Rivalling Disaster Experiences: The Case of the Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro, Canary Islands 9783839455128

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Benedikt M. Orlowski Rivalling Disaster Experiences

Social and Cultural Geography  | Volume 44

Benedikt M. Orlowski, born in 1979, works as a research associate at the Department for Urban Research and Statistics in Nürnberg. The human geographer did his doctorate at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and is a member of the working group on »Cultures and Disasters« at the local Institute for Geography. In 2015, he co-edited a volume on Cultures and Disasters which has become a seminal book in its field. His research focus is on human geography, particularly the geography of risk and cross-disciplinary approaches to volcanic risk, and risk and the media.

Benedikt M. Orlowski

Rivalling Disaster Experiences The Case of the Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro, Canary Islands

Funding was supported by the R2C2 working group (Routines and Ruptures in Cultures and Cities) at the Institute of Geography at FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg and by the Ilse und Dr. Alexander Mayer-Stiftung. The work at hand represents the slightly edited version of the author's doctoral thesis which has been accepted by the Faculty of Sciences of the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg with the original title of "La Crisis Sismica: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice. A Case Study of the 2011-2012 Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro, Canary Islands" in 2019. Examiners: Prof. Dr. Fred Krüger (Institute of Geography, FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg) and Prof. Dr. Matthias Garschagen (Department of Geography, LMU München).

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http:// dnb.d-nb.de © 2021 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover layout: Maria Arndt, Bielefeld Cover illustration: "Satiroca", Rubén Armiche Benitez Padrón Printed by Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar Print-ISBN 978-3-8376-5512-4 PDF-ISBN 978-3-8394-5512-8 https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839455128 Printed on permanent acid-free text paper.

Contents

Acknowledgements ...................................................................... 9 Abstract.................................................................................. 11 1.

Preface: A Volcano Named ‘Cabrón’ .................................................13

2.

Introduction: The Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro ............................... 17

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands .......................................... 25 3.1. Location, Climate, and Population of the Canary Islands ............................. 25 3.2. Some Facts about El Hierro’s Population and Economy ............................... 27 3.2.1. Overview of the Island: Population and Settlements........................... 27 3.2.2. The Seismic Crisis and a Drop in Population? ................................. 28 3.2.3. Economy and Tourism: A Fragile Island? ...................................... 30 3.2.4. The Seismic Crisis and a Drop in Tourism? ................................... 33 3.3. Un solo pueblo? – The Administrative Structure of the Canary Islands ................ 34 3.4. The Canary Islands Plan for Civil Protection Against Volcanic Risks .................. 37 3.4.1. Hierarchical Structure of Spain’s Civil Protection ............................. 37 3.4.2. PEVOLCA – Organising Volcanic Risks......................................... 37 3.4.3. One Volcanic Risk – Shared Responsibilities between National and Regional Actors ................................................ 38 3.4.4. Volcanic Traffic Light – Synchronising Volcanic Activity and Response ......... 41 4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands .................. 45 4.1. From Myth to Science to Mystical Controversy: Stories of the Canary Islands’ Origin................................................. 45 4.2. The ‘Imperfect’ Hot Spot of the Canary Islands....................................... 47 4.3. El Hierro – A ‘Pyramid’ of Basalt ..................................................... 50 4.4. Exploring the Past: Volcanic Risk between Estimation, Exaggeration, and ‘Concealment’? ................................................... 53 4.5. El Hierro’s Seismo-Volcanic Event from the View of Volcanology ...................... 57

4.5.1. Seismic Anomaly: The Pre-Eruptive Phase (July 2011 – October 2011) ........... 58 4.5.2. Uncertainty about Explosiveness: The Eruption (October 2011 – March 2012) .... 60 4.5.3. Seismic Unrest: After the Eruption (March 2012 – March 2014) ................. 62 5. Culturally Borne Disasters ......................................................... 65 5.1. Opening Up and Bridging the Gap(s) of Disaster Rationales........................... 66 5.1.1. A Brief (and Incomplete) History of What Is Meant to Be a Disaster ............ 66 5.1.2. DRR Practice and the Trenches of Rationales ................................. 70 5.1.3. Local Knowledge – A Bridge over the Gap(s)? ................................. 75 5.1.4. Interim Conclusion: Four Axioms for Further Research ........................ 79 5.1.5. Another ‘Myth’: Islands and Insularity – Entity or Delusion? .................... 79 5.2. The Cultural Sense of Disasters ..................................................... 86 5.3. Phenomenon I: Risk ‘In-Between’ Individual and Collective Experience................ 89 5.4. Phenomenon II: ‘Truth’ and Ambiguities .............................................. 91 6. Geography of Risk Inspired by a Pragmatist Notion of Praxis ...................... 95 6.1. Truth Relativism and the Basics of Practice Theory .................................. 95 6.2. Fields of Practice and the Arena of Singularities..................................... 98 6.2.1. Fields of Practice ............................................................ 99 6.2.2. Stream of Experiences and Stabilised Rationales ............................ 100 6.2.3. Ruptures as Singularities ................................................... 104 6.2.4. The ‘Arena’ of Singularities .................................................. 105 6.3. Interim Conclusion: Rivalling Fields of Practice in the Wake of a Disaster............ 106 6.4. Disasters as Breaching Experiments? .............................................. 108 6.5. Resulting Questions for This Case Study............................................ 108 Research Design and Methodological Approach .................................... 111 First Contact with the Research Field ............................................... 111 The Process: Shifting Research Focus ............................................... 113 Grounded Theory and DRR .......................................................... 113 7.3.1. Grounded Theory as a Key to Individuals’ ‘Theories of Risk’.................... 113 7.3.2. Basic Idea of GTM: Data-Driven Research ..................................... 116 7.3.3. The Epistemological Orientation of GTM ...................................... 116 7.3.4. Abduction: A Pragmatist’s Approach to Sudden Inspirations.................. 120 7.3.5. Exploration and Experience-Making as a Way of Research ................... 123 7.3.6. Research Process with GTM ................................................. 124 7.4. Theoretical Sampling and Methodological Tools......................................127 7.4.1. First Phase – ‘Remote Sensing’ Medial Coverage and Comments ...............127 7.4.2. Second Phase – Detecting Continuities and Ruptures in Everyday Life ........ 128 7.4.3. Third Phase – Identifying Fields of Practice, Rationales, and Singularities .... 130 7.4.4. Fourth Phase – Going into Dialogue with the Data (2014–2018) ................ 133

7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3.

7.4.5. Overall Characteristics of the Sampling Groups .............................. 133 8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice .............................. 137 8.1. A View on the Past: Did Volcanic Risk Matter? ...................................... 137 8.1.1. Excursus: The Seismic Crisis of 1793 ........................................ 137 8.1.2. Out of Eruption, out of Mind? ................................................. 141 8.1.3. The Seismic Crisis as a Rupture of Aesthetics ............................... 144 8.2. The Practice of Being Herreño ......................................................147 8.2.1. The Community-Defining Concepts of Being Herreño ......................... 148 8.3. Staging a Disaster and Re-staging a Community ..................................... 161 8.3.1. “It’s Not Real” – La Restinga ‘Killed’ by the Alarmist News Media................ 161 8.3.2. Rationale: Sensationalism as the Cause of the ‘Seismo-Volcanic Crisis’ ....... 166 8.3.3. “The Monster is Rising” – How Real is the Unreal in the Media? ................167 8.3.4. ›Breaking Normalcy‹ – the ‘(Ir-)Rationale’ of Disaster Journalism..............179 8.3.5. Two Competing Scripts: ‘Alarm’ versus ‘Calm’ ................................. 181 8.3.6. Rupture between Disaster Narratives and Experience – “Seismic Violence Ruptures the Message of Tranquillity” ..................... 182 8.3.7. Ambiguity as a Key Phenomenon ............................................ 183 8.3.8. Experienced Ambiguity: The Evacuations .................................... 183 8.3.9. Comments as an Arena of Singularities: The Case of the ‘Masked Avenger’.... 185 8.3.10. Practices of Counter-Staging: Managing Disaster Vocabulary and Images .... 190 8.3.11. Interim Conclusion: Staging a Disaster and Re-staging a Community ......... 195 8.4. The Thin Red Line of Civil Protection ................................................197 8.4.1. “Prepared for What’s Planned, the Unexpected Arises” ........................197 8.4.2. Phenomenon: Communicating Uncertainty Is a Tightrope Walk ............... 200 8.4.3. Midpoint Practice: Resolving the Dilemma ................................... 203 8.4.4. Strategy: Speaking with a Single Voice ...................................... 205 8.4.5. Strategy: Run with the Pack – Proactive Information Management............ 206 8.4.6. Objective: Re-Education – Living in Certainty with Uncertainty ................210 8.4.7. Interim Conclusion: Education as the Solution? ...............................214 8.5. Science: The Power of Risk Construction ............................................216 8.5.1. Eradicating Contingency and The Practice of Mapping Volcanic Risks .........216 8.5.2. The Rationale of the Field of Hazard Research ................................219 8.5.3. IGN – Scientific Power by Decree .............................................221 8.5.4. INVOLCAN – Fighting for Volcanic Autonomy ................................. 223 8.5.5. Contingent Scientific Legitimacy – “Who Has the Seismic Network Has the Power” ............................................................. 226 8.6. Summary: Rivalling Fields of Practice in the Case of El Hierro’s Seismic Crisis ....... 231 9.

Conclusion: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice..... 235

References ..............................................................................241 Illustration Index ....................................................................... 265 Index of Tables ......................................................................... 267 Abbreviations .......................................................................... 269 List of Interviews........................................................................ 271

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Fred Krüger, the supervisor of my doctoral thesis. His providing the thematic framework of cultures and disasters proved to be an important inspiration that led to this work. He created a creative working environment in which I had the necessary freedom and support to adequately approach the complexity of crises and catastrophic situations. His personal commitment ensured the financing of my thesis, two field stays, and six years of employment at the Institute of Geography. The many experiences I have gained in teaching, organising field trips and co-authoring exciting publications have been deeply rewarding. I would also like to thank my great colleagues and friends at the Institute of Geography. In particular, I thank Klaus Geiselhart, who was an important source of inspiration for the theoretical background of this work. I would also like to thank the other members of our working group: Fabian Schlatter, Peter Führmaier, Christoph Haferburg, Tobias Häberer, Thomas Schmitt, and Annika Hoppe-Seyler were important partners in discussing the topics of this thesis or just to chat. And I would like to thank Erin Troseth for the thoughtful proofreading. It was a special honour for me to experience so much friendship, trust, support and openness from of my interview partners on Tenerife, La Palma, Gran Canaria, and most of all, the Herrenian people. Special thanks to all those who took the time to talk to me about their experiences and their knowledge about the seismovolcanic crisis. I would especially like to thank Sabine Willmann (Casa Rural El Sitio) and Beatriz Oliver for their active support and friendship. Both brought me into contact with important interview partners and made El Hierro a second home for me. El Hierro and its people are deeply rooted in my heart. I hope that with this work I can contribute to a better mutual understanding between the actors involved and that future (seismic) crises can thus be managed even better. I also thank my close friends and loved ones who helped me to overcome my own little crises with this doctoral thesis, who believed in me and had such a great understanding of the difficulties and sufferings of a ‘never-ending’ PhD student.   This thesis is dedicated to my late mother.  

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The work at hand represents the slightly edited version of my doctoral thesis which has been accepted by the Faculty of Sciences of the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg with the original title of „‘La Crisis Sísmica’: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice. A Case Study of the 2011–2012 Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro, Canary Islands” in 2019.

Abstract

This study deals with the social implications of the 2011 to 2012 submarine volcanic eruption off El Hierro, often referred to as a ‘seismo-volcanic crisis’, and its aftermath. The event caused hardly any material or physical damage but was nonetheless portrayed as a disaster in the media, causing great social tensions between various fields of practice: affected neighbours, the (social and traditional) media, sciences and academia, local government, and various institutions involved in disaster response and management. The work focusses on the creative internalisation of a natural hazard by individual actors, taking into account the actors’ embeddedness in various fields of practice, each with its own rationales. Current challenges of disaster risk reduction (DRR) are discussed in light of a dynamic understanding of culture, truth relativism, pragmatism, and practice theory. Based on a grounded theory methodology inspired by pragmatism, the study traces individuals’ mindsets and bases for action, iteratively switching between analysing data and processing theory. Interviews with over sixty people were conducted as part of this research. The crisis appears as rivalling framings of the natural event: from media and bloggers to politicians and people involved in tourism or civil protection. Overall, this led to a great rift between the different images of volcanic risk. Consequently, the interpretation of risk remained highly ambiguous, and scientific information that was supposedly neutral became the actual risk for the actors in civil protection and the tourism sector. The interstice between these fields and their rationales provides the ground for creative solutions. Examples of this are how commenters of online newspapers contrasted ‘alarmist’ statements in the media with their own interpretations and how civil protection experts developed a well-balanced information policy to avoid information ‘misuse’ by the media, though doing so ran the risk of being accused of censorship. This study shows how the current hot topics in society (scepticism towards the media and science; conspiracies) and the ways in which our relationship to information can be skewed are also relevant challenges in DRR. In order to acknowledge the complexity of risk adaptation praxis, future research must focus on the drivers and the dynamics of social change which are located in the gaps between supposedly established convictions. The ability of a society and

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its individuals to question and break with well-established rationales and practices has to be seen as the key to its adaptability. Keywords disaster risk reduction, DRR, culture, crisis, volcanic risk, earthquake risk, submarine eruption, adaptation, media, disaster management, disaster preparedness, civil protection, speculation, alarmism, social media, disaster journalism, islands, information management, Canary Islands, El Hierro, Tagoro, practice theory, pragmatism, phenomenology, grounded theory, local knowledge, community

1. Preface: A Volcano Named ‘Cabrón’

It was a rather fresh but placid early spring day when I was visiting La Restinga, the small fishing village in the south of El Hierro, two weeks after I arrived ‘at the end of the world’ or the ‘island of the meridian’. The splendid island has been given these notions as it once marked the westernmost outpost of the Spanish empire. A block of concrete holding a little steel globe reminds the visitor that the island once served as the prime meridian. I felt a little bit dizzy after surmounting the infinite serpentines of the timehonoured road with the unimposing number HI-1. The road connects the El Golfo valley with La Restinga over a distance of about thirty-six kilometres. Though a small island, the trip across El Hierro with the car took me over an hour and led me over the island’s peak, the fifteen-hundred-metre-high La Cumbre, passing through five different vegetation zones, from humid to arid, from laurel and fayalbrezal forests to pine forests to euphorbia. I met only one or two cars and in the villages the older residents looked curiously at me. After several dozen sharp turns, the last few kilometres of the road pass a rather recent lava field, auburn coloured and sprinkled with several elegant volcanic scoria cones. The razor-sharp basaltic formations on the arid lee side of the island are sparsely vegetated, with merry fellows of little euphorbia, and opening to a view of the tranquil village of La Restinga (Figure 1). Although some of the little shops and one of the few restaurants were open, the streets seemed too deserted to me, even for this little village. However, this observation applied to the whole island. I was goggling at the sea and wondered if the notorious but unnamed submarine volcano, somehow the reason I came, would do me the favour of erupting again, at least a little gas bubble, to cast out the gloomy stillness and the doubts about the enduring sense of my study. But there was not a single sign of its existence or anything that could make a stranger think about a volcanic eruption and the ‘seismo-volcanic’ crisis of 2011–2012. The Mar de las Calmas remained as calm as its name promised. Thankfully, around the corner at the small village square opposite the harbour with its oversized pier, some rusty voices rang out. A group of some friendly older fishermen gathered for a relaxed chat, accepting my timid request for shifting their

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Figure 1: The calm bay of La Restinga, with several scoria cones in the background.

Source: Photo by author, taken on 20 February 2013.

topic of conversation to the ‘seismic crisis’ only with a murmur. They complained in unison about the volcano’s fatal impact on the village’s economy, the media’s sensationalistic slant and the politicians’ self-interest. None of which I was hearing for the first time. I was eager to figure out if they had christened their ‘doom’. With a cautious voice, one of them replied to my question: “Volcán de la Restinga, no?!”. Then another raised his voice: “I would name it El Cabrón!” (the bastard) and everybody laughed. To more laughter, he explained “Because it fucked us.” Continuing, he stated that “it remained ninety meters below the sea surface. […] Hombre! It remained in a depth at which it is no use, not even for scuba diving” (2 Mar 2013, ID 83)1 . Their uncertainty about the name aroused my interest. During my further field work I asked my interviewees if they knew the volcano’s name. Most of them were convinced that the name either was (or must be) ‘El Volcán de La Restinga’, though ‘El Volcán de Las Calmas’ was also mentioned many times: I was even gifted a jute bag with a print of the submarine volcano and that name printed beneath it (see

1

References to interviews are given with the date of the interview and the ID number I assigned to it for the study. Below, I will also use pseudonyms for the interview partners.

1. Preface: A Volcano Named ‘Cabrón’

Figure 2: “Volcán de Las Calmas” print on a jute bag.

Source: Bag is designed collectively by the users of the Occupation Centre ‘El Sabinar’ (El Pinar); probably in 2012, with friendly permission of one of the former operators.

Figure 2). But the volcano remained without a real name, and scientific studies callously designated it as the ‘submarine volcano of El Hierro’. Several years later (in May 2016), in the tradition of the old explorers, the Spanish Institute for Oceanography officially named the submarine volcano ‘Tagoro’. It was their oceanographic vessel, the Ramón Margalef, that mapped the volcano for the first time. The name ‘Tagoro’s origins are in the Berber language, meaning a circular-shaped place made from stones, or a meeting place (eldiario.es 2016). Yet no one asked the Herrenians if they agreed with the name. There was neither a public vote nor did the scientists contact the island’s government before the name was made official. It may not surprise that El Hierro’s president Belén Allende commented on this questionable behaviour in a regional newspaper: “again they have proven the divorce between the scientific community and the society” (Belén Allende, according to Ávila 2016; translated from Spanish by the author). As the scientists’ behavior has led the Herrenians to feel ignored, it seems almost imperative to name the volcano according to a place where people meet and exchange. On the other hand, of course, one might raise the question of why no attempt had been made by the Herrenians themselves to name the volcano. If a thing is not named, is it inconceivable or just not existent? Apparently, the submarine volcano off of La Restinga, which almost has become a new island, remains a rather unloved child of El Hierro.

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This study deals with the events connected to the eruption of this unloved volcano and the social conflicts that arose during the seismic crisis of 2011–2012 and its aftermath. It remains to be seen whether ‘Tagoro’, as a name for the volcano, is not so unsuitable after all.

2. Introduction: The Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable. Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their times and seasons. Although persistent, they are sporadic, episodic. (Dewey 1994, 41)

This statement by John Dewey may sound particularly pessimistic when referring to the ‘world’ of the Canary Islands. Water scarcity, wildfires, heavy swell, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, giant landslides and tsunami waves usually don’t enter into someone’s mind if she or he thinks about the Canary Islands. Due to its reputation as an attractive destination for vacation and migration – and not only in the minds of so-called ‘woopies’ (well off older people) – outsiders are not likely to be aware that the Canary Islands are an archipelago with scare natural resources, a fragile economy, ecological problematics and natural hazards such as active volcanism. In the perception of visiting tourists, volcanic hazards play a tangential role, at least at first glance. None of the tourists in the adjacent seats on my several flights to the islands knew that the Pico del Teide is actually Spain’s highest mountain and an active stratovolcano. Yet in the past years volcanic hazards on the Canary Islands have received more and more public and scientific attention. This increased attention was triggered by two seismo-volcanic events: the 2004 seismic crisis of Tenerife and the 2011 seismo-volcanic crisis of El Hierro. Both attracted a huge media response. This study deals mainly with the latter of those events: the 2011 seismo-volcanic crisis on El Hierro, the geologically youngest island of the Canary Islands. In 2011–2012, El Hierro, the westernmost and smallest island of the volcanic archipelago and home to around 11,000 people, experienced a volcanic crisis, its

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first documented seismic activity in the last two centuries (Orlowski 2014, 30 f.).1 On 10 October, a submarine eruption, preceded by an increasing series of low-magnitude earthquakes, caused colouring of the sea, the emission of gas, and floating volcanic bombs. Located two kilometres offshore, south of the fishing village and diving site La Restinga, the eruption continued for five months (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Natural-color satellite image of the eruption taken on 10 February 2012.

Source: NASA/EarthObservatory, EO-1 – ALI, Robert Simmon (10 February 2012).

With the onset of the eruption, a special plan for civil protection came into effect that delegated responsibilities to various regional and national institutions. A state of red alert went into effect, emergency forces from the Canarian army were sent to the island, and in the course of the eruption La Restinga was evacuated twice. Additionally, the civil protection authorities enforced road closures and a fishing ban. Such measures were viewed critically by most of the island’s population, since they negatively affected both the fishers’ livelihoods and tourism, contributing to the generally fragile economic situation of the island. Concurrently with the economic crisis in Spain, where unemployment was more than 30 per 1

I have already published parts of this summary in a similar form in the 2014 IFRC World Disaster Report (Orlowski 2014, 30 f.).

2. Introduction: The Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro

cent, the event created a ‘double crisis’ that affected many of the islanders’ livelihoods. After the eruption ceased in March 2012, seismic activity recurred several times and caused speculation about a new eruption (Orlowski 2014, 30). For scientists, this was a rare chance to observe an ongoing eruption on the Canary Islands. Different hypotheses arose, and the diverging views about the hazardousness of the volcanic processes held by different regional and national scientific and political institutions provoked a heavy dispute about the ‘correct’ interpretation of the risks. While the population faced a very unsettling, if fascinating, natural event (which thankfully caused no casualties), the situation triggered intense and partly dramatised media coverage. Imagery of disembarking military forces and pictures of the ‘boiling’ sea were combined with alarming phrases such as ‘poison gas alert’ or ‘explosive gas bubbles’. To this day, a number of blogs report about the continuing earthquakes of the island. Maps depicting seismic events contribute to these disaster narratives, although most seismic activity they chart is below the threshold of perception (Orlowski 2014, 30). A viewpoint shared by most locals is that alarmist news coverage and actions taken by authorities had a needlessly deterring effect on tourism. Digital journalism and individual bloggers contributed to the ‘disaster stories’ in the media. Civil protection and local politicians were overwhelmed by the situation and worked hard to relay information, even though it was sometimes contradictory. All in all, the social implications of the ‘staging’ of the disaster provoked a lasting discussion about the purported ‘mismanagement’ of the crisis (see Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012). Despite its notably short duration and the fact that the eruption and the earthquakes caused only minor damage and no human loss, the event has had great implications on various aspects of social life on El Hierro (Orlowski 2014, 30 f.). As will be shown in this work, what was experienced as a ‘disaster’ by the population is due to a complex interaction of viewpoints and actions of different groups and individuals. A closer look at the range of experiences will reveal that the crisis people lived through was actually the interaction of rivalling framings of the natural event by different fields of practice: ascriptions supplied by the media, for example, are different from those of scientists, politicians, or people involved in tourism or civil protection. In the spirit of grounded theory methodology (GTM), this study develops its own theoretical approach to the seismo-volcanic crisis in the interplay between empirical data and theory formation. Deriving from this process, the event will be described as rivalling fields of practice in their staging and countering of disasters. Due to the experience-led research process, the more precise questions only arise in the examination of the researched phenomenon. They will therefore not be discussed in detail until a given point is reached (see Chapter 6.5).

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Outline of the work In Chapter 3 I would like to familiarise the reader with the research region. The chapter’s focus lies on the demographic, political, administrative and economic configuration of the Canary Islands and on the organisational structure of the Canary Islands’ civil protection, looking especially at volcanic risks. Both topics will be important for a better understanding of statements and observations in the empirical section. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the ways geosciences describe and approach volcanic risks on the Canary Islands. Considering the focus of this work on the social implications of the seismic crisis, this might appear unusual, however, the descriptions also serve to illustrate how volcanic risk is thought of and constructed from the perspective of the geoscience fields. This will also be of great importance in the chapters that address empirical observations. In Chapter 5 I will situate the overall objective of this work within the field of disaster studies and disaster risk reduction (DRR). A basic problem of DRR research, the phenomenon of the ‘gap’ between different rationales, will be identified. Preliminary theoretical steps will be taken to illustrate how this phenomenon might be tackled. In this sense, essentialist ideas of culture and knowledge systems are problematised and juxtaposed with the advantages of dynamic conceptions of knowledge and culture(s). Chapter 6 deepens the conceptional perspective of this study, which has been carved out in ‘dialogue’ with the empirical data. In the interplay of different conceptual perspectives (truth-relativism, pragmatism, practice theory, phenomenology) I present theoretical approaches that acknowledge the sociodynamic complexity of disastrous situations: fields of practice (certain contexts where practices are institutionalised in order to render life and social actions more predictable) and the arena of singularities (an arena where an individual’s solutions and explanations appear singularly in specific situations and moments). The question of the significance and the interplay of individual and collective experience, as well as ambiguities in the context of risks, also comes to the fore here. At the end of this chapter, I will present more detailed research questions through which I have examined the data. Chapter 7 presents the methodological style of research used in this work. With a grounded theory methodology (GTM) consistently interpreted as a pragmatist research style, it becomes possible to assess both the various rationales of the different fields of practice and the level of individual experience and action. In addition, this chapter describes the theoretical sampling and the specific methodology I worked with. Chapter 8 is then devoted to my empirical observations. The phenomenon of the seismo-volcanic crisis will be analysed based on different fields of practice and their interaction: the media, people affected by the crisis, civil protection, and

2. Introduction: The Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro

geoscience. Special attention will be paid to the rationales and conventionalised practices of each of these fields. The investigation will look at the internal ruptures within the fields that have occurred in the context of the disastrous situation through ‘rivalling’ interaction with other fields. The individual experiences of the interview partners are the key to understanding the reactions and changes within the fields. The drivers of change, risk production and social adaptation is located in the interstices of different rationales. In this respect I show how singular events can challenge stabilised convictions and stabilised behaviour patterns, revealing how individuals creatively aim to change them. Chapter 9 concludes the work and provides suggestions for future research. However, I first want to give a tabular overview of important events and actions of civil protection during the course of the seismo-volcanic crisis and its aftermath (2011–2013). As needed, the reader can consult the table to see, for example, how a newspaper report can be positioned in the overall course of events (see Table 1). Table 1: Chronology of the Seismo-Volcanic Crisis and Its Aftermath (2011–2013) Date

Seismo-volcanic activity, important events, actions of PEVOLCA

Alert

st

1 Phase: Seismic unrest in El Golfo area 2011 7 – 18 Jul

Increased seismic activity on El Hierro draws attention of the IGN staff (ID 51). Ground deformation started.

19 Jul

Sudden increase of seismic activity in El Golfo area. This can be considered as the unofficial beginning of the ‘seismic crisis’. The public has not yet been informed.

20 Jul

PEVOLCA plan activated by the authorities (ID 51).

22 Jul

First meeting of the Comité Cientifico and first public announcement to inform the public about the significant increase in seismicity. However, alert level remains ‘green’ and the public announcement highlights that “the situation is entirely normal, corresponding to the green level of alert in the traffic light public warning system, activating the monitoring and surveillance mechanisms necessary to coordinate the actions of civil self-protection and information to the population” (Gobierno de Canarias 2011a; translated from Spanish by the author).

1 Sep

Meeting of the Comité Cientifico together with representatives of the Cabildo El Hierro, Cabildo Tenerife and INVOLCAN. Alert level raised to ‘green/prealert’. Decision to draw up a communication plan to inform the population of El Hierro (Gobierno de Canarias 2011b).

23 Sep

PEVOLCA committee raises alert level to ‘yellow’ due to increased seismic energy and deformation. Educative talks in several villages organised by the IGN (Gobierno de Canarias 2011c).

“green”

“yellow”

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  2nd Phase: Migration and increase of seismic energy 4 – 26 Sep

Migration of the activity towards the south of the island. Several earthquakes felt by the population (max. 3.3 mag.).

27 Sep – 7 Oct

Further increase of seismic energy and migration offshore, southeast of the island. Evacuation of 53 persons from La Frontera (El Lunchón, Pie Risco, Los Corchos, part of Las Puntas and Guinea) to Valverde due to risk of falling rocks (27.09–29.09). Closing of Los Roquillos tunnel (until 27.10), and school closings. Public announcement says that “imminent eruption is not expected” (Gobierno de Canarias 2011e, 2011d). Dispatch of a mobile command post and various emergency facilities as well as emergency personnel and vehicles from Cruz Roja, Canary Islands Civil Protection and Unidad Militar de Emergencias (Gobierno de Canarias 2011f). At this time, scientists and officials speculated about an eruption in the El Golfo area; the whole emergency equipment was therefore stationed in the north of the island near the Mirador de La Peña viewpoint at Guarazoca (ID 80).

8 Oct

Earthquake with 4.3 magnitude felt on the whole island, with several landslides. Public announcement calls for the population to “remain calm” (Gobierno de Canarias 2011g).

“yellow”

3rd Phase: Eruption 10 Oct

Beginning of harmonic tremor and presumed beginning of a submarine volcanic eruption 2 km south of La Restinga. Observation of dead fish floating in the sea. Increased communication between IGN, CSIC, PEVOLCA and media (ID 51). Public announcement of PEVOLCA highlights that “the eruption is developing without risk to the population” (Gobierno de Canarias 2011h).

11 Oct

Alert level raised to ‘red, emergency/alert’ in La Restinga, whereas the rest of the island remains ‘yellow’. First evacuation of La Restinga (547 persons). Residents transferred mostly to other family homes or residences, tourists to the school in Valverde (Gobierno de Canarias 2011i; Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012, 23)

12 – 15 Oct

First observation of discoloured sea water, emission of gas bubbles and floating bombs (Restingolitas), 2.5 km southwest of La Restinga. Establishment of a 4 nautical mile maritime exclusion zone in the Mar de las Calmas (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c; El Día 2011).

21 Oct

Return of evacuated people to La Restinga.

31 Oct

Transfer of 17 trucks of the Unidad Militar De Emergencias including resources to accommodate and care for over 2,000 persons (Gobierno de Canarias 2011j).

4 Nov

Re-closing of the Los Roquillos tunnel and evacuation of eleven households in the north of the island (Las Puntas) due to risk of falling rocks (Gobierno de Canarias 2011k).

“red”

2. Introduction: The Seismo-Volcanic Crisis of El Hierro

  5 Nov

Strong emission of gas bubbles and ash columns. Second evacuation of La Restinga (200 persons) and momentary displacement of 51 persons from the El Golfo area (Los Polvillos and Los Guzmines) (Gobierno de Canarias 2011l).

8 – 9 Nov

Momentary closure of the Los Roquillos tunnel. Closure of Las Calas De Tacorón and Puerto Naos due to gas emissions (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

14 Nov

Return of the evacuated people of La Restinga. Additional experts from Canarian institutions are added to the PEVOLCA committee.

22 Nov

Public announcement: “The scientific working group of PEVOLCA maintains the prediction of a maximum expected magnitude on the island of 4.6” (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c)

25 Nov

Return of the rest of the evacuated people (El Golfo area) (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

7 Dec

Alert level lowered to ‘yellow’ (on shore). ‘Red’ level remains only for the maritime exclusion zone, until 5 March (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

7 Dec – 14 Feb (2012)

Tremor continues and further material is ejected. Increased water temperature in the area of the submarine volcano. Monitoring by PEVOLCA is maintained. Summit of the volcano grows to 120 metres below the surface (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

“yellow”

2012 17 Feb

Tremor ends

5 Mar

PEVOLCA officially communicates end of the eruption. Alert level for maritime exclusion zone lowered to yellow and radius limited to 0.5 miles around the eruption’s centre (08.03) (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

19 Apr

Alert level reduced to ‘green’ (on-shore) (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

“green”

Post-eruptive phase 24 Jun – 17 Jul

Increased seismic activity and deformation. Over 2,000 earthquakes registered, four of them over mag. 4 (Benito-Saz et al. 2017, 6). PEVOLCA raises alert level to ‘yellow’” for the zones El Julan and La Dehesa. Various press notes on the magnitude of the earthquakes and deformation (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

6 Aug

PEVOLCA lowers alert level to ‘green, situation prealert’ (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c)

14 – 19 Sep

Increased seismic activity and deformation. Over 500 earthquakes registered (max. mag 3). PEVOLCA notes that the events are related to the increased volcanic activity and do not pose a particular threat to the population. Civil protection measures are not taken (Gobierno de Canarias 2012).

“yellow”

“green”

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  2013

“green”

18 Mar – 4 Apr

Increased seismic activity. Over 2,000 earthquakes registered. Several earthquakes > mag 4 (25–31March). Strongest earthquake 4.9 (31 March) (Benito-Saz et al. 2017, 6).

26 Mar

4.6 Earthquake, noticeable on La Palma. Civil protection measures by PEVOLCA: Road closures in the area of the Los Roquillos tunnel and near Sabinosa, yellow alert in certain zones in the western part of the island (27 March – 10 April) (Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

10 Apr

Reducing alert level to ‘green, situation prealert’.

22 – 28 Dec

Increased seismic activity (> 500 registered earthquakes). 5.1 earthquake hit the island on 27 December, 17:47h (Benito-Saz et al. 2017, 8). The earthquake was situated 10 km east of the island at a depth of 15 km and was also felt on Tenerife, La Palma, and La Gomera. It caused no injuries but rockfalls in different parts of the island. Several persons had to be removed from Arenas Blancas due to blocked roads (Gobierno de Canarias 2013a). On the eve of the 5.1 earthquake, PEVOLCA reports that the earthquake series is possibly caused by a magmatic intrusion and that there is no particular need for action (Gobierno de Canarias 2013b).

“yellow”

“green”

Source: The table is a compilation of information taken from different sources including interviews, PEVOLCA press releases/public announcements, and others (as noted in the table).

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

3.1.

Location, Climate, and Population of the Canary Islands

The volcanic archipelago of the Canary Islands is located between 27°38′–29°25′ north latitude and 13°20′–18°10′ west longitude, at a distance ranging from approximately 100 to 400 kilometres (linear distance) from the African continent, slightly above the (disputed) border of Morocco and Western Sahara (see Figure 4). The archipelago is part of Spain and consists of the seven islands of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria, Tenerife, La Gomera, La Palma, and El Hierro (from northeast to southwest). Furthermore, there are six small islets in the proximity of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote, however, only one of them, La Graciosa, is inhabited. The two main islands, Tenerife and Gran Canaria, are a two-hour flight (around 1800 km) from the capital Madrid at the centre of the Iberian peninsula. The Canary Islands’ total area (7,447 km²) is distributed unevenly among the islands. The biggest islands are Tenerife (2,034 km²), Fuerteventura (1,660 km²), and Gran Canaria (1,560 km²). El Hierro, which is the smallest and westernmost of the seven islands, has a dimension of 29 by 15 kilometres (E–W/N–S) and an area of 269 square kilometres which approximately equals the size of the metropolitan area of Frankfurt am Main (ISTAC 2015, 4). The Canary Islands are often called ‘islands of eternal spring’ because despite their location on the latitudes of the Sahara, they have relatively cool average temperatures (20–22° C at sea level) all year round. The Mediterranean climate is characterised by hot, dry summers and precipitation mainly occurs from autumn to spring. Of particular importance for the mild climate is the northeastern trade wind and a southwest-directed stream of cool seawater. The trade winds usually give off their moisture in the higher northern areas of the islands, so that the southern, low-lying areas are typically the driest areas. However, the individual morphology of the single islands leads to a wide variety of microclimates and equally distinct habitats (Stierstorfer 2005, 33 f.). From the beginning of the twentieth century until 2011, the overall population of the Canary Islands almost sextupled from 364,000 to approximately 2.1 million. In comparison, Spain’s population grew only two and a half times in the same pe-

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Figure 4: Location of the Canary Islands and El Hierro.

Source: Illustration by author, based on OpenStreetMap.

riod (ISTAC 2015, 6). One important driver of this growth has been immigration, especially in the last decades. From the end of the 1960s to 2000, immigration from the Spanish mainland was of main importance. Since the mid-1990s, however, the number of foreign immigrants has risen sharply. These come mainly from Germany, the UK, Venezuela, Cuba, and Morocco. In 2005, the total foreign resident ratio surpassed 12 percent (Alemán and León 2012, 392 f.) These developments are connected with the arrival of mass tourism in the early 1960s. Today, tourism is the most important economic sector on the islands, resulting in over 14 million (as of 2016) guests each year. The great dependence on tourism is reflected in a highly specialized economy, producing over 30 percent of the Canary Islands’ gross national product (Garcia Herrera, Smith, and Mejias Vera 2007, 281; ISTAC 2017a). However, factors such as tourism, economic and demographic development, and population density vary highly among the seven islands and different zones. For example, the two largest islands, Tenerife and Gran Canaria, today share approximately 1.7 million people in almost equal parts, with a population density of around 500 persons per square kilometre and strong tendencies of urban sprawl around the capitals and tourism-related coastal areas (ISTAC 2015, 8). In contrast, on the economically less-developed islands such as La Gomera and El Hierro the population has stagnated or even decreased since the 1960s and

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

tourism is limited to rather small numbers. El Hierro, with a population of 10,675 (2014), is the least populated island (40 p/km²) (ISTAC 2015, 13).

3.2.

Some Facts about El Hierro’s Population and Economy

For a better understanding of the interviewees’ statements about the socio-economic effects of the volcanic eruption, I want to present some important facts about the settlement structure and the economic situation of the island.

3.2.1.

Overview of the Island: Population and Settlements

As mentioned above, El Hierro is very sparsely populated compared to the other Canary Islands. The 10,675 inhabitants (official number of 2014) (ISTAC 2015) are spread over a number of smaller settlements, with almost the entire southwest of the island (El Sabinar, La Dehesa, and El Julan) being uninhabited (see Figure 5). The island is divided into three municipal administrative areas: Valverde, La Frontera, and El Pinar. Valverde is the capital of the island, with the seat of the island government (Cabildo) and other important administrative institutions, such as the hospital and the Centro de Coordinación de Ámbito Insular (CECOPIN); the latter is responsible for organising civil protection on an insular level. Valverde is situated at an altitude of 400 to 500 metres in the humid and often cloudy north (see Figure 6 A). The administrative area of Valverde extends over a wide area, from Gurarazoca to El Tamaduste, as well as over large parts of the Nisdafe plateau, dominated by pasture and livestock, on which the settlements San Andrés and Isora are situated (see Figure 6 C). In total there were 4,973 inhabitants of the area in 2014. La Frontera is located in the relatively densely populated El Golfo area in the northwest of the island, together with the settlements of Los Llanillos, Tigaday, Los Mocanes, and Sabinosa. The valley is characterized by pineapple and banana plantations along with some viticulture and has a total population of about 3,901 inhabitants (see Figure 6 B). El Pinar is located on the southern edge of the island’s peak, La Cumbre, and along with Taibique, Las Casas, and the fishing village of La Restinga, stretches to the southernmost and driest part of the island (see Figure 1). Altogether, about 1,801 people live in the area, which is characterized by extensive grazing land, figs, viticulture, and volcanic fields (see Figure 6 D). It is worth mentioning that wide parts of the island’s landscape is dominated by abandoned agricultural areas, shrubbery, and volcanic fields. The upper areas of the El Golfo slope and most parts of La Cumbre, the highest part of the island, are wooded by laurel, pines, and juniper stands (ISTAC 2015, 13; Cabildo de El Hierro 2017b; Gobierno de Canarias 2017b; Stierstorfer 2005, 21, 61).

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Figure 5: Map of El Hierro: Main settlements, main roads, and important toponyms.

The hillshading gives an impression of the topography of the island. Source: Illustration by author, based on Gobierno de Canarias (2017b).

3.2.2.

The Seismic Crisis and a Drop in Population?

In the context of the seismo-volcanic crisis, my interview partners often stated that there has been a considerable drop in the island’s population because of the volcano’s negative economic effects (see Chapter 8.3.1). Yet, there were differing opinions on the topic (see Chapter 5.4). So what do the numbers tell us about this? The official figures reflect a slight downward trend (-3.7 percent) from 2011 (10,995) to 2016 (10,587). This means a total drop of 446 inhabitants after the seismic crisis (see Figure 7). Moreover, there seems to be a significant change in age distribution. While in 2000 the younger people (up to age 39) represented 51 percent, but by 2016 their proportion dropped to under 42 percent (ISTAC 2017e). It therefore seems reasonable that mainly younger workers have left the island. However, looking at this development in a wider context, an interpretation becomes less conclusive. In comparison to the other western Canary Islands, El Hierro shows a slightly higher variance in population growth, nonetheless, from the be-

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

Figure 6: Collection of four different views of El Hierro.

(A) Street scene in the island’s capital, Valverde; (B) The El Golfo valley from the ‘Mirador de la Peña’; (C) Grazing cattle on the Nisdafe plateau near San Andŕes; (D) Volcanic landscape near ‘Faro de Orchilla’ in the arid south (from top left to bottom right). Source: Photos by author, taken in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 7: Population development in El Hierro by age group, 2000–2016.

Source: Illustration by author, based on ISTAC (2016).

ginning of the 1990s to the 2012 the population all in all grew from around 7,000 to 11,033 persons. In relation to the island itself and expressed in relative numbers (+53

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percent), this growth is remarkable: it even exceeds the population growth rate of the remaining islands. Tenerife for example grew ‘only’ by 43 percent in the same time span, La Gomera by 38 percent, and La Palma by not more than 7 percent. The growth in El Hierro mainly took place until the early 2000s and then slowed down slightly but continued until 2012 (11,033); then there seems to be a reversal of this trend (ISTAC 2016). Data about the migration balance also reflects this reversal: after 2011 the numbers turn negative, with the younger age groups seeming to be more affected. However, the negative trend can also be observed on the other western islands, where after 2010 almost all values drop below zero (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Demographic development of the Western Canary Islands.

Total population of El Hierro and annual variation of Tenerife, La Gomera, La Palma, and El Hierro (%) in comparison. Source: Illustration by author, based on ISTAC (2016).

Thus, if one considers the population developments in an overall context, with the developments on the other islands, the question as to how far the volcanic eruption has had an influence on population change cannot be answered clearly. From the numbers, El Hierro’s population trends must certainly be seen rather in relation to the Spanish economic crisis (from 2008) than to the volcanic eruption. It should be noted, however, that persons who have moved to another island only temporarily for work may not have been registered.

3.2.3.

Economy and Tourism: A Fragile Island?

Spared from the mass tourism of the big islands, El Hierro has certainly remained the most untouched of the Canary Islands to this day. It was once inhabited by the Bimbaches, the aboriginals of El Hierro, presumably descendants of North African tribes (Quintero Reboso 1997, 143). The island was taken by Jean de Bethencourt

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

at the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the period after the Spanish conquest, livestock farming, forestry, and natural colourants like La Orchilla (Roccella canariensis) and hierba pastel (indigo; Indigofera tinctoria) were among the main sources of income (Quintero Reboso 1997, 275). Later, from the seventeenth century onwards, vine growing, cereal growing, and fishing also gained in importance (Quintero Reboso 1997, 516). Although El Hierro, with an average annual rainfall of 426 millimetres, is not the driest of the Canary Islands, it is considered climatically unfavourable due to its lack of natural springs and extreme variability of precipitation. The history and cultural identity of the island are marked by references to this scarcity (see Chapter 8.2.1.2), and at times, periods of drought led to economic crises and waves of emigration (Stierstorfer 2005, 38). In the year 2011, over 77 percent of El Hierro’s 3,810 employed people were active in the services sector (subdivided into public services, commerce/hospitality, and finance). Services also account for the highest share of the island’s gross value added (GVA), at 75 percent. Within this sector, public services (administration, health care, education, etc.) hold the largest share of jobs (42 percent of the total labour force). The great importance of the public services for El Hierro is remarkable: for comparison, in Tenerife public services consist of 31 percent of the total labour force (ISTAC 2017b). Commerce and hospitality comprise 26 percent of El Hierro’s total labour force, and finance 9 percent. The remaining 23 percent is split as follows: 14 percent worked in the construction sector, less than 4 percent in industry and energy, and just under 5 percent (168 persons) in the general field of agriculture (generating 3 percent of GVA). Yet the agricultural and fishing sectors are said to play a very important role in El Hierro’s economy. According to the statements of the interviewed local politicians, services and tourism still remain of secondary importance. Agriculture (e.g. banana plantations, pineapple plantations and livestock farming) and small-scale fishing today are the most important branches in this sector (Cabildo de El Hierro 2017a; Stierstorfer 2005, 64 ff.). Like the other islands and the rest of Spain, El Hierro was hit by high unemployment during the Spanish economic crisis. While unemployment in El Hierro was below 12 percent in 2007, it rose to over 25 percent in 2009. Between 2012 and 2014, values of up to just under 35 percent were achieved (as, for instance, in Tenerife and La Gomera). In 2016, the unemployment rate was still just below 30 percent (with 24 percent in Tenerife). The majority of the unemployed come from the service sector, followed by construction (ISTAC 2017d). Since tourism plays a special role in the context of the seismo-volcanic crisis, I would like to provide some details on this subject: until the 1980s, El Hierro was virtually untouched by any development, as tourism mainly concentrated and developed along the arid costal zones in the south of the two main islands and parts of of Lanzarote and Fuerteventura. In contrast to El Hierro, these islands un-

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derwent a fundamental structural transformation by means of a rapidly growing dependency of the regional economy on tourism. Related to this development is the continuing abandonment of rural areas and agriculture (Bianchi 2004, 501 f.). As a consequence, the main islands’ insularity decreased in terms of an improved communication with mainland Spain and a fundamental expansion of the local infrastructure. The situation was completely different on the rest of the islands. The poor connections and the lack of easily accessible beaches led to an absence of tourism on the western islands (La Gomera, La Palma, and El Hierro) until the 1990s (Bianchi 2004, 503). However, as the impact of mass tourism also caused a variety of negative aspects such as lasting alteration of the landscape, environmental damage, and land speculation (see Parra López and Calero García 2006, 90), the western islands might be seen as silent winners, as they preserved their unspoiled and natural character. Textbox 1: ‘Double Insularity’   With regard to the spatial fragmentation and discontinuity of the Canary Islands region, the term ‘double insularity’ is often used, as a stopover on one of the main islands is unavoidable for both tourists and goods (Morales Matos 2001, 173). In the case of El Hierro, this is particularly evident in its poor connections. There are no direct flights or ferries from the mainland to El Hierro, yet the port of El Hierro was enlarged 2004 and large cruise ships have been able to dock at the island since then. The issue of this ‘double insularity’ leads to regular disputes, especially when it is feared by the population that the two ferry operators (Fred Olsen and Naviera Armas) may further restrict the ‘unprofitable’ connections to El Hierro (see Diario El Hierro 2012c). In contrast to the other islands, El Hierro is much less developed for tourism, even if the island certainly has great potential for hiking, sports, and rural tourism due to its spectacular natural landscape. However, El Hierro is not very attractive by means of ‘typical’ beach tourism. Although the island has some attractive seawater swimming pools (charcos) and sheltered rocky bays, the few sandy beaches can only be enjoyed with extreme caution due to the currents. Diving tourism, on the other hand, plays an important role, especially for La Restinga, the fishing village near which the volcanic eruption occurred. The limited significance of tourism on El Hierro may change in the future. For several years, great efforts have been made to expand the island’s tourism in a sustainable way. The island is advertised as a contrast to the larger islands as a place for tranquillity, hospitality, folklore, and experiencing nature (see Patronato de Turismo 2017). The island offers a number of holiday apartments (casas rurales) and private accommodations, as well as some upscale offers (for example, the three-starred Parador Hotel located in the secluded Las Playas bay). In recent years (2011–2016)

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

there have been around thirty-five accommodation offers, with a total capacity of around 800 persons and an occupancy rate of around 30 percent (ISTAC 2017c). Most guests visit the island during the summer months, from July to September. In 2011, for example, 16,689 tourists were accommodated on El Hierro (for comparison: La Gomera had 150,474, and Tenerife over 4 million), with the proportion of Spanish tourists being extremely high compared to the other islands (see Figure 9) (ISTAC 2017c). An important event for El Hierro’s tourism is the quadrennial island-wide festival La Bajada (see chapter 8.2.1). The event attracts many tourists and former inhabitants of the island and leads to a significant, albeit short-term, increase in the number of tourists (Diario El Hierro 2017). In recent years, El Hierro has attracted international interest through various projects in the field of landscape protection and the sustainable energy industry. Since 2000, the entire island has been declared UNESCO biosphere reserve, and large areas of the island have been protected by nature reserve or landscape protection status. In order to maintain this image, various programmes for the sustainable development of the island have been implemented (detailed further in Chapter 8.2.1.3). The flagship project of these efforts is certainly the wind-hydro hybrid power plant Gorona del Viento, which was connected to the grid in 2015. According to the operator of the power plant, it can theoretically supply the whole island with renewable energy (Gorona del Viento S.A. 2017).

3.2.4.

The Seismic Crisis and a Drop in Tourism?

As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.3.1, many of the interview partners stated that the seismic crisis led to a decrease of tourists in El Hierro. Figure 9 shows that there was a significant decline in the number of guests accommodated between 2011 and 2013, that is, in the period during and shortly after the volcanic eruption. This decrease is especially true for guests of Spanish nationality (meaning guests from either the other islands or the peninsula). Overall, however, a 25 percent increase in the number of guests can be observed from 2009 to 2016 (for comparison: the number of guests of all the Canary Islands increased by 33 percent). Especially the increase in El Hierro’s foreign tourists, from 11 percent to 25 percent, is most conspicuous. The precise background and effects of this development in the context of the volcanic eruption are discussed in Chapter 8.3.

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Figure 9: Accommodated guests on El Hierro 2009–2016 (stacking chart).

Source: Illustration by author, based on ISTAC (2017c).

3.3.

Un solo pueblo? – The Administrative Structure of the Canary Islands

In order to give a better base for understanding the political and administrative tensions that have arisen in the context of the seismo-volcanic crisis, the following will provide an overview of the administrative structure of the Canary Islands. The territorial-administrative structure of the Spanish state is divided into municipalities, provinces, and autonomous regions. The Canary Islands are one of the seventeen autonomous regions (Comunidades Autónomas) of Spain (Bernecker 2006, 150 f.), and on their government’s website (Gobierno de Canarias) the logo of the institution is embellished with the slogan ‘un solo pueblo’ (a united folk). Yet, according to the islands’ 1982 statute of autonomy, the capital status is shared by the cities Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, thus governmental power is divided into two seats of government and two administrative districts. The western province of Santa Cruz includes the islands of Tenerife, La Palma, La Gomera, and El Hierro. In the case of the Canary Islands, each individual island of the archipelago also has its own government, including a president and council, called the Cabildo (Gobierno de Canarias 1982, 1). The significance of the Canary Islands’ administrative structure and their status as an autonomous region has to be viewed in an historical context. Their division into the two provinces can be traced back to the long history of a dispute between the two main islands which is often referred to as the ‘pleito insular’ (island dispute). For more than a century now, Tenerife and Gran Canaria have been fighting each

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

other for political and economic hegemony. In an attempt to settle this struggle, it was established in 1927 that both provinces were to be ruled by independent governments (Castellano Gil and Macías Martin 1993, 93 f.; Hernández Bravo 1990, 122). In the ensuing periods, of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime, these attempts at mutual demarcation experienced a prolonged interruption. General Francisco Franco was stationed in the Canary Islands and from there he planned his military coup against the acting government. Soon, the governments of Tenerife and Gran Canaria were under his control and movements of resistance against Franco, for instance on the island of La Palma, were broken (Castellano Gil and Macías Martin 1993, 107 f.). The dictatorship of Franco, lasting almost four decades (1939–1975), was characterised by a centralistic-authoritarian administration and the suppression of democratic and individualistic movements (Bernecker 2006, 47 f.). After Franco’s death, Spanish society went through a time of manifold social change and political reforms which gradually transformed the Francoist system into a liberal-parliamentarian democracy (this process is commonly summarised under the term transición) (Bernecker 2006, 52). To date, this process has been characterised by strong efforts towards regionalisation and autonomisation1 . This need for self-administration was translated into the form of the seventeen autonomous regions, which all have certain influence and duties, for instance, in legislation. Depending on a region’s individual negotiation skills, it was able to achieve additional competencies. Walther L. Bernecker (2006, 150) highlights the significance of regional cultures and languages in this process, as well as the significance of the (re-)achievement of political and economic rights of self-governance. These fundamental trends can also be observed on the Canary Islands. Immediately after the end of Franco’s regime, struggles for autonomy were revived on the Canaries. The Canary Islands in particular were acknowledged, as early as 1978, as a pre-autonomous state. The reluctant negotiations about their status were characterised by intense dispute, which sometimes spilled over into violence (Bernecker 2006, 152). These tough negotiations can be traced back to the power struggles between Tenerife and Gran Canary that arose with the pleito insular. Ultimately, the Canary Islands were granted autonomous status in 1982, with the exceptional case of a shared capital. It was agreed on that the islands’ supreme court would be established on Gran Canary and the Canary elected government on Tenerife. Both islands share the ministries equally, and the seat of the president alternates between the two capitals (Castellano Gil and Macías Martin 1993,

1

Only recently, the parliament of Catalonia passed a resolution of independence and decided to carry out a plan to separate from Spain by 2017; this referendum is, from the point of view of the central government, “illegal” and “unconstitutional” (Tagesschau 2015; TheLocal.es 2016).

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116; Gobierno de Canarias 1982, 1). The Statute of the Autonomy of the Canary contains further particularities, for example, the formulation of the right to defend “the identity and the values and interests of the Pueblo Canario [Canarian people]” and “the defence and protection of the nature and the environment” (Gobierno de Canarias 1982, 1). The particularities of the Canary Islands’ Statute of Autonomy which emerged from the pleito insular led to a strengthening of the economic, political and also cultural interests of the two districts. A good example of this is the fact that there are now two universities on the Canary Islands. In 1989, triggered by a “social movement” (ULPGC 2017), the Universidad de La Laguna (ULL) on Tenerife was split into two institutions by decree. Since then, Gran Canaria has been home to the second university of the Canary Islands, the Universidad de Las Palmas Gran Canaria (ULPGC) (ULPGC 2017). In both institutions there are courses of study and researchers who conduct investigations in volcanology. The research group Geología de Terrenos Volcánicos (GEOVOL), for example, which emerged from the ULPGC, hosts the activities of internationally renowned volcanologists Francisco José Pérez-Torrado and Juan Carlos Carracedo. This group focuses on creating models of the emergence of oceanic islands such as the Canary Islands (ULPGC/GEOVOL 2017). The ULL, on the other hand, offers a master’s degree in volcanology in cooperation with the Instituto Geographico Nacional (IGN) (ULL 2017). Presently, the island dispute can be linked to the phenomenon of the so-called insularismo político (political insularism), a political movement in the Canary Islands that stands for the particular interests of each island and is supported by a number of regionalist and nationalist parties (Fernández Esquer 2016, 2; Hernández Bravo 1990). The politically very powerful movement is viewed critically by some. Fernández Esquer, for example, notes that [insularismo] has acquired an extraordinary social transcendence, which has led to the political atomisation of the autonomous community in seven insular spaces, causing, in short, local factors to acquire an oversized weight in the region’s public sphere as a whole. (Fernández Esquer 2016, 3) Despite the freedoms gained through autonomy, the division into provinces, and the political efforts to strengthen the region, certain dependencies remain in relation to the Spanish government. For our purposes, the institutions and bodies responsible for the wider field of civil protection or monitoring of natural hazards in the Canary Islands are of particular interest. In this area, too, there are implications of the political structure.

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

3.4. 3.4.1.

The Canary Islands Plan for Civil Protection Against Volcanic Risks Hierarchical Structure of Spain’s Civil Protection

Spain’s civil protection and disaster management, just as the administration, are equally characterized by a hierarchical structure and their different levels coincide with the administrative structure. Consequently, the main guidelines for the handling of emergency situations are provided by the state, however, every autonomous region develops a plan based on its specific characteristics. This implies that most responsibilities of civil protection are organized at the regional level and even on the level of individual municipalities (European Commission 2015; Gobierno de Canarias 2017a). In the case of the Canaries, this means that the islands are equipped with a large number of institutions, instruments and resources for the planning and implementation of civil protection measures. One of the central instruments for implementing emergency management are the ‘plans of civil protection’. These relate to different administrative levels and risks: the Plan Territorial de Emergencia de Protección Civil de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias (PLATECA) provides a catalogue of the archipelago’s risks and instructions about the general organisation of emergencies. Subordinated to it, the so-called Planes Especiales deal with specific risks, for example, wildfire or volcanic risks. The latter is regulated by the PEVOLCA plan, described below.

3.4.2.

PEVOLCA – Organising Volcanic Risks

Volcanic risks are regulated in the Plan Especial de Proteccion Civil y Atencion de Emergencias por riesgo volcanico en la Comunidad Autonoma de Canarias (PEVOLCA) (Gobierno de Canarias 2017a). PEVOLCA was designed as a reaction to the 2004 Tenerife seismic crisis and published in 2010 (see Chapter 8.5.3, Textbox 5). The PEVOLCA plan was first put into action during the volcanic eruption on El Hierro in 2011–2012 and is therefore of particular importance in the context of this study. The plan is a detailed guideline (more than 340 pages) for the management of volcanic emergencies. The document provides, for example, information about different types and zones of volcanic risks on the islands. Most importantly, however, it defines the organisational structure and the responsibilities the different administrative levels (national, regional, and local government) carry in the case of a volcanic emergency. Figure 10 shows the general organisation chart and the different organs’ affiliations with each other. The structure of the plan is more or less hierarchical. Some of the named bodies are under the authority of the Canary Islands’ government and its individual institutions, and some of them are under national administration. In the course of El

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Figure 10: PEVOLCA general organisation chart.

The different colours indicate the organs’ affiliation to different administrative levels. Organs marked green are under the control of the state, blue represents organs of the Canarian government, red indicates organs of the islands’ governments (Cabildos), yellow refers to organs at community level. Source: Chart taken form the PEVOLCA document, Boletín Oficial de Canarias (2010, 140:18781).

Hierro’s seismo-volcanic crisis, however, there were tensions between the different institutional levels (see Textbox 3). The PEVOLCA organs are subdivided into ‘executive bodies’ with management functions, ‘auxiliary organs’ responsible for risk assessment and consulting, ‘organs of operative coordination’ which take over the management of emergencies, and finally the ‘organs of action’ which provide help, protection and logistics (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18780). Due to their quantity, not all the individual organs and their functions can be addressed in detail here, and therefore only the points of particular interest for this study are listed below.

3.4.3.

One Volcanic Risk – Shared Responsibilities between National and Regional Actors

The Comité de Direccion and the Director del Plan PEVOLCA are of central importance as they comprise the PEVOLCA executive body. The latter is a designated individual entrusted with the central coordination and implementation of all actions within the PEVOLCA. This person also determines which exact members are

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

appointed to the respective bodies (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18782). Closely linked to the management level is the Gabinete de Información (auxiliary body), which is responsible for the evaluation, communication and dissemination of information through various press spokespersons. Similarly, the Comité Científico de Evaluación y Seguimiento de Fenómenos Volcánicos (CCES) is of particular importance as an auxiliary body. It consists of representatives of the General State Administration and various representatives of regional institutions. The committee is responsible for investigating and monitoring the natural phenomenon and makes recommendations for action. Main responsibility lies with the direction and the staff of the state-run Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN) (see Chapter 8.5.3). The PEVOLCA document emphasizes the role of the IGN particularly clearly: The National Seismic Information Centre of the National Geographic Institute will be the body responsible for detecting, assessing and reporting, in the first instance, on those seismic phenomena that, due to their characteristics, may have volcanic origin and, where appropriate, be indicative of a possible increase in volcanic activity somewhere in the Canary Islands archipelago (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18737; translated from Spanish by the author). In this context the Centro de Vigilancia Volcánica plays and important role and thus is closely associated to the CCES. For instance, in the event of a volcanic crisis, it is responsible for the extension and maintenance of measuring instruments as well as for data analysis and forecasting the development of the crisis (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18801). According to the IGN’s spokesperson, twenty-fourhour surveillance is carried out by the IGN headquarters in Madrid, as the Canary Islands branch of the IGN in Santa Cruz de Tenerife does not have the necessary resources (22 May 2014, ID 51). Further members of the CCES under the state’s authority include the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) (see Textbox 2), the Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (AEMET), and the Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18787). The autonomous region is represented by the Departamento de Medio Ambiente del Instituto Tecnológico de Energías Renovables (ITER, Santa Cruz de Tenerife) [Department of Environment of the Technological Institute of Renewable Energies]. Furthermore, the acting Director of the Plan is able to appoint “specialists from each of the Canarian Universities [and] representatives of other institutions of recognized prestige in the study and research of volcanology in the Canary Islands” (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18787). This peculiarity has caused conflicts in the course of the El Hierro events (see Chapter 8.5.3).

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Textbox 2: CSIC – Government-Backed Science   The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) is a national research council and public institution affiliated with the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Its “fundamental objective is to develop and promote research for the benefit of scientific and technological progress, for which it is open to collaboration with Spanish and foreign entities” (CSIC 2018; translated from Spanish by the author). Ultimately, the existence of such a state-run research institution is due to the centralist idea of Franco, who founded the CSIC in 1939. In the course of the democratisation of Spain, the CSIC has also undergone a number of reforms and structural changes. Consequently, the CSIC now places participation and cooperation with national and international research institutions in the centre of its work. Nonetheless, it remains a most central and powerful player in the Spanish scientific community. With more than 15,000 people affiliated with it, it is the largest research institution in the country and produces about 20 percent of the scientific output of Spain (Ávila López 2016, 199; CSIC 2017). The most important organs of coordination are the Centro Coordinador De Emergencias Y Seguridad (CECOES), which acts as the top operational centre (existing both on Tenerifa and Gran Canaria), and the Centros De Coordinación Operativa Insulares (CECOPIN) at the level of the individual islands. On the municipal level, the Centro Coordinador de Emergencias Municipal (CECOPAL) takes responsibility for coordinating intervention measures. The organs of action are found at the lowest level. To name an example, the Gruppo de Intervención, which consists, among others, of fire brigades, volunteers and units of the state military, the Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME) (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18796 ff.). Textbox 3: The Canarian Government as the Sole Spokesperson for Transferring Scientific Information   Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the PEVOLCA plan envisages an amalgamation of government, science, civil protection, and communication at the highest level. This should presumably lead to better coordination between the institutions and facilitate clear and efficient communication with the public. As reflected in the following public announcement of the PEVOLCA Committee, this basic principle had to be defended repeatedly by the Canarian government over the course of the seismic crisis: The Government of the Canary Islands will report weekly on the evolution of the phenomenon, being the sole spokesperson for transferring scientific information. It also will set up a specific website, which can be consulted at www.gobiernodecanarias.org/dgse/sismo_hierro.html. (Gobierno de Canarias 2011c; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis added)

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands

In sections 8.4 and 8.5.3 I will discuss the implications of this special role in more detail.

3.4.4.

Volcanic Traffic Light – Synchronising Volcanic Activity and Response

In addition to the organisational structure, the PEVOLCA document contains clearly defined instructions for action in the case of volcanic activity. Of central importance in this context is the traffic light system, which consists of three volcanic risk levels: Semáforo verde (green) = Normal phase; Semáforo amarilla (yellow) = Pre-emergency phase; Semáforo rojo (red) = Emergency phase. The traffic light system acts as a warning system and catalogue of action both internally and externally. It serves to communicate the risk to the public and implies desired actions to be taken by the public. At the same time, it defines the corresponding actions for each body of the PEVOLCA (see Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18846 ff.). Table 2 shows an overview of the different phases and some examples for corresponding actions which have to be taken by the different bodies: The table demonstrates that the traffic-light system represents a ‘link’ between the (measured) volcanic activity, the alert level and the (expected) response of individual institutions and citizens. This scheme of handling and communicating volcanic emergencies was put into practice for the first time during the El Hierro seismic crisis. It is striking that no concrete values of volcanic activity are determined. As will be shown later, what initially seems to be conceived as an unambiguous, ‘mechanistic’ relationship turns out to be quite adaptable and experience-related on closer inspection. What is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ is determined in praxis (e.g. by consultation with the scientific committee) and can therefore undergo situationspecific changes (see Chapter 8.4).

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NORMALITY

Phase

Activation of the plan’s information policy

Direccion del Plan: Convene working groups. Inform the affected cabildos/municipalities Comité Cientifico: Volcanic monitoring, issuance of specific and timely reports Gabinete de Información: Intensification of public information CECOPIN: Evaluate resources and test communications

Moderate anomalies in the instrument records (One of the established parameters shows significant anomalies with respect to normal values.)

Moderate increasing (One of the established parameters presents increasing anomalies with a possible increase in pre-eruptive dynamics.)

PREALERT

“Perform your activities normally. Know your local physical environment and find out what to do in case of volcanic activity.” Educational programmes

Direccion del Plan: Name the members of the plan, make drills, public information programs Comité Cientifico: Mapping of volcanic hazards

Parameters established in a normal situation

STABILITY

Actions taken by the public

Actions of the organs (examples)

Volcanic activity

Situation

Table 2: The Canary Island Volcanic Traffic Light Scheme: Triggers and Actions.

“green”

Alert level

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EMERGENCY

PREEMERGENCY

ALARM

2

1

MAXIMUM ALERT

ALERT

Extremely violent volcanic activity Overflowing emergency services and/or activities that exceed the forecast  

The eruption begins

“Involves the initiation of preventive evacuation. Make yourself available to the authorities.” The population at risk performs preventive evacuation Protective measures are taken for exposed populations

Direccion del Plan: Complete evacuation of hazardous areas; medical, psychological and social assistance Gabinete de Información: Continuous information, including information about evacuations Comité Tecnico: Evaluation, e.g. of risks and the condition of the affected CECOES: Integrate state communication managers and resources

“Watch for communications from the civil protection authorities.”

Gabinete de Información: Daily communiqués Direccion del Plan: Evacuation of persons with difficulties CECOPIN: Keeps management informed about displaced persons

Comité Cientifico: Evaluation of potentially affected areas, daily communication with the direction, permanent monitoring CECOES: Communications to the population about the evacuation plan

Intense Indicators are consistent with a pre-eruptive state.

Pre-eruptive Phenomena The situation will be unlikely to return to normal.

Direccion del Plan: Canary Islands government officially declares the activation of the Plan Gabinete de Información: Detailed information on meeting points and evacuation routes

Strong Several relevant parameters show anomalies with respect to the mean with PRE-indication of a possible pre-eruptive state.

“red”

“yellow”

Source: Extracts of different tables from the PEVOLCA plan (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:11849, 18869–18874, 18926; translated from Spanish by the author).

 

3. The Study Area: El Hierro, Canary Islands 43

4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands

In the previous chapter we already learned how volcanic risks are organized by the Canary Islands plan for civil protection. In the following I would like to give an overview of how the volcanism of the archipelago is described from a geoscientific point of view and how the risks are assessed in scientific literature.

4.1.

From Myth to Science to Mystical Controversy: Stories of the Canary Islands’ Origin

Patterns of interpretation regarding the form and origin of the Canary Islands have a long history – from the islands’ aboriginal inhabitants to contemporary science. When reviewing the history of geological research about the Canary Islands, it reads like the history of the Enlightenment. A prime example of this is Juan Carlos Carracedo and Valentin Troll’s introductory chapter to the volcanological book Teide Volcano (Carracedo and Troll 2013b). The chapter’s title already bears the lucid narrative of the Enlightenment: “From Myth to Science” (Carracedo and Troll 2013a). The authors begin with the “pre-scientific period”, in which the Canary Islands, and especially Mount Teide, were surrounded by a particular mythological aura. The natives of Tenerife, the Guanches, saw Teide (from echeide, meaning ‘hell’) as the residence of a demonic deity. Later, the Greek philosopher Plato interpreted the Canaries as possible remnants of the legendary Atlantis. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, several seamen who passed the island reported seeing a smoky cloud around the island’s peak, fostering speculations about possible eruptions (Carracedo and Troll 2013a, 5 ff.). It was probably these adventurous stories which challenged the natural sciences which were establishing themselves in the late eighteenth century. What was then supposedly claimed to be the highest mountain in the world (according to Carracedo and Troll (2013a, 2), Mount Teide was considered highest mountain until Mont Blanc was measured in 1768) became a travel destination of the most

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extraordinary naturalists. Among them, Louis Feuilleé, Alexander von Humboldt, and later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Leopold von Buch. These pioneers of ‘modern’ volcanology shifted the focus of examination to the processes in the earth’s interior by means of cartography and systematic observation (Carracedo and Troll 2013a, 9 f.). In other words, their work was the starting point to the process of dispelling the myths about the Canary Islands’ origin. Yet, the history of geological research shows that it has been full of different theories (see Carracedo and Troll 2013a, 9 ff.; Rothe 2008, 40 ff.). Since the beginning of the scientific explorations at the end of the eighteenth century, viewpoints about the Canary Islands’ geological genesis were pluralistic, even the subject of controversy: the theory of the so-called Erhebungskrater (craters of elevation) was one of the first models about their origin and dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The German geologist Leopold von Buch argued that ascending magma lifted the earth’s crust, creating dome-like structures (Rothe 2008, 42). James Hutton opposed von Buch’s thesis by arguing that a large number of individual eruptions had piled up to form the islands (Carracedo and Troll 2013a, 12). At the beginning of the twentieth century, scientists quarrelled about if the islands were pure volcanic deposits grown from the depths of the sea or if they were once part of the African continent (Rothe 2008, 45). Often, details were the cause of these controversies, as for example the question of the origin of the ‘Caldera’ Las Cañadas on Tenerife. Different assumptions resulted in different views: either the crescentshaped formation was seen as a result of erosive processes or it was seen as the remnant of a huge volcanic explosion (see Carracedo and Troll 2013a, 13 f.). Presently, many different findings and scientific theories influence the picture of the geology of the Canary Islands. The principal basis for many of these are both the theory of plate tectonics and the hot spot theory. Technical innovations such as radiometric dating in geochronology, bathymetry in marine geophysics, and real-time monitoring systems in seismography are constantly offering new insights into the processes and the evolution of the Canary Islands. However, every technological innovation, every new data set, and every new insight may make a former conviction obsolete or give rise to new controversies. Thus, research about the geological evolution of the Canary Islands is extensive, but it is still well away from a final conclusion. In this way, various scientific debates have taken the place of the myths (see Rothe 2008, 42 f.; Schmincke and Sumita 2010, 2011b; Carracedo 2008). Seeing modern science as a liberator from myths has been criticised from various quarters. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002) noted that the enlightened society, precisely because of its ‘instrumental reason’, that is, the subjugation of nature by a technical-rational reasoning, only seemingly escapes myth. From their view, a supposed ‘objective’ view of nature leads to estrangement from it; ultimately, (repressive) economic and political systems take over the role of the

4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands

old myths (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Schmid Noerr 2002, 6 f.). The idea that science can rely on its ‘rational’ reasoning has also been challenged by practice theory: Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986) have exposed modern scientific work as a social practice (see Textbox 4). Science is therefore highly dependent on social systems of evaluation and reward. The credibility of the scientific statement does not depend on an ‘actual truth’ but must be actively established by practices that increase the credibility of the scientist. In this respect, ‘data’ and ‘arguments’ are only one side of a complex social credit system (Latour and Woolgar call this the ‘cycle of credibility’) which is also based, for example, on research funds and equipment (Latour and Woolgar 1986, 80:201). Textbox 4: Science as a Social Practice   As will be explored in Chapter 6, taking the point of view of practice theory tell us that existing scientific theories and explanations have to be considered as a product of certain scientific experience, knowledge, and a particular empirical starting point. Findings and explanatory models based on long-term scientific experience influence ensuing findings and models – and the conclusions drawn from them. Moreover, the field of scientific practice has to be seen as embedded into its wider social context. Scientific controversies should therefore not be seen as preventable deviations on a dead-straight line to a singular ‘truth’ but as part of social praxis and more precisely of scientific experience processes. The view of current scientific research on the Canary Islands volcanism is of great importance, as it was the starting point for the risk assessment that happened over the course of the seismo-volcanic crisis on El Hierro. I will therefore present some of the newer geological findings and models about the origin of the Canary Islands. This gives the reader a brief overview of the current state of research, some further controversies, and also an impression of the astonishing geological and geomorphological features of the islands.

4.2.

The ‘Imperfect’ Hot Spot of the Canary Islands

The Canary Islands are “a group of intraplate oceanic-island volcanos dominated by basaltic magmatism” (Carracedo and Day 2002, 1). They are situated on the passive continental margin of Northwest Africa and rise from depths of 3,000 to 4,000 metres below the sea up to 3,718 metres above sea level. Their highest peak is the impressive stratovolcano Mount Teide (Pico del Teide) on Tenerife, which is Spain’s highest mountain and, moreover, the highest in the Atlantic (Rothe 2008, 1 f.). Considering the huge dimension of the islands’ submarine platforms, these num-

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bers become even more impressive. Only about 10 percent of a volcanic massif like Tenerife lies above sea level (Schmincke and Sumita 2011a, 19). Over a period of several million years, the islands have been growing from the seabed and are subject to a constant interplay of buildup and erosion. Looking at the geological age of the islands from west to east (El Hierro–Lanzarote), it is striking that the islands are progressively older towards the east (see Figure 11). Radioisotopic surveys indicate that Lanzarote and Fuerteventura are the oldest islands (20.2 million years) and El Hierro is the youngest (1.1 million years) (Carracedo 2008, 21).

Figure 11: Cross section of the Canary Islands showing age versus height.

Source: Carracedo (2008, 20) [The labels for El Hierro and La Palma have been confused].

This age progression shows certain analogies to the Hawaiian archipelago and thus suggests a so-called hot spot, or fixed mantle plume, as a possible process behind their evolution (Carracedo and Day 2002, 1). According to such an assumption, the oceanic lithosphere migrates over firmly anchored melting zones. Within these zones, uprising mantle plumes melt basaltic material at a depth of about 100 kilometres. Most of the material remains on the way upwards in the crust, and eruptions are rather a rarity in this process (Schmincke and Sumita 2011a, 20). Whereas El Hierro and La Palma are still growing, Tenerife and Gran Canaria have apparently already passed their peak and, just as on Fuerteventura and Lanzarote, erosive forces are soon to prevail. However, the hot spot theory, a widely accepted explanatory model for the emergence of the Hawaiian archipelago, cannot, in the case of the Canary Islands, be held up as a certain explanation of their origin. The highly individualized course of geological development of each island, long spans of no volcanic activity, and simultaneous volcanic activities on different islands stand in opposition to this hot spot thesis (Rothe 2008, 50; Schmincke and Sumita 2011b, 21).

4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands

Several authors have therefore attempted to develop a more appropriate model (Carracedo and Pérez-Torrado 2013, 25 f.). One of these models was originally developed by Geldmacher et al. (2005) and is illustrated in Figure 12. The model proposes an interaction between a presumed “Canarian mantle plume” and an “edgedriven convection”. The latter is explained by cooling effects in relation to the colder African craton (Carracedo and Pérez-Torrado 2013, 26). The Canarian volcanologist J. C. Carracedo (2008, 23) highlights the strength of this model in its ability to to explain recent volcanism on the older islands, for example on Lanzarote, where its last eruption occurred in 1824.

Figure 12: Carracedo’s modified hot spot model.

The Canarian mantle plume is displayed here in interaction with convection currents resulting from cooling processes close to the continental crust. Source: Carracedo and Pérez-Torrado (2013, 27).

The model suggests that an understanding of the interaction between many different systems is needed to interpret the volcanic processes on the Canary Islands. It also implies that processes on the individual islands must be seen both as a part of the whole and as each bearing singular qualities. This basic understanding seems to be widely accepted, even if diverse models other than that presented above exist. Kaj Hoernle and Hans-Ulrich Schmincke’s (Hoernle and Schmincke 1993) ‘blob model’ is to be mentioned here as a further, fundamentally different one (see Figure 13). Despite the variety of models, it is widely agreed on that a wiede range of of large-scale geodynamic processes are involved, causing single islands to develop in their own unique ways (Schmincke and Sumita 2011a, 21; Rothe 2008, 59).

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Figure 13: A scientist of INVOLCAN presents the ‘blob’ model.

The ‘blob’ model by Hoernle und Schmincke is an alternative model to explain the ‘imperfect’ hot spot of the Canary Islands. According to the model, blobs of hotter material of different sizes rise up along the mantle plume (Hoernle and Schmincke 1993, 621). Source: Photo by author, taken in March 2014, Puerto de la Cruz (Tenerife).

4.3.

El Hierro – A ‘Pyramid’ of Basalt

How can El Hierro’s geological evolution be described within these principles? El Hierro is the fourth-highest island of the Canary Islands and rises up to 1,502 metres, though this then continues to a depth 3,800 metres below the sea surface (Benito-Saz et al. 2017, 2). The island is a “typical basaltic shield volcano mainly constructed by effusive volcanism but also featuring phases of both Strombolian and Hawaiian activity” (Pedrazzi et al. 2014, 862). El Hierro has a very characteristic triangular pyramidal form which is widely explained by the model of a threearmed rift/dorsal system (see Figure 14). Along these conjectured rift zones (Carracedo 2008, 30) a large number of volcanic craters testify to the eventful volcanic history of the island. The rifts are spaced about 120° from each other and orientated to the northeast, northwest, and south, a result of magmatic updoming processes being subject to the laws of the least effort (Benito-Saz et al. 2017, 2; Carracedo 2008, 30 f., 45 f.). According to this concept, magma seeks its way through the oceanic crust and penetrates through certain fractures: “once the crust is broken, [magma] would be injected through the fractures, forming vertical sheetlike dykes

4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands

that ascend to the surface to generate an eruption, during which cones and lava flows are formed” (Carracedo 2008, 31). Episodic lateral landslides that occur on all the islands are seen in connection with these rift zones. The dykes (which are the feeder conduits of fissure eruptions) produce outward forces and, perpendicular to them, flanks become more and more unstable (Carracedo 2008, 32, 38). Consequently, the geological evolution of El Hierro is characterised by different phases of buildup and decay: the dominant geomorphological structures are several basaltic edifices and volcanic deposits from different phases of activity and, as their counterpart, variously sized lateral slides (Benito-Saz et al., n.d., 2). El Hierro’s volcanic evolution can be divided into several phases and three main volcanic edifices (see Figure 15) (Carracedo and Day 2002, 240 f.). The Tiñor volcano, located in the northeast dorsal, represents the first and oldest structure and constitutes the subaerial base of the island. Its growth started approximately 1.2 million years ago and culminated 800,000 years ago in a series of eruptions and a subsequent giant lateral collapse. The Ventejís cone (1,137m), close to Valverde, remains the silent witness to those past events (Carracedo 2008, 49 f.). The next important phase is the layer-by-layer growth of the El Golfo volcano (emerging 545–158 thousand years ago) in the northwest of today’s island. It rose up to about the height of the Tiñor eruptions and was followed by a series of huge lateral collapses: El Julan in the southeast, the El Golfo depression in the north, and some smaller collapses. Already in the time following the gigantic El Golfo collapse (around 21–134 thousand years ago), El Hierro had nearly got its characteristic triple-lobe shape (Carracedo 2008, 52 f.). The following period was dominated by rift volcanism, and eruptions took place mainly in the El Golfo embayment and in the south of the island. The south-southeast and west-northwest rift zones are considered the most active rift zones to this today (Carracedo 2008, 55; Carracedo and Day 2002, 245). However, the processes that refilled the El Golfo depression are, for example, considered to be rather slow, at least compared to those on La Palma (Carracedo 2008, 56). Even with El Hierro being geologically the youngest island of the archipelago there has been no aerial eruption documented in recorded history. This is in contrast to Tenerife, La Palma, and Lanzarote, where there have been several eruptions (Carracedo 2008, 60). However, there are unconfirmed speculations about a possible (submarine) eruption on El Hierro during a series of earthquakes in the year 1793 (see Chapter 8.1.1), yet the most recent (aerial) eruption appears to be Montaña Chamuscada (around 2,500 years ago), north of San Andrés (Carracedo 2008, 62). A possible explanation for this contradiction (the absence of an eruption) is provided by volcanologic models which deviate from the ‘ideal’ hot spot model. According to the ideal hot spot model, the islands would have developed strictly one after another. Yet, in contrast to the other islands, El Hierro and La Palma evolved

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Figure 14: Schematic model of El Hierro’s rift system.

Source: Carracedo (2008, 31).

within the same time frame, although not simultaneously. To explain such particulars, Carracedo, for example, suggests an ‘on-off’ model, meaning an alternation of greater activity and lower activity between both islands (Carracedo 2008, 25, 58). Hoernle and Schmincke’s blob model (Hoernle and Schmincke 1993), on the other

4. A Scientist’s View on Volcanic Risks on El Hierro, Canary Islands

Figure 15: Simplified Geological Map of El Hierro.

Source: Carracedo (2008, 48).

hand, suggests the spatial and temporal erratic ascending of discrete magma blobs (see Figure 13).

4.4.

Exploring the Past: Volcanic Risk between Estimation, Exaggeration, and ‘Concealment’?

Considering the information given above, it is obvious that the complexity of the geodynamic processes of the Canary Islands (and in general), as well as the temporal and spatial incongruities of their geological evolution, make it difficult to predict the probability and the location of future eruptions. The conviction prevails, however, that this can be improved by collecting as much data as possible. Consequently, exact knowledge about past activity (temporal and spatial) and sci-

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entific models play an important role in assessing the risk of earthquakes and new eruptions. Carracedo (Carracedo 2008, 177) argues that due to the fact that the Canary Islands are located away from active edges of tectonic plates, the risk of earthquakes has to be considered mainly in connection with volcanic activity. Such activities are, firstly, magmatic processes (e.g. harmonic tremor or hydraulic fracturing by dykes) and, secondly, geological instability in the islands caused by volcanic activity (e.g. inflation of magmatic chambers or gravitational faulting) (Carracedo et al. 2013, 252). From Carracedo’s point of view, this means that “conditions required for high magnitude earthquakes to take place do not exist” (Carracedo 2008, 177). Low-intensity earthquakes (M 300). Just as in the report headlines, geographical locations play a particularly important role in the comments. Most often referred to are ‘the island’ (isla, 2276), ‘Hierro’ (1861), ‘Restinga’ (1452) and ‘Frontera’ (735). The ‘cabildo’ (591) is the most-often mentioned institution. The island’s president is referred to frequently (374), very often using his first name ‘Alpidio’ (573). Additionally, the groups ‘políticos’ (603), ‘científicos’ (529), ‘gobierno’ (504), ‘IGN’ (470), ‘pescadores’ (412), and ‘PEVOLCA’ (238) are given very frequent mention. ‘INVOLCAN’ is mentioned only 63 times, but the first name of the head of that institute ‘Nemesio’ (69) is referred to just as often. It is very surprising that in comparison to the official institutions the mysterious alias ‘Justiciero Enmascarado’ (The Masked Avenger) (876) is mentioned extremely often. On this I will report further below (Chapter 8.3.9). The following numbers suggest that in the comments the role of the population, or the ‘community’, plays a much greater role than in the reports themselves: the designation ‘herreño/herreña’ was often found in the commentary corpus (a total of 1,479 times), not only because it was used repeatedly as an anonymous user alias. Several of the comments contain formulations such as “ánimos (186) a todos los hermanos herreños” (courage to all the Herrenian brothers) or “a mis hermanos herreños” (to my Herrenian brothers). Comments containing those phrases were probably written mostly by residents of other islands or the mainland. They therefore represent expressions of solidarity directed to the islanders. The high proportion of other community-defining words such as ‘isla’, ‘gente’ [people] (1321), ‘pueblo’ (869) or ‘vecin*’ [neighbour] (251) shows that the focus of reader comments lies on the persons affected, which presumably created a strong ‘we’ feeling regarding the island’s ‘community’. As one might expect, the critical debate about the exaggerated reporting (‘alarmism’) is also reflected in the articles’ discussions (alarm*, 569; alarmist*, 156;

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catastrofis*, 32). In proximity to these words, the mysterious name ‘justiciero’ is frequently mentioned. Furthermore, topics such as tourism and the economy of the island are often mentioned together (turis*, 442; econom*, 185). Government aid to the fishermen is discussed in similar frequency (ayudas, 351), though less frequently than civil protection measures such as the evacuations (evacua*, 500) or the closing of the Los Roquillos tunnel (túnel, 848). Concerning actual references to volcanism and risks, the following picture emerges: terms related to volcanism and eruption predominate (volc*, 1768; erupcio*, 1089; magma, 528), whereas earthquakes are mentioned considerably less frequently (sismo, 768; seísmo*, 68; terremoto*, 602) and are often discussed in terms of their intensity and depth, often with reference to IGN and its webpage. Compared to the articles, the relationship between volcanism and earthquakes is reversed. Terms regarding risks (pelig*, 368; riesg*, 156) often collocate with ‘gente’, ‘población’, ‘restinga’, and ‘túnel’. The topic of rockfalls (desprend*, 108) collocates mostly with ‘túnel’. The risk of an explosion (explo*, 227) was discussed repeatedly with regard to ‘agua’ [water] and ‘magma’. This indicates that the risk of a phreatomagmatic explosion was repeatedly the subject of commenters’ discussion. Statements about fear (miedo*, 256; asust*, 149) occur mostly in proximity to ‘gente’ and ‘incertidumbre’ [uncertainty]. Of course, this very quantitative lexicometric view cannot be used to generatehighly reliable statements about the quality of the articles or the comments of the users. But the figures give a general impression of the intensity of the discussion and also the linkages between important key words which were debated. It turned out that alarmism was discussed above all, and there are indications that there was a great deal of uncertainty. A more detailed insight into the debate will be given below and will shed some light into the mysterious case of the ‘Justiciero Enmascerado’ (masked avenger) (see Chapter 8.3.9).

8.3.3.4.

An Island on Alert: Disaster Narratives in the Canarian Press

In order to address the accusation of ›alarmism‹, a fuller impression of the quality of reporting found in the print media landscape of the Canary Islands and in some international papers is needed, as these were known to a broader segment of the population than the online newspaper Diario El Hierro. Regional (printed) newspapers such as Canarias 7, El Día, La Opinión de Tenerife, and Diario De Avisos reported intensively about the seismic crisis.15 Initially,

15

The mayor’s office of El Pinar collected over seven hundred pages of newsletter articles (from the Canarian press) from the time period between 03 August 2011 and 15 November 2011 and provided them in three folders in the Museo de Restingolitas in La Restinga, including a list of the headlines. I used a digital copy of those folders as a reference for the following statements about the Canarian press.

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many reports focussed on the earthquakes’ quantity and magnitudes. Soon, speculations about the possible location and the potential violence of an eruption arose which were then contrasted by ›calming statements‹ from the civil protection authorities (PEVOLCA) and sometimes from other scientists. In general, the weeks before the actual eruption were marked by ›great uncertainty about the development of events‹. Calming statements made by the authorities (see Canarias 7, 12 Oct 2011 p. 10) alternated with warnings and reports of continuing earthquakes and the vertical lifting of the island. In addition, the first civil protection measures caused critical reactions: the evacuation of 53 people from their houses outside La Frontera at the end of September were dismissed by El Día (04 Oct 2011, p. 17) as a “false evacuation” and Canarias 7 questioned their adequacy: “El Hierro prevention or exaggeration?” (Canarias 7, 01 Oct 2011, p. 12; translated from Spanish by the author). Repeatedly, the emotions of the Herreños are cited, for example by highlighting that the residents are not afraid, just as the eighty-four-year-old Aurelio, who “meets the alarm with calmness” (Diario de Avisos, 03 Oct 2011, p. 13; translated from Spanish by the author). I will study the ›clash between alarm and calmness‹ in more detail in Chapter 8.3.5. As the earthquakes changed into a harmonic tremor (the seismological evidence of an ongoing eruption), the Canarian newspapers made the seismo-volcanic crisis their top story. There was speculation about the risk of an eruption on land and the possibility of a stronger earthquake: “Scientists warn the Herrenians of earthquakes up to magnitude 5” (La Opinión de Tenerife, 10 Oct 2011, p. 39; translated from Spanish by the author). When the volcanic eruption actually did occur, on October 11th , and it turned out to be an undersea eruption, the quantity of reports erupted equally. In the first four days of the eruption alone, more than eighty articles were published in the Canarian printed daily newspapers. During the eruption, several of the newspapers’ headlines contained unsettling wording: “Like water frying an egg”, for example, (Canarias 7, 12 Oct 2011 p. 10; translated from Spanish by the author) or “THE VOLCANO FILLS THE SEA WITH EXPLOSIVE BUBBLES” (Canarias 7, 09 Nov 2011, p. 1; translated from Spanish by the author). As the eruption continued, several articles started to discuss the risk of a Surtseyan-type eruption and a phreatomagmatic explosion: “The eruption of El Hierro reaches 150 metres below the surface and there are risks of explosions” (La Opinión de Tenerife, 16 Oct 2011, p. 1; translated from Spanish by the author) or “AN ISLAND ON ALERT. The explosives at 100 metres” (La Opinión de Tenerife, 12 Oct 2011, p. 2; translated from Spanish by the author). Also in national newspapers the risk of an explosive eruption became heatedly discussed: “The risk of explosion increases” (El País, 12 Oct 2011, p. 33; translated from Spanish by the author) and “The eruption in El Hierro could reach the coast” (ABC, 14 Oct 2011, p. 1, 63; translated from Spanish by the author).

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Beyond the textual level, some of the imagery used contributed to the catastrophised appeal: “SEA OF MAGMA” (Canarias 7, 16 Oct 2011, p.1; translated from Spanish by the author) and “The volcano is awake” (Diario de Avisos, 4 Nov 2011, p.1; translated from Spanish by the author) both show pictures of the ‘boiling’ sea. Some images of dead fish were also published. Taken as a whole, photographs showing the sea stirred up by gas bubbles, dead fish floating, and greenish discoloured seawater may definitely have resulted in a scenario that would scare off a potential diving tourist. Apart from reporting about every movement of the volcano, several of the articles published in Canarian newspapers dealt with the political and social turmoil caused by the volcano. Again, the headlines read as worrisome. Here, the volcanologist’s vocabulary came in handy for forming exuberant metaphors: El Día speaks of a “political ‘earthquake’” (‘Seísmo’ político) as two municipalities of El Hierro demand the reopening of the closed ‘Los Roquillos’ tunnel against the “resistance of the Canarian Government” (El Día 14 Oct 2011, p. 1; translated from Spanish by the author). Canarias 7 (4 Oct 2011, p. 12f.) speaks of a “political rebellion” and a “political fissure in the volcano” as Alpidio Armas, president of the Cabildo El Hierro, “accused the government of exaggerating security measures” (translated from Spanish by the author). ABC also brings in analogies to natural forces, stating “Volcano Alpidio Erupts” (ABC, 14 Oct 2011, p. 26).

8.3.3.5.

About to Blow: Disaster Narratives in the International Press

This selection of headlines from regional newspapers show that the general accusations island residents made against the media are not completely conjured out of thin air. However, surveying a selection of the international media’s reporting reveals even more disastrous notions of the event.16 Articles in the international press often used a very pictorial language of catastrophic scenarios and a multitude of metaphors and hyperbole. For example, on 29 November 2011 a headline in an English-language online newspaper read: “So is El Hierro about to explode?” The same article shows a picture of the El Golfo area with the subtitle “About to blow? Parts of the Canary Island of El Hierro have been evacuated over fears of a volcanic eruption” (MailOnline 2011). In combination with images of the evacuation, warning statements by scientists about landslides, the description of “a ball of magma rising to the surface”, and an earthquake map with over eight thousand epicentres, the article actually makes it seem as if El Hierro is doomed to an immediate end (see MailOnline 2011). On 8 November, a title in Germany’s Spiegel Online sounds equally disturbing “The 16

There are also less catastrophising reports of the volcanic eruption in the international press. The articles presented here are a chosen selection to show how the islanders’ image of the press as alarmist could be justified.

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monster is rising from the water” (Bojanowski 2011; translated from German by the author). Even if the article then provides more differentiated information, the first lines draw a threatening picture: Off the Canary Island of El Hierro there is a bang on the sea: 20-metre fountains and stones shoot up, the sea boils and smells of sulphur. The undersea volcano, which could create a new island in the Atlantic, only needs a few meters – then it will break through the surface of the water. (Bojanowski 2011; translated from German by the author) A few days later, the German-language tabloid press pulled out all the stops of the disaster narrative. On 11 November, the BILD Zeitung alerted: “Beaches closed: Poison gas alert on Canary island“ (Bild 2011; translated from German by the author). The report is not fundamentally wrong, as on 9 November coves near the eruption were in fact closed by order of PEVOLCA because it was assumed that gases could accumulate there (La Razón 2011). However, it is certainly a subtle difference whether one speaks of Giftgas (poison gas, a chemical weapon) or giftigen Gasen (toxic gases). The story of the evacuation also found its way into the German-language press. Euronews brings “fear of the volcano” into direct relation with the evacuations. The evacuations, which were carried out as a precautionary measure, are thus transformed into a fearful exodus: Fear of the volcano: Evacuations on El Hierro. […] It is bad especially for the old and weak. They have to leave their hometown, La Restinga, [… where] 600 persons are affected. To warn of a massive volcanic eruption, the authorities proclaimed the highest level of alarm (‘red’). (Euronews 2011, 12 Oct 2011; translated from German by the author) This selection of various headlines and content from the regional and international media ‘proves’ that the coverage of the volcanic eruption, at least in part, contained sensationalist elements. These primarily include metaphor-rich language and hyperbole, which, as Walters et al. (Walters, Mair, and Lim 2016, 6) remark, can have a deterrent effect on tourism since such headlines can be misinterpreted by readers.

8.3.3.6.

Unleash Hell: Examples of Disaster Narratives and Counters in Digital Journalism

In addition to the reports mentioned above, there were certainly a large number of other articles, television reports and features on the seismo-volcanic activities on El Hierro. However, the civil protection experts interviewed in this study ascribed great importance to web journalism and social media, and I therefore analysed the role of different Facebook groups from the point of view of civil protection (see Chapter 8.4.5). But Facebook groups are only the tip of the iceberg. There were

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a number of private non-commercial or semi-commercial blogs reporting on the volcanic eruption, and I would like to profile some of them here. A tourist googling ‘el hierro volcano’ might end up on the ‘Modern Survival Blog’ which “provide[s] information and ideas for prepping & preparedness in a modern world of uncertainty” (Jorgustin n.d.). In response to the 5.1 magnitude earthquake at the end of December 2013 the blog reported that the earthquakes on El Hierro could trigger a 300-foot tsunami and the destruction of the United States’ east coast (Jorgustin 2013). The forces of nature are stylised as rare but unavoidable (biblical) destruction scenarios: The reality is that the odds of such an occurrence is [sic] low. However we cannot escape the fact that sometimes the seemingly random behavior of the geophysical world that we live in — will occasionally unleash hell. (Jorgustin 2013) Since it was originally posted, the article has been revised several times by the blog author. In the version cited above, the author comments on an email of a reader who criticised such fear-mongering wording. Obviously such blogs are often operated by only one or a small number of people and represent, in principle, single expressions of opinion. However, even though a blog author’s identity and interests often remain in the dark, blogs can also receive lively comments from their readers. Another example is the German blog ‘uhupardo’. On the event of a 4.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2013, the blog writes: But the volcanologists had already given the all-clear signal in March! The volcano is extinct, the danger is over, everything is over. Yeah, whatever! […] In view of this situation, all the attempts at appeasement are now simply ridiculous: ‘No cause for concern’, ‘everything under control’, ‘quake centre far out in the sea’ and similar empty phrases are lined up uselessly and only testify to the helplessness of scientists and the authorities. […] But one thing is clear: normality no longer exists on El Hierro, the island that was the home of the ‘zero meridian’ for centuries before it was snatched away by Greenwich for political reasons. (Uhupardo 2013; translated from German by the author, emphasis in original) The ›clash between alarm and calmness‹ is also evident here. What is interesting about this example is how the author of uhupardo systematically fights the authorities’ statements of normalcy and declares the end of the state of ‘normality’ on the island. In the same article, the author even calls El Hierro “die Insel der Entwarnung” (the island of the all-clear signal). By using this ‘branding’, the complex declarations of the authorities are simply dismissed with a few words and the seismic events serve as irrefutable proof of the escalation of the situation. The urge to ›break with normality‹ seems almost obsessive in this case. The user comments on the above article show that the author’s arguments are quite controversial. Some seem to be satisfied with the article and ask for further

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advice or thank the author for the “interesting report”. Others, such as those from the user ‘hansirift’, try to counter the “sensationalism without professional substance [of such] quacks” (Uhupardo 2013; translated from German by the author) with scientific arguments: The fact is that the Canary Islands are volcanic hot spots. Not tectonic faults, but restless ground caused by the pressure and the movement of the magma inside the earth, [which] has led to the events of the last one and a half years off of El Hierro and will certainly have a further impact. (Uhupardo 2013; translated from German by the author) That ‘rational facts’ are set against the ‘irrational’ noise of (anonymous) ›alarmists‹ is a recurring form of countering. Scientific ‘facts’, however, are a double-edged sword. This is shown by the following case.

8.3.3.7.

The La Palma Case of Alarmism

From the perspective of the German-speaking Herreños there is a very interesting case: a German blogger and businessman, living on the neighbouring island La Palma, reported daily about the intensity and frequency of the earthquakes on his German-speaking blog (elhierro1.blogspot.de). In about one thousand posts, the blogger created his own chronology and narrative of the events and even selfpublished them as a book (see Betzwieser 2012). Interestingly, the German blogger baptised the volcano as: ‘Eldiscreto’ (Thediscrete), which some of the Germanspeaking people on the island mistakenly adopted as the ‘official’ name of the volcano, though the moniker remained unknown to most other Herrenians. The articles in his blog often depict histograms and earthquake maps (mainly from IGN sources) enriched with background information and the author’s own interpretations about the potential risks of the events. In some peculiar ways, the German blogger’s writing style mixes ‘scientific facts’ (seismic data, geological models, etc.) with his own risk estimations, based on his own ‘experiences’. At the end of October 2011, when the eruption is in full swing, he writes: Things are getting uncomfortable. An earthquake of 3.6 at 15.04 at 23 km depth in the Golfo-sea area. The strongest earthquake ever measured in the Golfo. In my experience, the magnitude of the earthquake will continue to increase. The real danger now is not primarily the volcano, but the quakes and the associated effects. (Betzwieser 2011; translated from German by the author, emphasis added) The German-speaking commenters on this report take this as an inspiration; some of them do their own elaborate research on the seismic events on other web pages, develop their own theories, and discuss them with other users. There are almost thirty comments on this article alone, which extend far beyond the scope of the article. Information, speculation, and discussion: an obviously enjoyable mixture

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which attracted a huge German-speaking community of ›armchair volcanologists‹. According to a counter on the webpage, the blog reached almost four million hits (as of January 2017). Many of the blog’s articles were also enthusiastically commented on by German-speaking visitors of the blog and it is reasonably assumed that it was a very important source of information for (potential) German tourists, since neither the Canarian nor the Herrenian authorities provided German-speaking information online at that time. Although many of the posts contain very speculative arguments, some of them suggest that the blogger was not entirely wrong in his assessments: 3.40 pm – this gush of earthquakes is now slowly subsiding. But it probably wasn’t the last earthquake. The steep slopes in the Gulf valley are particularly endangered. Stones or entire pieces of rock could break off and fall off. I wouldn’t use the tunnel right now either. (Betzwieser 2013; translated from German by the author, emphasis in original) One day later (26 March 2013) the road area near the tunnel was actually closed by the authorities. Nevertheless, this kind of ‘speculation-based’ individual risk assessment, including behavioural advice for the population, is of course highly problematic, as it is in direct competition with official communications. Not surprisingly, my interviews on El Hierro revealed that the blog was a thorn in the side of people working in civil protection and in tourism. The German blogger’s tendency of speculating about risks and a new eruption on the basis of his own contemplation led to a counter-initiative by some of the tourism professionals. A German migrant working as a tour guide reported: Konrad: I wasn’t involved, I was just very aggravated by his [the blogger’s] coverage, especially when there were smaller quakes, not noticeable to the population, but which he portrayed as the signs of another big eruption that one has to prepare oneself for, that even much more will happen. [...] And, um, that he then stoked fears that were inappropriate, [...] and operators of various accommodations, we then tried to influence this blog, to influence this blog or even to stop it, but that was not possible because of various things, that is, freedom of expression in democratic countries and so. As I have heard, they probably checked to have this blog closed, but that was unfortunately not possible. (6 Mar 2013, ID 86; translated from German by the author) Other interviews also showed that the German blogger from La Palma became a bogeyman for the uncontrollable disaster narratives out in the wide cosmos of the internet. Not only the German-speaking community of El Hierro was aware of the case. Several of my Spanish-speaking interview partners were upset about an ‘alarmist’ German blogger from La Palma, without knowing in detail the actual content of the articles or the name of the blog. For some of them, the author of the

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blog became a persona non grata, and one of the interviewees even suggested that the author of the blog would be chased away if he ‘dares’ to set foot on El Hierro.

8.3.4.

›Breaking Normalcy‹ – the ‘(Ir-)Rationale’ of Disaster Journalism

So there is evidence that the Herrenians’ feelings about ›alarmist reporting‹ is not unjustified and there is evidence that this became one of the main concerns of the population. Moreover, the previous chapter indicated that there were various attempts to ›counteract the disaster narratives‹. Before I show more of the practical effects of this circumstances, I would like to add a few theoretical thoughts about the rationale of journalism. Looking at scholarly discussion about disasters and journalism, the media’s tendency to exaggerate is not necessarily unusual (see Voorhees, Vick, and Perkins 2007; Walters, Mair, and Lim 2016). Hewitt (Hewitt 2015, 29 f.) argues that media in the age of global digital networking is putting us 24/7 in the first row of the audience, and that disasters are popular cover stories and fit seamlessly into our pop culture precisely because of their spectacle. Lilie Chouliarki (Chouliaraki 2006) takes a look at the issue from the side of the spectators and argues less pessimistically: news about disastrous events creates different degrees of sensitivity and thus different degrees of emotions in the viewer, depending on the particular way in which the suffering of the affected is staged in the media. Thus, news about a disaster does not always attract the greatest attention and international engagement. It can produce either indifference or pity, which, in the latter case, may also generate support or active help from the international community (Chouliaraki 2006, 93 ff.). Serious journalism is committed to certain quality standards and ethical principles (see La Roche and Meier 2004). Germany and other European countries rely primarily on self-regulation by means of press councils. The German press council was founded in 1956 and its press code includes a paragraph on disasters: The limit of acceptability in reports on accidents and disasters is respect for the suffering of the victims and the feelings of their dependants. Victims of misfortune must not be made to suffer a second time by their portrayal in the media. (German Press Council 2017, 8) In Spain there has been a press council only since 2004: The Arbitration, Complaints and Ethics Commission of the Federation of Associations of Spanish Journalists (FAPE) which has also defined a code of ethics similar to other European models (Suárez-Villegas 2015, 137). Apart from these (more or less voluntary) standards, however, there is also the conviction held by journalists that especially non-everyday events attract the greatest attention of the reader. The ‘man bites dog’ principle known among journalists is symptomatic of this. Only the extraordinary makes the

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news be news (La Roche and Meier 2004, 65). And, despite all standards, it can be assumed that in times of declining print runs and strong competition among the online media, economic constraints come to the fore. Juan Carlos Súarez-Villegas (Suárez-Villegas 2015, 135) argues that the “tension between the high standards of ethics in journalism and the temptation to produce sensationalist news to increase viewership or readership numbers persists as one of the main dilemmas among journalists, who are frequently urged by their own companies to increase revenue”. In his view, there is also a lack of suitable concepts to enforce sufficiently high standards in online journalism (Suárez-Villegas 2015, 147). Thus, the principle of attracting as much attention as possible to unusual events may become more and more important to the media industry. Especially the noneverydayness and the emotionality of a disaster are probably very welcome here. In order to reinforce emotionality, the ‘irrational’ element of catastrophe must be fuelled. And, as far as the tendency to hyperbole is concerned, in reference to another journalistic saying, one could put it bluntly: You never read about a volcano that did not erupt. Thus, disaster journalism is on the verge of journalistic seriousness but it cannot be dismissed as a purely self-serving and destructive: it seems to take on a tangible societal role. But how can this be systematised and what are the consequences of this kind of journalism for those affected? According to Josh Greenberg and T. Joseph Scanlon (Greenberg and Scanlon 2016, 5), disaster journalism follows certain patterns, including the systematic break with normalcy in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Then, portrayal of the emotions of the population (eyewitness reports) enjoy special attention. This is followed by an investigative phase, in which the uncertainties, the mysteries, are clarified with the help of experts and those responsible for disaster relief. In the post-disaster phase, normality is restored, and for this purpose, explanatory patterns are offered for what went wrong and, for instance, the authorities may assure that this will not happen in the future. Thus, a (ostensibly reliable) look into the future is established (Greenberg and Scanlon 2016, 5). In a sense, these ideal-typical stages of disaster narratives show similarities to some of the (ideal-typical) stages societies move through in their continuous cycle of social change, as has been described by Clausen in his ‘PERDUE’ model (see Chapter 5.1.1). One could therefore claim that the media representation of a disastrous event thus partly ‘reenacts’ the social process of coping with disasters. But how are these theoretical considerations reflected in our empirical data? In the case of media coverage of the volcanic eruption on El Hierro, there are certainly parallels to such a systematisation, although not in this linearity over time. In the time before the eruption, two contradictory stages, or narratives of stages, were effective:

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8.3.5.

Two Competing Scripts: ‘Alarm’ versus ‘Calm’

8.3.5.1.

“It’s a Disaster!” – Breaking with Normalcy

The disaster narratives depicted above reflect very well that in the case of El Hierro media reporting was actively scripting the ‘break with normalcy’. However, the disaster narratives in the media cannot be called the sole ‘cause’ for the multiple ruptures from everyday life that occurred in the context of the seismo-volcanic crisis. Rather, the disaster narratives form part of a nexus of diverse social circumstances and events. The long dormant period of volcanic activity on El Hierro probably almost completely excluded the possibility of a risky eruption from the lifeworld of most of the island’s residents (see Chapter 8.1.2). Thus the event lay outside the usual horizon of experience of the everyday life of the Herrenians. In addition, the measures taken by the civil protection authorities (e.g. evacuations, closure of the tunnel) disrupted the public life of the residents. The sensationalising of the imminent natural event by the media, including digital journalism, came out on top: it dramatically intensified the experienced break with normalcy. The ›forgotten island‹ suddenly came to the attention of the world and the communitydefining concept of ›tranquillity‹ was at stake (see Chapter 8.2.1). A multitude of everyday life’s continuities were thus ruptured by the events and the media functioned like an amplifier in this process. But, as already mentioned above, there was a countermovement.

8.3.5.2.

“Todo Tranquilo, Todo Normal!” – Restoring Normalcy

Vis-à-vis the scripts of ›breaking normality‹, there were several narratives effective during the seismo-volcanic events which attempted either to ›maintain normality‹ or continuously restore it. This ›message of tranquillity‹ was mainly disseminated through the media: as early as at the onset of the crisis there are articles highlighting the ›normality of volcanic activity‹. Several sources published assurances from scientists or civil protection authorities that the volcanic activity was something quite normal for the Canary Islands since they are a volcanic archipelago. Diario de Avisos, for example, quotes the Canarian volcanologist J. C. Carracedo: the recording of seismic movements in El Hierro is something routine, especially as it is the youngest island of the archipelago and, therefore, one of the most active. (Diario de Avisos, 26 Jul 2011, p. 17; translated from Spanish by the author) This statement referred to the hundreds of micro-earthquakes of the pre-eruptive phase, which could not be perceived by the population without the visualizations of earthquake maps or the reportings in the media (see Chapter 4.5.1). Although later referred to as an anomaly in scientific papers, earthquakes are represented here as normal. Later, in the course of the eruption, also clearly physically perceptible earthquakes were framed by expert statements as being within the narrative of

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normalcy. For instance, following a 4.3 magnitude earthquake felt on the island, El Día publishes: An expert from the [IGN] said yesterday that in pre-magmatic processes it is habitual to produce movements of between 4 and 4.5 degrees on the Richter scale. (El Día, 18 Oct 2011, p. 15; translated from Spanish by the author) Especially on the part of the authorities, normalising narratives found their way into the media. The repeated ›call for calmness‹ of the PEVOLCA speakers (e.g. Diario de Avisos, 26 Sep 2011, p. 13; Canarias 7, 12 Oct 2011 p. 10) and also the repeated presence of the word normalidad [normalcy] in the PEVOLCAS public announcements (see Chapter 8.4.1) in connection with the maintenance of the green alert level are part of these. In addition to the media discourses, the educational work of the experts on the ground can also be subsumed under the practices of normalising the events (see Chapter 8.4.6). Furthermore, there are articles that suggest the potentially ›touristically attractive character of the eruption‹ (e.g. Canarias7, 13 Oct 2011, p. 8), which can also be interpreted as a normalising framing. The idea that the volcanic eruption could have been a tourist attraction had it not been demolished by the sensationalist media and the ›exaggerated emergency measures was later mentioned with disappointment by many of my interview partners. Often references were made to Hawaii, where the volcanism of the islands is successfully commercialised in tourism.

8.3.6.

Rupture between Disaster Narratives and Experience – “Seismic Violence Ruptures the Message of Tranquillity”

The high level of tension between these two contradictory scripts and the practices involved in them became particularly clear when the eruption finally occurred. Then, the narrative of normality was strongly questioned. A 4.4 magnitude earthquake, a few weeks after the beginning of the eruption, encouraged the Diario de Avisos to portray the natural forces as an antagonist to the normalising framing of the officials. Its headline reads: “Seismic violence ruptures the message of tranquillity” (Diario de Avisos, 5 Nov 2011, p. 22; translated from Spanish by the author). The text reads even more interestingly, as it refers to the natural force as ›untameable by scientific reason‹. The increasing magnitude of the earthquakes resists the ‘rational’ attempts of the authorities to maintain normality: the scientific reason and the evident work of the different administrations invite, as far as possible, trust in a happy outcome to this crisis, but the unreasonableness of the seismic violence obscures the reason and shrinks the spirit of the most brave. (Diario de Avisos, 5 Nov 2011, p. 22; translated from Spanish by the author)

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The simultaneity of normality and abnormality, alarm and calmness, seems to be emblematic for this case, for as the above quotation shows, it was consciously experienced and reflected by the people. Also a large number of my interviews with Herrenians point to the fact that people were struggling with these simultaneously conflicting narratives.

8.3.7.

Ambiguity as a Key Phenomenon

The simultaneity of the narratives ‘normalcy’ and ‘disaster’ is surprising at first. Models for social adjustment processes in the context of crises or disasters often describe changes as linear or, at best, circular, reducing the process down to single stages (see Chapter 5.1.1). The above-mentioned model for disaster journalism (see Chapter 8.3.1) also adheres to a systematisation into phases. However, from such a viewpoint, the ‘side-by-side’ of different phases and the ‘chaotic’ of such complex societal processes of disaster experience remain underexposed – mainly because they do not address the ambiguities connected to disastrous situations. The empirical observations from this study indicate that in our case the ›forces of normalisation‹ were existent from the very beginning. From a very simplistic perspective, this could be traced back to the considerably long duration between the first earthquakes and the eruption. If the eruption had been completely immediate and ‘unannounced’, the forces of normalisation might have only begun later. But, this view does not suffice in giving us the full picture, as ambiguities regarding the risks remained, even long after the ‘official end’ of the seismo-volcanic crisis. In view of the theoretical discussion above about ambiguities (Chapter 5.4), it would appear that this simultaneity of different ‘stages’ is a common principle. The ‘solution’ of the disaster does not create complete ‘normality’ nor does it lead to the reconciliation of ‘laymen’ and ‘experts’ including the full elimination of vulnerabilities (see Clausen 1992); rather, different elements remain side-by-side, but possibly in different proportions to each other, less chaotic, and less ambiguous.

8.3.8.

Experienced Ambiguity: The Evacuations

As the following example shows, the ambiguity caused by the simultaneity of normalising and de-normalising narratives and practices was by no means subtle: it was consciously experienced by the people affected. A closer look at the first evacuation of La Restinga in October 2011 can help to better understand this phenomenon. Photos of the evacuation show the residents moving through the streets, loaded with their essentials, accompanied by their pets, and carrying their children. Surrounded by the emergency personnel, their faces appear concerned. The background is filled with ambulances, military vehicles, and trucks of the television

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stations. In contrast, photos also document the empty streets of the abandoned locality (Figure 42).

Figure 42: Four photographs of the first evacuation of La Restinga in October 2011.

Source: Canarias7 (2011) (photos taken by Arcadio Suárez, with friendly permission of Arcadio Suárez and the director of Canarias7, Francisco Suárez).

At the same time, the photos show that remnants of everyday life remain. Such scenes could also have been seen in the surroundings of a festivity. But, even if these images have little in common with the disaster images, of, for example, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, they represent a radical break with the regular idyll of the tranquil place of La Restinga, at least in combination with the disaster narratives in the media. As described in Chapter 8.3.7, at the time of the evacuations, the juxtaposition of normality and disaster reached their culmination. On the one hand, the reporting and evacuations of the residents of La Restinga caused great concern and fear, especially since there was, before the eruption, great uncertainty about the potential course of the events. On the other hand, there was no concrete threat on land, and the authorities created an atmosphere of security by giving (scientific) information. For the owner of a diving base, this constituted a very special area of conflict: Ernst: Then we met there, there were already buses and people responsible for us, who then explained to us that the probability is high that an eruption could

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

occur, but they cannot determine where. And just to be on the safe side, we have to get out. But we have enough time, we don’t need to be hectic, that won’t be in the next twelve or fourteen hours. They seem to be able to measure that with the gas values that are there, I don’t know exactly either. (20 Feb 2013, ID 72; translated from German by the author) According to the person’s statements, the situation ranged between abstract and concrete fear: abstract in the sense of the ‘disaster scenarios’ broadcast by the media; concretely in the possible personal consequences of the evacuation, namely the concern of losing diving tourists due to the volcanic hazard. Moreover, the diving instructor received firsthand experience of the media’s tendency to stage the situation. A television crew forced him and some of his neighbours to wait and line up in front of a mobile office in order to file compensation requests during their broadcasting time, even though the office already had been opened for a while (20 Feb 2013, ID 72). The actual ‘disaster phenomenon’ may be found precisely in this experienced ambiguity. The problem is not merely overwriting one’s own ‘reality’ with ›false images‹, but the indissolubility of the ambiguities, of whether there is a ‘real’ threat and identifying what it is. A loss of control over how outsiders report and interpret the situation materialised and prevented a further dealing with the ambiguity of the situation. The continuation of the ambiguity, or the difference between ‘normality’ and ‘disaster’ led, as will be shown below, to the emergence of an arena of singularities (see Chapter 6.2.4) in which a considerable dynamic was formed. I will demonstrate this through the case of the ‘Masked Avenger’:

8.3.9.

Comments as an Arena of Singularities: The Case of the ‘Masked Avenger’

In the following I would like to present the case of a ‘person’ who has taken a polarising and ‘singularising’17 position through his practices. In Chapter 8.3.3, I explained that the frequent mention of the mysterious name ‘El Justiciero Enmascarado’ was a surprising discovery in the reader comments in ‘especial crisis sismica’ section of the online newspaper Diario El Hierro. In various grammatical forms, the term ‘justiciero’ occurred around eleven hundred times in the examined corpus. If we assume that the comments published under this alias were composed by a single person, an estimated number of at least two hundred comments were written by this person. Some of the other commenters (e.g. ‘el fin’, 13 Oct 2011) expressed doubt that a single person could compose such a high volume of comments. This doubt

17

I will explain below what I mean by that.

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is not unjustified, as commenters were able to publish their comments without registration and with a freely chosen name. And, on occasion, El Justiciero defended his name against alleged impostors: “THE IDIOT who used my pseudonym on 09/10/2011 at 10:28:44 was not ME” (09 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis in original). However, the fact that sometimes the pseudonym may have been ‘misused’ is not decisive for this analysis, because our focus is on the reactions to the contents of the comments, not on who is behind the pseudonym. The activity under this peculiar name started in September 2011 and peaked in November and December of the same year, when the eruption was in full course and the volcanic alert level was raised to red. The content of El Justiciero’s comments provoked a lively response by the other commenters. Most of all, he or she was subject to fierce criticism. On several occasions, the user has been accused of being an ‘alarmist’ by other commenters. ‘Taguacinte’ (1 Jul 2012), for example, responds to one of El Justiciero’s elaborate comments with the harsh words: “You’re a phony, alarmist, and anti-citizen” (translated from Spanish by the author). There are a great number of comments questioning El Justiciero’s credibility, not least because of El Justiciero’s anonymity, and there is often the accusation that his or her statements would only spread fear, among tourists, for instance. Why is this the case? Let’s have a look at some ‘typical’ contributions made by El Justiciero: during the phase of great uncertainty before the eruption, El Justiciero published comments that specifically attack the authorities’ ›message of tranquillity‹ (see Chapter 8.3.5): El Justiciero Enmascarado: Let’s see when they plan to evacuate the people of El Pinar and La Restinga, they don’t see that the epicentre is practically in Tacorón [northwest of La Restinga]. They are waiting for a TRAGEDY to act, this is incredible I find it depressing that they are deceiving us all they should move people who are closer to the HOT zone, they know this very well but they are still waiting for the BIG EARTHQUAKE to ACT and I am not ALARMING, the EARTH is giving the alarm or is it that no one sees it. (3 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis in original)   El Justiciero Enmascarado: how can they keep asking for calmness? What are you waiting for to evacuate us all from here? To get the quakes to magnitude 7 or what? CALM, CALM, CALM, CALM.... I’m tired of all this calmness. (9 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author) On other occasions, El Justiciero expresses his or her ›distrust towards the official representatives‹ and introduces the ›accusation of concealment‹:

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

El Justiciero Enmascarado: Esther [name of another user], it is true that they [the earthquakes] have gone down a bit but only between yesterday and today but in any case the IGN and AVCAN as well as the politicians are hiding information from us and are disguising some of the [details of the] earthquakes. (5 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author) Thus, El Justiciero discredits the established sources of information and pretends to know the ‘real truth’, a stance which obviously attracts a lot of attention and, equally, a large amount of criticism. In the first days of the eruption, El Justiciero postulated that a earthquake stronger than magnitude 5 could happen at any moment (11 Oct 2011) and, as the eruption started, El Justiciero even predicted the occurrence of additional volcanic eruptions: El Justiciero Enmascarado: Unfortunately they will see more spots in the next few hours, and hopefully it will not come too close to La Restinga. It must be remembered that there is still a lot of energy to be released. (12 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author) Apparently, and similar to the blog articles shown in Chapter 8.3.3.6, it is a recurring scheme to predict the further (negative) development of events on the basis of one’s own experience, or feelings.18 In response, there are voices that brand El Justiciero either as “the typical TROLL of discussion forums” (‘hechelon’, 29 Sep 2011; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis in original) or “a bored and alarmist neighbour from La Restinga” (‘Desenmascarando al justiciero’ [Unmasking the avenger], 2 Nov 2011; translated from Spanish by the author), for example. Speculations about his or her person and affiliation even take on conspiratorial dimensions, so it is assumed, among other things, that it could be a known authority such as a volcanologist. Others put it more openly: “I believe that Justiciero is someone we all know, but who can’t say everything he knows but is on the sly, who will it be?” (‘juank chicha’, 04 Nov 2011; translated from Spanish by the author). However, maybe it is precisely this uncertainty about El Justiciero’s identity that causes many to not ignore his or her writings. Several commenters, however, dismiss the predictions because of their inaccuracy and arbitrariness. ‘Lola’ for example, writes: Lola: two or three days ago he [El Justiciero] mentioned that there were going to be earthquakes of up to a magnitude of 5 during these days and so far it has failed [...]. [Justiciero] says so many things that are so disparate that some of them will be right. (12 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author)

18

Of course, El Justiciero’s remarks could also be described as simple ‘speculation’ instead of ‘experience-based’. However, assuming that all our actions and their underlying convictions are experience-based (see Chapter 6) – even if actions and statements may appear as ‘irrational’ to others– the term ‘experience’ is more appropriate.

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Araguaney argues similarly and recruits the community to join his ›fight against alarmism‹ and against El Justiciero: Araguaney: I and some of the people that read in this diary are tired of always saying the same thing, of encouraging people to be alerted but not to believe in the alarmism that has created this Señor Justiciero who, with the predictions in the style of Raphael [archangel], has not being correct in anything so far, not the tremors of great magnitude, nor the explosive eruption of the volcano, much less the evacuation of the whole island, so I tell you that this señor with his predictions is what has partly upset many people [both men and women], who believe what he says he knows (because neither you, nor I, nor those of us who say the opposite of him know nothing [sic], because he is ‘el SABELOTO’ [the know-it-all]), and of course I will continue against his alarmist and exaggerated predictions, [...] I am with you and those of us who don’t believe the Justiciero. (30 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author) Even if some commenters build up scientific counterarguments, criticism is primarily directed on a personal level. However, not all comments are clearly rejective. Another user argues LaVerdadEscondida [TheHiddenTruth]: [...] that the only one who was right with the magnitude 4 earthquake and the danger in La retsinga [sic] DAYS ago was JUSTICIERO ENMASCARADO (if they didn’t misuse his nickname), who for me is not an ALARMIST but a REALIST, proof that they [the officials] did not inform about all the possibilities at the time. (12 Oct 2011; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis in original) Looking at these comments, one could argue that El Justicero’s rating as realistic or alarmist, true or false, rational or irrational seems to depend on whether the predictions actually come true or not.19 But even at a later date, in July 2012, as the earthquakes reactivated and became stronger, attitudes towards El Justiciero remain divided. Thus, Justiciero repeatedly defends himself or herself against the accusations, yet shows little acceptance of criticism: El Justiciero Enmascerado: The activity will intensify in the next hours, the entry of new magma from greater depths in combination with superficial magma will provoke a major shock. Since the earthquakes can be more serious, I want to send a reassuring message to those who read this newspaper, they already labelled me as catastrophising and that’s not like it is. What I would like is that the people

19

An earthquake stronger than magnitude 5 actually occurred in December 2013 and there was much discussion among scientists afterwards as to whether there was a second eruption.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

are always prepared for every eventuality that happens, take measures for possible earthquakes of major magnitude which is at the moment what we are most worried about […]. And those who don’t like information of this type, they have an easy time, don’t open you computer, and don’t turn on the TV, there’s more!!! [...] [b]ut what they don’t have to do is to complain about being informative. (1 Jul 2012; translated from Spanish by the author) However, El Justiciero’s self-portrayal as a ‘realist’ and motto ›to be prepared for the worst at all times‹ is met with further rejection. Probably also because at this time the view had been established among large parts of the Herrenians that ›talking about the dangers makes it worse‹, or is the real danger (see Chapter 8.3.1). In contrast, the concept that ‘nature’ is simply unpredictable and that there can be no absolute certainty is widely accepted: Araguaney: Well, Justiciero last year predicted a great catastrophe but [it was nothing] and now he is coming back again as the phoenix from the ashes, so be careful not to let these earthquakes and the famous eruption last us many years, well as CALMA says, nature is unpredictable and when it has to happen she will tell us, so Justiciero please do not start with scaremongering and take some pills for your anxiety and despair, because from what you write you want a great misfortune to happen. (3 Jul 2012; translated from Spanish by the author) So the solution of the dilemma is to take nature ‘as it is’ and at the same time accept the alarmists as a possibility for learning: Calma [calmness]: you don’t have to be an expert to know that this seems to add up and to continue [...] but nature is nature and [it] could also stop just like that. We are really just like before, nature is unpredictable and nothing is 100% certain. Anyhow, I like Justiciero Enmascerado because you always create controversy, for better or worse, keep writing without alarmism because at least you distract us and sometimes we learn something. (3 Jul 2012; translated from Spanish by the author) How can the case of El Justiciero Enmascerado be placed in the broader context of previous considerations? In the rift between the scripts of ‘normality’ (formulated by the authorities) and ‘disaster’ (formulated by the media), El Jusiticiero takes an exceptional, singularising position. On the one hand, distrust towards the authorities and the scientific facts causes Justiciero’s predictions not to go unnoticed, while on the other hand, statements about a possible worsening of the situation are mostly rejected because they slip into the framing of the disaster narrative. Discussions around the comments of ‘El Justiciero Enmascarado’ become an arena of singularities (see Chapter 6.2.4) due to El Justiciero’s active positioning beyond common ways of speaking, such as those of the authorities (scientists, civil protec-

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tion, media, and politicians). Of great importance in this context is the fact that, despite all the speculation about his or her identity, the mystery about Justiciero’s identity has been maintained (at least as far as I know). This resulted in the impossibility of an unambiguous assignment of the Masked Avenger to a certain field of practice by the other commenters. The possibilities that the person might be a resident of La Restinga, a scientist, or a journalist, or something else, were equally likely. For El Justiciero, the anonymity of the internet resembles a form of ‘exile’ in which it becomes possible to recognize and spread the ‘truth’ (at least the truth from El Justiciero’s point of view). This provocative position beyond conventionalised forms of argumentation has interesting effects. In reaction to the comments of El Justiciero, a very contentious but also productive discussion emerged among the users of the web page. Subjects were, among others, the possible development of the eruption, the role of insiders and outsiders, politics and science, truth and untruth, and manipulation and freedom of expression. The discussion around the comments of ‘El Justiciero Enmascerado’ can thus be understood as a ‘third space’ in which the different rationales of different fields of practice are made fluid.

8.3.10.

Practices of Counter-Staging: Managing Disaster Vocabulary and Images

The observations presented so far raise the question of whether and to what extent the practices of the affected persons have influenced the practices of the media. Has the urge to ›fight against alarmism‹ on the part of the Herrenians affected the practice of reporting in some way? To answer this question, the interviews with journalists based on the island are of particular interest. These persons are theoretically in the intersection of two fields of practice: that of the media and that the affected people. Additionally, I will present the cases of two other persons who took their own ‘actions’ to counter the images in the media. In a group interview with journalists of a local television station on El Hierro, the reporters spoke about how they soon realised that their way of reporting could have negative consequences for the islanders. Mistakes on their own side were recognized, however, journalists from outside of El Hierro were mainly considered to be the source of the exaggerated reporting. Like many other interview partners, the local journalists trace the biased reporting back to the economic interests of the media: Carlos: [the] problem was, other television broadcasters came. And the other stations wanted to sell blood! A lot of freelancers came, so if the freelancers did not sell the news, they wouldn’t get paid. So they had to exaggerate the news. (16 May 2014, ID 40; translated from Spanish by the author)

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

As a result, the local journalists started to ›counter-stage the ‘external’ disaster images‹, which means that they were more careful to take images that were ‘as ›realistic‹ as possible’. Carlos: For example, we didn’t intend to... the earthquakes weren’t in populated centres, so we didn’t take images of the population, but of the coast, the sea, areas where there is no population, where there was no danger. No? Like we handle the vocabulary too, all that, what else?   Luis: Not to alarm. For example, there was an earthquake of a magnitude of three. It was felt by the population, but it wasn’t... nothing happened! [...] There was no damage to the infrastructure or a building [...] because nothing happened! (16 May 2014, ID 40; translated from Spanish by the author) The television journalists also mentioned that the strategy had been adopted that if no ›real damage‹ had been caused, there was no need to report on it in such a dramatic manner. Also, they tried to use a more measured vocabulary. Depending on the effects of the earthquakes, either the expression terremoto [tremor] or sismo [earthquake] is used: Marta: For example, don’t say terremoto— [Luis interrupts] Luis: Sismo! Marta: but movimiento [movements] or sismo. because saying terremoto, AH! [imitates outraged exclaim] Saying sismo or movimiento, it happens more that— [Luis interrupts] Luis: Or for example, like it produces damage or it does not produce damage. Sometimes it only produces damage, landslides, you know, the street is not broken, or a building... then terremoto, for example, we can’t say, but movimiento. (16 May 2014, ID 40; translated from Spanish by the author) However, these insights do not seem to have come only from the journalists’ own experiences. One of the journalists noted that there were recommendations from the authorities which were adopted by their station. When asked if they would take systematic action against the ›false images in the media‹ of other journalists, one of the journalists answers: Alberto: No. No. Because each television station is independent, it has its own criteria and they follow other criteria. On the part of the institutions, it was possible to ask as they have asked us that we can, well, [manage] the vocabulary, the images, and we as a media provider have accepted that recommendation, that, but... if another broadcaster says no, I want to sell, they are free to sell it! (16 May 2014, ID 40; translated from Spanish by the author) Alberto emphasises the voluntary nature of the decision and downplays the conflict with the other broadcasters. Both could be an indication that a certain tension remains for the individual due to his involvement in both fields and their rationales

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(working for the media and being part of the island’s ‘community’). Less neutral and much more belligerent was the host of a radio station on El Hierro: Quinton: And of course from here and through the radio we also fight directly for this island, so that the audiovisual media and as well the local press, like national or insular, [...] that the island never deserves to be treated that way, [...] to be given news that is not real. They’ve gone far from reality and they’re hurting the island! […] They have broadcasted and published data that is not [real]! They have always amplified their magnitude to sell more copies or keep attention on audiovisual media. And the Herreño is tired of that. (21 Feb 2013, ID 75; translated from Spanish by the author) Several of the concepts of ›being Herreño‹ mentioned in Chapter 8.2.1 can be linked to the statements of the radio presenter. That is, the image of the suffering and oppressed island is present (›the forgotten island‹), and also that of the strong-willed and headstrong spirit of the Herrenians. In the ›fight against false images‹ from the outside, these community-defining concepts are revived and simultaneously undergo validation and stabilisation. Similar concepts and strategies were also found among protagonists only indirectly involved in the media representation of the seismo-volcanic activity. With regard to the imagery of the island, the following example is interesting: a Herrenian photographer who in his work documents the nature and people of El Hierro even claimed to have abstained from taking any photos of the eruption or the discoloured water (la mancha). The negative connotations of the images of disaster journalism led him to concentrate even more on positive images of the island: Robert: I decided it was not appropriate to exploit something bad! I like photography, and I think where it’s wrong, there’s no reason to exploit it, is there? [...] [W]hen it’s a bad thing that has affected us all, I don’t find the logic of exploiting images and of something that doesn’t come across as real as it was. […] I’ve tried even more to look for more beauty, to look for more in order to promote my island. Do you understand? I try to take pictures and more pictures and more pictures of places that are amazing, as we have on the island. So you try to put them everywhere so people can see what’s on the island. I don’t sell, I don’t do anything. I’m just trying to get people to see that we have an island which is great, which is a wonder and we have to benefit from it. So it’s a way to incite people to come. (25 Feb 2013, ID 78; translated from Spanish by the author) Thus, in the fight against what is perceived as a false image, a clearer idea of what is understood as a true and valid image emerges. Looking at the photographer’s Flickr photostream at the time of of the eruption in October 2011, there is a perfect contrast to the disaster narrative in the media (see Figure 43). The evening sun sets over the quiet and lonesome landscape of long-frozen lava. Long-exposure pho-

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

tography of the coast smooths the ripples of the waves; land, water, and sky merge into a contrasting but harmonious alliance. The wooded and enchanted landscapes of the plateau appear unspoiled and primordial. A shepherd as if from another time and yet a vignette of an everyday routine: no sign of the eruption or anything associated with it.

Figure 43: Flickr photostream of a Herrenian photographer as of October 2011.

Source: Anonymised; with friendly permission of the photographer.

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There were also efforts on the part of actors active in tourism to rectify the island’s image. The owner of a diving school reports that during the seismic crisis he moved his equipment to the north of the island and convinced his customers of the safety of diving with ›underwater counter-images‹: Ernst: They knew perfectly well, I put pictures on my homepage more or less every day or every week, up-to-date pictures with a blog. With information about how it looks underwater, where can you dive, where there are risks, what are the risks at all. That means my bookings, people were of course informed, honestly so, and the only risk they had was just that they would have had to leave the island and could have just continued their vacation in Tenerife or another island. [...] Luckily, I have a lot of loyal customers, I convinced them it’s not a risk, and then they came. […] Actually, I didn’t persuade the people, but I just showed them what the situation was like! That means with a report that is written honestly and with pictures that were taken on those days. [...] [B]ecause the information you get in the media has always been spectacular, that everything is dead and the island is breaking apart. (20 Feb 2013, ID 72; translated from German by the author) The blog entries resemble a kind of photographic experience report20 in which the diving instructor describes his impressions of the problematic situation (e.g. the evacuations) and his dives during the seismic crisis. His narrated observations and experiences from the underwater world can be summarized under the concept ›underwater life returns in unexpected diversity‹. The possible uncertainty and fears of the readers are countered with curiosity and fascination and evidence of the ›positive effects of the natural spectacle‹. The ‘monster rising from the sea’ (see Chapter 8.3.3) is thus transformed into a ›life bringer‹ and the ›unique chance to experience it‹. Textbox 10 shows the way this was done. Textbox 10: Excerpt from the Diving School’s Blog   8 November 2018: Photographers, television, onlookers, and everyone hope that something sensational will happen. Same picture every day. Luckily for us it didn’t get worse, but that’s enough for us. [...] 15 November 2011: Photographer’s heart, what more do you want! Beautiful dives and nice divers make our life on El Hierro easier. All these underwater pictures were taken in the north, at different dive sites, without the danger of tremors or bad visibility. Thank you for the confidence of the divers who were here and those who hopefully will come. [...]

20

The photos published in the blog have unfortunately been lost because of a server migration. Only the text has been preserved for this analysis.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

18 December 2011: The sea is turning blue again. The volcanic activity has strongly decreased and the strong wind in the last days has enriched the sea with oxygen again. Quakes are almost non-existent. Unlimited diving with fun is possible in the north as well as close to the volcano. This gives great hope for all of us. [...] 24 December 2011: The situation has calmed down and my curiosity becomes almost unbearable. The harbour is open! One of the most exciting dives in my life. Many thoughts cross my mind. A landscape like a magical forest awaited me. […] The lack of crabs and fish has given the algae an unexpected life. The volcanic deposits certainly provide enough food. Something unique is emerging, life returns, for me and actually for all interested divers, a unique chance to experience it.   Source: Text kindly provided by the owner of the diving school; translated from German by the author.

8.3.11.

Interim Conclusion: Staging a Disaster and Re-staging a Community

In the previous chapters I have described the interaction between the fields of media and of those affected. Before I move on to the next fields of practice, I would like to present some concluding thoughts.21 First, the concept of the ›false images in the media‹ leads individuals to the objective of countering them with ‘true’, ‘real’ or ‘honest’ images. As the framing of El Hierro as a hazardous place has had tangible effects for the islanders’ wellbeing, many coping strategies have been aimed at altering the representation of the event. For example, the local media, being aware of the potential negative impact of ‘disaster vocabulary’, then worked to carefully ‘manage’ their imagery and reporting. Interview partners tended to refer to beneficial examples of volcanic activity (e.g. Hawaii), omitting statements about possible risks. Actors in the local tourism industry started their own blogs attempting to prove to their clients that in fact there was no threat. Tourism campaigns now try to emphasize the volcanic origin of the island as an asset. This shows that, on the one hand, the truthfulness of these counter-images draws on one’s own experience with events. As there was no major damage or injury from the volcanic events, the picture of catastrophic volcanism is not justified for most Herrenians. On the other hand, the ‘correct’ reality is situated in the context of the personal (financial) consequences of the ›alarmist reporting‹, and, in the overall meaning of the ›false images‹ for the island’s ‘community’. In this way, the

21

I have already published parts of this conclusion in a similar form in the 2014 IFRC World Disaster Report (IFRC 2014, 30–31).

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practice of ‘re-staging’ has effects on the islanders’ risk perception as well, as they are in between the different interpretations. Second, as a consequence, different ascriptions are merged into a meta-framing that reduces the contingencies. In this sense, the ‘Herrenian identity’ (Chapter 8.2) has gained new importance: El Hierro is often described as the ‘most remote’ or ‘forgotten’ island due to its limited accessibility and historical role as a political underdog in relation to the other islands. Hard living conditions because of water scarcity and periodic drought are part of the island’s history, fostering waves of emigration and remigration. Many cultural symbols of the island incorporate unity of society, modest living, connectedness with the land, and a ‘wild’ nature due to its volcanic origin. Being Herreño means being connected to nature, neglected by those in power, and, as a reaction, being part of a resilient and strong ‘community’. This somehow prototypical idea of an ‘island community’ is constantly reproduced in the island’s folklore, art, literature, advertisement, and political discourses. As this frame is very compatible with the circumstances this study examines, where potential threats, and the fight against adversities, are highlighted, the argumentations of individuals in regard to volcanic risk or the crisis in general are often connected to it. For example, the experienced predominance of exogenous truth (often viewed as ‘untruth’) over the islanders’ own feelings and impressions, including the associated loss of control over the endogenous image of the island, confirms tragicpessimistic elements of cultural identity, for instance, as being a political underdog (see Chapter 8.3.10). In short, to counter the crisis, long-established framings are mobilised and, thus, the significance of the ‘community’ is increased. At the same time, however, the ›strong-willed‹ or ›headstrong‹ self-assigned attributions associated with these concepts are revived. This leads to an overall revitalisation of the idea of a Herrenian community and a strengthening of certain cultural identity characteristics of being Herreño. This has important implications: the image of a resilient and consistent community tempts certain actors to tune out differing perceptions of risk and to verbally smooth over social differences. Adopting the volcanic risk as being part of the island’s ‘nature’ reduces remaining contingencies and is an effective ‘counter-framing’ to avoid further deterrence of tourists. Yet, this has led to a situation where showing fear or taking individual precautions has become a taboo in some cases, and ‘visible’ preventive actions such as public emergency drills are even frowned upon by certain actors (as will be shown in Chapter 8.4.3). Third, the ›valorisation of the volcano‹ is an extremely important idea in connection with the observed practices of (re-)staging the volcano. Just as the diving teacher transforms the disaster narrative of the media into a unique opportunity for nature and its visitors, many other interviews also showed the tendency of describing volcanism as a (tourist) attraction. The idea of valorisation affected all

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fields: affected persons, politicians, tourism representatives, journalists, scientists, and people working in civil protection. However, the relationship between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ is paradoxical and consistent at the same time. What do I mean by this? From the point of view of most of the interviewees, the real trigger of the ‘seismic crisis’ was the ‘false’ images in the media. The economic interests of the (external) media, that is, selling the volcano as a breathtaking disaster, led to the exaggerated reporting, which in turn, and in combination with the seemingly exaggerated measures of civil protection, led to a collapse in tourism and even to emigration. As a result, a series of practices and objectives emerged that strengthened the ideal of selling volcanism as something positive and attractive. The emphasis here is on selling and that is, perhaps, the core problem. It is not a question of whether something is sold as good or bad, harmless or dangerous. Rather, it is symptomatic that the linking of the ‘image’ of volcanism with economic interests has linked the practices of risk assessment to the practices of valorisation. As a result, a special tension arises between risk assessment and the ‘image’ of volcanism. This observation applies to the interaction between the fields of media and of those affected. In the following, I would like to take a look at the field of civil protection, since those affected also considered the civil protection measures in response to the seismo-volcanic event problematic.

8.4.

The Thin Red Line of Civil Protection

8.4.1.

“Prepared for What’s Planned, the Unexpected Arises”22

From the moment of the first perceptible earthquakes on El Hierro, a considerable need for information arose among the population. As demonstrated in Chapter 8.3.3, the events led to a great deal of media attention with a continuous coverage of the earthquake events, as well as the actions of civil protection and politics, the reactions of the population, and the opinions of individual scientists. An important source of this reporting were the official statements provided by communication bodies of PEVOLCA. The PEVOLCA press conferences and public announcements in particular were an important source of information for the pub-

22

The headline of this chapter is taken from the title of an internal CECOES PowerPoint presentation regarding the crisis’ communications management (“Preparados para lo previsto surge lo imprevisto”) (CECOES/Gobierno de Canarias 2014).

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lic.23 It is therefore worth taking a brief look at the overall character of these public announcements: Figure 44 shows a word cloud of the ninety-five most frequent words used in the headlines of the PEVOLCA public announcements about the seismic crisis of El Hierro. The announcements are written in a factual-technical tone and contain (as defined in the PEVOLCA plan) information on earthquake activity (e.g. magnitude), notifications on civil protection measures (alarm level, evacuations, road closures), scientific background information about risks to be expected (mostly provided by the IGN), and behavioural advice for the public (see Gobierno de Canarias 2017c).

Figure 44: Word cloud of the PEVOLCA public announcements’ headlines.

The cloud shows the ninety-five most frequent words in the headlines, n=194 (22 Jul 2011–10 Apr 2013). Source: Illustration by author, based on a corpus generated from Gobierno de Canarias (2017c).

The factual-technical tone of the public announcements, one might think, could also have resulted in a fact-based reaction. However, as described in the previous chapter section (8.3), this was rather not the case. Thus, from the point of view of the civil protection authorities, the communication of the event did not proceed as expected. Much like in the other fields, the interviews with persons active in civil protection revealed that during the event, the impression arose that the provided (contradictory) information led to great uncertainty among the population. This is, on the one hand, traced back to the ‘exaggerated’ presentation of the events by the ›alarmist media‹. On the other hand, criticism appeared from within civil protection regarding its actions. In hindsight, the PEVOLCA communications manager lamented that the information provided in the public announcements was incomprehensible and ›too scientific for the public‹:

23

An archive of the press reports is available at the webpage of the Gobierno de Canarias (2017c).

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PEVOLCA communications manager: What was the problem? That the information that was given was so much! It was too scientific [...]. In the beginning, the first phase, in our public announcements, when the website was mixed with a lot of information... scientific and technical information was mixed, and we always gave information [like] “today there have been twenty-five earthquakes of a magnitude such and such. And in the end we said, what nonsense! (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) In the course of the events, an attitude was solidified that the recipients of the information (that is, the ‘population’) did not have the necessary ›expert knowledge‹ to interpret the given facts ‘correctly’. This refers to the population’s general scientific background and, in particular, to their ability to interpret the real-time online monitoring system available on the IGN homepage. Especially the latter, several interviewees from the field of civil protection and science remarked, could not be understood ‘correctly’ without proper scientific background knowledge. On top of that, PEVOLCA authorities feel the official statements and earthquake maps were ‘misused’, for example, by web blog operators, to underline their ‘disaster narratives’ (see Chapter 8.3.3.6). In this respect, the ‘factual’ information provided by the authorities became a delicate matter, as every little detail might later serve as the basis for ›deviating interpretations‹. Yet, according to the PEVOLCA communications manager, it was not only the ›self-proclaimed experts‹ or ›armchair volcanologists‹ who caused confusion among the population. Volcanologists, geoscientists, and other experts from various institutions uttered their opinions in the media without ‘authorisation’ from the PEVOLCA authorities. The different risk assessments and interests of these institutions led to uncertainty on the side of the CECOES team: PEVOLCA communications manager: On the one hand it was INVOLCAN that had its history, and the IGN that had its own history. Because the IGN was here, but also in Madrid, understanding things differently than what they have been saying here! The CECIC also had several [...] representatives that some said one thing and others said another, or once they agreed more and once they agreed less. Thus, the IEO [Instituto Español de Oceanografía] also had its interests in promoting their actions. All these phenomena?! All those theories... that’s all a phenomenon because it is evidence of the richness of the debate, of the confrontation. (26 May 2013, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) These rivalling views on the phenomenon can be seen as the central problem facing the field of civil protection. Another fundamental problem was that neither the scientific institutions nor individual scientists were able to provide an unambiguous truth about the volcanic risk. As demonstrated in Chapter 4.4, there are different

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views about the risks and it is still virtually impossible to predict the development of seismic activity. Thus, the proposed ›lack of expert knowledge‹ among the population was only one part of the problem. As there was no singular truth to rely on, the civil protection authorities experienced a severe loss of control over how many ‘facts’ existed, and how they were interpreted. It was learned that even ‘neutral’ information, such as the number of seismic events, can lead to a high degree of uncertainty (or even scaremongering) due to an ‘exaggerated’ representation in the (social) media and plurality of interpretations. The head of CECOPIN El Hierro reports: Head of CECOPIN El Hierro: Diverse collectives in the social networks dedicated themselves to warning of risks existing of rockfall of I don’t know how much! Of course, you who are at home with your computer on Facebook, seeing that, what does this trigger in you? A lot of fear, doesn’t it? And a lot of, a lot of uncertainty, when actually from us, on the other side, the organisation specialised in that manner, has said that absolutely nothing will happen! So, in the end, that’s what generates distrust in the system, mistrust in the institutions, fear, generating a lot of unrest, that somehow is not adequate to the real situation of what’s happening! (12 May 2014, ID 25; translated from Spanish by the author) The quote above shows that the expert sees his own convictions about the risks as the factual and true reality (“real situation”). This truth, according to the attitude of the civil protection experts, should have been anticipated by the public. Instead, the interviewees were confronted with a very sceptical mood among the population and a great plurality of different opinions emerging. This difficulty was not anticipated by the original PEVOLCA plan. On the contrary, the plan incorporates the belief that a hierarchically coordinated action plan, including a controlled information policy, can be fully enforced (see Chapter 3.4). In essence, the plan does not include many ‘democratic’ elements. The population is to be informed via central organs and should behave in accordance with the instructions, as manifested by the volcanic traffic light system (see Chapter 3.4.4). In other words, the PEVOLCA plan does not anticipate that the population is involved in the way the information is being interpreted.

8.4.2.

Phenomenon: Communicating Uncertainty Is a Tightrope Walk

The context described above ultimately led to the phenomenon that information itself became the actual risk for the civil protection authorities. The loss of control of how it is interpreted is the real disaster. The civil protection authorities therefore had to develop a high degree of sensitivity with regard to the social effects of information about risks or measures to be implemented.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

This resulted in a special area of conflict because, first, the sovereignty of communication about the volcanic activity had to be restored, as seen from the point of view of those in charge of civil protection. However, they felt this could only be made possible if the provided information was regarded (again) as trustworthy and reliable by the population. Second, there was a conflict between the objective of informing the population as fully as possible and the experience that even ‘neutral’ or ‘scientific’ information could lead to a loss of control. At the same time, there was a fear that too little information could lead to ›accusations of ‘censorship’‹.

Figure 45: CECOES presentation: “Transparent and trustworthy message”.

Translation: “Information of interest, useful information, no rumors, no guesswork → censorship trustworthiness. Stay calm and maintain decisions. The differences between scientific and/or technical information and civil protection information must be clear. Source: CECOES/Gobierno de Canarias 2014.

As an internal CECOES PowerPoint presentation (Figure 45) shows, the restoration of trust was to be achieved through the separation of scientific/technical information and information on civil protection. However, the possible accusation of ‘censorship’ seems to be of great importance here. This is even more evident as it became a public issue. A newspaper report with the title “We never withhold information from affected neighbours: Juan Manuel Santana, the government’s face in the crisis, takes stock” (Gutiérrez 2011) shows that the accusation of concealment had to be opposed by the director of CECOES in a public statement to the media (see Figure 46).

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Figure 46: Newspaper article “We never withhold information from affected neighbours”.

Source: Diario de Avisos, 3 November 2011, p. 19; Gutiérrez (2011). With friendly permission of Diario de Avisos.

In the article, Santana rejects the idea that information had been concealed and points out that what was communicated to the population was also communicated by the scientists in their public talks with the population: Director of the CECOES: a population that knows what might happen is a population that is going to be better prepared to face any eventuality: it will not be surprised at all. The information that was given prior to the crisis, the most critical part of the eruptive process, was made known precisely by those previous talks with the scientists. (Gutiérrez 2011; translated from Spanish by the author). The ambiguity and contingency experienced behind the scenes was therefore not communicated to the outside world. Rather, reference is made to the non-contingency of science. This resulted in a great dilemma, which I would like to describe in the following.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

8.4.3.

Midpoint Practice: Resolving the Dilemma

The experiences of the individual civil protection experts led to a gradual adaptation of the way in which information about seismic activity and the risks connected to it could be given to the public. In the field between the commitment to providing objective information and the risk of being accused of censorship, a ›‘punto medio’‹ had to be found, that is to say, an information policy that conveys the most necessary information without leaving too much room for speculation or panic. This resulted in the phenomenon that the constant reporting of the number of seismic events was considered more and more ‘senseless’ and to be avoided. The PEVOLCA communications manager (employed at the Dirección General de Seguridad y Emergencias) explains: PEVOLCA communications manager: The emergency cannot be denied. But you can’t exaggerate either! It is very difficult to find the punto medio [midpoint] because, of course, we report that today ten thousand tremors have occurred. The number of ten thousand can be very valuable information, or can be negative information. [...] [T]hat’s a self-criticism of mine [...] that we are accustomed to report everything that happens. And we stopped doing it. Because it did not make sense. Because look, another day there were two [earthquakes], of [magnitude] one point two and one of one point six. What’s the point of reporting that? (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) The interviewee points out that she criticises herself for the content of the first public announcements. This suggests that the experience gained during the event has caused a fundamental change of attitude. Her statements also indicate that the ambiguities regarding the meaning of the earthquakes caused emotional stress. Later, she and her colleagues realised that a large number of earthquakes do not necessarily pose a risk to the population, but any statement about the earthquakes or the possible consequences of a (further) eruption can lead to ›false images in the media‹ – and thus to greater damage then the natural event itself. The conclusion was that only ›‘essential’ and ‘useful’ information‹ should be made available. ›‘Suspicions’ or ‘rumours’‹, on the other hand, should be discouraged. As described in Chapter 8.3.1 the Herreños had experienced the events in such a way that the real disaster was less the volcanic eruption, but rather the intervention of the civil protection authorities and the exaggerated reporting in the media. In the foreground were the negative economic effects and the damage to the island’s image. Hence, people living on El Hierro have often pointed out in my presence that the seismic activity is ‘normal’ by, for instance, highlighting that ›active volcanism is part of the nature of the island‹. The civil protection authorities (and the IGN staff I spoke with) recognised that this ›image of normality‹ became very important. While it was emphasized sev-

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eral times that openness is the best strategy to counter mistrust or insecurity, the question of the potential impact of announcing evacuations or even banal safety warnings was not easy to answer by the interview partners. To the question why it is so important to ›maintain the image of normality‹, the chief of the IGN office in Tenerife responded: Chief of IGN Tenerife: I think that this image is ironic. I think that what has to be told is what is happening and if the people sense that you are monitoring, that there is an adequate and operating system for guaranteeing your security, this is what to do. On Hawaii they do not conceal the eruptions, nor do they on Stromboli or Etna. And the people will see the eruptions, because they know that there is an operating system that guarantees their well-being. You do not have to conceal information. The information has to be, up to a certain level comprehensive for the population, including the web. (22 May 2014, ID 51; translated from Spanish by the author) The interviews gave me the impression that something we could call the ›the need for normality‹ of the Herrenians was very well perceived by the civil protection authorities and at least partly adopted. Moreover, the character of El Hierro’s population and its attitude towards the outer world has been referred to as peculiar and to some extent intractable (which in general corresponds with the self-image of the Herrenians). These perceptions certainly have had an important influence on the various strategies and the adjustment of objectives on part of the civil protection staff. An indication of its great sensitivity towards the attitude of the population is, for example, the statement that public drills are not easily performed on El Hierro as there are concerns held by the population about them: Head of CECOPIN El Hierro: Well then, I don't know [why there are no drills], I don’t know [laughs] whether it may be necessary! There seems to be certain fear about this type of [volcanic emergency] drill, a little bit because of its economic impact. Well, then, if there is a certain reluctance to do that kind of drill [...] there is a fear that the image that is created by the drills could damage the image of the island. I think it’s ironic, because I think it’s the opposite. But okay! (12 May 2014, ID 25; translated from Spanish by the author) Between the extremes of yielding to taboos and operating with an (overly) high degree of openness, the civil protection authorities had to take a balanced approach. On the basis of their experiences during the crisis, the civil protection experts have developed a number of objectives and strategies for reducing the fears and reservations of the population during future events. In the following I will present some of them.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

8.4.4.

Strategy: Speaking with a Single Voice

In order to further reduce the confusion on the part of the population, the idea arose to exert more influence on the scientists themselves or, in other words, to ›create a consensus‹: PEVOLCA communications manager: then it was another step [in] the information management, […] [it is required] in this situation, this ongoing journey, to control! Which is not censorship! It is control so that, I don’t... I don’t have to be telling you twenty-five theories from twenty-five people about a phenomenon. Because what I transmit is that you, as a citizen, are able to continue your everyday life! (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) It is emphasised here that control cannot be equated with censorship, which can be seen as a further sign that citizens’ reactions are considered highly critical. If one informs ‘too much’, it leads to confusion; if the impression is created that one has not informed enough, then an accusation of concealment, of censorship, might be levelled. This dilemma could hardly be resolved. The interviews with persons active in the field of civil protection showed that the image of an ›immature citizen‹ prevailed: of a citizen who could not handle diverse and possibly contradictory information, a highly distrustful citizen who also finds it difficult to properly place and evaluate scientific information. As a result, the civil protection authorities established the idea that their reports must be guided even more strongly. This idea can be summarized under the concept of ›speaking with a single voice‹: PEVOLCA communications manager: [...] but what had to be agreed upon is what should be sent out! It should be only one message! One single theory would be more accepted or less accepted. Because the citizen, if it doesn’t enrage him, it’ll make him go mad. He does not know who to trust, not if the government tells me one thing and the other tells me another. [...] [I]n Spain we are against the government, everybody! [...] [E]verything that comes from the government is a lie, it’s fake, it’s… I don't know. If you blend three or four opinions, you have the broth of conflict to discredit the official activity! (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) This statement also addresses the general mistrust of the Spanish people towards the authorities. Interviews with the islanders showed that this assessment is quite true. However, the conclusion that there is a need for tighter control over information is highly problematic. If the public gets the impression that information is being held back, mistrust continues to grow. The scientists at the state-run Instituto Geográphico Nacional (IGN) experienced a similar rift, as the IGN represents an organ that is both committed to the

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hierarchical structure of the civil protection plan and the ›scientific codex‹ (one could roughly describe, if with some exaggeration, the core of scientific ethics with the attributes “honesty, precision and truth” (Lüscher 2013)). Here, too, a path adapted to the situation had to be taken. In favour of the need for a greater appearance of consensus, the scientific convention of openly articulating various (contradictory) theories and freely exchanging opinions was surrendered: Chief of IGN Tenerife: Scientists have to discuss on a scientific level in order to reach a consensus on what the majority think is happening. That is what is transferred to emergency managers, and on the basis of that which has been decided between everyone, it will be decided what measures have to be taken. […] [A]ll committees are formed because in reality the interpretation is very complicated. What there should never be in front of society is publicly discrepant opinions! (22 May 2014, ID 51; translated from Spanish by the author, emphasis added) Behind a “closed door”, the head of the IGN and the Comité Científico continues, opinions among scientists can be freely exchanged, “but once we leave the Scientific Committee meeting there is one spokesperson who transmits the consensus. [This] does not mean that everyone else is not allowed to speak, but they must maintain the opinion that has been established in the Scientific Committee” (22 May 2014, ID 51). Obviously, the discrepancy between the fact that there can be no unambiguous scientific truth and the apparent necessity to represent a singular truth to the outside world has put the IGN in an awkward position. However, in view of the difficult position in which the institute finds itself, this becomes understandable (see Chapter 8.5).

8.4.5.

Strategy: Run with the Pack – Proactive Information Management

In order to resolve the tension between the ›responsibility of being a reliable source for risk assessment‹, the ›need for information control‹, and the ›peril of mistrust among the population‹, strategies have been developed to deal more proactively with ›information competitors‹. In this context, the civil protection authorities moved their primary focus to social media. A number of different groups are currently active on Facebook that regularly post information updated daily about seismic and volcanic activity on the Canary Islands. Some of them are run by official research groups. These include, for example, the Facebook page of the IGN and INVOLCAN, ‘MultiTeide’ (run by IGN/IGME) and GEOVOL (Grupo de Investigacion Volcanica, run by the Universidad de Castilla-la Mancha). Others, like AVCAN (see Textbox 11), are operated by private persons or organisations outside the direct sphere of influence of official circles.

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

Textbox 11: AVCAN, the ‘Unpleasant’ Information Competitor   An example of such an ‘information competitor’ is AVCAN (Actualidad Volcánica de Canarias)]24 , a Facebook group which, according to one of its operators, is maintained as a hobby by a heterogenous group of “normal people from all around Spain, the Canary Islands, and [the] Peninsula” (AVCAN speaker, personal communication via Facebook, 16 November 2015). This group, which partly has an academic background in geology and volcanology, regularly posts its own reports, photographs, graphics, and even animations about earthquake events on El Hierro and the Canary Islands in general. Often, data from sources such as the IGN or INVOLCAN is used to compose the articles. The page shares information about volcanic activity with a focus on the Canary Islands but also from all over the world. The site was launched in 2008 and since then (as of February 2018) has gained around 60,000 followers from various parts of the Canary Islands and Spain. The posts about the seismic events on El Hierro have been commented on and shared numerously. For comparison, the CECOES has 150,000 followers on Twitter, the Cabildo de El Hierro (which includes notifications from the CECOPIN El Hierro) has 13,600 followers on Twitter and 5,300 on Facebook, and INVOLCAN (Instituto Vólcanologico de Canarias) has around 27,000 followers on Facebook and 1,800 on Twitter. Thus, all in all, the number of subscribers to the ‘unofficial source’ of AVCAN is quite considerable. Figure 47 shows an example post from AVCAN, including an excerpt of the comments, published on December 29, 2013. The post shows buried and damaged roads caused by the 5.1 magnitude earthquake that happened two days before (see Chapter 4.5.3). The scenery is discussed very differently by the commenters and therefore serves as representative example for other posts on this page. Often, the comments in earthquakes refer to whether and where they were felt by the people (in this case, those far beyond El Hierro). Another pattern is that some commenters try to assess the risk on the basis of their own interpretations or comparisons (to other active volcanos) and advice is given on how authorities should act. Others express their fear without further explanation. There are also comments that claim the earthquakes to be harmless or negligible. Even if no persons were injured in the 5.1 magnitude earthquake, the images do seem threatening to the audience, which is reflected in the fact that it is spoken of in fear and one commenter suggested, for example, to “evacuate the island before there is no escape route left” (Figure 47; translated from Spanish by the author). Another form of threat, however, arises for one of my interview partners: the combination of a seemingly dangerous scene and the uncontrollable ‘mess’ of the 24

AVCAN on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Actualidad-Volc%C3%A1nica-AVCAN163883668446/

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Figure 47: AVCAN post on Facebook about the effects of the 5.1 magnitude earthquake. The left side shows the post, the right side an excerpt of the post’s thirty-one comments.

The pictures have been blurred by the author due to unclear image rights. In the original version, they show several rockfalls on roads and road damage caused by the 5.1 earthquake. Source: Screenshots taken from the AVCAN Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/Actualidad-Volc%C3%A1nica-AVCAN-163883668446/, 29 Dec 2013).

users’ personal risk estimates seems to be highly distressing for the staff of the civil protection authorities – especially since practically uninvolved parties (‘outsiders’) can also comment on the situation: PEVOLCA communications manager: The person in Madrid or Berlin? He does not need to know if the neighbour from El Hierro is going to evacuate, does he? Do you understand? And at the same time we report more for the cattle of the world than for the people mainly affected. And that is one thing we learned, that the main reason for our information is the affected neighbour! Not the rest. And in the Canary Islands on AVCAN’s page, mainly from Facebook, I followed it. They made me sick [laughs amiably], made me sick every day but I had to keep [following]. I got sick because it was a lot of theory from outside, and [??]. Not just the scientific part. Of all people’s comments! [...] [M]any people are calling things/saying: Crap! What a responsibility it is to have the people on the island! Look, it’s okay! Do you understand? So it conveys a feeling from the outside that does not correspond with the people inside! (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author)

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

The basis of the legitimacy of rejecting the outsiders’ views is the concept that outsider’s perception does not correspond to insider’s perception, a pattern of argumentation which reminds us of the observations of the affected neighbours (see Chapter 8.3.1). On the one hand, this is extremely remarkable, as it shows that the civil protection commissioner has a high degree of empathy for the views of those affected. On the other hand, the statement bears problematic implications: the ›‘knowledgeable’ insiders‹ are best placed to assess the danger of the events and the appropriate measures associated with them. Any other reaction (of those considered as ‘outsiders’) that does not correspond to this ‘truth’ is dismissed as ‘exaggerated’, ‘unqualified’ or just ‘false’. As there was no legal way to shut down the information competitors (which in any case would be censorship), the civil protection authorities had to take a more progressive approach. In the course of the events, CECOES Tenerife started its own social media accounts in order to inform the public about risks but also to counter the prevailing views: PEVOLCA communications manager: The problem of social networks is that you have to be there because there is so much fake news on social networks and you have to be there to counter it! [...] [W]e did not have a profile, for example, on Twitter, […] we didn’t have it until later, and we were missing it. Facebook we didn’t have so we couldn’t counter certain things. (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) The conflict with the information competitors forced the civil protection authorities to actively engage with social networks. Observing and participating in the networks have also created positive experiences. The head of CECOPIN El Hierro describes that these experiences also proved that social networks have great benefits compared to conventional ways of disaster communication: Head of CECOPIN El Hierro: We have realised that social networks are the most immediate and fastest [way] you can communicate. No loudspeakers or announcements, no press, no no, it’s the social networks! The island’s Cabildo of El Hierro posts that the island must be evacuated, and in five minutes everyone knows. (12 May 2014, ID 25; translated from Spanish by the author). Due to these experiences, the Canary Island’s civil protection with regard to volcanic risks has evolved into a proactive and strategic information management. It is conceivable that social networks will play an increasingly important role in the Canary Islands civil protection: a fact that will possibly be reflected in future formulations of a revised PEVOLCA document. However, the proactive use of social media is only one strategy to escape from the communication dilemma. The real problem is not seen in the media, but in the

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way information can be utilised by the population. For this reason, the following strategy is aimed at re-educating citizens.

8.4.6.

Objective: Re-Education – Living in Certainty with Uncertainty

In the case natural hazards, education is expected to increase public awareness and acceptance of disaster risk policies (see Blaikie 1994, 330 f.). In our case, too, the ‘experts’ see the solution in a ›better education of the population‹. To reach this goal, various public education programs were put into action that inform about the existence and the nature of volcanic risks on the Canary Islands. However, there are additional underlying motivations that arise from our specific situation. The interviewed persons in the field of civil protection were aware that even a proactive information management is not able to solve the communications dilemma in the long term. In order to avoid the population’s overreactions in the future, these interviewees have established the idea that citizens must be trained in volcanic risks to differentiate between ‘the right’ and ‘the wrong’ information. For this it is necessary to adopt the correct view. Only by education, it is hoped, citizens will be enabled to better deal with (multiple sources) information. An example of such educational programmes is the so called ‘charlas’ (‘talks’ or ‘public discussions’) which were first held during the seismic crisis. As a reaction to the seismic anomaly, scientists and civil protection experts travelled to El Hierro to inform its residents about the seismic events, or as the head of the IGN in Tenerife puts it: “telling them [the Herreños] what was going on under the Isle of El Hierro” (22 May 2014, ID 51; translated from Spanish by the author). Even this short sentence leaves little doubt as to who has the knowledge of correct interpretation. Those talks were started around September 2011 and at first were not well attended. This changed when the earthquakes were felt more strongly. The interviews with audience members in the talks suggest that, due to their scientific-technical character, the discussions have had a somewhat ‘enlightening nature’. Supplying the population with scientific interpretation patterns and more precise information on the expected risks had quite positive effects. Specifically, the characteristic scientific-enlightening style seemed to counteract the fears of the population, at least in some cases. A local teacher of El Hierro reports: Isabel: Fear, no! Because let’s see, the Geographical Institute [IGN] gave us talks. They told us the situation we were in. They interpreted [for] us, they made us an analysis of the data that they had, the specialists. And then? Well, we turned down the doubts we had about what was going on. Hence, the seismic movements as well as the possible eruption. And we knew more or less, we could have an idea. I believe that we have learned after the volcano, many people have learned to evaluate the island, that we live on a volcanic island. And we’ve learned to respect

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nature, okay? When it comes with that destructive force, or not, or constructive, right? And we all converted into little experts on this subject. (22 Feb 2013, ID 76; translated from Spanish by the author) The educational talks were seen as positive by a number of interviewed residents of El Hierro. But there was also criticism regarding the technical and scientific character of the talks. The following person experienced a veritable ›oversaturation of information‹, and even stopped using certain media channels. Also, the authorities’ attempts to clarify the situation by giving scientific knowledge was viewed critically: Emilie: our daily life was pretty pessimistic. Both at the work and the personal level there was a lot of news bombardment. During the year receiving information by television from media, not from the newspapers, and on a personal level, I was isolated from all media outlets. The only way I could bear my day. Because it was hard. And then there were many visits from scientists, many information talks were given. Some perhaps too technical. Which made it difficult for the information, that this information reached all citizens, who have no idea of volcanology. (25 Feb 2013, ID 77; translated from Spanish by the author) The idea of ›turning citizens into little experts‹ does not therefore seem to be completely unproblematic. Let us therefore take a look at another educational programme. Public education programs with regard to volcanic risks already existed before the 2011 El Hierro incident. Since then, however, they have been intensified. A very popular educational program is a series of events that is held at regular intervals in different locations across the islands. It is called Canarias: una ventana volcánica en el Atlántico (Canary Islands: A volcanic window in the Atlantic Ocean) (Figure 48). The series was initiated back in 2008 by INVOLCAN and ITER. It aims to raise awareness of volcanic risks among the population and to motivate them to actively contribute to risk reduction. The eighty-eight Canary Islands municipalities and their citizens can voluntarily participate in the programme. In 2013, twenty-seven municipalities and an average of fifty-eight people per community participated (INVOLCAN 2013). The program seeks to impart knowledge about the volcanic origin of the Canary Islands in an entertaining way, for example, in the form of ‘Volcanic Trivia’ (Ayundamiento El Rosario 2018). Additionally, there are profound scientific concepts on the agenda: The second day aims to inform and educate the audience on the conceptual difference between volcanic hazard and volcanic risk by showing the documentary ‘Reducing Volcanic Risk’ and promoting a subsequent discussion with the audience. (Ayundamiento El Rosario 2018; translated from Spanish by the author)

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Figure 48: Advertisement for the 2018 public education series “Volcanic Window”, with friendly permission of INVOLCAN.

Source: INVOLCAN/ITER.

The conviction of the necessity to convey scientific knowledge about volcanism (up to the basics of complex debates such as ‘hazard versus risk’) to the citizen in a comprehensible way is a pattern that is reflected in large parts of the collected data. This applies to the interviews with people in the fields of science, civil protection, and politics. A geographer of the ULPGC and member of GEOVOL stated: Geomorphologist: One of the good things about the crisis was that it awakened scientists and the Canary Islands government and the desire to transmit education about the volcanic risk and volcanology of the Canary Islands to the population!

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This has been good! And [it] must be sustained over time as part of the education of the Canarian population! On an island like El Hierro, La Palma maybe, Tenerife, a type of training for citizens that should be mandatory, continuous. (10 Apr 2014, ID 55; translated from Spanish by the author) ›Transmit education‹ is a key concept in this context. It means that it is assumed by the scientists that one’s own experiences and attitudes can be transferred to others. In their ›enlightening knowledge‹, which the academics and experts have gained through their education, they see the prospect of capacitating the citizens. An interesting aspect here is that the population’s ›expertisation‹ with regard to volcanic risks has a secondary motive which isn’t so obvious at first glance. Creating a greater awareness of the hazards posed by volcanic activity is a core idea, as this objective is also defined in the PEVOLCA document (see Chapter 3.4.2). However, according to the interviewees, providing volcanic risk education programs for the Canarian citizens may also enable the islanders to better deal with aspects of (scientific) uncertainty. The head of CECOPIN El Hierro puts it this way: Head of CECOPIN El Hierro: And then we have to know how to communicate the uncertainty. The sciences are not exact and there is a margin of error. Then you have to go step by step from some kind of measure, of measures, so that more or less children, the population, will understand, a little bit, that they live on an evidently active volcanic island. And you have to approach it from a positive point of view not negative! […] Every year we offer educational and awareness-raising activities about natural hazards mainly to all schools on the island. [...] So that people can mature about knowing their own environment and where we live. (12 May 2014, ID 25; translated from Spanish by the author) It is evident that (scientific) education is seen as the means to resolve several core problems that have been faced in communication during the crisis. Even with optimal monitoring of seismo-volcanic activity and a solid knowledge of the geological peculiarities of the Canary Islands, a prediction of the development of activity can only be made with great uncertainty (see Chapter 4.4). This uncertainty can only be communicated if the recipients (citizens) understand and accept the rationale behind it. The faith is, that if this is achieved, the citizens are sensitised to volcanic risks while at the same time desensitized against exaggerations. The CECOES Tenerife adopts a similar view: PEVOLCA communications manager: the society must be prepared to receive... uncertainty! To know that nature, that life, is not to be controlled one hundred percent. That’s where I get into pure and hard philosophy. […] A little bit like in the book The Black Swan. And the turkey is fed a hundred days and when it reaches the hundred-and-first day it will think that it will be fed [again], and you kill it to

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eat it. Then who are you in the world, in nature, to say “I control”? (26 May 2014, ID 53; translated from Spanish by the author) The metaphor used by the interview partner refers to the popular book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), which describes ‘black swans’ as extremely unexpected incidents and discoveries that have an high impact. For these rare events, it is characteristic that they are predictable only in hindsight (Möller and Wikman-Svahn 2011, 273; Taleb 2007). The fact that this reference is given in the context of El Hierro events was surprising to me at first, because the general occurrence of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions on the Canary Islands were anything but far-fetched or improbable – at least from the expert’s point of view. From the citizens’ point of view, however, the experience of the volcanic crisis indeed had some of the qualities of a black swan. So it does make sense to take a closer look at the book. Taleb speaks, for example, of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 but also of earthquakes: The probabilities of very rare events are not computable; the effect of an event on us is considerably easier to ascertain (the rarer the event, the fuzzier the odds). We can have a clear idea of the consequences of an event, even if we do not know how likely it is to occur. I don’t know the odds of an earthquake, but I can imagine how San Francisco might be affected by one. This idea that in order to make a decision you need to focus on the consequences (which you can know) rather than the probability (which you can’t know) is the central idea of uncertainty. (Taleb 2007, 210 f.) Taleb’s stance on uncertainty, as a turn away from probabilities towards effects, basically turns the rationale of applied hazard research upside down (see Chapter 8.5.2). Naturally, the consequences of a potential destructive natural event are very important outcomes of hazard research. However, in practice, any assessment of the need for prevention measures against these consequences is based on the probabilities identified. Hence, the CECOES communications manager‘s reference to Taleb’s ideas is quite an exceptional thing, a singularity. The concept of acquiring 100 percent truth and control (and thus security) about the natural phenomenon is surrendered in favour of the acceptance of uncertainty. That is not to be equated with fatalism; on the contrary, the civil protection commissioners are arguing for a differentiated attitude towards the multiplicity of facts and the residual uncertainties associated with this.

8.4.7.

Interim Conclusion: Education as the Solution?

For the members of the field of civil protection, the seismic crisis was primarily constituted by the fact that different opinions existed about the dangers of the event and these different views could not be controlled. This resulted in a particular

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tension between the objective of informing the population as precisely as possible, the danger of the information being falsified by the media, and the danger of being accused of concealment. One solution was seen in building a greater consensus and to deal proactively with the information competitors. The long-term solution is considered to be the (scientific) education of citizens, who ideally understand that there can be no unambiguous truth about the volcanic risks, but that it is nevertheless important to be prepared. Yet, it remains an open question whether educating the public will, in the future, prevent further dilemmas of civil protection on the Canary Islands and in DRR in general. I express this doubt on the basis of several considerations. First, the idea that scientific education enables citizens to adopt the ‘correct’ view on the phenomenon of volcanism is based on the conviction that the experts’ own and individual experiences are transferable to the public. This is doubtful because, as discussed in Chapter 5.1.3, the interchange between two knowledge systems (if one can say that there are such things) is to be understood as a dynamic system. Experience is not transferable one-to-one from one person to another or from one field of practice to another. Neither is science unambiguous nor can it be considered as a meta-language or universal rationale which can bridge the gaps between different spheres of experience. From two truths not one truth will emerge as the ‘victor’, but always new truths will emerge. Second, education is seen as the key to raise awareness in coping with other perils such as anthropogenic climate change (Luís, Vauclair, and Lima 2018). However, it is evident that even in societies with a high level of education and awareness of the risks of climate change, there is still a lack of acceptance for the necessary preventive measures. Doubts also remain about the credibility of scientific ‘facts’. The politicisation of facts makes it impossible to reach a consensus. Third, it is questionable whether the expectations anticipated by the authorities are in line with what citizens actually expect. As the interviews revealed, civil protection and also politicians assume that citizens have the need to obtain unanimous statements about risks in order to prepare themselves appropriately and, at the same time, to continue their everyday lives as smoothly as possible. Different theories on the risks or discord among the scientists regarding their convictions, would lead to confusion, fear, and chaos. ›Speaking with one voice‹, however, creates the risk of increasing distrust towards the authorities. It can even be assumed that the more unambiguity is demonstrated, the more untrustworthy a ‘fact’ becomes. The interviewees perceived this conflict and defended themselves against the accusation of censorship. Interestingly, there was also another solution, namely to teach the population that different truths can stand side by side but that it is nevertheless crucial to prepare for the worst case. Yet for this, the claim to 100 percent truth must be abandoned on both sides.

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The realisation of this is doubtful, as such a disclosure of uncertainties is diametrically opposed to the conventionalised practices of civil protection (as demonstrated in 8.4.2). It is also contrary to the expectations of citizens, who expect scientists, politicians, and the authorities to make unambiguous statements that they can use to orient their actions. It is therefore questionable to what extent these new convictions can be translated into practice.25 Finally, I would like to take a look at the field of science, which has faced problems both similar and different to those of civil protection.

8.5.

Science: The Power of Risk Construction

In the previous chapters, I gave examples of how scientific information has contributed to the conflicts of the seismic crisis: for those affected, scientific information about the risks of volcanism spread and ‘distorted’ by the media became an economic threat (see Chapter 8.3). For civil protection, the diversity and contingency of (scientific) truth about the risks became a problem because control over the information consensus was lost (see Chapter 8.4). In the following, I would like to analyse how this tense role of scientific truth affected the actors from the field of science. In order to better understand their actions and views, I would first like to address the conventionalised practices and underlying rationale of the field of practice of science. Subsequently, I present in detail the statements of two scientific institutions and their particular conflict situation, which has arisen in the context of the seismo-volcanic crisis.

8.5.1.

Eradicating Contingency and The Practice of Mapping Volcanic Risks

In Chapter 4.1 I have already discussed that the ‘instrumental reason’ is of great importance in modern science, but that it is apparently only able to eliminate the mystical aspects of ‘nature’. I also explained that, according to Latour and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar 1986), the credibility of a scientific statement is strongly dependent on social evaluation systems. In addition to these thoughts, I want to point out that the introductory chapters on the geology of the island can be seen as an example of how the contingency of scientific truth is reduced. One example of this is the ‘imperfect’ hot spot model (see Chapter 4.2). Models of this kind provide the basis for reliable reasoning, since they reduce the complexity of processes on the one hand and, on the other, seem to resolve inconsistencies or gaps

25

At the time of the interviews, respondents announced that the PEVOLCA plan will be revised based on the experience of the El Hierro crisis. The changes in this new plan could not be taken into account in this study.

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in explanations by ‘incorporating’ complexity or including exceptional cases. Even if there is no final conclusion about the geological processes behind the islands’ volcanism, models like Carracedo’s ‘modified hot spot model’ (see Carracedo and Pérez-Torrado 2013, 27) or the concept of the ‘rift zones’ serve as a basis for the elimination of contingencies and thus become the ‘reliable’ basis for statements on risk assessment. In one of my interviews, I asked a Canarian geomorphologist (not of those already cited) to put in a nutshell how one could imagine the processes below the island and how risky that volcanism is. He referred mostly to the scientific concepts presented in Chapter 4.2 and 4.3: according to his statements, the Canary Islands’ origins in a volcanic hot spot of which El Hierro is the geologically youngest island thus means the island is still ‘growing’. He described the nature of the volcanic activity as ‘slow’, and of ‘low intensity’, which mainly takes place along three rift zones (thus the triangular shape of the island) and in their prolongation below the sea surface. The seismic activity can be explained by the forces of magma fracturing rocks on its way to the surface. The Ggeomorphologist’s statements about the risks and their localisation derive from such conceptualisations Geomorphologist: [I]t is hard to imagine greater magnitudes than we have had, very hard. The general volcanism does not generate activity of greater categories. Not this type of volcanism! Basic volcanism […] the preferred areas are the rift zones. (10 Apr 2014, ID 55; translated from Spanish by the author). Thus, scientific models and concepts in combination with long-term databases allow scientific statements to be formulated that can have a certain ‘credibility’ – a certain persuasive power. However, as shown in Chapter 4.4, this does not necessarily mean that all scientists believe in the same concepts and, thus, risk estimations based on different concepts can be very different in turn. Moreover, an event such as the seismo-volcanic crisis on El Hierro can be seen as a new scientific experience: a point in time when models and explanations are questioned and new data leads to new conclusions. A closer look to the existing literature about volcanic hazards on El Hierro will make this clearer. As mentioned in Chapter 4.4, El Hierro was considered as one possible candidate for a new eruption well before the seismic crisis of 2011–2012, as the research up to that time and the models based on it indicated. Yet surprisingly, according to the statements of my interview partners in the field of science, explicit volcanic hazard assessment studies about El Hierro were rare or even non-existent before the 2011–2012 seismic crisis. This is already confirmed after a short review of the existing literature. Having a look at Elsevier’s bibliographic database SCOPUS, the keywords ‘hazard’ and ‘El Hierro’ result in only seven listings before 2011, and twenty-two afterwards. In contrast, there are several volcanic hazard studies regarding Tenerife (e.g. Araña et

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al. 2000; Martí, Spence, et al. 2008; Martí, Geyer, et al. 2008). Undoubtedly, it was the 2011 eruption that brought the island into the focus of scientific attention. Many of the studies I found are concerned with describing processes within the submarine volcano rather from thepoint of view of the natural sciences (e.g. Rivera et al. 2013; Troll et al. 2012; Eugenio, Marcello, and Martin 2012). However, there are also several studies concerned with questions regarding emergency management and the social implications of the crisis (e.g. García et al. 2014; Carracedo et al. 2015; Sobradelo et al. 2015). None of the studies listed in SCOPUS before 2011 is concerned explicitly with the assessment of risks emerging from volcanic activity on El Hierro. After the crisis, several studies were published that, based on past eruptive activity, examine the temporal and spatial probability of future eruptions, for example. Others provide maps of lava flow and ash fall scenarios (see Becerril et al. 2014, 2013, 2016; Pedrazzi et al. 2014). Thus, it can be concluded that since the 2011–2012 incident there is now a greater focus on the analysis and assessment of hazards and the calculation of volcanic risks. And it is obvious that it was not the previous prognosis that El Hierro was next candidate for an eruption that was decisive for the interest in further risk studies, but the event of the volcanic eruption itself. As an example of the way volcanic risk is argued after the 2011 incident on El Hierro, I would like to highlight the studies published by Laura Becerril et al. (Becerril et al. 2014) and Dario Pedrazzi et al. (Pedrazzi et al. 2014). As mentioned above (Chapter 4.3), most of El Hierro’s past volcanic activity has been described as effusive and not explosive in character. Also Becerril et al. (2014, 1856) argue that “recent volcanic activity on El Hierro is largely characterised by monogenetic mafic volcanism and the building of more than 220 cones, most of which are scoria cones that correspond to the most recent eruptive cycle (rift volcanism).” It is commonplace that mafic volcanism implies a comparatively lower silica content and thus a low explosive character. Most of the past eruptions on El Hierro are categorised as Hawaiian and Strombolian activity (VEI=0–2). However, the study points out that there are also indications of phreatomagmatic, hydromagmatic, felsic, and violent Strombolian activity in the past (Becerril et al. 2014, 1856 f.). The fact that there are signs of felsic eruptions in the island’s history encourages Pedrazzi et al. (Pedrazzi et al. 2014) to ask if the potential for highly explosive eruptions still exists today on El Hierro. They analysed a pumice deposit of a felsic eruption and highlight that its composition shows similarities with products of the 2011 eruption. Thus, they conclude that the magma below El Hierro “could have the potential for producing a large volume of eruptable felsic magma”. (Pedrazzi et al. 2014, 863). Considering these statements, the possibility of an explosive eruption on El Hierro can not be excluded. The data about past eruptions, collected by numerous scientific studies provide the basis for such argumentation by the authors named above. It is therefore quite justifiable to speculate on the extent to which future

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eruptions could pose a threat to the inhabitants of the island. Apart from this, effusive eruptions also bear a certain risk. In view of the great sensitivity of the Herrenian population to such statements, it is conceivable that such studies could generate a dismissive attitude from them. Especially the common practice of drawing ‘hazard maps’ can hold the potential for conflicts in this context, since maps of this kind give the island another ‘branding’ as a dangerous place. Becerril et al. (2014, 1865) created such a hazard map based on overlaying different scenarios, such as lava flows, pyroclastic density currents (PDCs) and ashfall scenarios. Figure 49 shows this map and a classification of island regions into four hazard levels. The key message of the map is that “although El Hierro is not a highly populated island, some medium- and high-volcanic-hazard zones coincide with some of the main inhabited areas” (Becerril et al. 2014, 1865). This includes wide parts of the El Golfo embayment and zones around Mocanal and Erese, but also Valverde, El Pinar, and La Restinga.

Figure 49: Hazard map of El Hierro, created by Becerril et al. (2014).

The map shows an overview of the integrated volcanic hazard zones for El Hierro based on lava flows, PDCs, and ashfall scenarios. Source: Becerril et al. (2014, 1865).

8.5.2.

The Rationale of the Field of Hazard Research

The example of mapping volcanic hazards on El Hierro demonstrates well the fundamental approach in the field of volcanic hazard research and also points towards

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its limitations. Considering, for example, the work of Becerril et al. (2014), the very principle of scientific practice has not changed much since the beginning of modern scientific practice. Data is collected, ordered, compared, dated and, finally, predictions are developed based on it. But what is empirical data in the context of scientific reasoning? And what is its role in the process of truth-making? Especially in the context of geological processes, a direct empirical access is rarely possible. Witnessing an eruption is the exceptional case in a life of a Canarian volcanologist. The collection of a preferably large amount of data about past events is therefore essential. John Dewey (1994 [1925]) describes this quite impressively with the example of a geologist: The geologist did not leap from the thing he can see and touch to some event in bygone ages; he collated this observed thing with many others, of different kinds, found all over the globe; the results of his comparisons he then compared with data of other experiences, say, the astronomer’s. He translates, that is, observed coexistences into non-observed, inferred sequences. Finally he dates his object, placing it in an order of events. By the same sort of method he predicts that at certain places, some things not yet experienced will be observed, and then he takes pains to bring them within the scope of experience. (Dewey 1994, 4a) With this example, Dewey highlights that experience is the very essence of science and that (scientific) experiences are “of as well as in nature” (Dewey 1994, 4a; emphasis in original). Thus, his concept of experience resolves the dichotomy between subject and object, as well as between nature and experience themselves. Moreover he argues that the “material of experience” of a scientist does not differ essentially from that of “men in the street” (Dewey 1994, 2a). However, the distance between experience and theory is marked by a much longer process and history of reasoning. However, in contrast to laymen’s reasoning, scientific reasoning must rely on data collected with empirical methods; everything else would be dismissed as nonscientific: The investigator assumes as a matter of course that experience, controlled in specifiable ways, is the avenue that leads to the facts and laws of nature. He uses reason and calculation freely; he could not get along without them. (Dewey 1994, 2a) In my view, Dewey’s understanding of scientific reasoning enables us to see ‘data’ as ‘enshrined experience’, and ‘theory’ or scientific models as ‘distilled experiences’. However, Dewey remarks, the term of ‘experience’ won’t be found too often in studies such as those cited in this work (Dewey 1994, 2). According to Dewey, this is attributable to the fact that the term is incorporated so well into sciences that work with empirical methods. Bruno Latour delivers a less benevolent explanation for this absence (Geiselhart et al. 2015, 128 f.). According to Latour, the ‘modern con-

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stitution’ of science involves a strict differentiation between social and natural sciences based on the differentiation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’: In terms of the modern worldview, both of these realms [social and natural sciences] are constantly concerned with what Latour calls a process of ‘purification’ in order to clear their object of investigation from artefacts of the opposite scientific approach. This separation, based on the underlying distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, has become extremely effective in producing research findings applicable in, for instance, disaster medicine or other emergency intervention. (Geiselhart et al. 2015, 129) For the scientific practice of the natural sciences, this means that it is necessary for scientists to largely mask out personal experience or the ‘subjectivity’ of the data and the statements derived from them, since everything social or cultural is perceived as weakening the credibility of scientific ‘facts’. It is therefore imperative for scientists that they, above all, present and prove the quality of their data to the outside world. Considering scientific work as a social practice, however, the social and personal qualities of the researcher and his or her research institute are not negligible. In Chapter 4.4 I have given an example of how, in the time before the seismovolcanic crisis on El Hierro, there were already public disputes and polemical arguments among scientists. The case of the 2004 seismic crisis of Tenerife has shown that in public individual scientists and their character can have a great influence on the credibility of their statements (Textbox 5). In the context of the seismovolcanic crisis on El Hierro, similar conflict situations arose. Two of the scientific institutions involved play a particularly important role here: the IGN and INVOLCAN. In the next sections I will explore the idea that the ‘polemical’ disputes (in the media) between different scientists can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, as consequences of different worlds of scientific experience; and on the other hand, as a rupture of the field’s rationale caused by the singular experience that the credibility of the data is also made dependent on social actions.

8.5.3.

IGN – Scientific Power by Decree

As it has became clear through the observations and statements of the interview partners presented so far, the state-run Instituto Geográphico Nacional (IGN) has been the most important scientific institution in the context of the events on El Hierro. The PEVOLCA plan has had a vital impact in this respect, as it puts the state in charge of drawing up a general disaster response plan against volcanic risks. This includes, as mentioned in Chapter 3.4.2, the establishment of a volcanic monitoring system. The responsibility of the government is to:

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[e]stablish the system and procedures for reporting and monitoring volcanic phenomena, to be used for civil protection purposes. This implies developing the volcanic surveillance system that guarantees the identification of possible precursor signs of eruptive crises in the Canary Islands archipelago and being able to provide the Government of the Canary Islands with the necessary information in real time on the basic elements that will help to determine each phase and situation of the emergency, anticipating the dangers with specific action plans in the sectors to be affected. (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18737; translated from Spanish by the author) Further, the document contains a very important detail which designates the IGN as being in charge of volcanic vigilance. As a state-run public service institution under the administration of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Fomento), the IGN has its headquarters in Madrid and a regional bureau in Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Its designated tasks include detection, mapping, risk evaluation, and risk communication regarding volcanic events (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18737 f.) (see Chapter 3.4.2). The Canarian government and the islands’ individual municipal governments (cabildos), on the other hand, are responsible for drawing up local action plans and implementing them. These include mostly concrete civil protection measures, such as evacuations (Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18933 ff.). Thus, PEVOLCA constitutes a priori a political (and spatial) separation of risk construction (state level) and risk coping/management (local level). This division has far-reaching consequences, both for the institutions’ general spheres of influence and for the assertiveness of their risk constructions. The most important player in the context of volcanic risk construction is therefore, by definition, the IGN. Yet, as will become apparent in the following, this status has been challenged to a great extent. It is important to highlight that the PEVOLCA document contains the recommendation for widespread participation in the scientific committee, but at the beginning of the crisis, mainly the state-run organisations IGN, AEMET, and CECIC took part in it. Many of the Canary Islands experts (e.g. from the two local universities and the Canary Islands Volcanological Station) felt excluded (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012, 20). It was not until November 2011 that additional experts from the Estación Volcanológica de Canarias (PPNO-CSIC) and the two Canary Island universities (ULL and ULPGC) were brought onto the PEVOLCA scientific committee (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012, 24). Among the scientists of these neglected institutions, this fostered a lasting dispute between the scientists of these neglected institutions and other committee members about the ‘mismanagement’ of the crisis and public quarrels.

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In particular, the accusation of inaction was made. In hindsight, Carracedo et al. (Carracedo et al. 2015, 193) criticise the late deployment of a bathymetric vessel and makes this responsible for the uncertainties about the eruption’s explosiveness. The lack of bathymetric information during the initial weeks of the crisis was probably a major factor in the road closures and evacuations of the initial eruptive phase due to the very high uncertainties at that point […]. We now know that the explosivity of the submarine eruption never reached a critical level, although the summit of the vent complex grew to a height of about 88 m b.s.l. at one point, but the eruption was, however, waning at that stage. (Carracedo et al. 2015, 193) But it was not only university scientists who criticized the PEVOLCA authorities. A special rival developed in INVOLCAN, which fundamentally criticized the approach and the role of the IGN.

8.5.4.

INVOLCAN – Fighting for Volcanic Autonomy

Interestingly, the IGN has not always played this paramount role. However, it did well before the release of the PEVOLCA document in 2010: the main responsibility for volcanic monitoring on the Canary Islands was transferred to the IGN as a reaction to the 2004 seismic crisis on Tenerife by enactment of a royal decree (see Boletín Oficial de Canarias 2010, 140:18738). According to the speaker of INVOLCAN (Instituto Volcanológico de Canarias), several scientific institutions were dedicated to volcanic monitoring back then: ITER (Instituto Technológico y de Energias Renovables), CECIC, and the IGN. However, the implementation of the law in 2004 marks a turning point in their relationship with each other as competition and dividedness between the institutions increased: Speaker of INVOLCAN: I think many problems start with this. Many of the current problems that we have in Spain about volcanic risk management start in 2004. This is my personal opinion. One is this for example: until 2004 I belonged to ITER […]. But that was not the only institution with an obligation to do the volcanic monitoring. Okay? There was a coexistence of several institutions without major problems, no? But in the middle of the crisis in Tenerife, El Ministrio del Fomento (Ministry of Development), in the parliament of the mainland in Spain wrote into law that the IGN, from that moment, was going to be the organisation in charge of volcanic monitoring in Spain. Without any consultation with the Canary Islands. And as you know from a political point of view, the political system in Spain is not centralized, we have different autonomous regions, autonomous! So the volcanic risk is the responsibility of both, national government and autonomic region. [...] For me that was really a shock. (25 Mar 2014, ID 56)

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However, it was less the perceived loss of political autonomy and more the lack of appreciation of previous efforts and that one’s personal competences, and those of other Canarian scientists, were not included in these management efforts, which had a highly insulting effect on the interviewee. As a consequence, the efforts to establish a fully-fledged, independent Canarian Institute of Volcanology as a complement to the IGN have been met with much enthusiasm. In 2005, shortly after the reorganizational events of the previous year, a group of scientists persuaded some government bodies to enact a decision to bundle all resources for volcanic monitoring into one single institution: Speaker of INVOLCAN: a collective a group of scientists from the mainland and from the Canary Islands was to persuade the senate to pass a motion that says that all the human resources and technical resources that the different administrations and public institutions in Spain have for the scientific management of volcanic risk should be integrated into one institution – to one team, the effectiveness of the effort, of the public effort. And that institution was going to be INVOLCAN. (25 Mar 2014, ID 56) According to the interviewee and a Madrilenian online newspaper (Montero 2016), the motion was approved in the years 2005 and 2006 by various political bodies, including the upper house of the Spanish parliament and the Canarian parliament. Yet, the process dragged on for years. Finally, former prime minister Zapatero spoke out in favour of implementing the decisions in 2009 which facilitated the foundation of INVOLCAN as a dependency of ITER in the year 2010. The hesitant implementation of the idea of a Canary Institute of Volcanology is blamed on lobbying by state research institutions and a lack of awareness on the part of the Canary Islands: Speaker of INVOLCAN: So decisions taken by unanimity in 2005 were, in 2009, not accomplished. Which gives you an idea about the poor view that Spanish society, especially people in the government, have about volcanic risk management. (25 Mar 2014, ID 56) Since its foundation, INVOLCAN has promoted its vision of an integrative approach to volcanic monitoring, meaning a greater appreciation of geochemical monitoring in combination with an improved monitoring of seismic activity and deformation. Yet, despite the support of the prime minister, the organisation still seems to struggle in enforcing their demands for a greater role in decision taking. The interviewed speaker of INVOLCAN depicts the organisation as neglected by national and regional politicians, criticises its lack of funding, and questions the competence and diligence of the IGN. As a counter-image to the IGN, he highlights the long-term efforts of the INVOLCAN in performing scientific fieldwork and in raising public awareness of volcanic hazards through events such as Canarias: una

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

ventana volcánica en el Atlántico (Canary Islands: A volcanic window in the Atlantic Ocean) (see Chapter 8.4.6). The struggle between the two institutions repeatedly led to open confrontation in the regional media, especially in concurrence with the emergence of ‘seismic crises’ such as those on Tenerife in 2004 on El Hierro in 2011. But, the quarrels among the two institutes are not only fought through the islands’ media. Also in international scientific journals, including the Bulletin of Volcanology, the dispute articulated with varying degrees of subtlety. A paper published mainly by members of INVOLCAN and ITER about the evidence of a (second) submarine eruption in 2012 west of El Hierro was subsequently harshly dismissed by Blanco et al., authors associated with the IGN and the IEO (see Pérez et al. 2014; Blanco et al. 2015): We have critically reviewed the content of that article and conclude that the data (some of which is inexactly interpreted or not correctly georeferenced) do not support the existence of a second eruption on the Island of El Hierro. (Blanco et al. 2015, 61) In response, Perez et al. (2015) (INVOLCAN) added further argumentation, coming to the conclusion that the data used by the authors of the above criticism, Blanco et al. (2015) (IGN), do not provide a sufficient basis to argue either for or against an eruption. Additionally, Perez et al. stress the need for open debate and free access to all data. Their main accusation, however, is that of ›data-protectionism and even concealment‹: When the exploration was carried out [by the research vessel] on June 28 following a request of the institution in charge of volcano monitoring in Spain (IGN), acoustic imaging data were recorded. These data were never shared with the scientific committee responsible for advising Civil Protection Authorities in the Canary Islands. The lack of sharing scientific information among the members of the scientific committee causes damage to open scientific discussions, but also is detrimental for timely forecasting of sudden/instantaneous dynamic events related to the volcanic phenomena. (Pérez et al. 2015, 4). This debate has since been further intensified and now reads like a science thriller: the accusation that the IGN withheld seismic data regarding a series of earthquakes close to Tenerife back in 2010 triggered an escalation of the dispute between the institutions. In an open letter to the IGN, signed by more than fifty regional and international scientists, the IGN is accused of withholding information and hampering access to their data: INVOLCAN has had to refer to the National Seismic Catalogue as the only source of information about the seismic activity registered on Tenerife and its surroundings, but that does not include a great quantity of data […]. This concealment of

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information puts at risk the advisory activity that INVOLCAN scientists do within the Scientific Committee for the Direction of PEVOLCA. (La Opinión de Tenerife 2015; translated from Spanish by the author) At the international congress of the European Geosciences Union (EGU) in Vienna, there was even talk of a “secret B-account” of seismic data that only IGN personnel had access to. According to the accusation by members of INVOLCAN and wellknown volcanologists, including Hans-Ulrich Schmincke, more than one thousand earthquakes were wilfully removed from the IGN’s public earthquake catalogue in 2010. According to the scientists, measurements of CO2 emissions taken during the same period clearly indicate earthquake activity is missing from the record, as the CO2 levels measured correlate well with increased seismo-volcanic activity (Montero 2016). In addition to levelling these accusations, INVOLCAN announced its resignation from the scientific committee of PEVOLCA: This flagrant concealment of public data from the Canary Islands society and from the scientists of INVOLCAN may have undesirable legal consequences due to liability derived from incorrect advice based on biased information provided solely by the IGN website. Faced with this situation, the scientists of INVOLCAN have taken the decision not to continue participating in the meetings of the scientific committee of PEVOLCA until the responsibilities related to these serious anomalies, which affect a public service aimed at guaranteeing the safety of the people living in these islands, are corrected and clearly defined. (Millet 2015; translated from Spanish by the author) At least for the time being, this can be seen as the climax of the conflict. But how can this be understood in the overall context of what has been discussed so far?

8.5.5.

Contingent Scientific Legitimacy – “Who Has the Seismic Network Has the Power”

Given the magnitude of the dispute between the two institutions, it appears that this escalation has other, more profound causes that go beyond personal and scientific differences. A number of distinct aspects can be brought into consideration: First, looking at the story surrounding the founding of INVOLCAN, obviously the question of ›political and institutional legitimacy‹ plays a major role. Considering the political dimension, this can be seen in the light of the Canary Islands’ general desire for autonomy (see Chapter 3.3). Although PEVOLCA has many elements that place the Canary Islands government and local institutions in responsible positions, the main responsibility for volcano monitoring lies with institutions associated with Madrid. The transfer of this responsibility into the hands of a Ca-

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

nary Islands Volcanological Institute therefore also implies increased autonomy and, in turn, a weakened influence of the national government. Second, since both institutions operate their own monitoring systems, the control and expansion of the systems, including the sovereignty over the interpretation of data are of particular importance. In other words, the quarrel is fought on the level of legitimacy, both in terms of legal authority and of possessing a (better) scientific database. Since both elements of this legitimacy are highly contingent (see Chapter 8.5.4, Chapter 4.4), representatives of both institutions have to assert their legitimacy practically continuously. One result is that both spokespersons of the institutes repeatedly emphasize that the roles they respectively claim are ›justified by law‹. However, the actual fight is waged on the basis of their scientific arguments. A particularly critical area of conflict emerges with regard to seismic data (see Textbox 12).

Textbox 12: The Seismic Network of the IGN   Especially in the beginning of the El Hierro crisis, key technology for the geoscientific observation of seismic incidents was the seismic monitoring network run by the IGN. In 2016, the Spanish seismic network includes over seventy active stations in total, with twenty-four of them distributed in uneven density across the seven Canary Islands. For comparison: the Hawaiian network consists of around sixty stations (USGS 2016). El Hierro is equipped with nine active stations, and Tenerife with four stations (IGN 2016a, 2016b). However, before the onset of the seismic crisis in 2011, El Hierro was quite sparsely equipped. Only two stations were permanently active on the island.26 In spring 2011, monitoring scientists observed an extraordinary increase of seismic activity in the region of El Hierro, and thus the island’s network was extended with eight additional stations, as well as several geochemical sensors and GPS stations for the monitoring of surface movement and deformation. As a result, it was then possible to track the development of seismic activity from its very beginning. It is often highlighted that for the geoscientific research on the Canary Islands this was the first chance to observe, record, and communicate such a process virtually in real time (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012, 10). Another feature of this technical upgrade is that the stations’ data has been made available in the form of a live feed on the website of the IGN. To this day, a special section of the IGN’s website27 provides constantly updated maps and visualisations of the island’s seismic activity (Figure 50). In addition to the locations of the events and graphical displays of seismicity waveforms, histograms and graphs about the measured deformations have also been made available to the public. Moreover, a small pictogram of a traffic light indicates the alert level, as declared by the PEVOLCA committee.

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Figure 50: Screenshot of the IGN’s “Serie El Hierro” webpage (as of 10 Apr 2013).

Behind each graph, detailed daily information and reports can be downloaded. Source: IGN (http://www.ign.es/ign/resources/volcanologia/HIERRO.html).

One important point in this area of conflict is that, although a significant amount of Spain’s seismic activity takes place in the archipelago of the Canary Islands, the main responsibility of receiving and analysing the network’s data around the clock lies with the IGN’s seismic data centre located in Madrid. The head of the Canarian Geophysical Centre of the IGN explains this contradiction by the necessity of a centralised and steady monitoring system including staff resources that can only be provided by the IGN in Madrid. As the leading role now held the IGN is contested by INVOLCAN (and maybe other scientists), the significance of this unique twentyfour-hour monitoring system is highlighted very often (22 May 2014, ID 51). The monitoring system of the IGN is thus an important pillar supporting the legitimacy of the institute’s leading role. In turn, however, the seismic network represents a target for criticism. Notwithstanding the fact that the submarine eruption triggered a significant technical upgrade of the monitoring system (see Textbox 12), 26

27

According to Pérez-Torrado et al. (Pérez-Torrado et al. 2012, 10), one digital system was located in the southeast of the island, transmitting via satellite to the IGN. Another analoguebased system was located in the island’s capital, Valverde. http://www.ign.es/ign/resources/volcanologia/HIERRO.html

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

the IGN is accused of having overslept in equipping the El Hierro with additional sensors in the time before the eruption. Additionally, it is stressed by the speaker of INVOLCAN that monitoring cannot only be based on seismic sensors but must also be accompanied by sensors for ground deformation and gas emission: Speaker of INVOLCAN: IGN has been in charge of volcanic monitoring in this country since 2004. When the seismic crisis started in 2011, do you know how many resources they had in El Hierro for volcanic monitoring? The same resources there were in 2003, before they assumed responsibility. For seven years they do nothing in El Hierro. [...] [I]n seven years they never set up any more seismometers, any GPS stations, any continuous geochemical stations. They just have only two seismometers [there]. (25 Mar 2014, ID 56) Despite this ex post critique, the upgrade of the seismic network in combination with the improved public accessibility to the seismic data made the IGN’s seismic network play a crucial role in the perception of the event. Most of the interview partners on El Hierro mentioned the IGN website as an important source of information, and many of them stated that they checked the page daily, even hourly, in the course of the crisis. Figure 51 shows two examples of graphs that have been provided on the IGN web page.

Figure 51: Two examples of graphs provided on the IGN website “Serie El Hierro”.

The map on the left depicts the locations of seismic activity in a timespan of fifteen days (21 Mar 2013–04 Apr 2013). The chart on the right shows the twenty-four-hour live data of one of the seismic stations on El Hierro on 21 March 2013. On this day, more than one hundred smaller tremors were registered, with the largest ripple on the graph at 22:52 indicating a 3.8 earthquake. Source: IGN (http://www.ign.es/ign/resources/volcanologia/HIERRO.html).

But precisely the public availability of this ‘real-time data’ is a point of criticism. The graphics and data sets made available online by the IGN are assumed to be

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too difficult for citizens to interpret. This criticism has been voiced by a number of the affected neighbours, politicians, and scientists, as well as civil protection personnel (see Chapter 8.4.1). The speaker of INVOLCAN’s criticism is that due to a lack of further explanations on the website, the significance of the data is likely to be misinterpreted by most of its ‘non-expert’ audience. In this respect, the publication of this data becomes a delicate matter. As one scientist of the ULPGC feels, Geomorphologist: scientists’ data is usually understood by scientists and most of the population doesn’t understand what this or that means. It’s not bad that it is there, but I have that limitation, right? It’s a kind of information, I'm not saying it should be reserved for scientists, but they should have the exclusive [right] on whether or not it is published. (10 Apr 2014, ID 55; translated from Spanish by the author) The statement about the exclusive right to publication shows that at the interface between science and the public data takes on a different dimension of meaning for the scientists. It is therefore comprehensible that the IGN’s dual role as a scientific institution and as a leading body of the civil protection plan resulted in a particularly tense relationship with the data. The role of responsibility resulting from the tasks of civil protection apparently created a different perspective on the handling of data, at least with respect to the outside world. The head of the IGN in Tenerife expresses the situation of the IGN compared to that of other scientists as follows: Chief of IGN Tenerife: It’s like in a family: parents are responsible for their children’s education. The grandparents, the uncles, the friends of the family can spoil them, in the good sense of the word, by giving them what they want. But those who mark the evolution of the children’s development are the parents. Because they are responsible for their education and here it is the same: may it be that we all have to have an opinion, but [...] the only institution that has [the responsibility] is the [IGN]. And this makes the point of view completely different. We have to maintain the instrumentation, we have to produce daily reports, we even have to maintain shifts of personnel who are not on duty, but we keep them twenty-four hours a day for several months, in a unit as small as you are seeing. And this is done because we assume the responsibility and we are unable to have the information in real time because we do not know the speed with which this phenomenon will evolve. So this is an intensity of work, which many others have, but they have it without responsibility. And responsibility makes the fundamental difference! (22 May 2014, ID 51; translated from Spanish by the author) Thus, the dual nature of the IGN as both a scientific and a civil protection body has the consequence that the scientific practice of open exchange of opinions is questioned. Instead, its responsibility towards citizens is emphasised as a decisive

8. Disaster Experiences in Rivalling Fields of Practice

factor. This does not mean that the IGN has abandoned scientific standards, but rather that the implications of the data in relation to the public are decisive for how they are handled. This has the result that a similar conflict emerges as has already been addressed in civil protection (see Chapter 8.4.3). The call for scientific consensus also brings with it risk of being accused of concealment. The ‘midpoint practice’ that emerged in the field of civil protection thus leads to an enormous social and professional tension among the scientists. The struggle of the two institutions for sovereignty of interpretation ultimately resulted in a further increase in the contingency of scientific truth. The individual scientists tried to counteract this by highlighting the legal legitimacy of their respective institutions, their personal expertise or their institutions’ special technical equipment. Thus, the role of data is also of primary importance: the data, their interpretation, and the control over their dissemination all become essential instruments for stabilising both the power relations between the institutes and the reactions of the public. Thus, for the scientists, the volcanic monitoring systems become instruments of power: the speaker of INVOLCAN sums things up: Speaker of INVOLCAN: a long time ago a volcanologist from the Azores which right now is the chancellor of Azores told me [...]: Who has the seismic network has the power! And I just laughed about it. Because, first I am not seismologist, but I understood with time. And it is true. (25 Mar 2014, ID 56) It is therefore not surprising that INVOLCAN is making great efforts to expand its own monitoring system and has also recently started to publish data from such monitoring on its homepage, including safety information for the public. Finally, the examination of the field of science shows that in the context of the crisis major disputes about the participation and legitimacy of scientific personalities and institutes have flared up. In the conflict between media, civil defence, and affected neighbours, the data on volcanic activity acquired a critical significance. In the following concluding consideration, I will place this in the overall context of this study and DRR.

8.6.

Summary: Rivalling Fields of Practice in the Case of El Hierro’s Seismic Crisis

I would like to finally conclude my empirical observations. Chapter 8 explored the seismo-volcanic crisis of El Hierro from the viewpoints of different fields of practice. First, it was analysed how the reporting on the event, and the tendency of individual media to stage a disaster, has generated a counter-reaction in the field of

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those affected by the crisis. In order to outshine the negative images of the media, positive aspects of volcanic eruption and volcanism in general were highlighted by individual actors. In the fight against the ‘alarmist’ or ‘false’ disaster narratives of the media, there were also cases of tabooing statements about risks as well as a general scepticism towards doings and sayings that could potentially contribute to the disaster images. Throughout the entire period of the crisis, there was a tugof-war between normalising and catastrophising narratives. Overall, this led to a great rift between the different images of ‘volcanic risk’. Consequently, the interpretation of risk remained highly ambiguous. Since the identity patterns of ‘being Herreño’ very well incorporated the island’s adverse circumstances, these gained new significance. Together with the practices of counter-staging, a certain degree of normalisation and stabilisation has been achieved. It also became evident how the information policy of civil protection and the educational campaigns of Canarian scientists have contributed to this process with their ‘normalising’ framings. However, the objective of the transfer of the technical-scientific rationale to the citizens, respectively the logic of training every citizen to become a mini-expert in volcanology, was viewed with scepticism by individual persons – both experts and laypeople. Second, in the field of civil protection, it was shown how civil protection experts developed a high level of sensitivity towards the feelings of the affected neighbours, which focused on concerns that the ‘alarmist’ images in the media were harmful for their island’s economy. As a result, scientific-technical information about the development of earthquake activity or the use of concrete civil protection measures ran the risk of being rewritten into disaster stories by the media and online blogs. In addition, various and diverging ‘theories of risk’ based on the scientific statements of experts and speculation-loaded stories of ‘hobby scientists’ were publicly discussed. The risk of losing control over the information and over its interpretation thus added to the risk of volcanic hazard from the perspective of civil protection. Concerned about further media ‘exaggeration’, confusion, and distrust among the population, strategies had to be developed to better control the flow of information. On the one hand, this resulted in a reduction of public information to a minimum and, on the other hand, the objective of creating a greater public consensus among scientists. The result was a balancing act of providing just enough information to ensure public safety without being accused of concealment. Moreover, the representation of the situation as ‘normality’ in contrast to the disaster images in the media further contributed to the ambiguity experienced on the part of the Herrenians. In order to resolve this dilemma in the long term, the aim of the interviewed experts is now to achieve better information control on the one hand and a population with a better scientific education on the other. Interestingly, the educational objective also includes the abandonment of the idea of an unambiguous, scientific

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truth: in other words, the reorientation of the population towards the idea that there can be no 100-percent conclusive risk estimation. Third, the conflict that arose in the field of science is closely related to these observations. The question of participation in the PEVOLCA decisions, or the question of who is part of the PEVOLCA Scientific Committee and to what extent, can be seen as the starting point of the dispute among scientists. The actual phenomenon, however, resulted from the interaction with other fields: Despite the great residual uncertainties regarding the geological mechanisms of the Canary Islands’ volcanism, there was a need for consensus on risk assessment towards civil protection and the population. The otherwise very productive public discussion culture of the scientists thus became part of the risk. In this process, the tensions between the staterun IGN and the Canary Islands’ INVOLCAN culminated in a struggle for scientific legitimacy. Access to the data and control of the volcanic monitoring system gained a special explosiveness in this respect, especially since real-time earthquake data became the pivotal point of public information sourcing. Overall, it can be said that the interviewed scientists have experienced a rupture in their own conviction that data quality is the decisive criterion for the credibility of data. At the crossroads with the public sphere, complex social games come into effect; the credibility of expert statements had to be creatively generated by individual scientists. However, the availability and generation of data (monitoring) have become an instrument of political legitimacy for the institutes, which is highly problematic. At this point, I would like to note that some readers might have found it useful to visualise the various fields of practice and each of their ways of thinking. It was important to me to describe the fields of practice and the individuals in their interdependence. Therefore, I started mapping the all the codes, concepts, and categories in a large code-relation network view. It helped me to structure this work; however, I refrained from publishing such a visualisation, since a static mapping cannot do justice to the dynamics of the relationships between the fields. Depending on the standpoint, the view would have been different. Therefore, it is not useful to reduce all these relationships and their dynamics to a simplified model, even if this appears tempting. As the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thích-Nhất-Hạnh notes: “When we are able to perceive things in the light of interdependence, one day the true nature of reality will reveal itself” (Thích-Nhất-Hạnh and Geist 2003, 178, translated from German). Thus, it must be the goal to focus on the mutual relatedness of the things that we encounter as phenomena.

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9. Conclusion: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice

This book has examined the seismo-volcanic crisis of El Hierro from the perspectives of various fields of practice and the individuals involved in them. The ways of thinking, patterns of interpretation and modes of action prevailing in the fields were described, and it was then examined how they came into conflict with each other: First, we have the field of the affected islanders, who, from their perspective, often perceived the measures of civil protection as exaggerated and the media to be dominated by panic-mongering. Nourished by the island’s cultural identity, they have developed creative practices to counteract ‘catastrophic’ images (cf. Chapter 8.3 f.). Then, there is the field of civil protection, where practitioners have fallen into a dilemma regarding their primary task of informing and protecting the population. Due to the adverse economic effects the ‘negative’ reporting and ‘exaggerated’ safety measures have had on El Hierro’s tourism, the measures themselves, as well as the potential loss of control over the interpretation of technical and scientific information, became viewed as the true risks for the experts in this field (cf. Chapter 8.4). And finally, we come to the field of science, which struggled to meet public demand for an unambiguous risk evaluation due to remaining uncertainties and the plurality of scientific findings. Moreover, in the context of institutional and individual disputes, experts became embroiled in power struggles over the sovereignty to interpret scientific ‘truth’ (cf. Chapter 8.5). It became apparent that these conflicting disaster experiences were an important driver in turning the relatively harmless natural event into an actual disaster. Individuals’ creative handling of this situation and their spontaneous solutions were the key to overcoming the adverse effects of this crisis. These solutions were also the starting point for eradicating ambiguity and restoring a feeling of continuity, normality and security. Towards a New Perspective: Social Change Takes Place in the Arena of Singularities With the analysis of the seismo-volcanic crisis from the perspective of the fields of practice, I suggested an alternative view of disasters. I analysed the nature of the fields’ underlying rationales and the conventionalised practices connected to

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them. In this way, the earthquake event appeared as a situation in which the different rationales collided, and as a result, conventionalized practices were questioned, altered, and (re-)invented. It was shown that the difference between the fields’ worlds of experience and the associated views on risk led to great tensions and ambiguities. Whereas other approaches would try to eradicate these ambiguities through the investigation of ‘positive’ knowledge, a new perspective emerged from a perspective based on pragmatism and practice theory. It is precisely the gap between the different rationales that acts as a motor of singular solutions. Adaptation, reconciliation, hybridisation and, thus, social change take place in the arena of singularities, in the ‘in-between’ or the ‘beyond’ of different realities. Social dynamics happen at the level of individual experience, in which individuals develop new strategies or objectives within critical situations. In this way they challenge conventionalised practices and thus plant the seed for change in their ‘own’ but also in other fields of practice. Examples of this were Herrenians who strategically published ‘counter-images’ in order to alter the ‘image’ of volcanic risks, local journalists who carefully managed their vocabulary in order to not contribute to disaster narratives, discussions in digital newspapers in which singular risk assessments could be shared and discussed without dependence on the rationales of the dominant fields, and a civil protection manager who gave up her claim to an non-contingent science in favour of the multiplicity of interpretations. The latter example is of great importance, especially with regard to the field of science, because, as shown in Chapter 8.5, a hegemonic claim to scientific truth has great potential for conflict. It is my personal opinion that instead of putting one’s strength into a struggle for scientific legitimacy it might be more sensitive to accept one’s own contingency and to value and acknowledge different scientific working methods and the various truths they produce. Ambiguities should not be compulsively ‘eradicated’ by the natural sciences; rather, in the sense of a pragmatist approach, it is perhaps an option to allow different statements about potential risks to stand side by side. In this respect, the idea of training society to be aware of ‘scientific insecurity’ instead of only aware of its level/degree of safety is very worth pursuing. At this point, it should be emphasized once again that, despite all truth relativism, there can and should be a better-founded truth (about risks), but a dogma of truth and consensus does not create trust but rather distrust and rejection among the ‘non-expert’ population. In my opinion it certainly makes sense and is useful to stand against disaster stagings guided by profit interests or mere panic-mongering and to actively counteract them. Currently, reports of earthquake activity in the digital media still lead to similar reactions in the social media and to disputes among scientists. Only recently, in May 2018, a British newspaper reported about a potential ‘mega-eruption’ of the

9. Conclusion: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice

Mount Teide due to a series of earthquakes, and this triggered fierce counter-reactions by INVOLCAN (see Blanco 2018; Diario de Avisos 2018). The actual volcanic crisis of the Canary Islands (the dilemmas presented above) does not, therefore, appear to have been overcome and could return to a similar dynamic in the event of a new volcanic eruption or stronger seismic activity. Significance of the Case Study for the Current Debate in Disaster Risk Reduction In conclusion, I would like to place the empirical observations in the overall context of this work. The first priority of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 (UNISDR 2015, 14 f.) calls for a (better) understanding of disaster risk. This also addresses the idea of a better understanding of the views of those affected by risks. In the practice of current risk research, this means investigating why something is done or thought of in a certain way. Often these ‘understandings’ and the resulting actions are conceptualised as socially shaped perceptions, culturally determined world views, or otherwise fixed schemes of interpretation. It has long been recognised that there can often be very different views of the same thing and that there is a ‘gap’ between the different interpretations. Accordingly, literature frequently refers to a gap between different logics or knowledge systems. Despite the acknowledgement of the existence of distinct risk perceptions, from the perspective of those who consider disasters as ‘avoidable’ in hindsight, the question still arises as to whose interpretations and whose actions were more ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’. The theoretical and empirical work of this thesis has shown that from a truthrelativistic perspective there is no point of view that is more rational than another. Every truth is well founded in experience and validated in everyday practice. A dynamic understanding of ‘culture’ and a consistent truth relativism in combination with a detachment from dualisms is a possible way to answer open questions within DRR. In order to break down the dualisms of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, ‘local’ and ‘Western’, ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘non-expert knowledge’, and ‘individual’ and ‘collective’, the approach presented above highlights the situational and interactional character of social praxis in the context of disaster risk. In this respect, also ‘science’ has to be understood as a product of individual experience: as a part of praxis where certain rationales are conventionalised, acted out, but also questioned continuously in interaction with other fields. This work has shown that a ‘disaster’ can be described as rivalling fields of practice and the emergence of experiences. In the case of El Hierro, the seismic crisis fostered the interaction of different institutional logics: local, regional, and international interests embodied by different scientific communities; institutions of civil protection; political actors; and the media. Thus, the focus of DRR has to lie on stabilised forms of different fields of practice and their ways of interaction.

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Especially in situations that are referred to as a ‘crisis’ or a ‘disaster’, different fields of practice are forced to interact, and, in their rivalling interplay, this causes ruptures on the level of individual experience. Those singularities – singular events or singular personal positions – contradict common hegemonic patterns of saying and doing. Singularities are the space of alliances and creativity: they are the driver of adaptation and thus can be understood as the motor of social change in the context of disaster risk. Singularities are key for a better understanding of different disaster risk productions and their dynamics. It has been shown that the construction, or rather the production, of risks is a highly dynamic and interactive process and takes place in the gaps, in the ‘inbetween’, of different collective worlds of experience. Through crises or disastrous situations, individuals experience ruptures on the level of everyday life and, in order to regain stability and continuity, can develop new strategies and objectives by creatively dealing with crisis-generated challenges. These new convictions, in turn, can have an influence on the rationales of superordinate fields of practice. In this respect, risk is always a product of society as a whole. In my opinion, social processes in the context of risks should not be described as a system; rather, it should be accepted that society and its change emerge from the juxtaposition of different worlds of experience. The gaps between them are the ‘interfaces’ of these worlds, and the dynamics of change are characterised by contradiction and ambiguity. If this is taken into account, it is the contradictions and not the syntheses that should be considered as the result of research. This way of thinking may also bring a new understanding of a society’s ‘vulnerability’ or ‘resilience’. The smaller the possibility for singularities and thus the break-up of existing path dependencies within stabilised practice fields, the less likely creative adaptation to the situation is. The question of resilience or vulnerability could be posed at the intersections of the fields of practice – at the gaps between the rationales and their associated social dynamics. This consideration could be explored with the help of a further case study if the question is asked to what extent singular solutions are able to emerge in a different disaster context and to what extent these singularities have an influence on the superordinate fields of practice. Thoughts for Further Research One main argument of this work is that rivalling interpretations and handlings of risk should not be understood as an exceptional phenomenon, an undesirable side effect or generally as an ‘error in the system’. Rather, rivalling interpretations of risks and the resulting ruptures are core elements that determine how societies experience crises and disasters. Only the breakdown of essential continuities and the confluence of different truths can turn a hazardous situation into the societal experience of a crisis or catastrophe. Encounters and conflicts between different

9. Conclusion: Disaster Experiences Emerging from Rivalling Fields of Practice

attitudes and modes of action must therefore always be taken into account in risk and disaster research as well as in intervention practice. Hazards can cause the emergence of controversial images of risk; this might not happen directly, but because people are situated in very different fields of practice, disastrous events trigger a multiverse of disaster experiences. Just as our lifeworlds and the fields of practice we are situated in vary, the ruptures caused by an event will vary as well. Encounters between the different attitudes and practices evolving from these ruptures propels the experience of ambiguity and insecurity. Looking at the ‘gaps’ between different rationales of different fields of practice provides insight into the nature of rivalling disaster experiences and is a crucial element for a better understanding of people’s different ways of handling and evaluating risks. Dealings with risks have to be analysed in the practical context of the actors’ worlds of experience, and dismissing them as ‘irrational’ should be avoided. Mitigation should be rethought as mediation. If this understanding is taken to heart, the perspective developed in this book provides an enriched view of other disastrous situations such as the social upheavals caused by the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. In the context of these topics, it is evident that rivalling interpretations are causing profound social conflicts. Obviously, the effects of these conflicts are a growing challenge for the management of crises. The case study of a seismo-volcanic crisis indicates that the plurality of information and the “loss of control” over the interpretation of scientific information can be regarded as core problems in societal coping with crises and disasters. Future research should therefore examine the role these phenomena play in other risk and disaster contexts. I would like to briefly illustrate this with two up-to-date examples: If we look at the social controversies related to the global climate crisis, scepticism about scientific facts is on the rise. Climate researchers are trying to counter this by providing further scientific facts and explanations (cf. Skeptical Science 2020). However, despite all these efforts, parts of the population even reject scientific information, and there is still a lack of political will to stop the negative effects our way of life causes the environment and the earth’s climate. Society is increasingly polarised. Sceptics reject forecasts on the impact of climate change as ‘scaremongering’, while groups such as Fridays for Future warn against playing down climate change’s consequences. In the ongoing coronavirus crisis too, triggered by the worldwide spread (pandemic) of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2 / Covid19), similarities to the observations in the El Hierro crisis can also be found. In numerous countries, the gap between healthcare practitioners’ recommendations and certain social groups’ attitudes is very palpable. While the majority of citizens trust information based on biomedical and epidemiological findings and show acceptance for the measures prescribed by the authorities, scepticism and resistance have also been growing. For some, scepticism even leads to abstruse theories in

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which governments and individuals become part of a large-scale conspiracy (cf. MDR 2020). In the coronavirus crisis the coexistence of different ‘truths’ has apparently led to great ambiguities and, likewise, social effects are occurring which have resulted in the authorities being accused of mismanagement or even disinformation and conspiracy. As incomprehensible, irrational or even repulsive as these ways of thinking may seem to scientifically educated DRR practitioners or health care experts, the social upheavals resulting from the clash of different truths and their effect on the management of the crisis must not be ignored. The societal effects of these conflicts have not been sufficiently investigated and could possibly be better understood with studies of a similar conceptual and methodological design as provided in this book. Acknowledging these conflicting groups is an important entry point for developing a profound understanding of the social effects of the pandemic and the reasons for the (lack of) acceptance of public health measures. If one turns to the rationale behind this scepticism and resistance with the aim of understanding it, deficits in one’s own intervention ‘logic’ can also be revealed.   Finally, I would like to say that the perhaps unloved name ‘Tagoro’, mentioned in the preface, for the submarine volcano of El Hierro may actually be not so unsuitable, even if it was decided on by a few scientists, with no input from the Herreños. If you think of its meaning as a meeting point in the sense of an ‘arena’ of different views on the volcano, this is, when we think of the experiences of the islanders, not so far-fetched. The submarine volcano actually was a place of meeting and interaction, more precisely, an arena of different practices and truths concerning a natural event and its risks. The social implications of these encounters constituted the real crisis, the real hazard, but also led to important insights and seeds of societal change. Perhaps this concluding thought reconciles the residents of the island somewhat with their unloved volcano, and perhaps they feel reminded by its name of the manifold experiences they have had in the course of these events.

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Illustration Index

Figure 1: The calm bay of La Restinga, with several scoria cones in the background. ........ 14 Figure 2: “Volcán de Las Calmas” print on a jute bag. ....................................... 15 Figure 3: Natural-color satellite image of the eruption taken on 10 February 2012. ...........18 Figure 4: Location of the Canary Islands and El Hierro. .................................... 26 Figure 5: Map of El Hierro: Main settlements, main roads, and important toponyms. ........ 28 Figure 6: Collection of four different views of El Hierro. ................................... 29 Figure 7: Population development in El Hierro by age group, 2000–2016..................... 29 Figure 8: Demographic development of the Western Canary Islands. ....................... 30 Figure 9: Accommodated guests on El Hierro 2009–2016 (stacking chart). .................. 34 Figure 10: PEVOLCA general organisation chart. ........................................... 38 Figure 11: Cross section of the Canary Islands showing age versus height................... 48 Figure 12: Carracedo’s modified hot spot model. ........................................... 49 Figure 13: A scientist of INVOLCAN presents the ‘blob’ model. .............................. 50 Figure 14: Schematic model of El Hierro’s rift system. ..................................... 52 Figure 15: Simplified Geological Map of El Hierro. .......................................... 53 Figure 16: Seismic activity before the onset of the eruption. ............................... 59 Figure 17: Different views of the El Hierro eruption.......................................... 61 Figure 18: Chronological division of the seismic crisis into seven phases. .................. 63 Figure 19: Clausen’s PERDUE model. ....................................................... 69 Figure 20: Dwellings built to be tsunami-resistant. ........................................ 74 Figure 21: Humboldt’s physical tableau of the Canary Islands. Geography of the plants of Tenerife. ............................................................................ 82 Figure 22: A series of experiences deriving from everyday practice. ...................... 103 Figure 23: Singularity: a rupture in the stream of experiences. ........................... 105 Figure 24: ‘Paradigm model’ coding scheme, according to Strauss and Corbin. ............. 117 Figure 25: Research process with grounded theory methodology. ......................... 125 Figure 26: Age of interviewees (all sampling groups)...................................... 135 Figure 27: Domicile of interviewees (all sampling groups). ................................ 135 Figure 28: Interviewees’ duration of residence on El Hierro. .............................. 136 Figure 29: View over Lomo Negro, with the El Golfo valley in the background. ............. 138 Figure 30: A group of tourists gazing at the Teide. ....................................... 143

266

Rivalling Disaster Experiences

Figure 31: Rubén Armiche, ‘Satiroca’. ..................................................... 145 Figure 32: Artistic interpretation of the 2011 El Hierro submarine eruption. .................147 Figure 33: Dancing villagers during the Fiesta de Candelaria in Los Llanillos 2013........... 151 Figure 34: Historical illustration of the ‘Árbol Garoé’. ..................................... 154 Figure 35: A special experience: lonely hiking trails on El Hierro. ......................... 156 Figure 36: Graffiti which reads “NEITHER BASE NOR RADAR EL HIERRO FOR PEACE”. ........ 158 Figure 37: Gorona del Viento: El Hierro’s wind-hydro hybrid power plant ................... 159 Figure 38: Newspaper report about the volcano causing unemployment on the island. .... 164 Figure 39: “Forbidden to talk about the crisis and the earthquakes”. ...................... 165 Figure 40: Comparison of seismic activity to number of articles and comments in ‘especial crisis sísmica’. .................................................................. 169 Figure 41: Word cloud of the headlines in the section ‘especial crisis sísmica’...............170 Figure 42: Four photographs of the first evacuation of La Restinga in October 2011. ....... 184 Figure 43: Flickr photostream of a Herrenian photographer as of October 2011. ........... 193 Figure 44: Word cloud of the PEVOLCA public announcements’ headlines. ................. 198 Figure 45: CECOES presentation: “Transparent and trustworthy message”. ................ 201 Figure 46: Newspaper article “We never withhold information from affected neighbours”. . 202 Figure 47: AVCAN post on Facebook about the effects of the 5.1 magnitude earthquake. .. 208 Figure 48: Advertisement for the 2018 public education series “Volcanic Window” .........212 Figure 49: Hazard map of El Hierro, created by Becerril et al. (2014). .......................219 Figure 50: Screenshot of the IGN’s “Serie El Hierro” webpage (as of 10 Apr 2013). .......... 228 Figure 51: Two examples of graphs provided on the IGN website “Serie El Hierro”. ......... 229

Index of Tables

Table 1: Chronology of the Seismo-Volcanic Crisis and Its Aftermath (2011–2013) ............. 21 Table 2: The Canary Island Volcanic Traffic Light Scheme: Triggers and Actions. ........... 42 Table 3: List of Interviews. Ages marked with * are estimated by the author. .............. 271

Abbreviations

  AEMET

Agencia Estatal de Meteorología

AHI

Agrupación Herreña Independiente

AVCAN

Actualidad Volcánica de Canarias

CBDRR

community-based disaster risk reduction

CCES

Comité Científico de Evaluación y Seguimiento de Fenómenos Volcánicos

CECOES

Centro Coordinador De Emergencias Y Seguridad

CECOPAL

Centro Coordinador de Emergencias Municipal

CECOPIN

Centros De Coordinación Operativa Insulares

CIT

Centro de Iniciativas Turísticas de El Hierro

CSIC

Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas

DRR

disaster risk reduction

EGU

European Geosciences Union

FAPE

Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas de España

GEOVOL

Geología de Terrenos Volcánicos

GTM

grounded theory methodology

IEO

Instituto Español de Oceanografía

IFRC

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IGN

Instituto Geográfico Nacional

INVOLCAN

Instituto Volcanológico de Canarias

ISTAC

Instituto Canario de Estadística

ITER

Instituto Technologico the Energias Renovables

ML

local magnitude scale (Richter magnitude scale)

PAR

participatory action research

PDC

pyroclastic density current

270

Rivalling Disaster Experiences

  PEVOLCA

Plan Especial de Proteccion Civil y Atencion de Emergencias por riesgo volcanico en la Comunidad Autonoma de Canarias

PLATECA

Plan Territorial de Emergencia de Protección Civil de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias

QDA

qualitative data analysis

ULL

Universidad de La Laguna

ULPGC

Universidad de Las Palmas Gran Canaria

UME

Unidad Militar de Emergencias

UN

United Nations

UNED

Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNISDR

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

USGS

United States Geological Survey

VEI

volcanic explosivity index

List of Interviews

Table 3: List of Interviews. Ages marked with * are estimated by the author. ID

Sampl. group

Date

Place of interview

Pseudonym

Occupation

Recording duration

Sex

Age

1

C

18.04.14

Los Llanillos

–

judge

no recording

f

52

2

C

19.04.14

El Mocanal

–

teacher

00:19:41

m

16

3

C

19.04.14

El Mocanal

–

owner of handicraft shop

00:15:46

f

75

4

B

21.04.14

Isora

Adriano

environmental education

00:52:00

m

53

5a

C

21.04.14

Isora

–

retiree

00:36:00

f

67

5b

C

21.04.14

Isora

–

retiree

no recording

m

81

6

C

22.04.14

Valverde

–

retiree

00:14:00

m

70

7

B

22.04.14

Valverde

Mayor of Valverde

Mayor of Valverde

00:36:00

m

37

8

C

22.04.14

San Andrés

–

real estate accountant

00:37:47

m

38

9

C

22.04.14

San Andrés

Camilo

retiree

00:38:21

m

62

272

Rivalling Disaster Experiences

  10

C

22.04.14

San Andrés

–

unemployed, unskilled labour

00:50:00

f

40

11

C

23.04.14

Frontera

–

housewife

01:14:00

f

45

12

C

24.04.14

Frontera

–

retiree, formerly selfimployed

00:38:42

m

51

13

C

24.04.14

Frontera

–

farmer/ retiree

recording failed

m

70

14

C

24.04.14

Frontera

–

farmer

00:38:24

m

43

15

C

25.04.14

Sabinosa

Amabel

unemployed, formerly selfimpoyed

00:51:44

f

41

16

B

27.04.14

Sabinosa

–

environmental occupation

00:47:23

m

29

17

C

27.04.14

El Pinar

Lara

farmer/ environmental occupation

00:46:00

f

33

18

C

28.04.14

Frontera

–

teacher

00:40:00

f

35

19

B

29.04.14

Valverde

–

disaster management

no recording

m

40*

20

C

29.04.14

Frontera

–

tourism

01:25:00

f

63

21

C

29.04.14

Frontera

–

vicepresidente CIT/tourism

00:37:53

m

45

22

B

30.04.14

Valverde

President of El Hierro

president, teacher, hospitality ind.

01:09:00

m

54

23

C

30.04.14

Valverde/ Frontera

–

animal and nature conservation

00:44:00

m

63

24

B

02.05.14

Frontera

–

Mayor of Frontera

00:26:32

m

40*

25

B

02.05/ 12.05.14

Valverde

Head of CECOPIN El Hierro

civil protection engineer

01:40:00

m

37

26

C

05.05.14

Frontera

–

artist

00:36:00

m

37

27

B

06.05.14

Frontera

–

politician

00:57:38

f

51

List of Interviews

  28

B

28.02.13/ 7.05.14

Frontera

–

journalist

00:10:00

f

58

29

C

07.05.14

Frontera

–

farmer

00:40:00

f

36

30

B

09.05.14

Los Llanillos

–

journalist

00:55:21

f

39

31

C

09.05.14

Frontera

–

freelancer cultural management

00:49:21

f

34

32

–

10.05.14

Frontera

–

recording of educational excursion

00:50:00

–

–

33

B

10.05.14

La Restinga

–

tourism

00:14:00

f

34

34

C

10.05.14

La Restinga

–

retiree, tailor, retiree (group disc.)

00:50:00

m

88

35

C

10.05.14

La Restinga

–

retiree

00:27:12

f

71

36

–

11.05.14

Frontera

–

no information

00:04:00

m

28

37

C

12.05.14

Frontera

–

maritime pilot

0

m

45*

38

C

15.05.14

Los Llanillos

–

consultant

00:06:00

m

45*

39

–

16.05.14

–

–

–

00:10:00

m

60*

40

B

16.05.14

Valverde

Carlos, Luis, Marta, Alberto

television journalists

01:06:00

m / f

35 – 50*

50

B

19.05.14

La Laguna

–

scientist/ geographer

01:50:00

f

45*

51

B

22.05.14

Santa Cruz d. T.

Chief of IGN Tenerife

Chief of IGN Tenerife

01:38:00

f

45*

52

B

26.05.14

Santa Cruz d. T.

–

seismologist

01:20:00

m

34

53

B

26.05.14

La Laguna

PEVOLCA communications manager

PEVOLCA communications manager

01:00:00

f

40*

273

274

Rivalling Disaster Experiences

  54

C

23.05.14

Las Mercedes

–

unemployed/ artist

00:23:00

m

65*

55

B

10.04.14

Frontera

Geomorphologist

geomorphologist/ professor

00:37:00

m

55*

56

B

25.03.14

Puerto de la Cruz

Speaker of INVOLCAN

Speaker of INVOLCAN

02:20:00

m

45*

70

A

17.02.13

Frontera

–

photographer

00:20:52

m

65*

71

A

19.02.13

La Restinga

–

diving instructor

00:09:07

f

30*

72

A

20.02.13

La Restinga

Ernst

diving instructor

01:06:41

m

45*

73

A

20.02.13

La Restinga

–

restaurant/ diving school owner

00:38:54

f

45*

74

A

20.02.13

La Restinga

Gilberto

restaurant owner

00:24:09

m

55*

75

A

21.02.13

Valverde

Quinton

journalist

00:38:21

m

50*

76

A

22.02.13

Frontera

Isabel

teacher (history/ geography)

00:38:02

f

56

77

A

25.02.13

Pozo de salud

Emilie

hotel staff

00:26:30

f

35

78

A

25.02.13

El Verodal

Robert

photographer

00:12:18

m

40*

79

A

26.02.13

Valverde

Rubén

artist

00:45:51

m

45*

80

A

27.02.13

Mirador de la Peña

–

tourism

00:29:03

m

45*

81

A

28.02.13

Tamaduste

–

retiree/ tourism

01:15:00

m

77

82

A

02.03.13

La Restinga

–

shop assistant

00:19:05

f

41

83

A

02.03.13

La Restinga

Group discussion fishermen

fishermen

00:18:41

m

40 – 85*

84

A

04.03.13

La Caleta

Jorge

author/ geophysicist

01:08:17

m

86

List of Interviews

  85

A

05.03.13

Frontera

–

tourism

00:13:03

f

36

86

A

06.03.13

Frontera

Konrad

tourist guide

00:22:42

m

50

87

A

22.02.13

Frontera

–

tourism

00:13:34

f

43

275

Social Sciences kollektiv orangotango+ (ed.)

This Is Not an Atlas A Global Collection of Counter-Cartographies 2018, 352 p., hardcover, col. ill. 34,99 € (DE), 978-3-8376-4519-4 E-Book: free available, ISBN 978-3-8394-4519-8

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Right-Wing Populism and Gender European Perspectives and Beyond April 2020, 286 p., pb., ill. 35,00 € (DE), 978-3-8376-4980-2 E-Book: 34,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-4980-6

Mozilla Foundation

Internet Health Report 2019

2019, 118 p., pb., ill. 19,99 € (DE), 978-3-8376-4946-8 E-Book: free available, ISBN 978-3-8394-4946-2

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Psychopolitics of Speech Uncivil Discourse and the Excess of Desire 2019, 186 p., hardcover 79,99 € (DE), 978-3-8376-3919-3 E-Book: PDF: 79,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-3919-7

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Powers of the Mind Mental and Manual Labor in the Contemporary Political Crisis 2019, 208 p., hardcover 99,99 € (DE), 978-3-8376-4147-9 E-Book: PDF: 99,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-4147-3

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