Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–65 [Second ed.] 1563242273, 9781563242274

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POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA "A classicof its genrejust got better.Teiwes's timely revisionensuresthatPolitics and Purgeswill remainan essentialpart of every Sinologist'sreferencecollection." RichardBaum, UniversityofCalifornia, LosAngeles "Politics and Purgesprovidesa major contributionto our understandingof the preCultural Revolutionpolitics in Chinaandits re-publicationis a mostwelcomeevent. It is all the more welcomebecauseof the lucid new introductionthat providesa masterfulreassessment of Teiwes's own earlierviews and thoseof otherrecent scholarship.The main conclusionstill standsthat politics in the period 1949-1965 shouldbe understoodin termsof a dominantMao ratherthan 'two-line' struggleor the variouswesternpermutationsof this Chineseformulation. "The new introductionrevealsevenmore strongly a politics at 'Mao'sCourt' in which seniorleaderstry to secondguessMao, adjusttheir preferencesto his desires,andtry to exploit his ambiguitiesto advancebureaucraticandpolitical interests.This new introductionoffers an admirablemodel for how the new sources andinterviewswith Chinesescholarsand participantscanbring Chinesepolitics to life by helping us to understandbetterthe motivationsof individual playersin the political process.Takentogether,the original book and the new introductionarea powerful tour de force that will ensurethat this remainsthe standardwork covering the period." TonySaich, UniversityofLeiden Politics/Asia

Studies on Contemporary China THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES George T. Crane

WORLDS APART RECENT CHINESE WRITING AND ITS AUDIENCES Howard Goldblatt. editor

CHINESE URBAN REFORM WHAT MODEL NOW? R. Yin-Wang Kwok, William L. Parish, and Anthony Gar-on Yeh with Xu Xuequang, editors

REBELLION AND FACTIONALISM IN A CHINESE PROVINCE ZHEJIANG, 1966-1976 Keith Forster

POLITICS AT MAO'S COURT GAO GANG AND PARTY FACTIONALISM IN THE EARLY 1950s Fredrick C. Telwes

MOLDING THE MEDIUM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE LIBERATION DAILY Patricia Stranahan

THE MAKING OF A SINO-MARXIST WORLD VIEW PERCEPilONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF WORLD HISTORY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA Dorothea A L. Martin

POLITICS OF DISILLUSIONMENT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER DENG XIAOPING, 1978-1989 Hsi-sheng Ch 'i

CONQUERING RESOURCES THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE PLA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE Benjamin C. Ostrov

THE PARADOX OF POWER IN A PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MIDDLE SCHOOL Martin Schoenhals

CHINA'S ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s

THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMS, MODERNIZATION, AND INDEPENDENCE Edited by the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United states

CHINA IN THE ERA OF DENG XIAOPING A DECADE OF REFORM Michael Ying-mao Kau and Susan H. Marsh, editors

DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA Pittman B. Potter, editor

POUTICS AND PURGES IN CHINA

RECTIFICATION AND THE DECUNE OF PARTY NORMS, 1950-1965 Frederick C. Teiwes

MORNING SUN

INTERVIEWS WITH POST-MAO CHINESE WRITERS Lalfong Leung

CHINESE FIRMS AND THE STATE IN TRANSITION

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND AGENCY PROBLEMS IN THE REFORM ERA KeunLee

THE MARKET MECHANISM AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA William A Byrd CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION TRIPOLARITY AND POLICYMAKING IN THE COLD WAR RobertS. Ross, editor

AMERICAN STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA

David Shambaugh, editor

Studies on Contemporary China

POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA

RECTIFICATION AND THE DECLINE OF PARTY NORMS, 1950-1965 SECOND EDITION

FREDERICK C. TEIWES

An East Gate Book

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Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

An EastGateBook

First published1993 by M.E. Sharpe Published2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square,Milton Park,Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017,USA Routledgeis an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1993 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any form or by any electronic,mechanical,or other means,now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopyingand recording,or in any information storageor retrieval system,without permissionin writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibilityis assumedby the publisherfor any injury and/ordamageto personsor propertyas a matterof productsliability, negligenceor otherwise, or from any useof operationof any methods,products,instructionsor ideas containedin the materialherein. Practitionersand researchers must alwaysrely on their own experienceand knowledgein evaluatingand using any information, methods,compounds,or experimentsdescribedherein. In using suchinformation or methodsthey should be mindful of their own safetyand the safetyof others,including partiesfor whom they havea professionalresponsibility. Productor corporatenamesmay be trademarksor registeredtrademarks,and are usedonly for identificationand explanationwithout intent to infringe. Library of CongressCataloging-In-PublicationData

Teiwes,FrederickC. Politics andpurgesin China ~rectification Teiwes, andthe declineof party norms, 195~195~1965I FrederickC. Teiwes.-2nded. p. em. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN 1-56324-226-5-ISBN 1-56324-227-3(pbk.) I. China-Politicsandgovemment--19452. Chung-kuokung ch'antang-Purges. DS777.55.T335 1993 95I.O~c20 95I.O~c20

93-1545 CIP ISBN 13: 9781563242274(pbk) ISBN 13: 9781563242267(hbk)

In memoryof my parents, Carl andFrederickaTeiwes

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Contents

Prefaceto the SecondEdition Prefaceto the First Edition Abbreviations Introductionto the SecondEdition Introductionto the First Edition PartI DOCTRINE, METHODS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1. RectificationDoctrine 2. The RectificationProcess:Methods,Sanctionsand Effectiveness 3. The Origins of Rectification

vii ix xi xiii

3 13 25 46

PartII RECTIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE NORMS, 1950-1957 4. Rectificationand the Consolidationof Power, 1950-1953 5. The Purgeof GaoGangandRao Shushi 6. The HundredFlowersExperiment 7. The Anti-Rightist Campaign

166 216

PartIll THE NORMS UNDER STRESS: RECTIFICATION AND PURGING, 1957-1965 8. Rectificationand the GreatLeap Forward 9. The DismissalofPengDehuai 10. Rectificationand"Verdict Reversal"during the Crisis Years, 1960-1962 11. SocialistEducation,1962-1965 Conclusion

261 301 345 385 467

APPENDICES Notes SelectedBibliography Index About the Author

495 559 575 594

83 130

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Preface to the SecondEdition

Mter the limited run first edition of Politics and Purgesin China quickly sold out, DouglasMerwin of M.E. Sharpeand I discussedon various occasionsthe possibility of a paperbackedition with the aim of bringing the book to a larger audience.While I wasdisappointedthatcommercialandtechnicalconsiderations preventedthis from happening,as is so often the casethis disappointmentturned out to be a blessing in disguise.With the passageof time a rich vein of new materialhasbecomeavailablewhich allows both a reevaluationof the arguments of Politics and Purgesand a deeperunderstandingof the processesbehind the eventsexaminedin the book. I am grateful to Doug for reviving the projectat a time when new insightsarepossible,andI haveattemptedboth to reexamineand extendthe earlier analysesof the pre-CulturalRevolution period in the lengthy introductionto this secondedition. Of all the peoplecontributing to the new sectionof this volume, one stands out. Warren Sun not only provided the tireless wide ranging servicesnormally thought of as researchassistance,he also repeatedlyengagedme on points of interpretation,madefruitful suggestionson where the original draft manuscript could be expandedand deepened,and in countlessways helped me refine my understandingof the eventsand processesunderstudy. I am deeply appreciative of his help. A number of other people assistedin various ways. Lucien Bianco, Anita Chan, Timothy Cheek, Bruce Dickson, Keith Forster, David Goodman,Carol Hamrin, Nancy Hearst, Bruce Jacobs,Roderick MacFarquhar,Mary Mazur, Tony Saich, SusanShirk, K. K. Shum, Dorothy Solinger and Graham Young provided commentson the draft and/or generouslysharedtheir own research fmdings or sources.Thanksareduethem all. As will quickly become apparentto readersof the new portion of this edition, an enormousdebt is owed to numerousChinesescholarswho provided vii

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important data on and much insight into the political history of the People's Republic. As in other recent research,I have been profoundly impressedwith their generosity,care and candorin discussingdifficult intellectual issuesunder sometimesproblematiccircumstances.It is difficult to expressthe depth of my gratitudeto thesemen and womenwho necessarilymust remainanonymous. Significant supportwas provided by the University of Sydney'sDepartment of Governmentand its staff. Lyn Fisher, as so often in the past, gave efficient and prompt researchassistance,Kathy Dempseyboth indexedthe new introduction to this edition and adjustedthe original index to the presentformat, and Roz Conyngham,Wilma Sharp(from the University though not the Department)and especiallyIsobel Horton preparedthe manuscript.At M.E. Sharpe,in addition to Doug Merwin's support for the project, Aud Thiessenand Angela Piliouras addressedthe complextechnicalquestionsinvolved in producingthe new edition. I gratefully acknowledgethe financial support of the Australian Research Council, the University of Sydney'soverseastravel grant program,and the Ian PotterFoundation.In particular,the generousfunding of the Australian Research Council providedthe resourceswithout which the substantialnew researchgoing into this edition would not havebeenpossible. Finally, no acknowledgmentof supportwould be completewithout a mention of my family. As always, Kathi, Inge and Jack sustainedmy spirits throughout, while recognition of the love and nurture of my father and mother has been especiallydeeply felt as this project was completed.It is to their memory that this volume is dedicated. FrederickC. Teiwes Sydney January1992

Prefaceto the First Edition

This study has evolved from a doctoral dissertationundertakenat Columbia University in the mid-1960sto the versionfinally emergingin the late 1970sand presentedhere. Over this period many peoplehave provided help and supportin variousways, for which I am deeplyappreciative. Four individuals require special mention. A. Doak Barnett, my mentor, drew me to the study of Chinesepolitics, saw the potential for a larger study in a graduateresearchpaper,and providedwarm encouragement and guidanceas my dissertationsupervisor. Michel Oksenberg,first as a fellow graduatestudent, then as secondreaderof the thesis,provided a constantflow of trenchantcriticism which forced me to refine my ideas and tighten my arguments.Roderick MacFarquharwas not only extremelygenerouswith his commentson the manuscript and particularly with his personalresearchmaterials,but in addition his book, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, contributed inestimably to my understandingof the 1956-57 period both in terms of new information and challenginginterpretations.Indeed,my own accountof the periodcan be viewed in part as a friendly dialoguewith Origins. Finally, Richard Baum shareda first encounterwith the 1962~51962~5period over a decadeago in our collaborationon Ssu-Ch'ing: The SocialistEducationMovement,a collaborationvaluableboth in terms of researchvistas openedup and intellectualstimulation as we both grappled with what remains an obscure period. Since then, on the basis of new evidence, we have both arrived at differing reinterpretationsof the Socialist EducationMovementand, as with MacFarquhar'sbook, my version owes much to the researchand insightsof Baum's Preludeto Revolution. In addition, I am particularly gratefulto GordonBennettand David Denny for repeatedclosecriticism of portionsof the manuscript.Commentsand/orresearch data which have strengthenedthe study were also contributedby Parris Chang, John Fincher, Thomas Fingar, Lois Hager, Alex Ikonnikov, Ellis Joffe, Con ix

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POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA

Kiriloff, Donald Klein, Hong Yung Lee, Kenneth Lieberthal, Robert F. Miller, Peter Moody, Pierre Ryckmans,Mark Selden,Richard Sorich, Wang Gungwu and Michael Yahuda.I thank them all for their help. Researchassistancewas providedby many people,most significantly by Kam Chak-yeeand Wong Yuk-lam in Hong Kong in 1967, and by Lam Lai-sing in Canberrafrom 1974 to 1976. Otherswho provided researchaid at various times are FlorenceDeeley, Lau Yee-fui, Tanaka Kyoko, Teng Hua and Ka-che Yip. Assistancein preparingearlier drafts of the manuscriptwas provided by Shari Heinrich, Marcia Milnes and SandraDonnelly. The versionwhich appearson the following pageswasjointly producedby Sylvia Krietsch and Wilma Sharp. Mary Ann O'Loughlin toiled with good humor to producethe bibliography and index. During the dissertationphase,Shari Heinrich provided invaluable editorial assistancein helping shapean unruly monsterinto a passableproduct. In recentyears,when I was on the vergeof despairover finding a publisherfor a study of this length, Mervyn AdamsSeldonwas a repeatedsourceof encouragement and advice. Finally, I am grateful to DouglasMerwin for taking the initiative which resultedin the study appearingin its presentform. Financial assistanceis thankfully acknowledgedfrom the following sources: the Fulbright-HaysFellowshipProgram,ColumbiaUniversity'sEast Asian Institute and ResearchInstituteon CommunistAffairs, the ChinaProgramof Cornell University, the ContemporaryChina Centreof The Australian National University, and the Departmentof Governmentand University ResearchCommitteeof the University of Sydney. In addition, the unique servicesand facilities of the Universities ServiceCentre,Hong Kong, madepossiblea fruitful yearof researchin 1966-67. The following institutionshavegiven me permissionto reprint material: 1. The ContemporaryChina Institute, Schoolof Oriental and African Studies, to quote from "The Purgeof Provincial Leaders1957-1958,"The China Quarterly, No. 27 (1966); and "The Origins of Rectification: Inner-PartyPurgesand EducationbeforeLiberation," The China Quarterly, No. 65 (1976). 2. The Regentsof the University of California to quotefrom Ssu-Ch'ing:The SocialistEducationMovementof1962-1966,Centerfor ChineseStudies,Berkeley, China ResearchMonographsNo.2, 1968; and "Liu Shao-ch'iand the Cadre Question,"AsianSurvey,April1968. 3. The ContemporaryChina Centre, The Australian National University, to quote from Elite Discipline in China: Coercive and PersuasiveApproachesto Rectification,1950-1953,ContemporaryChinaPapersNo. 12, 1978.

Finally, special thanks to Kathi and Inge for providing much joy during the hecticstruggleto completethe long, arduoustask. FrederickC. Teiwes Sydney December1978

Abbreviations

Organizationsand Policies APC CCP CDL CPPCC FFYP GAC GMD GPD MAC NPC

PLA

PLMPA PRC SPC

Agricultural Producers'Cooperative ChineseCommunistParty China DemocraticLeague ChinesePeople'sPolitical ConsultativeConference First Five Year Plan GovernmentAdministrativeCouncil Guomindang GeneralPolitical Department Military Affairs Committee National People'sCongress People'sLiberation Army Poor and Lower Middle PeasantAssociation People'sRepublicof China StatePlanningCommission

Publicationsand PublishingAgencies AJCA CB CJRB CLG CNA CNS CQ DBRB

TheAustralianJournal ofChineseA!fairs CurrentBackground Changjiangribao [YangtzeDaily] ChineseLaw and Government China NewsAnalysis China NewsSummary The China Quarterly Dongbeiribao [NortheastDaily] xi

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POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA

DGB DZRB ECMM FB/S GMRB GRRB HF HQ JFJB JFRB JPRS MMT MP MU NCNA NFCPRS NFRB PDA RMRB RMSC

sc

SCMM SCMM-S SCMP SCMP-S

sssc

sw

sxws

URS WHB XHBYK XHRB XHYB XX YCWB ZGQN ZGQNB

zzxx

Dagongbao [Impartial Daily] Dazhongribao [MassesDaily] Extractsfrom China Mainland Magazines Foreign BroadcastInformation Service: CommunistChina Guangmingribao [GuangmingDaily] Gongrenribao [Workers' Daily] TheHundredFlowers Hongqi [Red Flag] Jiefangjunbao [Liberation Army Daily] Jiefangribao [Liberation Daily] Joint PublicationsResearchService MiscellanyofMao Tse-tungThought Mao Papers:AnthologyandBibliography Mao Tse-tungUnrehearsed,TalksandLetters: 1956-71 New China News Agency Newsfrom ChineseProvincial RadioStations Nanfangribao [SouthernDaily] CommunistChina 1955-1959: Policy Documentswith Analysis Renminribao [People'sDaily] Renminshouce[People'sHandbook] Ssu-Ch'ing:TheSocialistEducationMovementof1962-1966 Selectionsfrom China Mainland Magazines Selectionsfrom China Mainland Magazines-Supplement SurveyofChina Mainland Press SurveyofChina Mainland Press-Supplement Shishishouce[Current EventsHandbook] SelectedWorksofMao Tse-tung Mao Zedongsixiang wansui[Long Live Mao Zedong'sThought] Union ResearchService Wenhuibao [Wenhui Daily] Xinhua banyuekan[New ChinaSemi-Monthly] Xinhua ribao [New ChinaDaily] Xinhua yuebao[New China Monthly] Xuexi [Study] Yangchengwanbao[YangchengEveningPaper] Zhongguoqingnian [ChineseYouth] Zhongguoqingnian bao [ChineseYouth Daily] Zhengzhixuexi [Political Study]

Introduction to the SecondEdition

Politics and Purges in China was basically written during the lifetime of Mao Zedong, with the final editing and conclusion finished just after the epochal Third Plenumof December1978.1 In the interveningperiod much has changed in the People'sRepublic of China (PRC) as a result of the reform policies growing out of the Third Plenum.Besidesthe multifacetedimpacton the lives of the Chinesepeople,the post-1978changeshave also involved a significant enhancementof the quantity and quality of available sourceswhich have allowed scholars,both foreign and Chinese,far greateraccessto detailedinformation on Chinesepolitics and given them reasonto reconsidertheir earlier analysesand conceptualizationsof political processesin the PRC. While the new edition of Politics and Purges presentsthe sametext as the 1979 version, this new introduction offers somereflectionson the interpretationsand argumentsof the book which havebeenstimulatedby the materialsthat havebecomeavailableover the pastdozenplus years. Politics and Purgescan be readat threelevels-asan analysisof rectification campaignsand high level elite purgesduring the 1950-65period, including an attemptto delineateand explain patternsand variations; as a broaderexamination of the norms shaping inner Party life generally and their decline in the pre-Cultural Revolution period; and as a major reinterpretationof key developmentsin and the natureof elite conflict at the Politburo level from 1949to 1965. In all of these senses,but most particularly as a general reinterpretationof pre-1966 PRC politics, the book provided detailed evidenceto underminethe influential "two-line struggle" model of Chinesepolitics in favor of a dominant Mao interpretation,thus supportingmy earlier more thematic statementof this approach.2 From the perspectiveof more than a decadelater, I believe that both new data and subsequentdevelopmentsbroadly support the argumentsof the book at all three levels, and none more so than its rejection of "two line strugxiii

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gle." This, of course,doesnot meanthat there are no errorsof fact or interpretation in Politics and Purges; indeed,in one case-thatof the purgeof Gao Gang and Rao Shushi(seebelow~hey below~heywere of major importance.At the sametime, the new dataand perspectivesof the post-1978 period provide the basisfor some adjustmentsof interpretationin other casesand new insights into the texture of Chineseelite politics, i.e., the political culture of the top leadershipgenerally,as well as a richer understandingof particular events. I shall explore these new departuresin the belief that fundamentallythey supplementrather than contradict Politics andPurges. As indicated,there has been no attemptto revise the first edition despitethe flood of new information. This is not simply becausethe magnitudeof the effort requiredto evaluateand incorporatethe new datacomprehensivelyinto a revised version is beyondmy current researchagenda,but it is also due to the belief on the basis of a general reading of the new material that the broad analysis is unlikely to be alteredby more intensiveresearch.For the purposesof this introduction, however,suchintensiveinvestigationshavebeenmadeinto a numberof key issuesemergingfrom the book. In addition to the resultsof theseinvestigations discussedbelow, relevant further argumentationand evidencecan be obtained by readingPolitics and Purges in conjunction with my two subsequent books, Leadership,Legitimacy, and Conflict in China (1984) and Politics at Mao's Court (1990).3 The former is a collection of essayswhich in broad thematic terms deal with someof the key issuesthat were, in a sense,left dangling by Politics andPurges: What was the basisof Mao's dominanceof elite politics, what dilemmas did this dominancepose for other ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) leadersas they confronted the contradictionsbetween normative Party rules and "prudential rules," i.e., the requirementsof political survival, what were the dynamicsof leadershipconflict in the last decadeof Mao's rule, and how were elite conflict and Party norms manifestedin the politics of the initial post-Mao and early reform periods?Politics at Mao's Court, by contrast,is a detailedreinterpretationof the one casewherePolitics and Purgesgot the story significantly wrong. It reexaminesthe Gao Gang-RaoShushi caseof 1953-54 using a wide array of new documentarysourcesas well as extensiveinterviews with Chinesescholarsand officials, and correctsthe errors of Chapter5 of this book which, nevertheless,still containsmuch useful information and not a few valid analyses.Of equal importance,Politics at Mao's Court is a casepar excellence of the above mentionedenhancedinsight into the texture of elite politics madepossibleby post-1978sources. The remainderof this new introduction discussesthe light shed on specific analysesof Politics and Purges by the sourcesof the reform era. After a brief considerationof the generalissueof Mao's dominance,I elaboratethe changes necessaryin the analysisof the Gao-Raocase,and then examinea numberof other important developmentsfrom the Hundred Flowers experimentto the eve of the Cultural Revolution where modifications are required,or where particu-

INTRODUCfiON TO THE SECOND EDITION

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larly contentiousinterpretationsof Politics and Purges have been bolsteredby new data. The discussionthen turns to an examination of a number of key questionsconcerningthe CCP'snormative regime and the texture of elite politics before the Cultural Revolution. In this context specialattention is given to the issueof how significant official norms were for the participantsin Chinese politics and especiallyto the recurrenttension betweenthe norms and the requirementsof political practice.Relatedto this, I concludewith an examination of a numberof textural featuresof leadershippolitics which are not only distinctive of the Chinesesystembut are also ambiguouslyrelatedto the CCP'sformal norms. PoUtics,PurgesandRectification, 1949-1965:Confirmationand Reevaluation When Politics and Purgeswas written it went directly againstthe grain of both the official CCP view of elite politics and the predominanttrend in Western scholarship.This, of course,was the "two-line struggle" interpretation-usually translatedinto social scienceterminology in the West-which positedan ongoing and often sharpconflict betweenChairmanMao Zedongand variouspowerful colleaguesin the Party hierarchyover generalideological orientation and a wide rangeof specific policy issues.In many such interpretations,moreover,this involved a finely balancedcontestwith Mao sometimesin retreatbeforea victorious coalition of opponents.In contrast,the story told in Politics and Purges,on the basisof detailedinvestigationinto someof the critical eventsof the 1949-65 period, portrayeda Mao who dominatedhis colleagues.This did not mean that the Chairman was totally "in command"since, like all politicians, he had to respondto eventsandcircumstancesbeyondhis control, and becausesomeof his major projectsled to unanticipatedand counterproductiveresultswhich on occasion left him confusedas to the desirablecourseof action. But what it did mean was that in any elite debate,when Mao choseto asserthimself, he got his way. The Chairmanwas the pivot of leadershippolitics, and the natureof conflict had much more to do with winning Mao over to one's favored position than with opposing him. Opposing Mao in the policy sense-onceMao's position was clear-wasrare; opposingMao in the political sensewas unheardof. Since 1978 official CCP history has adopteda view remarkablyclose to that arguedin Politics and Purges."Two line struggle" has beenrejected,and many of the specific propositionsof the book have beentacitly or explicitly endorsed. But while it is possible to draw pleasurefrom such confirmation, it of course cannot. be consideredconclusive since Party history in the reform era is still official history and thereforesubject to various restrictions and motivated-at least in part-by the objectiveof sustaininga particularpoint of view. Nevertheless, it is clear to all seriousscholarsthat the historiographyand materialsof the

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reform period havebeenfar more reliable and balancedthan what was available during Mao's reign both before and during the Cultural Revolution. More important than the official rejection of "two line struggle" is the vast amount of new documentaryevidencewhich providesdetailedsupportfor the generalpicture. In addition, I am particularlyimpressedwith the informationandinterpreta4 In my tions given by Chinese scholars during interviews and discussions. experience,thesescholars,who in not a few caseshavebeenwilling to deal with sensitivesubjectsin unorthodox ways, have lent overwhelmingbacking to the dominantMao thesis.If anything, I am led to concludethat Politics and Purges slightly understatedthe degreeto which Mao dominatedhis colleagues.This, however,still leavesmy interpretationin conflict with much recentscholarship in the West. While "two line struggle"hasbeenjettisonedas an explicit modeof analysis, there is still a strong tendency to interpret pre-Cultural Revolution politics in termsof oppositionto Mao ratherthan as adjustmentsto the Chairman which, in my view, the evidenceincreasinglydemonstrates wasthe case.

Gao GangandRaoShushi Ironically, the dominanceof Mao is particularlyborneout in the casewherePolitics andPurgeswas wide of the mark-thepurgeof Politburo memberand StatePlanning Commission(SPC) headGao Gang and Party organizationdepartmentchief Rao Shushifor factional activities designedto split the Party.This becomesapparent through an examinationof the differencesbetweenthe interpretationpublishedin 1979 and my presentunderstandingas detailed in Politics at Mao 's Court and further supportedby new sourceswhich havesubsequentlybecomeavailable,most notably the recollectionsof one of the central figures of the affair, Bo Yibo.5 The major conclusionsof the earlier analysisreproduced inChapter5 below were: (1) despitechargesthat Gao establishedan "independentkingdom" in the Northeast, regionalismwas not a major factor in his purgeashis Northeastregion hadnot been beyond the effective control of the central authorities; (2) while Gao had good relationswith the SovietleadershipandparticularlyStalin, thoserelationswerenot a major aspectof his activities or a precipitatingfactor in his fall; (3) policy issues played a secondaryrole at best in the efforts of Gao and Rao who did not put forward a coherentpolicy program; (4) the main factional appeal used by Gao Gang--anattemptto fan the resentmentof army leadersagainstthosewith "white area" or undergroundcareersduring the revolutionaryperiod,especiallyLiu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai---waspoorly conceivedandhadlimited impact;(5) the key circumstantialfactor in the situationwasMao's poorhealthwhich led Gaoto beginmaneuvers for a possiblesuccessionstruggleaimed at Liu and Zhou; and (6) overall, the effort of Gao andRao wasmarkedby inept politics andwas easilybeatenbackwith only minimal damageto Partyunity. The new materialsavailable since 1979 necessitatethe following observations concerningthe above conclusions.The first two conclusionssubstantiallyhold. Regionalismandthe Sovietfactor, while playing a tangentialrole in the affair, were

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

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by no meanscentral to the purge. The third conclusion on the comparatively minor role of policy also retains some validity, but Gao and Rao openly raised policy issuesas a significant part of their activities. Moreover,the generalpolicy debatesof the period were an essentialfactor shapingthe attitudesof key figures in the drama,none more so than thoseof Mao. The fourth and sixth conclusions must be substantiallyrevised; the effort to manipulatetensionsbetween"red" and "white" areacadreswas far more potent than originally believed,and Gao madeconsiderablymore headwaythan previously seemedlikely-even though the activities of Gao and Rao can in many respectsstill be consideredinept. Finally, Mao's health,althoughsomewhatpoor in this period and relevantto the unfolding events,was not a precipitatingcauseof Gao'sactivities.6 lnstead,what set Gao in motion was severalpersonaldiscussionswith Mao during late 1952early 1953 in which the Chairmanindicateddissatisfactionwith Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai.7 Rightly or wrongly, Gao interpretedtheseconversationsas providing an opportunityto displaceLiu andhimselfbecomeMao'ssuccessor. The last factor-Mao'sconversationswith Gao andotherclearif indirect expressions of dissatisfactionwith Liu and Zhou-arecrucial not only for launchingthe entire affair but for demonstratingthe dynamic of elite politics that prevailed throughout:otherleadersconsistentlyreactedto Mao'spositionsor perceivedpreferences,hung on his often ambiguouswords, and anticipatedhis moves and objectives. The centrality of Mao'sposition was clearly reflectedin the precipitatingcase of the new tax policies formulated by one of Liu's closest"factional" associates, Minister of Finance Bo Yibo, and endorsedby Premier Zhou Enlai.8 This issue, which was erroneouslytreatedas having no relationshipto the Gao-Raoaffair in Politics and Purges,emergedduring the period of Mao's private conservationswith Gao Gang. The hastily constructednew tax system, which sought to solve the problem of securingadequatestaterevenuesat a time when ownershipwas shifting to the statesector,was promulgatedon December31, 1952,and immediatelycaused a political storm. In part, this was due to the practical consequences of the new regulationswhich increasedthe tax burden of state enterprisesand also decreased their profits, the latter developmentproducingconsiderableconflict with local leaders who dependedon statesectorprofits for their revenue.But the greatervulnerability was the result of local protestscoming to the attentionof Mao who focussedon two ratherdifferent aspectsof the situation.In a mid-January1953 letter to Zhou, Bo and othersMao complainedthat the new tax systemhad not beendiscussedby the Party Center and that he only becameaware of it through the newspapers.The Chairman'sdispleasurehad an immediateimpact-Zhourespondedthe samenight, while Bo quickly called a meeting of the government'sFinancial and Economic Committeein a stateof "half seriousconcernand half bewilderment."In particular, Bo regardedMao's commentthat he only read of the matter in the newspapersa grave matter. While Mao apparentlyhad not beenconsultedbecausethe issue had been regardedas a concretegovernmentquestionnot requiring his attention, once raisedby the Chairmanit set off alarm bells at the highestlevels.9

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The secondvulnerablepoint was an ideological one raisedshortly thereafter when, during a briefing of the Politburo by representativesof Bo's Finance Ministry and other central departmentsin February,Mao sharply criticized the tax system'skey principle of "equality betweenpublic and private enterprises" as a "right opportunist"mistakeviolating the overall courseof Party policy laid down by the Central Committeein early 1949.10 The Chairman'ssensitivity on this point must be seenin the context of discussionswhich had been underway since the latter part of 1952 on the formulation of a "generalline for the transition to socialism." In this situation where Mao soughtways to push forward the developmentof the socialist system,a program placing the bourgeoisieand the state on equal footing for tax purposeswas seen by the Chairman as raising seriouspolitical questionswhich he now placedon centerstagefor much of the remainderof the year. This concern,moreover,dovetailedwith his dissatisfaction over a numberof past casesinvolving Liu Shaoqisuch as the famous1949 Tianjin talks where Liu downplayedsocialist objectivesto sooth capitalist fears at the time of communist takeover. Although Mao had actually concurredin someof theseinstances,they now seeminglygratedgiven the new emphasison the transition to socialism with the result that his discontent becameknown within the top elite and, to somegreateror lesserdegree,was conveyedto Gao Gangin their privatetalks.11 The joining of the tax issue to Mao's more generalizedconcernsabout the transition to socialism createda degreeof uncertainty within the leadershipin which the Gao-Raoaffair took shape.Even more than Mao's letter complaining about not being informed about the new system,the Chairman'ssharphandling of the ideological issueleft Bo Yibo in a stateof shock.But while the matterwas widely viewed within the leadershipas a seriousmistakeon Bo's part, it doesnot appearto have producedextreme tension before the middle of the year. Gao Gang, however, fortified by his conversationswith Mao seemingly saw the situation as one where Liu and Zhou had lost Mao's trust which thereforepresentedan opportunity to changethe leadershippecking order and himself becomethe CCP'smain leaderunderthe Chairman.In this he was encouragednot only by the tax issueand Mao's other discontentswith Liu and Zhou, but by his own substantiallyenhancedstatussince arriving in the capital in late 1952. In addition to his postingas headof the SPC,administrativereorganizationsin the first half of 1953 gave Gao broad authority over many of the key sectorsof the economywhile at the sametime reducingZhou's role and thus reflecting Mao's displeasurewith the Premierand the alleged"dispersionism"of his government apparatus.This development,which clearly indicated Mao's high evaluationof Gao, not only fed Gao's own assessmentof his expandingpower but added further uncertaintieswithin the leadershipas a whole. While the possiblesignificanceof Gao'senhancedposition was unclear,the fact of Mao's regardfor him and that he of all the regional leaders transferredto Beijing in 1952-53 was destinedto play the most influential role-a perceptionreflected in the saying

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that "five horseshave enteredthe capital led by one horse"-waswidely known. In the context of Mao's dissatisfactionwith Liu and Zhou it could only create tension,howeversuppressed for the moment.12 The uncertaintygave way to conflict at the National Conferenceon Financial and EconomicWork from mid-Juneto mid-August.Apart from factional appeals behind the scenes(seebelow), the key developmentwas the treatmentof the tax issue at the conference-aprocesswhich largely reflected Mao's actions and perceived preferences.While initially the conferencehad been planned as a routine gathering, under the circumstancescreated by the new tax system it changedinto a major meeting under the direction of Zhou Enlai. Nevertheless, the meetingseeminglyproceededin a fairly normal mannerfor four weeksuntil, on the eveningof July 11, Mao directedthat a leadershipsmall group meetingbe convenedand that Bo make a self-examinationbefore it. While this, in Bo's recollection,was designedto bring out into the open harshcriticism which Gao and others had been making in group meetings,it also clearly reflected Mao's view that Bo's errors were serious and must be struggled against. When the leadershipgroup meeting convenedon July 13 it was, as Bo remembered,a "turning point"; the atmospheresuddenlyturned tenseand Bo was subjectedto eight criticism sessionsover the next two weekswith Gao Gangtaking a prominent role in depicting Bo's errors as a questionof political line, and using the criticism of Bo to attack indirectly Liu Shaoqi.Bo was then required to undertake a secondself-criticism which, after nervouslyrequestinga delay, he gaveon August 1. This effort, however,was consideredinsufficient and not passedleaving Bo full of doubtsand the meetingin a stateof disarray.13 While Mao's ideological concernshad set the stage for Bo's ordeal, the Chairmannow movedto lower the tensionof the meeting.Briefed by Zhou on a daily basis of developmentsat the conferencewhich he rarely attended,Mao seeminglybecameconcernedat the damagebeing done to Party unity and took a numberof stepsto repair the situation. Realizingthat the overheatedatmosphere madeit difficult for Zhou, who was also vulnerableon the tax issue,to bring the conferenceto a quick conclusion, Mao suggestedcalling for outside help and arrangedfor Chen Yun, who was formally on sick leave, and Deng Xiaoping to addressthe conference.In their speechesChen and Deng criticized Bo for the errors Mao had pointed out, but at the same time they moved to lessen his predicamentby declaring the issuesinvolved were not those of opposinglines. This sameapproachwas adoptedin Zhou's conferencesummaryon August 11 which had been personally checked by Mao who deleted the most serious charges,and by the Chairman'sown August 12 speech.In the sameperiod Mao worked to cool things down further by counsellingvarious leaderson the need for Party unity, rebuttingspecific accusationsraisedby Gao and Rao againstBo and Liu, declaring Liu selflessand honest, and (unsuccessfully)suggestingto Gao that he seeLiu personallyto sort out their differences.Particularlyrevealing was an incident at the August 9 Politburo meetingconvenedto discussZhou's

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summarywhich Mao notified Bo to attend,and when Gao critically interrupted Bo's effort to explain himself the Chairman in tum interrupted Gao with a rebuke which resulted in Gao shrinking back. The net result of Mao's actions wasto defuse,but not resolve,the situation.14 The reasonthe matter was not settled definitively was that the ambiguity of Mao'sposition left key leadersuncertainof his intentions,a patternwhich would be repeatedon many occasionsin the future. While the Chairmanhad rescued Bo Yibo, the criticism of his errors in both Zhou'ssummaryand Mao's concluding speechremainedvery harshwith the result that Bo felt obliged to requesthis dismissal.15 Moreover, Mao's rebuke of August 9 not withstanding,the Chairman apparentlydid not confront Gao over his generalperformanceat the conference.On the contrary, Zhou Enlai's summaryexpressedagreementwith Gao's characterizationof Boasdishonest,and while Gao ignored Mao's suggestionof seekingout Liu, Liu for his part deemedit necessaryto twice go to Gao and conductself-criticism before him. In thesecircumstances,Gao concludedprogresshad beenmadein underminingLiu and Zhou, and steppedup his activities. He now soughtto win supportfor his elevationover Liu and Zhou from military cadres,and especiallya numberof key CCP leadersincluding Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai,Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, both during a "holiday" trip to Eastand Central-SouthChina after the financial and economicconferenceand in Beijing. In lobbying for supportGao useda numberof appealsincluding the promiseof high positionsin a Gao administrationand by creatingresentmentamongleaders with military and basearea backgroundsagainst those like Liu and Zhou with substantial"white area" experience.In this effort he not only arguedthat underground cadreshad a disproportionateshare of power in the existing arrangements,but that they also formed a faction that was seekingunfairly to increase its representationon the new Politburo to be chosenat the Eighth Party Congress which was plannedfor the nearfuture.16 Here,significantly, Gao tried to draw on Mao's prestigeby claiming that the Chairmanwas the representativeof "red" or base area cadres while Liu was the representativeof the "white areas." But undoubtedlyGao's strongestweaponwas the "rumor" that Liu was no longer trustedby Mao, an assertionwhich surely had somecredibility in the minds of other leadersgiven the developmentsof the springand summer.17 The potency of these appealswas shown by the fact that a significant although indeterminatenumberof high ranking leadersoffered varying degreesof supportto Gao. Most important was the backing, albeit fairly passive,given by Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai who tellingly later sought to excusethemselvesby claiming that Gao had duped them into believing that Mao had actually lost confidencein Liu. 18 The importanceof perceptionsof the Chairman'sintentions was even more strikingly reflected in the casesof the two key leaderswho did not offer backing to Gao Gang-ChenYun and Deng Xiaoping. Theseleaders were apparentlyapproachedby GaoaboutSeptemberbut only reportedhis activities to Mao about November after a delay of perhapstwo months.19 As an

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authoritativeoral sourceput it, they had to be extremelycareful in dealing with the issuesinceGao might indeedrepresentMao. Yet theseleaderswere perhaps better placed than any othersto divine the Chairman'smeaning. Initially, their hesitancyto back Gao arguablywas related to their roles-at Mao's behest-in easingthe predicamentof Bo Yibo and by extensionof Liu and Zhou; thus while they were well awareof Mao's dissatisfactionwith Liu and Zhou they also had reason to believe that the Chairman was not preparedto take serious action againstthem. Moreover, when they did decide to act, it most likely cameafter the National Conferenceon OrganizationWork which concludedin late October. During the courseof this conferenceMao had becomeincreasinglyhostile to the activities of Gao's"ally," Rao Shushi,who attackedanotherlong-termassociate of Liu, deputyorganizationdepartmentdirector An Ziwen, with the assitanceof Gao'ssubordinatesin the Northeast.When Mao determinedto bring theseactivities to a halt, as in August he dispatchedDeng Xiaoping to the conferenceto drive the messagehome. Seemingly,it was the Chairman'smore clear-cutposition which emboldenedChen and Deng to go to Mao and reveal Gao's approachesto them.2o Once informed of Gao'slobbying activities, Mao apparentlydeterminedthat his commitmentto Party unity outweighedany ideological or personalpartiality to Gao Gang,or any discontentwith Liu Shaoqior Zhou Enlai. He subsequently spreadthe messageto other still confusedleaders,sendingChen Yun to talk to Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping to PengDehuai. Meanwhile Zhou Enlai and Mao himself held discussionswith still other leadersso that by sometimein Decem21 Then, at a DecemberPolitber virtually all support for Gao had evaporated. buro meeting, Mao apparently stage-manageda situation where Gao was inducedto opposeMao's proposalthat Liu Shaoqitake over while the Chairman went on holiday, an attitude which was seenas evidenceof Gao'ssinister designs.When Mao finally-for the first time--directly challengedGao'sactivities on December24, 1953,the "conspiracy"collapsedlike a houseof cards.22 The centrality of Mao's position in politics at the top revealedin the preceding developmentsdid not mean that other leaderswere simply reactive to the Chairman, however. These leaders had a range of responsibilitiesand policy preferencesthroughout this period and could not simply sit back and wait for Mao. They promotedtheir agendasand sought to nudge the Chairman toward their solutions-agame played with consummateskill throughoutthe Gao-Rao affair by ChenYun in gaining Mao's backingon a numberof policy issuessuch as bureaucraticcontrol of the socialist transformationof the bourgeoisieand the moderationof policy toward commercial capitalists.23 If Mao was clearly opposedto the policy preferencesof anotherleaderor group of leaders,then the prudent choice was to retreat24; throughout 1953 officials on different sides of various issuesranging from Bo Yibo on tax policy to Gao Gang objecting to a peaceful approachto the transformationof bourgeoisieput aside their views once the Chairmandeclaredhis position.25 As suggested,where the Chairman

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had no known position or his precisepreferenceswere unclear,therewas room for initiative, but in many instancesuncertaintyled to temporizingand inaction. Either way, the patternof following Mao'scuesandtailoring goalsandstrategies to his perceivedpreferenceswas not limited to the policy and political issuesof the Gao-Raoperiod; it can also be clearly seenin subsequentmajor developmentsthroughoutthe pre-CulturalRevolutionyears. TheHundredFlowers

A key questionwhich could not be decidedon the basisof infonnation available when Politics and Purgeswas written andhascontinuedto be the subjectof scholarly contentionis the degreeof Politburo conflict over Party rectification and the Hundred Flowers movementin 1957. I arguedin Politics and Purges that while somedegreeof debatein top Partybodieswas likely given the innovativenature of the proposedrectification-especiallycriticism from non-Partybourgeoisintellectuals-the existing evidencesuggestedthat any differenceswere substantiallycontained and did not break out into polarizedconflict as claimed by the dominant scholarlyinterpretation.This evidence,I further argued,did not presentany convincing documentationthat the two "opponents"of Mao's rectification singledout by Westernscholarship--LiuShaoqiand PengZhen--badactually arguedagainstthe Chairman'sposition within the Politburo althoughthis could not be ruled out. The analysisalso emphasizedambiguitiesin Mao's known position, and notedapparent changesin his attitudetoward the role of intellectualsover the 1956-57period. In this view shifts in Party policy followed the changesin the Chairman'sperceptions.26 While definitive evidenceis still lacking in the absenceof detaileddocumentation 27 this broad analysis is sustainedby new information on Politburo discussions, since 1978.At the mostgenerallevel, oneof the PRC's which hasbecome available most authoritativePartyhistorianstold me that he had no knowledgeof top leadership differencesoverthe HundredFlowersandexpressedthe opinionthat"everyone followed Mao." While suchan assessment is perhapspaintedwith too broada brush, in my view it is barelyconceivablethat a majorconflict within the Politburo would not be known to my source.This analysiswasfurther supportedby otherwell placed oral sources.Most impressivewere thosewith accessto detailedcentraldocuments from the period who strongly denieddivisions within the core leadership.In their opinion, different views existedat lower levels,particularlyat whatwasdescribedas the deputydepartmentheadlevel,28 but not in the "CentralCommittee."The reasons for this, they argued,was that CentralCommitteeofficials understoodthe complete rationaleof the HundredFlowers, while outsidersdid not havethis understanding and consequentlyworried about the effects of the unprecedentedpolicy. Takentogether,theseseveraloral sourcesprovide powerful backingfor my low conflict argument.In addition, it is noteworthythat no post-1979 documentary sourceI am awareof acknowledgesdifferencesbetweenMao and his ranking colleagueson this issue.Of course,as with the failure of Cultural Revolutionsources

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to cite such differences,the absenceof documentationcannotprove the casebut it doesprovideadditionalsupportfor the interpretation.29 There is, however,one major new documentarysource,a substantialnumber of Mao's unpublishedspeechesfrom Februaryto April 1957 when the Chairman, to use his own term, "lobbied" for the Hundred Flowers policy.30 These speechesconfirm and provide richer detail on what was alreadyknown in 1979 -the ambiguity of Mao's position and his perceptionof"opposition" within the Party as a whole. In particular,in thesespeechesthe Chairmanrepeatedlyharped on the failure of up to 90 percentof Party officials to support the policy and criticized the restrictive view publishedin the Central Committee'snewspaper, Renmin ribao [People'sDaily], by Chen Qitong and three other army literary critics in early January1957. In this sameperiod Mao extendedhis dissatisfaction with Renminribao and its editorial staff headedby DengTuo to include the paper'sfailure to publicize his Februaryspeechon "Contradictions."Although the Chairmanworked himself up to considerableangerover the latter matter in particular,the new documentationas a whole providesyet more backing for the original interpretationof Politics and Purges while at the sametime providing new insightsinto the Mao-centeredpolitical process. In broadterms, Mao's lobbying efforts of spring I 957 were clearly designed to win over a Party membershipthat was confusedand fearful over where the HundredFlowersmight lead, as well as uncomprehendingas to why the victors of the Chineserevolution should be subjectedto criticism from suspectbourgeois intellectuals. Mao's tone is generally understandingto the point of acknowledging,on one occasion, thatthe concernsraisedwere "quite logical," and his advice to officials was to lay asidetheir fears. When discussingthe (usually) nine out of ten high ranking officials assertedlyagainstthe policy, Mao's description does not suggestopposition to him or even a focusedrejection of the policy acrossthe board, but rathera situation of considerabledoubt and lack of understanding.As the Chairman put it in his "Contradictions" speechin late February,"... amonghigh level cadresnine out often do not approveor [only] half approved,or do not understandwell. [Those] who really understand,really think this policy is correct,are a minority, so thereis a real needto work [at this], to work at persuading[people]."31 Apart from this modulatedview of "opposition," thesespeechesstrongly imply, as assertedby oral sources,that any resistancedid not come from the Center. Throughoutspring I 957 Mao consistently depicted the Hundred Flowers as the "Center's" policy, never implying any division within the core leadership,and in mid-March he flatly assertedthat "We [at the Center] have a unanimousopinion."32 The overall picture from Mao's own statementsin this period,then, is of a Party understandablyconfused,suspicious of the new policy, but led by a unified top leadership. While the precise attitudes and reactionsof leadersat the very top remain unknown, thesenew documentsdepict a familiar picture of lower ranking officials, including somewith significant positionsat the Center,attemptingto fig-

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ure out Mao's meaning,guide him in the direction of their policy preferences, and hesitatingto act in the face of uncertaintyover his preciseposition. Apart from perplexity causedby the inherent novelty of the Hundred Flowers experiment, confusion was further created by the ambivalencesin Mao's position which is even more clearly revealedby his spring speechesthan from previously availablesources.Thus while the Chairman'soverall determinationto promote bloomingand contendingcomesthrough,negativecommentsaboutintellectuals, endorsementof the needto criticize them, assertionsof the existenceof only two schools-theproletarianand the bourgeois,and reaffirmationsof Party leadership undoubtedlyaddedto the uncertainty.33 Indeed,on variousoccasionsMao's talks were interruptedby officials wishing, as Mao observed,"to fathom what is the Center'spolicy at the bottom," and seekingguidancefrom the Chairman,a directive or the convening of a meeting that would sort things out. In some instancesthe concernedofficials clearly soughtto draw Mao toward their views, as in a March 10 exchangewhere an official of Renmin ribao, perhapschief editor Deng Tuo, suggestedthat the danger of confusion from the Hundred Flowerspolicy arguedfor its delimitation. Here, aselsewhere,the overoptimistic Mao wavedasidethe request,effectively gaveno clearguidance,and told people not to worry and consider the matter for themselves.None of this relieved anxieties,nor had the effect of maximizing momentumbehind the very policies Mao favored.34 The specific casespreoccupyingthe Chairmanin spring 1957 further reinforce this picture. Throughoutthis period Mao cited the early Januaryarticle of Chen Qitong et al. as a dogmatistattack on the Hundred Flowers. Yet the full range of Mao's remarks indicate a more complex picture. First, as argued in Politics and Purges,when the article by Chen'sgroup initially appeared,it came at a time of comparativerestriction in the official attitude toward dissent in society as reflectedin the late 1956Renminribao editorial, "More on the Historical Experienceof the Dictatorshipof the Proletariat,"an editorial fully endorsed by the Chairmanat the time and even as late as mid-March although by then linked to a call for its flexible application.35 Moreover, accordingto Mao, when the Chen group submittedits article, rather than acting at the behestof higher levels, they did it "without waiting for orders"and "didn't even[bother] to check 36 Again, the picture is one of deep it with the [central] propagandadepartment." concern,even panic at the lower levels rather than resistanceorganizedfrom above. In this instance,moreover,given the recent authoritativeeditorial Chen and associatesmay have been convincedthat they were supportingthe Party's policy. Mao, in any case,later observedthat othersmight plausibly havethought that their article representedthe Center'sopinion.37 Whatever the early January perceptionsof the Chen group or the Renmin ribao editorswho acceptedtheir article, the evidencesuggestsMao took a while to focus on its negativeaspects.At the late January1957 conferenceof provincial secretaries,Mao, by his later admission,only made a few less than totally

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clear side commentson the case.On that occasion,in a context where Mao's own more general remarks still had a decidedly restrictive side,38 he praised Chenet al. as loyal and devotedto the Party while at the sametime calling for a policy of blooming and, according to his subsequentrecollection, adding the rider that their article could not serve as a guide. Subsequentlythe Chairman would complain mildly that reportssummarizingthe conferencefor lower levels by those who attendeddistorted his views by portraying him as approving the article and by omitting his qualifications.39 While this was arguablya caseof conscioustailoring of Mao's words to suit the preferencesof the officials concerned,the Chairman'slack of clarity left amplescopefor such an interpretation.Moreover,even as Mao turned to a more vigorousadvocacyof the HundredFlowersin mid-February,he still muddiedthe waters concerningthe Chen Qitong group by declaring that the standpointof their article was good, it was OK for Renminribao to publish it, and its main "dogmatist" failings were that it was dull, oversimplified, and unconvincing. Given Mao's ambiguousrecord on this score, it would not be surprising if leading membersof Renminribao were nonplusedwhen the Chairmanaccused them of a grovelling and unclear attitude toward the article over the next few weekswhen,for the first time, he declaredhis view that the article was wrong.40 If the Renminribao leadershiphad reasonto feel uncomfortableover Mao's changingviews on the Chen Qitong question,they soon receivedmore serious expressionsof his dissatisfactionwith their performance.By early April he linked the Chen Qitong issue to what he saw as a deliberatepolicy of Renmin ribao not to propagatehis ideason contradictionsand thus sabotagethe whole Hundred Flowers effort, a belief which culminatedin a particularly nasty incident when Mao furiously beratededitor Deng Tuo in the Chairman'spersonal quarterson April 10. The responsibleofficials of Renminribao, however, had beenfaced with a complexsituationwhereParty regulationsbannedpublicity on and quotationsfrom Mao's speechesbefore any text was published,and official proceduresrequireda processof revision and approvalof such speeches.In this caseMao himself declaredhis intention not to publish the late February"Contradictions" speechwithout revision shortly after its delivery and expressedmock horror at the consequences of issuing an unamendedversion.The revision processwas all the more difficult given that the speechwasso disorganized,unclear and plain contradictory that three complete rewritings were required before it was publicly presentable.Although the Party's daily had drawn up a plan to publicize Mao's speeches,it delayedgiven uncertaintyas to how to proceed-an uncertaintycontributedto by Mao's March 10 refusal to give specific guidelines on the HundredFlowers policy more generallywhen so requestedby his propagandists.This, togetherwith the fact that as late as March 20 the Chairmanspoke of launching rectification in 1958, could reasonablyhave led the responsible officials to conclude that a deliberate pace was not at variance with Mao's projectedschedule,and that the complexitiesof the situation arguedfor caution.

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While one can readily infer that the officials involved were anxiousconcerningthe moreradical implicationsof Mao'sideas,their hesitancyto act is mosteconomically explainedby the absenceof clearordersfrom eitherthe "Party Center''or from the Chainnanhimself.41 Indeed,the official of the PartyCenterresponsiblefor newspaperwork who was also one of Mao's leadingsecretaries,Hu Qiaomu,assumedsomeresponsibilityfor the performanceof Renmin ribao at the April 10 meeting in Mao's quartersby indicatingthat he wasunsurehow to handleMao'sspeeches andhadtemporarilyput the draft articles concerningthem on the back burner.42 That a figure who played sucha key role in Mao'spersonaloffice, a figure sensitiveto the Chairman'smany moods,was also unclearconcerningthe propercourseof action, further points to uncertaintyoverwhat Mao actuallywantedasthe key factor explainingthe courseof events.In any case,both Renminribao and the propagandaapparatusnow beganto publicizethe HundredFlowersheavily. While it is possible,as wasdonein Politics and Purges,to detect restrictive sentimentsin some media statementsthroughout April and May,43 overall the performanceof the propagandaapparatussurely gave effective supportto Mao's policies. For how else but through sustainedorganizational pressurecan the large scaleblooming and contendingof the hitherto suspiciousbourgeoisintellectualswhich emergedin May beexplained? In sum, the new data reviewedabovesuggestthat in 1957 as in 1953 officials treatedMao gingerly, attemptedto nudgehim in their preferreddirection,and,while undoubtedlyusingthe uncertaintiesof the situationto presstheir own views, fundamentally carriedout the Chairman'sprogramonce it was clearly set. The detailed evidenceconcerningthe Renminribao, however,appliesspecifically to sub-Politburo officials, while the preciseviews of those at the very top remain obscure. Nevertheless,the overall picture remainsthat of Politics and PufXeY-l>artyofficials, including his leadershipcolleagues,largely followed Mao without offering systematic oppositionto his policies regardlessof reservationsthey may haveharbored.44 Wherethe responseto Mao's initiatives in spring 1957lackedvigor, it was in large part dueto the ambiguitiesof anduncertaintyoverthe Chairman'sown position.

Chen Yun during the GreatLeapForward The generalpatternof Mao dominancewas revealedevenmore dramatically during the GreatLeap Forward. In two key instancesconcerningthe rectification-purge processduring this period, however, some modification of my 1979 interpretationsis in order. In the first case,the downgradingof Chen Yun in 1958, the broad point remainsvalid that this was the first post-1949 occasionwhen the authority of a Politburo member was emasculatedas a result of differencesrelating to current policy, but new information suggests a rather different processfrom what was, in contrastto all other casesexamined in Politics and Purges,originally arguedsolely on the basisof contextual evidence.In the earlier analysisChen'sdeclining influence was depictedas a caseof applying informal sanctionsagainsthim for policy advocacythat was

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inimicable to the Great Leap program.Chen, in other words, was being pushed out of a position of real influence, but the actual processwas rather low key, lacking both formal punishmentand internal criticism. In several respectsthis view requiresrevision. First, it is now clear that the circumstancessurroundingChen Yun's reduced role were less gentle than those suggestedin Politics and Purges. As shall be discussedat greaterlength later in this introduction,at the Nanningconferencein January1958 Mao launcheda scathingattackon not only Chenbut also Premier Zhou Enlai, an onslaughtwhich also slated two additional Politburo members and leadingeconomicofficials, Minister of FinanceLi Xiannian and StateEconomic Commission head Bo Yibo.45 The attack was notable not only for the severity of its criticism of thesePolitburo members,but also for the fact that it was not directedagainstexpresseddissentfrom currentpolicy but insteadat the allegedly "rightist conservative"policies of "opposing recklessadvance"(fan maojin) that thesefour leadershad promoted in 1956 to deal with imbalances createdby an overheatedeconomy-althoughat that time with Mao's concurrence.46Under the intensepressurecreatedby Mao's onslaughtit was not only impossible to articulate 1956-type views which contrastedso sharply to the emergingGreat Leap Forward line, but Chen, Zhou, Li and Bo were requiredto make self-criticismsat the SecondSessionof the Eighth Party Congressin May 1958.47 Yet theseleadersfared quite differently during the leap forward: Li and Bo played major policy roles under Mao's direct control of the economy;Zhou, althoughperhapssuffering a slight loss of status,48 continuedto perform his key administrativefunction; but Chen,althoughstill active on ceremonialoccasions, seeminglyhad little operationalrole in the economicspherehe had dominated during the first eight yearsof the PRC. How can thesedifferencesbe explained? Li Xiannian and Bo Yibo, although key figures in the fan maojin program, seeminglyfully acceptedMao's criticisms of "anti-recklessadvance"soonafter he beganthem in September1957. Indeed,even before he sufferedMao's attack by name at Nanning, in December1957 Bo condemnedthe policies he helped shapeeighteenmonths earlier. At the May Congresssessionboth Bo and Li offered apparentlyfulsome self-criticisms of their 1956 "transgressions,"and following the meetingthrew themselvesenthusiasticallyinto the work of guiding the Great Leap. Mao was impressed,as shown in his favorable commentson their respectiveJune 1958 reports on the economy.In particular, the Chairman seemedpleasedwith Bo's claim that Britain could be overtakenin two to three years' time rather than the fifteen or seven years previously projected.49 In contrast,no referencein Party history sourcesto similar praiseof Zhou in 1958 by Mao hasbeenlocated. Zhou's complex attitude, however, is perhapsbest indicated by his selfcriticism to the May Party Congress.In the period betweenthe March 1958 Chengdu conferencewhen Mao again lambastedthose responsiblefor fan maojin and May, Zhou and the others had to preparetheir self-examinations.

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From the accountof his secretary,this processcausedthe Premierconsiderable distress.While Zhou, on the basisof a personalconversationwith Mao, apparently acceptedthe view that the basiccauseof his errorswas that his thoughthad not kept up with the Chairman's,the actual drafting of the self-criticism was a painful experiencewhich revealed"contradictionsin his heart." A possibly revealingincident during the processoccurredwhen ChenYun rang Zhou, perhaps remindinghim of the reasonsfor "anti-recklessadvance,"and afterwards,seemingly given pause,the Premierlapsedinto five or six minutesof silence. In the event, however,whateverhis reservations,Zhou producedan excessiveself-criticism at the Congressin the samestyle he had shown during the Yan'an rectification. He not only assumedthe main responsibility for the errors committed which he characterizedas mistakesof guiding principle (fangzhen),endorsed Mao's view that such mistakeshad been used by the non-Party "rightists" in 1957 to launch a seriousclassstruggleagainstthe CCP, and equatedfan maojin with governmentwork breakingaway from Party leadership,but he also devoted a specialsectionof his speechto "learning from ChairmanMao." In this lavish praise,which prefigured Lin Biao's notoriousJanuary1962 paeanto the Chairman, Zhou held that experienceshowedMao representedthe truth, good results were inseparablefrom Mao's correct leadership,and on the contrary mistakes and lossesoccurredwhen the Party becamedivorced from his leadershipand directives-something demonstratedby the Premier'sown case.5° Chen Yun's self-criticism, however,displayeda coolertone. While Chentoo acceptedresponsibility for the "completely mistaken"fan maojin policies, the main thrust seemedto be on his insufficient understandingand excessivelynegative assessments of the economicsituation in 1956 and, someacknowledgement of Mao's timely rectification of the situation and his settingthe economyon its currentvictoriouscoursenotwithstanding,it apparentlylackeda discourseon the needto study the Chairman.51 This more modulatedposition may provide a clue to Chen'sapparentloss of function, but it is only part of a larger story. When other leadersset aboutcarrying out the Great Leap with their varying degreesof enthusiasm,Chen seeminglylapsedinto comparativeinactivity. Chen'sdistinctive behaviorwas summedup in an understatedmannerover twenty yearslater by Deng Xiaoping: "Neither ComradeLiu Shaoqinor ComradeZhou Enlai nor I for that matterobjectedto [the Great Leap], and ComradeChen Yun didn't say anything either."52 Of course Liu in particular did more than not object, he becamea major force in driving the ventureforward.53 But in "not saying anything" Chen both ceasedany contrary policy advocacyand no longer played a major implementingrole-he didn't opposebut, on the whole, neither did he participateactively.54 The central questionfor our purposesis whether he was pushedaside by an annoyedMao or steppedaside of his own volition, and the answeris by no meansentirely clear-cut. According to one authoritativeoral source,Chen'srole in 1958 reflected a career long modus operandi: when Mao was unwilling to listen to his ideas

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Chen'spractice was to stop talking or go into hospita1.55 Other sourcesplace greateremphasison the other side of the equation,i.e., becauseof Chen'sdifferent ideasMao pushedhim asideas an effective actor.56 On balance,the evidence gatheredfrom oral sourcesin particular suggeststhat at least to some degree Chen Yun's reducedrole in 1958 was a matter of his own choice, that he was unwilling to play an active role aIa Bo Yibo or Li Xiannian in carrying out an economicstrategy he believed to be deeply flawed. However, the commentof one suchsourcewho was a significant participantin the high level politics of the leap, someonewith a close personalknowledgeof Chen from an earlier period, that it was impossiblefor him to say whetherChen was pushedor steppedaside undoubtedly reflects a larger truth. Not only were both elementspresent,but there were important limits with respectto both the "pushing" and "stepping" aspectsof the situation-limits which reflected the complex relationship between the Chairmanandoneof his key subordinates. For Mao's part, his harshcriticism and Chen'sapparentreluctanceto shoulder major duties notwithstanding,he did not push Chen too far off the political stage.This was reflected not only in the fact that Chen'sformal rank remained unchangedand he continued to appear in public, but also in his June 1958 appointmentto head a new financial and economic small group of the Party Center.Although other key membersof the group--Li Fuchun,Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo and Tan Zhenlin-wereactive proponentsof the leap, it is clear that the group as such,while in theory providing overall supervisionof economicpolicy, in fact like Chen himself had little real function.57 This had two apparentadvantages. First, it provided a non-operationalorgan including the regime's most respectedeconomicspecialistthat Mao could consult, or as quickly becamethe case,chooseto ignore. Second,it provideda role, howeverempty in practice,for one of the CCP's most senior officials commensuratewith this status. In a system so sensitive to status, such an arrangementallowed the Chairman to honor Chen'shistorical contributionsand position without inhibiting Mao from taking direct personalcontrol of economicpolicy for the first time in the history of the PRC.58 Meanwhile, on Chen's side, his role as group head, while not intrinsically significant, was indicative of the fact that while he had "stepped aside" he had not entirely "steppedoff' the political stage.Although apparently largely keeping silent as Great Leap expectationsreachedtheir most absurd heightsin summerand early fall 1958, Chen maintainedhis presencewithin the leadershipand was positioned for a more active role should Mao changehis mind. In the event,such a changeon the Chairman'spart camesoonerthan Chen probablyimaginedlikely. Oral sourcesassertthat Mao was the first to point out the shortcomingsof the Great Leap and the needfor policy adjustments. 59 By the time of the first Zhengzhou conferencein November1958 he beganto addressthe excessesof the leap forward, now attacking economistsas "leftists" who got by on false pretences. Moreover, at ZhengzhouMao dropped a favorable referenceto Chen Yun as

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more knowledgeablethan himself about the economy.60 But given that the Chairman remainedfundamentallycommitted to the broad thrust of the Great Leap, Chen had to proceedwith great caution and beganto speakup about the WuchangCentral Committeeplenum. In one time of the November-December of his first movesjust beforethe plenum he drafteda proposalnot to publish the wildly ambitiousgrain and steel targets,but Mao's secretary,Hu Qiaomu, in an apparenteffort to shield Chen,failed to passon Chen'sopinion to the Chairman. Mao, however, now seemedinclined to give Chen some room to air his views and criticized Hu for his temerity in pigeonholingthe opinion of a Party Vice Chairman. Later in December, moreover, Chen gave a speechin Hangzhou where Mao was also stayingwhich raisedsome"seriousmistakesand shortcomings" and called for more attention to the quality of output as opposedto the current obsessionwith quantity. That Mao was not particularly displeasedis perhapssuggestedby the invitation Chen receivedto the Chairman'sbirthday party a few days later, an occasionthat Chen usedto air his concernsdirectly to Mao. While the Chairmandid not acceptChen'sviews, he left the door ajar with the commentthat they should let practice judge the matter. Mao later claimed that at this time he beganto sharesomeof Chen'sopinions, but this seemingly was not articulatedforcefully to others.As a result, while Chenwas able to voice his opinions more openly over the next few months, "No one listenedto him." What seeminglyhad happenedwas familiar-a shift in the Chairman'sposition had openedup possibilities for a concernedleaderto try and shapepolicy in a preferred direction. Contrary to the erroneousview in the original edition of Politics and Purges, rather than lapse into virtual silence by 1959, Chen had taken up the challengeof trying to curb the excessesof the leap. But in the contextof a continuing, if somewhattoned down, leap forward, the opportunity createdwasstrictly limited.61 With Mao's perceptionsof economicproblems deepening during the first half of 1959, Chen'srole-while still limited-grew accordingly. At the Shanghai Central Committee plenum in early April, the Chairman praisedChen for his contrary opinionson the 1958 food and steel targets,observingthat "the truth is sometimesgraspedby a minority even to the point of being in the handsof one person.'>62 After the plenum, moreover, Mao beratedseveral economic policy makersby telling them they knew nothing about the economyand should seek out Chento find out if their targetsfor steelwere practical.As a result Chenwas formally entrustedwith investigating the steel situation, his views were now listened to, and the steel target was reduced.63 Finally, in July during the early part of the Lushanmeetings,severalof Mao's secretariesapproachedthe Chairman with the suggestionthat Chen be placed in chargeof economicwork. The Chairmanrespondedpositively, not only stating that Chen'seconomicthought was correct, but observingthat "only when the country is in chaosdo you long for a good general.''When the Peng Dehuai affair erupted at the conference, however,the situationchangeddrastically. Even though Chen was not involved

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or even presentat Lushan, following the meeting he not only was not given control of the economy,but the central financial and economicsmall group that he headedwas abolished.64 To summarize,the new information availablesince 1979providesa much richer and more complex understandingof the downgrading--andsubsequentpartial revival-of ChenYun during the Great Leap than was possibleoriginally. It showsa processthat had harderedgesthan seemedthe caseearlier, yet at the sametime one where the reductionof Chen'srole was to a substantialextenta productof his own will. The new data also provide further evidenceof a leadershipin awe of Mao, falling into line behind his demands,and at most gently seekingto guide him to preferredoutcomeswhen the opportunityarose.In contrastto 1953, however,even so astutea leaderas Chen Yun had only limited successin moving the Chairman. Yet this limited successdid help moderatepolicy for a time and, while not restored to a major role, Chen was left in a position where his talents could be used on anotherday. ChenYun's cautious,sensitivehandlingof Mao was clearly preferable to PengDehuai'sapproachwhich triggeredthe explosionat Lushan.

TheCrisis at Lushan The secondkey developmentfrom the Great Leap period needingsomereexamination is preciselythe eventsat the Lushanmeetingswhich culminatedin the dismissal of Minister of DefensePeng Dehuai. Here the basic picture presentedin 1979 of eventsleading up to and unfolding at Lllshan has beenconfrrrned by voluminous PRCsourcesincluding Peng's"self-statement,"variousmemoiraccountsof Lllshan, Party history analyses,and interviews with Chinesescholars,as well as by new 65 That is, in the entire period since late 1958 Mao beganto Westernscholarship. confront the shortcomingsof the leap and, as seenin the abovediscussionof Chen Yun's role, waspreparedto makesignificant modificationsto the policiesbut not the conceptof the Great Leap. Moreover, when the Lushanconferenceconvened,Mao seemedready to continue this developmentuntil he received Peng'sfar-reaching critique of the leap and drastically altered his attitude. But the questionof Peng's intent in writing his critical "letter of opinion," and thusthe larger political meaning of Lllshan, hasremainedcontentious.WasPeng,andotherslike ZhangWentianwho alsocriticized the leap forward, engagingin "an all-out attackon [Mao's] policies'>66 and indeedon the Chairman himself, as various analystshave asserted,or was he seekingto persuadeMao to alter his courseas arguedin Politics and Purges?The new datagreatly strengthenmy original interpretationalthough,assuggestedearlier, not without somequalification.67 The unanimousview of the Party historiansconsultedis that although Peng Dehuai,ZhangWentian and othersin the alleged"anti-Partyclique" represented a broad strand of opinion within the leadership,their aim was not to confront Mao but to deepenthe trend of correcting the excessesof the leap which the Chairman himself had set in motion. There were, as I shall discussin a later section, concernswith Mao's "undemocratic" tendencieswhich had been in

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particularly strong evidenceduring the Great Leap, but the main story was the familiar one of divining the Chairman'sintentionsand making useof the opportunities they presentedto advanceone'spolicy preferences.That Mao'sdesireto correct the "left" was widely perceivedduring the "first stage" of the Lushan conferenceis amply demonstratedby the range of officials revealedby post1979 sourcesto have adoptedthis perspective.This included not only government administratorslike Zhou Enlai who now had scope to express his presumablymoderateinclinations,but also suchGreatLeap radicalsas Shanghai leaderKe Qingshi who broughtmaterialscritical of leftist phenomenato Lushan, and Mao's long time secretaryand troubleshooter,Chen Boda, who both openly aired concernin group meetingsand joined in private criticisms of the leap with the Chairman'sother secretariesHu Qiaomu, Tian Jiaying, Li Rui and Wu Lengxi. That theseleadersof different ideological tendencies,work responsibilities and Party rank-butwho all had a high degreeof personalaccessto Maowere on the sametrack indicatesthat an anti-left posturewas seenas important to retainingor regainingthe Chairman'sfavor.68 But while the main direction was relatively clear as Party leadersgatheredat Lushan,as arguedin Politics and Purgestherewas considerableambiguity as to the precisepolicy implicationsof this direction and particularly of how far Mao was preparedto go in correctingleft errors.This was inherentin the Chairman's attitudesince late 1958 that the Great Leap conceptwas correct and errors were limited to concretework problems,a view typified by his statementon the eveof Lushanthat althoughproblemswere "quite a few," "our achievementsare great ... and the future is bright." As we have seen,in this generalcontext many had earlier chosento ignore Chen Yun's moderatingsuggestions,and Chen, apparently mistakenly,6 9 even felt it necessaryto makea self-criticism in spring 1959. Others like Wang Jiaxiang, who expresseddoubts about the adequacyof the measuresto correct the people'scommunesadoptedin December1958, experiencedMao's displeasure,while still othersstifled their critical opinionsgiven the uncertainty of the situation notwithstandingMao's more cautious bent. Thus when the Lushanmeetingsbegan,evenallowing for the critical comments being made, considerablerestraint was evident. As Peng Dehuai observed,people were not airing opinionsfreely, a situation undoubtedlydue to fear of offending Mao.7° In this situationPengcould later interprethis actionsat Lushanas designedto overcomesuch hesitancyand foster the processof correcting the left trend by gaining Mao's backing,for problems"could be easily resolved"if the Chairman endorsedcorrectpolicies. Sucha calculation,of course,was basedon the principle that Mao was unchallengeable-aprinciple that informed his actions and those of others in his "clique" throughout the Lushan meetings. Rather than having a plan to confront Mao, Pengdid not even want to go to Lushan,preferring instead to remain in Beijing overseeingmilitary affairs, and only went when, among others, the Chairman himself rang up and urged him to attend.

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Similarly, Peng'sgreatestally at Lushan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and alternatePolitburo memberZhang Wentian, was also somewhatreluctantto go, but was persuadedto attend by Foreign Minister Chen Yi who argued that it would not produceproblemssince Mao had raised no objectionsto the critical remarksconcerningthe leap both Chen and Zhang had raisedat a Juneforeign affairs conference.Thus both PengDehuaiand ZhangWentian-theirdeepconcern over the economic situation and subsequentboldnessnotwithstanding71 Once present,other manifestedcaution about even attendingthe conference. signs of prudencewere in evidence.Despite some indiscretions,72 Peng later claimed he felt uneasyabout raising difficult questionsat group discussionsas it could produce"confusion." Moreover, in severaltalks with Hunan First Secretary Zhou Xiaozhou, a secretaryof Mao's in the 1930s who would soon be labelleda leadingmemberof Peng's"clique," the two men soughtnot simply to reinforceeachother'scritical opinion of the leap, but also apparentlyto urge one anotherto raise their concernswith the Chairman.In the event, it was only after Zhou Xiaozhou did see Mao and reportedback that the Chairmanwas sincere that Pengreluctantly decidedto approachMao himself. But while he was wary that his impetuousnaturemight result in giving offence to the Chairman,Peng had alreadyconcludedthat at worst Mao would sackhim as Minister of Defense with the effect of promoting his close colleagueChief of Staff Huang Kecheng to the post.73 Moved by thesefactors, Pengwent to the Chairman'squartersonly to find Mao asleep.This led to Peng'sfateful decisionto write his "letter of opinion," a private letter that could not be regardedas an open attackon Mao. Oncewritten, the letter was circulatedon Mao's instruction by the Central Committee'sGeneral Office-not by Pengas claimedin Politics and Purges.Thus Peng'sprivate communicationwas turned into an inner Party document.Peng seemedconcerned that the very fact of making the letter public could mean trouble and askedthe GeneralOffice to take it back, therebyindicating that he saw eventhe possibleperceptionthat he was criticizing Mao as politically dangerous.Moreover, once Mao did launch his attackon Peng,the old marshal,like many other participantsat Lushan, was astonishedby the ferocity of the Chairman'sreaction. Peng could not see how a letter meant only for Mao's eyes could be interpretedby the Chairmanas a political attack, and he bitterly askedhimself why after thirty yearsof closecollaborationMao could not have privately talked with him if he had made such a grave mistake. Peng'sanger, as well as the circumstancesof his letter, strongly suggestthat he did not conceiveof it as an attackon the Chairman.74 Yet we are left with the curious nature of the letter itself; part the polite memorial to the throne depictedby Politics and Purgeswhich, as the editors of Peng's"self-statement"assert, "seemsdiplomatic and mild," 75 yet which on reflection clearly containedsomebarbedcommentaryon the contemporary situation.76 The answer to this paradox seemsto lie in Peng'sprovocative nature.

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Penghad a history of not simply speakinghis mind, but also of provoking people to get them to do what he wanted. He had spokencrudely to the Comintern's military representative,Otto Braun, during the fifth encirclementcampaignin 1934 in an effort to securea changein tactics,77 and now he attemptedto use a more measuredvariation of the sameapproachon Mao. After writing his letter Pengtold ZhangWentian that he believed Mao's pre-Lushanmeasuresto modify the Great Leap had not gone far enough,and he deliberatelyincluded a few stings (ci) in the letter to induce Mao to go further.78 Thus the letter was not quite the polite memorial previously argued,nor doesit appearto have beenan effort to shift the blameto Liu Shaoqias speculativelysuggestedin Politics and Purges.19 Rather,the aim was to provokeMao througha private communication, not to challengehim politically, but in hopesof producing the desired policy change.It was disastrouspsychology,and producedfateful results for China in retardingthe processof redressingthe excessesof the Great Leap as well as for Pengpersonally. That Peng'sletter was not meant as a political attack, as well as the importanceof anticipatingMao'sattitude,is further suggestedby the reactionsof other leadersfollowing the circulation of the letter. Thesereactionswere varied. At first many participantsat the conferencenot only agreedwith the letter's policy advocacy,but significantly saw no major political problemwith it. For example, Zhou Enlai, normally a sensitive observerof the Chairman, commentedthat there was nothing to worry about. Othersclose to Mao, however,sensedthat a delicate situation had arisen. Thus Li Rui, one of Mao's secretaries,felt that Peng had shown a lot of daring that was virtually unique in writing the letter eventhough he too did not anticipateany seriousconsequences. Hu Qiaomuwas even more wary, observing privately that the letter might causetrouble. Still othersof demonstratedleftist inclination suchas Ke Qingshi and Sichuanleader Li Jingquan began to criticize the letter whether becausethey felt its policy implications went further than theycould accept,that in their view it genuinely did slight the Chairman,or in anticipation of Mao's displeasurewith Peng. In any case,theseinitial reactionssuggestthat the letter was far from universally perceivedas an attackon Mao, but that some at Lushanhad an inkling that the Chairmanmight respondbadly.80 One of the most revealing responseswas that of Zhang Wentian. Zhang sharedPeng'sdim view of the consequences of the leap forward, and they had exchangedviews privately before and during the conference.In the new, more uncertainsituationcreatedby Peng'sletter, Zhangdeterminedto supportPeng's views by giving a speechthat would arguethe casemore rigorously than Peng had. As he preparedhis speechhe was warnedby Hu Qiaomu that it was not a wise thing to do, but he decidedto go aheadeven though he recognizedthat it could potentially causesevererepercussions.As he subsequentlyarguedto his wife who questionedhis involvementwhere, as a foreign affairs official, he had no direct responsibility, in view of the dire plight of the masseshe had an

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obligation to speakup regardlessof the consequences. In the event,his speechon July 21 was an ordeal for Zhanggiven frequent hostile interjections.Yet even at this stagehe could not have known the full implications of what he had done, implications which beganto becomeclear when Mao addressedthe meetingon July 23. Once Mao had spoken and Zhang faced demandsthat he confessto seekingto overthrow Mao, Zhangcommentedon the absurdityof the accusation to his secretaryby observing,in a mannersimilar to PengDehuai'srationalefor acting in the first place, that such an aim was simply impossibleand only the Chairmancould rectify the excessesof the GreatLeap.s1 The emotional,intemperatenatureof Mao's outburston the 23rd was apparent when Politics and Purges was written, but post-1979sourcesgive a much clearerpictureof its impact.The immediateimpact was to astonishthe audience: it was not only Peng who was taken aback by Mao's ferocity. Perhapsmost revealing was the fact that four of the Chairman'ssecretaries,including Chen Boda who would soon changehis colors to adopt a posturesharply critical of Peng,returnedfrom the meetingto sit in stunnedsilencewith no one speaking for half a day. Yet given Mao's track record of harsh attacks that were not followed by severepunishment-ashad been demonstratedthe previous year concerningZhou Enlai and Chen Yun-many leadersapparentlystill believed the situation could be repaired and sought to play down the transgressionsof Peng and Zhang over the following days. Thus Bo Yibo and An Ziwen, two officials who had clashedwith Pengin the past and were speciallysummonedto Lushan following Peng's letter, limited their criticisms of Peng to historical questions,while other leadersas varied as revolutionary military commanderin chief, Zhu De, and the leftist agricultural boss,Tan Zhenlin, sought to lighten Peng'ssins. On the 26th, however, Mao declaredthat people and not just the issueshad to be dealt with, and it quickly becameclear that he was demanding Peng'shead regardlessof the widespreaddesire to cool mattersdown. As so often before, and as would be the case again in the future, now that Mao's attitude was completelyunambiguousthe resistanceof his colleaguescollapsed and attention focused on intensified criticism of Peng, Zhang and others now implicatedin his "clique."s2 Thus once Mao had placed his authority on the line the leadershipclosed ranks behind him; the implications of this for inner Party democracywill be examinedlater in this introduction. This did not mean that individuals did not object to what had happened,but their objectionswere limited to private expressions of sorrow rather than resulting in any attempt to curb the Chairman.The sympathythat existedwas now channeledinto persuadingPeng,whoseoptions had beenreducedto stubbornlyholding his ground in the face of massiveattack, engaging in self-criticism, or, apparently,suicide, to make the necessaryde83 Pengfinally acceptedpleasto "considerthe intermeaningself-examination. ests of the whole situation" and undertook the required self-criticism in considerationof Party unity and Mao's prestige,but he remainedbitter over the

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fact that "for the first time in my life, I havespokenout againstmy very heart!"84 Despitesignificant elite reservationsover Mao's actionsas well as his policies, the most his leadershipcolleagueswere willing to do was to try and find a way to easePeng'sdilemmawhile protectingthe Chairman'sprestigeand giving him the outcomehe wanted.

Conflict without Opposition,1960-65 If any period before the Cultural Revolution seeminglyfits the "two line struggle" model of elite conflict, it is 1960-65 following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Indeed, scholarly interpretationsof this type focus on theseyears when official policy reversedthe GreatLeap strategythat hadbeenadvocatedso strongly by Mao (but also by many other leadersincluding, not least, Liu Shaoqi), Mao's involvement in daily affairs markedly decreasedas he withdrew to the "second 85 and the new policies which saved the day were largely the line"of leadership, handiwork of otherson the "first line" such as Liu and Deng Xiaoping-thechief "capitalist roaders" of the Cultural Revolution-and,in 1961--62,Chen Yun who returnedfrom inactivity to play a critical role in overall economicpolicy. Oncethe crisis was past,and ChenYun amongotherswas preemptorilycastasideby Mao in the latter part of 1962,different tendenciescoexisteduneasilyin CCPprogramsuntil the onsetof the Cultural Revolution. Clearly Mao was in the forefront of efforts, howeverpartial and lacking in coherence,to place classstruggleat the top of the CCP'sagenda,while his colleagueson the "first line" were often preoccupiedwith the more prosaictasks of sustainingeconomicproduction and running a complex bureaucraticmachinery.Given thesecircumstances,it is understandablethat many scholars fashionedtheir own versions of the official CCP line in explaining the politics of the period from the Great Leap to the Cultural Revolution as one of significantoppositionto and fluctuating fortunesof the Chairman. New sourcesavailable since 1979, however,supportthe contrary interpretation advancedin Politics and Purges.First, a fragile and limited consensusemergedby 196I on the measuresrequiredto deal with the post-GreatLeap crisis, with Mao remaininga crucial figure in endorsingthis approacheven while he often kept his distancefrom the actual policy making process.86 The Chairman,moreover,was fully able to get his way once he reassertedhis own substantiallyidiosyncratic concernson policy and personnelmattersstarting with the August 1962 Beidaihe conference,but he proved unableto frame a clear, unambiguousprogramfor other leadersto implement, thus leaving them uncertainas to his actual intent. Furthermore, as the caseof the SocialistEducationMovementdramaticallydemonstrates, Mao frequentlyshiftedpositions,siding with the changingpolicy prescriptionsof his colleaguesat different times rather than follow a consistentline on major issues. Finally, over this period the Chairmangradually lost confidencein many of his key colleaguesbut this was not the result of any concertedoppositionon their part-in the words of one seniorParty historian, it would havebeenunrealto confront Mao. As before the key elementof elite politics was the effort of all partiesto win Mao

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over to their preferredpositions and to interpret successfullythe Chainnan's elusive wishes. Yet the new evidencealso allows a more nuancedview of the critical relationshipbetweenMao and his loyal but uncertaincolleaguesthanwas possiblewhen Politics and Purgeswas written. Mao's continuingdominanceof his colleaguesand their willing acceptance of this situation is indicatedby numerouseventsover the 1960-65period. A clear exampleis the gingerly treatmentof the Chainnanby his top associatesat the time of what should have been his greatestweaknessduring the crisis yearsof 1961-62.When Mao madea self-criticism in mid-1961 in an effort to promote inner Party democracyand an effective responseto the crisis, he askedthat his statementbe circulatedthroughoutthe Party but this was not done.87 Ratherthan being the resultof actionsby lower level officials asassertedin the 1979 edition, oral sourcesrevealit was noneotherthan Liu Shaoqiwho baulkedat its circulation out of fear of the consequences.This can be read in several ways. Liu undoubtedlywas concernedfor the stability of the system if its central figure were openly revealedto havefeet of clay. Yet Liu was arguablyalso acting out of prudence-prudence which warned that such an act, notwithstandingthe Chairman'sown request,could be read as anti-Mao by his enemiesor by Mao himself at somefuture date.WhateverLiu's actualreasoning,his suppressionof the self-criticism clearly does not indicate someonetrying to underminethe Chairmanpolitically. Similarly, an authoritativeParty historian related, in the sameperiod Peng Zhen undertookmany talks to cadre meetingsin Beijing to countersharpdissatisfactionwith Mao on the part of ordinary officials, arguing that the victory of the CCP was due to Mao, and "if we don't supporthim who can we support?"Thus at a time of presumptivevulnerability, a time when there was seriousdisaffection with the Chairman'sleadershipat lower levels of the Party in view of the national economicdisaster,Mao's leading comradesrallied aroundin an effort to protecthis prestige,as well as out of prudenceconcerning their own careers. Another sign of Mao's pivotal role was his ability to dictate terms to both ranking leadersand entire bureaucraticorganizations.A casein point was his strong criticism and abrupt shunting aside of Chen Yon in 1962 for alleged "rightism" in formulating economicpolicies just as thesepolicies helpedrescue the regimefrom its self- (andMao-) madecrisis.88 At the samejunctureMao not only dismissedor downgradedother officials who had contributedto national survival suchas agriculturalspecialistDeng Zihui, his displeasurealso extended to abolishing Deng's Central Committee rural work department-aword 89 Two from the Chairmanand a significant bureaucraticunit was disbanded. yearslater a similar instanceoccurredinvolving a much more powerful institution, the SPC,whoseleadershipincludedseveralactive Politburo members. By mid-1964 Mao was displeasedwith the efforts of the SPC to draw up a new five-year plan, felt that work was too slow and gave insufficient attention to defensepreparations,and demandedchangeswhich were dutifully

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implementedin 1965. Mao's authority was vividly revealed not only by the massiveshift in resourceswhich resultedfrom his intervention, but also by his blistering rejection of the initial responseto his prodding and the settingup of a new body to take over as China'smain economicpolicy organ. When the SPC prepareda September1964 documentin responseto Mao's concerns,and after the documentwas approvedby Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the belief that it would satisfy the Chairman, Mao astoundedthe plannersby declaring"You just want to practisethe ThreePeople'sPrinciples."SPCheadLi Fuchun, for his part, rushed home and ordered his secretaryto preparea selfcriticism. Shortly thereaftera so-calledsmall planningcommission(xiao jiwei) displacedthe existing SPCleadersas the overlordsof the economywith a group of officials of considerablylower rank led by Yu Qiuli. Mao's displeasurehad swept asidesignificant membersof the Politburo who had beenin chargeof the successfulprocessof economicrecovery and reducedthe role of arguably the 90 regime'smost potenteconomicbureaucracy. In all of thesecasesand many others in the immediatepre-Cultural Revolution yearsMao demonstratedthe capacityto intervenedecisively.Yet evenwhile the evidenceof Politics and Purgesdemonstratingthat the Chairman'smercurial policy preferencesratherthansustainedhigh level resistanceexplain pronounced swings in official programshas beenfurther strengthened,the issueof "opposition" remains. Fortunately, the materials of the past decadehelp to unravel further the paradoxof clashingideologicaland policy perspectiveswithout political opposition by sheddinglight on the attitudesof both Mao and his leading comrades.Perhapsthe most satisfactorysummaryof the overall situation was put by one Chinesescholar in informal conversationwho remarkedthat "there was no opposition but Mao may have believed there was--andthat's another divergenceof matter." For Mao's part, the Chairmansensed-accurately-the outlook betweenhimself and his colleagueson the "first line," but at the same time confusedthis with questionsof personal loyalty and fears that his own power was ebbingwhich resultedin distortedinterpretationsof eventsand people. From the perspectiveof other top leaders,as throughoutthe history of the PRC therewas no inclination to take Mao on politically-both collective loyalty to the founder of the regime and individual prudenceruled out any such ideas. However,in the contextof 1962-65when the Chairmanemittedmany contradictory signals,91 a form of limited passive resistancewas possible to a greater degreethan perhapssuggestedby Politics and Purges.The outstandingcasein point was Deng Xiaoping who apparently ignored Mao-inspired ideological movementsto a considerableextentand focusedon developingproductionwhile reducing his activities more generally, a posture which was retrospectively termed"passivesabotage"by Hu Qiaomu.92 But it is also important to emphasize that despitethe assertionsof various Party historiansof the basicunanimity of the "first line," in fact therewere somesignificant differencesif not necessarily thosepositedin Politics and Purges.93

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Ironically, given both their linking as "capitalist roaders"and Mao'sefforts to protect Deng-but not Liu-during the Cultural Revolution, in this period Liu Shaoqi picked up various of Mao's ideological themesand adopteda relatively "left" posturewhile, as suggested,Deng Xiaoping largely avoided radical programs. Nonetheless,in a larger sensethe "first line" did collectively face the Chairmanawareof his variousdiscontentsyet chargedwith running the country and thusrisking exacerbatingthosediscontents.How did they protectthemselves from this dilemma?According to severalseniorParty historians,the "first line" leaders,once they had reacheda collective view, took their major decisionsto Mao and only proceededif he gave his approval-in this way believing there would be no problem.94 As can be seen from several major developmentsin 1962-65,this was a grave miscalculationgiven Mao's increasinglyerratic, even paranoid,perceptions. A crucial caseillustrating the complex leadershippatternwas the 7,000 cadresconferenceconvenedin January1962to deal with the deterioratingeconomic situation-theinstancewhen, Mao was later to claim, he first becameawarethat there was somethingseriouslyamisswith his "first line" colleagues.As already indicated,this was a time of considerabledisaffectionamonglower level cadres who were representedamong the 7,000; Mao himself recognizedthis and decreedthat the conferencego into a second"let off steam"phase.Nevertheless,as in other instancesduring this crisis, the Chairman'scolleaguesmoved remarkably cautiously.A striking exampleof this was the knowing submissionof false financial figures to the conferenceby Bo Yibo and Li Fuchun; even at this late date officials hesitatedto exhibit full candor while Mao still retained illusions that the economywas in bettershapethan it actually was and continuedto affirm the Great Leap despitesanctioningmany practical policy adjustments.Also revealing was the reluctanceof Chen Yun to take a prominentrole at the conference. Although invited by Mao to speakto the meeting,Chen declined on the groundsthat he was unclearabout somematters.This, in the view of one senior Party historian, was a wise decision as the time was not yet right for more thorough going policy changes;only as the full seriousnessof the situation becameapparentin subsequentmonthsdid Chen assumeoverall responsibility for economicpolicy at the urging of Liu Shaoqiand with the approvalof Mao.95 Finally, fullsome praise of the Chairman was expressedat the conference. Post-Maohistoriography,probably accurately,makesa great deal of Lin Biao's lavish adulationof Mao on this occasionas fostering the cult of personality,but at least Deng Xiaoping was apparently not too far behind. Lin ascribed the difficulties of the previous few years to the failure to follow the directives, warnings.and thoughtsof ChairmanMao. Things would get markedly better,he argued, if only the Party listened to Mao's words and realized his spirit. The Chairman'sviews were correct and in accordwith reality; he was always ahead of everyoneelse in this regard.Blame for the existing situation was ascribedto "some comrades"who pulled his thought to the left, who didn't pay sufficient

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respectto or obstructedhis opinions.Deng, speakinga few days later and arguably undersomepressureafter Lin's remarks,linked the Party'spositive features to the Chairmanand its recent shortcomingsto "not a few comrades"insufficiently studyingand failing to understandtruly his exhortations.Strikingly, Deng declaredthat "to follow ChairmanMao's road is to follow the right road," and called on all assembledto "read the Quotationsfrom the Works of Chairman Mao" which had been published by Lin's army newspaperover the past half year. Generally speaking,while Lin Biao's praiseof Mao may have been extreme,ranking leadersseeminglyall showedrespecttowardsthe Chairman.Perhaps a more important difference is that other leaderslike Deng linked their praiseof Mao to a seriousdiscussionof the problemsfacing the regime, while the gist of Lin's messagewas that things weren't nearly as bad as they seemed, the previous years had seena significant "spiritual income" for the Party, and what was neededwas a little faith. Significantly in termsof Mao's stateof mind, even though he sharedthe view of the majority that seriousproblemshad to be dealt with, Lin Biao's words of all those articulated at the conferencemost gratified the Chairman;he commentedprivately at the time that the standardof Lin's speechwasvery high, a level otherleaderscould not match.96 If Mao's reactionto Lin's speechwas revealingof both his stateof mind and the delicatesituationfacing his leadingcomrades, even moresignificant was Liu Shaoqi's report and his speech to the conference.The report was the main documentof the conferencewhich had been producedby an elaboratedrafting processinvolving the conferenceparticipants. Moreover, it not only received Mao's approval, but the Chairmanalso asked Liu to deliver a more pithy oral statementwhich Liu duly madeafter prior discussionof its contentwith Mao. In theseefforts Liu articulatedwhat was, in effect, a systematiccritique of the leap and outlined the various measuresbeing taken to savethe situation. Liu did not introducepolicies which Mao rejected;in his own speechto the conferenceMao endorsedthe whole set of policies which would be attackedas revisionist during the Cultural Revolution. Nor did Liu seekto undercutMao's position; he rather assumedprimary responsibility for past mistakes as the leading comradeon the "first line." Some of his statements,particularly in the oral presentation,had far-reaching implications, e.g., that peasantsin some areas believed70 percentof the disastersfacing Chinawere man-made,many of Peng Dehuai's Lushan views had proven correct, and the leap, i.e., whether it was correct or not, could be reconsideredafter five or ten years, but Mao's own conclusionsthat "during the last few yearswe mademany stupid mistakes,"the Great Leap policies were not as persuasiveas the First Five Year Plan, and "it is not enoughto have the generalline" were also sweeping.And despitehis bolder statements,Liu was careful to affirm the correctnessof the Party's line, claim that achievementsoutweighedmistakes,and assertthat most errors had already beenovercome.97 Notwithstanding Mao's similar views as to what was necessaryin policy

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terms and the Chairman'sexplicit approval of Liu's report, various well-placed oral sourcesare convincedthat the 7,000 cadresconferencewas a watershedin his attitudestoward Liu. While Mao himself might say similar things ("it is not enough to have the general line"), for another leader to raise even cautiously questionsabout the adequacyof the political and theoreticalline with which the Chairman was so closely identified evidently appearedto Mao to smack of disloyalty. In particular, Liu's "new formulations" in his oral remarks even though Mao had beenbriefed on the gist of the speechseeminglyleft the Chairman very unhappymuch as PengDehuai'sstings had doneat Lushan.But while it is unlikely that Liu was seekingto provoke Mao as Peng had intended, he neverthelessdemonstratedconsiderablepolitical boldnessof a type that the Chairmanhad admiredin the revolutionaryperiod.98 Indeed,accordingto a well informed oral source, Zhou Enlai observedLiu's behavior with a mixture of admiration and surprise,commentingthat he didn't expect Liu to be so determined in adjustingthe economysince anyonewho challengedthe leap forward was likely to be jailed.99 Mao, however, perhapschastenedby the seriouseconomic situation and lower level disaffection,did not explode as at Lushan and gave no obvioussign of disapproval.The new materialsavailablesince 1978 do not underminethe argumentof Politics and Purgesthat in the policy senseit was more the further retreat from February 1962 which angeredthe Chairman,but they clearly indicate the emotional impact of the Januaryconferenceon Mao. From that time the Chairmanapparentlybeganto harbor unspokenresentment, and he would return to the "rightist deviation" of 1962 with Liu's 7,000 cadres conferencespeechas its prime manifestationwhen explaining his loss of confidencein Liu at the outsetof the Cultural Revolution.100 A secondmajor sourceof Mao'sevolving distrustof Liu concernsthe Socialist EducationMovement.Here too new information on Mao's stateof mind and Liu's own leadershiptraits becomecrucial to a better understandingthan was possiblewhen Politics and Purgeswas written althoughimportant uncertainties remain. In the policy sense,the basic 1979 analysisof the movementholds with some modification. In 1963--64changesin orientation occurredin responseto shifting circumstancesand leadershipperceptions,Liu's posture towards the movementwas largely "leftist" although it now seemsproblematicthat he was involved in any major conflict with PengZhen over its implementation,101 and Mao endorsedeachmajor shift of direction proposedby othersup to the start of 1965 when the Chairmanimposedhis own idiosyncraticstampon the campaign by raising the issue of "capitalist roaders" within the Party. A fascinating if ironic aspectof thesedevelopmentsis that of all the Party leaderson the "first line,"102 Liu Shaoqi was in some ways most in tune with Mao's concerns.A number of senior Party historians emphasisedthat from the fall 1962 Tenth Plenum Liu began to follow Mao on the issue of class struggle, a position reflected in the movement'sSecondTen Points directive of September1963 which fell underLiu's overall authority and raisedfor the first time the sloganof

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classstruggleas the key link. 103 In a more concretesense,Liu's leftism was most dramatically reflectedin his September1964 RevisedSecondTen Pointswhich endorsed,with Mao'sapproval,a deeppurgeof rural cadres. What explains Liu's "left" orientation?Party historiansoffer various factors -his position as the leader of the "first line" with ultimate responsibility for putting Mao's wishes into practice, the fact that the Chairman'spolicies were invariably endorsedby Party conclavesas at the Tenth Plenum and had to be carriedout as a matterof discipline, but also due to certain personalproclivities. In the view of one specialiston Liu Shaoqi,Liu had a tendencyto swayfrom one ideological position to another,particularly after criticism such as Mao handed out in abundancein fall 1962,and to seekone-sidedlytheoreticaljustification for the Chairman'snew views. All of this meant, various divergent perspectives notwithstanding,that Liu pursuedMao's emphasison classstruggleparticularly in the context of socialist educationduring the very period he fell out of favor with his leader. Why, then, did Mao turn on Liu and make him the numberone enemy in the Cultural Revolution?Policy differences,as in Mao's rejection of Liu's Revised SecondTen Points in late 1964-early1965,104 obviously played a role, but undoubtedlythere were larger dynamicsat work. Part of the answer,as arguedby someParty historians,is simply that as the main responsiblepersonof the "first line" Liu had to suffer the brunt of Mao's more generaldisaffection with his colleagues.Other scholars,however,point to the Chairman'sperception-albeit a faulty perception-thathis power was slipping away to Liu in particular. According to an authoritativeoral source,Mao had beenstruck by what he saw as a more wholeheartedbureaucraticresponseto Liu's commandsthan to his own. The issue was the dispatch of cadresto the countrysideto participate in socialist educationwork. In 1963 Mao called for officials to go to the villages in a very generalway but very few high-rankingcadresactually went. At a summer 1964conferenceLiu soughtto remedythis situationby emphasizingand making obligatory the needto respondto Mao'scall. As a result of Liu's strict directive Party and governmentdepartmentsmade the necessaryarrangementsand large numbersof officials were dispatchedto the countryside.In my source'sopinion, however, rather than being gratified at Liu's actions to effect his wishes, Mao harbored resentmentthat Liu could achieve results where he could not and worried that he was in the shadowswhile Liu had real political clout.105 While necessarilyspeculative,this analysisgainssupportfrom Mao's moody comment in November1964 at the height of Liu's radical approachto socialist education. Mao observedthat it would be betterfor Liu to be in commandto avoid succession problems, that he should be the Chairmanand Emperor Qinshihuang,for "even though I cursea lot it's no use, I'm ineffective, you [Liu] are formidable (lihai) . ..." 106 There was an air of dissatisfactionin these words where the concernwith power was palpable,and it was soon followed by the critical break with Liu.

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December1964 notonly saw a suddenshift in Mao'sposition on the Socialist EducationMovementvirtually "from out of the blue" as one seniorParty historian put it, it also was the occasionof a remarkablepetulant outburst by the Chairman. Shortly after Mao's commentson Liu's formidability and his own uselessness, Deng Xiaoping suggestedthat it was not necessaryfor Mao to come to a scheduledwork conference,assertedlyin view of the Chairman'shealth and out of respectand certainly becauseMao rarely attendedsuch meetings.Deng's purportedintentions notwithstanding,Mao reportedly was very displeasedwith his suggestion.Subsequentlywhen the conferencewas convenedto discusssocialist education,Mao advancedhis novel notion of "powerholders"and in the processseemingly turned the emphasisaway from ordinary cadresand rural class enemieswhich Liu-and the Chairman-hadpreviously stressedand towards the alleged powerholderson the capitalist road in the Party. Liu made some effort to clarify his views but he did not directly opposeMao's formulation. Only after Mao concludedspeakingdid he statethat somepeoplethought therewas a mixing of different typesof contradictionsand the situationwas very complex.Mao'soutburst,however,occurrednot on this occasionbut at the next meeting when the Chairman,holding the stateconstitution in one hand and the Party constitution in the other, declaredthat one person (Deng Xiaoping) violated his rights by trying to prevent him from attendingthe conference,while another(Liu Shaoqi)interruptedhim and wouldn't let him speak.As the conferencewent on into January,Mao continuedhis criticism of Liu and as on so many earlier occasionshis policy preferenceswere adopted.Moreover, at a Party life meeting (shenghuohui)of the Politburo held following the conferenceLiu was requiredto engagein self-criticism. This extraordinaryexpressionof irrationality on Mao'spart, similar in contentalthoughvastly different in form to his reaction to the speechesof Liu and Lin Biao at the 7,000 cadresconference,suggestsa Chairmanmore preoccupiedwith perceivedpersonalslights and a senseof his own vulnerability than policy issuesper se. It also demonstratedthat onceagain his leadingcomradeshad failed to anticipateMao's desires,a project which had become increasingly difficult given the Chairman's erratic behavior since Lushan.1rn The developmentsat the tum of 1964-65 have also contributedto an alteration of my earlier view concerningthe timing and natureof Mao's decision to purgeLiu Shaoqi.In Politics and PurgesI took Mao's statementto EdgarSnow that he decidedin January1965 that Liu had to go as simply indicating the start of an unfolding processthat remainedfluid and open to changewell into 1966. Now, however,to a significantdegreeon the basisof discussionswith a leading Party historian,I haverevisedmy view and believe that Mao was determinedto get rid of Liu politically from the time he indicated and soon set out on a deliberate,if obscure,courseto achievethat objective.To this end the Chairman secretly organizedor at least abetted the attack on historian Wu Han which becamepublic in late 1965,and then usedthat affair to undercutPengZhen and

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the Beijing municipal apparatuswhich he regardedas a crucial underpinningof Liu's power.108 Subsequently,while it is possibleto view Mao's initial entrusting of the Cultural Revolution to Liu's stewardshipin mid-1966 as a test of his long time comrade'sreliability, in the opinion of my main sourceit was a test Liu was boundto fail. Liu's attemptto channelthe movementinto non-threatening directionsresulted in his denunciationfor "suppressingthe masses,"but in the unlikely event he had chosena handsoff attitude my sourcearguedthat Liu would have been vulnerable to chargesof suborninganarchy. Moreover, once Liu was underattackeventsunfolded inexorably. Liu was deniedaccessto Mao, his personalstaff was withdrawn, and he was subjectedto physical mistreatment within the confinesof Zhongnanhaiwith little interventionby Mao to ameliorate the lot of his old comrade.In contrastto the picture of the Chairmanreassessing his designatedsuccessorfor well over a year after January1965, this interpretation argues a pitiless determinationto destroy Liu politically throughout this period.109 In sum, while Mao's motives must be a matter of speculation,the new evidenceavailablesince 1979 not only confirms the Chairman'sunchallengeddominance throughoutthe 1949-65 period but also providesa richer picture of an elite politics marked by adjusting to his desires,seekinghis support for one's policy preferences,and making use of ambiguities in his attitudesto advance bureaucraticand political interests.Mao's unquestionedpowerand the efforts of other leadersto use or accommodatethat power were apparentas early as 1953 in the Gao-Raocase and as late as the Socialist Education Movement in the mid-1960s.The frequent ambiguity of the Chairman'sposition creatednot only opportunitiesbut also significant difficulties for his leading comradesthroughout, but thesedifficulties becamemore severewith the passageof time and they were linked to the erosionof Party norms.

Party Norms with ChineseCharacteristics If the official conclusionsof the post-1978period have upheld the argumentsof Politics and Purges concerningthe dominanceof Mao, they have even more explicitly supportedthe book's basic theme of the decline of the normative structureprotecting inner Party democracyand safeguardingthe CCP from unregulatedfactional struggle.To a striking degreethe 1981 Resolutionon Questions in History since the Founding of the PRC replicated my analysisof an initial post-1949period during which Party organizationalnorms were largely observedfollowed by a period of Mao "gradually underminingdemocraticcentralism in Party Iife." 110 While this official position, as well as a wealth of new material, affirms the fundamentalargumentof Politics and Purges, the detailed evidencesuggeststhe need for some modification of the broad picture and a reconsiderationof somekey questionsconcerningthe norms of inner Party behavior. Is the distinction betweena period when the norms were followed and a

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period where they began to erode as clear-cut as implied? To what degree,in fact, were the norms a significant independentfactor in elite politics? And what broadertextural featuresof elite political culture formed the context in which CCPorganizationalnormsfunctioned? Inevitably there are gaps between reality and various official claims now madeconcerningParty norms--e.g.,the Yan'an tradition of persuasiverectification as totally antitheticalto the ruthlessmethodsof the Cultural Revolution, the distinction betweenthe good, democraticMao of the early and mid-1950sand the erratic,arbitrary Chairmanof the post-1957period, and the pictureof an elite with a deep commitment to inner Party democracy.Against these assertions variousanalystshaveclaimedthat the Yan'an rectificationwas a precursorof the Cultural Revolution111 and no goldenageof Party democracyexistedin the early post-1949period.112 More broadly, it has beenarguedthat, in effect, the normative rules were largely pious statementsof intent which never really functioned as claimed, and rather than shapinga systemthat regulatedconflict theserules 113 And an even were observedonly when everyonewas in basic agreement. more fundamentalchallengeto the view of a norm-influencedpolity are general characterizationsof Chinesepolitics under Mao as markedby vicious, life and deathstruggles,an essentiallyconflict ridden milieu where there was no substitute for victory, permanentlosersabounded,compromisewas not promotedas a value, and victors remained insecure in the face of widespreadimpulses for revenge.114 Such politics could not be further removedfrom the "democratic" and consensualpracticesofficially said to prevail during at least the 1949-57 period. Politics and Purgesactually stood somewherebetweenthe two perspectives outlined above, although clearly closer to the current official interpretation. Throughoutthe book the emphasiswas on the fragility of the norms; indeed,the very theme of decline underlined that fragility. This analysis quite correctly pointed to the key factor of Mao's dominanceas alwaysbeing a potential threat to the normsof collective leadershipand minority rights, a threatwhich became a particularly pronouncedreality from late 1957. The book also pointedto other sourcesof fragility such as the internal contradictionsand ambiguities of the norms, e.g., the demandfor disciplined implementationof the policy line which naturally inhibited critical discussionsand sat uncomfortablybesidethe formal right to retain dissentingopinions, and the even more fundamentalconflict between organizationalrules and revolutionary values. Given the course of the Cultural Revolution, the latter tensionwas nowhereexpressedmore poignantly than by Liu Shaoqiin 1939 when he declaredthat majority rule must be pushed asidein caseswhen a mistakenline had capturedthe majority.l 15 Subsequently, in Leadership,Legitimacy, and Conflict I discussedthe fragility of the norms in terms of a systematiccomparisonof normative rules with prudential rules, the requirementsof political survival in both the Maoist and post-Maoperiods.116 It is important to emphasize,however, that while the conflict between various

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formal democraticrights and the political imperativeof obeyingMao was crucial to elite calculations,the norms themselvesinvolved important prudential elements. That is, the norms were important not simply as values leadersshould adhereto, but as a framework providing predictability in inner Party life that servedto safeguardthe most immediateinterestsof the vast majority of leading and ordinary cadresalike. While the evidenceof the post-1978period sustainsthe view of Party norms as a real and important aspectof elite politics, it also calls for somemodification of the generaland particular analysesadvancedin Politics and Purges. At the most generallevel, the 1979 edition probably placedtoo much emphasison the letter of the norms when, for CCP leaders,a much looserappreciationwas more to the point. Thus while in a formalistic sensecollective leadershipimplied that Mao had only one vote, in fact it referred to a consultativestyle whereby Mao took on board the opinions of his colleaguesbefore reaching a decision. Importantly, such a loose understandingseemingly was perfectly acceptableas inner Party "democracy"to the Chairman'scolleagues.More broadly, it is most likely the casethat both a culturally derived senseof just behaviorand a belief that rights accrue to major contributorsto the revolution had more to do with normative expectationsthan did Party regulations.In terms of the role of these looser norms, I now believe that CCP leadersunder Mao gave less though still significant weight to them than seemedthe casea decadeago. This, in turn, is related to the judgmentthat Mao's imperial behaviorwas considerablymore in evidenceat an earlier period than previously believed-ajudgmentmost clearly supportedby the Gao Gang affair. These considerationswill be explored by examiningthe evolution of the norms after 1949, but first a brief discussionof the basicrectification model is in order. While the originalYan'anrectification of the early 1940shasbeenrepeatedly hailed as a reform oriented,educationalmovement,the reality was clearly more complex. Politics and Purges dealt with the coercive aspectsof the campaign, 117 Yet although arguably it did not attach sufficient weight to these aspects. perhapsmore important for my purposeshere than the underexaminedblatantly coercive elementsincluding arrestsand torture is the need to emphasizesome essentialaspectsof rectification. As argued in Politics and Purges and reaffirmed in post-Mao sources,the rectification approachcombines"persuasion" with often intensepressure-thepressurewhich as Mao observedmadecadres "break out into a cold sweat" before achieving a higher understandingof the correct line. Thus even though rectification was to avoid the "ruthlessstruggles and mercilessblows" of inner Party life in earlierdays, it most decidedlywas not designedto sparesensibilitieswhen exposingofficials' mistakes.Indeed,despite the rejection of past excesses,the initial rectification encompassedthe struggle culture of earlier periods and engendered-albeit without official sanction-an attitude that when dealing with errors the more severethe criticism the better.118 Given such an orientation,it is not surprisingthat rectification subsequentlywas

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to causeuneaseamongmany cadreseven to the point that the word "rectification" struck fear into their hearts.'19 Moreover, at the leadershiplevel, it was inevitable that individual leaderswould feel badly done by criticism they receivedin the Yan'anmovement.Undoubtedlythe most celebratedcaseconcerns the extensivecriticism enduredby PengDehuaiat the 1945 North China rectification meetingfor allegedmilitary and political mistakes.Pengclearly felt such criticism had been unfair, and he alluded to it on such subsequentoccasions as in 1953 in the context of the Gao-Raoaffair and again at Lushanin 1959. In this case,moreover,a main critic of Pengin 1945 and a target of Gao Gang in 1953, Bo Yibo, cameto regret his role, agreeingthat the criticism had beentoo harsh.120 Nevertheless,it is striking that the highest CCP leaders who have been through the processthemselveshave largely perceivedthe rectification tradition as beingrelatively benign.In Peng'scase,accordingto Bo Yibo's recollectionof a 1953 conversation,the old marshalcould acceptthe validity of the inner Party criticism he had receivedwhateverhis resentmentsconcerningits excessesand particular issues.For his own part, having just passedthrough harsh criticism during the Gao-Raoaffair, Bo was also able to acceptthe processparticularly in view of Mao's efforts to lessen its severity, correct unsuitablecriticism and recognizehis merits.121 In other words, whateverspecific injustices were perceived, Yan'an style rectification was widely acceptedwithin the leadershipas having a valid reform function tied to the Party'soverriding revolutionaryobjective and as being lenient in comparisonto the CCP'spast.Thus when the 1957 rectification was launchedthe Yan'ancampaignwas cited, howeverinaccurately in historical detail, to reassureParty membersthat the new campaignwould be conductedin the mannerof a "gentle breezeand mild rain." Similarly, as we shall see, even on the eve of the Cultural Revolution there were widespread expectationsthat rectification norms would hold and most cadresand leaders would escapeseriousconsequences. And the reform period rectification of the 1980salso repeatedlyrecalledthe Yan'an experienceas proof of the educational thrust of the drive and to distinguish it clearly from the chaotic and vicious Cultural Revolutionapproach.122 None of this is to deny an important element of underlying commonality betweenYan'an and the Cultural Revolution-oncea correct line had beenlaid down officials fundamentallyhad no choicebut to acceptit and admit their own pastmistakes.Again the exampleof Liu Shaoqiis particularly poignant.Liu was not only one of the key architectsof the Yan'an movement,during it he even engagedin an extremeCultural Revolutionstyle negationof otherleaders.123 Yet in the Cultural Revolution itself Liu not only becamethe preeminenttarget, but he was unable to defend himself given the acceptedunderstandingwhich had also markedthe Yan'anmovementthat whoeverwas underattackhad no right to speak except in self-criticism.124 Nevertheless,in the eyes of the elite which personallyexperiencedboth campaignsa fundamentaldifferencedid exist, and

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in fact the Yan'ancriticism was conductedwithin significant limits for the most part, quasi-objectivecriteria were usedin the assignmentof fault, the great bulk of leadersretained positionswithin the higher echelonsof the CCP, and Party unity was a genuine overriding objective of the exercise.What the surviving elite hasfailed to recognizeadequatelywas the vulnerability of the rectification approach and organizational norms generally to the various contradictions noted above,and most particularly to the overwhelmingdominanceof Mao.

GaoGangandthe "GoldenAge"ofParty Norms The previous discussionof the Gao Gang-RaoShushi affair not only demonstratedMao's dominance,it also raisedquestionsconcerningthe degreeof commitment of the leadershipto Party norms. In their efforts to anticipate Mao's wishesand avoid his wrath, key leaderseither clearly violated official norms or laid low in circumstanceswhere a firm commitmentto the norms would have arguedfor bolderaction. Factionalactivity, the pursuit of power and position by informal groups outsideof normal Party channelsand largely unrelatedto any principled stand on ideology or policy, was unambiguouslybanned by CCP organizationalprinciples as well as by the looserconceptionof Party unity, yet suchactivity was a key featureof the Gao-Raocase.Not only did Gao, basedon his apparentmisreadingof the Chairman,125 engagein behindthe scenesmaneuvers designedto alter fundamentallythe leadershiplineup under Mao, but as we have seen a significant number of high ranking officials secretly backed his cause.This reflected additional considerationsto the all important perception that Liu Shaoqiwas in trouble with Mao while Gao Gang had found his favor. In particular, it related to the way in which the norm of opposing factionalism relatedto the interestsof variousgroupingsor "factions" within the CCP.126 The desirability of avoidingconflict amongthe variousarmies,organizationsand personalnetworksof the revolutionary period in the interestsof larger Party unity convenientlydovetailedwith the power interestsof the various factions.The groupings which had formed all soughtrecognitionof their particularcontributionsto the revolution and a shareof the fruits of victory. Thesedesireswere satisfied by a generallyequitableshareout of official positionsafter the establishmentof the PRC. The norm banningfactional conflict, then, not only servedto bolsterParty unity, it also acted to protect the stake of different groups in a satisfactorystatus quo. In 1953, however, with both the Eighth Party Congressand a new state structure projectedfor the near future,127 a new balancingact would be required. As noted earlier Gao----assertedlyfalsely-claimed that Liu and his "white area" followers were planningto upsetthe factional balanceby increasingtheir representationon the Politburo. Gao pointed to a draft Politburo list drawn up by Liu's old associate, deputy organizationchief An Ziwen, which Gao assertedhad originatedwith liu and discriminatedagainstmilitary cadres,specifically Lin Biao who had allegedly beenleft off the list while the much lower ranking"white area"figure Bo Yibo had beenincluded.This seeminglyangeredvarious generalswho now supportedGao

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and participatedin secretactivitiesclearly forbidden by official principles.Given the added factor of Mao's perceiveddisenchantmentwith Liu, the ban on factional activity was substantially breachedin large part due to the belief that group interestswere under threat. Significantly, when Mao moved to redress Gao'sfactionalism he not only reaffirmed the ban and preachedParty unity, he again carried out a skillful balancingin the new Party and stateappointmentsto provide political supportfor the norms.128 At the very top, however, the responseto Gao's effort to build factional support was marked more by circumspectionthan open support. As discussed earlier, thosewho reportedly gave a sympathetichearingto Gao--mostnotably Lin Biao and PengDehuai-seemed passivein their backing.Even more suggestive were the responsesof ChenYun and DengXiaoping who, apparentlyuncertain of Mao's true aims, deflectedGao'sadvancesbut waited about two months before reporting to the Chairman on his flagrant violation of organizational norms. Deng's caution is further reflected in his 1980 remark that he entered "formal negotiations"(zhengshitanpan) with Gao, an action supportingan authoritative oral source'sconclusionthat Deng (and Chen) had to be very careful since they could not be sure that Gao did not have Mao's backing. Although threedecadeslater Dengattemptedto explain his and Chen'sreportingto Mao in terms of their concernfor Party unity and upholding principle, their delay until the Chaiman'sattitude was clearerstrongly suggeststheir personalpolitical futureswere a more critical factor in their actions.Nevertheless,it would be rashto concludethat Party norms played no role in their actions,or in their preferences for the outcomeof the affair. For Gao Gang'seffort threatenedto upsetnot only the Party unity which had contributedso mightily to the victory of 1949, but also the relative predictability of existing arrangementswhich placed them in key positions.Again, calculationsof political interestworked to reinforce the norms, albeit after a period of uncertaintywhen the two factors stood in potential conflict. In any case,whateverthe inherently unknowabledegreeof attachmentto the norms on the part of Chen, Deng and others, it was clearly less than that implied by the notion of a goldenageof inner Party democracy.129 But in anothersensethe distinction betweenthe pre- and post-1957periodsis confirmed since, at least on a benign reading of the Chairman'sintentions,l3° during the Gao-Raoaffair Mao did not directly violate the norms in the loose sensethey applied to him as he did so blatantly in attacking Peng Dehuai in 1959. Indeed, taken at face value Mao's actions from the latter part of the summer 1953 financial and economic conferenceserved to reinforce Party norms. Not only did he reaffirm and privately lobby for Party unity, he seemingly eventuallydecidedthat adherenceto the normsand a stableleadershipwas more important than any personalor policy preferencesfor Gao Gang. Moreover, when the Chairmaninitially moved to cool down inner Party conflict in early August, he took the step of himself engagingin self-criticism. Mao acknowledgedthat he sharedsomeresponsibilityfor Bo Yibo's errorsconcerning

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Xiannian and Bo Yibo) as responsible,and particularly his assertionthat those guilty of the error stood "only 50 metersfrom the rightists" sent shock waves through the assembledparticipants.The use of the dreadedrightist label meant no one dared to speakout for fear of being so classified. By raising what had been a policy question to a political-ideological one the Chairman created a situationwhereany real debatewas impossible.B9 Yet the situation at and following Nanning was more complicatedthan this account of Mao simply striking fear into the hearts of his leading comrades would suggest.First, related to our larger concernand the comparativelack of attention to the question of inner Party democracyafter 1949, there is little evidence-in contrast to events in 1959--of whether top leaders saw the Chairman'sactionsas a major breakof the norms.Although thereare indications that ZhangWentian-whowas not at Nanning-wasunhappywith Mao's attack on "anti-recklessadvance,"oral sourcesgenerally claim no knowledgeof the attitudesof otherleaderstowardsthe Chairman'sactions.In part, this seemsdue to the fact that quite apart from the elementof fear a significant consensushad quickly formed behind Mao. Whetherbecauseof a genuinedesirefor the rapid developmentof their backward country or the habit of acceptingMao's perceived superiorwisdom, with the obvious exceptionof Chen Yun there were no signs of even tacit opposition at the very top. Thus oral sourcesthat are well awareof the strongpressuresat Nanningand subsequentlyconcludethat "generally speakingthere was still collective leadershipin 1958." From this perspec140 within the leadershipand the ratification tive, becauseof the broadconsensus of decisionsby Party conferences,even though Mao now completely stopped attendingPolitburo meetingsthe processwas "democratic" and Chen Yun was simply an isolatedminority figure. Even ZhangWentian was initially part of the consensus.According to a source specializing in Zhang'scareer, in February 1958 Zhangwrote a letter to Mao after conductinga local survey to expresshis enthusiasmand delight at the excellentsituation. In the draft of the letter, however, Zhangalso noted someshortcomings,but in the final versiondeletedthese as not appropriateto raiseat that time given his limited knowledgeof the whole picture. Thus even the strongestproponentof inner Party democracywithin the leadershiprestrictedhis expressionon policy out of both enthusiasmfor the new programand prudencein the face of an arousedMao.l41 This situation where the question of inner Party democracywas not confronted continuedthroughout1958 as the fervor for the Great Leap built to even greaterheights.In addition, the fact that as with Bo Yibo in 1953 and DengZihui in 1955 Mao did not severelypunish Zhou and Chen, and that the May 1958 SecondSessionof the Eighth Party Congresswas treatedas a rectification meeting with the benign overtonesthat implied,l42 further servedto reducethe salience of "democracy" as an issue. So too did the fact that when problems becameapparentin the latter part of the year the Chairman took the lead in addressingthem, evenas others--againincluding ZhangWentian143-held back

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in expressingtheir own criticisms. Yet as further evidenceof faults in the Great Leap strategymounted,not only economicpolicy but also the questionof "democratic" expressionbecame increasingly important. This question would be raised in various ways-first at the spring 1959 Shanghaimeeting, and then at Lushan. Significantly, the key actors in placing inner Party democracyon the agenda at Shanghaiwere ZhangWentian and Mao himself. As in so many otheraspects of elite politics the Chairmanwas the catalyst.Aware by this time of not only the seriousnessof economicproblemsbut also of the need to encouragecritics to speakout if theseproblemswere to be adequatelydealt with, Mao now called on Party membersto emulateHai Rui, the Ming dynastyofficial who criticized the emperorand lost his position as a result, and dare to speak out and even be preparedfor beheading.Ironically, in view of subsequentdevelopments,the ChairmanpersonallygavePengDehuai a copy of the Hai Rui biography.At the sametime, however, Mao privately confessedduring the conferencethat while he wantedHai Ruis to appearhe fearedhe might not be able to bearcriticism if it was offered. He also noted that even "[Liu] Shaoqidoesn'tdare to speakto me frankly," and that although he had notionally beenon the "secondline" he was not completelyconfident of othersand thus returnedto the "first line" to attend to detail. While Mao clearly was ambivalent,by raising the Hai Rui analogy he provided room for Zhang to air his concernsabout inner Party democracy.Although my oral sourcespecializingin Zhangdoesnot believe it was intendedas a criticism of Mao, Zhang now spokeout at a group meetingand extendedthe Chairman'scall for candid speaking. While agreeing with Mao's appeal for daring, Zhangwent on to say that this was not enough,that it was necessaryfor the leadershipto createa democraticatmosphere,an environmentwhich encouraged lower levels to disclosedifferent views without fear of the consequences. By calling for more than acts of individual heroism Zhang now publicly raised the crucial questionof the necessaryconditions for democraticlife within the ccp.t44 When the Lushan meeting convenedthree months later the issue of Party democracywas evenmore salientto variousCCP leaders.PengDehuaicriticized the tendency of first secretariesto monopolize power, a comment ostensibly aimed at regional leadersas everyoneavoideddirect criticism of Mao. Indeed, given Mao's Shanghaiposture,early in the conferencein private conversation with the ChairmanZhou Xiaozhou expressedhis concernthat people were not speakingout at Lushan,that many didn't dareto talk aboutshortcomings,and he receiveda sympathetichearing.But even at this stagebefore the increasedtension causedby Peng'sletter, not to mention Mao's outburst of July 23, various leadersspokeprivately of the problemscreatedby the Chairman'sincreasingly willful leadershipstyle. Again ZhangWentianwas most acutein his assessment of the situation. Speakingto his secretaryZhangcomplainedthat the Party had becomearrogantand had lost its perspective,things were becominglike Stalin's

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later period, collective leadershipwas no longer tenable,and although he was a Politburo member he didn't know what was going on. In another more celebrated conversationwith Peng Dehuai, Zhang again raised the Stalin analogy but, ironically, Peng sought to defend Mao by arguing he was different from Stalin and far superior in his recognition of non-antagonisticcontradictions, althoughPengwent on to complainthat the Chairmanonly criticized othersand would neveradmit his own mistakes.As the situation becamemore tenseonce Peng'sletter was circulated,the democracyissuebecameeven more acuteand Zhang Wentian, not without foreboding, gave a systematic,theoretically based analysisof the great importanceof inner Party democracyin a July 21 speech. Thus considerableconcernhad beenexpressedboth publicly and privately within the leadershipbeforeand after Peng'sletter, but the biggesttest of leadership commitment to democratic norms came with Mao's withering attack of the 23rd.145 As we haveseen,in the shockand confusionfollowing Mao's attack various leaderssoughtto cushionthe blow and hopedthe Chairman'sangerwould soon pass.Undoubtedlya variety of motives were involved including personalcloseness146and, in a statusconsciousParty, respectfor Peng'shistoric contributions to the revolution. Another factor which undoubtedlycame into play was the policy concernsof thosewho sharedPeng'sattitude toward the Great Leap and correctly feared the necessaryremedial measurescould not be taken if a major campaignwas launchedagainst the old marshal. Yet clearly a sensethat the CCP'sloosely constructedrules had beenbrokenwas also deeplyfelt at Lushan. Deng Xiaoping's 1980 observationthat "it was normal for [Peng] as a member of the [Politburo] to write to the Chairman"147 was more than an ex post facto judgment;at the time therewere considerable,albeit private, lamentsconcerning the damagedone to inner Party democracy.It was the night of the 23rd, once they had recoveredfrom the initial shock,that Mao's secretariesbeganto talk in earnestabout Mao as the later Stalin. The next day ZhangWentian spokeof the tensesituation which made speakingup difficult and identified inner Party democracy as the key issue. And a week later one of the Chairman'ssecretaries, Tian Jiaying,complainedaboutthe inappropriateness of subjectingPeng,a Politburo member,to criticism in small group meetingswhen the Politburo had not discussedthe case,and sadly observedthat if Mao acted in this dictatorial manner his reputationin his later yearswould suffer.148 Thus democraticnormswere at issue-atleast for part of the elite. Yet perhapsmore telling for thesepeople than the letter of the Party rules was a more traditionally basedsensethat Peng had only beenacting as an upright official should-speakingout for the good of the realm regardlessof the consequences. This view is supportednot only by the currencyof the Hai Rui examplewhich Mao himself had introduced,but also by the fact that the individuals concernedfelt there was no option but to accept Mao's actionsmuch as Hai Rui had to acceptthe emperor'sedict.149 Perhapsthe strongestindication of the importanceof the norms is evidence

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that even those who differed with Pengon policy questionswere distressedby his fate, althoughthe details in this regardseemto be somewhatdifferent from what was advancedin Politics and Purges. In the first edition referencewas madeto the allegeddefenceof Peng'sright to speakout shortly after the meetings by the leftist leaderof Sichuan,Li Jingquan.150 This information, basedon Cultural Revolution sources,is hotly contestedby a participant in the Lushan events who declaredsuch a view on Li's part as "impossible" given that Li, along with Ke Qingshi, stood out for the ferocity of his attackson Peng. But anotherGreat Leap leftist, chief agriculturalpolicy makerTan Zhenlin, did show concernfor Peng and implicitly for the norms in a July 26 speech.While Tan declaredhe would engagein principled struggleagainstPeng'sletter to the end, he laudedPengas a good comradewho was loyal to the Party and country with many contributionsto the revolution. Moreover, he praised the writing of the letter as a brave act, as a very good thing. Yet despitehis attitude, which was reportedly representativeof the feelings of many others, Tan was forced to withdraw his remarkstwo days later as the pressuregrew.151 This crumbling of the will to standup for the norms was evident in the ineffectual actionsof other leaders.Zhu De, undoubtedlythe most sympatheticof all on a personalbasis, could only try to assistPengby making his criticism as mild as possibleunder the circumstances,an effort which only resulted in Zhu also coming under harsh criticism at both Lushan and the Military Affairs Committee meeting convenedimmediately following. And when Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who had not been presentat Lushan, questionedBo Yibo on what happenedand expresseddisappointmentwith the undemocraticway of handling Peng's views, Bo agreed but quickly added that they could only exchangethese opinions in private.152 The rich vein of new post-1978evidencethus strongly supportsthe argument of Politics and Purgesthat the normsof inner Party democracywere an important leadershipconcern at Lushan, but at the same time a concern which was rudely shoved aside by a determinedChairman. Yet this evidenceprovides a more subtle picture of the leadership'sattitude to the norms over the entire period from Nanning to Lushan. While undoubtedlya feeling that inner Party democracywas desirableexistedbeforeNanning,it was not a high salienceissue given Mao's generally consultativeleadershipstyle up to that point-notwithstandingseveralmajor deviations.The eventsat Nanning clearly increasedthe salienceof the question, but it remainedcomparatively low given the broad leadershipconsensuson and enthusiasmfor the Great Leap. But as problems with the leap becamemore prominent,and as Mao himself realizedthe needfor more democraticexpression,the significanceof inner Party democracybecame even more apparentfor many leaders. When Mao reacted harshly to Peng Dehuai at Lushan,far more harshly than he had reactedto any otherleaderin the entire period of his leadershipgoing back to revolutionarydays, the significance of the norms was brought home with startling force to the leadershipbut they

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were powerlessto resist in the face of Mao's authority. A new benchmarkhad been createdin elite politics. If Nanning had been the start of "abnormal inner Party life," then Lushan raisedabnormality to a new level. Not only as before was the question of inner Party democracyraisedpublicly only in ways which largely excludedthe Chairmanfrom criticism, but thereis little evidenceto indicate that after Lushantop leaderseven discussedMao's violations of democraticnorms privately amongthemselveshoweverthey may havefelt individually.153 Party NormsunderArbitrary Rule, 1960-66 Politics and Purges argued that following the Lushan watershedParty norms were significantly but far from totally sweptasidein this new periodof increased "abnormality." Mao himself reaffirmed organizationalprinciples on various occasionsin the 1959--65 period, but this aspectof the Chairman'sactivities was probablyoverstatedin 1979. With the benefit of new datathe sheerarbitrariness of so much of Mao's behaviorstandsin even sharperrelief than a decadeago. Examplesof this arbitrary behavior have already beendiscussed--Mao'sdisbandingof the Central Committee'srural work departmentin 1962,his criticism of the SPC in 1964 for practicingthe ideology of the Guomindang(GMD), and his irrational outburst at the end of I 964 that he was being denied his right to speak.Perhapsthe most bizarre example,and one with severeconsequences for the leaderinvolved, concernedVice PremierXi Zhongxunat the crucial Tenth Plenum of 1962, the occasionwhen Mao issuedhis famous slogan to "never forget class struggle." While other leaderssuch as Chen Yun were sharply rebuked by the Chairman at this time for their perceivedpolicy mistakes,Xi's "crime" was his approval of an historical novel aboutthe old Northwestrevolutionary baseareawhere Gao Gang had been active. Although Gao'sname had not beenused,it was clear which characterrepresentedhim. The appearanceof this novel, which fortuitously coincidedwith PengDehuai'sefforts to securea reexaminationof his case,was viewed by Kang Shengand othersas an attempt to "reversethe verdict" on Gao as well. They managedto convinceMao of this position, and when he read out a note from Kang at the plenum that "using a novel to attack the Party is a remarkableinvention," thesewords suddenlybecame a quotation from ChairmanMao. Xi's fate was sealed,he lost his posts, was dispatchedto the basic levels, and apparently was treated harshly even during the pre-CulturalRevolutionyears.154 But if Mao's regard for the norms in the years from Lushanto the Cultural Revolution now seemseven more cavalier than that pictured in Politics and Purges, in somerespectsthe degreeto which his colleaguesstill placedfaith in theseprinciples during the period of their decline might have beengreaterthan believedearlier. To be sure, a palpableawarenessof Mao's growing unpredictability permeatedthe leadership.Yet within the heightenedprudentialconstraints causedby this situation, most key leadersapparentlyobservedthe norms. According to· a senior Party historian, the leaderson the "first line" consistently

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applied"democraticcentralism"in theseyears.Even the most questionablepractices such as Deng Xiaoping's reported"passivesabotage"seeminglyamounted to ignoring certainof Mao'spreoccupationsin the ideologicalsphereand leaving them to other leadersto implement rather than acting againstthe Chairman's orders.I 55 Contraryto the analysisof the first edition, the famousChangguanlou incident of 1961 reinforcesthe generalpoint. This meetingof Beijing muncipal leadersnearthe Beijing zoo wasconvenedin late 1961 by PengZhento examine CCP documentsincluding Mao's speechessince 1958 in order to analyzethe reasonsfor the Great Leap debacle.Politics and Purges followed the Cultural Revolution version of this event-i.e., Peng clearly violated organizational norms by keeping it secret from higher Party authorities, thus reflecting the prudential requirementof avoiding Mao's anticipatedire. 156 According to another well placedoral source,however,this version is a grossdistortion. In fact, these activities, although not formally reportedto the Party Center, were not secreteither and simply representedPeng'sgatheringof referencematerial as part of his preparationsfor the January1962 7,000 cadresconference.This was an acceptableprocedurebefore a major conference,and the focus on leftist errors was consistentwith Mao's own contemporaryemphasison the need for investigationand criticism of the leap'sshortcomings.The incident was usedin the Cultural Revolution to frame Peng,but, accordingto my source,it in no way violated Partyrules.157 Indeed,the centralsecretariat,wherePengalso sat second only to Deng Xiaoping, had concludedits own review of Party documentsand sentits reportto Mao.158 While the new evidenceof the past decadesuggestsMao's observanceof Party norms after Lushanwas evenmore chequeredthan it seemedin 1979, this evidencealso allows a deeperunderstandingof Mao's sporadicefforts to uphold the normsand the reactionof his leadingcolleaguesto thoseefforts. In the view of an authoritativeoral sourceMao generally acceptedthe collective proposals of the "first line" in the yearsleadingup to the Cultural Revolution,his dramatic initiatives and lapsesnotwithstanding.In addition, when Mao did insist on his own way it was generally endorsedby some formal Party body producing a veneerof legality. More specifically, particularly in the,crisisperiod of 1961-62 the Chairman made a special effort to promote collective leadershipand free expression,and even, as we have seen,to practiceself-criticism. Two instances stand out---a May-June 1961 central work conferenceand the January 1962 7,000 cadresconference.As in 1959, Mao now recognizedthe needfor greater inner Party democracyto help overcomethe economicmessbut his attitudewas ambivalentandhis associatestreadedwith caution. The 1961 work conferencewas convenedto summarizethe experienceof the Great Leap and overcomeits mistakes-particularlyits leftist errors in agriculture. At this conferenceMao not only addresseddefectsin inner Party life, this was also the occasionthat the Chairmanmade his self-criticism which Liu refused to transmit to lower levels. Unfortunately little is known of Mao's self-

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criticism except that he said the Central Committeeand especially he himself shouldbearthe principal responsibilityfor the mistakesof the pastfew years.In the conference'sdiscussionof the shortcomingsof inner Party democracy,however, the focus was on the consequences of Lushan rather than the rights or wrongsof the meetingsthemselvesand the issuewas apparentlydeflectedto the lower levels where,it wassaid,first secretarieswere monopolizingcontrol to the detriment of collective leadership.While some progresswas made, on the democracyquestionas on other issuesthe progressin correctingthe left trend was not thorough. Especially revealingwas Mao's reaction to the efforts of "some people" to explain the persistenceof leftism. According to their analysis,which is both the view of Politics and Purges and consistentwith the Chairman's 159 the shockof Lushanand particularly the campaign January1961 observations, against right opportunismlaunchedfollowing the meetingshad a wide impact which preventedeffective measuresto deal with left mistakesand causedthe suppressionof inner Party democracy.Mao, showingthe ambivalencewhich had becomeso typical of his opinions at critical junctures,baulkedat acceptingthe full implications of this view. Instead he held that the struggle against right opportunismat Lushan had been necessaryand the only mistake had been to transmit the resultsof that struggleto the county and lower levels which indeed had the effect of disruptingtheir efforts to correctleftism.160 Mao's ambivalence,and the reluctanceof his comradesto pressthe sensitive democracyissue too far, were even more apparentat the 7,000 cadresconference.By the latter stagesof the conferencedemocraticcentralismhad becomea central item on the conferenceagenda,and it was addressedby various leaders from Mao and Liu down. Mao's role in pushingthe questionwasclearly critical. He not only decidedon the secondor "releaseanger" stageof the conference whereplain talking becamemore pronounced,but he also encouragedthe leaders of the conferencegroup sessionsto make sure the anger was well and truly released.Moreover, Mao again engagedin self-criticism, one which seemingly went somewhatfurther than his 1961 effort. Now Mao not only again assumed responsibilityfor the errorsof the recentpast,but affirmed that he too was bound by majority decisions-albeitwith a peculiar definition of a majority as everyone else having a view contraryto his own. And perhapsparticularly telling was the fact that Liu Shaoqi'sreport, which had beenbold in dealingwith economic questions,did not include a section on inner Party democracyin its first two drafts. Only after the Chairmanintervenedto emphasizethe importanceof democracywas sucha sectionincluded,and it was carefully phrasedto point away oncemore from Mao and toward regionalleadersand lower level cadres.161 Yet as we have seen Mao's emphasison democracydid not persuadean unpreparedChen Yun to offer his views nor prevent Li Fuchun and Bo Yibo from placing before the conferencea report they knew was false.162 And it did not preventa "self-critical" Chairmanfrom feeling that Lin Biao's unvarnished praisewas on a higher level than the efforts of his other colleagueswho tried to

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balancethe pressingpolicy needsof the momentwith the needto avoid offending Mao. The caution of his colleaguesnotwithstanding,they could not have beenfully awareof Mao's internal confusionon the issue.According to a senior Party historian who was presenton the occasion,the general effect of Mao's efforts was very beneficial and people felt at ease. Mao's major speechon democraticcentralismseemedpositive, and eventoday, "if one readsit word for word," it appearsall right. But, in his current view, Mao's self-criticism was superficial, it didn't really addresseither the nature of his own errors or the fundamentalshortcomingsof the leap forward. And, although it wasn'tapparent to my sourceat the time, he now seesan elementof rebukein responseto Liu's speech,a surfacing of concern with domestic revisionism in the Chairman's interpretationthat if there was no democraticcentralismin the Party then there could be no socialisteconomy,and if there was no socialisteconomythen China would degenerateinto a Yugoslav style bourgeoisdictatorship.But if this hint was not appreciatedat the time, variousof the Chairman'sparticularsensitivities were. As a result, when Liu observedthat many of Peng Dehuai's views at Lushanwere correct and there was nothing wrong in writing a letter to Mao---a proposition that reportedly angeredMao, he neverthelesshastenedto add that Peng could not be rehabilitatedbecauseof his illicit links to foreign countries, i.e., the Soviet Union, and his having formed an anti-Partyclique--chargesthat were false. Soon, however,Pengwould seeka reconsiderationof his casewhich would culminatein a puzzling encounterwith the Chairmanin 1965 after additional blows to Party norms.163 While further occasionalstatementsin support of the norms were made by Mao in the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution, nothing remotely matchedhis emphasison democracyin 1961-62. Instead,as oral sourceshave indicated, the Chairman'sattacks on various colleaguesin fall 1962 and late 1964 producedeven greatercaution in dealingwith Mao than previously.l64 The predicamentthis createdfor such leaders,a predicamentwhich produced not only caution but also some indications, however modest,of continuing respect for the norms, was richly illustrated by PengDehuai'scase. In mid-1962 Peng presentedhis 80,000characterletter to the Centerrequestinga reexaminationof his case.In so doing he was apparentlyfirst of all registeringa protestover the conclusionpresentedby Liu at the 7,000 cadresconference,yet arguably Peng was also expressingsomefaith or more likely hopein Party procedureswhich at the conferencespecifically sanctioned"verdict reversals"and in Mao's capacity to forgive. It is now clear from the testimonyof a seniorParty historian that this letter set in motion the eventsleading to Peng'sSeptember1965 audiencewith Mao when the Chairman,now endorsinga new posting for Peng in the Southwest, by Peng'saccountwent so far as to observethat "perhapsthe truth is on your side." What had happenedin the interveningthree years,accordingto my source, is that following Peng'srequesta committee to examine his case had been establishedunder Marshal He Long at the fall 1962 Tenth Plenum in a

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context where Mao both reaffirmed that Peng should not be rehabilitatedand criticized the "wind of verdict reversals."He Long'sappointmentwas significant for two reasons:first, he had beena sharpcritic of Pengat Lushan;second,only someoneof He's rank as a marshalhad sufficient statusto investigatePeng.The committeeconductedprolongedbut inconclusiveinvestigationsinto the various charges,above all concerningPeng's"illicit" ties with foreign countries.As a result, in the absenceof solid evidencethe committee reachedno conclusion, neither condemningnor clearing Peng Dehuai. This clearly showed both prudencegiven Mao'sdeclaredattitude,but also somecommitmentto procedures-and especially, it would seem, respectfor Peng's historic status-in that no bogusverdict was concocted.Moreover,someleadersbelievedthat evenif Peng could not be absolvedhe shouldbe given somework, and in thesecircumstances Mao apparentlyfelt obliged to make a gesturetoward Pengresulting in his new appointment.Yet in fact the Chairman'sangerwith the old marshalhad hardly abated and by the next month he was again attacking Peng at a Party work conference.In this instance,then, we seePeng'swillingness to test Party procedures,other leadersimplementingthoseprocedureshonestly,albeit gingerly, in an areaof sensitivity for the Chairman,Mao feeling it necessaryto acknowledge leadershipsentimentarising from the investigation,but the Chairmanultimately refusingto alter his hostility toward PengDehuai.I65 Peng Dehuai, of course,was also linked to anotherstrangedevelopmentof late 1965 which becamethe immediateforerunnerof the Cultural Revolutionthe criticism of WuHan'splay aboutthe upright Ming official Hai Rui who Mao now decidedwas an allegoricalrepresentationof Peng.The basicanalysisof the Wu Han affair given in Politics and Purges166 has been amply confirmed by post-1978materials:the publicationof Yao Wenyuan'scritical article in November 1965, after monthsof secretpreparationwith Mao's blessing,left the "first line" leaderssurprisedand confused;PengZhen'sactionsin defendingWuHan reflectedboth a defenseof Party normsin the sensethat Wu Han had no culpable organizationallinks to PengDehuai and angerthat bureaucraticprocedureshad apparentlybeen violated by the publication of the article in Shanghaiwithout clearing it with the Center; and Mao's position remainedelusive right up to March 1966 so that Pengcould reasonablyassumethat, even if he didn't have the Chairman'sexplicit blessing,there was at least enoughroom for him to try and persuadeMao of his own view. The new information, moreover, allows someclarification of key aspectsof thesedevelopments.First, PengZhen, while clearly trying to advancehis own preferences,proved remarkably sensitive to Mao's wishes once they were expressed;at the same time the Chairman's opaqueness throughoutthis period is even more apparent.Peng'sinitial reaction to Yao's article was basedon his ignoranceof its origins; once informed in late Novemberby Zhou Enlai and army Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing that it had Mao's blessing he quickly conveneda large meeting to organize propagationof the article. While this togetherwith subsequentmeasuredcriticism of Wu Han could

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be seenas--andin fact it undoubtedlywas-amaneuverto help Wu "pass the test," it was also consistentwith Mao's known attitudesconcerningthe historian whose protection the Chairman had called for in 1964 in the context of the ideological criticism then underway.Moreover, in a February8 audience,Peng subtly endorsedMao's Decemberlinking of Hai Rui and PengDehuai while at the sametime seekingto protectWu, and the Chairmanrespondedthat Wu could remain a vice mayor after undergoingcriticism. On this occasion,moreover, Mao acceptedwithout commentPeng'sFebruaryOutline which treatedthe errors of Wu and othersas academicmatters,nor did he raise contraryopinionsto other leaderswho visited him in this period. The uncertaintyof the Chairman's position at this late date is indicatedby the fact that, contrary to Cultural Revolution assertionscited in the first edition, anothermemberof the group responsible for the Outline, the radical Kang Sheng,voiced no dissentfrom its conclusions. Kang, too, apparentlywas still in the dark, and only beganto distancehimself from the report in March as Mao's attitudebecameclear.t67 Another aspect of the story, one perhapsnot given sufficient emphasisin Politics and Purges,concernsthe elite's continuingguardedfaith in Party traditions and Mao's self restraint.This is seenmost dramatically in the reactionof WuHan and his family to unfolding events.While Wu's reactionto Yao's article clearly had its ups and downs, swinging from scorn to concern mixed with confidenceto worry that somepowerful figure might be behindit all, 168 his wife expressedat the time the view that "after criticism, everythingwill be all right" (pipan, pipan, jiu haole).169 What this remark reflected was not a sensethat the criticism of Wu Han was appropriate-itwas grossly unfair and perceivedas such, but rather that as long as the criticism and self-criticism ritual was conformed to normal political life would be restored.This further indicateda widespread elite expectationthat things would not get out of control, that the traditional methodswith their convenientlimitations on criticism and the predictability of a favorableresult as long as the gamewas played appropriatelywould still be applied. Yet it was also more than a "game"; Wu Han and many other imminent victims of the Cultural Revolution lived very willingly within Party procedures,acceptedthem and cooperatedin observing them however much they resentederror in particularcases.170 Only as 1966wore on did suchofficials and the leadershipmore broadly becomeaware that more than specific errors were involved, that a deeply disturbedChairmanwas now willfully, if not fully consciously,171 distortingthe processitself.l 72 The attachmentto Party principles in this instance,as in earlier cases,undoubtedlyhad as much or more to do with self interestas with normativeobligation, but the norms clearly were important to the elite in both respects.This, in turn, is one of many considerationswhich strongly indicate that pre-Cultural Revolution elite politics is not adequatelyor accuratelycharacterizedas a vicious, revengefilled, life and death struggle. As the preceedingdiscussionhas amply illustrated, the Party'sloosely structurednorms were a significant feature

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of CCP politics even if they were easily violated by Mao and even if elite support for them was at least as much basedon prudential as principled impulses. Moreover,expectationsof limits on inner Party conflict existed even in the most problematicperiodsbeforefull scaleCultural Revolution.

Conclusion:PartyNormsand Political Practic~ Practic~ TheTexture of Elite Politics The foregoing argumentis essentiallytwo-edged.On the one hand, the norms were a significant feature of pre-Cultural Revolution Party life. On the other, they coexistedwith practicesand impulsesof the leadershippolitical culturewhat I call the texture of elite politics-which in various ways were in tension with the norms yet in otherscontributedto a patternof elite interactionbroadly supportativeof CCP organizationalprinciples.Thesepracticesand impulses,and their complexrelationshipto Party norms,were a constantof the 1949--65period notwithstandingthe dramaticswings of Party politics, and they can be seenin the rich new evidenceavailable concerningthe various casesanalyzedabove. The elite political culture they reflect derivesfrom both traditional hierarchical relationshipsand the specific traditions of the CCP'srevolution, a potent amalgam which produceda modeof politics contraryto not only Westernpracticebut also to the way many WesternanalystshaveinterpretedChinesepolitics. The most fundamentaltextural featureof elite politics is indicatedby the title of my revised analysisof the Gao-Raocase-Politicsat Mao's Court. Here the imagery is of the imperial palace,of the emperorsurroundedby anxiouscourtiers seekingto gain or retain his favor, to obtain his backing for their various projects and political interests.Some indication of the evidencesupportingthis image hasalreadybeengiven, but the significanceof the phenomenafor official normsjustifies further comment.As previouslynoted,at the time of the Gao-Rao affair Chen Yun proved the past masterof this brand of court politics, winning Mao's approvalfor suchobjectivesas bureaucraticcontrol of the socialisttransformation of the bourgeoisieand the moderationof policy toward commercial capitalists.Later, however,when Mao becamemore involved in economicpolicy the task was difficult even for someoneas skilled as Chen Yun. During the Great Leap Forward Chen could only pick his opportunitiesto articulate his and preferencesto limited effect in accord with Mao's changingassessments, basically keep quiet when the Chairmanwas not in a mood to listen. While in onesenseconvincingthe leaderof one'sposition is part and parcelof democratic politics universally, in the Chinesecasethe absolutediscretion on Mao's part reflected a far more authoritarianreality. Even more telling, of course,was the reluctanceto approachMao on the absolutely vital questionof the leadership lineup at the highest level. The impulse to keep one's distance even in the relatively·"democratic"period of the early 1950swhile the Chairmanwas per-

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ceived to be ruminating on the fate of his most senior colleagues,as in the behaviorof Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping during the Gao Gangaffair when the fate of Liu Shaoqiand Zhou Enlai was perceivedto be in the balance,reflects both an acceptanceof Mao's power to alter the most critical power relationships and a fear of being draggeddown by a false step.There was simply no recourse to the Chairman'sdisfavor, a situation in profoundtensionwith eventhe prevailing modestinterpretationsof the rights of otherParty leaders. The reasonsfor this situation bearanalysis.The primary reason,as arguedin Leadership,Legitimacy, and Conflict, was the charismaticlegitimacy conferred on Mao by the victory of 1949.173 For CCP leadersMao's greatcontributionsin achievingthe revolutionarygoals they had devotedtheir lives to outweighedall his excesses.ChenYun probablyput this attitudebestin 1981 when he observed, "When ComradeMao Zedongcommittedmistakesmany old cadressufferedbut 174 The everyonestill had faith in him [and] could not forget his achievements." resultantimpulseto obediencewas reinforcedby both the authoritariantraditions of the internationalCommunist movementand China's "feudal" past, both of which created pressurefor ideological conformity and veneration of the top leaderP5 This, of course,was reflected in a more widespreadtendencyto one man leadershipat all levels which permeatedthe entire Party structure.According to the post-Mao critique of this tendency,such attitudes as "obeying the [P]arty's leadershipmeantlisteningto a certainperson'swords," "say[ing] yes to whatever[one's] 'superior'sayswithout reserve,"and attributing "all our victories and achievementsto individuals" was rife among CCP cadres.Moreover, with regardto the Chairmanhimself, many cadresparticularly from rural areas adopteda deeply reverentialattitudeof "loyalty to the monarch."176 For all these reasonsa political culture of submissiveness existedat both high and low levels within the CCP. While the formal quasi-democraticnormscorrespondedto real leadershipvaluesand expectations,ultimately they were less powerful than the needto have someone"in charge"(zhuchi), a neednaturally growing out of the searchfor dynamic leadershipof the perilous revolutionary enterpriseyet fully compatiblewith and influencedby traditional culture. Otherfeaturesof elite political culture, however,had a much more ambiguous relationshipto Party norms. A prime casein point concernsthe unusuallyacute CCP sensitivity to status-statuslargely derived from seniority in and contributions to the pre-1949Chineserevolution. In the Gao-Raoaffair this was manifested in many ways. Thus becauseof his great military victories during the revolution, Lin Biao was both a key target for Gao to win over to his causeand someonewidely recognizedas worthy of Politburo membershipdespitepersistent ill health which preventedhim from playing an active political or administrative role. Also, Deng Xiaoping claimed to have rejectedGao's approachon the groundsthat Liu Shaoqi'sstatus(diwei) hadbeenfixed by history. Moreover, when an angry Mao wanted to denounceRao Shushi openly at the fall 1953 organization conference,Zhou Enlai successfullycounselledthe Chairman

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againstthis courseon the groundsthat washingthe top level leadership'sdirty linen in front of mere provincial level figures wouldn't doP7 Suchsensitivity to statuswas compatiblewith leadershipstability and Party unity-as long as the requisiteinterestsof variousleadersand groupswasobserved.As arguedearlier, the pragmaticconcernwith maintaininga broadly accepted"factional" balance reinforcedthe official norm banningovert factional activity. At the sametime, however,evenfalse rumorssuchas thoseallegedlyspreadby Gao Gangthat the balanceof factions was being challengedby Liu's group could ironically stimulate clearly illegitimate factional maneuvers.And while status might have shielded ranking leaders from threatening criticism in the absenceof Mao's 8 the systematicexclusionof broaderParty audiencesfrom high dissatisfaction,I7 level differencesdid little to encouragean atmosphereof "democratic"discussion within the organizationas a wholeP9 Statusconsciousnessalso served to reduce responsibility, and therefore the effective functioning of the system,in a numberof ways. Although perhapsa uniquecasegiven both his continuousill healthand Mao's unusuallyhigh regard for him, Lin Biao's career demonstratesseveral paradoxicalconsequences of statusconsiderations.While at the time of the Gao-RaocaseLin-although on sick leave--didhavea major postingas headof the Central-Southregion, subsequently until Lushan he only held positionsof high prestigebut no operational authority as a Politburo member,vice premierand, from 1958, Party vice chairman. This, of course,was in large part due to Lin's ill health,but accordingto a well informed oral source it also reflected the difficulty of finding a position appropriateto Lin's status. With Peng Dehuai Minister of Defence, it would have been inappropriatefor Lin who had roughly equal status180 to serveunder Pengin the areaof his expertise,the military. Thus, in the view of this source, the convenientsolution was to give Lin the title of vice premier but he had nothing to do. Had Lin actually been healthy and this logic applied, the regime would haveforegonea major talent for the sakeof respectingstatus. But Lin was ill, at least to some degree,181 and subsequentdevelopments showedhow greatpolitical influenceand administrativeclout could be exercized by someoneof questionablecapabilities.Although Lin initially did not attendthe Lushan meetingspresumablybecauseof ill health, he was summonedby Mao after Peng Dehuai's letter and played a major role in attacking Peng-arole which undoubtedlygainedin effectivenessbecauseof Lin's reputationas a great general.After LushanMao appointedLin to replacePengas Minister of Defense despitethe view of Marshal Luo Ronghuanthat Lin was too ill to do the job effectively, and henceforthLin presidedover military affairs. According to oral sources,while from 1959 to the Cultural Revolution Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing administeredthe army, ultimate authority (subject to Mao) restedclearly with Lin. Thus, in a way strongly replicating the relationshipbetweenMao and the "first line," Lin was able to intervenedecisively but at the same time remain aloof from and even uninterestedin daily affairs. It was clearly not a recipe for

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collective leadership,but rather a highly authoritarianand curiously inefficient superior-subordinate setup.182 More generally,the use of sick leave or other leave by high ranking leaders also has ambiguousimplicationsfor the norms.183 Even where real illnessesare at issueas apparentlywas the casewith Lin Biao, the ability of powerful politicians to retreatfrom official duties for substantialperiodssuggestsa weakening of accountability. In at least some instances,moreover,sick leave appearsto havebeenas much a political tactic as a medical imperative.Arguably a casein point was Chen Yun's sick leave in early 1962 which allowed him to delay his return to an active leadershiprole to a more propitious moment.184 Even more striking was the assertedlybogussick leave of Kang Shengfrom 1949 to 1955. Kang, having been passedover in favor of Rao Shushi in 1949 as the leading Party official in East China, a position that would have befitted his Politburo status,reportedly falsely declaredhimself ill and only reemergedas an active force with Rao's fali. 185 Other forms of leave could also be used by top level figures. For example,in December1951 Liu Shaoqiapparentlywent on holiday rather than attendthe trade union congresswhich fell under his direct responsibility becausehis position on the role of trade unions had been overturnedby Mao in the previousmonths. Hugely embarrassed,Liu decidedto leave Beijing ratherthan attendthe meetingwhich would endorsethe rejectionof his views.186 Thus various forms of leave, whether for illness, holiday or to tend to regular 187 were convenient devices available to work rather than attend conferences, high statusleadersfor prudentialreasonsof political advantage~radvantage~r evensimply the indulgenceof hurt pride. While diplomatic illnessesare hardly unknown elsewhere,the Chinesecaseincluding long self-imposedperiodsin the shadows followed, Mao willing, by the restorationof one'spower is particularly striking. The practiceprobablycontributedto elite stability by providing a mechanismfor leaders to avoid conflict, but in none of the casesabove did the officials in questionvigorously participatein collective policy debateas ostensiblydictated by the principles of inner Party democracy.Yet paradoxically,given the larger authoritarian leadershipculture, the ability to stand aside and then return at strategic junctures facilitated the processof policy adjustment provided the Chairmanwasreceptive. The deliberate opting out from collective decision making by the use of official leave perhapsreflects broaderphenomenaof elite interaction indicative not of collegiality but of the relative isolation of various top leadersfrom one another.While any judgmentmust be tentative,the Gao-Raocasein particular suggestsconsiderabledistanceamongat least someleadersat the top with close links limited to people working in the same functional area or from the samerevolutionary "faction." While in one sensethis is hardly remarkableand would be mirrored by similar tendenciesin any political system,the suggestion of separatecircles in the Chinese case seemsparticularly pronounced and is clearly in tension with the formal emphasison collective leadership.

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The most striking exampleto emergefrom the eventsof 1953 is that Gao and Rao themselves,despite official chargesof having engagedin a conspiracy, apparentlynever engagedin face to face consultationconcerningtheir political maneuvers.Rather, Rao seemsto have concludedthat Gao was gaining Mao's favor and independentlycarried out supportativeactivities accordingly, while Gao observedRao'sactionsand left it at that. This, of course,had the advantage for Rao in that he observedthe explicit ban on overt factional plotting, but it also reflected the distancebetweenthe two men given their different revolutionary experiencesand functional responsibilities.Perhapsmost telling in this regardwas the incredulity with which many cadresgreetedthe official versionof a Gao-Raoplot-an incredulity basedon the belief that their separaterevolutionary careersmadeintimate relationsimplausible.188 The larger implication of this instance, however, is that the genuine free exchangeof views for legitimate purposesaccording to the CCP's organizationalnorms would be significantly inhibited by the tendency for leaders to keep to their own circles.189 If the various status related features of elite political culture did little to promote vigorous democraticlife, as indicated above it could-andnormally did~ontribute did~ontribute to a comparativelystable leadershippolitics as sought by the CCP's normativeregime. As radical and dramatic as various policy shifts were in the pre-Cultural Revolution period, the name of the game was essentially conservative.The objectivewas to hold one'sposition or graduallyrise as openings naturally arose, not to leapfrog over the bodies of politically disgraced colleagues.Moreover, where "bodies" did exist as in the caseof Peng Dehuai after Lushan, it is significant that only figures of requisite historical statussuch as Lin Biao moved into the breach.The degreeof meaningfulcollegiality which actually existed outside of well establishedpersonalnetworks or work related contactsmay have been limited, but the balancedsharing of positions among different groupsservedto defusepotential tensions.Structurally, the systemof life tenure with no well-defined exit pattern meant that although the loss of position could signal very hard times, in fact only seriouspolitical trouble would result in dismissalfrom official posts. Rectification may have beena ritual to a degree,but the reform emphasisdid serve to keep purging under considerable constraintsespeciallybeforethe Great Leap, and particularly at the higher levels. Indeed,the Politburo electedin 1945 was substantiallyin place20 yearslater on the eve of the Cultural Revolution.190 The generalpatternwas not a vicious life and death struggle among different factions before 1966; at most a cautious warinessof other groups, a phenomenonnot unknown in far different political systems,served to inhibit the genuine impulse to collective discussionwhich existeddespiteeverything.The real threat, however,camenot from the dynamics of elite competition but from the supreme leader. Each major breach of organizationalnorms can be tracedto Mao's actions--whetherseeminglyinadvertent as in the Gao-Raocase,due to explosive pique as with PengDehuai, or

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as a result of a deliberateif confusedplan as in the launching of the Cultural Revolution. The inner Party democracywhich did exist in 1949-65 might paradoxically be termed "feudal democracy."That is, the CCP's various quasi-democratic practices existed at the discretion of the "emperor," a discretion which was alwayssomewhaterratic but decidedly more so after 1957. Thesepracticesalso coexistedwith other textural features of elite political life emphasizingstatus considerationsand cautiouspolitics which, while not antitheticalto Party norms, often stood in sometensionwith them. Statusoften translatedinto a certainlack of responsibility,while caution aboveall meant not pressingeither one'sviews or the very right to havea voice in the face of an arousedMao. At the sametime anotheraspectof the CCP's normative culture-thepursuit of ideological correctnesswhich allowed for, albeit in the nameof rectification, considerableinner Party struggle-alsoimpingedon both the conflict moderationand "democratic" aspectsof Party principles. But all thesecomplicating considerationsnotwithstanding, elite attachmentto the norms, as indicated most dramatically at Lushan, was real if secondaryto loyalty to the leader and the requirementsof political survival at his court. Understandablythen, once the Chairman had passedaway it was no surprise that restoring traditional principles becamea heartfelt initiative of Mao's former leadershipcolleagueswith major ramifications for reform era politics.I91

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Introduction to the First Edition

The history of post-1949Chinesepolitics has normally beenwritten in terms of debateand conflict over social and economicquestions.However,anotherset of issues has also been of enormousimportanceto the leadersof the People's Republic of China-the organizational norms defining acceptablebehavior within the elite. What rights do ChineseCommunistParty leadershave in the policy making process?What principles bind Party officials in the implementation of policy? What types of behaviorare beyondthe pale? How is inner elite conflict ideally handled?What norms guide the administrationof discipline? When are purgesjustified? This study focuseson thesequestionsfor the period from the founding of the PRC to the startof the Cultural Revolution. Rectification, the distinctive approachto elite discipline developedby the CCP leadershipunderMao Zedongin the early 1940s,occupiesa key position in the Party'sorganizationalnorms. It embodiesseveralprinciples which quickly becamebasic Party doctrine: the vast majority of officials are "basically good" and their mistakescan be corrected,discipline must aim at achievingreform and utilizing the talentsof such officials for the CCP'scause,and disciplinary methods on the whole should be lenient and limit purgesto exceptionalcases.In the revolutionary period, this approachbuilt on existing leadershipunity to extend and deepenthe commitmentof the CCP elite to Maoist programsand methods, thus playing an important role in the Party'seventualsuccess.Quite naturally, Chineseleaderssubsequentlyapplied rectification methodsto major problems and conflicts which aroseafter the nationwideseizureof power. Rectification principles are firmly linked to other key organizationalunderstandings.Given a basiccommitmentto the CCP'scause,leaderscan participate in a relatively open policy making processmarked by collective decisionsand rights for minorities. In the conduct of policy debate, the participants must openly advocatepositionsaddressedsolely to the merits of the issuesat hand; no 3

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disciplinary action should be taken against the expressionof views-however erroneous-provided it is donewithin legitimateParty forums. But sanctionsare called for in casesof factional activity where groups of leadersseek personal advantageby bandingtogetheroutside normal Party channels.In general,discipline will focus on shortcomingsin policy implementationas indicatedby the explicit concernof rectification with "work style"-the mannerof performing dutiesand dealingwith people.Moreover,the administrationof disciplineshould be essentiallyan inner elite affair. Although the "masses"might be drawn into the processfrom time to time, ultimate authority restsfirmly with the Party and any popular role is subject to strict control. While theseunderstandingsform a coherent set of organizational norms, it is a fragile one subject to multiple strains. Post-1949Chinesepolitics can be seenin terms of the erosionof these organizationalprinciplesafter an initial period of smoothfunctioning in the early and mid-1950s. The following analysis traces this processup to the Cultural Revolutionwhen the normswere almosttotally shattered. At the centerof this dramawas Mao Zedong. Mao, with somebut not total justification (see Chapter3), has been credited with creating the rectification approachin contrastto the "ruthlessstrugglesand mercilessblows" employedby the pre-Mao leadershipsof the CCP. In emphasizingthis contrastthe emerging Maoist leadershipof the 1940s pictured itself as tolerant of former opponents and eagerto createan atmospherein which diverseelementscould contributeto the revolutionary causewithout fear of arbitrary purgesand excessivepunishment. Yet by the late 1950simportantdifferencesappearedwithin the leadership over organizationalpractices,differenceswhich placed the traditional approach underchallenge.As with conflict over economicandsocial policies,thesedifferencesshouldnot be seenas reflectinga "two line struggle"betweenMao and his supposedopponentsin the Party machine.1 The patternof conflict was far more complex, with Mao himself a crucial variable who frequently changedhis position. Indeed,Mao was at oncethe foremostproponentof long establishedorganizational normsand the political force whoseactionscut the groundfrom beneath thosenorms.Ironically, Mao'sconcernfor maintainingthe valuesof the Chinese revolution destroyedthe organizationalguidelineswhich had servedthe revolution so well. Aims andTargetsof Rectification The conduct of rectification, and with it the whole structureof CCP organizational norms, has been affected by changing patternsof problems, goals and target groups. Rectification movementshave sought to achieve a number of related yet often contradictoryobjectives: the consolidationof CCP leadership over society,the ascendancyof a particulargroup within that leadership,bureaucratic control in a goal orientedorganizationwhere the goals frequently change, vigorousimplementationof new Party policies, improvedcadre"work style," the

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elimination of behaviorjudged deviant by the Party leadership,and the internalization of valuesand outlooks promotedby the regime-i.e.,genuineattitudinal change. The target of the rectification process is a broadly defined political elite composedof millions of individuals. It rangesfrom membersof the Party'stop policy making organ, the Politburo, to the lowest officials outside the Party. This elite includes all membersof the CCP, with or without office, and all cadres in the official and quasi-official organizationsof the PRC: the Party apparatus,the statebureaucracy,the People'sLiberation Army (PLA), stateand joint state-privateeconomicenterprises,educationalinstitutions,rural production units, urban residentialorganizations,"massorganizations"suchastradeunionsand women's bodies, and the so-called "democratic parties" left over from preliberation days. Analysis must delineatewhich segmentsof this elite are the primary targetsof a given movement.Does a campaignreachleaderswith a role in shapingpolicy or only thosewith responsibilityfor implementingpolicy? How doesthe impact of a movementvary with administrativelevels, geographicregions, and functional specialties?Are Party and non-Partycadres,or rural and urban officials treateddifferently? The answersto thesequestionswill be relatedto the typesof deviant behaviorunder attack,the methodsusedand the degreeof their severity, as well as with the relationship of campaign objectives to contemporaneous Party programsand the generalpolitical context. Severalbroad variablesshapeboth the focus and methodsof a rectification campaign.One critical factor is the degreeof leadershipcohesion.Analytically, the casesexamined in this study" fall into two categories.Most rectification movementswere responsesto problemsarising outsidethe top Party leadership; in such instancesrelative unity or different degreesof division existedover the natureof the problemsand the appropriateresponse.But in two cases--thepurge of Gao Gang and the dismissalPengDehuai-rectificationefforts originated in leadershipconflict at the highest level and were only subsequentlyextendedto similar questionswithin the ranks of lower level cadres. Generally, in both situationsthe greaterthe divisions within the leadershipthe more likely rectification would departfrom established norms and employ harshpurge methods. "This book dealswith nationwiderectification campaignscenteringon Party and government cadres.It generally excludesrectification efforts implementedon a sub-national level, nationwidecampaignsin a single functional area,and Party reform measuresundertaken as a subordinatepart of other political movementsor on a fixed basisas the annual overhaul of rural communes.Of the casesexaminedhere, only the study campaigns carriedout in conjunctionwith the 1954-55purgeof Gao Gang(seeChapter5) fell short of a full scalerectification movement.SeeZhaoHan, ed., TantanZhongguogongchandangde zhengfengyundong[Talks on the CCP'sRectification Campaigns],(Beijing: Zhongguo qingnianchubanshe,1957), which excludesmention of the Gao affair. Nevertheless,it is includedherefor its intrinsic importanceasa purgeat the very apexof the CCP.

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A secondmajor variable is the short term phasecharacterizingthe political system.Post-1949China has been marked by a political rhythm of periods of intensemassmovementsseekingsocial,economicand/orpolitical breakthroughs -mobilization phases-and periodsof relaxationdevotedto correctingimbalanceswhich appearedduring upheavals-consolidation phases.bNormally, a mild rectification approachhas prevailedduring consolidationphaseswhile more severe sanctionshave been employed during mobilization periods. Thirdly, the nature of administrativearrangementsat a given time, especiallythe degreeof centralizationor decentralization,will havean importantbearingon the aims and targetsof rectification. The aims and instrumentalitiesof rectification have also varied with the distinctive overall objectivesof eachmajor period since 1949. In 1950-53,a period of basic leadershipconsensus,programsconcentratedon the consolidationof power and economic recovery leading to planned economic constructionand socialist transformation.From 1954 to early 1956 constructionand transformation on the Soviet model were the dominantconcernsof a still united leadership; the marginal impact of the Gao Gang affair stood as testimony to that essential unity. With institutional transformationlargely completed,emphasisturnedeven more sharply to economicdevelopmentin 1956-57.Soon, however,the inadequaciesof the Soviet model in Chineseconditionsbecameincreasinglyapparent and initial steps were taken to develop uniquely Chineseinnovations. In this processsignificant leadershipdifferencesemergedover both economic policy and the conductof rectification, but thesedifferenceswere containedby established Party norms.The need to find an appropriatedevelopmentalstrategyled, in late 1957, to the radical Great Leap Forward. From that time until 1962 Chinesepolitics was dominatedsuccessivelyby the crashimplementationof the Great Leap, efforts to modify the experimentand major conflict over its course, and total retreat from the strategy. New leadershipdivisions intensified and organizationalnorms were repeatedlyviolated. Finally, from late 1962 to early 1966 efforts focusedon both economicrecovery from the disastersof the Great Leap period and ideological revitalization to offset the costs of the retreat. Throughoutthis period the leadershipgropedfor new directions,uncertainas to how to reconcile its various tasks. Differences--but not polarization-again emergedover rectification as well as social and economicpolicies. Such differences,combinedwith the inability to reconcile ideological and economicobjectives, set the stagefor the Cultural Revolution. While the focus of rectification efforts has shifted according to the above factors, many problemsrepeatedlyrequiring rectification are inherent in certain salient featuresof the political system.The revolutionary heritageand goals of the CCP demandideologicalzeal,closeties to the massesof Chinesepeople,and bIn actual practicephasesare frequently mixed, having aspectsof both consolidation and mobilization. Moreover,in the 1960sthe alternationof phasesbeganto breakdown.

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strict discipline from membersof the elite. This createsconstanttension with poorly educatedofficials lacking a cleargraspof the ideologicaland policy goals of the Party, others who fall into routinized bureaucraticpatternsof behavior, and thosewho assumeattitudesof superiority towardsordinary peopleand use their positions to seek special privileges. In these and other matters the gap betweenParty ideals and elite reality has been a persistentsourceof concern leadingto rectification efforts as early as 1950and as late as fall 1965. The commitmentboth to social transformationrequired by Marxist-Leninist ideology and to modernizationhas led policy makersand officials in chargeof policy implementationto strive for socialist objectivesand rapid economicdevelopmentwith insufficient regard for material obstaclesand popular attitudes. During the masscampaignsof the 1950sthis causedunrealisticassessments of possibilities, gross exaggerationsof accomplishments,and harsh measuresto drive the population in pursuit of elusive goals. Moreover, the realignmentof social classeswhich accompaniesrapid changein a revolutionarysociety is not a smoothprocess:a major problemhasbeenthe lingering prestigeand influenceof former elite classesamonga wide rangeof officials. This was particularly significant just after liberation in the early 1950s,and signs of its revival appearedin the 1960sfollowing the dislocationsof the Great Leap Forward. While remnantsof the old elite may impede social change,their skills are often neededfor technologicaland economicdevelopment.Furthermore,efforts to build a modernstatecreatetensionbetweenthe highly politicized revolutionary virtues idealized by Mao and apolitical technical skills. This can be seenin aggressiveefforts by professionalsto maximizeauthority within their spheresof competenceat the expenseof the Party apparatus.The clash of theseefforts with the "totalitarian"c impulse to establishfirm control overall spheresof activity was reflected throughout the 1950s and 1960s in fluctuations between Party control and professionalautonomy. The sheer size and complexity of China and its bureaucraciesalso create constantfriction betweennecessaryflexibility in policy implementationand centralized control. While rigid policy implementationcreateseconomiclossesand social tensions,legitimate adaptationof policy to local conditions is often distorted into promotion of parochial interests.Similarly, as in all large bureaucracies, individual administrativedepartmentsneglectoverall interestsand engage in bureaucraticinfighting to increasetheir own authority and resources.The difficulty of obtaining efficient communicationin a complex organizationis a major aspectof theseproblems,and of the previously noted tendencytowards exaggerationin masscampaigns.Moreover,an organizationthe size of the Party cwhile the "totalitarian model" as applied to the Chinesepolitical system has many shortcomings,the concept is neverthelessuseful in highlighting policy centralization, single party dominance,state penetrationand control of society, and ideologically prescribedsocial change.

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and statebureaucraciesis of necessitystaffed by a heterogeneous elite, a situation which inevitably gives rise to conflict. Not only have recurrentconflicts of interest arisen betweenParty membersand officials outside the CCP, but also differencesin social origins, revolutionary and post-revolutionaryexperiences, and functional responsibilitieshavecausedtensions.While Maoist ideology sees considerablevirtue in conflict, their disruptive consequences have requiredfrequentefforts to containsuchdisputes.In addition, otherbureaucraticphenomena suchas overlappingorganizations,bloatedstaffs and red tape,thoughrepeatedly denounced,periodically reappearas vexing problems. Despitethe organizationalprinciple that policy advocacyas suchis not culpable behavior,the insistencecommonto Communistpartieseverywherethat there is only one correct policy line for a given period generatesstill anotherset of problems.If contraryviews continueto be articulatedafter a policy is laid down, the result may be to undermineimplementationof official decisions.Moreover, if policy debateis particularly bitter, the victors will be temptedto attack and punish thoseoffering alternativepolicies. While criticism of proponentsof "incorrect" policies hasbeena repeatedfeatureof post-1949Chinesepolitics, in the early and mid-1950ssuch criticism was relatively restrainedand largely outside the rectification process.From the late 1950s,however,as the policy consensus eroded disciplinary sanctionswere increasingly used against advocatesof rejectedpointsof view. Finally, the absenceof an institutionalizedprocessfor the transferof supreme leadershipis always a potential sourceof instability. The organizationalnorms which guided the CCP in the pre-CulturalRevolution period were closely linked to a stableleadershipheadedby Mao. When Mao's health apparentlycameinto questionin 1953-54,leadershipconflict broke out at the apexof the CCP resulting in the purge of Gao Gang. In the immediatepre-Cultural Revolution years Mao's questionablehealth and maneuveringfor the successionwere undoubtedly importantfactorsin the tensionsof the period. In a successionsituation,the dangerwill alwaysexist that rectification will be transformedfrom a methodof resolvingproblemsto a weaponfor seizingpower.

RectificationCampaignsand Purges Thus far we have emphasizedthe persuasiveorientation of rectification. This orientationis apparentin the ChineseCommunistterm for "rectification,"zhengfeng, a contractionof zhengdun,to "correct" or "put in order," and zuofeng,"work style" or "spirit." The literal meaningsof theseterms accuratelyreflect the reform andreindoctrinationemphasisof rectificationfound in official discussions: In order to realize unity of thought and unity of organization,ChairmanMao createdthe methodof the "rectification campaign."... Throughthe rectification campaign,the entire Party membership... studiescertain selecteddocu-

INTRODUCfiON TO THE FIRST EDITION

9

ments, makescontact with reality, carries out systematiccriticism and selfcriticism, and on the basis of carrying out study puts into effect necessary organizationalprocedures.This enablesus effectively to solve problemsmet in the courseof Party building, and to reach the goals of reforming and raising the ideological level of Party membersand putting in order Party organization. Concerning... rectification, Chairman Mao has pointed out two principles: "First, 'learn from past mistakesin order to avoid future ones';second,'cure the illness in order to save the patient.' The meaningof 'learning from past mistakesin order to avoid future ones' is that we must exposepast mistakes without reservation... to enableour future work to be more careful and better done. Butthe aim of our exposingmistakesand criticizing shortcomingsis like a doctor curing an illness entirely for the purposeof savingthe patientand not in order to use the patient to examine his death.... We must welcome one who has committed mistakes,no matter how serioushis mistakesmay be, as long as he is not afraid to seethe doctor and does not persistin his mistakes until they reach the stageof incurability and is sincereand truly willing to reform, so as to help him curehis illness andbecomea goodcomrade."2 Clearly the stressis on educationrather than coercion, redemptionrather than punishment. In actual practice,however,rectification campaignshave utilized variouscoercive sanctionsincluding the purge. There is no single term in CCP usageto expressthe conceptof "purge," nor is there a body of official doctrine concerning this method of elite discipline. However, the three most commonly used terms for "purge," qingchu, qingxi and suqing, all convey the senseof "weed out," "get rid of," "liquidate" and "eradicate." In contrast to rectification, the tone is one of retribution and punishment.While there is no explicit Chinese Communist statementdelineating which disciplinary punishmentsconstitute a purge, the basic measuresseem to be expulsion from the Party and expulsion from the ranks of cadres.Thesesanctionscan be employedin movementsspecially organizedto weed out undesirableelementsfrom Party and other organizations,3 but they have more commonly been used in conjunction with rectification and otherpolitical movementsor simply as part of regulardisciplinary checkups. In addition, thereare a numberof disciplinary measuressomewherebetween the educationalemphasisof rectification and the punitive stressof the purge.For example,the sanctionof dismissalfrom official postsbearssomeof the connotations of "purge," but also holds out the possibility of return to active political life if willingness to reform is demonstrated.Such measures,as well as more informal deviceswhich reduce or eliminate the power of erring officials, are aptly describedby Donald Klein's phrase,"semi-purge."4 Despitetheir different emphases,the rectification campaignand the purgeare relatedconcepts.While rectification assumeswillingnessto reform, it recognizes someofficials will resist persuasivemethods.As a result, rectification campaigns also make substantialuse of coercive disciplinary measures.In caseswhere

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cadrespersistin deviant behaviordespiterepeatededucationalefforts, the most severedisciplinary measureof expulsionis invoked. Thus the purge is regarded as an extremeaction taken only when rectification fails. Conversely,in Party doctrine, disciplinary punishmenthas a persuasiverole both by providing inducementsto reform and as a lessonfor rank and file cadres.5 Therefore,purges of major figures are frequently accompaniedby intensivepropagandaand educational efforts, and dismissedofficials are often given new positionsafter repenting. Even when severecriminal sanctionsare applied, attention is given to the possibility that purged cadreswill reform themselvesand play a useful role in society.6 In sum, rectification campaignsnearly alwaysinvolve a degreeof purging, while purgeshaveeducationalas well as disciplinary functions. Although rectification normally involves purging and other disciplinary measures,specific campaignsvary greatly in termsof the relative leniency or harshness of the methodsactually involved. Indeed, individual movementscan be placedon a persuasive-coercive continuum(seeChapter2) reflecting the severity of methodsand sanctionsemployed.The subsequentanalysis,after tracing relevant developmentsbefore liberation, then examinesin detail each of the major rectification efforts from 1950 to 1965 with major attentionto thesequestions. The tendencyof rectification campaignssince the late 1950sto cluster at the coerciveend of the continuum is eloquenttestimony to the declineof Party normsin the pre-CulturalRevolutionperiod.

PART I

Doctrine, Methodsand Historical Development

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1 Rectification Doctrine

The theoreticalunderpinningsof rectification were laid in Yan'an during the late 1930sand early 1940sas part of the creationof a coherentsetof Party organizational norms. This doctrine underwent remarkably little developmentin the 1950-65 period despite a profound evolution in Mao's overall thought. The theoretical refinementthat did take place was mostly confined to Mao's 1957 writings-especially his essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions amongthe People"which elaboratedthe conceptof "non-antagonisticcontradictions." This development,althoughaccompaniedby a major departurein rectification methods,did not break with past doctrine. It was essentiallyan effort to extend well establishedprinciples to a new situation following "the victory of socialist transformation"(see Chapter6). A far more significant impact on the rectification processgrew out of Mao's increasingpreoccupationwith protracted classstrugglefrom 1959 onwards,but this did not directly alter formal rectification theory.a Cultural Revolution sourceshave claimed that this relatively unchanging body of theory in fact containedtwo conflicting tendencies,one associatedwith Mao and anotherwith his chosenheir, Liu Shaoqi.This hasled somescholarsto see important divergenciesin the writings of Mao and Liu on organizational matters. Mao is pictured as making obedienceconditional on correct policies, emphasizingdramaticdisplaysof emotionin resolvingtensions,and being intent upon bringing extra Party forces into the rectification process.In contrast,Liu is viewed as the advocateof rigid discipline, rationalizing conflict and repressing undueemotion,and maintaininga strict demarcationbetweeninner Party rectifi-

• Disagreements over the conductof the SocialistEducationMovement(1962-65)did, however,involve different theoreticalformulationsconcerningthe targetsof that particular campaign.SeeChapter11. 13

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cation and massactivities.' This analysisrejects such an interpretation.While differencesdid appearbetweenMao and Liu on rectification in the pre-Cultural Revolutionperiod, they did not consistentlyargueopposingpositions.Moreover, their writings of the Yan'an period which formulated rectification doctrine were fundamentallycomplementary;any differenceswere matters of nuanceor the degreeof attention each gave to specific problems.To the extent Mao and Liu differed over specific rectification campaignsin the following two and a half decades,it was in large measuredue to the difficulty of applying the ambiguities of the doctrineto new circumstancesratherthan to any long standingdifferences in emphasis.

Contradictionsand Proletarian Consciousness Rectification doctrine is firmly linked to the larger body of CCP ideology. Party theoreticalwritings, particularly thoseof Mao, place enormousemphasison the existenceand implicationsof "contradictions"(maodun).2 In the dialectical perspective,the world "teems with contradictions"and neither history nor society can be properly understoodwithout an analysisof the relation of contradictory forces. The Party as an active force in history is required to define the principal contradictionof each historical period and align with its progressiveaspectin a struggleto overcomeand transformthe reactionaryaspect.Moreover,the contradictions of societyare reflectedwithin the Party itself and struggleis a necessary feature of Party life. According to Mao, "If there were no contradictionsin the Party and no ideological strugglesto resolvethem, the Party'slife would come to an end."3 The natureand form of contradictionsboth in society and the Party, however, are in perpetualflux, and thereforepose major problemsfor analysis and handling. As elaboratedby Mao in 1957, thereare two kinds of contradictions,"antagonistic" (duikangxing) and "non-antagonistic"(feiduikangxing). Rectification techniquesare particularly designedfor handling non-antagonisticcontradictions, while purges are suited to antagonisticcontradictions.An antagonistic contradictionis one "betweenourselvesand the enemy," i.e., in the post-1949 period, betweenthose who support socialism as defined by the CCP and those who relentlesslyopposeit. Such a contradictionis irreconcilable;one antagonistic force must prevail over the other. In contrast to contradictions"between ourselvesand the enemy,"contradictions"amongthe people"are generallynonantagonistic.While the compositionof the "people" is alwayssubjectto change, since the establishmentof the PRC it has consistedof all classes,strata and social groupswhich approveand supportsocialist transformationand construction. Among theseclasses,strata and groups, and betweenthem and the Party, exist conflicting interests,but thesecontradictionsare subordinateto the common interest of the people as a whole. Such contradictionscan be reconciled,

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15

adjustmentscan be madeto accommodatethe different needsof various groups without unduestrainon the people'sunity.4 It is important to note that what distinguishesantagonistic from nonantagonistic contradictions,and thus the suitability of rectification or purge methods, is not "objective" considerationsof class but rather the "subjective" attitudesof the groupsconcerned.Although classcontradictions,especiallythose betweenthe bourgeoisieand proletariat,are frequently antagonistic,this neednot be the casein all situations.bAn enemy is defined by his hostility to the Party and not by his classstatus,even though in many casesthere may be an identifiable link betweenthe two. But while theory delineatesthe types of contradictionswhich require the use of rectification or purge techniques,it provides no clear guidelinesfor identifying thesecontradictionsin practice.The slippery task of determiningthe nature of any specific contradiction, already made difficult by the subjective criteria which must be applied, is further complicatedby the fact that the contradiction itself is subject to constantflux. In everyday life as well as periods of major historic changeantagonisticcontradictionsmay be transformedinto nonantagonisticones and vice versa. Mao spoke of both possibilities in "On the CorrectHandlingof Contradictionsamongthe People": The contradictionbetweenexploiter and exploited, which exists betweenthe national bourgeoisieand the working class,is an antagonisticone. But, in the concreteconditions existing in China, such an antagonisticcontradiction, if properly handled,can be transformedinto a non-antagonisticone and resolved in a peacefulway. But if it is not properly handled,if, say, we do not follow a policy of uniting, criticizing and educatingthe national bourgeoisie,or if the national bourgeoisiedoes not accept this policy, then the contradiction between the working classand the national bourgeoisiecan turn into an antagonistic contradictionas betweenourselvesand the enemy.5 Thus the possibility of changein the natureof a contradiction,whetherfor good or ill, dependson two factors-thewillingnessof the peopleconcernedto accept transformationand the properor improperhandlingof the situationby the Party. As we shall see,both considerationsstandat the heartof the rectification process. b Mao's great stressin the 1960son antagonisticclassstruggleraisesthe questionof whetherhe changedhis mind on this point. While his new emphasison protracted,bitter classstruggledid alter the implications of the notion that classcontradictionscould be non-antagonistic,the doctrine itself continued to receive official sanction through the reprinting without alteration of "Correct Handling of Contradictions"even during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, in the immediatepre-Cultural Revolution period there were statementsthat antagonisticcontradictionsbetweenthe working classand bourgeoisie would neverthelessstill be handledas a contradictionamong the people. See Zhou Enlai's 1964governmentwork report in Main DocumentsoftheFirst Sessionofthe Third National People'sCongressof the People'sRepublic of China (Beijing: Foreign LanguagesPress,1965),p. 32.

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CultivatingProletarian Consciousness

Rectification is not designedsimply to correct deviant thoughtsand attitudes. Above all it seeksto develop"proletarianconsciousness" (wuchanjiejiyishi), to raise systematicallythe level of eachperson'sknowledgeof and commitmentto proletarianvalues.Thus rectification involves educationand training, what Liu Shaoqi termed "cultivation" (xiuyang), in pursuit of a fundamentaltransformation. This concept, while originally applied to Party members,can easily be extendedto non-Partycadresaswell. In CCP theory proletarian consciousnessis not simply a reflection of the attitudesof a particularclass.It is a stateinfused with moral fervor involving the utmost dedication in striving for highly valued yet elusive goals. Liu passionately statedthis view with referenceto Party members: When contradictionsarisebetweenthe interestof the Party and the individual, we can, without the slightest hesitationor feeling of compulsion,submit to Party interestsand sacrifice the individual. To sacrificethe individual for the sakeof the Party,for the sakeof class,for national liberation,or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one'sown life, without the slightesthesitation, with a feeling of happiness-thisis the highest expressionof Communist morality, the highestexpressionof principle by the Party member,a pure and 6 honestexpressionof the Party member'sproletarianconsciousness. True proletarianconsciousness is not an easystateto attain. Seekingthat state may be comparedto travelling down a long, tortuous road besetby dangerson all sides.As an individual startssucha journey he is subjectto a wide variety of evil influencesleft over from traditional and bourgeoissocietieswhich still persist in the ideological realm after basic changesin production relations. Even Party membersof pure proletarian origin or veteran cadreswho have gone throughyearsof revolutionarystruggleare threatenedby particularisticpressures and selfish temptations.Often thesepressurescan only be overcomethrough an emotionallyand psychologicallyexactingprocess.As Mao put it in 1942: It is necessaryto destroy these [petty bourgeoisinflvences] and sweepthem away, but it is not easy.... The first step... is to give the patienta powerful stimulus: yell at him, "You're sick!" so the patient will have a fright and breakout in an overall sweat;then he can actually be startedon the road to recovery.7 Indeed, the need for such traumatic methods is understandablesince what is askedof the individual is nothing less than he transform his world outlook, that he overturn his entire identity (fanshen)by shakingoff all perniciousinfluences of the past. But at the sametime the needfor emotional traumaraisesproblems in implementingParty reform, particularly in view of the dangerof excessive

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17

struggle. It is a delicate task to determinewhen emotional intensity is required and when it is counterproductiveto the aims of rectification. Despiteawarenessof the difficulties involved, rectification doctrine is optimistic about the potentialitiesof the process.Official statementshave repeatedly held that 90 to 95 percentof cadresare good or comparativelygood and capable of being reformed by proper rectification techniques.While proletarian consciousnessis subject to backsliding, repeatededucationwill assurethat these cadresreturn to the path of righteousness. The basisof this optimistic view is firmly rooted in the assumptionthat the vast majority of individual cadresand Party memberswant to be transformedor at least are willing to accepttransformation.This can be seenin one of Mao's most characteristicconcepts: "unity-criticism-unity" (tuanjie-piping-tuanjie). Starting with a desirefor unity, the applicationof criticism results in the attainment of unity on a new basis.8 That is, most cadressubjectively desire to serve the people despitetheir shortcomings;the Party, as the repository of truth, reveals the nature and sourceof their mistakesthrough criticism; and as a result unity is achievedon a higher, more consciouslevel and shortcomingsare overcome. While proper educationalmethodsare a key factor in this process,the matter rests ultimately with an exerciseof individual will. Even cadresamong the 5 to 10 percentwho are judged unworthy, provided they sincerelydesireto change their ways, can be saved.9 The Party only rejects those who despite patient, persistenteducationsteadfastlyrefuse to accept transformation.Thus rectification may be seenas a morality play in which the sinner,besetby temptation on all sides,can by meansof a moral choice obtain salvation.It was one of Mao's deepestconvictions that, faced with such a choice, only a very few will reject the graceoffered by the Party. RectificationDoctrineand Party OrganizationalNorms While the willingnessto acceptthe Party'soffer of graceis essentialfor ideological reform, successfulrectification also requires that Party leadersskillfully managethe reform processitself. Rectification,then, must be seenin the context of the CCP's general approachto the managementof complex organizations. Since strugglewithin the Party and other official organizationsis deemedboth inevitableand desirable,the taskof the leadershipis to seethat it assumesproper forms and is channeledinto productive ends. This task is closely linked to the largerframeworkof CCPorganizationalnorms.

Discipline andDemocracy To be acceptable,strugglemust be "principled," i.e., it must involve basic ideological differences.Its aim must be to assurethe victory of positive proletarian

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views over reactionarybourgeoisideology. But what are the implicationsof this for Party discipline? In theory, organizationaldiscipline is contingentupon the ideologicalcorrectnessof Party policies. Liu Shaoqicstatedthis clearly in 1939: The contentand essenceof Party unity is ideological unity createdby Marxism. This ideological unity is absolutelybasic. Without it the Party'scohesion cannotbe assuredand is boundto breakdown. Therefore,if thereare ideological differences or differences of principle within the Party, then struggle should be launchedto regain unity. If there are a few Party memberswho persistin their mistakenideasand principles and will not give them up, in the end they must be expelled(like the Trotskyitesand rightists). If thoseinsisting on thesemistakenideasand principles are a majority in the Party, then in the end there may be no choice but to split with them and establisha separate organization Gust as Lenin left the Social Democratic Party and set up a separateCommunistParty).10 The need for organizationalsplitting, however, only applies where the Party leadership follows an incorrect policy line. In the current situation where a "correct" leadershipunified around Mao had assumedcontrol of the CCP, Liu advocatedstrict Leninist discipline. Party memberswere to obey majority decisions and higher level orders even when they were convinced such decisions were wrong in principle. While Liu allowed that the existing leadershipcould make mistakes,thesewere merely passingshortcomingswhich would inevitably be corrected.11 At the sametime, Mao also hammeredhome the needfor obedience. He repeatedlyspoke of the need to observeorganizationaldiscipline, to march in step, and directly attacked the tendency of minorities to refuse to submit to the majority.12 Like Liu, Mao held that the Party also neededdemocracy, "but it needscentralizationeven more."13 Although flexibility was allowed in applying higher orders,d both men clearly felt an effective organizationrequires a disciplined chain of commandwhere the authority of higher levels is acceptedwithout question. Disciplined policy implementation,then, is a natural by-product of an ultimately correct Party leadership.But if the leadershipis ultimately correct,this is c During the Cultural RevolutionLiu was repeatedlyaccusedof promotingblind obedienceto ordersfrom above,thuscreatingan ideologically unprincipled"slavish mentality" within the Party. The following demonstratesthat his advocacyof discipline was not absolute.More importantly, a full reading of the writings of Mao and Liu during the Yan'an period indicatesthat, if anything, Mao placedeven greateremphasisthan Liu on the need for discipline. Cf. Stuart R. Schram,"The Party in ChineseCommunistIdeology," CQ, No. 38 (1969), p. 8. dThe needto apply centraldirectivesflexibly to suit local conditionsis a basictenetof CCP administrativedoctrine.While there is considerableambiguity concerningprecisely what is legitimateflexible application,thereis no right to refuseto implementhigherlevel ordersas a matterof principle. SeeLiu's July 1941 essay,"On the Intra-PartyStruggle," in Boyd Compton, trans., Mao's China: Party Reform Documents,1942-44 (Seattle: University of WashingtonPress,1966),pp. 221-22.

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19

due in large measureto an open, democraticdecision making process.Within appropriateParty bodies, CCP leaders have clear rights to argue their views vigorously without fear of retribution for winding up on the losing side. Moreover even if one is in the minority, as long as he implements the majority decisionhe is free to continueto hold his opinion and again advocateit at future Party meetings. Indeed, dissentershave a duty to press their case since their views might prove correct and eventually win over the majority.l4 Thesemeasures,by encouraginga free flow of ideasand opinions, have in fact worked to strengthenthe policy processby facilitating decisions basedon adequate information and the correctionof errorsin due course.Furthermore,thesenorms have clear implications for Party rectification. If advocacyof alternativepolicy views is legitimate, then rectification could not be aimed at "erroneous" policy views per se. Insteadit would focus on "deviations" in "work style" and policy implementationas is emphasizedby rectification doctrine. Indeed,such assurancesare necessaryto guaranteethe vigorous debaterequired for sound policy. Of course,mattersare not so simple. An inevitabletensionexistsbetweenthe right to "reserveopinions" (baoliu yijian)-i.e., to continueto hold to dissenting views after a decision-andthe needfor strict discipline in implementingParty policies. The need to bolster implementationby assertingthe correctnessof official policies augursill for thoseattemptingto persuadetheir comradesof the desirability of a different course. Moreover, the notion that the leadershipis ultimately correct is in basic conflict with the principle of minority rights. According to Liu Shaoqi: If lines of reasoninghavebeenworked out but still no final unanimity hasbeen reached,it becomesquite clear who is running counterto the interestsof the struggleof the Party and proletariat,and the problem can easily be solved by making organizationaldecisionsagainstthose comradeswho persist in their errors.15 Thus while the norms concerningminority rights contribute to an open policy process,contradictionsexist which posemajor obstaclesto realizing such rights and openness. Inner Partydemocracy,furthermore,doesnot meanthe absenceof restrictions on acceptabletypes of conflict. Rectification doctrine forbids "unprincipled struggle"(wuyuanzedouzheng)reflecting the narrow interestsof individuals and groupsdevoid of ideological substance.Here such mattersas individual position and prestige,personallikes and dislikes, and conflicting departmentalinterests become objects of contention. Particularly dangerousis "factional struggle" (paibie douzheng)wherea groupof Party membersbandstogetherto seekpower within a given unit or area,or evenwithin the CCP as a whole. Factionssimply use policy issues to further their schemesfor aggrandizement;they are

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hypocritical and have no principled position on anything.16 But as with other matters,no clear criteria exist to determinewhen a group of leadersis engaging in factional activities, and when they are simply exercisingtheir right to express dissentingviews. In politics policy advocacyand the pursuit of power are hardly separable.The critical variablein pre-CulturalRevolutionChinawas the relative cohesionof the top leadership.While leadershipcohesionwas strongthere was little incentive for factional politics; correspondingly,new policies could be introducedwith only marginaleffect on the powerstructure.But as that cohesion weakenedthe tensionsand uncertaintysurroundingpolicy advocacynecessarily increased. Uncertainty over motives is linked to important ambiguitiesconcerningacceptable modes of expressingpolicy disagreements.Factions plot behind the backsof those they oppose;they exchangeviews and make plans secretlyoutside of official Party bodiesPWhile such practicesare clearly unacceptable, informal discussionsof policy mattersare an inevitable and necessarypart of leadershipactivities. Yet critical views expressedin suchan informal mannerare clearly vulnerableto chargesof conspiracy,especiallywhen divisive issuesare before the leadership.On the other hand, to speakonly in official councils can also be dangerous.If a strong dissentingview is statedin such bodies without prior warning, it may be taken as a "sneakattack" on one'scolleagues.Thus a considerablegray areaexists in CCP organizationalnormsconcerningthe exerciseof the right of minoritiesto dissent. Minority rights are clearly within the framework of the minority obeying the majority. But what, then, is the role of individual leaders?The norms which emergedin the 1940s,consistentwith the letter of Leninism, assertthe principle of collective leadership.Decisionsshouldbe madeaccordingto the wishesof the collective ratherthan the inoividual Party secretary;in this fashion policy reflects morecomprehensiveand betterbalancedviews. In principle, Mao too wasbound by majority decisions;as Liu put it, "ComradeMao [Zedong] is the leaderof the whole Party yet he also obeys the Party." Yet in virtually the samebreath Liu observedthat " ... Mao [Zedong has] handledthings well and representedthe truth so we obey [him]." 18 Such statements,togetherwith contemporaryexaltation of Mao as "savior of the Chinesepeople," clearly qualified the norm of collective leadership.Still, as shall be seenin subsequent chapters,it doesappear that this norm did apply to Mao at least flexibly, and that he was willing to acceptand indeed promotedthe notion of a certain responsibility on his part to adhereto majority views contraryto his own. Nevertheless,Mao did not speakas a merefirst amongequalsand his prestigeundoubtedlyallowed him to persuade a majority to support him on mattershe felt most deeply about. But while this might have beensufficient to sustainthe norm of collective leadershipas long as an overall policy consensusexisted,the vitality of the principle would clearly be in question if Mao's views fundamentally differed from those of significant numbersof his comrades.

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21

TheParametersofStruggle In dealing with the rights and dutiesof CCP membersand leaders,Party organizational norms also lay down guidelinesfor handling improper behaviorwithin the elite. In the early 1940sMao and Liu addressedthemselvesto suchquestions as the appropriatemethodsfor and desirable limits on "inner Party struggle" (dangnei douzheng). One crucial question concernedthe proper role of the massesin internal Party reform. In generalterms,both men took positionswhich emphasizedthe separate,leading role of the Party but did not bar some mass participation in Party rectification.e Liu was particularly clear concerningthe of the Party: "The vanguardof the proletariat should differentiate separateness itself not only from all otherclassesbut also from the massesof its own class."19 Meanwhile, Mao emphasizedthe Party'sfunctions of "leading" and "acting for" the masses.On the questionof rectification, neither Mao nor Liu was especially clear on what type of role people outside the Party could play. Liu assertedself-cultivation could not be divorced from the massesand responsible officials had to conduct self-criticism before the people, while Mao sanctioned the participation of non-Party people in the investigationof cadres.20 Nevertheless,both leadersdemonstratedconcern that dissidentswould circumventproper proceduresand attempt to mobilize supportoutsidethe Party. As Mao put it: Many Party membersdo not offer criticism within the Party but on the outside. This is becausethe political meaningof Party organizationhas not yet been establishedin the averageParty member'smind. As a consequence,he does not understandthe importanceof organization... and can see no reasonto distinguishbetweencriticism within andcriticism without. This could lead the Party down the road to destruction.2l Thus the CCP's leading spokesmenwere concernedwith limiting the role of extra Party forces in rectification and emphasizingParty leadershipof the process, but they were not precise in dealing with this complex question. While some mass participation in Party discipline was allowed, the parametersremainedcloudedwith uncertainty. In exercising its leadershipover the rectification process,Mao and Liu argued, the Party is responsibleboth for seeingthat struggle is adequatelydevel°Cultural Revolution sourceshave pictured Liu as the advocateof "closed door'' rectification designedto preventmassparticipationin Party reform. In fact, not only were the views of Mao and Liu in the early 1940ssimilar in their emphasison the need to control such massparticipation,but Liu subsequentlyplayeda leading role in severalof the most dramaticinstancesof popularintrusion into the rectification process(seeChapters3 and 11).

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oped, that problemsare not swept under the rug, and for preventingexcesses.f One dangeroustendencyis to glossover real differencesin ideology during inner Party struggle.This deviation,"liberalism" (ziyouzhuyi),is frequently manifested in the failure to criticize someonebecauseof a desire to maintain cordial personal relationships,e.g., with old friends, fellow villagers, fellow students,and old colleaguesand subordinates.Anotherfactor stifling criticism is fear of retaliation by the personcriticized. As a result discontentis channeledinto irresponsible, behindthe backcriticism outsidethe frameworkof regularParty procedures, causingdisunity behinda screenoffalseorganizationalharmony.22 While attackingthe avoidanceof conflict, Mao and Liu also criticized several tendenciesleading to unnecessarystruggle. One was the failure to distinguish betweenenemiesand comrades.Mao raisedthis questionin criticizing the disciplinary methodsof earlier CCP leaders: Hitherto, two phraseshave appearedconstantly in our essaysand speeches, one is "struggle ruthlessly,"and the other is "attack mercilessly."It is entirely necessaryto use such meansin dealing with the enemy and with opposition thought,but it is a mistaketo usethem in dealingwith our comrades...23 Another tendencywas to raise minor questionsto the level of principle. Liu arguedthat problemsof a "purely practical nature" involving routine administration do not, in theory, concern questionsof principle. On such matters differences of opinion are natural and acceptable;these conflicts do not require ideological struggle to assurethat the "correct" view prevails. Instead, such problemsshouldbe settledby compromiseto avoid prolongedconflict.24 Allowing questionsof a purely practical nature and differencesamongcomradesto escalateinto bitter disputesoften leads to "mechanicalstruggle" (jiJcie douzheng).In this form of strugglethe goal of ideological reform is cast aside; rectifying mistakesdegeneratesinto attackson individuals. Personalgrievances and factional differencescome to the fore and instead of strengtheningParty unity such strugglesdeepenalready existing rifts. In thesecircumstances,Liu observed,extrememethodsbecomecommon as " ... some comradesthink ... the sharperthe criticism, the more severeand rude the method and attitude of criticism, the better...." 25 "Mechanical struggle," moreover,relies heavily on organizationalmeasures,including criminal sanctions,while ignoring persuasive methods. The only "education" involved is that of making an example of a personwho has committederrors in order to coerceothers into line. Shortcomruu was chargedduring the Cultural Revolution with advocating"inner Party peace" in an effort to inhibit genuineideological strugglewithin the organization.While Liu, as the chief exponentof the doctrine of "inner Party struggle," did lay down rules to curb excessiveconflict within the Party,theseguidelinesdid not rule out all struggleindiscriminately andin fact dovetailedwith Mao's Yan'anefforts to createa more lenientdisciplinary process.

RECfiFICATION DOCTRINE 23

ings are grossly exaggeratedand no defenseis allowed. Even the act of confession becomesan empty ritual: ... certain comradesconfesstoo many errors.As a meansof escapingattack, nothing can equal a full confession.Althoughthe error is confessed,in actuality, the comradehimselfstill hasno understanding ... .26

Thus excessesin inner Party struggle underminethe goals of rectification. Morale is jeopardizedby harsh sanctions,true reform becomesimpossible, and Party unity is weakenedratherthan raisedto a higherlevel. The precedingsuggestssomeof the difficulties involved in channelingorganizational tensionstoward desiredobjectives.On the one hand,the populardesire to maintain harmony-frequentlydue to the persistenceof traditional tiesaccentuatesthe needto induceconflict within official organizations.On the other hand, repeatedefforts to promotestrugglecan createan environmentconducive to conflicts over narrow ends which only intensify existing divisions without providing the desiredideologicalunity. Suchefforts thus producetensionswhich spill over the boundariesof "principled" struggle but are particularly hard to control becausethey have been initiated in the name of "principle." And attemptsto suppressthe resultingexcessesmake it more difficult to foster a spirit of struggle. Moreover,the variousdistinctionsdefining whichtypesof struggleare proper do not offer clearguidancefor the implementationof rectification. As Liu noted, " ... comradesstill ask, what is principle? What problemsare purely of a practical natureand do not involve principle?"27 In reality, this demarcationis highly ambiguous.If enough details of routine administrationare compromisedthen basic Party policies may be compromisedas well. In addition, the view of a world in constantflux further complicatesefforts to maintain such distinctions. Since day to day administrativequestionsmay becomequestionsof principle as conditionschange,the boundariesof the categoriesare subjectto repeatedalteration. Moreover, how can principled struggle over ideology be reconciledwith "reservingopinions" on policy? Even when it is clear that struggle is justified uncertainty may appearconcerning the methods to be adopted. How severe shouldthe strugglebe in a given case?At what point are educationalmethodsno longer sufficient and organizationalmeasuresincluding purgescalled for? Concreteanswersto suchquestionsare not found in CCP writings on rectification. Thus the guidelinesfor rectification, and Party organizationalnorms generally, contain large areasof ambiguity. The overall thrust of the norms is clear; they supporta coherentsystemmarkedby relative opennessin decisionmaking, strict obediencein policy implementation,and leniency in elite discipline. But applying the norms to specific circumstancesis a task fraught with difficulty. Despitethe responsibilityin theory of eachParty memberto initiate "principled" struggleon his own, rectification doctrineassumesthe existenceof a unified and

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"ever correct" Party Centerto regulatedebatewithin the elite, identify objectsof struggle,and determineappropriatemethodsof discipline. Without the authoritative voice of the organizationstrugglewould surely degenerateinto anarchyas individualsand groupstried to apply vaguecriteria accordingto their own lights. In the final analysis, rectification theory is highly optimistic on two scores. First, althoughrecognizingthe persistenceof unhealthyideological trendsin the Party and society, it postulatesa basic unity of interestsamong the leadership, cadresand people,and a willingness to be savedon the part of an overwhelming majority of eachgroup. Second,the theory placesgreatfaith in the effectiveness of educationalmethodsand the capacityof CCP leadersto managethe rectification process.Such sanguineassumptionsdrastically overestimateboth the malleability of Chinesesociety and the ability of the central leadershipto withstand the inevitableconflicts of politics. Rectification doctrine-andthe larger structure of CCPorganizationalnorms--providethe foundationof a viable systemfor managingelite behavior. But this system,far from being universally valid, is itself dependentupon transientpolitical circumstances.

2 The RectificationProcess: Methods,Sanctionsand Effectiveness

Together with rectification doctrine, a variety of techniquesand sanctions gave the Party reform processits distinctive cast in the entire period from the early 1940s to the Cultural Revolution. In this chapterwe first highlight the natureof Chineserectification by contrastingit with Stalinist terror. Next, we discuss the crucial role of small group methodsduring rectification movements. We then elaboratethe various informal and formal disciplinary sanctions involved in the process,including their impact on the careersof high ranking officials. Finally, an assessmentis madeof the effectivenessof rectification by examining factors enhancingand limiting this approachto elite discipline. In this assessmentwe evaluatepersuasiveand coercive measures and develop a persuasive-coercive continuum for analyzing different rectification movements.

TheAbsenceof Terror Besidesthe "ruthless struggles"of pre-Mao CCP leaders,the rectification approach was developedwith another"negative example" in mind: the Stalinist Great Purge of the 1930s.3 As is well known, the Stalinist purge and CCP rectification differ significantly. Stalin's methods involved a far higher purge rate, harshersanctionsincluding frequent use of capital punishment,secret police administration,and a cynical disregardfor reform and education.1 But "No open criticism of Soviet methodswas articulatedduring the initial rectification effort of the early 1940s. In the 1950s, however, Mao on severaloccasionsindicated disapprovalof Stalin'sharshapproachto discipline;e.g.,seehis 1957commentsinHF, p. 270. 25

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one of the most notablecontrastswith the Stalinist period, the lack of "terror," hasnot beensufficiently emphasized. Dallin and Breslauer,authorsof the most systematicstudy of terror in Communist systems,merely concludethat terror has manifested"significant distinctive features" and "has been far more restricted in China than it had been at a comparablestage in Soviet Russia or Eastern Europe." Yet, as Dallin and Breslauerthemselvespoint out, coercionand terror are not identical. The essenceof terror is its unpredictabilityand arbitrarinessin striking someoneregardlessof whetherhe obeysthe state'scommands.Flouting commandsmay court danger,but even enthusiasticcomplianceis no guaranteeof safety. This was clearly the situation in Stalin's day when, in Ilya Ehrenburg's words, "the fate of man was not like a gameof chessbut like a lottery." Although a rationale existedfor determiningcategoriesof victims, there was arbitrarinessin the choiceof individual victims.2 The rectification processhasoccasionallyproducedphenomenaassociated with Stalinist terror: escalatingdenunciations,breakdownof trust between people,and intenseanxiety. Nevertheless,the basic approachin dealing with individuals has been selectiveand surgical rather than arbitrary.b Rectification movementsprior to the Cultural Revolution were generally under strict Party control with targets carefully chosen, models of deviant behavior widely propagated,and sanctionsmeted out accordingto the seriousnessof offenses.The emphasison persuasionrequired a demonstrablelink between thosepunishedand the deviationscriticized. Comparedto Stalin's expansive suspicion,the assumptionthat hard core political opponentsare only a small portion of the community in China has encourageda discriminating approach. The processhas by no meansbeen infallible, and the innocenthave suffered from distortionsand excesses.There have beencases,as in the 1951-52attacks on former Nationalist administrative personnel (see Chapter 4), in which individuals suffered as much for their group associationas for their own acts. Nor has the Chineseapproac" guaranteedpredictability. Behavior seemingly by a given set of policies hascomeunderattackfollowing a change necessitated of line. However,oncethe orientationof a campaignbecameclear,a cadrecould assesshis vulnerability on the basisof past actionsand mitigate discipline by appropriate acts of contrition. The failure to tolerate such calculation and manipulation made the Cultural Revolution into the only CCP campaignto b Here the discussionis limited to control of the elite as distinct from control of the generalpopulation.While the latter caseis less clearcutsinceentire groups-e.g.,landlords, bourgeoisintellectuals,urban capitalists--havecome under sweepingattack, the generalizationof an absenceof terror also applies. Even in dealing with such suspect groups the CCP has differentiatedbetweenindividuals accordingto behavioralcriteria whenmetingout sanctions.

THE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 27

approximate"terror." In the pre-1966period, however,even relatively coercive movementswere markedby a substantialdegreeof predictability.c

The RectificationProcess: Small GroupMethods,Disciplinary Sanctionsandl.eadershipCareerPatterns The core of the rectification process in China is the small group (xiaozu). 3 Organizingmembersof work and residentialunits into small groupsfor discussion purposeshas beena basic featureof life in post-1949China, particularly in urban areas. The use of small groups of ten to fifteen persons for political activities has been most developedin the Party, state bureaucracyand educational institutions. Small group activity has normally followed the rhythm of post-1949development,intensifying in contentand frequency during mobilization phases,relaxing and becoming more routine during consolidationphases. The tempo has increasedduring rectification movements,but hasvaried considerably accordingto the policy objectivesand political climateof the moment. The use of small groupsgreatly facilitates Party control. Although there may be somegroup choice,group leadersare officially designatedby and responsible to higherauthority.They are briefed on official policy and taughthow to conduct group meetings.If the systemfunctions well the leadershipcan communicateits objectives and expectationsin intimate circumstances.Moreover, small group discussionsprovide information about the participants which the leader may record and passon to higher levels. As a result, bureaucraticcontrol is enhanced since individual cadresmay be punishedor rewardedon the basis of what is revealedin the group meetings.4 The potency of the small group lies in its ability to link "study" (xuexi) of documentson current policy or basic theory and "criticism and self-criticism" (piping ziwopiping) in group discussion.In discussions,passivity is ruled out and someparticipationensuredby requiring all to expressan opinion. Involvementis increasedby relating the discussionof policies and theoriesto the performance of the unit and its members. Here criticism and self-criticism, the systematic

c Particularlystriking is the evidenceof predictability in hostile memoiraccounts.E.g., Robert Lob as told to Humphrey Evans,Escapefrom Red China (New York: CowardMcCann, 1962), cites variousexamplesof sanctionsunrelatedto actual behavior.Nevertheless, the overall thrust of Lob's book demonstrateshow even someonewith a questionablebackgroundcan avoid heavy sanctionsand indeedgain important positions within establishedinstitutionsby consciouslyadjustingactionsto currentPartypolicy. In contrast,during the Cultural Revolutionwith the absenceof tight organizationalcontrol and clear definitions of "anti-Mao" acts,virtually all savea handful of Party leaderswere fair gamefor Red Guard attacks.Moreover, no strategyof action could assurepolitical survival underthesecircumstances.SeeChen Yi's Cultural Revolutionlamentthat "everybodyis in a panic and nobody knows when misfortune will befall him"; "Collection of Chen Yi's Speeches"(RedGuardpamphlet),in SCMM, No. 636.

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examinationof the faults of each memberof the group, comesinto play. Thus dry discussionsof problemsand shortcomingsin Party directivesare enlivened by criticisms of othersand confessionsof one'sown defects. Under suchcircumstances,the pressuresfor behavioraland attitudinal conformity can be immense.Assumingmost of the group acceptsthe official position, a number of factors contribute to group pressures.First, a form of collective responsibility exists becausemembersknow they will be judged according to how successfullyproblem casesare handled. For example,when a group must approvethe confessionsof its membersbeforeforwarding them to higher bodies, there is an incentive to be more demanding.Secondly,individuals who are not major targetsof criticism may feel the need to changetheir ways to avoid such criticism in the future. Finally, the threatof ostracismexertstremendouspressure to conform to group norms, whetherthe norms are spontaneous or a calculated responseto political cues.

Disciplinary Sanctions The pressuresof the small group are enhancedby a wide rangeof informal and formal sanctions.Any bureaucraticor productionunit can initiate informal sanctions against its members.Formal disciplinary punishments(jilu chufen) are imposed by the Party, governmentadministrativeorgans, or police and legal organs.Party cadresare subjectto all three types of discipline and legal punishment.dWhile all sanctionsmay be metedout at any time, their frequencytendsto 5 increaseduring rectification campaignsand otherpolitical movements. Bureaucraticand productionunits havea variety of informal sanctionsat their disposal.eThe mildest of these sanctionsare included in regular methods of small group educationand reform. Criticism and self-criticism can be applied as the mild informal sanctionof "educationthrough criticism" (piping jiaoyu). Somewhat more severeis the requirementfor a cadre to make a "self-examination" d"Administrative discipline" by governmentorgansagainstcadresin their employ is not to be confusedwith the "administrative"punishmentmetedout by the public security apparatuswhich is treatedas a form of legal punishmentin this study. In our usagelegal punishmentconsistsof (1) "administrative"sanctionsrangingfrom formal warnings,modest fines and short periodsof detentionto indefinite periodsof "rehabilitationthroughlabor" in labor camps,i.e., sanctionsadministeredby the police aloneunderthe SecurityAdministration PunishmentAct of 1957; and (2) criminal sanctionsranging from "supervised labor'' to capital punishmentwhich legally must be imposedthrough the court system. While the following discussionis in the presenttense,it is basedon information available for the pre-CulturalRevolution period. Nevertheless,many of the samesanctionsappear to have beenoperativesince 1966.For example,Party disciplinary measuresstipulatedin the 1956CCPConstitutionwere also includedin the 1969, 1973and 1977Constitutions. •The CCP has been inconsistenton this point. For example,official sourceshave occasionallyreferred to education through criticism as a formal disciplinary measure (chufen), but Party and statedisciplinary regulationstreat it as an informal device to be usedbeforeformal measuresareapplied.

THE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 29

(jiantao) or "confession" (tanbai) before his unit, often in specially convened "criticism meetings"(pipinghui or pipanhui). Thesetwo sanctionsare frequently imposedwhen educationthroughcriticism hasfailed and involve more intensive criticism from a cadre'sco-workers.Normally, if thesemeasureslead to reform, a cadreis exemptedfrom formal disciplinary action (mianyuchufen).6 A much more severe informal measureis "struggle" (douzheng)which is generally accompaniedby formal sanctions.This is frequently a central feature of rectification campaigns,occurring in the climactic stagesof a movement.It focuseson a limited numberof cadreswho have beensingled out as representative of the most seriousevils. Struggleis conductedin small groupsand, in its most severeform, in large scale"strugglemeetings"(douzhenghui)which may last for days.Struggletargetsare subjectedto carefully organizedtorrentsof abusewhile forced to standmute with bowed heads.Public humiliation is sometimescoupled with physical intimidation such as hitting and kicking. At its worst, strugglecan be an unnervingand terrifying experience,and suicideis not uncommon.? In addition, there are the obvioussanctionsinherentin the powerover careers held by leadersof bureaucraticand production units. The lowest of thesesanctions is the subtle one of one the job harassment.Often the regular personnel deviceof transfer(diaodongor tiaopei) is usedto removetroublesomeor disruptive cadreswhile avoiding formal disciplinary procedures.In caseswhere a cadre's political backgroundis questionablebut formal action seemstoo harsh,transferto a less sensitivepost offers a prudent solution. For example,a former cadreinterviewed in Hong Kong said that after he came under political suspicionhe was quietly sentto anotherlocale. Apparently his unit leaderwasunwilling to takeformal action becausehe was popularwith his co-workers.The useof suchjob reassignments is a significant sanctionsincea cadrecan be dispatchedto a far lessdesirablejob or location and forced to pull up whateverroots he had establishedin his original unit.8 Similarly, the periodic "downward transferof cadres"(xiafang ganbu) to lower administrativelevels can operateas a formidable informal sanction.f

rXiafang first appearedin the early 1940sas the "to the villages" campaign,but it did not becomea widely used techniquein post-1949China until 1957. This processhas multiple goals including retrenchingexcesshigher level personnel,eliminating bureaucratic phenomena,and strengtheningbasic level leadershipas well as educatingand disciplining those sent down. Downward transferdiffers from the "simplification of organsand retrenchmentof personnel"(zhengdunjigou jinshu bianzhi, zhengdunbianzhi jingjian jigou or jinshu jigou he bianzhi) which was usedin the early and mid-1950sby having both broaderaims and a substantiallylarger scope.For example,simplification and retrenchmentin the first half of 1954 dispatched150,000cadresto lower postswhile the first year of xiafang resulted in the downward transferof 1.3 million cadres.John Wilson Lewis, Leadershipin CommunistChina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1963}, pp. 220-32; RensselaerW. Lee III, "The Hsia Fang System:Marxism and Modernisation," CQ, No. 28 (1966}, pp. 43-49; andRMRB, April17, 1955,in SCMP, No, 1042.

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All personnelserving in governmentorgans are subject to administrative disciplinary measures(xingzhengchufen) which supplementinformal sanctions. Party membersgenerallyreceivecoordinatedParty discipline as well. However, when administrative punishmentis administeredfor work errors due to low 9 cultural level or inexperience,no Partydiscipline is considerednecessary. 10 The administrativemeasuresare : warning (jinggao); registrationof a demerit (jiguo) or a major demerit (jidaguo); demotionin grade(jiangji); suspension of duties in order to confess (dingzhi fanxing)11 ; demotion in office (jiangzhi); dismissal from office (chezhi); probationary expulsion (kaichu liuyong chakan); expulsion from the ranks of cadres(qingxi chudui or qingchu chudui)12 ; and [permanent]expulsionfrom the ranks of cadres(kaichu, kaichu ganbuor kaichu duiji). The relatively light penaltiesof warning and the registrationof demeritsdeal with minor violations of state discipline. Even these sanctionsare seriousbecause,along with all other informal and formal disciplinary measures,they are enteredin cadres'dossiersand affect future careerprospects.Demotionin grade, also for minor violations, meansa reduction in civil serviceranking and salary, but the cadre retains his original office. More seriousviolations may result in periodsof suspensionduring which cadreswrite confessions,often undera form of housearrestwithin their unit. This can continuefor weeksor monthsbeforea satisfactoryconfessionis made and the cadresare allowed to return to their former postsor to otherposts. Demotions to lower ranking posts are also invoked for major violations of statediscipline. Dismissal fromofficeg for someoneholding more than one positions generallypertainsto his primary position, but in seriouscircumstancescan apply to concurrentpostsas well. Probationaryexpulsionfor very seriousviolations is accompaniedby trivial assignments,reduced wages, and continuing examinationsof behavior. Those who repent may be reassignedto responsible work, usually of lesserimportancethan their former duties. Those who do not show evidenceof reform are expelled.The two forms of expulsiondiffer in that qingxi or qingchu chudui allows for possible readmittanceafter repentance, while kaichu is intendedto be permanent.In eithercase,expulsionis harshsince it meansthe end of the relatively good wagesand living conditionsof official 13 life and relegationto the statusof an ordinary laboreror peasant. Apart from or beyond discipline by state administrativeunits, a number of Party disciplinary measures(dangji chufen) are available in cases involving Party members.One sanction,althoughtechnically not a disciplinary measure,is "exhortation to withdraw from the Party" (quangaochudang). It is applied to Party memberswho fall short of membershipstandardsdue to erroneouspolitical gDismissal from posts (chezhi) should be distinguishedfrom removal from office (mianzhi). The former is a disciplinary measurewhile the latter is an administrativedevice

which carriesno implication of punishment.

THE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 31

views or failure to observestrict discipline and an austereliving style.14 Such "voluntary" withdrawal implies less disgrace than expulsion, but it is still a severemeasuresince loss of Party membershipremovesa cadre from the most powerful segmentof the elite and otherwisedamageshis career. Formal Party disciplinary measuresare15: warning (jinggao); seriouswarning (yanzhongjinggao); registration of a demerit (jiguo) or a major demerit (jidaguo)16; dismissalfrom postswithin the Party (chexiaodangneizhiwu); probation within the Party (liudang chakan); expulsion from the Party (qingxi chudang or qingchu chudang)17 ; and [permanent] expulsion from the Party (kaichu dangji).h Party warnings and demerits are a blot on an official's record which may inhibit advancement.Dismissal from posts in the Party bureaucracyapplies to leadershippositions only. If a cadre holds more than one leading position, he may be deprived of one or all posts dependingon the circumstances.A Party memberstripped of his Party posts still retains membershiprights and may be assignedto lesserpositions.Probationis generallyset for a specific period varying from severalmonthsto severalyearsand involves the loss of Party postsand such membershiprights as voting in Party meetings.At the end of the probationary period,a memberwho hasshowngood behaviormay have his rights restored but he is unlikely to regain his former positions.18 Expulsion,with or without the possibility of readmission,is the most severeParty sanction.It is usually accompaniedby the loss of any significant governmentposts,and frequently of purely formal positionsin representativebodies.Although expelledParty membersmay serve in minor governmentposts, it is only in exceptionalcasesthat they ever againplay importantroles.19 Administrative and Party sanctionsmay apply to violations of discipline and policy, the misuseof official power, immoral behavior(particularly in sexualmatters), and poor work style generally.They are also usedfor minor violations of state law committedwhile performingofficial duties.Seriousviolations of law, however, require legal sanctionsaswell asParty and/oradministrativemeasures.; For Party members,criminal sanctionsmust be precededby expulsion from could also be taken collech Under the 1945 CCP Constitution disciplinary measures tively againstentire Party committeesor branches.Thesemeasureswere: censure(zhize); partially reorganizingleadingorgans(bufen gaizu qi lingdao jiguou); dismissingleading organs and appointing new leading organs(chezhi qi lingdao jiguan bing zhiding qi lingdaojiguan); dissolvingan entireorganization(jiesan zhenggezuzhi); andcarryingout a new registrationof Party members(jinxing dangyuande zhongxindengji). Thesecollective measuresweredroppedfrom the 1956PartyConstitution.SeeGongchandangdangzhang [Constitutionof the CCP], June11, 1945 (n.p.: n.pub.),p. 23. iThe police and court systemnot only administersuch sanctions,but they have also taken a leading role in implementing purge movements,e.g., the sufan campaignof 1955-57(seeabove,n.3, Introduction).In suchcases,however,overall responsibilityhas beenplacedclearly in the handsof the Partyorganization.

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the Party, while governmentregulationsrequire automaticremoval from office of statepersonnelreceivingcriminal punishmentfrom the courts.20 As the various legal punishmentshavealreadybeenstudiedin detail elsewherethey will not be treatedcomprehensivelyhere.21 The full rangeof legal sanctionsfrom fines, confiscationof property and deprivation of political rights to various forms of forced labor, long term or life imprisonmentand the death penalty have long been used againstParty members.But, in as far as can be determined,capital punishmenthas been used only in a tiny fraction of cases,at least until very recently) Finally, there is the quasi-legal sanction, frequently used in major campaigns, of classifying a cadre or Party member as an enemy of the state, a politically ostracizedelement.Such classification(dai maozi, literally "to put on the cap") as a landlord, rich peasant,counterrevolutionary,bad elementor rightist involves the loss of political rights and continuous police surveillance, and is generally accompaniedby struggle and formal disciplinary 22 measures. Although the coercive aspectsof discipline are recognized,23 the principles behindthe applicationof informal and formal sanctionsreflect the educationand reform emphasisof rectification doctrine.Theseprinciplesstress(1) the seriousnessof the circumstancesof the case-mainlythe extent to which an act may influence other cadresor the public; (2) past behavior-agood record, especially if linked to good class status, will soften disciplinary action, while a politically questionablehistory will lead to harsherpenalties;and (3) willingness to reform-theextentof confessingpasterrors,the sincerityof self-examination, and often informing on others.24 The ambiguity of these guidelinesallows ample scopefor subjectivejudgment reflecting prevailingpolitical winds in the administrationof elite discipline. Flexible criteria thus contribute to great variation in the severity of measures actually employedduring rectification campaigns.

LeadershipCareerPatterns: The "Semi-Purge"ofHigh Officials How are the CCP's disciplinary guidelines applied to high ranking leaders? Careerdata reveal that the reform emphasisof rectification doctrine has in fact beenadoptedin casesinvolving powerful central and regional figures. In addition to situationswherecriticism short of formal disciplinary sanctionsis deemed i There are indications that the death penalty has been used more frequently in the campaignagainstthe "gang of four'' than before October1976. The evidenceas of late 1978 has beeninsufficient to judge whetherits use hasextendedbeyondthosewho have committed various acts of violence. There is as yet no evidenceof its application to former leadingofficials.

TilE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 33

sufficient,k this can involve various forms of the "semi-purge"where leading officials suffer actualcareersetbacks. In the mildest form of "semi-purge,"formal disciplinary measureshavebeen appliedto high ranking cadreswithout seriouslydamagingtheir careers.This is illustratedby a caseduring the Three Anti Campaigninvolving seriousbureaucratic behavioron the part of WuhanParty and governmentleaders.As punishment for their errors in 1952 Party First SecretaryZhangPinghuawas demoted to deputy secretary,while Mayor Wu Defeng was dismissedfrom office (chezhi). In neitherinstance,however,did this result in a severecareersetback. Zhangremainedan activefigure in Wuhanandby 1954againwasfirst secretary. Subsequentlyhe gained alternateCentral Committeestatusand held important Partypostsin Hubei and Hunan,becomingfirst secretaryof Hunanin 1959.Wu, within seven months of his dismissal,was appointedsecretary-generalof the important Political and Legal Affairs Committeeof the Central-Southregional administrativeapparatusand in 1954 becamedeputydirectorof the StateCouncil staff office dealing with political and legal affairs. He subsequentlyheld additionalkey postsin this sphereincluding the vice presidencyof the Supreme 25 People'sCourtandCCPCentralControl Committeemembership. In the Wuhancase,the careerimpact of the actionstaken were highly marginal and temporaryat best.Whethersomesubtle limits were placedon possible future advancementis impossibleto say, but there is little to indicate that such was the case.This examplestrongly suggeststhat the useof formal sanctions is genuinelyregardedas a methodof "learningfrom pastmistakesin order to avoid future ones"wherehigh ranking officials are concerned. The reform aspect in handling leadershipcasesis even more strikingly illustrated by instancesof leading officials suffering severecareersetbacksbut resumingresponsibleduties after a period in the political wilderness.One such patterninvolves assuminga post of markedly reducedimportancecomparedto one'spreviousposition. Huang Kechengis a good example.Huang was PLA chief of staff, vice ministerof defense,and a CentralCommitteesecretarywhen he becameinvolved in the PengDehuai affair in 1959 (seeChapter9). At that time he was relieved of his PLA and defenseposts (mianzhi) and completely disappearedfrom public view. Although sparedpublic disgrace,Huang was severelycriticized in secretParty documentsand apparentlyhad beencastinto kWhile self-criticisms by high officials are often pro forma exercisesto encourage active self-examinationsby ordinary cadres,in some instancesit is clear that serious problems are involved. For example, during the 1951-52 Tluee Anti Campaign(see Chapter4), the governor and two vice governorsof Jiangxi province made a joint selfcriticism of their concealinginformationfrom higher authorities.Nevertheless,theseofficials were not dismissedand continuedto serveas threeof the most importantleadersof Jiangxi for over a decade.CJRB, February9, 1952; and FrederickC. Teiwes,Provincial Party Personnelin Mainland China 1956-1966(New York: OccasionalPapersof the EastAsianInstitute,ColumbiaUniversity, 1967),pp. 26, 34-35.

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POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA

political oblivion. Yet in late 1965 he reappearedas a vice governorof Shanxi.26 While quite a comedownfor Huang, his casedoes typify the CCP practiceof giving usefulwork to errantofficials evenin seriouscases. Formerly disgracedleaderswho regain positions equal to their previous standingare especiallyinteresting.Pan Fushengis a striking example.Pan, an alternateCentral Committeemember,was first secretaryof Henanin the mid1950s.By 1958, however,he had beendismissedfrom his posts (chezhi) and publicly denouncedfor forming an "anti-Partyfaction" (seeChapter8). After an absenceof five years,Panreappeared in late 1962as headof the All ChinaFederation of Supplyand Marketing Cooperatives.In 1966Panagainbecamea provincial first secretary,this time in Heilongjiang,thuscompletingthe full cyclePAn even more surprising case is that of Li Shinong, a Party secretaryin Anhui expelledfrom the Party(qingchu chudang) in 1958 who resumedthe sameposition form of expulby 1963.28 Li's caseindicatesthat the provisionfor a non-permanent instances. sion from thePartyis a deviceactuallyusedin politically significant Undoubtedlypolitical comebackssuchas thoseof Huang,Panand Li do not simply reflect recognition of their sincere repentance.More complex factors suchaschangingperceptionsof needsandshifts in the political balanceof power are surely involved Indeed,one of the largestrehabilitationsof disgracedofficials in post-1949China-the1961-62"reversalof verdicts" (seeChapter10)explicitly involved an admissionof error by the Party Center rather than the reform of the rehabilitated.This developmentin fact reflecteda weakeningof rectification norms as the administrationof elite discipline from the late 1950s becameincreasinglylinked to changesin overall policy lines. Nevertheless,the practiceof restoringpower to previously denouncedofficials, a rare phenome1 obviouslyowesmuch to the rectification ethos. non in Communistsystems, FactorsInftuencingtbe Effectiveness of Rectification

The effectivenessof sanctionsand techniquesemployedduring rectification movementsvary with circumstances.Beforeexaminingthis variation in specific campaignsof the pre-Cultural Revolution period in subsequentchapters,we shall first draw upon theoreticalliterature,as well as empirical studiesof CCP methods,to analyzefactorswhich affect the efficiency of the rectificationprocess. The difficulty in gauging the successof rectification measuresderives in part from the multiple andfrequentlyconflicting goalsof the process.While rectification attemptsboth to root out deviantcadre behaviorandraiserank and file morale,the intensepressuredirected against shortcomingscan be profoundly depressingto 1While this has been most prominent in the PRC, it has not been unique to China. Rehabilitationswere a significantfeatureof EastEuropeanpolitics following the deathof Stalin as shownby the casesof Gomulkain Polandand Nagy in Hungary.Thesedevelopments,however,were clearly part of the political struggleaccompanyingpolicy changes in the post-Stalinperiod and did not reflect any establishedapproachto elite discipline.

TilE RECfiFICATION PROCESS 35

morale. Similarly, the processseeksofficials who both vigorously implement current Party policies and avoid errors which offend popular sensibilities-a balanceof activenessandcircumspectionwhich is often difficult to maintain.29 Peoplewith varying socio-economicor political backgrounds(not to mention different personalitytypes) will respondto rectification appealsand techniques differently. For example,studiesindicate that youthsof middle school and university age are much more likely than their more cautious elders to respond enthusiasticallyto pressurefor attitudinal change-i.e.,in Robert Lifton's phrase,to be "zealousconverts."3 Class differencesmay also have an effect. Although influenced by ideologies most liable to produceopposition to Party objectives,idealisticintellectualsappearmore proneto whole heartedconversion 31 In general,membersof a than pragmaticand phlegmaticworkersandpeasants. group accordedhigh prestigeare more likely to respondto official appealsthan membersof low prestigegroups.32 There is the addedcomplicationthat certain groupsmay be more responsive to some rectification objectivesthan others. Old Party cadreswell versed in democraticcentralismmight energeticallycarry out new policies linked to rectification but ignore injunctions to correctpetty abusesas not applicableto them, while non-Party administratorsespecially vulnerable to such movementsmay ceasedeviant behaviorbut tread cautiouslyregardingnew directives.33 Finally, group reactionswill vary from campaignto campaignaccording to how each group'sinterestsareaffectedby the movementsin question.

°

Coercive,Persuasiveand Tangible Appeals

The appeals usedto implementrectificationvary greatly.This variationis only partially reflectedin the ingeniousphrasecoinedby Scheinand associates-"coercive persuasion."For the processnot only involves changing proportions of coercive andpersuasiveappeals,it also encompasses obtaining complianceand change through the allocationof rewards-i.e.,tangibleappealsin the broadestsense.m mwhile this analysis does not regard the tripartite categorizationof "appeals" (also variously labelled ''powers,""controls," "rewards"or "sanctions")as comprehensiveand doesnot acceptall theoreticalpropositionsconcerningthese"appeals,"it basically adoptsthe categoriesof "coercive,"''persuasive,"(also termed"symbolic" or "normative") and "utilitarian" or "remunerative" (i.e., "tangible") appealsas articulated in Amitai Etzioni, The ActiveSociety:A Theory ofSocietaland Political Processes(New York: The FreePress, 1968),pp. 370-73;and G. William Skinnerand Edwin A. Winckler, ''ComplianceSuccession in Rural CommunistChina: A Cyclical Theory," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., ComplexOrganizations,A SociologicalReader,2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1969), pp. 411-12. It should be noted that the discussionof "tangible rewards"does not imply the degreeof measurement,precision and rationality suggestedby Etzioni and Skinner and Winckler. It simply meansthat in somerectification situationsthere has been a valid expectationthat approvedbehaviorwill securesuchconcreterewardsasjobs, promotionsand Partymembership,while deviantbehaviorwill resultin the denialor lossof suchrewards.

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In particular, Party control over all careeroptions provides powerful tangible backing to both coercionand persuasion.Not only doesthe possibility of losing official positionsinhibit deviant behavior,but concernwith one'sfuture place in 34 Moreover, the rectificasociety enhancessusceptibility to official arguments. tion processprovides strong incentivesthrough the recruitmentof new cadres and Party members."Activists" (jijifenzi) who take the lead in criticizing errors during rectification become prime targets for recruitment, although generally some evidenceof political enthusiasmbefore the movementis equally important.35 Upward mobility is provided for thosealready in official positionsby the need to fill posts left vacant by dismissalsand purgesin the courseof a campaign. Thus the careeropportunitiesgeneratedfurther the aims of rectification both by stimulating participation in the processand by replacing unsuitable cadreswith vigorous new blood. This suggests,however,that the availability of desirablepostsbecomesan importantlimiting factor. More broadly,the ability of the state to provide material rewardsfor major social groups will influence the receptivity of cadresdrawn from thosegroupsto the objectivesof rectification.36 Turning to "coercivepersuasion,"it is clear that the two elementsof coercion and persuasioncannotbe easily separated.While rational and emotivearguments are usedto securea changeof viewpoint, this takesplacein the contextof some form of external pressure.The subjectsof the process,in the words of Schein, "[are] coercedinto allowing themselvesto be persuaded."37 But if coercionand persuasioncannotbe separated,it is possibleto distinguishdifferent mixes of the two appealsin various rectification movements.The distinguishingfeaturesof a relatively persuasiveapproachare heavyrelianceon rational argument(although not to the exclusionof emotivesymbols)in a calm settingwith infrequentuseof sanctionsof any kind. A heavily coerciveapproach,on the other hand, involves extensiveuse of a wide range of criminal, administrative,Party and informal sanctions"in a highly charged,threateningatmosphere.The range of possible approachesis illustrated by the persuasive-coercivecontinuum representedin Figure 1. Eachrectification campaigncan be placedon this continuumaccording to the typesandfrequencyof sanctionsemployed. Coercion and persuasionboth seek three kinds of compliance: negative behavioral compliance-abstainingfrom proscribed acts; positive behavioral compliance-carryingout designatedactivities; and attitudinal compliance-bringing beliefsinto line with official doctrine. Coercion is widely regardedas particularly suited for securingnegativebe-

"Only criminal punishmentsand some of the more severeinformal sanctionsfit the precise definition of coercion as "physical sanctionsor forceful deprivation of basic needs"(Skinnerand Winckler, "ComplianceSuccession,"p. 412). Administrative,Party and many informal measurescould more preciselybe viewed astangiblesanctionsin that they take away or threatenjobs and wages,but in terms of "coercive persuasion"they may be treatedascoercivedevices.

THE RECfiFICATION PROCESS 37

P~--------------------------------------~C

~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • informal sanctions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ;::.

criticism & self-criticism

confession

on the job harassment

xiafang

severe struggle

struggle

transfer

cr: · · · · · · · · ···Party and administrative discipline warning demerits

demotion suspension of duties

• • !lo

expulsion dismissal

labor reform

mass trials

death

prison classification as enemy Figure 1.

Persuasive and Coercive Measures to Obtain Compliance

havioral compliance.Even here, however, thereare limits to its effectiveness. Coercion, particularly in heavy doses,generatesalienation from and hostility towards those who exerciseit. While in some circumstancescoercion inhibits undesirablebehaviorand crusbesopposition,in othersit stimulatesevasionand resistance.Coerciveappealsare also of limited effectivenessin securingpositive behavioralcompliance.Generallyquite largescaleundertakingscan be sustained at a high level of activity for short periods,but over longer periodsdisaffection, paralysisand fatalism underminecontinued performance.Therefore, timingknowing when to easethe pressure-becomes a key to the successfuluse of coercion.Similarly, it is important to apply only the proper degreeof coercion. Experimentalpsychologyhas demonstratedthat anxiety induced by threatscan improve individual task performanceup to a certain thresholdbut beyond that thresholdperformance drops significantly. The important point is to manipulate pressureto induce moderatestress which heightensmotivation but to avoid extremestresswhich destroysit.38

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The impact of coercion on attitudinal compliancefollows a similar pattern. Generally, resentmentand hostility engenderedby prolonged coercion undermine receptivity to official values.Coercioncan, however,play a positive role at a key stagein the processof attitudinal change.Here the distinction developed by Schein between"unfreezing"---creatinga willingness to abandonprior beliefs, and"changing"-the formation of a new setof beliefs,is important.During the "unfreezing"stagecoercivepressures,often including quite severeones,are vital for success;the anxiety, humiliation and exhaustionthus createdis needed to motivate the subject to discard officially disapprovedattitudes. As we have seen,Mao reachedmuch the sameconclusionwhen he declaredit necessaryto "give the patienta fright" beforeactualreform could be started.39 Even at this stage,however,the possibility of making peoplepsychoticor, as hasfrequently happenedduring intensecampaigns,driving them to suicide indicatesthe need to easepressuresbefore things get out of hand. Moreover, the "changing" stage requires a non-hostile atmospherewhere the emphasishas shifted to persuasionif new ideasare to be successfullyinternalized.Only when the individual perceivesthe solicitude of the authoritiesfor his well being and some autonomy in analyzing the situation is he likely to adopt officially approvedbeliefs.Thus rectification and thought reform haveoften beenmarkedby a shift from "assault"to "leniency." As with positive behavioralcompliance,timing is crucial if coercionis to be effective in securingattitudinal compliance.40 In contrastto coercion,persuasionis widely regardedas bestsuitedfor securing attitudinal compliance.If persuasioncreatesa consensuson values,however, in an important senseit will also be more successfulthan coercion in obtaining both positive and negativebehavioralcompliance.If widespreadagreementexists on norms of behavior, it follows that desirablebehaviorwill be facilitated and deviant behaviordiscouraged.The net result will most likely be less deviance than if alienation producing coercion were the main guarantorof order.0 Nevertheless,there will still be individuals and groups outside the consensus prone to anti-social acts. With thesepeoplepersuasivemethodsare unlikely to work and coercion will be more effective for achieving negative behavioral compliance. In terms of rectification, this suggestspersuasionwill be better suited for remedyingrelatively minor shortcomingsof large numbersof cadres who basically acceptthe official value system.While harshmethodsmight also curb such deviations,it would be at considerablecost in termsof alienationand disruption. But in casesof seriousviolations by a few, coercion will be more efficient in rooting out dangerousbehavior.PIf seriousviolations are widespread 0 Similarly, the distribution of ample tangible rewardsthroughoutsociety can provide potentsupportfor public order. PCoercionmay also be more effective than persuasionin securingpositive behavioral compliancewhen the acts involved conflict with deeply held valuesor demandextreme sacrificesfor causeswhich do not havewidespreadpopularsupport.

THE RECfiFICATION PROCESS 39

coercion may also be necessarydespite the danger of counterproductiveside effects. The degreeto which persuasioncan predominateover coercionin attemptsto achievecomplianceis closely linked to the extentof attitudinal changerequired. If the aim is the learning of new but non-controversialconcepts,then little "unfreezing" and hence little coercion is needed.On the other hand, if new beliefs are incompatiblewith deeply held values,considerablecoercivepressure -or "giving the patient a fright" in Mao's terms-will be requiredfor "unfreezing" althoughthere will be a point at which it becomesself defeating.Irrespective of the use of coercion, however, the effectivenessof persuasionper se dependson a number of rational and emotive considerations.The processof forming new beliefs-the "changing stage"-is largely a cognitive process. Once"unfreezing"hasoccurred,peopleseekinformation on which to basetheir new outlook. If this outlook is to correspondto the wishesof the authorities,they must be able to control information so that only what affirms desiredopinions reachesthose undergoingchange.The Party's monopoly of masscommunications greatly facilitates such information control by allowing constantrepetition of approvedideas,barring all but orthodox interpretationsof events,and censoring facts challengingthe official line. Nevertheless,the denial of disconfirmingevidencewill be impossibleif there is a substantialdiscrepancybetweenofficial policy and readily observablesocial phenomena--e.g., claims of the correctnessof Great Leap Forward policies during the economic crisis of 1961-62. It is therefore crucial that beliefs being promoted be compatible with the experienceof those undergoingpersuasion. Moreover, for persuasionto be successfulbeliefs must be logically coherent, they should provide a convincing interpretationof what is known. One of the strengthsof CCP ideology is that its view of foreign aggressionand internal exploitation offers a credible explanation for much of Chinese political and social history. But where there are glaring inconsistenciesofficial assertions producedoubt and confusionratherthan genuineacceptance.Finally, it hasbeen demonstratedthat an individual's acceptanceof ideas is directly related to the clarity with which he perceivesthem. Thus when a clear picture of desired attitudes is presented,people motivated to changecan easily grasp them. But wheresignalsare ambiguousor subjectto suddenalterationevensomeoneeager for changewill havedifficulty in forming a new belief system.41 In addition to the above cognitive considerations,the successof persuasion also dependson emotive factors. Rectification is largely concernedwith values rather than fact and thereforeinvolves intensely emotional matters.Even when persuasivemeasuresare carried out in a calm atmosphere,without orchestrated tension, an emotional content may be present.Such content may enhancethe effectivenessof persuasionwhen the new values promoted are analogousto existing values. For example,rectification efforts to further the collective ethic and self-sacrifice draw on strong feelings that people should behave in this

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manner. Emotional support is further provided if a referencegroup advocates official values.The Party'simageof invincibility also createsa powerful attraction to the organizationand its views. Conversely,if the authoritiesappearweak and unsureof themselvestherewill be less inclination to accepttheir assertions. Further,whereofficial ideology attacksdeeply held values,as in the caseof filial piety, strong emotionalforces will be arrayedagainstpersuasion.The need for "unfreezing"and coercionis then created.42 In sum, effective rectification requiresskillful use of all appeals--coercive, persuasiveand tangible. In general,chancesof fulfilling the aims of rectification are enhancedthe greaterthe availability of tangible rewardsboth in society at large and for participantsin the processunless,of course,a fundamentalattack on the desire for such rewards is an overriding objective. Moreover, "coercive persuasion"is much more effective than Stalinist terror not only for attitudinal compliancebut also for positive and negativebehavioralcomplianceas it recognizesthe inherentlimitations of coercion.But the mix of coercionand persuasion will vary considerablywith the objectivessought.The most basicconsideration is the degreeof changesought in a given movement,but other factors such as conflicting goalsand diversetargetgroupsmust also be taken into account.This complexity suggests,to say the least,considerabledifficulty in obtainingoptimal effectivenessfrom "coercivepersuasion."

ProblemsofImplementation Effectivenessalso dependson the performanceof small groupsand higher level authorities responsiblefor implementing tqe rectification process.The small group plays a crucial role at every stageof attitudinal change.During "unfreezing" it createspsychologicalpressurefor rejecting prior beliefs by treating as alien those holding proscribedviews. Once "changing" beginsthe small group becomesa key sourceof information from which new beliefs are formed. In seekingto identify with the group the subjectof the processadoptsits valuesand behavior.A final stage,"refreezing"or making new attitudeslast, also relies on the small group. Given the importanceof acceptanceby the group, constant reinforcementof desiredattitudesin group interaction deepensthe individual's commitmentto thoseattitudes.43 As both Chineseand Westerncommentatorshave observed,however,small groupswill not necessarilyfunction in the mannerdescribedabove.Groupscan generateconformity which either supportsor resists views promoted by the authorities.If the dominantgroup attitude opposesthe official line, social pressures will operateto reinforce resistance.While small groups are unlikely to offer overt opposition,strong deviant opinions can generatean undercurrentof oppositionlimiting the effectivenessof the group in achievingofficial goals.44 More significant are problems created by other weak points of the small group. For small groups to work well both a high degreeof control over group

THE RECfiFICATION PROCESS 41

activities and solidarity amongits membersare required.The control necessary to manage"coercivepersuasion"properly is not easily attained;the pressuresof a unit's regulartaskscan divert time and energyfrom small group activities.The absenceof solidarity can be detrimentalin severalsenses.If deepfrictions exist within a group, whatevertheir cause,the ability of the authoritiesto mobilize the group will be seriously underminedsince the need to belong to the larger unit will not exist. Indeed, one faction may resist the official line simply on the groundsthat anotherfaction embracesit. In caseswhere such frictions do not exist but the generalsenseof group identity is weak, social pressuresfor compliancewill be diluted by the member'slimited involvementwith the group. Moreover, experimentshave shown that regardlessof the numberof peoplewithin a group who articulate views challengingthose of an individual, if a single other individual affirms his view the tendencyto yield to the pressureexertedby the larger group is almost totally wiped out. Thus if a personunder attackcan gain the support of others, his resistanceto the rectification processwill increase markedly.45 Perhapsthe most importantfrailty affecting small groupsconcernsthe quality of membersand leaders.Even if considerablesolidarity and basicsupportfor the Party exists, the effectivenessof the small group will be considerablyimpaired unless there is a high degreeof understandingof and commitment to specific valuesand policies. It is likely, however,that many cadres,particularly thoseat the basic levels with a low cultural and political level, will not readily grasp official arguments.There may also be a tendencyto adhereto traditional and particularistic attitudes rather than those officially promoted.For example,the traditional avoidanceof conflict and considerationsof "face" will inhibit small groups from engaging in effective self-criticism. Group members will often focus on inconsequentialmattersrather than exposingimportant problems.And while theseshortcomingsare seriousenoughin small group members,they are doubly damagingwhen found in group leaders.As group leadersmust convey the objectives of the Party to the group and orchestrategroup activities, any failure of understanding,skill or commitmenton their part can prove disastrous. Thus the continuing difficulty of cultivating small group leaderswho are both well groundedin their group and committedto Party goals is a major hindrance to effective rectification.46 While the key arenafor implementingrectification is the small group, policies guiding the processare set by the highestParty authorities.For the processto be successfuleffective links must be establishedbetweenpolicy making and implementingbodies.Two main methodshave beenusedto achievethis end. One uses the regular chain of command. Party committeesat each administrative level are charged with guiding rectification at their respective levels; higher committeesoverseesubordinatecommitteeswhich in turn direct rectification work in the organs under their control. While special ad hoc rectification machinery is frequently set up to guide campaigns,it is staffed by personneldrawn

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from the establishedlocal leadership.At the basiclevels leadershiprestswith the Partybranches.The secondmethodrelieson work teams(gongzuodui) organized at higher levels and sentto participatein the rectification of subordinateorgans. While the preciseauthority of thesework teamsrelative to local leadersvaries, they often havea clearly superiorrole. Eachmethodhas its strengthsand weaknesses. Relianceon establishedleaders to rectify their own units placesauthority in the handsof people with an intimate knowledgeof concreteproblems.They are able to tailor the "coercive persuasion"processto the needsof individuals and groups.However, if those leadershave seriousshortcomingsthey will be able to deflect the movement awayfrom themselves.They may alsobe unwilling to deal fmnly with the errors of thoseunderthem for fear of arousingresentmentwhich will complicateregular work. Work teams,on the other hand,are equippedto handlethoroughlythe problems of leading as well as ordinary cadres.In so doing, however, work teamsrun considerablerisks of acting without adequateknowledgeof the local situation, thus underminingmorale. If work teamsdeal harshly with mistakes, local cadresmay be unwilling to resumeofficial dutiesafter the teamswithdraw. And if local leadersare rudely brushedasideby work teams,they may fmd it difficult laterto reasserttheir authority.47 We can hypothesize,then, that relianceon establishedlocal leadersis best suitedfor handlingrelatively manageableshortcomings,while work teams,besidesbeing essentialin areasof weak local leadership,are appropriatefor more intractableproblems.Subsequent chapterswill examinewhetherthis rule was in fact followed by the CCPin theperiodup to the CulturalRevolution. Distortions and excessesinevitably appearduring the rectification process. The delicaterelationshipbetweenrectification and regular work is a recurrent problem. Ideally, rectification links generalconceptsand principles to concrete problemsof work and individual behavior.But sometimes,especiallyin mild campaigns,participantswill avoid relating rectification to their work. Instead, they will engagein abstractdiscussionswhile escapingseriousself-criticism. Moreover,many cadreswill avoid participatingin campaignactivitiesaltogether on the pretextthat they are too busy with their normal duties.Thusthe compartmentalizationof rectification and work, togetherwith the assumptionthat work takesprecedence,preventsimprovedwork performance.During intensemovements,however,a contrarytendencyoften appears.Priority is given to uncovering defectsto the extent that the functioning of the organizationis severely disrupted.Occasionallythe entirework of a unit grinds to a halt. While interruptions to work are often justified as necessaryto achievea campaign'soverall goals, administrativeand economiccosts frequently exceedexpectations.Improvementsdue to eliminating deviant behaviorare thereforeoffset to some degreeby thesecosts.48 The effectivenessof rectification is enhancedby the recruitmentof energetic new cadresinto Party and stateorganizations,but recruitmentis subjectto its

THE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 43

own deviations.In contrastto periodsbetweenpolitical movementswhenrestrictive practicesnormally predominate,during campaignsstandardsare often loweredas recruitmentgenerallybecomesa major task. Responsibleofficials under pressureto show results frequently slight official selectioncriteria and proceduresin the effort to meet recruitmentquotas.As a result, vacant postsmay be filled by peoplelacking requisiteideological understandingor political commitment. If this tendencygets out of handthe achievementsof rectification are to someextentundone.Insteadof replacingtired and corrupt cadreswith vigorous new blood, oneform of inadequateleadershipmay give way to another.49 Rectification is also vulnerableto distortion by the individuals who manage the process.Responsible officialsat all levelsare supposedto pursuegoalssetby the central leadership,but the considerablepowersof mobilization, investigation andpunishmentcan also be usedto advancepersonalinterests.Suchofficials not only suppresscriticism voiced againstthem during movements,they also settle accountswith subordinateswho have given offense in the past. The fear of retaliation thus generatedunderminesrectification measures.Higher authorities, awareof this tendency,havetakenstepsto correctit but the dangerremainsand, we can imagine,becomesespeciallyseriouswhen campaignguidelinesare unclearor divisionsappearin high Partycircles. The moreprecisethe criteria defining deviantbehaviorthe easierit is for higher level bodiesto identify distortionsof those criteria. Where the definition of error is ambiguousabusesare harderto detect.Conflict at the top is the most likely sourceof suchambiguity.so Another commonproblemis the tendencyof major movementsto get out of hand.Sucherrorsas excessivestruggleandoverly harshdisciplinarypunishment are often inevitableoncea massmovementis underway.With centralauthorities insisting on the necessityof rooting out dangerousevils---andeven settingquotas for the guilty 'L--it is hardly surprisingthat excessesoccur. Suchexcessescan be severelydetrimentalto the rectification process.They not only have caused considerablenumbersof suicidesbut also a more pervasivenervousstrain due, as one commentaryput it, to "fear of the two characterszhengfeng."51 While such anxiety may contributeto rectification goals in somecircumstances,more generallythe countetproductiveaspectsof coercionpredominate. Finally, a less dramatic but perhapsmore seriousdistortion of rectification occurs when its processesbecomeroutine. Routinization involves more than superficial participationin rectification activities; it is the progressivedevelopment of suchtendenciesover time. Recollectionsof former mainlandresidents, togetherwith the findings of clinical psychology,suggestthat rectification and similar thoughtreform processeshadtheir deepestimpact in the early 1950sfollowing the Communisttakeover.Not only did important political circumstances-q Explicit purge quotas were used in 1955 during the sufan campaign;see above, Introductionto the First Edition, n. 3. The implicit useof quotasis discussedin Chapter4. Of course,quotascanalsohavethe effect of limiting the extentof a purge.

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especiallyinitial enthusiasmfor CCP successes in unifying the country, bringing internal peaceand economicreconstruction-favorsuch efforts, but the fact that most people were experiencingthesetechniquesfor the first time considerably enhancedtheir vitality. Not knowing quite what to expectand often overawedby manifestationsof CCP power, people had little opportunity to develop psychological defensesagainstpolitical movements.Therefore,the "unfreezing"potential of "coercivepersuasion"wasat its maximum. Repeateduse of these techniques,however, tended to producediminishing returns. Ritualized public displays replaced inner conviction as emotional involvement in the processebbed. A number of factors are involved. First, an important aspectof complianceis social adjustment,both in the senseof adjustment to small group pressuresand to demandsby the authorities. In order to secure approval of the group and to avoid official sanctions,people comply behaviorallyincluding public expressionof orthodox attitudes.The first experiencewith rectification is a learningprocessin which many participantscometo understandthe roles they are to play and the responsesthey should makeduring the process.With suchunderstandingnew campaignscould be facedwith greater confidenceand unorthodox attitudescould be retained with minimum tension. Moreover, to the degreeanxiety still existed, it centeredon playing one'srole adequatelyratherthan on the attitudesin question. Another factor is that repeatedexposureto rectification, i.e., to the coercive aspectsof the process,tends to generatehostility. Apart from excessesin any specific campaigna cumulativecoercionfrom successivemovementsproduces resentment.Such resentmentmay be expressedin outburstsagainst the Party when pressuresare eased,as in the HundredFlowers period (seeChapter6), or they may create a protective inner passivity against officially approvedideas. Meanwhile, the passageof time betweencampaignsprovidesan opportunity to accumulateevidence-i.e.,disconfirming experiences-whichchallengesofficial dogmasat a cognitive level. In this regardwe can speculateaboutthe effect of constantlyshifting objectivesand deviationsfrom movementto movement. While such shifts may be rational by some criteria, it is likely-particularly where the shifts are rapid and approvedbehavior is transformedinto deviant behavior-thatmany peoplewill perceiveonly inconsistencyand developreservationsaboutofficial beliefs. In somecaseswhere peopleare highly motivated,however,clinical psychology demonstratesit is possible for control over expressionof unorthodox attitudes to extend to their expressionas thoughts. Here the social adjustment function of beliefs completely eclipsesthe function of appraisingobjectivereality. In such cases,however,there is an atrophy of the ability to think creatively and people are reducedto ritual responsesto cues from authority. When such cuesare not forthcoming they can only flounder without purpose.This type of ritualized behavior and thought underminesan important aim of rectification since the ideal cadrenot only acceptsorthodox beliefs but carriesout his duties

THE RECTIFICATION PROCESS 45

actively and imaginatively, deriving coursesof action from general principles without benefitof detailedinstructions.52 Repeateduse therefore robs rectification of its effectivenessin obtaining attitudinal changeand insteadproducesroutinized responsesbasedon calculation, resentmentand skepticism.An "internal migration" resultswherebyactual views remain private. Even where attitudinal complianceis achievedit is often ritualized and devoid of creativity. Ironically, however,attemptsto break down routinized rectification patternsmay also have detrimental consequences. For cadreswell versedin rectification proceduresat least play their roles properly, thus providing behavioralcompliance.On the other hand, drastic alterationsin existing practices,as in the Cultural Revolution, confuseparticipantsand producelesspredictablebehaviorwith no guaranteeof greaterattitudinal change. Conclusion

Rectification techniquesencompassa wide variety of measureswhich can be combined in a multiplicity of ways. When functioning optimally these techniquescanbe a powerful force influencingbehaviorandattitudes.Their successful utilization, however, is contingenton many factors and requiresextremely skillful managementof rectification movements.In additionto the manypossible combinationsof techniques,differencesamongvarioustargetgroupsand potentially conflicting goalsgreatly complicatethe task of leadingrectification. Naturally, the processis vulnerable to shortcomingsof cadres responsiblefor campaignleadership.The effectivenessof rectificationis also inextricably linked to broadersocial and political conditions. If the political systemis adequately meetingthe needsof society it will be much easierto reform and revitalizethe elite than when failures producewidespreadsocial malaise.Furthermore,thereis an apparentlink betweeneffective rectification and leadershipunity. With such unity it is possibleto assignclearobjectivesand ensureorganizationaldiscipline, factors critically necessaryfor achievingbehavioralcomplianceand attitudinal change. Finally, successfulrectification requiresa careful blend of coercionand persuasion.Coercion is a sourceof vulnerability as well as potential strength.On the positive side, coercivemethodsare essentialboth to providethe environmental control which facilitates persuasiveefforts, and to createconditions for farreachingchange.But while this was clearly recognizedby Mao's injunction to "give the patient a fright," the thrust of rectification doctrine warns against excessiveharshness.Similarly, our behavioralanalysisof "coercivepersuasion" shows coercion will be counterproductiveif used to excess,especially when genuineattitudinal change,high moraleand creativeleadershipare major goals. The traditional persuasiveapproach,then, is firmly rooted in the actual constraintsof the disciplinaryprocess.

3 The Origins of Rectification

The developmentof rectification theory and practicein the early 1940swas both an extensionof and reaction to the earlier history of the CCP.8 Official histories and somescholarly analysisidentify rectification with Mao while assertingthat other leadersadvocatedsharply contrastingapproaches.Thus CCP leadersbefore 1935 purportedly pushedcoercive disciplinary methods-dubbed "ruthless strugglesand mercilessblows" (canku douzhenghe wuqing daji)-while Mao •Two broaderinfluenceson rectification should also be mentioned-theChinesecultural tradition and Soviet theory and practice.Many specific featuresof rectification have parallelsin the Confuciantradition. Confuciandoctrinestressedself-examination,attitudinal change,and educatingrather than merely punishing wrongdoers.Moreover, Confucian practice,while resortingto purgesto rid the elite of unorthodoxviewpoints,was also marked by a reluctanceto kill literati who strayedfrom the approvedpath. Indeed,Liu Shaoqi claimed "The national characterof the Chinesepeople prefersleniency; they do not like harsh treatment"("Self-Cultivation in Organizationand Discipline" (July 1939), CLG, Spring 1972, p. 53). Finally, traditional culture emphasizedinterpersonalrelations, group pressures,and preferencefor informal over legal mechanismsof conflict management. Still, it is difficult to find precedentsfor the intensive group indoctrination of rectification campaigns.See David S. Nivison, "Communist Ethics and ChineseTradition," Journal ofAsianStudies,November1956; and RobertJay Lifton, ThoughtReform and the Psychologyof Totalism: A Studyof "Brainwashing" in China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,1961), pp. 389-98. Soviet theory and practice had a major impact on CCP disciplinary methodsfrom the foundingof the Party and continuinginto the periodof Mao's dominancenotwithstanding the rejection of Stalinist excesses.Apart from fundamentalconceptssuch as democratic centralism,the CCP also took such basic methodsas the systematicstudy of documents and criticism and self-criticism from Soviet experience.Moreover, before Stalin's terror those aspectsof the Leninist tradition which encouragedfar-ranging debatewithin the leadershipand includeda disinclination to act againstdissentersundoubtedlyhad a significant influence on the CCP in its formative years.SeeRobert V. Daniels, Conscienceof the Revolution(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1960). 46

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47

attemptedto foster systematiceducation.Mao's undoubtedcontributions to rectification notwithstanding, the following analysis argues that this view both overstatesactual differences and overlooks the developing nature of Mao's position. As we have seen, it has also been argued that a clear divergenceemerged between Mao and Liu Shaoqi over the preferred approachto elite discipline: Mao assertedlyfavored thoroughgoingideological struggleand the involvement of non-Partyforces in the process,while Liu soughtto curb struggle and limit massparticipation.In Chapter1 we rejectedthis view on the basisof the writings of the two men; here we deepenthe analysisby examiningthe two rectification movementscarried out before nationwidevictory in 1949. This revealsnot only that the "Liuist" campaignof 1947-48involved deeperstruggleand more meaningful massparticipationthan the initial "Maoist" effort of 1942-44,but that in fact an essentialagreementexistedbetweenthe two men in both instances.The substantialdifferencesbetweenthe two movementsmust be attributedto leadership imperativesunder contrastingconditionsrather than to the predilectionsof individuals. Of the factorsaffecting Party disciplinary methodsin the pre-1949period two stand out: the relative degreeof leadershipunity and the degreeof threat from external sources.An overview of ChineseCommunistpolitics during the entire period precedingthe founding of the PRC leads to the following hypotheses: First, when a revolutionary organization during its struggle for power suffers from leadershipcleavages,it tendsto adopt coercivetechniquesof internal control; when the organizationis unified it tends to adopt persuasivecontrol techniques. Second, in situations where such an organization has a secure environmentit may developsystematiceducationalmethods,but where its external environmentis threateningsuch methodsare not possibleand coercive means are often introduced.bThe following discussionelaboratesthese hypothesesas they apply not only to the basic contrast betweenthe "ruthless struggle" and rectification periods but to unfolding eventssurroundingthe two pre-liberation rectification campaigns. b Thesehypothesesdo not assumeany necessaryrelationshipbetweenthe degreeof leadershipunity and a threateningor secureexternalenvironment.If both factors favor eitherpersuasiveor coercivecontrol methods,then the likelihood of suchmethodsis considerably enhanced.If the two factors operatein contrary directions, then a more complex patternwill result as in the 1947-48casediscussedbelow. Furthermore,the hypotheses exclude revolutionary regimes in power not simply becausethey are inapplicableto at leastone major case-thatof Stalin-butbecausethe very fact of statepowerprovidesa qualitatively higher degreeof security than that which could be attainedduring revolutionary struggle. How this higher degree of security both affected the impact of changesin the externalenvironmenton control techniquesand influencedthe relationship betweenParty unity and control techniquesafter 1949 is a problem examinedin subsequentchapters.

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The Legacyof FactionalPolitics From the founding of the CCP in 1921 until Mao Zedonggained preeminence within the Central Committeein 1935, factional disputesconcerningthe course of the Chinese revolution deeply divided the Party. Retrospectively,Mao reserved his sharpestcriticism for the leadersof the so-called"third 'left' line" from 1931 to 1934, men who largely belongedto the returnedstudentfaction. This faction, which had close Soviet ties and gainedascendancyin the Central Committee due to the direct intervention of Comintem agents,brought about Mao's temporaryeclipse but was finally overcomeby Mao without benefit of Comintern support following the fall of the Jiangxi Soviet. In interpreting the differencesbetweenhimself and the proponentsof the "third 'left' line" 10 years later, Mao depictedan unambiguousstrugglebetweenthe allegedlyadventuristic military postureand harsh political and economicpolicies of his opponents,on the one hand, and his own cautious military strategy and moderatesocial reforms, on the other, when in fact the situation had beenfar less clear-cut.1 What is of special interestto this study is that Mao went beyondcriticisms of revolutionary strategiesand attackedthe methodsof handlingdisputeswithin the Party which had prevailedat that time: Wheneveran erroneouspolitical line becamedominant,an erroneousorganizational line inevitably emerged.... Accordingly, the various ... Jinesof the (1927-34] period opposedComradeMao [Zedong's] organizationalline as well as his political line.... In particular, in order to enforce their will, the exponentsof the [1931-34] line invariably and indiscriminately brandedall Party comradeswho found the wrong line impracticableand who therefore expresseddoubt, disagreementor dissatisfaction,or did not actively support the wrong line or firmly carry it out; they stigmatizedthesecomradeswith such labels as "[r]ight opportunism,""the rich peasantline," "the line of conciliation" and "double-dealing";waged"ruthlessstruggles"againstthem and dealt them "mercilessblows," and even conductedthese"inner Party struggles" as if they were dealing with criminals and enemies.This wrong kind of inner Party strugglebecamethe regular methodby which the[se]comrades... raised their own prestige,enforced their own demandsand intimidated the Partycadres.2 This attack not only reflected the past position of Mao whose supportershad beensubjectedto "mercilessblows," it also supportedMao's efforts in the 1940s to create a new set of principles for handling tensionsunder his consolidated leadership.But the questionremains: were there in fact two organizationalapproachesin the pre-1935period emphasizing"ruthlessstruggle"on the one hand and systematiceducationon the other? While the pre-1935leadersdid not develop systematiceducationalmethods for handling cadredeviationsdespiterepeatedcalls for study, and often treated

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their opponentsharshly, it is also clear that they observedsome restraints in handingout Party discipline. Although Chen Duxiu and other leaderswere expelled from the Party, many of thosewho lost out in factional conflicts during the late 1920sand early 1930sretainedParty membershipand some-e.g.,Qu Qiubai-regainedimportant positions even before Mao assumedleadership. Moreover,Mao himself was reelectedto prestigiouspostswhen his actualpower was at its nadir-asituation not unlike Mao's later practiceof reservingCentral Committee places for former opponentswho had lost all real influence-and there is evidenceof the returnedstudentleadersseekingcooperationwith Mao despitetheir differences.3 Thus while Party purgesin these years were extensive,4 even underthe returnedstudentsCCP practicereflectedrecognitionof the needto limit inner Party conflict. For Mao's part, the evidencesuggestshe was not fully committed to an educationalapproach.Although Mao's 1929 Gutian resolution,which was later resurrectedas a rectification document,did call for systematicpolitical education, its basicthrust was to bolster Mao'sposition vis-a-visthe Central Committee then under Li Lisan by placing army political officers underthe authority of Mao's Front Committee.5 The clearestexampleof Mao's willingness to ignore persuasionand opt for coercive methodswas the Futian incident in late 1930. The incident beganwith Mao's forces arrestingsome4,400 membersof a Red Army corps andmost of Li's local followers, assertedlybecauseof connections with an "anti-Bolshevik league" set up by the GMD several years earlier. In response,a political commissarof the affected army corps led an attack on Maoist forces at Futian, freed most of the local leadersjailed there, and established a rival Soviet governmentnearby. Mao counterattackedand suppressed the rebellion after several months,reportedlymaking use of widespreadexecutions and masstrials. What is of particular relevanceto us is that Mao's Central Committeeopponentsusedthe Futian incident to attackhim in termsthat were evenharsherthan those Mao later used against them. Thus Mao was accusedof unprincipled factional struggleswhich sent many Communiststo their deaths,excessiveuse of force, and indiscriminateuse of torture and capital punishment-a"reign of terror"-while neglectingmobilization and education.Mao was not, of course, the only leaderconductingharsh purgesat this time. But those he carried out together with the strugglesagainst alleged "anti-Bolsheviks" in other Soviet areasproduceda reaction within the Party. By 1934, some curbing of political securitybureausand shakingup of securitypersonnelhadoccurred,althoughthe stark policy of "no mercy for classenemies"continued.Howeverlimited, opposition to mercilessstruggle developedbefore Mao gained predominantpower and, ironically in view of later Maoist history, Mao'sown actswere one catalyst of this opposition.6 In a more fundamentalsense,the questionis whetherany leadercould have instituteda systematicrectification programin the pre-1935period. On balance,

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the answerappearsnegative.The youth of the CCP was clearly a factor; it takes time to build up an organizationand develop organizationaltechniques.More significant was the precariousenvironmentwithin which the CCP functioned. During the period of the GMD-CCP alliance up to 1927 the Party was able to function openly but was alwaysexposedto Nationalistpressureand ultimately to the threatof GMD military action. From the 1927split to 1935 the CCP was able to develop military forces and maintain scatteredrural baseareas,but Communist forces faced repeatedGMD harassmentwhich finally succeededin destroying most of thesebases.In this hostile environment meresurvival had highest priority; while, ideally, educationalmeasurescould havestrengthenedthe Party, under the circumstancesmore pressingtasks took precedence.Moreover, the tensioncreatedby the threat'simmediacyreinforcedtendenciesto rely on harsh disciplinary measuresfor elite control. Another factor inhibiting the developmentof a rectification approachat this time was the deepfactional cleavageswithin the Party. Thesecleavages,which were intensified by repeatedrevolutionary failures, the imposition of vague yet demandingCominterndirectives,and a diverseParty membershipof labor organizers, young Soviet trained intellectualsand rural guerrilla leaders,were not conduciveto mild methodsof settling differences;bitter conflict maderecourse to coercion all but inevitable. Moreover, even if in this situation a rectification programhad beenproposedby one group, it could not havebeeneffective. With Party leadershipfragmented,any effort to correct errors by rectification measureswould haveflounderedin disagreementover the natureof thoseerrorsand the failure of dissidentfactionsto carry out the campaign. When Mao obtainedpreeminencewithin the CCP leadershipin January1935, the Party was still in the midst of the Long March and the time was not yet ripe for the introduction of systematicrectification. However, factors inherent in Mao's new situation can, in retrospect,be seenas inclining him to more persuasive, less harsh methods than had been the norm up to that time. First, the coalition which supportedMao not only objectedto the disastrousmilitary policies of the previous leadership,but many of its membershad suffered from ruthlessstruggle.Although Mao was not without fault himself, it was nevertheless widely recognizedthat he had suffered badly at the handsof the returned students.As Chen Yi put it over 30 yearslater, "ChairmanMao's prestige... is due to his having been humiliated the most and having beenwronged...." 7 Yet if Mao were to be credible as a leaderwho would break with such practicesparticularly in view of his own blemishes-itwas necessarythat he adopt a conciliatory approach.Initially he patchedup differenceswith former opponentsand did not allow them to apologizeto him8; eventually it meantrestraint was used when these apologieswere finally demanded.Closely related to the benefits to Mao of adopting a moderateposture were the limitations on his power; althoughpreeminentwithin the new leadershiphis authority was far from absolute as even membersof the returned student group retained important

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posts.cMao could not have taken drastic action against his old opponentseven if he desired to do so. According to Chen Yi, "Chairman Mao [in 1935] ... describedthe loss incurred to the revolution [by the previous leadership]not as a mistake in political line, but only as a mistake in military line. If he pointed out at the time that the mistakewas a political one, somepeoplewould .... He pointed it out only in Yan'an 10 definitely have found it unacceptable 9 years later." But while the need to build unity around Mao's fledgling leadership made conciliation the order of the day, it was not the same thing as a systematicrectification approach.Indeed, the necessityof conciliation delayed the reform efforts and concomitantdemotionswhich markedthe initial rectification movement. The First Rectification Campaign,1942-44 The first rectification campaign(zhengfengyundong) was the product of the entire period following the arrival of Mao Zedong in Yan'an. Someof Mao's most significant writings in this period articulatedthe themeof the needto unify Marxist-Leninisttheory and Chineserealitieswhich cameto play a major role in the 1942-44campaign.Moreover, the developmentof Party schoolsin Yan'an provided a potent meansfor indoctrination in Mao's concepts.As early as the Central Committee plenum of September-November 1938 the CCP adopteda programof increasededucationand training for Party members.Subsequentlya study movementinvolving 4,000 cadresin the Yan'an region was carriedout in 1939-40and cadreeducationwas extendedto other baseareas.Party directives also called for screeningcadresin conjunction with education,and a limited degreeof purging took place.10 The period leading up to the rectification movementsaw the gradualgrowth of Mao's power, a processwhich that campaignbrought to its conclusion.Despite the official dating of Mao's accessionto leadershipin January1935, he subsequentlyhad to meet several challenges,most significantly from Wang Ming, a leader of the returned student faction who had left China in 1931. Wang'sarrival in Yan'an in late 1937 apparentlymarkeda setbackfor Mao on the critical issueof the natureof the new united front with the GMD. Although the united front debate,which had been under way well before Wang'sreturn, was hardly as clear-cutas official historiesclaim, it doesappearthat Mao advocated subordinatingsome CCP goals but strictly maintaining the Party's independence,while Wang, reflecting Soviet interest in a bulwark of antiJapanesepower basedon Chiang Kai-shek'sarmies,arguedfor closercooperation with the Nationalists.It took nearly a year for Mao's line finally to emerge cThis may well still overstateMao's position in 1935-36 when a returnedstudent, ZhangWentian,the newly appointedgeneralsecretary,wasperhapsMao'sequal.

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victorious at the September-November 1938 Central Committeeplenum, a victory which markedan importantmilestonein Mao's consolidationofpower.11 It is significant that it was this plenum which initiated plansfor inner Party education, for Mao's substantialsuccessin achieving a consensuson his power and policies provided the basic unity of outlook and stability of leadershipupon which the first rectification movement could be launched. Moreover, Mao's strategiesof capitalizing on growing nationalist sentimentand extendingCCP influence to large areas of North China behind Japaneselines resulted in a dramatic increasein both the territory under Communistcontrol and in Party membership.According to CCP estimates,at the end of 1940 the areasof substantialCommunistcontrol encompassed 100 million peoplewhile the Party had grown by 20 times since1937 to 800,000members.12 The vast influx of new Party memberscausedproblemsas well as opportunities. Party leaders were unable to screen adequatelythe new members,and educational effortssince 1939 were judged unsuccessful.Moreover, the heterogeneouscompositionof that membershipcreatedobstaclesto the achievementof Party programs.The bulk of CCP recruitsconsistedof illiterate peasantslacking knowledgeof Marxism-Leninismand imbuedwith traditional values;they were bound by particularistic social relationshipsin conflict with Party goals. The other major streamof new membershipconsistedof studentsand intellectuals who had fled from the Japaneseoccupiedurban areasof North China. Strongly motivatedby nationalism,theseelementspossessed many skills in short supply in Y an'an but their idealsand ideology were as likely to be reformist as Marxist and, if Marxist, were frequently proneto a radical dogmatismabhorredby Mao. In addition, the CCP'sunited front andpatriotic appealstendedto blur its revolutionary programand hinder the growth of Marxist-Leninistconceptsamongboth peasantsand intellectualsPDespite theseproblems, the official retrospective judgment was that the CCP was already sound ideologically, politically and organizationallybefore the 1942 movement,14 and, indeed,a baseexistedupon which further consolidationcould proceed: the infrastructureof Party schools which had beenbuilt up provideda foundationfor a more systematicand larger scaleeducationaleffort to overcomethe Party'sdeclaredinadequacies. More generally,the outbreakof the Sino-Japanese War and subsequentCCP gains dramaticallylessenedthe threat to Party survival thus providing an environmentin which rectification could be contemplated.The elementof threathad not beenentirely eliminated,of course,and securitymeasuresagainstsaboteurs, enemyinfiltration and"Trotskyism" in the late 1930sencompassed a continuing role for coercion.15 Furthermore,despite the successesof Mao's united front policies,the continuedpresenceof returnedstudentleadersin importantpostsin the Party propagandaapparatusindicatedthat the fmal consolidationof the Mao16 Nevertheless,the more favorable ist leadershipwas still to be accomplished. environmentoverall wasconduciveto a persuasiveapproachto elite control. In 1941-42, however,eventswere becomingmore threateningto the CCP.

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The Party'srapid expansionunderMao's united front policy precipitatedsharp clasheswith the Japaneseand GMD. In 1941, following a major Communist military offensive, the brunt of Japaneseattacksshifted to the Communistsand resultedin a dramaticcontractionof their baseareas.Moreover,the GMD blockade of the Yan'an region, initiated in 1939, was tightened in 1941 and the Nationalistsalso cut off the subsidyprovidedto the CCP underthe tennsof the united front. These pressurescreatedan immediateneed for improved Party moraleanddiscipline which the rectificationcampaignsoughtto provide.In this sense,the movementwas at leastin part a responseto the worseningsituation. However,it is importantto note that the Yan'anarea,wherethe campaignwas implementedmostthoroughly,faceda political and economicratherthan a military threat.Thus the problemsto be dealtwith in Yan'anwere suitedto rectification methods, and the environment,despite increaseddangers,was still sufficiently stableto enablethe implementationof thesemethods.17 Finally, beforeturning to the first rectification campaignitself, it is important to emphasizethe degreeto which it was Mao's campaign.Not only were his theoriesandwritings the main objectsof study, but his personalinitiative can be seenat every stage.Most significant for subsequentanalysisis the lesserrole playedby Liu Shaoqi.Although Liu' s writings were the mostimportantof those studiedapartfrom Mao's,andhe did havea significantrole in the later stagesof the campaign,he was not in Yan'anin 1941 and most of the latter half of 1942 whenkey decisionsconcerningthe movementweretaken.18 Thusin tennsof day to day managementit is clear that, in contrastto the situation in 1947-48,Mao ratherthanthe Party's"organizationman" wasin charge.

TheTargetsofRectification The basic aim of the zhengfeng campaignwas to build a unified Party out of its heterodoxelements.Systematicand intensive educationin basic conceptsof Marxism-Leninismand in Mao's currentpolicies and strategieswas crucial to this goal in three respects:(1) to eradicate"non-proletarian"ideas; (2) to createprimary loyalty to the Party over all conflicting personal,local and factional bonds;and (3) to provide the diverseelementsof the Party with common goals and a common body of knowledge to use in solving concrete problems.To achievetheseaims "threebad work styles" were singledout for extensivecriticism-"subjectivism"(zhuguanzhuyi) in the study and analysisof problems,"sectarianism"(zongpaizhuyi) in political life and organizationalmatters, and "stereotypedParty writing" or "fonnalism" (dangbagu) in methodsof expression. As thesethree work styleshavebeendealtwith at length elsewhere,we shall only examine brieflya few importantaspectsof the problemsinvolved. Sectarianism,in addition to other problems,referredto poor relationsbetweencadres and the peasantmasses.This was partially due to the tendencyof leading offt-

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cials to stand apart from the populace and rely on bureaucraticmethods of leadership.Theseofficials had little first hand knowledgeof social reality and consequentlyalienatedpeoplewho were harmedby their uninformeddecisions. In addition, estrangementmarkedthe relationsof many basic level cadreswith the masses.This was due to harshand arbitrary leadershipmethodsemployedby cadres,methodsto a large extent made unavoidablebecauseof heavy demands placedon the peopleby the difficulties of 1941-42.Nevertheless,the population came to resent local leaders who constantly increasedtheir burdens without adequatelyexplaining the reasons.All of this created the danger of a Party isolatedfrom the massesand in turn led to a centralthemeof the movement:the needto developmassline methodsof close contactbetweenleadersand led so the Party could both determinethe views of the peopleand effectively promote its policiesamongthem. In attackingsubjectivism,particular stresswas attachedto criticism of "doctrinairism" (jiaotiaozhuyi),d the pursuit of Marxist learning in abstractwith no effort to relate it to the needsof the Chineserevolution. The campaignplaced great emphasison the needto adapt Marxism to actual conditions in China, the Sinifying of Marxism, which in turn led to harshcriticism of thosewho soughtto baseall action on Soviet experience.This, however,did not mean adenial of the significanceof Soviet methods,many of which were repeatedlyemphasized,but rather developmentof the habit of viewing political problemsin their specific Chinesecontext. The leading "doctrinaires"attackedduring the campaignwere Mao's old antagonists,the returned students,people whose views had been formed to a significant extent in Cominternschoolsratherthan by revolutionary practice in China. Similarly, in criticizing formalism in propaganda,a sphere where the returned studentswere still strong, pointed referencewas made to "foreign formalism"-thepracticeof writing aboutSovietexperiencesinsteadof illustrating points with Chineseexamplesreadily understandable to native audiences.Thus the assaulton subjectivismand formalism not only promoteda more pragmaticapproachto problemson the part of Party cadres,it also asserteda critical attitude towards Soviet precedentsand further eroded the influence of 19 Mao'sformer Cominternbackedopponents.

Developmentofthe Movement The zhengfengcampaign actually began in 1941 with a series of directives, speechesand conferences.Most important of these was an enlargedPolitburo meeting in Septemberwhich discussedthe Chineserevolution and particularly dThe other form of subjectivism to come under attack was "empiricism"

(jingyanzhuyi),the tendencyto becomeengrossedin concretefacts without applying the

theoreticalperspectivesof Marxism-Leninism.This was most prevalentamong poorly educatedlocal cadres.

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criticized Party policies before 1935. Thus from the very outset an important objective of the movement was to undermine the remaining influence of the returnedstudentgroup despiteits continuedpresencein the propagandaapparatus chargedwith the campaign'simplementation.The Politburo also directedthe "developmentof an all Party ideologicalrevolution" and,subsequently,over 100 high level cadresin Yan'an beganrectification study. Moreover, in December 1941 a drive againstexcessivebureaucracywas launchedwhich becameone of severalkey campaignscoordinatedwith rectification. Guidelinesfor the movementwere laid down by Mao in two speechesin February1942. Discussionsand investigationsfollowed in committees,organs and schoolsdirectly subordinateto the Central Committeeand in military units in the Yan'an area. In early April a formal rectification for the entire Party in Yan'an was announcedand a GeneralStudy Committeeunder Mao was established to provide overall direction.This meantbroadeningthe movementbeyond the ranks of high level cadresand nearly 10,000cadresparticipatedin rectification study in Yan'an at that time. However, at meetingsheld in June to review the campaign,CCP leadersapparentlyconcludedthat a prolonged movement was necessaryif rectification goals were to be achieved. In that month the Central Committeealso orderedthe extensionof rectification to all Party membersoutsidethe Yan'an region and it was subsequentlycarriedout in the various anti-Japanese baseareasbehind enemy lines.20 The more hostile conditions in these areas, however, made impossible the thorough implementationof Yan'an-afact later pointed out by the most important leaderof areasbehind Japanese lines, Liu Shaoqi: Some[rectification measures]can be usedbut much cannotbe used.If you use Yan'an'smethodand hold a discussionmeetingin which you say all you want to say,of coursesometimesyou talk one day, two days ... you're not finished in a month! But beforethe talking is finished the enemywill breakin .... So if you want to convenea discussionmeetingit is just as well ... not to talk so much, to keep it under your belt. ... When you come back here [to Yan'an] you can relax a bit, it doesn'tmatterif the meetingbreaksup in confusion.21 As rectification was extendedto the anti-Japanesebases,the campaign in Yan'an itself underwentan important developmentwith the holding of a senior cadres'conferencefrom October1942 to January1943 underthe auspicesof the Party's Northwest Bureau. One of the crucial tasks of this conferencewas to render a verdict on Party history-in this caseof the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (Shaan-Gan-Ning)Border Region. Significantly, nearly all top Party leaders madeimportant speecheswith the notableexceptionof membersof the returned studentfaction. After Mao, the dominantfigure at the conferencewas Gao Gang, Party secretaryof the NorthwestBureauand a key leaderof Communistguerrillas in Shaanxiduring the early 1930s.At that time Gao and Liu Zhidan, the top local leader,had had seriousdifferenceswith representatives sent to Shaanxiby

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the Party Center which remarkably paralleled contemporaneousdisputes between Mao and Central Committeeleadersover military and political strategies in Jiangxi. While undoubtedlyoversimplifying differencesas Mao did vis-a-vis developmentsin Jiangxi, the conferencedepictedthe central representativesas pushing a strategyof positional warfare when Communistforces were weaker than their opponents,and a narrow political approachwhich alienatedpotential allies in contrast to the flexible guerrilla tactics and mild social policies assertedly advocatedby Liu Zhidan and Gao Gang. Whateverthe precisedifferencesin fact, the bitternessof the conflict had resultedin the arrestof the local in 1935, a move which had beenvoided by leadersby the central representatives Mao upon his arrival in Shaanxibut only censuredofficially at the conference.In addition to theseerrors, the central representativeswho had retainedimportant local positions after 1935 were now chargedwith "right opportunism"-again the deviation of Wang Ming-after the new united front with the GMD was formed. Thus the judgmentof the conferencenot only solidified Gao'sposition within the borderregion, but by virtue of closeparallelsto Mao's struggleswith the returnedstudentsit also further consolidatedMao's position within the Party as a whole.22 The senior cadres'conferencealso engagedin extendeddebateon the tasks currently facing the Party and decided to intensify the mass line approachto transformsociety at the village level. Such measureshad begunwith the earliest stagesof rectification in 1941-42 when the campaignfor "picked troops and simplification" (jingbing jianzheng) and a "to the villages" movement (xiaxiang) had easedburdensby reducing the size of the bureaucracyand brought many intellectual cadres into direct contact with village problems and local cadres for the first time. In 1942, moreover, a campaign to reduce rent and interest utilizing cadres recently sent to the grass roots both enhancedthe strengthof PeasantAssociationsand erodedlandlord power in the villages. The seniorcadres'conferencenot only affirmed thesedevelopments,it also laid the basisfor the vigorousdevelopmentof cooperativeand productionmovementsin 1943 which involved both cadresand massesin the vital task of developinga stagnantagrarianeconomy.Thesemeasures,in addition to enlistingactive popular participationin vital undertakings,reflectedMao's key rectification principle that Party work shouldbe solidly anchoredin Chinesesocial reality.23 In the spring of 1943 attentionshifted from educationto the work of investigating cadres' history (shenchaganbu lishi gongzuo), a task concerningproblems of counterrevolutionaryactivity. Party organizationshad, as indicated previously,screenedmembersfor possibleenemyagentssincethe late 1930sbut had not been directed to conduct a widespreadpurge. The new emphasison anti-subversionwork had been presagedby Mao's call for increasedvigilance "against spies" at a July 1942 meetingof the GeneralStudy Committee,and a "broad mass movementto fight spies" unfolded in 1943. As a result of these efforts by August 1943 some 4,000 "GMD agents"and other hostile elements

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had been uncoveredin the Shaan-Gan-NingBorder Region while many times more people with undesirablepast connectionsor who had merely committed errors in work confessedtheir shortcomings.In this processexcessesoccurred, however,as responsibleofficials confusedgeneralproblemsrequiring rectification with counterrevolutionwhere cadreinvestigationwas necessary.Theseexcessesincluded torture to extract confessionswhich brought harm to "good comrades."One reaction to this was to limit sharply the previously leading role of the security forces in cadre investigation. In any case, the use of coercive measuresduring the rectification movementreflectedthe continuingimportance of hostile aspectsof the CCP's environment.24 Moreover, it appearscoercion was more prevalentat the front and in borderregionsbehindJapaneselines than in the secureYan'anarea.e The CCP also turned its attention to the recruitment of mass activists for leadershiproles as the weedingout of hostile elementsunfolded. In June 1943 Mao implied at least somepurging when he spokeof the needto replacefailing leaders: In the processof a greatstruggle,the compositionof the leadinggroup in most casesshould not and cannotremain entirely unchangedthroughoutthe initial, middle and final stages;the activists who come forward in the courseof the strugglemust constantlybe promotedto replacethoseoriginal membersof the 25 leadinggroupwho are inferior by comparisonor who havedegenerated. While figures on actual recruitmentand lossesin Party membershipare not available,overall membershipfigures indicate that after a decline in 1941-42, probably due mainly to the contractionof Communist held areas,a substantial buildup of Party strengthtook place in the final yearsof the rectification campaign to reach1.2 million membersby the time of the SeventhCCP Congressin April 1945, an increaseof 50 percentsince the end of 1940.26 Much of this expansionwas undoubtedlyunrelatedto rectification and its concomitantpurges, but it doessuggestthat no deeppurgeof the Partyoccurredin this period. The movementin its final major phasein 1944 once again returned to the questionof Party history. In addition to the September1941 enlargedPolitburo meetingand the seniorcadres'conferenceof late 1942-early1943,the Politburo held severaldiscussionson Party history in 1942-43 prior to launchingsimilar discussionsamongseniorcadresthroughoutthe Party in the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944. It was at this time, moreover, that many-althoughnot all-of the returnedstudentleaderswere easedout of their posts in the propa• According to an August 1943 directive, Zhonggongzhongyangguanyu shencha ganbu de jueding [CCP Central CommitteeDecision concerningInvestigatingCadres], investigationsin Yan'anhad not resultedin any killings but the peculiarcircumstancesat the front and border regions necessitatedthe suppressionof certain individuals. I am indebtedto Hong Yung Lee for calling this documentto my attention.

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gandaapparatus.A key role in the discussionswas played by Liu Shaoqiwho vigorously endorsedthe Maoist version of the Party's past. This apparently cementedthe alliance betweenMao and Liu which had beendevelopingsince they joined forces in the unitedfront discussionsof 1937-38.The benefitsof the arrangementfor Liu were underlinedas many of his subordinatesin the base areasbehind Japaneselines beganto assumekey Central Committeeposts in organizationand propagandawork, including thosevacatedby the returnedstudent group. All of this servedas preparationfor the SeventhCongresswhich assertedlyattained"an ideological and political unity without precedentin the history of the ... Party" and issuedthe detailedresolutionon historicalquestions declaringMao the embodimentof correctpolicies for the revolution as a whole and Liu the model of correct tactics in "white areas" (baiqu) under enemy control. Thus attackson the returnedstudentgroup served to unify disparate elementsof the Party from Gao Gang to Liu Shaoqiaround Mao's leadership both by reviving pastgrievancesandproviding immediatebenefits.27 As before,the rewriting of Party history servedto strengthenMao's position but now it wasaccompaniedby a burgeoningcult of Mao. Apart from raising his personalstatusto heights without precedentin CCP history, the exaltation of Mao, togetherwith the rectification theme of making Marxism-Leninismrelevant to Chineseconditionsand extensivecriticism of earlier CCP leaderswho had been heavily influenced by Comintern directives, representeda dramatic assertionof Chineseindependenceof the Soviet Union. The whole questionof Party history clearly involved more than settling old scoreswithin the CCP; it necessarilyraisedquestionsconcerningSoviet responsibilityfor major setbacks to the Chineserevolution. While public assessments of the Soviet role were withheld, CCP leaders made it abundantly clear that there were many imperfections in Soviet practice and China could not simply copy the Russian exarnple.28 DespiteMao'scontinuingdeferenceto Sovietauthority on theoretical matters,by the conclusionof the rectification campaignhe and his colleagues hadclearly declaredtheir right to determineconcretepoliciesbasedon their own readingof Chineseconditions.

RectifiCationandthe Literary lnteUigelllsill As would be the casein severalpost-1949rectification campaigns,the creative intelligentsiaof writers and artistsplayeda specialrole in the initial movement. Theseradical intellectuals-especiallythe significant numberswho flocked to War but also Party membersand Yan'anafter the outbreakof the Sino-Japanese sympathizerswho went to GMD areas-posed a sensitiveproblemboth because they were deeply affectedby the heterodoxideologiesof the cities and because their wOtk had a considerableimpact on public opinion within and without the liberatedareas.Moreover,the handling of literary intellectualsduring the 1942-44

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movementis of particular interestdue to somestriking similarities to the Hundred FlowersCampaignfifteen yearslater. Following Mao's February 1942 speecheswhich set the tone of the movement, many writers apparently took heart from the criticisms Mao made of narrow minded tendencieswithin the Party and hoped the leadershipwould listen to their own criticisms of CCP shortcomings.In March they issued a barrage of critical essayswhich were published in Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], the official Party daily. Theseessaysattacked,often savagely,bureaucratic aspectsof Yan'anlife and paintedthe Party as an emergingnew elite. In this the writers now used against the CCP the samepolemic talents they had previously employedagainstthe GMD. Moreover, they assertedtheir right of independentcreativity unhinderedby Party policies and directives.The official reaction was not long in coming. In early April the writers were no longer allowed to publish their views. At the startof May the CCP convenedthe Yan'an Forum on Literatureand Art whereMao laid down authoritativepolicies on the creativearts. Mao rejectedclaims of creativeindependenceand insistedon the strict subordinationof art to politics; writers were to fashion optimistic and heroic accountsof life in the liberatedareasand reservecriticism for the Party's 29 opponents. In the two monthsfollowing Mao's talks organizedattacksunfolded against the dissidents.The only figure singled out for public denunciationwas Wang Shiwei, the most causticof the critics who was also vulnerablebecauseof past Trotskyite ties, but many other writers confessedtheir errors as the pressure mounted.Oncecriticism andconfessionssessionsconcluded,leadingcritics generally lost their positionsin the literary bureaucracyand were sentto factoriesor the countrysidefor reform through labor. And Mao later acknowledgedthat the most seriousoffender, Wang Shiwei, was executedby security forces.30 Thus coercive measuresquickly supplantedthe persuasiveemphasisof rectification with regardto this small but significantgroup. Yet it shouldbe stressedthat this developmentcameonly in responseto what was seenas a severeprovocationby peopleof questionablebourgeoisorigins. It apparentlydid not alterthe reform thrust of the movementasappliedto the vastmajority of Partymembersandcadres. While the outpouringof intellectuals'criticisms followed by a severeofficial reactionhas obvious parallelsto the situation fifteen yearslater, the similarities should not be overstated.In contrastto the HundredFlowers period when repeatedefforts were madeto solicit the views of the intelligentsia,Mao's February 1942 speechescontainedno explicit or implicit invitations for criticisms of the Party by writers andartists. Indeed,it took considerablenaiveteto interpret Mao'sremarkswhich wererepletewith barbsdirectedat bookishintellectualsas reflecting a willingness to exposethe Party to the attacks from that quarter. Moreover, since some of the critical writers had ties to the returned student faction it wasdoubly dubiousthat their views would be welcomedby the Maoist leadership.Perhapsthe simplestexplanationof their miscalculationis that they

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were not long removed from the free-wheeling, contentiousatmosphereof Shanghailiterary circles and had not been sufficiently socialized in the disciplined life expectedof Party workers. The intensiveeducationof the unfolding rectificationcampaignprovidedthe first tasteof that socialization. SummaryandEvaluation Severalresultsof the initial rectification campaignare clear. Mao, whoseleadership had gained strength steadily in the years precedingthe movement, now attainedunprecedentedpower with the systematicunderminingof the returned studentgroup. Moreover,the Maoist leadershipwhich solidified in this period, in no small part due to the successesof Mao's policies, provided a more unified high commandthan the CCP had known at any time since its founding. It was this unity as much as Mao's Sinocentricrevolutionarytactics which formed the basisfor the CCP'sunmistakableassertionof independencefrom Moscow during the rectification movement.In terms of the Party as a whole, a more thorough and extensiveeducationalprogram was carried out than was previously possible,although it was necessarilylimited in the more exposedanti-Japanese baseareas.It was during the campaignthat the small group methodscentral to rectificationwere developedon a largescalefor the first time. Although the emphasiswas on educationand official claims were madethat disciplinary measureswere seldom taken during the movement,it is clear that somevery harshpunishmentswere metedout, especiallyto literary intellectuals and as a result of anti-subversionwork carried on in conjunctionwith rectification. Moreover,while thereare no reliable figures on the total numberof purges, dismissalsfrom Party and governmentpostsdid occur to some degree.31 Still, any large scale expulsion of Party membersat this time is doubtful. At the highest levels the stresswas also on reform. While severalof the returnedstudent leaders-mostnotably Wang Ming-were reducedto politically insignificant posts, no expulsionsof leading personalitiesare known, and even figures like Wang retained seatson the Central Committee elected in 1945 as living examplesof Mao's tolerance.It should be recalled, however, that even in the daysof ruthlessstrugglesimilar gestureswere made. What is more difficult to evaluate is the extent of the CCP's successin actually achievingideological reform within its ranks. An official Party history published in 1958 hailed the rectification campaignas a monumentalsuccess which "wiped out the influencesof doctrinairism ..., helped many new Party membersof petty bourgeoisorigin to discardtheir original stand,greatly raised the Party'sideological level and achievedan unprecedentedunity of the whole Party...." 32 During the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, Zhou Enlai minimized the achievementsof the movementand indicated that it was largely confined to high level cadres.33 In this regard, a comment in the Party press during the rectification movement of 1947-48, a campaign under the direct

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leadershipof Liu Shaoqi, is of special interest. This commentfavorably comparedthe then currentrectification to the original one in termsof mobilizing the massesfor criticism of Party cadresratherthan relying on reform "from the top down." 34 While the motive behind such an observationremainsa moot point, it once again brings sharply into questionthe view that in mattersof Party reform Mao consistentlyadvocatedthoroughgoingstruggle and the direct involvement of the masseswhile Liu arguedfor restraintson struggle and sharp boundaries separatinginternal Party mattersfrom areasof popularconcern. As will be seenbelow, the 1947-48movementdid involve intensestruggles and massparticipationwhich went beyondanythingattemptedin 1942-44.Still, the view implied in the 1947 commentaryand Zhou's 1967 statementthat the initial rectification campaignwas largely an elitist affair is misleading.Not only did many of the measuresundertakenin conjunctionwith rectification--e.g.,the xiaxiang movement-affectthe basic levels, but the entire emphasisof the movementon the needto understandChinesesocial realitiesmilitated for a grass roots approachto leadership.Moreover, by 1943, rectification study itself had extendedoutsidehigher Party circles to lower levels and to fields beyondsuchas secondaryschools in the Yan'an area. Nevertheless,it is undeniablethat the movementdid startat the top and was conductedmost thoroughlyat that level. In another regard it was stipulated at the outset that non-Party people in organsundergoingrectification could voluntarily participate;in practiceall nonCommunistsin suchunits took part. Yet while this indicatesa blurring of the line between Party membersand non-Party cadres,it should be stressedthat the participation of non-Party people took place within a highly structuredformat and did not involve attacks on Party officials by outsidersas such. Another important aspectof the campaignwas the great stressput on professionaland technicalimprovementas well as ideologicalreform. Thus educationalmeasures to raise levels of literacy and fundamentalknowledge plus various in-service training programsto improve job relatedskills formed an important part of the overall rectification program. In this emphasiswas not on thought strugglebut 35 on prosaictasksneverthelesscrucial to revolutionarysuccess. Finally, in terms of generalstyle it is fair to concludethat rectification itself as distinct from various coordinateprogramswas a "closed door" (guanmen) affair. William Hinton's description of the rectification experiencesof a low level cadreis instructive: Cai Jin [the cadre] was delegatedto take part in the [zhengfeng]movement. For a whole year ... he sat in school, read, transcribedhis thoughts, and talked. During that period he minutely examinedevery facet of his past, his outlook at various stagesof maturity, the decisionshe had made,both in his personallife and in the courseof his work, and the classstand he had taken. All this was discussedand analyzedwith the help of classmateswhosebackgroundwas similar to his own.... Slowly and painfully he built for himself a new classoutlook, a codeof loyalty.36

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While there is little reasonto doubt that the cadre discusseddid undergoan emotionally taxing experience,it was clearly not an experience"in the midst of the masses."Instead, it took place in a school specially set aside where the participantswere all cadresof similar social origins. In many respects,then, the first rectification campaign did have the nature of a movement designedto indoctrinateand train an elite which was clearly distinct from the massesin the eyesof top CCP leaders,despitetheir repeatedurgings that the membersof that elite get close to the masses andunite with them. As Mao had put it in 1937, it was wrong "to be indifferent to [the masses]and show no concern for their well-being [as this would mean] forgetting that one is a Communistand behaving as if one were an ordinary non-Communist."37 For all its emphasison the massline, the Maoist rectification of 1942-44stoppedfar short of exposingthe Party to massstruggle. Rectification and Land Reform, 1947-48 The rectification campaign(zhengdangyundong)f of 1947-48,in contrastto its predecessor,focused mainly on rural basic level Party organizations.With the exceptionof a "democraticmovement"in the army, the campaignlargely concerned problems arising from the implementationof land reform in liberated areas.Whereasthe initial campaignhad been most thoroughly implementedin the secureYan'an area,now the major emphasiswas on Northeastand particularly North China where the decisivebattlesof the civil war were being fought and Communist base areaswere expanding.38 Another major differencebetweenthe two movementsis, as previouslynoted, that Liu Shaoqi rather than Mao was in operationalcontrol of the movement. This was due not only to Liu's responsibilitiesas head of the Central Committee's land reform department,but also to the fact that the central leadership was organizedinto two groups as an emergencymeasurefollowing the fall of Yan'an to GMD forces in March 1947. One group, headedby Mao, remainedin the Shaan-Gan-NingBorder Region while the other under Liu went to the Shanxi-SuiyuanLiberated Area and then on to Pingshancounty in the ShanxiChahar-HebeiBorder Region; the two groupswere reunited in May 1948 with Mao's arrival in Pingshan.During the periodof separationLiu chairedtwo major conferencesdetermining land policy and oversaw land reform in the crucial North China area. Mao, especially from late December1947, also frequently commentedon the agrarianand rectification questionsbut, as Mao himself later implied, Liu was directly concernedwith guiding rectification in particular.39 rAlthough officially translatedas "Party consolidation," and having a somewhat harshertone in Chinesethan zhengfeng,zhengdangis regardedas interchangeablewith zhengfeng.SeeZhaoHan, Tantan, pp. 16-17.

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By April 1948 at the latest, however, the Party leadershipdeterminedthat there had been serious mistakesof a leftist nature during the land reform and rectification drives. While initially blamewas placedpredominantlyon the basic level cadresthemselves,some fault was attachedto Liu and others for their direction of the campaigns.Liu 's culpability was againraisedduring the Cultural Revolution when his stewardshipin 1947-48 was characterizedas " 'left' in form, right in essence"and-with some justification-explicitly comparedto similar deviationsduring his leadershipof the Socialist EducationMovementin 1964(seeChapter11).40 But the questionto be examinedhereis whetherdifferencesover the actual direction of policy existed betweenMao and Liu during 1947-48, or did Mao also support policies which producedthe results subsequently labelled"leftist deviations"? Finally, in an importantsensea richer understandingis possibleof the 194748 campaign than of the 1942-44 movement becauseof the existenceof a lengthy, first hand accountof its progresswithin a basic level unit in William Hinton's Fanshen. Hinton's account of land reform and rectification in Long Bow, Shanxi, tells only of developmentsin one village out of tensof thousands -a village which had many but clearly not all of the problemsfaced elsewhere by the twin movements.But whatevertheir uniqueness,the unfolding developments in Long Bow both provide a useful check againstofficial histories and illuminate the impact of rectification on the ordinary rural cadreupon whom so much of the revolution'ssuccessdepended.

LandReform,1946-47 The growing tensionsbetweenthe GMD and CCP which culminatedin full scale civil war in 1946broughtaboutimportantchangesin many CCP policies, not the least of which concernedland reform. The united front approachof relying on rent reduction in order to avoid alienatingrich peasantsand enlightenedgentry, i.e., landlordswilling to cooperatewith the Party, gave way to land confiscation and redistribution.This occurredin the context of growing classpolarization in the countrysidewhich requirednew policies. On the one hand,landlordsand rich peasantstendedeither to side with the GMD or withhold their supportfrom the CCP in hopesof a Nationalist victory. At the sametime, the less well-off peasants who were the Communists'natural allies were called upon for increasing sacrificesto the Party'scausein termsof military manpower,suppliesand labor; clearly concretegainsfor thesepeoplewere necessaryto sustaintheir revolutionary enthusiasm.The Party leadership,however,did not quickly or fully graspthe implicationsof the new situation;as late as February1947Mao spokeof a united front as broadas that of the anti-Japanese period and which includedthe enlightened gentry.41 Indeed, as Tanaka Kyoko has shown, the radicalizationof CCP Policy in 1946-47actually followed the appearanceof radicalism at the grass roots in North and NortheastChina. It was in these areaswhere memoriesof

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especiallyharsh exploitation by collaboratorswith the Japanesewere fresh, and the dangerof losing social and economicgainsto GMD backedlocal elites was immediate,and not in the more stableShaan-Gan-NingBorder Region, that the impetusfor a more thoroughgoingland revolutionoriginated.42 The first major changein land policy cameshortly beforethe outbreakof full scalewar but at a time of increasingGMD gainsin clasheswith CCP forces.The May Fourth (1946) directive, which followed a period of increasingland confiscation at the basic levels, shifted the emphasisfrom rent reductionto land redistribution for the first time since 1937. Despite being hailed as an effort to "eliminate the feudal land owning system,"the directive was in fact a vagueand cautious documentwhich did not call for confiscation of landlord land (apart from that of collaborators)but insteadsuggestedways in which suchland could be purchasedand distributed to the peasants.In the year following the May Fourth directive, land policy gradually placedmore emphasison confiscationin responseto seizuresby the peasants.Still, throughoutthis period Mao and his associatesremained ambivalent in their attitudes towards land reform; while calling for its vigorousimplementationthey also warnedagainstexcesses,particularly againstencroachingon the interestsof middle peasants.Meanwhileactual developmentsalso presentedcontradictoryaspects.In some areasland reform was at best superficial with little popular involvement and local power still largely in the handsof landlords. In other areas,however, radical land reform measuresexceededParty policies, resultedin the killing of innocentpeople,and seriously alienatedbroad segmentsof the rural population. While later official criticisms emphasizedthe excessesof 1946-47,by mid-1947 Party leadershad apparentlyconcludedthat the main dangerfacing the movementwas insufficient 43 mobilization of the masses. The beginning of intensive efforts to mobilize the massesfully for land reform was apparentlya regional campaignin the Shanxi-SuiyuanLiberatedArea in the springand summerof 1947. Basedon the experiencesof this campaignin which Liu Shaoqiand Kang Shengplayedleading roles,a conferencewas called by the Shanxi-SuiyuanParty Sub-bureauin June. This conferencewas to be criticized by Mao in April 1948 for adoptingultra-left policies,44 but his overall assessmentwas that, by overcoming rightist deviations,it had been a success without which land reform and Party rectification would havefailed. Moreover, Mao's enthusiasticcomments in July 1947 on a letter from Liu to ShanxiSuiyuancadresindicatecontemporaneous supportfor the radicalline.45 The final step in formulating a radical land program was a National Land Conferenceconvenedby Liu in Pingshanin September1947 which adoptedan Outline Land Law of China.This law, which wasconsiderablymore detailedand radical than the May Fourth directive, reportedly corrected"a certain lack of thoroughness"in that directive. The Outline Land Law not only abolishedthe land ownershiprights of all landlordsand decreedequaldistribution to all membersof the rural populationapart from traitors; it also stipulatedrequisition and

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distribution of "surplus property" of rich peasantswhile failing to mention the needto protectthe interestsof middle peasants.Authority for carrying out these provisions was vestedin the peasantsthemselves,i.e., in PeasantAssociations (nonghui), including middle peasants,and Poor PeasantLeagues(pinnongtuan) restricted to the poorest elementsin the villages. Although this program was shapedby Liu's land conference,the fact that it was issued in October by the 46 CentralCommitteestrongly suggestsMao's assent. The timing of the final step in the radicalization of CCP land policy was closely linked to a fundamentalturning point in the courseof the civil war. In the July-September1947 period the PLA went on a nationwideoffensive and carried the battle into areasheld by the GMD. Thus a new and deepersecuritywas gained for the liberated areas and land reform and Party rectification could proceedin a more thoroughgoingfashion without worries about enemy disruption. It was not merecoincidencethat on the sameday that the Central Committee approvedthe Outline Land Law the PLA issueda manifesto,written by Mao, proclaiming confidencein the coming victory. In this favorable situation large cadres'conferencesdealing with land reform and the associatedtask of Party rectification were held in practically all liberatedareasin the monthsfollowing the adoption of the law; their emphasiswas on criticizing rightist ideas and satisfying the demandsof poor peasantsand hired laborers.By early 1948 the Party was organizingwork teamsto go to selectedkeypoint areas(zhongdian) and systematicallyimplementthe new program.47

TheNeedfor Party Rectification The task of land reform ultimately dependedon Party cadresat the village level and it had been apparentfor some time that these local leaders had serious shortcomings.Higher authorities saw two interrelated problems--widespread cadremisbehaviorand the "impure" (bu chun) classstatusof many cadres.Cadre behaviorwas judgedfaulty in a numberof respects.One major concernwas the previously mentionedtendencyof failing to carry out land reform thoroughly. Local cadres,often fearful of continuinglandlord influenceand the possibility of a GMD revival, in many areascompromisedwith the landlords and failed to mobilize the peasantsto struggleagainstthem. Another importantcategorywas petty corruption and the arrogationof specialprivilegesby village leaders.Hinton graphically portrayeda wide variety of cadremalfeasancesincluding taking choice articles from confiscatedlandlord property, refusing to contribute labor service,avoiding military service,stealingfrom the public warehouse,and forcing their attentionson village women. By theseand other acts cadresbeganto behaveas a new elite and causedconsiderableresentmentamongthe people.A final category concernsharsh and arbitrary leadershippractices.These were clearly present in leftist excessesduring land reform when local cadresoften played a key role in massstrugglesresulting in excessivebeatings,killings and

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suicidesof landlords and othersconsideredenemiesof the Party. Many cadres also engagedin high handedif lessextremebehaviortowardsordinary peasants which was subsumedunder the label "commandism"(minglingzhuyi). It is importantto note that commandismcould be associatedwith either leftist or rightist deviations. Both those cadreszealously carrying out radical land reform and those merely administeringroutine tasks while land reform lagged frequently usedforce ratherthan persuasionto obtain popularcompliance.Thusevenwhere no attemptto gain personaladvantagewas involved, local leadersoften exacer48 batedrelationswith the masses. Thesefaults led to efforts to reform basic level cadresthrough a "wash your face" (xi/ian) campaignin spring 1947. The method adoptedfor this campaign was very similar to that employed during Party rectification a year later. It involved bringing the massesinto the processby requiring all cadresto face criticism by a council of delegateselectedby the peasants.Oncecriticism began, however,it beganto get out of hand,at leastin part becauseindividuals dissatisfied with the new order usedthe opportunityto attack the cadres.The reactionof the Party in Long Bow wastypical: Insteadof allowing this storm of criticism to rage and using it to educatethe peasantsto distinguishhonestfrom dishonestopinionsso that the cadrescould reform and all the people profit from a living political lesson, the district leaderslost their nerveand retreated.They intervenedon behalfof the cadres criticism, both honestanddishonest.49 and in effect suppressed Yet it appearsthat CCP leadershad little choice but to call off the campaign before it was fully under way. For at a time when the GMD was still on the offensive and the CCP's hold on many areaswas under severethreat, it would have been a grave risk to underminewhat experiencedleadershipthere was in the countryside.By September1947, however,the new situation createdby the CCP'sgeneraloffensive greatly enhancedthe security of local Party organizations andreopenedthe possibility of systematicallydealingwith errantcadres. The relatedproblem-thatof "impure" classorigins-wasan inevitableconwar underconditions sequenceof rapid Party expansionafter the Sino-Japanese of civil war. By autumn 1947 the CCP had 2.7 million members,more than doublethe mid-1945figure, and the fluid battlesituationhad madecontrolsover recruitment and indoctrination of new membersextremely difficult. In these circumstances,many landlords,rich peasantsand "riffraff'(liumangfenzi) reportedly "snuck into the Party" and gainedcontrol of some Party, governmentand massorganizationsin the villages. By the September1947landconferencethese impurities together with an alleged rightist tendency to overlook them were consideredseriousbarriersto the successfulimplementationof land reform, and both the conferenceand subsequentregional meetingsplacedheavyemphasison the need to rectify the situation.50 Thus it is hardly surprisingthat in Hinton's

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area a "quick and superficial check on the backgroundof the comradesin the village branches[following a regional meeting] convincedthe County Committee that at least 40 percentof the local Communistswere of landlord or rich peasantorigin." 51 Similar evaluationswereapparentlymadein many otherareas. When the National Land Conferencedecidedto launch Party rectification in conjunction with intensified land reform, the decision was based on several misperceptions.First, to judge by Hinton's evidence,estimatesof the degreeof 52 Moreover, infiltration of the Party by classenemieswere grossly exaggerated. the tendencyto link cadreclassstatusand misbehavioroverlookedthe fact that a greatdeal of that behaviorwas committedby officials of poor peasantorigins. In any case,both left and right deviationsduring land reform came largely from cadreinexperience,popularpressuresfor radical action or, conversely,restraints createdby unstablecircumstances,and the ambiguity of CCP agrarianpolicies in this period. Finally, by identifying the main dangeras a rightist tendencydespite the fact that much cadre misbehaviorcould just as easily be associatedwith leftist deviations-andbolsteringthis with classanalysis-Partyleadersinevitably createda situationwhereradical excesses could flourish.

TheExcesses ofLandReform andRectification By all subsequentaccountsthe measurestaken as a result of the National Land Conferenceovercameexisting rightist tendenciesthus achievinga thoroughgoing implementationof land reform and the cleansingof Party branchesof class enemiesand degenerates. But inevitableexcessesaccompaniedthis achievement. They took a variety of forms. The indiscriminatebeatingand killing of landlords and rich peasantswhich had appearedearliercontinuedto mark both land reform and the suppressionof counterrevolutionariesafter the Septemberconference. This resultedin substantialpopularalienation,and in someareas"bad elements" (huaifenzi)reportedlyexploitedthe situationto take revengeby murderingworking people.But excessiveviolencewas far from universal,and in Long Bow the beatingsand killings which accompaniedland reform following the village's liberation were not repeatedunderthe new law. Another set of problemsarosefrom the official insistencethat land reform had not beenthorough;in simplesttermsthis meantthat not enoughproperty had beentaken from the rich and given to the poor. One result was sweepingconfiscation of the rich's property including daily necessities,the diversion of energy into often futile efforts to uncover landlords' imagined hidden wealth, and seizure of industrial and commercialholdings-particularlythose owned by landlords and rich peasants-despite explicit protection grantedsuch enterprisesby the Outline Land Law. It was not only the upperstratawho were disadvantaged by the renewedemphasison redistribution, however. Given the land law's call for equal distribution per capita, it was inevitable that some better-off middle

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peasantswere forced to give up property. Additional dimensionsof the problem are illuminated by Hinton's account of developmentsin Long Bow, a village where redistribution had originally been thorough, but due to the prevailing assumptionsthe work team in chargehad declaredland reform stillborn. Following Central Committee regulations,a new classificationof all families was undertaken. Although the tendency, criticized elsewhere,of broadeningthe categoriesof landlord and rich peasantto include unjustly middle peasantsand other working people did not occur, the intrinsic importanceof classification (i.e., how a family was classifieddeterminedwhetherit would benefit or suffer from the new redistribution)generatedconsiderableanxiety and conflict within the village. Moreover, the assumptionthat land reform had not beenthoroughly implementedled to an overestimateof the numberof poor peasantsand therefore increasedthe threat to the limited resourcesof thoseplacedin higher categories. Furthermore,the relative lack of surplus property in the community, given the actual thoroughnessof the earlier distribution, meant bitter disappointmentfor the poor whosehopeshad beenraised. Finally, in thesecircumstancesattention turned to imaginedcadregraft as a solution to the puzzleof wherethe presumed excesswealth due to the poor had gone.As actualgraft had beensmall scalethis did not uncoversignificantpropertybut it did demoralizelocal cadres.53 The aboveproblemsto a significant extent reflectedtwo intertwined tendencies later denouncedas the "poor peasant-farmlaborerline" (pin-gunongluxian) and "tailism" (weibazhuyi).The notion expressedin the official mediathat poor peasantsand farm laborersshouldrule and the governmentshouldbe responsive to them first of all rural elementsinevitably causeddisregardof middle peasant interests. Middle peasantswere often excluded from peasants'representative bodiesin addition to being subjectto confiscationsand erroneousclassification. Moreover,the slogan,"Do everythingas the masseswant it done," which came out of Liu Shaoqi'sJune 1947 conference,purportedlyresultedin the uncritical acceptanceby many cadresof the views and demandsof poor peasantsrather than the exerciseof the Party'seducationaland leadershiproles. Actually, leadership, especially that provided by work teams dispatchedto carry out land reform, was crucial in mobilizing poor peasants,but once mobilization was under way responsiblecadreswould often bend to the will of the newly organized poor. Thus the work team cadressent to Long Bow, with the county Party secretary'sinjunction that "He who cannot find poor peasantsin the villages doesn'tdeserveto eat!" ringing in their ears,devotedtheir entire first week in the community to visiting poor peasants,soliciting their opinions, and selectingactivists who would play a key role in subsequentclassifications--i.e.,to "striking roots and linking up" (zhagenchong/ian), the methodwhich would alsobe used and criticized during the Socialist Education Movement in 1963-64. In this instancethe work team cadresin no senseabdicatedleadershipand soughtwith considerablesuccessto moderateexcessivedemandsas the movementdeveloped. Nevertheless,in Hinton's words, they "were pushednow one way, now

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another[by the views of different groups and] more often than was wise they allowed their weight to fall on the sideof extremismamongthe poor."54 In many respectsthe excesseswhich appearedduring Party rectification mirrored thoseof land reform. Rectification in someplacesinvolved intensestruggle resulting in unwarrantedbeatingsand overly harsh disciplinary punishment including sweeping dismissalsof erring cadres. In implementing the "three checkups"into cadre class origins, ideology and work style, work teamsoften either overestimatedthe numberof rich peasantsor landlords in Party branches or evaluatedcadreson the basisof classbackgroundalone, thus ignoring their contributionsto the revolution. Moreover, spurredon by attackson the rightist tendencyof ignoring the problemof impure elementsand by the influenceof the poor peasant-farmlaborer line, some work teamsconcluded,on the basis of uncovering cadre misbehavioror individual Party memberswith landlord and rich peasantties, that entire brancheswere underthe influenceof classenemies. As a result, insteadof retainingParty branchesas leadingorgansand working to reform their members,work team cadreseither dissolvedbranchesor set aside their powers and relied on Poor PeasantLeaguesand PeasantAssociationsto spearheadrectificationwork.55 The crux of the problems arising during rectification lay in the triangular relationshipbetweenwork teams,local cadresand peasantmasses.Armed with the authority to conduct basic level rectification, work teams undercutthe authority of local cadreseven if they did not go to the extremeof dissolving the Party branch.The Long Bow work team,for example,assumedlocal cadreguilt for an attackon one of its membersand took the drastic stepsof suspendingall village cadres,dissolving all massorganizations,and effectively ending all the normal activities and responsibilitiesof the Party branch.And even after these measureswere rescindedseveralweekslater on the instruction of higher levels, and the local cadresreturnedto their posts,the village continuedto look to the work teamfor leadership.The methodof conductingrectification also profoundly alteredthe relationshipof cadresand masses.In contrastto the campaignin 1942, Party rectification was not carried out within the confines of specific organizations but insteadthe entire processwas thrown open to active participation by ordinary peasantswho had the right not only to criticize but to take part in the determinationof disciplinary measures.This was possibleonly in the contextof the changedmilitary situation; only with the CCP'sgeneraloffensive was there sufficient security to open up the hitherto secretlife of the Party. In Long Bow this processtook the form of a "gate," a forum where eachmemberof the Party branch56 had to face delegateselectedby the villagers from their own number. Only when the delegateswere satisfiedthat a cadrehad sincerelyowned up to all his malfeasances,that his casewas not so seriousas to require legal action and that he would return any graft, would they allow him to "pass the gate" (guoguan) and resumehis official duties. Cadreswho had previously exercised unchallengedlocal power now had their fate placedin the handsof the masses. 57

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The potential in this situation for destroyingthe moraleof village cadresand critically weakeningParty leadershipat the basiclevels was clear. In this regard the Long Bow caseis particularly revealing since an extremesituation did not arise. As with land reform the work team mobilized the massesfor rectification and carefully guidedthe process.In this the teamleaderswere very successfulin temperingsentimentsof revengeamong the peasants;although some villagers advocatedbeating offending cadresthe majority favored a moderateapproach which recognizedthe contributionscadreshad madein earlier struggles.Moreover, the examinationat the gate revealedthat the great majority of local Communistswere poor peasantsand graft involved minor amountsrather than gross misappropriations;thus the delegatestook a lenient attitude,emphasizingeducation and reform rather than punishmentand let all but four of the village's 22 Party members pass the gate. The relative mildness of the process-which avoidedthe cadresuicidesthat occurredin other villages in the samecountydid not, however,preventsubstantialestrangementon the part of local Communists. Anxiety gripped Party membersduring their confrontationswith the peasantdelegatesat the gate.Many respondedto the pressuresof the situationby admitting things which were untrue, while thosewho refusedto confessto false chargeswere not allowed to pass the gate. Thus even after passingthe gate cadresreflected with bitternesson the sharp and often unfair attacksthey had receivedafter having taken the lead in the local revolution at great personalrisk. Moreover,the new role of the massesin village affairstogetherwith prohibitions on the useof force by cadreshad resultedin a situationof "extremedemocracy" where peasantsrefused to obey cadre orders or undertakepublic duties. Thus increasingburdensfell on cadresat the cost of time they would normally devote to their own land. Finally, the prestigeof Party membersremainedlow evenafter passingnot only the initial gate,but also a final gate a few monthslater. Villagers continuedto treat them with animosity, scorn and derision. In thesecircumstancesit is not surprisingthat various local Communistsconcludedthere was little to be gainedfrom being a cadre.Presumably,the situationwas much more seriousin villageswhereParty rectification had not beenas restrainedas in Long Bow.58 Curbing the Excesses: The RolesofMao andLiu

The problems causedby excessesin the implementationof land reform and rectification gradually becameclear to CCP leadersand eventually led them to emphasizethe importanceof curbing leftist deviations.The official ex postfacto view, one articulated by both Mao and Liu Shaoqi, was that starting with a Central committee meeting in December1947 in northern Shaanxi and Mao's report, "The PresentSituation and Our Tasks," the Party rapidly correctedthese deviations.59 Other evidence,however, suggeststhat the official version over-

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statesthe leadership'sperceptionof the problem in December1947 and that it was only in late March or April 1948 that the Party camedown unambiguously againstthe excessesof the twin movements.The questionof timing gainssignificancein view of subsequentsuggestionsthat Liu was responsiblefor the leftist tendenciesof the period. For if Mao had indeedcome out clearly in December 1947 againstthe policies which producedthe leftist trend while Liu continuedto push those policies, then there would be a substantialbasisfor assertionsof a Mao-Liu split over land reform and rectification. Considerabledifficulties surroundany effort to uncoverthe precisepositions of Mao and Liu. In the caseof Liu only one statement-albeitan important elaborationin February1948 of rectification measures-isavailable.60 Although 11 statementsby Mao dealingwith the land and rectification questionsexist for the period December1947-April 1948, all but three are available only as they appearin the SelectedWorks after 1949.61 Thus it is possible that alterations were madein Mao's actualstatementsin early 1948which changedtheir emphasis; in any case,the thrust of the following analysisis sustainedby the versions in the SelectedWorks. Mao's December1947 report did indeedwarn againstrepeatingthe ultra-left mistakesof 1931-34in land reform. But this in itself does not indicate decisive action againstleftist errors. Directivesand statementsby Party leadersgenerally hedge against tendenciesthat might be anticipated from over zealous implementationof approvedpolicies. What is critical is the overall emphasis-the main orientationwhich providesclues for the priorities of lower level officials. The overall emphasisof Mao's report was supportfor the Outline Land Law-a documentwhich encouragedradicalism.6 2 Mao's position, although calling for attention to middle peasantinterests,did in fact provide a basis for the poor peasant-farmlaborerline: To carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly, it is necessaryto organizein the villages ... not only PeasantAssociationson the broadestmass basis, including farm laborers, poor peasantsand middle peasantsin their electedcommittees,but first of all Poor PeasantLeaguescomposedof poor

peasantsand farm laborers and their elected committees;and these Poor PeasantLeaguesshouldbe the backboneof leadershipin all rural struggles.

Our policy is to rely on the poor peasantsand unite solidly with the middle peasantsto abolish the feudal and semifeudalsystemof exploitation by the landlord class and by the old type rich peasants.. . . Here two fundamental principles must be observed.First, the demandsof the poor peasantsandfarm

laborersmustbe satisfied,this is the mostfundamentaltaskin the land reform.

Second,there must be firm unity with the middle peasants,and their interests must not be damaged.63

Significantly, Mao's emphasison the first principle was reflected in the basic level implementationof land reform at the expenseof the second principle,

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somethingwhich subsequentlycameunderattack.64 Similarly, Mao's remarkson the stateof Party organs--whichincludedno warningsagainstpossibleexcesses -