gallimard, 1960, p. 500. iii. Besides the fame acquired by his poetry, Valéry was elected a member of the Académie de France in 1926 and appointed a Professor at Collège de France in 1937. iv. “Si j’avais à vraiment faire mon portrait au lieu d’un jeu, j’y mettrais cette physionomie particulière que je ne me vois point avoir, et auprès, cette généralité´ que je me sens. Tout ce qui m’est spécial, ne me semble pas de moi - et tout ce qui est général, fût-ce à autrui, m’appartient par un sentiment. Il me semble être plus général que moi-même, qu’un individu.’’ P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 26. v. Valéry seems sometimes to like playing ‘hide and seek’ with his public; nonetheless, his irony reveals the dilemma concerning the publication of the notebooks: “Si mon ouvrage n’est pas nul - il est très précieux; et je le garde pour moi. S’il est nul - il n’a aucun prix pour nul et je le garde - pour personne.’’ P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 6. vi. See N. Celeyrette-Pietri, Valéry et le moi: des Cahiers à l’œuvre, Paris, Klincksieck, 1979, pp. 35–39. vii. “Mon véritable Moi est ou serait, (sauf illusion) si général, si indépendant des événements et des caractères, que toute personnalité, même la plus admirable et la plus heureuse, ne modifierait pas ma foi… d’être encore autre chose, de devoir être autre que quel homme que ce soit entièrement définissable.” P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 92. viii. “Ma pensée a été souvent dominée ou orientée par une intention d’en finir avec tel ensemble de possibilités mentales. J’ai voulu considérer les inventions littéraires, (qui se présentent comme des événements singuliers,) comme des cas particuliers - dont il fallait découvrir la forme générale, ou formule. De même les idées méta- physiques. Le but de l’Homo me semblait être d’épuiser tells pouvoirs ‘psy[chiques]’. Celui de l’esprit de réduire ses formations apparemment différentes à leurs types et de ne pas se re-commencer.’’ P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 157. ix. See J. Derrida, “Les Sources de Valéry. Qual. Quelle.” in “MLN ”, Vol. 87, No. 4, French Issue: Paul Valéry (May, 1972), pp. 563–599.

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x. See B. Scapolo, “L’Isle sans nom, peinture du désordre, ruine de la fiducia” in L’Isle sans nom, un projet dramatique inédit de Paul Valéry, B. Zaccarello and F. Johansson, ed., Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2018, pp. 151–164. xi. See P. Valéry, Peri tˆon touˆ theouˆ ou des choses divines (J. Peslier, ed.), Paris, Kimé, 2005 and Zaccarello, Benedetta & Johansson, Franz & Mérel, Fabienne Mérel, “Du divin et des dieux”, Recherches sur le Peri tôn tou theou de Paul Valéry, Peter Lang, 2014. xii. P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 85. xiii. P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 647. xiv. P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 120. xv. Valéry loved to depict himself as the «Robinson [Crusoe]» of consciousness. xvi. See P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. II, Paris, Gallimard, 1974, p. 567. xvii. As we saw the “protocol” of composition ruling the writing of the notebook seems to be conceived as a spiritual practice. xviii. P. Valéry, Cahiers, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 624.

CHAPTER 15

Spirituality of Action: Reading O. V. Vijayan’s Khasakkinte Ithihasam and Gurusagaram Through William James’ Concept of Religion Vinod Balakrishnan and Shintu Dennis

Introduction: The Concept Spirituality through James and Vijayan Dale Riepe’s “A Note on William James and Indian Philosophy” must count as one of the most convincing assessments of James’ encounter with Indian philosophy (Riepe 1968). While many have rightly located James’ encounter with the London Lectures of Swami Vivekananda (1897) and Max Muller’s account of Sri Ramakrishna (1899) in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and Pragmatism (1907), not many have methodically addressed James’ intellectual wrestle with a new found interest that required of him the committed involvement which he was reluctant to give.

V. Balakrishnan (B) Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli, India e-mail: [email protected] S. Dennis Marian College Kuttikkanam, Kuttikkanam, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_15

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One important reason Riepe posits is the diagnosis by Dickenson S. Miller and quoted by Ralph Barton Perry in The Thought and Character of William James (1948) that it was a case of divergent orientations, so patently true of most East-West encounters, that James was all for “attachment” while Indian philosophy was all for “detachment.” However, that diagnosis of Dickenson and endorsement by Riepe need not be read as a cause for divergence; one could work toward a rapprochement and with adequate justification too. If intentions are any indicators of will, then James, who “alternated between watchful waiting and judicious retreat” (Riepe 1968: 590), was not intending an ideological distance. On the contrary, he was serious about strengthening the intellectual bridge by encouraging younger colleagues like James Haughton Woods to study Indian thought. Miranda Shaw attests to the fact that James shared with the Buddhists the “conviction that self is not a permanent entity” (Shaw 1987). Moreover, through Paul Carus, Peirce and James were being translated for comparative study by Buddhist thinkers like D. T. Suzuki. “There is no doubt that James was exposed to Buddhist thought… James also owned and annotated a number of books on Buddhism, such as Paul Carus’ History of Buddhism, Warrier’s Buddhism in Translation, Koeppen’s Die Religion des Buddha and Max Muller’s History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature” (Shaw 1987). The attachment which James espouses is an immersion in life that can be differentiated as “facts right here-in-the-hand” which is not spiritually different from the “detachment” espoused by Indian thought, provided one ceases to see the latter as “metaphysical luxuriousness” (Riepe 1968). The morality of “detachment” is not different and should not be if it must be understood—and it has always been the desirable reading—to cleanse the everyday act of personal, vested interest that is not only a taint but a serious impediment to a rigorous inquiry. If one examines the spirituality in James’ public renunciation of “intellectualistic logic” in the Hibbert Lectures of 1908, he was but stamping his approval on rigorous inquiry which cannot be mistaken for a common sense of “attachment”. One helpful gesture of Perry in The Thought and Characters of William James is to put together a seamless tapestry from 1897 till 1910 when James was not cut off from Indian thought but had more occasions to seriously engage with it. His reading of Emerson in 1902 causing a reenchantment with Indian philosophy; the essay on consciousness, though spiked with skepticism, was a significant turn, stoked by more inquiries

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into Buddhism and interest in panpsychism, thanks to his friend Charles A Strong. Through the correspondence with John Dewey and Strong and through the works of Alfred Lloyd and Fechner, James was finding himself reconciling his own pluralism with panpsychism. One might suppose, he saw the logic of that Pluralistic Universe tying in harmoniously with panpsychism and say, Sankhya philosophy of the East. That he did not state it explicitly is a fact which must not cause a closure of the rapprochement, but work it out as a viable space of “detached attachment” or spiritual pragmatism, if we may call such a gesture. Spirituality is a term that often is confined within the definition of the mystical, often taken to be the antonym of pragmatic action. Being a system that combines the scientific loyalty to facts and the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, pragmatism does not limit itself within the boundaries of positivism, rather, it goes beyond positivism to provide the possibility of self-validation through original individual experiences including the spiritual (James 1907). William James uses the term “religion” rather than “spirituality” where religion does not confine to the conventional limits of meanings attributed to the institutionalized system of rituals and practices. James’ concept of the personal branch of religion may sound similar to man’s conscience or morality, but he prefers to adopt the term “personal religion.” Even in the churches, the founders owed to their own “direct personal communication with the divine” (James 1920). Religion, to James, means “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (James 1920). James gives a major partition for religion: one is the institutional religion and the other, the personal religion. Worship and sacrifice, procedures for the workings on the dispositions of the deity, theology and ceremony and ecclesiastical organization, are the essentials of religion in the institutional branch… an art of winning the favor of the gods…In the more personal branch of religion it is on the contrary the inner dispositions of man himself which form the centre of interest, his conscience, his deserts, his helplessness, his incompleteness. ..The relation goes direct from heart to heart, from soul to soul, between man and his maker. (James 1920)

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James completely neglects the institutional branch of religion. Vijayan, on the other hand, considers the practices of religion to be the beginning. In his collection of essays, Vijayan says, “Every religion begins with rituals; but through a step by step process, what they lead us into is the life beyond the senses” (Rajasekharan 2005; our translation). Vijayan throws light on the possibility of a reverse process of what James speaks about. Vijayan does not negate the significance of religious rituals; rather, he elevates them to a position where they become the threshold of a spiritual consciousness. O. V. Vijayan (1930–2005), the bilingual writer from Kerala, created a landmark in the history of the Malayalam Novel with Khasakkinte Ithihasam (1969) where the protagonist Ravi reaches the village as a single teacher in the village school leaving behind the material prospects of a sophisticated city life, a promising life of a researcher and the secured love life with Padma. Ravi, in the village of Khasak, is immersed in his search for meanings and truths in the mobile and immobile elements of nature. The search itself becomes a spiritual journey to Ravi where he discovers gods in the palm groves and the raindrops of Khasak even when the truth he searches remains elusive. Any history of the Malayalam novel remains incomplete without a major note on Vijayan’s Khasakkinte Ithihasam which was later translated by Vijayan himself as The Legends of Khasak (1990). A decade after Vijayan’s passing away in 2005, literary reviewers still commemorate Vijayan and his novel through articles. One of the recent ones says, “The novel captures Ravi’s transformation from his radical past to his current life as a seeker of spiritual truths and values” (Chandran 2015). In Gurusagaram (1987), the 1990 Kendra Sahitya Academy Award winning novel, “the spiritual wanderer” (Rajeevan 2005) in Vijayan reaches a more sublime state of enquiry. The novel was later translated by Vijayan as The Infinity of Grace (1997). The romantic revolutionary in Khasak grows into a sharp satirist in the second novel Dharmapuranam and then evolves into a more determined spiritual seeker in the third novel Gurusagaram which is about the spiritual journey of Kunjunni, a journalist and the evolution of his spiritual relation with his daughter Kalyani. William James does not approach philosophy as a scientist does; rather, he adopts a proactive method thereby creating space for interpretation. O. V. Vijayan, unlike James, is a creative writer from Kerala who breaks away from the traditional stereotype of a novelist but, like James, incorporates philosophical insights into fiction. While their modes of expression vary,

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the essence of their philosophies finds connections that surpass distance. At the same time, there are differences that remain as differences which add to possible multiple interpretations. Rather than coming directly into truth, James decides to dwell upon Peirce’s “Serious meaning of a concept” (James 1904). Here, he chooses Peirce’s classification over his own pragmatic purpose of “a method of carrying on abstract discussions” (James 1904). James puts Peirce’s “pragmatic text above his own, but with the implicit position that Peirce annotates his own idea better.” The serious meaning of a concept, then, “lies in the concrete difference to someone which its being true will make” (James 1904). James’ abstract discussion of the pragmatic truth stands clarified through Peirce’s “Serious meaning of the Concept” where the qualification “serious” points to the quality of involvement demonstrated by the individual. It, logically, points to the awareness of being related to the world; the consistent curiosity that transacts with that world through questions that reaffirm and sometimes redefine the relatedness. It is the perception of reality through a glimpse of a difference in the dynamic state of relatedness, which causes a sense of expansion of the field of consciousness. All these logical possibilities are implicit in both the Peircean Concept and the Jamesean Truth. Vijayan’s characters seem to be curious interrogators as most of them communicate by means of questions. Even propositions are tactfully concluded with the hook of enquiry than the settled truce of a period. If one were to examine the psychology of the characters, one finds them to be wired for philosophy. But to make that assessment, one must approach them philosophically. Most of them are not philosophers; they have a natural bent for articulating their curious minds that makes them, through the gesture of interrogation, philosophical. In this regard, one can see how James too as an academically untrained philosopher was approaching mind and life with the sensitivity of a novelist whose approach to an understanding of life must necessarily happen through the mind/s of individual/s who cannot be seen as passive consumers or inheritors of ideas and concepts. On the contrary, they must be active, curious and ever expectant of perception that insightfully expands the field of one’s relatedness to the world. A point of convergence between James and Vijayan is that both are more interested in discovery than in definitions,…[and] not to be deterred from pursuing various vital questions simply because they were ruled out a

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priori by such formal and arbitrary distinctions as those between logic and psychology, or between logic and ethics. (Knox 1913)

Spirituality into Action As Mullin says on pragmatism, “A belief is a rule of action… We act on our beliefs; otherwise they are not really beliefs” (Mullin 2007). No action is derived out of a single judgment. Mind perceives experiences separately and then combines them together to lead an individual into action. In the philosophy of action, the intention that leads one to active action [rather than the passive action] plays a significant role. Pragmatism calls for intentional action that leads one forward. Spinoza says: “I will analyze the actions and appetites of men as if it were question of lines, of planes, and of solids” (James 1920). The spirituality of an action comprises the intention that is involved in the process. In his essay, “Worship,” Emerson says “In our definitions, we grope after the spiritual by describing it as invisible. The true meaning of spiritual is real; that law which executes itself, which works without means, and which cannot be conceived as not existing” (Emerson 1876). The reality of spirituality finds expression in action. Donald Davidson [1980, essay 3] asserted that an action, in some basic sense, is something an agent does that was ‘intentional under some description,’ and many other philosophers have agreed with him that there is a conceptual tie between genuine action, on the one hand, and intention, on the other. (Wilson and Shpall 2012)

According to James, many thinkers resort to “medical materialism” which equates religious experience to “diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover” (James 1920). James negates all these arguments: “there is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition” (James 1920). The presence of a mental history or any physiological process cannot be considered as a reason to negate the spiritual significance of an experience. Every scientific doctrine, thoughts or feelings flow from “the state of their possessor’s body at the time” (James 1920). Intrinsic eccentricity is an accepted norm for a genius that does not become a reason to impugn the value of the fruits of their genius. Belittling the productions of similar

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eccentricity of a genius in spirituality based on organic process is a pure bias. While “masterpieces are left unchallenged,” religious geniuses are prejudiced to be inferior in medical materialism. Their [religious opinions] value can only be ascertained by spiritual judgments directly passed upon them, judgments based on our own immediate feeling primarily; and secondarily on what we can ascertain of their experiential relations to our moral needs and to the rest of what we hold as true. Immediate luminousness, in short, philosophical reasonableness, and moral helpfulness are the only available criteria. (James 1920)

Religion is a collective term and the religious sentiment is a “collective name for many sentiments which religious objects may arouse in alteration…” (James 1920), and not a simple abstract religious emotion. Action for Ravi, the protagonist in Khasak, is in his journey of enquiry “hunted by poignant memories of an anarchic past, changing into a spiritual wanderer” (Rajeevan 2005). His collective sentiments begin with his own pure intention of the search for truth. He walked the sunsets all alone, and saw the gods of Khasak in twilight. They stood guard over the follies of men. He saw them in the cavernous interior of the mosque, in the luminous breath of the mouldering dead, on the great tamarind tree, inside the serpent statuettes, beside desolate tracks. What was the mystery they guarded? The palm grove that stretched without end, the twilight neither sunrise nor sunset could resolve? Perhaps this was his sin and his divinity, and the gods and goddesses its witnesses. (Vijayan 1998)

Once Born and the Twice Born Taylor brings out the classification of the once born and the twice born invoking James. The “twice-born” sick souls are who cannot but “see the pain, the loss, the evil, the suffering in the world” and the “once-born” healthy-minded are who think that “all is well with the world and/or that they are on the right side of God” (Taylor 2002). In the contrasting classification, ironically, James prefers the sick souls to the healthy, as being “more profound and insightful” (Taylor 2002).

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Let us then resolutely turn our backs on the once-born and their sky blue optimistic gospel; let us not simply cry out, in spite of all appearances, “Hurrah for the Universe!—God’s in his Heaven, all’s right with the world.” Let us see rather whether pity, pain, and fear, and the sentiment of human helplessness may not open a profounder view and put into our hands a more complicated key to the meaning of the situation. (James 1920)

All of O. V. Vijayan’s protagonists are “sick souls” who cannot but see the sorrows of the world, empathize with them, thus coming out with profound insights. It is the existential angst of Ravi, in Khasak, for instance, that leads him in the journey of discovering truths. Khasakkinte Ithihasam is not just the story of a single village with a single-teacher school, but the celebration of existential tension, lively images, memories of evolution and the intensity of death. Celebration, a word filled with positivity and beauty, is juxtaposed with death and suffering thus opening a new dimension of looking at these human conditions with language as the tool of exposition. To Vijayan, story is an instrument through which he opens up insights that are unique to every writer just like the palm lines in one’s hands, as he says in Ithihasathinte Ithihasam (Vijayan 1989). Nature’s continuous and kind downpourings of vision are those insights that form the spirit of all sentient beings. That day Ravi told the children the story of the lizards. In times before Man usurped the earth, the lizards held sway. A miraculous book opened, the children saw its page rise and turn and flap. Out of it came mighty saurians moving slowly in deep canyons after the dull scent of prey, and pterodactyls rose screaming over their nesting precipices. The story was reluctantly interrupted for lunch; after hurried morsels the children raced back to school and huddled round their teacher. The pages rose and fell again… Long before the lizards, before the dinosaurs, two spores set out on an incredible journey. They came to a valley bathed in the placid glow of sunset. My elder sister, said the little spore to the bigger spore, let us see what lies beyond. This valley is green, replied the bigger spore, I shall journey no farther. I want to journey, said the little spore, I want to discover. She gazed in wonder at the path before her. Will you forget your sister? asked the bigger spore. Never, said the little spore.

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You will, little one, for this is the loveless tale of karma, in it there is only parting and sorrow. The little spore journeyed on. The bigger spore stayed back in the valley. Her roots pierced the damp earth and sought the nutrients of death and memory. She sprouted over the earth, green and contented… A girl with silver anklets and eyes prettied with surma came to Chetali’s valley to gather flowers. The Champaka tree stood alone – efflorescent, serene. The flower-gatherer reached out and held down a soft twig to pluck the flowers. As the twig broke the Champaka said, My little sister, you have forgotten me! (Vijayan 1998)

Khasak cherishes the indigenous myths and legends without the limits of religion, a spiritual culture where the search for meaning itself becomes the spirituality. The creative word for Ravi is a constant companion in the midst of ambiguous questions hovering around him in his quest for meaning. The genuine attempt to resolve these questions itself leads to the purgation of mind. A single-teacher school transforms the whole ambience of the village which was deep rooted in traditional myths, legends, conventional religious practices and superstitions. In the classroom, the students look unconvinced about the story about spiders where the females ate up their mates. They wanted the reason for the death of spiders. The idea that the male was paying for its sins of the previous birth convinces the kids who knew so well about the after-effects of karma. Learning, which had so far been limited to religious studies, is left open to the new world of scientific knowledge, but not by negating all those beliefs which the villagers had cherished so far. Ravi does not try to correct those little beliefs of students which they had heard from their ancestors. However, the perception of the students is thrown open to the new learning without limiting themselves to the amateur religious teachings that they had from the mullah. J. Krishnamurti says: The truly religious person…is seeking what is true, and that very search has a transforming effect on society. That is why education must be principally concerned with helping the student to seek out truth or God, and not merely preparing him to fit into the pattern of a given society. (Krishnamurti 1964)

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To him, religion has nothing to do with the priests, churches, dogmas or organized beliefs. “Religion is the seeking of what is truth, what is God, and this search requires enormous energy, wide intelligence, subtle thinking” (Krishnamurti 1964). Krishnamurti also equates truth to insight which is mystified while thought is the equivalent to consciousness in its basic level. “If the seed of truth is planted, it must operate, it must grow, it must function, it has life of its own” (Krishnamurti 1977). While the growth and operation can be related to the action-oriented philosophy of pragmatism, the inner life corresponds to a mystified truth. To Krishnamurti, truth is a vivid mystical concept while to James, the mystification is a choice. One’s ideas lead one truly because of their intrinsic truth. James says, “The truer is the one that pushes farther; so we are ever beckoned on by the ideal notion of an ultimately satisfactory terminus” (James 1909).

Subtleness of Spiritual Action “A dominant metaphor for spirituality is the journey, which evokes a sense of constant movement and progression” (Paintner 2007). The spiritual evolution of Vijayan as a writer and enquirer moves from the unsettled consciousness of Ravi in Khasak into a more composed Kunjunni in Gurusagaram. The conflicts within the mind of the protagonist Kunjunni, the Delhi-based journalist, are presented with alarming complications as that of the 1971 Indo-Pak War connected with the liberation of Bangladesh, which forms the background of the novel. Like every novel of Vijayan, in Gurusagaram too, it is not just the protagonist alone who undergoes a transition, there are multiple characters who evolve through their relationships to better realize their own existence. Even the dilemma in the revolutionary Thapasachandran is said to be a result of his inability to reach “his Durga” (Vijayan 1987). “Guru,” the ‘enlighten-er’ is not the same for all. The grace that leads can come from a human, many men or nature varying with each one’s spiritual journey. The discovery can be in the form of persuasion, but never one that is forced upon. The subplot of Colonel Balakrishnan who turns to sanyasa adopting the name Nirmalananda brings in a spirituality of sanyasa which is not merely constituted of meditation, but of action. Kunjunni, with his uneasy marriage with Shivani, misses the presence of his most loved daughter Kalyani. His heart leaps with every letter that he receives from his little

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girl. During those disturbed days, it is at the ashrama of his friend Nirmalananda that he finds solace. Kunjunni looked at his watch. He said guiltily, ‘Bala, I have kept you from your dhyana.’ Nirmalananda, though, was full of grace. His serenity rested upon the dark grass around the lake, the breeze-rippled waters, the moon rising above these, and on Kunjunni’s disquiet. He said, ‘You have not kept me from my dhyana.’ (Vijayan 1998)

Here, Nirmalananda is pragmatically spiritual where he finds spirituality not in rigid rituals, rather actions that are of value to himself and his fellow beings at the present. It was Kunjunni who was in need of Nirmalananda’s presence. Giving him that time and space that lead to inner peace itself was dhyana. On pragmatism, Emile Durkheim says: “The basis of our action is a hierarchy of values which we ourselves have established. Our action is therefore only worthwhile if that system of values can be realised, made incarnate, in our world. Pragmatism thus gives a meaning to action” (Durkheim 1983). The warm and spiritual relation that Kunjunni maintains with his daughter Kalyani, in spite of his broken family life with his wife Sivani, remains a strong theme in Gurusagaram. Kalyani’s letters filled with all innocence and love come to her father who is in Delhi. The spirituality transcends the biological limitations when Kunjunni’s love for his daughter remains intact even when he realizes that Kalyani is not his daughter, but that of Pinaki, his wife’s lover. The pathos and pain intensify when this news comes to him when Kalyani passes away after struggling with cancer. The knowledge that comes as a burden melts away on the shores of the river while sitting next to Nirmalananda who shows Kunjunni the expanse of the ocean filled by the grace of the Guru. Kunjunni’s fatherhood, the spiritual relation and love for the daughter could not be contained within biological considerations, but get expression through his action. Cosmic nature hearkened to his cry. He heard millions of leaf voices, rivers and mountains were full of speech. Trees and plants, crystal springs and dumb stones answered reverberantly in Kalyani’s voice. ‘Father! Oh my father!’ (453)

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Taylor invokes James to ascertain the point that “one’s feelings make a difference to one’s action” (Taylor 2002) much more than that of ideas. Nothing could negate the power of his daughter’s love. Vijayan says, “If there is something called the cosmic mind, or a God, it must keep reverberating within the hearts of man and animal” (Rajasekharan 2005) (own translation). In “Humanism and Truth Once More,” James contextualizes pragmatic truth as the more meaningful purpose of philosophy. Rather than functioning from an objective standpoint making pronouncements that must be humanistically appropriated, philosophy, according to James, must become the way life is lived. By this classification, the theoretic distance that separates philosophy from life is reduced and, possibly, erased. Reacting to Mr. Joseph’s criticism of his earlier essay, “Humanism and Truth” to the October issue of Mind (1901), James clarifies what “the pragmatic movement may intelligibly mean” (James 1905). He points to the new alignment so that “the humanistic scheme and the notion of theoretic truth fall into line consistently enough” (James 1905) This is precisely the point of convergence between James and Vijayan. Both were reacting to the human choices of the autocratic institution and the corporate giants who were collectively, by their actions, banishing the human out of all equations. Both James and Vijayan subscribed to a humanism in which truth lay not in “the absolute Idealism (with a capital I)” of the philosophers but in the pragmatism that, much against a mistaken popular notion as opportunism, still “believed in the importance and power of ideals of a more historically and culturally contingent sort” (Coon 1996). Hence, both, in their separate ways, were fighting to restore and revive the spirit of humanism that was rapidly losing hope and faith in the ideals of “pluralism, tolerance, and individual freedom” (Coon 1996) which James did by restoring with a new name some old ways thinking and which Vijayan did by populating, with common folk, a pragmatic fictional space. Both, through their brands of radical empiricism, strove through philosophy and fiction to restore “people’s faith with the ability of the individual and the small group – in ‘small systems of things’ – to create a better world” (Coon 1996). Spirituality, unique to each individual, is beyond sensory experiences and material goals. To James, religion is the individual’s personal relation from “heart to heart, from soul to soul, between man and his maker” (James 1920) in The Varieties of Religious Experiences: A Study

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into Human Nature (1920). Both Vijayan and James meet at the point of discovering the indwelling divinity.

References Chandran, Sarat C. 2015. “O.V.V.’s Magic.” The Hindu, May 3. Literary Review. Coon, Deborah J. 1996. “One Moment in the World’s Salvation”: Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James. The Journal of American History 83 (1) (June): 70–99. Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of American Historians. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945475. Durkheim, Emile. 1983. “Pragmatism and the Question of Truth.” In Pragmatism and Sociology, ed. Emile Durkheim and John B. Allcock. New York: Cambridge University Press. Emerson, Ralph Waldo. 1876. “Worship.” In Conduct of Life, ed. John Johnson Lewis. Ralph Waldo Emerson Texts. 9 March 2009 22:36:32. http://www. emersoncentral.com/worship.htm. 15 May 2014. James, Williams. 1904. “Humanism and Truth.” Mind, New Series 13 (52) (October): 457–475. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248582. ———. 1905. “Humanism and Truth Once More.” Mind, New Series 14 (54) (April): 190–198. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248035. ———. 1907. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green. ———. 1909. The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’. London: Longmans, Green. ———. 1920. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. London: Longmans, Green. Knox, Howard V. 1913. “William James and His Philosophy.” Mind 22 (86) (April): 231–242. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248802. Krishnamurti, J. 1964. Think on These Things, ed. D. Rajagopal. Chennai: Krishnamurti Foundation India. ———. 1977. Truth and Actuality. Chennai: Krishnamurti Foundation India. Mullin, Richard P. 2007. The Soul of Classical American Philosophy: The Ethical and Spiritual Insights of William James, Josiah Royce, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Albany: State University Press. Paintner, Christine Valters. 2007. “The Relationship Between Spirituality and Artistic Expression: Cultivating the Capacity for Imagining.” Newsletter: Spirituality in Higher Education 3 (2) (January): 1–6. Rajasekharan, P.K. (ed.). 2005. O V Vijayante Lekhanangal. Kottayam: DC Books.

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Rajeevan, Thachom Poyil. 2005. “Spiritual Outsider.” The Hindu, May 1. http://www.hindu.com/lr/2005/05/01/stories/2005050100050100.htm. Riepe, Dale. 1968. “A Note on William James and Indian Philosophy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4): 587–590. JSTOR www.jstor.org/sta ble/2105694. Shaw, Miranda. 1987. “William James and Yog¯ac¯ara Philosophy: A Comparative Inquiry University of Hawai’i Press.” Philosophy East and West 37 (3) (July): 223–244. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398517. Taylor, Charles. 2002. Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Vijayan, O.V. 1987. Gurusagaram. Kottayam: DC Books. ———. 1989. Ithihasathinte Ithihasam. 1989. Kottayam: DC Books. ———. 1990. Khasakkinte Ithihasam. Kottayam: DC Books. ———. 1998. trans. O. V. Vijayan: Selected Fiction. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Wilson, George, and Samuel Shpall. Summer 2012 Edition. “Action.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.sta nford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/action/.

CHAPTER 16

Is Homing Spiritual Praxis? Nirmal Selvamony

An action that is conventionally called “spiritual” or “religious” could be understood in light of the concept of tin.ai (home).i If spiritual actions are ultimately soteriologically oriented, their liberative end is identical with “homing” or the articulation of love-based kin relation among the members of home (tolk¯ appiyam III.3.1: 1–2)—supernature, nature and humans. To proceed with this line of thinking, we may begin with the concept of action in tolk¯ appiyam (II.3.29). Eight elements constitute action: act, agent, patient (the one acted upon), place, time, instrument, intention and end (purpose). These eight may be subsumed under three coordinates: agent, patient (one acted upon) and context. If the agent includes instrument and intention, the context does place-time (immanent and transcendent supernature) with all its occupants (objects, natural beings, humans and supernatural beings), and the end of action. In view of the concept stated above, how can we characterize a spiritual act? It usually includes such group actions as congregational worship and funerary rites, or individual actions like prayer, meditation, fasting and so on. Though these actions may involve natural and supernatural beings besides humans, they may tend to become anthropocentric if the

N. Selvamony (B) Former Head, Department of English Studies, and Dean, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Central University of Tamil Nadu, Neelakudy, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_16

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spirit being is not allowed agency. Actions in which all the three members of home enjoy agency will be sacro-naturo-human rather than wholly human. For example, in an ancient Tamil song that speaks of the life of the primal people of the coastal community, the mother of a girl tells her daughter “your sister (Alexandrian Laurel) is more special than you yourself” (narrin.ai 172). A reader who belongs to a state society is likely ¯¯the mother’s reference to the tree as a sister as an example to understand of the use of the “poetic” device, a figure of speech, and in this case, a metaphor. But in reality, the song shares with us “the life” that is lived by the coastal people. What we consider “poetic” experience is actually lovebased kinship that exists in a tin.ai family of which the girl and the tree are members. When the girl moves away from the shade of the sister-tree to that of another, she does so because she considers the tree her real sister rather than a metaphor for a sister. Though the tree does not push the human sister away from under its shade, it does influence her spiritually. The act of moving away from the sister-tree is a response (on the part of the human) to the putative (spiritual) agency attributed to the tree by the human. The tree, in this case, is the natural agent that influences (literally, flows into) the humans even as the supernatural agent “inspires” (or breathes into) the poet. A human being can regard a tree as a real sister rather than as a metaphorical one only when a human being and a tree stand in a lovebased kinship relation, which was normative in a primal society. But when such society gave way to the state society, the relation among the members of the home—human, nature and the sacred—was no more kinship. Now the relation became stratified. The tree was no more kin but another living being, inferior to the humans, at times useful and at other times useless or even harmful. Consider the way the tree is described in the following songs from tirukkural., the most well-known didactic text in Tamil: ¯ Resolve is real glory. Without it people are nothing but trees. (600. Trans. Nirmal Selvamony) Void of humanness, even those with sharp intelligence are like trees. (997. Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

A product of a state society, tirukkural. reflects the worldview of such a ¯ society in which the tree does not collaborate anymore in the human act but remains the object of human representation deprived of any significant agency (Manes). But the narrin.ai song shows how humans and ¯¯

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non-humans are part of a tin.ai, a home in a primal society and how they are co-praxic. In such co-praxis (which is sacro-naturo-human), the supernatural agent is already always present rendering the act “spiritual.” How about much commoner spiritual acts such as fasting and meditation we perform in post-primal societies? Can we say that the “patient” of a spiritual act is always a spiritual being like God? This may be true of prayer. But a crow fed before a meal, the patient of such an act, is both a natural being and a spiritual one, especially the latter when considered an ancestor. What about meditation? The object of contemplation is not always a spiritual being; it might well be a dot on the wall or a thought. The patient in an act of fasting is not a spiritual being but one’s own body. The natural entity, food, is conspicuously absent. While food is not agentive in fasting, in yogic breathing, the universal energy in the form of breath enters the body and energizes it. In short, the natural entity may collaborate in a human action either actively or passively. If the spiritual being is not present as a patient in certain putative spiritual acts like meditation and fasting, why do we consider them “spiritual” at all? In these acts, the spiritual being is present not as the patient but as a part of the context along with several other entities that constitute the praxic territory of the agent (Selvamony, “kaLam and Free Space”), whereas in such actions as prayer, it is patient itself. However, we may not count only those actions in which the spirit being is patient as spiritual ones. As all the three beings (human, spiritual and natural) have their roles in human acts, it is futile to call a particular act “spiritual” or “natural.” Identifying an action by only one of its constituents, such as the patient (nature/supernature/human) or context (supernature-naturehuman) or agent (human), will amount to misrepresentation and denial of equal importance to all the three. The three constituents of action—context, patient and agent—are also members of tin.ai (home). If context includes supernature, nature and human, patient could be either supernature or nature or humans (or a group of two or three members), and the agent is the human being who performs those actions we designate as “spiritual.” In order to see how these members of home articulate a love-based kin relation, let us dwell a little bit on the idea of home itself. Home is usually thought of as a type of scale-specific space (Allen). When we refer to home as nest, house, abode and seat, we think of it as a type of small space, whereas if we conceive of it as habitat, village, town, estate, state, region, country and nation, it is a type of large space. But

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home can also be spoken of in a scale-free manner. For example, when home is described as “residence,” one does not know whether it means a house (small spatial entity) or a country as such (large spatial entity). Definitions of home are not purely spatial in character. They are inflected by temporality, especially when questions of nativity arise. The underlying question is “How long does one have to live in a place in order to call it one’s home?” While present occupancy is the determining parameter, any place currently occupied by a person can count as home as it does to the bioregionalists (Berg 218). But when continuous occupation for a specified period of time is the determining criterion as in the case of citizenship, present occupancy alone will not count for calling a place home. When residential occupancy is extended to maximal past time, say up to the time of one’s birth, the home of the resident may be considered “native”; when it is stretched beyond the lifetime of an individual well into the past, the time of one’s parents, grandparents and even foreparents, home could well be “indigenous.” If we go by the criteria of nativity and indigeneity, an individual could have only one home. But if duration of occupancy were the criterion, then an individual could have multiple homes. Significantly, nativity and indigeneity are not durational notions at all. Even if one does not live in the place where one was born, one’s birthplace is one’s native home, if nativity is acknowledged as a valid criterion for defining home. Even if one has not occupied her/his indigenous home for several generations, it remains her/his indigenous home. Evidently, the notions of nativity and, especially, indigeneity require the criterion of ancestry for calling a place home. Ancestry, in its turn, bridges the natural and the supernatural by including those foreparents who continue to be members of the family only in their spiritual form. One can modify one’s home but can neither deny its existence nor choose to have it or not to have it. Such an understanding of home invalidates all attempts at defining home as something that is created by an agent. All creational definitions of home are diametrically opposed to the understanding of home in primal societies like tin.ai. tin.ai denotes both the primal society and the primal home. The latter includes not only the human agents like the father, mother, child and some relatives but also the non-human agents like other animals, birds, plants and ancestral spirits (Selvamony, “Oikos as Family,” 38; “tiNai as Tree,” 216; Minz 129–130).ii In a typical house of the tribe known as mar¯ am in Manipur in the North East of India, even today the humans

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occupy the inner part of the house along with animals and birds, which take the chamber(s) nearest the front door (Kanga). The ancestral spirits also have their own niche in a primal house. If the ancestors were represented by a fire altar in a Greek oikos (Coulanges 40), in a South Indian house, they may be represented by several devices: a knife, a brick, a stone or even a nail on the wall. Sometimes, there is no representation at all. But such spaces as the sacred groves where the ancestors reside are also regarded as their homes. If Indians called their primal home tin.ai,i the Greeks named it “oikos ” (Everett 36–38). Of the three members of home, only the human being attempts to shift the home to a location of his/her choice or claim that the entire world is her/his home. Reportedly, Chief Seattle pointed out to the European how the latter was ready to abandon her/his ancestors and make a new home in an alien land thousands of miles away from the native home. In his “parting” speech, he said to the Governor “…To us the ashes of our ancestors are sacred and their resting place is hallowed ground. You wander far from the graves of your ancestors and seemingly without regret” (30). Besides being ready to make any place our home for our own reasons, many of us legitimize our “migrancy” on grounds of universality (Selvamony, “Migrancy…”). The persona of Lhasa Tsering, living the life of an exile outside his homeland, Tibet, drives home quite poignantly the fact that one cannot dwell in a universal home: … I can pretend the world is my home, I can tell others what I want them to hear, But how can I hide the truth that is inside me? How? How can I face my days? (11)

The notion of vasudhaiva kutumbakam is very often spoken of as an example of universal home. Bhalchandra Nemade discusses it and shows how it is “damaging to the spirit of nativism” (240–243). He asserts that “…any human being or literature can stand tall only in its own native land and linguistic group” (235). Whether we call the universal home “world home” or “earth family” or “world family,” no such thing exists in the real world. They are all things of the mind (Selvamony, “Serving Flesh …” 103). A real home or family is an entity that can exist only in a particular place in the real world. If the natural member

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of the home, such as a tree, typifies “rootedness” (Selvamony, “tiNai as Tree”), the supernatural member, namely the ancestral spirit, resides in the home-place. For primal people, the place where the ancestor dwells is home, a point which Chief Seattle tried to drive home.iii Though all people today may not understand home in the manner we have described it, everyone is born in a family that lives in a home. In other words, one does not choose one’s native home because it exists already. When one chooses to make a new home, one has to leave behind, if not all, at least some of the original members, especially the ancestor.iv This means that the whole home is not really “portable” (Selvamony, “Portable Homeland”). The concept of home may be better understood if we turn to the homes of the non-human beings. It is true that humans have transported plants and animals to locations other than the homes of the latter to such an extent that it is hard to tell where each plant or animal belonged originally (Crosby). However, the ecological concept of “biome” shows us clearly that plants and animals do have their own homes. They “have evolved to adapt to the climate, topography and available nutrients in a particular ecosystem or biome” (Pickering and Owen 15). “From the bitter cold Poles to the wet heat of the tropical rainforest, and from the mysterious depths of the ocean to windy mountain tops, the world is divided into a series of living zones, called ecosystems. Each zone is the home to a characteristic range of plants and animals” (Scott 59). Though biologists differ among themselves regarding the number of biomes there are on the surface of the earth, five primordial ones are identifiable: scrub jungle or grassland, mountain, arid tract, riverine plain and sea coast (Selvamony, “An Alternative Social Order”). In Western understanding of biome, human communities do not find a significant place. For example, one cannot tell which human communities occupy the mountain biome. But in the theory of tin.ai, each of the five primordial land divisions (scrub jungle, mountain, arid tract, riverine plain and sea coast) includes its own distinctive human communities as well. However, in the course of history, humans and other beings have shifted their home locations. Though migration is not a threat to survival, it denies the migrants the original quality of life. Even as the human can survive in a place that is not her/his home, a plant or animal can also do so. But it is also true that any organism thrives or reaches its full stature only in its own home (Nemade).

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Though we have spoken of home in objective terms, it is more praxic than objective. The praxic mode of home has to be distinguished from the creation of home in non-primal societies discussed earlier. While the former is based on kin relation among the three members (supernature, nature and humans) of home, the latter is an exclusively human institution. Articulation of love-based kin relation among the three members may be called tin.aital or homing. Homing is as much spiritual poiesis (rather than praxis) as it is natural and human. Therefore, characterizing it as “spiritual” is tantamount to misrepresenting it by neglecting its other aspects, namely the human and the natural. Homing is to be home. It is more than being “at home” for the latter suggests that home is a mere place. In fact, homing is the basic need of all the members of home. The desire to be home is most strongly expressed at the time of one’s death. As one is born in a home, it is quite fitting that one lives there and dies there too. Over the first one has no control. But over the others, namely living and dying in one’s home, one does have. Due to a strong ideological pull, several people leave their homes either temporarily (like the nomads) or permanently. Even those who leave home experience a strong desire to return to it. The present writer was surprised to know that the strongest need of even a Christian bishop in his last days was not a heavenly or religious one, but quite a worldly one: returning to his native home and being with his ancestors. That is the only thing he wanted his children to do for him rather than reading the Bible or praying or singing a hymn. Even a Christian who does not believe in ancestor worship craves to be with his ancestors particularly at the time of death. This deep-seated desire to go home is perhaps a stronger urge than several others identified by scholars. Urges such as being happy (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 317), powerful (Nietzsche 411),v instinctive (Freud 563–568) and finding meaning in life (Frankl, The Will to Meaning x, 48) may be effective only when one has full control over one’s bodily and mental functions. But the urge to “home” outlasts the others as a metarational, visceral one. The need to home has to be understood in light of a philosophical anthropology that regards the humans from a holistic perspective, in relation to nature and “supernature,” not individualistically, as a psychosomatic entity. Home subsumes the person. In fact, self-realization, the goal of several religious systems and philosophies, also presupposes the

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primacy of the individual person. Indeed, we need to distinguish this ultimate end from the deep ecological intuition, which is also designated by the same term (Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement” 80). The latter intuition consists in identifying one’s self with the larger self that includes all selves. However, this intuition is not quite the same as homing because the deep ecologists do not see the ancestral being as part of the interrelational ecological web of which the human being is a part. Another primary human need is said to be finding meaning in life. Even this need is an individualistic one privileging life. Primal societies did not value life as most of us do. When there was a choice between honor and life, the former was the uncontested priority of the primal people (tolk¯ appiyam III.3.22). To them, the most pressing priority would not be surviving ghastly situations (like a holocaust as in the case of Frankl), but a life lived for others, a life of love, in which you emptied yourself in order to accommodate the legitimate need of the other. The most immediate other is the one at one’s own home. Living for a world is possible only in thought, not in reality. As Lhasa Tsering’s persona confesses, “I can pretend the world is my home.” One can live only where one is located. Therefore, one’s duty is to live for the others in one’s praxic territory. Hemingway’s short story “The Old Man At The Bridge” exemplifies this point well. The story is about an old man who is unable to leave behind his animals and birds, which he regards probably as the members of his own family, when there is a curfew during the Spanish Civil War (1936– 1939). He does not pretend to be living for all the animals of the world. As in many other cases, one realizes the true value of one’s home only when one views it from the outside. After seeing the whole of the East and the West, one realizes that one’s home is the best. Going out of home or “exhoming” has to be complemented by returning home. When one is out of home, one becomes “nostalgic” (Slovic). Nostalgia is a “painful” feeling (Gk. algia) for one’s “nostos ” (home). Nevertheless, some who step out of their homes do not return. By abandoning their homes (“exhoming”), they disrupt them, yet do not wholly unmake them. Disruption of one’s home impacts both the exhomer and those at home. If the former is rendered “homeless,” the latter are left with a partial home. When one exhomes, one cannot recreate it elsewhere because one severs one’s kinship allegiance to the ancestor who does not migrate. By defying or disregarding the authority of the ancestor (the head of a household), the one who abandons home seeks to form new group allegiance.

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Some persons abandoned their homes and made “homelessness” a way of life. One of the first to make such an attempt was Rishabhadeva, the founder of Jainism. Legend has it that he relinquished his throne and left home to meditate in a grove called Siddhartvana under an Ashoka tree. After standing under this tree in the same meditative posture for twelve months, he became an ascetic, abandoned all his clothes and ornaments and began to wander from place to place (Ghosh 20).vi Combining strict self-discipline and unconventional manners, he made a virtue of wandering and founded asceticism, a new way of homeless life. The twenty-fourth tirthankara, Mahavira is also “said to have left his home at the age of thirty in order to seek salvation and to have wandered for twelve years far and wide in the Ganges valley, until, at the age of fortytwo, he found full enlightenment, and became a ‘complete soul’ (kevalin) and a ‘conqueror’ (jina)” (Sources 43). Another illustrious person who experimented with homeabandonment was the founder of Zoroastrianism, Zarathustra (b. circa 1700 BCE) who left home when he was barely twenty years old to wander for about ten years in search of truth. At the end of his wanderings, he experienced illumination (“Zoroaster”). Abraham (circa 2000 BCE), the founder of Judaism, did much the same thing. He left behind his home at Ur, an important Sumerian city-state (in modern Iraq), and wandered wherever Yahweh led him. According to The Bible, he migrated to Canaan because God had promised to give land to him and his descendants (“The World of Genesis” Atlas ). It might be possible to interpret Abraham’s migration to Harran and then to Canaan as a part of the transhumance behavior of a nomadic tribe to which he belonged. So did Jesus of Nazareth, much later, who left behind his home, gathered twelve disciples about him and forged a new lifestyle. About five hundred years before Jesus Christ, Siddhartha (Buddha), a prince of Shakya Republic at the foot of the Himalaya, also abandoned his royal home to found an alternative way of life. At about the same time, there lived an eminent Chinese scholar, Lao Tzu (6th c. BCE), who quit his job in a library of the Zhou Dynasty when he was disenchanted with the corrupt practices of the state and went into exile at the age of eighty. He is said to have travelled on the back of a water buffalo to reach as far as Tibet. Reportedly, he returned from his wanderings to live the life of a hermit at ripe old age (“Lao Tzu: Father of Taoism”). Lao Tzu’s younger

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contemporary Confucius (551 BCE–479 BCE) departed from his homeland when he was fifty-four years old for political reasons. He remained in self-exile for about fourteen years and returned home in utter poverty and spent his last years teaching his disciples (“Confucius”). In the post-Christian era, some of the Saivite and Vaishnavite saints (who collectively founded Hinduism) also chose the homeless lifeway. K¯araikk¯alammaiy¯ar (punitavati), the first saint of Saivism, became ¯ her home but because her husband homeless not because she left (paramatattan) left her, married another woman and made a new home for himself ¯(Pechilis). However, Ammaiy¯ar’s homelessness cannot be understood except in relation to her devotion to Siva. Akkamahadevi, a fellow follower of Siva, sums up her experience in the following verse: To quench hunger I roam the country for alms; To quench thirst I seek brooks, tanks and wells; To pass the night I go to the unswept temple; Channamallikarjunadeva! To find company for the spirit I turn to Thee! (Santhanam 313)

Home-abandonment often entails foregoing one’s natal family and remaining without one or recreating another by entering into familial relation with the head of one’s religion. If ton.t.arat.ippot.iy¯alv¯ar, a Vaishnavite ¯ saint, sings: “He who is radiant and dwells in Thiruvarangam is father and mother…” (tirum¯ alai 37: 1–2), m¯an.ikkav¯acakar, a Saivite saint, considers civan his mother and father (tiruv¯ acakam 37: 3:1), and Akkamahadevi sees¯her deity, Channamallikarjuna, as her husband: You are my husband and I, your wife. I have none else, O Lord. Falling in love with you, I came, I followed you. When every passerby is grabbing my hands, Tell me, O Husband, How can you stand it? O master Channamallikarjuna, When strangers are dragging away The woman leaning on your arms, O king of compassionate ones, Is it proper to stand aside and look on? (I Keep Vigil of Rudra 110)

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My husband comes home today. Wear your best, wear your jewels. The Lord, white as jasmine, will come anytime now. Girls, come meet Him at the door. (Mahadeviyakka 322, Speaking of Siva 121) For ages have I wooed Thee As Thy bride and I come to Thee Anointed with the sacred ash, The bridal thread upon my wrist, Channamallikarjunadeva! That I may Thy consort be! (Santhanam 314)

Though the relationship between Jesus and the church was spoken of as one between a bridegroom and bride (Ephesians 5:25; John 3:29), and his relationship with his own mother was a subject mentioned in The Bible (John 19:26–27), he too devalued the worldly family. When his mother and brother came to see him, “Someone said, ‘Your mother and your brothers are here outside, they want to speak to you.’”Jesus turned to the man and said, “Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?” and pointing to his disciples, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers!” “Whoever does the will of my heavenly Father is my brother and sister and mother”. (Matthew 12:46–50)

Rejection of one’s natal home characterizes the texts of the founders of religion as well as those of the saints. Also consider the following verse of a well-known saint, Kabir (15th c.): “The whole world did I discover,” Kabir says, “for a permanent home, Having examined well I found: Except God no one was my own”. (Karki 73)

Besides challenging the normative family, home-abandonment menaces sexuality itself, the very foundation of family and home. The Kannada saints convey this idea quite forcefully in the following verses: If they see breasts and long hair coming they call it woman, if beard and whiskers they call it man: but, look, the self that hovers in between is neither man nor woman, O Ramanatha. (Dasimayya 133, Speaking of Siva 9)

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Look here, dear fellow: I wear these men’s clothes only for you. Sometimes I am a man, sometimes I am a woman. O lord of the meeting rivers, I’ll make war for you. but I’ll be your devotee’s bride. (Basavanna 703, Speaking of Siva 11)

Home-abandonment seems to be, perhaps, the most important condition for the founding of a religion. In other words, religion calls for an anti-home attitude on the part of the founders. If homing or the proper relationship of humans with the non-human world is the soteriological end of religion, it is quite ironical that religion originates from home-abandonment. The oldest religion, Jainism, set the trend of recommending the homeless lifestyle. Even today, one can see how all the major religions negotiate home-abandonment and home-orientedness. The more religious the more “homeless.” Kinship and tradition wither away when religionvii grows upon a seeker who exhomes and quests after a new relationship with a home-substitute. Rishabhadeva is the first-known human being in world history (there could be others who are not spoken of in historical accounts though!) to experiment with exhoming. He was possibly a contemporary of the Indus Valley people or even preceded them (Sangave 132). The image of the ascetic seated cross-legged surrounded by beasts in one of the seals of the Indus Valley shares some of the characteristics of this archetypal exhomer (Sangave 108–109): disregard for proper clothing, disheveled appearance and yogic posture. Historical accounts of this pioneer exhomer do not fail to mention all but the last item on this list. When people first came upon such a person, they were, not surprisingly, baffled. Street brats even threw stones at him because they considered such a man mad. Amusement, ridicule and hostility soon turned into perplexity, awe and reverence.viii One of the fundamental features of exhoming is utter disregard of the body. Initially, the exhomer could have even taken efforts to attend to those needs of the body which were part of the routine of the home-based lifestyle. But eventually such attention could have been more trouble than help in the quest after a new identity. This means that home is necessary to look after the body in a conventional and traditional way. Some of the routinized basic bodily needs such as food, cleanliness, clothing and shelter (in such ecosystems where clothing and housing are necessities

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than comforts) dictate the biological, praxiological and cultural rhythm of a home/society. When one leaves home, it is not possible to maintain the idiorhythmic routine anymore. Under such circumstances, the exhomer believes that he/she is better off disregarding the body rather than suffering the guilt of neglect. Exhoming is the origin of asceticism also. This is why tiruval..luvar spoke of two types of ethics, the domestic and the ascetic (illaram and ¯ turavaram; family life and renunciation). Asceticism and renunciation are ¯ ¯ inalienably associated with exhoming. Though renunciation within homelife is a theoretical possibility, actual practice demands abandonment of home.ix Home-abandonment, the basis of religion and asceticism, seems to be an anti-natural and anti-tin.ai act or desire from evolutionary and ecological perspectives. As such, a human being is born within a home, more specifically, a tin.ai, and lives in it. The ultimate values of life, namely happiness (inpam), substance (porul.) and morality (aram) (tolk¯ appiyam ¯ are realized within this primordial home ¯not as autonomous III.3.1: 1–2), values but through different actions and interactions therein. Though tin.ai was, probably, not always a picture of perfection, social interactions were regulated by the ultimate values. But when state society emerged, it offered opportunities for new interactions and behavioral experiments. One could meet people from other places and nations who practiced alien customs and beliefs (pat..tinapp¯ alai 213–218). Such encounters could ¯ have motivated the tin.ai-dwellers to look at their own lifestyle critically. When there are two different beliefs about the same phenomenon, you may either see them as two different ones (legitimizing diversity), or grade and prioritize them to see which is the better of the two. The latter is the usual approach of the truth-seekers of the state society. Truth-seeking is closely related to the soteriological ends of religion: nirvana (as in Jainism and Buddhism) and salvation (as in Christianity), which may well be subsumed under “proper interrelationship” of the members of tin.ai. To be enlightened or “saved” or to turn away from sin is to orient oneself properly to the human, natural and supernatural members of one’s home. If so, the ultimate goal of life of humans and other organisms is to (re)orient their relationship to the other members of their homes. Such (re)orientation is synonymous with homing in tin.ai but not in the major religions. In fact, truth-seeking culminates in the affirmation of one’s own truth and denial of those of the others. Such denial is not without adverse

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consequences—fundamentalism, communalism and crusades. To Deloria, the purpose of religion is not truth-seeking but “integration of land and peoples in harmonious unity” (292),x ultimately, homing. Homing has to be seen as a basic right of all organisms including the human. A major threat to this right is the state society itself. Most collective human enterprises which go hand in hand with state formation, namely deforestation, invasion, war, development, urbanization, colonization, imperialism and civilization, are dehoming ones one way or another. Nothing drives home this point more emphatically than the postmodern theory, namely ecocriticism. Though ecocriticism has been defined in more than one way by ecocritics, we might do well to see it as the criticism of home (Gk. oikos; oikos + kritos = oikocriticism > ecocriticism). It is a kind of criticism which explores the relation between an organism and its home. We may briefly discuss this relation in the following poem of Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih: Only Strange Flowers Have Come To Bloom Since David Scott, they have come a long way, these pears, supplanting the natives everywhere. And charming, when spring returns, their youthful forms, their blossoms giving us such a sweet look. In winter they seem starved and stand despairing in the cold having worked out their own misery. Like them we shed our old ways and having shed them we find no spring to bring the flowers back. For how long can we go on living like wind-blown thistle downs? In the park I saw those strange flowers again

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that I have seen bossing around courtyards and private gardens. Like flowers, only strangers and strange ways have come to bloom in this land. (Nongkynrih 6–7)

In his footnote to this poem, the author glosses the fact that “pears were brought to the Khasi Hills by David Scott, [the] infamous British ‘conquistador’ of the region” (Nongkynrih 6). While operating as an agent of the British Raj for about twenty-nine years (1802–1832) in the Khasi Hills and thereabouts, Scott had apparently introduced among other foreign elements, the common pear also in this part of the North East of India. Perhaps Scott found the temperate climate of the high altitude plateau region of the Hills congenial for the alien pear (“Pear: Tree and Fruit”).xi Though a temperate fruit tree could grow in any temperate area of the world, it belongs to a home, which has its own ecological web. The temperate pear is still a stranger even in a temperate area of the Khasi Hills, as Nongkynrih points out because David Scott did not see the tree as a member of a home, but as an individual that could be planted anywhere he desired. Displacing the tree from its native home, Scott dehomed it. In an alien land, the pear is a bossy invader who displaces the natives. If pear is the invader in the Khasi home of Nongkynrih, rice is the intruder in the home of the speaker-persona of a contemporary Tamil poem. While the speaker in the Khasi poem does not list the native organisms displaced by the alien intruder, the speaker in the Tamil poem laments the loss of the native species of his dryland home. The poem communicates quite poignantly the destructive outcome of such development venture as the building of a dam. The “algia” (aching) for “nostos ” (home) on the part of the speaker is unmistakable in the event of the impending dehoming wrought by the apparently benign irrigated agricultural project which seeks to convert the dryland into a wet one. With the drylands becoming wet There is no shade anymore. Is it just that there is no shade? No millet, no maize; No gourd that climbs and blooms in the evening;

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No partridges that stir out suddenly From under the groundnut plants At the slightest sound; No pigeons in the shade of the neem Among the cactus hedge; No coucals, no koels. No cassia, the croton of the dry lands To inspire the koel to sing. The bare dam built on the small stream Laid waste our village. The dams on Kaaviri had destroyed Forests far and wide. We lost our forests for rice, And then, no rain; Now, no forest, and no rice. (“puñcai nañcay¯ aki,” palamalay. Trans. ¯ Nirmal Selvamony)

If Nongkynrih and palamalay bring home to us the ill effects of ¯ the following sonnet of his, touches upon dehoming, Wordsworth, in the possibility of rehoming, which consists in remaking of a home in disrepair.xii The world is too much with us; late and soon, Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers; Little we see in Nature that is ours; We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon; The winds that will be howling at all hours, And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers, For this, for everything, we are out of tune; It moves us not.–Great God! I’d rather be A pagan suckled in a creed outworn; So might I, standing on this pleasant lea, Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn; Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn. (1802; Noyes 317)

The speaker-persona in the above poem is unable to enjoy the companionship of the oceanic supernatural creatures such as Proteus and Triton. He/she is not in tune with the natural and the supernatural members of her/his home because he/she does not believe in the supernatural

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anymore. But without belief the desired harmony is unattainable. Now, why does not the speaker believe in the supernatural? Though the answer is not stated directly, we can infer that it is the speaker’s Christian faith which prevents her/him from believing in the existence of such supernatural creatures as Proteus and Triton. In fact, it would be a sin for a Christian to believe in any such thing. Therefore, he/she wishes that he/she were nurtured in paganism rather than Christianity so that he/she could be in tune with nature and the sacred and rebuild the disrupted home. Building and rebuilding home, the most fundamental actions, are at once spiritual, natural and human. So far we have seen that the liberative end of any praxis we choose to call “spiritual” or “religious” is in effect synonymous with homing or articulating love-based kin relation among the supernatural, natural and human members of home and that such praxis is in fact poiesis, not entirely spiritual but at once sacro-naturo-human homing. Though religion originated from home-abandonment, and the state societies we live in have dehomed us considerably, homing continues to be the basic need of humans.

Notes i. For a discussion of the meanings of tin.ai, see Nirmal Selvamony’s “tin.ai Studies.” ii. Anthropologist Elizabeth Marshall Thomas observes: “Among all mammals, and among most other vertebrates, the basic social unit is a mother and her children. But the so-called social animals form strong and fundamental alliances far in excess of the bare bones maternal tie. Among dogs the basic unit is the pack, classically a mated pair with their young from several litters. Among people the unit is the extended family, a hunter-gatherer band” (80). Evidently, the extended family Thomas speaks of does not include non-human beings, who are also legitimate members of the family, tin.ai; nor do most other definitions of family (Goode 31; “The changing family in Asia”; Herberger & McEwan 8). iii. To the Chinese, homeland is ancestral land, “zuguó” ˇ on account of the rooted ancestors present in the home-place (Yang 167; Stafford 115). iv. A prevalent notion in Tamil Nadu is that it is possible to move the ancestor (kulateyvam) from one place to another. They seek to accomplish this feat by transferring a handful of earth (pit.iman.) from the original home-place of the ancestor to the new location. Alternatively, they also carry images or representations of the ancestor to their new homes (Selvamony, Fieldwork). The spirit of the ancestor and the place where it dwells

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v. vi.

vii.

viii. ix.

x.

xi.

xii.

become inseparable when the spirit inhabits a place. But the notion of the portability of the ancestor is based on the mistaken assumption (of the state society) that spirit and its dwelling place are separable. For the preeminence of power in Adler’s work, see Freud’s “An Autobiographical Study,” in The Freud Reader 33. Supposedly, Rishabhadeva is said to have wandered through Konka, Venkata, Kutaka and southern Karnataka, or the western part of the peninsula and influenced the people of these places (Gopalan 15). Evidently, the word religion here refers to the “classical” religions, especially Jainism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Saivism and Vaishnavism. All these religions are products of the state society and have to be contrasted with the pre-religious spirituality of primal society. The Greek Stoics share many of these traits but they belong to a much later time, say around 500 BCE. R. K. Narayan’s personae have a strong desire to renounce. Even if they are householders, they consider asceticism superior to domesticity. Nagaraj, the protagonist of The World of Nagaraj, practices temporary asceticism almost every day in his own house by putting on an ocher robe and isolating himself from the rest of his family in a meditative mood in a separate room (12). Other protagonists like Chandran (of The Bachelor of Arts ), Jagan (The Vendor of Sweets ) and Raju (The Guide) either have a fling at asceticism or embrace it at some point in their lives. See: Selvamony’s “Serving Flesh and Fish Blood.” Vine Deloria Jr. points out that “This feeling of importance of land is also present in Western countries, but it has undergone a radical change. It has transformed itself into patriotism on the one hand and religious nationalism on the other” (145). Pyrus pyrifolia or the Asian Pear and Pyrus serotina or the Wild Pear are the two major species of pear grown commercially in Meghalaya and a few other parts of the North East of India (www.kiran.nic.in/pdf/public ations/Diversity_of_Horticulture.pdf). Peter Berg’s concept of reinhabitation has to be distinguished from rehoming. The former has to do with an individual or a group of humans learning to live in harmony with a place already damaged by disruptive lifestyle, whereas the latter has to do with remaking a family of humans and non-humans.

References Allen, John S. 2015. Home: How Habitat Made Us Human. New York: Basic Books.

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Aristotle. 1947. Nichomachean Ethics. Book I. Chapter 7, 1097: 20. Trans. W.D. Ross. In Introduction to Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, 317. New York: The Modern Library. Atlas of the Bible with A-Z Guide to Places. 1983. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Berg, Peter. 1978. Reinhabiting a Separate Country: A Bioregional Anthology of Northern California. San Francisco: Planet Drum Foundation. “Confucius.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/ent ries/confucius. Coulanges, Fustel De. 1916. The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws and Institutions of Greece and Rome. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton Kent & Co., Ltd. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.81548/page/n43. Crosby, Alfred W. 2000. Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900, 2nd ed. Reprint. Cambridge University Press. Deloria, Jr., Vine. 1994. God Is Red: A Native View of Religion. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing. Everett, W.J. 1990. “Work, Family and Faith: Reweaving Values.” In Value Education Today, ed. J.T.K. Daniel and Nirmal Selvamony, 36–38. Madras and New Delhi: Madras Christian College and All-India Association for Christian Higher Education. Frankl, Viktor E. 1988. The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy. Reprint. New York: Plume. Freud, Sigmund. 1995. “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” In The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay, 563–568. Vintage. Ghosh, A. 1974. Jaina Art and Architecture. Published on the occasion of the 2500th Nirvana Anniversary of Tirthankara Mahavira, vol. 1. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanapith. Goode, William J. 1964. The Family. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc. Gopalan, S. 1975. Outlines of Jainism. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited, 1 rpt., 1975. Hemingway. 2014. “Old Man at the Bridge,” September 3. www.biblioklept. org/2012/0706/read-the-old-man-at-the-bridge-a-short-story-by-ernestmhe mingway. Herberger, L., and P.J.M. McEwan. 1978. “The Family as a Unit in Health Studies.” In Health and the Family: Studies on the Demography of Family Life Cycles and Their Implications. Geneva: World Health Organisation. I Keep Vigil of Rudra: The Vachanas. 2010. Trans. H.S. Shivaprakash. Penguin Books. Kanga, Monica (presently, Doctoral Scholar, Department of English, University of Hyderabad, India). 2014. A Personal Interview, August 2. Karki, Mohan Singh. 2001. Kabir: Selected Couplets from The Sakhi in Transversion. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited.

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“Lao Tzu: Father of Taoism.” www.chebucto.ns.ca/Philosophy/Taichi/lao.html. Lhasa Tsering. 2003. Tomorrow and Other Poems. Rupa & Co. Manes, Christopher. 1996. “Nature and Silence.” In The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology, ed. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm, 15–29. University of Georgia Press. Minz, Nirmal. 1998. “Sarhul: A Way of Maintaining Life in the Primal Societies of Jharkhand.” In Spiritual Traditions: Essential Visions for Living, ed. David Emmanuel Singh, 129–130. Delhi and Bangalore: ISPCK/UTC. Naess, Arne. 1995. “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects.” In Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions, 64–84. Boston and London: Shambhala. Narayan, R.K. 2012. The World of Nagaraj. Mysore: Indian Thought Publications. 14th Reprint. narrin.ai. https://www.projectmadurai.org/pm_etexts/716utf8/pmuni0296. ¯¯ html. Nemade, Bhalchandra. 1997. “Nativism in Literature.” In Nativism: Essays in Criticism, ed. Makarand Paranjape, 233–254. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Nietzsche. 1968. The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books. Nongkynrih, Kynpham Sing. 2011. The Yearning of Seeds: Poems. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India. Noyes, Russell (ed.). 1959. English Romantic Poetry and Prose. New York: Oxford University Press. 3rd Printing. pat..tinapp¯ alai. https://www.projectmadurai.org/pm_etexts/utf8/pmuni0479. ¯ html. pazamalay. 1999. “puñcai nañcay¯ aki,” kur¯ o.t.tankal.¯ o.tu koñca n¯eram, 1991; trans. ¯ Discourse of Development.” In Nirmal Selvamony, “Post-coloniality and the Post-coloniality: Reading Literature, ed. C.T. Indira and Meenakshi Shivram, 67. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. “Pear: Tree and Fruit.” Encyclopedia Britannica. www.britannica.com/EBchec ked/topic/447953/pear. Pechilis, Karen. “Karaikkal Ammaiyar.” World Religions and Spirituality. https:// wrldrels.org/2017/05/27/karen-pechilis/. Pickering, Kevin T., and Lewis A. Owen. 1997. An Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge. Sangave, Vilas Adinath. 2001. Facets of Jainology: Selected Research Papers on Jain Society, Religion and Culture. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan Pvt. Ltd. Santhanam, K. (ed.). 1969. An Anthology of Indian Literatures. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. Scott, Michael. 1994. Ecology. Oxford University Press.

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Seattle, Chief. 1972. “My People…” In T.C. McLuhan’s Touch The Earth: A Self-Portrait of Indian Existence. New York: Pocket Books. Selvamony, Nirmal. 2003–2004a. “Oikos as Family.” tiNai 3. Chennai: Persons for Alternative Social Order. ———. 2003–2004b. “tin.ai Studies.” tin.ai 3. Nirmaldasan and Nirmal Selvamony. Chennai: Persons for Alternative Social Order. http://www.angelfire. com/nd/nirmaldasan/ts.html. ———. 2005. “Human Identity in Some Contemporary Asian Poems.” Akshara: Annual Research Journal of Critical and Creative Writing in English 1 (1, March): 1–18. ———. 2006. “Migrancy in Literature.” In Migrant Voices in Literatures in English, ed. Sheobhushan Shukla and Anu Shukla, 115–126. New Delhi: Sarup & Sons. ———. 2008a. “Portable Homeland: Robin Ngangom’s Take on the Dying tiNai Tradition in the Indian North East.” Kavya Bharati 20: 150–170. ———. 2008b. “The Limits to Human Identity.” Sacred Heart Perspectives: Journal of Culture and Religion 3 (1): 42–67. ———. 2009. “An Alternative Social Order.” In Value Education Today: Explorations in Social Ethics, ed. J.T.K. Daniel and Nirmal Selvamony, 215–236. Chennai: New Century Book House, rpt. 2009. ———. 2012/2013. “Serving Flesh and Fish Blood as Neopostcolonial Poetics.” A Review Essay on S. Shankar’s Flesh and Fish Blood: Postcolonialism, Translation and the Vernacular. University of California Press and Orient Blackswan Private Limited. In Journal of Contemporary Thought 37 (2013): 95–112. ———. 2013. “tiNai as Tree: Revisiting Tree Worship in Tamil tiNai Societies.” In Ecology and Life Writing, ed. Alfred Hornung and Zhao Baisheng, 215– 239. Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Winter. ———. 2015. “kaLam and Free Space in Nongkynrih’s The Yearning of Seeds.” Kavyabharati 27: 199–221. ———. 2018. Fieldwork on kulateyvam (clan deity) in Tiruvarur District, March–June. Slovic, Scott. Nostalgia. “Varieties of Environmental Nostalgia.” www.docin. com/p-192284694. Sources of Indian Tradition. 1958. Volume 1. Gen. Ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press. Speaking of Siva. 1973. Trans. A.K. Ramanujan. Penguin Books. Stafford, Charles (ed.). 2004. Living with Separation in China. Routledge. The Bible: New Revised Standard Version. 1989. Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers. “The Changing Family in Asia: Bangladesh, India, Japan, Philippines and Thailand.” 1992. Bangkok, Thailand: UNESCO; UNESCO Principal Regional Office for Asia and Pacific.

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Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall. 1994. The Tribe of Tiger: Cats and their Culture. Simon & Schuster. tirukkural.. uraikkottu (A Compendium of Commentaries), 7th ed. tiruppanant¯a.l: ¯ ¯ k¯acittirumat . am, I Part (Ethics), 2007; II Part (Statecraft) 2011; III Part (Love) 2008. tirum¯ alai. 2000. The Sacred Book of Four Thousand. Nalayira Divya Prabandham Rendered in English with Tamil Original, trans. Srirama Bharati. Chennai: Sri Sadagopan Tirunarayanaswami Divya Prabandha Pathasala. tiruv¯ acakam. 1984. Ed. n¯ı. kantac¯amippil..lai. an.n.¯amalai nakar: Annamalai University. tolk¯ appiyam. https://www.projectmadurai.org/pm_etexts/pdf/pm0100.pdf. Wordsworth. The World Is Too Much with Us. https://poets.org/poem/worldtoo-much-us. Yang, Fenggang. 1999. Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation and Adhesive Identities. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. “Zoroaster.” New World Encyclopedia. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ entry/Zoroaster.

CHAPTER 17

Performative as the Language of Pragmatism: A Reading of Indian Spirituality Ranjan Kumar Panda

In the discourse of performative, telling and meaning are represented as a single unit. The idea of statement making, in this connection, is considered as performative act that exhibits meaning and shows speech and action have same epistemic status (Searle 1969). The epistemological significance of the performative expression brings in the role moral agency into the dialogical space of communication where dialogue and conversations are treated as important realm of developing understanding. Truth is grasped being engaged in dialogical form of communication, where one encounters an intentional engagement that not only discloses the agent’s intention, but also provides an opportunity to share the meaning. In this regard, the pragmatists’ notion of meaning and truth goes hand in hand. In other words, truth and meaning are not beyond the realm of the grammar of language, rather very much part of the linguistic/communicative intentionality that pervades our everyday life. Moreover, the communicative intentionality that forms the dialogue

R. K. Panda (B) Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_17

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elucidates normativity involved in the articulation of statements or expressions (Panda 2012). The speaker and the listener as moral agents live in the realm of the dialogical space exhibiting commitments and obligation to each other. Thus, the pragmatists’ theorization of meaning emphasizes cooperative commitment and cooperative responsibility. In this chapter, I would like to discuss the intentional communicative structure in which the semantics of the performative is discussed. This would also help us comprehend the semantics of the language of spirituality that involves (karuna) love, freedom and self-knowledge that are considered as the expressions of the spiritual in the theoretical framework of Indian spirituality. Indian spirituality has always emphasized the ethical and dissociated from the religious construal of the spiritual. In this regard, normativity is intrinsic to the language of Indian spirituality. The contemporary Indian philosophers like Radhakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo, Gandhi, et al. have critiqued the language of spirituality. They have articulated the notion of spirituality emphasizing the normativity of human life which is in harmony with the philosophical significance of the purus¯ arthas —the end or the meaning of life.

Philosophizing as Dialogical Inquiry: Absence and Presence of Spirituality The notion of philosophizing as dialogical inquiry is central to Indian philosophy. This has been very well highlighted by Amartya Sen and A. Raghuramaraju. Sen tries to bring out various modes of argumentative encounters and their deep groundings in the intellectual narrative of Indian tradition (Sen 2005). The argumentative tradition that Sen explores shows an epistemic turn ‘towards uniformity and orthodoxy in contemporary India’ (Guha 2005). Raghuramaraju, on the other hand, reflects on the fact that how the dialogical structure of Indian philosophical tradition is ruptured by the colonial intervention (Raghuramaraju 2006). Both Sen and Raghuramaraju have moved away from the mainstream thinking on the notion of spirituality in Indian philosophical tradition. Lucian Pye while reviewing Sen’s Argumentative Indian makes this observation: “Moving beyond the standard depictions of “Spiritual India” in mainstream sociology and anthropology, Sen delights in exploring paradoxes, in which Indian cultural attributes usually seen as problems and liabilities are made into virtues” (Pye 2006: 171). This is also true in the case of Raghuramaraju’s reading of the dialogical nature

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of Indian philosophy. His interest lies in exploring the politics of the dialogue rather than the debates on Indian spirituality. Referring to the reconstructive phase of the classical Indian philosophy, Raghuramaraju gives a brief citation of the writing of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan which goes like this “[philosophy in India is] …essentially spiritual. It is the intense spirituality of India, and not any great political structure or social organization that it has developed, that has enabled it to resist the ravages of time and accidents of history… the spiritual motives dominates the life in India” (Raghuramaraju 2006: 12). My essay here does not intend to offer the critique of the intellectual investigation of these two texts. Rather, my concern here is to delve into the performative nature of language of spirituality in the discourse of the dialogical inquiry of philosophizing. Philosophical dialogues and conversations are both logical and intentional. The logicality of the dialogue aims at construing new knowledge with clarification, justification, validation, etc. For instance, the dialogue between Y¯ajñavalkya and his wife Maitreyi in Brihad¯ aranyaka Upanishad is not mere conversation in the context of settlement of property between Maitréyi and K¯aty¯ayani, rather the conversation that unfolds the juxtaposition between the materiality of life and the spirituality of life. Maitreyi: ‘Blessed one, if I had this whole earth, filled with riches, would I become immortal by it?’ Y¯ ajñavalkya: ‘Oh, no, no.’ ‘Your life would be as the life of the wealthy, but there is no hope for immortality through riches.’ Maitréyi: ‘what use to me is something by which I cannot become immortal? Blessed one, teach me what you know.’ Y¯ ajñavalkya: ‘Ah, dear as you are to me, you have grown yet dearer. Come sit down, I will teach you: but as I explain, meditate upon it’.

Let us look at the method of Y¯ajñavalkya’s teaching. He teaches Maitreyi to relate with the self with love to the dearest husband, wife, children, priesthood, royalty, world, the self… ‘it is the self that must be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon, all this is known’ (Roebuck 2000: 90–91). Here, Y¯ajñavalkya’s basic recommendation to Maitreyi is to contemplate and understand the reality of the self . The self as the source of action need not be identified with the behaviour that it causes. The behaviourists have tried to construe by reducing the notion of self to the behaviours. Actions are voluntary and intentional. It occurs in the knowledge of the self. But behaviours are

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bodily, caused by various functions of the bodily activities. To consider that self is cause of behaviour is to locate self entirely within the body. On the other hand, some think that the self is embedded in the body and independent of the body. In other words, the materiality of the life does not envelop the self, whereas, for behaviourists or the materialists, the body is the self. Could the self be located in that way? Or, it is something that is neither inside nor outside the body, rather is the wisdom itself. Y¯ajñavalkya clarifies to Maitreyi through the analogy of taste of the rocksalt/saindalavana. He says, “As a lump of rock-salt is without an inside, without outside, and consists entirely of taste, so this self is without an inside, without an outside, consists entirely of wisdom” (Roebuck 2000: 92). This illustration puts Maitreyi in confusion, that is, the problematic of dualism embedded in the very nature of knowing. The notion of knowing as an act and the notion of knowing as an act of a knower are logically related. Maitréyi was suggested to grasp this logical relation (dharma) in order to understand the immortality of the self. Y¯ajñavalkya’s construal of the notion of self as real is grounded on the discourse of self-knowledge and its semantics. As knowledge seeking is an integral part of philosophizing, the intent of Y’s conversation with M in this regard is to show her that ‘immortality of the soul’ signifies ‘infallible self-knowledge by which everything is known’. While elucidating the intent of Y¯ajñavalkya’s philosophizing self-knowledge, Nayak writes, “To my mind, Y¯ajñavalkya here is drawing the attention of Maitreyi away from metaphysical questions regarding consciousness after death or liberation and is asking her to concentrate on philosophical enlightenment, the infallible and self-complete knowledge of non-dual reality. For Y¯ajñavalkya, different varieties of speculation about life after death or condition of dying person may be significant from the standpoint of layman who is interested in survival; but one, who is free from desires on account of philosophical wisdom, being nondifferent Brahman, is merged in Brahman and there is no question of transmigration in his case” (Nayak 2002: 72). Philosophical knowledge frees oneself from the bondage of duality. It helps us transcend the materiality of life. Such knowledge is infallible by knowing which one could know everything. So, Y¯ajñavalkya was interested to show Maitreyi the importance of articulating selfknowledge with a reflective thinking which is central to philosophizing. Knowledge alone can help us in this regard, as it brings enlightenment. However, the reflective attitude of the self needs to be further illustrated: ‘self is something which can conceive of itself as itself’ (Ganeri

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2012: 112). In connection with the Upanishadic conception of self, Ganeri clarifies that self is portrayed as ‘a single mass of cognition’. He writes, “The self is spoken of there as being without a core or a surface, but as pervading the subject in the way that salinity pervades brine water or salt crystals. The implication is that it is something which is diffused throughout one’s experiential life: ‘When a chunk of salt is thrown in water, it dissolves into that water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way this Immense Being has no limit or boundary and is a compact mass (ghana) of cognition (vijn¯ ˇ ana)’ (Brhad. Up.2.4.12). The picture is of the self as being an invariant mode of self-consciousness which saturates the entirety of one’s inner life, a constant hum of presence to oneself” (Ganeri 2012: 121). The story of self involves the knowledge of the interiority of life and also its presence in the form of a body. The body as the representation of the materiality of life is not neglected; rather, it is essential to understand the condition of embodiment. In this connection, the cognition or the knowledge of the self is to show that complexity involved in understanding the ontology of the self. The spirituality of life will be a meaningful philosophical discourse not by denying its ontology of self. Spirituality without self and self-knowledge is something vacuous. Hence, Y¯ajñavalkya’s dialogue with Maitréyi clarifies the significance of knowledge/truth seeking and benefit of perseverance to obtain clarity on meaning and truth concerning the notion of self and its immortal presence.

Dialogue as Performative Act: An Inquiry Concerning the Universality of the Self The rationality underneath the dialogue aims to explicate the values of life which pertains to the intentional mode of engagement. The intentional mode refers to the ontology of the semantic structure that unfolds the intentional engagement between the self and its other. In other words, the intentionality holds the relationship between the subjective pole of addressing and telling and object pole that listens to and acts upon the expression. Referring to this intentional engagement, Ramchandra Gandhi writes, “One would say that this result in a situation where a response is not sought to be elicited from audience, but is solicited from him. And human beings because of the form of their social life have good reasons for responding to the solicitation of their human beings” (Gandhi

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1974: 107). The notion of addressing, for Gandhi, is primitive, whereas it is absent in the case of the Searlean account of performatives. It is also to be noted that the notion of eliciting is causally cohesive. It is causing communicative context.1 The condition of solicitation unfolds the normative demand fulfilled by hearer for the accomplishment of communicatively exhibited act. Gandhi critiques the Searlean account of performative expression which considers communication as primly a rulegoverned activity—because speaking is an institutional fact; it is guided by the rules of the institution.2 Gandhi emphasizes that communication is about telling something that begins with the act of addressing. To address is to invite the other to be engaged in a conversation. So, in telling, one is not informing the other to do something as it has been emphasized in the Searlean theorization of performatives. Rather, in addressing, one identifies the person in the other and intends to have ‘communicative contact’. This indeed is an important element that Gandhi brings up to the reader. In the act of addressing, ‘we imaginatively see one another’. That imaginative seeing is an imperative in conversational engagement as the speaker before addressing is in ‘conversational relationship with me’. Gandhi writes, “In order for you to be able to refer to me in conversation with me, in order for you to be able to think of me descriptively or prescriptively, in order for you to be able to see me as a certain sort of creature in conversation with me you must already be in a conversational relationship with me.. this is a tautology, but it has an important consequence” (Gandhi 1976: 4). The conversational relationship is supposed before entering into real conversation. In this supposition, the speaker imaginatively conceives the presence of the self of the hearer. Such a conceptual comprehension of the self is significant, as in the case of addressing one is primarily referring to the self of the listener. He further narrates, “In addressing me, in seeking a conversational relationship with me, you cannot refer to me. And yet you identify me, mean me! You are 1 I am grateful to Professor Amitabha Das Gupta for this clarification, during the discussion session of my paper titled “Communicative Intentionality: An Analysis of ‘the rules of statement making’,” presented in UGC-SAP Seminar on Linguistic Representations: The Road Ahead, at Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, 2011. 2 For details discussion, see Ramchandra Gandhi’s The Presuppositions of Human Communication (1974) and I have discussed this debate in my paper “Communicative Intentionality: An Analysis of ‘the rules of statement making’,” in Linguistic Representations: The Road Ahead, ed. R.C. Pradhan, Hyderabad Studies in Philosophy, No. 10, 197–215. Decent Books, New Delhi, 2012.

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able to do this because in order to be able to address me you are obliged to see me as a unique but bare particular, as me and not as a creature of any sort, and in addressing me you put across to me this thought of me as myself, a soul” (Gandhi 1976: 4–5). In a conversational relationship, the self is being identified through the act of addressing. But this identification involves a non-referential element, that is, the me of being existing as invited person to participate in the conversation. The identification is construed non-descriptively, though conversational relationship itself is descriptive. In the conversation between Y¯ajñavalkya and Maitréyi, one finds the engaged conversational relationship does involve the element of the act of addressing and identifying the self. The ontology of self is conceived as a presupposition of a conversational relationship. This presupposition is prior to the normative structure that exists in a conversational relationship. Unless we conceptualize the notion of self in the linguistic form of life, the engagement becomes mechanical. So the presupposition of self as a primordial element of conversation gives an impression of the presence of the spiritual. The construal of the spiritual here is the result of being conscious of the presence of the self and also the consciousness of one’s own self. Gandhi writes, “Self-consciousness itself is an imaginative recreation of the communicative form of human life. And morality is wholly derivative of from principle of caring inherent in the communicative situation” (Gandhi 1974: 9). We imagine the presence of self and being conscious of it while being engaged in a communicative relationship. Gandhi conceives that living such a life is so fundamental that it not only explains the normativity embedded in communicative situations but also gives a sense a relationship and identity. One cares the other or feel obliged to the other, which is nurtured and recreated through the self -consciousness. In this connection, the notion of self is conceptualized as universal category that initiates dialogue in the form of addressing and also solicits another self in the other. The self creates a communicative situation to engage the other self in this relationship which characterizes communication as ‘cooperative action’. The communicative thus maintains a sense of equality which is normatively realized being part of the communicative relationship. Communicative relationship is not merely about exchange of words; rather, we ought to treat each other as equals. Thus, the normativity of human social life is realized through language. Language not only helps us to communicate with each other but also represents the self.

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The communicative intentionality in which the dialogue is formed constitutes an intentional linguistic field. The linguistic field encompasses the forms of life, in which language is used as an everyday activity of life. Forms of life are multiple ways of living a linguistic life that exhibits their everyday engagement with various activities. As Wittgenstein says, the forms of life and the language games are neatly interwoven. The grammar of this relationship helps in explicating the life—that is, its contingency as well as the universality. The contingency is enclosed by the boundaries of a specific culture, language, race and religion. The universality of life, on the other hand, transcends these boundaries to address the metaphysics of life (Pradhan 2002: 1). Maitréyi’s concern in the dialogue is to have the knowledge of the universality of the self that transcends the contingencies of living conditions.

The Language of Spirituality: Self and Its Performatives The universality of the self is realized in the semantic structure of the language of spirituality. This realization is a semantic act because being engaged in contemplation or thinking is a performative act (Hintikka 1962: 19). Delving into the analysis of language of spirituality, Agarwal writes, “To understand what spirituality is all about we have to understand deeply what is involved in such ideas as ‘the search of truth’, ‘inwardness,’ ‘freedom’ and ‘self-knowledge,’ etc. rather than ‘worship,’ ‘God’, ‘prayer’, ‘revelation’ and so on” (Agarwal 1998: 59). The general understanding of language of spirituality involves prayer, meditation, worship, etc., whereas there could be a search of truth while living most simple life or cultivation of a deep sense of reflection could be treated as an act of spirituality. And, similarly to make a sincere effort in nurturing freedom to serve the society honestly, according to Agarwal, is the language of spirituality. Thinking with this language of spirituality is to address the epistemology and the ontology of the spiritual. The pragmatist concern to speak about the epistemology and the ontology, as Giri points out, “needs radical supplementation of self-cultivation, selfcritique, and broader crossing” (Giri 2004: 91). Spirituality contemplated through the linguistic categories such as ‘prayer’, ‘worship’, ‘revelation’ though have been much part of the spiritual activities, still have not freed the being from its bondage of the materiality of the life.

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The materiality of life constructs the self as mere psychological fact constituted of memories that cause behaviour. Defining it further, Agarwal writes, “Unfortunately we take it to be real permanent entity. Next, the self is menaced by the inbuilt feeling of insecurity and that makes SOS [the security of psychological self] the dominating principle of active life. Such self is necessarily self-seeking through fulfilment of those desires which give it a feeling of its continuity, safety and prosperity. The self-seeking implicates the individual in constant strivings to new ‘achievements’ in a personal psychological future. However, its ‘achievements’ must remain an illusion, for in reality neither the achiever nor the (psychological) achievement has any substantiality. The self does not ‘become’ its achievements, simply because the self does not have the ontological status which admits of ‘becoming’” (Agarwal 1998: 64–65). The materialistic account of life constructs the notion of self assuming that there is nothing real about the self. The desire to know the reality of the self ceases as the materialistic account tries to show that everything about it is grounded in the ontology of the physical. The history of the physical is limited to the material existence and causal explanation. The historical and the causal accounts show how life is conditioned by the laws of nature. Such condition nullifies freedom. And, life without freedom implies limitations of the material life-world, where humans cease to be human. As Daya Krishna puts it: “Man’s enterprise in knowledge and action cannot but be regarded in freedom, if it were not so, they would not be human” (Krishna 2007: 1). Freedom as power of creation is intrinsic to life. It helps in showing the actuality of the being and the being in the pure possibility. Freedom need not be limited to the mere analysis of the actual but also beyond it. That is, go beyond its constitutive performance. Hence, Giri’s appeal to the radical reconstruction of the self-cultivation is justified. Daya does make a radical revisit to the Kantian paradigm in which freedom is construed as constitutive principle. He shows that cultivation of freedom transcending the dichotomy, i.e. ‘to create’ or ‘not to create’ or ‘to choose or not to choose’, is to walk on the path of niv¸rtti—not wanting anything. On the other hand, the opposite of it is prav¸rtti which shows the functional features of freedom, but it is not really so. Because ‘all enterprise of man in the field of knowledge or art or morals or the realization of values are seen as sign of bondage, rooted in some fundamental mistake or error called avidy¯ a or mithy¯ ajñ¯ ana as Nyaya sutra calls it p¸rav¸rtti dosa’ (Krishna 2007: 4). This grounding error (vbh¸r¯ anti) needs

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to be transcended with its logical presupposition of the fact that the being is a jijñ¯ asu who aspires to pursue the purusartha and realize it. The jijñ¯asu is a seeker of truth. And, the act of truth seeking is cultivated by s¯ adhan¯ a or contemplative intentionality as well as the dialogical intentionality. The content of pragmatic spiritualism proliferates if and only if there is a desire to know and have self-knowledge—¯ atmanam vidhi or know thyself. Thus, spirituality posits a transcendental goal.

Spiritual Pragmatism and Philosophy of Spirit The cultivation of contemplative spiritual thinking and practice sadhana is a prima facie condition of knowing oneself atmajnana. Nevertheless, for a jinjnasu, the sadhana unfolds that spiritual aspirations are not only to know what the spirit or the self is but also how the spirit relates to the world and the ultimate reality as a whole. In this connection, it is important to bring before us what kind of resolution spirituality demands from the perspective of pragmatism. Spirituality is a ubiquitous notion and deeply related to religion and religious practices. But it is often found that religions do function in an institutional framework where their practices involve rigidity and their stringent expressions and actions show their sectarian attitude, which results in rendering a narrow concept of spirituality. The intent of sectarianism sows the seeds of hatred and ill feelings in society, and that turns out to be a threat to humanity. In a pluralistic society, when some religious followers publicly assert the supremacy of their religious values without considering respecting other religions, then the peace and harmony in the society are disturbed. The pragmatists have tried to save the spiritual values by filtering out from their basket of religious values. And, try to show that one could live a spiritual life without being strictly religious. While drawing a difference between spirituality and religion, Dalai Lama suggests that “Spirituality I take to be concerned with those qualities of the human spirit—such as love and compassion, patience, tolerance, forgiveness, contentment, a sense of responsibility, a sense of harmony—which brings happiness to both self and others. Ritual, prayer, moksha, etc., are part of religious faith. But they may not sometimes touch these inner qualities” (1999: 22). The spiritual values have practical significance as it genuinely relates the self with others, nature, and the divine. The spiritual life is valueladen; it concerns with other’s well-being. A spiritual person must act responsibly and compassionately and must exhibit patience and resilience

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to tolerate, which requires a lot of spiritual practices that transform an ordinary person to a moral person. This cultivation of virtues in life is called ‘divinization of the human’ (Giri 2016). The spiritual pragmatism, as a philosophical discourse, thus aims to communicate the practical significance of spirituality without affiliating spirituality to any religion. In this connection, it is necessary to analyse the philosophy of the spirit. The spirit is expressed through its subjective attitude and is selfsubsistent so far as its existence is concerned. Subjectivity is comprehended through different grades of its engagement with the world, with others and with itself. The content of these graded experiences is disclosed through introspection. According to K. C. Bhattacharyya, introspective analysis of the spirit shows that the content of subjective engagement is grasped ‘as the speaking of subjectivity.’ My subjectivity is what I voice from the first-person point of view. To say ‘I am’ is not only to refer to myself through using a symbol I ; rather, am is the ‘meaning of selfsubsistent being’ which speaks about its subjectivity (Bhattacharyya 1983: 475). The unfolding of the content of ‘the speaking subjectivity’ involves three grades of introspection: first, the embodied consciousness; second, the personal relationship with other selves; and third, the consciousness of over-personal self. The consciousness of the over-personal self forms the identity in difference, a relation that is unintelligible to the objective attitude and conceived as an abstract fact of that explains the identity relation. Bhattacharyya writes, “The consciousness of the over personal self is thus one with the I is the religious form of the spiritual consciousness. The study of all contents enjoyed in explicit reference to the subject I may be called the philosophy of spirit” (1983: 476). The spiritual consciousness is a form of self-consciousness that transcends other grades of consciousness, and projected as only being conscious of itself. The objectivity of this spiritual consciousness, therefore, can be derived from the over-personal nature of the self, that is, the spirit which knows itself explicitly and exclusively its presence. “Spirit as a pure Being apprehended in all experience,” writes Coward while summarizing the view of T. R. V. Murti (Coward 2003: 94). Murti’s analysis of the philosophy of spirit is an expansion of the Bhattacharyya’s and Radhakrishnan’s notion of spirit. Only through philosophical analysis, we can have clarity over its epistemic and ontological functions. The spirit, for Radhakrishnan, is pure and free, whereas the empirical self is concerned with the business of life. The true nature of the

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spirit is though profound and vast; still, it is a hidden phenomenon which requires philosophical and deeper engagement through love and devotion to have the glimpse of its divine presence (2012: 209). The divine presence of the spirit is expressed or manifested through the spiritual or the subjective attitude of value seeking. Radhakrishnan writes, “The human mind is value seeking. It strives for unity and coherence, for harmony and beauty, for worth and goodness. Each of the values of truth, beauty and goodness have its own specific characters. We cannot arrange them in a hierarchy or subsume one under the others. We have clear testimony that these values are absolute, and this means faith in God” (2012: 202). The spirituality of the spirit, in essence, shows intentionality of value seeking. It is a quest for knowing, not only helps in integrating values such as truth, beauty, and goodness but also develops self-knowledge.

The Culture of Spirituality and Its Critiques The development of self-knowledge as content of spirituality is the result of self-cultivation. The notion of cultivation is one of intrinsic potential quality of man. It initiates the movement of rising up ‘humanity through culture’. The movement is an act of spiritual freedom—is an ‘inner action’ (Buber 1965). This action not only commences with the self but also forming the field of dialogue that turns to the other. In this regard, the movement has two important functions with regard to the notion of cultivation as defined by Dallmayr; they are preservation and transformation (Dallmayr 1994). The idea of cultivation is meant to preserve the self and transform the process of educating it. In this connection, Giri draws our attention to Dallmayr’s ‘deep participation in the liberating project of spiritual heritage of humanity as he personally takes part in the new spiritual strivings in Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity’ (Giri 2004: 94). The liberating project is indeed a project of spiritual pragmatism where he strongly appeals to the resurgence of spirituality (Dallmayr 2004: 86–87). As long as we keep engaging in the dialogue of spirituality placing it in the realm of ‘spiritual marketplace’, the deep cultural division in our society will widen further and further. We need to renew the thinking. And this renewal demands the resurgence of the creative spirit of the humanity to realize global spirituality. ‘ Spirituality has helped bringing changes in the society emphasizing the notion of ultimate truth of spirit and in the light of them the actual has to be redefined’ (Radhakrishnan

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1923: 24–49). As the actual lives in the state of becoming, it only unfolds the transformative aspects of the self. The real as the ultimate truth can be grasped by creative intuition. As S. Radhakrishnan writes, “Creativity is cognitive, aesthetic, ethical or religious activity springs from thought which is intuitive or spirituality quickened. There is no greatness, no sublimity, no perfection whatever be the line, without the touch of this creative energy of life. The heroes of humanity, its Buddhas and Christs, its Platos and Pauls, are all shaped after the same pattern and inspired from the same elemental source of life” (Radhakrishnan 1932: 161). The spirit in man appears as if disengaged with the actual, as is well described the Mundaka Upanishad and in the Kena Upanishad (Gambhirananda 2007). This being can never be objectified or externalized in the conventional rational thinking; rather in our contemplative and dialogical engagement, the existence of the spirit can be intelligible to all the jijñ¯ asus who contemplate to grasp its presence as co-inherent and co-existent reality in man. The act of transcending as creative act shows how it passes through the layers of the selfhood—the various ko´sas such as the physical, the biological, the psychological and the logical aspects of the self (Taittiriya Upanishad) (Radhakrishnan 1923: 149). The act of integrating or engagement with spirit is to know the truth. This revelation is not something to do with the scientific epistemology. Rather, epistemology deals with ahistoric semantic fact where the ontology and the epistemology are melted down. It is freedom from all structures and dualities (Panda 2005: 14). For Yajnavalkya, ‘self is its own light’—‘¯ atamaiva´sya jyotir bhabati’. For Daya Krishna, ‘one begins to feel its own feeling’ (2003: 134–135). And, the feeling must be retained to speak about the spiritual transformation of self and society. The deepest reality demands such disclosure not merely for the individual enlightenment, but for the collective freedom for the collective emancipation. This responsibility lies with all ¯ ach¯ aryas —as the moral ´ a¯ being and as the guide to their fellow being. The Svet¯ avatara Upani¸shad maintains that ¯ acharayam pususo veda. The knower is obliged to communicate or share knowledge. The divine wisdom needs to be cultivated with the contemplative intentionality of thinking, willing and feeling for truth. For Aurobindo, this ‘the self-knowledge is a creative becoming embodying and symbolizing the highest human possibility. And, one must recognize the growing light within us’ (1992: 53). Unless this recognition is translated into the realm of the dialogical engagement of thinking and performing, sustaining with it is always problematic. As Kakar puts

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it, “The spiritual, then, incorporates the transformative possibilities of the human psyche: total love without a trace of hate, selflessness carved out of psyche’s normal self-centeredness, a fearlessness that is not a counterphobic reaction to the fear that is an innate part of the human psyche. Yet spiritual transformation is not once for ever achievement even in the case of enlightened spiritual masters and saints. It remains constantly under the threat from the darker force of the psyche” (Kakar 2008: 5). Hence, what is indeed demanded is the culture of spirituality as necessity to maintain peace and prosperity. Dallmayr’s notion of global spirituality suggests having a constant renewal through the ‘spiritual praxis’ (2004: 87). The cultivation of spirituality is not an extraordinary phenomenon; rather, it is a phenomenon that needs contemplative action and global inspiration. As strong critique of ‘spiritualism’, that is ‘spiritual marketplace’, Dallmayr brings to us two significant messages referring to Jnˇ anadev and Gandhi. “For Jnˇ anadev, natural devotion is an ordinary experience available to every human being, in fact to every being in the world; but it is also a ‘wondrous secret’ deserving to be tended by a caring or loving heart. In its continually sustaining power, devotional care is not so much a distant goal which needs to be deliberately pursued or implemented; rather, it is always already there, lying in wait for humans – inviting them to settle down in its comfort. Viewed in terms of traditional purus¯ arthas (goals of life), bhakti is a peculiar kind of non-goal – without being negligible or marginal to human life. Compared with supreme goal of moksha, bhakti offers a unique mode of liberation or emancipation: a liberation not from, but in the world, allowing humans to live freely and caringly” (Dallmayr 2001: 45). Jnanadev’s appeal here is deeply spiritual in the sense that he urges us to understand the hidden incredible power that involves human life. This is realized through the cultivation of care and love in our everyday life. Every ordinary performance and engagement must exhibit love and care, like a devotee who expresses his/her devotion in thoughts, words and deeds. Love and care are vital elements of devotional expressions and actions that help the devotee to sustain against all odds of life. As the devotee aspires to realize purusarthas - the valued ends of life which includes the realization of dharma, artha, kama and moksa. Realization of moksa is regarded as the supreme end of life by attaining it one is being liberated – is free from all kinds of bondages of life. This freedom is to be realized while

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living in the society.3 In Indian philosophy, there has been discussion of the concept of jivanmukti. Jnanadev considers this as a unique mode of living that helps also in liberating others. A jivanmukta being a liberated person is not affected by his engagement with the world; rather, his spiritual living in the society shows how he/she helps in emancipating the other. This cultivation of spirituality is an example of a disengaged engagement that a liberated person dwells in while performing emancipatory actions. These actions are selfless and being performed by a true karmayogi. A karmayogi ought to perform niskamakarma—that is, not to desire the fruit of action before performing the action. Dallmayr calls Gandhi a karmayogi who has cultivated ‘contemplative action’ and the ‘mysticism of everyday life’ which are the two integral features of spiritual praxis. ‘Mahatma Gandhi - a guide post evident in his commitment to Karmayoga’ opted for a grass-roots approach seeking to generate goodwill and ‘heart unity’ between different communities. As he admonished his fellow workers at one point, “Islam is not a false religion. Let Hindus study it relevantly and they will love it even as I do…. If Hindus put their house in order, I have not a shadow of doubt that Islam will respond in a manner worthy of its liberal traditions” (cf. Dallmayr 2004: 149). Gandhi’s appeal to understand the significance of personal religious discipline is important towards ‘the sane and healthy transformation of the wider social order’ (p. 148). Gandhi respected all religions, and he followed his own religion. He aimed to establish social order showing the greater value in performing non-violent actions. A true lover of humanity ought to follow the principle of non-violence or ahimsa in thoughts, words and deeds. While articulating the notion of ahimsa, Gandhi emphasized that there is a normative understanding of the notion of truth. Hence, truth can be realized by performing non-violent actions. A wider social order is possible provided there are a communicative relationship and cooperative understanding that exist among all the communities. Performative being the spirit of pragmatism, the critiques of spiritual pragmatism have reflected upon the nature of performances. The notion of spirituality has been construed normatively, rather grounding

3 For further investigation, see J.N. Mohanty’s “Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition: Toward an Indian Theory of Moral Action,” Indian Ethics (2007) and Rajendra Prasad, “Theory of Purusarthas: Revaluation and Reconstruction,” in his Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Concepts and Essays in Ethics and Metaethics (1989) Also see, G.C. Nayak, “Values: Dharma and Moksa,” Philosophical Reflections (Revised Edition, 2002).

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exclusively on mysticism. Values like cooperation, responsibility, commitment, equality and freedom are normative elements of life that form performances which are part of the everyday life as well the performances that lead to realize the higher values of life. Spirituality pervades in each of us, in every entities that are existing in the universe. In this connection, selfless and fearless actions are valued and need to be articulated through creative spirit in order to establish cooperative relationship in society. The manifestation of spirituality is nothing but its expression in our cognitive, ethical and aesthetic aspects of life. The articulation of spiritual knowledge demands a harmonious bonding that prevails in all these spheres of life. The critiques of Indian spirituality have emphasized this while advocating the notion of self-knowledge. They are moved by the philosophical ideas and actions of Buddhas, Christs and the Socrates, Jnanadevs, Gandhis and many other moral exemplars who have tried to live their life to show that love, dignity, freedom, non-violence, care, commitment, trust and cooperation are essential for both individual and social emancipation. They have lived the life of jivanmuktas by cultivating these values in our everyday life and have articulated their self-knowledge in the language of spirituality to elevate us towards the realization of the higher truth or the supreme ends of life—purus¯ arthas. Thus, aspiration to know the spiritual is grasped by living a normative life that helps the person explicate the meaning of life.

References Agarwal, M.M. 1998. Ethics and Spirituality. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies. Bhattacharyya, K. 1983. Studies in Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: Motilal Banarashidass. Coward, H. 2003. T. R. V. Murti. New Delhi: MunshiramManoharlal Publisher and Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Krishna, Daya. 2003. “Freeing Philosophy from the ‘Prison House’ of ‘ICentricity’.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XX (3): 135–143. ———. 2007. “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXIV (2). Dallmayr, F. 1994. “Culture and Global Development.” Journal of Contemporary Thought 4: 99–111. ———. 2001. “Walking Humbly with Your God: Janeshawar and the Warkaris.” Journal of Contemporary Thought 13.

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———. 2004. Peace Talks: Who will Listen? Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Gambhirananda, S. 2007. Kena Upanisad: With the Commentary of Sankaracharya. Kolkata: Advaita Ashram. Gandhi, R. 1974. Presuppositions of Human Communications. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gandhi, R. 1976. The Availability of Religious Ideas. London: The McMillan Press Ltd. Ganeri, J. 2012. The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the Frist-Person Stance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Giri, A. 2004. “Knowledge and Human Liberation: Jürgen Hebermas, Sri Aurobindo and Beyond.” European Journal of Social Theory 7 (1): 85–103. Giri, A. 2016 “Spiritual Pragmatism: New Pathways of Transformation for the Posthuman.” In Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures, ed. Debashish Banerji and M. R. Paranjape, 225–242. New Delhi: Springer. Guha, R. 2005. “Arguments with Sen: Arguments about India.” Book Review, Economic and Political Weekly, October 8. Kakar, S. 2008. Man and Divine: Spirit and Psyche in the Modern world. New York: Penguin Viking. Mohanty, J.N. 2007. “Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition: Toward an Indian Theory of Moral Action.” In Indian Ethics, ed. Purusottma Bilimoria, Joseph Prabhu, and R. Sharma. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nayak, G.C. 2002. Philosophical Reflections, rev. ed. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Panda, R.K. 2005. “The Nature of Philosophizing: A Dialogical Critique.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXII (2): 115. ———. 2012. “Communicative Intentionality: An Analysis of ‘the Rules of Statement Making’.” In Linguistic Representations: The Road Ahead, ed. R.C. Pradhan, Hyderabad Studies in Philosophy, No. 10, 197–215. New Delhi: Decent Books. Pradhan, R.C. 2002. “The Life-World and Its Metaphysical Significance.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Special Issue. Prasad, Rajendra. 1989. “Theory of Purusarthas: Revaluation and Reconstruction.” In Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Concepts and Essays in Ethics and Metaethics. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Pye, Lucian. 2006. Review of an Argumentative Indian. Foreign Affairs, May– June. Radhakrishanan, S. 1923. Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Radhakrishnan, S. 1932. An Idealistic View of Life. Bombay: George Allen & Unwin. Reprinted, second edition 1976. Radhakrishnan, S. 2012. An Idealistic View of Life. Noida: Harper Elements.

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Raghuramaraju, A. 2006. Debates in Indian Philosophy: Classical, Colonial and Contemporary. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Roebuck, Valerie J. 2000. trans. & Intro The Upanishads. New Delhi: Penguin books. Searle, J.R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, Amartya. 2005. The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity. New York: Allen Lane & Penguin. Sri Aurobindo. 1992. The Synthesis of Yoga. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.

CHAPTER 18

Gardens of God: Spiritual Pragmatism and Transformation of Religion, Politics, Self and Society Ananta Kumar Giri

Introduction and Invitation: From Kingdom of God to Gardens of God Spiritual pragmatism calls for rethinking and reconstitution of self, language, culture, society and the world. One important language which has influenced religion, polity, society and the world is the language of Kingdom of God. In this chapter, an effort is made to rethink and reconstitute this language of Kingdom of God and cultivate and generate a language and relationship of Garden of God. In self, society, religion and politics, we are used to the language and discourse of Kingdom of God. But in this God is presented as an Omnipotent King who is also angry at a slight deviation. We get glimpses of such powerful and angry God in Old Testament as well as in many other religious traditions of the world.i In such a discourse and portrayal of God, we fail to realize that God is mercy, rahim, karuna and compassion. God is our ever awakened nurturer and He/She is continuously

A. K. Giri (B) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India © The Author(s) 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5_18

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walking and meditating with us with mercy as well as firm challenges for self-development, mutual realizations and responsible cosmic engagement and participation. The vision and discourse of Kingdom of God have many a time been imprisoned within a logic of power where we are prone to valorize God’s power in order to valorize our own power on Earth, especially the logic of sovereignty at the level of self and society, rather than realizing God’s mercy. This has led to varieties of discourses of political theology in which we are much more preoccupied with power of God rather than God’s mercy. God here is also a powerful Patriarch. Political theology from Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmidt has been linked to violence in religion and politics as well.

Gardens of God: Overcoming Power and Violence and Cultivating a New Relational Praxis and a New Advaita (Non-duality) There is a fundamental challenge of overcoming the logic of power and violence in the discourse and practices of Kingdom of God in societies and histories. The eternal statement in the New Testament where Jesus Christ tells us that “Kingdom of God is within you” helps us move from power and violence to inner spheres of meditation, self-cultivation, selfrealization and mutual co-realizations. It must be noted that Jesus did not come on Earth to be a King rather help us realize our God’s nature, our essential and integral God dimension of existence which is a dimension of love, mercy, mutual care and anger at unjust social systems (Chopra 2009; Dallmayr 2005). As Harvey Cox, the noted theologian and thinker tells us in his How to Read the Bible, the real impulse of the vision “kingdom of God is within you” in Aramaic is to realize that Kingdom of God is across you (Cox 2016; also see Cox 2010). This makes the sadhana of realization of Kingdom of God relational. To realize Kingdom of God as across us is to realize that our work and meditation within ourselves need to be part of efforts to relate to others—in manifold worlds and movements of relationships. Realizing the language of within as across also challenges us to go beyond a literal understanding of inner as confined within oneself in a closed sense and realize that inner is also related to the worlds around in manifold ways in relationships of non-duality rather than in a framework of dualism between outer and inner and self and other. For realizing Kingdom of God in our lives and society, we need to

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go beyond a dualism between inner and outer, self and other, individual society, Nature and Divine and realize that Kingdom of God permeates all across. This is a spirit of creative and moving non-duality from traditions like Vedanta which overflows to the discourse of Kingdom of God in Christian traditions as well as other traditions nurturing what S. Radhakrishnan, the great philosopher and spiritual seeker, terms as Christian Advaita (Radhakrishnan 1994, 1939). Advaita challenges us to go beyond the dualism of self and other, swadharma and paradharma, and cultivate a way of walking with God together, a path of Sahadharma and God of togetherness. This is suggested in the concluding lines of Rigveda where there is a call for Samgachadhwam, Sambadadhwam— walking together and speaking together. For Daya Krishna, this path of togetherness is the call of the future and the God to come is a God of togetherness. In his words: Rta and Satya provide the cosmic foundation of the universe and may be apprehended by tapasa or disciplined “seeking” or sadhana and realized through them. The Sukta 10.191, the last Sukta of the Rigveda, suggests that this is not, and cannot be, something on the part of an individual alone, but is rather the “collective” enterprise of all “humankind” and names the “god” of this Sukta “Somjnanam” emphasizing the “Togetherness” of all “Being” and spelling it out as Sam Gachhadhwam, Sam Vadadyam, Sambho Manasi Jayatam, Deva Bhagam Jathapurve Sanjanatam Upasate. (Krishna 2006: 8)

Realizing Kingdom of God as a journey of togetherness where God is a co-walker with us also invites us to realize Kingdom of God as Gardens of God and God as a Gardener, a creative Gardener, rather than a powerhungry Sovereign dancing with the cosmic dance of what Fred Dallmayr, the deep thinker and seeker of our times, calls “sacred non-sovereignty and shared sovereignty” (Dallmayr 2005). As theologian Brigitte Kahl writes: “We might expect God to lean back and watch the creature taking up the spade to start digging and planting [..] But instead we see God taking up spade and planting the trees in the garden, definitely hard and dirty manual work” (quoted in Shore-Goss 2016: 48). But when God is taking up spade by taking spade ourselves we collaborate with God in the continued process of gardening in the process also blessing Him and Her as we also become blessed.ii In Christian traditions, we can also realize Lord Jesus Christ as a Gardener. As Julian of Norwich writes in

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her Sowings: “For I saw the Lord sitting like a man. I watched, wondering what kind of labor it could be that the servant was to do. And then I understood that he was to do the greatest labor and the hardest work there is. He was to be a gardener, digging and ditching and sweating and turning the soil over and over, and to dig deep down, and to water the plants at the proper time” (quoted in Shore-Goss 2016: 93). In Gardens of God, we all beings live including the snake, Adam and Eve. It is different from Garden of Eden where snake is considered evil and there is the elementary anthropocentrism built into this. We are conventionally entrapped in a literal understanding of Garden of Eden and fall from it by the deviation of the snake, Adam and Eve. But we can now transform the vision and discourse of Kingdom of God to Garden of God and realize snake, Adam and Eve as children of both God and Mother Earth. With a cross-cultural realization, we can realize that it is possibly the Divine in snake which might have inspired Eve to whisper to Adam to eat the forbidden Apple so that the dance of creation and the Divine play on earth could unfold. As Daryl Damning so aptly invites us to realize: “The Garden of Eden is not understood as an original state of humanity but as a vision of what God desires of us in the end” (quoted in Shore-Goss 2016: 47).iii For understanding this unfolding, we can here draw upon traditions such as Kundalini and Tantra from Indic traditions which challenge us to realize the significance of serpentine energy and Kundalini in life.iv The energy at work and in meditation in Gardens of God is not just sweet, it also involves the difficult and necessary task of weeding but gardening in Gardens of God strives to be as much nonviolent and kind as possible without causing unnecessary and uncalled for harm to all beings concerned. Gardening here is neither just rational nor emotional but involves a deep interplay of emotion, intuition, reason, imagination and deep visions.v

Gardens of God: From Ramrajya (Kingdom of Ram) to Ramvana (Garden of Ram) Transforming Kingdom of God into Gardens of God also challenges us to creatively walk and meditate with the discourse of Ramrajya—Kingdom of Ram. But Lord Ramachandra spent fourteen years in the forest and an alternative reading and realization of turn of events suggest that Lord Ramachandra was eager to come out of the trappings of the palace in Ayodhya and practice the path of renunciation. Sita was also too eager to

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come out of the palace; as a daughter of Earth, she was feeling suffocated in the palace.vi But in the forest Ramachandra faced a lot of challenges including his entanglement in violence. When Surpanakha, Ravana’s sister, expressed her love for him, he got her nose and ear cut through Laxmana, his brother. To express one’s love for another soul is not a crime, and even though Surpanakha threatened to harm Sita, Lord Ramachandra could have showered kindness and mercy on Surpanakha rather than getting her ear and nose cut off. Ramachandra operated with a power logic and logic of violence too quickly without bringing forth mercy and compassion. Ramachandra also killed Bali, the brother of Sugriva, from behind. Even though Bali had tormented Sugriva and had abducted his wife, this is not a justification for Ramachandra to kill him from behind. Ramachandra after coming back to Ayodhya and being the King also killed Shambuka for reading the Vedas. If Shambuka violated the existing varnashrama norm where the Shudra is supposed not to read to the Vedas, then he could have been invited to the court and a conversation could have taken place. Ramachandra also could have transformed this institution of indignity and annihilation. But instead Ramachandra straight away severed the neck of Shambuka.vii He also banished his pregnant wife Sita to the forest hearing suspicion about her character. All these bring us to the difficult challenge of violence in the discourse and reality of Ramrajya—Kingdom of Rama. Using the name of Rama and to build a temple for Rama, Hindu fundamentalist forces destroyed the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and inflicted violence on people and polity. After the demolition of Babri Masjid which was animated by a movement to build the Ram temple in Ayodhya and the accompanying violence, destruction and killing, Ramchandra Gandhi, the Mahatma’s grandson, goes to the place which is worshipped as the birthplace of Rama and finds that there is a place Sita’s Rasoi, Sita’s Kitchen—a place of cooking for Sita. In his book Sita’s Kitchen, Gandhi invites us for a different realization of life, religion, politics and spirituality: [..] Sita’s Kitchen is the entire field of her self-imaging Shakti, powerfully represented by the earth. It is on earth, in the embrace of the Divine Mother, that all are born, all creatures great and small; all forms manifest, noble or evil; and all are nourished. [..] The truth of Rama is the truth of advaita, non-duality, the truth of singular self-consciousness and its cinematic field of self-imaging Shakti which is Samsara. [..] Annihilationism (the readiness to destroy all life and civilization on earth) is the highest

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stage of development of dualism [..] Dualism is the conviction that self and not-self are everywhere pitted against one another. (Gandhi 1993: 16, 18, 20)

Much of the activities in Ramchandra Gandhi’s book Sita’s Kitchen happen in the forest where princes are following a girl who has stolen their valuables and they meet her in the presence of Lord Buddha. Lord Buddha is discussing with them the meaning of life and unlike Ramachandra is not telling them to cut off her nose and ear. This journey with anger and temptation to violence but its overcoming is happening in the forest in Sita’s Kitchen which suggests that to overcome the temptation to violence coming from kingdom domains and palaces we need to cultivate a dimension of forest in our lives. Charles Taylor, the deep philosopher coming from Christian tradition, also realizes the significance of thisviii as Rabindranath Tagore long ago had challenged us to understand the distinction between civilization which is based upon the primacy of the city and the polis and the civilization which is based upon the life and spirit of the forest, the ecological consciousness of the forest (Tagore 1915). Walking and mediating with such movements and reflections, we can now rethink and transform the discourse of Ramrajya into Ramvana— Garden of Rama. This is a journey and movement from violence to non-violence which is facilitated by interrogative and transformative movements of both Sita and Shambuka. Sita does not offer to go through Agnipareekhya (the test of fire) and helps Rama to overcome his sometimes implicit patriarchal binding in a spirit of true gender liberation as Shambuka challenges Rama his dharma in killing him. Shambuka festivals in Uttar Pradesh where our brothers and sisters celebrate the life and spirit of Shambuka and works such as Sitayana by deep poets such as K. R. Srinivasa Iyenger and The Forest of Enchantment by the spiritually attuned novelist Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni help us in this journey (Divakaruni 2019; Iyenger 1987). We thus transform Ramrajya into Ramvana and here we draw inspiration from Krishna’s legacy of nurturing Vrindavan. In Ramvana, all beings live with their difficulties as well as urge for overcoming their temptations for egoistic aggrandizement and violence. This challenges us to transform our conventional and dominant discourse of Kingdom of God into Gardens of God in the process helping us transform our language, self, culture, society, religion, polity, world and cosmos. Transforming

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Kingdom of God to Gardens of God opens up new ways of looking at the traditions of political theology and links it to the vision and practice of deeper cross-cultural spiritual realizations.ix

Gardens of God, Gardening with God: Spiritual Pragmatism and Transformation of Religion, Politics, Self and Society Cultivating Gardens of God is a transformational journey and it involves the transformation of religion, politics, self, culture and society. The discourse and practice of Kingdom of God are implicated in logic of power and violence. Cultivating Gardens of God invites us to garden with God, Nature, Human and Divine and transform existing discourses and practices of religion, politics, self, culture and society. This involves creative border crossing between pragmatism and spirituality as outlined in this volume and also creative works and meditations of spiritual pragmatism. It challenges us to transform the dominant violent link between religion and politics spearheading its ugly head in India and many parts of the world now and realize Ahimsa—non-violence in relations and noninjury in modes of thinking—in language, self, society, culture, religion, spirituality, polity and the world.

Notes i. In many religious spaces and traditions, we hear stories of angry Gods and Goddesses who subject their too cruel tests, suffering and sometimes becoming a part to the annihilation of followers of other gods and goddesses in mutual battles. ii. By co-laboring with the Divine, we bless him or her. It builds upon the deep realization in the Deuteronomy where it is said: “You shall bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8: 10). In an insightful essay on this, David Curwin (2018) tells us about one thinker Rashba and his student Asher who help us to understand the deeper significance of humans blessing God: Reshba only hints at the ‘secret’ that man can assist and contribute to his God, but his student Rabeone Bahyaben Asher, says so explicitly in a number of places. In the introduction to his commentary on [..] (Deuteronomy 33), he writes:

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God deserves the berakhyt of man, and He has commanded us in this, as it says, ‘You shall bless the Lord your God”. (Deuteronomy 8: 10) iii. Robert E. Shore-Goss also writes: The Garden of Eden is a mythic projection of God’s graced space for a future ecotopia, for we alienated ourselves from the garden of the Earth over the last two centuries. (Shore-Goss 2016: 95) iv. This is suggested in the following poem by the author: Cross and Kundalini Being with Cross Walking and Meditating Upward Flow of Energy Love, Concentration and Co-Evolution From the Bottom to the Top From the Underworld to Light Supreme Awakening and Generation of Kundalini Not only vertical But also horizontal Self, Other and the world Becomes a Sadhana and Tapasya of Cross Kundalini flowing across As a Grace of Mutualization With and Beyond the Terror and Tyranny of Annihilation. v. Stephen Toulmin (1988) makes a distinction between French gardening which is much more rational and English gardening which is open-ended. vi. This is suggested in the following poem by the author Sita A Daughter of Earth Sita A Daughter of Earth Flowing With Streams Singing with Springs Dancing With Birds Kissing the Plants Here Comes Rama

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Brings Her to The Palace in Ayodhya In Bed With Rama Sita tells him The Beauty of the Buds The Gift of the Open The Limits of Weapons The Illusion of Kodanda [1] Rama realizes the joy of freedom Opens his ears to Ahimsa [2] Soaks the art of renunciation Happy to get the order of Banabasa Going to the Forest Sita is overjoyed Asks Sita Rama in the Forest Why are you still Wearing your Weapons? The Birds and People Plants and Animals Would Be Afraid Some May Be Killed Are you yourself so Afraid That You Cannot Walk in The Forest Without Kodanda? Come! Let us Overcome Our Fear With Embrace Embrace Each Other With Burning Passion Flowing Meditation Embrace of Demons: Outer and Inner Embrace of the Forest Embrace of the Sky Embrace of the Earth Embrace of the Other Embrace of the World Our Divine Mother. [For Kralawi Sita and her husband Maruta who work in the Tea Research Institute near Bandung, April 15, 2017, 751 AM. This is inspired by an inspiring alternative dance production about Sita by creative artist and

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dancer Dr. Anita Ratnam and performed in India International Center, New Delhi] In her book, The Forest of Enchantments, Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni (2019) also tells us how Sita asks Rama why his soldiers are unnecessarily cutting down trees and plucking flowers on the way from Mithila to Ayodhya. Divakaruni writes how during this journey Sita calls Ram and order his soldiers not to do this. What Divakaruni writes below deserves our careful consideration: The only distressing was the callous behavior of the soldiers. Could he order them not to harm the trees? ‘This is their home, and we are visitors,’ I added. ‘We should treat them with courtesy and not cause them needless pain.’ Ram’s brows drew together in surprise. Clearly, he’d never considered that plants feel pain as we do. But he inclined his head. ‘You are tender-hearted, my dear. I can’t fault that. It’s right and necessary that women should be so.’ I wanted to ask him, wasn’t it as important for a king to feel the hurt of others as women did? Wasn’t he responsible for animals and birds and tress in his realm, as well as people? Who would protect them if he didn’t? [..]. (Divakaruni 2019: 56) [1] Kodanda is the weapon of Rama [2] Ahimsa means non-violence vii. It is to be noted that many Dalit movements in Uttar Pradesh now are celebrating Shambuka festival to protest against this violence and celebrate the courage and sadhana of Shambuka. viii. Taylor suggests that if we do not develop the forest dimension of our life, we remain caught up in the spirals of violence. Taylor (2011: 22) tells us: I am tempted to speculate further and to suggest that the perennial susceptibility to be fascinated by death and violence is at the base of a manifestation of our nature as homo religiosus. From the point of view of the forest dweller, it is one of the places this aspiration for beyond most easily goes when it fails to take us to the forest. This does not mean that religion and violence are alternatives. On the contrary, it means that most historical religions have been deeply intricate with violence, from human sacrifice down to intercommunal massacres, because most historical religions remain only imperfectly oriented to the forest.

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Taylor here adds that entering the forest means not to be just bound to life as it is and not just valorize life uncritically but to enter the forest “through the full-hearted love of some good beyond life” which has implication for our change of identity. Taylor here insightfully tells us: “But entering the forest involves something more. What matters beyond life does not matter just because it sustains life [..] entering the forest means aiming beyond life or opening yourself to a change in identity” (ibid.: 17). Developing the forest dimension challenges us not to be entrapped in a logic of world embeddedness but also to develop a linked mode of world renunciation going beyond the dualism between the householder and the renouncer. For example, in Indian culture and society, individuals are excepted to be householders but this is just only one stage of life, the last stage of life is called vanaprastha or the forest stage. But modernity has forgotten the integral need for cultivating this vanaprastha dimension of life as it remains entrapped within a logic of household, home and world embeddedness thus making the world a jungle, a banyaprastha as Chittaranjan Das (1992) would argue (Das here makes a difference between vanaprastha and banyaprastha, dimension of the forest and dimension of the jungle). But in Indic tradition while being a householder one ought not forget the need to cultivate a simultaneous linked spirit of renunciation what Gandhi building upon Bhagvad Gita called anasakti yoga (the yoga of non-attachment). This resonates with traditions of thinking and being called letting go (Dallmayr 2014). Even on a sociological plane, this is an unavoidable challenge as T.N. Madan tells us how the householder’s success “lies in his ability to resist extremist alternatives and to thread the middle ground, combining the values of domesticity and detachment” (Madan 2003: 302). ix. Dallmayr’s critique and reconstitution of the cult of sovereignty in political theology is an important help here which also can be in the direction of practical spirituality (Dallmayr 2005). In his insightful foreword to our edited book Practical Spirituality and Human Development, Dallmayr has invited us to walk and meditate with such new pathways of movement from political theology to practical spirituality (Dallmayr 2018).

References Chopra, Deepak. 2009. The Third Jesus: The Christ We Cannot Ignore. Harmony Books. Cox, Harvey. 2010. Future of Faith. San Francisco: HarperOne. ———. 2016. How to Read the Bible. New York: Harper Collins. Paperpack Edition.

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Curwin, David. 2018. “Humans Blessing God: A Mystical Idea and Modern Implications.” Tradition 50 (4): 19–36. Dallmayr, Fred. 2005. Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2014. Mindfullness and Letting Be: On Engaged Thought and Acting. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. ———. 2018. Foreword to Ananta Kumar Giri (ed.) Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations in Religions and Societies. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Das, Chittaranjan. 1992. Shukara o Socrates [The Pig and Socrates]. Berhmapur: Pustaka Bhandara. Divakaruni, Chitra Banerjee. 2019. The Forest of Enchantment. Delhi: HarperCollins. Gandhi, Ramachandra. 1993. Sita’s Kitchen: A Testimony of Faith and Inquiry. Stonybrook: SUNY Press. Iyenger, K.R.S. Srinivasa. 1987. Sitayana. Madras: Samata Books. Krishna, Daya. 2006. “Rgveda: The Mantra, the Suktaa the Mandala or the Rsi, the Devta, the Chanda: The Structure of the Text and Problems Regarding It.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 23 (2): 1–13. Madan, T.N. 2003. “The Householder Tradition in Hindu Society.” In The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood, 288–305. Oxford: Blackwell. Radhakrishnan, S. 1939. Foreword to Gandhi’s Challenge to Christianity by S.K. George. London: Allen & Unwiin. ———. 1994. The Recovery of Faith. New Delhi: Harper. Shore-Goss, Robert E. 2016. God Is Green: An Eco-Spirituality of Incarnate Compassion. Eugene: Cascade Books. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1915. Sadhana. London: Macmillan. Taylor, Charles. 2011. Dilemmas and Connections. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toulmin, Stephen. 1988. Return to Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Index

A action, 47, 49–51, 56, 57, 59–62, 263, 266, 267, 270–272 Advaita, 41, 46, 52, 56–59, 62, 317, 319 ¯ Anandam¯ urti, S.S., 69, 79, 83, 84 Arjuna, 68, 81, 82 Aurobindo, Sri, xii, xv, 3, 4, 13, 49, 94, 221, 227, 230, 231, 234, 242, 243, 246 Austin, J., 227

B Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a , 47, 67, 68 biblical fall, 70, 72, 76 Buber, M., 308

C Chesterton, G.K., 70, 71 Christian, 43, 46, 52, 66–68, 70, 75, 76, 80, 83, 85 Christian Advaita, 317 Clifford, W.K., 67, 73

cogito, 121 compassion, 315, 319 consciousness, 42, 45–49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71–77, 80–85 Cox, Harvey, 316

D Dallmayr, Fred, 316, 317, 325 dehoming, 288–290 Dewey, John, 147, 149, 164, 172, 173 dharma, 13, 72, 300 discovery, 265, 270 Divakaruni, Chitra Banerjee, 320, 324 duality, 48, 51, 58, 63, 68, 72, 75, 76, 80, 81, 83–85 Durant, Will, 115, 131

E Elder-Vass, Dave, 155, 163–171 exhoming, 282, 286, 287

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7114-5

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INDEX

F Feuerbach, L., 220, 236 Fichte, J.G., 220, 232 freedom, 42, 62, 118–129, 131 FUNDAEC, 154, 155, 159–162, 166, 170

G Gandhi, M.K., 129 Gandhi, Ramchandra, 319, 320 gardener, 317, 318 Giri, A.K., 13, 242–244

H Habermas, J., 149, 151, 154, 164, 165, 170, 224, 242–244, 246 happiness, 65–69, 71–74, 77, 80, 82–85 Heehs, Peter, xi–xiii Hegel, G.W.F., 220–222, 230, 236, 245 Heidegger, Martin, 180–182, 198–202 Himmler, Heinrich, 67, 77–79 Hinduism, 41, 44, 284, 308 homing, 275, 281, 282, 286–288, 291 Husserl, 180, 181, 201

I Ignacio de Loyola, 258 Ignatieff, Michael, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 162, 169, 171, 173 Iyenger, K.R. Srinivasa, 320

J James, William, 4, 6, 7, 12, 18–20, 22, 27, 31, 66–69, 72–75, 82,

83, 85, 220, 261–268, 270, 272, 273 Joas, Hans, 148 Julian of Norwich, 317

K Kahl, Brigitte, 317 Kant, I., 116, 119–121, 123, 128, 129, 219, 220, 230 karuna, 315 Krishna, 68, 80, 81 Krishnamurti, J., 269, 270

L LiKEN, 154–159, 162, 165, 166, 170 Locke, Alain LeRoy, 152 Luhmann, N., 243, 245, 246

M Mallarmé, Stéphane, 250 Marx, K., 220, 228 m¯ ay¯ a , 186, 187, 189–191, 194–197, 199, 201 meditation, 68, 72, 77, 81, 84, 85 meta-communication, 237 meta-language, 223, 228–231 monism, 46, 51, 52, 55, 57, 58, 67, 71, 75, 83, 85 Morris, Charles W., 225–227

N nadi-´sakti, 196 New Advaita, 316

P Parsons, T., 243 Peirce, Charles S., 72, 115, 219, 220, 227

INDEX

Peterson, Jordan B., 66–78, 82, 83, 85 phenomenology, 116 political theology, 316, 321, 325 postcolonial ecocriticism, 288 pragmatism, 42–44, 46, 49, 50, 59, 62, 263, 266, 270–272 praxis, 81, 119–121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129–131 R Radhakrishnan, S., 80, 82, 317 radical holism, 150, 159, 165, 170 rahim, 315 Ramakrishna, 8, 121, 125, 126, 131, 261 Rawls, John, 118 reflection-theory, 233 rehoming, 290, 292 Reid, Herbert, 149, 153–156, 161, 171 religious pragmatism, 66, 68 revolutionary, 119, 121, 124 S Sahadharma, 317 Sankara, 92, 95, 99 Sarkar, P.R., 68, 69, 71, 75, 79, 81–85 Sartre, J.P., 116, 117, 128 Schwartzentruber, Paul, xi Searle, J., 227 sense-medium, 231, 233 Sharma, Arvind, xi, xiii Sitayana, 320 ´ Siva, 52, 63, 71

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social justice, 121, 138, 142 sphota, 195, 196 spirituality, 41, 59, 262, 263, 266, 267, 269–272 suffering, 49, 52, 65–69, 72, 74, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85

T Tantra, 7, 10, 46–48, 51, 67, 68, 71, 72, 76, 77, 79–85, 214, 318 Taylor, Betsy, 149, 153–157, 161, 170, 171, 173 Taylor, Charles, 320, 324, 325 Tillich, P., 235, 245 tin.ai, 275–278, 287, 291 tin.aital , 281 Touraine, 148 truth, 46, 58, 264, 265, 267–270, 272

V Vedanta, 7, 53, 90, 91, 93, 94, 317 Vijayan, O.V., 261, 264, 265, 267–273 Vivekananda, Swami, 41, 46, 53, 93, 121, 123–129, 261

W Weber, M., 220, 237, 246 Wittgenstein, L., 226, 227

Z Žižek, Slavoj, 65–72, 74, 75, 77–79, 82, 83, 85