Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition (Politics and Development of Contemporary China) 3030700151, 9783030700157

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Marcus P. Chu

Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition

Politics and Development of Contemporary China

Series Editors Kevin G. Cai, University of Waterloo, Renison University College, Waterloo, ON, Canada Daniel C. Lynch, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

As China’s power grows, the search has begun in earnest for what superpower status will mean for the People’s Republic of China as a nation as well as the impact of its new-found influence on the Asia-Pacific region and the global international order at large. By providing a venue for exciting and ground-breaking titles, the aim of this series is to explore the domestic and international implications of China’s rise and transformation through a number of key areas including politics, development and foreign policy. The series will also give a strong voice to non-western perspectives on China’s rise in order to provide a forum that connects and compares the views of academics from both the east and west reflecting the truly international nature of the discipline.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14541

Marcus P. Chu

Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition

Marcus P. Chu Department of Political Science Lingnan University Hong Kong, China

Politics and Development of Contemporary China ISBN 978-3-030-70015-7 ISBN 978-3-030-70016-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Since the 1980s, China has staged quite a number of international sporting events that are unable to command much attention from the Chinese public. It is because (1) participants are not professional elite athletes, (2) Chinese teams are unlikely to win championships or lead medal tables, and/or (3) sports programs excluded from the Summer Olympics are featured. Why is China keen to host these sporting events? This book aims to answer this question by reviewing 21 cases. The findings reveal that the holding of international sporting events with a low popularity has been constantly leveraged by both central and local authorities to accelerate economic development, polish China’s image, and realize the supreme leaders’ political ambitions. Hong Kong, China

Marcus P. Chu

v

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Anne Birchley-Brun, Kevin Cai, Ashwini Elango, Ted Fung, Glen Hamilton, Ariel Hu, Vic Li, Shalendra Sharma, Shukkanthy Siva, Greg Whitten, Jack Wong, Max Wu, Eilo Yu, and Alina Yurova for their advice, guidance, and help. I also thank Lingnan University Direct Grant (DR19B6) and Research Seed Fund (F102342) for supporting the research of Chapters 2, 4, and 7. Lastly, my utmost gratitude goes to my parents. I could not have completed this monograph under the COVID19 pandemic without their love and care.

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Contents

1 3 5

1

Introduction 1.1 Objective and Outline of This Book References

2

Leveraging FIFA Tournaments 2.1 China and the 1985 FIFA U-16 World Championship 2.2 China and the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup 2.3 China and the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup 2.4 China and the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup 2.5 Conclusion References

7 8 12 20 26 30 32

3

Leveraging the AFC Asian Cup 3.1 China and the 2004 AFC Asian Cup 3.2 China and the 2023 AFC Asian Cup 3.3 Conclusion References

39 40 47 52 53

4

Leveraging FINA, IAAF, and FIBA Events 4.1 Shanghai and the 2011 FINA World Championships 4.2 Beijing and the 2015 IAAF World Championships 4.3 China and the 2019 FIBA World Cup 4.4 Conclusion References

59 61 64 69 73 73

ix

x

CONTENTS

5

Leveraging Winter Sports Events 5.1 Harbin and the 1996 Asian Winter Games 5.2 Changchun and the 2007 Asian Winter Games 5.3 Harbin and the 2009 Winter Universiade 5.4 Beijing and the 2022 Winter Olympics 5.5 Conclusion References

6

Leveraging Youth Multi-sports Events 6.1 Shanghai and the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade 6.2 Nanjing, the 2013 Asian Youth Games, and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics 6.3 Jinjiang and the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade 6.4 Shantou and the 2021 Asian Youth Games 6.5 Conclusion References

7

8

79 80 83 86 90 95 96 103 106 110 112 116 118 119

Leveraging Sporting Events for Firefighters, Police Officers, and Soldiers 7.1 Hong Kong and the 2006 World Firefighters Games 7.2 Chengdu and the 2019 World Police and Fire Games 7.3 Wuhan and the 2019 Military World Games 7.4 Conclusion References

123 124 128 131 135 137

Conclusion 8.1 In the Deng Xiaoping Era 8.2 In the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Era 8.3 In the Xi Jinping Era References

143 144 145 147 152

Index

153

Abbreviations

AFC CAA CBA CCP CFA CGAS CISM CPAF FIBA FIFA FINA FISU GATT IAAF IOC IOF ISF ITTF ITU KOC NATO NPC OCA PLA ROC SAR

Asian Football Confederation Chinese Athletics Association Chinese Basketball Association Chinese Communist Party Chinese Football Association China General Administration of Sport International Military Sports Council California Police Athletic Federation International Basketball Federation International Federation of Association Football International Swimming Federation International University Sports Federation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade International Association of Athletics Federations International Olympic Committee International Orienteering Federation International School Sport Federation International Table Tennis Federation International Telecommunication Union Korean Sport & Olympic Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization National People’s Congress Olympic Council of Asia People’s Liberation Army Republic of China Special Administrative Region xi

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

UEFA WHO WTO

Union of European Football Associations World Health Organization World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The first part of this chapter explores China’s hosting of sporting events since the 1980s. It explains why most of those sporting events were unable to command much attention from the Chinese public. The second part of the chapter introduces the objectives of this book. It also offers a brief outline of the analytical foci of the next seven chapters. Keywords China · Sporting events · Research objective · Chapter outline

The hosting of the 1990 11th Asian Games in Beijing became a popular topic of discussion among the Chinese public. This was partly because the Chinese team’s medal haul demonstrated the sporting dominance of China in Asia and partly because other Asian states improved their opinions on the post-Tiananmen Chinese government following the meticulously organized opening and closing ceremonies (Fan and Lu 2013, pp. 103–106; Wu 1999, pp. 437–438). Eleven years later, the magnificent celebration of the 21st Summer Universiade in Beijing won high acclaim from the international sporting community. The Chinese public meanwhile warmly applauded the Chinese team for their remarkable performances across the competitions (Chu 2018, pp. 1310–1313). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_1

1

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Over the next seven years, the central and local governments intensified efforts to renovate Beijing and enhance the competitiveness of Chinese athletes. As a result, the 2008 Summer Olympics was feted as a truly exceptional celebration of sport. The number of gold medals won by Chinese Olympians surpassed those won by their American and Russian counterparts. These achievements enhanced the pride of the Chinese public toward the nation and their allegiance to the Communist regime (Fan and Lu 2013, pp. 157–183). The pride and allegiance intensified following the extravagant presentation of the 2010 16th Asian Games in Guangzhou, the lavish celebration of the 2011 26th Summer Universiade in Shenzhen, and the tremendous success of the Chinese athletes in these two events (Mangan et al. 2013; Chu 2016). Between Deng Xiaoping’s formal accession to power in 1978 and Hu Jintao’s retirement in 2013, Chinese cities staged other international sporting events alongside the 2008 Summer Olympics, the 1990 and 2010 Asian Games, and the 2001 and 2011 Summer Universiade. This included two Asian Winter Games, two FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Women’s World Cups, an AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Asian Cup, a FIFA U-16 World Championship, a FINA (International Swimming Federation) World Championships, a Summer Gymnasiade, a Winter Universiade, and a World Firefighters Games. Although these events enjoy a good reputation among the international sporting community, none of them was able to draw much attention from the Chinese public. The reasons for this are threefold. First, unlike the Europeans, the North Americans, and the Australasians, the Chinese public are generally only interested in the sports programs included in the Summer Olympics. The competitions of winter sports, military sports, and firefighting sports do not figure in their list of concerns. Second, the Chinese public generally prefer to watch competitions featuring renowned elite athletes. Therefore, events featuring secondary school students, firefighters, police officers, soldiers, and other non-professional athletes are less popular in China. Third, even when events attract elite athletes, Chinese people like to watch competitions in which their compatriots have a good chance of winning. As a result, interest in events including badminton, diving, gymnastics, shooting, table tennis, weightlifting, and women’s volleyball is high, whereas interest in events featuring other sports programs is low. In 2013, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as the leader of China. Since then, Chinese cities have not only been slated to host the 2021 31st

1

INTRODUCTION

3

Summer Universiade and the 2022 19th Asian Games, but also continued to pursue sporting events with a relatively low popularity in China. As of 2019, they have staged an Asian Youth Games, a FIBA (International Basketball Federation) World Cup, an IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) World Championships, a Military World Games, a Summer Youth Olympics, and a World Police and Fire Games. They will present an AFC Asian Cup, an Asian Youth Games, a FIFA Club World Cup, a Summer Gymnasiade, and a Winter Olympics in the 2020s as well.

1.1

Objective and Outline of This Book

So why is China constantly keen to host sporting events that the public are unconcerned with? This book aims to answer this question through an in-depth review of the 21 events in which (1) Chinese athletes were unlikely to win the championships titles or lead the medal tables, (2) the participants were not elite athletes, or (3) sports excluded from the Summer Olympics were featured (Table 1.1). The findings show that staging such events was not done with the intention of promoting the Sport for All movement within Chinese society or due to any publicity for the universal value of athletic competition. Instead, they were used to accelerate economic development, polish China’s image, and realize the supreme leaders’ political ambitions. Chapter 2 scrutinizes four FIFA-governed tournaments: the 1985 U-16 World Championship hosted in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian; the 1991 Women’s World Cup hosted in the four Guangdong cities—Guangzhou, Foshan, Jiangmen, and Zhongshan; the 2007 Women’s World Cup hosted in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Chengdu, and Wuhan; and China’s successful bid for the 2021 Club World Cup. Chapter 3 explores the hosting of the 2004 AFC Asian Cup in Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Jinan, together with China’s bid for the 2023 AFC Asian Cup. Chapter 4 investigates three internationally renowned swimming, athletics, and basketball events: the Shanghai 2011 FINA World Championships, the Beijing 2015 IAAF World Championships, and the 2019 FIBA World Cup staged by Beijing, Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Foshan. Four events featuring winter sports competitions—Harbin’s holding of the 1996 Asian Winter Games, Changchun’s holding of the 2007 Asian Winter Games, Harbin’s holding of the 2009 Winter Universiade, and Beijing’s bid for and organization of the 2022 Winter Olympics—are

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Table 1.1 Features of 21 sporting events reviewed in this book

1985 FIFA U-16 World Championship 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup 1996 Asian Winter Games 1998 Summer Gymnasiade 2004 AFC Asian Cup 2006 World Firefighters Games 2007 Asian Winter Games 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup 2009 Winter Universiade 2011 FINA World Championships 2013 Asian Youth Games 2014 Summer Youth Olympics 2015 IAAF World Championships 2019 World Police and Fire Games 2019 FIBA World Cup 2019 Military World Games 2020 Summer Gymnasiade

Performance of Chinese delegation/team

Participation of Chinese Inclusion of sports professional elite athletes not featured at Summer Olympics

Eliminated in quarter-final match

No

No

Eliminated in quarter-final match

Yes

No

1st place in medal table 1st place in medal table First runner-up

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

2nd place in medal table 1st place in medal table Eliminated in quarter-final match 1st place in medal table 2nd place in medal table 1st place in medal table 1st place in medal table 11th place in medal table 1st place in medal table 24th place in final standings 1st place in medal table –

(continued)

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INTRODUCTION

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Table 1.1 (continued)

2021 FIFA Club World Cup 2021 Asian Youth Games 2022 Winter Olympics 2023 AFC Asian Cup

Performance of Chinese delegation/team

Participation of Chinese Inclusion of sports professional elite athletes not featured at Summer Olympics

–

Yes

No

–

No

Yes

–

Yes

Yes

–

Yes

No

Source Author’s database

examined in Chapter 5. Five multi-sports events in which only young athletes took part—Shanghai’s 1998 Summer Gymnasiade, Nanjing’s 2013 Asian Youth Games and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics, Jinjiang’s bid for and organization of the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade, and Shantou’s bid for and organization of the 2021 Asian Winter Games—are reviewed in Chapter 6. A study of three sporting events for firefighters, police officers, or soldiers—the Hong Kong 2006 World Firefighters Games, the Chengdu 2019 World Police and Fire Games, and the Wuhan 2019 Military World Games—is conducted in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 sums up the findings of the 21 cases and discusses the missions of China’s sporting events under the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic and tense relations with the Western world.

References Chu, M. P. (2016). Provincial governments and China’s international megasports events: A case study of Guangdong. Sport in Society, 19(10), 1622– 1634. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2016.1159197. Chu, M. P. (2018). China’s decisiveness in Olympic bids: Leveraging international sporting mega-events to improve Beijing’s odds of success. International Journal of the History of Sport, 35(12–13), 1306–1324. https://doi. org/10.1080/09523367.2019.1593146. Fan, H., & Lu, Z. (2013). The politicisation of sport in modern China: Communists and champions. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

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Mangan, J. A., Dong, J., & Lu, D. (2013). ‘Glittering Guangzhou’: The 2010 Asian Games – local rivalries, national motives, geopolitical gestures. International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(10), 1071–1086. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09523367.2013.790375. Wu, S. (1999). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiyushi 1949-1998 [PRC sports history 1949-1998]. Beijing: China Book Press.

CHAPTER 2

Leveraging FIFA Tournaments

Abstract This chapter reviews how the four FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) tournaments hosted in China since 1980— the 1985 U-16 World Championship, the 1991 Women’s World Cup, the 2007 Women’s World Cup, and the 2021 Club World Cup—were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 1985 FIFA U-16 World Championship · The 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup · The 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup · The 2021 FIFA Club World Cup

After succeeding Mao Zedong as the leader of the Communist regime in September 1976, Hua Guofeng was keen to import equipment from Western countries that would enhance the productivity of China’s heavy industries and aid his ambitious ten-year economic plan. While these measures successfully boosted China’s GDP, they also led to a severe slump in China’s foreign reserves. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping succeeded Hua. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities shelved the ten-year economic plan and activated the Reform and Opening Up. Although quadrupling China’s GDP of 1980 by 2000 was one of the goals of the Reform and Opening Up, no aggressive measures with the aim of stimulating national © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_2

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economic growth were immediately launched. Instead, the state officials, under Former Vice Premier Chen Yun’s advice, ceased the outflow of foreign reserves, controlled the central and local governments’ financial expenditures, and executed the readjustment and retrenchment policy (Vogel 2011, pp. 424–435). In this climate, the Shanghai municipal government only spent CNY 60 million on hosting the 1983 5th National Games of China. Nevertheless, the city’s performance impressed FIFA President João Havelange. He thus suggested China host the 1985 U-16 World Championship (Zhongguo zuqiu, 1993, p. 155), a new FIFA tournament in which sixteen male national teams from Asia, Africa, North and South America, Europe, and Oceania were to compete.1

2.1 China and the 1985 FIFA U-16 World Championship Since the U-16 World Championships was believed to bring the following benefits, the Chinese authorities ignored the Chinese youth team’s extremely slim chance of winning the title, accepted Havelange’s invitation, and slated Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian as host cities. First, in the summer of 1983, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary, Hu Yaobang approved a Beijing bid for the 1990 Asian Games (Liang 2007, p. 244). After the city won the bidding competition in September 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang, on behalf of the Chinese central government, proclaimed that his motherland would pursue the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Zhao Ziyang,” 1984). Hosting the U-16 World Championship and receiving the participant overseas young footballers were seen as valuable experience for Beijing and its organization of the 1990 Asian Games. They also showcase China’s capability to host sporting mega-events and facilitate its pursuit of the Summer Olympics. Second, in the late 1970s, the Chinese authorities terminated the ‘Down to the Countryside Movement.’ Tens of millions of less-educated young people who had joined the movement returned to their hometowns. However, due to the short supply of jobs, some of them remained unemployed for years. Inevitably, a few such people became involved in crime. Although local governments adopted measures to tackle this social issue, the incidence of murder, rape, and other serious violent crimes continued to increase through the early 1980s. In 1983, the Chinese

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government, with Deng Xiaoping’s endorsement, activated the nationwide ‘Strict Hard’ campaign, which aimed to tackle this social issue with harsh legal penalties (Tanner 1999, pp. 83–104). It was hoped that staging the FIFA U-16 World Championship in four safe and peaceful metropolises would demonstrate the success of the government’s tough anti-crime policy to both Chinese and overseas spectators. Third, after the Chen Yun-led retrenchment and readjustment policy was successful in balancing the budget and bringing double-digit annual GDP growth to China, Deng ordered both central and local governments to accelerate pace of the Reform and Opening Up. To this end, the Chinese authorities, in the third session of the 12th CCP Central Committee, decided to push forward with the economic development of urban areas and stipulated that coastal cities should free their markets and attract overseas investment (“Zhonggong zhongyang,” 2008). The holding of the FIFA U-16 World Championship matches could therefore be a useful way of showcasing the professional skills and technological know-how of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian, advertise their business potential and profit-making opportunities, and attract investment. While the cities prepared for the World Championship, the Chinese national football team competed with Brunei, Hong Kong, and Macao in the first round of the 1986 FIFA World Cup Asian region qualification. Chinese football fans were confident that the national team could easily cruise into the second round as it had never been defeated by the other three teams. They were even optimistic about its chance to qualify for the 1986 FIFA World Cup in Mexico because the national team had come second at the 1984 Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup. However, China and Hong Kong tied for first place in the qualification tournament after several rounds of competition. In this situation, the fans remained confident that the national team could beat Hong Kong in a play-off match in Beijing on May 19, 1985, to progress (“Zhongguodui yingneng,” 1985). The Hong Kong football team manager, Kwok Kaming, also admitted that his team’s chances were relatively low (“Laizi xianggangdui,” 1985). Unexpectedly, the Hong Kong team won 2-1. The failure of the Chinese national team to qualify for the World Cup caused hundreds of Beijing fans to vandalize public facilities, hurl insults at the Hong Kong footballers, and attack their supporters and foreign journalists. The hooliganism was extensively reported by the international media. The AFC officials expressed disappointment (“Shijiebeisai saoluan,” 1985).

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The Chinese authorities were anxious, because the uncivil behavior of the Beijing fans brought adverse impacts to domestic politics and international relations of China. To attract foreign investment, win the hosting rights for international mega-events, and boost China’s profile in the world, the Chinese government usually relied on promoting the harmonious features of Chinese society and the friendliness of Chinese people to visitors. However, it was widely thought that the hooliganism would inevitably undermine the image of the country, affect its investment environment, and damage overseas condidence in Beijing’s ability to host the 1990 Asian Games and other mega-events. Additionally, in December 1984, the British and Chinese governments concluded the negotiations over the handover of Hong Kong and signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration. It stipulated that, after the end of British rule on June 30, 1997, China would strictly comply with the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle and Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), would enjoy a high degree of autonomy with which to manage its own affairs. Although the leaders of both governments stated that they had made the best deal for the future of the city, local people continued to be concerned. It was because that for decades, many Hong Kong residents had harbored a dread and mistrust of the autocratic Communist regime on the mainland, and that China’s economic situation, business environment, social order, and legal system were commonly viewed as inferior to those of Hong Kong. Deng Xiaoping thus repeatedly promised at official occasions that, under the ‘One country Two Systems’ principle, Hong Kong would continue with the capitalist system and liberal values left by its British colonizers for at least fifty years (Deng 1993, pp. 58–61; 67–68; 72–76 & 101–103). However, it was thought that offending Hong Kong’s sportsmen and media workers might undermine Deng’s efforts and cause unwillingness among the Hong Kong public to embrace the handover. Furthermore, during the CCP 12th National Congress, the goal of realizing the national unification with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan became the top priority of the CCP (Hu Yaobang, 2009, pp. 320– 355). The Chinese government subsequently used extensive propaganda to stress that the citizens of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were the compatriots of the Chinese. However, some Chinese people did not embrace this view. Rather, they insisted upon treating Hong Kong citizens as foreigners. It became common for Beijing fans to insult Hong Kong footballers and their supporters after the Chinese national team was

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defeated (“Beijing qiumi,” 1985). This made the position of the Chinese government difficult and hampered efforts toward unification. Accordingly, the Chinese authorities condemned all those involved in the Beijing hooliganism for their incivility and stupidity, penalized those who had led the hooliganism with years in jail, delivered an apology to the Hong Kong footballers and their fans, made further efforts to appease the Hong Kong public, took oversight of Shenyang’s preparations to host the upcoming match between the Liaoning team of China and the Seiko team of Hong Kong that was scheduled on May 26, 1985, and gave a guarantee that Beijing would host the 1990 Asian Games flawlessly (“5 yue,” 1985; “Beijing liang,” 1985; “Xushi tan,” 1985; “Jiulingnian yayunhui,” 1985). They also decided to launch a series of activities in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian, so using the FIFA U-16 World Championship to (1) educate Chinese youngsters about how to become civil spectators and (2) restore confidence of world society in China’s holding of international football competitions. While the Chinese Communist Youth League Central Commission, the China National Commission of Sport, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Chinese state media were organizing those activities in the four cities (“Kedabei qijian,” 1985), the central and local administrations, following the instructions of the CCP that had been delivered by the 12th Central Committee third session, began to liberate the markets of urban areas. This led the wider public to keenly take part in business activities and accelerated the pace of China’s GDP growth. It however also caused hedonism and mammonism to flourish in Chinese society, the reluctance of many officials to uphold Marxist doctrine when handling daily duties, and the dramatic increase of the incidence of corruption, bribery, smuggling, and black-marketeering. Not surprisingly, senior conservative members of the CCP were furious. Throughout 1985, the state media frequently emphasized the importance of combating bourgeoise liberalization. In this situation, Deng Xiaoping chose not to show his eagerness for China’s economic expansion at public occasions (Baum 1994, pp. 178–179). Premier Zhao Ziyang also pushed measures designed to calm senior conservatives. These included assigning Vice Premiers Yao Yilin and Li Peng to chair the opening and closing ceremonies of the FIFA U-16 World Championship on behalf of the Chinese government in preference to the reformist Vice Premiers Wan Li and Tian Jiyun (“Diyijie guoji,” 1985; “Kedabei zuqiusai,” 1985). Li Peng, before attending the closing

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ceremony, made special efforts to convey Deng’s positivity about the tournament and China’s future football development to FIFA President João Havelange and General Secretary Sepp Blatter (“Juban kedabei,” 1985). The sophisticated organization of the Chinese authorities allowed hundreds of thousands of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian residents to watch the 32 matches of the twelve-day football event without serious incident. On August 7, spectators in the Beijing Workers’ Stadium witnessed the Chinese national team’s failure in the quarter finals. Unlike their counterparts in May, they did not insult the victorious West German team, but instead clapped and cheered the outstanding skills of its players (“Zhongde jiaolian,” 1985). Havelange and Blatter thus praised China’s hosting of the competition. The spectators in the capital city were also applauded by the Chinese state media (“Beijing shi,” 1985). Following the FIFA leaders’ complimentary words, Deng Xiaoping hoped that China might host more sporting mega-events to help push forward the Reform and Opening Up. Therefore, he endorsed the Chinese authorities’ plan to pursue the 2000 Summer Olympics in November 1985 (“Shenban chenggong,” 2007). Yao Yilin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, and Wu Xueqian meanwhile were appointed to the CCP Politburo. This arrangement indicated that some of them might join the Politburo Standing Committee with Zhao Ziyang at the first session of the CCP 13th Central Committee in the fall of 1987.

2.2

China and the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup

In view of Deng’s endorsement of China’s quest to host the 2000 Summer Olympics, Havelange, who intended to pass the hosting rights of the 2002 FIFA World Cup to an Asian state, considered that China might be interested in staging the 2002 World Cup. In 1986, he and Blatter made repeated remarks to the international media that it would be good for the development of soccer if the 2002 FIFA World Cup could be celebrated in China, the most populous country on the planet (“Zhongguo jiangshi,” 1986; “Aweilanre jiwang,” 1986; “Aweilanre zaici,” 1986; “Xiwang zhongguo,” 1986). Meanwhile, Japan announced it would compete to hold the event. The Chinese authorities were delighted by the FIFA leaders’ comments but they were reluctant to put forward the application because, despite the success of the 1985 U-16 World Championship, Chinese cities were viewed as being unable to meet transportation, stadium, and hospitality

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requirements for staging FIFA World Cup. It was also thought that the pursuit of the 2002 FIFA World Cup would distract from the bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics and might affect China’s relations with Japan.2 Given the Chinese authorities’ reluctance, FIFA suggested China host the 1988 Women’s Invitation Tournament (“Wosheng kewang,” 1986)— a twelve-day event featuring the participation of twelve national teams from around the world and being envisaged as a test of whether the holding of the first Women’s World Cup in 1990 was feasible. Although the Chinese national women’s football team—the champions of the 1986 AFC Women’s Asian Cup—was believed to have only a small chance of winning the Invitation Tournament, the Chinese authorities embraced FIFA’s suggestion and marked Guangdong province as potential hosts (“Wosheng kewang,” 1986; “Zhenxi baogui,” 1988). In fact, Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong, had successfully staged China’s first international women’s football tournament in November 1983.3 Additionally, as part of the upcoming 1987 6th National Games of China, the Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou municipal governments were spending CNY 300 million on new stadia and the renovation of their urban infrastructure and raising a CNY 30 million sponsorship from commercial bodies and the public (Sports Chronicles, 1991, p. 738). Aside from its cities’ sound experience of holding sporting events and seeking commercial sponsorships, choosing Guangdong as the host of the 1988 Women’s Invitation Tournament was also seen as critical to improving China’s chances of holding the first FIFA Women’s World Cup and pushing forward with the economic development of the province. As soon as the FIFA Women’s World Cup was initiated by Havelange and his colleagues in 1985, the Chinese authorities made known their interest in becoming hosts. The reasons for this interest were threefold. First, since the scale of the FIFA Women’s World was smaller than that of the FIFA World Cup, Chinese cities were believed to be able to fulfill hosting duties. Second, it was thought that a successful celebration of the first Women’s World Cup in 1990 would gather good experience that could be used when hosting future sporting mega-events and improve the odds of a successful bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. Third, in March 1986, Premier Zhao Ziyang announced that during the 7th FiveYear Economic Plan (1986–1990), China would increase its participation in international sporting affairs (Zhao 2006). Hosting the FIFA Women’s World Cup, then, might be a perfect step toward this goal.

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Moreover, since 1980, the central government of China had continuously delegated power to local governments, allowing the provinces with great autonomy to push forward the Reform and Opening Up. The leaders of Guangdong accordingly adopted bold measures to enhance industrial and agricultural productivity and attract foreign investment. Its GDP growth under the 6th Five-Year Economic Plan (1981–1985) thus was faster than that of Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, and many other wealthy regions. By 1985, its total export volume was ranked first among the Chinese provinces (“Wosheng chukou,” 1986). To encourage Guangdong to continue to be the locomotive of the Reform and Opening Up, in May 1986 Governor Ye Xuanping (son of Marshal Ye Jianying) announced the provincial government’s determination to strengthen its economic connections with Hong Kong, Macao, and other overseas markets during the 7th Five-Year Economic Plan (“Ba gaige,” 1986). He and his administration were also willing to hold the 1988 FIFA Women’s Invitation Tournament and other mega-events. As Guangdong was being chosen to host the 1988 FIFA Women’s Invitation Tournament, student demonstrations began around China’s cities. The participants complained about the poor living conditions on campuses, opposed official profiteering, and demanded China’s democratization. This nation-wide movement, together with other public protests in 1985 and 1986, led to the anger of senior conservatives and their decision to oust the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaodang, who had consistently supported freedom of expression and opposed efforts to combat bourgeoise liberalization (Baum 1994, p. 207). Deng Xiaoping endorsed this decision. After Hu was removed from office, his successor, Zhao Ziyang, with Deng’s backing, did not attempt to slow down the development of China’s economy. Instead, during the opening of the 13th CCP National Congress, he emphasized a determination to further speed up the Reform and Opening Up (Zhao Ziyang, 2016, pp. 217–254). Meanwhile, the new Politburo Standing Committee was composed of Zhao, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin. Reformists Wan Li and Tian Jiyun’s retained membership in the Politburo. Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zemin also joined the Politburo. To ensure that Chinese local authorities would strictly follow his instructions as delivered to the 13th National CCP Congress, Zhao went to Guangzhou in November 1987, watching the opening ceremony of the 6th National Games of China and praising the efforts of the Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou municipal governments. The other guests,

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including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Juan Samaranch, also gave a thumbs-up to Guangdong for its excellent performance in holding this fourteen-day competition. These compliments reinforced the local authorities’ intentions to have Guangzhou stage the Asian Games in the 1990s (Chu 2016, pp. 1623–1624). However, since the 1990 and 1994 Asian Games had been assigned to Beijing and Hiroshima, it was believed that the Olympic Council of Asia unlikely chose another East Asian city to host the 1998 Asian Games. The provincial authorities shelved their plans and instead decided to stage the 1990 FIFA Women’s World Cup on behalf of China. The meticulous organization of the 1988 FIFA Women’s Invitation Tournament became key to realizing this plan. In view of the provincial government’s tremendous efforts in organizing the 1988 FIFA Women’s Invitation Tournament, both the AFC and FIFA favored Guangdong as host for the first Women’s World Cup (“Aweilanre boshi,” 1988). Havelange subsequently announced that, to avoid distraction from China’s holding of the 1990 Asian Games, the first Women’s World Cup would be staged in 1991 rather than in 1990 (“Guoji zulian,” 1988) In the meanwhile, to further liberate market and speed up reform, Zhao Ziyang followed Deng Xiaoping’s instructions, ordering the central government to remove decades-old price controls over some daily necessities. Due to the public’s fear of steep rises in the price of those goods, nationwide panic buying occurred. Inevitably, China’s inflation rate increased and public dissatisfaction with the state intensified. With this unexpected turn of events, Zhao put an end to the bold measure and handed over the power of managing national economic affairs to Premier Li Peng. Deng also accepted suggestions from senior conservatives that the government should increase the supply of daily necessities, cut capital expenditure, reduce fixed investment, and slow down the pace of the Reform and Opening Up. The new macroeconomic arrangement meant the Chinese central government was reluctant to financially cover the holding of the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup, although it were still interested in bringing this tournament to China’s shores. Governor Ye Xuanping and his colleagues, despite witnessing the panic buying, were confident that Guangdong would become China’s wealthiest province after 1989. They also believed that the province was able to fully cover the total expenditure on the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup. Given this, in February 1989, the central government informed FIFA of

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the decision that Guangdong would host the event on behalf of China (“Shoujie nüzu,” 1989). FIFA accepted. Former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang died on April 15, 1989. In the next three months, hundreds of thousands of university students gathered at Tiananmen Square, memorializing him for being honest and upright and pressing the Chinese authorities to enact political reform. Since the student protestors gained the sympathy of Zhao Ziyang and other reformists and began to be echoed by the Chinese public, similar gatherings appeared in the other big cities. Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and the other conservative officials however deemed that this massivescale nationwide movement was a political plot, aiming at overthrowing the Communist regime. A brutal military suppression of the protest thus took place in the morning of June 4. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were reportedly killed on the streets of Beijing (Kristof 1989). After the crackdown, senior CCP members decided that the excessive market liberalization of the 1980s was the root cause of the nationwide protests. Given this, Deng Xiaoping—the architect of the Reform and Opening Up—retired. Zhao Ziyang and other reformists were removed from power. New CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, together with Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier Yao Yilin, decided to follow the advice of Chen Yun and other senior conservatives, activating another round of economic retrenchment. Li and Yao also tried to slow the growth in national GDP with the 8th Five-Year Economic Plan (1991– 1995) and retrieve power delegated to local governments. Moreover, the governments of the US and other Western democracies collectively condemned the Chinese authorities for their bloody suppression and imposed sanctions. Considering the position of the Western countries, the confidence of FIFA officials in China declined. Some of them even suggested FIFA cancel China’s hosting of the 1991 Women’s World Cup and pass the competition to another country (Dong 1991). Havelange however resisted this suggestion because he insisted upon not mixing sport with politics. The decision that China would stage this soccer mega-event thus remained unchanged (“Shoujie shijiebei,” 1989). Meanwhile, due to Seoul’s outstanding celebration of the 1988 Summer Olympics, South Korea decided to apply for the 2002 FIFA World Cup (“Seoul bid,” 1989). Japan was still viewed as the frontrunner in the bidding race. Due to his strong dissatisfaction with the Chinese leaders’ conservativeness in the early 1990s, Deng repeatedly pressed for the central

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government to take big steps toward market liberalization. Although Li and Yao later readjusted the economic growth rate in their drafted 8th Five-Year Economic Plan, the state media in Beijing deliberately did not cover Deng’s calls. He thus went to Shanghai and used the municipal Party Secretary Zhu Rongji and the local newspapers to release his messages. Subsequently, Guangdong Party Secretary Lin Ruo echoed Deng’s position (Fewsmith 2008, p. 50). Governor Ye Xuanping criticized Li Peng and his colleagues for their intention to seize back economic power from local governments (Baum 1994, p. 327). The provincial authorities meanwhile decided to prepare for the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup in a high-profile manner, so as to arouse people’s enthusiasm for the development of Guangdong, intensify local economic connections with foreign investors, and restore the confidence of FIFA officials. Accordingly, they called on the local public to donate money to the hosting of the competition, made extensive renovations to urban areas of Guangzhou and other hosting cities, and warmly welcomed overseas sponsorship—particularly from Hong Kong. Moreover, since the successful hosting of sporting mega-events was thought to be a way to repair China’s national image in the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese authorities attached great importance to Beijing’s preparations for the 1990 Asian Games. President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng endorsed Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Li zongli,” 1990; “Jiang Zemin,” 1990). They and other state leaders chose not to interfere in Guangdong’s high-profile preparation for the 1991 Women’s World Cup. While supporting the Women’s World Cup became a province-wide exercise, Lin Ruo was made chair of the Provincial People’s Congress of Guangdong and Ye Xuanping was given the job of managing the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The new Guangdong Party Secretary Xie Fei and Governor Zhu Senlin continued in their predecessors’ footstep by enthusiastically pushing forward with provincial economic growth, attracting foreign investment, and preparing for the Women’s World Cup. In the summer of 1990, the satisfaction of the AFC and FIFA with Guangdong’s urban renovation, stadium standards, and hospitality arrangements led João Havelange to once again suggest that China apply for the 2002 FIFA World Cup (“Aweilanre qiwangwo,” 1990). The Chinese authorities did not pursue Havelange’s suggestion however, as a bid for the 2002 FIFA World Cup might distract from Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics.

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In early 1991, Havelange announced that he and other important figures in the international sporting community would visit Guangdong during the ten-day Women’s World Cup. Beijing also activated a bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. Meanwhile, negotiations between the IOC and FIFA over the inclusion of Women’s football in the Olympic movement moved into the final stage. It meant that a consensus about allowing female footballers to take part in every Summer Olympics from 1996 would be reached soon. The central government realized that the 1991 Women’s World Cup could be used to not only display China’s capability to hold competitions of this newly IOC-recognized sport, but also to lobby Havelange and other visitors to support Beijing’s pursuit of the 2000 Summer Olympics. Therefore, the China National Commission of Sport Chairperson Wu Shaozu proclaimed that Guangdong’s holding of the Women’s World Cup was crucial to Beijing’s ongoing Olympic bid (“Ruhe banhao,” 1991). His colleagues also arranged for Beijing Vice Mayor Zhang Baifa, who was taking charge of the executive affairs of the bid, to meet Havelange and other foreign guests at Guangzhou during the Women’s World Cup (“Guangzhou zuode,” 1991). In response to Wu’s proclamation, Guangdong Governor Zhu Senlin delivered a television address, ordering the entire province to prepare well for the Women’s World Cup (“Zhu Senlin,” 1991). Former Guangdong Party Secretary Lin Ruo also emphasized the event’s importance to China’s national image and international status and appealed to officials at all levels of the Guangdong government to flawlessly complete hosting duties (“Jiushoujie shoujie,” 1991). He and former Governor Ye Xuanping later attended the opening and closing ceremonies of the Women’s World Cup at Guangzhou together with Zhu (“Shoujie shijie,” 1991; “Shoujie nüzu,” 1991). These two figures’ high-profile words and deeds showed that, although they no longer chaired the provincial Party and executive affairs, their political influence in Guangdong was still high. Referring to the participant footballers’ vocal appreciation for China’s sophisticated organization and the enthusiasm of the Guangdong public for women’s football, Havelange called the 1991 Women’s World Cup an excellent party. He also promised that, if Brasilia was eliminated from the 2000 Olympic bidding contest, he would cast his vote for the Chinese capital city and that he would appeal to other Latin American IOC members to support Beijing (He 2008, p. 24). The Chinese authorities therefore concluded that the Women’s World Cup had successfully shown

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China’s ability to host sporting mega-events and created favorable conditions for Beijing’s pursuit of the Olympics (“Guangdong renmin,” 1991). Meanwhile, along with bids from Sydney, Berlin, Manchester, Istanbul, Milan, Tashkent, and Brasilia, Beijing’s application letter was duly delivered to the IOC. The Chinese authorities announced that the 14th CCP National Congress would be held in Beijing during the fourth quarter of 1992. The Soviet Union dissolved. Deng Xiaoping worried deeply that if Chinese leaders continued to be so conservative in their handling of national economic affairs, China would very likely follow the fate of the Soviet Union and all the efforts he had made since the late 1970s would be in vain. To turn the tables, during his 1992 southern tour, he repeatedly asked the local leaders of Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Shanghai, and Jiangsu to push forward the Reform and Opening Up. He also successfully gained the backing of most of the senior members of the Chinese military, meaning anyone who did not support the reforms would be forced to step down (Vogel 2011, p. 677). Jiang Zemin subsequently not only criticized himself for his own sluggish following of Deng’s advice (Baum 1994, p. 247; Fewsmith 2008, p. 66), but also stressed at the 14th CCP National Congress that the Chinese authorities should accelerate the Reform and Opening Up during the 1990s. Moreover, Guangdong Party Secretary Xie Fei joined the CCP Politburo and former Shanghai Party Secretary Zhu Rongji joined its Standing Committee. While the Chinese authorities were busy dismantling their conservative economics, the IOC announced that its assessments pointed to Beijing’s bid as inferior to Sydney’s in terms of environmental conditions, sports facilities, and internationalization standards. Besides, due to the dissatisfaction of President Bill Clinton and his Democratic Party colleagues with China’s dismal human rights record and that of Prime Minister John Major and his cabinet with the Chinese authorities’ disapproval of Governor Chris Patten’s Hong Kong political reform package, the US and the United Kingdom openly opposed Beijing’s bid to host the 2000 Summer Olympics. To mitigate this criticism, China released political dissident Wei Jingsheng. The Chinese authorities intensified their lobbying of IOC members, particularly those from Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Chu 2021, pp. 12–13). Upon the withdrawal of Brasilia from the contest, Havelange kept his promise, fully supporting Beijing in the remaining bidding process (Liang 2007, p. 426).

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A few days before the vote, Beijing Vice Mayor Zhang Baifa’s delivered a media interview in which he noted that, if the political interference of the US led to Beijing’s failure in the current bid, China would boycott the 1996 Atlanta Olympics in retaliation. This set off a firestorm in the international sporting community. While the Chinese authorities were thinking of how to shift the IOC voters’ attention away from Zhang’s provocation and stupidity, the Australians donated generous amounts of cash to the IOC members for their support of Sydney. This strategy successfully led a few members who had promised to vote for Beijing to change their minds at the last minute. The Chinese capital city was defeated by a narrow margin by its Australian competitor in September 1993 (Chu 2021, pp. 12–13). Shortly after the failure, China was persuaded to accept Havelange’s invitation to apply for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. However, since Beijing’s failure was viewed as a result of the Western English-speaking countries’ collective obstruction, Chinese authorities judged that their top priorities should be to speed up the Reform and Opening Up, boost the economy, and build harmonious ties with the US and other Western democracies. FIFA was informed in November 1993 that China would not pursue the 2002 World Cup (“Chinese rule,” 1993). In 1994, the involvement of tycoon Chung Mong-joon boosted South Korea’s chances of winning the rights to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup dramatically. The bidding process became a neck-and-neck race between South Korea and Japan. Given this, Havelange, in May 1996, made the unprecedented decision to offer the two East Asian countries the chance to co-host the football event (“Korea, Japan,” 1996). Both the Japanese and South Korean Football Associations accepted. Two years later, Sepp Blatter succeeded Havelange as FIFA President.

2.3

China and the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup

During his 2000 visit to China, Blatter praised the urban development of Beijing and Shanghai and the achievements of Chinese teams in women’s football (“Guoji zulian,” 2000). In fact, despite Deng Xiaoping’s death and the Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese government, under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, closely implemented the 9th Five-Year Economic Plan (1996–2000) that aimed to further spur market liberalization and economic growth. Consequently, the privatization of state-owned enterprises as well as the urban development of Beijing, Shanghai, and other

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Chinese metropolises accelerated. Moreover, the Chinese women’s football team, led by striker Sun Wen, won the silver medal in the 1996 Summer Olympics and they finished runners-up in the 1999 Third FIFA Women’s World Cup. The team was viewed as having a good chance to win the 2003 Fourth FIFA Women’s World Cup. The Chinese authorities were delighted with Blatter’s complimentary remarks. However, they did not think that their footballers were capable of winning the Women’s World Cup in 2003.4 Nevertheless, shortly after the most powerful person in world soccer departed, the Chinese Football Association (CFA), the body with the duty of managing soccer affairs in the country, put forward its application to hold the 2003 Women’s World Cup. This decision was related to Beijing’s ongoing bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Aside from intensifying efforts to spur market liberalization and economic growth at home, Jiang and his administration attached great importance to enhancing the international engagement of China and boosting its status and profile on the world stage. Thus, they took initiatives to establish multilateral mechanisms; strengthened co-operation with the US and other Western states; signed and ratified international treaties on weapons non-proliferation, human rights, and environmental protection; accelerated efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO); and approved a Beijing bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. To ensure that most IOC members would support Beijing in the vote scheduled for July 2001, the Chinese authorities intensified efforts to improve local infrastructure, environmental conditions, transport, and security. They also sought ways to demonstrate China’s capability of hosting sporting mega-events to the international society. Successfully bringing the 2003 Women’s World Cup to China in 2000 served this purpose perfectly. Additionally, since China enjoyed over 8% annual GDP growth during the 9th Five-Year Economic Plan and had good chance to join the WTO in 2001, President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and their colleagues decided to continue with fast economic development, increase the employment rate, and strengthen IT-related infrastructure in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) (Zhu 2000). Through the holding of the 2003 Women’s World Cup, Chinese cities would upgrade stadia, transportation, airports, and hotels, as well as expand Internet and telecommunication services, so facilitating the ambitious social and economic goals of the leaders to be realized.

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While China’s application letter was delivered to FIFA, Australia had already put forward its intention to stage the 2003 Women’s World Cup. Some European FIFA members favored Australia because (1) Sydney was going to host the 2000 Summer Olympics, (2) the excellence of Australia’s environmental conditions was internationally recognized, (3) the Australians had shown enthusiasm for women’s football, and (4) concerns were raised about China’s eradication of Falun Gong and the persecution of its practitioners. FIFA President Sepp Blatter however insisted on following his predecessor Havelange’s principle that football must not be mixed with politics. He and the other FIFA members also believed that, given China’s sheer population size and rapid economic development, the financial return from holding the Women’s World Cup in Chinese cities would be better than that in Australia. Consequently, China was awarded the 2003 Women’s World Cup in October 2000. Blatter later suggested Shanghai, which was applying for the 2010 World Expo, take up the duty of staging the event’s opening and closing ceremonies as well as the semi-final and final matches (“Nüzu shijiebei,” 2001). Following the rapid GDP growth of Shanghai and the fast urbanization of the Pudong district in the 1990s, the municipal authorities decided to transform their jurisdiction into an international center of economy, finance, trade, and shipping by 2020. Mayor Xu Kuangdi subsequently thought that it was necessary to hold the 2010 World Expo to enhance the internationalization of Shanghai, raise its global profile, and facilitate the overall success of the transformation. While this ambitious idea was endorsed by Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju, President Jiang Zemin, and Premier Zhu Rongji, Moscow of Russia, Yeosu of South Korea, Wroclaw of Poland, and Querétaro of Mexico respectively put forward applications for the 2010 World Expo (Chu 2020, pp. 319–320). The Chinese authorities realized that letting Shanghai host more mega-events in the 2000s was key to increasing its chance of victory in this fierce international contest. Thus, they arranged for Xu and his colleagues in the municipal government to meet the President of the Special Olympics Organization (“Zhongguo teao,” 2000). This meeting laid the foundations for the city winning the hosting rights of the 2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games in May 2002, six months before the selection of the 2010 World Expo host (“2007 nian,” 2002). The CFA also accepted Blatter’s suggestion, assigning Shanghai to play the leading role in the holding of the 2003 Women’s World Cup.

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The municipal government consequently announced that the Shanghai Stadium, a newly built outdoor pitch with a seating capacity of at least 56000, would hold the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2003 Women’s World Cup as well as four group matches, two semi-finals, and the final. Chengdu, Hangzhou, and Wuhan meanwhile had renovated the stadia that would be used to present the other 25 matches of this tournament. The CFA also started marketing the 2003 Women’s World Cup and seeking sponsorships. Given China’s dismal human rights performance, the US congressmen introduced a resolution opposing Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics. To ease the tension between the US and China that had been caused by the death of the Chinese pilot in the Hainan collision incident, President George Bush announced that he and his administration would be neutral to Beijing’s ongoing Olympic pursuit. Meanwhile, in the report drafted by the IOC Evaluation Commission, Beijing was viewed as being superior to the other bidding cities in terms of overall ability to host the Summer Olympics (Chu 2021, p. 18). Not surprisingly, it won the hosting rights by a landslide in July 2001. Over the next four months, China joined the WTO. Its national football team qualified to participate in the Japan-South Korea 2002 FIFA World Cup. The CFA expressed interest in bringing the 2014 FIFA World Cup to China. Chen Liangyu succeeded Xu Kuangdi and Huang Ju as Shanghai Mayor and Party Secretary. The public were thrilled with the accomplishments. They yet worried that the personnel arrangement would affect Shanghai’s odds in the World Expo bidding contest. To ensure that the most prestigious cultural fair on the planet would be staged within its jurisdiction in 2010, the Chinese government put forward a lavish hosting proposal for the World Expo. President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji also keenly took part in the lobbying at home and abroad. Eventually, Shanghai won the hosting rights on December 2, 2002 (Chu 2020, pp. 319 & 320). In addition, in the 16th CCP National Congress, the Chinese authorities unveiled the goals of quadrupling China’s 2000 GDP and the building of a moderately prosperous society—which commonly describes a pleasantly contented society composed of a broad, comfortable middle-class—by 2020 (Jiang Zemin, 2006, pp. 528–575). It meant that the prime goal of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao was to follow in their predecessors’ footsteps by supporting the rapid economic growth of the nation. Furthermore, the CFA, after 2002, seldom raised the prospect of applying for the

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2014 FIFA World Cup. It was because (1) the national football team suffered crushing defeats at the 2002 FIFA World Cup and (2) FIFA expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the CFA and Chengdu in preparing for the 2003 Women’s World Cup.5 While the CFA and the Chengdu municipal government adopted measures to fix the problems, China was included in the World Health Organization (WHO) list of epidemic areas affected by the outbreak of SARS. Subsequently, FIFA moved the 2003 Women’s World Cup to the US and assigned China as host of the 2007 Women’s World Cup instead. To prevent the money and effort of Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chengdu, and Wuhan from being wasted, the Chinese authorities accepted this offer. They meanwhile learned that the IOC had concerns about whether Beijing would be able to prepare properly for the 2008 Summer Olympics. After China was removed from the WHO list of epidemic areas, President Hu came to Lausanne promising to the IOC President Jacques Rogge that Beijing would successfully complete its duty to stage the 2008 Summer Olympics with the support of the Chinese government. The CFA subsequently suggested Beijing and its neighbor Tianjin, which had been assigned to host the 2008 Summer Olympics’ men and women’s football group matches, should stage the 2007 Women’s World Cup together with Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chengdu, and Wuhan (“2007 nüzu,” 2005). Moreover, the CFA dropped plans to pursue the 2014 FIFA World Cup, because Blatter openly favored Brazil (“Bulate qingxiang,” 2004). In the wake of the SARS outbreak, Hu began to believe that China’s severe income disparity and ecological damage were due to the long pursuit of fast GDP growth. He initiated the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to reach a balance between rapid economic growth and sustainable social development. To echo this new governance principle, Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan cut the budget for building the Beijing National Stadium, which would hold the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympics and its athletics competitions. His administration also refused to take part in the holding of the 2007 Women’s World Cup. Tianjin however agreed to work with the other Chinese cities, because its municipal leaders believed that the experience acquired from the holding of the 2007 Women’s World Cup would facilitate the smooth staging of the men and women’s football group matches at the 2008 Summer Olympics (“2007 nüzu,” 2005).

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In November 2005, the CFA announced that the 5th Women’s World Cup would be staged in September 2007 and that the opening and closing ceremonies, as well as semi-final and final matches, would be held in Shanghai (“Nüzu shijiebei,” 2005). The Shanghai municipal government subsequently proposed using the Hongkou Football Stadium instead of the Shanghai Stadium, because the latter had been reserved for the opening ceremony of the 2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games. Although the Hongkou Football Stadium was the home stadium of the Shanghai Shenhua Football Club, it could only contain 33000 spectators. It was smaller than that of any of the stadia hosting the Women’s World Cup matches in Hangzhou, Wuhan, Tianjin, and Chengdu. The CFA thus hesitated to endorse the Shanghai municipal government’s proposal. The Tianjin municipal government promptly suggested that the CFA should let the brand-new Tianjin Olympic Stadium—which could contain 65000 spectators—hold the opening and closing ceremonies as well as the semi-final and final matches (“Shanghai haishi,” 2006). Moreover, FIFA President Sepp Blatter, in a press conference, suggested China bid for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (“Zhongguo youzige,” 2006). While the CFA was assessing Tianjin’s ability to play a leading role in the Women’s World Cup, Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu was arrested due to his misuse of public funds and taking of bribes. This scandal undoubtedly affected the image and investment environment of Shanghai and the international society’s confidence in the ongoing organization of the 2010 World Expo. Premier Wen Jiabao thus emphasized that the 2010 World Expo was crucial to Shanghai’s development (“Wen Jiabao,” 2007). Meanwhile, Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping, son of former Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, was transferred to Shanghai to chair the municipal political affairs. The CFA subsequently agreed to present the opening and closing ceremonies as well as the semi-final and final matches in rather the Hongkou Football Stadium than the Tianjin Olympic Stadium. The reason behind this decision was because that (1) adopting the Shanghai municipal government’s proposal enabled Xi, who had been selected to succeed Hu Jintao as the supreme leader of China in the year 2012, to acquire experience in chairing China’s international affairs and (2) assigning Tianjin to play the leading role of hosting the Women’s World Cup would intensify the international society’s worry about the investment environment of Shanghai and its organization of the 2010 World Expo.

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Sepp Blatter and his FIFA colleagues, together with Xi, watched the splendid opening ceremony of the Women’s World Cup and its exciting first match in Shanghai on September 10, 2007. Over the next twenty days, they also witnessed the sophisticated organization of 31 other matches and a closing ceremony. Blatter thus once again suggested China apply for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Bulate zhichi,” 2007). The Chinese authorities however were indifferent. Meanwhile, Xi left Shanghai and joined the new nine-member Politburo Standing Committee in the 17th CCP Central Committee first session. This arrangement further bolstered his chances of becoming the next supreme leader of China. The successful celebration of the Summer Olympics one year later spurred President Hu Jintao and his colleagues to make China a strong sporting power (Hu Jintao, 2016, pp. 101–114). The central government thus approved of Chinese cities keenly pursuing international sporting events. Blatter also suggested China make a bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The Chinese authorities still declined (“Guoji zulian,” 2008). In December 2010, FIFA had no choice but to pass the hosting rights of the 2018 World Cup to Russia and that of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. One month earlier, the 184-day-long 2010 World Expo, which saw 73 million visitors and the participation of 246 countries and international organizations, rounded off in Shanghai. As the organization of this mega-event was highly praised by the world’s political leaders, business tycoons, and social celebrities, the municipal authorities’ confidence to turn Shanghai into an international center of economy, finance, trade, and shipping by 2020 was enhanced (Chu 2020, p. 322).

2.4

China and the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup

In order to control the Communist regime, lead globalization, and rejuvenate the Chinese nation, Xi Jinping, after his formal accession of power at the first session of the 17th CCP Central Committee in November 2012, activated a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, chaired newlyformed central leading groups, re-organized the Chinese military, handled territorial disputes in the South China Sea in an uncompromised manner, revitalized the role of state enterprises in the national economy, removed presidential term limits, and launched the Belt and Road initiative. He also attached high importance to the development of football. This was not solely because he was a football fan, but because football was viewed as being able to boost patriotism and collectivism among the public,

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raise China’s status and profile in the world arena, and facilitate the realization of the national rejuvenation. Therefore, in 2015, the State Council issued the Overall Chinese Football Reform and Development Programme, which aimed to reform the CFA; improve the operations of professional football clubs, professional football league, and campus football; enhance the standards of technical football staff and national football teams; upgrade nationwide football facilities; and bid for the FIFA World Cup (“Zhongguo zuqiu,” 2005). While the ambitious football program sparked a heated discussion among the public, Sepp Blatter lost his position at FIFA due to his involvement in bribery and money laundering. Over the next few years, his successor, Gianni Infantino, activated a series of reforms. One of them was to increase the number of World Cup participant teams from 32 to 48 from 2026. This facilitated the joint bid of the US, Canada, and Mexico to defeat Morocco in the contest to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Like his predecessors Joan Havelange and Sepp Blatter, Infantino favored emerging economies with large populations, like China, to host FIFA events. However, he did not openly invite China to apply for the 2030 World Cup or the 2034 World Cup. Meanwhile, since the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) noted that, according to FIFA convention, the 2030 World Cup should be hosted in Europe, rather than any other continent (“Europe to,” 2017), the United Kingdom expressed interest in co-hosting the event with Ireland. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia also declared their intention to make a joint bid. Despite this, FIFA still received the application from Morocco and a joint bid from Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay. Xi was interested in bringing a future FIFA World Cup to China (“FIFA President,” 2017). But he realized that since the pursuit of its hosting rights entailed a journey with lots of uncertainties, it would be necessary for China to strengthen its ties with FIFA before making any bid. Thus, his administration and Chinese enterprises generously sponsored the 2018 FIFA World Cup, invited FIFA to supervise the Overall Chinese Football Reform and Development Programme, and successfully arranged for CFA Vice President Du Zhaocai to join the FIFA Council (“Chinese firms,” 2018; “FIFA and,” 2019; “China’s Du,” 2019). Meanwhile, FIFA decided that, from 2021, the number of participant teams in each Club World Cup would increase from 7 to 24 and that the interval between Club World Cups would be four years rather than one year. Xi Jinping and his administration subsequently decided that

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China should host the 2021 Club World Cup (“Guoji zulian,” 2019). Undoubtedly, the successful holding of the 2021 Club World Cup would demonstrate Chinese cities’ capability and boost China’s odds of success in the 2030 or the 2034 World Cup bidding contests. However, there were other reasons. First, 2020 was the year that China was supposed to have become moderately prosperous. This magnificent achievement would be vividly demonstrated to the world through this FIFA tournament. Second, the central and local governments could intensify efforts to promote football and build stadia after winning the bidding process. The implementation of the Xi-endorsed Overall Chinese Football Reform and Development Programme thus would be accelerated. Third, it was believed a successful celebration of the 2021 Club World Cup would give China more influence within FIFA. This would bring long-term impact on China in the global football development (“2019 nian,” 2019). Fourth and most importantly, some Asian and African countries that had participated in the Belt and Road initiative suspended several infrastructure projects led by the Chinese enterprises from 2018. President Donald Trump also imposed tariffs on USD 250 billion worth of Chinese products to penalize China’s years of unfair trading practices with the US. These events damaged the reputation of China in the world, undermined its competitiveness in the international markets, and obstructed Xi’s aspiration of leading globalization and rejuvenating the Chinese nation. Hosting the 2021 Club World Cup became to be seen as crucial as it could not only show FIFA’s trust in China, but also serve to mitigate international society’s apprehension surrounding Beijing and its global programs. It needs to be noted that Xi did not compromise with Trump. Rather, he slapped tariffs on USD 100 billion worth of the American products in retaliation. Inevitably, tensions between China and the US escalated. Meanwhile, the SAR government, with the blessing of Chinese leaders, proposed an extradition law by which anybody in Hong Kong could be sent to the mainland for trial if their words or deeds breached Chinese law. Since the proposal was viewed as a severe violation of the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle, over one million Hong Kong residents marched in the streets between March and June 2019, calling for the SAR government to cancel it. Chief Executive Carrie Lam however refused. The local police also brutally dispersed and arrested the young students who intended to obstruct the legislation (“Police violence,” 2019). Subsequently, massive protests were held in the city one after

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another throughout the summer of 2019, although the SAR government announced the suspension of the legislation. A few radical participants even defaced Chinese national symbols, vandalized public property, and demanded Hong Kong independence (Mahtani 2019). Xi and his administration held a hard-line toward Hong Kong, as they thought that the protests shared characteristics with color revolutions and showed signs of terrorism (Chung and Cheung 2019; Zhang et al. 2019). Surprisingly, the Hong Kong people did not back down even when the Chinese authorities’ plan to use troops to restore order was revealed. Their political persistence subsequently gained extensive support from the US politicians and celebrities, including Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey. Given their furiousness over Morey’s stance, the Chinese authorities asked the NBA to fire him at once and Chinese companies to suspend business co-operation with the Houston Rockets. The rough interference with a fellow American’s freedom of expression caused antipathy toward Xi and his administration in the US. Senator Rick Scott even called for FIFA to reject China’s application to host the 2021 Club World Cup (“Sen. Rick,” 2019). Since he followed his predecessors’ position that football should not be mixed with politics, Gianni Infantino did not take the American politician’s advice. Instead, in October 2019, he and his colleagues unanimously voted for China to host the 2021 Club World Cup.6 FIFA also openly hinted that China should bid for the 2030 World Cup (Morgan 2019). Since this showed that Infantino might not be firm in his support of UEFA, Egypt expressed interest in holding the event. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru also planned to co-host it. However, the Chinese authorities did not put forward an application while Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang, Jinan, Hangzhou, and Dalian were assigned to stage the competitions of the Club World Cup in December 2019. In 2020, the entire world was severely hit by COVID-19, a novel coronavirus that was first found in Wuhan. The South American Football Confederation and UEFA thus rescheduled the 2020 Copa América and the 2020 European Championship to 2021. FIFA later also postponed the 2021 Club World Cup (“FIFA president,” 2020). Since there was no sign showing that the COVID-19 pandemic would end in near future, Infantino announced in December 2020 that Japan had agreed to host the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup with the participation of only 7 teams in December 2021 and that the holding of the first 24-team Club World

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Cup in China was still on the FIFA agenda, but he and his colleagues had not decided when it would take place. The international media deemed that 2025 should be the ideal year of the tournament’s celebration (“FIFA extends,” 2020). As of January 2021, neither FIFA nor the Beijing side gave response to this view.

2.5

Conclusion

Aside from pushing the Reform and Opening Up, Deng Xiaoping, after becoming the supreme leader in the late 1970s, wanted China to peacefully unify with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan and host world-renowned sporting mega-events. In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed between Beijing and London meant that Hong Kong would become a part of China in 1997. Beijing also obtained the rights to host the 1990 Asian Games and expressed interest in pursuing the 2000 Summer Olympics. However, Chinese football fans’ hooliganism in May 1985 undermined the image of China in the international sports community and caused further apprehension in Hong Kong about the handover. The Chinese authorities subsequently attached great importance to the 1985 FIFA U-16 World Championship. It was because a flawless celebration of this international soccer tournament in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian was viewed as a useful way to restore international confidence in China’s ability to host sporting mega-events and to boost sympathy in Hong Kong with the unification. In 1989, the student-led Tiananmen democratic protests and the Chinese authorities’ brutal crackdown resulted in Deng’s retirement. It also caused the newly incumbent CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and their colleagues to manage economic affairs in a more conservative manner. Deng’s strong dissatisfaction with this caused him to repeatedly emphasize the importance of pushing forward with the Reform and Opening Up and carrying on with market liberalization. The provincial chiefs of Guangdong accordingly decided to make the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup an extravagant party and associate it with Beijing’s ongoing bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics, so as to display their determination to stand with Deng. Deng’s southern tour in early 1992 successfully forced Jiang, Li, and their colleagues to shelve conservativeness, accelerate the Reform and Opening Up, and engage more in international society. Over the next ten

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years, the economic growth of China skyrocketed. The Chinese government joined the WTO. Beijing and Shanghai were awarded the rights to host the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo. While the Chinese public were proud of these achievements, the SARS pandemic led to international worry about China’s investment environment and Beijing and Shanghai’s organization of the two mega-events. The Chinese authorities decided to restore international society’s confidence in China by the successful hosting of the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup. Additionally, Xi Jinping, who had been chosen to lead the Communist regime, used this soccer tournament to gain experience in handling international affairs. To ensure that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation could be realized by the middle of the twenty-first century, Xi Jinping, after his formal accession of power in 2012, accelerated China’s economic and political expansion in the world. He also set aside promises given by his predecessors. Those measures boosted nationalistic sentiments among the Chinese public. They however resulted in the Asian, African, and Oceanian antipathy toward the Beijing-led Belt and Road initiative, the massive anti-government protests in Hong Kong, and the deterioration of China’s international image. Xi subsequently decided to apply for the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup as a way of mitigating a tough situation on the international stage.

Notes 1. The U-16 World Championshipwas initiated by FIFA General Secretary Sepp Blatter after watching Singapore’s successful Lion City Cup, an international under-16 football tournament, in 1982. President João Havelange and the chairpersons of the FIFA confederations later accepted this initiative and decided to hold the first U-16 World Championship in 1985 (Dorai 1985). 2. During his Tokyo visit in 1983, the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang called on young Japanese people to visit China. He also supported Japan strengthening its military for the purposes of self-defense. To appreciate the Chinese leader’s goodwill gesture, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, during his Beijing trip of 1984, promised to lend JPY 470 billion to China for supporting the Reform and Opening Up. While the honeymoon between the two countries was ongoing, Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where the names of A-class war criminals are listed. The Chinese government issued a moderate statement in response to this controversial

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3.

4.

5.

6.

move. Many Chinese students however were furious about the attitude of the government toward Nakasone’s Yasukuni Shrine visit, so they organized a series of anti-Japanese protests in 1986. This event inevitably caused Beijing some embarrassment (Dreyer 2016, pp. 173–176). To ensure that Japan would continue backing China’s economic development, Chinese authorities decided that any exercise that carried with the possibility of undermining Sino-Japanese ties, like China’s participation in the 2002 FIFA World Cup bidding contest, must be avoided. This was an eleven-day tournament in which six Chinese local teams and the Singaporean and Japanese national teams participated (“Guangzhou guoji,” 1983). The elimination of the Chinese women’s football national team in the group stage of the 2000 Sydney Olympics confirmed that the Chinese authorities’ view was correct. Aside from seeking sponsorships by itself, the CFA also assigned a Chinese company to raise funds for the 2003 Women’s World Cup. However, its inexperience in handling international promotions meant that the performance of this company was poor. Thus, FIFA bluntly asked the CFA to fire the company and revise the event’s marketing strategies. Moreover, since the renovation of the Chengdu Sports Centre failed to meet the expectations of FIFA, the Chengdu municipal authorities were warned to improve (“Guoji zuxie,” 2002; “Chengdu zhongxin,” 2002). Not surprisingly, this decision was condemned by the international human rights organizations (MacInnes 2019).

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Guangzhou zuode feichang chuse [Guangzhou did a good job]. (1991, November 16). Guangzhou Daily, p. 1. Guoji zulian xuanbu 2021 nian xinban shijubei luohu zhongguo [FIFA announce China will host the 2021 Club World Cup]. (2019, October 24). Xinhua. http://sports.xinhuanet.com/c/2019-10/24/c_1125147452.htm. Guoji zulian zhuxi aweilanre pingjia nüzu yundong [FIFA President Havelange comments about women’s football movement]. (1988, June 21). Sports Fans, p. 1. Guoji zulian zhuxi bulate de zhongguo zhixing [FIFA President Sepp Blatter’s China visit]. (2000, April 15). Guangming Daily, p. 4. Guoji zulian zhuxi bulate: fang zhongguo yingshenban 2022 shijiebei [FIFA President Sepp Blatter: China should activate bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup]. (2008, August 21). Liaoshen Evening News. Guoji zuxie yanli piping zhongguo zuxie [FIFA strongly criticize CFA]. (2002, April 20). Market Daily, p. 5. He, Z. (2008). Jianxin de huihuang: wode shenao riji [Tough glory: My diary of Olympic bids]. Hong Kong: Motherland Press. Hu Jintao fenbie huijian luoge he Ding Zhaozhong [Hu Jintao meets Jacques Rogge and Samuel C. C. Ting respectively]. (2003, June 3). People’s Daily, p. 3. Hu Jintao wenxuan disanjuan [Selected works of Hu Jintao volume III ]. (2016). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Hu Yaobang wenxuan 1975-1986 [Selected works of Hu Yaobang 1975-1986]. (2009). Hong Kong: Wen Wei Publishing Company. Jiang Zemin wenxuan disanjuan [Selected works of Jiang Zemin volume III ]. (2006). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Jiang Zemin Yang Shangkun fenbie huijian Samalanqi [Jiang Zemin and Yang Shangkun respectively meet Samaranch]. (1990, September 23). People’s Daily, p. 2. Jiulingnian yayunhui yiding bande genghao [1990 Asian Games will be hosted better]. (1985, May 26). Overseas Chinese Daily News, p. 1.2. Jiushoujie shoujie nüzusai choubei qingkuang shengrenda zhuren huiyi tingqu huibao [Guangdong People’s Congress Chairperson listens to the report about the organization of the 1st FIFA Women’s World Cup]. (1991, October 15). Nanfang Daily, p. 1. Juban kedabei shige henhao de changju [Holding U-16 World Championship is a very good pioneering work]. (1985, August 22). Sports News, p. 1. Kedabei qijian juban wenming guanzhong huodong [Organizing civil spectator activities during the World Championship]. (1985, July 11). Beijing Daily, p. 1. Kedabei zuqiusai zai Beijing yuanman jieshu [U-16 World Championship rounded off in Beijing]. (1985, August 12). Sports News, p. 1.

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Korea, Japan to share World Cup. (1996, June 1). South China Morning Post, p. 26. Kristof, N. (1989, June 5). Beijing death toll at Least 300; army tightens control of city but angry resistance goes on. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/beiijing-death-tollleast-300-army-tightens-control-city-but-angry-resistance.html. Laizi xianggangdui de xiaoxi [Information from Hong Kong team]. (1985, April 23). Soccer News, pp. 1&2. Li zongli laidaole xunlianguan [Premier Li Peng comes to training centre]. (1990, July 20). China Sports Daily, 1. Liang, L. (2007). He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic dream. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. MacInnes, P. (2019, October 24). FIFA under fire after announcing China will host 24-team Club World Cup. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/football/2019/oct/24/fifa-china-host-24-team-club-world-cup-2021human-rights. Mahtani, S. (2019, July 21). Hong Kong protestors outmaneuver police, vandalize Chinese Liaison Office. Washington Post. https://www.washingto npost.com/world/asia_pacific/police-dramatically-increase-security-in-hongkong-as-protests-continue-unabated/2019/07/21/1de14dd2-aafa-11e98733-48c87235f396_story.html. Morgan, T. (2019, June 5). Fifa open to China bid for 2030 World Cup in blow to GB and Ireland hopes. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co. uk/football/2019/06/05/fifa-open-china-bid-2030-world-cup-blow-gb-ire land-hopes/. Nüzu shijiebei hounian 9 yue 10 ri jie [Women’s World Cup will open on 10 September 2007]. (2005, November 24). Beijing Youth Daily. Nüzu shijiebei zhusaichang qiaoding [The main stadium of Women’s World Cup is confirmed]. (2001, April 21). Shanghai Youth Daily. Police violence puts Hong Kong government on defensive. (2019, June 12). New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/asia/ hong-kong-protests.html. Ruhe banhao nüzu shijinsai Wu Shaozu tichu liutiao yaoqiu [Wu Shaozu talks about six points about how to successfully hold the FIFA Women’s World Cup]. (1991, July 25). China Sports Daily, p. 1. Sen. Rick Scott to FIFA Council: reject communist China as host of Club World Cup. (2019, October 23). Senator Rick Scott. https://www.rickscott.senate. gov/sen-rick-scott-fifa-council-reject-communist-china-host-club-world-cup. Seoul bid for World Cup. (1989, December 28). South China Morning Post, p. 24. Shenban chenggong liaoquele Deng Xiaoping suyuan [Beijing’s success in the Olympic bid fulfils Deng Xiaoping’s dream]. (2007, February 16). People.

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CHAPTER 3

Leveraging the AFC Asian Cup

Abstract This chapter explores how China’s bids for and organization of the 2004 AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Asian Cup and the 2023 AFC Asian Cup were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 2004 AFC Asian Cup · The 2023 AFC Asian Cup

Since the university student-led protests in the Tiananmen Square were viewed by the Deng’s government as an attempt to overthrow the Communist regime, troops brutally suppressed the participants. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were reportedly killed in the streets of Beijing on the eve of June 4, 1989 (Kristof 1989). The bloody crackdown resulted in sanctions being imposed by the US and other Western countries, the frustration of Chinese applications to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other international mechanisms, Deng’s retirement from office, and the decision of General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and other Chinese leaders to intensify financial retrenchment and slow the Reform and Opening Up (Feinerman 1996). While the Chinese authorities strictly upheld conservative principles to handle economic affairs over the next two years, Eastern European states abolished the Communist rule one after another. In © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_3

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December 1991, the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist Bloc, also collapsed. Deng, the architect of the Reform and Opening Up, realized that if market liberalization failed, China would follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union and its satellite states and his political legacy would vanish. Thus, in January 1992, he successfully gained the endorsement of senior Chinese military members. This meant anyone who did not support the Reform and Opening Up must step down at once. Jiang Zemin subsequently criticized himself for being slow to boost the national economy. He and other Chinese leaders, at the 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress held in October 1992, agreed that China must further liberate markets and speed up the pace of economic development. Not surprisingly, Chinese GDP skyrocketed in the next three years. The Chinese authorities duly informed the public of their determination to continue with fast economic growth from 1996 to 2000 and double the 2000 GDP by 2010. Although the US and other Western countries resumed economic ties with China from 1994,1 their dissatisfaction with Beijing’s trade reform remained. As such, the Chinese government failed to join GATT or become a founding member of its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Jiang Zemin and his colleagues were not too discouraged by this setback. In March 1996, the Chinese government commenced negotiations over accession to the WTO. It particularly encouraged its wealthy coastal provinces to intensify international engagement, so facilitating the success of the negotiations. Shanghai and Guangdong subsequently informed the Chinese Football Association (CFA) that they were interested in hosting the 2000 AFC Asian Cup. South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Lebanon also applied to host the soccer tournament.

3.1

China and the 2004 AFC Asian Cup

Given its successful presentations of the 1988 FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Women’s Invitation Tournament and the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup, Guangdong, the locomotive of the Reform and Opening Up, became the most experienced region in China at holding international soccer competitions. Although experience of staging mega-soccer tournaments was absent, Shanghai, the commercial center of China, had celebrated the 1993 East Asian Games and the 1996 Asian Pacific Region Special Olympics Games as well as was going to stage

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the 1997 National Games of China and the 1998 Summer Universiade. It would also complete the building of a multi-purpose stadium with the seating capacity of at least 56000 in 1997. In addition, after 1990, China became influential on the AFC Executive Committee, which duty was to choose the host nation of each Asian Cup, because the CFA senior administrator Xu Fang became its member and concurrently took up the position of the AFC Senior Vice President. The above factors led the Chinese public to believe that either Guangdong or Shanghai might easily win the rights to host the 2000 AFC Asian Cup. The CFA however realized that neither Guangdong nor Shanghai had an advantage over South Korea, which had just been awarded the 2002 World Cup alongside Japan, Malaysia, which was going to host the 1997 FIFA World Youth Championship and the 1998 Commonwealth Games, or Hong Kong, which had been a keen host of the AFC-governed competitions since the 1950s. It thus incorporated both Guangdong and Shanghai’s hosting proposals into one application document, to increase the odds of success. This strategic move was later confirmed to be the right call because the AFC assessment report stated that China’s bid was superior to its rivals in terms of stadium standards, hotel management, and marketing potential (“Kaochatuan mimi,” 1996; “Zhongguo shenban,” 1996). South Korean tycoon Chung Moon-jun, who was also a FIFA Vice President and a member of the AFC Executive Committee, subsequently deemed that his motherland should cancel its bid and back China, so reciprocating China’s firm support to South Korean cities’ pursuit of the international sporting events in previous years2 and enhancing the chance of bringing the 2000 Asian Cup to East Asia. While the Korean Football Association was digesting Chung’s thoughts, Hong Kong, which would be returned to China by the British in 1997, discontinued its application because its stadia were unable to meet the standards expected by the AFC.3 Since Kuala Lumpur and its sister cities gained the blessing of both the AFC President Ahmed Shad and its General Secretary Peter Velappan (“Zhongguo shenban,” 1996), Malaysian officials believed they could defeat their competitors. Moreover, Lebanese officials did not feel discouraged even though Lebanon seemed the weakest candidate in the race. Instead, they enthusiastically lobbied the members of the AFC Executive Committee.

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It needs to be noted that the AFC Executive Committee was composed of eighteen members. Aside from Xu Fang of China and Chung Moonjun of South Korea, the other sixteen members were from Indonesia, Kuwait, India, South Korea, North Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, Lebanon, Thailand, Nepal, Pakistan, Japan, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates. In the last stage of the bidding contest, all seven West Asian members declared that they would cast their votes for Lebanon as the holding of the 2000 Asian Cup in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon facilitated Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s ambitious Horizon 2000 policy, which aimed at revitalizing the national economy of Lebanon as well as the peace and development of the entire West Asian region (“Pushuo mili,” 1996). On the other hand, China’s odds of success in the bidding contest decreased proportionally. It was partly because Xu unexpectedly died of a heart attack and partly because Velappan strongly criticized the manager of the Chinese national team for his attitude toward the media in the 1996 Asian Cup and its players for their inactiveness in the competition (“Weilapan buman,” 1996; “Shenban 2000,” 1996). South Korea meanwhile withdrew from the bidding contest. To turn the tables, the CFA proposed that its senior administrator, Zhang Jilong, should succeed Xu Fang as the AFC Senior Vice President and a member of its Executive Committee and that Zhang’s nomination should be completed before a host was chosen for the AFC 2000 Asian Cup in December 1996. However, the members of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Thailand, Nepal, Pakistan, Japan, and Sri Lanka in the Executive Committee decided that this matter should be discussed in a special meeting in January 1997. This situation led the AFC President Ahmed Shad and General Secretary Peter Velappan to realize that Lebanon would likely win the rights to host the 2000 Asian Cup. Malaysia subsequently discontinued its application (“Zhongguo weihe,” 1996). The reason for the Indonesian, Thai, Nepalese, Pakistani, Japanese, and Sri Lankan members to stand with their West Asian colleagues had more to do with China’s controversial behaviors and uncertain future than the peace and development of Lebanon. In 1995 and 1996, the Chinese military undertook a series of missile tests in the Taiwan Strait and underground nuclear tests in Lop Nur. The Chinese government also ignored the Dalai Lama’s recommendation, unilaterally selecting the candidate of Panchen Lama. Those events inevitability caused tension and dissatisfaction in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. In addition, the

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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping disappeared from the public view from 1994. The international media frequently speculated about the deterioration of his health and expressed worries about China’s political orientation and economic situation after his death. Despite being pushed to the brink of a precipice, the CFA officials still promoted Shanghai and Guangdong’s economic achievements, marketing potential, world-class stadia, and excellent hospitality facilities (“Zhongguo weihe,” 1996). Their efforts failed to turn the situation. China only obtained two votes—from the North and South Korean members—whereas Lebanon acquired fourteen votes (“Libanen zhuban,” 2000). In the next three months, the CFA senior administrator Zhang Jilong was appointed as the new Senior Vice President of the AFC and a member of its Executive Committee. Deng Xiaoping died. To maintain the confidence of the Chinese and foreigners in the post-Deng China, President Jiang Zemin, at the 15th CCP National Congress, promised to speed up not only domestic market liberalization and economic reform, but also international engagement (Jiang Zemin, 2006a, pp. 1–49). Accordingly, his administration intensified efforts to collaborate with the US and other Western states, embrace the multilateral mechanisms on human rights, weapons non-proliferation and environmental protections, and join the WTO. Beijing also announced a bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. However, the Chinese authorities’ eradication of Falun Gong was seen as a severe violation of human rights. The anti-American protests against NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade also led to tense relations between Beijing and Washington. Overseas political analysts were pessimistic about China’s ongoing negotiations with the US over the WTO accession. The officials of the two countries yet reached agreement in November 1999. While President Jiang and his colleagues were celebrating this accomplishment, ongoing military conflicts with Israel caused Lebanon’s holding of the 2000 AFC Asian Cup to be put in doubt. The AFC General Secretary Peter Velappan subsequently seemed determined for the 2004 Asian Cup to be held outside West Asia (“Zhongguo jiang,” 1999). The Chinese leaders deemed that their motherland should hold this soccer tournament. Shortly after it activated the bid, the CFA was informed that Beijing, which was applying for the 2008 Summer Olympics, was willing to stage the opening ceremony of the 2004 Asian Cup, its semi-final and final matches, and the group matches

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featuring the Chinese nation team. The Chongqing and Chengdu municipal governments also expressed interested in holding games, so as to raise international visibility of the two cities and facilitate their implementation of ‘China Western Development’—an ambitious strategic program launched by state authorities in the 10th Five-Year Economic Plan (2001– 2005) (Zhu 2000). Since the success of the Shandong Luneng Football Club in 1999 had led to lasting local enthusiasm for football,4 Jinan— where the club was based—became the fourth city to make known its interest in hosting games. Shanghai and Guangdong however did not apply to celebrate the 2004 Asian Cup on behalf of China. It was because the former had decided to pursue the 2003 FIFA Women’s World Cup and some officials of the latter were being investigated by the central government for smuggling and corruption. While the CFA was reviewing the hosting proposals of Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Jinan, Taipei became the only applicant for the 2001 AFC Women’s Asian Cup. The Chinese authorities quickly ordered the CFA to activate a bid to host the competition, so as to foil Taipei (“Zhongguo xianqi,” 2001). In fact, since Jiang and his colleagues believed that Taiwanese politicians would use sporting megaevents to bolster ‘Two Chinas’ or ‘One China One Taiwan’ sentiments, Chinese cities were frequently used to obstruct Taiwanese cities in this way. One of the instances was that under the support of the Chinese government, Beijing successfully obtained the rights to host the 2001 Summer Universiade in 1998 by eliminating Kaohsiung (Chu 2017, pp. 1671–1672). Shortly after receiving China’s documents to apply for the 2004 Asian Cup and the 2001 Women’s Asian Cup, the AFC Executive Committee— which was composed of seventeen members from Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan (“Zhongguo shenban,” 2000)— learned that Iran and Thailand had made bids to host the 2004 Asian Cup as well. To ensure that this soccer tournament would be celebrated outside West Asia, the Iranian authorities were informed that the AFC would back an application for the 2007 Asian Cup if it discontinued with its current bid (“Yilang tuichu,” 2000). Iran took the advice and announced support for China in the bidding contest (“Zhang Jilong,” 2000). The AFC General Secretary Peter Velappan meanwhile also stated

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that he personally favored China’s bid to hold the 2004 Asian Cup (“Yazhou de,” 2000). Thai officials, faced with this tough situation, still believed that they had chance to win for three reasons. First, since the Thai member had supported Lebanon in the bidding contest for the 2000 Asian Cup three years earlier, all six Arab members in the current AFC Executive Committee were expected to cast reciprocal votes for Thailand (“Shenban yazhoubei,” 2000). Second, staging the Asian Cup in Southeast Asia was the AFC President Ahmad Shah’s stated wish. It was thought this would lead to all the five Southeast Asian members in the AFC Executive Committee supporting Thailand. Third, the stadia in Chongqing were viewed by the AFC officials as unsatisfactory (“Chongqing renbujubei,” 2000). The sports facilities in Beijing, Jinan, and Chengdu were also seen as dilapidated. On the contrary, the stadia in Bangkok and other Thai cities had been praised, because to meet the standards of holding the 1998 Asian Games football competitions, they had been fully renovated (“Zhongguo danxin,” 2000). In August 2000, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) shortlisted five applicant cities as candidates to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. Beijing was included but Bangkok was eliminated. This result inevitably affected Thailand’s chance of victory in the competition to host the 2004 Asian Cup. While Thai officials were formulating strategies to reverse the situation, Chinese authorities ordered the CFA to discontinue the bid for the 2001 Women’s Asian Cup. They also associated China’s bid for the 2004 Asian Cup with Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. As winning the hosting rights of the 2008 Olympics would be a useful boost to the international profile of China and arouse much national pride in the public, the Chinese authorities sought ways to improve Beijing’s odds. Obtaining the 2004 AFC Asian Cup was deemed to be important, because being assigned to play the leading role in staging the 2004 Asian Cup would increase Beijing’s chances of success in the fierce competition with Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, and Toronto. Moreover, discontinuing the bid for 2001 Women’s Asian Cup was also believed to be essential because the absence of China’s obstruction allowed the Taiwanese member of the IOC to support Beijing’s pursuit of the 2008 Summer Olympics. While both Chinese and Thai officials persuaded the members of the AFC Executive Committee to support their motherlands in the last stage of the race, China defeated Australia—whose largest city Sydney was

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going to celebrate the 2000 Summer Olympics—in the contest to secure rights to host the 2003 FIFA Women’s World Cup. Given this result, all the Arab members in the AFC Executive Committee decided to support China. The East Asian members cast their votes similarly. China won the rights to host the 2004 AFC Asian Cup. The AFC meanwhile also passed the 2001 Women’s Asian Cup to Taiwan. Apart from removing the bidding obstacle, the Chinese further strengthened sporting ties with Taiwan in the first half of 2001. As expected, the Taiwanese IOC member promised to support Beijing’s application for the 2008 Summer Olympics (Wu and Tseng 2001, pp. 227–240). Other IOC members’ confidence in the Chinese candidate city also skyrocketed after (1) the US President George Bush announced that he and his administration would hold a neutral position to China’s ongoing Olympic pursuit and (2) the Chinese authorities promised to carry out a lavish improvement to its pollution, traffic congestion, and inferior sports facilities (Chu 2021, pp. 17–18). Consequently, the capital city of China won landslide victory in the IOC vote of July 2001. Four months later, the Chinese national football team qualified to take part in the 2002 FIFA World Cup. The Chinese government also joined the WTO. It needs to be noted that the Chinese football fans suffered because of their national team’s fiasco in the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Given the accession to the WTO, President Jiang Zemin thought that China’s high-speed economic growth should continue beyond his retirement. At the 16th CCP National Congress, he revealed the authorities’ determination to quadruple the 2000 GDP and complete the building of a moderately prosperous society by 2020 (Jiang Zemin, 2006b, pp. 528– 575). While Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, was formulating policies to realize this goal with his colleagues, SARS began to spread. Although the central and local governments’ prompt measures lowered the fatality rate in China, the pandemic caused the international society to be apprehensive about Beijing’s capability of holding the 2008 Summer Olympics. Hu thus met with the IOC President Jacques Rogge in Lausanne in June 2003, promising that China would stage the 2008 Summer Olympics flawlessly (“Hu Jintao,” 2003). His administration meanwhile recognized that it was important to faultlessly celebrate the 2004 Asian Cup, the first sporting mega-event held in China after the end of the SARS outbreak, so restoring the confidence of the international society in Beijing. Over the next twelve months, the municipal governments of the four hosting cities intensified efforts to build stadia, renovate urban areas, prepare for

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the opening ceremony, and publicize the tournament in which sixteen national football teams would take part. Since Chinese football fans were still disappointed and angry with the Chinese footballers for their performance in the 2002 FIFA World Cup, they gave lukewarm support to their national team’s competitions. Only a half of the seats in the Worker’s Stadium of Beijing thus were occupied for the opening ceremony of the 2004 AFC Asian Cup and the first match between China and Bahrain. Moreover, a technical glitch in the stadium gave the impression that the spectators were booing the guests. The AFC General Secretary Peter Velappan, in the post-match press conference, blasted the spectators, blamed the organization of the Chinese, and asserted that Beijing was an unsuitable host for the 2008 Summer Olympics (“Beijing qiumi,” 2004). Those words, over the next few days, were extensively reported by both the Chinese and international media. The Chinese authorities promptly ordered the municipal governments of the four hosting cities to increase the number of spectators and fix the technical problems in the stadia. They also informed the AFC of the technical glitch in the Workers’ Stadium and asked Velappan to retract his speech. The absence of similar issues at the remaining matches meant that Velappan went on to deliver a sincere apology for his critical words and praised the 2004 Asian Cup as the best AFC-governed event of all time (“Asian football,” 2004; “Weilapan yazhoubei,” 2004). While the state leaders were happy with the U-turn of the most powerful person in Asia’s soccer community, the Chinese nation team was defeated by the Japanese national team in the final of the 2004 AFC Asian Cup. Fans however were satisfied with the result. Some were even optimistic that China would qualify for the Germany 2006 FIFA World Cup. Yet, the Chinese national team was eliminated by the Kuwaiti in the 2006 FIFA World Cup Asian regional group matches. Disappointment reigned again.

3.2

China and the 2023 AFC Asian Cup

Although he was a die-hard football fan, Deng Xiaoping never expressed interest in China hosting a FIFA World Cup. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao witnessed Beijing’s holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Neither one however intended to pursue the FIFA World Cup. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping told foreign visitors in an official meeting of 2011 that

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bringing the World Cup to China was one of his dreams (“Xi Jinping tan,” 2013). Thus, a few weeks before he became the most powerful person in the nation, the CFA unveiled a plan to bid for the 2019 AFC Asian Cup (“Shenban yazhoubei,” 2013), because the members of its management board believed that a successful holding of this soccer tournament would facilitate Xi’s dream of hosting the FIFA World Cup to be realized. In the meantime, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Myanmar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Thailand informed the AFC of their willingness to hold the 2019 Asian Cup as well. While the CFA’s decision to pursue the 2019 Asian Cup was made in February 2013, the media appealed to the state authorities to allow Zhang Jilong’s participation in the AFC presidential election scheduled for May 2013. His win could not only boost China’s influence in the Asian football community, but also improve China’s odds of hosting the 2019 Asian Cup (“Zhonguo shenban,” 2013). The state authorities declined this advice. They emphasized that given the successful celebrations of the 2004 AFC Asian Cup, the 1991 and 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cups, the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Asian Games, and the 2011 Summer Universiade, China’s chances of success in the ongoing Asian Cup bidding competition were good (“Shenban yazhoubei,” 2013). A few months later, the municipal governments of Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Nanjing, Qingdao, Wuhan, and Xi’an entered the competition to stage the 2019 Asian Cup. The CFA was particularly glad of Nanjing’s participation, because it had been assigned to host the AFC 2013, 2015, and 2017 U-19 Women’s Championships, the 2013 Asian Youth Games, and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics. To consolidate power and boost popularity, Xi spent most of his time leading the nationwide anti-corruption movement. Despite a busy schedule, he still paid attention to the development of soccer in China and praised Chinese footballers for their great efforts in training and competitions (“Xi Jinping zai,” 2013). However, the Chinese national football team, in June 2013, suffered a crushing defeat (1:5) in an exhibition game at home to the Thai national youth team. The Chinese national team apologized for its poor performance and terminated José Antonio Camacho’s role as coach. Some senior members of the Chinese authorities worried that the fiasco would affect the AFC Executive Committee members’ impression of Chinese football and harm China’s chances in the 2019 Asian Cup bidding competition. The CFA and the Chinese cities

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thus should think about discontinuing the application (“Zuxie tuichu,” 2013). Two months later, the OCA President Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah and his colleagues gave applause to Nanjing for its innovative cost-saving measures in organizing the 2013 Asian Youth Games. The municipal government also proudly announced that the overall expenditure of this eight-day sporting event was under budget (Chu 2016, pp. 205–209). While the state media extensively publicized Nanjing’s achievements, rumors of the Nanjing municipal leaders being investigated by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection due to their involvement in bribery began to circulate. The CFA thus fell into a quandary. On the one hand, given its enthusiastic engagement in international sports affairs, abandoning Nanjing in the bid for the 2019 Asian Cup would be unreasonable. On the other hand, if the Nanjing senior officials’ involvement in corruption was confirmed, it would affect China’s chance of success in the bidding contest. Meanwhile, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Malaysia cancelled their applications to host the 2019 Asian Cup. Bahrain was viewed by the media as the frontrunner because the former president of the Bahrain Football Association, Salman bin Ibrahim Al Khalifa, had just been elected as the AFC President (“Sanguo fanqi,” 2013). Aside from launching the anti-corruption movement, in 2013 President Xi Jinping also unveiled the Belt and Road initiative—which enabled China to play a leading role in infrastructure advancement in Asia, Africa, and Europe. To ensure the smooth implementation of this ambitious cross-continental project, the Chinese government planned to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. It also decided to terminate ongoing undertakings that might hinder interest of the member states in the three continents. Accordingly, the CFA announced that China would follow in the footsteps of Lebanon, Myanmar, and Malaysia, by discontinuing pursuit of the 2019 Asian Cup. Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand later also dropped their applications. The bidding process became a race between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. In October 2013, the investigation of Nanjing Mayor Ji Jianye by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection began. While Ji’s involvement in corruption was confirmed two years later, Nanjing Party Secretary Yang Weize was arrested for the same charge. Meanwhile, the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative, in which over sixty countries in the three continents had agreed to participate, commenced. The

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United Arab Emirates was chosen by the AFC to host the 2019 Asian Cup. In addition to the senior officials in Nanjing, three former CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee members—Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, and Guo Boxiong—were arrested because of their involvement in corruption. This, together with the formation of a series of central leading groups and a re-organization of military regions, was viewed as further strengthening Xi Jinping’s power in China. Moreover, to make Xi’s World Cup dream come true, the State Council emphasized the importance of bringing more international football tournaments to China (“Zhongguo zuqiu,” 2015). Accordingly, in late 2015, the CFA applied to host the 2023 AFC Asian Cup. Twelve cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Dalian, Xi’an, Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Changsha, Suzhou, and Guangzhou, later expressed interest in taking up hosting duties (“The CFA,” 2019). Shortly after China was confirmed as a candidate, the AFC received the applications of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Although Thailand and Indonesia cancelled their bids a year later, India, the host of the 2017 FIFA U-17 World Cup, joined the competition. Some AFC Executive Committee members thought the 2023 Asian Cup should be awarded to the latecomer, because none of the previous Asian Cup tournaments had been held in the South Asian region and Indian professional football had developed quickly since 2010. To increase China’s odds of success in the bidding contest, the CFA intensified lobbying of the AFC Executive Committee members. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping informed FIFA President Gianni Infantino of China’s determination to host a World Cup in the near future and ordered his subordinates to accelerate the process of turning China into a strong sporting power (“FIFA President,” 2017; Xi 2017). The CFA promptly decided to have its vice president, Du Zhaocai, join the FIFA Council, so as to boost China’s say in the decision-making mechanisms of the international football community. India discontinued its application for the 2023 Asian Cup in October 2018. This move not only enabled the Indian cities to concentrate their resources on the holding the 2020 FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup, but also made China the frontrunner in the 2023 Asian Cup bidding contest. While the CFA officials were pleased, Xi, who had been given indefinite control of Chinese political affairs by amending the constitution, was distracted. It was partly because President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on USD 250 billion worth of Chinese products to penalize China

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for years of unfair trade practices and partly because the governments of some Belt and Road initiative member countries suspended a number of Chinese-led infrastructure projects to avoid incurring massive debts. On the other hand, South Korean President Moon Jae-in was in high spirits because his friendly meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jongun allowed the athletes of the two countries to march together at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics and even play together in the women’s ice hockey competition. As hopes for peace emerged on the Korean peninsula, the International University Sports Federation invited the two countries to co-host the 2021 Summer Universiade (“FISU proposes,” 2018). The South Korean side however declined. It planned to take up Gianni Infantino’s proposal to co-host the 2023 Women’s World Cup with North Korea (“China all,” 2019). Although Xi was troubled by the tension between the US and China and the dissatisfaction of member states with the Belt and Road initiative, his determination to bring a FIFA World Cup to China remained unchanged. The CFA subsequently launched a bid for the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup. Du Zhaocai was also successfully elected as a member of the FIFA Council (“China’s Du,” 2019). To obtain Du’s support for the two Koreas’ FIFA 2023 Women’s World Cup co-hosting plan, the Korean Football Association decided to drop its bid for the 2023 AFC Asian Cup. The AFC subsequently granted the hosting rights of the 2023 Asian Cup to China in June 2019. Over the next seven months, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi’an, Dalian, Qingdao, Xiamen, and Suzhou were chosen to stage the soccer tournament in which 24 Asian teams would take part (“2021 nian,” 2019). China also won the rights to host the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup. Additionally, due to a deterioration in relations between Seoul and Pyeongchang, South Korea forwent the plan to co-host the 2023 Women’s World Cup with North Korea in December 2019 (Yoo 2019). The Chinese government, to restore the confidence of member states, successfully brought Italy, Luxemburg, and Switzerland to the Belt and Road initiative (Johnson 2019; Bodoni 2019; Cheng 2019). With Xi’s endorsement, China also made concessions when signing the firststage trade deal with the American government (Pramuk 2020). Xi and his administration’s controversial measures to handle the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan in early 2020 however led to a worldwide pandemic, worsened Beijing’s relations with Washington, and damaged

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China’s international image. FIFA even postponed the holding of the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup. Yet, given the smooth progress of the Chinese cities’ stadia building (“2023 nian,” 2020), the AFC did not plan to re-schedule the celebration of the 2023 Asian Cup.

3.3

Conclusion

One year after Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the supreme leader, Beijing activated a bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. This project not only aimed to spur China’s economic reforms and international engagement, but also tried to boost the sense of pride felt by the Chinese public toward their nation and the Communist regime. However, despite being shortlisted as one of five candidates, Beijing’s bid was viewed by the IOC as inferior to its competitors. Chinese authorities subsequently attached importance to the ongoing pursuit of the 2004 AFC Asian Cup. It was thought being assigned to host the opening and closing ceremonies of this soccer tournament and its semi-final and final matches would improve Beijing’s chances in the Olympic bidding contest. In December 2000, Beijing was awarded the rights to stage the 2004 AFC Asian Cup in partnership with Chongqing, Jinan, and Chengdu. Eight months later, it became the host of the 2008 Summer Olympics. However, the SARS pandemic in the first half of 2003 caused worry in the international society about whether China could successfully complete the Olympic gathering. The Chinese authorities therefore decided to reverse the situation by using the 2004 AFC Asian Cup, the first sporting megaevent held in China after the pandemic was over. The AFC General Secretary Peter Velappan eventually admitted that the three-week tournament was the best event in the history of the AFC and retracted his view that Beijing was incompetent to present the 2008 Summer Olympics. From 2015 until 2019, the Chinese authorities attached great importance to the bid for the 2023 AFC Asian Cup, because winning the hosting rights of this soccer tournament helped China to pursue the FIFA World Cup, strengthen it as a strong sporting power, and realize the national rejuvenation—all noted as the top priorities of Xi Jinping. In addition, since the COVID-19 pandemic severely degraded China’s image on the global stage, the 2023 AFC Asian Cup, like other sporting events hosted in China in the 2020s, was expected to help restore international confidence in Xi and his administration and bring their political ambitions to fruition.

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This chapter also reviewed the reasons behind China’s failure in its 2000 AFC Asian Cup bid and its decision to withdraw from the competition to host the 2019 AFC Asian Cup. A series of political and military measures adopted by Beijing in 1995 and 1996 brought severe tension to East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. The vast majority of the AFC Executive Committee members thus supported Lebanon, whose newlyformed government was working for domestic restoration, over China, even though the sporting facilities of the former were inferior to those of the latter. In 2013, Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road initiative, a cross-continental program with the aim of enhancing China’s sharp power in the world. To ensure that all the countries in Middle East would join, the Chinese authorities promptly withdrew from the 2019 Asian Cup bidding contest in which most of the candidates were from West Asia.

Notes 1. One of the instances was President Bill Clinton’s decision to delink the renewal of China’s Most Favourable Nation status with Beijing’s human rights performance. 2. For instance, in 1995, China enthusiastically lobbied the members of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) to choose Pusan over Kaohsiung in the race to host the 2002 Asian Games. The South Korean city thus achieved a landslide victory (Chu 2017, pp. 1670–1671). Moreover, China remained silent when the bid for the 2002 FIFA World Cup became a race between South Korea and Japan, despite the fact that Chinese officials had previously favored Japan (He 2008, p. 228). 3. The AFC expected that the host of the 2000 AFC Asian Cup should have at least one stadium with a seating capacity of 60000. However, the largest stadium in Hong Kong could only contain 40000 spectators (Alladin 1996; Hui 1996). 4. The Shandong Luneng Football Club was the winner of the 1999 National Football Jia A League and the 1999 CFA Cup.

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He, Z. (2008). Jianxin de huihuang: wode shenao riji [Tough glory: My diary of Olympic bids]. Hong Kong: Motherland Press. Hu Jintao fenbie huijian luoge he Ding Zhaozhong [Hu Jintao meets Jacques Rogge and Samuel C. C. Ting respectively]. (2003, June 3). People’s Daily, p. 3. Hui, J. (1996, December 20). Lack of venues scuppers Cup bid. South China Morning Post, p. 32. Jiang Zemin wenxuan dierjuan [Selected works of Jiang Zemin volume II ]. (2006a). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Jiang Zemin wenxuan disanjuan [Selected works of Jiang Zemin volume III ]. (2006b). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Johnson, M. (2019, March 23). Italy endorses China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/fda398ac-4d72-11e9-b4018d9ef1626294. Kaochatuan mimi baogao libanun defen bugao [Lebanon does not obtain high scores in the assessment report]. (1996, December 23). Soccer News, p. 3. Kristof, N. (1989, June 5). Beijing death toll at Least 300; army tightens control of city but angry resistance goes on. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/beiijing-death-tollleast-300-army-tightens-control-city-but-angry-resistance.html. Libanen zhuban 2000 nian yazhoubei [Lebanon will host the 2000 AFC Asian Cup]. (1996, December 24). China Soccer News, p. 1. Pushuo mili de jingzheng [A bewildering contest]. (1996, December 19). Soccer News, p. 2. Pramuk, J. (2020, January 15). Trump signs ‘phase one’ trade deal with China in push to stop economic conflict. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/ 15/trump-and-china-sign-phase-one-trade-agreement.html. Sanguo fanqi shenban yazhoubei [Three countries cancel applications for the Asian Cup]. (2013, August 8). Beijing News, p. A36. Shenban 2000 nian yazhoubei libanun jiezu xiandeng [Lebanon become frontrunner in the 2000 AFC Asian Cup bidding contest]. (1996, December 16). Soccer News, p. 15. Shenban yazhoubei biance zhongguo zuqiu [Bidding for the Asian Cup facilitate Chinese football standards to be improved]. (2013, February 3). Beijing Youth Daily, p. 15. Shenban yazhoubei taiguo shi jindi [Thailand is China’s competitor]. (2000, August 14). Soccer Fan News, p. 2. The CFA: 2023 nian yazhoubei zuizhong chengban chengshi shangdai queding [The CFA: the cities to host the 2023 AFC Asian Cup have not been confirmed yet]. (2019, June 6). Xinhua. http://www.xinhuanet.com/sports/ 2019-06/06/c_1124589095.htm.

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Weilapan buman zhongguodui [Velappan does not satisfy Chinese nation team]. (1996, December 16). Soccer Fan News, p. 4. Weilapan yazhoubei 10 fen [Peter Vellapan: I give 10 marks to China’s holding of the AFC Asian Cup]. (2004, August 8). Soccer News, p. 12. Wu, C., & Tseng, I. (2001). Aoyun changwai de jingji: Wu Jingguo de wuhuan shiyue [Competition outside the Olympics: Wu Ching-kuo’s vow under five rings]. Taipei: BookZone. Xi, J. (2017, October 18). Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era – delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Xinhua. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping% 27s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. Xi Jinping tan zuqiumeng: zhongguodui jin shijiebei juesaiquan [Xi Jinping talks about his football dream: Chinese national team can be qualified to take part in the FIFA World Cup final round]. (2013, October 2). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/10/131002_xij inping_football_indonesia. Xi Jinping zai moxige yanjiang: woshi zuqiumi zhongguo zuqiu yizhi hennuli [Xi Jinping delivers speech in Mexico: I am a football fan and Chinese footballers work very hard all the time]. (2013, June 6). People. http://politics.people. com.cn/n/2013/0606/c1001-21757142.html. Yazhou de weilai zai zhongguo [China is Asia’s future]. (2000, July 31). China Soccer, p. 1. Yilang tuichu youjiaoyi [There is a trade-off behind Iran’s withdrawal]. (2000, November 2). Soccer News, p. 12. Yoo, J. (2019, December 13). S. Korea withdraws bid to host 2023 FIFA Women’s World Cup. Yonhap News Agency. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN 20191213007300315. Zhang Jilong tan yazhoubei shenban taiqian muhou [Zhang Jilong talks about Asian Cup bid inside story]. (2000, October 30). China Soccer, p. D4. Zhongguo danxin yechang mengduo [China worry about its chance of success in the bidding contest]. (2000, October 23). Soccer News, p. 5. Zhongguo jiang shenban welinglingsi nian yazhoubei [China will bid for 2004 Asian Cup]. (1999, December 20). Soccer Fan News, p. 1. Zhonguo shenban 2019 yazhoubei jiangyu xiya zuji Zhang Jilong ruodangxuan zengfama [If Zhang Jilong becomes the AFC President, it would increase China’s odds in 2019 Asian Cup bidding competition vis-à-vis West Asian countries]. (2013, February 4). Wen Wei Po, p. A32. Zhongguo shenban jikeneng xiansheng [China would win the bid by a small margin]. (2000, October 23). Soccer News, p. 5.

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Zhongguo shenban youshi yu kunnan bingcun [China has both advantages and disadvantages in the bidding contest]. (1996, November 11). Soccer News, p. 2. Zhongguo weihe shenban shibai [Why did China fail in the AFC Asian Cup bid]. (1996, December 23). Soccer News, p. 3. Zhongguo xianqi shenbanchao [China keenly bid for international soccer events]. (2001, July 3). Soccer Fan News, p. 1. Zhongguo zuqiu gegai fazhan zongti fangan [The overall Chinese football reform and development programme]. (2015, March 16). Central People’s Government of PRC. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-03/16/ content_9537.htm. Zhu, R. (2000, October 9). Guanyu zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan dishige wunian jihua jianyi de shuoming [Outline of 10th Five-Year Economic Plan]. Central People’s Government of PRC. http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/ content/2000/content_60547.htm. Zuxie tuichu yazhoubei shenban [The CFA discontinue Asian Cup bid]. (2013, September 5). Qingdao Daily, p. 11.

CHAPTER 4

Leveraging FINA, IAAF, and FIBA Events

Abstract This chapter reviews how the three internationally renowned swimming, athletics, and basketball events of the 2010s—the Shanghai 2011 FINA (International Swimming Federation) World Championships, the Beijing 2015 IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) World Championships, and the China 2019 FIBA (International Basketball Federation) World Cup—were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 2011 FINA World Championships · The 2015 IAAF World Championships · The 2019 FIBA World Cup

After Shanghai’s rapid economic development in the 1990s, the State Council, in 2001, endorsed the municipal government’s plan to transform the city into an international center of economy, finance, trade, and shipping by 2020 (“Shanghai jingji,” 2016). To this end, the municipal government, under the leadership of Party Secretary Chen Liangyu and Mayor Han Zheng, not only proactively upgraded urban infrastructure and formulated investment-friendly policies, but also enthusiastically organized the 2010 World Expo and quested for sporting mega-events. After being chosen to stage a Formula One motor race from 2004, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_4

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the 2005 ITTF (International Table Tennis Federation) World Championships, the 2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games, and the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup, the municipal authorities launched a bid to host the FINA 2006 Short Course World Championships. Macao and Incheon also expressed interest in hosting this aquatic event. While the Shanghai municipal government handled the bidding tasks, the Chinese central and the Beijing municipal governments worked closely toward the organization of the 2008 Summer Olympics. In the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the Olympics would not only advance the socioeconomic development of the capital city, but also arouse national pride among the public and demonstrate China’s resurgence to the world. However, due to the unexpected SARS outbreak in the first half of 2003, questions regarding China’s ability to complete the celebration of the Summer Olympics emerged. President Hu Jintao thus informed the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Jacques Rogge that the pandemic would not affect the building of the Olympic stadia. He also promised that with the Chinese government’s full support Beijing would deliver a very successful Olympics in 2008 (“Hu Jintao,” 2003). Additionally, the SARS outbreak badly hit the Chinese market and triggered deep worry in overseas investors about the development prospects of Shanghai. Chen and his colleagues realized that winning the hosting rights for the 2006 Short Course World Championships would be a good way to restore investors’ confidence. Accordingly, they intensified efforts to publicize Shanghai’s world-class urban infrastructure, fine aquatic stadia, decades-long contribution to China’s water sports development, and enthusiastic engagement in international sporting affairs. FINA officials were impressed. In the meantime, Macao, to improve its chance of victory, promoted its extravagant plan to host the 2005 East Asian Games. Since its experience in staging sporting mega-events was nil, Incheon promised that it, if successful, would donate USD one million to FINA and cover the transportation, accommodation, and food expenditure of every participant athlete that was ranked in the top five for their competitions (“Shanghai huode,” 2003). Macao’s extravagance and Incheon’s generosity however could not alter FINA officials’ favorable impression of Shanghai. It won the hosting rights by a landslide on July 12, 2003 (“Shanghai huo,” 2003). Party Secretary Chen Liangyu, Mayor Han Zheng, and their colleagues were excited by the victory. They meanwhile attached great importance

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to the words delivered by President Hu Jintao in the meeting with the IOC President Jacques Rogge. The Shanghai municipal government thus meticulously organized the Short Course World Championships and other sporting mega-events over the next three years because the relevant experiences facilitated the Chinese central and Beijing municipal governments to flawlessly stage the Olympics (“Shanghai quanli,” 2003). Not surprisingly, in 2006 FINA officials gave a thumbs-up to Shanghai’s sports venues, athlete accommodation, telecommunication and Internet services, anti-doping measures, and hospitality (“Guojiyonglian guanyuan,” 2006). They also encouraged the city to apply for the FINA World Championships, the most prestigious water sports event on the planet.

4.1 Shanghai and the 2011 FINA World Championships China joined FINA in 1980. From 1982 until 2005, its elite divers and swimmers participated in all eight FINA World Championships. The performances of the Chinese elite divers were outstanding but those of the Chinese elite swimmers were mediocre. The Chinese thus were never ranked at the top of those events’ medal tables. Nor did the Chinese authorities expect that their compatriots might surpass the athletes of the US, Russia, or Australia in the future. Moreover, some Chinese elite swimmers were viewed with suspicion during the FINA World Championships of the 1990s, because of their involvement in doping (Fan and Lu 2013, pp. 132–133). Even so, shortly after the celebration of the 2006 Short Course World Championships was over, Party Secretary Chen Liangyu thought that his administration, to extend the legacy of the 2010 World Expo at home and abroad, should bring the 2011 World Championships to Shanghai. This idea was later endorsed by the central government. When FINA received Shanghai’s application documents in which the municipal authorities highlighted that they intended to hold the tournament beside the site of the 2010 World Expo, Doha, Durban, Madrid, San Francisco, and Seoul also expressed interest in staging the aquatic event. Shanghai and Doha were shortlisted (“Shanghai jiji,” 2007). A few months after Shanghai launched its bid, Chen was removed from office due to his involvement in bribery and misuse of public funds. This scandal undoubtedly damaged the reputation of Shanghai.

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It also resulted in apprehension about the investment environment of the city and its organization of the 2010 World Expo. The central and local governments realized that if Shanghai won the 2011 FINA World Championships bidding contest with Doha, it would go some way to restoring confidence. Accordingly, Chinese Olympic gold medallist Luo Xuejuan was asked to publicize the city’s excellent 2006 Short Course World Championships and China’s long contribution to international water sports development together with the central and local officials (“Shanghai yingde,” 2007). On the other hand, Doha had little experience of staging international aquatic tournaments, despite its extravagant hosting of the 2006 Asian Games. Qatar could not have been said to have played a significant role in the development of international water sports. FINA, on March 25, 2007, thus chose the Chinese candidate city. Xi Jinping, son of former Vice Chinese Premier Xi Zhongxun, meanwhile became the new Party Secretary of Shanghai. Over the next few months, Xi did not pay attention to the organization of the 2011 FINA World Championships. Instead, he attached great importance to the preparations for the 2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games and the 2010 World Expo. It was because (1) Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao respectively inspected the site of the World Expo in May and attended the Games’ opening ceremony in October, and (2) Chen Liangyu, who had proposed Shanghai to hold the FINA World Championships, was ousted from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While Hu and Wen were satisfied with the municipal authorities’ handling of the duties, they did not deliver any words regarding the organization of the FINA World Championships (“Wen Jiabao,” 2007; “Hu Jintao,” 2007). Xi joined the Politburo Standing Committee during the 17th CCP Central Committee First Plenary Session in October 2007. This arrangement indicated that he, in 2012, would succeed Hu as leader of China. Meanwhile, Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Politburo, was appointed to chair the political affairs of Shanghai. Like Xi, Yu remained silent about the 2011 FINA World Championships. This led the building of the Shanghai Oriental Sports Center, an indoor athletic complex with a seating capacity of 18000, and other organizing tasks to be undertaken in a low-profile manner by Mayor Han Zheng and his colleagues in the Shanghai municipal government. In April 2008, Chen Liangyu was sentenced to eighteen years in jail for taking bribes and abusing power (Barboza 2008).

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In August 2008, the sixteen-day Beijing Summer Olympics was praised by the IOC as truly exceptional games. The Chinese team topped the medal with 48 gold, 22 silver, and 30 bronze. In view of the achievements, Hu Jintao stressed that it was necessary to build China into a strong sporting power (Hu Jintao, 2006, pp. 101–114). While the residents of Shanghai anticipated that Hu’s words would trigger the central government to keenly promote the FINA World Championships, the global financial tsunami hit China. Questions about Shanghai’s holding of the 2010 World Expo subsequently re-emerged in international society. Hu and Wen Jiabao, who had endorsed a CNY 4 trillion package to stimulate the national economy, repeatedly gave instructions to the central and local governments to ensure that the six-month-long cultural fair would be an utter success (“Zhongnanhai qingqian,” 2010). They also decided to chair the opening and closing ceremonies, respectively. Therefore, the Shanghai municipal authorities did not put the promotion of the World Championships in the top of its 2009 agenda. Rather, they worked with Beijing toward preparations for the World Expo. Eventually, the central and local authorities spent over USD 45 billion on the gathering. From May until October 2010, over 73 million people visited the World Expo in which 246 countries, international organizations, civil groups, and business corporations took part. While the UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon and other international figures gave a thumbs-up to the brilliant organization of Shanghai, China, despite being hit by the global financial tsunami, retained fast GDP growth. It was also confirmed to have become the second largest economy on the planet (Barboza 2010). These accomplishments were viewed as evidence that China was superior to Western countries in terms of governance style, economic development, and crisis management. Enthusiastically promoting the FINA World Championships, which aimed at extending the legacy of the 2010 World Expo at home and abroad, thus was supposed to be a reasonable exercise of the central and local authorities in 2011. While successfully completing the holding of the World Championships was underlined in the 2011 Shanghai municipal government working agenda (Han 2011), Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao did not publicize this sports gathering that had been proposed by Chen Liangyu. Nor did they intend to attend its opening and closing ceremonies. Given this, the central government’s low-key attitude toward the event continued. Mayor Han Zhang and his colleagues in the municipal government had no choice but to carry out the promotional activities within their jurisdiction.

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On July 16, 2011, Yu Zhengsheng, in the capacity of a CCP Politburo member and Shanghai Party Secretary, accompanied the IOC President Jacques Rogge, FINA President Julio Maglione, and other senior figures in the international sporting community, in chairing the opening ceremony (“Dishisijie guojiyonglian,” 2011). Over the next two weeks, the water sports event was only quietly celebrated (“Yichang jingqiaoqiao,” 2011), even though the Chinese team finished second in the medal table with 15 gold, 13 silver, and 8 bronze—the best performance of Chinese athletes in the FINA World Championships since 1982. Nevertheless, Rogge and Maglione still complimented Shanghai highly for its meticulous organization (“Meicilai Shanghai,” 2011; “Tiyu rang,” 2011). One year later, Hu Jintao stepped down from office. Xi Jinping, as expected, became the new CCP General Secretary and Chinese President. Yu Zhengsheng joined the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and presided over the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Shanghai’s political affairs, from then until 2017, were under the control of Han Zheng.

4.2 Beijing and the 2015 IAAF World Championships In August 2009, the media reported that the Chinese Athletics Association (CAA) intended to bid to host the 2015 IAAF World Championships in Beijing. Calls for the plan to be shelved quickly emerged due to the weak competitiveness of Chinese track and field athletes (“Tianguan shenban,” 2009). In fact, Chinese teams had failed to finish in the top five of the medal table in any of the previous twelve IAAF World Championships from 1983 to 2009. Additionally, while Chinese divers, shooters, weightlifters, gymnasts, judokas, boxers, swimmers, wrestlers, archers, rowers, fencers, sailors, canoers, taekwondo martial artists, table tennis players, and badminton players obtained 48 gold medals at the 2008 Olympics, the 110 m hurdle world record holder and the Chinese public’s great hope, Liu Xiang, was forced to retire from the competition with an injury in the first-round heats. The Chinese track and field team only won a silver medal and three bronze medals in Beijing. Nevertheless, both the Chinese central and Beijing municipal governments approved of the CAA’s plan. It was thought that holding the 2015 IAAF World Championships in the Beijing National Stadium might extend the legacy of the 2008 Summer Olympics,1 strengthen China’s

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influence in the international athletics community, and facilitate China’s rise to international sporting power. In February 2010, the IAAF was informed of the Chinese capital city’s application. Meanwhile, London, the host of the 2012 Summer Olympics, and Chorzów, a Polish city with no experience of staging world-renowned sporting mega-events after the 1980s, put forward their intentions to host the event as well. Britain’s reputation in the IAAF had been severely damaged in the early 2000s, because financial reasons had caused London to abandon a planned hosting of the 2005 World Championships (“Picketts Lock,” 2001). To ensure that this embarrassing event would not affect the judgment of voters in this newest bidding contest, UK Athletics, the body governing athletics affairs in Britain and Northern Ireland, stressed that, if London became the host, at least GBP 25 million would be spent on organizing the 2015 World Championships and the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, which had been assigned to stage the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2012 Summer Olympics, would be the venue. The CAA subsequently played a financial card, promising that Sinopec—one of the most influential oil and gas enterprises in the world—would offer a cash sponsorship of USD 28 million to the IAAF from 2011 until 2015, if the 2015 World Championships was presented to the Chinese capital city (Zhao 2015). While they were pleased with the arrangements made in Beijing and London, the IAAF officials were informed of Chorzów’s withdrawal. The media later reported that the London City Council and the British government might be unwilling to offer funding if London was awarded the World Championships (“Cash crisis,” 2010). The British public also learned that the decision of whether to retain the athletics track in the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park after the 2012 Olympics would be made after the date of the IAAF’s choice of hosting city (Ormsby 2010). The IAAF officials subsequently suggested that to avoid uncertainties, UK Athletics discontinue the current bid and pursue the 2017 World Championships. The British accepted (“London pulls,” 2010). Beijing, in October 2010, obtained the hosting rights. Over the next two years, the public witnessed Liu Xiang’s failures to win gold medals in the 2011 IAAF World Championships and the 2012 Summer Olympics. They also gave much attention to who would lead the CCP and national executive after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao stepped down in 2012. Theoretically, the Politburo Standing Committee members, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, were supposed to take up the

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positions. But the Politburo member Bo Xilai had emerged as a creditable candidate because the policy measures adopted in his jurisdiction of Chongqing after 2007 had been highly praised by the state media. Unexpectedly, Bo was removed from office in February 2012 due to his involvement in bribery. Xi and Li, benefiting from the scandal, succeeded Hu and Wen as the Chinese President and Premier. They were also ranked the first and the second in the seven-member CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Xi, after taking office, announced that he would (1) lead China to become a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and a fully developed economy by 2049 and (2) realize the national rejuvenation by the middle of the twenty-first century. To this end, he thought he should not follow his predecessors Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, who made decisions together with their colleagues in the Politburo Standing Committee and handled China’s relations with the world in a low-key manner. Instead, he needed to autocratically rule the country and be proactive in international affairs. Therefore, a nation-wide anti-corruption movement was launched and a number of central leading groups were formed, so eliminating retired and incumbent senior officials who had the potential to challenge Xi and consolidating his supreme authority in the Party, state, and military. The Belt and Road initiative, which aimed at strengthening China’s sharp power in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania and facilitating Beijing to become one of the directors of globalization, was introduced. The Chinese military upheld a hard-line and assertive attitude regarding territorial distributes with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. In November 2013, the IOC received the application letters of Beijing, Stockholm, Oslo, Almaty, Lviv, and Kraków to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Since holding this sporting mega-event in Beijing could display China’s successful transformation into a moderately prosperous society and facilitate China to become a strong sporting power, Xi participated keenly in the lobbying and publicity activities. Meanwhile, all the European candidates discontinued their applications. Beijing, nevertheless, was still not sure of winning largely because of its severe air pollution and a low popularity of winter sports in China. To mitigate, Xi promised that his administration would mobilize 300 million Chinese people to take part in winter sports activities if Beijing became the host. A total of USD 130 billion was also earmarked by the central and municipal governments to improve the capital city’s environment and air quality. The Chinese

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candidate eventually defeated its Kazakh rival by a narrow margin on July 31, 2015 (Chu 2016, pp. 124–127). Before the IOC chose the host city of the 2022 Winter Olympics, the Hangzhou municipal government informed the Zhejiang provincial government of its intention to hold the 2022 Asian Games. Governor Li Qiang, political protégé of Xi, promptly gave approval, because winning the hosting rights would polish his CV and holding the event, like the 2022 Winter Olympics, would demonstrate China’s successful transformation into a moderately prosperous society under his patron’s leadership. After obtaining the endorsement of the central government, Hangzhou delivered its application documents to the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) on August 18, 2015 (Chu 2021, pp. 93–94). Xi was delighted with Beijing’s success and Hangzhou’s application. His supreme authority in the Party, state, and military meanwhile had been further consolidated because four retired and incumbent senior officials who intended to stage a coup—namely Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and Ling Jihua—had been arrested and the power of Premier Li Keqiang and other Politburo Standing Committee members had been weakened. The implementation of his signature project, the Belt and Road initiative, also commenced. Under this favorable situation, Xi decided to chair the military parade at Tiananmen Square that would celebrate the 70th Victory over Japan Day and attend the opening ceremony of the 2015 IAAF World Championships. To avoid distracting the public’s attention from the 2022 Winter Olympics bid, the Beijing municipal government did not prepare for the 2015 IAAF World Championships in a high-profile manner. Instead, they quietly handled the renovation of the Beijing National Stadium and other organizational tasks. They also decided to limit the performances in the opening ceremony to only twenty minutes, to ensure that the event would be completed in a simple and frugal manner (“Tianjing shijinsai,” 2015). Even so, the IAAF President Lamine Diack was very satisfied with the relevant works and very much looked forward to watching the nine-day celebration that was due in August 2015 (“Guojitianlian manyi,” 2015). In addition, the IOC President Tomas Bach, the OCA President Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah, and other international sports celebrities received their invitations to attend the opening ceremony. They all accepted with delight. However, five weeks before the opening of the IAAF World Championships, a series of explosions in Tianjin’s Binhai New Area caused

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173 deaths and over 790 injuries. The international society subsequently raised concerns about China’s ability to protect public safety and stage mega-events. Since this would surely undermine Beijing’s organization of the 2022 Winter Olympics and Hangzhou’s bid for the 2022 Asian Games, Xi decided to talk to Tomas Bach, Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah, and their colleagues in the IOC and the OCA in person during the celebration of the IAAF World Championships. To ensure that the President’s endeavors would be successful, the Beijing municipal authorities realized that it was necessary to present the World Championships without the slightest hitch. Thus, they intensified efforts to control traffic, inspect the stadia and hotels, oversee the opening ceremony performance rehearsal, and mobilize the public to support the event. In the meetings with Bach and Al-Sabah before the opening ceremony, Xi promised that with the full support of the Chinese authorities, Beijing and Hangzhou would present a fantastic, extraordinary, and excellent Winter Olympics and follow with a very successful Asian Games in 2022. The guests very much appreciated these words (“Xi Jinping,” 2015a; “Xi Jinping,” 2015b). They also voiced approval of Beijing’s air quality and environmental management after hundreds of track and field competitions took place smoothly at the Beijing National Stadium and the streets of the city over the next nine days (“Guojitianlian guanyuan,” 2015). It needs to be noted that despite grabbing a gold, seven silver, and a bronze, the Chinese delegation failed again to make the top five of the medal table (“15th IAAF,” n.a.). After obtaining the compliments of the powerful figures in the international sporting community, Beijing’s strict environment and security management continued, to ensure a successful military parade at Tiananmen Square for the 70th Victory over Japan Day.2 Xi eventually chaired it under blue skies. This high-profile proceeding underlined that his power in Party, state, and military had been consolidated and that he, unlike his predecessors, would handle international affairs without any shyness. In addition, the day before the opening of the 2015 IAAF World Championships, Bach had a chance to meet Premier Li Keqiang. Li guaranteed that Beijing, with the support of the Chinese government, would hold an economical and sustainable Winter Olympics in 2022 and expressed his ‘envy’ of Bach’s attendance at the opening ceremony with Xi (“Li Keqiang,” 2015). This triggered speculation about whether his words were related to the decline of his power.

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China and the 2019 FIBA World Cup

After witnessing the meticulous organization of the Summer Olympics, in April 2008 FIBA officials suggested Beijing apply to host the 2014 17th FIBA World Cup, the most prestigious basketball tournament on the planet, in which 24 national teams from five continents would take part (“Beijing niban,” 2008). The Beijing municipal government promptly expressed interest in doing so because its senior executives deemed that the existing stadia in their jurisdiction were well up to the task. Four months later, President Hu Jintao, in view of international society’s praise of the 2008 Olympics and the unprecedented medal haul of the Chinese team, asked his colleagues to turn China into a strong sporting power. To extend the Olympic legacy and facilitate the realization of the leader’s ambitions, the Chinese government approved the Beijing municipal government’s aspiration to host the 2014 World Cup. In December 2008, FIBA received the application documents of the Chinese capital city. Italy and Spain also activated bids to host this basketball competition. Beijing, over the next few months, invited four more cities with worldclass indoor stadia and rich experience of staging international sports tournaments—Hangzhou, Suzhou, Shenyang, and Qingdao—to co-host the event. It also obtained the guarantee of the China Unicom—one of the largest telecommunication corporations in the country—that it would sponsor FIBA to the tune of EUR 6 million over the next five years, so as to increase odds of success (“Beijing nanlan,” 2009; “Nanlanshijinsai xinzeng,” 2009). However, the municipal authorities of the five cities did not request the state leaders of China to take part in lobbying activities, nor mobilize the local residents to give support. Moreover, as being confident of their stadia and urban infrastructure, they decided to spend just USD 14 million on staging the event. On the other hand, since the holding of the 2014 FIBA World Cup was thought to be able to revitalize local economies from the global financial tsunami, the Italian government planned to spend extravagantly EUR 32 million on tournament operations and EUR 600 million on its hosting cities’ urban renovation. Italian business enterprises also pledged to provide a cash sponsorship of EUR 6 million to FIBA. Although its budget was less than that of Italy (EUR 27.5 million on tournament operations and EUR 314 million on urban renovation), Spain, with the Spanish King’s blessing, promised that if it won the rights to host the tournament, it would not only offer a cash sponsorship of EUR 6

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million to FIBA, but also publicize women’s basketball around the world and support FIBA’s future international co-operation programs (“Beijing nanlan,” 2009; “Nanlanshijinsai xinzeng,” 2009; “Shili youyin,” 2009). Due to the contrast, the Chinese cities were eliminated in the first round of the vote. Spain defeated Italy in the next round (“Nanlanshijinsai zhongguo,” 2009). In November 2012, the Executive Committee of FIBA announced that, to avoid a clash with the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the 18th FIBA World Cup would be staged in 2019 rather than in 2018. It also decided to expand the number of the participant nation teams from 24 to 32 and link this tournament to the qualification for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics (“Zhongguo nanlan,” 2012). Meanwhile, to rejuvenate the Chinese nation, the newly incumbent leader Xi Jinping (1) intended to centralize political power in his hands by launching a nation-wide anti-corruption campaign, re-organizing the military, and forming a number of central leading groups, (2) decided to complete China’s transformation into a moderately prosperous society by 2020, (3) held a hard-line toward the territorial disputes in South China Sea, (4) strengthened China’s political influence and sharp power in international society through the Belt and Road initiative and other cross-continental economic programs, and (5) determined to accelerate China’s pace of becoming a strong sporting power. He was also informed that the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA) proposed to put forward Beijing, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Foshan, Dongguan, and Shenzhen as hosts of the 2019 FIBA World Cup (“Zhongguo youyi,” 2014). Xi believed that holding this sixteen-day sporting event could improve the Chinese national basketball team’s chance of qualifying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics competition, display the eight cities’ superior infrastructure and advanced socioeconomic development, celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Communist regime, and show that China was ready to transform into a moderately prosperous society and was heading toward a strong sporting power. He also deemed that Nanjing’s outstanding celebration of the 2nd Summer Youth Olympics in August 2014 and the China General Administration of Sport (CGAS) Vice President Xiao Tian being nominated as a FIBA Vice President made a successful bid more likely. Thus, FIBA received China’s application documents in December 2014. France, Germany, the Philippines, Qatar, and Turkey also entered the race.

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Over the next few months, Nanjing Party Secretary Yang Weize and the CGAS Vice President Xiao Tian were arrested on charges of bribery (“Zhongguo jiangban,” 2015). The CBA yet did not worry that the scandals might undermine China’s chance of victory. It was because (1) France, Germany, Qatar, and Turkey discontinued their applications for the 2019 FIBA World Cup, (2) former NBA player Yao Ming and former FIBA President Ching Men-ky promised to help the CBA officials in lobbies (“Yao Ming,” 2015), and (3) Wuhan and Beijing succeeded in the 2019 Military World Games and the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding contests. China won the hosting rights of the FIBA World Cup by defeating the Philippines on August 8, 2015. To make the celebration of the sixteen-day international basketball tournament a grand party, the hosting duties initially assigned to Suzhou were passed to its neighbor, Shanghai—China’s financial and commercial center. It and the other seven cities, under the central government’s supervision, later meticulously renovated stadia and mobilized their residents to take part in basketball activities. Moreover, from 2018, Xi Jinping was entitled to preside over Chinese political affairs indefinitely by amending the constitution. His administration’s sharp power in the world had been boosted by the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative and other Beijing-led economic programs. It was expected that he would majestically attend the opening ceremony of the 2019 FIBA World Cup and other Chinese-hosted international gatherings to display his supreme authority and his determination to rejuvenate China and lead global affairs. While Xi hit it big at home and abroad, President Donald Trump came to the decision that it was necessary to penalize China for its decades of unfair practices in trade with the US and compel its government to buy more American agricultural goods. Accordingly, he slapped 25% tariffs on USD 50 billion worth of Chinese products and 10% tariffs on USD 200 billion worth of Chinese products. Given his belligerence, Xi did not step back. Instead, he imposed tariffs on USD 110 billion worth of the American goods in retaliation. To make its opponent back off in the trade war, the American authorities asked Canada to extradite Meng Wanzhou, the Chief Financial Officer of the Chinese telecommunication powerhouse Huawei, to the US.3 The Chinese delegation negotiating with the Americans, led by Vice Premier Liu He, subsequently agreed to buy American agriculture goods in the amount as expected by Trump. Xi however turned down Liu’s deal. Trump promptly increased the tariffs

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from 10 to 25% on USD 200 billion worth of Chinese products in May 2019, pushing his Chinese counterpart to make concessions (“Timeline: key,” 2019). Xi, in this unfavorable situation, was distracted. Hong Kong became another source of distraction to Xi. The Hong Kong government, in February 2019, proposed an extradition law which meant that anyone in the city could be sent to China for trial if their words or deeds were viewed by Beijing as breaching Chinese law. This gained the endorsement of the Chinese leaders (Zhang and Yang 2019; Chen 2019), despite being extensively viewed as a violation of the One Country Two Systems principle. In June, over one million people marched on the streets to demand the government withdraw the legislation at once. However, Chief Executive Carrie Lam declined, and the police brutally dispersed people who intended to obstruct the legislation (“Police violence,” 2019). Therefore, massive protests were held in Hong Kong one after another although Lam suspended the legislation. A few radical participants even defaced Chinese national symbols, vandalized public property, and demanded Hong Kong’s independence (Mahtani 2019). Since they thought that the protests showed a manner of color revolutions and the signs of terrorism (Chung and Cheung 2019; Zhang et al. 2019), the Chinese authorities supported the controversial actions of the police and even considered restoring the social order with troops (Wong et al. 2019). Surprisingly, the Hong Kong public did not back down. Meanwhile, the tension between Washington and Beijing escalated after the US State Council called China a ‘thuggish’ regime in response to the Beijing-controlled media’s disclosure of the personal information of an American diplomat who had met with protest leaders in Hong Kong (Landay 2019). Stung by the trade war with the US and the ongoing protests in Hong Kong, Xi, despite dutifully attending the opening ceremony and meeting the senior FIBA executives, was not in the mood to leverage the 2019 World Cup as a way of demonstrating his tremendous leadership and supreme authority. Accordingly, the Chinese government only invited the Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte, who was visiting China, to watch the opening ceremony with Xi and the FIBA executives. After returning to Manila, Duterte informed the media that his Chinese counterpart was in a ‘fidget’ over the social unrest in Hong Kong (“Feizongtong: Xi,” 2019). Moreover, the Chinese state media covered the sixteen-day tournament in a low-key manner, because the Chinese national basketball team being placed 24th in the final standings and failing to directly qualify for the

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2020 Summer Olympics would cause the public faith in China’s capability of becoming a strong sporting power to falter.

4.4

Conclusion

This chapter reviews the 2011 FINA World Championships, the 2015 IAAF World Championships, and the 2019 FIBA World Cup. It shows that the central and local governments’ keenness to pursue and organize these three sporting events was based on a desire to extend legacy of China’s holding the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo, speed up the internationalization of the hosting cities, help China become a strong sporting power, and push forward with its transformation into a moderately prosperous society. This chapter also investigated the varying attitudes of Chinese leaders toward the three events. After former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu was imprisoned for bribery and misuse of public funds, President Hu Jintao and his colleagues were deliberately indifferent toward the 2011 FINA World Championships— a Chen-proposed project. Hu’s successor Xi Jinping kept a high profile during the 2015 IAAF World Championships, to show that his supreme authority had been successfully consolidated. China’s trade war with the US and Hong Kong’s anti-government protests disinclined Xi from attending the 2019 FIBA World Cup in a similar manner.

Notes 1. The opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympics and its track and field competitions were held in the Beijing National Stadium, which can accommodate over 90000 spectators. 2. Some of those measures were viewed by the international media as severely disturbing the daily life of Beijing residents (Bai 2015; “Beijing’s World,” 2015). 3. Meng was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver airport on a charge of committing fraud to circumvent the US sanctions against Iran.

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Guojitianlian guanyuan wei Beijing lantian dianzan [The IAAF officials give thumbs-up to Beijing’s blue sky]. (2015, August 31). Beijing News, p. A09. Guojitianlian manyi Beijing [The IAAF is satisfied with Beijing]. (2015, April 17). Beijing News, p. C12. Guojiyonglian guanyuan shengzan choubei gongzuo [FINA officials praise preparation tasks]. (2006, February 26). Shanghai Youth Daily. Han, Z. (2011, January 23). 2011 nian Shanghai shi zhengfu gongzuo baogao [2011 Shanghai municipal government work report]. Shanghai Municipal Government. http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2319/nw1 1494/nw12330/nw12336/u21aw476705.html. Hu Jintao dao Shanghai qinqie kanwang weiwen guangda ganbu qunzhong, [Hu Jintao see local officials and public in Shanghai]. (2007, October 1). People. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/6339263.html. Hu Jintao fenbie huijian luoge he Ding Zhaozhong [Hu Jintao meets Rogge and Samuel C. C. Ting respectively]. (2003, June 3). People’s Daily, p. 3. Hu Jintao wenxuan disanjuan [Selected works of Hu Jintao volume III ]. (2006). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Landay, J. (2019, August 9). U.S. calls China ‘thuggish regime’ for singling out U.S. diplomat in Hong Kong. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ushongkong-protests-usa/us-calls-china-thuggish-regime-for-singling-out-usdiplomat-in-hong-kong-idUSKCN1UY2IM. Li Keqiang huijian guoji aoweihui zhuxi: tiyu yundong keyi zengqiang renben xiangshang de Liliang [Li Keqiang meets the IOC President: Sports can help the public to move upward in the social ladder]. (2015, August 23). National Bureau of Statistics. http://www.stats.gov.cn/wzgl/ywsd/201508/ t20150824_1234300.html. London pulls out of 2015 World Athletics race. (2010, November 4). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/athletics/9156858.stm. Mahtani, S (2019, July 21). Hong Kong protestors outmaneuver police, vandalize Chinese Liaison Office. Washington Post. https://www.washingto npost.com/world/asia_pacific/police-dramatically-increase-security-in-hongkong-as-protests-continue-unabated/2019/07/21/1de14dd2-aafa-11e98733-48c87235f396_story.html. Meicilai Shanghai douyou xinfaxian [New things would be found in every Shanghai trip]. (2011, July 19). Jiefang Daily, p. 4. Nanlanshijinsai xinzeng 4 xieban chengshi [Four more cities are invited to cohost the FIBA World Cup]. (2009, March 21). Guangzhou Daily, p. A13. Nanlanshijinsai zhongguo shenban shili xibanya duode jubanquan [China fail in the FIBA World Cup bid and Spain win the hosting rights]. (2009, May 25). Beijing News, p. A28.

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Ormsby, A. (2010, November 4). Athletics-London drops 2015 world championships bid. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/athletics-britain-idU SLDE6A22HT20101103. Picketts Lock bid scrapped. (2001, October 4). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ sport2/hi/athletics/1577797.stm. Police violence puts Hong Kong government on defensive. (2019, June 12). New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/asia/ hong-kong-protests.html. Shanghai huo jubanquan shijie duanchi youyong jinbiaosai [Shanghai won World Swimming Championships hosting rights]. (2003, July 13). Jiefang Daily. Shanghai jiji shenban 2011 nian shijie youyong jinbiaosai [Shanghai works very hard in the 2011 FINA World Championships bid]. (2007, March 22). Guangzhou Daily, p. A30. Shanghai jingji zhongxin jishe [The construction of Shanghai economic center]. (2016, October 14). Information Office of Shanghai Municipality. http:// touch.shio.gov.cn/government-news/detail_long.aspx?id=2623. Shanghai quanli zhichi Beijing banaoyun [Shanghai will give all-out support to Beijing for the holding of the Olympics]. (2003, July 15). Wenhui Daily News, p. 1. Shanghai yingde 2011 nian shijie youyong jinbiaosai jubanquan [Shanghai win the 2011 FINA World Championships hosting rights]. (2007, March 25). Oriental Morning Post, p. 14. Shili youyin changguan zhanji xunduishou [China’s inferiority in terms of stadium standards and national basketball team competitiveness is another reason for loss]. (2009, May 25). Wen Wei Po, p. A35. Shanghai huode duanchi shijinsai jubanquan ceji [Sidelights on Shanghai being awarded the World Swimming Championships hosting rights]. (2003, July 13). Xinmin Evening News, p. 7. Tianguan shenban shijinsai rezhengyi [CAA’s proposal to host the IAAF World Championships has controversy]. (2009, August 7). Wen Wei Po, p. A32. Tianjing shijinsai kaimushi jiangzai baitian jinxing biaoyan huanjie jin 20 fenzhong [The IAAF World Championships opening ceremony will be held at day time and its performances will only last 20 minutes]. (2015, August 11). Legal Evening News, p. A26. Timeline: Key dates in the U.S.-China trade war. (2019, October 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-timeline/ timeline-key-dates-in-the-us-china-trade-war-idUSKBN1WP23B. Tiyu rang chengshi gengjingcai [Better city better sports]. (2011, August 1). Jiefang Daily, p. 2. Wen Jiabao zaihu kaocha: bawo jihui ba Shanghai jianshe de genghao [Wen Jiabao inspects Shanghai: Seizing opportunities so making Shanghai better].

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(2007, May 16). Central People’s Government of the PRC. http://www.gov. cn/ldhd/2007-05/16/content_616531.htm. Wong, C., Cheung, G., Tsang, D., & Ng, T. (2019, July 24). Chinese military can be deployed at Hong Kong’s request to contain protests, Beijing says. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/ article/3019854/chinese-military-can-be-deployed-hong-kongs-request-con tain. Xi Jinping huijian guoji aoweihui zhuxi bahe [Xi Jinping meets the IOC President Tomas Bach]. (2015a, August 23). People’s Daily, p. 1. Xi Jinping huijian guoji aoxie zhuxi yaao lishihui zhuxi aihamaide qinwang [Xi Jinping meets the OCA and the National Olympic Committees Association President Sheikh Ahmad]. (2015b, August 23). People’s Daily, p. 1. Yao Ming zaizhu zhongguo shenban [Yao Ming helps China bid for the FIBA World Cup]. (2015, August 6). Beijing Youth Daily, p. A21. Yichang jingqiaoqiao de shenghui [A quiet event]. (2011, August 1). Jiefang Daily, p. 1. Zhang, K., & Yang, Z. (2019, May 23). CPPCC leader voice support for extradition bill. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2019-05/ 23/content_37472806.htm. Zhang, Y., Zhang, K., & Dai K. (2019, August 13). Sign of terrorism seem in HK unrest. China Daily. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/250/250/ 246/1565630378909.html. Zhao, X. (2015, September 16). Zhongguo shihua: wei meihao shenghuo jiayou [Sinopec: Pushing forward a better living], China Petrochem. http://www.chi nacpc.com.cn/info/2015-09-16/news_2393.html. Zhongguo jiangban 2019 nanlan shijiebei [China would host the 2019 FIBA World Cup]. (2015, May 5). Guangzhou Daily, p. B05. Zhongguo nanlan ruao nandu zengda [Chinese national basketball team being qualified to take part in Olympic competitions has been difficult]. (2012, November 13). Beijing Daily, p. 20. Zhongguo youyi ban nanlan shijiebei [China intends to host the FIBA World Cup]. (2014, September 6). Wen Wei Po, p. A34. Zhongnanhai qingqian shibo [Zhongnanhai enthusiastically support the World Expo]. (2010, April 28). State Council Information Office of PRC. http:// www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/xwfb/01/05/Document/619129/619129.htm.

CHAPTER 5

Leveraging Winter Sports Events

Abstract This chapter explores how the four winter sports events hosted in China from the 1990s onward—the Harbin 1996 Asian Winter Games, the Changchun 2007 Asian Winter Games, the Harbin 2009 Winter Universiade, and the Beijing and Zhangjiakou 2022 Winter Olympics— were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 1996 Asian Winter Games · The 2007 Asian Winter Games · The 2009 Winter Universiade · The 2022 Winter Olympics

In 1992, the celebrations of the 16th Winter Olympics and the 25th Summer Olympics were completed in Albertville of France and Barcelona of Spain. Since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) stipulated that from 1993 the Winter Olympics and the Summer Olympics should be staged in different even years, the next Winter Olympics would take place in 1994 instead of 1996. To avoid a clash with the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer of Norway, the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) decided in 1992 to switch the holding of the 3rd Asian Winter Games from 1994 to 1996. Unexpectedly, Sinuiju of North Korea, which had

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_5

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been assigned to host the 3rd Asian Winter Games, expressed dissatisfaction with this rescheduling. Its government relinquished its hosting duties (Liang 2007, p. 276). While the OCA had no choice but to accept the decision of the North Korean city, the leaders of China’s Heilongjiang province were well aware that after President Yang Shangkun and the military leaders promised to back Deng Xiaoping’s position—anyone who did not support the Reform and Opening Up must step down from office (Vogel 2011, p. 677), General Secretary Jiang Zemin not only ceased using conservative principles to formulate economic policies, but also decided to emphasize the necessity to accelerate market liberalization and international engagement at the 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress. They accordingly launched a proposal for Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang province, to hold the 1996 Asian Winter Games, so showing their determination to closely follow in the footsteps of Deng and Jiang. The central government promptly approved the activation of the bid. The OCA meanwhile also received a letter of application from Gangwon of South Korea.

5.1

Harbin and the 1996 Asian Winter Games

After the Chinese government established diplomatic relations with its South Korean counterparts in August 1992 and the Korean Sport & Olympic Committee (KOC) Chairperson and IOC Vice President Kim Un-yong pledged to support Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics, the China General Administration of Sport (CGAS) did not want the 1996 Asian Winter Games bidding competition to undermine the harmonious relations between China and South Korea. Its officials thus informed the South Koreans of a plan to lobby the OCA to pass the hosting rights of the 1996 and 1999 Asian Winter Games to Harbin and Gangwon in turn. Kim thought that it was reasonable to let Gangwon and Harbin respectively hold 1996 and 1999 Asian Winter Games if Beijing won the bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics or let Harbin and Gangwon stage 1996 and 1999 Asian Winter Games if otherwise. The CGAS did not oppose this idea (Liang 2007, p. 277). Despite being backed by the Chinese government and over 98% of the local residents, Beijing’s 2000 Summer Olympics bid was viewed as inferior to Sydney’s in terms of environmental conditions and extent of internationalization. Western condemnation of China’s dismal human

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rights performance further damaged its chances of victory. Moreover, the Australian side, to improve its candidate city’s odds, offered cash donations to some IOC members, including those who had pledged to vote for Beijing. Sydney eventually won the bidding race. Both the Chinese authorities and the public were sorely disappointed with the result (Chu 2021, pp. 12–13). While Beijing was encouraged to apply for the 2004 Summer Olympics, Pusan of South Korea expressed interest in holding the 2002 Asian Games. Taiwan was also set to choose either Taipei or Kaohsiung to make their bid (Wu and Tseng 2001, pp. 85–87). Kim Un-yong thus took the initiative of submitting the proposal about letting Harbin and Gangwon stage 1996 and 1999 Asian Winter Games respectively to the international sporting community, so as to ensure that China would fully support the South Korean city in the 2002 Asian Games bidding competition with Taiwan. The IOC President Juan Samaranch appreciated Kim’s move. The OCA President Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah and the OCA members all gave their endorsements (Chu 2013, pp. 1053–1054). The Chinese media reported Harbin’s success extensively, but they did not reveal the role played by the South Korean. In 1994, the Heilongjiang provincial and Harbin municipal governments decided to spend a total of CNY 700 million on renovating stadia and urban infrastructure. The Chinese central government also announced that parts of its sports lottery revenue would be appropriated for the organization of the 1996 Asian Winter Games (“Harbin yadonghui,” 1994a; “Harbin yadonghui,” 1994b). The state media however did not extensively cover the stories. Instead, they keenly promoted the 1994 Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled, the first sporting mega-event staged in Beijing after the 2000 Summer Olympic bidding contest had ended in disappointment. Since over thirty thousand people were mobilized to help the participant disabled athletes, the international sporting community complimented Beijing on its organization. The haul of 298 gold, 238 silver, and 148 bronze gave the Chinese team top spot on the medal table. Thus, in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the seven-day 1994 Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled had successfully aroused national pride and raised Beijing’s international profile (“Shoudu longzhong,” 1994; “Deng Pufang,” 1994). A few weeks later, they were further pleased by the Chinese swimmers’ excellent performances at the 1994 FINA

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(International Swimming Federation) World Championships in Rome— breaking seven world records (“Shijie shi,” 1994). However, their spirits were dampened after eleven Chinese swimmers were confirmed to have been involved in doping at the Hiroshima 1994 Asian Games (Yuan 2009, pp. 29–32). Meanwhile, China’s application to resume its status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was rejected. Although the failure to join the GATT resulted in China being excluded from the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO), President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and their colleagues were still optimistic about the potential for China’s economic development, because the US President Bill Clinton had removed the link between the annual renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation status and the Beijing’s human rights performance. Thus, in 1995, the 9th Five-Year Economic Plan was formulated, which aimed to accelerate the pace of economic growth from 1996 to 2000 and double China’s 2000 GDP by 2010 (Li 2006). Moreover, due to Tianjin’s outstanding holding of the 1995 ITTF (International Table Tennis Federation) World Championships and the Chinese athletes’ clean sweep of all seven competitions (Chu 2021, p. 39), the sense of national pride among the Chinese public had soared. There was even a wish for Beijing to host the 2004 Summer Olympics. President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and their colleagues however did not give the green light, although winning the 2004 Summer Olympics would surely further boost the national pride of the public and help achieve the GDP targets.1 Nevertheless, the state media, to avoid disappointing the public, did not report Beijing’s non-participation in the 2004 Summer Olympics bid. Instead, they zealously publicized how Heilongjiang and Harbin, under the Chinese central government’s supervision, had completed the meticulous organization of the 1996 Asian Winter Games within just 26 months (“Weizhe tuanjie,” 1996; “Zhanshi yazhou,” 1996). Moreover, the members of the Chinese team understood that to consolidate China’s status in the Asian sporting community and remove the negative associations caused by the Chinese swimmers who took banned substances in the 1994 Asian Games, it was crucial for them to not only win gold medals in Harbin but also show that fierce competition could be met without cheating. The Chinese team finished the competition with fifteen gold, seven silver, and fifteen bronze and was ranked top of the medal table. None of its members was confirmed to have used banned drugs to spur

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their competitiveness (“Disanjie yadonghui,” 1996). In addition, after witnessing the splendid performances of the opening ceremony with President Jiang Zemin and the sophisticated organization of the eight-day competition with the provincial and municipal executives, the OCA President Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah admitted that Harbin was ready to host a Winter Olympics (“Liangchuang zhizui,” 1996). The Chinese government thus concluded that the athletes’ achievements and the OCA’s compliments were a result of the success of the Reform and Opening Up and the impressive collectivism led by the CCP. The local authorities also noted that the holding of the 1996 Asian Winter Games was a milestone that had showcased Heilongjiang’s ability to boost the economy and arouse national pride (“Li Tieying,” 1996; Yue 1996).

5.2

Changchun and the 2007 Asian Winter Games

In January 1999, the 9th National Winter Games of China rounded off in Changchun, the capital city of Jilin province. Given its satisfaction with the organization of this ten-day sporting event, the CGAS suggested that the Changchun municipal government apply for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. Changchun Party Secretary Mi Fengjun, Mayor Li Shu, and their colleagues accepted this suggestion, because successfully staging the international gathering could boost the economy of the city, upgrade its urban infrastructure, raise its international visibility, and improve the local environment. The municipal government submitted the proposal about Changchun’s application for the 2007 Asian Winter Games to the Jilin provincial government for approval in March (“Woshi de,” 2002). Despite favoring the municipal government’s proposal, Jilin Party Secretary Wang Yunkun, Governor Hong Hu, and other provincial senior officials did not give immediate approval. It was because the Asian Winter Games application would likely distract the provincial government from eradicating the activities of Falun Gong and supporting Beijing’s ongoing application for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Two years later, the practice of Falun Gong had disappeared from Jilin. The neutrality of the US government, the confidence of the IOC senior executives, and the support of the Chinese public boosted Beijing’s chance of winning the rights to host the 2008 Olympics. The Jilin provincial government thus approved Changchun’s pursuit of the 2007 Asian Winter Games and passed the decision to the Chinese central government for endorsement on June 14, 2001 (“Woshi de,” 2002).

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The Chinese central government promptly delivered endorsement, because the holding of the 2007 Asian Winter Games was seen as (1) a boost to the economy of Changchun and its internationalization and (2) facilitating the overall development of the Northeastern region2 — one of the pillars of its 10th Five-Year Economic plan (2001–2005) (Zhu 2006). Over the next few months, Beijing triumphed in the 2008 Olympics bidding contest with Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, and Toronto. The OCA received application documents from Changchun, Almaty, Beirut, and Tehran. Since they were busily preparing for the 16th CCP National Congress and handling Shanghai’s application for the 2010 World Expo, none of the Chinese leaders participated in the lobbying and publicity activities of Changchun. Even so, the OCA executives were still favorably impressed by Changchun’s plan to host the 2007 Asian Winter Games and the other bidding tasks completed by the provincial and municipal governments. The withdrawal of Tehran and Almaty further improved Changchun’s odds (Chu 2013, p. 1053). Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities announced that the 16th CCP National Congress would open in Beijing in November 2002. Both central and local officials realized that Changchun’s failure in the contest with Beirut would certainly taint the ambience of this significant political gathering. Accordingly, they intensified efforts to lobby the OCA executives and members. Despite the ongoing conflict between Lebanon and Israel, Beirut, with the full support of the West Asian sporting community, also campaigned well. The OCA eventually made the decision to award the rights to the 2007 Asian Winter Games to Changchun and the 2009 Asian Winter Games to its Lebanese rival.3 One month later, President Jiang Zemin, at the 16th CCP National Congress, unveiled the Chinese authorities’ decision to quadruple the GDP of 2000 and complete the building of a moderately prosperous society by 2020 (Jiang Zemin, 2006, pp. 528–575). This message indicated that, under the leadership of his successor Hu Jintao, China’s efforts to liberate markets, encourage business activities, and seek rapid economic growth would continue. While the relevant policies were being formulated by Hu and his colleagues, SARS broke out in China. The pandemic severely hit the economy of the country and caused international concern about China’s ability to hold the 2008 Summer Olympics and other mega-events. Hu promised that Beijing, with the support of the Chinese government, would successfully complete the celebration of

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the 2008 Summer Olympics (“Hu Jintao,” 2003). His administration gave the green light to the Northeastern regions to accelerate infrastructure renovation and internationalization (“Zhenxing dongbei,” 2019). Additionally, Hu initiated the Scientific Development Concept, which emphasized the importance to seek GDP growth with socioecological sustainability (Hu Jintao, 2016a, pp. 104–105). The Changchun municipal government faced a dilemma. On the one hand, to ensure that international confidence in China’s holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics and other mega-events could be restored and that the goal of accelerating the Northeast region development might be realized, Changchun planned to lavishly spend CNY 22 billion on building new stadia, upgrading hotels and other hospitality facilities, improving the local environment and urban infrastructure, and inviting sportsmen from all the OCA member countries and regions to take part in the 2007 Asian Winter Games. On the other hand, to echo Hu’s Scientific Development Concept, the Beijing and Guangzhou municipal governments had cut costs when building the 2008 Olympics and 2010 Asian Games stadia (Chu 2019, p. 103). It seemed that Changchun needed to reduce expenditure on the 2007 Asian Winter Games. While they were puzzled, the municipal officials learned that to successfully leverage the 2005 East Asian Games as a pre-celebration of the 2008 Summer Olympics, the Macao government, between 2001 and 2005, had continuously increased its outlay on building stadia and renovating urban infrastructure (Chu 2019, pp. 103–104). This was not condemned by local pro-Beijing media. Rather, Chinese officials who had taken part in the organization of the 2008 Summer Olympics visited Macao to learn from its experience of hosting this sporting mega-event (Chu 2019, pp. 103–104). The municipal officials were also informed that despite the budget cuts to stadium building, the overall investment of Beijing and Guangzhou in the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 Asian Games was still large4 and that President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao would come to Changchun attending the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2007 Asian Winter Games. Given the above arrangements, the Changchun government decided to retain the CNY 22 billion budget (“Touzi 220,” 2005). It needs to be noted that while Chinese central and local governments sought ways to contain SARS, the 2003 Asian Winter Games opened in Aomori of Japan. In this eight-day competition, the Chinese team, unlike their predecessors which topped the medal tallies of the 1996 and 1999

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Asian Winter Games, ranked third on the medal table with only nine gold, eleven silver, and thirteen bronze. Although the competitiveness of the Chinese skating and skiing sportsmen in international tournaments was constantly mediocre, the Chinese authorities were dissatisfied with their failure to become the most successful winter sports nation within Asia, because they thought it might affect China’s image and status in the athletic community of the continent. Recapturing first place in the medal table thus became the top priority of the Chinese team in the 2007 Asian Winter Games. After witnessing the brand-new stadia, hotels, and urban infrastructure, enjoying the solemn opening and closing ceremonies with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, and watching the eight-day fierce competition in which over 790 elite skating and skiing athletes from 25 countries and regions took part, the senior OCA executives admitted that Changchun had presented the most successful and amazing winter sports event in the OCA history. These words indicated the restoration of international confidence in China’s holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics and other sporting mega-events. They also inspired the municipal government to apply for the 2018 Winter Olympics. Moreover, the Chinese team won 19 gold, 19 silver, and 23 bronze, successfully securing top spot on the 2007 Asian Winter Games medal table (“Huo Zhenting,” 2007; “Yaao lishihui,” 2007; “Zhongguo ju,” 2007).

5.3

Harbin and the 2009 Winter Universiade

To extend the development of Harbin and the Northeastern region as well as expand the national pride of the Chinese public generated by Beijing’s successful Olympic bid, the Heilongjiang provincial government, in last quarter of 2001, decided that Harbin should try to host the 2010 Winter Olympics. The Chinese central government endorsed this ambitious plan but, since they were busy preparing for the 16th CCP National Congress and handling Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Chinese leaders chose not to take part in the bidding activities. Although the provincial and municipal governments tried their best to persuade the IOC members, and mobilized local residents to give support, the absence of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and their colleagues from the lobbying and publicity diminished Harbin’s chances. The rigorous IOC assessment of the information provided by the applicant cities also noted Harbin as inferior to its competitors in terms of weather conditions,

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sports venues, and internationalization. It thus failed to be shortlisted as a candidate in August 2002 (Chu 2016, pp. 120–123). Eleven months later, Vancouver won the hosting rights by eliminating Pyeongchang and Salzburg at the 115th IOC Session. After SARS had been successfully contained in the second half of 2003, the Heilongjiang provincial government decided to let Harbin apply for the 2009 Winter Universiade. It was hoped this would enhance the city’s experience of hosting sporting mega-events and its internationalization. The Chinese central government later approved this proposal and promised to give its full support, because winning the bidding competition would enable the international society to cease its worrying about China’s holding of sporting mega-events in the post-SARS era and accelerate the pace of Heilongjiang’s economic growth and social development. Meanwhile, the Harbin municipal government, with the support of the Heilongjiang provincial government, started planning a pursuit of the 2014 Winter Olympics (“Shizhengfu pinqing,” 2004; “Shi Zhongxin,” 2004). The International University Sports Federation (FISU) also received a bid to host the 2009 Winter Universiade from Erzurum. Although it was a small mountain city in the eastern part of Turkey with a population of only 400 thousand, Erzurum had some of the best winter sports facilities in West Asia. The Turkish officials also promised that, if Erzurum won the hosting rights, its municipal government would spend USD 100 million on improving urban infrastructure and sports stadia and activate a bid for a future Winter Olympics (“Haerbin de,” 2005). The Harbin municipal government, with the Chinese central government’s blessing and the Heilongjiang provincial government’s backing (Song Fatang, 2004; Zhang Zuoji, 2004; Zhongyang zhengfu, 2004), in turn informed the international sporting community of its determination to lavishly upgrade its winter sports stadia and urban infrastructure and pursue the 2014 Winter Olympics (“Haerbin shenban,” 2004). FISU chose the Chinese city in January 2005. Two years later, the Turkish city was awarded the rights to host the 2011 Winter Universiade (“Shenzhen zhuban,” 2007). Success in the 2009 Winter Universiade bidding contest enhanced the Heilongjiang provincial and Harbin municipal governments’ confidence in their bid to win the 2014 Winter Olympics. The Chinese central government however decided to back Sochi’s bid to host the 2014 Winter Olympics (“Zhenqing qianshou,” 2007), reciprocating Russia for its support of Beijing in the 2008 Summer Olympics bidding competition.

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It was also hoped that supporting Sochi would facilitate cultural exchange between China and Russia in 2006 and 2007 and help the Russian parliament to approve the implementation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Sino-Russian Border Eastern Part. The provincial and municipal governments thus called off their ambitious pursuit. In July 2007, Sochi was awarded the 2014 Winter Olympics hosting rights after defeating Pyeongchang and Salzburg at the 119th IOC Session. Meanwhile, the IOC members approved President Jacques Rogge’s plans to create Summer and Winter Youth Olympics and agreed to hold the first Summer Youth Olympics in 2010 and the first Winter Youth Olympics in 2012. Subsequently, the Heilongjiang provincial government, which was working with the municipal government to prepare for the 2009 Winter Universiade, declared its interest in Harbin hosting the 2012 Winter Youth Olympics and asked the central government for endorsement. The endorsement was given, but the officials of the central government, to avoid distracting attention from the organization of the 2008 Summer Olympics, decided not to take part in the lobbying activities or mobilize the support of the Chinese public. Neither the provincial nor the municipal governments were discouraged by this arrangement. Instead, they were optimistic about Harbin’s odds due to the FISU executives’ praise of the organization of the 2009 Winter Universiade (“Yuan haerbin,” 2008). However, after reviewing the application documents of Harbin and the other three applicant cities—Innsbruck of Austria, Kuopio of Finland, and Lillehammer of Norway—the IOC executives deemed that Harbin was weaker than its European rivals. It was eliminated in the 2012 Winter Youth Olympics bidding contest (Chu 2016, pp. 123–124). The Chinese state media did not extensively report Harbin’s failure. Rather, they publicized CNY 3 billion earmarked to upgrade the skating and skiing stadia of the city, renovate its urban infrastructure, improve its local environment, and organize the 2009 Winter Universiade (“Wanshi jubei,” 2009). Additionally, despite the Chinese athletes’ mediocre performance in the previous Winter Universiade, the Chinese 2009 Winter Universiade team was ordered to top the medal table. It was hoped this would extend the national pride aroused by the medal haul of the 2008 Summer Olympics and help China to become a strong sporting power (Hu Jintao, 2016b, pp. 101–114). While the Chinese authorities were looking forward to Harbin’s brilliant festival of winter sports and the Chinese athletes’ outstanding competitiveness, Taipei and Gwangju activated bids for the 2015 Summer

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Universiade. To increase Taipei’s odds of success, Taiwanese officials informed Beijing of their plan to lobby the FISU executives and members in Harbin during the Winter Universiade. Given President Lee Tenghui and his successor Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence sentiments and deeds, the Chinese authorities had intensified efforts to marginalize Taiwan in international society over the previous twelve years. Not surprisingly, their measures had successfully obstructed the Taiwanese cities from winning in the 2001, 2007, and 2011 Summer Universiade bidding contests. However, the Chinese authorities no longer held a hostile attitude toward the Taiwanese government after Ma Yingjeou, a pro-unification figure, had become the President in 2008. They allowed Taiwanese officials to lobby in Harbin and decided to hold a neutral stance toward the 2015 Summer Universiade bid (Chu 2017, pp. 1676–1677). During the nine-day Winter Universiade, Taiwanese officials took full advantage of their freedom. The Chinese team unprecedentedly won the greatest number of gold medals and topped the medal table. FISU President George Killian praised Harbin for its organization. He also suggested the city apply for the 2018 Winter Olympics (“President Killian,” 2009; “Datilian zhuxi,” 2009). It needs to be noted that Pyeongchang of South Korea had decided to bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics. As holding the Winter Olympics might help China become a strong sporting power, both the Heilongjiang provincial and the Harbin municipal governments accepted Killian’s suggestion. While the central government learned Harbin proposed to bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics, Changchun, the host of the 2007 Asian Winter Games, with the support of the Jilin provincial government, revealed the same intention. Heilongjiang officials were confident that, since its experience of holding sporting mega-events was richer than Changchun’s, Harbin would be chosen by the central government to pursue the Winter Olympics on behalf of China. The central government however backed Pyeongchang. The decision was seen as a way to strengthen China’s trade relations with South Korea and consolidate their strategic cooperative partnership. Harbin and Changchun both thus cancelled their plans to pursue the 2018 Winter Olympics (Chu 2021, pp. 138–140). Pyeongchang eventually won the hosting rights by defeating Annecy and Munich at the 123rd IOC Session.

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5.4

Beijing and the 2022 Winter Olympics

Aside from those of Oslo, Lviv, Kraków, Almaty, and Stockholm, the IOC also received the letter of Beijing and Zhangjiakou—a small city in Hebei province—in late 2013, conveying a wish to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Both Chinese and overseas observers were pessimistic about the Chinese cities’ chance of victory in this bidding competition for four reasons. First, the 2018 Winter Olympics was to be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The members of the IOC were thought to be less likely to pass the hosting rights of the next Winter Olympics in another East Asian city. Second, after the celebration of the 2008 Summer Olympics, severe air pollution had returned to Beijing and its neighboring regions. No world-class elite athletes would be willing to compete in a place with such a notorious environmental problem. Third, the huge distance between Beijing and Zhangjiakou and the likelihood of insufficient snow constituted another Achille’s heel. The other applicants did not have such issues. Fourth, the IOC was believed to be reluctant to pass the Winter Olympics to China, where the popularity of winter sports was low (Chu 2016, p. 124). President Xi Jinping strongly supported a Beijing and Zhangjiakou’s bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics, because overcoming such skeptical views and winning the hosting rights could further consolidate his authority and display his ability and determination to rejuvenate the nation. In fact, given the speedy economic growth of the 1990s and 2000s, the Chinese authorities were under pressure to carry out political reforms and turn the country to be more open and liberal. A die-hard fan of Mao Zedong, Xi despised liberal democratic values and believed that single-party autocratic rule was the only way to transform China into a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and a fully developed economy by 2049. Therefore, he strengthened his grip on the political and civil spheres of China and sought to aggressively expand its sharp power in the world. Given Xi’s endorsement of the bid, the Chinese central and Beijing municipal governments decided to improve the air quality of Beijing and its neighboring region and mobilized over 90% of Beijing residents in support of the pursuit of the 2022 Winter Olympics. They would also make sure there was a sufficient supply of water to make artificial snow and build an express rail link between Beijing and Zhangjiakou. These efforts deeply impressed the IOC. In contrast, Stockholm, Kraków, and

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Oslo discontinued their applications because of the local opposition. The political instability of Ukraine caused the withdrawal of Lviv as well (Chu 2016, pp. 125–127). To make the majority of the IOC members choose Beijing instead of Almaty, Xi played a trump card in the last stage of the bidding contest, promising that his administration would mobilize 300 million Chinese people to take part in winter sports activities (“Xi Jinping,” 2015). The Chinese capital city’s success was confirmed in July 2015. Over the next few years, Xi successfully eliminated his political rivals and strengthened his control of the Party, state, and military. He also amended the constitution so that he was entitled to stay in power indefinitely. Given the supreme authority of Xi, Chinese central and local officials attached great importance to his words and deeds, including those related to the 2022 Winter Olympics. From 2016 to early 2019, Xi frequently gave instructions to the 2022 Winter Olympics organizing committee and the Chinese athletes, inspected the construction sites of the skating and skiing stadia in Beijing and Zhangjiakou, and promoted the event at home and abroad. His reasons for doing so were related to the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Coordinated Development Program, the Belt and Road initiative, and the doping scandal that had engulfed Chinese Olympians. Beijing had enjoyed an economic boom from the 2000s, whereas the GDP growth rate of its neighbors, Hebei and Tianjin, had remained comparatively mediocre. The gap was viewed as an impediment to China’s transformation into a moderately prosperous society and a fully developed economy. The Chinese authorities therefore launched the Beijing-TianjinHebei Coordinated Development Program, which aimed to use the socioeconomic advantages of Beijing to push the comprehensive development of Tianjin and Hebei. After winning the hosting rights, Xi definitively associated the 2022 Winter Olympics with this program (“Xi Jinping,” 2017). It was believed the joint enterprise of Beijing and Zhangjiakou in handling the stadium building, environmental improvements, and express rail link construction would strengthen the long-term interconnectedness of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei. In 2015, Xi activated the Belt and Road initiative to make China the director of development for Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania by building roads, ports, railways, and grids. Over sixty countries subsequently borrowed money from the Chinese government and joined this Beijing-chaired grand project. However, the publics of the participant

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countries found that, after incurring huge amounts of Chinese debt, their leaders were at the mercy of Beijing when handling both domestic and international affairs. They also felt uneasy when tens of thousands of Chinese workers appeared in their homelands. The termination of infrastructure projects under the purview of Chinese companies and withdrawal from the Belt and Road initiative therefore became the policy of some participant countries’ politicians in 2018 (Kynge 2018; Taylor 2018). Xi attached great importance to this matter. He decided to leverage the 2022 Winter Olympics to demonstrate the brilliant stadia, railways, roads, and urban infrastructure of Beijing and Zhangjiakou to the people of the participant countries and restore their confidence in China’s involvement in their local development (“Xi Jinping,” 2019). With the Chinese delegation’s unprecedented medal haul in the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, national pride soared. President Hu Jintao and his colleagues decided to make China a strong sporting power. After his formal accession to power, Xi constantly urged his subordinates and Chinese athletes to work toward this ambitious goal. In the report delivered to the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi even underscored the necessity to accelerate the process (Xi 2017). Yet, the scandals about the IOC stripping three Chinese women weightlifters of their gold medals from the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and a Chinese modern pentathlete of her fourth place finish at the Rio 2016 Summer Olympics due to their use of performance enhancing drugs undermined the international reputation of China (“China facing,” 2017; Butler 2017). They also weakened the trust of the Chinese public that their homeland would be able to become a strong sporting power. Xi deemed the 2022 Winter Olympics could turn the tables. He reminded Chinese sportsmen that upholding the commitment to anti-doping in Beijing and Zhangjiakou was more important than hunting medals (“Xi Jinping,” 2019). While the Chinese central and local governments followed Xi’s instructions strictly in preparing for the 2022 Winter Olympics, the international media extensively reported on the Chinese authorities’ severe violation of human rights in Xinjiang, an autonomous region of Northwest China where most of the residents were Uyghur Muslims. Since their language, religion, and customs were different from those of the Han Chinese, some Uyghur Muslims had always sought the independence of Xinjiang. A few radicals even adopted terrorist methods to promote their political pursuit. Xi was furious. The local government of Xinjiang thus built re-education camps to indoctrinate over one million Uyghur Muslims.

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Mosques and other religious facilities were also aggressively removed (Ramzy and Buckley 2019). Given this, the US government condemned the inhuman measures. Its congressmen passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act which aimed to penalize any Chinese officials involved in the local suppression. The US Congressional Executive Commission on China called on the IOC to strip Beijing of the 2022 Winter Olympics (“Remarks by,” 2019a; “Remarks by,” 2019b; Diamond 2018). Tomas Bach and his colleagues however ignored the call. China was also accused of severe violations of human rights in Hong Kong. In the summer of 2019, millions of Hong Kong people protested on streets and demanded the government formally cancel the proposed extradition law, investigate the behavior of the police force in the previous protests by forming an independent commission of inquiry, and begin political reform so that the Chief Executive and lawmakers could be chosen by genuine universal suffrage. Their cause obtained support from the US diplomats and celebrities. However, since some radical protestors vandalized public property, defaced Chinese national symbols, and expressed their wish for the independence of Hong Kong, Xi and his colleagues thought that the protests had characteristics of the color revolutions and showed signs of terrorism. Thus, Hong Kong police brutally arrested participants. Chief Executive Carrie Lam ignored the demands. The Chinese authorities intended to settle the issue with troops and retaliated against the US diplomats and celebrities by disclosing their personal information and obstructing their business activities in China. President Donald Trump expressed concern over China’s position. The US congressmen passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act with the purpose of punishing those who took part in suppression. Senator Rick Scott addressed a letter to Tomas Bach, which pressed the IOC to cancel Beijing’s hosting of the 2022 Winter Olympics (“Sen. Rick,” 2019). Bach and his colleagues again disregarded the call. To thwart the political pursuits of the Hong Kong people, the Chinese authorities, with Xi’s endorsement, enacted the National Security Law for Hong Kong in 2020. Since this move was viewed as destroying the autonomy and liberty of the city, President Trump and his colleagues adopted a series of measures to penalize the Communist regime, including announcing the decision to terminate Hong Kong’s special trade relations with the US and endorsing the Hong Kong Autonomy Act passed unanimously by the congressmen. Other Western states also raised concerns

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and revised their policies toward Hong Kong. While Xi and his administration held the uncompromising stance toward the foreign responses, their suppression over the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang continued, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The congressmen subsequently introduced resolutions in both the House of Representatives and the Senate that demanded the IOC relocate the 2022 Winter Olympics (“H.Res.963,” n.a.; “S.Res.526,” n.a.). Some, together with international human rights organizations and politicians from other Western countries, called for the IOC member countries and regions to boycott the competition if the decision to allow China to stage the event was not reversed (Westcott 2020). United Kingdom Foreign Minister Dominic Raab hinted that the United Kingdom would not take part in the 2022 Winter Olympics (Wintour 2020). His party mates urged the member states of the Commonwealth to join the boycott (Tobin and Ballinger 2002). While the international media were extensively reporting the above words delivered by the politicians and executives of the Western powers, the economy of their homelands was hit severely by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the contrary, a series of mandatory measures imposed by Xi and his administration effectively contained the spread of COVID-19 in their jurisdiction. China even became the only major power on the planet with GDP growth in 2020 (Cheng 2021). Since the economic performance could be used to perfectly demonstrate that China’s oneparty authoritarian system was superior to Western countries’ democratic and liberal system, Xi was pleased. He meanwhile was confident to make the 2022 Games an utter success, because (1) the progress of Beijing and Zhangjiakou’s preparation was highly praised by the IOC, (2) although the Chinese authorities’ hardline measures toward Hong Kong and Xinjiang continued, the EU Commission reached a comprehensive investment agreement with China and some of its member states promised to support Beijing’s Olympic celebration, and (3) Joe Biden, who constantly criticized Donald Trump’s domestic and foreign policies, won in the US presidential election (Brunsden et al. 2020; Zhang 2020; Gillien 2021; Houston 2021). Yet, there was no sign showing that Biden’s team intended to overturn the tough line of Trump’s administration toward China. The EU Parliament also extensively condemned the Communist regime for its severe violation of human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Given this, Biden was advised of the necessity to work with the US allies and other democracies for the Olympic boycott (Hanson 2020; Mohsin et al. 2021; Wintour

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2021). In short, it is believed that tensions between China and the West will be ongoing and that a great deal of uncertainty to the holding of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and Zhangjiakou will remain.

5.5

Conclusion

This chapter investigated four winter sports events in China—Harbin’s holding of the 1996 Asian Winter Games, Changchun’s holding of the 2007 Asian Winter Games, Harbin’s holding of the 2009 Winter Universiade, and Beijing and Zhangjiakou’s bid for and organization of the 2022 Winter Olympics. The findings reveal that they were leveraged by the Chinese central and local authorities to boost the economic development of the Northeastern region and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, to enhance international confidence in Beijing’s holding of the 2008 Summer Olympics, to extend China’s Olympic legacy at home and abroad, to display the Chinese capability to become a strong sporting power, and to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese political system under Xi Jinping’s tremendous leadership. This chapter also reviewed the Western countries’ accusation of China’s dismal human rights performance from the late 2010s and its possible impact on the holding of the 2022 Winter Olympics.

Notes 1. There were five reasons behind this unexpected decision. First, Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong was arrested in July 1995 for his involvement in corruption and Vice Mayor Wang Baoseng’s death. This scandal did significant damage to Beijing’s international image. Second, to retaliate for Lee Tung-hui’s visit to the US through which Taiwan’s democratization was successfully promoted, the Chinese military undertook missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. This move, as expected, was strongly condemned around the Western world. The Chinese authorities however would conduct another round of missile tests in 1996 with the purpose of obstructing Lee’s bid to win the presidential election. In that atmosphere, Western executives and politicians would extensively promote their anti-China views if Beijing took part in the 2004 Olympics bidding contest. Third, politicians from Western countries also accused the Chinese authorities of arbitrariness in selecting the candidate of the Panchen Lama. It was believed that Beijing officials would be troubled by criticism of China’s miserable human rights performance during the bidding process. Fourth, after 1994 Deng Xiaoping’s

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health deteriorated severely. If he died during the bid, international society would surely raise deep concerns about the political stability of China. The IOC members’ confidence toward Beijing’s holding of mega-events would also fall sharply. Fifth, Athens of Greece and Cape Town of South Africa had applied to host the 2004 Summer Olympics. The Chinese authorities believed that Beijing would be unable to gain the full support of Samaranch and the African IOC members because (1) Samaranch had once expressed regret for the decision to choose Atlanta as host of the 1996 Summer Olympics in preference to Athens, and (2) to show the solidarity of Africa, it was thought that all the African IOC members would cast their votes for Cape Town (Chu 2021, pp. 134–138). 2. The Northeastern region is composed of three provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. 3. The OCA cancelled Beirut’s rights to hold the 2009 Asian Winter Games in 2003 because it failed to comply with the hosting contract (Haddad 2003). 4. The Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Games cost USD 44 billion and CNY 122.6 billion, respectively (Chu 2021, pp. 18 & 92).

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Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. (2019a, September 25). White House. https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nat ions-general-assembly/. Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture. (2019b, October 24). White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-lecture/. S.Res.526 - A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the International Olympic Committee should rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic games to be hosted by a country that recognizes and respects human rights. US Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-resolution/526. Sen. Rick Scott to International Olympics Committee: Stand up for human rights; don’t host Olympic Games in Communist China. (2019, October 17). Senator Rick Scott. https://www.rickscott.senate.gov/sen-rick-scott-internati onal-olympics-committee-stand-human-rights-dont-host-olympic-games. Shenzhen zhuban 2011 xiadayun [Shenzhen obtain 2011 Summer Universiade hosting rights]. (2007, January 18). Tai Kung Pao, p. A25. Shi Zhongxin huijian meiguo keren [Shi Zongxin meets American guests]. (2004, July 3). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Shijie shi nimende [The world is yours]. (1994, September 16). China Sports Daily, p. 1. Shizhengfu pinqing shendongao guwen [The municipal government invites consultants for Winter Olympics bid]. (2004, May 31). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Shoudu longzhong juxing zhongguo canjiren tiyu daibiaotuan qinggong dahui [The ceremony to congratulate the Chinese delegation of the 1994 Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled is grandly held in Beijing]. (1994, September 12). China Sports Daily, p. 1. Song Fatang huijian guoji datilian kaocha pinggutuan [Song Fatang meets the FISU inspectors]. (2004, November 18). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Taylor, A. (2018, August 22). Why countries might want out of China’s Belt and Road? Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2018/08/22/why-countries-might-want-out-chinas-belt-road/?utm_term=. ef9a81086ca5. Tobin, G., & Ballinger, A. (2002, November 12). Australia shouldn’t ‘shy away’ from boycotting Beijing Winter Olympics after China trade sanctions. ABC. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-12/australia-encouraged-toboycott-beijing-winter-olympics/12876106. Touzi 220 yi diliujie yadonghui chouban gongzuo jinzhan shunli [Investing CNY 22 billion, the organization of the 3rd Asian Winter Games is going smooth]. (2005, June 21). Beijing Youth Daily. Vogel, E. F. (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Yuan, S. (2009). Zhongguo nanzihan: Yuan Weimin yu titan fengyun [Yuan Weimin and sporting situation]. Hong Kong: Ming Pao Press. Yue, Q. (1996, February 17). Fayang yadong jingshen xhenxing quansheng jingji zai disanjie yadonghui zongjie qinggong dahuishangde jianghua [Speech delivered in the 3rd Asian Winter Games congratulatory ceremony], Heilongjiang Daily, p. 1&2. Zhang, R. (2020, December 31). China, Italy celebrate 50 years of ties with their sights on space, trade and the Olympics. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/311 6001/china-italy-celebrate-50-years-ties-their-sights-space-trade. Zhang Zuoji huijian guoji datilian kaocha pinggutuan [Zhang Zuoji meets the FISU inspectors]. (2004, November 19). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Zhanshi yazhou titan de huihuang [The display of Asian sports excellence]. (1996, February 4). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Zhenqing qianshou xiexinpian zhonge renwen hezuo kaixinju [New page about China-Russian cultural exchange opens]. (2007, September 2). Economic Daily, p. 4. Zhenxing dongbei laogongye jidi [Revitalize the industrial base of China’s Northeastern region]. (2019, November 10). Xinhua. http://www.xinhua net.com/politics/2019-11/10/c_1125214362.htm. Zhongguo ju chengban dongaohui haiyou duoyuan [How long of China’s host of Winter Olympics]. (2007, February 5). Beijing News, p. A28. Zhongyang zhengfu jiji zhichi harerbin shenban dadonghui [Central government support Harbin’s bid for Winter Universiade]. (2004, November 20). Harbin Daily, p. 1. Zhu, R. (2006. February 16). 2001 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao [Chinese government work report 2001]. Central Government of PRC. http://www. gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm.

CHAPTER 6

Leveraging Youth Multi-sports Events

Abstract This chapter aims to show how the five multi-sports events for young competitors hosted in China from the 1990s—the Shanghai 1998 Summer Gymnasiade, the Nanjing 2013 Asian Youth Games, the Nanjing 2014 Summer Youth Olympics, the Jinjiang 2020 Summer Gymnasiade, and the Shantou 2021 Asian Youth Games—were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 1998 Summer Gymnasiade · The 2013 Asian Youth Games · The 2014 Summer Youth Olympics · The 2020 Summer Gymnasiade · The 2021 Asian Youth Games

Unlike their counterparts in Guangdong and other coastal provinces, executives in Shanghai were less eager to accelerate local economic development in the 1980s. Deng Xiaoping was dissatisfied with this. During his Shanghai visit of early 1988, he ordered the municipal authorities to boost the GDP of their jurisdiction. The Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, Mayor Zhu Rongji, and their colleagues subsequently adopted a series of measures, including activating a bid to host the 1993 Summer Universiade. Buffalo of the US also submitted its application to the International

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_6

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University Sports Federation (FISU). Since Shanghai had absolute advantage over Buffalo in terms of financial ability and stadium standards, FISU President Primo Nebiolo, in early 1989, suggested the latter discontinue its application and pursue the 1995 Summer Universiade. The American city declined this suggestion. A few months later, hundreds of thousands of students occupied the Tiananmen Square and expressed their demand for China’s democratization. Unlike the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his followers, who sympathized with the students, Deng Xiaoping, Premier Li Peng, Mayor Chen Xitong, and other conservative officials came to the assessment that the occupation aimed to overthrow the Communist regime. They thus ordered troops to shoot the unarmed civilians in Tiananmen Square and on the streets of Beijing with live rounds. The brutal crackdown enraged both the West and the Chinese public. While the US decided to impose sanctions on China, Shanghai residents paralyzed the municipal roads and railways. Given these events, Nebiolo and his colleagues lost confidence in the Chinese city applicant. Buffalo was awarded the 1993 Summer Universiade (Chu 2021, pp. 105–108). After the bloody suppression, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang as the CCP General Secretary. Deng Xiaoping retired from office. Since speedy market liberalization was blamed for the Beijing protests in 1989, the Chinese authorities, with the endorsement of Jiang and Li Peng, adopted conservative measures that slowed economic development. Deng was angry about this. He not only made Beijing bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics, but also ordered the municipal government of Shanghai to accelerate the Reform and Opening Up. Subsequently, Shanghai put forward an application to host the 1997 Summer Universiade. FISU meanwhile had received the letters of Sicily and Palma de Mallorca about hosting the event. While the Chinese officials realized that FISU President Nebiolo personally favored the 1997 Summer Universiade to be held in Sicily instead of the other applicants, Beijing, Sydney, Manchester, Berlin, Tashkent, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Milan, and Brasilia were confirmed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the applicants for the 2000 Summer Olympics. To ensure that Nebiolo and his protégés in the international sporting community would support Beijing in the fierce Olympic bidding competition, the central government cancelled Shanghai’s bid and backed Sicily. The FISU President, who also presided

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over the IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations), was very pleased with this move and promised that he would vote for the Chinese capital if Milan’s pursuit of the 2000 Summer Olympics was discontinued (Chu 2021, pp. 133–134). In September 1991, Sicily and Palma de Mallorca were assigned to host the 1997 and 1999 Summer Universiade, respectively To compensate Shanghai, in early 1992, the Chinese central government chose it to host the 1993 East Asian Games. In the meantime, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and their colleagues learned that senior figures in the Chinese military had supported Deng Xiaoping’s proclamation that anyone who was reluctant to support the Reform and Opening Up must step down at once. They subsequently abolished any conservative philosophy surrounding their national policies and promised to push forward with economic development. They also attached great importance to Beijing’s ongoing bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. In 1993, the Shanghai municipal government staged the East Asian Games lavishly to accelerate local GDP growth and improve Beijing’s odds of success. Although President Juan Samaranch and his colleagues gave a thumbs-up to the municipal government for its brilliant organization of the twelve-day event, the Western politicians appealed to the IOC to disqualify Beijing from the competition to hold the 2000 Olympics because of China’s grim human rights record. Moreover, the environmental conditions, sports facilities, and internationalization standards of Beijing were viewed as inferior to those of Sydney. The IOC eventually awarded the games to the Australian city. While debate over whether Beijing should bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics was taking place, Shanghai was chosen by the Chinese central government to stage the 1997 National Games of China. The 1993 East Asian Games had also brought CNY 300 million to the municipal revenues (Chu 2021, p. 39). Consequently, the Shanghai authorities not only accelerated upgrades to stadia, renovated urban infrastructure, and improved the local environment, but also continued to pursue international multi-sports events. One of them was the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade, a multi-sports event governed by the International School Sport Federation (ISF).

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6.1

Shanghai and the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade

The ISF, in early 1994, received five applications to host the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade. They came from China, Israel, Ireland, Peru, and Slovakia. Since he was impressed with the city’s economic potential and its brilliant organization of the 1993 East Asian Games, the ISF President and his colleagues favored Shanghai (“Shanghai jiang,” 1994; “Benxiang weilai,” 1998). While the Shanghai municipal authorities were pleased with the victory, they were also chosen to work with Special Olympics China to stage the 1996 Asia Pacific Region Special Olympic Games (“Shanghai jiangban,” 1996; “Yatai diqu,” 1996). Meanwhile, the IOC was informed that no Chinese city would apply for the 2004 Summer Olympics (“No Chinese,” 1996). The Special Olympics China was tasked with managing the sporting affairs of people with intellectual disabilities in China. It was supervised by the China General Administration of Sport (CGAS), the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, which was under the charge of Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping’s elder son (“Woguo de,” 2007). Since Deng Pufang attached great importance to Special Olympics activities in China, President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and other senior officials in the Chinese central government gave their blessing to the 1996 Asia Pacific Region Special Olympic Games (“Jiang Zemin,” 1996). The Shanghai municipal government also handled the organizational tasks meticulously, including arranging for over ten thousand local students to help the participant athletes (“Wanming qingnian,” 1996). The Special Olympics President Eunice Kennedy Shriver thus complimented Shanghai on their celebration of this five-day international sporting event (“Zhongguo banshi,” 1996). Her words boosted the municipal authorities’ confidence that they could successfully hold the 1997 National Games of China and the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade. While the public were looking forward to the 1997 National Games of China, Jiang Zemin became the new supreme leader of China upon Deng Xiaoping’s death, Chen Xitong’s expulsion from the CCP, and Qiao Shi’s retirement. In addition, during the 1st Plenary Session of the 15th CCP Central Committee, a new Politburo Standing Committee was formed. The ranking of its seven members implied that Li Peng would be transferred to chair the National People’s Congress and Zhu Rongji would chair the Chinese central government. The changes meant that none of the people who endorsed the shooting of unarmed civilians in the summer

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of 1989 would direct China’s domestic executive tasks and international affairs from 1998 onward. Given this, Juan Samaranch, in his meeting with Jiang during the 1997 National Games, suggested China should apply for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Jiang did not reject Samaranch’s suggestion for three reasons. First, the Chinese authorities, in the 9th Five-Year Economic Plan, had decided to accelerate the pace of economic development between 1996 and 2000, so laying the foundation to double China’s 2000 GDP by 2010 (Li 2006). It was thought that holding the 2008 Summer Olympics would facilitate this ambitious goal to be realized. Second, to assist their business enterprises in making lucrative profits in the Chinese market, the governments of the US and other Western countries, in 1997, reduced criticism of Beijing’s poor human rights records, strengthened co-operation with their Chinese counterparts, and gave a green light to China’s engagement in the World Trade Organizations and other international mechanisms. It was believed that all the Western democracies would hold neutral positions or support China if it applied to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. Third, the IOC had chosen Athens to host the 2004 Summer Olympics. This decision increased the probability that an Asian city would stage the 2008 Summer Olympics. Samaranch was delighted with Jiang’s response. He also complimented Shanghai on its brilliant organization of the 1997 National Games of China in which around 7600 athletes had participated. These words inspired the Shanghai municipal government to bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics on behalf of China. While the Chinese authorities were informed of this, they also learned that the Beijing municipal government wanted to do so. The newly incumbent Premier Zhu Rongji subsequently stated that he personally favored Shanghai because the city had better urban infrastructure, traffic conditions, and air quality. Samaranch also thought that Shanghai should launch a 2008 Olympic bid because of its less politicized reputation (He 2008, pp. 292–293). Other members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee did not agree with Zhu. Jiang Zemin announced that the seven members would make the choice in November 1998. In view of this, Mayor Xu Kuangdi decided to use the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade, which was scheduled for October, to improve Shanghai’s chances. Compared with the Olympics, the Asian Games, the East Asian Games, the Universiade, or the National Games of China, the Summer Gymnasiade was a less-popular sporting event, because its participants were unknown secondary school students

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rather than famous professional athletes and its scale was small. To draw the attention of local residents and ensure that the number of the participant countries and regions would be more than any previous Summer Gymnasiade, the Shanghai municipal government issued a CNY 30 million lottery at home and carried out extensive promotions abroad (“Shijie zhongxuesheng,” 1998d). Therefore, the organization of the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade became a hot topic of conversation among Shanghai people. Over thirty countries and regions promised that their junior athletes would take part in the eight-day competition (“Shijie zhongxuesheng,” 1998c). Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (Li Peng, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, and Li Lanqing) were satisfied with the preparations of the Shanghai authorities. They meanwhile learned that Kaohsiung of Taiwan had become the frontrunner in the ongoing 2001 Summer Universiade bidding contest. Since he was re-elected as the Republic of China (ROC) President in 1996, Lee Teng-hui had intensified efforts to form the Taiwanese identity and discouraged local businesses from investing in the Chinese mainland. His administration had also proactively engaged in global affairs, contacted the countries that had normalized diplomatic ties with Beijing, and appealed to the United Nations to officially recognize Taiwan. The Chinese authorities deemed that Lee’s words and deeds breached the ‘One China’ principle (which insists that Taiwan is an indispensable part of China, rather than an independent sovereign state) and instead aimed to promote ‘One China One Taiwan.’ Therefore, it seemed necessary to obstruct Kaohsiung’s application to host the 2001 Summer Universidad and other Taiwanese exercises on international stage. Mayor Jia Qinglin realized that, if Beijing took part in the 2001 Summer Universiade bidding competition, it might not only defeat the Taiwanese city and obtain the hosting rights, but also increase its chance to win the internal competition with Shanghai. Subsequently, his administration put forward a hosting proposal to the Chinese central government for approval. Zhu was pleased about the Beijing municipal government’s move. He promised that he and his colleagues would give backing. After learning that Zhu had signed a letter supporting Beijing’s pursuit of the Summer Universiade and his deputy Li Lanqing had lobbied FISU Vice President George Killian in person (Chu 2021, p. 111), Mayor Xu Kuangdi thought that Shanghai must make the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade a great party to ensure that it would be chosen to bid for the

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2008 Summer Olympics on behalf of China. In September, he delivered a speech that called for the mobilization of all of Shanghai’s residents in support of the eight-day sporting event (“Yingjie shizhonghui,” 1998). His colleagues frequently inspected stadia, hotels, and other hospitality venues. The municipal government arranged for over ten thousand local students to take part in the opening and closing ceremonies, recruited ten thousand local residents as volunteers, and invited over three hundred internationally renowned referees and overseas journalists to judge the competitions and report on the Gymnasiade (“Shijie zhongxuesheng,” 1998a; Shijie zhongxuesheng, 1998b; Shizhongyun zuo, 1998; Guoji caipan, 1998). Since 650 young athletes from across the world would participate in the competitions (“Wudazhou qingshaonian,” 1998), the Ministry of Education and the CGAS thought that the Summer Gymnasiade was useful practice for the Chinese juvenile elite athletes, particularly those with the potential to take part in the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, to accumulate experience and enhance competitiveness.1 96 of them later were selected from secondary schools across China (“Zhongguo zhongxuesheng,” 1998). Their primary duty was to win as many medals as possible. The ISF President was amazed with the organization of Shanghai and proclaimed that the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade was the best event in the ISF history (“Zhongtilian mishuzhang,” 1998). The Chinese team won 41 gold and finished top of the medal table (“1998 nian,” 2019). While Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee were delighted with these accomplishments, they were informed that Beijing had replaced Kaohsiung as the frontrunner in the 2001 Summer Universiade bidding contest. In addition, since some pro-China IOC members supported Beijing’s pursuit of the 2008 Summer Olympics, Samaranch no longer backed Shanghai. Thus, the most powerful seven people in China agreed to let Beijing take up the bidding duties on November 12, 1998 (He 2008, pp. 293–296). Despite their disappointment, the Shanghai municipal authorities had no choice but to accept this decision. Beijing was also chosen by FISU to stage the 2001 Summer Universiade two weeks later. In July 2001, it won the rights to host the 2008 Summer Olympics by a landslide.

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6.2 Nanjing, the 2013 Asian Youth Games, and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics To ensure that the 2008 Summer Olympics would be an utter success, the Chinese central and Beijing municipal governments spent a total of USD 44 billion on upgrading urban infrastructure, improving the environment, building stadia and athletes’ accommodation, and modernizing hotels, restaurants, and other hospitality facilities. After witnessing the extravagant opening ceremony on August 8, 2008, and the sophisticated organization of the competitions over the next fifteen days, the IOC President Jacques Rogge acknowledged that the capital city of China had presented a truly exceptional gathering. Hu later concluded that the Olympics successfully boosted national pride. He also emphasized the importance of making China a strong sporting power (Hu Jintao, 2016, pp. 101–114). One year later, Party Secretary Zhu Shanlu, Mayor Ji Jianye, and other municipal leaders agreed that Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu province and the host of the 2005 National Games of China, should host the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics to help realize President Hu Jintao’s ambitious goals, extend the Olympic legacy in China, and push forward with local economic development. After obtaining the approval of the Jiangsu provincial and Chinese central governments, Nanjing sent an application letter to the IOC. Jacques Rogge and his colleagues meanwhile were informed that Guadalajara of Mexico and Poznan´ of Poland were entering the race. The IOC eventually passed the hosting rights to the Chinese city in February 2010 for two reasons. First, its executives were impressed by Nanjing’s holding of the National Games of China in 2005. Second, the economy of Europe and North America was seriously hit by the global financial tsunami but China still maintained 9% annual GDP growth. While Zhu Shanlu, Ji Jianye, and the other municipal leaders decided to extravagantly host the event and renovate their jurisdiction, the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) invited Nanjing to host the 2013 Asian Youth Games. They promptly accepted because the experience generated from staging the Asian Youth Games might strengthen Nanjing’s ability to celebrate the Summer Youth Olympics (Chu 2021, p. 43). A few months later, Former Wuxi Party Secretary Yang Weize, who had close personal ties with the Politburo Standing Committee member and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Secretary Zhou Yongkang as well

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as the Politburo member and the Organization Department Chief Li Yuanchao, succeeded Zhu as the Party Secretary of Nanjing In spring 2012, Chongqing Vice Mayor Wang Lijun met American officials at the US consulate in Chengdu without the approval of Beijing. The CCP General Office Director Ling Jihua’s son died in a mysterious traffic accident. Through investigating the two cases, the Chinese authorities found that (1) Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and his wife were respectively involved in bribery and murder, (2) Bo intended to stage a coup together with Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, and other senior Party and military figures, aiming to remove Hu Jintao’s successor Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders from office, and (3) Ling had been collaborating with Li Yuanchao to strengthen their political might and weaken Xi’s authority. Therefore, Bo was ousted from the CCP and was arrested with his wife. Xi, after his formal accession of power in November 2012, launched a nationwide anti-corruption and anti-extravagance campaign to boost his power and popularity and eliminate Bo’s allies and their protégés. The CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which was chaired by the Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Qishan, started investigations in central and local officials. Given his close ties with Zhou Yongkang and Li Yuanchao, rumors that Party Secretary Yang Weize would be investigated circled Nanjing in early 2013. To prevent himself from being purged, Yang decided to use the upcoming Asian Youth Games to advertise the justness of Xi Jinping’s anti-extravagance principle. The municipal authorities thus adopted a series of innovative measures that aimed to reduce the cost of the torch relay, the opening and closing ceremonies, the athletes’ living quarters, the competition arrangements, and the daily operations of the organizing committee. When the actual outlay on the event—CNY 700 million— was confirmed to be under budget, the Chinese state media extensively publicized Nanjing’s accomplishments. The OCA President Ahmad AlFahad Al-Sabah also gave a thumbs-up (Chu 2016, pp. 205–209). Shortly after Nanjing municipal authorities confirmed that thriftiness would also become the keyword of the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics, Beijing activated the bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics and the Nanjing Mayor Ji Jianye was arrested on charges of bribery. Yang subsequently described Ji as the ‘tumor of Nanjing’ and stressed his intolerance of corruption (“Yang Weize,” 2015). During the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, President Xi Jinping invited the IOC President Tomas Bach to attend the opening ceremony of

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the Nanjing 2014 Summer Olympics. He also publicized Beijing’s bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics and stressed his determination to make China a strong sporting power (“Xi Jinping,” 2014). Consequently, Yang Weize unveiled two proposals to the public: leveraging the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics to publicize Beijing’s bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics and bringing the 2019 Asian Games to Nanjing (Chu 2021, pp. 44 & 141). Meanwhile, since former Jiangsu Vice Governor Gao Dezheng was enraged by Yang’s ruthless comment about his son-in-law, Ji Jianye, he complained to the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of Yang’s involvement in corruption (“Yang Weize,” 2015). Wang Qishan and his colleagues realized that it was necessary to establish whether the current Nanjing Party Secretary was guilty. As Yang was under suspicion by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Xi Jinping and his administration did not endorse his two proposals (Chu 2021, pp. 44–45 & 141–142). Nevertheless, the municipal authorities won Bach’s acclaim because the innovative cost-saving measures adopted in Nanjing had brought the overall expenditure of the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics under budget and less than that of holding the 2010 Summer Youth Olympics (Chu 2016, p. 210). Five months after the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics was over, Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua were expelled from the CCP and investigated by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, respectively. Yang Weize’s involvement in bribery was also confirmed. In addition, although central and local officials did not in the end associate Nanjing’s brilliant celebration of the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics with Beijing’s bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics, Beijing still won the bidding competition.

6.3

Jinjiang and the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade

Aside from the successful removal of Xi’s political rivals and their protégés and the Chinese capital city’s victory in the Winter Olympics bidding contest, there was further good news for China in 2015: A GDP growth rate of 7% had been maintained and the Belt and Road initiative, a crosscontinental economic program with the aim of strengthening Beijing’s sharp power in the world, had been successfully launched. This made Xi believe that China was on track to become a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and a fully developed economy by 2049 and accomplish the national rejuvenation by the middle of the twenty-first century.

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However, polls indicated that Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party was leading the 2016 Taiwan presidential election race. She went on to defeat her rival Eric Chu of the Kuomintang by a landslide. In her victory speech, Tsai promised her supporters that Taiwan, in the next four years, would seek symmetrical relations with China and be more united and powerful, so all the fellow countrymen would not be humiliated anymore when displaying their national flag (“Cai Yingwen,” 2016). The reason for giving this high-profile pledge was more than just because of her anger toward a South Korean entertainment company which, a few days before the election, forced its seventeen-year-old Taiwanese performer Chou Tzu-yu to deliver an apology after she upraised the ROC flag at a show (Buckley and Ramzy 2016), but also due to the decadeslong international norm which had been extensively regarded by most of the Taiwanese as a discrimination against their homeland. Given Beijing’s uncompromising ‘One-China’ Policy, the IOC, in 1979, stipulated that the Taiwanese, when taking part in the Olympic Games, must adopt the title ‘Chinese Taipei’ and use newly designed symbols rather than Taiwan’s official name—the ROC—and its national flags and emblems. The Olympic Formula above was later extensively applied by both international governmental and non-governmental bodies as the way to settle the island’s participation in their activities. The prohibition against the Taiwanese to display the national flag of the ROC on public occasions outside their homeland became a globally-recognized norm. To avoid Taiwan being isolated in the international society, its authorities had no choice but to unconditionally comply with the norm since the 1980s. Moreover, after Lee Tung-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo’s ROC presidency in 1988, the de-Sinicization campaign was launched, so that a Taiwan-centric seed was successfully planted in the mind of the local young generations. President Chen Shui-bian then strictly followed Lee’s footstep during his tenure from 2000 to 2008. Consequently, some of the locals were proud of being identified as the Taiwanese and reluctant to echo Beijing’s ‘One-China’ policy. They were also indignant about the adherence to the Olympic Formula and the prohibition from displaying the ROC national symbols, because both of which were viewed as downgrading the sovereign status of Taiwan and disrespecting its independent identity. Apart from the pledge in her victory speech, Tsai also deliberately used the term ‘historical fact’ to replace ‘1992 Consensus’ in her inaugural address delivered on May 20, 2016 (“Beijing expresses,” 2016).

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Her aim was not only to implicitly display her political belief that Taiwan was an independent sovereign state rather than a part of China, but also to explicitly demonstrate her policy orientation, which would be different from that of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou. As a die-hard prounification figure, Ma of Kuomintang insisted upon the 1992 Consensus which stated that although Taiwan and the Mainland could interpret the meaning of ‘One China’ according to their own definition, they belonged to one China forever. Beijing appreciated Ma’s position, so the Chinese central and local governments favored Taiwan’s economy during his eight years in office. It also helped Taipei take part in the activities of international organizations and win the hosting rights of the 2017 Summer Universiade. Xi Jinping, in November 2015, even met Ma in Singapore. As expected, Tsai’s victory speech and inaugural address enraged Xi and his colleagues. The Chinese authorities thus adopted a number of retaliatory measures that included suspending the communication mechanism with their Taiwanese counterparts, slashing the number of Chinese citizens allowed to visit Taiwan, and obstructing the Taiwanese authorities from attending the International Civil Aviation Organisation annual assembly. To show the uncompromising stance toward China’s assaults and the determination to raise Taiwan’s international visibility and status, Tsai took initiative of phoning the US President-elect Donald Trump (“Trump speaks,” 2016). Her administration also supported Taipei’s organization of the 2017 Summer Universiade and helped Taoyuan with its 2020 Summer Gymnasiade bid, where it was in competition with Budapest of Hungary.2 Shortly after the phone call with Trump, Beijing pressured São Tomé and Príncipe to terminate diplomatic ties with Taiwan and exchange ambassadors with China (“China resumes,” 2016). It later successfully blocked Taiwanese officials from participating in the 2017 World Health Assembly (Horton 2017). The Chinese team was deliberately absent from both the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2017 Summer Universiade and most of its competitions (Chu 2019, pp. 140–141). However, since its proposals for holding the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade were deemed superior to those of Budapest, Taoyuan became the frontrunner in the bidding contest. While Chinese leaders frowned, the Fujian provincial government announced that Jinjiang intended to apply for the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade. The central government promptly gave approval. It also decided to give the city the best chance of winning the bidding contest

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with Taoyuan and Budapest. Jinjiang’s pursuit of the sporting event however was more than just a ploy to hamper its Taiwanese opponent. It was hoped the bid would demonstrate the Jinjiang municipal authorities’ ambitious transformation plan. In the mid-2000s, Jinjiang, a county-level city in Fujian province with a population of two million, became one of the largest running shoe producing cities in the world. Ten years later, its GDP exceeded CNY 170 billion. The municipal authorities were not content with the status quo. Instead, they decided to make their jurisdiction an internationally renowned sporting city (“Jinjiang: dazhao,” 2019). To this end, the city no longer merely advanced manufacturing technology and logistics management, but also engaged with the international sporting community by holding the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade and other athletic gatherings. In order to defeat their rivals, the Chinese authorities promised that Jinjiang would spend over EUR 210 million on stadium building and urban renovation, offer ERU 2 million to the ISF in royalties, and cover the flight, living, and dietary costs of the participant athletes. They also guaranteed that two hundred overseas secondary students recommended by the ISF would receive scholarships to study in China every year and over twenty Chinese enterprises would strengthen their co-operation with the ISF. The Taiwanese city candidate did not revise its proposal, which promised to spend over ERU 5.7 million on organizing the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade and provide ERU 1 million to the ISF in royalties. Nor did Budapest play a generous financial card to counter. Jinjiang was chosen to host the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade in October 2017 (Shenban 2020, 2017, pp. 9–11; “Zhengzhuban shizhongyun,” 2017). Four months later, Jinjiang also obtained the rights to stage the 2019, 2021, 2023, and 2025 University Football World Cups from FISU (“Lianxu sijie,” 2018). Given the satisfaction of the participant athletes with the stadia, accommodation, dietary, and competition arrangements, the FISU executives concluded that the 2019 tournament had been a resounding success (“University World,” n.a.). The compliment boosted the confidence of the Jinjiang officials that they would go on to host a magnificent Summer Gymnasiade in 2020 and transform their jurisdiction into a genuinely world-renowned sports city. The entire world was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020. Accordingly, the IOC and the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) rescheduled the 2020 Summer Olympics and the 2021 Club World Cup. The Chinese authorities also suspended

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all the international sports competitions within their jurisdiction. In July, the Jinjiang municipal government, which was busy containing the pandemic, learned that the ISF had decided to postpone the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade to 2021 (“ISF calendar,” 2020).

6.4

Shantou and the 2021 Asian Youth Games

Shortly after Beijing won the rights to host the 2022 Winter Olympics, the central government approved the intention of Hangzhou—the capital city of Zhejiang province—to pursue the 2022 Asian Games. President Xi Jinping took part in the lobbying as he believed this sporting event, like the 2022 Winter Olympics, would (1) facilitate China to become a strong sporting power and (2) demonstrate that under his tremendous ten years of leadership, China had become a moderately prosperous society. In September 2015, Hangzhou was awarded the hosting rights. Two years later, Xi had a chance to meet with the OCA President Ahmad Fahad Al-Sabah. Aside from commending Al-Sabah for his decades-long contribution to international sporting affairs, he promised that his administration would support Hangzhou to stage a successful Asian Games in 2022 and continue to back the work of the OCA in managing the sporting affairs of Asia (“Xi Jinping,” 2017b). Moreover, at the 19th CCP National Congress and many other official occasions during 2017, Xi repeatedly emphasized that accelerating the pace of making China a strong sporting power was key to the national rejuvenation (Xi 2017; “Xi Jinping,” 2017a). Given these words, the central government intensified efforts to supervise the Hangzhou municipal government’s preparations for the 2022 Asian Games and assist the municipal government of Sanya, a seaside resort in Hainan province, to bid for the 2020 Asian Beach Games. Sanya duly won the hosting rights in August 2018. The central government was not complacent about its success. It decided to bring even more OCA events to China. While the urban renovation, stadium building, and environment improvement projects began in Sanya, Xi Jinping repeatedly reminded the authorities of Guangdong, the wealthiest province in the country, that they must complete two important tasks. First, although seven cities in the Pearl River Delta region were working with Hong Kong and Macao to build the Greater Bay Area—whose economic potential was estimated

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to be able to surpass those of the bay areas in the US and Japan, Guangdong needed to narrow the income gap between the Pearl River Delta region and other parts of the province. This would ensure that China would successfully become a moderately prosperous society by 2020. Second, to facilitate the national rejuvenation, the provincial authorities needed to consolidate ties with overseas Chinese, particularly those whose ancestors were from Guangdong, and strengthen the allegiance of these people toward the Communist regime (“Xi Jinping,” 2018a; “Xi Jinping,” 2018b). In the meantime, Shantou, a Chiuchowese-speaking city on the eastern coast of Guangdong province, triggered a bid for the 2021 Asian Youth Games. Initially, the OCA passed the rights to stage the 2017 Asian Youth Games and the 2021 Asian Youth Games to Hambantota of Sri Lanka and Surabaya of Indonesia. Hambantota’s award however was overturned because the autonomy of the National Olympic Committee of Sri Lanka was destroyed by the Sri Lankan government. Surabaya also discontinued its organization of the 2021 Asian Youth Games after being assigned to hold the 2018 Asian Games (“Games-OCA,” 2017; Butler 2016). The OCA had no choice but to cancel the 2017 Asian Youth Games. It also called for cities to bid for the 2021 Asian Youth Games. The central government endorsed Shantou’s application for two reasons. First, winning the 2021 Asian Youth Games would give China three consecutive OCA-governed sporting mega-events from 2020 to 2022. This would show China steadfastly supporting the work of the international sporting organization, enhance Beijing’s influence in the Asian sporting community, and aid China’s transformation into a strong sporting power. Second, the holding of the 2021 Asian Youth Games could be leveraged to accelerate Shantou’s urban renovation, economic development, and international engagement. This would facilitate Guangdong to narrow the socioeconomic gap between its eastern part and its Pearl River Delta region and reinforce the allegiance of overseas Chiuchowese-speaking people to the Communist regime. Shantou was not challenged by any Asian cities for the 2021 Asian Youth Games. It became the latest Chinese city to be chosen to stage an OCA-governed sporting mega-event in March 2019.3 The municipal government subsequently spent CNY 4.4 billion on building a brandnew sports complex that included an outdoor stadium with a seating capacity of 22000, an indoor gymnasium with a seating capacity of 8000, and a 17000 square meter training ground. This complex would stage

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the opening and closing ceremonies of the event, its track and field competitions, and its gymnastics events. The municipal government also commenced upgrading its urban infrastructure, improving the environment, and renovating the existing sports venues (“Disanjie yaqinghui,” 2019). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the IOC and FIFA postponed their gatherings, which were initially scheduled to be staged in 2020 and 2021. The OCA also suspended the 3rd Asian Beach Games in Sanya. The plan to celebrate the 3rd Asian Youth Games in November 2021 remained unchanged because the pandemic did not bring Shantou’s preparations to a halt (Pavitt 2020; “Shantou 2021,” 2020).

6.5

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed five multi-sports events in which only youth athletes participated—Shanghai’s holding of the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade, Nanjing’s holding of the 2013 Asian Youth Games and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics, Jinjiang’s bid for and organization of the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade, and Shantou’s bid for and organization of the 2021 Asian Youth Games. The findings reveal that the competitions were leveraged by Chinese central and local authorities to boost local economic development and international status, aid the pursuit of more prestigious sporting events, defend the One China principle and national integrity, promote Xi Jinping’s ruling principles, and push forward China to become a moderately prosperous society.

Notes 1. One of them is gymnast Xing Aowei. He won five gold medals in the 1998 Gymnasiade. Two years later, he won a gold medal in the Sydney Olympics. 2. For instance, the ROC Vice President Chen Chien-jen in person lobbied the ISF senior executives to support Taoyuan (“Chen Jianren,” 2016). 3. China, the most athletically competitive country in Asia, was chosen to host the following nine OCA-governed multi-sports events between 1980 and 2018: the 1990 Asian Games (Beijing), the 1996 Asian Winter Games (Harbin), the 2007 Asian Winter Games (Changchun), the 2007 Asian Indoor Games (Macao), the 2010 Asian Games (Guangzhou), the 2012 Asian Beach Games (Haiyang), the 2013 Asian Youth Games (Nanjing), the 2022 Asian Games (Hangzhou), and the 2020 Asian Beach Games (Sanya).

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CHAPTER 7

Leveraging Sporting Events for Firefighters, Police Officers, and Soldiers

Abstract This chapter explores how the three multi-sports events hosted in China since 2000 for athletes who were also firefighters, police officers, or soldiers—the Hong Kong 2006 World Firefighters Games, the Chengdu 2019 World Police and Fire Games, and the Wuhan 2019 Military World Games—were leveraged by the central and local authorities. Keywords The 2006 World Firefighters Games · The 2019 World Police and Fire Games · The 2019 Military World Games

In August 2000, Beijing was shortlisted by the IOC as one of the five city candidates to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. President Jiang Zemin subsequently delivered a speech, ordering all Chinese nationals to back the capital city in the fierce bidding competition, to improve its chances of success. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa echoed this sentiment on behalf of the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). Supporting Beijing’s application to host the 2008 Summer Olympics thus became an important duty of his colleagues from then until July 2001 (Chu 2021, pp. 63–65). Since it is entitled to a high degree of autonomy under the One Country Two Systems principle, Hong Kong theoretically does not need © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_7

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to take part in affairs under the Chinese state’s charge. Tung however thought that engagement in Beijing’s Olympics pursuit would kill two birds with one stone. Since Hong Kong’s return to China in July 1997, Tung had been constantly accused of being incompetent to lead the SAR government. Even so, he did not intend to step down, but instead decided to preside over the local executive for another five years from 2002. Taking the initiative in backing Beijing might be rewarded with Jiang Zemin’s blessing for the renewal of his position. Tung also thought that if Beijing emerged victorious from the bidding process, Hong Kong might stage one or two 2008 Summer Olympics sports programs. This was able to boost the local economy and enhance its internationalization and competitiveness. Beijing successfully won the rights to host the 2008 Summer Olympics by a landslide in July 2001. A few months later, Jiang Zemin gave his blessings to Tung Chee-hwa’s term extension. While the public realized that Tung would continue leading the Hong Kong executive, the central government brought an end to talk that Hong Kong might in some way co-host the 2008 Summer Olympics with Beijing. The SAR government was left with no choice but to seek the hosting of other international sporting events. In 2002, it endorsed the application of the Hong Kong Fire Service Department and the Hong Kong Fire Protection Association to host the 2006 World Firefighters Games (“Gangduo xiaofang,” 2004). Cities in Spain, Italy, the US, and Japan also expressed interest in staging the gathering.

7.1 Hong Kong and the 2006 World Firefighters Games Shortly after Tung Chee-hwa began his new contract as the Chief Executive in July 2002, a SAR government proposal to enact a national security law was unveiled. Although the response of Hong Kong public to this move was highly divided, the government did not extend the consultation period or make any major revisions to the bill. In addition, given Tung and his administration’s failure to contain the SARS outbreak, the economy of Hong Kong slumped dramatically and hundreds of residents died. Consequently, over half a million people attended a massive rally on July 1, 2003, the sixth anniversary of the handover.1 The demonstrators asked Tung and his colleagues to resign and the SAR government to cancel the enactment proposal. They also expressed demands for the

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implementation of universal suffrage when selecting the Chief Executive and forming the legislature. Tung decided to ignore the protestors, but some pro-government lawmakers choose not to stand with him. Given this, the government’s bill was unable to pass in the legislature. Tung thus shelved the proposal to enact the national security law indefinitely. His colleagues who had taken charge of the matter resigned. The economic slowdown and political disharmony affected international confidence in the business environment of Hong Kong. It also narrowed the chance of the city winning the 2006 World Firefighters Games. The Chinese central government deemed that it was necessary to support Hong Kong to boost the local economy and restore international confidence. Its subordinate units subsequently followed the newly signed Close Economic Partnership Agreement, encouraging Chinese enterprises to raise funds in, and Chinese citizens to travel to, Hong Kong. They also supported the SAR to apply to host the 2009 East Asian Games, the 2005 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, and the 2006 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Telecom World (Chu 2019, pp. 35–36 & 70–71). Meanwhile, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the legislative body of China, began interpreting the Basic Law of Hong Kong, to tighten the Chinese authorities’ grip over the local political reform. The demands for implementing universal suffrage to select the Chief Executive and form the legislature were rejected. The SAR was instead permitted to use a government-modified method to select the Chief Executive in 2007 and form the legislature in 2008 (Wang 2017, pp. 193–194). Since the NPC Standing Committee’s interpretation of the Basic Law was condemned as a breach of the One Country Two Systems principle, over two hundred thousand people took part in protests on July 1, 2004.2 Although much political disharmony remained, the WTO, the ITU, and the East Asian Games Association were impressed with Hong Kong’s hospitality and the Chinese government’s endorsements. The city was awarded the rights to host the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference, the 2006 ITU Telecom World, and the 2009 East Asian Games. While the SAR government and local public were pleased with this, the Hong Kong firefighters gave an outstanding performance in the competitions of the 2004 World Firefighters Games. These accomplishments led the World Firefighters Games WA Inc to let Hong Kong host the 2006 World Firefighters Games (“Xiaofang aoyun,” 2004). To ensure that the holding of

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this eight-day international event would not become an unpopular exercise, the SAR government promised that it would not use public money to handle the organization and that it would devote much effort over the following two years to attracting the participation of more than five thousand firefighters from overseas (“Xiaofang aoyunhui,” 2004). While the Hong Kong Fire Service Department and the Hong Kong Fire Protection Association started fundraising and promotional activities at home and abroad, China’s incompetent surrounding to quarantine foreign horses for international competitions was confirmed. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and his colleagues subsequently submitted Hong Kong’s plans to host the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian events to the Chinese central government for approval. The central government, at that time, thought that aside from boosting the local economy, it was also necessary to deepen the SAR’s integration with the Chinese mainland and intensify its citizens’ patriotism. Letting Hong Kong co-host the Olympics with Beijing was believed to be able to serve this purpose, so the application of the SAR was approved. The IOC later endorsed Hong Kong as host of the Olympic equestrian events (Chu 2019, pp. 71–72). To ensure that the SAR government’s modified methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and forming the legislature in 2008 would gain the support of the public, the Chinese authorities removed Tung Chee-hwa from office and nominated his deputy, Donald Tsang, to chair the SAR executive. Tung’s resignation in March 2005 did ease tensions between the SAR government and society. On July 1, no more than 21000 people joined the protests.3 Nevertheless, due to the opposition of pro-democracy lawmakers, the SAR government’s modified methods of selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and forming the legislature in 2008 were rejected by the legislature in December 2005 (Wang 2017, pp. 195–200). While both the central and SAR governments were disappointed at this unpleasant result, the international society voiced its recognition of Hong Kong’s outstanding hosting of the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference (Chu 2019, pp. 38–39). Tsang and his colleagues subsequently decided to continue with the 2006 World Firefighters Games, the 2006 Telecom World, the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian events, and the 2009 East Asian Games, so boosting Hong Kong’s international reputation, bolstering the confidence of local residents under the One Country Two Systems principle, and helping the government’s next round of the political reform proposals to be passed in the legislature. The Chinese

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authorities meanwhile announced that they would send Guangdong firefighters with professional athletic skills to participate in the 2006 World Firefighters Games as a display of their full support to the SAR (“Shijie xiaofang,” 2006a). In February 2006, the locals witnessed an eight-day spectacular event featuring three thousand firefighters from 37 countries and regions together with over five thousand overseas tourists and thrilled to see the Hong Kong delegation ranked top of the medal table. They also learned that of HKD 11 million raised by the government, only HKD 8 million had been spent on the organization of the games and that the surplus would be donated to local charities (“Shijie xiaofang,” 2006b). The 2006 World Firefighters Games thus was concluded as a success. Ten months later, over one hundred thousand people spent around HKD 900 million at the five-day 2006 ITU Telecom World (Chu 2019, p. 40). These accomplishments, together with the arrival of a vast number of Chinese investors and tourists in 2006, boosted the economy of the SAR, raised its international reputation, restored the confidence of the public in the One Country Two Systems principle, and helped Donald Tsang to get the Chief Executive contract renewed. They also laid the foundation for the city to successfully stage the Olympic equestrian events in August 2008 and the East Asian Games in November 2009. Shortly after he started his second contract term as the Chief Executive in July 2007, Donald Tsang activated another round of political reform. The NPC Standing Committee subsequently permitted the SAR to select the Chief Executive and form the legislature in 2012 using the government-modified methods as well as select the Chief Executive and form the legislature since 2017 using universal suffrage (Wang 2017, pp. 200–205). Over the next two years, Hong Kong’s flawless celebrations of the Olympic equestrian events and the East Asian Games successfully boosted local residents’ allegiance toward China and their confidence in the One Country Two Systems principle (Chu 2019, pp. 74–75). However, the popularity of Tsang dropped significantly because prodemocracy lawmakers were strongly dissatisfied with the modified method of choosing the Chief Executive and forming the legislature in 2012 that had been proposed by the SAR government. The Chinese government decided to work with the SAR government toward political reform. Their collaboration, despite being criticized for undeniably breaching the One Country Two Systems principle, successfully achieved compromise with some pro-democracy lawmakers. The

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SAR government’s modified method of selecting the Chief Executive and forming the legislature in 2012 was passed by the legislature in 2010 (Wang 2017, pp. 212–223). Two years later, Leung Chun-ying succeeded Donald Tsang as the Chief Executive and the 70-member 2012–2016 Hong Kong legislature was formed.

7.2 Chengdu and the 2019 World Police and Fire Games On May 12, 2008, an earthquake with a magnitude of over 8.0 hit Wenchuan County and its neighboring regions in Sichuan, a populous province in southwest China. The police and fire services of Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan, rushed to the affected areas immediately. Their operations, together with the efforts devoted by parties from the other parts of China, were later praised by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon and other international figures (French 2008). Three months later, the 2008 Summer Olympics opened in Beijing. The IOC President Jacques Rogge, after witnessing the outstanding organization, admitted that the sixteen-day event had been truly extraordinary. The Chinese team also topped the Olympic medal table. President Hu Jintao thus underscored the determination to build China into a strong sporting power (Hu Jintao, 2016, pp. 101–114). Over the next two years, Chinese cities proactively pursued the rights to host international sporting events. With the support of both Chinese and overseas donations, reconstruction projects in the disaster-hit areas of Sichuan progressed smoothly. The Chengdu municipal government thus decided to compete with Montreal and Toronto for the rights to host the 2017 World Police and Fire Games. The Sichuan provincial government also expressed interest in vying with Tianjin, Hunan, Hubei, and Shaanxi for the rights to host the 2017 National Games of China. Tianjin had an absolute advantage over its rivals in terms of economic achievement and experience of holding sporting mega-events. It thus was assigned by the Chinese central government to stage the 2017 National Games of China (“Tianjin Sichuan,” 2011; “Tianjin huo,” 2017). This inevitably affected the confidence of the California Police Athletic Federation (CPAF) executives in Chengdu, although they had been impressed by the efforts of Chengdu firefighters in rebuilding Wenchuan and other parts of Sichuan (“Quanli zhichi,” 2011). Meanwhile, the Toronto City

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Council announced that it would not support a bid to hold the international sporting event for financial reasons. CPAF thus awarded the hosting rights to Montreal.4 Chengdu was not discouraged by the elimination. In 2012, its municipal government activated a bid to stage the 2019 World Police and Fire Games. CPAF also received an application from Rotterdam. While Chengdu was thinking of ways to improve its chances of success in the contest, the Sichuan officials’ mismanagement of the cash donations to rebuild areas hit by the Wenchuan earthquake was uncovered (Chu 2019, p. 43). The Chengdu municipal government promptly ceased publicizing the achievements of Sichuan’s reconstruction during the bidding activities and switched to promoting the allure of its traditional local culture. This strategy successfully led CPAF to decide that the 2019 World Police and Fire Games should be held in China, rather than in Europe.5 Chengdu won the competition in July 2013. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping energetically handled the nationwide anti-corruption campaign, formed central leading groups, re-organized the military, and expanded surveillance mechanisms. He also launched the Belt and Road initiative. As previously noted, these measures helped remove Xi’s rivals from the political stage, weakened the power of his colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee, strengthened the state authorities’ grip on the public, and intensified Beijing’s sharp power around the globe. The President however thought that they were not enough to consolidate his authority within China and realize China’s supremacy in the global arena. Through the amendment of the Chinese constitution in 2018, Xi became entitled to serve as Chinese President indefinitely. His ‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era’ became the guiding principles of the Chinese central and local governments to formulate policies. In February 2018, Xi went to Sichuan ordering the local officials to work strictly according to the Xi Jinping Thought (“Xi Jinping,” 2018). To echo the leader’s global ambitions, Mayor Luo Qiang decided to forge Chengdu into the ‘World City of Sporting Events’ (Luo 2018, 2019). From November 2018 to May 2019, the city successfully obtained the rights to host the 2021 Summer Universiade, the 2022 ITTF (International Table Tennis Federation) World Championships, and the 2025 World Games. Meanwhile, to ensure the eight-day World Police and Fire Games would be an unqualified success in August 2019, Luo’s colleagues were sent to Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen to learn from

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their experience of organizing the 2008 Summer Olympics, the 2022 Winter Olympics, the 2010 Asian Games, and the 2011 Summer Universiade (“Chengdu gains,” 2019). Thousands of Chengdu residents were mobilized to take part in the promotional activities. Despite Chengdu’s tremendous efforts to prepare for the event, none of the Chinese national leaders attended its opening ceremony. The state media seldom reported the preparation. However, stories about the August 8 opening ceremony were extensively covered. This was not due to the city’s sophisticated organization of this two-hour spectacular show, instead because of the spectators’ warm welcome and deep support for the police athletes from Hong Kong—representatives of the police force that had played a controversial role in the anti-extradition movement. After 2014, the antipathy of the Hong Kong people toward Beijing kept rising. It was because Xi and his administration ‘upheld their comprehensive jurisdiction over the political affairs of the SAR, blocked pro-democracy figures from taking part in the 2017 Chief Executive election, took people to the Chinese mainland from Hong Kong in a secretive way, and downplayed the practical significance of the SinoBritish Joint Declaration – which establishes the city’s entitlement to a high degree of autonomy under the One Country Two Systems principle’ (Chu 2020, pp. 322–324). Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying, his successor Carrie Lam, and their subordinates in the SAR government stood firmly with Beijing rather than the people they represented. In March 2019, the SAR government proposed a law which allowed any individual physically in Hong Kong to be extradited to China or Taiwan for trial if requested. Despite the strong opposition of the Hong Kong public, Chief Executive Carrie Lam retained a plan to complete the legislation on June 12. Tens of thousands of young people occupied Admiralty on the morning of June 12, hindering the lawmakers from entering the legislature building. The chairman of the legislature subsequently called off the meeting. The young protestors however did not leave. In the afternoon, the government framed the occupation as a riot and the police dispersed the crowd and arrested participants with the excessive use of tear gas, rubber bullets, bean bag rounds, and physical force (“Police violence,” 2019). Anger caused by the characterization of the occupation as a riot and by the subsequent actions of the police led over two million people to peacefully take part in a rally on June 16. They demanded Lam resign. They also demanded the government cancel the process of making the

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proposal law at once (the government had suspended enactment of the law one day earlier), retract the characterization of the June 12 gathering as riot, stop prosecuting the arrested participants, and investigate the legal liability of the police officers who had taken part in the dispersal of the crowd. Lam promptly delivered an apology to the public but no concrete action regarding the protestors’ demands was afterward taken. In the ensuing protests of July and August (most of which had not obtained the approval of the police), the participants demanded the rights to select the Chief Executive by genuine universal suffrage. Some radical young people even vandalized public property, defaced Chinese national symbols, and expressed their wish for the independence of Hong Kong (Mahtani 2019). In response, the police force escalated its use of violence to arrest protestors. It also flagrantly intruded onto private premises without search warrants, ignored triad members who indiscriminately attacked unarmed civilians, and insulted journalists and first-aiders (“Jingshanchuang wuyuan,” 2019; Kuo and Yu 2019; Mann 2019). While the complaints over the brutality and misconduct of the police were raised, the Chinese authorities deemed that the demands and actions of the protestors had characteristics of the color revolutions and showed signs of terrorism (Chung and Cheung 2019; Zhang et al. 2019). The state media thus mobilized the Chinese public to condemn the protests and support the police. Reports of Chengdu residents cheering the Hong Kong police in the opening ceremony of the World Police and Fire Games served their purpose. Overseas guests did not intend to mix sport with politics so no comment about the Chengdu residents’ cheer for the Hong Kong police was given. The athletes’ cheerfulness in the subsequent competitions led the CPAF senior executives and the Rotterdam 2021 World Police and Fire Games organizing committee members to praise Chengdu for its brilliant organization (“Chengdu kaimushi,” 2019; “Woxiangwei Chengdu,” 2019). This made the municipal government confident that they could flawlessly present the Summer Universiade, the ITTF World Championships, and the World Games over the next six years and truly build the World City of Sporting Events.6

7.3

Wuhan and the 2019 Military World Games

In 2011, Mayor Tang Liangzhi and his administration proposed to bring a future Military World Games to Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province

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that boasted a population of over eleven million (“Dianzan Wuhan,” 2016), so echoing President Hu Jintao’s determination to build China into a strong sporting power and replicating Beijing and Guangzhou’s experience of using a sporting mega-event to accelerate urban development. This proposal was endorsed by the Hubei provincial authorities. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose affairs were then within the purview of the CCP Central Military Commission Vice Presidents Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, however refused to give immediate approval. While Hubei provincial and Wuhan municipal officials were thinking of strategies to persuade the PLA leaders, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu as the leader of the CCP, the head of the Chinese state, and the chief commander of the Chinese military. To consolidate power, Xi launched the nationwide anti-corruption campaign shortly after he took office. Xu Caihou later was confirmed to be involved in a bribery scandal. An investigation into whether Guo Boxiong accepted bribes also commenced. These disgraces severely affected the image of the PLA as the force that guarded the ruling legitimacy of the CCP. Moreover, Xi, unlike his predecessors, held a hard-line and assertive attitude regarding territorial disputes with China’s neighbors—displaying his determination to defend national integrity and forge China’s global supremacy. The officers and soldiers of the PLA thus were repeatedly ordered to improve their loyalty to the CCP, strengthen their discipline, and sharpen their capabilities to fight and win wars (“Xi Jinping,” 2013). While the measures to improve the PLA were being implemented, Colonel Abdulhakim Al-Shino, President of the International Military Sports Council (CISM), was invited to visit Nanjing by the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics organizing committee. After watching the opening and closing ceremonies and the eight days of competitions, he deemed that the 2019 Military World Games should be staged in China (“Juntihui zaokanshang,” 2015). Since the successful holding of the Military World Games could be leveraged to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Communist regime and showcase the heroic and mighty Chinese military under his leadership, Xi Jinping ordered the PLA and the Chinese central government to work with Wuhan in the application (“Guofangbu: diqijie,” 2018). CISM received Wuhan’s application documents in February 2015. Wuhan was the only city to bid to host the 2019 Military World Games but its municipal government, with the full support of the PLA,

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the Chinese central government, and the Hubei provincial government, keenly promoted its plans to CISM. Colonel Abdulhakim Al-Shino and his colleagues were extremely impressed by these efforts. The Chinese city was confirmed as host in May 2015. To guarantee that the 2019 Military World Games would successfully display the prosperity of China after seventy years of the Communist rule, and the mighty and heroic PLA under his tremendous leadership, Xi Jinping assigned a Vice Premier and a Central Military Commission Vice President to chair the organizational tasks (“Diqijie shijie,” 2017a). The Wuhan municipal authorities drew up a budget of CNY 140 billion to upgrade infrastructure, improve the environment, and build stadia (“Diqijie shijie,” 2017b). While the central and local authorities were busy handling their duty tasks, Xi, who was just entitled to serve as the Chinese President with no time limits by amending the constitution, went to Wuhan and met with Indian Premier Narendra Modi. Since his guest was favorably impressed with the city, Xi decided to attend the opening ceremony of the 2019 Military World Games. He also hoped that the Chinese delegation would finish at the top of the medal table. The central government and the PLA realized that this was no mean feat.7 Therefore, with the assistance of the Chinese General Administration of Sport, a ministry of the central government with the duty to manage the sporting affairs of the country, the PLA carefully selected over 550 soldier athletes—some of them were members of Chinese national teams—to take part in all the competitions of the 2019 Military World Games except golf (“Wojun tiyu,” 2019). Their prime duty was to win as many gold medals as possible. In the first week of October 2019, a massive parade was held in Tiananmen Square to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Communist regime. The Chinese central and local authorities also organized a series of grand ceremonial activities. The international media covered not only these events, but also the ongoing US-China trade war and the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests. Accusing Beijing of decades of unfair trade practices with the US, President Donald Trump imposed 25% tariffs on USD 50 billion worth of Chinese products and 10% tariffs on USD 200 billion worth of Chinese products as a penalty. Xi promptly put tariffs on USD 110 billion worth of the American goods in retaliation. To ensure that the US would gain the upper hand in the trade battle, Trump continued imposing tariffs on Chinese products. His administration also (1) asked the Canadian authorities to extradite Meng

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Wangzhou, the Chief Financial Officer of the Chinese telecommunication dragonhead Huawei, to the US, (2) banned American companies from working with Chinese companies that specialized in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and digital surveillance, and (3) labelled China a currency manipulator (Chu 2021, p. 156). Xi and his administration could not adopt effective measures to counter the American assaults. Furthermore, despite the SAR government’s cancelation of the extradition bill in September 2019, Chief Executive Carrie Lam, with the support of Beijing, had declined to meet the other demands of the Hong Kong public. Radical protestors continued vandalizing public property and calling for the independence of Hong Kong. In response, the police force shot at protestors with live rounds. Lam activated emergence powers to ban mask wearing during protests (“As it,” 2019; “Hong Kong,” 2019). The inferior position in the trade war, the brutality of the Hong Kong police, and the controversial measures the SAR government had used to deal with the protests severely affected the image of Xi and his administration and tainted the 70th anniversary celebrations of the Communist regime. Wuhan’s flawless holding of the Military World Games and the Chinese delegation’s rich haul of medals thus became to be viewed as of vital importance. While Xi, the CISM senior officials, and the other overseas guests had very much enjoyed the grand performances in the opening ceremony and over nine thousand participant athletes from over one hundred countries and regions had given their thumbs-up to the stadia and hospitality of Wuhan, the Russian, French, Austrian, Polish, and Swiss runners collectively raised a complaint about their Chinese rivals’ cheating in both the men’s and women’s middle-distance orienteering competitions. The judges later confirmed that the Chinese runners had completed their cross-country races with illegal help from spectators and making use of course markings and small paths only they were aware of, rather than with a map and compass. Consequently, the International Orienteering Federation (IOF) and CISM disqualified the Chinese runners, banned them from other orienteering competitions, and rejected their appeals (Kuo 2019; Stanway and Anantharaman 2019; Westcott 2019). After the penalty was given, the IOF delivered a statement that accused the Chinese runners of misconduct (“Swiss and,” 2019). The international media extensively reported the story. Since the cheating blemished Wuhan’s Military World Games and the image of the Chinese military

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under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the state media of China did not unveil a single word about it. Expulsion from the orienteering competitions did not damage the other PLA athletes’ morale. The Chinese team eventually won 133 gold, 64 silver, and 42 bronze in the other competitions, finishing top of the medal table. The number of gold medals won by Chinese athletes exceeded the sum of those won by their Russian, Brazilian, French, Polish, and German counterparts.8 Moreover, given its extravagant urban renovation, world-class stadia, and meticulous organization with the PLA and the Chinese central government, Wuhan had exhibited an ambition to surpass Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese first-tier metropolises. It had also demonstrated an ability to hold the Summer Olympics (“Yaoban jiu,” 2019). Xi Jinping, who was still distracted by the Sino-American trade war and the Hong Kong protests, thus commended the Chinese medallists and their coaches. He also stressed that the 2019 Military World Games was an utter success (“Xi Jinping,” 2019; “Zhongyang junwei,” 2019). In spring 2020, the entire world was severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, a novel coronavirus which was first found in Wuhan. American officials and politicians subsequently referred to the coronavirus as the ‘Wuhan virus’ or ‘China virus’ even during official occasions (Rogers 2020; Vazquez and Klein 2020). Xi and his colleagues were enraged by this. The Chinese state media extensively propagandized that although the virus had first been found in Wuhan, it did not necessarily mean that China was the source (Deng 2020). A Chinese diplomat even promoted a conspiracy that American soldiers might have brought the novel coronavirus to Wuhan under cover of the 2019 Military World Games (Westcott and Jiang 2020). This led the sporting event to be talked about in the international society. It also prompted Donald Trump and his administration to be determinedly aggressive in their countering of the Communist regime.

7.4

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the sporting events hosted in China for athletes who were also firefighters, police officers, or soldiers. While the 2006 World Firefighters Games was used to boost the economy of posthandover Hong Kong and enhance the confidence of local people and international society in the One Country Two Systems principle, the 2019 World Police and Firefighters Games was leveraged to promote the revitalization of Sichuan after the 2008 earthquake, highlight Chengdu’s

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capability to become the World City of Sporting Events, and confirm the Chinese authorities’ firm support of the Hong Kong police, who were playing a controversial role in the globally observed anti-extradition protests. The 2019 Military World Games was a stage to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Communist regime and display a mighty and heroic image of the PLA under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Six months after its completion, the 2019 Military World Games was even used by the Chinese authorities against their American counterparts under the COVID-19 pandemic.

Notes 1. Over a half million was the figure provided by the organizer of the protest. The police however stated that the number of the protestors was at least 350,000 (“Touding lieri,” 2003). 2. The organizer claimed that over 530000 people participated in the protest. The police however stated that only 200000 took part (“53 wan,” 2004). 3. The organizer claimed that 21000 people joined the protest. The police however stated that only 17000 people took part (“Jinnian qiyi,” 2005). 4. Due to the boycott of local firefighters, Montreal pulled out of hosting the 2017 World Police and Fire Games in 2016. CPAF subsequently awarded the competition to Los Angeles (“Montreal pulls,” 2016). 5. From 1985 to 2017, all seventeen World Police and Fire Games were held in cities in North America, Western Europe, and Australasia. 6. In November 2020, Chengdu’s plan to bid for the 2032 Summer Olympics with Chongqing was unveiled to the public (Sun 2020). 7. The first reason was about the athletic competitiveness of the Chinese soldiers. Since it was weaker than the athletic competitiveness of their Russian and Brazilian rivals, Chinese delegations failed to top the 2007, 2011, and 2015 Military World Games medal tables. The other reason concerned navy swimmer Ning Zetao. After winning gold medals in the 2014 Asian Games, the 2015 FINA World Championships, the 2014 CISM World Military Swimming and Lifesaving Championships, and the 2015 Military World Games, Ning no longer accepted high-intensity training. Instead, he zealously built up a celebrity status, concentrated on earning advertising money, and developed businesses. Not surprisingly, he was excluded from the Chinese team (Goh and Rutherford 2017). It was believed that this case was the tip of an iceberg in the Chinese elite sports circles. 8. The Russian, Brazilian, French, Polish, and German delegations were respectively ranked in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th, and 6th place in the medal tally with 51, 21, 13, 11, and 10 gold (“Diqijie shijie,” 2019).

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Mahtani, S. (2019, July 21). Hong Kong protestors outmaneuver police, vandalize Chinese Liaison Office. Washington Post. https://www.washingto npost.com/world/asia_pacific/police-dramatically-increase-security-in-hongkong-as-protests-continue-unabated/2019/07/21/1de14dd2-aafa-11e98733-48c87235f396_story.html. Mann, D. (2019, December 7). International humanitarian norms are violated in Hong Kong. The Lancet, 394(10214), 2067–2068. Montreal pulls out of 2017 World Police and Fire Games after unions promise boycott. (2016, March 20). National Post. https://nationalpost.com/news/ canada/montreal-pulls-out-of-2017-world-police-and-fire-games-after-uni ons-promise-boycott. Police violence puts Hong Kong government on defensive. (2019, June 12). New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/asia/ hong-kong-protests.html. Quanli zhichi chengdu shenban di 17 jie shijie jingyunhui [Fully support Chengdu to host 17th World Police and Fire Games]. (2011, January 20). Chengdu Evening News, p. 2. Rogers, K. (2020, March 10). Politicians’ use of ‘Wuhan Virus’ starts a debate health experts wanted to avoid. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/03/10/us/politics/wuhan-virus.html. Shijie xiaofang jingji dasai Guangdong zuduo shoujin [Guangdong athlete won the World Firefighters Games first gold medal]. (2006a, February 21). Nanfang Daily, p. A04. Shijie xiaofang jingji ming jiemu xunyou [World Firefighters Games will open tomorrow]. (2006b, February 17). Ming Pao, p. A12. Stanway, D., & Anantharaman, M. (2019, October 25). China orienteering team disqualified from world military games. Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-games-military-china-orienteering/china-orienteering-teamdisqualified-from-world-military-games-idUSKBN1X40BS. Sun, X. (2020, November 27). Chengdu, Chongqing planning joint bid for 2032 Summer Olympics. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/ 202011/27/WS5fc0b218a31024ad0ba9804f.html. Swiss and Russian dominance at a dramatic CISM Military World Games (updated). (2019, October 21). IOF . https://orienteering.sport/swiss-andrussian-dominance-at-a-dramatic-cism-military-world-games/. Tianjin huo 2017 nian quanyunhui jubanquan [Tianjin obtain hosting rights of 2017 National Games of China]. (2011, August 17). Chengdu Economic Daily, p. 21. Tianjin Sichuan Shaanxi Hunan shenban dishisanjie quanyunhui quanyun jieli 2017 sheineng jiebang? [Tianjin, Sichuan, Shaanxi and Hunan bid for the National Games of China, who can obtain the hosting rights?]. (2011, January 14). Guangzhou Daily, p. AIII09.

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Touding lieri kouhan daodong [Asking Tung Chee-hwa to step down in hot sunny day]. (2003, July 2). Ming Pao, p. A03. Vazquez, M., & Klein, B. (2020, March 19). Trump again defends use of the term ‘China virus’. CNN . https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/17/politics/ trump-china-coronavirus/index.html. Wang, F. (2017). Xianggang zhengzhi fazhan lichen 1843-2015 [Political development of Hong Kong 1843-2015]. Hong Kong: Zhonghua Book Company. Westcott, B (2019, October 26). Chinese team disqualified for ‘extensive cheating’ at Military World Games. CNN . https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/ 24/asia/china-military-world-games-cheating-intl-hnk-scli/index.html. Westcott, B., & Jiang, S. (2020, March 14). Chinese diplomat promotes conspiracy theory that US military brought coronavirus to Wuhan. CNN . https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lij ian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html. Wojun tiyu daibiaotuan chengli ji shishi dongyuan dahui zaijing juxing [The ceremony of forming the PLA delegation for Military World Games was held in Beijing]. (2019, August 30). Changjiang Daily, p. 1. Woxiangwei Chengdu dianzan [I want to give thumbs-up to Chengdu]. (2019, August 14). Chengdu Daily, p. 4. Xi Jinping chunjieqian fusichuan kanwang gezu ganbu qunzhong” [Jinping visits Sichuan before the Spring Festival]. (2018, February 14). People’s Daily, p. 1. Xi Jinping dui diqijie shijie junren yundonghui chenggong juban zuochu zhongyao zhishi [Xi Jinping delivers remarks about the successful holding of the 7th Military World Games]. (2019, November 7). Central Government of PRC. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-11/07/content_5449866.htm. Xi Jinping zai jiefangjun daibiaotuan quanti huiyishang qiangdiao laolao bawo dangzai xinxingshi xiade qiangjun mubiao [Xi Jinping, in the meeting with the People’s Liberation Army delegation, emphasized the importance of strengthen the military in the new situation]. (2013, March 12). People’s Daily, p. 1. Xiaofang aoyun gangzhai 32 jin rusanjia [Hong Kong firefighters win 32 gold medals in the World Firefighters Games]. (2004, September 20). Ming Pao, p. A03. Xiaofang aoyunhui gangduo zhubanquan [Hong Kong win the World Firefighters Games hosting rights]. (2004, September 30). Apple Daily, p. A12. Yaoban jiu bandao zuihao [Let us do the best]. (2019, October 29). Changjiang Daily, p. 1. Zhang, Y., Zhang, K., & Dai, K. (2019, August 13). Sign of terrorism seem in HK unrest. China Daily. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/250/250/ 246/1565630378909.html.

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Zhongyang junwei zhuxi Xi Jinping qianshu tongling jiajiang canjia diqijie shijie junren yundonghui yundongyuan jiaolianyuan [Central Military Commission President Xi Jinping signs general order, commenting Chinese athletes and their coaches who participated in the 7th Military World Games]. (2019, October 29). Central Government of PRC. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/ 2019-10/29/content_5446374.htm.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Abstract This chapter reviews the strategic functions of the 21 sporting events in the broader political context of China since the 1980s. It also offers prospects for the possible roles to be played by China’s sporting events in the 2020s, under the direction of the central and local authorities. Keywords China · Sporting events · The Deng Xiaoping era · The Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era · The Xi Jinping era

Unlike the North Americans, the Europeans, and the Australasians, the Chinese are less interested in the sporting events with any of these three features: the participation of non-professional athletes, the inclusion of sports not featured at the Summer Olympics, and Chinese teams with very little chance of winning championship titles or topping medal tallies. Nevertheless, China has still keenly hosted such events ever since the 1980s. Through reviewing the 21 cases, this exploration has confirmed that they have been leveraged to serve the broader strategic goals of the central and local authorities at home and abroad.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4_8

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8.1

In the Deng Xiaoping Era

When Deng Xiaoping took office in the late 1970s, Chinese authorities began to liberalize markets and seek overseas investment to push economic growth. They also worked with the British and the Portuguese toward peaceful unification with Hong Kong and Macao. Deng even intended to bring the 2000 Summer Olympics to his motherland to boost his compatriots’ sense of pride in the Communist regime and raise the status of China in the world. However, the violent and destructive behavior of local spectators after the Chinese national football team was defeated by its Hong Kong rival in Beijing in May 1985 severely dented the image of the country within the international sporting community. It also affected the confidence of Hong Kong people in the 1997 political handover and of overseas corporations in the investment environment of China. The central government subsequently organized the FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) U-16 World Championship together with the municipal governments of Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, and Shanghai, because the successful celebration of this twelve-day tournament was believed by Deng and his colleagues to be able to tackle the issues raised by the hooliganism. Over the next few years, China retained rapid GDP growth. Its people, though, were troubled by severe inflation and official corruption. University students thus organized a series of protests in Beijing in the spring of 1989 and demanded that Deng and his administration enact political reform. This movement had the sympathy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his allies. Deng however viewed the protests as a plot to overthrow the Communist regime. On his orders, troops suppressed the unarmed protestors in the Tiananmen Square and the streets of Beijing on June 4. The governments of the US and other Western democracies promptly condemned the Chinese authorities for the crackdown and imposed sanctions. Meanwhile, Jiang Zemin succeeded Zhao as the General Secretary. The Chinese authorities concluded that market liberalization was the root cause of the student protests. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the Reform and Opening Up, retired from office. Jiang and his colleagues upheld the use of conservative principles to formulate economic policies. Not surprisingly, the GDP growth rate of China slowed after the second half of 1989. Deng’s dissatisfaction with Jiang and his colleagues’ performance caused him to continuously call for Chinese central and

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local officials to adopt bold measures to attract foreign investment and boost the economy. He also successfully persuaded the Beijing municipal authorities to activate a bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. Jiang chose not to endorse Deng’s signature project and the state media did not report his calls. To support Deng, Guangdong provincial authorities publicized their sophisticated preparations for the 1991 FIFA Women’s World Cup. They also associated the extravagant celebration of this fourteen-day tournament with Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. Deng was highly appreciative. In early 1992, he went to Guangdong to encourage provincial officials to accelerate economic development. He meanwhile successfully obtained the endorsement of senior Chinese military figures for his position—anyone who does not support the Reform and Opening Up must step down at once. Jiang Zemin promptly put aside his conservative policies and emphasized the importance of liberating markets and boosting the economy. He also gave his support to Beijing for its pursuit of the 2000 Summer Olympics. Dissatisfaction with China’s bleak human rights record led to Western politicians, in 1992 and 1993, continuously lobby the international sporting community not to support Beijing’s application for the 2000 Summer Olympics. Beijing was eventually eliminated from the bidding contest. In 1994, President Bill Clinton’s decision of delinking China’s Most Favored Nation status from Beijing’s human rights performance relieved the tension between the US and China. Other Western states also started re-approaching China. In view of this, the Chinese public thought that Beijing should apply for the 2004 Summer Olympics. After a series of controversial events led the global image of the Chinese authorities to remain a tarnished one, Beijing, in January 1996, decided not to put forward the application. The state media did not extensively cover this story. Rather, they promoted Harbin’s lavish celebration of the 1996 Asian Winter Games, a project that had been launched with the aim of polishing China’s image in international sporting community. While the sporting event was viewed as an unqualified success, Deng Xiaoping’s health deteriorated. He died in February 1997.

8.2

In the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Era

After Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng as supreme leader, China proactively liberalized markets and boosted its economy. It also tightened

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economic ties with the US and other Western countries and engaged in international institutions. Juan Samaranch, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President, thus suggested China bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Jiang accepted this suggestion and Beijing and Shanghai put forward their intention to apply for the event on behalf of China. To improve its chances in the contest, Shanghai made the 1998 Summer Gymnasiade a grand party. Nevertheless, Jiang and his colleagues still chose Beijing to pursue for the 2008 Summer Olympics on behalf of China. The Shanghai municipal government later proposed that it bring the 2010 World Expo to its jurisdiction. Jiang and his colleagues gave approval. Over the next few years, the two Chinese cities successfully won the rights to host the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo. The Chinese government also joined the World Trade Organization. These accomplishments led Jiang to set a goal of quadrupling China’s 2000 GDP and completing a transformation into a moderately prosperous society by 2020 before his retirement from the Party and state in 2003. As Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, was considering how to push national economic growth, China was severely hit by the SARS epidemic. International society was subsequently apprehensive about Beijing and Shanghai’s ability to complete the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 2010 World Expo. To mitigate the anxieties, the Chinese cities, with the full support of the central government, successfully staged the 2004 AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Asian Cup, the 2007 Asian Winter Games, and the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup. It should be noted that the 2007 FIFA Women’s World Cup was also used to help Xi Jinping, who would succeed Hu as the Chinese political leader, generate experience of handling international sporting affairs. Due to their dissatisfaction with the Special Administrative Region government’s measures to contain the SARS epidemic and proposal to enact a new national security law, over half a million Hong Kong people participated in a protest on July 1, 2003. Although Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa later cancelled the proposal, the morale of local people remained low. International society was also pessimistic about the future of the One Country Two Systems principle. To tackle the situation, Hong Kong hosted a series of international events with the full support of the Chinese authorities. One of them was the eight-day 2006 World Firefighters Games.

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In August 2008, Beijing’s extravagant Summer Olympics was praised by the IOC as a truly exceptional event. The Chinese team also unprecedentedly topped the medal table. These achievements boosted the pride of the public toward the nation and the Communist regime and led to Hu Jintao’s determination to make China a powerful sporting nation. To help realize Hu’s ambitious goals and maintain the sense of pride circulating among the public, Harbin, with the financial backing of Heilongjiang province, staged a luxurious 2009 Winter Olympics. This eleven-day sporting event was also used to show that the Chinese authorities had given a green light to Taiwan’s participation in international affairs under the leadership of their newly incumbent pro-unification president, Ma Ying-jeou. From May until October 2010, Shanghai’s ostentatious celebration of the World Expo further boosted the status of China around the globe and inspired a reinvigorated passion for the motherland in the Chinese public. The Shanghai municipal government therefore decided to stage the 2011 FINA World Championship to extend the legacy of the World Expo. Hu Jintao and his colleagues were indifferent toward this sixteen-day international aquatic event because it had been the brainchild of former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu, who had been confirmed as accepting bribes and misusing public funds. One year later, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu as the leader of the CCP. He also became the head of the Chinese state and the Chinese military in early 2013.

8.3

In the Xi Jinping Era

The most important mission of Xi Jinping, son of former Chinese Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, was not to follow in Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao’s footsteps and push forward with market liberalization and economic growth. Rather, it was to ensure that under his autocratic leadership, China could transform into a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and a well developed economy in 2049 as well as realize the national rejuvenation by the middle of the twenty-first century. To this end, he activated a nationwide anti-corruption movement shortly after his accession to power. He also ordered Chinese central and local officials to cease extravagance and uphold a sense of frugality in their daily business. The Nanjing municipal authorities consequently adopted a series of innovative cost-saving measures when hosting the 2013 Asian Youth Games

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and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics. The two events won the acclaim of both Xi and international society. While over a million of the officials were being investigated for their political discipline, Xi proposed the Belt and Road initiative, a Beijingchaired cross-continental program that aimed to strengthen China’s sharp power in the world. He was assertive in handling China’s territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea. Xi also associated the enhancement of Chinese military might and the forging of China into a strong sporting power with the realization of the national rejuvenation. Accordingly, Chinese cities successfully launched bids to host the 2019 Military World Games, the 2019 FIBA (International Basketball Federation) World Cup, and the 2022 Winter Olympics. They won all of these three events in 2015. Xi meanwhile was in high spirits, because the power of his political rivals had been successfully undermined by the anti-corruption movement, the implementation of the ambitious Belt and Road initiative had commenced, and China had strengthened its military capabilities in the South China Sea. The Beijing 2015 IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) World Championships thus was used to showcase Xi’s accomplishments at home and abroad. A few months later, a meeting with Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore propelled Xi back onto the front pages of the international media. This unprecedented move yet failed to affect the low popularity of Ma and his affiliated Kuomintang in Taiwan. Ma’s fellow party member, Eric Chu, thus was defeated by Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2016 Taiwanese presidential election. Tsai, as expected, did not follow her predecessor in recognizing the 1992 Consensus and supporting unification with China. Instead, she proactively promoted the sovereign status of Taiwan and worked toward its international engagement. Xi was enraged by this. Beijing subsequently suspended China’s economic interactions with Taiwan. Jinjiang, China’s largest running shoe producing city, with the full support of the central government, also eliminated Taoyuan from the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade bidding contest. The sporting event was later used to facilitate Jinjiang’s participation and by extension increase China’s say, in international student sports circles. In early 2018, Xi had five clear reasons to be extra confident about achieving the national rejuvenation by the middle of the twenty-first century. First, by strengthening his grip on the Party, state, and military and amending the constitution, he had been given the power to preside

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over the political affairs of China indefinitely. Second, under his leadership, China was making good progress toward a transformation into a moderately prospectus society. Third, Taiwan’s economic growth slowed down because of its tensions with China. The popularity of Tsai Ing-wen and her affiliated DPP had slumped, whereas that of the pro-unification Kuomintang politicians had soared. Fourth, through a series of assertive deployments, China had successfully expanded its control of the South China Sea. Fifth, over sixty countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania had joined the Belt and Road initiative. To intensify China’s influence in the international sporting community and accelerate toward becoming a strong sporting power, Xi became determined to improve China’s soccer standards and planned to bring a future FIFA World Cup to his motherland. He also promised to support the work of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) and other iternational sporting organizations. The Chinese Football Association subsequently activated bids for the 2023 AFC Asian Cup and the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup. Shantou put forward an application to host the OCA-governed 2021 Asian Youth Games. Xi was no longer in high spirits after mid-2018. It was because (1) President Donald Trump had imposed tariffs on Chinese products to penalize China for decades of unfair practices in its trade with the US and demanded the Chinese government increase its purchase of American agricultural products, and (2) a number of Chinese infrastructure projects were suspended in countries that were members of the Belt and Road initiative. While they were seeking ways to fix these issues, Xi and his colleagues learned that the growth of China’s GDP slowed, the persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang was revealed, and radical participants in the anti-extradition bill protests defaced Chinese national symbols and demanded Hong Kong independence. The Chengdu 2019 World Police and Fire Games subsequently was used by the Chinese authorities to support the Hong Kong police force, members of which had arrested protestors with excessive force. China also lavishly presented the 2019 FIBA World Cup and the 2019 Military World Games and successfully obtained the rights to host the 2021 Asian Youth Games, the 2023 AFC Asian Cup, and the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup, so diverting international attention away from the events which were unfavorable to the image of China and the realization of Xi’s political ambitions. Aside from supporting the controversial behavior of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Chinese authorities demanded the US corporations sack

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employees who publicly sympathized with the Hong Kong protestors. This resulted in a rebound of Tsai Ing-wen’s popularity in Taiwan, American public antipathy toward the Communist regime, and the determination of American lawmakers to penalize Chinese authorities for the violation of human rights. While Tsai defeated her Kuomintang rival Han Kuo-yu in a landslide in the 2020 presidential election, the US congressmen passed the Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. Some of them even called for the international sporting community to revoke China’s rights to host the 2022 Winter Olympics and other sporting events. In the first-phase Sino-American trade agreement of January 2020, China promised to purchase more American agricultural products. While Trump and his colleagues were pleased, COVID-19, a novel coronavirus that was first found in Wuhan of China, spread globally. The pandemic resulted in the death of a large number of people in the US, Europe, and East Asia and severely hit global economy. Trump blamed the Chinese authorities for their incompetence in preventing the spread of the coronavirus and asked them to compensate. In response, the Chinese authorities surprisingly adopted the ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy (Westcott and Jiang 2020). Tactics included spreading a conspiracy theory that COVID19 was made in the US and brought to China by American athletes competing in the Wuhan 2019 Military World Games. This approach, as expected, increased the tension between Washington and Beijing. Meanwhile, a series of economic, military, and diplomatic measures adopted by Xi’s administration also resulted in China’s unharmonious relations with Australia, Canada, India, Taiwan, and the UK. In June, the National People’s Congress, the legislature of China, with Xi’s endorsement, enacted the National Security Law for Hong Kong without the public consultation. This rushed and unilateral legislation was widely viewed as a severe breach of the One Country Two Systems principle. The US thus decided to terminate its special economic ties with Hong Kong (“The President’s,” 2020), enacted the Hong Kong Autonomy Act,1 and emphasized the threat posed by Beijing to the free world (“Communist China,” 2020). Other Western countries also expressed regret and revised their policies regarding Hong Kong. Additionally, given the Chinese authorities’ continual persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Western politicians and international human rights organizations called for the boycotting of sporting events hosted in China. In response, the Chinese authorities took pleasure in

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announcing that over fifty countries in the world supported the legislation of the National Security Law for Hong Kong and that the Chinese cities’ meticulous organization of the 2020 Summer Gymnasiade, the 2021 FIFA Club World Cup, the 2021 Asian Youth Games, the 2022 Winter Olympics, and the 2023 AFC Asian Cup continued, although the celebrations of some of them had been postponed by the international sporting organizations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the pandemic deepened China’s economic uncertainties and triggered a confidence crisis in creditors that had lent cash to Chinese corporations (“Evergrande faces,” 2020). Premier Li Keqiang even made a shocking admission that China still has over 600 million people with a monthly income of barely CNY 1000 (“Premier Li,” 2020). These domestic headaches, together with the assaults of the US government2 and the unharmonious ties with its neighbors and the other members of the Western world, have inevitably led to apprehension about whether China is able to become a genuinely moderately prosperous society by 2020, gain the respect of international society, and lead globalization. Given this, Chinese cities will grandly present the sporting events in the 2020s and generously entertain the participant athletes. It will be hoped that this strategy can demonstrate China’s successful control of COVID-19, project the superiority of the Chinese political system, restore the confidence of the world in the Communist regime, strengthen the centripetal force of its members towards Beijing, and facilitate Xi to realize his ultimate political ambition—completing the national rejuvenation of China by the middle of the twenty-first century. The Chinese authorities will also impede the Western politicians and international human rights organizations from turning the idea of boycott into reality. Otherwise, the tremendous efforts to host the sporting events will be futile.

Notes 1. From August 2000 to January 2021, the US government slapped sanctions on 35 Chinese and Hong Kong senior executives and politicians who were involved in the making and execution of the National Security Law in accordance with the Hong Kong Autonomy Act. 2. In November 2020, Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in the US presidential election. His nominee for Secretary of State Antony Blinken backed Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of Trump’s administration, for designating Chinese authorities’ persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as genocide (Wadhams 2021). His nominee for Secretary of the Treasury

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Janet Yellen also stressed that the US was preparing to use the full array of tools against China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal practices (Fang 2021). Their words showed that the US government’s tough line toward China would continue after Trump stepped down.

References Communist China and the Free World’s Future. (2020, July 23). US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worldsfuture/. Evergrande faces crisis of confidence over $120 billion debt. (2020, September 25). Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-25/ evergrande-faces-crisis-of-confidence-over-120-billion-debt. Fang, A. (2021, January 20). Yellen vows ‘full array of tools’ to curb China’s abusive practices. Nikkei. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-rel ations/US-China-tensions/Yellen-vows-full-array-of-tools-to-curb-China-sabusive-practices. Premier Li Keqiang meets the press: Full transcript of questions and answers. (2020, May 29). PRC State Council. http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/ news/202005/29/content_WS5ed058d2c6d0b3f0e9498f21.html. The President’s executive order on Hong Kong normalization. (2020, July 14). White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presid ents-executive-order-hong-kong-normalization/. Wadhams, N. (2021, January 20). Pompeo accuses China of ‘genocide,’ with support from successor. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/art icles/2021-01-19/pompeo-labels-uighur-crackdown-genocide-in-final-shotat-china. Westcott, B., & Jiang, S. (2020, May 29). China is embracing a new brand of foreign policy. Here’s what wolf warrior diplomacy means. CNN . https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-war rior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html.

Index

A AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Al Khalifa, Salman bin Ibrahim, 49 Asian Cup, 2, 13, 41, 44–47, 53 1984, 9 2000, 17, 40–43, 45, 46, 52, 53 2004, 3, 4, 40, 43–48, 52, 146 2007, 3, 44, 48, 146 2019, 3, 48–53 2023, 3, 5, 47, 50–52, 149, 151 Executive Committee, 41–46, 48, 50, 53 Shad, Ahmed, 41, 42 U-19 Women’s Championships, 48 Velappan, Peter, 41–44, 47, 52 Women’s Asian Cup 1986, 13 2001, 44–46 Albertville, 79 Almaty, 66, 84, 90, 91 Aomori, 85

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 Asian Pacific Region Special Olympics Games, 40 Athens, 96, 107

B Beijing National Stadium, 24, 64, 67, 68, 73 Tiananmen Square, 16, 39, 67, 68, 104, 133, 144 Workers’ Stadium, 12 Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Coordinated Development Program, 91 Beirut, 42, 84, 96 Belgrade, 43 Berlin, 19, 104 Biden, Joe, 94 Blinken, Antony, 151 bourgeoise liberalization, 11, 14 Bo Xilai, 66, 111

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. P. Chu, Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition, Politics and Development of Contemporary China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70016-4

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INDEX

Brasilia, 18, 19, 104 Brunei, 9, 44 Budapest, 114, 115 Buffalo, 103, 104 Bush, George, 23, 46 C CAA (Chinese Athletics Association), 64 Camacho, José Antonio, 48 Cape Town, 96 CBA (Chinese Basketball Association), 70, 71 CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 49, 111, 112 Central Committee, 9, 11, 12, 26, 62, 106 central leading groups, 26, 50, 129 Central Military Commission, 132 General Office, 111 National Congress, 10, 14, 19, 23, 40, 43, 46, 80, 84, 86, 92, 116 Politburo, 12, 19, 50, 62, 64 Politburo Standing Committee, 14, 19, 26, 50, 62, 64–67, 106, 107, 111, 129 CFA (Chinese Football Association), 21–25, 27, 32, 40–45, 48–51 CFA Cup, 21, 53, 149 CGAS (China General Administration of Sport), 70, 71, 80, 83, 106, 109 Changchun, 3, 83–86, 89, 95, 118 Changsha, 50 Chengdu, 3, 5, 23–25, 32, 44, 45, 48, 50–52, 111, 128–131, 135, 136, 149 World City of Sporting Events, 129, 131, 136 Chen Liangyu, 23, 25, 59–63, 73, 147

Chen Xitong, 95, 104, 106 Chen Yun, 8, 9, 16 China Disable Persons’ Federation, 106 China National Commission of Sport, 11 China Unicom, 69 China Western Development, 44 Chinese Communist Youth League Central Commission, 11 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 17, 64 Chongqing, 3, 44, 45, 50–52, 66, 111, 136 Chorzów, 65 Chung Mong-joon, 20 CISM (International Military Sports Council) Al-Shino, Abdulhakim, 132 Military World Games, 132, 134, 136 World Military Swimming and Lifesaving Championships, 136 Clinton, Bill, 19, 53, 82, 145 Commonwealth Games, 41 corruption, 11, 49, 50, 66, 95, 111, 144 coup, 67, 111 COVID-19, 5, 29, 51, 52, 94, 115, 118, 135, 136, 150, 151 CPAF (California Police Athletic Federation), 128, 131 World Police and Fire Games 2017, 136 2019, 129

D Dalai Lama, 42 Dalian, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 29, 30, 48, 50, 51, 144 Deng Pufang, 81, 106

INDEX

Deng Xiaoping, 2, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 19, 20, 30, 43, 47, 52, 66, 80, 95, 103–106, 144, 145, 147 Strict Hard campaign, 9 Doha, 61, 62 Dongguan, 3, 70 doping, 61, 82, 91 Down to the Countryside Movement, 8 Durban, 61 Duterte, Rodrigo, 72 E East Asian Games 1993, 40, 105, 106 2005, 60, 85, 125, 126 2009, 125–127 Erzurum, 87 EU Commission, 94 Parliament, 94 F Falun Gong, 22, 43, 83 FIBA (International Basketball Federation) Ching Men-ky, 71 Executive Committee, 70 World Cup 2014, 23, 69, 70 2019, 3, 4, 69–73, 148, 149 FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Blatter, Sepp, 12, 20–22, 24–27, 31 Club World Cup 2021, 3, 5, 26–31, 51, 52, 149, 151 Council, 15, 27, 51, 53 Havelange, João, 8, 12, 13, 15–18, 20, 22, 27, 31 Infantino, Gianni, 27, 29, 50

155

U-16 World Championship 1985, 3, 8, 11, 12, 30, 31, 144 U-17 Women’s World Cup, 50 U-17 World Cup, 50 Women’s Invitation Tournament, 13–15, 40 Women’s World Cup 1990, 2, 13, 15, 17, 59 1991, 3, 4, 12, 15–18, 30, 40, 48, 145 1999, 21, 44 2003, 3, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 44, 46 2007, 3, 4, 20, 24–26, 31, 48, 60, 146 2023, 3, 50, 51 World Cup 1986, 9, 12, 13, 32 2002, 12, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 32, 41, 46, 47, 53 2006, 47, 60 2014, 23, 24 2018, 25–28, 50, 70 2022, 3, 26, 151 2026, 27 2030, 27–29 2034, 27, 28 World Youth Championship, 41 FINA (International Swimming Federation) Maglione, Julio, 64 Short Course World Championships, 60–62 World Championships, 2–4, 60–65, 73, 82, 136, 147 1994, 81 2011, 2–4, 61–64, 73, 147 2014, 136 FISU (International University Sports Federation) Killian, George, 89, 108 Nebiolo, Primo, 104

156

INDEX

Summer Universiade 1993, 103, 104 1995, 104 2001, 2, 44, 89, 108, 109 2007, 89 2011, 2, 48, 89 2015, 88, 89 2017, 89, 114 2021, 51 University Football World Cup, 115 Winter Universiade 2009, 87, 88 2011, 87, 89 Five-Year Economic Plan 6th, 14 7th, 13, 14 8th, 16, 17 9th, 20, 21, 82, 107 10th, 21, 44, 84 Formula One motor race, 59 Foshan, 3, 70

G Gangwon, 80, 81 global financial tsunami, 63, 69, 110 Guadalajara, 110 Guangdong, 3, 13–19, 30, 40, 41, 43, 44, 103, 116, 117, 127, 145 Guangzhou, 2, 3, 13, 14, 17, 18, 29, 32, 50, 70, 85, 96, 118, 129, 132 Guo Boxiong, 50, 67, 132 Guofeng, Hua, 7 Gwangju, 88

H Hainan, 116 collision incident, 23 Haiyang, 118 Hambantota, 117

Hangzhou, 3, 23–25, 29, 50, 67–69, 116, 118 Harbin, 3, 80–83, 86–89, 95, 118, 145, 147 Hariri, Rafic, 42 Hebei, 90, 91, 95 Heilongjiang, 80–83, 86–89, 96, 147 Hiroshima, 15, 82 Hong Hu, 83 Hong Kong Basic Law, 125 Close Economic Partnership Agreement, 125 Fire Protection Association, 124, 126 Fire Service Department, 124, 126 Greater Bay Area, 116 Human Rights and Democracy Act, 93 Kwok Ka-ming, 9 Lam, Carrie, 28, 72, 93, 130, 134 Leung Chun-ying, 128, 130 National Security Law, 93, 124, 125, 146, 150, 151 One Country Two Systems, 10, 28, 72, 123, 125–127, 130, 135, 146, 150 Patten, Chris, 19 protest, 28, 29, 31, 72, 73, 93, 125, 131, 133–136, 149, 150 Tsang, Donald, 72, 126–128 Tung Chee-hwa, 123, 124, 126, 146 hooliganism, 9–11, 30, 144 Horizon 2000 policy, 42 Houston Rockets, 29 Morey, Daryl, 29 Huang Ju, 22, 23 Huawei, 134 Meng Wanzhou, 71, 134 Hubei, 19, 128, 131, 132 Hunan, 19, 128

INDEX

Hu Qili, 12, 14 I IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) Diack, Lamine, 67 World Championships, 2–4, 64, 65, 67, 68, 73, 148 2005, 65 2011, 2, 3, 65, 73 2015, 3, 4, 64, 65, 67, 68, 73, 148 Incheon, 60 Innsbruck, 88 International Civil Aviation Organisation, 114 IOC (International Olympic Committee) Bach, Tomas, 67, 68, 93, 111 Evaluation Commission, 23 Rogge, Jacques, 24, 46, 60, 61, 64, 88, 110, 128 Samaranch, Juan, 15, 81, 96, 105, 109, 146 Session, 87–89 Summer Olympics 1996, 79, 96, 106 2000, 80, 104, 107, 123 2004, 45, 52, 81, 82, 96, 106, 107 2008, 21, 23, 24, 45, 46, 52, 60, 63, 83, 87, 88, 90, 92, 107, 109, 110, 123, 126, 128, 146, 147 2012, 88 2020, 46, 115 2032, 136 Summer Youth Olympics 2010, 88, 110, 112 2014, 110, 112 Winter Olympics 1992, 19, 79

157

1994, 79 2010, 86, 95 2014, 88, 111 2018, 86, 89, 90, 93 2022, 66–68, 90, 92–95, 112, 130 Winter Youth Olympics, 88 IOF (International Orienteering Federation), 134 ISF (International School Sport Federation), 105, 106, 109, 115, 116, 118 Summer Gymnasiade 1998, 5, 105–109, 118, 146 2020, 5, 115, 116, 118, 148, 151 Istanbul, 19, 45, 84, 104 ITTF (International Table Tennis Federation) World Championships 1995, 82 2005, 60 2022, 129 ITU (International Telecommunication Union) Telecom World, 125, 127 J Japan, 12, 13, 16, 20, 29, 31, 32, 41, 42, 44, 53, 85, 117, 124 Jiabao, Wen, 23, 25, 62, 63, 65, 85, 86 Jiangmen, 3 Jiangsu, 14, 19, 110 Jiangxi, 19 Jiang Zemin, 14, 16, 17, 19–23, 30, 39, 40, 43, 46, 47, 52, 66, 80, 82–84, 86, 103–109, 123, 124, 144, 145, 147 Jianxing, Wei, 108 Jihua, Ling, 50, 67, 111, 112 Ji Jianye, 49, 110–112

158

INDEX

Jilin, 83, 89, 96 Jinan, 3, 29, 44, 45, 52 Jingsheng, Wei, 19 Jinjiang, 5, 114–116, 118, 148 Jintao, Hu, 2, 23, 25, 26, 46, 47, 60–66, 69, 73, 84–86, 88, 92, 108, 110, 111, 128, 132, 146, 147 Scientific Development Concept, 85

K Kaohsiung, 44, 53, 81, 108, 109 Kim Jong-un, 51 Ki-moon, Ban, 63, 128 Kim Un-yong, 80, 81 KOC (Korean Sport & Olympic Committee), 80 Korean Football Association, 20, 41, 51 Kraków, 66, 90 Kuala Lumpur, 41, 104 Kuopio, 88

L Lausanne, 24, 46 Liaoning, 11, 96 Li Lanqing, 108 Lillehammer, 79, 88 Lin Ruo, 17, 18 Li Peng, 11, 12, 14–17, 30, 39, 82, 104–106, 108 Li Qiang, 67 Li Ruihuan, 108 Li Shu, 83 Liu He, 71 Liu Xiang, 64, 65 Li Yuanchao, 111 Lop Nur, 42 Luo Q iang, 129 Lviv, 66, 90, 91

M Macao, 9, 10, 14, 30, 60, 85, 116, 118, 144 Madrid, 61 Major, John, 19 Manchester, 19, 104 Manila, 72 Mao Zedong, 7, 90 Mi Fengjun, 83 Milan, 19, 104, 105 Ministry of Civil Affairs, 106 Ministry of Education, 109 Ministry of Public Security, 11 moderately prosperous society, 23, 46, 66, 67, 70, 73, 84, 90, 91, 112, 116–118, 146, 151 Modi, Narendra, 133 Montreal, 128, 129, 136 Moon Jae-in, 51 Moscow, 22 Most Favourable Nation, 53

N Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 31 Nanjing, 3, 5, 48–50, 70, 71, 110–112, 118, 132, 147 National Football Jia A League, 53 National Games of China 1983, 8, 13 1987, 13, 14 1997, 105–107 2005, 110 2017, 128 National Olympic Committee of Sri Lanka, 117 National Winter Games of China, 83 Ning Zetao, 136 NPC (National People’s Congress), 106, 125, 127, 150

INDEX

O OCA (Olympic Council of Asia) Al-Sabah, Ahmad Al-Fahad, 49, 67, 68, 81, 83, 111, 116 Asian Beach Games 2012, 118 2020, 116, 118 Asian Games 1990, 118 1994, 79 1998, 15 2006, 62 2010, 2, 48, 85, 110, 118 2014, 118 2018, 116–118 2022, 67, 68, 116, 118 Asian Winter Games 1996, 79–81, 83, 118 1999, 80, 81 2003, 85, 96 2007, 83–86, 118 Asian Youth Games 2013, 48, 49, 110, 111, 118 2017, 48, 117 2021, 117, 118, 149 Oslo, 66, 90, 91 Overall Chinese Football Reform and Development Programme, 27, 28

P Palma de Mallorca, 104, 105 Panchen Lama, 42, 95 Pearl River Delta, 116, 117 PLA (People’s Liberation Army), 132, 133, 135, 136 Pompeo, Mike, 151 Poznan, ´ 110 Pudong district, 22 Pusan, 53, 81 Pyeongchang, 87–90

159

Q Qiao Shi, 12, 14, 106 Qingdao, 48, 51, 69 Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, 65 Querétaro, 22

R Rotterdam, 129, 131

S Salzburg, 87, 88 San Francisco, 61 Sanya, 116, 118 SARS, 24, 31, 46, 52, 60, 84, 85, 87, 124, 146 Sino-British Joint Declaration, 10, 30, 130 Scott, Rick, 29, 93 Seoul, 16, 51, 61 Shaanxi, 128 Shandong, 14 Luneng Football Club, 44, 53 Shanghai 2010 World Expo, 22, 25, 26, 31, 59, 61–63, 73, 84, 86, 146 Hongkou Football Stadium, 25 Oriental Sports Center, 62 Shenhua Football Club, 25 Shangkun, Yang, 17, 80 Shantou, 5, 117, 118, 149 Shenyang, 11, 29, 69 Shenzhen, 2, 3, 70, 87, 129 Shriver, Eunice Kennedy, 106 Sichuan, 128, 129, 135 Sicily, 104, 105 Sidon, 42 Silk Road Fund, 49 Sinopec, 65 Sinuiju, 79 Sochi, 87, 88, 111

160

INDEX

South American Football Confederation, 29 2020 Copa América, 29 South China Sea, 26, 66, 70, 148, 149 southern tour, 19, 30 South Korea, 16, 20, 22, 23, 40–42, 44, 50, 51, 53, 80, 81, 90, 113 Soviet Union, 19, 40 Special Olympics China, 106 Special Olympics Organization, 22 Special Olympics World Summer Games, 22, 25, 60, 62 Stockholm, 66, 90 strong sporting power, 26, 50, 52, 63, 66, 69, 70, 73, 88, 89, 92, 110, 112, 116, 117, 128, 132, 148, 149 Sun Wen, 21 Supplementary Agreement on the Sino-Russian Border Eastern Part, 88 Surabaya, 117 Suzhou, 50, 51, 69–71 Sydney, 19, 20, 22, 32, 45, 80, 104, 105, 109, 118 T Taipei, 44, 81, 88, 89, 113, 114 Taiwan Chen Chien-jen, 118 Chen Shui-bian, 89, 113 Chiang Ching-kuo, 113 Chou Tzu-yu, 113 Chu, Eric, 113, 148 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 113, 148, 149 Han Kuo-yu, 150 Kuomintang, 113, 114, 148–150 Lee Teng-hui, 89, 108 Ma Ying-jeou, 89, 114, 147, 148 Olympic Formula, 113

One China One Taiwan, 44, 108 One-China Policy, 113 presidential election, 113, 148, 150 ROC (Republic of China), 113 Tsai Ing-wen, 113, 148–150 Two Chinas, 44 Tang Liangzhi, 131 Taoyuan, 114, 115, 118, 148 Tashkent, 19, 104 Tehran, 84 Tianjin, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 24, 25, 29, 30, 50, 51, 67, 82, 91, 128, 144 Binhai New Area, 67 Olympic Stadium, 25 Tian Jiyun, 11, 12, 14 Tian, Xiao, 70, 71 Toronto, 45, 84, 128 Tripoli, 42 Trump, Donald, 28, 50, 71, 93, 94, 114, 133, 135, 149–152

U UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), 27, 29 2020 European Championship, 29 UK Athletics, 65 US Congressional Executive Commission on China, 93 US State Council, 72

V Vancouver, 73, 87

W Wang Baoseng, 95 Wang Lijun, 111 Wang Qishan, 24, 111, 112 Wang Yunkun, 83 Wan Li, 11, 14 Washington, 43, 51, 72, 150

INDEX

Weize, Yang, 49, 71, 110–112 Wenchuan, 128, 129 WHO (World Health Organization), 24 World Health Assembly, 114 “Wolf warrior”diplomacy, 150 World Firefighters Games Western Australia Inc World Firefighters Games 2004, 124, 125 2006, 5, 124–127, 146 World Games, 3–5, 71, 129, 131–136, 148–150 Wroclaw, 22 WTO (World Trade Organization), 21, 23, 31, 40, 43, 46, 82, 107, 125, 126, 146 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 40, 82 Ministerial Conference, 125, 126 Wuhan, 3, 5, 23–25, 29, 48, 50, 51, 70, 71, 131–135, 150 Wu Shaozu, 18 Wu Xueqian, 12 X Xi’an, 48, 50, 51 Xiamen, 51 Xie Fei, 17, 19 Xi Jinping anti-corruption, 26, 48, 49, 70, 111, 129, 132, 147, 148 Belt and Road initiative, 26, 28, 31, 49, 51, 53, 66, 67, 70, 71, 91, 92, 112, 129, 148, 149 national rejuvenation, 52, 66, 116, 117, 147, 148, 151 Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, 129

161

Victory over Japan Day, 67, 68 Xinjiang genocide, 151 re-education camp, 92 Uyghur, 92, 94, 150, 151 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, 93 Xi Zhongxun, 25, 62, 147 Xuanping, Ye, 14, 15, 17, 18 Xu Caihou, 67, 132 Xuejuan, Luo, 62 Xu Fang, 41, 42 Xu Kuangdi, 22, 23, 107, 108

Y Yaobang, Hu, 8, 10, 16, 31 Yao Ming, 71 Yao Yilin, 11, 12, 14, 16 Yasukuni Shrine, 31 Ye Jianying, 14 Yellen, Janet, 152 Yeosu, 22 Yongkang, Zhou, 50, 67, 110–112 Yu Zhengsheng, 62, 64

Z Zhang Baifa, 18, 20 Zhangjiakou, 90–92, 94, 95 Zhang Jilong, 42–44, 48 Zhaocai, Du, 27, 51 Zhejiang, 25, 67, 116 Zheng, Han, 59, 60, 62, 64 Zhongshan, 3 Zhu Rongji, 17, 19, 21–23, 86, 103, 106–109 Zhu Senlin, 17, 18 Zhu Shanlu, 110 Ziyang, Zhao, 8, 11–16, 104, 144