Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China: Playing the Language Game (Politics and Development of Contemporary China) 3030667065, 9783030667061

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Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China Playing the Language Game

Yayoi Kato

Politics and Development of Contemporary China

Series Editors Kevin G. Cai University of Waterloo Renison University College Waterloo, ON, Canada Daniel C. Lynch School of International Relations University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA, USA

As China’s power grows, the search has begun in earnest for what superpower status will mean for the People’s Republic of China as a nation as well as the impact of its new-found influence on the Asia-Pacific region and the global international order at large. By providing a venue for exciting and ground-breaking titles, the aim of this series is to explore the domestic and international implications of China’s rise and transformation through a number of key areas including politics, development and foreign policy. The series will also give a strong voice to non-western perspectives on China’s rise in order to provide a forum that connects and compares the views of academics from both the east and west reflecting the truly international nature of the discipline.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14541

Yayoi Kato

Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China Playing the Language Game

Yayoi Kato Department of Political Science Moravian College Bethlehem, PA, USA

Politics and Development of Contemporary China ISBN 978-3-030-66706-1 ISBN 978-3-030-66707-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my mother Kazuko, my father Kichiro, Willy, and Billy

Contents

1 6

1

Introduction References

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Multiple Faces of Ideology: Definitions and Approaches Narrow and Broad Conceptions Pejorative and Neutral Conceptions Ideology as an Action-Oriented Belief Ideology as an Instrument of Power Ideology’s Integrating and Disintegrating Functions Conclusion References

7 9 11 12 14 16 18 18

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Analyzing the Language Game: Conceptual Framework Dominance of State-Centric Approach Ideology as Practice Conceptual Framework of Language Game Case Studies: SOE Reform Discourses Under Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping SOE Reforms Background Puzzle and Hypothesis Research Assumptions and Focuses References

21 22 25 27 29 31 33 36 37

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CONTENTS

41 42 44 48 49 52 55 58 59 59 61 64 68 69 70

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SOE Reform Discourse Under Jiang Zemin Data and Methods Categorization of Participants Context of the Debate “Improving Socialism” Rhetoric Gao Shangquan’s “Improving Socialism” Rhetoric “State Entrepreneurship” Rhetoric Mixed Effects: Integrating and Dividing Opposition Rhetoric The Rise of Liberal Critics Social Equality and Stability Rhetoric Conservative Backlash: “Reform Threatens Socialism” Toward the 15th Party Congress Conclusion References

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SOE Reform Discourse Under Xi Jinping Data and Methods Categorization of Participants Context of the Debate Nationalist Rhetoric: Reinforcing the Division Neoliberals’ Weakness: Li Yining’s Deng Line “Win-Win” Rhetoric: Facilitating Common Grounds Anti-Neoliberalism Rhetoric: Leftists’ Discursive Campaign Xi’s Spokespersons? Impacts Conclusion References

75 76 77 82 83 87 91 96 97 100 102 103

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Two Faces of Ideology: A Double-Edged Sword for Rulers Comparing Operative Ideology Discourse Under Jiang Zemin Discourse Under Xi Jinping Comparing Fundamental Ideology Comparing Ideological Lines Comparing Ideology Work Ideology: A Double-Edged Sword for Rulers References

107 108 109 113 118 119 124 129 131

CONTENTS

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Conclusion: Ideology, Language, and Political Power References

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Appendix: Major Items on Coding Sheets

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Index

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4

Major groups in the discourse over SOEs’ ownership restructuring (1992–1997) Major groups and their average ideological and issue positions, adopted rhetoric, and institutional affiliations Percentage of authors who employed nationalist rhetoric in each group Percentage of authors who employed “win-win” rhetoric in each group Major rhetoric employed in SOE reform discourse under Jiang Zemin Characteristics of major rhetoric employed in SOE reform discourse under Jiang Major rhetoric employed in MO reform discourse under Xi Jinping Characteristics of major rhetoric employed in MO reform discourse under Xi

46 79 86 94 109 111 113 116

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter introduces the topic and central claim of the book, discusses the aims and contributions of the book, and provides the brief summaries of subsequent chapters. Keywords Ideology · The Communist Party of China · State-owned enterprise reforms · Language game · Xi Jinping

Ideology is an extensively studied and thoroughly contested concept. Due to its diverse definitions, finding a common definition is almost impossible. The concept has been defined as a wide range of different matters, including beliefs, doctrines, values, cultures, norms, and political theories, often in conflicting ways. As a result, it is harder to grasp the concept of ideology as it is further studied. Due to the confusion surrounding the concept, some scholars recommend entirely abolishing the term, ideology, and replacing it with more narrowly defined terms. However, abolishing the term might be possible in academia but not in politics. In reality, politics still operates on ideology even after the “end of ideology” and “end of history.” Ideology is strongly associated with governance, legitimacy, and political power, and political systems cannot be maintained without it, regardless of they are democracy, dictatorship, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_1

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or communism. For political leaders, ideology is an indispensable political resource to successfully govern and garner regime support. Ideology can also unify people with diverse backgrounds and bind a group, community, and nation together. Order, stability, and national cohesion cannot be maintained without it. On the other hand, ideology is also a powerful force that can divide our world and let us fight against each other. It is a force so powerful that some people are willing to die for it. Then, what is ideology? Does it bind us together? Or does it divide us? Is it an indispensable tool for governance and legitimacy? Or is it a primary cause of conflict? Is it an instrument for power or a natural phenomenon in human societies? The purpose of this book is not to provide additional definitions of ideology or unify conflicting definitions. Rather, this book’s central theme is the multi-faced, contradictory nature of ideology. The Chinese communist party strongly relies on ideology to affirm its right to rule. Ideology’s indispensable function in enhancing the party’s governing capacity and legitimacy has been widely acknowledged by scholars in the field of Chinese politics. However, less attention has been given to how party ideology operates in the real world of politics, such as in contentious public discourses and policy processes, and whether it truly functions as effective political rhetoric for facilitating support for and compliance with party policies. This book situates ideology in a dynamic environment of contentious public discourse and analyzes its operational dimension. How has party ideology been interpreted by the political elite, social groups, and individuals? How is it practiced in public discourse and policymaking? What function does party ideology perform? Does it function as a guide to steer public discourse, integrate contending parties, and facilitate support for party initiatives? Or does it operate otherwise, becoming one of the contending rhetoric and dividing the public? This book challenges the normative assumption of ideology’s legitimating function shared by many scholars. It argues that in reality, ideology does not always operate as an effective political instrument for the party to enhance its governing capacity and legitimacy. The book demonstrates that ideology has, at least, two contradictory operative functions—integrating and dividing, depending on how it is practiced in the real world of politics, such as in contentious policy discourse. It can either act as an effective political rhetoric that alleviates elite division and mobilizes support for party policies, or can operate otherwise by deepening divisions, creating conflicts, and negatively affecting the party’s governing

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capacity. Therefore, ideology can be a double-edged sword for rulers: it is a vital resource for political leaders to legitimate and sustain their rule; yet, it potentially destablizes their rule as well. Existing studies on the communist party’s ideology and propaganda work tend to assume that ideology is a resource solely utilized by the party to enhance regime support and its downward flow from the party center to the public. Scholars focus on the intensions, discursive strategies, and techniques of persuasion employed by the party and engage in the content-based analysis of party rhetoric and slogans. This book questions this state-centric approach, analyzes ideology in the social and communication contexts, and focuses on its operational dimension, assuming that ideology can be a resource for the ruled as well. The book defines ideology as an action-oriented belief practiced by social and political actors to promote their interests through political action such as policymaking and political discourse (Seliger 1976; Link 2013). Drawing on the literature on the critical theory of ideology and critical discourse analysis developed in sociology, linguistics, and media/communication studies, the book conceptualizes public discourse as a “language game” (Wittgenstein 1953) played by the rules set by the party. It examines how party lines, theories, and slogans are interpreted by multiple state and nonstate actors in the language game and “operationalized” as political rhetoric for justifying their claims, framing issues, and promoting their agenda. Although party leaders set the rules of the language game by defining their ideological lines, party ideology does not always function as an effective means of persuasion as intended by the party. In other words, the double-edged operative functions of ideology make it a vital yet risky resource for the party. Through the rhetorical analysis and coding of more than 900 periodical articles published in Chinese media outlets, this book studies the highly contentious policy discourses over state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (1992–1997) and Xi Jinping (2014–2016). The case studies examine how party ideology—Deng, Jiang, and Xi’s ideological lines, slogans, and directives—was interpreted and operationalized by multiple groups in the policy discourses and how the practice of ideology influenced the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes. The analysis demonstrates two opposing operational functions of ideology in public discourse: consensus-inducing and conflict-inducing. While Deng’s ideological line functioned as a consensus- and compliance-inducing force in the discourse in the 1990s,

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Xi’s Chinese Dream slogan and nationalist ideological line were employed by conservative groups to limit the reform and attack the liberals, which polarized the discursive community. Through the comparison of the two policy discourses, the book investigates major determinants of ideology’s operational functions within the framework of the language game. It examines the relationship between the party leaders’ ideology work and the operational functions of party ideology and clarifies the complex relationship among ideology, language, reform governance, and political power in the broader context of China’s economic reforms. This book has three aims. First, it takes a distinctive approach to ideology and sheds light on the neglected areas of its study in the field of Chinese politics. The book focuses on ideology’s practice rather than its doctrines and texts, analyzes it in the communication context, and demonstrates the alternative way in which ideology is disseminated in the real world. By including contexts, communication, and meaningconstruction process into the analysis, the book suggests new angles to study the communist party’s ideology, governance, and legitimacy. Ideology is neither a static set of beliefs or written doctrines; nor is it solely propagated by the propaganda apparatus and state media. Ideology is a dynamic process of practice. Social groups and individuals also employ it as a resource to justify themselves, make decisions, and advance their interests. In this process, party ideology is contextualized, contested, and reconstructed and often ends up having different meanings and functions than originally intended by the party. The book’s central claim—ideology is a double-edged sword for rulers—reveals the neglected areas of research on ideology and its relevant subjects, such as legitimacy, political power, and authoritarian governance, beyond the area of Chinese politics. Second, the study of ideology is essentially multi- and inter-disciplinary. Ideology, discourse, and power have been extensively studied in sociology, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, communication studies, and cultural studies. Political scientists have not paid sufficient attention to the literature on ideology developed by other disciplines. This book borrows concepts, theories, and research methods from linguistics, sociology, and communication studies and introduces them to political scientists. At the same time, it analyzes the subjects studied in other disciplines, including rhetoric, symbolism, the construction of meaning, and the power of language, from political science perspectives and promotes the dialogue among different disciplines.

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Lastly, studying ideology’s functions and their implications for the communist party’s governance is particularly important now since Chinese politics has been making an increasingly authoritarian turn and ideology has been rehabilitated under Xi. The study of public and media discourse has been declining in the Xi era because of the crackdown on the public sphere and civic activism. This book demonstrates the effects of Xi’s re-ideologization and re-centralization of power on public discourse and provides valuable insights into the ruling capacity, vulnerabilities, and prospects of Xi’s rule. The book is based on archival research conducted in Hong Kong, China, and the analysis of the data downloaded from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) network. The book is organized in the following way. The two following chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, survey existing literature of ideology and articulate the conceptual framework and research methods of this study. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss two case studies. The last two chapters discuss the findings of the case studies and their implications for the party’s ruling capacity and legitimacy. More specifically, Chapter 2 provides a survey of multiple definitions of ideology submitted by scholars across different disciplines, categorizing them according to several different criteria. The chapter compares various definitions of and approaches to ideology and illuminates the contradictory, multi-faced nature of ideology and its functions. Chapter 3 articulates the conceptual framework of this study. It reviews the existing literature on the communist party’s ideology and propaganda work, including the “authoritarian resilience” paradigm, the literature on party legitimacy and ideological adaptation in the post-Mao era, the discourse analyses of party rhetoric, and the treatment of ideology in propaganda studies. The chapter submits a critique of the state-centric approach adopted by the existing literature and introduces this book’s alternative approach—analyzing ideology’s operational dimensions in the communication context. The chapter introduces Wittgenstein’s notion of “language game,” clarifies the relationship among ideology, language, and power, and applies the concepts to the Chinese context. It conceptualizes reform policy discourse as a “language game” and articulates the way through which the framework is applied to the analysis of China’s reform policy discourse. It introduces two case studies, provides background information on SOE reforms, and articulates research assumptions and focuses.

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Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the two case studies: the policy discourse over SOEs’ ownership restructuring under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s and the discourse over the mixed-ownership reform (MO reform) of SOEs under Xi Jinping in the 2010s. The two case studies examine how party ideology was operationalized by major groups in the language game as political rhetoric for persuasion and their effects on the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes. Each chapter identifies influential figures who adopted major rhetoric and examines central claims, discursive strategies, promoted issues, targeted audience, and rhetorical appeals of each rhetoric. Chapter 6 compares the findings of the two case studies and analyzes major determinants of ideology’s operational functions by revisiting the conceptual framework of the language game. The framework establishes a link between party ideology and its operational functions. The chapter argues whether party ideology functioning as a unifying or dividing force in public discourse depends significantly on the ideological lines of party leaders and their approach to ideology. By contrasting Deng and Jiang’s ideology work with Xi’s, the chapter argues that party leaders’ stronger ideological commitment tends to activate its conflict-inducing function. It concludes that the double-edged operational functions of ideology— division-alleviating and division-inducing—make it a difficult resource for rulers to handle. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, examines the relationship among ideology, language, governance, and political power in the broader context of China’s economic reforms. Based on the findings of the case studies, the chapter submits a critical assessment on Xi’s ideology work and its implications for the party’s ruling capacity, legitimacy, and political power.

References Link, P. (2013). An anatomy of Chinese: Rhythm, metaphor, politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Seliger, M. (1976). Ideology and politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Wiley-Blackwell.

CHAPTER 2

Multiple Faces of Ideology: Definitions and Approaches

Abstract This chapter provides a survey of multiple definitions of ideology submitted by scholars across different disciplines, categorizing them according to several different criteria. The chapter compares various definitions and approaches to ideology and highlights the contradictory, multi-faced nature of ideology and its functions. Keywords Ideology functions · Ideology practice · Language · Political domination · False consciousness

Ideology has multiple faces and functions. Eagleton lists more than twenty definitions in his book, Ideology, An Introduction (1991). Ideology is a set of beliefs that helps to legitimate a dominant political power; it is a set of beliefs that characterize a social group or class; it is the process of producing meanings, signs, and values in social life and the medium in which social actors make sense of the world. Ideology can be false ideas, illusions, dogmas, and preconceived ideas that distort our understanding (Eagleton 1991: 1–4). Dijk submitted a similar survey regarding the definitions of ideology, categorizing them into two groups, general and critical conceptions of ideology. As general concepts, ideology is a political or social system of ideas that organizes and legitimates the actions © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_2

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of social groups. It is self-serving and a function of the material and symbolic interests of the group. Ideology is also a shared framework of beliefs about society and provides a specific understanding of the world. As critical concepts, ideology is associated with the notions of power and dominance and can be defined as the prevailing ideas of an age. The ruling class makes their ideologies accepted by the subjects as an undisputed knowledge of the natural way things are. Thus, ideology can be a system of false, distorted, or misguided beliefs that conceal real social relations and serve to deceive others (Dijk 1998: 2–9). Ideology has been defined and conceptualized in various and often conflicting ways for particular reasons. First, the study of ideology is multidisciplinary: it is a subject that has been extensively studied by scholars in different disciplines, including philosophy, political science, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, cultural studies, and media/communication studies. Each discipline examines different composites, dimensions, and functions of ideology from its own disciplinary needs and perspectives, resulting in the impossibility of scholars to agree on its definitions. Second, ideology has multiple dimensions and functions, such as epistemological, cognitive, and discursive dimensions, as well as social, political, and psychological functions. Thus, scholars who focus on different dimensions and functions of ideology observe completely different aspects of ideology. Third, the study of ideology is influenced by real-world conditions such as the Cold War, and its definitions often reflect scholars’ own ideological orientations and world views. Hence, the study of ideology itself is often ideological. With myriad definitions of ideology available, scholars can only agree that ideology is “essentially contested and controversial concepts” (Dijk 1998: 1). Given the central focus of this book—two-faced, double-edged functions of ideology, it is appropriate to highlight the contradictory nature of the conceptions of ideology. This chapter examines major debates over the conceptions, approaches, and functions of ideology across the disciplines by categorizing them according to the following criteria. • Is ideology a political thought and doctrine? • Are ideology and its effects measurable? • Is ideology a coherent system of thought? Can its structure be examined? • Is ideology a part of cultural and social values? • Is ideology an illusionary belief?

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Is ideology an action-oriented belief? Is ideology an instrument of power and domination? Is ideology practiced through action, institution, or language? Is ideology an extremist belief? Does ideology promote unity or disunity?

Narrow and Broad Conceptions First, scholars have divided over whether ideology is a coherent system of political thought with explicitly stated doctrines or a set of beliefs that is not clearly distinguishable from cultural systems and social norms. The former is the narrow conception of ideology and the latter, the broad conception. Political scientists tend to assume that ideology and politics are closely intertwined and adopt the narrow conception, defining ideology as a politically-oriented, interest-based belief system consisting of core concepts and principles, such as Marxism. Thus, the effects of ideology on political processes, decisions, and behaviors can be measured. Campbell et al. considered ideology as an elaborated set of beliefs—or a “belief system”—having political functions and examined its influence on voting behavior. In The American Voter (1960), the authors state that ideology has an elaborated, coherent, and hierarchically ordered structure and allows individuals to make sense of a broad range of events (Campbell et al. 1960: 192–193). The End of Ideology (Bell 1960) was also written based on the assumption that ideology has an identifiable set of doctrines and its effects on politics are measurable; otherwise, the “end” of ideology cannot be detected and measured. Some scholars equate ideologies with “isms” and consider them extremist beliefs and thoughts. For Putnam, ideology is a “comprehensive, consistent, and deductively organized” belief system that is “consciously held.” He considers it as a “closed, rigid,” and “emotionally charged” belief system and identifies certain characteristics of “ideological attitudes,” such as intolerance toward opponents, prone to dichotomous, and opposition to compromise and consensus (1971: 654–655). Some scholars consider ideology as a system of thought having a coherent and orderly structure and try to unravel the structure and inner workings of a “black box” (Sartori 1969). Seliger dissembles ideology into several different composites, namely “description, analysis, value judgments, moral prescriptions, technical prescriptions, implements, and rejections,” and examines the functions of these composite and their

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interaction (Seliger 1976: 102–106). Seliger also submits the notion of the “bifurcation of ideology” and divides ideology into fundamental and operative dimensions. While the fundamental part consists of moral principles, the operative part implements these principles through political action. The two dimensions are intertwined, but a tension between the two arises when fundamental principles do not match the reality or political needs. In order to maintain a coherence of an ideological system, each dimension must be adapted to one another, which leads to the transformation of the ideological system (Seliger 1976: 16–17). Rejai (1991: 4) divides ideology into five dimensions—cognition, affect, valuation, program, and social base—and engaged in the comparative analysis of different ideological systems including Marxism, nationalism, fascism, Nazism, and Leninism. Freeden examines “core” and “peripheral” concepts of several ideological systems and argues that different ways of interpreting and assembling these concepts create different ideological systems (Freeden 1996: 75–82). While political scientists consider ideology as political thoughts and beliefs, sociologists, linguists, and anthropologists tend to conceive it in broader terms and often equate it with cultural systems, common-sense values, and social norms. They incorporate societal, cultural, cognitive, and linguistic dimensions into the concept of ideology and emphasize its implicit, dispersed, and societal nature. Parsons, in The Social System (1951: 349–350), defined ideology as a “system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity.” Under broader definitions, ideology is so widely shared within a community that it becomes part of social norms and conventions of the community (Dijk 2006: 117). It is integrated into daily lives and functions as a framework for social groups and individuals to interpret the world. Hall defines it as the mental framework deployed by different classes and social groups to make sense of the world (Hall 1996: 26). Ideology also defines who we are. Dijk argues that ideologies are ideas and values of social groups to organize and coordinate the interpretations and practices of the groups (Dijk 1998: 8). More specifically, he states: Contrary to most traditional approaches, ideologies are defined here within a multidisciplinary framework that combines a social, cognitive and discursive component. As ‘systems of ideas’, ideologies are socio-cognitively defined as shared representations of social groups, and more specifically as the ‘axiomatic’ principles of such representations. As the basis of a social

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group’s self-image, ideologies organize its identity, actions, aims, norms and values, and resources as well as its relations to other social groups. (Dijk 2006: 115)

Geertz’s conception of “ideology as a cultural system” is one of the broadest definitions of ideology. As an anthropologist, Geertz focused on social and psychological dimensions of ideology and argued that ideology renders otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful and enable individuals to act purposefully. Ideologies serve as “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (Geertz 1973: 205, 220). Once ideology is equated with shared meanings, collective conscience, and a cultural system, it becomes subtle and often unconsciously held by the members of a collectivity. This characteristic of ideology is similar to the notion of “sociological propaganda” submitted by Ellul, which is defined as “the penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological context” (Ellul 1973: 63). Sociological propaganda is subtle, diffused, and thus more difficult to grasp than political propaganda and ideologies, but unconsciously molds individuals and makes them conform to society. It is not the product of deliberate propaganda action but is increasingly effective because individuals accept its doctrines and disseminate them through education, entertainment, advertising, and other daily and non-political activities. As a result, “a whole society actually expresses itself through this propaganda by advertising its kind of life.” This happens, Ellul argues, because any society seeks to integrate the maximum number of individuals into it and unify its members’ behavior according to a pattern (Ellul 1973: 62–65). Under the broader conceptions, ideology is integrated with social processes; therefore, it cannot be treated in isolation and must be situated within the framework of a general social theory (Thompson 1984b: 179).

Pejorative and Neutral Conceptions Scholars have also debated whether ideology is illusionary and false beliefs or rational ideas that reflect the real world. The former is the pejorative conception and the latter is the neutral conception. The pejorative conception originated from Marx and Engels’ conception of ideology as “false consciousness” (Marx and Engels 1970). They considered ideology as illusionary, distorted, and false beliefs employed by a ruling class to obscure the reality, create social unity, and maintain its political power.

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This process is manipulative, unconscious and self-deceptive, within which a ruling class claims illusionary ideology as universal and rational truth and forges a myth of a unified community (Freeden 2003: 5–6). On the other hand, neutral conception assumes ideology as natural phenomena in the human world. Ideologies are formulated to satisfy the basic natural human needs and have thus existed throughout the history of humankind (Camargo 2013: 28). In neutral conception, ideology is “any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to explain or justify social, economic, or political realities” (Jost 2006: 652). While the neutral conception has been adopted by functionalists and behaviorists in sociology and political science, as well as psychologists and anthropologists, the pejorative conception has been inherited by Marxist and post-Marxist scholars such as Gramsci, Althusser, and Thompson. Scholars have debated this “reality-illusion dichotomy” (Camargo: 2013: 21) for a long time. For example, Seliger considers the pejorative conception restrictive and criticizes it for reducing ideology to dogmatically distorted extremist beliefs (Seliger 1970: 326). He argues that the conception of ideology must be neutral and introduces an “inclusive” conception which applies the term, ideology, to all systems and examines it in the social and political contexts (Seliger 1976: 14–20). On the other hand, Thompson criticizes the neutral conception and introduces a “critical” conception, which considers that ideology is “essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power” or “relations of domination” (Thompson 1984a: 4–5). The difference in pejorativeneutral conceptions has been reflected in the debate over what functions ideology has.

Ideology as an Action-Oriented Belief Rather than assuming ideology as knowledge, theory, or a solely ideational matter, some scholars have linked ideology and the real world and investigated its political and social functions and how it is practiced. What functions scholars assign to ideology depends largely on their conceptions of ideology. Scholars who advocate the pejorative conception tend to consider ideology as an instrument of power and domination employed by a ruling or dominant class. On the other hand, scholars who advocate the neutral conception tend to assume that ideology’s main function is to guide political action and behavior including voting, policymaking, and collective action. Seliger (1976) argues that ideology is an

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action-oriented system of thought that guides and justifies political action. Thus, it is inseparable from politics and has the potential to change the world. He defines ideology as: sets of ideas by which men posit, explain, and justify ends and means of organized social action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot, or rebuild a given order. (Seliger 1976: 4)

He explained the link between thought and action through the “bifurcation of ideology” noted above. While “fundamental” ideology defines moral principles, its “operative” part applies the fundamental principles to the real world and defends specific political decisions and actions in policymaking and argumentation (Seliger 1976: 16). The link between ideology and political action is also indicated by behaviorists such as Campbell et al. (1960) and “end-of-ideology” theorists such as Bell (1960) and Lane (1962), although the latter claimed that ideology had lost the function to guide political action. Freeden (2003: 4–11) argues that ideology provides a framework that assists individuals in interpreting political events and making political decisions. He states: Ideologies are endowed with crucial political functions. They order the social world, direct it toward certain activities, and legitimate or delegitimate its practices. Ideologies exercise power, at the very least by creating a framework within which decisions can be taken and make sense. (Freeden 2003: 11)

Rejai argues that ideology has a high potential for mass mobilization, referring to it as a “mobilized belief system” (Rejai 1991: 11, 218). In terms of interpreting the world and mobilizing individuals, ideology functions like framing. Frame is a “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 21) employed by individuals to interpret political and social events. Frame is also employed by the media and policymakers to define political issues and provide moral evaluation and treatment recommendation (Entman 1993: 51), thus shaping public opinion and public policy. Frame also has mobilization capacities. Social movement scholars study framing tasks and alignment process to build powerful collective action frames to recruit supporters (Snow et al. 1986: 464–476). However, frame is more like a technique of persuasion employed in policymaking and social movement than a set of beliefs. It is also tied to specific issues. Oliver and

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Johnston (2000: 45–47) argue that frame is closer to a marketing tool while ideology is a deeply held, complex system of ideas acquired through education and socialization. In this sense, frame functions as one of the composites of ideology submitted by Seliger (1976: 102–106), such as “operative dimension,” “technical prescription,” and “implements” that apply the fundamental moral principles to specific issues, contexts, and actions.

Ideology as an Instrument of Power On the other hand, scholars who maintain the Marxist, pejorative, and critical conceptions tend to consider ideology as an instrument of political domination, manipulation, and power. This is the legitimating function of ideology which has been extensively studied in the field of Chinese politics. As Eagleton writes, ideology is a set of beliefs or ideas which “helps to legitimate a dominant political power.” Through various methods including linguistic, entertainment, and cultural symbols, “a dominant power promotes, naturalizes, and universalizes its own beliefs to legitimate its rule, while denigrating and excluding other values and beliefs” (Eagleton 1991: 1–6). Even if ideology is not consciously held and has been part of social values and norms, deliberate propaganda action is operating in society. Gramsci’s notion of “cultural hegemony” states that a ruling class or dominant group uses cultural institutions such as ideology rather than force to maintain its political power: a dominant group propagates its ideology as social and cultural norms so that it becomes the society’s common-sense values (Gramsci 2010: 488). Althusser (2014) submitted a similar notion, “ideological state apparatuses.” Ideology is practiced by cultural institutions called “ideological state apparatuses” such as church, school, and family, which propagate and enforce a dominant ideology through rituals and customs. Yuezhi Zhao (1998) describes the Chinese communist party’s ideological domination in the post-Mao era employing a similar notion to the “cultural hegemony.” Even if the post-Mao leadership abandoned crude political indoctrination and does not promote Marxist political doctrines like class struggle, it is not the “end of ideology.” Party ideology still operates in various cultural and entertainment forms and “its grip on the people is no less totalistic.” Thus, “the media’s promotion of consumerism is no less ideological than their promotion of class struggle during the Mao era” (Zhao,1998: 5–10).

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While Althusser and Zhao consider ideology being practiced through cultural institutions and media, Thompson argues that it is practiced through language. Since language is the principal medium through which meaning is mobilized in the society, the language of everyday life is the very locus of ideology and the very site of the meaning which sustains relations of domination (Thompson 1984a: 73, 89–90). Similarly, Dijk argues that ideologies are expressed and reproduced in social practices and acquired, confirmed, changed, and perpetuated through discourse at all levels of text and talk (Dijk 2006: 115). Thus, the analysis of language is central to the study of ideology (Thompson 1984a: 73). According to Bourdieu, language is an “instrument of power and action,” not merely a means of communication. Power relations are reflected in language. He argues that a dominant power or ruling class imposes its own language—in a form of ideology—on the whole population as the only legitimate language and unifies “the linguistic market.” Thus, speaking the language means “tacitly to accept the official definition of the official language of a political unit” (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 45) and through which relations of domination are reproduced. Bourdieu writes: Integration into a single ‘linguistic community’, which is a product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language, is the condition for the establishment of relation of linguistic domination. (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 46)

The legitimating function of ideology is associated with stability and system maintenance rather than political change and action. Ideology is a resource for rulers, instead of social groups and individuals, to preserve the status quo through political manipulation. This notion originated from Marx’s argument on “false consciousness”: those who control the means of production maintain their position by promoting false consciousness within the working class (Marx and Engels 1970). Thompson argues that relations of domination are sustained by a mobilization of meaning which legitimates an existing state of affairs (1984b: 183). Although the legitimating function is primarily studied by political scientists from the rulers’ perspective, some psychologists study it from societal perspectives, presenting the “system justification theory.” Jost and Banaji investigate why disadvantaged segments of society, such as the

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people with low socioeconomic status, support the status quo rather than demand changes. They consider ideological motives—in particular, “false consciousness”—as one of the major factors that motivate the disadvantaged class to justify the existing social order (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004: 881).

Ideology’s Integrating and Disintegrating Functions Another controversial issue regarding the functions of ideology is whether it promotes unity, stability, and cohesion of a community or produces polarization, conflict, and even warfare. Ellul’s definitions of “propaganda of integration” and “propaganda of agitation” contrast the opposing functions of ideology well. Whereas propaganda of integration makes an individual an organic and functional fragment of a collectivity and unifies and stabilizes the group (Ellull 1973: 74–76), propaganda of agitation is a subversive ideology intended for destroying the established order through revolutions or rebellions. Agitation propaganda is often employed by governments to mobilize subjects for collective action or war efforts, which is normally carried out by mobilizing hatred and attributing one’s misfortunes and sins to the enemy who must be eliminated (Ellul 1973: 71–76). Scholars who adopt the broader conceptions of ideology tend to accept ideology’s binding, integrating, and unifying function. Parsons argues that ideology promotes the integration of a collectivity by providing a set of norms for social cohesion (Persons 1951: 349–350). Dijk argues that ideology is a shared framework of beliefs about society, facilitates a group’s specific understanding of the world (Dijk 1998: 8–9), and guides the group’s attitudes, opinions, and collective action. In this sense, ideology can be propaganda of integration. The Marxist and pejorative conceptions of ideology also advocate its integrating function through the manipulation of symbols and language by a ruling class. However, the more cohesion and solidarity of a group promoted by an ideological system, the more hostility generated toward other ideological systems, which leads to division and conflict in broader society. Ideology, like nationalism, has both inclusive and exclusive characteristics. Seliger incorporates “rejections” composite into ideology: he argues that ideology is always defined in opposition to others and that ideological systems are mutually exclusive (Seliger 1970: 326). Dijk indicates

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“ingroup - outgroup polarization”—that is, our good things and their bad things tend to be emphasized while our bad things and their good things are de-emphasized or mitigated (Dijk 2006: 124). Eagleton also notes that a dominant power promotes its own beliefs while denigrating other beliefs (Eagleton 1991: 1–6). As far as ideology is a group-oriented system of beliefs, mutual hostility and exclusiveness among different ideological systems seem to be inevitable. However, the level of hostility and exclusiveness to other ideological systems depends on the level of commitment to one’s own ideology. This issue is relevant to the debate over whether ideology is an emotionally charged, extremist belief or not. Scholars who adopt the narrow and “restrictive” conceptions tend to define ideology as an extremist belief that needs deep, passionate, and emotional commitment (Bell 1960; Rejai 1991; Sartori 1969). Rejai argues that political ideology is an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, and action-related system of beliefs and is acquired as a matter of faith (Rejai 1991: 218). This definition nearly equates ideology with religious beliefs. Putnam’s definition of ideology as biased, irrational, utopian, and “affectively or emotionally charged” belief system is similar to Rejai’s definition, as well as Ellul’s “propaganda of agitation.” Putnam’s “ideological attitudes” include extremism, hostility toward political opponents, “black-white” thinking, opposition to consensus and pluralist politics, and orientation to conflict (Putnam 1971: 655). Is ideological pluralism impossible? At least, the broader definitions of ideology submit more lenient characteristics of the concept, including its self-serving function as a mental framework of interpreting the world and defining group identities, as well as a society’s natural commitment to ideology as cultural and social norms. Sartori argues that whether ideology leads to conflict or not is determined by the types of ideological systems that are distributed within society. Sartori examined the probability of conflict by categorizing ideological systems based on cognitive status (closed or open) and emotive intensity. He concluded that “ideological warfare” is more likely between the systems with closed cognitive status and higher emotive level. On the other hand, “pragmatic transactions” or mutual adjustment are possible between the systems with open cognitive status and lower emotive level (Sartori 1969: 404–409).

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Conclusion This chapter introduced the multiple definitions of ideology and revealed their diverse and contradictory nature. As Dijk states, ideology is an “essentially contested and controversial concept” (Dijk 1998: 1). However, the purpose of this book is not to submit additional definitions of ideology or seek a unified concept of it. This book examines the very contradictory and double-edged nature of ideology’s functions. Indeed, such multi-faced and conflicting characteristics could be the true nature of ideology. The scholarship of ideology is vast, diverse, and multidisciplinary. This book borrows some of the definitions, concepts, and approaches introduced in this chapter—in particular, the different dimensions and composites of ideology, ideology as an action-oriented belief, and the close association of ideology and language—and incorporates them into the conceptual framework and research methods of the case studies.

References Althusser, L. (2014). On the reproduction of capitalism: Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (G. M. Goshgarian, Trans. and Ed.). Verso. Bell, D. (1960). The end of ideology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Bourdieu, P., & Thompson, J. B. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Camargo, R. (2013). The new critique of ideology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. (1960). The American Voter. Chicago: Wiley. Dijk, T. A. (1998). Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. London: Sage. Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. Journal of Political Ideologies, 11(2), 115–140. Eagleton, T. (1991). Ideology: An introduction. London: Verso. Ellul, J. (1973). Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Vintage Books. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and political theory: A conceptual approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freeden, M. (2003). Ideology: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books.

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Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gramsci, A. (2010). Selections from Prison Notebooks. New York, NY: International Publishers. Hall, S. (1996). The problem of ideology: Marxism without guarantees. In D. Morley & K. H. Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (pp. 57–84). London: Routledge. Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61(7), 651–670. Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in systemjustification and the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33(1), 1–27. Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political Psychology, 25(6), 881–919. Lane, R. E. (1962). Political ideology. New York: Free Press. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). The German ideology (C. J. Arthur, Ed.). New York: International Publishers. (Original work published in 1846). Oliver, P. E., & Johnston, H. (2000). What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement research. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 4(1), 37–54. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Putnam, R. D. (1971). Studying elite political culture: The case of “ideology”. American Political Science Review, 65(3), 651–681. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/1955512. Rejai, M. (1991). Political ideologies: A comparative approach. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Sartori, G. (1969). Politics, ideology, and belief systems. American Political Science Review, 63(2), 398–411. Seliger, M. (1970). Fundamental and operative ideology: The two principal dimensions of political argumentation. Policy Sciences, 1, 325–338. Seliger, M. (1976). Ideology and politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464–481. Thompson, J. B. (1984a). Studies in the theory of ideology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Thompson, J. B. (1984b). Ideology and the Critique of Domination II. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de theorie politique et sociale, 8(1–2). https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/art icle/view/13989/4763. Accessed 6 July 2019. Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, market, and democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing the Language Game: Conceptual Framework

Abstract This chapter articulates the conceptual framework of this book. It reviews the existing literature on the communist party’s ideology and propaganda work, submits a critique of state-centric and contentbased approaches to ideology, and introduces the book’s alternative approach—analyzing ideology’s operational dimension in the communication context. The chapter introduces Wittgenstein’s notion of “language game,” clarifies the relationship among ideology, language, and power, and applies the concepts to the Chinese context. It conceptualizes reform policy discourse as a “language game” and articulates the way through which the framework is applied to the analysis of China’s reform policy discourse. It introduces two case studies, provides background information on state-owned enterprise reforms, and articulates research assumptions and focuses.

This chapter is partially based on the article, Kato, Y. (2020). Two faces of ideology: Double-edged functions of ideology in the reform discourse under Xi Jinping. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. Accepted May 20, 2020, First Published Online September 30, 2020. The article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 4.0 License. https://jou rnals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1868102620933899. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_3

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Keywords Authoritarian resilience · Discourse analysis · State-owned enterprise reforms · Rhetoric · The Communist Party of China

The legitimating function of ideology is one of the most thoroughly studied areas in the field of contemporary Chinese politics. Ideology’s indispensable roles in enhancing the party’s governance and legitimacy, in particular, its normative function that “guides public sentiment along lines congruent with state policy” (Perry 2013: 28), have been widely acknowledged by the scholars who study ideology, propaganda, and authoritarian governance. However, less attention has been given to how party ideology operates in the real world of politics. How is party ideology practiced— interpreted, operationalized, and disseminated—by multiple state and nonstate actors in the real world of politics, such as in policy process and contentious public discourse? Does it truly function as effective political rhetoric for facilitating support for and compliance with the party’s policy initiatives and enhancing its governing capacity and legitimacy? This book focuses on this operational dimension of party ideology. This chapter critically reviews the existing literature on the party’s ideology work and articulates the conceptual framework of this book.

Dominance of State-Centric Approach The operational dimension of party ideology has not been sufficiently explored by existing literature on party ideology, propaganda work, and legitimacy. In the field of Chinese politics, the study of ideology is closely linked to that of legitimacy. According to Perry, resorting to ideological influence or so-called cultural governance—rule by symbols and rituals rather than by force—is part of China’s traditional political culture and is indispensable for political persuasion and regime support (Perry 2013: 2). Due to the primary focus on legitimacy, scholars tend to adopt a statecentric approach to ideology, assuming it as a resource solely utilized by the party and focusing exclusively on the party-side’s intentions, discursive strategies, and efforts to propagate its ideology. Many studies on party ideology in the post-Mao era belong to the so-called authoritarian resilience paradigm, which argues that the party’s constant ideological adaptation is one of the key factors for the regime’s survival. The post-Mao party leaders have successfully maintained legitimacy through

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the continuous adjustment of party ideology and propaganda work to the changing domestic and international environment. The party has constantly upgraded and re-oriented party ideology suited to its new policy initiatives by incorporating new elements and reinventing old elements, through which party legitimacy has been reproduced (Gilley and Holbig 2009; Holbig 2013; Perry 2013; Yang 2014). To initiate economic reform, Deng Xiaoping employed “Four Cardinal Principles,” “primary stage of socialism,” and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to justify a market economy. As the contradiction between the party’s revolutionary heritage and rapid economic growth became apparent, Jiang Zemin employed the “three represents” and transformed the party’s status from a revolutionary party representing the working class to a party representing all the people, including “advanced social forces.” Hu Jintao adjusted the excess of market reforms with “harmonious society” and re-appropriated socialist concepts such as “new socialist countryside” to quell social protests and maintain social stability. Throughout the reform era, the party continues to rearticulate Maoist concepts such as “social contradictions,” its revolutionary traditions, and other socialist values (Zhao 2011: 206–208; Travescas 2013). Nationalism is another important instrument for the party to garner regime support. Perry argues that the cultural governance with nationalistic flavor is a long-term tradition. The party has been employing nationalism since the time of the communist revolution and continuously reframing it for different purposes. Mao submitted the idea of the “revival of the Chinese nation” by equating it with the victory of the revolution. Deng promoted the “indigenization” of Chinese socialism with his socialism with Chinese characteristics (Perry 2013: 10–12). Jiang drew heavily on nationalism and launched the Patriotic Education Campaign in the late 1990s. Hu engaged in the extensive propaganda campaigns of patriotism at the times of the Beijing Olympics and Sichuan earthquake (Tsang 2009). Xi’s China Dream is the continuation of this tradition and re-appropriation of nationalism applied to new political goals (Yang 2014: 110; Minzner 2014: 14; Wang 2014). Nationalism is, Suisheng Zhao argues, the “most reliable claim to the Chinese people’s loyalty and the only important value shared by the regime and its critics” (Zhao 2005– 2006: 134). It can also be employed for pre-empting Western values from captivating the public (Tsang 2009: 15). By presenting itself as the defender of China’s pride and unity, the party has employed nationalism

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as an effective instrument for enhancing its legitimacy (Perry 2013; Tsang 2009). The major focus of these studies is the party’s “successful” management of ideology to legitimate its rule, and scholars normatively assume the legitimating function of ideology. On the other hand, little attention has been directed to how party ideology has been received and interpreted by the public, what effects and responses it has produced, and whether it has functioned in the ways intended by the party. In terms of the one-sided focus on the party side’s strategies, the literatures on party ideology are not clearly distinguishable from the studies of the party’s propaganda work. Although propaganda studies generally focus on the technical means of mass persuasion and thought control, they share the state-centric assumption that ideology is a tool for the party to control the public’s mind and mostly support the “authoritarian resilience” thesis. The party engaged in the systematic effort to organize propaganda suitable for the market economy, targeted the audience with “market friendly” propaganda (Brady 2012a: 1), and depoliticized society. While maintaining censorship, the party used the commercialized media skillfully, employed “positive propaganda,” and educated the public. Thus, the party’s capacity to guide public opinion is the major factor for the authoritarian resilience (Gallagner and Stockmann 2011; Esarey et al. 2017). Nevertheless, these studies do not draw sufficient attention to the content of ideology. Propaganda scholars tend to treat ideology as a set of dogmatic beliefs and slogans without exploring its contents, sometimes simply call it “propaganda,” and assume its downward flow from the party center to the public, considering the media and propaganda apparatus as the “mouthpiece” (Zhao 1998: 19) of the party. Furthermore, the two terms, ideology and propaganda, are not conceptually differentiated and used interchangeably as synonyms in many propaganda studies, with party ideology often referred to as “party propaganda.” In a rigorous sense, ideology is a set of beliefs and ideas, whereas propaganda is the means of persuasion, or by definition, “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandists” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2015: 7). Discourse studies, on the other hand, have engaged in the contentbased analysis of party ideology. They focus on the usage of language and analyze political vocabulary, rhetoric, and framing employed by party leaders from Mao to Xi, through the text analyses of their speeches,

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writings, and monographs. Notable examples are the analyses of the party’s “stability discourse” in response to crises such as the Tiananmen uprising and anti-Japan protests (Sandby-Thomas 2010), Jiang Zemin’s “formalized language” for preserving stability (Marllineli 2013), Hu’s re-articulation of Maoist rhetoric of “social contradictions” (Trevaskes 2013), the historical discourse of “victimhood” (Renwick and Cao 1999), Xi’s framing of an economic downturn as the “new normal” (Holbig 2018), and Xi’s China Dream concept (Wang 2014). Ji Fengyuan (2004) analyzes “linguistic engineering” in the Mao era, which is equivalent to Orwell’s Newspeak. Mao attached new meanings to words, created new political vocabulary, and imposed his revolutionary discourse on the population in order to transform their thought and mobilize them for the Cultural Revolution. These discourse studies contextualize party slogans, rhetoric, and language and examine the operational dimension of party ideology in response to crises and changing political and social conditions. However, they also maintain the state-centric approach: they primarily focus on the party-side’s “attempt to affect people’s attitudes and beliefs by manipulating the language” (Ji 2012), assuming the downward flow of party rhetoric from the party leaders to the public. They are mostly silent on how party rhetoric and political language have been understood or interpreted by the recipients and whether they have produced the desired effects and responses intended by the party.

Ideology as Practice The state-centric assumption of the downward flow of ideology blinds scholars to the recipient-side perspectives and the way through which ideology operates in the real world. The existing literature has examined the party’s efforts to propagate its beliefs and engaged in the content-based analysis of party ideology, but scholars are mostly silent on how party ideology has been interpreted and practiced by the recipients including the political elite, social groups, and individuals. Ideology is not merely a thought or doctrines written in texts but also provides the public with the framework for making sense of the world (Hall 1996: 26) and shapes and organizes the identities, actions, aims, and norms of social groups (Dijk 2006: 115). Seliger defines ideology as an action-oriented belief: “a set of ideas by which men posit, explain, and justify ends and means of organized social action” (Seliger 1976: 4). This means that the public also employs ideology for interpreting

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events, making decisions, and taking actions. To understand the operational functions of party ideology and their implications for the party’s governing capacity, it is necessary to analyze ideology in the communication context and examine its practice, specifically, the way through which party ideology is interpreted and utilized by the recipients in the real world. Seliger’s “bifurcation of ideology” provides a useful link between ideology as a thought and as a practice. He divides ideology into two dimensions: fundamental and operative. The fundamental part consists of theoretical, moral, and ethical principles, while the operative part implements the fundamental principles through political action, such as policymaking and argumentation (Seliger 1970, 1976: 14–16, 109). Ideology, at its core, is an abstract and symbolic doctrine; however, in the policy process, it is used by policymakers to interpret, justify, and legitimate specific policies (Trout 1975: 259). Applied to the Chinese context, fundamental ideology is party leaders’ ideological lines, rhetoric, and slogans, which consists mainly of moral principles and political doctrines. The operative part is the process in which the fundamental ideology and its principles are implemented and practiced by multiple actors in the actual decision-making or discourse processes. Once the operational dimension is added to ideology, it is no longer a static set of doctrines and ideas as assumed by the state-centric approach. Ideology becomes a dynamic process of practice: it may be re-contextualized, transformed, and often reconstructed through the process. Party rhetoric and slogans are interpreted by multiple political and social groups and individuals in diverse contexts, such as in policymaking, working units, education, protests, public discourse, entertainment, and daily conversations. In this process, party ideology often assumes new meanings. Through the discursive process, a shared meaning of party ideology may be newly constructed and reconstructed, then disseminated and propagated by these actors, rather than by the party’s propaganda apparatus. Holbig’s (2018) study of Xi’s “new normal” and Cao’s (2014) study of “soft power discourse” analyze such recontextualization and contestation processes of party rhetoric and slogans. In the real world, therefore, party ideology may function in entirely different ways than originally intended by party leaders. In other words,

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party ideology’s effectiveness in enhancing party legitimacy and governance depends not only on the party’s discursive strategies and propaganda work but also on how it is interpreted, operationalized, and disseminated in the real world.

Conceptual Framework of Language Game This study situates ideology in the dynamic environment of contentious reform policy discourse, analyzes it in the communication context, and examines the operational functions of party ideology in public discourse. Does party ideology function as effective rhetoric that integrates contending groups in the discursive community and promote party initiatives? Or does it operate otherwise, dividing the discursive community and slowing down reforms? This research adopts the critical conception of ideology and assumes that ideology is an instrument of power and is practiced through language. Thompson argues that language is the principal medium through which meaning is mobilized in society. The language of everyday life is the very locus of ideology and the very site of the meaning which sustains relations of domination (Thompson 1984a: 73, 89–90). Thus, ideology must be analyzed by situating it in the social world and paying attention to the power of language. He writes: The analysis of ideology is, in a fundamental respect, the study of language in the social world, since it is primarily within language that meaning is mobilized in the interests of particular individuals and groups. (Thompson 1984a: 73)

To investigate how party ideology and rhetoric are practiced in public discourse, this study borrows Wittgenstein’s notion of “language game.” He stated, “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein 1953: $23). Language is embedded in contexts and social practices and acquires meaning only when used in a specific context. A context imposes certain rules on social discourse, and speakers must know the rules to understand the meaning of the language used in that context (Wittgenstein 1953: $19–27). Wittgenstein’s notions of language, meaning, and context, can be applied to the study of ideology and power relations.

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Bourdieu argues that language is an “instrument of action and power,” not merely a means of communication (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 37). Language reflects asymmetrical power relations in a society. A dominant power imposes its own language on the whole population as a legitimate language, unifies “the linguistic market,” and establishes its “linguistic domination.” Thus, power relations are reflected in language, and speaking the language means “tacitly to accept” the official language defined by the dominant power (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 45–46). Similarly, Thompson argues that language is a principal medium through which a dominant power mobilizes a meaning in a way that legitimates an existing state of affairs, thus sustaining “relations of domination” (Thompson 1984b: 183). A legitimate language is defined by a dominant power, acquired by speakers, and reproduced through discourse, creating individuals capable of producing expressions relevant to specific situations and tacitly adjusting to the relations of power (Thompson 1984a: 7). In this sense, public communication is “systematically distorted” (Habermas 1970) by power, resources, status, and authority, and the genuine “rational public sphere” postulated by Habermas (1989/1962) is nonexistent. However, this very distortion creates a context, imposes certain rules on social discourse, and defines the meaning of the language used in the context, thus, setting the rules of the language game. This study conceptualizes reform policy discourse as a language game played by the rules set by the party. The language game concept establishes a link between fundamental and operative ideologies and clarifies the relationship between ideology, language and power in the Chinese context. In China, the party sets a legitimate language in the form of party ideology by mobilizing meaning in a way that justifies its supremacy. Party ideology and party lines—fundamental ideology—imposes the context in which public discourse takes place, thus, setting the rules of the language game. The rules define the appropriate uses and meanings of specific terms and slogans, set “no-go zones” (Brady 2012b: 160), and inform players on what can and cannot be promoted or denied in the discourse. The rules are often implicit, but participants in the discourse must know, share, and abide by the rules to play the game. Therefore, participating in the discourse means “tacitly to accept” the party’s political domination. However, Perry Link (2013) argues that ideology can be a resource not only for party leaders but also for the “ruled” to advance their interests and defend themselves in language games. In policy discourse, participants utilize party leaders’ ideological lines to justify their claims, promote

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issues, persuade others, and form alliances, in their attempt to influence policy outcomes. To do so, party ideology must be adjusted to a specific issue area and operationalized as effective rhetoric that appeals to the audience. In this way, ideology can be operationalized as issue-framing, agenda-setting, and policy maneuvering tools in policy discourses and processes. In addition, through this discursive process, party ideology is disseminated and propagated by “involuntary” propaganda actors (Ellul 1973), such as academics, bureaucrats, and business professionals, in their attempts to promote their institutional, economic, and personal interests. And through this process, the party’s political domination is sustained. However, in contentious public discourse, there are always multiple interpretations of the same party line. As long as game players abide by the rules, they have the relative freedom to choose how to interpret and operationalize party ideology and can disseminate it with their interpretations attached. Therefore, even if party leaders set the rules of the game, they often have little control over how their ideological lines are interpreted and employed by various actors as a political tool to justify their arguments, facilitate compromises, or attack opponents. Thompson indicates that “the meaning of an expression is susceptible to contestation and change” (Thompson 1984a: 132). Different interpretations of party ideology may compete against each other or some groups may assign new meanings to it, resulting in disagreement and deepening divisions in the discursive community. Thus, from party leaders’ perspective, ideology work is not always successful. Their ideological lines often do not “strike a chord with its intended audience, slogans can be hijacked, and rhetoric may backfire when opponents assign different meanings” (Perry 2013: 33). On the other hand, if party ideology is employed as an effective instrument for promoting party policies, a shared understanding of party ideology can be constructed in the course of discourse and deliberation process, which could alleviate elite divisions, facilitate compliance with party policies, and enhance the party’s ruling capacity. This study examines this double-edged characteristic of ideology’s operational functions.

Case Studies: SOE Reform Discourses Under Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping The following two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, examine two policy discourses over state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms as case studies. The first case is the policy discourse over SOEs’ ownership restructuring

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under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s (1992–1997), which was implemented under the “grasp the large, let go of the small” policy. The second case is the policy discourse over the mixed-ownership reform (MO reform) of SOEs under Xi Jinping in the 2010s (2014–2016). Through the qualitative analysis and coding of more than 900 periodical articles published in Chinese media outlets, academic journals, and internal publications, the two case studies examine how party ideology—the top leaders’ ideological lines, slogans, and directives—was interpreted and operationalized by multiple groups in the policy discourses and how the practice of party ideology influenced the dynamics of the discourses, configuration of the policy community, and policy outcomes. SOE reform is one of the most ideologically charged issue areas due to its attempt to restructure the public ownership system, the foundation of socialism. China’s economic reform is, in principle, an attempt to reconcile socialism with the market. Due to the incompatibility of socialist and market principles, new reform programs always produce contradictory demands, such as the pursuit of social equality and economic efficiency, as well as the preservation of public ownership and the promotion of private ownership. These contradictory demands produce ideological tensions and divisions among the policy elite. SOE reform is the core element of China’s economic reform and embodies such contradictions. Since its initiation nearly 40 years ago, SOE reform has been dragged by heated ideological debates over the issues of ownership and the state’s role. The so-called “capitalist or socialist” debate in the 1990s was a typical example. The new SOE reform agenda under Xi, MO reform, has equally been suffered from its contradictory demands: socialist demand for public ownership and market demand for private ownership, as well as political demand for state control and economic demand for the “decisive role” played by the market. Due to these inherent ideological contradictions of China’s economic reforms, the discursive community of SOE reforms is highly divisive and contentious, which requires the utilization of party ideology as effective rhetoric for persuading opponents, negotiating compromises, and alleviating the divisions caused by the inherent contradictions of the reform. This, in turn, makes SOE reform a suitable issue area for analyzing how party ideology is operationalized and whether it functions as a division-alleviating or a division-intensifying force.

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SOE Reforms Background China’s SOE reforms were initiated in the 1980s with a gradual expansion of enterprise autonomy on managerial decisions. The government initially granted more managerial autonomy to the managers of SOEs by separating ownership and managerial control rights. However, the operational efficiency and financial performance of SOEs did not improve as expected. Assuming that ownership stakes impose harder budget constraint, the government initiated shareholding experiments in 1984, allowing employees of smaller SOEs to invest capital and receive dividends (Ma 2010). In 1987, the government introduced the “contract management responsibility system,” under which a majority of SOEs were converted to contracted or leased firms. The 1988 Enterprise Law defined the director of an SOE as a representative of a “legal person” and set two separation principles: “separation of ownership from management” and “separation of government from enterprises” (Xiao 1998: 275). Shareholding experiments were restricted during the Tiananmen setback, but the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991, respectively. The State Council issued the “Notice on the Revitalization of Large and Middle-Sized Enterprises” in 1991 and initiated the ownership restructuring of large SOEs through the formation of SOE groups. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in spring 1992 which jump-started the economic reform, the party set a goal to establish a socialist market economy at the 14th Party Congress held in the same year and endorsed the application of shareholding to large SOEs under the premise of the “public ownership system as the mainstay” (POSAM). By the mid1990s, the prototype of the SOE group model had taken shape and been implemented under the “grasp the large, let go of the small”. Chapter 4 focuses on this critical period of the reform between the 14th Party Congress in 1992 and the 15th Party Congress in 1997. The policy discourse over SOE reforms during this period is characterized by heated ideological debates over the political status of the rising private economy and the legitimacy of the ownership reforms of SOEs. The discursive community was deeply divided into reformers and conservatives. In addition, the SOE reform in the 1990s was the major part of the process legitimating the new economic system, socialist market economy, which made the discourse heavily ideologically laden and contentious. In addition, the Jiang era was the transition period from the “personalistic” politics (Fewsmith 1996: 232) of the Mao and Deng eras to a more

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institutionalized and pluralistic politics. Although the policy process was still confined to the policy elite and had little input from the public, the policy community was expanding with the inclusion of new actors, and the policy elite was divided into a variety of groups from radical reformers to leftists. Despite the highly contentious nature of the debate, leftists’ criticisms, and the death of Deng in 1997, the party under Jiang achieved drastic policy outcomes. At the 15th Party Congress in 1997, it adopted the “grasp the large, let go of the small” as an official policy and endorsed the legitimate status of private ownership. After the Party Congress, Premier Zhu Rongji undertook the large-scale restructuring of the state sector, corporatizing large SOEs, forming SOE conglomerates, and making them the commanding heights of China’s economy through the implementation of industrial policies. Small- and mid-sized SOEs were de facto privatized, converted to employee ownership, or dismantled. By the mid2000s, the SOE groups had emerged as China’s “national champions” and expanded their operations in the global market. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established under the State Council in 2003 for supervising the operations of the SOEs owned by the central government. Due to the centralized state control of SOE groups and their growing presence in global economy, China’s SOE group model has been labeled as “state capitalism” (Bremmer 2010). The state sector has enjoyed preferential access to state financing and subsidies, such as the stimulus package at the time of the global financial crisis, and has monopolized the strategic industries such as energy, defense, telecommunication, and aviation. The rapid expansion of the state sector created the trend called “guojin mintui”, “the state sector advances, the nonstate sector retreats.” However, many SOEs have been plagued by low profitability, operational inefficiency, accumulated debt, and corruption. By the time Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, a new round of SOE reforms had become an urgent necessity (Leutert 2016: 85). MO reform was one of the key economic agendas addressed by Xi at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee Meeting in November 2013. It was an attempt to introduce private capital investment into the state sector and diversify the ownership structure of SOEs to improve their performance. In terms of introducing private capital to the public sector, MO reform is similar to the shareholding practice initiated in the 1980s. For this reason, some policymakers equated the two reforms.

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Xi’s motive was, however, to transform SOEs into real market players and increase their profitability by introducing private capital and management know-how to the state sector, while avoiding full-scale privatization. The MO reform agenda was closely tied to the party’s decision to give market forces the “decisive role” in resource allocation, through which Xi tried to reduce the role of government in resource allocation, remove the state economy’s privileged access to resources, create a competitive environment, and improve overall economic efficiency (Kroeber 2013). Politically, Xi wanted to strengthen the state sector for social stability and enhance the Chinese economy’s international influence (Leutert 2016: 85). Chapter 5 focuses on the policy discourse over this MO reform from 2014 to 2016. The initial expectation for the reform was high, and the debate began with excitement and optimism. The ideological spectrum of the policy community had shifted toward the right for the two decades since the 1990s, and neoliberalism ideology had taken root in the minds of many policymakers. Thus, the liberal-conservative division was initially dormant. However, Xi’s tightening thought control, attack on Western values including neoliberalism, and extensive disciplinary campaigns significantly impacted the ideological and political climate of the discursive community. Xi’s hard-line policies strengthened the voice of conservative groups that advocated limited reform to maintain the dominance of the state sector and criticized liberal policymakers who promoted the reform, which nearly polarized the policy community. Despite some high-profile pilot programs such as Sinopec’s reform, the policy process and implementation were slow and often stalled, which was reflected in the limited policy outcomes of the reform. Puzzle and Hypothesis The two SOE reforms were more than 20 years apart, but the nature of the policy processes and discourses share some similarities. The reform process of SOEs is basically very slow, incremental, and ideologically divisive. The policy elites in the 2010s debated the same issues as the ones discussed in the 1990s, including the lack of enterprise autonomy, bureaucratic corruption, lower profitability of SOEs, state monopoly and subsidies, administrative reforms, efficient allocations of state-owned assets, and the state economy’s strategic importance. This indicates that many of the fundamental problems of SOEs have not been solved after

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all those years. In addition, the discursive community of SOE reforms in the 1990s and 2010s was equally contentious and divided into the two camps, reformists and conservatives. These similarities derive mainly from the ideologically contradictory nature of China’s SOE reform as discussed above. Unlike the SOE reforms in the post-communist countries such as Russia which abolished the inefficient public sector through privatization, China’s goal is to preserve and strengthen it. Due to the socialist ideological constraint placed on private ownership, the party has avoided full-scale privatization while introducing neoliberal measures to reform SOEs. Contradictory socialist and market demands nearly always produce ideological tension among the policy elite, which slows down the reform process. However, there are notable differences between the two discourses, specifically, the initial conditions surrounding the two reforms and their policy outcomes. When the ownership restructuring of large SOEs was initiated in the early 1990s, China just emerged from the Tiananmen setback during which international political and economic sanctions were imposed on the country and the political and ideological climates were hostile to the reform. Conservative hardliners maintained powerful influences within the party, and the division between reformers and conservatives was strongly felt. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in eastern Europe threatened the party’s legitimacy as well. Furthermore, the new leader, Jiang Zemin, was not well known and did not have a strong support base within the party. Thus, Deng, Jiang, and other reformist leaders were in adverse conditions to initiate the new reform in the 1990s. On the other hand, when Xi initiated MO reform, China had already become the second-largest economy and enjoyed international prestige with its growing economic power. Many Chinese firms, both state and private, had become global market players, while neoliberal ideology had established “hegemony” (Zhao 2008: 288) among the policy elite. Xi quickly consolidated his power base, launched the China Dream slogan to tap into popular nationalism, and enjoyed the reputation of a strong, committed, and reformist new leader. Thus, Xi initiated the reform in far more advantageous conditions than Deng and Jiang did in the early 1990s. The two reforms also show a stark contrast in their policy results. However, the initial conditions of the reforms were not reflected in their policy outcomes. Despite the strong ideological division in the policy

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community and the hostile political, economic, and international environment, the party under Jiang accomplished the drastic policy outcomes under the “grasp the large, let go of the small,” reviving the dying state sector, completely transforming it, and legitimating private ownership. On the other hand, MO reform under Xi largely failed to accomplish its original goals, such as improving SOEs’ financial performance, marketizing the management of SOEs, and reducing market entry barriers to private investment (Milhaupt and Zheng 2016). With the initiation of “supplyside structural reform” (SSSR) in late 2015, the MO reform agenda lost its salience in the discourse and was absorbed into the SSSR agenda without achieving a meaningful agreement or consensus on the issues over mixed ownership. The contrast between the reform outcomes poses a puzzle: Xi initiated the reform in far more advantageous conditions, but the quality of policy outcomes was far greater in the reform under Jiang. Naughton argues that most of the reform agendas addressed by Xi at the 2013 Third Plenum have only produced “incoherent and disappointing” results and that the quality of policy outcomes sharply declined under Xi (Naughton 2016). Although policy outcomes are determined by various factors, this study hypothesizes that how party ideology was practiced in the two reform discourses significantly influenced the two reforms’ policy outcomes and the party’s ruling capacity. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate a clear contrast in the operational functions of party ideology in the two discourses. In the discourse under Jiang, party ideology, in particular, Deng’s theories, slogans, and Jiang’s pro-market party line, were employed by leading reformists to justify the reform, persuade conservative opponents, and facilitate a shared understanding of the goals of the reform. Even if a consensus of the policy community was not achieved, party ideology was operationalized as effective political rhetoric for alleviating the existing ideological tension and facilitating compliance with party policies. On the other hand, in the MO reform discourse, Xi’s nationalist ideological line, symbolized by the China Dream slogan, was employed by conservative forces to justify the state economy’s strategic importance and continuous dominance, which conflicted with the goal of MO reform, thus intensifying the existing liberal-conservative division. As Xi’s anti-corruption campaign accelerated, the division was further exacerbated by the discursive campaign launched by leftist intellectuals who employed Xi’s words to obstruct the

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reform, attack neoliberalism, and rectify the liberals, essential supporters of the reform. Research Assumptions and Focuses This research examines the double-edged functions of ideology in public discourse—consensus-inducing and conflict-inducing. To clarify the focuses of this research, it is necessary to articulate the assumptions of this study regarding consensus and conflict. A major query of this research is whether party ideology functions as a division-alleviating or division-deepening force in public discourse, not whether it facilitates consensus or conflict. As discussed above, due to the incompatibility of socialist and market principles, China’s economic reform programs always produce conflicting demands and ideological tension among the policy elite. To achieve a full consensus in the discursive community, this ideological tension must be resolved. However, it is not assumed in this study that the tension can be resolved through discourse, regardless of how skillfully party ideology is operationalized. The ideological tension exists at the fundamental level and cannot be resolved unless either socialism or market reform is abolished. In other words, the tension between the two ideologies—Marxism and neoliberalism—is built into the system, party ideology, and the rules of the language game. Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, still a core theory guiding China’s market reforms, contains this tension. So does SOE reform, an attempt to marketize and privatize SOEs without renouncing public ownership and state control. As long as this built-in tension exists, a full consensus of the political universe is impossible. There is, however, still room for negotiation to narrow differences and alleviate divisions caused by the built-in ideological tension, if party ideology is skillfully operationalized as effective rhetoric for persuasion and employed in a way that accommodates others’ interests. Indeed, the major purpose of policy discourse is to find acceptable solutions to dividing issues and push reforms further. All actors are bound by their institutional, economic, and personal interests, as well as ideological beliefs. Public discourse is a site of contestation in which diverse interests and interpretations of party ideology compete, from which some rhetoric prevail. This analysis focuses on whether the existing divisions produced by the built-in contradictions of the reform are alleviated or intensified

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by the adopted rhetoric operationalizing party ideology and whether the entire discourse is characterized by a consensual or conflictual trend. In the following chapters, the analysis specifically focuses on how the top leaders’ ideological lines, slogans, and directives were interpreted, operationalized, and propagated in the discursive community; who led the discourse, articulating reform goals and major issues, defining agenda, and engaging in persuasion; what types of rhetoric were employed, by whom, and what effects they produced; what contending issues and conflict arose in the course of the debate; and how the adopted rhetoric influenced the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes.

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CHAPTER 4

SOE Reform Discourse Under Jiang Zemin

Abstract This chapter discusses the first case study: the policy discourse over the ownership restructuring of state-owned enterprises under Jiang Zemin (1992–1997). The analysis focuses on how party ideology— ideological lines, slogans, and directives of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin—were operationalized by major groups and influential figures as political rhetoric for persuasion and examines its effects on the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes. Through the qualitative analysis and coding of nearly 500 periodical articles, the chapter identifies major rhetoric, their central claims, discursive strategies, rhetorical appeals, and interactions. The chapter concludes that despite the highly contentious nature of the debate, Deng’s ideological line was skillfully operationalized by reformist groups to promote party initiatives and performed a compliance-inducing function in the discourse. Keywords Deng Xiaoping ideology · Socialism with Chinese characteristics · SOE reforms · State capitalism · Jiang Zemin

Ownership restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was a new round of reforms initiated in the early 1990s and implemented under the “grasp the large, let go of the small” 抓大放小. While large SOEs © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_4

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were corporatized and converted to SOE groups maintaining state ownership, small- and mid-sized SOEs were de facto privatized, converted to employee ownership, or dismantled. A series of reform programs introduced in the 1980s, including shareholding and the contract management responsibility system, did not improve the operational efficiency and financial performance of SOEs adequately. Due to the poor performance of the state economy, the value of state-owned assets was decreasing at an alarming rate and threatened the very foundation of socialism. The major purpose of the new reform was to establish an efficient state asset management system that preserves and increases state-owned assets. The major debates over SOEs’ ownership restructuring occurred in the period between the 14th and 15th Party Congresses of 1992 and 1997, respectively. Once Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in early 1992 jump-started economic reform after the Tiananmen setback, the government initiated the formation of SOE groups on an experimental basis. At the 14th Party Congress, the party set the goal of establishing a socialist market economy and endorsed the application of shareholding to large SOEs under the premise of the “public ownership system as the mainstay” (POSAM) 以公有制为主体. By the time the 15th Party Congress was held, the foundation of the SOE group model, officially called the state asset management system 国有资产管理体制, had taken shape and been implemented. This analysis focuses on the six-year period of the reform discourse from Deng’s Southern Tour in early 1992 to the 15th Party Congress in September 1997.

Data and Methods The primary data source of the analysis is the articles published in the journal, Internal Reference on Reform 改革内参. This journal is a policyoriented internal journal called neibu, which is circulated among China’s policy elite in a restricted manner. Published since 1986, the journal was edited by the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems 国 家经济体制改革委员会 (SCRES),1 a leading research institution in the 1 SCRES was established in 1982 under the State Council. Zhao Ziyang, then Premier, served as director, and prominent economists such as Gao Shangquan and An Zhiwen served as vice directors. After Zhao’s removal in 1989, the Commission was taken over by Li Peng. During the reorganization of the State Council offices in 1998, SCRES was renamed as the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System (SCORES)

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1980s and the 1990s. The primary mission of SCRES was providing policy recommendations to the State Council and Central Committee. The journal’s credibility and its role in leading China’s economic reform have been widely recognized. During the 1990s, prominent reformists such as Wu Jinglian and Wen Tiejun served on its editorial board. Since the journal was at the forefront of reform in the 1990s, reformist positions were well represented in it, but the voices of highly conservative forces, such as the Old Left, were not. Therefore, this analysis also employed open-source conservative and leftist journals such as Seeking Truth 求是 and The Pursuit of Truth 真理的追求. The use of Internal Reference on Reform as a primary data source is helpful in analyzing the six-year debate systematically. In the Jiang era, the policy process was still confined to the elite, with little input from the public. The Internet was not yet a popular mode of communication, nor did such concepts as “netizens” and “public sphere” exist. The media was not yet commercialized, the number of media outlets much smaller than that of the Xi era. Although the policy community was expanding incorporating new actors and the policy elite were divided into a variety of groups from radical reformers to conservative hardliners, there were limited media outlets serving the different ideological spectrums in the early to mid-1990s. Despite the journal’s liberal position, it carries a variety of articles regardless of the ideological positions of authors. Therefore, it is possible to detect major contending groups, salient issues, and prevailing rhetoric, as well as shifting ideological climates and configuration of the policy community. The use of internal publications is also beneficial in examining the contentious debate without the interference of official propaganda. Unlike open-source publications, internal publications are largely free from party propaganda intended for public consumption. The policy elite engaged in relatively free and informal discussions of reforms, submitting innovative and even provocative perspectives, embryonic ideas, and emotionally charged criticisms. This was possible even in the early 1990s, as long as the authors abided

国务院经济体制改革办公室 and transferred part of its authority to the State Council and State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). In 2003, SCORES merged with SETC and the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), which formed the current National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). For more details about the SCRES, see Keyser (2003).

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by the rules of the language game and did not step in “no-go zones” set by the party. The journal was published bimonthly in the 1990s. During the six-year research period (1992–1997), 144 volumes were issued, carrying approximately 2,000 articles. Since the journal covers a wide range of issues, the articles that discuss SOE reforms and related issues, 479 in total, were selected for analysis. The types of articles vary and include opinion essays, theoretical essays, commentaries, interviews, investigative reports, seminar reports, conference minutes, and documents issued by party and government offices. Since the major focuses of this analysis are ideological arguments and rhetoric, extensive reading, summarization, and rhetorical analysis of the articles were the main methods of analysis. The discourse process was reconstructed and analyzed based on the summaries of each article, supplemented by party leaders’ speeches, government directives, open-source publications, secondary sources, and the coding of the articles. Coding was adopted mainly for categorizing articles and authors and detecting major issues, debates, rhetoric, and slogans employed. Since the coding sheet is simple and straightforward (see Appendix), the entire coding was completed by the author. The analysis focused on how Deng and Jiang’s ideological lines, slogans, and directives were interpreted by the major groups participating in the discourse and operationalized as political rhetoric for persuasion. Major focuses of the analysis are: who led the discourse, articulating reform goals and major issues, defining agenda, and engaging in persuasion; what rhetoric were employed, by whom, and what effects they produced; what contending issues and conflict arose in the course of the debate; and how the adopted rhetoric influenced the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes.

Categorization of Participants The Jiang Zemin era was the period of transition from the “personalistic” politics (Fewsmith 1996: 232) of the Mao and Deng eras, to more institutionalized and pluralist politics. Even if the policy process was largely confined to the elite, the policy community was expanding, and the discourse occurred in an environment in which various institutions and groups were operating. The authors of the articles—the participants in the discourse—were broadly distributed among the central bureaucracies, research institutions, academic institutions, the media, various

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local government bodies, party institutions, industrial and business associations, and state and non-state enterprises. The ideological division of the discursive community was strong throughout the research period. Authors were roughly divided into two camps—reformist (liberal) and conservative, with each camp subdivided into different groups. While the reformist camp promoted reforms, conservatives resisted it, arguing that shareholding and ownership restructuring would lead to privatization, cause further loss of state-owned assets, and threaten the foundation of socialism. However, the configuration of the discursive community was in flux, as new groups emerged and the existing camps split and fragmented. The “reformist versus conservative” dynamic in the initial phase broke down as the “grasp the large, let go of the small” was de facto implemented by the mid-1990s. This was because the emerging SOE group model with centralized state control largely betrayed the original goal of SOE reforms promoted by liberal intellectuals, namely a separation of government and enterprises 政企分开. The implementation of the policy also triggered large-scale social changes, including rising unemployment, widening rich-poor gap, and widespread corruption, which significantly affected the ideological climate of the discursive community. The major contending groups in the discourse and their ideological and issue positions are summarized in Table 4.1. The reformist camp was led by senior reformist officials and academics who set the agenda, defined issues, and theoretically justified new reform practices. Many of them were affiliated with leading official research institutions, such as the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), SCRES, and the Central Party School (CPS). The senior reformists included advisers to the top leaders, such as the then vice-director of SCRES, Gao Shangquan. In the initial phase of the discourse, the reformist camp was relatively monolithic. Reformists submitted various proposals of SOE group models based on the separation principle of government and enterprises, examining foreign models, and monitoring test sites. However, once the Third Plenum of the Central Committee issued the “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure,” or the “1993 Decision,” the dynamics of the discourse began to change. Some leading reformists from SCRES, DRC, CPS, and central bureaucracies began to promote a state-led development of SOE groups through industrial policies and centralized state control. As the corporatization of

Conservative Camp

Liberal/conservative

Conservative

Bureaucratic interests Working class interests Leftists

No

No

Yes

Support for SOE groups

ACFTU, academia No

Central and local Yes bureaucracies ACFTU, academia No

CASS, academia

SCRES, CASS, CPS, DRC, academia CASS, local SCRES, academia

Institutional affiliation

SOE groups, industrial policy, property rights, MES Property rights, MES, Capital market development Labor rights, social welfare, SHCs SOE groups, industrial policy Labor rights, social welfare, SHCs Labor rights, anti-privatization

Major issues promoted

CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences); CPS (Central Party School); DRC (Development Research Center of the State Council); ACFTU (All China Federation of Trade Unions); MES (Modern Enterprise System); SHCs (Shareholding cooperatives)

Conservative

Conservative/reformist Camps Conservative Camp

Liberal/conservative

Social democrats

Reformist camp

Reformist camp

Liberal

Liberal Critics

Group category Reformist camp

Ideological position

Major groups in the discourse over SOEs’ ownership restructuring (1992–1997)

Senior reformists Liberal

Table 4.1

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SOEs was initiated and SOE groups were formed, some liberal intellectuals and officials in the reformist camp turned into outspoken critics of the emerging “state capitalist” model and bureaucratic corruption. The reformist camp nearly split into those who promoted SOE groups and the liberal critics who adhered to the original goals of the reform—enterprise autonomy, clearly defined property rights, and free market competition. On the other hand, the de facto implementation of the “grasp the large, let go of the small” produced massive unemployment, surplus labor, and social disparity, resulting in the emergence of a new group of liberals, the “social democrats,” who promoted social welfare and labor rights issues. These liberals were equally critical of SOE groups that laid off workers and failed to compensate their employees. The conservative camp consisted of three major groups. The first was the powerful “bureaucratic interests” consisting of the central bureaucracies and local government administrators who had managed SOEs under central planning. In the initial phase, many bureaucrats resisted the separation of government and enterprises, especially, the “boundary setting” (Walter and Howie 2006) between state and enterprise property rights for the corporatization of SOEs. The bureaucrats were largely motivated by their institutional interests and the desire to keep SOEs under state control, rather than by their ideological commitment. They were ideologically pragmatic: while they supported the socialist principles of state planning, state control of economy, and public ownership, many bureaucrats also advocated neoliberal reforms to make SOEs globally competitive corporations. Thus, their attitudes toward the reform were not consistent. As the “grasp the large” was implemented, many bureaucrats became aggressive promoters of the formation of SOE groups, state industrial policies, and industrial restructuring. The second group was the “working class interests,” a group of left-leaning economists, trade union representatives, and labor theorists who promoted workers’ rights and the conversion of SOEs into collective employee ownership called shareholding cooperatives (SHCs) 股份合作制. Unlike the bureaucrats, their issue positions reflected their ideological commitment. They employed the traditional socialist values such as the “master’s status” of the working class and promoted SHCs as an alternative to SOE groups. As social security and labor rights issues became salient in the mid-1990s, their positions increasingly converged with those of the “social democrats” in the reformist camp. The last group consisted of highly conservative leftist intellectuals, often called the Old Left, who opposed ownership reforms

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and private ownership for ideological reasons. Their ideological commitment to Marxist, Maoist, and traditional socialist values was so strong that they questioned the legitimacy of the entire market reforms since 1978. They promoted their primary agendas, namely, the working class as the vanguard of the party, anti-privatization, and anti-capitalism, during a brief period of conservative backlash in 1996.

Context of the Debate The first trace of SOEs’ ownership restructuring dates back to the 1988 Enterprise Law which defined the director of an SOE as a representative of a legal person and set two separation principles: a “separation of ownership from management” 两权分离 and “separation of government from enterprises” 政企分开 (Xiao 1998: 275). Although shareholding experiments were restricted during the Tiananmen setback, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991. In May 1991, the State Council issued the “Notice on the Revitalization of Large and Middle-Sized Enterprises” and initiated SOE group experiments. Once the year 1992 began with Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour and the reform was back on track, the State Council issued the “Standard Opinions” as a preparation for SOEs’ corporatization and the 1994 Company Law. For reformist groups, the major task in early-1992 was to reorganize the relationship between the government and SOEs by clarifying the property rights relations between the two. The drafting of the Company Law was in progress and the central elite was debating which property rights could be delegated to SOEs. This “boundary setting” was divisive due to the conflicting motives of the policy elites—the normative goal of separating government and enterprises and the desire to keep SOEs under state control. The reformists faced the bureaucratic opposition and conservative forces, which argued that the reform would lead to full-scale privatization and the restoration of capitalism. The emergence of capitalist institutions such as the stock market and the rise of the private economy deepened the conservatives’ fear of capitalist restoration and resistance to the reforms. However, once the 14th Party Congress addressed the establishment of a socialist market economy, reformists expressed a sense of optimism and excitement and initiated the promotion efforts of the new reforms. As the debate unfolded, rhetoric of various types emerged during the sixyear discourse. Considering the link between fundamental and operative

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ideologies set by the framework of the language game, the detection of major rhetoric was based on quoted party slogans, theories, and directives of Deng and Jiang (available in the coding sheet), and the close examinations of the articles carrying them. The analysis focused on how specific party lines, slogans, and theories were operationalized in relation to the authors’ ideological positions, promotion of issues, and intended goals. Through this process, several major patterns of the operationalization of party ideology were identified as prevailing rhetoric. The following analysis focuses on four major lines of rhetoric detected: “improving socialism,” “state entrepreneurship,” “social fairness,” and “reform threatens socialism.” The first two are reformist rhetoric which operationalized Deng’s ideological line, theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the new party line prescribed by the “1993 Decision.” The latter two are opposition (conservative) rhetoric that operationalized traditional socialist and Maoist values. The analysis below identifies influential figures who employed these rhetoric and examines the central claims, key terms, discursive strategies, targeted audience, and rhetorical appeals of each rhetoric.

“Improving Socialism” Rhetoric “Improving socialism” rhetoric was the operationalization of Deng’s pragmatism and theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Its central claim was that market reforms are necessary to preserve and improve socialism. The rhetoric was initially employed by senior reformists such as Gao Shangquan to theoretically justify a socialist market economy and the use of capitalist methods to reform SOEs, and later widely adopted by reformist authors to promote enterprise autonomy, property rights clarification, capital market development, and other reformist issues. The rhetoric was a pragmatic attempt to use socialism as a marketing tool to promote a market economy. Employing the rhetoric, reformists appealed to conservative forces, pointing out how beneficial the reform was for strengthening the public ownership system, the foundation of socialism. This logic was often described in critical tones by foreign scholars: the attempt to turn “socialism into a cover for policies of development inspired by capitalism” (Dirlik 2005: 9), the “broad interpretation of socialism to provide room for policy maneuvering,” or the use of socialism as an “ideological shield against leftist criticisms of

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reforms” (Chen 1999: 460, 464). However, it was the skillful operationalization of Deng’s ideological line, in particular, Deng’s remarks during the Southern Tour, the so-called “Nanfang talk” 南方谈话. Deng’s major remarks were: • • • • •

• • • •

•

Liberate (develop) production forces. Develop socialism with Chinese characteristics. “Seeking truth from facts” 实事求是 is the essence of Marxism. China is in the “primary stage of socialism” 社会主义初级阶段. “Three favorables” 三个有利于. The three criteria to judge reform practices are: whether they promote the development of socialist production, strengthen the power of the socialist nation, and improve the people’s living standard. The ratio of planning and market in the economy is not the criterion to determine whether it is capitalism or socialism. Both planning and market are tools to manage the economy. Be alert to the right but mainly to prevent the left. Be bolder, be sure, boldly try and proceed with reforms. In order to realize the superiority of socialism over capitalism, it is imperative to boldly borrow the accomplishments of human creativity, including advanced capitalist management methods that contribute to the development of production forces. “One center, two basic points” 一个中心、两个基本点: develop production forces while maintaining the Four Cardinal Principles and “reform and opening” (Deng Xiaoping Commemoration Net 2013).

Although Deng’s ideological line is applicable to different areas of reforms, reformers contextualized Deng’s slogans, theories, and remarks, situated them in the context of SOE reforms, and employed them to persuade conservative forces who questioned the legitimacy of the reforms. They employed the rhetoric for assuaging conservatives’ fear of capitalism, theoretically justifying the adoption of market practices to reform the public ownership system, and emancipating the minds of conservatives. To alleviate conservatives’ fear, reformers tried to correct their misperception of the reforms—SOE reforms restore capitalism—and negotiate a shared understanding of the reform with their opponents. To this end,

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reformers relaxed the rigid dichotomy of socialism and capitalism, operationalizing Deng’s pragmatism and “production criterion.” They argued that the issue at stake is not ownership, but how to develop production forces to improve socialism, and that the best way to do so is to use capitalism rather than reject it. Wang Jue, a reformist CPS scholar, drew an analogy to Deng’s cat theory and argued that new practices—regardless of they are socialist or capitalist—must be adopted as long as they improve the public ownership system (Wang Jue 1992b: 9–11). Gao Shangquan quoted Deng’s remark in the Nanfang talk, “socialism has market, capitalism has planning,” and stressed the benefits of borrowing capitalist practices to strengthen the material base of socialism (Gao 1992: 8–10). The “primary stage of socialism” was also employed by many reformists to justify the practice of all available means, including capitalist ones, to develop production forces at that stage. To justify ownership reforms and market practices, reformers operationalized Deng’s pragmatism in conjunction with historical materialism. They argued that socialism is developing and could take different forms; therefore, it is important to flexibly reform the system and adapt to the changing environment (Gao 1992: 10), rather than adhere to the theoretical and ideal form of socialism. Once production forces reached a new level, the existing system must be reformed to meet the demands of the new economic conditions. New market practices such as shareholding and private ownership emerged in the process of the historically determined development of socialism; thus, shareholding is the new “materializing form of the public ownership system” 公有制的实现形式 (Wang 1992a: 12). These arguments were based on Deng’s pragmatic slogans, in particular, “seeking truth from facts” and “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.” Reformers stressed the importance of correctly understanding China’s conditions and practicing new methods to find a new path of socialist development. The major goal of the rhetoric was to “emancipate” the minds of conservative opponents who resisted the reform and facilitate their compliance with it. Reformers articulated the rhetoric in a way that had logical, emotional, and motivational appeal. Social movement scholars argue that effective collective action frames define the problem with a clear causal statement, identify what is to be blamed (diagnostic framing), articulate solutions (prognostic framing), and urge others to act (motivational framing) (Benford and Snow 1988: 199; 2000: 615–618). The

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“improving socialism” rhetoric contained all these components, articulating problems, what was to be blamed, and what was to be done. Reformers argued that what made SOEs a symbol of inefficiency was the lack of enterprise autonomy and undefined property rights under the “ownership by the whole people” 全民所有制 (Hao and Wen 1992: 24), which led to the loss of labor incentive, accumulated debts, and “iron rice bowl” mentality. Thus, SOEs’ management must be reformed through the clarification of property rights, shareholding, and corporatization (Wang 1992a: 9–11). What is to be blamed is not capitalist institutions such as the stock market and shareholding but “traditional mindset” 传统的观念 and “blurry understanding” 模糊认识 of the reform, which manifested themselves as resistance to the reform and fear of capitalist restoration. What needs to be done is to eliminate such a “traditional mindset” and boldly carry out the reform. Reformers repeatedly called for the emancipation of the mind, employing succinct slogans such as “renew perception” 更新观念, “eliminate ideological obstacle” 破除思想 障碍, and “eliminate doubt” 破除疑虑 (He and Li 1992: 15–18). They also infused motivational components into the rhetoric to urge others to act. Stressing the danger of the massive debts of SOEs and the loss of the dominant status of the state economy, many reformers argued that the future of socialism depends on whether SOEs are reformed successfully (Su and Pan: 1992: 12). By linking SOEs’ performance with the fate of socialism, reformists evoked a sense of crisis and urgency and signaled the opponents that resisting the reforms would lead to the ominous consequence which the conservatives were most afraid of: the collapse of socialism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist regimes in this period made such claims empirically credible. Stressing how important the reforms were for preserving and improving socialism, the reformers appealed to conservative opponents that they (the reformists) were the ones who equally, and even more seriously, cared about the future of China’s socialism. Gao Shangquan’s “Improving Socialism” Rhetoric Gao Shangquan was one of the earliest employers of the “improving socialism” rhetoric. He was a prominent economist who served as one of the top advisers to Deng and Jiang in the 1990s and participated in the drafting of important party documents such as the 1993 Decision and Jiang’s report at the 15th Party Congress. Because of his credentials

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and expertise, Gao played the role of a reformist opinion leader in the discourse and took the initiative in the persuasion effort. Gao’s rhetoric in the early 1990s epitomized the “improve socialism” rhetoric: operationalizing Deng’s Nanfang talk, he criticized the conservatives’ misperception of the reform, stressed the need for reforming the existing system by introducing market practices, and called for the emancipation of the mind. Gao argued that SOEs were the foundation of socialism and that the superiority of socialism could not be sustained without their reform. He assured that the purpose of SOEs’ ownership restructuring was to revitalize the state economy based on the principle of POSAM, “the public ownership system as the mainstay” 以公有制为主体, and firmly denied privatization, stating, “there is no way out through privatization” 私有 化是没有出路的. To persuade conservatives, Gao first pointed out their common misperceptions, rejected their claims as inaccurate, and urged them to correct the “biased knowledge” 偏颇认识 by “seeking truth from facts.” Some critics argued that a command economy is the basis of socialism, the introduction of a market economy would lead to confusion and chaos, and central planning must be maintained for large SOEs. Gao criticized these arguments for lacking the correct understanding of planning and market and introduced Deng’s well-known remark: Market is not the same as capitalism; socialism has market; planning economy is not the same as socialism, capitalism also has planning. (Deng 1994: 373)

To clarify Deng’s point, Gao submitted evidence that “socialism has market” and that “capitalism has planning.” When Lenin realized that central planning did not work for development, he reintroduced commodity trade and utilized market forces to develop production forces; thus, socialism has market. Car companies in capitalist countries such as Honda manufacture products based on meticulous planning to optimize production efficiency; thus, capitalism has planning. Gao also argued that the rapid development of the market in rural China in the 1980s contributed to China’s production growth, but the experience did not transform China into a capitalist state. Thus, market can be utilized for improving socialism, which was “proven by practice” 实践证明. Gao based his arguments on Deng’s pragmatism, in particular, “seeking truth from facts” and “practice is the sole criterion of testing

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truth.” He repeatedly urged the audience to eliminate “blurry understanding” 模糊认识, develop “correct understanding” 正确的认识 of planning and market, and strengthen “market thought” 市场观念. Gao stated: Emancipate your mind, seeking truth from facts. We uphold the reform. The reform is for self-improvement and further development of socialism by reforming the system that does not work for developing social production, which includes the reform of planning economy. (Gao 1992)

Gao stressed the importance of understanding China’s conditions and reforming its socialism according to the real conditions rather than adhering to theories. Adjusting Marxism to China’s condition is, after all, the very process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Gao employed the term “primary stage of socialism” to explain the mismatch of Marxist theory and China’s reality. According to Marx, socialism is built on the material base of highly developed capitalism. In theory, central planning works well if applied to the system with highly developed material base, but China is still at the “primary stage of socialism.” Thus, Marx’s theory is not applicable to China’s current condition. Gao stated: In theory, a planning economy under public ownership can overcome the contradictions arising from private ownership in capitalism, which demonstrates the superiority of socialism. However, this is merely a possibility, not a reality… It is necessary to transform the possibility into a reality through hard efforts. Planning must respect the law of value, the law of supply and demand, and needs to be scientific. Through this, planning finally works for developing the economy, and the superiority of socialism is realized. (Gao 1992)

In the initial phase, the major purpose of the “improving socialism” rhetoric was justifying the adoption of the new system, socialist market economy, rather than promoting specific SOE reform issues. By skillfully operationalizing Deng’s slogans, especially “seeking truth from facts” 实 事求是, “proven by practice” 实践证明, and the “emancipation of the mind” 解放思想, Gao and other leading reformists justified the need for adopting the market to achieve the superiority of socialism over capitalism and tried to facilitate a shared understanding of a socialist market economy. The rhetoric played a crucial role in reorienting the minds of

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many policy elite, making them more receptive to a market economy and mobilizing support for the reformist agendas. The rhetoric also helped Deng’s theory to penetrate the minds of the policy elite and serve as the mental framework to make sense of the reform, make decisions, and implement the reform. These are the functions of ideology indicated by Hall, Seliger and Dijk: ideology serves as the mental framework to make sense of the world (Hall 1996: 26) and organizes the interpretations, practices, and actions of social groups (Seliger 1976; Dijk 2006: 8). The rhetoric maintained its presence throughout the research period and was adopted by many reformers to justify ideologically sensitive matters such as private ownership and to promote a wide range of reformist initiatives, including the transformation of SOEs’ management, clarification of property rights, liberalization of financial market, enterprise autonomy, administrative reforms, social security reforms, and state asset management issues.

“State Entrepreneurship” Rhetoric The Third Plenum of the Central Committee issued the “1993 Decision” in November 1993. “State entrepreneurship” (SE) rhetoric was the operationalization of this new party line addressed by the document. The Decision accommodated the reformist agenda of enterprise autonomy and called for the reform of SOEs’ management according to the demands of socialist market economy, introducing the concept of the Modern Enterprise System (MES) 现代企业制度 characterized by “clearly established property rights, clarified rights and responsibility, a separation of enterprises from government, and scientific management” 产权清晰 、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学. SOEs must operate independently in accordance with law, be responsible for their own profits and losses, and compete in the natural selection process of the market. The Decision adopted neoliberal terms, such as efficient allocation of resources 资源 的优化配置, prioritizing efficiency 效率优先, and survival of the fittest 优胜劣汰 to encourage further reforms of SOEs. On the other hand, the Decision reflected the party’s growing concern over shrinking state assets and its determination to maintain state ownership of large SOEs and make them the commanding heights of the economy. The document prescribed several important matters in this regard. First, it reiterated that POSAM is the basis of a socialist market economy. Second, while encouraging the development of “varieties of economic elements” 多

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种经济成份, the Decision stated that the state economy—in particular, SOE groups—assumes the “leading function” 主导作用 of the national economy, expands its influences, and controls the lifeline of the national economy. Third, it also prescribed the core idea of “grasp the large, let go of the small,” stating that large SOEs are converted into different types of enterprise groups, while smaller SOEs are leased out, sold to individuals, and converted into SHCs. Lastly, the Decision called for the creation of an efficient state asset management system that preserves and increases stateowned assets and declared that state assets must be managed under the ‘unified ownership held by the state’” 国家统一所有 (Communist Party of China 1993: ch.2, (4)–(9)). The Decision significantly affected the direction of the reform and the dynamics of the subsequent discourse. Soon after its issuance, senior reformists initiated a promotion drive of the new party line, submitting their interpretation of the party document. Such an effort is necessary to facilitate a shared understanding of the party line, eliminating conflicting interpretations advanced by opposition forces. Official lines and speeches are often deliberately ambiguous and avoid specifics to provide a leeway for interpretations. The SE rhetoric emerged during this promotion drive. The rhetoric was employed by some reformists and the central bureaucracies to promote the “grasp the large” part of the policy. It adopted Deng’s production criterion and prioritized the development of production forces. In terms of advocating neoliberal principles such as economic efficiency, entrepreneurship, and economies of scale for developing production forces, the SE rhetoric was similar to “improving socialism.” However, the SE rhetoric emphasized the state’s role as the owner of SOEs and its proactive role in restructuring the state sector to realize its “leading function.” With the adoption of the term, the “state’s rights and interests” 国家权益, the rhetoric evoked the spirit of state entrepreneurship. The “state” was personified and urged to act like an entrepreneur who protects his or her own interests, rights, and profits, and proactively engage in the preservation and increase of state assets (Hong 1994: 7–8). In terms of this, the rhetoric could be called “state capitalism” rhetoric. The rhetoric was ideologically contradictory in advocating neoliberal principles but defending the superiority of public ownership and stronger state control, embodying the inherent contradictions of China’s economic reform. The arguments of Hong Hu, vice-director of SCRES, in mid-1994 conveyed the core ideas of the SE rhetoric. Hong repeatedly employed

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the key term, “leading” 主导, and defined socialist market economy as the economic system in which the “state economy becomes the leading force” 以国有经济为主导. Hong stated: The main mission to build socialism is to develop production forces. The state economy is the dominant force 主导力量 in the national economy and an important and integral part of the socialist economy 社会主义经济基础 的重要组成部分. The vitality of the state economy is a determining factor for realizing the superiority of socialism over capitalism. (Hong 1994)

Hong argued that the state, as the owner of state assets, has the responsibility to revitalize the state sector. Repeatedly employing the term, the “state’s rights and interests” 国家权益, he stressed the importance of restructuring the state economy to protect the state’s rights, interests, and assets. Hong defined the important missions of the state as follows: • Clarifying the state’s property rights to preserve and increase state assets. • Optimizing the operation of state capital and revitalizing the state economy to realize its “leading function.” • Organizing a state asset management system that satisfies the demands of a socialist market economy. Employing the slogan, “uphold state ownership, protect the state’s rights and interests” 坚持国家所有权, 维护国家权益, Hong evoked the spirit of state entrepreneurship by emphasizing the state’s new role as a shareholder of SOEs. He argued that the state, as a shareholder and investor in SOEs, has the right to receive dividends out of firms’ profits. As an investor, the state has the right to be involved in the decision making of SOEs, even if it does not directly control their operational decisions. Hong also called for the optimal allocation of state capital through the reorganization of the state sector and industrial restructuring. In this way, the state economy and the market would be integrated, and the state economy’s leading function would be realized. Hong also claimed that the State Council represents the state, exercises the unified ownership right of state assets, and manages all the state assets in the nation in a unified manner (Hong 1994: 7–8).

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Mixed Effects: Integrating and Dividing The SE rhetoric had both positive and negative effects on the discourse: while it promoted the reforms by integrating some groups, its justification of strengthening state control had a dividing effect. On positive effects, the SE rhetoric did not compete with the “improving socialism” rhetoric. There was a division of labor between the two. While the “improving socialism” rhetoric employed Deng’s theory to reorient the mindset of policymakers to be more receptive to a market economy, the SE rhetoric persuaded the policy community to put Deng’s theory into practice and build a socialist market economy. By the mid-1990s, many reformists had shifted their focus away from the theoretical justification of market reforms toward the technical discussions of how to improve the state economy’s operational efficiency. They adopted the SE rhetoric to promote the MES, liberalization of the financial market, state share trading, and the optimization of the allocation of state capital. The SE rhetoric also raised policymakers’ awareness of legal rights 合法权益. Huang Sujian, a reformist at CASS, criticized the blurred line separating the “ultimate ownership right” held by the state and “enterprise legal person property rights” held by SOEs. Huang argued that the lack of clarification and unified definitions of these rights had caused confusion, illegal trading of state property rights, and further loss of state assets. He called for the clarification of legal rights for an efficient state asset management, especially, as to who exactly represents the state’s ownership and investment rights (Huang 1994: 22). The rhetoric also infused neoliberal values in the minds of bureaucrats and SOE administrators, persuaded them to accept the new role of the state, and lured them to the reformist camp. In the initial phase, these former “central planners” supported the continuous bureaucratic control of SOEs and resisted reformist initiatives such as enterprise autonomy, shareholding, property rights clarification, and administrative reforms. The SE rhetoric, however, accommodated their institutional interests by promoting the “leading function” of the state economy and the state’s active role in restructuring SOEs, which helped transform the bureaucrats into aggressive promoters of SOE groups and industrial policies. The growing association of some leading reformists and the central bureaucracies was reflected in the formation of the so-called, industrial policy state (Huang 2008) in the mid-1990s. SOE groups were increasingly linked with industrial policies as the Company Law was promulgated

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in mid-1994. The State Council issued the “Outline of the National Industrial Policies in the 1990s” and selected 100 central SOEs for corporatization, forming 53 enterprise groups (World Bank 1997). The State Planning Commission (SPC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) aggressively promoted industrial policies and state subsidies for SOE groups, including their preferential access to bank loans, land use rights, and import licenses. On the other hand, SE rhetoric’s promotion of state-led development, industrial policies, and strengthening state control conflicted with the original goal of SOE reforms, which was to enhance SOEs’ autonomy and make them competitive in market. It betrayed the expectations of many reformists who submitted various proposals of SOE group models based on the principle of separation of government and enterprise in the initial phase. The SOE group model proposed before the 1993 Decision consisted of three-tiers: government level state asset management bureau at the top, corporate investment bodies such as holding companies and state asset management corporations (SAMCs) in the second tier, and regular SOEs at the bottom. Under this model, SAMCs were granted the right to manage state assets and form SOE groups inviting outside capital and through cross-shareholding. This would allow the state to retreat as a nominal owner, delegating its ownership and investor functions to independently formed SAMCs, through which enterprise autonomy is protected (World Bank 1997). However, when SOE groups were actually formed, a central planning was nearly reintroduced: most of SAMCs were wholly state-owned, enterprise property rights remained nominal, and the State Council was the owner of state assets for smoother implementations of industrial policies. This resulted in the growing criticism of SOE groups and the split of the reformist camp.

Opposition Rhetoric The Rise of Liberal Critics The implementation of the “grasp the large” triggered a backlash against the reform and produced new divisions in the discursive community. The formation of the “industrial policy state” was a serious setback to enterprise autonomy, the primary goal of SOE reforms. As SOE groups were formed, the reformist camp roughly split into two—a group of reformists who promoted SOE groups with the SE rhetoric and a group

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of free market-oriented liberals who were increasingly frustrated with, and disappointed by, the shrinking enterprise autonomy. The emerging division of the reformist camp roughly corresponded to the division indicated by China’s Mr. Market, Wu Jinglian. According to Wu, there were two different models of economic reforms under consideration since the mid-1980s: the East Asian model of government-led development and a free-market Western model. The former was favored by senior reformists and the latter by liberal intellectuals (Wu 2008). The “senior reformists” who advocated the East Asian model largely matched the profiles of some leading reformists from the State Council, CASS, CPS, and SCRES who employed the SE rhetoric and initiated industrial policies with the central bureaucracy. Despite their lip service to enterprise autonomy and the MES, these reformists were more inclined toward the state-guided development of SOE groups. On the other hand, liberal intellectuals who favored a free market model began to criticize SOE groups for “no separation of government and enterprise” 政企不分, employing some common terms. They called the reform “old wine in a new bottle” 新瓶装旧酒 (Chen 1995b: 16) and corporatized SOEs fangpai gongsi 翻牌公司, companies that changed in name only, not in substance. These firms were run by the same government administrators called popo 婆婆, meaning grandma or nanny, and enjoyed the same privilege and state support as they did under the traditional central planning (Chen 1995a: 4). In the SOE group model implemented, the line of separation between the government and enterprises was unclear. Legal person property right, which was supposedly to protect the managerial and financial autonomy of SOEs, conflicted with the state’s investor and shareholder rights, with which it could interfere in the business operations of SOEs (World Bank 1997). The secondtier holding companies and SAMCs were wholly state-owned, assumed a quasi-state function and became the “new nannies” 新婆婆 of SOEs (Zhu 1995). Prominent economists such as Wu Jinglian, Zhang Chengyao (CASS), He Yang, and Tang Fengyi (CASS) were particularly vocal in their criticism. They attributed the problems of SOEs to the legacy of the old system of central planning and called for the reform of the government. Tang referred to it as an “institutional inertia barrier” 体制惯性障碍 and argued that the government is not only the driving force of the reform but could also be an obstacle to the reform. Employing the term, “liberation” 解放—the same term employed in Deng’s slogans, “liberate production

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forces” 解放生产力 and “emancipate the mind” 解放思想, Tang stated, “the reform is not only about liberating SOEs and production forces, but also liberating the government” (Tang 1995). Although the liberals’ criticisms raised some important issues concerning legal rights, state asset management, and government roles in economy, they did not culminate in meaningful policy changes. The criticisms did not resonate with the intended audience, notably the central bureaucracies and SOE administrators who formed and operated SOE groups. When the critics raised the concerns, SOE groups had already been formed and industrial policies formulated one after another. It was impossible to slow down this accelerated trend toward the “industrial policy state.” The lack of resonance derived also from the absence of coordinated efforts on the part of liberal critics. Although the arguments of some critics were persuasive, their criticisms did not evolve into a powerful “anti-state capitalism” rhetoric. To be a persuasive rhetoric, there needed to be coherent themes, moral principles, and motivational components that urge others to act. Though some critics were prominent figures in the policy community, no one assumed leadership in persuasion, acting as opinion leaders, operationalizing party ideology, and articulating the issues. As the SOE group model was consolidated toward the 15th Party Congress, enterprise autonomy regressed to the pre-reform level. It is ironic that SOEs enjoyed more autonomy under the contract management responsibility system implemented in the 1980s, which delegated the full control of enterprises to the managers of SOEs (Oi and Walder 1999). Wu Jinglian stated in 1999, “It was sad to see that after so many years of reform of large SOEs, China went a full circle and almost returned to where it had started” (Qian and Wu 1999). Conversely, the lack of a unified rhetoric by liberal critics had a positive effect on the discourse because the rise of a powerful counter-rhetoric against the SE rhetoric could have produced a deep division in the policy community that potentially disrupts the discourse and slows down the reform. Social Equality and Stability Rhetoric As the “grasp the large” was implemented, so was the “let go of the small” part of the policy. Many small- and mid-sized SOEs were dismantled, causing massive layoffs of workers and triggering large-scale social changes. The rapidly marketizing society, rising unemployment,

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and growing social disparity significantly impacted the ideological climate of the discursive community in the mid-1990s. Two new trends were observed from 1995 to 1996. First, as various state organs established SOE groups, bureaucratic corruption became a major issue of the discourse. Both liberal and conservative authors argued that government officials and SOEs’ managers monopolized the benefits of the reforms, carved up state assets, and pursued their personal gains. Their speculative investments in the stock market had caused economic bubbles and inflation (Huang and Yang 1995). Bureaucrats and SOE administrators were often called “official merchants” 官商 (Zhang 1996: 31), “bureaucratic interests” 部门利益, and “vested-interest groups” 既得利益集团 (Xiao 1995: 37). Liu Yingqiu, CASS researcher, and Wu Jixue, scholar on corruption, employed the term, “power capital” 权力资本, and warned of its negative effects on the economy, reforms, and social stability. They argued that the power capital had been formed by power holders who took advantage of the lack of legal framework and clear property rights in the transitional economy and had been profiteering on the reform. Since corruption is highly contagious, the power capital had been growing fast, distorting the economy, and producing unfair economic competition and inefficiency (Liu 1995; Ke and Yang 1995). Another trend was the growing concerns over social stability. Critics of the reform increasingly adopted negative terms in this period, including contradiction 矛盾, unemployment 失业, polarization 两极分化, corruption 腐败, and social instability 社会的不稳定. In this context, a new group of liberals emerged and raised social welfare issues. They shared the characteristics of social democrats in Western countries and expressed concerns over the rising income gap, unemployment, and collapsing social security system, as the welfare functions of SOEs were dismantled. They called for government actions to deal with social problems caused by the adoption of the market economy. These “social democrats” can be considered liberal, given their commitment to market reforms, but increasingly faced the dilemma that a pursuit of economic efficiency invites the polarization of society and political and social instability. They began to debate how to balance the principles of efficiency 效率原则 and fairness 公平原 则 (Chen 1996: 14). Some social democrats considered the establishment of a new social security system crucial for the success of further market reforms and proposed the setup of social security funds and commercialization of non-productive assets of SOEs to build a new social security system.

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Some social democrats linked the issues of corruption, workers’ rights, and social stability, framing them in a way that resonated with the traditional socialist value of social equality. CASS researcher Yang Fan was a liberal economist who focused on macro-economic issues, but he sympathized with the unemployed and the deteriorating conditions of SOE workers. Yang argued that SOE groups were increasingly controlled by the powerful few—bureaucrats and managers who had accumulated power and wealth—and SOE workers were worse off by losing their jobs, employee benefits, pensions, and other welfare services. He presented it as a moral issue of “fair distribution of wealth” 分配公平 and called for the allocation of state assets to social security programs that compensate workers suffering due to the reform. Yang urged that state assets must be equally distributed and not controlled by the powerful few. He considered regulating the vested interests and providing social welfare to workers as the state’s responsibility; otherwise, the polarization of the society would endanger the reforms and negatively affect the government’s credibility. Yang stated: The adjustment of SOE workers to the market economy can only be through “redemption,” not through “deprivation.”.…State assets cannot be controlled by a powerful few through illegitimate means. The socialization and equal distribution of state assets must be pursued. Compensate workers who had been displaced and whose firms had gone bankrupt through legislations. Whether the government can successfully carry out this task is a test of its capacity. If this task is neglected, the government loses its credibility, which is certainly not acceptable. (Yang 1995)

As labor and social security issues became salient in 1996, some social democrats and liberal critics began to advocate the conversion of SOEs into employee ownership, SHCs, as an alternative to SOE groups, for enhancing labor incentive and productivity. As a result, they found a common ground with the conservatives who defended workers’ rights. SHCs had long been promoted by labor theorists and activists (see the “working class interests” in Table 4.1) in order to make workers truly the “master” of their firms. Despite ideological differences, some liberals’ support for labor rights and employee ownership alleviated the existing division between the reformist and conservative camps. The rise of labor and social welfare issues was, however, a precursor to the conservative backlash in late 1996.

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Conservative Backlash: “Reform Threatens Socialism” The ideological climate of the discursive community turned conservative and the backlash against the “grasp the large, let go of the small” peaked in mid- to late-1996. The party launched the “socialist spiritual civilization” campaign, adopting the “Resolution on Several Important Issues of Strengthening the Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization” at the Sixth Plenum in October 1996, which strengthened the voice of conservative forces. Anti-foreign sentiment was on the rise, culminating in the publication of China Can Say No 中国可以说不 in late-1996. Nationalistic sentiment manifested itself as a growing hostility toward foreign capital and Western economic theories. From mid- to late-1996, a number of highly conservative articles appeared in Internal Reference on Reform, some of which carried Maoist slogans such as “the Chinese communist party is the vanguard of the proletariat” (Xie 1996: 20) and called for opposition to “de-nationalization” 非国有化 (Guang 1996). In this context, some conservatives and leftists employed a traditional socialist concept, the “master’s status of the working class” and began to criticize the reforms for causing the declining status of workers. They considered the working class being exploited by the state, the owner of SOEs, and deprived of human dignity under the “grasp the large, let go of the small” (Xie 1996: 20). Social democrat Yang Fan argued that workers could not be mere “wage labor” 雇佣劳动者 under capitalist control and recommended strengthening the roles of trade union and labor representative meeting in SOE groups to enhance workers’ representation (Yang 1996a). The Labor Movement Research Association 工运研究会 at the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) held a seminar in August 1996 and discussed “socialism with Chinese characteristics and the master’s status of workers.” Some participants, including labor theorist, Han Xiya, leftist scholars, Xiang Qiyuan and Liu Rixin, operationalized the clause in the Constitution and Party Charter—“workers are the masters” 工人是主人—as well as traditional socialist concepts, including the people’s democratic dictatorship, class struggle, union of workers, and exploitation, and criticized the reform for promoting capitalism and worsening status of workers. The report of the meeting was later published in Internal Reference of Reform and Productivity Research. Their major statements were:

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• The working class, as the vanguard of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is an indivisible entity. Under socialism the interests of the owner, manager, and workers of SOEs must be united. However, while public servants have become business owners, workers have become slaves again. In this way, the class foundation of party rule and people’s democratic dictatorship would be lost. • Who does our country depend on? There is no class struggle between labor and capital in the public ownership system. All workers unite, work together, and divide profits. However, under the new state ownership system, all legal rights belong to investors, not to workers. This is the problem of capitalism and makes the state capitalist. • Rising annual salaries of SOE executives produced vested interests and corruption. SOE executives are not paid by their work but by capital. The emergence of labor market and market-based salary distribution led to the unfair distribution of profits to workers. • Jiang Zemin emphasized in 1989 that the party’s grassroots organizations in SOEs, such as trade union and labor representative meeting, must become the political core and assume political leadership. • Western economic theories consider workers as wage labor, advocate unfair distribution of wealth, and do not recognize workers as owners of their firms. By correcting the misleading influences of Western theories, workers can become masters of their firms again. • Those who support bourgeois liberation and the enemy forces at home and abroad have invited capitalism to China, created the capitalist wage labor system, and made workers exploited and oppressed again. If workers and peasants suffer, it means that the direction of the reform is wrong and deviated. The reform must not be carried out at the expense of workers and farmers (Yang 1996b). Although the leftists did not explicitly oppose the party’s reform initiatives, it was implicit in their arguments that the reform “threatens” and destroys the foundation of socialism. This rhetoric was clearly seen in the articles published in conservative and leftist journals during this period. An article published in Qiushi in late 1996, “On the issues of wholeheartedly relying on the working class,” argued that the master’s status of the working class, one of the fundamental principles of socialism, had changed in the course of the reform as private firms came to represent

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“advanced production forces.” The reform had caused the declining political status of workers, and thus, the party representing the working class was fading away (Yuan 1996). Immediately after the party adopted the Resolution on socialist spiritual civilization, Liu Rixin, then researcher at SPC, published an essay titled, “Correct anti-Marxist views, uphold the master’s status of workers,” in the leftist journal The Pursuit of Truth. Liu argued that shareholding and property rights trade were blatant privatization practices and had resulted in the declining status of workers. The reform had achieved its purpose of establishing a capitalist market economy based on private ownership; thus, the means of production were no longer owned by the working class. Quoting the party’s Resolution, Liu called for drawing a clear line between Marxism and anti-Marxism. In order to defend his argument, Liu employed Mao’s slogan at the 7th Party Congress, “wholeheartedly relying on the working class” 全心全意依靠工人阶级 (which was repeatedly quoted by Jiang Zemin later), as well as Deng’s emphasis on the important connection between the working class and the development of production forces. By highlighting the gap between the party leaders’ words and the reality, Liu justified his argument that the reform was heading in a wrong direction, spreading “anti-Marxist” views, and threatening the socialist foundation of the country (Liu 1997: 9–14). Liu also infused nationalist sentiment into his arguments. Quoting Chen Daisun, a pioneer nationalist, he warned of the negative influences of Western economic theories, arguing that they reflected the perspectives of the capitalist class and advocated privatization and the removal of public ownership, thus, leading China on the evil path of capitalism (Liu 1996: 2–6). Leftists played the language game quite skillfully, indeed. They selectively quoted the top leaders’ remarks and slogans, the Constitution, and Party Charter to justify their arguments, raised issues seizing the momentums created by the issuances of major party decisions, directives, and resolutions, and infused nationalistic sentiment, moral principles, and motivational components into their arguments to enhance emotional appeals. Many leftists also demonized and refuted reformist arguments in a logical manner. Further, because their arguments were based on Marxist, Maoist, and traditional socialist values, no one could openly deny or oppose them. Considering the widespread concerns over social disparity in the mid-1990s, the “reform threatens socialism” rhetoric could have been a powerful counter-rhetoric against the reformist rhetoric stating the

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opposite: “reform improves socialism.” Articulated and amplified well, the leftist rhetoric could have mobilized the groups of critics for a countercoalition against the promoters of SOE groups. In that case, however, a powerful leftist rhetoric could have deepened the division of the policy community and derailed the reform. For this reason, leftist criticisms were considered threatening by the reformist party leadership (Chen 1999; Brady 2008). However, the “reform threatens socialism” rhetoric did not strongly resonate with the discursive community for several reasons. First, Maoist rhetoric of the vanguard of proletariat, the master’s status of the working class, and class struggle were not in harmony with the dominant ideological code of the discursive community in the mid-1990s. Deng’s pragmatism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and neoliberalism ideology had already taken roots in the minds of many policy elites. It was very difficult for leftists to reverse this ideological trend toward marketization, even if the reform had created mounting social problems and no one could reject the legitimacy of their claims based on Marxist values. Second, leftists did not successfully align their rhetoric with the concerns raised by social democrats and liberal critics of the reform, such as corruption, bureaucratic control of SOEs, unfair market competition, and social welfare issues. Leftists adopted the “reform threatens socialism” rhetoric specifically for addressing the declining status of workers, antiprivatization, and anti-capitalism. They did not adjust their extremism and highly accusatory tone to accommodate social welfare and stability issues. Third, more importantly, Deng’s decree, “be alert to the right but mainly to prevent the left,” continued to operate in the discourse as the safeguard against leftist criticisms, at least until the 15th Party Congress. The decree was incorporated in the rules of the language game. Even if the conservative turn in late 1996 strengthened the voice of leftists, the adjustment mechanism soon set in and reformist initiated their counteroffensive against leftist criticisms (Chen 1999) as the Party Congress drew closer. In sum, although the opposition rhetoric promoted social security reforms, anti-corruption, and the “party-building” mission in SOE groups, the major opposition groups—leftists, social democrats, labor theorists, and liberal critics of SOE groups—largely failed to engage in coordinated efforts to appeal to the broader policy community and mobilize a counter-coalition against the “grasp the large” initiative. The weakness of the opposition rhetoric, however, had positive effects on the

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discourse. The rise of a powerful counter-rhetoric against the “improving socialism” and SE rhetoric could have polarized the discursive community and slowed down the reform. On the other hand, the rising criticism of SOE groups triggered the reconfiguration of the discursive community. The initial “reformers versus conservatives” division broke down as each camp was divided into those who promoted SOE groups and those who criticized them. This new cleavage was roughly corresponding to the dilemma felt by the social democrats: prioritizing economic efficiency invites the polarization of society and brings about social instability. The new cleavage, “economic efficiency versus social equality,” began to divide the policy elite toward the late 1990s and became one of the precursors to the rise of the New Left in the Hu era.

Toward the 15th Party Congress During the conservative backlash, reformers kept a relatively low profile and the use of the reformist rhetoric decreased. However, the “industrial policy state” began to take shape in this period. Despite the harsh criticism of bureaucratic corruption, the central bureaucracies aggressively promoted new industrial policies to make large SOEs globally competitive and initiated the first wave of international listing of SOE groups such as China Telecom (Walter and Howie 2006). They also discussed the establishment of a national-level state asset management commission supervising central SOEs, which was later realized by the formation of the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). A turn of the ideological climate came immediately after Deng’s death in February 1997. Jiang Zemin made the “May 29 speech” at CPS and warned against the danger of leftist thought. This speech encouraged the reformists’ counteroffensive against leftist criticisms (Chen 1999),2 as well as their effort to facilitate the policy community’s compliance with major reform agendas in the coming Party Congress, including the “grasp the large, let go of the small.” Although some liberal critics continued to criticize SOE groups and corruption, leftist voice significantly weakened after this speech. At the Congress held in September, Jiang officially endorsed SOEs’ ownership restructuring and the legitimate status of private ownership. 2 For a detailed account of the conflict between the reformists and leftists within the Party and Jiang’s consolidation of power after Deng’s death, see Chen (1999).

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Deng’s theory was written in the Party Charter. By upholding Deng’s “production criterion” and “primary stage of socialism,” Jiang incorporated the developmental goals into the official party line and removed the ideological constraint placed on private ownership. Jiang’s message was reminiscent of Deng’s cat theory: it does not matter whether a firm is public or private, as long as it develops production forces. By addressing this, Jiang replaced the “ownership criterion” with the “production criterion” and attempted to close off the “socialism versus capitalism” debate. On the other hand, Jiang tried to maintain the ideological equilibrium of the policy community by taking the middle position: while accommodating reformists by endorsing the private economy and SOEs’ ownership reforms, Jiang reiterated the principle of POSAM and the state economy’s “leading function,” encouraged SOEs’ conversion to employee ownership for the union of capital and labor, and addressed the need for building a social security system (Jiang 1997).

Conclusion Despite the highly contentious nature of the debate, party ideology—in particular, Deng’s theory and slogans—was skillfully operationalized by reformist groups in congruence with the party policies and functioned as an effective instrument for guiding the discourse and promoting the reform, which was reflected in the policy outcome, notably in the drastic transformation of the state sector. Considering the inherent contradiction of China’s market reforms, the divisions observed in this analysis are anticipated findings. However, the case study demonstrated that party ideology—Deng and Jiang’s ideological lines—was operationalized in the way that reoriented the mindset of policymakers to be receptive to market principles and facilitated a shared understanding of the reform and compliance with the party initiatives. This prevented the existing liberal-conservative division from intensifying, polarizing the discursive community, and derailing the reform. Even if a full consensus was not achieved, party ideology, overall, functioned more as an integrating, division-alleviating force than a disintegrating, conflict-inducing force in the discourse.

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CHAPTER 5

SOE Reform Discourse Under Xi Jinping

Abstract This chapter discusses the second case study: the policy discourse over the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises under Xi Jinping (2014–2016). The analysis focuses on how Xi’s ideological line, slogans, and directives were operationalized by major groups and influential figures as political rhetoric for persuasion and examines its effects on the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes. Through the qualitative analysis and coding of more than 400 periodical articles published in Chinese media outlets, the chapter identifies major rhetoric, their central claims, discursive strategies, rhetorical appeals, and interactions. The chapter concludes that Xi’s China Dream slogan and nationalist ideological line were employed mainly by conservative groups to limit and criticize the reform and performed a division- and conflict-inducing function.

This chapter is based on the article, Kato, Y. (2020). Two faces of ideology: Double-edged functions of ideology in the reform discourse under Xi Jinping. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. Accepted May 20, 2020, First Published Online September 30, 2020. The article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 4.0 License. https://journals.sagepub. com/doi/10.1177/1868102620933899. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_5

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Keywords Mixed ownership reform · Neoliberalism · Sinification of Marxism · Neo-Maoist · China Dream

Mixed ownership reform (MO reform) of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was one of the key economic agenda items addressed by President Xi Jinping at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee meeting in November 2013. It was an attempt to introduce private capital investment into the state sector and diversify the ownership structure of SOEs to improve their performance. The policy discourse began after the issuance of the “Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” so-called the “2013 Decision,” adopted at the Third Plenum. The peak of the debate was from early- 2014 to late- 2015. The initiation of supply-side structural reform (SSSR) in December 2015 significantly reduced the policy community’s interests in MO reform, and the major agenda of the discourse began to shift away from MO reform to SSSR by mid-2016. This chapter analyzes more than 400 periodical articles published in Chinese media outlets in the three-year period from January 2014 to December 2016. The analysis focuses on how Xi’s ideological line, slogans, and directives were interpreted and operationalized as political rhetoric for persuasion by major actors in the discourse.

Data and Methods The data—periodical articles—were downloaded from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database. The database was searched by the keyword, “mixed-ownership system” 混合所有制. The document type was set to “periodicals” 期刊, which includes academic and policy journals, party and government publications, and magazines intended for the business community, specific industries, and popular audience. To closely examine ideological, rhetorical, and theoretical arguments, other types of publications, such as dissertations, books, newspaper articles, and social media posts, were not included in the data. The keyword search yielded nearly 3000 articles. The articles were first categorized by the year and date of publication and then sorted by the number of downloads, which indicates how broadly the articles have been circulated. Then, the most downloaded 150 articles each year, 450 in total, were selected for analysis. After data cleaning, the total number of articles was 424,

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which were published in more than 100 printed media outlets in China. The types of articles vary, including opinion essays, theoretical essays, commentaries, interviews, research articles, seminar reports, conference minutes, and documents issued by party and government offices. Since the major focus of this analysis is on ideological arguments and the use of rhetoric, extensive reading, summarization, and qualitative analysis of the articles were the main methods of analysis. The discourse process was reconstructed and analyzed based on the summaries of each article, supplemented by party leaders’ speeches, government directives, internal publications, secondary sources, and the coding of articles. Coding was adopted for the categorization of authors and detection of major issues, debates, rhetoric, and slogans employed. As the coding sheet is simple and straightforward (see Appendix), the entire coding was completed by the author. The analysis focused on how Xi’s ideological lines, slogans, and directives were interpreted by the major groups participating in the discourse and operationalized as political rhetoric for persuasion. Major focuses of the analysis are: who led the discourse, articulating reform goals and major issues, defining agenda, and engaging in persuasion; what rhetoric were employed, by whom, and what effects they produced; what contending issues and conflict arose in the course of the debate; and how the adopted rhetoric influenced the dynamics of the discourse and policy outcomes.

Categorization of Participants The categorization of the authors of the periodical articles was based on their issue position on ownership—whether to support the state or private economy—and ideological orientation. The purpose was to detect major ideological divisions caused by the built-in ideological tension over SOE reform. The coding sheet includes two issue position items: (1) author’s support for the state economy’s dominance, which is measured by the commitment to the “public ownership system as the mainstay” (POSAM) 以公有制为主体, and (2) author’s support for private sector development, measured by the promotion of the removal of private firms’ discrimination, equal status of public and private ownership, diversification of ownership, and regulatory issues concerning private firms’ protection and enhanced status. Ideological orientation was measured by authors’ commitment to (1) Marxism or (2) neoliberalism. Commitment

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to Marxism was measured by authors’ engagement in theoretical arguments based on Marxist and socialist theories; quotes of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and other Marxist thinkers, criticism of market reforms and neoliberalism for the preservation of socialism, and the promotion of traditional socialist values such as social equality and workers’ union and well-being. Commitment to neoliberalism was measured by the promotion of neoliberal principles, values, and practices, including economic efficiency, fair market competition, entrepreneurship, clearly defined property rights, and enterprise autonomy. To separate the issue and ideological positions, support for POSAM and private-sector development were not considered necessary components of the commitment to Marxism and neoliberalism, respectively. This separation was also necessary because some authors supported these issues for non-ideological reasons. Based on the coding, the authors were categorized into four major groups: “neoliberals,” “Marxists,” “leftists,” and “pragmatists.” Support for POSAM and commitment to Marxism, as well as support for privatesector development and commitment to neoliberalism, are strongly associated with one another in many articles. This indicates the major fault line dividing the discursive community. The former association represents conservative forces who advocated limited or no reform, and the latter represents reformist liberal forces who supported the reform. Authors showing the latter association—support for the private-sector and neoliberalism—were labeled “neoliberals.” Authors showing the former association—support for POSAM and Marxism—were categorized as “Marxists” and “leftists.” The two groups have the same issue and ideological positions, but leftists’ positions are more clear-cut. While they strongly supported POSAM and Marxism, they nearly rejected privatesector development and neoliberalism. In addition, there is a group of authors who strongly supported POSAM but had a neoliberalism orientation. These authors were labeled “pragmatists.” Table 5.1 shows each group’s average ideological orientation, issue positions, major rhetoric adopted, and institutional affiliations. Neoliberals were market-oriented, reform-minded policymakers and intellectuals—so-called liberals—who promoted private sector development, marketization of SOEs’ management, and regulatory issues, including the protection of private firms’ investor rights, anti-state monopoly, government withdrawal from SOE management, and the deregulation of capital markets. Many neoliberals initially expected that MO reform would be an opportunity to promote the equal status of

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Table 5.1 Major groups and their average ideological and issue positions, adopted rhetoric, and institutional affiliations Ideological orientation

Support POSAM

Support private sector

Major rhetoric

Institutional affiliations

Neoliberals

Neoliberalism

No

Yes

Win-win

Marxists

Marxism

Yes

Yes/No

Nationalist

Leftists

Marxism

Yes

No

Pragmatists

Neoliberalism

Yes

No

Nationalist Anti-neoliberalism Win-win, Nationalist

Academia, government, business Academia, think tank, CPS, CASS Academia, CASS Government, business

Ideological orientation was dichotomously coded. Issue positions were not. CPS (Central Party School); CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

the state and private sectors and restructure China’s economy allowing the market to play the “decisive role.” Neoliberalism ideology—in particular, the pursuit of economic efficiency, entrepreneurship, and fair market competition—had become so deeply ingrained in neoliberals’ minds that very few engaged in ideological arguments relevant to socialism. Their individual views and issue positions were not closely associated with their institutional affiliations. They spread across various institutions, including official research institutions such as the Central Party School (CPS), Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), and Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), as well as Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), academia, business associations, and private firms. Despite the widespread acknowledgment of “silenced” liberals in the Xi era, nearly half of the categorized articles were written by neoliberals. Prominent neoliberals include Li Yining (Beijing University), Cai Jiming (National People’s Congress, NPC, Qinghua University), Li Yizhong (CPPCC), Wang Zhongming (Vice-chairman, All China Federation of Industry and Commerce, ACFIC), Xie Lujiang (CPS), Huang Sujian (CASS), and Hu Jie (CASS). “Marxists” were a group of conservative authors with a Marxist orientation, such as party theorists from CPS and New Left academics who promoted social welfare and labor rights issues. Marxists firmly supported

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the upholding of POSAM and the state economy’s “leading function” 主导作用. Leading Marxists were party theorists affiliated with CPS, CASS, and Marxist research institutes in major universities, such as Gu Yimin (Fudan University), Zhang Zhuoyuan (CASS), and Jia Huaqiang (CPS). They engaged in the theoretical justification of mixed ownership by reinterpreting Marxism and drawing on Deng’s theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Their arguments were relatively constant and uniform because they maintained the official party line that the emergence of mixed ownership is the historically determined development in the course of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Although these party theorists were not so vocal as the other groups in proposing new reform measures, they maintained constant presence in the policy community throughout the research period and played the role of “party spokesmen,” interpreting the party line and directives, disseminating them, and articulating the theoretical foundation of new reform practices. Leftists were a group of highly conservative ideologues with a Marxist and Maoist orientation. While the leftists can be categorized into the Marxist group because of their strong support for POSAM and commitment to Marxism, they were separated from the Marxist group in this analysis because of their distinctive characteristics and roles in the discourse. Unlike mainstream Marxists who justified mixed ownership by reinterpreting Marxism, leftists adhered to Maoist and traditional socialist values, heavily quoted the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao, and maintained the three “anti-s”: anti-capitalism, anti-West, and anti-neoliberalism. Their anti-neoliberalism discursive campaign from late 2014 to late 2015 strongly impacted the dynamics of the discourse. Many leftists were affiliated with Renmin University and CASS. Leading leftists such as Zhou Xincheng, Wei Xinghua, and Sun Zongwei were faculty members at Renmin University, and Cheng Enfu, Leng Zhaosong, Xiang Qiyuan, He Ganqiang, and Xie Changan were affiliated with CASS. There were also some researchers affiliated with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Finance, Nankai University, and Nanjing University. The articles written by Zhou and Wei recorded a high volume of downloads from the CNKI database. The last group, “pragmatists,” consisted mainly of bureaucrats and business professionals who supervised and ran SOEs, such as SOEs’ senior executives, officials from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), NDRC, the Ministry of Finance, state

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investment companies, and other relevant government agencies. Their articles account for one-fourth of the categorized articles. The label, “pragmatists,” refers to their pragmatic intentions and attitudes toward the reform and ideology. Most pragmatists strongly supported POSAM, which originated from the socialist principle of public ownership, but shared a neoliberalism orientation. The association of support for POSAM and neoliberalism orientation deviates from the other three groups. While the issue positions of the neoliberals, Marxists, and leftists reflected their ideological orientations, pragmatists’ issue positions were largely determined by their practical interests, such as institutional, commercial, and personal interests including career concerns and job security. They were “pragmatic” about ideology: if the state sector can maintain its dominance and strength—either through the POSAM principle or neoliberal reforms—their interest would be served. Their pragmatic attitude toward ideology resembles Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism and embodies the builtin ideological contradiction of China’s economic reforms. Although this group is often collectively referred to as “bureaucratic interests” (Pei 2006: 63) and criticized for their resistance to SOE reforms, it was not a monolithic group. The pragmatists can be roughly divided into reformminded officials and businessmen who welcomed private investment to improve SOEs’ performance, such as Song Zhiping, Chairman of China National Building Materials Group Corporation (CNBM) and Chinese Pharmaceutical Company (Sinopharm), and relatively cautious state officials who advocated limited reforms to maintain POSAM, such as Peng Jianguo, deputy chief of the SASAC Research Center. Reform-minded pragmatists adopted issue positions similar to those of neoliberals and promoted neoliberal measures to improve SOEs, such as management autonomy, entrepreneurship, and strategic private and foreign investment in the state sector. However, their support for the reform derived mainly from their intention to use private capital to maintain the strength of the state sector. They “pragmatically” promoted reform measures benefiting the state sector but had less interest in promoting issues diminishing SOEs’ privileged status such as anti-state monopoly and regulatory issues concerning the legal rights and protection of private investors. Cautious bureaucrats, on the other hand, considered the preservation of a certain degree of state control and ownership necessary for strengthening the state sector and, thus, firmly defended POSAM, citing SOEs’

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strategic importance for national security and their public service functions. Although they did not commit to Marxism, they were nationalistic and adopted Realism perspective on global economy issues.

Context of the Debate The debate began with a sense of excitement over the new reform addressed by the new leader, Xi Jinping. Initially, the media’s attention was intense. Business magazines published numerous articles on MO reform, or hungai 混改, accompanied by photos and cartoons. Business journals, such as New Financial Management 新理财 and Market Observer 市场观察 published special reports on hungai, interviewing prominent officials and SOE executives. Initially, neoliberals were optimistic enough to assume that the reform would end the trend of “guojin mintui” 国进民退, “the state sector advances, the non-state retreats.” Liberal media outlets and associations, including ACFIC, China Private Economy Research Society, and CPPCC’s newspaper office, organized seminars on hungai focusing on private investors’ perspectives. Pragmatists equally welcomed the new reform. SASAC initiated the pilot program that introduced mixed ownership to China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). The business community paid close attention to the experiment and assessed its progress, benefits, and problems. Sinopec’s experiment was largely considered a success, selling nearly 30 percent of its marketing and distribution businesses to private investors. SASAC initially categorized SOEs into three groups— competitive, functional, and public service SOEs—and promoted the reform of SOEs operating in competitive industries. While some reformist SASAC officials recommended the “exit” of state capital from competitive industries, cautious bureaucrats such as Peng Jianguo and State Council counselor Ren Yuling called for the preservation of the state’s controlling stakes in mixed firms (Ren 2014: 30). Party theorists in the Marxist group maintained the party line and defined a mixed ownership economy as the “basic economic system” of the primary stage of socialism, under which various forms of ownership coexist under the principle of POSAM (Ma 2014: 4–7). MO reform was, however, from the beginning plagued by the lack of clear roadmap, policy specification, and serious commitment by both state and private firms, which frustrated many neoliberals. By mid-2014, only a

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handful of SOEs had initiated hungai. SASAC’s classification was continuously disputed, shifting over time, and not specific enough to select SOEs eligible for hungai. SASAC revised its initial categorization later and divided SOEs into “commercial I,” “commercial II,” and “public service” categories. In this classification, SOEs originally categorized as “functional,” which included SOEs operating in the areas vital to national security such as energy and telecommunication, were put in the commercial II category, which facilitated Sinopec’s pilot program. However, Peng Jianguo, deputy chief of the SASAC Research Center, mentioned that strategic SOEs vital to national security were on the “negative list” that prescribed the areas in which the reform must be “prohibited, delayed, or cautioned” (Deloitte Research Centre 2015: 5). In addition, many SOEs and private firms were reluctant to “mix” with one another. While SOEs were concerned about the loss of state-owned assets through hungai, private investors worried about whether their investor rights would be protected after investing in SOEs and felt like “a sheep entering a lion’s den” (Yuan 2014: 1–5). With frustration and uncertainty mounting, the discursive community was increasingly divided over ownership: the neoliberals who promoted the diversification of SOEs’ ownership, on the one hand, and Marxists, leftists, and some pragmatists who upheld POSAM, on the other. The division was considered a resurgence of the so-called “capitalist or socialist debate” 姓资姓社的论争 (Cai 2014b: 10), which had divided the policy elites since the 1980s. As the debate began, various rhetoric emerged prior to the leftists’ discursive campaign. Considering the link between fundamental and operative ideologies established by the framework of the language game, the detection of major rhetoric was based on the quoted party slogans, directives, and Xi’s words available on the coding sheet and the close examinations of the articles carrying them. Through the examination of how specific party slogans, theories, and directives were employed in relation to authors’ intended goals, promoted issues, and ideological positions, three major patterns of the operationalization of party ideology were detected: nationalist, “win-win,” and anti-neoliberalism rhetoric.

Nationalist Rhetoric: Reinforcing the Division Nationalist rhetoric was the operationalization of Xi’s nationalist ideological line and his China Dream slogan—the “great rejuvenation of the

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Chinese nation.” Due to Xi’s repeated emphasis on the strategic importance of the state economy, nationalist rhetoric was mainly employed by conservative forces—leading Marxists, leftists, and some pragmatists—to defend the upholding of POSAM in the course of MO reform. However, there was a variation in how Xi’s nationalist line was operationalized among these groups. • Marxists’ indigenization rhetoric Leading Marxists, in particular, party theorists affiliated with CPS and CASS, employed “indigenization” rhetoric and engaged in low-profile but constant persuasion efforts to promote a mixedownership economy based on the principle of POSAM. They differentiated China’s mixed-ownership economy from the simple coexistence of public and private ownership in capitalist countries and defined it as “mixed-ownership system with Chinese characteristics” 中国特色的混合所有制经济 (Tian and Liu 2014: 31). By emphasizing its uniqueness, indigeneity, and socialist nature, they infused a sense of nationalism into their arguments and defended the importance of POSAM and the continuous dominance of the state economy. Zhang Zhuoyuan, CASS researcher, argued that China’s mixed-ownership economy must be built on the country’s distinct historical and socialist foundation, and, therefore, POSAM is an important component of China’s mixed economy (interviewed by Ma 2014). The indigenization rhetoric was often accompanied by the term, “Sinification of Marxism” 马克思主义中国化 (Zou 2014: 75), and the chronological account of China’s market reforms since 1978. This term conveys that China’s successful reform experiences had corrected the shortcomings of the original Marxism and stimulated a sense of national pride, thus, sitting nicely with Xi’s China Dream slogan. Many Marxists argued that building a uniquely Chinese mixed-ownership system with POSAM would realize the Chinese dream. • Leftists ’ anti-capitalist rhetoric Some Marxists, pragmatists, and leftists stressed national security— one type of nationalism—to defend the vital importance of POSAM. In particular, the leftists firmly defended the upholding of POSAM by claiming that the state’s control of the lifeline of the economy is crucial to avoiding foreign and private capital control of China’s economy (Cheng and Xie 2015: 59). The leftists’ nationalist rhetoric

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was largely based on their anti-foreign, anti-capitalist, and antiimperialist beliefs and can be called “anti-capitalist” rhetoric. They interpreted the China Dream slogan, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” from the Maoist perspective of anti-imperialist struggle and employed it to limit private and foreign investment in SOEs, obstruct the reform, and accuse the promoters of MO reform of inviting capitalism to China (Zhou 2014b: 33). • Pragmatists’ economic nationalism Xi’s China Dream slogan initially appealed to some reform-minded pragmatists who had nurtured a sense of national pride in China’s growing economic power and the ambition to transform SOEs into globally competitive, world-class corporations. They employed “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” to encourage strategic private and foreign investment in SOEs to improve SOEs’ competitiveness in the domestic and international markets. On the other hand, some cautious bureaucrats supported POSAM from the Realism perspective of economic nationalism, arguing that strengthening the state economy would enhance China’s global influence and serve her national interest (You 2014: 56). The nationalist rhetoric, however, did not function as effective political rhetoric to integrate the discursive community and promote the reform. It was largely employed by the conservative forces to defend POSAM rather than promote diversified ownership, thus, conflicting with the primary goal of MO reform. For this reason, the rhetoric did not resonate with its intended audience, the neoliberals, the major supporters of the reform. For neoliberals, POSAM was the root cause of SOEs’ inefficiency and the power asymmetry between the public and private sectors. Neoliberals also considered SOE reform issues in the domestic context—the issue of state and market—rather than in the global context. Therefore, the rhetoric of indigenization, national security, and national interest, did not appeal to their reason. As a result, the rhetoric reinforced the existing liberalconservative division. Table 5.2 shows the percentages of the authors in each group who employed nationalist rhetoric in the three-year research period. Whereas more than one-third of the Marxists and the leftists employed it, very few reformist authors—only 8% of the pragmatists and 6% of the neoliberals—did so. This disparity corresponds to the existing division between the supporters of Marxism and of neoliberalism, as well

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Table 5.2 Percentage of authors who employed nationalist rhetoric in each group

Ideological orientation Neoliberals Marxists Leftists Pragmatists

Neoliberalism Marxism Marxism Neoliberalism

Employed nationalist rhetoric (%) 6% 37% 35% 8%

as between those who supported the state economy’s dominance and those who supported private-sector development. The lack of persuasiveness of the nationalist rhetoric also derives from the discursive strategies adopted by the participants and Xi’s ideological line. The nationalist rhetoric was largely employed in a symbolic manner rather than for promoting specific reform measures, such as the classification of SOEs open for private investment and the reform of SOEs’ corporate governance. Mainstream Marxists (party theorists) articulated the indigenization rhetoric well but concentrated on theoretical arguments and did not promote specific reform measures with the rhetoric. The pragmatists were inclined to employ the China Dream slogan in a symbolic manner, often merely to pay lip service to the party line and did not operationalize it to promote specific measures that could transform SOEs into “world-class” corporations. The leftists adopted the rhetoric to obstruct the reform, as discussed later. Most specific reform measures were proposed by neoliberals without employing the nationalist rhetoric. The weakness of the rhetoric derives also from a lack of sound theoretical foundation in Xi’s ideological line, the “fundamental ideology” on which the rhetoric was based. At the time of the discourse, the China Dream slogan had not been articulated by Xi in congruence with his major reform programs and with Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, a guiding theory of China’s market reform. In fact, party theoreticians had difficulties incorporating Xi’s nationalist line into their theoretical justifications of mixed ownership. The indigenization rhetoric was an attempt to reconcile Deng’s theory with Xi’s nationalist line but was largely based on Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics and historical materialism. Xi’s Chinese Dream slogan was often employed in a highly abstract manner. One Marxist article states:

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Starting from our national conditions, promoting the development of a mixed-ownership system based on POSAM will open a new era of China’s economic and social development and accelerate the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. (Tian and Liu 2014: 24)

The lack of elaboration and theoretical foundation in Xi’s ideological line could also explain why very few neoliberals employed it to promote their agenda. This passivity is in sharp contrast to the leading reformers in the 1990s who led the discourse over SOEs’ ownership restructuring under Jiang, drawing heavily on Deng’s slogans including “seeking truth from facts,” “three favorables” and the “emancipation of the mind,” as discussed in Chapter 4. The liberals’ passivity suggests that Xi’s nationalist ideological line was not successfully “regimenting” the minds of neoliberals, essential supporters of the reform. Theoretically, neoliberals adhered to Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, which de-emphasized the differences between public and private ownership and called for the integration of the public ownership system and the market. These findings indicate that Xi’s ideological line, despite the well-publicized China Dream slogan, was not operationalized as an effective instrument for promoting his reform agenda.

Neoliberals’ Weakness: Li Yining’s Deng Line No unified and powerful rhetoric was employed by neoliberals. Although some neoliberals made persuasive arguments to promote MO reform, their rhetoric largely isolated each other. However, in the initial phase of the discourse, prominent liberal economist Li Yining submitted the liberal interpretation of the 2013 Decision, theoretically justifying mixed ownership by operationalizing Deng’s ideological line, and promoted MO reform. Although Li’s rhetoric did not resonate with the discursive community strongly, it could be considered an alternative interpretation and operationalization of party ideology. Li had excellent credentials. As a faculty member of the Guanghua School of Management, Beijing University, he was former advisor to Premier Li Keqiang and close to the party leadership. Li has been called “Mr. Stock Market” (Kristof 1989) or “Li Gufen” 厉股份 because of his pivotal role in promoting shareholding, establishing the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, and formulating the Security Law. He was

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also called “Mr. Private Economy” or “Li Minying ” 厉民营 for his contribution to the development of the private sector. He participated in the formulation of the “36 Articles” issued by the State Council in 2005, which encouraged private investment in SOEs (Lardy 2014: 91). Li’s arguments were largely based on Deng’s pragmatism: in particular, on “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth” 实践是真理的唯一标 准 and “seeking truth from facts” 实事求是, which was reflected in Li’s frequent employment of the terms, “practice” 实践, “practice-oriented” 实践性, and “proven by practice” 实践证明. Due to the strong emphasis on practice, Li’s rhetoric can be called “practicism.” His arguments had a striking similarity to the “improving socialism” rhetoric employed by the leading reformers in the 1990s as discussed in Chapter 4. Li employed Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics to justify the theoretical deviation of China’s socialism from Marxism, persuade his opponents to correctly understand the real condition of China’s economy, and encourage practice and innovation through “seeking truth from facts.” Li was active in the earlier phase of the debate. He was particularly impressed by the 2013 Decision, which acknowledged the “decisive role played by the market in resource allocation” 市场在资源配置中起 决定性作用 and defined mixed ownership as the “prime method for materializing China’s basic economic system” 基本经济制度的重要实现 形式 (The Communist Party of China 2013). Li called these two statements “theoretical breakthroughs” (Li 2014a). Although praising party decisions is a ritual and part of the rules of the language game, Li operationalized the phrase—the “prime method for materializing the basic economic system”—for justifying the theoretical deviation of mixed ownership from Marxism. He argued that China’s “basic economic system” was the product of theoretical innovations and that China’s mixed ownership economy had grown out of the long-term process of practices (Li 2014c). Since Li had witnessed the entire process of China’s economic reform since its initiation, he could situate MO reform in the evolutionary process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. According to Li, mixed ownership originated from the shareholding reform in the 1980s and 1990s, which was defined as the “prime form for materializing the public ownership system” 公有制的主要实现形式. Li traced the first appearance of the term, mixed ownership, back to a party document issued in the late 1990s. The term officially appeared in the 2003 Decision adopted at the Third Plenum of the 16th Party Congress (Li 2014c: 3). In 2006, Li himself defined mixed ownership as the “new

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public ownership system” 新公有制, which consists of a small number of state-controlled firms and a large number of mixed firms, and anticipated that the “new public ownership” would soon become a dominant ownership form of Chinese firms (Li 2006). In this context, Li welcomed the further clarification of mixed ownership and the adoption of MO reform in the 2013 Decision, which states: Vigorously develop mixed ownership economy. The cross holding and mutual merger of state-owned capital, collective capital, and non-public capital are the prime method for materializing the basic economic system, beneficial to enhance the functions of state capital, increase state capital, and enhance its competitiveness, and beneficial for different ownership systems to complement each other, promote each other, and develop together….Promote non-public firms’ participation in SOE reforms, promote the development of mixed firms controlled by non-public capital, and promote the establishment of the modern enterprise system in private enterprises. (The Communist Party of China 2013)

By describing the evolution of mixed ownership, Li stressed that China’s economic system and economic theories are constantly developing by incorporating new practices, and, thus, theoretical deviations are normal and legitimate. Li also employed nationalism to emphasize the practice- and innovation-oriented nature of China’s economic system, by employing the term “mixed ownership economy with Chinese characteristics” and praising its originality (Li 2014c). Li’s adoption of this term and emphasis on China’s uniqueness resembled the indigenization rhetoric employed by mainstream Marxists. However, Li did not employ Xi’s China Dream slogan, nor did he promote the principle of POSAM. Li’s indigenization rhetoric was entirely based on Deng’s pragmatism: the “mixed ownership economy with Chinese characteristics” has been built through the practice of “seeking truth from facts,” and, as a result, “we finally found the socialist economic system suitable for China’s national conditions” 适合中国国情的社会主义市场经济体制 (Li 2014b: 2). Li’s “practicism” is reflected in his strong faith in entrepreneurs, or qiyejia 企业家, regardless of they are public or private business owners. Li believed that entrepreneurs are a driving force of China’s reforms and that China’s development depends on their innovations and practices, claiming that the word, qiyejia, is a synonym for innovators (Li 2014a). Li particularly held Song Zhiping, Chairman of Sinopharm and CNBM, in high

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regard, referring to Song’s management style as an “innovative development model” 创新发展模式. Song’s two firms successfully carried out MO reform as pilot programs. Li described Song’s success as a “breakthrough of MO reform” and attributed it to his leadership, innovative capacity, progressive vision, and awareness of social responsibilities (Li 2014b). Li’s rhetoric, however, did not impact the policy community strongly for several reasons. First, Li did not employ the term, POSAM, nor did he quote Xi’s China Dream slogan, party line, and directives, except for some quotes of the 2013 Decision, notably, the “decisive role” of the market. To negotiate with the conservatives who firmly defended POSAM, it was necessary to frame issues referring to the POSAM principle and pay lip service to Xi’s ideological line. Even if Deng’s theory is still a guiding theory in China’s reform, entirely relying on Deng’s pragmatism diminished the persuasiveness of Li’s rhetoric. Second, Li’s arguments, as an economist, consisted mainly of straightforward recommendations of neoliberal measures, such as the removal of market entry barriers to private investment, optimal allocation of state capital, and introduction of independent boards of directors. Li’s strong faith in neoliberalism and support for the equal status of the public and private sectors alerted some conservatives, especially leftists, later triggering their attack on neoliberalism. In terms of this, Li’s neoliberal rhetoric reinforced the existing ideological division in the discursive community. Lastly, the change in the ideological climate of the discursive community also accounted for the lack of resonance of Li’s rhetoric. Li’ practicism might have been widely adopted by his fellow liberals, had it been advanced in the 1990s, when reformers faced the formidable conservative opposition attacking market reforms in general. However, neoliberal values had taken root in the minds of many policymakers by the 2010s, and many neoliberals did not perceive the urgent need to coordinate their persuasion effort to “emancipate” the minds of the conservatives. Especially in the initial phase of the debate, the neoliberals considered Xi as a liberal leader, welcomed his pro-market economic agendas, and were optimistic about the reform. Under such conditions, Li’s rhetoric did not have a strong appeal to his fellow liberals.

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“Win-Win” Rhetoric: Facilitating Common Grounds Xi’s declaration of the “new normal” 新常态 in May 2014 strongly impacted the policy community. Many authors considered SOE reforms entering a new stage and adopted the term, a “new round of SOE reforms” 新一轮国企改革. Although the anti-corruption campaign had intensified and the leftists expanded their influence in the discursive community by then, there was a rising hope among reformist policymakers that the long-debated ownership issues could be resolved under the “new normal.” In this context, “win-win” rhetoric was employed by some pragmatists and neoliberals. The rhetoric conveyed that the collaboration of state and private firms through hungai strengthens and benefits both. The ideological underpinning of the rhetoric was the term Xi repeatedly emphasized, “two unswervingly” 两个毫不动摇, which was originally addressed at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 and re-appeared in the 2013 Decision. Unswervingly strengthen and develop the public ownership system, uphold the public ownership system as the mainstay, realize the state economy’s leading function, continuously strengthen the state economy’s vitality, control, and influence. Unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public ownership system, strengthen its vitality and creativity. (The Communist Party of China 2013)

Song Zhiping, NPC delegate and Chairman of two SOEs, Sinopharm and CNBM, was instrumental in spreading the rhetoric. Song’s two firms successfully carried out the pilot programs of hungai, inviting private capital, clarifying property rights, and reforming the corporate governance of the two firms. With his credentials, Song acted as an opinion leader in the earlier phase and promoted consensus among contending groups. To discourage the “capitalist or socialist debate,” he repeatedly stated that MO reform was neither nationalization nor privatization (interviewed by Yao 2014: 29–30). He also published the book, Guomin gongjin 国民 共进, Joint progress of state and non-state, which became a catchphrase of the “win-win” rhetoric. Song explained his “joint progress” theory as follows: The major characteristics of mixed ownership are the cross holding of shares and mutual integration of different ownership systems; the ultimate

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goal of MO reform is maximizing Chinese firms’ efficiency regardless of they are state or non-state firms. Both state and nonstate firms have shareholders and operate under the Company Law, which protects their legal rights and interests. (interviewed by Yan 2014: 44)

Song also promoted a “win-win” formula: SOEs’ strength + private firms’ vitality = Chinese firms’ competitiveness 国企实力+民企活力=企业竞争力. (interviewed by Yan 2014: 44)

Song was categorized as a pragmatist for his support for POSAM and the party line; however, his proposals were completely neoliberal. He harshly criticized SOEs’ inefficiency and lack of management autonomy and entrepreneurship, and assiduously promoted an independent board of directors (Song 2014: 38–39). The “win-win” rhetoric was initially employed by some reform-minded pragmatists who tried to attract private capital to improve SOEs so as to preserve the superiority of the state economy. Li Rongrong, former chairman of SASAC, repeatedly encouraged strategic foreign and private investment in the central SOEs (interviewed by Wu 2014). Former chairman of Sinopec, Fu Chengyu, employed the “win-win” formula and openly claimed that private investment was crucial to realizing the state economy’s “leading function.” Fu stated: SOEs represent China’s economic power, private firms represent China’s economic vitality: power and vitality together create China’s economic competitiveness…..Let’s promote each other, develop together, and realize win-win. (interviewed by Wu 2014: 49)

The rhetoric also spread among neoliberals, especially leading liberals such as Li Yining, Huang Sujian, and Cai Jiming, who were concerned about the deepening ideological division and slow progress of the reform. Li Yining (2014b) wrote the preface of Song’s book, Guomin gongjin, and praised the successful reform of Song’s companies as a model of “winwin” collaboration. Liu Yingqiu, then director of the Private Economy Research Center at CASS, argued that MO reform is not a matter of “who eats whom” and that the relationship between state and private firms must be complementary (interviewed by Xie 2014: 97). Some neoliberals linked the “win-win” rhetoric with the “new normal.” A research group at the Institute of Industrial Economics

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at CASS led by the prominent liberals, Huang Sujian and Huang Qunhui (2014: 5–24), published a twenty-page article in China Industrial Economics , which recorded a high volume of downloads from the CNKI database. They framed mixed ownership as the “new normal” of Chinese firms’ ownership structure and called for the synthesis of the state economy and the market by adopting mixed ownership as a principal ownership form. Employing the “win-win” rhetoric, they argued that private investment can be a powerful driving force of SOE reforms and called for the strategic restructuring of the state sector through MO reform. In a similar vein, Cai Jiming (2014a: 58–65) proposed the relaxation of Marxism to theorize a new relationship between public and private ownership under the “new normal.” Li Yining weighed in, criticizing the dichotomy of public and private ownership and defined mixed ownership as the “middle ground” 中间地带 between the two: Socialist economic theory has a dichotomy of public and private: if not public, it is private, if not state-owned, it is private. In this way, a middle ground between public and private ownership is ignored. The actual economy consists of diverse ownership systems. In the area between public and private ownership, different forms of mixed ownership exist. This objective condition should not be ignored. (Li 2014c: 3)

Cai and Li’s arguments were, indeed, very similar to the Marxists’ promotion of the “Sinification of Marxism.” Marxist CPS scholar, Jia Huaqiang (2014: 6–13), criticized the rigid dichotomy of “public versus private ownership” as a dogma caused by a one-sided understanding of Marxism and called for the reinterpretation of Marxism to promote mixed ownership. The “win-win” rhetoric and the “new normal” facilitated certain common grounds among leading neoliberals, pragmatists, and Marxists. The “new normal” itself did not evolve into a coherent rhetoric but contributed to the proliferation of “win-win” rhetoric by providing the context and momentum to promote new perspectives. Although the major division over POSAM still existed, the arguments of influential figures in each group, including Song, Huang, Cai, Li, and Jia, agreed on:

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Table 5.3 Percentage of authors who employed “win-win” rhetoric in each group

Ideological orientation Neoliberals Marxists Leftists Pragmatists

Neoliberalism Marxism Marxism Neoliberalism

Employed win-win rhetoric (%) 16% 13% 0% 20%

• The collaboration of SOEs and private firms is the key to the success of MO reform, strengthens both the state and non-state economies and enhances the competitiveness of the national economy. • Under the “new normal,” mixed ownership becomes the principal ownership form of Chinese firms, which is consistent with the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This demonstrates that the skillful operationalization of party ideology can alleviate divisions and facilitate a shared understanding of the reform. Table 5.3 shows the percentages of authors in each group who employed the “win-win” rhetoric in the three-year period, which shows a different pattern from that in Table 5.2. The adoption of the “win-win” rhetoric was led by the reformist groups, namely pragmatists and neoliberals, and the rhetoric was adopted more equally by the three groups of authors except for leftists: 20% of the pragmatists, 16% of the neoliberals, and 13% of the Marxists. Figure 5.1 compares the percentages of authors who adopted the nationalist and “win-win” rhetoric. The adoption of the nationalist rhetoric was very high among Marxists and leftists who shared a Marxist ideological orientation but low among neoliberals and pragmatists who shared a neoliberalism orientation, which indicates that the rhetoric reinforced the existing liberal-conservative division. On the other hand, the adoption of the “win-win” rhetoric is more equally distributed regardless of each group’s ideological orientation except for leftists. This indicates a division-alleviating function of the “win-win” rhetoric. The strength of the “win-win” rhetoric derives mainly from congruence between the rhetoric, each group’s agenda, and the party line. Although many pragmatists were motivated by their pragmatic institutional interest in attracting private capital to strengthen the state sector, the rhetoric of collaboration and joint progress appealed to many neoliberals who were concerned about the intensifying ideological division, slow

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Fig. 5.1 Percentage of authors who employed nationalist and “win-win” rhetoric in each group

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40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

Nationalist rhetoric

Win-win rhetoric

reforms, and power asymmetry between the state and private sectors. The rhetoric was also adopted by some Marxist scholars because the “collaborative development” 共同发展 of different ownership forms has been the party line since the 1990s. Even if each group’s agenda varied, the rhetoric to a certain extent facilitated a shared understanding of the reform’s goals. In addition, the dissemination of the rhetoric by prominent figures like Song and Li, as well as the adoption of succinct slogans and formulas, enhanced its effectiveness. If the issue of POSAM had been further negotiated employing the “win-win” rhetoric, some compromises over ownership issues might have been possible. However, the discourse was increasingly politicized by the leftists’ discursive campaign as Xi’s anticorruption campaign intensified. As a result, the “win-win” rhetoric failed to maintain its salience.

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Anti-Neoliberalism Rhetoric: Leftists’ Discursive Campaign Leftist intellectuals expanded their influence in the discourse from late2014 to 2015. Xi’s hard-line policies, especially anti-corruption campaign, embrace of Mao’s legacy, and attack on Western values including neoliberalism, encouraged them to launch an anti-reform and anti-neoliberalism campaign. Leftists are sometimes referred to as “neo-Maoists,” a group of highly conservative intellectuals who criticize market reforms and attempt to revive Maoist legacies. According to Yuezhi Zhao, they were marginalized in the media discourse in the Jiang and Hu eras because of the “hegemony” of neoliberalism and had no access to major print and broadcast media. They occasionally launched discursive campaigns in cyberspace, criticizing the dominance of Western economic theories and the privatization of SOEs in defense of traditional socialist values, working-class interest, and social stability. They tend to seize openings in the discursive space and become vocal in the debate, expressing anti-capitalist and nationalistic sentiment (Zhao 2011: 225–228). Zhao’s description of neo-Maoists largely matches the profiles of the leftists in this analysis. Their discursive campaign peaked from late-2014 to mid-2015. With the growing presence of leftists, there was a notable increase in the employment of outdated Maoist slogans such as class struggle, capitalist exploitation, foreign domination, and the “master’s status” of workers. Leftists’ primary agenda was to uphold POSAM, anti-corruption, and anti-neoliberalism. As noted above, they employed the nationalist rhetoric with anti-capitalist and anti-foreign flavor to defend POSAM, stressing its importance for national security. Quoting Xi, the Constitution, and the Party Charter, they argued that POSAM is the foundation of party rule and contended the importance of the state’s control of the lifeline of economy for national security (Cheng and Xie 2015: 61). Since their ideological orientation and adherence to POSAM were clearly incompatible with MO reform, the leftists nearly obstructed the reform, advocating the preservation of wholly-state-owned SOEs, state monopolies, and strengthened government supervision of SOEs. They specifically opposed “one stroke” 一刀切 reform that applies standardized reform measures to classified SOEs, Sinopec’s pilot program, and SASAC’s “exit theory” 退出论 of state capital from competitive industries (Wang and Li 2015: 45–47; Sun 2014: 20–22). The anti-corruption campaign provided them

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a legitimate reason to call for slowing down MO reform to protect public assets. The leftists constantly alerted the policy community to the danger of the losses of state assets through MO reform and asset stripping. Zhou Xincheng, then dean of School of Marxism Studies at the Renmin University, accused the neoliberals of promoting privatization under MO reform and warned that China’s economy would soon be controlled by capitalists if MO reform was used as an opportunity to swallow public assets (Zhou 2014a: 67–68; b: 33–34). Some leftists nearly equated private investment with asset stripping, referring to private investors as “profiteering wolves” 空手套白狼的民资, and argued that MO reform cannot be the process of “corrupted privatization” 腐败型私有化 (Gao 2014: 34–35). Xi’s Spokespersons? Although the leftists also played the language game, they relied more on direct quotes of Xi than the operationalization of his party line. Leading leftists such as Zhou and Wei picked Xi’s words that matched their agenda, disseminated them with an authoritative and coercive tone, and urged the policy community to “correctly understand” 正确认识 the party center and conform to Xi’s words, actions, and spirit (Zhou 2014b: 31, 34). In this way, they nearly made a cult of personality around Xi and acted as if they were Xi’s spokespersons. Considering their opportunistic tendency, they were probably self-appointed spokesmen, taking advantage of Xi’s hard line and promoting their agendas in the hope of influencing the discourse and decision-making process. Naughton (2015: 6–7) argues that the rigidity of top-down control often opens up opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to hijack the policy process: they seize opportunities, redefine agenda, recreate them, and take initiatives away from dominant players. Interestingly, however, there was a high level of congruence between Xi’s positions on SOE reforms and leftists’ agenda.1 Xi’s repeated emphasis on the strategic importance of SOEs and anti-corruption campaign greatly helped the leftists promote their anti-reform agenda under Xi’s authority. The following speeches and directives of Xi are frequently quoted by the leftists: 1 Creemers (2015) who analyzed the constitutional debate in the same period, noted that the anti-constitutionalist position taken by neo-Maoists closely aligned with Xi’s agenda.

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• Xi’s address to the Anhui delegation to the NPC in March 2014: “Don’t let reforms present an opportunity for profiteering on state-owned assets” (Sina Weibo 2014). Leftists extensively quoted the phrase, the “opportunity for profiteering” 谋取暴利的机会, to criticize private investment to SOEs. • Xi’s address to the Shanghai delegation to the NPC in March 2014: “SOEs cannot be weakened; Must be strengthened” (Zhu et al. 2014). Leftists frequently quoted this remark to defend POSAM. • Two “Opinions” approved by the Deepening Reform LSG in June 2015 and later issued by the Central Committee: the “Several Opinions on Upholding the Party Leadership and Party-Building Mission in Deepening State-owned Enterprises Reforms” and “Several Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the Supervision of Enterprises for the Prevention of the Losses of State Assets.”2 These two opinions helped the leftists link MO reform with the anti-corruption campaign and provided them a legitimate reason for discouraging the reform to protect public assets. • Xi’s speech on the state economy’s strategic importance in Changchun in July 2015. Xi submitted “Two upholds” 两个坚持: “Unswervingly uphold the important position of SOEs in national development and uphold the efforts to make SOEs better, stronger, and bigger.”3 After this speech, “Make SOEs better, stronger, and bigger” 做优做强做大国有企业, became the popular mantra of leftists. • Xi’s speech in Jilin in July 2015. Xi submitted his version of “three favorables” 三个有利于, revising Deng’s original: “SOE reforms are beneficial for increasing state assets, beneficial for enhancing the state economy’s competitiveness, and beneficial for improving the capacity of state assets.”4 Leftists employed this slogan to emphasize the state

2 Their titles in Chinese are: “关于在深化国有企业改革中坚持党的领导加强党的建设 的若干意见” and “关于加强和改进企业国有资产监督防止国有资产流失的意见”, respectively. 3 习近平长春考察聚焦国有企业 [Xi Jinping’s Changchun trip focuses on SOEs]. Retrieved from http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0717/c1024-27322828.html. 4 习近平“三个有利于”重要论断确立深化国企改革标准 [Xi Jinping’s ‘Three Faborables’ established the standard for deepening SOE reforms]. 共产党员网 [Communist party member network]. Retrieved from http://news.12371.cn/2015/08/05/ARTI14387385 13705105.shtml.

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economy’s social obligations and rebut neoliberals’ criticism of state monopoly and state control of SOEs (Zhou 2015). • The “Guiding Opinions on Deepening State-owned Enterprise Reform” issued by the Central Committee and State Council in September 2015. The document strongly reflected Xi’s party line stressing anti-corruption, the strategic importance of the state economy, and the China Dream (The Communist Party of China 2015). Wei Xinghua, Renmin University professor affiliated with the Marxism Research Institute at CASS, published an article titled “Study and Firmly Grasp the Center’s Guiding Opinions,” and disseminated the leftist interpretation of it. Wei stressed the important role of the state economy in determining the future of China’s socialism and raised concerns about further losses of state assets through corruption and neoliberal reforms. He called for strengthening moral education, disciplinary supervision, punishment for corruption, government’s role in the economy, party-building mission, and public opinion control (Wei 2015: 1–5). In addition to the congruence between Xi’s position and leftists’ agenda, there was consistency in the leftists’ arguments. Their articles are strikingly similar in terms of discussed topics, quoted slogans, promoted issues, reasoning, targeted “enemies,” and accusation methods. Thus, all the arguments of leftists sounded as if they were issued by a single propaganda organization. This suggests a certain degree of coordination among leftists. Jowett and O’Donnell (2015) argue that successful propaganda tends to originate from a highly centralized decision-making authority that produces a consistent message. As noted above, many leftists were affiliated with Renmin University and CASS, and some with a research institute, the Collaborative Innovation Center for Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics 中国特色社会主义经济建设协同 创新中心 founded in 2012 with the collaboration of Nankai University, Nanjing University, Renmin University, Economics Department at CASS, and the National Bureau of Statistics. Although more research is required to understand Xi’s association with leftist scholars, the congruence between Xi’s positions and the leftists’ agenda and the consistency in leftists’ messages produced an impression in the discursive community that they were the spokespersons of the party center and Xi’s party line. No criticism of leftists was found in any of the analyzed articles.

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Impacts What impacts did the leftists’ discursive campaign have on the discourse? Their campaign made anti-corruption a salient issue in the discourse. The “party-building” mission and disciplinary supervision were incorporated into the corporate governance reform of SOEs. The leftists’ advance also encouraged left-leaning economists and New Left authors to promote labor rights issues and the employee stock option to make workers truly the “masters” of their companies, as well as the salary reform in SOEs to reduce the income disparity between management and labor. The anti-corruption campaign and leftists’ advance significantly affected the atmosphere of the discursive community as well. The initial optimism and excitement over MO reform faded away by early 2015. Magazine articles featuring images and cartoons, as well as special reports on hungai, mostly disappeared by then. Neoliberals’ articles that harshly criticized SOEs’ inefficiency, slow reforms, and the discrimination of the private sector decreased as well. However, even at the height of their campaign, the leftists did not completely hijack the discourse. The number of leftists’ articles is smaller than that of other groups, just 12% of the total. In addition, their discursive campaign was intense but short in duration. When their campaign peaked in the first half of 2015, the percentage of leftist articles went up from 8% in the previous year to 24%, while neoliberals’ percentage went down from 58 to 31%. With the initiation of SSSR in late 2015, however, leftists’ articles began to decrease, while neoliberals’ articles increased again. Furthermore, leftists’ ideological values—the outdated notion of anti-capitalism and the threat of foreign domination—were clearly in disharmony with the dominant ideological code of the policy elite and failed to persuade even their fellow Marxists. Even under the leftists’ fierce attack on neoliberalism, the neoliberals were not completely silenced, although they toned down their criticism of slow reforms and pro-private sector stance. Rather than encouraging the reform, many neoliberals kept a low profile, discouraged ideological debates, and demanded policy specifications—in particular, the classification of industries eligible for MO reform. Prominent liberals, such as Cai Jiming and the Dacheng Enterprise Research Institute, a private think tank run by ACFIC, continued to promote “sensitive” issues such as anti-state monopoly. In addition, many neoliberals supported the anti-corruption campaign and criticized

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state monopolies and persistent bureaucratic control of SOEs, hoping that the punishment of vested interests would promote further reforms. Despite the disciplinary campaigns targeting bureaucratic corruption, the pragmatists weathered the leftists’ fierce attack, possibly, because of their support for POSAM. Some reformist-minded pragmatists—SASAC officials, financial market regulators, and SOE executives—continued to encourage private investment in SOEs. The major factor that sustained this “business as usual” was the policy specifications and directives issued by the State Council and Li Keqiang. The Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) in late 2014 re-emphasized the need for improving SOEs’ competitiveness and corporate governance. Li’s Government Work Report in 2015 encouraged the further development of the non-state economy and the legal protection of private firms’ property rights. The “Opinions on Developing the Mixed Ownership Economy in SOEs” issued by the State Council in September 2015 specified more detailed classification of SOEs eligible for MO reform. However, the leftists’ interlude at the prime time of the discourse disrupted the entire language game in several ways. First, the direction of the discourse is largely determined by who leads it, interpreting the party line, operationalizing it, and defining the issues, since effective persuasion depends on the control of communication flow (Jowett and O’Donnell 2015: 297). Even if their campaign was short, the leftists behaved as Xi’s spokespersons, disseminated their interpretations of the party line, and took the initiative away from the major players at the critical time of the discourse. The group that normally assumed the role of “party spokesmen” was leading Marxists (party theorists). They served as the voice of the party, interpreted the party line, and articulated the theoretical foundation of the reform. The leftists somehow “hijacked” this role, redefined the agenda, and attempted to impose Xi’s words on the discursive community in an authoritative manner. Although the debate returned to normal by mid-2016 as their articles began to disappear, the MO reform discourse had lost its momentum by then, and the major agenda of the discourse soon shifted away from MO reform to SSSR without producing compromised solutions to MO reform issues. Second, by imposing Xi’s words on the policy community, the leftists widened the discrepancy between the party line demanding ideological conformity to Xi and the party policy demanding neoliberal measures to reform SOEs. This discrepancy was clearly observed in the contradictory directives issued by Xi that stressed the strategic importance of

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SOEs and the State Council, which encouraged further reforms. The discursive community was further divided when Xi was quoted by leftists and Li Keqiang by neoliberals. This discrepancy has been reported by some policy studies accounts. Political agenda and reform objectives ran in opposite directions under Xi, and the contradictory agenda resulted in the widespread uncertainty perceived by policymakers and poor policy outcomes (Naughton 2016: 43). Lastly, leftists employed ideology as a rectification and indoctrination tool rather than a means of persuasion for policy maneuvering. Their arguments are characterized by clear-cut dichotomy of right and wrong, intolerance, and a highly accusatory and coercive tone. They considered the existence of debate as evidence of “one-sided understanding” and “erroneous thought,” which must be rectified, and engaged in the fierce accusation of the erroneous thought and its holders. They submitted neoliberals’ arguments in a highly distorted and exaggerated manner, accused them of “deliberately misleading the reform” (Ding 2014: 82), and framed the on-going discourse as an ideological battle between Marxism and neoliberalism (Zhou 2015: 9–12). Their anti-neoliberalism rhetoric made ideology the central issue of the discourse, politicized it, and crystallized the existing division over socialism and the market.

Conclusion This analysis demonstrated that ideology functions differently, depending on how it is operationalized in public discourse. The “win-win” rhetoric employed by the reform-minded elite facilitated certain common grounds, discouraged ideological debate, and promoted reform. This is an example of ideology’s division-alleviating and integrating function. On the other hand, the nationalist rhetoric employed by the conservative groups and the leftists’ anti-neoliberalism rhetoric demonstrated ideology’s opposing function—reinforcing the existing division, politicizing the discourse, and polarizing the discursive community. In particular, the leftists’ persuasion effort took a crude form of indoctrination and rectification, in which Xi’s slogans and words were employed to attack opponents rather than persuade them. As a result, ideology itself became a salient issue and a primary cause of conflict. These findings suggest that when ideology is not operationalized in congruence with party policies, employed in a crude form, and imposed on others, it becomes a divisionand conflict-inducing force.

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Despite the adoption of the “win-win” rhetoric, the overall MO discourse is characterized by a conflictual rather than consensual trend, which is reflected in the limited policy outcomes. Although policy outcomes are determined by various factors, the discourse did not facilitate compromised solutions for important issues, such as the adjustment of the power asymmetry between the two sectors, industries eligible for mixed ownership, and the role of the party in SOEs. Considering the built-in ideological tension of China’s market reforms, the divisions observed here are anticipated findings. However, the analysis demonstrates that party ideology—Xi’s ideological line, slogans, and directives—functioned more as a dividing force than an integrating one. Chapter 6 compares the two discourses under Jiang and Xi and examines major determinants of ideology’s operational functions by revisiting the conceptual framework of the language game.

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Yuan, E. (2014). 关于发展混合所有制的几点思考[Some thoughts on developing mixed-ownership system]. 上海市经济管理干部学院学报 [Journal of Shanghai Economic Management College], 12(5), 1–5. Zhao, Y. (2011). Sustaining and contesting revolutionary legacies in media and ideology. In Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry (Eds.), Mao’s invisible hand: The political foundations of adaptive governance in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center. Zhou, X. (2014a). 关于混合所有制的若干思考 [Some thoughts on mixedownership system]. 国企 [China SOE], 4, 66–71. Zhou, X. (2014b). 关于巩固和完善基本经济制度的若干问题—兼论如何正确认 识发展混合所有制经济 [Concerns over strengthening and perfecting the basic economic system—correctly understand ‘developing a mixed-ownership economy’]. 学习论坛 [Tribune of Study], 30(8), 31–35. Zhou, X. (2015). 坚持把国有企业搞好 学习习近平视察吉林的讲话,划清马克思 主义与新自由主义的界限 [Uphold strong SOEs—Study Xi Jinping’s Jilin speech, Draw a clear line between Marxism and neoliberalism]. 毛泽东邓小平 理论研究 [Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Theory Research], 8, 9–12. Zhu, M., Tan, Y., Wang, H., & Jian, G. (2014, March 6). 习近平:国企不仅不能 削弱 而且要加强 [Xi Jinping: SOEs cannot be weakened, must be strengthened]. 解放日报 [Liberation Daily]. Retrieved from http://finance.sina.com. cn/china/20140306/063918421003.shtml. Zou, S. (2014). 马克思主义混合所有制思想及其现实意义 [Marxist mixedownership theory and its real significance]. 经济纵横 [Economic Crisscross ], 9, 75–78.

CHAPTER 6

Two Faces of Ideology: A Double-Edged Sword for Rulers

Abstract This chapter compares the findings of the two case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 and analyzes major determinants of ideology’s operational functions by revisiting the conceptual framework of the language game. The framework establishes a link between party ideology and its operational functions: whether ideology operates as a consensus- or conflict-inducing force depends not only on participants’ discursive strategies but also on party leaders’ ideological lines and governance, which set the rules of the language game. By contrasting Deng and Jiang’s ideology work with Xi’s, the chapter argues that party leaders’ deeper commitment to ideological unity and rectitude is likely to activate ideology’s conflictinducing function. Due to its dual operational functions, ideology can be a double-edged sword for rulers. Keywords Rhetoric · Language game · Deng Xiaoping pragmatism · Public opinion management · Xi Jinping thought control

This chapter compares the findings of the two case studies and examines the major determinants of ideology’s operational functions by revisiting the conceptual framework of the language game. Ideology’s functions

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_6

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are determined by various factors including the ideological configuration of discursive communities, institutional and personal interests of actors, and policy and issue contents, as well as the broader political and economic contexts wherein discourses occur. However, the two case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate a sharp contrast in the ways that party ideology was operationalized in the two discourses. While Deng’s ideological line was operationalized by the reformist forces to facilitate a shared understanding of the reforms and promote party policies, Xi’s ideological line was not employed in a way that alleviated the existing division and promoted the reform. Why did party ideology operate in such different ways in the two discourses? Considering the built-in ideological contradictions of China’s market reforms, the liberalconservative divisions, as observed in the two discourses, are expected to be found. However, why did party ideology function as effective rhetoric for persuasion under Jiang, while under Xi it did not? Why did it function as a compliance-inducing force under Jiang, while it operated as a conflict-inducing force under Xi? The framework of the language game establishes a link between fundamental and operative ideologies—namely, party leaders’ ideological line and its operationalization. Whether ideology serves as effective rhetoric depends not only on the discursive strategies of the participants but is also greatly shaped by fundamental ideology—party leaders’ ideological lines, theories, and slogans, as well as their ideological governance, which set the rules of the language game. The first section of this chapter examines the operational dimension of ideology, comparing the discursive strategies of the participants, focusing on the major rhetoric, their interactions, and their effects on the dynamics of the discourse. The second section examines the fundamental ideology. It compares Deng, Jiang, and Xi’s ideological lines and approaches to ideology and examines how these factors influenced the ways the party ideology was operationalized in the two language games. By comparing the two discourses, this chapter reveals the double-edged nature of ideology’s operational functions and its implications for the party’s governing capacity.

Comparing Operative Ideology The two discourses occurred in relatively similar ideological, political, and institutional contexts, even though they were two decades apart. However, there are notable differences in the ways the party ideology

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was operationalized and functioned in the two discourses. This section compares the discursive strategies of the participants with a focus on the major rhetoric employed and their interactions and functions. Discourse Under Jiang Zemin In the discourse under Jiang, the four major rhetoric were detected: “improving socialism,” “state entrepreneurship” (SE), “social equality,” and the leftist rhetoric—“reform threatens socialism.” Table 6.1 lists the major groups that adopted each rhetoric, the party ideology that was operationalized in the rhetoric, and the major issues promoted by the rhetoric. “Improving socialism” and SE rhetoric operationalized Deng and Jiang’s reformist ideological lines and promoted the establishment of a socialist market economy, the ownership restructuring of the state sector, and the formation of state-owned enterprise (SOE) groups. “Social equality” and “reform threatens socialism” were employed by the opposition and conservative forces and operationalized traditional socialist values such as social equality, the “master’s status” of the working class, and class struggle. “Improving socialism” rhetoric played an important role in the early phase of the reform. It encouraged the “emancipation of the mind,” theoretically justified the adoption of capitalist practices to reform SOEs and helped transform the mindset of many policymakers to be receptive to a Table 6.1 Major rhetoric employed in SOE reform discourse under Jiang Zemin Rhetoric

Groups

Operationalization

Promoting issues

Improving socialism

Reformists

Deng

State entrepreneurship (SE) Social equality

Reformists Bureaucrats

Deng, 1993 Decision

Socialist market economy, SOE autonomy, property rights SOE groups, industrial policies

Social democrats

Reform threatens socialism

Leftists

Traditional socialist values Traditional socialist values

Social welfare, labor rights Labor rights, anti-privatization

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market economy. It facilitated a shared understanding of socialist market economy and made Deng’s theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics the guiding principle of China’s economic reform. Deng’s theory became the mental framework for many policymakers to make sense of the reform and act on it. The persuasiveness of the rhetoric derives from several factors. First, senior reformers operationalized Deng’s pragmatism and “production criterion” in a way that made the most contentious issue of the reform—whether the ownership reform is capitalist or socialist— nearly irrelevant. The rhetoric conveyed that it does not matter whether firms are state- or privately-owned as long as they develop production forces. In this way, it helped alleviate the existing liberal-conservative division. Second, the rhetoric also had a strong “cultural resonance.” Media and social movement scholars argue that effective frames must accommodate the interests, beliefs, and concerns of the audience, drawing on the existing cultural codes and shared beliefs in order to sell stories, shape public opinion, and recruit supporters (Benford and Snow 2000). This can be applied to political rhetoric as well. Socialism is the dominant cultural code of China’s policy elite regardless of their ideological positions, and upholding socialism is a part of the rules of the language game. This cultural resonance made it impossible for the conservatives to openly reject or criticize the rhetoric’s central claim—market reforms strengthen socialism, which, in turn, reduced the chances of the rhetoric being contested. Thus, it resonated with the broader audience, including the conservative forces and helped alleviate the existing liberal-conservative division. Third, the rhetoric is broad in its scope and can promote a wide range of issues from property rights reforms, the Modern Enterprise System (MES), to social security reforms under the banner of “improving socialism.” Rhetoric with a broader scope has more relevance to a broader audience (Benford and Snow 2000: 618–619), and thus has a higher potential to prevail and integrate the audience. Table 6.2 lists the major characteristics of the four rhetoric, focusing on the level of resonance, the duration of dominance, scope, and functions. In comparison with other rhetoric, “improving socialism” was broader in scope and stronger in resonance, and its dominance lasted longer than the others. The second reformist rhetoric, SE, was built on the relative success of “improving socialism.” SE rhetoric became dominant in the mid1990s, infusing neoliberal values into the minds of the policy elite and persuading state officials to build a new state sector that satisfies the

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Table 6.2 Characteristics of major rhetoric employed in SOE reform discourse under Jiang Rhetoric

Adopters

Party line

Improving Reformists Deng socialism State Reformists Deng, entrepreneurship Jiang (SE) Social equality Opposition Trad. Socialism Reform Opposition Trad. threatens Socialism socialism

Duration Resonance Scope

Function

Long

Strong

Broad

Unifying

Long

Strong

Narrow Unifying/dividing

Short

Fair

Broad

Dividing

Short

Weak

Broad

Dividing

demands of socialist market economy. It operationalized Deng’s “production criterion” and Jiang’s party line prescribed in the 1993 Decision. In terms of this, SE rhetoric was similar to “improving socialism”, but the two rhetoric played different roles and complemented each other. While “improving socialism” introduced market ideology in the initial phase, justified it, and prepared the policy community for the new reform, SE rhetoric persuaded the audience to put the new ideology into practice and build a socialist market economy. Compared to “improving socialism,” SE was narrower in scope; it prioritized the developmental goals and specifically promoted the “grasp the large” part of the policy—the corporatization of large SOEs, formation of SOE groups, and implementation of industrial policies. SE rhetoric motivated the audience with economic and practical interests rather than with moral and ideological principles—for example, protecting the state’s rights and interests, increasing state-owned assets, and realizing the state economy’s “leading function.” In this way, it accommodated the institutional interest of the central bureaucracies and SOE administrators and lured them into the reformist camp. Regarding this, the rhetoric functioned as a division-alleviating force. However, SE rhetoric embodied the built-in ideological contradiction of China’s economic reform and was ideologically contradictory—marketizing and corporatizing SOEs while preserving state ownership and control. Despite its success in promoting the reform, the implementation of the “grasp the large” policy led to the development of a new division, inviting criticisms

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from fellow reformists who adhered to the original goal of SOE reforms— that is, to enhance enterprise autonomy. Thus, SE rhetoric performed both integrating and dividing functions. On the other hand, the two opposition rhetoric—“social equality” and “reform threatens socialism”—did not strongly resonate with the policy community. Table 6.2 suggests that their presence was also shorter in duration. The relative weakness of the opposition rhetoric derives largely from the fragmentation of the opposition groups. Despite the shared concerns over corruption, rising unemployment, social disparity, social welfare, and worsening conditions of SOE workers, the opposition groups—the liberal critics of SOE groups, social democrats, labor theorists, and leftists—did not engage in coordinated efforts to advance a common rhetoric due to the differences in their ideological positions and focus issues. Both “social equality” and “reform threatens socialism” are broad in scope and could have integrated and mobilized a wide array of groups under their banners. In particular, the leftists’ “reform threatens socialism” rhetoric could have mobilized a counter-coalition against the reformists who implemented SOE groups if it was articulated and advanced in a way that accommodated the concerns raised by other critics of the reform and aligned them. But such powerful counter-rhetoric was not materialized because of the leftists’ issue-specific approach exclusively focusing on the “master’s status” of the working class and anti-privatization, their outdated Maoist line, and Deng’s decree of “prevent the left.” “Social equality” rhetoric also had the potential to mobilize the critics of SOE groups under its banner of social equality, stability, and fairness. However, the time was not ripe enough to raise social welfare issues during the accelerated phase of SOE group formation in the mid-1990s, and the New Left had not emerged by then. Social welfare and labor rights issues became salient in the late 1990s and the Hu era. Whether party ideology functions as effective rhetoric to facilitate common grounds and promote party policies depends also on the interaction and power balance among the major rhetoric. Considering the built-in ideological contradictions of China’s market reforms, the liberalconservative division, the highly contentious nature of the debate, and the rise of the opposition rhetoric are anticipated findings. However, the important issue here is whether party ideology operated in a manner that alleviated the existing divisions or intensified them.

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Table 6.2 shows the asymmetrical relationship between the reformist and opposition rhetoric. The duration of presence and the level of resonance of the two reformist rhetoric are longer and of higher quality than those of the two opposition rhetoric. This demonstrates that, despite the rise of the opposition rhetoric, the reformist rhetoric maintained relative strength in their resonance, established their dominance, and effectively promoted the party’s reform initiatives. Even if the existing liberal-conservative division persisted throughout the research period, the relative weakness of the opposition rhetoric prevented the existing division from deepening and disrupting the discourse. The rise of equally powerful opposition rhetoric would have reinforced the existing liberalconservative division and derailed the policy process, as it happened in the mixed-ownership reform (MO reform) discourse under Xi. Table 6.2 also highlights that the two reformist rhetoric operationalized Deng’s ideological line, while the two opposition rhetoric employed traditional socialist values. This suggests that Deng’s ideological line was operationalized in a way that subordinated the traditional socialist values and helped facilitate compliance with the party’s reform initiatives. Thus, even if a full consensus of the policy community was not achieved, party ideology, all in all, functioned more as a division-alleviating force than a division-intensifying one and successfully promoted the party initiatives. Discourse Under Xi Jinping In the MO reform discourse under Xi, three major rhetoric were detected—nationalist, “win-win,” and “anti-neoliberalism.” As Table 6.3 shows, nationalist and “anti-neoliberalism” rhetoric operationalized Xi’s Table 6.3 Major rhetoric employed in MO reform discourse under Xi Jinping Rhetoric

Groups

Operationalization

Promoting issues

Nationalist Win-win

Marxist, leftists Neoliberals Pragmatists, Marxists

Xi Reformist party line (two unswervingly)

Anti-neoliberalism

Leftists

Xi, Mao

POSAM Mixed ownership, joint progress of state/private firms Anti-neoliberalism, anti-reform

POSAM = “Public ownership system as the mainstay”

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ideological line and were employed by the conservative groups who advocated limited reform. “Win-win” rhetoric was the only reformist rhetoric that fully promoted MO reform but did not operationalize Xi’s ideological line. The distribution of the major rhetoric under Xi is quite different from that under Jiang: the conservative rhetoric were dominant under Xi while the reformist ones were under Jiang. The shift in the ideological climate is one of the reasons for the difference. The two discourses were separated by nearly two decades. The ideological spectrum of the discursive community shifted toward the right in two decades. In the 1990s, the reformist groups played the role of “party spokesmen” and led the debate, interpreting Deng’s party line, disseminating it with “improving socialism” rhetoric, and theoretically justifying the adoption of market practices to reform SOEs. In the Xi era, the role of “party spokesmen” was mainly carried out by the conservative side, in particular, party theorists and conservative academics who belonged to the “Marxist” group. They interpreted Xi’s ideological line, disseminated it with their interpretation attached to it, and theoretically justified mixed ownership in reference to the original Marxist theory and Deng’s theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Xi’s ideological line and China Dream slogan were operationalized by these conservative forces as the natinalist rhetoric to justify the strategic importance of the state sector and limit the MO reform. One of the variants of the nationalist rhetoric, “indigenization” rhetoric, argued that China’s mixed ownership economy must be built on the country’s distinct historical and socialist foundation, thus, the principle of POSAM—the public ownership system as the mainstay—being an indispensable part of it. Since the upholding of POSAM conflicted with the goals of MO reform promoted by the reformist groups, including the marketization of SOEs’ management through the infusion of private capital, further diversification of SOEs’ ownership structure, and equal status of the public and private sectors, the rhetoric reinforced the existing liberal-conservative division over ownership issues. The shift in the ideological climate also explains the relative weakness of the liberals in the discourse under Xi. They were the major promoters of MO reform; however, they failed to take initiatives in persuasion efforts, operationalizing Xi’s party line, justifying mixed ownership, and negotiating a shared understanding of MO reform with the conservative opponents. After the two decades of “neoliberalism hegemony” (Zhao 2008: 288), neoliberal ideology had been deeply ingrained in the

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minds of many policy elites in the initial phase of the debate. Unlike the reformers in the 1990s, the liberals in the 2010s did not perceive the urgent need to “emancipate the mind” of the policy community, nor did they face a formidable conservative opposition that argued reforms running a capitalist road. The less antagonistic ideological environment provided the liberals little incentive to engage in theoretical arguments relevant to socialism and justify neoliberal reforms to persuade the conservative forces. The initial excitement and optimism displayed by many liberals reflected this favorable environment. However, their excitement was short-lived and was soon replaced by the frustration over the reform’s slow progress, caused by the lack of policy specification and serious commitment by both SOEs and private firms. Many liberals resorted to the harsh criticism of persistent problems of SOEs, including their operational inefficiency, state-sanctioned monopolies, and bureaucratic control, while some turned to sarcasm. Despite their loud criticism, the liberals lacked coherent strategies for persuasion and largely failed to address these problems with a unified rhetoric. The initiative was rather taken by reformist bureaucrats and SOE executives (pragmatists) who employed the “win-win” rhetoric. It operationalized “two unswervingly”—the reformist party line calling for the joint development of different ownership systems. Xi repeatedly employed the “two unswervingly” slogan but it originated from Deng’s production criterion that de-emphasized the difference between public and private ownership. The “win-win” rhetoric stressed the benefits of the collaboration and merger of state and private firms and promoted the reform. The rhetoric was broad in scope and accommodated the interests of the different groups. While it accommodated the “pragmatic” interests of SOE administrators who wanted to use private investment to improve SOEs, it also helped the liberals promote the equal status of the state and private sectors. The rhetoric did not conflict with the interest of the conservative Marxists who acted as “party spokesmen,” as “two unswervingly” was part of the official party line. By accommodating and reconciling the interests of the different groups, the rhetoric facilitated certain common grounds among the contending groups having different ideological orientations and integrated them for a short period of time. Without the leftists’ discursive campaign, it could have functioned as powerful rhetoric to facilitate the politics of compromise and the policy community’s compliance with the party initiative.

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However, the dominance of the “win-win” rhetoric was short-lived and the rhetoric was increasingly subordinated by the discursive campaign launched by leftists. The leftists in the 2010s were more powerful than the ones in the 1990s. They were emboldened by Xi’s hard line and anticorruption campaign, and there was no safeguard against their advance, equivalent to Deng’s “prevent the left.” The leftists took initiatives away from party theorists and reformist groups that had dominated the discourse in the earlier phase, selectively operationalized Xi’s words and directives that matched their anti-reform agenda, and acted as if they were Xi’s spokesmen by disseminating their interpretation of the party line in an authoritative and coercive tone. Their anti-neoliberalism rhetoric, fierce accusations of neoliberalism, and rectification of the liberals crystallized the existing liberal-conservative division. Leftists’ persuasion took a crude form of indoctrination and rectification, wherein Xi’s slogans and words were employed for attacking opponents rather than persuading them. As a result, ideology itself became a major issue, which politicized the discourse. Although their campaign was short in duration and the resonance was weak, the anti-neoliberalism rhetoric was powerful enough to disrupt the entire discourse and obstruct the reform. The leftist campaign demonstrated that when party ideology is not operationalized in congruence with party policies, imposed on others, and employed as a rectification tool, it becomes a division- and conflict-inducing force that disrupts the language game and slows down reforms. On the other hand, a broader, accommodative, and non-coercive rhetoric tends to activate ideology’s integrating function. Regarding the interaction and power balance among the major rhetoric, Table 6.4 demonstrates a pattern opposite to the one found Table 6.4 Characteristics of major rhetoric employed in MO reform discourse under Xi Rhetoric

Adopters

Party line

Duration

Resonance

Scope

Function

Nationalist

Opposition

Medium

Fair

Broad

Dividing

Win-win Anti-neoliberalism

Reformists Opposition

Xi, Deng Deng Xi, Mao

Short Short

Strong Fair

Broad Narrow

Unifying Dividing

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in the discourse under Jiang (see Table 6.2). In the Jiang era, the reformist rhetoric maintained dominance and no powerful counterrhetoric emerged. Thus, the integrating function of the reformist rhetoric outweighed the dividing function of the opposition rhetoric. In the discourse under Xi, none of the three major rhetoric established dominance the same way that the two reformist rhetoric did in the Jiang era. The strengths of the conservative (opposition) and reformist rhetoric were more balanced under Xi, which is likely to increase competition among them and reinforce the existing liberal-conservative division. The nationalist and win-win rhetoric did not become antagonistic to each other because they shared Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics as the basis of their claims. However, the leftist’s anti-neoliberalism rhetoric opposed, rectified, and suppressed the “win-win” rhetoric. As a result, the dividing function of the two conservative rhetoric—nationalist and anti-neoliberalism—outweighed the integrating function of the reformist “win-win” rhetoric. Evidently, the discursive community was fundamentally divided over the issue of POSAM throughout the research period. This means that the most contentious issue of the discourse was still ownership, even two decades after the official legitimatization of the private economy at the 15th Party Congress in 1997. As noted earlier, ownership issues are the manifestation of the ideological contradiction inherent in China’s economic reforms, an attempt to reconcile socialism with the market. In promoting new reforms, the existing elite division caused by this built-in ideological contradiction—preserving public ownership while promoting private ownership—must be overcome through the skillful operationalization of party ideology. The “win-win” rhetoric attempted to alleviate this tension but was not powerful enough to suppress the two conservative rhetoric that reinforced the tension. In comparison, there are many similarities between the two discourses, including the existence of liberal-conservative division caused by the builtin ideological contradiction of SOE reforms, the major groups in the discursive communities consisting of liberals, conservatives, and pragmatic business community, the major issues promoted by these groups, and the occurrence of conservative backlash. However, the two discourses considerably differed in terms of the primary operational functions of ideology. In the Jiang era, the divisions produced by the inherent contradiction of the reform were alleviated through the skillful operationalizations of party ideology by the reformist forces. Despite the rise of the opposition

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rhetoric and the conservative backlash, the entire discourse is characterized as consensual rather than conflictual. In the Xi era, on the other hand, the existing division was reinforced by the operationalization of Xi’s ideological line, and the entire MO discourse is characterized as conflictual. Although policy outcomes are determined by various factors, the difference in ideology’s primary operational functions largely corresponded to the policy outcomes of the two reforms. In the 1990s, the state sector went through a drastic transformation: large SOEs were restructured, emerged as China’s “national champions” by the mid-2000s, and became global market players. On the other hand, the MO reform discourse did not facilitate compromised solutions to important issues, such as the adjustment of the power asymmetry between the two sectors, the reduction of market entry barriers to private investment, the specification of industries eligible for mixed ownership, the role of the party in SOEs, and the corporate governance reform of SOEs.

Comparing Fundamental Ideology The comparison made above indicates that the two reformist rhetoric operationalizing Deng’s ideological line successfully promoted the reform, functioning as a division-reducing force. On the other hand, the two conservative rhetoric operationalizing Xi’s ideological line discouraged the reform, intensified the existing division, and negatively affected the policy results. This contrast poses new questions. Why was Deng’s ideology operationalized by the reformists to promote reforms, while Xi’s ideology was employed by the conservatives to limit reforms? Why was Xi’s ideological line operationalized in the way that deepened the existing division, while Deng’s was not? The conceptual framework of the language game establishes a link between party ideology and its operational functions. How ideology is operationalized in public discourse is not solely determined by discursive strategies of the players of the language game but also significantly influenced by fundamental ideology—the top leaders’ ideological lines and directives that set the rules of the language game. In other words, another key factor that determines ideology’s operational function is party leaders’ ideological lines and ideology work, particularly how they approach ideology and employ it for managing public opinion, policy process, and public discourse. The following section compares the party leaders’ ideological lines and ideology work and examines their influences on the language game.

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Comparing Ideological Lines A comparison between Deng and Xi’s ideological lines reveals notable differences in several aspects, namely, the level of elaboration, congruence with party policies, and coherence with other party agendas. First, Deng elaborated his ideological line in the form of theories, slogans, and directives since the beginning of the reform; his ideological line was a system of coherent thoughts that had been widely disseminated in China since 1978 and guided the reform in different issue areas. The Nanfang talk was the essence of Deng’s ideological line. This Talk clarified the primary goal of the reform, suggested the means to reach the goal, and identified the obstacles. To discourage ideological debates, Deng de-emphasized the differences between planning and market, socialism and capitalism, and public and private ownership, issued the warning on the left, and clarified the criteria to be used to judge new reform practices. Moreover, Deng employed succinct slogans that conveyed his pragmatism, notably, “seeking truth from facts,” “three favorables,” and the “primary stage of socialism.” He also called for the emancipation of the mind and demanded bold executions of reforms. Deng’s highly elaborated thought enabled senior reformists to interpret, contextualize, and operationalize it in a persuasive manner in the language game. The durability of the “improving socialism” rhetoric largely owes to this factor. Second, Deng defined his ideological line in congruence with the party’s policy initiatives. The Nanfang talk was largely the preparation for the launch of the major reforms in the 1990s, including the establishment of a new economic system, socialist market economy, and the initiation of a new round of SOE reforms. Ideological lines should be defined broadly enough to be applicable to different issue areas and contexts, but the core principles of the party line must be in tune with the party’s policies in order to effectively guide the language game. For example, Deng’s pragmatist slogans, such as the cat theory, “three favorables,” and “seeking truth from facts,” did not specifically address SOE reform issues but were adjusted to the context of the SOE reforms and served as powerful key words to justify a socialist market economy and promote SOEs’ ownership restructuring. Lastly, Deng’s ideological line, directives, and party initiatives maintained coherence throughout the Deng era. Unlike Mao, Deng did not engage in adventurous policies or initiatives that deviated from his ideological line. Despite his balancing acts, the recurrent “fang shou

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cycle” observed in the 1980s (Baum 1994), and the crackdown of the Tiananmen uprising, Deng remained committed to “reform and opening,” prioritizing the development of the production forces, encouraging the emancipation of the mind, and demanding the integration of socialism and the market. The coherence in his overall agenda can be well summarized by his slogan of “one center, two basic points” 一 个中心、两个基本点, which called for the development of production forces while maintaining the Four Cardinal Principles and “reform and opening.” Deng’s adherence to market reforms reduced uncertainty and strengthened the voice of the reformers in the discourse. Due to these attributes—articulation, congruence, and coherence—Deng’s ideological line successfully guided the language game and promoted the party’s reform initiatives. On the other hand, a close examination of Xi’s ideological line reveals a few problems in terms of its articulation, congruence with party policies, and coherence with his other agendas. First, despite the well-publicized Chinese Dream slogan, Xi’s ideological line was not—at least at the time of the discourse—fully developed, articulated, and made coherent enough to successfully guide the language game and promote his reform agenda. Xi’s ideology did not form a coherent system of thought until the 19th Party Congress in 2017, which officially addressed the Xi Jinping Thought. His nationalist ideological line, symbolized by the China Dream slogan, did not have core principles, clear focuses, and a unified definition. Xi first mentioned the slogan in his speech at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, when he was elected the general secretary of the party. Since then, Xi has addressed the slogan on various occasions, including in his inauguration speech at National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in March 2013, when he was elected president. Although the slogan has enough symbolic appeal to prompt national confidence and patriotism, it is not an elaborate system of thought as Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics is. Moreover, the slogan is so broad that it can be interpreted in various ways. Xi made several remarks about the Chinese Dream in his speech at the NPC, including the greatness of the Chinese civilization, the establishment of a well-off society and socialism with Chinese characteristics, fostering of the “Chinese spirit” 中国精神, the unity of the people, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation under the party’s leadership (Xi 2013a). China Daily published Xi’s remarks on the China Dream in this address:

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We must realize it by closely depending on the people, and we must incessantly bring benefits to the people. Bear in mind the mission, unite as one, and gather into an invincible force with wisdom and power. All Chinese people deserve equal opportunities to enjoy a prosperous life, see their dreams come true and benefit together from the country’s development. I will always be loyal to our Motherland, be loyal to the people and dedicate all my time and energy to my duties and responsibilities to serve the people. I will never let you down and will live up to the trust and expectations of people of all ethnicities. We cannot show the slightest complacency or display any slackness at work. (Zhao 2013)

These remarks were abstract and symbolic and devoid of core principles, which made the operationalization of Xi’s ideological line quite difficult in the language game. The analysis presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that party theorists (Marxists) faced difficulties in reconciling Xi’s slogan with Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics for theoretically justifying mixed ownership. Due to the lack of core principles and elaboration, the slogan was often employed in a highly abstract manner or merely for paying lip services to the party line. Symbolism is an important component of ideology since it helps expand its scope and enhances its applicability to a wide range of issue areas and contexts. However, symbolism can also lead to conflicting interpretations of the same ideological line and, consequently, produce disagreement and conflict in the language game. As the analysis demonstrated, the China Dream slogan was interpreted and operationalized in various ways by the different groups, including “indigenization” rhetoric of the Marxists, “anti-capitalist” of the leftists, and “Realism” of the pragmatists. In addition, nationalism, despite its emotional appeal, can be a “double-edged sword” (Zhao 2005) and backfire on the reform agenda being applied to contentious issue areas such as SOE reforms. In fact, Xi’s nationalist ideological line invoked a sense of xenophobia, anti-foreign sentiment,

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and economic nationalism, and strengthened the voices of the conservatives and leftists who defended the strategic importance of the state sector for the sake of national security and attempted to limit the reform. The nationalist rhetoric with anti-West and anti-capitalist flavor employed by the leftists was also a case in point. Second, Xi did not present the slogan in congruence with his policy agendas. It is difficult to find any logical connection between the Chinese Dream slogan and the economic reform agendas addressed by Xi at the 2013 Third Plenum, other than that economic reforms would build a prosperous society and help realize the Chinese dream. The 2013 Decision laid out various policy agendas but the term, Chinese Dream, 中国 梦, was only employed twice in the document, in the very beginning and at the end in a very symbolic manner. The paragraph that contains the term reads as follows: Faced with a new environment and new tasks, we must deepen the reform comprehensively at this new historical turning point, and continuously strengthen every confidence in taking the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, in our theories and in our system so as to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects, eventually making China a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious, and realizing the Chinese dream of the nation’s great revival. (The Communist Party of China 2013)

Lack of a clear connection between Xi’s policy agenda and ideological line made the operationalization of Xi’s ideology difficult; it was especially challenging for reformists to contextualize specific key words and employ them to justify and promote the reform. Thus, the reformist rhetoric—“win-win”—did not employ Xi’s China Dream slogan but instead operationalized “two unswervingly,” which is the reformist party line that originated from Deng’s ideological line. Similarly, the “indigenization” rhetoric employed by party theorists was an attempt to reconcile Xi’s slogan with Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, but its central claims were largely based on Deng’s theory. Trevaskes (2011) argued that the top leaders’ ideological rhetoric is a crucial mechanism for maneuvering party policies, supplying the normative base of action, overcoming ideological barriers, and steering politically sensitive discourse such as judicial reforms. She studied the policy discourse over judicial reforms in the Hu era and argued that the party leadership employed

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Hu’s “harmonious society” concept, infused new values into the judicial system, and skillfully guided the debate, which made the system-wide reform possible. Lastly, the major agendas initiated by Xi in the earlier period of his term—notably, nationalism symbolized by the China Dream slogan, anti-corruption campaign, and reform initiatives—were not ideologically coherent. When Xi came into power in 2012, both domestic and international audiences welcomed his China Dream slogan and expected him to be a decisive and pro-market reformer. However, Xi could not live up to the initial expectation as he increasingly tightened ideological, media, and social control and centralized the decision-making process. The “Document No. 9” (2013) circulated among party officials in April 2013 identified the “seven false ideological trends”, and Xi’s “August 19 speech” called for strengthening the control over public opinion, academia, and the Internet (Xi 2013b). However, the economic agenda that Xi addressed at the Third Plenum in November 2013 was quite neoliberal, allowing the market to play the “decisive role,” calling for MO reform, and even welcoming mixed ownership firms controlled by private capital. The lack of integrity among these different agendas, especially the discrepancy between the tighter thought control and neoliberal market reforms, produced conflict between the political objective demanding ideological rectitude and the economic initiative demanding neoliberal measures. The contradictory agendas aroused uncertainty, which was felt by many policymakers, and deepened the division in the discursive community. They also misled major supporters of the reform—the neoliberals—who were initially excited about the reform, then, became frustrated, disappointed, and eventually silenced. On the other hand, Xi’s attack on Western values, in particular, neoliberalism, strengthened the voice of the leftists and encouraged them to attack the liberals and obstruct the reform. Despite the tighter ideological control, Xi’s ideological line was not operationalized in a way that successfully guides the language game and promotes the reform. Instead, it deepened the existing division and polarized the discursive community. Considering the built-in ideological tension in China’s market reforms, the existing division between the liberals and the conservatives can be expected as normal. However, the analysis demonstrates that party ideology—Xi’s ideological line, slogans, and directives—functioned more as a division-inducing than a divisionreducing force, reinforcing the existing division over ownership. In order

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to successfully guide the language game and promote party policies, party ideology must be defined in congruence with party policies, elaborated, and made coherent with other agendas. Although party leaders cannot directly control how their ideological line would be interpreted and operationalized by game players, how party ideology operates in public discourse is not only determined by participants’ discursive strategies but also significantly shaped by fundamental ideology—the top leader’s ideological line that sets the rules of the game. Despite the well-publicized China Dream slogan, Xi’s ideological line was not developed, articulated, and coherent enough to guide the language game, alleviate the existing division, and facilitate compliance with his reform agenda. Although a few common grounds were facilitated by the “win-win” rhetoric drawing on “two unswervingly” and Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, neither of these are Xi’s original ideological platforms. Comparing Ideology Work The operational functions of party ideology are also determined by party leaders’ ideological governance: how they approach ideology, how they manage it through propaganda work, and how they employ it for public opinion and discourse control. There is a striking contrast between the party’s ideology governance in the two eras—“ideological openness” (Minzner 2018: 8) under Jiang and tight control under Xi. In the reform era, the party abandoned the Maoist propaganda model for mass mobilization and indoctrination and modernized its ideology and propaganda work, employing softer means of control. Under Jiang, the party initiated the reorganization of its propaganda work making it suitable for the market economy and adopting new techniques of mass persuasion. The major objectives of propaganda work shifted away from indoctrinating the masses to educating the public, guiding public opinion, and diverting the public’s attention from various social problems (Brady 2012). The successful market reforms have been largely attributed to the de-emphasis of ideology and ideological pragmatism under Deng and Jiang who encouraged debates over economic reforms and the reinterpretation of socialism. The reorientation of party ideology to socialism with Chinese characteristics overcame the ideological barriers to marketization (Zhao 1998: 47), and the spread of “market friendly propaganda” (Brady 2012) depoliticized the society. As the party’s control over citizens’ internal beliefs and lives weakened, the society started to become

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increasingly liberalized, commercialized, and internationalized as labor markets, civil society organizations, and investigative journalism emerged (Minzner 2018: 20–22). On the other hand, tighter ideological, media, and social controls characterize Xi’s governance. Under Xi, ideology has been “rehabilitated” (Zhang 2016), and government officials, media, and academic institutions have been forced to conform to Xi’s ideological line, which stresses nationalism, moral and ideological rectitude, and the study of Marxism. The crackdown on academia and online discourse has silenced public intellectuals and suppressed civic activism. The “Document No. 9” identified the “seven false ideological trends,” including the Western constitutional democracy, universal human rights, civil society, and neoliberalism, and demanded the strengthening management of the ideological fronts by rectifying erroneous thoughts, promoting conformity to Xi’s thoughts and actions, and enhancing the control over public opinion and the media (Document 9, 2013). Xi’s “August 19 speech” at the Ideology and Propaganda Work Conference addressed that the party was in a “public opinion struggle” and promoted fighting against “hostile forces” that deny Marxism, party rule, and Four Cardinal Principles (Xi 2013b). Xi also embraced Mao as a symbol of its commitment to nationalism and populism (Zhang 2016). Scholars argue that Xi’s assertion of control and rectification measures derive mainly from Xi’s concerns over the mounting problems the party faced when he came to power, including the growing public criticisms, the loss of control over public discourse, and the slowdown of economic growth. Xi has been trying to strengthen the government’s ability to implement reforms, maintain social stability, and rebuild its legitimacy (Zhao 2016: 1170). How are the differences in the party’s ideology work reflected in the management of the language game and the operational functions of the party ideology? There are notable differences in the party’s discourse management in the Jiang and Xi eras, especially in terms of balancing contending forces and managing conservative backlashes. Deng took a distinctive approach to manage public discourses, the so-called middle course approach. It is not simply taking ideologically middle positions and balancing contending forces but also encouraging debates within the boundary set by the party. Deng encouraged debates over the reinterpretation of socialism, while prohibiting them in political realms (Sun 1995). Deng’s “no debate decree” (Zhao 2008: 34) that discouraged the debate over whether the reform is socialism or capitalism

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was also a part of the “middle course approach.” Jiang largely inherited this approach and equally encouraged vigorous debates over the reinterpretation of socialism. While Deng strategically chose this approach to justify and promote reforms, Jiang took it as a defensive measure to maintain political stability. Instead of proactively shaping debates, Jiang monitored them, acting as a balancer of contending forces and accommodating both reformist and conservative positions in major party decisions such as the 1993 Decision and his address at the 15th Party Congress. Jiang avoided taking sides and did not make his positions clear, an approach that Lam called the “policy of strategic ambiguity”: Jiang carefully maintained a balance among contending forces so that no one would challenge his rule (Lam 1999: 43–46). On the other hand, Jiang often acted decisively to silence or intervene in the discourse in order to remove destabilizing forces. In his “May 29 speech” before the 15th Party Congress, he issued the warning against the left, facilitating the reformists’ counter-offensive against leftist criticisms (Chen 1999). He also suspended some conservative and leftist journals including The Pursuit of Truth. Jiang’s accommodative approach and balancing acts were largely successful in alleviating the division in the discourse and facilitating compliance with party policies. Due to Jiang’s contradictory and ambiguous positions, ideologically sensitive issues that could have caused political conflict, notably, SOEs’ ownership reforms and the legitimation of private ownership, were successfully adopted at the 15th Party Congress and implemented, paving the way toward further economic growth. Xi also engaged in balancing acts of contending forces and took ideological contradictory positions. However, Xi’s balancing acts and contradictory positions rather fragmented and polarized the discursive community than integrated it. Xi’s neoliberal reform agenda initially invigorated the reformist forces, but his tighter political control nearly silenced them later and emboldened the leftists. This can be regarded as Xi’s attempt to balance the two opposing forces; however, it seemed more as the lack of integrity in his overall agendas than a strategic effort to balance the two opposing forces. The coexistence of tighter political control and neoliberal reforms had destabilizing effects on the MO reform discourse: it created contradictory political and economic demands, encouraged leftists’ advance, and eventually polarized the discursive community. Xi’s contradictory positions on SOE reforms also led to similar results. While the 2013 Decision stipulated the “decisive

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role” of the market in resource allocation and even welcomed mixed firms controlled by private capital, Xi repeatedly emphasized the strategic importance of the state sector and strengthened the party’s role in supervising SOEs. Xi’s contradictory positions allowed different groups to pick Xi’s words that matched their agenda and justify themselves, as observed in the different operationalization of the China Dream slogan and leftists’ selective quotes of Xi, which fragmented the discursive community and reinforced the existing division. Contradictory directives constitute an important component of balancing acts. Deng promoted economic reform while prohibiting political one. Jiang also accommodated contradictory agendas submitted by both reformist and conservative forces. Then, why did the balancing acts by Deng and Jiang have unifying effects, while Xi’s have dividing effects? A crucial difference was observed in the roles played by the top leaders. Jiang balanced contending forces with a relatively hands-off approach. He did not make his positions clear, let the policy elite debate, and accommodated contending positions in party decisions. In this way, he acted as a referee of the game and facilitated a bottom-up decision-making and discourse process. On the other hand, Xi made his positions clear, imposed his will on the discursive community, and demanded conformity to his thought and action. Once the top leader makes his position clear, it always invigorates some groups and dismays the others. It makes the top leader a player and contender in the game rather than a referee whose job is to ensure fair play in the game. Since the language game is a site of contention, opposition groups are soon formed, which deepens the existing cleavages and disrupts the language game. This indicates that balancing acts and top-down control are not quite compatible with each other. The top leaders’ approach to ideology is largely a reflection of how they perceive ideology and how deeply they are committed to ideology as a belief system. While Deng and Jiang perceived ideology as a political resource to promote reforms, Xi considers it a belief system and demands ideological unity and rectitude. Xi’s perception of ideology is similar to that of Mao, who believed that beliefs can transform human behaviors and societies. This difference in commitment is reflected in the ideological openness under Jiang and the tight control under Xi. Deng and Jiang’s use of ideology was largely pragmatic. They utilized it as a political device for managing debates, balancing forces, and intervening in the debates when necessary. They also employed ideology as

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an instrument for agenda-setting and denial. Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 948) noted that those who control ideology and social values have the power to control what issues can be raised in the political system. Deng utilized this agenda-setting and denial function to manage the discourse by incorporating the “production criterion,” “no debate decree,” and “prevent the left” into his party line. Jiang followed suit and occasionally exercized agenda-setting and denial power. He issued a warning on the left to quell the conservative backlash. In his address at the 15th Party Congress, Jiang closed off the long-dragged “socialist or capitalist” debate by upholding the “production criterion.” Agenda denial is especially important when it comes to managing conservative backlashes that can polarize the policy community. Due to the built-in ideological contradictions of China’s market reforms, reform discourses nearly always produce conservative backlashes. Similar backlashes were observed in the discourses in the Jiang and Xi eras, during which the leftists expanded their influence and criticized and obstructed the reforms. In order to promote reforms, the top leaders need to prevent such backlashes from polarizing the policy community and disrupting the discourse and policy process. In this regard, Deng’s decree of “prevent the left” worked as a safeguard against the leftist criticisms. It denied their agenda, isolated them, and prevented them from expanding its influence, hijacking, and politicizing the discourse. Without this safeguard, the leftists might have taken the initiative away from the reformists and mobilized the opposition forces by employing the “reform threatens socialism” rhetoric. For this reason, the Old Left was considered to be a major threat to the reforms in the Jiang era (Brady 2008: 74). Deng and Jiang understood the potential threat of “socialization of conflict” by the leftists: disadvantaged parties have incentives to publicize their issues and expand the scope of conflict in order to mobilize support (Schattschneider 1960: 39–40). Therefore, Deng employed party ideology as an agenda denial tool and inserted the safeguard into the rules of the language game. On the other hand, Xi tends to consider ideology as a belief system and his commitment to ideology is far deeper than those of both Deng and Jiang. Xi’s emphasis on the harmonization of the spirit of the party and people, the centrality of propaganda and ideology work, and the mandatory study of Marxism in the “August 19 Speech” poses a striking contrast to Deng’s ideological pragmatism and openness that encouraged the reinterpretation of socialism. As Putnam (1971: 655) argued, a deeper commitment to ideology makes it an emotionally charged belief

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system and strengthens the “ideological attitudes,” including hostile and intolerant attitudes toward political opponents, black-white thinking, and opposition to compromise, consensus, and pluralist politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, a deeper commitment also increases mutual hostility and exclusiveness among different ideologies. As observed in the leftists’ discursive campaign in the MO reform discourse, the “ideological attitudes” are associated with the traditional propaganda methods characterized by indoctrination, rectification, and downward flow of communication and tend to politicize the discourse by making ideology a central issue and induce conflict. Although similar leftist criticisms and conservative backlashes were observed in the two discourses, Xi’s party line was not equipped with a safeguard that can prevent the leftists’ attack of neoliberalism and obstruction of the reform. Instead, Xi’s deeper commitment to ideology and hard-line policies encouraged their advance. As a result, ideology became the primary cause of conflict and division and lost its function as an effective controlling device for integrating the policy community and promoting party policies.

Ideology: A Double-Edged Sword for Rulers This chapter examined the major determinants of ideology’s operational functions by revisiting the conceptual framework of the language game. The framework establishes a link between fundamental and operative ideologies—or party ideology and its operational functions. Through the comparison of the major rhetoric employed in the two discourses (operative ideology) and of the party leaders’ ideology work (fundamental ideology), the chapter demonstrated that how party ideology is practiced in public discourse is significantly shaped by the party’s ideology work, the fundamental ideology. Party leaders’ ideological lines and ideological governance—in particular, how they approach ideology and utilize it to manage public discourse—set the rules of the language game. These factors greatly influence the ways how the language game is played and determine whether party ideology performs a consensus-inducing or conflict-inducing function. The chapter highlighted the sharp contrast in the party’s ideology work under Jiang and Xi. Deng’s ideological line was coherent, well-articulated in congruence with party initiatives, and equipped with the safeguard against conservative backlash, which allowed the party ideology to operate as a division-alleviating force and promoted the drastic policy outcomes.

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On the other hand, Xi’s China Dream slogan was not clearly defined and well-articulated in line with his reform programs, which made the operationalization of Xi’s ideological line difficult in the language game and intensified the existing division over ownership. Furthermore, there were also notable differences in how the party leaders approached ideology and utilized it to manage the discourses. Deng’s “middle course” approach and Jiang’s “strategic ambiguity” reduced the intensity of ideology in politics, tolerated ideological differences, and balanced contending forces, which prevented the polarization of the discursive community. On the other hand, Xi’s stronger commitment to ideology and imposition of ideological rectitude and unity, made ideological commitment an important issue, produced the contradictory agendas, and nearly polarized the discursive community. As a result, the party ideology lost its function as an effective instrument in managing the language game to promote Xi’s reform initiatives. This difference largely derives from how the top leaders perceive ideology and how deeply they commit themselves to ideological beliefs. While Deng and Jiang considered ideology as a resource to control policy processes and discourses, Xi perceived it as a belief system and deeply committed to it. Deng and Jiang’s commitments to ideological beliefs were weaker than those of Mao and Xi, which made their pragmatic use of ideology and loosened control possible. If they had had the same degree of commitment to ideology as that of Xi, the hands-off approach would have been impossible. However, the very “ideological openness” and hands-off approach enhanced the party’s ability to guide public opinion and implement reforms, as the “authoritarian resilience” paradigm argues. This suggests that by rehabilitating ideology, Xi has been undoing the party’s effort to modernize the propaganda work initiated under his predecessors and undermining its ability to manage public discourse. It is ironic that Xi’s deeper commitment to and rehabilitation of ideology activated its conflict-inducing function and negatively affected his reform agenda, given that Xi’s original motive for the tighter ideological control was to enhance the government’s ability to implement reforms and rebuild its legitimacy. Although more empirical research and comparison of public discourses are necessary to understand the multiple operative functions of ideology, this analysis suggests that ideology can be a double-edged sword for rulers due to its two contradictory operational functions. Rulers need

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an ideology to sustain their rule; however, ideology potentially destabilizes their rule as well, especially when ideological rectitude and unity are overly emphasized and imposed. Therefore, ideology is a difficultto-handle resource for rulers. The comparison of the party’s ideology work revealed that party ideology does not always function as an effective instrument for facilitating agreements, compromises, and compliance with party policies, guide public opinion, and enhance the party’s governing capacity, as widely assumed in the existing literature. A deeper commitment to ideological beliefs and the imposition of ideological conformity are more likely to generate mutual hostility among different ideologies, make ideology a primary cause of conflict, and disrupt the language game. This works as a reminder of the fact that in the Mao and early post-Mao eras, ideology felt so intense that ideological differences nearly always produced conflict, power struggles, and factionalism. In this way, ideology ceases to be an effective controlling device for party leaders in managing public opinion and discourse. Thus, ideology can be a risky resource for rulers, even if it is an indispensable resource for enhancing their governance and legitimacy. The concluding chapter examines the relationship among ideology, language, and political power in the broader context of China’s economic reforms and examines its implication for the party’s reform governance and legitimacy in the Xi era.

References Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 56(4), 947–952. Baum, R. (1994). Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000, August). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. Brady, A. M. (2008). Marketing dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Brady, A. M. (2012). China’s thought management. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Chen, F. (1999, June). An unfinished battle in China: The leftist criticism of the reform and the third thought emancipation. The China Quarterly, 158, 447–467.

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The Communist Party of China. (2013, November 12). The Decision of the Central Committee of CPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform. English version. http://english.court.gov.cn/ 2015-10/08/content_22130532.htm. Accessed 18 August 2018. Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation. (2013, November 8). ChinaFile. https:// www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation. Accessed 19 June 2019. Lam, W. W. (1999). The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore: Prentice-Hall. Minzner, C. (2018). End of an era: How China’s authoritarian revival is undermining its rise. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R. D. (1971). Studying elite political culture: The case of “ideology”. American Political Science Review, 65(3), 651–681. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/1955512. Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The Semi-Sovereign People: A realist’s view of democracy in America. Rinehart and Winston Inc: Holt. Sun, Y. (1995). The Chinese reassessment of socialism, 1976–1992. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Trevaskes, S. (2011). Political ideology, the party, and politicking: Justice reform in China. Modern China, 37 (3), 315–344. Xi, J. (2013a). Speech at the first session of the Twelfth National Party Congress (March 17, 2013) 习近平:在十二届全国人大一次会议上的讲话 (2013年3 月17日). Central Government Portal 中央政府门户网站. http://www.gov. cn/ldhd/2013-03/17/content_2356344.htm. Accessed 10 April 2018. Xi, J. (2013b). Speech at the National Ideology and Propaganda Work Conference. China Digital Times. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2013/11/ 网传习近平8•19讲话全文:言论方面要敢抓敢管敢/. Accessed 5 April 2018. Zhang, T. (2016, March 1). China’s coming ideological wars. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/01/chinas-coming-ideologicalwars-new-left-confucius-mao-xi/. Accessed 8 September 2018. Zhao, S. (2005). Nationalism’s double edge. The Wilson Quarterly, 29(4), 76– 82. Zhao, S. (2016). The ideological campaign in Xi’s China: Rebuilding regime legitimacy. Asian Survey, 56(6), 1168–1193. Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, market, and democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Zhao, Y. (2008). Communication in China: Political economy, power and conflict. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Zhao, Y. (2013, March 18). Chinese dream’ is Xi’s vision. China Daily. https:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16315025. htm. Accessed 29 July 2020.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Ideology, Language, and Political Power

Abstract This concluding chapter examines the relationship among ideology, language, governance, and political power in the broader context of China’s economic reforms. Based on the findings of the case studies, the chapter submits a critical assessment on Xi’s ideology work and its implications for the party’s ruling capacity, legitimacy, and political power. Keywords Xi Jinping rule · Dictator’s dilemma · Two faces of power · Mobilization of meaning · China economic reform

This book demonstrated the contradictory nature of ideology’s operational functions. It can either assume the function of effective political rhetoric that persuades others, alleviates divisions, and mobilizes support for state policies, or take up the opposite function, which deepens divisions, produces conflicts, and negatively affects the state’s governing capacity. Due to the dual functions, ideology can be a double-edged sword for rulers. It is an indispensable resource for rulers but a risky one as well. In order to enhance a regime’s ruling capacity and legitimacy, it is imperative for rulers to define, articulate, and deploy ideology in a way that activates its integrating and legitimating functions. On the other © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8_7

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hand, if rulers impose ideological unity and rectitude, then that ideology can become a source of division and conflict and negatively affect their regime’s governance. The findings of this study illuminated some important relationships among ideology, language, governance, and political power. First, this study found a paradoxical relationship between the party’s ideology work and party ideology’s operational functions. The integrating function of ideology is associated with party leaders’ relatively weaker commitment to ideological unity and purity, notably, Deng and Jiang’s ideological pragmatism, hands-off approach, and “policy of strategic ambiguity” (Lam 1999: 43–46). This finding is counterintuitive. It is plausible that a leader’s emphasis on ideological unity is more likely to integrate society, a group or a nation, and enhance the leader’s governing capacity. However, the comparison of the two discourses revealed the opposite: the encouragement of the reinterpretation of socialism, the accommodations of contending views, and the flexible balancing acts promoted the reforms, facilitated compliance, and enhanced the party’s governing capacity in the Jiang era. On the other hand, Xi’s deeper commitment to ideology and imposition of ideological conformity to the party center deepened the division in the discursive community and slowed down the reform process. How can this paradox be explained? This issue is relevant to the debate over the narrow and broad conceptions of ideology discussed in Chapter 2. Political scientists tend to define ideology as a politically oriented, consciously held, and coherent belief system with explicitly stated doctrines and principles, which also includes “isms” and extremist beliefs. On the other hand, sociologists and anthropologists tend to define ideology as a set of beliefs not clearly distinguishable from cultural systems and social norms necessary for social cohesion. The former is the narrow definition of ideology, and the latter is the broader definition. The broader definitions tend to emphasize unity and cohesion of collectivities. Yuezhi Zhao argues that ideology became more implicit in the Jiang and Hu eras as the party shifted its ideology work from “crude political indoctrination to more subtle forms of ideological domination.” She explains this shift with the “broadened concept of ideology: instead of seeing ideology as an explicit and static set of doctrines, ideology is perceived as an active practice operative on the level of common sense and everyday consciousness and discourses” (Zhao 1998: 5, 10). The marketization of party ideology in the reform era added market values such as economic efficiency and consumerism to

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party ideology. As a result, party ideology was gradually merged into societal values. Once propaganda is skillfully framed in a way that incorporates social and cultural values, it is expressed, disseminated, and reproduced “involuntarily” by the media and the public. This is Ellul’s notion of “sociological propaganda” (Ellul 1973). As a result, party propaganda spreads into all spheres of our lives and operates on the level of “everyday consciousness and discourses.” In this way, ideology can be equated with social norms or culture that binds a nation together, as the broader definition argues. Although the public perceives this shift as the diminishing influence of ideology and de-politicization of society, Zhao asserts that party ideology is still operating in various cultural and entertainment forms, and “its grip on the people is no less totalistic” (Zhao 1998: 5–6). She argues that even if the party abandoned indoctrination in the reform era and does not promote Marxist political doctrines such as class struggles, it is not the “de-ideologization” or “end of ideology” (Zhao 1998: 5). Party ideology is still “indoctrinating” the public and integrates society more subtly and efficiently. The shift from the tight to soft control of ideology, indeed, made the party’s ideological domination subtle but even more totalistic. Therefore, the above-mentioned paradox—the association of the de-emphasis of ideological unity and the integrating function of ideology—can be explained in this way. The removal of the top-down imposition of ideology broadened the concept of ideology, made the party’s ideological domination more subtle and totalistic, and activated the integrating function of party ideology. What Zhao explains here is the notion of “cultural hegemony” submitted by Gramsci: a ruling class propagates its ideology as social and cultural norms in order to maintain political power rather than by means of coercion and force (Gramsci 2010: 488). This notion suggests that when ideology is felt subtly rather than intensely, expressed implicitly than explicitly, and disseminated involuntarily than coercively, it is more likely to integrate societies. Thus, skillful ideology work makes ideology less explicit, activates its integrating function, and enhances “relations of domination.” This notion is consistent with the “authoritarian resilience” thesis and the findings of this study. This approach was, however, reversed by the “rehabilitation” of ideology under Xi, who considers tighter thought control and ideological unity necessary for rebuilding party legitimacy. Suisheng Zhao argues that Xi’s multiple ideological campaigns and tightening control over the media and education derive mainly from Xi’s concerns over the party’s

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vulnerability to public anger about corruption, income disparity, and pollution, at the time of the economic slowdown. Xi tries to prevent the “explosion of political participation that challenges the status quo” and to strengthen the government’s capability to implement reforms (Zhao 2016: 1170, 1187–1188). Brady also argues that the “liberalization of Chinese media since the 1990s has opened up the Pandora’s Box of public opinion.” Xi attempts to “curb public debate, reset the boundaries of public expression, and silence popular criticism” (Brady 2016: 10–11). If Xi’s primary motive behind the tighter control had been his perceived vulnerability of the party to public anger and criticisms, Xi might have been trapped in the “dictator’s dilemma.” This study demonstrates that the more ideological unity and rectitude Xi demands, the less effective party ideology becomes as an instrument for enhancing the party’s ruling capacity. Rulers’ deeper commitment to ideological unity is likely to activate ideology’s dividing function, slow down reforms, and negatively affect their governing capacity. This paradoxical relationship—the emphasis of unity induces division and conflict—makes ideology a vital yet risky resource for rulers. Second, by adopting the framework of the language game, this study also illuminated the relationship among ideology, language, governance, and political power in the broader context of China’s economic reforms. Clarifying this relationship is important to understand the implications of Xi’ tighter control of ideology for the party’s ruling capacity, legitimacy, and political power. According to the notion of “cultural hegemony” and the “authoritarian resilience” thesis, effective ideology work can reduce coercion but enhance “relations of domination.” The party’s ideology work is closely related to how the party exercises its power. Deng and Jiang abandoned the Maoist propaganda model, reduced the intensity of ideology in politics, and employed ideology as a resource to guide public opinion and discourse. Their pragmatic approach to ideology provided the party with an alternative way to exercise its power without weakening its control and domination. This shift can be explained by the notion of the “two faces of power” introduced by Bachrach and Baratz: Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decision that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the principal process to public consideration of only

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those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences. (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 948)

The way that the party exercised its power shifted away from the use of the first face of power in the Mao era—the top-down imposition of ideology by coercive means—to the second face of power—“creating or reinforcing social and political values” that were favorable and advantageous for the party in implementing reforms. The adoption of the second face of power is clearly observed in Deng and Jiang’s management of the discourse. Instead of imposing the Marxist belief on the discursive community, they employed ideology as a tool to manage the language game, encouraged debates within the established boundary, and, when necessary, utilized it as an instrument for agenda-setting and denial to “subordinate other conflicts” (Schattschneider 1960: 71). This non-coercive approach helped the party ideology function as an effective means of persuasion in the language game, “emancipated” the minds of the policy elites, and facilitated compliance with party policies. Thus, without using coercive power, the party enhanced its governing capacity. However, Xi’s tighter control has brought back the first face of power to the forefront. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the use of the first face of power significantly weakened the party’s ability to employ ideology as a device for managing the contentious reform discourse. Coercive measures are inherently incompatible with the management of the language game because they discourage the game from being fairly played. With Xi’s hard-line policies, traditional propaganda methods characterized by indoctrination, rectification, and downward flow of communication were revived in the discourse, and party ideology was often operationalized for attacking and rectifying opponents rather than persuading them, which made party ideology the primary cause of conflict. It is reasonable to state that the leftists’ discursive campaign was largely the manifestation of Xi’s use of the first face of power. Whether the party can successfully set the rules of the language game or not has significant implications for its reform governance. Policy studies literature indicates that the party’s ability to produce effective policy outcomes has been declining under Xi. The major reform agendas Xi addressed at the Third Plenum have only produced “incoherent and

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disappointing” policy outcomes. In particular, the policy process of stateowned enterprise (SOE) reform has been “broken” and the quality of the policy outcomes sharply declined under Xi as a result of the centralization of decision-making, the lack of policy specification, and the coexistence of contradictory agendas (Naughton 2016: 40–41). Intense ideological and disciplinary campaigns have plagued the policy processes of other reform areas, such as fiscal and judicial reforms. Heilmann argues that Xi’s autocratic leadership and tightening control have reduced the party’s adaptive capacities and the advantages of the “bottom-up experimentalism” that have driven China’s economic reforms (Heilmann 2016: 8–9). Policy discourse is, in a sense, a microcosm of the public sphere. A similar dynamic that occurred in the mixed ownership reform (MO reform) discourse could be replicated in broader society. If the party cannot successfully manage the language game, how can it guide public opinion, regiment the public’s mind, and “manufacture consent” (Lippmann 1922: 248)? To escape from the dictator’s dilemma, rulers need to understand the importance of language and its close association with political power. Ideology is practiced through language, not by coercion. Ideologies are expressed, acquired, reproduced, and perpetuated through language (Dijk 2006: 115). In other words, “language is an instrument of power,” borrowing Bourdieu’s words (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 37). Language is the principal medium through which meaning is mobilized in society in a way that sustains relations of domination (Thompson 1984: 73). A dominant power or ruling class imposes its own language— in the form of ideology—on the whole population as the only legitimate language and unifies the “the linguistic market.” Thus, power relations are reflected in language (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991: 45–46). For Chinese leaders, successfully defining a legitimate language— or ideological line—is the key to regimenting the public’s mind and rebuilding legitimacy without resorting to coercion. If this is successfully accomplished, ideology becomes a highly productive resource for party leaders. The top leader’s ability to define and redefine ideological lines is particularly important, considering the distinctive nature of China’s market reform. As noted earlier, China’s economic reform is an attempt to reconcile socialism with the market. Due to the incompatibility of socialist and market principles, new reform programs always produce ideological tension and division among the policy elites. SOE reforms particularly embody this built-in contradiction of China’s reform and have suffered

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from the long-dragged ideological debates caused by the conflicting demands—political demands for public ownership and state control, on one hand, and economic demands for private ownership and the “decisive role” of the market, on the other. This unique nature of China’s economic reform requires party leaders to submit ideological alternatives that could activate ideology’s consensus-inducing and integrating function for the implementation of reforms. If “language is an instrument of power,” the key to alleviating the built-in ideological tension is mobilizing new meanings, which can only be done by the top leader who has the authority to define a legitimate language, or fundamental ideology. In other words, the party leaders’ job is redefining ideological lines, infusing new values into the public, breaking new ground, and mobilizing compliance with party initiatives, as Deng once skillfully did. By justifying a market economy through socialism with Chinese characteristics and private ownership through the “production criterion,” Deng mobilized new meanings and changed the rules of the language game. Given the inherent contradictions of China’s reforms, without such efforts, ideology is prone to be a dividing force, which negatively affects the party’s ruling capacity and legitimacy. Suisheng Zhao argued in 2016 that Xi had not successfully advanced a coherent ideological alternative: the party had increasingly resorted to nationalism while re-embracing communism (Zhao 2016: 1192). This study supports Zhao’s remark. Has Xi developed a coherent ideological alternative since then? Despite the establishment of the Xi Jinping Thought at the 19th Party Congress, there are indications that the inherent contradictions of socialism and the market have continuously dragged out the ongoing SOE reforms. MO reform is still in progress today, but its pace is slow. Against the initial pledge of the “decisive role” of the market, the state is reluctant to withdraw from SOEs’ management and even “strikes back” (Lardy 2019). The protection of private investors shows no sign of improvement and the power imbalance between the state and private sectors has been widening (Zhang 2018). These latest developments suggest that Xi’s ideological line does not alleviate the contradictions produced by his economic reform agenda. On the contrary, the contradictions seem to be widening as political and economic objectives increasingly fall apart by tightening ideological control. Schattschneider (1960: 66–68) once stated that the definition of alternatives determines “what politics is about” and allocates power. Power

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belongs to those who can successfully define “politics.” To sustain relations of domination, it is imperative for China’s top leaders to mobilize meanings in a way that regiments the public’s mind, rather than imposing ideological rectitude and unity. How meaning is mobilized affects how the language game is played and how ideology operates in the real world of politics, and, therefore, has significant implications for the party’s ruling capacity, legitimacy, and political power.

References Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 56(4), 947–952. Bourdieu, P., & Thompson, J. B. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brady, A. M. (2016). Plus ça change? Media control under Xi Jinping. Problems of Post-Communism., 6, 1–13. Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. Journal of Political Ideologies, 11(2), 115–140. Ellul, J. (1973). Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Vintage Books. Gramsci, A. (2010). Selections from Prison Notebooks. New York, NY: International Publishers. Heilmann, S. (2016). Introduction. In S. Heilmann & M. Stepan (Eds.), China’s core executive: Leadership styles, structures, and processes under Xi Jinping. MERICS Papers on China (Vol. 1, pp. 6–10). https://www.merics.org/sites/ default/files/2017-09/MPOC_ChinasCoreExecutive.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2018. Lam, W. W. (1999). The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore: Prentice-Hall. Lardy, N. (2019). The state strikes back: The end of economic reform in China? Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Naughton, B. (2016). Shifting structures and processes in economic policymaking at the centre. In S. Heilmann & M. Stepan (Eds.), China’s core executive: Leadership styles, structures, and processes under Xi Jinping. MERICS Papers on China (Vol. 1, pp. 40–43). https://www.merics.org/sites/default/ files/2017-09/MPOC_ChinasCoreExecutive.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2018. Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The Semi-Sovereign People: A realist’s view of democracy in America. Rinehart and Winston Inc: Holt. Thompson, J. B. (1984). Studies in the theory of ideology. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Zhang, L. (2018, August 7). The three dangers of China’s mixed-ownership reform. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ economy/article/2158036/three-dangers-chinas-mixed-ownership-reform. Accessed 12 December 2019. Zhao, S. (2016). The ideological campaign in Xi’s China: Rebuilding regime legitimacy. Asian Survey, 56(6), 1168–1193. Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, market, and democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Appendix: Major Items on Coding Sheets

Coding Sheet for SOE Reform Discourse Under Jiang Zemin (1992–1997) 1. Articles (a) Publication date (b) Publisher (c) Title 2. Authors (a) Name (b) Institutional affiliation (c) Occupational position (d) Group categorization (reformist, liberal critic, bureaucratic interest, labor interest, leftist, other) 3. Ideological orientation (a) Liberal-conservative scale (very liberal, liberal, neutral, conservative, very conservative) 4. Issue positions (mentioned/not mentioned, if mentioned, specify support/not support) (a) Shareholding © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8

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(b) Private economy/ownership (c) Separation of government and enterprises (d) POSAM (public ownership system as the mainstay) (e) Anti-state monopoly (f) Industrial policies, SOE groups (g) Party building mission (h) SHCs (shareholding cooperatives), labor issues, compensation (i) State share trade, financial market development (j) State asset management, state asset losses (k) Anti-corruption (l) Social security/welfare issues (m) Social stability (n) Nationalism, anti-foreign sentiment (o) Other issues discussed (specify)

worker

5. Arguments (a) Rhetoric employed (specify) (b) Party slogans adopted (specify) (c) Problem indications (specify) (d) Policy recommendations (specify)

Coding Sheet for SOE Reform Discourse Under Xi Jinping (2014–2016) 1. Articles (a) Publication date (b) The number of downloads (c) Publisher (d) Title 2. Authors (a) Name (b) Institutional affiliation (c) Occupational position (d) Group categorization (neoliberal, pragmatist, Marxist, leftist, other)

APPENDIX: MAJOR ITEMS ON CODING SHEETS

145

3. Ideological orientation (a) Ideological orientation (Marxism—yes/no) (b) Ideological orientation (neoliberalism—yes/no) (c) Liberal-conservative scale (very liberal, liberal, neutral, conservative, very conservative) 4. Issue positions (support/not support/not mentioned) (a) POSAM (b) Private economy development (c) Anti-corruption (d) Anti-state monopoly (e) Corporate governance (f) ESOP (employee stock option) (g) State asset management (h) Other issues discussed (specify) 5. Arguments (a) Rhetoric employed (specify) (b) Party slogans adopted (specify) (c) Problem indications (specify) (d) Policy recommendations (specify)

Index

A action-oriented belief, 3, 12, 18, 25 administrative reforms, 33, 55, 58 agenda-setting, 29, 128, 137 All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), 79, 82, 100 All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 64 Althusser, L., 12, 14, 15 anti-corruption campaign, 35, 91, 95–98, 100, 116, 123 anti-Japan protests, 25 anti-neoliberalism, 79, 80, 83, 96, 102, 113, 116, 117 An Zhiwen, 42 authoritarian resilience, 5, 22, 24, 130, 135, 136

B Bachrach, P., 128, 136, 137 Banaji, M.R., 15, 16 Baratz, M.S., 128, 136, 137

Beijing Olympics, 23 Beijing University, 79, 87 bifurcation of ideology, 10, 13, 26 black box, 9 Bourdieu, P., 15, 28, 138 Brady, AM., 24, 28, 67, 124, 128, 136 bureaucratic interests, 46, 47, 62, 81

C Cai Jiming, 79, 92, 93, 100 Campbell et al., 9, 13 Cao, Q., 25, 26 capitalism, 32, 48–51, 53, 54, 57, 61, 64–66, 85, 119, 125 capitalist or socialist debate, 83, 91, 128 censorship, 24 Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC), 101 Central Party School (CPS), 45, 46, 51, 60, 68, 79, 80, 84, 93

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Y. Kato, Party Ideology, Public Discourse, and Reform Governance in China, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66707-8

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148

INDEX

Changchun, China, 98 Chen Daisun, 66 Cheng Enfu, 80 China Can Say No, 64 China Daily, 120 China Industrial Economics , 93 China National Building Materials Group Corporation (CNBM), 81, 89, 91 China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), 5, 76, 80, 93 China Private Economy Research Society, 82 China Telecom, 68 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 45, 46, 58, 60, 62, 63, 79, 80, 84, 92, 93, 99 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 79, 82 Chinese Pharmaceutical Company, 81, 89, 91 class struggle, 14, 64, 65, 67, 96, 109, 135 coding, 3, 30, 44, 77, 78, 83 Cold War, 8 Collaborative Innovation Center for Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics, 99 communism, 2, 139 Communist Party of China 14th Party Congress, 31, 42, 48 15th Party Congress, 31, 32, 42, 52, 61, 67, 68, 117, 126, 128 16th Party Congress, 88, 91 18th Party Congress, 120 1993 Decision, 45, 49, 52, 55, 59, 109, 111, 126 19th Party Congress, 120, 139 2013 Decision, 76, 87–91, 122, 126

Central Committee, 32, 43, 45, 55, 76, 98, 99 party-building mission, 67, 98–100 party center, 3, 24, 97, 99, 134 Party Charter, 64, 66, 69, 96 communist regimes, 34, 52 communist revolution, 23 Company Law, 48, 58, 92 conservative backlash(s), 48, 63, 64, 68, 117, 125, 128, 129 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 64, 66, 96 contract management responsibility system, 42, 61 corporatization, 45, 47, 48, 52, 59, 111 corruption, 32, 33, 45, 47, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 99, 101, 112, 136 cultural hegemony, 14, 135, 136 Cultural Revolution, 25

D Dacheng Enterprise Research Institute, 100 “decisive role” (of the market), 30, 33, 79, 88, 90, 123, 127, 139 Deepening Reform Leading Small Group, 98 Deng Xiaoping (Deng), 3, 6, 23, 31, 34–36, 42, 44, 49–54, 58, 60, 66–69, 80, 81, 86–90, 108–122, 124–130, 134, 136, 137, 139 cat theory, 51, 69, 119 Nanfang talk, 50, 51, 53, 119 practice is the sole criterion for testing truth, 51, 88 pragmatism, 49, 51, 53, 67, 81, 88–90, 110, 119, 124, 128, 134 primary stage of socialism, 23, 50, 51, 54, 69, 82, 119

INDEX

149

production criterion, 51, 56, 69, 110, 111, 115, 128, 139 production forces, 50, 51, 53, 56, 61, 66, 69, 110, 120 seeking truth from facts, 50, 51, 53, 54, 87–89, 119 Southern Tour, 31, 42, 48, 50 three favorables, 50, 87, 98, 119 Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), 45, 46, 79 dictator’s dilemma, 136, 138 Dijk, T.A., 7, 8, 10, 11, 15–18, 25, 55, 138 Document No. 9, 123, 125

G Gao Shangquan, 45, 49, 51, 52 Geertz, C., 11 global financial crisis, 32 Government Work Report, 101 Gramsci, A., 12, 14, 135 grasp the large, let go of the small, 30–32, 35, 41, 45, 47, 56, 61, 64, 68 Guanghua School of Management, 87 Guiding Opinions on Deepening State-owned Enterprise Reform-Guiding Opinions, 99 Gu Yimin, 80

E Eagleton, T., 7, 14, 17 economic efficiency, 30, 33, 56, 62, 68, 78, 79, 134 Ellul, J., 11, 16, 17, 29, 135 employee ownership, 32, 42, 47, 63, 69 end of ideology, 1, 14, 135 Engels, F., 11, 15, 80 enterprise autonomy, 31, 33, 47, 49, 52, 55, 58–61, 78, 112 Enterprise Law, 31, 48 exploitation, 64, 96

H Habermas, J., 28 Hall, S., 10, 25, 55 hands-off approach, 127, 130, 134 Han Xiya, 64 He Ganqiang, 80 Heilmann, S., 138 He Yang, 60 historical materialism, 51, 86 holding companies, 59, 60 Hong Hu, 56 Hong Kong, 5 Huang Sujian, 58, 79, 92, 93 Hu Jie, 79 Hu Jintao (Hu), 23, 25, 96, 123, 134 harmonious society, 23, 123 new socialist countryside, 23

F false consciousness, 11, 15, 16 fascism, 10 Four Cardinal Principles, 23, 50, 120, 125 framing/frame/frames, 3, 13, 14, 24, 29, 51, 63, 90, 110 Freeden, M., 10, 12, 13 Fu Chengyu, 92 Fudan University, 80 fundamental ideology, 26, 28, 86, 108, 118, 124, 129, 139

I ideological state apparatuses, 14 Ideology and Propaganda Work Conference, 125 indigenization, 23, 84–86, 89, 114, 121, 122 industrial policy/policies, 32, 45–47, 58–61, 68, 109, 111

150

INDEX

industrial policy state, 58, 59, 61, 68 Institute of Industrial Economics at CASS, 92 instrument of power, 9, 12, 14, 15, 27 Internal Reference on Reform, 42, 43, 64 iron rice bowl, 52 J Jia Huaqiang, 80, 93 Jiang Zemin (Jiang), 3, 6, 23, 25, 30, 34, 35, 44, 49, 52, 65, 68, 69, 96, 103, 108, 109, 111, 114, 117, 124–128, 130, 134, 136, 137 May 29 speech, 68, 126 strategic ambiguity, 126, 130, 134 three represents, 23 Jilin, China, 98 Jost, J.T., 12, 15, 16 Jowett, G.S., 24, 99, 101 L Labor Movement Research Association, 64 labor rights, 46, 47, 63, 79, 100, 109, 112 Lam, W.W., 126, 134 Lane, R.E., 13 language game, 3–6, 27, 28, 36, 44, 49, 66, 67, 83, 88, 97, 101, 103, 107, 108, 110, 116, 118–121, 123–125, 127–131, 136–140 leading function, 56–58, 69, 80, 91, 92, 111 leftists, 32, 35, 43, 46, 47, 49, 64–68, 78–81, 83–86, 90, 91, 94–102, 109, 112, 113, 115–117, 121–123, 126–129, 137 legal rights, 58, 61, 65, 81, 92

legitimate language, 15, 28, 138, 139 legitimating function (of ideology), 2, 14, 15, 22, 24 Leng Zhaosong, 80 Lenin, 53, 78, 80 Leninism, 10 liberal-conservative division, 33, 35, 69, 85, 94, 108, 110, 112–114, 116, 117 liberal critics, 46, 47, 59, 61, 63, 67, 68, 112 Li Keqiang, 87, 101, 102 linguistic domination, 15, 28 linguistic engineering, 25 linguistic market, 15, 28, 138 Li Peng, 42 Li Rongrong, 92 Liu Rixin, 64, 66 Liu Yingqiu, 62, 92 Li Yining, 79, 87, 92, 93 Li Yizhong, 79 M Mao era, 5, 14, 22, 25, 131, 137 Mao Zedong (Mao), 23–25, 31, 44, 66, 78, 80, 96, 113, 116, 119, 125, 127, 130, 131 Market Observer, 82 Marxism, 9, 10, 36, 50, 54, 66, 77–80, 82, 84–86, 88, 93, 94, 102, 125, 128 Marxists, 12, 14, 16, 48, 54, 66, 67, 78–86, 89, 93–95, 100, 101, 113–115, 121, 135, 137 Marx, K., 11, 15, 54, 78, 80 master’s status (of workers), 47, 64–67, 96, 109, 112 meaning, 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, 25–29, 60, 138–140 means of production, 15, 66 middle course approach, 125, 126 Ministry of Finance, 80

INDEX

mixed-ownership, 6, 30, 76, 84, 87, 113 Modern Enterprise System (MES), 46, 55, 58, 60, 110

N Nanjing University, 80, 99 Nankai University, 80, 99 National Bureau of Statistics, 99 national champions, 32, 118 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 43, 80 nationalism, 10, 16, 23, 34, 84, 85, 89, 121–123, 125, 139 National People’s Congress (NPC), 79, 91, 98, 120 Naughton, B., 35, 97, 102, 138 neoliberalism, 33, 36, 67, 77–79, 81, 85, 86, 90, 94, 96, 100, 102, 116, 123, 125, 129 neoliberals, 78, 79, 81–83, 85–87, 90–94, 97, 99, 100, 102, 113, 123 neo-Maoists, 96, 97 netizens, 43 New Financial Management , 82 New Left, 68, 79, 100, 112 Newspeak, 25

O O’Donnell, V., 24, 99, 101 Old Left, 43, 47, 128 Orwell, G., 25 ownership by the whole people, 52 ownership restructuring, 6, 29, 31, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 53, 68, 87, 109, 119

P Parsons, T., 10, 16

151

Patriotic Education Campaign, 23 Peng Jianguo, 81–83 Perry, E.J., 22–24, 29 polarization, 16, 17, 62, 63, 68, 130 policy maneuvering, 29, 49, 102 populism, 125 positive propaganda, 24 post-Marxist, 12 power capital, 62 practicism, 88–90 pragmatists, 78–86, 91–94, 101, 113, 115, 121 privatization, 33, 34, 45, 48, 53, 66, 91, 96, 97 Productivity Research, 64 profiteering, 62, 97, 98 proletariat, 64, 65, 67 propaganda apparatus, 4, 24, 26 propaganda of agitation, 16, 17 propaganda of integration, 16 property rights, 46–49, 52, 55, 57–60, 62, 66, 78, 91, 101, 109, 110 public ownership system as the mainstay (POSAM), 31, 42, 53, 55, 69, 77, 78, 80–85, 87, 89–93, 95, 96, 98, 101, 113, 114, 117 public sphere, 5, 43, 138 The Pursuit of Truth, 43, 66, 126 Putnam, R.D., 9, 17, 128 Q Qinghua University, 79 R Realism, 82, 121 reform and opening, 50, 120 Rejai, M., 10, 13, 17 relations of domination, 12, 15, 27, 135, 136, 138, 140 Renmin University, 80, 97, 99

152

INDEX

Ren Yuling, 82 resonance, 61, 90, 110, 111, 113, 116 Russia, 34 S Sartori, G., 9, 17 SASAC Research Center, 81, 83 Schattschneider, E.E., 128, 137, 139 Seeking Truth (Qiushi), 43 Seliger, M., 3, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 25, 26, 55 shareholding, 31, 32, 42, 45, 48, 51, 52, 58, 59, 66, 87, 88 shareholding cooperatives (SHCs), 46, 47, 56, 63 Sichuan earthquake, 23 Sinopec, 33, 82, 83, 92, 96 social democrats, 46, 47, 62–64, 67, 68, 109, 112 social disparity, 47, 62, 66, 112 socialism with Chinese characteristics, 23, 36, 49, 50, 54, 64, 67, 80, 86–88, 94, 110, 114, 117, 120–122, 124, 139 socialist market economy, 31, 42, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57, 58, 109–111, 119 socialist spiritual civilization, 64, 66 socialization of conflict, 128 social security, 47, 55, 62, 63, 67, 69, 110 social welfare, 46, 47, 62, 63, 67, 79, 109, 112 sociological propaganda, 11, 135 Song Zhiping, 81, 89, 91 Soviet Union, 34, 52 stability, 2, 15, 16, 23, 25, 33, 62, 63, 67, 96, 112, 125, 126 Standard Opinions, 48 state asset management, 42, 55–59, 61, 68

state asset management corporations (SAMCs), 59, 60 state capitalism, 32, 56, 65 state capitalist model, 47 state-centric approach, 3, 5, 22, 25, 26 State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems (SCRES), 42, 43, 45, 46, 56, 60 State Council, 31, 32, 43, 48, 57, 59, 60, 82, 88, 99, 101, 102 State Development Planning Commission, 43 State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), 43, 59 state monopoly, 33, 99 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 32, 68, 80, 82, 83, 92, 96, 101 state-owned enterprise group(s), 31, 32, 42, 45–48, 56, 58–64, 67, 68, 109, 111, 112 State Planning Commission (SPC), 59, 66 stock market, 48, 52, 62 Sun Zongwei, 80 supply-side structural reform (SSSR), 35, 76, 100, 101 system justification theory, 15

T Tang Fengyi, 60 Thompson, J.B., 11, 12, 15, 27–29, 138 thought control, 24, 33, 123, 135 Tiananmen setback, 31, 34, 42, 48 Tiananmen uprising, 25, 120 trade union, 47, 64, 65 Trevaskes, S., 25, 122

INDEX

U unemployment, 45, 47, 61, 62, 112 W Wang Jue, 51 Wang Zhongming, 79 Wei Xinghua, 99 Wen Tiejun, 43 Western economic theories, 64–66, 96 Wittgenstein, L., 3, 5, 27 workers’ rights, 47, 63 working class, 15, 23, 46–48, 63–67, 96, 109, 112 Wu Jinglian, 43, 60, 61 Wu Jixue, 62 X Xiang Qiyuan, 64, 80 Xie Changan, 80 Xie Lujiang, 79 Xi Jinping (Xi), 3, 5, 6, 24, 29, 30, 32–35, 76, 77, 82–84, 86, 87, 90, 91, 95–99, 101–103, 108, 113–116, 118–130, 134–139

153

August 19 speech, 123, 125, 128 China Dream/Chinese Dream, 4, 23, 25, 34, 35, 83–87, 89, 90, 99, 114, 120–124, 127, 130 new normal, 25, 26, 91–94 two unswervingly, 91, 113, 115, 122, 124 two upholds, 98 Xi Jinping Thought, 120, 139

Y Yang Fan, 63, 64

Z Zhang Chengyao, 60 Zhang Zhuoyuan, 80, 84 Zhao, S., 23, 121, 125, 135, 136, 139 Zhao, Y., 14, 15, 23, 24, 34, 96, 114, 121, 124, 125, 134, 135 Zhao Ziyang, 42 Zhou Xincheng, 80, 97 Zhu Rongji, 32