Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands [1st ed.] 9783030538392, 9783030538408

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands

Teresa Ruel

Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance Series Editors Linze Schaap Tilburg University Tilburg, The Netherlands Jochen Franzke University of Potsdam Potsdam, Germany Hanna Vakkala University of Lapland Rovaniemi, Finland Filipe Teles University of Aveiro Aveiro, Portugal

This series explores the formal organisation of sub-national government and democracy on the one hand, and the necessities and practices of regions and cities on the other hand. In monographs, edited volumes and Palgrave Pivots, the series will consider the future of territorial governance and of territory-based democracy; the impact of hybrid forms of territorial government and functional governance on the traditional institutions of government and representative democracy and on public values; what improvements are possible and effective in local and regional democracy; and, what framework conditions can be developed to encourage minority groups to participate in urban decision-making. Books in the series will also examine ways of governance, from ‘network governance’ to ‘triple helix governance’, from ‘quadruple’ governance to the potential of ‘multiple helix’ governance. The series will also focus on societal issues, for instance global warming and sustainability, energy transition, economic growth, labour market, urban and regional development, immigration and integration, and transport, as well as on adaptation and learning in sub-national government. The series favours comparative studies, and especially volumes that compare international trends, themes, and developments, preferably with an interdisciplinary angle. Country-by-country comparisons may also be included in this series, provided that they contain solid comparative analyses. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15960

Teresa Ruel

Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands

Teresa Ruel University of Aveiro Aveiro, Portugal

ISSN 2523-8248     ISSN 2523-8256 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance ISBN 978-3-030-53839-2    ISBN 978-3-030-53840-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my family. O Amor é o meu peso. Onde eu for, ele me levará. (Confissões XIII, 9, Santo Agostinho)

Preface

The Atlantic insular regions of Portugal and Spain (Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands) have remained understudied notwithstanding the vast literature on regions and regionalism in Europe. Whereas in Spain, the subnational dimension of politics is always present when studying political and policy processes and outcomes, the same cannot be said with regard to the case of Portugal, where a small but growing community of political scientists is still primarily focused on the national dimensions of politics. Despite the pluralist composition of regional party systems and the holding of regular and fair elections, alternation is practically absent in the three regions. This is perhaps the most intriguing feature of the Atlantic insular regions of Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands. What factors explain the absence of political alternation in these regions? A confluence of historical, constitutional, institutional, socio-economic and cultural factors comes into play. The lack of statutory provisions setting a series of safeguards to the opposition; an regional government organizational framework that favours strong presidential executive in detriment of power-sharing arrangements and institutional checks-andbalances; weak parliamentary scrutiny over executive rule; extensive political patronage over decentralised state services and a tentacular presence of political cronies from the incumbent party in all civil society domains (e.g. local football clubs, casinos, local economic groups in

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particular in the construction and tourism sectors, local branches of commercial banks, local media outlets); weak institutionalisation of regional party structures, often captured by family groups; an electoral system that generates safe majorities in detriment of openness to independent or new party formations; entrenched electoral strongholds; the prevalence of revolving door practices that blur the public/private divide and help to consolidate a cast of business politicians in the local power elite; a stratified social structure shaped by the influential role of prominent families in the local economy and society and the absence of meaningful countervailing forces; a public spending development model based on infrastructure and social benefits coupled with a tax benefits’ regime to private investment that generates fictitious wealth with little distributive value; all these factors account for the absence of alternation and credible alternatives. This book is perhaps the first attempt at dissecting the multiple reasons behind the longevity of incumbent parties and the lack of success of opposition parties to challenge the status quo in these singular insular regions. The research findings substantiating this publication seem to suggest that consistent positive economic outcomes, resulting from a successful use of policy mechanisms and instruments available to steer the regional economy (such as the possibility of incurring in high levels of public debt, large-scale injection of EU structural and cohesion funds and an extensive use of public-private partnerships and other off-budget practices), were the most relevant predictor of the continuous electoral success of incumbent parties; whilst factors of an institutional order, such as the degree of party institutionalisation, lack of access to institutional resources, and an electoral system unfriendly to newcomers, help to explain the continuous unsuccess of opposition parties. Holding office over a long period of time in a context of prosperity (even if attained at the expense of intergenerational equity and by hiding public-private investment liabilities), not only enables incumbents to make specific payoffs to voters through pork barrel spending, it also undermines the chances of opposition parties to become credible alternatives. This publication constitutes a pioneering and innovative approach to the puzzling phenomenon of absence of political alternation in subnational units of established democracies. It offers an in-depth analysis of the political, institutional and economic determinants of non-alternation in

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three regional contexts from two consolidated southern European democracies with different centre-periphery institutional arrangements. The book also makes a comprehensive contribution to the literature on regional political systems and may help to stimulate further research on this specific subset of subnational units (insular regions) that are insufficiently studied in the European context. Institute of Social Sciences University of Lisbon Lisbon, Portugal February 2020

Luís de Sousa

Acknowledgments

This book is the product of several years of research of the most wonderful Atlantic Islands, yet understudied Southern European regions. It wouldn’t have been possible without the support and encouragement of Luís de Sousa, Iván Llamazares and Manuel Meirinho Martins, my doctoral supervisors. I’m greatly indebted to my colleagues and friends. Patrícia Calca, who kept up with me in this rewarding adventure! Thanks for your time, encouragement and friendship! My greatest thank to Alice Cunha, Célia Belim and Sebatian Khöler. To Guillermo Bóscan, Pablo Biderbost and Gisselle de la Cruz who shared with me valuable methodological discussions of how to overcome the lack of available data during the work in progress stage. Thanks for your hospitality during my Visiting in the AECPA-University of Salamanca. My initial project implied expert interviews with the leading actors on the democratization and decentralization processes, and also regional premiers in the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. Unfortunately, some of them were not available to give me his testimony, and others do not allowed me to record and/or to publish it. I address special thanks to João Abel de Freitas, Roberto Amaral, Eduardo Paz Ferreira, Emanuel Rodrigues (in memorium), João Bosco Mota Amaral and Professor Juan Hernández Bravo de Laguna for their valuable insights and significantly

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profitable ‘oral history’ that they have shared with me, in order to understanding a large number of points which these three regions experienced. It has provided an empirical foundation for theoretical innovative work through crucial narrative politics. To my family that was always supportive, thanks a lot! I’m thankful to Filipe and Eva for whatever is called love, ever and ever…and forever!

Contents

Part I   1 1 Setting the Scene: Introduction  3 2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 15 3 Mapping the Cases: The Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 35 Part II  69 4 Party Competition at Regional Level 71 5 Intra-party Democracy101 6 Regional Economic Performance123 7 Conclusions145 Index153

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Abbreviations

AC ACs ACN AD AM AGI AHI AIC AIL AP/PP BE CC CCI CDS CDS/PP CPR EC ENP EU FCM FEPU FLA FLAMA FP FRIA GDP

Asamblea Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain) Autonomous Communities Asamblea Canaria Nacionalista (Canary Islands, Spain) Aliança Democrática (Portugal) Asamblea Majorera (Canary Islands, Spain) Agrupación Gomera Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain) Agrupación Herreña Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain) Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (Canary Islands, Spain) Agrupación Insular de Lanzarote (Canary Islands, Spain) Alianza Popular/Partido Popular (Spain) Bloco de Esquerda (Portugal) Coalición Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain) Centro Canario Independiente (Canary Islands, Spain) Centro Democrático y Social (Spain) Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular (Portugal) Constitution of Portuguese Republic European Commission Effective Number of Parties European Union Frente Centrista da Madeira (Madeira, Portugal) Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido (Madeira, Portugal) Frente de Libertação dos Açores (Azores, Portugal) Frente de Libertação da Madeira (Madeira, Portugal) Federación Progressista (Canary Islands, Spain) Frente Revolucionária para a Independência dos Açores (Azores, Portugal) Gross Domestic Product xv

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Abbreviations

ICAN IF IMF IUC JPP LAPA LOAPA LOFCA LOTRACA LOREG MAIA MAPA MES MFA MIRA MIRAC MP MPAIAC MPT PAN PCE PCE-Can PCTP/MRPP PDA PS PCP/CDU PCU PNC PND PP-Can PSD PPM PREC

Iniciativa Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain) Independientes de Fuerteventura (Canary Islands, Spain) International Monetary Fund Izquierda Unida Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain) Juntos Pelo Povo (Madeira, Portugal) Liga Acção Patriótica dos Açores (Azores, Portugal) Ley Orgánica para la Armonización del Processo Autonómico (Spain) Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas (Spain) Ley Orgánica de Transferencias Complementarias a Canarias (Spain) Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General (Spain) Movimento de Autonomia das Ilhas Atlânticas (Azores, Portugal) Movimento de Autodeterminação do Povo Açoriano (Azores, Portugal) Movimento Esquerda Socialista (Portugal) Movimento das Forças Armadas (Portugal) Movimento de Independência Revolucionária dos Açores (Azores, Portugal) Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria del Arquiplelago Canario (Canary Islands, Spain) Member of Parliament Movimiento para la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Arquipelago Canario (Canary Islands, Spain) Movimento Partido da Terra (Portugal) Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza (Portugal) Partido Comunista Español (Spain) Partido Comunista de Canaria (Canary Islands, Spain) Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (Portugal) Partido Democrático do Atlântico (Portugal) Partido Socialista (Portugal) Partido Comunista Português/Coligação Democrática Unitária (Portugal) Pueblo Canario Unido (Canary Islands, Spain) Partido Nacionalista Canario (Canary Islands, Spain) Partido Nova Democracia (Portugal) Partido Popular (Canary Islands, Spain) Partido Social-Democrata (Portugal) Partido Popular Monárquico (Portugal) Processo Revolucionário em Curso (Portugal)

 Abbreviations 

PSOE PSOE-PSC PTP SC UCD UDP UPC UPM VAT

Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spain) Partido Socialista de Canarias (Canary Islands, Spain) Partido Trabalhista Português (Portugal) Spanish Constitution Unión Centro Democrático (Spain) União Democrática Popular (Portugal) Unión Del Pueblo Canario (Canary Islands, Spain) União Povo Unido (Madeira, Portugal) Value Added Tax

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4

Electoral results in Azores 1976–2016 (% of vote share and number of seats) 74 Electoral results in Madeira 1976–2015 (% of vote share and number of seats) 76 Electoral results in Canary Islands 1983–2015 (% of vote share and number of seats) 84 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in Azores (1976–2016) 87 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in Madeira (1976–2015) 87 Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in the Canary Islands (1983–2015) 88 GDP levels per each region and a relative measure of regional state-­wide GDP (regional GP divided by state GDP) 2000–2016127 Unemployment in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 1996–2016 (%) 129 Regional debt in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 1996–2016 (eur/millions) 131 Citizens’ perceptions of quality of life, economic situation and major economic issues at the regional level (2012, 2015 and 2018) 136

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

Setting the Scene: Introduction

1.1   Introduction With millions I do inaugurations, and with inauguration I won elections.1 After 44 years of regional democracy in Madeira, a statement by the former regional premier for almost all of its history Alberto João Jardim is still to be the ruling party winning formula. The Social-Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social-Democrata) come into office on Portuguese regions—Azores and Madeira—with the first regional elections of June 1976 and remained in power in Madeira since and ruled in Azores for 20 years until the PS took over the executive in 1996 and which remained in power since them. In the Spanish Comunidad Autonóma de Canárias, state-wide parties (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español; CDS, Centro Democratico y Social and AP/PP, Alianza Popular/Partido Popular) became dominant during the two decades of democracy (1983–1995) until the Coalición Canaria (regionalist party) come into office in 1995 (in a coalition with PP), which lasted until 2015. These cases raise the question: Why does political alternation occurs in some political systems and not in others? This reveals that party dominance can also occur in fully-fledged democracies which bring us understanding of the mechanisms that parties 1  Com milhões faço inaugurações, e com inaugurações, ganho eleições (former Madeira’ regional premier, Alberto João Jardim), Público, 27 January 2009.

© The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_1

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and politicians employ to secure dominance over time in a given political system postponing political alternation rule. Political alternation phenomenon has a valuable importance to representative democracies. Political alternation is the prima facie of political contestation (Pasquino, 2011; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) where the opposition has the opportunity to win and defeat the rulers (Przeworski, 2009; 2010; Przeworski et  al., 2000) through the competition for popular vote (Schumpeter, 1942/2003). Departing from these three Southern Europe paradigmatic cases— Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands—this book explores the phenomenon of political alternation through in-depth contextual understanding of the path of regional historical legacies at democratization and decentralization processes started in the 1970s; the institutional architectures and the scope of regional authority endowed in those regions; the specific dynamics of regional politics; and the constellation of political parties and actors and the regional elections results, as well as, contextual factors that might explain why some political parties have better performances than other at regional elections. Throughout comparative lessons I seek to highlight the range of factors that affect regional electoral dynamics and outcomes and to develop a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of long-standing incumbency or the absence of political alternation within regional democracies. Understanding change or survival in power is one of the central challenges in political science inquiry. Politicians value office as an intrinsic value and might keep those authority over time (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005; Downs, 1957). Thus, a party that wins elections over time, while the opposition constantly fails to achieve alternation rule is considered an ‘uncommon’ phenomenon in liberal democracies (Pempel, 1990). This phenomenon might constitute a paradox within democracies, to the extent that, governments act with the aim of being re-elected. Scholars attribute re-election prospects to factors such as, controlling political apparatus and economic performance (Downs, 1957); controlling agenda-setting and legislative initiatives (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002), or distributive and clientelistic politics (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). Thus, understanding of the “politics behind the survival in office is the essence of politics. (…) The desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions and the

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objectives of foreign policy; it influences the very evolution of political life” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005, p. 9).

1.2   Decentralization of the State: The Emergence of the Regions Territory is an essential reference of political and social life (Keating, 1998). The decentralization processes evolved in recent last decades in Europe have answered territorial demands for the accommodation and recognition of some political communities (Keating, 2013). In the last five decades, regions have enhanced their authority scope (Hooghe et al., 2016; Keating, 1998) and created a meso-level of government with a range of political powers over a diversity of policy areas (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Keating, 1998; Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel, 2008; Swenden, 2006). Some countries have federalized their structures (Germany), developed asymmetric forms of federalism (Spain) or advanced into forms of regionalization/decentralization (Italy, UK and Portugal), while others have engaged a delegation of competences to specific regions (France). These processes have been among the most remarkable arrangements of institutional change of the post-war period. These changes underlined that the nation-state have no longer the exclusivity of political authority and policy making (Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Swenden, 2006; Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel & Jeffery, 2013). The rescaling of state authority has strongly strengthened the power of regions and prompted the rise of the regional tier of government within the states. Regions2 developed systems of political representation, delegation and accountability, endowed with directly elected assemblies and executive powers, with their own civil services, that are responsible for decision-making over a range of policy areas (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Marks et  al., 2008; Ruel, 2019; Swenden, 2006). The creation of regional political institutions since the 1970s empowered both regional actors who accessed political power and, voters who could express their opinion about policies and governments across 2  ‘Region’ is a contested concept (Keating, 1998). For research purposes I follow the (minimal) definition proposed by Marks et al. which considers ‘region’ to be “a coherent territorial entity situated between the local and the national levels which has a capacity for authoritative decision-making” (2008, p. 113).

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electoral arenas (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Swenden, 2006). As a result, new dynamics in partisan competition arise and distinctive party systems (regionalist parties and or regional branches of the state-wide parties) distinct from national level ones have been established (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Ruel, 2015, 2019). The territorial scope of authority has also increased over the past 40 years. These trends have been captured by the regional authority index (RAI)3 developed by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2010). The RAI measures the authority a regional government exercises over those who live in the region (self-rule) and the authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in a country as a whole (shared-rule) over time (Hooghe et al., 2010, 2016). Regional authority varies across countries, within countries and between regions. In 2010, the Azores and Madeira both have a RAI-score of 19.5 (Ruel, 2019) and in regionalized Spain Canarias’ comunidade autonóma scored 23.5 (Hooghe et al., 2010, 2016). Decentralization of authority has created a new regional arena of competition—regional—where political parties and voters have the incentive and opportunity to mobilize and respond to regional issues (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Maddens & Libbrecht, 2009; Thorlakson, 2009), through exercising the authority endowed to regional governments. Additionally, regional authority has promoted a new space of politics which also encouraged the development of political careers at sub-national levels (Maddens & Put, 2013; Stolz, 2003; Teruel, 2011). Hence, regions matter much more directly to voters, parties and interest groups. Winning control of regional government and securing it has a significant and growing prize (Jeffery, 2014).

1.3   Setting the Scene: The Framework of Analysis Political alternation corresponds to the “replacement of a government with a completely different composition, in terms of political parties and members, from the government that has been replaced” (Pasquino, 2011, p. 21). Alternation is defined by the process of complete removal between governments which “who were in government at time t-1, no longer has 3  Self-rule is operationalized through four dimensions: institutional depth; policy scope; fiscal autonomy and representation. Shared rule is operationalized by law-making; executive control; fiscal control and constitutional reform (Hooghe et al., 2010).

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to be at time t” (Pasquino, 2011, pp. 21–22). Thus, political alternation occurs when the incumbents (parties and members) are replaced by different other in public office; whereas by contrast, the absence of political alternation take place when voter’s reward the ruling party. Political alternation is a critical outcome of liberal democracies at any level of government. However, there have been few attempts to conceptualize it or analyse the conditions involving this social and political phenomena. In axiomatic terms, the occurrence or absence of political alternation in a given political system is a result of voter’s preferences through voting. From the ‘new institutionalism’ perspective (March & Olsen, 1984), institutions are central to the understanding political system as a whole. Thus, I aim to explain one of the key-features of democracies performance, namely political alternation at the regional level of government. To enhance comparison I employ a common analytical framework across case-studies, exploring and discussing several regional-based factors that might align the understanding and explanation of the absence of political alternation (Madeira), or long-terms of incumbency (Azores and Canary Islands). The Azores and Madeira have had a single-party government, whereas the Canary Islands have followed a coalition formula where a non-state-wide party has a pivotal position in the cabinet. This study covers a period of 40 years (1976–2016) comprising both the first and the latest regional electoral cycles in the three regions. It uses a common framework of analysis, including the following dimensions: (1) pattern of party competition, (2) intra-party democracy and (3) regional economic performance. The understanding of puzzling outcomes requires an in-depth knowledge of the cases. Data sources are rich. Firstly, she assembled new data and evidence on historical background; secondly, institutional dimensions are aggregated through a regional elections, party competition’s features; government constellations and party leaders; thirdly, macroeconomic indicators are set up using several sources of information. Expert interviews were performed in order to shed light onto important events and details that signal the path towards the phenomenon under study: political alternation. 1.3.1  Case Studies Comparative research has frequently overlooked Azores and Madeira. The ‘scale’ and diversity of these regions might be narrow, but the democracy

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performance within them exemplifies the puzzling political outcomes that are taking place at regional level: regional democracies without alternation in office and/or long terms of incumbency. By contrast, some studies have point out the distinctive strengths of the non-state-wide party (Coalición Canarias) within regional and national politics in the Canary Islands (Field & Botti, 2013; Pallarés & Keating, 2003). However, the ‘story behind’ has been hidden as a result of the fact of most of the research is often written in Portuguese and Spanish which limits their impact among a broader audience. This book provides an innovative study, beyond the ‘usual suspects’4 to a wide English audience. It provides theoretical contribution by set up a conceptual discussion of a major political phenomenon of alternation and, empirical evidence using in-depth case-studies. It offers a comprehensive study of political alternation by exploring and explaining the long-lasting processes, historical and political; the different historic experiences and path towards democratization and consequently decentralization across the three cases; the interactions of several factors of regional institutional architectures—parties, actors, economy and social short-cuts—for a comprehensive understanding of regional dynamics and their main political outcomes. The major purpose of this book is to contribute to the comparative literature on regional democracy. An intimacy and in-depth knowledge with the cases is privileged over the relation among variables, in order to achieve the major goal: contextualize institutional and social backgrounds and encourage causal-process analysis of complex entities (Ragin, 1987). I follow a comparative strategy anchored in case-study research. Accounting for empirical regularities in order to evaluate and interpret cases to each other in the light of theories, requires understanding, explaining and interpreting diverse historical outcomes and processes and their significance for current institutional arrangements and political outcomes (Ragin, 1987, pp. 1–6). I underline the main similarities and differences between the cases through dense narratives, accounting for a range of characteristics, together with the interaction within long-lasting processes (Della Porta, 2008; Gerring, 2001; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Focusing on regional units, help us to examine the spatiality uneven nature of major processes of political transformation (Snyder, 2001, 4  The regional studies tend to focus on the ‘usual suspects’ such as Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain and Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom.

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p. 94), avoiding what has been labelled as ‘methodological nationalism’ (Jeffery & Wincott, 2010; Martins, 1974).5 Looking within the state using a regional scale of analysis, this book explores region-level questions in a way that will produce an effective understanding of a broader phenomenon of political alternation exhibited at the regional-level of politics. I do this on the basis of an innovative approach examining three regions within two Southern European countries. The case selection has followed the ‘most similar and most different’ research design. The Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands are three regions set in a larger structure of two multilevel states (Portugal and Spain). Each region is endowed with regional authority. They each have a system of representation and regional executive; and legislative powers over a range of policy areas, such as education, health, infrastructure, environment and culture. The absence of alternation and long-terms of incumbency have turned the regions into party’s strongholds. Thus, these three cases are suitable to examine the drivers of the type of democracy that has evolved in some regions of Europe. The major purpose of this book is to contribute to the comparative literature on regional democracy, placing the diverse factors that might explain political outcomes of regional polities, through the three cases studies. The main findings suggest that institutional factors such as party competition and electoral competitiveness impact on the prospects of political alternation. The ruling party’s leaders have transformed Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands into party strongholds in response to regional autonomy, which in turn jeopardized opposition parties to challenge the incumbents. Likewise, long terms of incumbency clearly have tangled strong political leaders with long-standing economic relationships which have developed the ability to control political apparatus and economic performance. In addition, holding public office enhanced party leader survival and organizational autonomy within party structures. These factors reveal to be strong predictors for incumbents survival in office over time within the three regional democracies—Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands.

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 The assumption that the nation-state is the obvious focus for social science analysis.

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1.3.2  The Structure of the Book The book is organized in two parts: Part I sets the mise-en-scène of the research puzzle (Chap. 1) and then presents a theoretical framework and the literature review regarding the main topics of the book (Chap. 2) which are critical to the framing of research topic of political alternation. Chapter 3 is dedicated to mapping the cases—Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands—, setting a comparative overview of the historical background and the major historical events that triggered into decentralization. Furthermore, it is outlined the regional institutional architectures—institutions, electoral rules and party systems—and the fiscal arrangements that regions are endowed with in order to manage their sources and allocation of resource within territory. Part II offered the empirical research across the cases. Chapter 4 comprises the patterns of party competition through the exploration of their properties from the regional elections results. Additionally, turnout in regional elections is discussed. Chapter 5 takes into account the internal organizational structure of political parties regarding the vertical integration within the territory, the candidate selection and the rules governing the party leader selection. Chapter 6 illustrates the economic performance of regional-scale democracies and some indicators are presented and analytically discussed (regional GDP, unemployment and public debt). As a complement, it describes the regional citizen’s perceptions towards regional economy through three time series provided by the Eurostat Flash Barometer (2012, 2015 and 2018). In the end, she offers a conclusion that reveals the findings across the three case-studies, offers a comparative analysis, and discusses the impacts of this type of outcomes to democracies. This book is about political alternation. It’s about parties and politicians. It’s about power and resources employed to secure dominance over time at the Ilhas Afortunadas6 (Fortunate Islands).

6  Gaspar Frutuoso nicknamed Atlantic islands (Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands and the Cape Verde) in the XVI century as Ilhas Afortunadas (Saudades da Terra, 1873).

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References Primary Sources Público, 27 January 2009.

Secondary Sources Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. (2005). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT Press. Cox, G., & McCubbins, M. (2005). Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the U.S.  House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dandoy, R., & Schakel, A. (2013). Regional and national elections in Western Europe—Territoriality of the vote in thirteen countries, comparative territorial politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Della Porta, D. (2008). Comparative analysis: Case-oriented versus variable-­ oriented. In D. D. Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), Approaches and methodologies in social sciences—A pluralist perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Field, B., & Botti, A. (2013). Politics and society in contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gerring, J. (2001). Social science methodology: A criterial framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Schakel, A. H. (2010). The rise of regional authority. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203852170 Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A., Osterkatz, S. C., Niedzwiecki, S., & Shair-­ Rosenfield, S. (2016). Measuring regional authority—A postfunctionalism, theory of governance I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hough, D., & Jeffery, C. (2006). Devolution and electoral politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Jeffery, C. (2014). Introduction: Regional public attitudes beyond methodological nationalism. In C. Jeffery, D. Wincott, & A. Henderson (Eds.), Citizenship after the nation state—Regionalism, nationalism and public attitudes in Europe (Comparative Territorial Politics Series). UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Jeffery, C., & Wincott, D. (2010). The challenge of territorial politics: Beyond methodological nationalism. In C.  Hay (Ed.), New directions in political science. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Keating, M. (1998). The new regionalism in Western Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

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Keating, M. (2013). Rescaling the European State—The making of territory and the rise of the Meso. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Loughlin, J. (2001). Sub-national democracy in the European Union: Challenges and opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maddens, B., & Libbrecht, L. (2009). How state-wide parties cope with the regionalist issue: The case of Spain. A directional approach. In W. Swenden & B.  Maddens (Eds.), Territorial party politics in Western Europe. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Maddens, B., & Put, G. (2013). The selection of candidates for eligible positions on PR lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999–2010. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 23(1), 49–65. https://doi.org/10.108 0/17457289.2012.743465 Mahoney, J., & Goertz, G. (2006). A tale of two cultures: Contrasting quantitative and qualitative research. Political Analysis, 14, 227–249. https://doi. org/10.1093/pan/mpj017 March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734–749. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961840 Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Schakel, A. (2008). Measuring regional authority. Regional & Federal Studies, 18(2), 111–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13597560801979464 Martins, H. (1974). Time and theory in sociology. In J. Rex (Ed.), Approaches to sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pallarés, F., & Keating, M. (2003). Multi-level electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain. European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030103005 Pasquino, G. (2011). Teorizzare l’alternanza, la sua pratica e la sua mancanza. In G. Pasquino & M. Valbruzzi (Eds.), Il potere dell’alternanza: teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo. Bologna: Bologna University Press. Pempel, T.  J. (1990). Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominance regime. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Przeworski, A. (2009). Self-government in our times. Annual Review of Political Studies, 12, 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.062408.120543 Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the limits of self-government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. A., Cheibub, A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracies and dictatorships. In Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ragin, C. (1987). The comparative method—Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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Ruel, T. (2015). Madeira Regional Election 2015: A polity tyrannized by majorities or the end of an era? Regional & Federal Studies, 25(3), 313–320. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1053876 Ruel, T. (2019). Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-state-wide parties. Regional & Federal Studies, 29(3), 429–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1526786 Schakel, A., & Jeffery, C. (2013). Are regional elections really ‘second order’ elections? Regional & Federal Studies, 47(3), 323–341. https://doi.org/10.108 0/00343404.2012.690069 Schumpeter, J. (1942/2003). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London and New York: Routledge. Snyder, R. (2001). Scaling down: The subnational comparative method. Studies in Comparative International Development, 36(1), 93–110. https://doi. org/10.1007/BF02687586 Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, voters and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stolz, K. (2003). Moving up, moving down: Political careers across territorial levels. European Journal of Political Research, 42, 223–248. https://doi. org/10.1111/1475-6765.00081 Swenden, W. (2006). Federalism and regionalism in Western Europe: A comparative and thematic analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Teruel, J.  R. (2011). Ministerial and ministerial elites in multilevel Spain 1977–2009. Comparative Sociology, 10, 887–907. https://doi.org/10.116 3/156913311X607610 Thorlakson, L. (2009). Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations. Party Politics, 15, 157–177. https://doi. org/10.1177/1354068808099979 Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. New  York; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

2.1   Introduction Alternation, rotation in office or turnover is terms frequently used as synonymous, but their distinctions have not been addressed or analyzed. The topic of political alternation has been neglected by democratic theory, partly due to the assumption that this phenomenon is taken for granted in fully-fledged democracies. “The emergence of alternation in office is the most surprising aspect of democratic history” (Przeworski, 2009, p. 77). However, “the silence of democratic theory, even in its most modern versions about alternation in office is astonishing. Neither Kelsen (1988/1929), nor Schumpeter (1942/2003), Downs (1957), Dahl (1971, 1989), nor Bobbio (1987) ever mention it”. None have paused to consider its consequences. In particular, these theorists who have emphasized the role of political parties in organizing and representing public opinion and who have seen electoral competition among parties as the essential feature of democracy (Przeworski, 2010, p. 78) have overlooked the topic of political alternation. The attempt to understand how parties and politician prolong their tenure in office over time requires establishing a dialogue with several streams of literature that addresses the major elements that frames and set the mechanisms underly the phenomena.

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2.2   What Is Democracy?: A Minimalist Approach Democracy is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956).1 That is, it means many different things to different people. The term derives from the Greek—demos—meaning ‘the people’, and—kratos—which denotes ‘authority’. The classical understanding of democracy was that it vested power in the ‘will of the people’ in order to promote the ‘common good’. Definitions and concepts build on this understanding, but commonly only provide a meaning that is useful in relation to the specific research goals of a given author and the specific cases under analysis (Collier & Lewinsky, 1997, p. 11). Democracy theory has generated many definitions of what democracy should be and what really is, essentially because, as Whitehead observes, “our values may differ or because our political concepts may lack ultimate logical or empirical validation, but also because our political cognition is inherently critical and reflexive” (2002, p. 18). Democratic theory is profuse. No consensus exists on how to define democracy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore all of this literature’s theoretical approaches. Many scholars placed on a continuum ranging from minimalist (procedural) to maximalist variations of democracy (Dahl, 1989; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Schumpeter, 1942/2003). This book takes a perspective focused on assembling the major constellation of attributes that bolster political alternation as an expected outcome of liberal democracies. Accordingly, I follow the minimalist approach which endorses the analytical stringency, precision and clarity (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 13) to the research puzzle. One of the first influential theorists to contribute to the understanding of democracy was Joseph Schumpeter in his seminal work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942/2003). The Schumpeterian approach rejects the classical prescriptive definitions, which state that the people, through their ‘common will’, elect representatives to realize the common good. He asserts that “the democratic method is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people themselves decide issues through the elections of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 250). Thus, he assumes that there is a common good and 1  Contested concepts are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably evolves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie, 1956, p. 167).

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citizens have sovereignty to pursue political decisions and act through rational orientations. Schumpeter advocated a systematic critique of this view, reflecting the fact that citizens are not sufficiently informed or rational enough to carry out these tasks. Contrarily, they are more likely to form irrational opinions or have their options manipulated against their own interests (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, pp. 271–272), to the extent the ‘will of the people’ is not genuine, it’s artificially manufactured by leaders. Thus, Schumpeter emphasizes that democracy is not a mechanism for identifying the ‘will of the people’. It is an institutional mechanism of competitive selection of rulers. That is to say, democracy is a political method, an institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative, and administrative decisions. Hence it cannot be an end in itself (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 242). He describes the democratic method as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people vote” (1942/2003, p. 269). This formulation definitively eliminates assumptions concerning the common good, which emphasizes the institutional mechanism of competition and delinks democracy’s legitimacy from the ‘will of the people’. The Schumpeterian perspective reinforces that democracy is a recognized method for the “free competition for a free vote”, available to communities of any size (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 271) where the citizens have the opportunity to produce governments, that is, accept or reject the people who are to rule them (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, p. 285), through vote.2 In the wake of the Schumpeterian understanding of the merits of electoral competition, William Riker highlighted the virtues of liberal democracy as a form of government. On Liberalism against Populism (Riker, 1965/1982), Riker stands in the Schumpeterian tradition, featuring voting as major attribute, to the extent it involves some kind of popular participation in government (Riker, 1981, p.  95). Voting as a method of aggregating values encloses some properties as necessary conditions to the 2  Schumpeter adds other conditions: (1) appropriate leadership; (2) the effective range of policy decision should not be extended too far; (3) the existence of a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less strong esprit de corps; (4) political leaders should practice a good amount of democratic self-control and mutual respect; (5) a large measure of tolerance for difference of opinion, and (6) all the interests that matter must be nearly unanimous not only in their allegiance to the country but also to the structural principles of the existing society (Schumpeter, 1942/2003, pp. 289–296).

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concept of democracy, namely: (1) participation (in government) where implicitly all the citizens have the possibility to rule and be ruled; (2) liberty, the quintessential condition of free expression of political opposition, a means of minimizing the wrath of the majority; and legal and political equality to take part in the governing of a state (Riker, 1965/1982, pp. 6–8). Moreover, Riker’s argument suggests that holding public office is pro tempore and voting is the mechanism to control officials and avoid tyrannical majorities (Riker, 1965/1982, p. 10). Thus, voting and term limits in power are the sufficient conditions to protect liberty (Riker, 1981, p. 9). Robert Dahl offered one of the most comprehensive contribution on this domain and well-established in the literature in his book Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971). Dahl’s approach distinguished democratic regimes from polyarchy, as a set of institutional arrangements that allows public opposition and establishes the right to participate in politics. Polyarchy is an “ideal system and the institutional arrangement that has come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of an ideal” (Dahl, 1971, p. 9). It is defined as a “system of political control in which the highest officials in government of the state are induced to modify their conduct so as to win elections in political competition with other candidates, parties and groups” (Dahl, 1989, p. 219). In these terms, Dahl formulated a set of institutional guarantees that enlighten polyarchies: (1) the existence of elected officials who control policy and government decisions, (2) the regular practice of free elections, where elected officials are chosen and removed; (3) the inclusiveness of suffrage which guarantees the right to vote to all adults; (4) the right to run for office in the terms of being elected; (5) the protection of freedom of expression such that citizens can express themselves without fear of reprisals; (6) the existence of alternative sources of information regulated and protected by law; (7) the protection of freedom of association, to include political parties and interest groups, (8) and institutions for making government policies depend on the votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl, 1971, 1989). Dahl’s polyarchy relies on two concepts: political contestation and political participation. Political competition is necessary to democratic rule. All democratic political systems must afford the opposition some chance of winning and taking office through free and fair elections; have protections for expression and association freedoms, and have an institutionalized party system. Political participation is guaranteed through popular

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sovereignty and the protection of the right to vote as well as extensive citizens’ participation (Dahl, 1989, pp. 221–223). More recently, Przeworski has defended Schumpeter’s accounts of democracy as a method of leadership selection. Przeworski assumes that Schumpeterian approach takes for granted that alternation in office will occur, based on the assumption that elections will provide political moderation and office holders know that they may be tomorrow’s opposition, so, it impels them to act with restraint (1999, pp.  45–46). Przeworski defines democracy simply as “a system in which parties loses elections” (1991, p. 10) and “those who govern are selected through contested elections” (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 15). He considers that a democracy’s operational terms should provide the selection of the executive and legislative branches through contested elections; the presence of more than one party and chances for political alternation, after a reasonable interval (two terms). Thus, competitive election is a condition in which incumbents face a chance of being voted out of office (Przeworski et al., 2000, pp. 15–28). Przeworski’s work is the first to identify alternation in office as the prima facie evidence of contestation (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 16) if the voters so decided (Przeworski, 2010, pp. 166–167). Contestation entails three main features, namely: i) ex-ante uncertainty, where there is some positive probability that at least one member of the incumbent coalition will lose in a particular round of elections, that is, the eventual outcome is unknown ex-ante; ii) ex-post irreversibility, that whoever wins elections will be allowed to assume office; and iii) repeatability, the elections must be repeated regularly and all political outcomes must be temporary (Przeworski et  al., 2000, pp.  17–18). Nevertheless, holding elections is not a sufficient condition for a regime to qualify as democratic. It is necessary to guarantee that the losers are allowed to compete, win, and assume office (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 18). Further research has followed Schumpeterian strand. For example, Giuseppe Di Palma has characterized democracy as a political regime that is “premised on free and fair suffrage in a context of civil liberties, on competitive parties, on the selection of alternative candidates for office and on the presence of political institutions that regulate and guarantee the roles of government and opposition” (1990, p. 16). Similarly, Norberto Bobbio described the democratic system as one in which power is exerted in the name of or on behalf of the people by the virtue of the procedure of elections (1987, p. 25). Birgham Powell also distinguished the value for democratic processes of competitive elections where several political parties

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organize political alternatives facing voters and in which citizens are eligible to participate (1984, p. 93). Several criticisms have been made regarding the minimalist defining features of democracy, namely, the excessive focus on the electoral attribute—“fallacy of electoralism” (Diamond, 1999, p.  9)—to the extent that, contestation had neglected other dimensions (for example civil liberties or inclusiveness) that should be accounted for as a ‘building block’ of democracy properties. Recently, research on the quality of democracy has deserved attention from political scientists (Beetham, Bracking, Kearton, & Weir, 2002; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Morlino, 1998; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). These research agenda has drawn some important insights into clarifying democracy’s conceptual framework. For instance, Schmitter and Karl have discussed around “What democracy is … and is not”. The authors stressed that democracy is not only a unique and equal set of institutions, it is a “system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (1991, p.  76). Additionally, O’Donnell emphasizes participation, claiming that in a “democratic regime, the access to the main governmental positions is decided by elections that are competitive, free, egalitarian, decisive and inclusive, and those who vote have the right to be elected […] and at least two competitive parties have a reasonable chance to make their views known to all voters” (O’Donnell, 2004, pp. 14–15). These democracy definitions discussed here acknowledge, in particular, the electoral attribute and thus, as the institutional driver to selection of rulers through competitive popular vote.

2.3   Party Competition Liberal democracies are characterized by competition for power and political parties are the political bodies that makes democracy “the only game in town” (Przeworski, 1991). Party competition is a manner of alternation of parties in office (Schlesinger, 1984). Departing from Sartori’s classical definition of a party system as “the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (1976, p. 44), party system determines, lato sensu, which parties would be permanently excluded from government while, others always govern (1976, p. 139).

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Researchers have long sought to classify party systems, from Duverger (1954) to Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968) to Rokkan (1968) to Sartori’s typology (1976) or Mair (1997). Political parties are the intermediate structures between society and government capable of placing, through elections, candidates for public office (Sartori, 1976, p. 64), and thus, distinctive types of party systems might produce distinctive opportunities for alternation in power. Giovanni Sartori’s framework of analysis establishes the patterns of competition in the European party systems through the number of parties and their ideological distance. He settled the ‘counting rules’ to assess relevant parties within the party system. Political parties are relevant when they have coalition or blackmail potential. Coalition potential depends on parties’ ability to form governmental coalitions and/or support government, whereas blackmail potential refers to the impact on direction of party competition. That is to say, parties are considered relevant when they influence the competition and the formation of government. The relevance of political parties is understood in light of the party systems format, i.e., the number and the relative strength of interacting units and the direction adopted by the electoral ‘outbidding’. The format of party systems is grouped into two parties, those with up to five parties (limited pluralism) and those with six parties or more (extreme pluralism) (Sartori, 1976, pp. 119–129). A two-party system is characterized by two major political parties which “usually take form of a choice between two alternatives” (Duverger, 1959, p.  215) and that alternate in power. These two parties have the same chances of winning elections and form single-party governments without coalitions. By contrast, in a multiparty system there are three to five political parties of different size. None of them have enough electoral strength to govern alone. In multiparty systems, the coalition partnership depends on ideological polarization within parties. Sartori distinguished moderate pluralism from polarized pluralism. In moderate pluralism, the relevant parties in the system are ideologically close and cabinet-oriented. The system of moderate pluralism is characterized by centripetal competition where the main parties tend to converge to the center of the left-right spectrum in order to capture the median voter. Polarized pluralism systems have relevant anti-system parties. The left-to-right spectrum is occupied by one party or a group of parties and the competition tends to be pushed from the center to the extremes (Sartori, 1976, p. 135).

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Predominant party format is critical to my research reasoning. A predominant party system is characterized by one party rule using a single-­ government formula over a long period of time,3 controlling an absolute majority of seats in the legislature (Sartori, 1976, p.  124). That is, it reflects “a power configuration in which one party governs alone, without being subject to alternation, as long as it continues to win electorally an absolute majority” (Sartori, 1976, p. 196). This type of party system signals a low degree of contestation in which, despite the existence of free and fair elections, a political party controls the public office over an extended period of time while other parties are “without hope of being in government” (Ware, 1996, p. 159). Following Sartori’s understanding, Peter Mair provides a contribution framed by the structures of competition. Structures of competition capture the stability among political parties’ interactions regarding partisan composition of government. Structures of competition can be either closed (and predictable) or open, depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or familiarity in government formation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The structure of competition is closed when there is either total or absence of alternation; the governing formula is stable and familiar; and the access to government is restricted to a few parties. That is to say, protagonists and the patterns of their alliances are stable. By contrast, the structure of competition is open when governments have partial political alternation; the governing alternatives lack stable composition and all parties have the possibility to participate in government (Mair, 1996, pp. 1–22). The Sartorian typology of party systems and the structures of competition offered by Mair set up the configuration of the political party’s interactions within the system. They either define parties’ likelihood to get into power and/or the parties or coalitions that would be systematically excluded from government. These contributions are important endeavors to signal and understand the puzzling outcomes of party competition and the likelihood of political alternation in a given political system.

3  Sartori considers the length of incumbency (three consecutive legislatures at least) and the threshold of 50% of seats (1976, p. 196).

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2.4   Political Alternation: A Bird Eye View Alternation in government is not in itself a blessing. Let us admit that it is desirable in general and in the abstract that, where a country is divided between two blocs, each of them should some day come to power, one of them should not be condemned to the ungrateful role of a perpetual opposition. But having said that, we should not change government unless the new oneholds out more hope than the old. (Aron, 1982, p. 3)

In Western democracies it is assumed that political parties compete for power and incumbents will be regularly replaced. In competitive polities, political alternation is the ‘gold standard’ and an indicator of the existence of competition for popular vote (Schumpeter, 1942/2003). Diverse empirical perspectives have supported the conceptualization of political alternation. Nevertheless, conceptual boundaries are vague and ambiguous. Setting up a definition, establishing its properties and the cut-­ off points, goes beyond prescriptive impetus. Addressing a political phenomenon requires the identification and delimiting of ‘what-is’ at stake (Mair, 2008; Sartori, 1970). Every research starts by addressing the phenomenon under study, the ‘basic unit of thinking’ (Sartori, 1970). The ‘good practices’ of concept formation states that when a researcher wants to have a more general concept, she tends to lessen the properties or attributes she considers (extension); or when she wants a narrower concept she adds more attributes (intension). Thus, when a list of attributes of a concept increases, the set of objects to which this concept applies will narrow and conversely the more limited the characteristics and properties of a concept, the larger the class of ‘things’ to which it refers (Gerring, 2001; Goertz, 2006; Mair, 2008; Sartori, 1970). The major goal of concept formation is to capture the meaning and have a denotative concept able to travel when applied to different contexts to avoid ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1970). Etymologically, alternation comes from the Latin word alternate which means ‘the act of changing from one thing to another’ (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). In a democratic context, political alternation is anchored on the normative assumption that people (demos) have the expectation to use their power (kratos) to throw the incumbents by opposition, in a given election.

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Aristotelian assumption serves as departing point to understand the role of alternation. Based on Hansen (1991), alternation is the essential prescriptive mechanism that couples democracy to liberty, as it illuminates that everyone “would rule and be ruled in turn”: A basic principle of democratic constitution is liberty. That is commonly said, and those who say it imply that only in this constitution do men share in liberty; for that, they said, is what every democracy aims at. Now, one aspect of liberty is being ruling in turn. … Another element is to live as you like … So this is, the second defining principle of democracy, and from it has come the ideal of not being ruled, not by anybody if possible, or at least only in turn. (Cited in Hansen, 1991, p. 74)

However, the method for the selection of public officers was predominantly lot in an equal procedural chance to govern, with short terms in office and restrictions on reelection. By contrast, modern democracies are representative, and elections are the mechanism to ruler’s selection (Manin, 1997). As Lipset argued, in democratic regimes is provided regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office (1963, p. 27). In representative democracies, political alternation is described as a natural outcome of democratic competition (Ieraci, 2012, p. 530) or an intrinsic outcome of party competition (Sartori, 1976, p. 186), but then, little research has been done on it. In the operationalization of the Mair scheme of the structures of competition he had advanced three indexes, as an attempt to look at changes in government (degree of government alternation). In proposing the index of government alternation (IGA), Mair adapted Pedersen’s volatility index to the measurement of ministerial volatility, which in practice, measured the degree of government staff changes (total, partial or none) within cabinet; the innovative governmental formulas was captured by the index of innovative alternation (IIA) which accounted for the number of innovative governments, and the index of openness (IO) measured political parties’ access to government (Mair, 2007, p. 140). In those operationalization purposes, Mair has, en passant, stated that “government alternation involves the introduction into office of new (previously non-­ governing) political parties” (Mair, 2007, p. 140). However, Mair defined

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individual governments in a coalition format and considered government alternation exclusively in terms of changes in partisan composition (when a party leaves the cabinet or joins the cabinet), rather than when elections of a prime minister and replacement occur without a partisan change. Changes in party composition and political alternation had been mistakenly understood as synonymous. Modifications in partisan composition of governments (partly, wholesale or total) and a prime-minister replacement without a partisan change are events that might occur in the absence of political alternation. Some conceptual ambiguity prevailed until the beginning of the twenty-­ first century when some scholars started to develop contextual-based research in order to establish a fine-grained structure of meaning and its referents regarding political alternation concept. The study conducted by Kaiser et al. (2002) assumed that the possibility of alternation is a function of accountability. The authors’ argument departed from the assumption that “political systems which grant the minimum chance of alternation in power can be expected to take voters preferences and to be responsive regarding policy outputs” (2002, p. 315). Alternation is, according to the authors, restricted to the change of the major governing party whether it is governing alone or in a coalition (2002, p. 316). Thus, they emphasized some institutional factors that favor alternation, not on the question of whether it will occur. Electoral system disproportionality and low number of relevant parties fosters change in governmental coalitions; a bipartisan and predominant party systems offers a strong chance of total changes in government (2002, p. 318). In the same vein, Horowitz et al. (2009) have looked at change in the ruling leader or leaders in post-communist countries, measuring the frequency of government turnover. They distinguished leadership turnover—change in rulers—and ideological turnover—change in rulers’ ideological and policy preferences, and their contrasting effects on different institutional and policy outcome (2009, p. 110). The authors established two possible thresholds for government turnover: “one rule would be to count turnover as occurring if these remaining or overlapping parties are in the minority within the coalition. A stricter rule would count an alternation only if the remaining parties are not necessary to form the new majority coalition” (2009, p.  111). Thus, government alternation is framed as partisan composition change. Notwithstanding such efforts to operationalize alternation, the definition is still equivocal in which political

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alternation appears to be tangled with governmental change and cabinet turnover. Przeworski et  al. (2000) labeled political alternation the prima facie evidence of contestation. In Self-government in our times (2009) and Democracy and the limits of self-government (2010) Przeworski offered a discussion of an understanding of the merits of alternation for civic peace, self-government, and political participation. His argument started with some ‘big prescriptions’ for electing government and the merits of representative democracies: “representative governments were designed as a bulwark against despotism, to disable governments from doing much of anything, bad or good, by checking and balancing powers and protecting the status quo from the will of majority” (2010, p. 162). In practice, he emphasizes that “peaceful alternation (without bloodshed) was rare until the last quarter of twenty century. As suddenly and unexpected, and especially since 1990, alternation became more and more frequent, and then less sudden and expected, enforced by the claim that if we are ruled by others, we can be ruled by different others, in turn” (2009, p. 164). Alternation is the expression that opposition has the opportunity to win in a given electoral competition (Przeworski, 2005, pp. 266–7) and defeat the rulers (2010, p. 169). Thus, he set a major conceptual cut-off point of alternation definition: rulers might be replaced in power, through electoral competition, by the opposition parties. Likewise, Curini and Zucchini (2012) made a major input through the conceptual disentangle among cabinet turnover and political alternation. They clarified that cabinet turnover does not necessarily imply government alternation to extent that, the rotation of leaders from incumbent parties or the replacement of some cabinet members cannot be considered, lato sensu, an example of change in power (2012, p. 828). Rather, government alternation implies a new coalition and the preferences of the incoming cabinet should be far enough from the status quo in many policies areas (Curini & Zucchini, 2012, pp. 828–829). Ieraci (2012) also recognized the normative value of government alternation as natural outcome of democratic competition, although not all democratic political systems display it. The author argues that a “perfect government alternation mean an unbroken series of complete change of the incumbent, i.e., one party or coalition of parties substituting another after a crisis or an election” (2012, p. 530). The author has elaborated an index—the government turnover index (GTI)—to measure the effective

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degree of government alternation among parties in the contemporary European democracies. It shows some factors might favor or hinder government alternation, such as party system format or institutional factors (2012, p. 530). Gianfranco Pasquino overcame this conceptual ambiguity that has persisted over time. He challenged the ex-ante assumptions, and presented, in a low level of abstraction, the most comprehensive insight into the concept formation of political alternation. Il potere dell’alternanza—Teorie e richerche sui cambi di governo set up the conceptual boundaries, the main attributes and the cut-off points of the concept, that is, what is alternation and is not. Pasquino defined political alternation as the “replacement of a government with a completely different composition, in terms of political parties and members, from the government that has been replaced” (2011, p.  21). That is, alternation designates the process of complete removal among governments which “who were in government at time t-1, no longer has to be at time t” (2011, pp. 21–22). That is to say, political alternation takes place when political parties and its members are completely removed from office, in particular by opposition parties. The mechanism which drives into political alternation is political competition at elections time. Cabinet change or government turnover are ascertained by political actors (according to intra or extra-institutional factors), but it is not an outcome of voters’ preferences. Returning to Aristoteles, political alternation involves ‘rule and being ruled in turn’. Public office is an intrinsic goal to politicians and winning office and survival in it are the essence of politics (Downs, 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Most extensive work has been doing on this strand have followed different bulks of literature, based on government formation and party dominance centered on country-studies. Several democracies have experienced periods of single-party dominance. Paradigmatic cases include such as Italy in the post-war period with Christian-Democrats (1946–1992); Japan from 1960 through the mid-1990s; Sweden from 1932 to 1976; and Israel until 1977. Party dominance occurs when a party controls power over a long period of time, “for a generation or more” (Duverger, 1954, p. 308), that is “significantly strong than the others” (Sartori, 1976, p. 193). A political party that wins elections over an extended period of time, while opposition constantly fails to meet alternation rule is considered ‘uncommon’ within liberal democracies (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Pempel, 1990; Vampa, 2018). As Pempel

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highlights, despite “free electoral competition, relatively open informative systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of political association, a single-party has managed to govern alone or as a primary and on-going partner in coalitions, without interruption for a substantial period of time” (1990, p. 1). This dominance is revealed over the electorate, political parties, over government formation and over public policy agenda (1990, pp. 3–4).4 Several explanatory factors have been put in place for democracies that have experienced long periods of single-party dominance in power, in particular the median voter position (Downs, 1957; Riker, 1976; Sartori, 1976; Cox, 1997); electoral rules (Duverger, 1954; Greene, 2007; Lijphart, 1994); socioeconomic coalitions (Pempel, 1990); resource availability and incumbency advantages (Greene, 2007; Levintsky & Way, 2010) and the historical legacies (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Vampa, 2018). Some scholars have investigated the duration of cabinets; political and ideological determinants of cabinet survival and termination (King et al., 1990; Laver, 2003; Warwick, 1994), while others have focused on leader duration at chief executive (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), presidents (Samuels, 2004) or party leaders (Andrews & Jackman, 2008). The regional democracy literature has focused its attention, particularly, on variations in regional elections (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013, Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery & Hough, 2003; Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Schakel, 2017); party system congruence (Thorlakson, 2007); and regional government formation (Bäck, Debus, Müller, & Bäck, 2013; Däubler & Debus, 2009; Debus, 2008; Deschouwer 2009; Falcó-Gimeno & Verge, 2013; Ştefuriuc 2009). Drawing on theories of government formation literature developed at national level has emphasized the interaction among national and regional levels, highlighting the congruence or incongruence between governments formed across levels. Recently, Schakel & Massetti (2018) have accounted for the sources of regional government composition and alternation, underlining the impact of institutional factors, for instance the electoral rules or the scope of political authority on the likelihood of government alternation. Evidence point out 4  Pempel established four dimensions of party dominance: (1) a party must be dominant in numbers, it must hold more legislative seats than its opponents; (2) a party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position over other parties; (3) a party must be dominant in terms of time in power and (4) a party must be dominant in the public office (1990, pp. 3–4).

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that strong regional parties, once in office, tend to prolong their tenure in office (2018, pp. 719–720). Furthermore, institutional variables have been identified as major factors that influence the distinctive behavior of regions within multilevel states. These include social cleavages and local identities (De Winter & Tursan, 1998; Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery & Hough, 2003; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983); electoral rules, electoral calendars and coattails effect (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995, 1989; Anderson, 2006; León, 2012); economic swings from national to regional levels and the formal or informal linkages within national and regional levels of authority (Key, 1953; Snyder, 2001; Gibson, 2005). However, political alternation at regional level is not a common feature in Western democracies (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel & Massetti, 2018).

2.5   Chapter Final Remarks In this chapter I revise theories and concepts critical to frame my argument. Setting the key-concept and connecting perspectives that are important to address the topic of this book—political alternation. Political alternation definition is still equivocal in which political alternation appears to be tangled with governmental change or cabinet turnover. Nevertheless, the literature has made some efforts to operationalize it. In the end, I’ve underlined the major research advances through the regional politics literature.

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Aron, R. (1982). Alternation in government in the industrialized countries. Government and Opposition, 17(1), 3–21. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1982.tb00675.x Bäck, H., Debus, M., Müller, J., & Bäck, H. (2013). Regional government formation in varying multi-level contexts: A comparison of eight European countries. Regional Studies, 47(3), 368–387. https://doi.org/10.1080/0034340 4.2012.733072 Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton, I., & Weir, S. (2002). The IDEA handbook on democracy assessment. The Hague: IDEA/Kluwer Law International. Blondel, J. (1968). Party systems and patterns of government in western democracies. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1(2), 180–203. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0008423900036507 Bobbio, N. (1987). The future of democracy: A defense of rules of the game. Polity Press. Bogaards, M., & Boucek, F. (2010). Dominant political parties and democracy: Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons. London and New York: Routledge/ ECPR Studies in European Political Science. Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. (2005). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT Press. Collier, D., & Lewinsky, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research. World Politics, 49(3), 430–451. Cox, G. (1997). Making votes count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Curini, L., & Zucchini, F. (2012). Government alternation and legislative party unity: The case of Italy 1988–2008. West European Politics, 35(1), 826–846. Dahl, R. (1966). Political opposition in western democracies. New-Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New-Haven: Yale University Press. Dandoy, R., & Schakel, A. (Eds.). (2013). Regional and national elections in Western Europe: Territoriality of the vote in thirteen countries. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Däubler, T., & Debus, M. (2009). Government formation and policy formulation in the German states. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(1), 73–95. https://doi. org/10.1080/13597560802692322 De Winter, L., & Tursan, T. (Eds.). (1998). Regionalist parties in Western Europe. London: Routledge. Debus, M. (2008). Party competition and government formation in multi-level settings: Evidence from Germany. Government and Opposition, 43, 505–538. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2008.00267.x

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Pallarés, F., & Keating, M. (2003). Multi-level electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain. European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030103005 Pasquino, G. (2011). Teorizzare l’alternanza, la sua pratica e la sua mancanza. In G. Pasquino & M. Valbruzzi (Eds.), Il potere dell'alternanza: teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo. Bologna: Bologna University Press. Pempel, T.  J. (1990). Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominance regime. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Powell, B.  G. (1984). Party systems and election outcomes. In Contemporary democracies—Participation, stability and violence. President and Fellows of Harvard College, Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market—Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A. (1999). Minimalist conception of democracy: A defense. In I.  Shapiro & C.  Hacker-Cordón (Eds.), Democracy’s value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A. (2005). Democracy as an equilibrium. Public Choice, 123, 253–273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4 Przeworski, A. (2009). Self-government in our times. Annual Review of Political Studies, 12, 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.062408.120543 Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the limits of self-government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracies and dictatorships. In Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. Riker, W. (1965/1982). Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. Riker, W. (1976). The number of political parties: A reexamination of Duverger’s law. Comparative Politics, 9(1), 93–106. https://doi.org/10.2307/421293 Riker, W. (1981). A confrontation between the theory of social choice and the theory of democracy. In R. L. Braham (Ed.), Social justice. Dordrecht: Springer. Rokkan, S. (1968). The comparative study of nation-building. International Social Science Council, 7(3), 51–52. Rokkan, S., & Urwin, D. (1983). Economy, territory, identity: Politics of West European peripheries. London: Sage. Samuels, D. (2004). Presidentialism and accountability for the economy in comparative perspective. American Political Science Review, 98(3), 425–436. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540400125X Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. The American Political Science Review, 64(4), 1033–1053. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356 Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems—A framework of analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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CHAPTER 3

Mapping the Cases: The Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands

3.1   Introduction The primary objective of any state—as Rokkan and Urwin put it—is to preserve the integrity of the territory and to ensure within these borders the legitimacy of its existence trough obtaining popular support legitimacy for and acquiescence of its political authority (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983, p. 166). Territory is a critical feature of political and social life. It provides the basis for political action, representation, and accountability; political mobilization and policy-making, intimately linked to identity and sense of belonging of a political community (Keating, 1998; Hepburn, 2010). The post-Westefalian period had demonstrated the importance of regions and sub-national territories to politics, beyond the nation-state. Since the end of the Second World War, states in Europe evolved to a convergence strategy in order to balance regional development, especially in poorer territories, within national states. Economic objectives and scale planning were defined as major goals seeking to minimize disparities, motivated by the need of central governments to ease the weight of the status apparatus to a lower level of political authority (Keating, 1998, 2013; Hepburn & Detterbeck, 2018). These top-down regional policies (‘regionalization’) contributed to the emergence of territorial demands for accommodation and recognition of some political communities (‘regionalism’), which enhanced the prospects of decentralization and territorial rescaling (Wallace, 1994; Keating, 2013). © The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_3

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In the late 1980s, the recognition of territorial and functional differentiation of the sub-state level became widely disseminated as a way to improve decision-making, the legitimacy and accountability of political institutions, and efficiency on the delivery of public services and policy innovation (Keating, 1998; León, 2010; Loughlin, 2001; Rodden, 2004; Sharpe, 1993). Therefore, in the last five decades regions assumed a key role on politics and enhanced their authority scope (Keating, 1998; Hooghe et al., 2016). States engaged in distinctive forms of transference of political authority and policy competences to the regional tier of government. Some countries have established a federal model (Germany), others asymmetric forms of federalism (Spain) and regionalization/decentralization (Italy, UK, Portugal or Finland), while some have engaged in modest forms of delegation of competences to specific regions (France). These major transformations of political authority, from the national to the regional level, show that in contemporary times the nation-state is no longer the primary form in which political authority is exercised. The Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands exemplify the new landscape. They are islands territories with some of the most innovative autonomy arrangements within the states. Some islands have often rejected independence and others favoured the development of distinctive (and diverse) constitutional arrangements within state or supranational bodies (Watts, 2000; Baldacchino, 2006). Insular territories present a critical space in which to develop innovative formulas of territorial autonomy within larger territories, in which, autonomy arrangements has been negotiated, exercised and enhanced through relations of dependence and interdependence with the national political structures (Hepburn, 2012, p. 119) and thus, the type of democracy that these polities might shape within multilevel states.

3.2   Portugal: The Structure of the State— Unitary and Decentralized Portugal has been one of the most unified nation-states in Europe notwithstanding its annexation to Spain during the sixteen and seventeen centuries. Since then, the structure of the state as unitary and decentralized remains stable. The 1976 Constitution establishes that “the state shall be unitary and shall be organised and function in such a way as to respect the autonomous island system of self-government and the principles of

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subsidiarity, autonomy of local authorities and the democratic decentralisation of the public administration” (Article 6, CPR, 1976). Portugal underwent a process of decentralization and/or regionalization with the third wave of democratization in 1974 (Ruel, 2015, 2017, 2019). The vertical organization of the state was established by the 1976 Constitution along two tiered sub-national systems: the regional level through the autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira) and the local level with 308 municipalities and 3095 parishes.1 The regional tier of government entitled the autonomous regions self-government in order to guarantee democratic participation of the islanders, to promote regional economic and social development, to defend the interests of the islands, but also to strength national unity and solidarity between all Portuguese citizens (Article 235, 2°, CPR, 1976). After the discovery of the Atlantic islands in the fifteenth century,2 the administration of the Azores and Madeira has been divided into captaincies (capitanias) headed by grantees (capitães donatários) who governed the islands according to the dictates of the Portuguese Crown (Oliveira, 1996; Vieira, 1997, 2001). Liberalism period brought new avenues regarding the administration of the two Atlantic islands, named as 1  The administrative reform of the state held in 2013 (Lei da reorganização administrativa do território das freguesias—Law nr. 11-A/2013, 28th January) determined some amalgamation arrangements at the parish level. At municipal level this intent was postponed. Additionally, a supra-municipal arrangement emerged (in the mainland)—Inter-municipal communities (Comunidades Intermunicipais). Inter-municipal Communities is a cooperative arrangement of public service delivery of local policies in a coordinated approach of issues that goes beyond municipal borders (Teles, 2016). In terms of scope these entities are administrative and non-elected bodies, composed by the mayors (aggregated by geographic area). Moreover, the mainland territory is organized according to NUTS II (Norte, Centro, Lisboa, Alentejo and Algarve) through the Commissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional which shapes the deconcentrácion of the state in the territory (mainland). The regionalization process across the mainland remains as ‘wishful thinking’ issue. In the referendum held in November 1998, 2/3 of voters rejected the reform. 2  Portuguese and Flemish people and knights began to settle in the Azores after the island was found. The Azores constituted an important geographic asset in ‘New World’ commercial routes, in particular to America. Europeans (English, Italians and Spanish) brought Arabic and African slaves, taking large parcels of land for farming. The Portuguese archipelagos were part of the slave route, Madeira was particularly significant. Sugar, cereals and the wine economies also contributed to both regions’ strategic and geographic importance on the commercial routes. During maritime expansion, the Atlantic islands were a strategic point for the deployment of a system of colonisation based on commercial exploitation of certain primary goods.

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Ilhas Adjacentes.3 During the nineteen and twenty centuries Portuguese political elites at the islands began to equate the idea of territorial autonomy within the state. A regional consciousness against the centralising tendencies had been growing since 1880–1885, due some restrictions imposed by the national government to local entrepreneurs regarding the alcohol activity in São Miguel and Terceira islands (Azores) (Monjardino, 1990). The insular territories recognized due to their geographic status (remoteness) of being surrounded by the sea and cut off from the mainland (Selwyn, 1980; Royle, 2001), their constraints to accede to resources (poverty and economic dependency from the exterior), gave them the argument to demand regional autonomy from state-level. The a first ‘autonomic movement’ among the two territories emerged in Azores at the beginning of the twentieth century when Aristides Moreira da Mota demanded a distinctive, decentralized form of government for the region. He called for an administrative structure (Juntas Gerais) with deliberative powers on issues in particular to organize the public administration at regional level. This proposal had gained broad support in the islands. However the dissolution of the national parliament postponed its intents. In March 1895, the 2nd March Decree led to the institution of a decentralized administrative structure, firstly in the Azores—Ponta Delgada, Angra do Heroísmo, and Horta autonomous districts (Distritos Autónomos)—ensuring free administration of Azores by Azorean people (Livre Admnistração dos Açores pelos Açorianos). In 1901, this institutional arrangement was extended to Madeira (Leite, 1989a). During the early twentieth century, the first ‘separatist movements’ emerged, led by some 3  Some regional newspapers appeared in Madeira: O Patriota Funchalense (1821–1823); Independência (1928–1933); Jornal da Madeira—o Jornal (1906–1910); Diário da Madeira (1880); Correio da Madeira (1922); Trabalho e União (1907–1931) which have a strong regionalist orientation. Liga Regional (1928–1930) emerged as a regionalist project which had as major goal to become a regionalist party in order to defend regional interests within the country. Despite its failure, it had mobilized large sectors of the society and some consciousness arose. The Azorean identity, identified as the islanders’ way of living was documented by some Azorean writers across the world, such as Vitorino Nemésio (1944), José Martins Garcia (1987) or João de Melo. Gaspar Frutuoso’ Saudades da Terra pointed out since the sixteenth century the islands specifies within the Atlantic.

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immigrants, decrying British and American imperialism. Those claims were reinforced, particularly, against the Americans because USA sought to locate military bases in Ponta Delgada in the Azores during the First World War (Leite, 1989a). Eduardo Antonino Pestana launched the second wave of ‘autonomist movements’ from Madeira in 1920, triggered by economic and financial asphyxia from the central government to cereal and sugar industries and the lack of investment in tourism-supporting infrastructure (Veríssimo, 1991). Celebrations of the fifth centenary of Madeira’s discovery (1919) reinforced regional demands for autonomy. Manuel Pestana Reis assumed control of demands, lodging a strong regionalist claim, demanding the establishment of an autonomic arrangement to Madeira and Azores, recognizing their geographic status in the Atlantic, their commercial relationship with the world and their traditions and calling for differentiation regarding institutional arrangements of governance to those who lived in Madeira’s region (Reis, 1992). Three critical events took place during 1930s in Madeira during the Estado Novo dictatorial regime: the Revolta da Madeira (Madeira’s Revolt) in 1931, Revolta da Farinha (Flour’s Revolt) in 1934 and Revolta do Leite (Milk’s Revolt) in 1936. Those events represented the reaction against the monopoly of the cereal, sugar and milk transformation and distributions from middle-class landowners to big landlords. It had increased the price of the products and led to popular demonstrations and boycotts, in particular among dockers sector. Its impacts were extended to Azores and to African colonies where the transgressors were exiled, namely, in Azores and Cape Verde (Freitas, 2011; Nepomuceno, 2006).4 4  Since the population settlement in Madeira (XV century) the exploration of the land was made under Sesmarias rule. It was a medieval form of granting uncultivated land for settlement and improvement. In 1496 the Crown (D. Manuel I) introduced an agrarian contract named Contrato de Colonia (Colonia tenancy contract) (Serrão, 1992), a customary system of land-holding between aristocracy (landowners) (senhorios) and peasants (colonos). This Contrato de Colonia was grounded on a feudal model and has structured not only the economic production (wine, sugar, linen) but also the social structure in Madeira Island (Câmara 2002; Lizardo, 2015; Ruel, 2015). The state organized productive activity around a classe gardée which concentrated all resources, especially within British people (Freitas, 1984). A mercantilist economic model fostered a rigidly hierarchical society in which the majority of the population was dependent of small elite, which means, an exploited group organized by a patrimonial state (Ruel, 2015, 2017). It lasted until the democratic period (1976/1977) when the dependence of landlords was abolished and the property rights have returned to the farmers.

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In 1940, Salazar approved the statutes of autonomous districts (Estatutos dos Distritos Autónomous da Ilhas Adjacentes) in order to restore some social stability to the insular territories which allowed some regional income adjustments and taxes reduction. However, the strong budgetary discipline has postponed the decision (Leite, 1989b, 1995; Vieira, 2001). The primavera Marcelista (1969–1974), the period that followed the Salazar rule, re-opened the debate around territorial issues. A Carta ao Governador (22nd April, 1969), the Comércio do Funchal and the Grupo do Pombal assumed a strong opposition to dictatorship in Madeira. These social movements required regional structures of government to the island territories towards regional development (Veríssimo, 1991; Nepomuceno, 2006). Estado Novo’ liberalization opened some prospects towards decentralization. Carnation Revolution (Revolução dos Cravos) in 24th April 1974—a non-hierarchical military coup, conducted by left-wing military officers—had culminated with the democratization process after forty eight years of dictatorship. Portugal signed up the ‘third wave’ of democratization in 1974 and underwent a transition to democracy (1974–1976). This period was marked by significant political instability and polarization, especially among the leftist bloc regarding the institutional design of the forthcoming democratic institutions (Pinto, 2003). Political polarization also spread to the insular territories. Two ideological blocs emerged in the transition to democracy: those who defended a separatist and independentism formula and those who demanded a territorial autonomy arrangement (Ferreira, 1995, p.  181). The radicalization and the fear of communist takeover during the PREC (Processo Revolucionário em Curso— Revolutionary Process under way) in 1975 led to the rise of two major separatist movements in the Azores and Madeira,5 claiming a self-­ government rule in a radical rupture with the state. 5  The two most representative were the Frente de Libertação dos Açores (FLA—Azores Liberation Front) and Frente de Libertação da Madeira (FLAMA—Madeira Liberation Front). They have an anti-communist orientation that demanded independence for the islands territories. The Azorean Front had a strong programmatic orientation against the centralization tendencies of the state and claims for independence. In Madeira, FLAMA reflected an opposition to the communists in Lisbon. However, other movements have gained expression during this period, in particular in Azores. For example: Comité Açoriano 75; FRIA (Frente Revolucionária para a Independência dos Açores); MIRA (Movimento de Independência Revolucionária dos Açores), or MAPA (Movimento de auto-determinação do povo Açoriano).

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The Constitution-making phase (1975–1976) was marked by strong political tensions and violent episodes in Azores and Madeira. In April 1975 Américo Tomaz and Marcelo Caetano6 were exiled in Madeira, which has prompted popular demonstrations demanding the ‘purge of fascists’. Powerful events emerged led by the separatist groups, in particular, bombing-attacks and assaults to the leftist-wing headquarters in the region. Concomitantly, some political parties and regional political groups arose and gained leverage and popular support, especially in the left-wing (Nepomuceno, 2006).7 A turning point on territorial issues arose from the Azorean archipelago came on sixth June 1975.8 A farmer demonstration in Ponta Delgada erupted, organized by rural property owners. The high costs of production and transformation were the driving force in the protests, which had mobilized other sectors of the economy, concomitantly, threatened by the agrarian reforms under way in the mainland. Some separatist movements In Madeira, MAIA (Movimento de Autonomia das Ilhas Atlânticas); APAM (Associação Política do Arquipélago da Madeira); FPDM (Frente Popular Democrática da Madeira); EM (Esquadrão da Morte); JAM (Juventude do Arquipélago da Madeira); MAC (Movimento Anticomunista); MIM (Movimento Independentista da Madeira); MPLAM (Movimento Popular de Libertação do Arquipélago da Madeira); UPM (União do Povo da Madeira) and UNI-I-ARMA (União dos Independentistas do Arquipélago da Madeira). There exist scarce information and academic inquiry in this topic, regarding the separatist movements that erupted during the revolutionary process into archipelagos. It’s important to signalize that those separatist movements operated clandestinely. 6  Américo Tomaz was the last President of the Portuguese Republic of the Estado Novo’ dictatorship (1958–1974) and Marcelo Caetano served as Prime-Minister (Presidente do Conselho de Ministros) after Salazar’ death, from 1968 until the Carnation Revolution (1974). 7  In Azores, UDA (União Democrática Atlântica), PDC (Partido de Democracia Cristã); MIRN (Partido Independente para a Reconstrução Nacional); FEPU (Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido); LAPA (Liga Acção Patriótica dos Açores); AOC (Aliança Operária e Camponesa); MES (Movimento Esquerda Socialista); and the regional branches of MRPP, CDS; PS; PCP and PPD. In Madeira, the Comércio do Funchal and Grupo do Pombal groups were the main leftists (supported by the MFA) which gave rise to UPM (União Povo Unido), CIP (Centro de Informação Popular), UB (União das Bordadeiras) and CPU (Cooperativa Povo Unido) (Calisto, 1995; Nepomuceno, 2006). The right-wing were structured through Madeira’s Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático da Madeira) aligned with the old regime structures and Madeira’ Centrist Front (Frente Centrista da Madeira) (Calisto, 1995; Nepomuceno, 2006). 8  During 1975 the Azorean’ separatists received active backing support from American circles feeding the expectation that an independent state could emerge in the mid-Atlantic (Gallagher, 1983, p. 219).

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capitalized on this demonstration. At the same time, the Ponta Delgalda airport was closed and the radio station seized; the communist headquarters in Angra do Heroísmo and Faial were robbed and destroyed; the armed forces (army, navy, and air force) were vexed in the public sphere (Monjardino, 1990, pp. 105–106). These events constituted the first challenge to left-wing military rulers (Gallagher, 1983) which led to the governor resignation (António Borges Coutinho)9 and unveiling a new stage regarding territorial issues. In the aftermath, the Grupo dos Onze (Eleven’s Group), led by the ex-governor Borges Coutinho, proposed the creation of the transitional structure— Junta Regional—in particular in the Azores. Junta Regional (originally Junta de Planeamento) was a military structure nominated by the Portuguese Prime Minister (MFA/JSN) to the island territories. It had the responsibility of organizing and providing basic public services to the population until the first regional democratic elections. Additionally, Junta Regional was in charge of drafting the statutes of autonomy (provisional) and the electoral rules in both territories for the first regional elections held in 1976. In short, the historical path towards territorial autonomy reflected distinctive nuances in both polities. In Azores, identity, historical and cultural issues have gained relevance over other dimensions, whereas in Madeira economic motivations and functional pressures—enhanced by economic, social, and political conditions—constituted the leading mechanisms into regional autonomy arrangements. Azores and Madeira claimed a different structure of government within the state, anchored in their contextual-­ based factors (Leite, 1995). However, the ‘internal colonialism’ (Hetcher, 1975) imposed by the central government constituted the major hurdle to the success of the long-lasting demands towards autonomy and the defence of the regional interests until democratization (Ruel, 2017). One of the major remarkable features of the decentralization process at the regional level (Azores and Madeira) concerns the format that has encouraged the demands of regional authority: it was developed in an extra-institutional arena where the local elites led the process, and à posteriori, gained support of some political parties. 9  The Governor of Ponta Delgada was an MDP/CDE party member (Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission—Movimento Democrático Português/Comissão Democrática Eleitoral), one of the most important opposition parties to Estado Novo.

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In sociological terms, mostly of the islanders lack autonomist consciousness, but they knew it was crucial to overcome the centralist tendencies of the state-level government in the regions; the Azores and Madeira would have to take care of their collective goals properly through regional institutions (Emanuel Rodriguez interview, Funchal-Portugal, October 2013). The liberalism structure had prevailed during the Constitutional Monarchy (until 1910) period, First Republic (1910–1926) and during the dictatorship period (1933–1974). The advent of democracy and regional autonomy has attenuated the centre-periphery cleavage10 and brought a substantive structure of regional government to the Portuguese regions. As Emanuel Rodrigues as put it: regional autonomy of the Azores and Madeira was, perhaps, the major and most beautiful accomplishment of the Carnation Revolution (Emanuel Rodrigues interview, Funchal-­ Portugal, October 2013). The transference of competences to the regional level of government followed a ‘fast track’ where almost all of the policy areas were ‘regionalized’ during the 1980s. The scope of policies areas remained stable over time, although institutional reforms, namely a shared-rule scope, have clarified important policy-making issues (Ruel, 2017). Despite the regional autonomy arrangements, financial resources are the critical long-lasting contentious issue among state-level and regional governments.

10  The ‘periphery’ designates territorial units with a differentiated history within the state, territories that are home to cultural minorities and that at the time of the state and nationbuilding processes were subject to the homogenization policies of the state’s central elites. (Alonso, 2012, p. 24). The centre-periphery cleavage is essentially about territory and political control. It encompasses diverse institutional, cultural, and fiscal issues. The institutional component relates to the “political status of the peripheral territory inside the state”; the cultural component relates to the “protection and preservation of the peripheral group’s cultural distinctiveness and identity”; the fiscal component is “the way in which the power of revenue and expenditure should be distributed between the central state and peripheral administrations” (Alonso, 2012, p. 25).

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3.3   Azores and Madeira: The Institutional Arrangements 3.3.1  Political Institutions and Regional Authority Portugal underwent a process of decentralization and/or regionalization with the third wave of democratization in 1974 (Ruel, 2017, 2019). The 1976 Constitution established a regional tier of government that entitled the autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira) self-government in order to guarantee democratic participation of the islanders, promote regional economic and social development, defend the interests of the islands, and strengthens national unity and solidarity between all Portuguese citizens (Article 235, 2°, CPR, 1976). Regional autonomy11 assigned to the Portuguese regions (regiões autónomas) includes a system of representation with directly elected parliaments (assembleia legislativa) and regional cabinets (governo regional),12 their own civil service and decision-making autonomy over a wide range of policy areas (Ruel, 2015, 2019). Additionally, the state has its institutional representation in both regions— the Representante da República—who is appointed by the President of the Portuguese Republic for a term of five years (article 230.°, CPR).13 Regional autonomy assigned to Azores and Madeira is ensured by constitutional principles and by their statutes of autonomy, respectively. It was given a symmetrical self-government formula where both regions have the same powers and authority within the state. Nevertheless, their developments have been quite different regarding the distinctive time span to the approval and reforms of the autonomy statutes. The regional authority index (RAI) indicates that in 1976, when the statutes were provisional, the RAI-score was 15.5 for Azores and 14.5 for Madeira. In 1980 the RAI-­ score for Azores increased to 16.5, and it gradually increased to 19.5 due to the various reforms introduced over time (1986, 1998/1999, and 11  Regional autonomy refers to the right of a regional government to affirm its own will and to have its own laws (Riker, 1975). 12  The legislature is dominant. The executive branch is dependent on and responsible to the legislative branch. 13  The Representante da República is a hybrid institution within the Portuguese constitutionalism. He is responsible for the supervision of regional public administration, for signing or vetoing the regional legislative decree (regional legislation) submitting it for publication and appointing the regional executive (article 233.°, CPR). Representate da República constitutes the ‘check and balances’ within the regional political systems (Ruel, 2013).

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2007/2008). The statute of autonomy for Madeira remained provisional until 1991 and the RAI-score remained at 14.5. In 1999, the first amendment to it, hitherto, was introduced, which brought the RAI-score to Madeira to 16.5. Additionally, in 1998, the regional authority increased in the self-rule dimension due to the introduction of the regional financing law which reinforced the policy scope—the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible—and financial autonomy of the autonomous regions. Beginning in 1999, the autonomy statutes of Azores and Madeira evened the same level of regional authority and both islands score 19.5 on the RAI in 2010 (Ruel, 2019).14,15 3.3.2  Electoral System and the Party Systems Azores and Madeira adopted a system of proportional representation with closed party lists whereby seats are allocated according to the d’Hondt formula. Voting is not compulsory. The Azorean regional parliament elects 57 MPs trough nine electoral constituencies which match to the nine islands of the archipelago and, since the 2008 regional elections, one compensatory electoral constituency.16 Until the 2004 regional elections, the Azorean electoral system was characterized as extremely disproportional and unequal (i.e. malapportionment),17 which constituted a distortion to the ‘value of vote’ (Dahl, 1971). The district’s magnitude across the nine islands varies from 2 to 20 which mean that some parts of the population are heavily overrepresented. A compensatory electoral constituency of five mandates was 14  Regional authority varies across countries, within countries between regions, and over time. For example, different RAI scores are displayed between various regions in Belgium; between Corsica and regions in France or between the historic and non-historic regions in Spain or between the devolved institutions in the UK (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013, p. 11). 15  The 1976 Constitution determines that regional parliaments take the lead in proposing amendments to their autonomy statutes, electoral laws, financing laws and constitutional amendments, but the national assembly needs to approve the reforms. Legislative initiatives from Madeira parliament to approve or reform its autonomy statutes repeatedly clashed with constitutional principles and were frequently annulled or rejected by the Constitutional Court (Ruel, 2017, 2019). 16  In 2006 (Organic Law 5/2006, August 31st) was approved by the national parliament a reform to the Azores’ electoral laws which introduced a compensatory electoral constituency. 17  Malapportionment is defined as the discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the shares of population held by geographical units (Monroe, 1994).

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introduced at the time of 2008 regional election to decrease disproportionality and to introduce some equilibrium within the islands through aggregating the remainder votes from the nine constituencies to the regional level (Ruel, 2019). In 2009, term limits were introduced to regional premier in Azores, effective from 2012 election onwards (article n. 4.°, Law n° 2/2009). Madeira’ 47 MPs are elected in a single-tier constituency at the regional level. Until the 2004 regional elections, Madeira’s MPs were elected across eleven electoral districts with a fixed number of mandates according to the number of electors in each constituency. The number of mandates was fixed every four years and the total number of MPs in the regional parliament has increased from 41 in the first election of 1976 to 68 in the election of 2004. The decrease of the number of MPs to 47 favoured to set a fixed number to the total of seats in the regional parliament and remove some incongruences that persisted among the electoral districts, namely, three electoral constituencies had a district magnitude of one as a result of a decrease in the size of the electorate within these districts. The electoral law reforms in both regions opened up the electoral arena for new political parties, which now can more easily achieve political representation because of increasing proportionality of the electoral system (Ruel, 2015, 2019). The absence of non-state-wide parties (regionalist parties) in Portugal was introduced by a Constitutional ban (Article 51.4, CPR),18 which was implemented in 1976 in order to counter the rise of separatist movements during the transition to democracy (1974–1976). Nevertheless, state-­ wide parties do have territorialized party organizations on the islands (Ruel, 2015, 2019). The Azores has a two-party system in which the PS is structurally dominant and electorally stronger than the PSD which has led to a 20-years lasting PS-government. In contrast, the party system in Madeira was characterized during the three decades of democracy (1976–2007) as a predominant party system, where the PSD (Partido Social Democrata—Social Democratic Party) won absolute majorities without being subjected to the political alternation rule and, since 2011, it approximates to a multiparty system (Ruel, 2015, 2019).

18  “No party shall be formed with a name or manifesto that possesses a regional nature or scope” (article 51.4, CPR).

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The party systems in Azores and Madeira were structured by the first regional elections in 1976. The mainstream parties are PSD (Partido Social Democrata—Social Democratic Party), PS (Partido Socialista— Socialist Party), CDS/PP (Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular— Popular Party) and APU/PCP (Aliança Povo Unido/Partido Comunista Português—United People Alliance/Communist Party).19 APU entered the party system in Madeira after the 1980 regional elections. UDP/BE (União Democrática Popular/Bloco de Esquerda—Popular Democratic Union/Left Bloc)20 represented in Madeira the leftist branch. 3.3.3  The Cornerstone of Regional Autonomy: Fiscal Autonomy The processes of regional autonomy of the Azores and Madeira determined transference and allocation of fiscal powers to the regions. The financial resources and the fiscal mechanisms available to the regional level of government highlight the level of political authority exercised in a given territory. These governments had three avenues in which to capture fiscal resources: (i) central government transferences, (ii) shared taxation over which the central government sets the bases and rates or over which regional government can claim a specific share, and (iii) autonomous taxation in which the regional governments themselves set the rate.21 Since 1976, Azores and Madeira have had a symmetric financing system and a fiscal framework. The Constitution established, lato sensu, the capacity to adapt the national fiscal system to the regional contexts (Article 227, i), CRP) and dispose of the collection of taxes revenues, as well as of a part of the state’s taxes revenues, determined according to the principle of (national) solidarity (Article 227, j), CPR). Before 1998, the national 19  APU (Aliança Povo Unido—United People Alliance) was and electoral coalition formed by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP/CDE). 20  The UDP/BE (Popular Democratic Union/Left Bloc) has particular relevance to regional politics, in particular, to Madeira. The UDP was a left-extremist party which had a marginal role during the first decades of democracy (at national level) (Lisi, 2009). However, UDP in Madeira has a critical-player during the democratic transition. It has developed its social and regional based among the explored farmers, by the customary land-holding Contrato de Colonia and among embroiders. 21  Fiscal powers refer to the set of policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. It consists of a downward reallocation of revenue sources for subnational governments that can take a multiplicity of forms such as transfers from the central government, new subnational taxes, or tax sharing (Rodden, 2004).

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annual transfers from the state to the regional tier of government were unstable, politicized, ad hoc, and contingent on the bargaining position of the ruling party at national and regional levels (Paz Ferreira, 1985; Santos, 2000; Fortuna, 2008; Ruel, 2017). The first law regulating the regional financing systems (RFL—Lei das Finanças Regionais), took effect in 1998. Regional governments had been running large deficits, accumulating debt, and there were vertical fiscal imbalances. The law was designed to promote the efficiency and the equality of resources allocation among the two regions to promote social and economic development, sufficiency and functional efficiency (Article 25.°, RFL). Additional reforms came in 2007, 2010, and 2013, reflecting evolving economic and institutional environments. Some of these reforms resonated regulations introduced by EU, such as the Stability Growth Pact; for example, conditions under which these government could borrow and the scope of deficits narrowed; limits to new public-private partnerships and the reinforcement of reporting mechanisms regarding public finances at regional level. Since 1987, Madeira has displayed an additional instrument to support economic development through the attraction of foreign investments and capital—The Madeira Free Zone (Zona Franca da Madeira, ZFM). The ZFM’s objective is to attract investment to and create jobs in Madeira. It is managed through a concession contract by a private entity (75%) and the regional government (25%) for a period of 30 years. The European Commission has established four distinct regimes for the operation of Madeira Free Zone. Since 2015 the ZFM has had a preferential tax regime with a nominal corporate tax rate (IRC) of 5%, which have some limits of taxable profits to each company (plafonds). The activities currently developed regarding the last regime include industrial activities, the International Ship Registry of Madeira and international businesses services. Moreover, the European Union has also created a range of tools to promote development and economic growth among European regions. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) framed the cohesion, economic convergence, and the monetary union as the major issues among member-states and regions within the European Union. The EU structural funds and Cohesion Policy gave rise to the economic convergence and developments through several programs.

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3.4   Spain: The State of Autonomies (Estado de las Autonomias) Over centuries, Spain has been characterized as a highly centralized unitary state. However, Spain is one of the European countries where decentralization has travelled furthest and faster in recent decades (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2008). The 1978 Spanish Constitution recognized the “right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make up the Spanish State” (article 2.°, Spanish Constitution). State decentralization and the creation of the Estados de las Autonomias (State of Autonomies) with the establishment of regional institutions within the 17 Comunidades Autónomas (autonomous communities, ACs) was associated with process (Gunther & Montero, 2009, pp. 34–35). The Spanish democratization and decentralization processes accommodate its multicultural nature and citizens’ diverse identities (Martinez-Herrera, 2002). Territory has always been a critical and controversial issue in Spain on behalf of the state-building process (1977–1983). The country’s cultural and linguistic diversity and the social dynamics favored the emergence of so-called peripheral nationalisms anchored on stateless issues (Linz, 1973; Núñez Seixas, 1999, 2001). The country’s diversity dates back almost to the political unification of modern Spain in 1479; the conquest of Granada came in 1492 and the incorporation of Navarre in 1512. The Reyes Católicos transformed Spain into a confederation of political, cultural, linguistic and historical traditions. After the Reconquista, in what’s known as the country’s ‘Golden Age’ Spain modernized, ultimately establishing the Spanish Empire and charting routes to the Americas. In the end of the sixteen century some signs of decline appeared—the defeat of Felipe’ II Invincible Armada determined the end of Habsburg dynasty (Núñez  Seixas, 1999, 2001; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). The succession of the Bourbon dynasty opened a long period of narrowed responses to the processes of national homogenization. These responses triggered the Catalan Reapers’ Revolt (Els Segadors) in 1640. Ethno-territorial nationalisms resulted in innumerous military pronunciamientos: the War of Succession (1701–1714); the War of Independence (1808–1814); the Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1848 and 1872–1875) and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). During the War of Independence, Spain reaffirmed its cohesion as a national state against Napoleonic occupation. Those events constituted the landmark of a nation-building

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process which all the Spaniards fought against the external occupation towards their independence as country (Gunther & Montero, 2009). However, the Cadiz Constitution, which was adopted in 1812, did not resolve the ethno-territorialism conflicts. The liberals followed the Napoleonic tradition of the Unitarian state and the territories that have a strong historical identity and self-government tradition (Navarre, Basque Provinces, and Catalonia) perceived the liberalism regime as unnatural and oppressive. They demanded the restoration of their ancient fueros and local rights (Núñez Seixas, 1999; Gunther & Montero, 2009). The economic failure of the industrial revolution, the Spanish-American War defeat in 1898, led to the loss of the last of the Spanish Empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines), weakened the liberalism regime. Those events had reinforced the raison d’être of the Spanish peripheral nationalisms (Gunther & Montero, 2009, pp. 15–16). The Spanish path towards democratization developed under two premises: (i) the centrifugal centralist tendencies that defended a Spanish ‘indissoluble nation’ against regional diversities; and (ii) the ‘differential factors’ (hechos diferenciales) that sought the recognition of regional distinctiveness.22 The conception of the nation-state balanced between the centralism and the demands of self-government. Spanish peripheral nationalisms emerged, strongly, in the nineteenth century as a way to consolidate liberal revolution assumptions. Between 1875 and 1930, Spanish peripheral nationalisms assumed a counter-revolutionary status against centralist rule. Since then, several attempts to establish a form of decentralized organization in Spain have emerged (Encarnación, 2003; Gunther & Montero, 2009). The first attempt toward decentralization took place during the Second Republic (1931–1939). Despite its short duration, this period contributed greatly to the resolution of regionalisms in Spain (except the intents to Catalonia independence in 1934) through the constitutional design of the state (1931), situating Spain between a unitary and a federal state, recognizing the country as an ‘integral state’ (Gunther & Montero, 2009, p. 23). The Second Republic granted some degree of regional autonomy to the Generalitat of Catalonia (1932), approved the Basque Country’s 22  Hechos diferenciales has benefited from ‘conceptual stretching’ to the extent that each AC had competed for greater autonomy and the recognition of regional identities (historical, cultural or linguistic), which supported the idea to have constitutional recognition of a plurality of ‘regional nations’ within Spain (Aja, 1999).

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statutes (1936) and granted statutory rules to Galicia, but it was never enacted. The polarization of regional issues and the Republican opposition to the ‘integral state’ culminated in three years of civil war in 1936. The victory of the Spanish nationalists led to the institutionalization of the General Franco’s dictatorship rule, which forced the peripheral regions into a unitary and centralized state and consequently, as a way to prevent the contentious of Basque and Catalan nationalists and ‘disintegration of the Spanish nation’ (Núñez Seixas, 1999, 2001; Moreno, 2001). From the 1960s onward, demands for further regional autonomy have intensified. The historical regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia) encouraged the development of regionalist identity across other ACs, in a mimetic way, as a premise for self-government authority (Moreno, 2001). The democratization of Spain and the 1978 Constitution established the State of Autonomies, which would serve as the framework and the structure of the Spanish State. This multilevel arrangement is classified as ‘federal’, ‘quasi-federal’ (Lijphart, 1984); ‘asymmetrical federal’ or ‘multinational federalist’ (Linz, 1999), ‘non-institutional federalism’ (Colomer, 1998) or ‘imperfect federalism’ (Moreno, 1993). This ambiguity of classifications resulted from the ambiguous territorial model forged during the negotiated transition to democracy. Those asymmetries resulted from the distribution of political and administrative authority between the central and regional governments, the distinctive (legal) tracks toward regional autonomy, which took place at different times and thus, the level of policy scope across territorial units in order to accommodate and balance multicultural diversity among regions (Colomer, 1998; Aja, 1999; Encarnación, 2003; Gunther & Montero, 2009). The Spanish Constitution reflected an agreement between two different conceptions of territorial organization of the state: the ‘indivisible nation-state’ and cultural diversity on the one hand, and the ‘multinational nation’ on the other. It adopted a compromise encompassing the intents of the Francoist right, which wanted to preserve the unitary nature of Spain, and the left-wing democratic opposition that demanded a federal structure (Magone, 2011, p. 318). It recognized the existence of Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia as historical regions and determined the institutional configuration of the State of Autonomies (degree of regional authority; competencies, etc.) at the regional level as way to reflect these

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region’s contextual features (cultural, historical, social and/or economic) in their respective statutes of autonomy (Aja, 1999; Pino & Colino, 2010). The pre-autonomic stage started in 1979 and in 1983 all of the seventeen ACs were institutionalized as a tier of government within the Spanish State. Basque Country, Catalonia (1979) and Galicia (1981) ratified their charters of self-government, through referenda. Andalusia also proceeded under Article 151 (SC), after considerable political mobilization, while Navarre modernized its existing foral systems. To the other Spanish regions, regional autonomy was granted under the Article 143 (SC)— Aragon, Asturias; Balearic Islands; Cantabria; Castile and Leon; Castile-La Mancha; Extremadura; La Rioja; Madrid and Murcia—and Navarre, Canary Islands and Valencian Community acceded to regional autonomy through the Article 148 (SC), as a result of the “ethno-territorial race in search of equal access to the institutions of self-government” (Moreno, 2001, p.  215). The cities of Ceuta and Melilla enacted their autonomy statute in 1995. All of the 17 ACs have developed their own regional sub-cultures, although some of them are stronger than others but in general, they exist and co-exist simultaneously (Marks & Llamazares, 2006, pp. 252–256). As Moreno notes, the decentralization process has accommodated a diversity of collective identities, overhaul historical grievances and articulate a long-standing inclination for regional self-rule (2001, p.  291). Spain’s Estado de las Autonomias evolved over the time as a result of political negotiations and contingencies where state-wide parties and regional parties engaged in strategic and often bilateral bargaining and competition (Colino, 2008; Colomer, 1998; Gunther, Montero, & Botella, 2004; Field, 2016). Therefore, the constitutional ambiguity and openness of state structure encouraged the persistent tensions regarding the degree of decentralization and the balance between shared-rule and self-rule (Alonso, 2012). The harmonization of the institutional design became crucial for territorial organization. LOAPA (Law for the harmonization of the autonomy process—Ley Organica para la Armonización del Processo Autonómico)23 was approved in 1981 to rationalize the structure of the 23  In August of 1983, the Constitutional Court declared fourteen of LOAPA´s articles unconstitutional, upholding pre-pact autonomy powers (PSOE-UCD). Thus, a revised version was approved—Ley del Proceso Autonómico—in 1983. The Constitutional Court has had a crucial role in the institutionalization of the Estado de las Autonomias. It developed an arbitrary function in the disputes between regions and the national government regarding its competencies and legal interpretations, especially during

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state, prevent the future evolution of the state of autonomies’ arrangements and established the structure of institutional relationship among national and regional tiers of government (Pino & Colino, 2010). The ‘State of Autonomies’ was reviewed in the 1990s (Second Autonomic Pacts) by the two main parties, the PP (Partido Popular—People’s Party) and the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—Socialist Party) (Encarnación, 2003; Magone, 2008). In 1992 and 1994, they signed an agreement to balance the policy scope among the ACs with limited regional authority and to level the responsibilities towards a more symmetrical model of autonomy. The ACs essentially took over education, culture, social welfare (except unemployment insurance), and health care competencies, which gives them an important role in economic policy (Gunther et al., 2004). This was reinforced by a complementary process of administrative decentralization during the 1990s, whereby regional governments increased their administrative capacity alongside reduction of central bureaucracy (Gibbons, 2000). Moreover, the efforts to improve and harmonize the model of the ‘state of autonomies’ continue; some differences persist in terms of “size, power and self-­consciousness” (Pallarés & Keating, 2003, p. 240). In the context of the Spanish multilevel state, the statutes of autonomy were revised through negotiations among ACs and the central government regarding the policy scope of each region (the ones with fewer powers and those with more authority).24 It emphasizes the dynamics of intra-party politics among the statewide parties and the regional parties in both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary arenas. The competition over the statutes of autonomy is also a ubiquitous issue in Spanish politics, where reinforcement of powers by the ‘historic nationalities’ generated demands from the other regions (Moreno, 2001; Agranoff, 2005). Several reforms at the statutes of autonomy of several ACs were introduced between 2004 and 2011: in 2006  in the Valencian Community and Catalonia; in 2007, the Balearic Islands, Andalusia, Aragon, and Castile and Leon; in 2010, Navarre, and in 2011 Extremadura, respectively. The regions’ policy scope was strengthened, for example, to education and the constitutional-making process and the enactment of the statutes of autonomy. The Constitutional Court is the guarantee of the constitutional form of government, the protection of fundamental rights and the resolution of conflicts between the state and the autonomous communities (Aja, 1999; Moreno, 2001). 24  The statutes of autonomy require a regional initiative and the ratification of the national parliament. The same endorsement formula is applied to the statutes’ reforms.

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health services; to urban and local government affairs and to public safety, infrastructures, transport, agriculture and the environment (Fortes & Perez, 2013). 3.4.1  The Canary Islands: The ‘Insularism’ of Regional Authority The Canary Islands have developed an institutional structure of government through article 148, which framed its scope of authority supported by its statute of autonomy approved in 1982.25 The recognition of the ‘Canarian nationality’ did not occur until the 1996 statute reform. The first reform of the Canary Islands statute was introduced in 1996 (Organic Law n.° 4/1996) in order to accommodate the terms of LOTRACA26 (Ley Orgánica de Transferencias Complementarias a Canarias, Complementary Transfer to the Canaries Islands), the amendments regarding the Canaries’ economic and fiscal regime (REF, Régimen Económico y Fiscal), the accession to the European Union and the institutional reforms to the electoral system and at the Cabildos Insulares level. During the pre-autonomic period (1979–1982), the Canaries approved (1978) a provisional structure for the regional autonomy powers and political institutions, Junta de Canarias. The structure created a dual-­ configuration of the Canary Islands’ structure of government in the archipelago: regional institution headquarters are settled into the two main cities, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife. The choice reflects the pleito insular cleavage (Bravo de Laguna, 1998, 2004, 2008; García-Rojas, 2004a, 2004b). The first Junta de Canarias was settled in Tenerife (Cañadas del Teide) and was designed by party members from UCD, PSOE, PCE, Popular Party (AP/PP) and Asamblea Majorera (AM); a representative of the Spanish Crown and one representative of the seven Cabildos Insulares. The UCD27 had led the Junta de Canarias and Jerónimo Saavedra from the PSOE assumed the vice-presidency, until the

25  Organic Law nr. ° 10/1982 of August 10. Additionally, it was approved simultaneously with a complementary law regarding some transfers of competences (Organic Law No. 11/1982 of August 10)—LOTRACA (Ley Orgánica de transferencias complementarias a Canarias). 26  Organic Law nr. ° 11/1982, 10th August. 27  This leadership was carried out by UCD members such as Alfonso Soriano, Fernando Bergasa, Vicente Álvarez Pedreira, and Javier Ucelay.

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national elections in 1983.28 The Junta de Canarias drafted the forthcoming Canaries statutes of autonomy (Delgado Núñez, 2004, p. 37). Regional autonomy in the Canary Islands evolved strictly around the pleito insular, the islands dispute, between the Gran Canaria and Tenerife. Those disputes emerged from administrative, educational, commercial, and ecclesiastical differences among the islanders that have been prominent since liberalism period gave birth to the provincial and municipal organization in 1812. The 1912 Ley dos Cabildos had become an alternative solution to the provincial administrative division, but it amplified the pleito insular contentious politics (Bravo de Laguna, 1990).29 As a result, the 1983 statutes of autonomy reflected the intra-insular distinctiveness hampered by the administrative structure of Cabildos Insulares across the seven islands that compose the archipelago. Cabildistas and autonomistas dispute have highlighted the pre-autonomic stage in the Canary Islands. The lack of ‘unity in diversity’ and the absence of a conception of a regional authority arrangement has created a ‘distinctive format and distant autonomy’ in the Canaries (El País, 1988).30 In contrast with other ACs which claimed more power and resources from the central state, the Canary Islands asked that the central state appoint an intra-­ insular conflict referee and support regional solidarity (Peraza-Padrón, 2001, p. 39). Several cultural, historical, and territorial self-identification factors further fragmented and weakened Canarian nationalism. The ‘Canarian nationality’ had shaped the regional identity through insular status (Bravo de Laguna, 1998), but intra-insular factors continue to fragment Canary politics.31 The Fundamentos de la Canariedad is deeply rooted in geographic, orographic, historical, and economic factors. The Canary Islands are located in the middle of the inter-continental routes between Africa, America, and Europe and the island orography determined the

28  The Canary Islands’ state of autonomy (approved in 1982) established that the composition of the first regional parliament (provisional) would be according to the national elections results (Congresso de los Diputados) held in January 1983. 29  Cabildos Insulares are the insular-level governing bodies in the Canary Islands. 30  An El País’ article has characterized Canaries autonomy in early 1988 as: Canarias- una autonomia distincta e distante. El Pais, Tenerife, 21 June 1988, Carmelo Marin. 31  The statute of autonomy clarifies in its 57.° article that inter-insular solidarity is an imperative to the regional autonomy.

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production structure and privileged the agricultural sector, which produced sugar, bananas, and tomatoes32 (Hayek, 1992, pp. 9–10). Some episodes of independentism emerged from abroad in the end of the nineteenth century, led by Antonio Cubillo, who recovered the mythic ‘Guanche nation’, and by Secondino Delgado who trumpeted ‘Canarias modern nationalism’.33 During the Francoist regime, nationalisms in the Canary Islands were expressed through Canarias Libre, a newspaper founded in 1959 by Fernando Sagaseta and Carlos Suarez, inspired by the Cuban Revolution and by poor socio-economic conditions. In 1964, Antonio Cubillo formed the Movimiento para la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Arquipelago Canario (MPAIAC) at the Algerian exile (García-Lazaro & Trujillo, 2013). Other political platforms emerged during the pre-autonomic stage in Canary politics: the Unión Del Pueblo Canario (UPC) had an electoralist platform oriented by socialist ideology towards Canarians’ auto-determination; the UPC dissolved in 1986. The Pueblo Canario Unido (PCU) emerged as a left-wing political force after united the Partido de Revolución Canaria (PRC), Comunist Cells (CC), and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria del Arquiplelago Canario (MIRAC). Likewise, the state-wide parties, such as PSOE-PSC (Partido Socialista de Canarias), UCD (Unión Centro Democrático), CDS (Centro Democrático y Social) and AP (Alianza Popular) have established a foothold in the Canaries’ politics during the democratization period. 3.4.2  Political Institutions and Regional Authority Canary Islands institutions include the regional executive (Presidente del Gobierno) and the regional assembly (Parlamento de Canarias). The Comunidades Autónomas (ACs) establish parliamentary systems in which regional governments are politically responsible to regional parliaments. Each AC has as well a central government’s delegate (Delegado del Gobierno) who is appointed by the national government. He is responsible 32  During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sugar dominated the Canary Islands economy, as in Madeira Islands. Crises in the sugar market arose and prompted severe recessions on the islands. Those economic difficulties encouraged emigration to America, Venezuela, and Cuba. 33  Curiously, the nationalists’ concerns were launched from abroad, namely from Venezuela. Secundino Delgado developed in 1890 some arguments about the islanders’ condition. It was through a magazine El Guanche that Delgado expressed the nationalist doctrine. The guanchismo supported the Canary Islands nationalism.

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for the state administration in the territory of each regional community (Article 154, SC). Regional authority in Spain has changed over time and across regions. The regional authority index (RAI) indicates the Canary Islands have experienced three critical periods regarding the scope of authority in the islands. In 1983, with the approval of the statute of autonomy, the RAI score was 19.5; in 1987 it increased to 21.5 and ten years later in 1997 it was 22.5, reflecting reforms such as the amendment to the statute and the introduction of the Canaries’ economic-fiscal regime (Regimén Económico y Fiscal, REF). In 2006, the Canarias parliament approved a statute reform. However, the national Congress of Deputies thwarted it and the proposal was retired. From 2002 to 2010 the RAI-score has stabilized at 23.5 (Hooghe et al., 2016). 3.4.3  Electoral Rules and the Party Systems The Canary Islands adopted a system of proportional representation with closed party lists whereby seats are allocated according to d’Hondt formula. The 60 MPs of the regional parliament in the Canaries are elected through seven constituencies throughout the archipelago, one for each island. A triple parity principle was set up giving each of the two provinces, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, thirty MPs. The design of the district magnitude has balanced intra-insular features, shaping a relative parity among the two major islands (Gran Canaria and Tenerife) and the peripheral islands. Electoral rules have fixed district magnitude, as follows: 15 to Gran Canaria, 15 to Tenerife, 8 to La Palma, 8 to Lanzarote, 7 to Fuerteventura, 4 to La Gomera and 3 to El Hierro. A double electoral threshold was set up to regional elections: at the regional level (6 %) and at the island level (30 %) as a way to prevent fragmentation at regional assembly. In 1996 statute reforms, the representation threshold was revised into 3% of vote shares at the regional level and 20% at the islands district, as a result of intense pressure from local and insular parties (Bravo de Laguna, 1998, 2004, 2008; Llera, 1999). De facto, the Canary Island electoral system denotes unequal and disproportional representation among islands. Some parts of the population such as El Hierro are heavily overrepresented (García-Rojas & García, 2001).34 34  For example, an MP in El Hierro needs 1500 votes to be elected whereas an MP in Gran Canarias needs 25,000 votes. See Montero, Llera and Torcal (1992).

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The party system at regional level is dominated by two mainstream statewide parties, the PSOE and PP. In 14 out of 17 autonomous communities, the PSOE—Andalusia, Castile la Mancha, Extremadura, Aragon and Asturias—and the PP—Castile and Leon, Valencia, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Madrid and La Rioja—have captured more than 75% of the votes in regional elections. This contrasts with the historical regions, where regionalist parties dominate (Linz & Montero, 1999; Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Fortes & Perez, 2013). Non-statewide parties also play a crucial role in the Canary Islands. Multilevel electoral politics during the first decade of democracy gave prominence to the PSOE, CDS and the PP, but a non-statewide party, the Coalición Canarias, emerged in 1993 and became a key political party in the system, electorally stronger than statewide parties, which has led to a 20 years leading incumbency (1993 to 2015). Nevertheless, Canaries party system is an example of moderate pluralism. 3.4.4  The Regional Financing System: Sources and Allocation of Resources Financial autonomy is a crucial defining feature of the decentralized model which ensures the exercise of self-government rule in practice. The Spanish financial system is anchored on the principle of autonomy (article 137 and 156.1, SC), sufficiency (Article 157.1, SC), and solidarity (Article 2 and 138.1, SC). Regions have authority to increase or decrease their revenue allocation at the margin to ensure that regional governments have enough funds to cover developed expenditures and to ensure inter-territorial coordination among and within territorial levels (Herrero, 2005). The regional financing law (LOFCA, Ley Organica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autonomas)35 frames the financing system at regional level. It establishes two models of regional financing: the foral regime, which affects Basque Country and Navarre,36 and the common regime, 35  This financing arrangement applies to fifteen of the seventeen ACs. Navarre and Basque Country are financed through special regimes known as the Convenio Navarro and Concierto Vasco, respectively. 36  The financing arrangements for those two regions are called the Convénio in Navarre and Concierto in Basque Country and regulated by the Economic Agreement between the state and the charter Community of Navarre Act (Ley del Convénio Economico entre el Estado y la Comunidade Foral de Navarra) and the economic agreement between the state and the Basque Country Community Act (Ley del Concierto entre el Estado y la Comunidade del País

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which regulates all other Spanish communities. The common regime uses three major criteria: (i) a ‘tax mix’; (ii) an equalization mechanism; and (iii) three adjustment funds37 (Bassols et al., 2010). Transfers have served as an important income resource in regional financing, rather than regional taxes. Thus fiscal co-responsibility in the autonomous communities and its dependence central government transferences is low (León-Alfonso, 2007, p. 163). The current financing rules were approved at the end of 2009. This system comprises the transfer of 50% of personal income tax and VAT and 58% of excise duties on manufactured production of alcohol, tobacco and hydrocarbons. In addition, regions keep the 100% collection of the hydrocarbon-­oil retail sales, electricity tax, property and stamp duty taxes, tax of registration of motor vehicles, taxes on gaming, wealth tax and inheritance and gift tax. As well, regions can change their rates in these taxes, with some exceptions (VAT, excise duties, and electricity tax) (Delgado-Téllez & Pérez, 2018). Before the 2009 reforms, the territorial distribution system was regarded as arbitrary and also over-equalizing, that is to say, the regions which had larger fiscal capacity had fewer resources at the end of the year (Bosh, 2011). The Canary Islands enjoy a special status within the common regime based on three factors. First, they have a different economic and tax system from other ACs, (REF, Régimen Economico y Fiscal) due to their insularity and geographical remoteness. The state has deemed this necessary promote economic and social developments in the archipelago. Second, Vasco). Thus each of these regions has an agreement or pact between the Provincial Councils and the Central Government, by which the former have full capacity to collect most of the taxes within their territory, and wide-reaching capacity in fiscal regulations within the general tax structure of the state. In compensation the Basque Country collaborate by means of an annual sum determined by consensus called the “Quota” to the support of the burdens derived from the general administration of the state, taking into consideration the contributions the state makes in each provincial level (León-Alfonso, 2007). 37  The three major equilibria funds are the Competitiveness and the Cooperation Fund, the Sufficiency Fund and the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial). In the 2009 reform, the Sufficiency Fund was split into two parts. The socalled Essential Public Services Fund, a horizontal transfer, guarantees the same amount of resources to all ACs for the provision of health, education, and social services. The Global Sufficiency Fund, which works as a “cut-off mechanism” that compensates for the financial and fiscal imbalance among regions and has a hold harmless clause, is a vertical transfer that prevents all Spanish regions from worsening their financial situation with the reform. For further details see: De la Fuente (2009).

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the Canary Islands have a Free Trade Zone (FTZ/Canary Islands Special Zone) which benefits Canarian economy through lower taxes and other competitive advantages. Third, this recognized the exceptional fiscal and economic advantages the archipelago has enjoyed since the fifteenth century, through the Portos Francos regime (Free Ports) as one of the major mechanisms to offset geographic constraints, which include underdevelopment as well as remoteness and insularity. In sum, the regional financing system design of both Portugal and Spain has signalized and accentuated the features behind the process of ‘territorial rescaling’. In Portugal, the inexperience of the ongoing process of regional autonomy have prompted an ad hoc inter-governmental relationship regarding the amount of resources that national level government should provide to regional institutions (Eduardo Paz Ferreira interview, Lisbon, 2014). Likewise, in Spain during the first two decades of democracy, the distribution of resources to regional governments was subject to partisan bargaining, contingency, and competition among political parties (statewide and/or non-statewide) across the two-tiered level of authority. The allocation of powers occurred inductively, as a consequence of the asymmetrical authority arrangements (Moreno, 2001) which in turn, have raised major concerns regarding coordination and efficiency goals across territory (Gunther & Montero, 2009; Lago Peñas, 2016).

3.5   Chapter Final Remarks The processes of democratization alongside decentralization have endowed both Portuguese and Spanish regions with political institutions, powers and resources to accommodate the long-standing claims of regional autonomy within the structure of the state. This chapter offered a comparative overview of the historical background and the major critical events that triggered decentralization in the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. It outlined the regional institutional architectures, including the institutions, electoral rules, and party systems, and the fiscal arrangements with which regions are endowed in order to manage their sources and allocation of resource within territory. These constellation of factors described here allow identifying the distinctive paths towards regional autonomy anchored on idiosyncratic elements of each region and the institutional arrangements supporting the sub-­ national level of government.

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References Primary Sources CPR. 1976. Constitution of Portuguese Republic. Eduardo Paz Ferreira interview, national government advisor to the RFL  Regional financing law - (1997), March 2014, Lisbon, Portugal. El País, Tenerife, 21 June 1988. Emanuel Rodrigues interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 was elected to the presidency of the regional assembly in Madeira (1976–1980), October 2013, Funchal—Madeira, Portugal. LOFCA, Spanish Regional Financing Law, 1980 (Organic Law 8/1980, September 22nd). Organic Law 1/2006, February 13th, Madeira’ Electoral law.  Organic Laws 2/2001, August 25th and 5/2006, August 31th, Azores Electoral law.  Organic Law no. 10/1982, August 10th, Canarian Statute of autonomy. RFL, Portuguese Regional Financing Law, 1997 (Law no. 13/98, February 24th). SC, Spanish Constitution.

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Lisi, M. (2009). New politics in Portugal: The rise and success of the left bloc. Pôle Sud, 30(1), 127–144. https://doi.org/10.3917/psud.030.0127 Lizardo, J. (2015). A exploração da terra sob o regime da Colonia no arquipélago da Madeira. In J.  V. Serrão, B.  Direito, E.  Rodrigues, & S.  Miranda (Eds.), Property rights, land and territory in the European Overseas Empires. Lisbon: CEHC-IUL. Llera, F. (1999). The performance of the Autonomous Communities’ electoral systems: The predominance of the imperfect two-party-system. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 93–123. Loughlin, J. (2001). Sub-national democracy in the European Union: Challenges and opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Magone, J. (2008). Contemporary Spanish politics 2nd edition. London: Routledge. Magone, J. (2011). Contemporary European politics: A comparative introduction. M. Abingdon: Routledge. Marks, G., & Llamazares, I. (2006). Multilevel governance and the transformation of regional mobilisation and identity in Southern Europe, with particular attention to Catalonia and Basque Country. In R. Gunther, D. Diamandouros, & A.  Sotiropoulos (Eds.), Democracy and the new state in the New Southern Europe (pp. 235–262). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martinez-Herrera, E. (2002). From nation-building to building identification with political communities: Consequences of political decentralization in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978–2001. European Political Science Research, 41(4), 421–453. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00018 Monjardino, A. (1990). Raízes da Autonomia Constitucional. In Actas do II Colóquio Internacional de História da Madeira. Funchal: Secretaria Regional da Cultura. Monjardino, A. (2001). Os complexos da Autonomia. In Seminário Internacional Autonomia e História das ilhas (pp.  27–42). Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlântico. Monroe, B. (1994). Disproportionality and malapportionment: Measuring electoral inequity. Electoral Studies, 13(2), 132–149. https://doi. org/10.1016/0261-3794(94)90031-0 Montero, J. R., Llera, F., & Torcal, M. (1992). Sistemas electorales en España: una recapitulación. Revista Española de Investigaciones, 58(92), 7–56. Montero, R. J., Gunther, R., & Botella, J. (2004). Democracy in modern Spain. New Haven: Yale University Press. Moreno, L. (1993). Ethnoterritorial concurrence and imperfect federalism in Spain. Working Paper 93/10. Madrid: Unidad de Política Comparada (CSIC). Moreno, L. (2001). The federalization of Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers. Nepomuceno, R. (2006). História da Madeira—uma visão actual. Porto: Campo das Letras.

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Núñez Seixas, X. (1999). Los Nacionalismos en la España (siglos XIX y XX). Barcelona: Hipótesis. Núñez Seixas, X. (2001). What is Spanish nationalism today? From legitimacy crisis to unfulfilled renovation (1975–2000). Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24(5), 719–752. Oliveira, H. M. (1996). Regionalismos e Autonomia em Portugal: raízes históricas. In Actas do Congresso do I Centenário da Autonomia dos Açores—A autonomia num plano histórico (Vol. I). Ponta Delgada: Secretaria Regional da Cultura. Pallarés, F., & Keating, M. (2003). Multilevel electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain. European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030103005 Paz Ferreira, E. (1985). As Finanças Regionais. Estudos Gerais—Série Universitária. Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda. Peraza-Padrón, S. (2001). La Comunidade Autónoma de Canarias: antecedentes históricos y tratado constitucional. In J.J. Rodriguez Rodriguez & J. A. GarciaRojas (coord.) Instituciones de la Comunidade Autónoma de Canarias (pp. 37–79). Madrid: Marcial Pons y Gobierno de Canarias. Pino, E., & Colino, C. (2010). Spain: Strong regional government and the limits of local decentralization. In J. Loughlin, J. Kincaid, & W. Sweden (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of subnational democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pinto, A.  C. (2003). Contemporary Portugal—Politics, society and culture. New York: Columbia University Press. Reis, M.  P. (1992). Regionalismo. A autonomia da Madeira. In Programa das comemorações do quinto centenário da descoberta da Madeira. Funchal: Publicação Comemorativa. Riker, W. (1975). Federalism. In I.  F. Greenstein & W.  Nelson Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science (Vol. 5, pp.  141–162). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Rodden, J. (2004). Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and measurement. Comparative Politics, 36(4), 481–500. https://doi. org/10.2307/4150172 Rokkan, S., & Urwin, D. (1983). Economy, territory, identity. Politics of West European peripheries. London: Sage. Royle, S. (2001). A geography of Islands: Small island insularity. London: Routledge. Ruel, T. (2013). Representante da República. In J. Bacelar Gouveia & F. Coutinho (Eds.), Enciclopédia da Constituição da República Portuguesa. Lisbon: Quid Juris.

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Ruel, T. (2015). Madeira Regional Election 2015: A polity tyrannized by majorities or the end of an era? Regional & Federal Studies, 25(3), 313–320. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1053876 Ruel, T. (2017). As regiões autónomas (Açores e Madeira) nos debates parlamentares da Assembleia da República (1975–2015). Lisbon: Colecção Parlamento, Assembleia da República. Ruel, T. (2019). Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-state-wide parties. Regional & Federal Studies, 29(3), 429–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1526786 Santos, R. G. (2000). Relações Financeiras entre o Estado e a Região Autónoma dos Açores. In Actas do Seminário As relações financeiras entre o Estado e a região Autónoma dos Açores. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores. Selwyn, P. (1980). Smallness and islandness. World Development, 8(12), 945–951. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(80)90086-8 Serrão, J. (1992). Dicionário de história de Portugal (Vol. 2). Lisboa: Livraria Figueirinhas. Sharpe, J.  L. (1993). The rise of Meso-Government in Europe. London: Sage Publications. Teles, F. (2016). Local governance and intermunicipal cooperation. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Veríssimo, N. (1991). A autonomia insular: o debate na Primavera Marcelista. Islenha, 9, Funchal: Secretaria Regional Turismo e Cultura/Direção Assuntos Culturais. Vieira, A. (1997, Novembro 9–10). A Madeira na História de Portugal e do Atlântico. Conferência Sessão Extraordinária da Academia de História. São Vicente, Madeira. Vieira, A. (2001). A Autonomia na História da Madeira—questões e equívocos. In Seminário Internacional: Autonomia e História das Ilhas (pp.  143–175). Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlântico. Wallace, W. (1994). Rescue of retreat? The nation state in Western Europe 1945–93. Political Studies, 42(1), 52–76. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb00005.x Watts, R. (2000). Islands in comparative constitutional perspective. In G. Baldacchino & D. Milne (Eds.), Lessons from the political economy of islands. The resourcefulness of jurisdiction (pp. 23–29). Basingstoke: Macmillan.

PART II

CHAPTER 4

Party Competition at Regional Level

4.1   Introduction This chapter offers a set of insights related to the party competition in regional elections and the electoral performance of political parties at the regional level to illuminate why some political parties tend to do better than others at elections. It presents the constellation of parties and the regional government formation at the regional level and regional elections results over the last 40 years (1976 to 2016). Additionally, to forge theoretical links with key features of regional politics, I account for contextual variables such as the pattern of party competition, electoral competitiveness, and disproportionality.

4.2   Regional Elections Regional elections acquired increasingly importance resulting from authority enjoyed by the regional political institutions. In the three cases under analysis regional elections revealed the importance of regional governments and the voters’ attachment to a given political party over a long period of time. Over the last four decades of democracy the Portuguese autonomous regions—Azores, Madeira, and Canary Islands—have seen a major transformation in their daily political life with the shift on political authority downwards to regional democratic institutions. The regional tier of © The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_4

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authority structured opportunities to political parties to gain political power, office-seeking and shape policy agenda. Consequently, political actors have gained the opportunity to rule and be ruled in turn. The PSD come into office on both regions Azores and Madeira with the first regional elections of 1976 and remained in power in Madeira since ever. In Azores PSD held the power for 20 years until the PS took over in 1996 and which remained in power since then. Thus, a single party-government formula has prevailed in both regions. In Azores, Mota Amaral1 assumed the helm of government in 1976. Six political parties contested the first regional election, the PSD (Social-­ democratic Party), the PS (Socialist Party), CDS/PP (Christian-­ democrats/Popular Party); PCP (Communist Party), PCTP/MRPP (Portuguese Workers’ Communist Party) and the MES (Movement of Socialist Left), but only three of these political parties managed to get elected MPs into the regional parliament: PSD won twenty seven MPs; PS won fourteen seats and CDS/PP elected two deputies. Four years later (1980), PDA (Atlantic Democratic Party, Partido Democrático do Atlântico) emerged seeking seats in parliament. It would continue to run candidates until 2015 but never win enough votes to elect a representative.2 In 1984 regional election, PSD reaffirms its electoral supremacy within Azorean polity and APU (United People Alliance, Aliança Povo Unido), a coalition composed by PCP (Communist Party, Partido Comunista Português), MDC-CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement, Movimento Democrático Português) and PEV (Green Party, Partido Os Verdes) elected one deputy into regional parliament. In 1992, the ruling party retrieved the electoral losses from 1988 election (+5% of vote shares) and simultaneously, PS, the main challenger, has reduced the margins as the second most voted party (36.4%). CDS/PP in 1  Mota Amaral had a crucial role during the decentralization process, not only in Azores but also at national level. He served as MP during the last years of Estado Novo (Assembleia Nacional) and was elected to the Assembleia Constituinte (1975) in order to draft the forthcoming democratic 1976 Constitution. He also gave important input into the configuration of regional authority within the state and also on the statutes of autonomy in the Azores. In 1974, Mota Amaral has presented during the first PSD Congress the terms towards the territorial organization of political power within the state. Initially, the PPD/PSD regional branch in Azores was idealized as a regionalist party grounded on a social-democratic axis. 2  PDA dissolved in 2015 due to some irregularities related with the political parties’ financing.

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coalition with (Monarchist Party, Partido Popular Monárquico)—AD-A (Democratic Alliance-Azores, Aliança Democrática-Açores)—gets elected one MP (Table 4.1). In 1995 Mota Amaral announced his resignation, one year before the term limit to take up a seat as MP in national parliament, after being in office and holding the party leadership for 19 years. Meanwhile, Madruga da Costa assumed premiership for a year. The regional premier resignation led to PSD internal crisis, regarding the historical leader succession, which have triggered into political alternation.3 In 1996, PS won regional elections in Azores. Carlos César assumed regional premiership. The 1996 regional elections highlighted the mechanical effects of the electoral rules, in particular regarding the distinctive weight of each constituency: the PS was the most voted party (45.8%) and PSD obtained 41 percent of votes. However, both PS and PSD have elected 24 MPs to regional assembly. Four years later (2000), Azorean voters reinforced their preferences to socialist incumbency (+ 3.4% of votes and + 6 seats), whereas PSD decreased on vote shares (−8.52%). In the 2004 Azorean’ regional election, the PS has its best vote share ever (57%) which get elected 31 MPs over 52. To those elections, PSD has formed a pre-electoral coalition with CDS/PP (Popular Party, Partido Popular) and has obtained 36.8% of votes. Until the 2004 regional election, the Azorean electoral system was characterized as extremely disproportional and unequal,4 (Blanco de Morais et al., 2004) such that the value of votes was distorted (Ruel, 2019, p. 3). Electoral rules reforms stabilized the size of the regional parliament at 57 MPs in time for the 2008 election.5 They also created a compensatory constituency of five mandates in order to introduce some equilibria on proportionality, through aggregating the remaining voters from the nine constituencies into a single constituency (regional). Two new political parties, the PPM (Monarchist Party, Partido Popular Monárquico) and 3  In 1992, the Socialist Party have launched some initiatives as part of the Convenções da Autonomia (Autonomy’s Conference) challenging the incumbent and positioning itself as a credible alternative to the PSD. 4  That is, it had malapportionment, the discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by geographic units (Monroe, 1994). 5  The district magnitude across the nine islands has varied from 2 to 20 which mean that some parts of population are heavily overrepresented. The number of MPs in the Azorean regional assembly varied between 43 (1976) and 52 (2004) due to the fluctuation of eligible voters.

55.4/27 33.8/14 7.7/2 2.2/0 – 4.3/1 – – –

43

PSD PS CDS/PP APU/PCP UDP/BE UDA/PDA AD-Aa PSD-­CDS/PP PPM

Total mandates

43

57.3/30 27.2/12 4.47/1 3.2/0 1.6/0 2.29/0 – – –

1980

44

56.4/28 24.2/13 7.9/2 5.29/1 1.2/0 1.5/0 – – –

1984

51

48.57/26 33.48/22 7.05/2 3.8/1 0.77/0 – 1.33/0 – –

1988

51

53.59/28 36.4/21 – 2.3/1 – 1.41/0 4.58/1 – –

1992

52

41/24 45.8/24 7.37/3 3.48/1 0.87/1 – – – –

1996

52

32.48/18 49.2/30 9.56/2 4.83/2 1.38/0 – – – 0.8/0

2000 – 56.9/31 – 2.79/1 0.9/0 – 0.23/0 – 36.8/ 210.28/0 52

2004

Notes: aAD-A (Aliança Democrática-Açores) was a right-wing coalition formed at national level, formed by CDS/PP and PPM

Source: Author’s elaboration. Available at: www.cne.pt

1976

Political parties

Table 4.1  Electoral results in Azores 1976–2016 (% of vote share and number of seats)

57

20.26/15 49.9/30 8.7/5 3.14/1 3.3/2 0.7/0 – – 0.47/1

2008

57

34.53/20 51.29/31 5.93/3 1.98/1 2.35/1 0.51/0 – – 0.08/1

2012

57

32.62/19 49.02/30 7.56/4 2.76/1 3.87/2 – – – –

2016

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75

BE (Left Bloc, Bloco de Esquerda) emerged. They won one seat with 0.47% of the votes6 and two seats with 3.3% of the vote, respectively. Carlos César left public office and PS’ leadership in 2012,7 but his party retained power, winning the 2012 regional election and even expanding its percentage of votes and gaining a seat in parliament (+1.4%/+1 seat). Vasco Cordeiro became the regional premier and head of the PS in Azores. In 2016 the PS secured a large plurality of votes (49.0%) and seats (30). Vasco Cordeiro was re-elected. The PSD remained as the second most voted party, but had won the smallest portion of the votes since 1976 (32.6%). The centre-right (CDS/PP) and the Left Bloc (BE) each won two seats, respectively. CDU and PPM had obtained the re-election of their deputies. After 43  years of regional elections, single-party governments with long-term of incumbency is the norm in the Azores. Political alternation in Azorean history remained at one, in 1996 (Table 4.1). By contrast Madeira has never experienced political alternation. PSD has won every regional election since 1976. In 1976, six parties have contested the regional election. Four of them obtained parliamentary representation: PSD, PS, CDS/PP and UDP (Popular Democratic Union, União Democrática Popular).8 PSD obtained 60.4% of vote share and Ornelas Camacho assumed the helm of the regional cabinet. PS become the second major party (22.6%) and CDS/PP obtained two seats. UDP represented the leftists after the convulsed transition to democracy in the island, winning two seats (Table 4.2). The fear of communist takeover has driven to give the UDP a key role within the system, heavily boosted by the priest Martins Júnior and Paulo Martins.9 Ornelas Camacho on served 6  PPM’ MP was elected by the Corvo electoral constituency. This electoral constituency had a low district magnitude (M=2) and 353 eligible voters at the time of the 2008 regional elections. 7  When Carlos César assumed the party leadership and consequently the helm of government in 1996 he assumed that he would be able to serve three terms as regional premier. The Azorean’ statute of autonomy reform held in 2009 introduced a term limit such that the head of regional government could not serve more than three consecutive terms (twelve years). 8  UDP was a political party with a Marxist orientation which emerged in 1974. 9  Martins Júnior was elected in 1976 to regional parliament. He served as MP until 1988. In 1989 he contested municipal elections and became mayor of Machico. In the 1993 local municipal elections he was re-elected on PS’s party lists and retained power until 2001. In 2001 he returned to the regional parliament, staying there until 2007. Martins Júnior was viewed as the major competitor to Alberto João Jardim. In 1995 the President of the Republic Mário Soares awarded him the ‘Order of Liberty’.

60.4/29 22.6/8 9.6/2 1.85/0 5.16/1 – – – – – – – 44

PSD PS CDS/PP APU/PCP UDP/BE PSN PND MPT PTP PAN Mudançaa JPP Total mandates

65.3/35 15/5 6.46/1 3.13/1 5.48/2 – – – – – – – 44

1980 67.6/40 15.3/6 6.13/1 2.73/1 5.51/2 – – – – – – – 50

1984 62.36/41 16.79/7 8.19/2 2.03/0 7.73/3 – – – – – – – 53

1988 56.8/39 22.5/12 8.09/2 2.96/1 4.6/2 2.4/1 – – – – – – 51

1992 56.8/41 24.8/13 7.3/2 4.04/2 4.03/1 0.64/0 – – – – – – 59

1996 55.9/41 21.04/13 9.72/3 4.64/2 4.79/2 – – – – – – – 61

2000 53.7/44 27.4/19 7.04/2 5.5/2 3.6/1 – – – – – – – 68

2004 64.2/33 15.4/7 5.34/2 5.44/2 2.98/1 – 2.08/1 2.26/1 – – – – 47

2007

48.57/25 11.5/6 17.6/9 3.76/1 1.7/0 – 3.27/1 1.93/1 6.8/3 2.13/1 – – 47

2011

Notes: aMudança (Change) was a political coalition which contested the 2015 regional election in Madeira, composed by PS-PTP-PAN-MPT

Source: Author’s elaboration. Available at: www.cne.pt

1976

Political parties

Table 4.2  Electoral results in Madeira 1976–2015 (% of vote share and number of seats)

44.36/24 – 13.7/7 5.54/2 3.8/2 – 2.07/1 – – – 11.4/6 10.28/5 47

2015

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for two years before resigning in 1978 as a result of party structure decision. Alberto João Jardim took over the premiership, appointed by PSD regional branch.10 As Emanuel Rodrigues11 explained: The two years of Ornelas Camacho’ incumbency signalized to the PSD that a distinctive strategy was needed. The political instability at national level promoted by provisional governments and the steering clear of ‘regionalization’ powers by regional government required a distinctive approach. (Emanuel Rodrigues interview, Funchal—Portugal, October 2013)

Alberto João Jardim won the election in 1980, retaining his office, and the PSD captured the majority of votes (65.3%). APU12 elected one deputy. The subsequent elections (1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000) have reproduced and enhanced the power of Jardim and PSD while the opposition parties remained stable in terms of vote share and seats without gaining. The early election called in 2007 prompted by the financing law reforms13 amplified PSD hegemony (64.3%) in Madeira. Furthermore, the electoral reform introduced at election time transformed the eleven constituencies into a single, regional-based constituency which has extended political representation to two new parties: the MPT (The Earth Party Movement, Movimento Partido da Terra) and the PND (New Democracy Party, Partido Nova Democracia). 10  The Madeira Church hierarchy in the form of Bishop D.  Francisco Santana and Agostinho Cardoso (who was MP during the previous regime and Alberto João Jardim’s uncle) promoted Alberto João Jardim’s political rise. Bishop Santana had facilitated Jardim’s service as Jornal da Madeira’ (diocese newspaper) director, which culminated when he joined the regional cabinet in 1978. 11  Emanuel Rodrigues was a PSD MP, elected by Madeira electoral district. His significant parliamentary work included changing the regional authority framework and regional institutional arrangements during the 1976 Constitution draft. In Madeira’s 1976 regional election he was elected regional deputy and became the president of the assembly. 12  The APU dissolved in 1988 and PCP (Communist Party) and PEV (Green Party) have formed a new coalition, the CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária, United Democratic Coalition). 13  Alberto João Jardim resigned from the regional cabinet and called for new elections in order to legitimize and empower the cabinet’s position in the face of the financing law reform approved by the national parliament. He stated that an “electorate plebiscite” was needed to support and validates the forthcoming challenges imposed by the cuts on the amount of state transfers to the region. Mendonça, Tolentino (2007) “Alberto João Jardim apresenta demissão para forçar eleições antecipadas”, Público, 19th February 2007.

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The subsequent regional election held in 2011 registered a decrease in PSD vote share (−15.67%) and CDS/PP became the second major party with 17.63% of votes and elected nine parliamentarians. The centre-right bloc represented 71.3% of the electorate. In turn, the leftists bloc have a sum of 29.46% of votes: PS has cast 11.5% of votes and six deputies, and for the first time, PTP (Portuguese Workers Party, Partido Trabalhista Português) elected three MPs and PAN (Animals Party, Partido Pessoas, Animais e Natureza) gained one seat (2.13%). The CDU lost a single MP and BE lost its parliamentary representation. In 2011, eight political parties obtained representation at regional assembly. The 2015 regional elections revolved around the austerity policies imposed by the troika intervention14 and the additional austerity package enacted in the region led to an expectation of political alternation. After 39 years of incumbency, Alberto João Jardim announced his resignation from the regional cabinet due to intra-party contestation results15 (Ruel, 2015, 2019). Miguel Albuquerque16 took his place in the PSD.  He campaigned under the slogan Renovação (Renewal), distancing himself from the outgoing leadership. The social-democrats lost four per cent of vote shares winning a bare majority, confirming the tendency of vote shares decline for ruling party begun in 2011. Socialists had formed a pre-electoral coalition with PTP, PAN, and MPT under the banner Mudança (Change), winning 11.4% of votes and six MPs—five fewer than the four parties collectively had won in 2011. Socialists had the greatest electoral defeat since the first regional election of 1976. Christian-democrats (CDS/PP) reaffirmed their second leading position at regional parliament; BE returned to the regional parliament; CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária, United Democratic Coalition) went up one seat and PND maintained one representative. The ‘big surprise’ of 2015 election was the emergence of a new party—JPP (United

14  Troika consists of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 15  Alberto João Jardim was defeated in PSD internal elections in December 2014. An intense intra-party competition between six candidates ensued from Jardim’s resignation; Miguel Albuquerque was the victor. 16  Miguel Albuquerque was a mayor of Funchal, the capital of Madeira, for 19  years (1994–2013). He had been appointed mayor because his predecessor, Virgilio Pereira, resigned after clashing with Jardim.

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for the People, Juntos Pelo Povo)17—which won 10.28% of the votes and five seats (Ruel, 2015, 2019). There existed a strong expectation among political parties that 2015 regional elections would lead to alternation in government. However, it was frustrated, despite the replacement of Jardim. None of the opposition parties had managed to present themselves as a credible political alternative. This is in part because the PS has had so much leadership instability, which has made it difficult to develop a credible alternative to the PSD. Likewise, Madeira voters are highly conservative, to the extent that, having their electoral preferences have been concentrated in the centre-­ right bloc (PSD and CDS/PP) for 43 years. A third factor blocking alternation is that the PSD has had electoral strength at the local level, and the majority of the local governments are PSD-dominated (Table 4.2). The multilevel structure of the Spanish state has prompted a diversity of party systems in which state-wide parties and regionalists parties compete on the left-right and in territorial issues in national and regional elections (Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Oñate, 2010). The regional level (autonomous communities) in Spain reveal significant diversity within the country (historic vs. non-historic regions) and when compared to the regional tier in Portugal. The Canary Islands is a non-historic region, insular and peripheral. Canarians have within Spanish territorial organization, which have presented it as an example of strong regional identity anchored on their islands specificities (Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Fortes & Perez, 2013). The first regional elections in the Canary Islands took place in 1983. Much as it had in the 1982 national elections held to the Spanish Congress of Deputies, PSOE received a plurality of the votes, 41%. The party was to assume a pivotal position in the regional party system until 1993, reflecting the socialists’ role developed in the democratization process and support for its ideological position in favour of ‘territorial pluralism’ within ‘Spanish nation’ (Aja, 1999). However, with no party winning a majority, the archipelago had a minority cabinet, and still does today. The coalition’s formula is a defining feature in most Spanish regions (Downs, 17  JPP emerged as an independent popular movement at the local level in the 2009 local elections. At the start, JPP assumed control of the parish executive (2009), and in the 2013 local elections have reinforced their electoral support and won a mayor incumbency. In 2015, JPP was constitutionally established as political party in order to compete in regional elections.

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1998). In Canary Islands politics, is one of the main challenges that political parties have to face (Stefuriuc, 2009b). Jeronimo Saavedra formed a minority government in 198318 until 1985. The legislative arena fragmentation and the local and insular political constrains19 required a parliamentary agreement. In 1985 PSOE signed the Pacto de Progreso with the leftists-regionalist parties—Asamblea Majorera (AM), Partido Comunista de Canarias (PCE-Can) and the Partido Revolución Canarias (PRC)—obtaining their support for the PSOE until the end of the legislature. In the 1987 regional election, insular issues assumed critical importance at the time of government formation. The socialists had decreased the vote shares (losing 13.24%) and the regional branches of the CDS (Centro Democrático y Social) took over the executive. CDS formed a center-­right coalition with AP (Alianza Popular/Partido Popular) and AIC (Agrupación Independiente de Canarias) headed by Fernando Fernandez. One year later (1988) Lorezo Olarte replaced him. This center-­right coalition, known as Pacto Canario, was exposed to several political constraints and became vulnerable across the legislature, due to intra-party pressures and divergences from the municipal and insular party members. At municipal and insular levels, the political parties that formed the center-right coalition (CDS, AP and AIC) shared the ideological spectrum and disputed the same electorate. These in turn have created difficulties for governmental cohabitation (García-Rojas & García-Portillo, 2005; García-Rojas & Báez García, 2014). Though Canarias’ 1991 election, the socialist Jeronimo Saavedra returned to the regional executive in a coalition with the AIC (Agrupaciones Indepiendentes de Canarias). PSOE and AIC made several coalition 18  Saavedra investiture was made only at the second round of nomination due to the UCD position in the regional parliament. The Canaries’ electoral rules do not establish who is entitled to govern, after counting of votes. The head of government is nominated and voted on by the political parties represented at regional parliament. The support for a particular candidate to regional premier is subject to MP bargaining. That is, it is not clear that the most voted party will be the ruling party. For example, within Portuguese autonomous regions counterpart, the electoral rules determine that the head of the most voted party list is appointed head of government by the Republic’s Representative. 19  The political conflict in the Canary Islands is particularly anchored in local and insular social and political structures. The political configurations at municipal level and Cabildos Insulares have been influenced by the bargaining processes of regional institutions (parliament and executive) (García-Rojas, 2003).

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agreements—Pacto de Cemento—which failed successively during the mandate due to the overlap of insular agreements vis-à-vis the regional ones. The 1993 national election has triggered important effects on national, and in particular the Canary Islands party system. The emergent political party—Coalición Canarias, CC20—contested national elections (1993), which gave them leverage into regional politics in Canaries. CC had jeopardized the state-wide electoral gains achieved during the first decade of regional democracy; had challenged the electoral dynamics and the configuration of party systems; and gave parliamentary support to the state-­ level government. CC elected four MPs to the national parliament and three senators, and became, therefore, an important supporter of the PSOE minority government. At the regional level, as a result of a motion of no confidence (supported by the parties that take part of CC and AHI), Manuel Hermoso (CC) replaced Saavedra was replaced as regional premier21 (Bravo de Laguna, 1998; García-Rojas, 2004a). The 1995 regional election was the turning point in the Canaries’ politics. CC assumed a pivotal position within the political system and changed the patterns of party competition and government formation, previously established by the statewide parties. For the first time, CC elected 21 deputies to the regional assembly with 32.85% of vote shares, and formed a governing coalition with the PP, reflecting the external support that the CC provided to the Partido Popular at national level. Hermoso remained at the executive. CC has repeated its electoral success in the 1999 regional election and upheld PP as a coalition partner. Román Rodriguez became the head of cabinet. The party inaugurated a distinctive style concerning the coalition agreements. At the national level, CC has supported national government through parliamentary agreements, whereas the regional CC followed a government coalition’s formula supported by the state-wide parties. CC backed the Aznar’ government’s formation in 1996, establishing its ideological boundaries explicitly: ‘go with the party in Madrid’, neglecting the 20  Coalición Canaria consists of the Iniciativa Canaria (ICAN), Asamblea Majorera (AM); Centro Canario Independiente (CCI); Agrupaciones Indepiendentes de Canarias (AIC) and by Partido Nacionalista Canario (PNC) (Bravo de Laguna, 1998; García-Rojas, 2004a, 2004b). 21  After the UCD’ dissolution, Manuel Hermoso formed the Agrupación Tinerfeña Independiente (ATI). CC has strong social and electoral implantation in Tenerife. CC is a right-wing regionalist party that have agglomerated several minor, local, insular-based political parties.

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ideological proximity or other classical determinants of coalition formation (García-Rojas, 2004b; Stefuriuc, 2009a, 2009b). The subsequent regional election (2003) has exhibited the same outcomes regarding cabinet formation. CC and PP prevailed as coalition partners, despite PSOE being the most-voted party (35.01%). Adrián Martin led the cabinet. This coalition survived until 2005, when the head of government dismissed the PP’s regional ministers with the justification that PP had undermined the relationship between the Canary Islands and the national government (Stefuriuc, 2009b, p.  105). In the 2007 regional election Paulino Rivero became regional premier, sharing control of the cabinet with PP. In the 2011 Canarian election, CC and PP equalized their number of MPs, with 21 each. CC assumed the head of government and PSOE got the vice-presidency. CC has supported the Zapatero government at the Congresso and has approved the 2010 and 2011 national budget. In exchange Zapatero earmarked addition funds for the Canary Islands. This event explicitly confirms the CC’s willingness to work with national government when regional interests are at stake, even at the expense of ideology. The CC is ideologically closer to the Canarian Socialists than PP, resulting from ideological congruence regarding territorial issues (Stefuriuc, 2009b, p. 105).22 After two terms in office (8 years), Paulino Rivero left Canaries cabinet (2015). The CC leadership at regional office has been characterized by some instability. Despite CC incumbency, the head of cabinet has changed at the time of government formation. Rivero was the CC incumbent who stayed longest at the helm of regional office, driven by the nomination and bargaining processes in the regional assembly after regional election. In the 2015 regional election, Fernando Clavijo from CC (in coalition with PNC, Partido Nacionalista Canario and AHI)23 assumed the regional incumbency. CC also won a majority of parliamentary seats (18) that year, despite having lowered its vote shares (18.59%). PSOE obtained the majority of votes (20.26%), however, taking 15 seats. PP was the second most voted party (18. 94%), although get elected twelve deputies. The 22  This is a critical factor that explains the incongruence or congruence; the success or unsuccessful of governmental coalitions in the Canary Islands. CC party member explained this to an interviewer in 2006 (Stefuriuc, 2009b, p. 196). 23  The Coalicón Canarias and the Partido Nacionalista Canario has formed a permanent alliance in 2006 ahead of 2007 regional elections. The alliance has been renewed in 2011 and 2015.

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2015 regional election reaffirmed the regionalist party dominance, the CC leading position of government formation in Canary Islands. Following the 2015 regional election, CC chose PSOE-PSC as coalition partner, but the alliance broke in 2016 and CC has led a minority cabinet ever since. Podemos was the ‘big surprise’ of 2015 Canaries’ election which get elected seven MPs, re-organizing the party system at regional level. The Agrupación Socialista Gomera (ASG) elected three seats for the first time which illustrates the over-representation of a constituency (La Gomera) in the regional parliament (Table 4.3). The statewide parties traditionally compete along the left-wing dimensions comprising different positions over how to organize and distribute economic resources within regions; and the regionalist parties tend to compete over territorial dimension, related to the scope of regional authority that should be granted to regional institutions by the state (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Fabre & Martinez-Herrera, 2009; Elias, 2011; Alonso, 2012; Detterbeck, 2012). The ideological package of the mainstream regionalist party in Canary Islands—Coalición Canaria—is anchored exclusively on the center-­ periphery cleavage, demanding more resources and power at the regional level from the Spanish state. CC claims for itself the exclusivity of Canarias’s representation at the regional and national tiers, which in turn, constitutes their legitimizing political discourse to Madrid (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna, Tenerife—Canary Islands, February 2013). In sum, the electoral dynamics in the Canary Islands have shaped the importance of an insular arena and local factors—pleito insular—enhanced by the fact that most of the regionalist parties are island-based (AHI, from El Hierro or ATI from Tenerife). The ‘insularisation’ of Canary politics became a distinctive feature of its political system triggered by the emergence of the regional party system composed by insular and regional-based political parties (García-Rojas & García, 2001, García-Rojas, 2004a, 2004b). The regional branches of statewide parties led the first phase of the coalitional governments in the Canary Islands, from 1983 to 1987, which were significantly oriented by the national politics dynamics. The center-­right cabinet (1987–1993)—CDS, AP and AIC—has inaugurated the ‘insularization’ of regional politics in that its coalition agenda was captured by intraparty tensions at the municipal and insular level. The third stage was initiated by the CC cabinet predominance (1993), after a motion of no confidence, and the socialists have lost power and formed a coalition (AIC, CCN and ICAN) with the AHI parliamentary support (García-­Rojas, 2004a).

41.17/27 28.29/17 8.25/2 7.15/6 4.38/1 4.3/1 0.97/3 0.58/2 0.17/1 – – – – – – – – – – 60

PSOE AP-PDP-ULa AC CDS PCE CNC AM AGI AHI AIC AP/PP ICU ICAN PGG-PIL-IFb FNCc CC NC Podemos ASG Total Mandates

27.7/21 – 6.91/2 19.47/13 – – 0.81/3 – 0.21/2 20.13/11 11.18/6 6.1/2 – – – – – – – 60

1987

12.2/5 – – – – – – 60

33.03/23 – – 14.41/7 – – 0.71/2 – 0.21/1 22.7/16 12.8/6

1991 23.03/16 – – – – – – – 0.26/1 – 31.01/1 8 – 3.01/4 – 32.85/21 – – – 60

1995 24.03/19 – – – – – – – 0,33/2 – 27,13/1 5 – – – 36.9/24 – – – 60

1999 25.4/17 – – – – – – – – – 30.6/1 7 – – 4.83/3 32.9/23 – – – 60

2003 20.26/15 – – – – – – – – – 24.38/1 5 – – – 24.49/15 – – – 60

2007 21.57/15 – – – – – – – – – 32.85/2 1 – – – 25.65/21 9.33/3 – – 60

2011

20.26/15 – – – – – – – – – 18.94/1 2 – – – 18.59/18 10.4/5 14.5/7 0.56/3 60

2015

Notes: aCoalición PP (The People’s Coalition) was an electoral alliance comprising the People’s Alliance (AP), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Liberal Union (UL). bPlataforma Canaria Nacionalista (Nationalist Canarian Platform) was an electoral alliance in the Canary Islands, formed by the Party of Gran Canaria (PGC), Independents of Fuerteventura (IF) and Lanzarote Independents Party (PIL) ahead of the 1995 Canarian election. cCanarian Nationalist Federation (FNC) was an electoral alliance in the Canary Islands, formed by the Canarian Nationalist Party (PNC), Independents of Fuerteventura (IF) and Lanzarote Independents Party (PIL)

Source: Author’s elaboration. Available at: https://www3.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/elecciones/#/

1983

Political parties

Table 4.3  Electoral results in Canary Islands 1983–2015 (% of vote share and number of seats)

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The history of regional elections in Canary Islands indicates the importance of the following features. First, the electoral rules have accomplished the classical assumption of proportional representation none of political parties get the majority of votes and seats to govern alone. Second, and consequently, coalition formation and winning parliamentary support at the assembly has required permanent bargaining. Third, the alternation in power was prompted by the Coalición Canarias regionalist party in 1995, which has retained public office since that time. Fourth, Partido Popular have a strong coalitional potential, but isn’t a credible alternative to leading a cabinet formation. Fifth, when the statewide parties’ regional branches assumed power, the head of office needed parliamentary support or formed a coalition with regionalist parties. By contrast, when the regionalist party got the helm of the executive, it had to leverage alliances with statewide parties (Table 4.3). Bravo de Laguna described the situation thus: Historical and social legacies and center-periphery cleavages have determined the institutional arrangements, in particular, the electoral rules. In turn, the electoral outcomes have shaped constraints to political alternation. The effectiveness of political alternation will be met when the mainstream statewide parties (PSOE and PP) have obtained a comfortable majority of votes or formed a governmental coalition, removing CC from power. Up to now, the system has been blocked. (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna— Canary Islands, February 2013)

4.3   Patterns of Party Competition Historical and political legacies have been the most-cited explanation for party dominance within a political system (Pempel, 1990; Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Vampa, 2018). Azores and Madeira have revealed that party dominance and long-terms of incumbency can also occur in full-­ fledged democracies. The PSD has ruled Madeira in a single-party government since regional self-government arrangement was installed in 1976. In the Azores, the PSD was also dominant until 1996 when the PS became electorally stronger and met the alternation rule (Ruel, 2019). In the Canaries, Coalición Canarias prevailed as leading coalition incumbent from 1995 to 2015. In all three regions, opposition parties have had significant difficulty overthrowing the incumbents.

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In full-fledged democracies, politicians are elected in competitive elections which in turn hold representatives more accountable when elections are more competitive (Powell, 2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan 2002). Party competition within representative democracy literature entails a range of assumptions, including that elected officials will be accountable to citizens (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). This accountability, in turn, should at some point result in alternation in power. In this vein, party competition constitutes the critical feature to address political alternation (Sartori, 1976, p. 165). In order to explore the pattern of competition at regional level, I considered a range of contextual features of the political system that affect the outcomes of elections. First, I looked at the effective number of parties (ENP) across all elections held between 1976 and 2016. The ENP accounts for the number of political parties and their relative strength and shows the degree of party system concentration or fragmentation (Rae, 1968; Laakso & Taagepera, 1979).24 In proportional systems, the most voted parties tend to be favored when votes are translated into seats. In order to account for that, I have considered a measure to assess the (dis) proportionality between votes and seats, using the most used least square index (Gallagher, 1979).25 In addition, I compute electoral competitiveness in order to signalize the closeness among parties as a proxy indicator to capture the likelihood of political alternation.26 However, scholars do not have a consensus on this measure (Cox, 1997; Merrill & Grofman, 1999). A contestation is competitive when “no one party is given distinct advantage in elections and every party that wins any given election has a realistic opportunity to lose that office to another party in a near future” (Aldrich & Griffin, 2007, p.  4). Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 illustrate the evolution of the 24  The ENP is formulated as 1/∑Pi2, where p is the proportion of seats controlled by the i-th party (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979, p.  4). The ENP varies from 1 (where one party obtains all votes) to N (when votes are spread equally across parties). 25  LSq = 1 / 2 ∑ (vi - si)2 where vi is the percentage of votes for a party i; s is the percentage of seats for party I, and ∑ represents the sum for all parties. This index varies between 0 (full proportionality) and 100 (total disproportionality). 26  Party competitiveness is a property of competition that reflects the distribution of parties’ electoral strength, shown by electoral results (Sartori, 1976, p. 218). The party competitiveness is measured by the distance between the first and second most voted parties. The smaller the vote differences between those parties, the larger the competitiveness of an election. The smaller the margin between them, the more competitive is the election (Rice, 1985; Siaroff & Merer, 2002).

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Table 4.4  Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in Azores (1976–2016) Elections Azores

Disproportionality LSq indexa

ENPb

Electoral competitiveness

1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Mean

5.72 7.82 7.79 6.23 17.36 3.98 7.43 3.13 2.78 2.78 4.53 11.59

1.99 1.85 2.03 2.23 1.49 2.33 2.19 1.93 2.35 2.35 2.53 3.87

21.63 30.08 32.19 13.09 17.18 4.82 16.72 20.13 19.65 16.76 1.4 34.77

Source: Author’s elaboration Notes: aDisproportionality: least squares index (Gallagher, 1979); bEffective number of electoral (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979)

Table 4.5  Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in Madeira (1976–2015) Elections Madeira

Disproportionality LSq index1

ENP2

Electoral competitiveness

1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2007 2011 2015 Mean

6.18 10.83 9.58 11.44 8.94 9.71 8.78 8.64 4.43 3.84 5.01 14.56

2.12 1.54 1.52 1.61 1.94 1.87 1.99 2.01 1.92 2.93 3.18 3.77

37.77 50.33 52.32 45.57 34.35 32.03 34.91 26.3 48.82 37.07 32.93 72.06

Source: Author’s elaboration Notes: aDisproportionality: least squares index (Gallagher, 1979); bEffective number of electoral (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979)

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Table 4.6  Disproportionality, ENP and electoral competitiveness in the Canary Islands (1983–2015) Elections C. Islands

Disproportionality LSq index

ENP

Electoral competitiveness

1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 Mean

6.62 7.4 5.88 4.15 6.38 4.65 7.78 7.83 8.89 11.91

3.35 4.57 4.1 3.47 3.09 3.23 2.85 3.23 5.01 6.58

12.38 7.63 10.33 1.77 9.8 2.29 10.52 7.2 1.32 12.6

Source: Author’s elaboration Notes: aDisproportionality: least squares index (Gallagher, 1979); bEffective number of electoral (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979)

disproportionality, the ENP and the electoral competitiveness in the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands regions. In Duvergerian terms proportional representation tends to produce a multiparty system, whereas two-party systems are favored by plurality rule (Duverger, 1954). During almost three decades of regional democracy (1976–2004) the pattern of party competition in Azores reveals a strong concentration of the PSD and PS, which alternate in power. The period between 1976 and 1996 was characterized by a bipartisan party system where the PSD had obtained the absolute majority of vote shares with a lower level of electoral competitiveness. As a result of the 1996 regional election, major changes took place in the Azorean politics. PS obtained success and overthrew the PSD incumbent after 20  years when Carlos César became regional premier. This electoral contestation was significantly competitive, with only 4.82% of votes separating the PS and the PSD, resulting in an even number of MPs. The electoral rules reforms introduced at the time of the 2008 regional election reconfigured the competition in the regional arena in the Azores. Some systemic disproportionality that had prevailed was eliminated in favor of greater equilibrium between the nine constituencies (islandbased). The creation of a compensatory constituency (9+1) allowed the entry of two new parties (BE and PPM) which have increased the intensity

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of political competition. The vote-share measure shows that electoral competitiveness was on average 34.77. That is, there was a moderate degree of closeness among the most voted and the second major parties, which signals that the second major party will have huge difficulty toppling the incumbent in subsequent elections. ENP and the pattern of electoral competitiveness are stable over years, which is indicative of voters’ ongoing identification with a particular political party (Table 4.4). Regarding the disproportionality indicator, with the exception of the 1992 regional election, which has displayed the highest distortion in the translation of votes into seats, the pattern of disproportionality is quite stable. The oscillation is related to the number of parties in competition across the nine constituencies; the effort made by each party, according their size, on each constituency to obtain enough votes to get representatives. At the time of the 1996 election disproportionality registered the lowest score, greatly influenced by the strong contestability. The creation of the compensatory constituency (2008) lessened the degree of proportionality distortion. The performance of party competition illustrate that there are two political parties with government orientation: PSD and PS.  They reveal strong electoral and territorial implantation (across the nine constituencies) regarding the votes share and seats. Opposition parties obtained vote shares in particular constituencies. For example, the PCP elects representatives through the Flores and Faial constituencies and the PPM have their fixed electorate among the Corvo constituency. Even BE, which gained representation through the compensatory constituency, aggregating all their votes across the nine constituencies, can always rely on the loyalty of their voters. The pattern of party competition in Azores assumes a bipartisan format where there exist two mainstream political parties that had alternate in power, with long-serving terms in office. The Table 4.5 illuminates that Madeira’s pattern of party competition is distinctive from the one that has prevailed in the Azores. The PSD has dominated in terms of vote shares and seats since the 1976 founding elections. The ENP measures signalize a bipartisan tendency (2.34), but in reality the PSD has held an absolute majority of votes (60.4%) while its closest competitor holds only 22.6% of vote shares. The 1976 regional election constituted the antechamber of party dominance (PSD) of the Madeira polity. The regional contestations that have followed have reinforced the pattern and hampered the strengths of opposition parties. The 1980 election results reflected the divergent positions among the regional

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branches of social-democrats with the state-wide party, due to territorial autonomy issues. This event reinforced the vote shares of the ruling party and mobilized the regional electorate (80% turnout) signalizing its territorial distinctiveness. Madeira’s political system is likely to produce majoritarian outcomes, which in turn have increased the dominance of the ruling party in both the electoral and legislative arenas. District magnitude of the eleven constituencies fixed at every four years, created significant instability until the passage of electoral reform in 2007. Thus, the total number of MPs in the regional assembly constituted a critical hurdle to the opposition parties, in particular the opposition parties that get elected representative in districts with higher magnitude. UDP was the exception, which has been successful in the Machico constituency since 1976 due to the local contester. Nevertheless, electoral competitiveness increased in Madeira in the 2004 regional election by lessening the electoral gap between the PSD and PS. However, the PS has not presents a credible alternative, in the eyes of the voters, to PSD incumbency. The 2007 contestation opened the structure of competition and increased the number of relevant parties in the system. However, while the PS remains the major opposition party, its prospects of obtaining power have not amplified. Two new political parties got representation (PND and MPT), and the PSD reinforced its dominant position and opposition bloc became more fragmented (Table 4.5). The pattern of party competition in Madeira unfolded from 1976 to 2007 as a predominant party system, with the PSD winning absolute majorities of votes and seats. Between 2011 and 2015, it has been approximately a multiparty system because the number of relevant parties (ENP) has increased from 3.47 to 4.1 (Ruel, 2015, 2019). Notwithstanding, the number of political parties contesting regional elections, effective contestability remains frustrated, and consequently the likelihood of alternation. The ENP and electoral competitiveness are negatively associated; that is, the higher number of relevant parties has revealed greater fragmentation within the party system, in particular among opposition parties. However, the vote shares of the incumbent decreased in the 2011 and 2015 regional elections. In 2015 the opposition bloc obtained 47% of the vote and 23 of 47 seats at the assembly. Thus, despite the ruling party’s electoral majority, it seems possible a coalition formed by the opposition parties might challenge the regional incumbent. However, due to their ideological divergences, which cover all ideological spectrums, from right to centre-­right

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and left-wing in spite of their common aim of defeating the PSD, in practice, such a coalition seems highly unlikely. Despite electoral law reform (2007), the entry of new parties in the system, the change of the ruling party leader (2014), and the left-wing coalition formed at the time of 2015 regional election, the institutionalized and path-dependent structure of opportunities has not led to political alternation in the Madeira political system. The systemic low degree of electoral competition is strongly anchored on historical legacies of PSD and its electoral fortunes. They are, in turn, the corollary of its leading position on voicing territorial issues demanding for more regional authority (power and resources) from state-level government and satisfying the voter’s regional preferences (Ruel, 2019). In sum, the structure of competition remains predictable and stable regarding, on the one hand, the lack of political alternation and the persistence of the government formula—single-party government—and, on the other hand, the prevalence of a weak and fragmented opposition. Opposition parties did not manage to present themselves as a credible alternative hitherto and PSD still benefited from the long-lasting incumbency advantage even when the of former regional premier stepped down after 39 years (Ruel, 2015, 2019). The party system in the Canary Islands displayed a significant degree of party fragmentation at the first regional elections. The largest number of relevant state-wide parties, including UCD, CDS, and PCE, existed in the democratization period. These political parties disappeared gradually over the 80s when they merged into other Canaries’ political forces. Since 1995, CC agglutinated a range of center-right political parties into a large political platform. The party system fragmentation that characterized the Canary Islands from 1983 to 1993 was succeeded by a moderate pluralism, with three mainstream parties that have the same likelihood of gaining power: the PSOE and PP statewide parties and the CC regionalist party. Since 1995 the party system in the Canary Islands has experienced a relatively moderate degree of fragmentation (ENP around 4). In 2007, the excision at CC determined the institutionalization of the Nueva Canarias as a political party. Two political parties now share the nationalist and/or regionalist bloc. In 2015, the Canaries’ party system was opened to Podemos, a recently formed statewide party. The salience of territorial dimension has structured the party system and party competition in the Canary Islands, in particular, throughout the pleito insular. It also has led, within the Canarias’s party system, to the emergence of a

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sub-­party system at the local and insular levels (Bravo de Laguna, 1998; García-­Rojas & García, 2001; García-Rojas, 2004a). The district magnitude is the critical source of inequality (malapportionment) within Canarias’s electoral outcomes. As Bravo de Laguna put it: Eighty-five percent of the Canaries inhabitants, who live on the two major islands, Gran Canaria and Tenerife, elect half of the MPs to the regional parliament. The number of mandates fixed to each constituency were established according to the parity criteria among the two major islands and the peripheral islands, rather than, based on the number of inhabitants, which in turn, has created distortions to proportionality and regarding political representation among islands. (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna—Canary Islands, February 2013)

Additionally, the cut-off points to accede to representation—6% at the regional level and 30% of each island—have blocked the polarization and fragmentation of parties in the regional parliament. The threshold of 6% at the regional level is quite peculiar, given the fact that there are no constituencies designed at the regional level (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna, Tenerife—Canary Islands, February 2013). The party competition is developed and polarized at an insular level. Electoral outcomes have ensured a representation bonus to the party with the largest number of votes on each island, and as a result one in three candidacies find no success (Llera, 1999, p. 109). Elections in the Canary Islands are extremely competitive, with a strong regionalist party able to influence the outcome of regional elections and on government formation (Pallarés & Keating, 2003; García-Rojas, 2004a; Ocaña & Oñate, 2005). At election time, the mainstream political parties (CC, PSOE and PP) have the same prospects of being the most-­ voted party and/or to take part in a governmental coalition. CC has established a dominant position and a long-term incumbency (20  years) mediated by local and insular factors, leveraging the territorial cleavage with Madrid in the defense of regional interests. Nevertheless, the party has lessened territorial polarization and reduced parliamentary fragmentation. This, in turn, has facilitated the formation of governments based on (more) homogeneous majorities.

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4.4   Turnout at Regional Elections There exists an expectation that a greater level of identification of the electorate with regionalism and self-government institutions increases turnout (Henderson & McEwen, 2010; Calca & Kohler, 2014; Schakel & Dandoy, 2014) resulting from the relevance of the regional scale of politics. Turnout in the Azores is around 58% and in Madeira is 65%. In the first 1976 elections, 67.5% of the electorate voted in Azores, whereas 74.5% of Madeirans voted (Fig. 4.1). The highest turnout rates were recorded at the time of 1980 elections, 77% in Azores and 81% in Madeira. These regional elections were critical for both regions. The regional branches of the social-democrat party in both regions diverged from the state-wide party. The Democratic Alliance (AD—Aliança Democrática)—an electoral alliance of PSD, CDS/PP, and PPM—won the national elections in February 1980. However, the regional branches’ leaders of the Christian-democrats and the Social-­ democrats in Madeira did not support the AD. Regional authority issues were at stake. Those divergences may have encouraged turnout by mobilizing the regional electorate on the basis of a distinct political community with distinctive territorial interests (Ruel, 2019; Ruel & Calca, 2019).

90 80

Turnout (%)

70 60 50

Azores

40

Madeira C.Islands

30 20 10 0 1970

1980

1990 2000 Election Years

2010

2020

Fig. 4.1  Turnout at regional elections—Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands (1976–2016)

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The ‘spike’ in turnout in Azores happened in 1996 Azores (59.16%), reflecting voters’ dissatisfaction with the former incumbent Mota Amaral’s resignation in 1995, to take up a seat as MP at national parliament. The socialists profited from the discontent among voters and the party’s vote share increased 9%. In 1998, the scope of fiscal autonomy powers increased due to fiscal reforms. However, the participation in the regional elections decreased, challenging the assumption (Henderson & McEwen, 2010) that an increase in authority scope would enhance turnout. It’s noteworthy that a significant turnout decrease in 2007 and 2008 regional elections at both regions coincided with the electoral rules reform (Ruel, 2019; Ruel & Calca, 2019). Between 1976 and 2004, Azores and Madeira held their elections simultaneously every four years. At present times there exists no horizontal simultaneity between regional elections and there is also no vertical simultaneity with local, national, or European elections (Ruel, 2019). The latest electoral cycle in Azores and Madeira (2015 and 2016) registered the lowest turnout level in 40 years of regional elections. Azores had experienced a turnout decrease in all types of elections in the preceding years  (Fig. 4.1). For example, the 2014 turnout rate for the European election was 15.4%. Madeira consistently reports greater electoral participation for regional, national, and European elections than Azores (Calca & Kohler, 2014; Ruel, 2019). However, this turnout pattern is accompanied by low levels of electoral competitiveness. Turnout in the Canary Islands had been stable over time. Voter participation in regional elections is on average 61.7%. At the first regional election held in 1983, 62.5% of the electorate have voted. The instability of the centre-right government (CDS, AP and ATI) prompted a turnout decrease in 1991 (61.7%). However, in the 1995 regional election, the CC leverage from the national election in 1993 mobilized the Canaries electorate and increased electoral participation (+2.5%). However, turnout in regional elections in the Canaries has declined since the 2003 election. The 2009 regional financing reform, which increased powers and resources for regions, did not lead to increasing turnout in the next election (2011). The latest electoral cycle turnout scored the lowest in voter participation (56.06%). The Canaries record the lowest turnout in regional elections of any Spanish region (Pallarés & Keating, 2003; Fortes & Perez, 2013) (Fig. 4.1).

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4.5   Chapter Final Remarks Regional elections in the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands have fostered critical features to the understanding of politics at regional democracies. The electoral outcomes of all of three regions have displayed since 1970s and 1980s have been leveraged by regional interests and identity, which has become a distinctive factor of regional politics. The first regional elections in three insular territories have revealed the relative strength of the political parties during the democratization alongside decentralization processes. The role played by these parties during the democratization and decentralization processes was decisive in their ability to attain political power. PSD in Azores and Madeira became electorally stronger in 1976. In Azores, PSD was dominant until 1996 when PS overthrew the PSD incumbency, and alternation took place. PSD has ruled in Madeira since 1976, hitherto. The PSD was able to control the two Portuguese regions while being dominant at a national level (1987–1995). The alternation took place in 1995 at the national level, and one year later (1996), PS had successfully challenged the incumbency in Azores. The patterns of party competition that emerged from the 1976 founding elections differ in Azores and Madeira. The Azores display a two-party system format in which PSD and PS alternate in power; by contrast Madeira experienced a predominant party system from 1976 to 2007; since 2011, it approximates to a multiparty system (Ruel, 2015, 2019). In the Canary Islands, the PSOE’s regional branch assumed the regional executive office in 1983 and remained in power until 1993, significantly influenced by the national counterpart, with the Filipe Gonzalez incumbency (1982–1996). In the 1995 regional elections Coalición Canarias assumed a pivotal position within Canarian politics, shaping the electoral strength of the regionalist parties and the local and insular logics on cabinet formation at the regional level. During the first decade of democracy, the regional branches of the statewide parties in the Canary Islands were able to secure the majority of votes in the regional parliament (PSOE-­ PSC, CDS and AP). They formed minority governments, relying on coalition formation with the regionalist parties. Furthermore, the governing party and its allies have changed in almost every legislature and sometimes executive stability has been lacking. It shapes a paradigmatic case of complex negotiation process of cabinet formation and a high degree of discontinuity of regional premiers.

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Overall, the Canary Islands follow the trend common in other Spanish regions: there is one party that has a pivotal position in government formation over time (Pallarés, 1994; Pallarés & Keating, 2003; García-Rojas, 2004a). The functioning of the electoral systems has displayed important outcomes among the three regions. Regional elections results in the Azores and Madeira are predictable over time, such that ruling parties had secured the majority of votes. Electoral competitiveness is lower, which, in turn, lowers the prospects of political alternation. The proportional electoral rules had, de facto, produced majoritarian outcomes concentrating the majority of votes and seats in a single party. Opposition parties have not managed enough voters’ preferences to challenge the incumbents. In spite of the pivotal position of CC within Canarian politics, party system offers multiple political choices to the electorate; there exists an effective electoral competitiveness among parties at election time in that all political parties have the opportunity to take over regional government. The composition of government is a matter of political actors’ bargain regarding insular features and local intra-party dynamics.

References Primary Sources Emanuel Rodrigues interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 was elected president of the Madeira regional assembly (1976–1980), October 2013, Funchal—Madeira, Portugal. Juan Hernandez Bravo de Laguna interview, Dean Professor at La Laguna University, Tenerife, Canarias (February 2013), La Laguna—Tenerife, Canary Islands. Público, 19 February 2007.

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Blanco de Morais, C., Araújo, A., & Freire, A. (2004). Entre a Representação Desigual e a Derrota dos Vencedores - Estudo sobre a Reforma do Sistema Eleitoral nos Açores. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais. Bogaards, M., & Boucek, F. (2010). Dominant political parties and democracy. In Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons. London and New York: Routledge/ ECPR Studies in European Political Science. Bravo de Laguna, J. H. (1998). La construcción electoral de Canarias en la autonomia: una cuestión no resuelta. In M. Alcántara & A. Martinez (Eds.), Las elecciones autonómicas en España 1980–1997 (pp. 119–149). Madrid: Colección Academia, CIS. Calca, P., & Kohler, S. (2014). Este é um Caminho ou um Atalho? Desemprego e Turnout no Comportamento Eleitoral dos Portugueses no Sentido da Europa (1987–2014). In M. F. Rollo, J. M. Brandão de Brito, & A. Cunha (Eds.), As Eleições Para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal (pp. 47–67). Lisbon: Almedina. Canes-Wrone, B., Brady, D., & Cogan, J. (2002). Out of step, out of office: Electoral accountability and house members’ voting. The American Political Science Review, 96(1), 127–140. Cox, G. (1997). Making votes count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Detterbeck, K. (2012). Multi-level party politics in Western Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Downs, W. (1998). Coalition politics, sub-national style: Multiparty politics in Europe regional parliaments. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: Wiley. Elias, A. (2011). Party competition in regional elections: A framework for analysis. Working Paper nr. 295, Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. Fabre, E., & Martinez-Herrera, E. (2009). Statewide parties and regional party competition: An analysis of party manifestos in the United Kingdom. In W. Swenden & B. Maddens (Eds.), Territorial party politics in Western Europe (pp.  229–248). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1057/9780230582941_12 Fortes, B. G., & Perez, L. C. (2013). Spain: The persistence of territorial cleavages and centralism of the Popular Party. In R.  Dandoy & A.  Schakel (Eds.), Regional and national elections in Western Europe—Territoriality of the vote in thirteen countries (pp. 196–215). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gallagher, M. (1979). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Electoral Studies, 10(11), 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 0261-3794(91)90004-C García-Rojas, J. (2003). Pactos electorales y coalicciones de gobierno en Canarias 1979–2002. Política y Sociedad, 40(2), 137–156.

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Pallarés, F., & Keating, M. (2003). Multilevel electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain. European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030103005 Pempel, T.  J. (1990). Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominance regime. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Powell, B. G. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rae, D. (1968). A note on the fractionalization of some European party systems. Comparative Political Studies, 1(3), 413–418. https://doi. org/10.1177/001041406800100305 Rice, T. (1985). Gubernatorial and senatorial primary elections: Determinants of competition. American Politics Quarterly, 13(4), 27–446. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/1532673X8501300403 Ruel, T. (2015). Madeira Regional Election 2015: A polity tyrannized by majorities or the end of an era? Regional & Federal Studies, 25(3), 313–320. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1053876 Ruel, T. (2019). Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-state-wide parties. Regional & Federal Studies, 29(3), 429–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1526786 Ruel, T. & Calca, P. (2019, April 8–12). Beyond ‘usual suspects’—Citizen’s perceptions towards institutions and the regional level of government in Azores and Madeira. Paper presented at ECPR Workshop Joint Session Attitudes towards decentralization at multilevel states. Mons, Belgium. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems—A framework of analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schakel, A., & Dandoy, R. (2014). Electoral cycles and turnout in multilevel electoral systems. West European Politics, 37(3), 605–623. https://doi.org/10.108 0/01402382.2014.895526 Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What democracy is. … and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75–88. Siaroff, A., & Merer, J. W. (2002). Parliamentary election turnout in Europe since 1990. Political Studies, 50(5), 916–927. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-9248.00400 Stefuriuc, I. (2009a). Introduction: Government coalitions in multi-level settings—Institutional determinants and party strategy. Regional & Federal Studies, 19(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597560802692199 Stefuriuc, I. (2009b). Government formation in multilevel settings: Spanish regional coalitions and the quest for vertical congruence. Party Politics, 15(1), 93–115. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808097895 Vampa, D. (2018). Developing new measures of party dominance: Definition, operationalization and application to 54 European regions. Government and Opposition, 55(1), 88–113. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.12.

CHAPTER 5

Intra-party Democracy

5.1   Introduction Party leaders are the forefront holders of public office and a critical factor for understanding why voters vote for a party (Bittner, 2011). In this chapter, I tackle the major features of the organizational structure of political parties that have been operating at the regional scale of politics. I account for intra-party dynamics regarding the parties vertical organization; the leadership selection’ procedures governing each party, and the tenure in office displayed by each party leader across the three regional contexts.

5.2   The Regional Branches of State-Wide Parties The incumbent electoral fortunes and the status of longevity as a ruling party, tends to prolong the tenure of party leaders (Andrew & Jackman, 2008; Fabre & Méndez-Lago, 2009) reinforcing simultaneously the pattern of inter-party competition. Participation in government endows party leaders with a range of resources, ranging from cabinet portfolios and policy-making capacities to simpler governmental goods that can be strategically allocated. It is reasonable to assume that these resources are used to shape, sustain, or strengthen the party leader’s position (Andrew & Jackman, 2008, p. 670). That is to say, winning votes at elections time has

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an instrumental value for the achievement of party goals (Strøm, 1990, p. 573). One of the key ways to assess the strength of a party leader is “the vertical map of organizational power” (Panebianco, 1988) and leadership selection rules within party structures. The rules governing the leadership selection are critical to intra-party dynamics. They reveal information about leaders’ intra-party position and the status of their internal opponents (De Winter, 1993; Hazan & Rahat, 2010). The organization of intra-party decision-making strongly influences the outcome of a party’s collective action (Aldrich, 1995; Katz & Mair, 1994), shapes the distribution of power within a party, and reflects the veto points in the decision-­ making process through candidate selection procedures (Katz, 2001; Kircheimer, 1990; Michels, 1915; Ostrogorski, 1902; Ranney, 1981; Schattschneider, 1942). Selection of a party leader may take several forms: (1) primaries, which may be open—where the party’s rank-and-file members and sympathizers vote to nominate their candidate—or closed—when the decision is made at the elite level of the party; (2) by all party members in the constituency and/or by delegates at local conventions; (3) by a constituency committee; (4) by the regional organization; v) by the national bodies or by the national faction leaders (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Norris, 1996). Restrictions on the eligibility of the candidacy, party selectorate (inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness); decentralization (where the selection takes place in the party structure) and the voting system (how candidates are nominated) (Rahat & Hazan, 2001, pp. 297–9) are also important criteria of selection. The puzzle of intra-party selection begins with eligibility criteria, who nominates candidates, and who is nominated. It allows identifying who is in charge of selection procedures (national leaders, local officers or grassroots party member) and the party organization’s power over their leaders (Norris, 1996, p. 3). Mostly, party leaders are identified with the person who would become the head of government if the party gets successful at the elections time (Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2005, p. 282). Political leaders have as a major goal to prolong their position of authority, either holding public office or in a political party. It is expected that a strong party leadership that controls the selection procedures and is linked to a party in government enhances its likelihood of survival, that is, once in power, a political leader wants to continue in office. Political parties are central to the configuration of the political arena, and the selection of the

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leader is one of the most crucial decisions of any political party. While performance is an obvious determinant of party leader’s survival, the organizational rules also directly affect a party’s temporal strategy, flexibility regarding new competitive challenges (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 207). Political competition at different levels has relevant implications for party organization and party strategies (Deschouwer, 2003; Detterbeck & Hepburn, 2010). The process of decentralization or regionalization “created additional territorial-based citizen-agent relationships” (Lancaster, 1999, p.  64), and has prompted significant changes in political parties’ organization. Political parties have adjusted their structures to the challenges of multilevel political competition.

5.3   The Regional Party Structures Party organizations have echoed the territorial distribution of institutional political power organization and the parties on the ground reconfigured their political activity shaping the territorial configuration of authority. It is broadly established that in decentralized or regionalized settings party appeals has been territorialized (Hopkin, 2003; Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Jeffery & Hough, 2003), which in turn, has led to a differentiation in terms of policy profile (Maddens, Libbrecht, & Fabre, 2007) and distinctive regional party systems anchored on regional specificities (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). Furthermore, it has provided new power bases, greater resources and visibility to territorial leaders (Swenden & Maddens, 2009). Political parties in Portugal are state-wide because regionalist or non-­ state-­wide parties are not allowed according to the Constitution (article 51.4, CRP).1 However, state-wide parties do have territorialized party organizations in the Azores and Madeira, reproducing the regional autonomy arrangements (Ruel, 2015, 2019). The institutionalization of political parties in Portugal has developed alongside process of authority downwards to autonomous regions. Regional branches of statewide parties have acquired grater policy and organizational autonomy on crucial dimensions of party structure, such us membership structure, political

1  “No party shall be formed with a name or manifesto that possesses a regional nature or scope” (article 51.4, CPR). The absence of non-state-wide parties (regionalist parties) in Portugal was introduced by a Constitutional ban, which was implemented in 1976 in order to counter the rise of separatist movements during the transition to democracy (1974–1976).

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recruitment for elections (European, national, regional and local) and leadership selection. PSD (Partido Social Democrata, Social-Democratic Party)2 is a mass-­ party organization, with modern cadre features. It has a stratarchical structure, which matches the structure of the state. Its organizational structure comprises a nuclei (at the parish level), sections (at the municipal level), and districts (at the regional level). The Political Commission is the top-­ political body in each tier of organization. The PSD is synonymous with notables’ influence and party leadership charisma. PSD has been described as a “federation of local mini-parties with diverse styles and discourses” grouped around barons (Sousa, 2000, p. 1132) and dependent on leaders’ charisma (Frain, 1997). The PSD’s fractionalization (at the national level) has centered on personal rivalry rather than on ideology or political positions, reflecting the party personalist character. The PSD’s party leaders have essentially been ‘managers’, rather than uncontested decision-makers (Jalali, 2007, p. 39). The role of the Social Democrats’ leaders has been contingent on its electoral performance, and thus, institutional position (incumbent or opposition status) (Lisi & Freire, 2014, p. 127). The PSD’s rules of leadership selection have changed over time. In 1976 the first statutes had established the figure of party president, distinct from the party leader, where the president of the political commission was subordinated to the former. In 1981, under Balsemão’s leadership, a collegial style was adopted and the figure of party president was abolished. In 1986 the direct election of party leaders by party delegates was introduced, and it remained effective until 2006. After the 2005 national elections defeat, and once in opposition, PSD introduced party primaries to leader selection. A plurality voting system was adopted until 2012, when they switched to a majority run-off system (Frain, 1997; Lisi & Freire, 2014; Sousa, 2000). The main political body in the party is elected by party delegates. Also, the statutes establish formal requirements to party candidacies, such as membership seniority and the candidacy subscription, by a certain number of party members. The national congress is held biennially. Only party members (with paid quotas) are entitled to take part in the selectorate (PSD, 2011). 2  Despite the party designation—Social-Democratic Party—PSD is not a social-democratic party; it’s liberal, at least in economic terms. The PSD has adopted a more conservative orientation on social issues (Lisi & Freire, 2014).

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In terms of territorial organization, PSD’s (national) statutes provided regional structures to the Azores and Madeira’s organizational autonomy. Each regional branch has its own party statutes, in line with the hierarchical configuration of state-level. The Azorean branch has organized itself along the administrative structure of the archipelago: island, municipal, and local. In Madeira, the nuclei and sections are the organizational layers. The PSD regional branch in Azores had a major role during the Constitution-process making and has signalized to the state-level structure the critical relevance of the institutional autonomy arrangements within state organization. De facto, in the mid-1970s, Mota Amaral had tailored PSD to be a regionalist party. The regional branches of the PSD in the Azores and Madeira hold autonomy over the nomination functions and candidate selections for all electoral contestations (European, national, regional and local). The political commission at the regional level is the party gatekeeper, which ratifies the names proposed by the local structures. The party leader is selected according to a plurality voting system, commonly known as winner-takes-­ all. That is to say, the candidate who gets elected is the ‘owner of party’, and the challengers remain out of the party political bodies (PSD (Azores), 2011; PSD (Madeira), 2011). Regarding the horizontal relations within PSD, distinctive orientations emerge within regions. The Azorean organization is more aligned with the national structure and leaderships counterparts, whereas the Madeira’s branch had been more incongruent over time. There exist some sources of tension, in particular concerning the role of the regional branch, that make their way up to the national leadership. Such sources include eligibility criteria for candidates appointed by the regional branch to the national lists (for example, to European elections) and the political strategy of Madeira’s MPs in the national parliament, which seeks to defend regional interests regardless of whether the party is in office at national level. In practice, the PSD regional structures are not a purely administrative device for running day-to-day party business across the territory; they also have noteworthy decision-making autonomy within the statewide organization. The regional party leaders in the Azores and Madeira are agents with split loyalties, operating simultaneously at different levels of authority and with distinctive strategies: they are representatives of regional interests (at the national level) and they are the forefront of an ideological organization in the territory (at the regional level).

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Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista) is a mass-party, privileging a vertical integration structure. The main political bodies are the congress, national commission, and political commission. The executive branch is the secretary-general (party leader) and the executive committee (secretariat). PS also has a dual structure: the party on the ground is made up of local branches that integrate members of the party on a territorial basis and the party sectoral branches, which comprises members on the basis of their professional occupation. The territorial organization in general follows the institutional structure of the state: nuclei (parishes), municipality (local) and federations (regional) (Lisi, 2009; PS, 2011; Sablosky, 1997). The PS’s rules for party leader selection have changed over time. Originally the party congress elected the leader. This approach prevailed until 1992, when new law abolished the congress and endowed the political commission with the power to select the party leader through a simple majority (Lisi, 2009, pp.  117–125). In 1998 was introduced the direct election of party leader, by party members. The argument favoring closed primaries to leadership selection emerged in 1992, during intra-party contestation among would-be leaders. However, it was postponed. In 2012 PS’s statutes reform set up the election of the secretary-general by the majority of votes by party members. In 2013, a major internal reform was introduced: closed primaries for local candidates had taken place for the first time in 2013 local elections (PS, 2013). In 2014, due to the poor electoral results in the European election, António Costa challenged the secretary-general, António José Seguro, to clarify the party leadership. Seguro gave party members the opportunity to choose who will be in charge in the forthcoming national elections through open primaries (in which party members and sympathizers could vote). António Costa won the contestation. However, he was elected secretary-­ general in the end of 2014, through the direct methods. In 2018 the PS congress approved the introduction of open primaries for party leader selection. It will be effective in the 2020 congress. Concerning the vertical organization of the party, the PS has territorialized its party structures, which gave the regional branches (Azores and Madeira) the organizational autonomy to organize their own internal affairs. The Azorean regional branch has more organizational autonomy than Madeira. They have their own statutes (ratified by the national congress) (PS (Azores), 2011)  while the regional structure in Madeira has followed the national procedures until 2015. In 2015, after the strong

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electoral defeat in the regional election, the PS opened the intra-party contestation (PS (Madeira), 2011). Carlos Pereira became the leader of the party branch and for the first time, regional branch has approved its own statutes (PS (Madeira), 2015). The PS party leaders at regional level are directly elected by party members (Organic law n.º 2/2003, August 22nd),3 similar to the national level. Regarding candidate selection, regional branches have nomination powers over national, regional and local elections. The national structure has to approve of the MPs selected to run for the national parliament. The Popular Party organizational structure in Portugal reflects its electoral gains across the territory. It’s essentially anchored on party voters rather than its members (Van Biezen, 2003). Until 2005, the leadership selection was an affair of party congress. After a long-standing internal debate regarding the openness of the leadership selection procedures, the party remained restrained. In 2011, the party leader selection at the congress was made through a plurality of votes (PP, 2005; PP, 2011). The two regional branches in the Azores and Madeira gained autonomy within the party through separate statutes. At the regional level, the CDS/PP follows leader selection rules established by the national organization: the party leader is elected in congress by party members. The party leader in Azores has a four year term and the leader in Madeira serves for three years. Party leaders have statutory powers regarding recruitment of personnel to elections (national, regional and local) and on the definition of their own internal life. In terms of ideological orientation, CDS/PP in insular territories has privileged the defense of regional interests (PP (Madeira), 2005). The Communist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Português) is a traditional Marxist party, organized in  local branches. The party structure is essentially membership-based on the shop floor and the cell is the basic organizational unit. The aggregate cells are organized territorially, although the party follows a ‘democratic centrism’ style with a high centralized bottom-up structure where the Central Committee is the most important decision-making body (Van Biezen, 2003). The PCP is one of the few remaining orthodox communist parties in Europe, characterized

3  The political parties law (Organic Law nr.° 2/2003, 22nd August, amended by Organic Law nr.° 2/2008, 14th May) establishes that official party body’s selectorate is formally limited to the party members.

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by strong internal cohesion and discipline, as well as low levels of internal democracy (Cunha, 1997; Lisi, 2008). The PCP’s method for party leadership selection has remained stable over time. The central committee is the supreme political body and is responsible for the selection of the party leader. According to the party statutes, the method of leadership selection presents a low level of inclusiveness. In practice, the procedure is even oligarchic, because historic party leaders have veto power in relation to the newcomer’s leaders (Lisi & Freire, 2014, p. 130). The PCP’s territorial structures are strongly subordinated to the national structure. In the beginning of the 1980s, the Azorean branch was very incipient and irregular. Only after the 1984 regional election, when the PCP won seats in parliament has the party institutionalized its regional structure. Although, it’s territorial implantation in Azores was circumscribed to the oriental islands (Flores and Faial). In Madeira, the communist structure is particularly strong and well-embedded due to the trade-unionism role. As was described above, the regional structures of political parties in Portugal have significant autonomy within the party structure. The variations of the degree of vertical integration in these cases are smoothed by the formal institutional configuration. That is to say that the institutional design (regional authority) is coupled with regional branch autonomy, in a context were the non-statewide parties are not allowed. Given those institutional configurations, party leaders assumed a prominent role within the organizational apparatus. It has reinforced its leading position within regional branches, and concomitantly, self-reinforced by other factors, namely the position of the party within the party system or in terms of government formation. In particular, the incumbent political parties at the regional level have produced strong leaders and have based their legitimacy on robust electoral results. Thus, they have been driven into a self-­ enforced position of the regional leaders within the national party, which, in turn, have as corollary a long-standing position of autonomy of regional affairs. For example, the powers of candidate selection for all types of elections and the pressure put at the process of candidate nomination, on European elections as well the place in the list (eligible position) reaffirms the pivotal position of regional barons, anchored on electoral gains, within the state-level structures. Moreover, several tensions and contradictions emerged among the regional branches and the national party, justified by the dynamics of multilevel politics.

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Given the weakness of institutional anchors and the lack of vibrant civil society in the third wave of democracies of both Portugal and Spain, political parties have developed institutionalization across the representative institutions by ensuring the recruitment of political elites, the articulation and aggregation of interests and representation of social and political pluralism (Lisi & Freire, 2014; Pinto, 2003). Within regions, regional branches have followed the same strand. In Spain’s multilevel structure, the statewide parties have also answered to the decentralization process, within their regional structures. Spanish parties are generally characterized as highly centralized and oligarchical organizations, fully controlled by the party in the central office (Van Biezen, 2003; Van Biezen & Hopkin, 2004). However, in recent years, organizational changes were introduced among the main statewide parties, particularly, answering to the demands of multilevel electoral politics. The PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanõl, Socialist Party) has a federal structure composed of three territorial layers: local, provincial, and regional. The main governing body is the Federal Congress, which meets every three to four years. The Federal Executive Committee is the political organ that enjoys a large set of powers over the federate organizations. Since the late 1990s, the PSOE has developed an internal party change which recognized the autonomy of the territorial structures and entitled them to participate in national affairs decision-making (Méndez-Lago, 2006). The process of party federalization was coupled to state decentralization. However, the party has favored a bottom-up orientation in order to preserve party unity (Méndez-Lago, 2000, 2006). Since 1997, regional barons underpinned the party’s influence in the national structure through the establishment of the Territorial Council (PSOE, 1997). In 2004, the PSOE federal structure was fully institutionalized and consolidated. In practice the regional branches reproduced the national structure of the party. The regional structure includes a party leader, a secretary-general, a regional executive, and a regional congress. The national party has veto power over changes to the sub-national structure and the ratification of the federal committee. The regional branches have an important role in national decision-making in that they determine the composition of the federal congress. The number of members of each federation determines the number of delegates in the national congress. Delegates are elected on a provincial basis through closed and blocked lists. The federal congress is held every 3–4 years (PSOE, 2004).

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The PSOE’s candidate selection process is complex and multilevel. It is led by the political commissions. The statutes give regional branches strong autonomy in selecting MP candidates for the local and regional elections. The nomination process to national elections is made at provincial level. Party leader candidacy is proposed by the party organization or by party members. The candidates must fulfil the eligibility criteria of membership seniority (at least two years) as well the quota obligations. The party leader is selected in closed primaries (PSOE, 2004). The turning point in the PSOE’s party change matches with the end of the long-term Felipe González leadership. During the PP’s incumbency at the national level (1996–2004), the PSOE faced a long-lasting leadership crisis due to dual leadership (Joaquín Almunia and Josep Borrell) and lack of credibility because of a long series of corruption scandals. In 2000, Rodríguez Zapatero became the head of party and introduced a profound reorganization of the party. In so doing he recovered credibility and support among grassroots and voters. PSOE ‘opened the doors’ to sympathizers, a tool for electoral mobilization and a strategy to get the PSOE back into government. In 2004, Zapatero became prime-minister, which lasted until 2011, when PP returned to power (Barberà & Teruel, 2014; Bosco, 2013; Méndez-Lago, 2006). In the Canary Islands, the Socialists have their territorial branch—Partido Socialista Canario, PSOE-PSC. The candidate selection function is an affair of the regional branch and the party leader is elected by the regional congress. During the first decade of democracy in the Canary Islands the PSOE-PSC territorialized their structure and electoral implantation across the seven islands (PSOE-PSC, 2004). Popular Party organized itself in terms of local, provincial, and regional branches with organs of self-government. The autonomy of these sub-­ national structures remains strongly circumscribed. The territorial organization of the PP is nationally oriented (Popular Party (Spain), 2004). The regional tier is congruent with national decisions, in spite of the PP’s statutes underlining the regionalized character of internal organization. Sub-­ national party democracy is highly restricted and decision-making is centralized around the regional party president, reflecting the presidential model adopted at the national level (Van Biezen & Hopkin, 2004). The regional congress is held every 3–4 years where the regional party leader and the executive (composed by 22 members) are elected from a single blocked list.

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The 2004 statutes revision introduced the autonomous council, a consultative organ that gathers all regional party presidents to discuss ‘state of autonomies issues’. An exception to the territorialisation of the PP’s structure is the Union for Navarre People (UNP), a regionalist party that has maintained a ‘collaboration pact’ with the PP since 1993 (Pallarés & Keating, 2003). The PP’s regional branches have minimal influence over the national decision-making process, which remains highly personalized in the national leadership (Astudillo & García-Guereta, 2006). The territorial balance in congress is determined by the party membership with delegates sent by all territorial levels, through an open list system (Van Biezen, 2003). Since 1989, the party leader selection draws on a single blocked list, thereby restricting the possibilities for internal choice (Popular Party (Spain), 2004). The PP candidate selection process is controlled by the electoral committee established at all territorial levels. Candidates for national elections are proposed by the provincial electoral committees, and for the local elections, the list of candidates has to be approved at the state-level. Leadership selection is even more closed: regional structures or party members are excluded from the process. Candidates to regional parliaments, mayors, or provincial government are all proposed and ratified by the national electoral committee (Popular Party (Spain), 2004). The PP’s organization shapes the subordination of all territorial level political decisions. The party on the ground is strictly controlled by the national party leadership. The PP-Can is the designated structure in the Canary Islands, formally in line with the national party in terms of ideological position (Partido Popular-Can (Canary Islands), 2004). The two mainstream statewide parties in Spain, PSOE and PP, have kept a tight grip on their regional branches, justified by ensuring systematic party coherence across the territory. The state-level party has veto power over regional decisions, although strong regional branches and leaders at times might undermine the central party control. Nevertheless, holding government at the national level has provided a “consistent centralizing logic within statewide parties” (Swenden & Maddens, 2009, p. 268), and contrarily, regional incumbency has facilitated a strong role of regional leaders within the state-level party organization. Furthermore, regionalist parties constitute a critical factor to the understanding of Canaries politics. Coalición Canaria represents one of the best examples of non-statewide parties (De Winter & Tursan, 1998), operating at both regional and national levels. CC is an heterogeneous coalition

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initially formed in 1993 by distinctive (ideologically) insular-based political groups—Agrupaciones Independientes Canarias (AIC), Centro Canario Nacionalista (CCN), Centro Canario Independiente (CCI); Iniciativa Canaria (ICAN), Asamblea Majorera (AM) and Partido Nacionalista Canrario (PNC). The AIC and CCN were composed by dissidents from the CDS, which was deeply rooted in the archipelago. The insularist drift from extinction of UCD has been taken by Agrupación Independiente Tenerifeña (ATI), and latter integrated in AIC. The ICAN was formed by communists from Gran Canaria and the AM is a nationalist left-wing political party from Fuerteventura. In essence, the CC is a progressive and nationalist political organization that assumed the defense of the Canarias’ identity and the ‘nación Canaria’ (Coalición Canaria, 2005; García-Rojas, 2004) opportunely offered when the UCD dissolved and its adherents sought a party affiliation and by the successful PSOE’s motion of censure, which took over the former AIC-socialist incumbency (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna, Canary Islands, February 2013). Coalición Canaria prevailed as a heterogeneous coalition until 2005, when it formalized its institutionalization as a political party, as an excision with Nueva Canarias.4 During the congress held in 2005, CC assumed its ideological anchorage inspired by the twentieth century nationalism movements (Secundino Delgado and Antonio Cubillo) and recovered it as a ‘modern Canarian nationalism’. In practice, this kind of ‘nationalism’ is artificial, that is, it is a more demanding regionalism that aims to average the Spanish and European welfare standards through the exploitation of ultra-peripheral features (Tuñón, 2010). The CC’ social bases are the insular bourgeoisie and local party barons motivated by the powers, resource, and prestige that the party should overcome vis-à-vis regional institutions and Madrid (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna, Tenerife— Canary Islands, February 2013). The Coalición Canaria’s territorial organization is structured by islands and at municipal level. The CC developed is party’ social bases in Tenerife,5 which has settled a strong electoral implantation within the right-wing bourgeoisie. The CC internal organization is settled on the Consejo Político 4  Since 2005 Román Rodriguez has led the Nueva Canarias, after having served as regional premier during 1999–2003. The reasons behind the excision among CC and Nueva Canarias are related with divergences with the choice of the leading state-wide parties’ coalition partners. 5  Paulino Rivero was the first Coalición Canaria party leader. Rivero initially was oriented ideologically by UCD (1979–1983) and in 1983 he switched to ATI.

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Nacional (the supreme body between congresses), which enjoys a broad set of powers in terms of candidate selection. It has veto powers over the recruitment of MP (European Parliament, Congress of Deputies; Senate; regional assembly; mayors or Cabildos Insulares). In terms of leadership selection, the CC holds decision-making powers in the party congress. Each insular organization is assigned a number of delegates to congress who are elected in proportional lists. The congress is held every 3 years. The CC’s statute contemplates the existence of an extra-territorial organization, for example in Venezuela (Coalición Canaria, 2005).

5.4   Party Leaders and Longevity at Central Office Beyond the characteristics of vertical organization within political parties, another feature that should be accounted is the longevity of party leader. The party leadership longevity is driven by several factors of intra-party procedures, such as, the methods of leadership selection and the barriers imposed to potential challengers. In addition, the “vertical map of organizational power” (Panebianco, 1988) is balanced by the incumbency at regional institutions, which in turn, empowers party leaders with resources and raises the strength of incumbents in party structures. Nevertheless, electoral defeat and deterioration in terms of exchange in the electoral arena exert strong pressure for change within parties (Panebianco, 1988, p.  243). Party leadership longevity at the regional level can vary widely between countries and within countries. It is firstly related to the political party position in the system and their status—incumbent or opposition. Regarding the regional branches of political parties in Portugal, the association among incumbency and the tenure of the party leaders is clear. In Azores, PSD has assumed public office in 1976 under the leadership of Mota Amaral, who held party leadership without internal opposition for 19  years. But ever since Mota Amaral’s cabinet resignation in 1995, a leadership crisis has persisted within the party. Constant change in party leaders—no fewer than seven in 20  years—has left the PSD an ‘empty vessel’6 (Ruel, 2015, 2019).

6  PSD’ list of party leaders in Azores: João Bosco Mota Amaral (1976–1995); Álvaro Dâmaso (1995–1997); Carlos Costa Neves (1997–1999); Manuel Arruda (1999–2001); Vítor Cruz (2001–2005); Carlos Costa Neves (2005–2008); Berta Cabral (2008–2012) and Duarte Freitas (2012–2018).

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During the PSD incumbency in Azores, the major opposition party experienced leadership volatility.7 Once the PS took power in 1996, it attained leadership stability. Carlos César had assumed the socialist leadership in Azores and designed a governmental strategy to meet the alternation rule in Azores at the 1996 election. Since that time, PS’s incumbency has fortified and legitimized party leadership. The only shift in leadership was in 2012, when Vasco Cordeiro replaced Carlos César as party leader and as regional premier. Since 1976, Christian-democrats in Azores have had six party leaders,8 and the communist regional branch has had two party leaders in the last forty years.9 Party leaders’ tenure in office in Madeira displays the same trend as in Azores. Holding public office has enhanced the term within party leadership. As a result of intra-party pressures, Alberto João Jardim assumed the social-democrats’ leadership and the helm of regional government in 1978, replacing the former president Ornelas Camacho. Jardim had led the PSD and the regional cabinets in Madeira for 39  years when he announced his resignation in 2014. In October 2012, PSD party leadership was open to contestation for the first time since 1980. At first, only Miguel Albuquerque challenged Alberto João Jardim, but in 2014 internal elections there were six candidates (in addition to Jardim and Albuquerque, João Cunha e Silva, Sérgio Marques, Miguel de Sousa, and Jaime Ramos), and the long-time serving party leader was defeated. Miguel Albuquerque assumed PSD leadership (Ruel, 2015, 2019). The dominant position of PSD ‘one man, one rule’ at the party level and public office has jeopardized party leadership in the opposition parties, among socialists in particular. PSD electoral gains have made it difficult for PS leaders to retain the office. As a result, PS party leaders have held office for terms ranging from one year to twelve years. By contrast, for four decades Popular Party has had entrenched regional party leaders. The founding leaders Baltazar Gonçalves and José Cabral Fernandes held office during the first years of democracy. In 1988, Rui 7  PS’ list of party leaders in Azores: José António Goulart (1976–1982); Carlos César (1983–1985); Dionísio de Sousa (1985–1988); José António Martins Goulart (1988–1994); Carlos César (1994–2012) and Vasco Cordeiro (2013–present). 8  CDS/PP´ list of party leaders: Abel da Câmara Carreira (1976–1978); Vaz do Rego (1979–1984); Rui Meireles (1984–1993); José António Monjardino (1993–1999); Alvarinho Pinheiro (1999–2007) and Artur Lima (2007–present). 9   PCP’ list of party leaders: José Decq da Mota (1979–2005) and Aníbal Pires (2005–present).

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Vieira took the helm of Christian-democrats. In 1997, José Manuel Rodriguez assumed the head of the central office and kept it eighteen years. Lopes da Fonseca rose to leadership after a contentious regional congress in 2015 and served for three years. Similarly the communist party has had long-standing stability in its regional leadership in Madeira, with Edgar Silva serving from 2000 hitherto. Rui Nepomuceno, Mário Tavares, João Lizardo and Leonel Nunes playing leading roles among regional communists for decades. In the Canary Islands, party leadership displays similar patterns as those displayed in the Azores and Madeira in the sense that party leader’s tenure in office is coupled with their status of incumbent. For example, Jeronimo Saavedra served as PSOE party leader on the archipelago throughout its control of the regional executive office, from 1977 to 1985. PSOE-PSC in opposition was led by Alberto de Armas García (1987–1988); Saavedra then regained party leadership 1988 and held it until 1997.10 Since them Juan Carlos Alemán (1997–2007); Juan Fernando López Aguilar (2007–2010) and José Miguel Pérez García (2010–2017) have served PSOE-PSC leadership. At centre-right, PP-Can’s leadership overlaps with term in public office (Fernando Martín and Lorenzo Olarte). Jose Maria Soria served from 1999 to 2016, and resigned in 2016 as a result of the Panama Papers scandals. PP-Can has immersed on a deep internal crisis after the 2007 regional election. Several internal events erupted at the insular level that made it difficult for the PP-Can to continue in public office as CC’ coalition partner. Jose Maria Soria was implicated in several corruption scandals (urbanistic projects) linked to his former position as mayor at Las Palmas (1995–2003) and at Gran Canaria’ Cabildo Insular (2007–2007). However, Soria served as minister at Mariano Rajoy’s national government (2011) and remained in party leadership until 2016. The party leadership of the non-statewide party Coalición Canaria exhibit a distinctive feature vis-à-vis the PSOE and PP statewide parties. 10  Jeronimo Saavedra is a central actor on Canary politics that had developed a political career at different levels of government. He served as MP at Constituent Cortes in 1977 and was re-elected in 1979, 1982 and 1989. He became regional premier in Canary Islands twice, from 1983–1987 and from 1991–1993. He served as Minister within Felipe González cabinet (1993–1995 and 1995–1996). In 1996, 1999 and 2003 he was elected Senator. Between 2007–2011, he governed as mayor Las Palmas (Gran Canaria), overthrowing PP stronghold (12 years). Recently he served at the Ombudsman (Diputado del Común) in the Canary Islands (2011–2018).

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Since 1993, Paulino Rivero was elected the CC party leader. Although, when CC assumed the regional cabinet, Rivero was devaluated to head of government by Manuel Hermoso11 (ATI’ party leader), who was vice-­ president of the regional government under PSOE’ premiership. In 2007, Rivero added to regional incumbency the party leadership. This ‘state of affairs’ is a result of the CC original configuration: the lack of solid and authentic leadership; the organizational and ideological incongruence among its members have triggered into internal tensions which in turn, had been often affected the nomination of regional premier, government composition, or the coalition partnership (Bravo de Laguna interview, La Laguna, Tenerife—Canary Islands, February, 2013). Claudia Morales challenged Paulino Rivero and became the new CC party’ leader in 2008. However, Rivero prevailed at the helm of Canaries office. In the subsequent CC congress, Rivero returned to party leadership, serving from 2012 to 2017. CC as a non-statewide party has an organizational autonomy without hierarchical lines, which developed a strong sense of political identity and community among Canarian people. In sum, the tenure of regional party leaders is coupled by the incumbency status. Thus, it might be interdependent and path-dependent. However, they are both self-enforcing, as a result of the institutional resources and incumbent advantage offered by holding public office. Nevertheless, regional specificities, political actors and the conditions under which they operate constitute important drivers to understanding the dynamics of intra-party politics and the interaction among political parties at political system.

5.5   Chapter Final Remarks All statewide parties in the three decentralized states examined here reveal the difficulties posed by multilevel politics. As Hough and Jeffery argue they have to accommodate inter-territorial tensions over the distribution 11  Manuel Hermoso represents the paradigmatic puzzle/beat of Canaries’ politics: a local political leader (from Tenerife) which have legitimized and designed its political career on loyalties and pay-offs at local, and posteriorly at regional level. He served as Santa Cruz de Tenerife mayor from 1979 to 1991. He has been a pivotal actor within ATI, one of the former partners of Coalición Canarias; a government supporter of PSOE government (1991–1993) and the one of the leading politicians’ responsible for the vote of no confidence within PSOE-ATI government. Consequently, he assumed the head of government led by CC (1993–1999).

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of resources, managed the relationship between party official and representatives at various tiers of government, and speak for the ‘general’ interests whilst representing contradictory ‘particularistic’ interests (Hough & Jeffery, 2006, p. 15). In recent years, political parties across Europe have introduced some democratizing reforms in terms of leadership selection (Scarrow, Webb, & Farrell, 2000, pp. 142–144). The state decentralization process has also accommodated a party’s vertical integration to the regional branches given the significant autonomy within state-level structures. Engaging in an organizational autonomy within the organizational party structure, regional party leaders have been able to maneuver their parties’ internal affairs. Likewise, the party leader selection procedures are critical to political actor’s strategy within regional branches and at the regional party systems. The Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands have shown a strong ‘presidentialized’ style in which long-serving party leaders serve long terms in public office. Regional party leaders have revealed charismatic features, where the leader is merged with the party, which has a high level of autonomy within their apparatchiks, and there is a strong party cohesion around the leader in office (Panebianco, 1988, p. 145). That is, the personalization of politics has blurred the lines between the political party, party leadership, and incumbency (Ruel, 2015, 2019). Holding public office is a necessary condition to party leader survival. At the same time, the leadership survival of opposition parties has affected by the ruling leader’s longevity in office. The survival of opposition leaders in the central office is negatively associated with long-terms of ruling parties. Party leaders in opposition have little chance to prolong their tenure in office; that is to say, parties’ leaders who cannot lead their parties into government are replaced after an election. Thus, three factors have contributed to the parties’ regional branches autonomy and specific political profile, namely: the incumbency; the distinctive party system and the distinctive incumbency formula across levels.

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CHAPTER 6

Regional Economic Performance

6.1   Introduction Regional governments acquired important powers and consequently have been endowed with fiscal tools in order to pursue collective goals. Decentralization processes have been the result of specific political dynamics of each country (Eaton, 2001). It maps whether there are common patterns that can be identified across the features of regional economies at the Azores, Madeira, and Canary Islands. The variables considered include the regional GDP, unemployment profile, and public debt as major defining indicators as well as citizens’ perception of the economic situation according to Flash Eurobarometer surveys.

6.2   Regional Economic Performance Electoral performance of incumbents and the survival in office depends on their past actions (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). Likewise, the electoral support of regional incumbents depends on regional economic conditions (King, 2001; Lowry, Alt, & Ferree, 1998; Svoboda, 1995). In decentralised systems of government, the existence of a regional economic voting is anchored, in a broader sense, in the ability of regional governments to influence the regional economies. That is, regional economic voting takes place “if the regional incumbent’s electoral prospects depend on the regions’ performance” (Anderson, 2008, pp.  336–38). © The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_6

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Hereby, ruling parties will be less likely to collapse as long as economic conditions remain favourable for those groups that support the government. In decentralized contexts where the regional level of governance displays political and fiscal resources, it is expected that the regional executives and the party(ies) in office influence the economic outcome at the regional level and thus, in turn, will be rewarded or punished by the voters. Several studies support the thesis that economic performance predicts incumbent parties’ electoral success (Norporth, 1996; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000. Empirical evidence illustrate that economic factors such as growth, inflation, and unemployment affect the popularity of incumbents in many democratic countries (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-­ beck & Stegmaier, 2000). Regional governments have fiscal and expenditure powers over a range of public policies that could impact on economic outcomes at regional level. Some researchers have found a positive relation among economic performance and support for regional incumbents (Riba & Diaz, 2002; León, 2012; Queralt, 2012). In addition, incumbent parties use their resources and economic mechanisms to enhance their likelihood of re-election. Nevertheless, globalisation, growing economic integration, openness and interdependence, within the European Union and the Eurozone membership, have lessened voters’ sense that their elected leaders determine the economy, which has reduced economic effects on voting (Hellwig, 2001; Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Duch & Stevenson, 2008). In multilevel settings such as the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands, assigning responsibility and holding government accountable for their actions is difficult. Scholars observe in particular that (1) regional governments have limited power and thus little responsibility for economic conditions; (2) regional governments tend to promote a ‘vertical diffusion of responsibility’ (i.e., blame other levels of government for the bad results of their own policies, and claim responsibility for good results of alien policies); and (3) the media’s limited coverage of regional elections gives economic voters little ability to assess regional government’s role in determining economic conditions (Anderson, 2008, p. 329). De facto, multilevel systems might undermine citizens’ ability to identify which tier of government is responsible for what and who is in charge of the economy, i.e., the ‘clarity of responsibility’ (Anderson, 2008; León,

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2010; Powell & Whitten, 1993).1 The national context also contaminates the regional arena at elections time (‘coattail effect’), further diluting voters’ perceptions of economic performance at the regional level (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1989; 1995; León, 2010; Rodden & Wibbels, 2011). The research on this strand in Portugal has revealed some inconsistency. Political context has a strong impact on citizen’s perceptions, whereas ideology, religiosity, and social class are still strong predictors of voting. In addition, sociotropic perceptions are stronger than egocentric perceptions on voting choice. However, economic evaluation is the second strongest predictor of voting at the national level (Freire, 2007; Freire & Costa Lobo, 2005; Freire & Santana-Pereira, 2012; Gramacho, 2008). Regarding local elections (at municipal level), the evidence indicates that the performance of the national economy is an important indicator, especially when the same incumbent party shares the local and national governments (Martins & Veiga, 2013). Accounting for regional economic performance in Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands allows this analysis to incorporate the profile of regional economies within countries in accounting for political alternation. An underlying assumption launched here is that political economic variables determine regional party success and regional distinctiveness (Fraile & Lewis-Beck, 2010; Hearl, Budge, & Pearson, 1996; King, 2001; Lowry et al., 1998; Svoboda, 1995; Queralt, 2012). The terms of variation and disparities among regions regarding economic outcomes should help to identify a perspective of ‘regionalization’ in pursuing collective goals. In this section I explore economic data: (1) absolute GDP levels for each region and a relative measure of regional statewide GDP (regional GDP divided by state GDP); (2) unemployment rate, broadly recognized

1  The literature on decentralization emphasizes different theoretical arguments by which vertical power-sharing can discipline politicians and make them more responsive to citizens’ demands. According to the welfare economic assumption, decentralization approximates governments and citizens as well their direct participation in public decision-making through regional and local elections. It also enhances citizens’ control of incumbents because they may use multilevel governance to put pressure on officials within various governments to achieve their desired outcomes (Downs, 1998). Public finance scholars have emphasized the impact of fiscal decentralization and economic competition among tiers of government to enhance incumbents’ fiscal responsible actions (Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995).

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as a proxy indicator of economic performance and well-being (European Commission, 1996, 2001)2; and (3) public debt patterns.3 Additionally, a subjective complement to these data is presented, which records responses to the question: How do you judge the current situation of the economy of our region?, from Public Opinion in European Union Regions (Flash Eurobarometer), in order to capture regional citizens’ perception of the economic situation for the three regional territories.

6.3   Regional GDP and Employment Despite the existence of some studies of regional economies, data constraints render the analysis of sub-national macroeconomic indicators and public finances limited (Kopoin, Moran, & Paré, 2013; Lehman & Wohlrabe, 2013). Due to the lack of homogeneous measures of aggregate regional economic activity (in particular GDP) or fiscal data in both countries (Portugal and Spain) in a reasonable time spam I’ve considered aggregated data from the Eurostat Regional Yearbook, which provides a uniform, consistent breakdown of territorial units. Table 6.1 presents both absolute GDP levels for 2000–2016 for each region—Azores, Madeira, and Canary Islands—and a relative measure of the relationship of regional to state-wide GDP.  This indicator sets out what has happened at the sub-national level and highlights the specific territorial aspects within national landscapes. Important differences are exhibited by the three regions. The evolution of regional GDP in Azores is lower than in Madeira. The Canary Islands show a higher level of GDP over time than the Portuguese regions. Both Azores and Madeira have a similar economic structure, despite the geographic dispersion in Azores (the archipelago has nine islands) while Madeira’ archipelago have consist of two. Both archipelagos depend heavily on tourism, infrastructure (construction), and public 2  The allocation of resources available to deprived regions through the EU Structural Funds is made according to those indicators. 3  The poor sub-national governments’ fiscal statistics (data) and the statistical definitions used are not easy to reconcile with other sources of information on regional public accounts. For these reasons, I decided to collect these data from the Eurostat Regional Yearbook available from 2006. Regional public debt is presented in terms of millions of euros and expressed in terms of its evolution, not in terms of GDP ratio. The displayed public debt values do not consider the debt-relief services or the public-owned enterprises’ indebtedness at the regional level.

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Table 6.1  GDP levels per each region and a relative measure of regional state-­ wide GDP (regional GP divided by state GDP) 2000–2016 Regional GDP

Azores Madeira Canary Islands Regional GDP divided by state GDP

2000

2006

2007

2008

2011

2012

2015

2016

2456 3344 1667.4 0.15 0.2 0.07

3430.8 4101.1 24,000 0.2 0.24 1.63

3603.4 4305.8 24,380 0.2 0.24 1.7

17,260 4448.5 24,200 0.21 0.25 1.75

16,720 4367.2 22,770 0.22 0.26 1.8

16,110 3973.5 22,080 0.22 0.24 1.8

16,620 4237 23,080 0.23 0.25 1.78

17,010 4400 23,770 0.23 0.25 1.79

Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat Regional Yearbook

administration sectors (Mateus A. and Associados, 2009). During the mid-1990s Azores and Madeira were tied for reporting the poorest economic performance of any jurisdiction in Portugal.4 However, economic growth followed a sustainable path in the Azores. On average, the economy in the Azores grew by 0.5% per year from 1996 to 2008. By contrast Azores’ GDP suggests very uneven growth. The most expressive growth in terms of GDP matches with electoral calendar (regional elections). For example, in 2000, 2.5% GDP’ growth was registered, and in 2001, regional GDP shown negative values (−0.2%). During the first two decades of regional democracy, Azores had prioritized the construction of infrastructure (roads and ports) and modernizing agriculture and fisheries (two-leading economic sectors) through the European Structural Funds. Furthermore, emigrant’s revenue, in particular from the United States, offered some leverage to Azores’s regional economy during this period (Mota Amaral interview, Lisbon-Portugal, December 2013). Meanwhile in Madeira the premier’s administration prioritized infrastructure as well, but also housing (Emanuel Rodrigues interview, Funchal-­ Portugal, October, 2013). Both regions, because of their poor development in relation to other parts of Portugal as well as the EU in the mid-90s have benefited from substantial policy packages from national government (national budget) and from EU policies, mainly Structural Funds and 4  In 1995, the National Statistical Institute reported GDP per capita, per region, as follows: Norte (7.4%), Centro (7.4%), Lisbon (12.1%), Algarve (9.6), Alentejo (8.1%), Azores (7.1) and Madeira (7.5%) (Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), Portugal. Retrived from www.ine.pt).

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Cohesion Policy, in order to reduce economic disparities and converge within the European mainstream regions. Within a decade (2010) the Portuguese regions showed an exponential growth and the peak of its economic performance during the period analyzed. By 2010 they were considered, in particular Madeira one of the richest regions in the country.5 However, following the international sovereign debt crisis of 2008, Portugal received a bailout in May 2011. The troika (the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank) agreed to loan the Portuguese national government 78 billion loan-­ packages (effective until 2014) which established an austerity package of policies. The bailout program included cuts on public administration, and welfare state policy; public investments and salaries and have increased the tax burden on families and enterprises. Regions also have suffered from the external shocks and GDP growth at regional level assumed negative values (Ruel, 2019). In comparative terms, when I look at the relative measure of the relationship of regional to state-wide GDP, it is clear that the impact of economic growth in Azores and Madeira on the national economy over time is the same. The economic models followed by the regional incumbents, anchored on Keynesian assumptions, have produced stable outcomes over time. In addition, regarding the labour market in both regions, unemployed has displayed some congruence among regions, though both have lower values regarding the national average. GDP growth kept up with lower unemployed rates in Azores and Madeira until 2010. Since 2011, the sovereign debt crisis had significantly exposed the peripheral economies and labor market to external shocks. The peripheral economies of all three regions registered a period of recession after the 2008 crisis. Furthermore, there exists a structural unemployment which has been impossible to overcome. All three insular territories have an economic structure that heavily exposed them to the cyclical businesses of tourism and construction when the crisis arose. The virtuous period enabled a high level of employment. The peak of unemployment rates in Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands all occurred coincided in 2013: 17%, 18.1% and 33%, respectively. Employment in the 5  For the year 2010, the National Statistical Institute (INE) registered as GDP per capita, per region, the following values: Norte (13.1%), Centro (13.5%), Lisbon (22.7%), Algarve (16.8%), Alentejo (15%), Azores (15.3%) and Madeira (21.1%)  (Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), Portugal. Retrieved from www.ine.pt).

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Azores archipelago increased from 2001 to 2008, decreased strongly from 2008 to 2013, and began to recover in 2014 (see Table 6.2). The main driver of job creation in 2010 was the construction sector, which fell abruptly after that date and until 2013. The recovery began in 2014, mostly driven by agriculture and tourism sectors. In the beginning of 2000s, Azores reported a low industrialization level, low productivity in agriculture, and low population density dispersed among the nine islands (Amorim et al., 2004, p. 120). By contrast Madeira, despite its major improvements in its economic base was characterized by low qualification of human resources; lack of private initiative; low availability of R&D investment; low productivity in agriculture and high dependence on structural funds (Amorim et al., 2004, p. 124). The economy of Canary Islands relies in the service sector, especially in those activities related to tourism (ISCTAC, 2016). In spite of being an agricultural society (banana, tomato and cucumber) not long ago, the primary sector is marginal nowadays (Cabrera, 1998). Between 1980 and 1995 the highest rates of growth in Spain were achieved mainly in tourist regions, in particular in the Canary and the Balearic Islands (RodríguezPose, 2000), and during the period of 1996 to 2007 Canaries presented a

Table 6.2  Unemployment in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 1996–2016 (%) Unemployment 1996 2000 2003 2004 2007 2008 2011 2012 2015 2016

Azores

Madeira

C. Island

6.3 2.9 2.9 3.4 4.3 5.5 11.5 15.3 12.8 11.2

5.1 2.5 3.4 3 6.8 6 13.8 17.5 14.7 12.9

22.1 13.5 11.4 11.8 10.4 17.4 29.7 38 26.7 24.9

Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat Regional Yearbook, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Portugal (www.ine.pt); Instituto de Estadística de España  (www.ine.es) and Instituto Canario de Estadística (www. gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/)

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period of economic prosperity.6 However, Canary Islands still to be one of the lowest industrialized regions in Spain (Concha, Gil, Javier, & Urtasun, 2018). The Canary Islands reveal a structural pattern of unemployment. The demographic flows to the islands, from mainland Spain and from abroad, in particular from African countries, had pushed population up by more than a quarter in a decade (Caixabank, 2017). It was a period marked by economic contracting, high levels of jobless, and high levels of poverty (38%) (Herrero, 2012). Unemployment finally began to decrease in 2014 and the regional economies have gained ‘fresh breath’ which has been accompanied by the increase in economic growth. However, in general, Spanish regions as suffered more from employment than from GDP losses (Concha et al., 2018).

6.4   Regional Public Debt Regional levels of government, due to their political authority, have at their disposal a range of resources they can draw on to pursue collective goals. The sovereignty debt crisis echoed in 2008 exposed led to strong scrutiny by the national and international rating agencies, in particular at the sub-national level of governments (regional and local). Regional public debts (levels of indebtedness) represent a critical factor in the path towards economic performance and the incentives created by governments to the labour market. It helps signalize the terms in which the incumbent strategy to retain power leverages macroeconomic indicators. As we have seen, Portugal and Spain and their regions had highly influenced recession, in particular in change of GDP and change in employment domains. The crisis affected the sub-national tier of government and imposed distinctive programmes in order to encourage the economic growth and increase employment, even in a context were tax revenues have decreased and demand for public services and social protection triggered higher public expenditure (EC, 2013) (Table 6.3). 6  In the period 1995–2000, the GDP’s real growth, in these three regional economies, was on average superior to the EU’s average (27). The EU (27) registered 3.1%, Azores 4.1%, Madeira 9.4% and 3.7% in Canary Islands, respectively. During 2001–2007, the EU registered 2.3%; 2.1% in Azores; 4.2% in Madeira and 3.2% in the Canary Islands. http://ec. europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/rup_growth/rup_growth_ sum_pt.pdf

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Table 6.3  Regional debt in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands 1996–2016 (eur/millions) Regional debt

Azores

Madeira

C. Islands

1996 1999 2000 2003 2004 2007 2008 2011 2012 2015 2016

580 223 248 328 535.4 626.7 598.3 1057 1146.5 1485.2 1596

993.5 731.8 800.9 1135 1252.2 1427.1 1848.5 4058.3 4117.7 4934.1 4852.8

1020 882 905 1133 1178 1562 1883 3718 4686.7 6663 6935

Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat Regional Yearbook, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Portugal  (www.ine.pt); Instituto de Estadística de España (www.ine.es) and Banco de Espanã—Procedimento Deficit Excessivos das Comunidades Autónomas

The economic crisis has opened the ‘black box’ of sub-national public finances. The most unexpected event occurred in the Madeira region, when the Audit Court (Tribunal de Contas)7 identified and reported, in 2011, a ‘hidden debt’ of 4058.3 thousand million.8 As a result Madeira had to accept a bailout of 1.5 billion euro from the national government (effective until 2015) in order to cover its high levels of indebtedness. Between 2002 and 2012, Madeira’s public debt quintuplicated as a result of successive budgetary deficits. The high level of indebtedness in 7  The Audit Court has reported some cases of mismanagement and mismatching between revenues and expenditures since the 1980s. In April 2011 the Audit Court found Debt Repayment Arrangements (DRAs) made between Madeira’s regional government and construction companies in the amount of approximately EUR 184.5 million (of which EUR 141.3 million relate to arrangements concluded in 2008 and the remainders to those concluded in 2009). The Audit Court’s report also underlined the excessive regional public administration structure within the regional economy and the excessive governmental participation on the regional public sector enterprises (in 2011, the Madeira Autonomous region had a majoritarian participation in 51 enterprises). Report nr.°3/2011-FS/SRMTC (n.d.)—Auditoria orientada para os encargos assumidos e não pagos da Administração Regional Directa da Madeira—2009. 8  However, other resources have reported 6.300 thousand million (Pereira, 2015). The Eurostat Regional Yearbook reported, based on the national accounts (Procedimento Défices Excessivos) 4058.3 thousand million. Mendonça, Tolentino, “Cada madeirense deve 30 mil euros, o dobro da média nacional”, in Público 13/09/2011.

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Madeira is not a trend, it is path-dependent. Within one decade of achieving regional autonomy in 1986, Madeira had signed a ‘financial package’—Protocolo de Recuperação Financeira—with the national government, as a consequence of public finances imbalances. In 1989, Madeira embraced an extra financial package in order to surpass the structural indebtedness. In 1998, the national government assumed the public debt of both Azores and Madeira. Between the two regions it took on 550 billion euros in debt, corresponding to 90% of the total Azorean debt and 70% of Madeira’s. Regulation of the financing structure governing the relationship between the state and the regions introduced in 1998, overcoming the ad-hoc bargaining and lack of financing rules that prevailed between the state-level and the insular regions. The regional financing law established that the amount of transfers to regions each year be at least as large as those of the previous year, adjusted according to the national growth rate. As Paz Ferreira put it, the regional financing law was significantly generous to Portuguese regions. However, the financing rules overlooked the fiscal capacity of each region (Eduardo Paz Ferreira interview, Lisbon January 2014). After one year (1999), the national government also had to assume the accumulated debt of the regional healthcare system (EUR 60 millions) and other liabilities (EUR 221.5 million). In 2002, the approval of the Budgetary Stability Law9 required the state-level government to assume EUR 32.4 million in debt, each, for Azores and Madeira. Moreover, Madeira has benefited from bonus transfers of EUR 20 million in exchange for national budget approval by the PSD MPs (elected by Madeira constituency). Between 2002 and 2006, Madeira’s regional government received EUR 662.4 million in transfers from the national government, in 9  Organic Law 2/2002, 28th August. Under the terms of this law, all levels of public administration (local, regional, and national) must abide by three principles. The first is budgetary stability, which is defined as a commitment to a budgetary position of balance or in surplus. The principle refers to reciprocal solidarity, which means that all government subsectors are liable to contribute to budgetary stability. The third is the principle of budgetary transparency, according to which public entities must disclose certain information relating to their activities before they are entitled to transfers from the state budget. For more information: Portuguese Ministry of Finances (2002) “Stability and Growth Program”, Economic Research and Forecasting Department, Government of Portugal, Lisbon. The Budgetary Stability Law is part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It is a rule-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal policies in the European Union.

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addition to ordinary transferences in order to recover its budgetary stability. In 2008, Madeira’s executive made an additional request to account for EUR 89.1 million to the ‘Payment to services providers’ (Pagar a tempo e horas). The regional debt in Madeira has continued to rise exponentially despite the national government’s frequent provision of extra packages of transfer. The region has been over the excessive deficit procedure (EDP)10 since 2009. The public account deficits increased dramatically between 2010 and 2011 as a result of accumulated unaccounted expenditures; overdue situations (arrears) and reduction on transferences from the national government (2010 regional financing law reform); and EU, reflecting the loss of eligibility of Objective 1 programs11 (Pereira, 2015). Moreover, the accumulated public deficits reported might be reliable given the divergent amounts presented. After the troika bailout program was signed in 2012, levels of indebtedness have pursued a growth trajectory (2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016) despite the strong financial austerity  (Table 6.3). Ineffective structural adjustment and public investment strategies were ignored in spite of the recommendations of the Portuguese Public Finances Council (Paixão & Baleiras, 2013). Generally speaking, the structure and the pattern of public debt in Madeira reflect political choices that have prioritized public investments flows to construction; empowered public administration apparatus through public enterprises and public service employee; and expanded the welfare system in order to improve living standards of a tourist-island destination.12 These mechanisms upheld the ruling party’s position in office. 10  The Excessive deficit procedure, abbreviated as EDP, is an action launched by the European Commission against any European Union (EU) Member State that exceeds the budgetary deficit ceiling imposed by the EU’s Stability and growth pact legislation. The procedure entails several steps, potentially culminating in sanctions, to encourage a Member State to get its budget deficit under control, a requirement for the smooth functioning of Economic and monetary union (EMU). According to the ‘Protocol on the Excessive deficit procedure’, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty on economic and monetary union, Member States in the euro area and euro area candidate countries must demonstrate sound public finances. There are two criteria: the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. 11  The eligibility rule for determining ‘Objective 1’ status—i.e. ‘Regions whose development is lagging behind’, as are those whose average GDP per head is below 75% of the EU average (European Commission, 2008). 12  Lusa/SOL, “Dívida na Madeira é gota no meio da cratera da dívida portuguesa”, 03 October 2011.

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Azores has lower debt than Madeira. However, it has registered a significant spread in the last years. The levels of public debt during election years are not consistent across time. During the 2000 regional election, public debt stood at EUR 246 million; by 2004, it had doubled to EUR 535.4 million. Azores’s indebtedness peaked in 2008 and returned to its 2008 level in 2012 (Table 6.3). The troika memorandum imposed measures to guarantee the sustainability of public debt and that the national government refinances EUR 180 million in 2012 and 2013 for the region (Fortuna, 2016, p. 152). Azores’s deficit structure is anchored, beyond the logic of loans to inject liquidity into the economy, on the idea that there exists a substantial need to pay or refinance past loans and liabilities as a way to reduce costs involved in servicing of the debt. Furthermore, the excessive establishment of public enterprises on the periphery of the public administration has enhanced the costs of the regional tier. The Azorean airline is owned by the regional government and it also constitutes a huge onus drag on public accounts. At the time of Azores’s 2016 election, the regional debt was EUR 1596 million. It had accumulated during the PS’s incumbency (1996–2016). De facto, two years after the socialists took the public office, in 1998, the national government had assumed 70% of Azorean debt, which encouraged the ruling party to follow an expansionist economic strategy. Regional public deficits were also critical in Spain. In 2011, during regional and local elections, the Financial Times signaled the possibility of hidden public debt within regional and local administrations13 and the “continued fiscal slippage among several regional governments” (Moody’s Report, 29 July 2011). In 2012, the national budget deficit had to be revised several times due to the levels of regional indebtedness. Three extraordinary financial devices were created in order to minimize the imbalances at regional tier of governments: (1) 10 billion euros credit (Instituto Crédito Oficial); (2) a fund for the financing of payments to suppliers (35 billion euros); and (3) a regional liquidity fund—Fondo de Liquidade Autonomo—(18 billion euro plus 23 billion euros in 2013). Additionally, a Budgetary Stability Law (Ley de Estabilidade Pressuputaria) was introduced in 2012, which mandated the regional deficit not exceed 1.8% of GDP. However, by the end of 2014, most of the ACs had not been able to meet the public debt limits (Magone, 2016, pp. 210–12).  Financial Times, “‘Hidden’ debt raises Spain bond fears”, Victor Mallet, 16 May 2011.

13

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The autonomous communities in Spain represent the main agent of public expenditure (Fernandez Llera, 2011, p. 67) and the asymmetrical arrangements regarding accounting and taxes rules or equalization of transfers have led to complex dynamics across the regional level of governments (Lago-Peñas & Solé-Ollè, 2016). Over the years the regional governments have been increasing public spending and employment, and have resisted fiscal adjustment (Martí & Peréz, 2016). The level of indebtedness in the Canary Islands was likewise high, and in the last decade, it increased exponentially  (Table 6.3). The high unemployment rates and large deficit imbalances determined significant shifts in GDP growth. Since 2002, the Canary Islands have started to implement some budgetary measures according to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In 2012–2013 the Spanish government applied a bailout program to the Canary Islands through extraordinary loans of EUR 1914 million. As a result, in 2015 the Canary Islands met their budget stability target with the lowest public debt ratio (14.5%) in the region’s history (Banco de España, 2016). In Spain, some regional governments have taken fiscal austerity more seriously than others, assuming a higher political cost and taking advantage of their autonomy, particularly on the spending side of the equation, to meet their targets by making bigger cuts (Lago Peñas, 2016).

6.5   Citizens’ Perceptions of the Regional Economy Individuals understand their own reality through the lens of their own circumstances and form opinions accordingly with their region of residence (Cohen, 1996). Comparative public attitudes research has ignored the regional perspectives. As Painter notes, “little is known about the views of citizens themselves towards regions or institutions” (2002, p. 109). Individual-level data is challenging to gather, and smaller regions tend to be under-represented in opinion surveys research. The two Portuguese regions examined here have been particularly underexplored14 14  Little work on public attitudes at regional scales has been developed in states with regional tiers of government. The European Social Survey, the World Value Survey, the Eurobarometer, and the Portuguese national polls (electoral and post-electoral period) have sample frames which do not include respondents from Azores or Madeira regions. The questions asked in these surveys are simply not designated to capture citizen’s opinion about the regional scale of politics.

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(Ruel & Calca, 2019). To address this gap, I’ve assembled the available data on citizens’ perceptions about their regions to Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands, through the short-term time series Flash Eurobarometer for 2012, 2015, and 2018 years. The data suggests citizens’ understanding about economic performance in the three regions. The Flash Eurobarometer survey deals with a sample of N = 300 for each region with low response rate per question, which in turn pose difficulties to display a descriptive statistic in aggregated terms. Even though, I’ve three major questions were extracted from the questionnaire in order to advance a descriptive outlook of citizens’ perception on these domain. When asked, How do you judge the quality of life in our region? (Q1.1), almost all of the respondents underline that they observe a good quality of life in their regions. This finding could help us, as a cognitive short-cut, to link the satisfaction of quality of life with the performance of regional government in providing collective goals. If we assume that regional governments answer to citizens’ demands when determining collective goals, we could understand that citizens perceived that regional government ensure the quality of life that they perceive (Table 6.4). Table 6.4  Citizens’ perceptions of quality of life, economic situation and major economic issues at the regional level (2012, 2015 and 2018) Situation of economy Total good (%) Azores 2012 2015 2018 Madeira 2012 2015 2018 Canary Islands 2012 2015 2018

Quality of life

Total bad Total (%) good (%)

Most important issues

Total bad Unemployment (%) (%)

Economy (%)

45 45 62

51 48 34

68 69 81

29 24 16

71 63 57

32 23 22

16 32 64

81 60 31

52 68 82

45 26 13

76 61 48

39 23 16

10 22 42

87 73 56

52 62 42

47 35 56

86 75 62

36 27 16

Source: Own elaboration from Flash Eurobarometer 346 (2012), 427 (2015) and 472 (2018)—Public Opinion in EU regions

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The following question directly addresses economic performance: How do you judge the current economic situation in our region? (Q1.2.) Citizens reveal a striking pessimism about economic performance in Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. Concerning the impact of the 2008 crisis on GDP and unemployment, this perception is in line with the major economic indicators. Even as citizens feel their regions offer them a good quality of life, they recognize that the region is performing badly in economic terms. Overall the data from 2015 in all three regions suggest that citizens identify some economic performance improvements and those from 2018 illuminate, from citizens’ view, the good performance of regional economies, which, in turn, have increased their perception of their quality of life. Canaries’ citizens present an exception in that. They have a poor perception of their own economic situation and quality of life. However, in longitudinal terms, the perception among Canaries’ citizens is positive and they have recognized over time that economic performance is getting better, based on comparing 2015 to 2012 and 2018 to 2015. However, they noted an improving quality of life in 2015, which they felt had declined in 2018 (Table 6.4). Answers to the question, Which are the two most important issues facing our region at the moment? (Q3.) suggest concern about the economy in all three regions, where the results were the same: two out of three of the most-chosen issues were unemployment and the economic situation (education was the third). Azorean, Madeira, and Canaries citizens apparently recognize obstacles the regional governments face in these structural policy areas. At same time, this result might signalize that citizens are demanding more power over these critical public policy areas or that there should be state-level commitment and solidarity to overcome these long-lasting problems (Table 6.4). De facto, regional economies have a poor performance with low or negative economic growth, high unemployment rates and in-depth levels of public deficits. Nonetheless, citizens’ perceptions have underlined constraints faced by regional and peripheral economies after the 2008 crisis; they have rewarded ruling parties with re-election in office.

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6.6   Chapter Final Remarks The 2008 crisis affected regional democracies in two ways. It led to a decrease of tax revenues, increased taxes and investment cuts. It also led to increased regional demands for public services and social protection, triggering higher public expenditure (EC, 2013). There existed a sense of prosperity and growth, but it depended on national government transfers and European funds. Several adjustment mechanisms were introduced to minimize financial imbalances; loans and relief tools have edified the structure of regional economies over time. Moreover, the social features—low-­ qualified workers, a structural level of unemployment, and an above-average risk of poverty—had put pressure on the regional governments to support a considerable budget on social welfare, at same time as providing tax breaks to business enterprises and sustaining an extremely heavy public administration apparatus (EC, 2013). Financing arrangements affecting Azores, Madeira, and Canary Islands have imposed several constraints over time, such as unsatisfactory accounting and reporting rules to answer structural financing problems or the sustainability of regional finances beyond a very limited extent. Regions have made extensive use of public-private partnerships (PPPs), hidden liabilities in public-owned enterprises and other off-budget practices, as a way to bypass reporting rules (Fortuna, 2016). However, the financial packages given to the regional level of governments, in particular to Madeira, created a smoothed and illusory improvement. The ‘elephant’ remains in the room. Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands have experienced a long period of budget deficits while enjoying millions of euros from Structural and Coehesion funds (EU) and thus, a period of prosperity. There is a long-standing assumption that a spending deficit during an election year, in general, increases the prospects of re-election (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). Long-terms of incumbency clearly have entrenched political leaders with long-standing economic relationships and fiscal indiscipline. Recently, Portugal and Spain has increased strictness of fiscal rules through national Stability Growth Pacts, for instance, the imposition of zero deficit rule and regional borrowing operations required state-level approval. Additionally, the troika intervention in 2011 has provided some changes into recovering entrenched disequilibria among public finances at the regional level.

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The economic performance of the three regions led us to pose a question: have the public apparatus and the structure of political affairs that regional authority has legitimized had to look to financial resources to ensure collective goals at the regional level? Or have regional governments have power to manage resources and behave by overlooking the sustainability of public finances? Regarding citizens’ perception towards the economic situation, data shows that even in a recession period, regional governments have become successful in managing economic indicators and being re-elected. They have the perception, in the face of a poor economic performance that it is improving. The good quality of life they feel they have enables this optimism. That is to say, regional governments enjoy a strong economic backdrop (even fragile) which has been crucial for voters to reward incumbents over time.

References Primary Sources Financial Times, “Hidden’ debt raises Spain bond fears”, 16 May 2011. Eduardo Paz Ferreira interview, national government advisor to the Regional financing law (1997), March 2014, Lisbon, Portugal. Emanuel Rodrigues interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 assumed the Madeira regional assembly presidency (1976–1980), October 2013, Funchal—Madeira, Portugal. João Bosco Mota Amaral interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 assumed the helm of regional government in Azores. In addition, Mota Amaral served as PSD party leader (1976–1995), December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal. Lusa/SOL, “Dívida na Madeira é gota no meio da cratera da dívida portuguesa”, 03 October 2011. Público, “Cada madeirense deve 30 mil euros, o dobro da média nacional”, 13 September 2011.

Secondary Sources Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1989). Partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 373–398. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962396

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Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan politics, divided government, and the economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Amorim, C., Bongard, A., Ferreira dias, M., Silva, R., Lebre de Freitas, M. & Torres, F. (2004). Regional convergence in Portugal: The role of national and European policies. Cadernos INA 12. Oeiras: INA. Anderson, C. D. (2008). Economic voting, multilevel governance and information in Canada. Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, 41, 329–354. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0008423908080414 Banco de España. (2016). Boletín Estadístico: Deuda según el Protocolo de Déficit Excesivo (PDE) por Comunidades Autónomas. Cabrera, M. (1998). Formas de poder y economia canaria entre los siglos XV– XVII. Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporânea, 18, 13–28. Caixabank (2017). La economía de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias: diagnóstico estratégico. Colección Comunidades Autónomas, Madrid: Caixabank Research. Cohen, A. P. (1996). Personal nationalism: a Scottish view of some rites, rights, and wrongs. American Ethnologist, 23, 802–815. https://doi.org/10.1525/ ae.1996.23.4.02a00070 Concha, A., Gil, M., Javier, J., & Urtasun, A. (2018). Monitoring the Spanish economy from a regional perspective: Main elements of analysis. Documentos Ocasionales n.° 1809. Madrid: Banco de España. Downs, W. (1998). Coalition politics, sub-national style: multiparty politics in Europe regional parliaments. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008). The economic vote: How political institutions condition election results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eaton, K. (2001). Political obstacles to decentralization: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines. Development and Change, 32(1), 101–127. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-7660.00198 European Commission. (1996). First report on economic and social cohesion. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. European Commission. (2001). Second report on economic and social cohesion. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. European Commission. (2008). EU Cohesion Policy 1988–2008: Investing in Europe’s future. Inforegio Panorama 26, European Commission, Brussels. European Commission. (2013). The urban and regional dimension of the crisis— Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2776/74866 Fernandez-Albertos, J. (2006). Does internationalization blur responsibility? Economic voting and economic openness in 15 European countries. West European Politics, 29(1), 28–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402380500389208

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Fernandez-Llera. (2011). Decentralización, deuda pública y disciplina de mercado en España. Innovar, 21(39), 67–81. Flash Eurobarometer 356. (2012). Public Opinion in European Union Regions. European Commission. Flash Eurobarometer 427 (2015). Public Opinion in European Union Regions.. European Commission. Flash Eurobarometer 472 (2018). Public Opinion in European Union Regions.. European Commission. Fortuna, M. (2016). Portugal multilevel finance adjustments within sovereign debt and Euro crisis. In E.  Ahmad, M.  Bordignon, & G.  Brosio (Eds.), Multilevel finance and the Euro crisis—Causes and effects (pp. 148–174). UH, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Fraile, M., & Lewis-Beck, M. (2010). Economic voting in Spain: A 2000 panel test. Electoral Studies, 29(2), 210–220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. electstud.2010.01.003 Freire, A. (2007). Issue voting in Portugal. In A.  Freire, M.  Costa Lobo, & P. Magalhães (Eds.), Portugal at the polls in 2002 (pp. 101–124). Lanham, MD: Lexington. Freire, A., & Costa Lobo, M. (2005). Economics, ideology and vote: Southern Europe, 1985–2000. European Journal of Political Research, 44(4), 493–518. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00236.x Freire, A., & Santana-Pereira, J. (2012). Economic voting in Portugal 2002–2009. Electoral Studies, 30, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.02.006 Gramacho, W. (2008). Popularidade e economia no semipresidencialismo português. Análise Social, 43(3), 531–550. Hearl, D., Budge, I., & Pearson, B. (1996). Distinctiveness of regional voting: A comparative analysis across the European community (1979–93). Electoral Studies, 15(2), 167–182. Hellwig, T. T. (2001). Interdependence, government constraints, and economic voting. The Journal of Politics, 63, 1141–1162. https://doi. org/10.1111/0022-3816.00104 Herrero, C. (2012). La pobreza en España y sus Comunidades Autónomas 2006–2011. Valencia: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas. Instituto Canario de Estadística (ISCTAC). 2016. Retrieved from www.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/ Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España. (n.d.). Retrieved from www.ine.es Intituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). (n.d.). Portugal. Retrieved from www.ine.pt King, J.  D. (2001). Incumbent popularity and vote choice in Gubernatorial Elections. Journal of Politics, 63, 585–597. https://doi. org/10.1111/0022-3816.00080

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Kopoin, A., Moran, K., & Paré, J. P. (2013). Forecasting regional GDP with factor models: How useful are national and international data? Economics Letters, 121, 267–270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.007 Lago Peñas, S. (2016). Fiscal consolidation in Spain: State of play and outlook. Spanish Economics and Financial Outlook (SEFO), 5(1), 41–48. Lago-Peñas, S., & Solé-Ollè, A. (2016). Multilevel finance and governance in Spain: The impact of the Euro crisis. In E. Ahmad, M. Bordignon, & G. Brosio (Eds.), Multilevel finance and the Euro crisis—Causes and effects (pp. 175–211). UK, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Lehmann, R., & Wohlrabe, K. (2013). Regional economic forecasting: State-of-­ the-art methodology and future challenges. Economics and Business Letters, 3, 218–231. https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.3.4.2014.218-231 León, S. (2010). Who is responsible for what? Clarity of responsibilities in multilevel states: The case of Spain. European Journal of Political Research, 50, 80–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01921.x León, S. (2012). How citizens attribute responsibility in multilevel states? Learning biases and asymmetric federalism. Evidences from Spain. Electoral Studies, 31, 120–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.09.003 Lewis-Beck, M., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183–219. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.183 Lowry, R., Alt, J., & Ferree, K. (1998). Fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in American States. The American Political Science Review, 92, 759–774. Magone, J. (2016). The politics of troika avoidance: The case of Spain. In J. Magone, B. Lafland, & C. Schweigner (Eds.), Core periphery relations in the EU—Power and conflict in a dualist political country (pp.  205–215). UK: Routledge. Martí, F., & Peréz, J. (2016). Spanish Public Finances through financial crisis. Doc. de Trabajo n. ° 1620. Madrid: Banco de España. Martins, R., & Veiga, F. J. (2013). Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections. Public Choice, 155, 317–334. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127011-9849-0 Mateus A. and Associados. (2009). A Região Autónoma da Madeira como Região Ultraperiférica na União Europeia—o quadro de aplicação das políticas comunitárias: medidas de adaptação e ou derrogação das políticas comunitárias com incidência na Região Autónoma da Madeira (coesão, eficácia e integração). Lisbon: Abel Mateus & Associados. Moody’s Report. (2011, July 29). Announcement: Moody’s places Spain’s Aa2 ratings on review for possible downgrade. New York: Moody’s Research. Norporth, H. (1996). The economy. In L. LeDuc et al. (orgs.), Comparing democracies: Elections and voting in global perspective (pp.  319–342) Thousand Oaks: Sage.

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Painter, J. (2002). Multi-level citizenship, identity and regions in contemporary Europe. In J.  Anderson (Ed.), Transnational democracy. Political spaces and border crossings (pp. 93–110). London: Routledge. Paixão, M. & Baleiras, N. (2013). Análise dos Limites à Dívida nas Propostas de Lei de Finanças Regionais e Locais, Publicação Ocasional n. 1/2013, Portuguese Public Finances Council. Pereira, C. (2015). A Herança—Saiba como o Governo da Madeira escondeu a dívida. Funchal: Nova Delphi. Portuguese Ministry of Finances. (2002). Stability and Growth Program. Economic Research and Forecasting Department. Lisbon: Government of Portugal. Powell, B. G., & Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 391–414. Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., & Manin, B. (Eds.). (1999). Democracy accountability and representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Queralt, D. (2012). Economic voting in multi-tiered polities. Electoral Studies, 31, 107–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.09.002 Report nr.°3/2011-FS/SRMTC. (n.d.). Auditoria orientada para os encargos assumidos e não pagos da Administração Regional Directa da Madeira—2009. Riba, C., & Diaz, A. (2002). Economic voting in subnational government. In H. Dorussen & M. Taylor (Eds.), Economic voting. London: Routledge. Rodden, J., & Wibbels, E. (2011). Beyond the fiction of federalism: Macroeconomic management in multi-tiered systems. World Politics, 55(4), 494–531. https:// doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0016 Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2000). Economic convergence and regional development strategies in Spain: The case of Galicia and Navarre. EIB Papers—European Investment Bank (EIB), 5(1), 88–115. Ruel, T. (2019). Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-state-wide parties. Regional & Federal Studies, 29(3), 429–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1526786 Ruel, T., & Calca, P. (2019, April 8–12). Beyond ‘usual suspects’—Citizen’s perceptions towards institutions and the regional level of government in Azores and Madeira. Paper presented at ECPR Workshop Joint Session Attitudes towards decentralization at multilevel states. Mons, Belgium. Svoboda, C. J. (1995). Retrospective Voting in Gubernatorial Elections: 1982 and 1986. Political Research Quarterly, 48, 135–150. https://doi. org/10.1177/106591299504800108 Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416–424. https://doi.org/10.1086/257839 Weingast, B. R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: Market preserving federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11(1), 1–31.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

A political party winning elections over an extended period of time, while opposition constantly fails to meet alternation rule is considered ‘uncommon’ within liberal democracies (Pempel, 1990), although, politicians once in power want to prolong their tenure in office. They will use the available tools to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005). This prompt the puzzle addressed on this book: Why does political alternation occur in some political systems and not in others? Political alternation at regional level is not a common feature in Western democracies (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel & Massetti, 2018). Using three Southern Europe paradigmatic regions—Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands—I’ve taken a comprehensive look at the mechanisms that parties and politicians employ to secure long-term of incumbency in a given political system or strictly postponed political alternation. Pasquino have launched our theoretical benchmark for understanding political alternation. He defines political alternation as the “replacement of a government of a different composition, in terms of political parties and members, from the government that has been replaced” (Pasquino, 2011, pp.  21–22). Political alternation is relevant at theoretical level because it’s the prima facie of political contestation (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) and a predictable outcome of liberal democracies. It suggests that opposition has the opportunity to win and defeat rulers (Przeworski et  al., 2000, Przeworski, 2009, 2010) through the competition for popular vote (Schumpeter, 1942/2003). © The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8_7

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The in-depth study conducted here has explored three major dimensions: (1) the pattern of party competition, (2) the intra-party democracy and (3) regional economic performance over three regions for a period of forty years (1976–2016). Through this framework of analysis several factors were considered in the construction of my argument which in turn, has revealed explanatory power to longevity in office of parties and politicians. The main findings of the book indicate that the de facto historical and political legacies play a critical role in configurations of the institutional arrangements and political parties expressed via voting patterns. The path towards democratization alongside decentralization has introduced a major transformation in the regional scale of politics and has created a structure of opportunities such that political actors act strategically in order to prolong their tenure in office. The first regional elections in three regional polities—Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands—have rewarded political parties as the ‘founding fathers’ of decentralization processes which became quickly accommodated at regional institutions. PSD assumed the helm of government over Portuguese regions—Azores and Madeira—with the first regional elections and remained in power in Madeira since. The PSD also ruled in Azores for 20 years until the PS took over the executive role in 1996 and it has remained in power since them. In the Canary Islands, the state-wide parties (PSOE, CDS and AP) became dominant during the two decades of democracy (1983–1995) until the Coalición Canaria (regionalist party) came into office in 1995 (in a coalition with PP), which lasted until 2015. The pattern of competition in regional elections in the Azores and Madeira exhibits distinctive features. Azores shows a bipartisan pattern of competition where the two leading parties alternate in power in a single-­ government formula with long-terms of incumbency. However, there exist credible expectations that opposition could replace the incumbents at any given election. This prospect has been undermined by the persistent leadership crisis within the social-democrat party over the last 20  years since Mota Amaral’s resignation, and the constant changes in party leaders. While remaining the second most voted party since losing its position as ruling party, it has shown no sign of improving its status, hitherto. As Mota Amaral recognized, after almost 19 years of regional incumbency in Azores, voters desired a credible alternative offering a different policy solutions from the ones the PSD had implemented. According to his own account, he believed that a long-term in power creates an obvious

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political and psychological weakening. Likewise, long-terms of incumbency also constrain incumbent’s ability to remake programmatic strategies, responding to daily collective goals (Mota Amaral interview, Lisbon-Portugal, December 2013). Regional electoral outcomes in Madeira have conducted to social-­ democrats’ dominance. Alberto João Jardim has led regional government and PSD over 39  years until he announced his resignation in 2014. In spite of historical leader replacement, the PSD has become successful in succeeding regional elections (2015). Opposition parties, in particular the socialists in Madeira, did not present themselves as a credible political alternative and PSD was benefited from a long-lasting incumbency advantage even beyond Jardim’s ‘one man, one rule’ between 1978 and 2014. Regional elections results show that electoral competition is low, which is to say that, opposition parties have huge difficulties challenging PSD’ dominance. The socialists’ regional branch also has shown a permanent instability among his party leaders, resulting from the successive failure to lead the party into government, and after an election was replaced. The electorate may consider this a signal that they lack the skill to rule, which has condemned in particular Socialist Party to the ‘ungrateful role of long-­ term opposition’ (Aron, 1982). As Emanuel Rodrigues stated: The PSD dominance is anchored on several factors, such as: the role played by the Catholic Church during the democratization period; the emigrants in countries where the social-democrats prevailed as ruling parties, who have suggested to their families in Madeira that they should vote PSD, and the radical opposition that emerged during mid-70s, which in turn, has mobilized the electorate toward the PSD. Furthermore, the region in the 1970s showed an underdeveloped status, high levels of illiteracy and poverty, a shackled society, and PSD had managed to overcome these problems successfully. The instability and inability among the socialists have convinced voters to reward the ruling party in consecutive elections. The same was observed in Azores while Mota Amaral led PSD. Mota Amaral’s resignation has changed the contextual environment of regional politics.[…] Although, it’s a worrying issue, after almost 40 years, opposition parties, in particular PS, have not constituted themselves as a credible option to the electorate. (Emanuel Rodrigues interview, Funchal-Portugal, October, 2013)

In the Canary Islands, party competition has evolved since the creation of regional institutions around the distinctive regional interested echoed

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from the seven islands of the archipelago. The pleito insular has structured party competition in Canaries politics. Hence, the electoral gains and the configuration of government formation have shaped this intra-insular dynamics. During the first two decades of regional autonomy, state-wide parties have dominated party competition which has in turn benefited from the role played during the decentralization process. In 1995, Coalición Canarias (a regionalist party) took the regional office in coalition with PP-Can (a state-wide party), smoothing the local and insular issues in the regional-level government. CC has mobilized regional interests in a distinctive format—Contruir Canarias, a partir de cada una de las islas.1 CC has acquired a pivotal position within the political system and led the cabinet in coalition with PP-Can for 20 years. In 2015, PSOE-PSC supported CC in a coalition as premiership. Strategically, CC has mostly ‘gone with the party in Madrid,’ which has served regional interests and policy goals on the archipelago. Party competition in the Canaries elections has been extremely competitive where all parties have the opportunity to govern. After two decades of party system fragmentation, moderate pluralism was settled in. Over 26 years, CC has introduced major institutional transformations in Canaries politics: the statute of autonomy and electoral reform in 1996 which blocked the fragmentation of political parties in regional parliament (with the raise of electoral thresholds); improvements in their especial fiscal regime or the regional financing reform in 2009; and the reciprocity power enjoyed with national governments, backing them at the parliamentary level (PP and PSOE), making concessions on public policies as a trade-off in order to obtain regional investment or more self-government powers. Nevertheless, it is well established that CC assumed a dominant position within Canaries through brokerage and clientelistic politics (Pallarés & Keating, 2003, p. 242). Furthermore, party leaders have used regional government machinery to their advantage and have galvanized voters to vote the party into office. The longevity in power had produced further dominance in a virtuous cycle of incumbency advantages. Electorally strong parties and entrenched party leaders have undermined the prospects of political alternation. The three cases examined—Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands—have shown a strong ‘presidentialized’ style enhanced by the double status in 1

 “Build up Canary Islands, from each of its island” (Author free translation).

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the system: long-serving party leaders and long-terms in public office. That is to say, the personalization of politics has blurred the lines between the political party, party leadership, and incumbency (Ruel, 2019). One of the critical drivers of long terms of incumbency or the lack of political alternation is the leadership features of the regional premiers who establish closeness and confidence with their constituents (Mota Amaral interview, Lisbon-Portugal, December, 2013). The control of the economy also played an important role in the incumbent capacity to pre-empt or thwart opposition challenges. Regional incumbents in Azores and Madeira have adopted a strategic stance on socioeconomic issues influenced by deep-rooted historical factors that had shaped the productive and social structure of the regions. It has led to the development of a network of loyalties and payoffs which have in turn reinforced the ability of the ruling parties to provide collective goals and be rewarded at the polls (Ruel, 2015, 2019). A culture of patronage and clientelism consolidated the capacity to survival in office. As well, the resources available at the regional level—own resources, national budget transferences, and/or EU funds—have created incentives to develop an expansionist strategy grounded on public investments. Regional economies have displayed a prosperity period and economic growth and offered employment stability to their citizens in the short-term. However, this economic growth and the levels of well-being were supported by extensive public debt mechanisms that have exponentially increased over time. The 2008 crisis exposed the fragility of these peripheral economies to external shocks. In particular, Madeira and the Canary Islands exhibit higher levels of indebtedness than their Azorean counterparts. The soft accounting rules and the reliance on inter-governmental transfers have encouraged irresponsible behaviour by regional incumbents, which, in turn, sheds light on the structural problems regarding the sustainability of the regional finances, the structural pattern of unemployment or poverty, and also the lack of accountability from citizens. Territorial issues, regional interests, and policy goals have oriented incumbents towards the mobilization and attachment of the insular voters in each region. For instance, the strong position of the PSD’s branch in Madeira or Coalición Canarias that voices the territorial interests, often demanding more (financial) autonomy at the state-level, enhanced by the strong leadership, appeared to resonate within Madeira’s and Canaries’ electorate. In spite of the absence of regionalist parties in Portugal, the regional branches of parties, in particular, the incumbent parties behave,

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de facto, as regionalist parties (Ruel, 2019). Likewise, in the Canary Islands, CC has anchored its legitimator discourse on voicing regional demands to Madrid. Further research agenda should include in-depth inquiry regarding citizens’ perceptions towards regional democracy, institutions, and political actors, and in particular, about citizens’ voting behaviour in these three regional democracies with lack of alternation or long-terms of incumbency. During the writting of this book, Madeira and the Canary Islands held regional elections in the end of 2019. Major changes took place. For the first time, the election in Madeira was competitive. The distance between the first and second most voted parties was narrow (3.7%). PSD has enhanced its vote share and increased its number of MPs over its success in the 2015 regional election (+7.73% and +2 seats), while Socialists obtained the best electoral result in the history of regional democracy in these elections. PS obtained 36.0% of votes and elected 19 deputies. The other opposition parties (CDS/PP; PCP; BE and PTP) registered higher losses in terms of vote shares and seats, signalizing voter’s strategic behaviour which benifited Socialist party. PSD has secured the regional office in coalition with PP, for the first time, regional government in Madeira follows a right-wing coalition formula. This evidence indicates that electoral competitiveness is one of the drivers of alternation in office. The closeness of electoral constestability opened, de facto, the prospects of political alternation. In the Canary Islands conterpart, CC was removed from office after 26  years of incumbency. PSOE-PSC was sucessful in the 2019 regional election with 29.43% of vote shares, obtaining the support of Podemos, Nueva Canarias (NC) and Agrupación Socialista Gomera (ASG) in government formation. This regional election were held under new electoral rules. Canaries Statute reform introduced in 2018 (Organic Law n.° 1, 2018) increased the number of MPs from 60 to 70; the electoral threshold was revised into 4% of vote shares at the regional level and 15% at the islands district, and a regional constituency of nine mandates was introduced to minimize proportionality distortions. Accordingly, district magnitude was reconfigured as follow: 15 to Gran Canaria, 15 to Tenerife, 8 to La Palma, 8 to Lanzarote, 8 (+1) to Fuerteventura, 4 to La Gomera and 3 to El Hierro. In a first glance, this institutional change signals major transformation on Canaries politics. It should be explored and analysed in further research. As of this writing, the cycle of regional elections among the three cases is

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not complete, as the Azorean’ election will be held in October 2020. There is a strongly expectation that PSD will challenge the long-lasting socialist incumbency. In practice, voters from Madeira and Canaries regions are signalizing and desiring for disctinctive political alternatives and policy innovation to their regions. For the sake of understanding, alternation is difficult to predict because they entail idiosyncratic factors and accidents of history sometime very minor. Changing governments is not an easy habit to acquire (Przeworski, 2015, p. 116). Although, this book provides a rich knowledge of the cases through idiosyncratic constellation of factors (historical, institutional, political, economic and social) that is instructive to the understanding the drivers that support the lack of alternation in office or long-terms of incumbency. In addition, the data presented here provides innovative information to enhance comparative research among regional scale of politics. As democracy, alternation in office is a never-ending quest. Political alternation requires credible alternatives, competitive electoral contestation or policy innovation. Although in representative democracies only voters have the power to oust incumbents from office. As Przeworski has stated, there is something still to improve: democracy and self-­ government of the people (Przeworski, 2010, p. xiii).

References Primary Sources Emanuel Rodrigues interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 was elected president of the Madeira regional assembly (1976–1980), October 2013, Funchal—Madeira, Portugal. João Bosco Mota Amaral interview, national MP during the constitution-making period (1975). In 1976 assumed the helm of regional government in Azores. In addition, Mota Amaral served as PSD party leader (1976–1995), December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

Secondary Sources Aron, R. (1982). Alternation in government in the industrialized countries. Government and Opposition, 17(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1477-7053.1982.tb00675.x

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Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. D. (2005). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dandoy, R., & Schakel, A. (2013). Regional and national elections in Western Europe—Territoriality of the vote in thirteen countries (Comparative Territorial Politics). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pallarés, F., & Keating, M. (2003). Multi-level electoral competition: Regional elections and party systems in Spain. European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697764030103005 Pempel, T.  J. (1990). Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominance regime. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Przeworski, A. (2009). Self-government in our times. Annual Review of Political Studies, 12, 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.062408.120543 Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the limits of self-government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A. (2015). Acquiring the habit of changing governments through elections. Comparative Political Studies, 48(1), 101–129. https://doi. org/10.1177/0010414014543614 Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. A., Cheibub, A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracies and dictatorships. In Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ruel, T. (2015). Madeira Regional Election 2015: A polity tyrannized by majorities or the end of an era? Regional & Federal Studies, 25(3), 313–320. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1053876 Ruel, T. (2019). Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-state-wide parties. Regional & Federal Studies, 29(3), 429–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1526786 Schakel, A., & Massetti, E. (2018). A world of difference: The sources of regional government composition and alternation. West European Politics, 41(3), 703–727. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1400237 Schumpeter, J. (1942/2003). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London and New York: Routledge.

Index

A Accumulated debt, 132 Adjustment, 138 Agricultural society, 129 Albuquerque, Miguel, 78 Alternate, 23 Alternation, 3, 15, 95 Alternation in power, 86 Alternative candidates, 19 Amaral, Mota, 72 AP/PP, 3 Aristotelian, 24 Assembleia legislativa, 44 Asymmetrical arrangements, 135 Atlantic islands, 37 Authority scope, 36 Autonomic movement, 38 Autonomist consciousness, 43 Autonomist movements, 39 Autonomous regions, 37 Autonomy, 108 Azores, 3, 36, 71, 123

B Bailout, 128 Bipartisan party system, 88 Bobbio, Norberto, 19 Budgetary deficits, 131 Budgetary stability, 133 Budgetary Stability Law, 132 C Cabinet turnover, 26 Camacho, Ornelas, 75 Canarian nationality, 54, 55 Canary Islands, 4, 36, 52, 54, 71, 123 Candidate selection, 102 Carnation Revolution, 40 Case-studies, 7 CDS, 3 Centralism, 50 Centre-periphery cleavage, 43 César, Carlos, 73 Citizens’ perceptions, 126, 135–137

© The Author(s) 2021 T. Ruel, Political Alternation in the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53840-8

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INDEX

Clavijo, Fernando, 82 Closed primaries, 106 Coalición Canarias, CC, 3, 81 Coalition formula, 7 Coalition’s formula, 79 Collective goals, 130 Compensatory constituency, 88 Competition for power, 20 Competitive parties, 19 Competitive struggle, 17 Comunidad Autonóma de Canárias, 3 Cordeiro, Vasco, 75 D Dahl, Robert, 18 Debt, 132 Decentralization, 5–6, 35, 49, 102, 123 Delegado del Gobierno, 56 Democracy, 16 Democratization, 40 Disproportionality, 88 Dominant position, 90 E Economic disparities, 128 Economic factors, 124 Economic growth, 127 Economic situation, 137 Economic structure, 126 Education, 137 Elected assemblies, 5 Elections, 19 Electoral arenas, 6 Electoral competitiveness, 86, 88, 90 Electoral dynamics and, 4 Employment, 128 ENP, 88 Executive powers, 5 Expansionist economic strategy, 134

F Farmer demonstration, 41 Federal structure, 109 Fernandez, Fernando, 80 Financial autonomy, 58 Financial imbalances, 138 Financial resources, 47 Financing system, 47 Fiscal adjustment, 135 Fiscal austerity, 135 Fiscal autonomy, 47–48, 94 Fiscal powers, 47 Fiscal slippage, 134 Fiscal tools, 123 Fragmented opposition, 91 FTZ/Canary Islands Special Zone, 60 G Geographical remoteness, 59 Giuseppe Di Palma, 19 Governmental change, 26 Government formation, 28, 92 Government turnover, 25 Governo regional, 44 H Hechos diferenciales, 50 Hermoso, Manuel, 81 Historical grievances, 52 Historical legacies, 4 Historic nationalities, 53 I Identity, 95 Ideological incongruence, 116 Ideological organization, 105 Important issues, 137 Incumbents, 7, 101, 104, 123 Independentism, 40, 56 Individual-level data, 135

 INDEX 

Infrastructure, 126 Institutional arrangement, 17 Institutional design, 108 Institutional guarantees, 18 Insularisation, 83 Insularism, 54–56 Insularity, 59 Insular organization, 113 Intra-insular distinctiveness, 55 Intra-party democracy, 7 Intra-party dynamics, 101 Islands specificities, 79 Islands territories, 36 J Jardim, Alberto João, 3, 77 Junta de Canarias, 54 Junta Regional, 42 L Labour market, 128 Leadership selection, 101 Left-wing military, 42 Levels of indebtedness, 131 Lipset, S. M., 24 Longevity of party leader, 113 Long-serving party leaders, 117 Long-serving terms in office, 89 Long-term of incumbency, 75 M Madeira, 3, 36, 71, 123 Madeira and Azores, recognizing, 39 Madruga da Costa, 73 Majoritarian outcomes, 90 Malapportionment, 92 March 1895, 38 Martin, Adrián, 82 Meso-level of government, 5 Moderate pluralism, 91

Modern Canarian nationalism, 112 Multicultural diversity, 51 Multilevel electoral politics, 109 Multilevel states, 9 Multiparty systems, 21, 46 N National leadership, 105 Non-state-wide parties, 46 O Off-budget practices, 138 Olarte, Lorezo, 80 Opposition, 4, 18, 104 Opposition parties, 77, 89 Organizational apparatus, 108 Organizational autonomy, 103, 105, 106 P Pacto de Cemento, 81 Parlamento de Canarias, 56 Parliamentary fragmentation, 92 Partisan competition, 6 Party competition, 7 Party dominance, 3, 27, 85, 89 Party federalization, 109 Party fragmentation, 91 Party leaders, 101, 105 Party leader selection, 106 Party leadership, 115 Party leader survival, 117 Party organizations, 103 Party selectorate, 102 Party’s strongholds, 9 Party structures, 102 Party systems, 21, 47, 103 Pasquino, Gianfranco, 27 People vote, 17 Peripheral economies, 128

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INDEX

Peripheral nationalisms, 49 Pleito insular, 83, 91 Pleito insular cleavage, 54 Policy making, 5 Policy scope, 53 Political alternation, 73, 91, 125 Political authority, 36, 130 Political communities, 5, 93 Political competition, 103 Political contestation, 18 Political institutions, 71 Political participation, 18 Political parties, 20, 72 Polyarchy, 18 Portugal, 36–43, 103, 108, 125 Powell, Birgham, 19 Pre-autonomic period, 54 Predominant party system, 22, 46 Presidente del Gobierno, 56 Presidentialized’ style, 117 Primavera Marcelista, 40 Process of decentralization, 103 Proportional representation, 45 Przeworski, 19 PSOE, 3 Public administration, 126–127 Public enterprises, 133 Public office, 18 Public-owned enterprises, 138 Public-private partnerships, 138 Public spending, 135 Q Quality of life, 136 R Recession, 130 Re-election, 124 Régimen Economico y Fiscal, 59

Regional authority, 4 Regional barons, 108 Regional branches, 103, 109 Regional branches of the state-wide parties, 6 Regional consciousness, 38 Regional democracies, 3, 95, 138 Regional distinctiveness, 50 Regional economic performance, 7 Regional economies, 125 Regional elections, 28, 57, 71 Regional financing law, 132 Regional financing systems, 48 Regional GDP, 125 Regional governments, 71, 124 Regional identity, 55, 79 Regional institutions, 49 Regional interests, 95, 105 Regionalism, 112 Regional issues, 51 Regionalist claim, 39 Regionalists parties, 6, 79, 83 Regional parliament, 45 Regional party structures, 103–113 Regional politics, 4 Regional self-rule, 52 Regional specificities, 103 Regional structures, 105, 108 Regional tier, 44, 71 Regions, 5–6, 35, 105 Relevant parties, 21 Representante da República, 44 Revolta da Farinha, 39 Revolta da Madeira, 39 Revolta do Leite, 39 Riker, William, 17 Risk of poverty, 138 Rivero, Paulino, 82 Rodriguez, Román, 81

 INDEX 

Rotation in office, 15 Rulers, 20 Ruling parties, 124 S Saavedra, Jeronimo, 80 Sartori, 21 Schumpeter, Joseph, 16 Selection of rulers, 17 Self-government, 26, 36 Self-government rule, 58 Separatist, 40 Separatist movements, 38 Single-party dominance, 28 Single party-government, 7, 21, 72 Social-Democratic Party, 3 Sovereign debt crisis, 128 Spain, 49 Spanish Constitution, 51 Spanish financial system, 58 Spanish parties, 109 Stability and Growth Pact, 135 State decentralization, 109 State of autonomies, 49–60 State-wide parties, 3, 79, 103 Statutes, 104 Statutes of autonomy, 44 Structural funds, 129 Structure of competition, 90 Sub-national public finances, 131 Subsidiarity, 37 Sub-state level, 36 Surveys research, 135 Survival in power, 4 Sustainability of public debt, 134 Sustainability of regional finances, 138

T Tenure in office, 15, 29, 101 Territorial autonomy, 40 Territorial interests, 93 Territorial issues, 41, 79 Territorial leaders, 103 Territorial level, 111 Territorial polarization, 92 Territorial rescaling, 35 Territory, 5, 35 Tourism, 126 Transferences, 133 Triple parity principle, 57 Turnout, 93 Turnover, 15 Two-party system, 21, 46 2008 crisis, 128 U Unemployed, 128 Unemployment, 137 V Vertical organization, 101, 106 Voters, 6 W Welfare system, 133 Winning office, 27 Z Zona Franca da Madeira, ZFM, 48

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