Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations [1st ed.] 9789811571015, 9789811571022

Citation preview

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations Edited by Ananta Kumar Giri

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society

Ananta Kumar Giri Editor

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations

Editor Ananta Kumar Giri Madras Institute of Development Studies Chennai, India

ISBN 978-981-15-7101-5 ISBN 978-981-15-7102-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For Margaret Chatterjee, Vincent Sheen and Francis X. Clooney

Foreword

Pragmatism has fallen on bad days. As commonly used in our time, the term tends to stand for a down-to-earth outlook, for a pliant accommodation to “the way things are”—or the way things are assumed to be in a given context. The only yardstick accepted by devotees of pragmatism is hard-nosed compliance with factual conditions, a compliance which alone can insure success of one’s chosen aims. What is bypassed by this stance is the plethora of possibilities which can be pursued in response to prevailing conditions. What is completely sidelined is the ethical quality of a chosen course of action—a neglect which rules out of order any concern with spirituality and creative human imagination. The decay of pragmatism just described is the result of many factors, above all the rise of “scientism” and “positivism” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What is commonly meant by positivism is the exclusive reliance on factually ascertained knowledge, a reliance which necessarily shuns any kind of “negativity” as well as any form of worldtranscendence (and self-transcendence). In a similar way, what is meant by scientism is the elevation of factual knowledge to an all—embracive worldview bordering on a metaphysical creed or dogma. Seen in this light, scientism is clearly very different from modern science which is predicated on sober inquiry and questioning. Taken as serious inquiry in the latter sense, science has no trouble in being compatible with a non-positivist imagination and even spirituality.

vii

viii

FOREWORD

Once stripped of its positivist and scientistic overlays, it is not hard to recover the genuine meaning of pragmatism, and thereby also its important historical significance. The crucial redeeming feature of pragmatism is its connection with practice or praxis, as distinguished from cognitive observation or neutral knowledge. This connection was a constitutive ingredient in the work of Aristotle who explicitly treated social and political inquiry as a part of “practical philosophy,” that is, the philosophy of human practice. Importantly, practice in his work was not just a random activism or instrumentalism but rather an active orientation toward “goodness” seen as an ethical, comprehensive standard. Equally important was his conception of human being as a self-transcending agent capable of fashioning a political community (polis ) anchored in social justice. Aristotle’s influence on the development of social and political thought (in the West) has been enormous. In the aftermath of the “Enlightenment,” this influence can still be detected in Hegel’s political philosophy who viewed the “state” (Staat ) as the embodiment of an ethical idea and all citizens as the participants in the formulated and steady transformation of this idea. In more recent times, however, pragmatism in its genuine sense is associated most directly with the work of John Dewey whose conception of participatory agency was indebted equally to Aristotle’s “practical philosophy” and to Hegel’s comprehensive social idealism. With the former, he viewed theorizing not as the search for abstract formulas but as an “inquiry” which, rooted in everyday experience, seeks to distill the purpose of human conduct. With Hegel he was linked through his endorsement of a shared normative standard of social life. One point where Dewey moved resolutely beyond both of his precursors was in his commitment to democracy seen as a public space open to the free and equal participation of all citizens. He is rightly considered one of the foremost mentors of modern, secular and, post-secular (or spiritual) democracy. As he wrote in one of his early essays on the topic: “Democracy is a social, that is to say, an ethical conception, and upon its ethical significance is based its significance as governmental. Democracy is a form of government only because it is a form of moral and spiritual association” (Dewey 1969; also Dallmayr 2010). This statement could and should still be viewed as the guiding motto of democratic citizens everywhere. Dewey’s pointer to spiritual dimension of democracy points to the spiritual dimension of practice and pragmatism as well. The present volume

FOREWORD

ix

explores the spiritual dimensions of pragmatism as well as pragmatic aspect of spirituality and hope this would inspire renewal and transformation of both pragmatism and spirituality which is a call of our times. Fred Dallmayr University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, USA

References Dallmayr, Fred. 2010. Democratic Action and Experience: Dewey’s ‘Holistic’ Pragmatism. In The Promise of Democracy: Political Agency and Transformation, ed. Fred Dallmayr, 43–65. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Dewey, John. 1969. The Ethics of Democracy. In John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882–1898, vol. 1, ed. George E. Astelle et al., 236–240. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University.

Preface

Life is a manifold journey with paths, destinies and destinations–known and unknown. Both our pathways, destinies and destinations have multiple roots and routes in our practices, practical living as well as their spiritual bases and horizons. Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations engages itself with our experience of living which includes both our practice and different pragmatic trajectories as well as their spiritual bases and aspirations. It deals with the theme of pragmatism as a movement of thinking emerging from USA with pioneering thinkers and savants such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey and opens pragmatism to varieties of cross-cultural conversations and co-realizations. It strives to explore spiritual dimension of pragmatism and pragmatic and practical dimension of spirituality. In carrying out such mutual opening, critique, and transformations, this volume strives to make both pragmatism and spirituality part of a larger conversation of and on not only with human kind but also with life kind where it includes all beings and not only humans. It opens American pragmatism to cross-cultural conversations for example exploring pathways of mutual transformations between American pragmatism and pragmatic and spiritual pathways from other philosophical and spiritual traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Yoga, and Tantra. It opens both pragmatism and spirituality to rooted and routed planetary conversations where we converse with our roots and across routes in a spirit of mutual learning and transformations. This makes our thought and

xi

xii

PREFACE

lives part of our connected planetary existence going beyond valorized closures of many kinds such as Euro-American triumphalism, ethnocentrism, and anthropocentrism. Planetary realizations refer to processes of realizing in thought and practice that we all belong to our planet are children of Mother Earth and our thinking and practice embodies this realization. By opening pragmatism and spirituality to border-crossing conversations, Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society helps us realize both planetary conversations and planetary realizations. In our life’s journey sometimes a conversation for a moment can lead to long-term explorations. In February 2010, I was speaking with my dear friend Makarand—Professor Makarand Paranjape teaching at Jawaharlal Nehru University and presently Director of Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla—during the annual Dialogue of Humanity Symposium held at Fireflies Intercultural Ashram, Bangalore. Makarand told me that he is coming to Pondicherry University next month to join a seminar on “Re-Reading Sri Aurobindo.” I became interested in this and wrote to Professor V. Muraleedharan, the-then Professor of English of Pondicherry University and the Director of the Seminar. Professor Mauraleedharan kindly welcomed me to present a paper in this and while preparing for this seminar, I re-read Sri Aurobindo’s Human Cycles and found Sri Aurobindo’s reference to the call of a higher pragmatism, a nobler kind of pragmatism in this. This inspired me to present a paper on “Sri Aurobindo and Spiritual Pragmatism” in this seminar in Pondicherry University in March 2010. After this I co-nurtured an international seminar on “Pragmatism and Spirituality” at Acharya Institute of Management, Bangalore which was jointly supported by Acharya Institute of Management and Indus Business Academy, Bangalore. After this I had initiated one more session of this dialogue in Indus Business Academy, Bangalore in 2012 and then had organized an international seminar on this theme in 2016 at Indus Business Academy, Bangalore jointly organized by Madras Institute of Development Studies and Indus Business Academy and supported by a grant from Indian Council of Social Science Research. The present volume emerges from these dialogues and papers presented in these forums. Some of the papers in this volume were published in a special issue on this theme in 3D: IBA Journal of Management in 2014. It is with joy and gratitude that we offer Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society to interested scholars and humanity after almost a decade of our strivings. I thank Professors Makarand Paranjape and V. Muraleedharan for their initial interest and support. I thank Professors V. Byra Reddy

PREFACE

xiii

and Kiran Reddy of Acharya Institute of Management who kindly hosted our dialogues. I thank Professor Subhash Sharma and friends in Indus Business Academy, especially Mr. Manish Jain, CEO of IBA and Mr. Ramamoorthy, Administrative Officer of IBA, for their continued support for our dialogues and for hosting our seminars on this especially our 2016 international seminar. I thank Indian Council of Social Science Research for financial support. I thank Professor Sashanka Bhide, the-then Director of Madras Institute of Development Studies, for his support. The book has been with the way for a long time and I thank all our contributors for their kindness, generosity, and patience. I thank Professor Fred Dallmayr for his Foreword to the volume and Professor Joseph Prabhu for his Afterword. I am grateful to Sara Crowley Vigneau and Connie Lie at Palgrave Macmillan for their kind support and encouragement. I thank Justin Hewitson for his help in editing and for his kind support and encouragement. I am grateful to Vishnu Varatharajan, my friend and inspiring and dedicated co-traveler, for his kind help all through out in finalizing this book. We dedicate this volume to Margaret Chatterjee, Vincent Sheen, and Francis Clooney. Margaret Chatterjee was a creative philosopher and explored many issues in philosophy and our life worlds. She wrote insightfully about Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, and many savants. She also wrote poetry. Her many works such as Hinterlands and Horizons: Excursions in Search of Amity, Gandhi and the Challenge of Religious Diversity: Religious Pluralism Revisited, Lifeworlds, Philosophy, and India Today, and Life World and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys are deep inspirations for us. What Chatterjee writes in her preface to Life World Ethics: Studies in Several Keys are helpful in our journey with pragmatism, spirituality, philosophy, and life: Contemporary scholarship in the social sciences reveals fascinating commonalities and dialogues in life worlds across the globe, while philosophers strike me, as by and large, not yet drawing on the reservoir of the material to the extent that they could. John Dewey’s advice that philosophers should shift attention from their own technical problems to the problems of humankind is particularly pertinent in our times. (Chatterjee 2002, 2005a, b, 2007)

Vincent Sheen was a deep philosopher from China who taught many years at University of Toronto. I met him in our RVP (Research in Values

xiv

PREFACE

and Philsophy) seminar at Shandong University, Jinnan in August 2018 where he presented an important paper on “Confucianism and Spirituality.” We all in this meeting were deeply enriched by his wisdom and presence. I was in Toronto in November 2018 after taking part in the Parliament of World Religions and was sad to hear about his sad passing away. Our dedication is a humble tribute to this thinker and seeker. Francis X Clooney, SJ is an inspiring student of inter-religious studies and comparative theology. Frank teaches in the School of Divinity at Harvard and was also the Director of Harvard Center for the Study of World Religions. Frank is an inspiring scholar and seeker whose life and works inspire us to find new relationships between practice and spirituality in our troubled worlds. Frank had hosted a presentation of mine on this theme of pragmatism and spirituality at Center for World Religions in November 2015. Frank’s many works such as The Future of Hindu Christian Studies: A Theological Inquiry and Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders, help us in our journey. Here what Frank writes in his preface to Comparative Theology help us in our journey: “If we want to take diversity and religious commitment seriously, then there is a need for comparative theology, a mode of inter-religious learning particularly well-suited to the times in which we live” (Clooney 2011, 2017). Frank has worked with Mother Goddess traditions of Christianity and India and what he writes in his Divine Mother, Blessed Mother: Hindu Goddesses and the Virgin Mary are deeply challenging and needs to be walked and meditated further with as in our book we have not explored further transformational links among feminism, pragmatism, and spirituality: Goddess do not fit in easily with the established theological categories of the Western traditions. Jews, Christians, and Muslims have for the most part portrayed God as male and not-female, even at times going on to assert that God in truth is beyond gender as constituted by physical characteristics. We cannot help but notice that it is a Father who is beyond gender, not a Mother; it is a Father, beyond Gender, who sends his Son, and not His daughter, into the world, that Son, in turn takes birth as a human male adn not a human female. The God who is beyond gender is still called “God” and not “Goddess.” If the divine reality is named and imaged predominantly in male terms to the exclusion of female terms, our understanding of God will be truncated. Although some men may find it comfortable to think that the divine

PREFACE

xv

reality reflects the human image in ways that men find it potentially intelligible, many women still find the female experiences and images, and by the perception that their own gendered identity somehow makes them unlike God as traditionally conceived in Christianity, as God, as Father, as Son. If some men are satisfied while many women feel marginalized, we all suffer, since we are left with a diminished set of experiences to draw upon in imagining and addressing God. We are deprived of a whole set of natural, cultural, and religious resources such as might otherwise enrich our understanding of the divine Person. (Clooney 2005: 3–4)

This volume is a sequel to two volumes on Practical Spirituality and Human Development that I have edited from Palgrave Macmillan—Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations in Religions and Societies (2018) and Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Creative Experiments and Alternative Futures (2019). This is accompanied by a companion volume, Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity. These volumes taken together strive to envision and practice spirituality, pragmatism, religion, and politics in new ways and help realize non-duality and non-injury in a world full dualism and injuries. They also strive to create a world of beauty, dialogue, and dignity in our world torn by ugliness, indignity, and monological assertions of many kinds. I hope Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossings, Transformations and Planetary Realizations help us in living and thinking differently about and with pragmatism and spirituality and contribute to evolutionary transformations of self, consciousness, society, and the world. As we move ahead and together with our journey with pragmatism and spirituality as part of border-crossing walks and meditation, planetary conversations, and planetary realizations, we can walk and meditate with the following thoughts of S. Radhakrishnan from his The Philosophy of Tagore, a traveller with spirituality and creative practice: God has put eternity into heart of man. When cultivated it introduces to a higher world than the material. (Radhakrishna 1918: 13)

We can also possibly sing and dance with the following two poems:

xvi

PREFACE

Logos: Co-Realizing Dance Logos Word Spirit World Join us in our offering Becomes Manifest in our Journey of Sincere Seeking Sprouting Multitudes of Co-Realizing Dancing. (Giri 2019: 148)

Oh Supreme Beauty Oh Supreme Beauty! Pure Consciousness Limitless Energy of Care and Compassion I walk with you in manifold paths of Practical renunciation Each moment is A sadhana and struggle With Love and Transformation. (Giri 2019: 123)

Children’s Day and Deepavali, Festival of Light November 14, 2020

Ananta Kumar Giri Chennai, India

References Chatterjee, Margaret. 2002. Hinterlands and Horizons: Excursions in Search of Amity. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Chatterjee, Margaret. 2005a. Gandhi and the Challenge of Religious Diversity: Religious Pluralism Revisited. Delhi and Chicago: Promilla & Co. Chatterjee, Margaret. 2005b. Lifeworlds, Philosophy, and India Today. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies. Chatterjee, Margaret. 2007. Lifeworld and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Clooney, Francis X. 2005. Divine Mother, Blessed Mother: Hindu Goddesses and the Virgin Mary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clooney, Francis X. 2011. Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

PREFACE

xvii

Clooney, Francis X. 2017. Future of Hindu-Christian Studies: A Theological Inquiry. London: Routledge. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2019. Weaving New Hats: Our Half Birthdays. Delhi: Studera. Radhakrishnan, S. 1918. The Philosophy of Rabindra Nath Tagore. Delhi: Atlantic.

Contents

1

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: An Introduction and an Invitation Ananta Kumar Giri

1

Part I Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: New Horizons of Theory and Practice 2

3

4

Pragmatism and Spirituality: New Horizons of Theory and Practice and the Calling of Planetary Realizations Ananta Kumar Giri Pragmatism, Geist and the Question of Form: From a Critical Theory Perspective Piet Strydom Naturalistic Spirituality, Religious Naturalism, and Community Spirituality: A Broader Pragmatic View Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley

13

41

69

xix

xx

CONTENTS

5

Pragmatism and the “Changing of the Earth”: Unifying Moral Impulse, Creative Instinct, and Democratic Culture Julie Mazzarella Geredien

6

Towards Spiritual Pragmatics: Reflections from the Graveyards of Culture Marcus Bussey

7

Mystical Pragmatics Paul Hague

8

Pragmatism and Spirituality in Anthropological Aesthetics Janusz Baranski ´

95

123

145

167

Part II Pragmatism and Spirituality: Border-Crossing Adventures, Creative Experiments and New Pathways of Planetary Realizations 9

10

11

12

Peirce’s Semiotic Pragmaticism and Buddhist Soteriology: Steps Towards Modelling “Thought Forms” of Signlessness Alina Therese Lettner

187

Spiritual Pragmatism: William James, Sri Aurobindo and Global Philosophy Richard Hartz

221

William James’s Pragmatism and Some Aspects of Roman Catholic Teaching Edward Ulrich

247

Gandhi, Hegel and Freedom: Aufhebungen, Pragmatism and Ideal Type Models Johannes (Hans) I. Bakker

263

CONTENTS

13

14

15

xxi

Cosmopolitan Nationalism, Spirituality and Spaces in Rabindranath Tagore and Sri Aurobindo Payel Chattopadhyay Mukherjee

285

Thought of Mahatma Gandhi: A Path-Breaking Experience of Spiritual Pragmatism Sanghamitra Patnaik

305

Pragmatism, Spirituality, and the Calling of a New Democracy: The Populist Challenge and Ambedkar’s Integration of Buddhism and Dewey Kanchana Mahadevan

325

Afterword

347

Index

351

Notes on Editor and Contributors

Editor Ananta Kumar Giri is Professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. He has taught and done research in many universities in India and abroad, including Aalborg University (Denmark), Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris (France), the University of Kentucky (USA), University of Freiburg & Humboldt University (Germany), Jagiellonian University (Poland), and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has an abiding interest in social movements and cultural change, criticism, creativity and contemporary dialectics of transformation, theories of self, culture and society, and creative streams in education, philosophy, and literature. Dr. Giri has written and edited around two dozen books in Odia and English, including Global Transformations: Postmodernity and Beyond (1998); Sameekhya o Purodrusti (Criticism and Vision of the Future, 1999); Patha Prantara Nrutattwa (Anthropology of the Street Corner, 2000); Conversations and Transformations: Toward a New Ethics of Self and Society (2002); Self-Development and Social Transformations? The Vision and Practice of Self-study Mobilization of Swadhyaya (2008); Mochi o Darshanika (The Cobbler and the Philosopher, 2009); Sociology and Beyond: Windows and Horizons (2012), Knowledge and Human Liberation: Towards Planetary Realizations (2013); Philosophy and Anthropology: Border-Crossing and Transformations (co-edited with John Clammer, 2013); New Horizons of Human

xxiii

xxiv

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

Development (editor, 2015); Pathways of Creative Research: Towards a Festival of Dialogues (editor, 2017); Cultivating Pathways of Creative Research: New Horizons of Transformative Practice and Collaborative Imagination (editor, 2017); Research as Realization: Science, Spirituality and Harmony (editor, 2017); Beyond Cosmopolitanism: Towards Planetary Transformations (editor, 2017); The Aesthetics of Development; Art, Culture and Social Transformations (co-editor, 2017); Beyond Sociology (editor, 2018); Social Theory and Asian Dialogues: Cultivating Planetary Conversations (editor, 2018); Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations in Religions and Societies (editor, 2018); Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Alternative Experiments for Creative Futures (editor, 2019) and Transformative Harmony (editor, 2019); The Calling of Global Responsibility: New Initiatives in Justice, Dialogues and Planetary Realizations (forthcoming); Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: New Pathways of Consciousness, Freedom and Solidarity (editor, forthcoming); Cross-Fertilizing Roots and Routes: Identities, Social Creativity, Cultural Regeneration and Planetary Realizations (editor, forthcoming); Roots, Routes and A New Awakening: Beyond One and Many and Alternative Planetary Futures (editor, forthcoming); Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo (editor, forthcoming); Learning the Art of Wholeness: Integral Education and Beyond (forthcoming); and Cultivating Integral Development (forthcoming). Website: www.mids.ac. in/ananta.htm.

Contributors Professor Johannes (Hans) I. Bakker lectured at many conferences and taught for more than forty years at four different universities and retired from the University of Guelph. His work has focused on the epistemological approach associated with semiotics as seen through the lens of Max Weber’s ideas concerning ideal types. His Neo-Weberian approach stresses Ideal Type Models (ITMs) and he has recently spoken on that in Dubrovnik and Prague. He guest edited a special issue of Sociological Focus on Grounded Theory and has edited more than a dozen books. His work on Max Weber’s ITM of “Patrimonialism” has been applied to Indic Civilization in the Indonesian archipelago and his work on rural sociology has involved the study of land tenure and rural development.

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

xxv

Janusz Baranski ´ professor in the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. His subjects of interest are among others: theory and methodology of anthropology, theory of culture, anthropological aesthetics, anthropological museology, and cultural heritage. Author of the books (in Polish): Socjotechnika mi˛edzy magia˛ a analogia: ˛ szkice o masowej perswazji w PRL-u i III RP (Sociotechnics Between Magic and Analogy: Essays on Mass Persuation in Poland Under Communism and After the Fall of Communism), ´ Swiat rzeczy: zarys antropologiczny (The World of Things: An Anthropological Outline), Etnologia i okolice: eseje antyperyferyjne (Ethnology and Surroundings: Anti-peripheral Essays ) and Etnologia w erze postludowej: dalsze eseje antyperyferyjne (Ethnology in the Post-folk Era: Further Antiperipheral Essays ). Recently he conducts research on cultural heritage in the region of Polish Spisz. Marcus Bussey is Deputy Head, School of Social Sciences at the University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. As a cultural theorist, historian, and futurist he works on cultural processes that energize social transformation. He uses futures thinking and embodied workshops to challenge the dominant beliefs and assumptions that constrain human responses to rapid cultural, social, environmental, and technological change. He is currently focused on the role of anticipatory aesthetics as a processoriented approach to helping individuals and organizations develop inclusive and resilient futures for the planet and its people. Marcus has coauthored with Professor Richard Slaughter Futures Thinking for Social Foresight (2005). He has also co-edited two books with Sohail Inayatullah and Ivana Milojevi´c—Neohumanist Educational Futures (2006) and Alternative Educational Futures (2008). In addition, he has edited Tantric Women Tell their Stories (2007) and Dynamics of Dissent: Theorizing Movements for Inclusive Futures with Meera Chakravorty and John Clammer. Marcus has held fellowships at Nanyang Technical University, Singapore and Tamkang University, Taiwan. He is currently Program Leader in Futures Studies at his university. Marcus is on the editorial boards for the Journal of Futures Studies, Foresight, and On the Horizons. His new book of poetry (as social theory) The Next Big Thing! (Studera Press) was released in March 2019. For more information on Marcus: http://www.usc.edu.au/explore/structure/facultyof-arts-business-and-law/staff/dr-marcus-bussey.

xxvi

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

Fred Dallmayr is Packey J. Dee Professor in the departments of philosophy and political science at the University of Notre Dame. He holds a Doctor of Law degree from the University of Munich (1955) and a Ph.D. in political science from Duke University (1960). He has been a visiting professor at Hamburg University in Germany and at the New School for Social Research in New York, and a Fellow at Nuffield College in Oxford. He has been teaching at Notre Dame University since 1978. During 1991–1992 he was in India on a Fulbright research grant. Among his recent publications are: Between Freiburg and Frankfurt (1991); The Other Heidegger (1993); Beyond Orientalism: Essays On Cross-Cultural Encounter (1996; Japanese translation 2001); Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village (1998: Persian translation 2005); Achieving Our World: Toward a Global and Plural Democracy (2001); Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices (2002; Italian translation forthcoming); Hegel: Modernity and Politics (new ed. 2002); Peace Talks—Who Will Listen (2004); Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents (2005); In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times (2007); The Promise of Democracy: Political Agency and Transformation (2010); Integral Pluralism: Beyond Culture Wars (2010), Comparative Political Theory: An Introduction (2010); Return to Nature? An Ecological Counter-History (2011) Contemporary Chinese Political Thought (with Zhao Tingyang 2012); Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis (2013); Mindfulness and Letting Be (2014); Taming Leviathan: Toward a Global Ethical Alliance (2014); Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginnings (2015); and Against Apocalypse: Recovering Humanity’s Wholeness (2016). He is a past president of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (SACP). He is currently the Executive Co-Chair of “World Public Forum—Dialogue of Civilizations” (Vienna) and a member of the Scientific Committee of “RESET—Dialogue on Civilizations” (Rome). Julie Mazzarella Geredien is an independent scholar living in Annapolis, Maryland, USA, currently completing several book projects related to citizenship and social change. She has published chapters in anthologies, on topics like gender, community, democracy, social and environmental justice movement, and social healing. Her background experience is in the arts, mind-body practices, public education, and service work with youth. She holds a B.S. from the School of Speech at Northwestern University, an M.F.A. from the Center for Excellence

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

xxvii

at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and an M.S. from the College of New Jersey, formerly the Teacher’s College at Trenton State. Paul Hague was born in England and educated mainly as a mathematician, spending most of his business career with IBM in sales, marketing, and software development in London and Stockholm as an information systems architect. In 1980, Paul saw that if we are to understand the essential difference between humans and machines with so-called artificial intelligence, and so rebuild our education and economic systems on Love, Peace, and the Truth, we need to answer the most critical unanswered question in science: “What is causing scientists and technologists, aided and abetted by computer technology, to drive the pace of scientific discovery and technological development at unprecedented exponential rates of acceleration?” This essay on “Mystical Pragmatics” introduces Paul’s researches, further explained in a pair of complementary models of evolution in The Four Spheres: Healing the Split between Mysticism and Science and Through Evolution’s Accumulation Point: Toward Its Glorious Culmination, to be published. He is currently based in Gothenburg, Sweden. Websites: mysticalpragmatics.net and paulha gue.net. Richard Hartz studied philosophy at Yale University and South Asian languages and literature at the University of Washington. Since 1980 he has lived in Pondicherry, India, where he is an independent scholar studying Asian languages and cultures with a particular focus on Sanskrit literature and the writings of Sri Aurobindo. His book The Clasp of Civilizations: Globalization and Religion in a Multicultural World was published in 2015. He now works with Sri Aurobindo Ashram Archives, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, India. Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley is CSU Outstanding Professor of Philosophy of and Wang Family awardee for outstanding teaching, research, and service at California State University, Bakersfield. She is author of Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities: A Roycean Public Philosophy (Vanderbilt University Press, 1997) and Josiah Royce in Focus (Indiana University Press, 2008). She is a recipient of the Herbert Schnieder Award for outstanding contributions of American Philosophy. She serves as President of the Josiah Royce Foundation and Chair of the Advisory Board for the Royce Critical Edition. She is immediate past President of the Josiah Royce Society. In addition to articles on Josiah Royce, her recent

xxviii

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

publications include “Kant as Public Intellectual and Political Theorist,” Pragmatist Kant, Edited by C. Skowronski, ´ Brill, 2018; “Royce on Self and Relationships: Speaking to the Digital and Texting Self of Today,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2018. Alina Therese Lettner is an independent researcher with a classical humanistic background. She completed her English/American and Italian Studies at the Universities of Vienna, Stirling, Florence, and Innsbruck, Austria (M.A. 2002). She has undergone training in a whole range of classical philologies (Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Biblical Hebrew) and modern languages (e.g. Hindi, Hungarian, Indonesian, Norwegian), including sociolinguistic fieldwork (New Zealand, Singapore) and paleographical basics (Old English homilies, Latin and Byzantine manuscript cultures). She holds a second degree in Indology and Medieval English Language and Literature from the University of Göttingen, Germany (M.A. 2013). She has served as a research assistant and lecturer during the time of her doctorate at the Department of English and American Studies (IfAA), University of Kassel. In 2014, she successfully defended her dissertation thesis (summa cum laude): Eine Philologie der Denkformen für Indien und Europa: Sanskrit-S¯ utras und Semiotik in den Cultural Studies, i.e. a ‘semiotic philology of thought forms’, developed with regard to the classical intellectual traditions of India and Europe. https://uni-kassel.aca demia.edu/AlinaThereseLettner. Kanchana Mahadevan is Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Mumbai. She teaches and researches in the areas of feminist philosophy, decolonization, critical theory political thought, aesthetics, and film. Her book Between Femininity and Feminism: Colonial and Postcolonial Perspectives on Care (published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research in collaboration with DK Printworld New Delhi in 2014) examines the relevance of Western feminist philosophy in the Indian context. She is currently working on the relationship between the secular and the postsecular with reference to gender. She has held several visiting professorships and fellowships. Payel Chattopadhyay Mukherjee conducts research that has been broadly on the theories of Cosmopolitanism, Home, Indian Nationalism, and History of Ideas in South Asian Studies. She has written for several scholarly publications including Routledge Research in Postcolonial Literatures, South Asian Review, Journal of Human Values to name a few, and

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

xxix

has presented her research at academic forums like The European Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (EACLALS), The South Asian Literary Association (SALA, USA), Association for Asian Studies (AAS, USA), and Canadian Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (CACLALS). She has been a co-lead in an international project on collaborative teaching and research in Canada. She has taught courses on South Asian literary narratives, critical theories, and academic communication in different institutions like Indian Institute of Management (Indore, Bodh Gaya), Indian Institute of Technology (Gandhinagar), National Institute of Design (Ahmedabad, Gandhinagar), Ahmedabad University, along with classes for students at University of Saskatchewan, Canada. Currently, she is a faculty member at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi. Sanghamitra Patnaik is an Associate Professor at School of Law, KIIT University, Bhubaneswar, India. She obtained her M.Phil. and Ph.D. from American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She has wide experience in the field of academics and research. She has been awarded various grants and scholarships from such bodies as Indian Council of Social Science and Research (ICSSR), New Delhi, Government of Odisha and American Studies Research Centre (ASRC), Hyderabad. Her published works cover Indo–US Relations, Environmental Politics, Climate Change, Indigenous people and Culture and Human Resource Management. She is a member of the AdvisoryCommittee of IPSA RC-35. She represented India in SUSI-2013 sponsored/nominated by Department of State, USA. Joseph Prabhu is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles, and Adjunct Professor of Religion at Claremont Graduate University. He is the editor of The Intercultural Challenge of Raimon Panikkar (Orbis Books, 1996) and the co-editor of the two-volume Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges (Ashgate, 2007). He is also the editor of the forthcoming Raimon Panikkar as a Modern Spiritual Master (Orbis Books, 2020), and the author of the forthcoming Liberating Gandhi: Gandhi’s Legacy for the 21st Century and Beyond. He has been a Consultant to the UN Human Rights Commission and has been both a Trustee and an Executive Committee Member of the Parliament of the World’s Religions. He has lectured in

xxx

NOTES ON EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

more than eighty universities around the world and was honored by his university with an annual lecture series in his name. Piet Strydom an ethical exile from the apartheid regime who came to Europe in 1974, is since 2011 retired from the Department of Sociology, University College Cork, Ireland. His research interests cover from critical social theory and cognitive sociology, through the philosophy and history of social science, to substantive areas like rights, risk, responsibility, cosmopolitanism, environment, and the human mind. Major publications include Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology (Routledge, 2011), New Horizons of Critical Theory: Collective Learning and Triple Contingency (New Delhi: Shipra, 2009), Risk, Environment and Society (Open UP, 2002), Discourse and Knowledge (Liverpool UP, 2000). He edited Philosophies of Social Science (Open UP, 2003, with Gerard Delanty) as well as special issues of the European Journal of Social Theory and the Irish Journal of Sociology. Details of his latest writings are available at https://ucc-ie.academia.edu/PStrydom and https://www.resear chgate.net/profile/Piet_Strydom. Edward Ulrich is a Professor of Theology at the University of St. Thomas in the United States of America. There he teaches Christian theology, world religions, and has taken his American students to India to expose them to the cultures and religions. Much of his research has focused on interreligious issues, especially in terms of Swami Abhishiktananda, who cofounded Shantivanam Ashram near Trichinopoly. Currently, he is researching Mahatma Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghose in their roles as nationalists, placing them into comparative perspective.

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3

Fig. 9.4

The relation of Geist and form The human world Static X and Y––captures the vertical and horizontal on a single plane Fractal X and Y on a dynamic multidimensional field The intercultural and transdisciplinary model of a “semiotic philology of thought forms” devised by Lettner in keeping with Peirce’s triadic conception of semiosis A Peircean interpretation of “dependent arising” (prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada) visualised with regard to the semiosic genesis of karmically conditioned and psychophysically embodied “forms of consciousness”, i.e. “life forms” A sketch of (phenomenal) “forms of consciousness” as embedded in karmically regulated processes of psychophysical embodiment with regard to the five skandhas and the theory of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) The Buddhist notion of “concept” (P. paññatti, S. prajñapti) as mapped onto the Peircean model of semiosis

55 60 132 133

190

195

199 203

xxxi

CHAPTER 1

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: An Introduction and an Invitation Ananta Kumar Giri

Pragmatism is an important philosophical movement originating in the USA in late nineteenth century in the works of the American polymath Charles Sanders Peirce and subsequently developed by pioneers such as William James and John Dewey which has influenced ways of thinking and practice in the last one hundred fifty years in the USA, Europe, and many parts of the world. In the works of early American pragmatists such as Peirce, James, and Dewey pragmatism was part of a much more wider and global conversations such as Peirce dialoguing with both Christianity and Buddhism, William James with Swami Vivekananda from India, and John Dewey visiting China in 1919 and engaging with Chinese philosophical traditions. But this was not cultivated further in the work of later day American pragmatists such as Richard Rorty who did not continue this engagement with social and philosophical issues from other traditions and parts of the world. Pragmatism here seems to have become insular as evidenced in the tile of one of Rorty’s book, Achieving our Country (Rorty 1998; also see Balslev 1991). But pragmatism is part of not only

A. K. Giri (B) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_1

1

2

A. K. GIRI

achieving our country but what Fred Dallmayr calls Achieving our World in the process of rethinking, broadening, deepening, and transforming our visions of practice, pragmatism, word, and the world (Dallmayr 2001). Pragmatism from the very beginning was always concerned with the higher and deeper dimensions of quality of practice, society, and life which resonated with a spiritual dimension of practice and pragmatism in an open way without being narrowly confined to conventional idols of religion, science, and secularism. Our book, Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Border Crossing, Transformations and Planetary Realizations explores some of these issues. It engages with pragmatism as part of conversations across multiple philosophical and cultural traditions. This is part of a vision and practice of planetary conversations and planetary realizations where we converse across borders and realize that we belong to our planet and learn together going beyond ethnocentrism, Euro-American centrism, and other entrenched closures. The book begins with the Part I of the book. It begins with the essay by Ananta Kumar Giri, “Pragmatism and Spirituality: New Horizons of Theory and Practice and the Calling of Planetary Conversations.” Giri discusses border-crossing dialogues between American pragmatism and critical thought in continental Europe as in the works of Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas which has led to the field of Kantian pragmatism. Giri strives to deepen and broaden this dialogue to Indian and Chinese philosophical and spiritual traditions. He also tries to rethink the conventional pragmatic approaches to language, self, and society by exploring its spiritual dimension. He engages with Sri Aurobindo, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein and explores spiritual dimension in their engagement with and reconstruction of language, self, and society. Giri also cultivates the vision and practice of mystical pragmatics by engaging with the works and lives of Meister Eckhart, Sri Ramakrishna, and Swami Vivekananda. Giri’s essay is followed by Piet Strydom’s “Pragmatism, Geist and the Question of Form: From a Critical Theory Perspective,” in which Strydom looks at the genealogy of pragmatism in the Kantian/Left Hegelian tradition and discusses the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, and C. Wright Mills. Strydom approaches the word “spirituality” from a broader conceptual perspective and here approaches the word Spirit from a multilingual perspective. Here what Strydom writes deserves our careful consideration: When the word ‘spirit’ is approached from a multilingual perspective, particularly considering the Germanic Geist, it quickly becomes apparent

1

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION …

3

that it cannot be confined exclusively to religion or religious belief, but has to be broadened to cover also the human spirit / mind. In turn, however, the latter cannot simply be understood as something metaphysical, since it has to be acknowledged that its embodiment is of central importance and that it thus has a natural history. This implies that the embodied spirit / mind and form are, if not coeval and coextensive, actually closely related to one another.

In his essay, Strydom also deals with the question of form as it relates to both pragmatism and Geist and argues how form has simultaneously sociocultural roots as well as roots in nature. He then explores the reality and manifestation of Geist-infused form. He also explores the significance of the human spirit/mind as form in “holding open the abundant potentialities for realising an appropriate human world— something sorely required today for problem-solving and world-creation. For Strydom, both pragmatism and critical theory calls for spirited and minded subjects.” Strydom also relates this calling of minded and spirited subject formation to realization of infinity in our lives. Strydom thus writes: Finally, then, it may be submitted that to be committed and reflexively oriented from within practical situations toward the structuring and regulatory efficacy of the cognitive order as rendered possible by its infinite unconditioned potentialities would be tantamount to being ‘spiritual’ in the best sense of the word – both spirited and minded. On this we shall have to count to solve the pressing problems of our time and to create a sustainable and justifiable human world for ‘spiritual’ subjects whose dignity, rights and vulnerability are secured by democratic and cosmopolitan means on an ecological and planetary scale.

Strydom’s essay is followed by Jacqueline Ann K. Kegley’s “Naturalistic Spirituality, Religious Naturalism, and Community Spirituality: A Broader Pragmatic View,” in which Kegley discusses the work of the pioneering American pragmatist Josiah Royce. Kegley explores the rich insights of Royce on spirituality and religion. These are explored first through an analysis of Royce’s Sources of Religious Insight, a phenomenological exploration of religious experience, an experience that has a natural history. A fundamental aspect of religious spirituality for Royce is self-transcendence and unification of individual meaning through loyalty to an ideal and

4

A. K. GIRI

connections with others in a community of loyalty. Royce’s religious naturalism is evident in his various writings on types of monotheism and his affirmation of a deity fully involved with and in the natural world. Royce’s The Problem of Christianity focuses on Christianity as a message about the progressive realization of the “Universal Community in and through the longings, the vicissitudes, the tragedies and triumphs of this process of the temporal world.” Royce expounded a naturalistic spirituality and a religious naturalism but in doing so, he expands our view of spirituality and religion, giving it a rich community flavor. Spirituality, for Royce, is about deep connection, meaning, and joy. It is about individual meaning and unification accomplished through loyalty to an ideal and connection with others in a community of loyalty. Joy is achieved through an attitude of love toward the universe and in reverence for Community as essential to pragmatism—a theme which resonates with Martin Luther King’s emphasis on creation of a beloved community. Kegley’s essay is followed by Julie Mazzarella Geredien Sri Aurobindo’s epic Savitri “Pragmatism and the ‘Changing of the Earth’: Unifying Moral Impulse, Creative Instinct and Democratic Culture,” in which Geredien is concerned with creation of beloved community like Kegley and Rosiah. She discusses the work of John Dewey and others here and presents Dewey’s work in building community and resolving conflicts. For Geredien, pragmatism is concerned with healing deep conflicts. In a creative way, Geredien discusses Bahai perspective on change of Earth. She argues how we have to make creative link among moral impulse, creative instinct, and democratic culture. For Geredien, spiritual pragmatism “offers a path of thought and action through which moral impulses, creative instinct and democratic culture become increasingly united, thereby healing deep rifts and addressing serious systemic errors at the root of global problems today.” Geredien’s essay is followed by Marcus Bussey’s “Towards Spiritual Pragmatics: Reflections from the Graveyards of Culture,” in which Bussey discusses pragmatism exploring the liminal realm of reality. As he writes, “There is something liminal about reality—and pragmatism acknowledges that condition by working the between that lies betwixt idea and action, aspiration and perspiration, hope and the quotidian. Such work requires a future-sense to come into play and that sense involves sensitivity to creative play and the possibilities inherent to our contexts when we take the lid off authority and throw away the rule book.” In his essay, Bussey makes a case for a poetics of possibility that is grounded in what he terms the “graveyard of culture.”

1

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION …

5

He seeks to navigate this graveyard with a poet’s eye which involves both the heart and the head in formulating new and emergent futures. He builds his case via a series of reflections each beginning with a poem. Culture is the resource upon which this exploration rests and poets are deeply attuned to their cultures and mine them to offer spiritual insights into the human condition and also into the kind of resources available to us in the struggle to free ourselves from negative sentiments and narrow worldviews in order to genuinely engage in the work of creating a world— alive to mystery and possibility—that we would wish to be the inheritance of future generations. As Bussey notes, “All cultures have their graveyards—and their skeletons in cupboards. The poet, as a kind of Tantrica, picks their way carefully through the detritus of ages in the search for the old and deep that can be returned to the present.” Busseys’ essay is followed by Paul Hague’s “Mystical Pragmatics: Harmonizing Evolutionary Convergence,” where Hague building on the works of Charles Sanders Peirce cultivates pathways of mystical pragmatics. For Hague, “mystical pragmatics is an intelligent way of collectively organizing our lives in harmony with the fundamental law of the Universe, which Heraclitus, the mystical philosopher of change, called the ‘Hidden Harmony’.” Hague’s essay is followed by Janusz Baranski’s “Pragmatism and Spirituality in Anthropological Perspective” in which Baranski discusses the works of Richard Schusterman, Clifford Geertz, and John Dewey in the field of anthropological aesthetics and how their work make a bridge between pragmatism and spirituality. With these we come to the Second Part of our book “Pragmatism and Spirituality: Border-Crossing Adventures, Creative Experiments and New Pathways of Planetary Realizations.” This part brings pragmatism in conversations with many other traditions of thought and practice from around the world. This begins with the insightful essay of Alina Therese Lettner, “Peirce’s Semiotic Pragmaticism and Buddhist Soteriology: Steps Towards Modelling ‘Thought Forms’ of Signlessness.” In her essay, Lettner builds on Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmaticist theory of thought-signs in order to further develop her semiotic model of thought forms with regard to the immediacy or “Firstness” of phenomenal forms of consciousness (S. vijñ¯ an.a, P. viññ¯ an.a). Setting out to clear the ground for the Buddhist soteriological modality of signlessness, she proposes to investigate the pragmatic enactment of “thought forms” as “life forms” through the Noble Eightfold Path and the context

6

A. K. GIRI

of Buddhist soteriology. Conventional sign processes like language and conceptual construction are modeled by her with regard to the “five aggregates” (S. pañcaskandha, P. -kkhandha) of empirical personality and put into the larger context of “dependent arising” (S. prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada, P. pat.iccasamupp¯ ada). In so doing she draws upon Peirce’s conception of semiosis for bringing into view the karmic conditioning and psychophysical embodiment of phenomenological events (dharmas ) that in Buddhism are seen to operate without the assumption of a permanent self. Reconstructing Buddhist soteriology along the lines of Peirce’s semiotic pragmaticism, she thus arrives at a broad understanding of thought forms on the basis of various theoretical and methodological synergies that allow her to accommodate in her model the signless pragmatics of the Buddhist meditational path toward liberation. Lettner’s essay is followed by Richard Hartz’s “Spiritual Pragmatism: William James, Sri Aurobindo and Global Philosophy.” Hartz’s essay expands the framework for understanding philosophical pragmatism beyond the Euro-American context in which it is usually discussed. Starting from William James’s influential exposition, Hartz looks at the development of pragmatism in modern Indian thought as represented by the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, who appears to have been familiar with some of James’s writings. He shows that Aurobindo’s Hegelian tendencies are counterbalanced by pronounced affinities with Jamesian pragmatism. Aurobindo refers specifically to James when commenting on a perceived narrowing of the distance between Western and Indian thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He comes closest to James when he speaks of a will to know, believe and be, by which we “create our own truth.” Aurobindo endorses the pragmatic rejection of theoretical knowledge divorced from practical application in the broadest sense. He agrees with James in placing at the center of his philosophy the question, “What is life eventually to make of itself?” The comparison of William James and Sri Aurobindo underlines the global relevance of philosophical pragmatism and suggests a promising direction for the revitalization of philosophy. Hartz’s essay is followed by Edward Ulrich’s who is in his essay “William James’s Pragmatism and Some Aspects of Roman Catholic Teaching” shows how the pragmatism of James is at odds with the traditional theological and philosophical approaches of the Catholic Church. The Church had insisted, since ancient times, that there is an objective and knowable order. Against the trends of modern philosophy, segments of the hierarchy of the Church, especially in the late

1

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION …

7

nineteenth century, had promoted the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas as an example of how reason can plumb, with integrity, the mysteries of both the universe and God. In contrast to that, although not addressing James in any direct way, more innovative Catholic thinkers developed a version of Aquinas’ thought, known as “transcendental Thomism,” that gives a more foundational role to religious experience. That, in turn, made an impact. All in all, in the Church today, there is an increased emphasis on not simply arguing the validity of beliefs and doctrines, but showing their relevance and how they relate to human experience. Ulrich’s essay is followed by Johannes (Hans) I. Bakker’s essay, “Gandhi, Hegel and Freedom: Aufhebungen, Pragmatism and Ideal Type Models” which engages with pragmatism, Gandhi and Hegel. He begins by making some comments on epistemology that are relevant to Pragmatism by going back to the epistemology of philosophical idealism. Idealism can be linked to the creation of the modern university as a center of intellectual “autonomy.” The basic point here is that to understand Gandhi, using words available in every day circumstances is not enough. Words and concepts like sublation used by Hegel are helpful here. Hegel’s use of this dialectical concept fits Gandhi’s philosophical conceptualization of political, economic and social change. Gandhi fought colonialism. For Bakker, we need to understand what the abstract concept of “colonialism” is before we can fully conceptualize the abstract concept of “postcolonailism.” For Bakker, we have to think in terms of a logic which involves an Aufhebung of subsumptive predicates. American pragmatism often does that, although it is not always obvious that there is a link between progressive left-Hegelianism and American Pragmatism. For Bakker, we must think about it as, metaphorically speaking, coffee without milk, or, to put it simply, “black coffee” as an “object.” It is much like Husserl’s epoche’. But Hegel is less static and more dynamic, more historically based which helps us understand both Gandhi and pragmatism as dynamic formations with self, society, culture, history, and the world. Bakker’s essay is followed by Payel Chattopadhyay Mukherjee’s essay “Cosmopolitan Nationalism, Spirituality and Spaces in Rabindranath Tagore and Sri Aurobindo” which explores the notions of pragmatic spirituality through the spaces institutionalized by Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore. She has argued that the abstractions of their philosophical spirituality could be realized within the materiality of the spaces. In her essay she also pertinently emphasizes that within these institutionalized spaces, spirituality was entwined with a kind of cosmopolitan

8

A. K. GIRI

nationalism that was aimed at practicing self-reliance and self-critiquing as a means of realizing the life-long engagement with the idea of freedom of mind, ingeniously associated with cultivating ideological and cultural independence. In doing so, she engages with Sri Aurobindo and Tagore’s pursuit of a kind of spirituality as an everyday experience, intersecting with the issues of nationalism, politics, education, freedom, and poetry. Chattopadhyay Mukherjee’s essay is followed by Sanghamitra Patnaik’s “Thought of Mahatma Gandhi: A Path-Breaking Experience of Spiritual Pragmatism.” In her essay, Patnaik explores the new dimension of power cultivated by Gandhi when Gandhi says that power gets expanded when it is shared with others. For Patnaik, Gandhi’s idea of means justifies the end contests Realist ideas of public morality and private morality and Kautilya’s dual standard of morality. For him both politics and religion share common goal—welfare of the common people. The article focuses on the pragmatic ideas of Gandhi who advances the idea of redefining power by adhering to Truth and Non-violence. He emphasizes on the concept of “power with” instead of “power against”—a true reflection of spiritual pragmatism. Gandhi’s vision and practice of sharing power in terms of power with rather than power over finds support in the philosophy of John Dewey and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Patnaik’s essay is followed by Kanchana Mahadevan’s essay, “Pragmatism, Spirituality and the Calling of a New Democracy: The Populist Challenge and Ambedkar’s Integration of Buddhism and Dewey.” This essay engages with Ambedkar’s distinct notion of democracy as a response to populism. It develops Ambedkar’s reconfiguration of freedom, equality, and solidarity as going beyond the formalism of parliamentary democracy. It notes that Ambedkar discerns an exclusive emphasis on rationality and formalism as encouraging majoritarianism. Mahadevan points to the similarities between Ambedkar and Dewey in their respective projects of social democracy of dialogue without barriers of caste, race, class, and gender. However, her essay also argues that Ambedkar cannot be restricted to a Deweyan framework, given that he situates democratic ideals in the context of Indian tradition. Ambedkar upholds that democracy cannot simply imitate its European versions. His critique of liberalism and Marxism reveals the difficulties of universalizing a specific cultural context across diverse global cultures. This chapter concludes by exploring Ambedkar’s turn to Buddhism for an alternative non-populist interpretation of democracy that stresses on affect and social harmony.

1

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION …

9

The volume is enriched by the deep and insightful reflections of Joseph Prabhu, himself a great spiritual seeker and philosopher. In his Afterword, building on Hegel, Prabhu tells us that our book is part of a long tradition of reconfiguring the task of the philosophical as finding “cross-section of metaphysics and the mundane.” This quest now needs to go beyond the Eurocentric and West-centric biases of Western philosophy and needs to be part of conversations across borders what is cultivated in our volume as planetary conversations and planetary realizations. Prabhu quite insightfully helps us realize a broader and deeper pragmatism which helped by opening pragmatism from one intellectual tradition to others such as American pragmatism to other philosophical, religious, and spiritual traditions. Such broadening and deepening helps us realize that pragmatism is not just accommodation to facts to but is as much concerned with the “ought” as with the “is.” Finally Prabhu tells us how we are all called by a new journey with Spirit (and I would like to add practice here too) and this volume is part of such an epochal journey of our walking with Spirit and practice and spirited practices of our times. Prabhu begins with Hegel and concludes with Hegel which also resonates with the spirit of Sri Aurobindo: I would like to conclude with some other words of Hegel, this time taken from the Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit: “It is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and it is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward.” It is a pleasure to encounter a volume, composed by authors drawn from across the world, who are alive to the motions of Spirit in our time.

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society invites us to engage with new visions and pathways of spirit work in our self, culture, society, and the world and here the following lines from Sri Aurobindo’s epic Savitri can inspire us: Across leaping springs of death and birth And over shifting borders of soul-change, A hunter on spirit’s creative track, He followed in life’s fine and mighty trails Pursuing her sealed formidable delight In a perilous adventure without close

10

A. K. GIRI

In a perilous adventure without close. At first no aim appeared in those large steps: Only the wide source he saw of all things here Looking toward a wider source beyond. For as she drew ay from earthly lines, A tenser drag was felt from the Unknown, A higher context of delivering thought Drove her toward marvel and discovery; There came a high release from pettier cares, A mightier image of desire and hope, A vaster formula, a greater scene Ever she circled toward some far-off Light. (Sri Aurobindo 1993: 188)

References Balslev, Anindita Niyogi. 1991. Cultural Otherness: Correspondence with Richard Rorty. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study. Dallmayr, Fred. 2001. Achieving Our World: Toward a Global and Plural Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Rorty, Richard. 1998. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in TwentiethCentury America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sri Aurobindo. 1993 [1950–1951]. Savitri. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.

PART I

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: New Horizons of Theory and Practice

CHAPTER 2

Pragmatism and Spirituality: New Horizons of Theory and Practice and the Calling of Planetary Realizations Ananta Kumar Giri

Introduction and Invitation Pragmatism has been an important philosophical and sociocultural movement in the United States of America which has influenced our views of self, language, social reality and human condition and has opened

This first builds on a presentation on “Sri Aurobindo and Spiritual Pragmatism” presented at the international seminar on “Re-reading Sri Aurobindo,” organized by Department of English in 2010. I thank Professor S. Muraleedharan and Professor Makarand Paranjape for their kind invitation and interest. This then has been presented in several workshops in India, Europe and the USA as part of our dialogues from Asian Forum for Social Theory. A related version of this essay has come out as “Spiritual Pragmatism and the Transformation of the Posthuman” in Critical Posthumanism, ed. Makarand Paranjape and Debashish Banejree (Springer, 2016). A. K. Giri (B) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_2

13

14

A. K. GIRI

up new avenues of creativity of freedom, action and imagination.1 The last century has seen its spreading global influence. American pragmatism cultivated by pioneering savants such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey influenced the post-war continental philosophy of seekers such as Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas from Germany. This influence has not been one-way. In the works of Apel and Habermas, we see a mutual dialogue between American pragmatism and streams in continental philosophy—namely Kant, leading to what is now called Kantian pragmatism (Habermas 2002; Giri 2013), which in its own way was an effort to simultaneously engage with the pragmatics of both communication and action, practice and transcendence.2 Kantian pragmatism has influenced critical theory in philosophy and social sciences and opened up pragmatism to new realities and possibilities resulting from the dialogue between American pragmatism and continental philosophy. It is also part of a new movement of democratic practice in societies with histories and legacies of entrenched authoritarianism and totalitarianism such as post-war Germany.3 The democratic impulse in philosophy of pragmatism, as in thinkers such as John Dewey, has also influenced visionaries and strivers of democracy such as B. R. Ambedkar of India.

Deepening and Widening Pragmatism: Planetary Conversations This dialogue needs to be broadened, becoming part of what can be called planetary conversations, where we move from our locations of visions, practices and philosophical traditions and dialogue across different traditions of thinking and practices of the world (see Giri 2018a). There is a need for dialogue between varieties of pragmatism while simultaneously exploring spiritual bases and horizons of pragmatism. For example, Confucianism does have an important emphasis upon practice and pragmatism.4 John Dewey visited China and became familiar with the Confucian streams of theory and practice.5 Confucian philosopher Roger Ames finds resonance between Confucian perspectives on individualism, community and ethics and Dewey’s perspectives on expanded individualism and democracy. As Ames writes: In thinking through the Confucian notion of radically embedded, relationally constituted, and always emergent persons, we might expand upon Dewey’s notion of ‘individuality’ as a potentially productive example of

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

15

an associated analogy. There is a profound resonance between the holistic and inclusive notion of social harmony to which the Confucian role ethic aspires, and John Dewey’s conception of a flourishing democracy as a political and religious ideal [..] Dewey might help us bring [the] Confucian version of relationally constituted persons into clearer resolution as a basis for thinking through alternative relational notions of agency, autonomy and choice. (Ames 2019: 14)

In a similar way, Fred Dallmayr (2007) also helps us understand the manifold relationships between Confucian practices, Dewey’s pragmatic vision and vision and practices of seekers such as Gandhi, which help us understand and broaden the terms of discourse of pragmatism and spirituality: Despite his deep modesty, Confucius himself can be seen and was seen, as an ‘exemplar’ or ‘exemplary person’ (chun-tzu) who taught the ‘way’ not through abstract doctrines but through the testimony of daily living. At this point, the affinity with the Deweyan philosophy comes clearly into view—a fact perhaps not surprising given Dewey’s extended visit to China after World War 1. As in the case of Gandhian swaraj, leading a responsible life in society involves self-restraint and the abandonment of domineering impulses. In Confucius’s own words, humanness or to be properly human (jen) means to ‘conquer oneself (ke-chi) and to return to propriety (fu-li). (Dallmayr 2007: 15)

Pragmatism has a spiritual horizon and base as in Confucianism6 and also in many streams of Indian tradition where there is a focus on sadhana and transformative practice. In this context, Sri Aurobindo (1970) in his Life Divine talks about a nobler pragmatism “guided, uplifted and enlightened by spiritual culture and knowledge.”7 In his Human Cycles Sri Aurobindo also talks about spiritual vitalism. In his journey with language, Sri Aurobindo goes beyond a narrow pragmatic view of language and urges us to realize language as mantra and cultivate the mantra dimension of language which has the power to realize new potential with self, language, society, reality, world and cosmos. Harold Coward who has written on Sri Aurobindo’s approach to language as mantra tells us: The term mantra signifies a ‘crossing over’ through thought (root man ‘to think’), and tr (to cross over) from the Transcendent to the human

16

A. K. GIRI

levels. As mantras, the Vedas are primarily manifestations of the descent of Spirit into the world, and, through the repeated chanting of them, an ascent from the physical to the spiritual can be accomplished. As pure Sanskrit language, the mantras are conjunctions of certain powerful seed syllables which endure a certain rhythm or vibration in the psychosomatic structure of consciousness and arouse a corresponding psychic state. This is Sri Aurobindo’s theory as to how language evolves from certain seed-sounds into root words from which come an immense progeny. Not only does language evolve, but also seed-sound mantras represent concentration points of transcendental energy from which evolutionary spiritual growth can take place. (Coward 1989: 145)

Sri Aurobindo strove to realize such a meaning of language as mantra in his sadhana of poetry. In Raghunath Ghosh’s words: Sri Aurobindo’s poetry is generally called “overhead poetry” is the poetry of the overmind. The overmind in terms of Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy, is nearest to the identity of being and becoming, the supermind, the sovereign truth—consciousness. From this plane of expression and vision, word and rhythm become at once intense and immense to the utmost. The overhead utterance is marked by a value and a form in which all qualities of the subordinate planes fuse in something diversely ultimate, and variously transfigured by an inmost oneness with the cosmic harmony and with the supracosmic mystery. Language in such an atmosphere becomes mantra. Sri Aurobindo’s poetry has shown how and when mantra is possible. (Ghosh 2008: 93)

Sri Aurobindo developed his approach to language by walking and meditating with the dance of words in the Vedas and with his own sadhana of poetry in his epic Savitri (Sri Aurobindo 1950). But this view of language is not confined only to these realms. Mantra constitutes a part of all languages as a reality or potential and it can bring forth a different and a new world and word (see Om 2018).8 Sri Aurobindo urges us to go beyond a simplistic view of language as a reflection of society. This resonates with Martin Heidegger’s conception of language as a way-making movement. What Heidegger writes in his essay, “Way to Language” deserves our careful attention: “What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs” (Heidegger 2004: 410). Furthermore, “What is peculiar to language thus conceals itself on

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

17

the way, the way by which the saying lets those who listen to it get to the language” (ibid.: 413). For Heidegger, “the way to language is the [..] way-making movement of propriation and usage” where “propriation propriates human beings for itself, [..] propriation is thus the saying’s way-making movement toward language” (419, 418): What looks more like a tangle than a weft loosens when viewed in terms of the way-making movement. It resolves into the liberating notion that the way-making movement exhibits when propriated in saying. It unbinds the saying for speech. It holds open the way for speech, the way on which speaking as hearing, hearing the saying, registers what in each is case is to be said, elevating what it receives to the resounding word. The saying’s way-making movement to language is the unbinding bond, the bond that binds by propriating. (ibid.: 419)

What Heidegger speaks about language as saying as part of “waymaking movement” finds a resonance in many cultural movements in societies and histories. For example, we find this in the people’s enlightenment tradition of Europe, namely the folk high school movement and people’s enlightenment patiently cultivated by NFS Grundtvig and Kristen Kold (see Das 2008). Both Grundtvig and Kold challenged us to realize language as “living words”—words that could enliven and energize us (see Giri 2019a, b). This is also akin to Sri Aurobindo’s suggestion to create poems to embody language and action differently which would work like mantra. In Sri Aurobindo and Heidegger we find streams of spiritual pragmatism in their meditations on language, self, being and reality. This can also help us explore and realize the simultaneous attention to the pragmatic and spiritual in Wittgenstein’s approaches to language. For philosophically attuned anthropologist Veena Das, this begins with Wittgenstein’s spiritual struggle which has both a biographical and philosophical dimension and which is at the heart of his conception of language as a form of life. As Das, building upon the work of philosopher Stanley Cavell, helps us understand this: When anthropologists have evoked the idea of forms of life, it has often been to suggest the importance of thick description, local knowledge or what it is to learn a rule. For Cavell, such conventional views of the idea of form of life eclipse the spiritual struggle of his [Wittgenstein’s] investigations. What Cavell finds wanting in this conventional view of forms of life is that

18

A. K. GIRI

it not only obscures the mutual absorption of the natural and the social but also emphasizes form at the expense of life [..] the vertical sense of the form of life suggests the limit of what or who is recognized as human within a social form and provides the conditions of the use of criteria as applied to others. Thus the criteria of pain do not apply to that which does not exhibit signs of being a form of life—we do not ask whether a tape recorder that can be tuned on to play a shriek is feeling the pain. The distinction between the horizontal and vertical axes of forms of life takes us at least to the point at which we can appreciate not only the security provided by belonging to a community with shared agreements but also the dangers that human beings pose to each other. These dangers relate to not only disputation over forms but also what constitutes life. The blurring between what is human and what is not human sheds into blurring over what is life and what is not life. (Das 2007: 15–16; emphasis added)

Here Das helps us to realize how Wittgenstein develops a spiritual pragmatic approach to language which can help us transcend given and accepted forms of life such as anthropocentrism and nation-state centred rationality. Spiritual struggles in forms of life bring critical and creative movements of self, society and consciousness to language as a form of life. The movement dimension in Sri Aurobindo and Heidegger meets spiritual struggle as movements of self and consciousness in Wittgenstein thus challenging us to cultivate border crossing genres of spiritual pragmatism with creative memory works with Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Sri Aurobindo. On a biographical level, Wittgenstein faced existential angst to the point of contemplating suicide when he left Cambridge, England to join the Austro-Hungarian Army in the First World War. He worked as a cook for the Austro-Hungarian Army and was struggling with the meaning of life and existence. Once while walking in the evening he found a copy of Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief in a book store in Poland. Reading it he found hope and it saved his life. He used to always move with this book to the point that his fellow soldiers in the Army used to call him as “Man with the Gospel” (Bartolf 2018). Wittgenstein’s journey with Tolstoy made him sensitive to the predicament of human suffering and we find in his Philosophical Investigations a deep concern with alleviation of suffering.9 Wittgenstein’s journey with spirituality and pragmatism has also a poetic dimension as he also walked and meditated with Rabindra Nath Tagore’ play The King of the Dark Chamber as Wittgenstein also wanted to write his philosophy as poetry (see Tyler 2014).10

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

19

Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society: Cultivating Pathways of Mystical Pragmatism In his journey with life, language and philosophy Wittgenstein had a mystical turn; we find such mystical streams in pragmatism as well. Charles Sanders Peirce was the father of American pragmatism and he went beyond the dualism between science and mysticism and was deeply engaged with mysticism. He also walked in the paths of other religious and spiritual traditions such as Buddhism. As Paul Hague writes in this volume: Most significantly, Peirce’s architectonic studies led him to a life-changing mystical experience in 1892, writing in a letter, “I have never before been mystical, but now I am.” This experience led Peirce to see that there are no divisions in Ultimate Reality, which he saw as an Immortal Continuum, sometimes called ‘Field’ in science today. To denote this seamless, borderless worldview, he coined the word synechism ‘continuity’, from Greek synekh¯es ‘holding together, continuous, contiguous’. This is of central importance in Mystical Pragmatics. As Peirce wrote in an unpublished article titled ‘Immortality in the Light of Synechism’ following his profound mystical experience, “though synechism is not religion, but, on the contrary, is a purely scientific philosophy, yet should it become generally accepted, as I confidently anticipate, it may play a part in the ‘onement of religion and science’.

As is well-known, Peirce developed triadic semiotics of firstness, secondness and thirdness. Firstness as a category tries to capture immediacy, spontaneity, freedom (also in a cosmological sense referring to the situation before the evolution of habits or laws); it designates a quality or even just a possibility, the state of being regardless of any second. Secondness (which implies a first) is the relevant category of relation, dependence, reaction, brute force and similar states.11 He also developed a theory of abduction as a supplement to induction and deduction which “is an advanced form of guessing at possible regularities that can explain surprising phenomena” (Brier 2017). For Soren Brier, an insightful scholar of Peirce, his theory of abduction “rests on a philosophy of anticipation which includes a theory of divine on an evolutionary basis” (Brier 2017). Here Soren Brier helps us understand that “In Peirce’s philosophy, God as thirdness is agape or evolutionary love, which makes the universe grow evolutionarily by taking habits.” Peirce helps us go

20

A. K. GIRI

beyond the dualism between science and religion and his “philosophy of pragmaticist triadic semiotic transcends the usual boundaries between philosophy, religion and science in modernity after Kant and Hegel” (ibid.). Furthermore, “Peirce’s mature semiotic philosophy is especially focused on the connection between faith, love and logic as well as knowledge, truth, signification and ethics as means to obtain the Summum Bonum. One could call it the best of all possible worlds. It is a magnificent philosophy encompassing both science and religion” (ibid.). What is to be noted is that Peirce’s semiotics embodied deep crosscultural and trans-religious border crossing and co-realizations. Peirce strove to realize not only some of the inner truths in Christianity but also in Buddhism. Brier tells us how Peirce “saw Buddhism and Christianity melting together within a transcendental religious view of empathy and love as the foundation of reality.” In the context of the current war among religions and the still lack of interest in dialogue on the part of Euro-American philosophers and sociologists with other religious and cultural traditions, Peirce’s semiotics of dialogues and pantheistic mysticism suggest us creative pathways to future. This finds resonance in contemporary efforts in creating a semiotics of dialogues across borders and bringing semiotics and ethics together as the works of Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio (2007; also see Petrilli 2003). Alina Therese Lettner’s essay in this volume on the border-crossing dialogue between Peircean semiotics and Buddhist philosophy is also helpful here.

Spiritual Pragmatism: Self, Culture and Society as Fields of Practical Mysticism and Practical Transcendence Mystical pragmatism in Peirce encourages us to explore and realize streams of mystical pragmatism in other related movements of thoughts and practice as well. For Luchte, the pragmatists “focus upon the convergence between Wittgenstein and Heidegger in terms of their pragmatic criteria of meaning as use. This stream explicitly opposes the early mysticism of Wittgenstein, and the later mysticism of Heidegger [..]” (Luchte 2009). But Luchte himself points to the “the shared appreciation by Wittgenstein and Heidegger of the mystical, of the wonder in face of existence, expressed in such questions as ‘why is there something, rather than nothing?’” But the mystical and the pragmatic are not opposed to each

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

21

other. There are also traditions of practical mysticism. For example, we see this in the works of both Meister Eckhart and Sri Ramakrishna. Eckhart was not just mystical but he also preached in the languages of people and gave support to the emancipatory movements of women in the church and society, that is known as the Beguines (Mieth 2009). Sri Ramakrishna from India also embodied practical mysticism (Rolland 1954). Ramakrishna’s practical mysticism embodied both deep silence as well as creative communication. It was also passionately concerned with human suffering when consciousness does not merely witness but also weeps. Saint Arakshita Das from Odisha, India, tells us in one of his writings that Parama, the Supreme, weeps with the suffering of humanity (see Das 2004). The weeping of the Supreme urges us to acknowledge that human beings also weep at the suffering of self and other.12 Ramakrishna wept seeing human poverty and suffering and tried to do his best to ameliorate it. Ramakrishna’s practical mysticism was also border crossing and dialogical as Ramakrishna strove to go beyond a single religious identity and lived as a seeker in many religious paths such as Christianity and Islam.13 Ramakrishna’s practical mysticism was thus deeply dialogical embodying what is now called “dialogic dialogue” (Cousins 1992; Panikkar 2010). This had a deep influence on Swami Vivekananda who in his own way strove to embody the dialogical quest of his master as well his concern with human suffering (Giri 2014). Swami Vivekananda “was formed by the mystical experience of his teacher” (Schouten 2012: 82). For him, “The best commentary on the life of [Jesus] is his own life. ‘The foxes have holes, the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.’ That is what Christ says as the only way to salvation; he lays down no other way.” He writes about Jesus: “He had no other occupation in life, no other thought except that one, that he was a spirit. [..] And not only so, but he, with his marvelous vision, had found that every man and woman, whether Jew or Gentile, whether rich or poor, whether saint or sinner, was the embodiment of the same undying spirit as himself. Therefore, the one work his whole life showed was to call upon them to realize their own spiritual nature. [..] You are all Sons of God, immortal Spirit. ‘Know,’ he declared, ‘the Kingdom of Heaven is within you.’ ‘I and my Father are one.’ Dare you stand up and say, not only that ‘I am the Son of God,’ but I shall also find in my heart of hearts that I and my Father are one?” (Swami Vivekananda 2011: 21).

22

A. K. GIRI

With a creative dialogue with Meister Eckhart, Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jurgen Habermas and John Dewey, we can cultivate paths of spiritual pragmatism as a new way of looking at self, society, language and reality. Spiritual pragmatism involves practical discourse as suggested in the critical theory and practice of Jurgen Habermas and practical spirituality as suggested in the works of Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo as well as in many transformative spiritual movements in societies and histories.14 Practical discourse as moral argumentation has a dimension of spiritual pragmatics of communication involving not only argumentation but also mutual listening which helps in realization of democracy.15 The vision and practice of practical spirituality also helps in deepening and enrichment of democracy. Both practical discourse and practical spirituality strive to go beyond easy productions of dualisms such as friend and enemy and create non-dual realizations in our lives which is not one point solution but a continued striving with ever wakeful works and meditations of contingencies and transcendence. Spiritual pragmatism shares this vision and striving as well. Spiritual pragmatism also strives to realize non-duality as an ongoing sadhana and struggle in life, culture and society. It must be noted that there is an important legacy of overcoming dualism in American pragmatism as well which we notice in the work of social philosophers such as George Herbert Mead who urge us to go beyond the dualism of subject and object (Giri 2012). Spiritual pragmatism in its more social manifestation of critique, creativity, struggle and emancipation. Resonates also with a tradition of American pragmatism which Cornell West (1999) calls “prophetic pragmatism,” inviting us to the struggle and martyrdom of savants such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement. Spiritual pragmatism helps us to rethink self. In modernity, self is primarily conceived of and sought to be realized as a “technopractitioner” (Faubion 1995). Rarely do we realize that self also has a transcendental dimension which is at work in the domains of our practice (Giri 2006, 2017). A field of practice is not only a field of routine reproduction of existing habits, habitus and structures, doxa (Bourdieu 1971) but also a field of creativity, critique, transformation and transcendence.16 This is not only a field of immanent transcendence that critical theorists such as Jurgen Habermas and Piet Strydom talk about but also is a field of transcendental immanence (see Habermas 1990; Strydom 2009). Spiritual pragmatism invites us to rethink and realize self as a field of practical

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

23

transcendence, immanent transcendence and transcendental immanence. Practice and pragmatics help us to be part of a flow of the practical and transcendental holding infinity in our palms and walking and meditating with the Infinite in and with our feet. Spiritual pragmatism also calls us to realize the work of flow and border crossing between practice and poetry and realize the poetic dimension of practice and the practical dimension of poetry (Giri 2017). The poetry of practice also challenges us to realize the performative dimension of practice and invites us to weave new words of life, regeneration and resurrection which then become a force for weaving new worlds (Giri 2019c). Here what Marcus Bussey writes in this volume deserves our careful consideration: The poet’s eye helps us approach the subject of spiritual pragmatics via the symmetry of head and heart. This chapter turns to poetic wisdom to explore spiritual pragmatic possibilities before our culture today. The aesthetic dimension of poetic expression is synthetic in nature and allows us to reflect on spiritual pragmatism and any attempt at synthesis. Such synthesis is understood poetically as a movement towards wholeness in a forever fractured world.

The performative here is linked to our continued movement of unfoldment of potential, self as well as other, and is part of manifold processes of self-realization and co-realization.17 It is not only activistic but also meditative. The reconceptualization of self in spiritual pragmatism has implication for rethinking and transforming our conception, organization and functioning of culture and society. The sociocultural field is not only a field of functional and mechanical practice, it is a space of life and regeneration; it also has a subjective and transcendental dimension.18 It is not only a field of action but also a circle and flow of meditation.

Spiritual Pragmatism: A New Eros and Transformation of Democracy Breath is the foundation of life and It is also the site of the work of the Spirit. But in the Western tradition with the ideology of cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I exist), rarely do we realize that “I breathe therefore I exist” and “we breathe therefore we exist.” Spirituality challenges us

24

A. K. GIRI

to be aware of the flow of our breath and to cultivate it further. Spiritual pragmatism is a way of working with our breath individually as well as in manifold webs of togetherness. It helps and challenges us realize that one’s breath overflows to and influences others. Spiritual pragmatism invites and challenges us to share our breath in a way of mutual assurance and trust. Sharing our breath is the beginning of a spiritual community as Irigaray writes: “This proto-ethical plane of shared breath is the ethical germ of a spiritual community, i.e., a community of embodied individuals, caring for each other” (Luc Irigaray 2002: 136). Spiritual pragmatism creates a new eros of sharing of our breath and also cross-fertilization of our dreams and practices.19 The new erotics of spiritual pragmatism also helps us to relate to ethics and aesthetics in a new way. It seeks to renew both ethics and aesthetics with spiritual pragmatism as well as to create flows and border crossing between them. Spiritual pragmatism crates the emergent genre of aesthetic ethics which helps transform our existing conception of practice (see Quarles van Ufford and Giri 2003; Clammer and Giri 2017). It also strives to realize responsibility as a manifold process of self-cultivation and care of the other. Spiritual pragmatism cultivates responsibility as pragmatics of holding our hands, walking and looking up to the face of each other with courage and compassion. It strives to cultivate responsibility as a manifold verb of activistic and meditative co-realization of the ethical and the aesthetic as a quest for realization of Truth, Goodness and Bliss (Satchidananda) in self, culture, society and the world (Giri 2020). Spiritual pragmatism also helps us to rethink and transform democracy. Pragmatism has had a deep impact in rethinking democracy, for example, as evident in the vision and work of seekers such as John Dewey. Dewey’s pragmatism not only challenged the technocratic reduction of democracy to expert control but also brought the challenge of cultivation of art to democracy and public sphere. Dewey inspired the formation of what can be called an “aesthetic ecology of public intelligence” (Reid and Taylor 2010; Also see Dallmayr’s Foreword to this volume and Julie Geredien essays in this). Dewey’s pragmatism not only inspired philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas but also political pioneers such as B.R. Ambedkar—a theme explored creatively by Kanchana Mahadevan in her essay in this volume. Ambedkar built upon Dewey for whom the conception of democracy and liberty are based upon “communication” (Skof 2011: 126). But Ambedkar also added to Dewey’s pragmatism the vision and practice

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

25

of dhamma, righteous conduct from Buddhist path (Ambedkar 2011). For Skokf, “Ambedkar’s ‘pragmatist’ vision of democracy rests on his views about dharma, religion and social ethics with related reconstruction of social (and ‘political’) habits” (ibid.: 128). For Ambedkar, following Dewey’s argumentation, use of force is allowed, while the use of violence is not permitted.20

Walking with Spiritual Pragmatism as a Way of a Continued Adventure of Consciousness and Social Transformation The border crossing between pragmatism and spirituality thus brings us to these inter-linked themes and challenges of life, self, culture, society, history, future and the world. It challenges us to change ourselves and our modes of “cognitive operation” and go beyond one-sided absolutism of closure and violence of either the practical or transcendental, material or spiritual and write poems, paint rainbows and dance across dualisms of many kinds (Beall 2015; also see Wilmore 2004). Along with the poetic, dance becomes an important part of the vision and practice of spiritual pragmatism in societies and histories as it dances across multiple entrenched dualisms such as friend and enemy and the material and the spiritual and creates contingent spaces and times of non-dual realizations. Here we can take inspiration from multiple dance traditions of humanity such as the Dance of Shiva, Krishna, Parvati, Purusha and Prakriti.21 We can also draw inspiration from the dance of Christ on the cross and the dervish in the streets and deserts. Spiritual pragmatism challenges us to realize the violence of one-sided absolutism and find our paths of weaving threads of connections and integration amidst the continued violence of closure and fragmentation. Violence and non-violence are eternal and epochal challenges of life and today in the midst of growing violence, spiritual pragmatism challenges us to continue to strive for paths of non-violence in thought, action, organization of life and imagination. Here Buddha, Gandhi, Habermas and Sri Aurobindo dance with Irigaray, Dewey, Peirce and Ambedkar, challenging us to cultivate a new pragmatics, politics, poetics and spirituality of life in self, culture, society and the world. As Habermas challenges us which has an echo of Gandhi:

26

A. K. GIRI

Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history the trace of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently closes off the path to undistorted communication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimates: mankind’s evolution towards autonomy and responsibility. (Habermas 1971: 315)

And as Vattimo (2011: 139–140) writes: At the horizon line of the near future toward which we gaze, pragmatically assessing the utility of truth, there lies a more distant future that we can never really forget. Rorty alludes to this with the term solidarity, which I propose to read directly in the sense of charity, and not just as the means of achieving consensus but as an end in itself. Christian dogma teaches that Deus Caritas est, charity is God himself. From a Hegelian viewpoint, we may take the horizon to be that absolute spirit which never allows itself to be entirely set aside but becomes the final horizon of history that legitimates all our near-term choices.

Notes 1. To understand this we can read the following paragraphs of thought from Hans Joas (1993: 4–5) [..American pragmatism is characterized by its understanding of human action as a creative action. The understanding of creativity contained in pragmatism is specific in the sense that pragmatism focuses on the fact that creativity is always embedded in a situation; i.e. on human being’s ‘situated freedom.’ It is precisely this interconnection of creativity and situation that has given rise to the repeated charge that pragmatists merely process a theory that is a philosophy of adaptation to given circumstances. This accusation fails to perceive the antideterministic thrust of the pragmatists. [..] It is perhaps best to trace the importance of situated creativity for pragmatism in the works of all four major representatives of pragmatism. The decisive innovation in Charles Peirce’s logic of science—namely, the idea of abduction—is aimed precisely at generating new hypotheses and pioneering their role in scientific progress. Peirce’s speculative philosophy of nature is built around the question of under which conditions the New can arise in nature. His philosophy also endeavours to find a niche for artistic creativity in an age characterized by both the dominance of science and Darwinism,

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

27

a way of thinking that brought the Romantic philosophy of nature to an end. Of William James it can be concluded from his biography that for him a conflict between a belief in free will with religious justification and naturalistic determination was not simply an intellectual problem, but rather one that actually paralyzed all his mental powers. Accordingly, his attempt to find a way out of this dilemma by regarding the ability to choose as itself a function crucial to the survival of human organism in its environment not only signaled the beginning of functionalist psychology, but was also a step which unleashed his lifelong productivity. John Dewey’s work was coloured by his theory of art, or, rather his theory on the aesthetic dimension of all human experience. Far from being geared exclusively to solving problems of instrumental action, the unifying element running through Dewey’ s work, with the numerous areas it covers, takes the shape of an inquiry into the meaningfulness to be experienced in action itself. As for George Herbert Mead, his famous theory of the emergence of the self is primarily directed against the assumption of substantive self; his concept of the human individual and the individual’s actions is radically “constructive.” In all four cases the pragmatists’ ideas are not devoted to the creative generation of innovation as such, but to the creative solution of problems. Despite all the pathos associated with creativity, the pragmatists endeavoured to link it to the dimension of everyday experience and everyday action. In his The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound, Unger (2007: 40) also helps us understand the relationship between pragmatism and freedom: We are not exhausted by the social and cultural worlds we inhabit and build. They are finite. We, in comparison to them, are not. We can see, think, feel, build, and connect in more ways than they can allow. That is why we are required to rebel against them: to advance our interests and ideals as we now understand them, but also to become ourselves, affirming the polarity that constitutes the law-breaking law of our being. 2. Here we can follow the following paragraphs of Steven M. Levine’s elaboration of the quest for Kantian pragmatism in Habermas as he tries to bring engagement with language and social action together: Kantian pragmatism addresses a lacuna in Habermas’ work that has existed since Knowledge and Human Interests, namely, the relative

28

A. K. GIRI

neglect of issues in theoretical philosophy. For while Habermas’ formal pragmatics has obvious relevance for theoretical philosophy, its explicit purpose is to formulate a theory of communicative action which itself is meant to ground a critical theory of society and a discourse/theoretic conception of morality, law, and democracy. Kantian pragmatism, in contrast, directly addresses two theoretical questions that arise in light of the linguistic turn: the epistemological question of realism and the ontological question of naturalism. The first asks how we can secure the notion of an objective reality that is the same for all even if our access to the objective world is always mediated by language. Without an answer to this question, the relativism and contextualism endemic to the linguistic paradigm appears unavoidable. The second asks how the normativity that pervades the lifeworld can be reconciled with the fact that sociocultural forms of life evolve naturally. Although these issues are intertwined, for reasons of space we will only address the former question. The major innovation of Truth and Justification is Habermas’ embrace of the thesis that the question of realism can only be addressed by examining both the “horizontal” communicative relations between subjects and the “vertical” relationship that subjects establish with the world through action. In other words, to establish realism we need not only a theory of communication but also a theory of action and learning in which reference to an objective world is ratified in practice. The Kantian pragmatism outlined in Truth and Justification thus moves beyond the linguistic pragmatism embedded in Habermas’ theory of communicative action and joins forces with pragmatism in its classical variant. In this way, Habermas distinguishes himself from other contemporary pragmatists like Rorty, Brandom, Apel and Putnam whose work generally remains at the level of linguistic representation. While these thinkers are concerned with practices, they are mostly concerned with linguistic cognitive practices and not with the practices and actions by which agents cope with problematic situations in the objective world. But without accounting for the latter practices in addition to the former, the problem of realism, and hence the threats of relativism and contextualism, cannot be satisfactorily addressed. (Levine 2010) 3. I had met with late Professor Karl-Otto Apel in his home near Frankfurt in May 2002. During our conversations, Professor Apel told me how

2

4.

5.

6.

7.

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

29

dialogue with American pragmatism had helped in his personal and collective journey of democratization of thought and action. He was a member of Hitler Youth Brigage and studying philosophy gave him a new sense of purpose. His dialogue with American pragmatic thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce helped him in his own democratization of consciousness. In his insightful essay on this Tan (2016) discusses several aspects of similarity and differences between Confucian and pragmatic pathways. Tan writes: “Pragmatist inquiry, by reconstituting Confucian ideals to yield what Dewey called ‘judgements of practice’ that are the bases of intelligent actions to actualize ideals, should strengthen rather than weaken one’s moral commitments. [..] Instead of the certainty of ideals, a modern Confucian employing Pragmatist method can find courage in the hope that directing actions more intelligently through experimental thinking will have a better change of realizing Confucian ideals and bringing about a better world.” As Skof (2011) tells us, “Dewey’s well-known visit to China from 1919 to 1921 generated a lot of interest. Dew was granted a doctorate honoris causa from National Peking University. He was also called a ‘Second Confucius’.” Professor Vincent Shen, a great philosopher in this field who taught at University of Toronto, also explored the spiritual dimension of Confucianism in his works. He presented a paper on this theme at the international seminar on “Learning Across Cultures” organized by Research Center in Philosophy and Values (RVP) at Shandong University, Jinnan, in August 6–8, 2018. It is sad that Professor Shen passed away shortly after this in Toronto in November 2018. As Richard Hartz tells us in his essay in this volume that Sri Aurobindo had read William James and had a deep appreciation of his work and significance. In Hartz’ words: A few years after the death of William James, we find Sri Aurobindo noting “that the gulf between East and West, India and Europe is much less profound and unbridgeable now than it was thirty or forty years ago.” He commented particularly on the rise in the West of “new philosophies … not indeed directly spiritual, vitalistic rather and pragmatic, but yet by their greater subjectivity already nearer to Indian ways of thinking.” Occasionally he mentioned names in this connection. He referred, especially, to “the thought of Nietzsche, of Bergson and of James.” Speaking of the interest of Bergson, James and others in intuition and mysticism, he emphasized that the writers in question could by no means be dismissed as “incompetent dupes of the imagination,” but were “psychologists of the first

30

A. K. GIRI

rank and the most original contemporary thinkers in the philosophic field.” Sri Aurobindo clearly had a favourable impression of William James, but we have almost no clues to what he might have read of his philosophical writings. He recalled in the 1930s that “a long time ago” he had read a book on psychology by James (perhaps The Principles of Psychology, unless he meant the abridged version, Psychology: Briefer Course). He had found it “not at all an ordinary book in its kind,” a rare compliment from the Indian Yogi to a Western psychologist. Otherwise on the few occasions when he mentioned James by name it was in connection with his philosophy. These passing references provide little specific information. But they do suggest that he regarded James as a key figure in a trend of modern thought that was important for the future. 8. Here what Om Swami writes in his The Ancient Science of the Mantras: Wisdom of the Sages helps us: Everything we do and feel in our lives is dependent upon the maze of words that constantly surround us [..] Forget about spoken words, even our own thougths, when play as conversations in our heads, completey change the way we feel about ourselves and others. Our mind is a constant siege of words, both positive and negative. The compelling hold of words, their immense potential, abilitiy to influence our lives, were not lost to the seekers of truth. The sage of yore recognized the hidden power held in the nucleus of a word. The birth of the ancient science of mantras was no accident. For, it recognized our intrinsic connection with words. They are our link to the world wihtin and without. It is the energy of the sound that binds us, with the universal energy around us. Every living entity responds to words spoken with love. [..] [..] the energy of the mantras is aimed at calling upon the universal energy, a way of drawing its attention towards us. (Om 2018: ix–x) 9. This has inspired anthropologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Veena Das in their work on social suffering. See Bourdieu et al. (2000) and Das (Das 2007). We can also note here what Miles Hollingworth, an insightful contemporary biographer of Wittgenstein, writes below:

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

31

Wittgenstein was drawn to the image of the suffering Christ not because he was religious, but because he believed that suffering was its own world (the oppoiste of this world of syntax and sense); and that the world of suffering was the truth in relation to which this world then becomes the fantasy. Those who suffer know that their suffering fragments them and pulls them apart at their atoms and send them abroad on some eternal voyaging; and that space and time and history and psychology are correspondingly meant to be the Realism that stops all that, and which pull them together for one last run at this world call ‘life.; I am tending towards deep mysticism here, but then deep mysticism was what Wittgenstein was all about. Realism desbribes this world as the place in which our losses really are sustained, and properly so, and the dead do not come back to life. That, for example, is what sex is about. It is the arrow of time. Love, on the other hand, is heedless of these things. Wittgenstein had a great capacity for love. And perhaps that is what his life and his philosophy and his mysticism were really expressing. (Hollingworth 2018: 6) 10. As Rush Rhees (in Citron 2015: 63) tells us: I remember one time when Wittgenstein was mentioning Nietzsche’s remark: ‘Wir wollen auswending gerlent warden’ (‘We—i.e. philosophers want be learned by heart). Wittgenstein was emphasizing the difference between a book on philosophy and a theoretical or scientific work. He was completing the Part 1 of the Investigations. In connection with this, ‘We want to be learned by heart’ he said he could understand why certain philosophers had tried to write what they had to say as poems. (Once or twice later he referred to his manuscript of the Investigations as ‘my poems’). 11. Considering that Peirce describes the sign as a triadic relation between a representamen, an object and an interpretant, the mediating notion of thirdness (associated with representation, reason, mediation and indeed the sign) and his definition of the sign are intricately linked as in the following passage (Collected Papers = CP 2.274): A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members

32

A. K. GIRI

are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations [..] Peirce goes on to analyze his conception of a sign with regard to the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, which gives us the three sign trichotomies: The sign in the narrow sense of Representamen (i.e. a First) can in itself be a Qualisign (a mere quality or a possibility), a Sinsign (a fact) or a Legisign (a law); it relates to its object by way of firstness, secondness or thirdness yielding an Icon (where the qualities of the sign are decisive, as in a painting), an Index (where you have some direct or indeed indexical relation to the object: e.g. a street sign pointing in the right direction) or a Symbol, where the meaning is conventionally established. Finally, the interpretant can be either a Rheme (i.e. a possibility, as with a single term like “house”, whose concrete application remains far from clear); a Dicent (which is basically a proposition) or an Argument, which takes place at the level of reasoning. I am grateful to my dear friend Alina Therese Lettner for her help with this (personal communication). Wikipedia defines these three categories as follows Peirce’s categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories) Name

Typical characterization

As universe of experience

As quantity

Technical definition

Valence, “adicity”

Firstness

Quality of feeling

Ideas, chance, possibility

Vagueness, “some”

Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a quality)

Secondness

Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation

Brute facts, actuality

Singularity, discreteness, “this”

Reference to a correlate (by its relate)

Thirdness

Representation, mediation

Habits, laws, necessity

Generality, continuity, “all”

Reference to an interpretant

Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such, which has the quality) Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate) Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant)

12. As Derrida urges us to realize in the following passage, our eyes are meant not only to observe but to weep: And Nietzsche wept a lot. We all know about the episode in Turin, for example, where his compassion for a horse led him to take his

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

33

head into his hands, sobbing. As for Confessions [..] it is the book of tears. At each step, on each page, Augustine describes his experience of tears, those that inundate him. [..] Now if tears come to the eyes, if they well up in them, and if they can veil sight, perhaps they reveal, in the very course of this experience, in this coursing of water, an essence of the eye. [..] the eye understood in the anthropo-theological space of sacred allegory. Deep down, deep down inside, the eye would be destined not to see but to weep. The following poem of the author also presents the work of tears in our lives for generation of commonalty and solidarity: Tear, Soul and Solidarity Let me cry My tear is For soul and solidarity My tear washes away my ego Into an ocean of aspiration An aspiration for mutualization Gathering together for a soulful sociality Evolution of a new humanity Co-breathing and co-birthing a new divinity (Giri 2019c: 150). 13. Jan Peter Schouten tells us that once Ramakrishna saw a picture of Madonna in one Jadu Mallick’s country house and he was immediately moved by it. After this he also realized the presence of Jesus. Ramakrishna was also deeply moved by the Biblical story of Peter walking on water: “A picture of this scene was later hung on the wall of his quarters in the temple; it was the only image that was borrowed from the Christian tradition” (Schouten 2012: 87). 14. On practical spirituality see Giri (2018b) and (2019d). 15. In his engagement with the discourse ethics of Habermas, Dallmayr (2011) argues how it focuses primarily on argumentation and does not cultivate the practice of listening. Dallmayr brings listening and dialogue together which is one of bringing practical discourse and practical spirituality for cultivating conversations, dialogues and democracy as a multidimensional project of self, culture, society and polity. See Dallmayr (2011) and Giri (2013). 16. In his Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture, Richard Fox (1989) offers a critique of Bourdieu’s view of habitus.

34

A. K. GIRI

17. Here we can link to the creative work of Lois Holzman and her work on social therapy which builds upon Vygotsky’s concept of “zones of proximal development.” In Holzman’s work on social therapy where participants speak and work with each other, being together constitutes a pragmatic field which also is a field of realization of each other’s potential. See (Holzman 2008). 18. In Ken Wilber’s following quadrant model of the integral, it seems as if society does not have a subjective dimension.

Individual

Collective

Interior

Exterior

Upper Left (UL) Quadrant I Intentional—“I” Lower Left (LL) Quadrant III Cultural—“We”

Upper Right (UR) Quadrant II Behavioral—“it” Lower Right (LR) Quadrant IV Social—“it”

19. Here what Luc Irigaray (2002: 115–117) writes deserves our careful consideration: Carnal sharing becomes then a spiritual path, a poetic and also a mystical path [..] Love takes place in the opening to self that is the place of welcoming the transcendence of the other. [..] The path of such an accomplishment of the flesh does not correspond to a solipsistic dream [..] nor to a fin-de-siecle utopia, but to a new stage to be realized by humanity. [..] Nature is then no longer subdued but it is adapted, in its rhythms and necessities, to the path of its becoming, of its growth. Caressing loses the sense of capturing, bewitching, appropriating [..] The caress becomes a means of growing together toward a human maturity that is not confused with an intellectual competence, with the possession of property [..] nor with the domination of the world. 20. As Ambedkar argues: “Buddha was against violence. But he was also in favor of justice and where justice required he permitted the use of force” (quoted in Skof 2011: 131). 21. Here what Subash Anand, a theologian and spiritual seeker writes deserves our careful consideration: Sometimes I sit for prayer in a chapel with darkness all around me. More than once I have caught myself contemplating the flame of

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

35

the oil-lamp placed close to the tabernacle. The dance of the fire grips me, and I can go on watching it for long, unmindful of the passing of time. Slowly as I began to meditate on the Nataraj icon— and I have been doing this for quite some years now—I understand a little what was happening to me. The Spirit whom I received in Baptism has not pushed out the Spirit I received from my ancestors. The more I try to contemplate the Nataraj icon the more it fascinates me, and I thank God for making me a child of the land which has given to the world an icon which is aesthetically superb and theologically profound. This icon fascinates me all the more because I am trying to reflect on my Christian faith in the light of Hindu wisdom. I find the Nataraj icon very appropriate to express my own faith. Jesus tells us that God, who as the perfect Being (sat) grounds all being, is a most loving Father. He is indeed the Merciful One. He is Shiva. In Him there is perfect self-possession and self-awareness (cit): the primordial Word (logos or sabda). From this perfect selfawareness of perfect Being arises the perfect joy of Being (ananda), and from this springs forth Breath (pneuma), that Spirit which makes Speech (vac) possible. The Nataraj icon can be seen as expressive of this Trinitarian mystery. (Anand 2004: 168–169) Anand also writes: Siva too has a maternal side deep within him because he is ardhanari-isvara, and lasya is his tender, nurturing dance. It is very significant that, in the Siva-Sahasra-nama, Siva is described not only as the great male organ (maha-linga, 74a)—but only once, and also as the great womb (maha-garbha, 81d, 103c, 131a)—that too thrice! In primal symbolism the tree has a great affinity with woman and hence a maternal character. Siva not only appears like a tree, but himself the cosmic Tree. (2004: 163) Here the following thoughts of Henryk Skolimowski on dancing Shiva are helpful and we can read these together with Anand and realize the deeper significance of a dancing Shiva and dancing Christ in our lives, societies and the cosmos: Dancing Shiva is the symbol of life unfolding, of recreating itself, partly destroying itself in order to create novo. Dancing Shiva is you and me engaged in the creative / destructive process of life. [..] The eternal dance of Shiva becomes the dance of healing—of the

36

A. K. GIRI

planet and ourselves, becomes the dance of purifying our rivers, our mountains and our bodies [..] The new dance of Shiva is a form of Eco-Yoga, for the whole society [..]. (1991: 5, 10, 13)

References Ambedkar, B.R. 2011. The Buddha and His Dhamma, Critical ed., ed. Aakash Singh Rathore and Ajay Verma. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ames, Roger. 2019. Against Indiviualism, For Individuality: The Emersonian Rosemeont, Jr. Philosophy East and West 69 (1): 7–20. Anand, Subash. 2004. Hindu Inspiration for Christian Reflections: Towards A Hindu Christian Theology. Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakashan. Bartolf, Christian. 2018. “Tolstoy and Practical Spirituality.” In Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations of Religions and Societies. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Beall, Endall. 2015. Spiritual Pragmatism: A Practical Approach to Spirit Work in a World Controlled by Mind. Ego Paperback. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1971. The Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre, et al. 2000. The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Brier, Soren. 2017. C.S. Peirce’s Phenomenological, Evolutionary and Transdisciplinary Semiotic Conception of Science and Religion. In Research as Realization: Science, Spirituality and Harmony, ed. Ananta Kumar Giri, 53–96. Delhi: Primus Books. Citron, Gabriel. 2015. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Conversations with Rush Rhees: From the Notes of Rush Rhees. Mind 124 (493): 1–71. Clammer, John, and Ananta Kumar Giri. 2017. The Aesthetics of Development: Art, Culture and Social Transformations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cousins, E.H. 1992. Christ of the 21st Century. New York: Continuum. Coward, Howard. 1989. Language in Sri Aurobindo. Journal of South Asian Literature 24 (1): 141–153. Dallmayr, Fred. 2007. Liberal Democracy and Its Critics: Some Voices from East and West. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXIV (4): 1–24. Dallmayr, Fred. 2011. Life World, Modernity and Critique: Paths Between Heidegger and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Polity Press. Das, Chitta Ranjan. 2004. Mahimandalara Gita, Sri Arakhita Das, EKa Adhyana [The Gita of the World, A Study of Sri Arakhita Das]. Bhubaneswar: Odisha Sahitya Akademi. Das, Chitta Ranjan. 2008. A Revolutionary in Education Kristen Kold: A Pioneer of Danish Folk High School Movement. New Delhi: Shipra.

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

37

Das, Veena. 2007. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. Berkeley: University of California Press. Das, Veena. 2011. Moral and Spiritual Striving in the Everyday: To Be a Muslim in Contemporary India. In Ethical Life in South Asia, ed. Anand Pandian and Daud Ali. Delhi: Oxford U. Press. Faubion, James D. (ed.). 1995. Rethinking the Subject: An Anthology of Contemporary European Thought. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Fox, Richard G. 1989. Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture. Boston: Beacon Press. Ghosh, Raghunath. 2008. Humanity, Truth and Freedom: Essays in Modern Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Northern Book Center. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2006. Creative Social Research: Rethinking Theories and Methods and the Calling of an Ontological Epistemology of Participation. Dialectical Anthropology 30: 227–271. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2012. Sociology and Beyond: Windows and Horizons. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2013. Knowledge and Human Liberation: Towards Planetary Realizations. London: Anthem Press. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2014. The Multiverse of Hindu Engagement with Christianity: Plural Streams of Creative Co-walking, Contradictions and Confrontations. In The Oxford Handbook of Christianity in Asia, ed. Felix Wilfred. New York: Oxford University Press. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2017. Poetics of Development. International Journal of Social Quality 7 (1): 36–52. Giri, Ananta Kumar (ed.). 2018a. Social Theory and Asian Dialogues: Cultivating Planetary Conversations. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Giri, Ananta Kumar (ed.). 2018b. Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Transformations in Religions and Societies. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2019a. Lifeworlds and Living Words. Social Change 49: 241–256. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2019b. Cultivating New Movements and Circles of Meaning Generation: Upholding Our World, Regenerating Our Earth and the Calling of a Planetary Lokasamghraha. Journal of Human Values 26: 146–166. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2019c. Weaving New Hats: Our Half Birth Days. Delhi: Studera. Giri, Ananta Kumar (ed.). 2019d. Practical Spirituality and Human Development: Creative Experiments for Alternative Futures. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2020. The Calling of Global Responsibility: In Search of Glboal Responsibiliiteis. London: Routledge (in press). Habermas, Jurgen. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon Press.

38

A. K. GIRI

Habermas, Jurgen. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 2002. Postscript: Some Concluding Remarks. In Habermas and Pragmatism, ed. Myra B. Aboulfia and Catherine Kemp. London: Routledge. Heidegger, Martin. 2004. The Way to Language. In idem, Basic Writings. London: Routledge. Hollingworth, Miles. 2018. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holzman, Lois. 2008. Vygotsky at Work and Play: Social Therapeutics. New York: Routledge. Joas, Hans. 1993. Pragmatism and Social Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levine, Steven. 2010. Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth. Philosophy and Social Criticism 36: 677–695. Luchte, James. 2009. Under the Aspect of Time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the Place of Nothing. Philosophy Today 53 (1): 70–84. Luc Irigaray, Luce. 2002. Between East and West: From Singularity to Community. New York: Columbia University Press. Mieth, Dietmar. 2009. Meister Eckhart: The Power of Inner Liberation. In Modern Prince and the Modern Sage: Transforming Power and Freedom, ed. Ananta Kumar Giri, 405–428. New Delhi: Sage. Om, Swami. 2018 [2017]. The Ancient Science of the Mantras: Wisdom of the Sages. Mumbai: Jaico. Panikkar, Raimundo. 2010. The Rhythm of Being. New York: Orbis Books. Petrilli, Susan. 2003. Modeling, Dialogue and Globality: Biosemiotics and the Semiotics of Self. Sign System Studies 31 (1): 65–105. Petrilli, Susan, and Augusto Ponzio. 2007. Semiotics Today: From Global Semiotics to Semioethics, a Dialogic Response. Signs 1: 29–127. Quarles van Ufford, Philip, and Ananta Kumar Giri (ed.). 2003. A Moral Critique of Development: In Search of Global Responsibilities. London: Routledge. Reid, Herbert, and Betsy Taylor. 2010. Recovering the Commons: Democracy, Place and Global Justice. Urbana Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Rolland, Romain. 1954 [1929]. The Life of Ramakrishna. Mayavati, Almora: Advaita Ashram. Schouten, Jan Peter. 2012. Jesus as Guru: The Image of Christ Among Hindus and Christians in India. Delhi: Overseas Press India. Skof, Lenart. 2011. Pragmatism and Deepened Democracy: Ambedkar Between Dewey and Unger. In Democratic Culture: Historical and Philosophical Essays, ed. Akeel Bilgrami, 122–142. Delhi: Routledge.

2

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY: NEW HORIZONS OF THEORY …

39

Skolimowski, Henryk. 1991. Dancing Shiva in the Ecological Age: Heralding the Dawn of Ecological Reconstruction in 21st Century. New Delhi: Clarion Books. Sri Aurobindo. 1950. Savitri. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Sri Aurobindo. 1970. Life Divine. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Strydom, Piet. 2009. New Horizons of Critical Theory: Collective Learning and Triple Contingency. Delhi: Shipra Publications. Tan, Sor-Hoon. 2016. Confucianism and Pragmatist Methods: Keeping Faith with the Confucian Moral Mission. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook in Chinese Philosophy Methodologies, ed. Sor-Hoon Tan, 155–179. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Taylor, Charles. 2011. Celan and the Recovery of Language. In Dilemmas and Connections. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tyler, Peter. 2014. The King of the Dark Chamber: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rabindra Nath Tagore and the Mystical Turn. Inaugural Lecture, St Mary’s University. Unger, Roberto M. 2007. The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vattimo, Gianni. 2011. A Farewell to Truth. New York: Columbia University Press. Vivekananda, Swami. 2011 [1900]. Christ the Messenger. Mayavati, Almora: Advaita Ashram. West, Cornell. 1999. On Prophetic Pragmatism. In The Cornell West Reader. New York: Basic Civitas Books. Wilmore, G.S. 2004. Pragmatic Spirituality: The Christian Faith Through Afrocentric Lens. New York: New York University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Pragmatism, Geist and the Question of Form: From a Critical Theory Perspective Piet Strydom

Introduction To begin with, two preliminary remarks need to be made at the outset. First, since Pragmatism and Critical Theory are different versions of the Kantian/Left-Hegelian tradition, I approach Pragmatism, the narrower of the two, from the broader Critical perspective. This doesn’t exclude reservations about the failings of Critical Theorists, however. Second, since I have a multilingual understanding of the word ‘spirit’ and its cognates, I approach the word ‘spirituality’ from a broad conceptual perspective. This leads to an emphasis on the concept of form which is central to both Pragmatism and Critical Theory. The argument regarding Pragmatism and form is presented in two parts. In the first, I clarify the central issue by offering an analytical presentation of the elements of my argument against the background of the multi-phase Pragmatist debate. Considering that Pragmatism, like Critical Theory, is centrally concerned with human activities and their respective

P. Strydom (B) Department of Sociology, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_3

41

42

P. STRYDOM

forms, and given that the debate is largely about form, I pose a question about the conceptualisation of form, asking whether it should be conceived exclusively as a sociocultural matter or rather simultaneously also as having roots in nature. When the word ‘spirit’ is approached from a multilingual perspective, particularly considering the Germanic Geist, it quickly becomes apparent that it cannot be confined exclusively to religion or religious belief, but has to be broadened to cover also the human spirit/mind. In turn, however, the latter cannot simply be understood as something metaphysical, since it has to be acknowledged that its embodiment is of central importance and that it thus has a natural history. This implies that the embodied spirit/mind and form are, if not coeval and coextensive, actually closely related to one another. In the second part, Geist-infused form and its different manifestations are probed. Starting with an excursion into the intellectual background of contemporary thinking, a unique perspective is opened on the human social world, including both its generative processes and cultural-cummetacultural structures. This provides the opportunity to investigate the relation of Geist or spirit/mind and form, particularly in respect of the role they play in the generation and structuration of our world. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding the significance of the human spirit/mind as form in holding open the abundant potentialities for realising an appropriate human world—something sorely required today for problem-solving and world-creation. But as both Pragmatism and Critical Theory stress, this calls for spirited and minded subjects.

Part I The Metaproblematic of Pragmatism The first question is: What is the metaproblematic of Pragmatism? What serves as the metalevel assumption informing and driving Pragmatism? The same applies also to Critical Theory as a philosophical and social-scientific direction sharing a Kantian/Left-Hegelian heritage with Pragmatism—the two contemporaries who respectively founded Pragmatism and Critical Theory being Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Marx. The answer is that the constitutive assumption of Pragmatism, as of Critical Theory, concerns the relation between human agency or activities (pragmata) and their forms.

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

43

Since the reversal of the neglect of Pragmatism in American universities, the intensifying debate about its status has been and still is essentially about this metaproblematic. However, it is particularly the question of form that is at issue in different phases of the debate, while the question of human agency or activities remains largely taken for granted. The significant differences between positions adopted on the question of form continues to this very day. As regards the agency or activity side, Pragmatism is clearly quietistic as is evidenced by the fact that it focuses only on action, conduct and practices, but not also on critique and especially transformative praxis, as is the case in Critical Theory. As regards form, Pragmatism is ambivalent, conceiving it either broadly or narrowly, with the dominant contemporary trend being rather narrowly. The relevant difference between Pragmatism and Critical Theory can be indicatively summarised by means of the following sharp contrasts: First, how should human agency or activities be conceived—as confined to situated action, conduct and practices or as also including critique and transformative praxis? Should the focus be on problem-solving activities or should it also be directed towards activities of world-creation, including world-transformation? Second, how should form be conceived—as represented by context-immanent values and norms, ones that emerge from within and remains confined to concrete situations, or should context-transcendent presuppositions also be regarded as vehicles of form? Is form a matter of context-immanent generality or also of context-transcendent universality? The tensions within Pragmatism and the differences between it and Critical Theory become transparent when one turns to the protracted phase-bound debate about Pragmatism. The Debate About Pragmatism Classical and Neo-classical Pragmatism, 1870s–1940s The early debate about Pragmatism was inaugurated in 1897 when James brought Peirce out of oblivion by nominating him as the founder of this American philosophy. Peirce had advanced the idea of Pragmatism already as early as the 1870s. In personal communications and writings as well as publically, he not only showed his appreciation, but also replied intellectually by insisting on the fundamental difference between James’ conception of Pragmatism and his own version. Mead, Dewey and Mills continued the debate until the beginning of the 1940s when the abandonment of

44

P. STRYDOM

Pragmatism in favour of analytic philosophy started to take effect due to economic, political, intellectual and cultural changes stimulated by the two World Wars. Peirce advocated a broad quasi-transcendental pragmatism which harked back to Kant, but a post-Hegelian Kant whose emphasis on a priori constitutive principles and consciousness were replaced, respectively, by his own deduction of the grounds of validity and the concomitant sign-mediated or semiotic processes. Accordingly, he saw action and even also perception as presupposing ‘general purposiveness’ made available by ‘intellectual concepts’ (1998: 401)—that is, concepts functioning as incursive validity concepts, for instance, basic ‘ideas of human life…Truth, Right, and Beauty’ (1998: 197), making available ‘grounds of validity’ (1992: 56). Such structures he treated as harbouring ‘potentiality’ and representing ‘form’ (1998: 388, 478) necessary for structuring and regulating activities and determining their object. Depending on Peirce, James (1978) developed a psychologicalsubjective pragmatism which is narrowly restricted individualistically as well as situationally and instrumentally. Even against Peirce’s urging, he persisted in foreshortening generalised ideas to particular situated actions and conceivable practical consequences of such ideas to psychological effects. For this reason, Peirce’s emphatically introduced the contrasting neologism ‘Pragmaticism’ (1998: 448) in 1905. The fact that Dewey earlier had been a Hegelian goes some way towards accounting for the communal-political pragmatism he advocated in the late 1920s and 1930s. Although broader than James’ version, it was significantly narrower than Peirce’s in that it was situationally confined. Simultaneously, it was also instrumentally oriented towards communal problem-solving by means of ‘inquiry’ (Dewey 1927, 1938). The latter was portrayed as indeed generating a regulative ‘form’ (1938: iii), yet a form strictly internal to the particular situation. That such contextimmanent form is devoid of any universal categories, for example, validity, truth, justice and sincerity, however, is borne out by his preferred communicatively enabled collective standard of ‘cooperative self-governance’ (1927). In this respect, notably, Critical Theory’s conception of ‘research’ (Forschung ) differs significantly from Dewey’s idea of ‘inquiry’, which is why Horkheimer (1972) and Marcuse (2011: 81) distanced Critical Theory from Pragmatism. Since Mead maintained a closer relation to Peirce than Dewey and accordingly sought to reconstruct his Kantian-Hegelian baggage, he was

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

45

able to develop a significantly broader version of Pragmatism, one aimed at doing justice to universalism. For him, Pragmatism was equivalent to the philosophy of the act (Mead 1938), with the act conceived as passing through different phases. Considering its temporal structure, his is a universal-communicative type of Pragmatism. Starting with the transition from animal gestures to human symbolically meaningful action and social interaction, he envisaged a progressively expansive form. The formation of an identity or self and, hence, mind is dependent on recourse to the group-based ‘generalized Other’ (1974: 90) which, in turn, both feeds into and is conditioned by ‘democracy’ in the sense of communicatively organised communal relations. But far from democracy being the final structuring form, it presupposes the context-transcendent conceptual or reason-based ideals of ‘universal discourse’ and ‘universal human society’ (1974: 327–328). In these terms, he advocated internationalism or what today is called cosmopolitanism calling for identification with and participation in a universalistic human sociocultural form of life. Mills’ (1940, 1964, 1970) broad critical-sociological Pragmatism is unique in that it combines the two Left-Hegelian strands by incorporating ideas from early Critical Theory in Pragmatism. While employing Dewey’s conception of language and vocabulary as collective action, he simultaneously attacked what he regarded as his ‘nakedly utilitarian scheme’ and proposed a sociological correction by taking both the social and cultural nature of motives seriously. Socio-political problems are certainly experienced as ‘personal troubles of milieu’ and conditioned by ‘public issues of social structure’, but their proper understanding and critical resolution demands appeal to context-transcendent ‘master symbols of legitimation’, for example, the universal concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘reason’ (1970: 46). The tensions plaguing Pragmatism in its classical and neo-classical versions were reproduced in the subsequent phase of the Pragmatist debate. The Late Twentieth/Early Twenty-First-Century Debate, 1960s–Present This phase of the debate took off in the late-1960s, then underwent a reinvigoration and quite drastic turn in the 1980s and reached a crescendo in the 1990s, yet it is still continuing in the twenty-first century, with a new nodal point around Brandom’s work. It was opened by Apel’s incisive rehabilitation of Peirce, the neglected founder of Pragmatism, and then amplified by Habermas. It is especially Habermas’

46

P. STRYDOM

widely read work of the late-1960s that drew the attention of American scholars, including a pragmatist like Bernstein, from which followed the debate. Jettisoning his earlier analytic philosophical convictions, Rorty, also impressed by Habermas, launched the programme for what became known as ‘neo-Pragmatism’ in the early 1980s, and by the 1990s he was deeply embroiled in criticisms and meta-criticisms of a wide range of philosophers, both American and Continental. The enormous impact of Rorty’s writings, still felt today even after his death in 2007, owes much to his revitalisation of Dewey’s approach by means of injections of European philosophical ideas. Thereby he sought to undermine Apel’s Kantian-Peircean interpretation of Pragmatism. In the early 1990s, Brandom forcefully entered the debate, having studied with Rorty while also impressed by Habermas, and meanwhile has generated an extension of the debate around his particular appropriation of pragmatists and their precursors. Besides a large number of contemporary pragmatists, Habermas, Apel and Wellmer are also partaking of those exchanges. On the basis of meticulous study, Apel (1967/1970, 1980, 1981) offered an interpretation of Peirce as having accomplished a transformation of Kant that deflated the great German philosopher’s strong transcendentalism by replacing his solipsistic assumption of the centrality of consciousness by sign-mediated or semiotic processes instead. Despite Peirce’s rejection of a priori constitutive transcendentalism, Apel nevertheless saw him as retaining a quasi-transcendental position which was defined by the recognition of the efficacy of transcendent ideas, as evidenced by Peirce’s emphasis on intellectual concepts as the grounds of validity playing a vital role in the control of action and the creation and organisation of the human sociocultural form of life. Apel’s own ‘transcendental pragmatics’ is a systematically developed version of Peirce’s transformation of Kant. The early Habermas (1972) followed in Apel’s footsteps with his parallel programme of ‘universal’ or ‘formal pragmatics’ (1979). Like the transcendental in Apel, the universal or formal qualification of Pragmatics indicates an insistence, as in Kant’s ‘conditions of possibility’ (1968: B395 = A337) and Peirce’s ‘grounds of validity’ (1992: 56), on the necessity and unavoidability of recourse to context-transcendent form. Rorty’s (1982, 1989) ‘neo-Pragmatism’ is in large measure a restatement of Dewey’s contextually confined view, but enhanced by borrowings from European philosophy going beyond Dewey’s understanding of the role of language. Alongside Dewey, Rorty (1979) nominated

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

47

Wittgenstein as the most important philosopher. Rorty’s central thrust is a concerted attack against any transcendental residue in philosophical thought—indeed, against philosophical thought as such. Dewey’s concern with motives articulated in different registers or ‘vocabularies’ (Rorty 1989: 5) is retained, but for the systematic unfolding of that fruitful idea Heidegger’s conception of language proved essential. Particularly the notion of humans as involved in an ongoing process without any goal, forming a concatenated ‘conversation’ in which one vocabulary displaces another, and of the innovative ‘world-disclosing function’ of language (1989: 66), enabled him to present his position in a way that many found persuasive. By contrast with its widespread uptake, however, the constricted nature of neo-pragmatism is clear for all to see in, for example, the vociferous debate of the 90s between Rorty and his critics. Withdrawing from the public and political sphere in favour of adopting a private ironic stance, he nevertheless submits that there are beliefs that ‘can still regulate action’, but each one of them rests purely on a ‘contingent historical circumstance’ (1989: 189). Besides his doctoral supervisor Rorty, Brandom (2015, 2011) was deeply influenced by the early Habermas, an influence retaining its force to this very day. Against this background, his project to restore the balance between the two extreme interpretations of Pragmatism becomes intelligible. Noteworthy is that the title of his important work, Making It Explicit (1994), unmistakably invokes Peirce’s understanding of Pragmatism as an approach to making our ideas clear. Brandom’s focus is not confined to the linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons, since by relating linguistic ‘expression’ to ‘the conceptual’ dimension within the context of ‘discursive practices’, he unmistakably seeks to bridge the gap. His reaching towards the context-transcendent side is confirmed by his depiction of the conceptual dimension as a ‘privileged vocabulary’ which serves as a ‘repository of expressive resources for making semantic and pragmatic structures explicit’ (1994: 643). The relations of mediation between expression and concepts are theorised in inferential terms, but what is remarkable is that he does not refer to the whole set of modes of inference so important to Peirce. What does stand out, by contrast, is his preference for a Wittgensteinian grammatical interpretation of rules, distanced from Kant, and in later work pursued along Hegelian lines. Habermas’s position culminated in his late ‘Kantian pragmatism’ (2003) which strikes a balance between Apel’s deflated Kantian transcendentalism and Peirce’s pragmatism. As is the case with his many

48

P. STRYDOM

contributions to the debate (1972, 2003), however, this strategy is as tension-laden as ever. It has been reinforced by the criticisms he received from both sides over many years. His encounter with pragmatists, beginning with Bernstein and later including Rorty, was accompanied by encouragement and demands to deflate the transcendentalism shared with Apel still further. Habermas’s (1998) pointed rejection of Rorty’s contextualism bears out his unwillingness to go too far. However, the pressure emanated not only from Americans, but even from his own Critical Theory side represented by his close associate Wellmer (1986, 1998, 2003) who for years persisted in criticising both his and Apel’s attachment to idealisation. Apel (2003) resolutely resisted any further deflation, but Habermas relented which called forth Apel’s (1998) reinforcement of his repeated criticisms. Persuaded by Wellmer and Lafont, Habermas (2003) went beyond his early moderate shift from transcendental-pragmatics to his own ‘formal pragmatics’ (1979) by supplementing his former discursive conception of truth with a pragmatic concept of truth embedded in everyday action and rooted in nature. This is a significant pragmatist and weak naturalist construct, but overall this position proved problematic since his attempt to satisfy the transcendental requirement by introducing a transcendent unconditional concept of truth lacked good reasons. As long as the necessity of idealisation through transcendent recourse is not properly argued for, the impression of Habermas’s new construct as ambivalently suspended between two poles will persist. This matter is taken up again below. It is clear, then, that the most recent phase of the Pragmatist debate, just like the preceding one, continues to vary between narrow and broad conceptions of the structuring and regulative form of activity. But this still leaves the question of the specific nature of the form that some interpret narrowly, others broadly and still others ambivalently. Form—Exclusively Sociocultural or Also Natural? While the debate about Pragmatism is essentially concerned with the question of form, the unabated competition between narrow and broad interpretations leads to human activities being regarded quite differently. Form-wise, they are seen as structured and regulated either by contextimmanent norms or rules, or by context-transcendent ideas, rule-systems, concepts or principles. It might appear as though form in these interpretations, irrespective of whether narrow or broad, is conceived as confined

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

49

exclusively to the sociocultural domain. For human activities are seen as generating social and cultural structures which are in turn needed for directing and guiding such activities. However, this overlooks another most important dimension necessary for an adequate understanding of form. It is indicated by the question whether form is exclusively a sociocultural matter, or whether it is not at the same time also rooted in nature. It should be noted that Pragmatism was originally a rejection of the modern dualistic philosophy introduced by Descartes and that, on the whole, it has since then been pursued on the alternative assumption of naturalistic monism. All of life, including human life in every one of its manifestations, is shot through with nature. Peirce (1992, 1998) combined the observance of natural history and its evolutionary structuring with Kant and Hegel in the development of their respective versions of Pragmatism. On the one hand, Peirce accepted the evolutionary ‘unity of origin of humankind…[and of]…dogs, parrots and finches…’ (1998: 468). Both humans and animals are products of physis or nature in the sense of a ‘force’ that gives birth to life. Simultaneously, both are subject to nature in the sense of ‘an inheritance…[or]…law’, with the result that, as offspring, both have ‘a general resemblance to the parent’ (1998: 121), thus exhibiting elementary natural forms in their thought processes and behaviour. The organic cognitive endowment or the ‘instincts’ of humans, however, are much more ‘mutable’ than those of animals due to language, a vast range of ideas and recording formats. On the other hand, accordingly, Peirce drew a distinction between this natural substrate and the human psychosociocultural world embracing human psychology and ‘the extraordinary variety of languages, customs, institutions, religions, as well as the many revolutions these have undergone…’ (1998: 468). In accordance with this complex view, he insisted on seeing ‘an affinity’ of ‘mind’ (i.e. Geist ) both with nature and with such structuring principles of the human world as ‘truth’ (1998: 24, 108, 444). The mind is rooted in the human organic endowment and is hence found in every individual, but already there it takes a ‘dialogical form’ (1998: 402). In communication, the minds involved are of one mind, what Peirce calls ‘commens’, in which the minds of the interlocutors have to become fused if they were to relate to one another. This general manifestation of mind, he submits, ‘consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset’ (1998: 478), for the process of communication to take off at all. This means they need to have command of the relevant basic

50

P. STRYDOM

ideational, conceptual or regulative structures representing the enabling ‘potentiality’ and thus ‘form’ (1998: 388) required by communication and interpersonal relations. In Peirce’s view, then, form—associated with mind—is a marked feature of the sociocultural world, yet it can by no means be confined to it alone, since it is simultaneously dependent on natural history and evolution and their outcomes such as the organic cognitive endowment and the general mind of the human species which makes the formation of basic ideas, concepts and regulative principles possible in the first instance. Mead (1938), who was conscious of working in an intellectual context requiring the integration of Darwin’s contribution, amplified Peirce’s evolutionary approach. The ‘act’ central to his conception of Pragmatism was thus not confined to symbolically significant action and social interaction and their ideational, conceptual and regulative structures or forms, since an account of the transformation of the biological organism into the minded human, or of impulse into rationality, was obligatory. This demanded consideration of the natural history of conduct that allowed an evolutionary account of the transition from animal gestures to characteristically human communication. The key was to conceive the act as passing through distinct ‘elementary stages or forms’ (Mead 1974: 18). Whereas Darwin focused on the expression of emotions, he emphasised the neglected social context instead and, hence, regarded the gesture as the initial form of an animal’s act that is taken by another as an indication of forms of the act still to come in later stages. Conceiving the gesture as social by nature enabled him to reconstruct the emergence of symbolic and language communication. On the one hand, this evolutionary outcome presupposes the acquisition of a self or ‘mind’, a form of ‘reflective intelligence’ distinct from animal intelligence, which is a ‘social phenomenon’ insofar as it requires membership of an organised set of social relations or a ‘society’ with a ‘language’—i.e. a mechanism consisting of a ‘body of symbols’, ‘ideas’ or concepts that allows the differentiation of meanings and thereby makes possible ‘reflexiveness’, establishing relations with environmental features, envisaging future possibilities, anticipating consequences, indicating this to oneself and others, and action (1974: 118–119, 131–134). On the other hand, however, symbolically meaningful linguistic communication and its social entailments also presuppose the organic cognitive endowment, including the brain and nervous system, of the biological individual. For this biological substrate and its neurological form are abiding features that do not

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

51

fall away when they metamorphose into a socially organised self with a full-fledged reflexive mind and becomes writ large. In his mature philosophy, Dewey (1925) presented a view of the world as an admixture of contingent and transitory aspects, on the one hand, and the patterned regularities of natural processes, on the other. The social domain, symbolically organised through language and temporally continuing as a series of succeeding events, belongs to the former contingent dimension. But since it cannot escape nature, it simultaneously exhibits features of a general structured order. These features are relevant to knowledge production, including knowledge about the social world. Accordingly, Dewey insisted on the importance of a naturalistic approach according to which human life, irrespective of whether biological or social, is part of nature and thus follows certain recognisable natural patterns. The type of regulative ‘form’ (1938: iii) generated through communicative relations within particular situations can therefore also be regarded as rooted in nature. It may surprise or even shock some scholars who value Rorty’s concerns with language, conversation, narrative, metaphors, vocabularies and so forth, that he too, like the majority of pragmatists, proceeds from a basic naturalistic assumption. His concern is ‘the history of metaphor’ (1989: 16) conceived in analogy to natural history. This implies a transfer of the evolutionary perspective to language and communication. In this respect, he on the one hand appeals to Wittgenstein interpreted as a behaviourist about language and, on the other, to Dennett who eliminates the mind by means of an algorithmically interpreted Darwin. In accordance with the adaptationist approach, then, Rorty naturalistically considers ‘language as we now see evolution, as new forms of life constantly killing off old forms – not to accomplish a higher purpose, but blindly’ (1989: 19). Is there any room left for Geist or the human spirit/mind here? Brandom, the leading contemporary American pragmatist, is exceptional among the major representatives as far as the naturalistic outlook is concerned. Given his focus on the inferential relations mediating between expression and rule-like conceptual forms within discursive practices, his approach obviously remains socioculturally confined. In accordance with his ‘normative pragmatics’ (Brandom 1994: 3), these relations are stylised in terms of normativity. The sociocultural world is a normative realm that embraces all actions, practices and institutions as well as their conditions and entailments. This is how Brandom (2015) regards

52

P. STRYDOM

Hegel through eyes that were conditioned by Habermas. Ignoring natural history and evolution, social actors are taken as exclusively languageusing beings engaging in linguistic practices, abstracted from their organic endowment and biological pre-structuration. Whatever structuring and regulative forms are operative in the normative world are of a strictly sociocultural kind. Habermas (2003) proceeds from a monistic ontology of a naturalistic kind in the sense of continuity between nature and the sociocultural form of life. Simultaneously, however, he adopts an epistemological perspective that regards the sociocultural world as requiring treatment in its own terms rather than seen as completely determined by nature. This set of complementary assumptions is presented under the title of ‘weak naturalism’ (2003: 22, 28). This moderate conception of naturalism, a more precise rendition of Peirce and Mead, contrasts sharply with the stronger versions of naturalism assumed by Dewey and Rorty, while it also highlights the one-sidedness of Brandom’s pure normativism. To grasp form adequately, then, one has to give up two prevalent extreme views. The first is a purely sociocultural, whether sociologistic or culturalistic, conception and the second a strong naturalistic conception. Contrary to both these untenable positions, an understanding of the phenomenon of form at the centre of the Pragmatist debate requires that both the mutually implicated dimensions of nature and the sociocultural world be incorporated, while adequately construing the relation between them. The Word ‘Geist’—A Multilingual View According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘spirit’ refers to ‘the part of a person that consists of their character and feelings rather than their body’. The cognate ‘spiritual’ could mean ‘relating to the human spirit as opposed to material or physical things’ or ‘relating to religion or religious belief’. It could be plausibly ventured that the latter is the primary meaning of the word in the ordinary English language understanding. Presupposing the spirit–body dualism or mind–body problem, the former secondary meaning is obviously couched in metaphysical terms, which excludes the relevance of nature. Remarkably, too, no mention is made of the relation between the words ‘spirit’ and ‘mind’. The entry on ‘mind’ in the Oxford Dictionary likewise makes no mention of ‘spirit’. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology,

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

53

‘spirit’ derives from the Latin spiritus meaning breathing, air, life, pride and courage, and entered English through the Old French esperit. It lists also subsequent historically accumulated meanings such as breath of air, vital principle and the Christian incorporeal being. Again, no connection is made between ‘spirit’ and ‘mind’, presumably due to their independent etymological origins. Yet it is only with reference to the close relation between the two words that it could be explained why both are employed to translate the German Geist. The translation of Geist from an English standpoint is typically rendered by ‘spirit’, but in the case of Hegel’s work, for example, the use of ‘mind’ is required to faithfully capture certain meanings, as for example in Baillie’s translation of The Phenomenology of Mind. It is striking that while there is a clear English preference for ‘spirit’ in the translation of Geist, the demand from the Germanic perspective is quite different. The Collins German Dictionary, for instance, relates the German Geist first of all to Denken (thought) and Vernunft (reason) and then offers ‘mind’ as the primary translation. Only secondarily are such phrases as ‘the Holy Ghost or Spirit’ and ‘the Spirit of God’ listed. In his translation of Hegel’s analysis of the inherently tension-laden relation between state and church in The Philosophy of Right, Knox notes that the preferred English translation for the word Geistige would be the ‘spiritual’ as the domain of religion rather than the ‘mental’ or the minded, but Geist actually encompasses both meanings as crucial to Hegel’s discussion of the possible permutations of the relation between these two institutions. As for Hegel (1966, 1967) himself, Geist pervades the entire human domain, from ‘subjective mind’ via ‘objective mind’ to ‘absolute mind’— that is, from the individual, through the sociocultural framework and organisation, to the reflexive mind itself. It thus covers all human activities, all institutions and everything else that makes those possible. And of central importance is that each of these levels is normatively structured, directed and guided in their development and realisation by their own internal logics, whether it is self-consciousness, freedom, reason, morality, religion or knowledge. Marx, the Left-Hegelian, critically corrected the master’s position on two vital counts. A regards Hegel’s philosophy of nature, he stressed that the human being is ‘directly a natural being ’, a ‘human natural being’, and as such is a ‘species being’—the latter embracing both ‘nature and species spiritual property’ (1969: 181, 182, 112, 114). And as a natural species being who ‘lives on nature’ and whose body is thus complemented

54

P. STRYDOM

by nature as distinct from the human body, humans are an inalienable ‘part of nature’ (1969: 112). As regards Hegel’s logic, Marx filled in the lacuna left by his idealistic and conservative vacillation on the question of the irreducibility of action or the primacy of practice and his consequent flight into hyper-abstraction. Humans indeed engage in conscious self-creation through speech and labour, but instead of conceiving these activities as abstract and empty, they must be understood as real living acts that extend also into ‘praxis’ in the sense of ‘practical-critical’ or even ‘revolutionary activity’ which could bring a new ‘human society’ into being (1967: 400–402). Mind for Marx is therefore not merely ‘definite concepts ’ or ‘universal fixed thought-forms ’, as for Hegel, but also ‘natural powers of life…[belonging to]…an active natural being’ (1969: 189, 181). Abstract forms of Geist /mind are lent impetus by and filled with Geist /spirit anchored in nature. The thrust of the argument, then, is that Geist should be understood as covering both mind and spirit and, further, that it is neither simply something metaphysical nor something quietistic. Rather than purely incorporeal, first, it is rooted in nature by deriving from the human organic cognitive endowment which, itself, is dependent on nature, socioculturally shaped, psychologically operative as thought, volition and agency, and socially and culturally manifest as their products—namely, context-transcendent ideas and concepts, on the one hand, and contextimmanent norms, values and institutions, on the other. And second, far from admitting of confinement to immanent reproductive social activities, Geist is a factor that time and time again is at work in transgressive and transformative activities essential to world-creation. The Relation of Geist and Form Geist or spirit/mind is anchored in nature and assumes an embodied form through the human organic cognitive endowment and activities of various kinds that generate a variety of multilevel social and cultural forms which, in turn, have a structuring and regulating effect on the activities as well as on the attitudes and commitments driving them. If not coeval and coextensive, Geist and form are mutually implicated and thus inseparable. Form, irrespective of the level at which it occurs, is never simply fixed, static and abstract, since it is from start to finish infused with Geist that is vital for its emergence, generation and developmental impetus. This being the case, Geist and form are all-pervasive, manifest at all relevant levels.

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

55

First, there is the naturalistic level of the human organic cognitive endowment forming the root of the operations of form-giving Geist at other levels; second, the individual level of the configuration of brain modules and cognitively fluid interconnections of the mind; third, the collective level of the phylogenetic form of Homo sapiens sapiens ’ mind, stabilised evolutionarily and setting the outer parameters of thought, volition, activity as well as of culture and society; fourth, the contexttranscendent level of conceptual conditions of the human form of life, what may be called the metacultural ‘cognitive order’, established and elaborated by sociocultural evolution, which make possible, structure and regulate culture, social activities and psychological structures; fifth, the context-immanent level of cultural models in great variety, all presupposing the overarching metaculture, which at their own lower level exert a secondary structuring and regulating effect; and, finally, the Geist-driven generative, historical-constructive process of speech, action, labour, practices, reflection, critique and praxis upon which all the levels listed above are dependent for their activation. Figure 3.1 presents the mutually implicative relation between Geist and form. As an icon designed to facilitate thought and comprehension, it incorporates the above levels and orders their relations in terms of anchorage in nature and elaborated in historical as well as evolutionary manifestations. Presupposing the organic cognitive endowment, the historical-constructive process gives rise to structures that allow both Form1 Phylogenetic form of mind: cognitive modules & fluidity evolu on of the species mind

Form2 Metacultural form of mind: cognitive order of society/ conceptual conditions

Form0 sociocultural evolution Organic Form3 cognitive Cultural forms of ac vi es: endowment: psychosocial historical-constructive process: variety of cultural models root Geist / ac on,speech,labour,prac ces,cri que,praxis spirit

Fig. 3.1 The relation of Geist and form

56

P. STRYDOM

the general evolution of the human mind and the more specific evolution of social relations and culture. At all the levels, corresponding forms emerge—organically, the cognitive endowment; phylogenetically, the form of the human mind; socioculturally, the cognitive order of the human form of life; and a variety of cultural models matching the different kinds of human activities. Considering that Geist and form pervade the whole constellation, conclusions can be drawn as to the positions of the different versions of Pragmatism. Metaproblematically speaking, Pragmatism is concerned with human activity and its form. For their part, the major versions of Pragmatism are markedly different renderings of this general assumption. First, the narrow Pragmatism of James, Dewey and Rorty focuses only of action, speech and practices and their particular psychological or cultural forms— Form3 in Fig. 3.1. Naturalistic assumptions, as in Dewey and Rorty, have the reductive effect of disallowing anything beyond Form3. Lacking naturalistic reflection, this is the popular version of Pragmatism dominant since the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the broad quasi-transcendental Pragmatism suggested by Peirce and extrapolated by Apel and long represented by Habermas, includes both Form3 and Form2 and, additionally, also reflection, critique and praxis. Here however, Form0 is ignored and the sociologically important Form2, the cognitive order, remains untheorised or under-theorised. This is also the case with Brandom. Finally, weak-naturalistic transcendental pragmatism approached by Peirce, Mead and the later Habermas points to the most comprehensive version, potentially covering the entire variety of human activities and their respective forms, from the organic, through the phylogenetic, to the sociocultural and metacultural. At this level, American Pragmatism and German Critical Theory would encounter each other most closely—were they to adequately realise their inherent potentials.

Part II To outline a framework within which the role of Geist and form can be clarified, a foray into the philosophy of mathematics first highlights the notions of infinite processes and their limit concepts which are then transferred to the human world in order to present a social-scientific account. This provides a platform for focusing on cultural models and, especially, the cognitive order of society as limit concepts—that is, naturally rooted,

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

57

socially articulated cultural and metacultural structures. These structures punctuate the processes, but also harbour both vast potentialities and realisable possibilities. If these resources were to be activated and tapped for the purposes of creating a more adequate human world than the one we are living in today, the limits represented by these structures need to be confirmed, but also challenged and elaborated. Infinite Processes and Their Limit Concepts A fruitful route towards grasping Geist-inspired and -filled form and its different manifestations is to clarify the parameters—the complementary concepts of infinite processes and limit concepts. Infinite Processes On investigating the problem of continuity or infinity, Aristotle (2015: Book III, Part 6) drew a basic distinction between ‘potential infinity’ and ‘complete infinity’. He accepted the former, but adhering to the classical Greek focus on the concrete and their concomitant horror infiniti, he felt compelled to reject the latter as logically impossible. Only two thousand years later in early modern times did scientists, mathematicians and philosophers, backed by Indian and Arab ideas, pick up the thread again and succeeded in establishing the core aspect of the theory of infinity. Focusing on the so-called ‘geometrical sequence’, scholars appreciated that two distinct series are implicated—an increasing or ‘divergent’ and a decreasing or ‘convergent series’ (Dantzig 2007: 150; Kline 1990: 1110). The divergent series consisting of the addition of natural counting numbers, say 2 + 4 + 8 + 16…, has a total that grows exponentially larger without end. By contrast, the convergent series is exemplified best by the transcendental number pi (π) which, when algorithmically derived, delivers a number that grows in decimal places while becoming ever smaller as it closes in on the value of π, yet without ever reaching that value. While Newton and Leibniz made the convergent series the basis of the mathematical branch of calculus, Galileo notably reversed Aristotle’s rejection of complete infinity by creating the method of idealisation, thereby preparing the ground for a significant development in modern philosophy. Taking cues from mathematics, Kant (1968: B386 = A330–B388 = A332) identified two continuous or infinite series in the domain of thought, respectively called the ‘descending series’ on the side of ‘the

58

P. STRYDOM

conditioned’ representing a ‘process of becoming ’ with ‘potentiality’; and the ‘ascending series’ on the side of ‘the conditions’ which we can never comprehend in its totality, but in respect of which we nevertheless must envisage such a ‘totality’ given ‘in its completeness ’ if we wish to make inferences and judgements. Complete infinity, contrary to Aristotle, is a logically possible idealisation which, although not applicable to any experiential object, is nevertheless essential for making sense of such objects, as long as it is internally coherent and consistent. Such a complete totality of conditions refers to our necessary and unavoidable presuppositions without which it is impossible not just to investigate any object domain, but also to create and organise society. Accordingly, Kant gave complete infinity, or the imagined totality of conditions, a central place in his philosophy under the title of ‘an idea or concept of reason’ (Kant 1968: W320 = B377) which functions as a structuring and regulative principle. Implied, of course, is still a third infinite series—the subjective dimension from which sense is made of the convergent and divergent series. While Kant conceived it in the solipsistic form of the transcendental subject of knowledge, it has since become understood in communicative terms. Peirce, an accomplished mathematician who stressed ‘continuity’ throughout his philosophy, is the one who introduced the idea of this communicatively conceived subject of knowledge, referring to it as the ‘COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase in knowledge’ (1992: 52). Limit Concepts Associated with any process is the question of its limit, and infinite processes are no exception. In addition to infinity, therefore, Aristotle originally submitted: ‘“Limit” denotes the last point of anything, i.e. the point beyond which it is impossible to find any part of it, but within which all of its parts are found’ (1961: 32). Much later, this philosophical step provided the starting point for the mathematicians to transpose the notion of limit into the foundational concept of modern analysis (Kline 1990). It is on this philosophical–mathematical basis that Kant established his ‘critical philosophy’ which is essentially a philosophy of limits. In all three his critical works, Kant (1956, 1968, 1972) related the concept of limit to both of the series he identified. As regards the ‘descending series’ qua ‘process of becoming ’, the limit is comparable to the value of π as an ideal limit towards which the calculation indefinitely tends but can never reach. Here Kant mentions ‘examples’ or ‘models’

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

59

of self-cultivation or conduct (Kant 1968: A569–571 = B597–599; Kant 1956: 152)—for instance, acting like a’ wise man’—which one tries to emulate yet can never fully realise. Such examples or models functioning as limit concepts of processes of becoming are thus effectively finite ideal limits. By contrast, he associated the infinite ideal limits with the ‘ascending series’ qua ‘complete infinity’. Here, he proposed an imagined ‘totality’ (Kant 1972: 93) arrived at through idealisation and imposed by the mind’s power on infinite processes, which thus makes possible inferences, judgements, knowledge, justifiable conduct and the appreciation of beauty. Necessary and unavoidable idealised totalities of this kind are what he more precisely called ‘an idea or concept of reason’ (Kant 1968: A320 = B377), including such concepts as ‘validity’, ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, ‘moral law’ and ‘beauty’. Each one of these represents an infinite ideal limit of the accumulative divergent or ascending series without which the human world simply cannot do. Infinity and Limits in the Human World The point of recalling this neglected background of contemporary thought is to enable better understanding of the parameters of the human world. The whole complex of infinite processes and limit concepts is manifest, indeed, repeats itself on three distinct dimensions—the objective, sociocultural and subjective dimensions of the human world. This implies that each of these dimensions unfolds in accordance with the convergent and divergent processes and is structured by their corresponding limit concepts. Each consists, first, of a historical-constructive process driven by spirited or formed human activities and has a finite ideal limit concept representing its particular form; and, second, an evolutionary process stabilising the structures generated by the historicalconstructive activities so that they function as the infinite ideal limit concept or form which, in turn, structures and allows regulation of those activities. Figure 3.2 offers an overview of the whole set of relations relevant in the present context for developing a transparent account of the human world for the purposes of understanding Pragmatism and the question of Geist and form. The human world embraces three constitutive dimensions, the objective, sociocultural and the subjective, each of which represents an infinite process. Each dimension is driven forward endlessly by human activities generating a historical-constructive process, a; and in

60

P. STRYDOM

Limit concept:

finite ideal: cultural model

infinite ideal: cognitive order

TRUTH Infinite process: Objective

b a

π sustainable human-nature relation RIGHT/ JUSTICE

Sociocultural

b a π democratic-cosmopolitan planetary society SINCERITY/ AUTHENTICITY

Subjective

b a π cognitively fluid subject appropriate to a sustainable & cosmopolitan planetary society

Fig. 3.2 The human world

each case, it is accompanied by an evolutionary process, b, which lets the structural features emerging from the activities accumulate over time and stabilise. Not incorporated into this diagram but exhibited by Fig. 3.1, this evolutionary process has both a natural phylogenetic and a sociocultural aspect, the former leading to the stabilisation of form of Homo sapiens sapiens’ mind and the latter stabilising the metacultural conceptual conditions of the human world. Again, in each case, limit concepts operate in respect of both the historical-constructive and the evolutionary processes. Process a is marked by a finite limit value, comparable to pi and thus indicated by the symbol π, which takes the form of a context-immanent cultural model, or a set of interrelated cultural models, emulated by the generative activities yet never fully realisable. These models exert a structuring and regulating effect on the activities and the orientations and attitudes behind them.

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

61

In turn, process b, presupposing the human form of mind, is punctuated by an infinite limit concept in the form of a context-transcendent metacultural layer of presupposed principles, the cognitive order. This form lays down the outer parameters and thus structures and regulates the cultural models at the lower context-immanent level. From the multiplicity of possible examples, the diagram presents cultural models that have emerged only very recently and, therefore, are now only beginning to structure and regulate the activities central to the current historicalconstructive process aimed at generating a new kind of a subject and a corresponding sustainable democratic-cosmopolitan planetary society. As for the metacultural cognitive order, the major principles of truth, right/justice and sincerity/authenticity stand as the infinite ideal limits which lay down the highest sociocultural parameters. Structuring and Regulating Forms—Cognitive Order and Cultural Models Through the human spirit/mind at work at every level, historicalconstructively directly and evolutionarily more indirectly, form pervades the whole of the human world. To appreciate the structuring and regulating function it fulfils in respect of orientations and activities of all sorts as well as of forms at lower levels, the different dimensions must be distinguished. To begin with, form is biologically rooted through the human organic cognitive endowment and it remains so through the range of activities made possible by the different fluidly interrelated cognitive modules or domains of intelligence harboured by that endowment and carried out in the spirited and minded manner typical of human beings. Simultaneously to being spirit- and mind-based, form is therefore also shaped by evolution as a process of structural accumulation and stabilisation. As pointed out, two distinct evolutionary dimensions and hence two distinct domains of accumulation and stabilisation are implicated. First, the natural process of evolution that gave rise to the Homo line includes phylogenetic developments in the sense of shaping and establishing forms of all kinds which at times are also affected by the way in which biological organisms relate to and engage with their environment. Particularly relevant here is the relatively recently acquired cognitively fluid form of mind characteristic of Homo sapiens sapiens. Lacking it, there could be no human world with its typical contents and unique features.

62

P. STRYDOM

Second, form is dependent also on sociocultural evolution which requires a much higher degree of input by human historical-constructive activities than phylogenetic evolution. Presupposing the form of the human mind, sociocultural evolution leads to the establishment of the metacultural cognitive order of the human world at the upper contexttranscendent level. Involved are the accumulation and stabilisation of rational potentials qua foundational concepts commonly presupposed yet mostly taken for granted by humans as conditions. They contain such constructs as truth, right/justice, sincerity/authenticity, number and so forth. They not only lay down the basic sociocultural parameters for the creation and organisation of society, but also represent the necessary and unavoidable structural elements without which the human world is inconceivable. Aside from the cognitive order, however, sociocultural evolution is at work also at the more specific context-immanent level of cultural models. These are formed by the accumulation and stabilisation of structural features that emerge from the interrelation of historical-constructive activities and particular selective combinations of cognitive order principles. For good or ill, cultural models come in a great, even inexhaustible, variety—for example, from modes of dress, culinary recipes, musical genres, marriage and burial rituals, via French republicanism, Englishness, Christianity, Hinduism, democracy and human rights, to currently relevant sustainability, cosmopolitanism and a new kind of subject. Within the parameters the cognitive order imposes, such cultural models function by directing and guiding specific activities, but they can of course also be altered by such activities. The Cognitive Order as Limit Concept or Form Thus far, the cognitive order was presented as the conceptual conditions of the human world that emerged from the stabilisation of the key structural features of historical-constructive activities bearing rational potentialities. As a stabilised metacultural layer, it is the limit concept associated with the infinite process of sociocultural evolution and its product, society. By the same token, it is the totality or idealised form the human mind imposes on this evolution in order to understand it structurally, give it meaning and make it manageable for the purposes of creating and organising society. The cognitive order is much more enduring than context-immanent structural forms such as cultural models which are

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

63

directly affected by history. Although more enduring, it is by no means immutable like Kant’s ideas of reason, since according to its own unique temporality it is subject to evolutionary change. Considered closely, the cognitive order is comprised of a wide range of concepts, or elementary cognitive structures, which divide into three major domains. The left-hand of Table 3.1 presents a list of some of the most prominent principles sorted into the objective, social and subjective domains. They function as limit concepts, meaning that the cognitive order is effectively a composite limit concept comprised of more specific limit concepts. Either singly or more commonly in combination, the cognitive order elements serve as structuring and regulating principles for cultural models, activities and the orientations behind them. The selective combinations in which they functionally appear depend on the particular complex of cultural models, activities and orientations for which they have relevance at a given moment—for example, in a latent conflict situation over how to solve the climate change problem, or in a discourse about cosmopolitanism. The fact that different configurations of cultural models, activities Table 3.1 The cognitive order

Infinite ideal limit concepts/ conceptual conditions • Objective: truth number efficiency instrumentality, etc. • Social: right equality solidarity justice legality, etc. • Subjective: truthfulness authenticity appropriateness, etc.

Infinite/continuous sources of potentiality

• Language • Logic • Mathematics • Informational redundancy ‘The unconditioned’ as sociocultural source of the sense of Geist, spirit/mind or ‘spirituality’

64

P. STRYDOM

and orientations call for unique selective compositions of cognitive order principles under specific situational conditions demonstrates that the cognitive order’s type of form is an inherently flexible and dynamic one which complements its multidimensional componential or particulate nature. From a cognitive-theoretical perspective, an appropriate and unique selection is made of relevant cognitive order principles that are then combined or composed in response to the demands of the particular situation. The focus now shifts to the right-hand of Table 3.1. Infinity and the Unconditionality of the Cognitive Order The cognitive order of society as the form of the human world presupposes and depends on an infinite or continuous objective, sociocultural and subjective process that far outstrips it by running above and beyond it. As the overall limit concept, it punctuates the process by functioning as the overarching form determining what belongs to the human world, thus rendering the process intelligible and manageable. The nature of the relation between the cognitive order and the infinite process, as well as the way the latter affects the former, become visible through such complexes as language, logic and mathematics to which should be added also informational redundancy. The most obvious feature of these complexes is that they enable the structuring and regulation of different types of activities through the various cognitive order principles, each of which serves as limit concept. But close inspection reveals the defining aspect of vague potentiality that infinity or continuity lends to each of these complexes and thus to the cognitive order principles. As for language, grammar provides a structure on which rests an opaque holistic network of interdependent and inter-definable concepts (Brandom 1994), each of which not only possesses an inexhaustible surplus of semantic meaning (Habermas 1984), but also implies potential pragmatic forms. And since both languages and language games in principle admit of translation into one another (Apel 1980), they represent an equally diffuse holism. Logic, second, points to the endless patterning of relations on the basis of corresponding premises and inferences, and thus reveals the inexhaustibility of reasoning which structurally implies the indefinite advancement of knowledge and learning (Leibniz 1968; Kant 1968; Hegel 1969; Peirce 1998; Badiou 2007). Third, mathematics historically made a crucial contribution to the understanding of

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

65

infinity (Kline 1990; Dantzig 2007), but particularly pertinent here is the conception of the divergent series or infinitely increasing process (Cantor 1955; Peirce 1992, 1998), which on the objective, sociocultural and subjective dimensions builds up towards unimaginable and uncomprehended totalities and enforces the necessity of limiting cognitive order principles. Finally, all cognitive processes, including those involving the cognitive order, generate informational redundancies—superfluous information not belonging to a communicated message itself yet nevertheless necessary for its intelligibility(Shannon and Weaver 1949; Bateson 1972; Luhmann 1998)—that represent forms operating as constraints directing and guiding understanding. The holism, opacity, inexhaustibility, limitlessness, indefinite extension, diffuseness and ineffability borne by language, logic, mathematics and informational redundancy and exceeding the cognitive order represent ‘the moment of unconditionality’ (Habermas 2003: 99), ‘the indeterminate’ (Husserl 1950: 101) and ‘uncomprehended complexity’ (Luhmann 1995: 27) entailed by the most basic presuppositions we humans make every day. This is the mark that the infinite process leaves on the cognitive order principles which as limit concepts punctuate it. It is the vast, invoked, unconditioned, indeterminate, over-complex and as yet uncomprehended potentialities cordoned off by the punctuation that give rise to the pervasive and abiding sense of Geist or spirit/mind profoundly impacting on the human world. Different interpretations are stimulated by this experience. From the post-metaphysical philosophical and social-scientific perspective adopted here, on the one hand, the vast suggested openness must be borne in mind throughout as something of the utmost significance for the disclosure, opening up, development and elaboration of the human world. From another perspective pursuing an entirely different goal, on the other hand, the sense of unconditionality, indeterminacy and over-complexity is associated with spirituality in the narrow meaning of religion or quasi-religion and some corresponding divinity, Supreme Being, mystical totality or simply a mystery. For Pragmatism and even more so for Critical Theory, by contrast, the invoked sense of the vast, open but indeterminate potentiality beyond, the totality of which we shall never get fully transparent, serves as confirmation of the feasibility and necessity of always being alert to new nuances and interpretations of our cognitive order principles which could contribute to the resolution of recalcitrant problems and the creation of a truly human world. In other

66

P. STRYDOM

words, the unconditionality, indeterminacy and over-complexity suggest that we humans and our world could be structured and regulated by more sophisticated conditions than at present.

Conclusion Finally, then, it may be submitted that to be committed and reflexively oriented from within practical situations towards the structuring and regulatory efficacy of the cognitive order as rendered possible by its infinite unconditioned potentialities would be tantamount to being ‘spiritual’ in the best sense of the word—both spirited and minded. On this we shall have to count to solve the pressing problems of our time and to create a sustainable and justifiable human world for ‘spiritual’ subjects whose dignity, rights and vulnerability are secured by democratic and cosmopolitan means on an ecological and planetary scale.

References Apel, Karl-Otto (ed.). 1967/1970. Charles S. Peirce: Schriften I-II . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Apel, Karl-Otto. 1980. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Apel, Karl-Otto. 1981. Charles S. Peirce. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Apel, Karl-Otto. 1998. Auseinandersetzungen in Erbrobung des transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Apel, Karl-Otto. 2003. Wahrheit als regulativen Idee. In Reflexion und Verantwortung, ed. D. Böhler, M. Kettner, and G. Skirbekk, 171–198. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt. Aristotle. 1961. Metaphysics. London: Dent. Aristotle. 2015. Physics. Adelaide: University of Adelaide. Badiou, Alain. 2007. Being and Event. London: Bloomsbury. Bateson, Gregory. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Frogmore: Paladin. Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brandom, Robert. 2011. Perspectives on Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brandom, Robert. 2015. Towards Reconciling Two Heroes: Habermas and Hegel. Argumenta 1 (1): 29–42. Cantor, Georg. 1955. Contribution to the Founding of the Theory of Transitive Numbers. New York: Dover.

3

PRAGMATISM, GEIST AND THE QUESTION OF FORM …

67

Dantzig, Tobias. 2007. Number. London: Plume. Dewey, John. 1925. Experience and Nature. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Holt. Dewey, John. 1938. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt. Habermas, Jürgen. 1972. Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann. Habermas, Jürgen. 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society. London: Heinemann. Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I. London: Heinemann. Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. On the Pragmatics of Communication. Cambridge: Polity. Habermas, Jürgen. 2003. Truth and Justification. Cambridge: Polity. Hegel, G.W.F. 1966. The Phenomenology of Mind. London: Allen & Unwin. Hegel, G.W.F. 1967. The Philosophy of Right. London: Oxford University Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 1969. Science of Logic. London: Allen & Unwin. Horkheimer, Max. 1972. Critical Theory. New York: Continuum. Husserl, Edmund. 1950. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. The Hague: Nijhoff. James, William. 1978. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1956. Critique of Practical Reason. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Kant, Immanuel. 1968. Critique of Pure Reason. London: Macmillan. Kant, Immanuel. 1972. Critique of Judgement. New York: Hafner. Kline, Morris. 1990. Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern, vol. I–III. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1968. Philosophical Writings. London: Dent. Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas. 1998. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, vol. I. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Marcuse, Herbert. 2011. Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation. London: Routledge. Marx, Karl. 1967. Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. New York: Doubleday. Marx, Karl. 1969. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New York: International Publishers. Mead, George H. 1938. The Philosophy of the Act. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mead, George H. 1974. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mills, C. Wright. 1940. Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. American Sociological Review 5: 904–913.

68

P. STRYDOM

Mills, C. Wright. 1964. Sociology and Pragmatism. New York: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. Wright. 1970. The Sociological Imagination. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Peirce, Charles S. 1992. The Essential Peirce, vol. I. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Peirce, Charles S. 1998. The Essential Peirce, vol. II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1982. The Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shannon, C.E., and W. Weaver. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. London and New York: University of Illinois Press. Wellmer, Albrecht. 1986. Ethik und Dialog. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Wellmer, Albrecht. 1998. Endgames. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Wellmer, Albrecht. 2003. Die Streit um die Wahrheit: Pragmatismus ohne regulativen Ideen. In Reflexion und Verantwortung, ed. D. Böhler, M. Kettner, and G. Skirbekk, 143–170. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt.

CHAPTER 4

Naturalistic Spirituality, Religious Naturalism, and Community Spirituality: A Broader Pragmatic View Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley

This chapter explores the rich insights of the American pragmatist, Josiah Royce, on spirituality, and religion, I argue that Royce expounded a naturalistic spirituality and a religious naturalism but in doing so, he expands our view of spirituality and religion, giving it a rich community flavor. Spirituality, for Royce, is about deep connection, meaning, and joy. It is about individual meaning and unification accomplished through loyalty to an ideal and connection with others in a community of loyalty. Joy is achieved through an attitude of love toward the universe and in reverence for the relations of life. Royce’s naturalism is evident throughout all his writings on religion and religious experience. He argues that religious experience, like any

J. A. K. Kegley (B) Department of Philosophy, California State University, Bakersfield, Bakersfield, CA, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_4

69

70

J. A. K. KEGLEY

sort of human experience, has its natural history.1 Royce’s Sources of Religious Insight 2 is a truly classical phenomenological exploration of religious experience. It parallels The Varieties of Religious Experience by James,3 but transcends it in several ways. First, unlike James’ work, Royce’s work explores religious experience common to much of mankind rather than the special genius cases that are the subject of James’ work. Secondly, it studies both individual and communal religious experience, grounding spirituality in man’s basic sociality and seeing the community as itself able to achieve a sense of spirituality. Thirdly, The Sources is solidly based in the experiential and empirical. Unlike James’ emphasis on the subliminal self, Royce asserts that the principal religious motives are indeed perfectly natural human motives. Royce explored in depth the history of religions and the concept of a divine being. Royce’s God is a Spirit, a Person, and not an external creator. He writes: “He (God) expresses himself in the world and the world is simply his life.”4 In answering the question “what in the idea of God constitutes Divinity?” Royce looks for the hypothesis about reality that most adequately addresses the need of man for depth and unification of self as believer and evaluator. Like Paul Tillich, the integration of personality is, for Royce, a central part of religious experience. This is expressed by Tillich in terms of an ultimate concern which gives depth, direction, and unity to all concerns of the person and by Royce in his concept of loyalty which brings integration to the person and unites him/her with other beings in pursuit of an ideal. Like Tillich, Royce sees doubt and fallibility as central to all faith and religious experience has given the ongoing development of the universe and the endless possibilities that it promises. For Royce, religious spirituality is not about certainty but attitude toward the universe. A most profound contribution of Royce to the discussion of religion and spirituality is his recommendation that the most fundamental choice of every person is his or her loyal love for the whole universe which leads in turn to reverence for the relations of life.

Royce’ Naturalistic Spirituality Josiah Royce was so often mistakenly characterized as a pure idealist, yet a careful study of the total corpus of his work reveals a far more complex understanding of Royce including his turn in his later works to a processoriented notion of God and an understanding of an evolving universe full

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

71

of potentiality and uncertainty which enabled humankind to play a key role in crafting a life of what Father Frank Oppenheim calls an “ethicorational spirituality.”5 In his 1899 The World and the Individual Royce writes: “the self of each man apparently has had an origin in time, and a development such as makes it dependent, for its contents and character, upon natural conditions.”6 Yet, Royce was also clear that human organic nature should also be normed by an ethical spirit which was, for Royce, simply the “ethical life.” This was not a “supernaturalism” nor a “sentimentalism” but rather a deep naturalistic communal spirituality which included a commitment and loyalty to community life, a reverence for relations human and nonhuman, and a love for the universe itself. Oppenheim identifies Royce’s view as a naturalistic spirituality. I will use this term though one can also identify Royce with spiritual naturalism, namely, a term applied to philosophical and religious worldviews that are naturalistic in their basic view, but which also have spiritual and religious perspectives. We begin our exploration of Royce’s Naturalistic spirituality with his Sources of Religious Insight. The Sources explores many of the ways that human beings can get in touch with religious experience, with a spirituality. All these sources are grounded in man’s natural human life. At the center of religious experience for Royce is the fact that humans have a deep need for an ideal for their lives, some goal that will bring unity and purpose for their entire experience. Humans do not do well with fulfilling this need on their own and Royce argues that they need some “deliverer,” some presence, power, individual, and/or community to address their need and assist on their path. Thus, for Royce, the ideal, the need, and the notion of the deliverer are at the center of religious experience. In this work, Royce explores the seven ways that this fundamental human need can be addressed. However, before turning to these sources, it is important to set the context for both Royce’s work on religious experience and that of James. The time in which these two philosophers were undertaking their explorations of religious experience was one where the scientific worldview was in ascendency. It was a time of scientific reductionism. James clearly expressed his opposition to the accepted opinion of his time that “all the special manifestations of religion have been absurd.”7 He labeled the scientific worldview “medical materialism,” a view that “reduces all human beliefs and faiths to some physical condition.” This “Medical Materialism finishes up St. Paul by calling his vision on the road

72

J. A. K. KEGLEY

to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic.”8 James argues that this claim is speculative and not empirical, and one not based on human experience. James and Royce both courageously affirmed the significance of religious experience, of an experience of spirituality as the broadest and deepest experience of humanity. This stance of James and Royce gains even more significance from the fact that both philosophers engaged in experimental psychological research; both wrote texts on psychology9 and both served as President of the American Psychological Association.10 These two pragmatists strongly believed in religious experience, in a spirituality as a natural part of human experience. Indeed, Argentinian scholar, Claudio Vaile, notes, as have other scholars, that both James and Royce share “unconventionality in looking for the ground of religion outside narrow theologies.”11 Further, Religious Studies scholar, Linnell Elizabeth Cody, argues that Royce’s interpretation of religion is “not dependent on scripture or ecclesiastical warrants, but depends on the adequacy of his analysis of our experience. Royce traces the full theological implications of his social and temporal vision of reality, a methodological move that yields a novel theological alternative to contemporary theism.”12 As we will argue, Royce is proposing a rich religious naturalism and a naturalistically based spirituality. These positions, for him, are grounded in his belief that the fulfillment of human potentiality and the achievement of genuine individuality is only achieved by participation in an equally genuine community experience. Genuine individuals and genuine communities need each other. In fact, the late prominent American philosopher and renowned scholar of American philosophy, John McDermott, remarked that Royce’s philosophy is significantly salvific for today because of his argument that “true individualism is possible only insofar as one participates in a series of self-sufficient, complete communities.”13 We turn now to The Sources of Religious Insight, a truly phenomenological exploration of human religious or spiritual experience. In this book, Royce explores seven sources of human religious insight. Royce identifies the first source as arising from a deep human need, a need to overcome human fallibility which obstructs the efforts of human persons to achieve their goals and their fulfillment. For Royce, a fundamental fact of human nature is that humans are finite beings with a finitude of consciousness. He writes: Our finitude means, then, an actual inattention—a lack of successful interest, at this conscious instant, in more than a few details of the universe.14 Royce argues that if we wish to be

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

73

fully human and fulfilled as human beings, we must do two things: (1) intensely develop our power of response to the universe, to maintain as much openness as possible; and (2) to fully recognize that full truth and reality are still to be recovered. Human failure is twofold: (1) the sin of irresponsiveness, the deliberate choosing to narrow our focus, and (2) the sin of pride, the lack of humility about our limited grasp of truth and reality. Both individuals and communities can fail in this regard, resulting in failure to tolerate and understand perspectives different from our own and to claim that we or our community possess the ultimate truth on all matters. Royce states: “The deeper tragedies of life result from our narrowness of view.”15 Human beings need self-transcendence and this is a matter that concerns all human beings. What is needed is insight into the need—the need for self-transcendence—and into the way of salvation, the way to address this need. Thus, religious insight is composed of three elements: The Ideal (the Highest Aim of one’s life, fulfillment as a human being) The Need (the need for Self-Transcendence) The Deliverer (the presence, the power, light, truth, or great companion who helps the individual and saves a person from his/her need) Thus, the first source of religious insight for Royce is to recognize our need for self-transcendence. Human beings need those who can inspire and aid them in overcoming their individual pride and can give them a sense of unity and meaning in their lives. These mentors often are saints, mystics, and founders of religious communities but equally can be those exhibiting a deep naturalistic spirituality. Royce cites Buddha and Socrates as such guides. Most importantly, Royce asserts that the search for salvation belongs to no one “type of piety or of poetry or of philosophy.”16 Religious insight, for Royce, is a natural process open to everyone. But Royce also challenges an appeal only to individual religious experience. A great difficulty for such, argues Royce, is what he calls “the religious paradox.” This is the difficulty for a fallible human self, infected with narrowness of view and the sin of pride, to know the advent of the spirit, the answer, the deliverer. Royce would ask of James, who emphasized individual religious experience that welled up from the subliminal

74

J. A. K. KEGLEY

self and the depth of one’s subconscious, “how is it possible to distinguish genuine communication with the spirit and the misguided hubris of false prophets?” Royce asks us to think of individuals and communities who claim direct contact with divine revelation or a spiritual source and yet present the world with conflicting interpretations and claims and questionable behavior. Because Royce saw individual religious experience as insufficient selftranscendence, he focuses on the social world and communities, although Royce views communities as finite and as fallible as individuals. Human beings are essentially social beings and Royce believed that even selfconsciousness is achieved through interaction with others. Thus, a second source of religious experience comes from human’s social nature, namely the experience of love and support of other individuals. Throughout his philosophical career Royce focused intensely on the relationship between individuals and communities. He was convinced that individuals need community and others to achieve genuine selfhood; he was equally convinced that communities need exemplary individuals to keep them vital and to assist them in minimizing false pride and self-interest.17 Royce affirms that the human being cannot be saved alone; he needs his fellows. To illustrate his point, Royce cites two classic examples of individuals who discovered that they could not be saved without the help of their fellows and that their salvation was to be found in the social world. The first example is Coleridge’s “Ancient Mariner,” who, in killing the albatross, becomes a curse to his fellows and in cursing him, they leave him alone in the nightmare of utter solitude. His curse was to “be alone in a wide, wide sea.” His escape from the horrors of despair begins with the first moving of his heart toward all living beings. He finds human companionship, love, and relationships. The second example Royce uses is Raskolnikov in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, who, after his crime and efforts at self-justification, “finds himself prey of a simply overwhelming sense that he is alone among men … he is as one dead amongst specters.”18 Like the Ancient Mariner, Raskolnikov finds his salvation through love, love taught him by the martyred Sonia. In these examples, Royce finds the “familiar conception that salvation involves reconciliation both with the social and the divine order, reconciliation through love and suffering-an escape from the wilderness of lonely guilt to the realm where men can understand one another.”19 These cases focus on the lost individual isolated from human companionship and redeemed through love and relationship. But Royce also

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

75

believed that a redeeming broader vision and self-transcendence can happen in certain experiences of ordinary life such as the sight of one’s newborn child and the love thereby engendered which pulls one outside of self. The love of husband and wife can also be a source of selftranscendence, especially if the couple cherish their union, the bond, and relationship which they have which can pull each one outside self to a higher loyalty. Royce writes: “In fact, to seem to find the divine in the person of your idealized friend or beloved is a perfectly normal way of beginning your acquaintance with the means of grace.”20 Self-transcendence is the key for Royce, and he finds two other sources, both a part of human nature, namely, reason and will. Royce conceives of reason as an ability to provide a synthetic view of many facts, to grasp a complex of relations in their total unified significance. He points to insights in mathematics that provide novel discoveries and novel syntheses. About insight, Royce writes: “The three marks of insight are breadth of range, coherence, and unity of view.”21 Insight brings one outside of self to a broader view of reality. Human will can also be a source of religious insight in that it can provide one with a unity of action, a plan which brings together many facts into one whole. Action can center one and call one outside of self, especially action done in relation to others and for others. Both James and Royce believed in meliorism, namely, the view that the world can become better or made better by human effort. The role that can be played by “will” can best be seen in the notion of the “Beloved Community” expounded by Royce and Martin Luther King, namely, the idea of a spiritual or divine community capable of inspiring and achieving the highest common good through concerted human effort. This leads to another source of religious insight for Royce, namely, loyalty to a community. This is the fifth source of religious insight for Royce. Loyalty to community is a primary source of religious insight because the community pulls us out of ourselves and unites us in relationship and action with others. Loyalty to the community leads to self-transcendence as well as centers the self in a meaningful way. And communities are charged by Royce to be loyal to loyalty, to advocate for community building and to respecting the loyalties of others, to transcend their community by reaching out to other communities, to learn from them, to thereby enrich their own communities and broadening their own view of reality. As the community achieves self-transcendence so does the self.

76

J. A. K. KEGLEY

Another compelling source of religious insight for Royce was what he called the “religious mission of sorrow.” In his “The Problem of Job,”22 Royce suggests that we are “essentially all companions in misery” and that the being called God suffers with us. In The Sources, Royce defines sorrow as a creative way to transform suffering into sorrow, revealing new possibilities and a wider perspective. Suffering can call attention to our pride and lack of insight and call us to seek a broader view of others and the world. It can give us companionship with others who are suffering, and sorrow can be shared so that we are no longer alone in our grief. In his review of The Sources,23 Jacob Lowenberg argues that this book presents a significant understanding of religious experience by reinterpreting many traditional religious ideas and challenging traditional religions to generalize the idea of salvation to make it relevant to any wanderer who is seeking some saving light. Royce offers a novel theory of sin in terms of human irresponsiveness and pride. He challenges all to see self and community as ethical categories, and to pursue their selfrealization by way of dedication to the community. In the end, Royce proposes a religion of community, a Beloved Community of loyalty and love. He characterized the Beloved Community as a spiritual or divine community capable of inspiring and achieving the highest common good. He believed individuals should strive toward the goal of achieving the Beloved Community, and that the more individuals who join the effort, the greater the possibility of its realization. Martin Luther King significantly builts his own moral and social philosophy in this idea.24 King envisioned the “Beloved Community” as a global community in which violence, racism, poverty, hunger, and homelessness, and all other societal ills will no longer be merely tolerated, but actively resisted. In the “Beloved Community,” hatred and prejudice of all kinds will be replaced by a willingness to transcend differences in a spirit of cooperation. For King and Royce, the Beloved Community is built on the ideal of agape love. Again, this community is related to will and to meliorism. The last portion of The Sources concerns the “Invisible Church,” which Royce describes as the “community of all who have sought for salvation through loyalty. … the crowning source of religious insight is actual loyalty, service, devotion, suffering, accomplishments, traditions, examples, teaching, and triumphs of the invisible church ….”25 This is not an unqualified affirmation of institutional religion, but rather is a powerful challenge to all religions. Royce writes: “The invisible church,

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

77

then is no merely human and secular institution. It is a real and superhuman organization. It includes and transcends every form of the visible church.”26 Such an affirmation is also one of a religious naturalism and of a naturalistic spirituality for the phrase “superhuman” does not imply supernatural but rather the transcending of ordinary human capacities. In this case, it is self-transcendence through community and through a broader vision of human possibilities. Both Royce and King believed that the achievement of Beloved Community was possible if only humans transcended their narrow perspectives and pride to build a community in which all were valued, respected and which all could flourish.

Royce’s Religious Naturalism Religious naturalism is a view whose concept of God is not that of a deity that is supernatural as most god concepts are, but rather sees God as in or of the real world. To establish that Royce fits into this category, I will focus on two articles, “What Is Vital in Christianity?” and “Monotheism.”27 In the first article, Royce clearly affirms his understanding of Christianity as a philosophy of life and discusses in detail his understanding of the person, life, and work of Jesus. In both articles, Royce asserts his belief in God as a Spirit and Person, and not as an external creator. Throughout his writings on religion, Royce argues against any causal notion of the Absolute or God and, indeed, views the idea of God as external as a clear barrier for anyone dealing with the problem of evil. The “Monotheism” encyclopedia article is especially insightful in interconnecting concepts of God with three cultural influences, those of Greece, Israel, and India. In the essay, “What Is Vital in Christianity?” Royce approaches religion with a historic-empirical approach akin to modern anthropology. He views religion as it has developed within human history. He writes: “any religion presents itself as a more or less connected group: (1) of religious practices, such as prayers, ceremonies, festivals, rituals, and other observance, and (2) of religious ideas, the ideas taking the form of traditions, legends, and beliefs about the gods or spirits.”28 The term “vital,” says Royce, is metaphoric, as in the vital features of an organism. If these changed, the organism would not necessarily be destroyed but would be an essentially different type of organism,

78

J. A. K. KEGLEY

and Royce illustrates this with the examples of gill breathing and lung breathing. But “vital” also connotes alive for the persons who are followers of the religion, and this usage bears similarities to Paul Tillich’s understanding of religious symbols as alive or dying. Further, this term lends primacy to religious practice. Thus, Royce seeks to answer the question: “What Is more vital about a religion: its religious practices, or its religious ideas, beliefs, and spiritual attitudes?” He emphatically affirms that it is religious practice. Royce distinguishes between more elementary and more complex forms of religious experience. More elementary forms emphasize religious practices rather than the conscious beliefs which accompany the practice. Here Royce makes two significant points. First, he notes that persons may share religious practices, while being far apart in religious ideas, or interpretations of the reasons for the practices or the god(s) to whom the practices are addressed.29 Philosophers and others who study religions primarily in terms of beliefs often do not recognize this important fact. Royce then observes that, generally in human history, religious practices precede “at least the more definite religious beliefs.”30 As people engage in practice, they begin to consider why they thus engaged in these practices. With great “tongue in cheek,” Royce applies his principles to the group of pigeons in the Harvard Yard who cluster around those who feed them. He imagines the pigeons coming to consciousness and beginning to regard this way of getting food as a sort of religious function and thus to also begin to worship the feeder. Royce then writes as follows: If they did so, what idea about this god would be to them vital? Would their beliefs show that they first reasoned abstractly from effect to cause, and said, ‘He must be a being both powerful and benevolent, for otherwise his feeding of us in this way could not be explained’? Of, course, if the pigeons developed into theologians or philosophers they might reason thus. But if they come to self-consciousness as … men generally do, they would more probably say at first: ‘Behold, do we not cluster about him and beg from him and coo to him’ and do we not get food by doing this? He is, then, a being whom it is essentially worthwhile to treat this way. He responds to our cooing and our clustering. Thus, we compel him to feed us. Therefore, he is a worshipful being. And this is what we mean by a god; namely, someone who it is practically useful to conciliate and compel by such forms of worship.31

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

79

In this passage, Royce critiques the causal approach to God that is represented in many of the proofs for God’s existence. He is also clearly expressing a pragmatic attitude to beliefs and ideas. Royce goes on to argue that as religion grows, practices easily pass over from one religion to another, and, with every transition, seem to preserve, or even increase their sacredness. Most importantly, as they enter a new religion, a new explanation is offered, and new ideas developed to fit each change in setting. Royce illustrates this point with the example of the adoption of the Christmas and Easter festivals by Christians. He points out that this was not initiated by Christianity. Rather, writes Royce, “It [Christianity] assimilated them. But it then explained why it did so by saying that it was celebrating the birth and resurrection of Christ.”32 Royce next turns to those cases where beliefs become primary. Here sincere profession of belief becomes significant and the unbeliever is seen as an infidel, an enemy not only of the true faith, but also perhaps of mankind. And, writes Royce, “In consequence, religious persecution and religious wars may come to seem, at least for a time inevitable means for defending the faith.”33 If you believe not rightly, you have no part in the religion and are labeled a heretic, whereas, if you do not participate in the practices, you are called a dissenter. With regard to these two emphases in religion, Royce astutely observes “the appeal that every religion makes to the masses of mankind is most readily interpreted in terms of practice.”34 However, as religions become more complex the conflict between right practice and right belief becomes a crucial question. Royce, however, believes those who seek genuine religion would seek “an affair of the whole man, not of deeds alone, nor of the intellect alone, but of the entire spiritual attitude, —of emotion and trust, —of devotion and of motive, —of conduct guided by an inner light, and of conviction due to a personal contact with religious truth.”35 What is wanted is a unity of faith and practice, a “reaction of the whole spirit in the presence of an experience of the highest realities of human life and of the universe.”36 This is what is vital to a religion, and, yet, says Royce, it is today a problem. How can such a solution be any longer an object of reasonable hope, when the faiths have become uncertain, the practices largely antiquated, our life and our duty so problematic, and our environment so uninspiring to our religious interest?37

80

J. A. K. KEGLEY

Here, in my judgment, Royce expresses, in general, our situation today. Next, Royce turns to the question, “what then is vital to Christianity?” This, of course, prefigures his discussion in The Problem of Christianity. This earlier exposition, however, is instructive. First, Royce defines Christianity as “an interpretation of life, —an interpretation that is nothing if not practical, and also nothing if not guided from within by a deep spiritual interest and a genuine religious experience.”38 The question, then, says Royce, is what interpretation of life is vital to Christianity? It must be answered, he believes, in terms of solving both the personal problem of salvation and the problem of the salvation of mankind. It also demands an answer about the spiritual attitude which is essential to the Christian religion. There are, notes Royce, two basic answers to the question of what is vital to Christianity. One focuses on the gospel of Christ and living according to those teachings, while the other stresses the superhuman nature of Christ and his atoning death. Royce engages in a critical analysis of each of these views. About the first, Royce makes the following important points. First, nobody can doubt that the sayings of Christ embody a new and profound teaching. The two essential teachings, in Royce’s view, are: (1) The Fatherhood of God, which involves the divine love for man; and (2) the assertion of the infinite worth of each individual person. Secondly, Jesus not only taught this doctrine sincerely, he lived it and won others to this way of life, and he was ready to die for it, and when the time came, he did die for it. Thirdly, the Master meant his teaching to be related not only to the individual soul and its salvation, but also to the reform of the whole existing and visible social order. Or, “expressed in our modern terms, the teacher contemplated a social revolution, as well as the before-mentioned universal religious reformation of each individual life.”39 Royce further asserts: “The meek, the poor were to inherit the earth; the mighty were to be cast down; the kingdoms of this world were to pass away; and the divine sovereignty was to take its visible place as the controller of all things.”40 The prophets of our day such as Cornel West would resonate with this statement. Royce does, however, caution that interpretation of “The Kingdom of Heaven” is problematic. Royce feels that the emphasis in Christianity on Jesus and his message is incomplete and inadequate when viewed alone as a religious ideal. More vital, argues Royce, are the doctrines of the incarnation and atonement when they are rightly interpreted. Further, he writes that the truth in these notions must be separated from legends. Royce then identifies these

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

81

two ideas: the first is that God is a spirit and person, but does not exist in separation from the world as its external creator, that “He expresses himself in the world; and the world is simply his life, as he consciously lives it out … In this entire world God sees himself as lived out.”41 Secondly, there is triumph over suffering: “Perfect through suffering, —that is the universal, the absolutely necessary law of the higher spiritual life”42 and, “the most precious and sacred of human relationships, are raised to their highest levels … only when we not merely learn in our own personal case to suffer, to sorrow, to endure, and be spiritually strong, but when we learn to do these things together with our own brethren.”43 Here is the religious mission of sorrow discussed in The Sources and the emphasis on the communal discussed in The Problem. Finally, as for atonement, there are those who tell us what atonement means, they “are the ones who are willing to suffer vicariously.”44 Royce summarizes this discussion: First, God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude. And, secondly, our sorrow is God’s sorrow. God means to express himself by winning us through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life; and therefore, our fulfillment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity.45

I believe that views presented in this essay are those of religious naturalism. The essay, “What Is Vital in Christianity,” sets out themes for both The Sources and The Problem; however, before turning to these works, we should consider the additional insights on the nature of religion contained in the encyclopedia article, “Monotheism.”46 After briefly reviewing monotheism as a doctrine in contrast to polytheism and pantheism, Royce makes the following claim: “… from the historical point of view, three different ways of viewing the divine being have been of great importance both for religious life and for philosophical doctrine.”47 The three ways to which Royce refers are three forms of monotheism “which India, Greece, and Israel put before us.”48 Royce then discusses what, in his view, are the essential features of monotheism as developed in these three cultural contexts. From Israel, we have the ethical monotheism of the Prophets of Israel. God, in this religious context, is defined as “the righteous Ruler of the world, the Doer

82

J. A. K. KEGLEY

of justice or as the one whose law is holy or who secures the triumph of the right.”49 Turning to Greece and to Hellenistic monotheism, God is defined as the “source, of the explanation, or the correlate, or the order, or the reasonableness of the world.”50 The third type of monotheism is labeled Hindu pantheism. Royce notes that this understanding had many different historical origins and appeared, in fact, as part of the Neoplatonic philosophy and the philosophy of Spinoza. This type of monotheism insists not only upon the sole reality of God, but also asserts the unreality of the world.51 More relevant to our previous discussion, Royce argues that the “whole history of Christian monotheism depends upon an explicit effort to make a synthesis of the ethical monotheism of Israel and the Hellenic form of monotheism.”52 This effort, however, says Royce, has proven especially difficult. The Hellenic tradition with its intellectualistic emphasis on the Logos was in favor of defining the unity of the divine being and the world as the essential feature of monotheism, whereas ethical monotheism dwells upon the contrast between the righteous Ruler and the sinful world, and between divine grace and fallen man. Royce, then, concludes: “Therefore, behind many of the conflicts between the so-called pantheism in Christian tradition and the doctrines of ‘divine transcendence’ and ‘divine personality,’ there has lain the conflict between intellectualism and voluntarism, between an interpretation of the world in terms of order and an interpretation of the world in terms of the conflict between good and evil, righteousness and unrighteousness.”53 In my judgment, this is an insightful observation on the history of Christianity. This history is made even more complex, says Royce, due to the influence of the Indic type of God. This concept influenced mysticism and, of course, Neoplatonic philosophy which, in turn, influenced Christian philosophy and theology. Augustine is a prime example of this influence. Further, within Christianity, the mystics have often pointed to the failure to resolve the conflict between moral and intellectual interests. Royce writes: “The mystics … have always held that the results of the intellect are negative and lead to no definite idea of God which can be defended against the skeptics, while … to follow the law of righteousness, whether or not with the aid of divine grace, does not lead, at least in the present life, to the highest type of knowledge of God.”54 Then, Royce, with his respect for the experiential in religion, writes: “Without this third type of monotheism, and without this negative criticism of the work of the intellect, and this direct appeal to immediate experience, Christian doctrine,

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

83

in fact, would not have reached some of its most characteristic forms and expressions, and the philosophy of Christendom would have failed to put on record some of its most fascinating speculations.”55 Royce then reviews the history of the so-called proofs for God’s existence—generally an expression of the Hellenistic influence in Christianity—and says that there is some basis in the claim that these efforts to grasp the divine nature via the intellect lead to results remote “from the vital experience upon which religious monotheism, and in particular, Christian monotheism must rest, if such … is permanently to retain the confidence of a man who is at once critical and religious.”56 Royce also reviews Kant’s struggle with the intellectualism–voluntarism conflict and notes that the God of Kant is the righteous Ruler and the kingdom of ends is a universe of free moral agents. This realm, for Kant, stands in contrast to the ideal realm of holiness or moral perfection which can never be known by men either through mystical vision or logical demonstration. For Kant, God is defined in terms of will; the righteous man wills that God exists.57 These struggles remain, says Royce. He predicts that the question “Is God personal?” will become more explicit as the modern thought becomes more aware of what constitutes a person. Finally, it is not surprising that Royce argues that whatever answers to the questions about the nature of the world that are developed—is it real, rational, ethical?—we must not put exclusive emphasis on any one characteristic. For, “as we have seen, the problem of monotheism requires a synthesis of all the three ideas of God.” Thus, any attempt to address these three questions must be an answer that does adequate justice to the three ideas and the three problems. As we well know, Royce’s own efforts were aimed at achieving this synthesis and providing an answer to these three questions. Thus, he sought in his conceptions of God to give an account of the nature of reality that would satisfy the “moral insight,” “the theoretic insight,” and the “religious insight.” And the three Conceptions of Being addressed in The World and the Individual embody aspects of the three ideas of God and address the three questions. The stage is now set for The Problem of Christianity.58 This book is a culmination of Royce’s effort to address the question of a conception of the Ultimate and of the nature of reality that is adequate to human experience. Christianity is viewed as a philosophy of life, and the question Royce asks is “In what sense, if any, can the modern man consistently be, in creed, a Christian?”59 The phrase, “modern man,” refers to all contemporary persons entrusted to develop and transmit to future

84

J. A. K. KEGLEY

generations the most cherished elements of wisdom of the humankind. In focusing on creed, however, Royce is clear that he is not concerned here with dogma or with theological beliefs.60 Rather he seeks the essentially vital and living ideas that will find expression in communal practices and religious-moral living and that will speak to all humanity. Finally, Royce will focus on living religious experience as expressed in the early Pauline Christian communities. Royce writes: “Historically speaking, the Christian Church first discovered the Christian ideas. The founder of Christianity, so far as we know what his teachings are, seems not to have defined them adequately.”61 Further, he observes, “They first came to a relatively full statement through the religious life of the Pauline Churches; and the Pauline epistles contain their first, although still not quite complete formulation.”62 As indicated earlier in our discussion of the essay, “What Is Vital in Christianity,” Royce refuses to ground the essence of Christianity on questions or the founder’s person or the details of his life and he does not see Christianity as a religion of the Master. Rather, for Royce, the essence of Christianity is its stress on the saving community. Royce writes: “The thesis of this book is that the essence of Christianity, as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian Church believed itself to represent, and the being which I call … the ‘Beloved Community,’ as the true source, through loyalty, of the salvation of man.” Royce further claims: “This doctrine I hold to be both empirically verifiable within the limits of our own experience, and metaphysically defensible as an expression of the life and the spiritual significance of the whole universe.”63 It is indeed the community, which allows us to understand more fully the teachings of the Master. Of Jesus’ teaching, Royce found two ideas especially crucial—his preaching of love and the Kingdom of Heaven. Both were mysterious and in need of interpretation. Thus, love is a mystery, for although we know we are to love God and our neighbor, the question is how. How can I be practically useful in meeting my neighbor’s needs? Anyone who has tried to be benevolent or to meet the needs of others knows that there can be a huge crevice between your interpretation of what a person needs and what she believes she needs. It is the interpretation of Jesus’ teachings in the letters of Paul that make the difference for Royce. What can make the loving of our neighbor less mysterious and difficult is community, for a community “when united by an active

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

85

developing purpose is an entity more concrete, and, in fact, less mysterious than any individual man.”64 In community we can come to know each other, to see what each other’s needs are. I need not ask “who is my neighbor for my neighbor and I are members of one and the same community.” The essence of Christianity, for Royce, is contained in three ideas. The first of these is that the source and means of salvation is the community of believers. Community is also the basis of the ethic of love taught by Jesus. Royce writes: This, the first of our essential ideas of Christianity is the idea of a spiritual life in which universal love for all individuals shall be completely blended, practically harmonized, with an absolute loyalty for a real and universal community, God, the neighbor and one church.65

The other two essential ideas are: “the moral burden of the individual and atonement.” In discussing the moral burden of the individual, we need to return to Royce’s understanding of sin as grounded in two human conditions. The first is the finitude of our consciousness: “Our finitude means, then an actual inattention—a lack of successful interest, at this conscious instant, in more than a very few details of the universe.”66 This finitude of consciousness is not itself sin, but the condition of sin. As indicated in our earlier discussion, Royce argues that because of our finitude we are called upon to do two things if we wish to be fully human beings: (1) to intensely develop our power of response to the universe around us, to maintain as much openness as possible; and (2) to recognize that full truth and reality are still to be discovered. Our sinfulness thus is twofold: (1) the sin of irresponsiveness-“To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an ought that one already recognizes.”67 Secondly, we have the sin of pride, the lack of humility about our limited grasp of truth and reality. Sin, in this sense, is making absolute that which is only finite. This is the illusion of selfishness but restated as an inordinate responsiveness to one’s own present interests, parallel to the irresponsiveness to the greater world beyond. Though human nature is finite, it also has an infinite dimension. This is manifested in our very possibility of self-transcendence and aspiring to goals and ideals which are not finite. This is the demand for selfactualization in an ideal, for loyalty to a cause. Thus, the first condition for

86

J. A. K. KEGLEY

sin is our finitude, understood in terms of irresponsiveness to the broader world, and inordinate responsiveness to self- interests. The second condition for sin lies in the very solution one seeks to broaden one’s view, namely, in social life. Social life helps us toward self-transcendence, but, in the very process of social cultivation and selfdevelopment, the self-will and the individual are brought to fruition. In Royce’s view the social order can lead a person to sin in two specific ways. It can encourage him to give into the collective will and become a “they,” a part of the crowd, rather than a unique self. One can refuse to take responsibility for one’s own existence, to be a self. Royce thus expresses his notion of guilt in terms of self-loss: Now the sense of guilt, if deep and pervasive and passionate, involves at least a dim recognition that there is some central aim of life and that one has come hopelessly short of that aim…the true sense of guilt in its greatest manifestation involves a confession that the whole self is somehow tainted, the whole life, for the time being, wrecked.68

However, in addition to loss of self and refusal to be a self, one may fall into another sin fostered by socialization, namely egoism, a belief that salvation can be achieved by the individual alone. This is the sin of pride, a withdrawal into the world of self-sufficiency. This error also results in a deep sense of guilt, the experience of guilt, anxiety, and inner conflict which results from the painful awareness of deeply rooted egoism. To be saved, an individual cannot help himself by any word or deed of his own. The only escape, contends Royce, is loyalty. In loyalty the individual achieves transcendence and unity; he achieves his unique goal which he genuinely chooses and loves, and it is the social will of the community. Individual and social will unite. However, this unification must not be social conformity and a blending of wills. Royce writes: Even if the individual needs his social world as a means of grace and a gateway to salvation, the social order, in turn, needs individuals that are worth saving and can never be saved itself unless it expresses itself through the deeds and inner lives of souls deeply conscious of the dignity of selfhood, of the infinite worth of unique and intensely conscious life.69

The community which saves must be one which truly loves the individual, values his uniqueness, and one in which the individual truly loves and values the community and each of its members. Such a community cannot

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

87

be created by any merely social will, but only by an act of love, of grace on the part of an individual, in the case of Christianity, by the act of Jesus Christ. Some potent and loyal individual, acting as a leader must declare that for him the community is real. In such a leader, and in his spirit, the community will begin its own life, if the leader has the power to create what he loves. Royce writes: We know how Paul conceives the beginning of the new life wherein Christian salvation is to be found. This beginning he refers to the work of Christ … He both knew and loved his community before it existed on earth … On earth he called into this community its first members. He suffered and died that it might have life. Through his death and in his life the community lives. He is now identical with the spirit of this community.70

Thus, for Royce, we achieve what he calls “the realm of grace,” the realm of powers and gifts that save, by thus originating and sustaining and informing the loyal life. The realm contains three essentially necessary constituent members. First, the ideally lovable community of many individuals in one spiritual bond; secondly, the spirit of the community, which is present both as the human individual whose power originated and whose example, whose life and death, have led and still guide the community, and as the united spiritual activity of the whole community; thirdly, charity itself, the love of the community by all its members, and of the members of the community.71

This is the community of grace, the saving community, and the beloved community. Salvation lies in loyalty and love to the beloved community. However, Royce was very aware of the depth of human failure and sin, and so he identifies another type of sin, the most tragic of all. It is the sin of betrayal or treason, which occurs after the individual discovers a loyalty that gains his inner commitment, a loyalty that allows him to overcome the sins of conformity and loss of self, the conflicts of conformity and self-will. This sin occurs when, after finding a cause, he betrays it and cuts himself off from the community of loyalty, the community of grace. The traitor is one who has had an ideal and has loved it with all his heart, soul, mind, and strength, but now has been deliberately false to his cause. Such a sin of betrayal or treason places the traitor in what Royce calls the ‘hell of the irrevocable.’ Hell is the awareness on the part of the sinner and the community that the deed of betrayal has been done and cannot

88

J. A. K. KEGLEY

be undone; although it may be transformed in its meaning and changed in its consequence, it cannot be erased. Such is the temporal nature of human action. Royce writes: The hell of the irrevocable; all of us know what it is to come of the border of it when we contemplate our own past mistakes or mischance. But we can enter it and dwell in it when the fact ‘This deed is irrevocable,’ is combined with the further fact, “This deed is one that unless I call treason my good and moral suicide my life, I cannot forgive myself for doing.”72

The guilt of this free act of betrayal is as enduring as time. This is the “moral burden of the individual.” This act of treason can only be overcome by an act of atonement. This is the third essential Christian idea. In explicating his idea, Royce rejects two traditional doctrines of atonement, the penal and the moral. The penal theory fails because it ignores the individual personality of the sinner. To say someone else has been substituted to pay for one’s sins is not to reconcile the sinner to himself or to God. The moral theory urges the sinner to repent, which he has already done and, indeed, this repentance is at the heart of his moral existence in the hell of the irrevocable. To overcome this deepest of sins, this treason, the sinner must be reconciled both to himself and to the community. And, for Royce, it is not just a matter of love and forgiveness, it is true that love must be restored, but it will be the love for the member who has been a traitor, and the tragedy of the treason will permanently form part in and of this love.73 The treason can be overcome only by the community or by a steadfast loyal servant of the community who is the incarnation of the very spirit of the community itself. Royce writes: This faithful and suffering servant of the community may answer and confound treason by a work whose type I shall next venture to describe in my own way. Thus: first, this creative work shall include a deed, or various deeds, for which only this treason furnishes the opportunity. Not treason in general, but this individual treason shall give the occasion and supply the condition of the creative deed which I am in ideal describing. Without just that treason, this new deed (so I am supposing) could not have been done at all. And hereupon the new deed, as I suppose, is so ingeniously devised, so concretely practical in the good which it accomplishes, that, when you look down upon the human world after the new creative deed

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

89

has been done, you say first, “This deed was made possible by the treason; and secondly, The world as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all.” That is, the new creative deed has made the new world better than it was before the blow of treason fell.74

Several significant aspects of Royce’s analysis of sin and atonement need emphasis here. First, he recognizes sin, conversion, and salvation as ongoing processes and not single events. Secondly, salvation is both personal and communal, and both personal and communal alliances must be continually renewed. Thirdly, sin is both personal and communal in two more senses. Its consequences affect both the individual sinner and other individuals as well. To personally repent and achieve salvation is not enough. There must be healing of the community; the sinner is loved but only as a traitor. Others must move out in love and initiate forgiveness and atoning acts. And these acts must be specific and concretely relevant to the situation. If a life is the act of betrayal, an act of truth and openness must occur which increases the sense of trust in the community and makes the sense of individual and communal obligation higher and stronger. Sin is both personal and communal in still another sense. There can be communal sin in that a community may portray itself as the ultimate goal, worthy of the ultimate loyalty. It betrays the goal of loyalty to loyalty and engages in the sin of making absolute what is finite. Communal sin needs atonement. It, too, can come through the individual or the community. The individual member must somehow atone in the world of communities by being critical of his own community and seeking to bring about a higher level of loyalty. Presumably, another community can lead the sinful community to a higher level of meaning and loyalty by a creative act of atonement and transformation. Royce does not develop this latter idea, but it is one worthy of further exploration at another time. Thus, the three central ideas of Christianity are community, the moral burden of the individual, and atonement. This true crux of the matter however is the Beloved Community. It is the highest exemplification of graced community. Grace transforms persons into new creations; in this beloved community, members will become instruments of good to each other and vessels of grace to each other, atoning and transforming. Indeed, the Beloved Community is engaged in a temporal yet endless task of uniting individuals in love and understanding, in unfolding the mystery of one’s neighbors to each member. It is engaged in the work of

90

J. A. K. KEGLEY

the spirit. Royce writes: “The essential message of Christianity has been the word that the sense of life, the very being of the time process itself, consists in the progressive realization of the Universal Community in and through the longings, the vicissitudes, the tragedies and triumphs of this process of the temporal world.”75

Notes 1. See: The following works of Josiah Royce, “Immortality,” Hibbert Journal, Vol. 5, 724–744, reprinted in William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, New York: Macmillan & Co. 1911, “What Is Vital in Christianity?” Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 2, 408–445, reprinted in William James; and 1916, “Monotheism,” in James Hastings, Editor, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. 2. Josiah Royce, 1912, The Sources of Religious Insight, New York: C. Scribner’s Sons. 3. William James, 1902, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 4. Josiah Royce, 1909, “What Is Vital in Christianity,” Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 2, 408–445, reprinted in William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, 99–183. The citation is from William James, 167. 5. Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., 1999, “The Middle Royce’s Naturalistic Spirituality,” The Personalist Forum, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring, 129–142, 129. 6. Josiah Royce, 1899, 1901, The World and the Individual, 2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 2: 246. 7. These concerns were expressed in a letter from James to Frances R. Morse published in by Ralph Barton Perry in The Thought and Character of William James, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., II, 326–327. 8. William James, 1961, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, New York: Collier, 29. 9. William James, 1890, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., New York: Dover Publications. And Josiah Royce, 1903, Outlines of Psychology: An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications, New York: The Macmillan Co. 10. In an interesting essay, Argentinian scholar, Claudio Vaile, affirms that this was a courageous stance by James and Royce, noting that they both “openly vindicate religious before the growing agnosticism of the day.” See: Claudio Vaile, 2013, “William James’ Conception of Religion in Josiah Royce’s Mature Thought and Three Approaches,” Pragmatism Today, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1. 11. Vaile, 2.

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

91

12. Linnell Elizabeth Cody, 1988, “Royce and Post-modern Theology,” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 9, 149–164, 151 and 154. 13. John J. McDermott, 1916, “Preface,” The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, 2 vols., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, II, 640. 14. Josiah Royce, 1959, The World and the Individual, New York: Dover Publications, II, 59. 15. Royce, The World and the Individual I , 48–49. 16. The Sources, 15. 17. See Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, 1997, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities: A Roycean Public Philosophy, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, especially Chapter 2, 24–53. 18. The Sources, 70. 19. Ibid., 74–75. 20. Ibid., 71. 21. Ibid., 5–6. 22. Josiah Royce, 1897, “The Problem of Job,” The New World, Vol. 6, 262– 281. Reprinted in 1898 in The Studies in Good and Evil. A Series of Essays on the Problems of Philosophy and Life, New York: D. Appleton and Co. 23. Jacob Lowenberg, 1912, “Review of The Sources of Religious Insight,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 1, October, 83–88. 24. See: Dwayne Tunstall, 2009, Yes, But Not Quite: Encountering Josiah Royce’s Ethico-Religious Insight, New York: Fordham University Press; Robert E. Brit, 2012, The Liberatory Thought of Martin Luther King, Lanham, MD: Lexington Press. 25. The Sources, 220. 26. Ibid., 281. It is worth nothing here that Royce’s father and mother were religious people, although their temperaments in this regard were quite different. Josiah’s mother, Sarah, practiced religion through music, worship, and reflection on scriptures, while Josiah Sr. tended toward dogmatism, often quoting scripture passages for various occasions. Sarah also wrote about her mystical experience in the desert during her trek to California [Sarah Royce, 1932, A Frontier Lady: Recollections of the Gold Rush and Early California. With a foreword by Katharine Royce, edited by Henry Gabriel, New Haven: Yale University Press]. Although Royce’s early reading included the Christian scriptures, he read widely on religion, including the Hindu scriptures in Sanskrit, and his undergraduate thesis concerned Greek religion [Josiah Royce, 1875, “The Intention of Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus, Being an Investigation in the Department of Greek Theology,” Bulletin of the University of California, No. 16, June, 113–137]. However, during his lifetime, Royce had no formal religious affiliation. In a 1904 article, Royce recommended that a teacher of philosophy should conscientiously avoid all connection with any sect or

92

J. A. K. KEGLEY

27.

28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

form of the visible church. Josiah Royce, 1903, “What Should Be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 3, April, 280–285. Josiah Royce, 1909, “What Is Vital in Christianity,” Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 2, 408–445; Reprinted in William James ND Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, New York: Macmillan Co.; and Royce, 1916, “Monotheism,” in James Hastings, editor, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 8: 817–821. Ibid., 125. Josiah Royce, 1909, “What Is Vital in Christianity,” Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 2, 408–445, reprinted in William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, 99–183, 103. Ibid. Ibid., 105–106. Ibid., 107. Ibid., 109. Ibid., 111. Ibid., 116. Ibid., 117. Ibid., 125. Ibid., 130–131. Ibid., 147. Ibid., 148. Ibid., 167 and 169. Ibid., 173. Ibid., 177. Ibid., 179. Ibid., 183. Josiah Royce, 1916, “Monotheism,” in James Hastings, editor, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 8: 817–821. Ibid., 818. Ibid., 818. Ibid. Ibid., 818–819. Ibid., 819. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 820. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 821.

4

NATURALISTIC SPIRITUALITY, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM …

93

58. Josiah Royce, 1913, The Problem of Christianity, New York: The Macmillan Company, reprinted in 1968, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. The citations are from the 1968 edition. 59. Ibid., 62. 60. Royce writes: “These doctrines, then, need no dogmas of any historical church to define them, and no theology, and no technical metaphysical theory, to furnish a foundation for them. In the second place, however, these Christian ideas are based upon deep metaphysical truths whose significance is more than human.” The Problem, 42–43. 61. Of Jesus’ teaching, Royce found two ideas especially crucial—his preaching of love and the “Kingdom of Heaven.” 62. The Problem of Christianity, 43. 63. Ibid., 45. 64. Ibid., 94. 65. Ibid., 98. 66. Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 59 (Dover edition). 67. Ibid., 349. 68. Ibid., I, 48–49. 69. The Problem of Christianity, 131. 70. Ibid., 133. 71. Ibid., 162. 72. Ibid., 162. 73. Ibid., 178. 74. Ibid., 180. 75. Ibid., 387.

CHAPTER 5

Pragmatism and the “Changing of the Earth”: Unifying Moral Impulse, Creative Instinct, and Democratic Culture Julie Mazzarella Geredien

Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Social Healing Pragmatism is a practical philosophy that is concerned with addressing the real-world consequences of human actions, and with interpreting a full range of human needs. It offers the citizen a path through which new moral consciousness might be achieved and conditions of good living for all created. As a psychologist and educational reformer, John Dewey grasped the potential of pragmatism to bring about a much more profound collective state of social integration, even while holding fast to the particularity of the individual and recognizing the realities of intra and intergroup differences. His affirmation of an integrated principle within community life, through which public intelligence is developed and society reorganized, did not diminish the validity of his seemingly contradictory claim, that conflict and variety are essential to justice, democratic association, and learning (LW 2: 259; Bernstein 2010: 82). He believed

J. M. Geredien (B) Annapolis, MD, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_5

95

96

J. M. GEREDIEN

that it was only when confronted with a problem that humans begin to think in a realistic and integrated manner. The citizen’s psychology and communicative power emerge when “there is a conflict of social customs of such a nature that the individual can go on acting only by working out himself the proper mode of action” (Dewey 1991: 101). Spiritual pragmatism is a description, in philosophical terms, of how the individual goes about “working out” that right way of acting. Today, pragmatism is particularly important for disentangling and healing complex global problems and social ills. Many conflicts now are what James Bohman has termed “deep” conflicts, in that they contest dominant forms of public reason, challenging the “moral assumptions and political procedures” of the modern European nation-state (1996: 73). These require new ways of thinking about justice and reason-making, and therefore, a revised conception of the nature of democratic culture. The integrated principle upheld by Dewey engages pragmatism as a method of connecting the material and the spiritual, so that, in the attempt to address the root issues present in deep conflict, historical trauma can be more wisely understood and troublesome divides between body and mind, nature and society can be reconciled. The Sioux tribe stance, regarding the monetary compensation offered by the United States for its violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, when it illegally seized the Black Hills and large areas west of the Missouri River, is the kind of conflict Bohman is talking about. A Yankton Sioux Tribal council member, Darrell Drapeau, who teaches at Ihanktowan Community College, has reminded that the Treaty, for Sioux, is a living document. It signifies protection of rights and homeland for the Sioux and these are still vital concerns and needs for them. He questions the Treaty’s status as merely “an artifact of America’s uncomfortable past”—when the U.S. Constitution, a much older document, signed four generations earlier, is nevertheless, still perceived to be a vital governing force in the daily life of U.S. citizens. Attorney for the Cheyenne River and Great Plains Tribal Chairman Association, Mark Von Norman, gets at the moral and sociocultural rift present in the conflict. In this statement, quoted in a Smithsonian magazine article, he indicates the Sioux disinterest, not only in money as replacement for sacred lands, but more generally, in an assimilationist framework of thinking: We don’t always think that the courts are the right forum for us, because it’s really nation to nation, and it shouldn’t be a United States court telling

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

97

our Sioux Nation tribes what the treaty means. It’s based on the principal of mutual consent (Cutlip 2018).

As psychologist Isaac Prilleltensky has posited, in his efforts to persuade social scientists to consider a wider range of moral questions raised by various psychological approaches to human development, “the moral point of view is always relative to the subjectivity of the moral agents and their social context” (1997: 519; italics my own). In a pluralist world, this means that justifications for actions need to arise out of an appreciation of multiple moral viewpoints, rather than any one culturally dominant perspective. In addition to the kinds of differences present in the conflict between the Sioux Nation and the United States, which reflect a deeper conflict regarding what constitutes public reason when “moral and epistemic standards are inextricably intertwined” (Bohman 1996: 75), there are now also critical environmental controversies to contend with. These latter involve plant and animal life, ecosystems, and the non-living. Reid and Taylor perceive that this is indeed the time for the public to free itself from the political hindrances and veils of ignorance that obstruct the rise of moral consciousness: [the] cultural and political webs of plurality are peculiarly urgent now as the jaws of greenhouse gases close around our planet, externalities concatenate uncontrollably, and the legions grow of people made superfluous in the global economy and culture. Externalities dangle everywhere, and we have lots and lots of illth to monitor and get under control- if we can (2010: 14).

The “proper mode of action” Dewey referred to entails addressing these problems and more, without resorting to absolutism, that is, it requires regulating and balancing multiple values, not obscuring or oppressing any of them. The pragmatist’s challenge is to nurture a nonavoidant and inclusive attitude that overcomes the obstacles presented by cultural pluralism, social inequality, and institutional complexity, the three hindrances to deliberative political life, cited by Bohman (1996: 3). In his definition of the moral good as a particular approach to social and political endeavor, Dewey further described how this attitude functions: The moral good is not truth-telling, benevolence, etc., but the attitude which is most effective in maintaining all of them [the values which have been realized in the life of humanity and which we wish to maintain],

98

J. M. GEREDIEN

simply seeing that each one of these has its place provided for it (Dewey 1991: 54; italics my own).

For Bohman, this attitude is cultivated in a dialogical account of deliberation, in which norms and procedures for reaching an understanding are continually reinterpreted “in light of new experiences and problematic situations” (Bohman 1996: 53). Despite the reality of conflict, a unique form of “cooperative activity” progressively unfolds because of an overarching collective acceptance of a “distributive ideal of agreement that accords to each his own motivation for cooperating in processes of public judgment” (ibid: 53). Established practices are not the basis of shared agreements then. Instead, a democratic culture informed by deliberation requires that one’s “intelligible actions” be accountable to others. Actors can reflexively maintain the cooperative activity needed for deliberative democratic life by adopting an attitude that extends accountability “to all actors and to new situations” (ibid: 54). Pragmatism is concerned with this dialogical or mediating process of managing diversity, conflict, and accountability. It respects a full range of different values and as in cases of deep conflict, like that involving the Sioux Nation and United States, acknowledges and honors entirely different modes of perception and feeling (Locke 1989). It endues the action-oriented philosopher with an attitude of cooperation that is both empirical and non-absolutist and a methodology that unifies these two. In his book on the topic, first published in 1907, William James explained that a pragmatist “turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins” and toward a feeling relationship to “concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power” (James 1978: 20). This open-mindedness and emphasis on the need for responsible action leaves “the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up” (James 1978: 20). In pragmatism, the “open air and possibilities of nature,” are able to oppose fully all “dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of finality in truth.” Nevertheless, pragmatism is not authoritarian or in any way fixed in its expression of power: it “does not stand for any special results” and “is a method only” (ibid: 20). Pragmatism then is able to empower the sovereign citizen to relate to conflict and plurality in an optimally flexible, dynamic, and practical way. Rather than

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

99

becoming agitated or ossified, one’s means of gaining understanding becomes increasingly resilient and adaptive. Dewey perceived that this improved attitude toward reaching an understanding “simply represents the biological life process” involved in our optimal human development (Dewey 1991: 308). He further maintained that, “integration of mind-body in action is the most practical of all questions we can ask of our civilization” (LW 3: 29). Intellectual and spiritual activities are not for a realm of “ideal matters too refined to be infected by gross matters.” They need to employ and direct “physical instrumentalities” in such a way that real-world material changes can be fully instantiated (ibid: 29). Especially when faced with the challenges of deeper human conflict, one’s pragmatic attitude toward the creation of democratic culture must act as a guiding intelligence directing both the mind and body of the citizen, toward the emergence of a new public consciousness that serves the purpose of bringing about “better control and direction” (1991: 308). In addition, Dewey asserted that beliefs and activities “tend toward abnormality” to the degree that theory and practice, ideal and real have become divided and to the extent that psychological processes do not reflect the wisdom of the deeper neurobiological processes involved in integrative reasoning and multi-leveled comprehensions (LW 3: 29; Hall 2011). On the other hand, beliefs and activities that defer to the importance of the integration of mind–body in action contribute to the unification of theory and practice because they invite meta-awareness of how psychological and biological processes can be better aligned, and this in turn supports citizen engagement in reconciliation work and in problem-solving related to crises like environmental degradation (van der Kolk 2014; O’Dea 2014). As stated in the opening, deep conflicts and urgent dilemmas especially call for a renewed conception of justice and more plural modes of reason-making in which dominant cultural norms are not universalized. Instead, one’s relation to facts, action and power is respected, and the autonomy and agency of the subject as political actor is given due regard so that each value might “have its place provided for it” (Bohman 1996; Touraine 1995; Dewey 1991: 54). In this chapter, I examine how pragmatism as a philosophy of social healing provides an explanation of social thought and action that is capable of unifying moral impulse, creative instinct, and democratic culture. First, I discuss the relationship of biological impulse to the democratic ideal. I explain why, in the pragmatic conception of democracy, the

100

J. M. GEREDIEN

connection between these two is always preserved. Pragmatism upholds a higher criterion of authenticity, so that the need to be responsible and accountable in one’s thoughts and actions comes to the fore, as a kind of faith activity that improves spiritual functioning in the society. The first section of the chapter considers how this commitment introduces for consideration a theoretic approach to reality in which citizens participate in the making of democratic culture so as to create social conditions that respond to the inmost spiritual desires of humans, to know and understand all that can be, and to love all that is loveable (Helminiak 1998). I consider one major criticism of Dewey’s vision of democratic culture and respond to this, defending Dewey, by elaborating on the meaning of faith activity. Then I look at James’ advice to the pragmatist, to gather the real referents and practical function of abstract terms like reason or truth, and to set these inwardly grasped, specified meanings to work. This requires reflection that integrates, over time, personal feeling, sensory experience, factual data, and individual and collective memory. I consider how efforts like Truth and Reconciliation, and public disclosures, contribute to the pragmatic effort of gaining greater conceptual insight and moral power. In this second section the reader is also introduced to a Bahá’í ecological metaphor of growth and transformation which provides a way of understanding how the sincere spiritual pragmatist unites theory and practice through experience and interaction in community. These kinds of metaphors convey the interrelationship between religious instinct, nature, artistic practice, and scientific insight that Dewey referenced in his work. Countering the Western notion that an inherent contradiction exists between instinct and culture, the poetic images reconcile polarities like ideal and real, order and variety, generality and particularity. Instead of relying upon lifeless, one-directional “banking concepts” of learning (Freire 1993), knowledge formation in spiritual pragmatism is linked to interactive processes of growth and blossoming within Nature. I conclude that the aesthetic ecology promoted by this pragmatism supports truth-seeking and transparency in society and encourages the kind of human development needed to unify moral impulse, creative instinct, and democratic culture.

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

101

Moral Impulse and Democratic Ideal The concept of a moral impulse was being developed in different ways in the early twentieth century, not only by American pragmatists like Dewey interested in democracy, education, and the psychological dimensions of social reform, but also by thinkers like Henri-Louis Bergson. Bergson was a Nobel prize-winning French-Jewish philosopher who in the first half of the twentieth century affirmed the importance of intuition and immediate experience in understanding reality, over that of pure intellectual rationalism. He was also interested in questions pertaining to creativity, transindividual creative force, and causal power. Scientists in other countries also took up the concept of a moral impulse. Notably the respected Russian-Swiss neurobiologist Constantin Monakow, who in this time period theorized, based on his study of the capacity of the brain to heal and adapt after injury, that there was indeed a vital, evolutionary, autonomous, intelligence within life, which he termed the “horme” (Sarikcioglu 2018). An organizing factor that was rooted in protoplasm and that mobilized, through the necessary process of struggle, “the upward drive of individual organisms and species in new directions,” the horme could be viewed as the continual “lead protagonist in a drama of species change and development” (Harrington 1996: 90). The overall motivating creative impulse of the horme was present within every living cell of a person. Called a “Worldhorme,” it linked humankind not only to ancestors and descendants, but also to the entirety of the living world (Harrington 1996: 90, 92). Monakow understood the horme to be constituted of five basic instinctual urges, beginning with the instinct in the embryonic phase of life “to form and grow according to one’s morphological plan,” and progressing to the instinct “to strive for holistic unity with the cosmos,” or what Monakow called the “religious instinct”. The horme at its most evolved level of instinct could serve as a source of moral orientation for humanity (Harrington 1996: 94). Writing on the history of the concept of holism in German culture and the re-enchantment of science, Harrington explains that Monakow’s appreciation of the interconnectedness of humanity and the process of identifying with an increasingly larger living community, “up to species, the organic world and finally the cosmos,” led him To advocate a politics of cosmopolitanism—albeit one that bears little relationship to the “ideology of internationalism” of the time. For Monakow,

102

J. M. GEREDIEN

international community was not a thing of human reason but rather of mystical necessity—the “natural” culmination of a holistic world view in which all living creatures were united in the cosmic dynamic of hormic evolution (95; italics my own).

Monakow’s biopolitical view directly challenges Rawlsian notions of public reason, which tend to socialize the public “into identification with a specific social role — that of ‘a particular type of liberal democratic citizen’” (Steinmetz 2018: 504; quote from Button 2010: 255). In this rationalist view, the values related to citizenship reflect “reigning norms of membership and legitimacy in defining the bounds and character of our moral concern for others” (Steinmetz 2018: 504). However, when civic engagement becomes a way of life, and a cultural practice of striving, then the relational and inclusive ideals of spiritual democracy come into play. The fact of the matter is that, it is not possible to define in a limited or closed manner, the bounds or the character of the public’s concern for others. The ways of caring, and the spheres in which caring arises, are complex, dynamic, and plural. For instance, in the 1980s U.S. Sanctuary Movement contestation regarding “all those affected” by the problem of U.S. policies in relation to migrants and asylum-seekers itself crossed many borders. Citizens engaged with questions pertaining not to one given domain, but many, like “legal categories, public discourse, and the nation’s moral imagination” (Steinmetz 2018: 504). As Bohman (1996) points out, public deliberation by its very nature, requires many different forms, each characterized by equality, non-tyranny, and publicity, because there is no one single domain in which deliberative politics unfolds. It necessarily involves a variety of activities. These include: “formulating and achieving collective goals, making policy decisions about means and ends, resolving conflicts of interest and principle, and solving problems as they emerge in ongoing social life” (1996: 53). There is no one form of public reason appropriate to these multiple domains of concern and varieties of deliberative activity. Like Dewey’s vision of a Great Community brought about through the public’s realization of a self-organizing integrated principle (LW 2: 259), Monakow’s intuition of an international community as a mystical necessity reflects the idea that, even given the multiplicity just described, coherence might be achieved through collective integrity to the “spirit of Dharma”. Giri clarifies that in this expression, Dharma is a way of being responsible

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

103

that serves and fulfills needs for Justice. It is a source of human unity and a path to articulating the most encompassing life purpose for all humans. Dharma refers to modes of right conduct and thinking which is different from righteousness as a fixed system of classification between right and wrong especially imprisoned within a political and religious system of classification between righteous self and unrighteous other…Dharma challenges us to go beyond an anthropocentric reduction of justice and dignity and realize our responsibility not only to human beings but also to the non-humans… (Giri 2016: 5).

In this sense, the spirit of Dharma is about how the structure of human consciousness and the “continued unfolding of spirit toward the universe of being” are known through their inherent “normative requirements” (Helminiak 1998: 16). These are: to begin with, that consciousness bring awareness to a person, and therefore attentiveness; next, that in the quest to understand life, intelligence be engaged; after this, that as judgments are made, based upon what is known from understanding, that these evaluations be reasonable; and finally, that in the progress made toward self-determining actions and world, responsibility in the dharmic sense become the leading transcendental precept that “keeps open the openended unfolding of consciousness” (ibid: 16). The root meaning here of what one “ought” to do, one’s moral purpose or dharma, abides within the reality of “what is,” so that human authenticity, as in Buddhist practices of becoming, has “objective validity” built into it—as a “fruit of authentic subjectivity” (Helminiak 1998: 17; quote by Lonergan 1972: 292; Macy 1991). The democratic ideal as a vitalizing force is an expression of the spirit of Dharma. As a means of becoming it obligates one to fulfill the normative requirements within the structures of consciousness outlined by Helminiak. His tripartite model of the human can help one to further understand the connection between moral impulse and democratic ideal. In this model, three interrelated levels of being interact with one another to generate different modes of conduct and thinking. The physical dimension of the person is organism; the feeling, affective dimension of the person, psyche, which includes imagery and memory, built on the internal functioning of the external perceptual system; and the mental dimension is spirit, expressing dynamism in one’s approach to “all there is to be known and loved” (Helminiak 1998: 11). The critical point here

104

J. M. GEREDIEN

regarding the relation between impulse and ideal is this: the mystical necessity Monakow refers to, arises because there is a “non-reflecting dimension” in the human spirit. Moral impulse expresses this dimension, which is experienced through self-transcending movement and “openness to the ineffable”. The presence of a non-reflecting or natural, unconscious dimension explains mystical experience through the tripartite model of the human being, “apart from any appeal to God” as an external reality (ibid: 23). In a natural holistic process of growth guided by the spirit of Dharma, the mystical experience provoked by one’s responsive relationship to the “non-reflecting dimension” in the human spirit, eventually becomes necessity (ibid). Judith Green builds on this line of thinking, when she describes how an approach to democracy that is formalized and institutionalized as political machinery, is conceptually inadequate (1999). Such an approach, she claims, does not recognize the “directional guidance of the democratic ideal” making a place for moral impulse and the dynamic ways it has historically influenced the unfolding of social life (Green 1998: 432). In the tripartite understanding of the human being, the moral impulse, that in actual experiences within community life advances progression through the structures of consciousness—leading one from awareness to understanding to judgment to responsible self-determination—becomes increasingly democratic as it manifests in an open-ended way, as both a “directional tendency” and a “motive force” (432). As Dewey reminded, democracy, as an idea, is “the idea of community life itself” (Dewey 1927: 328; quoted by Green 1998 432–433). The motive force within community expresses the democratic ideal through the self-transcending movement provoked by moral impulse. Furthermore, the ceaseless struggle to follow the guidance of a directional tendency assures that this motive force will endure, fulfilling the evolutionary self-transcending potentials of Worldhorme, as Monakow would say. Finally, moral impulse supports the “tendency and movement” of democracy toward its “final limit,” as it moves and inspires given individual persons to interact with science, religion, humanities, and art. These interactions are characterized by a more complex, comprehensive, and inclusive understanding of social health as social and systemic integration (Dewey 1927: 328). The motive force behind these intellectual and spiritual interactions is deeply social, responding to the distinctions within the tripartite model of the human. It is therefore perceived as a

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

105

key component of the moral good as an “attitude” toward social transformation. The moral impulse is crucial for keeping citizens on track, ontologically and epistemologically, with a practical and global ethical and spiritual vision, one aligned with a “politics of cosmopolitanism” such as advocated for by Monakow. Inviting connection to the motive force and deeper directional tendency within democracy, the visionary democratic ideal, though perhaps mystical, is not utopian. It serves practically “as basis for criticism of institutions as they exist and of plans of betterment” (Dewey and Tufts, LW 7: 349; Green 1998: 434). The democratic ideal connects citizens inwardly to the spirit of Dharma when it functions this way. It empowers them to be accountably self-determining, reminding them of their innate regulatory powers. Right regulation of systems in the human body increases the capacity of the citizen to participate in self-governance. So too, in the outer world, public intelligence may be introduced to transform social inertia through a more wise regulation of resources, life energies, and power. This creates conditions not only for moral and spiritual association, but also, for the authoring of new and improved social and legal forms (Reid and Taylor 2010). In a “politics of cosmopolitanism,” ideals function both critically and constructively, then. They act as regulatory intelligences, not prescriptive principles. Consider how early Church councils, impelled by moral impulse, engaged socially with precepts and principles from Greek culture, in order to critique and to transform problematic issues. The councils established creedal definitions that all could agree to internalize and commit to within a personal and cultural way of life. Today, citizens within emergent publics may begin to take similar initiative, developing a pragmatic relation to guiding ideals, one oriented by the directional tendency of moral impulse itself. Helminiak perceives that the “hallmark of spiritual functioning” is in the quality interaction of pairs like credo and commitment, meanings and values, vision and virtue, beliefs and ethics, understandings and evaluations (1998: 15). The first half of these pairs represent levels of consciousness involved in awareness, understanding, and judgment, while their second half pertain to decision-making and integrity to the spirit of Dharma. The distinction between the two sides of the pairs is akin to the difference between descriptive science and a normative science of ethics: the former provides facts describing what is; the latter provides information necessary for action, about the value of facts and what “ought to be” (1998).

106

J. M. GEREDIEN

With a meta-framework for analyzing spiritual functioning, the criteria of authenticity can begin to be better assessed and prioritized in education, institutional life, and within a personal and cultural way of life. Attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness can then inform cooperative activity, producing the wisest meanings, creeds, visions and beliefs; and a sense of mutual responsibility can begin to empower how the values, commitments, virtues, ethics, and evaluations directing normative ethical action in the real world actually function. A “science of ethics or ideals” therefore becomes possible in a society that is spiritually functioning. It both responds to and informs living regulatory realities within real-world interactions, rather than imposing prescriptive principles (Carter et al. 2001). Attentiveness to regulation and right relation becomes a “middle way” path of wisdom. Citizens are invited to explore diverse possibilities for interacting with multiple worldviews, ontologies, and imaginaries. Like normative scientists, members of publics seeking truth and transparency, are encouraged to think broadly, clearly, logically, and empirically about all of the analyzable data needed to improve spiritual functioning in a society and to address the consequences of human action. The democratic ideal here serves to identify biases in theory and practice; to encourage collaboration and creativity as the basis for ethical critical thinking; to promote inclusive and holistic practices; to transcend tribalism and embrace globalism; to synthesize the personal, social, situational, political, ecological, and auxiliary virtues inherent in ethical decision-making (Carter et al. 2001). Democracy as ideal is therefore not visionary in the imaginative sense. Instead, it directs one to strive toward the “hallmark of spiritual functioning” (Helminiak 1998). Many have questioned whether Dewey’s idea of democratic method is naïve (Flay 1992; Estremara 1993; West 1989; Hewitt 2002). Each individual citizen, through democratic education and communication, develops a pragmatic approach mindset toward the diverse resources in collective life. Persons work toward political freedom with a sense of civic responsibility, within various meetings, exchanges, and collective judgments. They apply the intelligence that they accrue to “protect, discover, and enhance the conditions that nourish more democratic associations with others” (Hewitt 2002: 9). In the self-transcending movement of spiritual growth, citizens become able to adopt the perspective of both observer and participant. They therefore are able to call upon various cultural perspectives, including “political, economic, international, educational, scientific and artistic, religious” (Dewey LW 13: 187; Hewitt

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

107

2002: 9), in order to discern with greater acuity the nature of the “existing conditions and relations that one is a part of”. In this way, they become able to bring about improved conditions and more creative and ethical relations (9). Is Dewey’s proposed method indeed capable of transforming the underlying power complexes at the root of social inertia and unaddressed power differentials within social relations? Political freedom requires that both inter-agentive and systemic non-domination be realized (Hayward 2011). Only through the kind of responsibility referred to by Helminiak, in which specific normative requirements are fulfilled can the self-deceptions and false rationalizations that hinder the realization of democracy as mystical necessity, be overcome. Without integrity to the spirit of Dharma, “the ideas and habits of thought by which those subjugated legitimize their own subjugation” remain unchanged (Hewitt 2002: 10). In his own response to critics of Dewey’s political philosophy and vision of educational reform, Randy Hewitt affirms Dewey’s pragmatic insight that democratic ideal is not separate from moral impulse. That ideal instead expresses a motive force and directional tendency in the human being. Humans naturally seek improvement of experience. There is no reason to believe they cannot work together to improve spiritual functioning. With the right intentionality, they can achieve the level of authenticity needed to transform the power complexes implicated in inter-agentive and systemic domination: …despite the Sisyphean nature of the task, Dewey … provided every sound philosophical reason for believing so. Is it naive to believe that human beings have all the capacities necessary to correct themselves, to force, through peaceful discussion and collective pressure, entrenched forms of power to act for a greater justice? Dewey answers: ‘Is human nature intrinsically such a poor thing that the idea is absurd? I do not attempt to give any answer, but the word faith is intentionally used. For in the long run democracy will stand or fall with the possibility of maintaining the faith and justifying it by works’ (Hewitt 2002: 10; quote from Dewey and Tufts LW 7: 152).

Dewey believed that spiritual functioning would improve as citizens actively distinguished the integrated quality of spirituality-in-action from those qualities observable in other kinds of actions. Most notably, he stated, “We need to distinguish between action that is routine and actions

108

J. M. GEREDIEN

alive with purpose and desire” (1928: 2). It is necessary to consider actions in their integrated wholeness so that a person can discern the different qualities of behavior resulting from different modes of integration and kinds of relationships to power. Various forms of logic, moral reasoning, perspective taking, and coherence making are present in human interactions. As these intersect with one’s locus of authority, boundaries of social awareness and development of symbolic reasoning, different kinds of faith activity emerge (Fowler 1981; Parker 2009: 41). Theologian James Fowler observed in this activity distinct stages of faith development (1976, 1996). For Fowler, faith is not a set package of necessarily theological understandings. Instead, it is an expression of motivational forces within human nature. Constituted by evolutionary dynamic structural actions, which are highly interactive with the environment, faith is stabilized through dispositional ways of living and valuing. Faith is in behavior and activity, then, and the motivations underlying them, rather than in any one statement of a belief system or social identity bound to a particular religious group. Recognizing and understanding faith is about appreciating cognitive dispositions, ways of knowing, modes of feeling, and orientations toward grandeur, as applied in action. Furthermore, stages in faith development are not discrete but overlap with one another and are context-dependent. Fowler’s understanding of faith is therefore akin to Dewey’s faith in democracy: faith is a permeable and mutable process. Through faith activity, moral impulse animates democratic ideal, both internally, as one proceeds from awareness of experience, through to understanding and judgment; and externally, as one commits to decisions and ongoing actions. Faith in democracy becomes a personal way of life through one’s active concern for: spiritual functioning; increased recognition of the qualities of actions that express integrated wholeness; and ongoing transformation of the limitations on freedom and sources of systemic error in one’s conditions. Dewey and Tufts explain, democracy needs to be understood “as an ideal of social life [that] in its political phase …is much wider than any form of government…it expresses the need for progress beyond anything yet attained” (LW 7: 349). Green similarly relates the democratic ideal to faith activity when she states that it represents the “prophetic possibility within our individual and shared experience” (1998: 434). The existence of deep conflicts and environmental crises calls humanity to recognize that this progress is indeed imperative today. By engaging in the mediating movement of pragmatism, and adopting a pragmatic stance and attitude,

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

109

conceptions of Justice can be revised. Kinds of reason-making used to make public decisions, can then be expanded, so that the “prophetic” social possibilities within the human experience can become new social realities. The Changing of the Earth Likewise perceiving faith as dynamic activity rather than static ideal, William James asserted that the pragmatist must not allow large abstract words, like God, Truth, and the Absolute to become a resting place for the mind. When a citizen understands the theoretical, existential, and ontological bases of abstract concepts like Reason and Freedom, then she can ascertain their real referents and analyze their social role. Without serious, contemplative engagement with these commonplace notions and conceptual ideas from social science, religion, and philosophy, citizens merely call upon them in a routine way. Their capacity to transform the society’s conceptual foundations is limited, accordingly. Pragmatism provides a solution, in that it requires that people integrate life observations, deeper feelings, and memory, making diverse connections and building more complex and refined networks of meaning. Broadly encompassing terms like the Absolute will then appear “less as a solution,” and instead, “as a program for more work,” and “as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed” (James 1978: 20). Dewey perceived that pragmatism in this sense “marks a return to the idea of philosophy which prevailed when reflective thought was young and lusty, eager to engage in combat in the public arena, instead of living a sheltered and protected life” (LW 3: 25). The process advocated for by James, of meditating on ideas and making meaning, is not only intellectual but also creative and biological. Writing on the regions of the brain and biological processes involved in reaching an understanding, biologist David Zull (2002) explains that for significant comprehensions to occur, there needs to be deeper integration of learning. For most people with both brain hemispheres intact, this involves more engagement with the brain structures in the back cortex. Intensive processes of building understanding enable the brain to distinguish both what things are and where things are. The what region responds to physical form attributes that distinguish the boundaries of what something is and allows for generalization; the where region defines spatial relationships, which includes metaphorical relations of sequence,

110

J. M. GEREDIEN

that have to do with the relative value (or size of importance) of one thing compared with another in a given circumstance, and therefore is relevant to prioritization. Zull concludes that “What (category) and where (relationship) are cornerstones of mind” (88). In terms of Dewey’s definition of the moral good, cited in the opening of this essay, the what cornerstone of mind grants one a broad scope of vision. It allows a person to locate the many worthwhile values realized in the life of humanity. The where cornerstone helps a person to see that each value “has its place provided for it” (Dewey 1991: 54). Zull cites these words of Lewis Thomas to illustrate how time-intensive integration processes are in the back cortex, the region implicated in transformational learning and genuine comprehension: We pass the word around; we ponder how different people put the case, we read the poetry; we meditate over the literature; we play the music; we change our minds; we reach an understanding (Zull 2002: 83).

The specific activities involved in contemplative work may be different for different people and may vary in cultures and times periods. Translating this into the biological framework of how learning happens, Zull summarizes that what all people seem to do generally is “gather new information, think about it, identify categories and relationships, engage with it in [diverse] creative ways, and eventually we understand” (ibid: 89). The ongoing development of the mind necessitates significant periods of reflection on sensory data and the retrieval of specific memories. He warns that, “trying to speed up comprehension may distract us and obscure important aspects of both what and where” (ibid). Unfortunately, present-day educational norms literally bank on this speed up, as they rely on space-time frameworks for learning that fit human-constructed paradigms of achievement and that attempt to gear students to meet scheduled requirements for material worldly success, but that short-circuit the biological processes involved in integrative psychological reflection, pragmatic philosophy, and genuine dialogue. Helen Keller notably commented on this problem as she experienced it as a young woman studying at Radcliffe College. Disappointed that the schedule of courses left no time for deeper processes of comprehension, she wrote:

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

111

But in college, there is no time to commune with one’s thoughts. One goes to college to learn, it seems, not to think. When one enters the portals of learning one leaves the dearest pleasures—solitude, books and imagination—outside with the whispering pines (Keller 1902, Chapter 20).

The political and economic paradigm produces social conditions that exclude classes of people from the gifts of a contemplative life, including the intellectual and imaginative joy of reading. The community sector therefore lacks human resources needed for developing the conceptual insight needed to change the established cognitive order of the society. Norms, policies, and laws formally express that order (Strydom 2015). They reflect not only the collective mind in a society but the time that citizens have invested in critical reflection and back cortex integration processes, “communing with one’s thoughts” as Keller phrased it. This means that, in democratic life, legal policies reveal the quality of activity present as citizens either express, or fail to express, their faith in democracy. Changes in policy achieved through new conceptual insights come about through changes in the quality of faith activity. An example of this is how deliberative time spent in Truth and Reconciliation has influenced legal policy and democratic culture. This kind of work has created trends in civil law toward restorative justice and away from punitive judgment, reflecting a new level of spiritual functioning in the society (O’Dea 2012). Nelson Mandela established the first Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, but freely elected governments have established them also in Argentina, Columbia, Brazil, and Canada. In Argentina, the National Commission on the Disappeared (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) operated for nine months, from December 1983 to September 1984 to investigate the disappearances of people between 1976 and 1983 due to a series of military juntas in which thousands of people considered to be “subversives” (leftist guerillas) were abducted, tortured, killed. The book Nunca Mas championed the truth of the people’s voices regarding this persecution and became not only the most read book in Argentina, but also, a kind of testament to the power of people’s faith in democratic ideals of speech and freedom. In movements like those in Argentina, an abstract concept like Truth is not a remote ideal. Instead, it interfaces directly with political infrastructures and social actions on the ground. It permeates human feelings at the level of survival and transforms moral emotions and thoughts from

112

J. M. GEREDIEN

the inside out, generating, over time, the new insights, language, perceptions, and values to reconcile deep conflicts. By bringing light to social injustice, rather than allowing it to remain hidden or silent, citizens are able, as pragmatists, to rethink democratic norms in their society. Bohman points out that, disclosure is “an act of expression that opens up new possibilities of dialogue and restores the openness and plasticity necessary for learning and change”. In pragmatism, disclosures do not in themselves reveal truth, but are “prior to truth” in that they concern “what makes truth possible” and require “public reflection to test them for idiosyncrasy” (1996: 229). Bohman writes: In critical discourse moments, historical experiences may ‘disclose’ new forms of democracy and new democratic principles.…Learning requires coherent development, but it also is discontinuous to the extent that whole new types of reasons and principles may be introduced into the public basis of justification. The term ‘disclosure’ is meant to signify the innovative side of social learning, which is typical of the public use of reason (Bohman 1996: 231).

As publics include diverse modes of reason-making, marginalized or silenced voices, and submerged themes in their deliberative life, they heal the division between subjective personally lived experience and outer world events. Citizens come to feel and know how transsubjective spaces of truth provide an ontological basis for social problem-solving. Processes of knowledge building and social integration in this way become a mode of being authentically human. Public acts of truth-telling and citizen disclosures assist citizens in developing the articulated political and philosophical insights that are the pragmatist’s work, according to James. Through public communications, citizens become better able to ascertain the real referents and social role of formerly abstract terms like freedom, justice, or truth. Citizens could develop this ability further through education dedicated to improving spiritual functioning and deliberative life. Indeed, without educational reform supporting this direction in citizenship, there are serious limits to citizens’ ability to create a completely democratic culture. Through truthtelling and disclosure, it becomes apparent that the intensity of human feelings like desire, sorrow, rage, and hope demand new social structures (Reid and Taylor 2010). Today, ontology is separated from epistemology by foundational dichotomies, like those between: public and private; paid

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

113

and unpaid labor; production and reproduction; order and disorder in social relations; man-made and natural; mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. These dualities short-circuit the deeper processes of creativity and integration that are involved in maintaining the connection between moral impulse and democratic ideal. The deliberations of Asian American women striving to adopt an authentic Christian spirituality are an example of this crisis and need for reform in education and in society at large. The women linked the experience of the suppression of both grief and anger, to the social positivism used to hold together structural relations that bind family life to the growth mindset, or “production mode” aspects only, of Christianity. They also linked it, by extension, to the logic of the global capitalist system that now influences education and the development of all life on the planet. Just as anger is not talked about in our homes and often considered unnecessary to express, grief is also looked upon as unimportant. We were taught that instead of looking towards the struggles, we should only work towards achievements and the “good things” that happen in life….In many ways, we were taught to look only upon the resurrection of Christ and the recognition of the life that were (are) given. As much as this is important and necessary, the crucifixion and the death of Christ were often overlooked. The three days before his resurrection and the necessary mourning that took place was not a priority. It certainly was not good to feel and give space to such grief (Bae 2017).

In creative democracy’s quest for truth, the total transformation of self and world made possible through emotional rationality and integrity to moral impulse can be understood through metaphors that connect the individual and the community to organic life and death processes on the planet. For example, Bahá’í Writings refer to the “changing of the Earth”. In these Writings, the word Earth signifies not only our outer world planet, but also the “earth of understanding and knowledge” within the human heart1 . For the movement of the moral good to change conditions in the world, one needs a total reformation of human character. This reformation engages biological life systems. However, it requires intellectual and spiritual interaction with meta-level premises, or presuppositions. These come from different sources. They are: collected from a broad study of human history, that discerns lateral universals across cultures (Werbner 2017; Reid and Taylor 2010); found in ethical treatises

114

J. M. GEREDIEN

arising out of communal reflection and action, like Four Worlds Principles for Creating a Sustainable World, (from Global Indigenous Wisdom Summit); and discovered in Revelation recorded in scripture. The intellectual principles and spiritual ideals within this last are depicted in Bahá’í Writings as a “heaven” that rains onto the “earth” of the human heart, as “bountiful showers of mercy” producing “myrtles of unity” in the “soil” of human hearts. Bahá’u’lláh exclaims: What blossoms of true knowledge and wisdom hath their illumined bosoms yielded! (Kitáb-i-Íqán, 43)

Here supposedly abstract principles and ideals take on organic life and vitality. The breaking open of the seed of spiritual knowledge within the human heart and the death of its outer covering, makes possible the life of the flower. The process of blossoming and growing itself creates greater unity and rootedness. This personal experience of knowledge formation produces the meta-wisdom of the communal self (Narvaez 2014); it is conducive to cooperative activity in which “the moral point of view is always relative to the subjectivity of the moral agents and their social context” (Prillentensky 1997: 519). Formation of ethics becomes a psychological process that unfolds within relationship and that involves the time-intensive process of back cortex integration, referred to by Zull. It expresses the underlying dynamics of interdependence (the “myrtles of unity”), that constitute community. In the Bahá’í metaphor, comprehension of ethical precepts and integration of divergent creative instincts within the recipient, together bring about a stabilized moral impulse that can support a science of ethics or ideals. The result is the making of “true knowledge”. Like Monakow’s scientific theory of the horme principle, which is an internal holistic physiochemical process, aligned with a larger evolutionary creative force and blueprint of integral development, humankind journeys toward that wisdom which continuously reveals to it, its multifaceted moral orientation. Citizens therefore come to participate in “the aims and methods by which further experience [and therefore, creative democracy] will grow in ordered richness” (MW 14: 229). This inwardly transformational journey of forming ethics, and the simultaneous political process of contributing to the emergence of just social structure, encompasses spirituality and ecology, psychology and the vigor, beauty and resilience of natural growth. The result is the reformation not only of the person, but

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

115

the culture. Progress is achieved through greater individual and collective commitment to emotional integrity and to the creativity and complexity inherent to processes of renewal and self-transcendence, like that alluded to by the Asian American women. Green elaborates on how the pragmatic and democratic attitude toward life that emerges would change the human relation to particular goods and interests, and therefore impact the formation of new value imperatives and practical norms: In its ethical dimension, deep democracy as a way of life would give rise to and depend upon a sense of persons, relations, our ecosystems, and nature as a whole as precious. Individual persons, memories, hopes and active projects, as well as the cultures, communities, and ways of life that form, locate, and direct these, would be regarded as morally significant (Green 1998: 436).

Dewey’s vision of the citizen as an ecological recipient and producer of wisdom in the feeling sense Green describes above, is aligned with the Bahá’í vision of a totally engaged and creative transformation within the person and social reality. It also resonates with his belief, that through artistic practice, the citizen could develop social political insight and have an enriched experience of conceptual meaning. By this he meant a religious experience of illumination and comprehension, that is not removed from life, but rather, encompasses the experiences of everyday life in that it is continuous with biological life processes of unfolding and maturation, like those described by Bahá’u’lláh (EW 1: 91). Reid and Taylor observe that in this regard, Dewey “outlined an aesthetic ecology of public intelligence” (2010: 126). In Experience and Nature (1958), Dewey further clarified that a distinction must be made between modes of practice “that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable” and modes of practice “which are full of enjoyed meanings” (LW 1: 268; italics my own). The latter are advocated for in the Bahá’í Writings and by Green when she radically affirms recognition of the moral significance of both “Individual persons, memories, hopes and active projects,” and of the matrixical energies present within “cultures, communities, and ways of life”. When Helen Keller extolled “the dearest pleasures—solitude, books and imagination” and indicated that “the portals of learning” that produce meanings worth caring about might be found in communion with “the

116

J. M. GEREDIEN

whispering pines” she too was siding with modes of practice that are inherently and immediately enjoyable (1902, Chapter 20, see quote at beginning of this section). Dewey understood artistic practice to be essential to the remaking of tradition since it engenders respect for the kind of deep feeling referenced by Bahá’u’lláh, Green and Keller, and because it protects the ability to comprehend and create symbolic language. The kind of artistic practice Dewey advocated for also cultivates creative instinct. It contributes to the aesthetic dimensions of experience within cultural traditions and multicultural institutions guided by the motive force, directional tendency, and criticality of democratic ideal. Intelligent modes of artistic practice nurture the creative values like “variety, multiplicity, dynamism, and jazz-like fusions” that support emergent deliberative life within these aesthetic dimensions; such values are able to partner cooperatively with the values that tend to protect status quo norms, like “purity, unity, simplicity, and stability” (Green 1998: 436–437). When individuality is affirmed and creative values encouraged, deliberative activity flourishes. Bohman observes that, “Like a good jazz trio, deliberation succeeds … when each individual maintains his or her distinctiveness and the group its plurality” (1996: 56). For this reason, the fostering of an aesthetic ecology promotes wisdom and the fulfillment of environmental and social justice (Reid and Taylor 2003: 79). We are presently alienated from this ecological experience of power as constitutive of being. Artistic practice reawakens this experience, activating the inner faculties involved in comprehension, and purifying human feelings so that these can become part of what Spinoza called intuitive knowledge. All sciences, and especially fields like neurobiology and evolutionary psychology, are “handmaidens” assisting in this fulfillment of Nature. As Dewey reminds, “both philosophy and the sciences were conceived and begotten of the arts”; the sciences once aspired “to find their issue in arts of the special branches of life” and philosophy “in the comprehensive art of the wise conduct of life as a whole” (LW 3: 25). In the partnership of science and art: “freshness, continuity, and connectedness compatible with innovation” infuse social development; and the presence of beauty in all its “myriad faces” is recognized (Green 1998: 436–437). Describing inner and outer world transformation through these metaphors of growth, hints at how relational developmental systems require the stabilization of moral impulse for their evolution. The

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

117

growth of biological and social structures that support more enlightened forms of human association—like the development and integration of neural pathways for modulating fear and emotion or the practice of deep listening—must be rooted in the interactions within community that allow divergent creative instincts, and distinct modes of feeling and ontologies, to achieve coherence through fulfillment of the normative requirements within the structures of consciousness described by Helminiak (1998). Joanna Macy sees the complex inter and intrapersonal interactions that make the moral good and that transform culture through inner blossoming of comprehension processes, as “a movement away from entropy”. In it, intangible webs of relationship are spun, new forms, new ideas, new realities emerge. …differentiation and integration go hand in hand; they abet and give rise to each other. …This notion is at variance with the idea that there is an inherent conflict between instinct and culture. …the systems view perceives a continuum in the flowering of integrated heterogeneity (Macy 1991: 187; italics my own).

Self-realization is not “at odds with harmonious interaction” and engagement in the life of community because “it is in relationship, not in isolation, that beings give expression to diversity and distinctiveness” (Macy 1991: 187). Green affirms this interactionist stance. She perceives that in the “contingent processive metaphysics of deep democracy” the intangible within human interiority, like “ideas, memories, and hopes” actually have “empirical effects”. This is witnessed in the popularity of books like Nunca Mas and in acts of public disclosure involving personal narrative. In these, the intangible within human interiority interacts with “material characteristics, forces, and relations… in patterns of mutual influence” (Green 1998: 436). With care for an aesthetic ecology, the dynamic and embodied self-organization of ideals and precepts contributes over time to a blossoming and flourishing of public intelligence—an “ordered richness” of ongoing further experience, within and across people in community, that itself characterizes the development of creative democracy. In this self-organizing movement, the “forces inherent in human nature and already embodied to some extent in human nature” are protected “to their logical and practical limit” as the normative requirements of consciousness direct the citizen to regard human and

118

J. M. GEREDIEN

non-human life on the planet, its variety in all its relations, as holy and inspiring awe and wonder (Green 1998: 436). Macy concludes that: It would seem that Freud’s view, so influential in our culture, stems from a polarization of the notions of order and variety—as if order, sacred or secular, were some preset master plan we can only follow by inhibiting novelty, by being good children obedient to an autocratic father (Macy 1991: 188).

Far from polarizing order and variety, the wisdom conveyed in New Earth metaphors, like Bahá’u’lláh’s, holds up the promise of a spiritual and intellectual democracy that protects truth-seeking, transparency, cultural creativity, novelty, and planetary biodiversity. As in Monakow’s assertion of the horme principle, there is no need “to fight or repress” instincts. Instead, the key is “to learn to orient our feelings toward those higher instincts”; one can do this through the artistic practice advocated for by Dewey. In this practice, which is closely associated with the religious instinct, “biological health and internal harmony” are “automatically promoted” (Harrington 1996: 94). The journeying horme left a biological record of its “progressive achievements” in the human body, said Monakow, one that provided moral order and direction for humanity, as it revealed that “spiritual, selfless instincts stood naturally above and over selfish, material instincts” (ibid: 94). By respecting one’s deepest biological impulses, which pulse within the protoplasm of one’s very own cells, a person comes to feel and know humanity’s greater evolutionary course (ibid: 98). Their creative instincts, as expressed through artistic practice, represent a fulfillment of Nature in this sense, and are a practical means of giving birth to new philosophies and sciences. The democratic ideal does not suppress the enjoyed meanings within the teachings of moral leaders and visionaries nor does it attempt to quash spiritual knowledge including the wisdom within Scripture and sacred or holy ways of life. The motive force within these sources of guidance and dimensions of human development and their directional tendency instead are understood to be essential to a creative democracy. Spiritual pragmatism is concerned with rooting the democratic ideal in the heart of each individual citizen. Therefore, it offers to humanity the beauty and integrity of an aesthetic ecology that responds to more noble inspirations. One is naturally motivated in these conditions to nurture and respond to moral impulse, and to recognize the connection between that

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

119

impulse and a greater evolutionary path. In the aesthetic ecology, order and variety contribute spontaneously and collaboratively to the maturation of citizenship and of the community sector. As in the metaphor of the “changing of the Earth,” moral personhood, no longer constricted by compartmentalizing habits of mind and by the imposed space-time constraints of the political economy, itself becomes a fertile ground for unifying moral impulse, creative instinct, and democratic culture.

Note 1. This phrase from Bahá’í Writings is found in the Kitáb-i-Íqán, or Book of Certitude, which was originally called Risaliy-i-Khal, Epistle to the Uncle, because it is a response by Bahá’u’lláh to questions from the Báb’s uncle, about the nature of his nephew’s station. A major theme throughout this tablet is the nature of spiritual perception and conceptual realization. Bahá’u’lláh explains in different ways how the Manifestations of God are to be understood metaphysically prior to their particular existence and epistemologically prior to their universal identity and unity. When people are fixated on personal power, or confused by personal insecurities, their thinking becomes overly materialistic and literal. They do not comprehend the nature of the unity and particularity of the Manifestations, and the progressive nature of God’s Revelation. This kind of conditioning is akin to overly socio-centric modes of social change that focus more on obedience to external forms than on internal moral realization within the citizen and genuine creative ethical action. Shoghi Effendi translated this tablet and has explained that it was “written in fulfillment of the prophecy of the Báb, Who had specifically stated that the Promised One would complete the text of the unfinished Persian Bayán, and in reply to the questions addressed to Bahá’u’lláh by the as yet unconverted maternal uncle of the Báb, Hájí Mírzá Siyyid Muhammad.” (Shoghi Effendi 1987: 139) For more on this work, please visit https://bahai-library.com/wilmette_kitab_iqan_outline.

References Bae, Bayoung. May 23, 2017. The Eschatological Truth in Asian Theology found at medium.com/chiaroscurogy/the-eschatological-truth-in-asian-theology. Bahá’u’lláh. 1950. Kitáb-i-Íqán [The Book of Certitude], 2nd ed., trans. Shoghi Effendi. Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust. Bernstein, R.J. 2010. The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bohman, James. 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.

120

J. M. GEREDIEN

Button, Mark E. (2010). Contract, Culture and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes to Rawls. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press. Carter, L., G. Miller, and N. Radhakrishnan. 2001. Global Ethical Options. New York: Weather Inc. Cutlip, Kimra. November 7, 2018. In 1868, Two Nations Made a Treaty, the U.S. Broke It and Plains Indian Tribes are Still Seeking Justice found at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/1868-two-nat ions-made-treaty-us-broke-it-and-plains-indian-tribes-are-still-seeking-justice180970741/. Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and its Problems. New York: Holt. Dewey, John. 1928. “Preoccupation with the disconnected.” From Body and Mind: A Lecture to the New York Academy of Medicine. First Published in the Bulletin of the NY Academy of Medicine: 1927–1928. Dewey, John. 1958. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications Inc. Dewey, John. 1969. John Dewey The Early Works, 1882–1898 Volume 1: 1882–1888 Early Essays and Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1983. The Middle Works of John Dewey, Volume 14, 1899–1924: Human Nature and Conduct, 1922 (Collected Works of John Dewey), ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1985a. The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 3, 1925–1953: 1927– 1928, Essays, Reviews, Miscellany, and Impressions of Soviet Russia, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, textual editor, Bridget A. Walsh. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1985b. The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 7, 1925–1953: 1932, Ethics (Collected Works of John Dewey), ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1988a. The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 1: 1925–1953: 1925, Experience and Nature (Collected Works of John Dewey), ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1988b. The Later Works, 1925–1953 Volume 2: 1925–1927, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, textual editor, Bridget A. Walsh. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1988c. The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 13: 1938–1939. Experience and Education, Freedom and Culture, Theory of Valuation and Essays, ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1991. John Dewey Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901, ed. and with an introduction by Donald F. Koch. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Effendi‚ Shoghi. 1987. God Passes By. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Pub Trust.

5

PRAGMATISM AND THE “CHANGING OF THE EARTH” …

121

Estremera, M.A. 1993. Democratic Theories of Hope: A Critical Comparative Analysis of the Public Philosophies of John Dewey and Henry A. Giroux. New Jersey: Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. Flay, Joseph. 1992. Alienation and the Status Quo. In John Dewey: Critical Assessments ll, ed. J.E. Tiles, 307–319. Routledge: New York. Fowler, J. 1976. Stages in Faith: The Structural-Developmental Approach. In Values and Moral Development, ed. T. Hennessy, 173–211. New York: Paulist Press. Fowler, J. 1981. Stages of Faith. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Fowler, J. 1996. Pluralism and Oneness in Religious Experience: William James, Faith-Development Theory, and Clinical Practice. In Religion and the Clinical Practice of Psychology, ed. E. Shafranske, 165–186. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Freire, P. 1993. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum Publishing Co. Giri, Ananta Kumar. 2016. Spiritual Pragmatism: New Pathways of Transformation for the Posthuman. In Critical Post humanism and Planetary Futures, ed. Debashish Banerji, Makarand R. Paranjape. New Delhi: Springer India. Green, J.M. 1998. Educational Multiculturalism, Critical Pluralism, and Deep Democracy. In Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate, 422–448. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Green, J.M. 1999. Deep Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Hall, Stephen. 2011. Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience. New York: Vintage Books. Harrington, A. 1996. Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hayward, Clarissa Rile. 2011. What Can Political Freedom Mean in a Multicultural Democracy?: On Deliberation, Difference, and Democratic Governance. Political Theory 39 (4): 468–497. Helminiak, D. 1998. Religion and the Human Sciences: An Approach Via Spirituality. New York: State University of New York Press. Hewitt, Randy. 2002. Democracy and Power: A Reply to John Dewey’s Leftist Critics. Education and Culture XIX (2). James, William. 1978. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keller, Helen. 1902. The Story of My Life at Internet Archive (scanned books original editions color illustrated). Koch, Donald. 1991. Introduction. In Lectures on Ethics, 1900–1901: John Dewey, ed. Donald F. Koch. IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Locke, Alain. 1989, ed. Leonard Harris. The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lonergan, B.J.F. 1972. Method in Theology. New York, NY: Herder and Herder.

122

J. M. GEREDIEN

Macy, Joanna. 1991. Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural Systems. State University of New York Press: Albany, NY. Narvaez, Darcia. 2014. Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture and Wisdom. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. O’Dea, James. 2014. The Conscious Activist: Where Activism Meets Mysticism, 1st ed. London: Watkins Publishing. O’Dea, John. 2012. Cultivating Peace: Becoming a 21st Century Peace Ambassador. San Rafael: Shift Books. Parker, Stephen. September 2009. Faith Development Theory as a Context for Supervision of Spiritual and Religious Issues. Counselor Education and Supervision 49 (1): 39–53. Prilleltensky, I. May 1997. Values, Assumptions, and Practices: Assessing the Moral Implications of Psychological Discourse and Action. American Psychologist 52 (5): 517–535. Reid, Herbert, and Betsy Taylor. 2003. John Dewey’s Aesthetic Ecology of Public Intelligence and the Grounding of Civic Environmentalism. Ethics and the Environment 8 (1): 74–92. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 40339053. Reid, Herbert, and Betsy Taylor. 2010. Recovering the Commons: Democracy, Place, and Global Justice. Springfield: University of Illinois Press. Sarikcioglu, L. 2018. Constantin von Monakow (1853–1930) and His Legacy to Science. Childs Nervous System 34: 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00381017-3378-1. Steinmetz, Alicia. 2018. Sanctuary and the Limit of Public Reason: A Deweyan Corrective. Politics and Religion 11: 498–521. Strydom, Piet. March 2015. The Latent Cognitive Sociology in Habermas Extrapolated from Between Facts and Norms. Philosophy Social Criticism Philosophy Social Criticism 41 (3). Touraine, A. 1995. Critique of Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell. Van der Kolk, Bessel. 2014. The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind and Body in the Healing of the Trauma. New York: Penguin Books. Werbner, Pnina. 2017. De-Orientalising Vernacular Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Local Cosmopolitan Ethics. In Cosmopolitanism and Beyond: Towards a Multiverse of Transformations, ed. Ananta Giri. London: Palgrave Macmillan. West, Cornel. 1989. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. Zull, James. 2002. The Art of Changing the Brain: Enriching Teaching by Exploring the Biology of Learning. Sterling, VA: Stylus.

CHAPTER 6

Towards Spiritual Pragmatics: Reflections from the Graveyards of Culture Marcus Bussey

With every refusal comes an embrace, Turning away is always turning towards. Marcus Bussey (2019: 28)

There is something liminal about reality—and pragmatism acknowledges that condition by working the between that lies betwixt idea and action, aspiration and perspiration, hope and the quotidian. Such work requires a future-sense to come into play and that sense involves sensitivity to creative play and the possibilities inherent to our contexts when we take the lid off authority and throw away the rule book. This chapter seeks to do just this and test this understanding of pragmatism via poetry and the graveyard. That sounds dramatic but it proves a useful method for looking beyond the current constraints that frame what is possible. Spiritual pragmatism is a concept that has effects and these are only now beginning to be understood. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue concepts are to be judged by their effects in the world. Only time will tell how we

M. Bussey (B) University of the Sunshine Coast, Sunshine Coast, QLD, Australia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_6

123

124

M. BUSSEY

judge our current thinking and its effects. Yet we can always rest assured that for every hegemonic moment there are, as Derrida (2005) reminds us, innumerable inversions: that is the heterotopic promise and spiritual pragmatics draws on this promise delving deep into the past, the present and the future to reimagine human potentiality. ∗ ∗ ∗ Poets are the archaeologists of culture. They plumb its depth for the new that lies at the heart of the old and they give this re-enchanted thing back to us in forms that move us beyond our present fixations to new possibilities. This is why Sri Aurobindo stated that the poets of the future will utter mantras (Roy 1990). These mantras are the vehicle to take us beyond present forms and in so doing unify us with deeper, richer possibilities of self and other. The poet’s eye helps us approach the subject of spiritual pragmatics via the symmetry of head and heart. This chapter turns to poetic wisdom to explore spiritual pragmatic possibilities before our culture today. The aesthetic dimension of poetic expression is synthetic in nature and allows us to reflect on spiritual pragmatism and any attempt at synthesis. Such synthesis is understood poetically as a movement towards wholeness in a forever fractured world. The fracture, of course, is the modern human experience. It is the wound upon which our greatness as an industrial civilisation is based. It is also, as Leonard Cohen reminds us, the crack that lets the light in and as such it is the source of both the current global problematique and all attempts to engage with it. The graveyard is a significant cultural site. Archaeologists love graveyards but so too do the Tantricas1 who inhabit a space between ordered reality and the shadows of the Chaosmos which represent the fermenting brew of possible impossibilities from which both future forms and present fears emerge (Svoboda 1986). All cultures have their graveyards—and their skeletons in cupboards. The poet, as a kind of Tantrica, picks their way carefully through the detritus of ages in the search for the old and deep that can be returned to the present. They are alert to this world of shadows, and we can listen with them to the possibilities before us in this moment when a renewed spiritual pragmatics is taking shape. In this work we too are archaeologists of the soul and Tantricas in the graveyard. Before us lies the wasteland of the present which is so rich yet constrained

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

125

by an anorexic world system where the physical poverty of the majority equates to the spiritual poverty of the minority. This essay is written as a series of reflections on elements of practical spirituality and the critical possibilities it presents us with. The arts are political tools that can either ensnare us in narcissistic Self-alienation or awaken us to our relational potential in a world that is connected and rich with possibilities. It is for this reason that I begin each section with a poem.

Part 1: Feel the Story The Australian indigenous elder Bill Neidjie (1920–2002) is not strictly speaking a poet. These lines come from a series of conversations he had with Keith Taylor in the 1980s (Neidjie 1989: 19). Listen Careful Listen carefully, careful and this spirit e come to your feeling and you will feel it…anyone that. I feel it…my body same as you. I telling you this because the land for us, never change round, never change. Places for us, earth for us, star, moon, tree, animal, no-matter what sort of a animal, bird or snake… all that animal same like us. Our frien that. This story e can listen careful and how you want to feel on your feeling. This story e coming through you body, e go right down foot and head, fingernail and blood… through the heart.

Neidjie sees with a poet’s eye and he goes to the heart of the business in that we story ourselves into the world. The story is both about us but also it is us as each story describes a line of flight, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s poetic term (1987), that is definitional of our relationship with Being. For Neidjie this paradoxical relationship is expressed via the story’s ability to participate in the storying: This story e can listen careful. Yet it

126

M. BUSSEY

is also embodied, a visceral and somatic experience of a Being-Becoming relationship with the world: and how you want to feel on your feeling. This reciprocal position places our humanness in the world as a pragmatic expression of spirit. It opens us to relational being and all the ethical and spiritual implications such a consciousness evokes. The implication for Neidjie is simple: Listen carefully. Such listening is a call to being in the world, to paying attention to this world—to its intimate markings and its diverse voices and expressions. Each and everything is itself a song, just as we are song. Listen carefully, careful and this spirit e come to your feeling and you will feel it…anyone that

This call to being present is where we grow wholeness from the alienation that separates spirit from world. Thus, any element of the life-world can speak to us; beckon to us; demand our attention; inspire inquiry, curiosity and the research this fosters (Wexler 2008). A spiritual pragmatics draws us into this relationship of listening carefully. The poet in me was recently called to attention when I was walking on the outskirts of Bangalore and saw a kingfisher sweep across a pond of water. As I describe here my attention moved to another level of presence: The bird flew A streak of colour Sleek arc of pure life It knows itself as full of life It does not think on birdness It is one with the flight of winds It is one with the sunlight and the morning I saw the bird and it placed me in the world It anchored my restlessness for a moment in stillness It took my love and fed it It lifted my heart into the light. I saw the bird and my spirit knew Light and bird, Divine and self In one sweeping arc of colour (Bussey 2019: 84)

In a Hindu creation story Brahma wakes on the belly of Vishnu and in his half sleeping state his eyes flutter. This rapid, REM-like

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

127

blinking is how our human consciousness experiences the world: fragmented, fleeting, staccato-like images flickering past (Albrecht-Crane 2005; Calasso 1999).2 Yet if we ‘listen careful’, pay attention, we come to discover the basis from which relational consciousness emerges. We find that we are at home in this world. This world and all that it expresses welcomes us, the human prodigal; it be-homes us, to use the words of Nirmal Selvamony.3 This be-homing is one place we can start to consider spiritual pragmatics. The home is the story-vehicle for our becoming whole. It is where our stories converge with maximum potency and from where our actional being can function with the greatest integrity. It is also the seat of our heart. When the heart is involved, as I state in my poem about the bird, then attention is easy. The ability to be aware, present in each moment is an expression of dharana (concentration/focus). Dharana is one of the eight limbs of yoga and essential for spiritual development (Sarkar 2010). It helps us overcome the blinking of Lord Brahma’s eyes by establishing a basis for perception of a unified field of Being. The will to concentrate/focus without heart is fragile, but heart without focus is equally so. The ingredient that joins head and heart, self and other, micro and macro is Love. Thus, the body identification that Neidjie is describing is an invitation to love our world as an expression of our own corporeal and spiritual being, in fact there is no separation between these states as they are expressions of a single field of apperception. Love is what enables attention. It is love that helps us Listen carefully. So, storying practical spirituality is about understanding that attention and presence facilitate our be-homing in the world. It all begins with letting the world in, feeling the story, allowing it to do its work on us: This story e coming through you body, e go right down foot and head, fingernail and blood… through the heart.

Part 2: Dust Pragmatism is about working the space between an idea and the lifeworld. This is dusty work and involves negotiation with the structures that frame meaning and process. The Australian poet David Rowbotham

128

M. BUSSEY

(1994: 62) conjures this grounding of the aspiration in reality with the metaphor of dust. Dust on my hands, like death’s ash, clings. The sun burns blue and a crow sings. Dust on my lips has death’s tang. The silence seethes; the red airs hang. Dust in my throat dries song to a croak. Pray speak beauty. But dust first spoke.

Dust is what our bodies are made from. We walk this dusty earth. We do so often under the impression that we walk alone and in the company of death. Yet death, so familiar a figure in the graveyard, is also a reminder to live. The attention that death brings to each moment is also in fact an expression of love. Modernist culture fears death because of the privileged space given to the ego. The ego finds its finitude in the graveyard and this is the original sin that births anxious-identity into the modern world. The ego seeks certainty before the fundamental uncertainty of its own finitude. This is a paradox because the erasure of the ego is certain, in that death is a certainty. Consumerism is a response to this uncertainty, as is the diminution of both the past and the future. The present for the ego is eternal. A spiritual pragmatics reinvents the ego as a vehicle for depth and becoming whole. The yearning for certainty becomes a yearning for completion: for wholeness. This longing for wholeness is akin to the longing for beauty that Rowbotham alludes to. We long for beauty, but dust first speaks. Dust is everywhere, but what is it? At one level it is the physical world; beyond that it is still everywhere—on hands, lips and in the throat. In this sense it can be understood as a metaphor for consciousness. Not the metaphysical kind we associate with Platonic and Judeo-Christian traditions but the vibrant kind common to non-dualistic life-worlds in which consciousness

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

129

is part of the life-field. It is perhaps what Prabhat Rainjan Sarkar (1921– 1990) called microvita (1991). Such consciousness is integrated into the plane of being in which we all function and across which we all travel (Bussey 2010). We are sparks of consciousness in a field of consciousness. When this possibility is taken seriously we understand that what we do to another we do to ourselves. So dust like death’s ash clings to us as we go through the graveyard of culture; it is on all we do and touch. Thus, we are always home, even when we feel the most lost. It is the sensing of lostness, of separateness and dislocation that we feel as the wound. This is a form of death as we are cut off from what we love. As a result, we are unable to listen carefully, to pay attention—to see relationship or experience grounded love. The relational consciousness that would engage this wound is enacted via a spiritual pragmatism; it is in the cultivation of the relationship with another that we experience selfhood but not as radical brittle self but as co-nurtured be-homed self. This is the root of resilient identity and the place from which a spiritual pragmatics can emerge.

Part 3: I Am the Life of My Beloved Rumi (1207–1273) admits to being lost. He seeks to find himself in relationship with the Beloved. This Beloved is our Home. This is the logic of the Bhakta.4 It is a form of logic that is aware of the significance of relational consciousness—a way of being conscious born of our awareness of the other in our lives. What can I do? I do not know myself. I am no Christian, no Jew, no Magician, no Muslem. Not of the East, not of the West. Not of the land, not of the sea. Not of the Mine of Nature, not of the circling heavens, Not of earth, not of water, not of air, not of fire; Not of the throne, not of the ground, of existence, of being; Not of India, China, Bulgaria, Saqseen; Not of the kingdom of the Iraqs, or of Khorasan; Not of this world nor of the next: of heaven or hell; Not of Adam, Eve, the gardens of Paradise or Eden; My place placeless, my trace traceless. Neither body nor soul: all is the life of my Beloved…5

This other is Consciousness, or self as atma.6 The attention at the heart of spiritual pragmatics is based on this awareness in which the spiritual

130

M. BUSSEY

pragmatist feels attentive to the relationship that is found in all things around them. Nothing is outside of the Beloved. The world that is our home becomes our relational ground. Thus, the kula 7 of the Beloved is this world we live in and thread our way across; the kula of the Beloved is our body and it is also the Cosmos; the kula is the nirguna 8 that gloves the saguna 9 in loving silence. In this world we are nothing but our love for the Beloved and we work for this Beloved in the world— this is the source of our tapashya.10 If we are unable to love, then we are nothing and the agony of this loss is a powerful source of manic energy as we desperately seek to dull the pain through the endless japa 11 of materialism. If we believe there is no purpose, no spirit; if we believe there is no unity; if we say this to ourselves in the dark cave of our being (the guha 12 of self-declamation); if we repeat this wound over and over again as mantra; then we experience it as such. After all, a belief is simply an idea we repeat over and over in self-validation (Hicks and Hicks 2006). This positioning of self beyond the kula of the Beloved is the source of the modernist alienation from this planet. A spiritual pragmatics works to re-enter the home, the kula of our Beloved. It is in opening to love that we begin this work. It is love that links the microcosm with the macrocosm. When the poet announces, as Rumi does, that we are not our reflection in the mirror he or she is telling us to look again. Who are you? Who am I? Rumi is looking to the depth of the matter. He is pushing beneath the surface litany of ego identity. Yet he is not denying the reality of being of India, China, Bulgaria, Saqseen. He is seeing beneath the form to the essence. He is demanding ontological depth when depth, through the sense of being lost, homeless in this world is denied us. The pragmatics here demands of us that we work the relative context as a horizontal field of being-conscious-of-relationship while holding on to the depth work that spirituality requires of us. To love is to pay attention; to pay attention, to be attentive, is to move into the presence of the Beloved—to feel the Beloved in every cell. To breathe the Beloved in and out is the source of the passion we need to work in the world but not on its terms (Macy 2007). We are seeking a different story. The poet’s languaging of new possibility is essential here. They stand as shaman between two worlds. We need to stop trying to be worthy of the story we are given and to search for stories that are worthy of us! Rumi defines himself through negation—yet his is a positive affirmation of a dimension of being that lies beyond our modern perception. The relational logic means that

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

131

if he is the life of the Beloved then he is also off the world: of India, China, Bulgaria, the Saqseen. To reach this point is to walk through the graveyards of civilisations who have been supremely confident and yet failed at some level where relationship was the only glue. Rumi, in his archaeological work, is delving beneath the apparent fixed reality of our context—the horizontal field— and demanding the vertical depth that anchors pragmatic engagement in the world. He is offering us the vision of a new humanity that lives and breathes beyond current closed definitional logics and the brittle identities that accompany them. Sarkar has offered neohumanism as the critical spiritual dynamic for this new humanity (Sarkar 1982). The critical spirituality at work here draws on the expansive intimacy which comes from vaeragya 13 (Bussey 2000, 2006). This is the critical ability to withdraw from identification with a narrow identity. This involves us moving from the narrow, specificity of a given sense of self to ever broader, less constrained senses of Being that go beyond place, trace, body and soul. Such a critical vantage point allows us to reflect on self and other as two points in a continuum of being. This kind of vaeragya posits reflection as dynamic and moving across the fields of meaning-making as mapped by historical, temporal and geographical logics. It takes as its ultimate reference the home of the Beloved and questions any other referent as limited and partial (Inayatullah 2002). Such a relational axis, involving the necessity of vertical depth with horizontal attention to one’s context, suggests a pedagogy of possibility beyond dominant modes of education that attend only to the horizontal requirements of an unreflective system (Bussey et al. 2012). Spiritual pragmatics is the substance of such a reimagined educational system. Such a process can be captured visually as the X and Y axes of a dynamic field in which X and Y are not set coordinates as in Fig. 6.1 but fractal points of spiritual pragmatic engagement in the endlessly emerging chaosmos as in Fig. 6.2. Such a conception is never fixed but open always to new expression in which vertical depth demands of us a sensitivity to becoming that is spiritual and attentive to the love of the Beloved; while the horizontal gaze takes this love into the field of action where ethical considerations are framed through the relational consciousness that the vertical engenders. Such a multidimensional representation of the spiritual pragmatic field is reminiscent of Max Ernst’s (1891–1976) depiction of the young man

132

M. BUSSEY

Fig. 6.1 Static X and Y––captures the vertical and horizontal on a single plane

contemplating a non-Euclidian fly.14 The fly as a vector of the consciousness that creates the young man is beheld, or attended to, in order that Being can be experienced. Such a relational process also invokes Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) thinking on the relationship between the orchid and the wasp in which, through processes of reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation, both are constructed and deconstructed simultaneously. The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. (1987: 10)

This process involves the orchid in becoming-wasp and the wasp in becoming-orchid. Deleuze and Guattari continue: Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

133

Fig. 6.2 Fractal X and Y on a dynamic multidimensional field

form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying. (ibid)

The dialogic nature of these mutual becomings also lies at the heart of a spiritual pragmatics in which the relational logic of becoming whole is generated through our paying attention, listening careful, feeling the story, tasting the dust. Just as the young man and his non-Euclidian fly and also the story of the wasp and the orchid remind us, there is no end, no terminus to this becoming whole. We are forever becoming and therein lies both the beauty and the paradox of spiritual pragmatics.

134

M. BUSSEY

Part 4: God’s Ground Rumi places Being in the kula of the Beloved. He does this so that we can find the ground from which to act. Meister Eckhart (1260–1327) taught this in his creation spirituality (Fox 2003: 93). God’s ground is my ground and my ground is God’s ground. Here I live on my own as God lives on her own. All our works should work out of this inner most ground without a why or a wherefore.

This ground is the source of the dust of consciousness. It is both the internal basis on which being is experienced as an inner–outer expression of consciousness, while also being the foundation of a relational consciousness from which action can emerge. A sensitivity to the ground upon which the Divine meets the unit mind is a central element of spiritual pragmatics. It links the local and immediate concerns that drive action in the world with the inner devotional experience, the bhakti, of the spiritual pragmatist seeking to serve the Beloved in the world of form. From such awareness the poet as spiritual pragmatist develops both vertical ontological depth as the inner dimension to social action along with horizontal ethical breadth in engagements with their context. Such a combination suggests a pedagogy of possibility in which personal realisation is linked through action with collective co-realisation (Giri 2011). The potency required for social transformation comes from this grounding. The ground is the home or kula of the spiritual pragmatist; it is the place from which they come to begin the work; it is the place they remain within as they do the work and it is also the place they return to when they finish the work. The kula is always with us—we can deny home at a conscious level, we can forget about it at the unconscious level, but we cannot in fact ever leave it. This is why Eckhart states that: All our works should work out of this innermost ground without a why or a wherefore. But to be in the world, alive to the possibilities that abundantly fill this space the poet also needs to be critically aware of the limitations of context. All culture is caught in a

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

135

functional binary which plays out in social dynamics as two evolutionary drivers (Bussey 2011). The first is that culture emerges in the human journey to guarantee security in a world that is unstable. The second is that, with the guarantee of security, comes the creation of a stable field of signs and meaning from which human potential may be expanded. Security and expansion are not easy bedfellows and often compromise one another (Pinker 2011). The poet, as archaeologist, looks at civilisation with a critical eye. The poet, as mystic, looks at civilisation with a healing eye (Bussey 1999). Through their experiences in the graveyard of culture they reveal what is of positive benefit to human development and what, under the mask of pseudo-culture, is toxic. We can tell the difference by looking at the effects of any cultural practice on people’s lives. What diminishes human possibility is pseudo-culture; what expands it is culture.

Part 5: Leave This Chanting! One of the challenges is to overcome the cultural templates for spiritual expression. Many such templates have reduced spirituality to ritual and distanced it from the work of the world in order to conform to hierarchical religious systems. Rabindranath Tagore (2011: 23) challenges us clearly to set aside such cultural coding and get busy in the world. Karma yoga15 is an essential element of spiritual pragmatics. Thus, we find dust as an important element of Tagore’s thinking in this poem. Leave this chanting and singing and telling of beads! Whom dost thou worship in this lonely dark corner of a temple with doors all shut? Open thine eyes and see thy God is not before thee! He is there where the tiller is tilling the hard ground and where the path-maker is breaking stones. He is with them in sun and in shower, and his garment is covered with dust. Put off thy holy mantle and even like him come down on the dusty soil!

The dust of the labourer, which could be construed as unclean or demeaning, becomes a glorious badge of honour. Dust, as consciousness crafted through engagement with the world, will be a key product of spiritual pragmatics in which this chanting and singing and telling of beads is put aside. A spiritual pragmatist must open their eyes in order to see the world not as a reflection of their current expectations but as a field

136

M. BUSSEY

of possible transformations or what Deleuze and Guattari call becomings (1987). This is a collective task of co-evolving in which the work is as much about the encounter with the other as it is about the physical exertions of all who labour for deeper more inclusive futures for all. In this work the spiritual pragmatist takes responsibility for the kula that is our world. As such the work is both a be-homing and also a rehoming as we collectively join those in sun and in shower to re-establish the relational patterns that a spiritual pragmatics inspires. This invites in a neohumanity that promises a Renaissance of spirit in the world. Tagore worked for such a Renaissance in his Shantiniketan which was the expression of his deeply connected humanism. His poem here invokes the spirit of this spiritually pragmatic project in which humanity moves into balance with the natural world and in which culture shifts to allow for the realisation of human possibilities inherent to the work. The pedagogy of such a place is palpable. Such projects bring up the question: how do we balance ideology with the work? Pray speak beauty, we whisper; but dust first spoke. The work, the need must always lead us: we must come down to the dusty soil. It is the ground upon which we test our ideals. This is the basis for a spiritual pragmatics. Relational logic is pragmatic by definition, it invites us to participate in the emergence of a new process of being-becoming in which possibility is open, not fixed, and driven from the context by the unique within the general. When we ask about ideology, we are considering the issue of utopia. As Ashis Nandy quipped, one man’s utopia is another man’s terror (Nandy 1987). Pragmatic spirituality and its critique of what is given as reality, offers us a utopic to consider alternative eco-social arrangements (Bussey 2009). It is not utopia we strive for but eutopia,16 the good life.

Part 6: The Tasteless Water of Souls The poet has brought us to a new place where we can reimagine ourselves and our relationships. This is a place beyond identity where we drink of the tasteless water of souls. This is the grass that grows wherever the land is and the water is, This is the common air that bathes the globe. This is the breath of laws and songs and behaviour, this is the tasteless water of souls…this is the true sustenance.

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

137

Walt Whitman (2010: 23–24) Walt Whitman (1819–1892) was a great leveller. For him prince and pauper were on the same footing. The grass was the common denominator. Out of love the grass supports us all as we travel through life. Grass, as rhizome, acts as the fertile ground upon which social process unfolds (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). It is a metaphor for our humanity, our relational being in which what is common to all is definitional of us as opposed to what the ego would have us strive for in our separateness. In separateness we are brittle, vulnerable; not to the world, but to our own weakness. Whitman was no stranger to graveyards and the poor. For him culture was littered with graveyards, its core was to be found in what is common to all. Like Rumi he saw identity beyond the pallid markers we cling to in our ego-driven lives. For him the work of the world was the return to being beyond ego markers so that we can breathe the common air that bathes the globe. Spiritual pragmatics is a tool in our return. It offers a critique of the current modus operandi based on a spiritual relational consciousness. It anchors the spiritual pragmatist in their own inner work of becoming whole. This is a critically spiritual task which bears fruit in the lived world. Critical spirituality offers us a truth with two faces. The American Indian Black Elk (1863–1950) sums this up beautifully: You have noticed that the truth comes into this world with two faces. One is sad with suffering, and the other laughs; but it is the same face, laughing or weeping. When people are already in despair, maybe the laughing face is better for them; and when they feel too good, and are too sure of being safe, maybe the weeping face is better for them to see. (Neihardt 2008: 149)

The poor long for what they do not have and the rich worry about losing what they think they have. Neither are happy until they step beyond what confines them in time and place. The poor must be lifted up and the rich must learn to let go—in both instances they need to step beyond that which holds them in place. Whose is the easier task? Perhaps this is the wrong question as any task requiring us to rethink self and other is fraught with struggle. The spiritual work of becoming must be fed, however. We must sing of it; turn it into an art of becoming that collectively arises from being inspired by a task that can renew this world.

138

M. BUSSEY

P.R. Sarkar often spoke of this task. It is what lifts the spiritual aspirant from the mire of self into the light of a great work. Spiritual pragmatism, for Sarkar, was an invitation to fuse self-realisation with service to humanity. This he expressed in his philosophy of neohumanism and its socio-economic expression PROUT (Progressive Utilization Theory). Prout grounds neohumanism in people’s lives. For him the graveyard was where the Tantra of becoming was renewed. His was a poetry of self-transformation in which our re-homing hinged on an active engagement with the Divine. Thus, he offers both a pedagogy and a politics of possibility in which relational consciousness—a neohumanist critical sensibility—reframes epistemology and economics. Sarkar promotes such a shift because consciousness is deeply intertwined with our economic system; in fact, any engagement with consciousness invites a rethinking of how we relate through all of our systems (Sarkar 1992). Thus, spiritual pragmatics is an invitation to rethink these systems in the light of relational logic. When we are aware of relationship we become relationally alive to the other. The relational ethics of being this invokes challenges in any act that diminishes the possibilities of others from realising their potential. Such a consideration is not based on absolutes but on a negotiated awareness that in the field of spiritual pragmatics the unique plays out its emergent truth vis-à-vis the collective. For Sarkar this tension was the basis of neohumanist consciousness in which it is our awareness of relationship that shapes our becoming. For him such a stance is based on our relationship with the Divine, the Beloved, from which all other relationships spring. Many of Sarkar’s songs, his more than five thousand Prabhat Samgiita, sing of the Divine in personal terms. This personification is important as it moves the spiritual pragmatist from the horizontal, where ideology is a scaffold for social action, to the vertical characterised by a personal and relational dynamic that brings sweetness and confidence to all actions. Such songs move social action from the field of horizontal struggle to the vertical work that brings ontological depth and personal charm to our actions. When meaning is deeply anchored in resilient identity it cannot be diminished by the world of form. You have come today for suffering humanity, to remove the darkness from our minds and to love every living being. This world had lost all sign of happiness.

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

139

All the signs of suffering and pain were here, but you came to show a path of hope. You light the lamp of the earth brighter than ever before. You pour untold sweetness into the hearts of the suffering and downtrodden. You tell us to walk straight with heads held high.17

Such singing brings confidence and an aesthetic quality to the inner work and its outer expression. Spiritual pragmatists work with their heads held high. They offer us glimpses into human possibility and what moral courage, poetry and a deeply spiritual love can evoke in our lives. Those who take this task on are moving towards what Sarkar called sadvipra 18 status in which the sadvipra creates new spaces for human social evolution (Inayatullah 2002). They dream new dreams in which there is a reduction (not annihilation) of injustice. Thus, spiritual pragmatism is as concerned with poetry as with economics and the distributive systems that facilitate human and ecological well-being. In this song Sarkar is singing for the Divinity within us all; the Cosmic teacher as guru 19 who tears away the mental and spiritual darkness of ego and replacing it with the consciousness of relationship and home. The Guru within breaks down our own painful isolation and be-homes us again; singing of dust and travail while calling us ever deeper into the spiritual domain, the graveyard of ego and civilisational delusion.

Part 7: Questions not Answers It is tempting to play with a desire—a modernist compulsion—for final answers as New Zealand poet Dinah Hawken (1995: 24) observes. The Final Answer How can we live without questions when we don’t know the final theory? and if we know the final theory how will we live without questions? I like questions: they bring ligh

140

M. BUSSEY

at the end of a voice, space at the end of a word, time at the end of a sentence. I’ll have those three words brushed on my quiet face even when I know the final answer

Yet poetry helps displace this desire, white-ant this compulsion, by returning us to the graveyard which punctuates consciousness. The New Zealand poet Dinah Hawken (1943–) suggests such a punctuation by offering us questions as opposed to answers. Questions are like grass, they are humble and rhizomic in nature. Answers on the other hand are final. Terminal. Answers are great trees in the landscape of modern epistemology. They shut down possibility and cast long shadows. Spiritual pragmatism offers us questions as open-ended critique which acts as steppingstones into richer, deeper futures. This openness is essential. Hawken points to light at the end of a voice, space at the end of a word and time at the end of a sentence. All are liminal openings in her world where form dances with the formless. Voice, word and sentence are all artefacts of the horizontal. Certainly, they are necessary but without the vertical depth offered by light, space and time they leave the world bereft of deeper purpose and possibility. To return to an assertion I made at the opening of these reflections. Poetry offers us a symmetry of being in which head and heart are both validated while giving form to a spiritual pragmatics in which human potentiality is rehomed through a relational consciousness. Voice, words and sentences are structural elements that become more meaningful when caste against light, space and time. The final answer rightly eludes the seeker. Hawken imagines having the words light, space and time brushed onto her quiet face when she lies in the graveyard. This is so, she declares, even when I know the final answer. Such knowing is of course what gets her to the graveyard, as this site is another terminus for the seeker. For death follows the answer. Death is the shadow of the answer. The poet as archaeologist digs deep into culture and births the new from the old. Spiritual pragmatics is a form of cultural creativity that is arising because the material splendours of our world exist in the presence of so much misery. There is a distributive dysfunction at the heart of modernity. For all that has been achieved there is still so much more to

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

141

do. The world needs activists of all kinds to step forward. Thankfully there is no shortage of such people—see Paul Hawken’s (2007) book Blessed Unrest for a snapshot—and their struggle is to realise their inner riches while working for the world. Social mobilisation is a force sweeping the planet. Part of this stepping forward involves the reclaiming of the vertical amidst the struggles of the horizontal. We are being asked to engage a new vision of self and other that is approached subjectively through our own spiritual process while honing this as practice in the world of action. This suggests that spiritual pragmatism is part of a relational awakening that will propel us beyond the current constraints to imagination, heart and will. The language needed for this step is emergent and evokes a poetics of possibility. In such a poetics lies our spiritual potential for deep and meaningful relationship with the Cosmos and the Divine presence that guides us all in the work we do to birth a new humanity into being. In this work the poet and the mystic act as one in charting the depths of Being-Becoming while dancing and singing alternative inclusive futures into the world from the graveyards of culture.

Notes 1. Tantra, Sanskrit ‘that which liberates’. Tantricas in Indian tradition live and mediate in graveyards. Many engage in black magic. Others work for the world through deep spiritual practice of mediation and love. In the west Tantra is associated with sex, this is an ancillary element of tradition Tantra. 2. Deleuze looks at stuttering in a way not dissimilar to the description to Brahma’s blinking eyes. 3. Unpublished presentation at World Spiritual Transformation Forum Samgam, Bangalore February 13, 2012. Paper title: Spiritual Pragmatics and Practical Eco-Criticism. 4. Bhakta, Sanskrit for ‘devotee’. 5. Available at: https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/115470-what-can-ido-muslims-i-do-not-know-myself (Accessed January 5, 2020). 6. Atma, Sanskrit for Soul. 7. Kula, Sanskrit for ‘home’. 8. Nirguna, Sanskrit for ‘formless’. 9. Saguna, Sanskrit for ‘form’—the expressed universe. 10. Tapashya, Sanskrit for ‘service and sacrifice’. 11. Japa, Sanskrit for ‘repetition’ often refers to repetition of mantra (sacred sound/ideation).

142

M. BUSSEY

12. Guha, Sanskrit for ‘cave’. 13. Vaeragya, Sanskrit for ‘withdrawal’. 14. See the image here: https://www.pinterest.co.uk/pin/527624912568 171901/ (Accessed January 10, 2020). 15. Karma, Sanskrit for Work, Labour involving the physical exertion of the body; Yoga is a complex Sanskrit term—it translates as ‘unification’. This is a process orientation as unification for most of us is deferred. So yoga involves a series of practices (eight in total) involving the body, the mind and the spirit and is well defined in Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras. Karma yoga is the work we do as service to the world—service to the poor, to the environment—thus relief work, aid work, environmental restoration are all examples of karma yoga. 16. Eutopia, Greek, meaning the ‘good place’ as opposed to the ‘perfect place’ of utopia. 17. This is the translation of Prabhat Samgiita No. 647. The original appears in Bengali. See http://www.prabhatasamgiita.net/ (Accessed September 30, 2019). 18. Sadvipra, Sanskrit for ‘knower of truth’. 19. Sanskrit term: gu = darkness; ru = dispeller.

References Albrecht-Crane, C. 2005. Style, Stutter. In Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, ed. C.J. Stivale, 121–130. Chesham: Acumen. Bussey, M. 1999. The Healing Eye: Artistic Vision in the Thought of Prabhat Rainjan Sarkar. In Transcending Boundaries: prabhat Rainjan Sarkar’s Theories of Individual and Social Transformation, ed. S. Inayatullah and Jennifer Fitzgeral, 131–145. Maleny, Australia: Gurukula Press. Bussey, M. 2000. Critical Spirituality: Neo Humanism as Method. Journal of Futures Studies 5 (2): 21–35. Bussey, M. 2006. Neohumanism: Critical Spirituality, Tantra and Education. In Neohumanist Educational Futures: Liberating the Pedagogical Intellect, ed. S. Inayatullah, M. Bussey and I. Milojevic, 80–95. Taipei, Taiwan: Tamkang University Press. Bussey, M. 2009. A Utopic Reflection. Social Alternatives 28 (3): 57–58. Bussey, M. 2010. Microvita and Transformative Information. The Open Information Science Journal 3: 28–39. Bussey, M. 2011. Neohumanist Consciousness: The Next Evolutionary Step. Prout 22 (1): 14–15. Bussey, M. 2019. The Next Big Thing!. New Delhi: Studera Press. Bussey, M., Åse Eliason. Bjurström, Miriam. Sannum, Avadhuta. Shambushivananda, Mukisa. Bernard, Lionel. Ceruto, Muwanguzi. Denis, Ananta Kumar.

6

TOWARDS SPIRITUAL PRAGMATICS …

143

Giri, Asha. Mukherjee, Gennady. Pervyi, and Maria Victoria Pineda. 2012. Weaving Pedagogies of Possibility. In Learning for Sustainability in Times of Accelerating Change, ed. A.E.J. Wals and P.B. Corcoran, 77–90. Wageningen, NL: Wageningen Academic Publishers. Calasso, R. 1999. Ka, trans. T. Parks. London: Vintage. Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. B. Massumi. London and New York: Continuum. Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari. 1994. What is Philosophy?. New York: Columbia University Press. Derrida, J. 2005. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fox, M. 2003. Wrestling with the Prophets: Essays on Creation Spirituality and Everyday Life. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam. Giri, A.K. 2011. Gift of Knowledge: Knowing Together in Compassion and Confrontation. Sociological Bulletin 60 (1): 1–6. Hawken, D. 1995. Water, Leaves, Stone. Wellington, NZ: Victoria University Press. Hawken, P. 2007. Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming. New York: Viking. Hicks, E., and Jerry Hicks. 2006. The Law of Attraction: The Basics of the Teachings of Abraham. Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. Inayatullah, S. 2002. Understanding Sarkar: The Indian Episteme, Macrohistory and Transformative Knowledge. Leiden: Brill. Macy, J. 2007. World as Lover, World as Self . Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press. Nandy, A. 1987. Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Neidjie, B. 1989. Story About Feeling Broome. Western Australia: Magabala Press. Neihardt, J.G. 2008. Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux. Albany: State University of New York Press. Pinker, S. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence. London and New York: Penguin. Roy, P.K. 1990. Beauty, Art and Man: Studies in Recent Theories of Art. Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies. Rowbotham, D. 1994. New and Selected Poems. Sydney: Penguin Australia. Sarkar, P.R. 1982. The Liberation of Intellect: Neohumanism. Calcutta: Ananda Marga Publications. Sarkar, P.R. 1991. Microvita in a Nutshell. Calcutta: AM Publications. Sarkar, P.R. 1992. Proutist Economics: Discourses on Economic Liberation. Calcutta: Ananda Marga Publications. Sarkar, P.R. 2010. Yoga Sadhana: The Spiritual Practice of Yoga. Kolkata, India: Ananda Marga Publications.

144

M. BUSSEY

Svoboda, R.E. 1986. Aghora: At the Left Hand of God. Albuquerque, NM: Brotherhood of Life Books. Tagore, R. 2011. Gitanjali: Song Of Offering. Santiniketan: Vishva-Bharati Publishing Dept. Wexler, P. 2008. Symbolic Movement: Critique and Spirituality in Sociology of Education. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Whitman, Walt. 2010. Song of Myself and Other, Poems ed. Robert Hass: Berkely, Counterpoint Books.

CHAPTER 7

Mystical Pragmatics Paul Hague

Mystical Pragmatics is an intelligent way of collectively organizing our lives in harmony with the fundamental law of the Universe, which Heraclitus, the mystical philosopher of change, called the ‘Hidden Harmony’. However, Aristotle rejected this paradoxical both-and principle in favour of the divisive either-or Law of Contradiction, sending Western thought into the evolutionary cul-de-sac it is in today, based more on egoic analysis than on impersonal synthesis. This little-known basic design principle of the Cosmos, also called the ‘Principle of Unity’ or ‘Integral Tantric Yoga’, can be elegantly expressed in just seven words—Wholeness is the union of all opposites —or six mathematical symbols: W = A ∪ ~ A, where W means Wholeness, A any being whatsoever, ∪ union, and ~ not. From the perspective of Wholeness, opposites, also called dualities or polarities, cannot be separated; they are mutually dependent on each other.

P. Hague (B) Gothenburg, Sweden © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_7

145

146

P. HAGUE

This irrefutable truth can also be depicted in one simple diagram, showing that there is a primary–secondary relationship between the Ineffable, Nondual, Formless Absolute and the dualistic, relativistic world of form. In terms of Hegel’s dialectical logic, if Nonduality is the thesis and duality is the antithesis, then Wholeness is the synthesis. As a universal organizing principle, Mystical Pragmatics has evolved from David Bohm’s very general way of perceiving order in quantum physics: ‘to give attention to similar differences and different similarities ’, a notion of order that the artist Charles Biederman gave him. Bohm used the Principle of Unity and this simple ordering principle to reconcile the incompatibilities between quantum and relativity theories with the theory of the implicate order, which he regarded as a form of insight rather than a collection of symbols arranged on the printed page or stored electronically. As Albert Einstein wrote, ‘The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking’. This became crystal clear in the 1960s, when a group of mathematicians in the USA and UK introduced the ‘new maths’ into primary and elementary schools, attended by five–eight-year-olds. For thousands of years, we human beings had been using numbers without understanding how the concept of number is formed. This situation began to change at the end of the nineteenth century, when Georg Cantor developed the mathematical theory of sets, defined in this way: ‘By a set we mean the joining into a single whole of objects which are clearly distinguishable by our intuition or thought’. In other words, it is not possible to form the concept of three until the concept of set is formed.

Other examples of ubiquitous primary–secondary relationships are thus between set and number and semantics and mathematics. Recognizing such relationships, mathematicians introduced the abstract concept of

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

147

set into schools, so that children could intelligently and consciously learn how to form concepts, like distinguishing colours, shapes, and numbers in this illustration. This transcultural, transdisciplinary interpretative process is central to pattern recognition, conscious evolution, and all our learning. As the authors of The ‘New’ Maths pointed out, the new maths was intended to bring meaning to mathematics and hence to all other disciplines. But what are we interpreting when we form concepts in this egalitarian manner? Well, this became clear at the birth of the Information Society in the 1970s. In the data-processing and information-technology industry, information is data with meaning, where data, used in the singular, is the plural of Latin datum ‘that which is given’, from the Latin dare ‘to give; cause’. Information, on the other hand, derives from Latin inform¯ are ‘to give form and shape to, form an idea of’. However, data is much less than recorded facts, for facts, in themselves, involve some level of interpretation. To truly understand data, we need to study etymology, which Bohm aptly called the ‘archaeology of language’. For instance, data derives from a Proto-Indo-European (PIE) base *d¯ o ‘to give’, also the root of Sanskrit d¯ a ‘to give’. This means that before we interpret the meaningless data patterns of experience we need to recognize that they exist, constituting the entire Totality of Existence. Going deeper, we are led to the Datum of the Universe, as the Ultimate Donor of everything that exists in the ever-changing manifest world of form. This is the Absolute, the Immortal Ground of Being that we all share. The Datum alone—as the Divine Origin of the Universe—is Reality, which Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas called the Unmoved Mover: the Ultimate Cause of all change in the Universe. To establish this mystical worldview as sound science, we need to heal the deep split that began to open up between East and West some five thousand years ago, at the dawn of history and the birth of the first civilizations. On the one hand, Babylonians in Mesopotamia turned their attention outwards and began to map the skies, leading Western science to believe that the Universe is the physical universe of mass, space, and time and that all phenomena, including human behaviour, can be explained in terms of the laws of physics. On the other hand, Rishis in the Indus Valley looked inwards and discovered a quite different Universe, exquisitely expressed in the Sanskrit word Satchidananda ‘Bliss of Absolute Truth and Consciousness’.

148

P. HAGUE

However, materialistic, mechanistic science, based on a positivist philosophy, denies the existence of Reality. Similarly, for the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God is other; there is a great gulf between the Creator and created that can never be bridged. In contrast, the Rishis who wrote the Upanishads realized that Brahman and Atman—as the Absolute and Self, respectively—are One, declaring Tat tvam asi ‘That thou art’. This is a unifying principle that Meister Eckhart, the pre-eminent Christian mystic, also recognized when he said, ‘The eye with which I see God is the same as that with which he sees me’. As there is a primary–secondary relationship between Nonduality and duality, we are Divine, Cosmic beings having a human experience, not the other way round. In this holistic manner, we can learn to manage our business affairs in harmony with the basic law of the Universe, for pragmatics, as the science of business affairs, derives from Latin pr¯ agmaticus ‘skilled in business’, focusing attention on the relativistic world of form. Mysticism, on the other hand, is focused on being in egoless union with the Formless Divine. So Mystical Pragmatics is an oxymoron, unifying two extremes of human endeavour: mysticism and reason. With such self-understanding, grounded in the blissful experience of the Divine, we could transform today’s Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom Society into the eschatological Mystical Society—the Age of Light—as this diagram illustrates:

Peirce’s Architectonic The most significant precursor to Mystical Pragmatics is the architectonic of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce. However, Peirce (pronounced Purse) never completed his life’s mission ‘to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical sciences, in history, in sociology, and in whatever department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details’. To this end, Peirce made enormous strides towards the unification of mysticism and reason, viewing pragmatism, mathematical logic, philosophy, semiotics,

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

149

scientific method, and all other disciplines as various aspects of one underlying continuous reality. Let us then briefly review some key features of his integral philosophy, highlighting what is most relevant to the critical situation facing humanity today. Peirce founded the philosophy of pragmatism with an article titled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ in 1878, writing, ‘Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have’. Pragmatism in Peirce’s day was ‘A theory concerning the proper method of determining the meaning of conceptions’. To bring this basic principle up to date, the introduction to this essay has shown how we can achieve conceptual clarity, simplicity, integrity, and consistency in our mental models of the world we live in. Peirce’s pioneering studies of the calculus of relatives and first-order predicate logic have directly influenced the way that businesses are managed today. They have evolved into the abstract business modelling methods that information systems (IS) architects use to build the Internet. These mapmaking systems are of the utmost generality, applicable in all cultures, industries, and disciplines. If this were not the case, the Internet could neither exist nor expand at hyperexponential rates of acceleration. Influenced by his childhood hero Immanuel Kant, Peirce’s philosophy is essentially triadic, explained in an article in 1892 titled ‘The Architecture of Theories’: ‘First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation’. Peirce’s concepts of First, Second, and Third are thus similar to the three elements in the Principle of Unity, defined more specifically.

We see this triadic logic in virtually every aspect of Peirce’s philosophy. For instance, Peirce’s triadic approach to semiotics—the science of signs, which he cofounded with Ferdinand de Saussure—is illustrated in what

150

P. HAGUE

the cognitive scientist J.F. Sowa calls the ‘meaning triangle’. The referent here denotes the territory being mapped, which ultimately consists of data patterns emerging from the Datum of the Cosmos. De Saussure called both the concept and symbol that arise from the process of interpretation sign, distinguishing them with the words signified and signifier, where Peirce used interpretant and sign or representamen, respectively. So to share the experiences on which our writings are based, we must look and feel deeper than the words, which are just signs for symbols. Most particularly, if we are to rise above our machines, free of our mechanistic conditioning, it is vitally important to place the primary emphasis on the concept or mental image, rather than on the signifier, as is most commonly done today. For instance, the concept of tree could be represented by tree or arbre in English and French, respectively. No matter which language we use to express our ideas, we all have much the same understanding of the concept of tree. Similarly, we could have the number three in our minds as a concept, where the signifier, such as 3 or III, is called a numeral. And ultimately, while there is just one Absolute, which we all share, there are many beautiful names for God. If we are to end the holy wars—wars about the Whole—that have bedevilled human affairs for thousands of years, it is thus vitally important to transcend both the words and the categories. In particular, the distinction between numbers, as concepts, and numerals, as signifiers, is something that computers cannot make. Both concepts and the signifiers that represent them need strings of bits to denote them. This is the simplest way of proving that humans are not mere machines and therefore that technological development cannot drive economic growth indefinitely, requiring a radical change in the work ethic that has governed business since our forebears settled in communities to cultivate the soil and domesticate animals. Peirce’s thoroughgoing, systemic approach to making our ideas clear provides a triadic approach to the scientific method. In an article titled ‘Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis’ in 1878, Peirce realized that the terms in Aristotle’s syllogism could be arranged in three different ways, shown in the table below, later calling hypothesis abduction. Abductive reasoning seeks to determine the causes of the phenomena that we observe as symptoms, although this term is not widely used, even today.

7

Given Inference

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

151

Analytic

Synthetic

Deduction

Induction

Hypothesis

Rule Case Result

Case Result Rule

Rule Result Case

Deduction reasons from causes to effects Induction reasons from specific cases to general rules Abduction reasons from effects to causes

We need abductive reasoning to answer the most critical unanswered question in science: ‘What is causing the pace of scientific discovery and technological development to accelerate at exponential rates of change?’ Furthermore, Erich Fromm used abduction to suggest how we could heal our sick society in To Have or To Be? Specifically, he likened the medical healing process of symptom, cause, cure, and remedy to Shakyamuni Buddha’s Four Noble Truths, designed to free humanity from suffering. Most significantly, Peirce’s architectonic studies led him to a lifechanging mystical experience in 1892, writing in a letter, ‘I have never before been mystical, but now I am’. This experience led Peirce to see that there are no divisions in Ultimate Reality, which he saw as an Immortal Continuum, sometimes called ‘Field’ in science today. To denote this seamless, borderless worldview, he coined the word synechism ‘continuity’, from Greek synekh¯es ‘holding together, continuous, contiguous’. This is of central importance in Mystical Pragmatics. As Peirce wrote in an unpublished article titled ‘Immortality in the Light of Synechism’ following his profound mystical experience, ‘though synechism is not religion, but, on the contrary, is a purely scientific philosophy, yet should it become generally accepted, as I confidently anticipate, it may play a part in the “onement of religion and science”’. To see how Peirce’s architectonic could evolve into Mystical Pragmatics, we need to address the spiritual, scientific, and business aspects of human endeavour as a coherent whole. Let us therefore briefly explore three great movements unfolding in the world today: Spiritual Renaissance, Scientific Revolution, Sharing Economy, showing that they all share a common Ground and Context.

152

P. HAGUE

Spiritual Renaissance The essence of the Spiritual Renaissance taking place in the West today is that an increasing number of spiritual seekers are realizing that they live in union with the Divine, contrary to the teachings of the Abrahamic religions, which distance humanity from the Transcendent Absolute, which provides the Cosmic Context for all our lives. Accordingly, it is a cultural taboo to affirm, ‘I am Love’, which is our Authentic Self, the Immanent Divine Essence that we all share. To avoid charges of heresy and blasphemy, ‘Even the mystics of Jewish and Christian tradition who seek to find their identity in God often are careful to acknowledge the abyss that separates them from their divine Source’, as Elaine Pagels tells us. One who didn’t was the popular Sufi poet Rumi, who beautifully said, ‘Love is the sea of not-being and there intellect drowns’. We then realize that what scientists call ‘reality’ is nothing but an illusion, called m¯ ay¯ a ‘deception, appearance’ or l¯ıl¯ a ‘play of the Divine’ in Sanskrit. As the entire world of form is just an appearance in Consciousness, this means that time, which appears real as we go about our daily lives, is also an illusion. And so too is the entire process of evolution. To make sense of this situation, following the fundamental law of the Universe, we look at evolution, not in terms of the horizontal dimension of time, but from the perspective of the vertical dimension. To rise above our machines, free of the past and future, it is essential to live primarily in the Now, recognizing, with John of Patmos, ‘I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last’.

From this Timeless perspective, morphogenesis takes place in the Eternal Now, originating in the Absolute Datum, the Formless

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

153

Continuum that is the Alpha Point of the Universe. The upwards movement in this diagram thus represents evolution as the growth of structure, culminating in Wholeness, in what Aurobindo called Supermind: ‘The Supermind is the Vast; it starts from unity, not division, it is primarily comprehensive, differentiation is only its secondary act’. As the French palaeontologist, geologist, and Jesuit priest Pierre Teilhard de Chardin pointed out with his law of complexity-consciousness, the greater the complexity, the greater the consciousness. Conversely, the downwards movement is an involutionary one, leading to Oneness and No-mind, typically approached through spiritual practices, such as the many different types of meditation and yoga.

Realizing through time that only the Timeless Now is Reality is the essence of what Joseph Campbell called the Cosmogonic Cycle, depicted in this schematic life-and-death curve, where the vertical dimension of time is represented in the horizontal, as the Ground of Being. As Campbell says, ‘Redemption consists in the return to superconsciousness and therewith the dissolution of the world. This is the great theme and formula of the cosmogonic cycle, the mythical image of the world’s coming to manifestation and subsequent return into the nonmanifest condition’. As the diagram graphically illustrates, all beings in the Universe are born to die, or, in the case of mammals, birds, and reptiles, at least, are conceived to die. Being free of the fear of death lies at the heart of the Spiritual Renaissance taking place today, metaphorically described in the myths and fairy tales of all cultures and times, which Campbell brilliantly synthesizes.

154

P. HAGUE

In brief, the hero’s journey consists of three major stages: separation or departure, initiation, and return: ‘A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man’. Shakyamuni Buddha encapsulated the basic principles underlying the spiritual quest in his three marks of being (trilakshana): Nothing whatsoever in the Universe is permanent (anitya) and if we do not recognize this fundamental principle of existence, we shall suffer (duhkha). The way to end suffering is to pass through a psychological death, free of the sense of a separate self, of attachment to the egoic mind (Anatman), leading to Moksha ‘liberation’ and Nirv¯ ana ‘extinction’. The principal reason why spiritual seekers have traditionally left the society in which they live is that when people are preoccupied with everyday affairs, they tend to become detached from Reality, suffering from fragmented, split minds. As J. Krishnamurti wisely said, ‘It is no measure of health to be well-adjusted to a profoundly sick society’. However, Mystical Pragmatics requires us to take our mystical experiences directly into science and business, thereby cocreating quite new institutions that are grounded on the Truth—the ‘Pathless Land’. If today’s infants are to have any chance of growing old enough to have children of their own, we need to be totally free of our cultural conditioning. For Eckhart Tolle writes in A New Earth, ‘We are a species that has lost its way’. Vimala Thakar therefore asks, ‘Do we have the vitality to go beyond narrow, one-sided views of human life and to open ourselves to totality, wholeness?’ As she says, ‘The call of the hour is to move beyond the fragmentary, to awaken to total revolution’. Etymology shows us the key to this revolution. Calvert Watkins explains that human derives from Latin humus ‘ground, earth’, from PIE base *dhghem—‘earth’, showing that our forebears some 7000 years ago conceived of humans as earthlings in contrast to the divine residents of the heavens. So the split between humanity and God lies deep in the collective unconscious. To be humble, which derives from the same root, is therefore to deny our Divinity, as the patriarchal religions tell their followers to do. Accordingly, it is arrogant to realize and acknowledge our True Nature as Divine Beings, arrogance being the opposite of humility.

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

155

Scientific Revolution The essence of today’s revolution in science is twofold. First, scientists are beginning to realize that fundamental problems in astrophysics and quantum physics can only be resolved by recognizing that Consciousness provides the Contextual Foundation for all our lives. Secondly, many can see and feel, as evolution accelerates inexorably towards Wholeness, that no beings in the Universe are ever separate from any other, including the Supreme Being.

To establish these fundamental facts of existence as sound science, we turn what is called ‘science’ today outside in and upside down. First, to put Western civilization back on its feet—for today it is standing on its head—we map the Cosmic Psyche through self-inquiry, following the maxim that Thales and six other wise men inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi: ‘Know thyself’. Secondly, we are engaged in a contextual inversion, returning Western science to Reality and the Truth, depicted here. This is similar to the Copernican Revolution, when Johannes Kepler proved mathematically that the planets ‘circle’ the Sun in ellipses, as they had been doing for four and a half billion years, contrary to the beliefs of the Aristotelians and Christians in the Middle Ages. In today’s heliocentric revolution, we recognize that the Coherent Light of Consciousness exists in Eternity as Ultimate Reality, contrary to what many believe in today’s Dark Ages. Thomas S. Kuhn called such a revolution in worldview and scientific practice paradigm change or shift, from Greek paradeiknumi ‘show side by side’. For Kuhn, ‘normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time for its further practice’. In contrast, ‘at times of revolution, when the normal scientific tradition changes, the scientist’s perception of his environment must

156

P. HAGUE

be re-educated—in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt’. However, today’s scientific revolution is not a paradigm shift or change, for Consciousness, as a Continuum, is not a pattern. For ever since the early days of our species, humans have ‘sensed’ the Presence of Reality, from Latin præsentia, participle of præesse ‘to be before’, from præ ‘before’ and esse ‘to be’. Presence thus literally means ‘before being’ or ‘prior to existence’, and as the meaningless Datum of the Cosmos, it is prior to interpretation by a knowing being. So, rather than regarding the physical universe as the overall context for all our lives, we are beginning to realize that the Ocean of Consciousness is all there is, providing the Contextual Foundation that we need to interpret the meaningless data patterns of experience as meaningful information and knowledge. ¯ asha, Another term for Ultimate Reality is Akasha, from Sanskrit Ak¯ corresponding to Greek aither ‘pure, fresh air’, in Latin æther, ‘the pure essence where the gods lived and which they breathed’, which is quintessence, the fifth element, the others being fire, air, earth, and water. But what is this quintessential æther and how can we know of its existence, never mind that it is Ultimate Reality? Well, in 1887, Albert Michelson and Edward Morley showed in a famous experiment that an ‘æther wind’ could not be physically detected as the Earth passed through the supposed æther. Nevertheless, scientists today are increasingly recognizing the existence of the Æther, which is just another name for God. For instance, the systems philosopher Ervin Laszlo uses the word Akasha to refer to the Universal Quantum Field. He took the word from Vivekananda’s Raja Yoga: ‘Everything that has form, everything that is the result of combination, is evolved out of this Akasha.… Just as Akasha is the infinite, omnipresent material of this universe, so is this Prana the infinite, omnipresent manifesting power of this universe’, called Life in English. Having dispersed the clouds of unknowing that prevent the Coherent Light of Consciousness from radiating uninhibitedly through us, we then use Self-reflective Intelligence—the eyesight of Consciousness—to map the Cosmic Psyche, recognizing that the observer and observed are one, a principle that brought Bohm and Krishnamurti together about 1960. Thinking in this self-inclusive way is rather like a TV camera filming itself filming, illustrated by M.C. Escher’s famous lithograph ‘Drawing Hands’.

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

157

It is in this wholesome manner that evolution can become fully conscious of itself. For our minds create our ‘reality’, not the other way round. There is no objective physical world independent of a knowing being, implicit in Alfred Korzybski’s famous assertion, ‘A map is not the territory it represents’. Rather, we only see territories through our maps, radically changing what we believe to be the Territory. For instance, the brain arises from Consciousness, not the other way round. Self-reflective Intelligence, sometimes called the Witness in spiritual circles, is what distinguishes humans from the other animals and machines, like computers, clearly indicating that all attempts to build machines with artificial intelligence are bound to fail. We can see this most clearly through the semantic modelling methods that information systems architects use to build the Internet. Foremost among these is the relational model of data, which Ted Codd of IBM derived from mathematical structures that evolved from Peirce’s Algebra of Logic. Codd’s 11-page paper introduced a nondeductive logic, allowing paradoxes to be included in semantic reasoning, the most fundamental change in Western thought since Aristotle. Yet, this is just commonsense, for you cannot order a book or airline ticket on the Internet without invoking the relational model behind the scenes. The key point about IS modelling methods is that they are so general and abstract that they can be used in any industry whatsoever, whether it be manufacturing or retail, educational or medical, or banking or governmental. This is because all organizations have a deep underlying structure, reflecting that of our minds and hence the Cosmos. To complete today’s scientific revolution, we need to bring these implicit patterns into consciousness so that evolution can become explicitly conscious of itself within us humans. The result of this experiment in learning is transcultural Integral Relational Logic (IRL), the universal system of thought that we all use everyday to form concepts and organize our ideas in tables and semantic networks. IRL is based on E.F. Schumacher’s maxim for mapmaking: ‘Accept everything; reject nothing,’ allowing self-contradictions to be included, rejected from axiomatic linear logic. As the world is essentially

158

P. HAGUE

paradoxical, if we do not include paradoxes in our maps, they lead us dangerously astray as we navigate our way on our journeys through life.

IRL has become manifest through the Logos ‘the immanent and rational conception of divine intelligence governing the Cosmos’. It thus provides the Gnostic Foundation, coordinating framework, and Cosmic Context for ‘all knowledge’, the much sought-for but disparaged theory of everything, called the Unified Relationships Theory (URT), as this diagram illustrates, depicting the completion of Peirce’s architectonic. The URT is so named because relationships are a special case of fields in science and relationships make the world go round. IRL is the art and science of consciousness that underlies the sciences and humanities, healing the split between mystical psychology and mathematical logic. Transdisciplinary IRL is thus the primary discipline, replacing deductive logic, mathematics, physics, biology, and any other discipline that claims to be the most fundamental. Art and science derive from PIE bases *ar—‘to fit together’, also root of harmony and order, and *skei—‘to cut, split’, also root of schizoid. So artists put back together the distinctions that scientists have discerned. As IS architects are helping to drive the pace of social change exponentially, we can use IRL to develop a comprehensive model of the psychodynamics of society. For systems designers do not look at business enterprises in terms of the mass, space, and time of physicists. Rather, they look at society, and hence the Universe, in the abstract terms of form, structure, relationship, and meaning. This perspective enables us to state a unifying definition of evolution in whatever domain growth and development might occur: Evolution is an accumulative process of divergence and convergence, proceeding in an accelerating, exponential fashion by synergistically creating

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

159

wholes that are greater than the sum of the immediately preceding wholes through the new relationships that are formed, apparently out of nothing. As Jan Christian Smuts put it, “Evolution is nothing but the gradual development and stratification of progressive series of wholes, stretching from the inorganic beginnings to the highest levels of spiritual creation.” Teilhard refined this evolutionary worldview, looking at evolution in four stages since the most recent big bang 13.7 billion years ago: physical, biological, mental, and spiritual, taking place in four realms, each nested into the succeeding one. These we can call hylosphere, from Greek hul¯e ‘matter’, biosphere, from Greek bios ‘life’, noosphere, from Greek noos ‘mind’, and numinosphere, from Latin n¯ umen ‘divinity’. To reach the Omega Point of evolution, in the manner that Teilhard foresaw, we start afresh at the very beginning, at the Alpha Point, in a process that Arthur Koestler called paedomorphosis ‘the shaping or forming of the young’, in contrast to gerontomorphosis ‘the shaping or forming of the old’. For as he put it, ‘gerontomorphosis cannot lead to radical changes and new departures; it can only carry an already specialized evolutionary line one more step further in the same direction—as a rule into a dead end of the maze’. During paedomorphosis, on the other hand, evolution retraces its steps to an earlier point and makes a fresh start in a quite new direction. Paedomorphosis is thus a rejuvenating, renascent process; it leads to new vitality, new energies, and new possibilities. As Teilhard prophesied, we are currently in the middle of a 100-year transition period between the third and fourth stages, which we can call the mental-egoic age (the self-centered me-epoch, focused on conflict and competition) and the age of universal spirituality (the socially centered usepoch, focused on peace and cooperation). As he said, ‘The way out for the world, … the entry into the superhuman, will … yield only to the thrust of all together in the direction where all can rejoin and complete one another in a spiritual renewal of the Earth’.

Sharing Economy Having realized that none of us is separate from the Divine, Nature, or anyone else for an instant, we can invoke the social movements of Spiritual Renaissance and Scientific Revolution to cocreate the life-enhancing Sharing Economy, giving everyone on Earth the opportunity to realize their fullest potential as human beings.

160

P. HAGUE

The Sharing Economy is so-named because we all share the same Genuine Identity as the Cosmic Divine, being governed by the Principle of Unity—the Hidden Harmony. For identity derives from Latin idem ‘same’. Furthermore, the information in today’s Information Society has properties that are quite different from commodities. When a teacher gives information to her pupils, nothing is exchanged; they share knowledge, unlike goods we exchange for money in supermarkets, for instance. So in the eschatological Age of Light, we realize that in Reality there is no doership, or indeed ownership, as Advaita sages, like Ramesh S. Balsekar, former president of the Bank of India, taught. However, this realization is not easy while people are preoccupied with their livelihoods within the economic machine. To effectively deal with humanity’s challenges, we urgently need to establish a work ethic where spiritual awakening and psychological development have top priority, enabling us to recognize that the biggest threats to our health, well-being, and survival as a species are our fear and ignorance, rather than economic collapse, peak oil, rapid climate change, global water crisis, population growth, and species extinction, for instance. A society based on fear rather than Love is not sustainable. Following the invention of the stored-program computer, this is the only viable way forward for humanity. It is no longer true that humans are both workers and consumers in the economy, as articulated by Adam Smith in the opening words of The Wealth of Nations, the book that laid down the foundations of capitalism (and communism): ‘The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consists always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations’. Such a radical change in the way we conduct our business affairs is absolutely essential at the present time because the computer is a machine quite unlike any other that the Homo genus has invented during the past two thousand millennia. For unlike the flint axe, wheel, printing press, telescope, steam engine, and telephone, for instance, which extend our rather limited physical abilities, the computer is a tool of thought, able to extend the human mind, even in some cases replacing it. It is thus a fundamental misconception that technology can resolve humanity’s current crisis and heal our wounds. Only the awakening of Intelligence can do that. For humans are the leading edge of evolution, not computers.

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

161

As well as changing the way we work, we also need a radically new system of governance. We can see the increasing ungovernability of society in the polarization of political conservatism and liberalism, from Latin liber ‘free’. Yet, while conservatism is a natural state, called homeostasis ‘same state’ in systems theory, it is not a viable option at these times of accelerating rates of change. As the world of learning is much fragmented and deluded, even democracies are not viable, for they are as tyrannous as the despots they seek to replace. Living in unprecedented times, we cannot get to where we are going by starting where we are today. Rather, the population at large needs to pass through an apocalyptic death and rebirth process, for apocalypse derives from Greek apokalupsis, from apokaluptein ‘to uncover, reveal’, from apo ‘from, away’ and kaluptra ‘veil’. So apocalypse literally means ‘draw the veil away from’, indicating the disclosure of something unseen by the mass of humanity: the Hidden Harmony, the fundamental law of the Universe. Some evolutionary visionaries have observed that evolution is currently passing through the most momentous turning point in its entire history, called the Singularity or Accumulation Point in mathematical and systemstheory terms. For instance, John L. Petersen writes, we are currently entering a ‘historical, epochal change—a rapid global shift unlike any our species has lived through in the past.… There are no direction-pointing precedents for what is coming, … there is no one alive today who [has] lived through anything like what we’re anticipating’. The most critical issue is whether the Internet will continue functioning after the inherently unstable financial infrastructure of society collapses. In practical business terms, as the Internet is implicitly built on IRL, the Internet could provide the continuity we need to intelligently complete the transition into the glorious Age of Light. For money is a type of information and so can be represented in the business modelling methods of IS architects. But the meaning and value of information cannot satisfactorily be represented in the quantitative financial models of management accountants, investment bankers, and economists. However, the central problem here is that money is an immortality symbol, as Ernest Becker, the Pulizer prize-winning author of The Denial of Death, points out, intended to assuage the fear of death that arises from separation from our Immortal Ground of Being. So to question the role of money in society can raise intense existential fears. The anthropologists Marcel Mauss and A.M. Hocart have shown that money originated in

162

P. HAGUE

religion, in the sacrifices that archaic societies made to the gods, in an attempt to find Wholeness. For Sacrifice derives from Latin sacr¯ are ‘to make holy’, from sacer ‘sacred, holy’, and facere ‘to make’. So sacrifice literally means ‘make Whole’. Mapping human ontogeny onto phylogeny, the first humans were like infants in adult bodies, having little conceptual knowledge of the world they lived in. Nevertheless, they could feel the Presence of the Divine, beyond the physical senses. But what were they to make of what must have been a mystifying experience? Well, feeling empathetically into their wonderment, we can sense that they were aware that what they were receiving was a gift of the Divine, as the Datum of the Universe. But what could be given could be taken away; what could be created could also be destroyed, beyond their control. To deal with this perplexing predicament, the ancients invented deities to represent the Divine energies that they felt within themselves, projecting them outwards as distinct beings. Then, as humans began to feel more and more separate from each other and the Divine, money was invented as a means to facilitate trade, money deriving from Latin Moneta, cult name for the goddess Juno, in whose temple coins were minted. In particular, gold came to represent the substance that gives people status and security. For gold is yellow and shiny, like the Sun, which was one of the first deities to be worshipped, as a projection of the light of Consciousness radiating from our Divine Source. Money is undoubtedly the strangest concept that humans have ever invented. In essence, it is information, just a measuring stick for determining values, like a clock or thermometer. However, it has become reified as a commodity with value, to be bought and sold, like food and clothes. There is nothing more symptomatic of our insane society. If there were no money to fund wars, they could not happen. Furthermore, we have egoically reified information and knowledge in intellectual property laws, such as copyright, patent, and trademark, attempting to manage society within an obsolete materialistic, mechanistic worldview. We can see quite clearly that money is an immortality symbol from the tower blocks that banks build in the center of major cities. As James Robertson points out, these buildings play a similar role in society today to the cathedrals that dominated the centers of medieval cities. Both serve to reinforce our belief in immortality symbols; in the Middle Ages, the notion of a personal God, and today, money. As he goes on to say, ‘The theologians of the late middle ages have their counterpart in the

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

163

economists of the late industrial age. Financial mumbo-jumbo holds us in thrall today, as religious mumbo-jumbo held our ancestors then’. This is the most critical point. When people’s precarious sense of security and identity is based on immortality symbols, they do their utmost to defend them, even to the death. Because immortality symbols take on absolutist values, they are the root cause of the holy wars that are still ravaging the world. Rather, when we realize that there is no other in Wholeness, we become free of projections and introjections that disturb politics and so many human relationships. This is the basis on which we could cocreate the Sharing Economy, collectively living in harmony with the fundamental law of the Universe. At the time of writing, it is not possible even to outline the technicalities of this healthy way of managing our business affairs, for the Alliance we need to design the global information system for the Mystical Society is still in a very early stage of development. All we can do is visualize a global sangha, for as Thich Nhat Hanh has said, the next Buddha—as Maitreya, the ‘Loving one’—may be a community practising mindful living rather than an individual. Sanskrit maitreya means ‘friendly, benevolent’, from the same PIE base as community, from Latin comm¯ unis ‘shared, common, public’, originally in sense ‘sharing burdens’, from cum ‘together with’ and m¯ unus ‘office, duty; gift, present’, from m¯ unare ‘to give, present’. There is no need to live in the fear of God or deny the existence of God, as theists and atheists do. In the holographic Universe, God is no longer a mystery, for in IRL the concept of the Absolute is formed in exactly the same way as all other concepts, rationally and scientifically confirming the mystical experiences that humans have been ‘sensing’ for millennia. May we all soon be able to view humanity’s destiny realistically, beyond optimism and pessimism, hope and despair, realizing that no one can return Home to Wholeness, for nobody has ever left Home. For then we could live in Love, Peace, and Harmony with each other and our environment for as long as there are humans dwelling on our beautiful planet Earth.

164

P. HAGUE

References Aurobindo. 2001. The Life Divine. Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Balsekar, Ramesh S. 1992. Consciousness Speaks. Redondo Beach, CA: Advaita Press. Barker, Charles M., et al. 1965. The ‘New’ Maths for Teachers and Parents of Primary School Children. London: Arlington Books. Becker, Ernest. 1985. Escape from Evil. New York: Free Press. Blau, Evelyne. 1995. Krishnamurti. New York: Stewart, Tabori and Chang. Bohm, David. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Brent, Joseph. 1993. Charles Sanders Peirce. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Campbell, Joseph. 1968. The Hero with a Thousand Faces. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chandler, Daniel. 2006. Semiotics. London: Routledge. Codd, Ted. 1970. A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared Data Banks. Communications of the ACM 13 (6): 377–387. de Saussure, Ferdinand. 1959. Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library. Einstein, Albert. 1973. Ideas and Opinions. London: Souvenir Press. Fromm, Erich. 1979. To Have or To Be?. London: Sphere. Happold, F.C. 1970. Mysticism. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hocart, A.M. 1952. The Life-Giving Myth. London: Routledge. Isaacson, Walter. 2007. Einstein. London: Simon & Schuster. Kepler, Johannes. 1992. New Astronomy, trans. William H. Donahue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koestler, Arthur. 1975. The Ghost in the Machine. London: Picador. Korzybski, Alfred. 1994. Science and Society. Englewood, NJ: Institute of General Semantics. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. Laszlo, Ervin. 2012. The Akasha Paradigm in Science. Cardiff, CA: Waterside Publications. Mauss, Marcel. 1954. The Gift, trans. Ian Cunnison. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pagels, Elaine. 1990. Adam, Eve and the Serpent. London: Penguin. Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1992. The Essential Peirce, vol. 1. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1998. The Essential Peirce, vol. 2. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Petersen, John. 2008. A Vision for 2012. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing.

7

MYSTICAL PRAGMATICS

165

Robertson, James. 1985. Future Work. Aldershot: Gower/Maurice Temple Smith. Rumi. 1981. Rumi • Fragments • Ecstasies, trans. Daniel Liebert. Cedar Hill, MT: Source Books. Schumacher, E.F. 1978. A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Abacus. Smith, Adam. 1998. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smuts, Jan Christiaan. 1996. Holism and Evolution. Highland, NY: Gestalt Journal Press. Sowa, J.F. 1984. Conceptual Structures. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. 2003. The Human Phenomenon, trans. Sarah Appleton-Weber. London: Sussex Academic Press. Thakar, Vimala. 1984. Spirituality and Social Action. Berkeley, CA: Vimala Programs California. Tolle, Eckhart. 2006. A New Earth. London: Penguin. Turchin, Valentin. 1977. The Phenomenon of Science. New York: Columbia University Press. Watkins, Calvert (ed.). 2000. The American Heritage Dictionary of IndoEuropean Roots. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

CHAPTER 8

Pragmatism and Spirituality in Anthropological Aesthetics Janusz Baranski ´

The title of this article obliges us to invoke Clifford Geertz’s (2000: 96) opinion from his essay Art as a Cultural System, which in fact, is consistent with the more general heuristic formula developed by this master of interpretative anthropology: The talk about art that is not merely technical or a spiritualisation of the technical—that is, most of it—is largely directed to placing it within the context of these other expressions of human purpose and the pattern of experience they collectively sustain. No more than sexual passion or contact with the sacred, two more matters it is difficult to talk about, but yet somehow necessary, can confrontation with aesthetic objects be left to float, opaque and hermetic, outside the general course of social life. They

This project was financed from the funds of the National Science Centre according to Decision No. DEC-2013/09/B/HS3/03590. J. Baranski ´ (B) Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_8

167

168

´ J. BARANSKI

demand to be assimilated. (…) The chief problem presented by the sheer phenomenon of aesthetic force, in whatever form and in result of whatever skill it may come, is how to place it within the other modes of social activity, how to incorporate it into the texture of a particular pattern of life. And such placing, the giving to art objects a cultural significance, is always a local matter.

Geertz uses the two terms art and aesthetics. This comes as no surprise, since aesthetics is most often understood as the theory or philosophy of art. Geertz also seems to anticipate the indefiniteness of the two terms, albeit he does not dissect or analyse them in detail, even though doing so would help him to establish a clear borderline between the terms, or at least to indicate the relationships between them. On the other hand, he emphasises the ‘texture of a particular pattern of life’ and ‘cultural significance’, without which anthropologists would be at a loss to comprehend the category we understand in a satisfactory manner under the cryptonyms art and aesthetics. Geertz’s Art as a Cultural System is a good point of reference for the considerations that are presented in this article, which attempts to expand upon the inspiration provided by Geertz’s essay, but to do so with respect to aesthetics rather than to art, as I find the former to constitute a broader category than the latter. I shall attempt to ‘stand on Geertz’s shoulders’, as he himself puts it in his discussion on the metaphorically cumulative character in which scientific knowledge is established (Geertz 1973: 25), in order to once again draw from his laconic but nonetheless extremely accurate definitions and thus, perhaps, to lay down the foundations for anthropological aesthetics. In fact, a focus on aesthetics is nothing new in today’s scientific field of anthropology and its subdisciplines, such as ethnolinguistics, ethnomusicology, the anthropology of literature or the anthropology of art. However, as far as broadly-defined aesthetics is considered, perhaps a more apt term would be the anthropology of aesthetics or, better still, anthropological aesthetics. According to my knowledge, as yet, neither of these subdisciplines exists. While it is true that a book by Piotr Kozak (2013), which was published in Poland a few years ago, contains the term anthropological aesthetics, it is purely a philosophical work (a study on Alexander Baumgarten’s concept of aesthetics), which uses the term to denote the philosophical character of aesthetics. Also, while it is true that Jacues Maquet (1986) proposed the term aesthetical anthropology with respect

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

169

to anthropology as an empirical science, the term seems too narrow, or even inaccurate and misguiding. In his work, Maquet addresses fine art from an anthropological perspective; hence, his term is devised specifically for this occasion. However, the term is too narrow, as it concerns only a selected portion of aesthetic expressions, i.e. a respected form of art; and it is also too narrow because it brings to mind such names as aesthetic medicine or aesthetic cosmetology. Transcultural aesthetics, a term that is best represented (with respect to both its scope and its approach) in Polish academic literature by Krystyna Wilkoszewka’s (2004) book bearing the same title, seems inadequate as well. Wilkoszewska’s paper reviews selected forms of aesthetics from various cultural origins, in deference to Geertz’s postulate that aesthetics should be treated as a ‘local matter’. However, while her book’s greatest strength lies in its comparative aspect, which Wilkoszewska uses to highlight the abundance of ways in which the world can be experienced aesthetically, the book does not go beyond this ethnic criterion. Consequently, the most adequate term, with respect to the subject matter of this article, is anthropological aesthetics. This term suggests a particular understanding of aesthetics. Specifically, the adjective anthropological underlines the exceptional approach to aesthetics as an evaluative experience, through which we make value judgments. This approach is characteristic for anthropological analyses. However, it should not be construed as a complete detachment from philosophical reflection, even though pure aesthetics (the main branch of modern-age aesthetics derived from Kant’s teachings) is not my main point of reference, as it leads to the formalisation of the terms that are applied to fine art, including those that apply to the superior category of beauty. It is worth noting at this point that it was Kant who indicated the existence of an inferior (in his opinion) type of aesthetic experience, i.e. sublimity, which concerns everyday experiences and is determined by a sensual taste rather than a reflective taste. Kant’s taxonomy and his axiologisation of the two types of aesthetic experience and, consequently, the two types of aesthetic products, ultimately establishes art, from the philosophical point of view, as an autonomous field of human activity, which is an approach that was suggested as early as during the Renaissance. Unfortunately, Kant’s proposal results in a type of reductionism, which enforces the use of an analytical, deeply European criterion of aesthetics and, even worse, introduces a hierarchy within the experience of aesthetics. In my opinion, the philosophical interpretation of the concept of anthropological aesthetics proposed in this article should be sought not in

170

´ J. BARANSKI

the philosophy of modernity, which is represented here by Kant, among others, but instead is found in the beginnings of Greek philosophy. For instance, Kozak devotes much attention to the conceptual origin of the term aisthesis based on his analysis of the work by Baumgarten, who is the creator of modern aesthetics (2013: 99): The term appears for the first time in Parmenides, who uses it to distinguish between sensual perception and higher, rational, cognition. The former originates from, and is related to, corporeality. Plato, on the other hand, understands aisthesis as sensual experience, or perception. In Theaetetus, he states that the object of perception and perception itself are inseparable. Perception may also come in different types, such as visual, aural or olfactory perception, as well as in types that so far have not been named. However, perception is always separate from rational cognition (noesis ).

Perhaps the most well-known understanding of aisthesis comes from Aristotle, who also considers it to be a form of sensual perception: ‘(…) the act of perception, which involves a sense responding to stimuli that come from an appropriate property of a given object, such as a colour or sound. These stimuli activate the mind and allow it to accept and dematerialise the sensual form of this object’ (Kozak 2013: 100). Thus, sensual perception precedes rational perception as well as any conceptualisations, including artistic ones, even though in practice it is difficult to separate aisthesis from noesis. This concerns a particular, ‘dematerialised’ (to quote Kozak) type of sensuality that displays a certain amount of regularity, has a relatively stable form and is objective; but most importantly, the manifestations of this type of sensuality are subjected to an evaluation. Wolfgang Welsh (2005: 44), a proponent of such an understanding of aesthetics (aisthesis ), notes in this context that ‘we find the behaviour of a gourmet to be aesthetic, but not the behaviour of a glutton’ (translated from the Polish). This example takes us further into an anthropological exploration. Ordinary food, according to Welsh, may have an aesthetic quality, but at the same time it is a form of everyday reality, and of life in its original dimension. However, the food assumes a particular form and content not only in relation to its sources, which frequently depend on the natural conditions (hunting, farming, fishing or a mix thereof); but also, and primarily, in relation to how it is cooked, served and consumed (whether

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

171

it is stewed or fried, served as a single course or a series of courses or served at a particular time of day; whether there are any prohibited products or differences in the food depending on a person’s affiliation or social position; and other considerations). It is especially the second determinant that has already gained a cultural character, and thus can be treated as an example of a thematic reduction that delineates the scope of anthropology. Specifically, it indicates that anthropology encompasses culture as a way of life. In other words, anthropology pertains to everything that is related to the human condition, which in turn is always replete with meanings, values, beliefs and techniques—from the aforementioned food to the attitude towards transcendence. Once we realise that even ‘ordinary’ food has this attribute of aestheticism, rather than, for instance an ‘extraordinary’ still life painting that depicts the same food, it becomes even more obvious that aestheticism belongs to all aspects of human life and ways of living. However, few anthropologists—despite anthropology’s empirical orientation—have ever realised this fact, even though it originates far back in antiquity. As a result, generations of anthropologists have followed in Kant’s footsteps (as the discipline itself emerged after Kant), aiming to discover the aesthetic attributes among Poles, the residents of Krakow, the Yoruba people or indigenous Australians with respect to their various practices and forms of art—sculptures, music, dance or songs. These investigations have involved a process of double reduction. Firstly, the anthropologists have tended to reduce aesthetics to a pure and formalised, or even institutionalised, dimension of human expression, as is dictated by the modern paradigm. Secondly, the purified aesthetics is then forced into the aforementioned European categories, according to which a painting exhibition should contain different kinds of material than the theatrical stage. All of this has been done notwithstanding the fact that all people, whether they are mentioned in this article or not, originally had no such criteria. This means that the entirety of this anthropological research (descriptive, explanatory and interpretative alike) has been in vain, as it has ignored all local dimensions of aesthetics. Indeed, most languages do not include the terms aesthetics or art, which means that the relevant ideas do not appear in the local conceptualisations. Furthermore, sometimes forms of expression that would be considered as art from the European viewpoint, such as the rich ornamentation of religious artefacts created by the peoples of New Guinea, are not considered as especially noteworthy by the locals (Forge 2006). The opposite is also true: in Japan, brewing

172

´ J. BARANSKI

tea is considered as qualitatively similar to what Europeans would recognise as art. In both of these examples, as well as in many others known to researchers, the primary attribute is not the artistic value but, for instance, is the magic and ritualism of certain actions and artefacts, which are only relevant within their cultural (social or religious) context, and where the practising or manufacturing of them is meant to bring economic prosperity, good interpersonal relationships or a successful communion with the transcendental reality. Unfortunately, the aforementioned paradigm, according to which aesthetics is identified with art, has also affected the anthropology of art. After all, the name of the sub-discipline itself uses the category of art which, as stated above, is not universally recognised or accepted. Let us quote Wilkoszewska, who associates this act of reductionism with modernism: Modernity has forgotten about the roots of art and has torn it away from the context of life. Modernity puts fine art in opposition to utilitarian art, secluding the former in museums. This modernist – and thus historically limited – notion of art as an autonomous field claims pretence to universality, while preventing us from understanding art in other cultures. Indeed, no other culture has ever put such a strong divide between art and all other areas of human activity. If we wish to respect the art of different cultures, that is, to explore the value of this art, we must revise our notion of fine art with all of its ballast of European meanings. (Wilkoszewska 2004: 12)

It is not the aim of this article to revise the notion of fine art, even though doing so would lead us to a better understanding of the subject in question. However, it should be noted that anthropological reflection has fortunately always included a movement that focuses on investigating the non-artistic functions of (rather artificially delineated) art. Again, philosophical reflection proves to be useful here. For instance, even in 1966, Stanisław Ossowski indicated that the autotelicity of ‘pure’ art needed to be distinguished from the heterotelicity of art that is enmeshed in various cultural contexts (1996: 294). For example, while folk art can be represented by religious sculptures or by paintings, it is their religious function that determines their unique value, rather than their supposed artistic value. Indeed, in this respect, folk art has much in common with all forms of religious art, political art and contemporary critical art than with fine art. In all of these cases, the aesthetic dimension seems to play a

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

173

secondary role, and merely aids in the already-established religious beliefs, political ideologies or social programmes. Therefore, aesthetics proves to only constitute a perceptual or conceptual framework, depending on the iconicity of a given artistic endeavour. What is more, this framework is not a pre-constructed matrix that is used to systematise an experience (even though this aspect also manifests itself to a certain extent). Rather, the framework takes its properties from the dimensions of the structure and agency, the dimensions of sensuality and mentality, and from the dimensions of the collective and the individual. In this way, the aesthetic experience takes place according to many different criteria and trajectories. As Welsh notes, ‘Aesthetic experience as a whole distinguishes itself through a combination of contemplation, imagination, and reflection’ (1997: 20). These three categories can be translated into senses, content and rationality, respectively. An aesthetic experience, in turn, comprises not only visual data, but can encompass auditory, tactile, olfactory and taste data as well. From this perspective, aesthetics is not only transdisciplinary—drawing from the findings of many disciplines, such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology or psychology—but it must also encompass the non-artistic aspects of the reality within its transcultural dimension. These non-artistic aspects also pertain to the culturally established significance of the human senses (and, consequently, forms of art) which, after all, aid in human perception and in the experience of reality. Indeed, the intercultural perspective includes a variety of the types of such significance: from the dominance of the visual sense, which is characteristic of the European tradition (which in turn, determines the aesthetics of paintings, sculptures and other forms of artistic expression) to the dominance of the tactile, which is characteristic of Japanese tradition and gives a greater value to fancifully shaped ceramics that include many different textures. Other qualifications and value judgments can also be found, such as the dominance of the olfactory sense in Arabic tradition; the kinetic dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa or even the thermal dominance among the Tzotzil people in Mexico, whose reality can be evaluated based on heat (Wieczorkiewicz 2004: 97). These divisions of the senses cannot even be considered as a particular Eurocentric approximation, as different cultures define them in different ways. Consequently, the philosophical musings of the aestheticians need to be complemented by empirical research, including anthropological research. Hopefully, this research will conclude that, after Howard Morphy, ‘I tend to underline the relativity of

174

´ J. BARANSKI

the independence of cultural aesthetic effects, rather than their absolute autonomy. People are socialised in a particular aesthetic system, which is an inseparable aspect of their culture’ (2004: 119) (translated from the Polish). This definition of aesthetics is notably closer to how Pierre Bourdieu understands folk aesthetics, which is the reverse of Kantian aesthetics, i.e. pure aesthetics that precludes any deliberateness apart from that contained in a piece of art itself. In our case, such deliberateness—or the non-aesthetic function of art and all forms of creativity—does exist: ‘Working-class people expect every image to explicitly perform a function, if only that of a sign, and their judgements make reference, often explicitly, to the norms of morality or agreeableness’, as Bourdieu notes (1996: 5). The dimensions of folk aesthetics are not limited to their religious functions; nor to the aforementioned functions of morality or agreeableness. If we define folk, meaning a people, in a broader sense—thus ridding the term of its historical class connotations—we will conclude that, apart from the aforementioned transcultural view of aesthetics, there are as many aesthetics as there are peoples: Poles, Russians, residents of Krakow, residents of Alsace, Evenks, the Yoruba people and so forth. Indeed, each of these peoples provides examples of changing stylistics in their dress, whether that dress pertains to a social membership, religious ceremony and a given people’s attitude towards a personal god, totemic ancestor or forces of natures, or to body ornaments that inform others about one’s marital status or even one’s sexual availability. Finally, aesthetics is also present in the very basic (from the viewpoint of everyday human activity) dimension of work, which is related to its relevant requirements concerning attire, etiquette and interior (office and workshop) design. Sometimes an act is itself governed by the same requirements as the art of reaping wheat, as described by Włodzimierz Pawluczuk (1968), which used to be a common activity in bygone days. The sheaves would have to be of an appropriate length or thickness so that they could be aesthetically arranged in stacks or in barns. However, this definition of the aesthetics of work not only concerns bygone traditional cultures. After all, we appreciate aesthetically pleasing work to this day, and perhaps even more so than in the past. This is best illustrated by the art of designing, which is not only practiced—as is evidenced by patterns on fabrics, shapes of cars or interior decorations—but is even taught in special art degree courses. At this point, I would like to go beyond simply invoking this obvious fact, which, as some may argue, is a sign of the on-going aestheticisation

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

175

of contemporary reality, as is the existence of the many different aesthetics that are governed by particular peoples, as Bourdieu, Wilkoszewska and all the other transcultural aestheticians believe. In fact, this last demarcation criterion should be expanded with the rules according to which aesthetics varies according to age, gender, social membership, education, occupation and lifestyle. Various peoples, as well as various typological criteria, provide examples of this variability, which furthermore, increase over time. This is evidenced by the differences between the various aesthetics of European sculpture, including the Palaeolithic (e.g. the Venus of Willendorf), Renaissance (e.g. Michelangelo), the avantgarde and the numerous contemporary neo-avant-garde enterprises. This variability also concerns all folk aesthetics, which encompass not only local forms of sculpture, but also fashion, attitudes towards nature and etiquette. Furthermore, these folk- and non-folk-related divisions result in many hybridisations: such as the different aesthetic forms of the Hip-Hop subculture in the US, Poland and the Philippines. In his analysis of this musical scene, Richard Shusterman (2000) indicated that Hip-Hop, as a subcultural and musical movement, was equally as worthy of attention and of aesthetic judgments as other, acknowledged, musical genres. He also stated that because Hip-Hop is a form of art that constitutes an entire lifestyle, understanding it requires us to take into account a variety of different contexts, such as the relationships between Hip-Hop and the broader social environment, the attitude towards former traditions, the content of the songs and the related neologic inventiveness and the manners in which the songs are expressed and received or the changes in their reception. In this sense, the role of Hip-Hop extends beyond its music or lyrics. It is worth noting that this is true for all folklore, e.g. traditional African dance with its characteristic ‘interdependence or cooperation between dance patterns, music, rhythms or even lyrics and the poetry thereof’, as LilianaBieszczad (2004: 187) writes. The analogy between Hip-Hop and African dance is especially justified due to the former’s roots in the cultural traditions of Africa, which is present in many ways in the birthplace of Hip-Hop (the US). Nonetheless, this structural, all-encompassing trait of all folklore and its main ‘descendant’, pop culture, can be found everywhere. The same trait again leads to various adaptations, migrations of form and content and syncretic creations. Shusterman notes that the techniques used in Hip-Hop—namely, scratching, scratch mixing and punch phrasing—‘ give rap a variety of forms of appropriation, which seem as

176

´ J. BARANSKI

versatile and imaginative as those exemplified by Duchamp’s moustache on the Mona Lisa, Rauschenberg’s erasure of a De Kooning canvas, and Andy Warhol’s multiple re-representations of prepackaged commercial images’ (Shusterman 2000: 205). This similarity between Hip-Hop and folklore proves even more intriguing in the face of Shusterman’s proposal that it should be treated equally to what is referred to as high art. While he does not go so far as to suggest that folklore and fine art should also be treated as equal, it is a conclusion that follows naturally, and not simply by means of the logical transitivity of the implications. This is because, in Shusterman’s opinion, neither popular nor elite creations can be understood solely through the criteria of a formal analysis. Geertz agrees with this view, stating that ‘one can no more understand aesthetic objects as concatenations of pure form than one can understand speech as a parade of syntactic variations, or myth as a set of structural transformations’ (Geertz 2000: 98). He illustrates his statement with a line, which is a category of formal analysis. On the one hand, a line is abstract and transcends any particular culture; but on the other, its meaning can vary greatly between cultures. For instance, from the viewpoint of Yoruba aesthetics, a line constitutes much more than a simple artistic composition, as western tradition would describe it. A line occurs in all of the scarification practices among the Yoruba people, where the scars perform a social function, which in turn performs a religious function (ibid.). While Shusterman openly admits to being directly inspired by pragmatism, the same inspiration is not as obvious in Geertz. Nonetheless, several concepts—from the understanding of a culture as a network of signs, to the thick description method—indicate that a part of Geertz’s interpretative anthropology originates from this branch of American philosophy. In fact, it was pragmatism that safeguarded the heteronomity, pluralism, antiessentialism, antiformalism, anti-elitism and processualism of the human world and its axiology, including the aesthetics and the rules through which we learn about the world and gain knowledge in general. From this perspective, aesthetics (which some authors somewhat artificially separate from the entirety of human life for their analysis purposes), along with the experiences and creations that are related to it, forms a type of practice within a culture that is anthropologically defined as a lifestyle. In this form, aesthetics is present in many types of cultural phenomena: from folklore, through to fine art and pop culture (represented here by Hip-Hop), to fashion, etiquette and a common material culture. A

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

177

common material culture can also sometimes constitute an extension of the aesthetic values that determine our choice of everyday clothing or the furniture in our homes. In this context, Shusterman follows his philosophical mentor, John Dewey (1975), and extends the notion of aesthetics by postulating that aesthetics should be associated with life itself, since life always constitutes a type of practice, and is sometimes even a project that has the characteristics of art. Dewey suggested that we should take into account the ‘external facts’, i.e. the natural environment and the entirety of human life, in order to adequately understand an artistic creation. He based his postulates on ontological monism, which is present both in his philosophy and in Geertz’s anthropological theory. Note that this monism leads to significant theoretical consequences in our understanding of humanity and of its consciousness, cognitive tools, ideals and values. Thus, this perspective underlines the relationship between humanity and the environment, where experience is a function of humanity’s participation in the world and the changes we make to it. In a similar fashion, humanity’s cognitive processes, including various terms, are the tools with which we interact with the world. In essence, these are tools of action, rather than simply tools used to recreate a pre-existing state of affairs. What is more, our thoughts are made up of emotions, value judgments and all the possible contexts that determine what particular ‘truth of here and now’ we arrive at. Truth is thus measured according to its effectiveness; hence, verity judgments belong not only to science, but to other branches of culture as well, such as to religion or everyday life, and logic and mysticism are equally valid tools of cognition. This monism also opposes the Cartesian dualistic understanding of reality, composed of idealism (facts are secondary) and positivism (only facts matter). We can add folklore studies to this list of worldviews. In fact, according to Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, folklore studies belong to the same pragmatic tradition of thought. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett adds that everything which gives form to a value can be regarded as art, including the art of everyday life. This form does not have to meet any particular criteria of beauty. Art is not being restored to everyday life here; nor can we encounter the art of everyday life in art galleries, as everyday life is a different type of art that is represented by the interiors of houses, meals, conversations, etiquette, clothing, gardens and parades. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett goes as far as to describe the Corpus Christi procession as ‘performance art par excellence’ (Gablik 1995: 417). In contrast, as

178

´ J. BARANSKI

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett bitterly remarks, the Art World, which—according to the institutional concept of art (Danto 2006)—determines the criteria of art, is not considered as an example of a religious procession, since it only approves that which is available on the commercial market, and the commercial market has nothing to do with aesthetics and everything to do with money (Gablik 1995: 418). If that is the case, then can a financial value be considered as an aesthetic criterion? Thus, the immanently pragmatic perspective of the aforementioned philosophers and the related folklore studies prove to overlap with the more general paradigms of anthropology, which is represented here by Geertz, who considers human culture to be all-encompassing and continuous in character. This makes a culture permeate—in a manner that is undetectable in practice—everything to which we traditionally attach a taxonomic label. What is more, the great number of situationally, environmentally and, in general, contextually sanctioned criteria of truth, good and beauty—to invoke the three philosophical universal values—makes it impossible to indicate any single conceptualisation that is in force. In fact, these and other such qualifications are only analytical structures that have been created for the purposes of philosophy and the specialised disciplines of knowledge and analysis. Małgorzata Cymorek notes that ‘To isolate the aesthetic experience from the life experience in the creations of African culture is to impoverish both’ (2004: 205) and ‘Western high music, known as classical music, seems to be enclosed within the walls of an imaginary museum’ (2004: 208). However, the aforementioned anthropological framework indicates that the same is true not only of the ‘creations of African culture’, or of music. Dewey underlines this fact through his pragmatically-oriented aesthetics of continuity, which ties together art and life, and thus eliminates this artificial dichotomy along with ‘the dichotomies of body and mind, material and ideal, thought and feeling, form and substance, man and nature, self and world, subject and object, and means and ends’ (Shusterman 2000: 13–14). Bourdieu formulated his concept of aesthetics in the same spirit. He referred to aesthetics ‘in itself’, rather than ‘for itself’ (1996: 4). Furthermore, the latter form of aesthetics is ‘self-aware’, and is related to the post-Kantian understanding of an autonomous creation that is subject to contemplation, criticism and analysis. In turn, the former does not distinguish any finished or internally taxonomised set of creations (sculptures, literature or music); rather, it expresses the ‘naive’, direct perception that is emotionally, socially or religiously loaded. ‘Aesthetics in itself’ may refer

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

179

here to one of the aforementioned types of creations. For instance, the artistic value of a sculpture that depicts a holy person in a given religion would be secondary in terms of the viewer’s personal experience or contemplation. Instead, the most important aspect of the sculpture will be its teleological, hagiographical or historical content, or its content in relation to a particular community of believers, regardless of any scientific qualifications. Furthermore, ‘aesthetics in itself’ also concerns a dimension that is greatly different from the more acknowledged forms of art, namely, to everyday life, as the power with which we experience and perceive everyday life is no weaker than the power that pertains to the autonomous ‘aesthetics for itself’. Thus, aesthetics is equally as pertinent to paintings, sculptures and drawings as it is to interiors, clothing, the human body, everyday objects and etiquette, or to the aesthetics of existence, as Dorota Koczanowicz (2008) refers to this dimension of experiences. In his publication on everyday aesthetics, Tom Leddy (2004: 4) notes that even the usual route that he travels along during his journey from his home to his work at a university campus can be considered as an aesthetic experience. This experience forms an extremely complex whole that concerns not only man-made objects but natural features as well. Leddy uses the terms everyday aesthetics and environmental aesthetics to describe the experiences of civilization and of nature, respectively. However, civilization and nature usually blend together to form an indistinguishable whole that is composed of visual, olfactory and auditory experiences and is related to a myriad of stimuli, such as the sight of the shining sun combined with the clouds above and with the buildings that we pass by, vegetation blooming in the spring or withering in the autumn combined with shop windows, the vitality or pain in our bodies combined with the refuse spilling out of garbage cans, birdsong or traffic combined with the clothing of the passers-by. Leddy explains that this type of direct inflow of external stimuli may be transformed into a reflective project if our creativity begins to treat each stimulus as a separate source. As a result, a piece of art, such as a photograph, is created through a technique that is accessible to nearly all of us; and thus, the normally ephemeral experiences are immortalised in a photograph. However, we now know that photography, or any other acknowledged form of art, does not necessarily have to sanction the preceding experience as an aesthetic one. The experience does not even have to take a material form, and may instead remain purely as emotions, such as satisfaction,

180

´ J. BARANSKI

agitation, inspiration or shock. Even if it does take a material form, the art may not show any exceptional traits that would be discernible from the outside, or it may show such traits to a varying extent. These conclusions come not from philosophical musings, but from the empirical research conducted by Paul Willis among British youth. Willis focused on everyday life, which he defines as common culture, i.e. the popular and shared (to some extent) methods through which we make sense of life and find a sense of purpose in it. The content of common culture consists of, on the one hand, music, dance and media broadcasts—which are dimensions that are shaped by the external scenarios of everyday life—and, on the other hand, by interiors and human interactions—which are dimensions that lend themselves more to the individual creativity of each social actor. These dimensions of human interaction with reality involve the constant symbolic work that is performed by individuals and groups—who can both create and reproduce other people’s work—using verbal language, body language and material objects (Willis 1990: 10–12). It seems that the various scripts of everyday life are becoming an even greater part of the aesthetic experience today than they did during the time of Willis’s research. In particular, the material environment seems to be an increasingly prominent part of the peculiar culture of gadgets (from cell phones to cars), in which aesthetics is accompanied by the economic, social and gender-related dimensions, forming an inseparable and dynamic whole. The creative component of these practices is aesthetics (as defined above) and specifically, the contextually determined grounded aesthetics (as Willis calls it). Grounded aesthetics is a term used to express the values and emotions related to bodily experiences, and to imbue reality with broadly-defined axiological values. Therefore, it should be noted that this approach is somewhat related to Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s aforementioned proposal to treat aesthetics as one of the categories of ‘giving form to a value’. DorotaKoczanowicz expands upon Dewey’s concept of ‘the art of life’. She states, ‘Everyone can be an artist if they treat their own life as the material to work with. Common experiences can gain an aesthetic aspect if we use our creativity to give form to the shapeless process that we call life’ (Koczanowicz 2008: 108). There are as many forms of aesthetics (i.e. art) as there are fertile soils from which they can grow. These different aesthetics may also be common, in contrast to the elitist and uncommon aesthetics which constitute an autonomous dimension and an object of analysis. Furthermore, these forms of aesthetics are connected to the dimensions of the senses, emotions and direct experience, rather than to

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

181

an image or a text, and they undergo a constant process of ‘symbolic mediation’, i.e. the establishment and expression of meanings depending on the circumstances and the participants (Willis 1990: 22–26). The term grounded indicates the indelibility of such common aesthetics, which we all experience and practice. Under this definition, everyday aesthetics in a way complements the unusual, elitist aesthetics, which tends to be expressed in a formalised, but not necessarily permanent, manner. However, everyday aesthetics is a much vaster dimension that eludes the customary, predictable analyses. Moreover, it is rarely the subject of conscious reflection; rather, it is tied directly, inseparably and in a self-explanatory manner to everyday practices. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Geertz, a master of interpretative anthropology, postulates that aesthetics ‘cannot be a formal science like logic or mathematics, but must be a social one like history or anthropology’ (Geertz 2000: 118). This is because this broadly-defined aesthetics, which encompasses many human worlds, cannot be reduced to a single explanatory interpretation, because each instance of aesthetics is grounded in a specific space-time context that requires a thick description to be understood, as Geertz proposes. This emic methodological directive, which is related to the methodology of grounded theory, stipulates that term-based categories should be obtained directly from the empirical data, and that any previous a priori pre-categorisations pertaining to everything that is elitist or popular, high or low and professional or amateur should be ignored. Thus, there can be as many theories of aesthetics as there are the grounds of aesthetics. However, the baroque sculptures within these grounds may have little in common with folk sculptures or with ready-made sculptures; and additionally, these grounds will designate other functions, canons, criteria or interpretations. In terms of its onto anthropological status, grounded aesthetics resembles historical folk aesthetics, Bourdieu’s ‘aesthetics in itself’ and— according to Kirshenblatt-Gimblett—folklore. Specifically, KirshenblattGimblett draws an analogy between folklore and the aforementioned everyday aesthetics (1983). All of these types of aesthetics concern every human being, but their criteria differ considerably. In this sense, the aesthetic values are, so to say, democratic, and they are ultimately evaluated through the aesthetic experience. Also, the aesthetic values are subjective rather than objective, although various authors have attempted to objectivise them to a certain extent by categorising them according to age, gender, ethnic membership, class and many other criteria related to

182

´ J. BARANSKI

social affiliations, which determines the discreteness of a given collective entity. Sometimes, however, this objectivisation is limited to an individual horizon in the aesthetics of existence, as Koczarowicz explains. These different aesthetics are neither related to any class of objects nor to a class of emotions. Instead, as Bohdan Dziemidok (2002: 291) notes on the subject of aesthetic values, they ‘are the result of a particular relationship between certain properties of a given object and the emotions related to that object’. With this statement, Dziemidok admits that, as the aforementioned pragmatism suggests, since all facts involve a number of value judgments and all values depend on empirical experience, it follows that there exists an inseparable relationship and interdependence between the object of cognition and the individual who performs the cognition. The empirical reality is the human reality. From this perspective, this means that the reality also belongs to a specific cultural framework, and this framework gives each of us the authority to experience reality in an aesthetic manner. In other words, every human action is potentially aesthetic. To paraphrase Geertz’s view on art, a theory of aesthetics must also be a theory of culture, rather than an autonomous enterprise (Geertz 2000: 109). However, as should be mentioned again at this point, this theory does not concern any single universal theory of culture, as such a theory— according to Geertz—is impossible to create. Rather, this concerns a theory of a particular case, and in Geertz’s words, the task here is ‘not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them’ (Geertz 1973: 26). Finally, one could say that, if the above interconnected pairs are treated as the emblems of each epoch in the history of humanity, we are witnessing a meeting between pre-modernity and post-modernity. After all, we began with the ancient understanding of aisthesis, which is the aesthetics of the first philosophers and is an immanent and inseparable part of cognition through practice, rather than a part of any mental legitimising activities, in order to arrive at the contemporary grounded aesthetics of the common people. As with aisthesis, grounding, everyday life and Willis’s common culture do not demand legitimation. Rather, they are a part of the culture of ‘ordinary’ people and of the ‘ordinary’ culture of the people. In other words, this concerns culture as a way of life that manifests itself in an endless number of forms of adaptations to the natural environment, sanctionings of social relationships, constructions of a network of meanings, stereotypes, opinions, beliefs, role models, rituals, lifestyles, ideas and ideals. From this perspective, aesthetics becomes part

8

PRAGMATISM AND SPIRITUALITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

183

of a uniform axiological background that involves only proto-aesthetics or proto-ethics (1999: 57), which Shusterman refers to as the ethics of taste (2000: 243). Indeed, Koczanowicz goes as far as to say that today, everyday ethics—or, as she calls it, the aesthetics of existence—is a reaction to a crisis of ethics: ‘The aesthetics of existence has emerged as a new strategy for the existence of an individual, if that individual is unable to base his or her attitudes in any universal rule’ (Koczanowicz 2008: 156– 157). From a philosopher’s standpoint, this universal rule is represented by an intentionally adopted system; whereas from an anthropologist’s standpoint, it is represented by culture in its various ethnic and typological versions. Thus, we may talk about an alethic truth of life, (which is also a truth of life) that finds legitimacy in the original, pre-philosophical and uniform attitude towards reality, in which ontology, axiology and epistemology still live together and give human existence an irreducible meaning. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), we must also state that these and similar analyses eliminate this original, conceptual attribute of innocence.

References Bieszczad, Liliana. 2004. Taniec w afrykanskim ´ kontek´scie kulturowym––próba badan´ estetycznych. In Estetyka transkulturowa, ed. Krystyna Wilkoszewska, 181–192. Krakow: Universitas. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cymorek, Małgorzata. 2004. Estetyka jako medium trans kulturowe? Na przykładzie autochtonicznej muzyki afrykanskiej ´ (studium wst˛epne). In Estetyka transkulturowa, ed. Krystyna Wilkoszewska, 193–212. Krakow: Universitas. ´ Danto, Arthur. 2006. Swiat sztuki, trans. Leszek Sosnowski. Warsaw: Jagiellonian University Press. Dewey, John. 1975. Sztuka jako do´swiadczenie, trans. Andrzej Potocki. Wrocław: Ossolineum. Dziemidok, Bohdan. 2002. Główne kontrowersje estetyki współczesnej. Warsaw: PWN. Forge, Anthony. 2006. The Abelam Artist. In The Anthropology of Art, ed. Howard Morphy and Morgan Perkins, 109–121. Oxford: Blackwell. Gablik, Suzi. 1995. Conversations Before the End of Time. Dialogues an Art, Life & Spiritual Renewal, 410–433. New York: Thames and Hudson. www.nyu. edu/classes/bgk/web/gablik.pdf.Retrieved on June 11, 2012.

184

´ J. BARANSKI

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books. Geertz, Clifford. 2000. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York, NY: Basic Books. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara. 1983. The Future of Folklore Studies in America: The Urban Frontier. Folklore Forum 16: 175–234. Koczanowicz, Dorota. 2008. Do´swiadczenie sztuki, sztuka zycia. ˙ Wymiary estetyki Pragmatycznej. Wrocław: University of Lower Silesia Press. Kowalski, Andrzej Piotr. 1999. Symbol w kulturze archaicznej. Poznan: ´ Institute of Philosophy Press. Kozak, Piotr. 2013. Wychowa´c boga. Estetyka antropologiczna Alexandra Gottlieba Baumgartena na tle my´sli niemieckiej pierwszej połowy XVIII wieku. Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press. Leddy, Tom. 2004. The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics. In The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, ed. Andrew Light and Jonathan Smith, 3–22. New York: Columbia University Press. Macquet, Jacues. 1986. The Aesthetic Experience: An Anthropologist Looks at the Visual Arts. New Haven: Yale University Press. Morphy, Howard. 2004. Postrzegaj˛acrdzenn˛asztuk˛eaustralijsk˛a, trans. Maria Korusiewicz. In Estetyka transkulturowa, ed. Krystyna Wilkoszewska. Krakow: Universitas. Ossowski, Stanisław. 1966. Dzieła, t. 1, U podstaw Estetyki. Warsaw: PWN. ´ Pawluczuk, Włodzimierz. 1968. Swiatopogl˛ ad jednostki w okresie rozpadu tradycyjnej społeczno´sci terytorialnej. Studia Socjologiczne 3–4 (1968): 243–266. Shusterman, Richard. 2000. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Welsch, Wolfgang. 1997. Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics: Towards a New Form of the Discipline. Aesthetics and Literature 7 (1997), http://openjourn als.library.usyd.edu.au/index.php/LA/article/view/5251/5957.Retrievedon October 19, 2016. Welsch, Wolfgang. 2005. Estetykapozaestetyka. ˛ O nowa˛ posta´c estetyki, trans. Katarzyna Guczalska. Krakow: Universitas. Wieczorkiewicz, Anna. 2004. W stron˛e estetyki podrózniczego ˙ smaku. In Estetyka transkulturowa, ed. Wilkoszewska, Krystyna, 89–112. Krakow: Universitas. Willis, Paul. 1990. Common Culture: Symbolic Work at Play in the Everyday Cultures of the Young. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Wilkoszewska, Krystyna. 2004. Ku estetyce transkulturowej. Wprowadzenie. In Estetykatranskulturowa, ed. Krystyna Wilkoszewska, 7–20. Krakow: Universitas.

PART II

Pragmatism and Spirituality: Border-Crossing Adventures, Creative Experiments and New Pathways of Planetary Realizations

CHAPTER 9

Peirce’s Semiotic Pragmaticism and Buddhist Soteriology: Steps Towards Modelling “Thought Forms” of Signlessness Alina Therese Lettner

Introduction: A Peircean Semiotic Model of Thought Forms Building upon Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmaticist theory of thoughtsigns, the following essay intends to further develop my semiotic model of thought forms (Lettner forthcoming a & b) in order to tentatively accommodate the Buddhist soteriological goal of signlessness. In ordinary contexts of cognition and communication, “forms of consciousness” are embodied and embedded in various forms of social practice, including conventional sign processes like language and conceptual construction. By means of such karmically conditioned forms of psychophysical embodiment, “thought forms” are pragmatically enacted as lived forms of meaning-making, i.e. “life forms”. Belonging to the “Thirdness” of Peircean “habits”, life forms can be seen to correspond to habitual

A. T. Lettner (B) University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_9

187

188

A. T. LETTNER

patterns of bodily, linguistic and mental behaviour, i.e. “habitual dispositions” (Sanskrit samsk¯ ˙ ara; P¯ali sankh¯ ˙ ara)1 in Buddhist terms. These dispositional formations are crucial to the Buddhist soteriological aim of “rectifying our cognitive activities” (Lusthaus 2002, p. 4): for liberation means freeing ourselves from deeply ingrained habits that unconsciously control and distort our view of reality in the form of cognitive, dispositional, and psychological tendencies (cf. p. 53). While the mediating power of representation—which is comparable to the description of “apperception” or “conceptual identification” (S. samjñ¯ ˙ a, P. saññ¯ a ) in Buddhism—requires “Thirdness” in Peircean terms, the level of facticity and individual existence associated with “Secondness” can help us to understand how knowledge is constituted through reference to some “object” (cf. S. vis.aya): a notion that is captured in the context of the Buddhist theory of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana). And yet, at a more fundamental level of experience, perception also comprises the immediacy or “Firstness” of phenomenal forms of consciousness (S. vijñ¯ an.a, P. viññ¯ an.a). Clearing the ground for signlessness, in the present essay I can only hint at “mindfulness” (S. smr.ti, P. sati) as cultivated in the context of the five cardinal virtues in Buddhism and briefly touch upon the three doorways towards liberation, i.e. “emptiness” (S. ´s¯ unyat¯ a, P. suññat¯ a ), the “signless” (S. ¯ animitta; P. animitta) and the “wishless” (S. apran.ihita, P. appan.ihita) (cf. Conze 1962: 47ff., 56ff.). However, in order to contextualise the complex feedback relations between psychological, ontological and soteriological forms of being and knowing, the idea is to model the workings of “thought forms” with regard to the “five aggregates” of empirical personality (S. pañcaskandha, P. -kkhandha) and put them into the larger context of “dependent arising” (S. prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada, P. pat.iccasamupp¯ ada). In so doing I will draw upon Peirce’s conception of semiosis for bringing into view the karmic conditioning and psychophysical embodiment of phenomenological events (dharmas ), which in Buddhism are seen to operate without the assumption of a permanent self. This interpretation is hoped to bring into view both theoretical and methodological synergies between Peirce’s semiotic pragmaticism and Buddhist soteriology. Such a reconstruction is hoped to yield a comprehensive model of thought forms that will allow us to accommodate the signless pragmatics of the Buddhist meditational path towards liberation. More precisely, the methodological groundwork for the present paper has been laid by the transdisciplinary model of a “semiotic philology

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

189

of thought forms” with regard to the classical intellectual traditions of India and Europe (Lettner forthcoming a) and further developed into a cybersemiotic philology of Buddhist knowledge forms (Lettner forthcoming b; cf. a. Brier 2008). Before turning to explore the Buddhist liberational modality of signlessness, let us briefly take a look at how sign processes can be captured by a Peircean model of thought forms: i.e. a model developed from Peirce’s theory of “thought-signs” and the notion that “whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign” (CP 5.283). In keeping with his three universal (phenomenological as well as ontological) categories, Peirce describes the sign as a genuine triadic relation between a First, a Second and a Third, i.e. between a representamen, an object and an interpretant (cf. CP 2.228; CP 2.274). Thus, in formal terms, every triadic thought-sign (Sheriff 1994: 35) involves (1) “quality” in the form of the representamen; (2) “existent fact” by being connected in some specific way to the thing it signifies, i.e. the object and (3) “thought” by determining another thought-sign, i.e. the interpretant by creating “in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign” (CP 2.228, ca. 1897). By mapping the three classical philosophical dimensions of language, thought, and reality onto Peirce’s pragmaticist, triadic conception of semiosis, the interrelated pillars of philology, philosophy and cultural studies provide us with a transdisciplinary framework for semiotically modelling thought forms as paradigmatic modes of knowledge representation (see Fig. 9.1 below). Just as with Peirce the term “sign” may refer either to the representamen only or to the whole complex of signifying relations, “thought forms” in the narrow sense refer only to the first correlate, i.e. to some representamen as it appears in the phenomenology of experience. In fact, it is through the notion of Firstness, i.e. some “absolutely first” conceived as being “entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else” (CP 1.357) that Peirce’s approach creates space for something that goes beyond linguistic description or (assertive) articulation in thought, rather being something “that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent” (ibid.).2 In a broader sense, the notion of “thought forms” refers to the way in which the phenomenology of experience (through processes of cognition and perception) gives rise to such paradigmatic modes of modelling the world as regulate the constitution of knowledge through the object dimension (i.e. “Secondness”) and to the way in which cultural

190

A. T. LETTNER

Fig. 9.1 In analogy to Peirce’s conception of the sign as a relation holding between a representamen, an object and an interpretant (leading onto further such triads of semiosis), the triadic conception of thought forms involves (1) some sort of phenomenological “first”: i.e. phenomenal forms of consciousness, which in the realm of human culture at higher levels of linguistic-conceptual mediation typically become palpable as textualised and/or variously mediated “language forms” (corresponding to the representamen), (2) an object dimension relating to “reality” in the sense of (epistemological) knowledge forms and (3) socially and pragmatically interpreted “life forms”: that is, thought in its practically meaningful dimensions of cognition and communication as it occurs within the context of a particular ethnological/scientific/religious or other “culture” in a relatively coherent and habitual way

meaning is mediated (in terms of “Thirdness”) by being enacted and negotiated through the concrete interpretation of thought forms as life forms: thereby embodying the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness “as ontological modes of being (possibility, fact, and law) and as experienced in consciousness (feelings, reaction-sensations, and general conceptions)” (Sheriff 1994: 40). However, thought forms are not assumed to be stable and once-and-for-all-fixed forms of meaning. Rather, the enactment of thought forms through pragmatically and existentially grounded and contextualised life forms involves dynamic

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

191

feedback processes between what Danesi and Perron (1999) call micrological acts of text-making and “macrosignifieds” informing the symbolic order of a particular culture.

“Thought-Signs” from a Buddhist Perspective: The Semiosic Dynamics of “Dependent Arising” When tackling thought-signs from a Buddhist perspective, we first of all need to be aware that forms of “consciousness” (P. viññ¯ an.a, S. vijñ¯ ana) involve not only psychological processes like perception, conception, intention, etc. but also psycho-ontological relations that are understood to karmically determine cyclic existence as well as the soteriological aim of liberation: the latter is attained through states associated with a cessation of consciousness and of the karmic energies coming with it (cf. Waldron 2003: 21). When setting out to explore the whole universe as a manifestation of “thought forms” in such a broad sense, Peirce’s pragmaticist theory of thought-signs (cf. Hausman 1993: 57ff.) actually allows us to look at formations of thought and conceptual processes in a way that encompasses a whole web of (embodied) cognitive, linguistic and affective dimensions as explained by Indian Buddhist philosophical conceptions. To start with, Peirce considers consciousness as a pervasive phenomenon that is not limited to the mind of human beings, but rather constitutes “the immediate element of experience” in general (CP 7.365). According to his evolutionary cosmology, “signs we can be conscious of are part of cosmic Thirdness” (Sheriff 1994: 40). In fact, Peirce’s comprehensive conception of consciousness links up well with the (early) Abhidharma Buddhist use of viññ¯ an.a (P.; S. vijñ¯ ana) “consciousness”, which has been shown to involve two distinct, but interrelated aspects of meaning: 1. the function of a (momentary) “cognitive awareness” and 2. that of an (underlying) “sams¯ ˙ aric sentience” that persists throughout lifetimes (cf. Waldron 2003: 12; 20; 55; Coseru 2012, no. 4.1). To start with, Peirce’s notion of consciousness as “nothing but Feeling, in general” (CP 7.365) compares well with that “basic sentience necessary for all animate life, which in Buddhist thought is always dependent upon supporting conditions and perpetuated by karmic activities” (Waldron 2003: 20). In addition to this, Peirce’s conception of semiosis offers itself to be interpreted in terms of such momentary occurrences of conscious cognitive awareness as in Buddhism are understood to arise from moment to moment through the five senses and the mind in six

192

A. T. LETTNER

modalities of cognitive awareness (see note 7 and the discussion with regard to Fig. 9.3). Thus, what more specifically invites comparison to Indian Buddhist theories of consciousness is the notion that “every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death” (CP 5.284). I will argue that in deep-structural terms, the central Buddhist teaching of “dependent arising”, i.e. “arising” (utp¯ ada) “together” (sam-) “in dependence upon” (prat¯ıtya) (S. prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada, P. pat.iccasamupp¯ ada),3 can be regarded as being equivalent to Peirce’s conception of semiosis. This fundamental principle explains the way in which all things—or rather: all conditioned phenomena—continuously arise (and disappear again) on the basis of causes and conditions through the karmically regulated flux of dharmas (i.e. minimal elements of phenomenal experience). The Buddhist saying that “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination” (Majjhima Nik¯ aya I.28, cf. MN 1995: 283) points us towards the central Buddhist notion of (P.) “dhamma”/(S.) “dharma” (in the singular), which as the lawful regularity of “how things really are” (yath¯ abh¯ utam) is similar to Peirce’s notion of reasonableness in its aspect of Thirdness and the tendency to take habits. Even though Peirce’s notion of the growth of knowledge as embedded within his semiotic cosmology (cf. Brier 2017) has somewhat different implications in religious (or spiritual) terms,4 the Buddhist principle of dependent arising resembles the idea that nature is “a gradual unfolding of thought [which] has been going on and is still going on” (MS 872 as qutd. in Orange 1984: 65). However, according to the Buddhist view, thought processes do not automatically end at death, but are understood to span over various lifetimes in the sense of “(rebirth) consciousness” (vijñ¯ ana): i.e. consciousness understood as a “personality flux” (albeit changing and) spilling over from one life to another (Harvey 2013: 69). Liberation, by contrast, means an escape from a compulsion to repeat in one’s life such thoughts and emotions that have become embodied and enstructured in one’s habits as the result of previous experiences. As suggested by the meaning of nirv¯ an.a (lit. “blowing out”, “extinction”) and its frequent synonym nirodha (“stopping”) (cf. Conze 1962: 71), not only is liberation possible here and now—i.e. before death, but it amounts to a peaceful state that is structurally comparable to signlessness. This stands in a clear contrast to the functioning of consciousness within the context of ordinary reasoning

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

193

processes determined by the conditioning structures of karmic existence: “…through seizing on the signs or characteristics of things, mind functions according to a conceptual matrix that is not in accordance with the way things really are”, which is the very basis of suffering (D’Amato 2003: 194). How then can Peirce’s pragmaticist theory of thought-signs be used to deal with the Buddhist soteriological aim and practically liberating modality of signlessness5 ? Peirce’s understanding of the universe as a “vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities” (CP 5.119) amounts to a large-scale explanation of existence that is structurally similar to the “dharma of natural systems” described by “dependent arising” (cf. Macy 1991). In its general form, the theory of “dependent origination” comprises “theories accounting for genesis in general” (Sopa 1986: 105); in its special application, it seeks to explain “the genesis of a living sentient being in sam . s¯ara and the means of that being’s potential release from such a sam . s¯aric birth” (ibid.). In Peircean Buddhist terms we could say that the universe is a vast process of dependent arising, an expression of “the way things are” (yath¯ abh¯ utham, lit. “how they become”), working out its karmically conditioned conclusions in psychophysically aggregated living realities. That is to say, it does so with regard to the so-called “five aggregates” (pañcaskandha) of human empirical personality,6 which overlap with the “twelve conditioned and conditioning links” (nid¯ ana) of “dependent arising” (cf. Harvey 2013) (as is going to be discussed with regard to Fig. 9.3 below). In Buddhist terms, liberation through knowledge, i.e. “insight” or “wisdom” (prajñ¯ a ), does not come naturally through an evolutionary process of growing reasonableness as in Peirce, but requires “contemplative cultivation” (S./P. bh¯ avan¯ a ) on the path towards nirv¯ an.a through emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness. According to Peirce’s conception of God (or Reason) “the process of growth is the summum bonum” (MS 478 as qutd. in Orange 1984: 68). By contrast, what we might call the summum bonum of Buddhism in the sense of nirv¯ an.a is the very opposite: bringing the (karmically determined) process of “conditioned arising” to an end. Hence, from a Buddhist perspective, the ever-renewed unfolding of thought is the problem, not the process-philosophical solution. When trying to understand these complex relations with regard to the constitution of life forms from a Buddhist perspective, the series of “dependent arising” can help us to unravel the various relations between

194

A. T. LETTNER

karmically conditioned actions and psychophysically embodied forms of consciousness determined by ignorance and craving (see Fig. 9.2). To start with, (1) “ignorance” (P. avijj¯ a; S. avidy¯ a ) with regard to the four “noble truths”—i.e. the truth of suffering (P. dukkha; S. duh.kha), of its origination (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path (P. magga; S. m¯ arga) leading to the cessation of suffering—does not amount to “a ‘prima causa’, a metaphysical cause of existence or a cosmogonic

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

195

Fig. 9.2 This figure shows a Peircean interpretation of “dependent arising” (prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada) with regard to the semiosic genesis of karmically conditioned and psychophysically embodied “forms of consciousness”, i.e. “life forms”, including the “noble eightfold path” as the soteriological life form conducive to attaining liberation from this potentially unlimited cycle of “becoming”. In deep-structural terms, as well as in view of its fundamental significance as an explanatory principle, we may regard the process of “dependent arising” (S. prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada) as being equivalent in relevance to semiosis in Peirce’s philosophy of signs. The series of “dependent arising”, which is sometimes enumerated with a slightly different order (cf. Harvey 2013), comprises the following “twelve conditioned and conditioning links” (nid¯ ana): (1) “spiritual ignorance” (P. avijj¯ a; S. avidy¯ a ); (2) “constructing activities” (P. sankh¯ ˙ ara, S. samsk¯ ara); (3) “consciousness” (P. viññ¯ ana, S. vijñ¯ ana); (4) “mind-and-body”/“the sentient body” (n¯ ama-r¯ upa); (5) “the six sense-bases” (¯ ayatana); (6) “contact”/“sensory stimulation” (P. phassa, S. spar´sa); (7) “feeling” (vedan¯ a ); (8) “craving” (P. tan.h¯ a; S. tr..sn.¯ a ); (9) “grasping” (up¯ ad¯ ana); (10) “becoming” (P. bhava, S. bh¯ ava); (11) “birth” (j¯ ati); (12) “ageing and death” and other states of suffering (sorrow, lamentation, pain, unhappiness and distress) (jar¯ a-maran.a)

principle”: it rather works as a condition under which our present life and states of consciousness develop (Govinda 1961: 55). The practical intertwining between forms of consciousness and life forms can be worked out more clearly in Peircean pragmaticist terms with regard to the unconscious structuring dispositions described as (2) “constructing activities” (P. sankh¯ ara, S. samsk¯ ˙ ara), which are given as the second link in this series. In formal terms, the conception of karmic formations is captured well by Peirce’s notion that “every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions” (CP 5.265) as spelled out in “Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868). According to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, “different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise” (EP 1: 129–130). How then can thought forms be seen to function as pragmatically embedded life forms from a Buddhist perspective? In Buddhist terms, such “modes of action” also extend to that latent conditioning of embodied cognitive habits that are accrued over lifetimes in the form of “karmic formations” (samsk¯ ˙ ara) of body, speech and mind (cf. Lusthaus 2002: 536–537; Waldron 2003: 13ff.). The “karmic formations” (P. sankh¯ ara) condition (3) “consciousness” (P. viññ¯ an.a), i.e. they “ripen in states of consciousness”, and alongside

196

A. T. LETTNER

the latter (4) n¯ ama-r¯ upa (lit. “name-and-form”) arises, i.e.“mentalitymateriality”. This psychophysical organism is equipped with (5) the “sixfold sensory base” (P. sal.¯ ayatana), comprising the five physical sense faculties and the mental faculty. It is through these “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) that (6) “contact” (P. phassa) takes place between consciousa ) (cf. ness and its objects7 , which in turn conditions (7) “feeling” (vedan¯ Bhikkhu Ñan.amoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi‚ see MN 1995: 30–31, P¯a.li terminology in brackets). As a result of cognitive (or mental) afflictions and (unwholesome) affective tendencies, both “consciousness” (P. viññ¯ an.a) (3) and afflictive actions lead to yet further such forms of consciousness and “karmic formations” (2) as part of a self-perpetuating feedback cycle constituting the “intradynamics of mind” (Waldron 2003: 19–20). What provides the semiotic glue for this self-imprisoning autopoietic feedback cycle between “forms of thought” and “forms of life” are (spiritual) ignorance (1) and (8) “craving” (P. tan.h¯ a, S. tr..sn.¯ a, lit. “thirst”): through the dynamics of desire, (9) “grasping” (upad¯ ana) and (10) “becoming” (P. bhava, S. bh¯ ava), we may say that “the mind in action”—which is yet another apt way of translating “samsk¯ ˙ ara” (cf. Willemen 2004: 221)—gives rise to “the desired forms of existence” in keeping with the individual’s state of development (cf. Govinda 1961: 54)—Or as Lusthaus succinctly puts it: … “desire (intent) constitutes life-forms” (2002: 537). Just as with Peirce (ca. 1896) “in Willing, feeling forces its way out from us” (CP 7.543), “will” (cetan¯ a ) as the main “constructing activity” (P. sankh¯ ara, S. samsk¯ ˙ ara) is that which initiates actions (Harvey 2013: 68). “Birth” (j¯ ati) and “death” (maran.a) (11, 12) in the Buddhist context refer not only to the life forms of an individual, but actually signify “the arising and ceasing of objects, thoughts, persons, moments, etc.” within the perpetuating cycle of sams¯ ˙ ara: that is, dharmic arising and ceasing in each and every moment (Lusthaus 2002: 67). In other words, the functioning of the various links can also be seen to apply to “a succession of moments in the incessantly flowing stream of consciousness” (cf. Govinda 1961: 58). As Eckhart Tolle so aptly puts it: Karma is “the unconscious conditioning that runs your life”, and rebirth boils down to an identification with form: “Every time you identify with a thought that arises, you are born into that thought” (cf. Tolle 2011: 3, 42ff.). It is this deepstructural dimension that can be captured so well by Peirce’s pragmaticism and his theory of thought-signs, which may serve us to develop a conception of phenomenal forms of consciousness that is equally fit to treat consciousness as “an entirely non-psychological category” (cf. Piatigorsky

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

197

1984: 182; Lettner forthcoming c) and to encompass the complexities implied by the intertwining of the psychic and the cosmic dimensions of consciousness and sign processes (cf. Lettner 2019).

Phenomenal Forms of Consciousness Without a Permanent Self In order to formulate phenomenal “forms of consciousness” from a Buddhist perspective, we can work with Peirce’s notion that “When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign” (CP 5.283). An in-depth discussion of parallels between Peirce and Buddhist theories of consciousness (cf. Lettner forthcoming c & g) would require us to consider in detail the step taken “from phenomenon to sign” with regard to the opposition between “phaneral awareness/manifestation” and “semiosic representation” (cf. De Tienne 2013). Moreover, in order to do justice to the Buddhist goal of signlessness and the significance of “direct perception” (pratyaks.a) in Buddhist logic and epistemology, we would need to take a close look at the notion of immediacy in Peirce’s theory of perception, notably the question of how to accommodate a certain “presentationist” and phaneroscopic sensibility within the development of Peirce’s thought and his “representationist” theory of signs and perception (cf. Bergman 2004). However, the more modest aim of the present outline is to model in Peircean terms the “arising of awareness” as conceived in Abhidharma Buddhist theories8 as well as to further develop Peirce’s understanding of consciousness and conception of semiosis with regard to those six types of “cognitive awareness” or “consciousness” (vijñ¯ ana) as described by the theory of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) and “elements” (dh¯ atu).9 In fact, such an interpretation provides us with the necessary background for appreciating the role of consciousness and its relation to various sign activities and conceptualisation processes as described by the model of the five aggregates. In Fig. 9.3, the three early Buddhist classifications of dharmas into (1) “five aggregates” (pañcaskandha) or psychophysical “bundles” of sentient life (developed for explaining human empirical personality), (2) twelve “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) and (3) eighteen “elements” (dh¯ atu) (the latter two developed for explaining processes of cognition, notably perception) (cf. Willemen 2004), have been mapped onto Peirce’s model of semiosis with regard to the deep-structural analogy between the semiosic flow of thought-signs and Abhidharma views on the arising of awareness.

198

A. T. LETTNER

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

199

Fig. 9.3 This figure portrays phenomenal forms of consciousness with regard to the theory of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) as well as their embedment in karmically regulated processes of psychophysical embodiment that are associated with the “five aggregates” (S. pañcaskandha, P. -kkhandha) of empirical personality. In keeping with Peirce’s description of the categories in psychology, i.e. “Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or mediation” (CP 6.32), the process of sensory perception—which in Buddhism constitutes the “epitome of the operation of consciousness” (Ronkin 2018, no. 2)—can be reconstructed as follows: it is by means of some “contact” (spar´sa) and thus a reaction to some “other” involving Peircean Secondness that consciousness undergoes a transformation from the Firstness of phaneral awareness or immediate feeling to the Thirdness of a mediating representation involving habits and generalisation (which we have found to be the characteristics of mind, see note 9). In the context of perception we thus move on from “some feeling, image, conception...” (CP 5.283) of a “consciousness moment” (vijñ¯ ana; citta) and the Secondness of a particular “sensation” (vedan¯ a )—“reacting”‚ e.g. to a patch of colour—to the Thirdness of a general conception and thus to the perception of something as something in the sense of skandha 3, i.e. “apperception” (samjñ¯ ˙ a ). The various “sensory or cognitive faculties” (indriya) that may arise when (phenomenal) forms of consciousness are at work have been set out with regard to the theory of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) in note 7. As for Peirce’s theory of thought-signs (CP 5.283), “everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves” to the effect that “When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign” (ibid.). This semiosic constellation and flow of thought-signs has been visualised with regard to those factors that in Buddhism are understood to make up the phenomenal appearance of such an empirical self‚ i.e. the “five aggregates” (S. pañcaskandha, P. -kkhandha). Just as for Peirce our own thinking activity and semiotic manifestation does not exclude “its being a phenomenon of something without us” (CP 5.283) in the sense of some “object” being given through Secondness, the processual dharmic aggregates of “sensate matter”/“bodily form” (r¯ upa), “feeling” (vedan¯ a ), “apperception” (samjñ¯ ˙ a ), “consciousness or cognitive awareness” (vijñ¯ ana) and “habit-formations” (samsk¯ ˙ ara) have been mapped onto the karmically regulated flow of dharmas in such a way as to explain the psychophysical constitution of both subjectivity and objectivity

We can use Peirce’s conception of consciousness as set out in his theory of thought-signs (cf. CP 5.283) for modelling the way in which “thought forms” become psychophysically embodied with regard to the “five aggregates” (S. pañcaskandha, P. -kkhandha) that are understood

200

A. T. LETTNER

to constitute human empirical personality. In keeping with the conception of these aggregates as “distinct classes of processes” (Waldron 2003: 10) that do not involve the assumption of a permanent “self” or soul (cf. Lettner forthcoming e & h), Peirce’s processual view of semiosis and his comprehensive understanding of consciousness allow us to model the arising of “awareness” (vijñ¯ ana) as well as the sign processes of linguistic and conceptual construction coming with it in terms of a semiosic agency that is not bound to any notion of the subject as an agent. Rather, as the overlapping of the skandhic model with the explanatory principle of “dependent arising” (S. prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada, P. pat.iccasamupp¯ ada) shows,10 from a Buddhist perspective, the flow of thought-signs is regulated by the flux of dharmas (i.e. minimal units of phenomenal experience) according to the laws of conditionality (as explained above with regard to the twelve nid¯ anas, i.e. “links”). The literal meaning of the first skandha (= S.; P. khandha, “aggregate”) of r¯ upa (1) is “form”, “shape” or “appearance” (rather than “matter” as dead stuff), which shows us that the emphasis is placed upon the human embodied being in his or her sensorial and semiosic capacities. In its characteristic as “what offers ‘resistance’ (pratigha) to a sensorial body ([P.] saviññ¯ an.aka k¯ aya)” (Lusthaus 2002: 46) it is captured well by Peirce’s category of Secondness. The initial reactivity of “sensations” as described by the second skandha (vedan¯ a ) (2) can be seen to connect the mental and the material poles of the skandhas: i.e. “within the ‘body’ it manifests as the inner feeling of the body as pleasurable, painful or neutral, the proprioceptive sense” (Hayward 1987: 59). The “nomi-nal foci” of skandhas (2) “sensations” (vedan¯ a ), (3) “apperception” (S. samjñ¯ ˙ a, P. saññ¯ a ), (4) “dispositional formations” (S. samsk¯ ˙ ara; P. sankh¯ ara) and (5) “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana; P. viññ¯ an.a) can be considered as being equivalent to the “n¯ama” of n¯ ama-r¯ upa (“nameand-form”), i.e. link 4 in the series of “dependent arising”.11 Thus, the whole expression refers to the “linguistically-complex conscious body”, which (including the unconscious activities of samsk¯ ˙ aras ) denotes both the material and the psycho-cognitive components of the psychophysical organism (Lusthaus 2002: 54, 59). However, rather than denoting just the four n¯ amic skandhas, “n¯ama” refers to “the entire psycholinguistic sphere”, thereby implying such terms as Sanskrit prajñapti (P. paññatti, “designation”), as Lusthaus explains with regard to “language’s nominalistic pretext towards referentiality, accomplished by as-signing an identity to disparate conditions

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

201

through the sheer power of uniting them under a single name” (2002: 54–55). In fact, conceptual identification which goes along with the creation of a linguistic entity as a single referent (cf. Williams 1980) is accomplished through the third heap of aggregates, i.e. “apperception” (samjñ¯ ˙ a-skandha), which “refers to the capacity to comprehend the specific marks (nimitta) of phenomenal objects” (Coseru 2012, no. 2.3): hence, a notion that is highly relevant as a principle operating in contrast√ to signlessness. Literally denoting “associational knowledge” (i.e. sam˙ + jñ¯ a, ~ “knowing” by [putting] “together”), samjñ¯ ˙ a refers to all those further “conceptualisations” to which pleasurable, painful or neutral sensations (ved¯ an¯ a ) are subjected (Lusthaus 2002: 47ff.); and as such it would profit from a more detailed investigation with regard to Peirce’s notion of the interpretant as the mediating thought that determines the recognition of something as an object through the establishment of a habit.12 However, in the present paper, we can only furnish a rough outline of semiosic processes as described by the rationalising activity of Abhidharma analytic itself, in order to provide the necessary background against which to consider the Buddhist path of liberation towards signlessness. Thus, in the next section we are going to consider the notion of prajñapti (“designation”, “concept”) and offer an exemplary discussion with regard to the epistemological and ontological context of Sarv¯astiv¯adin Abhidharma assumptions.13

Modelling “Thought Forms” on Buddhist Notions of Linguistic and Conceptual Construction By analysing the correlations between ontological, epistemological, logical and grammatical parameters, “thought forms” allow us to bring into view not only thought in the narrow sense of ideas, but to clarify how philosophical positions conceptualise forms of being in relation to forms of knowing. This concerns the fundamental cognitive role of language and forms of consciousness, including the phenomenology of experience: notably dharmas in the context of Buddhist theories. From the perspective of the philosophy of grammar, concepts are abstract notions intended to help us simplify our grasp of things in order to make possible processes of thought and logical operations (cf. Köller 1988: 176–177). At the metatheoretical level of philosophical language and scientific discourse, this confronts us with the question of how to deal with the Buddhist

202

A. T. LETTNER

ideal of signlessness in methodological terms. So what about the functioning of concepts? According to Peirce, “Concepts are mental habits; habits formed by exercise of the imagination” (MS 318, 1907 = MS [R] 318:44, cf. Bergman and Paavola 2014). The notion of “concept” gets us right at the heart of signifying processes, including the various correlates involved by Peirce’s sign definition and the requirement of Thirdness for genuine semiosis. As Warder (1971) remarks in his study of “The concept of a concept”, the distinction of logical discussions between words or signs on the one hand and the meanings or objects referred to by them on the other hand is something that is found very early on in the Buddhist tradition due to its critical and epistemological preoccupations. Using the example of the term paññatti (= P., S. prajñapti “concept”), which involves various dimensions of meaning by designating (not always in a clear fashion) (1) the actual terms themselves, (2) the referents of “quasi-nonreferringterms” (in the sense that these entities exist “in name only”) or (3) a “private mental event accompanying their use” (cf. Williams 1980: 2), a more detailed study will be needed for working out the way in which the various dimensions of signification are linked to ontological claims and epistemological interests of Sarv¯astiv¯adin Abhidharma philosophy (cf. Lettner forthcoming i). Within the scope of the present discussion, the gist of conceptual relations can be presented in the form of a summarising sketch. Following the outline by Williams (1980), Fig. 9.4 tries to visualise and clarify the signifying relations involved in the Buddhist notion of “concept” (P. paññatti, S. prajñapti) by mapping the various dimensions onto the Peircean correlates of representamen, object and interpretant. Peirce’s broad definition of a semiotic object (cf. CP 2.232)14 lends itself well to modelling in semiotic terms the key distinction in Sarv¯astiv¯adin Abhidharma theory between the ontological categories of “ultimately real” entities (dravyasat ), which as dharmas are determined by “intrinsic nature” (svabh¯ ava), and “conventionally real” entities (samvr.tisat ), which as composite, macroscopic objects of ordinary experience exist “in name only” (prajñaptisat ). Thus, the referent of a word like “pot” is a composite entity or a “collection” of “single known existing thing[s]” to put it with Peirce (ibid.). In Buddhist terms, the seeming unity of such an object is the result of cognitive intentionality and naming as achieved through language. At the same time, it lacks the ultimate reality (param¯ arthasat ) of “those primary existents [i.e. dravyasat ] into which the prajñaptisat entities could be analysed” (Williams 1980: 1).

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

203

Fig. 9.4 This figure provides a visual sketch of how the Buddhist notion of “concept” (P. paññatti, S. prajñapti) can be mapped onto the Peircean model of semiosis

In fact, “wisdom” or “insight” (prajñ¯ a ) is regarded as an “analytical knowledge” of dharmas by the Sarv¯astiv¯adins (Willemen 2004: 218). This means that the “discrimination of dharmas” (dharma-pravicaya) possesses soteriological relevance and is frequently mentioned together (or even equated) with “insight” (P. paññ¯ a ) in the P¯a.li canonical materials (and commentarial literature) (Cox 2004: 550).

The Pragmatics of Liberation: Signlessness and Peircean Synergies In Buddhist soteriological terms, quite simply, “To build up senseperceptions is an undesirable misuse of the mind which has to be stopped” (Conze 1962: 64). Buddhist philosophical principles cannot be understood adequately without considering the central soteriological aim of attaining freedom from suffering, whose “way of deliverance” is described in old canonical textual sources (cf. Frauwallner 1973: 127ff.). The path towards liberation starts out with abstaining from the so-called “ten

204

A. T. LETTNER

unwholesome actions” (S. da´s¯ aku´sala) pertaining to body, speech and mind, which are complemented by the “class of moral commandments” (S. ´s¯ılaskandha; P. s¯ılakkhando; cf. “moral conduct” ´s¯ıla) (loc.cit. 129ff.). Before the relevant texts describe the practice of “mindful awareness” (S. smr.ti-samprajanya; P. satisampajañña), which comprises the preparation for meditation, the removal of the so-called five “hindrances” (S. n¯ıvaran.a, i.e. greed, malice, stiffness and obstinacy, excitement and repentance, doubt)15 and the attainment of four stages of “contemplation” (S. dhy¯ ana, P. jh¯ ana), a central passage describes the so-called “restraint” or “guarding of the senses” (indriya-sam . vara): When he sees a form (r¯ upam) with the eyes, hears a sound (´sabdah.) with the ears, smells a scent (gandhah.) with his nose, tastes a relish (rasah.) with his tongue, feels something touchable (spras..tavyam) with the body or knows a thing or a thought (dharmah. P. dhammo) with the thinking (manah.), he neither observes the general nor the particular. The evil (p¯ apakah.) unwholesome (aku´salah., P. akusalo) things or thoughts of greed (abhidhy¯ a, P. abhijjh¯ a ) and of displeasure (daurmanasyam, P. domanassam .) stream into him who does not protect the organ of the eye etc. Before that he tries to protect the organ of the eyes etc., and attains the guarding of the organ of eyes etc. Because he practices the guarding of the senses, he experiences blameless inner happiness without diversion. (qutd. in Frauwallner 1973: 131; cf. Conze 1962: 62)16

Thus, the Buddhist approach has important consequences for dealing with signs and semiotics. Since signs are that part of human attention towards the “outside” that keep the process of imagination, grasping and getting involved with the world going, they have the effect of binding humans to the cycle of rebirths called sams¯ ˙ ara (“wandering”). In this sense, at a most fundamental level, Buddhism implies a “semiotics of signlessness” (cf. D’Amato 2003) that aims at bringing the semiosic process to an end. While language relates to objects of experience in the lifeworld through intentionally grasping them, linguistic description cannot apply to nirv¯ an.a, which is unconditioned and “signless”: “…it is not an object of discriminative, intentional consciousness, but a release from all such objects” (McMahan 2002: 22). In addition to “emptiness” (S. ´s¯ unyat¯ a, P. suññat¯ a ) and the “wishless” (S. apran.ihita, P. appan.ihita), the “signless” (S. ¯ animitta; P. animitta) constitutes one of the “three doors to

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

205

deliverance”: it also implies that due to the overlay of sense perceptions with various impulses and conceptions all (such deforming and misleading, i.e. complex) perceptions ought to be abandoned (cf. Conze 1962: 62; cf. Lettner forthcomimg c).17 Within the above-mentioned famous formula describing the “restraint of the senses” (indriyasamvara), ˙ the notion that one should “not seize on” the nimitta (“sign”, i.e. “general appearance”) or anuvyañjana (i.e. the “secondary details”; P. a. anubyañjana) of an object presented through any of the six sense modalities (as described above with regard to the “sensory bases” or ¯ ayatanas in note 7), responds to the fact that more often than not attention to a sense stimulus results from an eagerness to listen and look, etc. By contrast, following the path of liberation implies a sort observation that observes without however giving heed to the stimuli presented or grasping those appearances as signs. To put it in semiotic terms: without treating the changing stream of dharmas as a stable sign standing for some supposedly permanent entity or lasting self. As Harvey explains in the context of his discussion of “‘Signless’ Meditations in P¯ali Buddhism” (1986), the detachment characterising the achievement of the meditational state called animitta-sam¯ adhi is described in paradoxical terms in the literature, e.g.: “in solidity he is not percipient of solidity (pat.haviyam . pat.hav¯ı-saññ¯ı) […] and yet he is percipient (saññ¯ı)” (cf. p. 42). Thus, the alreadymentioned third khanda (”aggregate”) of “apperception”, i.e. samjñ¯ ˙ a (P. saññ¯ a ) as the aspect responsible for classifying and labelling experience “does not latch onto a ‘sign’ as a basis for seeing solidity as solidity” (ibid.): Peircean Thirdness. While consciousness is usually “supported” to arise in conjunction with a “sensory or cognitive faculty” (indriya) and an “object” (vis.aya), consciousness in itself is “pure sensation, without any content” (Stcherbatsky 1923: 8). When dealing in semiotic terms with such pure consciousness that is “reached not by way of intellectual abstraction, but by realizing the inmost core of one’s self” (Conze 1962: 113), we would need to look to Peirce’s “nothing” in the sense of a “pure zero” that is “prior to every first” (CP 6.217). In fact, Buddhist methods of “overcoming and discarding the object” constitute a way for attaining nirv¯ an.a: “... paradoxically the pure thought, once it has come to itself, turns out to be essentially no-thought” (Conze 1962: 113). Such a “zero or negative basis for everything, which can also be viewed as a fullness of potentialities” (Brier 2008: 138–139) has in fact been posited by the most highly developed knowledge systems in the context of religious and

206

A. T. LETTNER

scientific theories alike, including‚ e.g. the empty set in mathematics or the quantum field in physics (cf. Brier 2017). Though underpinned with philosophical reflections, the teachings of the Buddha are “not founded on a theory”, but boil down to a practical way of deliverance “found through his own inner experience” (Frauwallner 1973: 124): Peircean Firstness (at the basis of Secondness and Thirdness). Importantly, in contrast to the origination of suffering as described by the so-called “forward mode” (anuloma), the twelve “links” (nid¯ ana) of dependent arising are also presented in the reverse order (pat.iloma), which leads to the cessation of suffering (cf. Waldron 2003: 13). This can also be seen from the succinct formula: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases”.18 We can conceive the Buddhist path of liberation along the lines of Peirce’s pragmaticism19 and in keeping with the doctrine famously summed up by the following exhortation: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object” (1905: 171). In view of such a pragmaticist interest in the effects and practical bearings of a conception, the Noble Eightfold Path can be understood as the epitome of the Buddhist way of life and it is at the same time pragmatically grounded in the life form of meditation.20 If “the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of that habit which [it] is calculated to produce”, which is Peirce’s paraphrase of his definition of Pragmatism (EP 2 = 1998: 398), the Noble Eightfold Path gives a clear account of the habits that the Buddhist way of life is calculated to produce. As Mircea Eliade explains with regard to the yogic techniques of Buddhism, “‘Truth’ must be understood and at the same time known experimentally” (1954/1958: 164–165), thereby coupling Peircean Thirdness of reason with the Secondness of concrete experience (and the Firstness of nonconceptuality). In a similar way, in his 1905 essay “What pragmatism is”, Peirce proposes to go beyond a narrow understanding of “thought”, explaining that “It should rather be understood as covering all rational life, so that an experiment shall be an operation of thought” (p. 170). Thus, the pragmatic grounding of thought forms in life forms—be it with regard to experiments performed in the laboratory or meditation practised in the forest—means that truth must both be grasped in intellectual terms and realised in practical terms.

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

207

We can now see that Peirce’s conception of thought is formulated in such a way that its envisaged ideal is broad enough for accommodating the Buddhist notion of liberating “insight” (prajñ¯ a ): “Of course, that ultimate state of habit to which the action of self-control ultimately tends, where no room is left for further self-control, is, in the case of thought, the state of fixed belief, or perfect knowledge” (1905: 170). It is true, however, that in Buddhist terms it would be more apt to somewhat modify Peirce’s definition and describe liberating knowledge in terms of a nonverbalisable insight (rather than a belief). In any case, spiritual transformation as conceived according to Buddhism is concerned with a fundamental transformation of consciousness through a de-conditioning of cognitive habits (cf. Harvey 2013: 67; Lusthaus 2002: 3–4). A breakthrough into signlessness through a liberation from the Thirdness of conventional signifying habits—including the illusionary assumption of stable relations between such fragmentary formations as subjectivity and objectivity (cf. Lettner forthcoming d)—can hardly be accomplished in conceptual terms. And yet, if it makes any sense at all to model “thought forms of signlessness” with the help of Peirce’s semiotic pragmaticism it is precisely because the spontaneity and immediacy of Firstness allows us to catch a glimpse of nonconceptuality. As for the intensification of consciousness implied by sam¯ adhi, the dimension of concentration here implies a thorough transformation of consciousness: in this, “it eliminates the tension between subject and object, or rather the creation of such a conceptual discrimination” through the force of an experience that is “not reflected or coloured by the medium of thought or preconceived ideas” (Govinda 1961: 69). In keeping with this practical dimension, dharma theory and analysis aims at deconstructing apparently stable notions of objectivity, including assumptions of permanent selfhood, by looking beyond linguistic and conceptual constructions of identity. In view of this, Peirce’s questioning of “the barbaric conception of personal identity” (EP 2: 3; cf. CP 7.572) as invoked with regard to a Brahmanical hymn points towards deeper parallels to explore with regard to the “continuity of being” and the “drama of creation” (ibid.): “Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity”, states Peirce (EP 2: 2; cf. CP 7.571) in Buddhist-like terms. However, Peirce’s synechistic notion of continuity cannot be compared in any straightforward way to Buddhist conceptions, but would require an in-depth discussion of various theories and terminological specificities, including an analysis of

208

A. T. LETTNER

culturally determined habits of metaphor.21 Still, theories like Peirce’s notion of “man as a sign” and his refusal to believe that we are “shut up in a box of flesh and blood” (CP 7.591) offer themselves to be read in light of the Buddhist understanding of human empirical personality. In fact, the karmic continuity observed with regard to the aggregation of the five skandhas or the continuous “mindstream” (sant¯ ana) (cf. Jenkins 2013: 469) can be captured well by Peirce’s synechistic view on the continuity between physical and psychic phenomena; and the latter even allows for an interpretation of “rebirth consciousness” (vijñ¯ ana, i.e. the second meaning of “consciousness” as discussed above, see p. 191): “Synechism refuses to believe that when death comes, even the carnal consciousness ceases quickly” (EP 2: 3; cf. CP 7.574). The fact that “dependent arising” (prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada) “is not used as a basis for personal interrelation, and is only problematically interpreted as interconnection” (Jenkins 2013: 469) need not stand in the way of synergies with Peirce’s notion of continuity. For Peirce’s definition of synechism as “the tendency to regard everything as continuous” (EP 2: 1; cf. CP 7.565) is broad enough to accommodate both the early classical Buddhist formulations of dependent arising as “a web of entanglement” (McMahan 2008: 135) and modern articulations of “interdependence” that “often convey a sense of celebration of this interwoven world, of intimacy and oneness with the great interconnected living fabric of life, and an expansion of the sense of selfhood into it” (p. 133). Both Buddhism and general systems theory go beyond anything like exclusive properties of an “I” in the sense that various sensory, affective and cognitive forms of interaction are seen to extend into “a reality wider than that enclosed by our skin or identified with our name” (Macy 1991: 184). In other words, both a biological (and psychic) tendency to self-preservation and a tendency to form open systems of increasing complexity are at the basis of cooperation and responsive interactions with the environment (Hayward 1987: 280). We can see these principles anticipated in Peirce’s combination of synechism with an evolutionary and pragmaticist philosophy, which allows for an interpretation in terms of the self-organising universe and complex (living) systems of modern cybernetics and systems theory (Brier 2008: 268ff.; Lettner forthcoming g). To sum up, at a deep level we may sense parallels between Peirce’s synechism and the transformation of consciousness to be effected by following the Buddhist path of liberation. Peirce maintains “that human thought necessarily partakes of whatever character is diffused through the whole universe, and that its

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

209

natural modes have some tendency to be the modes of action of the universe” (CP 1.351). Such a comprehensive view links up well with the Buddhist understanding of “wisdom” (P. paññ¯ a, S. prajñ¯ a ), which is nothing else than “the harmony between our mind and the laws of reality” (Govinda 1961: 70). Acknowledgements I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professor Ananta Kumar Giri for his warm acceptance of my work, which was most kindly brought to his attention by Professor Søren Brier of Copenhagen Business School, Denmark.

Notes 1. “P¯a.li” and “Sanskrit” will be abbreviated as “P.” and “S.” respectively. Whenever I am first giving a Sanskrit word in the plural as in skandha-s, ¯ ayatana-s and dh¯ atu-s, I am using a hyphen to indicate that the “-s” of English plural formation has been applied to the stem of a Sanskrit expression. Subsequent mentions of the same term (i.e. “tokens” in the Peircean sense) will be made without a hyphen. Whenever the English translation of a Sanskrit or P¯a.li term is given first, as in “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) or “elements” (dh¯ atu), the term in brackets corresponds to the stem form in Sanskrit or P¯a.li (i.e. without any plural inflection). Due to its by now common use in discussions of Buddhist philosophy, an exception is made with the word “dharma”, which in its plural meaning of “minimal constituents of phenomenal experience” will be indicated simply as “dharmas” without adding a hyphen before the final plural -s. In case Sanskrit and P¯a.li expressions do not differ, the latter will be indicated without adding any abbreviation. For a word about quotation procedures, including a brief explanation with regard to the Sanskrit and P¯a.li textual traditions, see notes 8 and 16 below. 2. As a “special suchness” or a (potential) quality without existence, the notion of Firstness as some feeling (as when having “a vague, unobjectified, still less unsubjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or of an ache, or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note”) (CP 1.303) allows Peirce’s conception to open up towards the dimension of nonconceptuality that is so significant to the Buddhist ideal of signlessness. The essence of Secondness, by contrast, “is something which is there, and which I cannot think away, but am forced to acknowledge as an object or second beside myself” (CP 1.358): hence, some “individual fact” or existence to be captured by the dyadic category of mere reaction, blind force or arbitrary will, while the lawfulness of some purpose or reason

210

A. T. LETTNER

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

requires a third, mediating element (cf. CP 1.328): i.e. Thirdness that is prominent in the idea of a sign or representation, generality, continuity, growth and intelligence (CP 1.337ff.). For a detailed outline of this principle (variously translated as “dependent origination”, “conditioned arising”, “conditioned co-arising” etc.) as well as an indication of relevant sources in the P¯a.li “collections” (nik¯ aya) see Harvey (2013: 46ff.; 67–68). For some thoughts on a “comparative ethics and epistemology of spiritual ‘growth’ vs. ‘not becoming’” that is developed with regard to the use of vegetative metaphors in the context of Buddhist and Christian models of faith and knowledge see Lettner (forthcoming f). For a critical discussion of possible synergies between Buddhism and pragmatism see Hayes (2003). The “five aggregates” (S. pañcaskandha; P. -kkhandha) are (1) “material form” or “body” (r¯ upa); (2) “sensations” (vedan¯ a ); (3) “apperception” (S. samjñ¯ ˙ a, P. saññ¯ a ); (4) “dispositional formations” (S. samsk¯ ˙ ara; P. sankh¯ ara); and (5) “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana; P. viññ¯ an.a) (cf. Coseru 2012; Waldron 2003). More precisely‚ the early Buddhist classification of dharmas into twelve “bases” of cognition or ¯ ayatanas (cf. Stcherbatsky 1923: 7ff.; Lusthaus 2002: 55–56) comprises six “sensory (or cognitive) faculties” (indriya) and six categories of corresponding “objects” (vis.aya): The indriyas are 1. caks.us “eye”/sense of vision, 2. ´srotra “ear”/sense of audition, 3. ghr¯ an.a “nose”/sense of smelling, 4. jihv¯ a “tongue”/sense of taste, 5. k¯ aya “body”, skin/sense of touch, 6. manas “mind”/cognitive faculty. The respective objective elements are 7. r¯ upa “visibles”/colour and shape, 8. ´sabda “audibles”/sound, 9. gandha “smells”/odour, 10. rasa “tastes”/taste, 11. spras..tavya “touchables” and 12. dharmas “mental objects”. The former are also regarded as the six “internal bases” (adhy¯ atma-¯ ayatana), while the latter make up the six so-called “external bases” (b¯ ahya-¯ ayatana). Taken together with the six modalities of “cognitive awareness” (vijñ¯ ana) they constitute the complete “sensorium” of the eighteen “elements” (dh¯ atu). To sum up, 6 “sensory faculties” (indriya) + 6 “objects” (vis.aya) = 12 “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana); 12 “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) + 6 modalities of “cognitive awareness” (vijñ¯ ana) = 18 “elements” (dh¯ atu). This fundamental classificatory scheme explains how “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana; P. viññ¯ an.a) arises when there is “contact” (S. spar´sa; P. phassa) between a “sensory or cognitive faculty” (indriya) and a corresponding “object” (vis.aya) (cf. e.g. Waldron 2003: 15). Thus, in order for “consciousness” (vijñ¯ ana) to arise as one of the six “consciousnesses” or modalities of cognitive awareness, the three factors of sense, object and awareness are needed (cf. Stcherbatsky 1923: 8). Looking at the example of a patch of colour being

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

211

perceived, we may say that the “element” (dh¯ atu) of “visual consciousness” (caks.ur-vijñ¯ ana) arises, as the internal sensory base or visual faculty of the “eye” (caks.us ) and the external sensory base of some “object” (vis.aya) that is visible as “colour/shape” (r¯ upa) act as “supporters” for this particular sensory awareness to appear. Such associations between a specific type of consciousness and the respective sensory modality, i.e. “between perception and thinking”, actually bear out a “habitual tendency of the mind towards conceptual proliferation” (Coseru 2012, no. 3.4). In fact, the here mentioned Buddhist notion of “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana), which appears as a consciousness moment in the sense of a particular modality of cognitive awareness, can be seen to build up into a phenomenon of habituation and generalisation as is typical of Peircean Thirdness. As Coseru explains: “while sense, object, and conscious apprehension come together as a consequence of past habituations and other conditioning factors, the ensuing cognitive awareness appears to both sustain and be sustained by these factors” (ibid.). As for the complex dynamics between consciousness and conditioning we would need to further look into the feedback relations between the “habit-formations” (S. samsk¯ ˙ ara) and “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana), i.e. skandhas 4 and 5 (to be discussed in more detail with regard to Fig. 9.3). 8. The Abhidharma Pit.aka (i.e. “Collection of Higher Doctrine”, ca. 200 BCE––200 CE) forms the third canonical body of Buddhist literature besides the s¯ utra texts and the “rules” of the vinaya texts: its intricate analysis of dharmas as minimal constituents of experience constitutes an integral part of Buddhism in the sense that dharma theory functions as the “theoretical counterpart” to meditation practice (cf. Ronkin 2018). The Therav¯adins and the Sarv¯astiv¯adins are the two main schools of Abhidharma, with complete textual corpora in P¯a.li and Sanskrit (with large portions being available only in Chinese translations), respectively. Depending on the relevant literature consulted in each case, Sanskrit or P¯a.li terms may at times be used to highlight something general about this genre of literature (rather than about a specific school tradition), without mentioning both the Sanskrit and P¯a.li terms in each case. 9. Following Sheriff (1994: 19) we may introduce the following “abbreviation” for describing correspondences between Buddhist notions and Peirce’s categories: consciousness ≙ Firstness and mind ≙ Thirdness. While according to Peirce consciousness in itself is “essentially Firstness” (ibid.) and thus “is nothing but feeling” (p. 25), we may say that the “continuity” (and thus: Thirdness) of mind involves the formation of habits (cf. CP 6.268). The way in which for Peirce consciousness relates to and/or involves the categories of Firstness,

212

A. T. LETTNER

Secondness and Thirdness can be seen from his outline on the “true categories of consciousness” (CP 1.377). Here the first category is “feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis”; the second category is “consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something”; the third category is “synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought”. We can now turn to see how all of this applies to the Buddhist conception of the “sensory bases” (¯ ayatana) and to consciousness (vijñ¯ ana). In Buddhist terms, consciousness rarely appears as “pure consciousness”, but usually as a “moment of consciousness” or “thought” (citta) in the company of the so-called “mental concomitants” (S. cait¯ asika, P. cetasika) (cf. Conze 1962: 111). In fact, these “mentals” or “mental factors” belong to a later explanatory conception, which together with the notion of citta (“consciousness moment”, “thought”) further differentiates the earlier skandhic notion of vijñ¯ ana as part of a comprehensive taxonomy of dharmas (cf. Cox 2004: 553; Willemen 2004; Lettner forthcoming c). Moreover, as set out in note 7 above, “mind” (S. manas, P. mano) functions as the sixth sensory faculty and “mental cognitive awareness” (S. mano-vijñ¯ ana, P. mano-viññ¯ an.a) constitutes the sixth type of cognitive modality as part of the ¯ ayatanas. In fact, the latter arises in conjunction with both “a previous moment of sensory cognitive awareness as an object and with its ‘own’ kind of object, that is, mental phenomena” (Waldron 2003: 29). As with Peirce’s third category of “synthetic consciousness” and “thought” (CP 1.377), in Buddhism it is mind that “organizes the data of the other senses, unifies them and turns them into perceptions of things and persons”, that is into “thought-objects” (Conze 1962: 112). 10. Skandha (2) in the model of the five aggregates, i.e. “feeling”/“sensations” (vedan¯ a ) also constitutes “link” (nid¯ ana) 7 in the series of dependent arising. Skandhas 4 and 5, i.e. (4) “karmic or dispositional formations” (S. samsk¯ ˙ ara; P. sankh¯ ara) and (5) “consciousness” (S. vijñ¯ ana; P. viññ¯ an.a), also constitute links 2 and 3 in the series of dependent arising. 11. Even before the sensorial capacity to interpret a particular sensation, a basic intentionality and predisposition (S. samsk¯ ˙ ara) to interpret has become embodied in the form of concrete physico-cognitive structures that make up this phenomenal body (n¯ ama-r¯ upa) (cf. Lusthaus 2002: 54).

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

213

12. As part of the phenomenological or formal categories, a sign’s interpretant represents the sign as a sign of the following ontological or material categories: “possibility” (rheme), “fact” (dicent sign), and “reason” (argument ) (Sheriff 1994: 41). 13. The realist Sarv¯astiv¯adins posited the “atemporal reality of dharmas in the past, present, and future” as is indicated by their name “Sarv¯asti-v¯adins”, i.e. those [who as a school posit that] “all exists” (sarvam asti) (cf. Waldron 2003: 66). 14. “The Objects--for a Sign may have any number of them--may each be a single known existing thing or thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which single Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other mode of being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances.” (CP 2.232). 15. For a discussion of how unwholesome states of consciousness and activities are counteracted by the cultivation of “faith” or “trustful confidence” (S. ´sraddh¯ a, P. saddh¯ a ) in the context of Buddhist ethics and the so-called “Noble Eightfold Path” see Lettner (forthcoming f). 16. Following Frauwallner, in this quotation Sanskrit and P¯a.li terms are indicated not in their stem forms, but in pausa (i.e. as they would occur in absolutely final position), which means that a neuter noun like “r¯ upam” is given with the final “-m” of the relevant declension being added to the stem “r¯ upa” and the final “-s” of a word which in its stem form is “´sabda” (“sound”) is here quoted as “´sabdah.”. 17. Within the context of the theory of perception as set out by the famous logico-epistemologists Dign¯aga (ca. 480–540) and Dharmak¯ırti (ca. 600–660), the English term “sensation” is usually employed to translate “pratyaks.a” in the sense of a perception not marred by conceptual construction (i.e. nirvikalpaka pratyaks.a), which distinguishes it from a “perception” that involves such an overlay of associations (cf. e.g. Stcherbatsky 1923: 56, note 1). 18. In P¯a.li: “Imasmim ad¯ a idam . sati idam . hoti; imass’ upp¯ . uppajjati. imasmim . asati idam na hoti; imassa nirodh¯ a idam nirujjhati” (MN.III.64; . . ѯan.amoli and Bodhi 1995: 927; cf. Waldron 2003: 191, 9 M II 32). 19. Peirce announced the “birth of the word ‘pragmaticism,’ which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” in order to distinguish the specificity of his approach from pragmatism (cf. Peirce 1905: 166). 20. The Eightfold Path is based on the three fundamental principles of “moral discipline” (P. s¯ıla, S. s´¯ıla) “concentration” (P./S. sam¯ adhi) and “wisdom” (P. paññ¯ a, S. prajñ¯ a ) (cf. Govinda 1961: 70), which comprise

214

A. T. LETTNER

the eight steps of (1) “right view” (samm¯ a dit..thi), (2) “right intention” (samm¯ a sankappa), (3) “right speech” (samm¯ a v¯ ac¯ a ), (4) “right action” (samm¯ akammanta), (5) “right livelihood” (samm¯ a ¯ aj¯ıva), (6) “right effort” (samm¯ a v¯ ay¯ ama), (7) “right mindfulness” (samm¯ a sati), and (8) “right concentration” (samm¯ a sam¯ adhi) (cf. Bodhi in MN 1995: 32–33; P¯a.li terminology in brackets). 21. Thus, a Peircean reading of Buddhism and a Buddhist impregnation of semiotic philology is hoped to profit from the philological dimension brought to bear upon the methodological groundwork done with regard to an intercultural and transdiciplinary reconstruction of thought forms and knowledge forms (cf. Lettner forthcoming a and b). As stated in note 4 (above), there is much to be learnt from a “comparative ethics and epistemology of spiritual ‘growth’ vs. ‘not becoming’” (Lettner forthcoming f) with regard to the relationship between theory and terminology. This can be seen even before investigating the commensurability of Peirce’s philosophy with the Buddhist approach, including a careful consideration of both his conception of God (cf. Orange 1984) and “the sense of awe with which one regards Gautama Booda” (letter to William James of 13 March 1897, cf. Ketner 1992: 9). Setting out to compare cultural metaphors of spiritual growth and liberation with regard to the “metaphors we live by” we may expect that the images employed in the context of a no-substance ontology like Buddhism are going to differ from such as are typically used in Western as well as in Indian substance-ontological texts of philosophy.

Abbreviations CP = Collected Papers EP 1, EP 2 = Essential Papers P. S.

cf. Peirce 1931–1958 cf. Peirce 1992 + 1998 P¯a.li Sanskrit

References Bergman, Mats. 2004. Fields of Signification: Explorations in Charles S. Peirce’s Theory of Signs, ed. Marjaana Kopperi, Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen, Petri Ylikoski, Bernt Österman (Philosophy Studies from the University of Helsinki 6). Helsinki: Department of Philosophy.

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

215

Bergman, Mats, and Sami Paavola. 2014. The Commens Dictionary. Peirce’s terms in his Own Words: Created and maintained by M.B.S.P. and João Queiroz. http://www.commens.org/dictionary. Brier, Søren. 2008. Cybersemiotics: Why Information is Not Enough. Toronto: Toronto University Press. Brier, Søren. 2017. Peircean Cosmogony’s Symbolic Agapistic Self-Organization as an Example of the Influence of Eastern Philosophy on Western Thinking. Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology December (131): 92–107. Conze, Edward. 1962. Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin. Coseru, Christian. 2012. Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP ). First publ. Thu December 3, 2009; subst. rev. Fri October 12, 2012. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian-bud dhism/. Cox, Collett. 2004. From Category to Ontology: The Changing Role of Dharma in Sarv¯astiv¯ada Abhidharma. Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 543–597. D’Amato, Mario. 2003. The Semiotics of Signlessness: A Buddhist Doctrine of Signs. Semiotics 147 (1/4): 185–207. Danesi, Marcel, and Paul Perron. 1999. Analyzing Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. De Tienne, André. 2013. Iconoscopy between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic. RS•SI/Recherches Sémiotiques 33 (nos. 1–2–3): 19–37. Eliade, Mircea. 1954/1958. Yoga. Immortality and Freedom, trans. from French by Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books. Frauwallner, Erich. 1973. History of Indian Philosophy. 2 vols. vol. 1: The Philosophy of the Veda and of the Epic. The Buddha and the Jina. The S¯ am . khya and the Classical Yoga System. Trans. from Engl. by V.M. Bedekar. Introduction by L. Gabriel. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Goodman, Charles. 2017. “Ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism”: First publ. Tue June 22, 2010; subst. rev. Wed February 1, 2017. https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/ethics-indian-buddhism/. Govinda, Lama A. 1961. The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy and its Systematic Representation According to Abhidhamma Tradition. London: Rider. Harvey, Peter. 1986. ‘Signless’ Meditations in P¯ali Buddhism. JIABS 9 (1): 25– 52. Harvey, Peter. 2013. “The Conditioned Co-arising of Mental and Bodily Processes within Life and between Lives”. In A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, 46–68. Malden, MA: Wiley & Blackwell. Hausman, Carl R. 1993. Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

216

A. T. LETTNER

Hayes, Richard P. 1995/2003. Did Buddhism Anticipate Pragmatism?: (Original publ. in ARC: The Journal of the Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University 23, pp. 75–88, 1995). https://www.unm.edu/~rhayes/pragmatism.pdf. September 23, 2018. Hayward, Jeremy. 1987. Shifting Worlds, Changing Minds: Where the Sciences and Buddhism Meet. Boston: New Science Library. Jenkins, Stephen. 2013. Compassion and the Ethics of Violence. In A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, 466–475. Malden, MA: Wiley & Blackwell. Ketner, Kenneth L. (ed.). 1992. Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898––Charles Sanders Peirce. With an intr. by K.L. Ketner and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Köller, Wilhelm. 1988. Philosophie der Grammatik: vom Sinn grammatischen Wissens. Stuttgart: Metzler. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming a. Eine Philologie der Denkformen für Indien und Europa: Sanskrit-S¯ utras und Semiotik in den Cultural Studies. Dissertation thesis, University of Kassel, Kassel University Press. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming b. Towards a Cybersemiotic Philology of Buddhist Knowledge Forms: How to Undo Objects and Concepts in ProcessPhilosophical Terms. Chapter 13 in Introduction to Cybersemiotics: A Transdisciplinary Perspective, ed. Carlos Vidales and Søren Brier. Dordrecht: Springer (Biosemiotics 21). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52746-4_13. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming c. Semiotic Roots and Buddhist Routes in Phenomenology and Intercultural Philosophy: A Peircean Study of Abhidharma Buddhist Theories of Consciousness and Perception. Chapter 3 in Roots, Routes and a New Awakening: Beyond One and Many and Alternative Planetary Futures, ed. Ananta Kumar Giri. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7122-0_3. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming d. Transpositional Subjectobjectivity and Wholeness––A Buddhist Phenomenological Prelude to Merleau-Ponty. In Transpositional Subjectobjectivity, ed. Ananta Kumar Giri. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming e. No Self, No Trivial Pursuits: Personhood and Agency in Buddhist Ethics. Reflections inspired by a dialogue with Charles Foster (Oxford). In Asian Journal of Social Theory, Inaugural Issue, ed. (in chief) Ananta Kumar Giri (Madras Institute of Development Studies) and John Clammer (Jindal Global University). Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming f. Of Seeds and Weeds in Buddhist and Christian Models of Faith and Knowledge: A Comparative Ethics and

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

217

Epistemology of Spiritual ‘Growth’ vs. ‘Not Becoming’. In Cultivating Transforming Faith and a New Ecology of Hope, ed. Ananta Kumar Giri. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming g. Buddhist Phenomenological Steps to an Intercultural Cognitive Semiotics: A Yog¯ac¯ara View on the Bio-Cybernetic Complexities of Living Systems: Paper accepted for the 4th Conference of the International Association for Cognitive Semiotics at RWTH Aachen, Germany (IACS4), cf. https://iacs4.signges.de/aachen2020/program (originally planned for July 2–4, 2020: Conference date postponed). Abstract available on https://www.academia.edu/43136371/_Buddhist_phenomeno logical_steps_to_an_intercultural_cognitive_semiotics_A_Yog%C4%81c%C4% 81ra_view_on_the_bio_cybernetic_complexities_of_living_systems_IACS4_A achen_2020_. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming h. Referenz ohne Referent in der Philosophie des Yog¯ac¯ara-Buddhismus: Ein Blick auf ‚nur Bewusstsein‘ (cittam¯ atra) und semiotische agency [i.e. “Reference without a Referent in Yog¯ac¯ara Buddhist Philosophy: Taking a Look at ‘Nothing-but-Cognition’ (cittam¯ atra) and Semiotic Agency”]: Paper accepted for the 16th International Conference of the German Semiotics Society (DGS 16) on Transformations—Signs and their Objects in Transition (University of Technology Chemnitz, Germany, Sept. 28 – Oct. 2, 2021). Section on “The End of Reference? Truth Claims in the ‘Post-Factual Era’” (Org. Georg Albert, Jörg Bücker and Jan Georg Schneider). Abstract available on https://www.academia.edu/44225508/_ Referenz_ohne_Referent_in_der_Philosophie_des_Yog%C4%81c%C4%81ra_B uddhismus_Ein_Blick_auf_nur_Bewusstsein_cittam%C4%81tra_und_semiot ische_agency_DGS_16_Chemnitz_2020_2021_. Lettner, Alina Therese. forthcoming i. Language and the Constitution of Objectivity in Abhidharma Buddhist Philosophy: A Semiotic View on ‘Apperception’ (samjñ¯ ˙ a ) and ‘Nominal Designation’ (prajñapti): Paper accepted for The Fifteenth International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences (ICHoLS XV, Università del Sacro Cuore in Milan, Italy, August 23–27, 2021). Abstract available on https://www.academia.edu/442 09461/_Language_and_the_constitution_of_objectivity_in_Abhidharma_B uddhist_philosophy_A_semiotic_view_on_apperception_sa%E1%B9%81j%C3% B1%C4%81_and_nominal_designation_praj%C3%B1apti_ICHoLS_XV_Milan_ 2020_2021_. Lettner, Alina Therese. 2019. Connecting Consciousness and the Cosmos in Cybersemiotics and Indian Buddhism: Two Process-Philosophical Paradigms for the Challenges of Change in Nature and Culture: Presentation given on June 15th 2019, 11.45–12.15 (in Session 10) at the 11th Conference of the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies (NASS XI) on « Anticipation and

218

A. T. LETTNER

Change » held at the Department of Social studies, University of Stavanger (UiS) in Stavanger, Norway, June 13–15th 2019, cf. https://ebooks.uis.no/ index.php/USPS/catalog/view/9/6/22-1. Abstract available on https:// www.academia.edu/39633654/_Connecting_consciousness_and_the_cos mos_in_cybersemiotics_and_Indian_Buddhism_Two_process-philosophical_p aradigms_for_the_challenges_of_change_in_nature_and_culture_NASS_XI_ Stavanger_UiS_Norway_2019_. Lusthaus, Dan. 2002. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yog¯ ac¯ ara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun. London: RoutledgeCourzon. Macy, Joanna. 1991. Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural Systems. Albany: State University of New York Press. McMahan, David L. 2002. Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mah¯ ay¯ ana Buddhism. London: Routledge Courzon. McMahan, David L. 2008. A Brief History of Interdependence. Publ. as ch. 6. in The making of Buddhist modernism by D.L. McMahan, 149–182. New York: Oxford University Press 2008. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/ 5902272/A_Brief_History_of_Interdependence, pp. 131–176. MN 1995. = The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the Majjhima Nik¯ aya. Trans. from Pali by Bhikkhu ѯan.amoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Orig. Trans. by Bhikkhu ѯan.amoli. Trans. ed. and rev. by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Kandy (Sri Lanka): Wisdom Publishers. Orange, Donna M. 1984. Peirce’s Conception of God: A Developmental Study. Lubbock: Instruction for Studies in Pragmaticism. Peirce, Charles S. 1905. What Pragmatism Is. The Monist XV (2): 161–181. Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers: Vols. 1–6, ed. Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss; vols. 7–8, ed. Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Peirce, Charles S. 1992. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1 (1867–1893). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Peirce, Charles S. 1998. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 2 (1893–1913). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Piatigorsky, Alexander. 1984. The Buddhist Philosophy of Thought: Essays in Interpretation. London: Curzon Press. Ronkin, Noa. 2018. Abhidharma: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP ). First publ. Mon August 16, 2010; subst. rev. Wed May 30, 2018. https://plato. stanford.edu/entries/abhidharma/. Sheriff, John K. 1994. Charles Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Sopa, Geshe Lhundub. 1986. The Special Theory of prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada: The Cycle of Dependent Origination. The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (JIABS) 9 (1): 105–119.

9

PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC PRAGMATICISM AND BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY …

219

Stcherbatsky, Theodor. 1923. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word “Dharma”. London: Royal Asiatic Society. Tolle, Eckhart. 2011. How Does Karma Fit in With Your Teaching?: Eckhart Tolle TV, published online on 3.11.2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=ScMCbyvEiSE. latest access on June 24, 2019. Waldron, William S. 2003. The Buddhist Unconscious: The ¯ alaya-vijñ¯ ana in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. London: RoutledgeCourzon. Warder, A.K. 1971. The Concept of a Concept. Journal of Indian Philosophy (1): 181–196. Willemen, Charles. 2004. Dharma and Dharmas. In Encyclopedia of Buddhism: A-L (2 Vols. Vol. 1), ed. Robert E. Buswell. 217–224. New York: Macmillan, USA. Williams, Paul M. 1980. Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka. Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 1–45.

CHAPTER 10

Spiritual Pragmatism: William James, Sri Aurobindo and Global Philosophy Richard Hartz

A Larger Pragmatism? In an age of professional specialization, philosophy risks being reduced to a discussion of verbal technicalities that have no discernible bearing on our lives. Yet there are philosophers who still insist on dealing with questions that matter. Some of them call their approach pragmatism. The term’s everyday associations have caused confusion ever since it was first attached to a philosophical outlook in the late nineteenth century. The original pragmatists themselves disagreed about what they meant by the name. But it has stuck, while proposed alternatives have been all but forgotten.1 Among the versions of Western philosophical pragmatism on offer, I will focus on William James’s classic exposition of this “oddly-named thing” (James 2000: 20).2 The pragmatic method in philosophy, James tells us, “is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences” (ibid.: 25). Much depends, then, on the meaning of “practical.” Taking it in the broadest sense, James understands “practical consequences” to include the psychological effects of holding a belief.

R. Hartz (B) Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_10

221

222

R. HARTZ

This leads him to conclude: “The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one” (ibid.: 27). As a way of evaluating philosophical alternatives, pragmatism has thus a metaphilosophical aspect transcending any one thought-system or even, as we will see, any one culture. The pragmatist movement in philosophy seemed to be in decline a few decades ago.3 Lately it has been reviving. Some of its champions have dreamed of reshaping philosophy as an activity more relevant to life. In a recent book, Philip Kitcher writes: “Classical pragmatism is, I believe, not only America’s most important contribution to philosophy but also one of the most significant developments in the history of the subject, comparable in its potential for intellectual change to the celebrated turning points in the seventeenth century and in the wake of Kant” (2012: xi). Referring to the “reconstruction of philosophy” envisaged by John Dewey early in the last century, Kitcher speaks of his own essays “as investigations in the spirit of the would-be pragmatist revolution.” His hope is “to renew the James-Dewey project for our own times” (ibid.: xiii). Likewise John Lachs, in his Stoic Pragmatism, ends a chapter entitled “What Can Philosophy Do to Make Life Better?” with the optimistic prospect: “The future lies in regaining for philosophy the power it once enjoyed and making it again a central player in the drama of gradual human self-improvement” (2012: 27). In the present chapter I will suggest an even larger framework for understanding the history and potential of pragmatism. As a distinct but diverse philosophical current, pragmatism began in America. More recently a number of European thinkers have acknowledged its influence. What is generally overlooked is that it has also found echoes in Asia. Its association with pluralism is no accident. As has been pointed out in an introduction to the subject, pragmatism with all its variant forms “is best viewed not as a set of doctrines but rather as a tradition of thought” (Bacon 2012: 2). Part of my aim is to show that this tradition has long overflowed the boundaries of Euro-American philosophy. When William James published a series of lectures in 1907 under the title Pragmatism, he subtitled his seminal work A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. He might have added that these ways of thinking were never confined to the West. Nor has the modern interest in renewing some kind of philosophical or spiritual pragmatism been restricted to thinkers in America and Europe. Perhaps George Santayana had an inkling of this

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

223

when he said of James, “He had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age…. His scattered words caught fire in many parts of the world” (Richardson 2006: 495). Similarities between Western pragmatism and aspects of non-Western traditions such as Buddhism and Confucianism have not gone unexplored.4 But attempts at detailed comparison have yielded mixed results. This was to be expected. Whatever the common features of the human condition, systems of thought arising in widely separated civilizations are likely to reflect such varying cultural assumptions and commitments that a productive dialogue between them may be hard to initiate. In such cases, comparative philosophy is in danger of being dismissed as a comparison of apples and oranges. Yet comparison has to be attempted, because in today’s globalized world we cannot afford the insularity of ignoring cultures other than our own. Differences must be appreciated and can be celebrated as a source of invigorating diversity. But the complementary search for commonalities as a basis for mutual understanding on our increasingly interconnected planet is an equally pressing need.

The Professor and the Mystic The comparison I propose to undertake is in many ways easier than directly comparing a modern Western philosophy with an ancient Eastern tradition. Even so, it will involve bridging a gap between civilizations with vastly different histories and contrasting value systems. But in this case, much of the work of overcoming the cultural distance between the so-called East and West has already been done for us by the thinkers in question, who in certain respects were early exemplars of the practice of what is coming to be called global philosophy.5 Sri Aurobindo, regarded by many as the most important Indian philosopher of recent times, can be taken as a spokesman of an Eastern civilization responding creatively to the impact of the modern world.6 We will look specifically at his engagement with the theory of pragmatism as formulated by William James. James was not only among the most original philosophers that America has produced and a significant contributor to the development of psychology in the nineteenth century, but a pioneer in the study of mysticism and religious experience. While investigating these domains he encountered a slightly earlier form of the religio-philosophical movement of neo-Vedanta in which Sri Aurobindo was to become a major figure.

224

R. HARTZ

The lives of these two thinkers overlapped. William James (1842– 1910) and Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) both lived partly during what has been called the belle époque of globalization.7 This was the time when, among other things, transcontinental communications had begun to be instantaneous, enabling newspapers to publish reports of daily events from all over the world. An event such as the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 had become possible for the first time in history, bringing representatives of religions and cultures from around the globe into face-to-face contact on a scale never before imaginable. For better or worse, European colonialism was imposing forms of Westernized education and culture on much of the world. As a result, James and Aurobindo thought, spoke, and wrote in the same language, English.8 We may therefore juxtapose their ideas without confronting the linguistic obstacles that can hamper attempts to compare philosophy written in European languages with texts in languages such as Sanskrit, Pali, or Chinese. For all their differences in culture, temperament, career, and achievements, James and Aurobindo were in some ways surprisingly similar individuals. Take their educational backgrounds. Though Harvard and Cambridge Universities, respectively, played some role in their intellectual development, neither these nor any other institutions received much credit from them for the manner in which their minds were formed. James’s schooling was so frequently interrupted that he used to say of his education that he “never had any” (Menand 2001: 94). But this apparent deficiency may have turned out to be an asset; as Dewey later observed, it may have “protected his mind against academic deadening” (Richardson 2006: 51). Much the same thing can be seen in the case of Sri Aurobindo. He lived in England from the age of seven until he was twenty, but later remarked, “My education in England was badly neglected” (2011: 10). He attributed the growth of his intelligence not to any systematic training but to “a wide haphazard activity developing ideas from all things read, seen or experienced” (ibid.: 238). What education James received was in science, not philosophy. When in his later years a friend called him “the greatest philosopher of our country,” he quipped, “God help the country” (Richardson 2006: 419). Nor was his lack of formal philosophical training compensated by a passion for the subject driving him to master it on his own. He could read with enthusiasm the works of a congenial thinker such as Bergson; but from most of the books of philosophy being produced by his contemporaries, he confessed, he got “nothing but a sort of marking time,

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

225

champing of the jaws, pawing the ground, and resettling into the same attitude like a weary horse in his stall, turning over the same few threadbare categories” (ibid.: 427). When James distinguishes the philosopher from “the rest of us non-philosophers” (1992: 614), he seems to be enjoying the sense of belonging to the latter group. As for Sri Aurobindo, he grew up lacking any pronounced inclination toward philosophy or aptitude for it. He was far more interested in literature and history. Though he read some of Plato’s dialogues in Greek, it seems to have been the style that attracted him at least as much as the content, for he later commented, “Plato was a great writer as well as a philosopher – no more perfect prose has been written by any man” (2004a: 522). The writings of Epictetus and other Stoics and Epicureans also appealed to him and he often referred to Stoicism in his writings on spiritual practice. But most of Western philosophy after the Greeks, especially German metaphysics, seemed to him “a mass of abstractions with nothing concrete or real that could be firmly grasped and written in a metaphysical jargon to which I had not the key.” He added that he “tried once a translation of Kant but dropped it after the first two pages and never tried again…. In sum, my interest in metaphysics was almost null, and in general philosophy sporadic…. As to Indian Philosophy, it was a little better, but not much” (2006: 112).

The Legacy of Hegel Both William James and Sri Aurobindo became philosophers almost in spite of themselves. Neither could be called a philosopher’s philosopher. This is reflected in their respective relationships to G. W. F. Hegel and the tradition of metaphysical idealism he represents. James was a declared anti-Hegelian. Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy, in contrast, is often said to have significant resemblances to Hegel’s. However, we will see that its affinities with Jamesian pragmatism are at least equally important and offset its apparently Hegelian aspect. But let us look first at James’s side of this complex triangular relationship. At the height of Hegel’s influence in America, James’s first public expression of his views on the great German philosopher caused something of a scandal. In “On Some Hegelisms” he virtually thumbed his nose at this iconic figure, writing irreverently:

226

R. HARTZ

His system resembles a mouse-trap, in which if you once pass the door you may be lost forever. Safety lies in not entering. Hegelians have anointed, so to speak, the entrance with various considerations which, stated in an abstract form, are so plausible as to slide us unresistingly and almost unwittingly through the fatal arch. (1992: 661–662)

Whatever James’s opinion of Hegel, this was hardly the tone that an aspiring philosopher—if he thought of himself as such at the age of forty—was expected to adopt toward one of the giants in the history of thought. More soberly, he struggled with Hegelian “absolutism” throughout much of his intellectual life, defining his version of pragmatism largely in opposition to Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. Yet in the first chapter on mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience, we come across a passage where James reveals an unexpected insight into what may have lain behind the abstractions of Hegel’s philosophy. It begins with an often-quoted remark about consciousness in general, based on a type of psychological or parapsychological observation and speculation in which James was keenly interested: Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation.

James then speaks of the philosophical implications of such an enlargement of our understanding of consciousness. This leads to a more personal reflection: No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded…. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance.

Reflecting on this insight and its significance, James is reminded of Hegel. For a moment he suspends his usual critical attitude toward this thinker:

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

227

The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity…. I feel as if it must mean something, something like what the Hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it more clearly.

When James published his lectures, he added a footnote to this passage elaborating on the suggestion of a mystical element behind Hegel’s thought: What reader of Hegel can doubt that that sense of a perfected Being with all its otherness soaked up into itself, which dominates his whole philosophy, must have come from the prominence in his consciousness of mystical moods like this, in most persons kept subliminal? (2002: 388–389)9

It may be partly some such mystical undercurrent in Hegel that seems to make most philosophers think of him when they read Sri Aurobindo. Steve Odin, for example, writes in a comparative study: The twentieth-century Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo, who has framed his own full-scale metaphysical synthesis, appropriated Hegel’s notion of an Absolute Spirit and employed it to radically restructure the architectonic framework of the ancient Hindu Ved¯anta system in contemporary terms. (2013: 182)

Odin goes so far as to conclude: In evaluating the significance of Sri Aurobindo’s work from a Western standpoint, it must be said that he has accomplished a landmark speculative synthesis of transcultural categories in his bold reconstruction of Ved¯antic thought in terms of Hegel’s dynamic model of reality…. Due to the comprehensiveness of Sri Aurobindo’s world hypothesis as an interpretive and explanatory speculative scheme, it has performed the great service of reinstating Absolute Idealism as a plausible philosophical alternative in the contemporary world. (ibid.: 194–195)

But as striking as are some of the parallels pointed out by Odin and others,10 there is no evidence to support the common assumption that Sri Aurobindo was directly influenced by Hegel. More than once he explicitly denied having read Hegel, as when he wrote: “I made in fact no study

228

R. HARTZ

of metaphysics in my school and College days. What little I knew about philosophy I picked up desultorily in my general reading. I once read, not Hegel, but a small book on Hegel, but it left no impression on me” (2006: 112). Twenty years or so after the serial publication of The Life Divine in its original form in the monthly review Arya, he commented on the paradox: “How was it that I who was unable to understand and follow a metaphysical argument and whom a page of Kant or Hegel or Hume or even Berkeley left either dazed and uncomprehending and fatigued or totally uninterested because I could not fathom or follow, suddenly began writing pages of the stuff as soon as I started the Arya and am now reputed to be a great philosopher?” (2004a: 216). Sri Aurobindo explained that the eruption of the “volcano” of philosophy in his writings was due not to any extensive reading or stimulation by others’ ideas, but to his spiritual development through the practice of Yoga (2011: 63, 70). Be that as it may, the impression of Hegelianism made by The Life Divine on most philosophical minds is undeniable. We need not concern ourselves too much with where this perceived element in Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy came from. If we require an external source, we can suppose that he had picked up Hegelian ideas in England at a time when they were very much in the air, or absorbed them in his general reading after returning to India. Either way, the influence would have come half-consciously in the unmethodical process of his selfeducation, to be combined later with other materials and transmuted into a philosophy of his own. From the point of view of Sri Aurobindo’s relation to pragmatism it is pertinent to ask, therefore, whether his thought has as much in common with Hegel’s as it is often said to have. William James, after all, presented pragmatism as almost the antithesis of Hegelianism and the neo-Hegelians reacted accordingly. To the extent that Sri Aurobindo has affinities with Hegel, however they came about, those affinities might be thought to make his philosophy incompatible with pragmatism. So before comparing his ideas directly with pragmatic thinking, it will be useful to clarify their relation to those of Hegel and his followers.

Logic and the Absolute Sri Aurobindo said next to nothing about Hegel himself, but commented briefly on some British neo-Hegelians who also happen to have been involved in debates with William James. A few passages from the writings of F. H. Bradley, H. H. Joachim, and J. M. E. McTaggart were sent

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

229

to Sri Aurobindo by correspondents who apparently expected him to find in them similarities to his own thought and especially to his account of a suprarational consciousness. In reply he emphasized, instead, the differences. “In the extracts you have sent me from Bradley and Joachim,” he wrote in one letter, “it is still the intellect thinking about what is beyond itself and coming to an intellectual, a reasoned speculative conclusion about it. It is not dynamic for the change which it attempts to describe.” Elaborating on what he found missing in these extracts, he continued: If these writers were expressing in mental terms some realisation, even mental, some intuitive experience of this “Other than Thought”, then one ready for it might feel it through the veil of the language they use and himself draw near to the same experience. Or if, having reached the intellectual conclusion, they had passed on to the spiritual realisation, finding the way or following one already found, then in pursuing their thought, one might be preparing oneself for the same transition. But there is nothing of the kind in all this strenuous thinking. It remains in the domain of the intellect and in that domain it is no doubt admirable; but it does not become dynamic for spiritual experience. (2012: 354)

Sri Aurobindo had no objection to “strenuous thinking” as such. He once apologized to readers of his own writings for the “strenuous intellectual labour” (1998a: 101) to which he was subjecting them. At the same time, he insisted that he had founded his philosophy “not on ideas by themselves,” but on experience. “I owed nothing in my philosophy,” he wrote, “to intellectual abstractions, ratiocination or dialectics; when I have used these means it was simply to explain my philosophy and justify it to the intellect of others” (2006: 113). The method of thinking that Sri Aurobindo noted in the work of the neo-Hegelians and contrasted with his own is what William James called “the logical machinery and technical apparatus of absolutism” (James 2009: 120). James scoffed at “the thin, abstract, indigent, and threadbare appearance, the starving, school-room aspect, which the speculations of most of our absolutist philosophers present” (ibid.: 59). His antipathy toward this style of reasoning often makes him sound hostile to the very idea of the Absolute. He dismisses F. H. Bradley’s conception of it as a “metaphysical monster” (ibid.: 22) and likens T. H. Green’s to “a sort of timeless soap-bubble large enough to mirror the whole universe” (ibid.: 56). On the other hand, he clarifies that it is “only the extravagant claims of coercive necessity on the absolute’s part that have to be denied by a

230

R. HARTZ

priori logic. As an hypothesis trying to make itself probable on analogical and inductive grounds, the absolute is entitled to a patient hearing” (ibid.: 113). He admits its emotional appeal—no negligible consideration in a pragmatic view: This admirable faculty of transcending, whilst inwardly preserving, every contrariety, is the absolute’s characteristic form of rationality. We are but syllables in the mouth of the Lord; if the whole sentence is divine, each syllable is absolutely what it should be, in spite of all appearances. In making up the balance for or against absolutism, this emotional value weights heavily the credit side of the account. (ibid.: 48)

Even more telling are James’s comments on the monistic mysticism of India, especially as embodied for him in Swami Vivekananda, whom he met after the Parliament of Religions. “To interpret absolute monism worthily,” James advises, “be a mystic.” In general, he goes on to point out, “Mystical states of mind in every degree are shown by history, usually tho not always, to make for the monistic view.” By way of illustration, he then treats his audience to a glowing account of the impression Vivekananda made on him: The paragon of all monistic systems is the Vedânta philosophy of Hindostan, and the paragon of Vedântist missionaries was the late Swami Vivekananda who visited our shores some years ago. The method of Vedântism is the mystical method. You do not reason, but after going through a certain discipline you see, and having seen, you can report the truth. Vivekananda thus reports the truth in one of his lectures here: “Where is any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the Universe … this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything?… If you go inside you find that unity between man and man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor, the gods and men: all are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion…. He knows the reality of everything, the secret of everything…. Neither death nor disease, nor sorrow nor misery, nor discontent is there….”. (2002: 68–69 [italics in original])

“Observe how radical the character of the monism here is,” James comments. “Separation is not simply overcome by the One, it is denied to exist. There is no many. We are not parts of the One; It has no parts; and since in a sense we undeniably are, it must be that each of

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

231

us is the One, indivisibly and totally. An absolute One, and I that One, – surely we have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has a high pragmatic value.” After a further quotation from Vivekananda about the psychological consequences of living in a state of consciousness where “all separateness has ceased” and “the whole universe has been melted into that oneness,” James sums up his own thoughts on this mystical monism and its relation to the intellectual philosophies of the Absolute: We all have some ear for this monistic music: it elevates and reassures. We all have at least the germ of mysticism in us. And when our idealists recite their arguments for the Absolute, saying that the slightest union admitted anywhere carries logically absolute Oneness with it, and that the slightest separation admitted anywhere logically carries disunion remediless and complete, I cannot help suspecting that the palpable weak places in the intellectual reasonings they use are protected from their own criticism by a mystical feeling that, logic or no logic, absolute Oneness must somehow at any cost be true. (2002: 69–70 [italics in original])

As for the “germ of mysticism” that James believes each of us to have somewhere in our being, he once wrote candidly about himself: My personal position is simple. I have no living sense of commerce with a God. I envy those who have, for I know that the addition of such a sense would help me greatly…. Now, although I am so devoid of Gottesbewusstsein [consciousness of God] in the directer and stronger sense, yet there is something in me which makes response when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others. I recognize the deeper voice. Something tells me – ‘thither lies the truth’ – and I am sure it is not old theistic prejudices of infancy. Those in my case were Christian, but I have grown so out of Christianity that entanglement therewith on the part of a mystical utterance has to be abstracted from and overcome, before I can listen. Call this, if you like, my mystical germ. (Barnard 1997: 19)

A Shift of Perspective Western philosophers from Plato onwards have tended to pride themselves on the rational pursuit of truth for its own sake. The Greeks, as the Indologist Wilhelm Halbfass points out, “had claimed that they possessed a capacity for theoria that distinguished them from other cultures, a unique freedom to ask questions about themselves and the world that

232

R. HARTZ

were motivated by wonder and curiosity alone.” The modern pragmatists, by redefining truth as what works, broke with this long-standing tradition of theoretical knowledge treated as an end in itself without reference to its value for life. In so doing, they could be interpreted as bringing Western philosophy closer to non-Western modes of thought—including Indian philosophy, which, as Halbfass observes, “does not advocate knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but instead proclaims its commitment to a spiritual and soteriological purpose” (1991: 243). A few years after the death of William James, we find Sri Aurobindo noting “that the gulf between East and West, India and Europe is much less profound and unbridgeable now than it was thirty or forty years ago” (2004b: 69). He commented particularly on the rise in the West of “new philosophies … not indeed directly spiritual, vitalistic rather and pragmatic, but yet by their greater subjectivity already nearer to Indian ways of thinking” (ibid.: 70). Occasionally he mentioned names in this connection. He referred, especially, to “the thought of Nietzsche, of Bergson and of James” (ibid.: 27). Speaking of the interest of Bergson, James and others in intuition and mysticism, he emphasized that the writers in question could by no means be dismissed as “incompetent dupes of the imagination,” but were “psychologists of the first rank and the most original contemporary thinkers in the philosophic field” (2003a: 631). Sri Aurobindo clearly had a favorable impression of William James, but we have few clues to what he might have read of James’s philosophical writings. He recalled in the 1930s that “a long time ago” he had read a book on psychology by James (most likely The Principles of Psychology, unless it was the abridged version, Psychology: Briefer Course). He had found it “not at all an ordinary book in its kind” (2004a: 526), a rare compliment from the Indian Yogi to a Western psychologist. Otherwise on the few occasions when he mentioned James by name it was in connection with his philosophy. These passing references provide little specific information. But they do suggest that he regarded James as a key figure in a trend of modern thought that he considered to be of great importance for the future. James himself had a sense that his own ideas were part of something larger. He described it as a “ferment” and a “slow shifting in the philosophic perspective” (1912: 190) comparable in scope to “the changes from aristocracy to democracy, from classic to romantic taste, from theistic to pantheistic feeling, from static to evolutionary ways of understanding” (ibid.: 245). In Sri Aurobindo’s scheme of social psychology,

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

233

this shift of perspective was a stage in “the transition from the rationalistic and utilitarian period of human development … to a greater subjective age of society.” That transition had begun with “a rapid turning of the current of thought into large and profound movements contradictory of the old intellectual standards, a swift breaking of the old tables.” One of these movements, Sri Aurobindo wrote, was the “new pluralistic and pragmatic philosophy”—evidently an allusion to James, who was not only the best-known exponent of pragmatism, but the author of A Pluralistic Universe. Although this and other recent tendencies of thought sought “to interpret being in the terms of force and action rather than of light and knowledge,” Sri Aurobindo clarified, they “were not a mere superficial recoil from intellectualism to life and action.” Writing at the time of the First World War, which temporarily disrupted these developments, he saw that in spirit they had been “an attempt to read profoundly and live by the Life-Soul of the universe and tended to be deeply psychological and subjective in their method” (1998b: 29–30). When Sri Aurobindo adopted the term “pragmatism” in his philosophical vocabulary, he was responding to some of the work of these contemporaries and immediate predecessors of his. In a number of passages in his writings the reference to American pragmatism is transparent. Elsewhere no deliberate allusion seems intended, but the employment of the words “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” is obviously influenced by the recently established philosophical usage. At other times these words are more ambiguous or occur in their ordinary meanings. Since he rarely mentioned names and it is hard to know exactly what he read, Sri Aurobindo’s occasional allusions to William James do not by themselves prove that when he referred to pragmatism he was thinking specifically of James’s version of it. Certain structural parallels between his system and that of the original pragmatist Charles Peirce have been pointed out (Odin 2013: 183), but these do not relate to pragmatism as such and Peirce’s direct influence need not be assumed to explain them. Peirce, for all his brilliance, lived and died in relative obscurity despite James’s efforts to publicize his contribution. Sri Aurobindo is unlikely to have come to know of him unless it was through James’s writings. He could more easily have become acquainted with the thought of John Dewey, but there is no evidence that he actually did so. Dewey, as Richard Gale has shown (1997: 49–68), tried (with the best of intentions) to naturalize James, to “despookify” him, downplay his mystical proclivities and make him more acceptable to the scientific and rationalistic mind in the

234

R. HARTZ

early twentieth century. In so doing, he moved pragmatism in a direction that Sri Aurobindo would have found less interesting than James’s real views, which he knew of and commented on. In speaking of pragmatism as an element in Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy, therefore, we need not hesitate to relate it mainly to the thought of William James.

Ideas and Their Consequences James gave credit for conceiving pragmatism to his friend Charles Peirce, whose contribution otherwise went largely unrecognized during his own time. He accepted Peirce’s principle of judging the meaning of an idea by its practical consequences. But he thought this principle “should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it.” What counts as a practical consequence need not, according to James, be confined to conduct as Peirce seemed to suggest. For the idea “inspires that conduct because it first foretells some particular turn to our experience which shall call for just that conduct from us” (1992: 1080).11 By taking into account experience as well as conduct in his interpretation of pragmatism, James introduced the psychological and subjective dimension that struck Sri Aurobindo as significant in this philosophy. As we saw at the outset, James advocates the pragmatic method in order to clarify the choice between “world-formulas” (1992: 1081). It may seem strange to call such a question a practical matter. But Sri Aurobindo likewise points out the far-reaching practical implications of some choices between philosophical standpoints. Comparing opposite views of the nature of consciousness, he observes: “The difference, so metaphysical in appearance, is yet of the utmost practical import, for it determines the whole outlook of man upon life, the goal that he shall assign for his efforts and the field in which he shall circumscribe his energies” (2005: 23). The metaphysical distinctions James considered most “intensely practical” (1992: 1084), in view of the potential consequences of the alternatives, were the ones underlying the debate between science and religion. The justification of religious faith, on the grounds that it “works” for people and gives meaning to their lives, preoccupied him in his later years and was part of his reason for developing pragmatism. He used the word religion, he explained frankly, in a “supernaturalist sense, as declaring that the so-called order of nature, which constitutes this world’s experience, is only one portion of the total universe, and that there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we now know nothing positive,

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

235

but in its relation to which the true significance of our present mundane life consists.” During James’s lifetime, this view of things had come under concerted attack in the name of science. In its defense, he argued that “we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again” (1992: 495). James knew that some of his audience would find such trust in invisible realities “sadly mystical and execrably unscientific” (1992: 495). But he was far more keenly aware of the limitations of science than most scientific minds of his time. He went on in the same talk, published in 1895, to portray the belief in science itself as a kind of religion capable of inspiring blind faith among many of its devotees: Science has made such glorious leaps in the last three hundred years, and extended our knowledge of nature so enormously … that it is no wonder if the worshippers of science lose their head. In this very University [Harvard], accordingly, I have heard more than one teacher say that all the fundamental conceptions of truth have already been found by science, and that the future has only the details of the picture to fill in. But … it is hard to see how one who is actively advancing any part of science can make a mistake so crude…. Whatever else be certain, this at least is certain – that the world of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of some sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea. (ibid.: 496 [italics in original])

These words were spoken a few years before Max Planck made the breakthrough in understanding radiation that would lead to the collapse of the overconfident rationalism of classical physics and its eventual replacement by the quasi-mystical paradoxes of quantum theory. As for religious beliefs, whatever may be claimed on behalf of science, their truth can neither be proved nor disproved. But even if there is no disproof, do we have a right to believe in things for whose truth there is no evidence? Agnostic positivists denied that we do. James proposed a bold solution. We need to redefine truth. The notion of truth, understood as ideas “copying” objective reality, was problematic enough even apart from the religious question. “But please observe, now,” James wrote in “The Will to Believe,” “that when as empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude,”—whose “most striking practical application to life,” he noted in passing, “has been the conscientious labors of the Holy

236

R. HARTZ

Office of the Inquisition”—“we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself…. Not where it comes from but what it leads to is to decide” (1992: 468).

The Truth We Create “The Will to Believe” and the other essays published with it in 1897 are among the writings of William James that Sri Aurobindo is most likely to have read. Pragmatism was published ten years later. By that time, Sri Aurobindo’s absorption in the Indian freedom struggle cannot have left him much time for reading. When after a year in jail and a few months of renewed political activism he disappeared from the Calcutta scene and reappeared in Pondicherry, it was under circumstances that at first gave him little access to books. But James’s earlier philosophical writings came out during a period when Sri Aurobindo was reading extensively.12 Despite his lukewarm interest in philosophy at the time, the latest writings of an American thinker whose psychological work had already impressed him could easily have attracted his attention. The writings he may have come across might be assumed to include James’s 1898 address “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” where he explicitly unveiled the theory of pragmatism already implied in earlier essays. In this way it would be possible to account for almost everything Sri Aurobindo can be shown to have known about this philosophy from his references to it, which occur mainly in works originally written and published in the later part of the second decade of the twentieth century. One of the clearest expressions of Sri Aurobindo’s understanding of pragmatism is found in a passage in his essays on the Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a where he comments on a verse in the seventeenth chapter: And then there comes a remarkable line in which the Gita tells us that this Purusha, this soul in man, is, as it were, made of ´sraddh¯ a, a faith, a will to be, a belief in itself and existence, and whatever is that will, faith or consti´ tuting belief in him, he is that and that is he. Sraddh¯ amayo’yam ˙ purus.o yo yac-chraddhah. sa eva sah.. If we look into this pregnant saying a little closely, we shall find that this single line contains implied in its few forceful words almost the whole theory of the modern gospel of pragmatism.

If it seems far-fetched to discover the concepts of a modern Western philosophy prefigured in a Sanskrit scripture written many centuries ago

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

237

in an alien civilization, let us recall James’s insistence that the central ideas of pragmatism are nothing really new; nor would he have been likely to object to finding them outside of the Western tradition. Sri Aurobindo goes on to explain his interpretation of the pragmatist concept of truth: For if a man or the soul in a man consists of the faith which is in him, taken in this deeper sense, then it follows that the truth which he sees and wills to live is for him the truth of his being, the truth of himself that he has created or is creating and there can be for him no other real truth. This truth is a thing of his inner and outer action, a thing of his becoming, of the soul’s dynamics, not of that in him which never changes. (1997: 482)

In this explication of an ancient text in the language of modern thought, Sri Aurobindo does not follow closely any particular enunciation of pragmatist principles by his Western contemporaries or predecessors. He is evidently summing up the impression that had remained with him from whatever he had read on the subject, probably years earlier. However, in contrast to the largely hostile misconceptions of pragmatism prevalent among James’s American and British colleagues, he had caught the gist of it accurately enough before reinterpreting and adapting it to his own purpose. Sri Aurobindo’s formulation can be compared with James’s own statement: Reality, we naturally think, stands ready-made and complete, and our intellects supervene with the one simple duty of describing it as it is already. But … may not previous reality itself be there, far less for the purpose of reappearing unaltered in our knowledge, than for the very purpose of stimulating our minds to such additions as shall enhance the universe’s total value…. In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative…. The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands…. Man engenders truths upon it…. The import of the difference between pragmatism and rationalism is now in sight throughout its whole extent. The essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.13 (2000: 112–113 [italics in original])

Faith plays a crucial role, as James says elsewhere, in this enhancement of the universe and making of the future.

238

R. HARTZ

The rest of Sri Aurobindo’s passage on faith or ´sraddh¯ a elaborates on the notion of truth as not something self-existent and immutable, but created in our process of becoming. James’s phrase “the will to believe” is almost quoted: [A man] is what he is today by some past will of his nature sustained and continued by a present will to know, to believe and to be in his intelligence and vital force, and whatever new turn is taken by this will and faith active in his very substance, that he will tend to become in the future. We create our own truth of existence in our own action of mind and life, which is another way of saying that we create our own selves, are our own makers. (Aurobindo 1997: 482)

Making the World Better Sri Aurobindo proceeds in the same chapter of Essays on the Gita to qualify his endorsement of the pragmatic position by saying that “this is only one aspect of the truth”; the other aspect is “the eternal Being out of which all becoming derives” (1997: 482). His philosophy as a whole, with its Vedantic roots, cannot be reduced to what it shares with any Western version of pragmatism. Yet the pragmatic rejection of theoretical knowledge divorced from practical application is central to Sri Aurobindo’s outlook. Spiritual realization itself was insufficient for him unless it leads to a transformation of life. This pragmatic orientation pervades his writings. At times the connection with pragmatism is made explicit, as in The Human Cycle, where the context is social psychology—for the spiritualization of the individual consciousness, about which as a mystic he had so much to say, was regarded by him as incomplete without a corresponding change in the society: A spiritual idea is a power, but only when it is both inwardly and outwardly creative. Here we have to enlarge and to deepen the pragmatic principle that truth is what we create, and in this sense first, that it is what we create within us, in other words, what we become. Undoubtedly, spiritual truth exists eternally beyond independent of us in the heavens of the spirit; but it is of no avail for humanity here, it does not become truth of earth, truth of life until it is lived. (1998b: 262)

William James was no less preoccupied with this “truth of earth.” He directed his arguments on the one hand against a materialism that would

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

239

deprive human beings of the faith most of us need, on the other against a type of philosophizing whose theories were “answers to enigmas, in which we can rest,” but not instruments by which “existing realities may be changed” (2000: 28 [italics in original]). James summarized his position when he said: The really vital question for us all is, What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of itself? The centre of gravity of philosophy must therefore alter its place. The earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights. (ibid.: 57)

James was arguing against the metaphysical abstractionism of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians, which seemed to him to undermine the will to change the world by reducing its evils to insignificant details in the ideal perfection of the whole. Sri Aurobindo opposed for analogous reasons the M¯ay¯av¯ada or Illusionism attributed to the eighth-century philosopher Shankara. Respecting him as “one of the mightiest of metaphysical intellects,” Sri Aurobindo nevertheless decried Shankara’s system for its practical effect of sapping the vitality of Indian civilization during the long period when his quietistic vision exerted a powerful influence: By denying God in life, by withdrawing the best souls from life, by discouraging … the sraddha of life,… he has enlarged the original Vedantic seed of ascetic tendency into a gigantic growth of stillness and world-disgust which has overshadowed for centuries the lives and souls of hundreds of millions of human beings. (2003b: 497, 499)

Whatever may have been the justification for these otherworldly tendencies in the past, Sri Aurobindo felt, they are not what we need today. We who live in the present age can no longer turn away from the challenges of earthly life, we the modern humanity more and more conscious … that there is a work for the race, a divine purpose in its creation which exceeds the salvation of the individual soul,… we who feel more and more, in the language of the Koran, that the Lord did not create heaven and earth in a jest, that Brahman did not begin dreaming this world-dream in a moment of aberration and delirium. (2001: 95)

240

R. HARTZ

History and the East Any purpose human life may have can only be worked out through history. Like Hegel, Sri Aurobindo developed not only a system of metaphysics, but a philosophy of history in which his metaphysics is applied to interpreting the course of our collective existence. Like Hegel, he took history to be directional and meaningful. Both of these philosophers considered the growth of freedom and rationality to be of central importance to the unfolding of the Spirit in history. But on the crucial issue of the role of the East in this process, their views diverge to opposite ends of the spectrum. For Hegel, “World history travels from East to West” (2011: 95); it begins in Asia and ends in Europe. Hegel accepted the orientalist stereotype of the unchanging East as opposed to the dynamic West and erected the edifice of his philosophy of history on this questionable foundation. Nor did he find anything redeeming in Asia’s vaunted spirituality. “What we call God has not yet in the East been realized in consciousness,” he maintained, “for our idea of God involves the elevation to the suprasensorial” (ibid.: 101). As regards India, unlike some of his contemporaries such as Schopenhauer, he was unimpressed even by the Upanishads with their exalted philosophical vision and their impersonal conception of the Absolute which seems far closer to Hegel’s own than anything to be found in the Protestant Christianity he preferred. As for the present and future of Asian civilizations, he was an apologist for colonialism, writing in his section on India: “The English, or rather the East India Company, are the lords of the land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected to Europeans; and China will, some day or other, be obliged to submit to this fate” (ibid.: 129). It goes without saying that Sri Aurobindo was far better informed than Hegel about Asian, and especially Indian, history and culture. His essay “The Conservative Mind and Eastern Progress” explodes the myth that the East has been static and ahistorical. In the East, however, the great revolutions have been spiritual and cultural; the political and social changes, although they have been real and striking, if less profound than in Europe, fall into the shade and are apt to be overlooked; besides, this unobtrusiveness is increased by their want of relief, the slow subtlety of their process and the instinctive persistence and reverence with which old names and formulas have been preserved while the thing itself was

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

241

profoundly modified until its original sense remained only as a pious fiction. (1998a: 134)

Sri Aurobindo recognized that a relative decline in the vitality of ancient Asian cultures had occurred, facilitating the westward displacement of world leadership to the previously backward countries of Europe in the last few centuries. In India he attributed this decline partly to the effect of world-negating philosophies, particularly “the later ascetic and antipragmatic Vedanta” that culminated in Shankara’s Advaita, as distinct from the “spiritual pragmatism” of the earlier Upanishads (2003b: 83). But Sri Aurobindo’s main concern was with the future. From a global perspective, he saw the revival of some kind of spiritually enlightened pragmatism to be precisely what is needed: For the most vital issue of the age is whether the future progress of humanity is to be governed by the modern economic and materialistic mind of the West or by a nobler pragmatism guided, uplifted and enlightened by spiritual culture and knowledge…. Therefore the hope of the world lies in the re-arousing in the East of the old spiritual practicality and large and profound vision and power of organisation under the insistent contact of the West and in the flooding out of the light of Asia on the Occident, no longer in forms that are now static, effete, unadaptive, but in new forms stirred, dynamic and effective. (1998a: 137–138)

The European triumphalism that mars Hegel’s historical thinking contrasts sharply with William James’s spontaneous sympathies with respect to Asia. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, biographer Robert Richardson relates, “James took the Japanese side, telling one friend, ‘The insolence of the white race in Asia ought to receive a check’” (Richardson 2006: 444). His “anti-imperial activism was not incidental,” Richardson remarks; “it grew naturally from his advocacy of pluralism and individual self-determination and from his conviction that we are mostly blind to the vital centers of the lives of others” (ibid.: 385). On the pragmatic principle of tracing ideas to their practical consequences, the stark difference between Hegel and James in their attitudes toward colonialism says something about their respective philosophies that cannot be ignored. In this light, a closer alignment of Sri Aurobindo with Jamesian pragmatism and a certain distancing of him from Hegelian absolutism is only natural.

242

R. HARTZ

Pragmatism and the Future William James was the most open-minded of the major figures in the history of Western pragmatism. In his hands this philosophical approach took a form that can easily be harmonized with Eastern thought. We have seen this in Sri Aurobindo’s incorporation of his understanding of the “pragmatic principle” in a philosophy built on largely Vedantic foundations. A recognition of this element in Sri Aurobindo’s writings might help to extend the relevance of pragmatism beyond the West. It might also contribute to a fuller appreciation of an original, important, and many-sided thinker whose work has already taken too long to enter the mainstream of philosophy. Whatever the future of pragmatism will be, it is not as an exclusively Euro-American tradition of thought that we can expect to see it develop. The commingling of cultures can only increase. The insularity that once made it acceptable to speak of philosophy as if it were a uniquely Western invention is rapidly becoming impossible.14 Unlike much of Western philosophy from the time of the Greeks onwards, Indian philosophy has tended to pursue truth not only in the spirit of a theoretical quest for knowledge as an end in itself, but for the sake of the inwardly liberating effects of the realizations to which the seeking for truth is meant to lead. Indian and other Asian philosophies have generally inclined toward pragmatism at least in this sense. During much of their history they may have often been too willing to let the outer life take its course. Sri Aurobindo tried to rectify this imbalance by insisting on the outwardly as well as inwardly creative power of the spiritual idea. From this point of view he considered Eastern and Western contributions to be equally necessary for the fulfillment of humanity’s collective potential. Philosophy in India and China has in the past, as Sri Aurobindo points out, “seized hold on life, has had an enormous practical effect on the civilisation and got into the very bones of current thought and action.” In the Greco-Roman world also, the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies “got a grip,” if “only among the highly cultured.” Sri Aurobindo noted in his own day “some renewed tendency of the kind,” mentioning Nietzsche, James, and Bergson among those whose philosophies “have attracted some amount of public interest” (2004b: 112). James himself observed, perhaps too optimistically: “Fortunately, our age seems to be growing philosophical again” (2009: 7).

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

243

We tend to think of ourselves as living in the most unphilosophical of times. But something in human nature always returns to the type of questions philosophy asks. The mental capacity required for philosophical thinking is far more widespread than ever before. A revitalization of philosophy, if it were to occur under present conditions, might well be global in scope and much more democratic in its reach than would have been possible at any time in the past. Among modern philosophical options, pragmatism is well attuned to the temperament of our age and suited to stimulate such a development. Its prophets may yet prove to have been more prescient than we think.

Notes 1. William James sometimes used “practicalism” interchangeably with “pragmatism,” but preferred F. C. S. Schiller’s term “humanism.” When Charles Peirce saw that he and James were talking about different things, he began calling his version “pragmaticism.” John Dewey eventually switched to “instrumentalism.” 2. Though James himself was initially responsible for popularizing Peirce’s name for this way of thinking, he evidently had second thoughts about it and his Pragmatism opens with the disclaimer: “The pragmatic movement, so-called – I do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it – seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air” (2000: 5). 3. It is commonly said that pragmatism, after dominating American intellectual life for half a century through such figures as James and Dewey, was eclipsed in the mid-twentieth century. However, this has been disputed. “Though it is the dominant understanding of the career of pragmatism,” Talisse and Aikin write, “the eclipse narrative is highly dubious…. Hence, it seems more accurate to say that in the years following World War II, pragmatism was in crisis, not eclipse…. What was clear at that time was that if pragmatism was to survive, it needed to be reworked, revised in light of new challenges from rival philosophical approaches” (2011: 6, 8). 4. For a comparison of pragmatism and Confucianism, for example, see Huang (2009). 5. See Angle (2012), Brooks (2014), and Connolly (2015). Angle describes his method more precisely as “rooted global philosophy.” To adopt this approach, he explains, “means to work within a particular living philosophical tradition – thus its rootedness – but to do so in a way that is open to stimulus and insights from other philosophical traditions – thus its global nature” (2012: 9).

244

R. HARTZ

6. The eminent academic philosopher Daya Krishna writes of “three great attempts to understand modernity in this country,” in the sense of trying both “to come to terms with and understand Indian civilization” and “to reformulate it in the context of the emerging West” (2012: 112). He was referring to the efforts of Gandhi, Tagore, and Sri Aurobindo. Of the three, only Sri Aurobindo—especially in his “great, magnificent opus” (ibid.: 113), The Life Divine—wrote a substantial amount of philosophy as the term is usually understood. 7. The phrase “belle époque of globalization” has been used for the period from about 1890 to 1914 (Held and McGrew 2003: 4). 8. Correcting a statement that suggested he had learned English as a foreign language, Sri Aurobindo clarified (writing about himself in the third person): “Sri Aurobindo in his father’s house already spoke only English and Hindustani, he thought in English from his childhood and did not even know his native language, Bengali. At the age of seven he was taken to England and remained there consecutively for fourteen years, speaking English and thinking in English and no other tongue” (2006: 25). 9. James’s speculation about Hegel’s “mystical moods” can be compared to a more general remark by Sri Aurobindo regarding “the intellectual thinker who (sometimes or partly) mysticises.” Giving his impression of the neo-Hegelian J. M. E. McTaggart, Sri Aurobindo observes that such a thinker usually “stops short at a mental abstraction,” but “if he has the true mystic somewhere in him, he will sometimes get beyond to at least flashes and glimpses” (2012: 368). 10. Odin speaks of a “functional resemblance” between Sri Aurobindo’s and Hegel’s concepts of the Absolute, but also draws attention to important differences. He points out, for example, that “Sri Aurobindo’s concept of the Absolute is not the deduced product of a dialectical logic, as is Hegel’s, but is rather a descriptive generalization of what he terms ‘superconscient’ phases of awareness as experienced through systematic yogic concentration” (2013: 182). 11. Parts of James’s 1898 address “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” quoted here, were reproduced almost verbatim several years later in Pragmatism. 12. The period when Sri Aurobindo would have had ample opportunities for reading extended up to the beginning of 1906, but ended abruptly with his departure from Baroda for Calcutta. 13. The quotation begins with a paraphrase of the nineteenth-century German philosopher Hermann Lotze, but James takes Lotze’s idea to be “identically our pragmatist conception.” 14. Academic philosophy retains, nevertheless, the dubious distinction of harboring perhaps the strongest reactionary and ethnocentric tendencies in all of the humanities. Bryan Van Norden (2017) discusses the reasons

10

SPIRITUAL PRAGMATISM: WILLIAM JAMES, SRI AUROBINDO …

245

for this state of affairs, drawing attention to the detailed demonstration by Peter Park (2013) that the exclusion of non-Western thought from the philosophical canon was a result of the successful rewriting of the history of philosophy by the pro-Kantian faction in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

References Angle, Stephen C. 2012. Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Aurobindo, Sri. 1997. Essays on the Gita. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 1998a. Essays in Philosophy and Yoga. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 1998b. The Human Cycle. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2001. Kena and Other Upanishads. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2003a. Early Cultural Writings. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2003b. Isha Upanishad. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2004a. Letters on Poetry and Art. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2004b. The Renaissance in India and Other Essays on Indian Culture. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2005. The Life Divine. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2006. Autobiographical Notes and Other Writings of Historical Interest. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2011. Letters on Himself and the Ashram. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri. 2012. Letters on Yoga—I . Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Bacon, Michael. 2012. Pragmatism: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Barnard, G.William. 1997. Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy of Mysticism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Brooks, Thom (ed.). 2014. New Waves in Global Justice. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Connolly, Tim. 2015. Doing Philosophy Comparatively. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Gale, Richard M. 1997. John Dewey’s Naturalization of William James. In The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

246

R. HARTZ

Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1991. Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 2011. Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. Ruben Alvarado. Aalten: WordBridge. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew (eds.). 2003. The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Huang, Yong, (ed.).2009. Rorty, Pragmatism, and Confucianism: With Responses by Richard Rorty. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. James, William. 1912. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. James, William. 1992. Writings 1878–1899. New York: Literary Classics of the United States. James, William. 2000. Pragmatism and Other Writings, ed. Giles Gunn. New York: Penguin Books. James, William. 2002. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Mineola, NY: Dover. James, William. 2009. A Pluralistic Universe. Sioux Falls, SD: NuVision. Kitcher, Philip. 2012. Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Krishna, Daya. 2012. Civilizations: Nostalgia & Utopia. New Delhi: Sage. Lachs, John. 2012. Stoic Pragmatism. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. Menand, Louis. 2001. The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Odin, Steve. 2013. Sri Aurobindo and Hegel on the Involution-Evolution of Absolute Spirit. In Situating Sri Aurobindo: A Reader, ed. Peter Heehs. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Park, Peter K.J. 2013. Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1830. Albany: State University of New York Press. Richardson, Robert D. 2006. William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Talisse, Robert B., and Scott F. Aikin (eds.). 2011. The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Van Norden, Bryan W. 2017. Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto. New York: Columbia University Press.

CHAPTER 11

William James’s Pragmatism and Some Aspects of Roman Catholic Teaching Edward Ulrich

For over a millennium, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed a hegemony over Western European life, society, religion, and culture. The hegemony began in the fourth century and ended in the sixteenth. Part of that hegemony was a synthesis between religious faith and the insights of human reason. Such a synthesis might surprise people today, given the widespread idea that science and religion are necessarily at odds with each other. However, in the late antique world and in the Middle Ages, Greek philosophy was greatly admired as the height of sophisticated thinking. Much of Greek philosophy argued that the world follows a reasoned pattern or order. In the earliest centuries of its existence, the Catholic Church began appropriating the insights of various schools of Greek philosophy, fashioning syntheses between religious faith and human reason. Modern philosophy is said to have dawned in the seventeenth century, with René Descartes. Modern philosophy involves an attack on Greek philosophy, calling into question the degree to which the universe is

E. Ulrich (B) University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, MN, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_11

247

248

E. ULRICH

knowable and follows rational principles. This threatened the Church’s synthesis between faith and reason. Since at least the nineteenth century, the Church hierarchy responded to various trends in modern philosophy by both attacking them and reasserting the earlier, medieval philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. However, in the twentieth century, many individual Catholic philosophers and theologians took approaches to modern philosophy that were more creative and constructive. Some of the results of those efforts have, in modified forms, become a part of formal Church teaching. American pragmatism is one of the many schools of modern philosophy which challenges traditional Roman Catholic thought. William James taught that instead of settling classic philosophical disputes through argumentation, one should consider the practical consequences of the philosophical doctrine at hand.1 In addition, he argued that in religion, experience is fundamental, and doctrine is secondary.2 These approaches are at odds with traditional Roman Catholicism, which has considered proper religious beliefs to be key to one’s salvation. Immanuel Kant’s critique of human reason has drawn far more attention, among Catholic philosophers and theologians, than American pragmatism. However, as this essay will show, some of their responses to Kantianism are relevant to the issue of pragmatism.

A Synthesis Between Faith and Reason Christianity was originally a persecuted religion. Its members were typically low class, uneducated, broken from social and religious norms, and puritanical in their morality. They did not fit in well in Greco-Roman society, and were considered a threat. In the second century, St. Justin Martyr attempted to change that through his treatises, the First Apology and Second Apology, which he addressed, respectively, to the Roman Emperor and the Roman Senate. He argued that Christianity is in accord with the best insights of the esteemed, Greek philosophers. For instance, he showed the parallels between the Christian rejection of popular Roman religion and the protests of some Greek philosophers against popular religion. In fact, he argued that men such as Socrates had known of the logos, the principle of reason in the universe, which took flesh as Jesus Christ. Justin’s writings were the start of a long history of synthesizing faith and reason.

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

249

In the fourth century, another early chapter in that history was the thought of St. Augustine. Before converting to Christianity, he steeped himself in a contemporary revival of Plato’s philosophy, the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. Plotinus believed that the supreme reality is a fundamental unity, “the One.” He also referred to it as “the Good.” The Good, by its nature communicates itself, emanating all beings, and radiating and touching all of them. Although he became Christian, St. Augustine’s writings are saturated with Neoplatonism, as he used it as a set of tools with which to think and reason about God, and human relations with God. One of the most significant chapters in the history of the integration of faith and reason took place in the Middle Ages. Through the crusades, Westerners rediscovered the works of Aristotle. These had been lost in the West, but the Muslim world preserved them. These works gave compelling, rational accounts of the world that did not refer to biblical ideas. This yielded a variety of reactions. Some philosophers abandoned Christian belief for the sake of Aristotle. Others thought it was the height of folly to trust human reason over and above what was purported to be divine revelation, and so they rejected Aristotle. However, others, such as Sts. Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, believed that they could integrate Aristotle and Christian faith. In fact, a key feature of Aquinas’s thought is that “faith properly understood cannot contradict reason properly understood.”3 A key aspect of Aquinas’s philosophy is his proofs of God’s existence. Aristotle had argued that there must be a “Prime Mover,” an ultimate motivator of all movement and growth in the world. Using similar arguments, based upon the observation of the natural world, Aquinas argued that there must be a being whose existence is necessary. The objects of the world are contingent and in flux, and so there must be a stable support, a being that is not a being but existence itself, from which beings derive their existence. He went further to argue that this ultimate reality has certain attributes, such as supreme beauty and goodness (Summa Theologica I. 1–11). Aquinas realized that proving that the world was created by God does not prove the entire edifice of Christian belief, such as the idea that Jesus Christ is God become human. However, he offered various arguments to prove the “reasonableness” of aspects of Christian belief. For instance, based on Plotinus’s idea, as transmitted through Pseudo-Dionysius, that the Good naturally communicates itself, he argued that it is reasonable that God should become incarnate as Jesus Christ (Summa Theologica

250

E. ULRICH

III.1.1). Through philosophical and theological argumentation, Aquinas presented Catholic faith as a seamless, compelling whole. Christian beliefs did not appear as free-floating and unanchored, but as rooted in the objective order of the universe. In these ways, the Church effected what the sociologist, Peter Berger, refers to as a “sacred canopy.” Human beings create religious ideas and institutions. However, these subsequently take on a life of their own. Whereas humans crafted the ideas and institutions, these, in turn, dictate to humans how they should act and be. What makes the canopy compelling, in large part, is that it appears in harmony with, or rooted in, the objective nature of the cosmos. The Catholic Church enjoyed a hegemony over Western European life, culture, and religion for well over a millennium. The classic synthesis of faith and reason helped to maintain that hegemony by raising and supporting a sacred canopy.

Modern Philosophy Challenges the Synthesis By the time of René Descartes (1596–1650) in the seventeenth century, a cynicism toward medieval philosophy had set in. Some of the humanists of the Italian Renaissance felt that medieval philosophy was removed from the realities of life. Other people felt that it bore no relationship to a life of piety and devotion. In addition, the Protestant Reformation called into question traditional religious authority. In this period of doubt, Descartes tried to identify a foundation for certainty. Up to that time, Western philosophy was based largely on Aristotle, and Aristotle based his conclusions on the perceptions of the senses. Descartes questioned whether humans should be so trusting of the testimony of the senses. For instance, dreams seem very real. If we can be deceived by dreams, how do we know that our present experience of the world is not also a dream? Thereby, Descartes questioned the testimony of the senses. He did feel confident in the sensation of his own, mental existence: “Nothing can be more easily and more evidently perceived by me than my mind.”4 Descartes thereby withdrew from the outside world and turned within himself. Turned within, he contemplated the many ideas in his mind, including “men, animals” and “angels.”5 He felt that these ideas could have been formed by his experience of his own self. Thus, these ideas do not necessarily indicate the objective reality of that which they represent.

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

251

However, he concluded that the idea of God, of “one who is eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things other than himself” must have come from outside himself, because such an idea could not have been generated from an experience of his own, finite and imperfect self.6 Not only must it have come from outside himself, but also it must be real. Existence is an aspect of perfection, and God is perfect, so God must exist. He concluded that God, in creating humans, implanted the idea of God in them, just “like the sign of an artist impressed upon his work.”7 In the century following Descartes, David Hume (1711–1776) gave a far more profound expression of skepticism. Skepticism was a valley through Descartes walked on the way to certainty. Hume, however, ended in skepticism. One of his foundational arguments is his critique of the notion of causality. If “B” succeeds “A,” then it would seem that “A” caused “B.” However, has anyone actually seen “B” come out of “A”? What one has seen is a succession of appearances. One assumes, on that basis a relationship of causality. Hume’s critique was a challenge to the recently developed Newtonian mechanics, with its laws of cause and effect. Further, it was a challenge to the older tradition of Thomistic metaphysics. If one cannot be certain about causes, one cannot be certain about anything argued on the basis of them, such as the idea that God is the cause of the world. Indeed, in his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume attacked numerous arguments that attempt to conclude, on rational grounds, that God exists. Hume’s arguments deeply challenged Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant was impressed by his arguments, but also by the predictive powers of modern science. Attempting to account for both, he concluded that the human mind constructs its experience of reality. Given that our experience of things is in large part a construction of our own minds, he believed that the mind does not grasp the truth of things in themselves. Space and time, for instance, are two categories which the mind brings to experience, thereby shaping the latter. Since the mind shapes experience, the natural world is not what we perceive it to be. Therefore, arguments for God’s existence, based on the natural world, are suspect. Yet, Kant believed in God. To consider the possibility of God’s existence, he turned away from the natural world to the domain of action, of morality. A starting point was the moral compulsion that humans feel, the sense of “ought.” He thought that this moral

252

E. ULRICH

sense was a sign that God, quite likely, existed. For instance, “The moral laws commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world.”8 In the face of rationalist critiques of the notion of God’s existence, Descartes and Kant turned within, Descartes exploring the idea of God and Kant the sense of moral obligation. Another figure, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), attempted to protect religion from rationalistic critiques by severing it from philosophy and conceiving it in terms of an intuitive experience of God. He did this in his 1799 work, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Schleiermacher addressed On Religion to his friends. They complained that religion is “bent on persecution and spitefulness, that it wrecks society and makes blood flow like water.”9 Schleiermacher’s response was that the quarreling and bloodletting is “sometimes over morals and always over metaphysics, and neither of these belong to” religion.10 True religion is an “intuition of the universe.”11 For instance, “the ancients, …, regarded every unique type of life throughout the whole world as the work and reign of an omnipresent being. They had intuited a unique mode of acting of the universe in its unity, and designated this intuition accordingly.”12 The troublemakers in religion are those who “inundate it with philosophy and fetter it to a system.”13 Schleiermacher had an enduring influence on theology and philosophy in the West. William James was one of many figures influenced by him. Similar to Schleiermacher, James considered experience as foundational in religion: “The founders of every church owed their power originally to the fact of their direct personal communion with the divine. Not only the superhuman founders, the Christ, the Buddha, Mahomet, but all the originators of Christian sects have been in this case; —so personal religion should still seem the primordial thing.”14 Whereas, traditionally, the Catholic Church has maintained that doctrine is key, James gave it a secondary importance: “Since the relation [to God] may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily grow.”15 In addition, “Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas.”16

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

253

There are two aspects of James’s downplay of religious doctrine which are relevant to this study. First, in his consideration of Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim examples of mysticism, he did not exhibit the religious exclusivity that is a part of traditional Christian belief.17 In fact, he was critical of Protestant Christianity for a relative lack of emphasis on techniques which promote mystical experiences.18 Second, related to his stance that religious belief is based far more on impulses than reason, he dismissed those ideas of God that, in his judgment, have no bearing on how humans live their lives: “Take God’s aseity, …; or his necessariness; his immateriality; his ‘simplicity’ or superiority …, how do such qualities as these make any definite connection with our life? …. I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any one of them should be true.”19 One should distinguish such abstract considerations, James argued, from considerations that directly affect human life: “What shall we now say of the attributes called moral? Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saintly life.…. Being omniscient, he can see us in the dark. Being just, he can punish us for what he sees.”20

Some Reactions to the Challenge These general developments in modern philosophy were challenges to the sacred canopy. The canopy is compelling because it seems rooted in the objective order of the cosmos. However, if the objective order is unknowable, or, if it does not exist, then the sacred canopy is free floating. Thereby it loses its compelling aura of sanctity. Accordingly, many in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church regretted the decline of medieval philosophy, and attributed many of the problems of the modern world to this. For instance, in 1879, Pope Leo XIII issued a letter to the bishops, Aeterni Patris, in which he attributed European political upheavals at that time to “false conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy,” and which “have now crept into all orders of the State.”21 Reacting to the decline of medieval philosophy, Leo XIII endorsed Thomas Aquinas as the Christian philosopher and theologian par excellence. In Aeterni Patris, the Pope praised Aquinas’s thought as the culmination of a long history of Christian thought, just as, in a different context, Swami Vivekananda praised Ramakrishna as the culminating holy

254

E. ULRICH

man in a long chain of such men. The Pope believed that Aquinas, who taught the harmony of faith and reason, was the perfect antidote to modern philosophy’s retreat from metaphysics. The Pope’s encyclical initiated a renaissance of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Key scholars of this renaissance were Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964), Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), and Étienne Gilson (1884––1978). In his account of the history of Western philosophy, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Gilson discussed the transition from medieval to modern philosophy. First, he pointed out that skepticism was already occurring in the late Middle Ages. There were so many different philosophical positions and arguments, which should one choose? In addition, philosophical argumentation seemed divorced from the moral and spiritual life. Furthermore, is not God beyond human thought? How, then, can philosophy presume to probe the depths of God? Thus, during the Renaissance, medieval philosophy collapsed.22 In Gilson’s words, Descartes came at the end of the Renaissance like “a young hero,” with the intention of doing “the whole business … all over again.”23 According to Gilson, Descartes was not successful in his attempt. The next five hundred years of philosophy demonstrated this failure. Western philosophy did not return to metaphysical certainties but slipped further and further into agnosticism and atheism. This culminated, according to Gilson, in the emergence of Marxism and fascism. The key issue, Gilson believed, between Aquinas and Descartes, was between realism and idealism. The realist stance of Aquinas holds that the mind reaches out to objects, accepts their reality, and knows that they, in turn, point to the reality of God. In contrast, the starting point of the idealist stance is the thinking processes of the mind. Descartes and Kant reflected on the thinking processes, but Gilson concluded that such reflection will never lead beyond the mind itself to affirm the existence of God: “If intellectual evidence is not enough to dictate our choice, history is there to remind us that no one ever regains the whole of reality after locking himself up in one of its parts.” Elevating the realist position over the idealist, Gilson wrote, “Man is not a mind that thinks, but a being who knows other beings as true, who loves them as good, and who enjoys them as beautiful. For all that which is, down to the humblest form of existence, exhibits the inseparable privileges of being, which are truth, goodness and beauty.”24 Thereby, Gilson attempted to both critique modern philosophy and offer a revitalized Thomism to a contemporary audience.

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

255

Men like Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, and Gilson were very critical of modern philosophy. However, some other Catholic thinkers attempted responses that were more creative. Particularly notable were the “transcendental Thomists,” who tried to reestablish the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas on a Kantian starting point. Some key transcendental Thomists were Joseph Maréchal (1878–1944), Bernard Lonergan (1918–1984), and Karl Rahner (1904–1984). Joseph Maréchal, who is considered as the father of transcendental Thomism, attempted to do this on the basis of the idea that there is a drive in the human being toward God. He gained this idea from Maurice Blondel, who, in turn, derived it from the German idealists who were wrestling with Kant. Maréchal pointed out that our intellectual activity has “limits which are gradually expanding. As long as any condition whatsoever will look to us as ‘limiting,’ we shall be certain that the absolutely last end of our intelligence lies beyond it, or, which amounts to the same, that the formal object of our intelligence extends beyond this limitation. For the awareness of a limit as limit contains logically, …, the knowledge of a further possibility.”25 He argued, further, that this intellectual striving itself has no limit that it reaches toward an “infinite Being.”26 This striving indicates the possibility of the existence of that Infinite, for otherwise “the basic tendency of our intellectual nature turns into a logical absurdity, the appetite for nothingness.”27 However, to affirm the possibility of this Infinite is to affirm its existence, for “to affirm of God that he is possible is the same as to affirm that he exists, since his existence is the condition of every possibility.”28 Karl Rahner was the most prominent and influential of the transcendental Thomists. His deliberations were influenced by Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Maréchal, and Martin Heidegger. A starting point for Rahner was the classic question of how the mind abstracts universals from particulars, how, for instance, it arrives at the general notion of “chair” from the experience of particular chairs. To conduct this abstraction is to “know the sensibly intuited as limited, as a realized concretion,” and one does this through a Vorgriff or “pre-apprehension” that “is the movement of the spirit towards the whole of its possible objects.”29 Further, this Vorgriff reaches out to being or existence as its horizon. Rahner believes it reaches out to being because through it, the mind arrives at judgements of truth. It affirms, for instance, that a particular object is a chair.30 That the Vorgriff reaches out to being implicitly affirms God’s existence. The reason is that “any possible object can come to exist in the

256

E. ULRICH

breadth of the pre-apprehension is simultaneously affirmed. An Absolute Being would completely fill up the breadth of this pre-apprehension. Hence it is simultaneously affirmed as real.…. In this sense, but only in this sense, it can be said: the pre-apprehension attains to God.”31 Thereby, Rahner believed that he had crossed the gap between idealism and realism. Successful or unsuccessful in crossing the gap, Rahner’s approach yielded a distinct spiritual vision of the human being. Gilson believed that human knowing reaches out to the reality of objects and, as seen above, affirms that they are crowned by “truth, goodness and beauty.”32 However, Rahner discussed the human being as a creature steeped in mystery: “The ‘whither’ of transcendence.…. its presence is the presence of such a transcendence that it is always given only as the condition of the possibility of categorical knowledge and not by itself alone. One can never go directly toward it. One can never reach out to it directly. It gives itself only insofar as it directs us silently to something else, to something finite as the object of direct vision.”33

A Modified Sacred Canopy Had he lived long enough to read Rahner and Maréchal, William James would probably not have been any more pleased with Transcendental Thomism than with traditional Thomism. In his estimation, personal experiences and psychological factors determine religious belief, not rational argumentation. Rahner’s deliberations would have appeared to him as more of the same.34 Furthermore, the distinction between idealism and realism would probably have seemed to him, and to many others, as an arcane point, relevant only to certain intellectuals, and having no bearing on life. However, although the distinction between idealism and realism may seem to be an obscure point, two different camps of Catholic philosophers and theologians tend to gather around these stances. The Thomistic revival tends to draw those who are concerned with the preservation of Catholic tradition, and Rahner those who champion modifying Catholic tradition in light of other considerations. Regardless of whatever objections James might have had against transcendental Thomism, it is definitely an importation of modern philosophy into Catholic thought. It is an attempt, for instance, to give more importance to experience. James defines religion as “the feelings, acts, and

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

257

experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”35 Parallel to this, Rahner’s frequent starting point in his theological deliberations was the human experience, as quoted above, of transcendence. Though James would have had disagreements with Rahner, the latter’s focus on experience took him in a few directions parallel to James. As seen, Rahner argued that an affirmation of God’s existence is implicit in the human act of knowing, and that the knowing subject is steeped in a mystery that lies deep within. In his subsequent writings, Rahner argued that Jesus Christ lies within those depths. Hence, if an individual surrenders to those depths, he or she is surrendering to Christ and may be saved, regardless of whether or not he or she has explicitly accepted Christ and become a Christian. Thus, with Rahner’s turn to experience, there is a considerable lessening of traditional religious exclusivism, which held that to be saved one needs to assent to the proper beliefs about Jesus.36 There is a further way in which Rahner’s thought resonates with James’s. James expressed impatience with philosophy and theology that had no direct bearing on human life. Rahner, with his turn to experience, focused not so much on arguing the objective truth of a classic doctrinal statement, but demonstrating its meaning for human beings. For instance, theologians like Aquinas were intent on arguing the truthfulness behind the traditional idea that Jesus Christ is the fullness humanity and the fullness of divinity united in one person. However, Rahner tried to explicate the relevance of this doctrine for human longings and desires. According to him, humans are limited, finite beings who long, whether they realize it or not, for the absolute. Further, being finite beings, they desire to experience the absolute in concrete circumstances, they long to experience the divine in communion with the concrete. Jesus Christ, according to Rahner, meets that need.37 The hierarchy of the Catholic Church has a long history of reasserting traditional Thomism. In 1962, Karl Rahner was forbidden to lecture and publish without special permission. However, later that year, he was invited to be a theological advisor at the Second Vatican Council. By that time, the Catholic Church had become a worldwide institution, and so Pope John XXIII felt that all the bishops of the world should come together to discuss what was happening in their churches and countries, and to see if anything needed updating in the way the Church was teaching and ministering. There is a turn to religious experience in

258

E. ULRICH

a particular Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes. The purpose of this text, also known as The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, is to explore how the Church could meet the needs of the modern world and continue to be relevant. In an effort to appeal broadly to humanity, Gaudium et Spes takes the idealist stance, or at least something akin to the idealist stance, abhorred by Gilson. It states that God can, indeed, be found within: “Whenever” the human being “enters into his own heart,” he or she “plunges into the depths of reality …; God, Who probes the heart, awaits him there.”38 In particular, one encounters God through the human conscience: “In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience.…. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged.”39 As with Rahner, the turn to experience came with a lessening of religious exclusivism. The document states that the saving grace of Christ touches all people, that salvation is possible outside of Catholicism: “The Christian …. will hasten forward to resurrection.… this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way. For, since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.”40 Related to this, and also notable, was a willingness to cooperate with non-Catholic institutions: “With great respect, therefore, this council regards all the true, good and just elements inherent in the very wide variety of institutions which the human race has established for itself and constantly continues to establish. The council affirms, moreover, that the Church is willing to assist and promote all these institutions to the extent that such a service depends on her and can be associated with her mission.”41 This openness to cooperation came as somewhat of a change. Last, but not least, there is an emphasis on demonstrating the relevance of a doctrine to human longings. In going within oneself, one might come to recognize the immortality of one’s soul. The human being “rightly follows the intuition of his heart when he abhors and repudiates the utter ruin and total disappearance of his own person. He rebels against death because he bears in himself an eternal seed with cannot be reduced to sheer matter. All the endeavors of technology, though useful in the extreme, cannot calm his anxiety; for prolongation of biological

11

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

259

life is unable to satisfy that desire for higher life which is inescapably lodged in his breast.” However, “God has called man and still calls him so that with his entire being he might be joined to Him in an endless sharing of a divine life beyond all corruption. Christ won this victory when He rose to life, for by His death He freed man from death. Hence to every thoughtful man a solidly established faith provides the answer to his anxiety about what the future holds for him.”42

Conclusion William James gave voice to some trends in the modern world. For good or for ill, there is a thirst, today, for experience and relevance to life. There is also an impatience with abstract, theoretical thinking. The Catholic Church, by appealing to spiritual experience and showing what spiritual needs it can meet, makes itself more compelling in the modern world. In addition, by emphasizing religious experience, it gives more of a ground for interreligious dialogue. For instance, there are affinities between India’s Advaitic spirituality and what Gaudium et Spes, and especially Rahner, state about encountering God within. Further, in being less religiously exclusivist and more willing to cooperate with non-Catholic bodies and institutions, the Church makes itself more of a player in today’s world, rather than an institution retreating from it. To assess these developments in Church teaching, this essay will conclude by turning to a different, but parallel situation. Just as the Church was confronting the modern world, so was India, through British rule, encountering the modern world. In an entirely different context, Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950), who was a mystic and Indian nationalist, wrote about India’s encounter with Britain. Although a nationalist, he did not believe in completely shutting out foreign influences. Rather, he believed that a key defense was to assume the best aspects of the foreign, invasive, culture: “India can only survive by confronting this raw, new, aggressive, powerful world with fresh diviner creations of her own spirit…. In that connection I spoke of the acceptance and assimilation from the West of whatever its knowledge, ideas, powers was assimilable” and “valuable for a new statement of life.”43 At the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church took a similar route. Without reneging its conviction that there is an objective and knowable ultimate reality, it experimented with a different approach to its teachings. Thereby it attempted to make them more relevant to a contemporary audience.

260

E. ULRICH

Notes 1. William James, 1921, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 45. 2. William James, n.d., The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, New York: Modern Library, 32. 3. David Smith, 2009, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Catherine A. Cory and Michael J. Hollerich, editors, The Christian Theological Tradition, 3rd ed. , Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 281. 4. Descartes, Ren´e, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980, 67. 5. Ibid., 72. 6. Ibid., 71. 7. Ibid., 77. 8. Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928, 227. 9. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 27–28. 10. Ibid., 28. 11. Ibid., 24. 12. Ibid., 25. 13. Ibid., 28. 14. James, Varieties, 31. 15. Ibid., 32. 16. Ibid., 73. 17. Ibid., 391–414. 18. Ibid., 397. 19. Ibid., 436. 20. Ibid., 437–438. 21. Leo XIII Aeterni Patris 2. 22. Étienne Gilson, 1937, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, London: Sheed and Ward, 92–122. 23. Ibid., 121. 24. Ibid., 323. 25. Joseph Mar´echal, A Mar´echal Reader, trans. Joseph Donceel, New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, 163–164. 26. Ibid., 165. 27. Ibid., 184. 28. Ibid., 185. 29. Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych, New York: Herder and Herder, 1968, 142, 145.

11

30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

WILLIAM JAMES’S PRAGMATISM AND SOME ASPECTS …

261

Ibid., 154–156, 169–179. Ibid., 181. Gilson, Unity, 323. Karl Rahner, The Content of Faith: The Best of Karl Rahner’s Theological Writings, eds. Karl Lehmann, Albert Raffelt, and Harvey D. Egan, New York: Crossroad, 1993, 97. See, for instance, his assessment of post-Kantian idealism (James, Varieties, 438–145). James, Varieties, 31–32. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4., trans. Kevin Smyth, Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966, 119. Ibid., 120. Catholic Church Gaudium §14. Ibid., §16. Ibid., §22. Ibid., §42. Ibid., §18. Aurobindo Ghose, The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo, Vol. 20, Pondicherry: AurobindoAshram, 1997, 43.

Bibliography Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Catholic Church. 2017. Gaudium et Spes. The Holy See. http://www.vatican. va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_196 51207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. Accessed December 26, 2017. Descartes, René. 1980. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Faggioli, Massimo. 2014. John XXIII: The Medicine of Mercy. Collegeville: Liturgical Press. Ghose, Aurobindo. 1997. The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo. Vols. 1–37. Pondicherry: Aurobindo Ashram. Gilson, Étienne. 1938. The Unity of Philosophical Experience. London: Sheed and Ward. James, William. 1921. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. James, William. n.d. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York: Modern Library. Kant, Immanuel. 1928. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. London: Longmans, Green& Co.

262

E. ULRICH

Leo XIII. 2017. Aeterni Patris. The Holy See. http://w2.vatican.va/content/ leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris. html. Accessed December 26, 2017. Maréchal, Joseph. 1970. A Maréchal Reader, trans. Joseph Donceel. New York: Herder and Herder. Maréchal, Joseph. 1944. Le point de départ de la métaphysique: leçons sur le développement historique et théorique du problème de la connaissance. Bruxelles: L’Édition universelle. Rahner, Karl. 1993. The Content of Faith: The Best of Karl Rahner’s Theological Writings, eds. Karl Lehmann, Albert Raffelt, and Harvey D. Egan. New York: Crossroad. Rahner, Karl. 1968. Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych. New York: Herder and Herder. Rahner, Karl. 1966. Theological Investigations. Vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth. Baltimore: Helicon Press. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1996. On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, David. 2009. Thomas Aquinas. In The Christian Theological Tradition, eds. Catherine A. Cory and Michael J. Hollerich, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

CHAPTER 12

Gandhi, Hegel and Freedom: Aufhebungen, Pragmatism and Ideal Type Models Johannes (Hans) I. Bakker

Introduction: Pragmatism, Idealism and Sociological Models In this essay I would like to make some comments about Pragmatism and Gandhi. I will deal with a number of abstract subjects. To do so I will make some comments on epistemology that are relevant to Pragmatism. But I will approach Pragmatism by first going back to one of the major roots of Pragmatism: the epistemology of philosophical Idealism. Idealism can be linked to the creation of the modern university as a center of intellectual “autonomy” (Collins 1998: 650–687). The contrast between realism and idealism is often difficult to understand. Who does not want to be “realistic”? Others may say that someone is “idealistic” because that person wants to achieve a noble end goal. Sometimes people will say they are “being pragmatic.” Here the terms will be used in a more academic sense. In the scholarly literature the words idealism, realism, and pragmatism have quite different meanings.

J. (Hans) I. Bakker (B) University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_12

263

264

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

Some may feel that it is not necessary to move away from common sense, everyday use of words when discussing Gandhi. After all, he was not an academic philosopher or theologian. But to really grasp the subtle nuances of Gandhian social philosophy and to see a link between Gandhi’s way of expressing ideas and academic literature requires moving to more sophisticated terminological distinctions. The first such distinction will require a little bit of the use of some German-language words. The basic point here is that Gandhi’s ideas are very much worth considering. To give him his due requires not just using the words we use in everyday circumstances. We have to use words like “sublation.”1

Sublations (Aufhebungen) and Comprehension To understand Gandhi well is difficult. Gandhi’s ideas are complex (although on the surface they may seem simple). He had a knack for getting at the essence of a problem. He led India to independence. He fought British imperialism in the name of freedom from colonialism. We are now in a postcolonial era. But the whole issue of colonialism and postcolonialism is highly contentious. We can take several steps back and start by some comments on European history and one aspect of what is called German-language philosophical Idealism.2 (That will eventually lead to looking at Pragmaticism and the epistemology of Ideal Type Models.) What is known as “German Idealism” (Emmanuel 2001) is an orientation in philosophy that involves thinking clearly about how we know what we know. We have to think about epistemological questions in order to appreciate the subtleties of Gandhian thought. We can understand Gandhi and his views on colonialism better if we grasp the idea of “sublations.” The German-language word is Aufhebungen.3 It refers to an “overcoming” or “breaking up.” It is a kind of moving forward without totally rejecting what came before. That does not involve a complete and final break, but instead a retention of a key set of factors. It is a kind of “bridging” of the past. For German-language thinkers the idea was important for a hundred years around the 1770s– 1870s. That was not because “Germany” was a colony. It was because there was no “Germany” at all. There were many small, independent states. Yet people wanted to create one state: one nation. Gandhi also wanted to create a new state: a new nation. That new nation-state did not take precisely the form he wanted. Instead, it became

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

265

India as it is now defined, but Pakistan (and eventually that part of Pakistan called the new nation of Bangladesh) broke away. Gandhi based his notion of a new nation on a very ecumenical view of the major religious institutions and spiritual traditions of Ancient Indic Civilization. He did not reject the Buddhist–Hindu and Judeo-Christian-Islamic values of his time and place. Instead, he “sublated” (enhanced) them. Aufhebungen are a part of what is meant by the European Enlightenment (Auklärung ). The Enlightenment thinkers wanted to broaden and enhance knowledge by removing obstacles caused by adherence to dogma. Enlightenment is a disambiguation or disentanglement (an Auflösung ). Part of the Enlightenment was a logical extension of the Protestant Reformation of Christian institutions. The idea of a unified Europeanwide empire called the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) had been bolstered by the Holy Roman Catholic Church (RCC). As the political importance of the HRE and the RCC declined, the notion of one Europe also declined, and the importance of separate national groups increased. With nation-states like England (later Great Britain) and France already established the German-speaking world was in a quandary. Was it a remnant of the HRE and therefore most appropriately the Austro-Hungarian Empire? Or would the German-speaking world be one state with one nation? The issue was circumvented by Otto von Bismarck dividing up the major parts of the German-language part of Europe into a new nationstate called Deutschland and leaving the Austro-Hungarian Empire (an empire with many nationalities) to one side. But for at least a hundred years all kinds of thinkers had the problem of German nationality in mind. That resulted in ideas now associated with Idealism. Later in this essay the link between the Enlightenment, Idealism, and American Pragmatism will be clarified. American Pragmatism (Shalin 2011) can be seen as a logical outcome of the ideas being debated in Europe (James 1994). The key nation that helped to form the new nation-state of Germany circa 1870 was Prussia. In that Kingdom and Empire called Prussia there were a number of very important philosophers. They rejected the extreme Patrimonial traditions and traditional “prebendal” bureaucratic systems of Prussia (Bakker 2010).Those thinkers were not, strictly speaking, German. They were Prussian citizens. The nation-state of Germany (Deutschland) did not formally come into existence until 1871. “Germany” encompassed only part of the German-speaking world. The other major Empire-Kingdom was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Part of what motivated many German-speaking people was a desire to catch up

266

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

to Great Britain and France and form a nation-state. The ideology of a nation-state required a belief in the fiction of a “nation” and therefore it was impossible to link Deutschland to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Much of the work of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (1977, 2010) can be understood contextually if we grasp the fact that they lived in worked in a time when there was not yet a German Empire, Kingdom, or nation-state. Instead, there were many states, some larger and some smaller. They were Patrimonial principalities. The Saxon, Hessian, and Bavarian states were important, as was the state of Hamburg (which encompassed far more than just the city of Hamburg). By far the most important entity politically and militarily in the mid-nineteenth century was Prussia. But Prussia’s historical background oscillated between extreme “Patrimonialism” with traditional bureaucracy (Bakker 2010) and a more egalitarian, fledgling Constitutional Monarchy (Ackerman 2019). Although he is often described as “German” the reality is that Hegel was a Prussian philosopher who was writing in the context of Prussian conditions, including at times severe forms of censorship. Part of the seeming obscurity of some of his writing is due to the fact that he had to elude the censors and not make it absolutely clear what he thought about traditional Roman Catholic and Lutheran theological ideas. He did not accept the Prussian state religion of Lutheranism and he had doubts about Roman Catholic dogma. But he did feel that over the course of time theologians became more careful in the wording of their ideas and that a gradual Enlightenment built on earlier theological ideas was possible. Hegel rejected “traditional legal authority” and groped toward an Enlightenment-inspired kind of Constitutional Monarchy and modern bureaucratic “goal-rational” norms. Marx (1967) utilized many of Hegel’s insights about political economy and history. Today Marx is much better known in academic circles than Gandhi (Bakker 1993a). Hegel wrote about “spirituality” and “society” in ways that are beneficial to understand in order to better understand Gandhi’s nationalism and patriotism. Bakker (1993a) points out that Gandhi was somewhat of a “heretic” when it came to Hindu dogma and cultural norms. He broke away from traditional values concerning caste and argued that they were not really ancient values. Hegel also broke away from tradition, but of course, unlike Gandhi, he himself never led a mass movement. Hegel did, however, create a way of thinking about social theory and the nature of human reality in this world that had implications for various

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

267

mass movements. However, the vagueness of his ideas meant that they could be easily interpreted as either a way of bolstering Patriarchal Patrimonialism or as a justification for egalitarianism, democratic freedoms, and significant social change. His ideas therefore took both relatively more right-wing, traditional, and left-wing “heretical” perspectives. On the right we have Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and such Existentialist writers (Tiryakian 1962) as Martin Heidegger. On the left we have Marx (1967) and Engels, and such Marxist writers as Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg. Today many academic philosophers believe that Hegel was a progressive thinker and that what seemed to some to be reactionary was window dressing to fool the censors. Hegel’s conceptualization of logic is a re-thinking of logic.4 Instead of following a strictly Aristotelian logic of the sort favored by the Roman Catholic and Lutheran theologians in his time, Hegel introduces a different way of thinking. One aspect of Hegel’s logic involves a rethinking of how we use “a predicate” in a sentence. If we say Gandhi had a theory of colonialism then Gandhi is the subject of the sentence and the phrase “had a theory of colonialism” is the predicate, while “colonialism” is the direct object. Clearly, we need an understanding of what it means to use a predicate. Redding (2017), building on his book (Redding 2007), makes it clear that Hegel elucidated two kinds of predicates. One involves an actual, material, physical substance that is ontologically real. For example, I can hold a specific cup of coffee (or mug of coffee) and I can say: “This is coffee” implying that it is not tea, water, or milk in that cup. Similarly, we can talk about a man whose name was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and think about him as he was at a specific time (t-1) in a specific place or “space” (s-1). It is obvious that the very young Gandhi who first went to South Africa as a freshly minted barrister was not precisely the same Gandhi as the man who led the Salt March. There was a degree of modification in his character (Aufhebung at the level of personality). Similarly, the actual events in the sub-continent of India in 1900 were quite different from actualities as they had been in 1800. The religious institutions we describe with the Ideal Type Model (ITM) of “Hinduism” changed many times in three thousand plus years (Collins 1998: 177– 271). Gandhi was well aware that Hinduism is not something which does not change and cannot change. He himself helped to change it.

268

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

Coffee Without Milk: Rising Above a Distinction that Does not Serve a Purpose This leads to a fascinating insight. In a way it is a very easy concept to grasp; but, nevertheless, it is worth taking time to consider it carefully. It can be conveyed by an anecdote mentioned by Slavoj Zizek at a talk he gave in Mumbai at the Jnana Pravana centre. An abbreviated version of the story runs like this. A human being (a “man”) enters a café and asks for “a cup of coffee without cream” (crème). The server (a “young woman,” but obviously it could be an old man, etc.) informs him that the café does not have coffee without cream because they do not have cream. However, they do have milk. So it is possible to order “a coffee with milk.” That would be an Aristotelian distinction: either/or. The man, obviously well versed in Hegel’s’theory of the subsumptive predicative and dialectical Aufhebung (“overcoming of a negation” or “negation of the negation”) responds with a smile: “Very well then, I would like to have coffee without milk.” The young woman presented a hypothetical or subsumptive predicate that also involved a negation: We do not have cream. The man then negated the negation with another subsumptive predicative: coffee without milk. The coffee without milk is the essence of what he wanted to drink: “black coffee.” He did not get angry and say: “What do you mean you do not have cream? All I want is a cup of black coffee!” He did not get angry and rant. There was no “revolt.” Moreover, he did not make any kind of even more subtle Aristotelian distinction between a cup or a mug. (It did not matter to him at that moment whether the black coffee was served in a mug rather than a cup.) And so it goes. The same Hegelian (or perhaps Neo-Hegelian) dialectical logic of Aufhebung can be applied to a discussion of Gandhi and postcolonialism. In one sense postcolonialism is the negation of colonialism; but in a wider sense it is an Aufhebung involving a subsumptive predicate. If all aspects of colonialism were completely abolished then what century would the geographical entity of “India” have to return to in order to be “pure”? Should there be a return to the philosophical insights of Ishvakrishna and a version of Samkhya called “satkaryavada: the effect preexists within its material cause”? Or should Vaisheshika’s “asatkaryavada” (Collins 1998: 236) be dominant in a Hindu India where all remnants of “Mongol” (Mughal) and “British” colonialism had been purged? Would it be better to “only” return to Advaita, which

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

269

supplanted “Buddhist” and “Hindu” ideas circa the first millennium of the Common Era? Would a twentieth-century interpretation of the Gita be sufficient? Imagine the same scene at the same café. The man enters and orders some postcolonial book. The young attendant—and let us make it a young man this time to avoid sexism—says: We do not have any books on postcolonialism. We only have books on the history of imperialism and on the history of colonialism. We also have some books about Benjamin Franklin, Sukarno, Ho Chi Min, Gandhi, and other human beings who had a role in independence struggles against European (including British) colonial and imperial powers. The wise Neo-Hegelian man then responds: “Very well then, please show me the section where I can find books about imperialism, colonialism and independence struggles by leaders.” It is very likely that in that very section he will find books that also deal in one way or another with the concept of decoloniality. Without entering too deeply into the philosophical problems related to ontology and epistemology, it is important to be somewhat clearer about “predicates” than is often the case in ordinary discourse in everyday life. This essay is about Gandhi and decoloniality. But you may not be able to read only about decoloniality. There may be some cream (colonialism) or milk (imperialism) in the brew. The link between German Idealism (as here represented solely by a few Hegelian ideas) and Pragmatism (especially the Peircean U.S. “American” variant) involves thinking about the way we perceive topics like “colonialism.” Colonialism is not just one thing, one “actual object.” It is an ideal type and can be used to develop several different Ideal Type Models (ITMs) (Bakker 2015).

Colonialism Comes in Many Shapes: And so We need to understand what the abstract concept of “colonialism” is before we can fully conceptualize the abstract concept called “postcolonialism.” As stated, we have to think in terms of a logic which involves an Aufhebung of susumptive predicates. American Pragmatism often does that, although it is not always obvious that there is a link between progressive left-Hegelianism and American Pragmatism (Shalin 2011: 37–191). We have to think about it as, metaphorically speaking, coffee without milk, or, to put it simply, “black coffee” as an “object” (Mead 1903). To fully appreciate political freedom and postcolonialism in terms of Gandhi’s social philosophy and theology we can explore his ideas in

270

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

contrast with other systems of thought. That is not easy and it requires a much more detailed discussion than is possible here. I made some tentative, baby steps long ago (Bakker 1993a). By briefly mentioning American Pragmatism, especially C. S. Peirce, and German Idealism, especially G. W. F. Hegel, we can highlight the originality of Gandhi’s thinking. Gandhi remains very relevant to social theory “today” (Giddens and Turner 1987). The Pragmatists and Idealists did not anticipate the dismantling (or, “deconstruction”) of the overseas colonies and the imperial relationship.5 However, post-World War II “globalization” in some ways goes beyond Gandhi’s thinking as well.

Gandhi’s Social Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Theology We can explore Gandhi’s social philosophy and theology by examining the roots of his ideas and then comparing and contrasting his thinking with other systems of thought. We have already taken a brief look at Germanlanguage Idealist philosophy as reflected in the idea of Aufhebungen in Hegel’s dialectic. Let us continue by also mentioning the similarities and differences between Gandhi’s framework and U.S.- American Pragmatism (Shalin 2011), especially the version of Pragmatism that Charles Sanders Peirce called “Pragmaticism.” Peirce (Nöth 1995) wanted to differentiate his ideas from more popular representations of Pragmatism. William James gave Peirce credit for his originality in proposing the general notion of American Pragmatism in the first place (Menand 2001). But Peirce felt that James had presented Pragmatism in somewhat too popular a fashion. Peirce’s Pragmaticism will be included under the general heading of Pragmatism here, but it should be carefully noted that Peirce developed an epistemology based on a triadic view. That viewpoint is somewhat difficult to fully explain and constantly keep in mind since it runs counter to our everyday common-sense view of reality. Our beliefs about common-sense reality tend to favor the notion that there are actual, real physical objects in the world. Of course, to some extent that is true. There are singular objects and there is an obdurate reality. But Peirce’s main point is that as soon as we try to discuss such objects in words we use “signs” that are not about one unique object. They are subsumptive and not about singular, real, “actual” concrete objects (i.e. this specific apple and not that one). If I pluck an object

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

271

from a tree and call it an “apple” then I am using a common designation. But that singular object is only called an apple because in the English language we have agreed to call a certain type of object an apple. The word “apple” is a subsumptive sign that many people have agreed upon for many generations. It is, at its simplest, what Peirce calls a “legi-sign” (legisign). A legisign that has been “legislated,” so to speak. There was no political legislature that made that determination. But in a sense, it is often called into being as the proper term for a specific “thing.” All words in all languages are, metaphorically speaking, legislated signs rather than subsumptive predicates that “fall out of the sky.” Such legisigns are the accepted meanings of words at any particular time in any specific language (e.g. French rather than German). That is true not only for singular objects (e.g. this specific mug of coffee), but also for more abstract “things” like philosophical ideas. Therefore, we discuss “Pragmatism” and now we mainly focus on U.S.-American Pragmatism (Menand 2001).Furthermore, we know that “American” in this context means the United States of America (or, USA) and not, for example, Brazil, a nationstate in the Americas (but in Latin America, or South America). There were philosophical systems that were very similar to American Pragmatism before Peirce borrowed the Greek word pragma. One such system of thought is what is commonly called “German Idealism.” As already indicated even that phrase is another legisign in the sense that it was technically Prussian and not really “German” at all in any political or economic sense that mattered.6 It is “German” only in the sense that many of the contributors wrote in the German language (as it is called in English, or deutsche Sprache). They wrote in Deutsch. But there was not yet any Deutschland. The nation-state and empire of Germany did not come into existence until 1871. (The English term utilizes the Latin word Germania.) Immanuel Kant, for example, was not a “German” writer, even though he wrote in the German language. He was a Prussian citizen and thus technically a Prussian writer. German Idealism can be considered to begin with Kant and his three major critiques. The Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998 [1781, 1787]) was the first and it set the standard for almost all European philosophy. Eventually that meant it also set the standard for North American (and Latin American) philosophy. In a sense all modern academic philosophers are Post-Kantian. It is vitally important to note for a full contextual understanding of Kant’s work that he wrote in a part of the Kingdom–Empire of Prussia at a time

272

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

when the idea of a unified nation-state called Deutschland was a kind of distant dream. Surprisingly, perhaps, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, can also be considered a Post-Kantian like Hegel and, at the same time, a kind of American Pragmatist (or Pragmaticist ) like Peirce. Gandhi is not a thinker who bases his ideas on ideas from the European Middle Ages or Classical Greek and Roman philosophers, of course. His ideas are rooted in the Indic Civilization of South Asia which so deeply influenced East Asia and Southeast Asia. But Gandhi’s interpretation of Indic ideas is not that of the earliest Vedic thinkers or the Upanishadic thinkers. Instead, he was deeply influenced by the ways in which British and other European scholars interpreted Sanskrit texts. Gandhi’s emphasis on Bhagavad Gita is in part a product of the European re-thinking of Indic Civilization and various schools of thought we associate with India and China. (For centuries Chinese states were heavily influenced by Indic ideas.) One of the best overviews of the various theologies and philosophies that form the basis of Indic and Sinitic Civilizations—as well as “Western European” Civilizations—is the magnum opus by Randall Collins (1998). It is entitled The Sociology of Philosophies and this essay leans heavily on his magisterial overview of the history of ideas. He is absolutely correct in his general interpretation of what he calls “attention spaces.” In different times and places, certain ideas gain prominence. In subsequent generations only about half a dozen or so ideas are really well remembered. Only a very small number of specialists remember more than about eight major thinkers from previous eras. Collins (1998) manages to summarize an enormous scholarly literature and apply a rigorous Comparative Historical Sociological (CHS) method that is due in part to the somewhat Neo-Kantian framework put forward by the German thinker Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber was educated as a classicist, historian, jurist, political economist, and much more. But he is mostly remembered in the discipline of sociology. That is because toward the end of his life he began to think about some of the Comparative and Historical ideas he was working with as not only aspects of a kind of German political economy (Sozialwissenschaft ) but also as moving into a kind of sociology (Soziologie). He called that “interpretive sociology” (verstehendeSoziologie). That is, rather than a Positivistic Sociology like that of Auguste Comte or Herbert Spencer he advocated a kind of sociology that would include not only causal generalizations (and where appropriate “laws” or quasi-laws) but

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

273

also generalizations based on the interpretation of human meaning. He used the common German-language word Verstehen. As a noun the word is always capitalized in the German language. (As an adjective it is not.) The word Verstehen essentially means understanding. To some extent it is associated with the idea of empathetic understanding. That often requires a degree of emotional intelligence. Some people tend to lack emotional intelligence due to the roles (or, “role sets”) they occupy (or for other reasons). For example, a four-star general in the United States recently showed a lack of emotional intelligence and empathetic understanding when it came to fully acknowledging the grief that a widow was experiencing as a result of the death of her soldier husband. She was pregnant with her third child. But the general advised the President of the United States to try to console her in the way that he himself had been consoled by another highranking military officer. That other man had told the four-star general that the death of his son should be viewed in the context of the fact that the son had chosen to be there at that time and in that place. The general’s son had signed on to be a U.S. soldier and therefore the father should not grieve too long. That kind of statement may console a general. But it is not likely to console a young widow. She had not served in the military. She had not signed on to have her husband killed. It was the wrong thing for the four-star general to say in that circumstance. It was also the wrong thing for the general to advise the President to say in that situation. But later neither the President nor the general could acknowledge their error. Instead, they then attacked the messenger, a woman who had reported on the widow’s grief. That woman was a good friend of the family and had known the slain soldier as a boy. That incident illustrates the subtle nature of empathy. For Weber the idea of interpersonal emotional intelligence is just the beginning. What is needed when we apply Comparative Historical Sociology (CHS) is an ability to empathize using Verstehen. That requires a kind of thought experiment (Gedankenexperiment ) where we put ourselves into the situation as perceived by other human beings in vastly different circumstances. If we think of the Indian sub-continent a thousand years ago, we are forced to think about a very different place than the nation-states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal today. We are also forced to try to translate the worldviews and preoccupations of people who lived in an era long before modern science. Few ordinary peasant cultivators in the subcontinent would have known much about what was happening at the

274

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

various royal courts. Their lives would not have been the same as even relatively poorly educated tribal people in the nation-state of India today. Today even the poor have some access to education and mass communications. A village may have a black and white Television (or even a color TV). No one in Ancient India or Ancient Pakistan would have had a wrist watch or a bicycle. Those technological innovations do not determine how people think, of course, but they do have an impact. They have some influence both in the short run and in the long run. All of that brings us back to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. As a boy he grew up in Kathiawad, in what is now called Gujarat State in the nation-state of India. At that time Kathiawad was a place where his father had an important function. He did not come from a poor family. He did not come from a family of Brahmins, but instead from a lower caste, the Modh Baniya caste in the Vaishya varna (Bakker 1993a) He was not a Brahmin or Kshatriya. That is, he was not a member of the two highest castes. But nevertheless, important changes that had taken place, due in part to colonialism, allowed him to travel to the center of the British Empire and the global capitalist world system: London, England. In London he was able to see firsthand the ways in which ordinary Englishmen and visiting foreigners lived. He experienced the British way of life and even experimented with it in various ways. He dressed in an English style befitting a young man who was studying law. He fraternized with Englishmen who were interested in Theosophy. They asked him about Bhagavad Gita. (Note that they did not ask him about the Vedas or Upanishads per se.) He knew that he himself was not actually all that well acquainted with the Gita. So, he started to learn more in order to be able to answer their questions. He then fell in love with the Gita. But although he had learned about it from childhood, he had never really concentrated on learning the Gita by heart. Eventually he memorized a great deal of it (or maybe even all of it). Note however that he did not only read the Gita in Sanskrit or Gujarati. He also read it in translation. Later he himself translated the Sanskrit into Gujarati and then with the help of his associates, people like Mahadev Desai and Vinoba Bhave, he further translated the Sanskrit and Gujarati versions into the British English of his day (Bakker 1993b). His English-language translation continues to be read even today. It is read in English by people who will never learn Gujarati or even Sanskrit. It can be argued that it is actually a very good, accurate translation (Bakker 1993b). But even if one were to evaluate it as a bad translation it is still also true that Gandhi

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

275

did make the effort to provide an English translation of his own (with his colleagues). He did not need to do that. There were already dozens of English-language translations some of which he probably consulted.

Some Further Comments on Bhagavad Gita This is not the place to go into a full-scale discussion of the Gita of course (Bakker 1993b) or of hermeneutics in general (Borg 2012).7 But a few basic remarks will be helpful in situating Gandhi in terms of American Pragmatism and German-language (Prussian) Idealist philosophy. The first popular English translation of Bhagavad Gita was not the very first translation of Gita into another language. But Sir Edwin Arnold’s Song Celestial is still worth reading. (It may have been the first English version Gandhi himself read first when he read it as a whole.) The idea of an Indo-European Language Family was first discussed by a British colonial civil servant who saw the similarities between Sanskrit grammar and Greek grammar. Most British civil servants were educated in Latin and Greek and therefore anyone who studied Sanskrit would quickly realize that there were many parallels. Those parallels do not exist in English, but they are retained to some extent in German grammar. Thus, many German-language scholars in countries like Switzerland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Denmark, or the Netherlands, where knowledge of the German-language was common, would have recognized some degree of similarity. It took some time for the Indo-European Language Hypothesis to be fully accepted. But now there can be no question about it. The languages of the Indian sub-continent are closely tied to most of the languages of Europe (including Great Britain and Ireland, but not Hungary and Finland). What does it matter? Well, it matters a great deal both for the history of ideas and for the full comprehension of Gandhi’s somewhat eclectic version of theology. Gandhi’s worldview is not a restricted version of one type of religion. As hinted at above, we need to recognize that the English word “Hinduism” is a label, a semiotic legisign. It is not the word used in the languages of India. A better expression might be sanatana dharma, but that term is also somewhat problematic. The word dharma is now familiar to many people in North America due to the influence of a religion that carried the English designation of “Buddhism.” But that word is often just as misleading as the word Hinduism. Textbooks use the words. But they rarely acknowledge that such words are what Weber

276

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

called epistemological ideal types. As indicated, I tend to call them Ideal Type Models (ITMs.). An ITM is a “model” that is based on a set of more limited ideal types. For example, the ITM of modern bureaucracy includes such subsidiary ideal types as: certification, hierarchy, careers based on general merit, chain of command, universalistic criteria for advancement, equal treatment under the law, and a host of others. Pre-modern, traditional bureaucracies before circa 1520 C.E. also had hierarchy but no full chain of command and no sense of careers based on general merit in the modern sense of merit. Chinese traditional bureaucracies were sometimes based on a kind of traditional literary scholarship and knowledge of texts deemed to be classical (Bakker 2010). All ITMs are simply onesided accentuations. They are not the reality of specific manifestations: not the “objective” reality of one concrete thing. For example, think of the ITM of a “constitutional monarchy” and the ITM of a “parliament” (Ackerman 2019). The actual organizational structure of the Canadian Parliament is not precisely the same in every respect as the actual structure of the Indian Parliament. But they are similar in so far as both are distant echoes of a now much improved British Parliament. Of course, when India and Canada were British colonies the British Parliament was far less egalitarian and therefore less democratic than it is today. We need to remember that we are not dealing with the kinds of “objects” of inquiry that are mainly characteristic of the so-called “hard” sciences since human beings continually shape and reshape social realities. We have to be open to interpretations in ways in which the “non-human sciences” are often not.

The Ideal Type Approach: Gandhian Social Theory and Decoloniality The term “actualism” is used by some philosophers when discussing actual historical persons and events. The second kind of predicate, according to Redding’s interpretation of Hegel’s logic, is the notion of a subsumptive judgment. We make a “judgment” about something that is somewhat or even very abstract by subsuming the “object” that we are discussing under a general label (e.g., the labels “colonialism” or “racism”). In order to make a subsumptive judgement, we need a “subsumptive predicate.” That is very close to what Max Weber meant when he discussed “ideal types” and it is what I am referring to when I argue

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

277

that an Ideal Type Model (ITM) consists of a set of ideal types (Bakker 2009, 2010). The idea of decoloniality and political freedom is often associated with a Neo-Marxian intellectual framework. There are of course many disputes as to which set of thinkers (or, Interpretive Network of social scientists, etc.) best captures what Marx really meant about imperialism, colonialism, and the potential for independence from an imperial power. The notion that both Marx and Gandhi would have approved of the ITM approach advocated here is highly controversial stand to take. I believe that Karl Marx would have entered into fruitful dialogue with Max Weber and Gandhi. If the three thinkers had lived in the same time (and more or less the same general location) they could have shared a great deal. Of course, Marx was born long before Weber and died when Weber was just a young man. Marx (1818–1883) and Weber (1864– 1920) never met. When Marx died in 1883 Weber would have been about nineteen years old. It is not at all clear how much of Karl Marx’s work Weber actually read. It may be that he read very little of Karl Marx’s work rather than German-language Marxists’ books and essays of the late 1880s up to the early 1910s. Let me focus for a few sentences on just Marx and Weber. Between 1883 and 1919 there were many Europeans who wrote about Marxist and Marxian ideas in German, Dutch/Flemish, French, Italian, and Hungarian. (Many Hungarians had their work translated into German or wrote in German.) Weber would have had ample opportunity to read secondary expositions by Engels, Kautsky, Bernstein, Luxembourg, and many others. (A thorough search through the MWGA would reveal more of the important details.) But imagine Marx and Weber meeting circa 1890 in Scheveningen, near the Hague’s Gravenhage, in the Netherlands. Or imagine them doing that in 1917, during World War I (since the Netherlands was a neutral country). It would have made a difference to those of us who are sincerely interested in strictly sociological theory and political economy (e.g., Sozialwissenschaften, institutional economics). We can even stretch our imaginations further and add a whole cast of characters, including of course Engels, Kautsky, Bernstein, Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Ludembourg, Alfred Weber, Marianne Weber, Georg Simmel, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Herbert Mead, Charles Sanders Peirce, and so forth. But unfortunately, we can only construct such a scene in our mind’s eye. To some extent this conference is a kind of logical extension of that

278

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

somewhat surrealistic idea. Too bad Karl Marx’s ghost and Max Weber’s ghost cannot make an actual appearance, as in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, where the whole play depends on the actual appearance of the ghost of Hamlet’s dead father. We can only speculate: Positivist or Interpretivist, or (somehow, perhaps magically?) both? The key contribution Gandhi would have made is to emphasize the relative unimportance of academic scholarship with regard to practical outcomes related to the struggle against British Imperialism and colonialism generally. Gandhi was not a European thinker. He picked up ideas that were helpful to him, but in essence his worldview remained “Indic” even though he was not an out and out traditionalist by any means (Bakker 1993a). By the same token there is no evidence that either Marx or Weber, two of the leading Comparative Historical Sociological (CHS) thinkers, paid deep attention to the spiritual connotations of the Gita. Marx might have dismissed the metaphorical content and thought of Hindu–Buddhist inspired spirituality as leading laborers and peasants away from full awareness of exploitation, but we know that Gandhi was quite well aware of exploitation and the evils of imperialist domination. Weber would have been more open to the ways in which the Gita presents a worldview that has real life consequences, but even he would not have fully grasped the spiritual meaning of Gita to Gandhi (Bakker 1993b). To fully study these and other topics empirically on the basis of good theoretical insights about imperialism, colonialism and capitalism it would be necessary to go into far more depth concerning the precise nature of those phenomena in different times and places. That is where ITMs come in.

The Heuristic Value of ITMs in General While I have previously argued about the heuristic value of the ITM of traditional authority that goes under the rubric of Patrimonialism (Bendix 1960, 1962, Riggs 1979, Turner 2019) I have not previously made a more general Meta-Methodological argument concerning the overall usefulness of ITMs for social sciences and humanities (i.e., the Geisteswissenchaften). I believe that terms which are often reified in sociological theory are actually more usefully taken to mean nothing more (or less) than ITMs. For example, as mentioned several times, the term “Buddhist” as a general label for an institutionalized set of religious belief systems is an ITM of a specific “world religion” and not anything concrete in and of itself.

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

279

What Difference Does It Make? It is clear that mere “thick description” of the sort advocated by Clifford Geertz and others will not provide enough intellectual “capital” to fully penetrate the mysteries of the workings of Neoliberal capitalism in an era of globalization. Gandhi’s ideas about Appropriate Technology (AT) swadeshi and sarvodaya (Bakker 1993a: 33–105) will become increasingly relevant for any significant shift in the nature of the world order. Without at least some degree of ecumenical comprehension of notions of Truth and Justice there cannot be any long-term sustainability and solutions to bio-physical environmental problems related to climate weirding. Without something akin to a Gandhian (or perhaps Neo-Gandhian) worldview the globalized political economic order may lead to catastrophe for millions if not billions of people. The significance of climate “weirding” in all parts of the world is one aspect of the current situation that should make decision-makers in government and industry think more carefully about Gandhian ideas of swadeshi and sarvodaya.

Conclusion This brief essay has merely scratched the surface. I have tried to indicate some links between Gandhi social philosophy and Prussian Idealism (Kant, Hegel) as well as U.S. Pragmaticism (Peirce, Mead). Hopefully it will be a small step toward better understanding, especially within the context of this collection of essays dealing with very similar themes. What is clear is that it is worth studying the ways in which Gandhi may have picked up (or independently co-discovered) some insights about the dialectic often associated with Hegel and Marx and some ideas about texts and the semiotics of signs usually linked to James, Peirce, and U.S.-American Pragmatism (or Pragmaticism). But even a fully developed discussion of the intellectual similarities among Marx and Weber (Bakker 2010), on the one hand, and Peirce and Pragmatists generally(Bakker 2009), on the other, would not do more than help in a small way to gain a slightly better appreciation of the level of sophistication that is implicit in Gandhi’s mature thought. Gandhi’s social philosophy and implicit sociological theory is well worth studying. Perhaps these remarks will stimulate thinking about Gandhi in a slightly different way. Today all nation-states are part of a global system which is based on ideas that tend to run counter to the main thrust of

280

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

Gandhi’s social philosophy. Gandhi believed in the freedom and independence of the nation-state of India, but he was not a contemporary right-wing nationalist. Today the globalization of the world capitalist economy is a key aspect of political economy (Tausch 2010; ChaseDunn 2019). Nevertheless, it is worth revisiting some aspect of the history of philosophy (such as Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung and Peirce’s epistemology) that can be found implicit to some degree in Gandhian thinking. For me personally the value of Gandhi’s way of thinking is apparent, but there have been many who have criticized him severely. Many of his most severe critics, however, do not take the time to articulate similarities and differences between Gandhi’s spiritual orientation and the best thinking of some Prussian, German-language and American, Englishlanguage thinkers who are much more commonly studied and appreciated in the United States, Canada, and many countries in Europe. A MetaMeta Paradigmatic, unified discipline of sociology—should such a thing ever come into existence—will supplant the quite diverse and somewhat scattered sub-sets of the general “field” of sociology that we have in the world today. Gandhi’s highly sophisticated, though seemingly so straight-forward, way of thinking will, in my opinion, be even more well understood and appreciated if that kind of “Pragmatic” and ‘‘Semiotic” Sociological discipline ever gets off the ground (Bakker 2011). Gandhi walked the talk. We can certainly criticize him, just as we can criticize all of the thinkers discussed briefly here; but, the core of Gandhi’s thinking is still relevant to the postcolonial situation post-World War II and the problems associated with simplistic nationalist chauvinism versus avant-garde thought about significant political economic change in the capitalist global “world system” (Chase-Dunn 2019). Gandhi’s attempts to improve life for ordinary people in what we now call India and Pakistan/Bangladesh are not the only example of attempts to ameliorate the harsh conditions faced by many people. There are other examples of significant social change such as the idea of Constitutionality (e.g., Ackerman 2019) or the notion that at least in principle wars should be fought with some notions of ethics still in mind (Hathaway and Schapiro 2017). The idea of a modern bureaucracy has shifted (Riggs 1979). But despite changes in the nature of society since his death, Gandhi’s social philosophy and implicit ideas on epistemology and sociological theory

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

281

should continue to be an example worth considering carefully, critiquing and utilizing for meaningful social action. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Ben Anderson, Kevin Anderson, Randall Collins, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Harry Dahms, Glen Filson, Ananta Kumar Giri, Uta Gerhardt, Hildred Geertz, Lauren Langman, Victor Lidz, Larry Nichols, Dmitri Shalin, Jonathan Turner, Stephen Turner, Immanuel Wallerstein, Tony Winson, and Irving Zeitlin for their work (and conversations with most of them), all of which helped motivate me. All errors are my own.

Notes 1. The standard translation of Aufhebung is sublation. But for many the word sublation is not all that clear. We can start with the very common use of “Auf-” in the German language. Auf can mean: on, upon, in, at, of, by, towards or on to. Hebung refers to lifting, raising, heaving, improving, enhancing, promoting, or increasing. In a sense Aufhebung refers to a certain kind of improving upon that which came before by enhancing it. Sublation is a kind of improving of understanding by enhancing nuances. For Hegel that occurs through a historical set of dialogues or “dialectics” where ideas get more and more refined. 2. It may seem needlessly pedantic to write “German-language Idealism” rather than just “German Idealism” but by writing about German Idealism in an era when there was no Germany (Deutschland) we obscure a great deal. A key aspect of Prussian philosophical Idealism had to do with the idea that reality is socially constructed. 3. Here what Collins (1998: 659) writes is helpful: “The unfolding of the plant from seed to bud to blossom can be described as a progression of negations and sublations” [Aufhebungen, or “negations of the negations”]. 4. For example I had to leave out any discussion of Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology. The mathematician Husserl’s attempt to ground all natural and social science in a very careful attention to “phenomena” is unthinkable without the German-language philosophical heritage touched on here. Due to space limitations, I have only touched on Hegel’s thought (Copleston 1965) before introducing one aspect of Peirce’s epistemology (Nöth 1995). 5. The term “deconstruction” has become associated with a set of Postmodern thinkers and therefore we need to be cautious in using the word in the 1950s sense. 6. The Latin term Germania is used in a modified way to apply to many different things, and the contemporary English word “German” has that Latin root, but no longer has the same specific geographical meaning as

282

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

Germania had for the Romans. We do not think about Germany the way the Romans thought about Germania. If the nation-state of Germany followed the boundaries of the Latin entity called Germania it would be a quite different entity. 7. Ultimately the hermeneutic rules that apply to the Hebrew Scriptures (Tanakh) and the so-called New Testament apply to the Bhagavad Gita and all sacred as well as secular texts. Turner (2019) makes the importance of “vocation” for Weber clear and part of such a vocation is due diligence in interpreting texts contextually.

References Ackerman, Bruce. 2019. Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard University Press. Bakker, J.I. (Hans). 1993a. Toward a Just Civilization. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. Bakker, J.I. (Hans) (ed.). 1993b. Gandhi and the Gita. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. Bakker, J.I. (Hans). 2009. Peirce, Pragmaticism, and Public Sociology: Translating an Interpretation into Praxis. In Nature, Knowledge and Negation. Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 26, ed. Harry Dahms, 229–257. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd. Bakker, J.I. (Hans). 2010. Deference Versus Democracy in Traditional and Modern Bureaucracy; Refinements of Max Weber’s Ideal Type Model. In Society, History, and the Global Hunan Condition, ed. Baber Zaheer and J.M. Bryant, 105–128. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield. (This is a Festschrift for Irving Zeitlin.) Bakker, J.I. (Hans). 2011. Pragmatic Sociology: Healing the Discipline. Sociological Focus 44 (3) (August): 167–183. Accessed May 26, 2019. https://www. jstor.org/stable/41633884. Bakker, J.I. (Hans). 2015. Thick Description, Nomological Laws and Ideal Types: Which Methodology Helps Most with Praxis? In Globalization, Critique and Social Theory: Diagnoses and Challenges (Current Perspectives in Social Theory), ed. Harry Dahms, 267–292. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd. Bendix, Reinhard. 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Doubleday and Co (hard copy). Bendix, Reinhard. 1962. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Doubleday Anchor Book (paperback). Borg, Marcus J. 2012. Evolution of the Word: The New Testament in the Order the Books Were Written. New York: HarperOne – HarperCollins.

12

GANDHI, HEGEL AND FREEDOM: AUFHEBUNGEN …

283

Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2019. Commentary on Globalization and Development: The Relevance of Classical ‘Dependency’ Theory for the World Today. International Social Science Journal. Collins, Randall. 1998. The Sociology of Philosophies. Cambridge, MA: Belknap at Harvard University Press. Copleston, Frederick. 1965 [1963]. A History of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern Philosophy, Part I: Fichte to Hegel. Garden City, NY: Image Books -Doubleday. Emmanuel, Steven M. (ed.). 2001. The Blackwell Guide to the Modern Philosophers: From Descartes to Nietzsche. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Giddens, Anthony, and Jonathan Turner (eds.). 1987. Social Theory Today. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hathaway, Oona A., and Scott J. Schapiro. 2017. The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World. New York: Simon & Schuster. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit [Geist ], trans. A.V. Miller. With a Foreword and Analysis of the Text by J. N. Findlay. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2010. Science of Logic, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. James, William. 1994 [1884, 1907]. Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth. Introduction by A. J. Ayer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Lectures delivered in 1906 and 1907 at Columbia University and a 1909 consolidation of other lectures which he started to present in 1884.] Kant, Immanuel. 1998 [1781, 1787]. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Marx, Karl. 1967. Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, trans. and ed. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddal. New York: Doubleday and Co. (hard copy) and Doubleday Anchor Book (paperback). Mead, George Herbert. 1903. The Definition of the Psychical. In Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago. First Series, vol. III , 77–112. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (Cited by Giddens and Turner 1987: 88, 114). Retrieved August 25, 2019, at https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Mead/pubs/ Mead_1903.html. Menand, Louis. 2001. The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Nöth, Winfried. 1995. Peirce. In Handbook of Semiotics, 39–47. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Redding, Paul. 2007. Analytical Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Redding, Paul. 2017. Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World. Unpublished paper presented at the

284

J. (HANS) I. BAKKER

Conference Reconsidering Hegel’s Logic, University of Pittsburgh, PA, April 14–16. Riggs, Fred. 1979. Introduction: Shifting Meanings of the Term ‘Bureaucracy.’ International Science Journal 31: L 563–584. Riggs, Fred. 1997. Modernity and Bureaucracy. Public Administration Review 57 (4): 347–353. Shalin, Dmitri N. 2011. Pragmatism & Democracy: Studies in History, Social Theory, and Progressive Politics. London and New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Tausch, Arno. 2010. Globalization and Development: The Relevance of Classical ‘Dependency’ Theory for the World Today. International Social Science Journal 61: 467–488. Republished in the same journal in 2019; see ChaseDunn 2019. Tiryakian, Edward A. 1962. Sociologism and Existentialism: Two Perspectives on the Individual and Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Turner, Stephan. 2019. The Road from ‘Vocation’: Weber and Veblen on the Purposelessness of Scholarship. Journal of Classical Sociology: 1–25.

CHAPTER 13

Cosmopolitan Nationalism, Spirituality and Spaces in Rabindranath Tagore and Sri Aurobindo Payel Chattopadhyay Mukherjee

Inclusive Spirituality and Nationalism The first half of the twentieth century in India is a crucial epoch in the realisation of a cosmopolitan modernity,1 sustaining within the nationalistic overtones of resistance against the disconcerting British imperialism. The undercurrent, however, was the processes of transition from being the colonial subjects of the Raj to redefining their indigenous identities in seeking the notion of self with a quest for an idea of swaraj. At this point of time, it was pertinent to redefine a subtle balance between the materiality of an imagined nation still unconceivable even at its nascent state and a spirituality that would enable a kind of restraint from imagining the excesses of freedom without a pragmatic philosophical knowledge or vision. I am not claiming that a balanced, practical notion of spirituality

P. C. Mukherjee (B) Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_13

285

286

P. C. MUKHERJEE

towards an understanding of the material conformations was an indubitable strategy in vogue, to be administered to the people of the country in general. I also cannot, at this point, negotiate for the thinkers I have chosen and claim that their quest of trying to merge spirituality with pragmatism, was a synchronous approach in the early quarter of the twentieth century, although it might be a relevant point to pursue, and I comment on this later in the subsequent sections of the essay. What I observe, and wish to articulate in this essay is, to understand how pragmatism and spirituality need not be looked upon as dichotomies, fundamentally countering the other but could be realised as complementary to each other’s conceptual profundity. This is particularly perceived through some of the thought threads of prominent social intellectuals who sought to define a new paradigm, registering the inclusion of the spiritual in the pragmatics of socio-spatial conformations. I study the notions of pragmatic spirituality through the spaces conceived, designed, and institutionalised by Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore. In doing so, I argue that the abstractions of their philosophical spirituality could be realised within the materiality of the spaces which were conceptualised for experiential understanding of living within the dialogues of the self and the other, incorporating the individual and the community. Also, it would be important to note that within these institutionalised spaces, spirituality was entwined with a kind of cosmopolitan-nationalism that was aimed at practicing self-reliance and self-critiquing2 as a means of realising the life-long engagement with the idea of freedom of mind, ingeniously associated with cultivating ideological and cultural independence. Both Sri Aurobindo and Tagore had been actively involved in the nationalist movements for relatively brief periods of their lives, which has invited both speculative criticism and ideological categorisations. Sri Aurobindo, despite his public isolation at the ashram in Pondicherry post-1910, was still very much cognisant of the political scenario of the nationalist struggle and was consistently advocating the idea of Indian Swaraj. Referring to some of the early writings of Sri Aurobindo, especially Bande Mataram, spiritual identity of the nation in his opinion was more of a concern and an emphasis on going back to the essential notion of the self. The self here, is a broader idea connecting the individual with the collective, not only in a metaphorical sense but also in a metonymical manner, where the quest for an individual’s “inner foundation”3 could be equivalent in discovering the notion of a quintessential national identity:

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

287

“The return to ourselves is the cardinal feature of the national movement. It is national not only in the sense of political self-assertion against the domination of colonisers, but in the sense of a return upon our old national individuality (Sri Aurobindo 2002)”. Sri Aurobindo has articulated his concern regarding nationalism arguing that the requirement is to develop a national character so integrally and spiritually Indian which would be free in its own definition. The emphasis on interpreting the freedom movement as a spiritual undertaking well placed within the precincts of a distressed political scenario, highlights Sri Aurobindo’s idealising the conceptual core of the nationalist struggle to also become a struggle for spiritual equilibrium: “The success of the national movement, both as a political and as a spiritual movement, is necessary for India and still more necessary for Europe. The whole world is interested in seeing that India becomes free so that India may become herself (Sri Aurobindo 2002)”. In a similar but not quite overlapping circumstances, Tagore’s venturing into education was, in a way, a continuation of his concern with, and contribution to, the nationalist movement. He chose education as means of reemphasising the indigenous academic system inclusive of a wider cosmopolitan overview of the world. This is especially evident when in 1921, shortly after the establishment of Visva-Bharati, Tagore said, “I have taken courage to invite Europe to our institution. There will be a meeting of truths here”.4 Tagore’s version of nationalism should be understood in these contexts where despite being opposed to the “coercive” and “sectarian” ways of the Swadeshi and non-cooperation movements, it was more focused on imagining a nation through the freedom of the mind. Even though there is a sense of being critically cautious of the chauvinistic tendencies of unreasonable patriotism, Tagore’s nationalism centred on the diversity of intellectual freedom and its cosmopolitan aspirations for dialogues. While I further deliberate on Sri Aurobindo and Tagore’s notions of practicing spirituality within their designated spacial peripheries, I shall also comment on what I deem was a recurring undercurrent in their prevalent thought threads— alternate notions of realising nationalism through lived and experiential everydayness.

288

P. C. MUKHERJEE

Self, Nation, and the Ashram Sri Aurobindo’s coming to Pondicherry in 1910 and eventually setting up an ashram, was preceded by another crucial event. The journey from the Karmayogin office at 4 Shyampukur Lane, Calcutta to Chandannagore (which was still under the French domination), and finally to Pondicherry, was actually a successive act, strategically meted out as a reaction to an impending arrest warrant by the British Government. In between 1906 to 1910, within the brief span of time, Sri Aurobindo, originally Aurobindo Ghosh until then, brought about a transformation in the perception of the Indian struggle for independence by evoking a pseudo-radical form of nationalism, inviting active interrelations with Lokmanya Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal. Sri Aurobindo had been instrumental in initiating secret revolutionary organisations5 for armed insurgencies; churning nationalistic sensitivities of colonial India to the ideal of political independence,6 and inculcating public consensus for non-cooperation and passive resistance against the foreign rule. It is pertinent that I make a note of this incisively intense period and the inception of the Swadeshi movement, characterised with an overt emphasis also on imparting nationalist education.7 This was immensely significant in catalysing the vigorous anticipation of independence from the British rule for which the nationalist trajectory in the first decade of the twentieth century was being charted, designed, and augmented with revolutionary principles. It was incredibly difficult to observe and comprehend Sri Aurobindo’s sudden exit from the Swadeshi movement and especially his renouncement of the leadership that he has strategically given to mould the course of the radical struggle against the British. Hence, the ashram which Sri Aurobindo situated, institutionalised, and established as a spiritual recluse for his yogic sadhana had to be defended multiple times from being labelled as an outstation locale for his political activities and networking with the aggressive nationalists of Bengal and in other parts of British India. One such instance was a statement issued to the Editor of The Hindu only a few months after his arrival at Pondicherry. Sri Aurobindo, still addressed as Babu Aurobindo Ghosh, gave an open declaration clearly stating his intention to remain in Pondicherry and reaffirming the importance of the space as suited to his spiritual practices. The statement had a heavy emphasis on the disassociation with his previous political identity as a practitioner of combative nationalism, and Sri Aurobindo clearly stated his conviction to only return to British India when he would be

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

289

able to arrive publicly.8 However, if one were to observe Sri Aurobindo’s writings, it would be impossible to escape the political contents in his discussions and the concern with the creation of a mature strategy for the independence through constitutional, political, and revolutionary movements. This is particularly indicated in his responses to a correspondent who questioned him about K. P. Kriplani’s article titled “Fifty Years of Growth”9 published in 1936 (Sri Aurobindo 2011). Sri Aurobindo, despite being years into isolation and Sadhana, meticulously answered every question and asserted the fallibility of the current political movements planned for the freedom struggle. His responses were rather direct, scathingly critical, and to some extent dismissive of the prevalent ways of channelising mass resistance against the colonial government, which he has argued, would be creating much more divisive undercurrents rather than a principled, constructive way to organise the independence struggle movements (Sri Aurobindo 2011). Referring to his early writings in the form of various short essays in Bande Mataram: Political writings and speeches, Sri Aurobindo has identified Nationalism as a “divinely appointed Shakti of the eternal”10 and the Nationalist creed as the “gospel of faith and hope”11 for striving towards freedom (Sri Aurobindo 2002). Sri Aurobindo’s insistence on the philosophical underlining of the self has been consistent even within the apparent fissure between his radical, political nationalism in Bengal and reclusive spiritual nationalism in the ashram at Pondicherry. His philosophical commitment to the sense of cultivated and closely guarded spiritual nationalism, brings together the possibility to integrate the idea of the ashram and understanding its space as a facilitator of the processes to self-resurgence and the emergence of an evolved nation. This idea of the nation, which Sri Aurobindo could conceptualise, had its spiritual essence simultaneously strengthened by the past and was also anticipating a free, universal inner being within the community of the nation as well as in every individual: When the European wishes to feel a living emotion for his country, he personifies the land he lives in, tries to feel that a heart beats in the brute earth and worships a vague abstraction of his own intellect. The Indian idea of nationality ought to be truer and deeper. The philosophy of our forefathers looked through the gross body of things and discovered a subtle body within, looked through that and found yet another more deeply hidden, and within the third body discovered the Source of life and form, seated for ever, unchanging and imperishable. What is true of the individual object,

290

P. C. MUKHERJEE

is true also of the general and universal. What is true of the man, is true also of the nation. (Sri Aurobindo 2002)

In Sri Aurobindo’s worldview, spirituality is instilled within the spatiality of the ashram. The word Ashram, however, was never a choice, as it had the traditional connotations of asceticism and renunciation, but was nevertheless, as Sri Aurobindo continued using the term “for want of a better word” (Heehs 2008). Sri Aurobindo’s position in the ashram was that of a master who has acquired the depth of higher consciousness and could be viewed as the manifestation of the inner self mindfulness, being representative of his own experiential spiritual force. His sadhana was the essence of his spirituality and it was transcendental not only as a supra mental consciousness but also as potential to communicate certain aspects of the self emancipation and development of an indigenous recognition of one’s identity and sense of belonging to the nation and beyond. The spatiality of the Ashram, as Heehs has stated, did not exert a territorial conditioning or limit the impact of spiritual engagements with oneself. It was more of a communion to the world, indicative of a microcosmic consciousness that could be spread through levels of experience and dialogues: But Sri Aurobindo believed that his force was “not limited to the Ashram and its conditions”; it also could be used to bring about “change in the [wider] human world”. He never claimed to have brought about specific terrestrial effects, but he asserted more than once that he was doing his sadhana not for himself but for the earth-consciousness. This obliged him to come down from higher levels of experience to work on “the physical”, that is, the physical nature in himself and the world at large. (Heehs 2008)

At this point, it is pertinent that I note the relevance of the Ashram as claiming to be a space of the integral yoga and also as a locus of the transformational self. Sri Aurobindo has termed the ashram as an experimental space, more specifically as a laboratory12 where the spiritual is to be realised not only through yoga but also through the diversity of representations that would be possibly realised in humanity. This is evident when Sri Aurobindo does not intersect spirituality with religion and was quite vocal about his Ashram being a space that did not encourage the concepts of caste, creed, religion, or gender. In one of his letters to a Muslim spiritual practitioner in 1932, Sri Aurobindo has underscored his

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

291

indifference towards religion, in particularly the Hindu religion, but has emphasised on the pursuit of spiritual reality of the divine as the core concern of yoga Sadhana in the Ashram: The Asram has nothing to do with Hindu religion or culture or any religion or nationality. The Truth of the Divine which is the spiritual reality behind all religions and the descent of the supramental which is not known to any religion are the sole things which will be the foundation of the work of the future. (Sri Aurobindo 2011)

This excerpt of the letter which carries a personal concern, and is almost bordering on a justification of being a non-Hindu space than being non-religious space, is subsequently followed by a declaration that Sri Aurobindo made to all the Ashramites: “The Asram is not a religious association. Those who are here come from all religions and some are of no religion. There is no creed or set of dogmas, no governing religious body”. The ambivalence in the understanding of religion requires a bit of qualification here and I should say that in Sri Aurobindo’s worldview, the ashram was neither a religious nor was it a secular space in the way we currently understand these terms, more so, in the popular imagination. In The Human Cycle, Sri Aurobindo has described “true religion” as a “spiritual religion,” which in “its deepest intent and purpose” connects the individual to a spiritual basis of life (Sri Aurobindo 1970).13 The nature of Sri Aurobindo’s “spiritual religion” can be further understood through Tagore’s meeting with him on 28 May 1928. Although it was a short encounter, I bring it up in this discussion because it shows the amount of anticipation including thinkers like Tagore had regarding Sri Aurobindo’s return to politics and thereby resuming communication with the outside world. Tagore has observed Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual lustre was the radiance of his inner light and mentioned that the serenity of his (that is, Sri Aurobindo’s) presence and utterance was that of a Hindu Rishi who has received the word of the divine while others awaited to hear from him.14 However, when Sri Aurobindo did not come into the public sphere even in the 1930s, Tagore had become impatient with his extended retirement (Heehs 2008). And it was not only Tagore but a number of other significant people in very different positions of their life, both Bengali leaders and beyond, had expressed their critique against Sri Aurobindo’s stress on spiritual progress

292

P. C. MUKHERJEE

when the expectation from him was to come forth and join the national struggle that had cumulatively ripened post the 1930s.15 If I were to understand and comment on Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual quest, it might be similar to what he had himself answered Tagore. He was not eager to expand outward until he has fully established an “inner foundation” or in other words, a connection with the only true spiritual religion (Heehs 2008). This “inner foundation” is the crux of Sri Aurobindo’s spirituality and not only the ashram but also his body defined the spatiality of the integral yoga connected with striving for a higher realm of consciousness. The undercurrents of nationalism, the consistent expectations by other leaders and influential public intellectuals, the discordance of an active political involvement as opposed to isolation for sadhana even within the precincts of the Ashram indicate the complex and layered negotiations of spirituality within the plural perspectives of the spaces that claimed Sri Aurobindo’s sense of belonging. In a way, it is in the understanding of the spiritual realm that could legitimately claim Sri Aurobindo’s physical, mental, and even the geographical space where he has belonged. This was not only an extension of the ideological space of his philosophy, but also expanding to the world his version of spiritual nationalism. Tagore, on the other hand, chose education as the spiritual core of his constructive nationalism in the form of conceptualising a university that would facilitate dialogues with the self and beyond with the world.

University, Nation and the World When Tagore established a university away from Calcutta in the rural setting of Bolpur in 1921, times were quite challenging. It was not only a critical phase after the First World War, but was also a point in Tagore’s life when he was trying to define the nuances of his cosmopolitannationalism. Like Aurobindo, scholars attribute a brief period of nationalism to Tagore that is roughly from 1903 to 1907, during which he was one of the leading figures of the Swadeshi movement. Tagore actively protested against Lord Curzon’s partition of Bengal in 1905 and his songs16 inspired the masses who were strictly against the parochial divisive policy of the British. However, he withdrew himself from the Swadeshi movement, disturbed by the intensity of hatred, and as Uma Dasgupta says, “unable to take its sectarian and coercive ways (26)”. In a letter written to his friend Aurobindo Mohan Bose on 19th November 1908,

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

293

Tagore has argued, “patriotism cannot be our final spiritual shelter” and has critically voiced his disapproval of a kind of xenophobia that was at the core of emerging nationalist movements: I will not buy glass for the price of diamonds and I will never allow patriotism to triumph over humanity as long as I live. I took a few steps down that road and stopped: for when I cannot retain my faith in universal man standing over and above my country, when patriotic prejudices overshadow my God, I feel inwardly starved. (Tagore 1997)17

While it was apparent that Tagore had uncomfortably moved away from being one of the active proponents of Swadeshi movement, disapproving of its predominant fanatic viscosity, the fact is that he never actually renounced the idea of inculcating the “swadeshi” through an alternative paradigm. He chose educational work as “an indigenous attempt in adapting modern methods of education in a truly Indian cultural environment”.18 I need to mention that Tagore’s focus on education was not an immediate effect of his retraction from the Swadeshi movement, but it had been a concern for him all along when he was trying to understand the ways in which his country would be equipped to handle the struggle for independence and also purge themselves off the excesses of nationalism that lead to being prejudiced against and deprecate other nations. Uma Dasgupta has called Tagore’s experiments at Santiniketan as his “dual approach to nationalism”, where on one hand he was trying to underscore the value of self-respect and on the other hand dismissed the excesses of “unreasoned nationalism” (Dasgupta 2002). Tagore was looking forward to underscore the significance of the freedom of mind which was a kind of intellectual space that was open to ideas from the world and create a kind of cosmopolitan commitment towards humanity in general, within and beyond territorial and cultural presuppositions. It could be argued that in some sense Tagore was also a revivalist, a point I will come to in the following passages, and at his initial stages of educational work, he set up a school in the recreational rural space of Bolpur for young children in 1901. Since this essay focuses on the spirituality and spaces, it would be required here, that I deliberate on the philosophy of the school which eventually became a university.19 Tagore’s early education primarily has been through a rigorous set up of home-schooling which he also desired for his children when he was looking after his family estates in Selaidah around 1898. In his

294

P. C. MUKHERJEE

1892 address titled “Siksar Herpher”, Tagore had been vocal against the discrepancy in English education administered in the West and English-oriented education in India. Although he had firmly expressed his concerns regarding the unsuitability and incompatibility of the English education for the Indian students, it was not until 1901 that he was considering the possibility of establishing a school in the lines of brahmacharya philosophy.20 The evolution of the cosmopolitan character of Shantiniketan in itself demands deeper analysis of the spiritual philosophies connected to its inception, growth, and subsequent development. In the initial stages, Tagore’s notion of the school resounded with his nephew Balendranath Tagore’s impression of a Brahma Vidyalaya and some similar other ideologies, where the emphasis was to create a cult of alternate nationalist education for Bengali Bhadralok boys, in the Bengali Hindu way, immersed within the guru-shisya ethos. The school was ardently nationalist in its way, seated with the ideas of vedantic philosophies, and offering a political alternatives to the British oriented imitative education, which according to Tagore’s opinion at that time, challenged the very foundations of Hindu self identity (O’Connell 2011). The notion of this kind of a school was later challenged by Tagore himself around 1907 when he was dismayed by the factionalism and the violence of the Swadeshi movement. As a consequence, he sought to establish alternatives ways of schooling that would be inclusive and tolerant, compassionate and sympathetic to the cause of humanity at large. However unlike the prominent western universities which Tagore understood as spaces that educate individuals to a form circles of elitist isolation from the society itself, he sought to create an educational space whose spiritual core would be dialogues with the nation and with the world. Thus when Santiniketan’s foundation was conceived it had already traversed through the narrow bylanes of being suited to a sanitised, ascetic version of celibate Hinduism to a more open, secular, and conducive to multiple cultural and international crossovers. This cosmopolitan evolution of university in 1921 dictated not only an alternative format to engage with meaningful education through a motivated intermingling with the society at large, but also promoted the focus on pursuit of Humanities and Arts as its core concern, something which was never mentioned during the early days of the school. The intertwining of the spiritual and pragmatic also became Visva-Bharati’s identity where young girls were encouraged to become a part of it along with the boys. Tagore’s Visva-Bharati was enabling the inclusive and meaningful

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

295

understanding of an experimental and aspirational microcosm—a university that claimed to internalise the philosophy of “yatra viswam bhabate ekanidam”. I look at this transition of Visva-Bharati from a school to becoming a university as a way of Tagore’s spiritual revivalism, which was not merely personal, or committed to the development of an individual, but was also simultaneously directed to incorporate and refine the dimensions of the national and the cosmopolitan. Visva-Bharati’s conceptual emergence shares the different phases of Tagore’s own political and spiritual evolution.21 In fact, its emergence as an educational space of cosmopolitan perceptiveness along with an inclusiveness of the national ardour was also the kind of transformation that Tagore has experienced in his personal life. In a way, the educational trajectory of Viswa-Bharati was much like the evolution of Tagore’s spiritual journey: In Indian education, we have to collect together treasures of Vedic, Puranic, Buddhist, Jaina and Islamic minds. We shall have to find out how the Indian mind has flown along these channels. By some means India will feel her identity in her diversity. We must understand ourselves in this extended and interlinked way or else the education we will receive will be like that of the beggar. No nation can be rich on begging.22

Tagore’s idea of education incorporates the different phases of his own understanding of freedom and the necessity to conceptualise university as a “meeting place” of dialogues. Visva-Bharati, modelled as a world knowledge centre, represented Tagore’s aspiration to create a space dedicated to symbolise the “spiritual unity of all races” (Tagore 1931).23 Therefore, Tagore’s symbiotic relationship with Visva- Bharati as a space which claimed to be the “vessel” which contained his life’s “best treasure”, was both a spiritual tradition and a gift that Tagore has hoped would deserve special care from his country and countrymen.24 Tagore’s anticipation of the crisis in the university was both material and spiritual, contained within the physical space of Santiniketan. While on one hand, the emphasis was on freedom of the human mind through education in Visva-Bharati, on the other hand it was a pragmatic challenge to practice an instrumentalisation of the ideals of world humanism in the university: “What I wanted to do was to free the student’s minds through education… that is why I could not bring our school under the discipline of any university”.25

296

P. C. MUKHERJEE

It is relevant to note that Tagore’s Visva-Bharati have had met with severe criticism of being an “abstract idea” and “being far away from reality”. In Provincializing Europe (2000), Dipesh Chakraborty cites Binoy Ghosh’s scathing remark on Tagore’s abstract humanism who said that it was nothing but “love for the world with love for God”: “But we say, this is simple day dreaming, spiritualism has become its refuge because of its disassociation from reality. This is impossible, absurd, and opposed to human history” (As quoted by Dipesh Chakrabarty 2000). The comment on Tagore’s humanism as a spiritual exercise in a way strengthens his romantic liaising with the idea of freedom as the spiritual necessity as well as an aftermath of education that facilitates notions of creative involvement with different cultures. It was also, however, an effort that Tagore has invested in the making of “a greatly encompassing” and “an unprecedented idea” of interpreting the university as a home to the world. While it might seem as a radical attempt to romanticise the university in keeping its scope abstract and varied, it could be looked upon as Tagore’s aesthetic spiritualism which is meted through his ideas on education. The practical considerations of building a space to incorporate both the distant and the different in its educational purview, was to lay the foundations of dialogues as the means to initiate the possible emergence of cosmopolitan-nationalism. In Tagore’s poetic vision, only through a creative communion with the world, the nation could incorporate the true essence of her spiritual pluralism.26

Spirituality, Spaces, Self, and Education In Republic, Book Five, Plato argues for the necessity of a merger between philosophy and state, or to be more precise in this context, the possibilities of intersections between philosophers and the state or nation.27 I read Sri Aurobindo and Tagore’s spiritualism in this manner of an everyday experience where they were both pursuing a kind of spirituality that was related to the issues of nationalism, politics, education, and freedom. While Sri Aurobindo had his public isolation from the prevalent political nationalism after 1910, through his idea of sadhana and the quest for the higher consciousness, did lay down the spiritual philosophy of a nation that he had imagined through her past. In doing so, Sri Aurobindo was not only redefining the individual’s commitment to integral consciousness of the self, but was also incorporating the ideas of swaraj as the foundation of

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

297

inner sovereignty of a nation that is to be newly imagined and established in communion with the world. Tagore too deviated from a direct involvement with the Swadeshi movement, retreating to education as an experiment and pursuit of an indigenous process of integrating modern theories of education embedded within the Indian culture. His emphasis on India’s transcendence from being understood as a geographical space to being an idea has also influenced his cosmopolitan-nationalism. While he has intended to create the ethnic emphasis of India’s spiritual foregrounding in leading the processes of communion with the world, he also has nevertheless intensified the necessity and the possibility of such an understanding of the world being feasible only through and with India’s presidential spiritual position: “Therefore my one prayer is: let India stand for the cooperation of all peoples of the world. The spirit of rejection finds its support in the consciousness of separateness, the spirit of acceptance in the consciousness of unity (Tagore’s letter quoted in Bhattacharya 1997)”. What remains to be stated almost as a penultimate argument in this context is materialism serves as a constitutive component in the spiritual conceptualisation of Sri Aurobindo and Tagore’s cosmopolitannationalism. This spiritualism is inclusive of the grotesque and the abnormal, and is open to experimentation even at the “tremendous cost of material success”.28 Understanding of this spirituality would therefore not be confined to some abstraction of the concept, but will be including not only the pragmatics of socio-political issues like ideas of nationalism and education, but also accomodates the individual who is aspirational and strives for a conscious engagement with the self and the other. The quest includes a philosophy of the everydayness, and both Aurobindo, and in a slightly more pronounced manner, Tagore, has used imagination as a category in understanding concepts of nationalism29 and swaraj as a means only, and not as an essence to achieving a sovereign future. It should not be a difficult to argue that for Sri Aurobindo and Tagore, their cosmopolitan-nationalism was intertwined with their aesthetic sense of involvement and their systematic reading of the nation.30 The pragmatism of their spiritual affiliation to the individual, social and the political, has emerged from their philosophical understanding of the plural historicity of the nation and her relations with the world beyond. By taking into consideration the everyday realities of the integrally diverse nation, Sri Aurobindo and Tagore has articulated the modes of vision to interpret, spiritually resurrect and establish a communion with the self,

298

P. C. MUKHERJEE

and the world at large. This has, in multiple ways, paved the possibilities to philosophically indulge, critique, and comprehend the pragmatics of spiritual materialism and the practicing of cosmopolitan-nationalism.

Notes 1. Professor Sachidananda Mohanty has used the term “Cosmopolitan modernity” in characterising it to be the philosophical ethos of the early twentieth century based on the lives and experiences of a few thinkers including Tagore and Sri Aurobindo. Cosmopolitan modernity is more than a functional term here. It is rather indicative of an introduction to new ideas of modernity taking into account the issues of cosmopolitanism and citizenship. See S. Mohanty, 2015, Cosmopolitan Modernity in Early 20th-Century India. New Delhi: Routledge. 2. Uma Dasgupta in her essay “In Pursuit of a Different Freedom: Tagore’s World University at Shantiniketan”, discusses that Tagore has emphasised on the understanding and practicing self-examination and self-reliance as a training essentially required in the struggle for independence (31). Dasgupta has argued that Tagore was fully committed to the cause of the nation’s independence and education was a possible means to building self-respect and deal with poverty and discriminations within society. 3. I talk about Sri Aurobindo’s ideas of the “inner foundation” with reference to his meeting with Rabindranath Tagore in the next section. Please see Peter Heehs, The Lives of Sri Aurobindo, p. 360. 4. Rabindranath Tagore, Visva-Bharati [collected writings], pp. 13–15 as quoted by Uma Das Gupta in her essay “In Pursuit of a Different Freedom: Tagore’s world university at Santiniketan”, p. 27. 5. Anushilan Samiti was a Bengali Indian revolutionary organisation in the early years of twentieth century. Sri Aurobindo, then known as Aurobindo Ghosh led the organisation known for its violent revolutionary struggle against the British Government with an aim to achieve freedom. See Asok Kumar Ray, 2013, Revolutionary Parties of Bengal: Dacca Anushilan, New Violence, and Jugantar, 1919–1930. Kolkata: Papyrus Books. 6. Sri Aurobindo, for a brief period of time, had regularly written in Bande Mataram, a revolutionary mouthpiece launched by Bipin Chandra Pal in 1906. See Sri Aurobindo, Bande Mataram: Political Writings and Speeches 1890–1908, p. 105. 7. Sri Aurobindo has his firm beliefs in the indigenous system of national education. In a letter to The Editor of New India, Sri Aurobindo has mentioned: “National Education is, next to Self-Government and along with it, the deepest and most immediate need of the country, and it is a matter of rejoicing for one to whom an earlier effort in that direction

13

8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

299

gave the first opportunity for identifying himself with the larger life and hope of the Nation, to see the idea, for a time submerged, moving so soon towards self-fulfilment. Home Rule and National Education are two inseparable ideals, and none who follows the one, can fail the other, unless he is entirely wanting either in sincerity or in vision. We want not only a free India, but a great India, India taking worthily her place among the Nations and giving to the life of humanity what she alone can give”. (See Sri Aurobindo, Open Letters Published in Newspapers, 1909–1925 [270–271]). The letters can be accessed at http://www.mot herandsriaurobindo.in/#_StaticContentSriAurobindoAshram/-09%20E Library/-01%20Works%20of%20Sri%20Aurobindo/-01%20English/-03_ CWSA/-36_Autobiographical%20Notes/-20_Open%20Letters%20Publ ished%20in%20Newspapers%201909%20%C2%AD%201925.htm. Sri Aurobindo, known as Aurobindo Ghosh was called upon to surrender on the warrant of Sedition, although the Calcutta High Court could not prove his editorial connections with Kamayogin. Please refer to Open Letters Published in Newspapers 1909–1925 accessed at http://www. motherandsriaurobindo.in/#_StaticContent/SriAurobindoAshram/-09% 20E-Library/-01%20Works%20of%20Sri%20Aurobindo/-01%20Engl ish/-03_CWSA/-36_Autobiographical%20Notes/-20_Open%20Letters% 20Published%20in%20Newspapers%201909%20%C2%AD%201925.htm. See K. R. Kripalani, “Fifty Years of Growth”, The Visva-Bharati Quarterly, vol. I, part IV, New Series (February–April 1936), pp. 53–60. Sri Aurobindo has written that “Nationalism is an avatara and cannot be slain. Nationalism is a divinely appointed shakti of the Eternal and must do its God-given work before it returns to the bosom of the Universal Energy from which it came. This was penned down on 16 November 1907 (“The Life of Nationalism”, Bande Mataram, 750). In Bande Mataram, Sri Aurobindo says: “They believe that the fated hour for Indian unification and freedom has arrived. In brief they are convinced that India should strive to be free, that she can be free and that she will, by the impulse of her past and present, be inevitably driven to the attempt and the attainment of national self-realisation. The Nationalist creed is a gospel of faith and hope.” (“Nationalism, Not Extremism”, Bande Mataram, 356). “In an Ashram which is a ‘laboratory’ … for a spiritual and supramental yoga,” he wrote, “humanity should be variously represented. For the problem of transformation has to deal with all sorts of elements favourable and unfavourable” (Aurobindo, Letters, 600, 705, 591, 634). In The Human Cycle: The Psychology of Social Development, Sri Aurobindo has defined true religion as: “It is true in a sense that religion should be the dominant thing in life, its light and law, but religion as it should be and is in its inner nature, its fundamental law of being, a seeking after

300

14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

P. C. MUKHERJEE

God, the cult of spirituality, the opening of the deepest life of the soul to the indwelling Godhead, the eternal Omnipresence…The spiritual essence of religion is alone the one thing supremely needful, the thing to which we have always to hold and subordinate to it every other element or motive” (177–178). These are the exact words that Tagore wrote about his meeting with Sri Aurobindo. The words indicate that Tagore was truly smitten by Sri Aurobindo spiritual soul and the way he was searching for an inner foundation in the ashram: “While my mind was occupied with such thoughts, the French steamer on which I was travelling touched Pondicherry and I came to meet Aurobindo. At the very first sight I could realise that he had been seeking for the soul and gained it, and through this long process of realisation had accumulated within him a silent power of inspiration. His face was radiant with an inner light and his serene presence made it evident to me that his soul was not crippled and cramped to the measure of some tyrannical doctrine, which takes delight in inflicting wounds on life…. I felt that the utterance of the ancient Hindu Rishi spoke from him of that equanimity which gives the human soul its freedom of entrance into the All. I said to him, ‘You have the word and we are waiting to accept it from you. India will speak through your voice to the world.’” (Please see Peter Heehs, The Lives of Sri Aurobindo, Part Five: Guide, “An Active Retirement, 1927–1950”, 360). Subhash Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru were particularly critical of Sri Aurobindo’s seclusion from the national movement after his arrival in Pondicherry (see Heehs, The Lives of Sri Aurobindo, 360–361). Tagore’s songs like “Banglar maati Banglar jol” and “O amar desher maati” became the anthem of the Swadeshi movement in Bengal. His songs became the life force of many revolutionaries and one such revolutionary of Anushilam samiti, Jibabtara Haldar in Anushilan Samitir Bhumika wrote, “In the year 1905 the heart touching patriotic songs of Tagore immensely influenced me”. Tagore was also instrumental in organising an event where Hindus and Muslims tied “rakhis” or yellow thread on each other wrists to express solidarity (see Abanindranath Tagore’s Ghoroa (1941), p. 32. This is an excerpt of a Letter to Aurobindo Mohan Bose, dated 19th November 1908, in Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, editors, Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 71. Rabindranath Tagore, Visva-Bharati, pamphlet, Santiniketan, 1929. In one of his letters to his son Rathindranath Tagore, Tagore ardently mentioned the importance of establishing an educational institution which would function like a “thread” connecting India with the worlds in the field of Bolpur, one of rural areas in the Birbhum District of present West

13

20.

21.

22.

23.

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

301

Bengal: “The Santiniketan school must be made the thread linking India with the world. We must establish there a centre for humanistic research concerned with all the world’s peoples. The age of narrow chauvinism is coming to an end for the sake of the future, the first steps towards this great meeting of world humanity will be taken on those very fields of Bolpur”. (Letter to Rathindranath Tagore, 11 and 28 October 1916, Translated from Bengali by Uma Das Gupta.) In one of the letters that he wrote to his friend Jagdish Chandra Bose, Tagore said that he was interested in developing the idea of establishing a school for chaste young boys who would be trained along the lines of the brahmacharya principles. The idea was to train these young boys to become Karma Yogis, or celibate young men dedicated to cause of the nation and society similar to the ideas of Lokmanya Tilak in Maharashtra. Please see Kathleen M. O’Connell’s essay titled “Education at Santiniketan: 1902–1920”, p. 20. Tagore as a thinker cannot be compartmentalised and argued through the binary and dualist framework of ideologies. His ideas cannot be legitimised as signposting either nationalism or the criticism of it, and which is often confused with a cosmopolitanism. Tagore’s cosmopolitanism has nationalism in its core and in its essence as well, without what he understood as, the excesses of nationalist practices and representation through coercive and violent means. Thus, when we read the letters between the Mahatma and the Poet, the usual interpretation is that of a debate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. In actuality, the dialogues were between two cosmopolitan-nationals who were both trying to interpret the nation, one through mobilising internal cohesion of the Indians through satyagraha, and the other through mobilising the mind through the intersections of the home and the world. Tagore’s ideological struggle is often understood through the characters of Nikhil and Sandip in his 1916 novel Ghaire Baire with Bimala becoming the space where they both collide and negotiate with the discontent. This quote is taken from Uma Dasgupta’s essay “In Pursuit of a Different Freedom: Tagore’s world university at Santiniketan”, p. 27. Dasgupta has cited the quoted as: Rabindranath Tagore, Visva-Bharati [collected writings in Bengali] Calcutta: 1963, p. 8, also The Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the Santiniketan Asram, Bolpur: 1918, p. 4. Tagore in his essay titled. “My Educational Mission” has wriiten: “We are building up our institution upon the spiritual unity of all races. I hope it is going to be a meeting place for individuals from all countries who believe in the divine humanity, and who wish to make atonement for the cruel disloyalty displayed against her by [hu]men” (Rabindranath Tagore, “My Educational Mission”, 1931, 30).

302

P. C. MUKHERJEE

24. In February 1940 Mahatma Gandhi visited Santiniketan. It eventually turned out to be his last visit to Visva-Bharati. Tagore who was quite aged and ailing at that time, wrote a letter to Gandhi immediately after he departed. This letter was crucial because it has expressed the anguish Tagore experienced regarding the future prospects of the university to which he had given a substantial amount of his mind, heart, and years. Some excerpts from Tagore’s letter to Gandhi read as follows: “Accept this institution under your protection…. Visva- Bharati is like a vessel, which is carrying the cargo of my life’s best treasure and I hope it may claim special care from my countrymen for its preservation” (Tagore to Gandhi, 19 February 1940 taken from Sabyasachi Bhattacharya’s The Mahatma and the Poet, p. 25). 25. These lines are taken from Uma Dasgupta’s “Tagore world University” where she cites Rabindranath Tagore, Visva-Bharati [collected writings], p. 32. 26. Rabindranath Tagore (1986) “Bharat Tirtha.” Sanchayita. Calcutta: Visva- Bharati Granthanavibhag, p. 507. The actual Bengali text is: “Paschim aji khuliachhe dwar; Setha hote sabe ane upahar; Dibe ar nibe milabe milibe jabena phire; Ei bharater mahamanaber sagartire”. In the poem, Tagore envisions India opening as a meeting ground of knowledge spaces and intercultural ideas of belonging. 27. Plato in Republic, Book Five says: “Either philosophers become kings in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and therein a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun” (Plato’s Republic, Book V, 509). 28. In one of his letters to Gandhi, Tagore has expressed his views on why India’s spiritual identity is inclusive of the materiality that involves on an everyday basis interaction with the dichotomies of individual and social parameters: “India ever has nourished faith in the truth of spiritual man for whose realisation she has made innumerable experiments, sacrifices and penance, some verging on the grotesque and the abnormal. But the fact is she has never ceased in her attempt to find it even though at the tremendous cost of material success. Therefore I feel that the true India is an idea and not a mere geographical fact (Bhattacharya, The Mahatma and The Poet, p. 66)”. 29. I use the word ‘imagination’ here with reference to Benedict Anderson’s 1983 book Imagined Communities. This book propounded an important

13

COSMOPOLITAN NATIONALISM, SPIRITUALITY AND SPACES …

303

idea of analysing nationalism and understanding nation as a concept that is constructed, established, and imagined by people who claim to belong to the land. 30. In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty says, “Literate members of the elite such as Tagore or Wajed Ali were not peasants. For them, nationalism was inseparable from their aesthetic experience of the phenomenon. But the aesthetic moment, which resists the realism of history, creates a certain irreducible heterogeneity in the constitution of the political. This heterogeneity appears in references to practices such as darshan or divyadrishti (divine sight), which occur on two registers in the writings of Tagore or Wajed Ali. In so far as these authors wrote as experiencing, imagining subjects of nationalism, these practices constituted for them experiences of the uncanny” (177–178).

References Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi (ed.). 1997. The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters and Debates Between Gandhi and Tagore 1915–1941. Kolkata: National Book Trust, India. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. Provincializing Europe: Post Colonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Das Gupta, Uma. 2002. “In Pursuit of a Different Freedom: Tagore’s World University at Santiniketan”. India International Centre Quarterly 29 (3/4): 25–38. Dutta, Krishna, and Andrew Robinson (eds.). 1997. Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haldar, Jibantara. 1950. Anushilan Samitir Bhumika. Essays. Calcutta: Prakashak Publishers. Heehs, Peter. 2008. The Lives of Sri Aurobindo. New York: Columbia University Press. Kripalani, K.R. 1936. Fifty Years of Growth. The Visva-Bharati Quarterly 1 (4) (New Series): 53—60. Mohanty, Sachidananda. 2015. Cosmopolitan Modernity in Early 20th-Century India. New Delhi: Routledge. O’Connell, Kathleen M. 2011. “Education at Santiniketan: 1902–1920”. India International Centre Quarterly 38 (1): 18–31. Page, T.E., E. Capps, and W.S.D. Rouse (eds.). 1937. Plato’s Republic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ray, Asok Kumar. 2013. Revolutionary Parties of Bengal: Dacca Anushilan, New Violence, and Jugantar, 1919–1930. Kolkata: Papyrus Books.

304

P. C. MUKHERJEE

Sri Aurobindo. 1970. The Human Cycle: The Psychology of Social Development. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust. Sri Aurobindo. 2002. The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo. Bande Mataram: Political Writings and Speeches. 1890–1908. Volume 6 and 7 . Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Press. Sri Aurobindo. 2011. Letters on Himself and the Ashram. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1919. The Home and the World, trans. Surendranath Tagore. Madras: Macmillan. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1922. Creative Unity. London: Macmillan. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1928. “Aurobindo Ghosh”. The Modern Review 44 (1): 58–60. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1931. “My Educational Mission”. The Modern Review: 621–623. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1986. “Bharat Tirtha”. Sanchayita. Calcutta: ViswaBharati Granthanavibhag. Tagore, Abanindranath. 2007. Ghoroa. Calcutta: Visva-Bharati.

CHAPTER 14

Thought of Mahatma Gandhi: A Path-Breaking Experience of Spiritual Pragmatism Sanghamitra Patnaik

Introduction Politics is the most crucial human activity that involves governance. Ethics is the set of principles those regulate the activity of governance and administration.1 Before we focus on Gandhian Ethics it is necessary to focus on the two schools of thought—Idealism and Realism. Idealism was an approach to international politics based upon liberal assumptions and principles. It was optimistic as it envisioned a world in which law, institutions and diplomacy replaced power, competition and use of force. This School was represented by St. Simon, Richard Cobden, Aldous Huxley, Russell, Mahatma Gandhi, Wilson and Margaret Mead. It gave emphasis on the role of education and international institutions to bring a better world. It focused on the Positive side of human nature.

S. Patnaik (B) KIIT School of Law, Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology Deemed to be University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_14

305

306

S. PATTNAIK

It proceeded with the assumption that the harmony of the interests was not impossible. Hans J. Morgenthau is the main exponent of realist theory. For him the central focus of realism was power. He defined power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other man” (Morgenthau 1993). He emphasized on: Inevitability of conflict among nations, Centrality of Power, Ever-present threat of war. The Realists focused on the Pessimistic view of human nature as imperfect and flawed. They highlighted Group egoism—the tendency of social groups to view themselves as different and better in some respects from other groups. It helped in understanding the dynamics of social conflict. They believed in Inevitability of social conflict. Their focus was on how to manage conflict and not on eliminating conflict as propagated by idealists. There was always a conflict between the groups those who benefited from the status quo and others who would benefit from changing the status quo. The realist ideas could be traced as far back as the ancient Greek historian—Thucydides. The Classical Realists were Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. The twentieth Century Neoclassical Realists Edward H. Carr (1892–1982), British Historian, Hans. J. Morgenthau—Political Scientist—University of Chicago (1891–1976), George Kennan—An American Diplomat and specialist in soviet Russian Affairs (1904–2005). The three core elements that could be identified with Realism are— “Statism” that regarded State as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people. “Survival” was the universal national interest of each nation and “Self-help” emphasized on each state as an actor was responsible for ensuring its own well-being and survival. For Classical Realists like Thucydides, foresight, prudence, caution and judgment constituted the political ethics of classical realism. Machiavelli focused on power (the lion) and deception (fox) as the essential means to conduct foreign policy. The goal was to defend own independence and survive. Machiavellian Maxims were: Be aware of what is happening. Do not wait for things to happen. Anticipate the motives and actions of others. Do not wait for others to act. Be ready to capitalize the opportunities in offing.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

307

The Dynamics of Power Power is the central theme of politics and ethics regulates the power. For Neoclassical Realists like Morgenthau (1965, Animus DominandiThe Human Lust for power) Morality was different in public and private sphere. International politics should be guided by situational ethics and political wisdom—prudence, judgement, resolve, courage and moderation, etc. Machiavelli and Kautilya supported the idea by prescribing to dual standard of morality. Kautilya gave due emphasis on synchronizing politics with ethics as far as internal administration was concerned. But he prescribed a different ethical norm in relation to the state’s preservation. The King was allowed to follow immoral methods/treacherous means to preserve the state. The State was identified as an ethical institution by Kautilya’s Arthashastra. It aimed at the material and moral development of the people. The administration of the state was known as Dhramasasan or the rule of virtues and morality. The King should adhere to moral means in the internal administration of the state.

Gandhian Ethics of Power Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) as discussed belonged to the School of Idealists. He gave equal importance to means and ends. For him ethics and politics should go hand in hand. Religion should not be separated from politics. His definition of power was unique. Power should not be used to dominate other by force or used against anybody/entity. Instead, power according to him got expanded when it was shared with others. The base of his ethics of power was very much dependent on who exercised it. His concept of power embraced the techniques of Non-Violence, Truth and Satyagraha.

Non- Violence Non-Violence or Ahimsa was one of the basic ingredients of Gandhiji’s political philosophy. He applied it for the first time in politics in a mass scale. Gandhiji interpreted non-violence as a positive force. According to him Non-violence was not mean weak submission to the will of the evil. The highest violence could be met by highest non-violence. It

308

S. PATTNAIK

was the technique of silently defeating and destroying evil by good and exchanging love for hatred. Non-Violence comprised of certain ingredients like truth, inner purity, fasting, fearlessness, non-possession of property and perseverance. Truth could be realized by non-violence. Truth was God to him. He said, “For me, truth is the sovereign principle which includes numerous other principles. This truth is not only truthfulness in word but truthfulness in thought also and not only the relative truth of our conception, but the absolute Truth, the eternal principle, that is God” (http://www.mkg andhi.org/truth/intro.htm). Fasting supported non-violence to exert moral force against whom it is directed. It cleaned up the body, mind and soul. Fearlessness was required on the part of the individual to realize the true power of non-violence. A coward person could not exercise the power of non-violence. It required moral courage and patience.

Satyagarha Satyagraha in its literary sense is “Agraha in Satya” means holding fast on to Truth. He was much influenced by Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedience. It was a technique of pursuing truthful ends through purest love-force and soul-force. For him non-violence and Satyagraha were synonymous. It contained moral force that could be used by the individual and the communities in both domestic as well as public life. It was always accepted as a weapon of the strong individual. It aimed at public welfare and not limited by narrow selfish interests of the individual. It was the moral weapon of the strong to fight against injustice, wrong deed, oppressions and exploitations. It was considered by Gandhiji as the inalienable right of the individual. Satyagraha was based on a definite and rigid code of conduct. A true Satyagrahi got the courage to sacrifice and suffer for the cause of Truth and public welfare. He should not submit under pressure or fear. He must be a person of discipline, self-control, purity of mind and actions. Satyagraha was different from passive resistance. Passive resistance was a weapon of the weak, whereas, Satyagraha was practiced by a brave person who possessed the courage to face the challenge.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

309

Swaraj The word Swaraj is a sacred word, a Vedic word, meaning self-rule and self-restraint, and not freedom from all restraint which “independence” often means (YI, 19-3-1931, p. 38). If Swaraj was not meant to civilize us, and to purify and stabilize our civilization, it would be nothing worth. The very essence of our civilization was that we gave a paramount place to morality in all our affairs, public or private (YI, 23-1-1930, p. 26). During the early years Indian’s Freedom Movement, he emphasized that Swaraj was meant for everyone, and it was particularly meant freedom from poverty. He said Swaraj should be a government based on morality (Navajiban 5-11-1925). He emphasized on economic liberty of the common people. His ideas of Swaraj were reflected in various occasions at various places as following: • In order to end the exploitation of the masses political freedom must include real economic freedom of the starving millions. The congress, therefore declare that any constitution…. Agreed to ……should provide……. For the following: (20 points agenda including free primary education” a living wage, Progressive taxation and reduction in military expenditure) (Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic Changes (Drafted by Gandhiji 31-03-1931). • “I shall work for an India in which the poorest shall feel that it is their country, in whose making they have an effective voice; an India in which there shall be no high class and low classes of people; an India in which all community shall live in perfect harmony. There can be no room in such an India for the curse of untouchablity or the cause of intoxicating drunks and drugs: women will enjoy the same rights as men…. This is the India of my dreams (“Statement to Reuter Aden 3-9-1931). • Swaraj of the people means the sum total of Swaraj (self rule) of individuals. Our villages can be revivified only by a revival of village industries…. Under Swaraj based on non-violence no body is anybody’s enemy, everybody contributes his or her due quota to the common goal, all can read and write and their knowledge keeps growing from day to day. Sickness and disease are reduced to the ‘minimum’. No one is a pauper and labour can always find employment….. it should not happen that a handful of rich people should

310

•

• •

• •

S. PATTNAIK

live in jeweled palaces and the millions in miserable hovels” (Harijan 25-3-1939). “Independence must begin at the bottom. Thus every village will be a republic or panchayat having full power…….in this structure composed of innumerable villages; there will be ever-widening, never ascending circles. Life will not be pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages till at least the whole becomes one life….. no one is to be the first and none the last. (‘Independence’ 21-07-1946.) His notion of democracy under Swaraj meant empowerment of every Indian…. Democracy must in essence, therefore mean the art and science of mobilizing the entire physical, economic and spiritual resources of all the various sections of people in the service of common good of all” (Talk 12-03-1939). “My notion of democracy is that under it the weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest. That can never happen except through non-violence” (Harijana 18-05-1940). “Corruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of democracy as they undoubtedly are today; nor majority a true test of democracy.”

Thus Mahatma Gandhi’s ethics of Swaraj looked for the formulation of required policies by the government. There should be a continuous effort on the part of the government for the socio-economic upliftment of the poor and weaker sections. His booklet “Constructive Programme” “its meaning and place” was published in 1941. It highlighted different programs of action in socio-economic fields such as Hindu-Muslim Unity, removal of Untouchablity, Other village industries, Village Sanitation, Basic Education, Adult Education, Education in village health & hygiene, Economic security, Women, Schedule Tribes, etc.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

311

Sarvodaya Gandhi’s Sarvodaya was very much influenced by Ruskin’s “Unto the Last”. He acknowledged that this book exerted the most radical and revolutionary influence on his life and philosophy. The idea of Sarvodaya was reflected in the word itself—Sarva and Udaya. Sarva means all and Udaya means upliftment. So Sarvodaya stood for the universal welfare. Commitment to all kinds of sacrifices, even unto death, for the welfare of others was the core theme of Sarvodaya. Kautilya’s Arthasastra, a masterpiece of treatise on diplomacy and state craft prescribed that the ruler should take care of his subjects as “In the happiness of the subjects lies his happiness, in their welfare his welfare. Whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subject she shall consider as good. (Kautilya, Arthasastra, Book-I, Chapter VII.) The essence of Gandhi’s ethical views in politics could be inferred from the following statement by Gandhi in 1936: (Socialism of My Conception, pp. 140–141). “Man’s ultimate aim is the realization of God, and all his activities, social, political, religious, have to be guided by the ultimate aim of the vision of God. The immediate service of all human beings becomes a necessary part of the endeavor, simply because the only way to find God is to see Him in His creation and be one with it. This can only be done by service of all. And this cannot be done except through one’s country”. According to Gandhi the individual could only realize his true nature within the family, the community, the nation and the world. Selfactualization could only occur within the society, not beyond it. He was of the opinion that true moral action elevated others and was not meant to exploit the weak and the ignorant. Gandhi’s vision of a Sarvodaya was innovative, engaging and stimulating when he said: My idea of Village Swaraj is that it is a complete republic, independent of its neighbors for its own vital wants, and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity (Socialism of My Conception, p. 145). The idea of Sarvodaya was based on Truth and Non-violence with trusteeship as its epicenter. Holding on to truth while non- cooperating with the evil was the strategy adopted to resolve the conflict and disagreement in the society. It strived to bridge the gap between “haves and havenots” through general welfare irrespective of various differences based on caste, religion, sex or occupation.

312

S. PATTNAIK

Trusteeship was based on the operative principle of social transformation and periodic renewal. The trustee was the repository of all talent and wealth that could be used for the common good. Periodically, the trustee would be called upon to relinquish the worldly goods those surpass his actual needs. He would voluntarily redistribute his material wealth among the poor. It enhanced his credibility as a conscientious contributor to the common good. Gandhi’s concept of trusteeship helped to balance the natural asymmetries between individuals and communities. The primary focus of universal welfare revolved round the village or the small community. It was the foundation on which the superstructure of nation was built up. It was, as Gandhi said, the center of expanding concentric circles that interlocked at many different points. The “village” was the symbol of “power with” fulfilling our multiple personal and social obligations in a very compressed, close and compact form. It reflected the principle of “Swadeshi” by using and serving one’s immediate surroundings—religious, political and economic through shared local efforts. Gandhi confirmed Kantian idea of innate moral dignity of all human beings. According to him even though the head is higher than the soles of the feet, both are equally important for the physical well-being of the whole human body. So no individual could dominate the other on the basis of his talent or wealth. Each individual’s role was equally important for growth of the society and nation.

End and Means According to Gandhiji, the means justified the end which contested Realist ideas of public morality and private morality and Kautilya’s dual standard of morality. Deliberating on the Ends and Means he said strongly: “They say that ‘means are after all means’. I would say that ‘means are after all everything’. Indeed, the Creator has given us limited power over means, none over end… The means may be likened to a seed and the end to a tree; and there is the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree. Means and end are convertable terms in my philosophy of life” (M. K. Gandhi, 17-7-1924), The “they” in this quote refers to the signatories of a petition which sought, among other things, the removal of a clause in the Congress constitution that referred to using only “peaceful and legitimate” means in the nationalist cause.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

313

He further explained the End and Means relationship through the following example: If I want to deprive you of your watch, I shall certainly have to fight for it; if I want to buy your watch, I shall have to pay for it; if I want a gift, I shall have to plead for it; and according to the means I employ, the watch is stolen property, my own property or a donation. Thus we see three different results from three different means (M. K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj (22-11-1909). According to Gandhiji, if freedom had been gained through immoral means, it would be nothing more than “English rule without the Englishman.” (ibid., 255.) He ridiculed the nationalist conception of independence as “a change of masters only” (M. K. Gandhi 1946) or “a mere change of personnel” (CWMG, 27, 369). Gandhi’s alternative vision of self-rule appreciated pluralist and decentralized polity based on the self-organizing capacity of the Indian village. He was very critical of political violence supported by “secret societies” (CWMG, 18, 304). Hostility against the ruling power offered little in terms of a model or method for attaining Swaraj in terms of the masses. He was of the opinion that it would certainly fail to establish true social, moral and economic freedom for the people of India. He believed in true self-rule that had to be truly self-determining. Swaraj should be acquired by the people instead of putting demand for it. He said “everyone will have to take it for himself” (Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 10, 305–306) It had to be acquired by building up power from within. This would immediately demonstrate the capacity for self-rule, thereby making British rule irrelevant. In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi associated the path to self-rule with a program of Swadeshi—the pursuit of self-reliance— through satyagraha (nonviolent resistance) (ibid., 310–311). He insisted on close connection between the means and the end by showing the example of expecting roses by planting noxious weed. He said we reap exactly as we sow (Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 10, 286–287).

Religion and Politics He prescribed a close rapport between religion and politics. While supporting for justified means to achieve the end he never rejected politics in favor of morality. For him both politics and religion shared common goal—welfare of the common people. He said the clearest possible definition of the goal and its appreciation would fail to take us there if we do not know and utilize the means of achieving it. He therefore, concerned

314

S. PATTNAIK

himself principally with the conservation of the means and their progressive use. He knew that if we could take care of them, attainment of the goal was assured. He felt too that our progress toward the goal would be in exact proportion to the purity of our means (M. K. Gandhi 1933). The immoral action by man was responsible for all kinds of evils and crisis. It was the religion that prescribed a certain code of conduct to regulate human behavior. No religion propagates for achieving selfish interest by rendering harm to other individual. He believed in Universal Religion based on humanism. By religion he did not mean any particular sect. It was the belief in the ordered moral governance. Any attempt to separate religion from politics would certainly pave the way for destruction of the society. According to Mahatma Gandhi, politics divorced of religion would make individual corrupt, selfish, unreliable, materialistic and unrealistic. Politics without religion according to him was like a death-trap because it killed the man from within. Replying to one of his critics in 1920, Gandhi wrote: “Let me explain what I mean by religion. It is not the Hindu religion, which I certainly prize above all other religions, but the religion which transcends Hinduism, which changes one’s very nature, which binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which ever purifies. It is the permanent element in human nature … which leaves the soul utterly restless until it has found itself, known its Maker and appreciated the true correspondence between the Maker and itself” (Young India, 1920). Gandhi’s ethical interpretation of politics could be evaluated on the tough-stone of the critical analysis of realists’ ideas. The realists were criticized by International Society Critique: (Martin Wight 1991) and Emancipatory Critique: Ken Booth (1991). The International Society Critique criticized them on the following grounds: • It overlooked the cooperative element of human nature. • It ignored the extent to which international relations form an anarchical society and not merely an anarchical system. • States were not only in conflict, they also shared common interests. • It ignored other important actors besides states, such as NGOs and human beings. • It played down the extent to which the relations of states were governed by international law.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

315

• It recognized the importance of national interest as a value but refused to accept that it was the only value that was important in world politics. The Emancipatory Critique wanted to transform the realist state-centric and power-focused structure of international politics. They focused on human liberation and fulfillment. Their concern was to determine the correct theory for guiding the practice of human liberation and they perceived security and emancipation were two sides of one coin. According to leading Emancipatory Critique Ken Booth, people were end not means in international system. Andrew Linklater (1989) insisted on “Global Human Security” and ‘“Toleration”—a willingness to accept views or actions with which one was in disagreement. French writer Voltaire (1694–1778) defined toleration as “I detest what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it” (http://www.voltaire.ox.ac.uk/ www_vf/about_voltaire/didnt_say.pdf). John Milton and John Locke in seventeenth century emphasized on toleration which should be extended to all matters regarded as private. On Liberty, J. S. Mill opined that it was a guarantee of personal autonomy and was thus a condition for moral self-development. Both the International Society Critique and Emancipatory Critiques reflected the ethics of Gandhiji’s moral development, common welfare and toleration as pathway to true human liberation, selfdevelopment, nation-building, international peace and human security. Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas on ethics and politics could also be validated in reviewing the Liberal’s views on international relations. The basic Liberal assumption was that the process of modernization was determined by human progress, human reason and cooperation. So, here one could notice the close connection of ethics and politics not the segregation of religion from politics. Even different sections of Liberalism confirmed the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. Sociological Liberalism focused on the following: • For Realists, International Relation was the study of relations between the governments of sovereign states while Sociological Liberalism contradicted it and emphasized on relations between people, groups and organization of different countries.

316

S. PATTNAIK

• They considered transnational relations as an important aspect of international relations. • As James Rosenau pointed out that international relations conducted by governments were to be supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies. John Burton (1972- book- World society) proposed “Cobweb model” of transnational relationships. He gave emphasis on Nation—states consisted of different groups with different interests, business groups, labor groups, etc.

Cobweb Model The realists’ model of the world often depicted the system of states as a set of billiard balls—a number of independent, self-contained units. The cobweb model was built on cross-cutting and overlapping group memberships with less conflict. Interdependence Liberalism pointed out the following: • Modernization increased the level and scope of interdependence between states. • Transnational actors (NGOs and transnational corporations) played a crucial role. • Military force was a less useful instrument. Institutional Liberalism highlighted the role of institutions: • They provided a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate. • They enhanced the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments. It was built on the idea that liberal democracies were more peaceful and law-abiding. • It focused on peaceful means of resolving the conflict and common moral values, economic cooperation and interdependence. In 1980s a new liberal critique of realism emerged. The Neo-Liberals assumed that:

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

317

• States were key actors in international relations but not the only significant actors. They always tried to maximize their interests in all issue areas. • In this competitive environment, states would seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation. • The greatest obstacle to successful cooperation was non-compliance or cheating by states. Cooperation could be achieved where it was seen as mutually beneficial. • The Neo-liberals minimized the importance of survival as the goal of each state. • Neo-liberals gave much importance on international interdependence and globalization. • They were more concerned with economic welfare or international political economy issues and other non-military issues such as international environmental concerns. • Neo-liberals perceived institutions and regimes as significant forces in international relations as they helped to facilitate cooperation. The above analyses focused on economic welfare, cooperation, importance on international interdependence and globalization. It also underlined economic cooperation and interdependence and peaceful means of resolving the conflict, common moral values and less use of Military force. These ideas confirmed Gandhian ethics and its implications.

Mahatma Gandhi, Dewey and Unger: Global Implications of Spiritual Pragmatism Mahatma Gandhi pointed out the ethical value of limitation of power, effective governance, accountability and justice. He developed a global and intercultural perspective of all religions. In a globalized, interdependent world of pluralistic societies, he did not visualize social reconstruction and welfare of the poor as charity. It stood as the harbinger of healthy and happy life for the whole world. He appreciated freedom in the form of Swaraj that stood for economic—self-sufficiency and equality for all in the absolute sense of the term. There should not be any kind of discrimination on the basis of caste, religion, sex and other differences.

318

S. PATTNAIK

Gandhi’s concept of “Sarvodaya” was based on a healthy give and take between the individual and society. Each contributed to the other’s moral, spiritual and socio- economic development, happiness and prosperity. It was built up on the firm foundation of truth and non-violence. It enveloped social welfare in its entirety. Gandhiji’s concept of religion based on humanism was the gist of all religions. It manifested in the goal of each and every political institution to work for human rights, peace and prosperity. He did not feel the urgency of segregating religion from politics rather he pointed out the indispensability of religion to strengthen politics, political institutions and governance starting from local to global. As a pragmatist, Gandhiji advanced the idea of redefining power by adhering to Truth and Non-violence. He emphasized on the concept of “power with” instead of “power against”. According to him people were the epicenter of power and effective communication helped to create a strong base to connect the people with one another. It helped people to build up trust and mutual understanding—a pathway for international peace and security. In “The Ethics of Democracy” Dewey emphasized on the eternal connection between the individual and society. According to him the individual’s identity takes shape in society. He considers society as “a social organism” in which the function of the various parts, like the human body, is conducive to overall harmony (Dewey 1888). Dewey and pragmatism make us to move beyond the individualistic, interest-based idea of democratic politics and the government. The pragmatic philosophy of reality, truth and science and the psychology reveal that the present pattern distorts both the human condition and the process of democratic governance. John Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism is based on his philosophy of education as a “lived-experience” philosophy. It is also considered as “shared experience” which implies that a person experiences learning with others. So it is termed as “experiential learning.” This “shared experience” is considered as the basic tenet of Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism. Learning with others is to experience with others the “most important lessons of life, that of mutual accommodation and adaptation” (Stever 1993). Dewey’s Truism perceived ‘Education’ “is a mode of life, of action” 59. Followed by scientific method education becomes the method of pursuing

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

319

happiness. The individual enjoys freedom to determine what is worthy of pursuit for ones’ self as well as for the community. Dewey says it best: “Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral. It is an activity which includes science within itself. In its very process it sets more problems to be further studied, which then react into the educative process to change it still further, and thus demand more thought, more science and so on, in everlasting sequence” (Dewey 1975). The cycle of learning requires sharing of ideas with others. Dialogue becomes the vehicle by which this transformation of growth and development takes place. According to Dewey, “language” is an important ingredient in carrying on this sharing of ideas. He explains this in his “Principles of Continuity and Interaction” 61 concept that leads us to “experiential continuity” (ibid., p. 36). Dewey considered “Continuity” as the symbol of growth. He believes that growth occurs continuously when individuals experience government with others—public administrators, power brokers and ordinary citizens. According to Dewey, democracy should be practiced in all institutions using the scientific method and the concept of the cycle of learning— public and private—as a working pattern. Dewey felt that just as the Cartesian school of thought went out of fashion when the GalileanNewtonian method triumphed, it would not be necessary to mention the importance of experience. Dewey hoped that this would eventually happen in philosophy. Experience would be considered the orthodox practice of thinking and searching for the truth (McDermott 1981, p. 253). John Dewey (United States) and Mahatma Gandhi (India) are the pioneer educational thinkers of the twentieth century who emphasized not just on the individual development based on urban middle class values. Instead, they gave priority on the societal development with concerns for democratization of educational process and its content for the empowerment of the masses. According to Dewey, the main aim of philosophy consisted of realization of social progress where the role of education was of greatest interest to him. Unger like Dewey and Gandhiji, unveiled the connection between practical progress and individual emancipation in his idea of democratic experimentalism. He affirms that the conditions of practical progress and individual emancipation can intersect. Here it is very much required to

320

S. PATTNAIK

find out the area of overlap between the conditions of practical progress and the requirements of individual emancipation. One should understand the institutional arrangements of society. Practical progress comprises of economic growth and technological innovation, supported by scientific discovery. It empowers the society to push back the constraints of scarcity, disease, weakness and ignorance. Individual emancipation refers to liberating individuals from the hold of social hierarchies. Development and individual emancipation depend upon the capacity to transform social effort into collective learning. It should be an undeterred effort to go beyond the pre-established social division and hierarchy. The best way to work out the idea of an affinity between practical progress and individual emancipation is to understand the nuances of modifying and moderating conflicting interests and thereby enhancing the force of human powers—deepening the experience of freedom. According to Unger, “Material Progress” is the result of the relation between cooperation and innovation. Innovation requires cooperation. The real form of cooperation is embedded in arrangements generating settled expectations and vested rights of different groups relative to one another. People regularly resist innovation because they believe it to threaten such rights and expectations. Group privileges should be discarded to achieve cooperation at the work place. It would pave the way for moderating tension between cooperation and innovation. It would broaden the scope of experimental innovation in economic activity. Individual endowments and capacities should be preferred to the group privileges and social divisions. We must denounce individual’s subjugation and depersonalization under the weight of frozen social roles. Freedom is at the root of self-possession and self-development. Social division and hierarchy shape the life of individuals on the basis of inherited resources and opportunities by subordinating the opportunities of cooperation to the interests of privileged classes. Individuals need to be free from the grip of these background structures. It confers the opportunity to participate in group life and helps to reconcile the basic conditions of self-possession and self-development. Unger believes that our capacity for love and solidarity grows through the strengthening of our ability to recognize and to accept the otherness of other people. It is in love, the love least dependent upon idealization or similarity, that we most radically accept one another as the original, context-transcending beings we really are, rather than as placeholders in a

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

321

social scheme, acting out a script we never devised and barely understand (Unger 1998, p. 16).

Conclusion Ethics of Gandhian thought stood the test of time for its universal character. He made the individual to mediate on the millions of dispossessed. The human being should think about the general human interests and misery instead of concentrating on his own selfish interest. He made the individual to discover truth by thinking of his neighbor, who represents humanity in miniature. We are living in a world in which there is much poverty, exploitation, selfishness and violence. No particular form of government or economic system presents any morally viable solutions for the world’s poor and dispossessed. Unfortunately, today religion is interpreted in its narrow sectarian and institutional meaning and is isolating and insulating individual from one another. Like the great American visionary, Tom Paine, Gandhi was very much optimistic about the power of the individual to begin the world over again. His talisman is worth noting here as it would help the individual to work for common welfare peace and prosperity: Whenever you are in doubt or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test: Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj for the hungry and the spiritually starving millions? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away.

Note 1. This is suggested in the following famous poem: No Man is an Island entire of itself; Every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main…. Any man’s death diminishes me, Because I am involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;

322

S. PATTNAIK

It tolls for thee…. John Donne (1571–1631)

References Chatterjee, Margaret. 1983. Gandhi’s Religious Thought. London: Macmillan. Chatterjee, Margaret. 2005. Gandhi and the Challenge of Religious Diversity: Religious Pluralism Revisited. New Delhi: Promilla & Co. Dewey, John. 1888. The Ethics of Demecracy. Michigan: Andrews & Company. Dewey, John. 1975. Experience And Education. New York: Collier Books. Gandhi, M.K. 1927. An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth, trans. Mahadev Desai. Vol. I was published in 1927 and Vol. II in 1929. From http://wikilivres.ca/wiki/An_Autobiography_or_The_Story_of_ my_Experiments_with_Truth. Retrieved on 12 September 2012. Gandhi, M.K. 1961–1999. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [hereafter CWMG], 100 vols. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Publications Division. From http://www.gandhiserve. org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Retrieved variously between June and August 2012. Gandhi, M.K. Hind Swaraj, 10, 274. Gandhi, “Is It Non-Co-Operation?” 27, 369. Gandhi, M.K. Preface to Indian Home-Rule (20-3-1910). CWMG, 10, 458. Gandhi, M.K. Hind Swaraj (22-11-1909). CWMG, 10, ch. 3. Gandhi, M.K. Speech at Meeting of Deccan Princes (28-7-1946). CWMG, 91, 371. Gandhi, M.K. Is It Non-Co-Operation? (8-5-1924). CWMG, 27, 369. Gandhi, M.K. Letter to The Times of India (22-8-1919). CWMG, 18, 304. Gandhi, M.K. Then and Now (17-1-1929). CWMG, 44, 4. Gandhi, M.K. Foreword to ‘Constructive Program—Its Meaning and Place’ (1311-1945). CWMG, 88, 325. Gandhi, M.K. My Notes (30-8-1925). CWMG, 32, 362–363. Gandhi, M.K. Atrocities by Officials (23-9-1928). CWMG, 43, 342. Gandhi, M.K. Policy of Making Khadi Self-Supporting (23-9-1928). CWMG, 43, 45. Gandhi, M.K. The Old Story (25-7-1929). CWMG, 46, 247–248. Gandhi, M.K. Ahimsa in Practice (27-1-1940). CWMG, 77, 245. Gandhi, M.K. 1999. Presidential Address at Belgaum Congress (6-12-1924). In The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Electronic Book), 98 vols., 29, 497. New Delhi. http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Gandhi, M.K. ‘An Appeal to the Nation’ (17-7-1924). CWMG, 28, 31016. Gandhi, M.K. Letter to Jawaharlal Nehru (14-9-1933). CWMG, 61, 393.

14

THOUGHT OF MAHATMA GANDHI: A PATH-BREAKING …

323

Iyer, Raghavan. 1973. The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, 366. USA: Oxford University Press. McDermott, John J. (ed.). 1973 [1981]. The Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One; 1. The Structure of Experience, 2. The Lived Experience, 253. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Mehta, Uday. 2010. Gandhi on Democracy, Politics and the Ethics of Everyday Life. Modern Intellectual History 7 (2): 355–371. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1993. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4–15. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Stever, James A. 1993. Technology, Organization, Freedom: The Organizational Theory of John Dewey. Administration & Society 24 (4) (February). Westbrook, Robert B. 1991. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-031599-173954/unrestricted/ etd5.pdf. http://robertounger.com/english/pdfs/demore.pdf.

CHAPTER 15

Pragmatism, Spirituality, and the Calling of a New Democracy: The Populist Challenge and Ambedkar’s Integration of Buddhism and Dewey Kanchana Mahadevan

The “Horizon” of Democracy and Its Crisis Democracy is “an unquestioned horizon” in the Western world, and also an aspiration for resistance movements against dictatorships in nonWestern contexts (Ferrara 2014). Paradoxically, democracy which arose in Greek city states during the fourth century BC and later on in the Roman republic (Crick 2002: 13), sustained itself through colonial expansion. Democracy occupies the exclusive space of legitimate politics, both in actual and ideal terms. Its critiques are based on its assumptions, thereby reinforcing its absolutism (Güven 2015: 2–4).1 Democracy as its Greek etymology reveals is kratia, the rule or power of the demos , the many (Crick 2002: 14) through their deliberative capacity in forming and defending opinions. There is a political side of states ruling

K. Mahadevan (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2_15

325

326

K. MAHADEVAN

through elected representatives (Güven 2015: 7) and a cultural aspect of independent judiciary, freedom of thought, exchange of ideas, and so forth. Western countries are perceived to incorporate both aspects, while non-Western contexts are assumed to focus on its narrow political aspect. This standard dichotomy is belied by Ambedkar’s theorizations of democracy. He laments its reduction to “constitutional morality, adult suffrage and frequent elections” (2002a: 64). For Ambedkar, “…the principal aim of [..] Constitution (for democracy) must be to dislodge the governing class from its position and to prevent it from being a governing class forever [..]” (Ambedkar 2002a: 64). By superficially upholding democracy as a procedure, the larger necessary contexts of social and economic democracy are overlooked. Procedure only reinforces the political power of the governing class and the governed further with the former wielding social and economic power (Ambedkar 2002a: 63). Ambedkar, thus, critiques parliamentary democracy as a failure if it is upheld without social and economic democracy for it will not provide an opportunity for a change in the governing class (Ambedkar 2002a: 60–64; Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 100–106). Rulers take refuge in being elected by the people to justify their own autocratic traits such as undermining debate. Ambedkar acknowledges the parliament as an alternative to hereditary rule via representation and periodic elections for change of government (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 207–208). Since it requires opposition and free elections (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 208), he is well aware of its improvement over violence and anarchy. Yet Ambedkar is disenchanted with its tendencies toward statism,2 which he believes stems from widespread social and economic inequality of disenfranchised and alienated masses. In this context, social and economic democracy becomes specifically relevant. Ambedkar’s critique of parliamentary democracy reveals how the rule/power of the people is deeply ambiguous. It can be understood in at least four different ways each with its own set of flaws (Crick 2002: 11– 13).3 The early Greek understanding of democracy upheld it as rule by mob with uninterrogated opinions. Plato critiqued it as anarchy, while Aristotle refined its definition as the rule of the few with consent of many. Machiavelli4 agreed with Aristotle’s mixed government as democracy; but this was to strengthen state power through popular approval. Against such statist nationalism, Rousseau advocated the general will reflecting the ordinary person uncorrupted by the artificiality of civilization. This posed threats to individual freedom. Since the nineteenth

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

327

century, democracy brought together a guarantee of individual rights with popular power. As Ambedkar notes, it differed from Greek democracy, as slavery was enshrined in the Athenian model.5 Nevertheless, this version did not consider the possibility of a tension between individual freedom and popular power without deliberating common issues of society and governance; a tension that often leads to shrinking individual liberties (despite legal guarantee) against hegemonic popular voice. This tension is especially palpable with democracy being anchored in vast populations (including migrants) and its quest for homogenization in the context of what Ferrara terms as “hyperpluralism” (2014). The problem of populism brings to light the weaknesses of other accounts of democracy as well. Thus, the anarchy of its mass character resonates with Plato’s understanding. Moreover, in this context the people as masses often play the role of backing the nation-state in an extension of Machiavelli’s definition. Further, Rousseau’s ordinary person is hardly ideal, given the proclivity to violence in being brainwashed to uphold undebated opinion as absolute. The “era of populism” (Jaffrelot 2018)6 supplants democratic freedom with tyranny. It does so in the name of the people. Populism, with its intolerance toward heterogeneity and deliberation, forsakes core democratic values. This is palpable in authoritarian regimes terming themselves as democracies via publicity apparatuses (Müller 2016: 19–20). Though it is rooted in people’s sovereignty, populism, unlike democracy, is authoritarian. Its differences with democracy have to be spelled out more clearly so as to comprehend the specificity of the threats to democracy by its own ideals (Müller 2016: 20). However, as several thinkers have noted, populism does not have a clear meaning, a fate it shares with “democracy.”7 There is no cohesive systematic exposition by any thinker of its fundamental principles. Moreover, populism differs in European and non-European contexts (Müller 2019: 35)8 ; it cuts across the political spectrum of right and left, as well as, established leadership to oppositional movements.9 It is driven by diverse concerns such as decolonization, “peasantism” (Müller 2016: 22), communist prospects, migration, religion, “liberal technocracy” (Müller 2016: 23) of elites, illiberal masses, etc. (Müller 2016: 22). Despite impediments in pinning down its meaning, one can follow Müller (2016: 12–14) and Ferrara (2018) to discern some of populism’s totalitarian strands. Populists tend to be wary of elites and uphold mass mobilization as a remedy. However, as Ferrara notes, one cannot associate such mobilization with any specific group such as the rural

328

K. MAHADEVAN

peasantry10 or urban lower income groups.11 Secondly, populists are inimical to pluralism. They do not acknowledge points of view that differ from their own. They uphold a self-righteous identity politics of the people united by the homogeneity of their point of view as authentic. Those who criticize such exclusivism are branded as “enemies of the people” (Müller 2016: 15) in its xenophobic versions (Jaffrelot 2018). The people of populism is construed as a normative stance toward the alleged moral debasement of elites (Müller 2016: 47).12 The diversity of people is forcefully unified through a single person or party (Müller 2016: 48). Populism dilutes institutional checks on such power through public discussion. Its fictive normative notion of unity, perfection, and oneness belies pluralism. Güven (2015) notes that Western populism overarches non-Western discourses; a turn to non-Western milieus such as the Indian reveal an alternative set of specificities.13 The increasing visibility of populism in India does merit comparative study with its European context as McDonnell and Cabrera affirm (12).14 The Indian theoretical critique of populism by Ambedkar, the chief architect of the Indian constitution,15 responding to the problem of majoritarianism in colonial India is still relevant in this respect. This is especially so because Ambedkar, like Ferrara (2018) and Müller (2014, 2016), attempts to salvage the people from populism.

Ambedkar’s Critique of Populism Studies of populism in India tend to foreground the recent resurgence of right-wing Hindutva.16 Yet populism in India is neither a new phenomenon nor restricted to the Hindu right. India has had a long complex history of populism as the Indian National Congress,17 towards which Ambedkar directs his critique (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 94). He questions both Congress and Gandhi for speaking on behalf of the entire nation in their opposition to support the British colonial government against Nazis (90–95).18 Ambedkar maintained that Nazism had to be resisted—even at the expense of working with the British—given its hostility to democracy. He questions Gandhi for stifling discussion on this matter, like previous others, to establish majoritarianism of privileged caste Hindus and upholding caste “as an ascending scale of hatred and descending scale of contempt” (242). According to Ambedkar unlike class, caste inequality hinders the individual from transforming his or her situation, since it determines

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

329

occupations for individuals on the basis of their birth. He shows how isolating underprivileged castes through beliefs and practices of untouchability allows for exploiting their labor for the development of privileged castes.19 It is also a source of discrimination against women, as caste-based communities are maintained by disciplining women and their sexualities. Conversely, caste hierarchies are also maintained through gender stereotypes.20 Ambedkar discerns the problem of majoritarianism in colonial India as fortifying privileged Hindu castes and patriarchy; he also perceives various political parties as contributing to this. Distinguishing between communal and political majoritarianism (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 118–121), Ambedkar notes that the caste system led to communal majoritarianism, which determined caste by birth and remained static, unlike changing political majoritarianism. Considering that caste Hindus have an edge over others in economic and social terms, their influence continues in the political domain as well; hence, he argues that this affects decision making at institutional levels. Ambedkar renounces majority rule to resist the transfer of caste privilege from the social domain to the institutional (116, 119).21 Ambedkar’s critique resonates with contemporary criticisms of populism that reveal how without deliberation, a political party, regime, or charismatic can foreclose democracy. He also preempts recent arguments that democracy’s tendency to undermine itself is the outcome of its ahistorical formulation (Güven 2015: 10–11). As Güven 2015 notes, democracy assumes the rational human subject to be situated in a neutral space upholding a standard opinion without reference to extraneous aspects such as socioeconomic or cultural location. Variants of democracy, from the social contract model to contemporary liberal paradigms, adopt either all or some aspects of such ahistoricity. Although deliberative approaches defend intersubjective dialogue, they shield democracy from pluralism of opinion and dissent (Güven 2015: 9–10). The ahistoricity of their interactive model leads to the absolutism of a singular point of view articulated prior to dialogue. Such tyranny differs from populism, but it still is the tyranny of a singular opinion. Ambedkar, similarly, upholds that democracy’s ideal conditions do not prevail in practical contexts.22 To function efficiently, electoral democracy has to repress conflict and opposition, which makes it easy for choosing tyrants, promoting majoritarianism and curbing freedom of speech. The people in this instance is not all people, but only the majority that is tolerated (Jaffrelot and Kumar

330

K. MAHADEVAN

2018: 119; Güven 2015: 15). Ambedkar is well aware of how democracy is sustained through undemocratic processes paving the way for its crisis-ridden populist avatar. For Ambedkar such crisis in democracy cannot result in its ambiguity23 or what Collier and Levitsky (1997) term as an “essentially contested concept” (433)24 whose range of meanings has led to “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 430–431). These include “authoritarian democracy,” “neopatrimonial democracy,” “military-dominated democracy,” and “protodemocracy” (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 431). Güven enumerates “pluralistic democracy,” “liberal democracy,” “deliberative democracy,” “radical democracy” (2015: 15) and the like. Ambedkar cites “parliamentary democracy,” (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 101) “government by discussion,” (219) and “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (ibid.). Given its contested character, democracy combines what Stevenson calls belief (factual reference to government, representation, elections, and so forth) with attitude (a subjective response of approving it)25 (1938). Yet these beliefs and attitudes are not intractable to make populist tyranny a foregone conclusion. Democracy is not a simple abstract idea, but a historically embedded notion (Comaroff 2011: 108) that needs “constant review and reinvention” (108). The alternative to populist democracy is not elitism, for as Müller notes, populism rightly questions the exclusion of masses from elite decision making. He notes how Erdogan emerged through the support of the neglected impoverished Anatolian people who were not heeded by the Kemalists (2016: 144). One cannot dispense with the “people” in populism as Müller (2016: 143) and Ferrara (2018) note, although its mob tyranny has to be jettisoned. Further, like democracy populism too, a much debated and ambiguous concept, combines belief and attitude. Hence, the connect between democracy and populism can be reexamined to ask with Ferrara whether democracy can be salvaged without succumbing to populism (2018). Further, one might ask whether the people can be tolerant of pluralism and deliberation. Thus, can one change the sets of beliefs and attitudes associated with democracy and populism? Ambedkar would respond to these questions in the affirmative for an alternate understanding of democracy which is social and economic, as much as, political. Breaking away from an exclusive parliamentary democracy, as well as, the ahistorical assumptions of canonical democracy (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 3), he maintains that socioeconomic

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

331

democracy can overcome populist divisiveness. For its foundation in the people implies both majority and the minority perspectives (4) that have to be taken into consideration in decision making. Ambedkar’s alternative understanding of democracy maintains that it cannot be reduced to a republic, nation, or a form of government (241). He notes that since the republic and parliament are institutions that affect all human beings in society, they cannot be controlled by either the majority or the minority, as both supress diversity. To be sure Ambedkar is aware that the “Government for the people” (6) can function without inclusive participation. He cites the Indian National Congress and Gandhi as instances of such majoritarianism, wherein government is established through the ballot and yet does not permit discussion. To resist the majoritarianism of populism, every single person’s participation in institutional activities should be encouraged (2). Ambedkar maintains that elections occur in specific sociohistorical and cultural contexts rife with inequality in access to economic and cultural resources (13). He identifies the caste system as an instance of such inequality. Those from underprivileged castes or the erstwhile “untouchables” (11) are controlled by privileged caste Hindus, the former “touchables.” They are brainwashed to accept their plight, inhibited from social mobility and denied recognition (11). Ambedkar aptly observes that “The untouchable is not even a citizen” (11). He highlights this lack of basic fundamental rights and especially the right to represent one’s own interests and representatives in office as a barrier to social transformation. Given that the government is also a form of association, caste hierarchy encourages some to develop at the expense of others (6–7). However, for Ambedkar “government by the people” (6) requires more than elections, it demands that people make their own laws so as to not be straightjacketed into masters who subordinate subjects. For making laws, people from diverse sections of society would have to form a government, which adequately represents opinions of all the groups in society so that fresh perspectives are generated through debates. To redress social divisiveness such as caste, Ambedkar suggests institutional representation for persons from socially vulnerable groups who are traditionally not taken into consideration (19). Against majoritarian representation, Ambedkar suggests a balance between representing majority and minority communities (116–117). Those from privileged caste groups, he upholds, will never raise their voices against the unequal Hindu social order, since it does not affect, but benefits them (20, 243–244). Instead, persons

332

K. MAHADEVAN

from disenfranchised castes have the potential to represent these interests so that egalitarian policies are legislated. Ambedkar notes how when different castes (and other groups) meet, interact, and cooperate with each other at institutional levels, they set into motion a process of resocialization in which the “attitude” (19) of caste hierarchy begins to dissolve. Such changes also percolate to society outside government institutions to resist the divisiveness of caste hierarchy. But Ambedkar notes that political representation in government of socially disenfranchised persons and diverse cultural groups is possible only when there is social democracy. Moreover, although top-down measures do contribute to social transformation they are not adequate. Thus, political democracy of “government by the people” requires social democracy as its foundation.26 The shared community for Ambedkar is not the Rawlsian distributive model in which individuals as basic units of society share a “piece of cake” (3). Arguing against the ahistorical assumptions of democracy, Ambedkar defends a social notion of personhood as the environment educates and influences one’s identity as a person. “…what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others” (6). Rather Ambedkar’s ideal community is one of active intragroup interaction and participation; this has to lead to intergroup communication since society is made up of several groups to make a political union possible. Thus, social democracy is a necessary condition for political democracy. Communicative action and participation within and between groups could result in disagreements and conflicts, but for Ambedkar this can be balanced through further interactions that encourage understanding of even differences. This is for Ambedkar a “like-minded” (3) perspective that allows for giving and taking from each other. Mere “physical proximity” (3) cannot lead to such harmony nor can physical distance disrupt it. Rather, Ambedkar notes that it is possible to live with each other through diversity through active communication of ideas and activity. Ambedkar enumerates the constitution of Indian society through religious identities such as Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsees, and Jews. He observes that barring the Hindus there is ample interaction within each of these groups. For Hindus do not permit interaction between the “touchable” and “untouchable” sections due to the barrier of caste (4). According to Ambedkar, the persistent social division of caste among Hindus—who form the majority of the Indian population—cannot be overlooked in any attempt to articulate a social democracy.

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

333

A democracy that integrates the political institutional aspect with the social can be read as Ambedkar’s alternative to the crisis of populism. Ambedkar reconstructed the notion of democracy very explicitly, shortly after India became a republic following the rule of law.27 Democracy, according to him, does not remain static but evolves according to the purpose at hand. British democracy had to pitch itself against the King’s autocracy. However, with this in place, modern democracy has another purpose, what Ambedkar terms as “the welfare of the people” (219). Hence, for Ambedkar democracy is on one hand a mode of government that undertakes the betterment of the people. And it also does so without violence. Clearly such a mode of government requires representation of all social groups, while the latter in turn would intermingle without caste isolationism. Thus, there is a coevality between political and social democracy for Ambedkar. He also acknowledges that such democracy could prevail only in an egalitarian society, citing empirical evidence to show how social inequities lead to the collapse of democracy. Ambedkar’s analysis resonates with those of Ferrara (2018) and Müller (2016) who argue that tyrannical populism is a response from the masses to the anxiety of economic inequality. Hence, improving the economy and generating employment contributes to mitigating populism. Ambedkar also upholds that his sense of democracy requires opposition and tolerance of disagreement. The system of plural political parties competing for representative power symbolizes the role of opposition. For there is an alternative to the existing mode of government that can in principle be rejected. Hence, governments are accountable to the masses who evaluate them through the system of elections. However, there cannot just be a single opinion that monopolizes within government, rather the latter’s decisions should come from critiques, dissent and debates between its members, as well as, from civil society. It is in this context that freedom of press matters. The free press is the backbone of the opposition, exposing the public to a plurality of points of view so that an informed opinion can be cultivated.28 Ambedkar spells out an equality before law and administration that abolishes the system of privileges as another condition for social democracy in which diverse people participate. The latter also mandates following a constitutional morality where minority representatives are given a genuine hearing and are not under the dictatorship of the majority. This is the morality of free thought, government, and life which for Ambedkar is encapsulated in active participating in social life where recognition, rather than discrimination prevails. Such a morality

334

K. MAHADEVAN

is upheld by what Ambedkar terms as “public conscience” (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 227); the latter ensures that there is justice even to the minority communities who are not held to ransom by the majority. The law, Ambedkar upholds, is not an instrument of control over society, but on the contrary, adheres to social morality. A democracy of mutual recognition and participation is not a one-time achievement. Illustrating with examples from after the first world war in Europe and latter from Syria and Egypt, Ambedkar warns against democracies degenerating into dictatorships. Thus, Ambedkar concludes that is only constant public vigilance that keeps democracy renewed. Ambedkar’s vision of democracy is particularly valid in the light of the pessimism toward reconfiguring democracy in egalitarian ways. Following Comaroff, the critique of elitism and authoritarianism waged by the people is a necessary condition (though not sufficient) for social change (2011: 104). However, one must distinguish between the people and populism; there is a possibility of the people emerging in populism as a critical voice that questions the elite (Müller, 2014). Hence, instead of dismissing populists as unthinking crowds, one needs to discern the possibility of engaging with them through critical voices with points of view.29 Ambedkar’s socioeconomic democracy is an attempt to resurrect the people from populism as critical voices (including minority points of view).

Social Democracy Through Pragmatic Buddhism: Beyond Rationalism The question remains as to how can social democracy be achieved. Ambedkar was skeptical about achieving it through an exclusive economic or legal focus. In this respect, his response to populism differs from the predominant ones, such as those of Ferrara (2018) and Müller (2016). The latter offer a liberal response upholding economic opportunity, rationality, and rule of law as having the potential to stave off populism. This framework assumes the individual to be a basic unit of society. Ferrara discerns populism as a response to economic inequality arising out of “disembedment” (2018: 473) of finance capital markets from territorial manufacture, social responsibility, and identifiable material value of commodities, etc. Markets exercise “absolute power” (Ferrara 2018: 473), once the prerogative of monarchs. Ferrara notes that the

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

335

law that is made by parliaments constituted through corporate sponsored elections tends to tune in to market preferences. In the twenty-first century, markets can bring down state power as several empirical instances reveal.30 Thus, markets exercise a force that cannot be easily tamed through human intervention. Hence, Ferrara believes that the onslaught of populism can be arrested only by addressing widespread economic inequality. Rather than abandon markets on a “neo-Marxist” (Ferrara 2018: 474) protectionist tone, he suggests protection of the consumer— an individual unit—under a common law31 as a step in this direction (474). The old-style left resistance through protests, publicity, and so forth is not effective in an era of fragmented labor and what Ferrara characterizes as “hyper-pluralism” (475). Moreover, it is wedded to an outdated model of productive forces and relations based on “wage labor and exploitation” (474). Ferrara argues that it overlooks consumption, a primary relation between individuals and market forces in the contemporary period. The consumer is more universal and has to confront forces whose operations are beyond his or her control. Ferrara lists corporates, insurance companies, banks, telecommunications, and regulatory bodies as instances. By extending legal protection to the consumer the possibility of “equality of opportunity in the market” is opened (475). According to Ferrara, this enables state-based action against market forces such as regulatory bodies in the eventuality of consumer vulnerability. Successful legal judgments defending economic rights in courts of law could offer a resistance to populism through a “global constitutionalism of human rights” (475). Ambedkar would agree with Ferrara’s critique of socialism as state control (2002b). Yet he would not accept the alternative of liberal individualism. He would be wary of valorizing the individual as a consumer, as it assumes that everyone in a polity has enough resources. The Indian context shows otherwise as widespread poverty and lack of access to material resources make it difficult for many to acquire the identity of consumer. Ambedkar, like Ferrara, identifies economic inequality as a central problem of a polarized society (2002a: 177); he appreciates Marx for his diagnosis about the exploitative nature of private ownership of property, understanding of class struggle and critique of the failure of speculative philosophy in addressing the material concerns of humanity. However, he is well aware that ameliorating economic inequalities for the individual does not quite remove the tensions of bifurcations along social caste.32 Economic class does not lead to social isolation, while the latter

336

K. MAHADEVAN

constitutes caste (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 242). The persistent caste barriers in institutional life—and in Ambedkar’s own experience33 —amply testify to the limits of attempts at economic equality sequestered from the social. Postcolonial India is constitutionally committed to improving the economic plight of underprivileged castes through affirmative action. However, this has not mitigated the problem of social apartheid and caste discrimination in the workplace.34 Indeed, the instance of conservancy workers in the Indian public sector demonstrates that stratified caste-based occupations largely define economic class (242). Thus, selfesteem35 cannot be guaranteed through economic resources; one would have to also engage with the social, in addition to the economic.36 Ambedkar, in a Deweyan spirit, upholds that human beings and their individualities are embedded in social worlds. Yet, despite its influence, society does not determine the individual. Ambedkar, like Dewey, puts forth a “transactional” (Thayer-Bacon 2006: 27) notion of the relationship between the individual and society, where their interaction leads to a constant making and remaking of social and individual identities in relational contexts. Further, for Ambedkar life cannot be restricted to its economic mode as human beings aspire for noneconomic values, such as “spiritual” (2002a: 189). The latter, he discerns, has found no place in the communist society. Ambedkar notes that the Russian revolution failed to deliver freedom and spiritual values, despite economic equality. This impeded social solidarity as well. An exclusive economic focus encourages determinism in filtering human life through laws of history. Ambedkar observes that both “logic as well as… experience” (Ambedkar 2002b: 177) have disproved such laws. Hence, he concludes that permanent proletarian revolution with an exclusive economic focus results in totalitarianism as “the Marxian Creed” (2002b: 176) reveals. Müller offers another law-based alternative to allay populism. He upholds pluralism as a democratic norm, rather than just an empirical fact; he follows Rawls in construing pluralism as a value and precondition for practicing democratic politics. Müller notes that this implies a commitment to being inclusive enough to engage even with those whose opinions radically differ from one’s own (Müller 2016: 139– 142). Economy equality and inclusiveness are possible through the law. Moreover, they open the possibility of dialoguing with populists in the public sphere and parliament with sustained arguments and evidence for the non-populist points of view. This could certainly impact by gradually denting the hegemony of populists with the strength of facts and

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

337

evidence. Further, the sections represented by the populists, typically those ignored by the perceived elite, would also have to be symbolically represented. However, Müller qualifies that this would be possible only in the instances of populists not violating the law. Thus, in adhering to the rule of law of meeting opposition with argument rather than exclusion or violence, Müller (2016, 2019) suggests that non-populists dialogue with populists so that the force of better argument prevails. Müller’s suggestions depend upon the law as a thread that binds together different members of society; such a bond enables conflicting parties to speak to each other civilly. Ambedkar is well aware of such a significance of the rule of law, given his own experience as a lawyer and maker of the constitution. However, his distinction between rules and principles (1957: IV, VII, III.2; 1979: 75) discloses that the law by itself cannot bind disputing social groups in civil debate.37 Rules are prescriptions followed through mechanical habit without freedom. Thus, “The rule may be right but the act is mechanical” (ibid.). Rules do not necessarily encourage reflection; “Either you break a rule or the rule breaks you” (Gokhale 2008: 142). This is well evidenced in populism professing to follow the rule of law and yet being marked by the replacement of dialogue with name-calling and hate speech. Principles, in contrast, are deliberated prescriptions based on independent judgment. They reflect on procedures and consequences from the perspective of human freedom. Without being anchored in principles, the law would be a ritual and would hardly serve as a bulwark against populism as Müller assumes. Rules are without affect, while principles are grounded in an intersubjective affective life-world of cultural practices, transformation, and reflection. Legal responsibility lies with the legislature in framing the law, the executive maintains it and the judiciary interprets it. However, for Ambedkar these institutional arms of the law depend upon the people (in society) and parties (in politics) to be upheld in an inclusive way. According to Ambedkar, a “bad” law can be salvaged with people’s shared moral practice, while without it even a “good” law can be destroyed (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 190). His own experience with the law was a case of a “good” law such as the Hindu Code Bill espousing equality of women in Hindu Personal Law being opposed through orthodox mob fury.38 As a result (among several other reasons), Ambedkar resigned as a Law Minister convinced that the law was a necessary but not sufficient condition for dialogue under conflicting circumstances.

338

K. MAHADEVAN

Ambedkar’s account of the crisis in liberalism resonates with Dewey who regards it as the loss of economic opportunity and social solidarity due to totalitarian violence and atomic individualism.39 It, thus, poses question(s) of identity regarding “…we-individuals, communities, peoples-…what kind of people we want to be” (McAfee 2008: 264). Neither rules-based legalism and nor rationality can answer this question in such a way as to anchor an inclusive model of democracy. Ambedkar finds an answer in the affective connect with the ancient traditions of India in Buddhism. Hence, Ambedkar’s “middle path” (Stroud 2018: 72) advocates democracy as solidarity and love, by avoiding the sectarianism of violence; the latter cannot be remedied by law alone. As Stroud notes, Ambedkar “echoes” (68) the Deweyan notion of democracy as an experimental “way of life” (69),40 rather than as a fixed set of institutional procedures. He invokes Dewey’s notion of “way of life” and his distinction between rules and principles to reconfigure Buddhism in a democratic way.41 For as, Jaffrelot and Kumar uphold, for Ambedkar Buddhism was the “crucible” (2018: xiv) of democratic politics. Ambedkar affirms Dewey’s pragmatism of selective appropriation of the past to find a voice for social and political democracy in the extant Indian Buddhist tradition. With Buddhism Ambedkar tapped into the reservoir of “past knowledge” (Dewey 1935: 50) stored in habits and practices and adapted it to mitigate the crisis of democracy. As an alternative to liberal individualism, such a rootedness has for Ambedkar the potential to forge people into a collective solidarity. For Ambedkar, just as for Dewey, such a process of renewal is not just one of reviving the past, but one of reimagining it. A shared past with its conflicts and harmonies strengthens social solidarity rather than legal rules or rational debates; for it is affirmed through sensitivity and thought that is directed to principles. Rather than debate the past by starting out with preestablished positions, Ambedkar exercises imaginative deliberation. In the latter, one apprehends diverse points of view, works with them through contradictions and change so that new perspectives can be imagined and anticipated.42 Thus, the deliberative democracy put forth by Ambedkar is about striving to be included in making a difference to the world; it concerns “…identity, relationships, belonging” (McAfee 2008: 265). Stroud notes that Ambedkar’s attempt to spell out the specific meaning of democracy during a turbulent period of populist reductions is reminiscent of Dewey’s similar attempt in his Creative Democracy (1939). Further, Stroud also conjectures that in the context of Ambedkar’s own

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

339

relationship to Dewey, it is probable that Creative Democracy influenced his innovation of democracy as a reconciliation of Buddhism and pragmatism.43 As a “way of life” democracy would have to proceed from faith in interpersonal relations through tolerance and openness. For Dewey when freedom in the public context is misused, it degenerates to “treason” (Dewey 1939; Stroud 2018: 70). Democracy cannot be mechanically renewed; according to Dewey, its renewal is contextual, creative, and inventive (1939). On an analogous note, Ambedkar proclaims that one does not have to turn to foreign influences for understanding democracy (1979: 77–78). Buddhism, according to him, has safeguards against Dewey’s “treason” through Bhikshu Sanghas. The latter, he notes, followed all the norms of parliaments, such as rule of law, ballots, and resolutions (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 195). Indeed, Ambedkar argues that Buddhism created the space for social democracy in India by establishing a culture of persuasive discussion to engage with differences (200–203). It also critiqued Brahmanical hegemony, ritualism, and social hierarchies of caste, class, and gender. Ambedkar gives several reasons for endorsing Buddhism (238–239). He appreciates its jettisoning of speculative metaphysics with a practical focus on transforming the suffering human condition. Moreover, Ambedkar was specifically struck by Buddhism’s concepts of prajna (understanding) based on social bonds, karuna (love) and samata (equality) (238). He develops the Buddhist sense of love as an alternative to violence and dispassionate rationality. For this Ambedkar distinguishes the Buddhist from Jain notion of ahimsa or nonviolence. The latter developed by Gandhi is the attitude of not harming others. This in Ambedkar’s view is not adequate to resist either the violent consequences of sectarianism for it only leads to quietist tolerance.44 Ambedkar proposes an alternate notion of active ahimsa as an affective process of loving everyone and everything within one’s horizon of action and beyond. It is a positive sense of openness toward others which for Ambedkar following Buddhism is Maitri or fellow-feeling (248). For Ambedkar such love results in nondiscriminating tolerant thought regarding one’s critics, “enemies” (Stroud 2018: 74–75) and outsiders. Besides one’s enemies and distant members of the human race, Ambedkar on a Buddhist note suggests that one’s feeling reach out to all living beings. Ambedkar also discerns the potential for such ecological love in the foundation of democracy in Hinduism (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 259–260). Brahma is the cosmic principle of oneness with which all

340

K. MAHADEVAN

individual souls identify. For Ambedkar, such a notion of togetherness and belonging has great potential for reinforcing social democracy. This requires the transformation of Brahma into a social principle from an abstract metaphysical one. He maintains that an emphasis on the latter allowed Brahmanism—the hierarchical system of gender and caste discrimination—to exercise a predominant hold on Hindu society. Hence, by reconstructing the notion of Brahma one can also establish an affective relationship to Hindu tradition from the contemporary needs of a non-divisive and nonviolent society that can be the touchstone of democracy. Ambedkar roots ecological love and caring action in the diverse and often conflicting religious traditions of Buddhism (Maitri) and Hinduism (Brahman). Ambedkar like Stevenson, invests persuasive love, rather than reason or law, with the moral power of bringing divided groups such as Hindus and Buddhists together. Functioning in a democracy requires interacting with others and heeding people, the base of social solidarity. It also requires faith and rhetoric. One cannot dictate to the people in a democracy; as populism’s tyranny reveals this is veiled autocracy (2003b: 378). Ambedkar observes that “You cannot win over a majority in the House by giving a black eye to your opponent” (2003b: 378).45 Nor is it possible to win over another to one’s point of view or even convey one’s point of view to the other exclusively through emotion-free rational argument. Ambedkar suggests that persuasive rhetoric grounded on fellow-feeling and faith be used to bring people to the position of dialoguing with each other. Such persuasion toward solidarity can counter populism’s divisive rhetoric. “No autocrat… need pay any attention to eloquence because his will is law” (Ambedkar 2003b: 378). Persuasion about Maitri and Brahman can bring both Buddhists (who are largely from underprivileged castes in contemporary India) and Hindus (who are both from privileged and underprivileged caste groups) together through relations of cosmic interdependence. This is the first step toward creating a habit of egalitarianism among social groups “…ready for continuous readjustment or recognition of reciprocity of interests” (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 246). Ambedkar upholds such a habit to be the crux of democracy. His love offers the possibility of responsible action or what Stroud terms as “communicative practices” (2018: 74) wherein one speaks with respect and without hate even with reference to one’s enemies and those regarded as outsiders and dissenters. For Ambedkar love is a

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

341

spiritual alternative to the ineffectiveness of law and reason in winning the people of populism back to dialogical engagement with each other. Acknowledgements Many thanks to Ananta Kumar Giri for suggesting the theme for this paper, his encouragement and patience. My gratitude to Biraj Mehta, Pradeep Gokhale, and Aakash Singh Rathore for their feedback on this paper. They helped me understand the nuances of Ambedkar’s democracy, particularly in relation to Buddhism. I thank Brunella Antomarini, Jyoti Waghmare, and Pradeep Waghmare for their help with this paper. However, I am solely responsible for its drawbacks.

Notes 1. Yet, this is ironic because as Güven (2015) observes, colonization in global, political, and intellectual ways continues in the name of democracy (3). 2. He also acknowledges how fascist dictatorships oppose parliamentary democracy because of its commitment to a procedural way of arriving at decisions through deliberation between members of the institutions. Ambedkar also critiques communists and socialists for repudiating parliamentary government (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 206). 3. See Crick (2002) for a detailed survey of diverse meanings associated with democracy since the Greeks (1–13). However, this array has not led to a specific set of. 4. Like the Roman republics and later the English and early American republicans (Crick 2002: 12). 5. Like “chalk from cheese” (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 218) as he notes. 6. Also see Müller (2016: 11). 7. See, for example, Müller (2016), Mackert (2019), Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), Canovan (1984), Comaroff (2011), Gandesha (2018), Ferrara (2018), and Jaffrelot (2018). For the distinctiveness of the Indian context see Subramaniam (2007) and McDonnell and Cabrera (2018). 8. Indeed, there are differences even within the Western context. Müller (2016) notes that populism in the American context allows for a continuity with liberalism, while such a continuity would be a contradiction in the European. 9. Müller notes how both Trump and Sanders were characterized as populists on the right and left, respectively (26). This was because both expressed the frustrations of the people with the establishment. 10. Such as in the nineteenth-century US.

342

K. MAHADEVAN

11. Müller links populism with lower income strata in the Western context (2016). However, in the Indian context populists also come from upper income groups (McDonnell and Cabrera 2018: 12). 12. Ferrara observes against prevailing opinions that populists do not necessarily resent the elite (2018). 13. Müller mentions the slogan “Indira is India, and India is Indira” (2016: 77) anecdotally as an instance of direct populist communication. He also cites Modi along with Orban, ´ Erdogan, Trump as united by a common strategy, despite the difference (2019: 35). But he does not discuss the Indian context further. 14. See Chandhoke (1999), Jaffrelot (2018), and Subramaniam (2007). 15. B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) was the principal architect of the Indian constitution and a champion of equality. Born in the most unprivileged caste in India, he consistently argued for demolishing the caste system as a basic condition for democratic freedom in India. 16. See the essays in the note 13 above for a representative sample. 17. Indira Gandhi can also be read as a populist leader. See Subramaniam (2007) for a detailed account. 18. Ambedkar questioned Gandhi’s and Congress’s rejection of the Cripps Proposals in 1942 (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 90–95). 19. Hinduism had a four-tiered caste system of what Ambedkar terms as “graded inequality” (242). They were divided into Brahmins (priestly intellectual caste), Kshatriyas (defense caste), Vaishyas (business caste), and the Shudras (the laboring and artisanal sections of society). Also see Ambedkar 2002c. 20. Brahmanical patriarchy in India discriminates against both women and underprivileged castes. For instance, neither have been allowed to read traditional treatises of knowledge that are in Sanskrit. 21. Indeed, Ambedkar in his 1945 attempt to dialogue with caste Hindus offers the compromise of accepting relative majority in the political domain, since they will continue to exercise power over social and economic resources (120). 22. As Güven 2015 (10) does. 23. Which it shares with populism. 24. Following Gallie. 25. Attitudes can take the form of disapproval as well. 26. See McDonnell and Cabrera (2018). 27. This reconstruction of democracy is derived from his speech at the Poona District Law Library in 1952 (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 217–229). India adopted a Constitution grounded on freedom and equality on January 26, 1950. Ambedkar was crucial to the making of the Constitution. 28. Ambedkar defended the free newspaper at the inauguration of the People’s Herald a paper dedicated to reporting the plight of the Dalits in 1944

15

29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

343

(Jaffrelot and Kumar 2018: 107–110). He upheld it as the basis of freedom for self and community development. For him “A newspaper in modern democratic system is the fundamental basis of good government. It is the one means of educating people” (109). Comaroff rightly notes that “… the voice of the people is often not pretty, or loving, or democratic…” (2011: 108). Ferrara cites the collapse of seven governments in Europe as a result of the economic crisis of 2008 (473–474). He opposes this to legislative law based on election. And one might add gender. Although Ambedkar has not explicitly expounded on the economic vulnerability of women, he has expressed concern for the secondary status of women in Indian society (2003b: 282– 283). He has argued on behalf of the equality of caste Hindu women with men in his Hindu Code Bill (2003b: 411, 455), he also recognized the specificity of the gendered struggle of women from underprivileged castes (2003b: 150). Women remain an invisible workforce in India by doing most of the unpaid care work (Ghosh 2016). Yet as Ghosh observes official agencies do not recognize such work in statistics. Moreover, there is an overall drop in women’s participation in paid workforce in India. One might add to Ghosh that much of the unpaid work is done by women from underprivileged castes. Further, mainstream Indian feminism ignored Dalit women for decades. In a discussion with Gandhi, Ambedkar proclaimed “Gandhiji I have no homeland” (2003a: 53). Ambedkar wrote about “Waiting for a visa” (1993: 663–691) in his own country documenting his own personal experience with the social apartheid of caste. See Guru (2011) for a detailed narration of the dynamics between Dalits and privileged caste members of institutions. This term is used as equal to self-respect following Guru. Gender inequality in Indian society has an analogous trajectory. The difficulties of achieving gender parity through economic measures reveals the centrality of the social to transformative relationships. See Ghosh (2016). Also see Gokhale (2008: 142) and Stroud (2018: 73). See, Rege (2013: 191–201) for details. See Dewey (1935: 28–55) for his argument on the crisis and his remedy. The phrase “way of life” is Dewey’s from his Creative Democracy (1939). It will henceforth be used with quotes and without specifically attributing it to Dewey or Ambedkar. Dewey was Ambedkar’s teacher at Columbia University. See Stroud (2018) for details of this influence, the courses that Ambedkar took with Dewey and an account of his annotated copy of Dewey’s Democracy and Education. Also see Stroud (2017a) for further details of Dewey’s impact on Ambedkar. Following Stroud, Ambedkar ties

344

41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

K. MAHADEVAN

pragmatism and Buddhism to reconstruct the past in a way that is relevant to the present (2018: 61, 64). See Stroud (2018: 73). This argument draws upon McAfee 2008s distinction that is inspired by Dewey (263–265). It extends Dewey’s argument to Ambedkar. Ambedkar’s distinction between rules and principles is similar to that between debate and deliberation. Stroud details this influence via “textual traces” (2018: 68) or “echoes” (2018: 68) However, as Berg and Midtgarden (2020) note, Ambedkar transcends pragmatism with caste as a critical concept. Ambedkar critiques Gandhi for encouraging such a form of quietism. See Stroud (2017b) for a detailed account of Ambedkar’s use of persuasion.

References Ambedkar, B.R. 1957. The Buddha and His Dhamma. Bombay: Siddharth Prakashan. Ambedkar, B.R. 1979. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 1. New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation. Ambedkar, B.R. 1993. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 12. New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation. Ambedkar, B.R. 2002a. Democracy. In The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, ed. Valerian Rodrigues, 60–64. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ambedkar, B.R. 2002b. Buddha or Karl Marx. In The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, ed. Valerian Rodrigues, 173–189. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ambedkar, B.R. 2002c. Origin of Untouchability. In The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, ed. Valerian Rodrigues, 396–405. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ambedkar, B.R. 2003a. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 17, part 1. New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation. Ambedkar, B.R. 2003b. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 17, part 3. New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation. Berg, Dag-Erik, and Torjus Midtgarden. 2020. Ambedkar’s radical moves beyond Dewey’s pragmatism. Counter Currents. http://countercurrents.org/ 2020/07. Accessed on 12 July 2020. Berman, Sheri, and Maria Snegovaya. 2019. Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy. Journal of Democracy 30 (3): 5–19. Bernstein, Richard. 2000. Creative Democracy—The Task Still Before Us. American Journal of Theory and Philosophy 21 (3): 215–228.

15

PRAGMATISM, SPIRITUALITY AND THE CALLING …

345

Canovan, Margaret. 1984. ‘People’, Politicians and Populism. Government and Opposition 19 (3): 312–327. Chandhoke, Neera. 1999. A Nation Searching for a Narrative in Times of Globalisation. Economic and Political Weekly 34 (18): 1040–1047. Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. World Politics 49 (3): 430–451. Comaroff, Jean. 2011. Populism and Late Liberalism: A Special Affinity? The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 637: 99–111. Crick, Bernard. 2002. Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dewey, John. 1935. Liberalism and Social Action. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Dewey, John. 1939. Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us. http://www.bel oit.edu/~pbk/dewey.html. Accessed on 12 June 2019. Ferrara, Alessandro. 2014. The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ferrara, Alessandro. 2018. Can Political Liberalism Help Us Rescue ‘The People’ from Populism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (4): 463–477. Gandesha, Samir. 2018. Understanding Right and Left Populism. In Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism, ed. Jeremiah Morelock, 49–70. Westminster: University of Westminster Press. Ghosh, Jayati. 2016. Women Are the Engines of Indian Economy but Our Contribution Is Ignored. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com. Accessed on 7 June 2019. Gokhale, Pradeep. 2008. Dr. Ambedkar’s Interpretation of Buddhism. In The Philosophy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, 109–152. Pune: Sugava Publication. Guru, Gopal. 2011. Liberal Democracy in India and the Dalit Critique. Social Research: An Annual Quarterly 78 (1): 99–122. Güven, Ferit. 2015. Decolonizing Democracy: Intersections of Philosophy and Postcolonial Theory. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and London: Lexington Books. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2018. The Lure of the Populists. Indian Express, February 26. Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Narender Kumar. 2018. Dr. Ambedkar and Democracy: An Anthology New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mackert, Jürgen. 2019. Is There Such a Thing as Populism? In Populism and the Crisis of Democracy: Concepts and Theory, vol. 1, ed. Gregor Fitzi, Jürgen Mackert, and Bryan Turner, 1–13. London and New York: Routledge. McAfee, Noëlle. 2008. Democracy’s Normativity. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 22 (4): 257–265. McDonnell, Duncan, and Luis Cabrera. 2018. The Right-Wing Populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and Why Comparativist Should Care). Democratization: 1–13.

346

K. MAHADEVAN

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Müller, Jan-Werner. 2014. ‘The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People’: Reflections on Populism. Constellations. Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press. Müller, Jan-Werner. 2019. Populism and the People. London Review of Books 41 (10): 35–37. Rege, Sharmila. (ed.). 2013. Against the Madness of Manu. New Delhi: Navayana. Stevenson, Charlie Leslie. 1938. Persuasive Definitions. Mind 47 (187): 331– 350. Stroud, Scott. 2017a. What Did Bhimrao Ambedkar Learn from John Dewey’s Democracy and Education? The Pluralist 12 (2): 78–103. Stroud, Scott. 2017b. Pragmatism, Persuasion and Force in Bhimrao Ambedkar’s Reconstruction of Buddhism. Journal of Religion 97 (2): 214–243. Stroud, Scott. 2018. Creative Democracy, Communication and the Unchartered Sources of Bhimrao Ambedkar’s Deweyan Pragmatism. Education and Culture 34 (1): 61–80. Subramaniam, Narendra. 2007. Populism in India. SAIS Review XXVII (1): 81– 91. Thayer-Bacon, Barbara J. 2006. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Dewey’s Renascent Liberalism. Education and Culture 22 (2): 19–30.

Afterword

In the Preface to his Philosophy of Right, Hegel says that “philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought.” The statement points to the intersection of the Timeless and the Universal with the timely and the particular. It is no accident that in his Berlin period (1818–1831), when he was at the height of his powers and his influence, Hegel often lectured concurrently on logic and on topical subjects like art, religion, law, and politics. Philosophy dwells at the cross section of metaphysics and the mundane. These remarks are pertinent to this book, because of at least three noteworthy features to be found in it: first, the idea of “planetary conversations”; second, the quest for a broader and deeper pragmatism than the conventional opinions about it; and third, the notion of disciplinary “border-crossings,” which seems to me to be both symptomatic and necessary in an age of globalization. Together they suggest a new and vital task and program for our time. Let me say a few words about each of these features before expanding on the possibilities that the new program might open up. The term “conversation” is essentially a democratic term suggesting a dialogical space where people can talk about matters of common concern on an equal footing. Understood in that particular way, one would have to say that planetary and global conversation has not been the norm for at least the last six hundred years since the onset of Western colonialism, as far as philosophy is concerned. Philosophy has been regarded © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2

347

348

AFTERWORD

as preeminently, and often exclusively, a Western preoccupation with a lineage going back to the ancient Greeks. The two other major centers of philosophy, India and China, have for the most part been ignored in most Western philosophy departments and their curricula. And such is the political-cultural prestige of the modern West, that the Western hegemony in philosophy has unfortunately been internalized in much of the rest of the world. Political colonialism may be dead, but intellectual colonialism is very much alive.1 So, it is refreshing to have a volume where thinkers as diverse as Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, and Bhimrao Ambedkar are in conversation with William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead on the nature and contours of properly understood pragmatism. I say “properly understood” to highlight both the fact that “pragmatism” is a highly contested notion and the fact that thinkers in different cultural and historical contexts will necessarily see it in different ways. It is a mistake, for example, to regard pragmatism as mere accommodation or adaptation to a given factual reality. For one thing, how a given set of facts is viewed or interpreted will vary over contexts. For another, the creative aspects of pragmatism are as much concerned with the “ought” as with the “is.” Second, the quest for a broader and deeper pragmatism suggests a revisioning of the discipline of philosophy itself. Since at least the time of Descartes and Hobbes in the sixteenth century and the professionalization of philosophy as an academic subject in the West, philosophy has been regarded as a strictly and exclusively cerebral activity. But this is to disregard much of its history in both the East and the West, where philosophy was seen more broadly and fruitfully as a way of life both in the Greek and Roman academies and also, more recently, in the UNESCO-sponsored initiative of Auroville, inspired by the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. We know that in the ancient academies philosophy was taught together with music, medicine, and gymnastics (among other subjects) as part of a curriculum designed to develop the whole human being in his or her physical, emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual aspects. Likewise, the experiment of Auroville is designed to bring people from many different cultures together to try to live together in peace and harmony. These models point the way to a more holistic and practical understanding of philosophy. Hence, the resonant subtitle of Ananta Kumar Giri’s chapter in this volume, “New Horizons of Theory and Practice and the Calling of Planetary Conversations.”

AFTERWORD

349

Such new horizons and planetary conversations naturally lead to a third topic and theme: the bringing together of philosophy, science, and spirituality as avenues of contemporary wisdom. This has, of course, to be done rigorously and skillfully. I am not talking, obviously, of any New Age mish-mash, but rather of interdisciplinary attempts of mutual learning, such as we witness in the relatively new field of Consciousness Studies, which tries to understand and integrate the insights from neuroscience, philosophy, and spiritual experience, as William James attempted to do in his classic text, composed more than a hundred years ago in 1901– 1902, The Varieties of Religious Experience. To this we may add such other exemplary texts as Sri Aurobindo’s The Life Divine, Jean Gebser’s, The Ever-Present Origin, and David Bohm’s Wholeness and the Implicate Order. The list could, of course, be expanded but these examples might serve as models of the kind of fruitful interdisciplinary research that our times need and call forth. Each age highlights its own distinctive vistas and challenges. Thus, the Copernican Revolution brought together the insights of astronomy, philosophy, poetry, and religious speculation. With the vast developments in biology, neuroscience, yogic science, and consciousness studies, our time seems ripe for a new synthesis, examples of which are provided in the essays featured in this volume. I would like to conclude with some other words of Hegel, this time taken from the Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit: “It is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and it is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward.” It is a pleasure to encounter a volume, composed by authors drawn from across the world, who are alive to the motions of Spirit in our time. Joseph Prabhu

Note 1. Joseph Prabhu, “Philosophy in an Age of Postcolonialism,” in History of Indian Philosophy: Routledge History of World Philosophies, ed. Purushottama Bilimoria with Amy Rayner, pp. 569–579. London: Routledge, 2018.

Index

A Absolute, 26, 53, 77, 85, 89, 98, 109, 138, 146–148, 150, 152, 163, 174, 227, 229–231, 240, 244, 256, 257, 308, 317, 327, 334 Absolutism, 25, 97, 226, 229, 241, 325, 329 Action, 4, 14, 17, 23, 25–29, 43–48, 50, 51, 54–56, 75, 88, 95–100, 103, 105–108, 111, 114, 119, 123, 131, 134, 138, 141, 172, 177, 182, 194–196, 204, 207, 214, 233, 242, 251, 281, 306, 308, 310, 311, 314, 315, 318, 332, 335, 336, 339, 340 Aesthetic ecology, 24, 100, 115–119 Ambedkar, B.R., 8, 14, 24, 25, 34, 326–344 American pragmatism, 2, 7, 9, 14, 19, 22, 26, 29, 56, 233, 248, 265, 269–271, 275, 279 Ames, Roger, 14, 15 Anthropological aesthetics, 5, 168, 169

Apel, Karl-Otto, 2, 14, 28, 45–48, 56, 64 Aquinas, Thomas, 7, 147, 248, 249, 253–255, 260 Ashram, 261, 286, 288–292, 300

B Beloved community, 4, 75–77, 84, 87, 89 Bhagavad G¯ıt¯ a , 236 Bohm, David, 146, 147, 156 Boundaries, 20, 108, 109, 222, 282 Brandom, Robert, 28, 45–47, 51, 52, 56, 64 Buddhism, 1, 6, 8, 19, 20, 188, 193, 204–207, 210, 211, 214, 223, 275, 338–341, 344

C Caste, 8, 140, 266, 274, 290, 311, 317, 328, 329, 331, 332, 335, 336, 339, 340, 342, 343

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. K. Giri (ed.), Pragmatism, Spirituality and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7102-2

351

352

INDEX

Christianity, 1, 4, 20, 21, 62, 77, 79–85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 113, 148, 231, 240, 248, 249, 253 Cognitive order, 3, 55, 56, 61–66, 111 Colonialism, 7, 224, 240, 241, 264, 267–269, 274, 276–278 Communication, 14, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 32, 43, 49–51, 74, 106, 112, 190, 224, 274, 291, 318, 332, 342 Community, 4, 14, 24, 69–77, 84–90, 95, 96, 100–102, 104, 111, 113–115, 117, 119, 150, 155, 163, 179, 286, 289, 308, 309, 311, 312, 319, 329, 331, 332, 334, 338, 343 Comparative philosophy, 223 Concepts, 7, 27, 34, 41, 44–48, 50, 54, 56–65, 70, 77, 82, 100, 101, 109, 111, 123, 146, 147, 149, 150, 157, 162, 163, 168, 169, 178, 180, 201–203, 206, 236, 237, 244, 268, 269, 290, 297, 303, 307, 312, 318, 319, 330, 339 Consciousness, 5, 16, 18, 21, 29, 44, 46, 53, 72, 74, 78, 85, 95, 97, 99, 103–105, 117, 126–129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137–140, 147, 152, 153, 155–158, 162, 177, 188–192, 194–197, 199–201, 204, 207, 210, 213, 226, 229, 231, 234, 238, 240, 290, 292, 296, 297 Cosmogonic cycle, 153 Cosmopolitan-nationalism, 286, 292, 296–298 Creed, 83, 84, 106, 289, 290, 299, 336 Critical theory, 3, 14, 22, 28, 41–45, 48, 56, 65

Critique, 8, 22, 33, 43, 55, 56, 79, 105, 136, 137, 140, 248, 251, 252, 254, 271, 291, 298, 314, 316, 325, 326, 328, 329, 333–335, 341, 344 Cultural models, 55, 56, 60–63 Culture, 4, 5, 7–9, 15, 22–25, 29, 33, 55, 56, 96, 98–101, 105, 110–113, 115, 117, 119, 124, 128, 129, 134–137, 140, 141, 149, 153, 171, 173–178, 180, 182, 183, 190, 191, 222–224, 231, 240–242, 247, 250, 259, 296, 297, 339 D Dallmayr, Fred, 2, 15, 24, 33, 280 Deleuze and Guattari, 123, 125, 132, 136, 137 Democracy, 8, 14, 22, 24, 25, 28, 33, 45, 62, 99, 101, 102, 104–108, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 161, 232, 310, 316, 318, 319, 325–334, 338–342 Democratic Buddhism, 338 Demos , 325 “Dependent arising” (prat¯ıtyasamutp¯ ada), 6, 188, 192, 195, 200 Dewey, John, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 14, 15, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 43–47, 51, 52, 56, 95–102, 104–110, 115, 116, 118, 152, 177, 178, 180, 222, 224, 233, 243, 318, 319, 336, 338, 339, 343, 344 Discourse, 15, 22, 28, 33, 45, 63, 102, 201, 269, 328 E Eckhart, 2, 21, 22, 134, 148 Einstein, Albert, 146

INDEX

Elk, Black, 137 Evolution’s Accumulation Point, 61, 161

F Ferrara, 327, 328, 330, 333–335, 341–343 Fichte, 266 Finitude, 72, 85, 86, 128 Form, 3, 5, 6, 16–19, 28, 36, 41–46, 48–52, 54–56, 58–62, 64, 65, 77, 78, 81–83, 88, 92, 96, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108, 109, 117, 119, 124, 129, 130, 134, 138, 140, 141, 146–148, 152, 156–158, 169–180, 182, 188–191, 193–196, 199–202, 206, 209–211, 213, 214, 222–224, 226, 228, 242, 248, 254, 264–266, 272, 288, 289, 292, 294, 312, 314, 315, 317, 320, 321, 331, 332, 342, 344 Formal-pragmatics, 28, 46, 48

G Gandhi, M.K., 7, 8, 15, 22, 25, 244, 263–270, 272, 274, 275, 277– 280, 302, 305, 307, 310–315, 317–319, 321, 328, 331, 339, 342–344 Geertz, Clifford, 5, 167–169, 176–178, 181, 182, 279 German Idealism, 264, 269–271, 281 Gilson, Étienne, 254–256, 258, 260, 261

H Habermas, Jurgen, 2, 14, 22, 24–28, 33, 45–48, 52, 56, 64, 65 Hawken, Dinah, 139–141

353

Hegel, G.W.F., 7, 9, 20, 49, 52–54, 64, 146, 225–228, 239–241, 244, 263, 266–268, 270, 272, 276, 279–281 Hegelianism, 228, 269 Heidegger, Martin, 2, 16–18, 20, 22, 47, 255, 267 Hidden Harmony, 5, 145, 160, 161 Horizon, 14, 15, 26, 182, 255, 339 Horkheimer, Max, 44, 277 Horme principle, 114, 118 I Idealism, 7, 177, 225, 254, 256, 261, 263–265, 279, 281, 305 Ideas of God, 83, 253 Infinity, 3, 23, 57–59, 65 Integral Relational Logic (IRL), 157, 158, 161, 163 J James, William, 1, 6, 7, 14, 27, 29, 30, 90, 98, 109, 214, 221–225, 228, 229, 232–234, 236, 238, 241–243, 248, 252, 256, 259, 260, 270 Joas, Hans, 26, 306 Justification, 27, 97, 112, 234, 239, 267, 291 K Kantianism, 248 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 20, 44, 46, 47, 49, 57–59, 63, 64, 83, 149, 169–171, 222, 225, 228, 248, 251, 252, 254, 255, 260, 266, 271, 279 Kierkegaard, 267 King, Martin Luther, 4, 22, 75–77 Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara, 177, 178, 180, 181

354

INDEX

Knowledge, 6, 15, 20, 51, 53, 58, 59, 64, 82, 100, 112–114, 116, 118, 148, 156, 158, 160, 162, 168, 176, 178, 189, 190, 192, 193, 201, 203, 207, 210, 214, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 242, 255, 256, 259, 265, 275, 276, 285, 295, 309, 338, 342 L Language, 2, 6, 13, 15–19, 21, 22, 27, 28, 45–47, 49–52, 64, 65, 112, 116, 141, 147, 150, 171, 180, 189, 190, 201, 202, 204, 224, 237, 244, 264, 271, 273, 275, 277, 280, 281, 319 Limits, 18, 56–65, 84, 104, 112, 117, 255, 290, 302, 336 Loyalty, 3, 4, 69–71, 75, 76, 84–87, 89 M Marcuse, Herbert, 44, 277 Marx, Karl, 42, 53, 54, 266, 267, 277–279, 335 Mead, George H., 22, 27, 43–45, 50, 52, 56, 269, 277, 279, 305 Meaning triangle, 150 Mills, C. Wright, 2, 43, 45 Mind, 3, 8, 9, 30, 42, 45, 49–56, 59–62, 65, 87, 96, 99, 109–111, 119, 134, 142, 150, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 169, 170, 178, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 203, 204, 224, 228, 230, 233, 235, 237, 238, 240, 250, 251, 254, 255, 265, 270, 277, 280, 286, 287, 293, 295, 300–302, 306, 308 Monakow, Constantin, 101, 102, 104, 105, 114, 118

Money and religion, 162 Monotheism, 4, 77, 81–83 N Nationalism, 7, 8, 266, 287–289, 292, 293, 296, 297, 299, 301, 303, 326 Naturalistic spiritual, 4, 69, 71, 73, 77 Neidjie, Bill, 125–127 Neo-Hegelians, 226, 228, 229, 239, 244 Nietzsche, 29, 31, 32, 232, 242, 267 Nonduality, 22, 146, 148 Non-Western traditions, 223 O Oppenheim, Frank M.S.J., 71, 90 P Peirce, Charles S., 1, 5, 6, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 42–47, 49, 50, 52, 56, 58, 64, 65, 92, 148–151, 157, 158, 188–193, 195–197, 199–202, 206, 207, 209, 213, 214, 233, 234, 243, 270–272, 277, 279–281 Philosophical pragmatism, 6, 221 Postcolonialism, 264, 268, 269 Pragmatism, 1–9, 13–15, 18–20, 24, 26–28, 41–47, 49, 50, 56, 59, 65, 95, 96, 98–100, 108, 109, 112, 123, 127, 148, 176, 182, 206, 210, 213, 221–223, 225, 226, 228, 233, 234, 236–238, 241–243, 248, 263, 269, 270, 286, 318, 338, 339, 344 Praxis, 43, 54–56 Principle of Unity, 145, 146, 149, 160 Proofs of God’s existence, 249 Public conscience, 334

INDEX

R Rahner, Karl, 255–261 Religious insight, 72, 73, 75, 76, 83 Religious mission of sorrow, 76, 81 Religious naturalism, 4, 69, 72, 77, 81 Religious practice, 77, 78 Rorty, Richard, 1, 26, 28, 46–48, 51, 52, 56 Rowbotham, David, 127, 128 Rumi, 129–131, 134, 137, 152

S Sarkar, P.R., 127, 129, 131, 138, 139 Sarvodaya, 311, 318 Satyagraha, 301, 307, 308, 313 Schelling, 266 Scientific Revolution, 151, 159 Second Vatican Council, 257, 259 Self-transcendence, 3, 73–75, 77, 85, 86, 115 Semiotics, 5, 6, 19, 20, 44, 46, 148, 149, 188, 192, 196, 202, 204, 205, 207, 214, 275, 279, 280 Sharing Economy, 151, 159, 160, 163 Shusterman, Richard, 175–178, 183 Signlessness, 5, 188, 189, 192, 193, 197, 201, 202, 204, 207, 209 Sin, 73, 76, 85–87, 89, 128 Social democracy, 8, 332–334, 339, 340 Sociocultural world, 50–52 Spirit, 2, 3, 9, 16, 21, 23, 26, 35, 41, 42, 51–54, 61, 65, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 87, 88, 90, 102–105, 107, 126, 136, 142, 178, 222, 227, 233, 240, 242, 255, 258, 259, 297, 336 Spiritual functioning, 100, 105–108, 111, 112

355

Spirituality, 2–5, 7, 8, 15, 18, 22, 23, 25, 33, 41, 65, 69–72, 107, 113, 114, 125, 127, 130, 131, 134–137, 159, 240, 259, 266, 278, 285–287, 290, 292, 293, 296, 297, 300 Spiritual pragmatism, 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 18, 22–25, 96, 100, 118, 123, 124, 129, 138–141, 222, 241 Spiritual Renaissance, 151–153, 159 Sri Aurobindo, 2, 6–9, 13, 15–18, 22, 25, 29, 30, 124, 223–225, 227–229, 232–234, 236–242, 244, 286–292, 296–300 Synechism (continuity), 19, 151 T Tagore, Rabindranath, 7, 8, 18, 135, 136, 244, 286, 287, 291–298, 300–303 “Thought forms”, 5, 6, 188, 189, 191, 199, 201, 207 Transcendentalism, 46–48 Transcendental-pragmatics, 46, 48 Transcendental Thomism, 7, 255, 256 Transdisciplinarity, 147, 173, 188, 189 Trusteeship, 311, 312 Truth, 20, 24, 30, 44, 48, 49, 61, 62, 73, 79, 80, 85, 89, 93, 98, 100, 106, 109, 111–113, 118, 137, 138, 142, 146, 147, 151, 154, 155, 177, 178, 183, 194, 206, 230–232, 235–238, 242, 251, 252, 255–257, 279, 287, 291, 302, 307, 308, 311, 318, 319, 321 Two dimensions of time, 152, 153 U Unconditionality, 65, 66

356

INDEX

Universality, 43, 172 Upanishads, 240, 241 V Vedanta, 241 Visva-Bharati, 287, 294–296, 298–302 Vivekananda, 1, 2, 21, 22, 156, 230, 231, 253

Vocabulary, 45, 47, 51, 233 W Welsch, Wolfgang, 170 Whitman, Walt, 137 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2, 17–20, 22, 30, 31, 47, 51 World-disclosure, 65 World peace, 159